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(18) OACSFOR (19) OT-RD-670182

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Jun 67) FOR OT 670182

27 June 1967

HEADQUARTERS,

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion [W.F.]

(11) 27 Feb 67

(12) 176.1

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Operational report for quarterly period ending 31 Jan 67.

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion for quarterly period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BATTALION
APO 96307

AVIB-C

27 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
Special Troops, US Army Vietnam
ATTN: S-3
APO 96307

(C) SECTION I: Significant Organization or unit activities

1. (C) Battalion Headquarters: (Saigon)

a. (U) S-1

(1) (U) During the reporting period the battalion had 31 gains and 37 losses. A larger number of the losses were members of the staff sections and other key personnel who had arrived in-country with the initial increments of the battalion headquarters. Among those personnel rotating were the Battalion Commander, the Executive Officer, and the Operations Officer. Sufficient time for overlap between incumbents and their replacements was provided.

(2) (U) 41 awards were presented to members of the battalion, including three Legions of Merit; two Soldier's Medals; nineteen Bronze Star Medals; sixteen Army Commendation Medals; and one Air Medal.

(3) (U) On 4 December 1966, this headquarters was the target of a Viet Cong terrorist bombing. Eleven members of the organization were wounded in the attack.

(4) (U) Initial elements of the 26th Detachment (G Series - Publications Team) arrived on 18 November 1966. The 19th PSYOP Company and the 25th Detachment (FD - Propaganda Team, Research & Analysis) arrived on 19 November 1966. The 24th Detachment (AA - Command & Control Team) arrived on 12 December 1966.

b. (C) S-2

(1) (U) The 25th Detachment arrived in Vung Tau on 19 November 1966. The detachment consisted of 3 Officers and 5 Enlisted Personnel. The additional team, less the Detachment Commander, has been used to expand the R & A subsection's working capacity and capabilities. The Detachment Commander is utilized as Section Operations Officer, and functions as both the assistant S-3 and the coordinator of the various team and subsection activities.

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(2) (C) In November, the 244th PSYOP Company requested additional information on "rallier motives", to provide a broader base of information for their report on that subject. Following the submission of the feeder report, it was decided to initiate a long term study on why Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army personnel decide to rally (NOTE: Official term is now "return"). The project consists of maintaining work sheets for each CTZ. All interrogation reports are screened for "return" motives, which are then listed under the appropriate headings. The project will be expanded to include the motives for joining, in an attempt to derive psychological vulnerabilities from a comparative study of the two sets of motives.

(3) (C) The section developed and submitted the first Specific Intelligence Collection Requirement (SICR #A1-UPE-UC776, "NVA Doctrine & Vulnerabilities (U)"). This CONFIDENTIAL requirement represents not only a means of increasing the inflow of information on the North Vietnamese Army, but a document specifically designed to provide psychological operations intelligence. Initial input has been received from CMIC and indications are that this document will provide important information. NOTE: SICR was submitted through MACV IOD and acted upon by MACJ 213.

(4) (FOUO) In the previous quarter, section periodic reports and special studies/reports were produced in from three to six copies, based on demand and existing requirements. However, the expansion of activities and outside interest has resulted in ever increasing requests for PSYOP data. Consequently, all reports are mimeographed and forty-five copies are produced for distribution to agencies in Vietnam, Okinawa, and the United States.

(5) (U) The section produced its first propaganda leaflet (i.e., from basic concept to finished product). This leaflet, the first of a new series, was based on extensive research and is directed toward the Vietnamese villager who has provided the Viet Cong with manpower, money, food and clothing. Production of the leaflet involved all the subsections and teams of this section.

o. (C) S-3

(1) (U) During this reporting period a number of personnel of this section rotated. Newly assigned personnel are now filling the positions of S-3, Ass't S-3, CIC of the Bomb Squad and Operations Sergeant. A period of overlap between new and departing personnel resulted in an orderly transfer of duties.

(2) (C) The printing section benefitted from the visit of Mr. Edward Ryan and Mr. Frank Civilibus, technical representatives from Natick Army Laboratory, Natick, Massachusetts. The two gentlemen were extremely useful in providing advice on maintenance and operation of printing facilities. The visit was even more valuable in that it coincided with the arrival of the 26th Detachment with its organic heavy mobile press, which had been damaged enroute to RVN. The bolts which fasten the press to the floor of the van were sheared when the LST carrying the detachment from Nha Trang ran into rough weather. The press fell on its side, causing extensive damage to its electrical and mechanical components. With the technical advice of Mr. Ryan and

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Mr. Civilikus, the 79th Maintenance Battalion, along with Pacific Architects and Engineers, had the press operational within two weeks. This press has increased the leaflet support capability of the 6th PSYOP Bn. Unfortunately, the new press has about the same incident rate of mechanical failures as the old press. This has been attributed to the damage incurred enroute. Despite the lack of spare parts and the mechanical difficulties, however, December was the record high month for leaflet production by this facility.

(3) (U) The PSYOP Bn MTOE, after completion of staffing at USARV Hqs, was forwarded to USARPAC and DA for approval. The MTOE was approved at those headquarters and JCS. The Secretary of Defense withheld approval pending further justification. This was provided. Several additions to the MTOE were required to conform to the latest requirements for submission of MTOE's. Additionally, a qualitative and quantitative analysis had to be made on personnel and equipment. Corrected copies of the MTOE were assembled and mailed to USARPAC and DA. Subsequently, DA asked for a concept for deployment for the MTOE. This document was prepared and submitted to MACPD on 25 January for comments and concurrence prior to it being sent to USARV (O&T Div, C-3).

(4) (C) Several additional responsibilities were assumed by the Battalion during this quarter.

(a) The formation of the leaflet order from off-shore facilities, which had been the responsibility of the Leaflet Branch of MACPD, was transferred to the Battalion. The leaflet order is submitted on a monthly basis to the 7th PSYOP Group for two hundred and fifteen million leaflets.

(b) The Battalion was tasked to provide a liaison officer to both 7th Air Force Tactical Air Control Center and the 7th Air Force Alpha Team to provide PSYOP support to three classified operations. The liaison officer attends daily briefings and targets leaflets in the operations area. The liaison officer also orders leaflets for the operations, and writes a monthly frag order for the leaflet-dropping aircraft.

(c) One officer attended the high altitude leaflet course given by the 7th PSYOP Gp on Okinawa. This officer is now the liaison officer to 7th Air Force for C-130 Fact Sheet missions.

d. (C) S-4

(1) (U) Logistics functions were disrupted by the bombing of the Battalion headquarters on 4 December 1966. Many critical supplies and records were destroyed. The situation deteriorated further when no suitable location was provided to separate, inventory, and evaluate the supplies and status. This situation will be corrected in February 1967 when the Battalion is assigned a permanent location at #6 Phan Thanh Gian.

(2) (U) During the reporting period the Battalion was faced with many logistic problem areas. Critical shortages of chemicals, printing plates, ream paper, and repair parts were prevalent. This problem, coupled with the difficulties encountered in the transportation and communication systems, the lack of maintenance support for both Army standard and PSYOP peculiar equipment available to Battalion units, often threatened the operational mission of the

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Battalion. The Battalion, attempting to solve these problem areas, has submitted a list of requirements, both immediate and future, to 1st Logistics Command with a request to have RO levels established at 1st Log support units located in each corps tactical zone. The Battalion has also requested that maintenance support responsibility be assigned to those agencies in each CTZ having capabilities of supporting the equipment necessary for PSYOP in Vietnam.

(3) (U) The primary problem at the present time is the high deadline rate of audio-visual equipment. Factors contributing to this problem are: lack of maintenance support referred to in para 1d(2); non-standard equipment; lack of spare or repair parts within the supply system; long lead times involved to obtain parts from CONUS civilian manufacturers; utilization of equipment for extended periods and under conditions not envisioned by manufacturer. USARV and 1st Logistical Command are currently studying this problem and this unit hopes an early solution can be found. Some of the recommendations proposed are: designated repair points within each corps tactical zone to service repair, or evacuate this equipment as required; establishing a large maintenance float which would replace equipment not readily repairable and allow PSYOP units to remain operational. AMC representatives are also working to expedite the requisitions submitted through the Quick Reaction Procurement system, 2d Logistical Command.

e. (U) Other Battalion Headquarters Activities

The Battalion Motion Picture Advisory Section and the Television and Radio Advisory Section, under the supervision of the senior military advisor to the Vietnamese Political Warfare Directorate, continued in their advisory capacity in the operation and maintenance of photographic equipment, and the production of numerous radio and television shows.

2. (C) Tactical Companies:

a. (U) 244th PSYOP Company (Da Nang)

(1) (U) The company continued to perform its assigned mission of providing psychological operations support, in the form of leaflets, loudspeakers, and audio-visual operations support, to all units in I CTZ. 110,906,700 leaflets were disseminated by air, with another 4,331,450 being disseminated by hand. Of these leaflets, 34,449,640 were produced by the company with the remainder being produced by the 6th PSYOP Battalion, off-shore organizations and ARVN printing sources. Aerial loudspeaker time was 140 hours and 10 minutes, with an additional 99 hours being broadcasted by US forces on ground and waterborne operations.

(2) (U) The supply and maintenance situation of the company improved greatly during the reporting period. Within the last month, the 30-day stock of reproduction supplies has been standardized and no longer presents a problem. The Functional Files, the Status Card File and the Property Book have become more useful and a Document File and a Document Register have been implemented.

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(3) (U) The reproduction section constructed a negative plate-maker. The need for better half-tone reproduction necessitated this improvement. A plate can now be produced from a negative after 4 minutes exposure. This new reproduction facility is both faster and results in higher quality.

(4) (U) During the reporting period a total of fifty (50) Psychological Operations Exploitation Teams (POET) missions have been completed for quick reaction psyop exploitation. As a result of these POET's, sixty-eight (68) leaflets, seven (7) posters, and twenty-seven (27) tapes have been produced. A total of 3,400,000 leaflets have been printed and dropped as a result of POET missions.

(5) (U) Closer liaison with III MAF and I Corps intelligence was established during this reporting period. This has reduced the amount of time that the company intelligence section must spend on order of battle and has assured that the company receives copies of all situation reports.

(6) (U) The Chieu Hoi program has yielded a steadily increasing number of ralliers in each month of the reporting period. A total of 572 ralliers came in during the quarter, with 238 rallying in the month of January alone.

b. (C) 245th PSYOP Company (Nha Trang)

(1) (C) During the past reporting period, 145,415,000 leaflets were disseminated. Of this total, 15,657,000 were produced by the 245th PSYOP Company. 552.25 hours of loudspeaker operations were directed toward targets in enemy areas. Leaflet and loudspeaker operations were in support of tactical and Revolutionary Development operations. The operations supported were: BYRD, PICKETT, FARRAGUT, THAYER II, DAZZLEM, PAUL REVERE IV, ADAMS, SAM HOUSTON, MAENG HO 8, and GERONIMO I.

(a) The objectives of leaflets used for tactical and Revolutionary Development operations were generally:

- 1 Establish population control.
- 2 Cause population to deny support to VC/NVA elements.
- 3 Describe to VC/NVA and local populace the terms of the Chieu Hoi Program.
- 4 Cause populace of VC/NVA controlled areas to expose VC/NVA personnel.

(b) The objectives of leaflet and loudspeaker operations during tactical operations were:

- 1 Demoralize VC and NVA troops.
- 2 Cause defections in VC/NVA ranks.

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3 Assure potential prisoners and returnees of fair treatment.

4 Exploit returnees to effect desertion of VC/NVA.

5 Alienate the VC/NVA forces from the populace.

6 Create a fear of impending doom in VC/NVA personnel should they continue to fight.

(c) Leaflets used prior to an operation gave safety instructions to the populace and rally instructions to VC/NVA sympathizers and troops.

(d) Results of psychological operations show 3347 returnees (Hoi Chanhs) for the reporting period. An increase of 2090 over last quarter. The returnees total since 1 Jan 66 is 10,042 in II CTZ.

(e) Aerial loudspeaker missions were flown in conjunction with and in support of separate operations down to and including platoon-sized units. A total of 854 aerial loudspeaker sorties were flown by the 5th ACS and 99 loudspeaker sorties were flown by Army aircraft in II CTZ.

(f) Six two-man loudspeaker teams from the 245th PSYOP Company were attached to USOPCON units for major operations in II CTZ. The direct support role of loudspeaker teams was effective in population control and in support of the Chieu Hoi Program when employed in and near villages and/or hamlets. It also proved effective when used in search and clear, and Revolutionary Development operations.

(g) Phase I of the 1967 TET Campaign in II CTZ was completed on 27 January 1967. In excess of 16 million leaflets were disseminated by the 5th ACS. Four million leaflets were delivered to DSA II Corps for dissemination by ARVN.

(2) (U) Operations and Training:

(a) PSYOP annexes of contingency plans for three proposed operations in II CTZ have been prepared with maximum emphasis being placed on use of accurate and timely intelligence to develop meaningful propaganda material, rather than use of standard, nation-wide materials.

(3) (C) Enemy Propaganda:

(a) Enemy propaganda creditability remains low with continued anti-American and anti-GVN themes. Used were slogans of "Johnson's war", "McNamara's war", continuing as the most prevalent themes. Photos of peace marches and draft incidents in the United States are used on leaflets.

(b) Several copies of leaflets directed toward the Koreans were analyzed during the period. The themes used were "Yankees are using Koreans as shields, don't fight against us (VC) and we won't hurt you (Koreans)".

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(c) One leaflet directed towards negro soldiers was found, the theme being the negro soldier is fighting to protect the KKK.

(d) There have been increasing examples of VC leaflets which have been written either by American or someone with an excellent knowledge of American military mannerisms and expressions.

(e) Example of VC propaganda:

1 Side 1: What's in it for you GI? McNamara says Americans will have to accept casualties. And that means you, brother, you won't find him sweating in the jungle or going home in a coffin. There aren't any bombs planted in the Pentagon, like there will be in your barracks, your base or the local bar.

2 Side 2: So what's in it for you? Combat pay and a purple heart if you're one of the lucky ones.....and what about the others? The marines who don't come out of the jungle, the pilots who don't make it back from their missions; the guys going home who got hit in the Saigon airport. Their combat pay doesn't do them much good, when they go home in a box. Better think it over, soldier.....There's not much in it for you!

(f) In the future we can expect VC propaganda to be directed toward exploitation of VC victories, any newsworthy incident in the United States, civil-rights demonstrations and draft card burning, etc. There is also an increasing indication that VC propaganda is directed mainly toward countering American propaganda rather than creating new themes for their own use.

(4) (C) Problem areas:

(a) A lack of coordination and communication between civilian and military agencies at the province level preclude maximum exploitation of returnees. The ARVN has a policy of expediting high-ranking NVA/VC cadre out of the province without providing US/FWMAF units in that area of operation a chance to exploit them either tactically or psychologically.

(b) A lack of adequately trained personnel to handle the jobs peculiar to PSYOP has continually plagued PSYOP support elements. This is especially so in the field of logistics where repair personnel are not authorized by TO&E nor are they available in local maintenance support units.

(c) Lack of replacement parts for non-standard equipment adversely effects the overall propaganda campaign in II CTZ. At present, none of the five US mobile audio-visual units are operational. Two of the three assigned presses in the 245th PSYOP Company have, for the most part, been operational, however, breakdowns occur frequently and quality reproduction is difficult. Steps are being taken to alleviate this situation.

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(d) The 20th PSYOP Bn (ARVN), located at Pleiku, has received printing materials for the most part from the 245th PSYOP Company, Pleiku Detachment. This is due to the ineffectiveness of their supply system.

(e) A shortage of PSYOP field loudspeaker teams (HB) has become apparent with the increase in numbers of brigade-size operations. At present, the 245th PSYOP Company has six field loudspeaker teams in the field, although, by TOE, only four such teams are authorized. The extra teams are made up from other sections within the company, thereby adversely affecting other operations of the 245th PSYOP Company.

(f) Adverse weather renders the U-10 aircraft inadequate for aerial PSYOP support. At present, the U-10 aircraft cannot take off and land with cross winds in excess of sixteen knots. In addition, Air Force Regulations (5th Air Commando Squadron Regulation 55-47) limit the use of the U-10 to a minimum of 1500 feet above the ground and a minimum visibility of three miles.

c. (U) 246th PSYOP Company (Bien Hoa)

During this quarter the company, in support of tactical operations in III CTZ, disseminated 83,368,000 leaflets by air and conducted 353 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcast. Of the leaflets disseminated during the reporting period, 35,535,000 were produced by the company. This is a significant increase over the previous reporting period. In addition to the previous mentioned aerial loudspeaker operations, numerous hours of ground loudspeaker broadcast were provided in support of tactical operations conducted by maneuver elements in the CTZ. Mobile field teams provide an array of different types of psychological operations support to the 1st Division, 4th Division, 9th Division, 25th Division, 173d Airborne Brigade, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 11th Cavalry Regiment.

d. (U) 19th PSYOP Company (Can Tho)

(1) The company arrived in RVN 19 November 1966 and proceeded to move to its present location in order to provide the much needed psychological operations for the IV CTZ. The movement was completed 2 December 1966. Some period of time was required to establish liaison with appropriate organizations in the area. The company was able to accomplish this in the shortest time possible and initiated psychological operations support to IV CTZ.

(2) During the period this report covers, the company disseminated 39,802,000 leaflets. Of these leaflets the company was able to produce 280,000. This small number produced was to be expected as the unit has only one press which arrived late in the month of December. The remaining leaflets were produced by other organizations in the IV CTZ, the 6th PSYOP Battalion, JUSPAO, and out-of-country sources.

(3) 159.9 hours of aerial loudspeaker operations were broadcast in support of tactical operations throughout the CTZ.

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(C) SECTION II: Part I - Observations (Lessons Learned)

LEAFLETS

(C) Item: Leaflet Development

Discussion:

a. Although the various subordinate tactical companies of the battalion originate numerous propaganda leaflets, the headquarters had never been directly involved in the complete development of a leaflet (i.e., from concept to finished product). Therefore, the task of developing a new leaflet proved of value in establishing formats and developing techniques.

b. Key steps in developing the first leaflet were:

- (1) Selection of the target group.
- (2) Collection of all available information on the target selected.
- (3) Forums which discussed and analyzed the information collected. Purpose of these was to ascertain that all target information was valid and known to all analysts and propagandists involved in the project.
- (4) Each individual in the project contributed a list of vulnerabilities, which were then exposed to additional forums, for the purpose of determining those that were valid and suited to exploitation.
- (5) Leaflet concepts and designs were developed and liaison and interrogation personnel dispatched to gather the required items not present in the battalion (information, photographs, symbols, etc.) and to test - through interviews - proposed concepts.
- (6) Formulation of the leaflet, to include sample copies, which were then sent out for a field pre-test.
- (7) Any necessary reworking of the leaflet and formal presentation of the finished product for final approval.

Observations:

a. Leaflet development, such as described above, requires approximately three weeks.

b. A research & analysis team requires access to a complete photo library and should determine potential requirements for photographs (i.e., place orders for specific photos on a contingency basis).

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(C) Item Leaflet size for Fact Sheet Mission

Discussion: A series of leaflets was developed to exploit the successful defection of a group of North Vietnamese from the village of Thanh Hoa in North Vietnam. When the idea was first conceived, 7th Air Force was asked if they would be able to make a drop on Thanh Hoa and the surrounding area. They stated the planes would be able to make a low-level run and drop the leaflets right on the town. The final artwork for the leaflet required that it be an odd size, one with unknown drop characteristics. Since the leaflets were to be released at a low altitude on the target, the leaflet size did not appear to be critical. Shortly after the leaflets were packed in bombs, it was determined that the defenses in the Thanh Hoa area would not permit a low-level drop and a high altitude release would be necessary. The drop characteristics had to be determined, which caused a delay in the mission.

Observations:

a. Those personnel who are involved with the origination of leaflets should have a working knowledge of the procedures in the physical makeup of a leaflet or consult an artist before final artwork is prepared.

b. All leaflets to be used in areas where anti-aircraft fire may dictate a high altitude delivery should be made in a size and paperweight which has favorable drop characteristics. This will enable the Air Force to adjust to most contingencies.

LIAISON VISITS

(U) Item: Visits with the Tactical Companies of the Battalion

Discussion: There exists a definite communications problem in Vietnam. This is particularly true of telephonic communications.

Observations:

a. It has been found that a monthly liaison visit to each of the tactical companies is the best method of communications to actually see what the true situation is.

b. This visit is also a good way of observing the operational procedures in the tactical companies.

c. Third, a liaison visit develops a rapport between the Staff Sections and the unit personnel.

PROPAGANDA TARGETING

(U) Item: Propaganda Targeting

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Discussion: During November 1966, controls on printing were established enhancing the quality of propaganda production and dissemination as opposed to quantity production and dissemination. This added emphasis came about as a result of a study of propaganda targeting techniques as practiced in II CTZ. It was found that many units would request large numbers of leaflets for a suspected enemy area with little thought for such things as size of enemy units, terrain features of the target and wind direction. In short, the "shotgun" effect was covering up lack of prior planning and targeting.

Observation: Selection of specific propaganda targets using the latest information available has caused a decrease in the amount of propaganda materials expended in II CTZ. As a result of specific targeting, a variety of themes beamed at a specific audience are being developed and disseminated in steadily increasing numbers of Hoi Chanhs in II CTZ.

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS

(U) Item: Effectiveness of Loudspeaker Operations

Discussion: Loudspeakers have been adapted to, and used with everything from a backpack to aircraft in II CTZ with varying degrees of success. Most of the returnees interviewed in II CTZ have stated that they have heard and understood at one time or the other, loudspeaker broadcasts by the US/FWMAF elements. Loudspeakers in the field have proven to be very effective when used with search and clear, and search and destroy missions. This extension of face-to-face communication is invaluable when the message is personalized and/or the literacy for the target audience is unknown or considered low. Loudspeakers can be used to inform the populace of changes in local ordinances or curfews and of non-combatant casualties is becoming more important all the time. The mobility of the loudspeakers when used with US/FWMAF units enables the commander to employ psychological operations whenever potential target audience may be found.

Observation: It has been found in II CTZ that loudspeaker broadcasts are a most successful means of pin-pointing target audiences and disseminating specific propaganda messages. The development of this media in all tactical units, especially the "Junk and Swift" Fleet, should be encouraged and monitored.

Part II - Recommendations

1. The audio-visual jeepster unit should be converted from a Kaiser-Willys jeepster chassis to an Army standard 3/4-ton truck unit. The unit now in development (AN/SQ-85) should be provided to the 6th PSYOP Bn for field evaluation. MACV Msg 47086, DTG 251238Z Oct 66 reflects the battalion's requirement for a total of 23 of these units.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

2. The proper stockage levels of paper, ink, and chemicals utilized by the battalion and its four companies should be maintained in the various corps tactical zones by the appropriate DSU. A 6th PSYOP Bn letter to 1st Logistical Command, Director of Supply, is being drafted indicating the quantities and locations in which these expendables are required.


3. Maintenance responsibility for both Army standard and PSYOP peculiar equipment be assigned to specific units for each tactical company.

4. Maintenance support units, once designated, should stock a 50% maintenance float for audio-visual equipment.

5. An evacuation point should be established for support of maintenance units to enable timely evacuation of repairable equipment to Okinawa as turn-in of salvage equipment and subsequent replacement.

6. Recently developed equipment with potential for PSYOP use should be provided the 6th Bn for field evaluation. The battalion has personnel operating in every geographical condition encountered in Vietnam who are qualified to conduct rigorous tests and subsequent evaluation of both field and static equipment.

Merrill W. Harper
MERRILL W. HARPER
Major, Artillery
Acting Commander



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AVHGC-DST (27 Feb 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

16 MAY 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-OT
APD 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310.

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 January 1967 from Headquarters, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference Paragraph 1c(3), Page 3, concerning MTOE action: The concept of deployment and the revised MTOE for the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion were forwarded to USARPAC on 17 February 1967 and 21 March 1967, respectively.

b. Reference Paragraph 1, Page 11, concerning the requirement for audio-visual equipment: The requirement for modular audio-visual units was established under ENSURE procedures and approved by DA on 19 April 1967. Eight units will be procured and shipped to the 6th Psychological Operations (Psyops) Battalion for field evaluation.

c. Reference Paragraphs 1d(2) and 1d(3), Pages 3 and 4, and Paragraphs 2 - 4, Page 12, concerning supply problems: Problems described in unit observations and recommendations were brought to the attention of USARV during January 1967. At that time the unit was based, for the most part, on the Counterinsurgency Supply Office, 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa. Subsequently, USARV has taken action to support the 6th Psyops Battalion through normal supply channels, as well as through the Counterinsurgency Supply Office. Logistical problems should now be greatly minimized.

d. Reference Paragraph 5, Page 12, concerning evacuation procedures of repairable equipment: USARV Regulation 750-6 provides sufficient guidance to resolve this problem.

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AVHGC-DST (27 Feb 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

e. Reference Paragraph 6, Page 12, concerning evaluation of new equipment: The 6th Psyops Battalion will be considered for participation in all future evaluations of ENSURE items which appear to have psychological operations application or potential.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


E. L. Kennedy
Colonel
Assistant General

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GPOP-OT (27 Feb 67)

2d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 6th Psy Ops Bn

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 9 JUN 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.
2. Reference paragraph 2a, 1st Indorsement. The MTOE was forwarded to Department of the Army on 10 April 1967.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


BENJAMIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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