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TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM
ORO-T-320

German Use of Indigenous Auxiliary Police in the Occupied USSR

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by

Eric Waldman
War Documentation Project
Alexandria, Va.



May 1955

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WORKING PAPER

This is a working paper prepared for the LOC Group of the Logistics Division concerned with ORO Study No. 22.17.

The objective of this study is to make an investigation of German war documents for the purpose of deriving information on German occupation experiences in the USSR useful to military government planners. This paper, "German Use of Indigenous Auxiliary Police in the Occupied USSR," deals with one specific problem in the field of civil affairs/military government, i.e., public safety and security; in this case the area is limited to the German Army Group Rear Area Center in the USSR. The findings and analysis are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

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Frontispiece—Map of the Areas under German Occupation

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LOGISTICS DIVISION

LOC GROUP

Technical Memorandum ORO-T-320

Published May 1955

German Use of Indigenous Auxiliary Police in the Occupied USSR

*The Ordnungsdienst (OD) in Army Group Center:
A Case Study in the Utilization of Soviet
Nationals for Security and Public Safety Tasks*

by

Eric Waldman

*War Documentation Project
Alexandria, Va.*



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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

To analyze the utilization of Russian manpower by the German military government in the USSR during World War II in the field of public safety.

FACTS

Regulation and control of the activities of an occupied enemy civilian population is a primary function of military government in the areas to the rear of the combat zone. Indigenous police or guard units may be used to supplement the occupier's troops in the accomplishment of this function.

An example of the utilization of supplementary forces drawn from the local population to assist in administrative tasks occurred in Russia in World War II. The German Army was responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the rear of the combat zone. Shortly after the Command of the Army Group Rear Area became operational on 5 July 1941, its commander enlisted indigenous manpower to supplement his own security forces. This was contrary to planning prior to occupation, which placed complete reliance for the maintenance of peace and order on the small German security forces. In the course of the war these indigenous guard units, the Ordnungsdienst (OD), developed into a sizable auxiliary force for important security assignments. This force permitted release of German troops for front-line service at a time when partisan activities were increasing and there was a shortage of German military personnel. The OD, in contrast to other indigenous military formations in the service of the Germans, such as the Eastern battalions and the Cossack units, never assumed major proportions. Nevertheless, it was considered by the Russians to be a special threat to their war efforts, particularly to their partisan operations, and of assistance to the German occupation administration.

DISCUSSION

In analyzing German experiences in the field of public safety, the following principal questions were considered pertinent:

(a) What lessons can be learned from the German experiences with various types of organization of an indigenous auxiliary force for public safety purposes? What was the interrelation between various changes in organization and employment of the indigenous force and the changes in the military situation?

(b) What were the factors in getting native people to volunteer for service in the auxiliary force? What kind of people enlisted for this type of service? What kind of events during the years of the German occupation influenced this process?

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(c) How did the auxiliary force perform in the various tasks assigned to it?
(d) What methods did the Soviets employ to eliminate the auxiliary service?
How successful were they? What countermeasures were employed and with what success?

The material used for this study consists almost entirely of captured German documents. Most of it comes from headquarters of units at various levels that were stationed or fighting in the Baltic States, Belorussia, the western parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and the Ukraine.

Although this memorandum emphasizes the area of Army Group Center, the differences in practice and experience in other areas occupied by the Germans do not influence the general findings.

The extent to which the findings of this study may be applied to a future occupation of Soviet territory is dependent on a number of factors, chief of which are: (a) changes in the attitudes of the Russian people since World War II; (b) whether the territory liberated is a satellite area; (c) general occupation policies; (d) the course of the military campaign; (e) the extent of partisan activities; and (f) the size of the occupier's security forces.

Bearing in mind these and other variables, the military planner can yet derive considerable benefit from German experiences.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Support of the Russian people was an important factor in the success or failure of the OD. The German policy of exploitation, German failure to understand the desires and aspirations of the Russian people, and German mistrust of Russian collaborators combined to alienate a large segment of the population at first willing to cooperate in the occupation, thus adversely affecting personnel procurement for the OD and the effectiveness of its operations.*

2. Development of the OD was hindered by lack of prior German plans for an indigenous police and security organization which in turn resulted in a lack of centralized direction and control, and shortages in personnel, supplies, equipment, and training facilities.

3. The Germans found it necessary to recruit untrained Russian personnel for the OD since regular police officials had either fled or joined the Red Army. Recruitment of local personnel to serve their own community units was considered most effective, while outsiders or POWs were found less reliable, less acceptable to the community, and more susceptible to partisan propaganda. However, effective utilization of OD units required that their employment be wider than the local community. Procurement of indigenous personnel by the volunteer method was generally preferable, but conscription would have had the advantages of providing the required numbers and of removing some of the stigma of collaboration.

* See ORO-T-301 "German Occupation Administration and Experience in the USSR," CONFIDENTIAL, for more complete discussion of general policies, and ORO-T-11, "German Psychological Warfare Against Russia." SECRET

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4. For the most effective organizational arrangements, German experiences pointed to the advantages of assigning permanent supervisory authority over the OD to the German military government agency, which would coordinate with tactical units utilizing OD personnel, and of working through indigenous officials at the rayon or large city government level. In the absence of such centralized German supervision, control of the OD by the various German agencies using it was facilitated by a functional division of the OD into four detachments: criminal police, political police, regular police, and special (antipartisan and guard) units.

5. Schools and other training facilities were essential, as most OD volunteers lacked prior experience.

6. Inefficiency and low morale in OD units was also caused by a shortage of supplies (weapons, ammunition, food, clothing), which was partly responsible for the mistreatment of the local population by OD personnel.

7. OD units functioned best when used to maintain order and protect their own communities; they functioned worst when used to assist Germans engaged in looting, seizing food and supplies, or conscripting personnel. Performance in antipartisan combat depended on the morale of the unit and on the degree of German supervision and leadership. OD inefficiency and unreliability were often the outgrowth of improper German leadership, discipline, and treatment.

8. Soviet efforts to disrupt or destroy the OD by terrorization, infiltration, and propaganda were quite successful; German countermeasures (propaganda, strict surveillance of OD units, dismissal of unreliable persons, and retaliation against families of deserters) were, on the whole, progressively ineffective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The long-term policy for the occupation of liberated Soviet territory should include elements designed to win the confidence and cooperation of the Russian people. This policy should be clear-cut, made known to the local population, and its liberating features implemented as early as possible in the military occupation.

2. A decision of whether to use Russian auxiliary forces for public safety tasks and if so for what tasks should be made well in advance of the occupation. Based on German experience, such a decision should take into account the possibility of: Russian resistance in the rear areas and the need for large occupation units; disruption of the indigenous police organization and a consequent necessity for initial reliance on the occupation forces for police functions; generally favorable conditions for utilization of indigenous public safety units, once the confidence of the public is gained. If indigenous police forces are to be used, general plans should be prepared for recruitment, organization, training, support, employment, and countermeasures. Recommendations based on the German experience follow.

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3. A local and voluntary recruiting system should be used, with special inducements offered, but plans should include provisions for conscription if insufficient personnel volunteer for service.

4. The organizational arrangements should provide for: vesting authority over indigenous public safety units in a single military occupation agency; local organization of the units corresponding to political subdivisions; and perhaps a functional breakdown (civil police, security guards, antiguerrilla forces, etc.) to facilitate assignment to various military agencies.

5. Instructors and administrative personnel, including interpreters, should be provided for training indigenous personnel in the various public safety functions.

6. Provisions should be made for material support, including food, arms, ammunition, and uniforms; and for moral support in acceptance and recognition of indigenous personnel and firm backing for the exercise of whatever authority is granted them.

7. Indigenous units should be employed in general for those tasks that help to ensure the safety and well-being of their own communities; strict supervision and capable occupation leadership must be provided all units; drafted members should be used for limited local duties where they can be kept under surveillance; and special inducements should be planned.

8. Measures should be planned to counteract Soviet efforts to prevent the formation and effective utilization of indigenous forces. There should be coordination of military government, psychological warfare, and antiguerrilla planning and operations.

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**GERMAN USE OF INDIGENOUS AUXILIARY POLICE
IN THE OCCUPIED USSR**

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum is a continuation of a larger study dealing with general aspects of German occupational problems and experiences in the administration of conquered Soviet territory in World War II.* The broader study gives considerable attention to details of the military government structure and analyzes German operational experiences in the selected functional fields of public safety, public education, and public health. In the course of writing the first memorandum it was decided to publish a separate one on German experiences in utilizing Russian manpower for public safety tasks in rear areas, because of the particular importance and special aspects of this field.

The Germans included many activities under "public safety": all police matters, including the creation or reorganization of an indigenous police system; matters pertaining to control of the indigenous population by means of registration and special identification matters; travel controls; fire prevention; control of waterways and transportation facilities; and antiaircraft defense. Other duties of public safety officials were connected with the supply of electricity, fuel, drinking water; quartering of troops; clearing roads, towns, and villages from rubble; and the collection of abandoned war materials.

The purpose of this memorandum is to derive lessons useful to military planners from an analysis of the utilization of Russian manpower by the German military administration, particularly in the security aspects of public safety functions.† It discusses the German experience with various types of organization of an indigenous auxiliary force for security purposes, their experiences in obtaining Russian manpower, the effectiveness of such a force in various tasks assigned it, and the problems of Soviet countermeasures. This type of German experience should be of particular interest to military planners, especially those in military government, since it furnishes an insight into specific conditions that a future occupier of Soviet territories is likely to encounter.

Whenever an invading army occupies enemy territory, it is faced with problems relating to the enemy civilian population. The activities of these people must be regulated and controlled in order to minimize interference by them in the successful continuation of military operations. This is the task of military government in the areas to the rear of the combat zone. Military government units either assume the governing functions directly, or

* Operations Research Office, "German Occupation Administration and Experience in the USSR," ORO-T-301, in press. CONFIDENTIAL.

† See *Ibid.* for other responsibilities of German public safety officials.

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they supervise whatever indigenous administrative offices are taken over or newly established by the occupant. Military government operations in the field of public safety, therefore, have a direct bearing on whether an area remains pacified or whether local disturbances, sabotage, or guerilla activities impair the lines of communication of the combat troops.

Military government must have at its disposition sufficient forces of coercion to enable it not only to maintain peace and order but also to enforce its own orders and administrative regulations. In some cases, these forces are furnished by the occupier's troops, while in others indigenous police or guard units are used to supplement these forces. This memorandum attempts to examine German procedures and experiences with indigenous auxiliary police units in the East.

Terminology

Because of the distinction made by the Germans between occupation administration carried out by civilian agencies and that controlled by military agencies—a situation unknown in US military government—some explanation of the terminology used in this study is required. The term "military government" refers to military government operations regardless of the agency involved. Operations conducted by the Army are covered by the term "military administration" and those undertaken by the civilian agencies of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium fuer die besetzten Ostgebiete) are called "civilian administration." The only possible misunderstanding could arise from the translation of the titles of German offices in military administration. The two principal military types were the regional office of military government (Feldkommandantur, usually abbreviated FK) and the local office of military government (Ortskommandantur, usually abbreviated OK). In certain areas a superior office of military government (Oberfeldkommandantur, usually abbreviated OFK) coordinated the activities of several regional offices. The reason that these titles of military administration were so translated, without indicating that they were used in military administration, is that these terms are already in general usage.

The use of the term "military administration officials" also needs some explanation. Differing from the US practice of commissioning individuals who either have the required background or are specifically trained for this purpose by the Army, the German system was to draft personnel for the administrative tasks without giving them officers' ranks. Instead, these administrative personnel had their own hierarchy. The situation is very much like that in the US War Department, where civilians were used after World War II in the occupation administration. Therefore these administrators are not referred to as military government officers but as military administration officials. In the occupied area under civilian administration, the officials were civilians as a matter of course. There is just one exception. It happened quite often that an officer of the German Army whose primary mission was that of a garrison commander (Standortkommandant) i.e., in charge of the troops either stationed in or passing through the locality and of all the military installations, also had military government functions assigned to him. In that case, he is not referred to in this study as an official but rather as an officer.

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Sources of Material

The materials used consist entirely of captured German documents except for the very few other materials indicated in footnotes. Not all German units kept their military records with equal accuracy, and the fortunes of war played great havoc with their preservation. Although these German military records constitute a unique source of material, it cannot be expected that there are no gaps in the documentation for all stages and for all events of the military campaign and occupation. Most of the material comes from high- as well as lower-level headquarters of units that were stationed or fighting in the Baltic States, Belorussia, the western parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR), and the Ukraine. In other areas the Germans remained for too short a time to make a revealing documentary record, or failed to preserve the documents giving the detailed story of their occupation. However, the material screened and analyzed for this study certainly is voluminous enough to permit formulation of some general conclusions about the organization, procedures, and experiences of the German occupation administration in the public safety field.

General Background

The German occupation of Soviet territory varied greatly in the different parts of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Baltic States were under German rule from the summer of 1941 to 1944 and, in some parts, even until 1945. Belorussia was occupied from the summer of 1941 until the middle of 1944. The situation in the Ukraine was more complicated. Parts came under German rule in the summer of 1941, although its eastern areas were not occupied until 1942. Parts of the Ukraine were lost again to Soviet forces, were again reoccupied and held through 1943 and early 1944. Most of the Crimea was in German hands from the middle of 1942 until the middle of 1944. The North Caucasus region was occupied from August 1942 to January 1943. Also certain parts of the RSFSR, such as the areas around Leningrad and Smolensk, Orel-Kursk, and Rostov-Stalingrad came under German rule for different periods of time, some from the fall and winter of 1941 until the spring of 1944.

The maximum area under German occupation (see frontispiece) had a peacetime population of at least 65 million people; however, as a result of the war the number of Soviet citizens who came under German rule was considerably smaller. Only estimates are available of the population loss of these areas caused by the Red Army draft and by evacuation, particularly of workers who were moved together with important industrial enterprises. The figure of a wartime population loss of 13,000,000, representing about 20 percent of the normal population, probably approximates the actual situation most closely.*

When the German Army advanced into Russia and quickly overran large areas, the Germans, according to plan, drew on the local population to assist them in administrative tasks. The Army was expected to conduct such administrative activities as were directly related to military operations but it had not foreseen that long-range systematic administration would be required before

*For a brief survey of the major military events of the Russo-German War, see ORO-T-301, *op. cit.*

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the conquered territories were sufficiently pacified and turned over to the newly established Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. The Army was therefore responsible for the exploitation of the country's resources and for the maintenance of peace and order in the rear of the combat zone. In addition to administrative measures and the supervision of newly created indigenous local governments, a great number of public safety tasks were involved. Although the Germans quickly recruited native collaborators for the indigenous administration within the area of military control,* it appears that they did not contemplate the employment of indigenous manpower, organized into military or paramilitary formations, for the execution of public safety tasks. This type of employment of indigenous manpower would have been incompatible with the Nazi political aims in the East.

The employment of indigenous personnel, organized in units, as auxiliaries for public safety tasks is a well-established practice in military government. Standard operation procedures of Western armies provide for the use of existing police organizations, which under close supervision of the occupation authorities are ordered to carry on their functions as executive organs of the military government offices until such time as circumstances permit a more thorough screening of the available personnel and a possible reorganization of the local police system. The Germans did not plan to follow this procedure in the East because their political aims, the "colonialization" (*Kolonisierung*) of the Eastern territories, excluded it. However, they could not expect to find a functioning police organization (with the exception of some local militia men) in their advance into the Soviet Union. Under the Soviet totalitarian system, the vast police organization was one of the most reliable organs of the Soviet government and therefore its personnel, insofar as it did not go underground, retreated with the Red Army and the bulk of the party and government officials.

For the Eastern campaign alone, because of the large areas involved, a new type of command—the Command of the Army Group Rear Area (Befehlshaber des ruckwaertigen Heeresgebietes)†—was created, through which the commander of the army group administered his rear area. The commanders of the armies retained executive power for their own areas, and under their jurisdiction were the commanders of the army rear areas (Kommandanten der ruckwaertigen Armeegebiets or Koruecks). Figure 1 shows the various subdivisions of the area of an army group employed in the East.

At the outset of the war in the East, there were three army groups in operation; each of them was to establish a Heeresgebiet as soon as the size of the conquered area became larger than the Koruecks could manage.

* The indigenous administration was strictly of a local character and was organized from the village community up to the rayon level.

The rayon is the largest administrative subdivision within an oblast (the largest administrative subdivision within a Soviet Republic) and is sometimes translated as "district." The number of rayons within an oblast varies greatly and depends primarily on the size of the oblast. In the Baltic States these subdivisions (oblast and rayon) were only introduced after the end of World War II. At the time of the German occupation, the indigenous administrative subdivisions there were still called by the names they were known under the Tsarist regime, i.e., *uyezds* and *volosts*. If a Soviet Republic could be compared with a state in the US, then an oblast would be roughly the equivalent of a county and the rayon the equivalent of a township. In fact, however, both the oblast and the rayon are much larger in size than either the county or township.

† The title was later changed to *Kommandierende General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber im Heeresgebiet*. In this study the commander of each army group rear area will be referred to as the Commander of the Heeresgebiet.

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Shortly after 5 July 1941 when Heeresgebiet Center became operational, the Commander of the Heeresgebiet enlisted indigenous manpower to supplement his own security forces. In fact his first administrative directive (the early part of July 1941) contained instructions pertaining to the organization, armament, and employment of these guards, which were to a certain extent a common enterprise of the military administration and the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).*




Fig. 1—Administrative Subdivisions of the Occupied East

In the course of the war these indigenous guard units—unauthorized by the higher command echelons of the military hierarchy—developed into a sizable auxiliary force, which was contrary to the original German notion about the use of indigenous manpower for important security assignments. The reasons for this development are:

(a) The relatively small number of German security troops assigned originally to the Commander of the Heeresgebiet. (This deficiency of troops became worse as the war progressed and more and more of these security units were used for front-line service.)

(b) The increase of partisan activities in the areas to the rear of the combat zone.

(c) The necessity to rely on indigenous manpower because of the shortage of German personnel created by an overextension of forces throughout Europe and by increasing war losses.

The fact that this development was neither planned nor centrally directed by the High Command of the Army may account for the difference in organization of these guard units within the various army groups. These differences in

* The SD was also concerned with security matters in the area of military administration, but its tasks were primarily of a political nature.

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organization, nomenclature, and subordination were further deepened by the fact that conditions, especially the threat from the partisan movement, varied from area to area. In addition, the outlook of the Army Group Commander and of the Commander of the Heeresgebiet had a significant influence on the utilization of indigenous manpower for public safety tasks.



Fig. 2—Map of Army Group Rear Area Center

The organization and employment of indigenous security guards might have developed along one of the following lines: (a) it might have become an organ intended primarily for the pacification of the country, organized strictly along military lines, and subordinated to German military commands; or (b) it might have been utilized primarily as a kind of local police under the immediate jurisdiction of the indigenous administrations and would thus have been characterized by less strict military organization with more emphasis on pure police functions. Actually, both of these developments took place simultaneously. Units in Army Group Center, the area under investigation, (see Fig. 2, a map of this area) followed the first line of development while those in Army Group North and army groups in the south followed the second.* In practice, the differences between the two developments were more a matter of degree than of principle.

* "Abchlussbericht ueber die Taetigkeit der Militärverwaltung im Operationsgebiet des Ostens," 1944, pp 55 (GMDs, HGeb 75156/1), hereafter cited as H.Geb.A, 75156/1.

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Although this memorandum emphasizes the area of Army Group Center, the difference in practice and experience in other areas occupied by the German military forces does not influence the general findings cited here. These findings also hold true, with certain reservations, for the areas under civilian administration. In general the security problems were the same, but the functions performed by the security troops in the areas under military jurisdiction were carried out by the police and SS organization in the areas under civilian administration. There were also differences in the methods of utilizing indigenous manpower for auxiliary police organizations and in the internal structure of such organizations. For example, in the former Baltic States the indigenous police enjoyed more independence than in other areas under civilian or military jurisdiction.

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Chapter 2

EARLY ORGANIZATION OF THE ORDNUNGSDIENST

BEGINNINGS OF INDIGENOUS POLICE UNITS

As early as July 1941 the German Army had conquered a sufficiently large area of the Soviet Union to warrant the activation of the newly organized commands of the Heeresgebiete (army group rear areas). Unfortunately, the records of this very early period are not available and therefore the original concepts that motivated the formation of the early indigenous police (covering the period 5-24 July 1941) can only be deduced from documents of a later date but regardless of the motivation the first administrative directive (Verwaltungs-Anordnungen Nr. 1) of the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center furnished instructions for the establishment of indigenous auxiliary police units, so-called Hilfspolizei.*

To avoid the inclusion of politically unreliable elements, the screening of employees was undertaken, primarily by Einsatzkommandos of the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei) who were the political police in the areas under military administration.† It also appears that these original indigenous auxiliary police groups were utilized by the Einsatzkommandos as well as by the regional office of military government (Feldkommandanturen, usually abbreviated FK), local offices of military government (Ortskommandanturen, usually abbreviated OK), or other military commands.‡

In less than a month from the time of the activation of some of these auxiliary units, the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center issued an administrative directive to clarify the status of these units. He emphasized that the German Army had no intention of creating an indigenous organization with

*Befh.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungs-Anordnungen Nr. 3," 24 Jul 41 (GMDS, 102 ID 18566/2, Anlage 75). This document makes specific reference to the first administrative directive.

†The Einsatzkommando was a section of Einsatzgruppe (Special Task Force) of the Security Police and Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst). There was one Einsatzgruppe attached to each army group. The commander of the Einsatzgruppe was the deputy of the Chief of the Security Police and SS Intelligence Service with the Commander of the Army Group Rear Area (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und Sicherheitsdienstes beim Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebietes). (See Befh.H.Geb.Mitte, Ia, "Hoeh. SS u. Pol. Fuehrer, Stand v. 1.8.41," GMDS, HGeb 14684/2, Anlage 68.)

‡Originally, the Commander of a Heeresgebiet had three security divisions assigned to his command. These security divisions contained, in addition to security troops, offices which were to conduct the administration of the areas occupied by the military. These offices of military administration were the regional offices of military government (Feldkommandanturen or FKs) and the local offices of military government (Ortskommandanturen or OKs). The Commander of the Heeresgebiet had additional military government offices directly subordinate to him. Furthermore, such offices of military administration also existed in the Korueck. (For a direct reference to the use of indigenous auxiliary units by the Einsatzkommandos, see RFSS u. Chef d.Deutsch.Poli. RMd.L., "O.-Kdo. Lg Nr. 24/41 (g.)," 25 Jul 41 (GMDS, EAP 99/1032).

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police responsibilities. The name Hilfspolizei apparently had caused this erroneous impression. In order to prevent the development of the same mistaken concept in the future, he ordered a change of name. The Hilfspolizei was to be called Ordnungsdienst (usually abbreviated as OD).^{*} This move was believed especially necessary because the SS also recruited a kind of auxiliary indigenous police organization also referred to as Hilfspolizei.

During the first few months of the Russian campaign the OD was officially considered an auxiliary organ of the local mayor (Buergermeister), but actually was kept under the closest supervision and control of either the Einsatzkommandos or the OKs. As a rule, the Einsatzkommandos, in the areas of their employment, initiated the creation of the OD groups and kept control over these indigenous units. Only when an Einsatzkommando was transferred to another area, did the OD unit come under the jurisdiction of the OK. The latter, however, with the assistance of the local mayors, organized OD groups in areas where no Einsatzkommandos were available to undertake this task.

It was the responsibility of the mayors of the community in which the OD unit was employed to provide the OD men with their nominal pay and rations.[†] The pay scale prescribed by the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center was:

Rank	Daily pay, reichsmarks
OD leader	1.00
deputy leader	0.75
OD man	0.50

In larger communities where OD groups were organized, the pay scale was:

Rank	Daily pay, reichsmarks
OD leader	1.50
deputy leader	1.25
group leader	1.00
deputy group leader	0.75
OD man	0.50

The Germans provided the weapons. The OD was armed with rubber truncheons. Only every third man was issued a pistol or revolver (when neither was available a rifle was substituted). In special situations, such as an imminent threat from the partisans, the Heeresgebiet Commander gave permission for additional armament.

White arm bands with the inscription "Ordnungsdienst" and the identification number of the individual OD man were his only distinguishing marks. The Einsatzkommandos or the OKs issued identification papers to OD members.

The OD was employed only locally and received its orders either from the Einsatzkommandos or from the OKs, whichever of the two agencies was in

^{*} Befh.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt. VII/K-Verw., *Verwaltungs-Anordnungen Nr. 3, * 24 Jul 41 (GMDS, 102 ID 18566/2, Anlage 75).

[†] Befh.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt. VII/K-Verw. *Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 6, * 12 Sep 41 (GMDS, Waffen SS, I. and II. SS Kav.Regts. 78037/197).

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control of the individual OD group. The mission of the OD was primarily to assist German troops on security missions. Thus its tasks included combat actions against partisans, preventing looting by the local population, preventing acts of sabotage, guarding against any type of local disturbance, guarding designated objects, and regulating traffic.* There can be no doubt that these OD groups were very small units and had hardly more than local significance.

This situation of relative insignificance of responsibility prevailed for several months in spite of the fact that the Heeresgebiet Commander as well as leading German police officials recognized the necessity of utilizing indigenous manpower for security tasks.†

The discrepancy between the very limited organization and employment of the OD during these first few months of the occupation and the realization that indigenous auxiliary units were needed on a considerable scale was indicative of one of the basic difficulties that the Germans faced in the East, partly the result of their own condescending attitude toward the local population. This attitude in itself was an outgrowth of the political aims that the Nazis wished to realize in the Eastern areas. Although the collaboration of the local population was required for a victorious conclusion of the war, the Germans were not ready to organize efficient and properly armed indigenous auxiliary units.

It seems that a large part of the local population, at least in the beginning, was willing to cooperate with the Germans. None of the early German reports contains any reference to difficulties encountered in getting the required number of indigenous collaborators. Furthermore, even the small pay and rations received from the mayors on orders from the Germans may have been an incentive for joining the OD since they guaranteed at least a chance for physical survival during the chaotic period of the early occupation.

Throughout this early period there existed a marked confusion about the different types of indigenous auxiliary units. The Commander of Heeresgebiet Center attempted to clarify this situation. In an administrative directive he explained that the Hilfspolizei, with which the OD was often confused, were auxiliary police units organized by orders of the Reichsfuehrer-SS and directly subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leader (Hoehere SS-und Polizeifuehrer).‡ These Hilfspolizei units were recruited from discharged POWs and from certain racial groups.§ The Reichsfuehrer-SS also attempted to straighten out this situation. He ordered that all uniformed indigenous police of the SS employed in the Russian territories were to be combined in the Schutzmannschaften.¶ The Germans themselves, however, never applied this terminology, i.e., Schutz-

* Befh. H. Geb. Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungs-Anordnungen Nr. 3," 24 Jul 41 (GMDS, 102 ID 18566/2, Anlage 75); Befh. H. Geb. Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 6," 12 Sep 41 (GMDS, Waffen SS, I. and II. SS Kav. Regts. 78037/197); 339. Inf. Div., Ic, "Merkblatt ueber Zustaendigkeit, Unterstellung und Aufgaben von ... Ordnungsdienst ...," 8 Nov 41 (GMDS, 339 ID 13914/4).

† For example, the Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chef der Deutschen Polizei stated in one of his orders, "The task of the police in the occupied Eastern territories cannot be accomplished by the available police and SS forces alone. Therefore it is necessary to organize auxiliary units comprised of those parts of the population which are acceptable to us. This has already been done in part by the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police." (RFSS u. Chef d. Deutsch. Pol. i. RMdl, "O.-Kdo. I. g Nr. 24/41 (g.)," 25 Jul 41, GMDS, EAP 99/1032.)

‡ The commander of all police forces in a particular area as direct representative of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.

§ Befh. H. Geb. Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 6," 12 Sep 41 (GMDS, Waffen SS, I. and II. SS Kav. Regts. 78037/197).

¶ RFSS u. Chef d. Deutsch. Pol. i. RM d. I., "Schutzmannschaften in den Ostgebieten," 6 Nov 41 (GMDS, EAP 99/1032).

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mannschaften for the auxiliary units of the police and Ordnungsdienst for the indigenous units of the Einsatzkommandos or offices of the military administration. Consequently some of the early confusion in regard to these terms remained.

FIRST REORGANIZATION

The first important change pertaining to the organization and the employment of the OD was ordered by the Heeresgebiet Commander in November 1941. The German experience with the OD up to that time and the realization of the magnitude of the security problems in the large areas in the East prompted this reorganization and expansion. A service regulation for the OD was issued by the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center in order to facilitate the creation of a better disciplined and more effective OD.*

An analysis of this service regulation reveals a number of interesting aspects of contemporaneous German concepts concerning the best methods of utilizing indigenous manpower for public safety tasks. The absolute control over these auxiliary units by the Germans was axiomatic. It was realized that some inducements had to be given to the local population in order to obtain a sufficient number of applicants for this voluntary service. The Germans wished to create the impression that the OD men did not assist the occupier at all but that they were serving their community; in this they succeeded. Thus it was believed that the participation of the local mayors in organizing the individual OD units would greatly facilitate the process of increasing the size and effectiveness of the OD. The initiative for setting up these units still rested with the Einsatzkommando, the OK, or the garrison commander (Standortskommandant) of the respective area, but the mayor was to select suitable men from the local applicants and was to submit their names to the responsible office of the Security Police or army for clearance.

Officially the OD was considered nothing more than an auxiliary organ of the local mayor, although the service regulation gave more emphasis to its functions in support of the security operations conducted by German troops and offices of the military administration. Only when the local OD unit was not preoccupied with a mission assigned to it by the local German agency, could the mayor employ the unit for the execution of tasks within his own field of responsibility and according to his own judgment. For this purpose OD men were authorized to arrest members of the population either on orders from their superiors or even on their own when the offender was caught in the act. Permission to search a house, for instance, first had to be approved by the Germans. The use of firearms was limited to self-defense or to cases when violators of indigenous law refused to surrender.

The superior position of the mayor in relation to the OD is indicated by the fact that he, as well as the OD leader of the unit, was authorized to punish OD men for minor violations. The Germans reserved the power of dealing with OD men guilty of more serious cases of misconduct.

* Befh. H. Geb. Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 11," 27 Nov 41 (GMDS, Korueck 17326/16).

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The earlier regulation pertaining to the restriction of the armament of OD units was rescinded, and all OD men received firearms. However, the supervising agency was ordered to make sure that these weapons were securely locked up in the unit guardroom when not in use during assigned missions.

In order to prevent the establishment of excessively large individual OD units, the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center restricted their size according to location and number of local inhabitants. In a rural community (Einheits-gemeinde, a number of small villages under a single administration), 1 OD man was authorized for every 100 inhabitants. In towns the ratio was 1 OD man for every 300 people, with 10 OD men for the first 1000 inhabitants. When the security problem of a given locality demanded a stronger force, permission for the employment of additional OD men within the existing group could be given by the German agency under whose jurisdiction the rural community or town fell.

For the purpose of facilitating better supervision of the OD units, the Germans ordered that wherever possible OD men were to be quartered together in suitable barracks. Their emphasis on strictest discipline, on a clear-cut military hierarchy within the units, and on absolute obedience of the individual OD man to his superiors indicates the German desire to set up an organization of a military nature that would lend itself to effective and close control.

The training of OD members was the responsibility of the German agency in charge of the respective area and was to include instruction not only in the use of the weapons issued, but also in the conduct of the OD man toward the local population, obedience to his superiors, methods of reporting, basic principles of traffic regulation, and guard duties.

The arrangement of the early phase of the OD regarding the supply system was retained. The mayor and the indigenous administration continued to provide the pay, rations, and quarters, and the Germans supplied the OD with the weapons and ammunition from captured Russian stocks.*

From various reports written by German agencies in the period following the issuance of this OD service regulation, it appears that the establishment of OD units received a considerable impetus. Within the individual security areas, into which the Heeresgebiet was divided, the organization of the OD groups progressed with varying speed. Some German agencies encountered difficulties in obtaining weapons in sufficient number. Others found greater obstacles in the procurement of rations and clothing for the OD men through the local indigenous administration.† Nevertheless in most areas the German agencies succeeded in setting up in the rural communities OD groups consisting of about 10 men and of about 40 to 60 men in the towns.‡ It is of interest that no direct reference could be found in the reports covering the period from November 1941 to April 1942 to the difficulties that either the Germans or the local mayors experienced in obtaining the desired number of volunteers for the OD.

* *Ibid.*

† 339. Inf.Div., Abt.VII/K-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 1 Jan 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Mar 42, p 7 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104). For example, on 1 Mar, the Regional Office of Military Government (FK) 581 reported 186 OD men within its area. Their armament consisted of 788 rifles, 80 pistols, 16 semiautomatic rifles, 1 automatic rifle, 9 light machine guns, and 1 heavy caliber machine gun. (FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 13 Mar 42, p 10, GMDS, 203 ID 32104.)

‡ 339. Inf.Div., Abt.VII/K-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 1 Jan 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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There is good reason to believe that this problem did exist, however, either in the form of first getting these volunteers or of keeping them together after they were integrated as a unit. The complaints of some German agencies about the inadequacy of the prescribed pay and the insufficient quantity of rations distributed can be taken as indications to this effect.* Nevertheless by February 1942 there were 11,538 OD men in local OD units in Heeresgebiet Center.† It seems that this over-all strength remained more or less stable until the middle of 1942 in spite of occasional heavy casualties suffered by some OD units. Sufficient replacements could apparently be obtained. Some German agencies reported that former POWs furnished very good replacement material.‡ Skilled laborers were excluded from recruitment because their services were needed in the industrial enterprises of the German armed forces.§

Of considerable interest are the opinions expressed by various German agencies concerning the value of the OD during this period because they influenced its further development and utilization. If, as some sources maintain, the OD was a complete failure from its very beginning and was nothing but an "organized robber band,"¶ then it is very difficult to explain why the Germans failed to discontinue the use of indigenous manpower for their security and public safety tasks altogether. In general the Germans were pleased with the performance of the OD at that time, especially in antipartisan operations,** although some German agencies did believe that the OD men were seeking only their personal advantage.††

A disturbing factor for the development of the OD during this period was a divergence in opinion among the various German agencies as to the primary task of the OD. Some agencies stressed the auxiliary police functions of the OD for the local mayor and declared that its antipartisan combat mission was rather secondary.‡‡ Other German agencies believed just the opposite and considered antipartisan operations as the most important and special task of the OD.§§

* 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Mar 42, p 7 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 15 Apr 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

† An infantry division used for security tasks in the Heeresgebiet, for example, explained that rations and clothing were the prerequisites for the employment of an OD man. A new reduction of the bread ration to 200 grams (about 7 ounces) had unfavorable effects on the efficiency and morale of the OD. (339. Inf. Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 1 Jan 42, p 5, GMDS, 203 ID 32104.)

‡ Befh.rueckw.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

§ 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 13 Mar 42, p 10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

¶ Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 18," 2 Apr 42, p 5 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

** Chef d.Sipo u.d.SD, IV A 2, "Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr. 67," 29 Aug 41, p 13 (GMDS, SD Reports 35).

†† See Befh.rueckw.J.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6); 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Mar 42, p 7 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 550, Kr.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 11 Apr 42, p 4 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 15 Apr 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Apr 42, p 10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6); OK II (V) 364, "Erfahrungsbericht ueber den Ordnungsdienst im Rayon Stodoloschtsche," 9 May 42 (GMDS, PzAOK 2, 30233/66).

‡‡ PzAOK 3, Ic/AO, "Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 3," 2 Mar 42, p 1 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 20736/4).

§§ 286. Sich.Div., Ia, "Divisions-Sonderbefehl," 31 Mar 42 (GMDS, 286 ID 19970/2, Anlage 47).

¶¶ 339. Inf.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 1 Jan 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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In spite of the assistance that the Germans received from the OD in their public safety and security tasks, the basic distrust of the Germans toward the indigenous collaborators was not dispelled during this period. For example, the thought that a great number of weapons were in the hands of the indigenous members of auxiliary units was a source of continuous concern to the occupier. In order to control this potential danger, the 286th Security Division ordered its subordinate units to exchange the weapons of its OD units for non-Russian rifles. It was believed that if such weapons would fall into the wrong hands, they would be of little value because they would be lacking the right type of ammunition. This Security Division also ordered that the weapons were to be issued to OD men only when they participated in missions led by a German unit.* Similar doubts were expressed by the 203d Security Brigade (later 203d Security Division). Although its subordinate OKs, which were immediately concerned with the execution of the security tasks, requested from their brigade headquarters a complete arming of the units, the latter questioned the wisdom of distributing so many weapons among the indigenous population in an area with very thinly dispersed German troops.†

In summing up the period from November 1941 (issuance of the OD service regulation) until April 1942 (the next important reorganization of the OD), the following points should be emphasized.

a. The number of OD men and OD units in Heeresgebiet Center increased to a considerable extent. Apparently the Germans did not encounter any specific difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of volunteers ready to serve in the OD. The OD men, like the rest of the population, had not yet experienced the full impact of German occupation methods, and it appears that they were inclined to believe that they were really serving their own ends by collaborating with the Germans. Perhaps they hoped that a quick pacification of their respective areas would speed up the return of peaceful conditions in which it would be easier to live and work. Their greater readiness to fight the partisans, who by the very nature of their operations disturbed the peace of the rear area, rather than to furnish effective assistance to the Germans in collecting agricultural products from the rural population, might bear this out. In other words there is reason to believe that OD members did not consider themselves as mercenaries in the service of the Germans but rather as local police organs working for the best interest of their community within the limitation placed on them by a foreign occupant.

b. The increase in partisan activities experienced during this period, even more than in the earlier months of the Russian campaign, seemed to have convinced the German agencies of the inadequacy of their own security forces in the rear areas and their dependence on indigenous collaborators. However, the original indoctrination of German personnel prevented a rapid change in their attitude toward these native assistants. Consequently OD units did not receive the weapons required to make them effective formations.

c. It also appears that the evaluation of the OD depended largely on the orientation of the reporting German agency. Thus, the SD report about the "organized robber bands" refers to the type of unit to which, for example, a military report attributes "heroic achievements." However, there were

*286. Sich.Div., Ia, "Divisions-Sonderbefehl," 31 Mar 42 (GMDS, 286 ID 19970/2, Anlage 47).

†203. Sich.Br., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Feb 42, p 6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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definitely considerable differences in the performance of the various OD units; their effectiveness depended on a variety of factors such as degree of supervision, type of leadership, morale, training, armament, and the particular location of a unit in an area of strong partisan pressures. Furthermore, in any group of over 10,000 men there are great variations of behavior and performance, and specific references in favorable as well as derogatory reports might well be based on truthful observations.

d. The most outstanding development in this period was the great increase in strength of the partisan movement. This fact, coupled with the great shortage of German security troops in the rear area, forced the German command to reconsider the best possible methods of exploiting indigenous manpower for security and public safety. This consideration led to the next reorganization of the OD.

This period is also of interest because some of the contemporaneous practices laid the foundation for subsequent difficulties. For example, German agencies procured replacements for their OD units from POW stockades. This procedure was in contradiction to their policy of accepting only local people for the OD who were considered more reliable than strangers for tasks connected with the protection of their communities against native lawbreakers and partisans. The expedient measure of recruiting POWs resulted in OD groups being composed of local men mixed with former POWs from other regions. Thus a considerable degree of difference developed in the reliability of these two groups of OD men, the POWs being much more susceptible to partisan propaganda than the local members.

During this early period, political implications were not easily detectable, perhaps because only a very small percentage of the population was brought into the service of the Germans. However, later on, when the Germans became increasingly dependent on the assistance of the local people, these people became more reluctant to risk their lives and properties in the face of a completely uncertain future under German rule. Then more and more agencies reported to their superior offices that it could not be expected that these people would continue their cooperation with the Germans unless some definite political program for the future was offered them.*

There is the further problem to what extent, if at all, the actions of the partisans against the OD affected its over-all development. For this early period, it appears that such partisan methods as killing and torturing OD men failed to impress the OD enough to make its units ineffective. The reason for the partisans' failure might well be found in the general situation of the war in the East, which made the OD men believe they were on the winning side.

And finally there is the question whether the partisans were able to penetrate the OD in order to destroy its effectiveness from within. In this connection the part the local mayors played in the recruiting process should be noted. The mayors were held responsible by the Germans for the selection of politically reliable applicants, i.e., anti-Soviet in conviction; therefore the presence of partisan sympathizers or former Soviet militia men in the OD would have been possible only with the knowledge and assistance of the local mayors. It is doubtful that the mayors at this time would have been willing to collaborate

* H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer August 1943," 12 Sep 43, p 13 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

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with the partisans and thus risk their own lives. Even if the Germans would not have discovered this scheme at the outset, the danger always existed that someone would denounce the mayor or the known Communist or partisan sympathizer to the local German agency. When at a later time such penetration of the OD was effected with notable results, conditions had changed.

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Chapter 3

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORDNUNGSDIENST

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES, APRIL 1942

On 29 April 1942 the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center issued an administrative directive* concerning additions and changes in the organization and service regulation of the OD. Two organizational changes were of special significance because they contained specific instructions for bringing the organization of the OD into accord with the demands and expectations of the Germans.

First, the effective utilization of the OD units demanded that their employment must transcend the local communities and should not, as previously, be limited to serving as an auxiliary organ of the local mayor's office. The new organization therefore provided that the OD was to be subordinate to the official in charge of the highest level of the indigenous administration—the leader of the rayon or, for larger towns, the city mayor.† This arrangement was to provide greater flexibility for the employment of the OD within any part of the rayon. For regular security duties, the rayon was subdivided into several police precincts (Reviere) and OD units were stationed in each of these precincts.

Second, the increased use of the OD in antipartisan operations suggested that earlier unauthorized and uncoordinated attempts at forming OD antipartisan formations be formalized. Furthermore it was also believed that the efficiency of the OD could be improved by creating the following specialized detachments within each unit according to four major types of employment to support the Security Police, SD, and military agencies:

(a) Detachment I (Abteilung I), criminal police detachment (Kriminal-polizeiliche Abteilung) in charge of assisting the Germans in guarding important economic enterprises and depots, setting up roving patrols for the prevention of thefts, looting, arson, sabotage, and other criminal activities.

(b) Detachment II (Abteilung II), political police detachment (Staatspolizeiliche Abteilung) charged with assisting the Germans (i.e., Security Police and SD) in their political security efforts. Specifically, these detachments were to report any kind of activity directed against the German Reich, or the German Army, police, or administration conducted by either individuals, resistance organizations, or partisans.

*Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., *Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 19, 29 Apr 42, pp 2-5 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

†Although the areas of rayons varied greatly, about 400 square miles can be taken as an average size in Heeresgebiet Center.

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(c) Detachment III (Abteilung III), regular police detachment (Ordnungspolizeiliche Abteilung) in charge of keeping peace and order among the indigenous population. Its tasks included traffic regulation, fire prevention, and enforcing administrative and economic directives originating from both the German and indigenous administrations.

(d) Detachment IV (Abteilung IV), special detachment (Sonderabteilung) to be utilized in operations against partisans and airborne troops as well as in guarding transports of agricultural products from the peasant communities to the collection points.*

These organizational changes produced a number of practical advantages for the Germans. By making the rayon leader or the city mayor responsible for the OD budget and OD personnel matters, and by using him as a channel of command and supervision, the Germans could centralize their control. It was no longer necessary for them to deal with every mayor in all the village communities and small towns.

The breakdown into four specialized detachments also facilitated division of the control functions exercised by the various German agencies. Thus Detachments I and II were supervised by the local offices of the Security Police or army;† Detachment III, by the offices of military administration (FKs and OKs); Detachment IV, by either the Security Police or the army.‡

Prior to these organizational changes the local mayors had been permitted to use the OD for executive functions whenever German priority assignments did not interfere. This limited power of employment granted only for Detachment III went into the hands of the rayon leaders or city mayors.§

German agencies in the field promptly complied with the new directive. OD units were withdrawn from small communities where they had little chance of tangling with the partisans and were concentrated in three or four larger units within each rayon. Each of them was subdivided into the four specialized detachments. It appears that close liaison existed between the military administrative agencies and the SD in the reorganization process, and between them the relative strength of the various detachments was decided.¶ Wherever possible the OD units were quartered in barracks in order to facilitate their control and assure quick deployment in cases of emergency.**

*Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 19," 29 Apr 42, pp 3-4 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6); Befh.rueckw.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 11," 27 Nov 41 (GMDS, Korueck 17326/16); Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "KTB Nr. 2," 1 May 42, p 3 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

†The Special Task Forces (*Einsatzkommandos*) of the Security Police had absolute control over personnel accepted for Detachment II.

‡This division of control functions among the various German agencies was poorly defined and apparently led to jurisdictional disputes. A later directive, Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 22," 2 Jun 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6), attempted to clarify the arrangement. Thereupon the Security Police had exclusive control over OD Detachments I and II, and the local offices of military government (OKs) or garrison commanders (*Standortskommandanturen*) were in complete charge of Detachments III and IV. This clear division of jurisdiction between the Security Police and the Army facilitated the subsequent complete separation of Detachments I and II from the OD.

§Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 19," 29 Apr 42, p 4 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

¶Detachments I and II were purposely kept small while III and IV received most of the men.

**FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 30 May 1942, pp 8-9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 201. Sich.Brigr., Abt. VII, "Lagebericht," 31 May 42, p 13 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4).

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The organization of entirely new OD units was also undertaken, particularly in areas under increasing pressure from the partisans. Thus, in June 1942, the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center reported 13,000 OD men in his area plus an additional 12,000 men* being organized in new units.

The further deterioration of the security situation in Heeresgebiet Center on the one hand and the generally favorable experience the Germans had had with the OD during the beginning of 1942 on the other, prompted the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center to order a further increase in the strength of the OD. His administrative directive starts out with the following statement:

The indigenous OD has assumed greater importance in view of the past security situation of the country and in view of its mission to assure law and order among the people. The OD must be made into an alert and powerful organ by an immediate increase in size combined with the build-up of a rigid organization under continuous German supervision.†

This new directive did not change the organizational setup of the individual OD units, but it emphasized the need for stronger units and the creation of new groups where such units were not yet in existence. The concept of the rayon OD or the OD for larger towns was retained and its maximum strength fixed at 300 men. The Germans had already gained sufficient experience to request that, whenever possible, young unmarried men from the immediate area should be selected for OD duty by the rayon leader or the city mayor. The screening process was retained, but the Security Police was to make its check after the appointments in order not to delay quick expansion.‡

Greater emphasis was placed on training personnel; the responsible German agencies for Detachments III (regular police) and IV (antipartisan) were ordered to assign suitable military police or noncommissioned officers as instructors for the OD units. The military divisions located within the Heeresgebiet were instructed to assist local German agencies by making training personnel available. The establishment of military training outposts, consisting of four to five men in charge of continuous supervision and training of the OD, had proved advantageous in practice. Primary emphasis was to be placed on the instruction of reliable noncommissioned OD officers.§

In spite of the greater significance attached to the OD under the new administrative directive, very little was done to improve the supply problem. The OD men were issued captured rifles of French and other foreign makes and, if these were not available, rifles from captured Russian stocks. Each man was issued 30 rounds of ammunition. Automatic weapons, machine guns, and heavy infantry weapons were prohibited to OD men.¶

* Gen. von Schenckendorff, "Vortrag des Befehlshaber [Heeresgebiet] Mitte, General von Schenckendorff bei Reichsminister Rosenberg," 2 Jun 42 (GMDS, FAP 99/1231).

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 22," 2 Jun 42, p 1 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

‡ *Ibid.*, pp 1-3; [Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte] Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Taetigkeitsbericht fuer Monat Mai 1942," 3 Jun 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6.) See also Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Jun 42, pp 9-11 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6; Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 7 Jul 42, pp 1-3 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

§ Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 19," 29 Apr 42, pp 2-3 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

¶ *Ibid.*, p 3.

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Following this directive of the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center, the organization of the OD in areas with well-organized units was as follows:

Rayon OD—commanded by rayon OD leader,
each rayon OD composed of 4 to 6 precinct OD units.

Precinct OD—commanded by precinct OD leader,
each precinct OD unit composed of 50 to 60 men.

Detachments I, II, III, and IV.

Whenever Detachments III and IV were stationed in barracks, the OD men received two-thirds of the regular German troop rations from the German authorities. The new regulation also provided that OD men were to receive, in addition to their regular pay, 10 rubles for each day spent on dangerous assignments.*

Reports originating from the various Security Divisions of Heeresgebiet Center and their subordinate office of military administration for June and July 1942 furnish some insight into the changes in organization, increase in strength, and employment of the OD. It was reported that the new concentration of the OD organization at the rayon level had the advantage of preventing the splitting up and weakening of its forces.† But the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center was still convinced that further improvements could be made. Experiences with the OD, especially in antipartisan combat, had demonstrated that these auxiliary units could be molded into a more efficient instrument for security tasks by further improving their military organization, by stricter supervision by the security divisions, by furnishing these units with better equipment and armaments, and by permitting garrisoned units of the OD to be armed with machine guns and heavy infantry weapons. The Commander of Heeresgebiet Center specifically ordered his security divisions to take greater interest in the development of the OD and to appoint within each division an officer who was to be in charge of the organization, armament, and employment of the antipartisan detachments (Detachments IV) of the OD. The emphasis on stricter military organization was expressed in a new table of organization:

OD man and senior OD man. Twenty OD men or senior OD men form a squad. At its head is the OD squad leader.

OD squad leader (rank of noncommissioned officer). Five squads comprise a platoon. At the head of the platoon is the OD precinct leader.

OD precinct leader (rank of lieutenant). Three or four precincts are organized under an OD sector leader.

OD sector leader (OD-Abchnittsfuehrer) (rank of captain). The OD sector leaders are under the command of an OD rayon leader.

OD rayon leader (OD-Bezirksfuehrer) (rank of major). At a later date, it was contemplated to subordinate the OD rayon leaders under the OD inspector (rank of colonel).‡

A stricter military organization of the OD necessitated a more thorough training which the Germans hoped to accomplish primarily by regular OD

* *Ibid.*, pp 4-5.

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Jun 42, pp 9-10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

‡ Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Ia/VII, "Einsatz des OD und sein weiterer Ausbau," 8 Jul 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/2, Anlage 11).

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schools.* These schools were set up to train the essential indigenous leaders; the small training details composed of military policemen or regular troops were primarily intended to give on-the-spot training to the entire OD unit. Thus an administrative directive of the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center† ordered the establishment of at least one OD school within the area of each security division‡ in order to train a sufficient number of OD leaders of noncommissioned officer rank. The aim was to have within 1 month at least 1 trained leader for every 10 OD men.§ In compliance with this directive the various security divisions reported the establishment of OD schools within their divisional areas.¶ One of the major difficulties the Germans experienced with the training of the OD was the lack of competent German personnel. One security division resorted to assigning experienced policemen from a reserve police battalion to the regional offices of military government (FKs) to assist the military policemen with their training of the OD because the military policemen themselves lacked the necessary experience.** Another security division established six OD schools and while its reports do not mention the caliber of the instructors, the lack of suitable interpreters was considered a great handicap in the training program.†† A third security division reported the establishment of three OD schools, each with a capacity of 60 men, where the division trained members of Detachments III and IV in 3-week courses.‡‡

Although the organizational changes could be carried out in the field by the security divisions and their subordinate commands, the attempt to obtain the desired increase in strength encountered certain difficulties because of an increasing reluctance of the local population to join the OD.§§ The German experience with the OD following the reorganization of April 1942 was in general the same as that of the earlier period. In the section of Chap. 4 analyzing German experiences, it is pointed out that the reliability and fighting qualities of the OD depended on a number of factors, and no basic change could be expected unless the over-all situation were altered considerably or the basic problems such as the issuance of sufficient arms, better supervision by the Germans, and more intensive training by qualified instructors were solved in a positive manner. But the general situation in the Heeresgebiet, i.e., the increase

* Komm.Gen.D.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Jun 42, pp 9-10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 23," 23 Jun 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

‡ At this time (July and August 1942) there were four security divisions in Heeresgebiet Center: 201st, 203d, 221st, and 286th.

§ Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 23," 23 Jun 42, p 4 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

¶ This directive also contained a proposed schedule for the 2-week courses in the OD schools. It included among other training: close order drill and mass formations; firing practice and care of weapons; police duties; and tactical exercises for squads and platoons, such as use of terrain, map reading, building of strong points, searching for partisans, and attacks against villages occupied by partisans.

‡‡ 221. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Einrichtung von O.D.Schulen" 29 Jul 42, pp 1-4 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 112a); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "[Divisionsbefehl]," 1 Aug 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 117); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 2 Aug 42, p 10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Aug 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 70); 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Juli 1942," 6 Aug 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

** 221. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Einrichtung von O.D.Schulen," 29 Jul 42, pp 1-4 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 112a); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "[Divisionsbefehl]," 1 Aug 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 117).

†† 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 2 Aug 42, p 10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

‡‡ 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Juli 1942," 6 Aug 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

§§ German experience in recruiting OD men is discussed in Chap. 4.

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of the partisan movement and the shortage of German security troops, left the German commander few alternatives and it seems that, in spite of some derogatory reports, he continued to press for greater utilization of indigenous manpower. Thus in the period from May to August 1942, when the German Army more or less took over the OD, its strength increased from 12,000 to 15,000 men.*

The development of the OD from late April until July 1942 was characterized by (a) basic reorganization according to the directive of the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center; (b) an effort to increase over-all strength in line with the added responsibilities and the further deterioration of the security situation; (c) greater emphasis on strict military organization and training; (d) quartering of OD units in barracks and the issuance of German troop rations to these units; and (e) increased interference on the part of the German Army in organization and control.

OD AFTER JULY 1942

The period from July 1942 until August 1943 brought few important organizational changes. The OD was by this time a fact—more the result of the security situation and the lack of sufficient number of German troops than anything else. The remaining problem was how to make the OD a more efficient, strong, and reliable instrument for German use. The subordination of the OD to the indigenous rayon administration was in name only and was perhaps primarily proclaimed for psychological reasons. As pointed out before, the rayon leaders participated in the nomination of new members to the OD, and the indigenous administration continued to furnish the pay and food for nongarrisoned OD detachments. The direct use of the OD by the rayon leaders or city mayors remained the exception. The rule was that German agencies, the security police for Detachments I and II, and the garrison commanders or offices of military administration (FKs and OKs) for Detachments III and IV controlled the organization, strength, discipline, and employment of the OD. With the practice of bringing OD units into barracks and supplying them with German troop rations, the role played by the indigenous administration became less significant. On the other hand it was realized that the indigenous administration did need an executive organ, and therefore its local offices were permitted to employ a few men for this specific task.

This period is therefore characterized by the effort to improve the OD and to transform the indigenous auxiliary units into an effective and combat-ready instrument by providing stricter military organization, better training, closer supervision, better weapons and equipment, more careful selection and screening of personnel, and a regulated system of compensations and awards. For example, a directive from the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center concerning the appointment of OD leaders and the regulation of rank insignias and OD uniforms was intended to strengthen the military character of the OD.†

* H.Gr.Mitte, Abt. VII, "Erfahrungsbericht der Militaerverwaltung beim Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe Mitte fuer die Zeit vom 22.6.1941 bis August 1944," Aug 44, p 33 (GMDS, HGr Mitte 75857), cited hereafter as H.Gr.Mitte, 75857.

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 24," 13 Jul 42, pp 6-9 and Anlage 2 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6).

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The over-all result of the German attempts depended largely on the attitude of the population toward the Germans. This attitude underwent considerable changes in the course of time because of the general war situation, the ruthless economic exploitation of the country by the occupier, the poor treatment of the local people, the recruiting methods for forced labor, and the influence of the partisans upon the inhabitants through propaganda, force, and terror.

The magnitude of the security and administrative problems faced by the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center becomes apparent when one considers the great size of the Heeresgebiet area on the one hand and the small forces of German security troops on the other. For example, in the middle of 1942, Heeresgebiet Center covered an area of about 77,000 square miles—the area of the state of Nebraska—with a population of 4.8 million. At the same time, the Commander of the Heeresgebiet had 40,000 to 45,000 German personnel under his command.

The difficulties inherent in this situation were recognized by the Army High Command (OKH), but for it the OD of Heeresgebiet Center was only one aspect of the general problem of how to utilize indigenous manpower in the East for military tasks. During the 14 months of the Russian campaign, numerous indigenous auxiliary units had been sponsored by various German commands without any authorization from above and with no attempt at coordinating their organization and employment. Therefore, in August 1942, OKH issued a basic directive attempting to bring order into the indigenous military formations as well as to sanction their existence retroactively. The directive began as follows:

The size of the Eastern territories and the necessity to be thrifty in the employment of German manpower have made it essential to utilize the resources and prisoners of war of the conquered territories in the East for services for the [German] armed forces (especially for the field armies) and for the war economy. . . . This [utilization of available manpower] requires the organizational mobilization and disposition of the employment of the population of the occupied territories and of the prisoners of war and the systematic compilation of old and new directives.*

The importance of this directive was not only that it spelled out in detail the organization, pay, rations, and employment of the various kinds of indigenous units, but also that it furnished the official authorization for the future utilization of indigenous manpower in military or paramilitary units. The official description of the OD was as follows:

Schutzmannschaften (Ordnungsdienst) in the zone of operation:

Into this category fall the Schutzmannschaftsverbände (Ordnungsdienst) employed locally in the zone of operations either as formations or as individual units, composed of indigenous men who joined voluntarily or of discharged prisoners of war of the occupied Eastern territories, and organized for police tasks or guard duties. . . .

Among them are:

With Army Group A and B: the "Hilfswachmannschaften"

With Army Group Center: the "Ordnungsdienst"

With Army Group North: the "Hilfswachmannschaften" and "Einwohnerkampfverbände."†

*OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt.(II), "Landeseigene Hilfskräfte im Osten," Aug 42, p 1 (GMDS, AOK 4, 26081/18).

†*ibid.*, p 2.

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This directive also increased the pay scale for the OD and made the Army responsible for supplying its rations. Units employed in antipartisan combat were to receive the same rations as the German field troops; units engaged in other types of assignment were authorized the same rations as the German replacement army. The German commands were also directed to assist in the procurement of uniforms. Indigenous police forces employed as executive organs of the local communities were not covered by these new regulations and their upkeep was completely the responsibility of the local indigenous administration. Compensation for part-time indigenous auxiliary units, which were employed only in cases of emergency, was determined by the existing pay scale of the indigenous labor; free rations were not authorized.*

In the fall of 1942, Heeresgebiet Center attempted to bring its OD organization into conformity with the provisions of this OKH directive.† The local situation greatly influenced the speed and the degree of any changes. For example, one regional office of military government (FK) reported that its OD had no army rations because transportation was not available to pick up the rations from the nearest army depot.§ Only in December could this office start to issue army rations.¶ Another regional office of military government reported that it had accomplished the division of its OD into a garrisoned and a nongarrisoned complement only at the end of December 1942. It also observed that the supply system of the OD was ineffective because of the overlapping of responsibility in several German offices.‡

Nevertheless there was an increase in the over-all strength of the OD in spite of the many difficulties (see Chap. 4), and by the end of November 1942 the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center could report that the OD had reached its goal of 30,000 men and was still expanding.**

Numerous reports from this period give evidence of the stepped-up efforts to provide better training for the OD. More and more schools were established and the courses often lengthened in time. But these schools still did not train sufficient numbers of OD officers and noncommissioned officers, a fact which greatly handicapped further growth and effective employment of the OD.††

During this period, many German agencies reported their satisfaction with the OD in antipartisan combat while others continued to point out its limitations and furnished examples of political unreliability and low morale. But the Germans had little choice and the best they could do was to try to get better control and supervision of the OD in their continuing use of it for security

* *Ibid.*, pp 23-29.

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 29," 2 Oct 42, pp 1-9 and Anlagen 1-5 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6).

‡ FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 31 Aug 42, p 12 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

§ FK 581, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 25 Nov 42, p 8 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

¶ FK 550, Abt.VII, "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 23 Dec 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

** Befh.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII, "Besprechungspunkte fuer die Dienstbesprechung am 27. d. Mts.," 27 Nov 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/3, Anlage 215).

†† See, for example: FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 25 Aug 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 31 Aug 42, pp 10-12 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 31 Aug 42, pp 14-16 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 1 Sep 42, pp 11-12 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Taetigkeitsbericht," 6 Sep 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2); 203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Sep 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 78); 201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 30 Sep 42, pp 12-16 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4); 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat September 1942," 6 Oct 42, pp 3-4 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2); FK 581, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 25 Oct 42, p 4 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/Mil.Verw., "Lagebericht," 30 Dec 42, pp 9-10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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tasks. Also during this period the old fiction of the OD as an auxiliary organ of the indigenous administration was completely dropped in practice and the German Army and the Security Police were the only agencies which had controls as well as the supply system in their hands. But in general the OD gave such a fine account of itself that the Germans in the beginning of May 1943 decided to extend the creation of OD units throughout the entire area of Army Group Center. This emphasis of creating OD groups in the army rear areas (Koruecks) does not imply, however, that the armies of Army Group Center had not used indigenous manpower in the form of OD units at a much earlier date.*

As pointed out, the Security Police and the SD had close control over OD Detachments I (criminal police) and II (political police). But the military agencies also depended on these detachments for information and intelligence necessary for effective employment of Detachments III and IV in their functions as regular police and as antipartisan units. Under the influence of the steady increase of power of the partisan movement, the individual tasks of the various OD detachments tended to overlap more and more. Nevertheless summary reports prepared by the German military expressed satisfaction about the cooperation among the various OD detachments and the army, police, and SD.†

It appears, however, that the Higher SS and Police Leader (Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer—HSSPF) of Army Group Center was not satisfied with this arrangement because the military offices still exerted some influence on Detachments I and II. Apparently there was no operational reason to change this arrangement and a separation of OD Detachments I and II from the rest of the OD organization, as desired by the Higher SS and Police Leader, was considered impractical because of the overlapping in functions.

In the summer of 1943 the Higher SS and Police Leader formally requested the separation of Detachments I and II from the rest of the OD because he wished to create from them a completely separate organization, directly subordinate to him. He justified his request by claiming that this change would enable the police and SD to realize a better-trained and more specialized auxiliary organ for police missions. This request was approved and in December 1943, from Detachments I and II, a new organization known as the Security Guard (Sicherheitswacht-Siwa) was formed.‡ From that time on all criminal and political police activities were handled by the German police and SD offices.§ This development reflects the general increase in power of the SS within the Eastern territories at that time.

Difficulties soon developed. The cooperation of the police and SD with the military offices in regard to their indigenous auxiliary organizations did not meet expectations, chiefly because the Security Guard was too preoccupied with its police tasks to keep the OD informed about developments of interest to the

*H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 33.

These OD units, often designated as "Miliz" or "Selbstschutz," have not been discussed so far because they lacked uniformity and were organized by the individual Koruecks and corps according to local requirements. However, after the general directive extending the OD organization over the entire Army Group Area, the OD units under the Koruecks and corps were assimilated with the Heeresgebiet units in matters of organization, supervision, and assignments.

†H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 33. H.Geb.A, 76156/1, p 57. See also PzAOK 3, Abt.VII/Mil.Verw., "Neugliederung der Abteilung I und II des OD in die Sicherheitswacht der Sicherheitspolizei," 31 Jul 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 19).

‡PzAOK 3, Abt.VII/Mil.Verw., "Lagebericht," 4 Jan 44, p 6 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 2).

§H.Geb.A, 75156/1, p 57.

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latter's missions. Thus the OD showed a tendency to organize from its own ranks new groups equivalent in their operations to the former Detachments I and II. On the other hand, the Security Guard organized in certain localities antipartisan combat units—a task clearly under the jurisdiction of the OD. A German Army evaluation report correctly points out that this development was a good illustration of the assertion that the nonexistence of a coordinating higher command will result in duplication of efforts and lack of cooperation among agencies occupying the same level in the hierarchy of command.*

By August 1943 the OD reached its maximum strength—about 45,000 men.† Numerous offices of military administration depended almost entirely on the OD because of the lack of German troops, and it was emphasized that they must carry out the pacification of their areas primarily by using their indigenous units.‡ The reliance on the OD for guarding and protecting economic and military installations is well illustrated by a report of a security division which employed for these tasks a total of 1183 OD men as compared with only 279 German troops.§

Because of the seriousness of the general situation—the German retreats in the face of the Soviet summer offensives of 1943 and the great increase of partisan operations—more and more leadership over the OD units was assumed by the German tactical commands rather than by the offices of military administration.¶

By the end of 1943 the Germans realized that the distinction between the regular police tasks of the OD Detachments III and the antipartisan operations of Detachment IV had lost real significance. In reality almost all the activities of the OD were by this time related to antipartisan measures. An administrative directive from the Commander of Army Group Center ordered the abolition of the division between Detachments III and IV as being unrealistic. The same directive also contained instructions regarding the employment of the OD: the commanders of the local offices of military government (OKs) were responsible for the employment of the rayon OD but were to follow closely the directives from the superior command, the regional offices of military government (FKs). The division of rayon OD and city OD into precinct units was reemphasized. The precinct OD leader was to receive the assignments for his units from the offices of military administration through the attached German supervisory personnel (military policemen or soldiers). Realizing the necessity to support tactical security units as well as various economic agencies, the commanders of OKs were authorized to attach—but only on a temporary basis—parts of their OD unit to the following agencies and commands: (a) units of the German security forces; (b) offices of economic affairs within the army group area; and (c) indigenous administrations of various levels. But even when parts of the local OD units were detached, the commander of the OK retained in all

*H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, pp 33-34.

†*Ibid.*, p 33.

‡221. Sich.Div., Ia, "O.D.," 22 Aug 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, HGeb 36509/5, Anlage 467).

§221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Sicherung der Wirtschaftsobjekte," 25 May 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/8).

¶This report is also of interest because it clearly indicates that there was a considerable difference in the utilization of the OD by the regular German security units and by the offices of military administration. In the areas under the jurisdiction of the former, 270 Germans and 342 OD men were employed for guard duties. In the areas under control of the latter, only 9 Germans were used for security duties as compared with 841 OD men.

¶H.Geb.A, 75156/1, p 59.

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cases his general supervision of the OD. It was felt that the permanent subordination of the OD to the same unit greatly influenced its reliability. Since security troops changed their locations very frequently because of tactical requirements, the OKs logically became the permanent supervisory agencies and were supposed to furnish the backbone for the OD. Because of the limited German personnel available to the OKs for training purposes, responsibility for training could be delegated to the security troops under whose command the indigenous unit was temporarily assigned. Close coordination between the commander of German tactical units and the offices of military administration was made mandatory in all questions relating to the supervision and employment of local OD units.*

During the period of relative stability of the front lines, from late 1943 until the middle of 1944, the German officials continued their efforts to improve the efficiency of these indigenous auxiliary units through intensive training. The system of OD schools was continued wherever conditions permitted. As an innovation of the training program, 200 Storm Troopers (SA men) were sent to the East to train OD units. While Army Group Center reported that these Storm Troopers contributed much to the unit training,† a later evaluation report of the same command stated that this enterprise was a complete failure. The Storm Troopers had good intentions but lacked combat experience in the East. They also were too old (50 to 60 years) and had no leadership abilities. As far as unit training was concerned, the offices of military administration were forced to fall back on the few available military policemen.‡

As result of the Soviet offensives and the westward movement of the front lines, Heeresgebiet Center shrank in its dimensions and was finally dissolved in October 1943. The Commander of Heeresgebiet Center became the Commanding General of the Security Troops and Commander in White Russia (Kommandierende General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber in Weissruthenien). Most of his former units, including the OD, remained under his command.§ After the Germans were pushed back by the Red Army the area under his jurisdiction coincided more or less with the area of the General Commissariat White Russia, an area of civilian administration. As a result, by April 1944 he became known as Armed Forces Commander in White Russia (Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weissruthenien)¶ and was directly subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command (OKW); but since this area had by this time become a zone of operation, he received his operational orders from the Army High Command (OKH).** This situation remained basically unchanged until the great Soviet offensive of June-July 1944. When this offensive gained momentum, almost all the troops of the Armed Forces Commander in White Russia employed as

*H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Militaerverwaltungs-Anordnungen Nr. 16," 1 Dec 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021).

†H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer August 1943," 12 Sep 43, p 12 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

‡H.Geb.A, 75156/1, pp 61-62.

§No formal order to this effect can be located, but the German situation maps for 10 and 11 Oct 1943 indicate that Heeresgebiet Center ceased to exist as a headquarters as of that date and was superseded by the new command, Kommandierende General der Sicherungstruppen und Befehlshaber in Weissruthenien. (OKH/GenStdH/Op.Abt.III, "Lage Ost, 10., bzw. 11.10.43 abends," GMDS, German Situation Maps, East.) See also OKW/WFSt/Qu.(Verw.), "Operationsgebiet im Osten," 30 Sep 43 (GMDS, EAP 99/157).

¶Gen.Kdo.Rothkirch, IIIa, "Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Sep 44, p 1 (GMDS, Russia 59467).

**Chef d.OKW, "Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Weissruthenien," 14 Apr 44 (GMDS, EAP 99/45).

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front-line units were relieved from his command and assigned to other headquarters. By the end of July 1944 the Russian offensive had already overrun the area of the General Commissariat White Russia and the remaining units of the Armed Forces Commander in White Russia were employed for tactical missions and were transferred to the command of the Third Panzer AOK.*

This brief discussion of the general developments and command changes in the Eastern theater of war are of great consequence for an understanding of further development of the OD. In the first place the OD came more and more under the jurisdiction of the Commander of Army Group Center;† secondly, the use of the OD as an executive organ of administration became less significant because the German agencies were less concerned with administration than with fighting against the advancing Red Army and the strong partisan units in their rear.

VILLAGE POLICE AND THE PART-TIME OD

From the preceding discussion it becomes apparent that the OD gradually evolved as an indigenous antipartisan combat formation as partisan operations in the rear areas became the greatest German security problem. The regular police activities of the OD occupied a position of much lower priority. Although the fiction of considering the OD as an auxiliary organ of the indigenous administration was maintained for a considerable time, the OD, in reality, constituted the security troops for the offices of military administration, and parts of it also were used in support of SD operations. The deployment of the OD, as has been pointed out repeatedly in this study, was controlled absolutely by these supervisory German agencies. Since the indigenous administration could not depend on the availability of the regular OD, the local mayors were permitted to employ one or two village policemen (Dorfpolizisten) in order to enable the mayors to carry out the orders they received from their superior rayon chiefs or to execute their own administrative regulations issued in compliance with directives from above. Contrary to the regular OD the village policemen remained directly subordinate to the mayors and were employed for such tasks as the collection of administrative penalties and supervision of the comprehensive registration system.‡ The village policemen received their weapons from the German authorities, but their rations and pay remained always a responsibility of the local indigenous administration.§

In addition to the regular OD the Germans proceeded to organize a so-called part-time OD (Hilfs-OD) as a kind of ready stand-by reserve. The mission of the Hilfs-OD was the protection of rural communities against partisan attacks when regular OD units could not protect their safety because of other commitments. The groups of the Hilfs-OD were composed of local volunteers who continued their agricultural activities; only for the purpose of periodic training or in cases of acute danger were they called up for temporary "active duty." The size of the groups varied with the size of the rural communities

*Gen.Kdo.Rothkirch, Ia, "Unterstellungen des Generalkommandos Rothkirch" (GMDS, Russia 61719/1).

†Compare the extension of the OD over the entire area of the Army Group Center in May 1943.

‡H.Geb.A, 75156/1, pp 66-67.

§H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 36; OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt.(II), "Landeseigene Hilfskrafte im Osten," Aug 42, p 29 (GMDS, AOK 4, 26081/18).

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they were to protect. The largest units had up to 25 men and were commanded by full-time OD leaders; smaller ones were led by part-time leaders. Appointments to the Hilfs-OD were made by the offices of military administration on recommendation of the local German food and agriculture official (Landwirtschaftsfuehrer). The identification of the Hilfs-OD followed the same system as the regular OD: a white arm band with the inscription "Hilfs-Ordnungsdienst." Pay and rations were not a German responsibility.

An interesting aspect of the Hilfs-OD is mentioned in a summary German Army report. According to this report these units developed in line with the concept of the so-called Wehrdoerfer (military colonies).^{*} Some experiments with these Wehrdoerfer were tried as early as 1942 by the FKs of Bryansk, Smolensk, and Klintsey. The establishment of the Wehrdoerfer resulted in a considerable decrease of partisan activities in these areas, but surprisingly enough these positive experiences did not result in the formation of Wehrdoerfer in other areas until much later (late 1943 and 1944).[†]

The Hilfs-OD did not constitute at any time an important indigenous auxiliary force and contributed only on a small scale to the pacification of the country. It is mentioned here because it constituted a specific kind of utilization of indigenous manpower in the fields of public safety and security. The above-cited summary report emphasizes the willingness and even spontaneous desire of parts of the rural population to organize these part-time units.[‡]

There is unfortunately a shortage of German reports dealing with the Hilfs-OD, a situation which might be explained by the fact that with the increase of partisan pressures in the rear areas, more and more of the Hilfs-OD men were incorporated into regular OD units or even formed complete new regular OD groups.

EVACUATION AND ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF OD UNITS

Beginning with the fall of 1943, when the front lines were pushed farther to the West, the evacuation of OD units and the families of OD men became an acute problem for the Germans. In spite of the difficulties they themselves had in attempting an orderly retreat, the Germans evacuated these people for two reasons: (a) the continued need for these indigenous units and (b) the desirability of saving these endangered OD men and their families in order to keep up the morale of other OD units stationed farther to the rear and not yet affected by the Soviet advance.

Numerous reports indicate the scope and nature of this evacuation and the ultimate disposition of the OD men and their families. In general one can distinguish four different alternatives open to the Germans:

^{*}H.Geb.A, 75156/1, p 66.

The Wehrdoerfer were part of the German security system in the rear areas. They were villages settled primarily by members of indigenous auxiliary units and their families and were organized to fight partisans. In certain cases when the location of the Wehrdorf was fixed to protect important installations or main supply roads, German troops reinforced the indigenous unit. In developing the concept of the Wehrdorf the Germans may have been influenced by the former "military colonies" established in the latter part of the reign of Alexander I (1801-1825).

[†]H.Geb.A, 75156/1, pp 239-240; FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 10 Feb 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

[‡]H.Geb.A, 75156/1, p 239.

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(a) Evacuation from the endangered areas to places far to the rear and eventual incorporation of at least parts of the OD units into the Schutzmannschaften of the Higher SS and Police Leader of White Russia.*

(b) Evacuation into the rear areas of the Korueck or of the Commanding General of the Security Troops and Commander in White Russia and the organization of so-called Wehrdoerfer with OD personnel.†

(c) Discharge of OD men volunteering for labor service in Germany or forced discharge of less dependable OD members and shipment of the latter with their families for labor service in Germany.‡

(d) Utilization of OD men in other capacities, such as employment in the so-called Labor Companies within the zone of operation.§

An evaluation report of Army Group Center stated that as a result of the first evacuation movement of their troops in the latter part of 1943, the overall strength of the OD by January 1944 had been reduced to about 20,000 men.¶

The Germans, however, were not always successful with their evacuation program. There were situations when the OD men did not wait for orders and left the areas near the front lines on their own.** On the other hand it was also reported that OD men avoided evacuation and apparently preferred to remain behind,††either to throw themselves at the mercy of the advancing Red Army or to remain in hiding.

The evacuation of the OD with destinations far to the rear of the front line, e.g., Latvia, often experienced considerable difficulties in terms of transportation as well as unwillingness of local officials to cooperate with the rede-

*PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII Mil.-Verw., "O.D.," 2 Dec 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 59); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Dezember 1943," 4 Jan 44, pp 6-7 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 2); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Januar 1944," 10 Feb 44, pp 4-5 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 29b); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII, "Schreiben an VI. A.K./Ic/Qu./VII," 12 Jan 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 10); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD-Familien im Fluechtlingslager Olita," 18 Apr 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 67); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Mai 1944," Jun 44, p 5 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 88a).

†PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat September 1943," 4 Oct 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021); Mil.Verw.Rat Rother b. H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Schreiben an Mil.Verw.Rat Rooschue b. PzAOK 3," 13 Oct 43, pp 2-3 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 15 Oct 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 43); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat November 1943," 4 Dec 43, pp 5-6 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 60); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Dezember 1943," 4 Jan 44, pp 6-7 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 2); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Januar 1944," 10 Feb 44, pp 5-6 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 29b); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 14 Mar 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 42a); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD-Familien im Fluechtlingslager Olita," 18 Apr 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 67); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Mai 1944," Jun 44, p 5 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 88a); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Neuorganisation des OD," 13 Jun 44, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 98).

‡Mil.Verw.Rat Rother b. H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Schreiben an Mil.Verw.Rat Rooschue b. PzAOK 3," 13 Oct 43, p 3 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "O.D.," 2 Dec 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 59); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat November 1943," 4 Dec 43, pp 5-6 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 60); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Durchfuehrung von Evakuierungen, Aufnahme der Evakuierten in Litauen im November 1943," 11 Dec 43, pp 1-4 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 67); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Entlassung von OD-Maennern," 9 May 44, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 79).

§PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "O.D.," 2 Dec 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 59); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Arbeitskompanie," 24 Oct 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 49).

¶H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 33.

**PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat September 1943," 4 Oct 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021).

††PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 15 Oct 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 43).

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ployment program. For example, incidents at the reception camp at Olita, Latvia, greatly damaged morale. Arriving transports of OD men and their families were relieved of practically all their possessions. Living conditions and food were of subhuman standards.*

The evacuation of OD units and dependents to the areas not so far to the rear also experienced great difficulties. The armies were alarmed at the practice of sending these units into areas located outside their own jurisdiction. Army orders were issued prohibiting this; the OD units were still needed to give support to the hard-pressed German troops.†

Prior to the great Soviet offensive of June 1944, the Third Panzer AOK attempted a reorganization of the remaining OD units of its corps and divisions. Since it was believed that the greatest contribution these indigenous formations could make to the over-all war effort was their antipartisan combat (their employment in small fortified positions had been a failure), the Third Panzer AOK ordered that all OD units under its jurisdiction be organized into so-called Bandenjagdkommandos (special partisan destruction units) and that the use of the OD for other than military tasks was prohibited. The only exception to this order was that permission could be granted to employ parts of the OD units for guard duties and essential police functions.‡ In the early part of June 1944, Army Group Center issued an order concerning the reorganization of the OD. As reported by the Third Panzer AOK, this reorganization involved a division of the OD into two parts: (a) OD units under the jurisdiction of the Koruecks as locally assigned (bodenstaendige) formations for the police functions in support of the local offices of military government (OKs); (b) the bulk of the OD forces in the corps areas as mobile antipartisan units. The order, however, made it clear that the locally assigned units could, when the situation demanded it, also be detached from the Korueck on a temporary basis and made directly subordinate to German troop commanders for antipartisan operations.§

The Third Panzer AOK even went further in its attempt to transform the OD into a strictly military organization by recommending to the Commander of Army Group Center a change of name for the OD (the proposed new name: Landwehr, Oblastnaya Oborona) and strictly military rank designations for its members. Also it was proposed to extend the regular disciplinary and penal code of the German armed forces to cover the OD units.¶

However, the Soviet offensive which also began in the same month (June 1944) and rolled back the entire front lines prevented any further development of this reorganization plan. In this German retreat the OD participated and with their families moved in treks about 600 miles westward to Schroetters-

*PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Durchfuehrung von Evakuierungen, Aufnahme der Evakuierten in Litauen im November 1943," 11 Dec 43, pp 1-4 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 67); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Dezember 1943," 4 Jan 44, pp 6-7 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 2); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD-Familien im Fluechtlingslager Olita," 18 Apr 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 67).

†PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 15 Oct 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 43); Mil.-Verw. Rat Rother b.H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Schreiben an Mil.Verw.Rat Rooschuev b.PzAOK 3," 13 Oct 43, pp 2-3 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 14 Mar 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 42a).

‡PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Mai 1944," Jun 44, p 5 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 88a).

§PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Neuorganisierung des OD," 13 Jun 44, pp 1-2 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 98).

¶*ibid.*

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burg (Lodz). They had to fight their way to the West and suffered heavy casualties. About 9000 OD men and 21,000 dependents reached Schroetttersburg where the march halted. The OD men expressed their desire to continue the fight against the Soviet forces and were sent to Neuhammer (Lower Silesia) for incorporation into German divisions. Thereby the OD lost its identity. The 21,000 OD dependents were added to the labor forces in Germany.*

*H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 35.

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Chapter 4

MAJOR OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE ORDNUNGSDIENST

In the foregoing chapters the major emphasis was on the development of the OD organization from its beginning until the time when the OD personnel became incorporated into tactical military units. An attempt was made to show the interrelation between various changes in organization and employment of the OD on the one hand and the changes in the military situation and conditions in the rear areas of Army Group Center on the other. In order to do this it was necessary to point out certain experiences the Germans had with the OD, while reserving a comprehensive treatment of various social, political, and military implications for this chapter. In addition, certain questions raised in the course of the past discussion are treated here.

The following questions are pertinent in considering the position of the OD within the system of the military administration set up by the Germans in the East—an indigenous auxiliary organization in the service of a foreign occupant:

- (a) What was the German experience in getting indigenous personnel to volunteer for service in the OD? What kind of people enlisted for this type of service? What kind of events during the years of the German occupation influenced this process?
- (b) What attempts, other than organizational changes already discussed, were made by the German authorities to strengthen the internal cohesion of the OD?
- (c) What were the German experiences with the OD in the various tasks assigned to it?
- (d) What relation existed between the OD and the local population?
- (e) What methods did the Soviets employ to eliminate the OD? How successful were they?

RECRUITMENT

The Germans could have employed two different methods in recruiting personnel for the OD: (a) an appeal to the male population to enroll voluntarily, utilizing various media of propaganda and furnishing specific incentives, or (b) forced recruitment. Throughout the history of the OD, the Germans relied on the first method because they believed that voluntary enlistment would attract the politically reliable part of the population, i.e., the anti-Bolshevik element, into the auxiliary police.*

*201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Lagebericht," 6 Sep 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

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In addition to voluntary enlistment, emphasis was placed on local recruitment since it was believed that the local population had a vested interest in the maintenance of law and order within its own communities. Nevertheless, German agencies did not rely exclusively on local manpower and occasionally recruited persons from other areas as well as discharged POWs. This deviation from established and prescribed procedures made the screening process more difficult and resulted in infiltration of the OD by unreliable elements. When this situation was recognized, orders were issued requesting the transfer of outsiders to their home areas; the reliance on local manpower was reemphasized.* Likewise, experiences with the POWs were disappointing and efforts were made to expel them from the OD.†

During the early phase of the Russian campaign, recruitment for small OD groups was handicapped primarily by the shortage of adult males. Sometimes this lack of manpower prevented the establishment of local units entirely. As time went on and voluntary enlistment did not meet German expectations, German agencies blamed the local population's lack of cooperation on the poor food, bad equipment, and insufficient supplies available for OD use.‡ The deficiency of supplies, particularly of arms, convinced the people that the occupant did not attach great significance to the local indigenous auxiliaries and highlighted the OD fear of not being able to defend itself against the superior arms of the partisans.§

As early as 1942 the Germans attributed low enlistment figures to partisan pressure on the local inhabitants. People were afraid to make common cause with the occupant because they feared partisan retaliation.¶ Naturally this was particularly true for areas strongly infested with partisan bands.**

Even after the OD units received better rations and clothing and greater efforts were made to furnish them with adequate weapons, the recruiting did not improve, in fact it grew worse. The Germans, therefore, were forced to change their explanations for the further drop in volunteers. They blamed the introduction of stricter military organizational structure†† and the garrisoning of indigenous forces in barracks. It appears that married men especially did not like to be quartered in barracks distant from their endangered families. Thus some German commands quartered only Detachment IV (anti-partisan) in barracks and utilized married OD members in the local communities for local protection.‡‡ But the real reason for the continued difficulties in recruitment seems to have been fear of the partisans whose activities the Germans were not able to suppress. Even faithful OD men wished to resign

*221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Ausbau des O.D.," 30 Aug 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 208).

†221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Gesamtbeurteilung der landeseigenen Verbände, Hilfswilligen und O.D.," 18 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 193b).

‡OK Wjasma (OK I/593), "Tätigkeitsbericht der Ortskommandantur I/593 in Wjasma," 2 Nov 41, pp 5-6 (GMDS, Korueck 17326/11); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 30 May 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

§OK Wjasma, *Ibid.* (OD I/593).

¶201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 31 Aug 42, p 14 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 8 Nov 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/2, Anlage 306); FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Tätigkeitsbericht," 24 Jul 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

**201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Lagebericht," 6 Sep 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

††221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 5 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 8).

‡‡FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Tätigkeitsbericht," 24 Jun 42, pp 3-4 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Tätigkeitsbericht," 24 Jul 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 31 Jun 42, pp 8-10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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because they felt that with their poor equipment they could not cope with the partisans.*

The voluntary recruitment system had demonstrated its limitations, and a proposal to resort to forced recruitment was repeatedly introduced. The exponents of this method pointed out that some kind of draft would, in addition to assuring the required strength of the OD, protect the OD men and their families from partisan revenge whose reprisals were mainly directed against voluntary collaborators with the occupation forces. It was also pointed out that unreliable elements that might come into the OD through forced recruitment would be eliminated by the mandatory screening process conducted by the SD and the Secret Field Police.†

It may be concluded that the following factors directly influenced the response of the local population to the German appeal for voluntary enlistment in the OD: (a) the availability of suitable males; (b) the supply of weapons, equipment, food, and clothing; (c) the morale of the population as a whole as influenced by the course of the war; and (d) the inability of the German Army to suppress the partisan bands.

An examination of the social composition of the OD would be rewarding because it would greatly facilitate an evaluation of the German method of handling the OD. A knowledge of the social make-up of the indigenous auxiliary units might also explain why the Germans were faced with a lack of competent OD leaders (officers and noncommissioned officers), undisciplined behavior, and unreliability among OD men when employed away from their own immediate sphere of interest. Unfortunately only one of the available German reports contains any direct reference to this matter, and therefore the following discussion on the social composition of the OD is based almost entirely on the author's deductions from information lending itself to this analysis.

The first important distinction must be made between the urban and rural OD. The Germans encountered considerable difficulties in obtaining a sufficient number of volunteers in the city areas. In the first place the populations of the larger towns within the area of Heeresgebiet Center were greatly depleted.‡ Second, the townspeople in general were less anti-Soviet in conviction than the rural peasant population.§ Third, a considerable part of the skilled and semiskilled laborers still in the town when the Germans arrived were needed either for the local industrial enterprises working for the German armed forces or for the fulfillment of the quota of laborers to be shipped to Germany.¶ Finally, the population feared that Soviet agents and informers, who could conceal themselves more easily in towns than in rural areas, would report their activities to the Soviet authorities. The available OD manpower was further reduced by the fact that members of the Soviet administrative groups, if they had not retreated with the Red Army, were too closely connected with the Soviet system and were a priori not suitable for inclusion. By elimi-

*Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt. I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 33—August 1943," 1 Sep 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

†201. Sich.Div., Abt. VII, "Lagebericht," 30 Sep 42, pp 12-14 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4).

‡Among the reasons for the depletion of the town population were the Red Army draft, the evacuation or flight of the administrative personnel (party, government, and industrial management), and the exodus of people to the villages in search of food.

§Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt. I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 33—August 1943," 1 Sep 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

¶Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 18," 2 Apr 42, p 5 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

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nating the preceding categories, it can be ascertained that the city OD must have contained a large percentage of unskilled laborers of older or very young age groups. On the other hand at least one favorable condition for OD recruitment in urban areas must be recorded. The danger from partisan bands was less in towns than in the country, and therefore the town population should have been less intimidated by the partisans. As a rule German troops located in the towns also provided a certain measure of security to potential indigenous collaborators.

The social composition of the OD in the rural communities is less complex than in the city. Since almost the entire rural population was composed of peasants and the German appeal for OD volunteers emphasized the peasant's role in protecting himself against the disrupting actions of the partisans, the rural OD most likely was composed almost entirely of peasants.

A report of the Third Panzer AOK illustrates the distribution of the population among towns and rural areas and clearly indicates the shortage of male inhabitants. According to this report, the area of this Army contained in August 1942 about 180,000 inhabitants, 40,000 in towns and 140,000 in the rural areas. The population consisted of 20 percent men, 30 percent women, and 50 percent children.*

The only available German report containing statistical material concerning the social composition of the OD originated with the Korueck of the Third Panzer AOK. It should be realized that conditions in the Korueck area, since it was closer to the front lines, were less consolidated than in the Heeresgebiet. This explains why some skilled laborers were still accepted for the OD since they were not as yet utilized in the few industrial enterprises put back into operation for the German armed forces. Furthermore the areas close to the front lines were not immediately affected by the labor recruitment program for Germany. Nevertheless this report confirms the general conclusions drawn above. Thus 155 OD men who participated in a training course in an OD school in the Korueck area would seem to represent a cross section of OD personnel in the entire area. The breakdown of these 155 men according to profession was:

66 unskilled laborers	4 machinists
27 peasants	6 tractor drivers
3 blacksmiths	1 peat master
2 carpenters	1 member of the fire brigade
2 cabinetmakers	2 soldiers
4 shoemakers	2 agricultural administrators
1 tailor	1 veterinarian
10 locksmiths	1 tanner
2 motor mechanics	1 technician
6 drivers	2 teachers
2 mechanics	4 railroad men
2 plasterers	3 bookkeepers

The breakdown in age groups for the same 155 men was:

17-20 years	51
21-30 years	60
31-40 years	35
41 years or older	9
Total	155 men

*PzAOK 3, A.Wi.Fü., "Die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse im Gebiet der 3. Panzer Armee," 26 Aug 42, p 1, GMDs, Wi/ID 2.438.

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Of these 155 men, 80 had previous military service; among them were 3 sergeants, 9 staff sergeants, 1 sublieutenant, and 3 lieutenants.

150 men were Russians, 3 were Ukrainians, 1 was a Pole, and 1 a Caucasian. None of them was a former member of the Communist party.*

The question of why these people volunteered for the OD is difficult to answer and only a few points can be suggested. As far as the city OD is concerned, the severity of the food situation might well have been a factor since an OD man was assured of his rations. Another incentive for joining might have been the desire of the individual to obtain advantages for himself as well as for his family either through preferential treatment by the foreign occupant or by using his own position of authority directly. A number of German reports refer to the latter practice,† and in one report the OD men were accused of having enriched themselves during liquidation actions against the Jews.‡ Furthermore it is quite possible that the traditional position of the police in Russia, a position of authority and power, always denied to the average citizen, might have induced some volunteers.

To what extent genuine anti-Bolshevik conviction was a motivating force is difficult to determine. Whether or not favorable statements made by the indigenous population can be evaluated as expression of deep-seated political convictions or were made just to please the powerful occupant is difficult to assess. On the other hand the expectation of gaining immediate advantages as well as land through a possible agrarian reform, which might favor indigenous collaborators especially, certainly decisively influenced certain eligible men to join the OD.

MORALE

It is axiomatic that the morale of individual members of military or paramilitary organizations and of entire units is of decisive influence on the effectiveness of the whole organization. Morale in the OD depended on certain major factors definitely beyond the control of the German commanders, who were in charge of the utilization of indigenous manpower for security and public safety tasks. Among these was the general attitude of the indigenous population toward the Germans, in itself a product of the way the war progressed and of certain German administrative and economic measures. Various organizational changes of the OD, which were intended among other things to strengthen the internal cohesion of the OD units, have already been discussed, as were the effects of the gradual improvement of OD rations, pay, and supplies leading eventually to the distribution of equal rations to the OD and to the German troops. In this section a number of items which the Germans singled out as significant in shaping OD morale are discussed.

Special Awards. The German agencies in control of the OD believed that special awards to individual men for outstanding performance was an effective means of raising the morale not only of the individual but also of the

*Korueck 590, "Ordnungsdienst. Monatsbericht Monat Juli 1942," 12 Aug 42, pp 2-3, GMDS, Korueck 27819/2.

†See, for example [Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte,], Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Taetigkeitsbericht fuer Monat Mai 1942," 3 Jun 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

‡Wi In Mitte, Chef Ff/M, "Lagebericht Nr. 15—Februar 1942," 7 Mar 42, p 42 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.58).

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entire unit. These awards were made in the form of extra rations, additional money, vodka, and tobacco. The Germans reported that the most effective kind of reward was letters of recommendation and approval. The Germans stated that pictures of Hitler were especially appreciated as awards of special honor; however, such a report may be difficult to accept.*

In connection with the system of awards, a directive of the Economic Staff East (Wirtschaftsstab Ost),† dated January 1942, concerning the enlargement of individual household plots of the peasants (bauerliche Hofparzelle) should be mentioned.‡ This decree provided that in the process of enlarging the household plot those peasants who distinguished themselves by their actions against the partisans were to receive first attention. This was a clever scheme since it capitalized on one of the most dominant desires of the Russian peasant population—the possession of land. This policy might have been a strong incentive for the people to support the German security effort, but before this program could get under way the general agrarian reform was put into effect in Heeresgebiet Center. This reform enlarged the individual household plots of all peasants, regardless of their contribution to antipartisan operations. The ill-timed implementation of the agrarian reform in terms of the earlier program deprived the German agencies for the time being of a very valuable inducement with which to obtain additional support in their security tasks.§

Special Compensations. Very early in the occupation the Germans realized the importance of providing pensions to families of OD men killed in action and preferential treatment to disabled indigenous collaborators. This preferential treatment took the form of extra rations, pensions, and favorable consideration in the distribution of land.¶

Uniforms. The question of adequate uniforms and rank insignia was believed to be of considerable importance for OD morale. The poor clothing and often the absence of any kind of shoes made the OD men look like a group of tramps and rendered difficult the development of the necessary esprit de corps. Even more important was the lack of prestige the OD could demand from the local population which regarded the German neglect of the OD as an indication of the inconsequential recognition extended to indigenous collaborators. Although the Germans recognized the consequences of the uniform problem they never solved it satisfactorily because of lack of material; as early as the summer of 1942 an unsuccessful attempt had been made to improve the uniform situation. The Germans anticipated that an improvement in the out-

*FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 15 Apr 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Br., Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 16 Apr 42, pp 5-6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

†An agency in charge of the over-all economic exploitation of the Occupied Eastern Territories.

‡Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Jun 42, pp 9-10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6); Befh.rueckw.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 14," 31 Jan 42, pp 1-2 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6).

§203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Aug 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 70).

¶203. Sich.Br., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 16 Apr 42, pp 5-6 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); Wi In Mitte, Chef Gr. III, "Verpflegung versehrter Angehoeriger der landeseigenen Verbaende, Hilfswilliger und den Ordnungsdienstes (O.D.)," 25 Sep 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 41); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht fuer den Monat September 1942," 28 Sep 42, pp 8-9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt.(II), "Landeseigene Hilfskraefte im Osten," Aug 42, pp 24-29 (GMDS, AOK 4, 26081/18); Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 29," 2 Oct 42, pp 3-6 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6).

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ward appearance of the men would increase their prestige in the eyes of the local population and thereby contribute directly to the morale of the OD itself.*

The OD and the Germans. The Germans made several interesting observations concerning the influence on morale of the relation between the OD and the German personnel charged with their training and supervision. Generally the OD men, according to German reports, wished to be led by German officers in whom they saw not just a comrade-in-arms but also a genuine leader whom they could admire. It was observed that the OD men gradually developed a personal loyalty to individual German leaders, and therefore an attempt was made to avoid whenever possible frequent changes of German supervisory personnel.† German reports do not attempt to explain this rather strange preference of indigenous collaborators for German leadership, but it is quite possible that their observation was correct. If the poor leadership material of the OD is considered, a fact which the Germans continuously reported,‡ it is understandable that the individual OD man might prefer a competent German leader to an incompetent superior from his own ranks. Furthermore it is also possible that the OD members believed that in an emergency such as an encounter with the partisans they would receive support from German troops and would be less likely to be abandoned to partisan "justice" so long as they operated under German personnel. In almost all German reports evaluating the OD a statement can be found which emphasizes that OD units were most reliable and efficient when under strong and just German leadership.

The OD men were largely dependent on German officials for assistance with their personal problems. It is evident that the extent of interest displayed by the Germans for the personal affairs of the OD men was of considerable influence on morale. Thus in some security divisions, special "morale officers" (Betreuungsoffiziere) were appointed, one for each regional office of military government, with the sole mission of caring for the personal welfare of OD members in the area.§

The Germans also recognized that an important aspiration of the OD men was to be treated by military commanders and occupation officials like German troops.¶ This was perhaps too much to be expected from the Germans but in certain fields at least they could show special recognition and feign equal treatment. The joint celebration of Christmas by German troops and OD men was enthusiastically received by the latter.**

Indoctrination. An interesting innovation was the oath which OD men took on assuming their assignments. It was believed that this oath would bind the

*221. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 29 Jul 42, p 7 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/2, Anlage 66).

†201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 29 Nov 42, p 8 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4); Kommandant v. Gomel, Ia, "An die Sicherungs-Division 221-Ia-," 12 Oct 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29350/5, Anlage 13); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht Juni 1943," 6 Jul 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/5, Anlage 344); PzAOK 3, Ia, "Beurteilung landeseigener Verbaende," 25 Apr 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 35568/17).

‡Cf. FK 581, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 25 Oct 42, p 4 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 28 Nov 42, pp 10-11 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

§221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 5 Dec 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/2, Anlage 385).

¶221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 5 Feb 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 48); 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Merkblatt fuer Behandlung landeseigener Verbaende, Hilfswilligen und O.D.," 10 Mar 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 59).

**221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 5 Jun 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 8).

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OD to a common cause with the Germans and would impress on them their integral and important role in the fight against Bolshevism.*

German propaganda directed toward the ideological indoctrination of the OD men must also be included in the efforts of strengthening the fighting spirit of the OD. For this purpose OD newspapers, OD propagandists, OD homes, and political meetings were utilized. A few selected statements from a conference of OD propagandists which took place in February 1944 are given below. A leading German official of the military administration stated:

... the best people are in the OD; [they] have already given their blood for the future of the country. The OD is the future police of the Russian sphere and therefore must protect the "new order." Every member of the OD must be conscious of the honor of being an OD man and must by his attitude express this sense of honor. It is stressed that OD propagandists are members of the OD and therefore undertake propaganda based on the practical activities of the OD. . . .

A member of the German propaganda department of the Army explained in detail the tasks of OD propagandists. "He [German propaganda expert] stressed the principle that the present fight is not only one of weapons but also a battle of ideas. Therefore the employment of the OD propagandists is of special importance."†

The Third Panzer AOK issued a directive at the end of March 1944 concerning the indoctrination of the OD. It begins as follows:

The OD must be subject to constant indoctrination and education [in German ideological concepts] in order to strengthen the discipline, sense of duty, and feeling of comradeship among the men. The proper attitude cannot be achieved by strict military disciplinary measures alone. Education and indoctrination must supplement strict military supervision in order to make the OD men comprehend the aim of their employment (creation of an indigenous police for the maintenance of security and order). Constant care for OD men, for their families and for the survivors of the deceased is absolutely essential.‡

German Personnel. In addition to the indoctrination of OD men, the proper attitude of German supervisory personnel assigned to duties with the OD was considered influential. For example, the Third Panzer AOK directed that special training was to be given to German personnel in order to enable them to carry out their assignments efficiently. It was a common experience that unreliability of the OD was the outgrowth of improper treatment received from the German supervisory personnel.§

Perhaps the most conclusive indication as to the success or failure of German methods in bolstering the morale of the OD lies in the actual per-

*"As a faithful son of my homeland I enter voluntarily into the ranks of the OD and solemnly swear that I shall fight honestly against Bolshevism and [that I] shall completely fulfill my duties as an OD member for the protection and reconstruction of my homeland. In the fight for liberation, which is carried on under the protection and with the help of the German armed forces, I pledge loyalty and absolute obedience to Adolf Hitler as the leader in the common fight against Bolshevism. I am at any time ready to sacrifice my life for [the fulfillment of] this oath." (H.Gr.Mitte, Ia/Ic/O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Vereidigung des OD," 26 Aug 43, GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 34).

†No author, "Niederschrift ueber die Tagung der OD-Propagandisten am 28. und 29. Februar 1944," n.d., pp 1-3 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 38).

‡PzAOK 3, Ic/AP/O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Propagandistische Betreuung des OD," 25 Mar 44, p 1 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 51).

§PzAOK 3, Abt.VII, "Beitrag zu dem Bericht ueber propagandistische Betreuung der landeseigenen Verbuende," 29 Oct 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 51); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "O.D.," 22 Aug 43, pp 1-2 (GMDS, HGeB 36509/5, Anlage 467).

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formance of the OD which will be examined in the next section. It is doubtful if the fact that several thousand OD men retreated with the Germans* can be taken as an expression of the internal strength of the OD units or of their ideological conviction; this phenomenon was offset, as is pointed out in many German reports, by the fact that a considerable part of the indigenous collaborators changed sides and went over to the partisans or Red Army.† A situation report prepared by the Economic Staff Center (Wirtschafts-Inspektion Mitte) summarizes this situation correctly:

[Indigenous] employees of the administration and of factories or OD [men] who worked for years for the German interest go over to the Bolsheviks because of fear of their early return. . . . Only elements who served the German cause at exposed positions and therefore cannot return to the Russians under any circumstances are compelled because of [their] need of self-preservation to continue to go along with us. . . .‡

GERMAN EXPERIENCES WITH THE OD

In Chaps. 2 and 3 reference was made to German experiences with the OD prompting various changes in its organization and employment. An attempt will now be made to relate these German experiences with the uses made of the OD and with the degree of support extended to it by German agencies. The various types of employment overlapped to a considerable degree and as time went on, all of them assumed more and more the nature of anti-partisan operations. Nevertheless a distinction may still be made between regular police tasks, guarding military and economic installations as well as supply transports and men, employment in local fortified positions (Stuetzpunkte), and antipartisan combat. The latter mission was undertaken either by the OD unit alone, normally commanded by German supervisory personnel, or the unit was attached to German troops or police units when operations were conducted on a larger scale.

For a firsthand view of German experience, the following presentation includes many direct quotations from German reports. Unfortunately these reports are not broken down according to various fields of employment, and often one quotation refers to experiences concerning different tasks. These will be discussed under the following headings: regular police tasks, guard duties, employment in fortified positions, antipartisan combat, and German support.

Regular Police Tasks. German experience reports dealing with police tasks of the OD give very little evaluation of actual performance. It appears from the general statements that the value of indigenous units in matters such as the enforcement of the compulsory registration system was well appreciated and that the performance must have met German expectations.§ A military garrison commander, for example, reported: "Regular police duties and traffic regulations were carried out by the few military policemen assigned to the

*H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 35.

†See PzAOK 3, A.Wi.Fü, "Raumungsbericht Zone I," 18 Oct 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.434).

‡Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt.I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 34—September 1943," 1 Oct 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

§Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/Mil.-Verw., "Monatsbericht fuer Monat November 1942," 5 Dec 42, p 6 (GMDS, HIGeb 31491/6).

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local office of military government [who were] reinforced by OD men."* Third Panzer AOK stated in a report dealing with an evaluation of indigenous units: "The OD is primarily in charge of police missions such as the maintenance of public order and guarding and protecting communities and important military installations."†

Guard Duties. A very early report of the Commander of Heeresgebiet North emphasized the good experiences made with the indigenous auxiliary units. Their employment had brought considerable relief in the work load of the offices of military administration.‡ In a monthly report of the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center, the following summary was found:

The OD was further employed for guard duties and security missions and in combat against the partisans. As in the preceding month, it has entirely proved itself. Individual cases of unreliability were immediately investigated and led to a reorganization of the respective OD platoon or squad. Based on the daily reports of the operation section [G-3] it was determined that in the course of 1 month the OD had completed 13 cases of successful antipartisan operations, 13 missions of guard duties which involved defensive actions against partisan attacks, and 12 reports dealing with events in which the OD was forced to retreat because of partisan attacks. It is noteworthy that in these cases in which the OD was forced to retreat because of overwhelming partisan forces, the OD suffered casualties. This fact gives proof of the reliability of the OD men.§

In 1942 at least some German agencies believed that the OD's most valuable contribution was its guarding mission. For example, one security division reported: "The experience made with the OD up to now is not uniform. In general it can be said that the OD constitutes a valuable help in guard activities, whereas in active partisan combat it has failed consistently."¶

Another security division of Heeresgebiet Center commented: "The OD has proved itself during the reporting month [November 1942]. OD personnel was employed not only for protection of transports and as potato-collecting commandos but also in fortified positions (communities)."*

The economic field agencies in charge of the exploitation of the occupied areas early realized the necessity of organizing indigenous units since German forces were not available for protection and executive tasks.†† The experiences of the economic agencies with OD units used as guard details were not good as a report dated January 1943 indicates:

On 22 January [1943] the German guards of the peat plants Yasen and Tatarka were transferred and in their place the Russian guards increased, so that in Yasen there are 36 OD men and in Tatarka 46 OD men who alone are in charge of the protection of the peat plants. A [German] master sergeant from the local office of military government of Osipovichi is supposed to take over their sole supervision. He will be stationed at the peat plant in Yasen. Basing judgment on experiences with the OD up to now, this guard detail will certainly not assure the production in any way.‡‡

*Stuetzpunktkommandantur I/593, "Taehtigkeitsbericht," 10 Aug 42, p 4 (GMDS, Korueck 24617/4).

†PzAOK 3, Ia, "Beurteilung landeseigener Verbaende," 25 Apr 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 35568/17).

‡Befh.rueckw.H.Geb.Nord, Abt.VII, "Verwaltungsaufgaben in Russland," 23 Sep 41, p 3 (GMDS, 281 ID, 15954/14, Anlage 35).

§Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/Mil.-Verw., "Monatsbericht fuer Monat Dezember 1942," 9 Jan 43, p 10 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6).

¶203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Aug 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 70).

**201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Oktober 1942," 6 Nov 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

††Wi In Mitte, Chef Fu/M, "Wirtschaftliche Auswirkungen der Partisanengefuhr," 24 May 42 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.30).

‡‡Wi Kdo Bobruisk, "KTB Nr. 5, Eintragung 22.1.1943," 22 Jan 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.565).

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Other reports originating with the economic agencies give accounts of the performance of OD men employed as guards in the evacuation of population and supplies during the retreat in the fall of 1943.

The assembling of treks was difficult because of lack of supervisory forces. Indigenous units unreliable. . . . Great difficulties during the march . . . through partisan-infected terrain. Treks often left to themselves. . . . The result was that they came under the influence of the partisans and went over to them. The accompanying OD was often in contact with the partisans and led the treks into their hands.*

The cattle treks organized by the regional economic officials were led by German officials and accompanied by the OD and various indigenous personnel. In certain cases, the OD has proved itself to be completely unreliable. OD strongpoints were suddenly deserted. The evacuation demonstrated clearly the unreliability and unfaithfulness of the Russian people, especially of the indigenous administration. . . .†

Fortified Positions. The pessimistic view of the OD taken by the economic agencies was not shared by all German commands. A security division reported:

More difficult position at the front during the winter [1942-1943]. The divisional area became almost entirely devoid of German troops. Thus came the hour of test for the OD. From the total of 119 fortified positions [spread over the entire divisional area] only 3 were unreliable and receptive to partisan propaganda. Only in one case did the OD-manned fortified position slay its German instructor.‡

In general [the OD] has proved itself. [After] the removal of our own [German] troops, the OD was left to itself. . . . The entire divisional area is covered with a net of OD fortified positions. Their presence alone accounts for the fact that considerable areas remained quiet and that in other areas the activity of the partisans could be reduced and suppressed. Thereby great [material] values and areas were retained for the armed forces. . . . The result of an eventual dissolution of the OD (about 9500 men [in the area of the division]) would be the end of all economic and administrative activities within the area of the division.§

Antipartisan Combat. Although police tasks were considered the primary mission of the OD, it was also utilized from the beginning for antipartisan combat. As early as April 1942 a security division reported that parts of the indigenous auxiliary units in Bobruisk and Gomel were organized into antipartisan units. Within the area of the military garrison commander of Gomel units of this kind were set up in about 30 communities. The report stated: "The experiences with the OD can be classified in general as very good. The OD men displayed great courage and fighting spirit many times in combat against the enemy, and they also can point to considerable successes."¶ However, a few months later, the same security division made certain qualifications concerning the effectiveness of the OD in antipartisan combat:

*Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt.I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 34 - September 1943," 1 Oct 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

†PzAOK 3, A.Wi.Fü, "Raumungsbericht Zone I," 18 Oct 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.434).

‡221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht Monat Muerz 1943," 5 Apr 43, pp 7-8 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 174).

§221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Gesamtbeurteilung der landeseigenen Verbände, Hilfswilligen und O.D.," 18 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 193b).

The last sentence quoted here appears to refer to a questionnaire sent by the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center to his subordinate units.

¶203. Sich.Br., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 16 Apr 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104). See also FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 13 Mar 42, pp 10-11 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104); FK 581, Verw.Gruppe, "Lagebericht," 15 Apr 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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In general the OD fought well; in individual cases it failed. Almost the entire OD of the rayon is concentrated in Lyuban because the OD groups in the various communities could not hold their own against the partisans. According to reports from the military garrison commander and the Secret Field Police, the OD lacks discipline. Numerous OD men were shown to be unfit. For example 70 OD men employed in anti-partisan combat were extremely cowardly when encountering enemy forces, in spite of the fact that the latter were numerically far inferior. Also in Bobruisk, the OD was again checked over and purged.*

Third Panzer AOK referred to the contribution of the OD in antipartisan operations in the area of its Korueck as: "The OD . . . rendered good services in fighting partisans . . . while suffering heavy casualties, [the OD] achieved great successes in combat with the partisans. When encountering regular [Red Army] troops, it, however, as a rule took to flight."†

The same Korueck evaluated its experiences in late 1942:

In general the OD proves itself. Operations against partisans should, however, be undertaken only under German command, an observation made all over the area of Army Group Center; otherwise, as it was observed again and again, such enterprises either degenerate into military games (Soldatenspielererei) or lead to wild [and] aimless shootings. . . .‡

Reports from the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center, from his various security divisions, and from the Koruecks describing the generally good German experiences with the OD in antipartisan combat are too numerous to be listed here. But it also should be noticed that not all German agencies were pleased with the performance of the OD. For example, the Economic Staff Center emphasized that the continuation of the economic exploitation of the country could only be assured when German security troops would suppress partisan activities. The OD did not show itself reliable enough for this task.§ But since sufficient numbers of German security troops were not available, the various German agencies concerned with the security of the rear areas were forced to rely on whatever the OD could achieve. Thus in June 1944, Army Group Center reported for its entire area: "The OD is employed to an increased extent in antipartisan combat. During the month covered by this report (May 1944), the OD successfully repulsed 9 large-scale partisan attacks."¶

The Third Panzer AOK summarizes the change in emphasis concerning the employment of the OD:

According to reports received, the morale and esprit de corps of the OD are good. For the OD of the corps and of the divisions a rigid organization was ordered. The bulk of the OD must be organized into antipartisan commandos because its distribution among small fortified positions failed to bring good results. Only a part of the OD personnel may be employed for guard duties and for other police missions.

*203, Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 2 Aug 42, p 10 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

†PzAOK 3, Ic/AO, "Partisanenbekämpfung," 4 Jul 42 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 20839/3).

This report refers to the experience with the OD in the area of the Korueck of the Third Panzer AOK; because of its proximity to the front line the OD also experienced skirmishes with regular troops.

‡Korueck 590, Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 4 Nov 42 (GMDS, Korueck 27819/3).

§Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt.I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 28—März 1943," 1 Apr 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.56).

¶H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer Mai 1944," 12 Jun 44, p 9 (GMDS, EAP 99/1169).

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The employment of the OD for nonmilitary and nonpolice tasks, as occasionally happens, must cease in the future.*

German Support. German experience reports also contain important information about the influence of German troops and German supervisory personnel on the effectiveness and reliability of the OD. There seems to be absolute unanimity of opinion in all reports, regardless of which German agency prepared them, concerning two points: (a) the OD performed best under German command and (b) the OD personnel required training by German instructors. As early as July 1942 the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center demanded that his security divisions pay more attention to the OD and assist the offices of military administration in matters concerning the OD.† He specifically stated:

The OD in Heeresgebiet Center has shown again its value in combat against partisans. Its losses were relatively high. Cases of unreliability occurred only rarely and happened only when the OD was not in the proximity of German troops and could not defend itself against numerically superior and better armed partisan bands. When the OD is under strict German leadership and supervision, it is an effective help in partisan combat as well as in the execution of regular police tasks.‡

A report of a security division, addressed to the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center, indicates the importance of German troop support in the initial activation of OD units.

The build-up of a really effective OD, especially in the areas formerly held by partisans, is of utmost importance. This, however, is only possible when the men who show interest in enrolling in the OD have the assurance that at first they will receive support in their work from German troops and that the bulk of the partisans will be dispersed or destroyed prior to their own commitment. Experience has shown that up to now the OD cannot stand up against more powerful partisan bands.§

Another security division reported that: "Employment of the OD, because of the over-all situation, is only possible in connection with fortified positions manned by German troops. As long as the OD can be employed together with German troops, it continues to be of value."¶

The Germans often attributed cases of unreliability of the OD directly to the lack of closer supervision. "During the month of December [1942] various cases of unreliability of the OD have occurred. They happened only where no adequate supervision by German skeleton personnel could be made available."**

A security division summarizes its experiences with the OD and utilizes them as a basis for its directive to its subordinate units and commands:

The experiences of the last months have shown better than ever that the reliability of the OD depends to a decisive degree on its German leadership and on the distribution of German soldiers throughout its organization.

* PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht fuer Monat Mai 1944," Jun 44, p 5 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 88a).

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Ia/VII, "Einsatz des OD und sein weiterer Ausbau," 8 Jul 42 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/2, Anlage 11).

‡ [Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte,] Abt.VII/Mil.-Verw., "Monatsbericht fuer Monat September 1942," 8 Oct 42, p 8 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6).

§ 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Partisanenbekämpfung," 29 Jul 42, p 2 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/1, Anlage 112).

¶ 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat November 1942," 6 Dec 42, p 2 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

** 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Dezember 1942," 6 Jan 43, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

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Only in very rare cases do Russian OD leaders and commanders of fortified positions meet German requirements to command a fortified position. It is necessary, therefore, to supply as a principle all fortified positions within the divisional area with a certain number of German instructors. Since the [number of] military policemen [assigned to] the regional offices of military government is insufficient, the troops must render assistance in their own interest. The problem is either to get the effective help of the OD by supporting them or to dissolve the OD and thereby surrender the country [to the enemy]. After looking at the problem in this manner, it follows that only really good soldiers can be considered as commanders of fortified positions—corporals, sergeants, and staff sergeants who are capable of understanding the Russian mentality and are [themselves] of the best character. . . .

As a principle, there should be two German instructors assigned to each of the fortified positions to begin with. . . .*

The same security division analyzes cases of unreliability of the OD as follows:

Impressed by the Russian summer offensive [of 1943] and influenced by an intensive propaganda against which we have nothing comparable to offer, the OD, especially in the area of Gomel, has recently become quite unreliable. The result was mutinies and ambushes in which a number of German soldiers lost their lives, as well as an increase of desertions to the partisans. On closer investigation, it usually was found that the dormant restive attitude was decisively promoted by the German skeleton personnel through improper treatment [of the OD men, such as] beating and severe insults.†

It appears that whenever the Germans were able to keep the OD under close supervision the reliability of the indigenous auxiliary units could be maintained. Army Group Center reported to the OKH in September 1943: "The still existing and repeatedly proved reliability of the OD in the entire Army Group Area is the result of the policy of doing everything to avoid leaving the OD to itself and of placing it instead under strict German command."‡

However, not all German commands and agencies understood the necessity of supporting the OD. They showed through certain actions that they were either entirely unaware of the existence of the OD or that they failed to appreciate even its potential value. Incidents like those reported by the Commander of Heeresgebiet Center to the Commander of Army Group Center must have had most injurious effects on the OD.

It was found in cases in which security troops participated in combined operations with some Panzer divisions, that certain front-line troops knew nothing about the existence of the OD or of its importance. Security troop commanders report that the combat troops pay no attention to the OD and thereby destroy the work used in building it up. . . .

On 24 November 1942 (action of the 20th Panzer Division), the OD strongpoint at Bukhary (13 km SW of the Akatovskoye Lake) was taken by a parachute-motorcycle company. The OD men were arrested and taken to a nearby community and locked in a barn. The company commander of a security company observed all this. The commander of the battalion had already given orders to shoot the OD men, although he was not present. The execution was delayed until the battalion commander returned. He declared on his return that he knew nothing about the existence of OD fortified positions.

* 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Stellung von deutschen Ausbildern fuer OD Stuetzpunkte," 25 Apr 43, pp 1-7 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 206a).

† 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "O.D.," 22 Aug 43, p 1 (GMDS, HGeB 36509/5, Anlage 457).

‡ H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer August 1943," 12 Sep 43, p 12 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

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He could not accept the identification papers carried by the [OD] men. He had ordered the confiscation of their weapons. Finally the release of the OD men could be worked out.

Some time earlier in the same area all inhabitants of a number of communities including women and children were shot by the SS Cavalry Division in a reprisal action. Among the victims were numerous family members of OD men. It is understandable that such measures cause great unrest among the OD and that the desire to fight in the OD ranks diminishes. The OD is already especially exposed to persecution from the hands of the partisans. Daily reports are coming in [telling] about the murdering of family members of the OD.

In view of the present need for the cooperation of the OD in the pacification of the country, it is requested that all armies be made responsible for instructing the front-line troops about the OD and for drawing their attention to the fact that in antipartisan actions the OD should not be shot but, on the contrary, should be utilized in an appropriate manner. The OD defends its immediate homeland, is well acquainted with the terrain, and should be especially useful for reconnaissance in antipartisan operations.*

An examination of German experience reports shows that none of the individual reports apply to the entire OD since local differences such as supplies, training, supervision, German skeleton personnel, geographic location, and the job assigned to the OD played important parts in shaping the character of the unit. German reports indicate that most agencies concerned with the OD were aware of these factors, but it appears that they failed to see the relation between the use made of the unit and the performance of the unit. They failed to realize that there was a great difference if the units were used as a kind of local police, as combat units against the partisans who threatened the very existence of their peasant economy, or as guard detachments for the various looting teams of economic agencies. The derogatory reports about the OD originating with these economic agencies clearly reflect the unwillingness of the OD men to assist the Germans in their forceful collection of foodstuffs from their fellow peasants or to protect depots of stolen property. For example, the employment of OD units from rural areas in support of the collection of the quota of agricultural products was a failure because these OD men hesitated or refused to take action against the peasants. The Germans then called OD units from towns for this task.† The Germans failed to see that the social composition and the attitude of the units placed certain limitations on the use of the OD.

It is also of interest to note that, with few exceptions, German reports do not indicate basic changes in experience with the OD over the course of time. The failure to report changes shows that the Germans were ignoring reality since there are many indications that the performance of the OD reflected the over-all deterioration of the German military position. Whether the Germans failed to report on this because they did not recognize the trend or rather because they did not wish to alarm their higher headquarters is impossible to determine.

Perhaps one of the most impressive arguments in favor of the great value of the OD is its casualty figures which cannot be explained alone by the fact

*Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Ia, "Einsatz des OD," 3 Dec 42, pp 1-2 (GMDS, II Geb 31491/3, Anlage 230).

†203. Sich.Brigr., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 14 Mar 42, pp 7-8 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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that the OD was insufficiently armed and poorly trained.* More convincing reasons for the heavy losses were that the OD men often carried the brunt of local partisan attacks and, as a rule, fought courageously for the pacification of their immediate home territories. Even the Germans were impressed by the casualty figures, and agencies which wished to emphasize the importance of the OD and its reliability used these figures to prove their point. For example, the 201st Security Division reported:

Killed in Jul 1942: 34 Germans and 21 OD men †
 Killed in Nov 1942: 31 Germans and 21 OD men †
 Killed in Dec 1942: 23 Germans and 16 OD men ‡

The reports of the 221st Security Division indicate an even greater proportion of OD casualties:

Losses for Oct 1942:

Killed 6 Germans and 26 OD men
 Wounded 4 Germans and 7 OD men
 Missing 0 Germans and 4 OD men ¶

Losses for Nov 1942:

Killed 13 Germans and 15 OD men
 Wounded 30 Germans and 8 OD men
 Missing 7 Germans and 4 OD men **

Losses for the period from 18 Jun 1942 to 31 Dec 1942:

Killed 95 Germans and 274 OD men
 Wounded 132 Germans and 130 OD men
 Missing 7 Germans and 69 OD men ††

Losses for the period from 1 Jan 1943 to 31 Aug 1943:

Killed 214 Germans and 367 OD men
 Wounded 266 Germans and 156 OD men
 Missing 29 Germans and 221 OD men ††

* Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Monatsbericht fuer Monat August 1942," 10 Sep 42, pp 6-7 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6); [Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte,] Abt.VII/Mil.-Verw., "Monatsbericht fuer Monat September 1942," 8 Oct 42, pp 8-9 (GMDS, HGeb 31491/6); Stuetzpunktkommandantur I/593, "Taetigkeitsbericht," 10 Aug 42, p 4 (GMDS, Korueck 24617/4).

† 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Juli 1942," 6 Aug 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

‡ 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat November 1942," 6 Dec 42, p 2 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

¶ 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer den Monat Dezember 1942," 6 Jan 43, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

†† 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht Oktober 1942," 8 Nov 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/2, Anlage 306).

** 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht November 1942," 5 Dec 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 35408/2, Anlage 385).

††† 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Taetigkeitsbericht des Ic vom 18.6.42-31.12.42," 20 Mar 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/8).

‡‡ 221. Sich.Div., IIa, "Monatsbericht fuer die Zeit vom 1.1-31.8.43," Aug 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/25).
 In addition to these losses, this division also registered the casualties of its other indigenous formations: killed—39 men; wounded—38 men; missing—59 men; and deserted—106 men.

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The reports of the 203d Security Division also show the relatively high losses of the OD:

Killed in Jun 1942:	71 Germans and 21 OD men*
Killed in Jul 1942:	18 Germans and 17 OD men†
Killed in Aug 1942:	16 Germans and 17 OD men‡
Killed in Sep 1942:	8 Germans and 55 OD men§
Killed in Oct 1942:	22 Germans and 13 OD men¶

The following are a few representative figures compiled by Army Group Center.

In May 1944 the OD losses for the entire area of the army group were: killed, 78; wounded, 81; and missing, 29.** The same army group recorded the following OD casualties for the period from August 1942 to June 1944: killed, 4044; wounded, 1974; and missing, 1757. These figures do not include the casualties suffered by the OD beginning with the retreat of 22 June 1944.††

These figures add up to a total of 7775 casualties up to June 1944. Considering that an undetermined number of the 1757 listed as missing might have deserted to the partisans or to the Red Army, the figure still indicates that the casualty rate was well above 10 percent of the total OD forces employed since the OD at its maximum strength in August 1943 had about 45,000 men.

Of interest also is the ratio between the number of killed and wounded. As a rule the number of wounded soldiers in combat exceeds the number killed, and the combat in the rear areas against the partisans did not constitute an exception as the comparable figures of German casualties indicate. However, the OD had more killed than wounded. None of the available German reports contains any suggestion or direct reference to this unusual situation. The following explanations are suggested: the exceedingly high proportion of killed OD men may be the result of the poor first aid and medical care extended to the indigenous personnel who, in many cases, were left to die while German soldiers with equally serious injuries were promptly taken care of; it is possible that the records were not accurate and lighter injuries which the unit medics could handle themselves might not have been reported; and finally it may have been due to the partisan habit of annihilating small OD outposts, operations in which no quarter was granted, and the killing of wounded collaborators in revenge for the OD's acts of treason to the homeland.

The above casualty figures can also be taken as an indication of the extent to which the OD was utilized by its German masters in spite of its poor equipment, lack of sufficient armament, inadequate training, and frequent abusive treatment by the German supervisory and skeleton personnel.

*203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Jul 42, p 5 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 46).

†203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Aug 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 70).

‡203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Sep 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 78).

§203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Oct 42, p 9 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 91).

¶203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 9 Nov 42, p 7 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 116).

**H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer Mai 1944," 12 Jun 44, p 10 (GMDS, EAP 99/1169).

††H.Gr.Mitte, 75857, p 33.

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THE OD AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

It would have been in the German interest if the OD personnel had been able to establish good relations with the local population since the performance of the OD as an auxiliary police and security organ depended largely on the type of physical and moral support given to it by the local inhabitants. Since the OD was recruited from the local population within the community or area in which the unit was to operate, the German agencies hoped that the OD men would remain on good terms with their neighbors. Although these good relations between OD and local population were maintained in some localities, numerous German reports contain information about excesses committed by the OD against the local people.

The Third Panzer AOK, for example, reported that some of the OD men stole from the local population and had to be shot by the Germans.* When OD men conducted house searches, the Germans reported that they robbed the people and treated them roughly "in Russian fashion."† Russian peasants complained to the German officials of the economic agencies about the unreliable elements in the OD and about their unrestrained and rude actions against the population.‡ It also was reported that the Russian civilian population had lost its confidence in the OD because the OD men stole from them and tormented the people.§ A detachment of the Secret Field Police noted that the population continued to complain about the complete arbitrary encroachments on their life and property on the part of the OD. The same report mentions that deserters from partisan bands were treated very poorly by the OD men, an action quite contrary to the propaganda interests of the Germans.¶

The behavior of the OD men toward the civilian population eventually led to a very negative attitude of the people toward the OD, which in certain instances became outright hostile. The arbitrary and unrestrained requisitions conducted by the OD men on their own behalf continued to give impetus to this development.**

The Germans also encountered considerable difficulties in using OD men to recruit laborers for employment in Germany, and they arrived at the following conclusions:

German soldiers must always be used as supervisory executive organs for the recruitment as well as for the transport of Eastern laborers to reception camps; (because) the assignment of executive functions exclusively to the OD had led at times to undesirable acts of terror.††

*PzAOK 3, Ic/AO, "Partisanenbekämpfung," 4 Jul 42 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 20839/3).

†Korueck 590, Abt.VII, "Lagebericht Monat Oktober 1942," 4 Nov 42 (GMDS, Korueck 27819/3); 203. Sich.Div., Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 1 Sep 42, pp 11-12 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

‡Wi In Mitte, Abt.I/1a, "Erfahrungsbericht ueber Zusammenarbeit in der Bandenbekämpfung mit den militärischen Dienststellen," 11 Dec 42 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.29); 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Politische Ueberwachung der Bevoelkerung," 19 Jul 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 86).

§Wi Kdo 201 (Orel), "Lagebericht," 27 Apr 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.525).

¶GFP Gr. 703, "Bericht ueber Lage u. Stimmung der Bevoelkerung," 30 Apr 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 35568/51, Anlage 95).

**221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Politische Ueberwachung der Bevoelkerung," 30 Jun 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 27).

††II.Gr.Mitte, II.Wi.Fü/O.Qu./Qu.2, "Ostarbeiter," 9 Jul 43, p 1 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

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An order, entitled "Excesses of the OD toward the Civilian Population," issued by the Third Panzer AOK in January 1944, clearly indicates how concerned the Germans were about this matter:

I. It happens that OD members succumb to the temptation to commit acts of robbery, looting, and other kinds of excesses against the civilian population. This kind of wild action damages the reputation of the OD and of the [German] armed forces and creates additional enemies for the Reich. Punishable deeds of OD men may under no circumstances be overlooked but must be dealt with according to the severity of the crime. In every case of a punishable crime a summary of evidence or report must be sent immediately . . . to the local judicial officer. . . . Sentences are to be publicly announced in order to serve on the one hand as a deterrent and on the other hand [as an indication] to the people that the German armed forces enforce absolute justice and order.

II. Cases of requisition conducted in enemy (partisan) territory are to be distinguished from wild robberies. Requisitions, however, may never be left to the judgment of the individual OD man; the local German supervisory agency (local office of military government) determines the areas (villages) and the objects which are declared free for requisition; [the German supervisory agency] makes the OD officer responsible for carrying out the mission in an exemplary fashion. . . .*

These reports clearly illustrate that the relations of the OD with the local population were strained and that the OD itself was at least partly to blame for the existence of these tensions. This situation of tension was definitely not in the interest of the German authorities since a widespread negative attitude on the part of a population toward an executive organization greatly reduces the latter's efficiency. Furthermore the Germans depended on the local population to furnish the manpower for the OD and for its replacements.

Interestingly enough, there is no indication in the reports to show that the Germans ever attempted to figure out the cause of this unusual behavior on the part of the OD. A number of factors might have been the basis of the attitude of the OD toward the local population:

a. Like the rest of the population, the OD men, who up to the time of their appointments were at the mercy of either indigenous or foreign authorities, became intoxicated with their newly acquired power and authority. Their attitude was further influenced by the tacit acceptance of the implications of traditional Russian police rule.

b. Prevailing deficiency in discipline, and poor supervision by inadequate OD officers and by undermanned local German agencies undoubtedly conditioned OD attitudes.

c. The example set by certain German agencies, especially the infamous task forces of the SD, and by individual German officials was an influence. It is noteworthy that the brutal treatment of the local population by German units continued even after the official German policy concerning the handling of Eastern peoples was changed.

d. The fact that German agencies did not supply the OD units with sufficient equipment and clothing was an incentive for the OD men to "collect" goods wherever they could be found. The possibility that some OD men had

*PzAOK 3, III/O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Uebergriffe des OD gegenueber der Zivilbevoelkerung," 28 Mar 44 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 63340/22, Anlage 52a).

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joined the indigenous auxiliary units with the express purpose of looting must also be considered.

e. The brutal methods employed in partisan warfare may have made it difficult to use restraint in dealing with "friendly" local people.

f. Personal revenge against former Soviet functionaries, sympathizers, and partisans was a factor.

g. Agents provocateurs within the ranks of the OD who attempted to drive a wedge between the OD and the local population exerted influence.

All the above discussion is based on the assumption that the German agencies followed closely the instructions received from their superior headquarters pertaining to recruiting only local people for the OD. However, there remains the question of how well the Germans really succeeded in getting local people to enlist in the OD especially since in many areas large-scale shifts of the population occurred as a result of forced evacuation because of military and tactical considerations.

An experience report originating with an army and dealing with the character of the OD personnel illustrates the great problem the Germans had on their hands when they attempted to promote better relations between the OD and the local population.

I. Attitude of the personnel

A clearly expressed patriotic attitude toward the civilian population does not exist. Community spirit and comradeship can be found only to a limited extent. . . .

II. Character

Basically good natured and modest. [The individual man] easily feels neglected and prejudiced against. In most cases a great desire for looting exists. Urge to be in the limelight prevails. Awards considerably increase the desire to show positive results. It is absolutely necessary to speak more about duties than about rights to the men; they easily remember the latter but forget the former. Strict methods in dealing [with the men] are essential, justice is an absolute requirement. The German leadership may under no circumstances fail or show any weaknesses. Only absolute correctness can lead to a basis of confidence. The passion for drinking is very strong and often leads to foolish actions which would not have occurred in a sober condition. In most cases visible regret appears afterward. There exists a desire for group life. Real leadership qualities show up only in very rare cases. The reason may be the poor education and the low living standard.*

SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO TERRORIZE, PENETRATE, AND PROPAGANDIZE THE OD

In spite of the fact that the OD, in contrast to other indigenous military formations in the service of the Germans such as the Eastern Battalion (Ost Bataillione) and the Cossack Units (Kosaken Hundertschaften) etc., never assumed major proportions, the Soviets still saw in it a special threat to their own war effort, especially to the partisan movement operating in the rear of the enemy forces. The OD units provided the Germans with some manpower and with important intelligence for antipartisan operations. Their familiarity

* XII A.K., Selbstschutzkompanie, "Erfahrungsbericht ueber russ. Selbstschutz Komp.," 18 Oct 42 (GMDS, XII AK 28746/9, Anlage E. 5).

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with the country, language, and people as well as with the tactics of the partisans made these collaborators particularly valuable German allies and especially dangerous enemies for the partisans. The OD further aided the Germans in the administration and economic exploitation of the occupied territories and thereby assisted the occupier in his effort to consolidate his position. And finally, the OD set an example of collaboration for the local population. The efforts of the Soviets conducted primarily by the partisans to bring about defection of the OD men are therefore quite understandable.

At least three basic methods employed by the Soviets to encourage OD men to desert the German cause and to join the partisans or Red Army can be distinguished: (a) terrorizing OD men by acts of brutal retaliation against both the men and their families; (b) undermining OD units from within after pro-Soviet elements had succeeded in penetrating the indigenous organization; (c) propagandizing the OD from outside the organization.

The systematic alternating use of terror and propaganda—coercion and persuasion—is a well-known Soviet device for making subjugated peoples conform with predetermined patterns of behavior and actions. The penetration of an existing organization within Soviet territories with the intent of destroying the organization from within was, however, a new type of challenge for most of the postrevolutionary Bolsheviks. It appears that they showed a remarkable adaptability for this task.

Acts of Terror. Terrorizing the OD was probably the earliest method employed by the Soviets with the specific aim of intimidating the indigenous auxiliaries and their potential replacements and collaborators. The Soviets were greatly aided in their endeavors by the admitted inability of the Germans to take effective countermeasures against the partisans who were killing OD men and members of the indigenous administration.* The partisans, as the long arm of the Soviet authorities, conducted their acts of terror against the OD men and their families in the most brutal and inhuman manner.†

It appears that in many cases acts of terrorization achieved the desired results. The Germans often explained their inability to recruit sufficient numbers of OD men,‡ the desire of entire units to leave the OD,§ and the return of weapons to German agencies by whole groups of auxiliaries as prompted by the OD's fear of the partisans.¶ Partisan pressure on relatives, wives, and brides of OD men to encourage them to desert to the partisans was at times so strong that the Germans were forced either to evacuate these families or to discharge the men.** At least one case is known in which the Germans extended a prolonged vacation to married OD men who were so deeply concerned about the fate of their families that they were of little use to the occupier.††

* Befh.rueckw.H.Geb.Mitte, Ia, "10-Tagesmeldung, Stand 31.1.42," 2 Feb 42, p 2 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/2, Anlage 40).

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, Abt.VII/K.-Verw., "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 18 Feb 42, p 10 (GMDS, HGeb 24693/6); Prop.Abt.W., Staffel Gomel, "Monatsbericht vom 20.6.43-20.7.43," 21 Jul 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 45).

‡ 201. Sich.Div., Abt.VII, "Lagebericht," 31 Aug 42 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/4).

§ FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 23 Sep 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

¶ 203. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht," 6 Oct 42, p 2 (GMDS, 203 ID 29186/2, Anlage 91).

** PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Fuersorge fuer den OD," 7 Sep 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 33).

†† FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 23 Sep 42, pp 4-5 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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Although in the early phase of partisan actions against the indigenous auxiliaries the outright killing of captured OD men was the rule, this practice changed in the course of time in order to induce voluntary surrender and to facilitate propaganda efforts. Threats of gruesome revenge and brutal retaliation for traitors to the Soviet fatherland, however, remained one important facet of the propaganda effort directed at the OD.*

Penetration. There is little information available concerning Soviet penetration of the OD in 1941 and early 1942. One local office of military government reported that a Communist functionary became enrolled as an OD man but was discovered and shot.† By September 1942 the Germans were convinced that the partisans had orders to penetrate the OD and that in certain cases they had succeeded in doing so. For example, a corps headquarters reported that captured partisans admitted that they were under orders to let themselves be recruited by the Germans for the OD.‡ A security division claimed that the partisans had informants within the OD who succeeded in making the OD of two rayons unreliable and were trying to induce the unit to desert to the partisans.§ Another security division reported the uncovering of a secret Soviet-Polish-White Russian organization in which, among officials of the indigenous administration, the leader of the OD of Marina Gorka and a large part of the local OD unit were involved.¶ A third security division observed that when the Soviets retreated they left behind a group of former party members and NKVD agents who were ordered to penetrate the indigenous administration in order to create a hostile attitude within the local population toward the Germans. They apparently succeeded in certain localities since this division discovered that one mayor, an old Communist party member, managed to get another Communist appointed as local OD leader. Together the two succeeded in keeping the people from revealing their identity to the Germans by means of threats and liquidation of persons whom they considered dangerous.** Russian parachutists were found whose mission was to influence indigenous personnel working for the occupant and to recruit such persons especially for intelligence work.††

A number of German reports illustrate the effects of Soviet penetration in the OD. A security division related that from May 1942 a secret Soviet radio transmitter operated in Novosybkov; it was manned by two agents who were brought in by parachute. When the radio station was uncovered, the two operators succeeded in escaping with the help of two OD men who later were apprehended and shot. As it was later discovered, the OD secretary of the registration office was in contact with these agents and assisted them in obtaining personal identification papers as well as in recruiting an agent net. The OD leader was not only aware of the existence of a subversive and terror organization but he assisted its members by making ammunition and hand grenades available to them. A number of these terrorists used OD member-

* Prop. Abt. W., Staffel Gomel, "Monatsbericht vom 20.6.43-20.7.43," 21 Jul 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 45).

† OK Rshew, Abt. I, "Tatigkeitsbericht," 8 Nov 41 (GMDS, Korueck 17326/11).

‡ LIX A.K., Ia/Pa, "Bandennachrichtenblatt Nr. 1," 2 Sep 42, p 2 (GMDS 12 Pz 25769/14).

§ 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Lagebericht," 6 Sep 42, p 3 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

¶ 203. Sich.Div., Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 28 Sep 42, pp 8-9 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

** 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Agentengruppe Ssurash," 6 Dec 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 56).

†† Wi Kdo Bryansk, "Lagebericht," 15 Dec 42 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.82).

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ship as cover for their activities.* The same security division reported the following incident:

On 16 February 1943, the command of the local office of military government of Krichev was confidentially informed that among the men of OD Detachment IV [anti-partisan] at Krichev, a conspiratorial group had been organized. This group had planned in a secret meeting to blow up a building during a "Strength through Joy" performance or a moving picture show and to use this event as the beginning of a blood bath among the Germans. The ammunition storeroom of the local office of military government in Krichev was to deliver the explosives. Liaison with the prisoners in the POW camp at Nova-Krichev was supposed to have been established and the assistance of 50 men was expected. A member of the conspiratorial group notified the local office of military government of Krichev. All members of the conspiratorial group were apprehended. It is noteworthy that the former OD leader of Detachment IV, previously a Russian first lieutenant who in the past had distinguished himself repeatedly, was the leader of this conspiratorial group.†

The German commander of Gomel observed that partisan attacks on OD strongpoints were well organized. One OD man was seen embracing the leader of the partisan band. It appeared that some OD men sided with the partisans. An OD man who was captured by the partisans but had managed to escape and to return to the Germans reported that he had seen partisans in OD uniforms.‡

Penetration of the OD by Soviet elements was listed by the Germans as one of the major factors causing the desertion of OD men. For example, Army Group Center reported: "Attempts to destroy the OD from within have been observed in individual cases. In Rudnya one of these attempts led to the desertion of 21 OD men to the partisans after they had slain the German skeleton personnel." §

During 1943 the partisans increased their efforts to destroy the OD from within preferring this method to direct military actions. A security division reported in this connection the interception of a radio message: "The partisans seemed to have changed their tactics toward the OD. An intercepted radio message states that not the OD but the German troops are to be engaged; the OD is to be made ineffective from within." The Germans considered these instructions significant since up to that time the partisans avoided combat with German troops whenever possible.¶

Especially during evacuations and retreats the Germans observed that OD men were in contact with partisan units and often succeeded in leading refugees whom they were supposed to protect directly into the hands of the partisans.**

It may be concluded from the German reports that the Soviets were successful in their attempts to penetrate the OD; they were not only able to diminish the usefulness of the OD for the Germans but also to utilize the OD as cover for their own subversive operations. It is quite possible that many acts of sabotage in the German rear areas carried out by Soviet elements were concealed

* 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Nr.33/43/geb.," 11 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 79).

† 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Nr. 117/43/geb.," 21 Feb 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 85).

‡ Kommandant von Gomel, Ia, "Lagebericht," 27 Aug 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/9, Anlage 137).

§ H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer August 1943," 12 Sep 43, p 12 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

¶ 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Bandenlage im Divisionsbereich," 29 Aug 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 9).

** Wi In Mitte, Stab, Abt.I/Id, "Lagebericht Nr. 34—September 1943," 1 Oct 43 (GMDS, Wi/ID 2.59).

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in this manner. Numerous cases of desertion of OD men to the partisans can also be interpreted as a direct result of the activities conducted by Soviet friendly elements within the OD. It is also quite understandable that the Germans became more and more suspicious of the OD's reliability. And finally, the successful penetration of the OD by Soviet elements undermined the confidence of faithful OD men who operated in constant fear of the presence of agents provocateurs.

Propaganda. Soviet propaganda directed at the OD was as a rule conducted by the partisans. Its primary purpose was to induce the individual OD men as well as entire units to desert to the forces which continued to serve the Soviet fatherland in the struggle against the foreign occupants.

One of the media was the mouth-to-mouth propaganda started either by the partisans themselves who mingled for this purpose with the population or by captured OD men who were released by the partisans after they were treated well by the latter, obviously for propaganda purposes.* The decent treatment of captured OD men by the partisans was quite in contrast to the brutal killings perpetrated during the early phase of partisan actions against the OD. This change in treatment resulted in increased OD desertions.†

Written propaganda was disseminated to the OD as a rule by individuals either as handbills or as wall posters. Printed appeals and leaflets were also occasionally dropped from planes.‡

Soviet written propaganda often took the form of appeals to collaborators in general or to OD units as a whole as the following two documents illustrate. These documents are presented here without deletions because they reveal the type of argument used by the Soviets in persuading OD men to cease collaboration with the enemy.

Death to the German Occupants!

To the Policemen and Mayors!

Think it over and return before it is too late! Fascist Germany broke her treaty and invaded our country. Hitler had counted on defeating the USSR within a few days; however, the Blitzkrieg did not succeed. Germany will be destroyed by the united forces of the USSR, England, and the USA and the other democratic countries of the world.

The manpower reserves of Germany and of her allies are coming to an end. They need an armed [force] to safeguard their order in the occupied counties, [to carry out] the plundering of settlements, and to fight our people and the partisans. For this purpose they established police units, called Ordnungsdienst. Here and there such traitors and egotists could be found who entered the police [service] and took up arms against their own people and the Red Army.

We address ourselves to all policemen, mayors, and to all those who are working in the agencies of the occupation power.

*27. Sich.Reg., "Tgb. Nr. 231/42 g.", 7 Jul 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29350/5, Anlage 13).

†221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Politische Ueberwachung der Bevoelkerung," 2 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 97); 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Bandenlage im Divisionsbereich," 4 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 4).

‡221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Politische Ueberwachung der Bevoelkerung," 2 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 97); Prop.Abt.W., Staffel Gomel, "Monatsbericht vom 20.6.43-20.7.43," 21 Jul 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 45).

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Think it over! You are doing an abominable thing. You are soiling the honor and dignity of the Russian people. You are helping the enemies of our fatherland. You, former citizens of the Soviet Union, have become traitors to the land of your birth. For stooping so low and becoming enemies to your fatherland your children, wives and parents will curse you.

On the Kalinin and West front the Red Army advances, destroys the German robbers, chases them from the Soviet soil.

For the treason to your homeland the people will bring you to account without mercy.

You still can save your lives and the lives of your families if you come over to us immediately.

We suggest that before it is too late you come over with your arms to the side of the Red Army and the partisans. Destroy the German garrisons, the means of communication and roads; let the German trains roll down the embankments; burn down the camps and come to us!

We guarantee, to you and your families, life and inviolability.

This leaflet is a pass to come over to the side of the Red Army and partisans. It is also possible to come over without this paper.*

Citizens of the Smolensk area!

Russian Comrades enlisted by the enemy into the German police! The partisans of the Smolensk area address you!

Yesterday, we received a leaflet in which traitors of the fatherland, traitors of the Russian people, who became lackeys of the Germans, intend to intimidate us. We are not afraid of threats! We have helped, we are helping, and we will help the Red Army, which is not only not destroyed, as the Germans are proclaiming, but is causing the enemy heavier and heavier losses. During the last 3 months, the Germans lost on the Soviet-Russian front 1,250,000 soldiers and officers, more than 4000 planes, 3390 tanks, and over 4000 guns.

In the fight which has lasted [now] for 1 year, in the northern part of the Smolensk area alone, we have destroyed more than 10,000 Germans, hundreds of motor vehicles, many military trains with soldiers, officers, and supplies. The Germans in their dirty newspapers call us "forest bandits." In his correspondence, however, the enemy refers to us as a "scourge" and as a "frightful power." And herein he is right. There, where the partisans are, the Germans cannot and will not be able to live! We shall annihilate them in our woods, in our villages, and wherever they appear. Every Soviet patriot from the counties of Kaspli, Dukhovshchina, Deinidov, Prechistaya, Yartsevo, Rudnya, Ponizovye and the other counties of the Smolensk area must take revenge on the enemy for the slain fathers, husbands, and brothers, for the wronged wives and sisters, for the slaughtered children, for the blood of the Russian comrades, for the fatherland!

The enemy knew how to employ for himself the weakness and cowardice of some Russian comrades and to hire them for his police; others who were unwilling to join [the police he] enlisted by force of arms and under pressure of persecution of their families. But the Germans themselves despise those people and do not trust them. As reprisal for every German killed in our ambushes, the Fascists shoot dozens of policemen. Not even the Germans trust these traitors of the fatherland!

*FK 550, K.-Verw.Gruppe, "Lage- und Taetigkeitsbericht," 23 Nov 42 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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Policemen!

Against whom are you working? Against whom are you turning the weapons which the enemies of our people, the Germans, have given you? You are turning against your own people; you have raised your weapons against your brothers and sisters, the partisans.

Only by coming over to our side, only by joining our common fight against the enemy of the Russian people, the Germans, will you cleanse yourselves from your shame [and] buy yourselves free from your guilt.

We call on you to enter our partisan detachments and fight with us against the Germans. Many have already realized their guilt and have come over to us and are fighting with us against the Germans. In one of our detachments are 2 platoons [comprised] of former policemen. Some of them not only atoned for their guilt, but were even recommended for decoration by the government for their fighting courage.

We are strong and we are numerous! We possess excellent weapons and our determination for victory is stronger than death. We cannot be defeated. You, however, are destined for destruction. You either fall by the hands of the avengers of the people, who will reach you wherever you are, or you will be shot by the Germans as soon as they have no further use for you.

Come to your senses before it's too late! Think about the 150 innocent inhabitants of Kaspli, who were shot in July of this year by the Germans in a bestial manner; look around you and you will see dozens of villages and communities which were burned down by the Germans and hundreds of people who were brought into slavery by them. Realize that only an implacable fight against the German robbers will save you from the kind of settlement which the Germans will make with you for the help you have rendered them in their horrible crimes. On the other hand, by common action, we shall, together with the Red Army, chase the enemy from our native Russian soil.

Come to us and fight with us against the common enemy of the Russian people, the Germans. However, if you continue to fight against us in the future as you have up to now, then a merciless judgment is waiting for you, if not today, then tomorrow, [and] if not tomorrow, then the day after tomorrow!

Mothers, wives, and sisters of the policemen!

Read this carefully and think about what is in store for your sons, husbands, and brothers if they do not come over to us but continue to be traitors to the fatherland. Eternal shame will come on you and your children!

Every policeman can come over to us with this leaflet calmly, without fearing anything, and enter our ranks. He will be forgiven; his life, and the well-being of his family will remain secure.

Visit without hesitation the camps of the partisan detachments. This leaflet serves as a pass for a single man as well as for entire groups of policemen who come over to us.

Death to the German occupants!

The Commander of the Partisan Detachments of the Smolensk Area, "Batya" *

A second type of Soviet written propaganda directed to the OD men were the appeals of former collaborators. This approach was considered important because it was intended to disperse the fears of potential deserters concerning their fate at the hands of the partisans after their desertion. It was designed

*XXIII. A.K., Ic, "Uebersetzung eines Flugblattes des Partisanenfuhrers 'Batya,'" Sep 42 (GMDS, XXIII AK 76156, Anlage 23).

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to convince them that they and their families would be treated as comrades who had failed but who were given the chance of redeeming themselves. The following two documents are examples.

Death to the German Occupants!

To all so-called "Ukrainian Soldiers," "Cossacks," and "Policemen"! From former soldiers (captured Red Army men) of the 221st German Division, 230th Battalion, Ukrainian Company, now "Red Partisans" [13 names follow].

Comrades! Because of the existing conditions, the [pressure of] arms and treacherous fraud, the German henchmen succeeded in putting a number of captured Red Army men and other Soviet citizens into their service. After they made you their servants, the Germans forced you to commit dirty actions in their interest, [such as] fighting your own people, murdering, plundering, exploiting [your] own people, destroying towns and villages of your native country.

Comrades! Enough of the German insolence unparalleled in history! Let us finish all of it. It is time to come to our senses. It is time to wake up from the devil's sleep. It is time to take revenge on the German conquerors. It is time to retaliate for the murders and tortures of captured Red Army men, and of our people, for our towns and villages, for our native country. This is the duty and sacred obligation of every fighter and citizen of the USSR. And every one of you can do it. Always, everywhere and at any time you can come over to us, to your own [people], to the Red Army, to the Red partisans, and you yourselves can organize partisan groups.

Comrades! Follow our example. Come over to the Red partisans; destroy anyone who attempts to obstruct your decision. Perhaps the thought of coming over to the partisans brings forth the fear that the partisans will take revenge on you for your service with the Germans, because the Germans try by all means to convince you, as they tried to convince us, that the Red partisans and the Red Army will annihilate you as traitors to your Fatherland. But this is a lie. The Germans themselves have no strength to fight the Red partisans and the outraged people; [therefore] they spread animosity among our people and exploit you against your [own] people. The Germans force you with their weapons and ruses to kill your friends and brothers in order to exploit this fight and to rule themselves. The Red Army and the Red partisans know all of this and take it into consideration. Therefore, all those who come over as friends to the partisans and to the Red Army will always be received by the partisans and the Red Army as friends with warm and brotherly greetings. The fear and worry about coming over to the Red partisans and to the Red Army is therefore without justification. They are only trump cards in the hands of the Germans. We had the opportunity to find this out by ourselves. On 23 September 1942, we, 13 men, left the Germans with our weapons from the village Polese, county Gomel, and went over to the Red partisans. The partisans were very friendly in receiving us. After a friendly conversation we were told that from now on we were partisans and citizens of the USSR with full rights. When we were told that, we felt suddenly as if other blood ran through our arteries, clear and hot blood of a citizen of the USSR. It is impossible to describe this atmosphere, this experience of joy. We were ashamed that we had not gone over to the partisans earlier.

Comrades! All of you should join the partisans without delay. Here are our own friends and brothers. Here are the real sons of our native country who together with the Red Army and all the peoples of the USSR fight against the German conquerors without regard to their own lives, and for honor, freedom, and independence of the homeland.

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Only in the ranks of the Red Army or Red partisans can everybody take revenge on the German cannibals for the death and torture of the captured Red Army men, of your fathers, brothers, sisters, for the destroyed towns and villages and [only here can one] fight for the honor, freedom, and independence of our homeland.

Death to the bandit Hitler, the organizer of the bloody world slaughter!

Long live our Red Army, the liberator!

Long live Comrade Stalin, the organizer of the annihilation of the German conquerors!

October 1942 *

Death to the German Occupants!

To the Police!

A few days ago we still were OD men in Lapichi and Cherveni and had served the Fascists with arms in hand and in fear of death. Hundreds of innocent citizens lost their lives through our hands. Instinctively one now asks oneself the question: How was it possible, that we, Soviet citizens, became traitors to our fatherland, friends of the spies, Luther from Lipien, Zarin from Miradino and of many other cannibals who drink the Russian blood?

There is only one answer: the Fascists deceived us, they pulled us into their spider webs and sent us against our brothers and fathers.

After we had recognized our crime toward the fatherland, we decided to go to the partisans. At first we were afraid that the partisans would shoot us, but later we decided that it is better to be shot by the partisans than to remain in the treacherous service and to kill our brothers, fathers, sisters, and mothers. We came with our weapons to the partisans and said: Do with us whatever you wish. We shall no longer serve the Germans. The partisans scolded us severely and said that they would give us an opportunity to make up for our guilt by fighting against the Germans.

We have rendered the oath to fight to the last drop of our blood with the partisans against the German conquerors of our fatherland and for our people.

Now we are Red partisans, the people's avengers. We have found out that in other counties of White Russia hundred of OD men are already fighting with the partisans against our blood-enemies, the German bandits.

We are able to see for ourselves the intensity with which the population hates the OD men and we advise you with clear conscience to escape from the bloody German paws before it is too late and to fight with weapons in your hands for your fatherland. We are warning [you] however that one can come to the partisans only with an open soul; traitors and spies are quickly discovered and shot. Leave [the Germans] while it is still possible; the partisans will accept you.

The former OD men
[signatures illegible]†

*221. Sich.Div., Ic, "An Prop. Abt. W. Smolensk," 9 Nov 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 65).

†203. Sich.Div., Abt. VII/K.-Verw., "Lagebericht," 28 Nov 42 (GMDS, 203 ID 32104).

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Appeals of former collaborators were also used to make the partisan leaflet series more impressive. For example, it was reported that the secret printing press at Klabino published the first issue of a leaflet series of the Gomel partisans which included appeals written by OD men who had deserted.*

And finally there were secret letters addressed to individual OD men which furnish us with a good insight into the Soviet propaganda method of combining promises and threats.† This practice does not seem to have been the result of individual actions of a few enterprising partisan leaders. On the contrary, German reports give the impression that these letters were a standard propaganda device. A security division reported: "In addition to leaflets, letters from partisans addressed to individual OD members and Russians employed at German offices were often delivered which appealed to them to desert and to bring along their weapons."‡

According to a security regiment report, the leader of the OD of Mglin received two letters via messenger from the partisans who demanded that he cease his activities for Germany and help his own brothers.§ The following two letters are examples of these "personal" appeals:

10 June 1943

Comrade Kozlov,

I believe that it is necessary to warn you that I am in possession of your letters addressed to Lieutenant Rakov and Afanasev. Therefore, your statement "better late than never" is unimportant for us and does not impress us. These documents which I have in my hands could, if need be, be used as evidence for your [own] doom.

The fatherland demands from us not fancy correspondence with pretty phrases, but useful concrete work for the destruction of the enemy. In this respect we have to take chances, [but] you are lacking in the Bolshevik power of decision. Every minute lost may cost you your life.

We specifically wish to know the following:

1. I happen to know that you have under your command 60 men. Report to me in your next letter when you, with your men and other people, can come over to us. (State exactly which road you will use and where we can meet you.)
2. Report to us the [strengths of the] following:
 - (a) policemen,
 - (b) indigenous units,
 - (c) German units,
 - (d) other enemy units. It is necessary to report exactly where and how many are quartered as well as their armament.
3. The strength of the garrison in Propoisk and their quarters (exact location and number).
4. What is the sentiment of the population toward the partisans, especially in the leading circles? (2 to 3 examples)

* Prop. Abt. W., Staffel Gomel, "Monatsbericht vom 20.3.-20.4.1943," 20 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 42).

† Prop. Abt. W., Staffel Gomel, "Monatsbericht vom 20.6.43-20.7.43," 21 Jul 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 45).

‡ 203. Sich.Div., Ic, "Monatsbericht fuer Monat Maerz 1943," 7 Apr 43, p 3 (GMDS, 203 ID 35950/2, Anlage 48).

§ 27. Sich.Regt., Ic, "Politische Ueberwachung der Bevoelkerung," 29 Nov 42 (GMDS, 221 ID 29380/9, Anlage 94).

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5. Before coming over, you may talk over these questions with Moshe (Moshe is OD Company leader in Propoisk) if you find it necessary, because your [mutual] relationship is known to us. Your decision about your wife and family is supported by us.

Comrade Kozlov, this is the last letter. If necessary your document will fall into the hands of the GFP [Geheime Feldpolizei, Secret Field Police]. Your ultimate fate will be decided there. We are speaking in simple Bolshevik words without threat.

We expect your answer on 13 June 1943.

Greetings,

Leader of the Special Section
[Soviet Counterintelligence Section]

(signed): Denisov
Captain *

Dear Friend and Comrade Seriozha,

By a piece of bread and by threats the German Fascists succeeded in drawing you into their nets. With deception and threats they demand that you fight your people and fatherland. The enemy has brought you and your family on a road from which there is no salvation. Although the Germans for the time being issue orders in our country, their cause is lost in spite of all. The course of the war, as you know, has considerably changed. The plan of the Fascist robbers is destroyed. Millions of German soldiers and officers who wanted to put you into slavery must sacrifice their lives, and their bodies will decay in the ground. We, who are writing these lines, were also deceived by the Germans and were on the fishhook of the cursed enemy. Now, in the hour of revenge, we are within the ranks of the comrades and are fighting with arms in our hands against the animal-like Fascists.

We derailed with great skill several troop transports. Several hundred "Fritzes" burned to death in the shot-up trucks on the roads. This is repeated daily; you have heard it yourself.

You, Seriozha, have a great task and you must carry out the miracle on the "Fritz" who sits in Propoisk. It is necessary to risk something to make a decision and show Bolshevik bravery. Many are afraid because of their past. However, they can make up for their guilt with work.

Enter the ranks of the partisans; time will not wait; the hour of revenge on the Fascists is here! Close ranks against the cursed enemy!

(Give this to Grishakin.)

With friendly greetings [names follow]

10 June 1943

(Signed) Korchagin†

*OK I (V) 845, Feldgendarmiergruppe, "B. Tgb. Nr. 1245/43," 15 Jun 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/9, Anlage 42).

†Ibid.

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In general, certain propaganda themes are fairly constant. The appeal to the patriotism of the OD men seemed to have produced good results.* Efforts were made to impress the OD men with the successes of the Red Army, the partisans, and the world-wide alliance fighting against Germany in order to convince the collaborators that they were on the losing side. They were also reminded that even if the Germans were to win, the OD men would still suffer, a reminder of which the Germans furnished ample supporting evidence. It is also of interest to note that all the examined propaganda appeals to collaborators do not contain any reference to the Communist party or to the Soviet system as such.

One exceptionally clever attempt made by the partisans to undermine the morale of the OD and to spread distrust among the OD men against their German masters does not fit directly into any one of the above-described propaganda methods but is mentioned here because it shows the resourcefulness of the partisans. The Commander of Heeresgebiet Center reported: "Two [German] members of a battalion of the 201st Security Division were captured by the partisans. The partisans made an offer to exchange them for OD men. The offer was refused, but negotiations for an exchange on a different basis are being conducted."†

If the Germans had accepted the proposed exchange of OD men for captured German soldiers, the partisans would have had a strong propaganda point to demonstrate to the OD to what extent the Germans considered them expendable.

According to the German reports examined, Soviet propaganda directed at the OD men was quite successful. Desertions of OD men to the partisans were attributed to this propaganda.‡ Even collaborators who had served for a prolonged period of time in the OD were affected by it; one security division observed that among long-term collaborators especially the desertion rate was high.§ The same report also reveals that Soviet propaganda was responsible for the desertion of many other OD men together with physicians, medics, pharmacists, mechanics, and tractor drivers—although it does not indicate if the latter group was part of the OD organization.¶ The Germans also observed that POWs among the OD were especially susceptible to Soviet propaganda, became more and more unreliable, and deserted to the partisans.** A German report indicates that former OD men who joined the partisans really attempted to redeem themselves in line with the proposals made in Soviet propaganda; they participated in ambushes in order "to be included in Stalin's grace."†† The proportions of known desertions reached by the middle of 1943 in Heeres-

* Cf. 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Bandenlage im Divisionsbereich," 4 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 4).

† Komm.Gen.d.Sich.Tr.u.Befh.i.H.Geb.Mitte, "KTB Nr. 3 der Fuehrungsabteilung," 11 Nov 42 (GMDS, II Geb 31491/1).

‡ 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer Dezember 1942," 5 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 8); 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Bandenlage im Divisionbereich," 7 Mar 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24).

§ 203. Sich.Div., Ic, "Monatsbericht fuer Monat Maerz 1943," 7 Apr 43, p 1 (GMDS, 203 ID 35950/2, Anlage 48).

¶ *Ibid.*, p 3.

** 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer Monat Maerz 1943," 5 Apr 43, pp 7-9 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 174); 221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Gesamtbeurteilung der landeseigenen Verbände, Hilfswilligen und O.D.," 18 Apr 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/4, Anlage 193b).

†† Wi In Nord, Stab, Abt.I/Ic, "KTB. Nr. 10," 1943 (GMDS, Wi/ID .168).

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gebiet Center—how many of the "missing" OD men had deserted naturally could not be determined—are indicated by these figures: June—272 men; July—206 men; and August—165 men.*

But even when Soviet propaganda did not succeed in inciting OD men to outright desertion or active sabotage, the Germans noticed that as one result the discipline and morale of the indigenous auxiliary units were negatively affected. They also were afraid that in the course of time the OD would be so strongly undermined that it would be dangerous for the Germans to issue arms to the OD men.†

The Germans tried to take countermeasures against the Soviet attempts to turn the OD against them. The German measures to combat defection were their own propaganda, strict surveillance of the OD units including the employment of indigenous informants planted in the OD, dismissal and punishment of unreliable OD personnel, and retaliations against the families of OD deserters.‡ As far as the employment of informants within the OD was concerned, it appears that by these methods the Germans occasionally were able to prevent serious cases of subversive activity.§ The retaliatory action against the families of OD deserters is well illustrated by a divisional order of a security division:

Families of OD men who deserted to the partisans are as a principle to be arrested immediately and turned over to the Secret Field Police. After screening [them] this [agency] will initiate action assigning them to the labor camp at Gomel unless they are shot as accomplices. Their entire property is to be confiscated.¶

However, it appears that German countermeasures as a whole were ineffective as is indicated by the great number of desertions and the continued German preoccupation with the reliability of their collaborators,**leaving the question open how much larger the desertion would have been without the German counterefforts.

*H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer August 1943," 12 Sep 43, p 12 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

†221. Sich.Div., Ia, "Monatsbericht fuer Monat Mai 1943," 7 Jun 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/5, Anlage 274); 707. Inf.Div., "Fernschreiben an Korueck 532," 9 Sep 43 (GMDS, 707 ID 41762/3).

‡221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Behandlung der Angehoerigen von Ueberlauftnern aus dem O.D.," 4 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 95); 201. Sich.Div., Ia, "Taehtigkeitsbericht," 6 Sep 42 (GMDS, 201 ID 29196/2).

§See, for example, 221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Nr. 33/43, geh.," 11 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 79).
¶221. Sich.Div., Ic, "Behandlung der Angehoerigen von Ueberlauftnern aus dem O.D.," 4 Jan 43 (GMDS, 221 ID 36509/24, Anlage 95).

**PzAOK 3, O.Qu./VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Lagebericht," 4 Oct 43, pp 5-6 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 39); PzAOK 3, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "OD," 17 Oct 43 (GMDS, PzAOK 3, 58021, Anlage 45); H.Gr.Mitte, O.Qu./Qu.2/VII (Mil.-Verw.), "Monatsbericht fuer Monat August 1943," 12 Sep 43, pp 12-13 (GMDS, EAP 99/1084).

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Chapter 5 IN CONCLUSION

An evaluation of any specific German policy or action in the occupied Eastern territories or in any particular area in the East must take into consideration the fact that the Germans entered the Soviet Union with definite and predetermined policies. For all practical purposes they intended to change as little as possible the Soviet system which they believed would be advantageous for strict German control of manpower and production. Thus it was assumed, for example, that the continuation of the collective farm system, under a different name, would facilitate the economic exploitation of the country. There was also the general attitude of the Germans toward the "inferior" Slavic peoples which was characteristic not only of Nazi policy makers and their followers but also of many of the military leaders. This overbearing attitude toward the Slavic population influenced to a considerable extent German methods of dealing with the indigenous people including even those who were willing to collaborate with the occupier. Much has been said and written about these two concepts, and a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is important to keep their existence in mind because they precluded the formulation of policies that took into consideration the interests and desires of the population and prevented the field commanders from, if for no other reason than military expediency, pursuing a different policy toward the native population and the indigenous collaborators when it became apparent that the cooperation of the local population was essential for victory. Even though it is most unlikely that a future occupant of the Eastern territories will be burdened with the same type of arrogant preconceptions, which preclude the formulation of sound policies, there are still a number of things which a potential foreign occupier might learn from a careful analysis of German experiences in such an area as discussed above.

In general, German methods in dealing with the over-all security problem were influenced by the following factors:

a. All German military and policy planning concerning the war against the Soviet Union reflected overconfidence in German power and underestimation of Soviet capabilities. Furthermore it was based on the conviction that the Russian campaign would last only a short time and would end in total German victory following the early collapse of the Soviet government.

b. The Germans neither possessed nor developed a set of alternative strategic concepts and policy schemes in the event that the Soviets would continue to resist.

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c. New occupation practices required by the prolonged war and by military set-backs emerged slowly, unsystematically, and usually too late to be effective.

d. Only small security forces were provided for the military occupation in the East since the Germans intended to divert only a minimum of forces from the front. Although the rear areas covered large territories and were traversed by long lines of communication, this plan was never altered.

e. Except for certain SS intentions no specific plans were made prior to the actual occupation for utilizing indigenous manpower for security tasks, and complete reliance was placed on the small German security forces for the maintenance of peace and order.

f. When the necessity of supplementing German security forces with indigenous manpower became apparent, the field commanders, such as the commanders of the Heeresgebiete or the Koruecks, proceeded to organize indigenous auxiliary units without authorization from highest headquarters, and therefore no uniform procedure existed. There were no prior plans for organization, subordination, supplies, rations, pay, awards, or compensations.

g. The Germans generally lacked understanding of the mentality of the Eastern peoples, who were a product of Russian tradition and the totalitarian Soviet system, a fact which aggravated the relations between the occupation forces and the population within and without the auxiliary units and deeply affected the effectiveness of the latter. Actually the indigenous collaborators were never fully trusted and therefore never received the kind of support required to mold them into formations of great fighting quality.

If the German expectation of an early collapse of the Soviet regime had been fulfilled, the factors listed would almost certainly have been far less significant to the security problem. The German plans were a logical consequence of the premises on which they were built. The unfortunate thing for the Germans was that their premises were wrong. The German plan of concentrating their military effort on the defeat of the Red Army and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet government was sound, but it depended entirely on an intensive and short campaign against an inferior opponent. The trouble was that the opponent was not as inferior as the Germans anticipated and, therefore the war became a drawn-out and costly enterprise.

The rear-area policies were likewise greatly affected by the over-all anticipation of a short war. The Germans in their advance naturally attempted to liquidate all possible centers of local resistance, but they assigned to these tasks a secondary priority believing that this could be done at their leisure after the main body of the enemy's army was destroyed. Thus the Germans contributed by default to the growth of resistance in the rear areas which in turn aggravated the security problems for the small German security forces. Eventually the Germans were in a most difficult position. As the war dragged on, rear-area security troops were called to the front line while in the rear areas the growing partisan movement expanded and was opposed only by insufficient and weak German units supported by poorly armed and equipped indigenous collaborators.

From the German experience in the public safety and security field it may be concluded that:

1. An invader of Soviet territory, regardless of his motivation for entering the country, must expect resistance in the areas to the rear of the front

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lines. This resistance will be generated by remnants of Soviet military forces caught in the rear or by Communists and Soviet functionaries who will repeat the organization of partisan units as they did during the last war.

2. The pacification of the rear areas is a major undertaking because of the large areas and the difficult terrain and requires much larger and better trained units than the Germans employed for this purpose.

3. Since over-all occupation policies tend to encourage or discourage resistance among the population, a clear statement of the occupier's policy and an early implementation of at least some of its aspects is desirable. For example, the return of the land to the peasants should be one of the first steps taken in areas liberated from Soviet rule. It is true that such undertakings are not in agreement with standard civil affairs/military government doctrines which clearly distinguish between the tasks of military government in the combat phase (when it acts as a mere tool for the successful conduct of military operations) and its mission in the later occupation phase (when it is an executive agency for over-all policy implementation). The reason for the suggested deviation is the necessity of gaining quickly the confidence of the indigenous population whose assistance is mandatory for a successful solution of the security problem. If high policy considerations must override such a measure as the early distribution of land (a reform which would have the greatest impact on a very large segment of the population), other liberating actions such as freedom of religion may also have salutary effects on the attitude of the indigenous population.

4. The willingness of a large segment of the Russian population to cooperate with the occupier was clearly demonstrated in the beginning of the German-Russian campaign. This favorable situation for the Germans, however, rapidly deteriorated when the Nazis put into practice their plans for exploiting the country and mistreating the population. It is not unlikely that a future occupier will be received with a less cooperative spirit than the German Army was and will be distrusted by the Russian people. Therefore, gaining the confidence of the population at an early stage of the occupation is of utmost importance and might be facilitated by disseminating a clear over-all policy statement and by genuine liberating actions.

5. The nature of the security problem will be influenced to a large degree by the general attitude of the population because the various resistance groups that in all probability will come into existence cannot operate for a prolonged period of time without the support of a substantial part of the population.

6. The occupier cannot hope to find even the remnants of an indigenous police organization since the police is a trusted and integral part of the Soviet system and therefore must be expected to retreat, as it did during the German advance, or go underground. In the beginning the occupant will have to rely almost exclusively on his own forces. However, again taking German experiences as a guide, the occupier may expect to find favorable conditions for the organization of indigenous auxiliary police and security units that can, when properly organized and directed, be a great help in the security and public safety fields.

German experiences in utilizing indigenous manpower for security tasks are indicative of mistakes to be avoided and problems to be overcome. Considering the large areas of the Soviet territory, it is often suggested and probably correctly, that a successful occupation of the USSR is possible only with

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the active support of the indigenous population and that therefore the people must be induced to collaborate in the maintenance of peace and order. Thus the question is not so much whether an indigenous auxiliary police should be organized at all but rather how it should be done.

First, it is absolutely essential that careful plans be drawn up for an indigenous auxiliary police force well in advance of the commencement of the occupation. The jurisdiction over the indigenous organization must be entrusted to one agency since division of authority leads to jurisdictional conflicts well demonstrated by the controversies between the SD and the German military agencies. This proposal does not preclude the possibility that the police organization might gradually become the responsibility of a provisional government or local administration; however, even in such a development, the same agency of the occupier must retain the supervisory or liaison functions.

Second, it is necessary to agree on the type of organization that would be most efficient for security tasks. Several solutions are possible. The organization could be based on the principle of decentralization and be comprised of a vast network of small local units directly controlled by the local agency in charge of public safety. Or it could have a clear-cut hierarchy and utilize the existing political subdivisions of the country. Indigenous auxiliary police units would be responsible not only to the local agency in charge of public safety but also to indigenous police officials of the next higher administrative level, who in turn would also be supervised and controlled at the next higher administrative level by the military governmental agency in charge of public safety. Or it would be possible to organize the indigenous police on a local level and carry the hierarchical organization up only to a predetermined administrative level. Furthermore it is essential to decide if the indigenous units should be further broken down according to their various missions. The German notion of the four different detachments* might basically have been a sound one although it is difficult to conceive that it was necessary for small local units. In communities of about 3000 or more inhabitants it appears more practical to organize police units along functional lines while keeping indigenous police units of village communities undivided.

Third, great attention will have to be paid to the proper supply system. As has been shown, the lack of weapons, ammunition, rations, clothing, etc., had a very bad effect—both psychologically and practically—on the indigenous personnel. Native resources are too uncertain to be relied on. Sufficient supplies also will reduce the not uncommon looting committed by indigenous collaborators.

Fourth, of great consequence is the recruitment policy. German reliance on local manpower was advantageous both because these people had a vested interest in the pacification of their immediate communities and because it considerably eased the screening process. However, it also had its disadvantages because it often made the size of the local unit dependent on the number of available local volunteers and not on the specific security requirements. Although the local and voluntary recruitment system is by far the best as long as sufficient numbers of local volunteers join the auxiliary indigenous police, not enough manpower can always be mobilized in this way. Perhaps a combina-

*Detachment I, criminal police; Detachment II, political police; Detachment III, regular police; and Detachment IV, special units (antipartisan and guard units).

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tion of the voluntary system with a forced recruitment policy could work if the drafted members of the police were employed only for limited duties. Although the volunteers could be used anywhere and in large mobile units that could be shifted as required, the drafted auxiliary policemen should be used only in the small local units for strictly local police missions, where they could most easily be supervised.

Fifth, the training of indigenous personnel is of utmost importance. Arrangements must be made to set up within a short time a sufficient number of schools and other training facilities where men, noncommissioned officers, and officers can be trained by capable instructors who either are familiar with the native languages or are assured the assistance of qualified interpreters. Since most of the volunteers will lack prior police training and may have joined the police for reasons other than to contribute to the maintenance of peace and order, good training and strict military discipline are mandatory. As German experience shows, the quality of the training and supervisory personnel is of decisive importance to the efficiency of the indigenous unit, and every effort should be made to keep the supervisory personnel with its indigenous unit as long as possible in order to facilitate the development of a genuinely loyal relationship between the indigenous personnel and the instructors and/or supervisors.

Sixth, the Germans seemed to have recognized a number of specific items as having great influence on the morale and efficiency of the indigenous auxiliary units although they failed to capitalize on them. For instance, it was recognized that the indigenous personnel were most anxious to be treated like German soldiers. It was believed that a "morale officer" (Betreuungsoffizier) was of great significance for the morale of the units. Moreover, prior to turning over security tasks to indigenous units, the area should be more or less pacified by the occupant's troops, thus giving the new units a good start. Anyone who has worked with indigenous personnel in occupied areas will confirm the fact that these people need a large degree of understanding and assistance in personal affairs from their immediate superiors in the occupation forces. Lasting influence on the morale of individuals and entire units depends on a genuine understanding of the supervisory personnel for the personal problems of the collaborators. Unfortunately the importance of such personal assistance is often not recognized and frequently it is regarded as a time-consuming nuisance not worth the additional effort.

Seventh, the occupant must also realize that the social composition of the indigenous units determines the way in which these units can be utilized. The standing of the indigenous units in the eyes of the local population is of great significance for their effectiveness. If, as was done in the German occupation, the OD is employed as guard units for looting teams, its usefulness becomes insignificant since eventually it is solidly opposed by the native population.

Finally a potential occupier of former Soviet territories should recognize two primary values which the Germans apparently ignored. One of them is that the police unit, consisting of local men, can be most useful in identifying former Soviet and Party officials who otherwise might be difficult or even impossible to detect. The other is that the collaborators' intimate knowledge of the local terrain makes them indispensable in police as well as military operations.

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It is hoped that the findings of this study support the thesis that in general the indigenous auxiliary police units could have been a far more valuable instrument for the pacification of the rear areas in the occupied Eastern territories if German policies, concepts, actions, and basic distrust had not prevented their effective development. It was certainly less the fault of certain imaginary Slavic characteristics than the fault of the Germans that the performance of the OD did not live up to German expectations. However, there can be no doubt that in spite of all the handicaps placed on the indigenous collaborators they did contribute considerably to the German attempt to consolidate the occupied areas. Even though the number of OD men never reached the impressive figures of former Russian POWs who entered various indigenous military formations fighting on the German side, the large group who, in the midst of their permanent environment, openly took sides with a foreign occupant may serve as a strong indication of opposition and resentment of the population to the Soviet system when the German attacked the Soviet Union.

It must be stressed again that any methods suggested above for solving public safety and security problems in the East are based on an analysis of German experience. It should be kept in mind that a wartime situation frequently has little in common with a situation considered desirable from a military government point of view. For instance, the recognition that large security troops are required for the rear areas is of no influence when the military situation requires all troops at the front lines. The same holds true for problems of early policy implementation. The land distribution, at best a complicated undertaking, would require large numbers of well-trained officials and indigenous collaborators. Good intentions are of little value if the personnel needed to implement them is not available. Nevertheless it should prove helpful to consider the requirements for an effective occupation administration; and prior planning and preparation—based not on speculation but on an analysis of German experiences—might prevent major policy breakdowns because of technical incompetence or manpower shortages.

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