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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (17 Aug 67) FOR OT RD-67X010

29 August 1967

**SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report - Operation Billings, conducted by
1st Infantry Division**

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Billings. Operation Billings was conducted by the 1st Infantry Division during the period 12-26 June 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General**

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 - 3d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry
 - 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry
 - 11th Infantry Brigade
 - 1st Infantry Division

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

26 July 1967

AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION BILLINGS

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation BILLINGS was a search and destroy operation. Reference: Map, VIETNAM, 1:50:000, Series L7014: Sheets 6332 II and III; 6331 I and IV.

2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: Initiated 121144 June 1967; Terminated 261838 June 1967.

3. (C) GENERAL: Operation BILLINGS was a 1st Infantry Division controlled operation. The operation was conducted against VC/NVA forces and installations in an area extending east from the SONG EE River to Route 1A and from PHUOC VINH north to Highway 13 lateral. The operation was the first conducted by the 1st Infantry Division in War Zone D. During the operation, elements of the 271st VC Regiment were fought and defeated on two occasions. The general area of the operation is shown at Annex C.

a. The reporting officer for this report is Major General John H. Hay, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division.

b. TASK ORGANIZATION: Control of the operation was exercised by Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, from a forward command post located at LAI KHE. The initial task organization is listed below. Subsequent changes are shown as they occurred, in paragraph 7 of this report. Commanders are shown at Annex A.

<u>1ST BDE</u>	<u>2D BDE</u>	<u>3D BDE</u>
1-2 Inf	2-2 Inf (Mech)	1-16 Inf
2-16 Inf	1-4 Cav (-)	1-18 Inf
1-26 Inf	2 Plat/B/2-34 Arm	2-28 Inf
1-28 Inf	A/5-2 Arty (DS)	B/2-34 Arm (-)
2 Sect/I/29 Arty(DS)	2 Sect/I/29 Arty (DS)	Plat E/1-4 Cav
1-5 Arty (DS)	1-7 Arty (DS)	Sect 4&5/D/71 Arty
C/7-9 Arty		Sect/I/29 Arty (DS)
		6-15 Arty (-)(DS)
		2-33 Arty (DS)

DIV ARTY

8-6 Arty (-) GSR 1-5 Arty
A/8-6 Arty GSR 6-15 Arty
D/8-6 Arty GSR 1-7 Arty
2-13 Arty (-) GSR
A/6-15 Arty Reinf 1-7 Arty
B/6-15 Arty Reinf 1-5 Arty
6-27 Arty (-) GSR

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4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex B

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division conducts airmobile assaults with 1st Brigade on 11 June 67 and 3d Brigade on 12 June 67 to kill or capture VC/NVA forces and capture or destroy militarily significant equipment, supplies, and installations in western War Zone D; continues to conduct operations in direct support of Revolutionary Development in AO LAM SON 67; continues oversight of operations in AO STRIKE.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Infantry Division conducts airmobile assaults with 1st Brigade on 11 June 67, employing three battalions, to secure a forward FSB, "GUNNER I", vic XT995545 and search and destroy within AO REBEL; with 3d Brigade on 11 June 67, employing one battalion, to secure a forward FSB, "GUNNER II", at CHI LINH, and on 12 June 67, employing two battalions, to search and destroy within AO YANKEE; prepares to conduct subsequent airmobile assaults and, on order, artillery base displacements throughout the operational area.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 12 June - The 1st Brigade initiated Operation BILLINGS by conducting airmobile assaults into LZ GOLF (XT938576) with the 1-28 Inf at 1325H, closing at 1420H, and LZ FOXTROT (XT972623) with the 1-2 Inf at 1126H, closing at 1228H. The 1-26 Inf continued to secure PHUOC VINH and the SONG BE River bridge (XT9244). The 3d Brigade initiated the operation by moving the 2-28 Inf from LAI KHE to FSB GUNNER II by fixed wing aircraft at 0815H, closing at 1410H. The 2-18 Inf continued local security operations at FSB GUNNER II. The 1-16 Inf and 1-18 Inf conducted security operations at LAI KHE.

b. 13 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 1-28 Inf and 1-2 Inf conducted search and destroy operations in Objective 2 (XT9357) and Objective 4 (XT9661), respectively. The 1-26 Inf continued security operations along Route 14 and conducted security patrolling around FSB GUNNER I. The 1-16 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ RUFE (XT9566), at 1117H, closing at 1222H, secured the LZ for the insertion of the 2-28 Inf, and then conducted limited search and destroy operations without contact. The 2-28 Inf moved by UH-1D aircraft from GUNNER II to LZ RUFE at 1235H, closing at 1337H.

c. 14 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 1-2 Inf, 1-28 Inf, and 1-26 Inf continued operations. The 2-16 Inf continued its security mission and cleared the road between the SONG BE River bridge and the NUOC VANG Bridge (XT9951). The 2-28 Inf conducted patrolling in the vicinity of FSB GUNNER II. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations west of LZ RUFE. At 1215H, at XT935658, Company C made contact with 5 VC who fled to the southeast. At 1430H, Company B received sporadic fire at XT937669. Artillery was directed into the area and contact was broken at 1416H. At 1430H, in the same general area, Company B made heavy contact with an estimated VC battalion, the company received heavy fire from the front and flanks. Artillery, air support, and gunships were employed in support of the units in contact. Company C was sent to reinforce Company B, linking up at 1814H. Sporadic contact continued until 1900H. The two companies returned to the NDP at LZ RUFE, closing at 2330H. VC casualties were 62 KIA(BC).

d. 15 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 1st Brigade units continued the previous day's operations. The 1-16 Inf conducted patrolling in the vicinity of LZ RUFE, and the 2-28 Inf conducted search and destroy operations west of that LZ.

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e. 16 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 1-28 Inf displaced to a new NDP (XT924546), closing at 1540H. The 1-16 Inf conducted search and destroy operations and cleared a LZ at XT947649. All other battalions continued their missions.

f. 17 June - Changes in task organization

3D BDE

2-2 Inf (Mech) (Eff 1930H)
1-16 Inf
1-18 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-28 Inf

1-2 Inf moved to FT003610, continued search and destroy operations, and established a NDP. At 0730H, Companies A and B, together with the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1-16 Inf, and Companies A and B, 2-28 Inf, moved from LZ RUFE to LZ XRAY (XT9668), closing at 1125H. At 1245H, B/2-28 Inf received semi-automatic fire from the northwest; the tempo of fire increased with the addition of automatic weapons fire, mortar fire, and hand and rifle grenades to the attack. At 1325H, a major assault was mounted against the Reconnaissance Platoon and A/1-16 Inf from the southeast and northeast, respectively, by elements of the 271st VC Regiment. The attack continued until 1459H. At 1430H, C/1-16, C and Rcn/2-28 Inf at LZ RUFE received semi-automatic and mortar fire which lasted throughout the day. Between 1700H and 1710H, the elements at LZ XRAY received 50-60 rounds of mortar fire. Counter mortar fire, artillery, air support, and light fire teams supported the entire day's action. Contact was broken at 1710H. The command post, 1-16 Inf, closed on LZ XRAY from LZ RUFE at 1905H. VC casualties were 274 KIA (BC) and 1 PW. The 1-18 Inf moved by R/W from LAI KHE to LZ XRAY at 1600H, closing at 1905H. During the move into the LZ, the battalion received 14 rounds of mortar fire at 1655H and 40-45 rounds at 1710H. No casualties occurred. The 2-2 Inf (Mech) moved from PHU LOI to LAI KHE at 1630H, closing at 1930H.

g. 18 June - Changes in task organization

3D BDE

1-16 Inf
1-18 Inf
2-18 Inf
1-28 Inf (Eff 0830H)
2-28 Inf

The 1-28 Inf moved from its field position to FSB GUNNER II and became OPCON 3d Brigade. At 1230H the battalion conducted an airmobile assault into LZ DEFLANT (XT953726) and established a NDP. The 1-2 Inf secured FSB GUNNER WHITE and conducted search and destroy operations to the west. The 1-16 Inf (-) secured LZ RUFE and was airlifted to FSB GUNNER II and then on to LAI KHE, closing at 1717H. The 1-18 Inf and 2-28 Inf conducted security patrols at LZ XRAY. The 2-18 Inf conducted local security patrols at FSB GUNNER II without incident.

h. 19 June - Changes in task organization

1ST BDE

1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf (Eff 1340H)
2-16 Inf
1-26 Inf

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The 1-16 Inf moved by airlift from LAI KHE to DONG XOAI (YT0775) and established FSB GUNNER III, closing at 1340H. All other units continued operations without significant incident. B/1-18 Inf located a base camp at XT951693 consisting of 53 bunkers, 47 of which were subsequently destroyed; the dismembered bodies of 35 VC, killed by an airstrike during the battle of 17 June were discovered.

1. 20 June - Changes in task organization

1ST BDE

1-2 Inf
1-16 Inf
2-16 Inf
1-26 Inf
1st VNMC Bn (Eff 1046H)
SF Det A-342 (MGF) (Eff 1700H)

The 1st VNMC Bn moved from TAN UYEN to FSB GUNNER I at 0756H, closing at 1046H, by CH-47 and assumed responsibility for the FSB security at 1030H. SF Det A-342 (MGF) closed DONG XOAI at 1700H. All other units continued their activities.

j. 21 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 2-16 Inf continued to secure PHUOC VINH and the SONG BE bridge. At 0703H, A/2-16 Inf engaged a small VC force at XT927447; at 0710H, contact was broken with unknown results. The 1-28 Inf continued to secure LZ DEFIANT and conducted search and destroy operations east of the NDP, locating and destroying a platoon size base camp at XT973728 at 1005H.

k. 23 June - Changes in task organization - None

The 1-28 Inf moved by helicopter from LZ DEFIANT to QUAN LOI, closing at 1140H without incident. The 2-28 Inf was helilifted from LZ XRAY to FSB GUNNER II and then airlifted to LAI KHE, closing at 1520H. The 1-18 Inf was moved to FSB GUNNER II and then to DI AN, the battalion (-) becoming OPCON 2d Brigade upon closing at 1745H.

l. 24 June - Changes in organization - None

The 1-2 Inf moved by UH-1D from FSB GUNNER WHITE to PHUOC VINH at 1130H, closing at 1210H. All other units continued their missions without significant incident.

m. 25 June - Changes in task organization

3D BDE

2-2 Inf (Mech)
1-16 Inf (Eff 1200H)
2-18 Inf
2-28 Inf

The 1-16 Inf continued security operations at FSB GUNNER III and conducted limited search and destroy operations to the north, west, and south of the NDP without incident. Company B, 2-16 Inf, made contact with 5 VC at XT952464 at 0709H; contact was broken at 0721H with unknown results.

n. 26 June - The 1st Infantry Division terminated Operation BILLINGS at 1838H without significant incident during the day.

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8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

- a. Artillery: See Annex E
- b. Engineer: See Annex F
- c. Signal: See Annex G
- d. US Air Force Tactical Air Support

(1) Tactical air support for Operation BILLINGS was satisfactory. Total sorties flown and total tonnage of ordnance expended are as follows:

DATE	SORTIES FLOWN			ORDNANCE EXPENDED		
	1ST BDE	3D BDE	TOTAL	1ST BDE	3D BDE	TOTAL
12 June	37	8	45	42.00	9.25	51.25
13 June	16	16	32	22.00	28.75	50.75
14 June	14	27	41	18.25	34.50	52.75
15 June	15	19	34	17.00	26.75	43.75
16 June	17	27	44	19.75	29.50	49.25
17 June	8	50	58	9.75	62.25	72.00
18 June	7	43	50	8.50	54.25	62.75
19 June	9	20	29	11.25	21.75	33.00
20 June	5	35	40	5.50	44.00	49.50
21 June	6	29	35	8.25	38.25	46.50
22 June	8	26	34	9.75	28.00	37.75
23 June	1	21	22	1.00	24.00	25.00
24 June	11	1	12	15.00	2.00	17.00
25 June	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3.00</u>	<u>9.50</u>	<u>12.50</u>
TOTAL	157	329	486	191.00	412.75	603.75

(2) Element of the 3d Brigade became heavily engaged with the enemy on 14 and 17 June 1967. The response to immediate tactical air requests on these two occasions was very satisfactory and the bombing on the part of the fighter pilots was excellent. However, the availability of CBU-2 and napalm on these immediate requests did not meet all of our requirements. CBU-2 and napalm are the major effective munitions which can be safely dropped in close proximity to friendly forces. On 14 June 67 seven immediate airstrikes were requested and flown. Four flights had CBU-2 and napalm and one flight had CBU-2 and 500 lb bombs. Ordnance on pre-planned strikes was a problem early in the operation; however, after a visit by CG, 7th Air Force little difficulty was encountered.

(3) There was a total of nine B-52 strikes flown in support of Operation BILLINGS. These strikes were extremely effective in opening key jungle areas habitually used by the VC and will greatly assist future ground

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operations in the same area. The importance of B-52 strikes in support of ground operations cannot be emphasized enough. Massed air power is an excellent weapon to assist in keeping the Viet Cong constantly off balance, on the move, completely disorganized, and to inflict casualties on personnel and equipment.

9. (C) RESULTS:

- a. US KIA-57; US WIA-197
- b. VC Personnel Losses: KIA(BC) - 347; PW - 1
- c. VC Equipment Losses:
 - (1) Weapons:
 - (a) SA - 1 CHICOM Carbine/2 - AK50's
 - (b) AW - 1 CHICOM 7.62 MG/ 1 LMG
 - (2) Ammunition:
 - (a) SA - 230 rds 7.62mm
 - (b) Mortar - 3 60mm
 - (c) RR 1 - 57mm; 1 - RPG-2; 1 - US 2.75 Rocket
 - (d) Arty 105mm - 2; 1-750 lb bomb
 - (3) Explosive Material:
 - (a) Grenades Hand - 4; Grenades Rifle - 1
 - (b) Mines AP - 1; Mines AT - 1.
 - (4) Miscellaneous:
 - (a) Documents 3.5 lbs
 - (b) Ponchos - 2
 - (c) 5 - 30 cal ammo boxes
 - (d) 1 - US Helmet Liner
 - (e) 2 - M16 Magazines
 - (f) 1 - bag clothing, misc clothing
 - (g) 1 - Kilo tobacco
 - (h) 2 - pigs
 - (i) 20 - chickens
 - (j) 1 - pick
 - (k) 7 - packs
 - (l) 1 - 7.62 magazine
 - (m) 1 - table
 - (n) Miscellaneous pots and pans
 - (o) 1 - 7.62mm ammo box
 - (p) 1 - Sampan
 - (q) 1 - Raft
 - (r) 1 - Bicycle
 - (s) 3 - 55 gal drums
 - (t) 1 - web belt
 - (u) 1 - commo reel w/30' wire
 - (v) 184 - Bunkers destroyed
 - (w) 300 meters of trenches destroyed
 - (x) 19 - Military structures destroyed
 - (y) 45 - Foxholes

10. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: See Annex D

11. (C) COMMANDER'S EVALUATION:

a. The 1st Infantry Division accomplished its three fold purpose in conducting Operation BILLINGS.

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(1) The 271st VC Regiment was located in the primary objective area, as indicated by the Division's intelligence planners, and elements of that regiment were defeated in two separate battles on 14 June and 17 June 67.

(2) VC base camps and way stations in the northern area of interest for the security of PHUOC VINH were located and destroyed. Particular emphasis was placed upon the destruction of such installations along the east-west line of communications from War Zone C to War Zone D. Landing zones and roads in the area were improved facilitating future operations.

(3) Valuable information was gained of the area of operations which will support future operations in War Zone D. Of particular significance was the acquiring of an appreciation of the limiting factors of operating in War Zone D. The type jungle encountered was considerably denser than that previously operated in by the Division. Fewer open areas suitable for use as landing zones exist.

b. The Division opened two new fire support bases at GUNNER III and GUNNER WHITE during the operation, in addition to the opening and clearing of Route 1A from PHUOC VINH to FSB GUNNER I for the duration of the operations.

12. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED.

a. Conclusions: Operation BILLINGS was the most successful operation conducted by the 1st Infantry Division since Operation JUNCTION CITY. The division achieved all of its goals for the operation. The experience gained at all levels in conducting an operation in War Zone D will provide a basis for future plans and operations in that area.

b. Lessons learned:

(1) When conducting operations in an area in which few landing zones exist, it is necessary to exercise particular care to insure adequate preparation of landing zones and to provide additional forces to secure those landing zones since the enemy can more easily predict the location of and plan counter measures against airmobile operations.

(2) Operations conducted in particularly thick jungle that greatly reduces the rate of movement of a ground force require that the force be of sufficient size and strength to enable it to successfully fight an enemy of greater size for the period of time needed to reinforce the elements in contact. During Operation BILLINGS, 1st Infantry Division units were instructed to conduct operation in no less than two company strength.

(3) Captured VC documents indicate future tactical innovations to be conducted by the VC:

(a) The use of a small decoy force to lure US units into an ambush by VC major forces.

(b) Emphasis upon attacking US forces during airmobile extraction operations.

(c) An intensification in the conduct of raids and ambushes.

(d) Increased emphasis upon the destruction of the initial element of an airmobile assault. Such tactics require that increased emphasis on vigilance, control, and security be exercised by commanders of all levels.


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(4) Poor weather conditions, especially low ceilings, that frequently occur during the monsoon season may require airmobile operations to be delayed in order to insure continued and adequate air support.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


J. C. PENNINGTON
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

ANNEXES:

- A - List of Commanders
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operations Overlay
- D - Logistics
- E - Division Artillery After Action Report
- F - 1st Engr Bn After Action Report
- G - 121st Sig Bn After Action Report
- H - 1st Bde
- I - 3d Bde
- J - 1st Avn Bn
- K - PSYOPS

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Annex A (List of Commanders) to After Action Report BILLING

1st Infantry Division	MG John H. Hay
1st Brigade	COL William E. Caldwell
2d Brigade	COL Charles C. Thebaud
3d Brigade	COL Sidney M. Marks
Division Artillery	COL Lawrence H. Caruthers
Support Command	COL George E. Newman
1st Bn, 2d Infantry	LTC William C. Simpson
2d Bn, 2d Infantry	LTC John D. Pelton
1st Bn, 16th Infantry	LTC Rufus C. Lazzell
2d Bn, 16th Infantry	LTC Joseph R. Ulatoski
1st Bn, 18th Infantry	LTC Richard E. Cavazos
2d Bn, 18th Infantry	LTC James F. Price
1st Bn, 26th Infantry	LTC Joseph H. Hoffman, Jr.
1st Bn, 28th Infantry	LTC Stanley J. Kuick
2d Bn, 28th Infantry	LTC Jerry S. Edwards
1st Sqdn, 4th Cavalry	LTC John W. Seigle
1st Bn, 5th Artillery	LTC William L. Depew
8th Bn, 6th Artillery	LTC Benjamin B. Safar
1st Bn, 7th Artillery	LTC John W. Cassell
6th Bn, 15th Artillery	LTC Frank E. Serio
6th Bn, 27th Artillery	LTC Edward C. O'Connor
2d Bn, 33d Artillery	Until 19 Jun LTC Charles D. Daniel
	19 Jun _____ LTC Arthur D. Wells
1st Aviation Bn	LTC Algin S. Hawkins
1st Engineer Bn	MAJ Edwin C. Keiser

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Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP BILLINGS. (U)

1. (C) Intelligence prior to operation: Prior to OP BILLINGS intelligence reports indicated that since the 1st of April 1967, there had been numerous reported VC unit sightings in the area of interest. Significant sightings occurred east of the SONG BE and in an area approximately 5km NW of PHUOC VINH. Since the 1st of April, there have been reported a total of 7 battalion, 9 Regiment and 1 Div Hq unit sightings. In addition to these sightings, several actual contacts in the area of interest were made by friendly units during the month of April. These contacts were with four separate battalion size units and one regimental size unit. Current intelligence indicates that elements of the 9th VC Div will present the major threat to US operations. The 271st Regt was the most probable main force unit that US units would likely encounter. This unit could have been, as in the past, supported by the 84-A NVA Arty Regt. Numerous local guerrilla units were known to be in the operational area. Reinforcing VC elements could come from the 273d Regt and the PHU LOI Bn within 24-36 hours.
2. (C) Enemy situation during the Operation: Initially, during OP BILLINGS, enemy contact was sniper and small unit activity. On the morning of 17 June a small element of US troops made contact with a squad of VC, 4 were killed. A search of their packs revealed that they were members of the 271st Regt. In the afternoon of 17 June two US Infantry Battalions were moving from south to north into a landing zone. As the two battalions prepared to dig in for the evening, they began to receive sporadic enemy fire from the west. The enemy fire built up rapidly and soon a main VC attack was launched from the north. A secondary attack was launched from the south minutes later. Small unit probing by the VC was conducted all around the landing zone. Snipers from the trees began to fire into the landing zone. Sixty mm mortars positioned about 600 meters northeast of the landing zone began firing into the area. The contact lasted for about 30 minutes. A quick search of the wood line around the landing zone yielded a wounded VC. Through interrogation and from documents in his possession it was determined that the 1st Bn of the 271 VC Regt launched the attack. The wounded PW stated that his unit was to assemble approximately 4km northwest of the landing zone. Documents taken from a dead VC contained a sketch map of a stream line with unit identification indicating their assembly position. From the information taken from the PW and the sketch maps, the VC assembly area was located and artillery and airstrikes were placed into the area. The rest of the operation did not result in any significant enemy contact.
3. (C) Weather and Terrain
 - a. Weather: OP BILLINGS was delayed one day due to rain and low overcast. Once the operation began weather was generally good to fair. The mean temperatures during the period was 94 degrees high and 74 degrees low. The average relative humidity was 72 per cent. The number of days with visibility restricted to 5 miles or less due to ground fog was 14 days. The number of days with a ceiling below 4000 ft. was 14 days. The total amount of rainfall during the operational period was 2.8 inches.
 - b. Terrain: The most prominent terrain feature in the area of operation is the SONG BE River, which flows north to south through the western portion of the area. There are also numerous streams in the area that flow generally north and south. Generally, the area is covered by dense jungle east of the SONG BE. The trees reach a height from 75 to 150 feet tall, well spaced, and have a dense canopy which inhibits the development of undergrowth. Bamboo grows in low wet areas, and is usually very closely spaced with dense canopy. Abandoned rice paddies are often covered with low, scattered scrub. Observation and fields of fire on the ground was generally poor except in the areas of the abandoned rice paddies. The principal cover for both units and

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Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP BILLINGS (cont) (U)

installations was the bunker, tunnel, and steep-banked stream built by the VC. The dense vegetation offered excellent concealment from ground and air observation throughout the entire area.

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Appendix 1 (Aerial Surveillance) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP BILLINGS (U)

1. (C) G2 Air operational control was exercised from LAI KHE throughout the period.
2. (C) During the period, the following aerial surveillance was conducted in support of division operations:
 - a. Red Haze:

(1) ASTA Platoon	27 targets
(2) 73d Avn Co	2 targets
(3) AF	0 targets
TOTAL	29
 - b. SLAR:

(1) ASTA Platoon	36 targets
(2) 73d Avn Co	0 targets
TOTAL	36
 - c. Visual: G2 Air Section personnel flew approximately 30 hours of visual reconnaissance.
3. (C) The following is the breakdown of SLAR and Red Haze returns during the reporting period:
 - a. SLAR: Total returns 242

Returns passed to 18th ARVN	5
Returns passed to 5th ARVN	7
Returns passed to 25th Div	22
Returns in 1st Div AO	218
Returns in AO negated	6
Passed to FSE & Bdes	212
Fired on by arty	58
 - b. Red Haze: Total returns 34

Returns in 1st Div AO	33
Returns negated	19
Returns passed to 5th ARVN	1
Passed to FSE & Bdes	14
Returns fired on by arty	3
 - c. Reasons brigades and FSE did not direct fire on RH and SLAR returns were:

(1) No hard target	70%
(2) Out of range	15%
(3) Friendly troops in area	5%
(4) Clearance denied	10%
4. (C) Two hundred and seventy-six targets were generated by Bloodhound missions during the period. One hundred and forty were fired on by artillery.
5. (C) The following photographic support was provided by division assets during the period:
 - a. Total requests flown 15
 - b. Number of individual prints 1750
 - c. Number of mosaics made 38
6. (C) Significant Accomplishments:
 - a. Maintained visual and SLAR surveillance over the area of operation and the surrounding area.
 - b. Maintained SLAR coverage of the Division TAOR and TAOI.
 - c. Coordinated the Division's reconnaissance efforts.
 - d. Reconned B-52 strike areas in support of Operation BILLINGS.
7. (C) Problems Encountered:
 - a. During the period five SLAR and five Red Haze missions were aborted due to equipment failures and weather conditions. Low ceilings in the morning have precluded visual reconnaissance.
 - b. The new airstrip at PHU LOI has not been completed. During rainshowers, the old runway could not be used by aircraft due to excessive water buildup caused by poor drainage.

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 11-26 June 1967) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for OP BILLINGS (U)

DATE	COORD	TGT BY	TYPE TGT	ACTION TAKEN
12 Jun	XT 907635	A/O	Base Camp, 3 mil structures with/tin roofs, trenches, bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 771225	A/O	Tunnel entrances	Tgt for arty
	XT 771229		covered w/logs	
	YT 004611	A/O	E-W trail, signs of heavy traffic	Tgt for arty
	YT 027623	A/O	E-W trail, signs of heavy traffic	Tgt for arty
	XT 877605	A/O	Base Camp, Co size	Tgt for arty
	XT 695705	A/O	Cxcert Bridge	Tgt for arty
13 Jun	XT 904644	A/O	Heavily used river crossing site	Tgt for arty
	XT 868310	A/O	VC supply area	Tgt for arty
	XT 869880	A/O	1 large military structure, recently planted ricefield. Work done at night.	Tgt for arty and defoliation
	XT 873591	A/O	Cave with trail leading E to river	Tgt for arty
	XT 912635	A/O	Defensive area of trenches & bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 932582	B/1-26	Base camp consisting of 10 Dest huts, 25 bunkers & 4 cocking areas	
	XT 927584	Recon/1-28	Regt size Base Camp, 150 bunkers (15' x 15') in two rings around compound Heavy O/H cover	Tgt for arty
	XT 946661	C/2-28	Defensive area of 75 fighting positions	Tgt for arty
	XT 928578	Recon/1-28	Base Camp, w/30 bunker w/OH cover, trench line	Tgt for arty
	14 Jun	XT 870607	A/O	River crossing point
YT 007739		A/O	Trail w/signs of heavy traffic	Tgt for arty
XT 929657		A/O	Small Base Camp (occupied)	Tgt for arty
YT 023276		A/O	Base Camp, unk size	Tgt for arty
YT 026623		A/O	Trail crossing Hwy 1A. Heavy traffic	Tgt for arty
XT 941558		A/1-16	Base Camp 300m long, consisting 30-40 bunkers & trenches	Tgt for arty
15 Jun	XT 930530	A/1-2	15 bunkers	Dest
	XT 965584	A/S	Exposed 5 bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 918657	A/O	River crossing site, rafts are used to move equipment across river	Tgt for arty
	XT 972412	A/O	8 trenches in parallel patterns	Tgt for arty
	XT 915415	A/O	9 trenches	Tgt for arty
	XT 954531	C/1-28	Platoon size Base Camp, 3-4 months old, 6 spider holes, 2MG psns, 2-10 meter trenches	Tgt for arty
	XT 967585	C/1-28	Defensive position consisting of "L" shape trenches, 5 bunkers w/OH cover, 34 foxholes, 1 mortar psn.	Tgt for arty
	XT 960587	C/1-28	Defensive Psn 14 foxholes w/OH cover	Tgt for arty
	XT 947599	C/1-28	Well-used NS trail	Tgt for arty

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 11-26 June 1967) to Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report for CP BILLINGS (cont) (U)

DATE	COORD	TGT BY	TYPE TGT	ACTION TAKEN
15 Jun	XT 947662	B/2-28	Well used E-W trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 936667	B/2-28	Base Camp, unk size	Tgt for arty
16 Jun	XT 912635	Div Arty	Base Camps, unk size	Partially dest. by arty
	YT 165605	A/S	Airstrike exposed 8 bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 846534	A/O	Heavy foot traffic across bridge	Tgt for arty
	XT 545405	A/O	Loc, new mil structures, bunkers People working in fields	Tgt for defoliation
	XT 952655	C/1-16	Well used N-S trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 951645	C/1-16	Loc a way-station	Tgt for arty
	XT 947652	C/1-16	Several well-used oxcart trails leading into LZ 4 vic XT 947649	Tgt for arty.
	XT 952655	C/1-16	Base Camp consisting of and bunkers, approx 2-months old	Tgt for arty
17 Jun	YT 143505	A/O	Active Base Camp	Tgt for arty
	XT 889574	A/O	Trail going from XT 889-574 to XT 891540 to XT 889528 evidence of hvy traffic	
	YT 169438	A/O	Approx 10 tunnel ent & 50 m of trenches	Tgt for arty
	YT 020544	B/1-26	Loc well-used N-S trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 945547	A/1-28	Well-used SW-NE trail along stream	Tgt for arty
18 Jun	XT 956682	B/2-28	Base Camp	Arty & Airstrike unk results
	XT 849584	A/O	Base Camp w/unk no. of bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 174437	A/O	Base Camp w/6 huts, 3 tunnel ent. 6 bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 874582	A/O	Well-used trails along river	Tgt for arty
	YT 000497	A/O	Well-used trails across clearing	Tgt for arty
	XT 956679	B/2-28	Loc wide well us NE-SW trail	Tgt for arty
19 Jun	YT 120505	A/O	Trail running NW-SE, well used	Tgt for arty
	XT 867590	A/O	Rice paddies that are worked at night	Tgt for defoliation
	XT 865603	A/O	Suspected VC storage area	Tgt for arty
	XT 908741	C/2-18	Loc NW-SE trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 900742	C/2-18	Loc NW-SE trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 933487	1-26	Loc well-used NE-SW trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 861261	A/1-4	Loc old French fortifications w/tunnels in and around fort	Searched
	YT 010620	1-2	Loc NE-SW trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 953717	C/1-28	Loc E-W trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 954676	Recon/2-28	Base Camp, 6 bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 951693	B/1-18	Base Camp, Co size, 53 bunkers	Hit by air strike 2/3 dest
20 Jun	XT 873582	A/O	2 new gardens-cultivated at night	Tgt for defoliation

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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 11-26 June 1967) to Annex B (Intelligence)
to After Action Report for OP BILLINGS (cont) (U)

DATE	COORD	TGT BY	TYPE TGT	ACTION TAKEN
20 Jun	XT 879589	A/O	Rice paddy-cultivated at night	Tgt for defoliation
	XT 90364	A/O	River crossing site, signs of recent use	Tgt for arty
	YT 127994	A/O	Village previously deserted now occupied	Tgt for arty
	YT 007739	A/O	Recently used trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 959683	B/1-18	Loc well-used E-W trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 009608	C/1-2	Loc NE-EW trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 959693	B/1-18	Loc N-S trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
	YT 029609	C/1-2	Loc NE-SW trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	YT 024604	C/1-2	Loc E-W trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 952674	Recon/2-28	Loc NW-SE trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 967687	1-18	Loc area where several trails converged	Tgt for arty
21 Jun	YT 030702	A/O	Tunnel ent. w/trail leading to it	Tgt for arty
	XT 854600	A/O	Bridge	Tgt for arty
	YT 150460	A/O	Base Camp, 7 huts (30'x-50') 3 large bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 952604	A/O	Loc well-used NW-SE trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 962721	A/1-28	Loc well-used NW-SE trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 901729	C/1-28	Loc E-W trail, not recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 952685	A/2-28	Loc E-W trail, heavy traffic	Tgt for arty
	XT 958719	A/1-28	Loc NE-SW trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 965721	A/1-28	Loc N-S trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 965719	A/1-28	Loc NW-SE trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 973716	A/1-28	Loc NS trail, recently used	Tgt for arty
22 Jun	XT 977716	A/S	Exposed 17 bunkers: still intact	Tgt for arty
	XT 998740	A/O	Loc 3 N-S trails, recently used	Tgt for arty
	YT 090455	A/O	Loc VC storage area	Tgt for arty
	YT 126552	A/O	50 m of trenches & bunkers	Tgt for arty
	XT 970730	C/1-28	Loc well-used N-S trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 973728	C/1-28	Base Camp, Co size	Dest
	XT 975729	C/1-28	Loc well-used NW-SE trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 983734	C/1-28	Loc well-used EW trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 927737	C/1-28	Loc well-used N-S trail	Tgt for arty
	XT 974715	1-28	Loc Base Camp, bunkers, bathing area, vehicle tracks running parallel stream	Tgt for arty
23 Jun	XT 931489	1-28	Loc E-W oxcart trail	Tgt for arty
24 Jun	XT 894635	A/O	Numerous trails, recently used	Tgt for arty
	YT 153598	A/O	Two large mil structures and numerous bunkers in immediate area	Tgt for arty
25 Jun	YT 033703	SF	Loc E-W trail recently used & heavily traveled	Tgt for arty
	YT 010712	SF	Recently cut trails, heavily used	Tgt for arty
26 Jun	YT 108318	A/S	Exposed 20 m trenches	Tgt for arty

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
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Appendix 2 (Hard Installations 11-26 June 1967) to Annex B (Intelligence)
to After Action Report for CP BILLINGS (cont) (U)

DATE	COORD	TGT BY	TYPE TGT	ACTION TAKEN
26 Jun	XT 975355	A/S	Dest 1 mil. structure, uncovered 3 bunkers	Tgt for arty
	YT 819385	A/O	Base Camp previously dest. now being reconstructed	Tgt for arty
	XT 882938	A/1-28	Loc N-S trail recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 888942	A/1-2	Loc N-S trail recently used	Tgt for arty
	XT 887953	A/1-28	Loc N-W trail recently used	Tgt for arty

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
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
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
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
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
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
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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION "BILLINGS"

(11 June - 26 June 1967)

1st Infantry Division Support Command



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

DEGRADE AS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM BASIC DOCUMENTS

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I. (C) CONCEPT OF SUPPORT OPERATIONSA. (C) GENERAL:

The basic concept for logistical support of Operation "BILLINGS" featured supply point distribution of high tonnage items from established base camps at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh as well as unit distribution of class V from Bien Hoa Airfield to Fire Support Patrol Base (FSPB) Gunner II at Chi Linh. The impetus of supply was from the rear and focused on maintenance of adequate stocks at forward supply locations to meet peak unit demands without any delay or adverse effect on tactical operations. Resupply of Lai Khe was predominately by land LOC, Phuoc Vinh Air LOC exclusively. Through continuous liaison by Support Command Commanders and staff, the ACoS, G-4, and the full use of the coordinating capabilities of the Logistics Operation Coordination Center (LOCC), logistical problems were identified early or anticipated before they reached a magnitude that hampered tactical disposition. Through the LOCC machinery, corrective action and anticipatory planning was initiated in a timely manner to insure logistical support of all operations.

B. (C) FORWARD COMMAND POST:

1. The Support Command Forward Command Post was established and operational in the Logistics Operation Coordination Center (LOCC) 10 June 1967, located at Division Headquarters (forward), Lai Khe. The LOCC function was to coordinate all support rendered and to receive, evaluate, consolidate and transmit to Division Logistical Base in Di An or Support elements at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh requests for Class I, II, IV, III and maintenance for appropriate action, and through aggressive follow-up action to insure that all valid demands were satisfied in the shortest possible time. The LOCC also served as the focal point for the consolidation of information pertaining to the status of supplies such as consumption receipts, and dues in. This information was translated into concrete planning data to insure the uninterrupted, adequate and timely flow of all classes of supplies to the ultimate consumer. Scheduling and controlling of fixed wing airlift for division support was performed in the LOCC.

2. Representatives in the LOCC were:

Support Command S-4 Section 1 Officer, 1 NCO, 1 EM
 701st Maintenance Battalion Material Section 1 Officer
 Division Transportation Office 2 Officers
 Tactical Airlift Liaison Officer (TALO) 2 Officers, 1 NCO
 1st Supply and Transport Battalion S-3 Section 1 Officer, 1 EM
 Division Ammunition Officer - 1 officer, 1 NCO, 2 EM

C. (C) METHOD OF DIRECT SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY:1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

a. The activities of the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion were controlled by the Battalion Commander through his staff and subordinate commanders. The Battalion CP was located at Di An. Operation of the permanent Forward Supply Sections at Lai Khe and Phuoc Vinh and the Chi aircraft refueling point at Chi Linh were controlled in a normal, routine manner. Telephone communications were maintained with the Battalion Headquarters at Di An and frequent visits to the forward areas by the Battalion Commander and his representatives provided timely and decisive action which insured expeditious handling of supply actions. The office of the Division Supply Officer served as the focal point for the coordination of the logistical support rendered by the Supply and Transport Battalion and consolidation of information pertaining to the status of Class I, II&IV, III and certain services in the forward areas. Here, data on consumption, receipts and amounts on hand was gathered and considered with the tactical situation, locations of unit and planned movement of units, to insure the efficient uninterrupted flow of adequate supplies to the forward area. In addition, an Assistant S-3 was located with the LOCC at the Division Forward Command Post for liaison with the Support Command Staff and the G-4.

b. The battalion concept of supply and service support for Operation "BILLINGS" involved utilization of established Forward Supply Sections at Phuoc Vinh and Lai Khe base camps. All units participating in the operation were supported with Class I, Class III and Class II&IV from those two locations. In addition, a refueling point was established at Chi Linh to provide a convenient refueling location within the operational area for command and control aircraft. Adequate stocks were maintained at Lai Khe by Land LOC from 1st Log Command

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activities located in the Saigon-Long Binh logistical complex and the battalion main supply facility at Di An. AF aircraft were utilized on a non-scheduled basis to supply both high tonnage and fast moving Class II&IV items to Phuoc Vinh. Class III and limited amounts of Class II&IV barrier material were supplied by air to Chi Linh. Normal frag of AF aircraft provided Class III and A rations to Phuoc Vinh. Normal frag of AF aircraft and Land LOC were utilized to provide A rations at Lai Khe. 24

c. The battalion maintained the capacity to provide emergency re-fueling in isolated field locations and to expand existing Class III facilities on short notice to support air-lift airmobile assault operations for the duration of the operation.

d. Support Locations

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUPPORT</u>	<u>DATES OPEN</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Lai Khe	I, II&IV, III, GR REG, SALVAGE	Permanent	1 Off 30 EM
Phuoc Vinh	I, II&IV, III, GR REG, SALVAGE	Permanent	1 Off 19 EM
Chi Linh	III	11-23 Jun 67	1 Off 4 EK

e. A combination of area and unit support was used during this operation. Class I and II&IV supplies were normally provided on a unit basis. Class III and GR REG service were normally provided on an area basis. Salvage collection was accomplished on an area basis utilizing internal transportation assets.

1. Lai Khe

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class II&IV while Class III, GR REG and salvage collection were provided on an area basis.

b. Land and air LOC were utilized for resupply.

2. Phuoc Vinh:

a. Unit support was provided for Class I and Class II&IV while Class III, salvage collection and GR REG service were provided on an area basis.

3. Chi Linh

a. Area Class III support was provided for command and control aircraft. Other Class III Products and Class II&IV barrier material were also provided on an area basis.

b. Air LOC was used exclusively for resupply.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion

a. Due to the small number of units involved in the operation and their proximity to division base camps and forward support companies, no permanent contact teams were established. Small, mission oriented assistance teams were sent out on specific missions when required, to fire support patrol bases and other locations.

b. Forward support companies rendered support to their normal customers.

c. Aircraft support was effected from CO's at Phu Loi, and contact teams were sent on request to on-site locations. 20 such visits were made during the period.

3. 1st Medical Battalion:

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The 1st Medical Battalion provided medical support to the division from the following locations: "B" Company from their base camp at Lai Khe. On 17 June 1967, "B" Company dispatched a "GO TEAM" to the vicinity of XT958676. This team returned to base camp at Lai Khe on 18 June 1967. "C" Company supported the operation with a forward medical team at Quan Loi. This team was moved to Quan Loi on 11 June 1967, and returned to their base camp at Di An on 26 June 1967. "D" Company supported the operation from their base camp at Phuoc Vinh. All medical companies had "GO TEAMS" ready to move "on order." Resupply to these medical companies was by air. The infantry units were resupplied directly from the medical companies at Lai Khe, Phuoc Vinh, and the division medical supply located at Di An.

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4. Division Transportation Office

a. The Division Transportation Office was organized into a forward and rear element. The forward element, located at the LOCC and consisting of the Division Transportation officer and the Assistant Division Transportation Officer, scheduled and controlled all fixed wing airlift for the division support. This included both tactical troop lift and logistical lift.

b. The rear element in Di An was responsible for setting up convoys for movement to the various forward locations. This included scheduling convoys, contacting all participating units, briefing convoy commanders, and assisting the military police in traffic control and in the establishment of convoy discipline for units departing Di An. The C7A aircraft traffic, under the direction of the DTO, was controlled by the Di An Airfield personnel.

5. Division Ammunition Office

a. Class V support was provided through forward distribution points (FDP) at Lai Khe and Phouc Vinh and through unit distribution by Air Force air to FSF Gunner II at Chi Linh. The Lai Khe FDP was resupplied by periodic Log Command convoys from Long Binh. EOD service was provided by a team from the 42nd EOD Detachment positioned at Lai Khe.

b. Ammunition supply service to the division was controlled by the DAO whose base of operation was in the LOCC at Danger Forward in Lai Khe. The DAO was assisted in the LOCC by three enlisted men. Two enlisted men from the DAO section assisted in operating each of the forward distribution points, at Lai Khe and Phouc Vinh. Stockage of the FDP's was coordinated by the DAO-LOCC and the ADAO at Long Binh.

c. The primary method of resupply for the units engaged in Operation "BILLINGS" was by air LOC.

Lai Khe FDP:
Air LOC- 100%
Land LOC- 0

Phouc Vinh FDP:
Air LOC- 70%
Land LOC- 30%

Chi Linh FDP:
Air LOC- 100%
Land LOC 0

d. Detonate Bravo had 105mm ammunition airlifted with them from Lai Khe to Gunner III, vicinity Dong Koi. Additional quantities were obtained by CH-47 from Quan Loi.

D. GENERAL SUPPORT AND RESUPPLY SOURCES:

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion:

The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion used its normal resupply sources throughout the operation. Requirements of supported units were routed to the Division Supply Office at Di An. For those items not available and for anticipated requirements, a request was placed on the 506th Field Depot in Saigon.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion

The majority of parts were obtained from the 506th Depot in Saigon, although some parts were obtained from the 185th, 725th and 610th Maintenance Battalions.

3. 1st Medical Battalion:

The advance platoon of the 32nd Medical Depot provided medical resupply to the division from its location in Saigon. Patient care was provided by the 24th Evacuation Hospital and the 93rd Evacuation Hospital located at Long Binh. Aeromedical evacuation was provided by the Air Ambulance Company (Prov) by locating two (2) standby "Dust offs" at Phouc Vinh.

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4. Division Transportation Offices: NONE

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5. Division Ammunition Offices:

The Long Binh Ammunition Depot, operated by the 3rd Ord Bn, provided ammunition by unit distribution to the Lai Khe FDP and to FSPB Gunner II. Ammunition for the Phuoc Vinh FDP had been prestocked during the Phuoc Vinh resupply convoys during the period 25 May through 1 June.

E. (C) UNIT RESUPPLY CONCEPTS

1. 1st Supply and Transport Battalion

Supply point distribution was provided throughout the operation. Unit trains were located vicinity Lai Khe or Phuoc Vinh. Units received supplies at the 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Forward Supply Sections at these two locations. An exception to this method of resupply was the delivery of Class II& IV barrier material to Chi Linh.

2. 701st Maintenance Battalion

No significant tonnages were moved to the forward contact teams. The forward support companies continued to support their normal customers.

3. 1st Medical Battalion

Medical resupply to infantry units of the division was by supply point distribution. Units desiring supplies brought requests to the medical company providing support. The supplies are issued and the requestor would return to his unit with the medical supplies.

4. Division Ammunition Office

Unit distribution from Long Binh was provided in all cases.

F. (C) SUPPORT OF NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS:

Two 155mm tubes, (Non-divisional artillery) at Chi Linh were supported by the Division Ammunition Office in the same manner as organic units.

G. (C) MAJOR ITEM LOSSES (SUPPORT COMMAND):

None

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II. (C) EXPERIENCE DATA

27 A. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

1. (C) Supply

a. (U) Quantities of Supplies Consumed:

ITEM	Air LOC	LAND LOC	TOTALS
Class I (Short Tons)	202.7		
JP-4 (Gallons)	136,748.0	358.0	561.3
Avgas (Gallons)	10,325.0	14,900.0	285,755.0
Mogas (Gallons)	53,049.0	9800.0	20,125.0
Bissel (Gallons)	45,111.0	71,038.0	124,087.0
Class II&IV (Short Tons)		62,686.0	107,797.0
Less Barrier Material	8.8		
Barrier Material	46.2	21.45	30.25
Medical Supplies	13.2	33.55	79.75
Class V		0	
Small Arms and other			13.2
Arty and Large Caliber	1583.55	64.42	64.42
	11.5	715.78	2299.33

b. (C) Support to G-5 Activities:

None

c. (U) Class I Analysis

(1) Location: Lai Khe

(a) A Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	1 day	53200	7600	48.9	0	44880	6411	14461
18-24 Jun 67	1 day	56406	8058	37.9	29.9	47700	6814	22496
25-26 Jun 67	1 day	0	0	0	0	12700	6350	18531
RECAP	1 day	109606	6850	86.8	29.9	105280	6580	18476

(b) B Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	15days	77000	11000	0	126.5	44490	6356	89398
18-24 Jun 67	15days	94500	13500	0	141.7	50820	7250	61845
25-26 Jun 67	15days	0	0	0	0	44100	22050	104484
RECAP	15days	171500	10719	0	268.2	139410	8713	85242

(c) C Rations

DATE	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	5days	10240	1463	0	26.5	8436	1205	18578
18-24 Jun 67	5days	7936	1134	0	27.7	22415	1714	18671
25 Jun 67	5days	0	0	0	0	1500	750	17230
RECAP	5days	18176	1136	0	54.2	22351	1397	18160

(d) Sundry Packs

DATE	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	3days	90	13	0	2.1	145	21	295
18-24 Jun 67	3days	180	26	0	4.2	193	28	181
25-26 Jun 67	3days	0	0	0	0	31	16	171
RECAP	3days	270	17	0	6.3	369	23	219

(2.) Location: Phuoc Vinh
(a) A Rations

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DATESS	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	1day	32224	4748	31.6	0	40900	5843	9511
18-24 Jun 67	1day	52489	7381	47.4	0	39900	5700	16557
25-26 Jun 67	1day	5100	2850	6.8	0	11100	5550	18920
RECAP	1day	90603	5663	85.8	0	91900	5744	14996

(b.) B Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	15days	0	0	0	0	29900	4271	140851
17-24 Jun 67	15days	0	0	0	0	39900	5700	99523
25-26 Jun 67	15days	0	0	0	0	10800	5400	75394
RECAP	15days	0	0	0	0	80600	5038	105256

(c.) C Rations

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	5days	0	0	0	0	11528	1647	17095
18-24 Jun 67	5days	10240	1463	24.5	0	3848	550	20586
25-26 Jun 67	5days	0	0	0	0	792	396	18761
RECAP	5days	10240	640	24.5	0	16168	1011	18817

(d.) Sundry Packs

DATES	S/O	TOTAL RECEIVED	AV DAILY RECEIPTS	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AV DAILY ISSUE	AV DAILY OH END
11-17 Jun 67	3days	60	9	1.4	0	147	21	181
18-24 Jun 67	3days	180	26	4.2	0	200	29	154
25-26 Jun 67	3days	0	0	0	0	3	2	210
RECAP	3days	140	9	5.6	0	350	22	182

(3) Class I Consumption Trends

Class I was available for issue at both Phuoc Vinh and Lai Khe and was based on ration requests from using units. No new trends were noted during Operation BILLINGS. Consumption of C-Rations was generally on a one meal per day basis in field locations, while A rations were consumed for the other two meals. Supporting elements and units not deployed to field locations consumed a complete A ration. Consumption of ice and other related Class I items was not out of proportion to standards established in previous operations.

d. (C) Class III Analysis

(1) Location: Lai Khe

(a) JP-4:

DATES	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	T T - T		AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION O/H END TO S/O (+ -)	
					AIR	HWY				
11-17 Jun 67	18	80,000	55,000	7,857	0	165	614.86	8784	55,138	-24,148
18-24 Jun 67	18	80,000	75,000	10,714	0	225	724.12	10345	55179	-24,821
25-26 Jun 67	18	80,000	0	0	0	0	15109	7555	49277	-30724
RECAP	18	80,000	130,000	8123	0	390	149007	9313	53198	-26564

Highest Day Issues: 19,454 on 19 June

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the period: 209.1

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(b) Avgas

DATE	AV NR OF DISP PTS	S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	TOT L S, ..R. MW	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H	VARIATION O/H S/O +-
11-17 Jun 67		10,000	0	0	0	4,200	600	21428	+11428
18-24 Jun 67		10,000	5,000	714	0	4,400	643	19543	+9543
25-26 Jun 67		10,000	0	0	0	1,200	600	19114	+9114
RECAP		10,000	5,000	313	0	9,800	650	20028	+10028

Highest Day Issues: 2,400 on 17 June 67

Percentage of Highest Day over Average Day for the periods: 369%

(c) Mogas

11-17 Jun 67	40,000	30,000	4,286	0	90	27093	3870	51646	+11646
18-24 Jun 67	40,000	30,000	4,286	0	90	34198	4885	52890	+12890
25-26 Jun 67	40,000	10,000	5,000	0	30	9747	4874	54032	+14032
RECAP	40,000	70,000	1375	0	210	71038	4440	52856	+12856

Highest Day Issues: 5,970 on 18 June 67

Percentage of Highest Day over Average day for the periods: 134%

(d) Diesel

11-17 Jun 67	40,000	10,000	1429	0	30	17438	2491	55099	+14099
18-24 Jun 67	40,000	20,000	2857	0	60	35751	5707	40558	+ 588
25-26 Jun 67	40,000	3,000	1500	0	9	9497	4749	33296	- 7204
RECAP	40,000	33,000	2083	0	99	62686	918	42984	+2484

Highest Day Issues: 5,839 on 26 Jun 67

Percentage of highest day over average day for the periods: 149%

(2) Locations: Phouc Vinh

(a) JP-4

11-17 Jun 67	17	100,000	11669	1667	35	0	28232	4033	79349	-19215
18-24 Jun 67	17	100,000	47700	6814	143.1	0	72596	10371	47185	-58950
25-26 Jun 67	17	100,000	6400	3200	18.2	0	11980	5990	41050	-58590
RECAP	17	100,000	65,769	1111	196.3	0	112808	7051	55,928	-45470

Highest Day Issues: 17,000 on 18 June 67

Percentage of highest day over Average day for the periods: 241%

(b) Avgas

11-17 Jun 67	9,000	0	0	0	0	1900	271	18639	+9639
18-24 Jun 67	9,000	0	0	0	0	2900	414	15753	+6753
25-26 Jun 67	9,000	0	0	0	0	300	150	14696	+5696
RECAP	9,000	0	0	0	0	5100	319	15,363	+7636

Highest Day Issues: 1,200 on 19 June 1967

Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 376%

(c) Mogas

11-17 Jun 67	30,000	9200	1314	28	0	13,272	1896	51,965	+20,965
18-24 Jun 67	30,000	2850	407	8.6	0	24,455	3495	34,238	+4,238
25-26 Jun 67	30,000	2800	1400	8.4	0	7934	3967	20467	-9533
RECAP	30,000	14,850	922	45	0	45,659	2,229	35,490	+5223

Highest Day Issues: 6,149 on 22 June 67

Percentage of highest day over Average day for the period: 275%

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(d) Diesel

DATE	AV MR OR DISP PTS	OR S/O GAL	TOTAL REC'D	AV DAILY REC'D	TOTAL AIR	S/T HWY	TOTAL ISSUE	AVG DAILY ISSUE	AVG DAILY O/H RMD	AVG DAILY O/H RMD	AVG DAILY O/H RMD	VARIATION O/H END TO S/O (+ -)
11-17 Jun 67			25,000	0	0	0	12911	1844	46259			+20545
18-24 Jun 67			35,000	6300	900	19.8	23944	3421	31052			+9052
25-26 Jun 67			25,000	2800	1400	8.4	5876	3785	18956			-5244
RECAP			25,000	9,100	569	28.2	42,731	2,571	39,222			+9194

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Highest Day Issues: 6,561 on 22 June 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 236%

(3) Location: Chi Linh

(a) JP-4

11-17 Jun 67	2	6,000	16720	2389	50	0	*1/12725	*2/1103	6982	+882
18-23 Jun 67	3	6,000	11,920	1920	36	0	11,215	1859	4766	-724
RECAP	2.6	6,000	28,240	2,172	86	0	23,940	1242	5924	-176

Highest Day Issues: 4,220 on 18 June 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 229%
*1 Reflects 5,000 gallon fuel shipped Chi Linh to Di An
*2 Does not include 5,000 gallon fuel shipped Chi Linh to Di An.

(b) Avgas

11-17 Jun 67	2,000	4230	603	12.7	0	2925	418	1535	-415
18-23 Jun 67	2,000	3300	601	10.0	0	2100	333	2300	+300
RECAP	2,000	7825	602	23.5	0	5225	420	1893	-107

Highest Day Issues: 790 on 15 June 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 188%

(c) Mogas

11-17 Jun 67	2,000	6440	920	19.3	0	4045	578	1589	-411
18-23 Jun 67	2,000	2550	425	7.7	0	3345	558	2043	+43
RECAP	2,000	8990	692	27	0	7390	568	1816	-164

Highest Day Issues: 1870 on 17 June 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 329%

(d) Diesel

14-20 Jun 67	1,000	2820	403	8.5	0	2380	340	741	-259
21-23 Jun 67	1,000	3000	1000	3	0	0	0	3106	+2106
RECAP	1,000	5820	582	11.5	0	2380	238	1450	+450

Highest Day Issues: 595 on 17 June 67
Percentage of highest day over average day for the period: 250%

(4) Class III Consumption Trends:

Analysis of Class III Consumption trends for Operation BILLINGS revealed no particular variation from what had been anticipated. The nature of the operational area and its distance from established base camps precluded the general use of both tracked and wheeled vehicles. This was one variation from recent operations in which mechanized and armored cavalry units were used extensively and was reflected by increased consumption of aviation fuels and a proportionate decrease in mogas and diesel consumption. Consumption of aviation fuels at the C&C aircraft refueling point at Chi Linh was higher than anticipated because refueling at that location was not limited to C&C aircraft as directed in the logistics annex to OPOBU BILLINGS. This can be attributed to the general knowledge that the refueling point was at that location and the Supply and Transport Battalion policy of refueling when and where needed rather than directing aircraft to other locations. Mogas and diesel consumption at Lai Khe remained about normal due to the displacement of Danger Forward to that location.

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(5) FUELING POINT FOR HELICOPTER ASSAULT AIRLIFT

LOCATION	TYPE AND NUMBER OF A/C	AVERAGE GALLONS PER A/C	DATE
(a) Lai Khe	HUL-D (30)	203.25	13 Jun 67
(b) Phuoc Vinh	HUL-D (30)	137.84	12 Jun 67
	HUL-D (30)	124.3	
(c) Quan Loi	HUL-D (30)	11.38	18 Jun 67

e. (U) Class II & IV Analysis

(1.) Selected Common Items:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>PHUOC VINH</u>	<u>TOTAL ISSUED</u>
Batteries:			
BA 350 (ea)	4603	3193	7256
BA 306 (ea)	455	357	812
Flashlights (ea)	0	0	0
Jungle Fatigues (Sets)	4612	3622	8234
Jungle Boots (pr)	459	361	820
Concertina (bndl)	15	11	26
Sandbags (ea)	111,680	130,320	272,000
GI Soap (cs)	149	116	265
Dishwashing Compound (lbs)	0	0	0
Paper Plates (ea)	53,000	47,000	100,000
Paper Cups (ea)	59,000	48,000	107,000
Insect Repellant (6 oz can)	387	249	636
Knife, Fork, Spoon (set)	229,400	140,600	370,000
8" U Pickets (ea)	2,286	2,178	4,464
Socks (pr)	2,684	1,716	4,400
Can, Water, 5 Gallon (ea)	210	130	340
Insecticide, Aerosol (2 oz Btl)	658	458	1,116
Toilet Paper (ca)	44	37	81
Helmet Liners (ea)	379	351	730
Ponchos (ea)	0	0	0
Canteen & Cover (ea)	753	509	1,262
Sweat Bands (ea)	0	0	0
Steel Wool (Cs)	0	0	0
Brush, Cleaning fibre (ea)	0	0	0
Insulated food container	17	13	30
In-flight packets	2,780	2,220	5,000

(2) Selected Repair Parts/ASL Item Demand Data

Following are the quantities of major assemblies used to support the operations for selected end items:

<u>END ITEM</u>	<u>NR SPT'D</u>	<u>MAJOR ASSY'S REPLACED</u>
M113	71	II - e 2E, 5T, 4t
M113A1	64	---
M18A3	40	II - e 5E, 5T
M132A1	6	---
M577	0	---
M577A1	20	---
M578	5	---
M68	11	---
M101A1	72	3e
M102	0	---
M114A1	0	---
M109	18	---
M110	4	1E
M107	0	---
M125A1	9	---
M106A1	13	---

Note: E - Engine t - Transfer r - Recoil assembly
 T - Transmission F - Final Drive

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(3) Selected Medical Supply Demand Data

ITEM	LAI KHE	PHOU VINH	QUAN. LOI	TOTAL
Albumin, Normal Serum	48	0	0	48
Dextran Inj	48	72	24	144
Dextrose & Sodium Chloride Inj. 6's	8	0	2	10
Lidocaine 1%	30	0	0	30
Water for Inj, 5cc	48	0	0	48
Sodium Chloride Inj. 6's	28	10	4	42
Adhesive Tape 3"x5"yds	0	50	0	50
Ace Bandage 3"x5"yds	0	12	3	15
Ace Bandage 4"x5"yds	54	24	0	78
Ace Bandage 6"x5"yds	50	0	4	54
Bandage Muslin 37x37x52	120	0	24	144
Battle, Dressing, 1g	0	144	432	576
Battle, Dressing, Med.	360	288	96	744
Battle, Dressing, Sm	576	288	72	936
Blood Recipient Set	48	0	0	48
Intravenous Inj. Set	96	11 - Q	96	192
Litter, Folding, Rigid Pole	50	100	12	162
Blanket, Bed, Wool	0	100	0	100

f. (U) Class V Analysis

(1) Location of ASP: LAI KHE Dates Open 11 Jun - 26 Jun

Items	Stock Obj	Av Daily O/H End	Total Recvd	Av Dly Recvd	S/T	Recvd Hwy	Av Hr Tubes	Total Iss	Av Dly Iss	Rds Per Tube/Day
81mm HE	8100	6787	18584	1161	0	129.34	35	22570	1421	40.6
105mm HE	7500	3497	20830	1302	0	731.30	8	14122	883	49.05
155mm HE	6000	0	2128	133	0	106.40	6	2128	133	22.17
4.2" HE	4000	14176	0	0	0	0	12	2736	171	15.08
8" HE	0	538	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C/More	1500	2244	4194	262	0	18.52	0	1488	93	0
TOTAL S/T						985.56				

(2) Location of ASP: PHOU VINH Dates Open 11 Jun - 26 Jun

81mm HE	8000	8687	0	0	0	0	18	8213	483.1	26.8
C/More		1539	0	0	0	0	0	426	26.7	0

(3) Location of ASP: PHOU VINH

Dates Open 11 Jun - 26 Jun

(Unit distribution by air)

105mm HE	0	6390	399	199.80	0	18	0	0	22.17
155mm HE	0	5414	338	348.92	0	12	0	0	28.17
TOTAL S/T						548.72			

(4) Location of ASP: CHI LINH

Dates Open 11 Jun - 26 June

(Unit distribution by air)

105mm HE	0	29154	2243	874.62	0	18	0	0	125.1
4.2" HE	0	5805	447	118.57	0	8	0	0	56
155mm HE	0	896	69	58.69	0	2	0	0	134.5
TOTAL S/T						1051.88			

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2. Services**CONFIDENTIAL**a. (U) Maintenance

<u>DS Workload 701st Maintenance Battalion</u>	
Job orders received	2133
Job orders completed	2085
Average ASL on hand	68%
Average ASL demand accomodation	77%
Total demands	10988
Total issues	5979
Total transactions	17657

b. (C) Medical

The following statistics reflect only patients processed by elements of the 1st Medical Battalion, and do not reflect patients evacuated directly to general support medical facilities supporting the Division.

LOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

<u>PATIENTS TREATED</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>PHOU VINH</u>	<u>QUAN LOI</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
IRHA	61	118	11	190
KHRA	36	2	2	40
NIB & DIS	801	905	193	1899
VC	1	0	0	1
DOA - NBI	0	1	0	1
CIDG	6	0	59	63
Whole Blood (unit)	30	32	0	62
Medical Supply (lbs)	12,000	8,550	800	21,350

c. (U) Laundry and BathLOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

Number of Showerheads	8	0	8
Number of Washers	2	2	4

d. (U) Graves RegistrationLOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

	<u>PHOU VINH</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Remains Processed	4	40	44

e. (U) Salvage CollectionLOCATIONS SUPPORTING OPERATION

	<u>PHOU VINH</u>	<u>LAI KHE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Turn - In Documents Processed	27	36	63

f. (U) Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Following is a recapitulation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal support provided by the 42nd EOD Detachment during the operation.

a. Number of incidents - 11(1) HE items destroyed:

U. S. - 11
V. C. - 4

(2) Small Arms destroyed

U. S. 53
V. C. 200

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B. Transportation

1. Summary of Fixed Wing Aircraft

Origin	Sort	Pass	Cargo (lb)	Tactical and Logistical Sorties								
				C123		C130		Sort	Pass	Cargo		
Di An	120	221	540,000									
Tan Son Nhut	49	567	126,100									
Bien Hoa												
Lai Khe				72	0	720,000	136	89			4,074,600	
Phouc Vinh				30	462	156,600	87	1499			1,303,300	
Chi-Linh				1	0	10,000	13	60			189,500	
Quan Loi				12	270	139,500	37	672			477,400	
				12	440	20,000	9	0			109,100	
Total	169	788	666,100	127	1172	1,016,100	282	2320			6,153,900	

Total Number of Sorties: 578
 Total Number of Pass: 4,280
 Total Pounds of Cargo: 7,866,100
 Total Number of Flying Time: 987

2. Summary of Convey Operations

a. Di An to Lai Khe

Date	No of Vehicles		No of Units Participating		Control HQ
	Div	Non-Div	Div	Non-Div	
11 June	20	15			
12	60	15	3	1	Deputy
13	7	15	2	1	Deputy
14	20	0	1	1	Deputy
15	26	55	4	0	1/7 Arty
17	25	86	3	3	Deputy
19	24	42	5	4	Deputy
20	28	41	4	3	Deputy
21	10	22	1	5	Deputy
22	8	52	1	1	Deputy
23	15	45	4	2	Deputy
24	25	35	5	3	Deputy
25	7	27	3	4	Deputy
Total:	221	455		2	Deputy

Lai Khe to Di An					
Date	Div	Non-Div	Div	Non-Div	Control HQ
11 June	22	20			
12	7	15	1	1	Deputy
13	7	15	2	1	Deputy
15	10	45	4	1	Deputy
19	42	40	5	3	Deputy
20	23	41	4	3	Deputy
21	13	22	4	5	Deputy
22	13	57	1	2	Deputy
23	50	45	4	2	Deputy
24	23	35	5	3	Deputy
25	11	27	3	4	Deputy
Total:	221	362		2	Deputy

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c. Phu Loi to Long Binh

Date	No of Vehicles		No of Units Participating		Control HQ
	Div	Non-Div	Div	Non-Div	
11 June	0	5	0	1	1/27 Arty
13	10	25	1	2	8/6 Arty 1/27 Arty
14	0	26	0	1	500 Engr
15	0	32	0	2	500 Engr 104 Engr
17	6	0	1	0	8/6 Arty
18	0	8	II 0	1	1/27 Arty
19	6	0	II 1	0	8/6 Arty
20	10	28	1	2	104 Engr 8/6 Arty 1/27 Arty
21	0	34	0	2	500 Engr 1/27 Arty
22	0	60	0	2	500 Engr 104 Engr
23	0	20	0	1	500 Engr
25	0	20	0	1	104 Engr
26	0	20	0	1	104 Engr
Totals:	32	278			

d. Long Binh to Phu Loi

11 June	0	5	0	1	1/27 Arty
13	0	25	0	2	1/27 Arty 104 Engr
14	0	26	0	1	500 Engr
15	0	32	0	2	500 Engr 104 Engr
17	6	0	1	0	8/6 Arty
20	10	22	1	1	8/6 Arty 104 Engr
21	0	20	0	1	500 Engr
22	0	60	0	2	500 Engr 104 Engr
25	0	20	II 0	1	104 Engr
26	0	20	0	1	104 Engr
TOTAL.	16	250			

e. Di An to Bien Hoa

12 June	16	0	1	0	2/16 Inf
23	30	0	1	0	2nd Bde
26	34	0	1	0	2nd Bde
Total	80	0			

f. Bien Hoa to Di An

23 June	30	0	1	0	2nd Bde
24	28	0	1	0	2nd Bde
26	34	0	1	0	2nd Bde
Totals:	92	0			

g. Di An to Long Binh

16 June	0	35	0	1	104 Engr
23	0	20	0	1	104 Engr

h. Long Binh to Di An

16 June	0	35	II 0	1	104 Engr
23	0	20	II 0	1	104 Engr

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Date	No of Vehicles		No of Units Participating		Control HQ
	Div	Non-Div	Div	Non-Div	
i. Bien Hoa to Phu Loi					
13 June	0	16	0	1	205 Avn
26	0	10	0	1	34th Engr
j. Phu Loi to Bien Hoa					
11 June	0	11	0	1	Lighthorse
k. Di An to FSBC					
13 June	20	0	1	0	B/1/7 Arty
l. Di An to Phu Loi					
18 June	18	0	1	0	Deputy
m. Di An to Cholon					
20 June	6	0	1	0	2nd Bde
n. Cholon to Di An					
20 June	6	0	1	0	2nd Bde
o. Phu Loi to Lai Khe					
25 June	0	17	0	1	1/4 Cav
26	0	10	0	1	1/4 Cav
p. Newport to Phu Loi					
22 June	0	33	0	1	205th Avn

3. Added below is stated data pertaining to the Phuoc Vinh Resupply Convoy operation: 24 May to 31 May 1967, a buildup phase necessary for the support of Operation "BILLINGS" from Phuoc Vinh.

a. Daily Support Requirements

1. Military Police:

a. Traffic Control Posts - 15

(1) Nr. of personnel - 3 OFF, 38 EM, 2 QC, 4 National Police
II = 0

(2) Nr. of vehicles - 21

b. Escorts.

(1) Nr. of personnel - 2 OFF, 30 EM.

(2) Nr. of vehicles - 12

2. Route Security

a. Song Be River Bridge South

(1) 3 Infantry Battalions

(2) 3 Troops Cavalry (-)

(3) Platoon of Devastate

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b. Song Bo River Bridge North

(1) 1st AF Infantry

(2) RPF Caval. platoon

B. Di An to Phuoc Vinh (Vehicle Number)

	25 May	27 May	29 May	31 May	Total
Cargo*	398	356	248	323	1325
POL	14	0	9	8	31
Control	28	21	24	31	104
Wreckers	11	7	8	9	35
Ambulance	4	4	4	5	17
Tractors (Spare)	10 305	6 391	9 302	5 381	30 1502

* Includes unit impedimenta vehicles

Cargo Vehicles Supplied By 1st Logistical Command

25 May - 99 S&P's

27 May - 90 S&P's

29 May - 68 S&P's

31 May - 65 S&P's

C. Phuoc Vinh to Di An

	24 May	26 May	28 May	30 May	1 June	TOTAL
Cargo	140	352	301	264	199	1256
POL	0	14	0	9	8	31
Control	6	28	21	24	26	105
Wreckers	3	11	7	8	6	35
Ambulance	0	4	4	4	5	17
Tractors (Spare)	0 119	10 119	6 339	9 318	5 219	30 1174

* Includes 2/28 and 2/18 Trains

D. Cargo By Class Daily (Approximate)

		25 May	27 May	29 May	31 May	TOTAL
Class I	S/T	90	68	0	84	242
Class II&IV	S/T	767	224	60	0	1051
Ecgr II&IV	S/T	602	699	661	144	2106
Class III	Gallons	70,000	0	45,000	40,000	155,000
Class V	S/T	1600	1448	456	444	3948
Gravel&Sand	Eu. Yds	235	230	405	150	1020
PX	S/T	105	144	0	0	249

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4. Support Command Participation in Convoys

<u>DATES</u>	<u>FROM - TO</u>	<u>Number of Vehicles S&T On</u>
11 June	DA - LK	10
12 June	DL - LK	5
13 June	DL - LK	6
17 June	DL - LK	17
19 June	DL - LK	16
22 June	DL - LK - JJ	11
23 June	DL - LK	13
24 June	DL - LK	5
25 June	DA - LK	3
Total Vehicles utilized	86	
Total Convoys	9	

II - II

II - II

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II - 12

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II - II

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III LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS

A. ITEM: Limitations of forward airstrips.

DISCUSSION: Both Chi Linh (Cao Song Be) and Dong Xoai (Tak Xa) airstrips were insufficient to handle the volume of air traffic programmed into those locations during the operation. The Chi Linh airstrip was able to handle two (2) aircraft on the ground at the same time, and the Dong Xoai airstrip was capable of handling only one (1) C-123 aircraft at a time. The volume of traffic flown into these two locations caused many lifts to extend into night-time operations. Flying conditions were marginal at both airstrips during those periods of time and operations were limited by bad weather.

RECOMMENDATION: Added engineer effort must be placed on improving the airfields for future operations involving a heavy volume of air traffic. Special emphasis on aprons and turn-arounds would increase the capabilities of the airstrips to handle more aircraft and in many cases, allow a lift to be completed during daylight hours.

B. ITEM: The lack of sufficient "Stockage in depth" at Chi Linh led to several emergency airlifts of ammunition.

DISCUSSION: There was no build-up of stocks at Chi Linh prior to the start of the operation, for reasons of security, in an attempt to enhance the element of surprise. 18 tubes of 105 Howitzers, 8 each 4.2" tubes and 2 each 155mm tubes were lifted into Chi Linh with a basic load of ammunition. The plan was to build-up the stocks to a comfortable level over a three day period, however, the battle of 14 June prevented this. An ER (Emergency requisition) was called to replenish 5000 rds of 105 ammunition which was expended over a 6 hour period. Three days later the battle of 17 July ensued. During this action over 10,000 rds of 105 HE was fired during a 12 hour period in support of the units in contact. This required another ER lift of ammunition from Bien Hoa.

RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, stocks of artillery ammunition must be built up to a comfortable level prior to the start of an operation. This is particularly essential when resupply is dependent on strict air LOC.

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IV (c) LESSONS LEARNED

A. Prior to the start of any operation involving the support of two or more Artillery batteries by Air LOC, contingency stocks of ammunition should be brought in during the build-up phase if the situation permits.

B. Reliable radio communications at both departure airfield (Bien Hoa) and the receiving airfield is imperative when supplying ammunition on an Air LOC. This was handled effectively during operation "BILLINGS" with a mobile AN/GRC 106 radio set at Bien Hoa and a similar set at Chi Linh. The airfield radio should be netted with the LOCC and with the DAO Office at Long Binh.

C. When it is anticipated that large tonnages of ammunition will be moved by air, particularly on a CE or ER, always have the DTO alert the 48th TC group so that adequate surface transportation will be made available to move the ammunition from Long Binh to the Air Base.

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO US FORCES 96345

AVDB-RAT

16 July 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: G3
APO US Forces 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: BILLINGS: search and destroy operation.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 11 June - 26 June 1967.
3. (C) GENERAL: The 1st Infantry Division Artillery was the artillery command headquarter for the operation. The 1/5 Artillery was in Direct Support of the 1st Bde and was responsible for planning and control of fires. The 2/33 Artillery was in Direct Support of the 3d Bde (Forward) and was responsible for planning and control of fires. The 1/7 Artillery was in Direct Support of the 2d Bde and the 6/15 Artillery was in Direct Support of the 3d Bde (LAI KHE). Missions and Task organization were specified in Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPORD 15-67 (OP BILLINGS). In order to support the scheme of maneuver, 4 Fire Support Bases were established: GUNNER I vic 995546; GUNNER II vic 925733; GUNNER III vic 063754; and GUNNER WHITE vic 004609. Reinforcing fires were available from PHUOC VINH and QUAN LOI by 6/27 Arty.
 - a. Reporting Officer. Major Jo O. Meeker, Assistant S3, 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

b. Task Organization.

1/5 Arty DS 1st Bde
CO: LTC William L. Depew

2/33 Arty DS 3d Bde
CO: LTC Charles D. Daniel (until 201000)
LTC Arthur D. Wells (From 201000)

6/6 Arty (-) GSR 1/5 Arty
CO: LTC Benjamin B. Sator

6/6/15 Arty Reinf 1/5 Arty
CO: CPT Fredrick B. Halbitter

LHAAB Reinf 2/33 Arty
CO: 1LT Jimmy W. Janacek

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AVDB-RAT

16 JULY 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

6/27 Arty (-) GSR 1/5 Arty
CO: LTC Edward G. O'Connor

2d Plat C/35 Arty (ARVN) OPCON 2/33 Arty
CO: CPT Le Van Luong

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE: See Annex A, OPORD 15-67 (OP BILLINGS). Intelligence gained from VR by Division Artillery air observers was negligible. Heavy jungle canopy restricted effective observation. Difficulty of locating base camps until they were opened by Artillery or air was a major difficulty met in this operation. The enemy situation, terrain and weather, and fortifications encountered did not materially effect the artillery support plan.

5. (C) MISSION: 1st Infantry Division Artillery provides artillery support for maneuver elements. 1/5 Artillery and 2/33 Artillery plans and coordinates fires for their brigade operational areas.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: All artillery units moved to field positions to occupy Fire Support Bases GUNNER I and GUNNER II on 11 and 12 June 1967. Units were prepared to establish additional Fire Support Bases to support the plan of maneuver.

7. (C) EXECUTION:

a. 11 June: B/1/5 Arty occupied FSB GUNNER I. A&B/2/33 Arty occupied FSB GUNNER II.

b. 12 June: B/8/6 Arty and D/1/5 Arty occupied FSB GUNNER I. HQ&C/2/33 Arty, LHA "A" and 2d Plt C/35 Arty (ARVN) occupied FSB GUNNER II.

c. 13 June: B/6/15 Arty displaced LAI KHE to PHUOC VINH by air. This was this units first move by CH-47 in Vietnam.

d. 14, 15, 16 June: No displacements of artillery.

e. 17 June: 8 in Plt C/6/27 Artillery displaced PHUOC VINH to FSB GUNNER I by road. 2/33 Arty expended 7,686 rounds in support of the battle at LZ "X-R.Y" resulting in VC body count of 222.

f. 18 June: A/1/5 Arty displaced PHUOC VINH to FSB GUNNER WHITE by air with the mission of reinforcing 2/33 Arty.

g. 19 June: B/1/7 Arty displaced LAI KHE to FSB GUNNER III by air with the mission of reinforcing 1/5 Arty. B/1/5 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER I to FSB GUNNER WHITE by air with the mission of reinforcing 2/33 Arty.

h. 20 June: LHA "B" displaced PHU LOI to FSB GUNNER III by air with the mission of reinforcing 1/5 Arty.

i. 21-22 June: No displacements of artillery.

j. 23 June: B/1/5 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER I to PHUOC VINH by road.

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report

k. 24 June: HQ, B&C/2/33 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER II to LAI KHE by air. A/1/5 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER WHITE to PHUOC VINH. 8 in Plt C/6/27 Arty and B/3/6 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER I to PHUOC VINH by road.

l. 25 June: 2d Plat/C/35 Arty (ARVN) displaced FSB GUNNER II to BEN CAT by air and reverted to parent unit control. B/1/5 Arty displaced FSB GUNNER WHITE to PHUOC VINH by air.

m. 26 June: LHAA "A" and A/2/33 displaced FSB GUNNER II to LAI KHE by air. Operation BILLINGS terminated.

n. Artillery expenditure in support of operation BILLINGS were:

105mm -	58,056
155mm -	13,474
8 inch -	1,766
175mm -	982
4.2 inch -	6,260

8. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Class I supplies were drawn from each unit base camp and flown to the field positions by CH-47. Positions were prepared in PHUOC VINH and meals flown to field location by resupply UHID.

b. Class II and IV items were obtained from the forward support companies which were airlifted to the field locations.

c. Class III supplies were provided in field location by the S and T Battalion.

d. Class V was airlifted into all Fire Support Bases. Pre-stocking of ammunition at the Special Forces Camp at CHI LINH was not completed prior to the start of the exercise. Resupply of ammunition was primarily by fixed wing aircraft directly from LONG BINH. During the battle of 17 June, a combat emergency was declared to replenish the Class V supplies at FSB GUNNER II.

e. Maintenance contact teams were made available to repair deadlined items in the field locations.

9. (C) COMMANDERS ANALYSIS: This operation was easily supported and once the operation began a minimum displacement of artillery was required. All displacements with the exception of GUNNER I were accomplished by air. Weather and the shortage of aircraft caused some moves to be slower than desired. The availability of artillery enabled establishing priorities of fire on a basis of a minimum of one battery per maneuver battalion. This greatly expedited the rapid delivery of fires. Aerial observation was maintained at all times the maneuver battalions were outside their NDP. This also expedited rapid delivery of observed fire. The DS Battalions headquarters was located so as to effectively control all artillery fires.

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10. (C) CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:

- a. At remote FSBs the level of ammunition stockage must be maintained at a high enough level to allow for contact missions. Even through the use of a Combat Emergency considerable time is involved in un-programed ammunition resupply.
- b. Height of Jungle Canopy must be considered by all observer and Fire Direction personnel when firing close support fires. The combination of very tall trees and normal dispersion errors may cause rounds to burst far short of the intended point of impact.
- c. Forward observers, Liaison officers, and FDC personnel must keep themselves continually abreast of friendly troop disposition at all times.
- d. The ground commander securing FSB, the S3 of the artillery and the Battery Commanders of Batteries that will occupy th. base must discuss the organization of the base prior to occupation. The artillery commander must be allowed to position his battery, commensurate with his mission and capabilities, within the FSB. Once this has been accomplished coordination for the remaining forces occupying the FSB may be accomplished.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

David R. Carrier
 DAVID R. CARRIER
 MAJ, Arty
 Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST ENGINEER BATTALION
APO 96345

AVDB-CE-3

14 July 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operation After Action Report

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321

1. NAME OF OPERATION: Operation Billings.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 110900H Jun 67 - 261838H Jun 67.
3. GENERAL: The command headquarters for the engineer portion of Operation Billings was Headquarters, 1st Engineer Battalion, Di An, acting in accordance with 1st Infantry Division OPORD 15-67 dated 6 June 1967. The 1st Engineer Battalion provided combat support to 1st Infantry Division operating in the western portion of War Zone D.
 - a. Reporting Officer: MAJ EDWIN C. KEISER
Commanding Officer
1st Engineer Battalion
 - b. Task Organization:
Hq, 1st Engineer Battalion - MAJ EDWIN C. KEISER
 - (1) Company A - DAVID R. FORD, CPT, CE
 - (2) Company C - PHILIP A. PASCARELLI, CPT, CE

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4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence prior to operation.

(1) The area of interest is divided by Route 13, which runs from the Cambodian border in the North to the lower limits of the operational area in the South. On the Eastern sector the Song Be dominates the terrain, whereas the Song Saigon occupies the Western area of interest. Both rivers are navigable year around, and together with Route 13, provide the VC with excellent transportation routes for movement of troops and supplies. The area is predominantly covered with broadleaf, evergreen secondary forests with large rubber plantations located at Michelin, Minh Thanh, An Loc, Quan Loi, and Loc Ninh.

The main force units likely to be encountered in the operational area are the 271st, 272nd, 273rd, and 101st NVA Regts, supported by the elements of the 69th Arty Group. The 52nd, 141st, and Phu Loi Bns could possibly be encountered in a reinforcing role.

b. These units can be considered capable of launching a multi-regional attack against US elements in the Bin Long Province area. In addition they pose a continual threat with their capability of conducting attacks against convoys or against NDP positions and Fire Support Patrol Bases throughout the area of operation.

c. Intelligence during operation.

(1) The following were detected and removed or destroyed:

- (a) 16 June 67 Small base camp vic XT 924547
 w/50 tons rice,
 (booby trapped)
 shoes, uniforms
- (b) 19 June 67 1 butterfly bomb vic XT 994596
- (c) 19 June 67 1 mined 105 round vic YT 003561
- (d) 23 June 67 1 plastic US mine vic YT 995538
- (e) 24 June 67 1 plastic wrapped
 explosive mine vic XT 994537
- (f) 24 June 67 1 Chinese mine vic XT 993534
- (g) Numerous other mines reported through infantry channels.

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(2) Company C received small arms and mortar fire on several occasions.

(3) There were 10 aerial reconnaissance flights in addition to daily command and control flights in the operational area.

(4) The 1st Engineer Battalion lost the following equipment due to hostile mortar fire: 1 chain saw, 1 M16 rifle, 1 .45 cal pistol, 6 protective masks, 2 M79's, 10 ponchos, 7 bayonets and scabbards.

5. MISSION: 1st Engineer Battalion supports 1st Infantry Division operation by opening and maintaining MSR's, clearing Fire Support Patrol Passes, clearing jungle, providing LZ cutting teams, and other combat support.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. 1st Engineer Battalion supported 1st Infantry Division units engaged in Operation Billings with two companies.

b. Company A was charged with opening and maintaining Rte LTL-1A from Phuoc Vinh to FSPB Gunner I (XT 995545), clearing that base for artillery, clearing fields of fire, clearing jungle along Rte LTL-1A north of FSPB Gunner I, and maintaining two LZ teams on standby.

c. Company C provided engineer teams to cut fields of fire and to clear artillery positions, and maintained two LZ teams on standby.

d. Company B continued its support of the 2nd Brigades Operation Lam Son with Revolutionary Development engineer work and jungle clearing.

e. Companies D, E, and Hqs, continued general support of the division.

7. EXECUTION:

11 June 67:

C Company - Two squads from the 3rd platoon departed Lai Phe via MH-1D helicopters at 0900H 9 June 67 for FSPB Gunner II vic XT 915735, closing at 1000 hours. These two squads immediately started to improve the LZ by removing large trees. The trees cut were used for overhead cover. At 1700 hours all positions had some overhead cover. On 10 June these same units continued to improve their positions, placed overhead cover, and cut fields of fire. On 11 June Operation Billings officially started. The two squads completed cutting fields of fire and improved positions by placing sandbags and camouflaging the positions.

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14 Jul 6712 June 67:

A Company - 1st platoon constructed resupply LZ for 1st Bn, 2nd Inf at XT 975625. 2nd platoon constructed resupply LZ for 1st Bn, 28th Inf at XT 935570. 3rd platoon opened the road from XT 972493 to XT 995543. No mines were encountered. Cleared 100,000 square meters of jungle for fields of fire at FSB Gunner I, XT 995545. Commenced construction of vehicle turn-around for resupply vehicles at FSB Gunner I.

C Company - 1st platoon departed Lai Khe at 0800 hours via UH-1D helicopters closing LZ Rufe (XT 952664) at 0830 hours. The platoon cut fields of fire and constructed mortar positions for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. 2nd platoon departed Lai Khe at 0830 hours, closing LZ Rufe at 0900 hours. This platoon cut fields of fire and constructed mortar positions for 2nd Bn, 28th Inf. Both platoons were extracted and flown to Lai Khe at 1200 hours; the 1st platoon by UH-1D helicopters and the 2nd platoon by CH-47 helicopter.

13 June 67:

A Company - 1st platoon cut a 400'x450' resupply LZ vic YT 973628 for 1st Bn, 2nd Inf and cut a 50'x50' LZ vic XT 973628 to be used by VIP's. The 2nd platoon was on LZ standby during the morning. At 1300 hours, 2nd platoon was moved by UH-1D helicopters to vic YT 952664 to cut an LZ for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 3rd platoon maintained 1700 meters of road from XT 995543 to XT 992523; also cleared jungle 50 meters on each side of this road.

C Company - The 1st and 2nd platoons were airlifted via UH-1D to LZ Rufe and continued work for 1st Bn, 16th Inf, and 2nd Bn, 28th Inf.

14 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon cleared jungle near LZ Foxtrot, YT 973-628. The 2nd platoon cut LZ Rufe, YT 952664, in support of C Co, 1st Engr Bn. They cut fields of fire 800 meters by 20 meters and blew 20 trees to clear mortar positions. The 3rd platoon cleared 2,000 square meters of virgin jungle at Fire Support Patrol Base Gunner I, maintained road from Phuoc Vinh to Gunner I, and cleared jungle along the same length of road.

C Company - The 1st platoon departed Lai Khe at 0700 hours via UH-1D to improve LZ Yankee (XT 946650) for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 2nd platoon departed Lai Khe via UH-1D at 1000 hours for LZ Rufe and continued to clear fields of fire for 2nd Bn, 28th Inf. The 2nd platoon was extracted at 1730 hours and 1st platoon was extracted at 1830 hours via UH-1D.

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15 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon improved LZ Foxtrot and improved fields of fire at the NDP for 1st Bn, 2nd Inf. The 2nd platoon worked on base camp development, operated the laterite pit at Phuoc Vinh, repacked the platoon LZ kit, and performed normal maintenance on platoon equipment. The 3rd platoon performed road maintenance from XT 992512 to XT 997550 (600 meters), cleared 175,000 square meters of jungle and improved Gunner I FSPB.

C Company - The 1st platoon was on immediate LZ standby and the 2nd platoon was on one hour LZ standby.

16 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon continued to improve LZ Foxtrot for the 1st Bn, 2nd Inf. In addition they discovered and destroyed a VC base camp containing three buildings, 50 bushels of rice (booby trapped), VC shoes, and uniforms at XT 924547. The 2nd platoon worked on base camp construction. The 3rd platoon performed road maintenance from XT 992512 to XT 998550, hauled 16 loads of laterite, cleared 136,000 square meters of jungle and continued to improve Gunner I FSPB.

C Company - The 1st platoon departed Lai Khe at 1000 hours for LZ Y-ray (XT 959680). Upon arrival at LZ X-ray they enlarged and improved it by cutting isolated trees. At 1230 hours a fire fight broke out at the northeast corner of the LZ. By 1500 hours, contact with the enemy was broken and the LZ mission continued. At 1730 hours the platoon was returned to Lai Khe by UH-1D.

17 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby. They repacked the platoon LZ kit, checked the chain saws, and moved to YT 003615. The 2nd platoon was on LZ standby. They repacked the platoon LZ kit and prepared to move to LZ X-ray. The 3rd platoon performed maintenance on the road from XT 992512 to YT 000555 (6,400 meters), hauled 30 loads of laterite, and cleared 60,000 square meters of jungle.

C Company - The 2nd platoon departed Lai Khe for LZ Y-ray and improved the LZ for 1st Bn, 18th Inf. At 1000 hours the 1st platoon was moved by UH-1D into LZ X-ray to clear fields of fire for the 1st Bn, 18th Inf. At 1530 hours the 2nd platoon moved from LZ X-ray to support 1st Bn, 28th Inf at LZ Yankee (XT 952664) where they cleared fields of fire. Both platoons were returned to Lai Khe at 1800 hours.

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18 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon cut overhead cover for 1st Bn, 2nd Inf, (YT 003675), returning to Phuoc Vinh at approximately 1505 hours. The 2nd platoon was on immediate LZ standby, worked on construction projects in the base camp areas, and furnished truck drivers to 3rd platoon. The 3rd platoon improved artillery positions at FSPB Gunner I, cleared 660 square meters of jungle, and performed road maintenance from XT 992512 to YT 000555 (6,400 meters).

C Company - LZ standby teams were provided to support the remainder of the operation.

19 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon worked on construction projects in the base camp, performed maintenance on the platoon's equipment, and furnished vehicles with drivers to 3rd platoon. The 2nd platoon was on LZ standby. At 1500 hours it moved to Gunner III (YT 062754) to cut overhead cover for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 3rd platoon cleared 90,000 square meters of jungle vic YT 002596, hauled 33 loads of laterite for access roads at Gunner I. Two mines were located; one a 105 mm round with pressure detonator at YT 003561; the second was a butterfly bomb at XT 994596. Both mines were detonated in place.

20 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby, performed maintenance on platoon equipment, checked chain saws, and repacked the LZ kit. The 2nd platoon remained at Gunner III cutting overhead cover for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 3rd platoon performed maintenance on the road from XT 992512 to YT 000555, hauled 33 loads of laterite, cleared 60,000 square meters of jungle, and cleared fields of fire for the artillery.

21 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby, checked out the chain saws, and worked on construction projects in Phuoc Vinh. The 2nd platoon remained at Gunner III clearing fields of fire for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 3rd platoon performed maintenance on the road from XT 992512 to YT 000555, hauled 26 loads of laterite, cleared 11,250 square meters of jungle, and improved artillery positions at Gunner I.

22 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby. The 2nd platoon remained at Gunner III cutting overhead cover for 1st Bn, 16th Inf and clearing jungle around airfield. The 3rd platoon cleared 500 square meters of jungle north of Gunner I, and hauled 100 loads of laterite for 1st Bn, 26th Inf, 1st Bn, 28th Inf, and aviation units located at Phuoc Vinh.

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23 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon extended the LZ at YT 032599 by cutting 4,000 square meters of jungle for 1st Bn, 2nd Inf. Upon completion of the LZ mission the chain saws were checked and serviced and the LZ kit was repacked. The 2nd platoon cut fields of fire for 1st Bn, 16th Inf. The 3rd platoon hauled 85 loads of laterite, cleared 30,000 square meters of jungle vic YT 003575. In addition the following mines were located:

1. A US type AT mine wrapped in plastic located at XT 995538. It was blown in place.
2. An APC hit a mine at XT 995537.
3. A dud or booby trap was located and accidentally detonated at YT 004570 (1 VN WHA).

24 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby and worked on construction projects in Phuoc Vinh. The 2nd platoon cut fields of fire for 1st Bn, 16th Inf, at Gunner III, returning to Phuoc Vinh at 1530 hours. This platoon used a total of 6,000 pounds of explosives in clearing fields of fire during the operation. The 3rd platoon located two mines as follows:

1. Approximately 20 lbs of explosives wrapped in plastic with bamboo detonator at XT 994537. It was blown in place.
2. A Chinese type mine weighing approximately 20 lbs at YT 993534. It was blown in place.

In addition the 3rd platoon cleared 35,000 square meters of jungle and hauled 80 loads of laterite.

25 June 67:

A Company - The 1st platoon was on LZ standby, performed maintenance on platoon equipment and worked on construction projects in Phuoc Vinh. The 2nd platoon performed maintenance on platoon equipment, checked and serviced chain saws, and repacked LZ kit. The 3rd platoon closed out Gunner I, policed up the area, and returned to Phuoc Vinh at approximately 1200 hours.

8. RESULTS:

a. Friendly losses:

- (1) Personnel: 8 WHA (1st Engr Bn)
 1 WMA

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(2) Equipment: 1 chain saw, 1 M16 rifle, 1 .45 cal pistol, 6 protective masks, 10 ponchos, 2 M79's, and 7 bayonets and scabbards.

b. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel: None

(2) Equipment: Small base camp, w/50 tons rice, shoes, uniforms. 1 butterfly bomb, 1 mined 105 round (booby trapped), 1 plastic US mine. 1 plastic wood explosive mine, 1 Chinese mine.

c. Construction:

(1) A complete rehabilitation of LTL-1A from Phuoc Vinh north to YT 000577 including pushing jungle back an average of 75 meters on each side of the road was performed.

(2) A total of 707,270 square meters of jungle was cleared. This is to include LTL-1A as well as LZ's and fields of fire in fire support patrol bases and LZ's.

(3) Timbers were cut for overhead cover on all defensive positions.

(4) 118 loads of laterite were hauled to repair and maintain ITL-1A.

(5) Individual and command protective emplacements were constructed for infantry, artillery, and engineer use. Maximum use was made of explosives for construction of these emplacements.

9. ADMINISTRATIVE:

a. Average strength in field during operation - 100.

b. Supply: Normal channels except for airlift of some supplies by UH-1D into LZ's.

c. Maintenance: Non-operational chain saws were flown to Bn Maintenance Shop for repairs. All other equipment repair was performed at base camps or at field locations.

d. Transportation: Organic transportation used for road repair. LZ teams required helicopter support from the Division's Aviation Bn.

e. Communications: TC&E FM radios were the principle means of communications.

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14 Jul 67.

f. Medical: The units had organic aid men available also, medical section of units being supported.

10. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: None.

11. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

a. The operation was successful from an engineer standpoint. There were no new problem areas or new enemy techniques encountered. An excess of equipment was taken on one of the initial L7 missions. This can be avoided by making advance aerial reconnaissance of the mission area. Such reconnaissance should be and is made when aircraft availability and time allow.

b. The importance of the two man cross cut saw in the L7 kit was made evident early in this operation. Chain saws are almost total ineffective in cutting trees 35" or greater in diameter. Because of the proximity of friendly troops and the quantity of explosives needed to fell a tree of this size, use of demolitions was restricted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Stanley G. Genega
STANLEY G. GENEGA
1LT, CE
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
Special

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HEADQUARTERS
121ST SIGNAL BATTALION
APO 96345

AVDR-SI-3

23 July 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Billings (U)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDR-SI-3
APO 96345

1. (U) Name and Type Operations:
"BILLINGS", a search and destroy operation in War Zone "D".
2. (U) Dates of Operations:
8 June 1967 to 27 June 1967.
3. (C) Location:
War Zone "D" Vicinity.
4. (U) Command Headquarters:
121st Signal Battalion, 1st Infantry Division.
5. (C) Unit Commanders:

LTC James M. Rockwell	Battalion Commander
1LT Arpad De Kovacsy	CO, Company A
1LT Richard D. Mohlere	CO, Company B
CPT Harvey J. Reynolds	CO, Company C
1LT John Robert Zimmerman	Plt Ldr, 1st Fwd Sig Plt
1LT Michael Edwin Bryant	Plt Ldr, 2d Fwd Sig Plt
2LT Lacy Thomas Graham	Plt Ldr, 3d Fwd Sig Plt
6. (U) Intelligence: No enemy electronic warfare was noted during Operation "Billings".
7. (C) Mission: Provide VHF, AM and FM radio, and secure on line teletype to all advanced elements of Division Forward. Provide all three Infantry Brigades with a VHF link into the Division Communications System.
8. (C) Concept of Operation: Operation "Billings" was a multi-brigade operation conducted in War Zone "D" designed to seek and destroy VC elements in the area of operation. Of primary interest was the 271st and 273d VC Regiments, part of the 9th VC Division. The 1st Bde and 3d Bde were designated as the units to conduct the search and destroy operation in War Zone "D". The 1st Bde headquarters remained in Phuoc Vinh with the maneuvering Infantry Battalions being air-lifted into their objectives. The 3d Bde established a Forward CP at Chi Linh. The division established a Forward CP at Lai Khe.

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DOD DIR 5200.10

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a. Company "A" was given the mission to support Division Main and all supporting elements at Di An Base Camp.

b. Company "B" was tasked to support Division Artillery at Phu Loi and provide a VHF link into the Division Communication System to the 1st and 3rd Bde.

c. Company "C" was tasked to provide VHF, AM, and FM radio communications for Danger Fwd.

9. (C) Excerpts:

a. Company "A" was given the mission of providing communications support for Division Main at Di An Base Camp. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
AN/MRC-59	6	Provide 144 channels VHF for elements of Division Base Camp.
AN/GRC-46	2	Provide AM RTT commo for Division Net 1.
VRC-46	2	Provide FM Radio in support of Division NET and Division Command Net.
AN/MTC-1	2	Provide local and trunk switching for all elements at Di An.
SB-675	1	Provide patching and test position for all VHF circuits.

b. Company "B" was given the mission of providing communications support for Division Artillery, 1st, 2d, and 3d Brigades. The company displaced the following personnel and equipment:

(1) 1st Platoon: Received warning order on 4 June 67. All communication equipment required was checked along with personnel on 5 June 67. Personnel and equipment moved to Brigade Forward location and established necessary communications. Major item of equipment utilized was:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide VHF radio link into Division Communication System from Brigade Forward location.

(2) 2d Platoon: Continued their mission at Di An Base Camp.

(3) 3d Platoon: Displaced to the Brigade Forward location and established a VHF link into the Divisional VHF Communication Net. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
AN/MRC-34½	1	Provide VHF link between Brigade Forward and Danger Forward.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide HF radio in Division Net 1.

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SUBJECT: After Action Report, Operation Billings (U)

(4) Company Headquarters: Received order to continue support of Phu Loi and provide 4 channel VHF system to 1st Brigade. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
AN/MRC-69	1	Provide VHF radio link between Division Forward and Lat Kha.
AN/MRC-112	1	Provide VHF link between Phouc Vinh and Devil Forward.

c. Company "C" was given the mission of supporting the Division Forward CP with required personnel and equipment. Adequate time was afforded to prepare all personnel and equipment. All equipment was checked out for operation. The personnel and equipment were conveyed to the Forward CP area 4 days prior to the change of command. Due to the repositioning of equipment and personnel the change of command from Division Rear to Division Forward was accomplished with a minimum of problems. Major items of equipment utilized were:

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
AN/MRC-69	5	Provide VHF radio links from Division Forward to the following: Division Main, Division Artillery and Brigade Forward's.
AN/GRC-46	1	Provide secure teletype and back-up for communications center teletype.
AN/GRC-26	1	Provide secure teletype for Net 1.
SB-611	2	Provide patching and test facilities for all VHF circuits.
AN/MRC-121	1	Provide FM communication for Divisional and Brigade Nets.
AN/MRC-112	2	Provide 4 channel VHF radio link between Devil Forward and Danger Main. Also for Deadly and Drumfire.

10. (C) Results:

a. The Battalion provided simultaneous communication for 9 different elements of the Division.

- (1) Division Main
- (2) Division Forward
- (3) Division Artillery
- (4) Devil
- (5) Devil Forward.
- (6) Depper
- (7) Duty

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(8) Duty Forward

(9) Quan Loi

b. Telephone Circuits Provided:

(1) Sole User Circuits at:

(a) Danger Forward	40
(b) Danger Main	8
(c) Phu Loi	6
(d) Devil (Phouc Vinh)	6
(e) Dagger (Di An)	3
(f) Duty (Lai Khe)	2
(g) Duty Forward	3
(h) Quan Loi	1

11. (C) Administrative Matters: No major administrative problems were encountered during the operation.

12. (C) Commanders Analysis: During Operation Billings, the Battalion experienced no unusual communications problems. Sufficient equipment was available to support the Division throughout the entire operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Earl C. Weeks

EARL C. WEEKS
CPT, SigC
Adjutant


3 Incls

- 1 - Tactical VHF Diagram
- 2 - Common User Telephone Routing Diagram
- 3 - HF Radio Diagram

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
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TACTICAL VHF DIAGRAM



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
ON R TELEPHONE ROUTING DIAG



Incl 2

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HF RADIO DIAGRAM



Incl 3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco, 96345

AVDB-SP-O

10 July 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MACV/RCS /J3/321)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco, 96345

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO San Francisco, 96345

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation BILLINGS; search and destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 110550 June 1967 to 261838 June 1967.
3. (C) GENERAL: The control and command headquarters for this operation was 1st Brigade Headquarters with task organization as stated in OPOD 14-67 (Operation BILLINGS). The operation was conducted in the area north and north-west of PHUOC VINH. 1st Bde secured route to FSB Gunner 1 (XT995545) while continuing the security of PHUOC HOA bridge, PHUOC VINH and maintaining tactical overwatch of the 1st Brigade TAOI. The plan envisioned by the commander, divided the operation into three phases. During Phase I, units were positioned in the area of operations with the 2/16 Inf securing PHUOC VINH and securing PHUOC HOA bridge with 1 company. 1/26 Inf moved securing the route to FSB Gunner 1 (XT99554) with B 1/4 Cavalry attached and secured FSB itself. B 1/5 Arty and B 8/6 Arty moved to FSB Gunner 1; prepared to fire LZ prep and support the airmobile assaults of 1/2 and 1/28 Inf. After a 24 hour weather delay, the 1/2 and 1/28 Infantry conducted airmobile assaults in to LZ FOX TROT and GOLF respectively conducting S&D operations prior to establishing NDP's. During Phase II, units conducted search and destroy operations in zone and provided security while 3-A-1 Eng cleared landing zones, fields of fire and repaired road network. Phase III would deploy units into additional areas of operation, depending on enemy activity during Phase I and II.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel William B. Caldwell, III.

b. Task Organization:

- (1) 1st Bde, COL William B. Caldwell, III.
- (2) 1st Bn, 2d Inf, LTC William C. Simpson.
- (3) 1st Bn, 26th Inf, LTC Joseph H. Hoffman.
- (4) 1st Bn, 28th Inf, LTC Stanley J. Kuick.
- (5) 1st Bn, 5th Arty, LTC William L. Depew.
- (6) 8th 6th Arty
- (7) 2d Bn, 16th Inf
- (8) B trp, 1/4 Cav

Downgraded At 3 Yr Intervals
Declassified After 12 Yrs

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16 July 1967

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SUBJECT: Combat After Action REPORT (MACV/RCS/J3/321)

(9) A/1 Engr, CPT David R. Ford.

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE.

a. Intelligence prior to the operation: Intelligence reports, captured documents, agent and local intelligence indicated that within the AO the primary threat was the 271 VC Regt, which had been located (XT8867) for over a month. Its heavy losses during operations against 1/26 (Operation JUNCTION CITY - 2) appeared to have been offset by subsequent replacements of personnel and equipment. Contact with Special Forces SIGMA units in May revealed units in the area, very probably of the 271 Regt, were aggressive, well trained, and well equipped. Indications were that the 271 Regt could be reinforced by the 272 as well as the 273 Regt. In addition, a two battalion VC force reported by SIGMA elements 16 May (YT1457) could reinforce the 271 Regt. Other indications were that Local force units up to platoon size and possibly Company size could be expected to be operating in the A.O. There were 21 Blood hound reports from within the A.O. during the period 24 May to 6 June 1967.

b. Enemy Situation During Operation: The VC evaded major contact, and minor contacts experienced during the operation failed to indicate any particular unit. The VC employed limited sniping, hit and run tactics by squad or smaller size units. Numerous trails prevailed in the area with a variety of booby traps and mines. Most of the trails in the area appeared to have been recently used and ran north to south.

c. Weather and Terrain: Rainfall was heavy during the first two days of operations, then slackened to occasional showers throughout the day. Fog was prevalent during early morning hours but dissipated early, usually before 0900 H. Terrain consisted of heavy jungle in most areas with scattered areas of secondary growth. However, in the 1/28 Inf zone, the terrain was generally dominated by scattered abandoned rice paddies which were covered with secondary growth and bamboo in the low wet areas. Trees throughout the area were estimated to be 75 to 100 feet tall. With the exception of the initial 24 hour delay, neither the weather nor the terrain had any significant effect on the operation.

d. Fortifications: The fortifications encountered varied from 2 man fighting positions to 10 man fighting positions some with overhead cover others without. The larger overhead positions generally had firing ports for 10 personnel and were covered with up to six (6) layers of logs and up to twelve (12) inches of dirt.

e. CA/Psychological Operations.

(1) MEDCAP: 250 patients were treated during MEDCAP at I.3 TRANG.

(2) Captured supplies and relief supplies:

a. None

b. 2,760 lbs rice, 15 cases powdered milk, 6 cases cooking oil, 1 case school kits, 1 case textile kits, 40 care packs, 1000 assorted canned goods, and other miscellaneous items were distributed during MEDCAP's and other activities.

(3) Psychological Operations.

a. 7 hours of loudspeaker broadcast were used in support of tactical operations in forward areas and around the PHUOC VINH area.

b. 225,000 leaflets dropped over the 1st Brigade operational areas. Themes used: Attention N.V.A. Soldiers; Safe conduct passes, and Allied power.

(4) Results of activities are not conclusive at time of report.

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5. (C) MISSION: 1st Brigade conducts airmobile assaults, search and destroy operations north of PHUOC VINH, clears and secures route to FSB Gunner 1 (XT995545), continues security of PHUOC VINH base camp, prepares for subsequent operations northwest of PHUOC VINH and maintains tactical overwatch of 1st Brigade TAO.

6. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: 1st Brigade secures PHUOC VINH with 2/16 Inf (-) and PHUOC HOA bridge with company 2/16 Inf; establishes FSB Gunner 1 (XT9954) 11 June 1967 and secures Gunner 1 with 1/26 Inf; conducts airmobile assaults 12 June 1967 with 1/2 Inf into LZ FOXTROT (objective 4) (XT971623) and 1/28 Inf into LZ GOLF (objective 3) (XT939579); prepares for subsequent airmobile assaults and artillery base displacement throughout AO REBEL; and maintains overwatch of 1st Brigade TAO.

7. (C) EXECUTION: The 1st Brigade initiated Operation BILLINGS at 110530 H June 1967, when B 1/26 Inf crossed SP heading north from PHUOC VINH. At 0630 H, A 1/26 Inf began to sweep road north from PHUOC VINH. At 0700 H, 3d Bde assumed OPCON TF DIXIE. At 0821 H, planned airlift of C 1/26 Inf and HHC 1/26 Inf was aborted due to weather. So C 1/26 Inf and Recon 1/26 Inf crossed SP at 0853 H and 0913 H, respectively. Elements of HHC (-) moved with later convoys. FSB Gunner 1 was secured by B 1/26 Inf at 0855 H, and the sweep of the road was completed by A 1/26 Inf at the same time. B 1/5 Arty and B 8/6 Arty displaced from PHUOC VINH to FSB Gunner 1 closing 111030 June 1967. Both batteries were prepared to fire in support of the 1/2 and 1/28 airmobile operations when a 24 hour delay of the lifts was caused by weather. 1/2 Inf and 1/28 Inf remained at PHUOC VINH and continued preparing for airmobile assaults on 12 June 1967. 2/16 Inf (-) secured PHUOC VINH base camp with one company securing PHUOC HOA bridge. At 1100 H, B 1/26 patrol found and destroyed one 60mm mortar round rigged with grenade type fuse. At 2138 H, (XT994547) there was an explosion, origin unknown. The remainder of the night passed without incident.

a. On 12 June 1967, the 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS, the security of the PHUOC VINH base camp, PHUOC HOA bridge and its overwatch of the Special Forces/C1DG Camps in SONG BE B team area. At 0619 H, 1/26 Inf began sweep of road. At 0658 H (XT994535) Recon 1/26 Inf located and blew in place two (2) 60mm mortar rounds which appeared to have been freshly placed. At 0725 H, Recon 1/26 Inf located (XT991531) one booby trapped butterfly bomb which was blown in place. D 1/5 Arty displaced from PHUOC VINH to FSB Gunner 1 closing 0925 H. 3 - A/1 Engr continued to clear fields of fire via FSB Gunner 1. 2/16 Inf (-) continued to secure PHUOC VINH base camp, route in sector and PHUOC HOA bridge with one company. 1/2 Inf conducted airmobile assault from PHUOC VINH to LZ FOXTROT (XT971623) closing 121300 June 1967. Landing was unopposed and NDP was established (XT974626). The lift required 85 sorties. At 1358 H, Recon 1/2 Inf receive sniper fire (XT977628) sustaining 1 MHA. Arty and Air was placed in suspected area of enemy with unknown results. At 1432 H, 1/28 Inf conducted airmobile assault into LZ GOLF (XT939579) establishing an NDP (XT935573) with negative contact. The 1/28 Inf established 3 AP's in sector with no contact. At 1529 H, B 1/2 located two hutches, one home made shotgun, a bag of documents, and 2 sacks of tobacco (XT977628). At 2345 a SLAR report indicated possible enemy movement (XT970620). Arty was fired into area with unknown results.

b. 13 June 1967: Phase II began with the units conducting search and destroy operations in sector. 1/26 Inf began sweep of road at 0615 H. At 0712 H, B 1/26 located and destroyed one home made anti-personnel mine (XT994647). At 0859 H, S2 1/2 Inf sighted 4 VC (XT992632). Arty was fired into area with unknown results. At 0843 H, B 1/28 Inf located small base camp (XT932582) base camp contained 4 cooking stoves, 3 bunkers w/overhead cover, 10 huts with sleeping positions and some freshly cut wood. Base camp was destroyed. At 1055 H, A 1/2 Inf sighted 3 VC running south along trail (XT960620); artillery was fired into area with unknown results. At 1210 H, grader from A/1 Engr (XT993533) detonated booby trap suspended from tree - negative casualties or damage. At 1308 H, A 1st Engr bulldozer detonated a small pressure mine about 10 meters off road (XT995537). No casualties or damage.

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At 1315H, an airstrike was placed in at (XT927584) uncovering a large base camp with 5 bunkers and 2 hutches along with several fighting positions. B 6/15 Arty was air lifted from LAI KHE to PHUOC VINH by C123 closing at 1335 H and assumed mission of reinforcing the 1/5 Arty. At 1355, Recon 1/2 Inf found an extensively booby trapped area in base camp (XT959621). At 1447, A 1/2 Inf searched base camp (XT959621) locating 5 hutches, two pigs, 25 chickens, a quantity of clothing, alcoholic beverages and two 25 pound bags of rice, one marked "Continental Grain Company". All were destroyed. At 1450H, the Recon Platoon working in the base camp with A 1/2 Inf sighted 2 VC and took them underfire with unknown results. At 1505 H, B 1/26 Inf reported Engr bulldozer on fire (XT991537). Fire was extinguished. No casualties. At 1515H, Recon 1/28 Inf located a base camp (XT929579), containing 150 bunkers w/heavy overhead cover. At 2225 H A 1/2 Inf reported movement to their front. Mortars were fired in the area with unknown results. At 2240 H C 1/28 AP ambushed a VC element believed to be Platoon size resulting in 4 VC KIA (85) and 1 US WIA. Arty remained in DS of 1st Bde. 1-A1 Engr cleared resupply LZ for 1/2 Inf 400' x 450' (XT973628). 3-A1 Engr cleared 100,000 square meters virgin jungle for fields of fire at Gunner 1 and maintained 1700 meters at road from (XT995543) to (XT992523) while clearing 50 meters each side of same length of road.

c. 14 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS conducting search and destroy operations in zone while securing PHUOC VINH base camp, PHUOC HOA bridge, FSB Gunner 1 and overwatching Brigade TACI. At 1055H, aerial observers from 1/28 Inf located base camp at (XT952567). From 1100 H to 1238 H 1/26 Inf conducted a MEDCAP in village of THUOC VANG treating 15 persons. At 1107H, A 1/28 (XT9350580) found 15 fuze wells from 82mm mortar and nine cans used for carrying small arms ammo. At 1306H, A 1/28 (XT925582) found three Z shaped trenches approximately 30 feet in length. At 1311 H A 1/28 (XT925581) located eight bunkers w/overhead cover. At 1331H, Recon 1/2 Inf while departing the NDP for a patrol received automatic weapons fire and sighted 3 VC dressed in black pajamas (XT969621). Fire was returned with unknown results. A 1/2 Inf was moved in as RRF while Arty and 2 airstrikes were placed in area with unknown results. At 1352H, A 1/28 located (XT925581)-one entrenching tool, one (1) cigarette lighter and one (1) one man fighting position. 1/28 placed out 3 AP's with no enemy contact. 1-A1 Engr cleared jungle near LZ FOXTRUT (XT973628), 3-A1 Engr cleared 2000 meters of virgin jungle at FSB Gunner 1, maintained road from PHUOC VINH to Gunner 1 and cleared jungle along same length of road. Arty remained in DS of 1st Brigade operations.

d. 15 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS conducting search and destroy operations in zone, local patrols, security of PHUOC VINH and PHUOC HOA bridge while maintaining overwatch of Brigade TACI, with no enemy contact. At 0955H, an air strike was placed in (XT965584) resulting in two (2) bunkers destroyed and an additional 6 bunkers and two (2) huts uncovered. At 1105H, an outpost of 1/26 Inf (XT994525) heard what appeared to be an individual moving through the undergrowth. Individual was taken under fire and fled to the east. His trail was found but nothing further. At 1105H, C 1/26 Inf located a well used trail (XT907556) large enough for carts, but showing no signs of use. At 1130 H C 1/28 (XT954581) located platoon size base camp which contained one (1) cooking area, six (6) spider holes, two (2) trenches, each 10 meters in length, two (2) machine gun positions, a well which was only half constructed, and an assortment of pots and pans. At 1413H, (XT967585) C 1/28 located an L-shaped trench which was 15 feet in length, 2 bombshelters, 34 foxholes, 15 covered bunkers, and 9 spider holes. B 1/2 conducted platoon size patrols from base (XT973608) with no contact. 1/2 (-) conducted local patrols with no contact. 1-A1 Engr continued to improve LZ FOXTRUT and fields of fire at 1/2 Inf NDP. 3-A1 Engr maintained road from (XT992512) to (XT997549) (6000meters), cleared 175,000 meters virgin jungle and improved FSB Gunner 1. 2-A1 Engr operated Laterite pit at PHUOC VINH base camp, reloaded LZ kit and worked on base camp development while maintaining TO&E equipment. Arty continued DS of 1st Brigade operations. 2/16 remained as RRF continuing security of PHUOC VINH base camp and PHUOC HOA bridge.

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10 July 1967

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e. 16 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS conducting search and destroy, security and TOAI overwatch. At 0037 H an ambush patrol from A 1/26 Inf reported movement closing in on them from two sides. Mortars were fired with unknown results. The movement ceased. At 0842 H, B 1/26 Inf found and destroyed a 15 pound homemade anti-tank mine with pressure fuze. At 0957H, an airstrike (XT994584) resulted in the destruction of 12 foxholes and 4 bunkers. At 1130H, 1/28 (-) commenced movement to new NDP closing at 1605 H with no contact. At 1152H, A 1/26 located a well used footpath on a 330 degree azimuth (XT983556) and at 1418H, located a second trail (XT994560). At 1418H, a patrol from A 1/2 saw two (2) VC and took them under fire (XT965628) with unknown results. C 1/2 located a tunnel and two (2) tons of rice (XT965627). Rice was destroyed. 1-A1 Engr continued improving LZ FOXTR0T and discovered VC base camp consisting of 3 hatches, 30 bushels of rice (booby trapped), VC shoes and uniforms. Location (XT992512) All were destroyed. 2-A1 Engr continued work on base camp while 3-A1 Engr maintained 6,200 meters of road (XT992512) - (XT998550). Hauled 16 loads of laterite, cleared 136,000 square meters of virgin jungle and cleared fields of fire at FSB Gunner 1. 2/16 Inf continued its RRF and security mission. Arty remained in DS of 1st Brigade operations.

f. 17 June 1967: On 17 June 1967 the 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS. At 1045H, B 1/26 located a well used trail (YT020544). At 1145H, A 1/28 conducting S&D operations (XT945543) observed 3 VC crossing rice paddy. Arty fire placed in with unknown results. At 1258H, while reconning by fire B 1/4 Cavalry sustained one (1) WIA (slight) dustoff effected 1310 H. At 1317H, C 1/26 with B 1/4 Cav reported movement to their front (YT001558), believed to be VC, airstrike was called for, then refused. Through an error, C 1/26 Inf sustained 2 WIA from friendly airstrikes at 1415 H. Dustoff completed at 1420 H. At 1408H, A 1/28 Inf (XT946548) located several rice bowls and C-ration cans, area appeared to have been used recently. At approximately 1430 H friendly Arty (XT998617) resulted in 8 wounded, 7 were evacuated. At 1512H, (XT943548) A 1/28 located two (2) cooking areas. At 1550H, 1/28 received warning order to be prepared to deploy to 3rd Brigade operational area under the control of the 3rd Brigade. 3 AP's were established with no contact. At 1920H, (XT994521) an LOH crashed. The LOH was secured for the night by elements of A 1/26 Inf with 2 APC's and 2 gun jeeps. 1-A1 Engr was on LZ standby, and had packed LZ pad and checked chain saws prior to moving to (YT003615). 2-A1 Engr LZ standby, repacked LZ pad and prepared to move to LZ X-Ray (XT967682). 3-A1 Engr maintained 6,400 meters of road from (XT992512) to (YT000555), hauled 30 loads of laterite, cleared 60,000 square meters of virgin jungle. 2/16 Inf continued RRF and security mission. 6th Bn, 27th Arty displaced the 8th platoon from C 6/27 Arty to FSB Gunner 1 (XT9954) to provide additional coverage for Infantry battalions working in the 3d Brigade AO. Closing at 1855 H.

g. 18 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS. At 0705H, 1/28 Inf commenced airlift from its NDP to CAU SUNG BE (XT931724) closing at 0900 H. 1/2 Inf conducted local patrols with no enemy contact. At 1210H, C 1/26 located an oxcart trail (XT993557). At 1227H, 1/28 Inf commenced airlift from CAU SUNG BE to (XT955725) closing at 1220H, and establishing an NDP. At 1440H, a strong point from B 1/28 (XT945728) made contact with four (4) VC engaging VC with M-79 and small arms fire. Light fire employed with unknown results. At 1506 H elements of B 1/4 Cavalry assisted in rescue from a mine field vicinity JUNGLE DEVIL RANGE, four (4) personnel of 1/16 Inf results 1 killed and 2 wounded from 1/16 Inf. Vehicles detonated 33 mines during the operation with negative damage to vehicles. 2/16 Inf continued security mission of PHUOC VINH base camp, PHUOC HOA bridge and remained RRF for 1st Brigade. 1-A1 Engr cut overhead cover for 1/2 Inf (YT003675) returning to base camp approximately 1505 H. 2-A1 Engr was on LZ standby. 3-A1 Engr improved gun positions at FSB Gunner 1, cleared 666 square meters of virgin jungle, and maintained road from (XT992512) to (YT000555). On 18 June 1967, A 1/5 Arty displaced by CH47 from Gunner White (YT0061) closing 1003H, with mission of GSR 2/33 Arty. B 1/7 Arty displaced by convoy from PHU LOI to LAI KHE and fixed wing from LAI KHE to DONG XOAI Special Forces camp (YT0675) closing at 1710H, with the mission of reinforcing the 1/5 Arty.

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h. 19 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. 2/16 Inf remained RRF and continued security mission of PHUOC VINH base camp and PHUOC HOA bridge. At 0500 H, C 1/2 AP reported heavy movement in front of the perimeter. Arty fire was placed in suspected enemy area with unknown results. 1/2 Inf (-) continued S&D operations with B 1/2 and C 1/2 conducting patrols from established patrol bases with no enemy contact. At 0642 H, B 1/26 Inf located butterfly bomb (not booby trapped) (XT996546) destroying it in place. At 0726 H, B 1/26 Inf (XT999556) located and destroyed an old 105mm round rigged for pressure detonation. At 0829 H, airstrikes were placed in (XT974537). Again at 0841 H, airstrikes were placed in same area with unknown results. At 0830 H, C 1/28 Inf (XT954719) located and destroyed a VC bicycle and poncho. At 1110 H and 1330 H, airstrikes were placed in (XT957707) with unknown results. By 1730 H, all elements of 1/28 Inf closed their NDP's, three (3) AP's were established with no enemy contact. At 1700 H, an airstrike was placed in (YTO4569) with undetermined results. 1-A1 Engr worked on base camp construction and performed maintenance of TO&E equipment. 2-A1 Engr - LZ standby moved at 1500 H, to Gunner III (YTO62754) to cut overhead cover. 3-A1 Engr cleared 90,000 square meters from (YTO02569) to (YTO03570), hauled 33 loads of laterite for access roads at Gunner 1 and located 2 mines: one 105mm round pressure type (YTO03561), 1 butterfly bomb (XT994596); both were destroyed in place. Arty remained in DS.

i. 20 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. 2/16 Inf continued its security mission and remained as DRRF. At 0704 H, 1/2 Inf reported that a ROBIN HOOD resupply slick for 1/5 Arty received fire (YTO00606). Arty and mortar placed in area with unknown results. 1/2 Inf conducted patrols, established NDP's and ambush patrols without enemy contact. At 0800 H, 1/26 (-) was airlifted to PHUOC VINH by CH47. A battalion of ARVN Marines assumed responsibility for Gunner 1 at 0845 H. The lift of the 1/26 Inf (-) was completed at 1015 H. 12 sorties were utilized. At 0835 H, an airstrike was expended (XT937698) with no enemy findings. At 1140 H, C 1/26 Inf was relieved along the road and closed PHUOC VINH. At this time 1/26 Inf assumed mission as DRRF with one company on 30 minute alert and 1/26 Inf (-) on one hour alert. At 1549 H, B 1/28 Inf (XT941719) located one (1) hut which had not been recently used. At 1635 H, B 1/28 Inf (XT946722) located three (3) 55 gallon drums which were empty, and one (1) one-man fighting position three feet deep. 1-A1 Engr LZ standby, repacked LZ pad and maintained TO&E equipment. 2-A1 Engr located at Gunner III (YTO62754), cut overhead cover for DEVOUR. 3-A1 Engr hauled 23 loads of laterite and maintained road from (XT992512) to (YTO00555) cleared fields of fire for Arty and 60,000 square meters of virgin jungle. B platoon 4.2 Assault Arty displaced by convoy from PHU LAI to LAI KHE and fixed wing from LAI KHE to DONG XOAI to provide close in fire support for Special Forces Camp, closing at 1600 H. Mission to reinforce 1/5 Arty effective upon closing.

j. 21 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued operation BILLINGS. Mobile guerilla force from Co A, 5 SFB continued to support 1st Brigade operations. 1st VNMC Bn continued to support 1st Brigade operations. No enemy contact was made during the period. 2/16 Inf continued security mission of PHUOC VINH base camp, PHUOC HOA bridge. At 1235 H, C 2/16 Inf conducted a search and destroy mission (XT932502) with negative findings. 2 AP's were established near PHUOC HOA bridge. No contact. 1/2 Inf conducted a battalion (-) operation with A & B Companies and the Recon element. Company A established a patrol base (YTO12592), Company B established a patrol base vicinity (YTO08597). The recon platoon established an ambush (YTO06601). There was no contact. At 0912 H, an airstrike was expended (XT970781) with negative results. At 1000 H, a 1/28 patrol saw one (1) VC (XT964718). The VC were engaged with small arms fire with unknown results. (one probable body count) At 1025 H, A 1/28 (XT966720) engaged two (2) VC with small arms fire and Arty was placed in as blocking fires. Results (2 VC probable body count) At 1348 H, an airstrike was expended (XT974716) uncovering several tunnels, bunkers, and fighting positions. 1/28 Inf established 3 AP's with no enemy contact. 1/26 Inf remained at PHUOC VINH as DRRF. 1-A1 Engr worked on base camp development, LZ standby and checked out chain saws. 2-A1 Engr cleared fields of fire at (YTO62754). 3-A1 Engr cleared 11,250 square meters of virgin jungle, worked on gun pads and hauled 26 loads of laterite for road maintenance. Arty continued to support 1st Brigade operations.

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k. 22 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. 1/26 Inf remained at PHUOC VINH as DRRF with one company plus the recon platoon on 30 minute alert, while 1/26 Inf (-) was on 1 hour alert. 2/16 Inf continued security mission of PHUOC VINH base camp, PHUOC HOA bridge and opened road between PHUOC HOA bridge and NUOC VANG. At 0703 H, (XT927447) a 2/16 flank security (5-6 men) for road sweeping team prematurely set off VC ambush. 1 claymore, AW, SA, and rifle grenades were fired by VC at the sweeping team in the road. Contact was broken at 0710 H. Mortar and Arty were placed in areas with unknown results. US losses - 2WHA. Road was secured by 2/16 at 0825 H. There were no further incidents, and 2/16 established 2 AP's with no enemy contact. At 1225 H, C 1/28 Inf (XT973728), located a base camp containing eight (8) foxholes with overhead cover, and nine (9) spider holes. Base camp did not appear to have been used recently. At 1500 H, an airstrike was expended (XT974716) uncovering several fortified bunkers, and a mess area with tables. At 1558 H, C 1/28 Inf located and destroyed a hut (XT980737). At 1605 H, a slick received small arms fire (XT974716), airstrike was placed into area uncovering 5 bunkers and 13 foxholes. At 1700 H, the 1/28 Inf was alerted to prepare to move from present NDP to QUAN LOI on 23 June 1967. A & B 1/2 Inf conducted local patrols around the NDP while C 1/2 Inf and the recon platoon moved to patrol bases and patrolled from them with no enemy contact. At 2125 H, the R flank LP of B 1/2 Inf and L flank LP of C 1/2 Inf reported movement. Arty and mortars were fired with unknown results. 1-A1 Engr extended existing LZ at (YT032599) cleared 4000 square meters of jungle and cut for 1/2 Inf, 2-A1 Engr cut fields of fire. Used 4500 pounds of demo while located at (YT062754). 3-A1 Engr hauled 85 loads of laterite, cleared 30,000 square meters of virgin jungle from (YT003573) to (YT002577) and opened road from (XT991511) to (YT003573). 3-A1 Engr also located the following mines in areas of responsibility one US AT wrapped in plastic (XT995538), blown in place. APC hit mine (XT995537) - no casualties or damage. Located dud on booby trap (YT004570), blown in place. (1 VN WHA) 1-A1 Engr LZ standby; 2-A1 Engr located at Gunner III (YT062754) continued to cut overhead cover and clear jungle around air strip. 3-A1 Engr opened 740 meters of road (XT991511) to (XT999521), cleared 500 square meters of virgin jungle, 100 meters north of Gunner 1 and hauled 100 loads of laterite for 1/26 Inf, 1/28 Inf and OWL CONTROL at PHUOC VINH base camp.

l. 23 June 1967: The 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. 1/26 Inf continued its mission as DRRF at PHUOC VINH. C 1/2 Inf conducted patrols around their NDP with negative contact. A & B 1/2 Inf with the recon platoon moved to and established patrol bases from where it conducted patrols with negative contact. All units closed back in to the NDP by 1730 H, with negative findings and negative contact. At 0800 H, the extraction of supplies for 1/28 Inf was completed. At 1015 H, the first lift of 1/28 Inf was off the ground enroute to QUAN LOI. The 1/28 Inf closed QUAN LOI at 1430 H, establishing a NDP (XT807902). 2/16 Inf continued to secure PHUOC VINH base camp and PHUOC HOA bridge. Bn opened the road at 0729 H, and closed it at 1857 H. 1/5 Arty: Bn continued to support 1st Brigade operations. B 1/5 Arty was airlifted (13 sorties CH47) to PHUOC VINH closing at 1350 H. At 1145 H, (XT993535) an APC from 6/27 Arty hit a mine. Track was blown off. No US casualties.

m. 24 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. 1st VNMC Bn continued to support 1st Bde operations. MCF, Co A, 5th SFG continued to support 1st Brigade operations. 1/26 Inf continued as DRRF at PHUOC VINH base camp and conducted local patrols to the west of PHUOC VINH without contact. 2/16 Inf continued to secure PHUOC VINH base camp with the Bn (-) and the PHUOC HOA bridge with C 2/16 Ing. 2/16 Inf opened the road at 0735 H, and closed it without incident. A 2/16 conducted a patrol to the south of PHUOC VINH without contact or incident. 1/2 Inf secured NDP and conducted local security patrols between 0750 H, and 0900 H, without incident. At 1025 H, 1/2 Inf started to airlift from field positions to PHUOC VINH base camp closing PHUOC VINH at 1210 H. 1/2 Inf upon arrival at PHUOC VINH prepared for future operations. At 0900 H the 1/28 Inf assumed responsibility for the security of QUAN LOI perimeter and providing a security force for the engineers daily. 1-A1 Engr was on LZ standby and worked on base camp development. 2-A1 Engr cut fields of fire (YT062759) and returned to base camp at 1530 H, using a total of 6000 pounds of explosives during the operation. 3-A1 Engr located and destroyed in place 2 mines. 1 mine approximately 20 pounds of explosives wrapped in plastic

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w/bamboo detonator (XT994537); a second mine was a Chinese type approximately 20 pounds located (XT993534), 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Brigade operations. 1/5 Arty was airlifted (39 sorties CH47) from FSB Gunner White, to PHUOC VINH closing at 1015 H. B 8/6 Arty and platoon C 6/27 Arty moved by road to PHUOC VINH closing at 1555 H without incident.

n. 25 June 1967: 1st Brigade continued to redeploy from Operations BILLINGS and prepare for future road clearing operations. 1/26 Inf remained as DR&F until 1700 H, when the mission was assumed by the 1/2 Inf. The 1/26 Inf conducted a local patrol to the west of PHUOC VINH between 0834 H and 1225 H. At 1011 H, (XT948483) the patrol located and destroyed 6 shallow holes three feet deep by four feet wide, estimated to be 3 weeks old. At 1410 H, (XT951482) the patrol located and evacuated an old can containing .45 caliber ammo. The can appeared to have been in the area approximately 2 weeks. Patrol closed PHUOC VINH without further incident. 1/16 Inf secured FSB Gunner 3; 1/16 Inf swept the area of previous nights with negative findings. Bn OPCON 3rd Brigade at 1200 H. 2/16 Inf continued to secure PHUOC VINH base camp and PHUOC HOA bridge. At 0643 H, 2/16 Inf started to clear the road from NUOC VANG to PHUOC HOA bridge. At 0707 H, platoon B 2/16 Inf (XT952464) received SA, AW and rifle grenade fire from an estimated 5 VC. Arty and light fire teams were employed in area. Contact was broken at 0721 H, with no US casualties. At 0835 H, 2/16 Inf had 6 detainees (XT952464). The 5 were determined to be innocent. 1 however was turned over to the National Police. 2/16 Inf continued security of road until relieved by the 1/2 Inf at the PHUOC HOA bridge at 1115 H, 2/16 Inf closed PHUOC VINH base camp at 1125 H, without further incident. 1/28 Inf continued to be OPCON 3rd Brigade. 3-A1 Engr policed area of Gunner 1 and returned to PHUOC VINH base camp approximately 1200 H. A1 Engr continued maintenance of equipment and prepares for future road operations. 1/5 Arty continued to support 1st Brigade operations. D 1/5 Arty moved overland FSB Gunner 1 to PHUOC VINH closing at 1155 H. B 1/5 Arty moved by land to PHUOC HOA bridge closing at 1645 H. 1st VNMC Bn secured FSB Gunner 1 and opened road between NUOC VANG and FSB 1. Bn moved at 1155 H overland to PHUOC VINH closing at 1350 H. 1st lift of R/W (CH47) to TAN UYEN lifted off at 1350 H. Bn became OPCON 2d Brigade at 1614 H, when last sortie left PHUOC VINH. Operation BILLINGS terminated 261838 June 1967; while the 1st Brigade continued its overwatch of the Brigade TAOI and began preparations for future road clearing operations.

8. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES.

a. Artillery; 1/5 Arty provided DS for the 1st Brigade and its elements 8/6 Arty, 6/27 Arty, 6/15 Arty, 1/7 Arty, 2HAAB and the 1/5 Arty fired.

(1) 4.2 Inch Mortar	2,075
(2) 105mm	23,291
(3) 155mm	9,159
(4) 8 Inch	1,440
(5) 175mm	885

b. Engr: A Co, 1st Ingr Bn supported 1st Brigade during operation BILLINGS

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c. Air Force: Air Force flew 42 pre-planned missions, 28 immediate missions, for a total of 70 strikes, accounting for 176 sorties. A total of 18 sky spots were flown for units in the field. The results of the airstrikes were 14 VC KIA (BC), 31 VC KIA (Prob), 22 bunkers destroyed, 28 bunkers damaged, 15 bunkers uncovered, 14 military structures destroyed, 13 fighting positions destroyed, 12 fighting positions and 1 bridge damaged, 2 trucks damaged and 2 rafts destroyed.

9. (C) Results:

a. US Losses:

- (1) Personnel: 15 MIA
- (2) Equipment Destroyed: None
- (3) Equipment Damaged: None

b. VC Losses:

- (1) Personnel: 94 KIA (BC) 3 KIA (Prob)
- (2) Equipment Captured: Small quantities of rice, medical supplies and documents, 1 homemade shotgun.
- (3) Equipment Destroyed: 4 tons rice, 8 military structures, 200 bunkers, 500 meters of trench line, 3 pressure mines, 4 booby traps, 2 command detonated mines, 25 chickens, 2 pigs, 34 sets of mixed clothing and miscellaneous medical supplies, cooking utensils and other food supplies.

10. (C) Administrative Matters:

a. Administrative plans were adequate.

(1) Supply:

- (a) Class I: No problems
- (b) Class II & IV: No problems
- (c) Class III: No problems
- (d) Class V: No shortage noted

(2) Method of resupply: Whenever feasible, ground resupply was employed, otherwise rotary-wing aircraft was utilized.

(3) Maintenance: No problem noted.

(4) Medical: D/1st Med provided excellent support.

(5) Communications: No problems noted.

b. Personnel Analysis: Section

(1) <u>BDE HHC</u>	<u>OPEN INITIATED</u>	<u>OPEN TERMINATED</u>
Auth	122	122
Asgn	155	150
FFD	130	131
PIF	0	0
PBC	130	131
(2) <u>1/2 INF</u>	<u>OPEN INITIATED</u>	<u>OPEN TERMINATED</u>
Auth	787	787
Asgn	867	866
FFD	797	811
PIF	579	587
PBC	218	224

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<u>COMPANIES</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>
HHC	107	208	115	189
Co A	147	59	149	69
Co B	177	53	116	67
Co C	148	63	157	64
Total	<u>579</u>	<u>383</u>	<u>537</u>	<u>389</u>

(3) 2/16 INF OPN INITIATED OPN TERMINATED

Auth	789		789
Asgn	761		760
FFD	740		750
PIF	639		640
PBC	101		110

<u>COMPANIES</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>
HHC	172	60	172	60
Co A	157	10	155	15
Co B	155	11	156	19
Co C	196	20	159	16
Total	<u>586</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>640</u>	<u>110</u>

(4) 1/26 INF OPN INITIATED OPN TERMINATED

Auth	846		846
Asgn	759		759
FFD	726		755
PIF	482		516
PBC	244		210

<u>COMPANIES</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>
HHC	114	128	154	106
Co A	119	32	127	41
Co B	115	56	129	32
Co C	134	28	134	26
Total	<u>482</u>	<u>244</u>	<u>545</u>	<u>210</u>

(5) 1/28 INF OPN INITIATED OPN TERMINATED

Auth	857		857
Asgn	862		822
FFD	800		756
PIF	548		537
PBC	252		219

<u>COMPANIES</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>
HHC	127	132	125	115
Co A	147	42	139	40
Co B	138	32	134	36
Co C	136	33	139	34
Total	<u>548</u>	<u>239</u>	<u>537</u>	<u>225</u>

(6) 1/5 ARTY OPN INITIATED OPN TERMINATED

Auth	532		532
Asgn	541		571
FFD	540		536
PIF	128		211
PBC	422		325

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PBC</u>
HQ	16	169	14	172
Co A	10	98	92	15
Co B	92	13	9	97
Co C	0	46	0	43
Co D	10	96	86	25
Total	<u>128</u>	<u>422</u>	<u>201</u>	<u>352</u>

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(7) <u>H/TROOP</u> <u>1/4 CAP</u>	<u>OPN INITIATED</u>	<u>OPN TERMINATED</u>
Auth	146	146
Asgn	175	170
PFD	170	144
PIF	148	148
PEC	22	16
<u>TROOP</u>	<u>PIF</u>	<u>PEC</u>
Trp B	148	22
Ttotal	148	22
		148
		16

11. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques: None

12. (C) Commander's Analysis: OPERATION WILLIAMS followed the planning schedule as envisioned by the commander. ~~Assess that the 1/28 Inf was detached from Bde control and attached to 3rd Bde due to enemy activity and intelligence in the 3rd Bde AO.~~

13. (C) Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. The mission of destroying VC/NVA forces and installations was accomplished by the destruction of numerous base camps throughout the AO. Although only minor contacts were made, an extensive area was searched and VC/NVA activities within the AO were seriously disrupted.

b. Lessons Learned:

(1) Due to an influx of replacements immediately prior to and during the operation, the need for refinement of the techniques involved in the airborne assault was apparent.

(2) As evidenced by the operations in the 3rd Bde AO, the VC appear to be using a tactic whereby a considerable force is positioned approximately 500 meters away from the LZ to escape the preparatory fires and then engages the assault force after these fires have dissipated.

(3) Command emphasis must continue to be placed upon sterilization of night defensive positions prior to extraction to preclude leaving anything of usable value to VC/NVA forces.

(4) Close coordination must be made by supporting artillery units to insure proper organization of Fire Support Bases so that immediate supporting fires are available as soon after occupation as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William S. Tuckerman
WILLIAM S. TUCKERMAN
Maj, Inf
Adjutant

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE AND IAT KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVDB-WB-C

16 July 1967

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (MA TV/RCS/J3/32)

THRU: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
APO US Forces 96345

TO: Commander
US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J321
APO US Forces 96243

1. NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation BILLINGS; Search and Destroy.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 110700 June 1967 to 261838 June 1967.
3. GENERAL: Command Headquarters 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, 1st Infantry Division OPOD 15-67 (Operation BILLINGS) (U); 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division OPOD 13-67 (Operation BILLINGS). Operation BILLINGS was conducted in the area of Western War Zone D. The 3d Brigade plan was to secure FS/PB at GUNNER 2 (XT917734) with one infantry battalion on 11 June; and conduct a multi-battalion combat assault on 13 June 1967; conducting combat reconnaissance in assigned AO; and to destroy VC/NVA forces and installations within the operational area.

a. Reporting Officer: Colonel Sidney M. Marks

b. Task Organization:

- Headquarters, 3d Brigade, Colonel Sidney M. Marks, CO
- 1-16 Infantry, LTC Rufus C. Lazzell, CO
- 1-28 Infantry, LTC Stanley J. Kuick, CO
- 2-28 Infantry, LTC Jerry S. Edwards, CO
- 2-18 Infantry, LTC James F. Price, CO
- 1-10 Infantry, LTC Richard E. Cavazos, CO
- 2-33 Artillery, LTC Charles D. Daniel, CO (12 June - 20 June 1967)
- 2-33 Artillery, LTC Arthur D. Walla, CO (20 June - Present)

4. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Intelligence Prior to the Operation: The area of operation was bounded by the following coordinates: XT8245, XT8278, YT1178, and YT1145. Prominent arteries of transportation were the Song Be River, which flows N to S along the Western edge of the area, Route LTL 1A, extending diagonally NE to SW across the center and Rte LTL 13 which runs NE to SW along the Northern edge. The area is dominated by secondary forest with considerable wet land rice areas along the numerous streams scattered throughout the area. There are several areas of moderately dense population along the waterways and major roads, with PHUOC VINH in the South and DONG IQAI in the Northeast being the most prominent. Operation BLUEFIELD was the most recent penetration of a small portion of this area by US Forces. The area was reported to have large and numerous VC base camps, tunnels, food storage areas, fortified positions and other allied installations, with heavy concentrations of installations in the SW and SE quarter of the area. In addition to the 271st VC Regt, reportedly would be TRI Hqs, THU DAU MOT and BINH LONG Province Committees and TAN UYEN, BEN CAT and CHON THANH District Committees and their subordinate elements.

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b. The area of operation was discovered to be a confirmed VC operational area as evidenced by the numerous large base camps found. Additional intelligence information gathered from the USSF Det at CHI LUNH confirmed large enemy unit sightings and discoveries of many base camps. At the onset of the operation, friendly troops did not engage any units, but received small arms sniper fire from

harnessing elements and caretaker units in base camps. It was apparent the 271st Regt would defend their positions throughout the general area. An exceptionally large number of trails, both large and small were found throughout the entire operational area, well used and indicating recent use by large and small elements. On 14 June 67, Company B 1-16 Infantry, vicinity XT937669 engaged an estimated VC company believed to be a unit of the 1st Battalion, 271st VC Regt. The VC were dressed in Khaki uniforms and employed mortars, AW/SA, M-79's, MG and hand grenades. The attack was repulsed with light casualties to friendly troops and 60 VC KIA (BC). During the hours of darkness, in spite of heavy artillery concentrations in the area, the VC evacuated many of their dead and wounded along with their weapons. On 17 June 67, 1-16 and 2-28 Infantry Battalions vicinity XT958675 were attacked by elements of the 1st & 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regt. The VC were dressed in Khaki uniforms, employed mortars, light and heavy machine guns, AK assault rifle, RPG-2, R.R.'s M-79's, SA and hand grenades. The attack was launched with two assaults from the front and one attack from the West flank, again the VC were repulsed with heavy losses, 196 VC KIA (BC) and heavy friendly casualties. In both attacks the VC initiated the attacks with SA and M-79 fire, then followed with a withering barrage of mortar fire. During an attempt to remove the dead and wounded from the battlefield, the VC again initiated a mortar barrage and heavy AW and SA fire, forcing the helicopters to abort their mission. Later during the day, a successful evacuation of the casualties was conducted. Again during the night of 17-18 June 1967, and in spite of heavy friendly artillery fire into the battle area, the VC extracted their dead and wounded along with their weapons. One PW captured confirmed the attacking VC unit as the 2d Battalion, 271st VC Regt comprised of Hqs Company, C1, C2, C3 and C4. One document taken from the body of a VC, indicated he was the XO of the 2d Company, 1st Battalion, 271st Regt and gave locations of the units shortly prior to the attack and the meeting places where they would assemble after the engagement. Heavy air and artillery support was rendered in both battles, with heavy AW fire directed at the aircraft. During the ensuing days, many dead VC were found (minus weapons). Some were found in groups indicating their bearers did not have sufficient time to bury them in the face of advancing friendly troops, and others were found in hastily built graves. Numerous trails were also found, many with large blood spots, leading away from the scene of the battle. SLAR and SPAR reports in the following days indicated the enemy movement to be going SW and NE. This was further corroborated by agent reports of enemy groups moving in the same directions carrying wounded on litters. The weapons captured were in excellent condition, and appeared to be brand new, as was the web equipment. During the remainder of the operation, the VC probed nightly the LP's, RP's and NDP's of the units, but made no attempt to engage in unit size. On 19 June 1967, Company B 1-18 Infantry vicinity XT951693 entered a base camp which had been previously hit by an airstrike. This base camp contained 35 dead VC and fresh blood trails throughout the entire camp. Also found were 53 bunkers with overhead cover new camouflage and latrines, along with many parts of bloody clothing and some medicine. It is possible that this base camp may have been used as an aid station or hospital to care for the wounded from the previous major engagement, and as a result of the airstrike; additional VC were killed and the wounded carried off prior to the arrival of friendly troops.

c. The operational area was mostly flat with heavy jungle undergrowth and in many places double canopy jungle. This area offered excellent concealment from the air and it was found to be extremely difficult in spotting base camps from the air or making accurate BDA assessment, except in cases where direct hits had been made and opened up the target. Weather during the first week of the operation was heavy rainfall, which did not hamper ground operations, but did force aircraft in support to operate under the most extreme conditions.

d. Base camps found throughout the operational area were very well constructed and most appeared to have been used recently. Many of the bunkers had reinforced overhead cover and were well camouflaged. Food caches and equipment caches were not found, however, many sampans had been sighted along the Song Be River and taken under attack resulting in their destruction. Significant base camps and fortifications found are as indicated:

IT946661	75 fighting pen outside the woodline and 50 inside the woodline.
XT936667	Base camp with 150 bunkers 4x6x4 ft w/OH cover and tunnels (approx 30-50% dest by air and arty).
XT967783	Base camp found by CHI LITH BMDG Elements (BC is Co size but was not entered by CTRG).
XT951693	VC with 53 bunkers, latrines and tunnels (new camouflage).

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IT972715	Log bridge over a river.
IT974715	5 bunkers, 3 foxholes and one L shape trench.
IT977716	17 reinforced bunkers with mess and bathing area.
IT956682	BC size unk (observed from the air).
IT941658	BC 300 meters long w/30-40 bunkers and trenches.

e. No civilian personnel were encountered by friendly elements in their maneuver area during the course of the operation.

5. MISSION: 3d Brigade secures and occupies FS/PB GUNNER 2; conducts air assault into LZ RUFE; conducts combat reconnaissance, Search and Destroy operations with two (2) infantry battalions to kill VC/NVA personnel; and to destroy VC/NVA installations in AO YANKEE.

6. CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

a. Maneuver: The 3d Brigade secures and occupies FS/PB GUNNER 2 (IT917734) with 2-18 Infantry commencing 11 June 1967; conducts airmobile assault on LZ RUFE with 1-16 Infantry on 13 June 1967; conducts combat reconnaissance operations in AO YANKEE with 1-16 Infantry and 2-28 Infantry to kill VC/NVA personnel and to destroy VC/NVA installations within the operational area.

b. Fire Support: Artillery fire support will be as follows:

- (1) 2-33 Artillery: DS to 3d Brigade (GUNNER 2).
- (2) Lighthorse A (4.2"): Reinforcing 2-33 Artillery (GUNNER 2).
- (3) A & B 1-5 Artillery (105): Reinforcing 2-33 Artillery (GUNNER WHITE).
- (4) 6-27 Artillery (8"/175): GS (QUIN LOI).
- (5) 1 Platoon 6-35 ARVN Artillery (155): Reinforcing 2-33 Artillery (GUNNER 2).

7. EXECUTION:

11 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade began Operation BILLINGS by moving the 2-18 Infantry by R/W aircraft from LAI KHE to CHI LINH commencing at 1610 hours. Upon closing the battalion secured the airstrip and Special Forces camp. At 0920 hours, one CH 47, while working in the airlift received one round of small arms fire resulting in minor damage to the aircraft. This occurred just east of the LAI KHE perimeter. The 3d Brigade CP moved by R/W aircraft from LAI KHE to CHI LINH commencing at 1140 hours. The remainder of 11 June passed without incident.

12 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 2-28 Infantry moved by PW aircraft from LAI KHE to an assembly area at CHI LINH commencing at 0920 hours and closing at 1500 hours. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2. The remainder of the 12th of June passed without incident.

13 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS with an air assault with two infantry battalions on one LZ. After an extensive air and artillery preparation, the 1-16 Infantry conducted an air assault from LAI KHE into LZ RUFE (IT954663), beginning at 1115 hours and closing at 1222 hours. At 1119 hours, a LFT covering the lift received small arms fire from the east side of the LZ resulting in 1 US WIA. The battalions secured the LZ for the insertion of the 2-28 Infantry and then occupied the Northern sector of LZ RUFE. The 2-28 Infantry commenced insertion from FS/PB GUNNER 2 into LZ RUFE at 1242 hours and closed at 1337 hours. Upon closing the battalion occupied the Southern half of LZ RUFE. At 1600 hours, vicinity XT946661, a patrol from C Company, 2-28 Infantry located and destroyed 125 fighting positions. At 2101 hours, two ambush patrols from C Company, 2-28 Infantry, vicinity IT949659, sprung their ambushes on an estimated 5 VC with unknown results. There were negative US casualties. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 without incident. The 2-28 Infantry defended an NDP in the Southern half of LZ RUFE and the 1-16 Infantry defended an NDP in the Northern half of LZ RUFE. The remainder of 13 June 1967 passed without incident.

14 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-16 Infantry conducted a company size Search and Destroy operation in AO ALPHE. The 2-28 Infantry conducted two company size Search and Destroy operations in AO TRAVO, with negative contact. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 and conducted local patrols without incident. During the days operations, airstrikes uncovered a base

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camp containing 25 feet of trench and 5 bunkers vicinity XT935667 and destroyed 2 sampans vicinity XT919658. At 1100 hours, vicinity XT941658, A Company, 1-16 Infantry located an old base camp approximately 300 meters long, containing 55 protective shelters. The area was marked for destruction by artillery fires. At 1215 hours, vicinity XT935658, A Company 1-16 Infantry observed and fired on 5 VC. The VC fled Southeast, leaving behind 5 ruck sacks containing small amounts of ammunition and documents. The documents were evacuated. At 1412 hours, vicinity XT937669, B Company, 1-16 Infantry received small arms fire. The unit withdrew and placed artillery into the area. The unit went back into the area at 1430 hours and made contact with an estimated VC battalion. The company received heavy fire from the front and flanks. Artillery, airstrikes and gunships were placed into the area. Contact was broken at approximately 1900 hours. At 1720 hours, two medevac ships equipped with forest penetrators were damaged by ground fire when they tried to extract the wounded. At 1730 hours, C Company, 1-16 Infantry was ordered to link up with B Company and assist in the evacuation of the wounded and dead. B Company started moving back toward LZ RUFE at 1717 hours, and the two companies linked up at 1814 hours. Both companies closed back into LZ RUFE at 2337 hours. Evacuation of the wounded and dead started at 2309 hours, and was complete at 2337 hours. Friendly casualties were 6 KHA and 15 WFA. The VC suffered 60 KIA (B). Flare ships gave continuous illumination and fire support both during the return to LZ RUFE and during the medical evacuation. At 1915 hours, vicinity XT907734, a patrol from C Company, 2-18 Infantry fired on one VC dressed in black pajamas. The VC fired 2 or 3 shots at the patrol and withdrew. There were no friendly casualties and unknown VC casualties. All battalions defended the same NDP's, and the remainder of 14 June passed without incident.

15 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 2-28 Infantry conducted two company size S & D operations to the west of LZ RUFE. The 1-16 Infantry secured LZ WFE without incident. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 without incident. At 0930 hours, vicinity XT947662, B Company 2-28 Infantry located a trail which showed recent movement from East to West. At 1150 hours, vicinity XT938667, B Company, 2-28 Infantry located 3 ponches and 3 US claymore blast caps and at 1215 hours vicinity XT936667 located 2 VC bodies. One VC was dressed in a Khaki uniform and the other in khaki trousers and a black shirt. Both wearing sandals and web gear. At 1132 hours, vicinity XT937667, A and B Companies 2-28 Infantry entered a large base camp. The base camp appeared to have been a way station, and there was nothing found in the camp. Both companies closed into their NDP's at 1735 hours. All battalions defended the same NDP's and the remainder of 15 June passed without incident.

16 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-16 Infantry conducted a two company S&D operation in CO Charlie, and cleared an LZ at position YANKS. The 2-28 Infantry secured LZ RUFE and conducted local patrols. At 0955 hours, vicinity XT951654, C Company, 1-16 Infantry located a way station used by approximately 6 individuals. At 1145 hours, the CO of B Company, 2-28 Infantry spotted 4 sampans. Artillery and airstrikes were placed into the area with unknown results. At 1435 hours, LZ RUFE came under mortar attack. Approximately 30 to 35 rounds of incoming 60 MM mortars were received. Artillery, airstrikes and a LFT were placed into the area as counter mortar fire. There were 20 US WIA. All battalions defended the same NDP's and the remainder of 16 June 1967 passed without incident.

17 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. At 0730 hours, the 1-16 Infantry (-) with B Company, 2-28 Infantry attached departed the NDP at LZ RUFE for position X Ray. The 2-28 Infantry (-) with C Company 1-16 Infantry attached remained at LZ RUFE until position X Ray was secured. The 1-16 Infantry continued to secure LAJ KHE and conducted local patrols without incident. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 and conducted local patrols. At 1035 hours, vicinity XT897730, A Company, 2-18 Infantry located and destroyed 27 one man foxholes. The lead element of 1-16 Infantry (-) reached position X Ray at 1030 hours. The battalion deployed with A Company, 1-16 Infantry in the Northeast side, B Company, 1-16 Infantry on the East side and the 29 Platoon on the South. E Company, 2-28 Infantry moved up the West side and linked up with A Company 1-16 Infantry in the North. The battalion (-) closed at 1125 hours. A Company 2-28 Infantry moved from LZ RUFE to LZ X Ray commencing at 1015 hours and closing at 1235 hours. At 1245 hours B Company 2-28 Infantry started to receive sniper rounds in to their sector of the perimeter. Fire then began to be received from the North and Southeast portions of the perimeter. The fire increased and was accompanied by automatic weapons fire.

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hand grenades, rifle grenades and 60 MM mortar fire. A major attack took place against A Company, 1-16 Infantry commencing at 1306 hours. The attack was conducted by 2 groups of 30-35 VC. This attack was accompanied by heavy ground fire and a 60 MM mortar barrage. The attack was repulsed and ceased at 1345 hours. At 1306 hours, another major attack took place simultaneously against the Recon platoon, 1-16 Infantry. At 1346 hours, a reinforcing element from Headquarters Company assisted the Recon Platoon in repulsing the VC attack. The attack against the Recon Platoon was also accompanied by heavy ground fire and a 60 MM mortar barrage. Sporadic small arms fire continued to be received until 1459 hours. Artillery, air and gunships were used throughout the contact. A total of 21 flights of TAG air were directed against the VC. Initial US losses were 27 KIA and 88 WIA. VC losses, initially, were 2 VC KIA (DC) and 1 POW. At 1700 hours, LZ X Ray came under mortar attack. About 30 rounds of 60 MM mortar were received resulting in 3 US KIA and 20 WIA. Counter mortar fire was placed into the area and the mortar attack ceased at 1704 hours, the 1-16 Infantry was airlifted from LAI KHE to LZ X Ray commencing at 1627 hours, and closing at 1905 hours. The lift was temporarily suspended during the mortar attack at 1705 hours, but was resumed at 1705 hours. A Company, and the Recon Platoon of 1-16 Infantry were airlifted out of LZ X Ray to CHI LINH commencing at 1745 hours and closing at 1830 hours. A follow up report gave 196 VC KIA (DC). The 2-28 Infantry (-) with C Company 1-16 Infantry attached defended an NDP at LZ RUFE. The 1-16 Infantry, 1-16 Infantry (-) and B and A Companies 2-28 Infantry defended an NDP at LZ X Ray. The remainder of 17 June 1967 passed without incident.

18 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-16 Infantry (-) was extracted by R/W aircraft from LZ RUFE and LZ X Ray commencing at 0945 hours and closing FS/PB GUNNER 2 at 1031 hours. The battalion then moved by R/W aircraft to LAI KHE closing at 1050 hours. The 1-16 Infantry conducted S & D operations around LZ X Ray and during the day the battalion discovered 22 VC bodies. The 2-28 Infantry continued security of the Western portion of LZ X Ray. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 and conducted local patrols. At 0900 hours, the 1-28 Infantry closed CHI LINH becoming OPCON of the 3d Brigade upon closing. At 1230 hours, the 1-28 Infantry commenced an air assault in LZ Defiant vicinity XT955726, closing at 1251 hours. During the day the 2-28 Infantry located 4 VC bodies, vic XT960683. At 0800 hours, vicinity XT956682, D Company, 2-28 Infantry located two destroyed claymores and one destroyed boobytrapped grenade. At 1103 hours, vicinity XT956682, B Company, 2-28 Infantry made contact with an estimated VC squad. The point was hit with a claymore and machine gun fire resulting in 1 US KIA and 3 WIA. Air, artillery and gunships were directed into the area with unknown results. Contact was broken at 1153 hours. At 1236 hours, vicinity XT960720 a HULL received 2 rounds of small arms fire. A gunship in the area took the area under fire and was shot down. The ship landed safely at vicinity XT964726. There was 1 US WL. The ship was secured by the 2-18 Infantry until it was extracted at 1340 hours. At 1432 hours, vicinity XT961681, a patrol from A Company, 1-16 Infantry fired on one VC with unknown results. At 1435 hours, vicinity XT959737, A Company, 1-28 Infantry, sighted 4 VC. Light Fire Team and artillery placed fire into the area with unknown results. At 1745 hours, vicinity XT956684, A Company, 1-16 Infantry located 5 entrenching tools, 10 Chicom grenades, miscellaneous web equipment, 7-7.92 M-6 Drums, 4-7.92 clips for an AK 47, 1-7.92 Russian LM-6 (RP-56) and miscellaneous documents. The documents were evacuated. The 1-28 Infantry defended an NDP at LZ Defiant. The 1-16 Infantry remained at LAI KHE and prepared for future operations. The remainder of 18 June 1967 passed without incident.

19 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-16 Infantry conducted an S & D operation in AO Mike with one company and the Recon Platoon. The 2-28 Infantry secured LZ X Ray and conducted local patrols. The 1-28 Infantry secured LZ Defiant, and conducted a company size S & D operation to the North of the LZ with negative results. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 without incident. At 1019 hours, vicinity XT951693, D Company, 1-16 Infantry located a large base camp containing 53 bunkers, and 35 VC bodies. Documents and parts of many bodies were also located in the area. The documents were evacuated. At 2210 hours, vicinity XT957778, an LP from B Company, 2-28 Infantry heard movement. The LP detonated a claymore and received small arms fire. The LP then was repositioned to a position 35 meters outside of the perimeter. They continued to hear noise without further contact. The battalions continued to defend the same NDP's and the remainder of 19 June passed without incident.

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20 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-18 Infantry (-) conducted an S & D operation in AO Kilo. The 2-28 Infantry continued to secure LZ X RAY and conducted local patrols. The 1-28 Infantry continued to secure LZ Defiant and conducted a company size S & D operation Southeast of LZ Defiant. At 0750 hours, vicinity XT959683, C Company, 1-18 Infantry located and evacuated 1 RFM round. Throughout the day, the battalion located several trails vicinity XT 969-685, XT959693, and XT959694. At 1041 hours, vicinity XT963693, C Company, 2-28 Infantry received several rounds of small arms fire. The unit pulled back and artillery and mortars were fired into the area with unknown results. At 1735 hours, vicinity XT959648, the Recon Platoon located 3 VC bodies KIL. Throughout the day, 1-28 Infantry located several trails leading to a log bridge over a river with trails on the other side believed to have been used by a platoon size unit, vicinity XT966795. At 2040 hours, vicinity XT962662 an ambush patrol from A Company, 1-18 Infantry heard movement. A claymore was fired with unknown results. The movement ceased at 2045 hours. Throughout the night, 1-18 Infantry's patrols heard movement but had no contact. All battalions defended the same NDP's and the remainder of the 20th of June passed without incident.

21 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-18 Infantry secured LZ X RAY and conducted local patrolling with negative contact. The 2-28 Infantry (-) conducted an S & D operation in AO Mike, North and Northwest of LZ X RAY. The 1-28 Infantry conducted a company size S & D operation Southeast of LZ Defiant. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 without incident. At 0850 hours, vicinity XT962721, A Company 1-28 Infantry located a recently used trail which indicated movement to the Northwest. At 0905 hours, vicinity XT963720, A Company, 1-28 Infantry located a North-south trail which had been recently used by small groups heading South. At 0908 hours, vicinity XT956683, C Company, 2-28 Infantry located 1 VC body which had been dead for 2 or 3 days. Two AK-47 magazines, 2 grenades and a pistol belt were also located and evacuated. At 0945 hours, vicinity XT965076, the Recon Platoon, 1-28 Infantry located a well used trail running North-South, used recently by about 10 individuals moving South. At 0958 hours, vicinity XT964676, C Company, 1-28 Infantry located one old VC body. At 1028 hours, vicinity XT966720, A Company, 1-28 Infantry took 2 VC under fire with small arms and artillery. At 1107 hours, vicinity XT956683, C Company 2-28 Infantry located 3 graves with 3 VC bodies. At 1311 hours, vicinity XT970716, A Company, 1-28 Infantry located a 20 MM shell with blood on it. All battalions defended the same NDP's and the remainder of 21 June passed without incident.

22 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-18 Infantry (-) conducted an S & D operation in the Eastern portion of AO Mike. The 2-28 Infantry secured position X RAY and conducted local patrols. The 1-28 Infantry conducted a company size S & D operation East of LZ Defiant. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 conducting a company sweep North and Northwest of the FS/PB. At 1505 hours, vicinity XT974715, the S-3 from 1-28 Infantry observed 5 bunkers and 3 foxholes uncovered by airstrikes. The helicopter then received automatic weapons fire. Another airstrike was placed into the area. While conducting a BDA after the second strike, the S-3 again received heavy automatic weapons fire. Artillery was placed into the area and continued during the night. All battalions defended the same NDP's and the remainder of the day passed without incident.

23 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 1-18 Infantry was airlifted by R/W to FS/PB GUNNER 2 commencing at 0953 hours and closing at 1025 hours. The battalion was then airlifted via F/W to DI AN commencing at 1530 hours and becoming OFCOM of 2d Brigade upon closing. The 1-28 Infantry was airlifted from LZ Defiant to QUEN LOI commencing at 1015 hours and closing at 1136 hours. The 2-28 Infantry was airlifted via R/W from position X RAY to FS/PB GUNNER 2 commencing at 0930 hours and closing at 0950 hours. The battalion was then airlifted by R/W from FS/PB GUNNER 2 to LAI KHE commencing at 1400 hours, and closing at 1520 hours. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 and conducted local patrolling without incident. The remainder of the day passed without incident.

24 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The forward Brigade CP at FS/PB GUNNER 2 commenced movement to LAI KHE at 1209 hours and closed at 1605 hours. The 2-18 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 and conducted local patrols without incident. The 2-28 Infantry prepared for future operations at LAI KHE. The 1-28 Infantry relieved the 4-7 ARVN of the perimeter of QUEN LOI at 0915 hours. The remainder of the day passed without incident.

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25 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade continued Operation BILLINGS. The 2-16 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 without incident. At 1200 hours, the 1-16 Infantry came under OPCON of the 3d Brigade. The battalion continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 3 at DONG XOI without incident. The remainder of the day passed without incident.

26 June 1967 - The 3d Brigade terminated its participation in Operation BILLINGS at 1038 hours. The 2-16 Infantry continued to secure FS/PB GUNNER 2 conducting local patrols without incident. The battalion (-) moved by F/W from FS/PB GUNNER 2 to DI AN commencing at 1435 hours. The remaining element moved by R/W to DI AN closing at 1905 hours and upon closing the battalion came under OPCON of 2d Brigade. The 1-16 Infantry continued to defend FS/PB GUNNER 3 and conducted local patrols without incident. The remainder of 26 June 1967 passed without incident.

27 June 1967 - The 1-16 Infantry moved by R/W from FS/PB GUNNER 3 to LAI KHE at 0610 hours and closed at 1719 hours.

8. SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Artillery: The operation was supported by 2-33 Artillery; A & B 1-5 Artillery reinforcing; 6-27 Artillery, GS, Lighthouse Alpha (4.2), reinforcing; 1 platoon 6-35 ARVN (155), reinforcing. Artillery fires were planned on all LZ's during the operations. Artillery fires were used extensively in support of ground forces. A total of 41,655 rounds of 105 MM; 3,521 rounds of 155 MM; 936 rounds of 8"; 832 rounds of 175 MM and 5,170 rounds of 4.2" MM were expended.

b. Air Force: The Air Force provided aerial observation and reconnaissance throughout the operation. Air Force ordnance was used in preparation of LZ's and in support of ground forces. A total of 276 close air support sorties were flown in conjunction with the operation.

9. RESULTS:

a. Personnel Losses:

- (1) US Losses: 37 KIA, 147 WIA
- (2) VC Losses: 329 KIA, 1 POW

b. Equipment Losses:

- (1) US Losses: 2 M-16 Rifles
- (2) VC Losses:

(a) Weapons:	Captured	Destroyed
7.62 Chicom LMG	1	-
7.62 Chicom Rifles (Type 53)	2	-
7.62 Chicom AR (Type 56)	2	-
AK 50	1	-
7.62 Soviet LMG	1	-
D 40 Rocket Launcher	1	-
(b) Ammunition:		
Chicom Grenades	12	-
RPG-2 Rounds	2	-
7.62 Rounds	810	-
Claymore Caps	-	3
Boobytrapped Grenades	-	2
CS Powder	-	10 lbs
AK 47 Magazines	6	-
Chicom Ammo Drums	7	-
(c) Equipment:		
Ruck Sacks	5	-
Web Gear	5	-
RPG-2 Carrying Case	1	-
Entrenching Tools	5	-
Pajamas Black	1	-
Ponchos	5	-
Table, small	-	1
Utensils (small amount)	-	-
Com Wire	-	1/2 Mile

(d) Three batches of documents found during the operation were evacuated through S-2 Channels.

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10. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

- a. Supply: Resupply was conducted by air. No supply problems were encountered.
- b. Maintenance: No maintenance problems were encountered during the operation.
- c. Treatment of Casualties, Evacuation and Hospitalization: No unusual problems were encountered with medical evacuation or treatment of the wounded.
- d. Transportation: No major transportation problems were encountered during the operation.
- e. Communications: Throughout the operation no problems were encountered during the operation.

11. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: No special equipment or techniques were employed during this operation.

12. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Since Operation BILLINGS was the first penetration by US Forces into this section of War Zone "D", the Iron Brigade was anticipating contact with large numbers of hard core VC forces. It was known that the VC considered the area a safe haven and that they would probably resist the destruction of their bases located there.

It is felt that the unit with which Company B, 1-16 Infantry made contact on 14 June was a covering force protecting the rear of VC elements moving west out of the operational area. The use of extensive artillery fires and airstrikes assisted B Company in breaking contact with a larger force, extracting its dead and wounded and prevented the VC from pursuing the unit and inflicting more casualties.

On 17 June it was quite apparent that the VC were expecting an air assault in to position X Ray and had prepared a attack timed to hit the US Forces at that most vulnerable period, when the troops were initially organizing the defense of the LZ. However the movement of the units overland caught the VC unprepared. They initiated their attack after several sorties of resupply had landed in the LZ only to find four rifle companies already on the ground. The actions of the defenders on the LZ were outstanding. The rifle companies held their ground under very heavy automatic weapons and sniper fire and maneuvered rapidly to cover gaps left in the line when Reconnaissance Platoon of 1-16 Infantry and one platoon of A Company 1-16th Infantry had received heavy casualties. Here again, the use of close air support and artillery broke the back of the VC attack and inflicted very heavy casualties on the attackers.

1-16 Infantry was replaced by 1-15 Infantry at position X Ray in order to enable the battalion to refit and get A & D Companies and Reconnaissance Platoon back into fighting condition.

Operation BILLINGS must be considered a successful operation for the Iron Brigade. The Brigade entered an untouched area, made contact with the VC on his own ground and inflicted very heavy casualties. The loss of these personnel, added to the knowledge that the US Army can, at will, attack his safe areas will greatly reduce the efficiency of the VC and weaken his will to resist.

Chiballa
for
SIDNEY M. MARKS
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
1ST AVIATION BATTALION
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-AVT

12 July 1967

SUBJECT: After Action Report "Operation Billings" (12 - 18 June 1967)

TO: Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVDB-T
APO 96345

1. GENERAL: The 1st Aviation Battalion provided general aviation support to the 1st Infantry Division throughout Operation Billings. Aviation support consisted of: (a) planning, coordinating and executing airmobile operations with organic and non-organic aviation resources; (b) providing normal organic aviation support (i.e., Command and Control, Resupply, Reconnaissance, Courier, Bloodhound and Photographic missions) to units within the division requesting this support; and (c) providing direct fire support with the armed helicopters from the organic Armed Helicopter Platoon.

2. MISSION: The 1st Aviation Battalion planned and conducted two airmobile operations and one Tactical Emergency (TAC-E) airlift in support of the 3rd Brigade during Operation Billings.

a. On D + 1 (13 June 67) the 1st Aviation Battalion planned and conducted the movement of 1/16th (Devour) and 2/28th (Dauntless) Infantry Battalions from Pick-up Zone (PZ) Lai Khe (1-16) to Landing Zone (LZ) Rufe (Coord XT952661), and PZ Chi Linh (2-28) to LZ Rufe. This operation was conducted with 30 lift helicopters (UH-1D) making 3 lifts per battalion.

b. On 17 June 1967 the 1st Aviation Battalion again supported the 3rd Brigade by conducting a TAC-E combat assault, moving 1-18 (Dogface) Infantry Battalion from PZ Lai Khe to LZ X-Ray (Coord XT960680). The TAC-E aircraft began arriving at Lai Khe approximately 20 minutes after being "scrambled" by ACC. Unit integrity for flights had to be disregarded for the most part, since aircraft from various aviation units supporting the division were diverted for the TAC-E lift; the exception being the 187th Assault Helicopter Company (II FFV RRF Avn Co) which arrived as a flight of 10 aircraft. In approximately 1 hr 45 min the lift force of 20 helicopters and 4 light and 1 heavy fire teams were assembled, formed, briefed, troops loaded and on their way to the battle area. The original plan was to move the 1-18 from Lai Khe to Chi Linh but the LZ was changed to LZ X-Ray when the lift force was approximately mid-way to the original destination. Flights were briefed in the air by the Air Mission Commander (AMC), giving flight routes, artillery and air fire support in progress, direction of landing, etc. The diversion was made with ease, again demonstrating the flexibility of aviation support. Flights into LZ X-Ray were interrupted several times by enemy mortar attacks, and had to be moved to an orbit area nearby until the LZ was again clear. In addition to moving 1-18 troops into LZ X-Ray, the following back-hauls were made from LZ X-Ray: 4 sorties of Engineer troops to LZ Rufe; 20 sorties of 1-16 (Devour) to Chi Linh; and 15 sorties of 1-16 to LZ Rufe. Despite the many moves that had to be made, this complicated operation was conducted in a most expeditious and professional manner and accomplished in short order without incident.

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c. Statistics for airmobile operations planned and executed by the 1st Aviation Battalion are as follows:

(1) Movement of 1-16 Inf Bn (Devour) - 30 acft - 80 sorties - 560 passengers (or passenger equivalents).

(2) Movement of 2-28 Inf Bn (Dauntless) - 30 acft - 80 sorties - 560 passengers (or passenger equivalents).

(3) TAC-E movement: (Total of 120 sorties).

(a) Movement of 1-18 Inf Bn (Dogface) - 20 acft - 81 sorties - 567 passengers (or passenger equivalents).

(b) Movement of Engineer troops - 4 sorties - 28 passengers.

(c) Movement of 1-16 Inf Bn (Devour) - 35 sorties - 245 passengers.

3. Statistics for 1st Aviation Battalion aircraft during Operation Billings are as follows:

a.	<u>Type Acft</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Cargo (T)</u>	<u>Pax</u>
	UH-1D	772	2360	85	5517
	UH-1B (A)*	230	364	--	--
	UH-1B	44	96	--	118
	OH-13S	106	284	--	156
	OV-1	42	150	--	--
	Totals:	1194	3254	85	5791

*Armed

b. Acft Availability:

UH-1D - 71.9%

UH-1B - 68.7%

OH-13S - 83.0%

OV-1 - 74.0%

c. Ammunition Expended:

7.62 - 122,900

40MM - 650

2.75 FFR - 742

d. Aircraft hit by enemy fire:

Three (3)

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e. Friendly casualties by hostile action:

Two (2)

f. Enemy losses:

KBA - 2 VC KEA; Damaged 3 VC Sampans and 2 log rafts.

g. Friendly Personnel Evacuated:

4 WIA and 3 KIA by use of Forest Penetrator; 18 WIA by landing in PZ.

4. Lessons Learned:

a. It has been noted that aircraft supporting Division Chemical on Bloodhound missions are required to repeatedly fly over the same areas, following the same flight route and at approximately the same time each day, thus setting a pattern which the VC can easily notice. The times and flight routes should be varied as much as possible, consistent with successful mission accomplishment, to reduce the possibility of aircraft receiving enemy fire.

b. The number of aircraft hits from enemy small arms fire is on the increase due to low ceilings which force aircraft to fly at lower than normal altitudes. All users of aircraft should consider cancelling or delaying missions not of a combat essential nature when low cloud ceilings and limited visibility are prevalent.

c. Preparation of Landing Zones by Artillery and Air limit the flight routes into and out of the LZ's for the lift helicopters during an airmobile operation. Several instances have been noted where the Air Force strike runs have passed directly across the lift helicopter flight routes, thereby causing a dangerous and unsafe condition to exist. To preclude this situation from developing, the Air Mobile Task Force Commander (AMTFC) who controls all fire support for the airmobile operation, must keep the Air Mission Commander (AMC) constantly informed of impact areas, direction and flight routes of AF aircraft, gun target lines, etc. The AMC then in turn can keep his flight posted.

d. Density of helicopters (other than those directly involved in the lift) in and around the LZ during an airmobile operation often creates a safety of flight hazard, due largely to the lack of communication between aircraft. This condition can be easily corrected by all aircraft monitoring the UHF frequency of the AMC (all Avn En and Co UHF frequencies are posted in the aviator SOI extracts); this will keep all informed on the status of the lift, when aircraft are approaching the LZ, and how other than lift helicopters can maneuver in and around the LZ and not interfere with the airmobile operation.

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Commanding

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Annex J to After Action Report BILLINGS

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The following psychological operations evaluation for Operation BILLINGS is submitted in accordance with 1st Division Regulation 335-6.

- a. The Division conducted psychological warfare throughout the operational area in support of offensive operations against main force VC/NVA units to reduce their combat effectiveness by undermining their morale, encouraging surrender, and causing defection through the Chieu Hoi program. To accomplish this psychological operations were conducted with centralized control. An attached PsyOps team from the 246th Psychological Operations Company supported 1st and 3d Brigade, and Division requirements under direct control of the ACoS, G5.
- b. Broadcasts and selected leaflets were utilized on suspected enemy locations upon G2/S2 recommendations in coordination with G3/S3. Special leaflets and loudspeaker appeals were directed at the 271 Regiment. Throughout the operation, emphasis was placed on close support in accordance with the day to day tactical situation.
- c. A total of 3,180,000 leaflets were dropped. These included 809,000 Safe Conduct Passes, 716,000 Chieu Hoi appeals, 565,000 1st Division Power appeals, 390,000 North Vietnamese Army appeals, and 100,000 selected standard leaflets. 400,000 special 271 leaflets and 200,000 special rally instruction leaflets were developed at G5 for this operation, representing 19% of the total leaflets dropped.
- d. Leaflet coverage ranged from a density of over 50,000 leaflets per square kilometer in area which enemy elements were reported to frequent, to approximately 5,000 leaflets per square kilometer in fringe areas.
- e. 19 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were played. All of these were especially written or adopted for Operation BILLINGS and recorded by the ACoS, G5 Section. A breakdown of the tapes by type is as follows: Allied Power, 8 hours; Chieu Hoi appeal, 3 hours 45 minutes; 1st Division power, 3 hours 30 minutes; Rally Instructions, 3 hours 45 minutes.
- f. Organic Divisional helicopters provided the dissemination means for approximately 85% of the total leaflets and 75% of loudspeaker broadcasts; while U-10 aircraft from the 5th ACS accounted for the remainder.
- g. PsyOps personnel were called upon to perform loudspeaker support of 3 separate rescue missions in which US soldiers were lost. Two of these missions were successful, with the lost personnel hearing and following the instructions, resulting in the recovery of 4 EM, 2 of whom were wounded. The third mission was run primarily as a precautionary measure, following which it was determined that personnel thought missing were accounted for.
- h. As no specific feedback has been obtained, effectiveness cannot be determined. It is felt that this operation provided groundwork for future PsyOps campaigns in this area and against the 271 Regiment.

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