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INSURGENT TERRORISM AND ITS USE BY THE VIET CONG (U)

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REVIEW ON _____



The American University

CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

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
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(U) Figure 1. South Vietnam

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INSURGENT TERRORISM AND ITS USE BY THE VIET CONG (U)

by
Norman A. LaCharité

July 1969

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(U) FOREWORD

(U) GENERAL

(U) This is a study of terrorism as it was practiced by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam from 1963 through 1966. The experience of its predecessor, the Viet Minh, helped to refine Viet Cong terrorist operations, and the latter has had many years in which to develop expertise in the area. The study usually is concerned with only two aspects of Viet Cong terrorism: those Viet Cong actions which can be described as terrorist acts, and the nonmilitary targets against which such actions were directed.

(U) Throughout recorded history, terror—that is, the use or threat of violence—has been used to achieve political objectives. Insurgents have used terrorism to disrupt, paralyze, and isolate governments from the general population, and governments have used it to suppress insurgents, control populations, and deter antigovernment activities. As used by the Viet Cong, terrorism is one of a set of related tactics, others being attacks, ambushes, and harassment of military and other security forces, sabotage, and propaganda.

(U) VIET MINH AND VIET CONG TERRORISM

(U) The tactical use of terrorism by the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh before them has reflected the changing strategic and tactical considerations—both in general and in specific locales—since the end of World War II. In their war against French security forces, the Viet Minh forces usually limited themselves to intimidating local administrators, but Viet Cong terrorists have been eliminating local government and police officials, youth leaders, teachers, civilians, and representatives of the central government.

(U) The main objectives of these acts have been similar. Foremost, of course, has been the unification of Vietnam under Communist rule. Both the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong first attempted to disrupt normal government services and operations, then tried gradually to insulate the central authority from direct contact with the masses, and finally, as they gained the capacity to do so, undertook to exercise partial or complete control over local populations. Throughout, certain types of terrorism apparently have been used to obtain support from local populations and to recruit personnel.

(U) U. S. ASSISTANCE

(U) As part of their responsibilities, the national and the military police of South Vietnam have sought to detect and prevent all threats to the security of the country. With the assistance of the United States, the government of South Vietnam has been developing plans to counter the actions of the Viet Cong and to maintain internal security.

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(U) PLAN OF THE STUDY

(U) The major findings drawn from the study and their implications for counteroperations appear in the Summary, for those readers who have time and interest for only a quick examination.

(U) Part I contains two introductory chapters. In Chapter 1, "Objectives and Methodology," a few of the major terms are explained, the potential contributions of the study in relation to the sponsoring agency are mentioned, and the general approach is outlined. In Chapter 2, "Conceptual and Historic Considerations," the findings of various studies on terrorism are presented, uses of terrorism are fixed within a conceptual model, and the extent to which the Vietnam case resembles the model is discussed.

(U) In Part II the patterns and characteristics of Viet Cong terrorism are discussed. In Chapter 3, actions and targets are analyzed, and in Chapters 4 and 5 patterns and characteristics are related to political events; national and religious holidays; military developments; seasonal cycles and agricultural activities; and communications development, population concentration, and geographic considerations.

(U) There is, in addition, an Appendix, where the basic data on which the study is based appears in tabular form.

(U) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

(U) Special assistance has been provided by many individuals during the preparation of this study. Among these are Mr. Ralph Swisher, a member of CRESS, who spent hours helping to prepare the data for analysis, and Mr. Marshall Andrews who acted as consultant. Appreciation is also extended to colleagues and members of the Review Committee who read the manuscript and offered suggestions.

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(C) SUMMARY (U)

(U) PROBLEM

(U) The purpose of this study is to ascertain the patterns and characteristics of Viet Cong use of terrorism directed at nonmilitary targets and to clarify relationships between these patterns and characteristics and other situational factors in order to optimize U.S. military response to such insurgent operations in Vietnam and possibly elsewhere.

(C) FACTS (U)

(U) Definition of Terrorism

(U) The term "terrorism" is used in this study to refer to overt acts involving the use or threat of violence that are designed to influence political behavior. The main characteristic of terrorism as it is treated in this study is the use of violence against nonmilitary persons or installations—generally in such a way as to avoid losses to the Viet Cong. Terrorism specifically includes harassment and harassing fire against hamlets and certain classes of individuals, detonation of mines—aside from specific military action—in the path of persons or vehicles; deliberate killings other than as part of a military action; assassination of government officials; and the forcible capture of one or a group of civilians. The general fear inspired by the presence of the Viet Cong and the continuous threat of violence are not included in the study.

(U) Assumptions

(U) Although no attempt is made to generalize from single cases, it is reasonable to assume that the findings of this study will have some general application. Because of similar historical backgrounds, the environmental conditions of countries in Southeast Asia as well as in other parts of the world are comparable. Therefore, insurgencies in these countries usually have some common features, especially in the modes of insurgent operations. In the event that the leadership in North Vietnam continues to influence the development of insurgencies in other parts of Southeast Asia—for example, in Thailand and Laos—there is little doubt that the experiences of the struggle in Vietnam will be used.

(C) Data: Access and Weaknesses (U)

(U) The primary source of data for this study was the RVN data bank in Saigon. The data bank is based upon thousands of intelligence reports from the field, only some of which are concerned with Viet Cong-initiated incidents. Additional information was drawn from a variety of sources, both classified and unclassified. Information on political events and on military developments was compiled primarily from "Deadline Data on World Affairs" and The New York Times Index. Other sources of information included the Cultural Information Analysis Center (CINFAC) of CRESS, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, The RAND Corporation,

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Research Analysis Corporation, Human Sciences Research, Inc., and open official and unofficial U.S. and Vietnamese reports.

(U) The overriding difficulties of analyzing reported incidents of Viet Cong terrorism were associated with access to the data and to data processing facilities. As an outside contract agency, under existing procedures CRESS must go through channels that delay both acquisition and computer processing of material. While an initial effort usually suffers from greater delays than might be experienced by subsequent ones, the quickest response to a simple and limited data request for this study took approximately one month. The problems of getting both the data and computer facilities cleared to handle classified data limited the initial analysis to a minimum of data and computer service. Additional questions that were generated by an examination of the data could not be quickly referred to the computer for answers.* If such analyses were desired on a continuing basis, it would be feasible only if adequate access to the data and to a computer was available.

(C) There is another and perhaps more serious problem directly related to this study, and that is the criticism directed toward the RVN data with respect to its reliability. Most of this criticism is leveled at the limited scope, accuracy, and potential utility of studies based on the RVN data. For this study, one of the more serious deficiencies of these data was the fact that definitions of actions and targets were neither specific enough nor strictly adhered to at every step of the collection and coding process. Therefore, categories of actions and targets are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the military observer must rely on an after-the-fact inquiry on specific Viet Cong incidents; this often results in conflicting testimony from participants or on-the-scene observers. The identification of the type of Viet Cong action rests purely on the judgment of the military observer; and since the operational differences between Viet Cong actions may be slight, they may not always be seen. If in one incident the Viet Cong used a combination of several techniques—for example, attack, terrorism, and propaganda—the military observer may report only on what are to him the most significant aspects of the incident, leaving out some information. Finally, there is evidence that the level of insurgency at any one period also affects the types of incidents reported. Thus, a high level of intense activity during a series of offensives may result in failure to report fully on low level incidents, with which this study is concerned.

(U) Nevertheless, the RVN data are still the best available source of systematically collected information on Viet Cong incidents.

(U) Methodology

(U) The frequency of Viet Cong use of terrorism from 1963 through 1966, countrywide and in five selected provinces, was mapped out and correlated with political, military, social, climatic, communications, population, and geographic factors. The analysis aimed specifically at ascertaining the patterns and characteristics of Viet Cong use of terrorism against nonmilitary targets and relating them to major political events, military developments, national and religious holidays, seasonal cycles, agricultural activities, population concentrations, communications development, and geographic considerations. In no way were these factors considered the causes of the use of terrorism; they are considered to be occasions and locations.

* (U) This problem results from CRESS' status as a contract agency.

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(C) MAJOR FINDINGS (U)

(C) Viet Cong terrorism against nonmilitary targets, on a countrywide basis, increased until July 1964 and then followed a gradual downward trend until the end of 1966. Presumably, the Viet Cong lessened their terrorist actions in favor of larger field operations and redirected their energies to military targets in answer to the influx of U. S. and Allied forces.

(C) Nationwide fluctuations in Viet Cong terrorism seem to have recurred during the same months in each of the selected years. Totals declined in December and January of each year. A more drastic decline in activities occurred during the summer of each year. The total tended to pick up sharply at the end of summer, usually in September.

(C) The direction and frequency of terrorism varied from province to province. In two of the five provinces selected for this study the trend paralleled that at the national level: upward to July 1964 and then downward. In another, the trend was downward through 1965, but leveled off in 1966 and remained relatively stable through the end of that year. In two other provinces, the trend was downward after July 1964, but was on the incline in 1966.

(C) Harassing fire and harassment, two of the most usual types of Viet Cong terrorist actions, set the general pattern for terrorist actions against nonmilitary targets. Both normally involve larger Viet Cong units than other types of terrorist actions, but smaller units than are needed for attacks and ambushes. Combined, they outnumbered by far the countrywide total of all other types of terrorist actions. Kidnaping, assassination, mining, and bombing followed in descending order of frequency and with some variation from province to province.

(C) Alterations in the pattern of Viet Cong targets over the four-year period suggest apparent changes in Viet Cong strategy. Countrywide, actions directed against government officials, both local and national, accounted for the larger part of the Viet Cong effort early in 1963. These gave way to actions against New Rural Life (NRL)* hamlets in the middle of that year, and by November, when the government of Ngo Dinh Diem fell, such actions accounted for nearly 70 percent of total terrorist actions against nonmilitary targets. Actions directed at the NRL hamlets gradually decreased from February 1964 so that by the end of 1966 they accounted for five percent or less of the total. Meanwhile, as actions against government officials and NRL hamlets decreased, those against civilians began to increase gradually from April 1964 and, during 1966, accounted for 46 to 68 percent of total terrorist actions. Concurrently, actions directed against civilian structures such as houses, schools, churches, and civil facilities increased, but accounted for a relatively smaller percentage of total actions. These patterns varied from province to province.

(C) Increases in monthly totals of Viet Cong terrorist incidents generally were reported during the months when successful military coups took place, when national and provincial elections were held, when tribal revolts in the Central Highlands occurred, and when the government introduced the Open Arms campaign and offered pardons to members of the Viet Cong.

(C) Monthly totals went down during months when the government declared a state of emergency or imposed martial law, when a new government was formed or changes in the existing government were introduced, and when important official pronouncements were made. Whenever martial law was lifted, however, there was an increase in the rate of Viet Cong

* (C) This was the name given to strategic hamlets after General Khanh's coup in January 1964.

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terrorism. No apparent upswing in Viet Cong terrorism was noticeable during months when the country experienced civil disturbances such as demonstrations, strikes, or riots, even when these were intensified by street fighting. One may conjecture that at least some of these civil disturbances were manifestations of Viet Cong involvement, and that in other instances the Viet Cong failed to take advantage of situations characterized by political instability and mass confusion because security forces were alerted.

(C) When the relationship between the rate of terrorism and prominent national and religious holidays and commemorative days established by the Viet Cong is analyzed, the results are inconclusive. Approximately half of the months in which these special days were celebrated experienced increases in Viet Cong terrorism; the other half experienced decreases. Trung Nguyen (Wandering Souls day), which in all four years under study was celebrated in August, is the only such event that was accompanied by a consistent decrease in the monthly total of Viet Cong terrorism; however, in August of two of the four years—1963 and 1964—the government imposed martial law or declared a state of emergency, which may have accounted for the decrease. And finally, in spite of the cease-fire agreed upon by both sides, Tet and Christmas have been celebrated in months during which the rate of terrorism went up. Generally, the agreed-upon cease-fire apparently did result in a drop in reported incidents during the celebrations, but this drop was more than compensated for in the several weeks prior to the celebrations when Viet Cong units increased their activities.

(C) There is some indication that during months when Allied forces* or Viet Cong units conducted large-scale military operations, terrorist activities were stepped up either in the provinces where these operations were being conducted, in nearby provinces (in the same Viet Cong military region), or in both. In most instances these actions were directed against civilians. Even when the rate of Viet Cong terrorism did not rise, it was redirected from installations to persons, especially civilians. Two factors—the mobilization of local inhabitants into work platoons in support of Viet Cong operations and the enforcement of population control measures to ensure that civilians did not contribute to the effort of Allied forces—explain in part the rise or redirection of actions against civilians.

(C) Judging by data from two provinces, there may be a relationship between seasonal and agricultural cycles and Viet Cong terrorism. In Vinh Binh, the Viet Cong appear to have increased terrorist activities during the rainy season. Terrorist activities were sometimes stepped up also during dry periods coinciding with idle months for agricultural laborers. In September and October, when waterways normally overflow and inundate wide areas, terrorist activities decreased. In Gia Dinh, the Viet Cong followed a pattern similar to the one they followed in Vinh Binh: in 1964 and 1965, terrorist operations were increased during the rainy seasons and harvest times. However, the pattern changed in 1966 and high incident rates were reported in dry as well as in wet months.

(C) The areas selected by the Viet Cong for terrorist operations usually have had well-developed roadways and waterways and populations of about 1,000 inhabitants per square mile. The speed and efficiency required to conduct some operations, the advantages of conducting them in densely populated areas so that the effect on civilian activities is more widespread, and the cover provided Viet Cong agents by population concentrations all contribute to the selection of areas of operations.

* (C) For the sake of clarity, the term "Allied forces" will be used instead of "friendly forces." It refers to all forces fighting on the side of the Republic of Vietnam.

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(C) OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (U)

(C) Insurgency (U)

(C) The Viet Cong actions analyzed in this study were small scale, designed not so much to defeat the enemy in the field and gain physical control over land masses, as to undermine supporting structures and use the resulting disorientation to influence the political behavior of the rural villager. The units used for these activities were relatively small: in 1964 and early 1965 they usually ran from ten to 25 members, depending upon the type of operation. Terrorist operations were conducted in open areas with well-developed communications systems and relatively large concentrations of people, rather than confined to difficult terrain. These operations never became so routine or stereotyped that the element of surprise, a major ingredient of success, was lost.

(C) Terrorist activities were not necessarily conducted by sections of the Viet Cong organization specifically assigned to terrorism. The Viet Cong main force was just as likely to employ terrorism to requisition supplies and recruits from the local inhabitants as were detachments. In large part, however, the operations usually fell within the purview of the village militia, which includes guerrillas, self-defense forces, and secret self-defense forces. Under the control of the party chapter committee, these local Viet Cong units, after evaluating current political and military situations in their areas, planned and rehearsed in detail all aspects of their operations. Directives from higher authority earmarked targets against which a certain monthly quota of actions were to be directed. The person in charge of the operation normally did the evaluating and planning.

(C) The relationship between an increase or decrease in Viet Cong terrorism and the success or nonsuccess of the guerrilla movement is not clear. Ordinarily, terrorist operations decline when field operations predominate, signifying perhaps the progress of the insurgent movement from an earlier stage to a later one. The countrywide military situation in South Vietnam during 1965 and 1966 did change significantly, as the size of the Allied forces and their field of operations grew: the Viet Cong increasingly resorted to major field operations, and terrorism against nonmilitary targets was less frequently used. Locally, however, there are indications that the Viet Cong increased terrorist operations concurrently with large military operations to mobilize the inhabitants into labor platoons or to prevent them from contributing to the effort of the enemy.

(C) Three characteristics of Viet Cong operations are worth noting: mobility, dispersion of forces, and population control. One way in which Viet Cong units appear to have maintained high mobility was by operating in areas with well-developed communications systems. The availability of major roadways and waterways appears to have eliminated the need to operate under the cloak of darkness; in some areas, the Viet Cong conducted as many operations during the daytime as at night, striking and withdrawing along main routes before Allied units could react.

(C) Viet Cong terrorist units do not appear to have been widely dispersed, moving from base to base to avoid detection and capture, but instead operated in the same general area over extended periods of time. Unlike insurgents in other cases, the Viet Cong terrorists did not shun mass contact. They did, however, avoid pitched battles even with responding civil guard units.

(C) To ensure support and cooperation, the Viet Cong exercised a great deal of control over the local population. This in the past has included violent action, threats, organization,

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and regimentation. In 1962 and 1963, civilians presumably voluntarily supported the Viet Cong, and so less terrorism was necessary to keep them under control. After 1964, when the Viet Cong began to expand their control over contested areas, terrorist actions were used against civilians. Again, when controlled areas were so secure that they no longer felt it necessary to rely on voluntary support from the people, terrorism was used to keep the population passive. It has also been general Viet Cong practice to forcibly recruit local inhabitants into Viet Cong work platoons and to take supplies by coercion, when necessary.

(C) Counterinsurgency (U)

(C) The operational role of government military forces in South Vietnam in countering terrorist activities against nonmilitary targets includes population and resources control, as well as normal police functions. Securing operations should be appropriate to areas in which the following conditions obtain: company-size or larger Viet Cong units have been eliminated; friendly forces are available in sufficient strength to prevent the intrusion of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese main forces; and the R and D cadres are working to establish administrative units and to eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure. The overall objectives should include denying Viet Cong terrorists the opportunity to exploit local inhabitants and providing these inhabitants, their communities, their installations, and their lines of communications the protection they need to conduct their everyday activities. Combined operations employing civil police, military police, and small tactical forces could perhaps best achieve these objectives.

(C) Success against Viet Cong terrorism would depend in large part upon having superior mobility. This should be possible, since the Viet Cong depend on well-developed roadways and waterways and operate where terrain does not limit movement, observation, communications, and control. Only in a few places would extensive improvisation be necessary. Use of watercraft, which offer good maneuverability in delta provinces such as Vinh Binh, is feasible. Inland waterways are plentiful, so that both armored amphibious vehicles and gunboats can be used effectively. Terrorist operations against nonmilitary targets along lines of communications have normally harassed and delayed the use of waterways, rather than denied them altogether.

(C) The employment of civil forces, such as government and key civil administrators, civil police, local police, special police, self-defense forces, teachers, and guides, would minimize the requirement for military units and provide counterforces with intelligence of Viet Cong operations and movements.

(C) The attention of counterterrorists should be focused upon the following targets of the Viet Cong: civilians, civilian structures and installations, and government officials, including police. Viet Cong terrorists increasingly resorted to large-scale coercion of civilians after April 1964. Since then civilians have been frequent targets, especially during local and national elections or large military operations. It may be necessary for Allied units to force civilian cooperation with government counterinsurgent programs. Although this may at first appear counterproductive, it provides civilians an opportunity and excuse to deny insurgent demands—and many civilians were forced to contribute to the Viet Cong effort to begin with.

(C) Whenever civilians must be protected, so must structures and installations. A rise in the number of actions against individual civilians has often been accompanied by a similar rise against civilian installations. Civilian installations are vital to normal activities, and especially local and central government officials. The requirement of logistical support of civilians and rehabilitation of these installations involve the use of engineer construction units.

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(C) PART I. INTRODUCTION (U)

(C) CHAPTER 1

OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY (U)

(U) The principal objective of this study is to help the Office of The Provost Marshal General (OTPMG) and other interested agencies anticipate the occasions, locations, and varieties of Viet Cong terrorism. In general, the report should assist the OTPMG in evaluating doctrine and programs of instruction related to problems of internal defense and development; more specifically, it should serve as background for school instruction, and it can be incorporated into training literature or used as reference material for future studies in this problem area.


(U) BACKGROUND

(U) The study is partially based upon discussions between the OTPMG and the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) that began in the mid-1960's. Because of changes in research personnel, availability of data, and requirements, the study has gone through several phases. Initially, it was to focus on terror—conceptualized as a state of mind induced by certain types of acts, including assassinations, bombings, and threats. The study was to be concerned primarily with the theoretical and historical aspects of terror and effective countermeasures; hypotheses and a program of possible countermeasures were to be developed using data from Vietnam, Malaya, Palestine, Colombia, and Venezuela. A second part of the study was to be concerned with developing possible programs of countermeasures to be carried out experimentally in an area experiencing violence, including terror.

(U) Later, a new research strategy was planned to focus upon Viet Cong terrorism. The basic approach was to ascertain the patterns and characteristics of Viet Cong terrorism and to relate them to other factors through multiple factor correlation techniques. It was assumed at the time that since the basic data required for the study were available in the Republic of Vietnam data bank at CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii and were already abstracted, coded, and stored on magnetic tapes, machine analysis could be utilized. It was also assumed that sets of instructions for programming the analysis were already available and little or no programming time or expense would be needed. Because terrorism is not the only insurgent technique used by the Viet Cong, it was decided that it should be studied within the framework of the total set of techniques. Information about Viet Cong attacks, ambushes, sabotage, and propaganda as well as terrorism was required to provide a total view of the Viet Cong effort to undermine the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(U) Serious problems of access to data and computer time arose, and so a much less ambitious research strategy was finally established in the spring of 1967, setting forth the guidelines for the present study.

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(U) Figure 2. RVN Subdivisions and Corps Areas

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(C) SOURCES OF DATA (U)

(U) The primary source of data for this study was the RVN data bank in Saigon. This data bank includes thousands of intelligence reports originating in the field, only some of which are concerned with Viet Cong-initiated incidents. These reports are abstracted, translated into a coding system, and stored in magnetic files. The computer printouts received from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through the cooperation of the Operations Analysis Section at CINCPAC Headquarters in Hawaii contain monthly totals of reported Viet Cong-initiated terrorist actions and the targets against which these actions were directed during the period from 1963 through 1966 for all of South Vietnam and for five selected provinces.

(C) The data received from DIA were augmented by additional RVN data received through the cooperation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in the Department of Defense. The additional information included not only actions and targets but also the location of reported incidents and the dates and time of day on which the incidents were initiated. The information was derived from a sample of incidents reported in Binh Dinh and Tay Ninh provinces during 1965 and 1966.

(U) Other information was drawn from a variety of sources both classified and unclassified. Major political events and information on military developments were compiled primarily on the basis of "Deadline Data on World Affairs" and The New York Times Index. National and religious holidays were derived primarily from A U.S.-Vietnamese Calendar of Holidays and Celebrations in Viet Nam. Information on geography, climate, agricultural activities, and population concentrations was drawn from open official and unofficial U.S. and Vietnamese sources. The Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, The RAND Corporation, Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), and Human Sciences Research, Inc., all have made some effort to analyze RVN data and have published classified studies that have been used.

(U) METHODOLOGY

(U) The overall approach used in the analysis of the data can best be described as clinical. It is analogous to the way that a doctor explains a patient's illness. He takes into account all of the relevant factors to determine which of these best explains the illness. The research process itself consisted of distributing all the information on particular incidents of Viet Cong-initiated acts of terrorism along a time dimension, portraying the levels* of terrorist acts, the dates of selected political and social events, phases of the military situation, and dates of the various seasons and agricultural activities. It included mapping the approximate locations of selected samples of incidents and describing peculiarities of the locations where these incidents occurred.

(U) Viet Cong terrorism is analyzed at the national level and in the five selected provinces of Thua Thien, Binh Dinh, Tay Ninh, Gia Dinh, and Vinh Binh (see Figure 2). The basis for selection varies. Aside from geographical distribution, each of these provinces has certain unique characteristics that make it interesting for this analysis. Thua Thien, situated between Quang Tri and Quang Nam, is one of the northernmost provinces in South Vietnam. Most of its population of over 400,000 is settled on a coastal strip that makes up approximately one-third of the province. During 1965 and 1966, only a few isolated enclaves were Viet Cong-controlled. Hue, the ancient imperial capital and the seat of classical Chinese culture and learning, is located in Thua Thien and is one of the few cities with a population of over 100,000.

* (U) Level here refers to the numerical factor and not intensity.

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It is the center of Buddhist learning and the site of many Buddhist rebellions which, on occasions from 1963 through 1966, reached violent proportions. Hue is also the northernmost base in the Allied military coastal supply system.

(U) Binh Dinh, a coastal province south of Thua Thien, has been one of the key provinces throughout the struggle against the Viet Cong. It was one of the first areas that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem attempted to take over from the Communists, and it was one of the provinces in which the Viet Cong continually disrupted pacification efforts. The province is the largest in terms of population and in the middle 1960's experienced an influx of refugees passing through toward the city of Qui Nhon. The Viet Cong successfully kept control over the larger part of Binh Dinh until troops from the Republic of Korea arrived. The Korean troops, who excelled in close combat by combining counter guerrilla operations and effective civic action, turned the province into one of the most peaceful in South Vietnam.

(U) Tay Ninh, which lies northwest of Saigon and borders on Cambodia, is both the center of the Cao Dai faith and headquarters for the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The latter is also known as the Military Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party and has a direct tie with the Lao Dong in North Vietnam. The Cao Dai have been less receptive than most South Vietnamese to Communist agitation, and they have been subjected to less Viet Cong harassment than inhabitants in other parts of South Vietnam. The Viet Cong in Tay Ninh gave up or lost control, leaving much of the province unoccupied by either force in 1966. The upper portion of Tay Ninh has been designated War Zone C.

(U) Gia Dinh Province surrounds the city of Saigon and has the largest concentration of population in South Vietnam. A large number of Catholic refugees moved down from the North to the Saigon-Cholon area after Vietnam was partitioned in 1954. It is the center of both government and commerce in South Vietnam. MACV headquarters are located in Saigon, and the surrounding area has many large military installations. The province has been designated Special Zone by the Allied Forces and Special Sector by the Viet Cong Forces.

(U) Vinh Binh is a coastal province southeast of Saigon. Nearly surrounded by water, during the peak of the rainy season it is flooded. Most of the hamlets and villages, as well as some of the larger district towns, are connected by streams and canals rather than by roads. It is almost a necessity to conduct the war in Vinh Binh by watercraft. This delta province is extremely fertile, and approximately 80 percent of its land is under cultivation. At planting and harvesting times the local guerrillas are busily employed with farm work. The Viet Cong maintained their control of the larger part of Vinh Binh during 1965 and 1966.

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(U) CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORIC CONSIDERATIONS

(U) A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON TERRORISM

(U) A brief survey of selected unclassified sources dealing with the concepts of terrorism* and its explicit and implicit theories indicates that there has been no systematic survey of this field. This is not surprising, because political violence, including terrorism, has been investigated very little until recently. Some tentative generalizations about threats and terror have been suggested in the classical and modern literature of political and social thought, and historical and journalistic accounts of the use of terrorism are by no means rare. However, in large part these works are descriptive, seldom making explicit the principles and processes at work. Thus, there are few studies that can provide scholars of political violence with guidelines for analyzing the many aspects of terror.

(U) In the general area of internal warfare, both T. P. Thornton and E. V. Walter have written essays† that are necessary reading. These essays complement each other in that one deals with insurgent use of terrorism while the other centers on the incumbent use of terrorism. "Document on Terror" also provides useful ideas on the analytical as well as on the operational levels. It not only employs the systems approach of identifying the various elements actually or potentially involved in the terror process but includes practical suggestions for the use of apparently time-tested terrorist acts. A careful reading of the entire "Document" is recommended since only its high points have been included in this study.

(U) Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to thoroughly explore those psychological and sociological phenomena which, although not involving terrorism, have similar patterns and characteristics. Several works on the effects of war, strategic bombings, and prisoner-of-war and concentration camps on individual behavior illustrate this type of phenomenon. The individual disorientation and social disorganization occasioned by war, strategic bombings, prisoner-of-war and concentration camps are comparable to the effects of terrorist acts.

(U) Most of the works on terrorism have emerged as byproducts of studies on internal war situations and totalitarian systems. The works† of Brian Crozier, James Cross, Andrew Janos, Colonel de Rocquigny, John Sorenson, Roger Spegele, Roger Trinquier, and Eqbal Ahman all make some attempt to indicate the role of terrorism in insurgencies and revolutionary warfare and to assess its positive and negative aspects. Cyril Black and Thomas Thornton, Bernard Fall, Lucian Pye, and Douglas Pike have much the same aims in studying specifically the Communist use of insurgent techniques. Y. S. Brenner's essay on the Stern Gang in Palestine also makes an important contribution in the same direction.

* (U) Although the word "terrorism" is used consistently in this study, it is recognized that "terror" and "terrorism" are used interchangeably by many scholars. Thornton writes that the word "terror" has two meanings: the first is an induced state of fear or anxiety, and the second is the tool that induces the state of being terrified.¹ The focus of this study is on the second.

† (U) Those listed in the Bibliography at the end of the study.

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(U) The works of Hannah Arendt, E. K. Bramstedt, Leo Lowenthal, Barrington Moore, Kurt Reizler, and Ezra Vogel represent only a small sample of the literature on totalitarian systems and the institutionalization of instruments of social control. Bramstedt's small work is particularly interesting in that it includes case studies on the structure and function of secret police organizations and some background on the personal characteristics of the individuals who organized and led them.

(U) The direction that various studies on terrorism will take is not yet clear. E. V. Walter suggests that to reveal the various shapes and roles of terrorism in their full complexity, a broad, unrestricted, comparative approach—that would include the works of ancient as well as modern writers covering several or more cultures—is required. Few scholars other than Walter have made meaningful contributions to that effort.

(U) PROPOSITIONAL STATEMENTS

(U) The following propositional statements are drawn from a wide variety of sources and give some indication of the relationship between terror or terrorism and other factors. They are, in a manner of speaking, the "lessons learned" from a review of the literature and suggest the general outlines of a slowly growing field of study. Apparent inconsistencies reflect the conflicting views of the authors. These statements are organized into seven categories with subdivisions:

1. Contexts: Social Conditions and Social Change Processes
2. Social Groups and Social Institutions:
 - Occupational and Demographic Groups
 - Generalized Actors, Status Groups, and Institutionalized Functions
 - Actors by Position or Activity; Organizations by Dominant Purpose
3. Characteristics of Groups and Institutions:
 - Organizational Characteristics, Requirements, and Capabilities
 - Perceptions, Values, Objectives, and Political Orientation
 - Psychological States and Orientations
4. Conflict and Activities: Conflict Situations, Events, and Activities
5. Revolutionary Process: Dynamics, Types, and Outcomes of Revolutions
6. Communications: Activities and Instruments
7. Nonsocial Elements

(U) Contexts: Social Conditions and Social Change Processes

(U) In the following statements attention is directed to the relationship between terrorism and the conditions of social change manifested by industrialization and the development of mass society. In some statements, mass society is closely associated with social disorganization, which usually implies a relative decline in the incumbent's control vis-a-vis the insurgent's. Mobilization, integration, and social advancement are considered parts of the change.

Institutionalized violence is a consequence of rapid social change that fails to provide the opportunity for the development of independent social groups, classes, associations, organizations, or institutions that can bring about multiple centers of power.²

Collective insecurity is related to the modern industrial society.³

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Terrorism is in general a product of mass society.⁴

Terror is related to modern civilization, especially to the pattern of the modern economy.⁵

Terror involves a number of forceful administrative devices used in an attempt to alter the structure of society from above: economic and social change that does not naturally evolve from changes in attitudes and social relationships must come about partly through the prodding use of terror.⁶

The primary aim of Nazi and Soviet systems of terror was the mobilization of the maximum powers of the state to produce social, economic, political, and cultural changes of a revolutionary nature.⁷

The civic function of terror can either be as a mechanism to prevent change or a reactionary device to bring back the community "to its original foundations."⁸

There are three general forms of terrorism. The first form is criminal terrorism. This form includes extortion, gangsterism, and brigandage, and it has no interest in changing the political or social order, or the private or moral law. The second form, social terrorism, is aimed primarily at the realization of a certain ideology or economic doctrine of a particular social group or nation—for example, anarchism, socialism, or communism. Political terrorism, the third form, is aimed at a change in the political order.⁹

Terror is directly associated with environmental conditions: out of mass poverty arises the pressure for economic betterment and so poverty sets the stage for violence. However, no new political system can be based on either violence or poverty.¹⁰

Terror, when it is designed to influence political behavior, aims at undermining the support structures of the regime and leaving the masses without centrally controlled political organizations. In this state of disorientation, the masses cast about in search of new political leadership.¹¹

The function of strategic terrorism is to weaken ties between the government and the people.¹²

The object of terrorism in Vietnam is to separate the general population from the existing sociopolitical system.¹³

Assassination of officials in Vietnam has been chiefly directed at eliminating the government apparatus; the disorientation that caused the physical and psychological separation of the rural villager from the government of Vietnam has been a byproduct.¹⁴

The state has at least four means available to control members of the population: intelligence, collective detention, intimidation, and elimination. The aim is to rid the state of potential revolutionary leaders so that the masses will have no one to follow but the state.¹⁵

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Governments are restricted to some extent in their means for controlling the population. Although they have at their disposal a wide variety of legitimate forms of violence that they can use to maintain order, if they resort to acts of terror their actions become illegitimate and leave the general population free to challenge the established political forms.¹⁶

Members of the general public that have been terrorized into supporting insurgents may welcome forced conformity to government regulations as an opportunity to deny the demands of the insurgents.¹⁷

The Emergency in Malaya became a peculiarly violent type of political struggle between the governmental authority and the Malayan Communist Party in their mutual attempts to affect the political behavior of the general population.¹⁸

The Viet Cong uses terrorism in Vietnam to gain and maintain control over the populace.¹⁹

The elimination of government officials in Vietnam has had two distinct results: first, the colleagues of assassinated officials become demoralized and the entire administrative network suffers; secondly, some obstacles to insurgent control are eliminated.²⁰

Terror is designed to influence political behavior in part by mobilizing the sympathy and support of certain classes of individuals.²¹

The Communists' rational use of terror underlies their entire efforts of political and military warfare in Vietnam. Their objective is to realize the integration of North and South Vietnam under one Communist regime.²²

Even a highly skilled system of "private" assassination is a weak weapon to use in the struggle for social advancement and eventually may hinder it.²³

(U) Social Groups and Social Institutions

(U) Few statements focus on the association between terrorism and social groups engaged in institutionalized functions. Those included here are concerned with social groups either as targets of terrorism or as opposition to the existing power structure.

(U) Occupational and Demographic Groups

(U) Few studies associate the use of threats and terror specifically with occupational and demographic groups, and even those few are largely concerned with the campaign directed against government officials and representatives in Vietnam.

The Viet Minh forces, during the French-Indochina war, usually limited themselves in their use of terror to the intimidation of local administrators. The new terrorists direct their often spectacular acts at local officials, security guards, village treasurers, and youth leaders.²⁴

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Early acts of Viet Cong terrorism in Vietnam were local and sporadic and consisted mainly of assassinations and kidnappings to eliminate local leadership.²⁵

In general, Viet Cong terror is directed against government officials—especially energetic and competent ones. Corrupt officials also frequently have been singled out as targets by the Viet Cong in order to please local inhabitants.²⁶

Very little terrorism in Vietnam has been directed toward the top level officials of the central government. Instead, terrorists have concentrated upon those middle and lower ranking officials who stand between the Viet Cong and their domination of the countryside.²⁷

Acts of group violence were a cohesive force among individuals of the working class in 19th-century Europe.²⁸

An uprising of the poor class against the wealthy class carries with it a much greater force than an uprising of the oppressed against the oppressors.²⁹

Viet Cong terrorism and other forms of violence have been directed primarily at persons who appear to be the enemies of the peasants, and outsiders, such as government officials and relatively wealthy peasants and outsiders collaborating with the government. The Viet Cong effort is intended to create an image of representing the poor peasants with action.³⁰

(U) Generalized Actors, Status Groups, and Institutionalized Functions

(U) The works reviewed give only brief attention to generalized actors (general population, members of groups, enemies of the movement), status groups (wealthy vs poor classes), and institutionalized functions (law enforcement, enforcement terror, police functions).

The number of individuals who take part in terrorist activities in an insurgency varies in direct proportion to the size of the population: a sparsely populated area requires fewer active terrorists.³¹

Terror is used more frequently against that part of the population that refuses to support the terrorist movement than against the active enemies of the movement.³²

Gaining an essential advantage over government authorities depends upon the success of a terrorist campaign that is directed toward the conquest of the population.³³

A degradation of the judicial process usually accompanies a reign of terror.³⁴

Enforcement terror is employed to bring the general population into line in the same manner that a parking ticket deters the offender from committing further traffic violations.³⁵

The function of a political police system is not so much law enforcement as it is the protection of a minority system of government.³⁶

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(U) Actors by Position or Activity; Organizations by Dominant Purpose

(U) Most of the writers who discussed actors in connection with the use of terrorism were primarily concerned with individuals or groups in opposition to the existing power structure. They also discussed government, security, and political organizations within the context of terrorism.

Terrorism is directed principally toward six major groups: racial or other minority groups, class enemies, social and parliamentary institutions, religious groups, foreigners, and political opponents.³⁷

Communist application of terror as a basic policy for the extermination of political opponents reached a wholesale level in Vietnam during 1957 and 1958.³⁸

Many incidents of terror in Vietnam are a part of a clear campaign directed against those who opposed the National Liberation Front (NLF).³⁹

The 1964 rise in Viet Cong terrorism was an indication of increased opposition to the Viet Cong by the people under Viet Cong control.⁴⁰

Removing undesirable political leaders, eliminating traitors, and making life unbearable for the enemy are the principal goals of terrorism.⁴¹

A terrorist is usually a part-time worker who operates in a small area around his residence, usually from a very weak position that is compensated for by a use of psychological warfare techniques.⁴²

Insurgents can be defined generally as an organization of persons and materials, aware of their aims, with sufficient materials at their disposal, who collectively comprise a physical and spiritual entity.⁴³

The terrorist of today can become the hero of tomorrow, but this provides no justification for terrorist activities; the end does not justify the means.⁴⁴

The terrorist is an individualist in his thinking; this individualism logically develops into spontaneous action that is often independent of the leadership's knowledge or approval. Spontaneous and independent action by the terrorist may have both good and bad effects on his organization. It is beneficial because it gives the organization a loose framework, so that an individual's capture by governmental authorities does not endanger the organization's survival. It is detrimental because the organization's leadership has no absolute control over the organization's actions.⁴⁵

Afrikaner intransigence in sub-Saharan Africa is forcing radical blacks to initiate campaigns of terrorism.⁴⁶

"Actors" in an incident of terrorism include the following: the person who commits the act, the victim, the members of the social group or class with which the victim identifies, and the neutral individuals who, while not directly affected by the incident, are aware of the incident (resonant mass).⁴⁷

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Victims who are at least potential supporters of the terrorists far outnumber the target victims of terrorism. ⁴⁸

Terrorism affects and conditions the behavior of the user as well as the victim. ⁴⁹

The entire population, not only the intended victims, becomes the target or object of terror. This occurs for several reasons. First, in order to eliminate those who oppose them, the terrorists must subject the entire population to terror. Second, for the terrorist the population is made up of supporters, passivists, and actual or potential opponents; the opponents must be destroyed and the passivists must be dominated. Third, if an opponent is operating incognito among members of a certain social group, then the entire group must be eliminated in order to ensure the destruction of the opponent. ⁵⁰

The purpose of the great purges of the Soviet Union was to check the abuses and incompetency of the Soviet bureaucracy. ⁵¹

With an efficient police apparatus, political dissenters are easily discovered and eliminated, especially when no overt political opposition or free expression is permitted. ⁵²

Terrorism is a method through which an organized group, faction, party, or movement attempts to achieve its avowed goals. ⁵³

The terrorist is a member of a specific arm of a political or military struggle; he operates under conditions of discipline, with an organization behind him, a clear objective ahead, and distinctive characteristics. ⁵⁴

Terrorists make up the insurgent organ that is partially or entirely charged with executing acts of terror. This organ is a separate unit only when executing its mission, however; in all other respects it remains an inseparable part of the total insurgent movement. ⁵⁵

The terrorist part of an organized insurgency need not be large in comparison with other elements of the organization, because a terrorist campaign can be conducted with as few as a dozen insurgents. ⁵⁶

Conspiratorial types of organizations generally use individual acts of terrorism. ⁵⁷

(U) Characteristics of Groups and Institutions

(U) Characteristics, requirements, and capabilities of social institutions (especially in the assertion of power and authority), sensory experiences, belief patterns, public opinion, value systems, attitudes, and psychological states of groups and individuals are related to terrorism in the following statements.

(U) Organizational Characteristics, Requirements, and Capabilities

(U) While characteristics, requirements, and capabilities have been viewed in many sources as principal considerations for the success or failure of incumbent or insurgent organizations, only a few have related these considerations to the use of threats and terror.

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The violence resulting from a group's reaction to inner dissension depends upon the intensity of the situation and peculiarities of the group structure. ⁵⁸

Terror is usually associated with tyrannical governments that function by using severe forms of indiscriminately applied punishments. ⁵⁹

Oppressive authority may be tolerated by some sectors of society because it operates against their enemies. ⁶⁰

A lack of absolute authority tends to generate terror. ⁶¹

Recent Viet Cong campaigns against the police were designed to destroy one of the government's symbols of authority. ⁶²

Ancient authors saw terror as a crucial part of a power system called tyranny. The tyrant, being driven by passion rather than reason, used terror to stop opposition to authority. ⁶³

The Viet Cong employ terror to emphasize the weaknesses of the government, discredit its power, and undermine its authority. ⁶⁴

Terrorism is absolutely indispensable when establishing a new power. ⁶⁵

An instrument for executing authority, terrorism includes all forms of compulsion and influence. ⁶⁶

There are two general types of terror: agitational terror or use of terror by insurgents, and enforcement terror or use of terror by incumbents. ⁶⁷

There is a correlation between the use of enforcement terror and organizational strength; the Viet Minh diminished its use of enforcement terror as it developed established strength. ⁶⁸

The primary function of terror as an institutional device for the enforcement of rules in the Soviet Union was to accelerate the momentum of the revolution. ⁶⁹

When insurgents do not possess the required capabilities for conventional or even unconventional military operations, they resort to terrorism. ⁷⁰

Aid from a foreign power is one of the most important conditions for the maintenance of insurgent terrorist activity. ⁷¹

Terror and its accompanying psychological responses appeared in prison camps, where individuals lost the continuity of their lifetime experiences. ⁷²

Fear of the unknown generates terror. Fear and terror both lessen when the unknown becomes known. ⁷³

Terror, developing from fear of the unknown, has disorienting effects. ⁷⁴

Fear of the unknown, leading to disorientation among the inmates of prison camps, left them in doubt about how to behave in the circumstances they faced. ⁷⁵

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(U) Perceptions, Values, Objectives, and Political Orientation

(U) Although few of the studies reviewed here generally stress physical considerations in their discussion of the use of threats and terror, most of them invariably wander into the non-physical plane including sensory experiences, images and beliefs, value systems, attitudes, and political orientation.

Communist doctrine does not advocate the use of violence in all situations. Communists use violence only when it seems the most promising means of achieving their goals. ⁷⁶

The Soviet purges, which generated widespread terror, were undertaken primarily to eliminate ideological differences. ⁷⁷

Urban terrorism can be used as a battleground; the two adversaries deliberately involve the entire population in order to convert it to their separate ideologies. ⁷⁸

Social terrorism is designed to bring about the realization of a certain ideology or a social or economic doctrine strongly held by a group or nation. ⁷⁹

In the third or formal stage of a revolutionary movement, a difference of opinion over salient issues often brings about a reign of terror. ⁸⁰

There is a relationship between terrorism and the climate of opinion in Vietnam. ⁸¹

Terrorism thrives only when a considerable portion of public opinion is favorably disposed toward terrorist aims. ⁸²

The Malayan Communist Party attempted, through the use of terror, to create a political vacuum among the Malayan Chinese which would force them to establish a community with a new set of political values. ⁸³

Strategic terrorism is used to change the social values of a society, while tactical terrorism is used to change the social norms of the society. ⁸⁴

Terrorist activities usually lie outside the norms of violent political agitation which are acceptable to society. ⁸⁵

Because acceptable norms of violent political agitation can change in a society, terrorism may appear to reflect the times. Loss of life means nothing when extended periods of death and destruction have made the population insensitive. ⁸⁶

In a police state, men often prefer the security of complete submission to the insecurity of expressing independent political attitudes. ⁸⁷

Terrorist activities are good general indicators of the social and political attitudes of the day. The extent of sympathy for the terrorists is a measure of the spread of revolutionary attitudes. ⁸⁸

In some situations the conflicting aspirations of incumbents and insurgents are of such a vital nature that neither will permit a resolution by constitutional means. These internal situations develop into extranormal types of violent political agitation, such as terroristic acts. ⁸⁹

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Terrorism may be defined as the use of violence for political ends. ⁹⁰

Terror must be directed toward an end beyond itself, usually political control. ⁹¹

The objective of the Viet Cong in Vietnam is the gradual elimination of direct contact between the central authorities and the masses. ⁹²

There are few cases where terror alone has been successfully used to attain a political aim. ⁹³

An immediate objective of the National Liberation Front's assassination campaign in Algeria was to enhance its prestige. This campaign was viewed by the Algerian masses as tangible proof of the organization's effectiveness, fearlessness, endurance, and fortitude. ⁹⁴

Use of violent methods in politics and diplomacy (international terrorism) is related to the rise of dictatorships. ⁹⁵

The Gestapo's enforcement of rules was an essential element in Nazi totalitarianism. ⁹⁶

Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are always committed in part to the use of physical and psychological terror. ⁹⁷

(U) Psychological States and Orientations

(U) Psychological effects and responses have been widely discussed in many of the studies reviewed here.

Terror may be described as a state of mind. The terrorist act itself determines the effect, but an act that terrorizes one individual may have a different effect upon another. In the process of terrorism, the terrorist act is the stimulus, and the response is the action or inaction pursued by the target individual when he perceives and interprets this act. "If the perception of the act leads to disorganized behavior such as hysteria or panic or the inability to take appropriate action, the individual is said to be in a state of terror." ⁹⁸

The emotional reaction, or psychic state, is one of the principal elements of the system of terror. ⁹⁹

Psychological responses to the atomic bombing of Japanese cities included disorganized behavior of individuals in the bombed cities. ¹⁰⁰

Prisoners in prisoner-of-war camps were uncertain as to how they should behave. ¹⁰¹

Terrorism may alienate significant portions of the masses from the insurgent movement, particularly if the socioeconomic institutions eliminated through terrorist acts are not replaced by the insurgents. ¹⁰²

High levels of alienation, inherent in insurgent groups that favor terrorism, predispose them to use terror and other violent activities. ¹⁰³

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The terrorist's faulty internalization of social values prevents him from overcoming the conflict between the objective world and his individual personality system. ¹⁰⁴

Individuals in concentration camps experienced personality breakdowns, developing a sense of hopelessness, apathy, and indifference. ¹⁰⁵

Apathy caused a breakdown in lines of authority within prisoner groups, and group cohesion tended to be destroyed. ¹⁰⁶

Chief emotional responses to the atom bombing in Japan were profound apathy and depression. ¹⁰⁷

Terror is in some measure an instrument of punishment; it is used indiscriminately to generate fear and paralyze any resistance to tyrannical regimes. ¹⁰⁸

The sudden shock of an overwhelming fear of death counts heavily in the effective use of terror as a political instrument. ¹⁰⁹

One aim of terrorism is to instill the sort of fear that leads eventually to conformity and obedience. ¹¹⁰

Terror induces fear, and fear deprives the individual of other spontaneous emotional or mental reactions. ¹¹¹

Fear generated through terrorism can sometimes create strong resistance to terrorist activities. ¹¹²

Chronic terror is likely to increase resistance. Under chronic terror, a population becomes accustomed to living in constant fear, adapts to it, and ultimately becomes immune to it. Thus, chronic terror eventually fails to create fear and instead creates a hatred of the terrorists. ¹¹³

Fright is one of the least lasting responses of terror. Danger perceived by frightened individuals can be fitted into a familiar pattern of past experiences, and the response is normally reasonable, logical, and predictable. ¹¹⁴

Fright is the response of individuals who might support, maintain, or identify with the targets of selective terrorism. ¹¹⁵

Many Japanese who underwent the atom bombing of their cities experienced intense terror, fright, and apprehensiveness. ¹¹⁶

Anxiety is a "middle-level" response, induced by fear of the unknown. Traditional norms of behavior have no relevance in a state of anxiety. The victim becomes socially disoriented, "casting about for guidance." Despair is a far-reaching and extreme response to terror. It is a result of intensified anxiety, when no course of action to bring some relief appears open. ¹¹⁷

The nonviolent control methods employed by the Chinese Communists evoke anxiety—thus, these methods are the functional equivalents of terror. ¹¹⁸

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Acute anxiety was the immediate emotional response evoked during the "crisis" phases of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies. The same acute anxiety response among British and German civilians during the continuous and severe air attacks of World War II has been noted. By sustaining feelings of personal invulnerability an individual can avoid anxiety during environmental threat; however, when the situation continues, and the individual's protective shell of personal invulnerability is shattered, he develops acute anxiety.¹¹⁹

Early twentieth-century revolutionists, having underestimated the fervor of the masses, attempted to stimulate them through the use of terror.¹²⁰

Insurgent terrorism is believed to elicit enthusiasm from members and supporters of the movement.¹²¹

Among the Viet Cong, the morale-building function of terrorism may only exist within the cadres; official Viet Cong documents on criticism and self-criticism indicate a widespread distaste for terror among the rank-and-file.¹²²

One of the immediate purposes of the Malayan Communist Party was to persuade the masses to be neutral, because only in a few selective situations did the insurgents need active or positive cooperation.¹²³

Terror is a method of reducing individuals to a point of passivity; terrorized persons become immobilized objects, react without thinking, and are almost totally controllable.¹²⁴

The Viet Cong uses terror to get neutrality or support from the population.¹²⁵

Mental paralysis is developed by terror, and the emotionally paralyzed individual either submits to or cooperates with the terrorist.¹²⁶

(U) Conflict and Activities: Conflict Situations, Events, and Activities

(U) The strategy and tactics behind conflict situations, techniques of social control, and the weapons systems associated with the use of terrorism are treated in these statements.

The Red terror of postrevolutionary Russia was basically a continuation of the armed insurgency.¹²⁷

A "threat" is intimidation, based on the power to hurt, and an "action" is the use of force, based on brute strength. An effective threat requires a greater knowledge of and sensitivity to an adversary's wants and fears than does military action, which is primarily concerned with the adversary's strength. To be effective, a threat must clearly define the behavior that will provoke violence and the behavior that will forestall violence.¹²⁸

Threats are often more effective if they remain "shadowy" or take the form of "dark hints."¹²⁹

Terror is used by the despot to eliminate resistance and prevent disorder.¹³⁰

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Violence and deception are merely means of bringing into concert the actions of individuals. ¹³¹

Terror in revolutionary France was a weapon to enforce political allegiance and to unify a nation threatened by foreign aggression. The French revolutionary leaders believed that the use of terror was inseparable from the active promotion of the political system. ¹³²

Radicals use terror as a control technique after taking over the course of the revolution from the moderates. ¹³³

The Gestapo tried to discourage resistance to the Third Reich by publicly disclosing the fates of opponents of the government: they publicized both the extent of punishment in concentration camps and the names of the new inmates. ¹³⁴

However, when punishments in concentration camps were publicly disclosed, the resultant public indignation forced the Gestapo to keep its terrorist activities secret in order to maintain their operations. ¹³⁵

The Communist Chinese used less violence in their techniques of political control than did other totalitarian governments. These subtler techniques, voluntarism and thought reform, are well-disguised forms of coercion and the functional equivalents of terror. ¹³⁶

The best defense against insurgency is well-organized terror. ¹³⁷

Terrorism is the most powerful weapon at the guerrilla's disposal, and it can only be met by counterterrorism. ¹³⁸

The only antidote for terror is unlimited counterterror or reprisal. ¹³⁹

The use of terror to decrease the will to resist is often counterproductive—resulting in an increase of the will to resist. ¹⁴⁰

Violent reactions to terrorism do not end terrorism, but only intensify it. ¹⁴¹

When the incumbents respond to terror with counterterror, the insurgents' terrorist actions often acquire a tone of legitimacy. ¹⁴²

A government action designed to force terrorists into increasing their terrorism and thus suffer public censure may backfire and lead the population to support the terrorists. ¹⁴³

Dependency on terror is particularly true of protracted conflicts, where the support of the population becomes a precondition for success. ¹⁴⁴

Terror is rarely used in a coup d'état. ¹⁴⁵

Terror and guerrilla warfare are variations of armed tactics in the early stages of insurgency and are usually replaced by other tactics at later stages. ¹⁴⁶

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Terror is an auxiliary weapon of dubious value and of short-lived potency, and it is rarely decisive. Although there are cases where terror may have been decisive, the evidence is not conclusive. ¹⁴⁷

There are few cases where terror alone was successful in achieving major political objectives. ¹⁴⁸

The goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it is aimed directly at the populace. ¹⁴⁹

Terror is designed to influence behavior in two ways: by mobilizing the population behind the insurgents and by immobilizing or neutralizing the incumbent's support. ¹⁵⁰

The multifarious utility of terror includes disruption of government control, demonstration of strength, advertisement, elimination of collaborators and traitors, protection of the movement's security, and the provoking of counter-action. ¹⁵¹

Terrorism, as a form of political pressure, is used to help control the population. ¹⁵²

Terrorism is a means of applying political pressure. ¹⁵³

Terror is sometimes used indiscriminately with the deliberate aim of creating an atmosphere of fear. ¹⁵⁴

Terror is more an exemplary form of punishment to ensure the movement's survival than a form of coercion to influence the behavior of the population. ¹⁵⁵

The admixture of threats and appeals, with their potential for physical violence, is manipulative persuasion. ¹⁵⁶

Terror was used in Malaya to compel individuals to provide food and other necessary supplies. ¹⁵⁷

In their use of terrorism, Communists have consistently subscribed to the following pattern: As guerrilla fighting continues and the position of the Communist organization becomes more secure, dependency upon mass support lessens, so the organization increases its use of terror to control the population; if the movement wanes and the leaders see no alternative but to coerce necessary support and supplies from the population, terror is used to this end. ¹⁵⁸

Terror is useful not only for obtaining supplies but also for gaining new recruits. Terrorism has a snowballing effect: as some members of the population begin to lend assistance with supplies and recruits to the insurgent movement, others readily follow their example. ¹⁵⁹

Terror may be used as a recruitment tactic when voluntary recruits fall below the quantity that the leaders believe is necessary. However, forced abductions tend to undermine the quality of the ranks. ¹⁶⁰

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Guerrilla warfare requires the kind of committed and covert civilian support that cannot be obtained at gunpoint; therefore, terror as a basis for civilian support is a myth. ¹⁶¹

Terror, as an activity involving violence, is directed against the body politic with hostile intentions. ¹⁶²

Terror is defined partly as entailing the threat or use of violence; but terror does not operate solely at the physical level. ¹⁶³

Terrorism as a problem in international law is composed of acts within the realm of violence. ¹⁶⁴

Violence is the principal element of terror. ¹⁶⁵

Terrorism is essentially a threat—one supported by physical violence to maintain its credibility. ¹⁶⁶

Terror can be either violent or nonviolent; to be successful, a balance must occur between violent and nonviolent terror. ¹⁶⁷

(U) Revolutionary Process: Dynamics, Types, and Outcomes of Revolutions

(U) The following statements discuss the limitations of terrorism, its relationship to other violent forms of activity, and the implications of its widespread and indiscriminate use.

Terrorism is used in the first active stage of insurgencies; thus, it lays the groundwork for the later stages of guerrilla and conventional warfare. ¹⁶⁸

The use of terrorism and guerrilla warfare is related to the armed tactics used in Mao Tse-tung's "stage of attrition" which, conceptually, is followed by insurrection and then civil war. ¹⁶⁹

Although terrorism may continue to some extent through several stages, it tapers off in later stages of the movement. ¹⁷⁰

Terrorist activities decrease when field operations become the insurgents' predominant form of action. ¹⁷¹

Terrorism is not necessarily confined to any particular phase of a revolution but is used as particular situations dictate. ¹⁷²

Terrorism begins in the third or formal stage of the revolutionary process. Transition from earlier stages occurs only with the development of an organizational structure with leaders, a program, doctrines, and traditions. This unifying development is often accompanied by the seizure of power by the radicals of the movement, the presence of conflict within the ranks of the radicals, the formation of a provisional government, and the initiation of terror as a control technique. ¹⁷³

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Mass terror creates a five-phase cycle, each phase defined by the population's psychological and physical reactions to terror. The first phase is characterized by low morale and increased restlessness as the psychological shock of the first wave of terror brings about frantic action, such as great interest in public meetings and overcrowding in places of entertainment. In the second phase, shocked by the unexpected increase in violence, the masses develop a shaky frame of mind, believing that they are in the center of a storm. They react by plotting, or by attempting to organize a defense or to negotiate with the terrorists; some take flight to regions not affected by the terror. By the third phase terror has reached its maximum and the targets are enveloped in fear; their attempts at defense are uncoordinated and normal public and social life slows down. The fourth phase is decisive in the success of the terrorist movement; the population is so paralyzed by fear that it offers no more resistance, and this is the most favorable time for the terrorists to establish control over society. During the fifth phase both terrorists and population make efforts to stabilize the situation: since terrorist aims have been achieved, terrorist activities decrease, and the insurgent position can be stabilized; at the same time, the psychological state of the population stabilizes at a new lower level.¹⁷⁴

Terrorism is rarely used in a coup d'état.¹⁷⁵

With few exceptions, terrorism as a policy is not employed in what has been referred to as urban mass action.¹⁷⁶

Communist leaders employ strategies of terror and unconventional warfare in the belief that limitless psychological effects can be created by very little force.¹⁷⁷

There are five criteria terrorists must meet to be successful. First, they must have a sound knowledge of the terrain, the inhabitants, and any hostile forces. Second, they must maintain a satisfactory supply organization. Third, they must have objectives that are easily understood and accepted by the people. Fourth, they must have the support of the local inhabitants—either as a result of their own persuasive tactics, or as a result of the incumbent's repressive actions. Finally, terrorists must have faith in their cause and a strong determination to see the action through no matter what the consequences.¹⁷⁸

Terrorists can hope to succeed with their activities only if they enjoy two types of support: a ready source of arms and other supplies and the approval of the overwhelming majority of the population. In a situation where support is only half-hearted or confined to a small portion of the population, part of the terrorists' activities must include keeping their nominal supporters in line. Even with wide public support, an extended period of terror often turns the public against the terrorists.¹⁷⁹

Insurgents' use of terrorism usually brings rapid but diminishing returns. However, the opposite was true in Palestine in the 1930's, when the returns were initially meager but increased later.¹⁸⁰

The success of insurgent terrorism depends less upon the damage inflicted than on the increasing expenditures forced upon the incumbents in their attempts to maintain security.¹⁸¹

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The use of discreet forms of terrorism is successful if the concessions required are less costly than resistance.¹⁸²

Terror is often a sign of insurgent failure and should be viewed as such if it is indiscriminately used.¹⁸³

In the Malayan case the civilian population became disillusioned by the Communists' indiscriminate use of terror, and this contributed greatly to the failure of the insurgency.¹⁸⁴

When political means are used to solve social problems such as mass poverty they eventually lead to terror. Terror, in turn, usually carries the revolution to failure.¹⁸⁵

Individual acts of terrorism may express a desperation that leads to the disintegration of the insurgent movement rather than to a weakening of the regime in power.¹⁸⁶

(U) Communications: Activities and Instruments

(U) The relationship between terrorism and communications activities is discussed in the following statements that center on propaganda, persuasion, public opinion and political expression, and the communication of threats.

Propaganda is used to inspire terror, and terror in turn is used for propaganda effect. Threats, appeals, and violence are blended together when terrorists attempt to dominate the political beliefs and actions of others in society.¹⁸⁷

There are three channels for directing people according to a preplanned pattern of thought and action: propaganda, bribery, and terror.¹⁸⁸

Terrorists may use propaganda as a substitute when terror becomes too costly in terms of life, time, and energy. The same psychological effects generated by terror can be generated by clever propaganda.¹⁸⁹

The Viet Cong begin selective assassination of their opponents only after they have failed to win them over by persuasive arguments.¹⁹⁰

There is a need for balance between persuasion and terrorism; success in winning over the local population through argument may lead to success in rising terrorist action against the authorities.¹⁹¹

Public opinion must be favorably disposed toward the terrorists' objectives and neutral toward their methods of operation for terrorism to function successfully as a means of political pressure. This situation comes about gradually, beginning when people become distrustful of the authorities because of real or imagined grievances; then people become more favorably inclined toward the terrorists' aims, if not necessarily toward their methods. The more favorable the climate of opinion toward the terrorists, the more active the terrorists will be toward their opponents.¹⁹²

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The government in power can use "ruthless slaughter and subsequent terror" to put down an insurgency only if it cares nothing for popular opinion and support.¹⁹³

Certain terrorist acts may be typical forms of political expression in Vietnamese society. Bombing in Saigon has been for many years an "accepted mode" of political expression, and the Viet Cong may not be guilty on every occasion.¹⁹⁴

Terrorists should make clear to the population that they use terror by necessity rather than choice. Terror may in part be defined as lying beyond the norms of acceptable violent political agitation, and so some sort of understanding must be reached between the terrorists and the population lest the people be so repelled by terrorist activities that they begin to oppose the terrorists' objectives.¹⁹⁵

A clear line of communication must exist between those who threaten and those who are threatened; not only must the threatener be committed to the threat, but the threatened must be made aware of this commitment.¹⁹⁶

One way of influencing the conduct of individuals is to make the bad consequences of unwanted behavior well understood.¹⁹⁷

A threat is more effective if those who are threatened are kept minimally informed.¹⁹⁸

Fear, which may lead to panic, lessens when the subject is well informed about the situation. Fear and panic, the two psychological responses to terror, can be partly combated by keeping those who are being terrorized well informed.¹⁹⁹

The Gestapo used the press to publicly announce the names of individuals who were sent to prison camps in an attempt to frighten other individuals into line.²⁰⁰

Many acts of violence and the destruction of life and property that accompanies them are symbolic, and the acts themselves are less important than the interpretation of them by the terrorists' opponents.²⁰¹

A terrorist act is intended to be viewed as a symbol, and the meaning of it is greater than the sum of its parts.²⁰²

Terror in the cities of South Vietnam is both symbolic and practical. The Viet Cong attempt to make the Vietnamese people afraid of associating with the Americans.²⁰³

(U) Nonsocial Elements

(U) Terrain, logistics, insurgent resources, and special occasions are related to terrorism in the statements below.

Two preconditions are especially important for successful use of terrorism: a sound knowledge of the terrain and a satisfactory supply organization.²⁰⁴

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Terrain may or may not permit the insurgents to move from guerrilla terrorism and unconventional warfare to conventional operations. 205

Terrorists cannot repeatedly commit certain kinds of terrorist acts close to their base of operations without being prepared for adverse effects. 206

Malayan Communist terrorists had a distinct advantage over the British in Malaya's jungle terrain. The British, unlike the terrorists, were required to undertake a rugged acclimatization program to increase their effectiveness. 207

The wars in Indochina and Algeria have clearly demonstrated that terrorism is a basic weapon that allows the insurgents to fight effectively against a traditional army with resources. 208

In Malaya, terrorist attacks decreased as the terrorists overextended their supply lines. 209

Holidays and recreational occasions are likely occasions for insurgent violence. Terrorist acts, in a number of cases, were conducted at night and during holidays or vacation periods. 210

(U) CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORY-BUILDING

(U) The preliminary questions of conceptualization and theory-building will now be considered. A frame of reference for studying Viet Cong terrorism is particularly necessary to help toward the larger goal of developing a theory of internal conflict. The first task is a simple one and consists of tying together the propositional statements presented above to give a coherent picture of what is known and what is being hypothesized about terrorism and its uses. In doing so, it will become clear that the insurgency in Vietnam is not unique, and that some of the lessons learned there may, with qualifications, be validly applied elsewhere.

(U) Social Change and Violence

(U) It is generally assumed that political violence, defined here as the employment of physical coercion for political ends, is related to social change—that is, there are certain underlying causes for the political violence to which transitional societies or societies otherwise experiencing social disorganization are particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, it is assumed that this disorganization results from the failure of part of the social system to adapt to changes occurring in other parts, and that failure to change the patterns of social interaction so that most parts of the social system are in balance gives rise to cleavages and antagonisms which then lead to disruptive violent conflict.

(U) Change and violence are also related to the form of political leadership and to a basic lack of consensus about the appropriate means and ends of government action. If the initiative for change comes from a nonauthoritarian leadership, then the change is likely to occur over a long period of time, perhaps a generation or more, and be accompanied by demands from dissident groups for more and faster change. Under authoritarian revolutionary leadership, change is likely to occur more rapidly, but to result in severe deprivations. Demands for rapid change can originate from above or below. When rapid change is initiated from above, such as in Nazi Germany and Communist Russia, the forceful administrative

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devices needed to mobilize maximum powers of the state to produce the desired results involve violence. The state's first task is to eliminate potential opposition leaders, so that the masses have no one to follow but the government. When change is pressed from below, as in many newly emerging nations, violence is involved in the insurgent organizations' attempts to weaken the pattern of social relations and to undermine the support structures of the regime so that the masses have no centrally controlled political organization. The immediate task in this case is the elimination of local government officials. In both cases the issue is political control: government authorities and insurgents are both essentially concerned with affecting the political behavior of the general population through the use of violence.

(U) Some of these patterns are evident in the Vietnam case. Traditional Vietnamese society was shaken by the successive impacts of colonialism, nationalism, large-scale Communist insurgency, and American military presence. As a result of the shifting fortunes of war, groups in the population became highly mobile, shuttling from one part of the countryside to another and from rural areas to urban centers. This caused a severe weakening of traditional ties. The government of South Vietnam, established during the mid-1950's, took a strong hand in centralizing political power, attempting to extend its control down to the hamlet level. The form of government was altered during the 1960's, but its substance remained basically unchanged and strongly authoritarian.

(U) The regime attacked the challenge of a Communist-led insurgency from two directions: it instituted enforcement agencies, such as an army and the national police, to deal with the opposition, both Communist and non-Communist, and set up a system of agrovilles and strategic hamlets to isolate insurgents and control the population while introducing changes from above. In the countryside, meanwhile, local government officials and other civilian leaders were subjected to intimidation, assassination, murder, and kidnaping as the insurgents attempted to establish their control over the population.

(U) Social Units and Violence

(U) There are nonpolitical as well as political social units involved in violent conflict in societies experiencing rapid social change. These may be characterized in various ways. Two units have already been suggested—insurgents and incumbents—those who are rebelling and those who are being rebelled against. Classically, insurgents have been thought to represent the lower class—laborers who subsist in relative poverty—and incumbents to represent the political leadership supported by the propertied upper classes. The situation in nineteenth-century Europe was a good illustration of this traditional alignment. But internal cleavages can also develop along different lines, between units other than the rich and the poor. Through the years, violence has resulted from the opposition of interests between slave and master; rural and urban classes; and different ethnic, religious, racial, and linguistic groups.

(U) In Vietnam, as in many other emerging countries, resentment against privileged, high-status foreigners and domestic elites led to an anticolonial nationalist movement. After the successful eviction of the foreign rulers, the differences between nationalist groups came to the surface, and violent conflict continued. Such struggles often involve a number of competing groups, which combine in coalitions or act as neutrals. The Vietnamese struggle for independence served to unite many different groups but, since independence, the patterns of political orientation often have been divisive.

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(U) Violence and Terrorism

(U) Terrorism is simply one weapon in an arsenal of violent actions available to either incumbents or insurgents. It has definite advantages and limitations that must be weighed against each other if it is to be used effectively. The use of force by a duly constituted government, once its sovereignty has been established, is ordinarily viewed by the general population as legitimate. A resort to terrorism, however, even when justified by declaring a state of emergency, may be considered illegal and result in unfriendly or even hostile reaction on the part of some segments of the population. Occasionally, such reactions take acute form, especially among those social units which attack the government on the grounds that it is using terror against its own people. Insurgents need make less pretense at legality. They justify terrorism as a weapon against a group that is wrongfully exercising political authority. However, there are also limits to insurgent use of terrorism. When it is used indiscriminately, especially against sectors of the population that are hostile to the insurgents instead of against the established authorities, the movement may be left without a popular base.

(U) Violence in South Vietnam has not been the exclusive monopoly of either side. The Viet Cong have used a variety of actions, including attacks, ambushes, sabotage, and propaganda, as well as terrorism. During the 1950's, selective assassination of local government officials, particularly energetic and competent ones, highlighted the pattern of Viet Cong violence, while popular support for the insurgent movement was sought primarily through propaganda. Conditions had changed by 1964, and an increasing amount of terrorism was used against the local population in order to obtain the supplies and recruits necessary for large military operations. The government also employed violence, primarily in military and police operations directed at the expanding Viet Cong war effort. Official intimidation at the village level was not uncommon; taxing power and security measures were sometimes used in a despotic and tyrannical manner. These actions generated some resentment, but had little effect on questions of the government's legitimacy since the regime had never really gained the allegiance of much more than a small segment of the population.

(U) Psychological Effects of Terrorism

(U) Besides being employed for the physical elimination of opposing forces, terrorism has indirect objectives. Different people react differently. Generally terrorism induces anxiety, fear, fright, or shock, which leads to disorganized behavior such as hysteria or panic, and individuals are left completely unable to take appropriate action or in a state of apathy and indifference. Thus, in the late 1950's and early 1960's representatives of the Saigon government—health officials, police, local administrators—were selected for Viet Cong terrorism, especially to demoralize those who had been effective against the insurgents and to discourage potential recruits from taking official positions; during the mid-1960's terrorism was used against the general population to elicit support or to induce neutrality. Mass terrorism is a characteristic of totalitarian regimes—it produces the same psychological effects but acts as enforcement of conformity, of action, or belief. The psychological effects of terrorism are not entirely dysfunctional: terrorism also generates enthusiasm among members of the movement and creates favorable attitudes toward the terrorists among individuals sympathetic to the movement. In Vietnam, such enthusiasm seems to have been shared only by the Viet Cong cadres.

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(U) Terrorism and the Phases of Insurgency

(U) Insurgency is generally viewed as a phenomenon of several phases, each having its own peculiar characteristics in terms of insurgent activities. Three phases of insurgency can be posited. During phase one, also referred to as the subversive or terrorist phase, insurgent leaders establish a network of clandestine organizations. Their activities usually are accompanied by an increase in lawlessness, including robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations. Insurgent movements in this phase rely heavily upon the support of disaffected segments of society, and use both persuasion and terror to get this support. Phase two is characterized by small-scale guerrilla operations. Subversive and terrorist activities continue through this phase, and the insurgents are still highly dependent upon the support of some segments of society. Open or positional warfare characterizes phase three. The insurgents directly challenge the incumbents' armed forces and engage in the kind of warfare that may reach the proportions of conventional war.

(U) In reality the phases of insurgency are not so clear-cut. Since activities from one phase are not abandoned but are carried on in the next, transitions from one phase to another are not easily identifiable. An insurgency is not likely to be in the same phase in all parts of a country. And the possibility of an insurgency reverting to an earlier phase after unsuccessful attempts to move into the next phase can add to the complexity. Few general statements can accurately describe the phase of the insurgency in Vietnam. At times during the mid-1960's the fighting in some provinces took on the characteristics of conventional warfare, although in most other provinces it was characterized by phase one and phase two activities.

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(C) PART II. VIET CONG TERRORISM (U)

(C) CHAPTER 3

PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS (U)

(C) ACTIONS (U)

(C) Actions Defined (U)

(C) The following section describes patterns and characteristics of those actions directed against selected nonmilitary targets by the Viet Cong that have been defined as acts of terrorism.¹ Harassing fire, one of the most frequently used devices, is defined as sporadic fire at a target from one or more weapons with no intent to maneuver, assault, or overpower. It may be directed at any kind of target and casualties may or may not result. Harassment, also frequently used, is carried out with the object of disturbing targets by raids, fires, and so forth, but stops short of attack or ambush with intent to overpower. Harassment frequently is used to describe the burning of crops or similar contact with the local population that is designed to force contributions of labor, supplies, and taxes.

(C) Kidnaping is the forcible capture by the Viet Cong of one or more individuals, including government officials and ordinary civilians.* Assassination is the physical elimination of one or more civilians or government officials. Mining, as an act of terrorism, is unrelated to a larger military action, and the mine is detonated against targets such as vehicles, watercraft, trains, individuals, or groups of individuals. The detonation of mines against bridges or rails ordinarily is considered sabotage.

(C) Other types of Viet Cong actions, not as widely used as those mentioned, are so closely related to them that fine distinctions are difficult to make. A bombing may be similar to a mining incident; the difference, presumably, lies in the weapon used. In a bombing incident, the missile usually is detonated upon contact with the target, as when it is dropped from an aircraft or hurled through the air; in mining, the explosion is detonated by action of the target, by the passage of time, or by fuse or other controlled means. There are also "firing" incidents, but this type of action is so similar to harassing fire that no real distinction can be made. "Murders" have also been reported; although murder is defined as the deliberate killing of one or more individuals, unrelated to a military act such as an attack or ambush, no real distinction can be made between assassination and murder. †

* (C) Although the RVN data bank's coding system includes within its category of Viet Cong targets both "civilians" and "inhabitants," no distinction between them has been made in reporting and coding instructions. In this study, therefore, "civilians" will be used to refer to both "civilians" and "inhabitants."

† (C) In this case, reporting and coding instructions make a distinction between assassination (the physical elimination of government officials) and murder (the physical elimination of civilians). These distinctions were not clearly adhered to, and the two actions were confused in the coding system. Therefore, the distinction appears in this study chiefly in terms of targets (civilians or officials).

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(C) Actions and Viet Cong Strategy (U)

(C) An understanding of Viet Cong strategy can be acquired by observing the distribution over a period of time of terrorist actions and the pattern of targets against which they were directed. A close look at specific actions and the frequency with which they occurred shed some light on changes in Viet Cong expenditure and direction of effort. However, certain significant aspects of these incidents cannot be seen in monthly totals; these include the impact of terrorism on the government of South Vietnam, the time and manpower required by the Viet Cong to plan and conduct terrorist activities, and the magnitude of incidents (in terms of the size of both forces, duration of incidents, and casualties inflicted on both sides).

(C) Unless viewed cautiously, the data may give incorrect impressions. Decreasing monthly totals of terrorist actions do not necessarily indicate diminishing Viet Cong insurgent activity. The introduction of U.S. and Allied combat forces in mid-1965 altered the pattern; the magnitude or intensity of major incidents (including ambushes and attacks) increased as the frequency decreased. Numerical data alone, therefore, cannot give the whole picture.

(C) Terrorism: Yearly Totals (U)

(C) A gross examination of total Viet Cong incidents of terrorism during the years 1963 through 1966 indicates an unmistakable downward trend from their peak in July 1964. The average number of incidents was 164 a month in 1963, 608 a month in 1964, 479 a month in 1965, and 265 a month in 1966.


(C) Province totals indicate variations from the national pattern (see Figures 3-6). In Thua Thien and Binh Dinh provinces, the national pattern was repeated: the monthly average in Thua Thien was four in 1963, 50 in 1964, 45 in 1965, and ten in 1966; in Binh Dinh it was 22 in 1963, 65 in 1964, 28 in 1965, and nine in 1966. But the peak in Tay Ninh was reached in 1963, with a monthly average of eighteen incidents; there were sixteen in 1964, ten in 1965, and about three in 1966. In Gia Dinh, the monthly average was four in 1963, nineteen in 1964, 27 in 1965, and 26 in 1966. Monthly totals in Vinh Binh reached two peaks, one in 1964 and another in 1966—four incidents in 1963, sixteen in 1964, ten in 1965, and fifteen in 1966.

(C) Action Patterns (U)


(C) The terrorist type of action is a low intensity one, requiring comparatively little effort to plan and execute. Thus, in 1965 it was estimated that it took six times more effort to execute an attack than it did to conduct an act of terrorism.² An attack required an average of 85 Viet Cong and an ambush an average of 66, while an act of harassment required 25, harassing fire 23, kidnaping twenty, mining sixteen, and assassination ten.³ These estimates, however, fail to indicate the cost/risk factor that presumably is considered in planning terrorist incidents. Harassing fire is much less risky than kidnapings or harassments, which require direct confrontation with the targets, usually take longer, and offer more chance of detection and challenge.

(C) The National Scene (U)

(C) Taken together, harassing fire and harassment nationally far outnumbered all other types of terrorist actions (see Figure 7). Regardless of fluctuation in the monthly totals,




(C) Figure 3. Total Terrorist Actions for the Republic of Vietnam (U)




(C) Figure 4. Total Terrorist Actions for Five Provinces (U)

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
GIA DINH




THUA THIEN



VINH BINH




(C) Figure 5. Total Terrorist Actions: Thua Thien, Gia Dinh, and Vinh Binh (U)



(C) Figure 6. Total Terrorist Actions: Binh Dinh and Tay Ninh (U)

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(C) Figure 7. Frequency of Selected Actions by Year: Nationwide and in Five Provinces (U)

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harassing fire and harassment remained the most frequently used actions. Monthly averages of harassing fire were 129 in 1963, 213 in 1964, 177 in 1965, and 102 in 1966. Harassments were not reported for 1963, but numbered 237 in 1964, 169 in 1965, and 66 in 1966.

(C) Kidnapings and assassinations were the third and fourth most frequently used terrorist actions. Kidnapings averaged sixteen in 1963, 97 in 1964, 91 in 1965, and 40 in 1966. The 1963 monthly average of assassinations was ten, but assassinations were relatively constant over the next three years, averaging 28, 31, and 26 incidents per month in 1964, 1965, and 1966, respectively.

(C) Except for murder and mining incidents, both of which were on the rise in 1966, few other types of actions were reported. The number of murders rose from thirteen in 1963 to 29 in 1964; only one was reported in 1965, but in 1966 the total rose to 121, averaging about ten per month. Minings, relatively constant in 1964 and 1965, went up from an average of three a month in 1963 to nine a month in 1964, and then from an average of eleven in 1965 to 24 in 1966. Bombings, more frequently used in 1963 and 1964 (a total of 30 and 21, respectively), were insignificant in 1965 (one incident countrywide), and used not at all in 1966. In the same way, firings increased from a total of fifteen in 1963 to 206 in 1964 (monthly averages of one and seventeen respectively), but none was reported in 1965 and only one in 1966.

(C) The Provincial Scene (U)

(C) It became apparent after the data were analyzed that a high percentage of the national total of actions took place in the five provinces selected for this study. Between 23 and 33 percent of incidents of harassing fire reported countrywide during the four selected years occurred in the five provinces. These provinces accounted for 16 to 30 percent of the harassments and from 12 to 28 percent of all kidnapings, while from 29 to 40 percent of all assassinations in South Vietnam were committed in the five provinces.

(C) Thua Thien trailed the other provinces in total incidents of harassing fire. Its peak year was 1964, when incidents averaged only seven each month. Harassments averaged 27 a month in 1964—more than half the year's total incidents. They averaged slightly more than twenty a month in 1965, but averaged fewer than three in 1966. Kidnapings averaged as high as thirteen a month in 1964 and 1966. Assassinations ranged between averages of two and seven a month in the 1964-1966 period.

(C) In Binh Dinh, incidents of harassing fire averaged seventeen, 21, fourteen, and three a month during the four years. Harassments averaged 28 a month in 1964, decreasing to eleven in 1965 and three in 1966. Kidnapings and assassinations followed the same pattern of frequency: kidnapings averaged three a month in 1963 and eleven in 1964, while assassinations went from two to four a month for the same two years. Both kidnapings and assassinations averaged only two or less a month in 1965 and 1966.

(C) The Viet Cong were less active in Tay Ninh than in Thua Thien and Binh Dinh, except in 1963 when incidents of harassing fire averaged seventeen a month. This decreased to seven a month in 1964, to six in 1965, and to one in 1966. Harassments, kidnapings, and firings were the only other types of actions that averaged more than one a month in any one of the four years: There was about one harassment a month in 1964 and 1965, and over one a month of both kidnapings and firings in 1964.

(C) In Gia Dinh, the number of incidents of harassing fire rose through 1966, monthly averages going from three in 1963 to six in 1964, to nine in 1965, and to fifteen in 1966.

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Harassments went from ten in 1964 to twelve in 1965, and then dropped to four in 1966. Assassinations, like harassing fire, increased over the period from fewer than one incident a month in 1963 to slightly over one per month in 1964, and from three a month in 1965 to nearly four per month in 1966. Mining operations averaged less than one a month until 1966, when the average rose to two. All other actions in this province averaged less than one a month for the entire period.

(C) Harassing fire in Vinh Binh rose in two of the four years: less than three a month were reported in 1963, eight in 1964, seven in 1965, and eleven in 1966. Harassments averaged four a month in 1964, dropped to one in 1965, and nearly ceased in 1966. Kidnapings varied in frequency from fewer than one a month in 1963, nearly two in 1964, about one in 1965, and back up to nearly two in 1966. Assassinations and minings both increased gradually during the four years to more than one each a month in 1966. Firings averaged more than one a month in 1964, with none reported in the other years.

(C) TARGETS (U)

(C) Targets Defined (U)

(U) Nonmilitary targets fall into two major categories: Persons and structures. Persons include government officials and civilians; "government officials" include village officials, hamlet officials, civil officials, and police. Structures are subdivided into official and civilian types. Official structures include district towns, district capitals, villages, hamlets, New Rural Life (NRL) hamlets, NRL hamlets under construction, council houses, land development centers, and village, district, and province offices. Civilian structures include schools, houses, buildings, churches, and civil facilities (e.g., railroad stations, telegraph and telephone stations, and public water facilities).

(C) Since NRL hamlets and other hamlets are two distinct targets, they will be differentiated.⁴ A hamlet is defined as the smallest population unit in the civil government structure. An NRL hamlet is a hamlet which is or will be fortified. It is defended primarily by its inhabitants and is embarking, or is intended to embark, upon a planned social, political, and economic development program. Viet Cong directives to destroy these fortified hamlets are aimed at breaking the RVN pacification program.⁵


(C) Target Patterns And Characteristics (U)

(C) The National Scene (U)

(C) New Rural Life hamlets, one symbol of government control, or at least ascendancy⁶, figured prominently among Viet Cong targets (see Figures 8 and 9). From October 1963 through January 1964, 66 to 71 percent of all terrorist actions were aimed at NRL hamlets. In the subsequent three years, this percentage decreased to between 3 and 5 percent.


(C) Terrorist actions against government officials also declined during the period, but less gradually than those against NRL hamlets. In the first half of 1963, such incidents accounted for 44 to 64 percent of the national total; by the end of the year, this class of targets accounted for only 1 percent of the total, and never for more than 16 percent from then through 1966.

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(C) Figure 8. Total Terrorist Actions Against Selected Targets by Year: Nationwide and in Five Provinces (U)

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(C) Figure 9. Percentages of Total Terrorist Actions Against Unfortified Hamlets and Villages (U)

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(C) Apparently much of the Viet Cong attention removed from NRL hamlets and government officials was redirected toward civilians. Although actions against civilians ranged as high as 33 percent in August 1963, a decided campaign was not in evidence before April 1964 and was not consistently maintained above the 50 percent level nationwide before October 1965. This drive clearly indicated that the Viet Cong were turning from persuasion to coercion in the effort to gain civilian support.

(C) Other targets or combinations of targets also became objectives of Viet Cong campaigns. An increased effort apparently was directed at district towns beginning in May 1965, when they were targets of 4 percent of total incidents, an average that went up to 12 percent in January 1966, but declined toward the summer. District capitals, province offices, district offices, village offices, council houses, and land development centers, as well as other symbols of government influence or control, were involved in 3 to 4 percent of total incidents in 1964 and went up to 6 percent in 1965. No such incidents were reported before January 1964, and those reported after 1965 seldom made up more than 3 percent of monthly totals. Schools, churches, and other civil facilities close to the everyday life of the inhabitants appear to have become major targets of terrorist actions at the same time that the campaign against civilians was stepped up in April 1964. Between December 1964 and March 1965, 10 percent of total terrorist activities was directed at such targets. Villages and unfortified hamlets were perhaps the most steadily assaulted targets over the entire four-year period: 13 percent of total monthly incidents in 1963, 25 percent in 1964, 16 percent in 1965, and 15 percent in 1966.

(C) The Provincial Scene (U)

(C) Month-to-month variation in Viet Cong terrorism at the province level was much greater than it was nationwide. However, the same basic strategy evident at the national level appears also in the five provinces. In Thua Thien, NRL hamlets were the number one target from the latter part of 1963 through most of 1964. Actions against civilians, picking up in April 1964, continued at high levels during 1965 and 1966. One major difference between the national pattern and that in Thua Thien was the Viet Cong effort against government officials, which stayed well under 14 percent of total monthly actions until 1966 when it went abruptly to 40 percent in one month. District capitals and offices were targets only from the middle of 1964 to the middle of 1965. Unlike the pattern at the national level, operations against villages and unfortified hamlets in Thua Thien were largely limited to 1964 and 1965 (accounting for 61 percent of total reported incidents in November 1964). The Viet Cong were also active against district towns between December 1965 and July 1966, and against schools, churches, and civil facilities in the fall of 1966.

(C) Target patterns in Binh Dinh approximated the national pattern. The drive against NRL hamlets was intensified during the fall and winter of 1963 and 1964, remained at a monthly average of 40 percent of total incidents in 1964, and dropped slightly to a monthly average of 37 percent during 1965. Incidents involving NRL hamlets far outnumbered those involving other targets during 1964 and 1965. A large Viet Cong effort against government officials, quite in evidence through most of 1963, was reduced sharply at the end of that year and from then on remained minor. Nongovernment civilians became the primary targets of terrorism by the end of 1965 and accounted for a monthly average of more than 45 percent of the incidents. Villages and unfortified hamlets were actively involved in 1964, when actions against them made up between 16 and 56 percent of the monthly total; the decline from January 1965 was gradual and erratic. Most types of operations against other targets were conducted in 1964 and 1965; during 1966, only a few sporadic forays against district towns, and houses and buildings, were reported.

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(C) The Viet Cong pattern of operations against specific targets in Tay Ninh is comparable to that in Thua Thien, although the campaign against NRL hamlets was greater and continued longer in Tay Ninh. During the early months of 1965, as many as 83 percent of all actions in Tay Ninh was aimed at the NRL hamlets, while in Thua Thien no more than 7 percent of the monthly totals centered on these hamlets. On the other hand, the campaign against villages and unfortified hamlets was much less definite in Tay Ninh and ended in 1964. As in Thua Thien, there was no sustained campaign against government officials in Tay Ninh; even during the peak years of 1964 and 1965, actions against them were sporadic and never exceeded 33 percent of the monthly total. Very nearly the same can be said about incidents involving civilians, which increased early in 1964 and reached high levels in 1965 and 1966, mostly during months when few other Viet Cong terrorist operations were reported. Aside from an increase in actions against schools, churches, and civil facilities during the summer and fall of 1965, no other nonmilitary targets received continuous attention from the Viet Cong.

(C) New Rural Life hamlets were the objects of the longest campaign of terrorism in Gia Dinh Province. As in the other four provinces, the campaign against NRL hamlets started slowly in 1963, but in the last quarter of that year actions against them went up from 75 percent of the monthly total to 100 percent. The campaign continued into 1965, and from January to November made up between 22 and 82 percent of total monthly actions. Government officials were on-again, off-again targets during 1963 and 1964 as they were in Thua Thien and Tay Ninh, and even during 1965 and 1966, when they accounted for 33 percent of total monthly actions, there were some months when they were not molested. But the campaign against non-governmental civilians came on strongly during April 1964 when such actions were 64 percent of the total. The campaign then abated until the end of the year, but it revived during 1965, and by the end of 1966 this effort ranged from an average of 46 percent of total monthly actions to 75 percent. Actions against villages and unfortified hamlets followed the same pattern, but at a much lower level. Schools, churches, and civil facilities also received sustained attention throughout 1964, 1965, and the first part of 1966; they, along with the remaining Viet Cong targets, experienced a reprieve from January 1966 until the end of that year, when assaults against them were renewed.

(C) Patterns of actions against specific targets in Vinh Binh Province differed in more respects from the national patterns than did those in the other four provinces. The Viet Cong in Vinh Binh never gave up the drive against NRL hamlets which began in earnest in the fall of 1963, reached a peak during January 1964, and continued to involve a large part of Viet Cong efforts during 1965 and 1966. As for government officials, they were never targets of any sustained drive. In fact, actions against them amounted to no more than 25 percent of total actions in any single month, and in the course of the four years they were targets in only nineteen of the 48 months. Civilians were involved as infrequently as government officials during 1963 and 1964. The campaign against them, which started in April 1964, reached a peak during the summer and was almost immediately relaxed. It began again in 1965 and accounted for 14 percent of the monthly total that year, rising to 27 percent in 1966. Actions against other targets, including villages, unfortified hamlets, and official structures, were much more sporadic, and no definite pattern was discernible.

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(C) CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXT (U)

(U) POLITICAL AND MILITARY TIMETABLE

(U) To provide the reader with a time frame in which to place the subsequent discussion, a brief chronological summary of major political and military events in South Vietnam from 1963 through 1966 follows:

1963

March 14—South Vietnamese government widens antiguerrilla operations in the Plain of Reeds.

April 17—President Diem proclaims the "Open Arms" campaign, designed to induce Viet Cong guerrillas to give up their arms and return to the South Vietnamese side.

May 8—Riot involving Buddhists and government troops erupts in northern city of Hue.

May 19—Government forces scour Cambodian border along Plain of Reeds.

June 3—Buddhist demonstrations break out in Hue; martial law is imposed.

June 16—Government forces respond to riots in Saigon.

July 17—Buddhists and government security forces have a violent confrontation.

August 21—Martial law is proclaimed throughout South Vietnam.

September 14—Presidential decree announces end of martial law, effective September 16.

September 27—Elections held for national assembly.

November 1—Military coup overthrows the Diem government.

November 2—Provisional government is established.

1964

January 6—Government decrees three-man military command.

January 30—Military coup overthrows junta.

February 4-6—Viet Cong launches offensive in Tay Ninh and Mekong Delta.

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July 4—National Liberation Front (NLF) appeals to all its supporters to step up offensive against government forces.

August 2-4—U.S. ships are attacked in international waters off the coast of North Vietnam.

August 11—President Johnson signs Southeast Asia resolution.

November 1—Viet Cong successfully attack Bien Hoa air base.

December 16—An Lao Valley in Central Highlands falls into Viet Cong hands after three-day battle.

December 20—South Vietnamese military dissolves the civilian parliament.

1965

February 18—Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh is ousted in bloodless coup in Saigon.

May 6—First U.S. combat troops are deployed to South Vietnam.

May 29—Viet Cong launch offensive in Central Highlands, taking advantage of the monsoon.

June 24—New government under Brig. Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky announces series of measures and proclaims a state of war.

July 12-18—U.S. begins a large-scale buildup of forces in South Vietnam.

November 14-22—Hanoi commits between 3,000 and 4,000 troops in conventional combat in Ia Drang Valley.

December 24-25—A one-day Christmas truce is agreed to by U.S. and Viet Cong.

1966

January 20-23—Temporary cease-fire marks the Vietnamese lunar new year (Tet).

March 2—U.S. official reveals total of 215,000 men in U.S. forces in Vietnam.

March 10-16—Protests begin in Hue and Danang after dismissal of popular Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chan Thi, district commander in Hue. Buddhist demonstrations begin in Saigon, also protesting General Thi's removal.

March 26—General strikes break out in Danang and Hue.

April 2-5—Antigovernment demonstrations intensify in Saigon and spread to other cities and towns in South Vietnam.

May 31—South Vietnamese government officials begin talks in Saigon in an attempt to resolve the two-and-one-half-month-old political crisis.

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June 7-12—U.S. paratroops, in one of their biggest battles, engage a North Vietnamese force north of Tan Canh in Kontum Province.

June 16—South Vietnamese government moves troops into Hue to deal with Buddhist disorders.

June 23—South Vietnamese troops seize the principal Buddhist stronghold in Saigon.

September 11—National elections held for 117-member constituent assembly to draft new constitution and pave the way for establishment of a civilian government in 1967.

October 15—One of largest U.S. offensives to date launched 60 miles northwest of Saigon along Cambodian border.

October 24—Beginning of Manila conference, where Premier Ky promises program of political and economic reform.

December 31—U.S. troop strength in South Vietnam reaches 389,000.

(C) POLITICAL EVENTS AND TERRORISM (U)


(U) A review of the situation in South Vietnam and conversations with military officers who have served in that country indicate that Viet Cong terrorist operations react to both political and military stimuli. For instance, violent changes in the national government and elections at both provincial and national levels have been accompanied by increases in Viet Cong terrorism (see Figure 10). In the following analysis, 50 selected political events, such as coups, elections, the issuance of proclamations, manifestations of antigovernment sentiment, and reforms in the government, are discussed in terms of accompanying variations in patterns and characteristics of Viet Cong use of terrorism. A similar analysis of national and religious holidays and military developments will follow.

(C) Coups d'Etat (U)

(C) Some of the months during which the Viet Cong increased their terrorist activities coincided with months during which coups d'état occurred; in five of the seven months in which coups were carried out, the Viet Cong stepped up the rate of terrorism throughout the country. Presumably, this was done to take advantage of a volatile political situation. The largest monthly increase of Viet Cong terrorism identifiable with a coup was in November 1963 following Diem's overthrow. Decreases in terrorism were reported during the coups of January 1965 and February 1965.

(C) In the five months in which coups occurred and that terrorism rose, harassing fire and harassments increased most dramatically; assassinations, kidnappings, and minings also increased. The actions were usually directed against New Rural Life hamlets, and village, district towns and district offices, and other civil facilities were also affected, but to a lesser extent. Both increases and decreases in actions against government officials and civilians were reported in months when coups took place.

(C) No marked change in the rate of Viet Cong terrorism can be detected in the five selected provinces for months during which coups took place. The Viet Cong in Thua Thien



(C) Figure 10. Major Political Events and Total Terrorist Actions (U)

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increased their activities in four months—primarily civilian assassinations and kidnapings. No clear pattern emerges from the other provinces, except that in Binh Dinh the Viet Cong seem to have increased their activities against NRL hamlets during months when coups occurred even when the total number of actions decreased.

(C) Civil Disturbances: Riots and Demonstrations (U)

(C) There was no great nationwide upsurge of Viet Cong terrorism during months when riots and demonstrations occurred, even when streetfighting, as in Danang during May 1966, was involved. In fact, during most months when large-scale riots and demonstrations were being conducted, the Viet Cong slightly decreased their terrorist activities, and totals for those months were lower than for previous months. Totals did increase during the June 1963 and the May 1966 riots and during the fighting in Danang. No national pattern is noticeable, however, nor can any pattern be determined at the province level.

(C) National and Local Elections (U)

(C) Both national and local elections were accompanied by upswings in Viet Cong terrorism. The Viet Cong were particularly opposed to the elections of September 1966, and in some areas anti-election activities were conducted for weeks before.¹ Harassing fire, harassment, and kidnapings increased, a large part being directed against civilians, government officials, and hamlets.

(C) In Thua Thien, no actions were reported for September 1963; harassments and kidnapings, in particular, increased in March 1965 and September 1966, but the targets varied. The Viet Cong in Binh Dinh stepped up activities in the 1963 and 1965 election months, but were comparatively inactive during September 1966. Kidnaping and harassment were the primary actions and civilians were the primary targets. In Gia Dinh, the Viet Cong were active during all three of the election months, particularly in September 1966. Kidnapings and harassments increased during all three months, and actions against government officials increased.

(C) Martial Law and Government-Imposed Restrictions (U)

(C) In months when martial law or a state of emergency was declared, the rate of Viet Cong terrorism went down, but during June 1965, when the government restricted certain activities, the terrorism increased. In two months during which martial law was lifted throughout the country, terrorist incidents went up. The only pattern observable at the national level is that kidnapings and actions against hamlets and government officials increased when martial law was lifted.

(C) A more definite pattern appears in the provinces of Tay Ninh and Gia Dinh: terrorism increased during the months when martial law or other restrictions were imposed and decreased when they were lifted. In Tay Ninh, interestingly, harassing fire seems to have fluctuated positively with total incidents of terrorism.

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(C) Changes in Government (U)

(C) Six occasions on which major changes were made in the government, or a new government was formed, were analyzed, and during five of these the Viet Cong decreased their terrorist activities. The decreases ranged from 100 to 300 incidents; and the one increase was only 21 incidents. In most of these months, harassing fire, harassment, or both, went down; actions against NRL hamlets were most affected by these declines, except during January 1964, when actions against NRL hamlets increased despite the sharp decrease in total actions during that month.

(C) In Thua Thien terrorism decreased in each month that a change in government took place, and total actions against NRL hamlets were decreased. In Tay Ninh, activities decreased during five of the six months, but no definite patterns in actions and targets were discernible.

(C) Government Communiqués, Decrees, and Announcements of Plans (U)

(C) During seven months of the period being studied, officials issued communiqués and decrees, or made announcements in official speeches, of the government's intention to institute political reform, hold elections, or pardon members of the Viet Cong. During five of those months the number of reported Viet Cong terrorist incidents was less than the previous months' totals. The two exceptions were April 1964, when plans for an elected constituent assembly were announced (the same month that one of Diem's brothers was sentenced to death), and May 1966 when Premier Ky issued a decree on elections.

(C) The decrease in national totals usually resulted from a reduction in harassing fire or harassment. However, during those same months kidnapings or assassinations increased, usually directed against government officials, and in some cases against hamlet officials. The types of incidents that increased during months in which future elections were announced or decreed are similar to those that increased when elections actually were held: assassinations, kidnapings, and harassing fire or harassments primarily against civilians and government officials. No pattern appears for any of the five provinces except perhaps Vinh Binh where terrorism increased in those months, usually as a result of a rise in harassing fire against various targets.

(C) Resignations or Purges of Government Officials (U)

(C) In three months during which high government officials resigned or were purged by higher authorities, the Viet Cong reduced the total number of terrorist actions. Only this general observation for the country as a whole can be made, since types and numbers of actions and targets varied considerably.

(C) The only consistent change in any of the five provinces was in Vinh Binh where the total increased in the months during which such events took place. There, the Viet Cong increased harassing fire in each instance, while kidnapings and actions against civilians and government officials increased in two months.

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(C) Revolts (U)

(C) Terrorist incidents generally increased during the two tribal revolts of September 1964 and December 1965. In both months the Viet Cong actions increased by more than 100; harassing fire, harassments, and kidnappings were increased. During the 1964 revolt the primary targets were NRL hamlets; during 1965 they were civilians and police.

(C) Incidents increased in three of the five provinces. In Tay Ninh, there was an increase of harassments and assassinations in one instance and of kidnappings in the other; civilians were the preferred targets. In Gia Dinh, kidnappings, harassments, and harassing fire, principally against NRL hamlets during 1964, and against hamlet officials, civilians, and police during 1965, increased. Harassments or harassing fire and kidnappings were the types of actions increased in Vinh Binh.

(C) Open Arms Policy, Release of Prisoners, and Amnesties (U)

(C) Viet Cong terrorism, nationwide, increased in April 1963, May 1964, and December 1965, when the government offered pardons to individuals or opposition groups. Thua Thien was the only province in which terrorist activities increased during all three months; in Gia Dinh and Vinh Binh, an increase appeared only in May 1964 and December 1965, respectively. However, no pattern of actions and targets emerged clearly at either the national or the provincial level.

(C) Social and Political Reforms (U)

(C) During July 1964, the repeal of an old Diem-imposed family law was accompanied by an increase of nearly 400 terrorist incidents. During October 1964, with the establishment of a new constitution, a decrease of nearly 300 incidents was recorded. Although this change appeared at both national and provincial levels, no clear pattern of the type of actions and targets emerged.

(C) Regional Conferences of International Importance (U)

(C) The total number of terrorist incidents decreased in months when the government of South Vietnam met with other nations in regional conferences. In both February and October of 1966, harassing fire and minings decreased, although assassinations increased. In February, actions against structures decreased, but actions against persons increased. In both months, incidents of harassing fire against village offices in Vinh Binh increased; no consistent pattern is seen in the other four provinces.

(C) Other Events (U)

(C) Single occurrences of three other types of political events were included in the study, but no light was shed on Viet Cong use of terrorism. Diem's brother was executed in May 1964; a warning was issued by the Viet Cong in March 1965; and a political convention was held in April 1966. In the months when the first two events occurred, Viet Cong terrorism increased, but decreased during the month when the convention was held.

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(C) Conclusions (U)

(C) There appears to be a significant relationship between the variation in number and types of terrorist action and major political events. Several sorts of major political events have been consistently accompanied by either increases or decreases in Viet Cong terrorist acts. Rises were reported in months when governments were overthrown by military coups. National and provincial elections also were accompanied by increases in Viet Cong terrorism. And whenever the government attempted, by announcing pardons or amnesties, to win over Viet Cong agents or sympathizers, there were increases in Viet Cong terrorism.

(C) Decreases in Viet Cong terrorism occurred after the imposition of martial law or other government restrictions on activities, the establishment of a new government or the introduction of major changes in the old one, and the releasing of communiqués or announcements whose content indicated plans for change or reform. Whenever martial law or stringent government regulations were lifted, however, there usually was an upswing in Viet Cong terrorism. Martial law or a state of siege usually was declared during strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of civil disturbances called by opposition groups. But the Viet Cong, who may have had a hand in instigating the disturbances, failed to take full advantage of the resulting instability and confusion, presumably because the security forces had control of the situation.

(C) NATIONAL AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS AND TERRORISM (U)


(U) In the following section the relationship between national and religious holidays and the incidence of Viet Cong terrorism is analyzed (see Figure 11). Special days commemorated by the Viet Cong are included.

(C) Tet Tan Sun (U)

(C) The Vietnamese lunar new year, or Tet Tan Sun, is the most widely known holiday outside of Vietnam; its celebration has been associated with well-publicized pauses in military activities on both sides. In recent years, Tet has been a three-day affair, part of which is reserved for visiting parents, elders, relatives, and friends, and has been observed by most members of the Viet Cong.* Tet is usually in late January or early February; in 1963, 1964, and 1965 it fell in February, and in 1966 it was celebrated the latter part of January.

(C) The Viet Cong have always announced weeks in advance by radio and leaflets and in lectures that they would observe Tet by a military cease-fire. At the same time, Viet Cong directives urged units and supporters to increase their terrorist activities prior to Tet. The almost complete absence of terrorist incidents during Tet usually has been preceded by a high level of activity; and Tet has been followed by a resumption of great activity.² As a result, total incidents in February 1964 exceeded the previous month's total despite the week-long halt during Tet.³ The same explanation presumably holds for 1965: In that year Tet was celebrated during the first week of February, so the increased activity prior to the holidays would have been reported in January, which included 64 more incidents of terrorism than February's total. In 1966, Tet was celebrated in the latter part of January, a month in which total incidents were lower than the total for December 1965.

* (C) J2 MACV interrogation reports and captured Viet Cong documents indicate that the Viet Cong generally observe Tet.



(C) Figure 11. National and Religious Holidays and Total Terrorist Actions (U)

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(C) Nationally, the change in Viet Cong terrorism during the month in which Tet was celebrated showed no consistent pattern. In 1963, monthly totals increased slightly from 36 incidents in January to 38 in February and in 1964 from 403 in January to 424 in February. During 1965 the figures for the two months were 563 and 499, respectively, the first presumably reflecting the higher rate of Viet Cong activity prior to Tet and the second the lack of activity during the Tet holiday. Since the number of Viet Cong terrorist incidents rose again in March 1965, the evidence that the Viet Cong make up for the actions missed during the cease-fire period is persuasive. In 1966, the January total of 344 was a drop from 482 the previous month.

(C) During the month Tet was celebrated in 1964, there were fifteen incidents each of harassing fire and kidnaping reported; assassinations accounted for five of the actions. Government officials, particularly at village and hamlet levels, were the primary targets, and hamlets were secondary. Hamlets became the primary targets in February 1964, with few incidents involving government officials; the number of kidnappings and assassinations dropped, and incidents of harassing fire rose to 412. One year later, in February 1965, the Viet Cong were still concentrating on hamlets and, to some extent, villages and civil facilities. Harassing fire and harassment were the main types of action. Civilians had become prominent targets, and again a wide use of kidnaping and assassination appeared. By the time of the Tet celebration in January 1966, the Viet Cong had focused most of their efforts on civilians, while district towns and hamlets were secondary targets. Harassing fire was normally directed against structures, while harassments, more numerous than incidents of harassing fire, along with kidnappings and assassinations were aimed at civilians.

(C) Le Van Duyet Day (U)

(C) Le Van Duyet day honors the man who unified the country of Vietnam during the early part of the 19th century. It is celebrated during or near the time of Tet. In 1963, this national holiday fell toward the latter part of January, a few days before Tet. In 1964, it was again celebrated shortly before Tet, but during the cease-fire period recognized by the Viet Cong. In 1965 and 1966, it was celebrated during the Tet holidays. This overlap tends to obscure any effect that Le Van Duyet day might have on Viet Cong use of terrorism.

(C) Hai Ba Trung Day (U)

(C) In the last part of February or early in March the Vietnamese celebrate Hai Ba Trung day, commemorating the anniversary of the death of the Trung sisters who led a revolt against the ruling Chinese in 41 A. D. In 1963, 1964, and 1965, Hai Ba Trung day was celebrated on March 1, March 19, and March 8, respectively; in 1966 it was celebrated on February 25.

(C) There was no increase in reported Viet Cong incidents of terrorism during March in 1963 that could have been attributed to the celebration of Hai Ba Trung; the total in that month was 38, the same as in the previous month, and kidnappings and assassinations against government officials continued to characterize the larger part of the incidents. In March 1964, incidents decreased from 424 in February to 389. Most of these were incidents of harassing fire against hamlets; secondary targets were government officials who were either kidnaped or assassinated. In March 1965 incidents went to 562 from 499 in February; actions were chiefly harassments and harassing fire against hamlets, followed by kidnappings and assassinations involving civilians and government officials. Hai Ba Trung day was celebrated during February in 1966, and whatever effect the holiday may have had on the monthly total of Viet Cong terrorism was obscured by other celebrations during the same month.

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(C) Birth, Enlightenment, and Death of Buddha; Anniversary of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu; International Labor Day (U)

(C) One of the most important religious holidays for the Vietnamese is the celebration of the Birth, Enlightenment, and Death of Buddha. This special day was celebrated in May in all four years. It is the same month during which the Viet Cong commemorate the fall of Dien Bien Phu and celebrate International Labor day. Except for 1963, there was an increase in the rate of terrorism during these celebrations.

(C) In May 1963, the total decreased (to 45 from 55 in April) and the Viet Cong were equally interested in striking at NRL hamlets with harassing fire, and kidnaping and assassinating government officials. The increase during May 1964, from 482 in April to 601, represented a rise in harassments against NRL hamlets; unfortified hamlets also were heavily struck by the same type of action; kidnaping and assassination of civilians were third in frequency. By May 1965, when total incidents of terrorism rose from 470 to 533, harassing fire and harassment directed against both NRL hamlets and unfortified hamlets still constituted the largest part of the Viet Cong effort. The number of kidnapings and assassinations involving civilians, however, was increasing gradually. During the same month in 1966, the total rose from 267 to 315 incidents. This rise represented an increase in harassing fire, assassinations, and kidnapings, mostly involving hamlets, villages, and civilians.

(C) Hung Vuong Day and Doan Ngo (U)

(C) Hung Vuong day, set aside by the Vietnamese to commemorate the founder of Vietnam's first dynasty, was celebrated during June in two years and during May in the other two. Doan Ngo, primarily a religious ceremony opening the summer season, was celebrated in June in all four years.

(C) Viet Cong terrorism increased during these celebrations in three of the four years. In June 1963, an increase in incidents of harassing fire, assassination, and kidnaping pushed the total up from 45 in May to 72; NRL hamlets and village officials were the primary targets. An increase in similar actions in June 1964 raised the total from 601 to 670, with NRL hamlets, hamlet officials, and civilians the targets of a large part of the actions. NRL hamlets, villages, civil facilities, and civilians were the chief targets in June 1965, when total actions increased from 533 to 722. The total went down from 315 to 262 in June 1966, representing a decrease in harassing fire, kidnapings, and assassinations; the targets relieved from pressure at this time included New Rural Life hamlets, district towns, and civilians.

(C) Trung Nguyen (U)

(C) Trung Nguyen (Wandering Souls day) was celebrated in August all four years from 1963 through 1966, and in each instance the Viet Cong carried out fewer acts of terrorism than they did in July. In August 1963 the total went down from 70 to 49, affecting all types of actions except assassinations. Most targets were affected by the decrease except civilians, who were subjected to an increase in terrorism. The total in August 1964 dropped from 1,009 to 717, this time representing a drop in all actions except kidnapings against most targets; actions against village and hamlet officials increased slightly. In August 1965, the total dropped from 541 to 326; all actions were reduced by the Viet Cong and nearly all of the targets were included in the decrease. The decrease in August 1966 was from 196 to 161 incidents. Incidents of harassing fire, kidnappings, and kidnapings decreased, but harassments and assassinations increased.

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(C) Tran Hung Dao Day and Le Loi Day (U)

(C) Two Vietnamese national holidays, Tran Hung Dao day and Le Loi day, falling within several days of each other, were celebrated in months experiencing an increase in Viet Cong terrorism in three of the four years. The first holiday commemorates the victory by Emperor Tran Hung Dao over the Mongols in 1284; the second commemorates the heroism of Le Loi, the son of a rich cultivator who launched a ten-year struggle for the recovery of national freedom and independence from the Ming Dynasty toward the latter part of the 14th century.

(C) These holidays were celebrated during the month of October in 1963, when the Viet Cong stepped up their terrorist activities to raise total incidents from 104 to 153. Incidents of harassing fire and kidnappings increased, and by far the most important targets at that time were the New Rural Life hamlets. Celebrations were held during September in 1964, a month in which incidents rose from 717 to 898. Harassing fire, harassments, minings, and kidnappings all increased. During 1965 these two holidays again were celebrated in September, a month when total incidents rose from 326 to 362. The rise represented almost entirely an increase in assassinations and kidnappings, most of them against civilians. In October 1966, these two holidays were celebrated in the early part of the month, and terrorist incidents decreased from 358 to 265, although assassinations and kidnappings increased.

(C) Birth of Confucius; National Day; the Anniversary of the Namky Insurrection (U)

(U) The anniversary of the birth of Confucius, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic of Vietnam, and the Viet Cong celebration of the anniversary of the Namky insurrection usually occur during November. In 1965, the birth of Confucius was celebrated in October, and National Day was celebrated in October until 1964, when it was changed to November 2, to commemorate the fall of Diem.

(C) During November 1963, Viet Cong terrorist activities increased, but in the same month in 1964, 1965, and 1966, they decreased. The rise in 1963, from 153 to 798, was almost entirely accounted for by incidents of harassing fire against New Rural Life hamlets, unfortified hamlets, and villages. The decrease in 1964 from 611 to 518 represented a drop in all actions except minings and kidnappings. In November 1965, harassments and minings increased, but all other actions decreased, so that the total (348) was almost the same as the October one (349). In November 1966, the total dropped from 265 to 181, as most actions except minings decreased.

(C) Foundation of the Liberation Army; the Birth of Christ (U)

(C) The foundation of the Liberation Army and Christmas are both celebrated in December and, in spite of the cease-fire agreed upon by both sides at the time of the Christmas holidays, Viet Cong terrorism usually has increased during that month. December 1963 was the one exception: the number of terrorist actions decreased from 798 to 513, almost entirely as a result of a decrease in incidents of harassing fire against NRL and other hamlets. In 1964, the total increased from 518 to 576 in December, as harassing fire, harassments, minings, and assassinations increased; NRL hamlets, villages, and civil facilities were prime targets. In December 1965, the rise was from 348 to 482, reflecting an increase in harassing fire, harassments, assassinations, and kidnappings, generally directed at civilians, district towns, NRL hamlets, villages, and village offices. In 1966, totals rose from 181 in November to 207

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in December; all actions except minings and kidnapings were increased, and more than half involved civilians.

(C) Conclusions (U)

(C) No direct association appears between available data on acts of Viet Cong terrorism and national and religious holidays. The use of monthly totals prevents a really discriminating examination of any such relationship. Because two or three holidays may be celebrated during the same month, the relationship, if any, between terrorist actions and any particular holiday is obscured.

(C) In 32 of the 48 months from January 1963 through December 1966, national and religious holidays as well as several Viet Cong commemorative days were celebrated. In sixteen of these months, the rate of Viet Cong terrorism increased; in fifteen it decreased; and in one month it showed no change.

(C) The month in which Trung Nguyen or Wandering Souls day was celebrated was the only one in which terrorist totals varied consistently: in all four years they decreased, usually reflecting a drop in all types of actions except those against persons—assassinations or kidnapings and harassments.

(C) Despite cease-fires agreed upon by both sides in recent years, Tet and the Christmas holidays usually have been celebrated during months when Viet Cong terrorism was on the upswing. Directives to Viet Cong units to increase activities to maintain a relatively steady state of terrorist actions account in part for the rises in January, February, and December.

(C) MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS AND VIET CONG TERRORISM (U)

(U) In the following examination of the relation between Viet Cong terrorism and military operations, both Allied and Viet Cong, only those operations within or near the five provinces selected are considered. Viet Cong subdivisions and military regions appear in Figure 12. Only major military operations, generally involving large units in three or more days of exercises (not necessarily actual combat), are considered in the analysis.


(C) There is some indication that the Viet Cong leadership, faced with Allied sweep operations or support of their own large-scale movements, ordered a step-up of terrorist activities. These activities were used primarily as population control measures⁴ and secondarily to mobilize laborers for different phases of a large-scale operation,⁵ recruit for short tours of duty,⁶ or even organize the collection of booty and cheer on Viet Cong guerrillas during operations.⁷ Increases in harassing fire, harassment, and kidnaping resulted.

(C) Operations in 1963 (U)

(C) In 1963, the Viet Cong scored heavily against the South Vietnamese armed forces. Although they could credit themselves with only one major military victory, they had held their ground and improved their general military position. RVN forces had also had some successes, but had been unable to crush the growing insurgent movement.⁸

(C) Ap Bac Counterattack. The chief Viet Cong military victory, in the Ap Bac area of Dinh Tuong Province in January 1963, was the result of a counterattack against RVN forces.

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(C) Figure 12. Viet Cong Subdivisions and Military Regions (U)

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In that same month, 36 Viet Cong terrorist actions were reported throughout South Vietnam. Gia Dinh and Vinh Binh, closer to the battle area than the other selected provinces, experienced little terrorism—only one incident being reported in each province.

(C) RVN Sweep. In February 1963, the RVN armed forces initiated a sweep operation in "Zone D" area, in Phuoc Thanh Province north of Saigon. Estimates in 1963 indicated that the area was the main center of Viet Cong strength⁹ and that it apparently had been infiltrated for some time.¹⁰ There were 38 incidents of Viet Cong terrorism reported in South Vietnam in that month. Of the five selected provinces, Tay Ninh and Gia Dinh were closest to the area, but no incidents were reported from either province.

(C) Plain of Reeds Operation. In March, 7,000 South Vietnamese troops entered the Plain of Reeds, an area west of Saigon that extends along the Cambodian border. This move was not accompanied by any nationwide rise in Viet Cong terrorism, but there were two incidents reported in Vinh Binh, a province in the same Viet Cong military zone as the area of operation, and there were three incidents in Gia Dinh, which lies within 50 miles of the area. All three incidents in Gia Dinh were bombings of houses, while there was one harassing fire and one assassination of a village official in Vinh Binh.

(C) RVN Offensives. The Viet Cong in April and May stepped up their nationwide terrorist campaign (55 and 45 incidents, respectively) and, at the same time, government troops launched a series of offensives in the Plain of Reeds, close to the provincial city of Moc Hoa in Kien Tuong Province. Tay Ninh was the only nearby province out of the five that had incidents reported in April (one assassination and one kidnaping of a village official); Gia Dinh was the only one in May (harassing fire against an NRL hamlet and a bombing of a house).

(C) Viet Cong Operation. A Viet Cong operation south of Ca Mau in An Xuyen Province in the latter part of November 1963 resulted in the destruction of an RVN system of military outposts and strategic hamlets. A great upsurge in Viet Cong terrorism occurred nationally during that month—from 153 to 798 reported incidents. In all likelihood, this rise was a result of a coup that overthrew Diem early in the month and presumably had little to do with the Viet Cong operation at the country's southern tip. In Vinh Binh, in the same military zone as An Xuyen, total reported incidents fell from seven in October to five in November.

(C) Operations in 1964 (U)

(C) Three RVN Offensives. Three offensive operations were conducted by RVN forces in January 1964. One, a sweep operation in Binh Duong Province, consisted primarily of unsuccessfully chasing Communist guerrillas for nearly a week; another, in Binh Dinh, was an attack on a large Viet Cong base; the third, in Kien Hoa's Thanh Phu district, was designed to stop a series of Viet Cong successes in the province. Decreases in Viet Cong terrorism accompanied these operations at both the national and provincial levels. Total incidents nationwide dropped from 513 in December 1963 to 403 in January 1964. In Tay Ninh, bordering Binh Duong on the west, the total during the same two months fell from 24 to four. In Gia Dinh, a province immediately south of Binh Duong, the totals were twelve and eleven. In Binh Dinh, scene of the second major operation, incidents dropped from 56 to 24. And finally, in Vinh Binh, which borders Kien Hoa on the south, Viet Cong actions were reduced from eight to five. Except for a mining incident reported in Gia Dinh, the incidents in the three provinces during January were mostly of harassing fire against New Rural Life hamlets.

(C) Viet Cong Initiatives West of Saigon. Taking the initiative in February, the Viet Cong launched two major offensives, one in Tay Ninh and the other in the Plain of Reeds. A Viet

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Cong radio directive that month ordered a renewed campaign against NRL hamlets. The number of terrorist actions increased from 403 to 424; however, total incidents against NRL hamlets declined from 266 to 194 and continued to decrease until April. In Tay Ninh, the Viet Cong increased their actions from four to six, concentrating on NRL hamlets. Gia Dinh and Vinh Binh reported eleven and five incidents, respectively, and actions against the NRL hamlets were not stepped up in either province.

(C) RVN Initiatives. In April, the South Vietnamese armed forces were particularly active in two areas: Tay Ninh, where they staged an invasion of what was believed to be the Viet Cong headquarters, and the Mekong Delta area, where they attempted to counter heavy Viet Cong attacks. On a nationwide basis, terrorist incidents rose by nearly 100 to a total of 482, nearly one-third of which were against civilians. In Tay Ninh, total Viet Cong terrorist acts increased from eleven to 27, targets included hamlets 22 times and civilians three. In Gia Dinh, nine more incidents than the previous month were reported, civilians being involved in more than half. In Vinh Binh, terrorist actions rose from eight to 25, over half of which were against hamlets.

(C) Delta Operations. In August 1964, both the Viet Cong and the RVN forces were active in the northern part of the delta area west of Saigon—one attacking government outposts and the other pursuing Viet Cong units. A nationwide decrease in Viet Cong terrorism accompanied these activities; the total in August was 717, as compared with 1,009 in July. Harassment was the most frequent type of action, although declining from a total of 351; harassing fire and kidnappings next (175 and 134). NRL hamlets were targets in 304 incidents, while civilians, unfortified hamlets, and government officials, in that order, were next most favored targets.

(C) An examination of Viet Cong activities at the provincial level during August reveals that the patterns of action in provinces in or near the areas of military operation differ from those in more distant provinces. In Tay Ninh and Gia Dinh, total actions fell from 26 to 20 and from 30 to 28; in Vinh Binh, the total went up slightly from 23 to 24. The predominant types of actions in these three provinces included harassing fire and harassments with few or no assassinations or kidnappings reported. Most incidents were directed against NRL hamlets and unfortified hamlets rather than against civilians. In the northern provinces of Thua Thien and Binh Dinh, however, the incident rate dropped sharply from 102 to 63 and from 139 to 95. In both provinces harassment was the most widely used action, followed by kidnaping. In Binh Dinh, assassinations nearly equaled kidnappings. Although NRL hamlets were the chief targets, civilians were the second.

(C) An Lao Valley. Early in December 1964, Viet Cong forces swept across the An Lao Valley in Binh Dinh; the valley fell into Viet Cong hands after RVN reinforcements were pushed back. The nationwide total of terrorist incidents during that month rose to 576 from 518, but in Binh Dinh the number dropped from 75 in November to 46 in December. Types of actions and targets remained the same. But in Thua Thien, which lies within the same Viet Cong military zone as Binh Dinh, the monthly total of incidents almost doubled, from 44 to 73, with actions and targets remaining basically the same.

(C) Operations in 1965 (U)

(C) Advanced Viet Cong War Phase. Two of the five provinces—Thua Thien and Binh Dinh—were scenes of much military activity in February 1965, as the Viet Cong reportedly entered phase three in their war against the government of South Vietnam. Large-scale military

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actions took place around Hue in Thua Thien and in north and central Binh Dinh; some minor actions occurred near Qui Nhon in the southern part of Binh Dinh. The Viet Cong decreased their terrorist activities in many provinces, and the national total declined from 563 in January to 499 in February. In Thua Thien, the number of incidents decreased from 74 to 51, representing primarily a reduction in harassments against hamlets. Assassinations and kidnappings of civilians actually increased. In Binh Dinh, however, the monthly total rose from 36 to 57, the result of an increased number of harassments directed at hamlets.

(C) Allied Operations. In March, major Allied military operations centered on the city of Danang (site of an important airbase), in Quang Nam Province, and around Tay Ninh, a Viet Cong stronghold. At the same time the Viet Cong increased terrorist activities; the nationwide total was 562, most of the increase being accounted for by harassments against unfortified hamlets and kidnappings of civilians. In Thua Thien, bordering Quang Nam on the north, the number of incidents rose from 51 to 67, mostly harassments against unfortified hamlets; assassinations and kidnappings were fewer in March than in February. In Binh Dinh, south of Quang Nam but within the same Viet Cong military zone, there were few changes, the total being 58 (up one) with the same types of actions and targets. Tay Ninh experienced an increase (from six incidents to twelve) which included renewed action against government officials and civilians. While the total was increased by only one incident in Gia Dinh, the focus changed from harassments against NRL hamlets to the kidnaping of civilians.

(C) Northern Activities. An upward trend in reported Viet Cong terrorism was observable in May 1965, as more U. S. troops arrived in the Danang and Chulai areas and large-scale actions were launched by the Viet Cong in five northern provinces. The national total rose from 470 incidents in April to 533 in May. In the area of action, some provinces reported increases and some reported decreases. Incidents in Thua Thien dropped from 49 to 41, with fewer assassinations and kidnappings, because most activities were directed against hamlets. In Binh Dinh the incident rate increased from 17 to 27, especially incidents of harassing fire and harassment of persons.

(C) Viet Cong Monsoon Offensive. In June the Viet Cong mounted a monsoon offensive in Thua Thien and a sustained operation in Quang Ngai. These coincided with a national increase of nearly 200 acts of terrorism. During this month, increases in both Thua Thien and Binh Dinh were reported as the totals went up to 51 and 53 from 41 and 27, respectively. The Viet Cong in Thua Thien redirected their effort against civilians. In Binh Dinh, a large part of the increase represented actions against hamlets.

(C) Allied Operations North and East of Saigon. A drop in Viet Cong terrorism appeared in July, when Allied forces began large-scale military operations in War Zone D and Bien Hoa Province, north and east of Saigon, respectively. The national total of incidents fell from 722 to 541. However, increases were reported in two provinces: Gia Dinh (bounded in part by both provinces involved in the Allied operations), where the rate went from 26 to 32, with a greater percentage of actions against government officials and civilians, and Tay Ninh (slightly distant and to the northwest of the area of operation), where the total for the month went from seven to twelve. Actions involving civilians accounted for four.

(C) Allied Operations in Quang Ngai and Phuoc Tuy. A sharp drop in incidents of Viet Cong terrorism was reported in August 1965, the same month in which U. S. Marines launched a large-scale operation in the Chulai area, north of the city of Quang Ngai, and another Allied operation got under way in Phuoc Tuy, a coastal province east of Saigon. The national total of incidents decreased from 541 to 326. In Thua Thien, north of Chulai, the decrease was from 50 to seventeen (a reduction in all actions against all targets reported in July, with

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civilians the main focus of Viet Cong harassments, and hamlets in second place). The total in Binh Dinh, south of the Chulai area, also dropped, from 25 to eleven, but ten of these—eight harassments and two kidnappings—were against civilians. Gia Dinh, west of Phuoc Tuy, also experienced some drop in Viet Cong terrorist activities (32 to 27), with hamlets and civilians being chief targets.

(C) Allied Sweep Operations. Nationally, the number of terrorist incidents increased to 362 in September. Allied sweep operations in the northern part of South Vietnam continued, particularly around Chulai in Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, and around Qui Nhon and An Khe in Binh Dinh. In Thua Thien, there were ten more incidents, directed in large part—eighteen compared with thirteen in August—against civilians. Terrorist operations also increased in Binh Dinh, from eleven to twenty, the chief activity continuing to be harassment of civilians, but with harassing fire against district towns also figuring prominently.

(C) Intensification of the War in Northern Provinces. As military operations were intensified by both sides in the northern part of South Vietnam in October, the number of incidents decreased slightly to 349. Most of the military action was concentrated in Binh Dinh, where large North Vietnamese units faced joint U. S. -South Vietnamese operations and where units of the Tiger Division from Korea landed and fanned out from the port city of Qui Nhon. The Viet Cong terrorism decreased in Binh Dinh itself, from twenty to sixteen, but in Thua Thien terrorist actions rose from 27 to 43, concentrated mostly on civilians.

(C) Ia Drang Valley Operations. In November, the Viet Cong maintained about the same rate of terrorism as in October—only one incident less. Major military operations at this time were being conducted in the Ia Drang Valley in Pleiku where North Vietnamese troops were fighting conventional combat operations against units of the U. S. Army. In Binh Dinh and Thua Thien, both of which fall within the same Viet Cong military zone, terrorist actions declined from sixteen to five and from 43 to 28, respectively. Harassing fire against structures was reported in Binh Dinh, while in Thua Thien the terrorist drive was against civilians (targets in 22 of the 28 incidents in November).

(C) Allied Sweep in Quang Tin. An eleven-day sweep operation was launched by Allied forces in Quang Tin Province in December 1965, a month during which terrorist operations increased nationwide from 348 to 480 incidents. In Thua Thien, north of Quang Tin, total actions went up from 28 to 43, civilians being involved in 37 (25 harassments, six assassinations, and six kidnappings). Seven incidents reported in Binh Dinh also involved civilians as the number of terrorist actions there increased from five to twelve.

(C) Operations in 1966 (U)

(C) Scattered Allied Operations. In January 1966 the Allied forces initiated major military operations in the Mekong Delta and in Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen—an area referred to as the Iron Triangle—north and northwest of Saigon. All of this activity was accompanied by a general decrease in terrorism, the total incidents dropping from 482 to 344. In Thua Thien, north of Quang Ngai (where the U. S. Marines were involved in a large-scale offensive), there were eleven terrorist operations, compared with 42 the previous month; harassments, assassinations, and kidnappings of civilians made up this total. In Binh Dinh where Operation Masher was in full swing, and from where the South Korean troops swept into Phu Yen, there were also eleven incidents; civilians and hamlet officials were the chief targets of harassments and assassinations. Tay Ninh's total dropped from eleven to two, both actions against structures. In Gia Dinh, the number of incidents dropped from 39 to nineteen; of nine targets

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involved, five were civilians. Six incidents were reported in Vinh Binh—a drop from sixteen; district towns and villages were the main targets.

(C) Sweeping Military Operations. In February, Thua Thien, Quang Ngai, and Binh Dinh were the major sites of sweeping military operations. The pace of terrorism in South Vietnam continued to decline, with 315 incidents reported. Incidents in Thua Thien dropped to five. In Binh Dinh, terrorist actions totaled twelve, mainly civilians who became involved in ten incidents of harassment.

(C) Continued Allied Operations. In March 1966 terrorist incidents were further reduced to 307, as Allied forces continued their operations in Thua Thien and Quang Ngai and initiated other operations in Tay Ninh and the delta region. Only three incidents were reported in Thua Thien, two against district towns. In Binh Dinh, the total rose to fifteen, with civilians involved in seven of them. In Gia Dinh, the number of terrorist incidents rose from twenty to 28 (twelve involving civilians, and four of the eight actions against government officials being directed toward the police). An increase was also reported in Vinh Binh where the total went up from twelve to twenty; NRL hamlets were selected over other targets, and civilians were involved in five of the incidents.

(C) U. S. Marines and South Vietnamese Troops in Northern Provinces. Total incidents of terrorism dropped for the fourth consecutive month in April 1966. U. S. Marines were involved in one of the largest battles of the war up to that time in Quang Ngai Province, and large units of South Vietnamese troops moved into Danang and Hue. Both Thua Thien and Binh Dinh reported slight increases in Viet Cong terrorism during this month, totals rising to seven and seventeen, respectively. On five separate occasions in Thua Thien civilians were involved in incidents of harassment, assassination, and kidnaping—indicating new priorities in that province. In Binh Dinh the drive against civilians was also stepped up, all but four of the incidents being directed against them.

(C) Scattered Allied Operations. In May a 21-day sweep through Binh Dinh was begun, Operation Paul Revere was launched on the border area west of Pleiku, and the delta area was again the site of a major military drive. Incidents rose to a total of 315. North of Binh Dinh in Thua Thien Province, attention was focused on government officials and civilians, who were involved in seven out of eight incidents. In Binh Dinh itself, Viet Cong terrorism was decreased to eleven incidents, five of the actions being against civilians and three against hamlet officials. Civilians were also the principal target in four of the five incidents reported in Tay Ninh. In Gia Dinh, terrorist actions declined slightly from 35 to 33, but the number of incidents against civilians increased from ten to sixteen; the drive against police in this province let up a little as the total of such incidents fell from ten to seven. In Vinh Binh, there was a sharp jump from four to 23 incidents, ten of them against hamlets and eight against civilians.

(C) Continued Allied Sweeps. Viet Cong terrorism dropped in June as the 21-day sweep operation in Binh Dinh and the drive in the delta continued, while U. S. paratroopers engaged the Viet Cong in Kontum and U. S. forces launched Operation El Paso II, 60 miles north of Saigon. Terrorist activity in Thua Thien was stepped up slightly again, from eight to nine incidents, the list of targets including civilians, hamlet officials, and police. The Binh Dinh total fell to six incidents, all against hamlets and villages. In Gia Dinh, of the 23 incidents reported, fourteen involved civilians. The total went down to eighteen in Vinh Binh, where civilians and hamlets were the main targets.

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(C) Activity Along the DMZ. Another drop (from 262 to 196) in Viet Cong terrorism occurred in July, when the principal military activity took place in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in the northern part of South Vietnam. Terrorism in Thua Thien increased by one incident during that month, including four actions against civilians and three against villages. No actions were reported in Binh Dinh.

(C) Northern and Delta Operations. The total Viet Cong incidents of terrorism declined for the third straight month in August 1966, reaching the lowest figure (161) since October 1963. During that month, Operation Colorado was launched south of Danang, and U. S. forces moved into the delta area, starting with the landing of troops east of Saigon in Operation Toledo. In Thua Thien, north of the Danang area, terrorism was stepped up to seventeen incidents, actions against civilians accounting for twelve. All of the nine incidents in Binh Dinh were directed against civilians. In Tay Ninh, the total increased from two to three incidents—two against hamlets and one against civilians. In Gia Dinh civilians were involved in eight of the fourteen incidents—two less than the previous month's total. In Vinh Binh, the total declined from sixteen to seven, including three incidents against hamlets and two against civilians.

(C) Delta Sweep and Marine Landing in Quang Tri. The jump to 358 incidents in September coincided with a sweep operation through the delta and the landing of U. S. Marines in Quang Tri. In Thua Thien the Viet Cong increased their acts of terrorism from seventeen to 30, more than doubling their effort against civilians (targets on 27 occasions). In Binh Dinh, there was a slight drop from nine to eight; three of the actions were leveled against civilians and two at district towns. The Viet Cong in Tay Ninh divided their two-incident effort between a New Rural Life hamlet and a hamlet official. They were very active in Gia Dinh, however, where actions increased from fourteen to 63. There were 41 incidents of harassing fire (nineteen of them against civilians), eight kidnappings, five assassinations, five harassments, and four minings. Altogether, civilians were involved in 29 incidents and government officials in thirteen (including seven police). Actions also increased in Vinh Binh, from seven to 21—six of which involved civilians.

(C) South Korean and U. S. Operations. There were two major operations in October: South Korean troops moved large numbers of refugees from the mountain areas to Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh, and U. S. forces launched Operation Attleboro in Tay Ninh, about 60 miles northwest of Saigon. Total incidents of terrorism decreased. In Thua Thien, terrorist activities dropped from 30 to nine incidents; although six of the nine were directed against civilians. Terrorism was also reduced in Binh Dinh—from eight to five incidents, three involving civilians. Gia Dinh experienced the greatest reduction in terrorist activities, the total dropping from 63 to twenty incidents, fifteen of them involving civilians. Tay Ninh's total rose from two to four incidents, all of them against civilians. And in Vinh Binh, where the number of incidents rose from 21 to 35, villages and village offices were the principal targets, civilians accounting for only eight.

(C) Operation in Tay Ninh. About the only large-scale operation in progress during November was Operation Attleboro in Tay Ninh. There was a general drop in Viet Cong terrorism. The drop was slight in Tay Ninh—from four to three incidents—and village officials were primary targets. To the southeast, in Gia Dinh, the total dropped from 35 to 21, but the civilian population was involved in fourteen actions. A substantial drop was also reported in Vinh Binh—from 35 to eight, with three actions each against civilians and NRL hamlets.

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(C) Conclusions (U)

(C) In Tay Ninh, in those months during which large-scale Viet Cong or Allied operations were undertaken within its boundaries, terrorism tended to increase and be generally directed against civilians. Although figures are small, when operations were conducted in other parts of the same Viet Cong military region, the incidence of terrorism in Tay Ninh generally declined. (See Figure 12 for Viet Cong military regions.)

(C) Terrorist actions were just as likely to decrease in Thua Thien as they were to increase in months when large-scale military operations were conducted within the province or close by. However, examined more closely, the information does suggest that in months when military operations were conducted outside the province they were accompanied by increases in Viet Cong terrorism, and the months when military operations were conducted within province boundaries were accompanied by decreases.

(C) In Vinh Binh, the Viet Cong generally increased terrorist activities in months when large-scale operations were conducted in the province or nearby in the same military region. Such increases were chiefly accounted for by actions against civilians, and secondarily by actions against hamlets.

(C) In Binh Dinh, terrorist actions were as likely to decrease as to increase in months when large-scale military operations were conducted in the province or close by. It does appear, however, that in months when military operations were conducted outside the province, increases in terrorist incidents were registered, while there was a decrease in incidents when military operations were conducted within provincial boundaries.

(C) In Gia Dinh, Viet Cong terrorism generally decreased when military operations were conducted in or near the province. However, in those months when total terrorist incidents decreased, actions against civilians often increased.

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(C) CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT (U)

(C) SEASONAL CYCLES AND AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AND TERRORISM (U)

(U) In the following pages monthly totals of incidents of Viet Cong terrorism will be discussed in relation to rainfall patterns and associated agricultural activities. Because of the great variation in rainfall and agricultural activities in different parts of South Vietnam, the analysis will be made at the province level. Weather information from the South Vietnamese Directorate of Meteorology for 1966 was not available, so the discussion is focused on the years 1964 and 1965. On the basis of 1964 and 1965 weather information, a projection into 1966 has been made, since periods of wet and dry weather and the concomitant agricultural activities recur at the same time year after year with great consistency, barring a natural disaster.

(U) There are two main reasons why seasonal cycles and agricultural activities are related to changes in monthly totals of Viet Cong incidents of terrorism. First, weather has some impact on Viet Cong operations and acts either as an encumbrance or an aid. Thus, heavy rainfall is an encumbrance when it bogs down the movement of troops and supplies, but an aid when it floods waterways that are impassable during the dry seasons. Second, rainfall largely determines the schedule for planting and harvesting rice and other crops; presumably, part-time Viet Cong fighters in the ranks of local units are released from active duty to work in the fields, at least during the busy harvesting periods.

(C) Regional Variations in Agriculture (U)

(U) The five provinces selected for this study are located in three different regions, each with a distinct cycle of rainfall and agricultural activities: Thua Thien and Binh Dinh in the Central Lowlands, Tay Ninh in the western Mekong Delta, and Gia Dinh and Vinh Binh in the southern Mekong Delta.¹ In the Central Lowlands, where two crops a year are grown, the first growing season usually begins in October, and the first crop is harvested during the last part of May; the second crop is harvested in late September. Only one crop a year is grown in the Mekong Delta area. Sowing and harvesting take place in about the same months in both western and southern regions. The dry season lasts from December until the end of March. Between April and mid-May, the fields are prepared and the rice is sown. It grows during the rainy season, which lasts from mid-May or early June to mid-November, and is harvested between mid-December and mid-February. Seedlings are replanted in mid-July and again in mid-August. Other activities such as weeding go on from mid-September to mid-October.

(C) One earlier study investigating the relationship between weather and Viet Cong activities concluded that annual rainfall patterns may have a more significant effect than the related

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agricultural activities. In the major rice-producing areas of the northern and southern regions, no discernible correlation between months of lessened Viet Cong activities and months of major planting or harvesting appeared. The same was true at the province level. The explanation suggested was that agricultural activities are dependent upon a number of factors—the amount of rainfall, the type of crops, and so forth—which differ not only from province to province but also from one district to another in the same province. When one Viet Cong group is busy in the ricefields in one district, another group in a different district of the same province may have its farmwork completed, so overall terrorist activities in that province would be little affected.²

(C) Five Provinces (U)

(C) With the possible exception of Vinh Binh and Gia Dinh, no close relationship between rainfall and monthly totals of terrorist actions appears in the five provinces selected for this study. In Vinh Binh, the most active months for Viet Cong activities were the wettest months of the year, usually from May through October. During the late spring and most of the summer, agricultural activities normally consist of transplanting and direct sowing of rice. Conversely, inactive months correspond with the dry months of the year—December through April; harvesting is the major preoccupation of the local population during this period (see Figure 13).


(C) Vinh Binh. In Vinh Binh, the communication system depends on waterways which need rainfall to be passable. The Viet Cong generally have relied upon and conducted their operations around a good communications system. During the rainy season an increase in Viet Cong terrorism was reported, while in dry periods, particularly around harvesttime, when the activities of at least some of the members of the Viet Cong were presumably redirected toward agricultural activities, a decrease in terrorism was reported.

(C) There have been exceptions to this relationship between wet months and high-incident rates in Vinh Binh. During April 1964 and January 1965, both dry months, relative highs in terrorist actions were reported. In this case, however, there are two considerations. Both months may have been idle months for the local inhabitants: the first falls between the end of the harvest period and shortly before sowing and transplanting activities begin; and the second between the end of the monsoon season and the beginning of the harvest period. Vinh Binh is a delta province made up of large estates, its population primarily composed of itinerant agricultural laborers who move from one district to another and one province to another in search of work during the busy periods of planting and harvesting. The idle periods give part-time guerrillas an opportunity to become active in terrorist operations, and the mobility of itinerant farmers increases their chances of making contact with Viet Cong units, which have controlled large portions of the delta for years.

(C) There were also one or two months each year during the wet season when monthly totals decreased, at times to rates below those reported in the dry months. This occurred in September or October, toward the latter part of the monsoon. At this time rivers and waterways of Vinh Binh usually overflow and cover miles of the province's land area. This flood is seldom destructive but does impair many activities, including, it can be assumed, Viet Cong operations. Interestingly, the highest monthly totals recorded in Vinh Binh in 1964 and 1966 were reported in the month just prior to the drop that corresponded with the annual flood.

(C) One final note on Vinh Binh: it was one of the few provinces where incidents of terrorism did not increase during the political crisis in 1963 that led to Diem's downfall. In

VINH BINH



(C) Figure 13. Seasonal Cycles, Agricultural Activities, and Total Monthly Actions in Vinh Binh (U)

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fact, there was a slight drop in monthly totals at that time, which cannot be explained in terms of rainfall.

(C) Gia Dinh. Gia Dinh followed a somewhat similar pattern to that of Vinh Binh. In two years, 1964 and 1965, the highest number of incidents was reported during the wettest periods of the year, usually from May to November; the inactive months coincided with the dry periods and harvesttime. This pattern was not evident for 1963, because so few incidents were reported until the latter part of the year when the Diem government fell. However, in 1966, the pattern changed; high-incident rates were reported for both wet and dry months, the peak being in April, just before the monsoon, and continuing into the early part of the rainy season. The high number of incidents reported in September appears to be the result of the national elections.

(C) A drop in the monthly totals of Viet Cong terrorism also was discernible in the month of October, when the rivers and other waterways rose to flood large areas of the province. The pace of activities tended to pick up slightly during the last two months of the year.

(C) Thua Thien. In Thua Thien, there seems to be no correlation whatever between seasonal cycles and agricultural activities on the one hand and Viet Cong terrorism on the other. Relatively high monthly incident rates were reported in June and July of 1964 just before the beginning of the monsoon season. The number of incidents then decreased, but rose again as the monsoon season was ending. The general trend in 1965 was downward during most of the dry months, then peaking in the middle of the monsoon season. In 1966, an appreciable rise in the incident rate during the rainy period was observed, but this was probably an effect of the national elections held in September of that year.

(C) A decline in the number of incidents in November 1964 coincided with the worst flood in 60 years of Vietnamese history. While it is plausible to attribute this drop to the rising water in which many local inhabitants lost their lives and property, there are at least two indications that the flood had little to do with lessened activity. First, most of the Viet Cong bases in that part of the country were on high ground and, according to U.S. official estimates, experienced only light damage compared with those along the coast.³ Viet Cong forces also recovered rapidly from the disaster, not having large numbers of refugees to care for.⁴ Secondly, the relatively low monthly total reported the end of a trend—after a July high of 102, the number of incidents dropped each month to a low of 44 in November. Besides, things were going well with the Viet Cong, despite lessening terrorism. During this period, it was estimated, the Viet Cong increased their control over the general area from 50 to 55 percent.⁵

(C) Incidents in Thua Thien did drop during harvest months in 1965 from 67 in March to 49 in April and 41 in May. And again in August terrorist actions dropped from 50 to seventeen. However, it is difficult to judge the relationship between these two events. Thua Thien is an intensively cultivated province with two or three crops a year. Moreover, it is characteristically a subsistence farming area, where most peasant families work their own plot of land throughout most of the year with few or no periods of inactivity. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that a farmer's Viet Cong activities have less to do with the agricultural cycles than is the case in the delta province.

(C) Binh Dinh. There is little evidence that rainfall or agricultural activities are related to terrorism in Binh Dinh, where the Viet Cong have been particularly active. There have been, especially in 1964 and 1965, significantly high rates of Viet Cong terrorism in both wet and dry months. Incidents of Viet Cong terrorism increased sharply during the wettest period of 1963, but this can probably be explained by political events such as the overthrow

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of Diem. In 1964 and 1965, monthly totals decreased in the dry season and during the April harvest and increased significantly in midsummer. The monsoon in 1965 had no apparent effect on terrorist operations, a high-incident rate appearing in the wet months. In that year, a decline in monthly totals was observed later in the rainy season. But this decline became part of a long-term trend that continued into 1966 and that may be attributed in large part to the success of Allied forces.

(C) Two more observations about rainfall and the rate of terrorism in Binh Dinh may be made. First, the declines that occurred in 1964 and 1965 during the April harvest did not appear in 1966. (In fact, a slight increase in the number of monthly incidents of terrorism reached a peak in April.) Second, the November 1964 flood that devastated the area had little effect on terrorist operations—a decrease of only three incidents, from 78 to 75, from the previous month was reported. The flood may have resulted in fewer of the larger Viet Cong operations, but not in terrorist actions.

(C) Tay Ninh. Tay Ninh, unlike the other four provinces, experienced little fluctuation in the number of incidents reported. Totals remained quite stable, with no more than 27 incidents reported for any one month except November 1963 (Diem's overthrow). In 1964, those months in which twenty or more incidents were reported fell between April and September. April had the highest total with 27 incidents. In that month less than two and one-half inches of rain was reported for most parts of the province, and on only five days was there any precipitation. In all other months with high-incident rates up to fifteen inches of rain fell, and there were as many as 25 rainy days. There were fewer incidents reported during the harvest months of December and January in 1964 and 1965 than during the planting months of April and May.

(C) Conclusions (U)

(C) The effects of seasonal cycles and agricultural activities on Viet Cong use of terrorism would lend themselves better to analysis at the district or even village level. In this study, where the investigation necessarily was conducted at the province level, data suggest a possible relationship between seasonal cycles and agricultural activities and Viet Cong terrorism in two of five provinces. In Vinh Binh, where good communications depend on rainfall to maintain waterways, the Viet Cong appear to have favored the rainy season and rice-sowing time over the dry season and harvesttime. However, terrorist incidents were also stepped up during the dry season in January and April, usually idle months for agricultural laborers between harvest and sowing. And the number of incidents declined in September and October during the peak of the rainy season when waterways overflowed.

(C) The Viet Cong in Gia Dinh also conducted most of their terrorist operations during the rainy seasons, and let up during dry seasons, coinciding with harvesttime, in 1964 and 1965. In 1966 the pattern changed in Gia Dinh and high-incident rates were reported in both wet and dry months.

(C) In a third province, Thua Thien, a decline in Viet Cong terrorism coincided with the floods of November 1964. However, the flood may have had little to do with the decline, since the low-incident rate reported in November followed a trend begun in July and since the Viet Cong were increasing their control over parts of the province despite the reduction in terrorist incidents.

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(C) COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT, POPULATION CONCENTRATION, AND GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS AND TERRORISM (U)

(U) In the following pages, incidents of Viet Cong terrorism against nonmilitary targets are studied in relation to communications development, population concentration, and geographic considerations. The acquisition of such information—on the location of the operational area within the province, the estimated time of day of the incidents, the casualties involved, some types of arms used, and descriptions of the operation and the target—permitted an analytical approach somewhat different from that in the preceding sections.

(U) Also, the sample of incidents is much smaller, including only those reported in Binh Dinh and Tay Ninh provinces in 1965 and 1966, which appear in rather small geographic clusters.

(C) Northeastern Binh Dinh (U)


(C) The incidents selected from both Binh Dinh and Tay Ninh are clustered in areas with both a high population density and major transportation arteries: for instance, the incidents reported over the two-year period in the northeastern part of Binh Dinh Province around the district town of Hoai Nhon (see Figure 14). In this area two small rivers, the Kim Son from the southwest and the An Lao from the northwest, join to form the Lai Giang, which flows circuitously for eight or ten miles into the South China Sea. The major national highway, Route 1, and the railroad track that parallels it, cross the Lai Giang. A provincial highway, TL 3A, and a communal loose-surface roadway, 514, branch out from the center of this area. There are between 750 and 1,000 inhabitants per square mile on the north bank of the Lai Giang, but fewer than 250 per square mile to the west and the south, where the landscape changes from rice paddies to mountains and dense forests.

(C) Terrorist actions in that area consisted primarily of harassment and harassing fire. Of 23 selected incidents, fourteen were reported as harassments and five as harassing fire; the remaining incidents included assassination, kidnaping, and mining. Although these actions were primarily directed against civilians, targets included hamlets, villages, civil facilities, schools, and houses.


(C) Several details on the geographical distribution of the incidents and the hours during which the incidents took place are worth noting. First, the majority occurred well within a mile of either a waterway or roadway, all within an approximately twenty-mile-square area. Incidents other than harassment and harassing fire that involved persons (assassinations and kidnapings) occurred in the less densely populated part of the area close to the jungles and hills. The majority of actions directed primarily at structures occurred at night, while those incidents directed at persons occurred during daylight hours.

(C) Phu My District in Binh Dinh (U)

(C) In Phu My district, south of Hoai Nhon and ten miles or so west of a major bay area, Vinh Nuoc Ngot, another cluster of incidents was observed in 1965 and 1966 (see Figure 15). The national highway, Route 1, and the railroad form the major north-south artery from which several loose-surface roadways branch out to the east and west. The territory to either side of the highway and railroad is more sparsely populated than the countryside closer to the bay. There are between 500 and 700 inhabitants per square mile around Phu My, and slightly less,



(C) Figure 14. Binh Dinh Province: Hoai Nhon Action Cluster (U)



(C) Figure 15. Binh Dinh Province: Phu My-Phu Cat Action Cluster (U)

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between 250 and 500, to the south, while to the east the population density increases to approximately 1,000 inhabitants per square mile.

(C) Although incidents of harassment and harassing fire together outnumbered any other single type of terrorist action (thirteen out of 21), the number of mining incidents (two in 1965 and three in 1966) is large enough to indicate their importance. Assassinations and kidnappings occurred less frequently in Phu My than in Hoai Nhon. The Viet Cong's preferred targets were civilians, but they also struck at civil officials, villages, hamlets, and houses.

(C) The most interesting aspect of this cluster of incidents is that fifteen of them occurred within a nine- or ten-mile stretch of Route 1 between Phu My and Phu Cat. It is interesting that all but one of the incidents examined in this location took place in low clear areas. Harassments usually consisted of stopping vehicles to confiscate food and supplies, and at times harassing fire consisted of firing at railroad crews. Mines were set by the Viet Cong along the highway or the railroad tracks and were detonated by passing passenger buses as well as by working railroad crews.

(C) Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh (U)

(C) Another cluster of incidents in Binh Dinh was located northwest of the city of Qui Nhon and along Route 1 (see Figure 16). The incidents in this cluster were more widely dispersed than in the other clusters. Furthermore, a greater number of incidents appear to have occurred away from main roadways and waterways than in the other two areas. There are few good roads in the area, but it abounds with crisscrossing footpaths and trails.


(C) A strategically important junction lies in the center of this cluster, where Route 19 meets Route 1, and communal highway 441 branches off from Route 1 to the city of Qui Nhon. Northwest of this junction the Ha Giao River separates into two lesser rivers that wind eastward to the sea. A little farther north, a loose-surface roadway, which becomes a cart track, also runs eastward to the coast. South of the junction of routes 19 and 1, interprovincial highway 6B branches off from Route 1 to the southwest; a communal highway branches east to connect with highway 441 a little to the west of Qui Nhon. Here the main railroad parallels interprovincial highway 6B, and a spur goes east along highway 441 to downtown Qui Nhon.

(C) This is the most densely populated area in Binh Dinh, having between 750 and 1,000 inhabitants per square mile, spread over a flatland area of ricefields. There is some brush in the northwest section of the area (least heavily populated part) and there are mountains and jungles to the southwest with virtually no inhabitants.

(C) Nineteen of the total 22 incidents in this area were reported in 1965. Harassments accounted for ten of the actions, and harassing fire for nine; there were two assassinations and one mining. Only six actions against civilians were reported. There were seven actions directed at NRL hamlets. One village, one building, and one hamlet official were also attacked.

(C) Several interesting points can be made about this group of incidents. There were frequently two actions occurring simultaneously within less than a mile of each other. There was a prompt response from the Allied forces—units of the Popular Forces responding in most cases and units of the Special Forces in several. In some instances the Viet Cong used Route 19 to withdraw to secure areas after actions taking place near that roadway. The assassinations took place in the midst of the densely populated area but in relatively small hamlets.

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(C) Figure 16. Binh Dinh Province: An Nhon-Tuy Phuoc Action Cluster (U)

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(C) South of Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh (U)

(C) Another cluster of incidents can be located just south of the Qui Nhon area in the eastern corner of Binh Dinh on the border of Phu Yen Province (see Figure 17). Here the major railroad line parallels interprovincial highway 6B, which runs through a small valley lying eight to ten miles inland and connects the villages of Nam Tang and Son Thanh with Van Canh. The hamlets to either side of the road, many of them abandoned because of the war, are interconnected by many footpaths and trails.

(C) The small valley is closed in by steep hills; it is dense jungle except for a few cleared areas where some rice is grown. There are as many as 250 inhabitants per square mile in the habitable areas.

(C) Only six incidents were reported in this area—five in 1965 and one in 1966. However, a study of them suggests some points about the Viet Cong mode of operation. Of the total of six, all took place on or close to the highway; four of them were harassments directed at civilians, two of these being part of the same operation. In September 1965 four villagers were stopped for information about Van Canh, and there was an incident of harassing fire (with 81mm. mortars) the previous July in the same area. In February 1966 a Viet Cong unit forced civilians to dig trenches on the hillside half a mile from the highway south of Van Canh.

(C) Capital City of Tay Ninh (U)


(C) The largest cluster of Viet Cong incidents occurred in and around the provincial capital city of Tay Ninh in Tay Ninh Province (see Figure 18). This city is situated in the southern part of the province, halfway between the Cambodian border on the west and the neighboring province of Binh Duong on the east. It is surrounded by ricefields and rubber plantations. There are sharply rising hills northeast of the area and low swampy fields in the southwestern part.

(C) The population in the immediate vicinity of the city is approximately 1,000 inhabitants per square mile, and it thins out to between 250 and 500 inhabitants per square mile to the west. The city and the surrounding area have the largest concentration of people in the province of Tay Ninh.


(C) The area is relatively well developed in terms of communications—roadways and waterways form a weblike pattern around the city. Route 22 runs through the city on a northeast-southwest diagonal, connecting near the center of the city with interprovincial highway 13 which bisects the city on an east-west line and then turns northeast. In the same general area that national highway 22 crosses 13, provincial highway 4 branches off to the northeast, and communal highway 241 runs south parallel with Route 22 for several miles. Another interprovincial highway, 26, runs from the city to the southeastern part of the province.

(C) The major waterway is the Vam Co Dong, a navigable river that winds its way from northwest to southwest. There is a small waterway, the Rach Tay Ninh, that cuts right through the city in a north-south direction.

(C) There were 30 incidents in the cluster of actions in and around the city of Tay Ninh: 22 in 1965 and eight in 1966. There was not only a lessening of activity in 1966 but also a significant change in targets. In 1965 there were twelve incidents of harassing fire and four of harassment. The targets for the most part were structures—hamlets, houses, churches,



(C) Figure 17. Binh Dinh Province: Van Canh Action Cluster (U)



(C) Figure 18. Tay Ninh Province: Tay Ninh Action Cluster (U)

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and civil facilities. In 1966 four of the eight actions were assassinations, of both government officials and civilians.

(C) Only a few of the actions in this area took place outside of the population center; harassing fire was directed at the same pagoda in the northeast foothill settlement of Xom Bai Trai three times, and twice the Viet Cong were reported to have collected taxes and forced the local population to purchase medical supplies and office equipment for them in areas northwest of the city. The great majority of incidents occurred near major roadways.

(C) Two other observations are worth making. The four assassinations reported in 1966 occurred toward the latter part of the year, between August and December. Second, fourteen of the incidents took place in three months in 1965: four in April (a variety of actions); four in July (harassing fire or harassment); and six in September (again varying types).

(C) Hieu Thien (U)


(C) Another cluster of reported incidents was around Hieu Thien, a district in the southeastern part of Tay Ninh near the border of Hau Nghia Province (see Figure 19). Here Route 22 from the north joins Route 1. A few hundred yards directly west of this junction the Vam Co Dong River winds its way southward to Hau Nghia Province. There are several other unmarked all-weather roads and numerous dry-weather roads, cart tracks, footpaths, and trails that unite outlying areas, including the swamps to the west, with the major roadways. The river itself is an important waterway. Although there are few commercial landing sites along this stretch of its banks, it is navigable all year by large sampans, motor launches, diesel barges, and smaller watercraft.

(C) The population density varies from one part of the area to another. There are 750 to 1,000 inhabitants per square mile in the places where most of the incidents were reported—that is, in the vicinity of the highway junction and eastward. In the swampy part of the area to the west, there are between 250 and 500 inhabitants per square mile.


(C) Of the fifteen incidents reported (eight in 1965 and seven in 1966), twelve were cases of harassing fire, two were assassinations (both civilians), and one a mining incident in which four civilians were killed and seven wounded when the bus in which they were riding detonated a mine. NRL hamlets and civilians were the primary targets, but unfortified hamlets, civil facilities, a district town, and the police were also attacked. Most of the incidents occurred at night, only three having taken place during the daylight hours.

(C) Southeast of Tay Ninh (U)

(C) Two other smaller clusters of terrorist incidents in Tay Ninh Province are worth discussing. One was in Hieu Thien district, an area bordered by Khiem Hanh and Phu Khuong districts (see Figure 20). It is completely surrounded by waterways and roadways. Approximately three miles to the west, the river Vam Co Dong, navigable during all seasons, flows to the south and the southeast. The national highway, Route 22, an all-weather, hard-surface road, follows the course of the river to Tay Ninh, where dry-weather, loose-surface roadways branch from it. The whole area is crisscrossed by minor roadways, paths, and trails, and interprovincial highway 26 cuts across it several miles to the northeast.



(C) Figure 19. Tay Ninh Province: Hieu Thien Action Cluster (U)



(C) Figure 20. Tay Ninh Province: Action Cluster Southeast of Tay Ninh (U)

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(C) The area is mostly flatland with ricefields and scattered settlements. The population density is between 250 and 500 inhabitants per square mile. West of this area, within five miles, are two relatively small "military areas."

(C) Only six incidents were reported for the two years, five of them in 1965. Three of those took place in December of that year. Harassing fire and harassment directed against civilians, civil officials, and hamlets characterized the incidents, with mines and grenades the principal weapons. Four of the six incidents occurred on or within half a mile of Route 22.


(C) The other small cluster is located in Khiem Hanh district in the southwestern part of Tay Ninh (see Figure 21). The area in question is a few miles west of the Saigon River, near the junction of interprovincial highways 19 and 26. There are ricefields in the surrounding area, which has 250 to 500 inhabitants per square mile. A small "military area" is situated a few miles to the northwest.

(C) Again, there were six incidents, five of which were reported in 1965. Only three types of actions were used: harassing fire, harassment, and kidnaping. The district town of Khiem Hanh was the target of two incidents in October 1965 when the Viet Cong shelled it with a few rounds of 60mm. mortar fire. The kidnaping incident took place in Long Cong village in March 1965, when nine villagers were forcibly taken away by the Viet Cong. Two NRL hamlets and one village were also Viet Cong targets in this area.

(C) Conclusions (U)

(C) The Viet Cong appear to have concentrated their terrorist activities in areas with well-developed roadways and waterways and a population density of between 250 to 1,000 inhabitants per square mile. The primary reasons for this are obvious: speed and efficiency of operations require easy access to target areas and unimpeded retreat; and, since terrorist operations are used primarily to control local populations, they must be conducted where the people are. The patterns suggest a secondary aim: blocking or at least hampering Allied strategic communications lines. Further, the patterns reflect an in-place terrorism, with agents living and operating among the government-oriented or neutral population.⁶

(C) Other impressions should be mentioned. The Viet Cong did not tailor their terrorist actions to either highly developed or sparsely populated areas; in fact, most types of actions have been used in both settings. Night action was not favored over day in most areas of Binh Dinh and Tay Ninh provinces, and operations were carried out in the daytime as often as at night. And, finally, in both provinces the rate of terrorism was on the decline by the end of 1966; with most of the incidents examined being reported in 1965.



(C) Figure 21. Tay Ninh Province: Kiem Hanh Action Cluster (U)

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No notes.

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(U) GLOSSARY OF TERMS

(U) For the convenience of the reader, the following definitions are given for some terms that are widely used in this study.

Allied forces. All forces that contribute to the defense of the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Assassination. The physical elimination of one or a group of civilians or government officials. Reporting and coding instructions make a distinction between assassination (the killing of government officials) and murder (the killing of civilians). This distinction was not consistently maintained in the actual reporting of incidents, and the two actions were confused in the coding system. Therefore, the distinction appears in this study chiefly in terms of targets (civilians or officials).

Bombing. An act, unrelated to a larger military action, in which the principal activity is the detonation of an explosive against a target—usually a vehicle, watercraft, or train, but sometimes an individual or a group of individuals. The missile is usually detonated upon contact with the target, as when dropped from an aircraft or hurled through the air. (See Mining.)

Hamlet. The smallest population unit in the civil government structure. Villages are usually made up of several hamlets.

Harassing fire. Sporadic fire from one or more weapons at a target or targets with no intention to assault or overcome.

Harassment. Actions against targets by raids, fires, and so forth, designed to disturb but stopping short of actual full-fledged attack.

Kidnaping. The forcible capture of one or more individuals, including government officials and ordinary civilians.

Mining. An action similar to bombing, except that the explosion is detonated by the activity of the target, by the passage of time, or by controlled means. (See Bombing.)

Murder. The deliberate killing of [one or more individuals] nonofficial civilians, unrelated to a military act such as an attack or an ambush. (See Assassination.)

New Rural Life (NRL) hamlet. A hamlet which is or will be fortified. It is defended primarily by its inhabitants and is embarking or plans to embark upon a planned social, political, and economic program. Prior to January 30, 1964, NRL hamlets were called "strategic hamlets."

Terrorism. Overt acts entailing the use or threat of violence that are designed to influence political behavior.

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(C) APPENDIX

RVN DATA: ACTIONS AND TARGETS(U)

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(C) TABLE 1
ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U)

HARASSING FIRE 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet	42	111	197	38	28	416	1117
NRL Hamlet Under Construction	1					1	5
Hamlet	4	89	8		2	103	343
Village		4		2	4	10	77
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)					1	1	2
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							8
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)							1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police					1	1	1
Totals	47	204	205	40	36	532	1554

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSING FIRE 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet	59	119	73	46	39	336	1299
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							1
Hamlet	19	87	7	6	17	136	588
Village	1	17	2	4	10	34	151
Village Office		12		3	11	26	72
District Office	2		2		2	6	129
Province Office							5
Land Development Center							10
House(s)		1		2		3	10
Building(s)							6
Church(es)							2
Civil Facilities	3	8	3	5	15	34	206
Village Official(s)				2	1	3	17
Hamlet Official(s)	1					1	6
Civil Official(s)							12
Civilian(s)	1	5	1			7	36
Inhabitant(s)				1		1	2
Police							
Totals	86	249	88	69	95	587	2552

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSING FIRE 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							12
Council House							
District Town	3	8	4	6	11	32	261
School	1		1			2	3
NRL Hamlet	3	98	51	48	29	229	840
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet	11	25	8	7	8	59	320
Village	3	14	1	4	2	24	160
Village Office	1	4			16	21	78
District Office	2	9				11	74
Province Office					1	1	2
Land Development Center							9
House(s)	2	2	1	5		10	28
Building(s)	1					1	2
Church(es)			3	1	1	5	7
Civil Facilities	8	6	7	14	21	56	228
Village Official(s)			1			1	1
Hamlet Official(s)	2					2	7
Civil Official(s)	2			1		3	9
Civilian(s)	3	4		4		11	52
Inhabitant(s)		1		1		2	3
Police			2	13		15	28
Totals	42	171	79	104	89	485	2124

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSING FIRE 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town	6	5	1	6	13	31	197
School				7		7	10
NRL Hamlet		6	5	15	29	55	188
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet	3	14	1	39	19	76	255
Village	7	6	1	6	34	54	174
Village Office				1	22	23	38
District Office					2	2	3
Province Office							1
Land Development Center							1
House(s)	2	1		7		10	14
Building(s)		1		1	1	3	6
Church(es)					1	1	3
Civil Facilities	1		1	3	1	6	13
Village Official(s)		1			1	2	2
Hamlet Official(s)		1		1		2	4
Civil Official(s)							3
Civilian(s)	9	6	2	65	13	95	261
Inhabitant(s)							1
Police	3		1	24		28	47
Totals	31	41	12	175	136	395	1221

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSMENT 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet	172	174	54	97	22	519	1671
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							1
Hamlet	126	138	2	13	14	293	795
Village	19	7		3	3	32	146
Village Office	1	5		1	3	10	20
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							10
House(s)							4
Building(s)				1		1	4
Church(es)					1	1	1
Civil Facilities	2			3	6	11	38
Village Official(s)				1		1	2
Hamlet Official(s)							1
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)	2	7	4			13	88
Inhabitant(s)		2				2	66
Police							
Totals	322	333	60	119	49	883	2847

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSMENT 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town					1	1	1
School				2		2	2
NRL Hamlet	10	53	6	88	10	167	666
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet	120	14		11	2	147	411
Village	13	5		3		21	96
Village Office	1	6			1	8	15
District Office							2
Province Office							
Land Development Center							13
House(s)	1	1				2	6
Building(s)							2
Church(es)	1	1				2	3
Civil Facilities	2	2		2	3	9	43
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)				1		1	1
Civil Official(s)	1					1	2
Civilian(s)	67	38	4	29		138	649
Inhabitant(s)	19	7	3	5		34	108
Police							
Totals	235	127	13	141	17	533	2020

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

HARASSMENT 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School		1		1		2	3
NRL Hamlet		1	1	2	1	5	7
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet	1			4		5	22
Village				1		1	12
Village Office				1		1	3
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)							
Building(s)							1
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							6
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)	23	30	2	34	1	90	268
Inhabitant(s)	4	3		9		16	112
Police	1					1	3
Totals	29	35	3	52	2	121	437

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

FIRING 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet			1			1	7
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							2
Village							3
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)							1
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)							2
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals			1			1	15

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

FIRING 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet		2	13	2	4	21	90
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet		9	2		5	16	47
Village					2	2	9
Village Office					1	1	8
District Office							17
Province Office							1
Land Development Center							1
House(s)							
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities					7	7	23
Village Official(s)			1	1		2	3
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)				1		1	7
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		11	16	4	19	50	206

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

FIRING 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet							
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							
Village							
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)							
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)		1				1	1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		1				1	1

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

MINING 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet	1		3			4	12
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet		1				1	4
Village							9
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)					1	1	10
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							2
Hamlet Official(s)							1
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)					1	1	1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	1	1	3		2	7	39

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

MINING 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet			1			1	8
NRL Hamlet Under Construction				3		3	
Hamlet		1				1	4
Village	1			1		2	14
Village Office				1		1	11
District Office				1		1	4
Province Office							1
Land Development Center							
House(s)							4
Building(s)							1
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities	1			1	2	4	22
Village Official(s)							2
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)	4	1	1		1	7	34
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	6	2	2	7	3	20	105

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

MINING 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House	1					1	1
District Town							
School							4
NRL Hamlet				1		1	4
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							
Village	1					1	4
Village Office	2			1		3	14
District Office							2
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)				1	1	2	11
Building(s)		1				1	9
Church(es)					1	1	1
Civil Facilities	1			5		6	34
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							1
Civilian(s)	9	3			1	13	51
Inhabitant(s)							1
Police							2
Totals	14	4		8	3	29	139

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

MINING 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							1
School	2				2	4	8
NRL Hamlet							1
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							5
Village	1					1	4
Village Office							1
District Office							2
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)	1			3	1	5	12
Building(s)			1	1	1	3	8
Church(es)							2
Civil Facilities				3		3	10
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)				1		1	1
Civil Official(s)							2
Civilian(s)	12	11	7	15	14	59	200
Inhabitant(s)							
Police				1		1	1
Totals	16	11	8	24	18	77	258

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

BOMBING 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet		2	4			6	16
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							1
Hamlet					1	1	3
Village							2
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)				4		4	5
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities				1		1	1
Village Official(s)							2
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)							
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		2	4	5	1	12	30

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

BOMBING 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet			2			2	3
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							1
Village	1				1	2	4
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							1
House(s)			1			1	2
Building(s)					1	1	1
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities				1		1	6
Village Official(s)				1		1	2
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)							1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	1		3	2	2	8	21

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

BOMBING 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
District Capital							
Council House							
District Town							
School							
NRL Hamlet							
NRL Hamlet Under Construction							
Hamlet							
Village							
Village Office							
District Office							
Province Office							
Land Development Center							
House(s)							
Building(s)							
Church(es)							
Civil Facilities							
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)	1					1	1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	1					1	1

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

KIDNAPING 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)		14	1	3	5	23	112
Hamlet Official(s)		4				4	25
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)					3	3	55
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		18	1	3	8	30	192

KIDNAPING 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)	1	2				3	35
Hamlet Official(s)	17	39	1		1	58	255
Civil Official(s)	1	12	2		2	17	43
Civilian(s)	132	78	15	15	19	259	840
Inhabitant(s)		3				3	8
Police							
Totals	151	134	18	15	22	340	1181

KIDNAPING 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)				1		1	20
Hamlet Official(s)	7	1		4	1	13	100
Civil Official(s)		1	1	3		5	27
Civilian(s)	154	18	10	31	13	226	927
Inhabitant(s)	1					1	13
Police	1			1		2	6
Totals	163	20	11	40	14	248	1093

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

KIDNAPING 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)							12
Hamlet Official(s)	2	1		2	2	7	48
Civil Official(s)				2		2	4
Civilian(s)	16	4		10	16	46	400
Inhabitant(s)							3
Police				4		4	8
Totals	18	5		18	18	59	475

ASSASSINATION 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)	2	15	1	3	3	24	65
Hamlet Official(s)		7		1		8	22
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)		2				2	7
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	2	24	1	4	3	34	94

ASSASSINATION 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)	2	1			1	4	28
Hamlet Official(s)	5	21	1	8	1	36	110
Civil Official(s)		1				1	19
Civilian(s)	26	20	2	7	2	57	182
Inhabitant(s)							1
Police							
Totals	33	43	3	15	4	98	340

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

ASSASSINATION 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)	3					3	18
Hamlet Official(s)	16	2	3	13	1	35	71
Civil Official(s)		5				5	28
Civilian(s)	66	7	3	22	5	103	248
Inhabitant(s)							
Police			3			3	12
Totals	85	14	9	35	6	149	377

ASSASSINATION 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)	2		2	1		5	22
Hamlet Official(s)	7	7	1	10	4	29	65
Civil Official(s)	2			3		5	6
Civilian(s)	22	5	6	27	9	69	198
Inhabitant(s)	1					1	1
Police				4		4	17
Totals	34	12	9	45	13	113	309

MURDER 1963	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)		1		1		2	6
Hamlet Official(s)							2
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)		2				2	4
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		3		1		4	12

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(C) TABLE 1

ACTIONS AND TARGETS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE
AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

MURDER 1964	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)		2				2	4
Civil Official(s)							23
Civilian(s)	1	2	1			4	4
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals	1	4	1			6	31

MURDER 1965	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)							
Hamlet Official(s)							
Civil Official(s)							
Civilian(s)		1				1	1
Inhabitant(s)							
Police							
Totals		1				1	1

MURDER 1966	Thua Thien	Binh Dinh	Tay Ninh	Gia Dinh	Vinh Binh	5-Province Totals	National Totals
Village Official(s)							9
Hamlet Official(s)							9
Civil Official(s)							6
Civilian(s)				1		1	10
Inhabitant(s)							5
Police							10
Totals				1		1	49

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U)

Countrywide 1963	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	7	13	4	15	19	29	36	17	39	104	541	361	1185
NRL Hamlet Under Construction			1			1			1	2		1	6
Hamlet	3	3	5	3			1	1	5	4	201	126	352
Village		1	1	2		5	9	5	8	9	36	12	88
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)			4	3	2				1	2	4	2	18
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities									1				1
Village Official(s)	17	9	11	23	14	29	16	10	31	17	12	6	195
Hamlet Official(s)	6	10	10	6	7	2			2	5	2		50
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)	3	2	2	3	3	4	8	16	16	10	2	2	71
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Countrywide 1964													
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	266	194	159	131	250	308	388	304	409	276	181	211	3077
NRL Hamlet Under Construction			1						1				2
Hamlet	91	183	121	64	102	64	259	111	127	90	115	108	1435
Village	20	8	31	17	24	22	40	29	48	30	23	32	324
Village Office				7	11	11	20	12	19	10	9	12	111
District Office	19	26	21	13	9	9	8	9	10	12	7	7	149
Province Office					2	1	3					1	7
Land Development Center				1	2	2	5	5	1		5		21
House(s)	4		2	1	1		2	2	5	1	1	2	21
Building(s)				1			2		3	3		3	12
Church(es)							1	1	1				3
Civil Facilities			1	22	22	15	40	34	52	26	24	59	295
Village Official(s)	3	12	32	9	7	9	3	5	3	5		1	89
Hamlet Official(s)		1	21	63	32	48	44	47	48	25	27	23	379
Civil Official(s)				3	3	6	15	3	13	10	10	11	74
Civilian(s)				147	128	154	156	145	150	121	110	106	1217
Inhabitant(s)				3	8	21	23	10	8	2	6		81
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Countrywide 1965													
District Capital				3	4	3	35	2	17				64
Council House				1									1
District Town			1	7	21	48		31		24	26	52	210
School						2	1	1	3	1	1		9
NRL Hamlet	207	187	202	134	134	226	149	62	66	47	43	55	1512
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	123	72	108	63	88	73	69	28	28	30	29	20	731
Village	26	37	13	15	21	30	23	17	15	15	19	29	260
Village Office	12	7	7	5	11	16	8	2	7	8	9	15	107
District Office	11	7	7	6	6	14	13	7	5	2			78
Province Office						1		1					2
Land Development Center	2	8	3		3	2	2				1	1	22
House(s)	3	3	7		2	4	4	1	4	7	5	5	45
Building(s)	1	1	1			3			3	2		2	13
Church(es)	1			1	1	2		2	3			1	11
Civil Facilities	40	45	54	21	21	40	30	20	11	8	9	6	305
Village Official(s)	6	3	1	3	4	2	3	1	5	5	1	5	39
Hamlet Official(s)	21	17	25	26	17	9	15	8	8	7	14	12	179
Civil Official(s)	5	11	13	12	4	5		3	2	8	3	1	67
Civilian(s)	102	101	113	155	168	197	174	134	176	176	171	259	1926
Inhabitant(s)	3		7	14	27	39	8	2	2	5	11	7	125
Police				4	1	3	4	4	7	4	6	12	45

(C) TABLE 2
**TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)**

Countrywide 1966	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town	40	31	26	22	22	13	3	5	15	7	5	9	198
School	1		3	2		1	1		9	1	1	2	21
NRL Hamlet	30	17	29	13	25	16	15	12	12	13	7	7	196
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	14	7	20	32	39	39	21	12	34	20	18	26	282
Village	13	6	19	8	11	21	24	11	37	18	10	12	190
Village Office	10	8	5	1	2		1		2	8	1	2	40
District Office					1			2		1	1		5
Province Office												1	1
Land Development Center	1												1
House(s)	4	1	2		1			2	4	3	5	4	26
Building(s)	1		2	1					1		5	5	15
Church(es)		3	1						1				5
Civil Facilities	11	2	3			1	1	1		1	1	2	23
Village Official(s)	1	8	4	2	8	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	38
Hamlet Official(s)	18	13	15	17	11	10	4	1	11	12	4	8	124
Civil Official(s)	1	1	3	2	1		1	2	2			2	15
Civilian(s)	168	187	140	125	152	143	104	97	202	160	104	106	1688
Inhabitant(s)	29	27	29	14	14				1	3			117
Police	2	4	6	15	15	6	7	2	11	2	3	2	75

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Thua Thien 1963	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet											15	28	43
NRL Hamlet Under Construction												1	1
Hamlet											2	2	4
Village													
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)												1	1
Hamlet Official(s)													
Civil Official(s)				1									1
Civilian(s)													
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Thua Thien 1964	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	18	13	14	13	20	48	30	29	28	12	4	2	231
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	2	2	9		2	4	31	11	6	22	25	31	145
Village				1	1	2	6	1	2		2	6	21
Village Office							1					1	2
District Office							1	1					2
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities							2	1	1			2	6
Village Official(s)						3							3
Hamlet Official(s)			2	1	1	7	3	2	2	3	2		23
Civil Official(s)						1							1
Civilian(s)				13	14	15	28	18	21	17	11	31	168
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Thua Thien 1965	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House				1									1
District Town						1						2	3
School									1				1
NRL Hamlet	5		3			2	1				2		13
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	33	9	31	7	18	10	10	3	1	8	1		131
Village	3	3	2	1	2	1	1		2		2		17
Village Office				1		2	1						4
District Office			1	1									2
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)										1		2	3
Building(s)									1				1
Church(es)									1				1
Civil Facilities	2	2		1	1	2	1		2				11
Village Official(s)			1				1					1	3
Hamlet Official(s)	5	4	7	2	1	1	3		1	1			25
Civil Official(s)			1					1		1			3
Civilian(s)	25	33	21	19	17	29	32	13	18	31	19	34	291
Inhabitant(s)	1			7	2	3				1	3	3	20
Police											1		1

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Thua Thien 1966	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town		1	2	1	1		1						6
School							1					1	2
NRL Hamlet													
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet				1						1		2	4
Village							3		5				8
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)								1	1		1		3
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities								1					1
Village Official(s)					2								2
Hamlet Official(s)		1			1	2		1		2	1	1	9
Civil Official(s)								2					2
Civilian(s)	11	1		3	4	6	4	12	22	6	11	2	82
Inhabitant(s)		1	1	2					1				5
Police		1				1	1		1				4

(C) TABLE 2

TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Binh Dinh 1963	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet		1	1	1	1	1	1		6	18	47	37	113
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	1	3	1						1		65	19	90
Village									1	1	2		4
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)	6	4	2	4	3	3		1	11	6	1		41
Hamlet Official(s)	3		3	3	2								11
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)									8	5	1		14
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Binh Dinh 1964	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	19	22	14	4	10	45	45	41	29	40	13	17	299
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	4	14	10	8	14	15	53	18	29	16	35	19	235
Village	1	1	1					1	6	5	7	2	24
Village Office					1		2	5	3	5	1		17
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)							1						1
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities						1	1		2		1	3	8
Village Official(s)		1		1									3
Hamlet Official(s)			2	9	1	12	10	10	11	2	4	1	62
Civil Official(s)						1	4				8		13
Civilian(s)				15	6	20	23	20	9	8	4	4	109
Inhabitant(s)									1	2	2		5
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Binh Dinh 1965													
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town						1	2		4		1		8
School													
NRL Hamlet	24	31	34	12	10	21	12		1	1	2	3	151
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	5	12	4		5	10			1	2			39
Village		4	4	1		4			1	2	1	2	19
Village Office	4		2			4							10
District Office			2		1		3		1	2			9
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)		1	1								1		3
Building(s)		1											1
Church(es)						1							1
Civil Facilities		3	2				1			2			8
Village Official(s)													
Hamlet Official(s)	1								1	1			3
Civil Official(s)		2		1		1		1		1			6
Civilian(s)	2	3	4	3	9	11	7	10	11	4		7	71
Inhabitant(s)			5		2					1			8
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Binh Dinh 1966	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town	1		2						2				5
School				1									1
NRL Hamlet	1	2	1	1	1							1	7
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	1		3	1	1	5			1	1		1	14
Village	1		1		1	1			1	1			6
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)											1		1
Building(s)												1	1
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)												1	1
Hamlet Official(s)	2			1	3				1			2	9
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)	5	10	8	10	5			9	3	3	2	3	58
Inhabitant(s)				3									3
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Tay Ninh 1963													
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet											184	22	206
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet											6	2	8
Village													
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)				2									2
Hamlet Official(s)													
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)													
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Tay Ninh 1964	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	3	5	8	19	18	13	24	13	18	8	8	6	143
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	1	1	2	3				1					8
Village					1		1	1		2			5
Village Office													
District Office										1	1		2
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)				1									1
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities								1		2			3
Village Official(s)			1										1
Hamlet Official(s)				1				1					2
Civil Official(s)									1			1	2
Civilian(s)				3	4	2		3	2	3	5	1	23
Inhabitant(s)							1						1
Police													

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Tay Ninh 1965	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town							1			3			4
School									1				1
NRL Hamlet	9	5	9	7	13	5	2	1	2	1	2	1	57
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet					1		4	1		1		1	8
Village					1								1
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)												1	1
Building(s)													
Church(es)									2				3
Civil Facilities		1				2	1	1		1	1		7
Village Official(s)												1	1
Hamlet Official(s)	1		1	1									3
Civil Official(s)			1										1
Civilian(s)	1		1	1	1		1	1	2		3	6	17
Inhabitant(s)							3						3
Police				1						3		1	5

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Tay Ninh 1966	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town	1												1
School													
NRL Hamlet		1		1	1		1	1	1				6
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet								1					1
Village											1		1
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)	1												1
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities			1										1
Village Official(s)											2		2
Hamlet Official(s)									1				1
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)		1	2	1	4			1		4		4	17
Inhabitant(s)													
Police							1						1

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Gia Dinh 1963	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet				1	1	2	3	19	12				38
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet													
Village											2		2
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)			3		1								4
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities								1					1
Village Official(s)	1				1	4					1		7
Hamlet Official(s)										1			1
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)													
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

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(C) TABLE 2
 TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Gia Dinh 1964	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	9	8	2	3	12	18	22	16	20	11	11	16	148
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet		1	2		5	2	1	4	3		1		19
Village	1						1	3	1		1	1	8
Village Office				1		1	1		1	1		1	6
District Office													1
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)									1			1	2
Building(s)							1						1
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities				1			2	1	2	2	2		10
Village Official(s)	1	1	1						1				4
Hamlet Official(s)						1		2	1		3	1	8
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)			8	2		3	1	2	2	3	3		24
Inhabitant(s)				1			1						2
Police													

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Gia Dinh 1965	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town					1		1	1		1	1	1	6
School							1	1					2
NRL Hamlet	14	10	4	18	15	18	18	11	17	9	3	2	139
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	2				3			2	6	2	2	1	18
Village		1			2					3	1		7
Village Office					1								1
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)									3	2		1	6
Building(s)													
Church(es)												1	1
Civil Facilities	2	2	3			3		3	5	1	1	1	21
Village Official(s)	1												1
Hamlet Official(s)		1	2	1			3	1	1	1	3	5	18
Civil Official(s)			3	1				6					10
Civilian(s)	1	3	6	2	4	5	9		10	7	16	17	80
Inhabitant(s)					1			1			2	2	6
Police					1			1	3		1	8	14

(C) TABLE 2
**TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
 COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)**

	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
Gia Dinh 1966													
District Capital													
Council House						1		1				1	6
District Town	2								6		1		8
School	1										1		
NRL Hamlet	1		3	2	2		5	1	2		1		17
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	3		3	9	6	3	1	2	8	3	2	3	43
Village		2	1			1			2			1	7
Village Office	2												2
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)	2	1			1				2	1	1	1	9
Building(s)												2	2
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities	3	1	1									1	6
Village Official(s)						1							1
Hamlet Official(s)			2	3	1	2			4	1	1		14
Civil Official(s)			1	1					2			1	5
Civilian(s)	2	13	9	10	16	14	10	9	29	15	14	11	152
Inhabitant(s)	3	3	3										9
Police			5	10	7	1		1	7		1	1	33

(C) TABLE 2

TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES(U) (Continued)

Vinh Binh 1963	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet						8	3	3		5	3	6	28
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet			1								1	1	3
Village		1				1					1	1	4
Village Office													
District Office													
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)									1	1			2
Building(s)													
Church(es)													
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)			1			3	1	1	1	1			8
Hamlet Official(s)													
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)							1	3					4
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Vinh Binh 1964	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town													
School													
NRL Hamlet	4	2	3	6	6	8	12	10	6	2	5	1	65
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	1	2	1	7	10	3	2	5	5				36
Village			2	2	1		1	2	3	1			12
Village Office				1		2		5	5	1	1	3	18
District Office			2										2
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)													
Building(s)				1									1
Church(es)							1						1
Civil Facilities				4	7	1		2	9	2	2	3	30
Village Official(s)		1											1
Hamlet Official(s)				1		1							2
Civil Official(s)						1	1		1				3
Civilian(s)				2	2	5	6		5		1	1	22
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Vinh Binh 1965	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town				1	3	2		2		1	1	2	12
School													
NRL Hamlet	10	2	6	3	4	5	1	2	1	3	1	1	39
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet	2	1				1	1		1	1	2	1	10
Village	1							1					2
Village Office	2	2			1		1			2	2	7	17
District Office													
Province Office								1					1
Land Development Center													
House(s)		1											1
Building(s)													
Church(es)	1					1							2
Civil Facilities	2	4	3	2	1	1	5		1	1	3	1	24
Village Official(s)													
Hamlet Official(s)						1						1	2
Civil Official(s)													
Civilian(s)	1		1	1	2	4			1	3	3	3	19
Inhabitant(s)													
Police													

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(C) TABLE 2
TOTAL ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC TARGETS BY MONTH:
COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

Vinh Binh 1966	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Total
District Capital													
Council House													
District Town	2	1	1			1	1	1	4	1			12
School			1							1			2
NRL Hamlet		1	6	2	8	2		3		2	3	3	30
NRL Hamlet Under Construction													
Hamlet		2			3	4	2		2	2		4	19
Village	2				1	1	7	1	7	12		3	34
Village Office	1	5	3		1		1		2	8		1	22
District Office					1					1	1		3
Province Office													
Land Development Center													
House(s)			1										1
Building(s)			1								1		2
Church(es)		1											1
Civil Facilities													
Village Official(s)			1										1
Hamlet Official(s)	1		1	1		2						1	6
Civil Official(s)					1								1
Civilian(s)		2	5	1	8	7	5	2	6	8	3	6	53
Inhabitant(s)													
Police						1							1

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(C) TABLE 3
ACTIONS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U)

1963	Harassing Fire	Bombing	Harassment	Firing	Mining	Assassination	Murder	Kidnaping	Aggregated Terrorism	Terrorization	Aggregated Harassment	Totals
Thua Thien	47				1	2						50
Binh Dinh	204	2			1	24	3	39				273
Tay Ninh	205	4		1	3	1		2				216
Gia Dinh	40	5				4	1	3				53
Vinh Binh	35	1			2	3		8				49
Totals	531	12		1	7	34	4	52				641
National Totals	1583	30		15	39	94	13	194	1	2		1971

1964	Harassing Fire	Bombing	Harassment	Firing	Mining	Assassination	Murder	Kidnaping	Aggregated Terrorism	Terrorization	Aggregated Harassment	Totals
Thua Thien	86	1	322	0	6	33	2	151		2		603
Binh Dinh	249	0	333	11	2	43	4	134			4	780
Tay Ninh	88	3	60	16	2	3	1	18				191
Gia Dinh	69	2	119	4	7	15		15		1	1	133
Vinh Binh	95	2	49	19	3	4		22				194
Totals	587	8	883	50	20	98	7	340		3	5	2001
National Totals	2552	21	2847	206	105	340	29	1181	3	5	7	7298*

* Total includes two "captures" reported in 1964 but not included in the table.

(C) TABLE 3

ACTIONS BY YEAR: COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

1965	Harassing Fire	Bombing	Harassment	Firing	Mining	Assassination	Murder	Kidnaping	Aggregated Terrorism	Terrorization	Aggregated Harassment	Totals
Thua Thien	42	1	235		14	85		163				540
Binh Dinh	171		127		4	14	1	20				337
Tay Ninh	79		13			9		11				112
Gia Dinh	104		141		8	35		40			2	330
Vinh Binh	89		17		3	6		14				129
Totals	485	1	533		29	149	1	248			2	1448
National Totals	2124	1	2020		139	377	1	1093			2	5757

1966	Harassing Fire	Bombing	Harassment	Firing	Mining	Assassination	Murder	Kidnaping	Aggregated Terrorism	Terrorization	Aggregated Harassment	Totals
Thua Thien	31		29		16	34		18				128
Binh Dinh	42		35	1	11	12		5				106
Tay Ninh	12		3		8	9						32
Gia Dinh	175		52		23	45	1	18				314
Vinh Binh	137		2		18	13		18				188
Totals	297		121	1	76	113	1	59				768
National Totals	1221		797		258	308	121	475				3180

(C) TABLE 4
 PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL TERRORISTIC ACTIONS AGAINST
 SELECTED TARGET CLASSES BY MONTH FOR RVN(U)

Month	NRL Hamlets	Hamlets and Villages	Civilians	Government Officials	District Towns	Month	NRL Hamlets	Hamlets and Villages	Civilians	Government Officials	District Towns
1963						1965					
Jan.	19	8	8	64	0	Jan.	37	26	19	6	0
Feb.	34	11	5	47	0	Feb.	37	22	20	6	0
Mar.	13	16	5	55	0	Mar.	36	22	21	9	0
Apr.	27	9	5	53	0	Apr.	29	17	36	10	1
May	42	0	7	51	0	May	25	20	28	5	4
June	43	7	6	44	0	June	31	14	33	3	7
July	51	14	11	23	0	July	28	17	34	5	6
Aug.	55	12	33	20	0	Aug.	19	14	42	5	10
Sept.	38	13	15	32	0	Sept.	18	12	49	6	5
Oct.	69	8	7	14	0	Oct.	13	13	52	7	7
Nov.	67	30	0	2	0	Nov.	12	14	52	7	7
Dec.	71	27	0	1	0	Dec.	11	11	55	6	11
1964						1966					
Jan.	66	28	0	1	0	Jan.	9	8	57	6	12
Feb.	46	45	0	3	0	Feb.	5	4	68	8	10
Mar.	41	39	0	14	0	Mar.	9	13	54	9	8
Apr.	27	17	32	16	0	Apr.	5	15	52	13	8
May	41	21	26	7	0	May	8	16	53	11	7
June	46	13	26	9	0	June	6	23	55	7	5
July	38	30	18	5	0	July	8	23	58	7	2
Aug.	42	20	22	9	0	Aug.	7	14	60	4	3
Sept.	46	19	18	7	0	Sept.	3	20	57	7	4
Oct.	45	20	20	7	0	Oct.	5	14	61	6	3
Nov.	35	27	22	7	0	Nov.	4	15	57	5	3
Dec.	37	24	18	6	0	Dec.	3	18	46	8	4

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(C) TABLE 5

TOTAL ACTIONS BY MONTH: COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U)

	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Totals
1963													
Thua Thien	--	--	--	1	--	0	0	--	--	0	18	31	50
Binh Dinh	10	8	7	7	6	4	1	1	27	30	116	56	273
Tay Ninh	--	--	0	2	--	0	0	0	0	0	190	24	216
Gia Dinh	1	--	3	--	2	2	0	--	7	4	22	12	53
Vinh Binh	--	1	2	0	0	12	5	7	2	7	5	8	49
Totals	11	9	12	10	8	18	6	8	36	41	351	131	641
National Totals	36	38	38	55	45	72	70	49	104	153	798	513	1971

	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Totals
1964													
Thua Thien	20	15	25	28	39	80	102	63	60	54	44	73	603
Binh Dinh	24	38	28	37	32	94	139	95	94	78	75	46	780
Tay Ninh	4	6	11	27	23	15	26	20	21	16	14	8	191
Gia Dinh	11	11	5	14	19	25	30	28	32	17	21	20	233
Vinh Binh	5	5	8	25	26	21	23	24	34	6	9	8	194
Totals	64	75	77	131	139	235	320	230	241	171	163	155	2001
National Totals	403	424	389	482	601	670	1009	717	898	611	518	576	7298

(C) TABLE 5
TOTAL ACTIONS BY MONTH: COUNTRYWIDE AND IN FIVE PROVINCES (U) (Continued)

1965	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Totals
Thua Thien	74	51	67	49	41	51	50	17	27	43	28	42	540
Binh Dinh	36	57	58	17	27	53	25	11	20	16	5	12	337
Tay Ninh	11	6	12	10	16	7	12	5	7	9	6	11	112
Gia Dinh	20	17	18	22	28	26	32	27	45	26	30	39	330
Vinh Binh	19	10	10	7	11	15	8	6	4	11	12	16	129
Totals	160	141	165	105	123	152	127	66	103	105	81	120	1448
National Totals	563	499	562	470	533	722	541	326	362	349	348	482	5757

1966	Jan.	Feb.	March	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Totals
Thua Thien	11	5	3	7	8	9	10	17	30	9	13	6	128
Binh Dinh	11	12	15	17	11	6	0	9	8	5	3	9	106
Tay Ninh	2	2	3	2	5	--	2	3	2	4	3	4	32
Gia Dinh	19	20	28	35	33	23	16	14	63	20	21	22	314
Vinh Binh	6	12	20	4	23	18	16	7	21	35	8	18	188
Totals	49	51	69	65	80	56	44	50	124	73	48	59	768
National Totals	344	315	310	267	315	262	196	161	358	265	181	207	3181

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1 DDR&E, LIB	1 CNP, LIB	1 USACDCARTYA
1 DDR&E, DD(SEAM)	1 DN, OCNR, D(PS)	1 USACDCAVNA
1 DDR&E, SA(B&SS)	1 CNO, D(SS&PG)	1 USACDCCBRA
1 DDR&E, D(WSEG)	1 DN, COMNAVSUPPACT	2 USACDCISSO
1 OASD(ISA), PD, MA	1 CMC	1 USACDCCEA
1 OASD(ISA), PPS, ER	1 HQUSMC, DCS(RD&S)	2 USACDCIA
1 DIA/DIAAP-7A	1 HQUSMC, H(CAB)	1 USACDCJAA
20 DDC-I	1 HQUSMA, CI&JMS, G-2	1 USACDCMSA
1 DIA/DIAMS-1A	1 DAF, AFXPPG	3 USACDCMPA
1 JCS, J-3, PAC	1 HQUSAF, AFCSAMI	1 USACDCMA
1 JCS, J-5	1 USAF, AFCHO	2 USACDCISSO, LIB
2 JCS, SA(C&SA)	1 HQUSAF, AFISIA	1 USACDCISSO, SA
1 JCS, SA(MAA)	1 HQUSAF, AFXDOC	1 USACDCSA
1 JCS, JS, HIST	1 HQUSAF, AFISPSA	1 USACDC, D(EVAL)
1 DUSA(IA)	1 COMSOTFE	1 USACDCTA
1 OASA(R&D)	1 CINCPAC, J3A1	1 USACDCILC, MT, HFP
✓ 1 AGAL, ASDIRS	1 CINCPACREP, MBI	1 USMA, D(MA&E), H&MA
1 OASA(R&D), A(RES)	1 CINCPAC-J5	1 USNA, LIB
1 USASA, CDA	1 USSTRICOM, SA	1 DINFOS, P&P
1 OCMH	1 MAAG-C	1 ICAF
1 OCRD, BES SC	1 USSOUTHCOM, J-2	2 AFSC
1 ARO-D	1 USMACV, CORDS(RAD)	2 USAF, AFAITC
1 OACSFOR, DSDC	176 USMACV, OD(PHYOP)	2 DINFOS, D(IR&G)
1 TJAG	1 CICV, SRA	2 USAWC, LIB
1 ODCSPER, DPSR	1 USSTRICOM, SJA	2 USACGSC, LIB
1 ODCSOPS, I&A, SO	2 USARSUPTHAI	1 USACGSC, DJCASO
1 ODCSOPS, I&A, C(E&GA)	1 ARO-FE	2 USASATC&S
1 ODCSOPS, D(PL), SC	1 ARPA, R&DCEN	1 USAWC, D(SOS)
1 ODCSOPS, SA/D(I&A)	1 ARPA, ODR	1 USAARMS, D(GS)
1 OC of SA, D(S)	1 ARPA, D(BEH SC)	1 USACAS, ODDL&P
1 CRD, D(AR)	1 OSD/ARPA RDFO (ME)	5 USACAS, LIB
1 ODCSOPS, D(OPR)	1 ARPA, ODR, LA	1 USAES
1 ODCSOPS, I&A, C(PM)	2 ARPA, RDFU-V	1 USAMS
1 ODCSOPS, D(PL)	1 USALMC, DLSIE	1 USACHS, D(RI)
1 ODCSLOG, D&S, P&T	1 USATTC, BSCI	1 USAMPS
1 OTPMG	1 USA RSCH U(KOR)	1 USAOC&S
1 USASRD	1 USABESRL	1 USAJFKCENMA
1 USAITAG, OACSI	1 USALWL, LIB	1 USAJFKCENMA, AD(USAF)
1 OACSI, C(RD)	1 USAINFHUR	1 USAJFKCENMA G-2
1 OACSI, WW, WB	1 FT DETRICK, LIB	1 USAJFKCENMA, AD(NAV)
1 OACSI, WW, EB	1 APG, STEAP-TL	1 USAJFKCENMA, G-3
1 OACSI, WW, SBB	1 USAADHRU	1 USASWS, OD(I), SS
1 OACSI, SW&FA	2 USACDCILC, LIB	1 USASWS, OD(I), RTL
1 OACSI, CI, CIAB	1 HQUSACDC, D(PL), C(LRD)	2 USASWS, LIB
1 OACSI, IDB, AO	1 HQUSACDC, D(PL), C(FID)	2 USASWS, MATA, R&A
1 AMS/ESSG	1 HQUSACDC, D(DOC), C(SO)	5 USASWS, PSYOP, R&A
1 OACSI, USAFD-O	1 USACDCISS	1 USAMA, D(UW)
1 ARO	1 USACDCIAS	1 USAQMS
1 ODCSOPS, OD, FE&PAC	1 USACDCIAS	1 USAAMS, T&CA, C(SO)
1 OASECNAV(R&D)	1 USACDCCSG	1 USASCHAMS, CO
1 DN, OCNR	1 USACDCEC	1 USASCHAMS, JO
1 CNO, STRAT(P&P)	1 USACDCADA	1 NAWC
	1 USACDCARMA	

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1 USNAV PGRD SCH	1 CINCSAC, OAI
1 USNAV AMPH SCH(VA)	1 JSTPS, NSTL
1 USNAV AMPH SCH(CALIF)	1 AFSC, SCPSL
2 AIR, UNIV	1 USAF, 1 CMBT APPL GP(DRE)
1 USAF, SAWC, D(I)	1 USAF, 6499 SPT GP OPPL
1 USMC SCH, LIB	1 COMUSAFSO(DAS)
2 USAINTS, LIB	21 STATE DEPT, I&R, INR
1 USAMS	1 STATE DEPT, ER, D&I
1 CINCUSARPAC, G-2	1 USIA, AD, R&A
1 USCONARC, DSCOPS-SWCA	1 USIA, LIB, ACQ
1 USAINTC, CO	1 USIA, LIB, IOA/L
1 COMUSARO, SCARGC	1 LC, DRD
1 USARJ, GD-P	10 CIA, CRS/ADD
1 CINCUSARPAC	1 NSA, TDL
1 COMUSARSO, SCARMA	1 AID, VN, RE&I
1 USCONARC, DCSIT-RD-RD	1 AID, PPC/TA/PARD
1 3 USA, AJAGT-PC	1 AID, WOH/RIG
1 XVIII ABN CORPS, PM	1 HUMRRO
1 1 SF GP(ABN), S-2	1 IDA
1 46 SF CO(ABN)	1 RAC
1 8 SF GP(ABN)	1 RAND(DC)
1 10 SF GP(ABN), S-3	1 HSR
2 2 PSYOP GP, S-2	1 RAND(CALIF)
1 7 PSYOP GP	1 RACIC
1 4 PSYOP GP, PDC	1 GRC
4 8 PSYOP BN, PDC	1 UNIV/HI, ATC
1 15 PSYOP BN, ATCSW-PO15-SB	1 RTI
1 6 PSYOP BN, S-2	1 BKDYN
1 9 PSYOP BN	1 RTI, M(IIG)
1 10 PSYOP BN, PDC	
1 7 PSYOP BN	
1 95 CA GP, FT	
1 97 CA GP, S-2	
1 41 CA CO	
1 3 CA GP(ABN)	
1 525 MI GP	
1 301 ASA BN	
1 XVIII ABN CORPS, CP	
1 7 SF GP(ABN), S-2	
1 3 SF GP(ABN), S-2	
1 93 PSYOP CO	
1 7 PSYOP GP, KOR	
1 97 CA GP, LIB	
1 96 CA GP	
1 7 PSYOP GP, Lib	
1 6 SF GP(ABN), HHC, S-3	
1 13th PSYOP BN, CO	
1 I CORPS, EACICA	
30 5 SF GP (ABN), S-5	
1 USN, NIOPSTRACTR	
1 USNAVFOR, P-N2	
1 FMF(ALT), HQFT, G-3	
1 USMCAS(NC), MAO	
1 FMF(PAC), G-5	
1 USMCB(PEN), CG	
1 FMF(ATL), G-2	

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13. ABSTRACT		
<p>(U) The study is an examination of terrorism as it was used by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam from 1963 through 1966. Viet Cong terrorist acts and their nonmilitary targets are mapped out in order to determine patterns and characteristics. These patterns and characteristics are then related to other factors, including major political events, national and religious holidays, military developments, seasonal cycles and agricultural activities, and population concentration and geographic considerations. This analysis of terrorist activities and their targets is designed to be an aid in anticipating occasions for, variations in, and locations of Viet Cong terrorism. Introductory sections include a review of the literature and an attempt to relate terrorism to the broader problems of social change and political violence.</p>		

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