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Defense Attache Office-Saigon  
RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY73/4  
23 Mar 73 - 30 Jun 73

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19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Threat Assessment; Friendly Situation; RVNAF Intelligence Capability; Force Structure; ARVN, VNAF, VNN, VNMC, Territorial Forces; Plans; Programs; Morale; Joint General Staff; Command and Con- trol; NVN MIG ACTIVITY; Airfields, Air Defense; Infiltration, Logistics; Artillery Ceasefire; Political Development; Force Level; Reserve; Order of Battle; Combat Arms; Personnel Readiness and Strength; Training; Operations; Continued Status;		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This assessment of the current military situation is a result of the combined efforts of RVNAF and DAO-Saigon. It is the first in many years developed without US advice at all levels. US ob- servers state that much of the data furnished by RVNAF is not validated nor do they feel that the GVN JGS command and control system is fully reliable. As a result of the Easter '72 offensive the enemy position is assessed as stronger than ever; his buildup and stockpiling of logistic resources is ominous. The war con- tinues with each side trying to defend or enlarge its sphere of influence and to clean up pockets of resistance. However, the growing GVN economic/morale		

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19. Supply Services; Civil Engineering; Maintenance; Petroleum; Port Operations; Regional Forces; Popular Forces; Desertions; Recruitment; Morale; Language Training; Central Training; Technical Translations; Lines of Communications; Highway Program; Military Construction; Dependent Shelter Program; RVNAF Retirement Plan; RVNAF Morale; Chain of Command; Communications.

Item 20 Continued: problem is presented as the direct result of US disengagement. RVNAF is described as being capable of holding the territory presently under control but lacking the defensive capabilities to withstand a major country-wide offensive. The dominant role in the continuing degradation of national political and military leadership is attributed to inflation. The lack of joint service manning at all levels of senior headquarters and the effective employment of Joint Task Forces appears to continue tactical command and control weakness. The CVN has recognized the economic impossibility of maintaining the present level of active force and is planning a reduction, but not until a more stable ceasefire environment exists.

LEVEL II

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Defense Attache Office-Saigon  
RVNAF QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT FY73/4  
23 Mar 73 - 30 Jun 73

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# DEFENSE ATTACHE SAIGON

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MG JOHN E. MURRAY

RVNAF

QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

4th QTR FY 73

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


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DAO QUARTERLY ASSESSMENT

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EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE  
FPO San Francisco 96620

AOSOP-OR

21 Jul 1973

SUBJECT: Letter of Transmittal - RVNAF Quarterly  
Assessment

Commander  
U.S. Support Activities Group  
Nakhon Phanom, RTAFB  
Thailand

The attached assessment is forwarded in compliance with  
JCS Secret message, 072105Z Mar 73, subject: Continuing  
SEA Reports (U).

G. L. GRUBBS  
Colonel, USAF  
Deputy, Log and Admin

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## FOREWORD

This is the first DAO quarterly assessment of RVNAF. It is the combined efforts of RVNAF, DAO, and the Embassy - particularly the Consuls General. It is intended to convey a panorama of the progress of the Ceasefire, the status of RVNAF, and the current military situation.

This assessment of RVNAF is the first in many years without U. S. advisors on the scene at all levels to develop it. It is, in a sense, more objective, as the personnel reporting are not actors in the drama, but detached observers of it. The dash of cynicism is healthy.

On the other hand much of the data is not validated, is almost entirely dependent upon RVNAF, and is not subject to the sharp U. S. advisor source scrutiny that was previously routine. There was no reluctance on the part of RVNAF to share and discuss the ingredients.


It was a post-MACV shock to become dependent on the RVNAF JGS and its chain-of-command. The JGS is often as startled at our interest in the details of military activity as we are by their apparent lack of concern. Their command and control system, in the American sense, leaves much to be desired. The chief lack is urgency, timeliness and an imperviousness to irritation over wrong information. The Sunday-syndrome, the illusion that the war stops then and on holidays, prevails.

It is well to put the text of this report in the context of the strategic setting. The position of the enemy as the result of his Easter '72 offensive, his blatant failure to adhere to the Cease-fire Agreement, and the imminent end of U. S. air power in Indochina, make him stronger than he's ever been. His buildup of new roads, pipelines, airfields and land line communications, his input of tanks, long range artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry, his stock piling of logistic resources are ominous. The RVNAF, of course, has not been idle. Absorbing the Enhance equipment, assuming the entire TACAIR mission, improving training and readiness, streamlining logistics and sharpening technical competence.

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And the war continues. At this writing the fighting west of Kontum City congeals, and drags on; and the 5th ARVN Division suddenly has a major fracas on its hands 25 miles from Saigon. Each side is trying to defend or enlarge its sphere of influence and clean up pockets of resistance. There appears no intent on either side to escalate to a major offensive. The spin-off of a Cambodian debacle, the economic-morale-depreciating crunch that is spreading in GVN with the U. S. withdrawal, compounds the omnipresent possibility of a minor episode expanding to a major calamity.

  
JOHN E. MURRAY  
Major General, USA  
Defense Attache

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AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAD	ARVN Associated Depot
AAG	Army Advisory Group
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack(s) by Fire
ABN	Airborne
ACA	Aircraft Clearance Authority
ACI	Aircraft Clearance Inspection
AC&W	Aircraft Control and Warning
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADIZ	Air Defense Identification Zone
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFLS	Armed Forces Language School
AFLST	Armed Forces Language Screening Test
AFSD	Air Force Supply Directive
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AI	Assistant Instructor
AIM	Air Intercept Missile
ALC	Air Logistics Command
AMA	Air Material Area
AMC	Air Material Command
AO	Area of Operations
AOB	Air Order of Battle
AOC	Air Operations Center
AOSAF-E	DAO Air Force Division Civil Engineering Br
AOSOP-OT	DAO Operations & Plan Division Tng Mgt Br
APQ	Airborne Target Tracking Radar
ARDF	Airborne Radar Direction Finding
ARTY	Artillery
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam
ASL	Authorized Stock List
ATC	Air Training Command
ATT	Army Training Test
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
BCE	Base Civil Engineer
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BOH	Balance on Hand
C&GSC	Command and General Staff College
CBD	Contract Base Development
CENCOM	Combined Center Highway and Waterway Committee
CETS	Contract Engineering Technical Services

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CF	Correlation Factor
CHMAAG	Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group
CIC	Combat Information Center
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
CLC	Central Logistics Command
CLD	Central Logistics Detachment
CMD	Command
CND	Chief, Navy Division
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMNAVFORV	Commander Naval Forces Vietnam
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
CPX	Command Post Exercise
COSAL	Consolidated Allowance List
COSVN	Central Office South Vietnam
CSAF/LG	Chief of Staff, Air Force Logistics
CTC	Central Training Command
DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DCSPER	Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel
DGTS	Director General Technical Services
DI	Drill Instructor
DIV	Division
DLIEL	Defense Language Institute, El Paso
DMJM	Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DODIC	Department of Defense Identification Card
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DTC	Division Training Center
ECL	English Comprehension Level
EDD	Estimated Delivery Date
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
ELST	English Language Screening Test
ELTP	English Language Training Program
EM	Enlisted Man
ESR	Equipment Status Report
ESS	Equipment Status Summary
FAST	Field Assistance Support Team
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific
FPJMC/FPJMT	Four Power Joint Military Commission/Team
FPS	Azimuth Search and Height Radar
FTX	Field Training Exercise
FY	Fiscal Year
GAF	Ground to Air Fire
GVN	Government of Vietnam
HUMINT	Human Intelligence

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ICCS	International Commission for Control and Supervision
IRAN	Inspect and Repair as Necessary
JCS	Joint Chief of Staff
JFO	Junior Foreign Officer
JGS	Joint General Staff
JLG	Joint Liaison Group
JMS-F	Junior Military School - Pleiku
JMS-VT	Junior Military School - Vung Tau
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
KIA	Killed in Action
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Vehicle/Personnel Landing Craft
LDPC	Logistics Data Processing Center
LN	Local National
LOC	Line of Communication
LOGAIR	Logistic Air Support
LOX	Liquid Oxygen
LSB/ISB	Logistics Support Base/Intermediate Support Base
LSI	Lear Siegler Incorporated
LSIL	Large Infantry Landing Ship
LSM	Landing Ship Medium
LSMH	Landing Ship Hospital
LSSL	Large Support Landing Ship
LST	Landing Ship Tank
LTL	Interprovincial Road
LVT	Landing Vehicle Tracked
LVTC	Landing Vehicle Tracked Command
LVTP	Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel
LVTR	Landing Vehicle Tracked Retriever
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MATTS	Military Air Terminal Transportation Services
MBBLS	Thousand Barrels
MCDEC	Marine Corps Development and Education Command
MILCON	Military Construction
MOGAS	Motor Gas
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
MR	Military Region
MRMC	Major Repair & Minor Construction
MRTTH	Military Region; Tri-Thien-Hue
MSS	Military Security Service
MTT	Mobile Training Team

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NWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NAVILCO	Navy International Logistics Control Office
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
NEC	Navy Enlisted Classification
NMMA	National Material Management Agency
NORM	Not Operational Ready - Maintenance
NORS	Not Operational Ready - Support
NRTD	Not Reparable This Depot
NRTS	Not Reparable This Station
NTC	National Training Center
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnamese Armed Forces
NVN	North Vietnam
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OJT	On the Job Training
ORPS	Overseas and Return Placement Staff
OR	Operational Ready
OR/TNG	Operational Ready/Training
(P)	Province
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PA&E	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PF	Popular Force
PMS	Planned Maintenance System
POI	Program of Instruction
POL	Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
POPAT	Protection of People Against Terrorism
PRB	Publications Review Board
PRG	People's Revolutionary Government
PSDF	People's Self Defense Force
QL	National Road
QTR	Quarter
R&I	Recruitment and Induction
RAMMS	Republic of Vietnam Logistics Data Processing Center
RAV	Restricted Availability
RC-47	Reconnaissance C-47
RCMOD	Reconnaissance Modification
REGT	Regiment
RF	Regional Forces
RF-5	Reconnaissance F-5
RHAW	Radar Homing and Warning
ROH	Regular Overhaul
ROK	Republic of Korea
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAFLS	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School



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SA	Surface to Air
SAAMA	San Antonio Air Material Area
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SMAR	Special Mission Airlift Request
SRAS	Special Repair Activities
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STYX	North Vietnamese Navy Missile
SVN	South Vietnam
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
TACC	Tactical Air Coordination Center
TC	Training Center
TCTO	Time Compliance Technical Order
TF	Territorial Forces
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TTB	Technical Translation Branch
UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
USAF	United States Air Force
VAA	Vietnamese Army Arsenal
VARs	Visual Air Reconnaissance Search
VC	Viet Cong
VIC	Vicinity
V-LOG	Vietnamese Logistics
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNAFM	Vietnamese Air Force Manual
VNMA	Vietnamese Military Academy
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy
VNNSC	Vietnamese Navy Supply Center
VNNSY	Vietnamese Navy Ship Yard
VNOSEP	Vietnamese Navy Officer Special Education Program
WIA	Wounded in Action
WESTPAC	Western Pacific



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## CHAPTER 1

### THREAT ASSESSMENT

1. (S) BACKGROUND: During the past month, there were no indications that the enemy will soon renew the main force war. In fact, since the announcement of the "new" ceasefire on 15 June, the enemy has been reemphasizing the political struggle.

2. (S) NVN MIG ACTIVITY:

a. In regard to North Vietnamese MIG activity, there have been developments which could affect South Vietnam. During the week of 17-23 June, over 150 MIG combat-related training flights were apparently conducted in NVN. This far exceeds the number of such flights for any similar period since the 28 January ceasefire. These training flights included MIG flights to the Bai Thuong area; however, no flights have been detected further south than 40 km south of Bai Thuong since the ceasefire.

b. There is no evidence of an impending southward deployment, but recent developments could portend the basing of fighters at southern airfields, a move which would significantly increase NVN's capability to conduct operations against the south.

3. (S) COMMUNIST AIRFIELDS IN SVN:

a. Concerning Communist airfields in the south, North Vietnam presently has the capability to use at least the following 12: Khe Sanh, Ca Lu, Dong Ha, Kham Duc, Ben Het, Dak To, Duc Co, Bu Prang, Loc Ninh, Thien Ngon, Katum and Minh Thanh. No instances of actual airfield use have been noted, but there have been occasionally low level references to planned flight activity.

b. The principal airfield renovation effort in SVN is at Khe Sanh in MR 1. This field has been rebuilt and the runway currently has a length of 4300 ft. It is considered sufficient for all NVA transports and some jet fighter aircraft, although they might be limited to reduced armament and/or fuel loads. Some limited support capability has been noted.

c. Additionally the airfields at Ca Lu and Dong Ha are being repaired, with present runway lengths sufficient to accommodate some transports.

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d. The field at Kham Duc is not being repaired or rebuilt but does have the capability of accommodating some light transport aircraft.

e. In MR 2 and MR 3 the runways of all the enemy held fields are of sufficient length to handle most heavy transport aircraft. The fields in MR 3 could be used to support Communist activity throughout the northern portion of the MR.

f. The overall effect of the renovation of these airfields will be to provide NVA/PRG forces with some logistical support and permit the movement of VIPs from one PRG controlled area to another.

## 4. (S) COMMUNIST AIR DEFENSE IN SVN:

a. There are continuing indications that NVN is expanding its SAM defense capabilities in SVN.

b. In the Khe Sanh area, from 20 May to 20 June, only four SAM sites were occupied while on 31 May 73, possible SAM equipment was identified in the A Shau valley. If the enemy has moved SAM equipment into the valley, the North Vietnamese will have air defense missile capability that threatens the VNAF air operations west of Hue.

c. In a related development, NVN forces may be acquiring new or improved air defense weapons. There are tenuous indications that enemy forces in northern MR 1 now have a 23mm self-propelled artillery vehicle. The self-propelled 23mm vehicle is probably the Soviet designated ZSU-23-4 which has been previously reported since at least July 1972 in the Hanoi area. The system is a highly mobile AA weapon which carries its own radar fire control.

d. In addition, reports from MR 3 reveal that NVA forces, in this area may possess an infrared homing missile similar in concept to the SA-7, but different in design and configuration. Called an "SA-2 rocket gun" by NVA units, the term may be a misnomer designed for internal NVA propaganda purposes because of the NVA reported success of the SA-2 guideline over NVN.

e. The missile's characteristics include a range of up to 2000 meters and a reload capability which the SA-7

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does not have. In addition, the system described by the source may have an improved handling capability over the SA-7 in that the operator is not required to visually track the target. Instead the missile can be fired and will search for the target for the first 1500 meters of flight, continuing for an additional 500 meters to final intercept should the missile acquire the target. If the target acquisition fails, the missile will self destruct.

f. The missile is reported to have downed a VNAF CH-47 helicopter on 3 June 1973. This new weapon is reported to have been used at two locations in central Tay Ninh Province, two locations in the Tay Ninh/Hau Nghia border area and one area in west central Hau Nghia. If the weapon exists, it should significantly improve low altitude, close in air defense, and consequently degrade VNAF capability to engage NVA ground forces and targets.

g. Communist AAA defenses have also been improved in-country with the addition of three AAA regiments in recent months in MRs 2 and 3. It is possible that with a build-up in AAA units in southern SVN, a division level authority may be organized to assume control over AAA operations.

### 5. (S) ENEMY INFILTRATION:

a. In infiltration activity, North Vietnam continues to send replacements south, but in greatly reduced numbers since the January ceasefire.

b. Over-all, infiltration is down 37% from that of last year. The current DAO infiltration estimate, compared with the corresponding period for 1972, is as follows:

<u>Area</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
DMZ/MRTTH	10,000	19,000
B-3FRONT	33,500	10,800
MR 5	15,600	8,000
COSVN	42,100	25,800

c. The following is the current DAO estimate of Communist artillery destined for or deployed in RVN.

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<u>Area</u>	<u>In-country (10Oct72)</u>	<u>Infiltrated</u>	<u>Totals</u>
DMZ/MRTTH	50-60	Unk	50-60
B-3FRONT	20-25	20-25	40-50
MR 5	5-10	65-70	70-80
COSVN	0-5	80-85	80-90

d. No regular armor infiltration groups were detected moving in the system in June; however, 14 tanks were photographed entering Laos logistics corridor in early June. Ultimate destinations are unknown and they are not included in our current estimate of NVA armor in South Vietnam.

<u>Area</u>	<u>In-country (10Oct72)</u>	<u>Infiltrated</u>	<u>Totals</u>
DMZ/MRTTH	60-65	Unk	60-65
B-3FRONT	10-15	90-100	100-115
MR 5	5-10	90-100	95-110
COSVN	25-30	165-170	190-200
Totals	100-120	345-370	445-490

6. (S) LOGISTICAL ACTIVITY: Communist rear service units continued a high level of activity.

a. Despite a "new" ceasefire the NVN initiated a "transportation offensive" in MRTTH and northern MR 5 in order to replenish depleted military stockpiles. The offensive has lasted through the end of June. At least three transportation regiments are currently providing transportation along the northern part of Rt 14. In addition the Communists have moved three major storage facilities from Laos into MR 1 possibly to the Rt 14 area. Also, as many as 10,000 short tons of supplies have apparently moved into VC MR 5 and the B-3 FRONT during June. In contrast, an estimated 50,000 short tons are believed to have crossed the DMZ into RVN since the January ceasefire. Photography showed an increase in vehicular traffic during the campaign. The bulk of the material shipped remains unidentified. If most of the total tonnage is food, the quantity would be sufficient to feed combat troops in VC MR 5 and the B-3 FRONT during June. In contrast, an estimated 50,000 short tons are believed to have crossed the DMZ into RVN since the January ceasefire. Photography showed an increase in vehicular traffic during the campaign. The bulk of the material shipped remains unidentified. If most of the total tonnage is food, the quantity would be sufficient to feed combat troops in VC MR 5 and the B-3 FRONT for 8 to 10 months.

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b. Based upon estimated enemy shipments of food and activity, DAO Saigon concludes that, as of the end of the dry season (end of May 1973), rear service units had moved supplies in sufficient quantities into southern Laos and South Vietnam to support country-wide offensive operations in South Vietnam at average 1972 offensive (31 Mar 72 - Jan 73) levels for a period of 15 to 18 months. Further, sufficient supplies to execute this military option would be in place in or adjacent to South Vietnam by the end of July 1973.

c. To support infiltration of men and material through Laos, the enemy continues to expand his POL pipeline system. NVA extension of its pipeline from NVN into Laos was first detected in mid-1969. A major branch has been supplying the A Shau Valley since early 1972. Although the terminus is hidden by dense jungle canopy, this branch is believed to serve traffic in the northern position of Route 14. In support of the NVN offensive a truck line was completed through the DMZ in April 1972, and is the main source of POL serving traffic operating along Routes 1 and 9.

d. The trunk line through Laos was later extended southward and by February 1973 had reached the Chavane area. A spur was built from the Chavane area toward the RVN border in early 1973. Although it disappears in dense vegetation, it is believed to cross the border, supplying traffic along Routes 966, 14 and 534.

e. The main line in Laos could easily be extended into Cambodia. All of the completed lines consist of four-inch diameter pipe having a daily capacity of 1,100 metric tons (1210 short tons).

## 7. (S) ORDER OF BATTLE:

a. Within South Vietnam, the enemy combat threat has not significantly changed over the past month. The estimated enemy strength by division is as follows:

<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>30 MAR 72</u>	<u>30 MAY 73</u>	<u>30 JUNE 73</u>	<u>NET DIFF</u>
304	9500	8500	8500	-1000
325	8500	5200	5600	-2900
320B	6300	4900	6300	0
324B	8000	8000	8000	0

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<u>DIVISION</u>	<u>30 MAR 72</u>	<u>30 MAY 73</u>	<u>30 JUN 73</u>	<u>NET DIFF</u>
711	6100	4600	4600	-1500
2	5600	4400	4500	-1100
3	5300	4000	4000	-1300
10	6500	3100	3500	-3000
* 320(-1)	6300	4000	4000	-2300
7	5300	2100	2500	-2800
9	3900	2600	2800	-1100
6	4200	2300	2300	-1900
5	4400	2000	2200	-2200
1	4300	3200	3200	-1100

\* Strengths adjusted to reflect only two regiments.

b. The upward changes in strengths from 30 May to 30 June of the 325th, 320B, 2d, 10th, 7th, 9th and 5th Divisions reflect adjustments made after a recent conference with the J-2, JGS staff.

c. The total threat within the Republic is as follows:

(1) MR-1:

Divisions	6
Regiments	22
Combat Personnel	52-62,000
Guerrilla	5-10,000
Admin Services	14-18,000
Total Personnel	71-90,000

(2) MR-2:

Divisions	3
Regiments	10
Combat Personnel	25-30,000
Guerrilla	5-10,000
Admin Services	10-15,000
Total Personnel	40-55,000

(3) MR-3:

Divisions	2
Regiments	15
Combat Personnel	15-20,000
Guerrilla	2-4,000
Admin Services	30-34,000
Total Personnel	47-58,000

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## (4) MR-4:

Divisions	2
Regiments	13
Combat Personnel	15-20,000
Guerrilla	8-10,000
Admin Services	6-8,000
Total Personnel	29-38,000

## (5) Total In-Country Strength:

Divisions	13
Regiments	60
Combat Personnel	107-132,000
Guerrilla	20-34,000
Admin Services	60-75,000
Total In-Country	187-241,000

## 8. (S) ARTILLERY THREAT:

a. The appearance of 122mm and 130mm field guns in the Cam Lo and Hiep Duc areas of MR 1 and Kontum Province in MR 2 and the detected deployment to MR 3 has led to some concern about the threat these guns pose populated areas within South Vietnam. Based upon aerial reconnaissance of road construction and infiltration routes, RVNAF has assessed the potential threat that these weapons pose to Pleiku City in MR 2 and the Tay Ninh and Bien Hoa/Saigon areas of MR 3.

b. Concerning the threat in the vicinity of Pleiku City, the enemy currently has or could gain access to three areas, all of which are within 25 km of the city. These areas can be reached and resupplied via several existing routes. Area 1 is in the vicinity of Plei Mrong on the Pleiku/Kontum border and is accessible to the enemy via Routes 110, 617, 511 and secondary Route 613 from the tri-border area. Areas 2 and 3 northwest and southwest of Thanh An, respectively, are terminals for a second system, which includes Routes 615, 567, and 19 from the Khmer and the tri-border areas. Most of these routes will support vehicular traffic year-round.

c. In MR 3, potential 122/130 targets in the Tay Ninh and Saigon/Bien Hoa areas would be within range of field guns firing from five areas. Access to these areas could be gained via several known infiltration routes. In the vicinity of Tay Ninh, area 1 located east of base



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area 354 and area 2 located within base area 355 are readily accessible from the Snoul area of the Khmer Republic via Routes 24, 22, 7, 4 and several secondary roads. Most of these roads are paved or have been recently repaired. Traffic has intensified in these areas since February and March of this year. Area 3, located within base area 359 north of Bien Hoa, and area 4, northwest of Bien Hoa, are accessible over two road networks, consisting of routes 14A, 1A, and 322, also originating in the vicinity of Snoul and running through Loc Ninh. These roads have been repaired by the enemy during the past year. Area 5, in the iron triangle northwest of Phu Cuong, is reached via inter-provincial route 14, a potential extension of the system supporting area 2 east of Tay Ninh. However, this segment is under GVN control, as are areas 4 and 5.

### 9. (S) EFFECTS OF NEW CEASE-FIRE:

a. Concerning communist activity since the joint communique of 15 June, no overt communist land grab has occurred. Combat activity peaked on 15-16 June, but has gradually declined since then except in Kontum, Quang Nam, and Chuong Thien Provinces.

b. Analysis of available intelligence suggests that no land grab was planned, since such an operation would have been counterproductive to current communist objectives. Additionally, if the communists had chosen to initiate a land grab similar to those of October and January, the GVN probably could have contained it, and might very well have taken advantage of the situation to further improve GVN control. Also, VNAF might have used this situation to bomb major communist logistics areas such as Dong Ha in MR-1 or northern Tay Ninh. The basic guidance provided by COSVN Directive 2/73 which signaled a change from heavy military emphasis to conducting a political campaign, still remains in effect. Furthermore, a new COSVN Directive 3/73, issued in early June, directed strict observance of the ceasefire and placed renewed emphasis on the political struggle. Rebuilding of the political infrastructure is to be accorded the highest priority, followed by proselyting and improving control of liberated areas. Operationally, "to strictly observe the ceasefire" only means that the enemy will not initiate large-scale offensives. The "political struggle", however, includes propaganda supported by sapper attacks on GVN outposts, destruction of critical GVN supplies (e.g., Long Binh Ammo Storage), terrorism and abductions.

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c. The current communist intentions in light of cease-fire II are:

(1) Observe the cease-fire in terms of main force warfare. Intelligence from all MR's indicates that communist forces have been ordered to react strongly to any GVN "nibbling" operations. The PRG is intent on projecting an image to the people that the communists intend to observe the cease-fire. Generally speaking, enemy actions in the past month have been defensive, designed to hold and improve PRG control in communist occupied area. Although the GVN's position since the end of January has eroded in several provinces, such as An Xuyen and Chuong Thien, it has been able to expand its control in several key areas, such as the lowlands of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces.

(2) Rebuild, upgrade and strengthen the infrastructure.

(3) Develop and improve control over "liberated areas".

(4) Promote freedom of trade and travel between PRG and GVN controlled areas. Trade with GVN controlled areas is necessary to supplement many essential items, such as food, POL, medicines and machine works, needed to sustain an increased civilian population. Additionally, by offering a better price for goods, the communists probably hope to induce more people to come into the PRG economic, and eventually, political sphere.

(5) Improve access to the population in GVN controlled areas and attract people to liberated areas. Free movement of people is vital to PRG intentions of using "the pull of the land" to encourage the populace back to their former homes and to the encouragement of increased trade.

(6) Proselyte GVN troops and officials. Increased proselyting is considered necessary to break down local GVN governmental control.

d. Current activity in southern MR 1 is the result of RVNAF attempts to eliminate spheres of communist influence in the coastal lowlands. Activity by 711th Division forces in Duc Duc District is designed to force ARVN units to contract their positions and eventually force the Rangers to withdraw from this area. By accomplishing this mission, the enemy would facilitate his access into the lowlands, block the southerly expansion

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of GVN control, and deny friendly ground observation of the important infiltration routes to Hiep Duc.

e. In MR-2, the activity west of Kontum City is a continuation of communist efforts to protect a buffer zone west of the provincial capital in order to operate an important north-south supply route and the fording site of the Yali Falls. Elements of the 24th and 66th Regts have been primarily responsible for occupying the areas west of the city. Despite ground assault and air and arty fire, enemy forces continue to hold their positions. Enemy forces place great importance on securing the areas west of Kontum since they are probably the places most susceptible to GVN interference along the Route 14 complex.

f. In MR-4, aggressive ARVN operations against communist strongholds have continued following ceasefire II. The GVN's major area of emphasis has been Chuong Thien Province. Both sides recognize the importance of Chuong Thien Province and each is working to prevent the other from gaining dominance. Chuong Thien is the hub of the lower delta - or, as the Vietnamese describe it, the "bottom of the rice bowl". The side that controls the lines of communication here - the canals and roads - substantiates a claim to effective control. The communists would like to make Chuong Thien the core of their "liberated" area in the lower delta; ARVN is just as intent on preventing this.

## 10. (S) COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

a. Concerning political developments, in order to improve the international stature of the PRG, it appears that diplomats from perhaps 10 countries visited the Dong Ha-Cam Lo area in early June, ostensibly to establish diplomatic relations with the PRG in SVN. Numerous references to this meeting have appeared in liberation radio broadcasts.

b. While the communists seem to be attempting to bolster the prestige of the PRG, analysis suggests Hanoi has apparently annexed communist controlled areas of Quang Tri Province into NVN and that the eventual annexation of enemy-controlled areas of Thua Thien may be in the formative stages.

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c. Hanoi is establishing a provincial level governmental apparatus in Quang Tri Province with a structure similar to the provincial governments in NVN. A recent ARVN returnee of early May reported that communist cadre in Dong Ha were referring to that city as the Quang Tri Provincial Headquarters of NVN. There have been several indications that there has been increased movements of civilians from NVN back to Quang Tri. Some of these people are former residents of the province who are being returned to their homes.

d. Obviously, at least in this area, the communists are attempting to implement their policy goals of creating a viable political community to compete with the GVN. The development of northern MR 1 would also facilitate the support of NVA military units in the area.

### 11. (S) CONCLUSION:

a. In conclusion, Hanoi continues to improve its combat potential in the south. The increased training status of the NVN MIG force and the improvement of airfields in occupied areas of SVN portend a possible deployment of NVN aircraft to SVN in the future. Communist forces continued to expand and improve their AAA capability with the probable goal of creating an air defense system throughout occupied areas similar to the high threat area in Quang Tri Province. The improved logistical status of the enemy, and has expansion of vital LOC's further enhances the communist's combat potential. Despite this buildup in combat potential, however, communist forces seem intent for the present on solidifying their own position in order to create a viable alternative to the GVN. The communists apparently do not plan to initiate offensive action at this time, but generally plan, at least temporarily to adhere to the cease-fire in regards to main force warfare. But enemy forces can be expected to vigorously resist any GVN attempts to expand its control. Consequently combat activity will probably continue in areas where spheres of influence have not been clearly defined and opposing interests clash.

b. The current DAO estimate of enemy intentions over the near term is as follows:

(1) The enemy will continue to infiltrate men and material into RVN to support political objectives and

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support future military operations.

(2) Except for MRTTH in northern MR-1, the NVA has not yet infiltrated sufficient infantry replacements to raise maneuver units to the level of strength necessary to support and sustain a major military offensive.

(3) The enemy is rapidly stockpiling sufficient supplies for a country-wide offensive and will probably continue to improve this logistics posture throughout RVN.

(4) The communists will not launch sustained country-wide offensive military operations.

(5) The communists will continue to conduct "political warfare" while maintaining an aggressive defense. They will selectively use military force to support "political warfare" and improve and facilitate area and population control.



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## CHAPTER 2

### FRIENDLY SITUATION

#### 1. (C) CEASEFIRE OVERVIEW:

a. Ceasefire I (CF-I) was characterized by enemy attempts to regain positions lost in Quang Tri Province just prior to the ceasefire; seize populated areas and key terrain; interdict lines of communication (LOC) and conduct harassing attacks. Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) artillery expenditures and tactical air support (TACAIR) sorties were higher than during the 1972 spring offensive. After the RVNAF counter operations, the situation began to stabilize. During the mid-CF-I period the incidents consisted primarily of attacks by fire (ABF) and minor ground actions. Ground to air fire (GAF) incidents against Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), U.S. contractor operated International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) aircraft increased during this period. Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) initiated several operations designed to expand areas of control that resulted in rapid enemy reaction. The use of artillery and TACAIR declined. Late in the CF-I period, after the publication of specific ceasefire directives by Joint General Staff (JGS) and a reduction of major ground initiatives by the enemy, combat activity and ceasefire incidents declined. However, the incident rate in Military (MR) 4 more than doubled and equaled the combined total of the other military regions. With the exception of major ABF at Tonle Cham, enemy activity consisted of minor attacks by fire in reaction to ARVN security operations, propagandizing, assassinations, kidnapping, and GAF against aircraft.

b. Initial period of ceasefire II (CF-II eff 15 Jun 73) the level of combat activity declined, with significant reductions in major and minor contacts, incoming artillery/rocket/mortar fire and casualties on both sides. There were 49% fewer violations reported during the initial 24-hour period of CF-II than for the same period of CF-I. The combat actions reported during the initial phase of the second ceasefire resulted from RVNAF operations to preempt any North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NV/VC) land grab offensive. Available intelligence suggests that enemy intentions have been defensive in nature. Another indicator was the reduction of ARVN 105 millimeter (mm) howitzer artillery expenditures from 90,301 to 6,601 during the initial 24 hours of each ceasefire. More minor incidents were reported to JGS in CF-II which were

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reported or considered significant during CF-I. The enemy seems determined to defend his sphere of influence from ARVN incursion in order to protect and improve his logistics network and administrative authority.

(Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4)

## 2. (C) MILITARY REGION I:

a. Initial CF-I activity in MR 1 consisted of enemy attempts to expand his area of control into population centers by seizing hamlets and isolating defending forces by interdicting lines of communication (LOC's). Major activity was centered in two areas; northern Quang Tri Province and Sa Huynh in southern Quang Ngai Province. Just prior to CF-I Marine units had seized the south bank of the Cua Viet River; however, their positions were soon overrun by heavy enemy attacks. Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMCM) defensive positions were subsequently reestablished at their original locations on the southern bank of the Thach Han River. Enemy units did infiltrate Marine rear areas but were cleared by friendly operations within a few weeks. No further combat activity has occurred in the VNMCM area of operations (AO). In the Airborne AO, enemy units launched heavy ABF and ground contacts against the south bank of the Thach Han River and successfully established a small foothold which they still maintain. Airborne units reacted with extensive artillery bombardment of enemy positions. In Quang Ngai, the enemy initiated a major attack and seized the Sa Huynh area just before CF-I. This action gained the enemy a major salt producing area and a suitable deep water port. It also effectively cut the only land LOC, QL1, into MR 1, from the rest of the country. ARVN forces subsequently recaptured the Sa Huynh area, consolidated their position and began returning the population to their homes. (The successful recapture of this area was considered the turning point in morale improvement within the 2nd Div.) In Thua Thien Province, enemy efforts were concentrated south and southwest of Phu Bai, northwest of Hue near the An Lo Bridge, where populated areas were attacked and infiltrated; and in an area 19 kilometers (km) southwest of Hue where an armored attack was repulsed. Farther south in the Dai Loc and Que Son Valley areas of Quang Nam Province enemy units launched attacks against ARVN forces that had seized key terrain just prior to the ceasefire. Ceasefire violations and levels of combat activity steadily declined during the months of March, April and May. However, during the last two weeks of CF-I, a significant increase was noted.

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


Figure (1)

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


Figure (2)

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


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


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The Song Bo corridor in Thua Thien Province and the coastal lowlands of Quang Ngai Province reported the most ceasefire violations. The Districts of Binh Son and Son Tinh, within the 2d ARVN Division (Div) AO, reported a significant increase. This increased level of combat activity was generated by the enemy's efforts to continue to harass ARVN and Territorial Forces conducting the GVN "Return to Village Program". Of the 32,000 refugees scheduled to return to their villages by 30 May 73, only 14,200 were reported to have actually returned by the termination of CF-I.

b. The first day of CF-II saw a 30% decrease in military activity in comparison to CF-I. The only statistical category that reflected an increase over CF-I was minor ABF. Casualties on both sides decreased significantly. In northern MR 1, above the Hai Van Pass, very little activity has been reported. During the early stages of CF-II, there was no attempt by the enemy to gain additional land or expand control over the population. The Song Bo Valley and Hue areas have been very quiet. In southern MR 1, enemy offensive operations accelerated immediately. Daily contacts have been reported southwest of Duc Duc in Quang Nam Province and in the Mo Duc and Duc Pho areas as enemy forces attempted to maintain a foothold in the lowlands. Toward the end of the second week of CF-II, MR 1 recorded an all-time low level of activity for the region. Only one or two incidents were reported; no major violations were reported. Overall, the intensity of reported activity and the consequent results have been greatly reduced in MR 1 during the first two weeks of CF-II.

(Figure 5)

### 3. (C) MILITARY REGION II:

a. As CF-I drew near, the enemy launched widespread attacks on hamlets and LOC's. The enemy infiltrated hamlets west of Kontum, northeast of Ban Me Thuot, southwest of Degi, southwest of Tuy Hoa and near Phan Thiet. LOC's were interdicted south of Kontum, northeast of Ban Me Thuot, east of Pleiku and in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces (QL 19, 14, and 7B). At Degi, a naval coastal radar station was overrun, creating a gap in the coastal radar system. The station was reoccupied several days later without opposition. These efforts were followed by a series of friendly operations designed to clear hamlets and reopen all LOC's. These ARVN security operations generated enemy reaction to include ABF and ground

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


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contacts. West of Thanh An, ARVN units attempted to retake a fire support base which they had evacuated shortly after CF-I. The enemy reacted with heavy ABF and ground attacks. Subsequently, ARVN units assumed a defensive posture, but enemy elements continued to harass them. During CF-I the major area of concern was Binh Dinh Province and in particular the area adjacent to QL1.

b. CF-II ushered in an immediate 70% decrease in reported incidents in comparison to the same period of CF-I. Reported casualties for the initial period declined sharply. Enemy incidents were characterized by infiltration of hamlets, interdicting of LOC's, ground attacks and ABF against RVNAF units. The major area of concern during CF-II has been the villages of Trung Nghia and Polei Krong, west of Kontum City, which were overrun by the NVA/VC forces on the evening of 7 June 1973. There have been no other land grab attempts. The situation in Kontum Province tends to overshadow the other provinces in MR 2 because the GVN forces are determined to retake the two villages. This increase in combat activity continued through the first two weeks of CF-II and accounted for approximately 75% of the ceasefire violations within MR 2. Overall, the intensity of reported combat activity decreased significantly during CF-I and began to increase sharply during CF-II.

(Figure 6)

## 4. (C) MILITARY REGION III:

a. Immediately following the ceasefire, enemy forces attempted to seize control of populated areas and interdict LOC's across the center of the MR in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy Provinces. These efforts were relatively successful. Enemy elements initially occupied or infiltrated over 100 hamlets and interdicted routes QL-20 in Long Khanh, QL-1, QL-15 in Bien Hoa, QL-13 in Binh Duong and QL-22 in Tay Ninh. After the first 24 hours the number of contested hamlets was reduced to about 30 and within 10 days all hamlets were returned to GVN control and all interdicted LOC's reopened. The enemy began to interdict the Bien Hoa/Xuan Loc railroad system on a regular basis. After this initial high level of combat activity, a period of relative quiet settled over the MR. Enemy activity was limited to ABF and minor probing actions. At this time ARVN began to secure population centers, LOC's and reacted to the enemy ABF and minor ground contacts. The enemy

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


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began constructing hamlets in the Ho Bo Woods and central Iron Triangle areas of Hau Nghia Province, which the ARVN proceeded to destroy with little enemy resistance. The most significant activity during the months of March, April and May was the siege of the Tonle Cham outpost. The significance of this ARVN garrison, occupied by the 92d Ranger Border Defense (RBD) Battalion, is its location on the Saigon River infiltration and logistics corridor. It also represents a thorn in the side of the enemy because it is located in the midst of an area that is not considered contested, but actually under enemy control. During the last two weeks of CF-I the intensity and frequency of ABF against the besieged Tonle Cham garrison declined. Aerial resupply efforts by C-123 aircraft and VNAF TACAIR strikes have been a primary factor in successfully defending the camp. Enemy T-54 tanks and captured 105mm howitzers were confirmed to be in the vicinity of An Loc. During the last two weeks of CF-I sappers attacked the 534th Ammunition Dump at Long Binh, destroying 10 ammunition pads containing an estimated 3,719 tons of ammunition.

b. Enemy activity decreased significantly during the first 24 hours of CF-II. A total of 20 incidents were reported as compared to 80 for the same CF-I time frame. Tonle Cham outpost did not receive any ABF or ground contacts during CF-II. The MR activity focuses on the provinces of Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Phuoc Tuy, however, the level and intensity have decreased. There were no attempts at a land grab. The Route 13 road clearing operation in Binh Duong and Binh Long Provinces was attempted by elements of the 5th ARVN Div in early June. The basic concept tasked the 7th Regiment to sweep north and south from Chon Thanh along Route 13. The 8th Regiment was to sweep north from Lai Khe and three Ranger Battalions were to sweep south from An Loc. As the operation commenced, all units reported contacts and attacks by fire. No units advanced beyond seven kilometers from their initial base areas. Stiff resistance resulted in moderate casualties. The route was never cleared and the operation was subsequently cancelled. The Joint General Staff reported all lines of communication under GVN control as open, with no hamlets contested. However, aerial resupply is still required for Tonle Cham, Chon Thanh, An Loc, and Song Be. Overall activity within MR 3 continued to steadily decline as CF-II terminated its second week.

(Figure 7)

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


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## 5. (C) MILITARY REGION IV:

a. Initial enemy activity was characterized by infiltration of hamlets, ground attacks against populated areas and widespread ABF. Although widely scattered throughout the region, the most concentrated enemy efforts were in Chau Doc, Kien Phong, Dinh Tuong and Chuong Thien Provinces. The RVNAF reacted and after the first three days, all land and water LOC's were reported open and about 15 hamlets remained contested. During the remainder of early CF-I, activity fluctuated in intensity but remained concentrated in the areas mentioned above. The mid-stage of CF-I was characterized by a continuing decrease in enemy initiated ceasefire violations; however, acts of terrorism became more evident. During the last two-week period of CF-I, enemy efforts were widespread and consisted of minor attacks against Territorial Force outposts, terrorist attacks against population centers, mining incidents, assassinations, and abductions. The terrorist attacks included a mortar attack on a school, a rocket attack on a refugee settlement and a grenade incident in a temple, all of which resulted in heavy civilian casualties. In the Hong Ngu area of Kein Phong Province, enemy forces renewed their attacks with major ground contacts that caused heavy enemy casualties. A very effective ground sweep operation was conducted by elements of the 9th ARVN Division which cleared both banks of the Mekong and imposed effective GVN control over the area between Hong Ngu and the Cambodian border. VNAF provided tactical air support and the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) deployed river craft to support the ground operations. Since the conclusion of this ground sweep operation and the formation of a Mekong Convoy Joint Task Force, there have been no reported incidents against convoys in Vietnam. In the delta the major incidents were centered in Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong Provinces and were major ABF followed by ground contacts. Three district towns and Territorial Force positions were targeted. The Regional Force/Popular Force successfully defended the entire area. During the months of March, April and May there were significant increases in major and minor ABF. Major contacts also increased. Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong reported the majority of the ceasefire violations. Minor contacts were the only ceasefire violations category that reflected a steady decrease during the middle and latter periods of CF-I. The last two weeks of CF-I noted increases in minor contacts and major ABF with decreases in minor ABF and major contacts. The Chuong Thien daily incident rate for these two weeks exceeded the daily incident rate of each



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of the other military regions. At one point Chuong Thien reported 33 ceasefire violations which was the highest incident rate for a 24-hour period in any single province throughout the country.

b. During the first two weeks of CF-II there was very little difference in the total number of ceasefire violations reported as compared to the equivalent CF-I period. Activity was characterized by stand-off ABF and minor and major ground attacks. The enemy activity continued to be concentrated in Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong Provinces. There was a noted decrease in combat activity reported in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province. The reported combined totals of ceasefire violations and casualties within Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong Provinces represented approximately 75% of the entire MR activity. Overall, the level and intensity of combat activity appeared to be decreasing within MR 4 as the second week of CF II ended.

(Figure 8)

6. (S) SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS: As of 30 June 1973, it is apparent that the level and intensity of combat activity since CF-I has steadily declined. During the early stages of CF-II almost all categories of ceasefire incidents declined sharply from the latter period of CF-I.


(Figures 9, 10, 11 & 12)

Casualties also have shown a steady decrease with the renegotiated ceasefire in effect. From the GVN point of view it was also evident that friendly initiated activities were beginning to decline as evidenced by fewer VNAF sorties flown and less friendly artillery rounds expended. Currently there are only four reported areas of concentrated activity throughout the country. Within MR 1 the districts of Son Tinh and Binh Son in Quang Ngai Province have become most critical because of GVN efforts to resettle the coastal lowlands. Within MR 2 the continuing battle for Poley Krong and Trung Nghia Villages in Kontum Province remains the most contested area within South Vietnam. The enemy has held the villages since the initial offensive thrust and is determined to control his LOC from the north. The RVNAF have countered with a concerted effort utilizing extensive air and artillery support. Nothing decisive has resulted and little progress has been made by either side in finalizing the outcome of the battle. Within MR 3 the road clearing operation (QL-13) by the RVNAF generated

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Figure (8)

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# FIRST CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 1

WEEK	JAN 26 - FEB 3	4 FEB 10 - 17	18 FEB 24 - 25	26 FEB 3 - 10	11 MAR 10 - 17	18 MAR 24 - 25	25 MAR 31 - 1 APR 7	8 APR 14 - 15 APR 21	22 APR 29 - 29 MAY 5	6 MAY 12 - 13 MAY 19	20 MAY 26 - 27 MAY 26	3 JUN 2 - 10 JUN 9								
INCIDENTS	439	400	434	392	256	283	282	203	150	129	139	149	156	126	106	120	88	99	133	114
MAJ/ MIN ABF	42/ 145	53/ 160	124/ 174	79/ 143	64/ 108	62/ 114	91/ 120	51/ 96	26/ 78	35/ 52	42/ 53	39/ 53	50/ 54	33/ 40	28/ 35	29/ 41	23/ 22	19/ 38	42/ 48	16/ 59
MAJ/ MIN CTX	33/ 219	11/ 176	14/ 122	3/ 167	3/ 81	6/ 101	1/ 70	1/ 55	0/ 46	0/ 42	0/ 44	0/ 57	0/ 52	1/ 52	2/ 41	0/ 50	1/ 42	0/ 42	2/ 41	3/ 36
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,488	5,803	7,182	4,156	2,537	6,431	8,000	2,596	1,809	2,040	2,943	3,164	3,190	2,080	1,759	2,120	1,534	1,139	3,444	1,696
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	227,028	226,122	215,060	129,296	83,584	98,091	37,315	17,315	4,796 (3 DAYS)	8,278 (6 DAYS)	11,721 (5 DAYS)	15,200 (5 DAYS)	19,886	16,451	11,219	8,766	11,103	8,711	13,309	12,280
SCH/ FLN SORTIES	310/ 132	466/ 184	436/ 271	436/ 261	328/ 37	308/ 113	236/ 36	224/ 0	128/ 0	126/ 0	126/ 28	126/ 0	124/ 0	124/ 0	126/ 0	126/ 0	126/ 0	126/ 4	126/ 14	132/ 14
K/ W FRD CAS	123/ 660	109/ 535	196/ 1023	91/ 397	53/ 223	79/ 324	59/ 270	37/ 167	28/ 148	25/ 166	26/ 144	39/ 186	21/ 170	34/ 133	25/ 86	52/ 147	14/ 96	23/ 32	28/ 134	19/ 112
K/ D EN CAS	630/ 25	426/ 20	786/ 61	549/ 28	186/ 1	283/ 7	146/ 6	91/ 1	68/ 10	54/ 1	71/ 0	100/ 0	98/ 1	70/ 6	79/ 1	90/ 0	98/ 6	82/ 0	132/ 4	92/ 0
K/ W CIV CAS	0/ 4	10/ 20	3/ 12	0/ 4	0/ 1	1/ 13	3/ 6	0/ 0	2/ 7	0/ 6	0/ 0	1/ 3	1/ 9	0/ 9	0/ 0	0/ 0	0/ 0	3/ 3	4/ 4	8/ 5

\* Computations are from most recent and do not reflect that certain figures which are higher by almost 10% (applies to all rows).

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# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 1

WEEK	JUN 15	JUN 21	JUN 22	JUN 28	JUL 5	JUL 6	JUL 12	JUL 13	JUL 19	JUL 20	JUL 26	AUG 2	AUG 3	AUG 9	AUG 10	AUG 16	AUG 17	AUG 23	AUG 24	AUG 30	SEP 1	SEP 6	SEP 7	SEP 13	SEP 14	SEP 20	SEP 21	SEP 27	OCT 4	OCT 5	OCT 11	OCT 12	OCT 18	OCT 19	OCT 25	OCT 26	NOV 1	
INCIDENTS	93	59	57																																			
MAJ/ MIN ADF	22	6	11	25																																		
MAJ/ MIN CTX	1	0	1	20																																		
EN ARTY INCOMING	2,210	346	543																																			
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	5,500	1,238	1,567																																			
SCH/ VNAF FLW SORTIES	60	126	154																																			
K/ W FRD CAS	38	5	15	58																																		
K/ D EN CAS	79	39	29	1																																		
K/ W CIV CAS	15	9	12	30																																		

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## MR 2

WEEK

WEEK		JAN 26 FEB 3 FEB 10 FEB 17 FEB 24 FEB 25 MAR 3 MAR 10 MAR 17 MAR 24 MAR 25 APR 1 APR 7 APR 14 APR 21 APR 28 APR 29 MAY 5 MAY 12 MAY 19 MAY 26 MAY 27 JUN 2 JUN 9 JUN 10-15																				
		INCIDENTS	208	117	139	143	105	78	72	75	126	113	110	101	89	98	96	69	71	65	94	99
MAJ/ MIN	ABF	8 / 70	5 / 31	11 / 41	9 / 38	20 / 18	7 / 7	10 / 20	7 / 25	22 / 50	6 / 40	6 / 37	2 / 35	7 / 21	2 / 16	5 / 14	5 / 16	6 / 13	5 / 10	12 / 16	13 / 21	
MAJ/ MIN	CTX	30 / 100	10 / 71	8 / 85	9 / 85	6 / 70	6 / 47	2 / 40	3 / 40	1 / 53	2 / 65	2 / 65	2 / 62	4 / 57	4 / 76	2 / 75	2 / 46	1 / 51	0 / 50	4 / 62	2 / 63	
EN ARTY	INCOMING	194	413	640	532	418	465	415	492	624	903	417	261	245	107	224	372	461	214	701	551	
FRD ARTY	EXPENDITURES	79,195	52,318	46,528	53,211	31,614	27,060	10,729	6,590	4,204	3,365 (5 DAYS)	5,203	4,175	9,439	4,644	4,770	7,190	5,463	3,257	7,842	14,762	
SCH/ FLN	SORTIES	434 / 506	434 / 394	434 / 378	519 / 538	444 / 424	418 / 278	386 / 148	378 / 258	384 / 203	370 / 162	298 / 128	294 / 229	290 / 227	290 / 211	294 / 215	310 / 221	292 / 148	294 / 192	294 / 213	305 / 137	
K/ W	FRD CAS	82 / 297	62 / 240	63 / 223	6 / 369	43 / 209	55 / 179	30 / 127	26 / 132	45 / 190	28 / 159	70 / 133	23 / 97	18 / 96	21 / 121	32 / 106	15 / 52	18 / 61	7 / 74	16 / 114	16 / 123	
K/ D	EN CAS	655 / 10	549 / 11	554 / 4	447 / 6	373 / 3	262 / 6	130 / 1	117 / 1	137 / 3	98 / 0	103 / 0	69 / 10	93 / 8	109 / 7	134 / 5	97 / 1	39 / 2	67 / 0	148 / 1	173 / 2	
K/ W	CIV CAS	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 15	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	14 / 81	0 / 0	0 / 0	0 / 0	2 / 24	5 / 6	0 / 6	1 / 1	

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# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 2

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WEEK	15 JUN 21	22 JUN 28	29 JUL 5	6 JUL 12	13 JUL 19	20 JUL 26	27 AUG 2	3 AUG 9	10 AUG 16	17 AUG 23	24 AUG 30	31 SEP 6	7 SEP 13	14 SEP 20	21 SEP 27	28 OCT 4	5 OCT 11	12 OCT 18	19 OCT 25	26 OCT 31	NOV 1
INCIDENTS	70	113	121																		
MAJ MIN ABF	10	4	13	19																	
MAJ MIN CTX	3	2	8	81																	
EN ARTY INCOMING	528	315	633																		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	11,144	15,908	19,991																		
SCH VNAF	232	280	315																		
FLX SORTIES	49	217	224																		
FRD CAS	18	38	50																		
EN CAS	127	85	250																		
CIV CAS	2	1	4																		

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# FIRST CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

## MR 3

WEEK	JAN - FEB												MAY - JUN																									
	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	
INCIDENTS	426	161	178	151	132	138	190	145	108	120	149	134	128	101	113	85	99	118	148	144																		
MAJ ABF	18	12	14	12	21	18	22	28	26	30	28	24	20	16	13	8	11	16	18	10	54																	
MAJ CTX	13	3	0	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	4	0	1	4	3	0	80																	
EN ARTY INCOMING	1,724	777	1,112	820	1,027	2,348	2,074	2,062	2,624	2,920	2,431	1,961	1,091	875	913	408	457	966	717	484																		
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	97,721	30,922	28,000	16,303	17,656	20,531	17,864	20,400	8,471	9,042	10,362	8,206	7,158	5,708	8,808	5,500	11,439	20,101	48,053	38,745																		
SCH VNAF	554	466	479	530	303	214	258	380	296	573	599	560	420	402	406	397	413	346	584	428																		
FLN SORTIES	513	316	457	282	176	72	105	285	206	469	360	304	282	272	290	330	259	243	470	236																		
K W FRD CAS	169	40	37	27	72	43	35	19	22	21	24	43	26	25	49	13	25	19	28	41																		
K D EN CAS	137	208	102	119	44	31	66	72	46	20	26	90	63	20	91	26	88	37	63	31																		
K W CIV CAS	1	4	0	0	0	3	3	0	10	1	0	0	3	8	1	12	1	3	2	6																		

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# SECOND CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 3

WEEK	JUN 15 - JUN 21		JUN 22 - JUN 28		JUN 29 - JUL 5		JUL 6 - JUL 12		JUL 13 - JUL 19		JUL 20 - JUL 26		JUL 27 - AUG 2		AUG 3 - AUG 9		AUG 10 - AUG 16		AUG 17 - AUG 23		AUG 24 - AUG 30		AUG 31 - SEP 6		SEP 7 - SEP 13		SEP 14 - SEP 20		SEP 21 - SEP 27		SEP 28 - OCT 4		OCT 5 - OCT 11		OCT 12 - OCT 18		OCT 19 - OCT 25		OCT 26 - NOV 1											
	INCIDENTS	97	84	67	MAJ/ MIN	ABF	6	9	33	19	5	11	MAJ/ MIN	CTX	0	1	58	55	51	EN ARTY INCOMING	327	328	302	FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	3,712	5,751	5,100	SCH/ FLN	VNAF	285	216	200	6	K/ W	FRD CAS	4	18	17	53	K/ D	EN CAS	31	66	30	1	K/ W	CIV CAS	2	4	0

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# FIRST CEASE FIRE PERSPECTIVE

MR 4

WEEK	JAN 28														JUN 10													
	FEB 5							FEB 12							FEB 19							FEB 26						
INCIDENTS	512	370	410	383	332	299	329	291	243	337	366	307	329	343	374	367	221	299	348	349								
MAJ MIN ABF	16	28	28	37	18	28	27	29	27	38	28	26	27	23	32	25	6	19	20	38								
MAJ MIN CTX	10	7	8	6	6	4	1	5	3	7	1	7	4	6	4	11	3	11	9	6								
EN ARTY INCOMING	2,351	2,060	2,123	2,011	1,967	1,723	1,672	1,485	1,293	1,836	2,139	1,945	1,310	1,682	1,884	1,565	917	1,425	1,898	1,800								
FRD ARTY EXPENDITURES	94,471	49,582	43,924	36,476	32,003	25,223	14,749	20,924	11,526	17,737	13,743	13,775	11,871	11,566	10,413	12,169	11,283	14,799	22,528	22,186								
SCH VNAF	494	574	656	304	238	238	197	154	152	192	132	154	152	152	154	154	154	154	144	76								
FLN SORTIES	497	426	440	186	167	82	38	97	105	158	91	113	116	121	117	129	84	88	92	44								
K W FRD CAS	98	78	83	281	209	95	36	97	93	202	79	38	61	69	113	134	48	71	137	52								
K D EN CAS	627	371	439	301	346	216	131	273	80	330	115	157	135	123	96	120	159	204	449	174								
K W CIV CAS	2	2	2	0	0	7	5	0	0	17	1	7	16	15	0	15	8	20	6	17								

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enemy reaction. Within MR 4 the continuing high level of ceasefire activity in Chuong Thien Province remains the focal point of enemy action in the Delta. The current level of combat activity is likely to continue until areas of control are agreed upon by the opposing forces.

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## CHAPTER 3

### ASSESSMENT OF RVNAF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY

#### 1. (S) J-2/JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. The operational effectiveness of the RVNAF intelligence services continues at a high level, despite withdrawal of major U.S. financial and personnel assets. A major contributing factor is the personal integrity and professional competence of the J-2. The effective organization and manning of the services with experienced, competent personnel have resulted in quality intelligence production which attests to the success of Vietnamization in the Intelligence field.

b. However, the overall effectiveness of the J-2/JGS is impaired by the following weaknesses:

(1) The J-2/JGS has the following personnel strength:

<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>
175 Officers	135 Officers
111 NCO's	88 NCO's
34 EM's	32 EM's
<u>320</u>	<u>255</u>

The above manning represents a shortage of 65 personnel.

(2) In the past, information relayed from the Corps to MACV over secure U.S. communications networks was passed to J-2/JGS. These channels are no longer available, and the RVNAF G2/J2 does not have sufficient secure lines of communications. As a result, reporting from the field is often late as much of it must be pouched to Saigon. The Intelligence Branch, Defense Attache Office, Saigon is helping the J-2 revise its TOE in an effort to resolve this problem. No firm implementation date is available.



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(3) When U.S. advisory elements were in the field, they served as a cross-check on the reliability of reporting by local RVNAF units. In their absence, there has been no way to ascertain the degree of reliability in the ARVN reporting of casualties, initiation of incidents, units in contact, etc., but there is reason to believe that considerable falsification is taking place. The introduction of U.S. Regional Liaison Officers in the field should ameliorate this problem.

(4) The U.S. funding of out-of-country operations was sharply curtailed following MACV's withdrawal. U.S. funds continue to provide for limited activity in Laos and Cambodia. However, the DAO Intelligence Branch is not aware of any unilateral RVNAF operations being conducted in North Vietnam. As a result of these restrictions, the RVNAF does not have adequate intelligence on activities in neighboring countries which vitally affect South Vietnam's internal situation.

(5) The J-2's technical control over Corps G-2's is not effective as Corps Commanders have sometimes encouraged (or directed) the G-2's to ignore J-2 directives.

(6) The Deputy J-2, who is also the Chief of the Military Intelligence Center,\* and the Chief of his Materiel Exploitation Division are ineffectual. The most pronounced effect of their inadequate leadership is reflected in the limited effort made to locate and exploit newly captured materiel.

\*The Military Intelligence Center was established on 1 July 1973 and consists of five Divisions: Intelligence Division (formerly the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam); Document Exploitation Division (Combined Document Exploitation Center); Materiel Exploitation Division (Combined Materiel Exploitation Center); Interrogation Division (Combined Military Interrogation Center); Support Division (Military Intelligence Maintenance Center). The reorganization has not yet had any impact on operational effectiveness.

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(7) The drawdown of operations and hostile actions has resulted in fewer documents, PW's and equipment being captured. This has reduced the data base available for evaluation and publication as finished intelligence.

### 2. (S) MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS)

a. While primarily a counterintelligence and security organization with direct access to the Office of the President, the MSS also has an intelligence collection capability. It is the most powerful of all RVN intelligence and security organizations and is highly efficient.

b. Key officers are known to be pro-U.S. and capable, dedicated individuals. MSS has an authorized strength of 4,825 and an actual strength of 4,386 personnel. The headquarters element in Saigon is staffed by approximately 660 officers and men. Each Military Region and the Capital Military District has a contingent of 50 officers and men. Each District has a six-man office. Within the military structure, MSS representatives are attached to every ARVN unit down to platoon level.

c. MSS is financed through RVNAF resources without any U.S. support.

### 3. (S) UNIT 101 - CLANDESTINE HUMINT COLLECTION

a. The Commander, Deputy Commander and Operations Officer of Unit 101 are capable, dedicated individuals with long careers in intelligence. Unit 101 has an authorized strength of 918 and an actual strength of 799 personnel. The headquarters element in Saigon is staffed by approximately 190 individuals and the six field detachments, which are further broken down into 27 teams, are composed of approximately 100 men each.

b. Unit 101 has proven its capability and has the flexibility to adjust and continue to collect information under any given contingency, except withdrawal of United States support. Without

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U.S. financial and logistical assistance, the Unit would probably not be able to maintain operations at a sufficiently acceptable level to justify its continued existence.

## 4. (S) VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

### a. HUMINT Collection

(1) The VNAF Director of Intelligence and the Chief of the VNAF HUMINT contingent are strong, capable leaders and have shown a keen interest in the direction and development of their collection assets. The majority of the VNAF officers have developed skills to a point where they could successfully operate on a unilateral basis.

(2) The Unit has an authorized strength of 15 and an assigned strength of 9.

(3) The Unit is completely funded by USAF. The scope of and/or number of collection projects would be reduced if it were forced to rely upon its own financial resources.

### b. PHOTINT

(1) VNAF's photo intelligence is limited by the number of aircraft and their susceptibility to ground fire. Six RF-5's and three of the 12 authorized RC-47's are dedicated to photo collection. These aircraft provide minimum coverage of MR's 2, 3, and 4. The RF-5 operates under the major handicap of its 70 mm camera; a system suited only for bomb damage assessment. There is little or no coverage of MR 1 due to the high threat posed by the NVN air defense systems deployed within the MR. The RVN continues to rely on U.S. reconnaissance resources for photo coverage of MR 1.

(1) RVNAF has the capability to produce photo materials such as duplicate positives, select prints and photo mosaics. Although their capacity to produce paper prints is limited, the quality of laboratory work is excellent.

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## SECRET NOFORN DISSEM

5. (S) VNN HUMINT COLLECTION: Key officers of the Special Collection Detachment have considerable experience in both the counterintelligence and positive intelligence fields. They have been trained at United States intelligence schools and are dedicated and capable officers. The SCD has an authorized strength of 168, but it is currently operating with an actual strength of 132 personnel. There are a total of 26 personnel at headquarters in Saigon. The remainder are assigned to six Collection Teams with an average strength of 17 personnel.

6. (S) SIGINT:

a. The J-7, Directorate General of Technical Services (DGTS), is responsible for RVNAF SIGINT. This staff agency is capable of providing relatively timely tactical intelligence through the use of its 11 direct support units assigned to the 11 ARVN Infantry Divisions. Direct support units for Ranger, Airborne, and Marine units are still in the process of being formed. The DGTS controls 33 EC-47 aircraft in its airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) program. Twenty-three aircraft are based in Saigon and are flying an average of eight missions per day against enemy units in RVN Military Region 3 and 4. The full potential of the remaining ten EC-47's based in Da Nang has not yet been attained due to support problems for 90hrs/mo/acft. Maintenance difficulties due to the age of the aircraft will be a continuing problem. At present, Da Nang based aircraft are flying four missions per day.

b. The RVNAF SIGINT capability is continuing to make progress. While the overall experience level is low, some success has been achieved in the area of collection. Progress is also being made in analysis and reporting. However, existing limitations include a shortage of DGTS personnel, the need for additional secure communications systems, and major problems in the ARDF program, particularly in the northern part of RVN.

7. (S) SUMMARY: RVNAF intelligence services benefit from personnel who, on the whole, are highly competent dedicated professionals. However, RVNAF intelligence services are inhibited greatly because of insufficient, outdated communications, the inadequacy of the RF-5 camera system, and the age of the EC-47's.

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## CHAPTER 4

### RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

1. (S) RVNAF approved force level of 1,100,000 was achieved by the 30 June 73 deadline.

(Figure 1)

A recapitulation of RVNAF force structure for FY 1974 is shown below:

	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>CHANGE</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>ASGD 30 MAY 73</u>
ARVN	448,953	+ 670	449,623	461,403
VNAF	64,507	+ 402	64,909	60,679
VNN	39,742	+ 439	40,181	41,256
VNMC	14,402	+ 36	14,438	15,484
RF	324,561	0	324,561	306,592
PF	206,028	0	206,028	211,887
AWAIT DISTRIBUTION	1,807	-1547	260*	
TOTAL	1,100,000	0	1,100,000	1,097,301

\*260 spaces for pending force structure actions.

(Figure 1)

The above FY 1974 RVNAF force structure changes were approved by JCS message 242257Z May 73 (S) with the exception of the VNAF Maritime Air Patrol Squadron. The operational requirement for a maritime air patrol is currently under review by higher authority. In order to meet the FY 74 force level, Popular Forces were reduced by 600 platoons throughout RVN. Plan called for the deactivation of 17,390 Popular Force personnel. Many of these PF soldiers were transferred to understrength ARVN and RF units in their respective area, thereby not losing the training and experience of these soldiers.

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(Figure 2)

<u>MR</u>	<u>PF PLAT</u>	<u>NO. PLTS DEACTIVATED</u>	<u>TOTAL STR</u>
1	29	100	2,900
2	29	129	3,741
3	29	100	2,900
4	29	248	7,192
Reserve	29	<u>23</u>	<u>667</u>
TOTALS		600	17,390

(Figure 2)

2. (S) RVNAF RESERVE: Both a regional and national reserve system has long been a serious problem to the GVN and RVNAF. An ad hoc committee was formed under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND) to conduct a study of national reserve systems. This committee made trips to Korea and Taiwan to evaluate reserve systems as possible models to follow in establishing an RVNAF reserve. It is reported that several alternatives for developing an RVNAF reserve are under study. The proposal calls for the demobilization of 100,000 men per year for three years from RVNAF in order to develop a reserve. The basic question under consideration is the merits of developing full unit or cadre only reserves. Additionally, it has been announced that 398,602 civil servants throughout the country will become uniformed cadre no later than the end of Dec 73. Its organization will be formed in the shape of a pyramid with the General Commissariat for Public Affairs as its highest command. It is reported that President Thieu wants to "centralize the command of government employees and shape them into a severe discipline". They will be obligated to attend a Civil Servant Training Center like military personnel. It is hoped this plan can be approved and implemented by Dec 73 so that by Jan 74 civil servants will be able to serve as "military" if required.

### 3. (C) RVNAF AIR DEFENSE:

a. Within the RVNAF force structure, the air defense capability is limited to counter the potential threat.

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b. The NVAF staging from forward bases in NVN, are capable of launching MIG-17/19/21's in large air attacks into the northern half of SVN. IL-28 twin-jet bombers (8 possessed) are capable of reaching Saigon. The MIG-17/19/21 force has limited bomb carrying capacity and is essentially limited to day and clear weather bombing. Nevertheless, with the element of surprise, substantial damage to military installations could result.

(Figure 3)

<u>AFLD</u>	<u>MIG-21</u>	<u>MIG-19</u>	<u>MIG-15/17</u>
Yen Bai	0	39	9
Kep	0	0	77
Phuc Yen	65	0	1
Hoa Lac	0	0	2
Dong Suong	7	0	0
Kien An	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	72	39	91

(Figure 3)

c. Equally significant, enemy air employed in the air superiority role could deny friendly controlled areas the support of VNAF air operations and provide cover for routine enemy air resupply into areas of SVN controlled by the enemy.

d. RVNAF air defense capability to counter this threat is limited in quantity, capability and proficiency. It consists of the ground radar control and warning system, F-5 fighters and M-42 twin 40mm and M-55 quad 50 caliber anti-aircraft weapons.

e. The F-5A is a short range, supersonic fighter carrying a fixed gunsight, 560 rounds of 20mm and two AIM-9B Sidewinder IR missiles. It is limited to clear weather intercepts/attacks and is not capable of intercepting or firing in clouds. Its night capability is limited. In addition, F-5 pilots have received little air-to-air combat or intercept training, concentrating

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rather on the ground attack role. Consequently, they lack proficiency against an enemy well trained in air-to-air combat against the U.S. The F-5 aircraft is capable of defeating the MIG-21, the major enemy aircraft of which 72 are possessed, but only in a narrow range of speed and altitude in a turning fight. The MIG-21 is faster and can run away, while the F-5 must skillfully force the enemy into his kill environment or face probable annihilation. This problem is further compounded in that F-5 armament (IR missiles and guns) has virtually no capability in the front hemisphere attack, forcing the F-5 to get into the stern quarter to be effective.

f. Currently, VNAF maintains two F-5's on five minute alert at Da Nang AB, two on 15 minute and two on backup. An additional four aircraft are on alert at Bien Hoa AB. The total F-5 force at Da Nang AB is 10-12 aircraft and 18 pilots. The number is limited due to non-availability of air-ground equipment and the airplanes return to Bien Hoa AB for major logistics support.

g. The VNAF aircraft control and warning system is limited in the northern part of the country due to significant terrain maskings which hide low altitude intrusion and because of the geography of North and South Vietnam which allows little warning time of penetration within MR 1 from the north, from seaward or from Laos. Aircraft early warning and control in South Vietnam is provided by five radar sites. At Binh Thuy an FPS-8 and an FPS-6A; at Tan Son Nhut an FPS-20A and an FPS-89; at Ban Me Thout an FPS-8 and an FPS-90; at Pleiku an FPS-8 and an FPS-90 and at Da Nang (Monkey Mountain) an FPS-20C and an FPS-6A. These radars, a combination of azimuth search and height finders, have capabilities of range on the order of 200 NM and height above 60,000 feet. This full capability is not realized because of several problems with terrain masking in both MR 1 and MR 2 and the chronic maintenance problems associated with height finder radars similar to the experience in the U.S. All controllers received basic training in the U.S. This training included training in intercept techniques. There is a continuing training program in existence in the VNAF AC&W group, particularly in MR 1; however, the volume of training sorties available is not sufficient to make either ground controllers or pilots proficient in air defense tactics. With the exception of the above mentioned problems with height finders, the radar maintenance capability and incommision rate is quite good. This is, in spite of the fact that the

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radars are tube type state of the art electronics which deteriorates rapidly in the climate of SVN.

h. The ARVN presently has four battalions of Air Defense Artillery (ADA). Each battalion consists of two batteries of M-55, truck mounted Quad 50 caliber machine guns with 24 units authorized to a battery. Each battalion also has one battery (✓) of M-42 twin 40mm guns. A normal battery is authorized 16 units; however, the battery (✓) is authorized 24 units. Two battalions are deployed and dispersed throughout the Monkey Mountain/Da Nang area and the other two battalions are deployed, each to MR 2 (currently Phu Cat) and in MR 3 (currently Long Binh). These units are not fully equipped to TO&E, generally running at just over half of authorized. All units are operational including the battalion at Phu Cat which has just completed training.

i. In January 1974, VNAF will receive first 6 F-5E's as replacement for F-5A's. Plans provide for eventual replacement of all six 24 units equipped (UE) F-5A squadrons with F-5E's. The firm production/delivery schedule of the first three squadrons, at 18 UE indicates activations in March, September of 1974 and January of 1975 respectively, with full operational capability six to nine months later.

(Figures 4 and 5)

j. The VNAF have established a rapid and responsive air defense command and control net. The procedures for initiating active air scrambles is free of the confusion associated with the scheduling/fragging of other VNAF activities. VNAF and U.S. controllers have some ADIZ and SVN overflight coordination difficulties because of distance and limited unsecure VNAF telecommunications between TACC's and DASC's. Conferences and message traffic have occurred on this problem and a monthly IFF code will be used when entering and leaving the SVN ADIZ.

4. (C) MODERNIZATION OF EQUIPMENT: Replacement of all M41A3 tanks with M48A tanks is under consideration. This subject is discussed in Chapter 5, ARVN Assessment.

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## COMPARING THE F-5A AND F-5E

1. Both aircraft are built by Northrup and from outward appearance are identical.
2. The F-5E is faster and vastly more maneuverable than the F-5A because of computer activated leading edge flaps.
3. The F-5E has greater range or bomb load than the F-5A (a typical F-5A mission is 4 x 500 lb bomb with a 100-150 NM radius of action). The F-5E can carry the same load over 300 MN radius or 7,000 lbs of ordnance in a 100 NM radius of action.
4.
  - a. The F-5A is restricted to clear air mass (engine ices up), utilizes "Kentucky windage" for air-to-air attack with guns and eyeball to determine when in range to launch the Infrared IAM-9B Missile.
  - b. The F-5E has a lead computing sight, search and track radar and a missile in-range computer.
  - c. Neither the F-5A or the F-5E is an all-weather interceptor since the AIM-9B/E is a clear air, infrared homing missile which can't be successfully launched in clouds.
5. Because of thrust to weight ratio, wing loading and extreme flight stability, the F-5E will, pilots being equal, more than match the MIG-21 in the standard maneuvering combat arena. Its area of potential superiority is much greater than the MIG-21 and gives the F-5E the upper hand whereas the F-5A is a match for the MIG-21 in a very restricted environment.

Figure (4)

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## F-5A/F-5E COMPARISONS

	<u>F-5A</u>	<u>F-5E</u>
Max Speed	1.4 Mach	1.6 Mach
Take Off Roll	2,500 ft	1,900 ft
Ferry Range	1,205 NM	1,745 NM
Max Thrust/Engine	4,080 lbs	5,000 lbs
Mil Thrust/Engine	2,270 lbs	3,500 lbs
Internal Fuel	3,790 lbs	4,360 lbs
Max External	3,549 lbs	5,987 lbs
Empty Weight	8,085 lbs	9,588 lbs
Max Takeoff Weight	20,575 lbs	24,737 lbs
Electronics	Tacan/UHF Radio IFF/SIF AIM-9B Missile Tone Optical Gunsight -- -- --	Tacan/UHF w/UHF ADF IFF/SIF w/Seek Point AIM-9B or E Missile in range computer Lead Computing Sight Radar Search & Track Air Data Computer Maneuvering Leading Edge Flaps
Weapons	M-39 30 MM Cannon/ 560 RDS Standard Rockets, Bombs, CBUs, and Napalm	Same
Air Refuel	No	Same
Jettisonable Pylons	No	No
Tailhook Arrestment	No	Yes
Heated Windshield	No	Yes
Engine Anti-ice	No	Yes
Two Position Nose	No	Yes
Gear f/Improved		
Angle of Attack	No	Yes
150 gal External		
Tanks	Yes	Yes
275 Gal External		
Tanks	No	Yes
Fire suppressant		
Tanks	No	Yes

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## CHAPTER 5

### VIETNAMESE ARMY

1. (C) AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS. The totals of the authorized and assigned strengths of combat units does not include the combat support and combat service support assets normally assigned under operational control to the senior command.

(Figure 1)

2. (S) AREAS OF OPERATION AND UNIT LOCATIONS:

a. Military Region 1 is subdivided into five Areas of Operation (AO). From north to south the AO's assigned are as follows: VNMC, ABN DIV, 1ST Div, 3d Div and 2d Div.

b. Military Region 2 is subdivided into two Areas of Operation. From east to west the AO's assigned are as follows: 22d Div and 23d Div. The southern half of MR 2 does not contain elements of either division.

c. Military Region 3 is subdivided into four Areas of Operation and one Special Zone. The Capitol Special Zone is the immediate area surrounding Saigon and the remaining AO's are assigned as follows: Ranger Command, 5th Div, 18th Div and 25th Div.

d. Military Region 4 is subdivided into three Areas of Operation and one Tactical Zone. The 44th Special Tactical Zone is occupied primarily by Ranger units and the remaining AO's are assigned as follows: 7th Div, 9th Div, and 21st Div.

(Figure 2)

e. Tactical unit locations down to and including regimental level are contained within each Military Region.

(Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6)



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AUTHORIZED & ASSIGNED STRENGTHS

AS OF 31 MAY 73

DIV.	Total Author	OFF	NCO	EM	Total Assgn	O/O Assgn Vice Author
1st	17,182	992	3,516	10,350	14,858	86
2d	14,102	841	2,492	8,577	11,910	84.4
3d	14,222	888	2,715	8,447	12,050	85
5th	14,102	870	2,551	8,385	11,806	84
7th	14,118	864	2,706	8,217	11,787	83
9th	14,159	789	2,447	7,383	10,619	75
18th	14,102	856	2,616	7,988	11,460	81.2
21st	14,118	836	2,751	8,612	12,199	86.4
22d	17,167	1,018	3,039	10,286	14,343	84
23d	14,102	882	2,488	8,263	11,633	82.4
25th	14,163	862	2,531	9,363	12,756	90
ABN	13,567	872	3,082	10,401	14,355	106
RGR	34,955	2,106	6,410	25,882	34,378	98.3
TOTALS	210,059	12,676	39,344	132,154	184,154	87.6

Figure (1)

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## AREAS OF OPERATION




Figure (2)


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ARVN

MR 1



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Figure (3)


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**ARVN**

MR 2




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Figure (4)

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
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AR VN

MR 4



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## 3. (C) COMBAT ARMS:

### a. Combat Divisions.

(1) The Airborne Division is an elite all-volunteer unit, well trained and well led. Members of the Division enjoy a reputation as aggressive capable fighters who are proud of their elite status. The airborne AO was recently shifted to northern Thua Thien (P) to thwart an enemy threat to that area. A battalion refresher training program is continuous as well as a rotating unit leave program. The Airborne Division is considered to be able to hold their own against an enemy attack in their area of operation. Other favorable assets are:

- (a) Above minimum operational strength level
- (b) Adequate arms and equipment
- (c) Relatively high quality of leadership
- (d) Morale and discipline good
- (e) Desertion rate low (below 200 per month)
- (f) Effective leadership

(2) The Marine Division is an all volunteer unit, well trained, with adequate arms and equipment and a relatively high quality of leadership. Even though the recent change in the VNMC AO has enlarged their AO, discipline and morale remain high. There is a continuous refresher training program established as well as a rotating unit leave program. Marine recruitment has been temporarily halted because all units are above normal strength and the desertion rate is low. Brigadier General Bui The Lan, Commander of the Vietnamese Marines, is an able and respected commander.

(3) The 1st ARVN Division is far from the combat effective Division it was prior to the spring of 1971 because of the serious casualties suffered in operation Lam Son 719 in Southern Laos and in the Defense of Hue in 1972. It is estimated that at least 50% of the company grade officers and key noncommissioned officers were lost. Although these leaders have been replaced, there has not been sufficient time for training and combat experience to develop a new generation of leaders. Since April 73,

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battalions of the Division are being rotated through the Division Training Center for two weeks of refresher training and refitting. By the end of July each infantry battalion will have a combat strength of over 600 men and the Division will reach 90% of authorized strength. The traditions and esprit de corps of the Division is good but more training is required before it will achieve the combat efficiency that it had before early 1971. The Division Commander, BG Le Van Than, is marginally effective, but a hard-working commander.

(4) The 3d Division was formed from a small cadre selected from ARVN units and filled with territorial forces and deserters in late 1971 and replaced the US 5th Mechanized Brigade in blocking positions on the DMZ. Training was minimal. In the spring of 1972 this Division was faced with the NVA invasion and subsequently their position was overrun, leaving the Division in complete disarray. The 3d ARVN Division has improved greatly from its defeat in Quang Tri Province, but has yet to prove its combat capability. Field and company grade leadership is considered good and is presently performing well in clearing the NVA/VC from the lowlands in Quang Nam (P). Brigadier General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Division Commander, is an outstanding commander and is doing a creditable job in rebuilding the Division.

(5) The 2d ARVN Division has recovered from the defeat it suffered in and near Que Son district, Quang Nam (P) in 1972. The 2d Division is credited with the counter attack to retake Sa Huynh during the ceasefire. The morale of the 5th and 6th Regiments has improved. The Division is deployed entirely in Quang Ngai (P) and is making progress in clearing the lowlands in the Province. Brigadier General Tran Van Nhut, Division Commander, is competent and has responded to the difficult task of taking over a demoralized Division in August 1972 and being forced to fight without sufficient time to train and rehabilitate the infantry battalions of the Division. The 2d Division is now considered one of the top ARVN Divisions.

(6) The 22d Division never had a distinguished record and during the 1972 NVA spring offensive, the 47th and 42nd Regiments were routed in Kontum (P) as was the 40th Regiment in northern Binh Dinh (P). Since the ceasefire,

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the 22d Division has been committed continuously and performed marginally in clearing lowland areas in Binh Dinh Province for resettlement. The enemy has offered only token resistance to these incursions and the 22d Division units have suffered only light casualties. The regiments are rotated to the Division Headquarters at An Son for rest and training. Morale is fair, but discipline and middle leadership is poor. The Division has a poor reputation and relationship with the local populations.

(7) The 23d Division has never been considered a strong Division. Since ceasefire 1, performance of the regiments has ranged from poor to slightly better than adequate. The 44th Regimental performance was poor in their drive to reopen QL-14 between Pleiku and Kontum. Likewise, the 44th, 45th and 53d lack initiative in their efforts to retake Poley Krong and Trung Nghia. The Division has not been tested in turning back a major attack; however, judging by present performance, it is doubtful that the Division would react quickly or forcefully enough to prevent the loss of large areas of GVN territory. Leadership, morale and discipline are the Division's greatest weaknesses. Being assigned to the "highlands" is tantamount to exile for most officers and men; consequently, large numbers of disgruntled officers and troops are reluctant to fight for a region that means so little to them. The Division Commander is not exerting effective leadership and does not enjoy a good reputation.

(8) The 18th ARVN Division is a combat effective unit. The Division appears to be well organized and somewhat mobile. Tactical dispersion of the Division elements is constantly maintained and elements are continuously rotated through the training center. The Division keeps approximately 2,000 of its assigned strength in the training center. The desertion rate is 2.5% and through use of the draft it receives approximately 900 recruits each month. Since the ceasefire, the 18th's major achievement has been the opening of the LTL-2 between Duc Thanh, Phuoc Tuy (P) and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh (P). BG Dao, the 18th Division Commander, is considered too cautious or conservative but a dedicated man both to superiors and subordinates. He continually visits his units and personally chats with his officers and men.

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(9) The 5th ARVN Division is considered marginally combat effective. This Division failed completely in their June 73 attempt to reopen QL-13 between Lai Khe and An Loc. Assigned strength averages 11,806 but only 7,745 are normally present for duty (PFD). The difference represents desertions, AWOL's, and other combat ineffectives. PFD strength is maintained by extensive use of the draft. The Division elements are not normally tactically deployed, but are grouped in base camps. As an example, Lai Khe, the Division base, presently quarters the Division Headquarters, one Regimental Headquarters, five infantry battalions, and one ACS squadron. The present commander, BG Lich, is considered better than predecessors. The Division has been hampered by a succession of poor commanders, most of whom were staunch supporters of President Thieu and probably selected on the basis of political affiliation.

(10) The 25th ARVN Division should be considered only partially combat effective. The 49th Regiment, located in Tay Ninh at the Tay Ninh west airfield, is considered by the sector as a negative factor in defense of the airfield because of the regiment's propensity to avoid combat actions and to loot areas. These troops are also notorious for their mistreatment of the civilian population and are reported to be trading with the enemy in Tay Ninh (P). The 46th and 50th Regiments are somewhat more effective than the 49th.

(11) The 21st Division has not held its own in Chuong Thien (P) or An Xuyen (P) even though recently reinforced with ten RF companies and two RBD battalions. Most of the Division units are camped in or near the province capital and appear content to sit back and let territorial forces take the brunt of the enemy pressure. Morale is low and the Division suffers from unimaginative and indecisive leadership. Individual misdeeds coupled with the misuse of firepower, especially artillery, has made this Division's presence a pacification liability. The Division does not have a good relationship with the population. Recently assigned BG Hung, Division, Commander, has a monumental task to improve the combat effectiveness of this unit.

(12) The 7th ARVN Division has proven itself as a combat effective unit before and since the ceasefire. This unit is generally well led and enjoys a relatively good

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level of training. The Division has shown an ability to move rapidly throughout the AO to spoil enemy attacks and to aid other units. Combat effectiveness has been proven by the Division's invasion of the Tri Phap training and hospital area and the expansion of GVN controlled territory in Dinh Tuong (P) and Kien Tuong (P). BG Nam, Division Commander, is considered good and is blessed with two well thought of regimental commanders. The 7th Division is considered the best in MR 4.

(13) The 9th Division is considered the second best division in MR 4. This unit has displayed a superb capacity to shift in and out of areas in repelling VC/NVA attacks. This is well documented by the repelling of the enemy attacks of Hong Ngu and the expulsion of the VC/NVA from their fortified positions along the Mekong River in northern Kien Phong (P). The training program of this Division calls for two companies from each regiment to conduct training daily. Each battalion has had one week's leave since the ceasefire went into effect. The Division is well led by MG Di; however, his staff has been ineffective in resolving administrative and personnel problems which are detrimental to morale.

## (14) Ranger Units:

(a) Rangers are organized under the Central Ranger Command into ranger groups, battalions, and ranger border battalions. Ranger commands are organized in MR I (Danang), MR II (Pleiku), and MR III (An Loc), while in MR IV the 7th Ranger Group is in the 44th STZ. Ranger battalions have 661 personnel authorized while ranger border battalions have 461.

(b) The rangers have been employed in various roles throughout RVN and often misused. In MR I, ranger units are employed in static roles primarily within the 3d Division area of responsibility (AO), while in MR II the ranger units have been used mainly to secure the national railroad line in Phu Yen (P) while construction is underway to make the railroad operational. Ranger units are also employed within the 23d Division AO in Kontum (P) and Pleiku (P). Primary ranger role in MR III is in the ranger command AO which is Binh Long Province. In MR IV, the 7th Ranger Group has responsibility for the 44th STZ. However, ranger units are frequently relocated by region commanders to meet the changing tactical situation.

(c) The rangers are considered well equipped



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and trained, but are reported to have low morale due to misuse. During the period of the ceasefire the rangers have not been involved in major conflicts except in two notable cases. Members of the 92d RBD Battalion at Tonle Cham have become national heroes for their stubborn defense of the base camp from 12 March to 14 June 1973. While suffering numerous casualties from over 10,000 rounds of mixed type indirect fire, only 26 of 56 wounded rangers chose to be medevaced. Conversely, the complacency caused by their relative inactivity in Chuong Thien Province resulted in the 66th Ranger Battalion receiving a surprise ground attack and suffering high casualties and loss of small arms and radios. The 67th Ranger Battalion came to the rescue and inflicted moderate losses on the enemy while suffering only light friendly casualties. The rangers normally can be depended upon for above average performance when required. Middle level leadership is considered better than that of the average ARVN division. The rangers are also victims of the inflation which has caused greater incidence of thievery. In many areas ranger units have been known to have alienated the population. Some evidence has been seen that during the ceasefire period, ranger units, like some ARVN units, have not exercised pre-ceasefire aggressiveness in performing assigned missions. Whether this is a result of local accommodation, lack of motivation, or chance of being killed during a ceasefire cannot be accurately reported. The rangers must be considered a viable fighting force and, which properly motivated and employed, are able to defend or counter enemy incursions satisfactorily. Discipline in the rangers leaves much to be desired and relationship with the population in many areas is not good.

## b. Artillery.

(1) ARVN 175mm Artillery Battalions were first activated in 1971 and by early 1973 totalled five battalions, each possessing 12 weapons. Additional weapons are on hand for utilization as maintenance float and for instructional use at the ordnance and artillery schools. ARVN assets are:

5 Arty Bn W/12 Wpns each	60
Float Wpns at 3d ALC	3
Float Wpn at 811th direct support unit	1
1st collection & classification annex	2
Off-shore repair program	7
Arty & Ordnance School	3



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Accountable assets	81
Combat losses not recovered	4
Total assets accountable	85

(2) A recent end item review concluded that ARVN accounting records do not accurately reflect the assets provided under the U.S. Military Assistance/Grant air program. On-hand assets and weapons off-shore for repair and return provide an excess maintenance float and will require a large repair parts inventory. When weapons gun tubes were replaced, the breech blocks were not die stamped so as to control the number of retubings. Weapons log books do not always accompany the weapons when they are issued or transferred. Mission effectiveness is impaired by a shortage of TOE equipment. The artillery battalions were not reviewing/adjusting their authorized repair parts load list to reflect current demand history, nor was organizational maintenance emphasized.

## (3) Shortfalls.

(a) Organizational maintenance could be improved on track pads, road wheels, and cleanliness of gun tubes. The 102d Artillery Battalion in MR I has been emplaced without significant activity for over six weeks. This combat inactivity should have resulted in improved organizational maintenance. However, this battalion is currently efficient in the above mentioned maintenance areas.

(b) All 175mm battalions have TOE shortages, most of which detract from the battalion operational capability.

(c) All battalions have repair parts on order. Random sampling of filled requisitions ranges from one day to nine months. More training is needed for requisitioning procedures.

(d) The prescribed load lists (PLL) is the repair parts authorized at unit level. After the initial twelve months, PLL's should be reviewed every three months and stock levels adjusted based on demands over the past 180 days. Problem areas exist in all battalions in procedures used to apply the correct demand data.

(e) Neither the CLC nor the artillery CMD have scheduled the field maintenance inspections planned for artillery battalions. There appears to be no field maintenance inspection agency within ARVN.

## (4) Summary/Conclusion.

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(a) By establishing field maintenance assistance teams that will periodically inspect artillery ordnance equipment, the ARVN will be better able to identify and resolve operational problems.

(b) Maintenance assistance visits to units would more appropriately be conducted under the direction of the CLC or the Arty CMD. If these visits are coupled with increased command emphasis on maintenance, the ARVN Arty would realize increased combat readiness.

(c) Redistribution and utilization of maintenance float assets within Vietnam would improve unit readiness and preclude unauthorized cannibalization.

(d) ARVN 105mm and 155mm howitzer assets will be surveyed during the 1st Qtr of FY 74.

(e) Current ARVN artillery assets are deployed throughout each military region.

(FIGURE 7)

## c. ARVN Armor.

(1) Within the ARVN there are three tank squadrons with three tank troops organic to the armor command. Each squadron is authorized 56 M48A3 tanks, the armor school is authorized 10, and the ordnance school is authorized 1, totalling 179.

(2) Personnel assigned to the materiel surveillance branch, defense audit office, conducted a physical audit of the 20th 21st and 22d tank squadrons. Their inventory revealed a total of 267 tanks O/H. An added purpose of the visit was to validate combat losses. Some of the results were:

(a) 20th tank squadron. The 20th tank Sq tanks were well maintained and operationally ready. There were many errors in serial number control records maintained by the national materiel management agency which probably accounts for the total number discrepancy above. Squadron certified reports of tanks left at the battlefield contained 12 serial numbers of tanks lost since the ceasefire. The auditors located 2 tanks of these at the squadron, one serviceable and the other was awaiting transportation to the Saigon collection & classification center. Crew training and efficiency was not evaluated during this visit.

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U N I T	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			HOW 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV
1 ALC. (MR 1)									
10th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	2			
20th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
30th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
44th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
20 Arty Plts How 105mm	40	40	1						
8 Arty Plts Bor. Def Ranger	10	13	0						
3 Arty Bns/1st Inf. Div	54	54	4						
3 Arty Bns/2nd Inf. Div	54	54	8						
3 Arty Bns/3rd Inf. Div	54	54	9						
101st How. 175mm Bn							12	12	0
102nd How. 175mm Bn							12	12	0
105th How. 175mm Bn							12	12	0
SUB. TOTAL	212	215	22	72	72	5	36	36	0
2 ALC - 5 ALC (MR 2)									
103rd How. 175mm Bn							12	12	2
37th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
220th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
3 Arty Bns/22nd Inf. Div	54	54	5						
63rd How. 105mm Bn	18	18	0						
69th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	2						
20 Arty Plts How. 105mm	40	40	2						
230th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
Arty. School	14	14	0	6	6	0	2	2	
National Military Academy	2	2	0						
3 Arty Bns/23rd Inf. Div	54	54	0						
29 Arty Plts How. 105mm	58	58	2						
12 Arty Plts Bor. Def Ranger	18	18	1						
SUB. TOTAL	276	276	12	60	60	0	14	14	

Figure (7)

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UNIT	HOW 105MM			HOW 155MM			HOW 175MM		
	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV	AUTH	OH	UN-SERV
3 ALC (MR 3)									
130th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
50th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
250th How. 155mm Bn				18	17	2			
46th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
Ordnance School	2	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	
3 Arty Bns/5th Inf. Div	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/18th Inf Div	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/25th Inf. Div	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/Airborne Div.	54	54	9						
3 Arty Bns/Marine Div.	54	54	7						
61st How. 105mm Bn	18	19	0						
44 Arty Plts How. 105mm	88	88	7						
9 Plts Arty Bor.Def Ranger	14	14	0						
104th How. 175mm Bn							12	12	
SUB. TOTAL	392	394	26	73	73	3	12	13	
4 ALC (MR 4)									
70th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
90th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
210th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	0			
47th How. 155mm Bn				18	18	1			
67th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	1						
68th How. 105mm Bn	18	18	2						
3 Arty Bns/7th Inf. Div	54	54	1						
3 Arty Bns/9th Inf. Div	54	54	5						
3 Arty Bns/21st Inf. Div	54	54	7						
64 Arty Plts How. 105mm	128	128	3						
8 Arty Plts Bor.Def Ranger	8	8	0						
SUB. TOTAL	334	334	19	72	72	1			
GRAND TOTAL	1214	1219	79	277	277	9	62	63	

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Figure (7)

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(b) 21st Tank Squadron. The auditors found that 9 of the 11 M48A3 tanks reported as combat losses were on hand and in various stages of repair or technical inspection. The tanks reported as combat losses were identified by ARVN serial number on the certified combat loss report. Squadron records show that tanks having the remaining two serial numbers never had been assigned to the 21st Tank Squadron. The Squadron Commander states that he had left two tanks on the battlefield which have not been recovered. The audit of this restricted item revealed the need to strengthen combat loss recording. The DATT informed the Commander of the CLC that a call forward for M48A3 tanks would be deferred until the proper validation of combat losses.

(3) Modernization of Equipment. Replacement of all M41A3 tanks by M48A3 tanks is under consideration. The M41A3 is obsolete in the U.S. system and repair parts will be a problem in the future.

(4) Conclusion. With the completion of an audit of two of the three tank squadrons, it is evident that ARVN M48A3 tank assets on hand exceed those authorized. One of the squadrons is maintaining its tanks in an operationally ready status. There is a requirement to review and validate the method of reporting combat losses of restricted items. It appears probable that the M41A3 will be considered for replacement by the M48A3. The Defense Attache has recommended that a specified number of M41A3 be replaced with the M48A3. Unfortunately Armor personnel do not enjoy a good reputation with the population in many areas due to thievery, pilferage, and tank movement and weapon firing practices.

(5) ARVN M41A3 and the remaining M48A3 assets will be surveyed during the 1st Qtr of FY.74.

(6) Current ARVN armor assets are deployed within each military region.

(FIGURE 8) . . .

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STATUS OF ARVN ARMOR AS OF JUNE 1973

REPORTED BY JGS

	APC. M113			TANK M41A3			TANK M48A3		
	Auth	O/H	Un-ser vic	Auth	O/H	Un-ser vic	Auth	O/H	Un-ser vic
I Armor Brigade	6	6							
4 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	16	1			
7 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	14	3			
11 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	15	1			
17 Armor Cav.	42	40	2	17	13	2			
18 Armor Cav.	42	38	4	17	15	3			
20th Tank Sqd	12	12					56	53	1
(MR 1)Sub. Total	228	216	12	85	73	10	56	53	1
II Armor Brigade	6	6							
3 Armor Cav.	42	35	6	17	15	1			
14 Armor Cav.	42	38	5	17	16				
19 Armor Cav.	42	36	6	17	16				
8 Armor Cav.	42	41	1	17	10	2			
21st Tank Sqd	12	12					56	47	7
(MR 2)Sub. Total	186	168	18	68	57	3	56	47	7
III Armor Brigade	6	6							
1 Armor Cav.	42	41		17	17				
5 Armor Cav.	42	38	2	17	17				
10 Armor Cav.	58	53	2						
15 Armor Cav.	42	44	1	17	15	1			
Armor/Ord School	20	19		10	10		11	11	
22nd Tank Sqd	12	12					56	54	2
(MR 3)Sub. Total	222	213	5	61	59	1	67	65	2
IV Armor Brigade	6	6							
2 Armor Cav.	58	51	1						
6 Armor Cav.	58	48	6						
9 Armor Cav.	58	42	11						
12 Armor Cav.	58	53	4						
16 Armor Cav.	58	52	4						
(No Tank Sqd)									
(MR 4)Sub. Total	296	252	26						
Total	932	849	61	214	189	14	179	165	10

Figure (8)

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## 4. (U) TRAINING.

### a. Individual Recruit Training.

(1) The 1973 training program called for a change in responsibility for individual training. All recruit training will now be done at the National Training Centers (NTC's). The training facilities and ranges at the NTC's appear to be excellent and are comparable to US training centers. It is apparent that the US advisory effort had imbued the US training concepts and range requirements into the ARVN training program. All training is guided by the standard US approach somewhat modified by local conditions and needs.

(2) With the concepts, range facilities, and Program of Instruction (POI's) in working order, it is considered that the individual recruit training program is at an acceptable quality level and should be able to maintain itself and correct minor deficiencies that exist. A great deal of the progress made in the second quarter is attributable to the Chief of Central Training Command (CTC), who is personally inspecting the training centers, overseeing the management of their training and progress, and providing on-the-spot guidance and corrective action.

(3) The following figures indicate the projected 1973 recruit training for ARVN/RF and the totals for the first half year:

	<u>1973</u>	
	<u>Projected</u>	<u>Actual (Jan-Jun)</u>
NTC's	198,000	85,100
DTC	<u>10,000</u>	<u>15,874</u>
	208,000	100,974

### b. Service Schools, Specialist, and MOS Training.

(1) Input during CY 1973 for the service schools is programmed at 73,000. Actual input from January to June 1973 was 24,639. The low level of input so far is attributable to the Political Warfare (POLWAR) Program connected with the ceasefire during the first three months of 1973.

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Input totals dipped from 4,650 in January to 1,715 and 3,010 for February and March. April, May and June totals were 4,578, 5,566 and 5,120 respectively. A steady input of a little over 6,000 per month was needed to meet programmed levels. Now, however, in view of the slippage, an input load of some 7,700 will be required per month for the remaining months to meet programmed figure.

(2) Several months before the Army Advisory Group (AAG) departed, it was suggested to CTC that all POI's should be completely reviewed, revised and updated. Review of about 300 of the total of 500 was completed at the departure of the AAG, and an additional 100 have been reviewed since. With the completion of this program, plans call for a continuous cycle of review and updating of the POI's so as to incorporate lessons learned and revisions necessitated by organizational and situation changes.

(3) With the movement of two 175MM artillery pieces to the Artillery School during February 1973, training in this weapon can now be given on a formal basis. The POI for this training is to be completed within the next two months and training should start in September. The POI calls for a one-week course to be given at each required level, from basic gunner to fire direction controller. Training for the 175 crews will be conducted following completion by the crews of basic artillery training.

(4) Several school relocations took place over the last quarter. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) moved from Dalat to Long Binh and the POLWAR College assumed the vacated facilities. The Armor School moved from Thu Duc to Bear Cat and the Intelligence School moved from Saigon to Thu Duc.

(5) Plans have been proposed to combine the three combat branch schools (Armor, Infantry, Artillery) into one school at Bear Cat. This proposal is still being studied and as yet no approval has been received. An obvious benefit of this proposal will be to offer combined training and cross-fertilization of staff proposals and ideas in the development of combined combat arms doctrine.

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c. NCO Training. In late 1972 it was determined that the output of officers would have to be expanded in 1973. It was also decided that the NCO Academy at Nha Trang would be utilized to train the extra officer candidates that the Infantry School could not handle. Therefore, NCO training is now being conducted at Lam Son NTC and Quang Trung NTC. Programmed input for NCO training was 3,000 for the 1st quarter with actual input of 3,617. Programmed input for the second quarter is 4,500 with an actual input of 3,784.

### d. Officer Programs.

(1) The junior officer training program was set back due to the POLWAR effort immediately before and after the ceasefire. Before the signing of the peace agreement, officer training was halted and the students and cadre were sent to the provinces to explain the RVN government position and to insure a formidable government presence. Classes resumed in March, but scheduled training had been set back almost three months. While 4,200 students were programmed to enter the 2d phase of officer training in the 1st quarter, only 551 actually entered training. Second quarter, second phase training programmed input is 4,850 but actual output will far exceed this figure due to the backload of officer candidates who finished Phase I training but who could not enter Phase II training during January - March. Junior officers output should realign itself with the programmed figure some time in the 3d quarter and progress more evenly thereafter.

(2) In late March, the C&GSC completed its move from Dalat to Long Binh where it now occupies the old United States Army Vietnam (USARV) headquarters complex. the C&GSC is designed to train field grade officers for regimental command and staff positions at division level or higher. During the 2d quarter, plans have been developed to upgrade the status and quality of the College. At present, all colonels and lieutenant colonels must attend the college. This lessens the prestige of the course and quality of instruction is compromised to accommodate some of the lesser gifted officers. Steps have been planned to correct these deficiencies. The next class of CONUS C&GSC returnees will be assigned to the C&GSC for instructor preparation and on-the-job training and then serve as instructors for two years. In July or August the name of the school will be changed to the Joint C&GSC and a larger portion of Air Force and Navy officers will attend.

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In August, revised criteria will be published for the selection of future attendees. Higher qualifications will be demanded along with greater emphasis placed on previous combat command. The maximum age may be reduced from 48 to 42 and majors who have been in permanent grade for two years may be admitted. Emphasis will be placed on attendance at the C&GSC as a stepping stone to the National Defense College. Four hundred officers are programmed to attend the C&GSC in 1973. One hundred ninety-one are presently attending the first session. In 1974, plans call for a single course of 43 weeks with a student load of 300.

(3) The Polwar College is currently training 209 cadets who will graduate from the two-year course in October. Graduation is three months late due to the time the cadets spent in the field during the Polwar Program initiated before the ceasefire. Two hundred new cadets are scheduled to begin school following the October graduation. In addition, a total of 649 attended the College's two and four month student officer courses during the first six months. Another 800 are programmed to attend during the second half of the year.

(4) The Vietnam Military Academy enrolled 312 new cadets in January 1973 as opposed to a target of 340. However, total student enrollment of 961 is close to the 1,000 capacity figure and next year about 260 new cadets will be admitted in line with the College's training capacity and the needs of the Armed Forces.

(5) In summary, officer training is progressing and recovering from the disruptions of the ceasefire. This training should meet the programmed 1973 level. POI revisions and improvements of instruction are adding to an increase in quality. Planned improvements at the C&GSC will upgrade field grade commanders and division level staff personnel.

## e. Unit Training.

(1) The major development of the 1973 training program has been the promulgation of the new unit training concept which, after much staffing, emerged in early April and has provided the basis for greatly improved and revitalized unit training. The concept, based on US practice, shifts unit training responsibility from the



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National Training Centers to the divisions, thereby forcing development of better qualified cadre within the operational unit. It also engenders the emergence of larger unit training (regiment and division) which was shown to be critically needed during the 1972 offensive when the NVA armor and infantry divisions initially swept across the northern and western borders.

(2) The CY 1973 unit training program is modified somewhat from the future objective program due to late publication and implementation, time limitations in 1973, and continued operational requirements, especially in MR 1 and 4. The modification entailed further concentration and flexibility of small unit training and elimination of the Army Training Test (ATT) for squad, platoon, and battalion.

(a) Period I is a 315 hour program of instruction, individual through company, conducted in the unit area of operation by unit cadre. No set time period is established for Period I because of probable operational requirements of units. However, units may not start Period II until satisfactory completion of Period I.

(b) Period II is a five-week program conducted by Infantry battalions at the Division Training Center. During this period battalions review key areas covered in Period I, fire organic weapons, conduct company ATTs and conduct a battalion Field Training Exercise (FTX) controlled and supported by regiment.

(c) Period III Training, Regiment/Division Command Post Exercises (CFXs), will be conducted if the operational situation permits. The following chart shows the present status of unit training by Corps as of June:

<u>*I Corps</u>	<u>Period I</u>	<u>Period II</u>
	<u>Bns</u>	<u>Bns</u>
1st Div	3	0
2d Div	3	1
3d Div	2	1
 <u>II Corps</u>		
22d Div	4	1
23d Div	2	1

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## III Corps

5th Div	8	1
18th Div	8	1
25th Div	8	1

## IV Corps

7th Div	1	1
9th Div	1	0
21st Div	3	1

\*I Corps. Because of operational requirements, at the first part of Period I training all units in I Corps will undergo a two-week refresher course conducted by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) at the units' respective Division Training Centers (DTCs). This will be followed by five weeks of on-site training by the battalion cadre to complete Period I and will, in total, exceed the 315 hours programmed for Period I.

(3) Airborne and Marine. Because of operational requirements, these units did not conduct programmed unit training initially but were to undergo a two-week refresher course at Dong Da NTC. Three battalions of each division completed the refresher training. More units started training after Armed Forces Day, 19 June 1973.

(4) Ranger. Five battalions completed two-week on-site refresher training conducted by MTTs. Two battalions completed a five-week refresher course at the Van Kiep NTC. One battalion is presently in training at Van Kiep.

(5) Armor. Three troops are currently undergoing Period I training. Two others have already completed Period I.

(6) Artillery. A total of 20 artillery battalions are presently undergoing Period I training.

(7) The unit training program is well founded in principle, is a most significant program, but will require time for full implementation. The divisions must now prepare for and accept the new training requirements and continue meeting ongoing operational requirements. This commitment will, however, release the divisions from recruit training so they can concentrate on upgrading their fighting capability through better teamwork and by

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which surpasses the 26,778 total programmed for all of 1973. This training consists mostly of specialized weapons retraining, squad and platoon leader refresher and platoon sergeant refresher courses. Such training will improve as the DTCs mature and as the units develop an internal training cadre capability.

g. 4th Quarter FY 73 ARVN Offshore Training Program.

(1) Objectives of Army of Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Fiscal Year 1973 (FY 73) Training Program are:

(a) Upgrade the Vietnamese Military Academy Faculty by improving the quality of instruction in furtherance of attaining the announced goal of self-sufficiency.

(b) Strengthen the training base by improving the qualifications of instructor personnel, particularly in the area of combined arms training. Improved motivational training is seen as a most important by-product of this program.

(c) Improve the management capabilities of ARVN.

(d) Continue the drive for ARVN self-sufficiency in the training base.

(2) The following is a brief summary of the entire ARVN FY 73 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP):

<u>FY 73</u>	<u>Spaces</u>	<u>Cost</u>
Beginning Program	428	
Additions	43	
Deletions	67	
Ending Program	404	\$2,266,911

(3) ARVN operational requirements necessitated making 43 additions to the program as follows:

<u>Additional Training Required</u>	<u>Additional Spaces</u>
TOW Missile	30
Naval Gunfire	6
Special Observer	3
Korean Log Seminar	3
Calibration Tech	1

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(4) The spaces originally programmed and the additions made to the program produced a total figure of 471. 67 of these spaces were deleted from the program as follows:

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Deleted Spaces</u>
Univ training cancelled by DA	38
Course discontinued	11
Univ student transfer	1
Unqualified ECL students	17

(5) The final number of spaces programmed in ARVN FY 73 SATP was 404. 385 have been completed or are in progress and the remaining 19 are university students awaiting a call forward date.

(6) The following offshore training courses were attended by ARVN personnel during 4th Quarter FY 73:

<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Spaces/Student Code</u>
Operations	Artillery Survey Off	2/0
Operations	Naval Gunfire Liaison Off	5/0
Operations	Naval Gunfire Air Spotter	5/0
Operations	Special Observer Tng	3/0
Comm/Electronics	Tactical Microwave Sys	1/E
Administrative	Personnel Management	10/0
Professional/Special	Language Instructor Refresher	3/0
Professional/Special	OJT Artillery Survey	2/0
Professional/Special	Field Artillery Off Advanced	2/0
Professional/Special	English Language Instructor	2/0
Professional/Special	Infantry Off Advanced	5/0
Professional/Special	Senior Off Defense Mgt	1/0, 1/C
Professional/Special	Civilian University	4/0
Professional/Special	Transportation Off Advanced	2/0

(7) The number of students sent to CONUS for training in 4th Quarter is as follows:

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost</u>
April	16	33,295
May	18	47,425
June	6	31,940

(8) Statistical summary of FY 73 ARVN Offshore Training for 4th Quarter is as follows:

<u>Courses Completed</u>	<u>Courses in Progress</u>	<u>Total</u>
10	37	47

(9) The fact that only 17 spaces in the FY 73 program were cancelled due to inability of candidates to attain the required English Comprehension Level (ECL) demonstrates the concentrated effort ARVN is making to provide a sufficient number of ECL qualified students. The progress achieved towards this end is further emphasized by the number of spaces cancelled in the 4th Qtr: only 2, or 1.5% of total attrition rate for FY 73.

(10) Training progress made during past FY:

(a) A smooth transfer of U.S. support and logistics facilities to ARVN was facilitated.

(b) Professional qualification of operational staffs was improved and quality of instructor personnel in the training base was upgraded.

(c) Significant progress toward self-sufficiency in training base was made as is evident by the reduced size of the FY 74 Offshore Training Program.

(d) Management capabilities of ARVN were improved, particularly in the upper and middle management field.

(11) Type of training to receive priority for FY 74:

(a) Civil Education. Support of Vietnamese Military Academy, training research branch, signal and engineer departments.

(b) Management Training. Command and Staff skills, logistics management areas at upper and middle management level.

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(c) Technical Training. Resource management skills, new skills required to support introduction of new items of equipment, skills required to operate Logistics/Support facilities transferred to ARVN.

(12) The FY 73 program continued to a very successful conclusion during FY 73. Meaningful programs were developed and adjusted to meet changing needs as ARVN took near maximum advantage of courses offered by filling them with qualified personnel. Continued success is anticipated and no major problems are expected.

### h. Training Centers.

(1) National Training Centers (NTCs) are well operated and managed. They all have standardized training facilities and ranges with training aids at the ranges well designed to facilitate the learning process. Most ranges and training facilities are on par with the major US training centers insofar as training and, in some cases, have innovations that add more to effective training. The NTCs are scheduled to train over 200,000 ARVN and RF recruits in 1973 and for the first six months about 85,000 have been trained. A heavier recruit training load will be assumed by the NTCs now that the Division Training Centers (DTCs) address themselves to their own division unit training and specialized training requirements. This should strengthen overall recruit training because the NTCs can focus their trained instructor cadre largely on recruit training and provide a better staff and better training facilities for this training.

(a) Problems that are detracting from training quality are, in general, a lessening level of necessary items of support; fuel, ammo, and adequate maintenance budgets. Areas that are being focused on to improve training quality are the upgrading of assistant instructors and the development of the drill sergeant concept. POIs are being readied for the first drill sergeant course. It is planned to incorporate the necessary instruction for assistant instructors which is scheduled to begin early next year.

(b) The NTCs have reached maturity and, if given the necessary support, should have no problem in handling the recruit training needs for ARVN. Secondary improvements in Assistant Instructors and the development of the



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Drill Instructor concept will enhance the quality of basic training and should insure good quality input into the divisions.

(c) In general, the individual training at the NTCs has continued to achieve satisfactory results. The problems of reduced support have detracted somewhat from overall results, but more time will be necessary for the continuing impact and the ability of the NTCs to cope with fuel, ammunition and budget constraints to be fully analyzed.

(2) Division Training Centers (DTCs), a fairly recent development, have evolved at a time when heavy operational loads were being placed on the parent divisions. Because of this their development has been somewhat stunted and uneven. The CTC monitors and advises the DTCs but has no direct authority to force changes upon the DTC commanders. CTC recommendations are passed to the JGS down through Corps to the divisions. Division commanders may place weight on these reports if JGS and Corps strongly endorse the CTC recommendation. During the past quarter, official visits have been made to most of the DTCs and several unsatisfactory reports have resulted. While the DTC commanders have been fairly responsive to in-house problems and recommendations generated from CTC visits, there is some upgrading which requires direct JGS action to pressure division commanders into diverting sufficient time, attention, and priority from operational matters to the DTCs to allow full upgrading of the facilities and training. The DTCs are now responsible to help conduct Period II unit training. While this will be the main responsibility of the battalions themselves, the battalions will lean heavily on the DTCs for assisting in lesson plan development, support and in many cases formal instruction. In turn, the DTCs will receive assistance from the NTCs who in the past have conducted the bulk of the unit training. As experience is gained at the DTCs and by the unit cadre, the divisions should be fully capable of carrying out a totally responsive unit training program tailored to their needs and fostering the unit integrity and cohesiveness the divisions lacked in the past.

1. Evaluation exercises are a key part of the unit training program as outlined in JGS/CTC Directive 380-1. The 1974 program calls for unit exercises and tests at every level from the squad through division. However,

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the 1973 program was somewhat modified because of the short time frame remaining after introduction of the directive and because of on-going operational commitments. The Directive does not call for any exercises to be conducted during Period I, (on-site training up through the company level) but provides for squad and platoon exercises and tests and battalion tests and FTXs during Period II and regimental and division CPXs for Period III. Testing will normally be conducted by the command two echelons above the unit being tested. A testing package, adopted from US directives and manuals, will be implemented throughout the remainder of the year. An experience factor will be needed for the units to fully develop and maximize the returns from the program.

## J. Inspection Program.

(1) The training inspection program is carried on at three different echelons to provide in-depth coverage of the major ARVN training programs. The Commander of CTC makes weekly inspection tours usually inspecting 2-3 training locations a week. During these inspections, he concentrates largely on visits to the training ranges, making recommendations where necessary, and receives briefings by the TC commander and staff on the follow-up to previous recommendations and improvements that the TCs have implemented by their own initiative. Commander CTC feels that the TCs gain a certain amount of pride in briefing about their own accomplishments. By continual visits to the different ARVN training facilities, the CTC Commander has fostered a greater responsiveness in the TC Commanders to CTC goals and has brought about improvements in quality and greater uniformity.

(2) Within CTC itself there is an inspection staff that is broken down into two sections. One section is for the evaluation of the service schools while the other inspects the NTCs and DTCs. Teams are sent to the various TCs and spend several days making an in-depth inspection and evaluation of each TC. These reports are forwarded to Chief, CTC who takes necessary action, directs the TCs to take necessary action and forwards unresolved issues to JGS for decision.

(3) The third echelon of inspection is located at the TCs themselves. Each TC has its own in-house inspection capability ranging from the commander to a special staff. At Quang Trung TC, for instance, each training area that is conducting training is inspected daily by

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an inspection team. A checklist is utilized and the main instructor is apprised of the inspection results which are also forwarded to the chief of the inspection section at the center.

(4) An adequate inspection program is in place within the training system and functioning adequately. However, greater attention to the DTCs, which are still lacking in many training areas and are about to shoulder a large part of the unit training program, is required.

### k. Assistant Instructors/Drill Sergeant Program.

(1) A program is now under development to improve the quality of AIs throughout the training program and to implement an interrelated drill sergeant program. Low quality AIs retard high quality training. The importance of the AI has previously been emphasized, but training to imbue necessary qualities into the AI ranks has not been adequate. The program is undergoing development and necessary modification and, based on the US approach, will be ready for implementation as a combined course in early 1974. The NCO Academy and the Infantry School have been tasked to develop the necessary POI for the course and prepare for training classes for cadre at the NCO Academy in early 1974. This should have a major impact on improving the quality of recruit training and NCO leadership.

(2) Included in the program is the development of the drill sergeant for recruit training which will develop better recruit handling and lend itself to more structured and formalized recruit training. The use of DIs will extend training and recruit control beyond the formal program and will give the recruits a greater sense of unity during their training phase.

1. Sister School Program. To insure continued liaison, the updating of instructional matter and support of the various service schools, a Sister School Program was developed by the Army Advisory Group (AAG) prior to its phaseout. The approach was that counterpart schools in the US and the RVN would assist each other and pass on lessons learned. With withdrawal of the AAG, the Commander CTC, wrote letters to each of the participating schools in the US requesting their continued support. Almost all of the CONUS sister schools responded and the program appears to be functioning quite well. A large

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amount of POIs and lesson plans and special studies have been received by the ARVN schools who have responded by forwarding lessons learned and information on combat feasibility of various weapons systems. A good example of this mutual exchange was the TOW missile. When the TOW was introduced to ARVN during last year's offensive, training POIs, manuals and guidance were provided by the US Infantry School. Later, as this was the first time this weapon system had been subject to actual combat use, an inspection team was dispatched from the US to the RVN to obtain ARVN's knowledge and experience with the weapon. This team departed RVN with a wealth of information from lessons learned, combat use, and some different aspects for training. This information resulted in a new US POI and some different employment concepts. This information was, in turn, dispatched to the ARVN Infantry School for modification and update for their training program and operational use. This illustrates the benefits both the US and ARVN can derive from this continuing program even though it is now dependent upon the written word rather than direct contact.

### m. Problem Areas.

(1) Fuel for vehicles, generators and bulldozers is being received by the TCs at about 50% of the levels of last year. This is having a drag effect on all the TCs and in some cases causing security problems where generators cannot operate to produce the necessary perimeter lighting. Until all allocated fuel is utilized for mission essential operations, rather than dissipated through theft and misappropriation, this problem and the related training impact will persist.

(2) Maintenance budgets are insufficient to meet minimum needs of the TCs. While the results of this insufficiency are not yet critical, a gradual deterioration of facilities, especially former US facilities, is anticipated. Problems such as deterioration of the range facilities, roads, offices and barracks, sanitary facilities and security defense works will develop over the next several months that will undoubtedly adversely affect training and morale. Resolute self-help projects by the RVNAF could save much deterioration; however, as yet no strong across-the-board drive is evident to stop deterioration.

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(3) Training ammo, according to the former AAG forecasts and authorization requests, is about half of what is necessary for proper individual recruit training. Distribution problems and pre-emption of ammo for operational requirements are the major reasons for training shortages. There have been recent instances where evaluation teams have stated that marksmanship results have not been satisfactory or that grenade training is inadequate due to a lack of ammo. Central Training Command and Central Logistics Command of JGS are not reviewing the FY 74 allocations and, assuming solution of the distribution problem, should be able to meet minimum training requirements if combat operations requirements do not surge.

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## 5. (C) SUPPLY/LOGISTICS:

### a. Data Processing and Logistics Management.

(1) RVNAF has 38 programmer/analyst personnel assigned to Republic of Vietnam Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS) at the Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC), who generally understand basic ADP logic and programming of subsystems; however, even though there has been contract support for some three years, they have not mastered supply logic. Without this understanding of the overall system, personnel cannot effectively determine where or why a program has failed to provide adequate support. If in-country support in data systems analysis is discontinued, offshore training would be essential.

(2) Review of National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) logistic management capabilities reveal a heavy reliance on U.S. contracted logistic management expertise, particularly in financial management, intensive item management, and major items management. The time required to build NMMA personnel into effective item managers is relative to what demands the U.S. commodity commands require to intelligently interface with NMMA through RAMMS. As a conservative estimate, 18 months to 2 years is required for ARVN item managers to become proficient by U.S. standards. Vietnamese item managers have been actively used for a limited period. To compound the problem, the LDPC and NMMA are two separate and equal commands. This relationship will not allow the Commander of NMMA to control any situation involving Data Processing or select logistic priorities requiring ADP facilities utilization. By experience gained in the 1st Logistical Command, we have concluded that present overseas logistics supply systems are built around automated data processing capabilities and are unable to function apart from them. The logistics commander who is unable to direct and control the primary tools upon which he relies for management is severely handicapped in making appropriate responses to changing situations. Scheduling and priority of computer usage must be in the hands of that individual who is most severely affected by management, or there is mismanagement of that usage. By making the automated data processing functions an integral part of the inventory control team, a better exchange of information and ideas is made possible for



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both the logistician, data processor, the planner, and the doer.

(3) In the area of financial management there has been little accomplished, mainly because RVNAF has only recently been able to identify competent personnel to staff this function. Personnel now assigned have been exposed for the first time to format work sheets which are required to justify future year expenditures. Again, we face a situation of determining how much expertise must ARVN actually develop. In our judgment the U.S. must accept something less from ARVN than we expect from U.S. experienced sources.

## b. Depot Operations.

(1) In August 1972, ARVN assumed responsibility for 1st ARVN Associated Depot (AAD), Long Binh, with U.S. contractor assistance in consolidating various storage facilities within RVN at 1st AAD and for operating the depot complex. On-the-job training was also furnished by the contractor with Vietnamization of the operation as a specific goal. On 30 June 1973, the contract expired and ARVN now has full responsibility for the 1st AAD. Technical assistance is furnished by DAO for continued training in depot operation and to assist in the integration of the remaining technical service type depots into the Associated Depot.

(2) ARVN may become self-sufficient with additional personnel for document control, care, preservation, and for the integration effort with continued technical assistance for another year.

(3) Training is required to interface the depot operation with the stock control function at the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) to insure accurate and timely input from the depot.

## c. Status of Ammo: (April to June 73):

(1) Available beginning of Qtr

Tonnage: 104,454 T

Dollars: \$225,677,514

(2) Expenditure during Qtr

Tonnage: 39,110 T

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Dollars: \$70,470,020

(3) On Hand End of Qtr

Tonnage: 141,816 T

Dollars: \$267,109,180

(4) Requisitions

Tonnage: 61,650 T

Dollars: \$80,283,737

(5) Stockage Levels

Tonnage: 175,530 T

Dollars: \$284,661,071

d. Shortfall

(1) Logistics/Management. Middle management in both LDPC and logistics operation at NMMA are sorely deficient. Their experience has been limited to a six-week CPX and the maximum of 16 months OJT. Tradition, culture and class differences do not allow maximum communications from top management through the working level to the operator who must keep RAMMS operational. Additionally, there is no motivation for self improvement based on financial gain potential. There are numerous supply type individuals who have been trained at U.S. supply activities, as well as at the Central Training Institute, who choose to be unemployed rather than work for the low wages offered by Vietnamese Government employment.

(2) Logistics/Supply. The following are identified deficiencies:

a. Training item managers in the areas of requirements and distribution.

b. Complete absence of adequate middle-management personnel.

c. Training in the use of advanced computer systems from the standpoint of programmers and systems analysts.

d. Training both management and item managers in the use of computer output.

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e. Lack of adequate staffing of logistical activities with skilled personnel.

## (3) Depot Operations.

a. ARVN has only one officer who has been trained in the U. S. (the warehouse branch chief). The entire operation is understrength. There are over 100 pieces of materiel handling equipment and only 25 qualified operators.

b. There is one officer trained in care and preservation. With the limited number of assigned personnel (29) the backlog is growing daily and resulting in damage to newly rebuilt secondary items; i.e., transmissions and engines, stored without necessary preservation.

c. An OJT program for ARVN personnel unfamiliar with depot operations must be established in order to reduce losses, establish accurate records, and eliminate equipment deterioration of costly secondary items.

d. In general, ARVN ability to manage a Depot/Centralized Supply Management Agency interface system will never equate to the U.S. efficiency level. Emphasis must be placed on achieving a level of acceptable efficiency, concentrating on only essential hard-core requirements for management and control data at the NMMA level.

## (4) \*Ammunition Deficiencies:

a. DODIC	A071
BOH	88.8 MIL PDS
STOCKAGE	193.3 MIL RDS
% STOCKAGE	45%
b. DODIC	B568
BOH	2.6 MIL
STOCKAGE	4.1 MIL
% STOCKAGE	63%

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c.	DODIC	B627
	BOH	78.6 THOUSAND
	STOCKAGE	199.4 THOUSAND
	% STOCKAGE	39%
d.	DODIC	C256
	BOH	396.9 THOUSAND
	STOCKAGE	677.1 THOUSAND
	% STOCKAGE	58%
e.	DODIC	G911
	BOH	371.7 THOUSAND
	STOCKAGE	600.0 THOUSAND
	% STOCKAGE	61%
f.	DODIC	N335
	BOH	2,867.4 THOUSAND
	STOCKAGE	3,461.0 THOUSAND
	% STOCKAGE	82%

\*None are below safe level

(5) Critical Shortages. Shortages in M16 Barrel and sight assemblies; 105mm Howitzer tube and cannon assembly; 155mm Howitzer Recoil Mechanism; and 175mm Self-Propelled Gun engine are highly critical items of command interest. Follow-up actions to CONUS on these items on 14 June 1973 has resulted in a response that the 155mm recoil mechanism was available and would be shipped. No replies have been received on the other items and additional follow-up messages are being prepared.

## 6. (C) MAINTENANCE:

a. Field Maintenance.

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(1) Quarterly ARVN progress report, 3d Qtr FY 73, indicates the operational readiness of all major items is above established ARVN standards of 80-90%. This is about 5% below DA standards. ARVN readiness data for 4th Qtr is not available.

(2) Operational readiness rate represents only that equipment in support maintenance as opposed to total population of equipment in the hands of users. Equipment deadlined in organizational maintenance shops, Keystone assets, and other items in stock as unserviceable, are not included in these rates.

(3) Actual operational readiness rates, when computed against overall density within ARVN are considerably lower than reported. Field visits reveal the OR rates to average not more than 70% for combat vehicles, 65% for tracked wheeled vehicle, 58% for material handling equipment and 85% for small arms.

## b. Depot Maintenance.

(1) Engineer Equipment. Considerable progress has been made by ARVN to achieve a satisfactory state of self-sufficiency in technical supply and rebuild facilities. Repair capability has increased 62% in FY 72 to 96% of the total requirements in FY 73. To prevent regression in this achievement, continued technical assistance will be necessary from outside sources. A study is presently in progress to determine the best cost-effective method of assisting ARVN in achieving self-sufficiency. The primary problem in achieving a state of self-sufficiency is that the majority of the ARVN personnel have only a limited level of education and are not fully able to interpret technical publications nor do they have the capability to develop sophisticated training programs necessary for modern equipment. To achieve the FY 74 Rebuild Program, there is a requirement for ARVN personnel to receive training on new materiel that has been added to the program.

## (2) Arsenal Equipment

a. Vietnamese Army Arsenal (VAA). Self-sufficiency in terms of skills and equipment required to perform depot rebuild of ordnance major items has increased from



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41% in 1971 to 91% in 1973 (an increase in production from 1394 to 2399 items). October 1974 is the target date for complete self-sufficiency for rebuild of approximately 320 items. Some slippage may be expected in self-sufficiency for combat vehicles due to delays in upgrading of facilities.

b. Through intensive efforts in rewarehousing, locating, and inventoring shop supply stocks at VAA, coupled with a detailed and comprehensive review of Bill of Materiel requirements data, and dollar value of repair parts requirements in support of projected rebuild has been reduced from 6.4 to 4.3 million dollars for a net savings of 2.1 million dollars. Requisitions have been adjusted accordingly. Additional savings have been possible by gaining visibility of metal stock which has reduced a potential U.S. investment by 1.2 million dollars. Net savings, therefore, equates to 3.3 million dollars.

(3) Maintenance Facilities. The present facilities used for depot maintenance are adequate for a bay type repair method. Plans are to expand them during FY74 to permit establishing production lines, adding new test equipment and accommodating items new to the Depot Maintenance Program.

## 7. Petroleum, Oil & Lubricants (POL)

a. The baseline for the program was established to support peacetime operations on ARVN densities and consumption factors extracted from U.S. service manuals. Procurement for the first half of the CY73 program was met with no short-falls. There was a 38% quantitative reduction from Jan-Jun 73; however, because of an average increase of 36% in product cost, the dollar value decreased only 23%.

b. ARVN is currently developing requirements, that when completed and validated by DAO, may increase the ground fuel quantities.

c. DAO proposed to JCS that ARVN personnel accept petroleum product direct from commercial oil companies to allow withdrawal of U.S. Petroleum Quality Assurance personnel. No decision from JCS has been received. Other alternatives for supply of petroleum to ARVN that would not require U.S. participation have been rejected because of inadequate GVN budget, drain on foreign



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exchange, and lack of RVNAF and RVN commercial transport tankers. JCS denial of DAO proposal will require that six U.S. personnel remain in RVN to support the POL Program.

d. Withdrawal of U.S. POL personnel is further complicated by the complex POL ordering and accounting systems required by the new integrated material management system. DoD instructions on management of this system will require the Ordering Officer for DSA POL contracts to remain under DAO. The accounting requirements could be transferred to RVNAF, CLD after a three-month training program.

## 8. (C) PORT OPERATIONS:

a. On 29 Mar 73, RVNAF assumed responsibility for military port operations, less MILSTRAP Documentation functions, accomplished by U.S. contractor (Alaska Barge and Transport Company). Stevedore services are provided by Vietnamese companies under contract with ARVN. Tonnage handled for 4th Qtr, FY73, was 95,532 MT inbound and 3,154 MT outbound for RVNAF, and 6,713 MT inbound and 33,546 MT outbound for U.S. interest cargo.

### b. Shortfall.

(1) ARVN cargo handling operations aboard vessels are unsatisfactory. Using the MSC planning factor (1500 MT per working day), five stevedore gangs working 16 hours per day should load/discharge 18.75 MT per gang hour. During May and June, ARVN was attaining only 12 MT per gang hour.

(2) Unsatisfactory conditions include lack of experienced ARVN supervisors, improper types of equipment utilized, e.g., five ton rough terrain forklifts used where a lesser capacity commercial type would suffice, assignment of stevedore gangs not in proportion to work to be accomplished, and lack of a senior port operations officer (available at all times) to insure efficient utilization of equipment and personnel.

(3) Port operations throughout the country must continue as a subject of prime concern for the appropriate CLC staff element.

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## 9. (S) CONCLUSIONS/SUMMARY:

a. This overview is based on reports from field observers, interviews with ARVN staff officers, Joint General Staff Operations reports, various DAO division statistics and DAO field trip reports. In contrast to previous MACV reports it should be pointed out that there is no longer direct daily observation of ARVN conducting field operations.

b. The ARVN training program for the 4th Qtr FY73, the first post ceasefire quarter, was characterized by the continued upgrading and standardizing of POIs for the National Training Centers (NTCs) and by shifting unit training responsibility from the National Training Centers to the parent divisions. The calendar year 1973 program is designed to make ARVN self-sufficient in its basic recruit training and to develop and upgrade the divisions' unit training capability so that each division can train its units according to its needs, geographical area, methods of operation and principle threats. This internal training should also develop critically needed cohesiveness and teamwork within each unit and the division. The major development of the 1973 training program has been the promulgation of the unit training concept. All recruit training is now accomplished at the NTCs. Officer training is progressing and recovering from the disruption of the ceasefire. An adequate inspection program is established and functioning effectively. The FY73 ARVN offshore training program continued to a very successful conclusion during FY73.

c. Present for duty strength throughout ARVN averages between 85 and 90 percent of assigned strength, but combat effectiveness varies with time on line, size of area of operations, leadership and morale. It is generally believed that the ARVN divisions can hold their present ceasefire positions if the enemy does not reinforce or does not launch a total offensive. ARVN divisions in MR I, MR II and MR IV have been engaged for lengthy periods of time over extended areas, particularly in the area of MR II where the ARVN was not reinforced after two ROK Divisions were withdrawn. Joint General Staff is attempting to relieve units who have had extended front line duty by a within-unit rotational policy that provides training and leave time for the troops.

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This policy has been implemented for Airborne and Marine Divisions in MR 1. Overall leadership quality is reported as good to marginal and in many cases better than previous reporting periods in that some officers who proved incapable during enemy pre-ceasefire I engagements have been removed and replaced with younger and/or more efficient leaders. On the other hand, as the NCOs corps was depleted and a possibility of over-age demobilization gets closer, some senior commanders express concern over middle unit leadership. Instances of cronyism, purchase of promotions and bribes for good duty locations still are prevalent throughout ARVN. Regular force relationships with the civilian population remain tenuous, particularly because of inflation causing soldiers to resort to even more drastic corrupt practices or outright thievery to keep their families in rice. Only a very few instances are reported of civil action programs and in at least three reports on regular troops "negative pacification" results were reported. There are some division and lower commanders who have recognized this problem and are tightening disciplinary measures for friendly civilian/military incidents. Morale, except in the elite Marine, Airborne and Ranger units, appears to have suffered to some extent for the following reasons:

(1) Inflation has put both the enlisted man and officer corps in a bind where the soldier finds it extremely difficult to feed his family on his military salary. The elimination of the rice ration in lieu of a cash payment has, in effect, reduced his salary, since the piaster buys much less than it did even a year ago.

(2) The normal draftee soldier has no desire to die during a "ceasefire". He is looking forward to being relieved of military service as soon as possible. However, some observers have reported that morale has risen where ARVN was successful in holding or regaining GVN territory.

d. Although no attempt will be made to establish a numerical rank order of divisions, identifying divisions at both ends of the spectrum can be made. Based on evaluation of all the indicators which include combat performance, morale, desertion rates, relationship with the local populace, training, discipline, leadership and administration, it is believed that other than the Airborne and Marine divisions, the 2d, 7th, and 1st divisions must be considered among the top ARVN divisions. While at the other end of the spectrum the 5th, 22d and

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23d divisions stand out as three weaker divisions. As has been pointed out in the specific comments and review of the divisions, there is some good and bad in all. For example, the 9th Division Commander is considered a good commander but is plagued with poor administration to include troop, pay and personnel administration problems. Between the two extremes can be found the remaining half of the ARVN Divisions. The degree of combat effectiveness and potential within the ARVN Divisions has varied during this quarter.

c. Supply and maintenance are areas where improvement is essential. Operational ready rates for ARVN equipment is less than acceptable. Field commanders complain of lack of POL and reduced allocation of certain types of ammunition. Most areas will improve with training and experience but pilferage and mismanagement are the main causes of POL shortages.

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## CHAPTER 6

### VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF)

1. (U) This chapter will present a picture of the VNAF as it is today and describe its continuing efforts to become a first rate Air Force. Strengths, weaknesses, training, logistics, equipment status, OR rates and the DAO assessment are included.

2. (S) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH AND ASSIGNED PERSONNEL READINESS

a. Current VNAF manning is shown in Figure 1. Overall military manning is 95%; officer manning 70%; enlisted manning 100%; and civilian manning is 44%. The low manning ratio in the civilian area is caused by fund constraints.

(Figure 1)

b. VNAF pilot manning, which largely reflects manning of other crew positions, is quite sufficient to fly all available VNAF aircraft on a sustained surge basis. The 2,541 squadron pilots (66 percent authorized manning) supplemented by staff pilots could perform at a rate exceeding VNAF maintenance capability. Figure 2 reflects the current manning by type of aircraft/mission. The special air mission unit figures have been omitted.

c. Personnel readiness of the rated force can be roughly determined by reference to Figure 2 column labeled Assigned OR/TNG. This figure, however, refers to aircrews which are in continuation/upgrade training. The majority of them are capable of performing basic combat missions.

(Figure 2)

d. The readiness of the enlisted force is inferred by the percentage distribution of assigned vs authorizations by skill level.

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VNAF PERSONNEL BY ORGANIZATION

UNIT/BASE	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		TOT MIL		CIVILIANS	
	(1) AUTH	ASGD	(1) AUTH	ASGD	(1) AUTH	ASGD	(1) AUTH	ASGD
HQ VNAF	894	474	2036	1740	2930	2214	99	33
ACA	19	13	66	53	85	66	0	0
AC&W	136	105	815	733	951	838	1	1
ALC	391	186	5858	3663	6249	3849	98	72
AMC	51	26	112	97	163	123	9	2
AOC	342	261	667	601	1014	862	0	0
ATC	390	236	921	833	1311	1069	23	7
Air Administration Unit		10		96		106		5
Bien Hoa - 3d AD	1298	851	7539	5116	8837	5967	137	61
Binh Thuy - 4th AD	853	449	4758	3349	5611	3798	74	20
Da Nang - 1st AD	1133	681	6403	4646	7536	5327	150	96
Nha Trang - 2d AD	803	445	3977	3573	4780	4018	70	21
Phan Rang	329	183	2481	1824	2810	2007	0	0
Phu Cat	524	239	3248	2204	3772	2443	0	0
Pleiku - 6th AD	632	373	3346	2293	3918	2666	47	5
Soc Trang	492	351	2833	1777	3325	2128	46	0
Tan Son Nhut - 5th AD	1234	958	6274	4707	7508	9665	163	89
Sub Total	9521	5841	51334	37305	60800	43146	917	412
Pipeline Tng		901	3469	17498	3469	18399		
Total	9521	6742	54803	54803	64269	61545	917	412

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Figure (1)

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(Figure 3)

<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>NCO's</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1	47%	21%	27%
3	.5%	51%	38%
5	1.5%	28%	21%
7	50%	--	13%
9	1.0%	--	71%

(Figure 3)

3. (S) AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY: The authorized air order of battle (AOB) is shown by military region. The AOBs closely represent the areas of operation with the exception of the support aircraft in the 5th Air Division which operate throughout the country.

(Figures 4, 5, 6, 7)

4. (S) EQUIPMENT STATUS: Current aircraft status rates are depicted in Figures 8 through 11. Since their receipt, the C-130A fleet has had an excessive out-of-commission rate. The OR rate averaged around 35% in April and May. Primary causes have been wing cracks, fuel leaks, engine problems, parts shortages, ground equipment deficiencies, limited repair capability and lack of sufficient maintenance.

(Figures 8, 9, 10, 11)

a. During June, DAO personnel and representatives from VNAF Headquarters and VNAF-ALC participated in FY74 contract negotiations for VNAF programs at Air Vietnam. Contracts were negotiated as follows:

(Figure 12)

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Qty</u>
A-37	Wing Mod	86
A-37	ACI	4

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## VNAF PILOT/COPILOT MANNING

TYPE A/C	AUTH	Assigned Or/Tng	Total Assigned	*
A-37	350	117/79	196	56
A-1	123	84/0	84	68
F-5	217	97/14	111	51
Total Fighter/Attack	690	298/93	391	57
C-7	135	54/55	109	81
C-130	118	58/64	122	103
C-123	---	13/15	28	---
Total Cargo	253	125/134	259	102
UH-1	1983	887/276	1163	58
CH-47	180	57/69	126	70
Total Helo	2163	944/345	1289	59
Liaison (U-17, O-1, O-2)	324	234/0	234	72
AC 119 K	59	19/19	38	64
AC 119 G	59	35/23	62	105
AC 47	53	30/19	49	92
Total Gunship	171	88/61	149	87
RC 119 L	43	5/0	5	12
EC 47	95	79/5	84	88
RC 47	44	33/0	33	75
U 6	10	9/0	9	90
Total Recce	192	126/5	131	68
T-37	31	21/0	21	68
T-41/O-1	27	33/0	33	122
UH-1	16	8/0	8	50
Total Training	74	62/0	62	84

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Figure (2)

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(Figure 3)

<u>LEVEL</u>	<u>NCO's</u>	<u>AIRMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1	47%	21%	27%
3	.5%	51%	38%
5	1.5%	28%	21%
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<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Qty</u>
A-37	Wing Mod	86
A-37	ACI	4

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VNAF

MR 1

DA NANG 1st AIRDIV	
41 WING	51 WING
110 20 02	213 38 UH-1
5 01	233 38 UH-1
7 U-17	239 38 UH-1
120 25 0-1	257 24 UH-1
7 U-17	253 38 UH-1
427 16 C-7	247 16 CH-47
718 DET 10 EC-47	
821 DET 8 AC-119K	
61 WING	
516 24 A-37	
528 24 A-37	
550 24 A-37	
538 17 F-5	




Figure (4)

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MR 2

VNAF





Figure (5)

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## MR 3



### 3rd AIR DIVISION

#### 23 WING

112 25 O-1

7 U-17

124 25 O-1

7 U-17

514 24 A-1

518 24 A-1

#### 63 WING

522 11 F-5A/B

6 RF-5

536 17 F-5

540 17 F-5

542 17 F-5

544 17 F-5

#### 43 WING

221 38 UH-1

223 38 UH-1

231 38 UH-1

245 38 UH-1

251 38 UH-1

237 16 CH-47

259E 12 UH-1

CAPITAL SPECIAL  
ZONE

#### 33 WING

314 4 VC-47

4 UH-1

2 U-17

716 12 RC-47

2 EC-47

2 C-47

8 U-6

718 20 EC-47

431 16 C-7

259G 12 UH-1

#### 53 WING

819 18 AC 119G

821 10 AC 119K

435 16 C-130

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Figure (6)

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


Figure (7)

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VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/E rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.




Figure (8)

6-15  
SECRET

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SECRET

# TRANSPORTS EC-47, C-7, C-123, VC-47, E/RC-47, C-130

VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/E rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.




Figure (9)

6-17  
SECRET

SECRET

VNAF OR System based upon squadron possessed A/E rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.




Figure (10)


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# C-130 AIRCRAFT

VNAF OP: System based upon squadron possessed A/E rather than UE; eg, when in Field or Depot maintenance, A/C is not possessed.



6-21

Figure (11)

SECRET

# SECRET

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Qty</u>
UH-1H	2200PE	39
CH-47	Life Extension	18
CH-47	ACI	2
C-119	ACI	5

This is the first time the VNAF participated in contract negotiations. VNAF personnel were very helpful during negotiations, but require greater exposure to contract negotiations before self-sufficiency in this area can be attained.

b. (C) F-5 Corrosion. An inspection of F-5 aircraft in storage at 3d Air Division, Bien Hoa, revealed 47 aircraft with extensive corrosion problems. Due to workload at VNAF-ALC and the large number of contractor personnel required, the decision was made to send the aircraft off-shore.

c. During the quarter all UH-1H for 2200PE, A-37 for wing modification, C-47 for RC-47 modification program, and C-130 aircraft were input to contractor programs, completing total FY73 programmed inputs. Two programs at Air Vietnam were partially terminated. These included the following:

(1) Four CH-47 Life Extension aircraft, due to aircraft not generating flying hours that were programmed.

(2) Five C-119 IRAN aircraft, due to contractor workload, quantity of aircraft in work, parts support problems, and aircraft being deleted from TO 00-25-4 for cyclic PDM.

(3) Recap of FY 73 aircraft repair contracts is as follows:

(Figure 13)

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Contractor</u>
C-47	IRAN/ACI	17	CAF
C-47	RC Mod	8	CAS

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<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Program</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Contractor</u>
C-7	IRAN	7	THIAM
C-119	IRAN	10	AVN
A-37	Wing Mod	70	AVN
UH-1H	2200PE	72	AVN
CH-47	Life Extension	11	AVN
CH-47	CBD	8	AVN
CH-47	ACI	2	AVN
C-130	IRAN	4	LASS
C-130	Wing Repair	3	LASS

(Figure 13)

d. (U) Engines. The ALC engine overhaul program for J85-17/17A and T-53-L13B has been established and engines are being produced, however, difficulty in obtaining spare parts for the T-53-L13B engine has been experienced. Many items formerly provided to support the program at ALC depot were rerouted to Air Asia, Taiwan, to support overhaul of RVN engines at that facility. Improvement in production of both types of engines will depend upon additional trained personnel and support of spare parts. The engine managers are well trained and capable of managing, reporting, and controlling all engines assigned to the VNAF.

e. NORS Analysis. In-depth NORS analysis was started during the fourth quarter FY 73 on C-130, C-7, CH-47, O-2, and F-5 aircraft. Presentations are made twice weekly at ALC and once a week at VNAF Headquarters. The NORS briefings are beginning to show results. VNAF Headquarters is directing air divisions to: comply with lateral support requests from ALC; properly place aircraft in NORM status versus NORS; and use cannibalization on aircraft in NORM or NORS in order to release aircraft NORS for one item. For the first time VNAF-ALC weapons systems managers are making NORS analysis and briefings. Training being provided by DAO personnel will enable VNAF weapons systems managers to become

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self-sufficient.

f. Prior to ceasefire 32 C-130 aircraft were transferred to VNAF. Thirty were not flyable due to maintenance problems which may be attributed to "fatigue". After an intensive C-130 NORS program was initiated, the number of OR aircraft rose to seven. This occurred within the first 45 days following "X" + 60. VNAF are presently experiencing a 50% O.R. level. This level fluctuates between 14 and 18 operational aircraft. With these C-130's available, along with all other VNAF assets, the cargo movement capabilities are greatly improved. Cargo not in the specific category of Air Force support such as munitions, clothing, and rations is considered by the JGS/Central logistics command as special mission cargo, moved only when missions are fragged by the JGS as special mission airlift requests (SMAR). When aircraft are available, the Vietnamese Air Force operates daily LOGAIR flights through all major MATTS.

g. AGE Repairs. VNAF capability to repair total AGE requirements is presently inadequate due to the lack of skilled repairmen, facilities, tools, and training. A representative from SAAMA, working in coordination with ALC DAO/VNAF personnel, has identified the major powered AGE for proposed off-shore repair by a service-type contract.

## 5. (C) LOGISTIC STATUS:

a. In order to expedite the Material Management training of VNAF personnel, a complete rewrite of VNAFM 67-1 was accomplished at PACAF. That portion of AFM 67-1/VNAFM 67-1 relating to VNAF logistics support was rewritten in terms which would be understandable by the Vietnamese personnel and applicable to the 1050-II computer operations. The rewrite team consisted of five US and two VNAF officers and senior NCO's, working from 28 March through 25 April 1973. One hundred twenty of the new manuals were published and distributed by VNAF Headquarters in June 1973. Amendments and changes will be coordinated, approved, published, and distributed by VNAF Headquarters.

b. NORS Reconciliation. A one-time reconciliation of all VNAF-ALC outstanding NORS requirements was

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initiated 26 June 1973. Separate messages requesting up-to-date status by weapons system were forwarded to applicable CONUS supply sources, with information to CINCPACAF, AFLC/MM and AFLC weapons systems managers. Replies have been carefully reviewed. Subsequent actions taken include: search of receiving and warehouse locations for items with old shipping status; phone contact with AFLC/MMI on NORS requisitions coded "No record" for reinstatement action; follow-ups on items backordered with distant EDD's; and revalidation of outstanding air division NORS requisitions. Emphasis is placed on insuring that NORS items are expeditiously repaired at ALC or NRTS'd to CONUS/SRAS.

c. Review of 365-day Requisitioning Objectives. The V-LOG, March 1973, directed that all 365-day requisitioning objectives for secondary items be reviewed and adjusted based on demand experience. This action was also identified in CSAF/LG message 171700Z Mar 73. A target date of 30 June 1973 was established for completion of this task. An audit listing of all special levels in the ALC supply account has been prepared, is being reviewed by ALC inventory managers, and is scheduled for completion not later than 30 July 1973. Actual adjustment of requisitioning objectives on ALC computer records will be accomplished not later than 5 August 1973. The initial audit listing indicates this action will reduce the VNAF dollar value of the ALC requisitioning objective from \$80.4 million, as of 25 June, to \$35.3 million.

d. AFSD's. Projects ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS caused many Air Force Supply Directives (AFSD) shipments to Republic of Vietnam. In most cases, neither DAO or VNAF-ALC personnel were aware of what the shipments constituted, the dollar value, quantity, ultimate destination, and/or application. The problem has been compounded by the fact that personnel at VNAF bases have not been reporting receipt of the equipment and spares shipped. CONUS AFLC AMA's have been requested to provide ALC with card decks of current AFSD's planned shipments in order to establish valid due-in records and audit trails of items shipped and received. DAO/VNAF will not accept AFSD's or push-type packages subsequent to 15 June 1973. Currently ALC is receiving some card decks from AMA's. Status of AFSD's from all AMA's is not known at this time. Many outshipment reports (RCS Log S 452) have been received for material

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believed to have already been delivered; however, these reports are of limited value since the complete package is not available at ALC. A DAO/VNAF equipment team is being formed to visit each air division in RVN to inventory, search, identify equipment assets, and establish proper accountability, thereby solving part of the problem for equipment shipped.

e. Stock Replenishment Requisitioning. CSAF/LG message 171700Z March 1973 directed suspension of stock replenishment requisitioning to preclude compounding existing materiel backlogs caused by push shipment under Project Enhance Plus. This action was implemented 21 March 1973 and will remain in effect until approximately 25 July 1973. In conjunction with suspension of stock replenishment requisitioning, actions have also been taken to cancel ANORS requirements over 30 days old, excessive stock replenishment requirements, and adjustment of 365-day requisitioning objectives. All of these actions have been completed with final update of computer records to be completed by 15 July 1973. Normal requirements computations and stock replenishment requisitioning, utilizing past consumption data and current flying hour program, will be implemented on or about 1 August 1973.

f. Common Service Item Support. VNAF common service item support is now handled exclusively through ALC. Bases no longer requisition these items directly from other RVNAF supply sources. ALC, in turn, is supported by the National Materiel Management Agency (NMA) which maintains an authorized stockage list (ASL) of 90,000 common service items. From the ASL, a total of 13,762 items are in use by VNAF. Since 16 March 1973, 4,813 items have been requisitioned from NMA, and to date ALC has received positive supply action on 1,178 (25%). A total of 3,437 (71%) have been back-ordered and 198 (4%) have been canceled. The high percentage of backorders is due to assets being located at ARVN storage sites, and issue priorities are given to ARVN requirements. This is a JGS support problem that is being watched; however, the problem must be solved by the RVNAF.

g. Repairable Generations to CONUS. VNAF-ALC Production Management Branch, in conjunction with ALC Production Control, completed a one-time purge of repairable assets during June 1973. This resulted in

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identification of 6,766 items that were not reparable this station (NRTS) for shipment to CONUS for repair. This contrasts to the 1,730 average monthly NRTS January through May 1973. The majority were NRTS due to backlog within in-country repair shops. This exercise has relieved the backlog within ALC's reparable processing center and should expedite return of serviceable assets into USAF/VNAF supply channels. This will continue to be a critical area for management surveillance to insure more cost effective logistic support.

h. VNAF Air Munitions Status: USAF/AFLC has prepared a "Memorandum of Agreement for Resupply of Air Munitions to the VNAF" which established a responsive munitions resupply system and which conformed to the ceasefire policy requiring control of restricted items. Effectiveness of this system will be further enhanced in the near future as plans are currently being developed for mechanization of the system. The mechanization will not alter the current resupply procedure but will provide mechanized stock balance reporting, inventory, and other statistical data for control and reporting purposes.

## 1. Technical Order and Publication Distribution.

(1) TCTO Procedures. The present TCTO/PDO procedures are too complex and require simplification. A simplified procedure has been submitted but has not been approved by VNAF. Management attention is being maintained in this area.

(2) Status of TO's on order from CONUS 1 January to 24 June 1973 is as follows:

(Figure 14)

Qty TO's ordered	6,509
Qty TO's backordered	1,825
Qty TO's cancelled	299
Qty TO's received	1,800
Qty TO's w/no status	2,858

(Figure 14)



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The lack of TO's is seriously hampering the programmed VNAF training, maintenance, and production program. Follow-up actions are continuing.

j. Computer Downtime. The VNAF have two 1050-II computer systems located at the Air Logistics Command at Bien Hoa. One system, consisting of a single computer with remote devices, supports all VNAF base supply and equipment management operations. This system has experienced few outages. The second system, consisting of two 1050-II computers, supports depot operation at the ALC. The depot computer system has been inoperative for an excessive amount of time caused by hardware malfunctions. Errors have also been detected in internally stored records during direct support processing. Parallel processing on an identical computer at Clark AB in the Philippines identified this problem. The problem will be further compounded by the change in contractors for computer maintenance effective 1 July 1973. To insure logistics support is not degraded, arrangements have been made to utilize the USAF mobile computer at Clark AB to perform off-line or indirect support operations. Special airlift will be arranged, if required.

## k. VNAF AIM-9 Missile Status:

(1) There are currently 302 AIM-9 Missiles authorized and in-country. One hundred eighty (180) are fully serviceable and 122 are short components such as contact fuzes and serviceable guidance and control units. Action is being taken to replace the reparable units with serviceable units in accordance with the one-for-one replacement criteria for controlled/restricted material. The reparable guidance and control units are being prepared for shipment at this time. It is estimated that shipping will be accomplished prior to 1 Aug 73. AFLC has advised serviceable components are available for airlift to VNAF upon certification that reparable have been evacuated from country.

(2) The current AIM-9 inventory is made up of B model missiles. Forty each F-5 aircraft are now being modified to provide AIM-9E capability. Estimated completion date 17 Aug 73. We have 48 each E Missiles authorized. However, only 24 each will be called forward



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at this time to satisfy an immediate requirement to equip 12 each aircraft for use in an air defense role. The remaining 24 will be provided as assets and priorities permit. It is anticipated that 9E operational capability will be attained on or about 17 Aug 73.

(3) Liquid Oxygen Capability. The Tan Son Nhut LOX Plant was down for parts and the Bien Hoa plant was the only operational plant in RVN, as the Da Nang plant was down and required a complete overhaul. We were able, through close monitoring, to secure the necessary instruments and materials for the Tan Son Nhut plant. The TSN LOX Plant is now in operation and "run" samples have been dispatched to the testing laboratory for purity checks. Arrangements were also made to get a contractor team with all of the required parts in to overhaul the Da Nang LOX Plant. This team will be dispatched from CONUS as soon as all parts can be accumulated. All three plants have assigned personnel trained in the operation and maintenance of the equipment, but with only limited knowledge of major repair and overhaul.

6. (C) SUPPLY SERVICES: The Supply Section of the Air Force Division, Logistics Branch, was organized to assist the VNAF in all phases of supply operations including training of personnel. Since 29 March 1973, the VNAF/DAO team has been striving to organize the supply system while concurrently arranging for the supplies needed to keep the VNAF operational. The VNAF supply system covers nine air bases and the depot (ALC) located at Bien Hoa.

## a. Training.

(1) Concept of Operation. Air Force Div, DAO entered into a contract with PA&E to train the VNAF personnel in warehousing techniques, materials, handling, inventory management, fuels management, requisitioning processing, and packaging and preservation.

(2) Current Assessment. No VNAF personnel were designated by VNAF headquarters to participate in the FY-73 program. In their place 800 local nationals (LNs) were entered into the training program. These personnel learned very quickly and are performing at an acceptable level. However, the contractors training efforts were all oriented toward USAF U-1050UU base supply concepts instead of VNAF supply procedures. These people are now being integrated. The current contract is due to expire on 31 December 1973. The VNAF will not have enough

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personnel assets to maintain their own system on this date. Therefore, every effort must be made to retain the existing trained local nationals within the VNAF personnel force allocation. The 800 LNs now employed are scheduled to be phased out by 31 December 1973. Action should be taken to either contract or absorb these personnel into the Vietnamese Civil Service. The JGS and DAO currently has these matters under consideration. Authorized versus assigned manning in the area of Base Supply is approximately 50% at all VNAF bases with exception of the Air Logistics Command which is better than 95% manned. The most critical shortages in these skills rest in the area of middle management (NCOs and Officers). Formal training courses combined with contractor OJT will provide training for some 50% of deficit during Fiscal Year 74. VNAF should be self-sufficient by last quarter of CY 73.

## 7. (C) CIVIL ENGINEERING.

a. There are three contracts covering the Civil Engineering Training of VNAF personnel at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Da Nang, Phu Cat and Phan Rang Air Bases. Two of these contracts are with Kentron Limited of Hawaii and cover both formal and On-Job-Training (OJT). One contract is for training in the operation and maintenance of facilities and the other in power production. The third contract is with PA&E for "O&M" Training Facility Maintenance only. Extension of these basic contracts from 30 June through 31 December 1973, with a stepped up training program of VNAF personnel, will enable the VNAF BCE capability to assume all O&M responsibility by 31 December 1973. Cost estimates for extending these contracts is \$2,340,000.

b. On 22 June 1973, meetings were held with both of these contractors to discuss the integration of VNAF OJT personnel into the contractor work force. Representatives of the contractor, VNAF-DE staff personnel and AOSAF-E were present. A decision was made and agreed upon by all parties that the integration would be accomplished on a shop by shop basis during July and August 1973. It was further agreed that when the VNAF personnel became sufficiently proficient to operate any shop that the contractor would withdraw his personnel and turn the complete shop and operations over to the VNAF Base Civil Engineers.

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Training would, however, continue through the period of the contract. This is presently being accomplished and Tan Son Nhut Air base will be 100% integrated by 16 July 1973.

c. Of the Military Construction (MILCON) and Major Repair and Minor Construction (MRMC) projects, six have been completed representing a total cost of \$681,000. At the close of FY73 there were ninety eight active projects, with an estimated total construction cost of \$3,588,000. In addition to the current on-going MRMC program, the VNAF have proposed 155 new projects for consideration in FY74. The estimated construction/repair cost for these projects is \$4,152,500. The VNAF have also identified 19 new MILCON programs, with an estimated construction cost of \$5,684,000 for FY74 funding consideration. All of these FY74 MRMC and MILCON proposed projects are presently being evaluated by Air Force Civil Engineering representatives as to their validity and justification of requirement at the nine respective VNAF Air Bases.

d. The CY71 Dependent Shelter Program was initially envisioned as a VNAF self-help construction program and consists of 2,400 units at a programmed cost of \$1,440,000. As of 30 June 1973, construction had commenced on 2,100 units of which 1,020 have been completed, reflecting an overall completion status of 72%. There were 751 of these completed units under beneficial occupancy. Many construction delays were incurred in this VNAF self-help program due to the shortage and erratic delivery of materials and supplies. Deliveries were not consistent with requirements or sequenced to need. Added to this was the limited knowledge and capability of the VNAF to perform in the construction crafts. To overcome these deficiencies and to expedite completion, 490 units at Soc Trang, Nha Trang and Pleiku Air Bases have been placed under contract. Present program planning provides for a target completion by December 1974.

e. The CY72 Dependent Shelter Program consists of 2,000 units at a programmed cost of \$600,000. Procurement and construction is being accomplished by the ARVN Civil Engineering Battalions or the MPCO. As of 30 June 1973, construction had commenced on 1,700 units, of which 1,360 have been completed reflecting an overall completion status of 82%. Of the units completed, 934 were under beneficial occupancy. Initially, 33 Community Facilities were

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authorized by USAF; however, none of these were funded for construction. The JGS then directed that 60 Shelter Units be converted to Community Facilities. As of 30 June 1973, work on three Community Facilities had commenced. The program completion date of 30 December 1973 continues firm.

f. A technical survey of fire protection apparatus at each of the 9 VNAF Air Bases was recently conducted by the Air Force Fire Consultant. It was found that, in many instances, vehicles were out of commission for clutches, front end assemblies, tires and fuel. All apparatus is 19-20 years old and has reached an age where it is most difficult to maintain in an in-service condition. It is essential that a bench stock of high mortality parts be maintained and readily available for the immediate repair and maintenance of these emergency vehicles. To assist the VNAF Fire Department organization, standard operational procedures have been formulated and translated for dissemination to each of the Base Fire Department organizations. These SOPs cover all critical aspects of the overall operations and should prove of valuable assistance to Base Fire Department personnel. A VNAF fire crash rescue proficiency training regulation was also formulated by the Air Force Civil Engineering Fire Consultant and is being translated to assist the VNAF Fire Departments in their proficiency training. This regulation covers all techniques and procedures as related to egress training, rescue teams and overall fire fighting organizations.

## 8. (C) TRAINING.

a. VNAF formal in-country training. From 1 Jan thru 30 Jun 73, 5,264 VNAF personnel entered formal in-country training. During this same period, 3,574 graduated from training, including some personnel entered during CY72.

(Figure 15)

(1) Status of formal in-country training is indicated by Quarter.

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<u>School</u>	<u>Entries</u>		<u>Graduates</u>		<u>In Tng</u>
	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>30 Jun</u>
Pilot Trng School	44	51	37	12	140
Technical School, Nha Trang	196	536	179	103	1260
Communication & Electronic Sch	95	191	110	115	372
General Service School (Admin AFSCs)	249	207	12	214	127
Mil Tng Sch (Basic Off/NCO Course)	1272	219	1938	51	862
Sub Tech Sch TSN	205	940	148	99	1226
Air Command & Staff School TSN	0	72	48	0	72
Air Divisions (Crew, Tng, Gunners)	528	89	47	232	248
	<u>2775</u>	<u>2489</u>	<u>2641</u>	<u>933</u>	<u>4502</u>

(FIGURE 15)

(2) In addition to this training, each Air Division and training location conducted Basic Military Training for VNAF recruits from 1 Jan thru 30 Jun

(FIGURE 16)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Entries</u>		<u>Graduates</u>		<u>In Tng</u>
	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>30 Jun</u>
1st Air Division	286	0	190	0	96
2nd Air Division	447	0	327	0	120
3rd Air Division	1165	8	769	0	404
4th Air Division	921	0	921	0	0



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<u>Location</u>	<u>Entries</u>		<u>Graduates</u>		<u>In Tng</u> <u>30 Jun</u>
	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	<u>3dQ</u>	<u>4thQ</u>	
5th Air Division	756	1052	351	905	346
6th Air Division	200	0	200	0	0
Air Trng Center	1783	535	1422	880	862
Sub Tech School TSN	487	200	491	0	200
	<u>6045</u>	<u>1795</u>	<u>4671</u>	<u>1785</u>	<u>2028</u>

(FIGURE 16)

b. On the Job Training (OJT) is being conducted by each Air Division and Operational VNAF organization.

(1) HQ VNAF OJT office reports that a total of 714 VNAF personnel are enrolled in VNAF conducted OJT programs and more than 1200 personnel are engaged in US contractor supervised programs. In addition, VNAF graduated approximately 600 OJT trainees during the first two quarters of CY73; 579 were in the last quarter. The US contractors were not required to develop a reporting procedure prior to 1 Jun 73, so it is not known how many OJT trainees completed US contractor sponsored programs during this period.

(2) Effective 1 Jul 73, there are 40 US contractor firms with VNAF OJT contracts who will be reporting monthly. Past experience in the VNAF OJT programs, as well as US contractor programs, has shown that VNAF operational and duty requirements often take priority over OJT. This problem will require additional command emphasis to upgrade the quality of VNAF mid-level skills and assume maximum participation in the OJT programs.

c. As a result of ENHANCE PLUS, twenty Squadrons were scheduled for either accelerated activation, transfer to a new aircraft system or added to the force structure. New aircraft added to the inventory included C-130s, C-12s and AC-119Ks. Key projects associated with ENHANCE PLUS are addressed below.

(1) A USAF Mobile Training Team (MTT) to train flight crews and maintenance personnel for 32 C-130s completed its project in February 1973. The objective of this program was to provide a cadre of skills in every



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area so that, aided by temporary US contract support for maintenance and OJT, the VNAF could rapidly achieve acceptable operational levels and self-sufficiency (except for depot maintenance) in C-130s. Supply support, maintenance problems and critical operational priorities inhibited transition into this aircraft throughout 4thQ FY73. In some flying skills, previously trained personnel regressed because of the lack of continuation training. The original program called for 32 crews to be trained to include 12 crews instructor qualified and Phase II (airdrop and short field landings) qualified. Current status reflects 12 pilot instructors, 12 navigator instructors, 12 flight engineer instructors and 12 Phase II qualified crews. A total of 40 aircraft commanders, 82 first pilots, co-pilots and 40 flight engineers are now qualified for airlift missions. This represents considerable progress in the C-130 program and provides enough crews to meet contingency requirements. It does not, however, represent a fully satisfactory program because maintenance constraints have limited achievement of full aircrew operational training, crew upgrading and especially Phase II training.

(2) Major C-130 aircrew problems center on three areas; flight engineer proficiency; Phase II training, especially utilization of high altitude/low opening aerial resupply in conjunction with the Beacon Only Bombing System (this is the only all weather bomb/resupply system available); and operation and maintenance of navigation systems, such as Doppler which is peculiar to the C-130.

(3) VNAF crew and airdrop training has been geared toward phaseout of the C-123s on 31 Jul 73. Sufficient aircrews have now received C-130A training to support 32 aircraft. However, a portion of these crews are currently flying C-123s and will require additional training prior to returning to the C-130A aircraft. Six C-130 crews are currently being trained in airdrops using the "Seek Point" guidance system. Project Seek Point personnel are in training at two locations: Bien Hoa and Binh Thuy. This training is being conducted by Sierra Research and consists of formal classroom training and OJT. There are presently 37 students in training (18 at Bien Hoa and 19 at Binh Thuy). The training has been delayed due to lack of aircraft available for training missions, bad weather, and equipment failure. The scheduled completion of this training is now 15 July for the operators and 25 August for the maintenance personnel.

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(4) In the maintenance area, formal and OJT training was provided to 552 VNAF by the USAF MTT in the major skills required to support and availability of students, later reassignments and entry level knowledge of the trainees all constricted the knowledge imparted and retained. Following the departure of the MTT, contractor support to continue VNAF upgrading was utilized and necessarily continues. Major progress has been made, and in many maintenance areas, the VNAF is performing at a high standard. However, in selected areas critical of overall operation of the aircraft, significant shortfalls in skill levels remain. Progress has and is being made, but self-sufficiency in maintaining the C-130 has not yet been achieved.

(5) Project ENHANCE PLUS turned over 22 AC-119K aircraft to VNAF. The 7th AF units turning over the assets were then programmed to train 15 aircrews and 51 key maintenance personnel by 28 March 1973. Even though ceasefire considerations resulted in an early March program termination, the major program objectives were achieved. Since then in-country training, largely by VNAF but with some contractor assistance, has continued. Crew manning is sufficient to meet all mission requirements and ongoing training will qualify additional assigned crews for full manning during the next few months. Because of the similarity in the AC-119K and the AC-119G and C-119, which were VNAF operated, maintenance training was rapidly accomplished, except in areas of dissimilarity with the other systems. A specific problem area for aircrew and maintenance has been the APQ-133 side looking radar. Neither maintenance nor operator self-sufficiency has been obtained with this difficult, yet important system.

## d. In-Country Pilot Training:

(1) The T-37 Undergraduate Pilot Training at the Air Training Center, Nha Trang/Phan Rang started on

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schedule at Nha Trang on 14 Feb 73 with ground school and T-41 flying training for 16 Air Cadets. The program requires T-37 training to begin the first week in July at Phan Rang. At this point, five additional Air Cadets will join this class from the 0-1 UPT (class 42-72) from Nha Trang. Sixteen T-37 IPs have completed CONUS training and are at Nha Trang. However, this program is still fraught with uncertainties due to lack of life support equipment (on order from CONUS), training aids and trainers lost in the supply system (now being repaired, found and refurbished), unprepared facilities at Phan Rang and the delays in removing the twenty-four T-37 aircraft from storage. At least ten T-37s will be operational by 1 Jul 73. However, fully adequate support for the training of the first class will be possible only if preparatory actions on all other aspects of this program undertaken in FY 4/73 now fall into place. Some slippages are to be expected. Creature comforts may suffer but the basic program to train jet pilots in-country should commence on time and will improve as experience is gained.

(2) During this reporting period (Jan-Jun) a total of 33 Air Cadets graduated from the T-41/01 flying training course at Nha Trang. The next class (class 42-72) is presently in training with twenty-two cadets and is scheduled to graduate 15 Oct 73.

(3) The in-country UH-1 pilot training program, a first, entered the first 43 cadets in ground school at Nha Trang ATC, in May. This class will transfer to Can Tho early in July for one month of U-17 flying training and flight aptitude screening, then on to Bien Hoa for six months of UH-1 training. The second class of 42 cadets started ground school in July. Perhaps more important, during this quarter selected personnel were upgraded to instructor pilots. Additional instructors are being trained and facilities and training aids prepared for this large program designed to produce 375 UH-1 co-pilots. U-17 instructor upgrading was an in-country effort, but UH-1 instructors upgrading was a joint effort concurrently transpiring in country at Bien Hoa and in CONUS. The Program represents a significant achievement and milestone for the VNAF.

(4) During FY 3/73 and 4/73, ongoing upgrade programs resulted in a total of 62 A-37 pilots completing training with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Air Divisions,

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12 C-130 crews completing Phase II training with the 5th Air Division, 64 F-5 pilots completing training with the 3rd Air Division and 55 O-2 pilots completing training at the 5th Air Division. At this time 18 A-37, 14 F-5 and 24 C-130 pilots are in training in the units mentioned above.

e. VNAF Military Assistance Service Funded Offshore Training Program .

(1) The FY73 objectives of the VNAF offshore training program were:

(a) Aircrew training was established as first priority with the objective of achieving adequate manning of trained aircrews according to squadron activation schedules.

(b) The second objective and priority was to provide training necessary to support new equipment coming into the VNAF inventory under ENHANCE PLUS.

(c) The third objective and priority was to provide minimum essential training in the areas of resource management, instructor, and professional training to further self-sufficiency.

(2) To achieve the above objectives, the following offshore training was programmed/input for FY73:

(FIGURE 17)

(a) A total of 351 personnel were sent to CONUS for aircrew training. Also, 241 personnel received follow-on training such as T-38 Phase III, A-37 CCTS, etc. VNAF was able to provide English qualified candidates to all aircrew spaces programmed (ECL 48 required for Pilot entries).

(b) The elimination rate of the undergraduate pilot training program due primarily to flying deficiency remained at approximately 25%. However, most of the pilot eliminees were effectively utilized in other programs. For example, 19 eliminees successfully completed the 6-week Weapon Controller-MAP Course. A total of 27 eliminees entered the 36-week Undergraduate Navigator-MAP Course during the year. Those eliminees with qualifying backgrounds (BACC II) in Mathematics, Physics, etc.,

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<u>Type Training:</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>	<u>No. Trained FY 73</u>	<u>No. Trained</u> <u>3QFY73    4QFY73</u>	
(a) <u>Aircrew Training:</u>				
UH-1 Instructor Pilot	\$ 253,320	30	--	30
CH-47 Instructor Pilot	57,720	8*	4	--
CH-47 Aviator Qual	1,002,570	78	24	7
UPI/T-41/T-37	7,056,080	224	54	40
UPT/T-38 PH III	1,346,520	49*	--	--
Pilot Instructor T-37	265,960	17	--	--
Instrument Pilot Instr	17,760	2	2	--
ADV FTR TNG F-5	552,070	8*	--	--
CCTS A-37	2,523,430	91*	--	--
Pilot C-47/Instrument Transition	540,660	46*	--	--
Pilot Instructor A-1	63,920	8*	--	--
Pilot Transition	18,080	4*	--	--
Undergraduate NAV-MAP	431,350	27*	--	--
	<u>\$14,129,440</u>	<u>351(241*)</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>77</u>

	Cost	FY73 Qty	Qty by Qtr 3rd 4th	
(b) Operational Training Course	\$ 121,930	45	3	17
(c) Communication/Electronics Training CONUS	348,060	101	8	6
(d) Maintenance Training CONUS	239,750	85	17	9
(e) Logistics Training CONUS	16,340	8	3	2
(f) Administrative Training CONUS	143,620	30	7	6
(g) ProgeSSIONal/Specialist Train- ing CONUS Includes CLO-ACSC, Def. Mgt & Nursing)	530,820	122	22	27
(h) Orientation Training CONUS	99,210	12**	--	5
(i) In-Country (MTT)	252,270	--	--	--
(j) Extraordinary Expenses	4,790	--	--	--
(k) Student Support CONUS	12,570	--	--	--
(l) Training USAF Personnel for MAAG Assignment	161,030	--	--	--
Aggregate:	<u>\$16,056,830</u>	<u>754</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>149</u>



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were effectively utilized in the electronics field. Only 30 pilot eliminees were returned to RVN without being trained in some other course. Elimination of students from academic courses other than pilot training was minimal.

(c) Pilot trainees entering Phase III T-38 training from the T-28 program of FY72 experienced considerable difficulty with the advanced aircraft. Only the most capable pilots completed the training. The eliminees were returned to RVN and received flying assignments in aircraft within their qualifications. It was estimated that the inability of pilots to function adequately in the T-38 was due to the limited 24 week training received in the T-28. This problem was not presented with the more experienced T-37 graduates entering T-38 training.

(d) The English language requirements continued to pose the most serious problem for the VNAF in meeting the FY73 SATP for offshore training of non-flying personnel. Since all initial entries into the pilot program required an ECL of 48 and the program provided 23 weeks of English language training in CONUS to progress to ECL 75, little difficulty was experienced with the pilots.

(e) The lack of English qualified candidates for non-flying courses was a major problem and the direct cause for cancellation of 96 training spaces. (Refer to Paragraph 2, Chapter 10).

(f) Even though there was an urgent need for responsible personnel in the workforce of VNAF, only three spaces were cancelled because candidates could not be released from their current duty. These were two candidates for the aerospace medicine course and one space for the Senior Officers International Defense Management Course. It is apparent that once a candidate meets the selection requirements for entry into CONUS training, release from his unit of assignment is assured.

(g) The VNAF have not placed some CONUS trained returnees in duties for which they were trained. This is a problem that VNAF must overcome and emphasize duty responsibilities above the desires of individuals. The Training Management Section will continue to monitor end-item utilization.

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(1) A DAO/PACAF/AFLC team visited nine VNAF bases in June 1973 to assess organizational and intermediate maintenance contract requirements. Objective of this project was to enable the VNAF to attain a measure of self-sufficiency with the assistance of contractor support. The concept applied was to, first, maximize training with a contractor best "level of effort." Best level of effort is predicated upon the VNAF providing students in the skills and quantities required to enable the contractor to train on specific maintenance tasks. Second, minimize and/or eliminate contractor augmentation and production, and last, to phase down and phase out the U.S. contract effort - consistent with the development of VNAF self-sufficiency.

(2) In order to determine training and augmentation requirements, the team reviewed "hard core" skills required for specific weapon systems. They looked at skill levels at each of the bases and determined that the bulk of personnel were assigned in the 3 level skill. They also looked at the manning posture, that is, quantity of personnel assigned versus authorized, and the availability of personnel in each of the skills that require training. No attempt was made to provide contractor training for all available technicians. Instead, a trade-off was made to program an adequate number of on-hand trainees for training and at the same time make sufficient personnel available to maintain aircraft and subsystems. To further define contractor training and augmentation requirements, the team made an on-site review of aircraft and aerospace ground equipment to determine overall general condition. As a result of the team's review, it was determined that training is required to support all the major weapon systems and to provide some limited augmentation.

(3) Contractor training is essential to all the aircraft weapon systems and most back shops which include such functions as pneudraulics, electrical, accessory repair, etc. In addition, several systems require augmentation, such as the C-130, CH-47, AC-119, EC-47, C-7 and F-5 which also includes on the job training for VNAF technicians. The C-119G flyable storage will continue pending JCS decision on activation of the RC-119L maritime patrol squadron. There is also a F-5A flyable storage support requirement which is contingent upon release of the aircraft to an offshore contract facility for corrosion repair. The T-37 preparation will be completed at Nha Trang in September and the

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aircraft will transfer to Phan Rang for use in the undergraduate pilot training program. Modifications, such as the ALE-20, FM-622 radio, ELM, RHAW, etc., were also considered to provide a total U.S. contractor presence. There will be additional Mod's as requirements are generated. Contractors will phase out as modifications are completed.

(4) Presently, there are 1047 U.S. LSI contractors in-country for O&E type work. With the shift in emphasis from production to primarily training, 375 contractors will be terminated on 1 August. There are LSI contractors associated with management overhead. This is an item to be negotiated at the 11 July 1973 contractor negotiation conference at McClellan AFB, California. To keep the U.S. overhead at a minimum, the contractor will hire local nationals to perform such duties as translators, interpreters, clerks, and the maintenance of training records. Twelve LSI contractors will be needed in FY 75 to perform the ALE-29 mod on the F-5.

(5) An important factor which was used in phasing down the contractor effort was the programmed availability of trained technicians from VNAF air training center resources. This equates to a projection of 2959 personnel for calendar year 1973. The key to success for this program is the VNAF providing students to the contractor for training.

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## 9. (S) CONCLUSIONS.

a. The VNAF is currently capable of performing its assigned mission. The impact of ENHANCE PLUS has put the VNAF in the position of having to grow into the force structure in every field of endeavor; operations, maintenance, supply, personnel and facilities. Training and lack of supply and maintenance support impose the most severe limitations. The lack of RVNAF team work in overall combat operational planning prohibits the realization of the full VNAF combat potential.

b. With the exception of the fixed wing gunships, reconnaissance and the A-1's, the VNAF pilots have very little capability in night or weather operations. This is a result of inadequate initial training, no continuation training and very little emphasis by operations supervisors. This attitude which shows no promise of change in the near future makes exotic, hard to maintain equipment, such as the Beacon only Bombing System of questionable value. For the entire VNAF bombing fleet is required on night/all weather training.

c. The Air Superiority/Air Defense potential of the VNAF is marginal. In the Air Defense role, the VNAF is handicapped by aircraft which have no capability (because of available weapons) in the front intercept environment. In addition, (again because of weapons) they are constrained to a clear air mass situation and stern attack geometry. Geographical shape and radar masking give VNAF very little early warning. The command and control system, although responsive, is still not quick enough to take advantage of early warning. In the air superiority role, the VNAF faces more experienced pilots flying equipment that is similar in capability. This will result in a serious disadvantage during the learning curve until the VNAF pilots gain experience in air-to-air combat. Training resources nor supervisory incentive are not sufficient to overcome these deficiencies in the near future.

d. Maintenance capability is limited due to lack of skills while the supply capability is constrained by poor supply discipline. Given the proper emphasis and time along with stability this situation should improve.

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e. Supply is a continuing problem compounded by lack of adequate number of middle managers along with a wide variety of complicated equipment; slow repair capability of complex end items and inadequate identification and distribution of available resources. This problem is also amenable to solution; however, it will require time and training until the personnel become experienced. The matter of supply discipline (the avoidance of diverting commercially valuable items from their intended use) is a matter of utmost priority. It is a problem that can only be solved by the RVNAF leaders.

f. A standardization and evaluation program needs to be established. This program would require each air crew to accomplish X number of any event every month, six months or year; e.g., high and low angle strafing, high and low angle dive bombing, skip bombing, aerial resupply, air to air combat maneuvering, etc. This would insure aircrew proficiency and provide a standard against which to measure the combat capability of any aircrew or squadron. This combined with a yearly program of minimum types of hours, i.e.; night time, weather time, instrument approaches should finely tune the VNAF and provide the Commander with a known combat capability. In summary, the present program is less than satisfactory. However, actions are being taken to strengthen the standardization and evaluation program.



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## CHAPTER 7

### VIETNAMESE NAVY (VNN)

#### 1. (C) AUTHORIZED STRENGTH:

a. Personnel Authorization. The FY 73 year end VNN total authorization remains at 39,735 with 5,744 officers, 14,243 NCOs, 17,230 enlisted and 2,518 pipeline personnel.

b. Personnel Strength. The personnel strength as of 30 June 1973 was 40,607. This figure includes 5,663 officers, 13,219 NCOs and 21,725 enlisted personnel. The latter figure includes pipeline and recruits.

#### 2. (C) PERSONNEL READINESS:

a. Since ceasefire the VNN has taken advantage of the time to train and conduct exercises. Improvement in ship operations, planning, logistic management and overall effectiveness has been noted by end-use monitors. This is further borne out by a gradual increase in the operational Readiness percentage of VNN ships and craft.

b. In May the VNN conducted their first underway replenishment exercise which was highly successful. Other operations, such as a rendezvous between the HQ 13 and her USN sister ship, the USS Kilauea, off Nha Trang in May, produced very favorable comment regarding seamanship, equipment condition and general appearance of HQ 13.

#### 3. (C) Equipment Status VNN Ships & Craft

a. Authorized Strength. The authorized number of ships and craft is 1548.

b. Current Strength. The current inventory of VNN ships and craft is 1508, as follows:

##### (1) Brown Water Fleet

1st Coastal Zone	273
2nd Coastal Zone	113
3rd Coastal Zone	85
4th Coastal Zone	67
3rd River Assault	85
4th River Assault	108
Amphibious Group	108
River Surveillance	239

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General Reserve	192
Cosflat	129
Logistic Support Command	78
CMD	<u>41</u>
	1417 Total

## (2) Blue Water Fleet

Sea Patrol, Coastal Patrol and Logistic Flotilla totals 91 ships. Operational Readiness reporting includes 81 of this total. The remaining 10 are support types.

## (3) Operational Readiness.

Reporting includes 666 of the 1417 Brown Water craft; the remainder being the support craft and small craft are not appropriate types for operational readiness reporting.

## (4) Operational Readiness Percentage. Average for the past quarter:

Blue Water Fleet 62%  
Brown water Fleet 79%

4. (C) CHNAVADVGRP letter, Serial 0043, dated 28 Mar 73, included 14 major issues pertaining to the attainment of VNN self-sufficiency meriting the attention of the CNO, VNN (ADM CHON). The VNN CNO has agreed that these issues should be addressed by Navy Division/VNN joint efforts. In addition, ADM CHON added one issue that he considered important and assigned a VNN Action Officer for each issue. Ten of these issues, plus other logistics issues that have been approved by the VNN are the basis for the Navy Division DAO/VNN Logistics Development Plan signed by the Chief, Navy Division, and promulgated on 30 June 1973 when the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy, affixed his signature to the document.

### a. LSB/ISB-ASB Technical Management:

(1) Checklists for the FAST (Field Assistance Support Team) concept for end-use surveillance are being developed for implementation by mid-July.

(2) VNN assumption of 3rd and 4th echelon maintenance of ARVN watercraft, scheduled to be implemented in increments beginning in October with 100% assumption by

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30 Dec 73, will not be accomplished unless the overall manning picture with the LSB/ISB complex improves. The JGS decision for early release of 441 16-year-old trainees from VNN Shipyard (VNNSY) to LSB's in July will further disrupt this marginal capability in that the unskilled work force is increased at a time when insufficient middle management personnel are available as supervisors.

b. VNNSY - Of the 31 Blue Water ships scheduled for overhauls during FY 73, the VNNSY completed 23. In addition, two LST's, HQ-500 and HQ-801, were scheduled to be completed the first week of July. The average FY 73 manhours for Blue Water overhauls between the 1st and 2nd quarter and the 3rd and 4th quarter reflects an overall 50% increase. This is also reflected in the number of craft overhauled; nine delivered during 1st and 2nd quarter as compared to 14 delivered during the 3rd and 4th quarter. At the present rate of overhauls for Blue Water ships, the Shipyard should be able to complete five Blue Water overhauls per month, which would meet the present scheduled requirements for FY 74.

c. VNN Fleet Command - Out of country overhauls in Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, include two PCE's, HQ-8, estimated at 96% complete, and HQ-7, scheduled to commence overhaul on 1 July 1973. HQ-400, a LSM(H), returned from Singapore and post-overhaul inspection was graded unsatisfactory. This is being investigated. Fleet Command has organized and is conducting a training program for shipboard personnel to improve the overall implementation of the Planned Maintenance System (PMS) with DAO consultants assisting in training procedures and curriculum.

d. Construction and Base Maintenance - The Contract Field Teams have been making regular field trips to VN Naval facilities which come under the authority of their respective LGS's. During the quarter, 102 site visits were made with discrepancies being noted as follows: Apr - 130; May - 45; and Jun - 11. Investigations were made of corrective actions being taken of known deficiencies. Some improvement was noted in the correction of reported deficiencies.

## 5. (C) SUPPLY:

### a. General

(1) U. S. DOD Civilian Consultant Personnel.

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Several significant accomplishments were made in the area of VNN supply during the month of June 1973. However, the Navy Supply Section continues to experience serious difficulties in obtaining qualified U.S. DOD civilian personnel to fill authorized consultant positions in several critical areas, particularly at the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center. The problem will be discussed further during meetings at CINCPACFLT during the week of 24 June 1973.

(2) Audit of VNN POL Operations. The Defense Audit Office has advised CNO, VNN, that they will undertake an audit of all aspects of VNN Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant (POL) operations, which may include: requirements determinations; accountability; storage control; distribution; quality assurance; and use of both bulk petroleum and packaged goods. This work will be performed concurrently with all elements of RVNAF.

(3) Proposal for Establishment of VNN Director of Supply Management. An important milestone was reached during the month as the CNO, VNN, gave approval to a concept for developing a supply specialty within the VNN. In response, VNN officials have undertaken planning for eventual establishment of a VNN Supply Systems organization whose commander/director will report directly to CNO and have authority for training VNN Supply Officers in the new system and provide for their career development through progressive assignments to designated Supply billets.

(4) Summary of Customer In-Country Codes for VNN. In May 1973, SECDEF approved retention of the two-digit coding system for in-country delivery of dollar line items procured in CONUS. Concurrently, four new codes were established for Navy use in requisitioning ammunition, major items and restricted war materials. All Navy dollar line items are processed through VNNSC; therefore, no change is required in Supply Center procedures for in-country delivery of these items. All Navy major items and restricted war material requisitions are processed through the DAO Navy Division MASF Plans and Programs Office and the Program Officer will commence using the appropriate, newly established codes for these items on 1 July 1973. All Navy peculiar ammunition requisitions are processed through the DAO Navy Division LSB/ISB/ASB Management

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Section Ordnance Unit. The Unit Chief has established two new codes (UICs) for use in requisitioning ammunition and this will not alter or affect his procedures. As a result, no program changes or significant procedural revisions will be required by the VNN or DAO Navy Division.

## b. Vietnamese Naval Supply Center (VNNSC)

### (1) General

(a) VNNSC management officials, with U.S. consultant guidance, completed computation of FY 75 - FY 79 budget requirements for Supply Center operations and programs to be incorporated in the overall VNN budget submissions for that period.

(b) Review of Blue Water Fleet COSAL items was completed and a total of 13,443 line item requisitions were transmitted to NAVILCO. The final count on required tugboat items was 616 lines valued at \$111,224.

(c) By telephone, the VNNSC Planning Consultant confirmed with NAVSUP that under MASF/MAP program receipt reporting requirements NAVILCO will accomplish the reporting on all dollar line items and Navy Division will report only the major "each" line item receipts.

## c. Supply Effectiveness

### (1) VNNSC

Net	93.5%
Gross	83.5%
Accommodation Rate	89.3%

### (2) ISBs/LSBs

Net	77.0%
Gross	58.8%
Accommodation Rate	75.8%

## d. Training

(1) VNN Supply Corps Officers School, Oakland. The first class of 25 VNN officers graduated on 21 June. There were six honor graduates and the average class grade was 88.7%. The second class is scheduled to commence 2 July 1973, and the 29 VNN officers comprising this class arrived in Oakland 27 June. Preliminary planning for



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transfer of the school to Vietnam has commenced. The Commanding Officer, NSC Oakland, has forwarded details concerning requirements for the physical plant and a listing of equipment/furnishings needed to establish the school in Saigon. It is anticipated that the first in-country class will be convened in early November 1973.

(2) Class A Storekeeper School, Cat Lai. A total of 200 ARVN enlisted men have been transferred to VNN and will receive Class A Storekeeper training at Cat Lai.

(3) Other. The Commanding Officer, VNNSC, is participating in a Management Training course in Saigon. In addition, supply training is being conducted for all VNNSC and VNNDPC officers.

## 6. (C) TRAINING:

### a. VNN/VNMC In-Country Training

#### (1) General

(a) An overview of the entire Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) in-country training for the 4th Quarter of FY 73 shows a current emphasis on the upgrading of the training of junior officers, non-commissioned officers and petty officers of both organizations. Although this emphasis has been apparent throughout FY 73, and is not particularly unique to this period, it suggests a continuing and commendable effort to strengthen the middle ranks professionally and to expand their opportunities in the Service. Minor declines in the in-country career training of senior officers has been more than offset by this judicious leavening of knowledge throughout the middle ranks.

(b) Interservice utilization of established Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) schools continues to preclude duplication of effort and expense in the training program.

(c) The current in-country training picture, coupled with the active offshore training program in effect, is expected to equip the Navy and Marine Corps with a broad capability to maintain their equipment and perform their operational tasks. A comparison of the 3rd Quarter with the 4th Quarter elicits no particular deviation, bad or good, from one quarter to the other; only the positive trend noted above.

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(d) The continuing failure to develop, or on some cases, even request training aids is still a significant deficiency in the overall training endeavor. Student hand-out material falls into the same category. Previous training advisors had continuously made strong recommendations in these matters, and it is hoped that, as stabilization continues, more interest will be directed by VNN/VNMC toward the development and use of training aids. In this regard, it is noted that a mock Combat Information Center (CIC) has been established during the 3rd and 4th Quarters at Naval Training Center-Nha Trang. Although not completely operational as yet, it has been used in the CIC course mentioned above.

## (2) VNN In-country Training

(a) Officer Training. The total number of officers programmed to receive training during the 4th Quarter was essentially met - 169 expected, 153 actual. Minor shortfalls in numbers expected to be trained at VNN formal training facilities were compensated for by other training at Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) schools and civilian institutions. Whereas somewhat fewer senior officers than planned received training, the number of junior officers trained surpassed expectations. Officer training at VNN facilities was conducted in the following areas: Navy Command and Staff Course, Unit Commander (line and engineer) Courses, Combat Information Center Watch Officer Course, Vietnamese Navy Officer Special Education Program (VNOSEP), and Riverine (boat captain) Training. Miscellaneous courses at RVNAF schools and civilian institutions included such areas as: Communications, Logistics, RVNAF Command and Staff College, English Language, National Defense College, Public Works, Military Police and Architecture.

(b) Two hundred and sixty-three midshipmen are expected to graduate from the Naval Academy in September.

(c) Enlisted training. It was expected that 1,457 enlisted men (EM) would receive specialty and leadership training in 14 Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC) at VNN facilities. Reports indicate that actually 1489 received training in 13 NEC. The reason for the shortfall of one NEC is that VNN has combined Sonarman and Radarman into one specialty. The training received by EM in VNN facilities was as follows: Storekeeper (projected 55/actual 78), Commissaryman (49/36), Disbursing Clerk (13/20), Boat-swain's Mate (102/100), Engineman (228/315), Electrician's

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Mate (108/130), Gunner's Mate (166/155), Radioman (103/161), Quartermaster (103/41), Yeoman (134/104), and Damage Controlman (195/197). "A" courses vary in length from 12 to 40 weeks. "B" courses are 12 weeks and "C" courses are one week. The statistics indicate a general upgrading of training in that the majority of students attended the longer "B" courses while very few attended the short "C" courses. By type of course, the projected and actual numbers of EM were as follows: "A" courses (projected 665/actual 585), "B" courses (33/886) and "C" courses (759/18). Additionally, 55 EM received training at various RVNAF schools and civilian institutions; and 60 received River Force (boat captain) training.

## b. VNN/VNMC NMAAF Offshore Training Program

(1) Objectives of the VNN/VNMC Offshore Training program are:

(a) To provide advanced professional training for both officers and petty officers to reduce the VNN resources management and middle-management shortfall.

(b) To provide advanced technical training beyond the in-country capability and to train VNN/MC instructors, thus improving the technical training capability and quality of the VNN/MC.

(c) To support the up-grading of VNN medical and dental care in both quality and quantity, thereby enhancing combat effectiveness and, perhaps even more important, nation building by providing medical care for the Vietnamese people.

(d) To enhance the proper utilization of U.S.N. materials and assets transferred to VNN by providing qualified personnel through proper training and indoctrination.

(2) A total of 56 VNN junior officers will have completed the nine-week Special JFO Supply course at NSC Oakland, California by Aug 73. Plans have been developed for a similar course of instruction to be presented by the Supply Section, Navy Division, DAO, Saigon. Instructor cadre will be drawn from returning NSC Oakland VNN graduates. Instructional materials will be provided by NSC Oakland. This in-country training facility should eliminate the need for future Offshore Supply training at this level of instruction, with an estimated saving of \$110,250 over a five-year period.

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Electrician's Mate CL-B	E2
Medical Equipment Basic	E1
Language Instructor	E1
Orientation Tour/Environmental Control	03
Gunner's Mate CL-A, Phase I/II	E2
Operations Research/System Analysis PG MS	01
Naval Command College	01
Fire Control Technician CL-A, Phase I/II	E2
Observership Medical Officer (Ophthalmology)	01
Observership Medical Officer (Internal Medicine)	01

\*E, Enlisted, O, Officer

(7) Status of FY 73 VNN/MC Offshore training for 4th Quarter were as follows:

<u>Completed</u>	<u>In-Progress</u>	<u>Total</u>
10	76	86

(8) Problems encountered during the Quarter follow:

(a) Seven CONUS courses involving 14 spaces were cancelled due to the inability of the VNMC candidates to pass the English language requirement, continuous field maneuvers, and reduced VNMC capability to acquire English language training which is provided in garrison. VNMC is aware that continuous emphasis on in-country English language training is required in order to meet mandatory language requirements for off-shore training. Courses cancelled were:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>QUOTA</u>
Adv. Communications Officer	01

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(3) The Vietnamese Navy continues to need more qualified medical specialists and technicians. Inadequate numbers of well trained personnel, coupled with understaffing in some medical facilities, reduces the VNN capability to adequately treat all patients. Additional spaces have been programmed in the FY 74 program to meet these training needs beyond those previously programmed.

(4) A total of 408 VNN/MC personnel were programmed for FY 73 Offshore Training at a cost of \$925,000. Thru FY 73, 329 had been trained or were undergoing training at a cost of \$803,538. Programmed 5th Quarter FY 73 training (training commencing between July 1 and September 30 as a means of increasing course scheduling flexibility during 1st Quarter) should result in total programmed quotas and dollar costs being met. The FY 74 Offshore Training program will provide training for 222 personnel at a cost of \$727,047.

(5) Resources Management Training remains the major deficiency and the major priority of the Off-Shore training program. Increased numbers of trained personnel in the field of logistics are required to improve procurement, maintenance, and transportation of materials, facilities and personnel. Although the Vietnamese Navy is close to its projected maximum strength, the rapid expansion has resulted in increased demands for trained middle management personnel. Progress has been made, but additional training is necessary to increase the Vietnamese Navy junior officer's management/technical expertise.

(6) The following Offshore Training courses were attended by VNN personnel during 4th Quarter FY 73:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u> *
Misc Pacific Fleet Officer course (Weapons Package)	02
Diver Second Class	E2
OJT Supply	07
Special Junior Foreign Officer Supply (Adv. Student)	02
Special JFO Supply	054
Hull Technician CL-A, Phase I/II	E2
Internal Current Electrician's Class CL-B	E2



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Electrician's Mate CL-B	E2
Medical Equipment Basic	E1
Language Instructor	E1
Orientation Tour/Environmental Control	03
Gunner's Mate CL-A, Phase I/II	E2
Operations Research/System Analysis PG MS	01
Naval Command College	01
Fire Control Technician CL-A, Phase I/II	E2
Observership Medical Officer (Ophthalmology)	01
Observership Medical Officer (Internal Medicine)	01

\*E, Enlisted, O, Officer

(7) Status of FY 73 VNN/MC Offshore training for 4th Quarter were as follows:

<u>Completed</u>	<u>In-Progress</u>	<u>Total</u>
10	76	86

(8) Problems encountered during the Quarter follow:

(a) Seven CONUS courses involving 14 spaces were cancelled due to the inability of the VNMC candidates to pass the English language requirement, continuous field maneuvers, and reduced VNMC capability to acquire English language training which is provided in garrison. VNMC is aware that continuous emphasis on in-country English language training is required in order to meet mandatory language requirements for off-shore training. Courses cancelled were:

<u>NAME OF COURSE</u>	<u>QUOTA</u>
Adv. Communications Officer	01

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Hospital Corpsman	01
Pharmacy Technician	01
OJT MARCORPS CONUS (Staf Opns)	06
Field Artillery Off. Adv.	01
Naval Gunfire Liaison Off.	02
Naval Gunfire Air Spotter	02

(b) One VNN student failed diver training because of his inability to handle the heavy-weight diving gear. Establishment of more definitive physical criteria for such courses, and strict adherence to the requirements, has been recommended to preclude this type of training abort.

(c) The processing of students by the VNN has improved over that of prior months. Students are being identified earlier and their mission orders are being published sooner so that US processing can proceed on schedule. Continued emphasis is required.

## 7. (S) OPERATIONS:

### a. Coastal Surveillance System:

(1) VNN reported boarding 279,970 craft this quarter, resulting in 339 craft and 1324 persons being detained for various reasons.

(2) The readiness rate of the Coastal Radar Stations as reported by VNN Fleet Command averaged 67.8% for the quarter. This indicates a steadily decreasing availability of sites since January. Actions are being taken to correct the radar casualties. Total contacts detected during the quarter were 7,908, of which 5,176 were tracked and 3,327 identified. A total of 27 Filter King Exercises were conducted to test the radar surveillance system, of which 26 were reported Satisfactory.

(3) Operational Readiness: Operational Readiness rates developed by the Navy Division for the quarter were 62% for the Blue Water Fleet and 70% for the Brown craft that are in restricted availability (RAV) and regular overhaul (ROH).

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(4) A major accomplishment during April was the seizure of a Thai narcotics trawler loaded with purportedly the largest quantity of raw opium and other narcotics ever seized. This capture brought world-wide favorable publicity to the VNN and resulted in a significant increase in morale and esprit de corps.

## b. Riverine Forces:

(1) During the reporting period, VNN units were involved in 109 fire fights resulting in a total of 13 VNN personnel KIA, 85 VNN personnel WIA and damage to some 95 VNN river craft. All of the incidents were alleged to be enemy initiated. Reported enemy losses were: 46 KIA, 7 CIA, 8 junks, and a variety of weapons and ammunition captured.

(2) Continued improvement is being noted, particularly with regard to VNN-ARVN-VNAF cooperation and interaction. This improvement is most notable in the joint efforts to provide security for Mekong convoys bound for Phnom Penh. During the month of April, there were two regular and one special convoy escorted to the border. The first, TP-38, which departed Vung Tau on 5 April and suffered heavy losses before finally reaching Phnom Penh on 15 April after a combined ARVN-VNN-VNAF operation to sweep the enemy from the east bank of the river between Tan Chau and the border, eventually involved 57 VNN Riverine craft in escort duties. TP-39 departed Vung Tau on 21 April and was escorted by approximately 50 VNN craft from Tan Chau to the border, encountering much less resistance from the enemy. The special convoy, which consisted of a tug and one barge, departed Vung Tau on 26 April and made an uneventful transit to the border, escorted from Tan Chau by about 25 Riverine craft. Of particular note during the month was the increased interest and participation of all echelons of VNN command, when it was recognized that a major effort would be necessary to get the convoys safely to the border. During May and June there were seven convoys which made the transit. Due to intensive joint ARVN/VNAF/VNN clearing operations between Tan Chau and the border, there were no incidents on the RVN side of the border involving any of these convoys.

## 8. (S) SHORTFALLS:

a. Threats from KOMAR Gunboats and MIG Aircraft of the DRV.

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(1) The drawdown of US military assets in RVN and the South China Sea has resulted in serious reduction of U.S. capability to conduct VNN-oriented maritime air patrols against enemy trawler infiltration of the RVN coast. In addition, the NVN Navy has been provided with the fast, highly maneuverable KOMAR gunboat, equipped with the STYX missile, against which the VNN has no defense. Similarly, the VNN has no effective defense against attack by MIG aircraft. Effective and responsive cooperation and support by VNAF is necessary to ensure that the coastal surveillance system will provide a deterrent to infiltration attempts, as well as to ensure a measure of defense in the event of attack against VNN units by KOMAR's or MIG aircraft. The former can be attained by development and employment of an effective Visual Air Reconnaissance Search (VARS) capability and the latter by coordinated joint operations between VNAF jet aircraft and VNN surface units.

(2) The VNN has been endeavoring for some time to convince the RVNAF JGS of the importance of effective VNN/VNAF coordination in these areas, and to obtain upgrading of the relative priority of the VNAF VARS mission so that more suitable aircraft would be assigned. Presently the missions are being flown by O-1 and O-2 aircraft with little or no armament and a maximum operating range of 15 miles from the shoreline. Heavily armed C-119's which could operate at greater distances from land are necessary for effective support against the KOMAR threat to VNN blue water ships.

(3) As a result of VNN pressure, the JGS convened a meeting on 4 May 1973 to discuss measures to be taken. As of 4 July 1973 no concrete action had been taken either to upgrade the VARS capability or to ensure VNAF response with suitable jet aircraft to VNN requests for assistance. The DATT has prepared a talking paper for General Vien outlining the overall situation and requesting that early action be initiated to improve VARS support to the VNN Coastal Surveillance System and develop a coordinated VNN/VNAF capability to counter KOMAR/MIG attacks. Specifically, the following avenues of approach were recommended.

(a) Upgrade the priority of VNAF VARS missions and integrate them into the VNN Coastal Surveillance System.

(b) Direct joint training exercises to be held between VNAF and VNN to establish the tactics and

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capability to intercept and destroy attacking KOMAR gunboats.

(c) Ensure VNAF response with F-5 aircraft from Da Nang Air Base when required by VNN, either to conduct an actual interception or a training exercise.

## b. Newport Expansion

(1) Several field trips have been made by VNNSC and JGS representatives to locate suitable buildings for the proposed VNNSC expansion at Newport. Several buildings have been tentatively selected and the Chief of the Development/Planning Board is submitting requests to JGS to authorize reservation of these buildings for possible movement to Newport. If, and when, such authorization is received, engineering evaluations will be initiated.

(2) Other problems related to the Newport Expansion Master Plan have yet to be resolved. These include action on: security fencing; fire and water mains; storage sheds; and paving. All of these subjects are under discussion with a view to establishment of a firm schedule for those which can be completed with in-country resources.

## 9. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Current combat capabilities of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) are considered adequate to meet major mission requirements in both blue water and brown water combat environments. Overall VNN capability has increased due to additional time available for training of personnel and maintenance of equipment compared to the early stages of Cease Fire I. Increased confidence in their capabilities is also attributed to seizure of the Thai narcotics trawler and successful escort of several convoys in RVN without assistance from the U.S. Capability of coastal radar system to detect enemy infiltration has declined steadily during this same period. Continued progress toward self-sufficiency goals will be dependent first and foremost upon adequate levels of MAP/MASF funding support. Given this adequate level of support, the VNN is considered to have the wherewithal to overcome remaining deficiencies with a declining, although continuing level of managerial and technical consultive assistance from US DOD. Remaining deficiencies in almost every instance relate to the need

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to develop a stronger middle-manager group and to delegate greater authority and responsibility to subordinate echelons of commands.

b. Looking at the broad problem areas confronting the VNN, they would fall in the following descending order of magnitude:

(1) Inadequate pay scales for both military and GVN civil service personnel.

(2) Inadequate subsistence allowances to maintain required standards of food service aboard ships and bases.

(3) Shortage of middle management, financial management, manpower management, planning and programming talent.

(4) Shortage of technical skills and weakness of maintenance procedures.

(5) Lack of headquarters level engineering and design capability.

c. Looking at specific problem areas in the same manner:

(1) Declining readiness/performance of Coastal Radar System.

(2) Need for development of coordinated VNN-VNAF training and tactics to counter NVN KOMAR and MIG threat to VNN.

(3) Failure of VNN Shipyard to meet overhaul completion schedules.

(4) LSB/ISB overhaul completions lagging behind schedule by about 20%.

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through CHMAAG Taiwan.

## 4. (C) LOGISTICS:

The logistics posture of the VNMC continues to be satisfactory but with certain areas still requiring close coordination and surveillance. VNMC equipment records do not, in all cases, accurately reflect on-hand equipment held by subordinate units. During the month of June, an equipment inventory of VNMC units based in the Saigon area was completed. The inventory of equipment on hand and in use by units deployed in MR I had earlier been furnished to VNMC LSB. A program for reconciliation of these VNMC conducted inventories with those recorded in the data bank, i. e., Equipment Status Report (ESR) and Equipment Status Summary (ESS), is underway. Initial research and analysis in the reconciliation project indicate variances between US and VNMC records. In this regard, HQ VNMC has observed that the quantity of equipment printed in the ESR and ESS did not correspond to the "in use" status in the Division. Inasmuch as the HQ VNMC was wary of accepting the VNMC produced inventory and was concerned about the reliability and validity of the ESR/ESS as a reconciliation base document, various discussions and conferences between VNMC Supply Consultant and VNMC G-4 were held during the month of June. The initially observed discrepancies were jointly discussed by VNMC G-4 and VNMC Logistic Support Branch (LSB) representatives. It was agreed that in order for VNMC LSB to have valid documentation, from which to conduct reconciliation, HQ VNMC would dispatch a clarifying message to the Amphibious Support Battalion. The message, duly dispatched, requested that Amphibious Support Battalion develop a complete and accurate list of Division equipment. This list is to be furnished to the VNMC LSB by 10 July 1973. Each month the Amphibious Support Battalion of the VNMC should submit to the VNMC LSB (with copy to HQ VNMC) an equipment differential report which provides an update of differences in on hand and issued from previous month. In this manner, the ESR and ESS can be kept in a state of reliability. HQ VNMC, in its 20 June dispatch, has requested Amphibious Support Battalion to provide a firm and accurate inventory by 10 July and subsequent monthly updates on the 15th of each succeeding month. HQ VNMC will attempt to

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complete the reconciliation of VNMC and US Equipment Records. This will include machine programming and required key punching of each line to update the ESR and ESS. Target for completion is 30 August 1973.

## 5. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

a. Operations. The Vietnamese Marine Division's area of operations was expanded during this reporting period.

### b. Training.

(1) The Vietnamese Marine Division continues its scheduling of individual and unit training in forward areas. Approximately two-thirds of the infantry training battalions had either completed or entered the two-week course at Dong Da Training Center in Phu Bai by the end of June 1973.

(2) Formal in-country training completed during May 1973 is as follows:

<u>Training Courses</u>	<u>No. of Students</u>
Transportation	42
Communications (Signal)	56
Logistics	10
Adjutant General	7
Quartermaster	6
Engineer	3
Ordnance	6
Military Police	2
Miscellaneous	37
TOTAL	169

### c. Other Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) Training:

(1) Officer Training. Seventy-eight officers attended the Officer Special Refresher Course at the VNMC Training Center and 18 officers received training at various RVNAF schools. Training at RVNAF schools was in the following areas: Communications, Supply, Adjutant General, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Artillery and Jungle Warfare/Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol. Since the officer training at VNMC Training Center was projected at 25, the figure 78 indicates

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A quantitative upgrading of VNMC officer training, and the training of the additional 18 for a total of 96 trained lends credence to this premise.

(2) EM Training. The total number of EM trained at VNMC Training Center was 1,365 as opposed to 2,553 projected. The training of NCO's, however, exceeded that which was expected - 230 as opposed to 150. The greatest "shortfall" was in the training of personnel entering the VNMC (recruits plus Army transferees). Whereas the projected number was 2,000 the actual number was 1,039 - about 52%. It is believed that a stabilizing combat situation has brought this about despite the continuing heavy operational commitment of VNMC. Other training conducted at the VNMC Training Center was: NCO Special Refresher Course, Basic NCO Course, and re-indoctrination of Deserters. In addition, 207 EM's received training at various RVNAF schools. The training included that listed above for officers plus Motor Transportation, Engineer, Band, Military Police, Administration and Finance, Military Intelligence and Medical.

(3) See Chapter 7 for overview of VNN/VNMC In-Country Training.

d. Names of candidates for the Amphibious warfare course and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College commencing in August 1973 at MCDEC Quantico, Virginia have been provided by the VNMC to the Navy Training Section (AOSOP-OT). The latter in turn has submitted the names to MCDEC for approval. See Chapter 7 for more detailed discussions of VNMC Off-shore Training Program.

e. To date there has been no planned amphibious training carried out between the VNN and VNMC.

## 6. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. The current status of the VNMC LVT-5 program involves a simple daily maintenance engine run-up schedule. Until spare parts support can be obtained the VNMC will not have a capability for amphibious assault training.

b. Maintenance capability of the Maintenance Company, Amphibious Support Battalion requires upgrading. There has been no indication of any significant

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change or progress made in the maintenance capability or responsiveness of the Maintenance Company, Amphibious Support Battalion. Three new ordnance mechanics have been assigned to the Company and two other men have returned from an ordnance school in Saigon. This still leaves the Maintenance Company 37 specialists short of the authorized TO&E of 215 personnel. The fact that many of the specialists assigned are inadequately trained intensifies the total problem. An evaluation of excessive engine changes indicates a need on the part of Maintenance Company personnel to institute better controls and criteria for determining final requirements for engine replacements. The VNMC will conduct a complete review and updating in all areas of equipment maintenance. Progress has been very limited. The problems are complex and require continued efforts in many directions. An in-depth probe will be conducted into the maintenance procedures, personnel requirements, shop equipment SOP's (receipt, inspection, repair/overhaul and re-issue of vehicles and equipment), excessive engine changes and deadlined equipment including parts support.

c. The majority of the VNMC's residual problems relate to equipment matters and are capable of being corrected by the VNMC itself with minimum assistance. With the decision that VNMC LVTP-5 amphibious tractors would not be replaced in the foreseeable future with LVTP-7 craft, the development of a true amphibious capability requires the VNMC to obtain additional training and a minimum level of spare parts support for its LVTP-5's. Attaining this objective also requires the initiation of a program for joint VNN/VNMC amphibious training.

d. Other deficiencies that must be overcome by the VNMC include an upgrading of maintenance capability (tasked to perform 75 percent of VNMC third echelon maintenance, ARVN has provided VNMC with sufficient personnel to accomplish only 50 percent), arranging assured transportation support for the 20 percent of its units that cannot be transported by organic assets, and filling shortages in the ranks of company grade officers and NCO small unit leaders.

## 7. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

a. The VNMC has instituted excellent command and staff procedures and directives to implement General LAN's policy of emphasizing logistics readiness. They do,

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however, have serious problems at the middle-manager level of action. Lack of experience, lack of skilled technicians, and an understrength officer level in the middle grades, are examples of these problems. This, coupled with the continued deployment of the majority of the VNMC strength in MR 1, tends to hamper an otherwise excellent logistical readiness awareness.

b. Morale and discipline of the VNMC remains very high even though the majority of the end-strength is in a deployed, defensive status in MR 1. Training of battalions, on a rotation-basis, has continued to occupy the major efforts of the Division. Plans are continuing for a battalion-size amphibious training program with the VNN in August.

c. The VNMC Division is considered to be one of the most combat-ready units in RVNAF. Enemy contacts during the period have been minor, but continue.

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## CHAPTER 9

### TERRITORIAL FORCES

#### 1. (C) REGIONAL FORCE/POPULAR FORCE (RF/PF):

a. This chapter presents a cursory view of the RVN Territorial Forces (TF); their organization, mission, employment and progress. From 1964 until 28 March 73 the Military Assistance Program provided US military and civilian advisors at all levels from district (sub-sector) to national level in Saigon, who were in a position to give accurate and impartial assessments of RF/PF progress and development. Since the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) and advisory personnel have inactivated, this assessment will be based upon a combination of RVNAF and the few remaining US field personnel reports on whether the RF/PF have effectively adjusted to the cease fire situation; militarily, politically and psychologically.

b. General Background (RF/PF). The RF/PF collectively constitute more than half of the manpower in the RVNAF. The Regional Force is province/district oriented while the Popular Force is village/hamlet oriented. The principal objective of RF/PF is to provide adequate security to the rural populace so that the ARVN can conduct operations against mainline enemy units.

#### 2. (C) REGIONAL FORCES:

a. In 1970 the RF officially became an integral part of the ARVN. Its present strength is over 300,000 soldiers.

(FIGURE 1)

b. Organization: RF units are assigned to the Province Chief (Sector Commander). In addition to the RF Company with a TO&E strength of 119 RF soldiers, the RF system now includes brigade level Sector Tactical Command Post (STCP-2 to 5 battalions), RF battalions (4 companies) and RF company groups (3-5 companies). These elements are normally subordinate to the Sector Commander.

c. Mission: The mission of the RF is to maintain security and conduct mobile offensive operations against enemy main force and local force units. JGS & MR Command emphasis is placed on intelligence, reconnaissance,

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CURRENT STRENGTH STATUS OF REGIONAL FORCES

DESIGNATION OF MR'S	A U T H				A S S I G N E D				U N I T S		
	OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	OFF	NCO	EM	TOTAL	Compa-nies	Sep Com-panies	BNs
MR1	3692	8872	31340	43904	2862	7529	27718	38109	200	60	50
MR2	5989	14481	50821	71291	4953	11742	44353	61048	378	92	82
MR3	5901	14482	51963	72346	5031	12504	48855	66390	336	95	84
MR4	9473	23331	84007	116811	7241	18115	77028	102384	516	125	144
CENTRAL AGENCY	1382	2398	2161	5941	340	1050	1447	2837			
TOTAL OF ORGANIZATIONS include 128 OFF + 281 NCO's + 249 EM = 658 scheduled)	26565	63845	220541	310951	20427	50940	199401	270768	1430	372	360
REPLACEMENT	1242	2312	10294	13848	1106	2464	29449	33019			
GRAND TOTAL	27807	66157	230835	324799	21533	53404	228850	303787	1430	372	360

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Figure 1

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and analysis of enemy movements to be used as a basis for attacking the enemy when he is moving or to organize nighttime patrols and ambushes.

d. Ceasefire Situation: Under the current ceasefire situation, the Chief/JGS has directed that the RF place increased emphasis on maintaining a strong defensive posture in all areas under GVN control, and on borders of contested areas where it is either known or suspected that the enemy is infiltrating, conducting logistics operations, or conducting agent intelligence operations. However; in reality, Regional/Provincial overviews indicate that these directives on the whole or in part are ignored. Not infrequently, TF regard their co-location with population as a license to carouse; some provinces indicate they misuse their mobility and go where the enemy is not. Many of the TF are interpreting their operations orders loosely, and are sometimes choosing their specific positions more for personal comfort than for operational effectiveness. Prior to the ceasefire they dared not stay away from designated ambush sites for fear of becoming victims of enemy harassments and interdiction fire.

e. Concepts of Employment: Employment is normally in the home sector. However, frequently on the order of the Military Region Commander, RF elements are employed as needed elsewhere in their MR to maintain security and support the ARVN.

(1) The Corps Commander of MR 2, it appears, more frequently than not, places the Territorial Forces under the operational control of the Senior ARVN Commander in Province, thus removing the RF from their customary role of manning outposts, preventing VC land grabbing, proselyting villagers, and infiltration of enemy forces into rural populated areas.

(2) In addition to its primary operational role, the RF are often tasked with providing training for the People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) and supporting the National Police Protection of the People Against Terrorism (POPAT) campaign plans.

### 3. (C) POPULAR FORCES (PF)

a. The PF have a background and history of development similar to the RF and has grown to a strength of approximately 212,000 troops.

(Figure 2)

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CURRENT STRENGTH STATUS OF POPULAR FORCES

DESIGNATION OF MR'S	A U T H				A S S I G N E D				PLATOONS
	PLT LEADER	SQUAD LEADER	PF	TOTAL	PLT LEADER	SQUAD LEADER	PF	TOTAL	
MR1	1275	3825	31875	36975	1154	3321	29163	33638	1275
MR2	1704	5112	42600	49416	1583	4525	38923	45031	1704
MR3	1230	3690	30750	35670	1169	3391	28683	33243	1230
MR4	3067	9201	76675	88943	2968	8593	74165	85726	3067
SCHEDULED	23	69	575	667					23
TOTAL OF ORGANI- ZATION	7299	21897	182475	211671	6874	19830	170934	197638	7299
REPLACEMENT			11730	11730	244	898	15954	17096	
GRAND TOTAL	7299	21897	194205	223401 x	7118	20728	186888	214734	7299

(x) Effective 1 May 1973, the authorized strength of the PF was reduced from 223,401 to 206,001 to bring the RVNAF Force structure in line with the agreed strength of 1.1 million. The means that PF was reduced by 600 PF Platoon, or approx 17,000 men.

Figure 2

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b. Organization: The only unit organization in the PF is the 29-man rifle platoon. Their mission to defend the village/hamlet periphery to prevent VC infiltration, to protect resources, lines of communication, and installations has been limited. Their effectiveness differs from Province to Province and performance varies from satisfactory to poor. However, Provincial overviews, in general, point up an overall decline in performance since the ceasefire. For example, in MR 4, the PF performance reached an all-time high during the 1972 offensive, where in Dinh Tuong seven RF battalions and 23 PF platoons were in a fully mobile role, conducting air, ground and water borne operations with professional flair. By GVN directive, the same units are today more static, only engaging in close-in security activities around population centers and rarely engaging the enemy. In An Xuyen, reports indicate that outposts often have only one man on duty and, on one occasion, one was overrun with only three men inside. In Dinh Tuong, PF have been known to evacuate their AOs even without the slightest enemy pressure and reportedly returned to their district headquarters as a group. There are similar reports in other regions.

c. Command and Control. PF platoons are under OPCON of the village chief who generally delegates this authority to the Hamlet Chief.

## 4. (C) EQUIPMENT STATUS AND MAINTENANCE:

a. RF/PF operations depends on the adequacy of their logistical, equipment and maintenance support. Since the ceasefire, numerous criticisms of the administrative and logistical inadequacies in refurbishing combat losses of unit and personnel equipment have been reported and maintenance of unit equipment; i.e., communication, transportation and weapons, has also become a serious problem.

b. Commanders have issued necessary maintenance instructions, but maintenance inspections are infrequent and superficial with little evidence of action taken by subordinate unit commanders to implement the instructions.

## 5. (U) LOGISTICS:

a. The Territorial Forces Logistics System is an extension of the RVNAF Logistics System and follows the same procedures as the ARMY Logistics Command.

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(FIGURE 3, 4)

b. Other Regional/Provincial overviews indicate that unit-for-unit and man-for-man, the RF/PF units have performed more continuous operational duty than the ARVN, yet it appears the Territorial Forces continue to get a very low logistical priority. Because of their continuous employment, more equipment is worn out or destroyed than in units that seldom engage the enemy. The magnitude of these equipment shortages, alone, indicates the cumulative effect of poor logistical and maintenance support to the Territorial Forces and the consequent decline in their tactical capabilities. In MR 2, Pleiku Province alone reported several thousand pieces of equipment from 59 unreplaced line items i.e., 245 radios, 638 M16 rifles 487 carbines, and twelve 2-1/2 ton trucks short.

c. Another logistical problem affecting RF tactical performance, as well as morale, is an order from the JGS withdrawing the monthly rice ration. Each RF is now authorized 1700 piasters per month in lieu of the rice. This method makes logistics simpler and less expensive to the GVN; however, the money allotted is not commensurate with inflated prices, e.g., one 48 kilo bag of rice costs approximately 5000 piasters. PF also lost their rice supplement effective 1 July 1973, and it was replaced by 25 piasters per man each day for a total of 750 piasters each month as long as he is on outpost duty. He receives 20 piasters per day when at his home station.

d. SLSC cannot draw rice allowances until after the end of the month; it also may not purchase rice for issue to units on operations unless the operations will last 15 days or more. Consequently, the troops in the field often go without field rations and take or steal rice from the rural population in order to survive. The problem of troop misbehavior has been exhaustively documented in the international press and by former MACV Advisory personnel over a decade of intimate involvement with RVNAF, and is so widespread that specific examples or troops involved should need no further amplification.

e. In the past, an indigenous field ration, consisting of dehydrated rice, salt, and dry fish was provided to the soldier. These rations are still available, but when issued to the soldier he loses his monthly rice ration, imposing an unacceptable hardship on his family. In effect, his salary lasts about one

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
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Figure (3)

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Figure 4

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week of the pay period.

## 7. (C) TRAINING:

a. The Central Training Command (CTC), under the JGS, is responsible for standardizing and conducting training for all military forces.

(FIGURES 6 AND 7)

b. In addition to Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Infantry Training (AIT) courses required for all military forces; there is also a wide range of training courses available to the RF/PF officers and NCO's to qualify them for leadership roles or to further improve officers and NCO's who have already had command experience.

c. RF/PF units undergo 24 hours of in-place training each month, although required to do so by JGS/CTC Directive 300-24, 1 Dec 70. Normally, RF/PF units are allowed to stand down from operational missions to conduct training and maintenance of equipment up to three days per month.

d. A major shortcoming of the sector and sub-sector commanders is their infrequent readiness inspections to determine unit's reaction to orders, knowledge of defense plans, training, reaction time, condition of weapons and equipment.


e. CTC/JGS reportedly conducts periodic inspections of training centers and schools to monitor and report on quality and status of training. Following is the results of CTC qualitative scoring of overall training at NTC's during CY 1972 (year-end report) and 1st quarter of CY 1973. Scheduled recruit training at the 10 NTC's for 287,750 ARVN/RF/PF soldiers but they actually trained 235,761. The JGS rated this fair to good and considered the total number of graduate recruits adequate to replenish the heavy combat losses suffered by ARVN/RF/PF during the 1972 general offensive. During the same period the NTC's trained a total of 43,331 PF recruits, while only 42,999 were scheduled. Whereas NTC's results in meeting established quotas in recruit training are impressive, there was a noticeable degradation in the areas of ARVN/RF/PF leadership training. This indicates a reluctance on the part of unit commanders to release

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**SERVICE SCHOOLS**



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Figure (6)

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Figure (7)

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release their company grade officers and NCO's for extended periods of time to attend NTC courses because of combat operational requirements.

F. During CY 73, CTC/JGC has scheduled a total of over 200,000 ARVN/RG/PF recruits for training, a substantial reduction from CY 1972 figures. Since 1 Jun 73, the NCO's have graduated a total of over 80,000 recruits, which is slightly less than half that were programmed. There is strong reason to believe that the JGS is making a concerted effort to increase RF recruit quotas to insure authorized strength of 324,799 by the end of this CY. Strong emphasis has been placed on the JGS/CTC to train increased numbers of PF to be integrated into under-strength RF units so as to bring them up to strength. Toward this end, the NTC's have trained 9,068 PF versus 1,196 scheduled during the first quarter of CY 73 and will match this figure during the second quarter.

## 8. (C) DESERTIONS:

a. Desertion and absenteeism among the Territorial Forces are current problems. Although there are numerous contributing factors, it is believed that the major causes are:


- (1) Low pay and subsistence allowance.
- (2) Operating for extended periods of time outside of their provincial boundaries, causing logistical support and resupply problems.
- (3) Separation from family places an additional strain on their already meager pay and subsistence allowance.
- (4) The threat of being integrated into ARVN. Khanh Hoa province reported that 52 desertions occurred among 100 soldiers levied for transfer to ARVN. Reportedly, they drift home, lay low for a while, then rejoin local force units under assumed names.
- (5) Moonlighting to supplement their pay and allowances. Absenteeism for this reason appears to be widespread and has varying degrees of influence on their combat effectiveness. Inspection visits to TF units reflect that rarely are more than 50-75 percent of the troops present for duty.

(Figure 8)

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Figure (8)

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## 9. (C) RF/PF RECRUITMENT:

a. The DCSPER/JGS has staff responsibility to manage RF/PF recruiting according to the General Mobilization Law of 1968 as amended by Presidential Decree 02, 8 July 1972. Those volunteers for RF units report to the nearest Recruitment and Induction Center (R&I) for processing into a National Training Center. J1/JGS levies each MR with a quarterly recruiting quota, based on anticipated personnel requirements.

b. RF may recruit personnel of ages 16 to 45 and PF from 16 to 48 but usually do not get the 18-20 year group that are subject to ARVN draft.

c. The PF recruiting program was terminated on 1 May 1973, in an effort to reduce their current authorized strength by 600 PF platoons (17,000 soldiers) which are to be integrated into the RF units to bring them to their authorized CY 1974, strength of 324,799. Prior to this termination, the recruitment program met their quotas easily because of the appeal of being assigned in their own sector with substantial numbers being assigned to their subsector.

## 10. (C) MORALE:

a. The overall morale of the RF/PF appears barely satisfactory at the moment. There are indications of deterioration, especially among those soldiers that are operating for extended periods of time outside of their provincial boundaries, as it places an additional strain on his already meager salary and subsistence allowances.

b. Evidence of continued deterioration of troop morale because of low salary and subsistence allowance was reported recently when the VC enticed a 15-man PF outpost in Trung Hien Village, Vung Liem District, Vinh Long Province to defect with their weapons. Eye witnesses to the event say the VC approached the outpost and asked the defenders to come out and have a drink and talk over their pay and supply problems. After a while, the entire unit left the outpost with the VC.

## 11. (C) SHORTFALLS:

a. Regional/Provincial overviews in general point out the continuing logistical and resupply problems in

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support of the RF/PF. In MR 2 alone the support has fallen off substantially since the ceasefire, thereby resulting in a serious shortage of critical supplies. These shortages have had a deleterious effect on RF combat effectiveness; a 65 percent cutback on B-rations for use on operations has already reduced the frequency and range of patrols. There has also been a 50 percent decrease in issuances of general quartermaster supplies; perennial shortages of trucks, 55 percent of all vehicles are deadlined because of a shortage of spare parts; 50 percent decrease in issue of gasoline and PRC-25 radios, Claymore mines, arms and equipment, and barrier materials. The list of shortages is long and extensive and has had a very serious effect on their overall combat effectiveness.

b. Although RF/PF unit strength figures vary countrywide, the present for duty strength of the forces averages 50 to 75 percent of their actual assigned strength. This is believed to be the direct result of the high rate of desertion and absenteeism due to moonlighting by the troops to supplement their salary. These problems, coupled with poor leadership and the RF/ARVN integration program, are expected to further deplete their strength and combat readiness state. Since provinces rely heavily on Territorial Forces to defend sensitive installations, LOC's, airfields and ammunition dumps, this could prove disastrous in the event of any all-out enemy offensive.

c. The RF/PF are also plagued with serious maintenance problems, and based on Regional/Provincial overviews, these problems are longstanding and have resulted in gradual attrition of essential equipment that is never replaced. The deterioration of the maintenance system has also taken its toll of equipment. The lack of command and lower level leadership emphasis on an effective preventive maintenance program, failure of units to submit or process requisitions, and the theft and corruption in the logistical system prevents supplies from reaching the requesting unit. In addition, the RF/PF have never enjoyed the same degree of support as that given to ARVN units.

d. The field commanders do not emphasize leadership and motivation training. They are reluctant to release any of their forces for leadership training in view of current shortage of present for duty strengths. This problem becomes more acute in highly contested areas

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where RF/PF forces are hard pressed by the enemy. Secondly, the selection of officers and senior NCO's for schooling is based on financial, family or political considerations rather than the individual's leadership potential.

e. The Regional/Popular Forces soldier is realizing for the first time what fighting a war with limited resources means. In pre-ceasefire days, helicopter support was plentiful, airlifting Americans, their counterparts plus critically needed ammo, weapons, water, and foodstuff to the remote outposts. Since the ceasefire, however, logistical as well as combat type aircraft support is much more limited and many times not available. The Corps Commander now must personally authorize all air combat support requests and his approval is difficult to obtain.

## 12. (C) SUMMARY:

a. The most significant problem emerging from the regional assessments of RF/PF is the pressing need for improved leadership throughout the Territorial Forces System. Some areas of importance to be addressed which could enhance the RF/PF leadership are:

(1) Field commanders increasing training quotas at the NTC's and service schools, for company grade officers and NCO's for the RF, and platoon leaders and squad leaders for the PF. Their overall battlefield performance against the enemy since the ceasefire has been rated from good to poor and reflects significant command weaknesses.

(2) Increased emphasis on command and control elements to conduct frequent unit refresher training at the NTC's, Divisional Area Training Facilities, and in-place training within the sector AO. Specific guidance is absolutely necessary for field commanders who are not exercising their training responsibilities.

(3) Improving the promotion system for lower echelon leaders, officers and NCO's. As an example, the most current RF strength reflects that while their assigned strength is within 50-70% of their authorized strength, this force continues to be plagued by a shortage of authorized officers and NCO's; 23% and 19% respectively. A more equitable promotion of

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those officers/NCO's who have already demonstrated their leadership abilities could do much to improve this important and necessary element of the RVNAF.

b. The need exists for a complete audit of the ARVN logistical, resupply, transportation and communication support for the Territorial Forces. It has become increasingly apparent that more command emphasis and follow-up action is required by field commanders to insure that RF/PF receive the same degree of logistical support that ARVN units presently enjoy. Frequent deployments of the RF/PF outside their normal base areas have been largely responsible for the general breakdown in this support.

c. There is no question that the RF/PF represents a significant fighting force for South Vietnam. Their principal and legitimate role of defending the rural populace insures that the GVN can successfully carry out the national policies of reconstruction, village self development, self defense and self government. The continuous and increasing deployment by field commanders of RF/PF forces away from their bases areas for the principal purpose of defending ARVN perimeters, LOC's, roads and bridges, etc., has caused extensive deterioration in the RF/PF program. The absence of adequate Territorial Forces in contested or high impact areas could conceivably cause numerous local inhabitants to abandon their villages and hamlets and move to more secure areas thereby surrendering these villages and hamlets to the enemy without a struggle. This should be a matter of primary concern to the GVN in their efforts to maintain the image of being the true representative of the entire population of South Vietnam.

d. The Chief, JGS, has directed increased emphasis be placed on upgrading the Territorial forces to bring them in line with their ARVN contemporaries.

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## CHAPTER 10

### RVNAF PROGRAMS, PLANS AND MORALE

1. (U) This chapter contains information relating to all military services. Topics are unrelated and include the following:

- a. In-Country English Language Training Programs (ELTP).
- b. Central Training Command/DAO Technical Translation Branch
- c. Lines of Communication (LOC's) Highway Program
- d. Military Construction (MILCON)
- e. Dependent Shelter Program
- f. RVNAF Retirement Plan
- g. Reduction Program Bulk Petroleum
- h. RVNAF Morale

2. (C) IN-COUNTRY ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING PROGRAM (ELTP):

a. Intensive English Language Training Program

(1) The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS), Saigon entered 604 students from all three services into the English Language Training Program (ELTP) during the 4th Quarter FY73. Classes were held 34 hours per week, six hours per day, Monday through Friday and four hours on Saturday. The average training load in this quarter was 900.

(2) In June the enrollment procedures at Armed Forces Language School (AFLS) were modified to permit more enrollments throughout FY74 and to assist the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) language training program to successfully meet the increased requirements of the FY74 Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). The joint VNAF-AFLS policy decisions of 8 and 23 January 1973 resulted in a severe enrollment burden at Nha Trang.

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In early June a conference with VNAF, Central Training Command (CTC), and the DAO Training Management Branch was held and the following reforms immediately implemented:

(a) AFLS (Saigon) immediately accepted 146 air cadets from the VNAF Language School (Nha Trang) who had made at least 30 on the English Language Screening Test (ELS). (Previous entry requirement into AFLS was 40). These students are temporarily supported logistically by VNAF in Saigon and started language training on 11 June 1973.

(b) An additional 422 cadets were tested for the 30 ELS in mid-June and 50% passed. Those with 30 ELS scores or more will be transferred to Saigon during July 1973 for language training. Previously the limiting factor was VNAF's inability to mess and billet the students. However, in July the AFLS will provide mess and billets in the renovated DAO Annex area (57 buildings were made available following US redeployments).

(c) An additional 469 prospective students were tested in late June. The top students will enter AFLS, Saigon. The same billeting/messing constraint will exist until July 1973. The Chief, CTC, has directed that the top scoring trainees of this group be admitted to AFLS and that the school increase its operative capacity to 1,600. The maximum duration of the training cycle is 18 weeks, but could be shorter based on student proficiency. In all cases it is geared to the requirements of the students. If this increased training capability is maintained, it should help to insure that VNAF meets its FY74 SATP CONUS requirements.

b. Intensive ELTP Data (April, May, June):

Number of Students

Army	337	(AFLS)
Navy	126	(AFLS)
Air Force	494	(AFLS)
Air Force	458	(VNAFLS)

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## Number of Lab Positions:

VNMA	110
POLWAR	26
JMS-VT	60
JMS-P	40

### d. Accomplishments:

(1) Defense Language Institute (DLI) training specialists continue to provide in-service training (IST) on a weekly basis to the host-country personnel. This instruction was centered on correcting English language areas that are particularly difficult for Vietnamese. As a result, the English Language Department of AFLS is improving the instructional level by placing increased emphasis on the following classroom management activities:

(a) Introduction of an increased amount of fluency drills, emphasizing stress, rhythm, and intonation.

(b) A more frequent use of selected readings, which are programmed as an out of class library assignment.

(c) The introduction and use of an advanced communication skills test, emphasizing structure and two-word verbs.

(d) Production of lesson/test tape materials to complement the review POI innovations.

(2) DLI-LTD personnel, working with AFLS personnel, continued to monitor and evaluate the host-country English language training program (ELTP). The instructor classroom performance was given special emphasis by providing detailed critique and related in-service training for the individual instructor. Classroom evaluations are used to organize teacher in-service training sessions geared to maintain/improve faculty language proficiency.

(3) Number of Students Eliminated: 9; Students in continuation status: 25.

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(2) Number of Lab Positions:

AFLS	320
VNAFLS	195

(3) Number of ECL Tests:

AFLS	918
VNAFLS	0

(Since October 1972, all offshore ECL testing is carried out at the AFLS, Saigon by direction of CTC. HQ VNAF ordered the VNAFLS to comply with this directive).

(4) Number of Students Sent to DLIEL (Lackland AFB, Texas):

ARMY	8
Navy	3
Air Force	82

(5) Number of Other Students Sent Direct Entry to CONUS:

Army	40
Navy	38
Air Force	60

(6) Total Sent to the US for Training: 231

c. Non-Intensive ELTP:

(1) There are four Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces academies which have non-intensive ELTP's. The schools and locations are: 1/ The Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA), Dalat; 2/ The Political Warfare College (POLWAR), Dalat; 3/ The Junior Military School (JMS-VT); and 4/ The Junior Military School (JMS-P), Pleiku.

(2) Non-Intensive ELTP Data:

(a) Number of Students:

VNMA	547
POLWAR	165
JMS-VT	1345
JMS-P	382

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## Number of Lab Positions:

VNMA	110
POLWAR	26
JMS-VT	60
JMS-P	40

### d. Accomplishments:

(1) Defense Language Institute (DLI) training specialists continue to provide in-service training (IST) on a weekly basis to the host-country personnel. This instruction was centered on correcting English language areas that are particularly difficult for Vietnamese. As a result, the English Language Department of AFLS is improving the instructional level by placing increased emphasis on the following classroom management activities:

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(3) Number of Students Eliminated: 9; Students in continuation status: 25.

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(4) The AFLS Library is undergoing an expansion of its facilities. This project is necessary to provide adequate shelving for the 3,500 (English Language) volume library which was provided through MASF or MAP.

e. Conclusion:

The Armed Forces Language School continues to meet or exceed all requirements and goals. The primary concern during this quarter has been the question of relieving the huge enrollment load at the Nha Trang LTP and providing the assistance necessary for the VNAF language training program to successfully meet its FY74 SATP off-shore commitments. In this regard, actions already implemented will substantially support both schools' efforts to fully implement the 1974 SATP. The use of joint DLI-Vietnamese academic program evaluations has greatly assisted in identifying weak areas and resulted in implementing or recommending additional enrichment-upgrade programs. This major emphasis on quality of instruction has been a continuing priority. Inspections, student output, and DLI-Vietnamese military staff evaluations indicate that the improvement and modernization efforts of the school has been and continues to be a success.

3. (C) CENTRAL TRAINING COMMAND/DAO TECHNICAL TRANSLATION BRANCH (TTB):

a. Since its founding in 1955, the TTB has provided continuing translation support to the RVNAF. Primarily structured for the translation of Army, Navy, and Air Force Field and Technical manuals, the military expertise of the TTB translators and typists cannot be matched for accuracy, speed or cost. Translation production in the past five years has increased more than 100 percent. Currently, at the TTB it is possible to have a moderate size technical manual translated within a 24 hour period.

b. The TTB is the only US funded group which translates US field and technical manuals into Vietnamese for the JGS, Central Training Command. TTB translators and illustrators are capable of translating, with ease, 2000 pages per month and preparing a similar number of camera

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master pages containing the accompanying artwork and illustrations. Personnel resources are 107 local nationals with an O&M Budget of \$103,550 for FY73. A budget of \$100,672 is forecasted for nine months of FY74. Several other technical translation attempts have been made by American and Vietnamese organizations, but their results have been sub-standard or slow. Alternate means of supplying RVNAF with translated publications have also been explored. Contractor proposals have been rejected due to the cost involved and the quality of the finished product. TTB's average cost per publication of \$400 for translation and preparation for printing remains the most cost-effective way to provide translation services. Contractor proposals have often been 10 to 20 times the TTB cost.

c. The RVNAF Publications Review Board (PRB) subject to Training Management Section (DAO) veto, determines annual translation and printing requirements and establishes priorities based on workload, capabilities and funding for TTB. The TTB is responsive to translation/printing requirements of this board which is chaired by the Chief of the Central Training Command, with members from CTC, Central Logistics Command, J-6, VNAF and VNN. The board chairman also determines where a publication is to be printed, i.e., in-country by civilian/military or Subic Bay. The RVNAF Publications Review Board had forecast in January the need for TTB to translate 226 publications during calendar year 1973. Workload status as of 30 June 73 is as follows:

Translations required (CY73):	226
Translations in progress:	102
Translations sent to PRB:	91
Publications reviewed by PRB and returned to TTB for printing:	59
Translations in progress of being reviewed by PRB members 15 Mar 73:	329
Translations in progress of being reviewed by PRB members 30 Jun 73:	337
Publications sent to offshore printing:	67
Publications sent to VN printing:	24

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## (4) MR-4:

Divisions	2
Regiments	13
Combat Personnel	15-20,000
Guerrilla	8-10,000
Admin Services	6-8,000
Total Personnel	29-38,000

## (5) Total In-Country Strength:

Divisions	13
Regiments	60
Combat Personnel	107-132,000
Guerrilla	20-34,000
Admin Services	60-75,000
Total In-Country	187-241,000

## 8. (S) ARTILLERY THREAT:

a. The appearance of 122mm and 130mm field guns in the Cam Lo and Hiep Duc areas of MR 1 and Kontum Province in MR 2 and the detected deployment to MR 3 has led to some concern about the threat these guns pose populated areas within South Vietnam. Based upon aerial reconnaissance of road construction and infiltration routes, RVNAF has assessed the potential threat that these weapons pose to Pleiku City in MR 2 and the Tay Ninh and Bien Hoa/Saigon areas of MR 3.

b. Concerning the threat in the vicinity of Pleiku City, the enemy currently has or could gain access to three areas, all of which are within 25 km of the city. These areas can be reached and resupplied via several existing routes. Area 1 is in the vicinity of Plei Mrong on the Pleiku/Kontum border and is accessible to the enemy via Routes 110, 617, 511 and secondary Route 613 from the tri-border area. Areas 2 and 3 northwest and southwest of Thanh An, respectively, are terminals for a second system, which includes Routes 615, 567, and 19 from the Khmer and the tri-border areas. Most of these routes will support vehicular traffic year-round.

c. In MR 3, potential 122/130 targets in the Tay Ninh and Saigon/Bien Hoa areas would be within range of field guns firing from five areas. Access to these areas could be gained via several known infiltration routes. In the vicinity of Tay Ninh, area 1 located east of base

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b. Of the 4,063 km comprising the LOC, 659 km were assigned to the Vietnamese Army (ARVN) Corps of Engineers for accomplishment. This program began in the fall of 1969 and is scheduled for completion in December 1975. As of 1 June 1973, ARVN has completed 344 km with 315 km still to be completed. Within the LOC Program, ARVN has also completed 8,341 meters of the 11,476 meters of bridge construction assigned. The roads in the LOC are not only vital to the Nation's security, but are also vital to the country's economic well being.

c. Dynalectron, a US invited contractor, provides the necessary maintenance on the 560 (480 pieces of commercial highway equipment and 80 pieces of equipment non-standard to the ARVN but standard to the US Army) pieces of heavy engineer construction equipment and parts for the commercial equipment used in the program. Daniel, Mann, Johnson and Mendenhall (DMJM), a USAID contractor, provides the necessary technical assistance. DMJM has prepared a two month highway design course that will provide highway design capability to local engineers to complement their work on the ARVN-LOC Program.

d. The National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) has not been able to supply needed parts. There is a serious shortage of quarry expendables. A 225 ton/hour Pioneer rock crusher has been deadlined for parts for more than one year. NMMA is responsible to supply the parts for the ARVN's TOE plus the 80 pieces of construction equipment, standard to the US Army but non-standard to ARVN. Dynalectron is much more successful supporting the 480 pieces of commercial equipment and the results are a very low deadline rate. It will be proposed that Dynalectron also supply parts support for the non-standard to ARVN equipment.

## 5. (C) MILITARY CONSTRUCTION:

a. The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)/Military Construction (MILCON) Program provides for construction and major rehabilitation of RVNAF facilities and is financed by VN funds provided through the GVN defense budget.

b. Projects under construction are administered by the Director of Construction (DIRCON). All work is done by lump sum contractors. Problems arise for Vietnamese

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contractors when offshore procurement is required, due to long lead times and complicated importing procedures set by the GVN. The high rate of inflation (about 30% per year) coupled with long lead times makes it difficult for a local contractor to present a meaningful proposal.

c. The present program consists of the following:

(1) Projects Under Construction:

	<u>No.</u>	<u>\$ Value</u>
Ammo Depots	2	\$ 90
Communications Facilities	4	98
Logistics Depots	1	233
Regular Forces (Bases)	2	59
Training Facilities	2	3,902
Total:	<u>11</u>	<u>\$4,382</u>

(2) Projects Under Design:

Ammo Depots	3	3,180
Logistics Depots	3	1,500
Const Bn	1	210
Total:	<u>7</u>	<u>\$4,890</u>

(3) Projects Funded, On Hold by SECDEF:

Ammo Depots	2	1,220
Hospitals	1	2,387
Total:	<u>3</u>	<u>\$3,607</u>

d. Vietnam does not produce a sufficient quantity of cement for its own use. It must depend upon imports to make up the difference, mainly from Taiwan and Korea. Recently Taiwan has imposed an embargo on cement exports. This has and will continue to affect the MILCON Program. A dependable supply of cement is not assured and the price has jumped from 610\$VN to 1,100\$VN per bag.

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## 6. (U) DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM:

a. Since 1961, the Government of Vietnam (GVN) has engaged in an effort to provide dependent housing for families of RVNAF personnel. Originally, the program was wholly sponsored by the GVN but as its extensive nature became more apparent, the United States began to assist with aid in the form of construction materials. By 1969, about 85,000 housing units had been completed but many had been destroyed by enemy action during the TET Offensive and by weather. At the beginning of 1970, only 49,000 usable shelters remained.

b. In May 1970, President Nixon committed the US to support 20,000 units per year over a four year period from 1971 to 1975. The program is being supported at a funding level of \$4.8 million a year for the purchase of construction materials and \$1.2 million for contract services.

c. Funds required for other construction materials and services not included in the US programs are provided by the GVN Defense Budget. The CY73 budget for this item is 1.2 billion \$VN. The US supports 50% of this with Joint Support Credits.

d. The total program is now 24% complete. This program was initially constructed by military engineers and occupant self-help. Little contractor effort was used. Local contractor participation and local materials purchases have increased each year to the point that in the CY73 program, 61.85% of the total effort will be by local VN contractors and 36% of the materials will be locally purchased, thus enhancing both the construction and materials industries. Although this program is currently intended for use by military dependents, it should be considered as a potential source of housing for Rural Development Cadres and for refugees.

e. To date, approximately \$2.9 million of FY73 funds have been obligated for material purchase. Approximately \$2.3 million of this amount was for purchase of CY73 materials and the remaining \$600 thousand was used to make up CY71 and CY72 material shortfalls. On 3 April 1973, the release of \$2.5 million was requested from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the second phase (1,000 buildings) for CY73. To date, no decision has been made to release those funds.

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f. Presently, Phase I material is on order with approximately 37% of the material being procured locally in Vietnam in order to facilitate faster delivery with less loss in shipping time and to stimulate the Vietnamese economy. Planning includes procuring even more materials locally when the Phase II money is released, but again a major stumbling block to local procurement will be cement.

g. A dependent shelter is quickly erected with a 10 unit building taking thirty days when built by military engineers. RVNAF has established cement block and wooden door and window prefabrication centers which contribute to this fast rate. The cost per unit is \$600. A problem is that a uniform design has not been agreed upon. The US Army, Air Force, Navy, and Seabees all had dependent shelter designs that were being used. Present planning calls for a local Army Engineer to design a shelter with maximum use of local materials and local construction. The goal is to get a better shelter, which would include water and electricity, at the same cost as today's shelter. Construction could be accomplished entirely by the Vietnamese with the DAO Engineer monitoring the end use as well as construction and acceptance.

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## 7. (C) RVNAF RETIREMENT PLAN FOR CY73:

a. A total of 71,753 military personnel will be demobilized beginning 1 July 1973, by phases.

b. Retirement is based upon physical disability and/or age in grade. Majority of personnel to be demobilized are those who are over age in grade but retained on active service by being in the Reserve age brackets.

(Figures 1 & 2)

c. Military pension regulations prescribe seniority pensions for all service personnel who complete 25 years of civil and military service. Extra credits for the 25-year eligibility can be obtained if one is:

(1) In ground or airborne combat operations - one year of service receives two years credit toward retirement.

(2) Wounded - one year additional (wound gratuity)

(3) A prisoner - two years

(4) On duty in an insecure area - 1 1/2 years

(5) Offshore school - two years

(6) On Navy craft in peacetime - 1 1/2 years

d. Proportional pensions are based on a percentage of base salary for those who retire after 15 years of service and who are older than 33. The proportional pension has a number of restrictions similar to US dual compensation.

(Figure 3)

e. Personnel not qualifying for pension receive a discharge pay and restitution of the 6% individual retirement contribution.

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## DEMOBILIZATION OF RVNAF FOR 1973

### A. Over Age Personnel for Retirement and Discharge.

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Army/Marine	2,036	10,116	18,706	30,858
VNAF	97	271	46	414
Navy	45	213	98	356
RF	665	3,879	8,125	12,669
PF	<u>0</u>	<u>140</u>	<u>2,276</u>	<u>2,416</u>
TOTAL	2,843	14,619	29,251	46,713

B. WACs Contract Expires and Retirement. 400

C. Category #2. Physically unfit. 12,564

D. Category #3. Disabled. 12,036

TOTAL 71,713

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Age-limits prescribed in Statute  
for RF personnel

Reference: Decree #50-SL/QP dated 18 March 1967  
(Article 25)

G R A D E	Age-limits	
	Combat Service	Technical Service
Private, PFC	42	45
Corporal, CFC	43	45
NCO	46	49
Aspirant	46	50
2LT, 1LT	47	52
Captain	49	54
Major	51	56
Lieutenant Colonel	53	58
Colonel	55	59

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## Age-Limits Prescribed in Statute for Selective Regulars

Reference: Article 247, Decree #13-CT/LDQGQL/SL dated 20  
October 1964, prescribing Statute for Regular Force  
In-Service Personnel.

G R A D E	Age-Limit		
	A	B	C
Private, PFC, Corporal, CFC	40	40	43
NCO	45	45	48
2LT, 1LT	46	46	51
Captain	46	48	53
Major	47	50	55
Lieutenant Colonel	48	52	57
Colonel	49	54	59
Brigadier General, Major General	51	56	61
Lieutenant General	53	58	62
General	55	60	
General of the Army	56	61	

Age Limit A : Applicable to flight personnel of the Air Force

Age Limit B : Applicable to:

- Army : Combat arms and Combat support arms
- Navy : Navigation personnel
- Marine Corps

Age limit C : Applicable to:

- + Army : - Technical Services
- Finance Branch, Personnel and  
Material Management Branch

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Figure (3)

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f. The facts above are extracted from Articles 280 and 285 of Law #13-CT/LDQGQL/SL signed by NG Duong Van Minh on 20 Oct 64. There are new but not yet implemented Laws #58 and #59 signed by President Thieu on 26 Dec 72 which modifies this approach.

g. The Ministry of War Veterans (MWV) administers veterans and survivors benefits which include disabled veterans' housing and training, production centers, orphan institutions and job referral services. The MWV has been authorized to open 33 provincial offices for a total of 44 provincial/city offices.

(Figures 4 & 5)

## 8. (C) REDUCTION PROGRAM - BULK PETROLEUM:

a. Effective 1 Apr 73, a reduction in the quantity of MOGAS and diesel fuel was imposed upon the RVNAF. Using as a basis the average monthly consumption for CY72 and considering equipment density, the following factors were used in estimating bulk POL consumption for FY74:

(1) Consumption rates per mile were obtained from FM 101-10-1.

(2) Equipment densities were compiled from inventories.

(3) Assumed vehicles to be 70% operational.

(4) Wheeled vehicles operated 20 miles per day on a 20-day month.

(5) Track vehicles operated 25 miles per month.

(6) Hourly consumption rates are based on eight hours per day, 30 days per month.

b. The results of this analysis were as follows:

<u>Comparison of POL Requirements</u>		<u>(In MBBLS)</u>			
	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>JP-4</u>	
CY72 Average Monthly Consumption	166.3	253.6	62.9	132.2	
Based on Equip. Density	88.8	224.3	70.1	242.4	
Difference	-46%	-12%	+11%	+83%	

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## MONTHLY PENSION RATES AND ALLOWANCES (alw) Effective 1 September 1972

1. <u>CPT (Grade I)</u> <u>w/ children</u>	<u>60% Disability</u>	<u>100% Disability</u>
Main Pension	11,040	18,400
Wife's alw	1,200	1,200
Children's alw	4,400	4,400
Total	16,640	24,000
<u>Widow w/4 children</u>		
Main Pension	9,200	
Children's alw	4,400	
Total	13,600	
2. <u>Sgt w/4 child</u>	<u>60% Disability</u>	<u>100% Disability</u>
Main Pension	5,200	8,800
Wife's alw	1,200	1,200
Children's alw	4,400	4,400
Total	10,800	14,400
<u>Widow w/4 children</u>		
Main Pension	4,400	
Children's alw	4,400	
Total	8,800	
3. <u>Pvt w/4 child</u>	<u>60% Disability</u>	<u>100% Disability</u>
Main Pension	4,650	7,750
Wife's alw	1,000	1,000
Children's alw	3,600	3,600
Total	9,250	12,350
<u>Widow w/4 children</u>		
Main Pension	3,872	
Children's alw	3,600	
Total	7,472	
4. Wards	400	per month (In addition to normal allowances received as orphans)
5. Dependent Parents	3,875	per month person regardless of rank
6. Orphans allowances (Included as children's allowances of widows benefits)	900 1,100	per month (Private to Corporal) per month (Sergeant and Officers)

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YEARLY BUDGET COMPARISON

	Expenditures CY 1970	Expenditures CY 1971	Expenditures CY 1972	Approved for CY 1973
Salaries & Allowances (Civ. Personnel)	53,070,000	60,625,000	130,112,000	136,935,000
Salaries & Allowances (Mil. Personnel)	29,424,000	34,007,000	44,558,000	45,066,000
Operational Expenses	34,000,000	48,000,000	67,647,000	118,172,000
Pensions & Benefits	2,800,000,000	15,619,091,000	18,012,319,000	24,438,224,000
Direct Grants for Special Projects - DV Housing, etc.	5,870,000	4,407,000,000	1,969,199,000	22,000,000
	<u>2,922,364,000</u>	<u>20,168,723,000</u>	<u>20,253,835,000</u>	<u>24,760,397,000</u>

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c. To effect a manageable transition in the application of the reduced allocations, DAO elected to phase in the 46% MOGAS reduction by starting with a 20% cut, incrementally applied over the 4th Qtr FY73. Diesel fuel was decreased 10% effective 1 Apr 73 with a cut incrementally distributed throughout the quarter.

d. RVNAF complained about what they considered a shortage principally of diesel. To have the greatest impact on DAO, ARVN manifested their displeasure by reducing the allocation in areas that would be noticed very quickly, such as insufficient fuel to operate support equipment at ports, depots, and the Army Arsenal. In each instance direct contact between the Army Division and the Office of the Commander, Central Logistics Command, resulted in the release of an increased allocation of production. There is evidence of a disproportionate application of the reduction within RVNAF. Some units have had their allocation reduced as much as 80%. This matter has been discussed with RVNAF recommending an equitable allocation. There is no better time than the present to force RVNAF to learn supply discipline and management of resources. This is especially true of POL with a worldwide energy crisis.

e. Commencing with the 1st Qtr FY74, the balance of the reduction, i.e., 26% MOGAS, 2% diesel, will be totally imposed effective 1 July. It is anticipated that there will be more complaints. The entire situation is being monitored carefully to assure that the quantities of products actually needed to sustain operations will be allocated.

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9. (C) RVNAF MORALE.

a. RVNAF morale is gauged by the following indicators:

- (1) Leadership
- (2) Desertion Rate
- (3) Discipline
- (4) Percent present for Duty as Compared to Assigned Strength
- (5) Troop Appearance
- (6) Equipment Losses
- (7) Conduct of Troops On and Off Duty
- (8) Combat Efficiency/Effectiveness
- (9) Esprit de Corps

b. JGS has reported to DAO that over-all morale within RVNAF is considered to be good and has been steadily improving since the beginning of ceasefire I; however, field reports and lack of aggressive reaction to ceasefire incidents do not fully corroborate JGS's assessments.

c. The major factors other than the usual variations in leadership and officer/NCO corruption have affected RVNAF morale, inflation and the understandable desire not to become a "ceasefire" casualty. The RVNAF military man of today earns 1/4 of that buying power which he possessed in 1964. It is estimated that 40% of his current pay is needed to buy rice alone. This leads to a breakdown in discipline, increased corruption and outright troop thievery of the civilian populace which has resulted in reports of RVNAF having a "negative pacification" influence in their areas of operation.

d. The RVNAF Joint General Staff states that the following problem areas are having a detrimental effect on morale improvement.

- (1) Dependent Housing

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- (2) Pay System
- (3) Leave Policy
- (4) Family Separation
- (5) Excessive Travel Time and Distance to Visit Families
- (6) Country-wide Inflation.

e. Joint General Staff anticipates morale improvement within RVNAF due to the following reported programs: (1) The R&R program recently initiated for the VNMC and ABN Div within MR 1; (2) A more liberal leave policy; (3) Decrease in combat activity; (4) More unit training; (5) Elimination of 100% alert; and (6) A demobilization plan.

f. ARVN leadership varies throughout the Military Regions with Regional Commanders generally taking a hard line with poor leadership and replacing ineffective officers. The 3d Division has almost totally been "rebuilt" with younger more capable field grade officers. Reports of corruption continue to plague the officer corps. A particular problem which is unique to MR II and has been reflected in less than aggressive combat operations is the undesirability of an assignment to the "highlands." It is reported that officers who have been banished for disciplinary or political actions or who cannot exert political or monetary influence are assigned to this region resulting in marginal leadership. At the command leadership level there remains much skepticism as to the ultimate success of ceasefire II based upon the limited results achieved during ceasefire I. The lack of any concrete assurance by the U.S. to assist the GVN if an all out NVA/VC offensive occurred has also inhibited substantial improvements of morale at the upper level. The overall desertion rate has averaged 2.83% of assigned strength during the last six months with desertions on a down swing in the latter month. The Joint General Staff published a letter to place emphasis on Command Leadership of Unit Commanders to reduce desertions and also instituted a monthly meeting of a new organization titled "Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Central Desertion Control Committee." All staff sections are represented and the minutes of the meeting are widely disseminated.

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g. The Marine and Airborne Divisions are highly trained and adequately armed and equipped. Each of these are volunteer units and morale, esprit de corps, and discipline are considered to be above average when compared to ARVN Division.

h. VNN morale is high as indicated by the continuing overstrength situation and the low desertion rate. Experience has shown that the Navy is considered a low-risk environment in comparison with the ARVN. As a result there are usually more volunteers among the conscripts than can be accepted. The average desertion rate of .57% of assigned strength for the last six months, second lowest in RVNAF, is further indication of high morale. Conversely, it is considered that the management of food service and the low subsistence allowances act to adversely affect morale. In summary, morale is high but could be improved by upgrading the quality of subsistence.

i. VNAF morale can be termed good to very good. The primary attendant of morale is the difficulty experienced by middle and lower ranged personnel in making military pay and allowances stretch to meet spiraling costs created by national inflation for the past six months. The VNAF average desertion rate has been .44% of their assigned strength. This desertion percentage is the lowest among RVNAF.

j. CONCLUSION: Overall morale is no better or worse than pre-ceasefire I with some indications of a slight upswing with certain ARVN units gaining confidence that they can go it alone. If any one factor could be selected as adversely affecting morale it is probably the economic squeeze which in turn affects corruption and civilian-military incidents. Reports from ARVN Commanders express confidence that RVNAF can hold present GVN controlled territory against anything but another enemy offensive.

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## CHAPTER 11

### JGS COMMAND AND CONTROL

#### 1. (C) CHAIN OF COMMAND:

a. Organization for national defense within the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, to include the Organization, mission and responsibilities of the Joint General Staff (JGS), is detailed and directed in Presidential Decree 614-a, TT/SL, dated 1 July 1970. Under the provisions of this decree, the President is Supreme Commander-in-Chief of RVNAF. Following the President, in order of authority, are the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense, and the Chief, JGS. The President is assisted in national defense policy formulation and implementation by the National Security Council. The Council is composed of the President as Chairman, the Vice President, Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief, JGS/RVNAF and the Special Assistant to the President for Security and Military Affairs (who is the Council Recorder).


(Figure 1)

b. While the Chief, JGS appears to be directly responsible to the Minister of National Defense (ref. Fig. 1), in reality, he deals equally directly with the President and the Prime Minister, depending on the nature and sensitivity of the matter at hand. The title of the Joint General Staff belies the fact that it is primarily an Army staff with liaison representation from the Vietnamese Navy (VNN), and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). As depicted in Fig. 1, the Chief/JGS does command the total RVNAF, to include the VNN and VNAF. He is also concurrently the Army Commander. But the Army's sister services (VNN and VNAF) have their own separate and distinct headquarters and staffs, physically removed from the JGS Compound. The VNN and VNAF Hq and staffs administer and support their own forces and have minimal liaison with the JGS. The VNN and VNAF Commanders are usually directed personally in command and policy matters by the Chief/JGS and the Chief of Staff, JGS. VNN and VNAF units in the field are under operational control of the Army Military Region Commanders. The VNN Commander, a Vice Admiral, and the VNAF Commander, a Lieutenant General, do retain direct command and control of special selected units and support

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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)



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Figure (1)

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elements. The preponderance of JGS staff element day to day activity is related almost exclusively to ground combat force matters. Figures 2 and 3 depict the organization of the VNN and VNAF.

(Figures 2 & 3)

c. Organization of the JGS is shown in Figure 4.

(Figure 4)

d. The actual chain of command from the President, Prime Minister, Minister of National Defense and the Chief/JGS, down to the Military Region Commanders is close-held, personal in nature, tightly knit and somewhat inflexible. Mission type orders are given to the MR Commanders and they are given command and control of the total resources determined sufficient to accomplish their missions. The staff sections of the JGS are internally oriented to assisting the Chief/JGS, in properly "managing" his command and control responsibilities. All but certain intelligence, technical and logistical staff actions and communications flows upward to the Chief/JGS, and Chief of Staff, JGS, and there is severely limited flow downward to the Military Regions and the MR staffs. Actual JGS staff functions and communications flow related to command and control of the MR's can be likened to an inverted triangle, if a correctly oriented triangle represented the conventional model of parallel staff involvement from higher to lower level, similar to US method of the commander's use of his staff.

(Figure 5)


e. The JGS system works as it is designed, but the philosophy of the system of command and control restricts the power of that command and control to the top few leaders dealing with the MR Commanders.

(Figure 6)

f. Beneath and within the MR's, the philosophy is similar in its selective restrictiveness of the power of command and control. In essence, important orders and directives are passed personally and verbally by the top leadership to the MR Commanders. Written memos for record at both JGS and MR level, and the

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VNN ORGANIZATION CHART



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Figure (2)

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VNAF ORGANIZATION CHART





Figure (3)

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**ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE JGS**




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


Figure (4)

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NOTE:

	Direct Command and Control
	Normal Staff Functional Involvement In Day to Day Operations
	Limited

\*The base of the triangles represents the delegation of authority for independent day to day staff intercourse between JGS and MR's. The conventional model contains that authority, the actual JGS model severely restricts or prohibits it.

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missions reflected in MR operation orders, follow on at a delayed later date. The written records eventually return to the JGS for note, recording and file.

(Figure 6)

JGS:	Commander	GEN CAO VAN VIEN
<u>MR 1:</u>	I Corps Commander	LTG NGO QUANG TRUONG
	1st Div. Co-mander	BG LE VAN THAN
	2nd Div. Commander	BG TRAN VAN NHUT
	3rd Div. Commander	BG NGUYEN DUY NINH
<u>MR 2:</u>	II Corps Commander	MG NGUYEN VAN TOAN
	22nd Div. Commander	BG PHAN DINH NIEM
	23rd Div. Commander	BG TRAN VAN CAM
<u>MR 3:</u>	III Corps Commander	LTG NGUYEN VAN MINH
	5th Div. Commander	BG TRAN QUOC LICH
	18th Div. Commander	BG LE MINH DAO
	25th Div. Commander	BG LE VAN TU
<u>MR 4:</u>	IV Corps Commander	MG NGUYEN VINH NGHI
	7th Div. Commander	MG NGUYEN KHA NAM
	9th Div. Commander	MG TRAN BA DI
	21st Div. Commander	BG LE VAN HUNG

(Figure 6)

## 2. (C) COMMUNICATIONS:

a. The JGS exercises internal communications and external command and control through the facilities provided by JGS Signal Battalion.

(Figures 7 & 8)

## 3. (C) SHORTFALLS AND ASSESSMENT:

a. While the JGS organization works and exercises command and control in the manner for which it was designed, there are several major shortfalls in the system which inhibit the Chief/JGS and staff from maintaining the day to day, timely, in-depth grasp of the tactical situation upon which active, effective command and control must rely.

b. The Corps/MR Commanders have free reign in conducting all operations within their regions. In effect, they run an empire of their own after being given mission-type orders and the resources with which to accomplish the mission. They can, and do, receive

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
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JGS SIGNAL BATTALION ORGANIZATION CHART



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Figure (7)

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
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**JCS, SIGNAL BN/COMMO DIAGRAM**

FIELD OPNS CO

(CMD) OPN CO



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policy, directives and guidance on matters deemed critical by the President, Prime Minister, and Minister of National Defense, in addition to being subordinate to the Chief, JGS.

c. Unless he specifically makes inquiry into specific operations and situations, the Chief, JGS, gets reports and information mostly on the initiative of the MR Commander. The absence of a detailed and specific system of reporting makes the Chief, JGS, vulnerable to receipt of "after-the-fact" information. The danger also exists that he will be denied timely access to vital indicators which have potential for developing into adverse critical situations. This situation is further compounded in that the complex and diverse governmental and armed forces command and control structure down to the lowest levels within the MR's almost precludes rapid and accurate reporting up through the chain of command, even when requested.

d. Because of the existing close-held restricted and personal verbal manner of communicating orders and directives between top level commanders and subordinates, the staff does not get actively and productively involved in assisting the Chief, JGS, to exercise his command and control responsibilities. For the most part, the staffs are not sufficiently knowledgeable of the current situation to conduct research and provide rapid, meaningful recommendations and alternatives to tactically related problems which would provide normal command and control assistance to the Chief.

e. The term "Joint General Staff (JGS)" is a misnomer. One of the greatest impediments to joint planning, staff action and coordinated joint operations within RVNAF is the lack of joint service manning at the highest General Staff levels. This lack of cross service staffing permeates down to the region level where joint planning and operations are essential. Region Commanders frequently commit multi-regiments/battalions to a specific operation but rarely, if ever, create a Joint Task Force Headquarters to coordinate air and ground forces. Few instances can be seen where Division Commanders have effectively used jump command posts to exercise command and control over multi-regiment operations. Unfortunately, RVNAF consists of both autonomous services and command and control headquarters and joint staffing of senior headquarters continues

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to be an organizational deficiency. As an example, J-3/JGS could be organized with an ARVN Brigadier General, two deputies, a VNN Captain and a VNAF Colonel. The JGS/TOC and intelligence center should be jointly staffed. It is believed that joint manning across the JGS would increase efficiency, facilitate joint planning, and provide valuable joint staff training for officers and NCO's of all services.

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## CHAPTER 12

### DEFENSE ATTACHE ASSESSMENT

1. (S) GENERAL. The RVNAF is capable of holding the territory they now have under their control; however, they would be unable to defend against a country-wide major offensive. As of 30 June 1973, both sides are attempting to clear out enemy influence in their areas of influence. Examples of the DRV/PRG actions were Tonle Cham, isolation of Song Be and An Loc (MR 3) and areas in other MR's contiguous to DRV/PRG LOC's. The RVNAF operations include the lowland approaches to the coast in Thua Thien Province, resettlement areas in Quang Ngai (MR 1), areas adjacent to QL-1 (MR 2), LOC's to Song Be (MR 3), and the LOC's and population/political centers in Chuong Thien and Dinh Tuong Provinces (MR 4).
2. (S) MORALE. The inflation and consequent high cost of rice have had a significant impact resulting in degradation of leadership (corruption), morale and discipline in all services. RVNAF troops cannot survive on the monetary subsistence that replaced the rice supplement. This problem has discouraged better RVNAF public relations. For example, RVNAF troops have resorted to theft of rice and pilferage from the heretofore friendly or tolerant GVN population. Reported RVNAF local pacification and civil development projects during the cease-fire period have been far below expectations.
3. (S) LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT. Generally common to all services is the lack of adequately qualified middle level leaders and logistics resource managers. Emphasis in placing qualified individuals in training schools has been made; however, time and continued command emphasis is essential.
4. (S) COMMAND AND CONTROL. Lack of joint service manning at all levels of senior headquarters is a problem without promise of change in the foreseeable future. Likewise, the effective employment of Joint Task Forces and jump command posts, when required, is expected to continue as a tactical command and control problem.



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5. (S) AIR DEFENSE: The lack of an adequate air defense capability can only be corrected by recognizing and accepting the threat and placing emphasis on obtaining and developing the appropriate defensive capability.

6. (S) FORCE REDUCTION: GVN has recognized the economic impossibility of maintaining a 1.1 million active force and is planning a force level reduction to .8 million. At the same time RVNAF has taken a sophisticated approach in planning for a ready reserve civilian force. Many country plans have been studied and it appears they will eventually adopt a plan along the same lines as the Republic of Korea now uses. However, a real force reduction will not be considered until a more stable ceasefire environment has been obtained.

7. (S) PROGRESS: There has been progress. Training and resource management have improved. There is a slow awakening to the fact that US largess is disappearing and resources must be managed in a dynamic manner. RVNAF staff officers are beginning to deal with each other in a fashion never achieved when US advisors were available. However, corruption is becoming much more apparent as supply levels are reduced and managed. Dishonest leaders and poor managers are being highlighted under these conditions to their subordinates. There are fewer "haves" and more "have nots". Inflation exacerbates the situation with the result that morale of the RVNAF is not improving. Only time will tell if there is enough time.

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## DATT ASSESSMENT LEDGER

### POSITIVE

1. Enhance and Enhance Plus
2. Turnover of US and ROK Equipment
3. Readiness
4. F5E Input (Begins in Jan'74)
5. Supply
6. Log Support Streamlining
7. In-Country Procurement
8. Reduction in US and TCN Contractor Presence
9. Improved Unit Training
10. Maintenance Offensive
11. TACAIR
12. Basic Ability/Desire to Learn
13. Increasing Technical Competence
14. CONUS Schooled Leadership
15. Standardization (Elimination of C-123, Certain Models of 119's & C-47's)
16. Computer Self-Sufficiency (Hardware and Capacity)
17. Country-Wide Communications Net

### NEGATIVE

1. Strategic Position of Enemy as a Result of '72 Spring Offensive
2. New Roads, Pipeline and Airfields in Enemy Territory
3. Input of Added Enemy Weaponry
4. US Bombing Halt
5. Corruption
6. Inflation (Cost of Rice)
7. Air Defense Capability (GCI Radar)
8. Intelligence and Operation Report (Sparse Since Departure of MACV)
9. VNAF Computer (Performance Erratic)
10. Command and Control at JGS (Lack of VNN and VNAF Reps)
11. Poor Aerial Photography
12. RVNAF More Inhibited by Cease-Fire Agreement (One-For-One Replacement)
13. Aircraft Maintenance-Skill Deficiencies
14. Middle Management
15. Nepotism
16. Aircraft "Catch-Up" Maintenance Problems
17. Coastal Radar (65% Operational)
18. Motivation (Lack of Aggressiveness)
19. POL (Management and Control)
20. Komar Threat (Lack of VNN and VNAF Coordination)

**SECRET NOFORN DISSEM**



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