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IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL AWARENESS TO THE COUNTERINSURGENCY  
EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2006

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

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## ABSTRACT

IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL AWARENESS TO THE COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES, by MAJ Francisco Ariel A. Felicidadario III, Philippines, 185 pages.

The Muslim insurgency in Southern Philippines has gone on for decades. The efforts to resolve it is heavily influenced by sociocultural dynamics that have developed and prevailed through the years. The Philippine military understands that awareness of these sociocultural dynamics is important to its counterinsurgency campaign.

Understanding is however different from actually doing something about it. This study therefore endeavored to illuminate the importance of cultural awareness in so far as the Philippine Army's counterinsurgency campaign in the Southern Philippines is concerned and analyzed if the current programs of the Philippine Army have sufficiently addressed this aspect of the campaign.

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Likewise I am deeply grateful to the support of my loveones; my sister, Mariel Felicidadario, who patiently helped me via e-mail, in the editing, proofreading and providing additional inputs to improve my work., to my loving wife, Melai who did the important work of tabulating the survey results and for continuously encouraging me to do my best always, and to my three children, Mika, Trigger and Jedi who serve as my inspiration for everything I aspire for and endeavor to do.

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## ACRONYMS

AARM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AO	Area of Operation
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BIAF	Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
ISO	Internal Security Operation
MBG	Misuari Breakaway Group
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NISP	National Internal Security Plan
NPA	New Peoples Army
PA	Philippine Army
SALA'AM	Special Advocacy on Literacy and the Advancement for Muslims
SPSG	Southern Philippines Separatists Group
SOT	Special Operations Team

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Our experience has shown that insurgents and terrorists often take advantage of people in impoverished communities in conflict areas to recruit adherents, gain support, or secure safe havens. It is for this reason that the AFP continues to support the on-going peace process with the MILF. Experience has taught us that we need to strengthen the hand of our moderate Muslim brothers. With unity of effort, we must drain the pond of poverty, intolerance and injustice from which terrorists and insurgents breed. (5th Asia Security Summit, 2006)

Hon. Avelino Cruz, Secretary of Defense, Philippines

For the MILF, negotiation is still the best option to resolve the conflict in Mindanao. We have already spent so much time, efforts and resources for this. In the words of the late Chairman Salamat Hashim, negotiation is the “most civilized and practical way of resolving the conflict in Mindanao.” The MILF holds on to that view. However if the Government insists to dilly dally and treat the peace talks as mere counterinsurgency tool, who can blame the Bangsamoro people if they choose other means to continue their legitimate struggle for freedom and self determination. (MILF Press Release, 18 September 2006)

Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, MILF Chairman

The Philippines have long been beset by internal conflicts that have transcended entire generations. One of these conflicts involves the Muslim separatist movements in Southern Philippines, which started in the early 1970s. The apparent objective of these groups is to establish a separate Muslim state. Some Muslim extremists have even turned to terrorism. Clashes between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Muslim separatist groups have been violent and have cost a lot of lives already. Likewise the government continues to pursue peace initiatives to resolve the conflict. Several of these initiatives have resulted to peace agreements that though intended to provide a lasting

solution to the problem, eventually served only as temporary respite to the violent fighting. Still the author believes that it remains the desire of all those concerned in the conflict, especially the affected population to live a peaceful and progressive life.

### Geographical Setting

The Philippines is an archipelago situated in Southeastern Asia between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, east of Vietnam (see figure 1). The Philippine archipelago is made up of 7,107 islands; favorably located in relation to many of Southeast Asia's main water bodies: the South China Sea, Sulu Sea, Celebes Sea, Luzon Strait, and the Philippine Sea which opens directly to the Pacific Ocean (*CIA World Factbook* 2006).



Figure 1. Map of Southeast Asia

Source: CIA, *CIA World Factbook*, "Southeast Asia," available from [https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/reference\\_maps/southeast\\_asia.html](https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/reference_maps/southeast_asia.html); Internet; accessed on 10 October 2006.

The country's many islands are grouped into three major island grouping; Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao (see figure 2). Mindanao, as can be seen on the map is synonymously the whole of Southern Philippines itself. It comprises five administrative regions; Regions IX (CARAGA), X (Davao), XI (Northern Mindanao), XII (SOCCSKSARGEN), XIII (Zamboanga Peninsula), and one autonomous region, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The regions are further divided into provinces, municipalities, and barangays and each unit is headed by a duly elected governor or duly elected city mayor or barangay captain, respectively.



Figure 2. Map of the Philippines with Regions and Provinces  
 Source: Wikipedia, *Regions of the Philippines*, available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions\\_of\\_the\\_Philippines](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_the_Philippines), Internet; accessed on 10 October 2006.



Majority of the Muslim Filipinos live in Mindanao. As of the 2006 Philippine Census, the population of the Philippines is around 80 million with the Muslim population comprising about five percent of the total population (NSO Philippines 2000). The Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) however estimated the Muslim population at about 11 percent or around eight million people (see table 1). According to the Philippine Human Development Report, this discrepancy is an added sore point in the conflict, as some critics refer to this as constituting “statistical genocide” that contributes to minimizing the social and political importance of the Moro issue. An important reason for the statistical problem is symptomatic of the issue itself. This is because data-gathering difficulties experienced in Muslim areas are bound to lead to underestimation. First, Muslims basically do not believe in registration of births and deaths. Second, the number of Muslim converts is usually hard to determine. Third, and perhaps the most important, respondents may not wish to admit to being Muslims for fear of being labeled a “terrorist.” In other words, Muslims, lack trust in NSO enumerators and so are not keen to register and affirm themselves as Muslims. This prevents NSO from getting the accurate count of Muslims (Human Development Network 2005, 15).

Table 1. OMA and NSO Estimates of Muslim Population as of 2000

Area	Total Muslim Population (OMA)	Total Muslim Population (NSO)
Non-Mindanao <sup>1</sup>	2,191,607 3.8%	212,835 0.4%
Mindanao <sup>2</sup>	6,157,576 34.0%	3,641,480 20.1%
Philippines	8,349,183 10.9%	3,854,315 5.1%

Source: Human Development Network, *Philippine Human Development Report 2005*, available from [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail\\_reports.cfm?view=826](http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.cfm?view=826), Internet; accessed on 10 October 2006.

Figure 3 shows the distribution of the Muslim inhabitants in Southern Philippines. Note that the highest concentrations of Muslims are residing in the areas covered by the AARM (figure 4).




Figure 3. Concentration of Indigenous People and Muslims  
 Source: Human Development Network, *Philippine Human Development Report 2005*, available from [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail\\_reports.cfm?view=826](http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.cfm?view=826), Internet; accessed on 10 October 2006.




Figure 4. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao  
 Source: Answers.com *Wikipedia Map Philippines*, available from <http://www.answers.com/topic/ph-locator-armm-png>, accessed on 10 October 2006.

This situation allegedly justifies the claim of the Muslim insurgents that they are fighting for Mindanao. To them, Mindanao used to be their homeland before they were

eased out of their homes and non-Muslims began owning their ancestral lands. It is with this backdrop that this study takes a look at the counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts of the AFP in Southern Philippines.

### Background

The armed confrontation between the Muslim separatist groups and the AFP started in the 1970s. The Muslims' struggle for their aspirations as an independent entity, however, dates way back the 16th century. Starting when the Spanish colonizers sent military expeditions from Manila to subjugate the Moros (native Muslims of Mindanao) and convert them to Christianity. The Moro's war of resistance against the Spanish colonizers lasted 300 years and was often bloody. Muslim chieftains emphasized that their survival as a race was at stake and they urged the Moros to maintain their resistance against the Spaniards (Angeles 1974).

The convoluted nature of the Mindanao conflict and the composite solution that it entails is fundamental in the study of how to more effectively carry out COIN measures. A large part of this is investigating the roots of the conflict. This study therefore provides the conflict background and a systematic analysis of the conflict as basis for understanding the shape, outcome and implications of counterinsurgency initiatives. This study shares Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria's enthusiasm for the adoption of new approaches in resolving the conflict (Danguilan-Vitug and Gloria 1989). Specifically, this study focused at analyzing the importance of cultural awareness in the AFP's COIN efforts in the Southern Philippines.

The AFP's deployment in Southern Philippines is designed to enforce peace and the rule of law. Divisions are responsible for specific regions (see figure 5). Then a

brigade takes charge of a district or several provinces. A battalion's area of operations (AO) may comprise of several cities and towns and then a company will be in charge of a town or several villages or barangays. This set-up places the officers and soldiers in direct contact with the members of the Muslim community on a daily basis. It is typical for members of the community to be sympathetic to the insurgents. Any misdeed committed by the soldiers whether intentionally or unintentionally aggravates the situation and may sometimes translate to specific failures in military operations and to combat casualties (Beleaga 2004).




Figure 5. AOs of PA Infantry Divisions and the Southern Command AO  
Source: OG3, PA, Internal Files.

These misdeeds most often arise out of disregard for the culture and sensitivities of the Muslim communities. Examples of these are acts of disrespect to a mosque or a Muslim spiritual leader, careless remarks to Muslim women or open display of alcohol drinking. With all these, the battalion's best source of intelligence is also the members of the same Muslim communities (de Manila 1989).

Like other COIN campaigns across the world, it is the Philippine military which initially and most often in the long term, shoulders the responsibility of responding to all the critical aspects of the insurgency. These aspects though are more, political, social and economic in nature than military (Guerrero 2002). This was substantiated in 2002 by a Social Weather Stations survey on the conflict in Mindanao which revealed that 43 percent of respondents cited violence in their areas due to family, clan or tribal disputes (also called "*rido*") as opposed to only 25 percent citing clashes between the military and the MILF/MNLF. Conflicts over community resources not only divide residents of communities themselves, they can often lead to conflict between the community and the government. And while the former can hamper productivity, investments and economic growth, the latter can in extreme cases lead to armed insurgency (SWS Survey 2002).

Likewise several studies show that insurgents are successful in recruiting youths from indigenous communities which are faced with change and displacement caused by government or private investments in such resource-intensive industries as forestry, mining or energy production and distribution (Tuminez, 2005). Apart from these considerations, cultural awareness likewise provides important advantages that can be used as part of military strategies and tactics. To cite an example, my experience in Mindanao has taught me that immediately after the feast of "Ramadan" the Muslim

insurgents celebrate its completion with a successful raid of any military detachment or installation. Thus, we learned to step up our camp defense preparations and try to preempt enemy actions by increasing perimeter patrols and staging ambushes on possible enemy avenues of approach. Attack times can likewise be timed to coincide with lower alert status of the enemy because of certain cultural practices. This tactic has likewise been validated by narrations of firsthand experiences of my American classmates in Afghanistan and Iraq.

### Problem Statement

The insurgency situation in Mindanao has gone on for such a long time now. Past approaches to the problem have accomplished little and the problems persist. There were, however, bright moments especially in 1996, when the Philippine government and the largest Moro guerilla group at the time, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), signed a Final Peace Agreement. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was not a party to the talks. The government reached out to them. Initially, the MILF offered one agenda item for talks with the government -- resolving the "*Bangsamoro*" (term used by the Muslims to refer to the independent Muslim nation they want to establish) problem. This is the search for territorial, political, cultural, and economic arrangements that would resolve long-term Moro marginalization and pave the way for economic development, political autonomy, and cultural renaissance for the majority of Moros (Tuminez 2005).

The peace accord with the MNLF however, eventually collapsed as a faction within the MNLF rejected the terms of the agreement. This group known as the Missuari Breakaway Group (MBG) continued the armed struggle. A positive outcome of the agreement was the integration of a significant number of reformed MNLF officers and

soldiers into the PA and the neutralization of most of the Muslim extremist's strongholds. Apart from the MBG, the PA's main threat in the area is now the MILF and the terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Del Rosario 2005).

To counter this problem, the Philippine Government continues to use everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the conflict. Peace negotiations are ongoing and these are monitored by the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) as well as the United States of America (USA). Economic development is being given focus, as funds are provided and developmental programs are being initiated in the region. Likewise, the local governance in the declared Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao is being strengthened. The AFP on the other hand, understands the need for improvements in its current COIN approach. A new approach, however, should take off from gains already made and more importantly address the various aspects of the problem. Foremost of these considerations are the sociocultural dynamics of the conflict. Yet how aware are the AFP leaders and soldiers of the importance of these dimensions or better yet is it really being emphasized in the ongoing COIN efforts.

This diagnostic study therefore documented and analyzed the profile of the AFP's and specifically the PA's COIN efforts in the Mindanao area in order to assess the state of cultural awareness in its current program implementation and to provide strategic measures for its improvement. Specifically, it sought answers to the following questions:

1. What is the profile of the AFP COIN efforts in terms of:
  - a. The cultural issues involved in the insurgency problem in Southern Philippines?

b. The significant differences in culture between the protagonists in this insurgency problem?

2. What *raison d'être* would advance the methods employed by the PA units in their operational areas in Southern Philippines, and

a. Can cultural awareness help determine success in an operational area?

b. Can cultural awareness be used to improve military operations and provide strategic or tactical advantage?

3. What degree of concentration is the PA giving to sufficiently address the issue of cultural awareness in its operational policies and training programs in as far as the following:

a. Sufficient knowledge of PA officers and soldiers about the history of the insurgency and the culture of the Southern Philippines;

b. Awareness of PA officers and soldiers regarding the importance of studying the culture of the Muslims in Southern Philippines;

c. Degree to which cultural awareness is emphasized in PA operational policies, training programs and educational curriculum.

4. What constraints, if any, were encountered by the PA in the implementation and sustenance of their COIN undertakings in the region?

This study sustained that should these questions be thoroughly answered and validated, it would provide a fresh and positive perspective to the COIN approach in Southern Philippines, specifically to the battalions and units who are the ones really immersed in the insurgency area.



### Significance of the Study

The Filipino society is not homogenous and its culture is as varied as the many islands it has. However, no matter how diverse it may be, it is still possible to speak of The Filipino Culture. Ethno-linguistic studies have found out that when certain basic characteristics of each ethnic group are examined, greater similarities than differences stand out. As it is, there are only two major sources of differences in Filipino lifeways, especially in Mindanao: religion (Islamic and Christianity) and language (Jocano 1998).

These differences are mostly due to tribal or community adaptation to local environments. While modernization has caused the rapid changes in trends and fashion and all the trappings of urban life, when one removes the outer trappings of modernity, even in the urban areas, one discovers that underneath the veneer, the Filipinos are still traditional in their institutional values and community outlook and that the core values and norms remain intact, even if they are wearing “signature” clothes (Jocano 1998).

It is on this premise that this study is anchored. The importance of culture and its awareness, as incorporated in the counterinsurgency efforts of the Philippine Army, shall be evaluated and the extent to which it is emphasized in the PA policies and training programs shall likewise be measured. In general, the findings of this study translate to concepts that could help the PA improve its current approach to the COIN efforts in Southern Philippines. It could serve as the initial step towards creating a comprehensive new approach to dealing not only with the Muslim insurgents but with the Muslim communities from which insurgents are from.

Specifically, the results of this study would provide invaluable insights and strategies that PA battalion officers and soldiers can incorporate, use or improve on as

they perform their tasks in their respective areas of operations. The lessons in this study can arm soldiers with vital knowledge that would help ease, to a significant extent, the Muslim resentment of the Army's presence and therefore result to cooperation and eventually peace in the region.

### Motivation for the Study

Prior to coming here at Fort Leavenworth, The researcher was assigned to the Philippine Army Training and Doctrine Command as the Commands' Operations Officer or the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Training, G3. This assignment enabled him to be a principal participant in the implementation of various training programs geared towards improving the way the PA fights its COIN campaigns. The focal point of all the improvements is the directive of the PA leadership for the implementation of a COIN-focused curriculum in all military training programs and educational courses. This initiative is taking off on a high note and progress has significantly been made in the review and revision of existing program of instructions. One of the significant observations made while on this assignment was that instructions and training of the PA seems to be heavily devoted to the communist insurgency side. The Muslim insurgency on the other hand has been limited to updates on the threat scenario. Analyzing his own experiences throughout his years of field deployment, the researcher noted that the COIN approach to the Muslim Insurgency seems focused more on combat operations while against the communist insurgency, the focus in on a comprehensive, holistic approach.to the underlying roots of the problem. This is clearly evident as there are seldom any scenarios dedicated to the Muslim insurgents during command post exercises conducted in officer training courses. In the mind of the researcher, this begs the question whether

giving the same focus to the Muslim insurgency would improve COIN efforts against the Muslim Insurgency.

The development of COIN-focused programs is a tedious process and, evaluations and validations is a continuing process. Just like the transformation of the US Army, this PA initiative is a continuing process, as such, the training programs are necessarily improved as better concepts and lessons learned are validated. One of the researcher's aims for doing this study is to provide additional data and insight that can help further improved the PA's COIN-focused training programs.

Moreover, the realization that our counterinsurgency efforts in Southern Philippines have been going on for decades, serves as my primary motivation to try to look at ways and avenues for improvement in our approach to the problem. I want this study to somehow contribute to further improvements in our counterinsurgency efforts and therefore help provide a positive outlook for the eventual resolution of the conflict.

#### Major Assumptions

The study is however facilitated by the following major assumptions:

1. That the Muslim insurgency in the Southern Philippines shall remain a major problem for the Philippine government in the next five years.
2. That the AFP and PA in particularly remains keen on improving its training programs to better equip the officers, NCOs and units with the tools they need to be really effective in pursuing a holistic approach to COIN.
3. That the Philippine government remains committed to its Strategy of Holistic Approach and that concerned government agencies are able to perform their part.
4. That the Philippines as a nation shall remain pro-democracy.

### Limitation and Scope.

This study primarily dealt with the counterinsurgency efforts of the PA in the Southern Philippines, targeting specifically the Muslim insurgency situation. It delineated its focus as entirely separate from the communist insurgency situation that is also prevailing in the Philippines. While this research endeavor invariably discussed the history of the conflict in the Mindanao area and the measures employed by government to address this situation, it however concentrated on assessing the cultural awareness level employed in its COIN efforts.

Another limitation was the fact that the sheer distance of the Philippines and the researcher inhibited certain avenues for research. Related lessons on cultural awareness ascertained from experiences of other countries, such as the US experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq were likewise used to illustrate important aspects of the study and to validate concepts and strategies that were be formulated.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents some related literature and studies on insurgency. There are numerous discussions on the topics associated with Islam extremism and cultural awareness both in the print form and through articles accessible in the internet. Previous studies made on the insurgency situation in Southern Philippines were likewise discussed. For facility of understanding, the review of related literature and studies were presented in topical form. It also presents the study's framework and the synthesis of the state-of-the-art.

#### Islam and Democracy

Sister Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood, who is considered one of Britain's leading authoritative authors on Islamic studies, sheds light on most of the common questions regarding the Islam culture and religion in her book "What Every Christian Should Know About Islam". Her book intimately discusses:

1. The irreconcilable differences between the Muslim and Christian Faith.
2. The goodness of the Muslim religion and that being a Muslim does not equal to being an extremist.
3. The profound explanation that terrorism and violence are as much taboo to the Muslim faith as it is to Christianity.
4. Lastly the discourse of the book offers an avenue for a genuine understanding of the Muslim culture and beliefs that can serve well to foster peaceful dialogues instead of violent disagreements (Maqsood n.d.).

The conflict in Southern Luzon was in Harber's thesis centered on establishing the Moro identity as it would be necessary if we are to resolve conflict and reach a compromise in the Southern Philippine insurgency dilemma (Harber 1998). John Esposito's book, "The Islamic Threat" analyzed in detail the complex and dynamic relationships between Islamic resurgence and democratization. He concludes that "for many Muslims Islamic revivalism is a social rather than a political movement whose goal is a more Islamically minded and oriented society but not necessarily the creation of an Islamic State". Likewise he states that "most Islamic movements are not necessarily antidemocratic" and that "our challenge is to better understand the history and realities of the Muslim world..." (Esposito 1999, 289). Dr. Maher Hathout's "Jihad vs. Terrorism" provides clarifications on the basic concepts of the Islamic faith that contradicts the Muslim terrorist's activities, such as the common misunderstanding that "Jihad" is evil, when it really is about the spiritual struggle for enlightenment as laid out in the Koran (Hathout 2002). These insights could provide the COIN operator with relevant talking points in influencing and convincing Muslim communities to disassociate themselves from the Muslim terrorists.

### The Filipino Muslim

Cesar Majul's "Muslims In The Philippines: A Historical Perspective" and Salah Jubair's "A Nation Under Endless Tyranny" provides this project with the Muslim viewpoint and perspectives as to the rightful heritage and legacy of the Muslims in the Philippines. Both books highlight how Islam came to the Philippines and stresses the historical fact that the Muslims are the only people that were never subjugated by any foreign occupier that landed in the Philippines. They further advocate the view that "a

careful analysis of the history of the Muslims in the Philippines will reveal that the character and attitudes of present-day Muslims are not only the result of what they have made out of themselves but also of what others have forced them to become” and that the problem in the Southern Philippines is anchored on a cultural malaise perceived by the Muslim populace to be still happening today (Majul 1973).

Likewise, several journals, investigative reviews, and other published articles on the aspects of adversary Muslim culture provides this study with authoritative points that validate the premise of this study regarding the real importance of cultural awareness in the Philippine Army’s COIN efforts against the Muslim extremists and separatist groups. Jane’s World and Terrorism Review on the Philippines published in May 2003, which described that the Southern Philippines remains a complex patchwork of tribal, ethnic, religious and political loyalties, with militants often displaying more allegiance to family or tribe than an insurgent ([www4.janes.com](http://www4.janes.com)).

#### The Mindanao Conflict

The book *Muslim Separatism: the Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* by K. W. Che Man provides a comparative study of the Muslim rebellion that is happening in the Philippines and Thailand. The author supports the view that the said conflicts emerged and continues to prevail because of a political and cultural phenomena resulting from a country’s growing up pains of national development and therefore having a general “national culture.” This in turn results to the marginalization of the Muslim culture as a disenchanting ethnic minority. According to the author, this disenchantment spawned a separatist attitude and an armed movement that is sustained by their Islam religion and the common bond among Muslims (Che Man 1990). Likewise

the book *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines* by Moshe Yegar tackles underlying cultural conflicts prevailing among the Muslim communities in Southern Philippines that hinders the full integration of these communities in the greater Philippine Society (Yegar 2002).

The Internet likewise abounds with authoritative materials discussing the various perceptions regarding the insurgency situation in Southern Philippines. Jane's Information Group Defense succinctly evaluated that the religious ideology of the MILF, and the sense of community among the group's members, is so strong that members highlight the centrality of their Islamic faith to their national identity. "Jane's World and Terrorism Review on the Philippines," published in May 2003, described that the Southern Philippines remains a complex patchwork of tribal, ethnic, religious, and political loyalties. Muslim militants often display more allegiance to family or tribe than an insurgent ([www4.janes.com](http://www4.janes.com)).

#### Muslim Extremism

"Terrorism in the Philippines" by Dirk J. Barreveld sets a plausible basis for analyzing the cultural complexities of Muslim extremism in Southern Philippines by looking at the root causes of the problem. The personal account by Gracia Burnham about her captivity in the hands of the ASG as related in her book, coauthored by Dean Merrill, *In the Presence of My Enemies* gives a real firsthand evaluation of the attitudes and cultural tendencies of the Muslim extremist that can be related to their motivation and operational strategies and tactics in fighting the Philippine Army (Barreveld 2001; Burnham and Merrill 2003)



### Other Related Studies

Another great resource for this study are the numerous scholarly works of military students and instructors in the various military institutions of the Philippines and United States, such as the National Defense College of the Philippines, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and Staff College, the US Naval Post Graduate School, US Army War College, US Army CGSC, and others. Ilkhab's *Feasibility of Integrating Filipinos Muslim into the Mainstream of the Philippine Society* was one of the related studies reviewed to give credence to the suppositions earlier postulated in this study (Ikhab 1990).

These materials make available synthesized and well-evaluated observations and conclusions that shall provide a more comprehensive discussion of the topic in this research. More importantly, several of these literary works are authored by Filipino officers, which would afford confirmation of specific details that shall be discussed in this study. An example is the master's thesis submitted by LTC Ricardo A. David Jr. titled "The Causes and Prospect of the Southern Philippines Secessionist Movement," Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, as part of his graduation requirement in December 2003 (David 2003). Most recent studies on COIN that guided this project is the master's theses of Major Elizabeth Bledsoe (US Army), USCSOC Class 2005, and Major Antonio Parlade (Philippine Army), USCGSOC Class 2006-01. Maj Bledsoe's thesis on the "The Use of Culture in Operational Planning" provides a well-founded analysis regarding the operational value of cultural knowledge and illuminates the benefits that it can provide the operational commander. Major Parlade's submitted thesis "An Analysis of the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines," to the CGSC, although

primarily centered on the communist insurgency gives a thorough assessment of the current insurgency situation in the Philippines and a dynamic review of the current COIN strategy. Important to this study, is Major Parlade's conclusion that there is indeed a need to implement fully a holistic approach to the Insurgency problem and at the same time improve the capability of the AFP and the PA in particularly to do it (Parlade 2006).

### The AFP's COIN Approach in the Southern Philippines

This study for the most part shall focus on the *SALAAM Manual* which is the cornerstone of the current COIN approach to the Muslim Insurgency in Southern Philippines. The operational concepts in the manual are a big departure from the usual direct combat which has been successful in stopping the growing violence in the area but not the real problem that spawns the violence. The manual gives focus to more interaction with the Muslim communities, using the local leaders, invoking the good teachings of Islam in order to gain the trust and support of the Muslim populace and therefore secure their cooperation to found a lasting solution to the peace and order situation in their area (AFP SOT Center 2002).

The thesis of LTC Tirso Gador titled, *Insurgency and Subversion in a Developing Country: A Case Study in a Philippine Setting* provided good lessons learned on the counterinsurgency campaign against the communist insurgency in the Philippines, that was used by this study to parallel COIN approaches against the Muslim insurgents. Further inputs were gathered from Luga's work on the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao, and Mastura's assessment of the crisis in the MNLF leadership, as well as the Muslim's autonomy movement. Both believe that understanding of how Muslims regard

themselves is crucial to strategizing a sound plan to resolve the problem there (Luga 2002; Mastura 1986)

### Cultural Awareness and Warfare

The United States Marine Corps' *Small Wars: 21st Century* gives this study a firm basis for establishing the importance of cultural awareness in warfare. This manual synthesized the lessons of all the COIN campaigns experienced by the US military. It asserts unequivocally that in order to optimize success, the first step to any COIN campaign is to have a comprehensive examination of the culture of the society or the country involved. It stressed that COIN are culture-intensive conflicts and that soldiers should study their strategic, operational and tactical significance (US Marine Corps 1940).

Likewise, Dr. Montgomery McFate's article "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture", stressed that cultural knowledge and warfare are inextricably bound and that understanding adversary culture can make a positive difference strategically, operationally, and tactically (McFate 2005).

### Synthesis of the State-of-the-Art

While there are ample literature and studies on counterinsurgency theories and approaches, there is a definitive dearth on the subject of the importance of cultural awareness in conflict resolution in Mindanao. However, enough references were found that had significant relationship to the study.

Pramoto's study of the political implications of the problem in Mindanao would further the argument that there is a need to root out the basic problems which beset the

PA COIN efforts so as to avert further political upheaval in the area (Pramoto 1990). Management of insurgency is complex enough as it is. With differences in religion and cultural practices thrown into the picture, the implementors of the PA COIN program are necessarily beholden to a host of stakeholders who, in more ways than one, need to be pleased and appeased. This is where the ethical considerations of the COIN efforts come to fore. Ethics would need a conscience and conscience, a heart (Villareal 1998).

The PA COIN practice comes in various forms. And in each of these forms speaks the heart of the Philippine Army. Furthermore, as many as there are arguments for the Philippine Army's involvement and presence in Southern Philippines, there are equally as many arguments against it. This difficulty is what makes it hard for the PA COIN efforts to shift patterns in its operational prerogatives. That is why an in-depth analysis of the sociocultural dynamics of the Mindanao conflict should both help in realizing the global imperative of peace so much so that what is realized is the favorable answer to both Islam and Christian dictums.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the research design, sources of data, population of the study, instrument, statistical treatment, and procedures in data gathering.

#### Research Design

Aside from data generated in the review of literature, the approaches which would be utilized in this study are first, the descriptive type to take care of the profiling. This type was chosen because detailed factual information of existing phenomena was collected; current conditions and practices were identified; and objectives were made clear as to the facts to be uncovered. Patterns and sequences of growth and/or change, as a function of time, were likewise investigated (Sabater 1995).

The second approach utilized is the historic case analysis. It involved the systemic collection and objective evaluation of data related to past occurrences. This was also utilized to test hypotheses concerning causes, effects, or trends of those events that may help to explain present events and anticipate future events in the Southern Luzon's armed conflict and its resolution. And as the historical method emphasizes the development of generalizations, principles or theories that would be helpful in predicting future occurrences, it makes its use in this study imperative (Sta. Romana 1995).

A description of "what was" and "what is" would undoubtedly give resulting data which could be used for an improved COIN approach in Mindanao. Analysis of data to be generated would be done with utmost objectivity and would not, in any way, compromise the integrity of the PA COIN efforts.

### Sources of Data

Primary data would be gleaned from the direct respondents of this study, which in this case would be PA officers and enlisted personnel in the Philippines. The secondary data would be culled from declassified military records. And as illustrated in the previous chapter, there is ample reference material related to the topic especially on the internet and all the materials on culture that are incorporated in the current USCGSOC curriculum. It should be noted, that were the researcher back in the Philippines he would have access to numerous materials that would be very helpful and significant to the research.

The review of all the references and books made available by the current curriculum of the USCGSOC would start with the topics discussed in the C150 lectures on culture and Military Operations. Then concentration shall be on articles specifically discussing the cultural aspects about the COIN problem in Southern Philippines and literatures tackling the relevance and importance of cultural awareness in military operations. Another important aspect of this phase of the research is the careful examination of the findings and conclusions found in papers written by other Filipino officers, who have likewise studied in US military schools.

Relevant materials from the Philippines, which shall establish the factual basis for most of my discussions, would be accumulated through mail, fax or email. These shall consist of data on; the religious, political and other demographic data on Southern Philippines and the Philippine Army; the general status of deployed units in Southern Philippines, the number of Muslim/Islam culture instructors and resource persons employed in PA learning institutions; and actual samples of training curricula currently

being implemented throughout the Philippine Army, as well as some published documents and journals, such as lessons learned documents that touches on adversary culture. This would include the declassified copy of the PA's current COIN approach in Southern Philippines--the *Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and Advancement for Muslims (SALAAM)* manual.

### Instrumentation

The tool, which would be used for data gathering in this study, would primarily be survey questionnaires. The questionnaires would be intended for the multitude of military officers and enlisted personnel who are then taking up various courses in the schools of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Philippine Army. The survey would be specifically meant for the battalion and company level officers and enlisted personnel who have been or are still deployed in Southern Philippines, particularly in the Muslim insurgency areas. The questionnaires shall be focused on establishing data regarding a common appreciation on the interplay of cultural awareness, adversary culture and PA operations in Southern Philippines, in relation to their actual experiences and observations. It shall likewise, create a clear index on the actual amount of education they received on cultural awareness and adversary culture, prior to deployment to the Muslim areas. Specifically, the survey instrument would consist of four parts:

Part I. The profile of the PA COIN program.

Part II. The methods employed by the Philippine Army units in their operational areas in Southern Philippines.

Part III. Assessment of the level of awareness of PA officers and enlisted men on the Filipino Muslims culture and way of life.

Part IV. Identify constraints, if any, in the implementation of the PA COIN program.

To help test the validity of these instruments, consultation with experts within the college was also done. Suggestions and comments were noted and duly incorporated into the final instruments.

#### Data Gathering Procedure

The data gathering procedure followed a systematic order. Primarily, the researcher sought the permission and coordinated, through electronic mail, with the appropriate authorities of the Philippine Military Academy, the PA Training and Doctrine Command and the AFP Command and Staff College for the conduct of the survey relevant to this study. After which the researcher endeavored to personally and continuously follow-up progress of the survey despite the distance, to ensure the maximum retrieval rate humanly possible. Inputs from the culture experts and instructors here at Fort Leavenworth apropos the topic, likewise formed part of the base data for this study. In all these endeavors, the guiding parameters of this undertaking was that the research results were able to sufficiently answer the primary and secondary questions laid out in the problem statement of this paper.

#### Statistical Treatment

Statistical treatment shall be in accordance to the type and nature of data to be gathered. Frequency counts shall be done to tally the survey responses from retrieved questionnaires; percentage will be used to determine the ratio between categories of a class in terms of every 100th part.



## CHAPTER 4

### SOCIOCULTURAL DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT

Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles, you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. (Sun Tzu 1963, 84)

Sun Tzu, *Art of War*

This chapter provides information which showcases the sociocultural and political dynamics of the conflict in Southern Philippines and the differences between the cultures of the Filipino-Muslims and the non-Muslim Filipino populace.

#### The Dynamics of the Mindanao Conflict

The dynamics of the Mindanao conflict and the role that various actors, in Philippine society, have taken and continually take in both fuelling and sustaining the conflict is central to the assessment of the PA COIN efforts in Mindanao. The role and outcome of the actions of these actors in the conflict dynamics are reflected on as they also participate (directly or indirectly) in the resolution of the insurgency problem in Southern Philippines. A careful analysis of the history of the Muslims in the Philippines will reveal that the character and attitudes of present day Muslims are not only the result of what they have made out of themselves but also of what others have forced them to become. Thus it is important to know how islam, forces which helped to shape the character of the present day Muslim Filipino (Majul 1974).

Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippines. Rich with natural resources, it is known as the “Land of Promise.” However, it also has the least developed

provinces in the country (Jayme n. d.,104). About nineteen of its provinces are among the forty four poorest provinces in the country. The predominantly Muslim AARM has four out of its five provinces included in this category. Likewise majority of the Mindanao provinces have low basic literacy rates as compared to the rest of the country, with AARM having the lowest at about 69 percent. Spending levels on social services such as health and education are also below the national average of 91 percent and are the lowest in the country (NSCB Philippines 2003).

The region has been the center of struggle for Muslim independence for many years, although today Christians predominantly populate it. The situation in Mindanao reflects religious and ethnic-based conflict within a single state. Religious minorities seek independence as a result of years of socioeconomic marginalization. State formation usually tries to give at least the illusion of unity by assuming a single nation. In this process, a developing state neglects the fact that the society can be ethnically and culturally heterogeneous (Jayme 2001 104).

Mindanao is also rich in natural resources, which is why the Philippine government cannot risk losing it given the scarcity of resources in the country. With a population of 15 million, the region provides a large tax and electorate base. All these characteristics make Mindanao valuable to the government as well as to political parties. Likewise as earlier explained the population in Mindanao is largely non-Muslim already, except for a very few areas which are dominated by Muslim inhabitants.

The history of the struggle of the Bangsamoro (Muslim nation) from the time the first colonizers stepped on the islands of the Philippines has been a series of struggles against invaders. And until today, the Muslim people or the Bangsamoro have strived to

preserve their culture and beliefs and to have a land they can call their own. In the era of the Philippines as an independent country, it was during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos that events sparked the call for independence, and many Muslims took up arms against the Republic of the Philippines. (Jayme 2001 105).

The most basic role of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in dealing with insurgency is to protect the sovereignty and Constitution of the country and maintain its stability. For any administration, peace in Mindanao can always be treated as a major political victory. It would seem, at times, that whenever there is instability in the political arena, the Mindanao situation flares up in the news. It is like a distraction to take attention away from any Government scandal or the like (Jayme 2001 107).

### Early Philippines

#### The Coming of Islam to the Philippines

Historians argue as to the exact timeframe when Islam came to the Philippines. Some historians refer to evidence that ships captained by Arabs, reached China from some island in the Philippines during the tenth century, while others claim the influx to have started around the year 1300 to 1400 (Majul 1974), In any case, all agreed that Muslim traders, who may be Muslim missionaries as well, came to the Philippines via trade routes that emanated from the Arabian peninsula (Jubair 1997).

The early centuries of Islam in the Philippines were marked by the gradual spread of the faith in the southern region especially in the areas represented today by Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Maguindanao, Cotabato and Lanao (Rasul 1999). The Muslim missionaries were guided by Islamic principles of no religious compulsion, thus the gradual and liberal promulgation of Islam. Known as Mukhdumin, the missionaries did not mean to conquer

the territories or exploit its inhabitants but to teach, and guide people to the right path (Esmula 2006). There is no historical evidence that the native inhabitants in these areas fought against the coming of a new religion. Many native practices survived, and people found ways to combine Islamic religion with their own beliefs and practices. The Muslims founded communities, called sultanates, and the chief of such communities was the sultan. Islamic communities were founded in many coastal parts of the Philippines during this period, including Manila (Vloeberghs. 2002).

Thus even before the emergence of a Philippine society, the Muslim areas in the Philippines had a strong system of local government by way of the sultanates which cover almost all of Mindanao then and had even one sultanate in the present day Manila. The sultanate and its Islamization paved the way for the promotion of education, shared culture and a strong sense of Muslim Brotherhood (Lingga 2004). These sultanates likewise have a fully functional commercial system and trade agreements with neighboring territories, to include the Bornean Islands and even with the Chinese and the Dutch traders.

#### The Spanish Colonization (1521-1896)

These strong sultanates became the bane of the Spaniards when they came to colonize the Philippines. Compared to the other settlements in the Archipelago which were widely scattered and whose political institutions were simple, the Muslim principalities were well organized, covering extensive lands on various islands, and having diplomatic and commercial relations with neighboring sultanates. The cohesion of the Muslim principalities was due principally to their Islamic political and social institutions. The politically and ideologically cohesive character of the Philippine Muslim

principalities is the principal reason why, unlike other parts of the Philippines, the Spaniards found it most difficult to subjugate Mindanao and Sulu (Majul 1974).

The race by the European powers then for highly profitable spices and other products of the “Spice Islands” ultimately led to worldwide competition for colonies and trading bases in Asia. Their desire to explore farther for oriental goods and new routes brought them to the Southeast Asia and eventually the Philippines (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1966). So the coming of the Western power in the sixteenth century brought a new dynamic to the Philippines -- the introduction of Christianity and the transformation of some areas into colonies subject to nations far away in Europe (Majul 1974).

The first Spanish expedition, under Ferdinand Magellan, manages to reach the island of Cebu in March 1521. The first encounter between the natives and the Spaniards was friendly, a testament to the fact that the early Filipinos were used to foreign traders already. They even succeeded in convincing the chieftain of Cebu and his followers to be baptized. The island of Mactan however proved Magellan’s undoing as Lapulapu – the chieftain there was hostile to the foreign colonizers. The decision of Magellan to invade Mactan on 27 April 1521 was met violently by Lapulapu and his men. Magellan and almost his entire troop lost their lives in the famous “Battle of Mactan”. Only 18 survivors manage to return to Spain (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1966).

This did not deter Spain’s imperialistic attitude, as the King of Spain continued to send more expeditions and troops to the Philippines now with the full intent of annexing the whole archipelago as a province of Spain. This time they directed first their campaigns to the Islands of Luzon and Visayas. “By means of the sword and the cross, the Spaniards accomplished the colonization of Luzon and the Visayas islands and

converted the natives to the Christian faith, but similar attempts to again establish Christianity in the Southern Philippines met stiff and bloody encounters" (Luga 2002, 20). This era of bitter wars of attrition lasted for more than three centuries from 1569 to 1898 and became known as the "Moro Wars" (Majul 1974).

Although the Muslim sultanates at various points in time were on the losing side, history still points out to the fact that they were really never subjugated by the Spaniards. These decades of bitter wars however have made the Philippine Muslim what he is today. They helped to define his attitudes and relations to all non-Muslim foreigners as well as to non-Muslim Filipinos (Majul 1974). From the superiority complex of the Spaniards came the terms "indio" which is referring to the non-Muslim natives that they have subjugated particularly in Luzon and Visayas, and "moro" to refer to the Muslims (Jumaani 2000).

This developed a negative cultural dynamic as the Spaniards painted the word "moro" as synonymous to pirates or barbarians. In an attempt to alienate the Muslims from the non-Muslims, although they claim that this is referring to the pirate-like or marauding tactics used by the Muslims as they keep on raiding Spanish controlled areas. The Muslims however just shifted tactics of bringing the fight to the Spaniards rather than waiting for them and fighting from a defensive stance. It is illustrated appropriately by the mothers' practice since that time to threaten their children to keep quiet or behave otherwise the "moro" will get them (Majul 1974). On the other hand the non-Muslims were paid by the Spaniards to either enlist or be mercenaries and go fight the Muslims. This naturally developed a strong displeasure from the Muslims who now see the non-Muslim Filipinos as willing puppets of the colonizers. Likewise one of the few battle

victories of the Spaniards against the Muslims was made into a street play, called a “moro- moro”, where the Spaniards and the non-Muslims as the good folks are depicted as defeating the evil ‘moros’. This play has been ingrained in the culture of the Filipino Christians and to this day is still part of it. This mistrust and character stereotyping are enduring attitudes of some people from both sides, up to this day.

In the end of their stay, the Spaniards may have firmly planted the Cross in the Philippines, but with the same intensity, she was no less successful in sowing the seeds of hatred and animosity between the Moros and the Indios (Jubair 1997).

### The Philippine Revolution of 1896

The Spanish colonization of the Philippines ended in 1896 when the Americans intervened. Before the arrival of the Americans though, the Philippine revolution was in full swing already. General Aguinaldo was later elected President by Filipino revolutionaries in the convention of Tejeros, Cavite in March 1897. He launched periodic military operations against the Spaniards but suffered heavy losses prompting him to accept an agreement -- the Truce of Biak-na-Bato, with the Spanish Governor General (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1966).

President Aguinaldo sought the participation and support of the Moros in the struggle against Spain by sending a proposal claiming that he is empowered to “negotiate with the Muslims Sulu and Mindanao to establish national solidarity on the basis of a real federation absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions” (Alunan 1969, 20).

The Muslim Filipinos never provided support or joined the Christian Filipinos’ revolution of 1896-99. Nonetheless, the amount of attention and resources that the Moro wars got from the Spaniards was so significant that it somehow helped lessen the Spanish

force that Aguinaldo's men are facing (Angeles 1974). This is again another sore point between the Christian Filipinos and the Muslim Filipinos.

#### American Colonial Period, (1896-1946)

Under the Treaty of Paris signed December 10, 1898 Spanish authorities ceded the Philippines to the Americans for US\$20 million (Forbes-Lindsay 1906). To the Filipinos this simply means that the Philippines just passed from being a Spanish colony to an American possession and so they hope things would be better.

The Americans encouraged Christian people from the northern Philippines to emigrate to Sulu and other areas of Mindanao. They also gave people from the south the possibility of studying in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, and taught them the modern, western ways of managing politics, economics and social life. This was part of the American strategy for getting a grip on the Islamic peoples of the southern Philippines. Unlike the Spanish colonizers, the Americans did not try to enforce Christianity with violence. Instead, they tried to impose their ideas through the education of some Moro rulers in the south. During the American period, other changes took place in Moro society: slavery was abolished; highways, schools and hospitals were built. The Moro people, however, did not welcome this development. They felt that the Americans wanted to make them inferior to the Filipino Christians, and they continued their resistance against colonization and attempts to transform the Philippines into a western, capitalist country (Glang 1969).

Like its predecessors, the United States pursued the policy of total control over the region and annexed Mindanao to the Philippine central government. However, unlike the Spanish who were concerned with religious assimilation, the Americans emphasized



the idea of democracy to the natives. Thus, the Americans implemented democratic institutions, laws and established schools (Gowing 1974). To speed up the political integration of Mindanao, the Americans employed civil officials and clerks in the area. They also encouraged the migration of Christian farmers to settle in Mindanao to help the Muslim. The intention was altruistic but unwise as in the coming years; this policy brought the region into conflict and bloodshed (Majul 1988). This became one of the prevailing outcries of the Muslims as the Christian newcomers began owning the lands they previously inhabit.

The early Muslim-American contact and military occupation<sup>123</sup> in the Moroland began on May 1899 and the Americans found the Moros still in control of their lands.<sup>124</sup> The Americans sought Muslim neutrality and friendship in the Philippine-American War (1899-1901)<sup>125</sup> which was flaring in Luzon. Thus, the significant American concern was to obtain Muslim acknowledgement of United States sovereignty in Mindanao and Sulu. The Americans feared the eventual tactical alliance between the Filipino revolutionaries and the Moro warriors which would be too difficult to handle (Glazer 1941). This arrangement invariably resulted to the Muslims indirectly help the American battle the Christian revolutionaries and so widened the rift between them.

Initially, the Moros and the Americans were quite comfortable with the arrangement in the way that the treaty defined the relationship. In 1903, the Americans imposed custom regulations, collected taxes, surveyed lands, conducted a census, and more importantly, forbade the time-honored Moro practice of slavery. Soon enough the uneasiness and suspicion exploded into violence. Some Muslim chieftains rebelled and attacked the Americans. The Muslim hostility was interpreted as a challenge to American

sovereignty. As a result, the American governance shifted from noninterference to direct rule with the establishment of the Moro Province (Jubair 1977)

The military occupation of the southern Philippines lasted from 1899 to 1903. The American policy of direct rule unwittingly transgressed the social structure, customs and laws by which the Moros had lived for centuries. To the Muslims, the American policy in the Moroland to develop, civilize, educate, and train the Moros in the art of democratic governance were, in fact, an imposition of alien law and infidel customs. The American administrators failed to recognize or ignored that Muslim Filipinos saw no separation whatever between the sacred and the secular. The concept of the separation of the church and states was unknown to the Filipino Muslims for they believed that their laws and customs were in line with the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. Thus, many Moros resisted to the death the fundamental changes of their beliefs and their traditions. Bloody resistance grew and clashes between Americans and Muslims were costly in terms of lives lost. (Gowing 1974).

In 1935 as the Americans establish the Philippine Commonwealth as a prelude to granting full independence the Muslim chieftains pleaded with the Americans to exclude Mindanao and Sulu in the grant of independence to the Filipinos (Jubair 1977). The Americans did not consider the request of the Muslims. At this time, the Christian Nationalist Filipinos had established a better relationship with the Americans. The Christian Filipinos readily embraced the American educational system, adopted the government administration and established valuable business relations and partnerships. Thus, the Moroland drifted further under the control of the Philippine legislature, instead of remaining an American responsibility (David 2003).

The American occupation may have paved the way for the independence of the Philippines as a country. Certain policies and actions, however, which have been implemented in Southern Philippines, further widened the rift between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. Distribution of land to new settlers drove the Muslims away as they know nothing about titling and that they do not accept the process of land titling as historically for them lands are owned by the tribes and not the individuals. The unbalanced economic and education opportunities further marginalized the Muslims. Likewise government representation for the Muslims was so little if not existing.

#### The Commonwealth Era (1935-1941)

The Philippine Commonwealth government was established in 15 November 1935 with Manuel L. Quezon as the first president. Despite the objections of the Muslim leaders, the Muslim provinces became part of the Philippine territory. An Office of the Commissioner of Mindanao and Sulu was created. The core national policies were economic development, strengthening of the region's security, and the advancement and integration of the Moros instead of the "pacification" and "attraction" policy propagated by the Americans. On 20 September 1938, President Quezon issued a memorandum authorizing the Department of Interior to give impetus to the work of improving the condition of the people, to develop the resources of the region, and not to recognize the power of the Muslim chieftains by protecting the people from the exploitation of their leaders. Likewise following the method used by the Americans the government encouraged more settlers from Luzon and Visayas to move to Mindanao, with the enactment of the Quirino-Recto Colonization Act. This Act declared settlement as the only lasting solution to the problem in Mindanao. The government likewise provided

development support to the settlers. In 1936, Commonwealth Act No. 141, declared all Moro ancestral landholdings as public lands. Aside from the loss of territory and system of governance, the Moros were not given adequate representation in the national government to advance their interests (David 2003). Moreover, under the Commonwealth regime, the Moros were denied special privileges guaranteeing protections of Islamic and traditional laws, the institution of the sultanate and socio-economic programs (Bertrand 2000). As the number of Christian Filipinos multiplied, the Moros became a minority in many of their strongholds. They began to be treated as second class citizens in their own land (Gowing 1974)

#### Japanese Occupation Period (1941-1945)

Full independence for the Philippines did not materialize as the Japanese Imperial Army suddenly invaded the country. Luzon fell immediately, then Davao and Sulu were also occupied then in April 1942, Cotabato and Lanao followed. Guerilla activity was widespread and plagued the Japanese authorities until the end of the war. Muslim and Christian Filipinos joined guerilla units led by the Americans. This time cooperation between the Christians and Moros became a necessity. Tens of thousands of Moros were either enlisted in the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFE) or joined the guerilla units to fight the invaders. The Filipino rebellion was waged by both Christians and Muslims in the form of hit and run tactics, ambushes and pitched battles. As expected the retaliation of the Japanese was just as damaging. (Majul 1988). However, some Muslims leaders also cooperated with Japanese authorities. They were convinced that it would be better to take part in the Japanese war efforts (Jubair 1977). The end of the war brought significant consequences to the Moroland. The rehabilitation produced

large amounts of cash, helping to prime the economy against dependence on a barter system. Likewise, many Filipino Muslims were now able to afford to go on pilgrimages and to build mosques (Majul 1988).

### Contemporary Philippines

#### The Marcos Administration, (1972-1986)

In 18 March 1968, twenty-eight young Muslim recruits of the Philippine Army were killed in the island of Corregidor -- Jabidah, by their army trainers. No clear story ever clarified what becomes known as the Jabidah Massacre. The strong suspicion was that it was to cover up a botched plan by the Marcos administration to try and take the back the Sabah Island from Malaysia. Sabah is an island historically owned by the Sultan of Sulu and therefore part of the Philippines. The Muslim recruits was supposed to infiltrate Sabah and start destabilization movements to convince the population there to rise up and secede from Malaysia, the plan was called "Oplan Merdeka." But the plan was uncovered and so the administration allegedly decided up to cover up it up -- the plan never existed (Vitug and Gloria 2000).

According to most scholars, this was the strongest spark that lit the Muslim rebellion against the government. Though it has been argued that the Jabidah Massacre was a myth (Azurin 1996, 93-103), the incident prompted Governor Udtog Matalam of Cotabato to form the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) declaring the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao. Matalam after several negotiations yielded to the request of the Philippine government to reconsider his cause, which he did. (Banlaoi 2006). This likewise gave rise to the activism of the Muslim students in the universities of Manila and Mindanao. Several student groups were formed and took their

protests to the streets. Bright Muslim students studying abroad likewise formed activists groups, such as the Philippine students' Union in Cairo, Egypt. Leading Personalities in this youth movement was Nur Misuari at the University of the Philippines and the overseas group of Salamat Hashim, Abdulbaki Abubakar, Mahid Mutilan, Ibrahim Abdulrahman and Khalifa Nando. Their presence in the most influential Arab capital at that time, and their proximity to other Muslim capitals in the Middle East and Africa, ushered in relationships with other Muslims also working for their emancipation. These contacts, especially with the Palestinians and the Pan-Arabic idealism of President Nasser of Egypt, buttressed in no small way the revolutionary inclination and motivation of these student groups. It also allowed for solicitation of support from many Muslim states and leaders (Jubair 1997)

By the time President Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the conflict in Mindanao was almost a full-scale civil war with paramilitary groups and the Muslim rebels fighting government forces and each other. "Martial law, with its ban on political groups, caused the dissolution of such aboveground Muslim organizations as the MIM and Nurul Islam, and the activation of the underground Moro National Liberation Front." Towards the end of 1972 most of the different Muslim groups were under the direction of the MNLF. "The MNLF never controlled all of the rebels fighting the government and was, in fact, a loosely knit group. Nevertheless, the MNLF was the principal, and by far the most important, armed separatist organization, largely because it became the major supplier of arms and ideological support for the insurgency." As to the local rebel commanders, they were "young and relatively well trained, having learned military skills in the army, the ROTC, or in the MNLF's Malaysian training camps. Others were former

outlaws, possessing the two requisites for insurgency—guns and the inclination to use them against agents of the state—and finding common cause with the antigovernment stand of the MNLF” (Mckenna 1998, 157-160).

After bitter years of violence, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF gave peace a chance with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on 23 December 1976, by the influence of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC made the MNLF drop its call for secession and instead accept autonomy. The agreement granted autonomy to thirteen provinces of Mindanao. However, Marcos went about the implementation of the agreement his own way and established two separate regional governments through constitutional processes (Jayme 2001 105-106).

This resulted to the failure of negotiations on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in 1977. With the collapse of the talks, Misuari wanted to revert to armed struggle for independence, thereby setting aside the Tripoli Agreement, while his Vice-Chairman Salamat Hashim was for exhausting the peace process for autonomy under the Tripoli Agreement. On 1978, the faction led by Hashim Salamat broke away from the MNLF and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Santos 2005).

#### The Corazon C. Aquino Administration, (1986-1992)

The growing discontent of the Filipino people because of Marcos’ dictatorship under the martial law resulted to the People Power Revolution of 1986, which dismantled the Marcos dictatorship. Corazon C. Aquino, the wife of murdered opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr. was sworn in as the new president. A woman of peace, she immediately pushed for the continuation of the peace talks with the MNLF (Santos 2005)

Meanwhile, the OIC and the Muslim World League (MWL), both based in Saudi Arabia undertook efforts to bring the MNLF and MILF into one negotiating group in preparation for the resumption of the Peace talks with the Aquino administration (Jubair 1997). The MILF and the MNLF have from time to time alternated their positions on political strategy (armed struggle versus peace negotiations) and objectives (independence versus autonomy) (Santos 2005).

The OIC informed the Aquino government that they would only host the proposed renewed peace negotiations if both Muslim groups are represented. Both Misuari and Salamat had already agreed to unite and close ranks for the purpose of the peace negotiations. However, the eagerness of President Aquino saw her setting aside protocol and security concerns by meeting MNLF Chairman Misuari in Jolo, Sulu, on 05 September 1986. The so called historic meeting resulted in a ceasefire agreement and moved into formal negotiations. This was followed by the GRP and the MNLF meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 03 January 1986. The agreement known as the Jeddah Accords reflected the concurrence of both parties to maintain the ceasefire and continue with the discussion of the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to the Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and Palawan. It was further agreed that substantive talks would follow in the Philippines (Jubair 1997). Also, in February 1987, the New Philippine Constitution was ratified and provided for the inclusion of a clause in the new constitution recognizing the autonomy of Muslim Mindanao (Mercado 1999). But the talks collapsed in May 1987 due to fundamental differences in the implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, breaches of ceasefire became frequent and armed encounters



persisted between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other Moro insurgents, like the MILF (May 1990).

The Aquino administration's drive for peace continued notwithstanding. On August 1 1989, she signed into law Republic Act 6734, creating an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao as mandated by Article X of the Philippine Constitution. The same law provides that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the 13 provinces and 9 cities specified in the Tripoli Agreement. In the November 1989 plebiscite that followed, only four provinces; Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi opted to accept the government's autonomy measure. Missuari called on the Muslims to boycott the plebiscite, claiming that it was a violation of the agreement on autonomy as stated in the Tripoli Agreement. The four-province Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990, and remains the only sub-national region with its own executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Gershman 2001). The conduct of the plebiscite was relatively peaceful. The ARMM elections that followed in 9 July 1990 saw the election of Zacario Candao, a Maguindanaon (Muslim tribe whose majority inhabits the province of Maguindanao) and legal representative of the MNLF, elected as Governor. Elected Vice- Governor was Benjamin Loong, a Tausug (another Muslim tribe, majority of which are in the Islands of Sulu). The legislative assembly was reasonably balanced with three representative from Tawi-tawi, and six each from Sulu, Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao (David 2003, 93-94).

The MNLF and the other Bangsamoro armed groups however, refused to recognize this political action of the government and instead return to armed struggle.

Similarly, the OIC has rejected the ARMM and supported the MNLF by urging the Philippine government to implement the Tripoli Agreement (Kamlan 2003).

In the final analysis, the Aquino administration was a transitional period as it restored the political structures and processes of democracy. The framework for peace has been built, and the constitutional requirement for granting autonomy to the Muslim areas in Southern Philippines was finally put into action. Some Muslim scholars however argued that it just solidified the position of the Muslim elite and isolated once more the Muslim middle class and the rural folks. So it was far from perfect but it established the foundation for future peace negotiations. Although negotiations with the MNLF failed and attempts to woo the MILF had been unsuccessful, it was during President Aquino's regime that the culture of peace was promoted (Vitug and Gloria 2000).

A complication to this hope of peace is the emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) during President Aquino's term. This group is believed to be composed of radical young members of the MNLF, who wanted more action to further their cause. The ASG leader -- Abdurazzak Abubakkar Janjalani aimed to wage "jihad" (holy war) against the Philippine government in reaction to the so-called atrocities committed against Muslims in the Philippines. The group attracted some "hard core" followers who received military training in the Middle East. Through the ASG, Janjalani envisioned the establishment of an independent Islamic State in the Philippines (Banlaoi 2006).

The ASG however employs terror tactics and it seems that it uses Muslim insurgency as a cover for banditry. The Abu Sayyaf make a point of gesturing toward an oppositional Moro identity, by, for instance, demanding that crosses be removed from public view or by interpreting one method in their arsenal of terror--decapitation as

rooted in Islam. But their modus operandi - kidnapping for ransom - suggests that profit, rather than Islam, is the predominant motivation for their activities. The MNLF and MILF seem to acknowledge this. They try to distance themselves from the Abu Sayyaf and have even pledged to cooperate with the government in its pursuit of the group's eradication. Still, the links among the groups remain unclear. There has been speculation that the group merely provides a cover for "legitimate" rebels moonlighting for profit (Garrido 2003).

### The Fidel V. Ramos Administration

In the 1992, presidential elections, President Aquino did not run for reelection and President Fidel V Ramos won over Congressman Ramon Mitra. President Ramos had been the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary under Martial Law, but he was one of the leaders of the people power revolution that toppled the dictatorship of Marcos. He also served under the Aquino administration, first as Chief of the AFP and then as Secretary of Defense.

During his term, President Ramos reinvigorated the peace process. He identified Mindanao as a key area for development. Peace talks with both the MNLF and the MILF were pursued. Finally, the government and the MNLF settled all questions on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement and provided a formula for autonomy acceptable to the MNLF (Bacani 2005). In 2 September 1996, a peace accord was reached by the Ramos administration and the MILF. It mandated the creation of an executive order creating the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Consultative

Assembly. The 1996 Peace Accord also had a provision for the amendment or repeal of the Republic Act 6734 (GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement 1996) (Jayme 2001)

The MNLF returned to the folds of the law and Misuari was elected governor of the AARM and at the same time appointed as chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). It was believed that by placing Misuari in charge of both institutions, “the peace settlement would gain wide recognition among the Muslim community and demonstrate to non-Muslims that autonomy can benefit all groups (Bertrand 2000, 4). Likewise in compliance to the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) with the MNLF about 5,530 former MNLF members and appointees were integrated into the AFP. The MNLF “integrees” after their indoctrination and training were assigned as regular and organic personnel of the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions, 53<sup>rd</sup> and 54<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigades, all in Mindanao (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). “The agreement formally ended MNLF armed struggle in Mindanao and Sulu that had lasted for about 30 years” (Jubair 1997). And despite the many uncertainties and problems in its implementation, it remains a positive sign for peace as “the GRP, MNLF and OIC still ACCEPT that the FPA still binds all the stakeholders to peace.” Everyone understood that all remain is for the commitment to be “translated NOW into tangible fruits of peace, development, and genuine people’s empowerment” (Mercado 2006).

The MILF and ASG rejected the peace accord and they continued their violent attacks engagements against the government. Both considered the agreement as an outright violation of the Tripoli agreements. MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat lamented that the Ramos-Misuari agreement did not address the Mindanao Muslims’ demand for self rule and vowed to continue the battle for “genuine Muslim Autonomy.” Similarly,

the ASG denounced Misuari as a traitor and declared to pursue their violent struggle for an Islamic State. On the other side, majority of Christians, especially those inhabiting areas that are in the ARMM or close to it, are also not comfortable with the accord. They conducted demonstrations and public condemnations to demonstrate their opposition to any compromise with the Muslims (David 2003).

#### The Joseph E. Estrada Administration, (1998-2001)

The May 1998 elections saw Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a former actor, sit as President of the Philippines with a remarkable majority vote. At the start of his administration, an “agreement of intent” was made between the GRP and the MILF. The agreement was about the commitment of both parties to “pursue talks on the substantive issues of the Mindanao conflict as soon as possible” (Quimpo 2000, 118).

From 1996 to 2000, the government and the MILF entered into a total of thirty nine agreements, joint communiqués, acknowledgments, and resolutions: sixteen agreements on the implementation of the cease-fire pact (organization of committees, repositioning of government and MILF troops, return of evacuees, and safety and security guarantees), thirteen on the framework of the talks, six on procedural matters, and four on recognition and verification of MILF camps. Throughout this period, no resolution was reached on the substantive issues raised by the MILF (Santos 2004).

President Estrada’s Cabinet approved the National Peace and Development Plan on 29 September 1999 which contains the Strategy of Total Approach (STA). The STA states the different policies and programs that would address all the various aspects of the conflicts and insurgencies in the country. It encompassed the political, socioeconomic, and security components of the approach. They announced it on 21 January the following

year (Aguirre 2000). The STA states the Four-Point Agenda of the government with regards to the MILF as follows: (1) The Government shall pursue peace negotiations with the MILF within the framework of the Constitution and the concept of meaningful autonomy; (2) The Government shall assert and uphold its authority under the Constitution (i.e., preserve territorial integrity, maintain law and order, and protect the civilian population through effective military and police actions); (3) The Government shall pursue socioeconomic development programs in the Muslim areas that would develop and uplift the living conditions of the people and serve as confidence-building measures and moral encouragement for the MILF to embrace autonomy; and (4) The Government shall continue with the full and effective implementation of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement as proof of their sincerity and goodwill to resolve the Mindanao problem politically (Peace Consultative Meeting 2000, 3)

This led to the formal opening of the GRP-MILF peace talks on 25 October 1999 in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. The talks were aimed at returning the MILF to mainstream society, attain lasting peace in Mindanao through a meaningful autonomy program and a consolidation of peace efforts. There were four succeeding peace talks. The first formal peace talk was also held in Sultan Kudarat on 19-20, January 2000. The second was from 1-2 March 2000, immediately followed by the third on 8-9 March in Cotobato City. An emergency meeting was also held on 27 April 2000 due to the brewing war climate (Mercado 2000).

During these times, skirmishes between the MILF and the Philippine Army continued. On 10 January 2000 the Muslim rebels took over the Talayaan Municipal Hall in Maguindanao. The Kauswagan Town Hall in Lanao del Norte was occupied on March

16 by MILF-NICC elements (Office of the National Security Advisor 2000). Likewise the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 21 persons from a Malaysian resort on April 23 and brought them to the jungles of Jolo. On March 20, the Abu Sayyaf took 30 hostages including known priest Fr. Roel Gallardo, C.M.F. who was soon after killed. Following that, 150 hostages were taken from Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat (Jayme 2001).

This prompted, President Estrada to announce an all-out-war policy on June 2000 against the Muslim rebels of Mindanao (Santos 2004). The all-out government offensives resulted in the suspension of the peace process, the shift in the MILF's armed struggle from conventional to guerilla warfare, and the declaration by MILF chairman Salamat of a jihad against the Philippine government. The MILF also scored the government for violating the cease-fire pact and agreements in which Manila acknowledged some MILF camps (Bacani 2005).

The GRP-MILF panel agreed to normalize the situation in Mindanao, commit to an ongoing peace process and stabilize the situation in a vital route, the Narciso Ramos Highway on April 27, 2000. However, the following day the war erupted, beginning in the highway stretch. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) assaulted the MILF position in Barangay Nuyo. On April 30, 2000, the MILF declared a suspension of the peace talks. The AFP attacked Camp Busrah Sumiorang, the second largest camp of the MILF, on May 25, not allowing the extension of the deadline for the evacuation of civilians and for negotiating the orderly withdrawal of MILF forces inside as called for by civil society groups. The peace talks resumed on May 30, 2000 and the MILF accepts the Four-Point government package. However, President Estrada continued to reject the calls of civil society for the halt to the fighting (Intengan, 2000). On June 1, a joint

statement was signed by the GRP-MILF on the GRP proposal for a meaningful autonomy contained in House Bill 7883 (Aguirre, 2000). President Estrada set June 30 as the deadline for the MILF to accept or reject his proposal for MILF autonomy only within the boundaries of Camp Abubakar. During this time, military operations still continued.

On July 2000, the AFP overran 50 MILF camps including the Bushra and Abubakar. The military offensive represented a significant setback to the rebel group and a large number surrendered to the government. However, contrary to expectations, the MILF did not fight in positional warfare to defend the camps, but abandoned the area and disbanded into small groups of guerillas and dispersed to the countryside (Wolters 2002). The MILF organized and conducted a counter attack in several areas. Hashim Salamat, who took refuge in Malaysia, called on the Moro people to rise in a jihad (May 2004).

As to the ASG, government troops conducted pursuit operation on 24 April, reportedly killing at least 17 ASG elements. Pursuit operations were continued against all the groups who kidnapped the group from the Malaysian resort. The hostages were released after the negotiations of the Libyan envoy Rajab Azzarouq. He secured the release of 17 hostages upon paying US \$25 million. The continued kidnapping activities of the ASG forced the government to continue its all out war against the ASG. A full scale AFP assault was conducted on the Island of Jolo on 17 September 2000 to rescue the remaining hostages and destroy the Abu Sayyaf. The military operations yielded 17 hostages rescued and killed more than 100 Abu Sayyaf and forced several members to surrender (May 2004)

The all out war likewise resulted to the massive displacement of about 700,000 people near the disputed areas. Likewise damage to properties was equally high and the



amounts for relief and rehabilitation reached billions of pesos. By August 2000, municipal halls, mosques, school buildings, roads, and bridges were damaged; and at least 5,000 houses were destroyed (David 2003).

Despite the “all out war”, President Estrada still pursued his peace initiatives, exemplifying the right hand and left hand approach. He reiterated his four-point approach to the Moro problem and then established the Presidential Task Force for Relief and Rehabilitation of Central Mindanao (PETFRRCM) with the mandate to “focus on quick-win programs to respond to the more immediate needs of the community and to regain the confidence of the community.” He promised to “win the hearts and minds” of those affected by the “all-out war policy” through various relief and rehabilitation program. Money released to the TF totaled P150 million before it was turned over to the new administration (Arguillas 2003).

By early 2001, President Estrada faced impeachment proceeding for charges of plunder. He was forced to resign following a massive yet peaceful “people power” demonstration that was supported by majority of the government officials and the military. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was sworn in as the next President of the Republic of the Philippines.

#### President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Administration (2001 - to date)

The devastating effects of President Estrada’s policy are now faced by the new administration of President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo. According to Chauhan, the “all out war” campaign has created “false dichotomies of majority-minority communities.” For the Muslims in Mindanao, they continue to fear alienation from their religion and culture, marginalization and loss of their land and homes (Chauhan 1991, 96-98).

Upon her assumption, President Arroyo immediately directed the resumption of the peace initiatives. She declared a unilateral cease-fire and called for the peace talks to commence. Preliminary talks were conducted on 21-24 March 2001. From 24 July to 3 August, the GRP and the MILF panels met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to settle the peace deal (Jayme 2001). Cease-fire guidelines were set on 7 August 2001.

Malaysia took an active role as third-party facilitator in the exploratory phases held in Kuala Lumpur. The first round of formal talks was held in Tripoli, where the parties agreed to the following: The talks revolved around the three main themes of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain. The negotiations resulted to the signing of the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement; the Implementing Guidelines of the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Peace Agreement; the Manual of Instructions for the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities and the Local Monitoring Teams; the Joint Communiqué on Criminal Interdiction; and the Implementing Guidelines of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation, and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Peace Agreement (Bacani 2005).

As the MILF began to embrace peace, the MNLF on the other hand was having a crisis. Issues of mismanagement and corruption bedeviled Misuari during his term as governor of ARMM and chairman of SPCPD. When he failed to seek reelection as ARMM governor, he threatened to resort to violence, which he carried out in Jolo in November 2001 (Banlaoi 2006). The MNLF was divided and some of the leaders broke away from Misuari and formed the Executive Council of the 15. The Council “retired” Nur Misuari as Chairman and gave him the title of Chairman Emeritus. Chairman Nur retaliated by expelling those who he now labels “traitors.” It seems that the Council of 15

is supported by Libya, Indonesia and Malaysia. However, Nur Misuari is still backed by the OIC and Saudi Arabia. On August 4, the MILF and the Council of the 15 met in Kuala Lumpur and agreed to form a Bangsamoro Solidarity Conference that would be a forum to discuss issues of the Bangsamoro people (Mercado, 2001). Misuari organized what the AFP calls now as the Misuari Break Away Group (MBG) of the MNLF, which according to the military has resorted to terrorism (Banlaoi, 2006).

In February 2003, the peace process was again suspended as the military launched combat operations and captured the new MILF headquarters in Buliok, Maguindanao. To return to the negotiations, the MILF demanded the government troop's withdrawal from Buliok. The government on the other hand, demanded that the MILF denounce terrorism and sever all ties with terrorist organizations. MILF chairman Salamat denied his group's involvement with any terrorist organization and issued a public statement denouncing terrorism. In July 2003, Salamat died of natural causes, and his Vicechairman for military affairs -- Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, became the new MILF chairman. In keeping with its part of the bargain, the government withdrew its forces from Buliok and lifted the arrest warrants previously issued to MILF commanders. With these, the peace talks again resumed and to this date negotiations are still ongoing (Bacani 2005). Operations against the ASG however are continued without let up.

### The Current Situationer

#### Moro Islamic Liberation Front

Since 2005, the MILF has been conducting recruitment activities in Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga Peninsula, Davao area, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao and the Lanao Provinces. Moreover, since the start of this year, the group has been expecting the arrival

of firearms from abroad to augment its arsenal. Despite these, the front has been holding peace negotiations with the government on the issue of ancestral domain. The latest exploratory talks last 20 March in Malaysia, was still not able to hurdle the contentious issues on ancestral domain. However, the parties are optimistic that these issues would be settled in the next round anytime this month. The MNLF likewise initiated 58 armed incidents which are in violation of the cessation of hostilities agreement. As of yearend 2005, the MILF strength was placed at 11,150 or an increase of 0.4 percent from the yearend 2004 figure of 11,100 (GHQ,AFP Internal Files). The current disposition of the MILF is as shown in figure 6.




Figure 6. MILF Deployment in Southern Philippines  
 Source: GHQ, AFP Internal Files

## The Missuari Breakaway Group

As of yearend 2005, the MBG's strength was placed at about 699, an increase of 284 percent compared to the yearend 2004 figure of 182. Similarly, their firearms went up by 73.2 percent from 187 pieces. These increases were brought about by the identification of new MBG personalities and the inclusion of about 450 previously unaccounted MBG members. From January to December 2005, a total of sixteen MBG-initiated armed incidents have occurred. Significantly, MBG elements were monitored actively participating in ASG armed confrontations with government troops last November. So far this year, it has conducted only one (1) ambush operation in Sulu that resulted to two soldiers killed. This can be attributed to the directive of Nur Misuari, to refrain from conducting any hostility during the recent "Balikatan" (RP-US joint military training) exercises (GHQ,AFP Internal Files). The MBG disposition is shown in figure 7.




Figure 7. MBG Deployment in Southern Philippines

Source: GHQ, AFP Internal Files

## Abu Sayyaf Group

Despite sustained AFP operations against the ASG, increases were posted in the group's strength and firearms. As of yearend 2005, the ASG strength was placed at 510, a 20 percent increase from the yearend 2004 figure of 425. In year 2005, the ASG initiated fifty two armed incidents. The total reflects an increase of 30 percent compared to the 2004 figure of 40. Notably, in the series of encounters between government forces and the ASG in Sulu in November last year, MBG elements have been monitored augmenting the bandit group during these encounters. From January 2006 to date, the ASG was involved in 17 violent incidents. The ASG's presence and activities could still be felt in about 178 barangays mainly in Sulu and Basilan (GHQ, AFP Internal Files). Shown in figure 8 is the disposition of the ASG in Mindanao.



Figure 8. ASG Disposition in Southern Philippines  
Source: GHQ, AFP Internal Files

### Cultural Diversity and Its Effect on the COIN Efforts

In terms of the policies to rebuild Mindanao, the current government has focused only on housing, which is perceived as a minor role in the whole development process. For the victims of the all-out-war, the rebuilding process includes the need for healing and peace education. Currently, Tabang Mindanao, a non-government organization, is the only group working on the Integrated Return and Rehabilitation Program (IRRP).

The agency INTERACT-Mindanao, created by President Arroyo to replace the Rehabilitation Task Force of the previous administration, is also criticized for not performing well. The government does not yet have a concrete and comprehensive rehabilitation program for the war victims (Abadiano 2001).

Whenever cross-cultural interaction involves the threat of violence, pre-deployment and in-service personal interaction training are even more crucial to successful communication (McConigal 1971). The history of the COIN approach in the Mindanao conflict reflects a dearth of pre-deployment training beyond language skills and the transfer of area information. Lest these mistakes be endlessly repeated it would seem that interpersonal skills should be central to future training.

“To defeat an insurgency you have to know who the insurgents are—and to find that out, you have to win and keep the support of the people” (Nagl 2006). The task of winning and keeping the support of the population is far more complex to understand. We could take a page off what the British did of gaining the trust of the Malay population. They have managed to develop long-term relationships and cultural awareness that bore fruit in actionable intelligence.

It would be wise to keep in mind that while the general Filipino population embraces the Christian doctrines and all its practices, the Muslims do not. Their concept of what is right and wrong is different from the average Filipino. Some Muslim group embraces killing for revenge or for “Jihad”, for most Filipinos, this is barbaric. While both consider family as important, the Muslims sanction the “eye-for-an-eye” treatment of any ill done to a family member. The fact that Muslim men are allowed to marry as many times as they could afford is a practice not allowed by the Catholic faith.

The cultural understanding we have now did not have the dependability to highlight, for example, that more than 75 percent of Muslims belong to one of tribes and that significant numbers of Muslims subscribe to many of the medieval conventions of Islamic law, from unquestioning obedience to tribal elders to polygamy, revenge-killings, and blood money paid to the relatives of persons killed in feuds.

It would be to our advantage were we to consider that the COIN efforts could understand the true depth of influence of Muslim leaders over their people. A broad cultural intelligence analysis, for example, could have drawn out the historical parallel between the cultural factors that contributed to many a war’s downfall.

The insipid level of detail dedicated to intelligence requirements which are focused on a people’s history and culture is a reflection of the imbalance of the military man’s training. The centerpiece of the hostile environment is the Muslims. Hence, it is important that cultural awareness is ingrained in the average soldier’s mind.



## CHAPTER 5

### THE AFP'S COIN APPROACH IN SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES

The insurgency problem in the country, particularly in the Southern Philippines, is multi-dimensional requiring a package of different but complementary responses. Military operations alone cannot solve this decades-long problem as sociocultural, economic, political and ethno-linguistic approaches to the insurgency problem must be applied together with the work of ensuring security. (*SALA 'AM Manual 2003*, vii)

General Narciso L Abaya, Chief of Staff, AFP 2003

The previous chapter analyzed the various sociocultural aspects impacting the ongoing conflict in Southern Philippines. The discussion highlighted two important realizations. First, that these sociocultural aspects of the conflict consequently dictate how the SPSG and ASG forces conduct their insurgency. This is the same case with most of the conflicts throughout history as “nations, states and others who wage wars, do so in ways appropriate to their culture and values” (Cebrowski 2004, 2). Second, this same situation vividly exemplifies the complex situation that PA soldiers have to deal with as they carry out their duties of winning the COIN fight.

Counterinsurgency is a multi-faceted type of warfare that defining it becomes a tiresome process. Various authors and even military manuals differ in their definitions. To avoid confusion NATO's definition is hereby used, "Counter-insurgency are those military, paramilitary, political, economical, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency" (USAF, JCS Publication 1 1987, 97). The Philippine Government, especially its Armed Forces is very appreciative of the complexity of the COIN fight. Throughout its long and continuing battle with both the communist insurgents and the

Muslim separatists it is fully understood that winning against the insurgents require a comprehensive and interconnected programs involving all the instruments of national power, concentrated against the insurgents endstate of undermining established authority and its replacement by another regime. “Thus far, efforts of the Philippine Government to combat insurgencies in the country have remained to be a partial success. A successful counterinsurgency must employ approaches and strategies that are specifically accustomed to the political, social, and economic conditions of the Philippines” (Seachon 2004, 16).

In this context and the realizations from the previous chapter, this chapter shall now illustrate the current COIN approach of the Philippine Government in Southern Philippines. The analysis of the COIN approach in this study is illustrated using the parameters of doctrine, training and organization. This is modified from the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities) problem-solving construct used by the United States Army to assess current capabilities and manage change (US Army FM 1 2005, 4-3). This chapter presents the results of the survey conducted, the AFP’s approach to the problem of insurgency in Mindanao, current campaign plan, personal experiences of the author, actual training being conducted by the AFP especially on cultural awareness.

### The Current COIN Campaign Program

#### Doctrine

##### National Strategy

The National Internal Security Plan (NISP) as approved by the President of the Republic of the Philippines encapsulates the national counterinsurgency strategy and the

roles of all components of the government in it. The plan is anchored on the framework, that “insurgency is like a tree. Cutting the tree alone will not solve the problem. Unless its roots are addressed and the insurgents that nurture it are destroyed, insurgency will persist” (NISP n.d., 8). It directs, therefore, a comprehensive effort involving all agencies of the government and including international support, as depicted in figure 6.




Figure 9. Pictorial Representation of Insurgency and Government Response  
 Source: Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, *NISP version 2.0*. (Malacanang, Manila, undated), 8.

Guided by these principles, and integrating the lessons learned from past campaigns, to include the COIN experience of other countries, the NISP adopted the “Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA)”. The SHA calls for a comprehensive and multidisciplinary response. “The military and police may help in winning the confidence of the people by providing security but their efforts must be accompanied by positive economic, psychosocial, and political actions to improve the lot of the populace” (NISP

n.d., 13). Further, the SHA dictates that the efforts of all concerned government agencies must be integrated and coordinated towards achieving the desired goal. Partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), the civil society and the citizenry is also emphasized. Figure 7 illustrates the various components and vision of the strategy.




Figure 10. The Strategy of Holistic Approach

Source: Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, *NISP Version 2.0* (Malacanang, Manila), 13.

### AFP Campaign Plan

In support to the National Internal Security Plan, the AFP formulated the Internal Security Operation (ISO) Plan “Bantay Laya”. It “lays the groundwork for the different campaigns of the AFP Unified Commands,” with the strategic goal to “decisively defeat the insurgents’ armed groups in order to attain and maintain peace for national

development” (*Bantay Laya Supplemental Handbook 2004, 3*). The plan is essentially a collage of past and present COIN approaches of the AFP, and lessons learned from the campaigns carried out based on these approaches. As such the plan presents the new concepts of the SHA as dictated by the NISP and the “Win Hold Win” (WHW) strategy, as well as the tested concepts from the “Lambat Bitag” campaigns that were initiated starting 1989.

At the level of the military the WHW strategy sets the priorities of the campaign. The idea is that the resources of the military is limited as such there is a need to identify the priority threat groups and areas of concentration. After the identification, the military shall focus combat power to win against the identified principal threat group and areas. For the less priority threats, the military shall apply the Hold concept by employing economy of force and limited-objective operations. As victory is attained against a priority threat, the focus shifts to winning against the next priority threat.

Likewise in case a less priority threat develops into a more dangerous threat then the military shifts to the Win phase from the Hold phase (*Bantay Laya 2001*). At the strategic level it can be illustrated by the current effort to (WIN) focus combat power and resources to defeating the communist insurgents (NPA), continue with the (HOLD) peace talks and limited-objective security operations against the separatist Muslim insurgents (SPSGs), while waging an all out combat operations (WIN) at every opportunity against the terrorists (ASG). For commands facing only one threat group in its AO, they prioritize according to specific units of the threat group or prioritize areas as regards the extent of insurgent’s influence over that area. For Commands facing more than one threat

group, like the Southern Command, the strategic principle of the WHW concept prevails. The same goes for the different Divisions and Brigades in their respective AOs.

To accomplish the above strategic precepts, the “Bantay Laya” utilizes operational principles culled from the NISP and the proven concepts of the “Lambat Bitag” campaigns. The Bantay Laya operational principles are: the Clear Hold Support (CHS) methodology; the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept and the Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS). The CHS methodology is fully employed in the Win posture. It entails the military employing full combat power “to CLEAR insurgency-affected areas of the armed groups and dismantle the insurgent politico-military structures” thereat. After the area is cleared, territorial forces are utilized to secure (HOLD stage) the area “to allow the other agencies of government to pursue consolidation and development activities. The AFP shall then SUPPORT the efforts of the various civil government agencies to address the root causes of the conflict” (Bantay Laya Supplemental Handbook 2004, 63-64). The CLEAR phase to be effective utilizes the SOT Doctrine. The SOT doctrine involves the Triad Concept of Operations specifically; Combat Operations, Intelligence and Civil-Military Operations. The concept uses the simultaneous yet integrated application of the three operational systems to defeat the armed insurgents, while at the same time destroying the politico-military structure-influence of the insurgents in the area and facilitate the delivery of services and development in the targeted community. The essence of SOT is the denial and dismantling of the insurgents “logistical-resource base, recruitment base and influence over the populace” (Bantay Laya Supplemental Handbook 2004, 176). This approach involves to a great extent the conduct of community immersions, daily interactions with

the populace, meetings with local leaders, community projects done by the military with the cooperation of the populace. Simultaneously, a community-based intelligence net is developed, that is not only dedicated to finding the insurgents but also seeks to neutralize the covert links of the insurgents with the populace. Simply put, the SOT concept is all about “winning the hearts and minds” of the populace.

### The SALA’AM Approach

It should be noted though that the COIN doctrine of the AFP is well-pronounced when referring to how to fight the communist insurgents. The SOT concept has been continuously applied in the communist insurgency affected areas but not in the SPSG-affected areas. Unlike the balanced approach implemented in the communist insurgency affected areas, “the AFP’s usual and most favored approach towards the SPSG is to lean more on combat operations” (SALA’AM Manual n.d., 2).

The rationale for the SALA’AM doctrine is the realization that though the SPSG is ranked second in the strategic priorities of the AFP, the fact remains that AFP forces are deployed in the SPSG-affected areas and continue to battle Muslim insurgents on a daily basis. Further, it is understood that apart from the ongoing peace talks (whose success is still a big question mark) no clear progress has really been made as far as a good campaign strategy against the SPSGs. If “winning the hearts and minds” of the populace is critical in the COIN fight against the communist insurgents it is no less important in the fight against the Muslim insurgents. In the words of the MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat himself, after a series of major AFP combat operations successfully captured all the major MILF camps in Southern Philippines in April-July 2000,

The government won over all our camps but not our hearts and minds. The worst of defeats is when the enemy (government) has won over our hearts and minds. (*SALA'AM Manual* 2002, iii)

Hashim Salamat, MILF Chairman

The intent of the SALA'AM concept, therefore is to duplicate the balanced approach implemented against the communist insurgents and implement a similar approach against the SPSGs. In coming up with the new approach the following weaknesses of the previous campaigns were identified:

1. The AFP approach towards the Muslim insurgents is mostly combat operations.
2. Poor appreciation of the "Bangsa Moro" identity.
3. Weak linkages with other community organizing and poverty alleviation groups (*SALA'AM Manual* n.d., 58-59)

To resolve the above observations, the SALA'AM shall make use of the SOT approach in the SPSG area. Certain aspects of the SOT however had to be modified to fit a different target audience--the Muslims in Mindanao. Focus is centered on the thorough understanding of the sociocultural dynamics not only of the Mindanao conflict but of the Muslim way of life in general. The SALA'AM Manual itself dedicates an entire chapter to the historical perspective on the Muslims of Southern Philippines, and the sociocultural dynamics of the conflict. (*SALA'AM Manual* n.d., 5-54). The implementation of the SALA'AM approach relies heavily on the training and organization of special SALA'AM platoons who are then deployed in SPSG-affected areas. These SALA'AM operators are trained to appreciate and understand the history of the Muslim conflict and the social and cultural structure of the Muslims in Southern Philippines. They next train on target area assessment, intelligence, community



immersions, psyops, SOT and CMO. Normally, after a month's immersion they then leave and turnover responsibility of the target area to the regular infantry battalions. The problem is that the territorial units are not trained on the SALA'AM methodology.

### Implementation Difficulty

It is evident that doctrine is present and valid but it is not translated well down to the lower levels in terms of training, tactics, and procedures (TTPs), for implementation by the regular battalions and companies. Likewise current AFP doctrine is still pretty much centered towards the communist insurgency and that the AFP is just starting to formulate doctrines against the Muslim insurgency. The common approach is all about combat operations against the Muslim insurgents. From my own experiences I noted that many of our troops are still unaware of our doctrines, although everybody seems to understand that the Mindanao problem is a complex one and therefore needs a holistic approach. This is maybe because as illustrated, the COIN approaches are centered on having ad hoc special units trained to undertake the tasks.

## Organization

### Inter-agency coordination

Presidential Executive Order Number 31 mandated the creation of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COCIC). NISP provides the organization of the as by. The COCIC is responsible for formulation of the NISP, the implementation of the strategy of holistic approach, and the synchronization and integration of the efforts of all the concerned government agencies in the COIN fight. In practice, however, except

for the military, there is still a lot to be desired about the actual participation and contribution and commitment of other government agencies.

#### Deployment of Forces for COIN

To implement the COIN campaigns the AFP has structured the deployment of forces in such a way that it would maximize area coverage while at the same time provide for meaningful interactions with the affected communities and populace. The PA Divisions are assigned to AFP Unified Area Commands while the Brigades, Battalions and Companies, organic or Opcon to the Divisions, are deployed in the troubled areas and actually established their camps inside their operational areas.

The intent is to maintain presence and influence the communities. The primary objective is to maintain peace and security, and set conditions favorable to the initiation of socioeconomic and political developmental programs. The secondary objective is to isolate the insurgents and deny them prospective logistics and recruitment bases. The COIN campaign in Southern Philippines is the responsibility of the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). SOUTHCOM is a joint, unified command. PA units in SOUTHCOM include the 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 6th Infantry Division. Figures 8 to 10 show the deployment of PA forces, in the Southern Philippines.




Figure 11. The 1st Infantry Division, Disposition of Units in AO  
 Source: OG3, PA Internal Files.



Figure 12. The 4th Infantry Division, Disposition of Units in AO  
 Source: OG3, PA Internal Files




Figure 13. The 6th Infantry Division, Disposition of Units in AO  
 Source: OG3, PA Internal Files.

### The Cadre Battalions

Cadre battalions were likewise organized to provide better command and control of the territorial CAFGU units. Prior to this arrangement, the regular infantry battalions were the ones also tasked to control CAFGU units in their AOs. This current organizational arrangement frees up the regular battalions to concentrate on their ISO missions (CLEAR phase of the CHS methodology), while the Cadre Battalions prepare the CAFGU units and control them when they assume their part in the Integrated Territorial Defense Strategy (in the HOLD portion of the CHS methodology).

### The SALA'AM teams

To further the COIN campaign in Southern Philippines the SALA'AM concept dictated the organization and creation of the SALA'AM platoons. These adhoc units are carefully selected and trained. Initially the selection process ensures that all the chosen personnel have already graduated from the SOT course conducted by the CMO School of

the Philippine Army. In addition the specialization training of the members of the platoon is given emphasis. The Pysops/CMO specialists all have prior training and/or experience in Psyops and CMO. The intelligence specialists should have adequate intelligence training and experience. There are also the medics, radio operators who are themselves certified SOT operators also. These SALA'AM platoons are deployed in priority SPSG-affected areas. They are charged with carrying out the holistic approach of understanding the prevailing issues in the target area, getting the cooperation of the populace to solve the issues, establishing a human intelligence network to find and fix the insurgents as well as their support networks in the area, and conducting CMO activities and developmental works in cooperation with the populace. At the outset the operations of these special units have met success. The only caveat is that after their, normally one month mission, they are returned to their former units and their responsibilities in the AO are turned-over to the regular battalions, who are not trained on the SALA'AM concept of operations, so continuity of the gains made is prone to be jeopardized.

#### Materiel and Facilities

As far as the AFP/PA logistical support to the ISO program is concerned it is somehow very robust despite the limitations inherent to the approved military budget. Current PA focus on the 100 percent equipage of infantry battalions is a good example of this. The current PA leadership is adamant to use majority of the Army budget on the procurement of new rifles, radios, vehicles, and other essential combat equipment needed by the infantry battalions in the performance of their ISO missions. TRADOC facilities and training equipment are continuously being upgraded as part of the modernization program of the AFP. What is left to be desired however is the current per capita budget

allocation to the different trainings which remains below par to the current peso value. The current funding computations for the training programs are almost six years old already that it cannot respond well to the rise in the current costs of material and services.

As to the SALA'AM program appropriate support is allocated to the training and immersion missions of the SALA'AM platoons as provided for in the approved SALA'AM Manual (*SALA'AM Manual*, 71-72). Training facilities for the training are likewise made available at GHQ, AFP and then at the sites of the 1st, 4th, and 6th Army Training Groups of the Philippine Army which are located within the AO of their corresponding numeric Infantry Division. There is, however, no consideration yet for supporting the training of regular battalions, companies and platoons, in the SOUTHCOM AO, on the SALA'AM concepts so that they themselves can undertake and utilize the new, balanced approach to the COIN effort against the SPSGs.

### Training

Improvements and changes in doctrine and organization have to be synchronized with training initiatives and programs to guarantee effectiveness for the military. To this end this study analyzes the training programs of the AFP, particularly the PA as far as inclusion of the new COIN approach in the Southern Philippines. Emphasis shall be on Individual Training Programs for officers and NCOs, Unit or Collective Training, and specialization training for COIN and ISO.

#### Individual Training

On Individual Training, a cursory examination of the training programs from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), to the basic and advance officer and NCO courses

at the PA Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the AFP Command and General Staff Course (AFPCGSC) shows that there is a lot to be desired to improve and further enhance the program of instructions, particularly on the aspect of cultural awareness as related to the current COIN approaches. The Philippine Military Academy Curriculum (see appendix C) shows that it is only on the first trimester of the final year of the military portion of the four-year curriculum that the cadets are educated and trained on the COIN concepts and the various issues surrounding the conflict. A sprinkle of instructions on COIN would be included in the discussions in the History and Strategy subjects of the regular academic curriculum. Improvements on the military curriculum are also needed to address the need for the cadets to have good foundation knowledge of the history and prevailing situation surrounding the insurgent threats they will be facing after their graduation.

The Program of Instructions (POIs) for the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) (see appendix D) prepares lieutenants for their jobs as platoon leaders and company staff officers. However the POI shows that it is heavily oriented on conventional warfare. ISO and COIN subject receive some amount of instruction time, but its structure is non-sequential and does not provide the needed foundation knowledge. There is no benefit of lectures on the background of the conflict, such as the history, the sociocultural dynamics prevailing on the problem, the strategies and tactics of the insurgents and the COIN approaches of the AFP and the government. On the Staff Subjects portion, however, the students received a five-period (one period is equal to an hours instruction time) instruction on the current responses to the security threat, featuring the NISP, and the various AFP and PA campaign plans. As part of the Intelligence lectures, the students are

given two-period updates on each of the various threats faced by the Philippines. After this, they also received a four -period lecture on CMO. Throughout the four months training some instructors would find it appropriate to relate his lessons to ISO and COIN. In totality, the ISO-COIN related discussions would comprise only about 21 to 30 periods of the total 560 periods of the IOBC curriculum.

On the other hand, the Infantry Officer Advance Course (IOAC) POI (see appendix E) illustrates some improvements over the IOBC POI as far as focus on ISO and COIN is concerned. The improvement however is largely centered on the 32-period practical exercise on Light Infantry Battalion ISO Implan formulation and the 24-period Infantry Brigade ISO Command Post Exercise. The foundational learning on ISO related subjects, however, is reduced to only about 20 to 25 periods as compared to the 30 periods in the IOBC. Also, just like the IOBC POI it is too conventional warfare focused and lacks lectures that would provide the students the foundational knowledge on the conflicts that they will try to overcome in their practical exercises. Per my experience as a staff officer and training evaluator at TRADOC, students usually rely on their own experiences and sometimes they are benefited by exercise evaluators who are kind enough to guide and provide them the nuggets of wisdom on ISO and COIN. This makes the process dependent therefore on the ability of the instructors to go out of their way and provide additional instructions throughout the exercise as needed. This is good only if the concerned instructor is knowledgeable and experienced enough on ISO and COIN. More importantly, both the IOBC and IOAC curriculum have not included yet the new SALA'AM approach to COIN in the Southern Philippines. COIN concepts discussed on



both courses always defaults to the communist insurgency and the answer to the Muslim insurgency remains combat operations only.

As I understand it, both the IOBC and IOAC POIs are still on the process of being improved. In contrast the AFPCGSC curriculum has been significantly improved. The current curriculum (see appendix F) shows more focus on ISO related subjects. The 152 periods are even dedicated to an entire on deliberate planning process on ISO where understanding the threat and various ISO concepts, strategies and lessons learned are major components of the learning process. It is noted, however, that the ISO focus of the curriculum is heavily centered on the communist insurgency. A distinct two periods are dedicated to a Muslim insurgency subject that is a lecture on Islamic Fundamentalism and Separatism by a Muslim professor. It can be argued that some of the subjects and modules, particularly the lectures on Current Threats, Social Movements and Revolution, National Security Assessment, and the like would probably be touching on the Muslim insurgency also, the design of the course as the exercises on the latter part of the course would show, indicates a leaning towards campaigning against the communist insurgents.

### Unit Training

The same dilemma plagues unit or collective training which is basically centered on the Infantry Battalion Retraining Program as far as the Philippine Army is concerned. Basically the battalion retraining is designed to improve the planning capabilities of the battalion command and staff, sharpen the individual soldier skills of the troops and properly and thoroughly train the squads, platoons and companies on combat TTPs for each unit level. Instructions on ISO subjects and updates on the ISO campaign are also thrown in the mix, but not to the extent as the training received by the SALA'AM teams.

### SOT, CMO and SALA'AM training

Apart from the aforementioned individual and unit training, specialization training on ISO and COIN are also provided by the AFP and the PA. Each Infantry Company deployed in communist insurgency affected AOs have at least one platoon trained on SOT Operations, so they can conduct effective ISO operations in their AO, while the rest of the platoons are dedicated to other security tasks and combat operations. Additional the SOT course is made available at the PA CMO School, to any personnel who wants to enhance their knowledge and capabilities on COIN. CMO and Psyops courses for officers and NCOs are also conducted at the said school to train personnel who are projected by their respective units to form their CMO and or Psyops staffs and operating units. As for the comprehensive COIN approach to the Muslim Insurgency problem, the SOT Center at the General Headquarters, AFP takes charge of the implementation of the SALA'AM concept by organizing and training the special SALA'AM platoons. SALA'AM training is heavily concentrated on understanding the history and sociocultural dynamics of the Muslim conflict. The Program of Instruction for the training as included in the SALA'AM Manual includes a 38-period "Knowing Oneself" module, a 44-period "knowing the Target Audience" module, a 30-period Intelligence module, a 53-period Psychological Operations module, a 30-period SALA'AM Concept module, and a 32-period module on the Government Programs and Peace Initiatives. The Knowing Oneself module includes instructions and discussions on the Philippine Military History and the past and present COIN approaches-campaigns and lessons learned from these campaigns. Additionally, the role of the government, the military and the individual soldier in ISO are given emphasis as well as the understanding of Human Rights and Man's nature and

needs. The Knowing the Target Audience module involves an in depth analysis of the history of the Muslim conflict, the Islam religion, the Muslim way of life and values, common grounds among Christianity and Islam, as well as the importance or impact of the various stakeholders in a Muslim community. A discussion about the different ills of the SPSSGs that can be exploited by the SALA'AM operators are also conducted. The Intelligence module concentrates on intel collection training, development of a local community intel net, interrogation and elicitation techniques and Order of Battle formulation and analysis. The Psyops module involves training on the Psyops processes, target analysis, propaganda themes and symbols formulation, negotiation techniques and conduct of CMO activities to further Psyops and the SALA'AM objectives. The SALA'AM Concept module involves the specialization of the teams and platoons of the procedures and processes of SALA'AM operations starting from the target area assessment to the community immersion phase, the community ISO survey and conduct of high impact projects that will help alleviate the quality of life in the community. The Government Programs module involves the orientation of the teams on the different programs being undertaken by the other government agencies in support of the COIN effort such as the Balik-baril (Cash for Gun) program, livelihood programs for rebel returnees, and the like. After all these modules, the students are then subjected to a series of practical exercises on all aspects of the SALA'AM process to further their specialization and training.

Evidently, apart from the current SALA'AM training which is still available only to a select, few adhoc platoons, the AFP/PA training program as a whole is basically not really responsive to addressing the sociocultural awareness aspect of the Muslim

insurgency. Officers are not provided all the tools they need to be able to effectively assess their area of operation and thus they are not able to integrate well with the Muslim community they are in contact with. This makes the winning the hearts and mind of the Muslim populace and isolating the Muslim insurgents from them a difficult thing to do. Language training is not even part of the training programs of the AFP and PA. Opportunities for officers and NCOs to learn the native dialects or languages spoken by the populace in their deployment areas are not available.

### Leader Preparation

As to the aspect of leadership and personnel, all the previous discussions point to the understanding of the AFP Leaders about the complexity of the insurgency problems faced by the AFP. Support of the current government and AFP leadership to the holistic approach to solving the insurgency situation is clearly evident as well. As far as the new approach to the Muslim insurgency the preparation of military officers and NCOs, and the selection of specially trained personnel to undertake the tasks are what needs more discussion.

As illustrated in the current AFP/PA training programs this is one area where there is still a huge room for improvement. Although it should be emphasized that in the context of the emphasis of past and current COIN concepts to deal primarily with the communist insurgents, PA officers can be considered well-prepared and totally oriented on the intricacies of the communist insurgency. They are likewise adequately-trained to deal with the execution of the ISO campaigns and approaches against the communist insurgents. Against the Muslim insurgents however, except for their adeptness in combat operations there is still a lot to be desired as far as the ability of the PA officers to

implement a holistic approach to solving the various issues surrounding the insurgency problem besetting the Muslim communities in Southern Philippines.

NCO preparation however remains fully concentrated on their capabilities to lead soldiers in combat and small unit leadership. The PA is however undertaking a serious effort to professionalize the NCO corps. Outstanding NCOs are selected to undergo Sergeant Major Courses, Advance and Basic NCO courses in foreign military institutions such as at the NCO Academy and Infantry School at Fort Benning. Additionally NCOs are now being trained on the ISO concepts themselves so they will be better prepared to assist the officers in the conduct of ISO tasks. Per my experience PA NCOs are still not oriented on gaining an understanding of the sociocultural dynamics of the COIN fight against the Muslim insurgents. Their usual inclination is to jump-off and conduct combat operations to neutralize the insurgents immediately.

#### Special Personnel for SALA'AM Operations

The selection of personnel for SALA'AM operations, however, is a very ideal concept. Salaam operators are properly picked and trained. The SALA'AM platoon follows the regular infantry platoon structure. What is different however is that half of members of the squad are Muslim military personnel. It is also a must for the squad to include at least an officer or soldier from the ranks of the MNLF returnees who were integrated into the Philippine Army. Likewise it is important for the squad to have an IMAM or Ustadz (Muslim religious leaders) (SALA'AM manual p67). The members of the platoon are likewise certified to have already undergone specialization training on either SOT, CMO or Intelligence prior to joining the SALA'AM platoon. This organization however remains an ad hoc unit. After the completion of the immersion

phase of the operation, the platoons are then disbanded and the members reports to their former units. It may still be beneficial because the returning personnel can then be the SALA'AM experts in their units. That is, however, granting that his unit is or will conduct SALA'AM operations, or even if he will be utilized per his new expertise. A negative side effect, however, in general is the disruption of continuity of the program. This is because as soon as the SALA'AM operators leave the area the regular infantry battalions to whom they will be turning over the responsibility are not trained on the SALA'AM concepts.

### The Survey

After analyzing the current approach of the government and the AFP to the COIN problem in Southern Philippines, this part of the study now presents the results of the survey that would further shed light to the assertions previously made. The survey was conducted on TRADOC student-officers and student-NCOs, and the PMA cadets. There were a total of 187 retrieved questionnaires. Of this number, one hundred are officers and NCOs currently enrolled at TRADOC. A random sampling of eighteen field grade officers attending the AFPCGSC was likewise added to the survey results.

Of the TRADOC registrants, thirty-three were taking the Infantry Officer Advance Course (IOAC); twenty-eight were Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) students; twenty were students of the Infantry NCO Advanced Course (INCOAC), and nineteen were field artillery NCO Basic Course (FANCOBC) students. There were a total of eighty-seven respondents from the graduating class of PMA, sixteen of which practiced the Islam religion.

## Profile of Respondents

The profile of the respondents were surveyed as to their basic profile (rank, gender, religion, area of origin), language proficiency, and whether they (except for the PMA cadets) have been deployed in Mindanao already.

### Basic Profile of Respondents

Of the TRADOC respondents, 61 percent were career military officers with ranks from first lieutenants to captains. All were males and 99 percent are Christians. The majority of these respondents are from the Luzon area and only 28 percent are from Mindanao (see table 2). The junior enlisted personnel are the privates first class (PFC) and corporals (Cpl) undergoing the Field Artillery NCO Basic Course (FANCOBC). The senior NCOs are the staff sergeants (SSg) and sergeants (Sgt) undergoing the Infantry NCO Advance Course (INCOAC). The first lieutenants (1LT) and second lieutenants (2LT) are those taking up the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC). The captains (CPT) are taking the Infantry Officer Advance Course.

Likewise, as shown in table 3, the majority of the respondents from PMA are also from the Luzon area, most were males, and 81 percent were Christians. Likewise note that majority of the cadets coming from Mindanao are actually Christians. These data further exemplifies previous data shown that there are now more Christians and people of other religion in Mindanao than there are Muslims. About 46 percent frequently socialize with people of other racial-ethnic group while 45 percent only does it sometimes. Data also shows that discussion about racial-ethnic issues is only done sometimes, if not at all.

	IOAC (N=33)	IOBC (N=28)	INCOAC (N=20)	FANCOBC (N=19)	TOTAL (N=100)
<b>Rank</b>					
PFC				7	7
Cpl				12	12
SSg			10		10
Sgt			10		10
2LT		26			26
1LT	16	2			18
CPT	17				17
	Total				100
<b>Gender</b>					
Male	33	28	20	19	100
Female	0	0	0	0	0
	Total				100
<b>Region</b>					
Luzon	14	14	13	9	50
Visayas	5	5	1	5	16
Mindanao	9	9	4	6	28
NCR	3	0	1	0	4
CAR	2	0	0	0	2
	Total				100
<b>Religion</b>					
Christian	33	27	20	19	99
Islam	0	1	0	0	1
	Total				100

	ISLAM (N=16)	CHRISTIAN (N=71)	TOTAL (N=87)
<b>Area of Origin</b>			
Luzon	1	47	48
Visayas	2	5	7
Mindanao	13	19	32
		Total	87
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	15	60	75
Female	1	11	12
		Total	87
<b>Socialization with another racial/ethnic group</b>			
Frequently	11	29	40
Sometimes	3	36	39
Not at all	2	6	8
	Total		87
<b>Dialogue with peers about racial/ethnic issues</b>			
Frequently	1	3	4
Sometimes	14	58	72
Not at all	1	10	11
	Total		87



### Muslim Language Proficiency of Respondents

The survey clearly indicated that the majority of the AFP's officers and NCOs does not speak the Muslim language, does not know how to write in the dialect, and comprehension is deemed either poor or very poor (see table 4). This substantiates earlier assertions made that the AFP and PA training programs do not provide for opportunities for officers and NCOs to learn other dialects or languages that are native to their areas of deployments. Learning of other dialects and languages are left to the initiative of the officers and NCOs as funds for this purposes are also not available. Usually what happens is that officers and NCOs learn the dialect or language spoken in their area of deployment through assimilation and daily practice of the language thereat. This process, however, takes a long time.

	IOAC (N=33)	IOBC (N=28)	INCOAC (N=20)	FANCOBC (N=19)	TOTAL (N=100)
<b>Spoken</b>					
Native Speaker	0	0	0	1	1
Fluent	1	0	1	1	3
Conversational	4	11	3	2	20
Does not speak it	28	17	16	15	76
	Total				100
<b>Written</b>					
Very Well	0	1	1	0	2
Fairly Well	2	2	1	4	9
Poor	14	5	2	1	22
Does not know how	17	20	16	14	67
	Total				100
<b>Comprehension</b>					
Excellent	1	0	0	0	1
Very Good	4	1	2	1	8
Fair	3	8	2	6	19
Poor	18	6	6	2	32
Very Poor	7	13	10	10	40

In the same category, table 5 illustrates the language proficiency of the members of the graduating class of the Philippine Military Academy. Data stipulates that most of the respondents do not speak, write or understand the Muslim Language. This is understandable because the addition of language training will add another difficult program to the already brimming academic load of the cadets for their baccalaureate degrees and the rigid military curriculum. Obviously, the majority of the Muslim cadets know how to speak the language, could write it fairly well, and could comprehend the Muslim dialect fairly. The Muslim cadets who have poor comprehension are either new converts or grew up in non-Muslim populated urban centers.

Table 5. Language Proficiency of PMA Respondents			
	MUSLIM (N=16)	CHRISTIAN (N=71)	TOTAL (N=87)
<b>Spoken</b>			
Native Speaker	6	2	8
Fluent	1	3	4
Conversational	5	13	18
Does not speak it	4	53	59
		Total	87
<b>Written</b>			
Very Well	3	1	4
Fairly Well	5	9	14
Poor	3	8	11
Does not know how	5	53	58
		Total	87
<b>Comprehension</b>			
Excellent	4	0	4
Very Good	0	5	5
Fair	8	13	21
Poor	2	8	10
Very Poor	2	45	47
		Total	87

### Assignment in Mindanao

As to whether they have been assigned in Mindanao, only a marginal majority has been deployed while 48 percent has not been assigned yet. However, 46 percent claims that they will not be deployed while 26 percent said they might be deployed in Mindanao (see table 6).

Deployed in Mindanao	24	9	12	7	52
Hasn't been deployed	9	19	8	12	48
	Total				100
Will be deployed in Mindanao	2	9	12	5	28
Wont be deployed	9	19	8	10	46
Maybe deployed	22	0	0	4	26
	Total				100

The majority of those who claimed that they would not be deployed to Mindanao are from the ranks of the NCOs. This is primarily because the PA implements the regionalization concept in the assignment of enlisted personnel. This program provides that as much as possible enlisted personnel should be assigned to units near within or their respective home regions. This is for morale and welfare considerations as the PA cannot provide for the heavy expenses involved in reimbursing soldiers whenever its time for them to go on rest and recreations or other authorized leaves. The proximity would likewise afford convenience to the soldier to immediately attend to his family in times of emergencies.

For officers, however, the intent is to nurture their well roundedness, flexibility, and balanced strategic and tactical orientation. That is why, officers are required both for promotion and positioning purposes that officers should served at least the minimum

deployment tour of two years at the three major campaign areas of the AFP, namely, the Luzon area, Visayas area, and the Mindanao area. The survey likewise points out to the fact that Muslim personnel are only a very small percentage of the AFP roster.

#### Perceived Profile of the AFP COIN Efforts in Southern Philippines

Table 7 presents the ranked responses of TRADOC officers and NCOs on the cultural issues they have perceived to have been considered in the COIN program, according to the officers and NCOs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Religious rites and beliefs; ethnicity, customs and traditions, and community life and social norms were deemed the most addressed issues in the COIN program as they were ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively.

ISSUES	IOAC (N=33)	IOBC (N=28)	INCOAC (N=20)	FANCOBC (N=19)	<i>f</i>	RANK
Culture of aggressiveness	6				6	6.5
Culture of violence	6				6	6.5
Religious Rites/Beliefs	7	2	7	9	25	1
Ethnicity, Customs and Traditions	4		2	8	14	2
Family Ties	2				2	11.5
RIDO System	1	4	2		7	5
Community Life and Social Norms	10			3	13	3
Socio-Economic Structure	1	3			4	9
Racial/Religious Discrimination	1	1			2	11.5
Government's lack of attention	0	2	1		3	10
Call for Mindanao's Independence	9	2			11	4
Land Conflict		5			5	8

Likewise TRADOC respondents identified certain cultural differences between the Muslim insurgents and the AFP and which are addressed in the AFP and PA COIN

program (see table 8). The practice of religion was identified by most as an addressed issue followed by ethnic discrimination and indifference and skepticism as the 2nd and 3rd issues addressed by the program. Language and conflict resolution were among those ranked lowest. The IOAC respondents, however, who were captains and 1st Lieutenants, deemed indifference and skepticism and community immersion to be at the top of the list of cultural issues properly addressed by the PA COIN program. NCOs identified practice of religion and reintegration of rebel returnees and “balik-baril” program as their issues.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCES	IOAC (N=33)	IOBC (N=28)	INCOAC (N=20)	FANCOBC (N=19)	<i>f</i>	RANK
Ethnic Discrimination	5	3		1	9	2
Indifference/Skepticism	8				8	3
Conflict Resolution	1				1	11.5
Practice of Religion	3	4		4	11	1
Lifestyle	2	1			3	7.5
Poverty	2				2	9.5
Islamic State of Mindanao	2	1	1		4	6
Language	1				1	11.5
RIDO		3			3	7.5
Solidarity	2				2	9.5
Community Immersion	7				7	4
Rebel Returnees and Integrees and <i>Balik-Baril</i> programs			6		6	5

As to the PMA respondents’ personal awareness regarding the Muslim insurgency in Southern Philippines, Muslim cadets identified *racial discrimination, poverty* and *issue about the separation of Mindanao* as their three top ranked sociocultural issues that affect the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. Christian cadets on the other hand, identified *biased perception against Muslims, religious differences* and *politics* as their top three issues. Both the Islam and Christian respondents identified poverty, separation of Mindanao and

ideological differences as issues that would affect the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao (see table 9).

Table 9. Sociocultural Issues that Affect Muslim Insurgency According to PMA Cadets			
MUSLIM (N=16)	RANK	CHRISTIAN (N=71)	RANK
Racial discrimination	1	Biased perception against Muslims	1
Poverty	2	Religious differences	2
Issue about separation of Mindanao	3	Politics	3
Education	4	Separation of Mindanao from the Phil.	4
Livelihood	5	Ideological differences	5
Bad perception	6	Land ownership	6
Generalizing (stereotyping)	7	Poverty	7
History of past conflicts	8	History	8
Religious conflicts and misunderstandings	9		
Differences	10		
Very high sense of pride	11		
Abuse of military in the field	12		
Unfair treatment	13		

As to what they think are the vital differences in culture between Filipino Muslims and the general Filipino populace that should be addressed by the PMA in counterinsurgency instructions and lectures, Islam cadets identified *tradition, religious and cultural beliefs* and *marriage* as at the top of their list while Christian cadets identified *tactics used by the insurgents, sociocultural root of insurgency* and *terrorism* as at the top of theirs. Both groups agree that history is an issue that affects the insurgency in Mindanao. The practice of religion and cultural beliefs are likewise common answers (see table 10).

ISLAM (N=16)	RANK	CHRISTIAN (N=71)	RANK
Tradition	1	Tactics used by the insurgents	1
Religious and cultural beliefs	2	Sociocultural root of insurgency	2
Marriage	3	Terrorism	3
Treatment of women	4	Muslim values and culture	4
Brotherhood between each other	5	Conservatism vs. liberalism	5
Way of life	6	Religious practices	6
Community bonds	7	History of war in Mindanao	7
Rearing children	8		

Several aspects that would advance counterinsurgency methods in the field were ranked by the TRADOC respondents. At the top of their list is awareness of the Muslims' *practice of religion*, followed by *concept of war and freedom*, and *kinship structure*. Lowest ranked were the aspects on *child-rearing*, *war history* and *familiarization with the terrain* as presented in table 11.

ASPECTS	IOAC (N=33)	IOBC (N=28)	INCOAC (N=20)	FANCOBC (N=19)	PMA		AVE RANK	RANK
					I=16	C=77		
Awareness of Muslims'								
Practice of Religion	2	5	1	3	2	4	<b>2.66</b>	<b>1</b>
Kinship Structure	5	4	2	4	6	1	<b>3.66</b>	<b>3</b>
Concept of War and Freedom	3	6	3	5	1	2	<b>3.33</b>	<b>2</b>
War History	6	7	5	6	4.5	3	<b>5.25</b>	<b>7</b>
Community Life	7	2	4	2	3	5	<b>3.83</b>	<b>4.5</b>
Child-Rearing	4	3	7	7	1.4	6	<b>4.73</b>	<b>6</b>
Language	1	1	6	1	7	7	<b>3.83</b>	<b>4.5</b>
Familiarization with area's terrain	8	8	8	8			<b>5.33</b>	<b>8</b>

Likewise table 12 presents the ranked aspects deemed by the PMA respondents as likely to improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in the field. The respondents have identified awareness building and advocacy as the first aspect that would prove helpful in field operations. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations and training in conflict resolution were ranked 2nd and 3rd, respectively. Ranked last was civil works and development of basic services.

Table 12. Aspects that Would Help Improve Military Operations in COIN								
ASPECTS	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		AVERAGE RANK	RANK
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Training in Conflict Resolution	2	1	5	4	7	2.5	3.58	3
Community Immersion	5	5	6	6	2	1.0	5.66	6
Psycho-Social Works	6	4	4	3	3	2.5	3.75	4
Traditional Orientation towards Peace and Promotion of Respectful Human Relations	3	2	2	2	1	4	2.33	2
Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue	4	6	3	5	5	7	5.00	5
Awareness-building and advocacy	1	3	1	1	6	6	3.00	1
Civil works and development of basic services	7	7	7	7	4	5	6.16	7

As to the degree of concentration given by the Philippine Army on cultural awareness in its policies and programs (see table 13), 69 percent of the respondents maintain that the degree of concentration given by the PA on *understanding the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency* is fairly well. *Difference in Culture and the perception of life of Muslims and the general Filipino populace* is deemed quite



significant. Majority of the respondents stipulate that the *Importance of knowledge of history and causes of the Mindanao conflict to COIN efforts* and the *Importance of understanding basic differences in culture between Muslim and the general Filipino populace to COIN efforts* are very important with 77.54 percent and 72.73 percent, respectively. Most respondents at 60.43 percent, have only some knowledge about the Muslim Culture and way of life. Majority of those undergoing the FANCOBC maintain that the degree of concentration given understanding the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency is poor.

The survey stipulates that majority of the TRADOC respondents claim that there is no opportunity for learning Muslim dialects in the current PA training programs (see table 14). Asked why, some say that some commanders take the initiative on this issue and that there are no available Muslim instructors who could teach them the Muslim dialect and that if there were, teachers are probably not highly motivated to teach. Others claim that the government feels that there is no language barrier since Tagalog as the national language, should provide for a common dialect. TRADOC respondents however said it is important to understand the language to enhance their dialogue and communication skills. While, 51.72 percent of the PMA cadets claim that their exposure to information and activities devoted to understanding ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relationships is quite significant, 34.48 percent claim that their exposure is quite considerable.

Table 13. PA's Degree of Concentration on Cultural Awareness								
ASPECTS	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		f	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Understanding the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency								
Very Well	0	1	4	0	1	6	12	6.40
Fairly Well	25	24	6	8	14	52	129	69.00
Poorly	8	3	9	10	1	11	42	22.46
Do not Understand It	0	0	1	1	0	2	4	2.14
Total							187	
Difference in Culture and the perception of life of Muslims and the general Filipino populace								
Considerable	5	7	7	4	5	17	45	24.06
Quite Significant	24	15	2	6	7	37	91	48.66
Barely Significant	3	5	7	4	1	15	35	18.72
Insignificant	1	1	4	5	3	2	16	8.56
Total							187	
Importance of knowledge of history and causes of the Mindanao conflict to COIN efforts								
Very Important	23	26	17	9	12	58	145	77.54
Slightly Important	10	2	2	2	4	9	29	15.51
Maybe Important	0	0	1	5	0	3	9	4.81
Not Important	0	0	0	3	0	1	4	2.14
Total							187	
Importance of understanding basic differences in culture between Muslim and the general Filipino populace to COIN efforts								
Very Important	24	26	9	8	14	55	136	72.73
Slightly Important	7	2	5	3	1	12	30	16.04
Maybe Important	2	0	3	4	1	3	13	6.95
Not Important	0	0	3	4	0	1	8	4.28
Total							187	
Extent of knowledge or mastery of the Muslim Culture and way of life								
Expert	0	0	1	0	3	1	5	0.27
Some knowledge	27	20	6	5	11	44	113	60.43
Does not know enough	6	8	9	8	1	21	53	28.34
No knowledge	0	0	4	6	1	5	16	8.56
Total							187	

Table 14. Opportunity for Learning Muslim Language and Dialects								
	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		<i>f</i>	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
TRADOC								
Yes	1	6	7	2			16	16
No	25	14	11	13			63	63
Not Sure	7	8	2	4			21	21
PMA CADETS								
Considerable					7	23	30	34.48
Quite Significant					7	38	45	51.72
Barely essential					1	10	11	12.64
Insignificant					1	0	1	1.15
	Total						187	

On the survey regarding the incidence of training given to TRADOC students on the sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency, findings state that 42 percent of the respondents agree that there are trainings, although according to them, it is not enough. The 26 percent are not even sure that there are trainings on the matter while 16 percent claim that there are no trainings at all. Only 16 percent, most of which are commissioned officers, claim that there are trainings of the sort (see table 15).

Table 16 presents the findings on the availability or presence of experts who teach Muslim culture and insurgency as part of their academic requirements or training modules. Most of the respondents claim that there are no experts who teach them about the matter while 42.25 percent declare that sometimes there are experts who teach them. Only 9.09 percent assert that there are experts who teach them about the Muslim Culture and the Muslim insurgency.

	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		<i>f</i>	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Yes, there are trainings	9	5	2	0			16	16
Yes, but not enough	15	17	7	3			42	42
Not Sure there are trainings	6	1	6	13			26	26
No trainings	3	5	5	3			16	16
Total							100	

	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		<i>f</i>	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Yes, there are	4	1	2	0	2	8	17	9.09
Sometimes	5	15	10	7	4	38	79	42.25
There are none	24	12	8	12	10	25	91	48.66
Total							187	

The respondents were also asked whether they believe that cultural awareness is crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Mindanao. Table 17 presents the findings on this matter. It is noted that the greater majority of respondents recognize the need for cultural awareness to ensure success in the field operations in Mindanao. Only 13.37 percent believe that it is not necessary while 12.30 percent contend that maybe it could be crucial.

	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		<i>f</i>	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Yes	32	21	5	13	12	56	139	74.33
No	0	2	14	2	2	5	25	13.37
Maybe	1	5	1	4	2	10	23	12.30
Total							187	

When asked to validate their answers to the issue above, most of the officers argue that to establish common understanding, build a good relationship and lessen the gap between the Muslim insurgents and the AFP, a high degree of awareness of the Muslim culture is necessary. They further maintain that awareness of a particular custom enables the player to merge well in that society and opens doors that would otherwise remain closed to him. After all, understanding the “enemy” is knowing how to deal with them.

All the respondents were asked to determine whether cultural awareness is something that should be given emphasis in their training curriculum. Out of the 187 surveyed or 68.45 percent, 128 respondents assert that cultural awareness should be emphasized in the training curriculum (see table 18). They declare that should the AFP include cultural awareness in the curriculum, whether as a separate course or integrated into other courses, culture sensitivity would be achieved thereby allowing men who will be assigned in Mindanao to have the leverage they need to blend into the Muslim environment because according to them, there are more civilians in the area than there are insurgents so they need to influence their way of thinking.

Table 18. Cultural Awareness should be Emphasized in the Training Curriculum								
	IOAC	IOBC	INCOAC	FANCOBC	PMA		<i>f</i>	Percentage
	N=33	N=28	N=20	N=19	I=16	C=71		
Yes	29	19	6	12	12	50	128	68.45
No	1	3	11	2	1	5	23	12.30
Maybe	3	6	3	5	3	16	36	19.25
Total							187	

Even so, majority of the higher NCOs taking the advanced course at TRADOC maintain that it is not needed. When asked why this is so, they claim that they are trained in the conventional manner and that there is a special operations branch who should be undertaking this course. They also claim that their enemy is not from within the Philippines but from without. This finding supports the analysis made as to the unpreparedness of the NCOs to assist the officers in the conduct of the ISO Strategy of Holistic Approach due to non-emphasis on ISO concepts in their training programs.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter contains the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the study. Areas for further research or study are also given in the last part of the chapter.

#### Précis of the Study

This study centered on the assessment of the Philippine Army's Counterinsurgency campaign program in Southern Philippines. This was primarily an attempt to gauge the implementation and inclusion of cultural awareness in the current PA COIN efforts in Mindanao. The endeavor was undertaken to address the basic need of every campaign program to succeed. This could be achieved by understanding the dynamics of the problem and its roots. And with the problem of counterinsurgency in the Southern Philippines spanning several decades already, it is imperative for the Armed Forces of the Philippine, together with the other stakeholders to identify or source out the inner workings of this conflict so that a comprehensive and well thought-out plan could be implemented to the satisfaction of all.

It is in this light that the study addressed the following sub-problems to gauge the degree of cultural awareness in the current PA COIN program:

1. What is the profile of the Philippine Army COIN efforts in Southern Philippines in terms of the cultural issues involved in the insurgency problem in Southern Philippines and the significant differences in culture between the protagonists in this insurgency problem?

2. What *raison d'être* would advance the methods employed by the Philippine Army units in their operational areas in Southern Philippines, and can cultural awareness help determine success in an operational area as well as be used to improve military operations and provide strategic or tactical advantage?

3. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Army giving to sufficiently address the issue of cultural awareness in its operational policies and training programs in as far as sufficient knowledge of PA officers and soldiers about the history of the insurgency and the culture of the Southern Philippines; awareness of PA officers and soldiers regarding the importance of studying the culture of the Muslims in Southern Philippines; degree to which cultural awareness is emphasized in PA operational policies, training programs and educational curriculum.

4. What constraints, if any, were encountered by the Philippine Army in the implementation and sustainment of their COIN undertakings in the region?

This study advocated the idea that an awareness of the Muslim culture and all its inherent intricacies would greatly help the army's effort to overcome the insurgency problem in Mindanao.

#### Summary of Findings

As to the result of the Survey, the findings of the study are as follows:

1. On the Profile of the respondents, all TRADOC officers are males, with 99 percent of them Christians, most of them come from the Luzon area and a good number of them have been deployed in the Mindanao area already. On the other hand, the respondents from the graduating class of PMA have 16 Islam students and 71 Christians and 55.17 percent are from Luzon and 36.78 percent are from the Mindanao area.



Majority are males. A marginal majority claim to frequently socialize with others of another ethnic-racial group and 83 percent sometimes hold dialogues with their peers about ethnic-racial issues.

As for language proficiency, the TRADOC officers do not know how to speak nor write the Muslim dialect and their level of comprehension of the same is poor. Of the PMA respondents, 68 percent does not speak the Muslim dialect, 67 percent does not know how to write it and 54 percent has low comprehension level. This is despite the fact that a good number of them come from Mindanao and 16 of them are Islam.

2. On the profile of the COIN efforts in Mindanao as to cultural awareness issues taken into consideration, TRADOC officers identified *Religious rites and beliefs*; *ethnicity, customs and traditions*, and *community life and social norms* were deemed the most addressed issues in the COIN program as they were ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, respectively. On the other hand, Islamic cadets identified *racial discrimination, poverty* and the *issue about the separation of Mindanao* as their three top ranked sociocultural issues that affect the Muslim insurgency in Mindanao. Christian cadets identified *biased perception against Muslims, religious differences* and *politics* as their top three issues

As to differences in culture between the AFP and the Muslim insurgents, TRADOC officers in training identified *practice of religion* as the most addressed issue followed by *ethnic discrimination* and *indifference and skepticism* as the 2nd and 3rd issues addressed by the program, respectively. While PMA Islam cadets identified *tradition, religious and cultural beliefs* and *marriage* as at the top of their list while Christian cadets identified *tactics used by the insurgents, sociocultural root of insurgency*

and *terrorism* as at the top of theirs. Both agree that history is an issue that affects the insurgency problem in Mindanao.

3. As to the aspects of culture that would advance the COIN methods in Mindanao, the averaged rank of all responses gave awareness of the Muslims' *practice of religion*, followed by *concept of war and freedom*, and *kinship structure*.

As to aspects that would provide tactical advantage in the field respondents indicated *awareness building and advocacy* as the first aspect that would prove helpful in field operations. *Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations* and *training in conflict resolution* were ranked second and third, respectively

4. As to the degree of concentration that the Philippine Army is giving to cultural awareness in its policies and programs, respondents maintain *understanding the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency* given attention fairly well. *Difference in Culture and the perception of life of Muslims and the general Filipino populace* is deemed quite significant. Majority of the respondents stipulate that *Importance of knowledge of history and causes of the Mindanao conflict to COIN efforts* and *Importance of understanding basic differences in culture between Muslim and the general Filipino populace to COIN efforts* are very important with 77.54 percent and 72.73 percent, respectively. And 60.43 percent of the respondents have only some knowledge about the Muslim Culture and way of life.

5. As to the existence of the opportunity for learning the Muslim dialect, TRADOC respondents claim that there is no opportunity for learning Muslim dialects in the current PA training programs. Some said that there are no available Muslim

instructors who could teach them the Muslim dialect and that if there were, teachers are probably not highly motivated to teach them the language. Others claimed that the existence of Filipino or Tagalog as the national language provides a common dialect that there's is no language barrier. TRADOC respondents however said that it is important to understand the language so that dialogue and communication skills will be enhanced.

While 51.72 percent of the PMA cadets claim that their exposure to information and activities devoted to understanding other racial/ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relationships is quite significant, 34.48 percent claim that their exposure to such is considerable.

6. On the incidence of trainings on sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency, findings state that 42 percent of the respondents agree that there are trainings although according to them, it is not enough. Twenty-six (26) percent are not even sure that there are trainings on the matter while 16 percent claim that there are no trainings at all.

7. On the availability or presence of experts who teach Muslim culture and insurgency as part of the academic requirements or training modules. Most of the respondents claim that there are no experts who teach them about the matter while 42.25 percent declare that sometimes there are experts who teach them. Only 9.09 percent assert that there are experts who teach them about the Muslim Culture and the Muslim insurgency.

8. On whether the respondents believe that cultural awareness is crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Mindanao. Findings stipulate that the greater majority of respondents recognize the need for cultural awareness to ensure success in the

field operations in Mindanao. Only 13.37 percent believe that it is not necessary while 12.30 percent contend that maybe it could be crucial.

9. As to whether cultural awareness is something that should be given emphasis in their training curriculum, 128 respondents out of the 187 surveyed or 68.45 percent assert that cultural awareness should be emphasized in the training curriculum. They declare that should the AFP include cultural awareness in the curriculum, whether as a separate course or integrated into other courses, culture sensitivity would be achieved thereby allowing men who will be assigned in Mindanao to have the leverage they need to blend into the Muslim environment because according to them, there are more civilians in the area than there are insurgents so they need to influence their way of thinking.

### Conclusion

Based on the above findings, and the analysis made of the sociocultural dynamics of the conflict, and the current COIN approach of the AFP and PA in Southern Philippines the following are the conclusions of this investigation:

1. That majority of the men who have been deployed and would be deployed in Mindanao are Christian males who do not speak, write or comprehend the Muslim dialect and that only a marginal majority claim to frequently socialize with others of another ethnic/racial group but a greater majority sometimes hold dialogues with their peers about ethnic/racial issues.

2. That religious rites and beliefs; ethnicity, customs and traditions; and, community life and social norms were the top-ranked cultural awareness issues taken into consideration in the current COIN program. Likewise, PMA cadets identified racial discrimination, poverty and the issue about an Independent Mindanao as the top three

sociocultural issues that affect the Muslim insurgency in the area. The practice of religion was identified as the foremost addressed issue. Both Christians and Muslims agree that history is an issue that affects the insurgency problem in Mindanao.

3. That the aspects of culture that would advance the COIN methods would be the understanding of the Muslims' practice of religion, concept of war and freedom and kinship structure and that what would provide a tactical advantage in the field would be awareness building and advocacy, training in conflict resolution and the traditional orientations towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations.

4. That the degree of concentration that is given by the Philippine Army to cultural awareness in its policies and programs are manifested in the following:

a. Attention is given fairly well to understanding the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency;

b. Difference in culture and the perception of life of Muslims and the general Filipino populace is deemed quite significant;

c. Knowledge of the history and causes of the Mindanao conflict in the COIN efforts is deemed very important; and,

d. Understanding the basic differences in culture between Muslims and the general Filipino populace is likewise very important.

5. That the opportunity for learning the Muslim dialect has not been given the priority in the current PA training program and that with Filipino or "Tagalog" as the national language, some believe that there is no language barrier. While 51.72 percent of the PMA cadets claim that their exposure to information and activities devoted to

understanding other racial/ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relationships is quite significant, 34.48 percent claim that their exposure to such is considerable.

6. That training on sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency is not enough and quite a few believe that there are no trainings on the matter at all. This qualifies conclusion number 4, because the military in general appears to put a premium on cultural awareness as far as the COIN campaigns are concerned. This does not translate into actual emphasis as far as the training programs are concerned.

7. That experts, who could teach Muslim culture and Muslim insurgency as part of the academic requirements or training modules, are practically nonexistent.

8. That everybody understands and accepts that cultural awareness is crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Mindanao.

9. That cultural awareness should be given emphasis in the training curriculum of TRADOC and the Philippine Military Academy.

### Recommendations

From the information gathered, the researcher offers the following prescribed actions:

#### 1. Translation of Strategic and Operational COIN precepts and Doctrines to TTPs.

The current ISO/COIN Approach of the Government and the AFP, in particular the SALA'AM Concept would be absorbed more rapidly and implemented widely if they are translated into TTPs for the Battalion level and below. This would provide the lower commanders down to squad leader base guidelines for the implementation of a balanced approach to the COIN situation in their respective AOs that would yield more lasting results.

2. NCO ISO/COIN Awareness Program. The Philippine Army should ensure that the program to professionalize the NCO corps should include their orientation as critical partners of the Officers in the Implementation of the holistic approach to the COIN problem. Officers and knowledgeable NCOs must involve themselves in orienting rank-in-file on cultural awareness and its implication on the COIN fight. The AFP should conduct workshop-seminars on the topic. This program would likewise ensure the individual actions and discipline displayed by the soldiers themselves will be in keeping with the intent of the Holistic Approach.

3. Full Integration of the Cultural Awareness Training and the SALA'AM Program in All Individual and Unit Training Programs of the AFP and PA. The rationale for this, as supported by the findings is that unlike the COIN Approach against the communist insurgents, the Muslim insurgency has the added dynamic of the basic differences between the general Pilipino populace and the soldiers with the Muslim populace and the Muslim insurgents. The communist insurgents essentially share the same norms and sociocultural background as the general Pilipino populace. That is why the ISO focused training as concerned with the communist insurgency centers its cultural awareness training on knowing the history, strategies and tactics of the enemy. The strategic, operational and tactical aspects supporting the “holistic approach” to the Muslim insurgency can only be effective if they are anchored on the thorough appreciation and understanding of the specific norms, values, beliefs, aspirations and sociocultural heritage of the Muslims and the Islam religion. As such it is important for Schools of the AFP to integrate cultural awareness modules in their curriculum. Likewise

experts on the subject matter should be tapped to teach these lessons so as to provide for valid training.

4. Regular Infantry Battalions Should Implement the SALA'AM Program. Even though the SPSGs remain the second priority threat as far as the NISP and the strategic ISO Campaign is concerned, the fact remains that Infantry battalions are actually deployed within SPSG-affected areas. A conclusive finding of this study likewise points to the consensus within the military that combat operations alone would not solve the Muslim insurgency problem. In this regard, it is suggested that the funding and support intended for the Special SALA'AM units be instead diverted to the training of designated platoons from each Infantry Company deployed in SPSG-affected areas, in the SALA'AM concept and operations. Community immersion should be a protocol for all units in the field to follow with the strategic intent of winning the hearts and minds of the populace. Making the battalions culturally attuned to the life of the Muslims would enable them to better interact with the populace they are serving and securing. Cultural awareness on the dynamics of the Muslim conflict shall provide them a valuable tool to use in formulating balanced and effective plans that are really attuned to the COIN situation prevailing in their respective AOs.

5. Provide for Opportunities for Language and or Dialect Training. The AFP and PA should conduct language training for officers and NCOs. It takes time to develop fluency in the dialect spoken in the area of deployment. The officer conducting COIN operations in his AO would have difficulty in the execution of his duties especially as far as the coordination with the local community leaders and integration with the populace is concerned. Interpreters are great but there is still a big difference as to the actual



translations of the messages as against direct verbal communication. This is a valuable tool in a counterinsurgency fight that the military should not deny its officers and NCOs. The study purports that it is highly beneficial for officers and NCOs to be trained to speak, write and comprehend the Muslim dialect before they are fielded out in the Muslim areas as this would definitely make them more effective in discharging their duties and responsibilities in the Holistic Approach to the insurgency problem.

#### Areas for Further Study

Apart from the Conclusions and recommendations culled from the study, certain areas for further study were likewise identified. The researcher believed that researches on the following topics shall further contribute valuable inputs to further improving the COIN campaign in the Southern Philippines:

1. A similar study focusing on a survey of how Muslim officers and enlisted personnel evaluate the current AFP/PA COIN campaign in Southern Philippines.
2. A comparative evaluation of counterinsurgency strategies being used today in Afghanistan and Iraq.
3. An in-depth study on the perceptions or misperceptions of the soldiers about Muslim Filipinos and its impact on the COIN efforts.
4. A research on possible differences in the aspirations and objectives of the general Muslim populace vis-a-vis the Muslim insurgents, and how it can further the COIN efforts.
5. A study on the relevance of poverty and illiteracy in the insurgency problem in Mindanao.

APPENDIX A  
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

1. Survey Questionnaire for TRADOC Students

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
for TRADOC Students

PART I. Respondent's Profile: (Please tick the appropriate box.)

Course:            IOAC     IOBC             INCOAC     INCOBC

Others: \_\_\_\_\_

Rank: \_\_\_\_\_

Native of Region: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender:                    Male             Female

Religion                    Christian             Islam     Others \_\_\_\_\_

Has been deployed in a Muslim-Populated area?    Yes     No

Years deployed: \_\_\_\_\_

Will be deployed in a Muslim-Populated area?    Yes     No     Most Probably

**Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:**

Spoken:    Native Speaker   
                Fluent   
                Conversational   
                Does not speak it

Written:    Very Well   
                Fairly well   
                Poor   
                Does not know how

Comprehension Level:    Excellent   
  Very Good   
  Fair   
  Poor   
  Very Poor

PART II. *Please provide us with your views on the following:*

1. Profile of the AFP COIN efforts in Southern Philippines.
  - a. What cultural issues have been taken into consideration?
    - i. \_\_\_\_\_
    - ii. \_\_\_\_\_
    - iii. \_\_\_\_\_
    - iv. \_\_\_\_\_
    - v. \_\_\_\_\_

b. What differences in culture between the Muslim insurgents and the AFP units and personnel have been addressed by the AFP COIN program?

- i. \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. \_\_\_\_\_
- v. \_\_\_\_\_

2. What aspect below if studied and learned well would advance the COIN methods used by the AFP units in their areas of operation in Southern Philippines? (rank from 1 to 9)

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:

- i. Practice of Religion \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Kinship Structure \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Concept of War and Freedom \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. War history \_\_\_\_\_
- v. Community life \_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Bringing up of their children \_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Language \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

b. Of the following, which helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank from 1 to 9)

- i. Training in conflict resolution \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Community immersion \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Psycho-social works \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations \_\_\_\_\_
- v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue \_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Awareness-building and advocacy \_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

3. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Army giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its policies and training programs? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- Very well
- Fairly well
- Poorly
- Do not understand it

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

- Considerable
- Quite Significant
- Barely essential
- Insignificant

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture and way of life?

- I am an expert
- I have some knowledge about it
- I do not know enough about it
- I have no knowledge about it

f. Are you given enough training on the sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- Yes, we are!
- Yes but its not enough!
- I am not sure we are given the training.
- No, we are not!

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in your course as part of the regular academic lessons?

- Yes, there are!
- Sometimes
- No, there are none!

h. Do Philippine Army Training Programs provide opportunity for learning Muslim dialects? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Not sure \_\_\_\_\_

i. Would learning Muslim dialects help AFP officer and NCOs perform their jobs better when assigned to Muslim areas? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

j. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Southern Philippines? Why?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	No	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Maybe	_____

k. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the curriculum of the TRADOC courses? Why?

<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	No	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	Maybe	_____

## 2. Survey Questionnaire for PMA Cadets

### SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE for Philippine Military Academy Cadets

PART I. Respondent's Profile: (Please tick the appropriate box.)

Native of:  Luzon  Visayas  Mindanao (Region \_\_\_\_\_)

Gender:  Male  Female

Religion  Christian  Islam  Others \_\_\_\_\_

In the past year did you socialize with someone of another racial/ethnic group?

Frequently  Sometimes  Not at all

Among your peers, how often do you discuss racial/ethnic issues?

Frequently  Sometimes  Not at all

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:  Native Speaker  
 Fluent  
 Conversational  
 Does not speak it

Written:  Very Well  
 Fairly well  
 Poor  
 Does not know how

Comprehension Level:  Excellent  
 Very Good  
 Fair  
 Poor  
 Very Poor

PART II. Please provide us with your views on the following:

4. Profile of personal awareness regarding the Muslim Insurgency in southern Philippines.

a. What sociocultural issues in your opinion affect the Muslim Insurgency?

- i. \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. \_\_\_\_\_
- v. \_\_\_\_\_

b. What do you think are the vital differences in culture between Filipino Muslims and other Filipinos that should be addressed by the Academy in COIN instructions and lectures?

- i. \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. \_\_\_\_\_

5. What would advance the COIN efforts of AFP units in their areas of operation? (*rank*)

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:

- i. Practice of Religion \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Kinship Structure \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Concept of War and Freedom \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. War history \_\_\_\_\_
- v. Community life \_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Bringing up of their children \_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Language \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

b. Of the following, which of these program helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (*please rank*)

- i. Training in conflict resolution \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Community immersion \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Psycho-social works \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations \_\_\_\_\_
- v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue \_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Awareness-building and advocacy \_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Civil works and development of basic services \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

6. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Military Academy giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its curriculum? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- Very well
- Fairly well
- Poorly
- Do not understand it

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

- Considerable
- Quite Significant
- Barely essential
- Insignificant

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture and way of life?

- I am an expert
- I have some knowledge about it
- I do not know enough about it
- I have no knowledge about it

f. What is the extent of your exposure in classes to information/activities devoted to understanding other racial/ethnic groups and inter-racial/ethnic relationships?

- Considerable
- Quite Significant
- Barely essential
- Insignificant

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in the academy as part of the regular academic lessons?

- Yes, there are!
- Sometimes
- No, there are none!

h. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

i. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the PMA curriculum? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

3. Sample Survey for CGSC Students

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE for PACGSC Students

PART I. Respondent's Profile: (Please tick the appropriate box.)

Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ Native of Region: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender:  Male  Female

Religion  Christian  Islam Others \_\_\_\_\_

Has been deployed in a Muslim-Populated area?  Yes  No

Will be deployed in a Muslim-Populated area?  Yes  No  Most Probably

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:  Native Speaker  Fluent  Conversational  Does not speak it

Written:  Very Well  Fairly well  Poor  Does not know how

Comprehension Level:  Excellent  Very Good  Fair  Poor  Very Poor

PART II. Please provide us with your views on the following:

7. Profile of the PA COIN efforts in Southern Philippines.
    - a. What cultural issues have been taken into consideration?
      - i. \_\_\_\_\_
      - ii. \_\_\_\_\_
    - b. What differences in culture between the Muslim insurgents and the army have been addressed by the PA COIN program?
      - i. \_\_\_\_\_
      - ii. \_\_\_\_\_
  8. What aspect below if studied and learned well would advance the COIN methods used by the PA units in their areas of operation in Southern Philippines? (Please rank from 1 to 9)
- a. Awareness of the Muslim's:
    - i. Practice of Religion \_\_\_\_\_
    - ii. Kinship Structure \_\_\_\_\_
    - iii. Concept of War and Freedom \_\_\_\_\_
    - iv. War history \_\_\_\_\_
    - v. Community life \_\_\_\_\_
    - vi. Bringing up of their children \_\_\_\_\_
    - vii. Language \_\_\_\_\_
    - viii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
    - ix. \_\_\_\_\_



b. Of the following, which helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank from 1 to 9)

- i. Training in conflict resolution \_\_\_\_\_
- ii. Community immersion \_\_\_\_\_
- iii. Psycho-social works \_\_\_\_\_
- iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations \_\_\_\_\_
- v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue \_\_\_\_\_
- vi. Awareness-building and advocacy \_\_\_\_\_
- vii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

9. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Army giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its policies and training programs? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- Very well
- Fairly well
- Poorly
- Do not understand it

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

- Considerable
- Quite Significant
- Barely essential
- Insignificant

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

- Very Important
- Slightly Important
- Maybe Important
- Not important

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture and way of life?

- I am an expert
- I have some knowledge about it
- I do not know enough about it
- I have no knowledge about it

f. Are you given enough training on the various sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- Yes, we are!
- Yes but its not enough!
- I am not sure we are given the training.
- No, we are not!

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in your course as part of the regular academic lessons?

- Yes, there are!
- Sometimes
- No, there are none!

h. Do Philippine Army Training Programs provide opportunity for learning Muslim dialects? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Not sure \_\_\_\_\_

i. Would learning Muslim dialects help AFP officer and NCOs perform their jobs better when assigned to Muslim areas? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

j. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Southern Philippines? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

k. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the curriculum of the TRADOC courses? Why?

- Yes \_\_\_\_\_
- No \_\_\_\_\_
- Maybe \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you!

## APPENDIX B

### RAW DATA, SURVEY RESULTS

#### 1. Raw Data from TRADOC Respondents.

#### IOAC Students – Summary of Responses

##### PART I. Respondent's Profile

Rank:     1LTs - 16     CPTs - 17  
 Gender:   Male - 33     Female - 0

Native of Region:	Region #:	
	1	3
	2	4
	3	0
	4	4
	5	3
	6	3
	7	1
	8	1
	9	2
	10	2
	11	2
	12	3
	AARM	0
	NCR	3
	CAR	2
Total Respondents		33

Religion:  
           Christian - 33                      Muslim - 0

Has been deployed?	Years deployed:	
Yes - 24	1 Year	1
	2 Years	2
	3 Years	2
	4 Years	3
	5 Years	7
	6 Years	3
	7 Years	2
	8 Years	0
	9 Years	2
	10 Years	1
	11 Years	0
	12 Years	1

No - 9

Will be deployed in Muslim Area?

Yes - 2

No - 9

Most probably - 15

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:

Native speaker	0
fluent	1
conversational	4
does not speak it	28

Written:

Very Well	0
Fairly Well	2
Poor	14
Does not know how	17

Comprehension Level:

Excellent	1
Very Good	4
Fair	3
Poor	18
Very Poor	7

PART II

1. Profile of the AFP COIN efforts in Southern Philippines.

a. What cultural issues have been taken into consideration?

culture of aggressiveness	6
culture of violence	6
religion	7
ethnic/tribal origin	2
culture of dialogue	1
community structure	1
culture of conflict	1
culture of isolation	1
lifestyle or community life	1
customs & traditions	1
RIDU system	1
Illiteracy	1
poverty	1
I have no first hand experience as regards to this sir	1
sex	1
race	1
status	1
family background	1

Muslim discrimination	1
call for independent mindanao	1
belief on war & God	1
origins, traditions	1
upbringing	1
way of life	1
war history	1
behavior	1
family ties	1
livelihood	1
social issues	1
culture of struggleness	2
culture of carrying fire arm	2
culture of greediness	1
social norms	1
isolation	1

b. What differences in culture between the Muslim insurgents and the AFP units and personnel have been addressed by the AFP COIN program?

culture of ethnic descrimination	3
culture of skepticism	6
I do not know/I am not aware	1
culture of indifference	1
inferiority/superiority complex	1
resolving some conflicts	1
bringing services and lecture to some areas	1
practice of religion	3
community life/way of life	2
illiteracy	1
poverty	1
I have no first hand experience as regards to this sir	1
search for islamic state of mindanao	1
traditional origin	1
sharing of power by datu	1
community immersion	1
military affairs	1
language	1
livelihood	1
salaam	1
culture of dialogue	3
culture of participation	2
culture of solidarity	2
culture of indifference	1

2. What aspect below if studied and learned well would advance the COIN methods used by the AFP units in their areas of operation in Southern Philippines?

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:

	Ranking									Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
i. Practice of Religion	8	9	6	4	3	1	2	0	0	33
ii. Kinship Structure	2	7	6	7	5	6	0	0	0	33
iii. Concept of War and Freedom	3	7	9	3	3	6	1	1	0	33
iv. War history	5	3	2	6	4	6	7	0	0	33
v. Community life	3	1	6	7	8	5	3	0	0	33
vi. Bringing up of their children	6	2	3	1	6	6	9	0	0	33
vii. Language	5	4	1	4	4	3	11	1	0	33
viii. Others: _____	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	5
ix. _____	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	5	2	

b. Of the following, which helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank from 1 to 9)

	Ranking									Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
i. Training in conflict resolution	12	5	2	5	6	3	0	0	0	33
ii. Community immersion	5	4	10	8	4	1	1	0	0	33
iii. Psycho-social works	1	3	8	8	5	6	1	1	0	33
iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and	5	12	4	5	3	4	0	0	0	33
v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue	2	7	6	1	11	6	0	0	0	33
vi. Awareness-building and advocacy	8	2	3	4	3	13	0	0	0	33
vii. Others: _____	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
viii. _____	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2
ix. _____	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Total	33	33	33	33	33	33	3	2	1	

3. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Army giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its policies and training programs? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

Very well	0
Fairly well	25
Poorly	8
Do not understand it	0

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

Considerable	5
Quite Significant	24
Barely essential	3
Insignificant	1

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

Very Important	23
Slightly Important	10
Maybe Important	0
Not important	0

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

Very Important	24
Slightly Important	7
Maybe Important	2
Not important	0

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture & way of life?

I am an expert	0
I have some knowledge about it	27
I do not know enough about it	6
I have no knowledge about it	0

f. Are you given enough training on the sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

Yes, we are!	9
Yes but its not enough!	15
I am not sure we are given the training.	6
No, we are not!	3

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in your course as part of the regular academic lessons?

Yes, there are!	4
Sometimes	5
No, there are none!	24

h. Do Philippine Army Training Programs provide opportunity for learning Muslim dialects? Why?

Yes	1
No	25
Not sure	7

i. Would learning Muslim dialects help AFP officer and NCOs perform their jobs better when assigned to Muslim areas? Why?

Yes	28
No	0

Maybe 

5
---

j. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Southern Philippines? Why?

Yes	32
No	0
Maybe	1

k. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the curriculum of the TRADOC courses? Why?

Yes	29
No	1
Maybe	3

IOAC RESPONDENTS' comments/reply to Questions H, I, J and K:

H.

- some commanders take the initiative on this issue
- They are not highly motivated to teach
- no available teacher to teach Muslim dialect
- not being taught or not part of my curriculum
- the army is not interested
- our army is confronting 2 threats throughout the country
- haven't undergone any learning program; even my troops
- not offered
- it is not integrated in the training module/poi
- it was not given emphasis
- there were PA personnel allowed to take Muslim dialects
- soldiers do fairly well studying dialects on their own

I.

- yes we can easily relate
- to understand more about them
- to build a good relationship to southern people of the phils.
- It will easily understand the language
- better communication
- in order to enhance communication process to Muslims
- it would depend on the capability
- you can easily interact with them as most poor folks do not understand other dialects
- we would be able to start to understand them
- they can better communicate with each other
- because it will resolve the language barrier and will make the job easier
- you can relate with the Muslim folks in the area by using their native dialect.
- because it is the intent in doing your job heartily that counts most
- good communications establish good relations
- better communication; less misunderstanding
- to bridge communication gaps

J.

- yes to establish common understanding
- to build good relationship
- to lessen the gap between the Muslim people
- it will improve understanding of the Muslim society
- to know better approaches



- in order to reinforce it with CMO activities of the AFP
- In order to contain some extremists
- as Sun Tzu had said "If you know your enemy, you need not fear hundred battles
- yes, knowing the enemy is essential in any battle
- it will help us understand the Muslim better
- It will broaden the individual soldiers' knowledge
- because it links us to the people of the area. This will clear the communication gap between soldiers and civilians
- yes because it is for the long term reprogramming of people's mind
- awareness of a particular culture brings how to properly approach problems in southern philis.
- cultural understanding, comprehension and respect is vital in having a good and peaceful relation
- cultural awareness is a major concern esp. in conducting stability of operations

K.

- to understand the culture of Muslims
- to have knowledge about cultural awareness/way of life of Muslims
- to help teachers understand more
- to have a knowledge & understanding when conducting ISO in SPSG
- only those already deployed at Muslim areas.
- Because we have different culture from batanes to jolo so students should at least have idea on what to expect on his area of operation.
- If possible, but better if part of the retraining program for b\_\_s in Muslim areas
- It is one way of knowing the enemy
- So that those who will be assigned in Mindanao will have enough background of the conflict.
- Because there are always civilians in the AOs and we need to influence their decisions
- Extra sensitivity on issues that will bring us closer to the people.
- The AFP must employ personnel that are knowledgeable of the different cultural aspects of the Filipino communities
- For us to know and understand cultural diversities
- A separate course will suffice to attain specific objectives

#### IOBC Students – Summary of Responses

##### PART I. Respondent's Profile

Rank: 1LT - 2; 2LT - 26

Gender: Male - 28 Female - 0

Native of Region:

Region #

1	1
2	7
3	2
4	4
5	0
6	1
7	3
8	1
9	2
10	2
11	1
12	4
AARM	0
NCR	0
CAR	0

	Total Nr of Respondents	28		
Religion: Christian - 27; Muslim - 1				
Has been deployed to Mindanao?	Yes - 9	<u>Yrs deployed:</u>		
		<u>1year</u>	<u>2years</u>	<u>8years</u>
		1	7	1
	No - 19			

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:

Native speaker	0
fluent	0
conversational	11
does not speak it	17

Written:

Very Well	1
Fairly Well	2
Poor	5
Does not know how	20

Comprehension Level:

Excellent	0
Very Good	1
Fair	8
Poor	6
Very Poor	13

PART II

1. Profile of the AFP COIN efforts in Southern Philippines.

a. What cultural issues have been taken into consideration?

-Muslim wants to be independent	1
-Human Rights	1
-Culture	1
-Family Feud	4
-Political	1
-Lifestyle	1
-Racial and Religious discrimination	1
-government lack of attention	2
-land conflict	6
-holiday celebration	1

b. What differences in culture between the Muslim insurgents and the AFP units and personnel have been addressed by the AFP COIN program?

religious aspect	4
rival differences and ethnic group	3
family or clan wars	4
tradition	1

2. What aspect below if studied and learned well would advance the COIN methods used by the AFP units in their areas of operation in Southern Philippines?

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:

- i. Practice of Religion
- ii. Kinship Structure
- iii. Concept of War and Freedom
- iv. War history
- v. Community life
- vi. Bringing up of their children
- vii. Language
- viii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
4	4	5	2	1	5	7	0	0	28
0	6	7	5	1	3	5	1	0	28
4	5	4	6	6	2	1	0	0	28
6	3	4	3	6	5	0	1	0	28
5	2	4	9	4	2	2	0	0	28
2	3	1	2	7	8	4	1	0	28
7	4	1	1	3	2	9	0	1	28
0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	4
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
28	28	28	28	28	28	28	4	2	

Total

b. Of the following, which helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank from 1 to 9)

- i. Training in conflict resolution
- ii. Community immersion
- iii. Psycho-social works
- iv. Traditional orientation towards peace
- v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue
- vi. Awareness-building and advocacy
- vii. Others: \_\_\_\_\_
- viii. \_\_\_\_\_
- ix. \_\_\_\_\_

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Total
10	0	3	3	2	10	0	0	0	28
2	7	2	7	6	4	0	0	0	28
3	6	5	4	8	2	0	0	0	28
8	6	8	4	1	1	0	0	0	28
2	7	3	6	7	3	0	0	0	28
3	1	7	4	4	8	1	0	0	28
0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
28	28	28	28	28	28	3	1	1	

Total

3. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Army giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its policies and training programs? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

Very well	1
Fairly well	24
Poorly	3
Do not understand it	0

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

Considerable	7
Quite Significant	15
Barely essential	5
Insignificant	1

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

Very Important	26
Slightly Important	2
Maybe Important	0
Not important	0

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

Very Important	26
Slightly Important	2
Maybe Important	0
Not important	0

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture & way of life?

I am an expert	0
I have some knowledge about it	20
I do not know enough about it	8
I have no knowledge about it	0

f. Are you given enough training on the sociocultural dimensions of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

Yes, we are!	5
Yes but its not enough!	17
I am not sure we are given the training.	1
No, we are not!	5

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in your course as part of the regular academic lessons?

Yes, there are!	1
Sometimes	15
No, there are none!	12

h. Do Philippine Army Training Programs provide opportunity for learning Muslim dialects? Why?

Yes	6
No	14
Not sure	8

i. Would learning Muslim dialects help AFP officer and NCOs perform their jobs better when assigned to Muslim areas? Why?

Yes	24
No	2
Maybe	2

j. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program in Southern Philippines?  
Why?

Yes	21
No	2
Maybe	5

k. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the curriculum of the TRADOC courses? Why?

Yes	19
No	3
Maybe	6

IOBC RESPONDENTS' comments/reply to Questions H, I and K:

H.

- to be more knowledgeable in conducting COIN threat
- because it has not been introduced to us yet.
- mostly those assigned in SPSG area
- to improve dialogue using their language
- lacks interest
- lacks personnel to do such
- has not been considered
- existence of a common dialect which is tagalog that the govt. do not consider language barrier
- to be able to comprehend the nature of their demands
- to avoid conflict esp. in our area
- to easily communicate with Muslims

I.

- to act like a Muslim
- very much, it will help a lot esp. communicating with them
- an better perform their job
- help us interact better with Muslims
- we will be more acceptable in their community

J.

- understanding their culture helps in understanding how they live and fight
- in consideration of their belief and culture
- to know the cause of conflict
- for better understanding of their way of living
- to be able to know how to deal with them
- because it has been a protracted conflict between Muslims and Christians
- guide in solving problem in Mindanao

K.

- it is useful to those assigned in Mindanao
- to avoid violating the rights
- to avoid hurting and violating cultural practices
- only knowing the enemy; not so particular with Muslims
- to know what appropriate approach to use during operations
- to have significant ideas of what the Muslims' way of life
- because most of us esp. the officers assigned from different parts of the country.
- Guide in solving conflicts
- Enhance level of awareness and preparedness of soldiers
- Personal interest in the culture should be enhanced.

2. Raw Data from PMA Respondents

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
for Graduating Philippine Military Cadets

CHRISTIANS	
# of RESPONDENTS	71

PART I. Respondent's Profile: (Please tick the appropriate box.)

Native of:  47 Luzon  5 Visayas  19 Mindanao (Region \_\_\_\_\_)

Gender:  60 Male  11 Female

Religion  71 Christian  Islam  Others \_\_\_\_\_

In the past year did you socialize with someone of another racial/ethnic group?

29 Frequently  36 Sometimes  6 Not at all

Among your peers, how often do you discuss racial/ethnic issues?

3 Frequently  58 Sometimes  10 Not at all

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:  2 Native Speaker  
 3 Fluent  
 13 Conversational  
 53 Does not speak it

Written:  1 Very Well  
 9 Fairly well  
 8 Poor  
 53 Does not know how

Comprehension Level:  Excellent  
 5 Very Good  
 13 Fair  
 8 Poor  
 45 Very Poor

PART II. Please provide us with your views on the following:

10. Profile of personal awareness regarding the Muslim Insurgency in southern Philippines.

a. What sociocultural issues in your opinion affect the Muslim Insurgency?

- i. Biased Perception Against Muslims
- ii. Religious Differences
- iii. Politics
- iv. Separation Of Mindanao From Philippines
- v. Ideological Difference
- vi. Economic Status
- vii. Land Ownership
- viii. Poverty
- ix. History

b. What do you think are the vital differences in culture between Filipino Muslims and other Filipinos that should be addressed by the Academy in COIN instructions and lectures?

- i. Tactics Used By The Insurgents
- ii. Sociocultural Root Of Insurgency
- iii. Terrorism
- iv. Muslim Values And Culture
- v. Conservatism Vs. Liberalism
- vi. Religious Practices
- vii. History Of War In Mindanao

11. What would advance the COIN efforts of AFP units in their areas of operation? (Please rank)

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:	TOTAL	RANKING
i. Practice of Religion	<u>199</u>	<u>4</u>
ii. Kinship Structure	<u>158</u>	<u>1</u>
iii. Concept of War and Freedom	<u>184</u>	<u>2</u>
iv. War history	<u>197</u>	<u>3</u>
v. Community life	<u>207</u>	<u>5</u>
vi. Bringing up of their children	<u>301</u>	<u>6</u>
vii. Language	<u>362</u>	<u>7</u>
viii. Others: _____	_____	
ix. _____	_____	

b. Of the following, which of these program helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank)

	TOTAL	RANK
i. Training in conflict resolution	<u>217</u>	<u>2.5</u>
ii. Community immersion	<u>212</u>	<u>1</u>
iii. Psycho-social works	<u>217</u>	<u>2.5</u>
iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations	<u>223</u>	<u>4</u>
v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue	<u>307</u>	<u>7</u>
vi. Awareness-building and advocacy	<u>251</u>	<u>6</u>
vii. Civil works and development of basic services	<u>237</u>	<u>5</u>
viii. Others: _____	_____	
ix. _____	_____	

12. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Military Academy giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its curriculum? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

6	Very well
52	Fairly well
11	Poorly
1	Do not understand it

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

17	Considerable
37	Quite Significant
15	Barely essential
1	Insignificant

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

58	Very Important
9	Slightly Important
2	Maybe Important
1	Not important

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

55	Very Important
12	Slightly Important
2	Maybe Important
1	Not important

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture and way of life?

1	I am an expert
44	I have some knowledge about it
21	I do not know enough about it
4	I have no knowledge about it

f. What is the extent of your exposure in classes to information/activities devoted to understanding other racial/ethnic groups and inter-racial/ethnic relationships?

23	Considerable
39	Quite Significant
10	Barely essential
---	Insignificant

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in the academy as part of the regular academic lessons?

8	Yes, there are!
38	Sometimes
22	No, there are none!

h. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program? Why?

54	Yes	_____
3	No	_____
9	Maybe	_____

Yes,

Because being aware of the background of the enemy, the kind of environment that the soldiers are into helps avoid further misunderstanding with the community there and help facilitate in accomplishing the mission of the soldiers in Mindanao in a more efficient and a less-casualty way.

i. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the PMA curriculum? Why?

50	Yes	_____
5	No	_____
10	Maybe	_____

Yes,

Because cadets will be young officers soon that might be assigned in the south. Being culturally aware means a faster way of communicating with the community in the south that could help facilitate the suppression of Muslim insurgents in the area..



SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
for Philippine Military Academy Cadets

ISLAM	
# of RESPONDENTS	16

PART I. Respondent's Profile: (Please tick the appropriate box.)

Native of:                     1 Luzon                     2 Visayas                     13 Mindanao (Region \_\_\_\_\_)

Gender:                       15 Male                       1 Female

Religion                       Christian                       Islam                       Others \_\_\_\_\_

In the past year did you socialize with someone of another racial/ethnic group?  
 11 Frequently                       3 Sometimes                       2 Not at all

Among your peers, how often do you discuss racial/ethnic issues?  
 1 Frequently                       14 Sometimes                       1 Not at all

Muslim Dialect/Language Proficiency:

Spoken:                       6 Native Speaker  
 1 Fluent  
 5 Conversational  
 4 Does not speak it

Written:                       3 Very Well  
 5 Fairly well  
 3 Poor  
 5 Does not know how

Comprehension Level:                       4 Excellent  
 Very Good  
 8 Fair  
 2 Poor  
 2 Very Poor

PART II. Please provide us with your views on the following:

13. Profile of personal awareness regarding the Muslim Insurgency in southern Philippines.

a. What sociocultural issues in your opinion affect the Muslim Insurgency?

- i. Racial discrimination
- ii. Poverty
- iii. Issue about separation of Mindanao
- iv. Education
- v. Livelihood
- vi. Bad perception
- vii. Generalizing
- viii. History of past conflicts
- ix. Religion conflicts and misunderstanding
- x. Differences
- xi. Very high sense of pride
- xii. Abuse of military in the field
- xiii. Unfair treatment

b. What do you think are the vital differences in culture between Filipino Muslims and other Filipinos that should be addressed by the Academy in COIN instructions and lectures?

- i. Tradition
- ii. Religious and cultural beliefs
- iii. Marriage

- iv. Treatment in women
- v. Brotherhood between each other
- vi. Way of life
- vii. Community bonds
- viii. Rearing children

14. What would advance the COIN efforts of AFP units in their areas of operation? (Please rank)

a. Awareness of the Muslim's:

	TOTAL	RANK
i. Practice of Religion	<u>47</u>	<u>2</u>
ii. Kinship Structure	<u>66</u>	<u>6</u>
iii. Concept of War and Freedom	<u>44</u>	<u>1</u>
iv. War history	<u>65</u>	<u>4.5</u>
v. Community life	<u>55</u>	<u>3</u>
vi. Bringing up of their children	<u>65</u>	<u>1.5</u>
vii. Language	<u>82</u>	<u>7</u>
viii. Others: _____	_____	_____
ix. _____	_____	_____

b. Of the following, which of these program helps improve military operations and provide tactical advantage in Southern Philippines? (please rank)

	TOTAL	RANK
i. Training in conflict resolution	<u>69</u>	<u>7</u>
ii. Community immersion	<u>44</u>	<u>2</u>
iii. Psycho-social works	<u>52</u>	<u>3</u>
iv. Traditional orientation towards peace and promotion of respectful human relations	<u>39</u>	<u>1</u>
v. Forum for contact, facilitation and dialogue	<u>61</u>	<u>5</u>
vi. Awareness-building and advocacy	<u>67</u>	<u>6</u>
vii. Civil works and development of basic services	<u>60</u>	<u>4</u>
viii. Others: _____	_____	_____
ix. _____	_____	_____

15. What degree of concentration is the Philippine Military Academy giving to address the issue of cultural awareness in its curriculum? (Please tick the appropriate box)

a. How well do you understand the history and causes of the Muslim insurgency in the Philippines?

- 1 Very well
- 14 Fairly well
- Poorly
- Do not understand it

b. How profound are the differences in culture and perception of life of the Filipino Muslims from the general Philippine populace?

- 5 Considerable
- 7 Quite Significant
- Barely essential
- 2 Insignificant

c. How important is it to the counterinsurgency efforts of the government, to know the history and causes of the Muslim conflict?

2	Very Important
1	Slightly Important
	Maybe Important
	Not important

d. How important is it to understand the basic differences between the Filipino Muslim culture from the greater Filipino culture in the counterinsurgency effort of the government?

14	Very Important
1	Slightly Important
	Maybe Important
	Not important

e. How would you rate the extent of your knowledge or mastery of the Muslim culture and way of life?

3	I am an expert
11	I have some knowledge about it
1	I do not know enough about it
	I have no knowledge about it

f. What is the extent of your exposure in classes to information/activities devoted to understanding other racial/ethnic groups and inter-racial/ethnic relationships?

7	Considerable
7	Quite Significant
	Barely essential
1	Insignificant

g. Are there experts on Muslim culture and on Muslim insurgency who are teaching in the academy as part of the regular academic lessons?

2	Yes, there are!
4	Sometimes
9	No, there are none!

h. Is cultural awareness crucial to the success of the PA COIN program? Why?

12	Yes	_____
1	No	_____
1	Maybe	_____

Yes;

- Because knowing the enemy is the key of accomplishing mission
- To know the do's and dont's in the Muslim communities
- It makes all acquainted to different cultures
- To comprehend the culture
- For better understanding of Muslim beliefs and practices

i. Is cultural awareness something that should be given emphasis in the PMA curriculum? Why?

12	Yes	_____
1	No	_____
1	Maybe	_____

Yes:

- So that cadets will be aware of the different cultures
- To understand the beliefs of other

## APPENDIX C

### THE REVISED PMA CURRICULUM

CURRICULUM for PMA Class 2006	
Bachelor of Science	

FOURTHCLASS YEAR					
1 <sup>ST</sup> TERM		2 <sup>ND</sup> TERM		3 <sup>RD</sup> TERM	
BMT	(6)	English 1	3	English 2	3
		Algebra	5	Trigonometry	4
		Humanities	3	Phil Literature	3
		Biology	3	Chemistry	3
		Phil History	3	Eng'ng Drawing	3
		Filipino 1	3	Filipino 2	3
				Info Tech 1	3
		Leadership 1	(1)	Leadership 2	(2)
		PE 1	(2)	PE 2	(2)
	(6)		20(3)		22 (4)

THIRDCLASS YEAR					
PC		Physics 1	4	Physics 2	4
		Psychology	3	Sociology	3
		Management	3	Economics	3
		PC1	3	PC2	3
		MAE1	3	MAE3	3
		MAE2	3	MAE4	3
		Leadership 3	(1)	Leadership 4	(2)
		PE 3	(2)	PE 4	(2)
			19 (3)		19 (3)

SECONDCLASS YEAR					
Plebe Detail	(4)	Logic	3	Ethics	3
		World History	3	Government	3
		Statistics	3	HMA	3
		Research Writing	3	World Literature	3
		MAE5	3	MAE6	3
		PC3	3	MAE7	3
		PE 5	(2)	PE 6	(2)
	(4)		18(2)		18 (2)

FIRSTCLASS YEAR					
Basic Law	3	Intro to Strategy	3	OPC	(11)
Env'l Science	3	Argu & Debate	3	LOAC Seminar	
Com Ideologies	3	Info Tech 2	3		
MAE8	3	MAE 10	3		
MAE9	3	Leadership 6	3		
Leadership 5	3				
PE7	(2)	PE8	(2)		
	18 (2)		15 (2)		(11)

AY 2005 – 2006

	1 <sup>ST</sup> TERM	2 <sup>ND</sup> TERM	3 <sup>RD</sup> TERM
CLASS 2006	Basic Law	Intro to Strategy	OPC
	Env'l Science	Info Tech 2	LOAC Seminar
	Comp Ideologies	Argu & Debate	
	MAE 8	MAE 10	
	MAE 9	Leadership 6	
	Leadership 5	PE 8	
	PE 7		
CLASS 2007	Plebe Detail	Logic	Ethics
	Leadership 3	Statistics	Government
	Professional Courses	Philippine Literature	HMA
	Role Modeling & Mentoring Course	Fund'ls of Research	MAE 6
		MAE 5	MAE 7
	PE 5	PE 6	
CLASS 2008	Elementary Analysis	Philosophy	Statistics
	Philippine Literature	Physics 1	Physics 2
	Psychology	Sociology	Fund'ls of Research
	Logic	Principles of Mgmt	Intro to Pol Science
	Info Tech 2	Economics	Public Speaking
	PE 3	Leadership 2	PE 5
	PE 4		
CLASS 2009	BMT	Filipino	Algebra
	Leadership 1	English 1	English 2
	ENG 100	Humanities	Psychology
	MAT 100	Intro to Pol Science	Philippine Literature
		Info Tech 1	Philippine History
		PE 1	PE 2
	MAT 200		

PMA MILITARY CURRICULUM

4CL FIRST TRIMESTER (New Cadet Training)			6 Units
Basic Military Training			
Module 1:	Basic Military Knowledge		
Module 2:	Basic Weapons and Training		
Module 3:	Combat Skills of the Individual Soldier		
Module 4:	Basic Unit Training		
Module 5:	Confidence Training		
4CL FIRST TRIMESTER (New Cadet Training)			6 Units
Basic Cadetship Training			
Module 1:	General Information		
Module 2:	Four Class System		
Module 3:	Cadet Honor Code System		
Module 4:	CCAFR Indoctrination		
Module 5:	Cadet Conduct Policy Board		
Module 6:	Rulings of Academic Board		
Module 7:	Changes in the Academy		
Module 8:	Standards of the Corps		
3CL FIRST TRIMESTER (Basic Soldiery Training)			3 Units
Module 1:	Review Module		
Module 2:	Map Reading		
Module 3:	Weapons Training		
Module 4:	Individual Skills		
Module 5:	Battle Drills		
Module 6:	Communications & Signal		
Module 7:	Confidence Training		
3CL FIRST TRIMESTER (Primal Leadership)			2 Units
Module 1:	Emotional Intelligence		
Module 2:	Self Awareness		
Module 3:	Self Directed Learning		
Module 4:	Self Management		
Module 5:	Social Awareness		
Module 6:	Relationship Management		
Module 7:	Resonant Style of Leadership		
Module 8:	Dissonant Style of Leadership		
Module 9:	Adaptive Leadership		
Module 10:	Inspirational Leadership		
Module 11:	Transformational Leadership		

2CL FIRST TRIMESTER (Leadership Development Course)		3 Units
Module 1:	Advanced Map Reading	
Module 2:	Weapons and Individual Training	
Module 3:	MFT & Battle Drills	
Module 4:	Introduction to Combat Operations	
Module 5:	Confidence Training	
Module 6:	Leadership Skills & Troop Leading Procedures	
2CL FIRST TRIMESTER (Role Modelling and Mentoring)		3 Units
Module 1:	Theoretical (Preparation) Phase	
Module 2:	Application Phase	
Module 3:	Practical Examination/FTX	
1CL ARMY FIRST TRIMESTER (OPC)		3 Units
Module 1:	Tactical Intelligence	
Module 2:	Troop Leading Procedures	
Module 3:	Civil Military Operations Module	
1CL AIR FORCE FIRST TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
1CL NAVY FIRST TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
1CL ARMY SECOND TRIMESTER (OPC)		
ARMY: Combat Leadership		3 Units
Module 1:	Principles of Leadership	
Module 2:	Be-Do-Know	
Module 3:	Stress in Combat	
1CL AIR FORCE SECOND TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
1CL NAVY SECOND TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
1CL ARMY THIRD TRIMESTER (OPC)		
ARMY: Unit Administration		3 Units
Module 1:	Personnel Management	
Module 2:	Personnel Action	
Module 3:	Discipline Law and Order	
Module 4:	Supply Management	
1CL AIR FORCE THIRD TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
1CL NAVY THIRD TRIMESTER (OPC) EQUIVALENT		3 Units
OPC PERIOD		
ARMY OPC		10 Units
Module 1:	Marksmanship	
Module 2:	Battle Drills	
Module 3:	Review of Tactical Intelligence and CMO	
Module 4:	On-the-Job Training	

OPC PERIOD		
AIR FORCE: Basic Airforce Officers' Course		10 Units
Module 1:	Academic Instructor Course	
Module 2:	Air Power Module	

OPC PERIOD		
NAVY: Naval Officer Qualification Course		10 Units
Module 1:	Sea Phase	
Module 2:	Rules of the Road	



## APPENDIX D

### PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION INFANTRY OFFICER BASIC COURSE

SUBJECTS	SCOPE	PDS	PTS
COMMON MODULE PHASE			
ACADEMICS			
A. COMMUNICATION SKILLS MODULE		16	10
1. Military Correspondence	Preparation of military correspondence; subj to letter; indorsement; personnel action form; messages; investigation report; morning report; Spot Report; etc.	2	
Graded Practical Ex	Actual preparation of report of Mil Correspondence.	2	5
2. Military Briefing with Methods of Instruction	Types of Military Briefing; Staff Briefing; Information Briefing; Decision Briefing; Mission Brief Techniques of Delivery; Steps in Lesson Preparation; Techniques of presentation; Lesson Plan Preparation Learning Strategies.	4	
GPE (exclusive of off-POI periods)	Oral Presentation.	8	5
B. GENERAL SUBJECTS MODULE		32	50
1. Phil Mil History	Evolution of PA; Campaigns During the Spanish Regime; Fil-Am War; Japanese period; Anti-Insurgency; SPT's; Foreign Missions; Role of PA in Nation Building	2	5
2. Mil Customs and Traditions	Mil Traditions, Mil Customs (Salute, Flag Ceremony , the 3 Volleys Over Graves, The White Flag on Truce, Wearing of Decorations; Trumpet or Bugle Call, Courtesy Calls)	1	5
3. Military Benefits, Leaves & Privilege	Leave; Collateral Entitlements; Health Services; Burial Services.	2	5
4. OESPA	Discussions on the Army Core values (Honor, Loyalty, Valor, Duty, Solidarity); Values and Ethics	2	5
5. Social Graces and Protocol	Service Etiquette (Intro, Cocktails, Formal Dinner, Informal Dinner, Dancing Etiquette).	1	5
6. Human Rights Seminar/ Law of Land Warfare/ ROE	To be Conducted by Representative from Commission on Human Rights.	4	5
7. Peace Process	To be conducted by a representative from Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process	4	5
8. Environmental Protection Seminar	Basic Concept of Ecology; Ecology in Relation to Other Services; Ecosystem and the Environment; Government Programs Being Promoted which are Related to Ecological Preservation; World Ecological Update.	4	5
9. Career Management	Procurement; AFOS and MOS; Classification and Assignment; Promotion; Reduction; Separation and Retirement; Schooling; Interaction/Open Forum; Role of the APMC.	2	5
10. First Aid (GPE)	First aid procedures	4	5
Written Examinations	Covered lessons without practical exercises	6	

C. LEADERSHIP MODULE		6	10
1. Leadership Development	Definition of leadership; Principles and factors of leadership; Values; and Traits of a Leader.	2	5
2. Counselling	Definition; counseling techniques; four steps to the conduct of normal counseling sessions	2	5
3. Case Study		2	

D. MAP READING MODULE		16	40
1. Applied Map Reading	Introduction to maps, grids, scale and distance; directions; methods of point location; elevation and relief; navigational equipment methods. GPS utilization	4	
Written Examination		4	20
2. Land Navigation	Day and night navigation	8	20

E. COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT MODULE		10	15
1. Fundamental of Signal Support	Definition of Terms; Principles of Signal Commo; Means of Signal Commo; Advantages & Disadvantages of each means; COMSEC; Phonetic alphabet; Passwords and their meanings; Radio-Tel Basic Message Format; Establishing a Radio Net; Radio Check	2	5
2. Fundamentals of Engineer Support	Engineer missions; equipment; organization; doctrine; TTPs; Mission, Capabilities, Concept of Employment, Organization and Equipment of Combat Eng'r Units of Infantry (L) Div; Five Functional Areas of Engr System; Support relationship between Engr and Maneuver Units.	2	5
3. Fundamentals of Combat Service Support	Fundamentals; Planning of BnCoy CSS; Resupply Opns; Resupply Techniques; Aerial Resupply; Maintenance; Trans;	4	5
Written Examination		2	

F. STAFF SUBJECTS		44	55
1. Officer Evaluation Report and NCOER (GPE)	Orientation and accomplishment of reports	1	5
2. Basic Admin Records (GPE)	Admin records at the platoon, company and battalion level	2	5
3. Military Justice	Terminologies; Preliminary Provisions; Court Martial Procedures; Punitive Provisions; Miscellaneous Crimes and Offenses.	4	5
4. Unit Supply Procedures	Classes of Supply; Supply distribution; Accountability/Responsibility; Supply economy; Duties and Responsibilities of Supply personnel. Platoon level inventories and supply procedures; assumption of responsibility for platoon equipment	4	5
5. Financial Management	TBD by guest lecturer	2	5
6. Response to Security Threats	NISP; AFP and PA campaign plans	5	10
a. National Internal Security Plan	To be presented by DND/J3 rep	(2)	(5)
b. AFP & PA Campaign Plans	To be presented by J3/G3 rep	(3)	(5)

7. Intelligence	Situation updates; GESCON; Barangay Module	16	15
a. Situation Updates	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers – former CPP/NPA/NDF, CPLA and SPSG cadre.	(8)	(10)
1) Communist Terrorist Movement	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers – former CPP/NPA/NDF and CPLA Cadres.	2	
2) SPSGs	To be presented by J2/G2 rep. Include resource speakers – SPSG cadre.	2	
3) Local and International Terrorist Groups	To be presented by J2/G2/PNP rep.	2	
4) Other Threat Groups	To be presented by J2/G2/PNP rep.	2	
b. Barrio Module	To be presented by G2, PA/Div G2	(4)	(5)
8. Civil Military Operations	Scope determined by CMO school. Emphasis on SOT	4	5
Written Examination		6	

G. ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS		20	40
1. Army Operations	PA Mission; ALBD; Tenets of ALB; Imperatives of ALB; Principles of War Combat Power; Battlefield Framework, Future Battlefield (film showing)	2	5
2. Combat Plans & Orders	Warning Order; Fragmentary Orders; OPORD/OPLAN; OPORD Preparations (emphasis on forms)	3	5
3. Overlay Techniques	Definitions of Terms; Situation Map; Opns Map; Overlays; Use of Overlay; Importance of Overlay; Standard Color Coding; Operational Terms and Military Symbols.	2	5
4. Offensive Operations	Concepts and fundamentals of offensive operations in a field environment; movement techniques; movement formations; movement to contact; decisive point; main and supporting efforts, offensive operational terms and graphics, fundamentals of the offense	3	10
5. Defensive Operations	Fundamentals of Defensive Operations; Purpose; Characteristics; Defensive Patterns & Framework; Control measures; METT-T Factors; Planning the Defense; Preparing the Defense; Conducting the Defense; Terminating the Defense.;	3	10
6. Retrograde	General Concepts; Definition of terms; Discussion on planning, preparations, and other tactical considerations for a platoon/company as part of a larger force in the conduct of retrograde operations; Withdrawal, Delay, Retirement	3	5
Written Examination		4	

H. COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION		4	30
1. Review	Off POI		
2. Examination		4	

SUB-TOTAL: ACADEMICS	148	250
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NON-ACADEMICS			
A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		9	7
1. Athletics		8	
2. Physical Training/PFT-1 <sup>ST</sup>	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	1	7
B. APTITUDE		1	15
C. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		2	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined		
SUB-TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS		12	22
TOTAL: Common Module Phase		160	272

SUBJECTS	SCOPE	PD	PT
AFPOS PHASE			
ACADEMICS			
A. WEAPONS FAMILIARIZATION MODULE		13	25
1. Mortar 60mm (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
2. 90mm RR (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
3. M203 (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
4. MG Theory/ Machine Gunnery (GPE)	Characteristics; employment	2	5
5. Organic weapons (Coy/Bn/Bde)	Discussion of Coy/Bn/Bde weapons systems tactical consideration in employment both in Offense and Defense	4	5
Written Examination		1	

B. COMBINED ARMS MODULE		35	70
1. Mechanized Infantry Operations	Familiarization with mechanized infantry operations; Capabilities and the Army's current thrust.	2	
Practical Exercise		4	10
2. Engineer Operations	Mobility/Counter-mobility/Survivability; Review on definition of terms; Planning considerations on M / CM / S; Mobility Tasks; Planning a Preparation; Breach tenets; Organization and Equipment; Obstacle Graphics; Survivability Tasks; Checklist	2	10
3. Fire Support Operations	FA Operations, Elements of call for fire; rules of direction; methods of target location; elements of message to observer (MTO); Corrections; preparation of call for fire; CAS, Close coordination attack using attack aviation assets, Basic of air to ground opn;	2	

Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction with artillery units	6	10
4. Close Air Support	Close coordination attack using attack aviation assets, Basic of air to ground opn.	2	
Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction if possible with PAF Units	6	10
5. Platoon/ Company Fire Planning (GPE)	Organization and equipment available for fire support at the platoon, company, battalion, brigade and division levels; the concepts of fire planning, and defensive tenets of fire planning; fire support coordination measures; tenants of offensive fire plan	4	20
6. Aircraft Procedures (GPE)	Capabilities and limitations of the UH-1H helicopter; procedures to load and unload a UH-1H helicopter; Airmobile operations	2	
Graded Practical Exercise	To be conducted in conjunction if possible with PAF units	4	10
Written Examination		1	

C. ARMY DOCTRINE AND TACTICS		84	145
1. Troop Leading Procedures (with Quiz)	Review and application of Overlay Techniques and Plans and Orders; 8 steps of TLP; application of TLP;	8	20
2. GESCON (Coy Level) (GPE)	Definition; features; uses; GESCON Process; Development of Templates	4	10
3. IPB (GPE)	Definition; Discussion of the steps in IPB; Development of Templates	4	10
5. MOUT	Definition; Discussion on the conduct of MOUT operations; considerations;	4	5
6. Link up opns	Definition; Planning Consideration; Conduct of Link Up Opeartions	3	5
7. Passage of lines	Definition; Purpose; General and Specific Considerations; Conduct of Forward and Rearward Passage of Lines	3	5
8. Relief in Place	Definition; Purpose; Planning Considerations; Conduct of the Relief	3	5
9. Breakout from Encirclement	Purpose; Preparation; Organization; Conduct of Breakout	3	5
10. Movement Formations and Techniques (GPE)	Application of concepts and fundamentals of movement formations and techniques; command and control of fire teams, squads and platoons; execution of the proper movement techniques for fire teams, squads and platoons in a tactical environment.	8	20
11. Battle Drills (GPE)	Proper movement techniques for squad and platoon movements in a tactical environment; Attcak; React to Contact, Break Contact, React to Ambush, Knock out bunkers, Enter and Clear a Trench and Conduct Initial Breach of a Mined Wire Obstacle; Enter Building/Clear Rooms	32	40
12. Patrolling	Definition; Planning Considerations; Types of Patrol (Recon, Combat, Tracking, and Patrol Bases);	8	20
Written Examination		4	

D. PLATOON AND COMPANY OPERATIONS GPE		216	260
1. Platoon Operations GPE		80	80
a. Platoon Offensive Operations Planning GPE	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan; TEWT; conduct of offensive operations; conduct of overwatch and support by fire; platoon battle drills; platoon operations; battle drills and collective tasks ftx.	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis and briefing	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task, task and purpose tree, timeline, terrain analysis, weather analysis, civil analysis, enemy analysis, troop analysis, enemy COA		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Studs proceed to the AO and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD/Briefing			
b. Platoon Defensive Operations Planning GPE	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD/Briefing			

2. Company Operations GPE with Map Board		80	80
a. Offensive Operations Planning GPE/TEWT	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan; TEWT; conduct of offensive operations; conduct of overwatch and support by fire; platoon battle drills; platoon operations; battle drills and collective tasks ftx.	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis and DMA briefing	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task, task and purpose tree, timeline, terrain analysis, weather analysis, civil analysis, enemy analysis, troop analysis, enemy COA		
2) COA preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Exercise Without Troops	Proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD and OPORD Briefing			
b. Defensive Operations Planning GPE/TEWT	Mission analysis; COA preparation; preparation of tentative plan; leader's recon plan	(40)	(40)
1) Conduct of detailed mission analysis	Mission concept of higher HQ (2 levels up); Specified and implied tasks; limitations/constraints; mission essential task		
2) Course of action preparation and sketch	Decisive point; main and supporting efforts; form of maneuver; other mission critical information and requirements; sketch to include: objective, boundaries, main and supporting attack axes, support by fire plan, adjacent units, control measures		
3) Preparation of tentative plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; mission/plan of higher HQ; mission statement for the platoon; concept statement and sketch		
4) Preparation of leader's recon plan	Enemy situation/ disposition; security considerations; recon party composition; priority of recon effort; route; contingency plans; special equipment		
5) Offensive Tactical Ex W/O Troops	Proceed to the area of operation and make final refinements in their COA. They are required to brief their final COA through the use of a terrain model.		
6) Completion of OPORD/Briefing			
3. Write for Life (Company GPE)	DMA; Preparation, analysis, comparison, sketch of COA; preparation of tentative plan; preparation of leader's recon plan; TEWT; complete OPORD & brief	16	50
4. Culmination FTX (GPE)	Company Offensive and Defensive Operations	40	50

E. LEADERSHIP AND COMPANY MANAGEMENT MODULE		12	50
1. Visioning	Providing Direction; The Visioning Process; Developing Vision and Command Philosophy; Pointers for Visioning; (*) Case Study	2	5
2. Taking Command of a Company	Challenges of a Company Commander; Duties and responsibilities; Pointers for taking Command of a Company; Command Transition; (*) Case Study	2	10
3. Admin Responsibilities of a Company Commander	Personnel and Administration; Training; Supply; Maintenance; Counseling; Other Command Matters.	2	5
4. Tactical Proficiency	Proficiency in Combat Operations; Proficiency in Intel Operations; Proficiency in CMO	2	10
5. Developing Unit Cohesiveness	Filipino Soldier's Behaviors and Traits; Communication; Rewards and Punishments; Feedback System; (*) Case Study	2	10
6. Team Building	Definition; Foundation of Effective Teams; Relevance of Team Building in the Military; Team Building Sessions/Workshop; Team Building within Pltn, Team/Squad Level; Facilitation Skills for Team Building; Pointers for Team Building; (*) Case Study	2	10
F. COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION		4	50
1. Review	Off POI		
2. Examination		4	
TOTAL: ACADEMICS		364	600

NON-ACADEMICS			
A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		23	63
1. Athletics		20	
2. Physical Training/PFT (2nd-4th)	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	3	63
B. CONDUCT			50
C. APTITUDE		1	15
D. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		12	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined	8	
3. Closing Ceremony		2	
TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS		36	128

RECAPITULATION			
Academics		512	850
Non-Academics		48	150
Total		560	1000



APPENDIX E

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION INFANTRY  
OFFICER ADVANCED COURSE

SUBJECTS	SCOPE	PD	PTS
COMMON MODULE PHASE			
ACADEMICS			
A. PA BASIC DOCTRINE		15	45
1. Introduction to Army Operations	Environment of Operations; Foundations of Full spectrum Operations	3	10
2. Fundamentals of Offensive Operations	Purposes; conduct at the operational and tactical levels of war; characteristics; conduct within the operational framework; forms of maneuver; types; conducting offensive operations; impact of technology	2	10
3. Fundamentals of Defensive Operations	Purposes; characteristics; types; conduct within the operational framework; conducting defensive operations; impact of technology	2	10
4. Retrograde Operations	Review on the purpose of retrograde operations and the types of retrograde operations	2	5
5. Fundamentals of Stability Operations	Engagement and Response; Characteristics; Types; Considerations	2	5
6. Fundamentals of Support Operations	Characteristics; Types; Forms; Considerations	2	5
7. Written Exam	All Subjects taken	2	
B. GENERAL INFORMATION		12	
1. Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law Sem/ Workshop	Updates on human rights principles, international and national perspectives, the CHR vision, mission, powers and functions, and programs and services, and the international humanitarian law.	4	
2. Ethical Standard and Public Accountability (ESPA)	Update on organization of the OESPA, AFP professionalism, the legal and moral forces, graft and corruption, the functional code and integration and role classification. Includes discussions on Army Core philosophy.	4	
3. Environmental Protection and Awareness	To be presented by DENR representatives.	4	
C. LEADERSHIP		8	20
1. Leadership Counseling	Counseling and counseling techniques to reinforce or change behavior in a subordinate and use developmental counseling instruction and techniques.	4	10
2. Leadership Development	A review on basic leadership principles and group discussion on leadership issues. A leadership symposium will be conducted with invited Bn & Bde commanders as guest speakers.	4	10

D. COMMUNICATIVE SKILLS		36	50
1. Personality Enhancement and development	Develop a winning personality through effective interpersonal relationship & oral communication	8	15
2. Mil Briefing	Types of Military Briefings; Staff Briefing; Info Briefing; Decision Briefing; Mission Brief Techniques and Delivery/Format of OPORD, WARNO, FRAGO, Characteristics of Combat Orders, Types and Purposes. Prep of Orders	8	15
3. Battle Review Analysis/Staff Study Writing	Lessons learned from selected battles and campaigns/ Staff Study topics relevant in the present organizational set-up and environment	20	20

E. BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM MODULE		37	80
1. Fundamentals of Maneuver			
a. Infantry Opns	Inf (L) Organization (Coy, Bn, Bde); Capabilities; Army TOE (Coy, Bn, Bde); Limitation; Mission; Concept of Employment (Coy, Bn, Bde)	2	10
b. Armor Opns	Organization (Coy, Bn, Bde); Capabilities; TOE of PA Armor Unit; Limitations; Types of armor assets; Employment of Armor units in the offense, defense, built-up areas; Different techniques in working with Armor units.	2	10
2. Fundamentals of Intelligence			
a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)	Introduction to IPB, conducting IPB, war-gaming and intelligence synchronization, and general guidelines and rules of thumb for use of IPB.	4	10
b. Graphical Estimate of the Situation in COIN Opn (GESCON)	Steps in the GESCON process, templating of opposing forces, weather and terrain, community situation, economic and events.	2	5
c. Fundamentals of Information Superiority	Characteristics; environment; contributors; planning and preparing to achieve information superiority; execution; impact of technology	3	5
3. Fundamentals of FS	A review on the fire support operating system and its standard control measures, fire support planning considerations and concepts, FA organizations, and the capabilities and limitations of the fire support system.	2	10
4. Fundamentals of Air Defense	The air defense battlefield operating system and its standard control measures, air defense planning considerations and concepts, the ADA organization, and the capabilities and limitations of the air defense system.	2	5
5. Fundamentals of Engineer Support	A review on the mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability operating system and its standard control measures, its planning considerations and concepts, the combat engineer organization, and the capabilities and limitations of the combat engineer system	2	5

6. Fundamentals of Combat Service Support	Purposes; characteristics; functions; planning and preparation; CSS in offensive operations, defensive operations, stability operations, and support operations; tactical CSS; Army CSS within Joint Operations; impact of technology	4	5
7. Command and Control			
a. Troop Leading Procedure	A review on the tactical decision making process at the company level and below	2	5
b. Military Decision Making Process	Decision making process at battalion level and above	2	5
c. Staff Organization and Functions	The commander, staff roles and relationship, and staff activities. The duties and responsibilities of the staffs, their relationship and staff estimate preparation.	4	5
d. Signal Support	A review on the organization, mission, functions, command and control of the signal battalion, and the capabilities and limitations of the signal system.	2	5
8. Written Examination	In 3 parts (a. Fundamental of Maneuver & of Intel; b. Fundamentals of FS, AD ES, & Log Spt; c. Command & Control)	4	

F. STAFF SUBJECTS		18	20
1. Response to Security Threats	National Internal Security Plan; AFP and PA campaign plans	4	5
2. Intelligence	Situation updates; GESCON; Barangay Module, Communist Terrorist Movement, SPSG, Local and International Threat Groups, Other threat Group.	4	5
3. Civil Military Operations	Scope to be defined by CMOS. Emphasis on SOT	4	10
4. PA Modernization	PA Modernization Program from G5.	4	
5. Written Examinations		2	

G. COMPREHENSIVE EXAM		4	30
	TOTAL: ACADEMICS	130	250

NON-ACADEMICS			
1. Athletics	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	12	
2. Commandant's Time	Dialogue with students	2	
3. Orientation	CG, G5, School, Non ACAD, Course Director briefs	8	
4. Command Activities		8	
5. PFT (1 <sup>st</sup> )			7
6. Aptitude			15
	TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS	30	22
SUBJECTS	SCOPE	PD	PTS
	AFOS PHASE		

ACADEMICS			
A. INTRO TO COMBINED ARMS OPNS		15	40
1. Movement Formations & techniques	Fundamentals, formations, techniques, location of key leaders & weapon systems, control measures, security.	2	5
2. Mechanized Infantry Operations	Fundamentals in the conduct of infantry and armor operations. Synchronize operations of a mix force of infantry & armor elements.	2	5
3. Organic Weapon Systems in Coy/Bn/Bde	Identification of PA Coy / Bn / Bde weapons inventory, capabilities and employment considerations.		
a. Coy / Bn Mortar Employment	Mortar system, manning, organization, ammunition and employment considerations.	2	5
b. Coy / Bn Anti-Armor Employment	Manning, organization, employment concept and tactics, fire control procedures, protection consideration, field expedient weapons for armor killer.	1	5
c. Coy/ Bn Machine Gun Employment	Manning, organization, employment concept and tactics, support by fire, minimum safe distances and surface danger zone considerations	2	5
4. Amphibious Operations	Definition of terms, landing force, site area, beach and beachhead, types/phases of opn and planning/conduct of opns.	1	5
5. Air Assault Opns	Basic plans, table for air movement, Number / type of aircraft in each serial and aircraft allocation	2	5
6. Military Operations in Urban Terrain	Fundamentals in the conduct of infantry and armor operations in urban terrain.	2	5
Written Examination	All subjects for Combined Arms Module	1	

B. COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS		11	25
1. Fire Support Planning	Fire support planning considerations and concepts, FA organizations, and the capabilities and limitations of the fire support system at Co/Bn offensive/defensive operations.	2	5
2. Mobility/ Counter mobility/ Survivability Planning	The Engineers msn, organization, capabilities and employment consideration in the Co/Bn defensive/offensive opns.	2	5
3. Scout Pltn Employment	The scout pltn's Msn, organization, capabilities, types of reconnaissance and security missions and employment consideration in the defensive/offensive opns.	2	5
4. TAC Air Support	Use of TACAIR, CAS, Planning and employment; suppression of en ADA & air asset capabilities and limitations.	2	5
5. Army Aviation Support	Msn, organization of the Army Aviation Bn, capabilities & limitations, air asset available, & employment considerations in the offense & defense.	2	5
7. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	

C. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS	Review of tactical logistics functions; CSS symbols and graphic control measures; Status and assessment charts; Combat effectiveness graphics	2	5
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D. LT INF COY OPNS		127	180
1. Intro to Lt Co Ops	Inf Coy mission, capabilities, characteristics limitations, operating system. Lt Inf Coy organizational set-up, personnel manning, equipment and duties & responsibilities of key personnel.	1	5
2. Troop Leading Procedure	Review on the 8 steps of decision making process at company level	4	5
3. Light Infantry Co Offense	Offensive opns doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristic, phases of offensive opns, forms of maneuver and the offensive framework in formulating coy tactical plan using troop leading procedure and commander's estimate at Inf Coy /Coy tm level. Effective planning for employment of FS, M/CM/C and CSS assets in a light Inf Bn Opn.	40	40
GPE with TEWT (Coy Deliberate Attack)	Coy planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT. Instructor assisted exercise through the steps of TLP		
4. Inf Coy/ Tm Defense	Defensive opns doctrine, purpose, fundamentals, characteristics, framework of offensive operations, and defensive techniques, in formulating coy tactical plan using troop leading procedure and commander's estimate at coy level. Breakout from encirclement is added.	32	40
GPE with TEWT Coy /Tm Deliberate Defense)	Coy planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT.		
5. Inf Coy/Coy Tm MOUT	Definition, purpose, characteristics of urban area, planning considerations in the MOUT Offensive/Defensive opns	32	40
Graded Practical Ex w/ TEWT (Coy Tm MOUT GPE)	Coy planning factors in a defensive opns in MOUT, quick decision making process w/ TEWT		
6. Coy Tactical OPORD Writing (TOW)	Practical exercise on OPORD writing based on a given scenario for a Coy Team.	16	50
7. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
8. Written Examination	All subjects for Inf Coy Opns	2	

E. LT INF BN/TASK FORCE OPNS		126	185
1. Intro to Inf Bn/Task Force Opns	Inf Bn/TF mission, capabilities, characteristics, limitations, operating system, Lt Inf Bn organizational set-up, personnel manning, equipment and duties & responsibilities of key personnel, C2,	2	5
2. Military Decision Making Process	Essential elements of the planning process within an Inf Bn and BDE level operation.	3	10
3. Inf Bn/Task Force Offense	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, framework, types, forms of maneuver, planning consideration. Purpose, concept & conduct of forward passage of lines. Effective planning for employment of FS, M/CM/C & CSS assets in a light Inf Bn Op.	40	40

GPE with TEWT (Inf Bn offense)	Inf Bn planning factors in the offense applying deliberate decision making process (step 1 and 2), OPORD & TEWT.		
4. Inf Bn Defense	Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, frame-work, types, categories of defense, planning considerations. Purpose, planning considerations & concept in the conduct of relief-in-place.	32	40
GPE with TEWT (Inf Bn Defense)	Bn/TF planning factors in the defense, deliberate decision making process thru step 3, OPORD & TEWT.		
5. GPE Light Infantry Battalion ISO Implan Formulation	Bde planning factors in the offense, deliberate decision making process, OPORD & TEWT. Offense multi-echelon/parallel planning and execution.	32	40
6. Bn Tac OPORD Writing (TOW)	Quick decision making process, OPORD writing IAW a given scenario.	16	50
7. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
8. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	

F. LIGHT INF BDE OPNS		67	65
1. Intro to Light Inf Brigade Opns	Inf (L) Bde Mission, capabilities, limitations characteristics, BOS. Inf (L) Bde Organization. Brigade C2 facilities functions in the battlefield. Fundamentals, purposes, characteristics, framework, types, forms of maneuver, planning considerations Purpose, planning, considerations & concept in the conduct of link-ups.	2	5
2. Inf Brigade Opn (Command Post Exercise)	Simulated command level combined arms operational exercise orchestrated by the Headquarters TRADOC, PA. Application and evaluation of the student's over-all knowledge in a conventional military operation.	40	30
3. Inf Brigade ISO (Command Post Exercise)	Simulated command level combined arms operation orchestrated by the Headquarters TRADOC, PA in ISO setting. Emphasis on GESCON.	24	30
4. ACE Evaluation	Class participation, quizzes, leadership		
5. Written Examination	All subjects within the Module	1	
G. Comprehensive Exam		2	100
	TOTAL: ACADEMICS	350	605

NON-ACADEMICS			
A. PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING		30	63
1. Athletics		30	0
2. Physical Training/Physical Fitness Tests (2nd-4th)	To be conducted by Non ACAD Dept and CSSO	off-poi	63
B. CONDUCT		0	50
C. APTITUDE		0	15

D. COURSE ADMINISTRATION		20	
1. Commandant's time	Dialogue with students	2	
2. Educational Tour	To be determined	16	
3. Closing Ceremony		2	
	TOTAL: NON ACADEMICS	50	128
RECAPITULATION			
Academics		480	850
Non-Academics		80	150
TOTAL		560	1000

## APPENDIX F

### CURRICULUM FOR THE AFP COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE NR. 47

Aim:

To prepare selected officers of the AFP for command and staff positions in the operational and strategic levels by developing their command, analytical and communication skills, and by providing them a broad understanding and knowledge of tri-service, joint and combined, multinational, and inter-agency operations, and of defense as a whole.

#### A. Foundation Phase (11 weeks)

##### Module 1 – Personal Enhancement Program

Subjects	Periods	Methods	Instructors	Points
1. Communication Skills Enhancement				
a. Effective Writing	16	L/PE	TBAL	6
b. Effective Speaking	16	L/PE	TBAL	6
2. Research Methodology	24	L/PE	TBAL	8
3. Personal Effectiveness Seminar/Workshop	8	L/PE	TBAL	3
4. The Art of Negotiation	8	L/PE	TBAL	3
5. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H,GSD	4
Sub-total	76			30

##### Module 2 – Decision Making and Military Planning

1. Complexity of Mgt Decision Making (DM)	4	L/D	COL NAIVE	
2. Mgt Problem and Decision Analysis	4	L/D/PE	COL NAIVE	
3. Models in DM	4	L/D	COL NAIVE	
4. Quantitative Approach to DM	8	L/D/ITI	COL NAIVE	4
5. Decision Analysis	8	L/D/PE	PROF LOPEZ	4
6. Mil DM, Cmdr Estimate & Staff Estimate Processes	16	L/D/GTI	COL IRRIBERI	7
7. DND-AFP Planning Execution System	8	L/D/GTI	COL AZUL	5
8. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H,CLMD	10
Sub-total	56			30

##### Module 3 – Command and Staff at Strategic Level

1. Exercise of Command at Strategic Levels (CSAFP & Selected UC Comdr)	8	L/GTI	LtGen Delos Santos	
2. Staff Works, Methods and Procedures	4	L/GTI	Col Pascua	
3. Military Correspondence	2	L/GTI	Capt Sevilla	
4. Staff Study	10	L/GTI	Capt Sagudo	5
5. SDF: Command & Staff Communications Tool	12	L/GTI	Capt Sevilla	2
6. Film Showing	2	ITI	H,CLMD	2
7. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H,CLMD	6
Sub-total	40			15



#### Module 4 – Strategic Leadership and Management

1. Strategic Leadership Concepts and Principles	4	L/C	COL DE LEON	
2. Strategic Management Concepts, Principles	4	L/C	LTGEN DATU	
3. Strategic Leadership and Management of the AFP (Maj Svc Comdrs' Time)	12	L/C	MAJ SVC CMDRS	
4. Systems Management and Resources Allocations	20	L/C	CAPT DAVID	
5. Biographical Study of Senior Leaders	8	GTI/P	H, CLMD	10
6. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H, CLMD	15
Sub-total	52			25

#### Module 5 – Historical Perspective of Warfare

1. Evolution of Warfare I, (Pre-Industrial Age)	4	L/D	TBAL	
2. Evolution of Warfare II (Industrial Age)	4	L/D	TBAL	
3. Emerging Concepts of Warfare (Info Age)	4	L/D	TBAL	
4. Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMA)	4	L/D/ITI/ GTI	TBAL	5
5. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H, SPD	10
Sub-total	20			15

#### Module 6 – Moral Dimension of Warfare

1. Int'l Laws & Ethics Governing War/Conflict	10	L/D/GTI	TBAL	2
2. Human Rights, Int'l Humanitarian Law	8	L/D/GTI	TBAL	2
3. CARHRIHL/JMC	4	L/D/GTI	TBAL	2
4. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H, SPD	4
Sub-total	26			10

#### Module 7 – Military & Society

1. Civil Military Relations (CMR)	12	L/P/GTI	TBAL	2.5
2. Media-Mil Relations (MMR) (4)	12	L/P/GTI	TBAL	2.5
3. Exam/GTI	4	W	H, GSD	10
Sub-total	20			15

#### Module 8 – Conflict & the International System

1. The Global System	4	L/D	TBAL	
2. International Relations	4	L/D	TBAL	
3. Islamic Fundamentalism & Separatism	4	L/D	Prof Wadi	
4. Communist Insurgency	4	L/D	TBAL	
5. Trans National Crimes	4	L/D	TBAL	
6. Population, Shift & Aging	4	L/D	POPCOM	
7. Environmental Concerns	4	L/D	TBAL	
8. Social Movement & Revolution	4	L/D	TBAL	
9. Int'l Conflict & Mil Force	4	L/D	TBAL	
10. Int'l Economics	4	L/D	TBAL	
11. Current International & Domestic Threats	4	L/D	TBAL	
12. Nat'l Secty Assessment (SWOT Analysis)	8	L/D/SD/ ITI/GTI	TBAL	5
13. Evaluated Examination	4	W	H, SPD	10

Sub-total	56			15
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Module 9 – Strategy and Policy Studies

1. Strategic Development	4	L/D	TBAL	
2. Policy Analysis & Dev't	4	L/D/SD/ GTI	TBAL	
3. National Development & Scty Strat Formulation Process	8	L/D/SD/ GTI	TBAL	20
4. Regional Security Assessment	8	L/D/SD/ GTI		
5. Evaluated Examination	4	W		10
Sub-total	28			30

Module 10 – AFP as a Military Force and Instrument of National Power

1. The AFP as Military Force & Instrument of National Power	4	LD	TBAL	
2. P.E. AFP Organizational Structure and Command Relationship (i.e., OD)	16	R/SD/GTI	Directing Staff	15
3. Introduction to Ground Warfare and the PA	4	L/D	TBAL	
4. Introduction to Naval Warfare and the PN	4	L/D	TBAL	
5. Introduction to Air Warfare and the PAF	4	L/D	TBAL	
6. EDO/TD	4	L/D	TBAL	
7. MOOTW	12	LD/GTI	TBAL	5
8. ISO	12	L/D/SD/ GTI		5
9. Evaluated Examination	4		H, MODTBAL	10
Sub-total	64			35

B. Tri-Service Phase (11 weeks)

PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE (omitted)  
(3 weeks)

PHILIPPINE NAVY (omitted)  
(3 weeks)

PHILIPPINE ARMY  
(4 weeks)

Subjects	Periods	Methods	Instructors	Points
TA10 Sub-Module 1 – Army Opns				
TA11 Fundamentals Of Army Opns	10			
TA12 Recon & Security Opns	2			
TA13 Armor Opns	2			
TA14 Artillery Opns	2			
TA15 Air Defense Artillery Opns	2			
TA16 Engineer Opns	2			
TA17 River Crossing Opns	2			
TA18 CEIS Opns	4			
TA19 Combat Service Support Opns				
TA20 Role of the PA in ISO	24			
TA21 Sub-Module 2 MDMP & PLANNEX	104			
TA22 Military Decision Making Process				
Admin Time	34			
Total	162			

		1st Week	2nd Week	3rd Week	4th Week
Day 1	8-10	Module Orientation	The Enemy	BDE Msn Analysis	DIV Msn Analysis
	10-12	PAR	The Enemy	BDE Msn Analysis	DIV Msn Analysis
	13-15	Fundamentals of Army Opns	The Enemy	BDE Msn Analysis Brief	DIV Msn Analysis Brief
	15-17	Fund of Army Opns	The Enemy	BDE Sit Analysis	DIV Sit Analysis
Day 2	8-10	Fund of Army Opns	BN Msn Analysis	BDE Sit Analysis	DIV Sit Analysis
	10-12	Fund of Army Opns	BN Msn Analysis	BDE Sit Analysis	DIV Sit Analysis
	13-15	Recon & Scty Opns	BN Msn Analysis Brief	BDE Sit Analysis Brief	DIV Sit Analysis Brief
	15-17	Athletics	Athletics	Athletics	Athletics
Day 3	8-10	Armor Operations	BN Sit Analysis	BDE COA Dev	DIV COA Dev
	10-12	Artillery Operations	BN Sit Analysis	BDE COA Dev	DIV COA Dev
	13-15	ADA Operations	BN Sit Analysis	BDE COA Dev	DIV COA Dev
	15-17	Engineer Operations	BN COA Dev	BDE COA Brief	DIV COA Brief
Day 4	8-10	River Crossing Opns	BN COA Dev	BDE Wargame	DIV Wargame
	10-12	CEIS Operations	BN COA Dev	BDE Wargame Brief	DIV Wargame Brief
	13-15	CSS Operations	BN COA Dev	BDE Decision Brief	DIV Decision Brief
	15-17	Athletics	Athletics	Athletics	Athletics
Day 5	8-10	MDMP	BN Wargame	PAR	PAR
	10-12	MDMP	BN Wargame	PAR	PAR
	13-15	IPB	BN Wargame	PAR	PAR
	15-17	IPB	BN Decision Brief	PAR	PAR

Joint and Combined Operations Phase (8 weeks)

Summary

Subjects	Period	Methods	Instructors	Points
Joint Transition	54			25
Campaigning Opn'l Warfare	50			40
Delib Planning Process (DPP)	152			185
Crisis Action Planning (CAP)	76			25
TOTAL	336			275

Module 1 – Joint Transition

Subjects	Period	Methods	Instructors	Points
JACO Orientation	2	L/D		
AFP Joint Doctrine	4			
RP – US MDT & others Bi-Agreement	4			
UN and Applicable Charters for PSO	24			
ALLIED Students' Country Military Presentation	8			
PE – NISP Review	4	SD/GTI		8
PE – NMS Review	4	SD/GTI		8
PE – ISO Plan Bantay Laya	4	SD/GTI		9
TOTAL	54			25

Module 2 – Campaigning Operational/Warfare

Subjects	Period	Methods	Instructors	Points
Intro to Campaigning/Operational Art	4			
Operational Factors (Space-Time-Force)	2			
Theater/Battle-Space Mgmt	2			
Operational Functions	2			
Stages Elements of Operational Warfare	2			20
Operational Planning	2			
Operational Leadership	2			
The Future of Opnl Warfare	2			
UC Experiences in Campaigning	8			
Campaign Studies & Presentations	24			20
TOTAL	50			40

Module 3 – Deliberate Planning Process

Subjects	Period	Methods	Instructors	Points
Deliberate Planning Process (DPP)	2	L/D		
Ph-1 (Initiation) Planning Initiation in the AFP	4			50
Intel Support to AFP Operations/JIPB	4	L/D		
Understanding the Threat CTM	4	L/D		
AFP ISO Designs, Concepts & Experiences	8	L/D		
SOT – AFP Operational Methods against CTM	4	L/D		5
Ph-2 (Concept Dev't) ISO against CTM	34	SD/SP/GTI		40
Pers Support to AFP Opns	2	L/D		
Logistics Support to AFP Opns	2	L/D		
Reservists' Support to AFP Operations	2	L/D		
CEIS Support to AFP Opns	2	L/D		
Ph 3 (Plan Development) ISO Against CTM	16	SD/SP/GTI		25
AFP Territorial Defense Designs and Concepts	4			
PE – Territorial Defense Plan Dev't	12	SD/SP/GTI		25
AFP HA/DR Designs and Concepts	4	L/D		
PE – HA/DR Plan Development	12	SD/SP/GTI		25
AFP AT/CT Designs and Concepts	4	L/D		
PE – AT/CT Plan Development	12	SD/SP/GTI		25
AFP Participation to UN Peace Operations	4	L/D		
PE – UN Participation Planning	8	SD/SP/GTI		25
Visits to UC Headquarters	8	Tour/Travel		
TOTAL	152			220

Module 4 – Crisis Action Planning (CAP)

Intro to Crisis Action Planning	4	L/D		
PE – Crisis Action Planning (CAP)	60	CPX		25
Film Showing	4	L		
Experiences in AFP Crisis Action	8	L/D		
TOTAL	76			25

C. Concurrent Studies (3 weeks):

Subject	Period	Methods	Instructor	Points
Commandant's Paper	104	L/ITI	H, GSD	80
Book Review	16	L/ITI	TBAL	20
TOTAL	120			100

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