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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



**OACSFOR**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (11 Mar 67) FOR

67-100-660336

16 Mar 67

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery **AD-8**

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

**9** Operational rept. for quarterly period ending 31 Oct 66.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY  
APO 96350

AVFA-AT-D

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Report~~ - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 October 1966, RCS (CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION 1 (S) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General:

a. On 20 August 1966, Colonel Ashley A. Blinn assumed command from Brigadier General Charles A. Symroski, of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. A change of command ceremony took place at the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) Quadrangle, Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam, 201400 August 1966. Captain Jimmie S. Pears, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery was commander of troops. Included in the ceremony were the massed colors of the attached battalions and the officers and men of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. Brigadier General Charles A. Symroski was presented the Legion of Merit during the ceremony by Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam. Principal guests in attendance were Colonel Donnelly P. Bolton, Chief of Staff and Colonel Linton S. Boatwright, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, I Field Force Vietnam. Colonel Orville L. Tobiason, Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery Group and the Battalion Commanders of the attached battalions were also in attendance. Following the change of command, an informal departure ceremony was held in the Lawson Building for Brigadier General Charles A. Symroski.

b. On 7 October 1966, Colonel Linton S. Boatwright assumed command from Colonel Ashley A. Blinn of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. On 10 October 1966, a change of command ceremony took place at the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) Quadrangle, Nha Trang, Republic of Vietnam. Captain Donald Borden, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery was commander of troops. Massed colors of the Battalions attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery were displayed at the ceremony. Guests included Lieutenant General Stanley R. Larsen, Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, Colonel Donnelly P. Bolton, 185  
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Chief of Staff, I Field Force Vietnam, and General and Special Staff Officers of Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam. Also attending were Colonel John W. Marr, Commanding Officer, 17th Aviation Battalion, Colonel Henry F. Grimm, Commanding Officer, Nha Trang Sub Area Command, Colonel Francis Kelly, Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), Colonel Orville L. Tobiason, Commanding Officer, 52d Artillery Group and Commanders of the battalions attached to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

c. The advance party of the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, 105-mm towed, from Camp Irwin, California arrived at Qui Nhon on 12 October 1966. The advance party consisted of the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Majikas, the S3, the communications officer and the battery commanders. The main body of the battalion was transported to Vietnam aboard the USNS Barrett and debarked at Qui Nhon on 28 October 1966. Home station for the unit is in the vicinity of Phu Cat. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery was sponsor for the newly arrived unit and provided vehicle transport, security, logistical and administrative assistance.

2. (C) Intelligence:

Critical Installations Security Survey.

(1) A survey team from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam conducts periodic visits to critical installations in II Corps Tactical Zone in order to evaluate the overall defensive/security posture of airfields, logistic areas, key communication sites, and large cantonment areas. An artillery representative from I Field Force Vietnam Artillery has accompanied the team on trips to the following critical installations: Nha Trang, Pleiku, Cam Ranh Bay - Dong Ba Thin, Phan Rang, Qui Nhon, An Khe and Dalat.

(2) Responsibilities of the artillery representative are to evaluate the effectiveness of countermortar defenses, employment of counterfire means, command and control methods utilized at each installation for timely target detection and response to enemy mortar or recoilless rifle attacks. Items of interest to the artillery team member are: countermortar radar location and operational status, adequacy of counterfire weapons, status of gun and radar personnel training, communications facilities for command and control, clearance to fire procedures, SOPs, fire planning, survey and employment of artillery, mortar and searchlight illumination means.

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(3) Reports of observation and recommendation are provided to the command concerned with overall defense/security responsibility of each critical installation. Findings of the artillery representative provide a basis for consideration for possible redistribution of available artillery assets.

## 3. (S) Operations and Training:

a. Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery participated in Combined Operation IRVING from 2 October 1966 through 15 October 1966. Colonel Ashley A. Blinn, Commanding Officer, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, served as Fire Support Coordinator for this operation. Maneuver forces participating were the 22d Infantry Division (ARVN), the Capitol ROK Infantry Division, the 1st US Cavalry Division (AM), Task Unit 708 from the 7th US Fleet and elements of the 7th US Air Force. Separate I Field Force Vietnam units participating were the 17th Aviation Group, 54th Signal Battalion and the 245th Psychological Operations Company. I Field Force Vietnam Artillery units engaged were Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, 52d Artillery Group, Headquarters and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery and B Battery, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery. Letter, Headquarters, Fire Support Coordination Center, Phu Cat, Republic of Vietnam, dated 14 October 1966, subject: Combat Operations After Action Report, FSCC Operation IRVING and addressed to Commander, US Military Assistance Command Vietnam contains details concerning the missions, concept of operation, execution of the operation and the activities of the Fire Support Coordination Center.

b. I Field Force Vietnam Policy Statement 66-2 was approved and published on 28 September 1966. This statement, staffed at Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, was formulated for the purpose of enhancing the combined effect of strategic bombers (US Air Force) and tactical field artillery. The policy specifies that where possible, artillery fire is to be planned adjacent to and coincident with heavy bomber strikes. This is to be accomplished by planning concentrations on avenues of approach to bombing target zones. These concentrations are fired prior to, simultaneously with, and subsequent to the bomb strike to fix and destroy the enemy in the kill zone.

c. I Field Force Vietnam Policy Statement 66-3 was approved and published on 4 October 1966. This statement, staffed at Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, was formulated for the purpose of defining the responsibility for security of US artillery units supporting ARVN or FWMAF operations. In essence, this policy states that the commander furnishing artillery units to support ARVN or FWMAF must insure that a security force is provided for the unit and . . . in no

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case will this force be less than the equivalent of one US rifle platoon per firing battery.

d. The 175-mm guns of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery and the 8-inch howitzers of the 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery were redistributed to provide six identical composite 175-mm/8-inch firing batteries, with three such batteries in each battalion. Each firing battery consists of two 175-mm guns and two 8-inch howitzers. This redistribution was based on experiences of the past year which have shown that with widespread and independent firing battery deployment, the combination of the salient characteristics of both weapons is extremely effective. Better area coverage is provided without loss of mass since targets fired rarely exceed battalion size and two 8-inch and/or two 175-mm guns firing on such targets have proven adequate. During the year the combination of weapons at widely separated locations was accomplished by means of cross-attachment of firing batteries between the two battalions, and of firing elements within the battalion. Although the cross-attachment proved the desirability of combining the capabilities of the two weapons, it created inherent command, control, logistical support, and administrative weaknesses when continued for long periods. Redistribution was accomplished by a phased termination of cross-attachments; property transfer of weapons and related material; and return of personnel to parent units. The redistribution of the weapons has resulted in a composite organization producing a more flexible and responsive firing unit which combines the range and lethality of the 175-mm gun with the known dependability of the 8-inch howitzer; and greatly reduced the command/control problems created by continued cross-attachment.

e. Artillery statistics for reporting period, I Field Force Vietnam.

(1) Missions Fired:

	<u>OCT</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>AUG</u>
Neutralization	2113	846	2133
Destruction	9	44	24
H&I	40712	37861	48699

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	<u>OCT</u> 3505	<u>SEP</u> 3465	<u>AUG</u> 3120
Other			
Total	46339	42216	53976
Observed	4960	3744	4441
Unobserved	41379	38472	49535

(2) Ammunition Expended:

(a) 2.75 HE	9567	11227	10579
(b) 105 HE	117625	133443	172920
105 I11	1843	3110	2647
105 WP	10654	3461	3977
105 SMK	3482	2778	2433
105 Other	58	0	0
Total	133662	142792	181977
(c) 155 HE	16845	16289	28708
155 I11	1672	666	572
155 WP	1318	777	538
155 SMK	227	257	166
155 Other	8	0	0
Total	22070	17989	29984
(d) 8-inch HE	4798	6914	6748
(e) 175-mm HE	4445	4127	4332

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f. A technical assistance team of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men arrived in II Corps on 13 October 1966. This team is from the US Army Artillery and Missile School, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, and has the mission of providing instruction on organizational maintenance of the 175-mm gun, SP, M107 and the 8-inch howitzer, SP, M110. They have been visiting the 175-mm/8-inch batteries of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery and observing, advising and instructing unit officers, weapons crewmen and maintenance personnel, in proper methods of weapon and carriage maintenance. The team has visited A, B, and C Batteries, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery in Plei Me, Duc Co and Plei Djereng and A and C Batteries, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery in the Phu Cat area. Their assistance has been of great value since these units are undergoing a large turnover of personnel.

4. (C) Logistics:

a. Although approval has been granted authorizing a standby generator for each AN/PQ-4 Radar set, generators have not been received. The ready availability of standby power is essential to continuous operation and the lack of the required number of generators continues to affect adversely the maximum utilization of AN/PQ-4 radars.

b. Lack of adequate repair parts for the carbon arc 30" searchlight continues to impair full utilization of this piece of equipment to support combat operations and the defense of base camps. In May 1966 a push package containing approximately \$112,000 worth of repair parts, marked for delivery to Battery B, 29th Artillery, supposedly arrived at the Qui Nhon Support Command but was never delivered to this unit. Letter, AVFA-AT-E, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery, dated 20 October 1966, subject: Lost Push Package for Thirty-inch Carbon Arc Searchlight, FSN 6230-712-5619, was dispatched to Commanding General, Qui Nhon Support Command in an attempt to locate the lost supply package. As of the date of this report, no answer has been received from this inquiry. The outstanding requisitions for the items included in the package were cancelled and resubmitted as Red Ball Express requisitions. This action is still pending. Non-availability of required repair parts and subsequent reliance on field expients to restore equipment to an operational status seriously degrades the units capability to provide reliable, sustained combat support. This headquarters has been informed by United States Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia that the AN/MSS-3 SLT which is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam during November could alleviate this problem. However, this SLT is not considered to be an adequate substituted for the present 30" carbon arc searchlight.

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Based on current forecasts the 30" MEND searchlight will not be in Vietnam until FY 68. It will be only at this time that full capability to provide reliable, sustained combat illumination support can be obtained.

c. The shortage of required repair parts for the M107, 175-mm gun continues to preclude maximum utilization of this essential artillery piece. The deadline time of this weapon, although slowly decreasing, is still high enough to be a matter of concern. Further, decrease of deadline time can only be achieved when needed repair parts are fed into the supply system at the required rate.

5. (U) Personnel:

a. Personnel and Administration:

(1) This headquarters, in addition to commanding seven attached subordinate artillery units, has continued to function as the artillery staff section of Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam.

(2) The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE 6-501E) which was submitted to Department of the Army in March 1966 by USARPAC to bring this headquarters to full TOE strength was approved. This unit was reorganized effective 1 October 1966 per General Order 232, Headquarters, USARPAC, dated 23 September 1966 with a personnel authorization of 34 officers, 2 warrant officers and 159 enlisted men. Personnel requisitions have been submitted to fill all authorizations. It is anticipated that this headquarters will reach 100% TOE strength by the end of CY 66. The following was the assigned strength of this headquarters as of the end of the reporting period: 28 officers, 2 warrant officers, 77 enlisted men.

b. Rest and Recuperation Program:

This headquarters received and utilized the following R&R quotas:

<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
2	4	7

c. Awards and Decorations:

The following awards and decorations were presented during this period:

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	AUGUST			SEPTEMBER			OCTOBER		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Air Medal	3			1		1			
Legion of Merit	1								
Bronze Star	1			2	1	3	3		4
Army Commendation Medal			2	2		2			2

## d. Morale and Discipline:

The morale and discipline of this organization have continued to be excellent throughout the reporting period.

## SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Part I. Observations (Lessons Learned)

#### 1. (U) Operations:

##### a. Item: Deployment of Howitzer, Self Propelled, 105-mm M108.

Discussion: Since their August arrival in the Republic of Vietnam the howitzer, SP, 105-mm, M108 has proven to be a highly responsive, flexible and valuable addition to the artillery weapons inventory. These weapons have been deployed on combat operations in the coastal lowlands, the central highlands and the Cambodian border areas.

Observation: Air mobility is not the sole solution to light artillery support requirements of maneuver elements. Proven principles of self-propelled and towed artillery deployment are still valid and have wide application in the counterinsurgency environment.

##### b. Item: Radar Registration of Artillery.

Discussion: Present practice in the I Field Force Vietnam area of operations is to register artillery almost exclusively by an aerial observer. This system has several inherent deficiencies:

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(1) Misplots of registration points by the AO will produce an invalid registration. This is particularly dangerous since the Fire Direction Center does not have accurate chart data and does not know their corrections are invalid.

(2) The conduct of a registration is almost totally dependent upon the availability of aircraft and/or observers and the weather.

(3) Site must be determined using map inspected altitudes.

(4) A time registration cannot be conducted.

These deficiencies can be overcome by use of the Radar Set, AN/MPQ-4 for the registration. Fire Direction Center and radar operator personnel, in general, however, have been found to be almost totally untrained in this potentially valuable technique.

Observation: Service schools and units training for deployment should exploit the possibilities of radar registration of artillery. Key personnel in battery and battalion Fire Direction Centers and radar operations should be trained in this procedure.

c. Item: Artillery Ammunition Vehicles.

Discussion: The deployment of self-propelled artillery has been hampered because associated wheeled vehicles do not have comparable mobility. A 175-mm battery, for instance, operating cross-country without its ammunition vehicles is capable of carrying only 3 rounds per tube. A 105-mm SP howitzer battery is limited to approximately one half of total basic load, (87 rounds on-carriage capacity), without its 5-ton ammunition trucks. The addition of the Ammunition Carrier, Full Tracked XM548 would substantially enhance the flexibility of these artillery units. Additionally, surface resupply of ammunition would be permitted frequently, thus greatly reducing the heavy aerial lift presently required to sustain self-propelled artillery in areas inaccessible to wheeled vehicles.

Observation: Self-propelled artillery being deployed to Republic of Vietnam should be equipped with full tracked ammunition carriers, similar to the XM548 in lieu of the presently authorized 5-ton trucks.

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### d. Item: Artillery-Air Force Coordination.

Discussion: Landing zone preparations are fired, by field artillery, heliborne machine guns and rockets and by Air Force fighter bombers. The coordination of these three forces is of obvious and critical importance. This coordination can be rapidly and effectively accomplished by having the artillery liaison officer or forward observer fly in the same aircraft with the Air Force forward air controller. The needed coordination is accomplished on-the-spot between artillery and Air Force. Artillery-helicopter coordination can be similarly accomplished by having the helicopter flight commander enter the artillery command or fire direction net or by having a forward observer with an AN/PRC-25 fly on the commanders aircraft.

Observation: This is an effective procedure for practical coordination between artillery, Air Force and Army Air fire support. Back-up is provided by the fire support element at brigade and division headquarters.

### e. Item: Artillery Fires as Concealment for Troop Movement.

Discussion: On Operation SEWARD friendly troop movements were concealed through the use of artillery fires. H&I type fires were conducted on the flanks, the front and the rear of maneuvering troops. The presence and maneuver of these elements was thereby more effectively concealed because NVA/VC observers in the area had to take cover. Additionally it is not normal practice for US units to place H&I fires within 1000M of friendly forces. Assuming this latter fact to be known to the enemy, the concealment was further enhanced because he would not expect US units to be in an H&I fire zone.

Observation: Coordination and good communication are of obvious and vital importance in this type of an operation.

### f. Item: Spare Power Source for AN/MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar.

Discussion: Excessive downtime of countermortar radars in II Corps Tactical Zone has been attributed in most cases to generator failure.

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Observation: Authority has been granted by USARV to issue one standby gasoline generator set, PU 107, for each AN/MPQ-4A countermortar radar. This action enhances the operational capability of the only effective means of countermortar protection presently available in RVN.

2. (U) Logistics:

a. Item: ASL/PLL for Low Density Artillery Equipment.

Discussion: Units with low density items are experiencing difficulty in obtaining adequate repair and replacement parts included on PLLs upon arrival in country. Support facilities have the same difficulty in developing a responsive ASL.

Observation: To compensate for the slowness that repair and replacement parts of low density items are introduced into the supply system, units being deployed to RVN with known low density items such as self-propelled artillery weapons, AN/MPQ-4 Radars, and searchlights should insure that the appropriate COMUS agency, (e.g. US Army Weapons Command) arrange for pre-packaging and shipment of PLL/ASL to unit destinations. Further, the deploying unit should have complete knowledge of the details of such shipments.

b. Item: Availability of M107, 175-mm Gun Repair Parts.

Discussion: The supply system must be made more responsive to the procurement and stockage of M107 repair parts, especially repair parts with high usage rate. The present scarcity of these parts not only reduces maximum employment of this weapon but increases the administrative workload of all support agencies because of frequent queries made by units in the field concerning status of repair parts requisitions, availability of parts, and the urgent requirement to repair deadlined M107 artillery pieces.

Observation: Continued emphasis and effort of all supply and maintenance facilities is needed to introduce an adequate supply of repair parts into the logistical system in order to decrease lead-line time of the M107.

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**Part II, Recommendations.**

**1. (C) Aviation Support of I Field Force Vietnam Artillery Units:**

a. Each of the battalions and the group headquarters assigned to I Field Force Vietnam Artillery has experienced continuous and serious difficulties in the exercise of command and control of their subordinate units. The primary cause of these problems lies in the widespread field locations of the firing batteries of non-divisional battalions. Routine tasks such as mail delivery, processing of pay actions, command visits and inspections, maintenance activities, etc., are severely hampered or, in many cases, precluded because of the lack of aircraft immediately responsive to the battalion commander. The Operational Report-Lessons Learned presently being submitted by these battalions includes comments concerning this problem.

b. Recommend that each non-divisional field artillery battalion, group headquarters and Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery be authorized an aviation section. Each section should have as a minimum, one light observation aircraft, (OLE) and one light observation helicopter, (H13 or H23).

**2. (C) Chronograph Team:**

a. I Field Force Vietnam Artillery presently has no organic capability for weapons calibration. All of the units in I Field Force Vietnam including US, ROK and ARVN have recurring requirements for weapons calibration. The lack of adequate target area survey precludes widespread use of the fall-of-shot method of calibration. The only effective means of calibration for artillery weapons is, therefore, by use of the chronograph. Present practice is to obtain chronograph support from an ordnance team based in Okinawa or from 1st Logistical Command in Saigon. All artillery units must be capable of providing continuous close support. To provide accurate close-in fires, the velocity error of each weapon must be known. Considering the rapid accumulation of rounds fired, (e.g. one 105-mm battery fired in excess of 10,000 rounds in less than 60 days) and the expected tube life of the heavy artillery 175-mm guns (3-4 months), velocity errors are constantly changing. This change must, for the sake of safety and accuracy, be known by the firing battery so they can compensate for it. To provide this information, a chronograph team must be readily available in the area and responsive to the tactical situation in order to assure frequent and continuous weapons calibration.

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b. Recommend that the chronograph team augmentation presently under preparation at this headquarters be authorized I Field Force Vietnam Artillery.

*Ashley A. Blinn*  
ASHLEY A. BLINN  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 October 1966, RCS (CSFOR-65) (U)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO US Forces 96350 5 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US Forces 96307  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington DC 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs with the Operational Report of Headquarters, I FFORCEV Artillery except as noted below.

2. (C) Section 2, Part I, Paragraph 1f: Depot stocks of PU-107 (400 cycle) Generators have remained at zero level for over 30 days. No advice is available from the 1st Logistical Command on incoming shipments. This headquarters, in recommending issue of standby generators in a message to United States Army Vietnam, dated 19 Sep 66, suggested that an alternate solution to this problem would be the procurement of PU-126/U Motor Generators (60-400 cycle converter) which will permit units to use any standard 60 cycle generator having an input of at least ten kilowatts as a prime power source for the AN/PRQ-4A Radar. This proposal should be reconsidered in view of the continuing failure of the present supply system to maintain adequate stocks of PU-107 Generators to meet recurring requirements.

3. (C) Section 2, Part I, Paragraph 2a: The Projector Assembly, Power Supply, Control Box, etc., incorporated in the AW/MSS-3 Searchlight, currently being issued in a 23 inch configuration, are interchangeable with Xenon Units used in the M48A3 tank and tower mounted applications. An authorized stockage list for this item has not yet been established at direct support or depot level. This absence of an adequate supply base for support of a new item of equipment will force using units to place additional demands on the current overburdened Red Ball Express System. Priority should be given to the establishment of a comprehensive support plan and depot stockage for all parts necessary to provide responsive, in-country, first through fourth echelon repair of the 23 inch Xenon Searchlight.

4. (C) Section 2, Part I, Paragraph 2b: One element of the problem associated with parts shortages experienced with the 175mm Gun and 8 inch Howitzer (self-propelled), is the fact that the buildup of logistical support elements has not reached the point where responsive technical support and repair parts stockage can be realized at the sub-area command level. COSTAR Light Maintenance Direct Support Companies, which are currently assigned artillery direct support missions, have deferred the majority of artillery support

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 October 1966, RCS (CSFOR-65) (U)

requirements to the Support Command General Support Company which does not function as a customer supply source. This fragmentation of responsibilities restricts development of a properly tailored authorized stockage list at direct support level.

5. (C) Section 2, Part II, Paragraph 2a: The effectiveness of a Ballistic and Technical Service Team (Detachment 1A, TOE 9-5000) is dependent upon their ready availability to provide precise measurement of muzzle velocities at progressive points in the life of a tube or cannon. The varying rates of fire and extremely heavy ammunition expenditure experienced in II Corps Tactical Zone supports the requirement for assignment of a Ballistic and Technical Team to the zone on a continuing basis. The independence of this type of detachment from other logistical services would permit its attachment to a subordinate headquarters of this command with an attendant improvement in transport and communications support.

6. (C) Section 2, Part II, Paragraph 1:

a. Current aircraft assignments to the 52d Artillery Group are as follows:

(1) 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery	2 O-1
(2) 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery	1 O-1 1 OH-13
(3) 5th Battalion, 14th Artillery	1 O-1 1 OH-13

b. On 18 Nov 66 this headquarters dispatched a letter to the Commanding Officer, 17th Combat Aviation Group outlining the following aviation support procedure for artillery units:

(1) The 52d Artillery Group to request aviation support from the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

(2) The 4th Battalion, 27th Artillery to request aviation support from the 10th Combat Aviation Battalion.

(3) Pending formation, the I FFORCEV Artillery Field Office will be authorized to request aviation support from the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion.

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c. The I FORCEV Artillery Officer has been advised of the limited aviation assets and that support will be rendered on a mission basis if such support will not deter from the primary commitments of aviation units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*William H. James*  
WILLIAM H. JAMES  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSPOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307  
17 JAN 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. (C) Reference Paragraph 4a, Section I, Page 6: Additional generators for support of the AN/MPQ-4 radar will be issued as they become available. The problem of supplying the PU-107 generator to counter mortar application, however, has been compounded by recent MACV authorization for issue of the same generator for use in conjunction with air traffic control radar, AN/TSC-71. Consequently, this headquarters is studying the feasibility of using the PU-126/U in conjunction with air traffic control radar instead of with counter mortar radar as recommended in paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement, to this report. This would free PU-107 generators for issue to counter mortar applications and avoid some of the problems that might be anticipated with the PU-126/U in a field environment.

b. (C) Reference Paragraph 4b, Section I, Page 6, and Paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement: The AN/MSS-3 23" Xenon searchlight has been accepted as a substitute for the carbon arc 10" searchlight because of problems with repair parts support. Replacement will be on a two for one basis with initial receipts and distribution on the AN/MSS-3 searchlight accompanied by concurrent parts anticipated in the very near future.

c. (U) Reference Paragraph 4c, Section I, Page 7: Repair parts support for the M107, 175mm Gun shows continued improvement and this is being reflected in reduced deadline rates. Adequate repair parts support alone, however, will not keep these weapons off deadline. Equally important is proper operator and organization maintenance procedures. A training team from Fort Sill recently has

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AVHGC-DH (31 Oct 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

completed comprehensive training of all M107/M110 batteries in-country on proper employment and maintenance of these weapons.

d. (C) Reference Paragraph 1c, Part I, Section II, Page 9: XM548 ammunition carriers are programmed for receipt and distribution in early FY 68.

e. (U) Reference Paragraphs 2a and 2b, Part I, Section II, Page 11: I Field Force Vietnam has been advised to submit justification for increasing the PLL on low density artillery equipment and the M107, 175mm Gun.

f. (U) Reference Paragraph 4, 1st Indorsement, Page 14: The situation described will be alleviated with receipt of additional direct support maintenance units that will permit normal allocation of responsibilities between direct and general support units.

g. (C) Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Section VI: Combat Support and Combat Service Support units' Aviation Section deploy to RVN at zero strength in personnel and equipment due to policy established by Department of the Army. These units must submit MTOF's after arrival in-country in order to have aviation sections authorized; however, no additional assets can be programmed for Combat Support and Combat Service Support units until DA can fill these requirements without delaying the deployment schedule of tactical airlift units. The recommendation has been made to Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, that internal adjustments in current aviation assets be made in order to meet operational requirements.

h. (U) Reference Paragraph 5, 1st Indorsement, Page 15: Records of Headquarters, USARV, indicate no request for a Ballistic and Technical Service Team (Det LA, TOF 9-500D) being received by this headquarters from I Field Force Vietnam. Upon receipt of such requirement, it will be processed accordingly.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



**R. J. THORNTON**  
1st Lt. AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-OT (undtd)

3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 8 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*ghmcullin*  
G. L. McMULLIN  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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