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EVOLUTION OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, 1941-1967

by

Virgil Ney

December 1967

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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ABSTRACT

United States Army Field Service Regulations, as early as 1914, contained the doctrine providing for the establishment and conduct of a theater of operations. The basic doctrine that the theater be divided into two formal parts, that is, the combat zone and the communications zone, has stood the test of time and combat. Sharp lines of demarcation are drawn functionally between ground, air, and naval forces within a theater of operations. Although the Theater Army, Navy, and Air Force existed during World War II they were not specifically so designated until the issuance, in 1950-1953, of the Field Service Regulations in force during the Korean War.

The case studies selected show the operations of the Theater Army, or its analogous counterpart, in World War II and the Korean War, and are cited in an attempt to answer the question "Did Theater Army Headquarters ever have a combat mission?" This study seeks to answer the above question by emphasizing certain changes in operational format and organizational concepts that occurred during the periods under consideration. It is demonstrated that at theater level, administration and supply were usually separated from the tactical combat mission.

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SUMMARY

Chapter I, Introduction and Historical Background, traces the evolution of the theater of operations during World War II. Attention is given to the development of the Theater Army and Theater Army Headquarters and their respective functions in combat. Comment is made upon two theaters of operations, the European Theater and the Southwest Pacific Area Theater.

Chapter II, Evolution of The European Theater of Operations, shows the beginning of the theater as a planning organization and its development into a multinational structure for the supplying and the waging of combat operations. The relationships of organizations which were analogous to the then unknown terms "Theater Army" and "Theater Army Headquarters" are shown as the theater of operations evolved under the then current doctrine.

Chapter III, Evolution of the Southwest Pacific Area Theater of Operations, explains how the theater was established and how it evolved. Theater Army and Theater Army Headquarters are shown by analogy. Comparison of the SWPA Theater and ETO is drawn briefly for the delineation of some of the basic similarities.

Chapter IV, The Far East Command and the Korean War, is concerned with the problems of the Theater Army and Theater Army Headquarters in an occupation situation turned suddenly into combat. The evolution of the United Nations Command, the functioning of GHQ, Far East Command and Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), are covered to show their effect upon Theater Army and Theater Army Headquarters operations.

Chapter V, CINCPAC and Vietnam, shows the operation of subordinate unified commands, US Army Vietnam and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, under the Pacific Theater Commander, Admiral U. G. Sharp, USN. Vietnam is shown not to be a theater of operations but a subordinate unified command.

Chapter VI, Conclusions, includes certain points deduced from the research connected with the prosecution of the study. Inasmuch as this study is to be utilized in future planning, some speculative comments are furnished.

Appendix C contains a total of twenty miscellaneous charts showing theater and other organizational structures from World War I to and including Vietnam. It is believed that the inclusion of these charts will be helpful in showing the evolution of the theater type organization over a period of fifty years of American military history.

A bibliography is appended.

EVOLUTION OF A THEATER OF OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, 1941-1967

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

An historical view of the then current thought on the constitution and administration of a theater of operations is provided by FM 101-10, Field Service Regulations, Administration, published in 1940. On December 8, 1941, the United States became involved in the conflict that had already engaged Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union against Germany. The war, up to this time, had offered little except defeat and frustration. The doctrine of the War Department, with reference to larger units, was based upon Field Service Regulations that extended back into the Army's history. The 1940 edition of the Field Service Regulations was related definitely to the United States Army's experience in World War I with modifications added at the War Colleges and in the War Department. While the term "Theater Army" is not used, there is an inference that administration and supply in contradistinction to coordination and control may come from a source other than the designated commander.

The 15 November 1943 edition of the same Regulations, the Field Manual in force during much of World War II, makes no mention of the term "Theater Army." While the term was not used, there was a headquarters in each theater of operations that was analogous to what is now termed "Theater Army Headquarters."

The revision of FM 100-15, Field Service Regulation, Administration, September 1949, established that:

... under the theater commander and in the direct chain of command are the theater Army commander, the theater Air Force commander and the theater Navy commander. These commanders are responsible to the theater commander for the planning of operations

and the administration of their respective forces. Such over-all direction and coordination as is necessary, for the efficient employment of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is exercised by the theater commander. The term base command is used to designate a smaller area in which the primary mission is the maintenance of a military base or bases. It may or may not be within the geographical limits of a theater of operations. The term defense command usually indicates an area in which contemplated operations are restricted to the tactical or strategic defensive. It may or may not be within the geographical limits of the theater. The theater is organized for tactical control and administrative control to the extent dictated by the theater commander. The character of modern warfare does not permit a complete division of the administrative and combat functions of the theater into entirely separate areas. Combat operations will take place throughout the entire theater and the commander must organize his forces and area so as to permit the necessary unity of command for both combat and administration. Normally, the theater of operations is divided into a combat zone and a communications zone, the boundary between them being prescribed to permit coordination of administrative responsibility.

FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, provided that the mission of a theater commander might be described in a true war plan or it might be stated in a letter of instructions or orders from the President or the War Department. Qualifications were to the effect that the assigned mission would usually be general in character and would leave great discretion to the theater commander who would provide for effective coordination of land, sea, and air forces at his disposal within the theater. He would insure that all operational plans were executed with energy and effectiveness. In addition, he must plan far in advance in order to meet unforeseen contingencies.

The theater army commander is largely a supervisor, planner, and coordinator, who decentralizes combat and administrative operations, to the maximum degree, to his army group and communications zone commanders, respectively.

The Theater Army Commander is designated by the Chief of Staff, United States Army. He is responsible for the tactical operations of all army forces in the theater, if no task force commander has been designated to command part of them. He is responsible to the theater commander for the administrative operations of all Army Forces in the theater. He coordinates his operations with those of the theater Navy, and Air Force. When a joint task force is organized,

he is responsible for furnishing support to the army component, and will, in addition, furnish such support to the other components of the joint task force as may be directed or authorized by the theater commander. He exercises command through the commanders of Army groups or armies, the Army reserve forces, the Communications Zone, and the Army replacement command (Ref 1)

At theater level it will be noted that historically there are considerations other than tactical military operations involved. FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual, Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data, Unclassified Data, Headquarters, Department of the Army, January 1956, defines theater army as follows:

... U.S. Theater Army Headquarters is the senior U.S. Army headquarters in a theater of operations. In a theater where only U.S. forces comprise the theater command, U.S. theater Army headquarters is charged with the overall supervision of strategic, tactical, administrative, and logistical operations of all U.S. Army elements.

The field manual, quoted above, did not prescribe any set organization for the headquarters, theater army. The normal headquarters sections, divisions, both general and special staff, are authorized. How they are assembled and how they function is dependent upon the specific mission, or missions, assigned to the theater commander. Normally, theater commanders are assigned missions in orders, letters of instruction, and often personal communication from their commander-in-chief, or higher-level governmental officers and agencies. FM 101-10-1 furnishes the rationale for the administrative role for theater army under the situation of a combined command in the following words:

When the theater is organized as a combined command, U.S. Army theater Army headquarters becomes for all practical purposes, an administrative headquarters for the support of U.S. Army forces only.

It should be noted that FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, enunciated the following doctrine: "The staff of a theater command employing only United States forces is a joint staff. The staff of a theater employing combined forces (United States and allied forces) is a combined staff." The headquarters exists essentially to provide command and control and support of the forces assigned to the theater. How these forces are assembled, grouped, and employed will be dependent upon the assigned mission. A theater army will have the following type units assigned: (a) combat forces, which include army groups, field army, separate corps, and sometimes separate divisions; (b) theater army logistical command which is responsible for all supply matters within a theater; (c) theater civil affairs command, which is responsible for all civil affairs matters within a theater:

(d) air defense command; (e) and US Army unconventional warfare forces. Under current operational doctrine, the theater commander establishes a joint unconventional warfare task force which plans and conducts unconventional warfare operations within the theater commander's area of responsibility. However, unconventional warfare on the guerrilla level usually comes within the purview of the commander of the field army in whose area the guerrillas are operating.

The post-World War II concepts advanced and doctrine promulgated recognized the need for the theater army as a distinct organizational entity. There were several reasons for this recognition. FM 110-5, Joint Action Armed Forces, provided that:

The armed forces in the field consists of components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force organized separately, or in combination... into such theater of operations, unified commands, specified commands, and other commands or joint task forces as may be established by appropriate authority.

Larger units consist of theater army, army group, field army, and corps.

FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, provided that:

Under the theater commander and in the direct chain of command are the theater Army commander, the theater Air Force commander, and the theater Navy commander. These commanders are responsible to the theater commander for the planning and conduct of operations, and the administration of their respective forces.

The command structure of a US theater of operations is organized and conducted as a unified command headquarters. The mission assigned the commander by higher authority governs the organization of the unified command. The capabilities and strengths of the elements comprising the command dictate the specific organizational patterns established by the commander. The theater commander exercises command of operations, as noted by the Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, by the following methods and means:

- (1) Through the service component commanders (such as theater army commander).
- (2) By establishing a subordinate unified command (when authorized).
- (3) By establishing a uni-service force reporting directly to the commander of the unified command.
- (4) By establishing a joint task force.

- (5) By attaching elements of one force to another force.
- (6) By establishing a functional command, e.g., a theater joint air defense command.

In the theater of operations, service forces are (1963) organized within each component force. Army, Navy, and Air Force thus provides its own combat service support. There are exceptional instances when combat support is provided by agreements between the Services for common, joint, or cross-servicing at the levels required, that is, force, theater, department, or defense.

In 1914, Field Service Regulations, United States Army, prescribed that the theater of operations be divided into two zones: the Zone of the Line of Communications, and the Zone of the Advance. This division of the theater of operations organization has stood the test of war and the passage of time. Indeed, a half century later, FM 100-15, The Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, December 1963, describes the organization for a theater of operations conducting land operations as follows:

A theater of operations is normally divided for land force operations into a combat zone and a communications zone.

(a) The combat zone is that part of the area of operations required by the combat forces for the conduct of operations. It includes areas in which a commander is directly capable of influencing the progress or outcome of operations by maneuvers of his ground gaining elements or by delivery of firepower with the fire support systems under his control or command. The size of the combat zone will vary with the assigned mission and the terrain and the type of unit and equipment involved in the operations. For tactical control purposes, the combat area will be divided into army group, field army, corps, and division and brigade areas. Each Commander is responsible for the area occupied, or utilized by his unit. In the usual situation rear boundaries for the combat zone are designated by the theater commander.

(b) By definition "the communications zone" is the rear part of a theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communication, establishments for supply and evaluation, and other agencies required for the immediate support of the field forces. The rear boundary of the communication zone is normally the rear boundary

of the theater as designated by proper authority.


In 1958, the Commanding General of the United States Continental Army Command, received from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, a report entitled Project NR CGSC 56-7, Theater Army Organization. Revised as of 31 July 1958 this study was instrumental in developing operational concepts and a proposed organizational structure for a theater army. Involved in the purpose of the study was the requirement that an organization be established that could discharge army responsibilities in a theater of operation. Additionally, the study was to provide a basis for the development of doctrine and tables of organization and equipment for the elements of a theater army. Included was the field army. The scope further included determination of the overall responsibilities and functions to be performed by Headquarters, Theater Army; Headquarters, Army Group; Headquarters Theater Army, Logistical Command; Theater Army Air Defense Command; Theater Army Replacement and Training Command; Theater Army Civil Affairs, Military Government Command; and Major Commands within the Theater Army Logistical Command (see Figure 1).

The principal components of a theater army will be: (a) field armies or army groups; (b) theater army logistical command; (c) logistical base command; (d) advanced logistical commands and area commands; (e) theater army replacement and training command; (f) theater army civil affairs military government commands; (g) the theater army air defense command.

With reference to the relationship of the US theater army commander to higher commanders, it should be noted that he remains directly responsible for certain activities that fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. These include: troop bases; doctrines and procedures for organizations; equipment, training, and employment of forces; and administrative responsibility. In addition, the US theater army commander is directly responsible for making recommendations to the theater commander. These recommendations include: the proper employment of US Army forces in the theater; the training of US Army forces; and the support to be furnished US Army forces by other services. The US theater army commander receives administrative support and technical guidance from the Department of the Army.

The US theater army commander is responsible for assigning a mission to each subordinate commander. Upon assignment of the mission he provides the subordinate commanders with available means to accomplish it. Further, he holds the subordinate commander responsible to him for the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

For purposes of this study, the European and Pacific theaters of operation in World War II, and the Korean War have been selected as representative of the state of the art of war at the particular time involved. It is recognized that there are many factors and circumstances that make each theater of operations separate and distinct from others. It is the thesis of



- X Indicates broad policies and directives
- ¹ Indicates organizations established by the theater commander, if required

Figure 1. Typical Organization of a Theater of Operations, US Army

the writer that while all theaters of operations during the period were different, there were elements common to all. These similar elements may be properly ascribed to adherence to the Field Service Regulations which prescribe doctrine covering the conduct of operations in the field. The differences may be credited to deviations from doctrine as prescribed in Field Service Regulations and personal or political considerations.

Basically, there are two problems involved in any military operation, supply and combat. The theater of operations exists solely for the purpose of solving these two problems. Under the Field Service Regulations, the theater structure is provided as a means by which workable solutions, which promise success, may be advanced. The organizational format of a theater of operations has been prescribed in the manuals in general terms. Only broad guidelines are given with the specifics left to be worked out by those on the ground, in the air, and on the sea who are to carry out the assigned mission. Flexibility of response by higher headquarters, that is, theater army, to the needs of the troops and the military situation must be a governing principle in the organization and conduct of a theater of operations of the present and in the future.

Theaters of operations write their histories in two ways, in unit records and combat achievements. Records, documents and memoranda, orders and plans are the written evidence of the activities required to gain the objective and accomplish the assigned missions. While simplicity is recalled as a principle vital to the operations of war, modern warfare in the twentieth century has created complex and sometimes ponderous structures for the waging of violence against the enemy. With hundreds of thousands of men to be fed, clothed, transported, and led against hostile forces, the theater of operations must be, above all, functional. The finest organization on paper is worthless unless it serves the man with the weapon as he advances toward the objective.

The European Theater of Operations US Army (ETOUSA) exemplified certain principles and doctrines of organization for the conduct of war never before observed in the United States Army. This was the first time that the United States Army had really fought in a war with the combat arms and services under unified command as ground, air, and sea forces. The British doctrine of separate headquarters for each of the above elements influenced to a marked degree the planning for and organization of the theater. The combined Allied headquarters, as the European Theater soon became, was, of necessity, supplanted in operational matters by the appointment of a Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander, not desiring that another headquarters be imposed between his headquarters and ETOUSA, reserved for himself the personal direction of tactical operations.

The existing Army Group system of command... fitted naturally into the operational plans which we had evolved, and I could not see how the appointment of a C-in-C Ground Forces over the Army Group Commanders to direct the forthcoming battles would in any way secure better coordination of effort. On the contrary, the appointment would, in fact, have necessitated a

duplication of personnel and communications which could have resulted in decreased efficiency, while such functions as the allocation of forces and supplies between the Army Groups were already performed by my own Headquarters (SHAEF) (Ref 2, p 85) (emphasis and parentheses furnished)

By the Supreme Commander's statement above, ETOUSA, which was in effect theater army headquarters, retained only supply and administrative functions for the tactical units. SHAEF, as the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, possessed the basic responsibility for the direction of combat operations. Actual command of the tactical units in contact with the enemy was exercised by the respective tactical unit commanders under the personal control of the Supreme Commander.

Another facet of large unit command and direction asserted itself at this time -- the practice of a commander "wearing two hats," as it was soon called. General Eisenhower was, at the same time, Commanding General, ETOUSA, and Supreme Commander, SHAEF. This practice of dual command might be good "insurance" for the overall commander, who initially wants to control supply, administration, and combat. But it is difficult for one to serve two masters and to lead two staffs. With the consolidation of SOS and ETOUSA, General Eisenhower removed one hat and continued with his basic combat mission, as outlined in his letter of instruction.

Consequently, General Eisenhower functioned as a Supreme Commander wearing "one hat" utilizing principal staff officers of both ETOUSA and SHAEF headquarters interchangeably. The principle of dual usage of staff officers, in the case of ETO and SHAEF, did serve to economize on personnel. This was especially so in the areas of highly-skilled staff officers, when as General Eisenhower relinquished one hat, the staffs ex officio of each Headquarters continued to be available to him. The following extract from The Report of the General Board, European Theater of Operations, Organization of the European Theater of Operations, Study No. 2, is significant of how the system operated:

The Supreme Commander also commanded ETOUSA and the major commands of ETOUSA were placed under the operational direction of the Supreme Commander. This resulted in the 12th Army Group and the 6th Army Group being dealt with directly by SHAEF on operational matters without the necessity of utilizing ETOUSA command channels. Similarly, when necessary, SHAEF dealt directly with the Communications Zone. Although matters of purely American interest were handled between the War Department and Headquarters, ETOUSA, those with direct operational implications were closely coordinated with Supreme Headquarters. However, the dividing line as to functions between the two headquarters was not clearly established, and responsibilities were often

determined by personal agreements between the two agencies when the necessity arose, or by the direction of the Chief of Staff. This resulted in the sections of the headquarters of SHAEF assuming dual functions and interests within the affairs of ETOUSA when their primary interest and responsibility clearly rested in matters pertaining to Allied affairs. The degree of interest and control of Theater functions varied in the U. S. staff sections of SHAEF. The G-4 Section assumed the greatest interest in Theater affairs since the other sections were more closely integrated with the British and had comparatively less to do with Theater functions (Ref 3, p 20) (emphasis furnished).

The military problem facing ETOUSA and SHAEF was the classical maneuver, landing on a hostile shore and defeating the enemy. The geographical fact of the English Channel, as an obstacle to be crossed, did exert certain influences upon the planning, organization, and conduct of the invasion. Inasmuch, as the forces to be employed were constituted from among Allies and there were land, air, and sea elements in the expedition, it was necessary, under the principle of unity of command, to designate a Supreme Commander for purposes of coordination and combat command. The principle of the base was of special importance to the invasion of Europe by the Allied Expeditionary Force. The separation of the objective from that base (the British Isles) by a temperamental and often hazardous open body of water made the operation a "calculated risk" of some magnitude. The retention of bases in England until the lodgment was assured was a requirement for the combat operations. Obviously, supplies and administration must emanate from the bases. Tactical command on the ground, in the air, and on the sea must, of necessity and by its nature, originate with the units. Command and tactical control must stem from the headquarters of the commander bearing the overall responsibility, in this case, SHAEF. Theater army headquarters in ETOUSA, in the British Isles, thus was relieved automatically of its tactical mission. Its only logical reasons for being were its responsibilities for the supply and administration of the invasion forces and those to follow as soon as the lodgment in Normandy was deemed a success.¹

The war in the Pacific differed in many respects from the conflict in the European Theater of Operations. In the Pacific the campaigns were fought over vast land and sea masses and great distances which posed difficult problems of communication and supply. The climatic, geographical, and health conditions made the Pacific Theater a most difficult area in which to mount an offensive against a victorious enemy.

¹ See Huston, Sinews of War, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1966, pp 530-531 for a discussion of the problem of overlapping responsibilities in the ETO.

The Pacific Theater was started on a note of military reverses of a most serious nature as General MacArthur was ordered by the President to withdraw from the Philippines to Australia. Once there, he was to re-constitute his forces for the long, hard march back to the Philippines and to the eventual surrender and occupation of the Japanese homeland. Basically, his problem differed radically from that confronting General Eisenhower in the large land mass of the European Theater. General MacArthur had to fight an amphibious war in which the naval arm, air arm, and the ground forces were required to work constantly together in the island-hopping campaigns. The fight for islands for air bases, as well as for supply bases, was a constant of the strategy employed by General MacArthur in the Pacific area. With islands of varying sizes constituting the bulk of the land mass to be secured, the employment of ground units larger than a field army was not feasible. In the Pacific campaigns there were no army groups assigned and in essence, the field army, the army corps, and divisions of the armies carried the brunt of combat. But in spite of environmental differences there were basic similarities between the European Theater and General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area. GHQ, SWPA was established in Melbourne, Australia, 18 April 1942, with General Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, including the following geographical areas: Australia, New Britain, New Ireland, New Guinea, Borneo, Celebes, and the Philippines.

It is of interest to note the establishment of an Allied Land Forces Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area under the command of an Australian general officer. Basically, this headquarters was the type of command structure which General Eisenhower objected to so strenuously in the European Theater. In the Pacific, with Australia as the primary base, and with the defense of Australia entrusted to General MacArthur as Supreme Commander, it was logical that he would designate an Australian as Allied Land Forces Commander. At that time, the Australians had more ground troops in the area for the defense of Australia and our forces were in the process of arriving, training, and deploying.

In February 1943, a separate headquarters from GHQ SWPA was established. The designation was United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). This installation was, in effect, Theater Army for the Southwest Pacific Area. The following extract will give a clear picture of its mission, as contrasted to the mission of GHQ SWPA, as noted above. From the above it will be apparent that General MacArthur wore two hats, as did his European Theater counterpart, General Eisenhower. The new headquarters was

...to supervise all Army training and administrative activities that were so closely related to the tactical and strategic direction of the war in the Southwest Pacific. The new command, United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), was a reconstitution of the USAFFE headquarters in the Philippines, discussed above. General MacArthur was in command of USAFFE as well as of General Headquarters Southwest

Pacific Area. Reporting to USAFFE was the extensive supply and training organization known as the United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area. On June 10, 1945, USAFFE was discontinued and its functions were transferred to General Headquarters United States Army Forces, Pacific. (Ref 4, p 840)

The tactical ground units of General MacArthur's forces fought island by island and recaptured Leyte, the Philippines in October 1944. The following extracts are significant of their activities under the Commander of Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

Sixth Army was established in the Southwest Pacific Area in February 1943 but did not enter combat until October 1944. In the meantime its headquarters served as the headquarters staff of the "Alamo Force," an interallied ground command of the Southwest Pacific Area that participated in operations in New Britain, eastern New Guinea, and Morotai. In October 1944 the Sixth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger, joined in the Philippines campaign under the operational control of Allied Land Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. Later it took part in the occupation of Japan and in January 1946 it was inactivated. (Ref 4, p 837)

The following brief description of the World War II Eighth Army and its operations in the Southwest Pacific Area is included to show the type and extent of tactical ground forces employed by General MacArthur in the campaigns in the Pacific. As noted, the Southwest Pacific Area did not permit the deployment of units larger than field armies. In essence, the Sixth and Eighth Armies and later the Tenth Army (on Okinawa) functioned as tactical units for General MacArthur in the Pacific as did the Twelfth Army and Sixth Army Groups for General Eisenhower in Europe.

The Eighth Army was established in the Southwest Pacific Area in September 1944 and was commanded successively by Brig. Gen. Robert O. Shoe and Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger. Under the operational control of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, it participated in combat operations in the Philippines in 1944 and 1945. When the Sixth Army moved to Leyte (Philippines), the Eighth was given operational control of the United States ground-combat troops in New Guinea. After the war the Eighth Army was reassigned to Japan as part of the occupation forces under the Far East Command. (Ref 4, pp 837-838)

The Eighth United States Army was destined to operate the occupation for General MacArthur's headquarters, termed Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). But this Army was to be again in combat as the

principal United States Army tactical unit during the Korean War, 1950-1953.

For the student of military history and the military profession, a comparison between the European Theater of Operations and the Southwest Pacific Area Theater of Operations may be in order. GHQ SWPA may be compared with Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Similarly, the tactical units, 12th Army Group, 21st Army Group and 6th Army Group may be correlated with Headquarters, Sixth and Eighth United States Armies. The Allied land forces under General Sir Thomas Blamey held nominal command over the Sixth US Army under General Walter Krueger. However, it should be noted that active tactical command of the Sixth Army by the Australian commander was voided by setting up the "Alamo Force" under General Krueger and General MacArthur's GHQ SWPA. The "Alamo Force" was in essence a device to tactfully remove the bulk of the Sixth Army from under Australian tactical command in the field.

From the above, both ETO and USAFFE were in positions analogous to the Theater Army Headquarters of today. Both were, by necessity, eventually to become administrative and supply sources while SHAEF and GHQ SWPA were to direct and control tactical operations in the field. By the nature of the operations undertaken, each organization was adjusted to the situation under the progressively changing and fluctuating conditions of combat. This flexibility, while sometimes difficult to attain, was provided for in the doctrine contained within the US Army Field Service Regulations and broadly stated directives of the period of history involved.

Historically, the Southwest Pacific Area theater deviated from the standard format for a theater of operations more than did the European Theater. There were several reasons for this: the terrain, the extent of the area involved, and the nature of the campaigns launched against the enemy. In the Southwest Pacific Theater, the problem of supply over vast water areas contributed toward bringing the administrative and supply factors of combat together under one headquarters. Tactical operations, as in the European Theater, under the principle of unity of command, were controlled and directed by a Supreme Commander. This fact separated combat operations from the mission of the analogous theater army.

In the European Theater, the Allied combined theater effort was a most vital factor in the overall planning and operations. The British Isles, as the springboard for the invasion of Normandy, was vital to the whole plan for defeat of the enemy. The manpower of the British and their military skills were factors which called forth the best in American leadership--in order that they be used properly and with the American forces. The combined Allied effort in the European Theater was almost wholly dependent for success from the command aspect, upon selection of the Supreme Commander. In this instance, diplomacy, tact, and military professional leadership of the highest order must be exerted to assure victory. To get the Allies to pull together as a team was one of the Supreme Commander's basic missions.

Theater army headquarters, or the military unit most analogous to it, at this period of history, in both the European and Southwest Pacific Theaters, inherently possessed the missions of administration and supply. Because it involved offensive warfare, the tactical mission had to be performed in the field, away from the base. Of necessity, this situation caused the tactical, operational part of the mission of theater army headquarters to be assumed by a command element on the ground. In ETO this was SHAEF, in the Pacific Area it was GHQ SWPA.

In a defensive operation, such as the early defense of the Philippines, an analogous "Theater Army Headquarters" may possibly possess a combat mission. Field Service Regulations, Operations, February 1962 states:

Defensive operations are normally most effective when minimum restrictions are imposed upon subordinate commanders. The mission and the area to be defended should be stated in terms which permit the commander to use his means to maximum advantage with minimum restriction on specific terrain features to be held. Defensive operations, however, inherently require restrictions not present in offensive operations. These result from the need for some degree of centralized control to insure the most effective use of resources, so that an adequate reserve remains for the decisive portion of the action. (Ref 5, pp 74-75)

It is of paramount interest, in connection with the subject of theaters of operations, to understand the precise mission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Broadly, the Joint Chiefs serve as the principal advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in military affairs. In his message to Congress on 3 April 1958, President Eisenhower commented upon the broad duties of the Joint Chiefs as follows:

I consider the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept essentially sound and I therefore believe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to be constituted as currently provided in law. However, in keeping with the shift I have directed in operational channels, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will in the future serve as a staff assisting the Secretary of Defense in his exercise of direction over unified commands.

The mission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as outlined in the Joint and Combined Staff Officer's Manual provides among other tasks the following: "...recommend(s) to the Secretary of Defense the establishment and force structure of unified and specified commands and reviews the plans and programs of these commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability." From the foregoing, it may be noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff exert considerable influence upon the type and operations of the unified and specified commands. Inasmuch as these commands are usually descended from a World War II or Korean War theater of operations, as in the cases of EUCOM, CINCPAC, and USARPAC, it is evident that

the Joint Chiefs have played a leading role in the evolution of the Theater of Operations. With the unified command concept and approach the theater army and theater army headquarters have been forced to give way to the component theory and practice of command organization within the old-time, World War II theater of operations geographical areas.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

In June 1942 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, then in Washington, submitted a draft of a directive for the commanding general European Theater of Operation to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army. This paper is of historical significance not only in its establishment of the theater of operation, but for its direct effect on the military future of its author. The following extract will explain:

On June 8 (1942) I submitted to the Chief of Staff a Draft of a 'Directive for the Commanding General, European Theater of Operation,' which provided for unified command of all American Forces, allocated to the European area. I remarked to General Marshall that this was one paper he should read in detail before it went out because it was likely to be an important document in the further waging of the war. His reply still lives in my memory: 'I certainly do want to read it. You may be the man who executes this. If that is the case, when can you leave?' Three days later, General Marshall told me definitely that I would command the European Theater. (Ref 6, p 50) (parenthesis added)


On June 23, 1942, General Eisenhower, with General Mark Clark and staff officers, left Washington for England to assume command of the European Theater of Operation, United States Army (see Figure 2). At that time the theater comprised only the United Kingdom and Iceland. It was popularly known as ETOUSA. The directive which the general received provided basically the following:

The Commanding General... European Theater... will command all US Army Forces and personnel now in, or hereafter dispatched to, the European Theater of Operation, including any parts of the Marine Corps therein which may be detached for service with the Army.

By agreement between Navy and War Department planning and operational control... will be exercised by the Commanding General... over all US Navy forces assigned to this theater.

Subject to such limitations within the British Isles as are necessary to avoid any violation of British sovereignty, the Commanding General, European Theater, is charged with the tactical, strategical, territorial, and administrative duty of a theater command.

The mission of the Commanding General, European Theater, will be to prepare for and carry on military



operations in the European Theater against the Axis Powers and their Allies. (Ref 6, p 52)

The Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater comments upon the organization of the European Theater of Operations. Normally, the organizational plans followed the conventional and traditional patterns of the American general and special staff. A very real and urgent problem facing the theater commander was how to establish separation of administrative functions from combat operations as provided in the Field Service Regulations:

This entire period was one of uncertainty, first as to the eventual form that the organization of the Headquarters United States Forces would take, and second as to whether the Supreme Commander would be British or American and the manner in which he would desire the United States Forces to fit into the Allied organization. Headquarters ETOUSA and each of the commands under it had to take a position in readiness that would enable them to function regardless of the final organization or of the commander selected. (Ref 3, p 70)

One of the problems connected with the organization of specific theater of operations procedure in the European area was the differences to be found in British, European, and American ways of operating. The British were traditionally wedded to the committee system whereas the Americans believed that the chain of command -- military channel system -- was the most efficient method of conducting military operations. One of the precedents for such a headquarters was the headquarters in the Mediterranean Theater where certain consolidations of the commands of General Sir Harold Alexander and General Dwight D. Eisenhower hinted at the proper approach to the creation of a combined headquarters for the overall Allied command. The following extract will indicate one of the early plans influencing the formation of theater army and how it was implemented.

For our part we had got early as far as envisaging two groups of armies. There might be more later, but the farthest point to which it seemed worthwhile to go was that at which there would be two -- one United States and one British. At first there was created in England the embryo of a First United States Army (FUSA) and further United States Armies to be brought into being. Confusion between FUSAG and FUSA was, of course, intense (and in part, no doubt deliberate for cover purposes) because of this similarity of abbreviated names and remained so until the Twelfth Army Group was rechristened as such. On the British side there was created the Twenty-First Army Group of Second British and First Canadian Armies. There would come a moment when these two army groups would

be a Supreme Headquarters, topped off with, according to written evidence, a British Supreme Commander, or, according to powerful rumour, an American Supreme Commander. But it seemed impossible to fill in the gap between the supreme head and the army-group commands without knowing which it was to be. (Ref 7, p 184)

Before General Eisenhower became commanding general of the European Theater of Operations, firm planning at the highest level indicated there would be three large Anglo-American commands. These were in the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and Northwest Europe. General Douglas MacArthur, heavily engaged in combat in the Southwest Pacific area, was not considered a candidate for the post of Supreme Commander in the European Theater. Further, General Eisenhower, a likely candidate for higher command assignment, had successfully commanded in the North African Theater of Operations. Among the Allies thought was developing that all operations against the Third Reich by the Western Allies would eventually come under a combined command under a supreme commander.

While the Allies were developing the strategy that culminated in the invasion of western Europe, the Americans began their buildup of troops and supplies and the development of the organization within the United Kingdom that would control the proposed Continental operations. Headquarters, United States Armed Forces in the British Isles, was organized in London on January 8, 1942. It replaced the Special Observer Group that had been organized in May 1941 as part of the United States Embassy staff. The European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) was established 8 June 1942, and on 24 June Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower arrived in London as its new commander. Eisenhower retained this command, in addition to his assignment as Allied Commander of the North African operations, until January 1943, when the reorganization of the High Command in the Mediterranean relieved him of his responsibilities in the European Theater. Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews then assumed command of ETOUSA, and upon his untimely death in an airplane accident in Iceland in May 1943 he was succeeded by Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers. By the end of August 1943, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quadrant Conference definitely committed the Allies to the invasion of France the following spring, the major American organizations in the United Kingdom were the theater headquarters and three subordinate commands: The Eighth Air Force, the field forces, and the Services of Supply. (Ref 6, pp 36-37)

In December 1943 General Eisenhower was notified of his selection as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (see Figure 3). His task was stated simply in a 12 February 1944 directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for the liberation of Europe from the Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.


2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed to securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. (Ref 9, p 53)

Sir Arthur W. Tedder, Chief Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force, was selected by General Eisenhower as his Deputy Supreme Commander. This was, of course, a professional recognition of the importance of air power to the success of the invasion of Festung Europa.

Uncertainties concerning the form to be taken by the organization of the headquarters of United States Forces were dispelled upon the assumption of command by General Eisenhower. In addition to his duties as Supreme Allied Commander, he desired to keep the command of the US Forces under his own control. At the same time he wanted to reduce the total number of headquarters and personnel working on Theater administrative functions, where there were possibilities of duplication of effort. The result was that Theater Headquarters was combined with Headquarters, SOS, and the Commanding General, SOS, was made Deputy Theater Commander, in addition to his other duties. This resulted in the Commanding General SOS having the responsibility for all forces in the Theater so far as administration and supply were concerned. (Ref 3, p 71)

The American military doctrine of separating command and administrative functions in field operations was strongly evidenced in the establishment of the Services of Supply (SOS) June 1942, under the command of Major General John C. H. Lee. Under General Lee's direction, within two years the United Kingdom became one of the largest military bases ever known to modern military history (see Figures 4 and 5).

Major General Robert Crawford was sent to England in July 1943 from his post as Commanding General, Services of Supply, US Army Forces



* U.S. Strategic Air Forces - ** Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Expeditionary Force
*** Allied Expeditionary Air Force




Figure 4. Organization of the Services of Supply, FROUSA, 19 August 1942




Figure 5. ETOUSA and SOS Command and Organizational Structure August 1943

in the Middle East. Here he served as Deputy Commander and, later, as Chief of Staff of Services of Supply and as G-4, Headquarters of ETOUSA. In November of 1943, he was made deputy G-4 of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC). When SHAEF was activated in February 1944, General Crawford was assigned as G-4.² (Ref 9, p 73)

The formation of the 1st US Army Group served as advance notice that the build-up phase of the European Theater of Operations was drawing to a close. The matters of a Supreme Headquarters and the choice of a Supreme Commander loomed large in the military and political arenas in both Washington and London. COSSAC was, in effect, a ready-made pattern from which could be fashioned an Allied Supreme Headquarters. General Sir Frederick Morgan became Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) in the Spring of 1943. In 1944-1945, he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff, SHAEF. General Morgan notes in his book Overture to Overlord that by November 15, 1944, COSSAC³

...had been transformed completely into an American type staff, and, moreover, into an operational staff, the real nucleus of SHAEF. (Ref 7, p 213)

Once the headquarters of the European Theater of Operations was established the planners then proceeded to set up within the theater an organization that would assume operational control as the Normandy invasion proceeded to unfold. The British established a tactical command for the operation including headquarters, Second British Army, the First Canadian Army, and 21st Army Group. At this time the largest US ground force in the United Kingdom was the V Corps. (Ref 8, p 37)

In April 1943, Major General Frank M. Andrews assumed command of the European Theater of Operations. General Lee, as the Commanding General Services of Supply, had submitted well-considered plans for the reorganization of the theater. With a new commander in position, General Lee submitted in May 1943 another plan for theater reorganization. This plan embodied much more of a radical change than had the others. Essentially, General Lee recommended that he be made a Deputy Theater Commander for Supply and Administration and that G-4, ETOUSA, be placed under his command.

² For detailed accounts of the organizational problems of ETOUSA and Services of Supply and SHAEF see Chapters I, II, III, and V of U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II - The European Theater of Operations, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol I: May 1941-September 1944, by Roland G. Ruppenthal, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1953.

³ For a detailed account of COSSAC and its eventual transformation into SHAEF see General Sir Frederick Morgan, Overture to Overlord, Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1950.

General Lee justified his recommendation with assertions to the effect that it would permit proper coordination of broad operational planning with logistical planning and affairs by providing for "the proper presentation of Air and Ground Force needs to the SOS" and by insuring "that the capabilities of the SOS are considered in the preparation of operational plans." General Lee's more than academic interest in theater reorganization is well-expressed in the following extract:

... General Lee was obviously concerned over the role of SOS in future operational and logistical planning. His latest proposal was intended to insure that future planning would be properly coordinated, in addition to bringing all supply and administration under the control of the SOS. General Lee's plan was a significant landmark in the history of command and organization, for it presented for the first time the idea of a Deputy Theater Commander for Supply and Administration, which was eventually adopted, and also pointed up the fundamental issue of the ETOUSA G-4's position vis-a-vis that of the Commanding General, SOS. (Ref 10, pp 160-162)

It is of especial interest to the student of military affairs to note in the above quotation the significance attached to General Lee's recommendation. His point of being appointed as a Deputy Theater Commander for Supply and Administration was well made and an important step in the direction and management of war. Here for the first time in our military history we were to possess a headquarters of theater level whose number two commander would bear the responsibility for both supply and administration--or logistics. General Lee's plan was adopted and ETOUSA/SOS carried on their planning and operational functions. Historical retrospect cannot but give General Lee generous credit for the logistical successes of the invasion of Europe.⁴ But there were those in the SOS who were upset by the methods of command used by General Lee who was "a soldier of the old school." As such, he was considered by some of his people to be a martinet but regardless of his method of operation, he achieved results which are what count in war. Ruppenthal comments upon the General's position at theater headquarters:

The atmosphere of the theater headquarters reflected in a large degree the attitude toward the commander of the SOS and deputy theater commander. General Lee continued to be a controversial personality throughout the history of the theater, owing to the anomalous position which he held. But the controversy over the SOS was heightened by his

⁴ For a general account of logistics in the European Theater of Operations see Logistics in World War II. Final Report of the Army Service Forces, A Report to the Under Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff by the Director of the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C., 15 June 1950.

personal traits. Heavy on ceremony, somewhat forbidding in manner and appearance, and occasionally tactless in exercising authority which he regarded to be within the province of SOS, General Lee often aroused suspicions and created opposition where support might have been forthcoming. (Ref 10, p 267)

General Omar N. Bradley, the commander of the 12th Army Group, and principal American ground commander for General Eisenhower, had the following commentary in the matter of the operations of the Communications Zone and its commander, General J. C. H. Lee:

As commanding general of the Communications Zone, the fastidious but brilliant Lieutenant General J. C. H. Lee was Eisenhower's chief logistician for all U. S. forces. An energetic and imaginative commander with bold executive talents, Lee suffered from an unfortunate pomposity that caused others to underrate his skills. Administratively, his was probably the most exacting task in the ETO and although Lee worked at it with the swagger of a martinet, he usually delivered the goods. (Ref 11, p 405)

As early as May 1943 Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers recommended that the US War Department establish a US Army Headquarters to "initiate actual planning for the 1944 operation." (Ref 13, p 114). In addition, General Devers recommended that a skeletonized headquarters for US Army groups should also be sent to England. Although this move was agreed to by General Sir Frederick Morgan, the Chief of Staff of Supreme Allied Command (COSSAC), the US War Department delayed the appointment of an Army Commander until August 1943. There was a further delay on the part of the United States in naming an Army Group Commander. Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, who had been the American commander in the Battle of Tunisia, was eventually selected, and he arrived in the United Kingdom in October 1943. With a cadre from Eastern Defense Command from the United States, General Bradley opened headquarters, First US Army, on the 20th of October 1943.

The rationale for the designation of a single ground force commander during the Normandy landings is well explained by the following extract from the Report of the General Board, US Force, European Theater, Study No. 2:

During the invasion of the Continent the ground forces were relatively small in comparison to those later to become engaged and the Supreme Commander placed the initial assault forces under a single commander. The Commanding General, 21st Army Group was selected to command this closely integrated assault and retained command during the build-up of the forces until SHAEF was established on the Continent on 1 September 1944. At this time, 12 and 21 Army groups began functioning as separate army groups with their commanding general responsible directly to the

Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander decided against having a single ground force commander, reporting directly to him as was the case with the air and naval forces. He believed that as Supreme Commander he would be, through necessity, so intimately in touch with the Army groups and with the allotment of air support for operations that he could not relinquish direct and immediate control. (Ref 3, pp 19-20)

The above extract cited from the Report of the General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Study No. 2, indicates that the Supreme Commander decided early against a single ground force commander, in the same sense that he possessed a single air and naval force commander. General Eisenhower justified this decision with the following:

He (Eisenhower) believed that if an overall ground force commander were designated, he would be constantly directing him in his efforts and that the establishment of an additional headquarters in the chain of command was unnecessary. So it was only for the initial phase of Continental operations and until the Supreme Headquarters was established on the Continent that the Supreme Commander utilized an overall ground force commander. From that time forward he placed himself in direct control. (Ref 3, p 20) (parentheses added)

In essence, General Eisenhower's Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) was functioning as headquarters, theater army for operations. Headquarters, ETOUSA was to function as theater army headquarters for administration and supply only. By this arrangement, the combat mission was removed from ETO and placed in SHAEF. The army groups did, in effect, constitute the tactical headquarters for operations under the command of the Supreme Commander (SHAEF). How this command was exercised by General Eisenhower is well explained by General Patton in the following extract from his War As I Knew It:

On December 19, 1944, General Eisenhower had a meeting at Verdun with General Bradley, General Devers, and myself and the members of his Staff present. The decision was made for the Third Army to attack the Southern flank of the Bulge. I was asked when I could make the attack. I stated that I could do so with three divisions on the morning of the twenty-third of December. I had made this estimate before going to Verdun, and had taken exactly eighteen minutes to make it. General Eisenhower stated that I should wait until I got at least six divisions. I told him that, in my opinion, a prompt attack with three was better than waiting for six - particularly when I did not know where I could get the other three. Actually, the attack of the III Corps with the 80th.

26th. and 4th Armored Divisions jumped off on the morning of December 22, one day ahead of the time predicted.

In making this attack we were wholly ignorant of what was ahead of us, but were determined to strike through to Bastogne, which we did on the twenty-sixth. I am sure that this early attack was of material assistance in producing our victory. (Ref 12, p 387)

In the beginning, SHAEF was strictly a planning organization with combat operations to begin upon D-Day and a successful landing on the continent of Europe. Under the plan, the army group headquarters was to develop as it was needed by the tactical requirements. While General Marshall, Chief of Staff, had already named Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley as the First US Army Commander, he was not ready at this time to name a commander for the proposed Army Group. General Jacob L. Devers (later commander of the 6th US Army Group) suggested that following the pattern of World War I a US General Headquarters be established to direct both operations and administration. This organization was to consist primarily of a field headquarters to direct combat operations and a rear echelon to accomplish theater supply and administrative functions. This was to be done by gradually doubling the staff sections of ETOUSA. Under General Devers' concept when the field headquarters moved to the continent, the theater would be reorganized, thus permitting at least in theory, a greater independence of operational and administrative command.

The following extract is significant in that it explains the rationale for the eventual development of the command structure without the establishment of a US general headquarters.

Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, the U.S. Theater Commander in early September (1943) took exception to the Morgan proposal. He felt that it would put units smaller than a corps under direct British command and would deprive the Supreme Commander of operational control in the early stages of the assault. He suggested instead that separate British and American zones of action be established with all U.S. forces, land, sea, and air, under a single U.S. commander, and that both Allied forces be directed and controlled as self-sufficient units by the Supreme Commander. His proposal for close coordination of the initial assault by the advanced headquarters of SHAEF was considered unsound by the COSSAC staff members who held that Supreme Headquarters was a strategic and not a tactical command. They felt it unorthodox to cut out army group and army headquarters, and saw no place where the Supreme Commander could go forward to

direct the battle in the early phases and still be in touch with the Allied governments. (Ref 9, pp 43-44)⁵
(Parenthesis added)

Finally, the plan envisioned the evolution of the command in three distinct stages, in the initial two phases of the landing and assault. However, in the initial assault phase, the First U. S. Army and the Second British Army, although under the direct command of General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery of the 21st Army Group, were to possess some degree of operational and logistical independence. The 21st Army Group, in the second phase, was charged with the mission of controlling tactical operations and administrative and supply operations. Supply operations were to be controlled by the staffs of the 1st Army Group and the Deputy Commander of the Communications Zone. In the third and final phase, the 1st Army Group was to be made responsible for an operational area and Headquarters, SHAEF was to exercise command of the two army groups. (Ref 10, p 204).

The concept of the higher command echelonment as advanced by General Devers was not approved in principle by General Marshall who believed that maximum separation of operational and administrative function was desired. Further, General Marshall believed so strongly that the new headquarters should not be burdened with theater administrative and supply responsibilities that he recommended that the Army Group be physically separated from ETOUSA. (See Fig 6.) In these words he established his principle "I desire that the Army Group Headquarters be initially controlled directly by General Omar N. Bradley under your supervision (Eisenhower's) and that it not be merely an offshoot to ETO Headquarters." The following extract from Cross-Channel Attack, by G. A. Harrison, is of interest:

First, U. S. Army Group (FUSAG) was activated on 16 October. Its first assigned task was operational planning under the direction of ETOUSA. The operational missions of both FUSAG and First Army were to be assigned later by COSSAC. By this time, however, it had already been decided that First U. S. Army would command at least all American troops in the assault and that 21 Army Group, chiefly because it was early on the scene and had participated in COSSAC planning would have over-all ground command in the assault and early build-up phases. In effect, those decisions meant that the role of FUSAG would be to take over command of U. S. troops when two American armies had become operational on the Continent, that is to say, after the establishment of the initial lodgement area. (Ref 13, p 115)

General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, controlled and coordinated the overall planning and final execution of Operation Overlord

⁵The initial COSSAC plan for Overlord called for one US and three British divisions in the assault under a British army commander.

(see Figure 6). Naval, ground, and air commanders were delegated with responsibility for detailed planning of their parts of the operation. The plan, when executed, was to be commanded by the Supreme Commander. The following extract indicates the division of the theater command on D-Day and until 1 September 1944.



It was evident after 1 September that there was doubt as to what functions would be carried on at the SHAEF level and what at the ETOUSA/Com Z level. The organizational charts issued by ETOUSA/Com Z at the time indicated that the organization at that headquarters was really the old SOS organization changed into a Com Z form, but with added theater functions, or rather with the retention of the Theater functions which the ETOUSA/SOS Headquarters had in the U.K. The functions retained by the theater commander himself at the SHAEF level were of a nature which General Eisenhower desired to keep under his personal control and were not published. (Ref 3, p 75) (emphasis furnished)

In January 1944, General Eisenhower ordered that Headquarters, ETOUSA and Headquarters, Services of Supply be consolidated. Although ETOUSA was commanded nominally by General Eisenhower, Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, the former Commanding General of the Services of Supply, actually controlled ETOUSA. The following comment is significant:

In Mid-January 1944,

... General Eisenhower had consolidated Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U. S. Army, which was responsible for all U. S. forces in the theater, and headquarters, Services of Supply, which had the chief responsibility for mounting and supplying the U. S. part of the operation. (Overlord) At the same time he appointed Major General John C. H. Lee, the Services of Supply commander with special responsibilities for administration and supply. General Lee's tasks included command of the Communications Zone troops in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, necessary activities in connection with static defense, and performance of additional duties delegated by the theater commander. (parenthesis added) (Ref 9, p 267)

Almost from its inception, the organization, as outlined above, encountered difficulties. These problems took the form of allegations from the field commanders that the commander of the services of supply possessed controls over personnel and supplies that could cause discrimination against the field forces. G-4, SHAEF staff officers were placed in the uncomfortable position of having to function as umpires between disputants and as advisors to the Supreme Commander. General Lee took the position as



Source: Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. I.

Figure 6. Planned Command Arrangements for Overlord

commander of the Services of Supply that General Crawford, the SHAEF, G-4, was endeavoring to exert control of all supply matters pertaining to the US forces. Fortunately, this period of difficulty in command responsibility definition on these highest levels occurred before D-Day. A partial solution was advanced by General Walter B. Smith, the SHAEF Chief of Staff who issued an order to the effect that the Supreme Commander would use the SHAEF staff officers only in the conduct of US matters which he had retained under his control (see Figure 7). (Ref 9, p 267)

Despite the order previously issued, as noted above, General Eisenhower was forced by the complex and tangled command situation to personally intervene between the two major commands in the matters of broad policy interpretation and assignment of objectives and priorities. He took the position that any of these facets which involved two or more US commands became the responsibility of the US theater commander. Falling back upon the well-known principle of delegation, he proposed certain duties to pass on to the commanders of the major commands. But he still reserved to himself the right to use the US elements in an advisory capability of the SHAEF staff and certain of the section chiefs of the special and technical staff sections of ETOUSA.

Further clarification and solution of this military command problem was attempted by the Supreme Commander when he promulgated on 21 July 1944 the procedure for

... carrying out "so called American administration in this Allied theater of operations." Communications with various U. S. headquarters on supply were to be channeled through the Communications Zone commander, since he retained all theater duties except decisions and policy on major differences among the principal U. S. commands. Because it was clearly impossible to separate U. S. and Allied matters completely, General Eisenhower added, he would habitually use "the senior U. S. officer in each of our several sections as an advisor on applicable U. S. matters, when the subject is of the type that requires the Theater Commander to take personal action." Although this arrangement, he noted, did not make SHAEF officers part of the theater staff, they were "convenient agents responsible to me for advice and where necessary for following up something of particular importance." (Ref 9, p 268)

With the advent of D-Day and the initiation of combat operations, the future of headquarters, ETOUSA appeared about to be restricted to the more prosaic roles of supply and administration. If the control of overall supply for combat operations was turned over to the Army group, ETOUSA would be cast in a somewhat minor role. Even worse, ETOUSA would be duplicating many supply functions performed by SOS. Such duplication would be wasteful of both manpower and supplies. The main question then was whether




Figure 7. Chain of Command, SHAEF, 13 February 1944

theater headquarters should exercise overall control of supply and administration; this control would be under direction of a deputy theater commander, or exercised by the operational field force headquarters. There were three possible solutions, i.e., implementation of a concept advanced by General Jacob L. Devers, which envisioned 1st Army Group Headquarters as the principal operational headquarters; or the establishing of a general headquarters in overall command, or the continuation of Headquarters, ETOUSA consolidated with Headquarters, Services of Supply (SOS). (Ref 10, p 197)

Once SHAEF Headquarters and the army groups were firmly involved in the tactical operations in France, and the planned takeover of operations by General Eisenhower occurred, what was to be the fate of ETOUSA? In essence, the question remained unanswered, at least, up to the time of D-Day and the immediately subsequent period. Headquarters, ETOUSA was well set up in London to function in the fields of supply and administration but these two activities were intended to be left under the national commanders within the framework of the Allied command. However, it was believed by those concerned that there should be an overall US headquarters. With its ready-made organization and its already assigned staff headquarters, ETOUSA could continue to carry on as a US headquarters.

The transfer of overall control of U. S. Forces to an Allied command raised an obvious question: what was to be done with the organization Headquarters, ETOUSA, and what was to be the command role of its commanding general? There remained the field of supply and administration, which was to be left under national commanders. Furthermore, it was generally felt that some overall US headquarters should be maintained. (Ref 10, pp 195-196)

The requirement for a base of operations called for retention of a stable and secure base in England in case the planned invasion of Europe did not succeed in making a lodgment--and the Allied Forces had to summarily withdraw. When the landing was secure, administration and supply would physically come within the responsibilities of the units engaged in combat operations. The pre-invasion roles of both the SOS and ETOUSA are explained below. The post-lodgment roles for these two headquarters on the Continent were not so clear. Ruppenthal comments:

Once the operation was launched, the SOS had to provide support from the United Kingdom for all U. S. forces on the Continent and arrange for continued support from the United Kingdom, the United States, and other sources. At the same time it had to be prepared to move from the United Kingdom to the Continent and organize the lines of communications there without interruption in its normal services. Fitting this ETOUSA-SOS organization into the planning setup of 1st Army Group and 21 Army Group and defining its future role on the continent proved to be one of the biggest

organizational problems still remaining. (Ref 10, p 205)

General Eisenhower insisted upon G-3 SHAEF maintaining close contact with Army Group commanders. The Deputy G-3, who was a British officer, effected this liaison with the Chief of Staff of the 21st Army Group. After D-Day the Supreme Commander, once the troops had landed successfully in Normandy, called upon his own SHAEF staff in such matters as planning combat operations and directing French Resistance operations, airborne forces, bombing, and interservice problems. (Ref 9, p 71)

As combat operations on the Continent developed, it was discovered by field commanders at army group and army levels that the system was not working in a satisfactory manner. The principal criticism came from both the SHAEF and the Communications Zone staffs, particularly, G-4. The unsatisfactory state of command functional relationships was again brought to the fore by the critical ammunition and gasoline shortages which appeared during the operations of August and September 1944. Much of the blame was placed by field commanders upon Headquarters, Communications Zone (General Lee). General Crawford, the SHAEF G-4, requested that the US members of the SHAEF staff be given "a considerably greater measure of supervision than (seemed) to be contemplated by existing orders." General Crawford's intentions are well-explained by the following extract:

He (General Crawford) did not mean that General Lee's staff should cease to function, but held that increased supervision by SHAEF was required...An alternative solution, he added, was to attach strong elements of Communications Zone to SHAEF to act directly under the Supreme Commander. (Ref 9, p 268) (parentheses added)

General Eisenhower did not act on any of the suggestions made, as above, by General Crawford. The situation of SHAEF and the Communications Zone Headquarters remained pretty much status quo until the end of 1944 (see Figure 8). Why the Supreme Commander failed to implement the suggestions of General Crawford cannot be readily ascertained from the record. However, it may be inferred that General Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, General Walter B. Smith, were in close proximity to Headquarters, Communications Zone and its commander General John C. H. Lee to give the difficulties which arose their personal attention and decisive action. This situation of proximity was most fortunate as it enabled the Supreme Commander to intervene, when necessary, to ensure that his operational decisions were carried out promptly. (Ref 9, p 268)

In summary, the European Theater of Operations exemplified the situation of a combined theater of operations absorbing and assimilating the combat forces of an ally. The designation of a Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces and the organization of the Joint Staff and the Combined Staff contributed to the principle of unity of command. The logistical support from bases and advanced bases functioned well under the Services of Supply type organization as envisioned under the Army Service Forces concept (see Figure 9).





Figure 8. Supreme Headquarters, SIAEF, 6 June 1944



Source: AC, S, G-3.

Figure 9. Headquarters, ETOUSA, 12 February 1945


In the European Theater of Operations the 12th Army Group, General Bradley; the 21st Army Group, General Montgomery; and the 6th Army Group, General Devers, in a practical sense, constituted the Theater Army tactical units available to General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander for the accomplishment of his mission, as outlined in his basic Letter of Instructions. As provided in the Plan (Overlord), General Eisenhower assumed command once the Normandy beachheads had been secured. Until that time, General Montgomery commanded both army groups. In effect, he was the Tactical Army Commander until General Eisenhower assumed over-all command.

From available evidence ETOUSA functioned as Theater Army headquarters for all Army activities except operations in the field. The principal tactical unit of ETOUSA, Theater Army, 12th Army Group, came under operational control of SHAEF.

On 1 August 1944, 12th Army Group assumed operational command over First United States Army (Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges) and Third United States Army (Lt. Gen. George S. Patton), itself remaining under the operational control of 21 Army Group (British) until 1 September 1944, when it was placed under the direct command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). (Ref 14, p 491)

In retrospect, the command situation in the European Theater of Operations was complicated by several factors including the following: it was a unified and Allied command, which tried out a Services of Supply combat support concept, as such. The Field Service Regulation operational doctrine of division of the theater of operations into two principal zones, i. e., the Combat Zone and the Communications Zone, was proven to be valid in actual operations (see Figure 10). Yet, there were difficulties within the areas of command and administration. The functioning of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander first as a planning headquarters and, later, as a tactical headquarters--with joint staff usage between ETOUSA and SHAEF posed serious problems of military command protocol. The following extract may help to clarify.

If this set up (ETOUSA-SOS) is difficult to understand some consolation may perhaps be derived from the knowledge that it was not always completely understood by the people involved in it and that in practice it often became somewhat difficult to operate. After the invasion there was a tendency for SHAEF to assume more and more the aspect of an American theater headquarters as well as an Allied one, and for General Lee's headquarters to gradually become a purely Communications Zone headquarters. But during the preparatory phase from January to June (1944), the consolidated ETOUSA-SOS headquarters was definitely the theater headquarters, supreme in the supply and administrative field under the



Source: Report of General Board, ETO

Figure 10. Headquarters, ETOUSA, 2 August 1944

direction of the deputy theater commander (General Lee). (Ref 10, p 201) (Parentheses added)

The functioning of the European Theater of Operations illustrates the operations of a combined headquarters from the point of view of planning activities, command, and subsequent operations. As an Allied headquarters, SHAEF was an outstanding example of the waging of war by nationals of different countries allied in a common mission. The complete integration of ground, air, and naval forces of the Allied powers was a tribute to the single-purpose planning of the participants to defeat of the enemy. The planning and execution of Overlord demonstrated the military professionalism of those responsible. The successes on the ground, in the air, and on the sea were directly attributable to the bravery, morale, skill, and spirit of self-sacrifice of units and individual personnel under competent leadership.


The entire structure of ETOUSA existed for purposes of planning, directing, administering, and supplying combat operations against the enemy. The ultimate test of the efficacy of the European Theater of Operations was to be found in its ability to organize, administer, and supply the theater army and other units within its area. But the organization of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, per se, removed from the Commanding General European Theater Headquarters (which was, in fact, theater army headquarters) control of the tactical combat mission. As noted, these operations were controlled directly by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. By this token, Headquarters, Theater Army, European Theater of Operations does not appear to have had a combat mission. From available evidence, ETOUSA possessed only a supply and administrative function for its theater army tactical units which were in combat operations as army groups under direct control of SHAEF (see Appendix B). Hence, Headquarters, SHAEF, did possess a tactical combat mission, which was carried out by the army groups.

The situation in the European Theater of Operations in 1943-1945 was a highly specialized one requiring the mounting of an air and sea invasion of hostile territory under command of a Combined Allied Headquarters. This initial separation of the invading forces from their original base had the effect of removing the combat mission from Headquarters. ETOUSA and bestowing by direct order of the Supreme Commander this operational responsibility upon SHAEF (see Figure 11).

After 1945, the European Theater of Operations became, through a series of changes, the United States European Command (USEUCOM). While not an active theater of operations, USEUCOM possesses that potential in connection with its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US European Command is in reality the bulwark of NATO's ready forces. Its geographical area of responsibilities includes the land areas of the members participating in the NATO pact. A US Army general commands the European Command and also serves as NATO's supreme military commander in Europe.

The Army component of USEUCOM is the US Army Europe (USAREUR) with headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. The major force within the

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Source: AC, S, (i-3).

Figure 11. Headquarters Com Zone/ETOUSA, 28 February 1945

USAREUR is the Seventh Army. Inasmuch as East Germany and Czechoslovakia are satellites of the USSR, units of the Seventh Army are stationed along the border region as a deterrent to would-be Soviet-trained aggressors. Seventh Army equipment and organization is well adapted to the terrain. Its weaponry possesses the capability of either conventional or nuclear response to an attack from across the border.

The following comment on the present-day position of the US Seventh Army is offered as significant of the trends toward the future, both as to strategy and weaponry. C. J. V. Murphy, Editor of Fortune Magazine, has said:

The great Seventh Army, dispersed among the un-numerable and now quite run-down Wehrmacht Kasernen, is under no illusions about the decline in the value of the reserve assets still being carried on its books. So long as the overall American capacity for decisive nuclear action continues to register in Soviet calculations, this switching of resources from one ocean theater to another is probably not dangerous. But as a long-run proposition, it has begun to worry the Army. It finds itself drawn deeper and deeper into Asia, but there is no place there for the massive divisions - for the heavy tanks and the cannon - in which so much of its capital has been invested over the years in the support of a forward NATO strategy. Yet Europe still remains the principal likely theatre of decision, and it is inconceivable that the light divisions being formed at such cost for the Vietnam war could ever be usefully transplanted to Europe for an emergency there. (Ref 15, p 124)

Of particular and additional interest, in the above-cited quotation, is the inference that there exists a "theater of decision." Further there is the inference that particular theaters may require certain type units and may never be able to successfully employ certain other of the newest US Army tactical formations. The validity of such inferential comment cannot be established within the limits of this study. However, it is believed to be necessary to point out that such thinking should be considered as germane to the overall subject of theater of operations evolution.

In his Annual Report, 1964, The Secretary of Defense commented upon the US Army posture in EUCOM as follows:

Along a 400-mile front of the Iron Curtain the major element of USAREUR -- Seventh Army -- has three mechanized infantry divisions and two armored divisions deployed in central Europe behind a screen of four armored cavalry regiments. These divisions, as well as the Berlin Brigade, completed reorganization under the ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Division) concept during fiscal year 1964.

To improve the combat readiness of the U. S. forces, the latest weapons and equipment continued to flow to USAREUR at a steady pace - the SERGEANT and PERSHING missile system, self-propelled 175mm guns, 155mm self-propelled howitzers to replace the 105's in division direct support battalions, and additional HONEST JOHN rocket launchers (Ref 16, p 111)

The addition of the latest missile systems such as the SERGEANT and the PERSHING is mentioned, as well as the conversion of all ground units to the ROAD concept. Inasmuch as this cited report was published in 1964 and there have been no subsequent reports of the Secretary of Defense in the public domain, the extract is included as of historical value and authenticity.

In Northeastern Italy, the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) constitutes the second most important combat element of USAREUR. This organization is a highly mobile tactical nuclear missile force. While it is much smaller than the Seventh Army its nuclear weapons give it an exceptional fire power for a unit of its size, approximately 10,000 men.

In 1966, France under the leadership of its President, General Charles de Gaulle, withdrew from the cooperative framework of NATO. This situation has placed USAREUR in an awkward position requiring the reappraisal of strategic and tactical plans. Further, in 1966 nearly 40,000 highly trained troops had to be withdrawn from USAREUR because of the pressures of the war in Vietnam. (Ref 17, p 135)

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being. Although NATO supports cooperation of its member nations in a number of fields, the heart of the Treaty is military cooperation. The United States, as one of its contributions, negotiated a series of bilateral agreements with member nations whereby direct military aid was furnished to bolster the armed strength of the NATO countries. In the first ten years of operation, the American military aid program for NATO nations amounted to some \$20 billion.

All of these measures were effective in containing Soviet imperialism in Europe. A stabilized western Europe, its armies refurbished, refitted, mutually supporting, and backed by the resources of the United States, its territories protected by the American nuclear arsenal, no longer presented its earlier temptation to Soviet adventures. Stalemated in one direction, the Communist Bloc sought targets of opportunity in other directions. New targets were not hard to find. (Ref 17, p 107)

Pizer, Lt. Col. Vernon, The United States Army, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967.

The relationship of NATO, EUCOM, and USAREUR to the World War II European Theater of Operations may not be too evident to the present-day reader. Briefly, ETO may be cited as the common ancestor of them all. Without the organizational base established by ETO during World War II, and carried over into the occupation, Marshall Plan, and NATO phases, the establishment of a unified command in Europe would have been difficult, if not impossible! The experience of the US Army in Europe during and after World War II had a salient effect upon the form and mission of our active theater of operations. The conversion of Army and Army Headquarters from a hot war to a unified command with cold war mission is an important accomplishment recorded in the post-war history of the European Theater of Operations geographical area.

The theater of operations in the future will, in general and in part, conform to the patterns established by its historical predecessors. Those patterns set by the European Theater of Operations during World War II were workable and functioned to assure Allied victory. Whether they will be acceptable and workable in a conflict of the future cannot be foreseen or foretold. In the long history of warfare the military profession tends to retain and improve proven, successful ways and means of achieving the objective. Today, the knowledgeable soldier is constantly looking toward the historical past and to the near and distant future. He does this in order to review old patterns, or to establish new and acceptable ones, for the conduct of military operations for which he and the members of his profession will bear the responsibility.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

The attack by the Japanese upon Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, and the subsequent invasion of the Philippines initiated a struggle in the Pacific that was to develop into one half of a global war. The purpose of this study is to show how a theater of operation theater army evolved and developed from the disaster at Pearl Harbor and the defense, surrender, and recapture of the Philippines. At its inception this theater of operations was perhaps one of the most disadvantaged large-scale military organizations in modern warfare.

Inasmuch as the Philippines are composed of numerous islands covering an area thousands of miles in extent, the problems of military organization and command were fraught with communication and supply difficulties. As the major Japanese attack was expected to be concentrated against the island of Luzon whereon was situated Manila, the capital of the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur concentrated the bulk of his available forces, both American and Filipino, on that island.

In July 1941 the Pacific command was designated by the War Department as the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The Far East Air Force (FEAF) was the air arm of General MacArthur's command. USAFFE was in existence until 21 March 1942. (Ref 18, p 4, Vol I)

The theater of operations in the Pacific area during World War II reflected the principles of theater organization and operation as outlined in the Field Service Regulations in a somewhat different way than did the other theaters of operations. Amphibious warfare was stressed and the use of bases for support of maneuvering ground, naval, and air forces was emphasized. The environment of the sea and the islands contributed to the importance of naval operations in the theater. The air arms of the Army and Navy were critical weapons in support of the island-hopping infantry campaigns of General MacArthur's forces as they fought toward the Philippines and advanced nearer the mainland of Japan.

In the Pacific, General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was an Allied and a joint command, and it also comprised a U.S. Army theater. The Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under Admiral Nimitz also was recognized as an Allied command, though actually it functioned as a U.S. joint theater; the South Pacific Area had a separate organization, but was subordinate to Nimitz, while he commanded directly the Central Pacific and the North Pacific subdivisions. (Ref 19, pp 492-493)

Historically, organization of the Southwest Pacific area began on a note of defeat as General MacArthur withdrew from the Philippines to Australia. The plan called for the use of Australia as a sanctuary-base to reconstitute

the US forces to defeat the enemy. The geography of the Pacific Theater was entirely different from that of Europe, and logistical support had to be furnished over vast seas, trackless land masses, and jungle areas: as a result, the Pacific war became a contest for bases.

Geographically, Australia was a natural selection for the major base from whence to mount the Allied advance against the Japanese. Upon his arrival there, General MacArthur found that a United States troopship convoy had already arrived. Initially, the troops aboard were formed into Task Force South Pacific (TFSP). Upon debarkation at Brisbane this designation was changed on 5 January 1942 to the United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA). The principle mission of USAFIA was to establish a service of supply in support of the United States and Philippine troops then fighting the last battle in the defense of the Philippines. Concurrently, General MacArthur's Far East Air Force moved from the Philippines to Australia. The basic mission for the Air Force at this time was to protect the lines of communication to the Philippines. Additionally, the small Air Force was to bring support for the operation, and cooperate with the Navy and Allied forces. The area of operation was designated as Australia and the Netherland's East Indies.

Responsibility for the administration and supply of their own units remained with the Australian branches of the services and with the units of the U. S. Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy assigned to General MacArthur's control. The administration of Netherlands Army and Air Force elements was handled through national channels, but logistical support was provided by American agencies. Administration and supply of the U. S. Ground and Air Forces, except for certain activities charged to the Air Force, were the responsibility of United States Army Forces in Australia, operating in accordance with policies set forth by General Headquarters. General Barnes, in command of United States Army Forces in Australia, was responsible for all U. S. Army Forces (other than air corps elements) except for operational control of the units assigned to Allied Land Forces. (Ref 18, p 34, Vol I)

The superior weight of the Japanese forces continued to push the Americans toward the eventual breakdown of their defense in the Philippines. Shortage of food, medicines, and ammunition contributed to that eventual end of formal resistance. On 22 February 1942, General MacArthur was ordered by President Roosevelt to proceed to Australia. Upon arrival there his instructions required him to organize a new headquarters and a new command for the prosecution of the war against the Japanese. The six-day journey through enemy territory is an epic of modern military history wherein a commander and segments of the staff of a defeated army withdrew against all hazards to a new base. To General Jonathan M. Wainwright fell the difficult and heartbreaking task of the last-ditch defense of the Philippines and eventual surrender to the Japanese. With General

Wainwright's surrender on 6 May 1942 the prior command organization was dissolved automatically.⁷ Between the departure of General MacArthur and the surrender of General Wainwright the USAFFE was being replaced by General MacArthur in Australia. (Ref 18, pp 29-33, Vol I)

Because of the rapid advances made by the Japanese in the Pacific area during 1941 and 1942, invasion of the continent of Australia was more than a possibility. General MacArthur, upon his arrival in Australia, faced two problems: the establishment of a base from whence to return to the Philippines, and organization, in conjunction with the Australians, of a defense for Australia. Inasmuch as Australia is almost as large as the United States, with more than 12,000 miles of coast line, organization of defense was a difficult task. The arrival of American troops in Australia helped bolster considerably the lightly manned Australian defense. In March 1942 the Japanese were moving steadily toward Darwin, the port on the Northwest Coast. Actually, both Darwin and Townsville had been bombed by a series of air raids. Actions had been initiated to implement a coordinated defense by the American and New Zealand governments and the new Allied commander-to-be. The final action in this matter awaited the arrival of General MacArthur. (Ref 18, pp 22-27, Vol I)

On 18 April 1942 General MacArthur assumed command of the Southwest Pacific Area and established his general headquarters at Melbourne, Australia. The forces immediately under his headquarters were as follows: the Allied Land Forces (ALF), Allied Air Forces (AAF), Allied Naval Forces (ANF), the United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFA), and the United States Forces in the Philippines (USFIP).

Directions issued under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by President Roosevelt established separate areas of command responsibility.

The directives thus approved--they were dated 30 March 1942--- established the two Pacific areas, set their geographical limits, named the commanders, and assigned their missions. MacArthur, as expected, was appointed Supreme Commander (a title he himself changed to Commander in Chief) of the Southwest Pacific Area; Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. The boundaries of the two areas conformed to the earlier agreement: MacArthur's domain included Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and all of the Netherlands Indies except Sumatra. Admiral Nimitz' command, though it had less land area, was even larger in extent and encompassed the remainder of the Pacific except for a broad band of ocean off the coast of Central and South America. It was divided into three subordinate

⁷The Philippine Garrison was actually a part of the theater organization--ABDA, i.e., American, British, Dutch, and Australian Forces allied against the Japanese.

areas, two of them, the Central and North Pacific, under Nimitz' direct control, and the third, the South Pacific, under a naval officer responsible to Nimitz. The dividing line between the first two was at 42° north, thus placing Hawaii, the Gilberts and Marshalls, the Mandated Islands, and Japan itself in the Central Pacific. The South Pacific Area, which extended southward from the equator, between the Southwest Pacific and longitude 110° west, included the all-important line of communications. (Ref 20, p 249)

Almost immediately, the Australian government named General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander in a new Allied Command, the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) as such, he commanded all Allied forces in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Ocean area as far north as the Equator. His responsibility was to the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff. Within one month, General MacArthur's theater command was established as a unified command in the Southwest Pacific. One of his first steps was to order complete integration of the United States and Australian forces for the defense of the continent. The Australian and United States Air Forces were placed under the command of General George H. Brett, United States Army Air Force. United States, Australian, and New Zealand naval forces were placed under the command of Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary, USN. In the Southwest Pacific Headquarters, administration remained integral to all national units assigned. Logistical support was furnished by the Americans to the Netherlands Army and Air Force. Under General Headquarters, SWPA, administration and supply of all US ground and air forces were the responsibilities of the United States Army Forces in Australia, which acted as a communications zone. The policies for supply and logistics were established by General Headquarters. The commanding general of the United States Army Forces in Australia was responsible for all operational control of the units assigned to the Allied Land Forces.

On 27 February 1943 the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE) were reestablished, with headquarters in Brisbane, Australia. Under command of General MacArthur at this time were Headquarters USAFFE; Special Troops, USAFFE; the 6th United States Army; the Fifth United States Air Force; and the US Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area (see Figure 12).

USAFFE functions were broadly defined under General Order No. 1, Hq, USAFFE 26 February 1943. The basic purpose in reconstituting the command was to relieve the General Staff, GHQ SWPA, of all administrative functions and operational duties which could be delegated to a separate headquarters (Theater Army) charged solely with exercising such functions.

A definite line of demarcation divided the responsibilities of USAFFE from those of GHQ, SWPA. The differences may be defined as follows:




Figure 12. Organization of United States Army Forces Far East, 26 February 1943


1. GHQ, SWPA, would continue to direct and control:

- a. Combat employment of all US army units in the SWPA. (This assignment to operational control would not, however relieve Hq, USAFFE of administrative responsibility for units so assigned except when specifically directed by Hq, SWPA).
- b. Military Intelligence - except counterintelligence activities specifically delegated to Hq, USAFFE.
- c. Policies governing relations with Allied Forces and with Allied governments and agencies.
- d. Increases in forces and means.
- e. General establishment of priorities, to the extent necessary to provide for strategical and tactical operations with respect to:
 - (1) Shipment of supplies, troops and replacements
 - (2) Assignment of replacements
 - (3) Geographical distribution of supplies and maintenance of supply levels.

2. All other activities of the United States Army in SWPA were to be directed and controlled by Hq USAFFE. (Ref 21, pp 10-11) (emphasis and parentheses added) (See App. E)

The Australian authorities readily adopted suggestions made by General MacArthur. The most complete cooperation existed throughout the war between him and the other nationalities within his command--Australians, Filipinos, Dutch, British, and New Zealanders. Not only was there an almost complete lack of friction and misunderstanding, but the ties of mutual respect, good will, and admiration among the commanders, staffs, and troops might well serve as a model for a mixed international force. General MacArthur's ability to gain and maintain the full confidence of these nations and their forces, of such marked national variance, was an important factor in the success of the Pacific War. (Ref 18, Vol I, p 30)

All functions and activities of the US Army in the Southwest Pacific Area (USASWPA) came under the control of Headquarters, USAFFE, except that General Headquarters, SWPA, controlled the combat employment of US Army units. Combat missions were initially conducted by the Sixth US Army, which was joined later by the Eighth US Army. Except when specified, Headquarters USAFFE as Theater Army Headquarters, continued to carry the administrative responsibility for the combat units (see Figure 13).



Source: Logistics in World War II

Figure 13. Southwest Pacific Area, September 1943

The plan provided by USAFFE indicated that GHQ SWPA would have the responsibility for planning and issuance of directives for training. Included were joint and combined training, and special training for future operations. Specifically, Headquarters, USAFFE provided the technical training of the united arms and services. Headquarters, USAFFE was not required to issue general directives covering training. (Ref 21)

When the return to the Philippines began, the Pacific Theater campaigns were marked by superior teamwork among the ground, air, and naval forces. On the ground, the tactical theater army, if one might be so identified, consisted primarily of two field armies: the Sixth and the Eighth United States Armies, under the command of General Walter Krueger and General Robert L. Eichelberger, respectively (in July 1945, the Tenth Army, Okinawa, under General S. B. Buckner, was added). At no time did the Pacific Theater see a tactical ground unit larger than a field army in operation. The army group, as used in Europe, was not appropriate to the Pacific because of the environment, the terrain, and the missions involved in the operations against the Japanese-held Pacific Islands. Task forces and regimental combat teams were usually employed when divisions were too large for certain missions.

In the Sixth Army, under General Walter Krueger, deceptive organizational patterns such as the Alamo Force were employed to confuse the enemy as to numbers and units. Alamo Force was, in reality, another paper name for the Sixth Army⁸ (see p 13). The Alamo Scouts were actual Ranger-type units whose principal missions were enemy harassment and intelligence-gathering.⁸ Sixth Army Ranger units were also employed to supplement the combat operations of the Army. In effect, the two Armies were the tactical army units of General MacArthur's command. Because of the distances involved and their complete separation by the nature of their respective missions, they were never to constitute an army group. With the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan (August 6, 1945), there was no requirement for the implementation of the invasion plan Coronet. Without doubt, the invasion, if it had become necessary, would have required the organization of army groups, from among units redeployed from the European Theater of Operations. Only one infantry division, the 87th Infantry Division, was engaged in re-deployment prior to VJ-Day (2 September 1945).

Theater Headquarters in the Pacific (General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific) (AFPAC), as the replacement of GHQ (SWPA), was organized on the typical general and special staff concepts. Supply was accomplished by a rear area Services of Supply organization of the communications

⁸ General Walter Krueger, From Down Under to Nippon, and General Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, contain detailed accounts of the operations of the Sixth and Eighth US Armies by their commanders during World War II.


zone type operating out of bases and advanced bases. Supply bases opened and closed and leapfrogged as the troops closed in on the Philippines.

By April 1945, after American troops had landed back in the Philippines, USAFFE was absorbed by GHQ AFPAC as theater army headquarters. On 7 June 1945, when General Headquarters AFPAC were in Manila, USASOS was discontinued. A new administrative headquarters designated as US Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) was established. The mission of AFWESPAC was "to provide and operate the administrative and service facilities and establishments for the logistical support of designated forces in the Western Pacific." Army Forces Western Pacific, with headquarters in Manila, was the logistical command for the theater prior to the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945.

GHQ AFPAC functioned as theater army headquarters until the end of the war in September 1945. With the occupation of Japan as its primary mission, GHQ AFPAC functioned as theater army headquarters until it was deactivated in January 1947. After January 1947, General MacArthur assumed another hat (CG USAFFE) (see Figure 14). Until that time he was wearing the hats of Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (SCAP); and Commanding General, GHQ AFPAC. In January 1947, the Far East Command was established in Tokyo with General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). The following extract explains the responsibilities of General MacArthur under his two principal hats:

Although GHQ FEC and GHQ SCAP were physically combined in Tokyo and the same staff functioned for both headquarters, there was a definite demarcation in the authority and responsibility on both geographical and functional bases. General MacArthur's authority as SCAP was limited to the occupation of the four main islands of Japan and some minor outlying islands and... he was responsible primarily for military matters, and his area of responsibility included the entire area assigned to the Far East Command. (Ref 22, p 6)

As noted, all noncombat functions of the US Army in the Southwest Pacific Area were under the control of Headquarters, USAFFE, which was the analogous "theater army headquarters" for that area during the war in the Pacific. Further, General MacArthur's GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area controlled the combat employment of US Army and Allied units. This responsibility included strategical and tactical planning, and the general units within the SWPA was furnished by USAFFE and USASOS as a communication zone type of organization. In view of these situations it is believed that Headquarters, USAFFE, as an organization in relationship to what would be later termed "Theater Army," did not possess a tactical combat mission (see Appendix B).



* CINCFE was also CG USAFFE. Major Army commands shown reported direct to CINCFE

———— Chain of Command, FEC
 - - - - - Chain of Command, SCAP

Figure 14. Organizational Structure of the Far East Command

CHAPTER IV

THE FAR EAST COMMAND IN THE KOREAN WAR. 1950-1953

In December 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that a comprehensive system of military commands be established in each of the several regions of military importance to the United States. On 1 January 1947 the Far East Command was established at Tokyo under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. GHQ, Army Forces Pacific (AFPAC), was inactivated and GHQ FEC took its place. As Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), General MacArthur commanded all land, naval, and air forces in the FEC. This command was exercised through the headquarters of the various services. In addition to the Far East Command's missions of the support of the occupation of Japan and the maintenance of military security in the Far East, the support of US foreign policy, and the carrying out of US military responsibility in the Philippines, General MacArthur's headquarters was charged with the formulation of plans and preparations to handle a general emergency. At this time General MacArthur, as theater commander, was wearing two hats: Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). As SCAP his authority was limited to the four main islands of Japan and some minor outlying islands. In addition, he was also responsible for nonmilitary activities in Japan. However, as CINCFE his responsibilities were primarily military. Geographically his area of responsibility included Japan, South Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, the Marianas-Bonin island area, and the Philippines. The theater organization structure of US forces in the Far East as of 1 January 1947 is shown in Figure 14.

Following World War II, conditions in Korea were in a state of agitation primarily over the division of the country after World War II into two camps--the Communist North and the Republic of Korea in the South. The 38th Parallel marked the boundary and Communists were anxiously awaiting the opportunity of uniting Korea by force.

On 25 June 1950 South Korea was invaded by Communist forces which moved across the 38th Parallel, captured Seoul, the capital, within three days, and proceeded southward with the objective of conquering all Korea.

The responsibility of CINCFE in Tokyo at the time of the attack was primarily the evacuation of American citizens from Korea as required by the US Ambassador. Under CINCFE's direction naval and air forces provided cover and transportation for the evacuation of the personnel to Japan. It should be noted that at this time the US forces and the Far East Command consisted of four understrength infantry divisions in Japan, and the limited Navy and Air Force units then stationed in the Far East.

The United States reacted swiftly to the Communist attack upon the Republic of Korea; on 25 June the US called for the cessation of hostilities and asked all members of the United Nations to render assistance. Almost immediately, President Truman directed General MacArthur to send military equipment to the Republic of Korea from mutual defense stocks

stored in Japan. Within two days the military situation had become so serious in Korea that the President authorized US air and naval forces to support the Republic of Korea troops. On 27 June the UN Security Council recommended that all members of the United Nations come to the aid of the Republic of Korea to repel the armed attack and restore peace and security in the area.

It is not the purpose of this study to follow the various actions of the Korean War. Basically, this portion of the study illustrates how an existing Theater of Operations converted from peacetime military occupational duties to full combat under the name of Theater Army in accordance with FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, 1950. In Korea this transition had to be accomplished in a matter of days over night at a heavy cost in men and materiel. General Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, Eighth Army, was tactical commander for General MacArthur, Commander in Chief, UN Command, with GHQ FEC serving as Theater Army Headquarters. As such he bore responsibilities comparable to the commanders of the army groups in the European Theater of Operations in World War II.

General MacArthur visited the front in Korea on 29 June 1950 and recommended immediately to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he as CINCFE be permitted to commit US ground forces to strengthen the Korean defense. This permission was granted on 30 June and CINCFE directed the commanding general, Eighth US Army, on occupation duty in Japan, to send troops to Korea. These combat elements were dispatched to Korea immediately. They consisted primarily of a small task force from the 24th Infantry Division, which arrived in Pusan, Korea on 2 July and was in action against the enemy on 5 July near Osan.⁹ The rapid military commitment of US troops was a desperate attempt to strengthen the Korean troops and halt the enemy drive to the South. In this effort it did not succeed, but it did slow their drive. The time thus gained allowed other US forces to arrive to reinforce the effort. On 6 July, General MacArthur directed General Walton H. Walker, Commanding General, Eighth Army, to assume operational control over the Korean combat area. He arrived in Korea on 7 July and the Eighth Army became operational on 13 July. The Eighth Army upon its transfer to Korea became known as the Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK). The following extract will explain:

The principal headquarters through which MacArthur directed the Army forces of his joint command was that of the Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK). The Eighth Army had been the organization occupying Japan. On July 13, 1950, its commander, Lt. General Walton H. Walker, a veteran of Patton's campaigns, transferred his

⁹See KOREA - 1950, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1952, pp 14-15, for an account of the operations of Task Force Smith.

headquarters to Korea. Through the "Taejon Agreement" Walker also directed the Republic of Korea Army through its chief of staff. The ROK Army never became officially part of the Eighth Army. . . Other United Nations troops were attached to the Eighth Army. (Ref 23, p 514)


At this time General Walker organized the defense to hold the enemy until reinforcements and new weapons could be brought into the field.

The following extract from the History of the Far East Command is quoted to show the command structure at that time:

At the time of the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea the command structure in the Far East Command was as shown in Figure 10. (see Figure 15 this volume). Certain changes in this structure were required to provide efficient conduct of operations and to meet changing conditions in the FEC. Most of these changes were in the joint/combined headquarters and in the Army forces. The Navy and Air Force structure remained basically the same throughout this period.

The USAFIK was established on 4 July 1950 as a separate command of the FEC and was responsible for the conduct of ground operations in Korea until 12 July, when this responsibility was transferred to Eighth Army. As forces from the UN nations arrived in the theater, they were placed under operational control of the appropriate US headquarters, as were the ROK forces when they were made available to General MacArthur by President Syngman Rhee. Although General MacArthur was appointed Commander in Chief of UN forces in Korea on 8 July and UN and ROK forces were committed under US component commands shortly thereafter, GHQ UNC was not formally activated until 24 July. CINUNC chose to establish this headquarters in Tokyo, utilizing the staff which was already performing the dual role of GHQ SCAP, and GHQ FEC. as the UNC staff and designating the major commands of FEC as major commands of UNC. This system continued throughout the conflict, except for a few instances when commands were established with purely UNC or FEC functions. (Ref 22, p 34) (parentheses added)

Inasmuch as the UN Security Council recommended that all military forces sent to Korea be placed under a unified command to be established by the United States, a request was made that President Truman designate a Commander in Chief for the UN forces. In accordance with this recommendation President Truman appointed General MacArthur Commander in Chief of the UN forces in Korea. Immediately, President Rhee of Korea



* CINCFE was also CG USAFFE. Major Army commands shown reported direct to CINFE.

———— Chain of Command, FEC

..... Chain of Command, SCAP

Figure 15. Organizational Structure of the Far East Command, 1 January 1947

assigned to General MacArthur the command of all Korean forces. A total of 16 members of the United Nations, including the United States, provided armed forces to the UN command (UNC).¹⁰ The following extract will be of interest as it explains how General MacArthur assumed another hat as Commander in Chief UN Command (CINCUNC).

On 24 July General MacArthur established General Headquarters, United Nations Command (GHQ UNC) in Tokyo with the mission of accomplishing the UN objectives in Korea. While this was a new responsibility, and the title "Commander in Chief, United Nations Command" (CINCUNC) represented another hat for General MacArthur, he continued to utilize the FEC/SCAP headquarters in carrying out his UNC tasks. Four major commands of the FEC were given dual designations as major commands of the UNC. They were the Eighth Army, the NAVFE, the FEAF, and Headquarters and Service Command, GHQ FEC. On 25 August the Japan Logistical Command (JLC) was established under CINCFE to relieve the Commanding General, Eighth Army of responsibilities and functions normally charged to a communication zone and permit him to concentrate upon the conduct of ground operations in Korea. (Ref 22, p 16)¹¹

On September 15, 1950, General MacArthur's brilliant maneuver in the landing at Inchon sent the North Koreans in retreat toward the Yalu river. The number of UN troops involved totalled 365,000 including those of the Republic of Korea. The tactical advantage of the Inchon Landing was soon lost when the People's Republic of China Army suddenly entered the war on 25 October 1950 in support of the North Korean Communists. On 23 December 1950 General Walker, Eighth U.S. Army commander was killed in an accident and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway came from Washington to take command of the Eighth Army. (Ref 24, pp 488-514 and pp 667-688)¹²

¹⁰ Members of the United Nations furnishing troops were, in order, USA, Australia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, New Zealand, Canada, France, Philippines, Sweden, Union of South Africa, Turkey, Thailand, India, Greece, and Belgium. Later Ethiopia, and Colombia also came in. The Republic of Korea furnished large numbers of troops but it was not a member of the United Nations. (Source: The Army Almanac (2d ed) 1959).

¹¹ The establishment of a logistical command followed doctrine in accordance with paragraph 14.3 in FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, Department of the Army, June 1950. The Japan Logistical Command was in essence analogous to the services of supply ETO during World War II.

¹² See August 3, 1953 New York Journal American for an article by Hal Boyle on General Walker entitled "'Little Bulldog' Saved Korea."

With the entrance of the Chinese into the war, General MacArthur's new Eighth Army Commander, General Ridgway, was given more latitude in the exercise of command. The following extract will explain:

To Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, who replaced the late Gen. Walton H. Walker as commander of the U. S. Eighth Army on 26 December (1950), MacArthur passed on the order to defend positions, inflict maximum damage on the enemy, and maintain major units intact. Within this framework he vested Ridgway with complete authority to plan and execute operations in Korea and ceased the close supervision he had formerly exercised over the Eighth Army and the X Corps. He assigned the X Corps to the Eighth Army so that for the first time since the X Corps landed at Inchon the Eighth Army commander controlled all U. N. ground forces in Korea. By now fifteen of the United Nations--the United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, France, Greece, The Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Belgium and Sweden had troops in Korea. (Ref 25, p 4) (parentheses and emphasis added)

The intervention of the Chinese changed the entire picture and the Eighth Army and its units had to fight defensively to maintain the status quo against the human-wave attacks of the Chinese. The following comment will explain the military situation facing the UN command at this time:

The two principal ground commands in Korea, the U. S. Eighth Army and the U. S. X Corps, had been physically separated from each other when the Chinese struck. The Eighth Army was in the western portion of the Korean peninsula, the X Corps in the east, with towering mountains between. Both had been operating directly under the United Nations Command in Tokyo, which was led by General MacArthur, who in turn received orders from President Truman and the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington acting as executive agents for the United Nations Security Council. (Ref 25, pp 3-4)

One of the anomalies of the command and organizational patterns of the Korean War was the activation and operation of the X Army Corps under the command of Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond. The X Corps had its inception in the planning of General MacArthur for his classical but controversial maneuver, the Inchon Invasion. Amphibious in character, the Inchon

Operation had for its objective -- the Inchon-Seoul area.¹³ X Corps, unit-wise, had its genesis in units assigned to, or en route to, join GHQ Reserve. General Almond, Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, was selected by the Commander in Chief as the Commanding General, X Corps with the understanding that the bulk of the Corps staff would be furnished by FEC. Further, General Almond was given to understand by General MacArthur that he would retain his position as Chief of Staff of FEC in addition to functioning as the corps commander. This unusual situation, in itself, gave General Almond two hats, i.e., one a staff hat and the other a combat command hat. This was a somewhat unorthodox command situation. (Ref 24, pp 490-491)

The command relationship between Eighth Army and X Corps continued to puzzle the commander of the Eighth Army, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker. As the impending juncture near Seoul of Eighth Army units with X Corps approached, General Walker felt that X Corps should come eventually under his command. ¹⁴ According to military usage and tradition, he had every right to feel that he, as the senior ground commander, should exercise command over all ground units in his area. Further, he and his staff held to the belief that all UN forces in Korea should be under a unified command. General Walker's attitudes, ideas, and plans for operations north of the 38th Parallel would, of necessity, be governed by the present and future operational capabilities of X Corps. Appleman points up the dilemma of General Walker in the following:

So far as is known, the nearest General Walker ever came to broaching the subject to MacArthur in writing was on 26 September (1950) when he sent a discreetly worded message to him suggesting that he would like to be informed of X Corps' progress and plans so that he could plan better for the approaching juncture of the two forces. General MacArthur dashed Walker's hopes in a reply the next day, informing him that X Corps would remain in GHQ Reserve, in occupation of the Inchon-Seoul area ready to take a GHQ-directed operation "of which you will be apprised at an early date." (Ref 24, p 609) (parenthesis added)

¹³For a detailed account of the Inchon Landing controversy see Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C., 1961, Chapter XXV. See also Col. Robert D. Heintz, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1968, for a study in detail of the Inchon Landing - with especial treatment of the U. S. Marine Corps' participation; and Walt Sheldon, Hell or High Water: MacArthur's Landing at Inchon, New York: MacMillan Company, 1968.

¹⁴Interview of the author with Brig. Gen. William A. Collier, Chief of Staff of Eighth Army during the Korean War.

There is ample justification for the X Corps command situation in the commentary advanced by Appleman. He points out that from the evidence available, personal and individual testimony and other sources, General MacArthur had planned to place X Corps under the command of General Walker once Seoul had been taken. The fact that X Corps under future plans would have to be supported in an amphibious operation on the East coast of Korea would necessitate close logistical support of X Corps. The Eighth Army was in a position to do this more easily in the opinion of several of the principal staff officers of General MacArthur's headquarters but they did not advocate the idea with the General. By September 1950, General MacArthur made his decision to operate with two commands in Korea: the Eighth Army and the X Corps. This decision was based upon the rail line, the road nets, and difficult terrain of North Korea (see map of Korea, p 63) and the possibility of logistical problems being encountered there. (Ref 24, p 610)


General MacArthur comments upon this problem in his Reminiscences:

Both the Eighth Army and X Corps were under direct control and central co-ordination of general headquarters until they were to meet in the north, when the united command would pass to General Walker. Until these two forces could unite, it would have been impossible for Walker in the west area to attempt command responsibility and co-ordination of the east coastal area. The logistical maintenance of an entirely separate and different supply line from Japan to the east coast would have been beyond him. (Ref 26, p 360)

In addition to the above cogent reasons for the separation of the two commands was the matter of the base. With Inchon secure, General MacArthur could employ that area as a base of operations and logistical support for a rapid pursuit of the North Koreans. From Inchon both the Eighth Army and the X Corps could be supplied but perhaps not in a rapidly moving situation. Further, General MacArthur wanted United Nations troops between the Eighth Army and the retreating North Korean troops. Logically, a landing on the East coast would place these forces in a favorable position to cut off the North Koreans retreating to the Northward. With Japan as the base for all operations in Korea, General MacArthur considered it feasible for two separate forces, Eighth Army and X Corps, to operate effectively under coordination from Headquarters, United Nations Command, in Japan. (Ref 24, pp 610-611)

Certain operational restrictions were imposed by higher authority upon the UN commander which made the Korean struggle a limited war in the truest sense.¹⁵ On 11 April 1951, General MacArthur was summarily

¹⁵ For case studies of the limited war aspects of the Korean War see: Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War - The Challenge to American Strategy, The University of Chicago Press, 1957, pp 163-193; and Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963, pp 39-57.



Source: James A. Houston. *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953*. OCMH. 1966.

Map of Korea

relieved of all his commands by President Truman and replaced by General Matthew B. Ridgway, Eighth Army commander. Immediately and effectively General Ridgway filled the vacant posts of the Supreme Commander. There was no loss of purpose or mission engendered by the sudden change of high commanders during the conduct of vital military operations. General Ridgway commented succinctly upon his new assignment as follows:

It was a hot assignment into which I had been thrown on such short notice. As Commanding General of the Eighth Army, I had been responsible only for the success of the Allied arms in battle in Korea. Now, as Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Far East, and Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, I was responsible for one of the great bastions of the free world. Overnight, I had to broaden my horizons to embrace a tremendous defensive theater that swings in a vast arc from the Aleutians to Formosa. (Ref 27, pp 222)

General Ridgway confirms, in the above quotation, that he, as Commanding General, Eighth Army, was in reality tactical commander for General MacArthur.


In connection with the Theater Army Organization in the Far East Command it should be noted that the old Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (AFFE) of World War II service had been merely a "ghost" headquarters attached to Headquarters, Far East Command. On October 1, 1952, it was reorganized and

... assigned the responsibility for all Army operations in Japan. Headquarters FEC and UNC were then streamlined by transferring the majority of the special staff sections and their functions to HQ AFFE, leaving only the general staff sections and necessary special staff activities in the headquarters. (Ref 22, p 36)

At this point AFFE relieved GHQ FEC of performing administrative functions for the troops in Japan. Supply functions for troops in the field were performed as previously mentioned by the Japan Logistical Command (See Figures 16 and 17).

In January 1953 Headquarters, Far East Command and the UN Command were reorganized. The reorganization provided for a Joint Staff Organization serving the major subordinate commands, the AFFE, the NAVFE, and the FEAF. This reorganization was in accordance with FM 100-15, Field Services Regulation, Larger Units, Department of the Army, June 1950, Paragraph 17 1.

Upon General Ridgway's relief as Supreme Commander, UN Command, to succeed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe, General Mark W. Clark, the distinguished commander of the Fifth Army in the Italian campaigns in World War II, was assigned as his successor. At this time, all Army forces in the FEC were placed under Headquarters, US Army Forces Far East. Here again General Clark, UN Commander, was



^a The UN Security Council had no command authority, but did receive biweekly reports from the UN commander.

^b The Army Chief of Staff acted as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

^c The UNCEC exercised operational control only over the air and naval forces under its command.

^d Although Headquarters, US Army Forces, Far East, had not been inactivated, it did not become operational until 1 October 1952.

^e The Military Advisory Group for Korea was assigned to Eighth Army command. It continued to discharge its mission of assisting the ROK Army and provided liaison between the Eighth Army and the ROK Army.

Figure 16. Channels of Command, July 1951




Figure 17. UN Command/Far East Command, Major Ground Forces, 1 July 1951

wearing another hat. General Clark retained command of the Army Forces Far East by exercising the command through a deputy commanding general (Ref 22, p 36).

When the armistice was signed in Korea on 27 July 1953, the limits of responsibility of CINCFE had been decreased to the point where geographically they had included only Japan, Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, and surrounding waters. CINCPAC assumed military responsibility for other areas of the Far East including the Philippines, the Marianas - Bonin Island group, and Formosa. General Clark's command structure as of this date is shown in Figures 18 and 19.

Korea, proper, was a geographical area (which became a combat zone) for which the Theater Commander, CINCFE had certain responsibilities as previously noted. The commands in Korea were, in themselves, subordinate unified commands serving under a joint command. By this token, the Army elements were cast in the role of Army components of a subordinate unified command. Theater Army headquarters initially was located in GHQ FEC, until headquarters, Army Forces Far East, was activated and took over this function.

Historically, the Korean War was the first conflict in which the Theater of Operations concept as prescribed in FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, was implemented. Based upon lessons learned from World War II, the theater of operations concept was proven sound and the missions of administration and supply were sharply separated from the tactical combat mission. As provided in FM 100-15 (1950), General MacArthur, as Theater Commander organized his logistical support in accord with the following excerpt from the above-cited Field Manual:

Normally, service forces within a joint theater are organized unilaterally; that is, each component force (Army, Navy, Air Force) has its own organization for providing the service support it requires. Depending upon the situation and the composition of the forces in the theater, the theater commander may organize over-all logistical support for the theater by assigning specific common support for the theater, by assigning specific common support missions or responsibilities to one component force. The designated force (Army, Navy, or Air) will act for all three, including any joint task force which may be organized. On the other hand, the theater commander may organize a joint logistics command for the common support of all components in the theater. The staff of such an organization will be a joint staff. In any event, there must be unified logistical and administrative support for all forces in the theater. The theater commander must provide for the exercise of close supervision, or even control, of certain logistical functions which, from their joint scope or interest, require a high degree of coordination at theater level. (Ref 28, p 12)




Figure 18. Far East Command Staff and Major Commands Organization, 1 January 1953




Figure 19. Organizational Structure of the Far East Command,
27 July 1953

General MacArthur was wearing a total of four hats, i. e., Commander in Chief, Far East Command, Commanding General, United States Army Forces Far East; Supreme Commander Allied Powers; and Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. All major Army commands reported directly to Commander in Chief, Far East Command. Hence, the CINCFEC was, in effect, Theater Army Commander. With the advent of the Korean War, General MacArthur was appointed as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command. The following extract explains:

The Security Council of the United Nations on July 7 (1950), directed the establishment of a unified Korean command. The United States was to be the U. N.'s operative agent, and was instructed to appoint the over-all commander. The next day President Truman named me commander-in-chief, and (the Republic of Korea was not a U. N. member) President Syngman Rhee signified his government's approval of the appointment. (Ref 26, p 337)

When the first US troops were committed in Korea in June and July 1950, Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, was required to function for the theater commander as the principal tactical unit of Theater Army. In this instance, General Walker's Eighth Army was analogous to General Omar N. Bradley's Twelfth Army Group in the European Theater of Operations during World War II. FM 100-15 (1950) states:

He (the Theater Army Commander) exercises command through the commanders of army groups and armies, the Army reserve forces, the communications zone, and the Army replacement command. The theater Army commander is largely a supervisor, a planner, and a coordinator who decentralizes combat and administrative operations, to the maximum degree, to his army groups and communications zone commanders respectively. (Ref 28, p 14) (parenthesis added)

General MacArthur's wearing of the four hats mentioned previously adds to the lack of understanding of the complicated command structure during the Korean War. For example: as Commanding General, Far East Command, his headquarters was, in effect, Theater Army Headquarters. As Commander in Chief, United Nations Command he engaged in directing combat in the instance of the employment of X Corps as an independent unit away from control of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, who was the actual ground commander for the United Nations Command. As noted, this rather unusual command situation with reference to X Corps was only a temporary arrangement until certain combat objectives were achieved.¹⁶ (see pp 60-61)

Brigadier General William A. Collier, USA-Retired, former Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army during the Korean War, indicated in an interview with the author that according to his recollection of events, GHQ, Far East Command was the functioning Theater Army Headquarters. Further, that initially Eighth Army, as well as GHQ, FEC were involved in administration

¹⁶ FM 100-15 (1950) paragraph 115 provided that a corps might be detached and operate alone.

and supply for the combat units in Korea until the establishment of the Japan Logistical Command for Supply Operations. Subsequently, FEC continued with its administrative functions. Also, that under General MacArthur, as the United Nations Commander, General Walton H. Walker was the tactical commander of all UN ground units (less X Corps--until it came under Eighth Army command) in Korea. At that time, he was in command of all UN ground forces.

In order to understand the command structure of the Far East Command during the Korean War, it might be helpful to compare it with the European Theater of Operations during World War II. Essentially, ETO and FEC were similar in concept and mission with, of course, the latter in an occupation rather than a combat situation. Superimposed over all commands in the area was the office of Supreme Commander Allied Powers -- in effect an allied command without function -- other than military occupation and civil government of Japan and contiguous specified territories. Carrying out the military occupation and civil government missions for the above two headquarters was the Headquarters of the United States Eighth Army with a serving staff and tactical units deployed over Japan. Eighth Army may be compared to the First United States Army Group in ETO which later assumed a combat role as the Twelfth United States Army Group. As there was no "theater Army" concept, as such, during World War II, a comparable institution must be identified within a theater. In Europe, the element most closely fitting the theater army role was ETO/SOS. Superimposed was the Headquarters of the Commander Supreme Allied Expeditionary Forces which assumed the tactical direction of ground forces after successful lodgment following D-Day in Normandy.

In the Far East Command with the appointment of General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, the role of Eighth US Army was in effect comparable to that of the First United States Army Group (Twelfth Army Group) in World War II. The Eighth Army was the principal tactical ground force until the organization of the X Corps. Initially, Eighth Army performed logistical as well as tactical functions until the organization of the X Corps. Initially, Eighth Army performed logistical as well as tactical functions until the activation of the Japan Logistical Command which assumed logistical tasks thus making the Eighth Army and X Corps strictly tactical units. The Japan Logistical Command was comparable in a smaller way, to the SOS of General Lee's in the ETO. Organized under provisions of FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, the Japan Logistical Command carried out the logistical mission until the end of the conflict.

Inasmuch as all Army forces in the Far East Command (during the Korean War) were assigned to either task forces or a unified command, the Theater Army Commander and his headquarters did not possess a tactical combat mission.

The theater of operations in the Far East during the Korean War exemplified the provisions of the Field Service Regulations, cited above, wherein the following is stated:

c. In a theater of operations in which U. S. Army units are part of a combined force, the strategical and tactical direction of U. S. Army groups and field armies normally originates from headquarters other than U. S. theater army. In such a theater the U. S. theater army commander may also be designated as the combined land force commander, or may be assigned no responsibility for combat operations. If the U. S. Theater Army commander has no responsibility for combat operations, the U. S. theater army headquarters becomes primarily an administrative and logistical headquarters for the support of the U. S. Army forces. Exceptionally, the theater army commander may be assigned to direct U. S. land force operations. In a theater where a U. S. unified command operated independently from a combined command, the U. S. theater army commander may be assigned responsibility to direct the tactical and combat service support operations of all U. S. Army Forces. (Ref 28, p 12)

In the Korean War we have a very good example of the employment of the theater army in a theater of operations in which

U. S. Army units are part of a combined force, the strategic and tactical direction of U. S. Army groups and field armies normally originate from headquarters other than U. S. theater army. (Note: direction originated in Korea from CINCUNC). In such a theater the U. S. theater army commander may also be designated as the combined land force commander, or may be assigned no responsibility for combat operations. (Note: in Korea, the latter situation obtained.) If the U. S. theater army commander has no responsibility for combat operations, the U. S. theater army headquarters becomes primarily an administrative and logistical headquarters for the support of U. S. Army forces. (Note: this was exemplified in Korea where GHQ, FEC performed these services--until Japan Logistical Command was activated.) Exceptionally, the theater army commander may be assigned to direct U. S. land force operations. In a theater where a U. S. unified command operates independently from a combined command, the U. S. theater army commander may be assigned responsibility to direct the tactical and combat service support operations of all U. S. Army forces. (Ref 29, pp 11-12) (emphasis and parentheses furnished)

In view of the experience of the United States Army in the Korean War modern command and control doctrine was promulgated in the later editions of FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units. The current doctrine for the control of the larger units in combat operations is based upon the accumulated military experience beginning with the first days of the

Republic and continuing to the present (1968). While doctrine for larger units comparable to those of today, was never a serious consideration until the American Civil War (1861-1865) our commanders on higher levels, at that time, were faced with many of the command and control problems encountered in the World Wars and the Korean War. Today, in Southeast Asia, the United States Army is again facing these problems in combat with a determined and resourceful enemy. The doctrine of command and control of larger units is again being tested in what has been called the third largest war in our history. The results of that testing will determine to a large extent the doctrine of command and control to be employed by the larger units of the future. What effects will be noted in radical changes cannot be readily assessed at this time. Great influence toward these changes will be the advances now made, and to be made, in the fields of communication and mobility. Improvements of conventional weaponry and the development of new type units for unusual tactical patterns will help shape the theater of operations of the present and the future.

CHAPTER V

CINCPAC AND VIETNAM

Immediately after 27 July 1953 numerous changes occurred in the organizational structure of the Far East Command. On 20 November 1954 Headquarters, AFFE, was moved from Tokyo to Camp Zama (Japan), and Headquarters, Eighth Army, was moved from Korea to Camp Zama. Headquarters, AFFE/Eighth Army, was formed of the two commands and Army Headquarters in Korea was redesignated as Headquarters, Eighth Army (Forward). Thus, CINCFE was relieved of one of his "hats," that of commanding General AFFE. In July 1955, Headquarters, AFFE/Eighth Army, moved from Zama to Korea, leaving a rear headquarters in Camp Zama. On 19 July 1956, the Department of Defense announced that on 1 July 1957 the Far East Command and the Pacific Command would be consolidated. Thus, the functions of CINCFE were transferred to CINCPAC, and Headquarters, FEC, was discontinued. Headquarters, UN Command, was closed at Tokyo and opened in Korea. On 15 November 1947, Headquarters, US Army Forces Pacific, was redesignated US Army Pacific (USARPAC). On 1 July 1957 USARPAC was made a theater-type headquarters under CINCPAC whose responsibility was expanded to include command over all Army units in the Pacific and Far East.

Primary missions (as of 31 Mar 1958): (1) to plan and be prepared to conduct operations by U. S. Army Forces as directed by Commander in Chief, Pacific; (2) to plan for and assist in the collection of intelligence; (3) to provide logistical support for operations as directed by CINCPAC; (4) to provide advice and assistance to CINCPAC, regarding Military Assistance program activities; (5) to provide advice and assistance to CONCPAC on U. S. Army planning in connection with Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) activities. (Ref 30, p 90) (parentheses added)

The Pacific Command, known as PACOM, is a descendant of the World War II GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area; GHQ AFPAC; and the GHQ, Far East Command of World War II and Korean War period. Headquarters for PACOM are in Hawaii; the area of PACOM contains approximately 85 million square miles, making it the largest of the unified combat commands. Its commander is designated as Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC).

The US Army component of PACOM is US Army Pacific (USARPAC) which is deployed in Hawaii, Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Vietnam, and Thailand. The geography of the regions makes USARPAC's logistical mission a difficult one because of the great distances requiring sea transport and air lift by the Navy and Air Force.

In Korea, the US Eighth Army is assigned the mission of blocking an enemy attack from the north. The Eighth Army consists of 20 divisions, two of which are American and 18 Korean, with token units from the Thai and

Turkish armies. Of interest is the integration of Korean troops down to squad level in the Eighth Army. Historically, this is the first instance since the Korean War where foreign troops have been integrated directly into the ranks of the US Army.

No US ground combat units are stationed in Japan, although there are units concerned primarily with logistical matters. By treaty agreement, bases such as Camp Zama, are retained for use in the common defense of Japan. This restriction eliminates the employment of these bases in Japan for support of US Army elements in Vietnam, Okinawa, or Korea.

In Okinawa, USARPAC provides tactical and logistical troops. The ground troops consist of the IX US Army Corps, an air defense brigade, and a rocket battalion. The logistical units on Okinawa are prepared to meet both current and emergency needs of the tactical units stationed on, or to be moved onto, the island.

Headquarters of USARPAC are at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. In accordance with theater organization USARPAC maintains a strategic reserve in Hawaii. Because of the ground combat now being waged in Vietnam, PACOM's ground strength is heavily concentrated there.

The subordinate commands of USARPAC as of 31 March 1958 were: (1) Eighth US Army, (2) US Army, Hawaii, and (3) 25th Infantry Division. The Eighth US Army included (1) the US Army, Japan, and (2) I Corps in Korea. The I Corps included (1) the 7th Infantry Division, and (2) the 1st Cavalry Division.

USARPAC maintains a military assistance advisory group (MAAG) and its support elements in Thailand. There is an extensive US Army support element in Thailand, all of whose functions are administered by the Ninth Logistical Command. (Ref 36, p 90)

In the Far East, the organization comparable to NATO of the European area is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO is a collective defense pact which was signed in Manila on 8 September 1954 by the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand. In addition to SEATO, there is the Australian-New Zealand-US Treaty (ANZUS). These two organizations cover the Asian-Pacific area. The armed forces of SEATO and ANZUS nations participate in joint exercises; unlike NATO, however, they are not joined together in a permanent integrated military structure. Both organizations emphasize standardization among their military forces. SEATO is concerned primarily with tactics and operational doctrine; ANZUS concentrates mainly upon standardization of weaponry and equipment. (Ref 17, p 102)

With reference to Vietnam, the Army is the largest contingent and is administered by Headquarters, US Army, Vietnam, which provides a direct channel from USARPAC to the ground forces. However, USARPAC does not become involved in tactical direction of operations. Technically, US Army Vietnam is a component of the US military forces in Vietnam. General William C. Westmoreland of the US Army wears two hats: one as commander of MACV and the other as commander of the US Army Vietnam.

General Westmoreland's immediate superior is CINCPAC, Admiral Ulysses G. Sharp, Jr.¹⁷

Admiral Sharp, USN, is theater commander of the Pacific Command (PACOM) which includes an area of 85 million square miles. This huge theater of operations extends from Pole to Pole and from the western coast of the United States to the Bay of Bengal; it contains 43 percent of the total area of the world (see Figure 20). It is the largest theater of operations in military history. Today, under Admiral Sharp, there are three service component commanders and their staffs to provide support for their respective services within Admiral Sharp's theater of operations. Further, Admiral Sharp, at his headquarters in Hawaii, has a joint staff which serves to give equal representation to each of the services in the unified command. To carry out this mission, the Theater Commander has established subordinate unified commands in Southeast Asia and the Eastern Pacific to meet the defense needs of these geographical areas.

General William C. Westmoreland, United States Army, commands The American Forces in Vietnam, which are subordinate to the Joint Pacific Command of Admiral Sharp. Vietnam, like Korea, has become a testing ground for the Defense Department's arrangement for interservice unified commands. This situation, as in Korea, requires a maximum cooperation among the Army and supporting Air Force and Navy elements. A most important difference between the Theater of Operations situation during Korea and the present situation in Vietnam is the lack of a Supreme Allied Commander. It should be noted that, although there are allied troops under command of the American commander, no supreme headquarters has been organized. In this connection, it has been observed that with the absence of a Supreme Headquarters and commander, the South Vietnamese forces do not always cooperate with the Americans as well and as closely as they might under the unifying effect of a supreme commander. (Ref 23, p 547)

It will be recalled that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, when President of the United States, proposed that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Joint Commands. This direction was to be performed without the intervention of any other agency. In order for the Secretary of Defense to carry out this directive, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would act as his staff. Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff for the Air Force had until this time possessed a statutory command status over their respective forces. Historically, the Army Chief of Staff had never been granted an active command status over the Army, hence no change was necessary in the functions of his office. To implement President Eisenhower's proposal, Congress abolished the statutory command authority of the Chiefs of the other two services. This action meant that the individual service chiefs could be by-passed whenever members of their services came under the direction of a unified theater commander, directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. (Ref 23, p 549)

Weigley, in his History of the United States Army, comments upon and compares the functioning of the services under the Secretary of Defense after 1947 with their functioning during World War II.

¹⁷ General Westmoreland was replaced by General Creighton W. Abrams in June 1968. Admiral Sharp will be replaced by Admiral John S. McCain, USN in August 1968.




Figure 20. The Military Chain of Command -- Vietnam

Both the political and military management of the war in Vietnam begin with the same chief executive officer, the President of the United States. After that, though, the tracks part, a fact that poses predicaments all through the process. The solid lines on the chart show command relationships and, in a sense, is always under negotiation. Communications flow both east and west. The broken lines show either the formal right of appeal of a subordinate to higher authority, or informal working relationships that have been improvised for this war.

Under the new arrangements the Army and the other services functioned in the defense establishment in a way not dissimilar to the activities of the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces in the Army of World War II. As AGF and ASF had raised, trained, administered, and equipped troops which they then turned over to the theater commands, AGF and ASF acting as huge procurement agencies and supply depots for those commands, so now the Army, itself, along with the Navy and Air Force, would train administer and equip formations to be turned over to the unified commands, the Army itself becoming a huge procurement agency and supply depot for the unified commands. Henceforth, the mission of the Army is to develop land forces for sustained combat, while the unified commands under the Secretary of Defense direct and control operations. (Ref 23, pp 549-550)

The American command system, as operated in Vietnam, is much stronger than it was in Korea. In accordance with the Policy enunciated in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2, Change No. 8:

A unified command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more services and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President. (Ref 31, p 38)

Under the above definition the US Army Vietnam commanded by General Westmoreland constitutes the Army component of the unified theater.

In the early part of 1967, a suggestion was made through the medium of Air Force Space Digest magazine that General Westmoreland be made full unified commander. By virtue of this recommendation he would then become in effect a Theater Commander, responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The author of the article suggested that better management of the war in Vietnam could be achieved by giving General Westmoreland authority over all operations, including the air campaign in the North and the ground campaign in the South. The following extract is of interest for its analytical approach to the command authority and control now possessed by General Westmoreland:

However, basic to any discussion of command arrangements are the authorities and resources the commander in the field has at hand to do the job. Put another way -- does General Westmoreland have all the authority he needs to accomplish his mission? Let's review his authorities: First, he had operational control of all Army and Marine ground and aviation units in Vietnam: also, the same

authority over Navy units operating in coastal waters and inside South Vietnam, exclusive of carrier strike forces in the Tonkin Gulf operating primarily against targets in North Vietnam.

He has, through his air component commander, operational control of US Air Force units operating in South Vietnam in support of all free world forces, including Vietnamese, Korean, Australian and US troops. He also controls all in-country airlift, all reconnaissance in South Vietnam and of the infiltration routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and areas adjacent to the DMZ.

In summary, then, COMUSMACV, General Westmoreland commands or has operational control of all US and free world forces (exclusive of RVN forces), ground, sea, and air, directly involved with operations in South Vietnam. He does not have control of Thai-based US Air Force forces striking North Vietnam, nor of the carrier task force operating from the South China Sea against the same area. (Ref 32, p 106)

The extract below is of considerable value because of the picture it gives of how General Westmoreland is proceeding to accomplish his mission, as a unified subordinate commander, under the overall command of CINCPAC.

Our current strategy is built around the utilization of all three arms: land, sea, and air. The primary emphasis to date has concentrated on the ground operation in South Vietnam, characterized by search-and-destroy exercises supported by air components. Additionally, the Navy supports the effort by off-shore bombardment and by assisting the Vietnam Navy to patrol the coast, harbors, and rivers of South Vietnam. Also, our revolutionary development program, or civic action campaign, through a recent reorganization has gained more and more momentum.

The air war consists of four distinct operations: (1) close air support and direct air support of US and allied ground forces in SVN; (2) interdiction of lines of communication (LOCs); (3) pattern bombing in South Vietnam by B-52s; (4) bombardment of NVN designed to interdict LOCs in NVN, inhibit infiltration of supplies and people from the North, and push Hanoi toward the conference table. (Ref 32, pp 106-107)

The war in Vietnam is now the third largest military operation in our history. In view of this fact, there are numerous officers of general grade,

of the Army and Air Force, who believe that there should be a single commander for all the forces in Vietnam (see Figure 21). All are in agreement that the unified commander should be General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of the Military Assistance Command (MACV). As noted, his immediate superior, Admiral U. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, has his headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii. The significance of this situation will be easily understood if we draw a historical parallel which is stated as follows:

...try and imagine for a moment that when General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, in the Channel crossing that led finally to the Nazi defeat, he had had his headquarters in Omaha instead of London. Or that when General Douglas MacArthur led the assault on Japan he had done so from Honolulu. Even the Korean War, which was waged by the United Nations, had a unified commander. (Ref 33, p 24)

In addition to the headquarters of Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland has another headquarters superimposed over him. United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) commanded by General Dwight E. Beach, USA, in Hawaii is thousands of miles from the scene of actual combat that must be directed by General Westmoreland. Further, General Westmoreland does not command the US Naval Forces in the South China Sea, nor the B-52 bombers based on Guam, nor the 300,000 South Vietnamese ground forces aligned with his American forces against the Viet Cong.

'Admiral Sharp's headquarters is too far back' one of them (the officers) said recently. ... It is not enough that General Westmoreland has assigned to him all the forces actually based in South Vietnam. The airplanes in Thailand, like those of the Seventh Fleet, are under the control of the Admiral (Sharp). It is true that they are operated by the Seventh Air Force under Lt. General William W. Momyer, based in Saigon, but the policies for Thai-based aircraft are dictated by the Admiral (Sharp). (Ref 33, p 25) (parenthesis added)

The proponents of a unified command point out some compelling reasons for this proposed reorganization. Interference with field operations and pressure from Department of Defense level allegedly cause old service rivalries to flare again. Queries explained by a "high level wants to know" emanate from the Pentagon. These are mainly in the realm of the "numbers game" and are statistical, couched in the following vein:

'... they (the other service) dropped so many bombs. Why haven't you done the same? And you had more losses than they had. Why? Explain why your loss rate per sortie is higher than the other service.' (Ref 33, p 25) (parenthesis added)

If General Westmoreland were granted command over a unified command embracing Southeast Asia, it is believed that the above type of




Figure 21. The Chain of Command for the War in Vietnam

interference would be stopped, since the component commanders could protest to their immediate superior. General Westmoreland, who would be directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is being proposed in the cited article is that Admiral Sharp, instead of heading the joint unified command as CINCPAC, be replaced in Vietnam by a new theater organization, with General Westmoreland as CINCSEA (South East Asia) (see Figure 22). This change would make General Westmoreland a Theater Commander in his own right. According to its proponents, the new organization plan would function more efficiently and economically. But there are political, as well as other considerations that must be weighed in establishing the proposed CINCSEA. Vietnam, while a large military operation, as far as men, places, and ships are concerned, is only a minute geographical portion of the huge Pacific area. The combat capability of the rest of the Pacific area must be considered, along with the current operations in Vietnam. While there is support in the Army for the unified command for General Westmoreland, it is believed that certain high-ranking Navy officers take a dim view of such a change. Further, General Westmoreland, himself, is believed to be more or less divided in his thinking upon the matter of a unified command. As the proposed CINCSEA, he is aware that the change would make for a more effective management of the war but he is not agreeable to turning over his responsibility for the ground war to an Army component commander. Further, he knows that such a move would damage his excellent relations with his Navy counterparts. He cannot risk such alienation.

As it is now constituted, CINCPAC is organized and operated in accordance with the doctrine promulgated by FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, December 1963. The command structure of the theater prescribed therein follows:

- a. The headquarters of a U.S. Theater of Operations is a unified command headquarters. The unified command is organized by the commander to perform his mission in accordance with the capabilities and strengths of the component elements.
- b. The theater commander (unified command commander) exercises operational command of assigned forces (ch. 3, JCS Pub 2, UNAAF)--
 - (1) Through the service component commanders (such as theater Army commander).
 - (2) By establishing a subordinate unified command (when authorized).
 - (3) By establishing a uni-Service force reporting directly to the commander of the unified command.
 - (4) By establishing a joint task force.
 - (5) By attaching elements of one force to another force.
 - (6) By establishing a functional command, e.g., a theater joint air defense command.




Figure 22. How a Unified Command Would Work

c. Service forces within a theater are usually organized unilaterally; thus, each component force (Army, Navy, or Air Force) has its own organization for providing combat service support. Exceptions occur when support is otherwise provided for by agreement or assignments involving common, joint, or cross-servicing at force, theater, department, or Department of Defense level. (Ref 34, p 7)

Under provisions of the above-cited regulations, US Army Pacific (USARPAC) functions as Theater Army Headquarters for CINCPAC. The mission of USARPAC is well stated in the following extract:

From its headquarters in Hawaii, USARPAC provides direction on troops, intelligence, training, operations, civil affairs, logistics, and fiscal (comptroller) functions for all U. S. Army forces in the theater. To accomplish this, seven subordinate commands have been established: U. S. Army Hawaii; U. S. Army Japan; U. S. Army Ryukyu Islands; U. S. Army Vietnam; U. S. Army Forces Taiwan; Eighth Army in Korea; and U. S. Army Support Thailand. (Ref 35, p 68)

Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., USA, Deputy Commander, US Army Vietnam, has stated well the mission of USARVN in the following quotation from The Army Green Book, 1967:

But the U. S. Army in Vietnam plays the leading role among American forces in the offensive ground war and in supporting the Vietnamese government's so-called Revolutionary Development program. Six divisions and the equivalent in separate brigades of almost two more divisions, plus additional forces of aviation companies, an armored cavalry regiment, armor battalions, artillery battalions, and engineer battalions pursue the ground war against the Viet Cong and the North. Vietnamese Army regulars who are taking on a greater share of the fighting. These fighting elements are joined by combat service support and specialized outfits to make up the 300,000-man U. S. Army force in Vietnam. (Ref 36, p 107)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

After a careful study of the European Theater of Operations and the Southwest Pacific Area in World War II, it is concluded that in both instances, the theaters evolved generally in accordance with Field Service Regulations and applicable doctrine of the times.

The World War II period of history did not witness the unified command on the theater level. The theater was formed and shaped as much by the requirements of the mission as it was by promulgated doctrine. Environment and geographical conditions gave each of the several theaters certain definite patterns of operations. Additionally, because of the multinational character of the theaters, national methods of operating in the field had to be reconciled and subordinated to the common usage patterns.

The British World War II doctrine of establishing a separate ground force commander and consequently a separate ground force headquarters was not reconcilable with American military doctrine. Because of the chain of command principle and the principle of economy of force, it was not desired to interpose an additional headquarters between the overall commander and the troops.

The 1943 Field Service Regulations, Larger Units do not mention the term "Theater Army" or "Theater Army Headquarters." By this omission, one must conclude that the terms were unknown to the Army of that day. However, the British practice of establishing separate headquarters for the three services, ground, air, and naval, did exert considerable influence upon the introduction later of the term "Theater Army" into the United States Army. Historically, General Eisenhower rejected the British practice because he felt that the interposition of another headquarters between himself and the troops was unsound and in violation of unity of command. Hence, "Theater Army Headquarters" was, by analogy, found residing within Theater Headquarters during the period of World War II.

In view of the type of warfare being waged, combat was of necessity divided into ground, air, and naval operations. Unified command, on the component level, was achieved partially in the Theater Army, Air Force, and Navy concept -- as yet, not prescribed doctrinally. Unified command was achieved on the highest level by the appointment of a Supreme Allied Commander who commanded the combined forces of all arms for the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In World War II, in the European Theater of Operations, and in the Southwest Pacific Area Theater of Operations, the Theater Commanders usually wore two or more hats. From a somewhat detailed study of the organization and operations of both theaters, it is concluded that the "two hat" situation was one that was forced upon the respective theater

commanders. They were placed in the position of having to accept dual command responsibilities for the following reasons: (1) the lack of sufficient staff officers to man separate headquarters for the accomplishment of the required mission; (2) the desire on the part of the theater commander to retain personal control of all facets of operations, that is, administration, supply, and tactical operations; (3) a scarcity of competent general and special staff officers; and (4) the wish of the commander to have his staff "double in brass" -- thus assuring optimum personal control -- without duplication of effort. The wearer of two hats, as commander of two headquarters and two staffs, was thus assured of maximum control with minimum organizational effort.

The dual command situation can be desirable in certain types of operations required to be accomplished in accordance with specific Letters of instruction or other types of directives and orders. Historically, it has been shown that often the other hat, in contradistinction to the one denoting combat leadership, signifies logistical and administrative functions.

In the European Theater of Operations in World War II, it is concluded that the distinct separation of command, administration, and supply was necessitated by the missions to be accomplished by the Supreme Commander, who was also the Theater Commander. With ETO and Services of Supply eventually combined, Theater Army Headquarters in ETO had responsibility for both functions of administration and supply for the tactical units under direct control of SHAEF.

With SHAEF Headquarters directing the tactical operations of the troops in the field through the Army Group Commanders, Theater Army Headquarters (ETO) did not possess a tactical combat mission.

In the post-World War II period, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were held over and maintained in a status quo without legal status until the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. The creation of the Department of National Defense in 1947 had the direct effect of changing the concept and doctrine of the Theater of Operations, as it was known through World War II.

By one legislative act, the power of command of the Service Chiefs was removed. The Army Chief of Staff never possessed such power. This step established the Secretary of Defense as the chief military decision-maker, although a civilian official of Cabinet rank. This action assured unified command at Theater of Operations level. The extract below is of interest because

...by introducing a single authority, inferior only to the President, and empowered to make armed forces-wide decisions consistent with the wishes of the President, a stumbling block to unity of the services was removed. The failure of the joint Army-Navy Board to achieve concrete results had amply demonstrated the futility of expecting meaningful, timely joint military actions to emerge from a party of partisan members who had no

authority save to report to party headquarters. By terms of the act, the Secretary of Defense became the over-all military decision maker, under the authority of the President. There was now a single voice on interservice affairs where previously there had been a chorus frequently singing in different keys. (Ref 17, pp 120-121)

In the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II, the theater of operations was formed in accordance with the provisions of the FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, 1940-1943. In the Pacific, organization was complicated by great water distances separating large, trackless, jungle land masses. Communication and supply problems were difficult of solution because of the distances involved. The term "Theater Army" was unknown in this period but there were certain factors influencing its later adoption. The fact that one of the Allies, the Australians, served under SWPA headquarters, brought considerable British military doctrine into the area. The establishment of Allied Land Forces Headquarters, under command of an Australian general officer attested to the effect of British doctrine.

The Korean War (1950-1953) was the first real test of the new Theater Army concept. Korea became a unified command under the Supreme Commander, United Nations Command. FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units, June 1950, governed the operations of the Theater and Theater Army.

Historically, it may be pointed out that we had in the Pacific Theater, during both World War II and Korea, two separate commands. These commands, which reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area (CINCSWPA), and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, (CINCPAC) Pacific Ocean Area (later CINCPAC), in World War II; during the Korean operations CINCFE and CINCPAC both functioned.

The American Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific, like the Supreme Commander in the European Theater of Operations, was not agreeable to the imposition of a ground force headquarters between himself and his units. The problem of a separate land force, containing both American and Allied troops, was solved by the use of the "Alamo Force" device, which placed American troops, for operations, under the tactical American commanders.

An analogous Theater Army Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area was located in the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). From investigation conducted in connection with this study, it has been determined that the mission of USAFFE was one of administration and supply; Theater Army Headquarters (USAFFE) had no tactical combat mission. Tactical ground combat was conducted by the Sixth and Eighth Armies under the direction and control of the Supreme Commander, General Douglas MacArthur.

Theater Army Headquarters, established by doctrine promulgated by Army Regulations, has had its mission of active direction of tactical combat removed by a series of practical requirements. The military situations in the European Theater of Operations and the Southwest Pacific Area were generally analogous, there was an enemy to defeat, but other than this common mission the inherent conditions of each Supreme Commander's overall mission were different. General Eisenhower's "You will enter the continent of Europe..."; General MacArthur's "I shall return" were almost basic mission statements. Both theaters were faced with a battle for bases, air and ground. Following the traditional Theater of Operations concept of a "forward" area and a "rear" area, tactical operations were "forward," and supply and administration were "rear". Theater Army Headquarters in the rear, as shown in this study, found itself without a combat mission. The removal of the forward elements, as they crossed the Channel to the Continent or secured the Pacific island bases for the advance to the Philippines and Tokyo, automatically altered the mission of Theater Army Headquarters. The establishment of supply bases in the rear and forward areas under the Army Service Forces concept removed the supply mission from Theater Army Headquarters. The one function still adhering to Theater Army Headquarters was the administration of personnel and units.

Today, with nearly all theaters of operations of the unified command type, and with the Headquarters Army component taking the place of Theater Army Headquarters, it is concluded that "Theater Army Headquarters," per se, does not possess a tactical combat mission.

APPENDIX A
TASK ASSIGNMENT



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22060

IN REPLY REFER TO
CDCRE-O

20 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORC

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 8-67, Organization of a Theater of Operations

1. The Commanding General requests that you perform a study within the scope of Project 1 of your contract for Calendar Year 1967.

2. Title: Organization of a Theater of Operations

3. Objective: To investigate the division of responsibilities among various headquarters of the theater, with emphasis on the Senior Army Headquarters in the Theater. The time period from 1941 to the present should be covered and information relating to the Army and Air Force should be considered. Information relating to the Navy will be excluded.

4. Why Work is Required: This work has been requested by the Institute of Advanced Studies to provide background information for use in the Army 85 study and, in addition should provide information for use in future Army studies.

5. Results Anticipated: This study will provide the Army staff, commands, and services with a complete and fully documented record of the division of responsibilities among the various headquarters of the theater of operations. It should answer the question, "Did Theater Army ever have an operational mission?"

6. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a memorandum.

7. Administration:

a. References:

(1) Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, European Theater of Operations, U.S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C., 1954.

CDCRE-O

SUBJECT: Task Assignment 8-67, Organization of a Theater of Operations

(2) Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, U.S. Army in WORLD WAR II, The War Department, Washington, D. C., Office of The Chief of Military History, 1951.


b. Direct coordination with the USACDC Institute of Advanced Studies is authorized.

c. Project Officer: Mr. J. E. Keith, Plans Directorate, HQ USACDC.

8. Correlation: This project is assigned Action Control Number 11608.

9. Request that you indicate your acceptance, analyze your resources, and provide the following information:

- a. Estimated technical man-months.
- b. Completion date.
- c. CORG Project Officer.


JOHN T. PIERCE III
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations Research Support
Division

APPENDIX B
DOCUMENTARY LETTERS

P. O. Box 69
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

November 17, 1967

I succeeded yesterday in discussing with General Eisenhower the content of your letter under date of November 13th.

General Eisenhower agrees with your conclusion that, after troops had been landed on the Continent on D-Day, Army Theater Headquarters as defined by you (ETO-SOS Headquarters) had no operational mission, at least other than anti-aircraft defense and Military Police activity.

With kindest regard and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Arthur S. Nevins
Arthur S. Nevins


November 8, 1967

In reply to your letter of 7 November, USAFFE was definitely an administrative headquarters. I will have to check my files at home to see whether I have a chart depicting the organization of SWPA.

In all of our combat operations, we were furnished logistical units by USASSOS which was the supply organization for the Commander in Chief. USAFFE was mostly a personnel organization under the direct command of General MacArthur with General Sutherland Chief of Staff of both USAFFE and GHQ. General Stivers was Deputy Chief of Staff for USAFFE only.


I will call you after I determine what I may have in the way of charts.

Sincerely,


C. D. Eddleman


APPENDIX C

**Theater and Other Organizational Structures -
1917-1967**




Source: Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War
(American Expeditionary Forces), 1937.


Organization of General Headquarters, AEF 5 July 1917



Organization of General Headquarters, AEF 16 February 1918



Division of Allied Command Responsibilities in Southeast Asia: March-April 1942




— Administration and Supply

..... Operations

Source: History of USAFFE June 1948.


Organization of Forces, US Army Forces Far East: 26 February 1943



Source: Reports of General MacArthur, The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol 1.
US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., January 1966

Organization of Forces for the Leyte Operation

CORG-M-318




— Command channel
 - - - - - Operational control
 - - - - - Liaison

2/ Effective 1 April 1944, the title Near Eastern was discontinued. Theater headquarters moved to New Delhi, India.
 3/ Headquarters moved to Calcutta on 15 April 1944.
 4/ Discontinued (December 1943).
 5/ Inactivated 31 January 1944, consolidated into Advance Section No. 1, Headquarters at Kunming.
 6/ Effective 31 December 1943, Bombay Port of Disbaration established as an exempted station under Commanding General, Transportation Service, SCS, CBI.
 7/ Established 1 January 1944.
 8/ Discontinued 31 January 1944; Headquarters, NCAC established at Lido on 1 February 1944.
 9/ Chinese Training and Combat Command, a troop pool providing officers for the organizations indicated.
 Source: Organization Chart, Asiatic Fleet, OVD, Nov 43, OCSIII.


Source:
 US ARMY in WW II - The China-Burma-India Theater, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Washington, D. C.: 1956

Organization of US Forces, China, Burma and India: November 1943 - April 1944




Source: China-Burma-India Theater - Stilwell's Command Problems, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Washington, D.C. 1956


Stilwell in the CBI Chain of Command, December 1943 - June 1944




Source: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Washington, D. C., 1959

Sino-American Liaison System (Schematic)






Chain of Command, SHAER: 13 February 1944




Operational Chain of Command, SHAEF: 1 April 1944




Source: AC, S, G-3.

Operational Organization of the Southwest Pacific Area, April 1944




Source: Report of General Board, ETO

Headquarters, ETOUSA, 2 August 1944




Allied Chain of Command, November 1944




NOTE: The general staff functions of theater are performed jointly by the US element of SHAEF and the General Staff of COM Z

Source: AC, S, G-3

Headquarters ETOUSA, 12 February 1945



Headquarters Com Zone/ETOUSA: 28 February 1945




* CINCFE was also CG USAFFE. Major Army commands shown reported direct to CINFE.

———— Chain of Command, FEC

..... Chain of Command, SCAP

Organizational Structure of the Far East Command:
1 January 1947



* CINCFE was also CG USAFFE. Major Army commands shown reported direct to CINCFE

———— Chain of Command, FEC

..... Chain of Command, SCAP

Organizational Structure of the Far East Command
20 June 1950



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13. ABSTRACT United States Army Field Service Regulations, as early as 1941, contained the doctrine providing for the establishment and conduct of a theater of operations. The basic doctrine that the theater be divided into two formal parts, that is, the combat zone and the communications zone, has stood the test of time and combat. Sharp lines of demarcation drawn functionally between ground, air, and naval forces within a theater of operations. Although the Theater Army, Navy, and Air Force existed during World War II they were not specifically so designated until the issuance, in 1950-1952, of the Field Service Regulations in force during the Korean War. The case studies selected show the operations of the Theater Army, or its analogous counterpart, in World War II and the Korean War, and are cited in an attempt to answer the question "Did Theater Army Headquarters ever have a combat mission?" This study seeks to answer the above question by emphasizing certain changes in operational format and organizational concepts that occurred during the periods under consideration. It is demonstrated that at theater level, administration and supply were usually separated from the tactical combat mission.			

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14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Theater Operations Theater Army Army Group Army Commander-in-Chief European Theater of Operations (ETO) Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) General Headquarters, United States Army Forces Pacific (GHQAFAPAC) Supreme Commander Headquarters Allied Powers (SCAP) Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces (SCAEF) Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEP) USARPAC (U.S. Army Pacific) AFPAC (Army Forces Pacific) FUSAG (First U.S. Army Group) CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief Pacific Area Command) USARVN (U.S. Army Vietnam) MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) USAFIK (U.S. Army Forces in Korea) OVERLORD (Code name for Normandy Invasion operation) USAFFE (United States Army Forces Far East) USAIA (United States Army in Australia) COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command) AFWESPAC (Army Forces Western Pacific) USASOS (United States Army Services of Supply) 21st Army Group FEC (Far East Command) Eighth Army Sixth Army Alamo Force Alamo Scouts Unified Command Army Component UNC (United Nations Command)						

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