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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MANCHURIA: THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE, 1931-1940

Chong-Sik Lee

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Chong-Sik Lee

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PREFACE

This Memorandum is one of a series of research studies on problems of counterinsurgency, undertaken by RAND for the Advanced Research Projects Agency. It stems from a decision to examine Japan's official reports and documents on its successful counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria in the nineteen-thirties where it was apparent that the problems faced by Japanese planners presented certain similarities to those encountered in other counterinsurgencies.

The bulk of this Memorandum consists of translations of Japanese official documents. Part 2 is the translation of a report on collective hamlets published by the Manchukuo Ministry of Defense Advisory Department, an organizational element headed by a Japanese Major General and charged with the ultimate responsibility for the internal security of Manchuria. Prepared by the highest agency concerned, it presents a comprehensive picture of operations and a comparison of experiences in different regions. Part 3 contains translations of eight official documents on selected aspects of Japanese operations, particularly reports on pacification, propaganda, and Communist organization.

Documents included in this Memorandum were consulted at the Harvard-Yenching Library of Harvard University, the Hoover Institution of War and Peace, and the Library of Congress. The translation in Parts 2 and 3 follows the text of the documents as closely as possible, without being so literal as to obscure the meaning. Where the original text was impossible to interpret, it has been

translated word by word. Wherever inaccurate tabular statistics were found in the original, they have been corrected.

To enhance the utility of these translated documents, they have been preceded and supplemented by the account in Part 1, placing them in historical perspective, showing the relevance of the reports to courses of action taken by Japanese administrators, and analyzing the problems faced, the lessons learned, and the degree of success attained. Surprisingly candid, these reports from Japanese officials in the field contain criticisms of operations and tactics that enabled higher officials to recommend and adopt measures better suited to specific situations.

As indicated, the documents themselves are selected from materials meticulously collected, analyzed, and circulated by Japanese security agencies as a result of their activities in Manchuria. Today, Japanese archives may contain more information about the Communist movement in Manchuria than any other collection in the world. The particular documents chosen herein for translation and commentary were selected both for their representativeness and for their relevance to the study of counterinsurgency.

The author, Chong-Sik Lee, was born in Korea and raised in Manchuria, China, and Korea. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley, and is now Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. Representative documents, relevant to the study of counterinsurgency, were selected for translation and commentary.

SUMMARY

When the Japanese Kwantung Army concocted the Manchurian "incident" in September 1931, the young officers intended to develop Manchuria into a Japanese colony. Having established the Manchukuo regime in 1932, the Japanese began to remold the economic and political structure of Manchuria. One of the most immediate tasks confronting the Japanese was to eliminate the active resistance of organized patriotic groups and to pacify the hostile population.

The initial stage of the "mopping-up operations" progressed smoothly, without requiring special techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. During the second stage of operations, beginning in late 1934, counterinsurgency tactics were used. These were necessitated by the rise of Communist influence in the anti-Japanese movement. The tactics used were (1) paramilitary "special operations," (2) direct efforts to separate the insurgents from the masses, (3) "purification" and administrative reform of towns and villages, (4) reconstruction and rejuvenation of towns and villages, and (5) propaganda and pacification.

In essence, the "special operations" consisted of the use of local civilians and surrendered insurgents for gathering intelligence, eliminating guerrillas, and performing counterintelligence functions. Some of these operations produced considerable results. The Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui (Cooperation and Assistance Society) was the most successful example.

The Hsueh-chu-hui was organized by the Japanese gendarmerie in September 1934. Because most of the population and also most of the guerrillas in the Chientao region were

Koreans, the Hsueh-chu-hui was largely made up of Koreans. Patterning its organization and operational methods after those of the Chinese Communist Party, the group succeeded in inducing a "witch hunt" among the guerrillas -- an action, however, that was effective only because many guerrillas had lost their will to fight and the local population was neutralized.

In order to break up the close relationship between the general population and the guerrillas, the Japanese constructed collective hamlets (also known as defense hamlets). This program, begun in 1933, was accelerated in December 1934; by 1937, there were more than 10,000 collective hamlets, accommodating 5,500,000 persons. The hamlets, on the whole, served the purpose of isolating the guerrillas, but there were many problems in executing the program. One of the most serious was that concentration in the hamlets caused much distress and often drove the masses closer to the guerrillas morally and spiritually. Greater care than the Japanese exercised would have been necessary to implement the program without doing serious harm to the population.

The Japanese took measures to prevent the outflow of grain and foodstuffs to the guerrilla zones. These measures, along with the collective hamlets, brought about acute shortages of supplies among the guerrillas.

In order to "purify" the towns and villages and to bring about administrative reform, the Japanese took the following steps: registration of the residents, issuance of residence certificates, regular and unscheduled checks and searches of residents and travelers, organization of the paochia and the self-defense corps systems, and

confiscation of unauthorized weapons. These regulative and antiguerrilla measures also laid the basis for the establishment of a normal administrative system, which in turn made possible the control of the population.

To bring about administrative reforms, the Japanese made attempts to select, train, and indoctrinate young men. They strove to eliminate some of the inequities existing at the local level, but they found that traditional antigovernment and anti-Japanese attitudes hampered their efforts

Reconstruction and rejuvenation of towns and villages was begun in the late 1930's, but only on a small scale and without enough improvement in the living conditions of the farmers to make the counterinsurgency operations effective.

The Japanese stressed propaganda and pacification, but because of various handicaps obtained unsatisfactory results. Some Japanese officials recommended various improvements in propaganda operations.

A large-scale insurgent movement cannot succeed without the active support of the population, and this support cannot be obtained without a common cause and some prospect of success in the insurgency. When the prospect of success was dimmed by the counterinsurgency operations, the guerrillas lost the people's active support. This kind of support is highly desirable but not essential for counterinsurgency. If the masses in the area of insurgency are effectively neutralized by either words or deeds, the insurgents can be defeated. But the measures employed by the Japanese army to combat the guerrillas further alienated the masses. More effective

cooperation between military and civilian officials could have reduced the harm done to civilians. To neutralize the masses effectively, intensive and prolonged socio-economic improvements would have been necessary. The Japanese recognized this fact at a later stage and adopted the classical Chinese term ch'ih'pen ("the rule of the roots") to characterize socioeconomic programs, as distinct from ch'ih-piao ("the rule of branches and leaves"), which designated the military and paramilitary operations.

The Japanese enjoyed some advantages in counterinsurgency operations. The guerrillas were without an active sanctuary, and the severe, long winters worked against them. In addition, the Japanese had an intimate knowledge of Manchuria and operated an efficient intelligence system. Reports and analyses that appeared during this period were remarkably candid. These unadorned and perceptive analyses of the immediate problems to be faced enabled the officials to recommend and adopt measures suited to each situation. The Japanese also displayed their will and determination to fight, and this not only affected the morale of the guerrillas but enabled the Japanese to mobilize sizable numbers of active collaborators.

The Japanese succeeded in their counterinsurgency operations in spite of strong anti-Japanese sentiment among the population. The Japanese compensated for the suppression of nationalism by establishing an orderly and efficient government. Since past regimes often had been disorderly and decadent, the contrast presented by the new government was impressive. While international and national issues meant very little to the farmers in

the hinterland, the actions and attitudes of local officials often meant the difference between life and death. It was probably the striking contrast between the old and the new officials that persuaded the farmers to return to their habit of docile obedience. Ultimately, the outcome of a war against insurgency depends on the farmer in the rural areas.

AUTHOR'S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Since 1962, when I first became interested in the subject of counterinsurgency while at Dartmouth College, I have received advice and assistance from many individuals. My two colleagues at Dartmouth, Gene M. Lyons and John Donnell (now at Temple University), encouraged me to conduct research on the Japanese experience in Manchuria. At Princeton, Robert and Jean Gilpin spurred my interest further, and the first outline of the project was produced there. I am particularly grateful to Stephen Hosmer, George Tanham, David Mazingo, and Paul Langer, all of The RAND Corporation, for their encouragement and support. I am indebted to Yong Mok Kim of Berkeley for assisting me in translating the document included in Part 2. My editor, Jesse M. Phillips of Menlo Park, California, patiently corrected and improved the translated text. At RAND, I was fortunate to have the assistance of Eleanor T. Harris, who has edited the final copy with a patience matched only by her cheerfulness.

The two maps are taken from Strategic Study of Manchuria: Military Topography and Geography (Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. III), Part 1, prepared by the Military History Section, Hq. Army Forces, Far East, distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955.

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PART 1

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MANCHURIA

PROVINCES OF MANCHUKUO 1932 - 1945

- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY
- - - - BOUNDARY OF KWANTUNG LEASED TERRITORY
- PROVINCIAL CAPITAL



U. S. S. R.



INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 1931, the Japanese Kwantung Army reported a mysterious explosion on the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway near Mukden. Alleging that the incident was caused by the local Chinese forces, the Kwantung Army Command began its "punitive" or "retaliatory" action. In spite of various efforts to localize the so-called "Manchurian incident," the Japanese troops occupied Mukden, Changchun, Yingkou, and Kirin within three days, and went on to occupy the rest of Manchuria.

The central figure in this incident was Lt. Col. Ishihara Kanji, the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, a Japanese contingent stationed in the leased territory in the Kwantung Peninsula and the South Manchurian Railway zone. The army contained many ultranationalist and dissident young officers who were dissatisfied with the government's foreign and domestic policies, which in their view reduced the power and prestige of Japan.

After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan had won two major wars, against China (1894-1895) and against Imperial Russia (1904-1905), and her international position as a leading power in the Far East was assured. But in spite of her rising prestige, Japan faced many problems, both domestic and international. There were periodic crises in domestic economy. A prosperous World War I foreign trade was curtailed in the face of stiffening competition. A succession of party governments strove to reduce military and other expenditures in response to foreign pressures and domestic exigencies. This not only

caused widespread unemployment among the population but also displaced large numbers of military officers. The worldwide depression after 1929 did not help the situation. The ultranationalist elements were particularly angered by what they considered to be the excessively conciliatory attitude of the government toward China and other powers. This deep-seated dissatisfaction was dramatized by the shooting of Premier Hamaguchi Osachi in the Tokyo station in November 1930 by a fanatical patriot.

In bringing about the Manchurian "incident" the core group around Colonel Ishihara set themselves two distinct objectives. The first of these was to present the government in Tokyo with a fait accompli and to reverse what they considered the conciliatory diplomacy of Foreign Minister Shidehara. The young officers desired to bring about Showa Ishin, or the "renovation" of the Showa era (comparable in significance with the Meiji Ishin), which in their view consisted of turning passive and submissive foreign policies into positive and aggressive policies. In the opinion of the young officers in Manchuria, Japan was at the crossroads, with the choice of either going down in history as a minor nation or becoming great and dominant. The ultranationalistic officers looked on the conquest of Manchuria as the first step to national greatness.

The second objective of the young officers was closely related to the first. Already, in the late 1920's, Colonel Ishihara had been speaking of a great world war. In his view, the First World War was not in actuality a world war; it was a war among the Western nations, and if the

Asian countries played any role, it was only a peripheral one. The true world war, which would be the last war of human civilization, would be fought with airplanes and would bring about total destruction. This war would be fought when Japan occupied the central position in Asia and the United States the central position in the West, and when airplanes would be able to circle the globe without landing for fuel. Since this war was inevitable, it was imperative that Japan prepare for the event. The occupation of Manchuria--and Mongolia along with it--was the first step in this preparation. Manchuria and Inner Mongolia had to be taken over and developed rationally. Of course, the development of Manchuria and Mongolia would also restore the prosperity of Japan and relieve her problem of unemployment.¹

These objectives required Japan to take over Manchuria permanently and to concentrate on its development as a colony. At first Ishihara advocated the direct extension of Japanese power under a government-general of Manchuria and Mongolia, but he later yielded to others who preferred to establish an independent state in Manchuria. Publicly, the state would be established by the Chinese, but the actual control would be in the hands of the Japanese. On March 1, 1932, the government of Manchukuo was proclaimed, and the Japanese development of the area began.

¹Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiyo senso e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War), Vol. I, pp. 359-374. The section on "The Eve of the Manchurian Incident, 1927-31" was written by Seki Hiroharu.

One can easily imagine the enormity of the problems involved in remolding not only the economy but the total political structure of a territory as large as Manchuria. Two of the most immediate tasks confronting the conquerors and the new regime were the elimination of active resistance by organized armed groups and the pacification of the hostile population. Our concern in this section is to analyze the ways and means employed by the Japanese for dealing with these tasks.

I. THE ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT IN MANCHURIA

Although the Kwantung Army succeeded in establishing the puppet regime, it was confronted with the determined resistance of a large number of Chinese groups. It should be noted that the Manchurian incident was staged at the height of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese populace. The dispatch of Japanese troops to the Shantung peninsula in 1928 and the subsequent attack on Chinese troops in Tsinan (May 1928) had precipitated an intense boycott of Japanese goods during 1928 and 1929. The boycott was resumed in 1931 after serious anti-Chinese riots took place in Korea in July of that year in the aftermath of the so-called Wanpaoshan incident. The riots inflamed the Chinese populace against the Japanese because the Chinese regarded the increasing number of Korean immigrants into Manchuria as agents of Japanese aggression and suspected the riots in Korea to have had Japanese encouragement. The occupation of Manchuria after September 1931 and the Japanese attack on Shanghai in January 1932, of course, added more fuel to the fires of Chinese hatred against Japan.

Anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria was as strong as in China proper, if not more so.¹ Chan Hsueh-liang,

¹See "Documents Relating to Anti-Japanese Feeling and Boycotts in Manchuria: Reports from [Japanese] Diplomatic Establishments [in that area], May 1928-July 1931," in Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, microfilmed for the Library of Congress, Reel S470, and "Documents Relating to the Protection, Evacuation, and Escape of Japanese Residents, and to Injuries

1. "Young Marshal" who had been appointed deputy commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the Republic of China in October 1930, was not willing to yield his territory gracefully to the Japanese. He established his advance headquarters in Chinchou and directed the anti-Japanese campaign in Manchuria. The total strength of Chang's Northern Army in 1931 was estimated at 268,000 men;² about 115,000 of these, however, were in northern China, to consolidate Chang's position there.³ Although some of the local commanders decided to cooperate with the Japanese and join the puppet regime of Manchukuo, many of them defied the Japanese and chose to resist them with arms. As a result of the enlistment of local Chinese, the anti-Japanese forces grew in number during the first few years of resistance. Aside from political considerations, socioeconomic conditions were favorable for the Chinese patriots. The worldwide depression had gravely affected Manchurian agriculture, and, further, the confusion created by the movement of the Japanese and Chinese troops made farming impossible in many regions. These factors led many farmers to abandon their fields and join bandit or patriot forces. Chang Hsueh-liang also enlisted the support of various secret societies, such as the Ta-tao-hui (Big Sword Society) and the Hung-ch'iang-hui (Red Spear Society).

Thus, as of September 1932, even after considerable losses of men from massive Japanese assaults in the spring

Suffered by Them (Sections on Manchuria)," Reels S473-476. The archives materials are hereafter cited as AJMFA.

²Taiheiyo senso e no michi, Vol. II, p. 388.

³Ibid, p. 85.

and summer of that year, the anti-Japanese forces in Manchuria were estimated by the Kwantung Army at 210,000 men.⁴ Between March 1932 and the end of 1933 the Japanese reported that they had engaged in battle with a total of 336,500 of enemy "insurgent" troops.⁵ This period has been referred to as the first period of security operations (see the police headquarters report, Sec. I, Part 3). Near the end of these operations, between July and August 1933, the strength of the anti-Japanese forces was estimated at 70,000.⁶

The rapid decline in the numerical strength of the anti-Japanese forces clearly indicates that the initial operations of the Japanese army were highly successful. This, of course, was to be expected. Although in the initial months the civilian and military leaders in Tokyo were reluctant to support the aggressive and adventuristic

⁴Ibid., p. 187. According to another source, the total number of the "bandits" or "insurgents" (including nonpolitical bandits) reached 360,000 at its peak. Gunseibu, Gunji Chosabu (Military Investigation Section, Department of Defense, Manchukuo), Manshu kyosanhi no kenkyu (Study of Communist Insurgents in Manchuria), n.p., 1937, p. 18. This top-secret document of the Manchukuo defense department, running to more than 1000 pages, presents one of the most exhaustive treatments of the Communist movement in Manchuria.

⁵See Study of Communist Insurgents in Manchuria, pp. 18-19.

⁶Ibid., p. 18. See also Gunseibu Komon-bu (Department of Advisors, Department of Defense, Manchukuo), Zen Man hizoku jousei handan (Estimation of the Condition of the Bandits in All Manchuria), n.p., April 1933. This document is available in Archives of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Other Agencies, microfilmed for the Library of Congress, Reel 107, frames 17088-17108.


policies of the Kwantung Army, the new Inukai cabinet that took office in December 1931 fully supported the extension of control in Manchuria. In addition to the regular forces of the Kwantung Army, the Japanese forces in Manchuria were reinforced by three army divisions, two cavalry brigades, a mixed army brigade, and three air battalions.

The Chinese, on the other hand, were fighting a "limited" local war. China was nominally unified in 1928, but unity was far from being a reality. The Kuomintang was weakened by divisions between Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking and Wang Ching-wei in Canton. Relations between Chang Hsueh-liang in Peking and Chiang Kai-shek were by no means smooth. The Kuomintang also had to contend with the Chinese Communist Party in southwestern China. These conditions prevented the Chinese Nationalist government from taking positive measures to counter the Japanese encroachment in Manchuria and forced it to leave anti-Japanese operations to local forces. In fact Chiang Kai-shek's inability to meet the popular demand for an open war against Japan led to his strategic resignation from the leadership of the Nationalist government from December 15, 1931, to January 28, 1932.

II. PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

By December 1934, when the Kwantung Army began to implement special techniques for counter guerrilla operations, the war in Manchuria had been in progress for more than three years. Numerous Chinese and Korean fighters had become victims of the Japanese army, and only fractions of the originally active anti-Japanese elements were still in arms. But those who remained had been toughened by their experience and were capable of offering stiff resistance. Their knowledge of geography, evading tactics, and other means of survival--the very skills that would frustrate the counter guerrilla forces--could not help but improve. And as their numbers declined, they resorted to guerrilla tactics to avoid frontal confrontation with the enemy. Consequently, the large Japanese army groups that had so effectively reduced the anti-Japanese elements during the previous three years were now often thwarted in their efforts.

During these years, the terrain of operation also changed. In the initial stage of the war, major battles had been fought in the vast plains of Manchuria that were highly favorable for conventional armies, but, as their numbers diminished, the guerrilla forces took to the hills. Because the mountains and forests of southeastern Manchuria lacked highway and railroad facilities, large armies were immobilized. Itagaki Teiji, the Japanese officer in charge of the Hangjen Prefecture in the hinterlands, depicted his territory as an area where "the daylight cannot be seen all day because it is always covered by shadows" and "only



gloom pervades." In this situation, the insurgent groups "were like independent regimes."¹ Yang Ching-yü, the commander of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army, "behaved as though he were the king of the forests and mountains in the Chi-an Prefecture."² (See the accompanying map of forest areas in southeast Manchuria.)

Accompanying the change in environment was the inroad of Communism among the guerrillas. The Chinese Communist Party had begun to operate in Manchuria as early as 1925, but up to 1934 it had not been able to build a mass following. In February 1934, the Central Committee of the party issued specific instructions to infiltrate the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Manchuria, and alliances were formed with these groups. The party's influence increased very rapidly, and the Communists took over the leadership of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army, which eventually encompassed the entire guerrilla movement in Manchuria.

Following these developments, a report of the Military Advisory Section of Manchukuo argued the need to change counterinsurgency tactics:

The total number of insurgents in all of Manchuria immediately before the launching of the autumn subjugation operation last year (1936) is said to have been 22,000. In comparison with previous years there has, of course, been a decline in number.

¹See "Pacification Activities in the Communist Bandit Area," reproduced in this volume (Part 3, Sec. XIV, pp. 217 ff.

²See "Public Security, Police, and Propaganda," reproduced in this volume (Part 3, Sec. XIII, pp. 189 ff.

The tempo of decrease, however, has been extremely slow during the last few years. This is not because the grip on the subjugation operation has been loosened. In spite of enormous human and material sacrifices, the subjugation operations have not produced anticipated results, and even though security conditions have improved in certain areas for [short] periods, it has not been possible to maintain this condition permanently. For instance, insurgents have almost completely disappeared from Fengtien and Chientao provinces and a part of Pinchiang province since early 1936, and these provinces are moving steadily toward restoration of peace and order; but, in contrast, the number of insurgents has increased and security conditions have deteriorated in Antung and Sanchiang provinces and in the eastern and northern parts of Pinchiang province. It is also a nearly universal phenomenon in Manchuria that the insurgent groups return to their original state of operation as soon as the subjugation period is terminated and troops are withdrawn. In short, counterinsurgency operations dependent on traditional methods seem to have reached their limit.³

In late 1934, the Kwantung Army began to implement its "special techniques" in what were known as "security operations," that is, counterinsurgency operations. The operations can be divided into five categories: (1)

³ Manshukoku, Gunji Komon-bu (Military Advisory Section, Manchukuo), "Examination of the Domestic Security Problem," Ch. 1 of Kokunai chian taisaku no kenkyu (Study of Domestic Security Measures), n.p., 1937, p. 1. This work, which is Vol. II of Manshu kyosanhi no kenkyu (Study of Communist Insurgents in Manchuria), op. cit., is one of the most important sources on countermeasures employed against the Communist movement in Manchuria.

paramilitary "special operations," (2) direct efforts for the separation of the insurgents from the masses, (3) "purification" and administrative reform of towns and villages, (4) reconstruction and rejuvenation of towns and villages, and (5) propaganda and pacification. We shall briefly examine these operations and evaluate their effectiveness as counter guerrilla techniques. In essence, the special operations refer to the use of local civilian personnel for gathering intelligence information, eliminating guerrillas, and performing counterintelligence tasks. Although these operations were not always successful, some of the accomplishments of this civilian group were impressive. For example, the special operations carried out by the Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui (Chientao Cooperation and Assistance Society) produced the following results during the twenty months between September 6, 1934, and June 30, 1936:⁴

Persons induced to surrender.....	2,255
Persons apprehended.....	3,207
Communist cells discovered.....	287
Weapons confiscated.....	237
Rounds of ammunition confiscated.....	4,506
Hand grenades confiscated.....	8

Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui

The Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui⁵ was organized on September 6, 1934, by the head of the Japanese gendarmerie

⁴"Special Operations," Ch. 4 of Study of Domestic Security Measures, op. cit., p. 155. Unless otherwise indicated, information on the special operations is based on this chapter, pp. 149-200.

⁵Not to be confused with the Hsueh-ho-hui, which

in Yenchi and was placed under the leadership of a Korean, Kim Tong-han. The majority of the population in Chientao Province, like most of the Communist guerrillas were Koreans, and the Hsueh-chu-hui (Hyop-cho-hoe in Korean) was strictly a Korean body. The principles of action enunciated by the society read as follows:

1. Propagate and nurture the idea of the unity of Japan and Manchukuo.
2. Induce the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the anti-Japanese and anti Manchukuo armies.
3. Plant righteous [anti-Communist] cells in the camp of the CCP and the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo armies.
4. Plant righteous cells among the general masses.
5. Uncover the underground activities of the CCP and the anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo armies.
6. Use loyal Koreans to destroy recalcitrant Koreans and strive for the cooperation of Japan and Manchukuo.⁶

was organized throughout Manchuria by the Japanese to win over the Chinese (see p. 21).

⁶Ibid., p. 165.

In short, the purpose of the society was to exterminate Communists.

The organizational and operational principles of the society were very closely patterned after those of the Communist Party. For instance, "white" (anti-Communist) cells of about five members each were organized at the lowest level, these being supervised by district offices, branch offices, and the headquarters. According to the society's records, the function of the cell (han in Japanese, pan in Korean and Chinese) was to uncover and prevent the infiltration of underground Communist insurgents and other undesirable elements. Whenever an abnormal situation developed within the jurisdiction of the cell--that is, whenever Communist activities were discovered within its jurisdiction--a report was made to the superior organizations and the cell would conduct a self-examination of its actions to consolidate and purify itself. The cell would also exercise surveillance over its members (many members had previous records of insurgency), and in the event any member established illicit connections with the Communists or rejoined the insurgents, the entire cell was held responsible.⁷

The Hsueh-chu-hui also followed the pattern of the Communists in its procedure for admission. Each new member had to be endorsed by two guarantors and had to swear to obey the orders of the society leadership and

⁷ Ibid. p. 166, quoted from Kyojokai gaikan (Survey of the Hsueh-chu-hui), (place and date of publication not known).

strive to destroy the Communists. The society also maintained an intricate network of intelligence communications. Each member was required to report the happenings in his village or area to the head of his cell, who in turn submitted weekly reports on the ideological tendencies of the membership and the general public to the head of an intermediate group. These reports were channeled through the hierarchy to the headquarters. As of May 1936, the society had 792 cells, 139 intermediate groups, and a total of 8,195 members.⁸

In addition to intelligence gathering, the Hsueh-chu-hui engaged in active counterinsurgency operations. For example, the society carried out a "hinterland operation" between May and July 1936 in the Ching-pai Lake region by organizing cadres from various branches and districts in an armed (pistol) unit. The objectives, specific assignments, and methods of operation were as follows:

Objectives:

1. Destroy or apprehend Communist and other "political" insurgents.
2. Guide the thoughts of the general masses.

Specific Assignments:

1. Investigate the bases and major figures of the CCP's Manchurian Province Committee and Eastern Manchurian Special Committee.

⁸"Special Operations," pp. 165-167.

2. Investigate the functional relationship between the local Communists and the central politburo in North China and the Red Army in Shansi.
3. Investigate the connections between the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Army and the Soviet Union.
4. Investigate the bases and organizational system of the Fifth Army [of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army] in northern Manchuria.
5. Destroy the Communist cells among the masses and separate the people from the CCP.
6. Establish the cells of Hsueh-chu-hui among the masses.
7. Maintain a strict surveillance of the activities and thoughts of surrendered insurgents and of Communist Party members in exile from Korea.
8. Search for and arrest military spies from the Soviet Union.
9. Infiltrate the Eastern Manchurian Special Committee with false Communist Party members

to investigate the internal conditions firsthand and to arrest or assassinate major officers.

10. Apprehend or assassinate Wang Te-t'ai, Fang Chen-sheng, Wu I-ch'eng, etc. [heads of the various armies].
11. Execute estrangement operations between the Communist and non-Communist groups to set them against each other.

Methods of Operation:

1. Maintain close liaison with the Japanese and Manchukuo military authorities in the assigned area and strive to assist their operations.
2. Disguise as bandits or Communist insurgents as situations demand in order to sow dissension among these people, destroy them, or apprehend them.
3. Thoroughly destroy insurgents' food units, agents, and small contingents.
4. Strive to alienate the insurgent leaders from their subordinates by sending letters or spreading rumors.

5. Strive to induce the ideological conversion of the insurgents and pacify the masses through the use of leaflets and posters.
6. Report all actions to the headquarters as soon as possible.

Thus, the society's activities ranged from intelligence gathering to actual raids on Communist headquarters, and included providing intermediaries for negotiations on surrender between insurgents and the gendarmerie, creating alienation within and among guerrilla groups and alienation of leadership from the rank and file, and carrying on propaganda and detective operations. One of the notable figures who surrendered to the society was An Pong-hak, the commander of the First Division of the Second Army of the Anti-Japanese Allied Army.⁹

The accomplishments of the Hsueh-chu-hui were far greater than is indicated by the mere number of those who surrendered and those who were apprehended. The society's infiltration into Communist groups and other maneuvers led the Communists to believe that many among themselves were involved with enemy agents, with the result that the entire Communist camp in eastern Manchuria was beset by suspicion and witch hunts. There is some evidence that the members of the Min-shêng-t'uan (People's Livelihood Corps--Mingsaengdan in Korean, Minseidan in Japanese), a Japanese-sponsored organization that existed between

⁹Ibid., p. 153.

November 1931 and July 1932, also took part in the infiltration activities.¹⁰ The purges and the general havoc that lasted among the Communists until 1936 have been known as the Min-shêng-t'uan incident. To organize and accelerate the sporadic witch hunting, a purge committee was created within the Communist Eastern Manchurian Special Committee.¹¹ In August 1934, the Manchurian Province Committee, for its part, ordered a "merciless purge and elimination of all antirevolutionary elements."¹²

The so-called Min-shêng-t'uan incident had a far-reaching impact on the future of the Communist movement in eastern Manchuria and on the counter guerrilla operations. Suspicion and confusion among the Communists was so prevalent that when Wang Tê-han, the new secretary of the Eastern Manchurian Special Committee, took office in January 1935, he decided to eliminate most of the Koreans from the predominantly Korean branch of the party. Wang's policy of arresting, confining, or murdering Korean Communist leaders led to a mass desertion of members at various levels, drastically reducing the party's strength. Wang was therefore forced to eliminate several prefectural committees and reorganize the movement.¹³ The majority

¹⁰On the establishment and dissolution of Min-shêng-t'uan, see the report of the Japanese Consul General in Chientao to the Chief of the Asia Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1931, in AJMFA, Reel SP 103, Document Number SP205-5, pp. 7193-7202, and the report of the Asia Bureau, January 1932, in *ibid.*, pp. 7648-7649.

¹¹For details, see Study of Communist Insurgents in Manchuria, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 116

of the Korean Communists, including Chu Chin, the commander of the First Division of the Second Army, and Yi Sang-muk, the head of the organizational department of the Eastern Manchurian Special Committee, deserted the movement to avoid torture and execution by their comrades.¹⁴ The success of the Hsueh-chu-hui's activities was thus due in part to excesses within the Communist groups.

Special Operations in Panshih and Tungpientao

The Japanese applied techniques similar to those of the Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui elsewhere, but on a much smaller scale. In Panshih Prefecture, west of Chientao, they organized the Hsueh-ho-hui [Cooperation and Harmony Society], a semiofficial organization created to enlist mass support for Manchukuo. The Panshih office of the society selected and trained "vanguard elements," who were assigned to operations to induce the insurgents to surrender, to disturb the inner structure of guerrilla groups, to kill guerrillas, and to collect intelligence. The activities of the Panshih group resulted in a total of 120 items of information and the surrender of approximately 270 persons between September and December 1935, which in effect reduced the insurgents in Panshih to zero.

¹⁴For a North Korean Communist account of the Min-sheng-t'uan incident, see Yim Ch'un-ch'u, Hang-Il mujang t'ujaeng shigiril hoesang hayo (Reflections on the Period of Anti-Japanese Armed Struggles), Korean Workers' Party Press, Pyongyang, 1960, pp. 91-107. The Korean Communists of today blame the incident on "left-deviationists."

In Tungpientao,¹⁵ on the other hand, a Special Operation Section was created in the Hsueh-ho-hui branch, with thirty select members from the Chientao Hsueh-chu-hui. Within three months, between August and November 1936, the special section induced the surrender of 136 insurgents, though only eleven of these were from Communist groups.

Lessons from the Special Operations

Because our knowledge of the special operations is very limited, it is impossible for us to draw conclusions that would apply universally to the situation throughout Manchuria. It is obvious from the cases described above, however, that the approach used by the Japanese in these three areas had certain advantages. Local civilian personnel, particularly those who had experience in guerrilla activities, were bound to be more familiar than the regular troops with the terrain and other intricate factors that make guerrilla operations successful. Small groups also had the advantage of mobility and inconspicuousness. Their disguise as farmers or as antigovernment guerrillas no doubt helped their operations.

These special operations, however, could only be effective when the guerrillas had been weakened by the massive assault of the regular troops, and when many had lost the will to continue the arduous life of a guerrilla

¹⁵Tungpientao (Eastern Border District) denotes the hinterland area in southeastern Manchuria including Hangjen, Chian, Kuantien, Tunghwa, Linchiang, and Ch'angpai prefectures.

fighting against superior forces. In Tungpientao, the fact that only 11 of the 136 who surrendered were from Communist groups indicates that the Communists were still powerful in this region and had not responded to the lures of the Special Operation Section.

The Military Advisory Section of the Manchukuo regime, which was staffed with Kwantung Army personnel, attributed the successes in Chientao to the improving condition of the Korean community. Actually, the economic condition of the Koreans had not improved, but the advent of the Japanese in Manchuria had bettered their position vis-a-vis the Chinese. The Korean masses were now at least free of oppression by the Chinese authorities, and many of them could foresee the possibility of owning land and escaping from the control of their Chinese landlords. These advantages, both real and potential, were sufficient to neutralize many of the Koreans who were formerly intensely anti-Japanese and motivated others to work for the Japanese. Without such sociopolitical and accompanying psychological changes in the population, the special operations could not have succeeded.

The above hypothesis is also substantiated by the behavior of those who surrendered. Whereas 42.1 per cent of the surrendered (or 1,497 out of 3,541) in the Pinchiang Province between 1932 and 1934 later returned to insurgent activities, almost none in Chientao did so.¹⁶ Since the

¹⁶In southern Manchuria, the surrender of Communists was not recognized after 1934; in the north, surrender was permitted only in certain cases; and in the east, surrender was encouraged. On the policies and results of surrender inducement, see "Special Operations," pp. 179-200.

treatment accorded to the surrendered and the system of surveillance in Chientao were more favorable than in other areas, the general atmosphere in each region is likely to have played the deciding role.

III. SEPARATION OF INSURGENTS FROM THE MASSES

The major problem encountered by the Japanese army in subjugating the guerrilla groups, particularly the Communist guerrillas, after 1933 was the existence of a close relationship between the general population and the guerrillas. As the several reports reproduced in Parts 2 and 3 of this study indicate, the Communist groups cultivated the support of the masses wherever they were. Through propaganda and example, the guerrillas awakened the patriotism of the people and convinced them that the guerrillas were the only true defenders of their interests. When necessary, the guerrillas terrorized the reluctant elements as a warning to others. An intricate network of anti-Japanese societies, peasant societies, and the like provided the guerrillas both with necessary supplies and with vital intelligence. Farmers were located in regions too remote to be protected by the Manchukuo authorities and the Japanese were forced to comply with the guerrillas' demands, even if they had no desire to assist the insurgent cause.

Collective Hamlets

To counteract this situation--the defenselessness of remote farmsteads--the so-called collective hamlets were established. (Some reports refer to these as defense hamlets.¹) The concept of the collective hamlet was not

¹For details on collective hamlets, see Part 2 of this study.

totally new in Manchuria when the Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo forces began to use it as an instrument of counter guerrilla warfare. According to one report, as early as 1926 the residents of Kan-an Prefecture, in Kirin Province, congregated in a central location to protect themselves against bandits.² Since banditry had long been rampant in Manchuria and government protection was not always reliable, it is possible that other communities preceded the people of Kan-an in the use of the concept. Under the Japanese occupation, however, the eight hamlets established in Chientao in 1933 as a relief measure for Korean refugees, comprised the first government-sponsored experiment. These hamlets were sponsored jointly by the Korean Government-General (the Japanese colonial government agency in Korea) and the Japanese Consulate General in Chientao and evidently proved successful. In December 1934, the Kwantung Army began to organize collective hamlets. According to the report of the Police Affairs Headquarters, there were 10,629 hamlets at the end of 1937, accommodating 5,500,000 people. An additional 2,550 hamlets were planned for 1938.

The several various reports reproduced in Part 3 indicate that the Japanese army was ruthless in instituting the collective hamlet program. Families were ordered to move from their farm homes with little or no notice, even if the collective hamlets were not ready. Some farmers were forced to move just before the sowing season, making

² See the report of the Police Affairs Headquarters reproduced in this volume (Part 3, Sec. XVI, pp. 259 ff.).

it impossible for them to plant any seeds that year, while others were ordered to move just before harvest. Many farmhouses seem to have been destroyed by troops engaged in mop-up operations before preparations had been made for the farmers' relocation. The only concern of the military was to cut off the guerrillas' sources of food supply and their contacts with the farmers. It may be assumed that, had the Japanese troops been dealing with their own people, they would not have done so thorough and merciless a job as they did in Manchuria.

On the whole, the collective hamlets did serve the purpose of isolating the guerrillas from the masses, and the construction of the hamlets became an essential part of the security operation. Many improvements and corrective measures, however, were required over the years for the hamlets to function effectively. The Police Department of Kirin Province reported as late as 1938: "The Communist insurgents who have infiltrated into the mountain-forest region ... of Huatien Prefecture have been assaulting the weakly protected collective hamlets and have been plundering food and grain."³ As of 1938, the thirty-one hamlets in Huatien Prefecture had only 464 police officers and 239 self-defense corps members (an average of 15 and 8 per hamlet); these forces were obviously not sufficient to counter Communist assaults.⁴ The Huatien prefectural government found it necessary to borrow police personnel from other areas to augment the defense of the hamlets.

³ See Part 3, Sec. XV, pp. 243 ff. of this volume.

⁴ See Part 3, Sec. XV, pp. 243 ff. of this volume.

It is also obvious that no one hamlet could resist the assaults of a large guerrilla group. On the other hand, to assign a sizable police or military contingent to each hamlet would have been too costly. Therefore, it was necessary to station military and police contingents in a central location, ready to be dispatched on call to the various hamlets. Vice-Governor Itagaki Teiji's diary for June 1938 illustrates this situation.⁵

The system of dispatching military and police contingents from central locations, together with the system of joint defense whereby a group of hamlets assisted each other in time of emergency, was feasible only if there were adequate communication and transportation facilities to provide mobility for the relief contingents. Because the guerrillas were operating in the hinterlands and the hamlets were located in remote areas where a highway system did not exist, it was incumbent on the Japanese authorities to install telephone lines and build highways. (Helicopters, of course, were not available in Manchuria in the 1930's.) Note, for example the statement of the Police Department of Kirin Province:

This [Huatien] prefecture is highly mountainous and contains many rivers and streams. Construction of security highways would cost great sums of money. Because of this, the prefectural government has not been able to construct any security highway worthy of the name. This is one of the reasons why the insurgents have been able to continue their existence and activities. Hereafter, the provincial and

⁵ See Part 3, Sec. XIII, of this volume.

prefectura⁷ governments shall make every sacrifice to construct the highways in order that the⁶ insurgents may be completely annihilated.

The experience in Manchuria reveals that the system of collective hamlets (or defense hamlets) can become an effective military instrument against guerrillas if (one should perhaps say only if) sufficient military forces are employed against the guerrillas in the surrounding areas to minimize their attacks against the hamlets, sufficient defensive forces are provided in each hamlet, and adequate military support is provided to each hamlet in an emergency. As one of the local Chinese in Pinchiang Province told the government officials, "It is absurd to attempt to construct collective hamlets rather than annihilate these Communist bandits."⁷ Even from a purely military point of view, collective hamlets could not become a substitute for active military operations.

Socioeconomic Impact of the Collective Hamlet

The Japanese experience with collective hamlets in Manchuria also makes it abundantly clear that forced migration to collective hamlets may have disastrous effects on most of the farmers involved, unless careful preparations have been made in advance. A few examples will give a glimpse of the sufferings of the Manchurian

⁶See Part 3, Sec. IV, p. , of this volume. References to highway construction, installation of telephone lines, and telegraphic facilities are numerous.

⁷See "Collective Hamlets," Ch. 2 of Study of Domestic Security Measures, reproduced in this volume (Part 2, Sec. IX).

farmers:

Tunghwa Prefecture

Because the people have been taken to construct collective hamlets or to repair security highways [during the harvest season], crops still lie unharvested under ice and snow.

The scattered residents of the mountains have been congregated in the collective hamlets, while many of their crops lie unharvested in the fields. Although the people wish to harvest their crops, it is now the season of the mop-up operation, and without a certificate of residence or an entry permit to uninhabited areas they cannot harvest their crops.

There are about 12 hamlets in the recent operation area [of the Pacification and Supervisory Team], comprising some 3,000 families and 20,000 persons. Of these, 380 families with 2,200 persons are lacking food at present. Others will manage until about May, but May and June are the sowing season. They can somehow struggle through with tree bark, etc., but they cannot till and sow for the food of the following year.

There were 13,000 starving families at the end of 1936, and most of the residents in Tunghwa Prefecture are expected to be in the same situation by the spring sowing season.

Many of the collective hamlets in Tunghwa Prefecture still have not completed their enclosing walls, and the construction of the houses is totally inadequate. The roofs are of tree bark or straw and the walls are full of holes; these cannot possibly hold out cold, wind, and snow. The residents do not have [adequate] clothing; [their only life-line is] the smouldering fire built in their houses. It is a wonder that there is no sickness among them.

Because the collective hamlet system was started late, there are no houses in Ho-shan-tzu-kou, Tunghwa Prefecture. All the people are living in caves. In Ho-tzu village, some people moved into the village as late as December 15. The several families who share

a house belong to the more fortunate category. Many of them live in the defenses of the hamlets....

In Shih-i-tao-kou, the location of the collective hamlet has been changed several times. The loss suffered by the farmers from destruction and construction of houses is appalling. Also, because of these frequent changes, the houses have not been completed even today. From the inside, one can clearly see white clouds in a blue sky through the roof. In this severe cold, one can imagine the sufferings of these people.⁸

Chian Prefecture

The hardships of the residents have reached the limit of endurance. Except in the town of Chian, it is said that one half of the residents will be short of food by the Chinese New Year (around March). Even at present, half the residents are short of food and lack bedding.... Because the collective hamlets were hurriedly built, epidemics are prevalent. The destitution in the river basin area is the result of inability to cultivate the hinterlands and of the consumption of crops from small areas by a large number of people. Because of the law against transporting it, grain cannot be brought from the hinterlands and other goods cannot come from the Antung area in exchange.... On top of all this, the Manchukuo army has stationed troops in the area in great numbers and has purchased food, aggravating the problem of shortages.⁹

The sudden concentration of great numbers of people in incomplete and inadequate houses

⁸ Excerpts from the report of the Second Pacification and Supervisory Team of the Security Operations Committee, quoted in "Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tunpientao," Ch. 6 of Study of Domestic Security Measures, op. cit.

⁹ Excerpt from the report of the 1st Motion Picture Team, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 287.

in the collective hamlets also caused epidemics. In 1936 there were more than 2,000 typhoid cases in Tunghwa Prefecture and 1,200 in Liuho Prefecture. There were many others in the neighboring area.¹⁰

Although these examples are not the most typical, the situation in the majority of the hamlets could not have been much better, for it was impossible for the residents of the hurriedly organized collective hamlets to have better living conditions than the general population, which was suffering severely from losses by war and starvation and the consequent reduction in crops.

Even the relatively well-planned hamlets showed the damaging effects of the collective hamlets on the farmers' livelihood. Farmed areas were reduced, distances between places of residence and farms were extended, more lands were rented than owned, tenant fees and public imposts were increased, additional compulsory labor was drafted, and the farmers' finances were reduced to a "hell of debts." According to the Japanese officials who studied the problem of the collective hamlets in detail, conflicts and the resulting pauperization of the farmers were universal in all the collective hamlets.¹¹ The problems were particularly serious because, as has been shown, the officials in charge of collectivization had not given sufficient consideration to the seasonal processes of sowing and harvesting and because more and more families were thrust into the already inadequate hamlets as people

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 407-408.

¹¹See "Collective Hamlets," Part 2, Sec. IX, of this volume.

were discovered by the troops in the hinterlands. In their haste to collectivize, local officials created the so-called small villages, which in effect were hamlets without defense facilities. Because these officials recognized the possibility that the small villages would be burred down by the guerrillas, minimal sums of money were allocated for their construction.¹² These villages served no purpose whatever except to worsen the farmers' living conditions and incite their resentment toward the Japanese.

It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the collective hamlets was to isolate the guerrillas from the general population. It is, however, a grave mistake to identify physical isolation with psychological alienation. What literature is available on the collective hamlet program in Manchuria leads one to the conclusion that while the hamlets did separate the guerrillas from the masses; physically, the program in fact drove the masses closer to the guerrillas morally and spiritually. Note, for example, the following statement in a report of the Chientao provincial government in 1939:

Even among the residents of collective hamlets, there are those who are looking for the opportunity to escape. Some of them fully accept the Communist propaganda and plan to stay in the hamlets permanently only because of their belief that their safety may be guaranteed if they provide food and other conveniences to the insurgents. Considerable numbers of residents sympathize with Communism and secretly plan to join the insurgents.

If the situation were left to take its own course, not only would the counterinsurgency operations of the armies and police become

¹²Ibid., p. 46.

more difficult, but many areas of this province would be dominated by insurgents, as in the period just before the founding of Manchukuo.¹³

One of the important sources of strength of the Communist guerrillas in Manchuria was their effective exploitation of the farmers' grievances. In this connection, Vice-Governor Itagaki's statements are worth quoting at length:

The farmers are ignorant, but they are not so ignorant as to be unaware of the destitute condition they have fallen into. The Communists have been appealing to the masses by stressing this fact. The farmers will never follow [the Communists] blindly on the basis of emotional appeals that are detached from actual life, but when the appeals are focused on actual problems concerning their livelihood, unremitting collective revolt may occur.... Construction of collective hamlets, construction of security highways, continued emergence of wastelands, starvation, sudden reduction of the population into half of the former figure, etc., are unsurpassed subjects for Communist agitation among the farmers.

Even though the farmers are not to be moved by theoretical propaganda advocating the construction of a Communist society or the defense of the fatherland of farmers and workers--i.e., the Soviet Union--one cannot guarantee that they will not be moved when the realities of life are pointed out to them. We are not afraid of Communist propaganda; but we are worried because the material for propaganda can be found in the farmers' lives. We are not afraid of the ignition of fire; rather we are afraid of the seeping oil.¹⁴

¹³"Pacification Operations Accompanying the Autumn/Winter Mopping-up Operation," Part 3, Sec. XVIII, p. 307 of this volume.

¹⁴See "Pacification Activities in the Communist Bandit Area (Personal Reflections)," Part 3, Sec. XIV, pp. 217 ff. of this volume. Emphasis added.

In spite of Itagaki's sagacious remarks and in spite of various recommendations of the analysts of the collective hamlet program in Manchuria, the collective hamlet system was used primarily as a military weapon. This is perhaps attributable to the facts that (1) these reports were prepared relatively late in the antiguerrilla operations and (2) the military and civilian personnel engaged in actual operations had little understanding of the nature of the war in which they were involved (the Japanese had little previous experience with guerrilla warfare).

Properly used, the collective hamlet program could have produced significant results not only in physically isolating the guerrillas but in winning the support and sympathy of the masses. As the report on collective hamlets in Part 2 suggests, the opportunity could have been utilized to eradicate some of the social injustices that had prevailed in the agricultural economy of Manchuria. As the first eight collective hamlets in 1933 seem to have developed, the collective hamlet system could have become a series of model farms. Some form of small-scale cooperatives could also have been developed, particularly to encourage subsidiary industries. But these effects would have been possible only if the collective hamlets had been established selectively in suitable localities and after careful preparations. Availability of funds, materials, and trained personnel would have been indispensable prerequisites for success.

Of course, a more deliberate execution of the hamlet program would have delayed the purely military mop-up operations. When, however, we consider the time required

to heal, if ever, the wounds inflicted on the farmers by rashly organized collective hamlets, the delay seems amply justified. It needs to be emphasized again that antiguerrilla warfare against the Communists had both military and political aspects.

IV. "PURIFICATION" AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

After the Kwantung Army succeeded in destroying most of the large groups of insurgent forces and physically separating the guerrillas from the farmers, the remaining major task was to detect and prevent the infiltration of guerrillas into towns and villages and the flow of communications and supplies between the guerrillas and their sympathizers. Because the Japanese were only beginning to establish their power in the Manchurian towns and villages, and the administrative system of Manchukuo was still at a rudimentary level, these problems posed a considerable challenge. The Chinese population in the "disturbed area" could not have been very sympathetic to the Japanese cause, and it was unrealistic to expect much assistance from them.

Security Programs

In the face of these conditions, the Japanese took the following steps: registration of the residents, issuance of resident certificates, regular and unscheduled checks and searches of residents and travelers, organization of the paochia and the self-defense corps systems, and confiscation of unauthorized weapons. These regulative and antiguerrilla measures also laid the basis for the establishment of a normal administrative system, which in turn would make possible control of the population.

Although these measures in themselves did not guarantee the isolation of the guerrillas from the general public, the utility of each program is obvious. Registration of the residents and issuance of certificates, for

instance, made it possible to identify residents and therefore it was more difficult for alien elements to infiltrate the towns and villages. Check posts were established at the entrances of towns and villages, and those without a resident's certificate or travel permit automatically became suspect. Since each family was issued a family register and was required to inform the police of the travel of family members or the presence of overnight guests, the tracking down of suspects was more easily carried on through routine checkups at night. Searches of houses and personal belongings were conducted as a matter of course.

The methods of issuing resident certificates varied from prefecture to prefecture in the early years, but it is likely that requirements were made uniform after 1938. For example, in the prefectures of Liuho, Fusung, Tunghwa, and Huinan, the following residents were required to carry certificates:¹

Liuho: males between the ages of 15 and 65 years
Fusung: males and females above the age of 15 years
Tunghwa: males above the age of 12 years
Huinan: males between the ages of 15 and 65 years

The report of the Military Advisory Department recommended, however, that the certificates should be required and issued only to males above 13 years old.² Females were excluded from the recommendation on the ground that the guerrillas had not used women to an extent that would

¹"Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," pp. 363-364.

²Ibid., p. 374.

justify the issuance of certificates. On the other hand, because the guerrillas used boys for communication and intelligence gathering, the Advisory Department found it necessary to attempt to control them.

Along with the registration of the residents, from 1933 the Japanese used the paochia system, or the system of neighborhood collective responsibility. Since the paochia system has been used in China since the eleventh century, the Chinese population was quite familiar with its workings.³ A Japanese source describes the paochia system in Manchuria as follows:

Paochia is the self-protection system that developed in Manchuria, and it is now quite an improvement over former systems. The district controlled by one police board is divided into several sections, and a paotung is organized in each section. The section is again divided into chia, with a chia chief, and then the chia is further divided into p'ai, with a p'ai chief. Thus the residents of the section, chia, and p'ai are held jointly responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in their districts, and they⁴ all undertake the duty of maintaining peace.

In principle, the paochia system involved the collective punishment of neighbors in the event of transgressions by a member of their chia, as well as rewards for meritorious records, though little attention was paid to the

³For details, see Kung-chuan Ksiao, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century, University of Washington Press, Seattle, Wash., 1960, Chs. ii-iii.

⁴Toa-Keizai Chosakyoku [East-Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau], The Manchoukuo Year Book, 1934, Tokyo, 1934, p. 91.

reward aspect in Manchuria. According to the Military Advisory Department, all the prefectural governments sternly enforced the system (or principle) of joint responsibility, and local officials tended to vie for the greatest number of cases detected and largest amounts of fines collected.⁵ The directive of the Fengtien Provincial Government stated, however, that "the self-awareness of the heads of chia [regarding their duties] should be promoted to contribute toward the maintenance of security and improvement of preventive policing, and in the event of a transgression strict but sympathetic coaxing should be provided to prevent the recurrence of such cases."⁶ In other words, although higher authorities discouraged heavy reliance on punishment, local officials were inclined to collect fines and resort to force.

Effective operation of the paochia system required not only threats of collective punishments, but the alert cooperation of administrative and local civilian personnel. To indoctrinate and train the administrative personnel, the Tunghwa prefectural government is reported to have summoned forty assistant heads and secretaries of pao for a week of lectures, and repeatedly inspected the activities of the heads of police stations, pao, chia, and p'ai.⁷ The effects of these efforts are not known.

Along with the paochia system, the Japanese organized

⁵"Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," p. 348.

⁶Ibid., p. 343.

⁷Ibid., p. 347.

self-defense corps (tzuweit'uan) in the towns and villages. At first the self-defense corps were haphazardly established on a professional, that is, paid, basis, but a compulsory and unpaid system was gradually adopted throughout Manchuria. Regarding the composition of the corps, the Manchoukuo Year Book of 1934 (p. 117) states:

They can be roughly classified into (1) those formed of the surrendered bandits, (2) those formed by disbanding the former Pacweituan [Peace Preservation Corps], and (3) voluntary bodies formed by young men recruited from all houses in case of emergency.

This source continues to say that those in the first two categories possessed "evil characteristics" and therefore were to be immediately disbanded and replaced by local men. Trusting security matters to "surrendered bandits"--the term that covers both the politically motivated "rebels" and the "pure type" bandits--was certainly risky, to put it mildly. It should be noted, however, that the Japanese had accepted, almost indiscriminately, large groups of "surrendered bandits" into the Manchukuo army in its early days. Like the self-defense corps, these individuals added little to the security or the "purification" of the "pacified areas." Because of the dubious background of the members of the self-defense corps, very few of them were equipped with rifles and pistols of government issue. As of December 1935, for example, 131 self-defense corps in Fengtien Province had only 460 pistols and rifles, which were supplemented by 1,187 weapons of old types, including outmoded rifles known locally as yangp'ao (Western rifles). In Antung Province, as of July 1936, none of the 140 self-defense corps was

issued any modern firearms; they had 1,373 old-type weapons. Sixteen corps in Chian Prefecture, in the same province, had no weapons at all. To improve their capabilities, corps members were trained rigorously to fight in battle, to collect intelligence, and to conduct searches and investigations.⁸ Detailed data on the effectiveness of the self-defense corps as an auxiliary police organ are not available, but their success would have depended chiefly on the general nature of the military operations against the guerrillas and the attitude of the population toward the government. The delay in the issuance of modern weapons indicates that the Japanese did not place much emphasis on these groups as counterforces to the guerrillas. The corps members were primarily used to assist the police in manning the check posts and the corps organizations as a vehicle of indoctrination and "social education."

As the construction of collective hamlets progressed and the availability of food for the guerrillas diminished, the towns and villages in the "pacified area" became more important to the guerrillas as sources of food supply. Hence the local police were given the additional task of preventing the outflow of grains and foodstuffs. To accomplish this purpose, the prefectural police established restrictions on the purchase and transportation of designated items by requiring permits to purchase or carry large quantities of these goods. In Huinan Prefecture, the restricted items and the maximum limits for

⁸Ibid., pp. 349-351.

purchase or transportation without permit were as follows:⁹

- Salt 3 chi (approx. 1.5 kg)
- Shoes 5 pairs
- Flour 2 sacks
- Meat 5 chin (2.5 kg)
- Cigarettes 1 box (25 packs of 10 cigarettes each)
- Sugar 2 chin (1 kg)
- Clothing 5 items
- Cookies and cakes . . . 5 chin (2.5 kg)
- Caps 2
- Socks 5 pairs

It is obvious that attrition is one of the most effective means of fighting guerrillas. Attrition of guerrillas, however, cannot be brought about unless they have been isolated from the crop-producing population or have been confined to a definable area against which an economic blockade can be instituted. The collective hamlet program and the restrictions on purchase and transportation of commodities were the principal means of attrition employed by the Japanese.

Extreme care, of course, had to be taken in deciding what commodities should be restricted, since excessive control over materials not essential to the guerrillas' survival would only interfere with local trade and hence would invite the animosity of local residents toward the government program. For this reason, the Military Advisory Department's report noted that the restrictions placed in

⁹ Ibid., pp. 361-362.

some prefectures on meat, cigarettes, sugar, cookies and cakes, flashlights, leggings, socks, and shirts were unnecessary and undesirable. The report recommended, on the other hand, that restrictions should be placed on every kind of grain that could be used as food and on salt, medicine, clothing, and textiles.¹⁰ This recommendation was based on investigation of the items most frequently pillaged or "requisitioned" by the guerrillas. The report noted that requests for cloth were most frequent in April and September, when the guerrillas prepared for seasonal changes in their uniforms. Requests for foodstuffs and grains were most frequent in May, June, and September. May and June were the months of food shortage in Manchuria, and September was when the guerrillas prepared for hibernation.

Post-1945 publications of North Korean Communist who participated in the guerrilla activities in Manchuria reveal that the shortage of food was their most acute problem--even worse than pursuit by antiguerrilla units. The following statement by Yim Ch'un-ch'u is typical:

In the spring of 1940, the Japanese wretches further intensified their food blockade against the partisan groups. As a principal method of cutting off the food supply of the partisan groups, the wretches further consolidated the policy of collective hamlets and tried madly to cut the relationship between the partisan groups and the general masses. Under these conditions, the only way for the partisan groups to solve the food problem was by destroying the enemy and taking his military provisions. There was virtually no other way. Therefore, the solution of

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 379-380.

the food problem could not help but become the most important combatant task and the one that would determine the fate of the partisan groups....¹¹

The memoirs of Yim and other guerrillas frequently mention that the partisans had to operate without food for several days or had to share a little salt water and a few handfuls of corn among several persons. Yim recalls that several of his comrades recovered quickly from illness after sharing a bowl of boiled corn on May Day of 1940. It is clear that the Japanese policy of attrition against the guerrillas was effective. According to one source, the Japanese opened the abdomen of Yang Ching-yü after he was killed in action in February 1940 at MENCHIANGCH'ENG and found grass in his bowels--evidence that this was the only food he had taken for some time.¹² Yang had been the general commander of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army.

The Japanese also strove to confiscate privately owned weapons from the population as a preventive measure against potential insurgency and against the population's passing the weapons on to guerrillas. Police procedures and the paochia system were used to register and then confiscate the weapons, but the number collected by 1940 was insignificant in comparison with the projected figure of one million items. It does not appear, however, that the concealment of weapons posed a major danger to the security operations in Manchuria.

¹¹Hang-Il mujang t'ujaeng sigirul koesang hayo, op. cit., p. 262.

¹²Max Perleberg (ed.), Who's Who in Modern China, Hongkong, 1954, p. 243.

Administrative Reforms of Towns and Villages

Administrative reforms at the local level were closely connected with counterinsurgency operations, in that efficient administrative organization was essential to control and education of the masses. Neither the paochia nor the self-defense corps system could operate under the old system of rule by local gentry. The Japanese found it necessary to establish town and village offices, appoint administrative personnel, and strengthen the control of the prefectural governments over the local officials. The old system of local contracts for public services was abolished, and modern budgetary practices were instituted.¹³

The Japanese recognized the importance of appointing young and capable administrative personnel, because such local officials as village chiefs, deputy village chiefs, and heads of pao, chia, and the self-defense corps were usually selected among landlords and wealthy farmers on the basis of traditional influence and power rather than capability. Because it was totally unrealistic to expect reforms or innovations to be initiated by those who were already well off, the Japanese emphasized the selection, training, and indoctrination of a young intelligentsia. These young men were trained to assist the local administrators through the Hsueh-ho-hui, the government-sponsored organization to recruit mass support for the Manchukuo regime.¹⁴

¹³"Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," p. 354.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 355.

The Japanese also strove to eliminate some of the inequities found at the local level, such as unrestrained, random collection and misuse of village taxes, unjust requisitioning of horses and vehicles, and excessive expenditures for the entertainment of visiting officials.¹⁵ Considering the magnitude of the total problem confronted by the Manchukuo regime, these were no doubt small problems. Yet these inequities and excesses were of direct concern to the villagers at the grass-roots level, and hence the correction of these situations was essential in any attempt to win the support of the masses.

Discussion of the overall problem of executing administrative and personnel reforms and bringing about efficient government is beyond the scope of this study, but some of the difficulties encountered by the Japanese in Manchuria should be noted. The most serious, aside from the ideologically and nationally motivated antagonisms of the Chinese toward the Japanese, were the ingrained corruption of officials, the masses' distrust of government, and the lack of dependable personnel. A Japanese army officer, Major Ishibashi, who was assigned to security operations in northern Manchuria for eight months, related his difficulties, and while some of his statements are sweeping and show national bias, much of his description can be accepted at face value.

Traditionally, the Chinese considered that the object in becoming an official was to gain wealth. Official positions were bought with money, and when one became an official, he somehow enriched himself. The noble

¹⁵Ibid., p. 354.

statesmen who worked for the nation or considered the welfare of the region or the people were few....This tradition cannot be changed overnight.

Japanese officials assigned to various regions are attentive to this situation, but they do not understand the language. Hence they cannot understand the thought processes of the Manchurian officials. Some prefectural governors enrich themselves by allowing the secret cultivation of opium despite its prohibition by national law. Some police chiefs collect money by permitting gambling. Certain provincial governors are said to have made 400,000 yuan in less than a year by playing mah-jongg....

In clerical affairs, officials are very passive, and inefficiency is carried to extremes. Some officials will say, "I have written so many words today," as if thinking that government business is something akin to lessons in penmanship. The only thing that impresses one is their superb chirography.

Since we are now in the transitional period after the establishment of Manchukuo, the heads of pao and chia receive many demands from government officials. On the other hand, the bandits place their demands through these individuals. If they oblige the bandits, the heads of pao and chia will be treated by the Japanese army or the Manchukuo officials as bandit sympathizers. If the heads of pao and chia do not comply with the bandits' demands, they will be either killed or kidnapped. No wise man, therefore, will be so foolish as to accept such a position. Wise and rich men will not remain in the villages....

Ilan Prefecture held an agricultural fair as a way to encourage the improvement of agricultural products and domestic animals. The displayed items were something to see. Horses were either blind or limping; hogs and pigs were skin and bone; grains were all chaff. This is because the people think that whatever animals are

submitted to the government will be taken away. If good grains are submitted for display, they think higher taxes will be imposed. Thus, even though Manchukuo has been established, both the officials and the people think that the function of the officials is to oppress the people.

Because the quality of the soldiers has been low and because the troops have been used only as tools of internal wars, the people never receive any benefit from the armies, although they may suffer greatly from them....If the Japanese or Manchukuo army is dispatched to an area to subjugate the bandits, the farmers flee with their horses, because they are afraid that the army will take away the latter....

Because there have been few periods of good government in China, the Chinese think that only bad officials will replace the bandits when the latter are eliminated. They believe in the adage that "bad government is more fierce than a tiger." Therefore, even though a completely new government of Manchukuo has been established, there is little inclination to rely on the state, the officials, or the army. There is absolutely no thought of cooperating with the government to eliminate the bandits.¹⁶

Major Ishibashi's observations clearly suggest that much propaganda and education would be necessary before administrative and personnel reforms could have some effect. To the vast majority of the masses, particularly in rural areas, governments and their agents, whatever their nationality or allegiance, were something to be shunned rather than befriended. For the Japanese, who

¹⁶"Opinions on Security Operations," in Hohei dai 18 Rentai (18th Infantry Regiment), Hokuman keibi no Omoide (Reflections on Guarding Northern Manchuria), Toyobashi, Japan, 1936, pp. 135-148.

were competing against the Chinese Nationalists and the Communist "insurgents" for the support of the masses, this traditionally negative attitude toward government authorities posed a difficult challenge. Because the masses habitually and instinctively identified with the insurgents, the task of isolating the insurgents was doubly difficult.

V. RECONSTRUCTION AND REJUVENATION
OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES

One of the means the Japanese employed in attempting to surmount their problems was a program of reconstruction and rejuvenation of towns and villages. Evidently many Japanese officials, including the authors of the Study of Domestic Security Measures, were aware that the success of the program for winning popular support and isolating the insurgents depended on bringing about fundamental improvements in the living conditions of the Chinese masses. All the measures enumerated above were necessary to attain peace and order, but they were essentially remedial and only concerned with immediate situations. If the opponents of the Japanese in Manchuria had been "pure" bandits or emotionally motivated diehard Nationalists whose ties with the people were not very strong and whose organization and discipline were not very well established, the measures described above might have been adequate. (This is not to say, however, that all the non-Communists were weak or that they failed to establish ties with the masses. On the contrary, many Nationalist groups sustained their movement up to 1935, when they entered the united-front framework.) The Communist and other anti-Japanese groups maintained strong ties with the people, and because of the deteriorated economic situation and the insurgents' propaganda, a significant proportion of the masses shared affinity with the guerrilla groups. Some of the counterinsurgency measures, such as the collective hamlets, contributed materially to the physical

separation of the insurgents from the general population, but these measures also bred conditions more favorable to Communist propaganda.

Numerous reports on the economic condition of the farmers in the "bandit-infested area" or the "disturbed area" leave us no doubt that the farmers had been subjected to the most hideous conditions. Starvation was a common phenomenon. Many of the farmers resorted to eating tree bark and grass roots, but even these had their limits. Such conditions prompted Vice-Governor Itagaki to write in 1939:

The situation is worst between March and May, when neither trees nor plants show their buds. It is truly sad to see the farmers surrounding elm trees on the mountainsides....The people's faces are lifeless. They are turning from a dark blue color to that of earth. Death is real.¹

Because of the war and ensuing starvation, the population of Panshih Prefecture declined from 330,000 in 1931 to 130,000 in 1935 and the area of cultivation from 240,000 hsiang (one hsiang is approximately an acre) to 45,000 hsiang.² In Hangjen Prefecture, the population declined from 220,000 in 1931 to 120,000 in 1939, and 30 per cent of the decrease was attributed to starvation and war.³ As some of the statements quoted above illustrate, strategies adopted by the Japanese aggravated the farmers'

¹See "Pacification Activities in the Communist Bandit Area (Personal Reflections)," reproduced in this volume (Part 3, Sec. XIV, pp. 217 ff.).

²"Special Operations," p. 171

³Itagaki, Part 3, Sec. XIV, p. 217 of this volume.

frightful living conditions. To many of the Chinese farmers in Manchuria, the environment became a real hell on earth.

As late as 1940, the incidence of starvation, destitution, and endemic disease among the farmers in many regions of Manchuria suggest that the Manchukuo regime had done little to reconstruct and rejuvenate the economy of the Chinese farmers. Those at the helm of Manchukuo and the leaders of the Japanese army were still preoccupied with the problem of eliminating the guerrillas rather than with the long-range problem of winning the active support of the masses. Operational plans for security and purification adopted by Fengtien Province government in 1936 did mention such programs as the "reconstruction of agrarian villages," "animation of public spirit," and "cultivation of waste lands,"⁴ and various other provincial governments also encouraged cultivation of abandoned lands,⁵ but these projects were carried out as a part of the militarily oriented security operation rather than for their own sake.

The Tunghwa Provincial Government's "Report on the Result of Reconstruction Operations" as of 1938,⁶ shows, on the other hand, that efforts had been made in certain sections of Manchuria to improve the living conditions of the farmers. Tunghwa Province's budget for reconstruction in 1938, for instance, allotted not only 823,652 yuan for

⁴"Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," p. 311.

⁵See "Collective Hamlets" in Part 2 of this volume.

⁶Part 3, Sec. XVII of this volume.

general expenditures, that is, for the defense of hamlets and the construction and repair of security highways and telephone lines, etc., but also 862,000 yuan for the improvement of the farmers' livelihood. These funds were intended for the construction of houses, the purchase of food, and the purchase of farm implements, seeds, and farm animals. Fairly extensive relief operations were also carried out in the same province, from which 2,693 families benefited in 1938.

No data were available to the present author on possible similar activities in other provinces, but it is reasonable to assume that the reconstruction program was not restricted to Tunghwa Province and that it was continued until the collapse of Manchukuo with the Japanese empire in 1945.⁷ We can therefore be certain that some advances had been made in the living conditions of the farmers, although it would have taken much longer than five years to restore the war-torn economy of the Manchurian countryside. We can also be certain that a marked improvement in the living conditions of the Chinese farmers was essential if the propaganda and "pacification" operations of the Japanese were to have the desired effect.

⁷For example, one of the programs adopted by the North Tungpientao Security Operations Committee, a joint civil-military agency created in November 1936, was to draw up an overall reconstruction program for its area ("Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," p. 257). The Tungpientao Reconstruction Committee was established by the premier of Manchukuo in January 1937 to buttress the economy of the area (ibid., p. 294). Tunghwa Province is a part of the Tungpientao region.

VI. PROPAGANDA AND PACIFICATION

The various reports reproduced in this study leave little doubt that Japanese officials in Manchuria were keenly aware that the key to ultimate success in the security operations or counterinsurgency operations was the support of the population. Because the Communists, who virtually dominated the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement in Manchuria after 1935 placed primary emphasis on winning popular support, the Japanese were obliged to enter into a competition with them to win over the masses. Elimination of the guerrillas by military means, of course, enormously enhanced the chances of winning the competition, but, as we have indicated throughout this section, military action alone was not enough.

Furthermore, military operations and other measures taken by the counterinsurgency forces created conditions detrimental to the farmers' livelihood. As far as the vast majority of the Chinese farmers were concerned, the counterinsurgency operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo troops brought enormous harm and no gain.

The Japanese and others who were involved in creating a favorable attitude among the masses toward the Manchukuo regime were confronted with the additional task of erasing the strong anti-Japanese sentiment implanted in the Chinese population by numerous patriotic groups. First, it was essential to neutralize the people and next to provide sufficient reasons for them to support the cause of the new regime. These were Herculean tasks. If the economic condition of the population had improved immediately after

the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, the task of winning popular support would have been easier. But the situation was exactly the reverse.

The Japanese were further handicapped by the fact that the situation in Manchuria was inseparable from the development of the Sino-Japanese war in China proper and indeed of World War II. Although the Japanese authorities had full control over the news media in Manchuria, they could not conceal the information that Chinese forces, both Nationalist and Communist, were offering stubborn opposition in China to Japanese encroachment. Unless resistance in China was completely subdued, or the Chinese governments and parties officially conceded Manchuria to Japan, the hope of the Chinese population for the recovery of the "lost territory" of Manchuria would not be abandoned. Japan's participation in World War II made her position all the more precarious, and this fact could not have escaped the notice of the Chinese population. Even in the hinterlands of Manchuria, where these developments would have been of little concern to the peasants struggling to stay alive, the guerrillas and dissident elements strove to arouse popular interest in news of the war.

In spite of the enormous odds against them, the Japanese attempted to win mass support for Manchukuo through propaganda and "pacification operations." (Although the term "pacification" would normally include military operations and other measures designed to allay agitation and resentment, the Japanese used it to denote political, economic, and ideological activities, excluding military operations.) Through propaganda, the Japanese

strove to counter Communist and Nationalist propaganda, to justify and rationalize the various emergency measures taken, and to arouse mass support for Manchukuo. Table 1 presents the summary of propaganda and pacification activities in five prefectures of the Tungpientao region between October 1936 and January 1937, and is illustrative of the general characteristics of the propaganda and pacification activities elsewhere.

Although the Japanese attached considerable importance to propaganda activities as a means of neutralizing the animosities of the Chinese population and winning their support, they seem to have met with serious difficulty in implementing their objectives. Much of the difficulty, of course, was caused by the disturbed economic and political situation, but lack of experience and sophistication on the part of personnel in charge of propaganda was also responsible. Thus the Senior Advisor to the Manchukuo army informed his subordinates in October 1936 that conventional propaganda methods such as lectures, distribution of bills and posters, movies, and medical treatment not only did not produce adequate results, but frequently produced countereffects. He attributed the unsatisfactory situation to these four factors:

1. Past activities failed to arouse the interest of ordinary farmers because [the propaganda agents] failed to take into consideration the economic, social, and cultural levels of the farm villages and simply repeated set formulas.
2. Because past efforts stressed the encouragement of [favorable] attitudes in the abstract

Table 1
 PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES IN TUNGPIENTAO, WINTER 1936/1937

<u>Prefecture</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Content of Propaganda</u>	<u>Other Activities and Information</u>
Chinch'uan	10 pacification teams (5 members each)		Distribution of paper, matches, and candles; dispatch of prefectural doctors for medical treatment; training of young men in cooperation with Hsueh-ho-hui
Huinan	10 pacification teams (6 members each)	Condition of purification activities; significance of the collective hamlets; the <u>paochia</u> system; inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo; the spirit of the foundation of Manchukuo	Dispatch of prefectural doctors; distribution of medical treatment coupons
Liuho	Training and guidance of stationary pacification personnel	Present condition of Manchukuo; significance of the purification program; effects of the collective hamlet program; the evils of Communism; the necessity of collecting weapons	Use of police chiefs, school principals, heads of <u>pao</u> and <u>chia</u> , village heads, and locally influential persons
	Medical pacification team		Provision of medical treatment; first-aid boxes provided in major hamlets; cooperation with health team from the provincial government

Table 1--continued

Prefecture	Organization	Content of Propaganda	Other Activities and Information
Liuh (continued)	2 mobile pacification teams (5 persons each) and a medical team	Significance of collective hamlets; permeation of the spirit of separation of bandits and population; permeation of the spirit of love for one's village	Provision of medical treatment; also 2 pacification teams (10 members each) of graduates of the Youth Training School organized to conduct pacification and investigation of the actual conditions in farm villages
Tung-hwa	3 mobile pacification teams (4 members each) for training of stationary pacification personnel	Unity of the army and the people for the elimination of insurgents; inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo; the <u>paochia</u> system; significance of the collective hamlets; awakening of the national consciousness; nurture of anti-Communist thoughts; protection of highways and communication networks; the true meaning of righteous government; collection of weapons	Distribution of salt, matches, and medicine; contact made with 10,000 persons at 52 locations; distribution of books, notebooks, pencils, and maps to educational institutions
Chian	2 mobile pacification teams for the establishing and training of stationary pacification teams in various villages	Permeation of rational consciousness and anti-Communist thought; inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo; permeation of desire to eliminate the bandits; the <u>paochia</u> system; collection of weapons	Emphasis on propaganda toward insurgent sympathizers, farmers, influential persons, and students

SOURCE: Manshukoku, Gunji Komon-bu [Military Advisory Section, Manchukuo], "Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," Ch. 6 of Kokunai chian taisaku no kenkyu [Study of Domestic Security Measures], n.p., 1937, pp. 394-396.

sense without relating these to the actual local administration in Manchukuo, these efforts did not win the trust [or support] of the farmers, whose central concern was their own livelihood.

3. Because the actual condition of the farmers had not been taken into consideration, the [propaganda] activities often invited resentment.
4. Propaganda activities were carried out for the sake of propaganda, and no efforts were made to exploit the effects of these activities. Also there was no permanency in the propaganda.¹

On the basis of this analysis, the Senior Advisor indicated certain guidelines for future activities. Government agencies issued manuals for improving the effectiveness of propaganda efforts. Persons in responsible positions were instructed to make recommendations based on their individual experiences. Two of these personal reports by Hayano Masao and Itagaki Teiji are reproduced in this study. Hayano's report on "Propaganda and Pacification Activities in Tungpientao" includes a succinct guide to effective propaganda operations. We have no way of determining the extent to which Hayano's recommendations were followed in Manchuria in subsequent years, but his conclusions are worth quoting at length:

¹"Fundamental Security Operations in the Northern Tungpientao," pp. 387-388.

1. The agent (or the person engaged in the pacification activities) must possess an enthusiastic spirit for the state, a critical mind, an observant eye, and cultural refinement. The most urgent task at hand is to obtain or train and cultivate personnel of this type. A degraded attitude in an agent is the most dreadful poison.
2. High-flown theories or abstract spiritual lectures are not very effective among people of the farming class. Only by tackling the actual problems directly relevant to the livelihood of the farmers can our propaganda be made effective. The posters must take into account the fact that the number of those who can read is very limited.
3. Treat farmers with warmest possible affection. Do not let them wait long or summon them from distant places. Never do things that would invite the antipathy of the farmers.
4. Secure [the support of] influential persons and able young men in the villages.
5. Agents must be physically strong. There were cases in the past when some of the agents suffered illnesses as a result of long, arduous work in remote villages. It is necessary to exercise and build one's body at ordinary times.
6. Propaganda and pacification activities must be closely connected and synchronized with various economic activities designed to advance the farmers' livelihood.²

²Part 3, Sec. XIV.

Obviously, the standards set up by Hayano for propaganda personnel and activities were very high. In effect, what he wanted were propaganda agents of the same caliber as himself or Itagaki Teiji. It should be noted, however, that if a society were capable of recruiting at the lowest level of government large numbers of loyal persons of critical mind, observant eye, and cultural refinement, that society would not be plagued by problems of insurgency. In reality, persons meeting the qualifications established by Hayano would have been extremely hard to find in Manchuria in the 1930's and 1940's. Recruitment would also have proved difficult because a great part of the Chinese population was still hostile toward the Japanese and even larger numbers were ambivalent in their attitude. In any event, persons meeting these qualifications would have been in demand for many positions of higher rank and thus could not have been spared for the hinterlands. It cannot be denied, however, that personnel of considerable merit were essential if propaganda operations were to produce tangible results.

The attempt made by Itagaki Teiji in this connection is noteworthy. Because recruiting was impracticable, Itagaki, then the Vice-Governor of Hangjen Prefecture,³ organized a small institute where he proceeded to educate and train personnel for administrative and propaganda functions. In addition to class lectures, he took the

³ It was customary for the Japanese to select Chinese for the leading positions in government agencies, such as the premiership or governorship, but in fact the vice-premiers or vice-governors held the power.

upperclassmen on periodic field trips to observe the existing inequities and study the means to correct them. These students also served as Itagaki's agents in finding out the grievances of the farmers. Through nightly discussions, the students gained insights into the actual problems, and, because Itagaki was in a position to correct undesirable conditions, the farmers were not unwilling to confide their complaints to the students. The unchallengeable authority of Itagaki in his jurisdiction and the confidence he radiated were, of course, the two essential features of the program. Itagaki's report reveals that he was devoted to his duty, and that much of what he accomplished was the result of his compassion for people and his unusual insight as a leader. It is doubtful, however, that similar educational and training programs could have been instituted on a large scale.

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VII. CONCLUSIONS

The experiences in Manchuria between 1931 and 1940, like similar experiences elsewhere in the world, clearly support the thesis that a large-scale insurgency operation cannot succeed without the active backing of the population.¹ In initiating the collective hamlet program in 1936, the Japanese Kwantung Army implicitly admitted as much. The Chinese Communist Party also recognized the importance of this factor and in 1935 issued explicit instructions to the Communists in Manchuria to use all available means to win the support of the local population. By 1940, when the Communist guerrillas had been virtually exterminated in Manchuria, one of the principal leaders, Wei Cheng-min, Secretary of the Southern Manchuria Special Committee of the CCP and acting commander of the First Route Army of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army, wrote to his superiors in Moscow lamenting the fact that his forces had lost contact with the masses owing to the attrition of indoctrinated and trained personnel and that the morale of the small number of men remaining under him was rapidly declining.² The 1940 reports of the guerrillas indicate that the movement could not be sustained very

¹See Chalmers A. Johnson, "Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict," World Politics, Vol. XIV, No. 4, July 1962, pp. 646-661.

²The text of the intercepted letter is translated into Japanese in High Court, Prosecutor's Bureau (Seoul, Korea), Shiso iho (Thought Report Series), No. 25, December 1940, pp. 62-80.

long unless more trained leaders were dispatched to Manchuria.

No doubt the remnants of the Communist guerrillas would have been enormously heartened if the request for additional party personnel had been granted. But without reinforcement by large numbers of trained soldiers, even a substantial force of well-trained agitators could not have rescued the insurgency movement in Manchuria. Lacking the military might to make their threats and intimidations credible to the local population, the insurgents faced great obstacles in mobilizing active popular support, despite the popularity of their cause. The Chinese Communist leaders both in China and Manchuria recognized this fact and after 1934 concentrated their efforts on building up strong armed groups in Manchuria. Even so, the tenacious efforts of the Japanese effectively destroyed the Communist forces there.

At times insurgents have the power to arouse a large number of people if their cause has broad support and if there is some prospect of success. But when the prospect of success is totally absent, a cause by itself is not sufficient to arouse a docile population. Blind and suicidal revolts may occur, but they are totally different from organized movements sustained over a period of time. The situation in Manchuria by 1940 did not present any prospect of success for the Communist guerrillas.

There is no doubt that successful counterinsurgency, like insurgency, requires the active support of the population. But this is true only to a degree. In most societies, particularly those where large-scale insurgency has arisen, it would be almost impossible for the regime in

power to win over the whole population. Nor is it necessary to do so in order to defeat insurgency, if that regime possesses some basis of legitimacy, other than naked force, and if it enjoys some popular support in areas not affected by the insurgents. In this sense, the tasks of an insurgency operation are inherently more difficult than those facing counterinsurgency operations.

To say that the task of the insurgents is more difficult than that of the counterinsurgency forces, however, is not to minimize the difficulties involved in defeating the insurgents. Once the insurgents have entrenched themselves in a given locality, they will doubtless subject the local population to indoctrination and other appeals. In order to diminish the influence and power of the insurgents, the counterinsurgency force must be able, by words or deeds, to refute the arguments of the insurgents. The minimum goal of the government must be to neutralize the political orientation of the population, while the more long-range and difficult task is to win mass support for the authorities. To resort to cruel punishments or other maltreatment of the affected population and active insurgents not only strengthens the convictions of these individuals, but also serves to stiffen the resistance of the whole insurgent camp. In Manchuria, for example, the guerrillas and others had been told by the Communist leaders that the Japanese would summarily execute all surrendered personnel. But according to Wei Cheng-min, the Communist leader, when the Japanese treated the prisoners hospitably, and bombarded the guerrillas with pictures and statements of those who had surrendered, the morale of the guerrillas weakened. This is an example of how one

type of counterinsurgency technique successfully thwarted the insurgents' propaganda. In the Manchurian insurgency, however, this example was one of very few in which the Japanese succeeded in refuting the insurgents' propaganda. Setting aside the question of Japanese aggression in Manchuria--a handicap that no amount of counterpropaganda could refute--other facts exploited by the Communist guerrillas were of immediate relevance to the population. As we have seen, such measures as the collective hamlet program inflicted enormous sufferings on the population. On many occasions, whole villages petitioned the Japanese to delay evacuation until harvest was completed, but to no avail. Villages, hamlets, and isolated farmhouses were ruthlessly destroyed, and the farmers were forced into totally unprepared collective hamlets, which in fact were nothing more than concentration camps. The Japanese army also recruited countless numbers of men for forced labor to construct highways and other defense facilities without paying any attention to the welfare of the farmers. No amount of counterpropaganda could refute the Communist arguments that the Japanese were there to enslave the people and that the Japanese propaganda about Wang-tao (the "kingly way") under the Manchukuo regime was a facade.

The problem underlying Japan's counterinsurgency methods in Manchuria was the front-line troops' disregard of the long-range effect of brutal acts. The higher ranking military officers were almost exclusively concerned with destroying the enemy, by whatever means were necessary, regardless of harmful consequences. In its effort to eliminate any possibility of enemy action, the military felt

that any adverse effects resulting from its activities could be dealt with by civilian officials. But these officials, who were in charge of pacification or collective hamlets, were subordinated to the army, and consequently lacked the authority to restrain the politically harmful effects of military operations. As a result, in late 1936, joint committees of military and civilian officers were established in some war zones to minimize the ill effects of military operations. Unfortunately for the Japanese counterinsurgency effort, the damage had already been done in many parts of Manchuria.

The main lesson to be learned from the counterinsurgency campaign in Manchuria is that front-line military operations must be closely coordinated with a sound pacification plan that includes political, social, and economic programs. The Japanese experience shows that short-range military victories may create serious sociopolitical problems that prolong the vitality of the insurgents. To neutralize the hostile population in the insurgent-occupied areas, the war must be fought not only on the battle front but on the political and economic fronts as well. The statement of Vice-Governor Itagaki Teiji is worth repeating: "We are not afraid of Communist propaganda; but we are worried because the material for propaganda can be found in the farmers' lives. We are not afraid of the ignition of fire; rather, we are afraid of the seeping oil."

Belatedly, the Japanese came to appreciate that socioeconomic programs should be a fundamental part of the counterinsurgency operation and they began to take corrective measures. One indication of this changing Japanese perception of the nature of counterinsurgency methods can

be found in their terminology classifying basic operational tasks. They adopted two classical Chinese terms, ch'ih-piao (chi-hyo in Japanese) and ch'ih-pên (chi-hon in Japanese). Ch'ih-piao--literally, "the rule of branches and leaves"--denotes emergency and peripheral measures, while ch'ih-pên--"the rule of the roots"--refers to the solution of the fundamental problems in government. In this classification, the purely military measures, including paramilitary operations, were ch'ih-piao, or peripheral, while policies designed to improve the living conditions of the population were ch'ih-pên, that is, fundamental. In spite of the fact that ch'ih-piao and ch'ih-pên were not always coordinated in the actual execution of policies (for example, in the collective hamlet program), the integration of various measures in both categories under the umbrella of "security operations" indicates, at least, that the Japanese understood the nature of the counterinsurgency tasks confronting them in Manchuria.

In the final analysis, the Japanese counterinsurgency effort was a qualified success. Prolonged and intensive concentration on operations in the ch'ih-pên category would have been necessary to heal the wounds inflicted by the Japanese army on the populace and to eradicate the possibility of further uprisings in the hinterland. In the purely military realm, however, the techniques employed by the Japanese succeeded in virtually exterminating the insurgents † 1940.

After orthodox military campaigns had reduced the number of the insurgents, the Kwantung Army brutally enforced the collective hamlet program to isolate the guerrillas and cut off their sources of supply and

information. At the same time, paramilitary groups were established by utilizing the insurgents who had surrendered to pursue the guerrillas. Because of the peculiar environment surrounding the Korean minority in southeastern Manchuria,³ these operations produced surprising results. At a later stage, when the guerrilla groups dwindled in number, small company-size units were organized to pursue the guerrillas relentlessly through the mountains and forests of the Manchurian hinterland. These units allowed the guerrillas no respite either to regroup themselves or to engage in propaganda. Various measures were also used to split the guerrillas internally and to weaken their total strength. Once the guerrillas were placed on the defensive, they gradually lost the mass support they had enjoyed.

In analyzing the factors responsible for the success of the Japanese military operation in Manchuria, we must also consider some of the advantages it enjoyed.⁴ No doubt one of the important factors was the lack of an "active sanctuary" for the insurgents.⁵ Although many of

³See Part 1, Section III, p. 25, of this volume.

⁴For a general discussion of counter guerrilla warfare, see R. C. Nairn, "Counter guerrilla Warfare in Southeast Asia," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, 1962, pp. 411-430.

⁵Bernard Fall defines "active sanctuary" as a "territory contiguous to a rebellious area which, though ostensibly not involved in the conflict, provides the rebel side with shelter, training, facilities, equipment, and--if it can get away with it--troops." See Street Without Joy, Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1964, p. 375.

the Communist guerrillas operated near the Soviet border and the Soviet authorities in Siberia were favorably disposed toward the insurgents, no large-scale Soviet support was ever provided. At this time the Soviet Union was not in a position to challenge Japan openly. In the late 1930's and early 1940's, some remnants of the guerrillas took refuge in Soviet territory, but the latter did not serve as an "active sanctuary." In fact, in April 1941, the Soviet Union demoralized the small number of Communist guerrillas remaining in Manchuria by announcing the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and the Frontier Declaration under which the USSR pledged "to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo."⁶ In the late 1930's and after, because of distance the Chinese Red Army in North China was not able even to maintain liaison with the guerrilla groups in Manchuria.

Another factor that favored the Japanese was the long and severe winter season in Manchuria. No doubt, the weather conditions also hindered the movement of counterinsurgency forces, but as the network of collective hamlets was expanded, the guerrillas' problems in obtaining food supplies during the winter became particularly acute. Their rate of attrition was bound to be higher in such conditions.

The third factor to be noted is the highly efficient intelligence system operated by the Japanese. On the modern history, geography, and socioeconomic conditions in Manchuria probably no country has produced more research

⁶For the full text of the Neutrality Pact and Frontier Declaration, see Amerasia, May 1941, pp. 109-110.

studies than Japan. The amount of such work sponsored by the South Manchurian Railway Company alone is overwhelming. The importance of this general--that is, nonmilitary--knowledge in counterinsurgency operations cannot be over-emphasized if we accept the thesis that a counterinsurgency operation is both military and political in nature.

The Japanese security agencies painstakingly collected, analyzed, and circulated intelligence data not only on the military operations of the guerrillas but also on all other relevant subjects. It is quite likely that the Japanese archives today contain more information about the Communist movement in Manchuria than any other collection in the world, including that of Communist China. Possession by the Japanese of both information and means to combat the enemy reduced to a minimum the guerrillas' opportunity to surprise the security forces and exposed them to maximum dangers.

The content of the reports and analyses circulated among the Japanese officials in Manchuria was marked by a surprising candor, as illustrated in the several excerpts previously quoted and in the translated documents in Parts 2 and 3 of this study. Even the lower echelon officials reporting from the front line did not mince words in describing the horrors perpetrated by their own forces, in spite of the fact that such descriptions implied criticism of decisions taken by the officials' own superiors. Criticism of the Japanese policy of conquest itself was the only taboo universally accepted by Japanese officials. Short of this, they were given maximum latitude to produce as accurate an assessment of the situation as possible. Although mistakes were continuously made throughout the

period of Japanese occupation, unadorned analyses of the immediate situation and intimate knowledge of the environment enabled the officials to recommend and adopt measures best suited to specific problems.

For instance, Itagaki Teiji, whose reflections are given at length below, found a millet stalk with six clusters, and seized the opportunity to propagandize: "The rare grain, spoken of since ancient times, has finally appeared. Heavenly Benevolence has been bestowed upon the Hangjen Prefecture. Hereafter, all natural calamities and those caused by banditry will certainly cease, and only happiness will prevail."⁷ Taking advantage of the traditional animosities between China and Russia, Itagaki organized roundtable meetings of Chinese veterans who had fought on the Japanese side in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in order to arouse their anti-Russian as well as anti-Communist sentiments. Temples and monasteries were restored, and high-ranking government officials regularly offered "prayers and thanksgiving for the restoration of peace and for the harvest." No doubt, reports of these prayers were disseminated widely among the population. Thus, confronted with an adverse environment, the Japanese official did his best to exploit all available opportunities to enhance his authority. Without an intimate knowledge of local traditions, customs, and even superstitions, these actions could not have been taken.

Also important was the Japanese demonstration of their will to fight, manifest from the time the first shot

⁷Part 3, Section XIV, pp. 217 ff.

was fired on September 18, 1931. Even in the hinterlands of Manchuria, no one could mistake the determination of the Japanese to pursue their original goal. This display not only affected the morale of the guerrillas but also enabled the Japanese to mobilize sizable numbers of active collaborators, without whose support the counterinsurgency operations could not have succeeded. As reported by the Kwantung Army, considerable anti-Japanese sentiment remained even among the rank and file of the puppet Manchukuo army as late as 1940. In spite of this, however, the Manchukuo army supplemented the Kwantung Army in destroying the anti-Japanese forces, and many Chinese assisted the Japanese cause. If the will and determination of the Japanese had ever been suspect, the number of collaborators would have been considerably smaller, particularly in the guerrilla-infested hinterlands. It is also important to note that the Japanese matched their determination with military power and other resources.

An attempt to assess the strength and weakness of the Japanese counterinsurgency operation must take into account the political background in Manchuria. Inasmuch as the Manchukuo government was universally recognized as a tool of Japanese imperialism, and incapable of making its own decisions, its very existence conflicted with the national aspirations of the Chinese. As the prolonged and large-scale resistance movement of both Communists and non-Communists indicated, the initial hostility of the Chinese population toward Japan was very strong. The intensive and ruthless Japanese measures for the subjugation of China, and the anti-Japanese propaganda conducted by the guerrillas, intensified Chinese hostility.

In this area, the problems of the Japanese counter-insurgency forces were similar to those of the French in Indochina after 1945, yet, unlike the French, the Japanese succeeded in defeating the guerrillas. Was the Japanese victory only a temporary one? Were the Chinese masses in Manchuria duped into accepting the claim that Manchukuo was designed for the "co-prosperity" of the "five races" (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Manchu, and Mongolian)? Or did the Japanese offer an acceptable alternative to Chinese nationalism? These are difficult questions and no clear-cut answers are possible. In spite of the limitations described earlier, the Japanese success in counter-insurgency appears to have been a genuine one, at least in coping with the immediate emergency. Lacking active assistance from the Soviet Union, the measures taken by the Japanese almost completely precluded the possibility of guerrilla resurgence. It is very doubtful that large numbers of Chinese in Manchuria accepted the Manchukuo government's slogans about the harmony of "races." The Japanese dominance over other national groups was too apparent.

To be sure, Japanese authority in Manchuria was based on force or the threat of force, rather than on legitimacy.⁸ But the memory of decadent governments that had existed in Manchuria before the Japanese occupation

⁸For a theoretical discussion of the elements of authority, see Andrew C. Janos, "Authority and Violence: The Political Framework of Internal War," in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War: Problems and Approaches, The Free Press, New York, 1964, pp. 130-133.

did help to evoke compliance short of coercion. In the Manchurian hinterlands, where the insurgency was mounted, the effective neutralization of the hostile masses enabled the Japanese officials and the Manchukuo state apparatus to begin to acquire an aura of legitimacy.

What the Japanese offered in Manchuria in lieu of Chinese nationalism was an orderly and efficient government. This benefit, of course, would have meant little had past governments been better organized and more responsive to the interests of the masses. But in the past, officials had sought private gain rather than law and order. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Manchuria consisted of several private domains controlled by Chang Tso-lin and later by Chang Hsueh-liang. Self-aggrandizement by government officials was accepted practice. It is no exaggeration to say that the local population feared the bandit-subjugating armies more than the bandits themselves, though banditry was rampant throughout Manchuria. Recognizing the fact that they had inflicted severe damage on the local population, the Japanese (or the Manchukuo government) immediately set out to remedy the situation. They attempted to restore the livelihood of the disaster-stricken farmers by providing medical and other relief measures that may have seemed strange and new to the population in the hinterlands.

Making all due allowance for exaggeration in Itagaki Teiji's report, it is highly probable that he and other officials made serious attempts to hear and correct the grievances of the farmers. No doubt, corrupt officials were weeded out and sincere efforts made to establish an upright regime within the given political framework. We

cannot assume, of course, that all Japanese officials in charge of local government shared the attitude or ability of Itagaki. Japanese officials were often highhanded and brutal. But the general direction of Japanese policy was toward establishing a modern administrative structure based on law.

It should be remembered that for most of the distressed farmers in the hinterlands, international and national questions had little meaning. The actions and attitudes of the local officials, however, often meant the difference between life and death. Once the agitators were removed, the semblance of equitable government established, and concern for the welfare of the populace displayed by high officials, the farmers were content to obey the edicts of the new regime. It was probably the striking contrast between the old and new officials that persuaded the farmers to return to their ingrained habit of docile obedience. It is such farmers who ultimately decide the course of a war against insurgency.

PART 2

REPORT OF MANCHUKUO MILITARY ADVISERS
ON COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

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INTRODUCTION

Kokunai chian taisaku no kenkyu (Study of Domestic Security Measures), Military Advisory Section, Manchukuo, [Changchun?], 1937, is a volume of reports on the collective hamlets (shudan buraku) in Manchuria and other pertinent materials that were originally produced for internal circulation by the Advisory Department of the Manchukuo Ministry of Defense. The responsibility of the Advisory Department was somewhat greater than its official title suggests. It was, in fact, a detachment of the Kwantung Army, headed by a Japanese major general, and charged with the ultimate responsibility for the internal security of Manchuria. Troops of the Manchuria-based Kwantung Army, with those of the Manchukuo army, were engaged in counter guerrilla warfare.

There is evidence that the Advisory Department was actively collecting and analyzing data about the condition of all the known anti-Japanese groups ("insurgents" to the Japanese), as well as the effects of the measures taken against them. Possibly some of the departmental archives are still in existence, but this is an open question. Two printed volumes published for internal use by the Advisory Department in 1937, however, survived the aftermath of Japan's defeat in 1945. The first of these, titled Manshu kyosanhi no kenkyu (Study of Communist Insurgents in Manchuria), is more than 1,000 pages in length and consists of data on the "Communist bandits," as the insurgents under Communist direction were termed. The second shorter work, Kokunai chian taisaku no kenkyu, is a report on the

security measures taken against the bandits. The translation presented in the following pages is drawn from this second work, Ch. 2, "Collective Hamlets," pp. 27-98.

The official nature of the report contributes to its importance for the student of counterinsurgent warfare in two key aspects. First, because the report was prepared by the highest agency concerned, it presents a comprehensive picture of operations and compares experiences in different regions. Second, the authors of the report were in a position to describe and analyze the operations, and to criticize and recommend corrective measures as well. It is possible that some of the recommendations included in the report were acted upon later. Additional reports about the collective hamlets after 1937 are available (eight have been translated and are included in Part 3 of this study), but are fragmentary; no other publication is as comprehensive as the departmental report.

The Japanese experimented with the idea of collective hamlets in Manchuria in 1933, but at that time the primary emphasis was on rehabilitating refugee farmers from the war-torn area. As the insurgents began to display tenacity and resilience, it became necessary for the Japanese to devise special techniques, especially when the insurgents turned to guerrilla tactics after two years of costly conventional warfare. It also became evident to the Japanese that the guerrillas depended on the local people for supplies and information. In many areas, the guerrillas established effective networks of supporting organizations. Thus the collective hamlet program was adopted as a measure, principally military, for isolating or quarantining the guerrillas by separating them from the rest of the

population.

The large-scale collective hamlet program seems to have been initiated in December 1934 in an orderly fashion and with considerable preparation. The number of hamlets, however, quickly multiplied, and exceeded the goal of 1,000 within two years. By the end of 1937, some 5,500,000 people had moved into 10,629 hamlets. This trend continued for another two or three years. If we consider the fact that these relocations of population took place in the hinterlands and at a time when fierce battles were being waged, we can appreciate the extent to which the hamlet program was a forced movement. The official investigators reported: "Many collectivization operations are carried on without adequate preparation, and most of these are not included in previous plans" (p. 60 of the text. Emphasis added).

The reasons behind these hasty operations are obvious. First, the collective hamlets had become the cornerstone of the antiguerrilla operations in Manchuria, and just as on any other battlefield, military considerations took precedence over all others. For most of the Japanese army officers in Manchuria, the counter guerrilla war was simply an extension of the previous conventional warfare, the collective hamlet program having grown out of the special circumstances created by the war. Evidently, the Kwantung Army did not instruct the officers and troops that the counterinsurgent warfare they were engaged in was a different kind of war, in which socioeconomic and political factors must be given as much attention as orthodox military ones. Even the military command in charge of counterinsurgency operations seemed to have had no

awareness, at least up to 1937, of the different kind of war it was engaged in. Thus, while the collective hamlet program was adopted as a major instrument of counterinsurgent warfare, the responsibilities for construction and administration of the hamlets were left to the underfinanced and undermanned civilian authorities of Manchukuo. The armed forces were allowed to proceed to the hinterlands and destroy whatever houses they found; it was the responsibility of the civilian officials to relocate the homeless farmers and provide them with housing, food, and other amenities, as well as with land to till. At the same time, it was expected that the farmers would be placed in the guarded confines of collective hamlets in order to separate them from the guerrillas.

Naturally, the civil authorities could not meet the sudden demands that were put on them, and the farmers had to bear the consequences. In the discussion of counterinsurgent activities in Manchuria in Part 1, I have cited some examples of the farmers' sufferings. A part of the report reproduced here analyzes the defects of the hamlets. The authors noted that the impulsive actions of the army not only hindered the pacification activities but also adversely affected the military operations. The Japanese (and Manchukuo) armed forces became the target of people's enmity--a development on which the insurgents thrived.

In order to minimize the ill effects of the hamlet program, the report recommended the creation of a strong agency, headed by the officer in charge of the army operations, which should be capable of fulfilling the functions of control, guidance, and liaison between the army's mopping-up operations and the civilian government's

collectivization program. A similar agency had been created in 1936 in one sector. We do not know whether the 1938 recommendation was adopted, but in any event, the value of such an agency could not be overemphasized.

I have asserted previously that, although highly desirable, it is not essential to win the active support of the majority of the affected population in order to win a war against insurgents. But in an area infested by insurgents, it is essential to neutralize the population. No doubt the physical separation of the guerrillas from the masses is a necessary step in this direction, but it will be self-defeating if it is accompanied by the strong antagonism of the population. As R. C. Nairn has so aptly stated: "A balance must be struck between measures aimed at destroying the guerrillas and the maintenance (or creation in some cases) of stable and progressive conditions in the community."¹

The report translated here is particularly valuable in that its authors accepted Nairn's cardinal principle of counterinsurgency in analyzing the collective hamlets in Manchuria. In this sense they were atypical of the Japanese army officers. The report is also based on the assumption that the collective hamlet program is an essential element in the counterinsurgency operation. The focus of the report is on the "secondary function" of the hamlets: the relationship between the construction of the

¹"Counter guerrilla Warfare in Southeast Asia," in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 417.

hamlets and the farmers' livelihood. The principal questions asked are how the sudden concentration of the farmers affects their livelihood, how the defects of the program can be eliminated, and what good use might be made of the hamlets in terms other than military. Although a case study of a hamlet reveals how the hamlets were constructed, the report does not go into the technical aspects of the physical construction. The report is essentially socio-economic in nature. Its principal findings can be summarized as follows.

For the farmers, the destructive aspects of the hamlets were: reduction in the scale of farming and increased primitiveness of farming methods, as exemplified in the reduction of the area of agricultural cultivation and the decrease in farm implements and draft animals; reduction in land owned by the farmers and increase in rented land and the number of tenant farmers; longer distances to be traveled to reach the farms; increase in village expenditures and compulsory labor; increase in debts; and greater poverty for the farmers. The two progressive aspects of the hamlets were reduction in the rate of tenant fees and elimination of the incidental burdens formerly put on tenants by landlords.

In order to eliminate the apparent defects of the hamlets, it was recommended that (1) the construction of hamlets should be kept to the absolute minimum required, (2) the hamlets should be dissolved when the basic purpose of security was attained in the area, (3) there should be better planning, and (4) management of government loans should be rationalized.

Based on the experience in the collective hamlets, a

limited extent of agrarian reform was recommended. Specifically, reduction of tenant fees and stabilization of the rights of the tenants were stressed. The following statement is particularly noteworthy: "If one reflects on the fact that one of the causes for the rise of Communist bandits is the harsh exploitation by the landlords and the destitution of the peasants, it becomes obvious that there is urgent need for reforms..." (p. 70). This was, of course, an oversimplified analysis of the basis for Communist strength in Manchuria, but it reveals the philosophy behind the recommendations.

In purely military terms, the collective hamlet program did accomplish its purpose in Manchuria. It did so particularly because the armed forces pursued all their goals ruthlessly and mercilessly. But the Japanese were not engaged in a purely military war. It is quite likely that their ruthless execution of the collective hamlet program added impetus to the guerrilla movement.

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VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF
COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Collective hamlets were first established in Chientao Province by the Korean Government General in 1933 for the purpose of settling Korean refugees in the area. After the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931, many Koreans fled from the hinterlands to the commercial sections of Chientao, Hunchun, and other safe zones to avoid the rampant and tyrannical bandits of military, Communist, and other backgrounds and origins. Some of the refugees, unable to return to their original places of residence, were selected to construct collective hamlets. The purpose of the collective hamlets was to facilitate the return of the refugee to farming, thereby stabilizing their livelihood, and to develop them eventually to be landed [or self-employed] farmers. By concentrating various facilities on these hamlets, it was hoped that they would become models for farming hamlets in the future.

The establishment of collective hamlets gradually enhanced the people's faith in government protection and in the hamlets' own self-defense corps. The security condition in the areas surrounding the collective hamlets improved remarkably. The number of those returning to farming in the vicinity became substantial, and some of those outside the hamlets voluntarily offered to help in the construction of the hamlets or offered to share the expenses of the self-defense corps. Thus, the collective hamlets had a favorable influence on the stabilization of the livelihood of the farmers and contributed greatly

toward pacification of the long restless populace.

In the hinterlands, however, where the prestige of the Imperial Army and the government authorities did not penetrate, bandits appeared frequently and peaceable citizens continued to flee to urban areas. The situation required immediate action.

Because of the great results accomplished by the first group of collective hamlets in restoring peace, the Kwantung Army proposed the construction of a second group. In the course of further consultations between the Korean Government-General and the military authorities, plans for setting up the second group of collective hamlets were formulated in 1934.

Thus the contribution of collective hamlets toward public security was recognized, and subsequently there was a rapid increase in the number of hamlets throughout the disturbed areas of Manchuria. The number of hamlets established or planned by 1936 is shown in Table 1.

Collective hamlets were established with the following two objectives:

1. Maintenance of public security: separation of the bandits from the populace through the elimination of scattered houses in remote areas and the strengthening of the self-defense capability of the peasants.

2. Improvement of the peasants' livelihood: development of agrarian economy, education, culture, and an administrative system.

The purposes of the collective hamlets in Chientao Province were stated by the provincial government as follows:

Table 1
COLLECTIVE HAMLETS, ESTABLISHED AND PLANNED, 1936-1938

Province	Collective Hamlets						Total
	Prefec- tures Concerned	Estab- lished by April 1936	Planned for 1936	Planned for 1937	Planned for 1938	Total	
Pinchiang	28	48	514	880	17	1,459	
Chilin	12	767	618	254	178	1,817	
Chientao	5	101	24	-	-	125	
Fengtien	13	51	120	34	11	215	
Antung	8	49	100	50	16	215	
Lungchiang	6	13	709	15	14	751	
Hsing-an-nan	1	330	11	-	-	341	
Sanchaign	13	-	83	-	-	83	
Chinchow	6	-	23	-	-	23	
Total	92	1,359	2,202	1,233	236	5,030	

Editor's Note: Totals in this and subsequent tables have been corrected when found inaccurate in the original text.

Scattered settlement [of the farmers] in remote areas was inevitable at the initial period of immigration, but the irrational nature of this [manner of settlement] is obvious today. The farmers may have been satisfied simply to till the land and lead an easy and comfortable life. However, since they live in the modern era and are citizens of a modern nation, they should not be able to enjoy the benefits of civilization in industry, education, or economy. Moreover, since last spring [1933], bandits of military and Communist backgrounds have engaged in wanton looting and plundering, taking advantage of the scattered dwelling places, and no resistance has been possible, owing to the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. People were deprived of their property and in many instances suffered the loss of their lives. The forces of the Japanese-Manchurian army and police were frustrated on many occasions because the authorities were not able to detect and apprehend recalcitrant elements who committed various atrocities. The territory was too large for a small number of government and army personnel. Such a situation cannot be tolerated from either the state or society. For this reason, as a means of promoting security and as a relief measure for the victims, plans have been formed to encourage the now scattered people to live in groups.

The purposes of collective hamlets in Sanchiang Province were stated as follows:

Significance in terms of public security:

1. The sustenance and expansion of the achievements of the military mopping-up operations.
2. The endowment and strengthening of defense capability through the concentration of residences.
3. The severance of bandits' channels of food supply through the eradication of

the scattered hamlets in the bandit zones, thus bringing about the self-annihilation of the bandits.

4. The breakdown of the ties between the bandits and the populace through strengthening the consciousness of self-defense.
5. The establishment of an intelligence network.

Significance in terms of economy:

1. The establishment of partially cooperative economic organizations as a result of the concentration of population. (The realization of cooperative organization.)
2. Positive guidance in agriculture.

The Pinchiang provincial government stated the purposes of the collective hamlets as follows:

The protection of life and property by the government through the consolidation of scattered residents of the remote areas and the installation of defense facilities. At the same time, the complete separation of the people from the bandits to enable the people to enjoy rays of culture, to form advanced economic, moral, and social organizations, and simultaneously to let the masses fully recognize the benefit of the new state [of Manchukuo].

The security functions of the collective hamlets do not require further elaboration. Collective hamlets were widely established primarily because they ably fulfilled the function of maintaining public security. The following observations will be made under the assumption that the construction of collective hamlets is an essential condition for the realization of security.

The core of the problem lies in the secondary function of the collective hamlets: that is, the relationship between the construction of collective hamlets and the improvement of the peasants' lives. The problems, in other words, are (1) how the sudden concentration of the heretofore scattered residences affect peasant life; (2) how the defects, if any, can be eliminated; and (3) how the future development of rural villages can be brought about upon such a foundation.

The Chientao area can be mentioned as an area in which the construction of collective hamlets has been most successful. The collective hamlet program originated there, and the success of the program, due partly to the positive participation of the Koreans, who constitute the majority of the population of the province, is famous. In the following section, collective hamlets in Chientao will be examined as a source of data for the solution of future problems.

IX. THE COLLECTIVE HAMLETS IN CHIENTAO PROVINCE

General Policies

MAJOR PRINCIPLES IN GUIDING COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Appointment of Central Guiding Leaders

A head and an assistant head shall be appointed in each hamlet. The head of a hamlet shall concurrently hold the position of the head of chia in the neighborhood system (the paochia system) in accordance with the law pertaining to the joint responsibility of the neighborhood. The assistant head of the hamlet shall be the chief of the self-defense corps. These officers shall be appointed by the governor of the prefecture (hsien) on the basis of recommendation from the villagers.

Guidance in Ideology

The law pertaining to the joint responsibility of the neighborhood shall be thoroughly enforced in order to repel subversive ideas. The Society of Bright Virtues (Ming Te Hui) shall be organized to promote ethics and morals. Moral training shall be provided and the method of ruling one's own household shall be taught in order to promote habits of good morals and manners, which will eventually result in the attainment of tranquil life and enjoyment of one's profession. The following shall be stressed in this connection: mutual assistance in virtuous works, exchange of civilities, mutual correction of errors, and mutual relief of sufferings.

Encouragement of Industry

In order to promote the economy of the hamlets and to

stabilize the livelihood of the residents, it is necessary to diversify agriculture. However, since most of the hamlets are located in mountainous areas, this cannot be encouraged as a general principle. Therefore, selection of the kinds of products to be produced should be made according to the environment, differentiating between the primary products or work and the sideline products. Every effort should be made to avoid crop failure or other calamities. Joint work [or teamwork] should be encouraged as much as possible and small-scale cooperatives of the Japanese industrial-cooperative type should be organized. The use and sale of the products should be regulated to mutually benefit the residents as a whole.

Promotion of Education

Education and Guarantee of Livelihood of the Members of the Self-defense Corps

With regard to education of the members, each hamlet shall constitute a basic unit of defense and, applying the principle of universal membership, every young man in the hamlet shall be trained [militarily] and educated. The [active] membership shall rotate among these young men on a yearly basis. Under the guidance and supervision of the Police Guidance Officers of the prefecture, the members of the corps shall receive training at least three times a year.

With regard to guarantee of livelihood, this shall be guaranteed to the members of the corps so that they will be able to devote themselves to their duties without worry and so that they may fulfill their duty for defense with loyalty and diligence. First, the total produce from

three hsiang shall be allocated to each member of the corps.¹ Lands allocated for this purpose shall be tilled collectively by the members of the hamlet. Second, in hamlets where such possibilities [in terms of the availability of land] do not exist, five to ten sheng [pints] of corn, millet, or kaoliang shall be collected from each household for each corps member in the hamlet and distributed among the corps members. Third, clothing of the corps members shall be supplied by the hamlet in addition to the above provisions.

Subsidy for the Stabilization of Livelihood

Although as a rule each hamlet should be self-sufficient, this cannot be attained until the foundations are solidified. The sympathy and protection of both the government and the people are needed. The subsidy shall take the following forms: (1) Unreclaimed lands belonging to the state and lands belonging to missing owners shall be allowed to be reclaimed and cultivated, and the entire crop shall remain with the cultivators. (2) When lands owned by civilians are cultivated, agreement should be made with the landlord, with rent fixed, for the time being, below 30 percent of the total crop. (3) In forest areas, lumber privileges shall be granted to the members of the hamlets in order to promote their income. Government authorities shall, within their power, arrange ways to

¹Editor's note: One hsiang is equal to approximately one acre or a piece of land that can be sown in one day. The original does not specify whether members of the corps in reserve--those not on active duty that year--were to receive the same treatment as the others, but most likely only those in active service were given crops.

collect wood for fuel without compensation. (4) Arrangements shall be made to assist small-scale cultivation of opium.² (5) When seedlings and breeding animals are available for distribution by the government, priority rights shall be granted to the hamlets. (6) Measures shall be taken to provide loans at minimum interest rates for business or subsidiary business purposes.

Fostering the Feeling of Attachment to the Hamlets

SELECTION OF LAND AND VILLAGERS

Criteria in the Selection of Land

The location [should be in an area] where fuel and building materials are easily obtainable. An average of five to ten acres of land per family shall be available within a distance of five Chinese li³ from the location. The site for the hamlet should be in the center of the farmland; it should not be skewed to either side. The hamlet should be located on high ground and the land should be dry and safe from flood. It should also supply potable water. The position should be advantageous for defense against attacks by bandits.

Criteria in the Selection of Villagers

Villagers should be sound in ideology and of diligent nature. They should have actual experience in agricultural cultivation. The hamlet as a whole should contain those qualified to be members of the self-defense corps.

²Editor's note: Cultivation of opium was forbidden in Chientao after 1936.

³Editor's note: One Chinese li is equivalent to 1,890 feet. The "Conference on the Third Collective Hamlets," 1936, extended the distance to ten Chinese li.

ACCOMMODATION OF FUNDS

Supply of Funds

The necessary amount in a prefecture shall be borrowed from the central bank or other financial institutions on the responsibility of the prefectural governor. The loans shall be provided for a four-year period. The interest on a loan shall be less than 0.7 percent per month, and it shall be computed in accordance with the Bank Accounting Law.

Regulations Concerning Subsidy Loans

Funds shall be loaned to assist the collective hamlets within the following bounds: for moving of houses or for construction of new houses: less than 50 yen per household; for agricultural cultivation: less than 20 yen per household.

Applications for loans require at least two guarantors with established credit who reside in the city, town, or village, and have immovable properties valued at more than 200 yen. In the event the guarantors own properties valued at less than 200 yen, five guarantors are required. The appropriate village heads or neighborhood heads (heads of chia) shall collect loans from the entire village or neighborhood, and shall submit collections to the prefectural governor by the end of August of each year. The term for repayment of loans shall be by installments for three years, and both the principal and interest shall be repaid by the end of August and November of each year. Those who have received loans and are negligent in repayment willfully or through carelessness will be charged overdue interest at a rate not exceeding 0.2 percent a month in addition to the fixed interest.

In order to facilitate the repayment of loans, repayment cooperatives shall be established in each village, and savings shall be deposited at the nearest financial institutions at the following rate in proportion to each person's income: 20 percent of gross agricultural output, 50 percent of the sales of opium, and 10 percent of wages or other income from sideline works.

CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Under the plans described above, collective hamlets have been constructed continuously since 1934. The progress of the program is indicated in Tables 2 to 6.

Table 2
NUMBER OF COLLECTIVE HAMLETS AND ACCOMMODATED FAMILIES

Construction Projects ^a	Number of Hamlets	Total Number of Families to be Accommodated	Average Number of Families to be Accommodated per Hamlet	Actual Number of Families Accommodated
1st group (1934)	25	2,504	100	2,397
2nd group (1935)	28	3,650	130	3,032
Additional construction for the 2nd group	7	-	-	-
Construction subsequent to special public security operation (Fall 1935)	12	-	-	-
3rd group (1936)	24	2,650	110	-

NOTE: The 1st project is as of May 1935. The 2nd project is as of the end of September 1935. The dates of the additional (or supplementary) construction to the 2nd project and the 3rd project are based on estimation.

^aEditor's Note: Dates given in this column refer to the time when projects were launched.

Table 3

EXPENDITURES FOR THE COMMON FACILITIES, COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Construction Projects	Distribution of Expenditures (in yen)							Total Expenditures per Hamlet
	Number of Hamlets	Common Residences and Other Facilities	Self-defense Corps (training and clothing only)	Purchase and Transportation of Weapons, Ammunition, and Sundry Items	Guidance and Supervision	Total		
1st group (1934)	25	9,600	7,000	-	3,000	19,600	784	
2nd group (1935)	28	34,400	11,000	1,871	3,798	51,069	1,823	
Additional construction for the 2nd group	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Construction subsequent to special security operation (Fall, 1935)	12	6,682	-	1,238	1,080	9,000	750	
3rd group (1936)	24	20,710	2,940	9,265	2,940	35,855	1,494	

Table 4
SUBSIDIES FOR COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Construction Projects	Estimated Number of Households (families) to be Accommodated	Distribution of Subsidies (in yen)					Total subsidies per Household
		House Construction	Agricultural Management	Total	House Construction per Household	Agricultural Management per Household	
1st group (1934)	2,504	125,200	50,080	175,280	50	20	70
2nd group (1935)	3,650	182,500	73,000	255,500	50	20	70
3rd group (1936)	2,650	Subsidies will be less than 70 yen per household (for house construction and agricultural management) and they will be increased or decreased according to financial capability; unitary lending that was practiced in the past will be avoided.					

Table 5
AREA OF CULTIVATION AND NUMBER OF DRAFT ANIMALS

Construction Projects	Number of Households Accommodated	Area of Cultivation (acre)	Area of Cultivation per Household (acre)	Number of Draft Animals (head) ^a	Number of Draft Animals per Household ^a
1st group ^b	2,397	15,016	6.3	2,267	0.95
2nd group ^c	3,032	13,832	4.5	2,350	0.78

^aDraft animals include cattle, horses, mules and donkeys.

^bAs of May 1935.

^cAs of the end of September 1935.

Table 6
SELF-DEFENSE CORPS

Construction Projects	Number of Villages	Number of Self-defense Corps Members	Number of Arms	Ammunition
1st group	25	384	376	-
2nd group	28	811	597	-

Summary of Investigation of Actual Conditions
in a Collective Hamlet: A Case Study

GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE HAMLET

Name: Chung-p'ing Village Collective Hamlet.

Location: Approximately 8 kilometers north of the railroad station of Ch'a't'iao'kou (Yenchi Prefecture), on the Changchun-Tumen railroad.

Construction process: The construction was started on April 22, 1935. The earthen wall was completed on May 1. Houses were constructed sometime in July. This hamlet is one of the second group of collective hamlets.

Number of households accommodated: 107 Korean and 5 Chinese families. An additional 28 Korean families live outside of the earthen wall, but are under the jurisdiction of the hamlet.

Funds: No subsidy has been issued for the common facilities of this hamlet. Of the 7,000 yen loan received for agriculture and for the construction of houses, 1,850 yen were spent for common facilities, 1,050 yen for laborers' food and clothing at the time of construction. The remaining 5,150 yen were lent to the members of the hamlet as capital for farming and for construction of houses.

The loans are to be repaid in installments within four years. Six persons form a unit responsible for each other's debts. Their houses are mortgaged collectively. Those completing their payments are released from this joint responsibility.

Labor required for common facilities: 3,300 cumulative workdays (approximately 300 persons worked for 11 days; approximately 100 additional persons were mobilized

from outside the hamlet to assist construction, but they were provided with meals only).

Self-defense Corps: Membership is compulsory for all males between the ages of eighteen and forty years. The corps is headed by the head of the hamlet. Only three corpsmen are on full-time duty at present, and these rotate on five-day shifts. The expenses of the self-defense corps are financed by the collective cultivation of the villagers of 8,000 tsubo [a tsubo is equivalent to 3.306 square meters; 1,800 tsubo equal one acre] rented from the landowners at 30 percent of crop rent. In addition to this, about 15 yen a month are collected from the villagers according to their financial capability. Corps weapons consist of 8 rifles and 30 rounds of ammunition.

Chientao Riots: There were forty to fifty farming families at the present site of the collective hamlet before the Chientao riots of May 1930. The families either were murdered by the rioters or they turned into bandits or fled the village. There were also approximately 100 families in the surrounding hills and valleys, but none of them remain at present.

SCALE OF AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT

Acreage of Cultivated Land

The following statistics (Tables 7-32) were compiled on the 107 families residing within the confines of the earthen wall of the village of Chung-ping and engaged in farming. Out of the total of 112 families in the hamlet, three families are not engaged in farming (two self-defense corps members and one blacksmith) and one family is farming only part time (partly engaged in masonry work). Five families were not available for investigation

at the time of compilation, September 17, 1936.

According to Table 7, the area of cultivation per family is 7,010 tsubo, or 3.9 acres, and this is far from the five to ten acres established as the norm in selecting the land for collective hamlets. According to the villagers, it is necessary to till at least 10,000 tsubo of rented land under the present conditions (characteristics of soil, taxes, etc.) in order to sustain a five- to six-member family (the average size of a family in this hamlet is 6.4 members). The average of 3.9 acres is remarkably small in comparison with the average of 4.7 acres in Chientao. In comparison with 9,234 tsubo of tilled land before the migrations, there is a decrease of 24 percent, revealing the intensification of the shortage of land due to migration into the collective hamlet. (See p.)

One family that was not included in Table 7 was of "fire-field farmer" origin. "Fire field farmer" refers to transitory farmers moving from one unreclaimed plot to another, abandoning the plot upon depletion of the soil.

According to Table 8, more than 30 percent of the families cultivate small plots of fewer than 5,000 tsubo [2.8 acres]. Furthermore, when comparison was made between the conditions before and after migration, in both cases the families cultivating more than 5,000 tsubo but less than 10,000 tsubo are the most numerous. Table 8 also reveals, however, that those cultivating more than 10,000 tsubo have decreased in number after migration, and the number of those cultivating fewer than 5,000 tsubo have increased after migration.

Table 7
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
ACREAGE OF CULTIVATED LAND

Period	Total Acreage of Cultivation (in <u>tsubo</u>)	Number of Farming Households	Acreage of Cultivation per Family (in <u>tsubo</u>)
Present	724,800	103	7.010
Before migration ^a	785,900	85	9,234

^a"Before migration" refers to the time before the construction of the collective hamlet. The acreage of cultivated land before migration was calculated on 85 families out of the 103 families. Two families that were not included in this total were former agricultural laborers. Other families engaged in nonagricultural occupations were as follows:

Commerce	3
Transportation laborers.	2
Gold-mine laborers	2
Members of self-defense corps.	5
Carpenter.	1
Earthware worker	1
Unemployed	1
Total	<u>15</u>

Table 8
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
AGRICULTURAL AND NONAGRICULTURAL POPULATION

Occupation	Number before Migration	Percent of Total	Present Number	Percent of Total
Landowners (by size of farm):				
Over 20,000 <u>tsubo</u>	6	6.9	2	1.9
10,000-20,000 <u>tsubo</u>	32	36.8	28	27.2
5,000-10,000 <u>tsubo</u>	37	42.5	40	38.8
2,000-5,000 <u>tsubo</u>	8	9.1	24	23.3
Under 2,000 <u>tsubo</u>	2	2.3	9	8.7
Agricultural laborers	2	2.3	-	-
Nonagricultural workers	16	-	-	-
Total	103	100.0	103	100.0

Table 9 compares only the 87 families who had engaged in farming before moving into the hamlet, to provide a more accurate basis of comparison.

Table 9
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
AGRICULTURAL POPULATION ONLY

Occupation	Number before Migration	Percent of Total	Present Number	Percent of Total
Landowners (by size of farm):				
Over 20,000 <u>tsubo</u>	6	6.9	2	2.3
10,000-20,000 <u>tsubo</u>	32	36.8	24	27.6
5,000-10,000 <u>tsubo</u>	37	42.5	34	39.1
2,000-5,000 <u>tsubo</u>	8	9.1	18	20.5
Under 2,000 <u>tsubo</u>	2	2.3	9	10.3
Agricultural laborers	2	2.3	-	-
Total	87	100.0	87	100.0

Draft Animals and Farming Implements

According to Table 10, the number of draft animals owned by the farmers is only 0.56 per family. Not only is this a very small number, but there has been a decrease by about one half in comparison with the 90 heads before moving into the collective hamlet. Against the 60 percent of the families that owned draft animals before migration

(Table 11), only 44.7 percent of the families own draft animals at present. This decrease in the number of farming families owning draft animals and the decrease in the number of draft animals owned per family indicate the trend toward bankruptcy among the peasants, which is resulting in cruel and excessive use of human labor, and in primitive farming.

The possession of farming equipment as shown in Table 12 also indicates a similar trend. The rate of decrease in farming equipment is not as severe as that in draft animals, but whereas the average family ownership was 0.56 for carts and 0.69 for plows before migration, the respective ownership is now only 0.51 and 0.52. The number of farming families without draft animals increased from 43.5 to 48.5 percent in the case of carts, and from 30.6 to 47.5 percent in the case of plows. Those without animals or farming equipment must either rent them from owners in order to cultivate and transport their crops or substitute human labor for these purposes. The number of such families is as much as half of the entire farming families.

Table 10
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
OWNERSHIP OF DRAFT ANIMALS

Draft Animal	Total Number Owned before Migration	Total Number Owned at Present	Average Number Owned per Family	
			Before Migration ^a	Present
Horses	2	8		
Cattle	88	50		
Mules	-	-		
Donkeys	-	-		
Total	90	58	1.06	0.56

^aThe number of draft animals per family before migration was calculated on the basis of 85 farming families (excluding the two agricultural laborers from the 87 farming families).

Table 11
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
FAMILIES BASED ON THEIR POSSESSION OF DRAFT ANIMALS

Status of Family	Number of Families before Migration	Percent of Total Families	Present Number of Families	Percent of Total Families
Families with draft animals	51	60.0	46	44.7
Families without draft animals	34	40.0	57	55.3
Total	85	100.0	103	100.0

Table 12
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
OWNERSHIP OF FARMING EQUIPMENT

Equipment	Number before Migration	Present Number	Average Number Owned per Family ^a		Families without Farming Equipment	
			Before Migration	Present	Before Migration	Present
Carts	48	53	0.56	0.51	37 (43.5%)	59 (48.5%)
Plows	59	54	0.69	0.52	26 (30.6%)	49 (47.5%)

^aCalculated on the basis of 85 farming families before migration and 103 farming families after migration.

In summary, we found that the area of cultivation is extremely small and that the shortage of cultivated land has been further aggravated by the construction of the collective hamlet. Draft animals and farming equipment are in short supply; they have decreased in number after the migration into the collective hamlet. The increased proportion of families without draft animals and farming equipment has forced the poorer families to depend on others for cultivation and transportation, or has resulted in the harsher use of human labor and primitive agricultural practices. Thus the construction of collective hamlets has brought about a retrogressive trend in agriculture and a destructive tendency in the agricultural economy.

Distance from Residences to Farms

The distance from the residences to the farms is comparatively short in this hamlet because, as has been noted before, this hamlet was constructed on the site of a sizable village, which existed prior to the Chientao riots of 1930. According to Table 13, the majority of farms are located within 5 li and only in 7 cases are the farms farther than 5 li. The standard for the selection of land (within 5 li) has generally been observed.

When the present commuting distance is compared with that between the houses and the farms before migration into the hamlet, however, the distance today is farther than before. The cases involving farmers commuting from Chatiaokou were caused by exceptional circumstances and, therefore, should be excluded from our comparison. Before the migration, about half of the farms were located within 1 li [approximately 0.4 kilometers] of the farmers' own houses; at present the percentage within such a short

distance is only 34.2. In contrast, the farms within the distance of 3 to 5 li have increased. The farms located at great distances require much more extra time and energy for both cultivation and transportation of crops, thereby decreasing efficiency in agriculture.

Table 13
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
DISTANCE TO BE COMMUTED TO FARMS

Distance	Persons Commuting from Own Houses to Farms before Migration		Persons Commuting from Hamlet to Assigned Plots	
	Number of Cases	Percent of Total	Number of Cases	Percent of Total
Less than 1 <u>li</u> ^a	47	50.5	40	34.2
1 to 3 <u>li</u>	21	22.6	45	38.4
3 to 5 <u>li</u>	14	15.1	25	21.4
5 to 10 <u>li</u>	8 ^b	8.6	7	6.0
Over 10 <u>li</u>	3 ^b	3.2	0	0
Total	93	100.0	117	100.0

^aEditor's note: One Chinese li is equal to approximately 0.4 kilometers.

^bThese figures indicate the families who had cultivated the land near the present locale of the hamlet before construction of the hamlet, but had been forced to move to Chatiaokou because of danger from bandits. They commuted from Chatiaokou to their farms.

Condition of Land Ownership

According to Table 14, approximately 70 percent of the land cultivated at present by the farming families of the hamlet is rented. In comparison with conditions before the construction of the collective hamlet, the farmers tilling their own land have decreased from 40.8 to 32.0 percent and the tenant farmers have increased in the same proportion. According to Table 15, four landlord families rented 53,760 tsubo of land before migration, whereas at present one family rents 18,000 tsubo. The others were compelled by the difficult environment to dispose of their land before moving into the hamlet. Table 16 reveals clearly the trend for farmers to degenerate into a tenant-farmer status. The landed [self-employed] farmers decreased from 27.6 percent before migration to 15.5 percent after. In contrast, the tenant farmers have increased from 51.7 to 59.3 percent, and those with some land of their own but renting land from others [partial tenants] increased from 18.4 to 25.2 percent.

Table 14
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
OWNERSHIP AND RENTAL OF LAND

Status of Land	Acreage before Migration (in <u>tsubo</u>)	Percent of Total	Present Acreage (in <u>tsubo</u>)	Percent of Total
Owned	320,800	40.8	231,300	32.0
Rented	465,100	59.2	493,500	68.0
Total	785,900	100.0	724,800	100.0

Table 15
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
RATIO OF LANDLORDS TO AMOUNT OF LAND RENTED

Period	Number of Landlords	Area Rented (in <u>tsubo</u>)
Present	1	18,000
Before migrati ^o n.	4	53,760

Table 16
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF FARMERS

Employment Status	Number before Migration	Percent of Total	Present Number	Percent of Total
Self-employed farmers	24	27.6	16	15.5
Partial tenant farmers ^a	16	18.4	26	25.2
Pure tenant farmers	45	51.7	61	59.3
Agricultural laborers	2	2.3	-	-
Total	87	100.0	103	100.0

^aOwn some land but rent others' property.

Table 17 reveals the increase in farmers without land. Even among those who own land, the number of those owning small plots of fewer than 5,000 tsubo has increased, while those with more than 10,000 tsubo has decreased.

Table 17
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
OWNERSHIP OF LAND

Farmers	Number before Migration	Percent of Total	Present Number	Percent of Total
Landowners (by size of property):				
Under 2,000 <u>tsubo</u>	-	-	2	4.8
2,000-5,000 <u>tsubo</u>	7	17.5	16	38.1
5,000-10,000 <u>tsubo</u>	20	50.0	17	40.1
10,000-20,000 <u>tsubo</u>	11	27.5	7	16.7
20,000 or more <u>tsubo</u>	2	5.0	-	-
Subtotal	40	100.0	42	100.0
Farm laborers without land	47		61	
Total	87		103	

Tenant Fees

The tenant-fee system prevailing in this hamlet is that of dividing the crops at the end of harvest rather than that of paying a fixed quantity of the crops. There were four cases of the fixed tenant-fee system among these farmers before their moving into the hamlet, but there is only one case under that system at present. The rates of tenant fees are shown in Table 18.

Table 18
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
RATES OF TENANT FEES

Rates	Number of Cases before Migration	Percent of Total	Number of Cases at Present	Percent of Total
30/70 ratio ^a	6	11.7	68	80.3
40/60 ratio	7	11.7	12	13.9
50/50 ratio	46	76.6	5	5.8
Total	59	100.0	86 ^b	100.0

^aEditor's Note: 30/70 ratio indicates 30 percent of the crop is paid as a tenant fee, and so on.

^bIn addition to this number, there are three cases in which no tenant fee is charged. In one case, the landlord is missing, and in the other two cases, tenant fees are excluded for the reason that the farmers reclaimed the land. Before migration there were two exemptions of tenant fees due to reclamation. One was exempt for three years and the other for five years.

According to Table 18, the 30/70 ratio of division is overwhelmingly practiced at present. The other ratios are limited to special cases; either the contracts were signed before the tenants joined the collective hamlet or the landlords pay for farm implements, draft animals, seeds, and food. It can be said, therefore, that the policy of the Chientao Provincial Government on tenant fees (30 percent) is being adhered to comparatively well. Since 76.6 percent of the tenant farmers were on the 50/50 ratio before joining the hamlet, it can be said that the obligations on the part of tenant farmers have been remarkably

reduced. Table 19 presents the labor and materials offered by the tenants to the landlords in addition to the tenant fees paid. It was customary for some of the tenant farmers to carry and thresh the crops for the landlords in addition to sharing the harvest. A few others paid the land tax. These practices were eliminated in the collective hamlet.

Table 19
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
ADDITIONAL BURDENS OF TENANT FARMERS

Labor and Taxes	Number of Cases before Migration	Number of Cases at Present
Transportation work	5	None
Grain threshing	8	None
Payment of land tax for one full year	2	
Payment of land tax for one-half year	1	

The rate of tenant fees in the collective hamlet has been determined through meetings of the representatives of landlords and tenant farmers, with the prefectural government serving as the moderator. Contracts are signed on an individual basis, but the practice of collective bargaining was effective in preventing undue exploitation on the part of the landlords. In comparison with the pre-hamlet conditions, this is an improvement, in itself.

Public Imposts and Other Burdens

According to Table 20, the number of days of compulsory labor was increased about fivefold in the collective

hamlet. This is, of course, a temporary phenomenon and is due to the construction of the hamlet, but, nevertheless, it severely affected the economy of the farmers. For instance (as shown in Table 21), in spite of the fact that the scale of farming has been reduced and the number of permanent employees decreased, the number of day workers hired has increased. This is indicative of the fact that as a result of the increased demand for compulsory labor, a shortage of manpower occurred in the busy farming season, and the farmers were forced to hire day laborers to fill the need. Also, the possibility of the farmers earning supplementary income during their leisure season has been greatly reduced.

Table 20
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
PUBLIC IMPOSTS AND OTHER BURDENS DURING A YEAR^a

Impost	Cumulative Total		Average per Household	
	Before Migration	Present	Before Migration	Present
Compulsory labor (days)	700700	3,598	9.6	49.3
Village or hamlet dues (yen)	594.60	1,436.58	8.15	19.68
Public imposts other than above (yen)	441.00	321.51	6.04	4.40

^aThis study was made on the 73 families that had exact figures on village or hamlet expenses, taxes, and the number of days of compulsory labor before migration. The data for the present imposts represent the annual average of the entire period of the hamlet's existence. There were only a few families (two before migration and one at present) that paid land taxes. The land tax, therefore, is not included in the item "Public imposts other than above."

Table 21
EFFECT OF MIGRATION ON
LABOR

Basis	Before Migration	Present
Yearly labor (or permanent)	2 men	1 man
Hired day labor (cumulative)	80 days	203 days

Because of the poverty of the farmers, only two families paid land taxes before moving into the hamlet, and none paid afterward. The major part of the public imposts paid by the farmers is for village or hamlet expenditures, and the amount paid at present is double the amount they paid before entering the hamlet. This condition probably will continue for some time. Public imposts other than the village expenditures have been somewhat reduced, but it is not clear whether the actual tax assessment has been reduced. Since all these figures are based on the actual amount paid by the farmers, there may very well have been uncollected taxes. The officially appraised amount of taxes is not known.

As shown in Table 22, almost every family is in debt. Tables 23 and 24 show the details of loans from the government for farming and the construction of houses.

Table 22
INDEBTEDNESS OF FAMILIES

Number of families with debts	99
Number of families without debts.	9
Total	103

Table 23
LOANS FROM THE GOVERNMENT FOR
FARMING AND CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSES

Total amount of loans (in <u>yen</u>)	5,867.00
Amount repaid (in <u>yen</u>)	125.00
Amount of loan per family (of those indebted) (in <u>yen</u>)	69.85
Number of families with debts.	84
Number of families without debts	19

Table 24
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS FROM GOVERNMENT

Amount of Loan	Number of Families
20 yen or less	2
20-50 yen	6
50-80 yen	52
80-100 yen	24
100 yen or more	-
Total	84

As shown in Table 24, 84 out of 103 families received loans from the collective hamlets' subsidy funds at the ratio of approximately 70 yen per family. Of the total loans of 5,876 yen, only 125 yen have been repaid. The

major part remains as debt. The details are shown in Table 24.

The farmers also own considerable sums of money to the Finance Section of the Korea Residents Association and to individual usurers (Table 25). Aside from loans from the subsidy funds 66 percent of the families are indebted to either the Finance Section of the Residents Association or to individuals (moneylenders, landlords, etc.) (Table 26). The debt is 3,496 yen, or 52 yen per indebted family.

The amount borrowed during 1936 is 1,435 yen, or 41 percent of the total debts. The reasons behind the sudden increase of debts are the unfavorable crops of this year and expenses incurred in moving into the hamlet.

Table 25
FUNDS BORROWED FROM THE FINANCE SECTION OF
THE RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION AND INDIVIDUALS

Lender	Total Loans through 1936		Loans for 1936 Only		
	Number of Loans	Amount (yen)	Number of Loans	Amount (yen)	Percent of Total Loans
Finance Section	37	1,721	6	378	21.0
Individuals	42	1,775	31	1,057	59.5
Total	79	3,496	37	1,435	41.0

Table 26
INDEBTEDNESS OF FAMILIES TO
FINANCE SECTION OR INDIVIDUALS

Number of families with debts	67
Number of families without debts.	36
	<hr/>
Total	103

It should be noted that debts to individuals are larger than debts to the Finance Section of the Residents Association. The farmers are compelled to borrow on usurious terms from individuals because of their low credit ratings.

The total of the foregoing outstanding debts, including loans from government funds, is 9,238 yen, or 93.31 yen per family. When we consider the weak economic foundation of the hamlet, this debt is too heavy a burden for the farmers to bear.

According to Table 27, about half of the loans are from the Finance Section of the Residents Association, whose monthly interest rate is 1.35 percent. Individual loans are for the most part at monthly rates of 3 to 5 percent, or 36 to 60 percent per year, and some are even at a yearly rate of 60 percent. The weaker the economic base of the farmers, or the more poverty-stricken the farmers are, the more likely they are to become prey to the usurers.

Although the majority of the farming families owe money, there are only two creditors in the hamlet (Table 28). This shows that most borrowing is done outside the hamlet.

Table 27
DEBTS ACCORDING TO INTEREST RATE

Monthly Interest Rate (percent)	Amount of Debt (yen)	Percent of Total Debt	Remarks
1.35	1,721	49.1	Loans from the Finance Section of the Residents Association
2-3	305	8.7	
3-5	907	25.9	
5 or more	100	2.9	
Other	463	13.2	No interest or unfixed rates ^a
Total	3,496	100.0	

^aThese are the debts originally incurred in the form of foodstuffs. They were later converted to cash when the debtors were unable to return the borrowed foodstuffs.

Table 28
LOANS PROVIDED BY RESIDENTS OF THE HAMLET

Number of Loans	Amount of Loans (yen)	Monthly Interest Rate (percent)
1	50	1.3
1	50	1.35

Table 29
SALE OF CROPS IN 1935

Crop	Quantity Sold (in koku)
Soybeans	50.5
Rice	3.4
Barley	<u>1.0</u>
Total	54.9

Table 30
SALE OF CROPS BY FAMILY, 1935

Families with crops to sell	19
Families without crops to sell.	<u>84</u>
Total	103

Table 31
CROP SALES BY MONTH

Month of Sale	Number of Families Selling Crops
October 1935	1
November 1935	13
January 1936	<u>1</u>
Total	15

Table 32
FOOD SHORTAGES

Period	Number of Families	Period	Number of Families
November 1935	2	April 1936	8
December 1935	5	May 1936	13
January 1936	5	June 1936	17
February 1936	9	July 1936	9
March 1936	9		
Total number of families suffering food shortage 77			
Total number of families not suffering food shortage 26			
Grand total 103			

Farmers' Living Conditions

The year 1935 was one of extremely poor crops, following bad crops the preceding year. According to the villagers, last year's crop per acre was between 0.5 to 1.5 koku [one koku is equivalent to 5.12 bushels], whereas the usual crop per acre is approximately 3 koku. Therefore the total amount of crops sold by the farmers in the hamlet was only 54.9 koku (Table 29), or only 0.5 koku per family. Moreover, only 19 of the 103 families had surplus crops to sell, and the majority of the farmers had no crops to spare (Table 30). Even the farmers who had some surplus sold out before the end of the year, as shown in Table 31, and there was no family that could save crops until spring, when prices soar. That some farmers sold crops out of dire necessity is evident from the fact that 9 out of 19 families who sold crops later purchased grain because of the food shortage.

Bad crops this year make it difficult to estimate the condition of the farmers' livelihood in ordinary years. As shown in Table 32, however, families not suffering a shortage of food were only 26 out of 103, and all the others suffered from chronic shortage. Moreover, some families were short of food as early as November of 1935, and the number of families needing food increased gradually as the season progressed. It can also be seen that the early crops since August relieved the food problem somewhat.

There are about ten families in the hamlet that could not afford to build new houses and instead built half-arch-shaped houses with walls of mat rushes and mud. They were poverty stricken at the time of moving into the hamlet and hence used the loans issued for houses to buy food. These families cannot engage in farming because of lack of funds; therefore, the lands assigned to them lie waste while they manage to subsist only by working at day labor and collecting firewood. It is also reported that there are three missing families who have squandered their loans and fled from the hamlet.

Bad crops are not a rare phenomenon in Manchuria. One out of every four or five years is a year of bad crops. The problem lies in the fragile economic base of the farmers, who are immediately and fatally affected by natural calamities. In the underdeveloped state of agriculture, such calamities cannot be averted.

SUMMARY

Destructive Aspects of the Hamlet Program

We can observe in the Chungping village the following series of elements, destructive to agricultural economy, that are caused by the sudden change in the farmers'

situation through the construction of the collective hamlet: (1) reduction in the scale of farming and increased primitiveness of farming methods, as exemplified in the reduction of the area of agricultural cultivation and the decrease in farm equipment and draft animals; (2) reduction in land owned by the farmers, and increase in rented land and the number of tenant farmers; (3) longer distance to the farms; (4) increase in village expenditures and compulsory labor; (5) increase in debts; and (6) increased poverty of the farmers.

Progressive Aspects of the Hamlet Program

We can observe at the same time the following progressive factors: (1) reduction in the rate of tenant fees and (2) abolition of feudalistic arbitrary burdens on the tenants.

Such negative tendencies in the agricultural economy following the construction of the collective hamlets are not confined to Chientao, but are quite commonly observable throughout Manchuria. In places like Manchuria, where agriculture is still underdeveloped, the decisive elements that control the livelihood of the farmers pertain to the land itself. The areas haunted by bandits, where concentrations of houses are needed, are generally mountainous. The natural conditions dictate that only small clusters of families be congregated. But problems have been generated by the sudden concentration of farming families as a result of the collective hamlet program.

Extreme cases of conflicts between the construction of collective hamlets and the farmers' livelihood will be presented here for reference.

In Tungning-hsien the farmers who were ordered to

move into the collective hamlets had been maintaining their meager existence by cultivating their fields. When they were ordered to move to the designated sites, however, they found no land to till, because the area of reclaimed land adjacent to the new hamlet was very small. Moreover, the distance to the adjacent farms was considerable and would have required long hours of commuting. Therefore, a reduction in crops in the event of the farmers' entering the hamlet was clearly foreseeable. Furthermore, it would have been impossible to expect any crop within the same year of their moving to the new location, because a long time would have been required for reclaiming the wasteland and the authorities had ordered the move in spring, when sowing should already have been started. For the farmers without any savings, the loss of crops in that year would have meant the loss of the means to subsist. Therefore the farmers submitted a petition, reproduced below, entreating permission to continue farming in their original place of residence and promising to move into a new location after the harvest. Some residents have complained also that the construction of collective hamlets was a security-maintenance measure that only menaced the livelihood of the residents. They say that the government ought to concentrate its efforts upon exterminating the few scores of bandits instead of driving out the farmers from the land that they themselves have reclaimed. There are many who remain in their original places of residence, refusing to move to a collective hamlet.

Petition

We beg a thousand pardons for tearfully filing a petition, for feeling only small pains, while we farmers have been rescued from numerous

difficulties and are receiving the heavenly blessings and extolling the graceful virtues of government like that of the emperors Yao and Shun. And yet we sincerely wish that you would provide us with immense benevolence.

With embarrassment we point out that the whole area of Hu-lu-hsiang-wei is the place of our residence and that we have four hundred to five hundred acres of cultivated land; we support our parents and children with the income from this land. About fifteen days ago, Wu Chang-ching, the acting assistant chief of the village, suddenly forwarded the order for us to move into the collective hamlet at Nan-chuan-tzu-kou. We were surprised to learn about it for the first time; all the villagers began to cry like children taken away from the mother's breast.

There is a saying that the year's plan begins in the spring. If we should move into the collective hamlet and should spend our time building houses and reclaiming wasteland in this season of sowing, there would be no means for us to support the aged parents and children. We pray that you will take our pitiful situation into consideration, and kindly postpone our migration until this coming August. We pledge that we will move to the designated place without fail at that time. We submit our petition in the hope that you will extend your benevolent hand.

Dated 1936

People of Hu-lu-wei
Tungning-hsien
Pinchiang Province

The following statements and actions of the inhabitants in the same region were registered:

Statement of an unidentified Chinese farmer:

The reason that the farming masses live in the mountains and valleys is that they have reclaimed the wasteland there with their

precious sweat and attained stability of livelihood. It is impossible for them to respond to a sudden order to move to a collective hamlet. The government should allocate to the farmers cultivated land comparable to the farmers' reclaimed land.

Statement of an unidentified Chinese farmer:

Our present habitat is a haven that has been reclaimed through our own and our families' efforts. To order us suddenly to move to a collective hamlet in the spring sowing season, which virtually determines the year's harvest, is really to threaten the livelihood of destitute people.

Statement of an important Chinese leader: The number of bandits that frequent the Tungning Prefecture is not more than 50 or 60. It is absurd to attempt to construct collective hamlets rather than annihilate these Communist bandits. It would be proper to subjugate the Communist bandits first and next to attempt to promote the welfare of the inhabitants.

Statement of an unidentified Korean farmer: We were suddenly ordered to move out of the land we live on in this spring season of sowing. But the land in the newly designated place is small and has no room for further reclamation. We need cultivated land sufficient to maintain many lives. Although Communist bandits are rampant at present, they do not cause much damage. It would be preferable to live on the present land rather than to move into a collective hamlet and suffer instability of livelihood there.

Report of the Tungning police: Twenty-three collective hamlets have been constructed in Tungning Prefecture since the end of October 1935. Because of this, the number of people evacuating Lao-hei-shan, Ta-tu-ch'uan, Ehr-shih-pa-tao-ho-tzu, T'ai-p'ing-ch'uan, and other remote areas gradually increased until

the end of April of this year (1936). Especially in the remote areas of Lao-hei-shan, villages that once had nearly 1,000 families dwindled to fewer than 100 families. The reason for this is that, although the inhabitants of villages situated comparatively close to the construction sites of the collective hamlets are favorably disposed to the program, the landed farmers from remote areas are not pleased with the thought of living in the collective hamlets because of the long hours needed to commute to their farms. Moreover, as the Communist bandits have become more active recently, the more affluent people have been returning in increasing numbers to their original homes in Shantung or moving into inner Manchuria. Many of the poorer people remain in this prefecture and are employed in road construction, lumbering, or other labor works.

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X. EXAMINATION OF BASIC POLICIES
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

Peculiarities of Collective Hamlets
in Different Localities

In the preceding section we have examined in detail the destructive influence of the collective hamlets on the agrarian economy in Chientao Province. It is estimated that these phenomena are more or less universal throughout Manchuria. It is true, of course, that the degree and the character of this influence vary according to the differences in natural and social conditions. The most important factor, and the one that controls the differences in various provinces, is the condition of arable land.

Table 33 indicates the following facts: Antung Province has the highest percentage of nonarable land (93 percent). The province is mountainous and has little land that can be cultivated. Whatever is available is also in small pieces and situated in scattered areas. Moreover, the population density is high, and hardly any arable land is uncultivated at present.

Chientao, like Antung Province, is a mountainous region (nonarable land, 81 percent), and the condition of land is similar. And yet it has a comparatively low population density, and the percentage of the uncultivated arable land is somewhat high.

Generally speaking, Fengtien Province has the highest population density, and it has almost no uncultivated arable land.

In contrast to the foregoing three provinces, Sanchiang Province has the largest level area, and its population density is also low. It also has much land suitable for cultivation. Its condition is in marked contrast to that of the others.

Kirin and Pinchiang provinces present roughly similar appearances. They occupy the intermediate position between the three provinces of southern Manchuria (Antung, Chientao, and Fengtien) and Sanchiang Province.

Table 33
CONDITIONS AFFECTING LAND CULTIVATION

Provinces	Population Density per Square Kilometer	Percent of Nonarable Land in Entire Area	Percent of Uncultivated Arable Land in Entire Area	Cultivated Land per Family (acre)
Antung	54.8	93.0	24.2	3.1
Chientao	20.4	81.0	46.0	4.46
Fengtien	112.2	56.2	30.2	4.4
Kirin	51.8	59.0	35.7	9.1
Pinchiang	30.0	58.5	45.7	7.4
Sanchiang	8.5	57.0	83.0	8.0

Bandit groups, especially of Communist and other political backgrounds, are based in the mountainous areas and their guerrilla district surrounds these bases. Therefore, the prime areas for the construction of collective hamlets (or the areas of insecurity) are generally in mountainous regions throughout the provinces. This is a common factor in all provinces; however, the impact of the collective hamlet program varies from province to province, depending on the natural and social conditions of the particular area.

Since the greater parts of Anung and Chientao provinces are mountainous, the likelihood for successful construction and maintenance of artificial collective hamlets (concentrated hamlets), after destroying the scattered houses in the naturally formed small groupings, is very slim. The smallness and the scattered nature of cultivated land are incompatible with the system of collective hamlets. This necessarily results in long distances between the hamlet and the cultivated land and in further fragmentation of farmland. These complications are further intensified by the density of population and the lack of arable land as manifested in the Tungpientsao area.

The construction of collective hamlets in Fengtien Province created problems by producing wasteland where there were formerly cultivated fields, and accelerated the problems of overpopulation and land shortage. When collective hamlets were constructed in mountainous areas, the complications stated above manifested themselves. These problems would not be solved even if the hamlets were built in plain areas, since overpopulation and shortage of arable land exist there also.

In Sanchiang Province it is easy to prevent the suffering among the peasants. Mountains are rare and the land is abundant.

The actual policies adopted for constructing collective hamlets in these areas were as follows:

In the Chientao Province area, there are 3,588 villages of fewer than 20 households throughout Yenchi, Hunan, Holong, and Wangching prefectures (hsien). The groupings of fewer than ten households in the same area, which have been considered for collectivization, contain a total of

15,660 households. An average collective hamlet should contain 50 to 100 households; those located along the railroads or those that are easily accessible through other modes of transportation should have 50 households. Those in remote areas or in forest areas should have more than 100 households.

As was indicated in Table 2 of Sec. II, the average hamlet constructed so far contains approximately 100 households. Yet the total number of households clustered in the extra-small groupings of fewer than 20 households is 26,200, or 40 percent of the entire farming households (approximately 65,200). When such a great number of farmers abandon the naturally formed villages and congregate in collective hamlets of 100 households each, it is only natural that the problem of land shortage occurs. This problem was clearly exemplified in the case of the Chungping Village hamlet.

A situation identical with that of Chientao Province was found in Tungpientao. In order to ease the conflicts between the formation of collective hamlets and the shortage of farms, some small villages of 10 to 50 households were built in the Tungpientao area, in addition to the regular collective hamlets with defense facilities. Considering the less favorable conditions in the Tungpientao area, it was only natural to take this measure.

These small villages are built either within the defense perimeter of the regular hamlets or within the cordon connecting various hamlets. The small villages are, in fact, a part of the movement toward the construction of collective villages based on economic criteria, and also a part of the movement to recover abandoned land

and eliminate uninhabited areas. In other words, these villages are the results of the movement to resolve the problems of the collective hamlets as security conditions improve, and to form villages adapted to natural conditions.

Security conditions in the nine prefectures of northern Tungpientao improved remarkably after the great punitive campaign of the fall 1936, except in Linchiang, Changpai, and Wusung prefectures. At the same time, the construction of collective hamlets made great progress. To facilitate a rapid rehabilitation of the impoverished agrarian economy brought about by fragmentation of farms and greater distances between them, numerous welfare oriented collective hamlets and small villages were constructed in 1937.

Thus, as security conditions improve, it becomes more and more difficult to maintain the original forms of collective hamlets constructed for purposes of security and to separate the bandits from the citizens. There is a strong and sharp tendency in the Tungpientao area to return to the original agrarian structure.

In Fengtien Province, the following policies concerning the construction of collective hamlets have been adopted.

The "Provincial Directive on Public-Security Operations" places both the collective hamlet system and the "small village" system under the law covering concentration of households. The kind of system to be adopted in each area depends on topography, economic conditions, and the interpersonal relationships of the peasants In plain areas, the system of collective hamlets is adopted.

In remote mountainous areas, the system of "small villages" is used. In principle, considerable sums of money are allocated to the collective hamlets for the construction of complete hamlets outside the bandit zone and no funds are issued for the construction of "small villages."

The reasons for separating these two categories are stated as follows: Eastern Manchuria is highly mountainous, and hence it is impossible to find any large area of cultivated land at any one place. The inhabitants are either those from Shantung, with meager farming implements, capital, and labor force, or Korean peasants driven out of their homeland [in Korea]. They are absolutely incapable of constructing either irrigation and flood-control facilities or roads and bridges to connect their homes to their farms. They therefore depend solely upon natural topography, and consequently their cultivated plots are extremely small. Here, it is contrary to all natural conditions to construct collective hamlets composed of 50 to 100 households. Collective hamlets that ignore economic factors cannot succeed.

Thus, in Fengtien Province collective hamlets are constructed only in plain areas because they would not succeed economically in mountainous regions. The families scattered in the mountainous and bandit-infested regions are concentrated in small villages of 10 to 20 households constructed near roads or at points fairly close to means of transportation. Since, however, it is possible for these small villages to be burned down by bandits after the concentration of families has taken place, the prefectural government and the inhabitants plan to build them with a minimum of expense and labor.

The following points are particularly noteworthy:

The recognition that it is impossible for collective hamlets to succeed in mountainous regions is a distinct advance in thinking, over the policy adopted for Chientao and Antung provinces.

It must be realized, however, that this kind of recognition and the concentration of collective hamlets in the plain areas was possible in Fengtien Province only because this province includes a considerable area of plains. Had Antung and Chientao provinces been endowed with plains, they would have adopted the same policy. Because of the paucity of plains in these provinces, however, the impossibility of constructing any collective hamlets at all would have been recognized if priority had been given to economic considerations. The general characteristic of the collective hamlets in these provinces is that they were forcibly constructed for security reasons and economic problems were ignored. Therefore, these hamlets are not durable, as they are now, and inevitably they will be destroyed when security conditions improve substantially.

It appears at first glance that the Fengtien Province policy of congregating the scattered houses in small villages is rational, because the policy takes economic factors into consideration. These small villages are defenseless, however, and they are out of reach of the security forces. They are, in fact, pitiful entities doomed from the beginning to the possibility of being burned down by bandits. In other words, the policy for "small villages" is a meaningless policy that has only reduced the degree of dispersion of the farmhouses without achieving the basic

purpose of separating the bandits from the law-abiding citizens. The province should have executed the policy of transferring the inhabitants of mountainous regions to plain areas and constructed collective hamlets that were fully equipped from the economic standpoint. We find the reasons for Fengtien Province's superficial policy in its social conditions, that is, the population density, the lack of uncultivated arable land, and the lack of room in the plain areas for accepting new farmers. This is quite comparable to the situation in Antung and Chientao provinces, where, although prefatory attention is being paid to economic factors, the geographical environment necessitates the construction of hamlets that are primarily concerned with security and hence have little durability.

The six southeastern prefectures in Kirin Province are mountainous and covered with forests. Security conditions in this region have been bad, and hence it has become a prime area for the construction of collective hamlets. This province undertook the construction of collective hamlets relatively early, and hence has frequently encountered unexpected obstacles and the difficulties that are usual in pioneering efforts. Their main problem is, however, that of land for cultivation. A report of the same province in 1936 stated:

The most important policy measure adopted to promote the security of these prefectures is the construction of collective hamlets. When villages are scattered in the hilly or mountainous regions they often become bases for bandits and the villagers are forced to collaborate with the bandits. This, of course, is most detrimental to the maintaining of public security. Therefore, the authorities responsible for public security pushed

through the construction of the hamlets mainly from the security point of view. They often did not take into consideration the basic conditions of agrarian economy, that is, the distance from the villages to the farms and the acreage of arable land per household. This resulted in the moving or fleeing of the farmers before and after the construction of the hamlets. Consequently, in 1935 orders were given that plans for future collective hamlets should consider various factors both for security and for agricultural cultivation.

It is evident here also that the construction of collective hamlets in mountainous regions necessarily contained conflicts concerning the farmland, and that these conflicts were solved by the exodus and scattering of the peasants. It should be noted that this population migration was facilitated by the fact that Kirin Province has a northwestern plain area where public security is well maintained and agriculture is well developed. Kirin Province is adjacent to northern Manchuria, which abounds in uncultivated arable land. In contrast to Chientao and Tungpientao, northern Manchuria can absorb large numbers of farm workers.

This spontaneous emigration of the farmers is a negative solution to the problems created by collective hamlets. It will inevitably result in a decrease of population in the six southeastern prefectures, which will turn increase the wasteland and bring about the decline of the forest industry. A positive solution to the problems was exemplified by the rehabilitation program instituted by the Kirin provincial government in 1936. As a step toward a wider range of farm rehabilitation, this program aims at rehabilitating the abandoned or artificially

created wasteland in the vicinity of the collective hamlets, at the same time accelerating the completion of the collective hamlets. This is quite similar to the measures taken in Tungpientao in 1937 for solving the problem of the land shortage by rehabilitating the abandoned wasteland.

Thus, in Kirin Province, the population emigration and the rehabilitation programs, through the use of abandoned farms, are beginning to alleviate the problems of the collective hamlet projects. Such trends are similarly observable in Pinchiang Province. The only difference in the latter case is that the abundance of arable land and low density of population in that province have made the population movement a much more effective means of solving the problems.

Since Sanchiang Province exhibits many differences from other provinces analyzed above, in terms of natural and social conditions, the construction of collective hamlets there has also produced many peculiarities. The "Principles of Collective Hamlet Construction" of this province states:

The collective hamlet program is not of a nature that can be applied throughout Manchuria regardless of locality, and the success of the program depends greatly on population density, the condition of land ownership, and other natural conditions affecting agricultural cultivation. Therefore, if the farm families are concentrated at a locality solely from the viewpoint of public security, the program will be confronted with numerous obstacles. Herein lies the reason for using the establishment of agrarian economy as the central and essential criterion in planning and guiding the construction of collective hamlets. The reasonableness of this emphasis is self-evident, in the light of past experience with collective hamlets in various areas.

In special areas, people may be compelled to collaborate with the bandits. In these areas, efforts to quarantine the bandits, and also all efforts toward public security, should concentrate upon building the material foundations whereby the farmers may be able to sustain their lives independently of the bandits. By nurturing this foundation, the farmers' means of self-defense may be consolidated, and they will be sheltered from destructive pressures in the agrarian economy. The final goal of these efforts should be the nurturing of power among the masses so that they will rise against all factors that menace their livelihood.

The foremost factor to be considered in constructing collective hamlets is the distribution of farmland surrounding the hamlets.

In Sanchiang Province, the proportion of tilled land vis-à-vis uncultivated land is extremely small. (In Sanchiang only a small proportion of arable land has been cultivated.) Uncultivated land is especially abundant in the areas where the construction of collective hamlets is necessary. This situation has resulted from the (adverse) security conditions in these areas.

Since the foregoing conditions prevail in the prime areas for the construction of collective hamlets in each prefecture, and since the desire for voluntary construction of collective hamlets is heightened among the masses, the possibility and favorable future of a collective hamlet program in this province is assured.

The above evaluation by the Sanchiang provincial authorities on the construction of collective hamlets seems very reasonable, and their confidence merits respect. The collective hamlet program in Sanchiang was only begun

in 1936, however, and evaluation of its actual performance must be left to the future.

An attempt has been made in this section to evaluate the policies of various provinces on the construction of collective hamlets. The findings can be summarized as follows:

In view of the natural and social conditions, the collective hamlets in Chientao and Antung provinces cannot satisfy the economic necessities of the peasants. In essence, they are oriented to public security and are most likely to be dissolved when public security is improved. Especially in Antung, where there is little possibility of alleviating problems through the natural emigration of the population (in contrast to Kirin Province), the difficulties of the farmers and the deterioration of agrarian economy will only become more serious unless measures for solution are found. It is first necessary to provide some positive control of the movement of population and to promote a program of intrastate [Manchuria] migration based on an all Manchurian perspective and rational distribution of population. Second, forceful guidance is necessary to develop the special secondary industries of this area, such as tussah silk, ginseng, charcoal and firewoods, tobacco, etc. Third, the problems generated by the construction of collective hamlets must be solved through maximum recruitment of the local labor force for the new heavy industries in the region.

Recently, public security in Chientao has been almost completely restored. As a result, the farmers' desire to leave the hamlets has been strengthened, enhancing the inclination to dissolve the collective hamlets. It is,

however, undesirable to revert to the original condition of agriculture for the following reasons: (1) Chientao, being adjacent to the Soviet Union, is an important geographic point for national defense; and (2), because the Koreans are highly susceptible to agitation, it is necessary to maintain a mode of life in which the government holds absolute control.

The major problem in the Chientao area is to settle the farmers and to establish the economic independence of the collective hamlets. The dilemma lies in the fact that it is impossible to solve the problem of farmland so long as the collective hamlet system is maintained.

By establishing small villages [or colonies] in the mountainous areas and constructing collective hamlets in the plain areas, Fengtien Province has theoretically solved the problems of the collective hamlet program. The remaining problem, however, is that the small villages in the mountains do not serve the purpose of quarantining the bandits. In reality, the provincial government constructed collective hamlets in mountainous areas to serve as security bases for the small villages, but these hamlets, of course, present economic problems. In this sense, the hamlets in Fengtien fall in the same category as those in Antung.

Although the collective hamlets in Kirin and Pinchiang provinces present the same kind of problems as those in Tungpientao and Chientao, the problems in Kirin and Pinchiang are being solved by natural emigration and the recovery of abandoned farm areas.

There are no theoretical problems in the policies of Sanchiang Province. Their merits should be judged by actual performance in the future.

Relationship between Collective Hamlets
and Military Operations

Every province is engaged in constructing collective hamlets under three-year plans, but it is seldom that these plans are smoothly executed. One of the reasons is the weakness of the security forces. While hamlets are under construction, bandit groups often attack and burn them, making it impossible to complete the construction. The other reason is the discovery in remote areas, during mopping-up operations, of additional scattered houses that require elimination. These families need to be placed in collective hamlets; consequently, the burden of hamlet construction is increased.

The guiding principles for collective hamlet construction in various provinces follow.

SOUTHERN MANCHURIA (ANTUNG PROVINCE)

The prefectural governors and councillors take primary responsibility in constructing the hamlets. They are to receive the guidance of the Japanese army units stationed in the area and to maintain close liaison with other government agencies. Guidance officers dispatched by these officials are to supervise and accelerate construction. Special attention is being paid to the following points.

Field Guidance Officers

Capable individuals with complete understanding of the significance of the collective hamlets are to be selected for this position. The field officers are to supervise and guide the local police chiefs and the heads of neighborhood organizations under the direct guidance of the

Japanese army units. It is necessary that these officers be fully informed of the prefectural policies.

Selection of Locations

Adequate consideration should be given to topography, availability of farmland, defense transportation, and communication facilities. Existing villages or hamlets should be used as much as possible.

Defense Facilities

Facilities most appropriate for the locality should be constructed under the guidance of the Japanese army. Maximum security should be attained at minimum cost.

Concentration of Families

All available means should be mobilized to help the farmers understand the purpose of the collective hamlets in advance of their moving. As for the time of moving to the hamlets, the seasons most convenient for the farmers should be selected, and the farmers should be allowed a considerable length of time for preparation. Defense facilities, however, should be constructed as rapidly as possible. At the time of moving, maximum security coverage should be provided for the farmers. The prefectural government should help the farmers by allocating land for buildings, negotiating farm-tenant relations, etc. With regard to common facilities, the strength of the self-defense corps should be consolidated by organizing and training new members. Priority should be given to assisting the collective hamlets to build industries, distribute seeds, and establish credit agencies and educational facilities. Subsidies for construction of houses should be granted so far as is possible (approximately 20 yen per family), but not to those who can move into the hamlets

without subsidy assistance. Violators [of directives] may be punished as disturbers of the peace.

Expenditure

Expenditures should be minimized and the burdens of the people reduced. All labor should be mobilized locally and most of the capital funds should be allocated for wages to be earned by the farmers.

Alteration of Hamlets

The number and location of hamlets in different localities may be altered according to necessity by the prefectural officials after consultation with the heads of the districts.

CENTRAL MANCHURIA (PINCHIANG PROVINCE)

The purpose of the defense hamlets [collective hamlets] needs to be clearly understood. They should be established with the cooperation and support of the entire population in the district concerned, and with the willing consent of the masses to be accommodated in them. Security policies have their foundation in the state of public opinion and the future prospects for security. This foundation will be greatly consolidated if the farmers actually experience the relationship between the security operations and the economic life of the masses. The collectivization and moving of villagers for the purpose of quarantining the bandits should be kept to the absolute minimum. Even these should be carried out after thorough preparation and with adequate funds and security measures.

The voluntary participation through persuasion of the residents should be made the basic rule in the collectivization and village-migration operations. Force may be used under special circumstances. Except in emergency

cases, however, permission of the provincial authorities should be sought before coercive measures are used.

NORTHERN MANCHURIA (SANCIANG PROVINCE)

The following procedures are followed in the construction of collective hamlets:

Investigation of the Selected Area

[Information is obtained regarding] security conditions, relationship between the bandits and the residents, condition of landownership, distribution of farmland, living conditions of the farmers, and condition of ownership of farm implements.

Propaganda and Pacification Operations

The prefectural authorities and other agencies concerned carry out propaganda and pacification operations in the areas selected as suitable for the construction of collective hamlets. The farmers in the chosen area are convinced of the value of the hamlets so that they voluntarily participate in the collective hamlet program.

Transportation of Materials

Building materials and other necessary items are transported during the winter's freezing season.

Economic Conditions of the Hamlets

Subsidy funds are provided for the construction of common facilities in the hamlet. Loans are granted for the construction of houses and for agricultural production. Farm rents [or tenant fees] are exempt for three years. Land taxes and other public imposts are exempt for two years.

Defense

During the construction period, the prefectural police units are charged with defending the hamlets so that the

farmers will suffer from bandits. The Japanese and Manchukuo army units provide assistance. After the construction period, the paochia system is to be completed, the self-defense corps unit consolidated, and the joint defense system consolidated among the hamlets in order to promote their self-defense capability.

Highways and Communications Networks

These are to be completed.

Thus, the guiding principles for the construction of collective hamlets in various areas have basic similarities. These principles can be summarized as follows:

1. Investigation and determination of location.
2. Propaganda and pacification operations directed toward the farmers to be accommodated [in the hamlets]. Respect of public opinion and enlistment of voluntary support.
3. Assistance for common facilities, houses, and agricultural management.
4. Transportation of materials to the construction points during winter.
5. Construction of collective hamlets during the farmers' leisure season.
6. Deployment of adequate defense forces.
7. As the defense facilities and houses are completed, the burning or removal of old houses; further improvement of hamlet buildings.

In sum, the purpose of the collective hamlets can be attained without too great a loss to the masses only if plans are drawn up and thoroughly examined through the period of a year. If the execution of these plans is

disrupted for some reason, the farmers immediately suffer damage and receive crushing blows to their livelihood.

As has been stated before, however, rarely can the plans be executed without disruptions. It has also been stated that there are two reasons for this. The first-- attacks by bandits--is self-evident. The second needs elaboration.

In the course of mopping-up operations by the army, many scattered houses that often serve as bases for the bandits are discovered, in the mountains. It is necessary in these circumstances to destroy the houses and remove the residents to an area protected by the authorities.

Many collectivization operations are carried on without adequate preparation, and most of these are not included in previous plans. Under these conditions it is inevitable that the people suffer. Extraordinary friction and destructive influences emerge in such situations.

Any necessary expansion of the collective hamlets beyond the original plans brings about shortages in government personnel and in materials, and the entire program suffers in consequence.

The causes are [as follows]: First, the prefectural governments, which are responsible for the actual execution of the collective hamlets program, do not have financial reserves for coping with emergency situations. Secondly, although the prefectural governments maintain liaison with the army through the Public Security Maintenance Association, the association is not strong enough to coordinate the army's mopping-up operations with the collective hamlet program. Therefore, the army is prone to take actions necessary for security reasons without paying any attention

either to the plans and abilities of the prefecture or the economic condition of the farmers. Most of the discrepancies occur because of this. The following measures are necessary to correct this situation: (1) The budgets of the prefectural governments should allow for the possibility of having to construct collective hamlets on an emergency basis; and (2) a strong agency capable of fulfilling the functions of control, guidance, and liaison between the army's mopping-up operation and the prefecture's collectivization program should be established and should be headed by the official in charge of army operations, for which a precedent is to be found in the Public Security Operation Committee in northern Tungpientao.

It should be noted, furthermore, that the army's concentration upon mopping-up operations inevitably inflicts great destruction and destitution upon the farmers. But, since the administrative organs are always responsible for rehabilitating the farmers, it is easy for the army to become the target of the people's enmity, and this hinders future army operations. Also, because the army is not directly responsible for rehabilitation activities, it tends to enlarge the destructive impact. It is absolutely essential, therefore, that an agency as described above be established so that such undesirable tendencies may be eradicated.

The collective hamlets are transitory and temporary establishments created for the attainment of public security. With the exception of Sanchiang Province, where natural conditions are favorable, few collective hamlets have solved the problem of [the paucity of] farmland from the beginning. We must, therefore, recognize the tendencies

in these hamlets toward disintegration and transformation. These tendencies are particularly noticeable in Tungpientao, where the basic problems in the hamlets are solved only by reclaiming the abandoned farms after security conditions have improved. The temporary stability in this area has been attained only through the sacrifice and destitution of the farmers.

On the other hand, in Kirin Province, where the effort to solve the problems of the collective hamlets have been relatively successful, the hamlets have considerable durability.

The collective hamlets in Tungpientao today cannot be rid of their unstable and transitory character, no matter how long they may stay in existence. With this situation, it is dangerous to expect permanence in these hamlets and to establish political, economic, and cultural facilities of a permanent nature. This would invite unexpected conflicts in the future.

It is not simply because we wish to alleviate the difficulties of the farmers, stabilize public opinion, and contribute toward the establishment of public security that we advocate internal migration, encouragement of secondary industries, and absorption of the labor force through industrialization in Tungpientao. Such efforts would, however, have the additional effect of enabling the collective hamlets to change their transitory character and attain permanence, thereby making it possible [or profitable] to provide progressive [or developmental] facilities for these hamlets.

Another problem that requires careful consideration is the restoration of the status quo ante. The essential

factor that would make it possible is the establishment of public security. If public security is established and the range of defense is expended through the development of roads and communication networks--in other words, if Tungpieniau is liberated from its traditional isolation--the dissolution of the collective hamlets and the restoration of the old form of demographic distribution will be feasible.

Needless to say, the collective hamlets are convenient for administrative purposes. This convenience, however, is of secondary significance in the construction of collective hamlets. In such areas as Tungpieniau, it is proper to consider the purpose of the collective hamlets to have been achieved once the bandits are quarantined and public security is established. To impose excessive duties on the hamlets is to threaten the livelihood of the peasants.

Thus, two different kinds of hamlets emerge: the temporary hamlets with disintegrative qualities and the transitional hamlets to which permanence must be provided as rapidly as possible through alleviation of conflicts. The choice of the kind of hamlet should be based on the nature of military operations and the degree of progress of other security operations. For instance, maximum efforts should be exerted to perpetuate the hamlets that are situated in the vicinity of the bandit areas and that are constantly menaced in order to form the line of blockade against the bandits. This is especially true where there is no prospect of rapidly suppressing the bandit areas. Other hamlets, however, need not be turned into permanent hamlets so long as definite progress is being made in public security. Rather, these should be organized

as temporary hamlets at the beginning, and necessary changes should be made from time to time to permit maximum progress and development of the farmers' economy.

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XI. EXAMINATION OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES
OF COLLECTIVE HAMLETS

It is obvious that public security cannot be attained through military measures alone; it also requires coordinated efforts in political and economic spheres. Collective hamlets are particularly significant in this respect because all these functions are concentrated in them.

From the political and economic point of view, the purpose of the collective hamlets is to improve the economic, spiritual, and cultural lives of the farmers. What lies at the base is agricultural policy. Because of the special environment, collective hamlets require special sets of agricultural policies. This section shall be devoted to the examination of this aspect of the collective hamlets.

The Need for Reform in the Farm-tenant System

In the areas where bandits have been rampant for a long period, many of the farmlands became desolate. Many of the former inhabitants either fled or were killed. In other cases, farming simply became impossible. In some cases even the ownership of the land is uncertain. The policies adopted in reclaiming these lands exert great influence upon the operation of collective hamlets. Many different temporary expediciencies have been adopted in different areas regarding all such lands.

In Fengtien Province, for instance, the following "Principles of Wasteland Rehabilitation" have been adopted for reclaiming these lands.

ON THE DISPOSITION OF WASTELAND

The prefectural government is to issue proclamations or notifications to the landlords--those who possess the right of management--requiring them to notify the government within a specified period as to whether they or their tenants will be engaged in reclaiming the wasteland.

The wastelands for which the above-mentioned report has not been filed or the reported intent has not been carried out will be controlled by the prefectural government, which will invite tenants for the reclamation and farming of the said lands.

Police officials or village heads will report in advance of the landlords, boundaries, and acreage of the abandoned farmlands. Clear distinctions should be made between land tilled by owners or tenants and that managed by the prefectural government.

ON THE TENANCY OF THE RECLAIMED WASTELANDS

The acreage of lands to be entrusted to tenants will be determined by the tenants' capability. The tenants will not be permitted to abandon or transfer the land at their own discretion.

Tenants must reclaim the entire area of the land entrusted to them during the first year.

Beginning with the second year of occupancy, rent may be imposed on the houses and house sites occupied by the tenants. Abandoned houses may be repaired and occupied without charge for three years.

Beginning with the fourth year, farm rent or tenant fees will be collected. No tenant fee may be imposed during the first three years.

The prefectural government will establish a committee

or committees to decide on the rate of tenant fees and the price of land.

Tenant contracts may be concluded between landlords and tenants in the fifth year. The amount of tenant fees must be determined with due consideration of the previous rates. All contracts must receive the approval of the prefectural government.

The landlord may not transfer the rights of the land to anyone other than the incumbent tenants, or mortgage it, or withdraw a lease without the approval of the prefectural government.

In case of flagrant misconduct, tenants will forfeit their rights.

ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

The prefectural governments may issue agricultural loans on the basis of ownership certificates, after sowing on the land has been completed. The limits on loans and the methods of repayment of loans shall be determined separately.

The prefectural governments shall assist the efforts of financially capable tenant farmers to acquire land and become landed farmers.

Similar to the practice in Fengtien set forth above, the following policies on the reclamation of abandoned farmlands have been adopted by the authorities in Kirin and Antung provinces:

Continuous natural calamities and troubles caused by bandits since the establishment of the nation [Manchukuo] produced 298,364 acres of wastelands in Kirin Province as of 1935. It resulted in a decrease of 290,445 kilograms in crops valued at 15,392,585 yen. Accordingly, national and local tax income was reduced by

447,410 yen. Because security conditions in this province have been improving steadily during the recent period, urgent efforts must be made to develop the industries by reclaiming the abandoned farmlands. Therefore, the province has promulgated laws on the recovery of abandoned lands and, beginning in 1936, has encouraged tenant farming, rented lands, extended loans for rehabilitation, and provided other guidance for agricultural development.

In the execution of the law, however, priority was given to the recovery of abandoned farmlands in the vicinity of the collective hamlet construction area, thereby contributing to the acceleration of completion of the hamlets. Other reasons for this special emphasis are as follows:

1. More abandoned farmlands are available in these areas.
2. There is little need in the collective hamlet areas to invite farm tenants from other areas.
3. Communications networks, roads, and security facilities are almost completed in the hamlets.
4. Because of the adverse security conditions in these areas, many landlords had abandoned rights over the lands for a number of years. Therefore, it was easy for the prefectural governments to negotiate on land control.

The essence of the law on the recovery of abandoned lands is as follows:

1. The prefectural authorities will conduct investigations and decide upon the acreage of wastelands to be reclaimed during the year. The development plan will be drawn up, and rights

over the land will be secured from the owners or administrators.

2. Tenant farmers will be invited to till land under the control of the prefectural government.

3. Loans of a certain amount of agricultural capital will be made to the tenants. The loans should be in kind.

4. The prefectural governments will issue prefectural bonds, borrow from the Central Bank, and lend the funds thus obtained to the farmers as agricultural capital.

5. The prefectural authorities will collect certain amounts of rent from the farmers to be used to pay the national and local taxes and for managerial and other expenditures. Any surplus will be returned to the owners.

6. Contracts between the prefecture on the one hand and the owners or administrators of the land on the other hand will be concluded for terms of three or more years. Upon expiration of the term of the contract, the land will be returned to the original holders of the rights. The owner, in this event, must extend priority benefits to the tenant farmers employed by the government in order that the interests of the landlords and the tenants may be harmonized.

The basic difference between Fengtien and Kirin provinces in dealing with the abandoned farmlands is that while Fengtien Province exercises direct control over the lands on which proper reports have not been filed or the reported intent has not been executed, Kirin Province

uniformly secures the rights over the abandoned lands and lets the tenants cultivate them under government control.

The reclamation of previously abandoned farmlands is significant not only for the expansion of farmlands, but also because it contributes toward the dissolution of conflicts in the established collective hamlets, thereby enabling them to attain stability and permanence. The reclamation operation also constitutes a movement to establish economically oriented collective hamlets and to create and expand small villages. The operation also provides an opportunity to reform the farm-tenant system. Neither province, however, has taken any positive action toward this end. The Kirin provincial government merely enumerates the following factors as the anticipated results of the reclamation operation:

1. Increase in agrarian production and hence in the income of the farmers.
2. Stimulus to owners of abandoned lands in other areas and acceleration of reclamation throughout the province.
3. Clarification of the overall condition of the land. This is extremely beneficial for the investigation of the land [ownership and use] system.
4. Knowledge of local practices between the landlords, tenants, and self-employed farmers as well as other facts in land management. This is also extremely beneficial for the future guidance of farm villages.

5. Increase in national, local, and other taxes, thus benefiting prefectural finance.
6. Prevention of mobility among the peasants, thus bringing about stability of the farmers' livelihood. This is extremely beneficial for the maintenance of local security.

In short, the objectives of Kirin Province are limited to obtaining data for the future establishment of the land-use system and tenant-farming system. But the establishment of [equitable and viable] systems is urgently needed throughout Manchuria.

Reform of the tenant-farming system is the first step in the execution of [viable] land policies in the future. Even though reform is not possible throughout Manchuria at this time because of the lack of fundamental data on the agrarian villages, reform of the tenant system for small areas is possible even at present. It is essential that the feudalistic relationships existing in the villages be eradicated through rapid execution of temporary and small-scale measures. Because the rates and methods of collection of the tenant fees are decided by the prefectural authorities during the contractual period of three or more years, and because the incumbent tenant farmers are to receive preferential treatment even after the termination of the contracts, the prefectural authorities are in a position at this time to effect some reform in agrarian relations. The points that require emphasis are reduction of tenant fees [or farm rent] and stabilization of the rights of tenants to till the land.

As will be related presently, the Chientao provincial government has had considerable success in reducing tenant

fees through the construction of collective hamlets, although no action has been taken to formalize the rights of the tenants to till the land. No action has been taken, however, in the other provinces. It is necessary for all the provinces to reform tenant-landlord relations through the reclamation of abandoned lands, to adopt temporary laws on tenancy, and to execute these laws particularly in the areas strongly menaced by bandits. Thorough execution of protective policies over the farmers in the collective hamlets is essential.

The tenant fees in the bandit zone have been remarkably low, but there has been a tendency to revert to the old condition of high rents as the collective hamlets are constructed, security conditions improved, and the abandoned lands reclaimed. It is necessary at this time to suppress this trend, and doing so will provide a convenient starting point for reform programs. If one reflects on the fact that one of the causes for the rise of Communist bandits is the harsh exploitation by the landlords and the destitution of the peasants, it becomes obvious that there is urgent need for reforms with the purpose of removing those factors that obstruct the development of rural areas. Reform is, furthermore, an absolutely necessary condition for the construction of collective hamlets.

The area that took the first, although rudimentary, step toward reform of the tenant system through the construction of collective hamlets is Chientao Province. Although some other areas provided for the exemption of farm rent for one to three years on newly reclaimed land (this has been the custom in the past), no other province besides Chientao has adopted regulations for the positive

lowering of tenant fees on a broad basis. In the collective hamlets in Chientao, it is stipulated that the farm rent on the privately owned lands shall be less than 30 percent of the crop. If we compare this with the past rates of 40 to 50 percent that had been customary in Chientao, it is obvious that the reduction has made an effective contribution toward stabilization of the tenant farmers' livelihood and the development of agriculture.

Aside from this, as we have seen in the case study of Chungping Village, great progress has also been made in other aspects of tenancy relations, through such measures as the abolishment of the practice of requiring tenants to provide free labor to landlords and that of permitting landlords to transfer responsibility for taxes and other public imposts to the tenants.

Some modifications of rates of tenant fees were made, however, in 1936, at the time of constructing the third group of collective hamlets in Chientao. The following rule was adopted:

Although 30 percent of the crop is regarded as the appropriate rate of farm rent from the standpoint of equalizing the income of the landlords and the tenant farmers within the collective hamlets, the farm rent should be decided at rates closer to 40 percent, in view of the fact that the customary rate at present is between 40 and 50 percent in other areas. There will, however, be no change in the rate in Ant'u Prefecture.

In other words, equilibrium of income between landlords and tenants is set up as the standard for deciding the rate of tenant fees. The method of calculation is set forth in Table 34.

Table 34

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RATE OF FARM RENT AND THE INCOME
OF THE LANDLORD AND THE TENANT
(per acre)

Class Status	Gross Output ^a (yen)	Total Expenses (yen)	Investment Return per Rent Rate					
			30 Percent		35 Percent		40 Percent	
			Net Profit (yen)	Interest Ratio (percent)	Net Profit (yen)	Interest Ratio (percent)	Net Profit (yen)	Interest Ratio (percent)
Landlord	85.20	4.26 ^b	21.30	14.2 ^c	25.56	17.0 ^c	29.82	19.9 ^c
Tenant		27.10 ^d	32.54	-	28.28	-	24.02	-

SOURCE: This table has been compiled from a report, "Concerning the Farm Rent in Collective Hamlets," submitted by the Chientao provincial government.

^aThe gross output per acre is considered to be 5.6 koku of grain valued at 67.20 yen (12.00 yen per koku) and straw worth 18.00 yen.

^bThe expenses of the landlord consist of national taxes and the public imposts.

^cThe interest rate of the landlord is calculated on the basis of 150 yen per acre of land.

^dThe expenses of the tenant farmer consist of seeds, 2.50 yen; farm implements, 1.50 yen; farm cattle, 3.6 yen; tilling expenses, 12.00 yen; harvest adjustment, 4.00 yen; and sundry expenses, 3.50 yen.

Table 34 indicates that the equilibrium of income between the landlord and the tenant farmer is attained at a point between 35 and 40 percent. This still allows the landlord a fairly high interest rate (17 to 19.9 percent) for his investment in land.

The fact that the net profit is equally distributed between the two parties, however, has no economic significance whatsoever. This is because the system does not allow for the tenant's capital investment or his extra toil, which brings about the increase in production. The landlord shares the result of these extra efforts by his tenant without contributing anything on his part.

No doubt, due consideration should be given to the landlord's investment in land and a certain ratio of interest should accrue to him. It is to be noted, however, that land does not have a fixed value. The value of the land is determined, rather, by the amount of farm rent. For instance, the decline in land value during the period of bad crops, caused by banditry or otherwise, came about only because the farm rent could not be collected. It is definitely not the decline of the value of land that makes the collection of tenant fees impossible. Therefore, it is irrational to calculate the ratio of interest accruing to the landlords on the basis of land values that were set up when the customary rate of farm rent was 40 or 50 percent. The decline in the value of land is desirable for the development of agriculture. This is because the decline in the value of land reduces the investment in the land, which bears no relationship with production, and proportionately increases the investment on the productive aspects of agriculture. This is particularly

significant in such areas as Chientao, where small-scale farming is predominant.

What, then, should be the criterion for determining the rate of farm rent? Despite the fact that the collective hamlets in Chientao are the representative ones and are the models for other places, their agriculture contains many negative factors, as we have noted before. For the development of rural areas in the future, it is necessary to enhance the rural economy of these collective hamlets and produce enough surplus to provide the peasants with capital for developing the farmland.

There is an inherent tendency for tenant fees to rise up to the limits set forth by law. If the regulations concerning farm rent are loose, it is obvious that the fees will surge even higher. The landlords exert strong pressure and often tend to step over the limits set forth by the authorities.

It is not easy for the tenant farmers to pay even 30 percent rent while undergoing the tremendous change in their economic basis that is necessitated by this migration into the hamlets. This was evident in the case study of Chungping Village, where the farmers' debts increased and their economic condition in general deteriorated.

The decrease of tenants' fee rates would reduce the value of land and hence increase the possibility of the farmers' acquiring land. It would also accelerate agricultural development by encouraging investment in the productive sectors of agriculture rather than in land. The increase in the tenants' share of income would not only enable them to sustain their livelihood, but would also create the opportunity for them to produce agricultural

capital, this consolidating the foundations of agricultural management. The standard for determining the rate of farm rent and tenant fees should be set at the point where some reserve can remain with the tenant farmers so that they will be able to contribute to such agricultural development.

Rationalization of Repayment of Debts

Repayment of debts is another factor that oppresses the members of the collective hamlets. Generally speaking, most of the farmers in Manchuria are in debt. The interest rate on loans is proportionately higher for those with less ability to repay. When these indebted farmers were accommodated into the hamlets, they acquired further debts by receiving subsidy loans for the construction of houses and for agricultural capital.

The subsidies provided the members of collective hamlets in various provinces were as follows.

In Chientao, Pinchiang, Sanchiang, Antung, and Fengtien provinces, each prefecture received credit from the Central Bank or other financial institutions, on the basis of bond issues, for money to be lent to farmers for the construction of houses or for agricultural management. The amounts of loans made were as follows:

Chientao	70 yen per family (1936)
Pinchiang	44 yen per family (plan of 1935)
Sanchiang	55 yen per family (plan of 1935)
Antung	20 yen per family (plan of 1936)
Fengtien	1,410 yen per hamlet (plan of 1936)

Loans are made in either cash (as in Chientao) or in kind (as in Sanchiang), and interest rates are generally 8 to 10 percent a year, with no repayment required for one to two years and with principal and interest payable in installments during the third and fourth years.

No subsidies were provided in Kirin Province specifically for the collective hamlets, but since the construction of collective hamlets is carried out in conjunction with the rehabilitation of abandoned land, the funds allocated for the latter projects were used for the collective hamlets as well.

The capital funds for the reclamation of abandoned lands were borrowed by the prefectural government from the Central Bank at 6.5 percent annual interest. The funds were in turn lent to the Land Reclamation Capital Funds Loan Associations organized by the farmers engaged in reclamation at the local level (usually at the p'ai, or the lowest unit of the paochia system). The members in each association are jointly responsible for the loans. The loans are issued in kind, the amount being limited to 15 yen for a mo (street or road) or 1,500 yen for a Loan Association. The interest rate is 10 percent a year, and principal and interest are payable in three years.

The Korean collective hamlets constructed by the Government-General of Korea are combined with the plan for creating self-employed or landed farmers. The plan calls for the Government-General's annual subsidy of 100,000 yen to the Oriental Development Company [or Colonization Company] for five years, beginning in 1932. The company is in turn to make loans up to 300,000 yen a year during the same period to enable the Korean farmers to buy and improve land, build houses, and buy farm cattle; also loans are to be made for other agricultural purposes. The standards for the loans are as follows:

For purchase or improvement of land . . .	650 yen
For construction of houses	40 yen

For purchase of farm cattle 50 yen
For other agricultural purposes 60 yen

The Oriental Colonization Company is to buy the land involved, add the improvement expenses to the value of the land, and sell the land to the Korean farmers on a fifteen-year installment plan. No payment is required during the first year. Loans made for the construction of houses and the purchase of farm cattle are payable in installments within five years. Loans for other agricultural purposes are payable within a year. All loans are made without mortgage, but a group of more than twenty individuals are jointly responsible for them. The interest rate on the loans is 8.2 percent per annum.

Thus there are various ways to extend loans to the farmers. But the increase of the farmers' debts as a result of the construction of the collective hamlets contains the strong dangers (or possibilities) that the farmers could become involved even further with usurers or that the meager economic foundations of the farmers could be additionally weakened by compelling them to sell their land, houses, or farm animals. This is because the extremely weak economic position of the farmers compels them to borrow more money at higher rates to repay the outstanding debts or meet the repayment schedule.

The schedules of loan repayments in Chientao and Sanchiang provinces are shown in Tables 35 and 36. It is obvious that the schedule in Sanchiang, by attempting to utilize the loan funds to accelerate future agrarian development, gives far greater consideration to the farmers' situation. For instance, in spite of the fact that the principal of the loan is smaller in Sanchiang (55 yen per

family) than in Chientao, the farmers are given a longer period for repayment. The principal is payable in four installments, the first payment being due in the third year. The interest rate is only 7 percent per annum. Instead of requiring equal payments as in Chientao, the payment schedule in Sanchiang is coordinated with the development of the farmers' abilities. As a result, surplus funds in the hands of the farmers in Sanchiang are more than double that of the farmers in Chientao, and the farmers in Sanchiang have much more resilience.

The farmer's ability to repay the principal and interest of loans is not sufficient for him to be independent and self-reliant. Possession of some surplus [or reserve] is absolutely necessary. This plan (in Sanchiang Province) of course has not been conceived for the purpose of maximizing the profit of the farmers, but proper care must be taken to allow the farmers to possess some surplus that could be allotted for expanded production and for emergency purposes.

Table 35
LOAN REPAYMENT IN CHIEN TAO PROVINCE

Period	Planted Acreage (acres)	Total Harvest (yen)	Expenses (yen)	Net Income (yen)	Annual Payment on Loan	Surplus (yen)
2nd year	5.0	363.00	268.80	94.20	29.38	64.82
3rd year	10.0	527.00	427.00	100.00	29.38	70.62

NOTES: The expenses in the first year were: production cost, 44.90 yen; farm rent, 108.90 yen; living expenses, 111.00 yen. Farmers cultivating five acres are allowed to plant three to four mou of opium. Farm rent (tenant fee) is 30 percent [of crops]. Loans are payable in three annual installments, the first payment beginning with the second year. The amount of loans per family is 70 yen. Monthly interest of 0.7 percent is charged.

Table 36
 LOAN REPAYMENT IN SANCHIANG PROVINCE
 (in yen)

Year	Income	Expenses	Payment of Principal	Payment of Interest	Farmers' Surplus or Shortage
1st year	152.62	181.57	-	-	-28.95
2nd year	334.72	188.87	-	7.60	138.15
3rd year	481.16	253.51	5.00	3.85	219.80
4th year	581.33	322.08	10.00	3.50	245.75
5th year	590.68	395.37	17.00	2.80	175.51
6th year	654.14	448.59	23.00	1.61	180.94
Total	2,794.65	1,789.99	55.00	19.36	930.20

NOTES: The area cultivated per family was 2.5 hsiang in the 1st year, 5.0 hsiang in the 2nd year, 7.0 hsiang in the 3rd year, 8.0 hsiang in the 4th year, 9.0 hsiang in the 5th year, and 10 hsiang in the 6th year. The tenant fee was 40 percent [of crop]. The loan was payable in four installments, the first payment beginning in the 3rd year. Loan per family was 55 yen. Annual interest was 7 percent.

Thus, in Sanchiang Province, the repayment of loans is scheduled to permit the future expansion and development of agriculture. In Chientao Province, in contrast, a clumsy method of loan collection has been instituted, and in order to correct the accompanying difficulties the desperate policy of permitting the cultivation of opium has been instituted. (This practice was discontinued later.) Chientao Province also assigned priority to the safe collection of loans. Thus, 20 percent of total crop, 50 percent of proceeds from the sale of opium, and 10

percent of other subsidiary income was compulsorily deposited at the nearest credit institution to assure collection of loans. These policies, in combination with such facts as the smallness of the cultivated fields, economic instability that had been aggravated by migration to the hamlets, and the total lack of protection against droughts and floods, increased the depths of destitution into which the farmers were pushed. The deteriorated situation of the farmers was evident in the case study of Chungping Village.

In areas, as in Chientao, where natural conditions do not favor the construction of collective hamlets, long-term loans at the lowest possible interest rates ought to be extended to the farmers. Other policies ought also to be designed to further stabilize and improve the farming economy. The policies adopted at present, instead of correcting the existing disruptive tendencies, can only lead to the final disintegration of the collective hamlets.

XII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The first group of collective hamlets in Manchuria was constructed in Chientao in 1933 by the Korean Government-General for the purpose of settling the refugees and enabling them to be self-reliant. Because of their great impact on the restoration and maintenance of public security, the hamlets were speedily constructed throughout the bandit-infested areas in Manchuria.

Two functions are generally attached to collective hamlets: i.e., the functions of quarantining the bandits and advancing the livelihood of the farmers. But the main reason for the spread of the collective hamlets throughout Manchuria was their effectiveness in quarantining the bandits. The advancement of the farmers' livelihood was advocated only as a secondary function. Therefore, extraordinary attention was paid to the security aspect of the collective hamlets, while they frequently had negative results on the farmers' livelihood.

It should be noted, however, that when the construction of the collective hamlets was not accompanied by advancement in the farmers' livelihood, the hamlets did not have a positive effect on security operations (particularly against the Communist bandits), thus hampering the future development of agriculture, which is the fundamental industry in Manchukuo.

In the case of Chientao Province, the collective hamlets have separated or quarantined the bandits from the law-abiding citizens by concentrating the scattered population of the mountain areas at focal points. But the

artificial congregation of the population has produced various conflicts, such as the reduction of the scale of agriculture, extension of the distance between places of residence and farms, increase in the proportion of rented lands, increased farm rent (tenant fees), increase of various public imposts (in connection with the construction of the hamlets), and increase in the farmers' debts (caused by the construction of houses and the need for agricultural capital). These problems and the resulting pauperization of the farmers are universal in all the collective hamlets.

In order to fulfill the long-range purpose of the collective hamlets, we must eliminate or alleviate the conflicts and facilitate conditions that would bring about prosperity in the agrarian villages. But the means for eradicating these problems vary greatly from one area to another, depending on geographic and economic conditions as well as on the military operations. No uniform procedure can be adopted for this purpose.

For instance, in the rich plain area of northern Manchuria, where much of the land is uncultivated and the population density is very low, it is not difficult to obtain farmland. Therefore, the region is assured of land for the future development of agriculture on a collective scale. It is quite possible in this region to concentrate the scattered population of the mountain area, which often becomes the hideout of the bandits, at a location properly equipped with economic facilities to develop permanent hamlets.

On the other hand, in Tungpientao and Chientao provinces quite contrary conditions exist. These provinces are quite mountainous, and only small farms dot the valleys

and banks of small rivers. Most of the arable land is occupied, and already the population density is excessively high. Probably the following measures should be taken in these areas to eliminate the problems brought about by the collective hamlets.

In central Manchuria, including Kirin and Pinchiang provinces, where a favorable social environment prevails, the natural movement of population has alleviated to a considerable extent the problems presented by the collective hamlets. Although this natural movement is extremely advantageous at present, it represents a loss in the long run for the agrarian development of Manchuria because the movement is reducing the population and increasing the wastelands. It is necessary, therefore, to prevent excessive emigration of the population by reclaiming the abandoned land, establishing permanent collective hamlets with adequate land, and constructing small villages with sufficient defense forces.

Since Tungpientao has the most unfavorable geographic and social conditions, natural processes cannot be expected to solve the problems of its collective hamlets. These conflicts will always depress the farmers' livelihood.

Therefore, in order to stabilize farmers' livelihood and consolidate collective hamlets of the permanent type, it is necessary to promote and regulate artificial intra-Manchurian emigration, at the same time forcefully guiding the sideline industries and reclaiming abandoned land.

Whether or not all the collective hamlets ought to be perpetuated is a question that requires careful deliberation. If such a policy is adopted in Tungpientao, it will be impossible to prevent the emergence of wastelands. Also,

severe blows will be dealt to such special industries in the area as the cultivation of tussah and ginseng. In other words, perpetuation of all the hamlets would adversely affect the national economy. Thus, it is desirable to adopt a flexible policy to suit the necessities of particular areas. In areas where public security has been restored or security facilities are reasonably well developed, it is possible to abolish the collective hamlets and permit the emergence of scattered but regulated [or controlled] villages. The villages should be adapted to the natural conditions of the area.

The natural conditions in Chientao are quite similar to those of Tungpientao, and the disintegrative tendencies there ought to be eradicated mainly for reasons of national defense. Therefore, in order to perpetuate the collective hamlets, special efforts must be made to improve agricultural production through agrarian reform, additional capital investment, and guidance in agrarian skills.

Although collective hamlets were easily organized in Chientao because of the support given by the Koreans, their economic aspects are very far from what might be called the effects of righteous government. The hamlets have very effectively achieved the objectives of eliminating the Communist bandits and establishing public security. Henceforth efforts must be made, in the interest of national defense, to perpetuate the collective hamlets by consolidating their economic bases. This would contribute toward the firm establishment of authority and keeping the support of public opinion.

With regard to general agrarian policies, it is to be noted that establishing a modern land-use system,

rationalization of land ownership, reform of the tenant system, reform of agricultural techniques, modernization and stabilization of agricultural finance, and adoption of the cooperative movement are important factors in the perpetuation of the collective hamlets. But, aside from the problem of the shortage of land, the problems that bear most directly upon the construction of collective hamlets are those of the tenant system and finance. The specific problem in the financial category is that of the additional debts incurred by the farmers in moving into the collective hamlets. The problem in the tenant system is that of distributing the surplus value in the new environment.

Except in Chientao, there is no trace of improvement in tenant relationships. But, needless to say, the construction of collective hamlets and the reclamation of abandoned land provide excellent opportunities for reforming the tenant system because these activities are carried out forcibly under the power of the state. It must also be noted that tenant fees [or farm rents] are extremely low in areas where the security condition is bad, but tend to surge back to the previous rates as the security condition improves. It is improper under these circumstances to allow the landlords to monopolize the benefits obtained from the establishment of collective hamlets and reclamation of wastelands, both of which require tremendous sacrifices on the part of the farmers.

Therefore, the process of constructing the collective hamlets ought to be regarded as one aspect of the process of reforming the tenant system. At a certain stage of development, temporary regulations on tenant fees must be

promulgated in the hamlets as a preparation for future extension of the regulations in other areas and the eventual promulgation of tenancy laws. These regulations should emphasize the lowering of tenant fees and the stabilization of the right to till the soil.

Another problem is that of providing the farmers in the collective hamlets with the opportunity to transform themselves into landed or self-employed farmers. Except for the hamlets in Chientao constructed by the Korean Government-General, where some temporary measures in this direction have been adopted, no areas have taken up this problem. In order for the collective hamlets to go beyond the function of quarantining the bandits and to develop the farmers' future livelihood and arouse the farmers' positive participation in the hamlets, it is most important and effective to give them the goal of becoming landed farmers. The following measures are necessary for this purpose: Land of unknown ownership or administration should be confiscated and nationalized under certain conditions so as to be made available, along with other nationally owned land, as land for self-employed farmers. In the event that the collective hamlets are constructed on wasteland owned by nonfarming landlords, the necessary land should be purchased by the government at forced sales. The land should then be offered for sale to the farmers, with tenant farmers given priority. No such provision has been made in the present programs for reclaiming land. If it is impossible to carry out the program to the point of producing actual economic results, it is still desirable to aim at political effects. Even to a limited extent this procedure would have a great political effect, in

that it would offer boundless attractions to the land-hungry farmers.

When the farmers move into the collective hamlets, they incur debts by borrowing from the government's loan funds for the construction of houses and for agrarian capital. It is not difficult to perceive that the relocation of the farmers necessarily inflicts them with severe economic blows and causes them to incur debts other than those to the government. Investigation in Chientao Province has shown an increase of more than 50 yen of nongovernmental debts per household. Thus the construction of collective hamlets not only drives the farmers into unfavorable conditions with regard to land, but also drives them into a "hell of debts." Taking these facts into consideration, government loans must be made with the most favorable terms for repayment. The method adopted in Chientao is extremely cruel in this respect and makes one wonder whether it amounts to anything more than a way to plunge the farmers into destitution.

PART 3

EIGHT DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO MANCHUKUO

SYNOPSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS

- I. "Public Security, Police, and Propaganda," prepared by the Department of Security, Police Affairs Headquarters, Manchukuo, 1938. This document presents an outline history of the anti-Japanese movement in Manchuria with an analysis of security operations. It describes both the military and the "civil-administrative" operations (the latter are discussed in Part 1 of this study). The report also discusses the characteristics of the police forces and of the propaganda activities carried out. Couched in the language of the Japanese militarists of the 1930s, the report presents a fairly accurate outline of the events up to 1938.

- II. "Pacification Activities in the Communist Bandit Area (Personal Reflections)," by Itagaki Teiji, Vice-Governor of Hangjen Prefecture, 1939. This account presents the personal views of a Japanese official in charge of a prefecture in which the Communist guerrillas had been very active. It describes conditions in the Manchurian hinterland, problems encountered in pacifying the peasants, propaganda efforts carried out by both the guerrillas and the anti-guerrilla forces, and other actions taken by the Japanese. The report reveals the author's insight into the problems he faced and his ingenuity in solving them.

- III. "Propaganda and Pacification Activities in Tung-pientao (With Emphasis on Linchiang Prefecture)," by Hayano Masao, a high-ranking civil servant in Linchiang Province, 1939. This is a personalized account of counter guerrilla activities. Hayano describes the conditions in his area and discusses some of the actions taken against the guerrillas. He attempts to set down the 'dos' and "don'ts" for novices.
- IV. "The Plan for the Special Security and Purification Operation in Huatien Prefecture," by the Police Department of Kirin Province, 1939. This report describes conditions, in particular counter guerrilla activities, in the hinterland.
- V. "Report on the Result of Reconstruction Operations [1938]," by the Tunghwa Provincial Government. This report is included to show what kind of reconstruction operations were carried out in a given year and how funds were distributed. It also describes military, propaganda, and pacification operations that were waged in the later stage of the counter guerrilla operations.
- Both Itagaki and Hayano were in Tunghwa Province, which had the highest concentration of Communist guerrillas up to the 1937-1939 period.
- VI. "Pacification Operations Accompanying the Autumn/Winter Mopping-up Operation (Substance of the Pacification Plan for the Population in Insurgent-infested

Areas)," by the Chientao Provincial Government, 1939. This document discusses general conditions in the various outlying provinces, including advances made by bandits and insurgents through raids on the villages and through propaganda and indoctrination. The goals of the fall campaign by the forces of the pacification plan are outlined in detail.

VII. "The Special Pacification Operation in the Eastern District," by the Chientao Provincial Government, 1940. This account describes briefly how the "pacification teams" were organized and operated.

VIII. "Organization and Operation of the Communist Guerrillas," by Okamoto Goichi, a prosecutor from Okayama, Japan. Okamoto presents a thorough examination, as of 1937, of the organization and operation of the First Army of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army, which was under the control of the Chinese Communists. The report deals with both the military and the political aspects of the army's operation. It is most likely that the report was based on information gathered from the captured or surrendered guerrillas. The so-called First Army had virtually ruled the hinterland in southern Manchuria, but it was completely destroyed by 1941.

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XIII. PUBLIC SECURITY, POLICE, AND PROPAGANDA*

Department of Security, Police Affairs Headquarters,
The Government of Manchukuo

Public Security

CHANGES IN THE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY AND THE INSURGENT GROUPS

Since the founding of the state [Manchukuo] in 1932, public opinion has been in turmoil, and peace has been disturbed. The insurgents who menaced the people and obstructed the attainment of wangtao [the perfect way of the ancient kings, or the kingly way] had at one point reached 300,000, but the earnest and brave efforts of various subjugating agencies headed by the Japanese army brought about great results. Thus the number of insurgents declined from 120,000 in 1933 to 50,000 in 1934; 40,000 in 1935; 30,000 in 1936; and 20,000 in 1937. As of September, 1938, the number of insurgents is estimated at 10,000. Of course, there were many difficulties in subjugating the insurgents, and numerous obstacles had to be surmounted.

The security operation of the past can be divided into three distinct periods. In the initial period, up to the end of 1933, the operation had been concentrated on

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Sanbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], Vol. 3, No. 10, October 1938.

annihilating the [anti-Japanese] troops under Ma Chan-shan, Su Ping-wen, and others who were of the Chang Hsueh-liang clique, the troops of the Northeastern warlords in Tungpientao, and the troops of T'ang Yu-lin in Jehol Province. During the second cleaning-up period, which began in 1934, contingents of Japanese troops were deployed in various parts of the country, the national army [of Manchukuo] was trained and deployed, and the police power was reinforced to annihilate remnants of various insurgent groups. Because of the high degree of success of these operations, the number of insurgents was reduced to 30,000 by the end of 1936. Since 1936, which marks the beginning of the third period of security operations, full-scale pacification activities have been instituted. Because of the success of these activities [which led to the winning of the support of the masses], the insurgent groups are now in an extremely precarious condition and the attainment of peace seems to be in sight.

The insurgent groups in Manchuria also underwent distinct changes in their characteristics after the establishment of Manchukuo. The first transitional period was marked by the strategic merger of the native [mounted] bandits [who preyed on the farmers and merchants in the previous era] and the rebellious troops from the local armies, who had maintained distinct identities. The second transitional period was characterized by absorption of these bandits by the Chinese Communist Party on the one hand, and the establishment of political insurgent groups supported by influential political figures in China on the other. The third and final transitional

stage was marked by the unification of all insurgents in the territory under the Communist hegemony operating with the slogan of "Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan" (Fan-Man, Kang-jih). The power of [nonaligned] political insurgents and native bandits waned perceptibly.

Beginning in the autumn of 1935, the Chinese Communist Party intensified its agitations for the establishment of the so-called All-Nation Unified National Defense Government (Ch'üan-kuo t'ung-i kuo-fang chêng-fu) and the organization of the All-Nation Unified Anti-Japanese Federated Army (Ch'üan-kuo t'ung-i k'ang-jih lien-ho-chün). For these purposes, the party aroused anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese feelings among the masses, gathered the military insurgents and native bandits under their control, and organized numerous armies under the name of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army (Tung-pei k'ang-jih lien-ho-chün). The armies, their commanders, and their respective areas of operations were as follows:

First Army, Yang Ching-yü, in Antung, Tunghua, and Fengti'en provinces.

Second Army, Wang Tê-t'ai, (Wei Cheng-min after the death of Wang), in Tunghua, Chilin (Kirin), and Chientao provinces.

Third Army, Chao Sang-chih, in I-lan and T'ang-yuan prefectures (hsien) of Sanchiang Province.

Fourth Army, Li Yen-lu (Li Yen-p'ing at present), in the Sanchiang and Pinchiang provincial borders.

Fifth Army, Chou Pao-chung, in the Pin-chiang and Mutanchiang provincial borders.

Sixth Army, Hsia Yün-chieh (Tai Hung-pin after the death of Hsia), in Hua-ch'uan and T'ang-yuan prefectures of Sanchiang Province.

Seventh Army, Yi Hak-man, in Jao-ho and Fu-liao prefectures of Sanchiang Province.

Eighth Army, Hsieh Wên-tung, in I-lan and Fang-cheng prefectures of Sanchiang Province.

Ninth Army, Li Hua-t'ang, in Sanchiang and Piachiang provincial borders.

These groups expanded and reinforced their strength by gathering the native bandits in their operating areas, and at the same time kept up group activities. As they extended their anti-Japanese front, they also organized the Tenth Army, under Wang Ya-ch'en, and the Eleventh Army, under Hsieh Chih-chung, and continued to disturb public security. Their tenacious propaganda and armed operations significantly disturbed the public and presented formidable obstacles to the permeation of culture and the way of the righteous movement.

The origins of the political insurgents can be traced back to the rebellion of troops under Wang Te-lin in October 1932. Since then, K'ung Hsien-ying and others have followed suit and organized the Northeastern Save the Nation Volunteer Army (Tungpei Chiukuo I-yung-chün).

Another group under Wang Feng-ke operated in Tungpientao. These groups sought to destroy Manchukuo and propagate anti-Japanese thoughts under the slogan of "Recovery of the Lost Lands" and were completely different from the Communist insurgents in their characteristics. Since the rise of these groups, the Soviet Union has given considerable encouragement to them.¹ This can be deduced from many examples of the secret supplying of weapons, ammunitions, and foodstuffs at every opportunity to such insurgent leaders as Li Hsüeh-wan, Chao Shing-chih, and Chou Pao-chung.

An outstanding feature in the changing condition of the insurgents is that while they have declined numerically every year, their quality has improved. Currently, the insurgents are striving to destroy the government's pacification efforts and at the same time are concentrating on winning public confidence for themselves and on disturbing public opinion by opposing Manchukuo and Japan and espousing Communism. Their efforts lead the masses astray on various matters and significantly hamper the development of natural resources and the improvement of the people's livelihood. Through their propaganda, the insurgents are also attempting to protect their sources of food and the channels used by their informers. It is truly regrettable that the efforts to separate the insurgents from the masses have not yet been

¹Editor's Note: The original says "The Soviet Union rendered considerable encouragement to Communist bandits," but none of the persons mentioned subsequently in the same paragraph was originally Communist. The author more likely meant "the political bandits."

completely successful. In all probability, there are no ways to annihilate the insurgents other than through the thorough execution of military [extermination] operations, construction of collective hamlets, extension of security highways, consolidation of the paochia system, and coordinated development of pacification and propaganda activities.

CONDITIONS IN THE MOST DISTURBED AREAS

It is inevitable that the degree of emphasis on security operations varies from one area to another, depending on natural geographical conditions and the proportionate importance of the regions from the point of view of national policy. The fact that the disturbance and aggravation are confined at present to a particular region is a result of this inevitable geographical imbalance in security operations. Thus the mountains and dense forests of Sanchiang Province and a part of Tunghua Province are responsible for the continued rampaging of the insurgent groups in that region. Yet the past policy of geographical imbalance in security operations has also produced the desirable effect of confining the insurgents to a special region, restricting their operating areas, and placing them in an encircled situation. These conditions led to a higher degree of effectiveness in exterminating the insurgents. Whereas the scattered operation of insurgent groups requires extensive security forces, their restriction to a limited area enables the security forces to concentrate their efforts and attain greater effectiveness.

Let us look into the major areas of disturbances more closely. After 1935, approximately 70 percent of all the insurgents in Manchuria were concentrated in Sanchiang Province. This was particularly so after the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police concentrated their subjugation operations in Pinchiang Province in 1935. Most of the insurgents fled from Pinchiang to Sanchiang, not being able to bear the pressures exerted against them. When, however, the brunt of attack was directed against Sanchiang Province, the bandit groups fled and concentrated their forces in the northern prefectures of Hua-ch'uan, Fu-chin, and Pao-ch'ing. For example, in the northern prefectures were concentrated the Fourth Anti-Japanese Army, under Li Yen-p'ing; the Fifth Army, under Chou Pao-chung; the Sixth Army, under Tai Hung-pin; the Seventh Army, under Hsueh-wan; the Eleventh Army, under Hsieh Chih-chung; and a part of the Third Army, under Chao Shang-chich. The accumulated number of probable insurgents in 1937 was as follows:

June	12,000
July	12,000
August	12,600
September	12,200
October	14,000
November	16,000
December	11,000

In the current year, 1938, the figures are reported to be the following:

January	5,420
February	8,636
March	5,434
April	4,200
May	3,821
June	3,646

Thus, the insurgent strength has been declining during the current year, but the region is still the worst security area in all Manchuria. The figures cited above, however, indicate that the subjugation operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police are producing significant results. Furthermore, since these counterinsurgency forces do not allow any large-group operations of insurgents or any attempt to establish a stationary base, the insurgents have been pushed into an extremely difficult situation. Although the insurgents have shown considerable activity in the previous summers, no significant activity has been observed in July and August of this year. There are indications that the insurgents are secretly engaged in harvesting opium at present, but it has become evident that they are attempting to move to another locality in search of new channels of food supply and new areas of operation. For instance, the Fourth and Fifth armies are moving [or about to move] to Pinchiang Province and the main body of the Sixth Army is moving into T'ang-yuan Prefecture. Thus the northern range of Sanchiang Province is likely to be relieved of bandit disturbances soon.

In Tunghua Province, Yang Ching-yü, the commander of the First Army, has commanded 5,000 subordinates through such powerful subordinates as Li, Hsü, and Pi, and behaved as though he were the king of the forests and mountains in the Chi-an Prefecture. His presence led to extreme destitution among the people and greatly hindered the restoration of peace in Tungpientao. The surrender, however, of Ch'êng Pin, the commander of the first division

of the army, who has operated for a long period in the Antung and Fengt'ien provincial borders, greatly affected the morale of the First Army. Since plans are being drawn up at present to launch a concentrated attack [against the First Army], its eradication is not likely to be very far off.

Lately there has been a noticeable degree of bandit traffic in Mutanchiang and Pinchiang provinces. The southern movement of the Fourth and Fifth armies, along with the renewed operations of the Second Army, resulted in the temporary disturbance of security in the area. This is an inevitable phenomenon accompanying the movement of the bandit groups; its temporary nature need not be stressed. Policies adopted [by the government forces] to counter these groups have left little room for the insurgents to maneuver, and they are being confronted with the ultimate decision of choosing between complete destruction and surrender.

SECURITY OPERATIONS

It is evident that the security and bandit conditions described above have had a direct relationship with the nation's economy and culture. These conditions are also the reasons behind our government's primary emphasis on security and the establishment of armed police forces.

Generally speaking, security operations consist of military and civil-administrative activities. Although it is necessary for these two types of activities to be carried out in harmonious steps, the former must always

serve as the promoting force behind the latter. This is because the immediate purpose of military activities is to bring about peace and order, whereas the civil-administrative activities are aimed at the development of human and material resources, progress in economy and culture, and improvement of the conditions of the people. In other words, the civil-administrative operations will further promote the effect of the military operations and prevent future aggravation of security conditions.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

The use of military force against the insurgents is the principal means of attaining peace and order, in that it will directly reduce the number of insurgents. But this method is to be used only as a last resort; it is not a method that is compatible with our nation's philosophy, which is the realization of the kingly way (wangtao). The most appropriate means suitable for a righteous government is that of liberating the masses from old notions implanted by a long period of exploitative rule by military cliques and feudalistic habits and of dispelling the illusions created by Communist ideology. Furthermore, the philosophy of the state calls for a proper understanding by the masses of the true nature of righteous government, the reasons behind the establishment of the state, and the current state of affairs. The insurgents should be given an opportunity to alter their misconceived notions and to become good citizens. This is why the operation for the inducement of surrender has such grave significance.

The statistics of the military operations from January to June of this year [1938] were as follows. The cumulative number of insurgents seen was 60,144 (average number of insurgents in one showing, 41). The cumulative number of counterinsurgency forces mobilized (including joint operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police as well as independent operations by police and the self-defense corps) was 238,406 (average number of counterinsurgency forces in one operation, 45). The total number of insurgents killed was 2,076 (monthly average, 346); captured, 410 (monthly average, 68); and wounded, 2,742 (monthly average, 457). The number of insurgents surrendering was approximately 2,300. This includes those who surrendered as a result of special operations carried out in the Northern Manchurian District since March of this year and those who surrendered to the armies, Hsieh-ho-hui, and police.

Thus, as a result of subjugation and surrender operations, approximately 4,700 insurgents were eliminated during the past half year. This, of course, demonstrates a remarkable advance in the [techniques of] military subjugation operations. It is estimated that concentrated security operations in the Sanchiang and Tunghua provinces will yield considerable results by the end of this year. It should not be long before insurgency is completely eradicated from all of Manchuria.

In connection with the military-security operations, one should not minimize the effect of underground operations by insurgents who infiltrate into towns to disturb public opinion, spy upon security and other operations,

and stealthily propagate "Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan" thoughts. The search for and arrest of these underground insurgents is essential for the success of military-security operations. Thorough gathering of intelligence and the apprehension of underground workers have contributed greatly to the success of military-security operations. It should be added that seasonal changes affect the intensity of the underground movement. Infiltration by insurgents increases during the winter [when armed operation in the hinterland becomes more difficult].

Civil-Administrative Operations

As has been stated above, the immediate aims of civil-administrative operations are the development of human and material resources and the improvement of the condition of the people. These operations also serve as a means of preventing the weakening of security. Some of the programs that fall into this category are as follows: construction of collective hamlets, town and village purification programs, training and consolidation of the self-defense corps, development of security highways, development of communication facilities, and collection of weapons. These programs significantly contribute to [the smooth performance of] administrative functions.

Collective Hamlets. The malignant security areas-- i.e., the areas where the power of government authorities has not fully penetrated in the past--were generally located in the remote hinterlands along the provincial

boundaries. Although the residents in these sections almost always suffered from the exploitation and extortions of insatiable insurgent groups, they have always maintained close relations with the insurgents, owing to intimidation, propaganda, or treachery. Because of the unclear distinction between insurgents and citizens in these areas, it has been impossible to bring about complete peace and order.

In order to eliminate this problem, the Civil Government Department (now the Security Department) issued instructions in December 1934 for promoting the construction of collective hamlets throughout Manchuria after the initial construction of thirty-six hamlets in Chientao Province early that year. The establishment of the collective hamlets was modeled after (1) the experience in Kan-an prefecture, Kirin Province, in 1926, when the residents of scattered villages congregated in central locations to protect themselves from attack by bandits, and (2) the effective experience of the eight collective hamlets established in Yenchi, Holung, and Hunch'un prefectures of Chientao Province by the Korean Government-General and the Chientao Consulate in 1933 as a relief measure for the refugees. Since then, the number of collective hamlets has rapidly multiplied, reaching 10,629 at the end of 1937 and accommodating some 5,500,000 persons. The number of hamlets planned for the year 1938 reached 2,550.²

²Editor's Note: These figures do not agree with the report of the Department of Military Advisors.

The purposes of the collective hamlets are to congregate in a central location the scattered houses of the remote areas, provide them with permanent defense facilities, protect the life and property of the residents, promote the livelihood of the agricultural society, and enable the residents to partake of the benefits provided by the government in security, transportation, communication, industry, and health. In short, the goal is to diffuse the spirit of righteous government and to maintain security.

Because the increased construction of the hamlets has a direct and grave influence on the very existence of the bandit groups, they have greatly dreaded the completion of hamlets and have therefore concentrated their major force on hindering the construction process or destroying the completed hamlets. Thus, there were 480 attacks on the hamlets last year, and there have been 180 attacks during the first six months of this year. Because of the concerted efforts of the government and the people, however, hamlet construction has been successfully carried forward, and [a large majority of] the people have been separated from the insurgents. The insurgent groups thus lost their bases as well as their sources of food supply. They are being pushed to the most remote hinterlands, directly toward the road of self-destruction.

The Paochia and the City-town-village Systems. The paochia system in our country [Manchuria] was first adopted in 1933, when the temporary law on paochia was promulgated. The law was designed to suppress the rampant banditry of that time and to restore peace. Under the direct command of

police officers, the paochia system augmented the subjugation operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police. During the four years since that time, the system has not only contributed toward the maintenance of security, which was the original mission of the system, but also has served as the forerunner of the administrative structure in towns and villages. In addition to performing the task of self-defense, it has nurtured the spirit of fraternity in neighborhoods and contributed greatly to the realization of righteous government and to the improvement of the condition of the state and society. Further consolidation of the system is contemplated for this year, and the paochia system will become one of the important elements of the special operations in the malignant security areas and the border areas. In the areas where security has been stabilized, the city-town-village system has been adopted [on the basis of the paochia system]. The law on the self-defense of the cities, towns, and villages was promulgated in December 1937.

Self-defense Corps. With the intent of maximizing the area under actual control by the limited security forces, self-defense corps were established, letting the citizens engage in self-defense of the cities, towns, and villages. The corps are under the guidance of the police and serve as auxiliary organs of the police in defending the collective hamlets and the paochia system. Actively engaged in the task of subjugating the insurgents, the corps also have the duty of promoting the welfare of the residents.

In the past the self-defense corps has been an agency that exploited the farmers, in that the corps members had been hired for pay. This, of course, is contrary to the basic purpose of self-government and self-defense. Therefore, it is contemplated that, while nurturing the spirit of patriotic service and self-government, the corps will undergo gradual transition to an [unpaid] compulsory service system. According to the established plan, all the paid self-defense corps, except some in special regions, will be eliminated by June 1939, and will be replaced by compulsory service corps.

Security Highways. The purposes of constructing security highways are to consolidate the police machinery, improve the effectiveness of collective hamlets, and perfect the communication networks. The security highway system is essential for [the success of] security operations. The highways will permit speedy movement of the police forces and enable small forces to guard wide territories. The construction of highways will also have a direct influence on the economic and cultural conditions of the residents.

In spite of the importance of highways, little attention had been paid to them by the warlords and other rulers of the previous era. As a result, passage by automobiles was not possible on the old roads, except in winter when the rivers were frozen. This situation greatly hampered the counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, in spite of financial and other difficulties, various provincial and prefectural governments have made

strenuous efforts by mobilizing the masses to repair and construct new highways. Highway construction was also expanded on the basis of the Three-year Plan for Security and Order. As a result, by the spring of this year [1938], 1,800 sections of highways were constructed, the accumulated length reaching 29,854 kilometers. These highways confined the bandits to certain areas.

Communication Facilities for Security Operations.

Little needs to be said about the necessity for communication facilities in maintaining security. The communication facilities inherited from the old warlord regime were very meager. Furthermore, the facilities erected by the old regime were largely inoperative; most of the telephone poles had deteriorated and the techniques used were primitive. As a result of concerted efforts by the central and local governments, 131,721 kilometers of new telephone lines have been put into serviceable condition. Further efforts are being made in this area in accordance with the Three-year Security Telephone Plan adopted in 1937.

Collection of Weapons. Under the long period of rule by the warlords, when there were virtually no police forces, the only means of protection available to the masses was self-defense. Therefore, the possession of weapons by civilians was inseparably connected with the maintenance of security. The possession of weapons by civilians, however, contributed directly to the rise of bandits after the establishment of Manchukuo. Therefore, the collection of these weapons became urgent if

public peace was to be attained. Recognizing this, the government undertook the task [of collection] immediately after the founding of the nation. In May 1933, the Department of Civil Affairs issued an ordinance--the temporary regulations on the control of weapons--in order to count and register weapons possessed by civilians; the number of weapons was estimated to be more than a million. Regulations on collection of weapons were also promulgated, and, accordingly, concealed weapons and weapons in scattered locations were collected. To date, 140 rifles have been collected, contributing significantly to the restoration of public security. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 more items need to be collected. The regulations on the collection of weapons were amended on April 1 of this year to carry the collection program to completion.

The Police

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Declaration of the Founding of the Nation states that [Manchukuo shall] "make every effort to eradicate the dark polity of the past, reform the laws, encourage local autonomy, appoint able persons by searching for human resources on a broad basis, encourage industry, unify the financial system, develop natural resources, improve the livelihood of the people, train police and the military, and eliminate the sufferings from banditry."

Under the so-called feudalistic rule that existed before the founding of the state, the private armies or military cliques ravaged the people, and ideas of a nation-state and of a [just] government of the people were virtually absent. The people were only oppressed and exploited. In this situation, it was impossible to anticipate the existence of a perfect police system. The residents had to resort to self-defense to achieve safety and happiness. It is not necessary for us to elaborate on the inevitable and unavoidable fact that the police system of our nation had to develop with peculiar missions and duties, in comparison with the police systems in advanced nations.

The essence of the spirit of our nation is that the peoples of the Far East shall cooperate in harmony, contribute toward eternal peace in Asia, proclaim morality to the world, undertake the responsibilities of defense under the joint-defense arrangement with Japan, develop natural resources jointly with Japan, and become a rising industrial nation. The spirit and actions of our police must be based on the above spirit. It is natural, therefore, for our police to undertake the responsibilities of "regulative police," rejecting the so-called passive policies of liberalism and capitalism. Considering the fact that our nation has a special problem of "plural communities" [Manchukuo allegedly was based on the harmonious cooperation of five "races"] and that the standards of the people have been deteriorated by traditionally unjust governments and rampant banditry, it is only natural that our police

should go beyond its ordinary functions and undertake other administrative duties. It is too early for the critics to call for the return of our police to its ordinary functions. Since the mission of the police is to maintain peace and order and to promote the national interest and the people's welfare, our police must positively and forcefully eliminate all dangers and perils inflicted on the society, [and their function] must, of course, change according to the change in social conditions. It is not likely, however, that our police will be able to discard its present function as a "national defense police" in the very near future. For instance, the Soviet Union has been obstructing the establishment of an order of justice as well as the setting of moral standards. One must not slight the threat of the Chinese Communist Party. In addition, the rampages of bandit groups threaten the livelihood of the people and seriously hamper industrial development. In this situation, it is absolutely necessary that our police force arm itself and face the internal and external problems. Therefore, any persons engaged in administering police affairs or justice must have the resolve to engage in special missions. They must also be resolute and true, incorruptible and fair, and must be dedicated to the application of the law and the use of force. They must also be daring, as situations demand, and must be prepared to render unlimited service to the nation.

In addition to these attributes, police personnel must also be capable planners and administrators. In other words, a police officer's insight into the special

conditions under which he must function or even into the overall condition of our country is not sufficient. Unless he can implement such insight through constructive planning, he cannot perform the missions assigned to him.

Until 1957, however, our police was in the first stage of development. It has not been possible to improve all aspects of the police simultaneously. Some functions were carried out on an emergency basis and others under temporary arrangements. Other sections of police were left undeveloped after the initiating stage. On the other hand, our police has administered the abolition of extra-territorial rights, transferred control of the local security units and highway police, and established the Border Police Units and the Police Guerrilla Units to display the true functions of the police. At the same time, substantial progress has been made in the administration of justice, criminal affairs, transportation, sanitation, special duties, public security, etc.

CONDITION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITY POLICE

The present condition of our nation clearly indicates that much of the progress in economy, social conditions, and culture depends on the establishment of public peace. Therefore, it can be said that the primary function of our police is to attain public peace (or public security). Although security conditions have been improving every year, malignant security areas still remain, as has been stated earlier, and one cannot assert

that the insurgents have completely disappeared from Manchuria. The police in peace-restored areas are moving toward ordinary functions, but those in the insurgent-infested areas are engaged in completely different activities. The police forces engaged in insurgent subjugation must suffer scorching heat and disease, frostbite, and hunger; they must also maintain constant vigilance against the possible surprise attacks and counterattacks by the insurgents, which keep the police personnel in a constantly tense condition. Numerous sacrifices have been made by the police in fighting against the bandits. The police must also provide protection for collective hamlets under construction, for security highways undergoing construction and repair, and for communication networks. They must also engage in pacification operations in the hamlets. In short, the police are at the forefront in constructing the way of justice and extending national power.

Forest Police Unit

In October 1935, regulations on lumbering and its protection were adopted, and in consequence the Forest Police Unit was organized. The purpose of this unit is to annihilate or prevent bandit operations in the mountain and dense forest areas and to provide protection for personnel engaged in the development of lumber resources. There are at present 56 locations where the members of the Forest Police Unit are stationed. Since a force of only 100 to 150 troops may be guarding lumber

workers dispersed through a wide forest area, which in fact is a hideout of insurgents, the difficulties confronted by the Forest Police Unit are beyond description. Many sacrifices have been made every year, and security forces are continually enlarged and consolidated, more being organized as the lumbering activities expand.

Hsien Police Guerrilla Units

As the subjugation activities progressed and their sources and routes of food and ammunition were cut off, the bandit groups were sealed off in the mountain-forest regions. On the other hand, the strategies and techniques of the insurgent groups seem to have improved. They are making incessant efforts to defeat our strategy of blockade and to maintain the sources and routes of supplies. They have been very skillful in their tactics of attack, emergence, and movement.

In order to suppress these bandits, Police Guerrilla Units were organized last March (1938) in various hsien [prefectures] where the problem of insurgent infestation exists. These units are charged with the responsibility of searching for and subjugating the bandits, making swift and proper movements as situations demand. They are the vanguard units of security police, always operating in the forefront. Considerable results are anticipated from these units.

In addition to the Forest and Guerrilla units, there are Border Police units, Sea Police, etc., that have special missions and duties to restore and maintain public security.

Propaganda

PUBLIC SECURITY OPERATIONS AND PROPAGANDA

It is self-evident that the attainment of public security requires the utmost effort, and that the armed subjugation activities must be accompanied by propaganda and pacification operations. For example, unless the residents' intentions and dispositions are in harmony, the thorough execution of subjugation operations only benefits the insurgent groups. Furthermore, the members of the self-defense corps, if they are to perform the front-line activities of insurgent subjugation and defend the cities, towns, and villages, need to be imbued with the spirit of public service and self-government. Therefore, efforts must be focused on impressing them with the spirit of the founding of the state and on providing them with spiritual guidance in benevolence and justice. Coercion alone not only will not attain true values and the original purpose, but will bring about harmful results. The members of the self-defense corps necessarily occupy central and important positions in the cities, towns, and villages. Only through cultivation of the spirit of justice can they effectively subjugate the bandits and prevent the success of the insurgents' appeasement policy toward the security agencies. The indoctrination [of the corps members] should also bring about the side effect of letting them bear and perform the responsibilities of maintaining and promoting the social facilities.

The same thing applies to the construction of collective hamlets. The establishment of the hamlets separates the people from the insurgents and cuts off the insurgents' sources of supplies, and thus contributes toward the maintenance of security. But unless the people positively support the collective hamlet program, it will not fulfill the secondary purpose of creating agricultural organizations dedicated to the goal of common existence and common prosperity and bringing about economic and cultural progress. Not only that. Lack of support on the part of the residents of the hamlets could serve as a cause for internal corrosion. It is possible for these hamlets to produce informers for the insurgents, leading to insurgent attacks. In order for the residents to become aware of the necessity for hamlets, constant, kind, and considerate guidance as well as education must be provided.

The expansion and consolidation of security highways and communication networks are tremendously important for security operations, advancement of the economy and culture, and development of natural resources. Actual results, however, cannot be realized by the sacrificial efforts of the supervisors alone, and can only be attained through full realization on the part of the workers that these networks are absolutely necessary to support the government, to maintain peace, and to bring about a desire on the part of the masses for public service. It is evident from the records of all activities that the concerted cooperation of the people is essential and that proper guidance must be provided to arouse sacrificial spirit.

This also applies to the collection of weapons. The ordinances and regulations can only be implemented if persons will voluntarily submit their weapons, as well as report the discovery of concealed weapons, and interest and persuade others to do the same. It is highly unlikely that even the most concentrated efforts of the government in searching for weapons will not yield commensurable results.

The same principle is applicable both to the operation of the paochia system and to the effectiveness of inducements to surrender. In these activities also, one feels the necessity of stabilizing the direction of public feeling and nurturing the ideological and conceptual foundations for cooperation in the task of constructing the nation. Of course, these tasks require the employment of different methods and means by the various agencies of the government. Propaganda and pacification, however, must always precede all other methods.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND PROPAGANDA

Because it has not been long since the establishment of the state, public opinion has not yet been settled, and there are those who believe that the founding of Manchukuo is in fact a territorial aggrandizement of the Japanese Empire, or a capitalist monopoly [scheme for the] exploitation of industrial resources, or an imperialist imposition of power over the [Chinese] people. In this situation, the Communist bandits are continuing their rampages and propaganda

activities in order to lead public opinion astray and to maintain their sources of supplies. There are still cases where residents of the hinterlands support the bandit groups and facilitate the [continued] existence of the bandits. The Soviet Union has been extending her evil hands, through the Chinese Communist Party, to communize the entire nation, and the Communists have been making considerable progress in [arousing the masses] against Manchukuo and Japan and for Communism. Therefore, propaganda activities designed to win the support of the public should not be slackened even for a day. It should be noted also that the changes in the current state of international and domestic political affairs have a direct impact on public opinion. For example, the fact that the residents in the border regions of the Northern Manchurian District tend to have a feverish dread of the Soviet Union proves the great impact of propaganda carried out by the Soviets. This phenomenon warns against slighting the propaganda or rumors spread by bandit groups and subversive elements. A similar situation was observable in the western border region of Jehol Province, where the bandits utilized unrest in public opinion to aggrandize their organizations.

It can be said that these phenomena are the results of the masses' misconception of the current state of affairs. But unless there are positive propaganda and pacification efforts, how can the masses come to a correct understanding? These unstable conditions are most distinctly observable in the more remote areas. But unrest in public opinion or the rise of reactionary

thoughts can take place with the speed of wind, regardless of the area. It is true that the propaganda and pacification operations must be carried out in the manner most suitable for the particular area. There should be no uniformity in the manner of operation. There cannot be any disagreement, however, [with the principle] that propaganda and pacification efforts should reach even the remotest corner of the nation. In reality, while propaganda and pacification operations are relatively well performed in the stabilized regions, there has been a tendency to ignore the hinterlands. This, of course, reflects the security condition. But the true value of propaganda and pacification lies in their preceding the "direct means of security operations," i.e., military subjugation operations. This, undoubtedly, is difficult, but efforts must be made regardless of the obstacles or the regions involved.

The first requirement in security operations is the execution of comprehensive propaganda and pacification programs designed to enlighten the masses and imbue them with the spirit of the founding of the state. Although there are many different means for attaining these goals, both spiritual and material, all must be executed under the assistance and guidance of police authorities. Therefore, security, police, and propaganda are intrinsically interrelated. The propaganda and pacification teams in various provinces and prefectures have been producing remarkable results in the attainment of peace and order, and they have endeavored to win the support of the public. It is hoped that continuous progress will be made in these endeavors.

XIV. PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES

IN THE COMMUNIST BANDIT AREA

(Personal Reflections)*

Itagaki Teiji

Vice-Governor, Hangjen Prefecture

In the Villages

Diary, June 20, 1938. Midnight: received an urgent report from Police Lieutenant X at Palishuntsu. "The village is completely surrounded--150 bandits with five machine guns--help!" Returned a message, "Defend to death until help arrives," and immediately ordered the organization of 100 troops. This will leave the town completely without troops. Absolutely outrageous that the bandits are attacking the same spot for the second time. They are insulting us. Pray to the tablet of the Goddess of Mercy that the police will hold until the troops arrive. Anxious. There were six wounded in yesterday's battle. This group of security forces is not even back in town. Apparently there were some casualties among the Japanese army troops also. Must not let even a village be burned. Think of the subordinates in the front line. Thoughts come and go. Cannot sleep. Moon is so pale.

This is the record of my life in June 1938, a few days before the surrender of the Communist bandit Ch'êng Pin (the commander of the First Division of the First

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], (marked Secret), Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1939.

Army, the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army), and when the Communist guerrillas were offering the last moment's resistance. Hangjen Prefecture is known as the roof of Tungpientao and the Communist zone. The daylight cannot be seen all day because it is always covered by shadows. Only gloominess pervades. Immediately after the Manchurian incident [1931], T'ang Chü-wu, the self-styled General Commander of the Liaoning People's Self-defense Army, rebelled against the government with his 25,000 men; Hsu Wen-hai, the head of the Police Affairs Bureau, also rebelled with his 1,000 men. Constant revolts followed. When I arrived in Hangjen, there were 600 bandits, all soaked in red [Communism] and freely roaming the territory. There were 70 appearances of the bandits in a month, involving a total of 1,406 bandits. Compared with 208 appearances and 3,214 bandits of August 1937, this was definitely an improvement, but I was always called at night by reports of attacks, and never could have enough sleep. The construction of defense hamlets had to be carried on forcibly throughout the prefecture. The population in the prefecture declined from 220,000 before September 1931 to 120,000 at present. There was a decrease of 10,000 during the last year alone. According to statistical reports, 70,000 moved out of the prefecture and 30,000 died. Out of the total of 520,000 mou [6.6 mou = 1 acre] of cultivated land in the prefecture, 150,000 mou were abandoned by early 1938. Because of the damages inflicted by the bandits and the forcible execution of mopping-up operations that followed the bandit appearances, the production base of the masses was completely overturned. The food shortage continued year

after year. Only a month after the harvest, petitions for food are flooding in upon the government. Without exception, those in the mountain villages are living on the bark of elm trees. The situation is the worst between March and May, when neither trees nor plants show their buds. It is truly sad to see the farmers surrounding elm trees on the mountainsides. It sounds only charitable to say that the people do not possess animated countenances. The word "animated" has no relationship whatsoever to these people. They are turning from a dark blue color to that of earth. Death is real. Knowing so well that the patient would instantly recover if he were given some food, one has to send him home with a few grains of jentan [or jintan--mouth freshener] saying that it will cure his stomach illness. The relief food is limited in supply. One's heartbreak on these occasions is simply unbearable.

The construction of the defense hamlets must be enforced--with tears. We issue small subsidy funds and severe orders [to the farmers], telling them to move to a designated location by such and such a date and that this is the last order. But it is too miserable [to watch] the farmers destroying their accustomed houses, and [to see] little innocent babies wrapped in rags and smiling on carts that are carrying the household goods away. A few days ago, a girl of sixteen or seventeen made me weep by coming to my office at the prefectural government and kneeling down to beg me to spare her house. She said, "Do we really have to tear down our house, councilor?" She had walked a long way to town thinking, "If I asked

the councilor, something could be done." Watching the bony back of the little girl who was quietly led out by the office boy, I closed my eyes and told myself, "You will go to hell." The hardship of the Japanese police officers at the forefront who have to guide the coercive operation directly is beyond imagination. I was told many times while I was on my inspection tours of the front, "I cannot go on with this kind of wretched work. I will quit and go home." These words, uttered [as we sat] around a lamp sipping kaoliang gin, sounded as though someone was spitting blood. In each case we had to console and keep telling each other that this was the last hill that needed to be conquered. The program was forced through mercilessly, inhumanely, without emotion--as if driving a horse. As a result, more than 100 defense hamlets were constructed throughout the prefecture. These were built with blood, tears, and sweat.

Along with this, the rehabilitation operations were carried out. Hangjen Prefecture issued bonds for rehabilitation purposes totaling 1,000,000 yuan by the end of 1938, but there is a limit to this. It is barely keeping the farmers from starvation and is nothing more than water poured on burning stone. The grain shortage in 1938 amounted to 75,000 koku [one koku is equivalent to 5.12 bushels], but the relief grain supplied by the prefectural government was only 15,000 koku. The Communist insurgents are rampant as ever, and attacks on the defense hamlets are incessant. The Communists' propaganda activities directed toward the masses are focused on the sorest points of the prefectural government.

The Communist operation in this prefecture was at its peak in July 1935, when the General Commander of the First Independent Army of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army, Yang Ching-yü, and his 300 subordinates established a "prefectural government" in the sixth district of this prefecture. They occupied village government buildings, elementary school buildings, etc., put up signboards of the "Headquarters of the Northeast People's Army," collected taxes, and established a semi-Soviet government. For four or five years, they ravaged the territory. But by June 1938, when Ch'eng Pin surrendered, group movements of Communist insurgents in this prefecture came to an end.

At first [the Communist organizations] in the different areas were like independent regimes and, because of abundant funds and strong lower level organizations, they had the support of the masses. But the thorough subjugation operations carried out by the Japanese and Manchukuo army and police, the progress of security operations, and [the Communists'] paucity of guidance and funds caused by the liaison break with the Chinese Communist Party after the China incident forced the Communists to use intimidation and threats to obtain the cooperation of the masses. The lower level organizations still persist. Into each police district, [Communist] political leaders of varying degrees of responsibility have infiltrated to organize units of approximately thirty armed members.

The completion of the defense hamlets had the immediate effect of quarantining the insurgents. Before this, [they] openly moved into villages, assembled the people,

and easily obtained [the support of] the masses. After the completion of the hamlets¹ the Communists adopted the method of directing their propaganda toward individual farmers working in the fields outside the hamlets or attacking a village and then kidnapping the villagers en masse to indoctrinate and train them for two or three days.

The farmers are ignorant, but they are not so ignorant as to be unaware of the destitute condition they have fallen into. The Communists have been appealing to the masses by stressing this fact. The farmers will never follow [the Communists] blindly on the basis of emotional appeals that are detached from actual life, but when the appeals are focused on actual problems concerning their livelihood, unremitting collective revolt may occur. The movement of the former Hungch'ianghui bandits in Tungpientao clearly attests to this fact. Construction of collective hamlets, construction of security highways, continued emergence of wastelands, starvation, sudden reduction of the population into half of the former figure, etc., are unsurpassed subjects for Communist agitation among the farmers.

Even though the farmers are not to be moved by theoretical propaganda advocating the construction of a Communist society or the defense of the fatherland of farmers and workers--i.e., the Soviet Union--one cannot guarantee that they will not be moved when the realities of life are pointed out to them. We are not afraid of

¹Editor's note: The "China incident" indicates the beginning of the full-scale Japanese invasion of China in July 1937.

Communist propaganda; but we are worried because the material for propaganda can be found in the farmers' lives. We are not afraid of the ignition of fire; rather, we are afraid of the seeping oil. Not long ago, Ch'eng Pin's group kidnapped about thirty villagers from the collective hamlet at Yu-chia-p'u-tzu in the Sixth District and indoctrinated them intensely for two or three days before setting them free. They were told:

You are the same Chinese people that we are. Why do you have to be under the Manchukuo government today, coercively pushed into the collective hamlet and enslaved as informers, guards, or road repairmen, when the farmlands and ancestral tombs are neglected and you are faced with food shortage because of lack of time [for farming]?

I fall into a strange sense of loneliness when a report reaches me that the farmers have been kidnapped and returned after propaganda sessions. I have an anxiety as though the farmers were being taken away from my hands one by one. At times I have had to battle against my sense of complete despair and extremity of loneliness with a surging desire to fight. I have to compete against the Communist bandits in winning the masses. The ultimate goal is victory. For this purpose, I have had to spend days and nights in planning the disposition of troops or drawing up operational plans. I have driven my subordinates without mercy. Many were wounded or killed in the course of fulfilling their duties. From the establishment of Manchukuo [in 1932] through last year [1938], 85 Japanese or Manchukuo soldiers and policemen under my command have been killed in

action. After the surrender of Ch'eng Pin, the insurgent forces declined continuously. Finally, by August, the long-held hope became a reality. Whereas there were 600 appearances [of Communist guerrillas] during April of last year, there have been almost none since last November. As a result of progress in reconstruction programs, there was an increase of 3,000 in population. Also, as a result of the recovery of formerly abandoned farmlands and because of the comparatively good harvest last year, the masses show unprecedented ease of mind this year.

In the past, the Sixth District, lying at the border of Penhsi, Hsingching, and Kuantien prefectures, has been regarded as the worst security area, and the prefectural authority had not been exercised there. But [last year] a farmer harvested a millet stalk with six clusters, which was unheard of heretofore. He placed the millet in a paper box lined with red paper and the village chief wrote "Rare Grain, Auspicious Happiness" (Ch'i-ku shui-hsiang) on top of it. It was brought to the prefectural government. Because this was the first good harvest since the establishment of the nation [Manchukuo], the farmers could not possibly dismiss it as simply an abnormal biological phenomenon.

Immediately the news was propagated throughout the prefecture to inspire and encourage the farmers: "The rare grain that has been spoken of from the ancient times has finally appeared. The Heavenly Benevolence has been bestowed upon the Hangjen Prefecture. Hereafter, all natural calamities and those caused by banditry will certainly cease, and only happiness will prevail."

Although available funds are limited, a theatrical group was invited from Antung last fall after the harvest to tour the prefecture and entertain the stagnated masses. The cumulative attendance reached 140,000. For some of these people, it was the first theatrical show in twenty years. Many traveled afar by horses or oxen in their best clothes and stayed overnight to see the shows.

I was happy to see the amused and laughing faces of farmers who had forgotten laughter for so long. One of the tasks of the prefectural administration for the time being should be to bring back laughter to the farmers, who have long forgotten it.

We have been contemplating the launching of a movement to restore the temples and monasteries within the prefecture in conjunction with the Hsieh-ho-hui [government-sponsored "Harmony and Cooperation Association"] movement. The plan is to utilize the accrued earnings from land cultivated in common to restore or reconstruct a temple or monastery in each village so that the farmers may rest their souls. It will not be futile to expose the farmers of the backward Tungpientao society to the true nature of righteous government by combining relief of mind, rest, and faith on a festival day. It is time to re-evaluate the notion of the unity of religion and government and the modern concept of the rule of power or the rule of law. The ultimate end of government can be attained only by that earnestness which is achievable only at the time of solemn prayer. Especially at the lowest, grass-roots level of politics, one must transcend the ages and recognize that this most ancient concept should serve as the characteristic of the newest polity. The elements of

conflict between the governing and the governed can be dissolved ultimately only through prayer or religious festivity. This is because the prayer and festivity demand the complete denial and surrender of self before heaven and earth. Last autumn, the prefectural governor led major officials and other representatives of various agencies in the prefectural capital on a hiking expedition to the temple at Wunyu Mountain, which is regarded as the foremost temple in the prefecture. A united prayer and thanksgiving was offered for the restoration of peace and good harvest. The temple crowned the top of the rugged 800-meter-high mountain and overlooked the clear stream of Hun River. It offered the best scenery in Hangjen. It may be that the sincerity of prayer on that occasion was understood by the farmers. On the occasion of my prefectural tour after that time, villagers were saying that hereafter only good [harvest] years would come because important people of the prefectural government had offered prayers at Wunyu Mountain. They were telling each other with moist eyes that God would certainly be good to the people from now on. I was choked with joy that the impromptu prayer expedition had drawn the people so much closer to us. I am thinking of permanently instituting semiannual prayer expeditions in spring and autumn.

Communist Propaganda

When a report reaches me that Communist propaganda has infiltrated a village, I must go to the village immediately. To delay even an hour or a day is to let the

propaganda spread among the people for that much time. Once we went to a village to investigate the reaction of the people immediately after a group under Ch'eng Pin had attacked that village. The losses suffered included some relief grain distributed by the government and a cow. The Communists propagandized in the village, however, that they were the friends of the people. I asked the congregated villagers, therefore, whether the bandits pillaging from the people what little grain and farm animals were distributed by the government were friends or enemies. Then a woman began to scream and shout, denouncing the pillage; she finally ended up crying. We gave her some medicine and candies to soothe her and promised that we would definitely take revenge on the bandits. Not very many pacification operations were as successful as this one.

There was another time when a grammar-school teacher was returned by the bandits. I sped to the village and talked to the teacher for a long time. He revealed to me the Communist propaganda:

The Japanese army was chased out of North China and finally retreated to Chinchou. Chiang Kai-shek is already in Shanhaikuan. If you do not establish relationships with us now, you will all be destroyed. Go back to the village and let the villagers and students know the news and prepare for the event [of Japanese retreat].

I asked his reaction to this propaganda, and we exchanged views until we reached complete understanding. Because of effective government propaganda regarding current events, the Communist attempt failed completely in this

instance. Before leaving the village, I witnessed the teacher's lecture on the "China incident" at his school.

Especially in Communist bandit zones, it will be a fatal mistake not to use the current political situation for propaganda among the people. In propaganda work, the most important thing is to take the initiative. Regardless of fact, the propaganda reaching the people first will determine the attitude of the people. Since farmers' lives contain ample ground for Communist exploitation, it is most important to take the initiative in propaganda. One effect of propaganda was shown by the statement of Ch'eng Pin [after his surrender]:

I have dedicated myself to the task of communizing the masses in the capacity of an officer of the Communist Party. I have not, however, received any instruction from the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party for six years, nor have I received any other communication. On the other hand, the supply of food and clothing was getting worse every year and the people were becoming more estranged. We have continuously expected support from the China mainland. Since March of this year, however, I have found newspapers and other information sheets put up alongside the mountain roads, reporting the conditions of the Sino-Japanese war and the development of Manchukuo. From reading these materials I have learned of the defeat of the Chinese army and the development of Manchukuo.

Pacification or propaganda work must begin with the actual problems, the problems immediately affecting the actual lives of those subject to propaganda. Especially in backward Tungpientao, the effect of propaganda work would be halved if this rule were not observed. Rhetorical,

superficial propaganda would only create boredom and resentment. Before conducting propaganda and pacification operations, one must examine what impact the propaganda or operation will have on the object of the operation. For example, the theatrical performances were put on for the first time in twenty years. Furthermore, the audience had to pay high prices to see the show twenty years ago, while the recent shows were free.

Four dispensaries were established within the prefecture. All of them are free of charge. Nearly one million yuan were lent by the national government to Hangjen Prefecture for reconstruction purposes, although the prefecture has no means of repaying the loan. This kind of thing could not possibly have occurred in the previous era of the warlords. Whether the people suffered or died from natural disasters or other causes was not the government's concern in the old era. None of this [benevolence of the government] has been experienced by the farmers before.

These simply comparisons and contrasts between the policies and attitudes of the old and new governments will enable the farmers to understand better our intentions toward the people [and win them toward the government]. On the other hand, farmers will not feel any sense of realism at all if one expounds on the pressures of the Soviet Union against Manchukuo, on Communism as the enemy of the people, or on the necessity of destroying the Soviet Union. It is even more foolish and futile to conduct theoretical explanations of Communism.

Communist bandits are one step smarter in their propaganda. They will never speak of Communism or the

Soviet Union in their propaganda work. Rather, the Communists emphasize the actual difficulties in the farmers' lives and connect these with anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese ideas. They use the strategy of [emphasizing] nationalism and patriotism.

In the eyes of the masses today, there is no actual difference between the Soviet Union of today and the old Czarist Russia. Therefore, how the Manchukuo government should evaluate the Russo-Japanese war [of 1904-1905] is a matter of grave significance. In order to arouse anti-Soviet feelings in the Tungpientao area, it is important to revive the memory of Hua-ta-jen, who led two thousand Manchurian volunteers to assist the Japanese army at the great battle of Mukden. Hua-ta-jen had been aroused by [feelings of] national sympathy toward Japan, which was resolved to oppose the southward advance of imperialist Russia. Atrocities committed by the Russians are still fresh in the minds of the elders in this area. When we speak of local ancestors who joined the ranks of the esteemed Colonel Hanada to oppose the arrogant Russians occupying the area, we find the rosy faces of young Manchurians becoming more flushed. Once I talked with the students at a Farmers' Training Center until late at night, speaking about the volunteer army. When I asked them of their intentions in the event of Soviet attack, their simultaneous and resolute answer was that they would follow in the footsteps of their ancestors. I cannot forget this experience. We are planning to invite ten survivors of the volunteers' army on the coming Army Day, March 10, to hold a round table to reminisce about days

past. They will later attend a rally of the prefectural people to be held in their honor and will be presented with letters of appreciation. We are also planning on publishing a pamphlet incorporating the text of the round table and an article on the significance of the Russo-Japanese war in contemporary perspective. This pamphlet will be used throughout the prefecture as a text for propaganda. Hua-ta-jen lives in the minds of the masses throughout Tungpientao. Probably he will live forever. Every child of ten knows his name. The word "Hua-ta-jen" gives us boundless pride and confidence.

At the Grass-Roots Level

Every time I make a tour of the countryside I come back with new stimulation, reflections, and confidence. Instructions issued from the desk in the prefectural government will, at most, reach the village offices. It is a long way from reaching the level of the hamlets. This realization can be obtained only through a tour of the countryside and by looking at things upward from below. Therefore, it is with fear on the one hand, and with the anxiety of a child opening a present on the other, that one discovers how the desires of the prefectural government are accepted by the people at the grass-roots level. Because of strong class barriers existing between town and country, often our desires are understood by the people in exactly opposite ways. For example, last year the prefectural government adopted a joint cultivation program in each village whereby all villagers jointly contributed labor to till the abandoned lands. As a result, 40,000 mou

of abandoned lands have been reclaimed and a total income of 50,000 yuan, or an average of 2,000 yuan per village, was assured. The plan was to allocate the income from this source to augment the village government expenses, particularly the salaries of the self-defense corps members. But when the program was begun, the farmers got the firm impression that the income from the venture would either become the property of the village heads or be used by the prefectural government. This impression caused considerable difficulty in carrying out the program. Recently when I toured the countryside again, I asked a peasant for whom the joint cultivation was being conducted. His answer was that it was for the prefectural government. I asked him therefore whether this did not make the government a robber. How could a government that engages in robbery at the same time issue relief grain and distribute cattle and medicine to the people? He said that he understood my point. When I explained to him that the income from the harvest would be accumulated at the village level and be used in the future as resource funds for small loans, the peasant promised to work harder on the program this year. As this example shows, I am certain that the projects based on [free] joint labor can succeed if the spirit behind them and the purpose of the projects are clearly understood by the farmers. As in the previous century, the farmers today absolutely distrust all power organizations.

Urgent measures must be adopted to readjust the farmers' burdens [or obligations] and totally eliminate the improper collection of funds from the farmers. Without exception, farmers are burdened with small collections

that actually amount to great sums of money. The total amount of these collections equals approximately one half of the taxes officially imposed on the farmers. Especially in bad security areas, each family has been paying somewhere between 0.4 yuan and 3.0 yuan [a year]. These [taxes] are collected in the name of entertainment for the military and police personnel or salaries for the heads of the military and police personnel or salaries for the heads of t'un [a unit below the village]. Such collections were possible because of collusion between some of the local gentry and police personnel. These abominable exploiters of the starving farmers are put into prison as soon as they are discovered.

As security conditions improve, many previously unknown facts of dubious nature begin to come to light. From the end of last year to the early part of this year, it has been necessary to dismiss forty police personnel and twenty-five civil officials because of opium addiction, improper conduct, or inefficiency. These actions cleared the air considerably. It is my custom to take with me a group of four or five students of the Farmers' Training Center every time I tour the countryside. I trust these students implicitly. I established the center during the second month of my taking office [as vice-governor of the prefecture] in the belief that the most important element in rehabilitation is the personnel. Funds were drawn from the budget for rehabilitation. The twenty graduates of the first class, who received six months of training, are already active in various towns and villages as the key members in their communities. I have a firm conviction that these graduates will be better than any

other men in all of Manchuria. Even if everything else in the prefectural administration fails, this program will be recognized as a success in the future.

It is not enough to provide training in classrooms. Practical training at the grass-roots level will determine the end product. We show [the students] the actualities of pacification operations at the time we tour the villages and let them know what we are seeking from the farmers. We also cause them to reevaluate the traditional criteria for judging good and evil. Through actual examples at the front lines, we suggest to them what should or should not exist, what is or is not permissible, or what should or should not occur. A single round of the pacification tour will not accomplish anything. Even though we wish to hear the opinion of the farmers, they will not speak out for fear of retaliation. Only their eyes convey to us the sense of petitioning.

Before students are dispatched to individual farmhouses, they are told the theme or themes of pacification. In the farmhouses, the students will hear and record the farmers' problems, complaints, and demands directed against the prefectural government. Farmers confide many things that we can never hope to hear. It is dreadful and at the same time pleasurable to hear the words of the farmers from the students in the evenings. I explain to them at that time what is just and unjust. The memory of the long hours of conversations we passed seated around a lamp and hearing the distant barking of wolves will forever remain in my heart. This memory will probably live in their hearts as well.

Returning to the prefectural government, I call meetings of the governor and the departmental and section chiefs. I demand self-examination of the leaders of the prefectural administration by citing to them the exact situation at the grass roots and by letting them hear the actual words of the farmers. It is not a problem of the "face" of a departmental or section chief. The prefecture must unite and continuously move forward through the stimulation provided by the farmers' voices and our self-examination process. In order to determine the reaction of the masses to government policies, a semi-annual tour is made in March and November by the governor, department chiefs, officers of Hsieh-ho-hui, and students of the Farmers' Training Center. During the course of the inspection tour, which covers every village in the prefecture, the responsible officials speak to the masses about the policies of the government and examine the impact of these policies at the grass-roots level. No deceit or tardiness is permitted on matters in which promises have been made to the farmers. Aside from the benefit of obtaining factual knowledge about the farmers, the tour provides the officials an unsurpassable opportunity to rediscover themselves among the farmers and acquire a sense of humbleness and piety.

There are many headaches in obtaining [correct information] on the people's condition. For instance, the system of soliciting secret letters from the people has been used previously in this prefecture, but the people here often use it for private motives. Those signing their names can be trusted, but the others can be regarded in general as having slanderous intent. If one is known

among the farmers, one also encounters those who submit direct personal petitions. A farmer will suddenly sit down on the ground and submit a piece of paper. At first, one is surprised by these men. Around the end of last year I was returning from one of my tours of the countryside. As we were approaching a hill, we saw bundles of kaoliang stalks in the middle of the road, just as if a bonfire was in the making. A sheet of paper was placed at the end of a stalk. When we stopped the automobile, we saw two peasants attempting to submit a "direct petition." It was the first time that I had been confronted with this sort of thing.

Intelligence reports of the police also provide very important information. Now that we are moving from the security-first principle to effective administration, various radical changes are expected [by the people]. Rumors fly in anticipation of railroad and power dam construction or mineral-resources development.

The fundamental pacification operations--as distinct from the security operations--must be aimed toward the submerged inner thoughts of the masses. In order to make this possible, we have organized this year a town and village information network quite similar to the police intelligence system. Twice a month, information on the topics listed below is received at the prefectural government from each town and village. These [reports] are submitted by information personnel at each town and village. I believe the organization of this kind of information network by the towns and villages themselves will provide important guidelines for the growth of the towns and villages.

Reported Items from the Towns and Villages
(submitted directly to the vice-governor of the prefecture)

1. Administrative matters
 - a. Population changes
 - b. Difficulties in administration
2. Agriculture or sideline industries
 - a. Agricultural production and general progress in agriculture
 - b. Movements of agricultural products
 - c. Condition of the price of agricultural products
 - d. Condition of food supplies in farming families
3. Natural or other calamities
 - a. Natural calamities; the area and extent of damage
 - b. Special incidents (attack of bandits or similar events)
 - c. Disposition of the calamities; preventive measures taken
4. Public opinion
 - a. Demands of the people on the government
 - b. Rumors; disturbances or commotions in public opinion
 - c. Racial problems between Koreans and Chinese

We have also prepared and distributed reference materials for local information personnel. Excerpts from newspaper articles dealing with current affairs, major news on prefectural administration, and statistical data are gathered and edited by the Administration Section [of the prefectural government]; mimeographed materials are distributed twice a month. Because these materials are edited from the prefectural administrative

point of view, their usefulness as text materials for the information personnel is far greater than that of ordinary newspapers or magazines. The information personnel conduct propaganda tours of the villages once a month, basing [their propaganda] on the reference materials. A Japanese chief of police in the area is required to accompany these propaganda tours. The reference materials are also distributed in the police officers' schools. These materials have proved to have high educational value. Thus the pacification activities in the rural areas are carried out simultaneously with the information-gathering activities. We have also distributed bicycles throughout the local agencies so that official communications from the prefectural government will reach even the most remote locality within two days. Newspapers are also distributed to town or village offices, police stations, and schools from the [administrative offices of the] prefecture.

The Role of Local Government

The spread of administrative power--in the conceptual or metaphysical sense--will by itself never be able to destroy the semi-feudalistic nature of the Manchurian agrarian society, nor will it be able to gather the support of the individual members of the masses under a new principle. The semi-feudalistic nature of Manchuria is exhibited in the collusion of army and police personnel, local gentry, and the commercial class. Unless the voluntary support of the masses [is obtained through an] organized system of local autonomy, even the most stream-

lined legal system in the towns and villages will be of no use.

Farmers cannot live on dreams. This is especially so in the agricultural society of Tungpientao. The farmer has been repeatedly told about the dream of "Righteous Government and Happy Land" (wangtao Lo-t'u) [the slogan of Manchukuo], but has never experienced actual realization of this dream. Everything before him is, in fact, destitution and destruction, the exact opposite of the nature of righteous government. Furthermore, even if the relief and rehabilitation activities should succeed, this would not lead directly to a basic change in the lives of the farmers. It must be realized that the productive capacities of the farmers have been fundamentally revolutionized as a result of thorough security operations.

One must constantly remember that the Communist bandits in the Tungpientao region thrive on the crisis in the farmers' productive capacities. There is imminent danger on the northern border (Russia). [In the event of a war against Russia], Tungpientao would serve as the strategic and material base for army operations. In order to annihilate the Communist bandits in the Tungpientao region, we must decisively execute a rapid transformation of the farmers' spiritual and economic situation along with forceful military operations. It is said that when one is prepared, he has no worries. When we are prepared, we will not need to fear the remaining bands of Communist insurgents.

The particular significance of the Hsieh-ho-hui and other cooperative movements in Tungpientao must be obvious. The most urgent task in the Hsieh-ho-hui movement is to

organize the young men and the boys by [teaching them] new ideas. The older generation may play a role in the new society but, because of their fatalistic and regressive attitude, they cannot play the role of pioneers in a revolutionary era. Social transformation must be preceded by the training of individuals. When young men with new ideas penetrate into the society, they will acquire new comrades and eventually will bring about an organized force. The transformation of man may seem to be the mildest kind of activity, but it is, in fact, the most vehement; it may seem to be the slowest in producing results, but it is, in fact, the swiftest. The current Hsieh-ho-hui training program for young men has some aspects that need to be corrected. These are (1) lack of leadership material and (2) uncertainty about the goals.

The immediate aim of the youth movement ought to be that of improving the character of the individual in his local environment. One must hold noble ideals, without ignoring unadorned reality. Both the Hsieh-ho-hui and the [other] cooperative movements must be based on actual local demands rather than on instructions from the central government. The initiative should be held by the localities. It should not be a government-manufactured movement.

Equally important is the agricultural cooperative movement (including the credit-union system). The scarcity of commercial capital in Tungpieniau provides great opportunities for the growth of the cooperative movement. The last two years' experience of issuing loans in the spring sowing season proved that the farmers' self-government system could be used as the guarantor of credit.

The exploitation of mining resources in Tungpientao on the basis of a [long-range] industrialization program for the area would eventually transform the small-scale and unorganized farmers into industrial laborers. Also, the construction of a power dam in the area would submerge a great area of farmland and therefore push the indigent farmers of Tungpientao off their farms. Even if the farmers were able to earn relatively high wages as a result of industrialization, this transformation could not be anything but a process of degeneration for the traditional farming families. To prevent this degeneration and provide these farmers with firm productive bases is an urgent national task. Since the farmers have never experienced the benefit of a righteous government, these benevolent policies would produce far greater [political] effect than in ordinary circumstances.

If the policies outlined above are executed, the small number of Communist bandits need not be feared. It is outrageous and sad that there are those who, while exaggerating the industrial potential of Tungpientao, ignore the existence of several hundred thousand souls still adhering to a primitive mode of production and suffering exploitation and destitution. The reorganization of these farmers is the most urgent requirement for the [improvement of] national security and [for more effective] administration.

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XV. PROPAGANDA AND PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES

IN TUNGPIENTAO

(With Emphasis on Linchiang Prefecture)*

Hayano Masao
Probationary Higher Civil Servant
Linchiang Prefecture Government

Mutely they received the ration tickets. They don't read. Some of them come back to get the same thing they received a while ago. Some of them get just one item and leave. They are more troublesome than children. But I felt boundless love toward these simple and earth-like farmers. Maybe it was because these Chinese resembled some of the Japanese farmers I knew at home. While these ignorant people appear to have been beaten by politics and ideologies far beyond their comprehension, they are in fact overflowing with stolid and tenacious power that nothing could ever affect.¹

Social Conditions

The socioeconomic conditions of the Tungpientao² region in general, and hence the Tunghwa Province, have

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], (marked Secret), Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 1939).

¹ Editor's note: This quotation is taken from the diary of a Japanese soldier engaged on the Chinese front: Hino Ashihei, Mugi to heitai [Soldier and Barley], Kaizosha, Tokyo, 1938, p. 39.

² Editor's note: Tungpientao (Eastern Border District) indicates the hinterland area in southeastern Manchuria including Hangjen, Chian, Kuantien, Tunghwa, Linchiang, and Ch'angpai prefectures.

certain peculiar elements. The region is highly mountainous. There are about 3,000,000 mou [6.6 mou = 1 acre] of cultivated land and 1,300,000 mou of arable but uncultivated land, while about 72,000,000 mou, or nearly 95 percent of the province, is uncultivable. Most of the population (796,000) is engaged in farming, and the majority belong to the indigent peasant class suffering from high tenant fees. The average area of cultivation per household is 3.1 hsiang [1 hsiang = 7 mou, or approximately 1 acre], and the small-scale, feudalistic tenant-farming system predominates. The area tilled by the average farmer in this province is not even half the usual area in North Manchuria. Geographically, the province is located in the most inaccessible area and therefore is isolated from markets. Only 25.5 percent of the sown area is given over to commercial products [or products that can become merchandise or "negotiable products"].

Thus the farms of this province are extremely small in scale, and the mode of farming is coarse and primitive. The defenseless farmers are immediately affected by natural or artificial conditions, and they are threatened with famine by the slightest calamities. The farm villages are more and more weakened and exhausted as time goes on. During the past several years, security conditions in the area have been continually disturbed. The strategy of collective hamlets, adopted to improve security conditions, has reduced the area of cultivation. The labor force has been reduced by excessive [government] conscription of labor for suppression of the bandits, construction of roads, and other burdens heaped upon the

farmers. These factors, along with the material and spiritual sufferings inflicted by Communist bandits, have severely hampered the development of agricultural productivity.

The Tungpientao region also has many Korean immigrants who are influenced by strong nationalist and Communist movements of long duration.

Most of the bandits in Tungpientao are "thought bandits" of either the Communist or the "Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan" line. Unlike simple bandits, they have political and ideological organizations and hold firm and well-established principles with which they attempt to win the confidence of the people. Accordingly, it is necessary to allocate the greatest efforts to ideological and propaganda warfare.

The Program

Confronted with these social conditions, the government has already spent great sums of funds in carrying on reconstruction, pacification, and other activities in Tungpientao. It has also mobilized a very considerable number of personnel for emergency and permanent remedial measures to revive the farm villages. Although the results of these efforts have been significant, only the surface of the problem has been scratched. The effects of these activities will largely depend on future guidance and efforts.

The farmers who cannot escape the feudalistic lord-serf system are naturally very low in cultural attainments and, at the same time, obstinate, irrational, and narrow

in perspective. For these reasons, many of them have a spiritual affinity with the insurgents. Therefore, in order to bring about the complete separation of the insurgents from the population, vigorous propaganda warfare must be conducted.

In order to prevent the mobilization of the farmers by the insurgents, annihilate the Communist insurgents, and enlist the farmers in the holy task of establishing Manchukuo, it is necessary to allocate sufficient security forces [to these areas] until the security condition is stabilized; at the same time, political, economic, and ideological activities must be carried out. In short, propaganda and pacification activities must accompany economic activities designed to accelerate the dissolution of feudalistic economic relationships.

In the sphere of economics, destructive effects and stagnant paralytic factors such as the following must be eliminated: degradation of the farmers into tenant-farmer status, usurious debts, oppressive village taxes and forced labor, reduction of farm tools and farm animals, fragmentation of farms, spread of disease, and natural and other calamities. At the same time, policies designed to advance the livelihood of the farmers must be firmly established and executed--for example, adjustment of the tenant-farm system, increase of farm products, utilization and development of land, and prevention of epidemics among farm animals.

In other words, propaganda and pacification activities must be designed to advance living conditions in the farm villages and, in practice, must be based on a firm grasp of the peculiarities of the farm society in Tungpientao

and on the awareness of the general social conditions in the region. Efforts (in areas that directly concern the farmers) should be gradually theorized, and the support of the farmers must be obtained.

Implementation of the Program

The most important lesson to be remembered from the unsavory experience of the past is the necessity of grasping in detail the peculiarities of the problems and coming to a critical and clear understanding of the locale and the times. It is futile to indulge in difficult and abstract theories or transcendental spiritual matters, forgetting the socioeconomic conditions or the cultural level of the farm villages. Most of the farmers will either doze or gaze at the speaker with stupid, empty, or puzzled faces. Therefore, we must, before executing any "spiritual activities," work to solve problems directly relevant to the interest of the farmers.

For instance, pacification activities must be adroitly combined with the capital loans (either in food-stuffs or funds for homes) or grants of farm animals and seeds. Or, the pacification activities may be linked with government relief works on flood, fire, or famine, which will cause the farmers to feel gratitude for the favors accorded to them by the government. In these propaganda works, under no circumstances shall the farmers in distant places be called together at a larger hamlet. The reasons for this are self-evident. Actions designed purely for the convenience of the [government] agent in terms of time or locale frequently invite the farmers'

serious resentment toward the agent's activities. By contrast, agents' visits to various hamlets even at the risk of danger or suffering will give the agents the benefit of direct observation and clear analysis of the particular circumstances of the area--such as socio-economic conditions, livelihood of the people, cultural conditions, and geographical environment. It is impossible to execute any program effectively in the villages without a firm grasp of these factors.

When seeds or cash are distributed to the villagers, it is necessary to deliver the items directly to the villagers rather than entrust the task to the head of the village, the head of the police detachment, or other influential persons in the village. This will prevent the misuse and abuse of power by some corrupt officials or other influential persons and also reduce the possibility of having these items allocated to the payment of the farmers' debts. It is, however, absolutely necessary to bring influential persons (elders of the villages, persons held in respect, and able young men) to the fore among the villagers and praise them in front of the farmers if their support is to be obtained and their power is to be utilized.

The "round table meetings" or lecture meetings in the villages must be held either in the leisure seasons of the farmers or at night so as to reduce as much as possible the loss of the farmers' precious labor power. It is also important that the [government] agents be punctual. Frequently, farmers are called together from distant places and are made to wait for long periods. This not only does not bring any benefit to the programs,

but also brings about adverse effects. The agents will be able to obtain valuable experience only by visiting each of the poor families.

At round table meetings, one must show warm affection and friendly compassion toward the stolid and simple farmers. A round table meeting with illiterate persons of low cultural consciousness truly requires efforts and patience unimaginable by city dwellers. High-flown theories must be rejected. If one asks questions very close to real life, such as "What is your most serious problem?" "How is this year's crop?" "Are there any illnesses?" What are the difficulties faced?" in simple language, with politeness, good will, sympathy, and without formalities, the farmers will slowly begin to answer. Some of the farmers ask questions far removed from the topic under discussion. But occasionally these questions yield invaluable results that are not noticeable on the surface. Some of the farmers are at first afraid that they may be reprehended [by the agents] for saying something. Others are fearful that the confession of truth might later bring about physical punishment or increase of taxes. These fears must be thoroughly dispelled from the beginning.

Lectures before the masses should be as short as possible. Ten to twenty minutes should be the limit.

One hot summer when we were delivering enthusiastic speeches to the villagers, we noticed that the majority of the audience were either yawning or dozing on account of fatigue from work or because of the dry content of the lecture. At first we were angry [at the farmers] and at the same time felt despair. But when we looked at the

stupid but genial faces of the farmers and reflected on our strategy, we gained a most valuable lesson in deciding upon the attitude to take in the pacification activities.

In dealing with the seemingly submissive farmers, who in fact have great fundamental strength, one must, rather than becoming infuriated or falling into despair, go down to the level of the farmers and meet them with that warm affection beautifully described in Mugi to heitai. One must feel "boundless love toward these simple and earth-like farmers." Anger, violence, or the showing of authority will only reduce all the efforts to nothing.

I was working in the middle of hot summer in villages surrounded by mountain ridges. An epidemic was spreading at the time. When I explained that we had come to treat the ill and provide medicine, villagers joyfully congregated before us, old women dragging their sticks and mothers clutching their sick children to their bosoms. We treated them with kindness and plainly explained the significance and benefit of the righteous government. There were many who welcomed us enthusiastically by asking when we would be back or we would bring medicine again.

While in the villages, one must be absolutely sure not to impose on the villagers. One must also refuse the invitations of the heads of the villages or hamlets. One must also pay for all expenses incurred. If one accepts an invitation, the expenses incurred will be levied directly among the villagers and will further impoverish them. One must love and enrich the farmers as much as possible. Truly the farmers are simple, stolid, and genial.

The construction of the security highway connecting Chinch'uan and Linchiang prefectures was a difficult project, going through deep forests and mountains, and had to be completed in a short period because it was a major line for the mopping-up operations. Therefore the prefectural government proceeded resolutely with the project enduring all sacrifices, overcoming dangers and difficulties, and fighting the attacking bandits. This prefecture alone mobilized more than 1,000 men, who camped in the open every day for the [duration of the] project.

In order to comfort and encourage these workers, the governor and the vice-governor of the prefecture directly participated in the project as supervisors and shared the laborers' lives in the open. The government also spent great sums to purchase cigarettes, pork, etc., and transported daily supplies to the project area for distribution. The government also inculcated the workers with the significance of the highway project, particularly the importance of the highway for subjugation of the bandits, industrial development, and transportation. As a result, most of the men mobilized for the project were content, and some of them even declared that "no wage need be paid if the budget does not allow it." Therefore, it was not necessary to mobilize labor coercively; some of the men participated voluntarily. As a result, the project was completed in a short span of time and contributed greatly to the mopping-up operation.

It is the policy of the (prefectural) government to treat the frostbite of the laborers mobilized in the mopping-up operation as quickly as possible. Serious patients are hospitalized and treated at the prefectural

hospital free of charge until recovery is complete. Moreover, their sacrificial attitude is praised, and actual plans have been made to restore as much of their earning ability as is possible. Members of the Hsieh-ho-hui [the government-sponsored "Harmony and Cooperation Association," designed to mobilize the population behind the Manchukuo government] and the National Defense Women's Association have frequently visited the patients and presented them with relief goods. Emergency measures have been taken in behalf of the families of conscripted laborers by providing cash and goods, at the same time impressing upon them the significance of the mopping-up operation.

It is certain that the great mopping-up operation is destroying the strength of the Communist insurgents and laying a foundation for security. One must show gratitude and respect for the contributing efforts. It is also true, however, that the operation has had to a certain degree a destructive impact on the farmers' livelihood. The present urgent social situation does not, of course, allow one to argue the merits and defects of the operation: The mopping-up operation must be carried through to completion. Therefore, we must devote all our efforts to reducing the operation's adverse impact on the farmers and to facilitating their speedy recovery.

For example, conscription of farmers for either the military operations or other works makes it impossible for them to gather their crops. The lack of labor in the farm villages directly affects their livelihood. We must grant all available assistance to the farmers and at the same time mobilize the members of the self-defense corps or

policemen to assist in the harvesting. Further, additional farm animals must be distributed. Only after such assistance is provided will it be possible to carry out the pacification activities effectively and win the support of the people.

In the hot summer, when the Yalu River was flooded, the water surged up overnight to the embankment of Linchiang, leaving only two feet at the top. The embankment was broken at many points, and suddenly the villages along the river were swept away. Both the houses and the crops were lost. The safety of Linchiang itself was threatened. In this situation, the prefectural government, the Hsieh-ho-hui, and the army set examples by joining in the efforts to repair the dikes, prevent further destruction, relieve the villagers, and distribute food. These efforts made a truly good impression. In particular, the disciplined and dedicated efforts of the army and the actual participation of Commander Suzuki aroused a sense of respect among the populace. Pacification activities during this period were most effective. No efforts surpass those that are directly concerned with the livelihood of the masses.

I also believe that the elaborate funeral given to a former bandit killed in action while assisting the efforts of the Tomimori Unit to induce surrender of the bandits will greatly benefit future activities. The funeral was under the joint auspices of various organizations and designated as a "prefectural funeral." Many of the deceased's former comrades of similar bandit background were overwhelmed and wept at the funeral. Memorial services for conscripted laborers killed in action are

also planned by the prefectural government and the Hsieh-ho-hui.

The Aiminhao (Love-the-People) automobile for pacification purposes and the Tat-ung Theatrical Group were indeed like rain in drought for the Tungpientao farmers, who are low in cultural level and also lack in recreational facilities. The number of villagers congregating for recreational events was exceedingly large. In the case of Liutaokou, in this prefecture, more than 3,000 villagers watched the motion pictures, which they were seeing for the first time in their lives, with fascination, and they stamped their feet and clapped their hands in joy. It was only regrettable that the streamlined and intrepid Aiminhao was impeded on many occasions because of impassable roads and other conditions. Gates at various hamlets were not large enough to let the automobile pass through. Of course, the intrinsic value of the Aiminhao was not reduced by this fact. To the villagers, whose vision is confined to their own villages, the development of the Great Manchukuo and the establishment of the righteous nation (as shown in the motion pictures) was an astonishing phenomenon. The motion pictures were extremely effective in increasing the confidence of the farmers in the government.

The provincial and prefectural governments, along with the Hsieh-ho-hui, conducted pacification activities on numerous occasions, and these efforts do seem to have produced some results. But it is difficult to maintain a firm organizational network in the farm villages by these efforts alone. There is a tendency

for the effect of the "pacification teams" to disappear immediately after the departure of these teams. It is necessary, therefore, at every possible opportunity to mobilize able village heads and local young men to let them continue the work initiated by the visiting teams, thereby causing the spirit of the movement to permeate thoroughly at the local level.

As has been stated before, medical treatment or the distribution of medicine in remote mountainous areas is most effective. When we visit the poor farmhouses one by one, at times treating pitch-black hands or feet in stuffy and dim rooms, at other times rubbing long-unwashed bellies for treatment, the people follow us to the end of the village bowing their heads in gratitude.

When farm animals or seeds are distributed to the villagers, government specialists on farming are mobilized for the event. Pacification activities are carried out along with the technical instructions. Actual problems from the real life of the farmers are taken up, and the farmers are requested to present questions on noxious insects, selection and improvement of seeds, fertilization, and afforestation. Guidance is provided cordially, demonstrating that the government is truly concerned with the farmers' welfare and the improvement of their livelihood.

In order to investigate the actual living conditions of the farmers and to grasp their simple thoughts, one must place great importance on the comprehension of language. It is essential to know the local tongue in order to communicate one's true desires to the farmers and to understand the farmers' demands without

dramatization. It frequently happens, if the education (or preparation) of the interpreter is not sufficient, that an exactly opposite meaning is conveyed. It is, furthermore, impossible to obtain in this area interpreters of the quality of those in the central government because of the difference in working conditions, including salaries and location. The two most essential requirements for us are, therefore, linguistic ability and the capacity to see the true picture of the farmers.

For example, at a speech on a certain anniversary, when I said "Kodo" (Imperial Way), this was interpreted as "Kodo" (highway), and "kyoyu" (enjoyment or possession) became "kyoyu" (common ownership), and I had to correct the words hurriedly later. I think it is a very good policy to let some Chinese, particularly the village heads or other influential persons, announce our demands. In the operation last winter, a certain able village head was put in charge of the operation in various areas and he was able to obtain the confidence of the farmers. I think that it is sufficient for us [Japanese officials] to direct the entire operation from behind [or above] and that we do not need to appear in the forefront.

Summary

The points discussed above can be summarized as follows:

1. The agent [or person engaged in the pacification activities] must possess an enthusiastic spirit for the state, a critical mind, an observant eye, and cultural refinement. The most urgent

task at hand is to obtain or train and cultivate personnel of this type. A degraded attitude in an agent is the most dreadful poison.

2. High-flown theories or abstract spiritual lectures are not very effective among people of the farming class. Only by tackling the actual problems directly relevant to the livelihood of the farmers can our propaganda be made effective. The posters must take into account the fact that the number of those who can read is very limited.
3. Deal with farmers with the warmest possible affection. Do not let them wait long or summon them from distant places. Never do things that would invite the antipathy of the farmers.
4. Secure [the support of] influential persons and able young men in the villages.
5. Agents must have a strong body. There were cases in the past when some of the agents suffered illnesses as a result of long, arduous work in remote villages. It is necessary to exercise and build one's body at ordinary times.
6. Propaganda and pacification activities must be closely connected and synchronized with various economic activities designed to advance the farmers' livelihood.

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XVI. THE PLAN FOR THE SPECIAL SECURITY AND
PURIFICATION OPERATION IN HUATIEN PREFECTURE*

Police Department, Kirin Province

Objectives

The Communist insurgents who have infiltrated into the mountain-forest region of the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth districts of Huatien Prefecture have been assaulting the weakly protected collective hamlets and have been plundering food and grain. Measures must be taken to strengthen the security forces and reinforce defense facilities to cut off completely the insurgents' route of food supply. At the same time, using the collective strength of the security forces assigned [to the hamlets], the insurgent groups should be attacked and destroyed. Propaganda and pacification operations should accompany the military operations to complete the separation of insurgents and citizens, thereby completing the task of purification.

Principles of Operation

SECURITY OF THE HAMLETS

Examination of the hamlets that have been attacked reveals that the weakness of security forces and deficient defense facilities have been the precipitating factors in the attacks. Therefore, it is urgent that [additional] security forces be brought in. Because of the lack of

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], (marked Secret), Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1938.

police officers and self-defense corps members, however, it is impossible to meet the need. Therefore, it is necessary to borrow security personnel from neighboring prefectures where security conditions have improved, and at the same time reinforce the defense facilities of the hamlets in order to ensure their security.

INSTALLATION OF SECURITY TELEPHONES

Owing to inadequate security telephone installations, it has not been possible for various hamlets to notify other hamlets at times of emergencies. As the security forces are reinforced, security telephones should be installed in the hamlets to facilitate communication.

CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY HIGHWAYS

This prefecture is highly mountainous and contains many rivers and streams. Construction of security highways would cost great sums of money. Because of this, the prefectural government has not been able to construct any security highways worthy of the name. This is one of the reasons why the insurgents have been able to continue their existence and activities. Hereafter, the provincial and prefectural governments shall make every sacrifice to construct the highways in order that the insurgents may be completely annihilated.

PROPAGANDA AND PACIFICATION OPERATIONS

Because this area is located in the mountain area and because of its remoteness, there has been little contact between the people and the government officials. Little opportunity has existed for the people to receive the benefit of the government either in terms of public security or general governmental administration. The people have largely been left exposed to the insurgents' devastations.

Separation of the insurgents from the citizens cannot possibly be hoped for under this condition. Therefore, the current special operation will emphasize in particular propaganda and pacification aimed at the separation of insurgents and citizens. Through these activities the government shall win the confidence and trust of the people.

The Period of Special Purification Operations

[This period will cover] the three months from May 25 to August 24, 1938.

Precautions in the Implementation of the
Operation Plan

As a matter of course, personnel engaged in the operation must make every effort to cooperate with the military activities of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. In the execution of the security operation, however, scrupulous precautions must be taken not to rely disproportionately on the power of the police nor to follow instructions in a formalistic manner.

ON WINNING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

[Government personnel must avoid]: grueling and cruel investigations of suspects when there is insufficient evidence; collection [or confiscation] of weapons when it is contrary to the purpose of defense; any action that is injurious to the people's livelihood.

ON FOSTERING THE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION

Scrupulous precautions must be taken not to hamper the promotion of the financial (banking) system, the industries, the economy, the pauchia system, the town and village administrative system, etc. [Personnel] must imbue the minds of the masses with the true spirit of the

pacification operation. They must unite with the people in the construction of a just nation and the improvement of people's livelihood. For this purpose, [everyone] must possess unswerving determination and dedication to carry out the operation and have the will to persevere, whatever the difficulties and afflictions that may confront them.

Detailed Instructions

SECURITY OF THE HAMLETS

REINFORCEMENT OF SECURITY FORCES

The following agencies are to dispatch the designated numbers of personnel to Huatien Prefecture for the duration of three months. (They are to be deployed in 32 weakly defended hamlets as shown on Table 1)

Chinese personnel:

Omuso office	100
Local police academy	174
T'unhua Prefecture	50
Pansih Prefecture	50
Police headquarters	2
Huatien Prefecture	118
	<hr/>
Total.	494

Japanese personnel:

Police department (provincial) . .	5
Pansih Prefecture	2
Ch'angch'un Prefecture	2
Yungchi Prefecture	1
I-t'ung Prefecture	2
Huatien Prefecture	15
	<hr/>
Total.	27

Duties

The duty of the hamlet units is to maintain the complete security of the hamlets. These units should pay particular attention to the following tasks:

1. Guarding the hamlets and cutting off the insurgents' route of food supply.
2. Examining the defense facilities of the hamlets and, if these are found to be inadequate, taking remedial measures swiftly.
3. Constantly striving to collect information on the insurgents. Upon receiving accurate information on the insurgents' movements [in nearby areas], the hamlet unit should take immediate action, either by itself or in cooperation with other units, to destroy the insurgents.
4. Striving to win the confidence of the people. Always be polite and kind toward the hamlet residents. In the farming season, if necessary, provide protection for the farmers in the field by assigning guards.

Equipment and Uniforms

Those with the rank of police lieutenant and above and the special duty personnel should each be equipped with a Mauser pistol (with 100 rounds of ammunition). Others should each be equipped with a rifle (with 200 rounds of ammunition). Those from outside Huatien Prefecture should arrive armed. They should bring raincoats and lightweight bedding. Weapons and uniforms of the students of the police academy will be provided by this department. Caps and police equipments will be issued by the academy.

Dates of Arrival

[Personnel engaged in the operation will arrive between] May 25 and May 27.

Table 1
PRESENT DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY PERSONNEL

Name of Hamlet	Police Officers	Self-defense Corps	Total
Wang-chia-shao-kuo	20	10	30
Hui-ch'uan-chan-hsi-kou	20	7	27
Yang-chia-tien	10	--	10
Wei-sha-ho-k'ou-tzu	20	10	30
Ta-teng-ch'ang	10	10	20
Hsiao-chia-p'i-kou Shang-ts'un	10	--	10
Hsiao-chia-p'i-kou Hsia-ts'un	10	10	20
Lo-t'o-chia-tzu	10	15	25
Ko-ma-shih	10	15	25
Mao-erh-shan	20	15	35
Ta-la-tzu	10	--	10
Lao-ying-kou	25	10	35
Total	175	102	277
Tung-an-t'un	20	--	20
Ya-lu-chiang	15	15	30
I-mien-chieh	15	--	15
Yen-t'ung-la-tzu	15	--	15
Han-ts'ung-ti	15	10	25
Ti-yin-tzu	14	10	24
T'ou-tao-kou	10	10	20
Ts'o-ts'ao-kou	15	--	15
Yao-ling-tzu	10	12	22
Erh-tao-kou-tzu	15	15	30
Total	144	72	216

Table 1 (cont.)

Name of Hamlet	Police Officers	Self-defense Corps	Total
T'o-ling-kou-tzu Shang	10	2	12
T'o-ling-kou-tzu Hsia	15	8	23
Han-ts'ung-ti	20	11	31
Wu-tao-kou	10	--	10
Han-ts'ung-kou-k'ou-tzu	15	2	17
Erh-tao-ho-tzu Hsia-ts'un	10	1	11
Erh-tao-ho-tzu Shang-ts-un	20	12	32
Kan-kou-tzu	15	14	29
P'iao-ho-ch'uan	20	15	35
Ma-chia-t'ang-tzu	10	--	10
Total	145	65	210
Grand total	464	239	703

Subjugation of Insurgents

The operation will be under the command of the governor of the prefecture. Close liaison must be maintained with the various hamlet units in the vicinity and with the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. The hamlet units shall daily collect information on the insurgents located within a radius of 12 kilometers around the hamlet. Upon receiving new information, they must convey it to the neighboring hamlets by telephone or other means and report it to the prefectural governor. In the event a subjugation operation is carried out jointly with the Japanese and Manchukuo armies, the hamlet units will receive their instructions from the Japanese army.

INSTALLATION OF SECURITY TELEPHONES

Within the limits of its financial means, the Huatien prefectural government shall immediately dispatch electricians to the following hamlets to install telephones. [Eleven villages are named.]

CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY HIGHWAYS

Construction of highways is extremely important for both the maintenance of security and the development of industry. Most urgently needed during the current purification operation are the following three lines, [which the prefectural government] will construct regardless of the sacrifices involved:

Kung-lang-t'ou to Menchiang prefectural border	30 km
Erh-tao-ho-tzu to Ma-chia-tian	13 km
Wang-chia-tien to Tung-nan-fen	<u>10 km</u>
Total	53 km

PROPAGANDA AND PACIFICATION OPERATION

In order to execute the current operation thoroughly,

the Huatien prefectural government shall mobilize the entire official personnel, including the governor, even at the expense of some of the ordinary administrative functions. Cooperation of the following personnel should be enlisted: officers of the paochia system, schoolteachers, locally influential persons, members of Hsieh-ho-hui.

Organization of Operational Teams

The team shall be headed by the prefectural governor. The vice-governor shall be the deputy head. The team shall be divided into three units, to be headed by the section chiefs of General Affairs, Administration, and Police Affairs, respectively. Each unit shall have five members in addition to the head of the unit. The first unit shall be assigned to the Eighth District, the second unit to the Sixth District, and the third unit to the Fourth and Seventh districts. Officers of the paochia system, schoolteachers, government doctors, locally influential persons, and members of Hsieh-ho-hui shall be assigned to the units when appropriate.

Guidelines for the Operation

Since most of the residents in this area are illiterate, the personnel engaged in pacification must avoid high-level theoretical discussions on wangtao [the kingly way] or on the principle of the unity of Japan and Manchukuo. The residents must be made to understand the benefit of wangtao and the inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo through discussions of phenomena near to their lives and directly connected with their daily lives. Lectures, leaflets, and posters must capture simple things closely connected with the people's daily living.

The team shall tour the entire jurisdiction to fulfill

its established goals. But the units must absolutely refrain from bothering the farmers by forcibly assembling them during their busy season. Activities must be carried out during the farmers' leisure season.

Medical doctors shall prepare necessary medicines and tour various villages. Medical treatment and administration of medicine must be done with kindness.

The condition of the indigents should be investigated and food and other daily necessities should be distributed to them.

The various teams should attempt to influence public opinion, regarding: the downfall of the Nanking government and the establishment of the Northern Chinese regimes; confidence in Japan and the Japanese army; the progress of Manchukuo; the mission of Hsieh-ho-hui; rejection of both the insurgents' malignant propaganda and rumors; the true spirit of the Axis treaty; the relationship of Manchukuo with the nations that have recognized Manchukuo.

SPIRITUAL FORCE

The basic requirement is that the personnel approach the operation with burning desire and a positive, brave, and sacrificial spirit. This spiritual force is actually the core of the operation; even if the organization is streamlined on the surface, it will be nothing more than a castle on the sand if it is void of the spiritual force. With this spirit, the personnel must be creative in discovering proper measures to deal with situations that come to the fore when social conditions are undergoing rapid and constant changes.

Reports

The various hamlet units must each prepare diaries on

insurgent activities and submit a ten-day report to the prefectural governor. The governor, in turn, shall submit a ten-day report to the head of the police department. The Huatien prefectural government shall prepare a detailed plan of operations based on this [provincial] plan and submit the plan to the provincial police department.

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XVII. REPORT ON THE RESULT OF
RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS [1938]*

Tunghwa Provincial Government

General Conditions

The purposes of the reconstruction operations have been maintenance of public security, relief of the indigent, stabilization of public opinion, guidance and assistance in occupations, encouragement in the development of natural resources, and development of transportation and communications facilities. These activities have been carried out according to the basic policies set forth in the "Plan for the Reconstruction Operation in Tungpientao," as modified by the results attained in 1937. As a result of concerted efforts by the army, the government, and the people, the anticipated results have been obtained.

This year's reconstruction operation was carried out under the following budget: general expenditures, 823,652 yuan, and capital funds, 862,000 yuan. Of the 823,652 yuan allocated for general expenditures, 600,000 yuan was from the [Manchukuo] national treasury's subsidy funds, and the remainder was carried over from the previous year. Except for 152,273 yuan, which has been allocated for the expenditures of the provincial Bureau of Reconstruction and for transportation expenses, 671,379 yuan were distributed to various prefectures (hsien) for the defense of hamlets, construction or repair of security highways and security

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], (marked Secret), Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1939.

telephone lines, security operations, sanitary facilities, and general expenditures of the prefectural offices.

The total sum available as capital funds was 932,172 yuan, because 70,172 yuan have been made available from the collection of the previous year's loans in addition to the newly allocated 862,000 yuan. Because some of the prefectures have not been able to expend the allocated capital funds, a total of 824,035 yuan has been loaned during the current year.

The capital loan funds were issued for the following purposes:

	<u>Yuan</u>
Construction of houses	73,555
Purchase of food	79,729
Farming	523,088
Commercial and industrial capital. . .	80,000
Ginseng cultivation.	210,000

The results accomplished by these funds were as follows:

Houses constructed	5,580
Families receiving food funds.	11,797

The loan of farming capital brought the cultivated area in this province to 623,574 mou, an increase of 21 percent from the previous year. The increase was due to the reclamation of abandoned farmlands. This resulted in a harvest of 1,316,927 koku, an increase of 28 percent above the previous year. Calculated in terms of cash, assessing 5 yuan per koku, there has been an increase of 26,584,635 yuan in the current year's production. This increase is equivalent to ten times the funds loaned for farming.

Figures for total families, population, cultivated area, highways, telephone lines, and collective hamlets

are presented in Table 1. [Loans from reconstruction capital funds are detailed by purpose and prefecture in Table 2, p. 275.]

Credits and debits in the special account for reconstruction operations in 1938 are itemized in Tables 3 and 4 [pp. 276 and 277].

Reconstruction Operations

RELIEF OPERATIONS

Relief of the Indigent

Although the number of indigents declined drastically in 1937 as a result of thorough relief and reconstruction operations carried out that year, the number of families suffering unanticipated calamities reached 2,693. Therefore, 28,321 yuan were issued for relief purposes. These funds were drawn from donations by the Manchurian Industrial Development Company and the general public. The prefectures themselves also devised means to collect extra funds. The details of the relief operations are shown in Table 5.

Medical Treatment and Administration of Medicine

As a result of the construction of collective hamlets, the farmers are placed into group life. Because of their lack of knowledge about sanitation and because of the lack of [sanitation] facilities, there is a great danger of [a rise in] contagious diseases. Therefore, the prefectural governments are instructed to dispatch government doctors on circuit missions to provide medical treatment and administer medicine. The provincial government also dispatched medical teams along with the pacification teams touring various prefectures. Statistics of medical treatment and administration of medicine are shown in Table 6.

Table 1
COMPARISON OF GENERAL CONDITIONS, TUNGWA PROVINCE, 1937-1938

Category	End of 1937	End of 1938	Increase In 1938	Percent
Number of families	119,033	131,763	12,730	11
Population	767,029	833,598	66,569	9
Cultivated area	3,018,448 mou	3,642,022 mou	623,574 mou	21
Security highways	3,796 km	4,521 km	725 km	19
Security telephone lines	4,376 km	6,889 km	2,513 km	57
Collective hamlets	278	353	75	26

Table 2
LOANS OF RECONSTRUCTION CAPITAL FUNDS, TUNGHWA PROVINCE, 1938
(in yuan)

Prefecture	Housing	Food	Farming	Commerce and Industry	Ginseng Cultivation	Total
Tunghwa	13,000	--	59,184	--	--	72,184
Liuho	18,420 (13,420) ^a	3,843 (3,843)	57,831 (2,831)	50,000	--	130,094 (20,094)
Chinch'uan	12,000	4,859 (8,659)	46,403	--	--	63,262 (8,659)
Huinan	--	9,000 (9,000)	151,589 (9,589)	--	--	160,589 (18,589)
Mengchiang	4,709	17,561	37,730	--	--	60,000
Fusung	1,020	--	34,444	--	--	35,464
Ch'angpai	4,830 (4,830)	--	48,651 (18,000)	--	--	53,481 (22,830)
Linchiang	5,596	23,600	56,873	--	--	86,069
Chian	47,800	4,709	30,383	30,000	30,000	142,892
Total	107,375 (18,250)	63,572 (21,502)	523,088 (30,420)	80,000	30,000	824,035 (70,172)

Editor's Note: Totals in this and subsequent tables have been corrected when found inaccurate in the original text.

^a Items in parentheses represent the reissued funds collected from the previous year's loans.

Table 3
CREDIT ENTRY FOR VARIOUS PREFECTURES, TUNGWA PROVINCE, 1938
(in yuan)

Funds	Tungwa	Luhu	Chinch'uan	Huinan	Mengchiang	Fusung	Ch'angpai	Linchiang	Chian	Total
Subsidy from the National Treasury and Other Income	66,801	51,277	105,322	43,886	88,186	63,510	64,658	96,338	87,401	671,379
Subsidies	31,039	24,942	100,644	33,868	69,197	47,323	29,492	60,800	39,714	437,019
Carry-over from previous year	26,940	26,335	4,678	457	18,989	16,187	35,156	34,361	23,826	188,939
Transferred funds	1,527	--	--	9,561	--	--	--	1,177	2,861	38,126
Fees received	7,295	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	7,295
Capital Funds	73,309	30,095	83,659	160,589	60,000	94,300	48,831	106,800	164,400	622,133
Public bond issues	73,300	110,000	75,000	142,000	60,000	94,300	26,000	106,800	164,400	862,000
Collected from previous year	--	20,094	8,659	18,589	--	--	22,830	--	--	70,172
Carry-over from previous year	9	1	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	11
Total	140,110	181,372	188,981	204,475	148,186	157,810	113,489	203,139	251,801	1,663,562

Table 4

DEBIT ENTRY FOR VARIOUS PREFECTURES, TUNGSHA PROVINCE, 1938

(in yuan)

Funds	Lungshwa	Liuho	Chinch'uan	Huinan	Mengchiang	Fusung	Ch'angpai	Linchiang	Chian	Total
Expenditures	39,036	53,509	115,883	43,886	87,749	46,105	64,658	93,734	91,401	635,952
Hamlet defense	4,243	6,470	11,296	6,700	18,710	6,368	7,360	11,937	34,500	107,584
Highways	19,944	14,000	82,755	12,400	42,800	24,218	34,200	53,837	29,000	313,158
Telephone lines	8,739	8,760	14,504	16,169	17,630	9,409	12,150	18,369	16,190	120,920
Security operations	1,412	1,619	2,382	1,900	2,500	1,041	2,400	2,500	4,500	20,274
Health facilities	900	1,500	1,000	800	1,000	275	2,000	900	900	9,275
Office expenses	3,798	5,605	3,946	5,917	5,100	5,794	5,948	6,191	5,311	43,610
Propaganda and pacification	--	--	--	--	--	--	600	--	--	600
Market subsidies	--	15,531	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	15,531
Capital Funds	72,184	130,094	83,262	160,589	51,999	35,464	87,081	86,069	142,892	857,554
Housing	13,000	18,420	12,000	--	4,709	1,020	4,830	5,596	47,800	106,375
Food	--	3,643	24,859	2,000	17,561	--	33,600	23,600	4,709	117,172
Farming	59,184	57,831	46,403	151,589	37,729	34,444	48,651	56,873	30,383	523,087
Vehicles	(1,600)	--	--	(5,720)	(800)	(3,880)	--	(6,156)	(2,175)	(20,331)
Seeds	(15,837)	(14,371)	(5,144)	(3,560)	(2,250)	(3,515)	(3,732)	(7,849)	(7,000)	(63,258)
Farm tools	(5,272)	--	(2,288)	(309)	(1,651)	(192)	--	--	--	(9,712)
Farm animals	(36,475)	(43,460)	(38,971)	(42,000)	(33,028)	(26,857)	(44,919)	(42,868)	(17,608)	(326,186)
Small scale farming	--	--	--	(100,000)	--	--	--	--	--	(100,000)
Commercial	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	(3,600)	(3,600)
Commerce and industry	--	50,000	--	--	--	--	--	--	30,000	80,000
Ginseng cultivation	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	30,000	30,000
Total	111,220	153,603	199,145	204,475	147,739	81,569	151,739	179,803	234,293	1,493,586

Table 5
RELIEF OF THE INDIGENT, 1938

Prefecture	Number of Families Aided	Persons Involved	Funds (yuan)
Tunghwa	250	1,551	5,014
Liuho	37	231	407
Chinch'uan	1	6	11
Huinan	153	918	1,673
Mengchiang	6	36	66
Fusung	8	48	88
Ch'angpai	130	845	1,187
Linchiang	985	5,478	5,462
Chian	1,123	6,514	14,413
Total	2,693	15,627	28,321

Table 6
 MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICINE
 TUNGHWA PROVINCE, 1938

Prefecture	Number of Persons Treated			Number of Persons Administered Medicine
	Male	Female	Total	
Tunghwa	262	147	409	3,540
Liuho	385	209	594	3,553
Chinch'uan	315	118	433	3,560
Huinan	370	125	495	1,750
Mengchiang	136	85	221	1,520
Fusung ^a	353	230	583	3,830
Ch'angpai ^a	762	521	1,283	4,430
Linchiang ^a	516	313	829	3,230
Chian ^a	353	271	624	4,410
Total	3,452	2,019	5,471	29,823

SOURCE: Public Health Department, Tunghwa Province.

^aIncludes people treated or administered medicine as a part of the special security operation program.

OPERATIONS FOR THE SEPARATION OF THE INSURGENTS
FROM THE PEOPLE

General Condition of Security

The security of this province improved greatly during 1937 as a result of unremitting efforts of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police, along with the reconstruction operations [carried out by the provincial and prefectural governments]. Tenacious insurgent groups are, however, still scattered in the mountain and dense forest regions, and they are not to be annihilated easily. Aside from the prefectures of Liuho, Huinan, and, in part, Tunghwa, the remaining six prefectures are insurgent-infested areas.

The numerical strength, the leaders, and the locations of the [insurgents] in the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army are as follows:

Approximately 200 insurgents under the command of Yang Ching-yü,¹ the commander of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army and the target bandit of the current autumn-winter subjugation operation, in the prefectural borders of Mengchiang and Huatien.

Approximately 200 insurgents under the command of Kin Il-song [Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after 1948], in the border region of Fusung, Ch'angpai, and Linchiang.

¹Editor's note: Yang was killed in action in February 1940 at Menchiangch'eng. "When the Japanese opened his abdomen they found grass in his bowels, giving evidence that this was the only food he had taken during the last months" (Max Perleberg (ed.), Who's Who in Modern China, Hong Kong, 1954, p. 243.

Approximately 100 insurgents under Ch'oe Hyon [Army General, Democratic People's Republic of Korea], in the border region of Fusung and Huatien prefectures.

Approximately 100 insurgents under Chon Kwang [or Ch'üan Kwang] in the border area of Mengchiang and Pansih prefectures.

Approximately 120 insurgents under "Chief of Staff Li" in the vicinity of Pansihp'aitsu in Mengchiang Prefecture.

Approximately 100 insurgents under "Leader [Chih-tao-yüan] Chang" in the Chinch'uan and Linchiang border area.

Another 80 insurgents under Ts'ao Ya-fan of the First Area Army in Chian Prefecture.

In addition to these Communist insurgents, there are approximately 200 local rebels in Fusung Prefecture and on the border of Fusung and Mengchiang prefectures under the leadership of P'ing-Jih-Chun, "Regiment Commander Yueh," and Ya-wu-ying, the former subordinates of Wan Hsun. Another 100 are scattered in the vicinity of the Fourth District of Chian Prefecture under the leadership of "Aide-de-camp Hsiao," "Battalion Commander Wei," and Pao Chung Kuo, who are of the Wang Feng-ke group. Since these local rebels are generally under the influence of the Communist insurgents, it is assumed that they would be eliminated naturally if the Communist insurgents were defeated. Therefore, the current plan for subjugation is primarily aimed against the major [Communist] insurgent groups.

The insurgents in this province numbered approximately 130,000 immediately after the Manchurian incident [1931], most of them being under the leadership of T'ang Chu-wu's Northeastern Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army [Tungpei K'ang-jih I-yung-chun]. As a result of major subjugation operations carried out by the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police forces, as well as the security operations carried out by the civil governments, the insurgent groups were greatly diminished. At the end of August 1937, the insurgents numbered approximately 2,600. At the end of August 1938, this was reduced to approximately 2,100. As a result of the current subjugation operations, the number of insurgents was reduced to 1,200 at the end of February 1939. In terms of quality, however, the remaining insurgents are all crack troops. Those defectors from the insurgents who surrendered to the government forces would have been eliminated by the insurgent troops if they had not placed themselves in government hands. Furthermore, the insurgents are very well equipped. They have 49 light machine guns and 2 bomb throwers in addition to the most efficient Japanese rifles. Their ammunition supply is quite abundant. With these advantages, the insurgent groups are making a last attempt to recover their strength. Therefore, [our efforts] against the insurgents cannot be relaxed.

Approximately 500 of the 900 Communist insurgents are Koreans. Although they are claimed as Communists, it seems that they are the reorganized elements of the old Korean Revolutionary Army.

There are approximately 300 active and armed local rebels [aside from the Northeastern Army group] at present.

Another 200 have hidden away their weapons for the autumn/winter subjugation operation season and are waiting for the thawing season; they are either living in the towns and villages as good citizens or spending the winter in the dense forest region of Ch'angpai and Fusung. Therefore, although the number of local rebels may seem to have decreased, they may, on the contrary, be more numerous [than before].

The activities of the major insurgent groups are described below.

Yang Ching-yü. Approximately 200 insurgents under Yang moved into this province in the thawing season of 1937 from their old base in the Pênch'i, Hangjên, and Kuantien area of Fengtien Province, because the collective hamlets were completed in that area. They infiltrated into Chian Prefecture, where the collective hamlet program had not been completed and the security forces were weak. By merging approximately 150 bandits under such figures as Li, Pi, and "Regiment Commander Hsu," who had been operating in the Mengchiang, Chinch'uan, and Linchiang areas, Yang's group reinforced itself considerably. After the attack at the tunnel under construction at Lao'ling on the Tunghwa-Chian railroad, on March 12, the power of the group expanded rapidly. Their activities became more rampant in the summer season, and their total number of attacks on railroad construction works (along the Tunghwa-Chian line) and on the hamlets reached approximately eighty. They have displayed utmost ferocity, and because of their devastations a part of Chian Prefecture had to be abandoned temporarily. At the time of their attack on the construction works of the Southern Manchurian Railroad at

T'uk'outzu, the insurgents recruited more than 300 coolies to their ranks, enhancing their strength to approximately 700. They possessed 90 light machine guns, 2 grenade throwers, and rifles and pistols of good quality. They were abundantly supplied with ammunition and possessed strong fighting power.

Yang's forces also strove to expand their supporting organizations, creating dangerous situations for security. As the collective hamlet construction and other security operations in Chian Prefecture progressed, and as the subjugation forces were concentrated in the area to undertake the autumn/winter operation, Yang's group left for the Mêngchiang and Huatien prefectural border region around September 20 for the purpose of reorganizing their forces into the Second and Third Area armies (Fang-mien-chün). The Kim Il-sōng group in the Ch'angpai area, and the insurgents under Chon Kwang, Ch'oe Hyōn, and Fang Chên-shêng in the Mêngchiang-Huatien area, were to participate in the reorganization. During their movement, however, Yang's forces received the surprise attack of the Nakagawa Guerilla Unit on September 24, at the Tunghwa-Chian prefectural border. More than ten insurgents were killed. The insurgents were attacked further by various subjugation units, but they adroitly moved northward, escaping the attackers. On October 18, however, they were surrounded and attacked by 1,500 subjugation groups at Li-fen-kou, in the Seventh District, Linchiang Prefecture. Particularly because of brave charges by the Tomimori Special Activities Unit [see below], some fifty insurgents of Yang's forces were killed. The remaining group fled to the dense forest area in Mêngchiang Prefecture, abandoning their dead

comrades. It was learned later that Yang summoned Kim Il-s^ŏng and others on or about January 12, 1938, to the vicinity of Shih-p'ai-tzu, M^ŏngchiang Prefecture, to hold a leaders' conference and convey new directives from the Soviet Union.

After the battle of October 18 [1937], no information was obtained on Yang's contingents until January 10 [1938], when it was learned that they were located in the northern district of M^ŏngchiang Prefecture. The Tomimori Unit left Pa-tao-chiang, Linchiang Prefecture, on January 11 in search of Yang. In cooperation with the Japanese and Manchukuo armies, the Tomimori Unit used the so-called dani tactics (the tactic of continuous pursuit) and attacked the insurgents in the Huatien-M^ŏngchiang prefectural border. The Tomimori Unit engaged in nine battles with Yang's major elements. Yang is at present the Commander of the First Route Army of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army and commands approximately 900 Communist insurgents.

Kim Il-s^ŏng. Approximately 200 insurgents under Kim Il-s^ŏng are based in the mountains and dense forest area of the Linchiang-Ch'angpai-Fusung prefectural border, professing themselves to be the Fourth Division of the First Route Army of the Anti-Japanese Federated Army. Although Yang's group displayed the utmost ferocity after the thawing season of last year, Kim has not [engaged in actions that have] produced much information. It seems that Kim Il-s^ŏng is under the command of Yang Ching-yü, but the two are equal in actual strength. It is very likely that Kim will succeed to Yang's post in the event of the latter's disappearance.

Military Subjugation Operations

Autumn/Winter Subjugation Operation. It has been the policy of the government in the past to engage police units for independent subjugation activities in close cooperation with the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. In initiating the autumn/winter operation, however, the jurisdiction of the armies and the police has been clearly delineated. [Under this agreement], the armies were charged with the sole responsibility of carrying out expeditions and subjugation operations, and the police were charged with the tasks of defending the collective hamlets, cutting off the sources of food supply to the insurgents, inducing surrender, and other general security tasks. In order to make this system [of cooperation and division of tasks] operate smoothly, a Subjugation Directorate was established. As a result of strenuous efforts in various activities, 1,054 bandits have been eliminated (see Table 7).

Special Surrender Operations. The plan for the special surrender operation or surrender inducement operation was adopted in January 1938, with the approval of the central government. This program was executed under the direct responsibility of the prefectural governors. As a result, the Provincial Special Activities Unit brought about 680 surrenders. Since the beginning of the autumn/winter operations [between October 1938 and February 1939], another 566 were induced to surrender.

Special Activities Unit. The two teams of the Special Activities Unit mentioned below were established under the control of the central government for the purpose of destroying the insurgent groups. Their specific task is to pursue the two major insurgent leaders, Yang Ching-yü and Kim

Table 7
 COMPARATIVE ESTIMATES OF INSURGENT STRENGTH
 BY THE ARMY AND THE POLICE,
 TUNGHWA PROVINCE, 1938-1939

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Police</u>
Estimated number of insurgents in September 1938	1,600	2,100
Insurgents eliminated:		
Killed	297	43
Captured	106	--
Surrendered.	<u>42</u>	<u>566^a</u>
Total	<u>445</u>	<u>609</u>
Estimated number of insurgents as of the end of February 1939	700	1,200 ^b

^aThis figure includes 70 surrendered who now serve the Tomimori and Kim Special Activities units.

^bThe details of the police estimates on the insurgent strength are as follows:

Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army line:

Under the command of Yang Ching-yü. . .	470
Under Yang's personal command . .	200
The First Area Army (Chian) . . .	150
Under Staff Officers Li and Ch'oe	120
Under the command of Kim Il-sōng. . .	400
Under Kim's personal command. . .	200
Not clearly Communist insurgents but satellites of Kim	100
Under Kim Kwang	100
Wan Ksun line	200
P'ing Jih Chün.	100
Yao Regiment Commander.	100
Wang Fēng-kê line	100
Aide-de-camp Hsiao.	30
Battalion Commander Wei	30
Pao Chung Kuo	40
Total	<u>1,170</u>

Only 80 insurgents under Director Liu moved into this province from Tungfeng Prefecture, Fengt'ien Province, on November 18, 1938.

li-söng, regardless of the territory involved. These units are to attack the leading insurgent groups unremittingly, without providing them any opportunity to obtain either food supply or respite. After routing the insurgents by the use of the so-called dani tactics [described above], the Special Activities Unit teams are also to conduct special surrender operations and other destructive operations to annihilate the insurgent forces.

The Tomimori Unit, headed by Chief of the Security Section of the provincial government, Tomimori, consists of 150 Chinese and 6 Japanese. It absorbed the Nagashima [Spec: 1] Activities Team on August 27, 1938, at Tunghwa. It also includes Ch'êng Pin² and his subordinates, who surrendered on June 30, 1938.

The unit has been pursuing its designated target, Yang Ching-yü, for the past six months in Chian, Tunghwa, Linchiang, Chinch'uan, Mêngchiang, Fusung, and Huatien prefectures. The unit is at present searching for Yang's main forces in the dense forest of the Mêngchiang-Huatien border area. [Huatien Prefecture is in Kirin Province.]

The unit has engaged in nine battles with Yang's main forces. The enemy abandoned 34 dead. Approximately 80, including the following leaders, surrendered: Ch'oe Chu-ji, police officer in the army headquarters; Cho Fwa-son, aide-de-camp of the First Area Army; Yun Ha-t'ae, staff officer of the headquarters' guard brigade; "Company Commander Sun"; [Political] "Director" Meng; and "Company Commander

²Editor's note: Ch'eng had been the Commander of the First Division of the First Army of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Federated Army.

Liu." The Tomimori Unit also induced the downfall of "Regiment Commander Pi" and Ch'en Hsiu-ming. Through these operations, the unit has been striving toward the complete destruction of Yang's forces. The Tomimori Unit has suffered 27 casualties, including 12 members killed, 8 auxiliary members killed, and 7 wounded.

The Kim Unit, headed by Superintendent (Tu-ch'a-kuan) Kim of the Police Affairs Headquarters [of the central government], consists of approximately 50 surrendered former insurgents. The designated target is Kim Il-sŏng. The team is at present operating in the Fusung, Ch'angpai, and Linchiang prefectural border region.

Civil-administrative Operations

It has been agreed that the executive agencies, particularly the police, shall be responsible for defending the collective hamlets, for cutting off food supplies to the insurgents, for searching and investigating travelers,³ for maintaining and furnishing equipment for transportation and communication networks, and for carrying out other pacification activities. Along with the reconstruction operations and industrial development initiated in 1937, much progress has been made in the civil-administrative operations. During the current [autumn/winter operation], the police emphasized the tasks described below.

Consolidation and Expansion of Hamlet Defense.

Thirty-five new defense hamlets were established in Chian Prefecture, and reconstruction activities were carried out in the 581 collective hamlets of the province. Hamlet

³Editor's note: Normally conducted at the entrances of villages, towns, and cities.

defense facilities were reinforced by using 139,090 yuan donated by the Manchurian Industrial Development Company and 107,594 yuan allocated for the current year's reconstruction operations in the government budget.

With the aim of arming all the residents of the hamlets, a plan for the distribution of 18,000 rifles was drawn up last year. Accordingly, 16,000 rifles have been distributed up to the present date. The result has been very satisfactory, as was demonstrated on January 26 [1938], when the insurgents attacked Pingkang, Chinch'uan Prefecture and the police and the people concertedly fought off the insurgents and manifested the power of the rifle units. It is believed that [the organization of the rifle units] will contribute greatly toward winning the support of public opinion, the collection of information on the insurgents, and the separation of the [law-abiding] citizens from the insurgents. Statistics on the insurgents' attacks of the villages reveal that although there were 231 attacks from January to September 1938, there have been only 23 attacks from October [1938], when the current operation started, to the end of February 1939. On two occasions the insurgents were repelled before they had infiltrated the villages (see Table 8).

Expansion of Security Highways Networks. Work on security highways has been carried out according to the annual schedule of the Three-year Plan for Reconstruction, taking into consideration industrial and economic conditions and other necessities. During 1937 there were 959 km of highways constructed, 74 km improved, and 159 km repaired. The funds expended were 578,084 yuan.

This year's work on security highways has maintained

Table 8

RESULT OF ATTACKS BY INSURGENTS, 1938-1939

Attacks	Statistics for 1938												Statistics for 1939		Total	
	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December	January	February		
	Rifle-shooting of villages	23	19	28	24	30	33	38	21	15	11	7	1	3		
Mines and other works	3	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	1	--	2		7	
Lumbering	3	2	3	--	--	--	2	2	2	--	--	--	3		17	
Transportation	2	1	2	4	5	9	6	11	1	2	1	1	--		45	
Other	3	12	9	4	4	5	5	13	5	6	--	5	--		71	
Damages																
Security agencies																
Killed	1	2	9	5	17	3	18	36	16	9	--	2	1		119	
Wounded	2	11	15	8	18	4	9	31	13	34	2	3	2		152	
Kidnaped	--	4	2	13	5	5	20	5	2	1	--	4	--		61	
Rifles taken	--	6	6	54	9	28	41	44	57	22	2	21	1		291	
Residents																
Killed	6	2	8	7	3	4	14	--	7	6	2	--	--		59	
Wounded	5	4	15	--	1	--	16	1	15	1	2	--	--		60	
Kidnaped	13	24	143	109	104	330	374	164	152	93	43	39	81		1,669	
Horses taken	132	25	52	20	70	13	17	11	90	1	24	3	33		491	
Food taken	100	250	180	100	250	100	650	30	35	20	5	9	--		1,729	
Insurgents																
Killed	34	74	27	5	13	--	7	21	36	77	20	15	3		332	
Wounded	4	96	28	11	31	25	29	32	13	29	7	10	--		315	
Captured	6	2	5	2	--	30	--	10	4	21	4	12	6		102	
Rifles captured	18	37	6	7	1	1	4	22	9	82	22	22	21		252	
Attacks repelled	4	--	--	1	1	3	--	2	--	2	2	--	--		15	

February 1938: Damages suffered by insurgents include two light machine guns.

March 1938: Damages inflicted by insurgents include eight houses and two automobiles.

April 1938: Approximately 20,000 yuan in cash and goods taken by insurgents.

June 1938: Approximately 10,000 yuan in cash and goods taken by insurgents.

July 1938: Approximately 10,000 yuan in cash and goods taken and one automobile burned by insurgents.

August 1938: Approximately 10,000 yuan in cash and goods taken and two trucks burned by insurgents.

close liaison with the provincial highways supported by the provincial budget. Reconstruction expenditures of 331,400 yuan are to finance the construction of 725 km of new highways and the repair of 7 km of highway and one bridge. A donation of 69,000 yuan by the Manchurian Industrial Development Company is to finance the construction of 79 km of new highways, 70 km of repair work, and 43 km of new clearings.

Security Telegraph Networks. The plan for the construction of security telegraph networks was adopted after rational examination of the needs for security, transportation, defense, administration, and economy. According to the annual schedule of the Three-year Plan for Reconstruction, 2,513 km of telegraphic lines have been newly established and 786 km repaired. The expense was 126,494 yuan.

Cutting off Sources of Food and Other Materials to the Insurgents. The armies and the police jointly distributed the security forces during last autumn's harvest season to protect the harvest, thus cutting the insurgents' route of food supply. On the other hand, close investigation, protection, vigilance, and supervision were exercised over the merchants' purchase and sale, transportation, and storage of grain.

Grain storage facilities were established in well-guarded hamlets to store grains produced by farmers in inadequately protected villages. Supervision was exercised so as to store a minimum amount of grain in the inadequately protected villages.

Other Measures for Separating Citizens from Insurgents

Certificates for the Residents. Before the current

subjugation operation was initiated, that is, by the end of September 1938, the residents' certificate system was reorganized. All the certificates in the province were renewed, and except in Liuho Prefecture, each certificate carried a photograph of the holder. This made it convenient to search and investigate insurgents. It also made it impossible for the insurgents to infiltrate the hamlets.

Apprehension and Destruction of Underground Organizations and Satellite Groups. In December 1937, the Kim Il-sŏng group's active satellite organization in Ch'angpai Prefecture, the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria [Chaeman Hanin Choguk Kwang-bokhoe], was uncovered. In October 1938, Yang Ching-yü's satellite organization in Chian Prefecture, led by Yang's aide-de-camp Ch'ên Hsiu-ming, was also destroyed. In view of the fact that most of those belonging to these organizations joined the groups as a protective measure, 20 of the 36 involved in the first case are already released on probation and are being used for the [counterinsurgency] operation. The rest will soon be released. Approximately 320 involved in the latter case, after the facts were explained to them, were released to guarantors. The response of these individuals, as well as that of the public toward the government's generosity, was extremely good; they have been praising the true way of justice (wangtao). This incident contributed significantly to the winning over of public opinion and to the separation of the citizens from the insurgents.

Propaganda and Pacification. Good results have been attained by means of propaganda and pacification sessions, medical treatment, and administration of medicine. It is

recognized that the villages in the insurgent-infested areas suffered greatly during the subjugation operation because of the billeting of civilians accompanying the troops and the conscription of wagon drivers among the villagers. A relief plan, to be implemented immediately after the end of the operation, is contemplated for these villages.

ACTIVITIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE PEOPLE'S LIVELIHOOD

Assistance for Agricultural Cultivation

It is a matter of course that assistance for agricultural cultivation has a close relationship with the success of reconstruction operations. As a result of last year's loan of 340,672 yuan, the farmers increased [the value of] their harvest by 1,364,774 yuan, an increase of fourfold. Assistance and guidance are being continued this year, and a total of 523,088 yuan has been lent this year. Of this total, 30,420 yuan was the sum reissued from collections on loans of the previous year. (See Table 9 for details.)

Loans for the Purchase of Wagons. As the highway networks have been expanded, long-distance transportation of goods has become possible. Therefore, farmers have been encouraged to purchase wagons--both the type with automobile tires and that with wooden-framed wheels.

Loans of Seeds. In order to facilitate the increase of production and the improvement of quality of the products, the provincial government purchased seeds of various products and distributed them to the prefectures. Loans were also provided for the purchase of seeds of traditional species. (See Table 10.)

Table 9
INCREASE IN CULTIVATION AND HARVEST

Prefecture	Cultivated Area (in mou)		Increase	Harvest (in koku)		Increase
	1937	1938		1937	1938	
Tungwa	585,766	661,931	76,163	606,531	982,175	375,644
Liuho	889,421	1,220,309	330,888	1,169,013	1,740,333	591,320
Chinch'uan	247,518	346,787	99,269	294,664	408,614	110,950
Huinan	496,191	552,026	55,835	1,046,552	1,246,111	299,559
Mengchiang	72,931	75,500	2,569	93,383	94,602	1,219
Fusung	63,260	81,640	18,380	186,306	229,125	42,819
Ch'angpai	114,602	117,680	3,078	145,254	148,500	3,246
Linchiang	276,570	328,164	51,594	463,404	478,261	14,857
Chian	272,185	257,985	-14,204	435,510	302,823	-122,687
Total	3,018,448	3,642,022	623,572	4,440,617	5,630,544	1,316,927

Table 10

DISTRIBUTION OF SEEDS OF IMPROVED SPECIES

Products	Species	Tung-hwa	Liuho	Chinch'uan	Huinan	Mengchiang	Fusung	Ch'angpai	Linchiang	Chian
<u>Kaoliang</u>	<u>Het-ku-shuang-hsin-pang</u>	500 kg	--	--	--	--	--	--	500 kg	--
<u>Kaoliang</u>	<u>Ai-hsing</u>	100 kg	--	200 koku	124 koku	--	--	--	28 koku	--
<u>Millet</u>	<u>Tao-pa-ch'i</u>	200 kg	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Millet</u>	<u>Ta-pai</u>	--	--	--	4,000 kg	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Soy beans</u>	<u>Huang-ao-chu</u>	--	150 kg	--	30 kg	--	--	--	30 kg	--
<u>Flax</u>	Hokkaido brand	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1 sack	--
<u>Wheat</u>	Hokkaido brand	--	--	--	--	--	--	27 kg	15 kg	--
<u>Potatoes</u>	Hokkaido "danshaku"	--	--	75 kg	25 kg	250 kg	2,500 kg	--	16,250 kg	10,000 kg

Table 11

PURCHASE OF FARM ANIMALS FOR RECONSTRUCTION

Year	Animals	Tung-hwa	Liuho	Chinch'uan	Huinan	Mengchiang	Fusung	Ch'angpai	Linchiang	Chian	Total
1937	Cattle	199	200	275	150	198	140	68	160	120	1,510
1937	Horses	--	--	--	--	100	--	--	--	--	100
1938	Cattle	120	327	334	348	190	226	150	149	121	1,965
1939	Horses	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
1939	Cattle	100	100	150	100	150	130	100	120	150	1,100
1939	Horses	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	Cattle	419	627	759	598	538	496	318	429	391	4,675
	Horses	--	--	--	--	100	--	--	--	--	100

Loans of Farm Tools. Following the practice in 1937, various prefectures acquired ploughshares, hoes, etc., and lent them to the farmers.

Loans of Farm Animals. In 1937 there were 1,350 cattle and 190 horses purchased from outside the province and lent to farmers, but the shortage continues to exist. During 1938 and 1939, more animals were purchased and distributed, as shown in Table 11. Rinderpest spread throughout the province in the beginning of 1939 and, in spite of desperate efforts, a considerable number of cattle died. (See Table 12.) Therefore, there is a more acute shortage of farm animals.

Table 12
EFFECTS OF OUTBREAK OF RINDERPEST

Prefectures	Effect on Cattle			
	Infected	Killed	Died	Cured
Tunghwa	112	8	81	23
Liuho	317	127	49	141
Chinch'uan	89	--	71	18
Huinan	371	296	75	--
Mengchiang	733	--	156	7
Linchiang	15	--	210	523
Chian	33	1	32	--
Total	1,670	432	674	712

Loans for Small-scale Farmers. A total of 100,000 yuan was lent in two periods. The first loan (62,554 yuan) was issued on June 6 to 3,775 families; the second (37,446 yuan) was issued on July 20 to 1,833 families. The total number of families receiving loans was 5,608.

Table 13
 AGRICULTURAL LOANS ISSUED
 (in yuan)

Prefecture	Purpose of the Loan					Total Loan
	Vehicles	Seeds	Tools	Animals	Unspecified	
T'unghua	1,600	15,837	5,272	35,475	--	59,184
Liuho	--	14,371	--	43,460 ^a (2,831)	--	57,831 (2,831)
Chinch'uan	--	5,144	2,288	38,971	--	46,403
Huinan	5,720 (5,720)	3,560 (3,560)	309 (309)	42,000	100,000	151,589 (9,589)
Méngchiang	800	2,250	1,652	33,028	--	37,730
Fusung	3,880	3,515	192	26,857	--	34,444
Ch'angpai	--	3,732	--	44,919 (18,000)	--	48,651 (18,000)
Linchiang	6,156	7,849	--	42,868	--	56,873
Chian	2,175	7,000	--	17,608	3,600	30,383
Total	20,331 (5,720)	63,258 (3,560)	9,713 (309)	326,186 (20,831)	103,600	523,088 (30,420)

^a Figures in parentheses indicate the amount reissued from previous loans collected. These are included in the total.

In addition, 3,600 yuan were issued in Chian Prefecture as commercial capital. (See Table 13.)

Loans for Housing Construction

Most of those who had been obliged to move to new locations because of the construction of collective hamlets or small villages [designed to reclaim the abandoned lands] were not able to finance the construction of their new houses. Of the 6,914 who moved, 5,580 fell into this category. Following the precedent of the previous year, 15 yuan were loaned to each family for housing purposes. Collected loans of the previous year were reissued in Liuho Prefecture (13,420 yuan) and Ch'ang-pai Prefecture (4,830 yuan). (See Table 14.)

Table 14
LOANS FOR HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, 1938

Prefecture	Newly Built Houses	Total Houses	Number of Loans Received	Amount of Loans (in yuan)
Tunghwa	916	26,707	916	13,000
Liuho	1,658	23,907	609	18,420
Chinch'uan	608	7,790	323	12,000
Huinan	--	13,579	--	--
M [^] engchiang	237	4,192	237	4,709
Fusung	68	9,491	68	1,020
Ch'angpai	322	8,311	322	4,830
Linchiang	715	18,702	715	5,596
Chian	2,390	19,084	2,390	47,800
Total	6,914	131,763	5,580	107,375

Loans for Food Supplies

The number of the indigent declined considerably in this province because of the thoroughgoing relief works of 1937 and the assistance given for agricultural cultivation. Because of the damages inflicted by insurgents and natural calamities, however, loans for food supplies were needed. (See Table 15.)

Table 15
LOANS FOR FOOD SUPPLIES

Prefecture	Families Receiving Loans	Cash Loans (in yuan)	Grain Loans (in koku)	Remarks
Tunghwa	3,595	--	2,779	From public granary
Liuho	75	3,843	--	Reissue, 3,843 yuan
Chinch'uan	1,204	24,859	--	Reissue, 8,659 yuan
Huinan	950	9,000	--	Reissue, 9,000 yuan
Mengchiang	2,044	17,561	--	--
Linchiang	2,681	23,600	--	--
Chian	1,248	2,527	457	Purchased at 2,182 yuan
Total	11,797	81,390	3,236	

Commercial and Industrial Capital Loans

In Liuho Prefecture 69 families needing loans were carefully examined. They were organized into 19 teams of five to six families each, and a total loan of 50,000 yuan was provided. In Chian Prefecture 30,000 yuan were issued

for the same purpose and contributed greatly to reconstruction.

In Tunghwa Prefecture 156,500 yuan were issued in 1937 as commercial and industrial capital loans. In September 1938, the entire amount was collected. Because of this good result, loans totaling 172,230 yuan, including the interests collected in the previous year, were made to 317 families in 1938.

Utilization of Forests

Since more than half of the territory in this province is covered by mountains, it is only natural that the use of forests is encouraged for the purpose of advancing the farmers' livelihood. In 1937, firewood cooperatives were established in various towns and villages, under their chiefs, to regulate the cutting of firewood. These cooperatives are gradually beginning to function this year. In Liuho Prefecture 13,500 kg of firewood were collected in 1938. In Fusung Prefecture 50,000 kg of firewood and 92,000 koku of lumber were produced.

Grain Markets

The grain market established in Liuho Prefecture in 1937 has been operating extremely well. The amount of grain harvested between November 1 and December 31, 1938, reached 26,621,903 chin [1 chin is equivalent to 0.5 kg]. The details are shown in Table 16.

Table 16
 TRADE AT LIUHO PREFECTURE GRAIN MARKET
 (November 1 to December 31, 1938)

Grain	Amount Traded (in <u>chin</u>)	Monetary Value (in yuan)
Soy beans	19,026,590	742,961
<u>Kaoliang</u>	1,195,400	35,559
Corn	576,928	16,767
Red beans	2,432,309	97,520
Unpolished rice	3,073,761	167,612
Polished rice	36,747	28,586
Green beans	168	6
Total	26,341,903	1,089,011

Loans for the Cultivation of Ginseng

In the past, Chian Prefecture produced a considerable quantity of ginseng, which was famous for its quality. Because of general impoverishment in this area, however, persons in Yingk'ou Prefecture monopolized the profits [of the trade], while the cultivators of ginseng suffered from usurious debts. In order to relieve the farmers from this condition, 30,000 yuan were lent to 195 families.

Ginseng cultivation in Fung Prefecture was at its peak in 1918 and 1919 when the annual production reached 400,000 chin and the highest price per chin reached 48 yuan. The situation began to deteriorate about 1924 and 1925. The cultivators of ginseng suffered severely after the Manchurian incident, when peace was disturbed and prices dropped sharply, from 70 to 80 cents per chin.

They were spiritually and financially broken, owing to plundering by bandits, exploitation by usurers, the unregulated market, and the drop in price. A great number of those with properties, therefore, returned to their original homes in Shantung Province, and only the former laborers without property or means of production remained behind. The ruin of these ginseng cultivators not only meant the destruction of the ginseng industry, which had been the backbone of the economy in Fusung Prefecture, but also greatly hampered the security operations. Therefore, in order to remedy this situation, the prefectural Reconstruction Committee took charge of the situation. The ginseng cultivators were brought together in a hamlet and the Ginseng Cooperative was revitalized. In 1937, loans totaling 330,000 yuan were made on the basis of the estimated production of 330,000 chin. In 1938, collections from the sale of products came to 220,000 yuan. The remaining 110,000 yuan were used in 1938 for that year's cultivation. The production in 1938 (28,000 chin) was sold for 180,000 yuan. As a result of improvement in quality, regulation of processing, and rationalization of marketing, the price per chin nearly doubled, from 3.47 yuan in 1937 to 6.54 yuan in 1938.

Propaganda and Pacification Operations

ACTIVITIES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE AUTUMN/WINTER SUBJUGATION OPERATION

The Activities Control Team was established under the vice-governor of the province to guide, supervise, and direct the efforts of various prefectural teams in separating the insurgents from the people and cutting off the insurgents' supply routes of food and weapons. Four

groups of the team were dispatched to various prefectures. The Control Team united the activities of the Hsich-ho-hui (Harmony and Cooperation Society), the Tao-te-hui (Morality Society), and the Information Liaison Committee. The control groups made sympathy calls and issued citations to the families of conscripted laborers who had become war casualties.

PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES DURING THE SUBJUGATION OPERATION

The purpose of the pacification activities is to transform the segment of the population that is sympathetic to the insurgents into law-abiding citizens positively cooperating in the construction of a brilliant Tungpientao. For this purpose all the pacification agencies of the army, government, and Hsieh-ho-hui were united in the Pacification Committee to consolidate the operation. The committee was placed under the control of the Subjugation Command. The committee also strove to judge accurately and ease the frictions apt to arise between the army and the police on the one hand and the people on the other. The committee also dispatched pacification teams (or entertainment teams for the army, police, and civilians), which produced great results. The third tour of the teams (December 7, 1938, to January 6, 1939) was accompanied by a theatrical group.

PAPER-PICTURE SHOWS

For a period of one month during the subjugation operation, paper-picture shows of a popular, impressionistic type were shown in the Tunghwa, Liuho, Huinan, Chinch'uan, and Linchiang areas. The results varied from area to area, depending on the (cultural and economic) condition of the people and other factors, but, in general, the shows produced good effects.

PACIFICATION THROUGH NEWSPAPERS

During the subjugation operation, the newspaper Aimin Choupao [Love-the-People Weekly News] was distributed free of charge throughout the province. The paper reported the progress in subjugation and reconstruction operations in Tungpientao. There were 7,000 copies printed in Chinese and 2,000 copies in Korean. Although this was a first attempt, it has produced great effects. The people came to realize the truth about the administration and the founding of the nation.

Reflections on the Reconstruction Activities in 1938

The reconstruction activities in Tunghwa Province entered the first stage of permanent operation in 1938 and have progressed positively toward the attainment of the established aims. The activities of this year have been based on the preparations and fundamental work of the previous year. It must be said that the economic and spiritual impact of the reconstruction activities on the citizens of the province has been very uplifting. We have observed an increase in the areas under cultivation as a result of the recovery of abandoned lands; an increase in agricultural production owing to improvement in seeds; an increase of farmers' cash incomes as a result of improvement in market facilities; remarkable progress among merchants and industrialists assisted by government loans; and the winning of public support through medical treatment and the administration of medicine.

On the other hand, desperate rampages and onslaughts by ideological insurgents under Yang [Ching-yü] and Kim [Il-söng] continue in the eastern region of the province,

and the subjugation operation carried on by the army and the police proceeds unremittingly. There was, at one time, danger of unfavorable public opinion; but the citizens of the province have been shown the steady improvement in public security, and they have been confronted with the benefits provided by the state in the reconstruction activities. There is a clear indication that the citizens' confidence in the state has been growing and that they are inclined toward self-regeneration. They are beginning to realize that today's suffering will bring about tomorrow's happiness. Even so, the reconstruction activities in this area need to be continued until next year.

In short, the activities of 1938 in the western region of this province have been extremely smooth, and the results have surpassed what had been anticipated. Activities in the eastern region were accompanied by considerable difficulties, but the reconstruction activities heightened the people's appreciation of and confidence in the state and contributed greatly toward winning the support of public opinion. Along with the opening of a railroad and the development of mineral resources, a bright and affluent Tunghwa Province will be a reality in the near future.

XVIII. PACIFICATION OPERATIONS ACCOMPANYING
THE AUTUMN/WINTER MOPPING-UP OPERATION

(Substance of the Pacification Plan
for the Population in Insurgent-infested Areas)*

Chientao Provincial Government

General Conditions

In spite of the frantic efforts of the Japanese and Manchukuo military and police authorities, insurgent groups under Yang Ching-yü, Ch'en Han-chang, Ch'oe Hyün, Kim Il-söng, O Paek-yong, Pang Chên-shêng, etc., continue to appear in various areas. Most atrociously, these insurgents pillage goods, and kill and wound men and animals. They are also systematically conducting Communist indoctrination operations in various villages. As a result, many villagers are led astray by the insurgents' propaganda and begin to work for the insurgents, passively or positively. All this adds to the burden carried by the pacification forces.

Furthermore, as situations become more aggravated, various malignant rumors spread among the people. The people are apprehensive, unable to engage in farming, and extremely agitated.

Already, in some districts, considerable numbers of farmers have disposed of crops, farm tools, cattle, and

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo [Pacification Monthly Report], (marked Secret), Vol 4, No. 10, November 1939.

farm animal. That had been distributed by the Manchurian-Korean Development Company and have escaped either to Korea or to areas near the border. Because the farmers were moving out of the insurgent-infested areas in a continuous stream, the situation could not be remedied by the ordinary kind of pacification operation.

Even among the residents of collective hamlets, there are those who are looking for the opportunity to escape. Some of them fully accept the Communist propaganda and plan to stay in the hamlets permanently only because of their belief that their safety may be guaranteed if they provide food and other conveniences to the insurgents. Considerable numbers of residents sympathize with Communism and secretly plan to join the insurgents.

If the situation were left to take its own course, not only would the counterinsurgency operations of the armies and police become more difficult, but many areas of this province [Chientao] would be dominated by insurgents, as in the period just before the founding of Manchukuo. At the same time all the development policies undertaken by various agencies would be completely nullified. Recently, the territory under the jurisdiction of this province has become known to the public as the richest part of northeastern Manchuria in terms of natural resources, and already some work of exploitation of its resources has begun. But this work would have to stop if the insurgents' strength should mount.

Located in the eastern border region, this province occupies an important position in the defense against the Soviet Union. The relationship [of our nation] with the Soviet Union has been deteriorating, and the national

defense system needs to be reinforced. Under this situation, the rampages of Communist insurgents, Communist propaganda activities, organization of underground activities, etc., are not simply a matter of the security problem of a province or a region, but are a grave national problem. [Neglect of the situation] may result in a serious setback to anti-Soviet measures.

For carrying out the autumn subjugation operation [or mopping-up operation by the armies and police] which is planned for early October, this province has established the following plan for propaganda and pacification in order to bring about the revitalization and stabilization of the people's livelihood. Two pacification teams have been organized. The first team is to accompany the subjugation forces, and the second team is to tour the secondary war front in the bandit-infested area. The function of these teams is to counteract the insurgent groups' tenacious efforts to communize the masses, agitate public opinion, and spread anti-army and revolutionary thoughts. This will be accomplished by distributing "comfort goods" and explaining in a comprehensible manner the various goals listed below. The teams are also to take whatever measures are necessary to relieve afflicted persons, and to facilitate the permeation of the spirit of the founding of Manchukuo and that of national harmony.

Goals of Propaganda and Pacification Operations

1. Separation of the insurgents from the people.
 - a. Compare the condition of the insurgents at the time of the founding of Manchukuo with that of the present.

- b. Establish confidence that the insurgents will be destroyed or will surrender.
 - c. Explain how the present condition of the insurgents makes necessary the activities of the subjugation forces.
 - d. Arrange for the collection and rapid transmission of information on bandits.
 - e. Make known the policy of severe punishment for those maintaining liaison with the insurgents.
2. Implantation of absolute confidence in the government.
 - a. Explain the just nature of the government's orders.
 - b. Implant confidence in the defense activities of the army and police; induce direct and indirect assistance.
 3. Activities for the relief of afflicted people.
 - a. Offer condolences to families afflicted by the insurgents.
 - b. Repair damages inflicted by the insurgents on houses and other properties.
 - c. Relieve those who are without adequate food as a result of insurgent operations.
 4. Clear understanding of the state of affairs and realization of the power of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police.
 - a. Explain the cause of the China incident and the current situation.
 - b. Explain the true nature of the Nomonhan incident.

The insurgents have been propagating false rumors about the current incident [the war in China].

It is necessary to give the masses correct information about the development of the war in order to counter the agitation among them.

5. Spread the spirit of the founding of the nation and the understanding of major national policies.
 - a. [Explain] the spirit of the founding of the nation.
 - b. [Explain the] racial harmony in Manchukuo.
 - c. [Explain] the unity of Japan and Manchukuo.
 - d. [Explain] the development policies and other major policies.

Past experience shows that the root of agitation lies in a misunderstanding of government policies. This leads to apprehension and conjectures, resulting in rumors.

6. Comfort and encouragement of the security agencies.
 - a. Express appreciation to various security agencies and at the same time carry on instructional activities among them.
 - b. Encourage further efforts in subjugation and defense.
 - c. Make "comfort goods" distributions of daily necessities, sweets, and medicine.
7. Comfort and relief of severely afflicted hamlets.
8. Medical and cinema teams.
 - a. [Dispatch] pacification teams to accompany medical and cinema teams.

- b. Provide medical treatment and administer medicine free of charge, thereby winning the support of the people.
 - c. Prevent the spread of endemics by providing education on sanitation.
 - d. Comfort the security personnel and the residents in the secondary war front through the use of movies. Because of the curfew, motion pictures cannot be shown in the front-line areas.
9. Others.
- Take necessary and proper actions as situations arise.

XIX. THE SPECIAL PACIFICATION OPERATION

IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT*

Chientao Provincial Government

Pacification Operations

The special pacification operation in the Eastern District has been divided into two stages. While the first stage was devoted to general and comprehensive activities, the efforts of the second stage have been focused on expanding the results of the first period, consolidating and perpetuating the collective hamlets around core hamlets, stationing members of pacification teams in these hamlets, completing the hamlets' self-defense system, and arousing and systematizing the notion of collective [or joint] defense of hamlets.

Summaries of the activities of various provincial teams are presented below.

THE FIRST PACIFICATION TEAM

The First Stage

Activities. In cooperation with the Ant'u prefectural team, [the First Pacification Team] concentrated its strength upon accurately determining the condition of the insurgents, collecting source materials, and establishing intelligence networks. Some members operated with the army; others acted as intelligence agents or were concealed

* Office of Information, Department of General Affairs, Council of State (Manchukuo), Senbu geppo (Pacification Monthly Report), (marked Secret), Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1940.

within hamlets. [The team] strove to separate the insurgents from the people and to strengthen the self-defense abilities of hamlets.

Condition of the Insurgents. All of Ant'u has been infested with insurgents, but the situation is particularly bad in the western border of the prefecture. Ant'u is the worst security area in the Eastern District. This province [Chientao] has had a long history of bandit infestation, and its defense facilities have been poor. Nevertheless, many new farmers have moved into the area, complicating the separation of citizens from the insurgents even further. It is extremely difficult to grasp the true condition of the insurgents. Repeated and enthusiastic pacification and propaganda activities, however, and the establishment of intelligence networks by nucleus members of the Hsueh-ho-hui, have led to the clarification of the condition of the hamlets. Thus, by the later part of the first period, considerable improvement had been made, at least on the surface. About that time, bandit activity also lost its vigor and an eerie calmness prevailed.

The Second Stage

Organization of the Team. [The team consisted of] five officials from the central government, four prefectural officers of Hsieh-ho-hui, two provincial officials, three prefectural officials, and four employees of the Manchurian-Korean Development Company: total, 18.

Summary of Activities. [The team was] divided into two groups. One group was assigned to Ant'u City and the other to Tashaho. They operated according to the guidelines for the second-stage activities, particularly striving to grasp the true condition of the insurgents, to

encourage the voluntary activities of the influential members of Hsieh-ho-hui at the local level, and to train young men of the area.

Condition of the Insurgents. A report has been received that the Kim Il-s^ung group has appeared in the basin of Lu-sui-ch'uan along the Fusung prefectural border, but this is not yet confirmed. Various agencies in the area agree that the insurgents are hiding in the upper streams of Ku-t'ung River and the southern white [i.e., non-Communist] area of the province. Insurgents have not been active in the Fusung-Tunhua prefectural border area, but there is no doubt that the area serves as the traffic route of large insurgent groups.

THE SECOND PACIFICATION TEAM

The First Stage

Summary of Activities. In the early period [the Second Pacification Team was] based at Lao-t'ou-kou, Yenchi Prefecture, and it operated in the T'ien-pao mountain region. But bandits attacked along the upper course of the Tao-mu-kou River. [The team then] carried out activities in that region, under the direction of the Commander Irebune. In the middle period, the team left the Irebune [army] unit and cooperated with the First Pacification Team in Ant'u Prefecture. The situation [the teams] faced was that most of the residents in the district had supported the insurgents' logistic activities.

Condition of the Insurgents. [The insurgents' condition was the] same as for the First Team.

The Second Stage

Organization of the Team. [The team consisted of] five officials from the central government, two local

officers of Hsueh-ho-hui, three members of the local Hsueh-ho-hui, three employees of the Manchurian-Korean Development Company, and two provincial officials: total 15.

Summary of Activities. [The team was] divided into two groups. As in the first stage, the main body of the team was located at Shih-ch'i-chieh. The other group was at Ta-hsun-tzu, where it was situated in the middle of two major insurgent camps, Mi-hun-chen in the north and Ma-t'ien-ling in the south. Separation of the insurgents from the citizens is impossible without special facilities. This situation necessitates the elimination of the two insurgent camps. The emphasis of the operation, therefore, is placed on this point.

Condition of the Insurgents. In the latter part of the first stage, the insurgents under Ch'oe Hyŏn moved into the southeastern white district in T'unhua Prefecture via Mi-hun-chen after attacking Pei-huang-ling, located in the western border. Since then no movement of the insurgents has been reported.

THE THIRD PACIFICATION TEAM

The First Stage

Summary of Activities. [The Third Pacification Team was] united with the Holung prefectural team and based at San-tao-kou. Stress was put on operations in Kuan-ti-fang and the Ch'ing-shan-li area, which had been heavily infested with insurgents. The team at times joined with the Akahcri [army] unit or separated into special units to assist the purification activities of the army and the police.

Because no insurgent activities were reported in the

middle period, the team was divided into three units. One unit was dispatched to the north of Musan, Korea, and the other to the Ant'u prefectural border in the southwest. Because of frequent emergence of small bandit groups in the Ant'u-Holong borders, the more able elements of the team were dispatched to that region. Considering the past activities of the insurgents in the Kuan-ti-fang region, and suspecting the existence of grain-storage depots high up in the mountains of western and southern parts of the region, the Third Team searched there for approximately a month in November. A member of the special activities team was dispatched from the provincial headquarters to assist the Third Team.

Condition of the Insurgents. The Kuan-ti-fang region has been attacked five times since the beginning of the subjugation operation, and it and the Ch'ing-shan-li region have been the worst security areas. No significant insurgent activities, however, were observed during the first period. In the past, the Hung-ch'i River basin in the southwestern section (the prefectural border of Ant'u and Holong prefectures) had been frequented by insurgents of the Kim Il-song group. Except for the appearance of seven or eight insurgents of the same group in the southern area of Hung-ch'i River in the latter period of this stage, no activities have been observed.

The Second Stage

Organization of the Team. [The team consisted of] four officials from the central government, six prefectural officers of Hsueh-ho-hui, three members of the local Hsueh-ho-hui, one officer from the Monopoly Office, two prefectural employees, and two provincial employees: total, 18.

Summary of Activities. [The team was] divided into three units as in the first stage and deployed in the same locations. The Third Team has moved to the vicinity of the white district in southern Ant'u Prefecture to confront the insurgents escaping from the attack of the Ant'u military forces.

Condition of the Insurgents. Insurgents in the deeply forested northern section of the western border of Holung have been inactive. Some insurgent movements, however, have been observed in the southern section. The team cooperated with the army and police in arresting several informers for the insurgents, but investigation of these informers revealed that large insurgent groups do not seem to exist in Holung Prefecture.¹

MEDICAL TEAM

The Fifth Medical Team of the Nosori [army] unit was assigned to the liaison section of Hsueh-ho-hui. This team provided medical treatments to [the people] in the insurgent infested area of Holung Prefecture. In the second stage, the team operated in the T'ien-pao-sha region of Yenchí Prefecture. It is now operating in the Tao-mu-kou basin region. This team is producing great results for pacification in these hinterlands where absolutely no medical facilities are available.

The Yenchí and Ant'u prefectural teams jointly organized a medical group. This group is accompanying the army medical team.

¹Editor's note: The report also lists the activities of the Yenchí and Wangch'ing prefectural teams. These are much the same in content as those of the provincial teams.

Results of the Operation and
Future Prospects

THE RESULTS

1. Heightening the sense of hamlet self-defense. Because the defense facilities of the hamlets have been strengthened, the residents are gradually acquiring the will to defend themselves apart from the guidance of the pacification teams and the government officials. The sense of opposition toward the insurgents has been sufficiently aroused.
2. Completing hamlet defense facilities.
 - a. Taking the initiative in setting examples and guiding the completion of defense facilities, such as mud walls, trenches, and barbed-wire fences.
 - b. Cooperating in the consolidation of the defense corps and in the training of the residents.
 - c. Cooperating in the distribution of defense armaments.
3. Heightening the spirit of cooperative defense of collective hamlets and organizing the joint defense system. The system of mutual [or joint] defense among two or three hamlets has been organized in Ant'u Prefecture. Contacts among influential members of various hamlets have been facilitated.
4. Winning, maintaining, and supporting the core members [of Hsueh-ho-hui].
5. Organizing and training young men.

6. Separating the insurgents from the citizens, and establishing intelligence networks.
7. Answering the inquiries presented.
8. Understanding the true condition of the hamlets, and collecting data for welfare operations.
9. Providing medical treatment.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The pacification operations, executed at present by the special teams, must be made the regular duties of the provincial and prefectural governments. Future activities must not only solidify and perpetuate the results obtained by the current operation, but must also utilize the organizational networks established by pacification operations, thus enabling the nucleus members of the local Hsueh-ho-hui to carry out activities with initiative. They must cooperate in the subjugation activities of the army and police, while maintaining close liaison with the provincial and prefectural headquarters.

XX. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE
COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS*

Okamoto Goichi

Prosecutor, Okayama District Court

Okayama, Japan

General Conditions

The Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army is under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party's Manchurian Province Committee and is scattered in the eastern Russo-Manchurian border region. These groups are carrying on activities to oppose Manchukuo and resist Japan; they are under strict discipline. In this section we shall briefly trace the history of the First Army of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army, which is currently operating in the Tungpientao region, as an example of the organizational process of the Red Army.

In the spring of 1932 the Panshih Central Prefectural Committee, which had been under the direction of the Manchurian Province Committee, established within itself a Military Department for the purpose of self-defense. This has been necessitated by the intensified counterinsurgency activities of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Guerrilla

* Okamoto Goichi, "Manchu ni okeru Chugoku kyosanto to kyosanhi" ("The Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Insurgents in Manchuria"), Shisho josei shisatsu hokokushu (Reports of the Inspection Tour of the Thought Conditions), No. 4, subtitled Manchu ni okeru kyosan undo (Communist Movement in Manchuria), Ministry of Justice (Japan), Criminal Affairs Bureau, Thought Study Material Special Series, No. 41, Tokyo, May 1938, pp. 41-77.

units were organized under the military department. Red Guard units were also organized as parts of Farmers' Associations. At first, these groups were weak, but they gradually obtained the support of the masses and the strength to conduct powerful military operations.

After the guerrilla units and Red Guard units were established, the Panshih Central Prefectural Committee strove to absorb the troops of the local armies that have been successively revolting against their superiors. Finally, in May 1932, the Northeastern Volunteers Army (Tungpei I-yung-chun) was established under the command of An Ki-ch'ang, the head of the prefectural committee. In June this group was renamed the Northeastern Farmer-Worker Volunteers Army (Tungpei Nung-kung I-yung-chun) and Ch'ang Ch'un-feng became the general commander. At this time the total strength was approximately 170 troops. In October of the same year, after enlisting more of the rebellious troops of the local armies and the workers of the Chi-Kai railroad, the group renamed itself the Chinese Red Army 32nd Army Southern Manchuria Guerrilla Unit (Chungkuo Hung-chun Ti San-shih-erh Nan-Man Yu-chi-tui). The numerical strength of the group at this time was approximately 230 troops, including 80 Koreans. The unit joined forces with the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Save-the-Nation Army (Tungpai K'ang-jih chiu-kuo-chun) and Big Sword Society (Ta-tao-hui) groups and increased its power.

In January 1933, the head of the Panshih prefectural committee was summoned to the Manchurian Province Committee. He discussed with the committee the [strategies for] communizing southern Manchuria. The committee directed him to reorganize the 32nd Army guerrilla unit into the

First Army of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army. Thereupon, the First Army was established in September 1933, on the second anniversary of the Manchurian incident. This organization was formalized at a conference of Red Army leaders held in Po-li-ho-t'ao, Pansih Prefecture. As a result of this group's activity, there were frequent cases of desertion and rebellion among the troops of the Manchukuo army. Yang Ching-yü became the general commander of the First Independent Division of the First Army of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army. The division at this time had approximately 720 troops and 1,000 other affiliated insurgents under its control.

While the First Independent Division was in operation, it was attacked by the Japanese army in October 1933. The Second and Third regiments of the division retreated to Tungpientao, thus effecting the previously contemplated southward move. By March 1934, the regiments in Tungpientao had absorbed other insurgent groups in the area and established the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army General Command for the purpose of consolidating the anti-Japanese front. [The Communists] held the actual power and carried out active guerrilla operations in Ch'ing-yuan, Liu-ho, and Chin-ch'uan prefectures.

The First Regiment, remaining in the original location, organized the Youth Volunteers Army (Ch'ing-nien I-yung-chün), of approximately 100 men (two companies) in January 1934. In May, the same group also established the Chiangpai Anti-Japanese Federated Army General Command (Chiangpai K'ang-jih Lienho-chün Tsung Chih-hui-pu) at I-t'ung-hsien. On November 5 of the same year, at the first congress of the representatives [of the Communist

groups] in southern Manchuria, held in the border area of Huinan and Mengchiang prefectures, the decision was made to revive temporarily the Southern Manchurian Special Committee [of the Chinese Communist Party] and organize the Second Independent Division of the First Army of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army. Thereupon, the First Regiment of the First Independent Division (regiment commander, Yuan Tê-shêng) joined with a few other Communist insurgent groups to form the newly established Second Division of the First Army.

After the First Independent Division moved south, the activities of the Chinese Communist Party suddenly gained momentum in Huinan, Chinch'uan, Ch'ingyuan, Livho, Mêngchiang, and Tunghwa prefectures. After the Provisional Southern Manchuria Special Committee was established, the Tunghwa Central Prefectural Committee was established on December 11, 1934, on the anniversary of the Canton riot. Thus the activities of the Party and the army have been gaining in force and cannot be underestimated.

Characteristics of the

[Northeastern People's Revolutionary] Army

The group under discussion is an armed organization under the instruction of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, seeking to recover the lost territory in Manchuria and to establish a Communist state. Thus it espouses Communism and offers great potential to anti-Imperial "Oppose Manchukuo and Resist Japan" movements. The platform of the Northeastern Anti-Japanese Allied Army¹ is as follows:

¹After 1935, when the Chinese Communist Party adopted the "full-scale united front" strategy in Manchuria, the People's Revolutionary Army became the "Allied Army."

1. Do not sell out the nation, do not surrender, and fight against Japanese imperialism and Manchukuo.
2. Protect the interest of the masses and permit the masses freedom to oppose the Japanese and freedom of press, assembly organization, and destructive actions.
3. Approve the arming of the anti-Japanese masses.

Organization of the Insurgent Group

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The organizational structure of the insurgent groups varies from one group to another and there is no uniformity. One example is shown below. The organizational structure of the Red Army is also in constant flux. The following chart is based on the latest information.

ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST ARMY OF THE NORTHEASTERN
PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

General Commander Yang Ching-yü	Guerrilla Unit Yang Ching-yü	3rd Squad	40 to 80 troops each
		4th Squad	
		5th Squad	
		6th Squad	
	First Division Ch'êng Pin	5th Squad	Total of 400 troops
		6th Squad	
7th Squad			
8th Squad			
Second Division Ch'ao K'o-an	Total, approximately 500 troops		
Special Units	Provisions--Commander Liu and 40 troops Transportation--Com- mander Chang Tê-fu and 40 troops		
Instruction Unit	Approximately 200 troops		
Intelligence Unit	10 members and security unit of 50 troops		

EQUIPMENT

Uniforms are sewn by the sewing unit of the army. Coarse white cotton cloth is dyed and cut. The collar is red and is similar to that of the Manchukuo army. Caps and leggings are also similar to those of the Manchukuo army. Japanese-made rubber-soled shoes are used. Knapsacks are of various colors.

Officers at the level of company commander, company political commissar, and above wear small pistols. All others, including platoon leaders, carry Japanese rifles. Platoon leaders carry 60 rounds of ammunition; squad leaders, 30 rounds; troops, 20 to 25 rounds.

RECRUITMENT

The troops of the Red Army are either enlisted through coercion, by kidnapping, or mobilized through propaganda. Local bandits are also inducted into the army.

Kidnapping and Coercive Enlistment.

The Red Army, which takes pride in the sharpness of its troops and their swiftness of movement, strives to win young men into its ranks. The army kidnaps young men during its movement [from one location to another], adroitly persuades them, and inducts them into the army. Once a person has joined with the insurgents, it is difficult for him to escape from them.

Recruiting through Propaganda

For recruiting the Chinese, villagers are gathered together and told:

Why are you suffering so much from lack of food? What pleasure do you get from being used by the Japanese army every day as laborers? The Japanese have established the puppet regime of

Manchukuo, sent in many troops, and are scheming to take over [the nation]. Wake up! Join our Red Army to repel the Japanese. If you join the Red Army, you will have enough to eat, and money and property will be divided equally. We are fighting against the Japanese army and their running dogs every day to bring happiness to our people. Quickly join our Red Army and repel the enemy.

If one responds to the above propaganda and wishes to join the army, the following procedures are taken. Two guarantors are required. No one will be accepted without guarantors. Guarantors have to be either the head of the local farmers' self-defense unit, the head of the anti-Japanese society, or members of the Red Army. Once a person has enlisted, he is required to memorize the ten items of the regulations of troop conduct, and he is issued an arm band reading "Resolutely fight against the Japanese--Never surrender." Weapons are issued to new recruits after ten days to a month of joint activity with the army.

For recruiting the Koreans, the Korean Communist insurgents select individuals in different localities and tell them the following:

You should join the Farmers Association of the Chinese Communist party line and fight against the landlords and capitalists. Since Manchuria has become a colony of Japan by her imperialist aggression--as has been the case of Korea--we, the Korean farmers, who share so much with the Chinese in terms of environment and standpoint, should join hands with the proletarian masses of Manchuria and destroy landlords and capitalists. At the same time, we should drive Japanese imperialism from Manchuria, establish a proletarian regime, and share happiness together.

Recruitment and acceptance of local bandits occur when local bandits are taken into the army either through coercion or propaganda. Before being admitted to the army, the local bandits are informed of the ten items of regulations and permitted to operate on their own for a period of three to four months. Their record during these months will be investigated and [if the records are satisfactory] they will be accepted into the army. The propagandizing by the Communist insurgents has produced favorable results, and the number of local bandits joining the Red Army has been on the rise.

[The ten] regulations on troop conduct are as follows:

1. Those abusing the masses will be punished.
2. Those destroying weapons will be punished.
3. Those informing for the enemy will be executed.
4. Those raping women will be executed.
5. Those deserting from the war front will be executed.
6. Those deserting with rifles will be executed.
7. Those departing from the army and disobeying orders will be punished.
8. Those concealing ammunition will be executed.
9. Those plundering properties without instructions will be punished.
10. Oppose Japanese and Manchukuo to death.

METHODS USED IN EXPANDING INFLUENCE

The Red Army's activities have been becoming more intense as the years go by. They have propagandized among the ignorant Chinese and Koreans and let them establish organizations opposing Japan and Manchukuo and have used these as satellite organizations. Local bandits have been

pacified and placed under control to expand the Communist strength. In case of attacks by the Japanese and Manchukuo armies, the insurgents utilize the intelligence networks of the satellite organizations and groups to avoid the brunt of the attack. Thus through combined use of propaganda and atrocious activities, the insurgents attempt to win over the residents.

There are several propaganda methods for pacifying the residents and obtaining local agents. While [an army unit is] camped in a locality, indigent residents of the vicinity are collected at one place and told: "You are Chinese and not citizens of Manchukuo. Never forget the existence of China." The insurgents then distribute one to two yuan to each person.

In order to execute underground activities thoroughly, and win the support of the public, the insurgents aim at winning young boys. When boys are congregated by the insurgents for meetings, adults are prohibited from listening to the meeting. Boys are told that they are second citizens of China and hence should cooperate in the completion of the People's Revolutionary Army's revolution.

Propaganda contains the following statements:

The Red Army is an army for the restoration of the lost territory [of Manchuria] and the armed struggle of the proletariat. Therefore, it does not harm the people and [on the contrary] is welcomed by the masses everywhere. The army is strongly supported by the Soviet Union. The Red Army is receiving weapons and ammunition from the Soviet Union. If there is a war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Red Army will disturb the rear of the Japanese army. The military strength of the Soviet Union [is so strong that] it would instantaneously destroy Japan and would bring about the establishment of

a Communist society which is our ideal. We will be freed from the pressure of Japanese imperialism. Regardless of sex or age, every Chinese has an obligation to assist the Red Army because it is devoted to the construction of a Chinese ideal nation-state. There are many comrades in every corner of Tungpientao. If one becomes a local agent of the Red Army, that will certainly be happy news. Officers of the Communist Party in Manchuria are joining the Red Army.

DISPERSAL AND CONCENTRATION OF THE INSURGENT GROUPS

As a result of the subjugation operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police, large group operations by the insurgents have become increasingly difficult. There is a tendency, therefore, for large insurgent groups to divide into small units. Groups too small to carry out military operations have been amalgamating into larger forces.

SEASONAL CHANGES

The practice of "gathering in summer and dispersing in winter" is not so evident among the Red Army groups as among the local bandits. But big units are dispersed between [late] autumn and winter, and the members hide in mountain strongholds or in villages close by the [operational] base for hibernation. Food is supplied by local agents or other satellite organizations. In the spring the insurgents again become active, their number having increased in the interim. [No explanation is offered for the increase.] It is normal for the insurgents to be most active in the summer period.

LIAISON AMONG THE INSURGENTS

Normally, orderlies are used for liaison purposes. Only those with long years of service and [with records of]

reliability are used as orderlies. In the case of short-distance communications, farmers are sometimes used also. In the case of written communications, only English or Korean is used. Boys between 14 and 15 years of age, old men, or Koreans are used as messengers.

Yang Ching-yü, who is in control of the entire operation, uses liaison personnel. In case of emergency or when ordering a meeting of the commanders of various units, he may use telegrams. It seems that [the army] possesses a telephone system. In the event the telegraphic facilities are needed, liaison personnel already planted in various cities are used as intermediaries. Various insurgent groups use messengers to send or receive telegrams.

THE EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE FIRST ARMY

Influence among the Insurgents

Yang Ching-yü, the general commander of the First Army, based in Tungpientao, is in full control of the various divisions. Almost all of the insurgent groups in the operational area of the First Army are overshadowed by the First Army. Through adroit propaganda and pacification operations, the bandit groups have been won over and have either carried out joint operations with the Red Army or provided assistance. Thus, the Red Army possesses an absolutely overpowering influence among the insurgent groups.

Influence among the Residents

Through propaganda and other means of pacification, the Red Army is desperately striving to obtain underground agents and to organize groups to support the Red Army. In addition to creating favorable impressions on the people, the Red Army occasionally carries out atrocious actions to

shock the people [into obedience]. Therefore, not only is the influence of the Red Army strong among the residents in its base area, but its power extends into its operational area to a far greater degree than has been suspected.

The Areas of Power

The power of the Red Army extends over the Tungpientao area in general and especially to the following prefectures which are its base areas: Mengchiang, Chinch'uan, Linchiang, Hangjen, Hsingching, Tunghwa, and Kuantien.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF THE INSURGENTS

General Condition

Those who voluntarily joined the Red Army in the early period of its operation believe in Communism and have strong convictions. Few of those coerced into the army, through kidnapping or other means, believe the Communist propaganda. Considerable numbers wish to separate themselves from the army and return home, but because of the army's severe sanctions against deserters and because of their fear of arrest by the Japanese and Manchukuo authorities, they continue to remain with the army.

Condition of the Surrendered

Many insurgents decide to surrender because they have lost their original will to fight, or have been wounded in battle, or suffer from physical and mental fatigue. Gradually, such men have come to doubt Communism and the possibilities for realizing Communist ideals. They have realized the unreasonable nature of insurgent activity, and the impossibility of permanently continuing it, from reading propaganda leaflets of the Hsueh-chu-hui [Kyojokai, or Cooperation and Assistance Society], which recommends surrender.

Operations of Insurgent Groups

GENERAL STRATEGY

Insurgent groups engage in guerrilla activities without a permanent base. They organize small units to destroy railroads, cut telegraph and telephone wires, and attack collective hamlets, small cities and towns, and Japanese and Manchukuo security establishments.

They always engage in guerrilla warfare and never carry out [major] attacks. There is no benefit to be gained from engaging in major attacks in which the [Red] army may suffer casualties and loss of ammunition. It is impossible to obtain [the support of] broad masses and a sphere of influence without intensive guerrilla warfare.

RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

A few old men disguised as beggars are dispatched to the target area several days before the attack. They visit local residents and government buildings to beg [for food and goods] while they thoroughly investigate security and other conditions. They report their findings to their unit.

On the day before the attack, a few men in ordinary clothes are dispatched to the target area as cookie and candy peddlers. They sell cookies and candies cheaper than others. At the same time, they keep government buildings and people's residences under surveillance to locate money and goods, and to determine who is to be kidnapped, the state of security, and other conditions. They spend the night at the location and join the attacking group to lead in plundering and kidnapping. They retreat with the attacking group.

Selected villagers serve as informers only on simple

and ordinary matters. Most of the reconnaissance activities are conducted by agents belonging to the guerrilla unit. Informants are not confined to any particular social class.

COMMUNICATIONS, CIPHER, AND PASSWORDS

In the past, all communications addressed to the [division and army] headquarters were drafted by political commissars and written in cipher [or codes]. However, because many party members surrendered to the authorities as a result of the active operations of the Japanese and Manchukuo army and police, and because the location of superior party organizations was not certain, it became necessary to ease the communication method. Hence the cipher system was eliminated and ordinary writing has been used. In order to protect secrets, duplicate copies of documents are not kept. If the document has been discovered [by the authorities] and confiscated during the process of communication, immediate changes are made in the contemplated plans of action.

When the telegraph or telephone is used for communication, a numerical code is used. When the telephone is used, the personnel identify each other with passwords and use cipher or codes to communicate the message.

MARCHING

When a company is moving, three or four of the troops precede the company as scouts, the last scout being thirty to forty steps ahead of the company. Scouts maintain a distance of fifty to sixty steps. If a regiment is moving, a company precedes the remaining body by approximately 200 to 300 meters. A platoon or company guards the rear, being separated from the main unit by approximately 300

meters. [There was no battalion system in the Red Army.]

LOOKOUTS AND GUARDS FOR CAMPING

Ordinarily, the headquarters [of the division?] sends out lookouts disguised as farmers into the vicinity of the camping ground. The mode of vigilance during encampment varies according to the terrain, but guards are posted on nearby high ground in three directions. A platoon will post four to five guards, including a squad leader; a company will post ten guards, including a platoon leader. Other guards are posted in the immediate vicinity of the camping ground. Enemy attack is signaled by rifle shots (sakuretsudan).

The Red Army uses boy troops to collect information on the condition of the Japanese and Manchukuo army and police and other matters in various areas. These boys wear ordinary clothes.

The Red Army collects information on the condition of the Japanese and Manchukuo subjugation units from local residents, agents, and others. The information is reported directly or by telephone. The information is used effectively to reap maximum benefit in attacks or to avoid the brunt of the attacks.

COMBAT TACTICS

The combat tactics vary according to the purpose of the operation or the nature of the terrain. The Red Army's tactics have improved greatly in the recent period and it has been using various artifices.

When confronted with the Japanese and Manchukuo army or police, the scouts or the advance guards fight fiercely against the enemy, allowing the main unit to prepare for battle. The main unit will occupy advantageous high

ground or turn to the flank to begin the battle. The retreat of the scouts is announced by bugles. If the situation compels the dispersion and retreat of the unit, all members meet at the site of the previous meal or previous camping ground.

Regardless of the size of the group, if the group is encamped, the commander designates a place for the retreat. (Normally the retreat is made to the high ground or forests.) If no location has been designated, bugle signals are used [to indicate the place of retreat].

A small unit may be thrust to the fore to lure the enemy into pursuit. The pursuing troops will be attacked from three directions at planned locations.

When confronted by the enemy, the units may temporarily retreat after a brief battle and then counterattack. This tactic is used most frequently at night.

In meeting and attacking the subjugation units, Red Army units take advantage of topography, such as mountain gorges or forests.

Weak police detachments are attacked at night by surprise.

Yang Ching-yü acts with his subordinates, but when confronted with the subjugation units, he separates from his unit to issue orders. When the subjugation unit is strong, he is far from his troops; when the subjugation unit is not formidable, he is near his troops.

METHOD OF ORDINARY ATTACKS

Attacks are planned by regiment political commissars and conducted after thorough investigation of conditions has been made four or five days ahead of the attack by a few important party members in civilian clothes. The

guerrilla unit is led quietly by guides on uninhabited mountain roads. Approximately 1.2 kilometers from the target area, the commander issues orders; the unit surrounds the target, raises the battle cry at a bugle signal, and charges. The commander remains approximately 200 meters behind the unit and issues orders by bugle.

ATTACKS ON VILLAGES

Attacks on villages are most frequently conducted when the security force of the village has been weakened by the dispatch of [some of its force to] subjugation units. After an attack has been planned, troops of the unit, informants, or bribed local residents are used to obtain information about the terrain, security conditions, target individuals, etc. When attacking a walled village, the main force of the attacking unit hides in the vicinity and only a few plainclothesmen approach the guards. The guards are taken by surprise, disarmed, and carried off to the hiding place of the main unit, and the attack begins. When the Manchukuo troops are standing guard, the insurgents approach the guard posts in uniforms similar to those of the Manchukuo troops and speak to the guards in Chinese. The guards are disarmed, and the attack begins. This latter method is used more frequently at night than during the day. Sometimes the attacking troops are deployed in several waves.

ATTACKS ON TRAINS

Most attacks on trains take place at night, and only rarely in daylight. Derailing is accomplished by destruction of rails, by the placement of objects on rails, or by the insertion of steel pieces between rails. When the train stops, it is attacked from both sides. Daylight

attacks on trains take place in gorges or on steep slopes. Trains are attacked either from both sides or from one side. Attacks are most frequent in forest areas.

ATTACKS ON SHIPS AND VEHICLES

Ships [sailing in rivers] are attacked from mountain tops. Vehicles are attacked in locations where speeding is impossible due to steep slopes or bad roads; attacks also take place on highways in gorges. Vehicles may be attacked from both sides of the road or from mountain tops. A recent sample was the attack of September 29, 1937, on the Kuantien Prefecture garrison unit truck that had been transporting weapons, ammunition, and food to the Watanabe Unit at T'aip'ingch'ang, Kuantien Prefecture. The truck was escorted by forty guards. Approximately 300 troops of Commander Yang attacked the truck at Ta-ts'o-ch'ao-kou. The insurgents surrounded the guards and attacked them by surprise from high ground.

MEANS OF OBTAINING WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER SUPPLIES

Supply of Weapons and Ammunition

Sometimes Japanese and Manchukuo troops, police, and security units are attacked for weapons and ammunition. Some weapons and ammunition are received from the general headquarters of the Red Army, which is located on the eastern border of Manchuria and the Soviet Union. A common practice is to purchase weapons and ammunition from the Manchukuo army, police, or security units. The purchases are made through local intermediaries by party officers or others who are dispatched to towns in disguise as farmers. One round of rifle ammunition is negotiated for 15 cents. Some influential insurgent groups such as that of Yang Ching-yü possess armories in their bases.

Supply of Daily Necessities

The Red Army cultivates opium poppies in the mountains to obtain funds; taxes are also collected from the residents in the vicinity of the base. The responsibility for purchase and transport of clothing and other items is delegated to the Farmers' Self-defense Unit, Anti-Japanese Society, or other satellite organizations. Uniforms are also obtained from captured Japanese and Manchukuo troops. Foodstuffs are voluntarily submitted by each household and collected through the paochia system. In order to prevent a shortage of food, sale of food outside the region is prohibited. Propaganda or liaison personnel in various cities and villages are used to purchase clothing, food, medicine, and other necessary items.

Other Information

The Red Army has personnel in charge of weapons and ammunition. It is reported that a directive of the Communist International contained a sentence stating: "The bandits [sic] in the eastern border region shall be supplied with weapons and ammunition to buttress their anti-Japanese and anti-Manchukuo activities."

ON PROPAGANDA

The Red Army's propaganda is conducted by propaganda agents in various cities and villages through speeches or posters. Their target is the general masses, particularly the young men and boys. Before spreading Communist propaganda, [the agents first] stress recovery of the lost territory [Manchuria], saving the nation, and love of the people. They also assert that the various security facilities in Manchukuo only enslave the people and do not bring happiness. After instilling anti-Manchukuo thoughts, [the

agents] speak in behalf of Communism. They assert that when the revolution is completed, land and properties will be equally divided and stability of livelihood will be guaranteed. The lower class residents are told that the activities of the Japanese and Manchukuo subjugation units should be reported swiftly and that rich rewards will be given to those who lead the Red Army into advantageous situations.

The following are examples of propaganda aimed at the general masses:

1. The poisoned fangs of the Japanese burglars have closed upon the three provinces in the northeast. For this reason, the masses in Manchuria have fallen into distress. The only ways to escape from the oppression of the Japanese devils are for the people to unite with the Northeastern Revolutionary Army, to drive out the Japanese devils, and to establish the Northeastern Government under freedom and equality.
2. Have you forgotten the fatherland? Why do you not resist the oppression of the Japanese government?
3. Why are you afraid of Japan? Wake up and fight for the fatherland and against Japan. We take up rifles to resist Japan.
4. You should organize anti-Japanese organizations as our supporters.
5. Our organization is spread throughout Manchuria. Our organization is truly devoted to the cause of opposing the Japanese and saving the nation, and we have great strength. Villagers, join

hands with our revolutionary army and swear to be anti-Japanese fighters. Otherwise we will burn the whole village down.

Propaganda agents gather the villagers and lecture to them on the propaganda topics given below. Leaflets are either distributed or posted on walls.

1. Young men should join our Red Army voluntarily, and the masses should unite and help us because the Red Army intends to recover Manchuria, destroy Japanese imperialism, and liberate the masses of Manchuria.
2. The Japanese imperialist army has already enslaved the farmers to repair the roads, burned small villages, and made the people live in collective hamlets. They are preparing to drop bombs from airplanes (on the hamlets) and slaughter the masses.
3. Manchuria is a part of China. We, the Save-the-Nation Army, are striving to destroy Manchukuo, which has been established by Japanese imperialism through burglar-like war, and to rescue the masses in Manchuria from distress and starvation. It is the duty of all Chinese, regardless of sex or age, to assist us.
4. The Japanese armies come to the countryside and harass the good people. They are the enemies of the people. The Communist Party is the true friend.
5. The only interest of the general Japanese population is to make money; they take all the properties of the masses to Japan.

6. We, the Communist Party, are an army of resistance to the Japanese and Manchukuo armies; we intend to recover Manchuria and return it to the masses of Manchuria. You, young men, should rise and act.
7. When Communism is established, the properties of the rich will be divided among the poor and the distinction between the rich and the poor will be eliminated. Only then, for the first time, will the people live in peace and enjoy their professions. Russians will come to Manchuria, and all of Manchuria will be communized. Peaceful Manchuria will be established through the power of Russia.

Theatrical Propaganda

Simple dramas are enacted to propagate ideas such as:

We, the Red Army, have engaged in many battles against the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police, and have disarmed many of them. There is no fit enemy for us. Look at the Manchukuo of today. Farmers are at the extreme of destitution. You should either join the Red Army or assist us.

Children and adults in Fusung Prefecture were coerced to attend the presentation of a drama on this theme.

Counterpropaganda

The following is an example of propaganda against the Japanese propaganda:

We have annihilated the Japanese and Manchukuo armies everywhere and captured many weapons. The fourth subjugation [or moving-up] operation of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies has been a failure and they have suffered great damages.

Propaganda against Manchukuo Army Troops

A recent example is a leaflet that was handed to a Manchukuo army soldier on July 21, 1936, about 8:00 a.m., as he was standing guard at Hsiao-wu-tao-kou in Liuho Prefecture. It was handed to him by a Korean. It was addressed "Dear company commander and all troops" and was signed by Feng Chien-ying, a representative of the anti-Japanese army. It advised the troops to revolt (against Manchukuo).

Source of Propaganda Funds

A representative of the Communist International, a Chinese, has entered Manchuria with a great amount of propaganda funds and delivered them to the revolutionary army.

Kinds of Propaganda Documents

1. Messages addressed to the troops of the Manchukuo army.
2. Messages addressed to the anti-Japanese officers and troops of the Wang Fêng-kê group.
3. Statements of repentance [from Manchukuo collaborators].
4. Messages addressed to all compatriots urging resistance to Japan and [the need to] save the nation.
5. Revolutionary songs.
6. Pronouncements of the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army.

Propaganda through Kidnapped Persons

Individuals have been kidnapped for the purpose of getting ransom money or filling the need for personnel. For various reasons, some of these people have returned.

Many propaganda materials are given to them, and they are forced to distribute the materials to their neighbors or spread them on roads.

Life of the Insurgents

FACILITIES AT THE BASE (MOUNTAIN STRONGHOLD)

Most of the insurgents have simply placed boards between trees in the forests and put up heated floors. Some of the bases, however, have elaborate facilities that include weapon repair shops, shops for the mending of clothing, and training centers for troops. Only a small number of Red Army insurgents are in the mountain strongholds; most of the large units roam the countryside. Using coercion, they requisition foodstuffs from local residents, through local activities units of the Anti-Japanese Society, and make them transport the food. The bases are located in the forests of M[^]engchiang, Chinch'uan, and Linchiang prefectures. It seems that bases are also located in Hangj[^]en, Hsingching, Tunghwa, and Kuantien prefectures.

VIGILANCE IN THE MOUNTAIN STRONGHOLDS

Because the mountain strongholds have simple facilities and limited capacities, most of the insurgents are stationed in the vicinity. For this reason surveillance is extended over a wide area; in some places three perimeters of guards are posted. Some troops disguised as farmers are used as lookouts. These lookouts maintain close communication and pay special attention to the discovery of the subjugation units.

ROAD MARKS

Each unit of the Red Army has a fixed territory for its activities and is familiar with local geography.

Sometimes, however, units are pursued beyond their territories. For these occasions, and for use at night, marks have been placed on the road.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POPULATION IN THE VICINITY OF THE BASE

The population in the base area in Mêngchiang, Chinch'uan, and Linchiang (Hangjên, Hsingching, Kuantien, and Tunghwa) tends to welcome the insurgents either because they have accepted the propaganda or because they wish to avoid injury from them. Some young men are voluntarily joining the insurgent groups. On the whole, the people have favorable feelings toward the insurgents and have been helping them. The power of the Red Army has spread among the masses far beyond expectation. The Anti-Japanese Society and the Anti-Japanese Farmers' Self-defense Unit are satellite groups of the Red Army. There is a strong tendency for the masses to rely on the insurgent groups for the protection of their lives and properties, because the power of the [Manchukuo] authorities does not extend to their area. The relationship between the insurgents and the people is very close and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other.

THE CREED OF THE INSURGENTS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF SECRETS

A Red Army officer has said: "We, the Communist Party members, fight on the conviction that we will never surrender to the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and will resist them to the last man." In other words, the creed of the Red Army is to recover Manchuria, destroy imperialism, oppose Manchukuo, resist Japan, and establish a Communist state. Considerable numbers of the troops, however, are uneducated or have joined the insurgents because

of unavoidable circumstances, and it is doubtful whether these truly believe in Communism.

Because many party members deserted or surrendered to the authorities after the Min-sheng-t'uan (or Minseidan) incident [mass purges within the party for alleged collusion with the Japanese government], the internal situation of the party is known to the authorities, and many plots have been uncovered by "white cells" [cells planted by the government security agencies], resulting in the sacrifice of a great number of comrades. Therefore, one or two agents are planted in each squad under the direction of political commissars to maintain secrecy. Secrets concerning party policies and the location of the party headquarters are closely guarded by the political commissars, and even the division commander is not informed of these secrets.

The following rules are enforced to maintain secrecy:

1. Major directives from the Soviet Union or Chinese Communist Party are to be known only among the officers and not to be shared with general members.
2. Those conspiring with the enemy and destroying the revolutionary organizations of the local masses are to be executed.
3. Those within the army who oppose revolutionary propaganda and organization by conspiring with the enemy shall be executed.

DAILY LIFE

The troops move from one friendly village to another and pay a fixed sum of money for food. They never engage in pillage. When an individual of pro-Japanese or

pro-Manchukuo conduct is discovered, however, he will be looted for that reason. To be prepared for staying in destitute villages, all troops carry a day's ration of rice, flour, or corn.

When troops are stationed in a village, an officer in charge of food will purchase grain (sometimes requisition by coercion) and have civilians cook the meal.

No salaries are paid to the troops. One yen each is distributed at the time of the New Year or other festival days.

The same food is provided to officers and men.

No recreation [is permitted].

All the captured goods (or acquired materials) are allocated for the unit's use or sold for military funds. A person is in charge of receiving and issuing these materials. Acquired grain is sometimes entrusted to members of the Farmers' Self-defense Unit or the Anti-Japanese Society for storage.

MILITARY SUPPLIES

Weapons and ammunition are either purchased from Manchukuo army and police units or obtained by disarming Manchukuo army, police, and self-defense units. Horses are purchased, requisitioned, or taken from farmers. Records of issue and supply of weapons and ammunition are kept by a person in charge. Weapons and horses that are issued to individual members are maintained by them. Some of the individuals join the insurgent groups with arms or horses.

FAMILIES

Some of the officers have [immediate] families, but these are left in their original homes in China or

elsewhere. Neither families nor mistresses accompany the group. Severe discipline regarding women is a characteristic of the Red Army. The reason for the severe prohibition against relations with women is that these relations lead to slackening of military discipline and this in turn leads to spiritual degradation and internal discord.

CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSION

Normally the insurgents operate in large groups, but at times of food shortage, or in order to avoid the brunt of attack by the Japanese and Manchukuo subjugation units, they divide into small units. But their area of activity is fixed and they rarely move out of their region. [For a slightly different version, see p. 330.]

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

At every available opportunity, the officers present problems in current affairs to their subordinates and guide their discussion. The educational and training policies are as follows:

1. Officers shall always weed out undesirable elements from the unit. Officers must also let the troops recognize the officers' authority and power.
2. Representatives of the party and the youth corps shall always assist the officers, study various problems together with the officers, and observe military rules more strictly than others.
3. Officers must pay very close attention to prevent the troops from beating or abusing the masses as the result of their severe training.
4. The troops should be conscious of class distinctions so that they may observe the regulations.

5. Everyone must understand that perseverance in the present hardships will lead to final victory.
6. Officers must thoroughly educate the troops by drawing on their own past experiences.

The following directives should be emphasized in the spiritual training of the recruits:

1. Let the recruits learn the revolutionary song to stimulate their "Oppose Japan and Resist Manchukuo" spirit.
2. The Japanese imperialists have burned the people's houses, plundered, and killed. Therefore, it is our duty to destroy Manchukuo and rescue the masses in Manchuria. We must persevere, whatever the hardship, for the sake of the Chinese masses.
3. Even if one stayed at home, one would spend a miserable life under the oppression of the Japanese army. It is the duty of the Chinese people to join our Save-the-Nation Army, recover Manchuria, and liberate the masses from enslavement by the Japanese army.

The following points are stressed in troop education: internal regulation of the army; suppression of counter-revolution; and harmonious relationship with the masses. There is no particular training in combat techniques.

THE CONTROL OF SUBORDINATES AND COMMANDERS

The officers use the following arguments to control subordinates and raise their morale:

1. Our resistance to the subjugation activities of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police is a kind of training.

2. When we carry out true war against the Japanese and Manchukuo, the Soviet Union will come to our aid.
3. Therefore we need not attack the Japanese and Manchukuo armies; it suffices to defend ourselves.
4. When Manchuria returns to our hands, we can all attain high positions [in government].
5. We are a proud army, saving the nation; everyone should work with pleasure in the light of this knowledge.

No special regulations are provided for reward and punishment. Those establishing distinguished records at the time of attack are reported to higher commanders by unit commanders or political officers and either receive promotions or are accepted into the party. No monetary rewards are provided. Violators of regulations are punished and reported to superior officers and political commissars. The worst transgressors are denounced before the troops and executed in secret locations; light transgressors are disarmed, relieved of military duties, and watched for a period. Quarrels among the troops are settled at the criticism meeting of the entire unit held under the unit's commander and political officer.

The death penalty is stipulated for desertion, pillage of residents' properties, rape, secret meetings with women, or informing on the condition of the unit [to the enemy]. Flogging or guard duties are prescribed for accidents caused by carelessness, loss of loaned goods, or destruction of weapons.

MISCELLANEOUS RED ARMY PROCEDURES

The villagers in the Red Army's base area are

notified of the arrival of the Red Army units through their liaison men, and they warmly receive the Red Army units with food and goods. The villagers also report the movements of the Japanese and Manchukuo armies so as to make the operations of the Red Army easier.

Various commanders of the Red Army keep staff diaries recording the battles and other operations. In a recent battle against Ch'eng Pin's unit, the subjugation unit found Ch'eng's staff diary on the body of a man who seemed to be an officer.

The Red Army holds party officers' meetings, party active elements' meetings, troop meetings, squad meetings, and military officers' meetings when they are encamped. They discuss and decide on policies toward the Japanese and Manchukuo armies and police, expansion and consolidation of their power, and purges of undesirable elements within their ranks. Leaders of other units sometimes join these meetings. Often some of the troops of the Red Army desert the ranks. The motives or psychological states of these deserters are not clear, but it is supposed that they feel their lives are in danger, are dissatisfied with the treatment accorded to them, or cannot bear the severe restrictions.

Affiliated Organizations of the Red Army

Because of the Red Army's skillful pacification of the ignorant farmers, most of the villagers in Hangjên, Kuantien, Tunghwa, and Hsingching prefectures maintain contact with the Red Army, for which they collect information about the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. On the other hand, they will not report information about the Red Army to the Japanese and Manchukuo forces. Thus, a close

relationship exists between the masses and the Red Army and it is difficult to differentiate between them. Some villagers have family members in the Red Army, and thus have a special relationship.

The organizations affiliated with the Red Army are as follows:

Anti-Japanese Farmers' Self-defense Unit This unit is under the command and guidance of Commander Ch'eng [First Division of the First Army]. The members are equipped with rifles and sticks. They wear the plain clothes of farmers. Their duties are to collect and transport foodstuffs, collect information, facilitate communication, and give general assistance to the Red Army. They also engage in the subjugation of small bandit groups.

Anti-Japanese Society. This organization has similar functions to those of the Farmers' Self-defense Unit. Its members are farmers, laborers, and merchants. They receive assistance from the Farmers' Self-defense Unit.

Chuang-chia-hui. This group has similar functions to those of the Anti-Japanese Society. Details are unknown.

Pao-kuo-hui [Save-the-Nation Society]. This group collects fixed amounts of money from the members and assists the insurgent groups' operations.

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