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SOVIET FRONTS AND MILITARY DISTRICTS AT WAR IN THE UKRAINE, 1943-44

Roger Beaumont

Soviet Fronts and Military Districts at War in the Ukraine, 1943-44

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FOREWORD

Through this publication we seek to extend and enhance the general understanding of the structure and dynamics of the organizations of the Soviet military. A correct assessment of the efficiency of any organization must be based on proper perception of the elements, linkages and functions of that structure.

The military districts of the USSR are interesting and important entities in the Soviet military apparatus. They serve rather well-defined missions in peacetime but take a rather different character when functioning in the mobilized mode or as frontal regions.

Roger Beaumont has in this study focused his keen eye and incisive mind on the events in Western Russia during World War II as the Nazis first swept through the military districts along the Soviet European border, then were pushed back out of them as the Soviet army got the upper hand. He examines the nature of the MD's during those tubulent years and elucidates their relations with other elements of the Soviet military organization. Finally, and importantly, he suggests some lines for future research to follow.

This is an important work and the Center for Strategic Technology is pleased to have been involved in it.

Richard E. Thomas
Director, Center for
  Strategic Technology

INTRODUCTION*

Since the rending of military doctrine and expectations in the Middle
East October War in 1973, the attention of the Soviet command has not only
been focused on "command and control" in the accepted Western sense of the
word, but also on the flexibility of their own system, especially the ar-
rangements between the TVD, the "front," and the organization of the mili-
tary district (MD). The Table of Contents of the Military Historical
Journal (VIZ) since then, and compared with the previous decade, reflect
the increase of interest along these lines.

At the same time, the role, command structure and competence of the
military district has come under severe scrutiny. In the past year or so,
the commander/MD has come to occupy a more significant position not only in
the Soviet military hierarchy but also in the Soviet operational hierarchy.
For example, the Commander of the Trans-Caucasus Military District now has
operational command of all the weapons systems in his district and, in
fact, can be regarded as the commander on the spot. This diverges substan-
tially from previous practice and, therefore, there is all the more rele-
vance in examining the role of the TVD Commander, i.e., the level of com-
mand which would control fronts, districts or other elements in war or
major mobilization.[1] Apparently, the Soviets are aiming at a form of lim-
ited decentralization, in which under General Staff supervision a TVD com-
mander has more latitude and MD commanders not only held more responsible

for the weapons within the district command, but are also given an increased post-attack recovery role. It can suggest that this all fits in with the Soviet notion of the possibility of a more protracted war, be it conventional or nuclear, or any combination of both.

There is, therefore, every reason to consider the Soviet evaluation of the Soviet experience with the Front/MD relationship and at the same time to delve even deeper and to look at the key question: the problem of field administration. This area of concern is visible from present Soviet investigations of the competence and the efficiency of staffs, and therefore an examination of Soviet staff procedures, military and civilian, is essential in understanding the nature of the operation of the Soviet system. What adds more importance to such a study is the fact that the new Soviet "model," as it comes into operation, will no doubt also be applied to the Warsaw Pact.

Part I of this study examines the role of MDs and Fronts and the differentiation of functions, including the examination of the interaction of several environments. Let us, for example, take the Trans-Caucasus Military District in its reaction to a possible intrusion by the US RDF into the Persian Gulf area: what sort of operational organization and interaction process will take place? Does this become a Front command? What are the logistical implications? Would the process of mobilization and/or redeployment conform to the established World War II pattern, or is an entirely new model emerging? Is it necessarily true that MDs would--or will--convert into front-type pattern? (Much of the supposed evidence for this is taken from Soviet exercises--but do these necessarily reflect operational/wartime practices? Exercises are usually designed for unit

training apart from the General Staff input.) Or should one anticipate another model? Above all, what can be concluded about what the Soviet command has definitely learned and intends to learn from its long and carefully manipulated examination of World War II experiences? It might be pertinent to note here that in the last two or three years there has been a revival of interest in World War I operations,[2] not least the Caucasus Front and party organization on the Caucasian Front during 1914-17. As they say in Bolshevik circles, "These things do not happen by accident."

This study assumes that the Soviet leadership and the Soviet military command are preparing for a more protracted war. This requires focus on the mobilized mode and the MD/Front combination, the management of partisan and special forces combinations and, not least important, the post-attack recovery capabilities of both Front and MD—in all modes, offensive and defensive. There is also the question of less definite influences, most notably the political and social contexts, which are also examined. This point is by no means academic. There is, for example, some evidence that from its "academic" investigation of partisan movements in the Second World War, the present Soviet General Staff has concluded that it should have control of this type of military-related operation—which was not the case in the Second World War. Therefore, we are speaking in precise terms about "the Soviet command model" sui generis, rather than abstractly or even generically. A major point of this paper is the drawing of attention to the great importance of not only the Soviet but also the Imperial Russian concept—and problem—of "field administration," or what the Germans have called Feldverwaltung, a subject not well explored in regard to the Soviet

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system or any other.[3] To this end, the reader will appreciate the signifi-cance of the tables of "field administration." (Appendix IA & IB) It is perhaps equally significant that these tables have only recently been pub-lished in professional Soviet military literature.[4] The subject of "field administration" needs thorough investigation, a task well beyond the scope or purpose of this paper.

Approach to the System: Institutions

In spite of the hunger for mathematical certainty in war by its con-trollers, the Soviet military system is notably indeterminate. Specula-tions regarding interpenetrability of sub-elements, purposes of structure, practices of power and future intentions abound in Sovietology and intelli-gence analysis. This study examines one phase in the growth and transition of Soviet forces, the Battles for the Ukraine, in 1943-1944. The fighting is not detailed, and accounts of Kursk, Orel-Belgorod, the Dnieper Bend and the retaking of Sevastapol, Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa can be found in any number of sources. Rather, this analysis focuses on Fronts, as they re-entered the areas where they were born of Military Districts and passed beyond into Eastern Europe. This passage is viewed through several lenses, to generate questions and hypotheses, as well as to conclude and deduce.

Military Districts, Fronts and the Rear Functions

The definition of the Military District in the Great Soviet Encylo-pedia[5] is: "a territorial combined arms command of units of various sizes, military educational institutions and various local institutions;" and in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia[6] "a large territorial unit, including

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various local military institutions--this civil-military unit includes elements of the army, party and organs of the Soviet Union government." The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms[7] defined Military District as "the highest administrative unit of military units, training institutions, military establishments of the various services and local registration-mobilization offices (military commissariats) disposed in a particular area." These definitions coincide with the aspect of interpenetrability noted by various analysts of the Soviet system.[8] Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, "The Soviet Triangular Dictatorship: Party, Police and Army: Formation and Situation," Ukrainian Quarterly (iv: 2) Summer, 1978, pp. 135-153). John Erickson has defined it as "a system for the optimization of manpower management in gross relative terms."[9]

The Military District System established by Dmitri Milyutin in 1862 conforms in several respects to the current Soviet system, suggesting a form of Russian historical continuity. The district commander, as in the days of Milyutin, remains under direct authority of a central minister and deals with subordinates who have some autonomy as members of the Military Council. They vote on key decisions, and have lines of appeal running up the chains of command of their own subdivisions.[10] Milyutin's reforms were a response to the manpower problems of the Crimean War, where culling out of reserves produced only 20 percent of the Army's strength in the field; many of those called were virtually unfit for service. The introduction of the Military District (which included provisions for education and unit newspapers) overcame the problem.[11]

The relationship between First World War[12] Fronts and Military Districts conformed to Milyutin's logic, and the contemporary view of that relationship:

> ...the direction of troops stationed in the rear of the fronts and mobilization functions were entrusted to responsive commanders and headquarters of military districts and local military commissariats subordinated to them.[13]

The Front is defined in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia as an "Operational-Strategic Combined Arms Force usually created at the beginning of a war for decisive operational-strategic missions to small operations (sometimes for a single strategem) generally in continental theater of operations;"[14] ("operational" in this context refers to roughly corps-army level "strategic" to Army Group and above). The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms describes Front "as the highest strategic form of Armed Forces; can be all arms."[15] It is also interesting to note that the military district is not seen as an actual military organization by all Soviet analysts, a fine distinction but one in keeping with the definition of the MD as the "highest administrative unit."[16] (Author's italics)

In any event, as precise as such definitions of intended function may seem, in the Great Patriotic War, political stress, mobilization, and, finally, war and near-defeat rent much asunder. The turbulence that World War II generated in Soviet military structures had been long anticipated by Soviet military analysts. When Mikhail Frunze studied the problem of front-rear dynamics in war in the mid-1920's, he observed that modern weaponry had broken down the fixed linear barrier between front and rear, thus forcing a unity of the two.[17] Frunze predicted that in war the crucial importance of rear functions would emerge dramatically and quickly, and

suggested that the special weaknesses of the USSR--space, thinness of population compared with major industrial nations, weak rail and industrial systems, and technological primitiveness--required "resolute militarization in time of peace of the entire civil apparatus."[18] Again, a clear boundary between geo-historical Russian and uniquely Soviet doctrine eludes the anatomist of the Soviet body, military and politic.

The outbreak of war in Europe and the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland in 1939, the war with Finland in 1939-40, and the occupation of Bessarabia in 1941 all produced changes in levels and readiness of forces and structure of staffs. The Special Military Districts became something like quasi-fronts, not only along the western border, but in the Trans-Caucasus, the latter out of fear of Franco-British designs on the rich oilfields of Baku-Grozny.

On the eve of Russian involvement in World War II, it was assumed by Soviet planners that "the army rear would deploy on the sites of the peacetime district chast' and installations"[19] and that, during the process of armed forces mobilization, "the Fronts' rear services were to remain essentially stationary..."[20] Although such assumptions were based on the view of a fairly static line of action close to the border, the western tier of Soviet Military Districts, including the "Special" quasi-fronts, was overrun by the Germans and occupied for about three years. By their own observations, the Soviet failure to define rear boundaries and supply processes clearly, and an inadequate transportation system added to the debacles of the period June 1941 to June of 1942, which cost the Soviet Army approximately four million men.[21]

A little more than a month after the German attack on June 22, 1941, logistical confusion led to the creation of a centralized support command headed by a Chief of Rear (tyl') Services, and "radical changes in all elements... ."[22]

In keeping with the view of the Military District as a command training ground, a number of district commanders and other military officials were named deputy/Front commanders for Rear Services.[23] In August, a rear service political section was formed[24] as it became clear that a good part of the Soviet Union would be under German control for some time. As the spectre of total defeat faded away in the winter of 1941, the Rear, like reestablishment of Soviet rule and the control of the Army, was linked to the framework of close fusion of political, military-logistical and "internal security" components of the Soviet system—three chains of command and communication, and three partially congruent elements.[25]

The Apparatus of Supreme Command

Most of the major command apparatus radiating from Stalin (see chart on p. 9) was created in the immediate aftermath of Operation BARBAROSSA, the Nazi suprise attack, June 22, 1941. Within 24 hours, five Fronts had been created from the western military districts (See Appendix II). A Reserve Front was created on June 23, and a High Command Stavka formed. It was replaced almost immediately by the Supreme High Command Stavka under Shaposhnikov. GOKO, the State Defense Committee, the main political "war cabinet," was created on June 30. On July 19th, after an interlude in Kuybeshev far to the east of Moscow, perhaps in a state of nervous collapse, Stalin returned to the capital and assumed direct command as

SOVIET COMMAND NETWORK
1941-1945

STALIN* — Roles:

Chairman, CPSU/ Secretary, Central Committee/Politburo

Chairman, State Defense Committee (GOKO)

Chairman, Defense Commissars

Main Political Administration

Supreme Commander-in-Chief

Organs of State Security
—NKVD
—MVD

Wartime Production Base and Bureaucracy

Commissars, 1941-42; Zampolits, 1942-on

Supreme High Command (VgK)

LRA

Stavka

Reserves, Strategic

Glavkom, Sector/Axis Commands, 1941-42

Stavka Representatives, Battle Managers, 1942-45

Chief, Rear Services

Technical Services

Military Council, Military District

— DIVISIONS
— "OOs"
— "spetsbats"
— Katyusha
— "garrisons"

— Navy Staff
— Main Political Admin.
— FLEETS (e.g., Black Sea)
— FLOTILLAS (e.g., Danube)

GROUND FORCES/ AIR FORCES:

Army, PVO Strany, Air — FRONT

Air, Tank, Shock — ARMY

Rifle, Tank, Artillery — CORPS   (temporarily disbanded as a level of command, 1941-42)

Rifle, Tank, Artillery — DIVISION   (strength cut c. 30-40% in late 1941)

(Guards designation up through Army)

Military Councils

NOTES:

*Stalin intervened at any level when he felt it appropriate.

━━━━━━ = lines of authority

────── = lines of political advice/consultation

─ ─ ─ ─ = uncertain lines of action

────── = existed at the beginning of the war — not disbanded

── ── ── = created and disbanded in the course of the war

─ ─ ─ ─ ─ = created and maintained until the end of the war

── ─ ── = created and maintained after the war

·············· = disbanded and recreated in the course of the war

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major German thrusts closed on Leningrad, the capital and the northeast coast of the Black Sea. Ultimately, he donned several hats, those of:

- General Secretary of the Communist Party
- Chairman of the Politburo
- Chairman of the State Defense Committee
- Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
- People's Commissar of Defense
- Supreme High Commander

He thus served as the "elected" head of the Party, and of its inner elite directorate, of its key defense bureaucratic entity, of its council, and chief of the armed forces. The Party's control function was much reduced, and most of Stalin's orders were transmitted through GOKO and VgK—the Supreme High Command. On August 7th, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces. Throughout the war, Stalin worked about 18 hours a day, demanding detailed situation reports in precise and formal form regularly, and sometimes beyond the daily reporting schedule. He also exercised control over the State bureaucracy through alternate channels, including the less visible conduit of the Organs of State Security.

GOKO remained a Communist party conclave, including Molotov, the Foreign Minister, and Voroshilov, a Civil War commander and survivor of the Purges, who, although discredited in the defeats of 1941, remained close to Stalin. Beria, Zhdanov, Mikoyan, Malenkov and Khrushchev also served on GOKO, among other principle Communist leaders. GOKO and the Economic Council, which expedited war production, had substantial cross-membership with the sub-bureaucracies of Soviet war production; almost half the People's Commissar's were members.[26] The boundaries between military and civilian became clearer during the war, but not without some pushing and shoving.

In late July 1941, GOKO created a Main Administration for Forming and Bringing Up to Strength the Forces of the Red Army (GLAVUPRAFORM). All manpower-related elements of the General Staff were folded into this structure under a Deputy Commissar of Defense. In the Spring of 1942, however, the Organization Department of the General Staff was revitalized, and on May 1941, GLAVUPRAFORM was closed down.[27]

The niceties of a hierarchical chain of command and the avoiding of override were not observed in the Soviet wartime system. Indeed, the skipping of echelons was institutionalized in retention of control over reserve elements by VgK, and the regular use of Stavka representatives as local battle planners and directors, working around and through the Front command and even lower levels from time to time. Vasilevsky, who replaced Shaposhnikov as chief of the Stavka in early 1942, and Zhukov and Konev all became super-commanders between VgK and the Fronts at various points in the war.

Another perspective on the practice (albeit well couched in hindsight) of the Front-Supreme High Command relationship appears in a recent biography of the youngest Front Commander, Chernyakovsky (later killed in action), being briefed by Stalin in preparation for his new role. The purpose, Stalin is reported to have explained, of assigning General Staff assistants (in this case Shtemenko) and a high level representative of the Stavka, Vasilevsky, to the Front was to "bring the headquarters closer to the fighting forces..." to "represent," not "duplicate." Vasilevsky had his own "range of duties, coordinating operations on several fronts with a view to a common task."[28] "As you know," Chernyakovsky's biographer quotes Stalin as saying, "a Front commander is directly subordinate to the Supreme

Commander, so you may call me any time on the hot line."[29] This, in essence, conforms to Ziemke's description of Stavka representatives as "an echelon of command capable of translating strategic guidance from the Stavka into operations"—and a qualitative counter-balance to inferior staff work at lower and intermediate command levels.[30]

Functions of the Rear Services

The snarl of the rear services caused by the overrunning of key western military districts led to a thinning of the "tail," by design and by circumstance. The large network of depots and bases in the Military Districts foreseen in pre-war plans as the foundation of operational fronts was reduced, and a philosophy of pushing supplies up close to the operational units[31] overlay a continual restructuring of the rear services organization and command authority.[32] The expanding torrent of motor transport to combat areas in 1943, as Lend-Lease trucks and jeeps arrived in large numbers and Soviet production increased, was controlled by High Command Rear Services.[33] By mid-1943, each level of command had to deliver supplies to its lower boundary.[34]

The High Command's allocation of manpower and supplies to the Fronts most heavily engaged produced considerable discomfort in other Fronts, a point on which Zhukov was defensive in his memoirs.[35] While centralization prevailed overall, the Rear Services of each Front was organized for a high degree of autonomy in refitting and repair.[36] Before the war, logistical networks of up to 500 km had been envisioned, but by Stalingrad (late 1942-early 1943), the depth of Frontal tyl' was down to 150 km in defense, and from 300 to 500 km in the attack, with the High Command controlling the direction and velocity of transport, ammunition and manpower. In 1943,

central depots moved west of the Moscow–Upper Volga line[37] and Advance Army Field Base Sections (GOPAB) tightened the distance between Frontal tyl' and combat zone to between 40 and 100 km.[38] For example, as the Third Ukrainian Front approached Vienna in January 1945, most of its tyl's structure was west of the Rumanian border.[39]

There are also glimpses of severe logistical failures; major attacks were delayed due to ammunition shortages and, as already noted, in which units were starved of supplies to feed the fighting Front. In the early 1970's, Marshal Zhukov spoke of "endless confusion and clashes" in the logistical system in 1941–42[40] and Marshal Chuikov indicated half the trucks dead-heading during the Berlin campaign were being towed; that captured alcohol was being blended into a kind of "syn-fuel," and that German artillery and ammunition were used extensively.[41]

A heavy dependence on local requisition is reflected in figures for 1942 for an army operating in the Ukraine, indicating the amounts gathered in one month (as a percentage of monthly need):[42]

```
flour . . . . . .  54%
vegetables. . . .  97%
meat  . . . . . . 108%
hay . . . . . . . 140%
oats  . . . . . .  68%
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The system did improve during the war and was effective, if not efficient, conforming with the view that the tyl' in wartime was "the entire territory of the country with its population, economy, state and political structure."[43]

The Manpower Dimension

Unevenness of administration within a framework of centralization also prevailed in the realm of the Military Districts' principal function: manpower. The case of GLAVUPRAFORM has already been noted. Military Districts which had not been overrun retained their traditional role as a source of manpower, e.g. the Ural and Trans-Baikal. Conscripts were selected according to industrial and agricultural needs where possible, and given as much training as possible. In the press of events, however, such niceties were often foregone. The anticipated close linkage between western border Military Districts and their respective mobilized Fronts was wrenched asunder by the 1941 offensive,[44] and organizational turbulence and uncertainty regarding boundary, function and organization affected the Soviet system throughout the war.[45] Few events conformed with expectation or predefinition. At the outset, the "rolling out" of Fronts from Military Districts produced discontinuity, since tactically oriented staff and command structures could not address the complexities of Feldverwaltung, nor did doctrine anticipate it--in spite of the First World War.

For example, prigranichny--frontier--Military Districts as opposed to vnutrennyi--internal--MDs did not always transform into Fronts immediately upon contact with the enemy, even though that was a general pattern in World War I and II.[46] In Odessa, Lieutenant General Shibisov, Commander of the Maritime Army and of the Odessa Military District during the German advance of late 1941, formed new units, dealt with local defense industries and prepared the facilities of an underground headquarters of the Maritime Army for the South Front commander and staff, who came from the Moscow Military District.[47] As the German offensive approached, an Odessa Defense

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Area was created by GOKO, but it was "not absolutely clear to the staff in Odessa how the troops were to be controlled."[48]

In the Spring of 1942, as the Nazis renewed their drive after being halted by a vicious winter, units were formed and shuffled, sometimes chaotically, in the Military Districts of East European Russia. Tension between field commanders and the Stavka on the one hand, and with some political officers on the other, mounted during the defense of Stalingrad, where continual forming and reforming of Fronts and duplication of command occured.

As the Red Army grew to approximately 600 divisions (each about a half to two-thirds the size of Western divisions in World War II), the number of Military Districts also increased, from 15 in 1941 to 32 by the end of the war. Except when actually passing through them, the Fronts did not have direct links with the Military Districts after which they were named. As already noted, the South Front, for example, formed on a headquarters spun-off from the Moscow District. The Volga Military District which served as the forming base for the 10th Army in late 1942, as the siege of Stalingrad intensified, was comprised of troops drawn from Moscow to Turkestan, many of whom were sent into battle virtually untrained.[49]

Nor was actual contact with an enemy necessary to justify a Front. A Far Eastern Front was formed in 1938 as tension with Japan mounted. In 1939, a Ukrainian Front spearheaded the Soviet occupation of Poland. In the Finnish Campaign of 1939-40, however, the Leningrad Military District headquarters directed combat from late November until early January, when a Northwestern Front was formed.[50]

Other strategies were employed as well. During the first year-and-a-half of the Great Patriotic War, theater/sector commands, (Glavkom) a layer of headquarters between GHQ and the Fronts, were established, and then disbanded.[51] In 1943, a Reserve Front was formed (another such command had been formed in the late spring of 1941) for five days, April 10-15. It then became the Steppe Military District, immediately behind the central battle-line.[52] When its function changed from assembling units and it received orders from the Stavka to prepare for combat at a designated basis, it was renamed the Steppe Front; its role as a Military District did not "accord in principle with the strong strategic reserves behind it."[53]

In 1945, further major reshuffling took place. (See Appendix II for a list of Fronts.) First, the crowding of forces into the geographic funnel of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia on the eve of the Battle of Berlin saw armies and Fronts abolished to bring others up to strength.[54] The span of control was eased by creation of two super-commands under Konev and Zhukov respectively while Marshal Vasilevsky, the Chief of the General Staff, the principal VgK representative during the war up to that point, took over as a Front commander when Chernyakovsky was killed. Stalin "undertook personally the task of coordinating the actions of all four fronts on the Berlin line of advance. . ."[55]

Similar restructuring was seen in the Far East in the Summer of 1945. Commanders and staff officers who fought the Germans were assigned steadily to the Far East from 1943 on, but in early 1945, major and staff command positions were filled by Hitler War veterans. A week before the Soviets attacked the Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1945, two Far East Fronts

were formed, the first, from the Primorye Group, and the second, from the Far East Front.[56]

Military District Boundaries: The Political Aspect

Military District boundaries, in politico-spatial terms, served as a kind of check-and-balance in Russia, Tsarist and Communist, both being vast realms, diverse in ethnic makeup, in terrain, resource and political complexion—and facing diverse threats. In Tsarist times, as now, some districts were seen viewed as more important than others. The most sought-after posts were those close to political power and visibility, like Moscow, or those at the highest levels of preparedness and size of forces.

Under the Soviet system, the Military District was retained, and as something more than a kind of historical momentum. In spite of a revitalization of the system early in the Civil War, and continual redrawing of district boundaries in the 1920's and 1930's, district functions remained the same in respect to military preparedness. It should be noted that the redrawing of district boundaries in the 1930's divided areas with strong nationalist aspirations—most notably the Ukraine and Byelorussia—which led Bertram Wolfe to conclude that: "step by step, a number of decisions of 'purely' or predominately military character resolved matters of national structure—unintentionally, but for just that reason, all the more decisively."[57]

Unintentional, perhaps, but under the early Bolshevik regime the Ukraine had been a named district with boundaries congruent with ethnic Ukrainia. Its split into five regions (primarily the Kiev and Odessa Military Districts) was seen as evidence of the regime's goal of Russification.[58] In a parallel move in 1938, links between districts, political and

military forces raised within their boundaries were broken by the decreeing of an "extraterritorial principle." Cadre units were henceforth constituted "without regard to the availability of draft quotas in given region and exclusively in the interest of their operational strategic designation."[59]

The Military District also had other political dimensions. Many analysts have pointed to the fusion of political and military "chains of command" in the Military Council of the districts—and of Fronts—although the exact limits and processes of military decision-making under conditions of crisis and war is not spelled out clearly. Shtemenko, for example, at one point, insisted that only the first member played a significant role;[60] but he also indicated that protocols sent up the chain of command by Military Councils of the Fronts—operationally-related petitions and dissents or concurrences—often stimulated Stalin's wrath,[61] and that the 1st Ukrainian Front Military Council prevailed upon the Stavka to reverse a decision to disband the Czech Corps.[62] Many accounts stress an active decision-making role of the Military Council in plans and operations[63] including tactical decisions.[64] In view of the tension between the Soviet army and the party, and the hunger for reflected glory on the part of the latter, especially after the downgrading of the commissars in late 1942, the question is more than academically interesting. Yet another question that lies close to the Military Council's role and structure is one often asked but left unanswered: "Who is the Third Member of the Council?" Why is his organizational affiliation never specified?[65] This should be kept in view when considering the reconquest of the Ukraine.

The Ukraine as Victim

The greatest single area of the USSR overrun by the Nazis, 1941-43, was the Ukraine. Hitler envisioned it as Germany's counterpart to British India in his dream of empire. The Ukraine had long been uneasy under Russian rule, and in the middle and late 1930's, as Russification, centralization and repression trampled down hopes of autonomy through federalism, old fears and resentments flared up. Well before the German invasion, Ukrainian nationalist activities were a major internal security problem, as infiltrators and agitators crossed the border to prepare the Ukrainians for a change of order, and to play a role in bringing it about.[66]

After the German attack, panic in Moscow was fed by the fact that the Germans were being greeted with open arms in the Baltic States, in Byelorussia, and in the Ukraine. Fortunately for the Soviet regime, however, the Wehrmacht was followed by security elements whose excesses dashed the hopes of some Nazis, like Alfred Rosenberg, who advocated a relatively moderate divide-and-rule policy in the East.[67]

The chessboard of much of the war in the East, the Ukraine was devastated. Out of a population of about 40 million, perhaps four million were dragooned into forced labor in Germany, and of those, perhaps only one-and-a-half to two million returned home after the war. The Soviets conscripted another four million Ukrainians—a fifth of Soviet manpower in the war. At the same time, several non-Ukrainian nationalities, e.g., half-a-million Crimean Tatars, seen as potentially treacherous or intractable by the regime, were dispersed from Ukraine and from other regions as well, throughout the Soviet Union; estimates range from 9 to 15 million. The Ukraine's major cities, towns and most villages were heavily damaged, and the great

hydroelectric dams were destroyed as part of the scorched-earth retreat in 1941. Beyond all that, great battles were being fought in the Ukraine until late 1944; Kiev changed hands three times, i.e., the Germans retook it once.

Submerged and Resurgent: The Party, Stalin and War

The Soviet military had suffered both massive indignities and injuries at the hands of the Communist party, especially during the Great Purge of the middle 1930's. Stalin's penchant for holding tightly to the reins of power bore bitter fruit when the Germans and their allies invaded Russia in June 1941. The well-known litany of Stalin's crimes and malfeasances in Premier Khrushchev's 1956 "secret speech" included a number of such military dimensions: the purging of the upper ranks of the Army; the excesses of the NKVD; the maldeployment of the Army on the eve of German attack and the failure to heed the warnings of attack.[68] In any event, Stalin managed to hold on to power even after the great defeats of the Summer and Fall of 1941, and centralization went even further. After his momentary psychic paralysis, Stalin began a rewiring of the switchboard of Soviet power, symbolically as well as militarily and politically, e.g., the reintroduction of such feudal and bourgeois trappings in the Red Army as saluting and epaulets, the resurrection of the Orthodox Church, and the abolition of Comintern in 1943. Another major feat of adaptive mimicry was the transformation of much of the Communist party hierarchy into a kind of officer corps. Unit commissars, discredited after the Finnish War of 1939-40, were reintroduced soon after the 1941 attack, then reduced in power again in late 1942. Party officials assumed military titles and uniforms, very much in the shadow of the military professionals but eventually sharing their

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glory.[69] Reduction of political authority came as Army commanders were demanding edinonachalie--one-man authority. They were also aided by the deeds of a principal party functionary, Mekhlis, Chief of Political Administration of an Army, whose interference led to a defeat of Soviet forces in battles around Kerch in May 1942.[70] In any event, the commissars' authority was reduced from shared command to political consultations, in the role of zampolit, a form which has prevailed since. Nevertheless, the Party retained control in two modes, one of which was formalized in the structure of Military Districts and the fighting Fronts, the Military Councils, and the other "organs" of Soviet government, which included the apparatus of State Security, the NKVD, and the Ministry of the Interior, the MVD, the latter subordinate to the former in wartime.

The Partisan Movement: Soviet Political Continuity and the Myth of Popular Resistance

Recivilianization of the Party came in stages as the Germans were driven from the territories of the USSR. Reestablishment of Military Commissariat functions and of the Military Districts in reconquered areas were landmarks on the road to formal re-Sovietization.[71]

Much groundwork for reimposing Communist rule, however, was laid before the Red Army retook the lost lands, by the partisan movement, which was a component of the Soviet military system. In the late 1930's, the problem of maintaining resistance against an invader was examined closely by the 4th Section of the NKVD, the branch responsible for partisan warfare, but Stalin had shelved the suggested programs perhaps out of the fear of arming dissidents.[72] Nevertheless, the NKVD and Border Guards left behind partisan cadres and underground government elements in the debacle of

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1941, who, some averred, had their families under surveillance or in cus-
tody in unoccupied Russia. In late 1941 and early 1942, however, most of
those fell prey to the coldest winter in 40 years. Moreover, the still
active and widespread hatred of the Soviet regime led to rejection and be-
trayal by the local population[73] and to attacks from pro-German Ukrainian
nationalist groups, as well as from German police and troops. Just before
the 1941 invasion, the Nazis issued a "kommissarbefehl"--an order to shoot
Communist officials. Some who would otherwise have ignored such a direc-
tive were offended by the heavy-handedness of the NKVD, e.g., the slaughter
of political prisoners and German prisoners.[74]

In any event, the Spring of 1942 saw new attempts of the NKVD to build
a partisan system in the western USSR. In the Ukraine, it meant war
against the Nazis by locals who were controlled by NKVD, party organ and
Army elements. The triadic web of communication and control implicit in
the Military Council and Military District underlay this effort as well.
There were several goals in the partisan war: to harry the Germans, who
proved to be as cruel as oppressors as the Russians; to suppress national-
ist groups in Moldavia, Bessarabia and the Ukraine; and, to keep Soviet
power visible. In spite of the official Soviet images of partisans as a
spontaneous movement, they were organized, supplied and controlled as part
of a military chain-of-command.[75] Recruitment, at first based on intimida-
tion and threat as well as incentives, surged after the Soviet victory at
Kursk in the Summer of 1943. The percentage of Communist Party members was
initially high, but declined as partisan operations increased. Although
the NKVD sparked the efforts, control was ultimately divided among elements

of the Soviet system; some were Army-controlled, and some were more anti-Nazi than pro-Soviet.

Nazi anti-partisan strategies ranged from brutality to sophisticated manipulative techniques, while their upper echelons debated policy. By the time the Nazis eased off--even Himmler thought they had gone too far--they had killed a chance to build a bulwark of client quasi-nations against the Russians.

Ukrainian Nationalism: A Two-Edged Sword

According to Khruschev, the inertia and the overt joy displayed by many Ukrainians during the Nazi conquest led Stalin to conclude that Ukrainians, like other dissident or reluctant elements, deserved exile en masse; only their large numbers prevented wholesale relocation. In spite of the fear and repression that characterized Stalin's regime, the Great Patriotic War did transform attitudes and expectations in the USSR. While foreign presence and observation grew substantially and some visitors, like Wendell Willkie, glimpsed traces of the GULAG, admiration for the Soviet achievement in battle, diplomatic expediency, and propaganda glossed over Western perceptions of the darker side of the USSR's internal security apparatus.

Ukrainian nationalism became a weapon in the Soviet diplomatic arsenal, as part of the imagery of the Soviets fighting to save the Motherland and cleanse the world of Fascism in league with other freedom-loving peoples. Although the regime emphasized Russian nationalism throughout the war--partly due to the fact that at the Nazi high-tide, Great Russians constituted most of the unoccupied Soviet population--the counter-theme of Ukrainian nationalism was kept alive. In early 1942, a "skeleton structure

of Ukrainian state, party and cultural organizations" existed, and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist party and other officials of the Ukraine "government-in-exile" and related institutions followed the fighting Fronts, 1942-43.[76] At the same time, Ukrainian language schools were maintained in territories east of the fighting.[77]

The Ukrainians were also the most represented non-Russian minority in the top ranks of the Red Army--seven out of one hundred senior generals and marshals--all the rest were Russians. Ukrainians comprised 20 percent of Soviet citizens mobilized for service in the war.[78]

Another gesture to Ukrainian nationalism was the Order of Bhogdan Kmelnitsky, created in 1943 for partisan heriosm, part of a series of decorations named for Great Russian heroes.[79]

As the Red Army rolled back into the Ukraine after its great victory at Kursk in July 1943, Soviet authority was reimposed by degrees, and somewhat selectively. Partisan bands were disbanded as quickly as possible. Churches remained open, and key church personnel were exempted from military service until the spring of 1944.[80] Nevertheless, Alexander Werth noted that mayors of major Ukrainian cities put in power by the Army were Russians--even though Ukrainians were appointed to such roles elsewhere in the USSR. Later, loyal party Ukrainians were brought into the hierarchy in larger numbers. At the same time, some elements of the Red Army not involved in the final campaigns were diverted to agricultural production.[81]

In October 1943, the Voronezh, Steppe, Southwest and Southern Fronts were renamed the 1st through the 4th Ukrainian Fronts, respectively, while Fronts further north were renamed for other frontier areas. These, however, had little direct linkage with Military Districts in the Ukraine

which had generated fronts at the beginning of the war, except through geo-strategic coincidence. In spite of all such gestures and labels, however, regathering of the overrun regions to the bosom of Mother Russia was ultimately firm and often brutal. The slogan covering the levies of manpower and supplies was "Everything for the Front!" The re-established party was active in organizing the civil government and mustering manpower for industry, agriculture and the Army. These exactions, layered on top of massive destruction, were later described as "draconian."[82]

The internal security organs also fought nationalist bands, principally in the western Ukraine. Some of these groups had been formed by the Germans; others, organized and equipped by the Soviets to fight the Nazis, turned on their traditional enemies. As the Fronts moved west, "specially created operational security groups" of the NKVD were in the Red Army vanguard, sometimes holding objectives until the main body arrived, securing of police, underground and intelligence records and fighting "bandit groups."*[83] A GOKO decree also assigned the NKVD to "garrison service" in liberated towns, on a scale of companies through regiments.[84] The Resistance in the Ukraine, which continued until the early 1950s, attacked Soviet authority by establishing its own governmental structures, and by trying to block Military Commissariat/District functions by appealing to the populace to resist mobilization, to falsify registration, to fail to report and, if mobilized, to organize desertions.[85]

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*Soviet terminology for their guerrillas was "partisan;" opposing guerrillas were bandits."

Fighting behind the lines was often intense. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Vatutin, a Front commander, was mortally wounded by OUN (Ukrainian Rebel Army) forces in March 1944. In a single month in the Spring of 1944, SMERSH ("Death to Spies") teams operating with the 1st Ukrainian Front reported 166 operations, the killing or capture of almost 1,000 Ukrainian "bandits," and the seizure of 61 arms cache.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union presented to the world an image of the Ukraine as a national state. In February 1944, USSR Foreign Minister Molotov announced a Ukrainian Union Republic with independent ministries of foreign affairs and defense.[86] This ploy was probably designed to support Soviet demands, and was accepted by the western Allies. Thus, the Ukraine and Byelorrussia gained national vote each in the U.N., which was formed in 1945. However, while V.P. Herasymenko, commander of the reconstituted Kiev Military District, was named Ukraine Commissar of Defense, there is no evidence of actual plans for a Ukrainian national force.[87]

The Military District Role in Re-Occupation and Reconstruction of the Urkaine

In spite of the constant reshuffling of centralized support functions by the High Command, the Military District system remained intact, and grew. The districts served as manpower selector, mobilizer, and trainer, and as an element in the support and supply network. The first through fourth Ukrainian Fronts, while only linked to the Ukraine as they passed through, benefitted from the forced mobilization of young Ukrainians—what the Germans called "booty Ukrainians"—who at one point comprised some 40 percent of the 1st Ukrainian Front.[88] As the Fronts moved out of the USSR,

the Military District fed a general pool out of which manpower and material was allocated, although the primitive state of transport and geography tended to direct the flow of replacements to the Ukrainian Fronts. (For a schematic diagram of the Front/Military District dynamic, see Appendix III.)

Re-established by a special order of the Committee of Defense of October 15, 1943, the Kiev Military District was spun off from Stalingrad Military District staff. In mid-November, it was located in Chernigov and returned to Kiev in January 1944. Its functions included[29]:

- recruiting
- establishing: separate units staffs
                 political administrations
                 military aviation forces
                 artillery commands
- material maintenance
- conduct and improvement of training
- designing military curricula
- raising armored, signal, and chemical cadres
- conversion of some armor and engineer forces into civil engineering and mechanized agricultural roles
- calling up youth for replacement companies
- establishing special experimental locally based units
- manning industry and agriculture
- safeguarding military transportation
- establishing a medical care system

As neat as this roster seems at first glance, those roles were played on a shaky stage, with an uncertain cast, and before a very hostile audience. The Military Commissariats, (voenkemat) the key manpower and training sub-elements of the Military Districts, functioned with advancing and retreating forces, raising labor for industry, forming units, processing grants and pensions and evacuating persons subject to imminent conscription from the front line area.[90] Battered in the Soviet retreat in 1941-42, industrial and transport systems in the Ukraine were further devastated by German scorched-earth tactics in their retreat.

Against this grim backdrop, Soviet rule was reimposed on people who had seen the Soviets routed. In spite of German brutality, many enjoyed the absence of the Stalinist regime.[91] Soviet extractive activities began even before the District was formally reconstituted. For example, requisitions of labor and tools were levied on Donbass miners during the retaking of the Crimea, while grain stores were taken by the "Red Army Fund," activities heavily leavened with "political work."[92] Massive conscription for the Army was paralleled by the drafting of forced labor for rail and road construction and maintenance. [93] Some 40,000 pre-draft youths, and many young girls, were ordered to mine labor.[94]

To many Ukrainians, drafting of males over 15 by the Red Army, other than farmers and workers, and commitment to battle with minimal training seemed a Soviet strategy of using them as cannon-fodder in lieu of deportation or out-of-hand execution.[95] Although such practices stiffened the anti-Soviet partisan movement and led to widespread avoidance of conscription, it may have been an ironic case of misperception, since Ukrainians were being subjected to a military logic in which the conservation of life was far less operational than the Germans', and which applied in other parts of the USSR.[96]

The reimposition of the Soviet system by the Party-cum-Army in the form of the Military Commissariats and Districts is obvious enough. The third leg of the stool of the Soviet triad, however, the Organs of State Security, lies most deeply in shadow. Although blurred and hard to trace, it was as vital in supporting that stool as the other two.

"A War Within a War": The Military Role of the Security Organs

While the military role of Soviet "internal" security organs is often brushed past,[97] others have stressed it. In analyzing the World War II partisan system, for example, Zawodny described the _troika_ system of Soviet government in which centralized control, through three separate chains of command and communication, fused only at the highest level.[98] Notably, the Soviets themselves define KGB and MVD troop units as elements "comprising as an aggregate the Soviet Armed Forces[99]." With that in view, one may consider the visible functions of the NKVD from 1938-1945:

- counterintelligence; interception of spies and anti-Soviet guerrilla cadres

- the first detection of the imminent German attack

- providing large number of officers and senior NCOs to serve as cadres for forming units

- combat at key points, in units as large as small armies,[100] throughout the war, e.g., the defense of Moscow. Beyond the gaggle of NKVD generals and units assembled in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, and Voronezh, reconquest of lost territories, and the conquest of Germany,[101] there are also indications that several army commanders were Chekists[102] who wore standard Army uniforms and insignia.[103]

- Special Detachments (OO)--_osobyi otdel_--to intimidate retreating troops and hesitant commanders, and for spearheading and seizing enemy security and intelligence data, and in some cases, liquidation, mainly early in the war

- salting of agents and informers (_sekosoty_) among the population and in the forces to watch for "wrecking"

- elements of the NKVD Dzerzhinsky Division provided "security" at Yalta

- inception, development and control of a sizable fraction of partisan forces

- manning of SMERSH--_Smyert shpionam_--"Death-to-Spies"--units

- responsibility for prisoner-of-war control and labor (including GULAG)

- control of "Katyusha" rockets[104]

How important was the military role of the "special organs?" The ongoing exhortation for "discipline and good organization," "iron discipline," and admonitions to "Relentlessly Strengthen Discipline,"[105] may be considered alongside the view of German commanders who fought in Russia who viewed such discipline as "the trump card of communism, the motive power of the Army, and was the decisive factor in Stalin's extraordinary political and military successes."[106] Another suggested that Soviet ". . . bull-headed . . . offensive methods . . ." were "due to the way their leaders lived in fear of being considered lacking in determination . . ."[107]

The definition of "troop control" includes the elements of: continuity, firmness, flexibility, quickness of reaction to changes in the situation.[108] At the same time, Stalin's still respected list of "permanent operating factors" in war are interesting to note, especially their ordering:

- stability of the rear

- morale of the army and the home front

- the number and quality of divisions

- the equipment of the army

- quality and capability of command personnel

This is also interesting when laid alongside such concepts as temp nastupleniya—tempo—operational speed—measured in kilometers per hour or per day, depending on the scale of operations;[109] the role of the nachal-niko napravelnii—the napravlentsi—officers assigned to supervise "axes of attack;"[110] and the NKVD's shtrafny batal'ion,[111] and zagraditelnye

otryrad, the "holding detachments."[112] In view of continuing emphasis on centralization and control.[113] One can note that, in World War II, Soviet security troops served as a peculiar, if not perverse, kind of "spare tire" or "reserve tank." If properly calculated force arrays and tempos and motivated troops carried the day, all well and good; but like the water-injector system on a high performance internal combustion engine, the Organs of State Security in their military role offered an extra increment of thrust.

Since the fall of Stalin, the extent to which his successors have reduced or abandoned terror has been a constant theme in Sovietology, and a visible point of criticism in Soviet dissident,[114] nor has utility of coercion been abandoned:

> When conviction alone does not produce the desired results, then coercion is employed. The forms of conduct used by a person are reinforced only in the event of a successful awareness of their expediency and necessity on the part of the individual. If these forms are still reinforced by frequent compulsory repetition by an individual, they are usually weakly assimilated, and a person abandons them once freed from constant psychological pressure. For this reason, coercion is very limited in indoctrination. In controlling conduct though, coercion is more widely applicable, since it is a question not of reinforcing forms of conduct, but rather a single realization of the conduct objectively necessary for the benefit of service. Coercion can force someone to do something on a sufficiently high level, but it cannot educate a person."[115]

The Front-Military District Dynamic in World War II: A Recapitulation

Before proceeding to analysis and suggestions for further research, a recapitulation of the MD-front dynamic is in order.

What Happened When the Fighting Front Approached and Entered the MD?

The Military District headquarters became a focal point in the forming of a Front; the commander and Military District prepared a Front HQ; the

administration of the rear areas suffered, sometimes generating chaos; individual military commissariats continued to function in retreat and advance; sometimes the Front formed in an MD had its command cadre sent in from other MDs, and drew troops and units from a number of MDs, some at great distances.

What Happened to the Front Born of a Particular District?

It floated free of direct connection with the MD; its subsequent direction and support was orchestrated by the VgK's Stavka, which included a close fusion with the Chief of the Services of the Rear, under a centralized system: if pushed out of the parent district, the Front could remain involved in MD-related dynamics by retaining sub-components of the MD in its area, and by controlling and supporting partisans left behind (along with the NKVD/NKGB); in the Ukraine, for example, the MD District Headquarters was re-established upon the regaining of a fragment of lost territory.

What Happened When the Front Re-occupied Former MD/MDs?

Alongside, if not in full coordination with the NKVD, it reimposed Soviet rule in coordination with party elements, including the appointment of mayors; the Military District was re-established; the MD Military Council and military commissariats began to muster forces and resources for the Army and for reconstruction; the geographical juxtaposition of the MDs and the Fronts (only some of which had actually been born in the region for which they were renamed in 1943-44) saw the allocation of supply and manpower from the MD, based on that overlay

What Happened When the Front Advanced Westward, Out of the District?

Allocation of MD manpower and supply to the Front was directed by the Rear Services, i.e., by VgK; again, as a function of propinquity,

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replacements from MDs tended to be assigned to the Fronts named for the region on which the districts lay until the spring battles in Czechoslovakia and Germany, when massive reshuffling under Stavka control took place in the crowded corridor of combat. There was no Ukrainian M.D. The MD's Army and Party elements raised troops, levied labor and supplies, rebuilt facilities, worked on reestablishing Soviet rule, fought partisans in a large sub-war (along with the NKVD/NKGB)

What Happened When the War in Europe ended?

Substantial numbers of troops and commanders and staffs went to prepare for war with Japan; Fronts in the West were disbanded; after the war ended, principal commanders and Stavka officers were assigned to roles in the MDs.

What is the Difference Between Front and MD?

The MD is a politico-logistical-administrative platform that provides a matrix for a range of manpower-related administrative tasks in war and peace; a base for forming large forces at the outset of war, i.e., fleets, Fronts or large Armies, and for subsequent replacement and training; Soviet practice regarding MD Front links has hinged on major, prolonged fighting, or imminent expectation thereof. In the Finnish War, an expected pushover led to an MD controlling heavy combat for a time; in the Far East, Front structures were created long before major operations actually took place.

In essence, existing units and first-line reserves within an MD, along with staffs and commanders operating through a headquarters superimposed on or drawn from MD headquarters were formed on the MD matrix, their geographic designation notwithstanding. In any major movement of the Front, they "slid off" and subsequent formation of separate Fronts was only

loosely tied to specific Military District structures; in addition, extra
MDs were created as it appeared necessary. While, in World War II, strate-
gic planning and direction, and allocation of resources were centralized
under Stalin's immediate control, and how much the design was idiosyncrati-
cally Stalinesque versus a product of expediency and consequent structure
is not easy to appraise, given the continuity of that model of centralized
power and concomitant structures, it seems reasonable to infer something
more than roughly analogous since--and henceforth.

Reflections on the Military Districts of World War II

The Military District is a multi-purpose military-political admini-
strative structure. Many of its functions are rooted in the pre-Soviet
system and can be seen in other systems as well, e.g., the German Wehrkrei-
sen, and in the American Army Corps system established in the National De-
fense Act of 1920, and which lives on, and with many--but not all--of the
functions of the MD[116]. In any case, the MD is Russian and Soviet, and is
the main manpower mobilization forming base, and one which should be evalu-
ated with the Ericksonian triad of doctrine-technology-style in view.
While the essence of Soviet fighting style in the first half of World War
II, especially, was to feel out, to make contact, to mount pressure, and,
then, to layer on a concentration of force which is psychically and physi-
cally unbearable, i.e., an orchestration of mass, velocity and concentra-
tion, the morphology of Soviet operation 1944-45, including the Far East,
reflected a trend toward maneuver. Increasing sophistication of the offi-
cer corps--especially staff depth--and greater mechanical mobility, commu-
nications and tactical refinement are reflected in doctrine moved toward a
model of refined, deft fluidity, reflected in the surprising speed and

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adroitness in Hungary in 1956, and at Prague in 1968. Orchestration of tempo, power and force remained visible elements, but the quality of the players, instruments, and conductors improved.

Studying the various individual functions of the Military Districts and its past patterns of performance, however, is somewhat deceptive. First, there have been substantial improvements at many points in the Soviet system since 1945:

- the formation of, and interaction of the USSR with the Warsaw Pact
- reduction of coercion in discipline and control
- increase in mechanization of the armed forces
- the introduction of helicopters and air-cushion vehicles
- the refinement and expansion of mechanization, and of command-and-control
- substantial upgrading of the Soviet command and staff, including a heavy training of senior party officials in res militariae
- increased literacy and technical capacity of the mobilization base
- new, expanded chemical warfare systems
- sophistication of artillery fire-control techniques
- proliferation of rockets, tactical and strategic
- increase in numbers and airlift of airborne forces
- ethnic profile changes
- computerization of staff process, including war games
- expansion of the Navy
- development of substantial amphibious forces
- extensive overseas basing and advising
- upgrading of military forces of the Organs of State Security
- substantial shifts in the authority relationship and organizational structures relating to aviation and PVO Strany

Beyond that, one must keep in mind such Soviet observations as:

experience of the Great Patriotic War cannot be applied mechanically in present day conditions. More often than not, the Armed Forces will have to defend themselves against a superior enemy...[117]

And:

Instead of the formerly insufficiently mobile, semi-static rear units and establishments operating during the last war,

mobile rear units and establishments were formed, which are well-equipped with transport means and are able to advance with the material supplies behind the attacking troops and to provide over-all support in highly dynamic, offensive operations[118]

Consideration of the Military District, in any event, leads to some further conclusions--and many questions. First, its functions are not clearly within one boundary or a general zone, but diffuse, and a mixture of momentum, design and pragmatism. Second, the MD is generally taken for granted as a kind of sub-element of the fighting structures, like British Army "Commands" and American home armies. Military Districts are a matrix from which flows the human material, sorted, chosen, prepared to the extent possible, depending on time, resources, and urgency-- or at least that was the case in World War II. How much, then, has the Military District been since refined as a node of independence, capable of regeneration and fusion with other surviving sub-elements following a nuclear exchange of other MDs? Is there a studied spreading-out of talent and resources according to a special sub-logic thrust upon the old system by the coming of nuclear weapons and strategic rockets, i.e., a substantial but not immediately visible change in the nature of the Military District?

In this respect, Ken Booth's cautions regarding mirror-imaging from the Anglo-American environment apply, insomuch as the compulsive restructuring can be a signature of the exercise of power in the dynamic of transient careerism, a psychic substitute for careful analysis and use of existing structures, and a reflection of shifts in political fashion, technological fads, or doctrinal exegesis. What of restorative capacity, an article of Soviet doctrine since the 1960s? Can any MD, like a divided

roundworm, grow back to become new organism of power--or is the concentration of power still, as it was in the World Wars, at a nerve center? Is the Moscow MD, with its ABM protection and special units, for example, analagous to the dense and sophisticated air defenses of the capital in World War II?[119]

The pattern of the Military Districts forming from an administrative-political base and support units into a Front, and the fusion of Fronts into regional command has long been a concern of Western analysts.[120] More recently, the evolution of such structures has also been of considerable interest to the Soviets.

One could hypothesize, in order to break set, that the presentation of linear and hierarchical structures in Soviet doctrinal discussion, directly and by implication, is a subtle Byzantine ploy, with Pavlovian overtones, designed to attract Western non-German military professionals' penchant for linearity, which has stamped their "style" since the Napoleonic Wars. Perhaps the Potemkin village of a frontal war may be another pattern of deft chess-like maneuvering in the spirit of Edward Katzenbach's suggestion that the Soviets play chess and Americans play poker, i.e., when they move, we raise them. Perhaps this is designed to distract from a series of "pressure-gain" scenarios a la Robert Asprey in other parts of the world, in which Churchill's view of the Soviets as a burglar trying all the doors and windows stands forth, and in which direct confrontation is always hinted but denied. But analysis must proceed with all contingencies in view--or as many as can be perceived.

Beyond that, how much has the Soviet recapitulation of the Great Patriotic War, beyond being a source of doctrinal data and patriotism[121] been

designed to draw western attention away from other matters?   The shift of emphasis to organizing linear operations parallels the lunge of the U.S. Army back to its doctrinal first-love, theater war in Western Europe, and away from the diffuse, subtle world of COIN and "Go"-like uncertainty of Vietnamese combat.

Another question that comes to mind in considering Military Districts stems from its generic aspect: how useful would the study of World War II--or pre-World War II--American, British, French, German or Japanese military manpower and administrative structures be in gaining insights into those systems, or their predecessors?   Such investigations would be far more interesting to academic historians, one would think at first glance, than to policy analysts.   Nevertheless, such an inquiry would turn over some "nuggets", in the way of mistakes made or advantages won and forgotten in the blur of events and the passage of time, e.g., the problem with security guards which emerged in 1941-42 when the National Guard was mobilized; McNair's battle over standard divisions; the lack of general awareness; the British problems with "Jock columns" and the Germans' with armored division structure.   Some aspects of military history are "time degradable" and scenario or technology related, but some have a rather more generic quality.   In a parallel track, the configuration of elements--i.e., the synergistic output of the fusion of elements--was more vital in some instances than was the quality of those sub-systems measured one by one, e.g., dive-bomber + fighter + tank + radio + doctrine = the blitzkrieg; and fighter + radar + Ultra + radiotelephone + telephone + Ground Observer Corps + doctrine = Fighter Command.   While this can be lumped under the label of "force multiplication," it suggests that the Military District

system, serving as the matrix on which doctrine and forces, as well as changing patterns of personnel selection are layered, is the laboratory bench on which any reconfiguration of existing elements into fresh synergies would be tested. An effective, durable manpower generating mechanism is a "force multiplier," too, even if not to the extent suggested by Walter Kerr in The Secret of Stalingrad.

Consideration of the MDs eventually leads to questions of comparison and ranking. Numbers are elusive--and only suggestive of reality. The fact that a Soviet divisional salvo is 400%, its tanks are 600%, its automatic weapons 1300% and its APCs 3700% above 1939 levels is far less interesting than its ability to focus and deploy that power, alone and within the structure of the Front-Army.[122] In respect to function, a qualitative shift in any of the MD's basic functions--or of its related services of the Rear or a combination thereof--would produce a substantially different product in the equation of screening + pre-training/indoctrination + mobilization + movement to units. Each point in the process can be viewed as the potential epicenter of qualitative change, managed as it is with a greater degree of bureaucratic focus and continuity, and a much tighter relationship with sub-elements than is the case in the West--and subjected to dialectical analysis as well.

On a more elemental level, one basic value in looking at the achievement of the Soviets in World War II under the ghastly pressures of defeat and dislocation is that it points up the resiliency and hardiness of the system, e.g., the institutional vitality of MDs as the basic medium for raising an Army of over 500 divisions.[123] The Military District thus reflects essential durability and simplicity which has characterized the

design of Soviet weapons and tactics, and which can be expected to be seen in future Soviet military equipment and operations. That vitality does not seem to have been eroded by the passage of time, but, rather, has been enhanced by new interests and concerns and by changing technology.

At the same time, analysis of the balance of force in Europe tends to overlook the over one-half million "security troops" organized as regular--and first class--combat units,[124] the value of which emerges again and again in a survey of World War II. But the prime function of the Soviet Military District--mobilization-- has also been overlooked or ignored.[125] Rank-ordering of MDs can follow various logics, from functional density of units over time, and changing patterns, to the assignment of key commanders and staffs, density of elite units and special weapons, complexity of functions, the apparent role in maneuvers as "test bed" for new systems, and so on.[126] Beyond numerical indices, any change in the status of MDs, whether in the forces moved into them, or subtler changes, indicating coiling of a strategic spring aimed at some particular area, would be useful in making estimates of Soviet doctrinal change or intent. Such obvious indications as changes in command, or mode or density of transport, positioning of supplies, security practices, calling off leaves and furloughs, units premovement procedures, et al., are also likely to be covered by a deception plan. From this study, it seems likely that every effort will be made to keep the location and role of the key headquarters invisible, or indeterminate in a shifting field of possible loci. Not yet is the function of the Stavka, even in World War II, clear enough to see how it selected and ranked people and moved them within the system, let alone what those practices have since been.

It seems useful to stress at this point how Soviet professional lit-
erature, since the 1973 Middle East War, has focused on the question of
"theaters of military operations." While denigrating the Western role in
World War II, the Soviets nevertheless display a great deal of interest in
how it was that two unmilitarized nations fought great campaigns on the
land, the sea and in the air at far greater distances from their homeland
than did the USSR, and with much less effective industrial or political
preparation, coercion, and loss of life. Nor can the fact that America
provided the British five to six times the Lend-Lease that the USSR re-
ceived, that the French were re-armed, the Chinese aided and a multi-front
war fought in the Pacific have gone unnoticed. They note in their defini-
tions and discussions that the Western Allies had three-four "TVDs" in the
Pacific, two in Europe and the Mediterranean, and, one each ipso facto, in
the Atlantic and in the Strategic Bombing Offensive. If frustration, re-
structuring and constant override from the top dogged their experience with
much shorter length of command networks, then the effective projection of
power, and war-fighting at any level would require much work, study, system
improvement and confidence--and a basing system at least approximately that
available to the western Allies in World War II (and since much eroded.)

Suggestions for Future Directions of Research

As John Erickson has suggested, in researching Soviet military affairs
one should follow their lead, i.e., watch what they study and do likewise.
That is particularly useful as a research strategy because, first, one must
face the reality of accessibility of data, and, second, because scanning
across the range of their evident interest is necessary in searching for
gaps in the fabric of their doctrinal and conceptual network, especially

since it is known to be structured to conform to several linear logics, and aimed at algorithmic descriptions of complex phenomena. A scan across, as well as, down the pyramids of Soviet logic, then, offers an opportunity to identify blank spots implied by the general trends and patterns of their paradigms and doctrine, and to note the disappearance or deviation of trends of thought from previous patterns. Here, dynamic modelling in graphic format would facilitate perception of a multivariate matrix, the size, complexity and transitions of which obviates narrative description or quantitative representation, and which risks over-reduction. (It would also conform in essence to the excellent, detailed maps which the Soviet General Staff have produced.) Such an approach also forces the analyst to move closer to the Soviet style and rigor, and away from fragmentary episodic, uneven, anecdotal and romanticized accounts which comprise much of Western academic military analysis.

By implication, then, research in Soviet defense requires vigor to match their deliberate, methodical approach. First, basic data needs to be arrayed, and simple, tedious analysis done of what is at hand, e.g., analyzing the tables of contents of the military journals (Voyennaya Mysl, Krasnya Zvezda, Voyenno Istoriicheskii Zhurnal, Voyenny Vestnik, Tyl', Morskoy Sbornik, et al.) and then proceeding on to topical and thematic appraisal, content and key word analysis, and codification of priorities of placement, word length, authorship, etc. Also of use would be an identification of western sources cited in Soviet analysis.

While analysis is hampered by censorship, fragmented and scattered data, inconsistency[127] and the spectre of disinformatsiya and propaganda, one can proceed in search of "nuggets" and patterns, in keeping with the

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admonitions of Richard Pipes, et. al.[128] Many questions and implications have emerged from this study. The following discussion, necessarily selective and impressionistic, deals with the most salient.

The complex aspects of the MDs need to be viewed in context, which suggests the utility of dynamic modeling and schematics to search for patterns, linkages, isomorphs and correlations, for example, a study of Russian/Soviet mobilization in the following wars with focus on tempo, patterns of deployment and the draw-down on MDs would cover much ground which Soviet analysts have studied in the search for data:

- the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78

- the Russo-Japanese War of 1904

- the First World War, 1914

- the Finnish War, 1939-40

- the Hitler War, 1941-42

- the Far East, 1945

- the Korean War, 1950-51 (a Soviet trained, equipped and advised army
  in a planned attack)

- the Hungarian invasion of 1956

- the Czech intervention of 1968

- the Afghanistan campaign, 1979-?

The 1941 and 1956 cases have certain parallels, given the mobilization of forces in Siberia in some haste. The invasion occupation of Poland in 1939 and Bessarabia in 1941, and the quasi-war with Japan in 1939 might also be included. Of special interest would be the identification of functions and procedures which appeared in many or most instances immediately before deployment outside Russia.

Beyond that, one may inquire further as to what extent mandatory military service fits into the scheme of forced labor and to what extent the dispersion of sizable numbers of nationalist youth, mixed among other elements, to various parts of the Union as military conscripts, given its origins in Stalinist era was (and is) a strategy of hostaging against revolt. What is the pattern, if any, of the location of units of the Red and the Soviet Army which were (and are) raised within districts which have some degree of non-Russian ethnic proponderance (other than those clearly relegated to awaiting roles)? Is their dispersion linked to adjacent security troops and elite units of the general force according to a ratio, pattern or a formula as were, for example, the forces of the Indian Army in the days of the Raj?

Analysis of such problems would focus less on tactical operations (although tactical morphological studies might be illuminating) and more on stages in build-up and assembly of commands and units, in mobilization and combat, of command-and-control arrangements, and on the origins of sub-units and rear services/field administration mechanisms.

A broad ranging assembly of data on "physiological" aspects of the MD requires tabular, graphic and subsequent qualitative analysis, using data drawn from emigre transcripts, German veterans of the Eastern Front, and German documents--memoirs, veteran and POW interviews, unit histories, the special monographs written by Ostfront veterans for the Western allies in the early Cold War, and microfilmed war diaries, and the records of Foreign Armies East, Soviet military journals and books, the Soviet Military Encyclopedia, and histories of Soviet combat formations and Military Districts, to examine such matters as:

- patterns of increase, decrease and boundary change over time relative to periods of tension, mobilization and demobilization, and especially the doubling of the number of MDs in World War II
- patterns of raising and movement of units and of "fillers" from the MDs to the fighting fronts and other areas, to interface with a dynamic model of combat unit movement and deployment in wartime; many unit histories have time-and-route maps, from mobilization through operations to demobilization, printed inside their covers; the CVE has a number of flow maps as well
- patterns of officer recruitment, by technical specialty and in respect to mobility and assignment, relative to military districts, i.e., are there "military regions" in the USSR like the American South, Ulster, Brittany, Scotland, or the Punjab[129], which provide disproportionately large percentages of regular officers?
- percentages of population mobilized from MDs relative to assignment to various specialties and duties, technical and political
- the distribution of technical training facilities, and of civil and military educational institutions

Beyond such patterns are some underlying questions:
- what is the relationship between various categories of Soviet units and designated eliteness? One sees, for example, references to the Cossack Infantry Division as part of the VgK reserve in World War II; were (are) the Guards, Shock, and NKVD/KGB elite combat-type forces part of a system in which standard and substandard units (including penal units and the use of "blocking forces") were (are)

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orchestrated and risk distributed in inverse--or direct--proportion to the criticality of the situation?

- is there a policy in regard to "fighting down" units to some level, or of rotating units? Obviously, the early campaigns of World War II offer little of an answer to such a question--except to show the system reacting to great trauma.

- what (is) the pattern of using various ethnic units?

Evidence on the use of Ukrainian conscripts in 1944, for example is contradictory; the presence of non-uniformed combatants in sustained battle in the Ukraine is now explained as a case of partisans fighting alongside their Army comrades. Certain ethnic groups were denied officer and technical roles in 1941-43.

Beyond that, in developing an index of Military District significance, one would likely find variation in certain facets of function and performance providing a sense of importance beyond a "general score." A crucial point in such an analysis would be the period of transition after World War II, when Stalin ordered General Staff officers and commanders out to the Military Districts at the end of hostilities. This offers another index in developing a pattern of links and of MD priority or significance. Who went where? Which commanders? What staff officers? What units?

The role of the MD's in the war was examined closely. While the utility of military history had been rejected in the General Staff Academy during the war, it was reinstituted almost immediately. In promulgating guidelines for the levels of knowledge of graduates of The General Staff Academy, the People's Commissariat of Defense in 1946 insisted that they know: "the principles of the operational preparation of a border district

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for war and the principles of the completion of the mobilization of Military District forces."[130] The tracking through of luminaries of the Second World War, through their proteges down to the present Soviet Command army has undoubtedly been done by intelligence order-of-battle specialists, but academic analysis has been more fragmentary. In a parallel vein, a straightforward Soviet unit lineage, to mesh with battle tracking would be useful, especially if further compared with Military District linkages. Certainly more needs to be done in looking at possible correlations of mobility in the officer corps, e.g., education, "class" and geographical origins; political links; doctrine and weapons affiliation, and clique formations—and MD experiences.

Other more complicated problems, requiring sensitivity to the fragility and scarcity of evidence include such questions as:

- the doctrine and the experience behind it in respect to Rear Area Security, in the Military Districts, Rear Services, and combat zones; in this context, references to anti-Soviet guerrillas east of the Nazi limit of advance are tantalizing; how were (are) the Security Organ custodians of strategic weapons, the traffic control units (which are not called military police, but which function as such), the railway and transport services fused? How do they operate and interact in the routine business of the Military District? How would they in mobilization and war?

- is there a clear boundary between Military Districts, beyond mere technical jurisdiction? Do vehicles, for example, pass through military or administrative surveillance or clearance?

- is the Military District designed as a kind of strategic autarchy, to fight on its own if necessary in the aftermath of major post-nuclear exchange, with each unit of organization comprising a zygote or clone of the Soviet system?
- how much is the MD a form of creative diversity, a laboratory consciously monitored and manipulated, in Pavlovlian style, to gain a corpus of experimental data to refine and develop systems?

Another topic worthy of close analysis, the "Security of the Rear," can be divided into several dimensions of activity and purpose beyond manpower allocation. "The Security of the Rear" in Soviet usage does not equate directly with the US term of "Rear Area Security." The latter is based on a view of the "rear" as the various support echelons and structures in the wake of field armies. While the Soviet Rear (Tyl') of fighting Fronts is roughly analogous in Stalin's prime "operational requirement," still in use, the "Security of the Rear" conforms to Lenin's view of the "rear" being the whole nation. In any case, diversion of Soviet (manpower and substantial womanpower) to activities other than fighting or support of the fighting fronts merits study, to determine how much the USSR was hampered by problems of internal security, sabotage, espionage, industrial dislocation, fighting "bandits," maintenance of the GULAG, line-of-communications security, frontier defense, maintenance of forces in the Far East and displacement and control of large numbers of dissident or suspect minorities. An analysis of Soviet women in the war of the caliber of Odom's study of paramilitary forces is needed, with clearer perception of the role of the Military District in mobilizing and relying

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on women. The extent to which resources were allocated to defense of head-quarters and of Soviet leaders would also be useful in determing the extra cost of totalitarianism in war, a hidden tariff on political illegitimacy.

Another vital question is: is the _Stavka_ function, in the form of people and doctrine, spread out through the hierarchies of the Military District System, as a kind of pre-program designed to reconstitute a VgK, Fronts, neo-Glavkoms or TVDs? Was, therefore, the disbanding of Glavkom and the short-lived Red Army Staff Officer Corps in 1941-42 a case of _Stavka_ stamping out bureaucratic rivals--or was it due to a dearth of talent, even at that level? Does the heir to the _Stavka_ serve as a nexus of human transponders in a large cybernetic system, in keeping with the original model of the _Grossegeneralstab_? Is the Military Council, in fact, a kind of shadow staff in that network? If so, how politicized is it, i.e., how reliably Communist? How much does the Party hierarchy cross-train into such a mode? Is that the real significance of key MD commanders and other principal's role in the Central Committee? Beyond that, has the number of people in and quality of the pseudo-crypto-_Stavka_, actual or _de facto_, and improved training, reduced or eliminated potential problems of inadequate _Feldverwaltung_, and lack of sophistication in lower tiers that led to battle-manager teams and the "law of the revolver?" Beyond that, would an increase in deftness, of _kultura shtabnaya_, merely mean a smoother replay of older doctrine and tactics? Or has it changed sub-logics and doctrine to an extent not revealed in maneuvers, not visible to emigres in their pawn level positions in, for the most part, marginal elements in the Soviet military, glimpsed only through such Ignatian tracts as those of Kontorov and Druzhinin? Thus, seeing the Soviet system as a linear or even second-order

extrapolation from the World War II experience and accounting for visible technology may be only one line in a spectrum of alternatives.

In this respect, one might consider the following thoughts on the reading-out of complex systems:[131]

> "It is never possible to measure anything to arbitrarily high precision. The only exception to this are some measurements that involve counting...However any measurement that involves measuring a continuous variable, such as voltage or position, is necessarily inexact even in principle. The reason for this is that any detector and associated equipment is made of material and that material is at a finite temperature. The atoms and electrons that make up the material jostle around in a random manner and because of this they give rise to a signal that is essentially indistinguishable from the signal that you are trying to measure..."

"We can sum up this problem in three words:

> DISSIPATION IMPLIES NOISE

> "Since any system has dissipation (with the possible exception of superconductors and superfluids), any system has noise. In many cases all that is necessary is to find the analagous quantities....to be able to treat the case completely."

Since despair is not a strategy, one approach to reducing the problem would be a careful look, across a wide range of material, at the command and staff process, a subject all too little dealt with in military science, history and strategic studies in the West. The dynamic is more than an approximation of the organization chart (and vice versa) and Soviet accounts rarely describe command and staff procedures or actual operational order extracts, etc., beyond cheerleading "Orders of the Day" which are far from five-paragraph field orders, estimates, journal and war diary entries, or after-action reports. In each of functional staff areas, only bits and pieces lie strewn about to suggest how the system has worked or works

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compared with how it is <u>built</u>, or what the end product may have been. In a similar vein, little descriptive graphic is available on headquarters or location.

Another study of value would be close examination of German, Allied, (including attache reports and technical service histories) and Soviet sources regarding Lend-Lease, not for the purpose of judging its cruciality but to follow it, as a kind of radioactive tracer through the administrative-logistical guts of the Soviet system—perhaps one reason why, beyond defensiveness and chauvinism, Soviet references to its role are relatively recent and very fragmentary. In this vein, the role of foreign contingents, e.g., Czech, Polish, French, British, American, might be examined as a whole, and compared with units raised from among Axis POWs and in the eastern European countries.

On the Orchestration of Research

Hopefully, orchestrating of Soviet military studies to fill in fuzzy and blank vectors in the general view of World War II and subsequent developments, and a move toward synthesis, would produce gradients of effectiveness of commanders, of techniques, of doctrine, of units and of Military Districts. A close study of such operations as Kursk, or Operation <u>Bagration</u>, in which data from both sides can be studied in depth would be useful, especially when dovetailed with links to Military District. A typology and a rank-ordering of Military Districts might emerge, analogous to the three categories of combat units. Some sense of what was learned, retained and discarded might also be attained. The dynamics of academic

research, however, based on individual impulse and interest, makes such orchestration and cooperation difficult. The low level of enthusiasm for Soviet military studies correlates with a low level of academic interest in military analysis in the U.S., and, growingly, in Europe. Indeed, enthusiasm seems inversely proportional to academic rank and prestige. If a significant change were to be effected, it seems that effort would best be placed at the undergraduate level, where development of a broad, interdisciplinary data base, sensitivity, and language skill, as well as a sense of military affairs in the broadest sense, can be developed, and where interest is keenest. While more research needs to be done, the real problem is: who is going to do it?

A Prognosticatory Post-Script

How has the MD functioned on the verge of Soviet aggression? Cases from the World War II era,--Poland, Finland, Manchuria, (1938-9 and 1955)-- indicate a pattern of infusion of fresh commanders and staff, and augmentation of Frontier districts with troops and equipment from other areas. In Finland, as in Afghanistan, relatively small numbers of elite forces served as the cutting edge, with reserves bearing the brunt in the opening operations. NKVD forces were especially active along the Western borders in 1939-41. (A KGB officer controlled the air incursion into Prague in 1968, and, apparently, the Soviet move on Kabul in 1979.) Notably, formation of Fronts has not followed a tight template; rather, ad hoc task-forcing around a central principle, using the scalpel first and, then, an axe, if necessary, seems to be the pattern--in aggression.

In view of this, one could build a model in opposition to the widely held view that the forces "poised" in Eastern Europe, heavily laced with

Guards and Shock units would crash into CENTAG. However, one might, see (or not see) the masked deployment of second and third class units, including mobilized reserves moving under the cover of large-scale maneuvers held in stages, to absorb the first shock of battle; after western forces were worn down and drawn in, the top-grade units would be used only after identification of the schwerpunkt. In such an instance, shifts in the activity of the Military Districts (a decrease, or profile change) might be the indicators, swallowed in the "noise" of maneuvers or "limited" mobilization. The first changes might take place far from the zone of contact, with those closest (and most closely watched) making indicative movements at the very last, on the verge of, or after attack. A variant would be the use of very few elite forces with larger standard forces feinting, with the best units --Guards and, Shock Armies, airborne divisions, spetznaz, amphibious forces--making deep flank thrusts after Western forces were drawn into massing to parry the Big Push. In such an instance the lead forces, under the guise of maneuvers or a sequence of maneuvers, could move through Military Districts and perhaps other regions which might otherwise proceed about their normal routine.

The key MDs might remain passive, with concentration or assembly of force following a curve in reverse of normal expectation, bringing forces to be committed from afar and reserves from near, and creating unexpected cadences and densities of attack. Front and sector/theater commands would co-occupy or spin out of MDs, again with little no perceptible shift in routine and traffic. Indeed, the maintenance of headquarters which operate up to and over the borderlines of strategic mobilization and deployment would not be seen to be operating outside normal limits, offering certain

advantages in the realm of maskirovka, as well as a means to nodal survival and as a cellular element in integral defense. In that sense, typologies and indices of MD activity in various modes would be very interesting, indeed.

The arraying of headquarters and the role of the various levels of command would be obviously crucial in any assemblage of forces. Soviet command-and-control literature stresses the need for being prepared to function in "degraded states" of communication. The retention of obsolete and obsolescent matériel also suggest that anticipation of functioning in a more technologically primitive state is reflected in reserves of equipment as well as in training and doctrine. The role of the MDs in such a "degraded" state of affairs, as links, transponders, alternate headquarters-staff sites, and as the repositories of arrays of older equipment more suitable for a decline in infrastructure, offers an interesting perspective from which to view the patterns of Soviet maneuvers in the MDs since the coming of nuclear weapons--and, beyond that, the content of the MD official histories.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

1. E.g., V. Karpov, "Operatsiya Gruppui Frontov Kak Osnovnaya Forma Reshenya Strategichskiz Zadach na TVD," _Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal_, (1981:8) pp. 66-74.

2. E.E. Kosmunov, _Russkii Front Pervoy Mirovoi Voynui_ (Moskva: Izdatel-stvo "NAUKA"; 1976.)

3. See n.a., _Führungstabe der Roten Armee_, OKH, Gen. Stab, Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost, Oct. 1944, Microfilm frame #6489362 ff; for a recent analysis of the problem in the Russian Army in World War I, see Daniel W. Graf. "Military Rule Behind the Russian Front, 1914-1917: The Political Ramification," _Geschichte Osteuropa_ (22:3) 1974, pp. 390-391.

4. John Erickson, "Leadership Command and Control in the Soviet Army" April, 1981, University of Edinburgh: Defence Studies, 23 pp.

5. _Great Soviet Encyclopedia_, 3rd ed., (New York, Macmillan, 1974) vol. 5, p. 258.

6. _Sovietska Voennaya Entsiklopediya_, (Moscow: Ministry of Defense, 1976) vol. 2, pp. 270-271.

7. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d., (Moscow, 1968) p. 43.

8. Alfred Meyer, _The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation_ (New York: Random House, 1965) pp. 59-64.

9. "Regionality and Territoriality in Soviet Military Policies," _Soviet Military Digest_, May, 1979, pp. 13-14.

10. For one perspective, see Graham Stephenson, _Russia From 1812 to 1945_ (New York: Praeger, 1970) p. 117.

11. A.M. Nikolaeff, "Universal Military Service in Russia and Western Europe," _Russian Review_ (8:2) April, 1949, pp. 120-3

12. E.E. Rosmunov, _op cit_.

13. V. Ryabov, _The Soviet Armed Forces Yesterday and Today_. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 27.

14. _Soviet Military Encyclopedia_, Vol. 8, pp. 332-333.

15. n.a. _Dictionary of Basic Military Terms_ (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office) (Moscow, 1965) transl. Canadian Secretary of State Dept., p. 230.

16. A. Timorin and V. Terent'yev, "Soviet Military Organization and Its Historical Forms," _Military Thought_ (1971:4) pp. 101-102.

17.   This is also found in contemporary definitions of front, e.g., Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, p. 230; "under modern conditions of nuclear missile warfare, the distinction between front and rear has virtually disappeared."

18.   Walter Darnell Jacobs, Frunze: The Soviet Clausewitz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969) pp. 170-171.

19.   B. Veselov, "The Army Rear During Offensive Operations in the Great Patriotic War," Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces (1979:12), p. 53.

20.   S. Kurotkin, "The Rear Services of the Armed Forces, Past and Present," Military Thought (1973:12), pp. 46-62.

21.   I. Zhernoscek, "On Theoretical Bases for the Development of Principles and Systems of Rear Support." Military Thought (1965:4) p. 9.

22.   S.M. Shtemenko, The Last Six Months (Garden City: Doubleday) 1977, p. 4.

23.   S. Maryakhin, "Rear Support of the Soviet Armed Forces During the Great Patriotic War," Military Thought (1971:9), p. 92.

24.   I. Bagramayan, "Development of Rear Services of Armed forces," Military Thought (1967:4), p. 26.

25.   I. Golushko, " The USSR Armed Forces Rear in the Great Patriotic War," Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces (1971:6) pp. 41-45.

26.   Hans Hinrich, "The Supply System of the Soviet Army," in The Red Army, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956) p. 225.

27.   Shtemenko, Last Six Months, p. 4-6.

28.   A. Sharipov, General Chernyakovsky, transl. Yuri Shirolov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980), pp. 295-6.

29.   Ibid., p. 297.

30.   Earl F. Ziemke. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, D.C.,: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961) p. 36; also see p. 240 on Vasilevsky's role in January, 1944.

31.   Veselov, op. cit., p. 53.

32.   N. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office n.d.) (Moscow, 1973), p. 125.

33.   S. Maryakhin, "Rear Support of the Soviet Armed Forces During the Great Patriotic War," Military Thought (1971:9), pp. 95 and 100.

34. F. Patyka and I. Chahan, "The Principles of Military Art in the Sphere of the Rear Services," Military Thought (1967:9), p. 61.

35. Georgii K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (London: Jonathan Cape, 1971) p. 517.

36. e.g., see O. Gurov, "The Bagration Operation," Technology and Armament (1976:6), p. 52.

37. Maryakhin, op. cit., p. 98.

38. Veselov, op. cit., p. 54; also see M. Novikov, "Rear and Support of the Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Offensive Against Berlin and Prague," Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces, (1975:4) pp. 67-72.

39. A. Shobunin, "The Rear of the Third Ukrainian Front in the Balaton and Vienna Operation," Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces. (1979:3) p. 58.

40. Vasili Peskov, This is My Native Land (Moscow: Progress Publishers) 1976, p. 107.

41. V.I. Chuikov, The End of the Third Reich (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978) p. 149.

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43. See translator's note, K. Abramov and M. Ivanov, "Leninist Ideas Concerning the Role of the Rear in Warfare," Military Thought (1971:9), p. 25.

44. Richard Woff, "The Military District: The War Role," pp. 200-221, in Erickson Research Group, The Soviet Military Districts, The Fleets and Forces in a Mobilized Mode, (College Station: Center for Strategic Technology, 1980).

45. V. Ivanov and A. Arkhipov, "Leadership of Military Operations in Theaters of Military Operations Based in the Experiences of World War II," Military Thought (1976:4) pp. 71-72.

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47. N. Krylov, Glory Eternal: Defence of Odessa, 1941. (Moscow: Progress Publishers) 1972, pp. 30-31, pp. 45,52.

48. Ibid., p. 104.

49. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War, 1941-45. (New York: Praeger, 1971) p. 205.

50. C.C. Potoskii, et al., The Soviet Army. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971) p. 100.

51. n.a., Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45: A General Outline, transl. D. Svirsky and Vic Scheirson (Moscow: Progress Pub- lishers, 1974) p. 451.

52. See G.K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov's Greatest Battles (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) p. 229.

53. S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-45. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970) p. 157-158.

54. Potoskii, op. cit., p. 149.

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56. Ibid., pp. 327-348.

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60. op. cit., p. 150.

61. Ibid., p. 211.

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63. E.g., A. Dobrayakov, "Military Communications in the Belorussian Op- eration," Rear and Supply of Soviet Armed Forces (1970:5) p. 68.

64. Colonel-General A.S. Zheltov, "The Third Ukrainian Front in the Bal- kans" in n.a., The Great March of Liberation (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972) p. 116.

65. See Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner, eds., Documents on Soviet Military Law and Administration. (Cambridge: Harvard, 1955) p. 29.

66. S. Ostrakov, Voeyennye Chekisti. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979) p. 124.

67. For various perspectives see Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine, 1941-44: A Study of Totalitarian Imperialism, (Milwaukee:

Marquette University Press, 1956) and Robert S. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-57 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) pp. 228-245.

68.   For the most recent indictments, see Alexei Tolstoi, Stalin's Secret War. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1981.

69.   John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Praeger, 1959), p. 126.

70.   Michael J. Deane, Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Crane and Russak, 1977) p. 19.

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72.   John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War With Germany (New York: Harper and Row, 1975) p. 27.

73.   Dymtro Doroshenko, A Survey of Ukrainian History (Winnipeg: Humeniuk Publishing Foundation, 1975) p. 761.

74.   See Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, trans. A.G. Powell (Chicago, Regnery, 1958) pp. 179-180.

75.   See John A. Armstrong, Soviet Partisans in World War II. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964) esp. pp. 39-54.

76.   Armstrong, Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, pp. 132-33.

77.   Armstrong, Politics of Totalitarianism, p. 150.

78.   Leo Hieman, "Russification of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1967," Ukraine Quarterly (xxiv: 1) Spring, 1968, pp. 38-48.

79.   One analyst has argued that the disproportionate influence of Russified Ukraine commanders as part of a "Stalingrad Group" which moved into key positions under Khrushchev. See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) p. 244.

80.   Ivan Sevic, Ukraine Review (iii:1), March 1956, pp. 19-20.

81.   Zhukov, op. cit. 553.

82.   Dymtro Doroshenko, A Survey of Ukrainian History. (Winnipeg: Humeniuk Publishing Foundation, 1975) p. 761.

83. Ostryakov, op. cit., 173-174.

84. O.G. Behov, I.K. Boyko and M.S. Logunov, Imeni Dzerzhinski (Voenizdat: Moscow, 1976) p. 126.

85. Ibid., p. 176.

86. Robert S. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 1917-1957 (New York: Columbia, 1962) p. 245.

87. Ibid., p. 250.

88. Ziemke, op cit., p. 299.

89. N.a., Krasnozhamennuiy: Istoriya Krasnozhamenniy Kievskogo Voennei Okrug, 1919-1972 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974) pp. 274-276.

90. N. Shelakov, "Development of Local Organs of Military Control in the Past 50 Years," Military Thought, (1967:12) pp. 20-21.

91. Abraham A. Hurwica, ed., Aspects of Contemporary Ukraine. (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago, 1955) p. 189.

92. N. Animosov, "Rear Support of the Troops in the Operation to Liberate the Crimea," Rear and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces, (1974:4) pp. 71-73.)

93. Werth, op. cit., p. 798.

94. Kubojovyc, op. cit., vol. 1, 1963, p. 894; also see M. Ivanov and A. Tomachevskiy, "Party Political Work in Rear Services Chasti and Installations During the Years of the Great Patriotic War," Journal of the Rear Services (1977:9) p. 52.

95. Yarslov Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II. (New Brunswick: Rutgers) 1964, pp. 29-30.

96. E.g., Zhukov's comment to Eisenhower that Soviet attacks through un-cleared minefields were made on the basis that such losses equalled those inflicted by machine guns and artillery in positions defended by troops, quoted in Raymond Garthoff's Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The Free Press: 1953) p. 237.

97. Alexander Werth: "The role of the NKVD in actual military operations is rather obscure..."; Russia at War, 1941-1945, p. 227. Herbert Goldhamer: "The KGB plays, no doubt, an important surveillance role, but...un-classified Soviet materials...maintain a total silence on this instrument of control...; The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level. New York, Crane Russak, 1975, p. 256, and Jeffrey Record: "(the KGB and MVD are) essentially paramilitary formations whose principal functions are to police Soviet borders, and in the event of war, to secure rear

areas and uphold the authority of the Soviet state within both military and civil populations"; _Sizing up the Soviet Army_ (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975) p. 8.

98. J.K. Zawodny, "Soviet Partisans," _Soviet Studies_ (xii: 3) January 1966, p. 373.

99. A Timorin and V. Terent'yev, "Soviet Military Organization and its Historical Forms," _Military Thought_ (1971:4), p. 96.

100. Collective authorship, _Pogranichyye Voiskia SSSR VV.O.V. 1942-1945_. (Moscow: Nauka, 1976.)

101. The NKVD Special Division served in the GHQ Reserve, and was maintained at full strength.

102. Oleg Penkovskiy, _The Penkovskiy Papers_. Transl. Peter Deriabin (New York: Doubleday) 1965, p. 37.

103. Victor Kravchenko, _I Chose Freedom_ (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1946) p. 427.

104. David Dallin, _The Real Soviet Russia_ (New Haven: Yale, 1947) p. 297.

105. Grechko, _Armed Forces_, p. 175; n.a., "Relentlessly Strength Discipline," _Military Herald_ (1972-79), pp. 1-6.

106. F.W. von Mellenthin, _Panzer Battles_, transl. H. Betzler (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma, 1956) p. 294.

107. B.H. Liddell Hart, _The Other Side of the Hill_ (London: Cassell, 1951) p. 336; also see p. 323; and James Lucas, _War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945: The German Soldier in Russia_. (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), pp. 31-32 and 35-36. General Gunther Blumentritt, in a postwar treatise, related a German radio intercept of messages between a regimental and division headquarters (Gunther Blumentritt, "Moscow," in Seymour Freidin and William Richardson, _The Fatal Decisions_, transl. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: William Sloane and Associates, 1956) p. 79).:

> "Regiment CO to HQ: 'Temporarily impossible to carry out attack as ordered., Twelve hour postponement necessary.'"

> "Division HQ: 'You will attack at once. If not, I'm afraid your health will suffer.'"

108. _Basic Military Terms_, p. 226.

109. _Ibid_., p. 221.

110. John Erickson, "Soviet Command Technology: 'Troop Control' and Time" _Soviet Military Digest_, April 1979, p. 9.

111. Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Doctrine (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 248.

112. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, p. 176.

113. A. Dunin, "The Evolution of the Soviet Land Forces Since the End of World War II," transl. Reuben Airstein, Survival (xxi:1) Jan./Feb., 1979, pp. 26-29.

114. E.g. see John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957), pp. 72-73; and "The Power of the KGB" in Petr Grigorovich Grigorenko, The Grigorenko Papers (Boulder: Westview, 1976), pp. 75-125.

115. V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotochkin and K.K. Platonov, Military Psychology. (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1972) (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.) p. 254; the authors, in further discussion use the phrase "control of conduct" in lieu of "coercion."

116. A Reserve Corps Commander was reportedly relieved during the 1961 Berlin Crisis call-up for a breakdown in the filler-assignment system.

117. Ivan Parotkin, The Battle of Kursk (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974) p. 201.

118. Bagramyan, op. cit., p. 32.

119. 100 P-39s could be in the air in 30 seconds of warning; there were three rings of bases, the outer ring with engines running and pilots planes for four hours; a second ring with engines warmed once an hour, with pilots also in planes; and an inner ring with engines warmed every two hours, and pilots on standby in tents, described in Edward V. Rickenbacker, Rickenbacker (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968) p. 348.

120. Louis B. Ely, The Red Army Today (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1949) pp. 168-170 and p. 242.

121. E.g., see Leon Goure, The Military Indoctrination of Soviet Youth (New York: NSIC, 1973) p. 33.

122. Lt.-Gen. A. Dunin, "The Evolution of the Soviet Land Forces Since the End of World War II," Survival (XXI:1) January-February, 1979) p. 28.

123. On the 1st of January, 1945, in Europe, the Germans had 260 divisions in the field in all theaters; the western Allies, (including Poles, Brazilians, French et al.) had 92; the Soviets 441. See Barton Whaley, Strategem and Surprise in War. ARPA Study # 920 F-9717, 1969, p. 162.

124. See The Military Balance, 1980-81 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981) for data.

125. See Robert Lucas Fischer, <u>Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces</u>, Adelphi Paper 127 (London: IISS, 1976) p. 28-29, which states that in a major battle that for "replacements it (the Warsaw Pact) would have to draw on the other divisions in the Soviet Union... (a) 50-division force... would represent the entire Soviet strategic reserve," and a footnote: "In the long run, of course, both sides could begin generating new units, if the war did not end. This possibility might be worth a few cheap hedges - but should not strongly influence peacetime planning."

126. For example, arraying MDs on the basis of percentage of divisions assigned within the MDs produces the following rank ordering, based on Richard Woff, <u>Briefing Papers on Command Changes in the Soviet Military</u> (College Station: Center for Strategic Technology, 1981) pp. 55-155, and D. Fedotoff White, <u>The Growth of the Red Army</u>. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) p. 359.

Ranking (1935 structure terminology used)

	1935	1980	%Change
Kharkhov-Kiev	24%-1	23%-2	-1
Far East-Maritime	12.5%-3	23.6%-1	+11.4
Belorussia	14.4%-2	7.9%-5	-6.5
Moscow	10%-4	7.6%-6	-2.4
Volga	8.6%-5	2.1%-10	-6.5
N. Caucasus	6.7%-6/7	5%-8	-17
Transcaucasus	6.7%-6/7	8.7%-4	+2
Leningrad	6.25%-8/9	6.2%-7	-0.5
Central Asia	6.25%-8/9	11.5%-3	+5.25
Siberia	3.8%-10	4.5%-9	+.7%

127. E.g., maps and narrative in some histories do not jibe.

128. See <u>Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Soviet Strategic Forces</u>, House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: 1980) pp. 8-9.

129. See John Erickson, <u>On the Investigation of Soviet Military Institutions</u>.

130. V.G. Kulikov, ed. <u>The General Staff: A History of the "K. Ye. Voroshilov" Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Order of Lenin and Suvorov 1st Class"</u> (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976) p. 221.

131. In L. Marton and W.F. Hornyyak, <u>Methods of Experimental Physics: Problems and Solutions for Students</u>. (New York: Academic Press, 1969) pp. 1-10.

APPENDIX I

STAFF ORGANIZATION FRONTS (ARMIES)
*Compiled by John Erickson
Based on VIZ, March 1981, and Other Sources

	Pre-war Establishment		19 September 1941		22 March 1942		18 March 1944	
Command group	9	(9)	7	(7)	9	(5)	7	(6)
Operations admin. (unpravlenic)	–	–	–	–	–	–	69	–
Operations section	35	(40)	36	(34)	59	(32)	33	(26)
Auxiliary CP	–	–	–	–	–	(6)	–	–
Reconnaissance section	85	(13)	63	(11)	102	(16)	87	(15)
Fortified district (UK) section	–	–	9	–	22	–	–	–
Combat/physical training section	–	–	–	–	–	–	11	(6)
Topographic section	22	(13)	17	–	16	–	14	(5)
Organization/manning section	34	(17)	24	(13)	33	(12)	39	(16)
Cyphers	29	–	73	(12)	78	(14)	33	(16)
Rear services, supply, road movement	36	(41)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Military communications (VOSO)	41	(21)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Economic section	35	(22)	44	(15)	39	(10)	55	(6)
Finance	5	–	3	(2)	3	(2)	3	(2)
Komendatura	2	(1)	1	(1)	1	(1)	4	(1)
Office	–	–	–	–	–	–	11	(5)
Total military personnel	333	(117)	277	(95)	362	(98)	333	(104)
Total civilian personnel	21	(18)	31	(7)	41	(7)	45	(11)

* Figures in brackets (   ) – represent establishments for army.

ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE FIELD ADMINISTRATION OF FRONTS (ARMIES) 1940-1944

	Pre-war Establishment		19 September 1941		22 March 1942		18 March 1944	
Military Soviet	11	(5)	8	(6)	8	(7)	11	(9)
Staff	333	(177)	277	(95)	362	(98)	333	(104)
Political Administration (section)	–	–	112	(–)	123	(–)	124	(51)
Artillery Cdr. Admin.	78	(44)	54	(34)	99	(42)	103	(55)
Armoured/mech. cdr. admin.	41	(19)	29	(16)	45	(17)	58	(11)
Engineer Administration (section)	50	(6)	27	(8)	25	(5)	29	(8)
Signals admin. (section)	72	(12)	41	(14)	49	(13)	56	(20)
PVO Admin. (section)	21	(5)	20	(4)	13	(3)	–	–
Chemical Admin. (section)	15	(3)	10	(9)	13	(6)	20	(5)
Chief/Rear Services	224	(100)	248	(121)	301	(118)	375	(142)
Captured weapons	–	–	–	–	–	–	29	(15)
Combat training section	13	(4)	5	2	7	(2)	–	–
Airborne services	15	(–)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Cadres/personnel	52	(17)	33	(16)	32	(13)	35	(14)
Cavalry Inspectorate	–	–	–	–	9	–	–	–
Military Procuracy/	–	–	–	–	–	–	22	(10)
Tribunal	–	–	–	–	–	–	18	(8)
Total military	925	(392)	864	(325)	1,086	(324)	1,213	(452)
Attached civilians	55	(35)	69	(25)	140	(32)	210	(61)

* Figures in brackets (   ) - represent establishments for army.

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX II

The Creation and Reorganization of Fronts
in World War II

Military Districts in the Zone of Contact at the Beginning of the War:

(Baltic)		Northwest - Disbanded 11/20/43
(Western Special)	on 22 June became Fronts:	West - became Central 2/2/43
(Kievan Special)		South - Activated 1/24/43
(Odessa)		Southwest - became 3rd Ukrainian

Fronts Created in the Course of the War:

6/24/41	- North	Disbanded 8/23/41
7/7/42	Central	Disbanded 2/2/43
8/16/41	Bryansk	Dissolved 10/10/43 HQ became HQ 1st Baltic, 10/20/43
8/23/41	Trans-Caucasus	Disbanded 12/30/41, Reactivated 4/8/42
9/9/41	Karelian	Disbanded 1/15/44
	Reserve Front	(Various Times, 1941-42)
10/17/41	Kalinin	Became 1st Baltic 10/20/43
12/17/41	Volkhov	
1/28/42	Crimea	Disbanded 5/19/42
7/7/42	Voronezh	Became 1st Ukrainian Front 10/10/44
7/8/41	Southeast	
7/12/42	Stalingrad	Became South Front 1/24/43
8/7/42	Volga	
9/28/42	Don	Disbanded 2/2/42
1/1/43	North Caucasus	
2/2/43	Central	Became 2nd Belorussian 1/22/43
2/2/43	Steppe	(ex Reserve Front & Steppe Military District) - became 2nd Ukrainian
10/22/43	Belorussian	
2/24/44	2nd and 3rd Belorussian	
4/21/44	1st Baltic	Became 1st Samland Group in Feb., 1945
10/10/44	2nd Baltic	
10/20/44	3rd Baltic	
10/22/44	1st) - - - - - - - - - - - (Voronezh 2nd) Ukrainian created ex: (Steppe 3rd) (Southwest 4th) (South	

APPENDIX III

Dynamic Interaction

Prior to Attack

KEY:

District Boundary	– – – –
District HQ	P
Front HQ	ᴘ
Party Functions	O
Mobilization and Recruiting	*
Education & Training	□
Security Organs-Internal	‖
Security Organs – Combat	×
Reconstruction Functions	⌓
Armies	▱
Direction of Advance	⟷

PARTISANS:
- Army Controlled ▽
- Spontaneous ▽
- NKVD Controlled ▼
- Anti-Soviet ⩒

Immediate Post-Attack, 1941

Military District Overrun, 1941-43

Re-Occupation of Military District, 1943-44

Reconstituted District Left Behind by Advancing Armies