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A PROTRACTED WITHHOLDING ROLE
FOR SOVIET SSBNS?

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ON
SOVIET NAVAL MISSION ASSIGNMENTS
KFR No. 235-79

15 JANUARY 1980

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<p>(U) This study is the third in a series of seven addressing the question of whether or not the USSR presently has a strategy of withholding a significant part of its SSBN force to influence the "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war that continues beyond the initial nuclear exchange.</p> <p>(U) A preliminary review of the potentially relevant statements of naval, military, and political leaders over the 25-year period from January 1955 to January 1980 covered in this study made it apparent that if the evidence to answer the question regarding protracted SSBN withholding was contained at all in the outpouring of the Soviet media, it was well buried and would require research and analysis. Accordingly, a three-part analysis was designed:</p> <p>1) All of the most promising statements of potential relevance would be extracted, categorized by subject matter, and provided in appendices;</p>				
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2) The data was based on a combination of the Soviet Communist Party's Congresses, which occur at 5-year intervals and are the occasion for promulgating the new 5-year economic plans; and

3) A final "summary" would examine each of the data-sets across the entire quarter of a century to guard against the possibility that the methodology employed of examining the data in three separate chronological chunks had not introduced any significant errors or obscured any important relationships between like data in different services.

PREFACE

This study is addressed to the question of whether or not the USSR presently has a strategy of withholding a significant part of its SSBN force to influence the "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war that continued beyond the initial nuclear exchange. A few prefatory remarks are in order to put the question in context.

It is well known that the USSR maintains only a small share of its strategic missile submarines in position for any nuclear exchange with which a war would be expected to start or escalate from an initial conventional phase. Consequently, it is apparent that the plurality of Soviet SSBNs will automatically be held in reserve at least until after the USSR's initial nuclear strikes and possibly subjected in part to a protracted withholding strategy.

That Soviet SSBNs have been given no major share with the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) in the initial deep nuclear strike against the continental U.S. in the event of a general nuclear war but rather have been assigned only a minor role against some coastal military targets in the initial exchange plus a reserve, backup role to the SMF for at least the immediate post-exchange period were the major conclusions of the study Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike. This was completed in April 1979 for the Chief of Naval Operations (OP 96) as the first of ten monographs on potential nuclear-war mission assignments for the Soviet Navy.

Rather than being assigned a major share in the most prestigious (and presumably best-funded) of all Soviet military missions, that for the initial deep strike, persistent Navy efforts

to gain such a share ever since the SMF was organized in 1960 have been repeatedly frustrated. Instead, as also shown in detail in the above-mentioned study, the Navy's SSBNs have only been assigned two very limited roles in strategic strike:

- (1) Against just some coastal military targets in the initial nuclear exchange along with the SMF and Long-range Air Force (LRAF); and
- (2) As a reserve, backup role to the SMF for deep strike in the contingency that the SMF fails to destroy all of its assigned targets for the initial nuclear exchange.

In light of the foregoing, the main question left unanswered and which will be addressed in this third Soviet naval missions monograph is:

Are the Soviets planning to withhold a significant part of their SSBN force beyond the initial period of a general nuclear war for intrawar deterrence/bargaining and war-termination negotiations?

Since a preliminary review of the potentially relevant statements of naval, military, and political leaders over the 25-year period from January 1955 to January 1980 covered in this study made it readily apparent that if the evidence to answer the question regarding protracted SSBN withholding was contained at all in the outpouring of the Soviet public media, it was well buried and would require a considerable amount of research and analysis to get at it. Accordingly, a three-part methodology was designed:

- 1) All of the most promising statements of potential relevance appearing in the Soviet media since 1 January 1955 would be extracted, categorized by subject matter, and provided in appendices;

- 2) Periodization of the data was based on a combination of the Soviet Communist Party's congresses, which occur at 5-year

intervals and are the occasion for promulgating the new 5-year economic plans (including military construction), and previous analyses which had concluded that the presently-existing SSBN-withholding strategy dated from around the time of the XXVth Party Congress in 1971. The resultant periodization of the study into three main chapters essentially was from 1955 to the XXnd Party Congress in October 1961, from the XXIInd to the XXIVth Party Congress in March-April 1971, and through the XXVth Congress in 1976 up to 1 January 1980. These three periods were to be examined separately and interim conclusions drawn for each period using the working hypotheses that no protracted withholding was in effect from 1961-1971 but that a de facto withholding policy was in effect in the late '50s and that an official strategy of protracted withholding of a significant part of the SSBN force has been in effect since 1971.

3) A final "Summary" would examine each of the data-sets across the entire quarter of a century to guard against the possibility that the methodology employed of examining the data in three separate chronological chunks had not introduced any significant errors or obscured any important relationships between like data in different periods.

This methodology was pursued its lengthy course, involving ten separate appendices containing about 600 promising statements from well over 500 individual sources culled from very roughly 100 books and 800 articles. This fairly exhausted the available source material so that the statements in the appendices provide a sufficient basis for any who might wish to make their own analysis and draw their own conclusions. The nature of the source material included in each appendix is indicated by its title. These are given in the Table of Contents overleaf. An Executive Summary follows which contains the major findings of this study and a brief description of the evidence on which these findings are based.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the third of ten studies undertaken for CNO (Op-96) on the various missions that the Soviet Navy might be assigned in any protracted nuclear war.* The major findings of this study to determine if the USSR has a protracted SSBN withholding strategy are:

- The Soviet SSBN force includes among its officially assigned roles and missions one which requires that a significantly large share of the force be withheld indefinitely from use in order to provide the USSR both with a deterrent force throughout such a war (and a force that would be less vulnerable than land-based ICBMs) and a strategic strike force-in-being to influence any war-termination negotiations in the USSR's favor.
- In the late '50s, due to the fact that the small number of the first generation of the Soviet Navy's ballistic-missile submarines were unsuitable for operations in the hostile ASW environments existing in the North Atlantic and Western Pacific, they were largely retained in home waters. Whether this was done just to insure their survival for deferred strike or alternatively or additionally for protracted withholding could not be determined from the available evidence.
- When the military missions under the USSR's "unified military doctrine" were first worked out by Khrushchev and the then Defense Minister, Marshal Malinovskiy, to take account of the "revolution in military affairs" that had brought nuclear-missiles to all of the services and nuclear-propulsion to the Navy's submarines, the newly-formed Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) was endowed in 1960 with the main "deep" strike mission against the continental United States while the Navy's SSBNs were parcelled out among one minor "operational" strike mission, a contingency backup mission to the SMF, and a protracted withholding role -- none of which posed any great long-term challenge to the SMF's retention of its chartered monopoly on the most prestigious and best-funded of all military missions.

*The two previously completed studies in this series of monographs on "Naval Mission Assignments" are "Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike" of April 1979, and "The SSBN-Protection Mission" of July 1979. The studies remaining to be prepared concern the potential missions for anti-CVA, anti-SSBN, anti-SLOC, pro-SLOC, and three involving cooperation with the Army Ground Forces.

- The protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was retained in the USSR's military mission structure from the XXIInd Party Congress in 1961 to the XXIVth in 1971 -- contrary to the findings of previous analyses of the period.
- The protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was continued after the XXIVth Party Congress through the XXVth in 1976 and down to the present.
- The Navy, led by Fleet Admirals Gorshkov, Kasatonov, Smirnov, and Yegorov, have been protesting sotto voce against the protracted withholding role for most of the 20-years of its discernible existence and, despite the development of such a substantial SSBN force over the intervening two decades, still have not succeeded in breaking the SMF's bureaucratic stranglehold on the deep strike mission or otherwise of relieving itself of the withholding role.

The evidence for the above findings is detailed and rather complex. In general, it is based on the "positive" indications of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy collated in Appendix B and the indications of naval opposition to such a strategy assembled in Appendix E. Additional data showing that the SSBN force was neither maintained in the high state of "combat-alert" readiness required of the SMF (Appendix D) nor assigned any major share with the SMF in the initial deep strike against the continental U.S. were interpreted as highly consistent with the finding that some significant part of the SSBN force had been subjected to protracted withholding since Khrushchev first formulated nuclear-missile age missions for the Soviet Armed Forces in January 1960.

For a summary of the evidence to provide brief supplemental details to the general comments above, the reader is referred to the "Summary and Conclusions" chapter with which this study is brought to a close.

I. A PROTRACTED SSBN-WITHHOLDING POLICY IN FORCE 1957-1961?

In 1957 and 1958, as the first ballistic-missile submarines of the diesel-powered Golf Class SSBs and the nuclear-powered SSBNs of the Hotel Class were brought into operation, a de facto, largely expedient withholding strategy appears to have been put into effect to govern their employment. If this tentative conclusion (and working hypothesis) is correct, this development may be seen to have been due to quite a number of factors, including:

1) Khrushchev's policy was one of "minimum deterrence" at least cost to be carried out by land-based strategic missiles. So, the USSR felt no imperative need to have ballistic missile submarines constantly out on peacetime combat patrols in launch position ready to share with Soviet land-based strategic-range missiles in a nuclear strike against the United States in the event of war.¹ Rather, the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) were organized in December 1959 to control all of the USSR's land-based missiles of strategic range and the formation of the SMF as a fifth service of the Armed Forces was announced to the world by Khrushchev on 14 January 1960 as expressly assigned to handle the initial deep strike against the U.S. -- and the leadership

¹Unlike the "massive retaliation" doctrine of the U.S. which based deterrence on the prospects of unacceptable damage, the USSR in these early years of the nuclear-missile era placed its reliance for deterrence on its capabilities for first "blunting" a strategic strike and then delivering an "answering" strike with all of its combat-ready strategic-striking forces. The preparing analyst of this report is indebted to Robert Berman of Brookings for the basic distinction between the deterrence doctrines of the U.S. and the USSR, which appears valid at least for the second half of the '50s.

of the Missile Forces made it clear that they would be unwilling to share any part of their key deep countervalue strike mission with the Navy's ballistic-missile submarines.

2) Khrushchev and Defense Minister Malinovskiy also must have been aware of the risk of accidentally triggering a war by deploying SSBNs into U.S. offshore waters where they beyond question would become the object of intensive ASW efforts to track them continuously and if possible force them to surface. Also, Khrushchev was well aware of the likelihood that American reaction to such a threat might be violent, as reflected by his rhetorical question at the time as to how (his critics thought) the U.S. would react if the USSR deployed missile submarines off American shores.

3) These first-generation ballistic missile submarines and their missile were poorly suited for forward deployment. The SS-N-4 missile with which both classes were armed had a range of only 350 nautical miles and could only be launched from the surface. In the extremely hostile ASW environment in which Soviet submarines would have to operate in both effecting the "breakthrough" of the GIUK Gap and in patrolling in or near launch stations in the Western Atlantic, the Golf-Class SSB lacked the submerged endurance required to be effective and the Hotel Class SSBNs were extremely vulnerable to US/NATO ASW due to their exceptionally high noise levels.

4) The Navy could not yet manage any substantial protection for SSBNs on forward deployment. Gorshkov felt strongly that the USSR should not repeat Germany's mistake in both world wars of sending their submarine strike forces out through narrow straits controlled by the opponent into a hostile ASW environment in the oceans without the support of accompanying surface ships and naval aviation. The USSR lacked the ocean-going ships with the necessary AAW, ACW and ASW capabilities to even escort SSBNs through the GIUK Gap let alone to give them continued support on the open oceans in face of the NATO naval coalition with its vast capabilities (based primarily on its CVAs) for exercising command of the oceans at the times and places of its choosing and for underway replenishment of its ASW hunter/killer forces so that they could remain at sea for extended periods.

Possible indications that the Soviet leadership was not unaware of the deterrent potential of their growing fleet-in-being of almost-unavoidably withheld SSBs and SSBNs surfaced in 1960 and 1961 in statements by Khrushchev and Admiral Sisoyev. The former, without specifically referring to SSBNs (but quite likely having them uppermost in mind since they were relatively invulnerable as long as withheld), stated that, since there was no real threat to the USSR on its land fronts, and especially since the context was one of surprise strategic strikes, in the event of a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR, the Supreme High Command would "always" find it "possible to bring reserve means into operation and strike targets from reserve positions".¹

¹Khrushchev, report to the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet, 14 January 1960, Stenographic Record, Political Literature Press, 1960, p. 38 (Appendix A, paragraph 1).

A Navy protest against the very conditions outlined above which had made it expedient (and perhaps necessary) to withhold rather than forward-deploying the Navy's ballistic-missile submarines was registered by Rear Admiral Sisoyev in April 1961. In a notable statement which argued implicitly that the SSBNs should be deployed forward so that they could share in the initial nuclear exchange, Sisoyev pointed out in effect that the traditional rationale for holding military forces in reserve had been invalidated by the advent of long-range nuclear missiles which were calculated to predetermine the outcome of any general nuclear war during the initial nuclear exchange.

The necessity for the withholding [reservirovaniye] of forces appeared in former times as an objective practice for the conduct of each one of the branches of combat activity. The skill to consider [employing] the reserve in good time and to use it to best advantage largely determined the success of battle. Therefore, for a long time, reserve groups were considered an inseparable part of battle.

At the present time [however], in connection with the sharp change in the nature of combat action (especially with regard to the significant growth in its rapidity), withholding forces, especially those included in the composition of strike groups of the order of battle, is not expedient.¹

In the light of Admiral Sisoyev's seeming advocacy that the Soviet SSBNs not be withheld, a statement made sixteen months earlier by an active-duty Captain First Rank may reasonably be interpreted as having constituted a different argument to the same end. Writing in the Soviet Navy newspaper on 8 January 1960, Captain Nikolayev implicitly advocated that an end be made

¹Rear Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, April 1961, pp. 27-28 (Appendix A, para. 2).

to the practice of withholding SSBNs in home waters and that the Navy be authorized to start deploying them on combat patrols (after the manner of the Polaris SSBNs) to enable them to share in the initial strategic strikes against the U.S. This message was conveyed to the knowledgeable Soviet reader by use of a foreign-navy surrogate and by reference to "some naval specialists" of unidentified nationality to argue that naval striking forces, because of their mobility, were less vulnerable than land-based installations and so might play "even a decisive role" in a nuclear war. Nikolayev noted that by the use of surprise [ob-viously to be achieved by SSBNs normally in or near their launch positions⁷ and "mass employment of nuclear-missile weapons" the USSR's "basic strategic missions" could be carried out "in the initial period of a war" (Appendix E, para 1).

In 1961 and 1962, there were a number of briefly-stated claims to a capability for Soviet SSBNs to strike coastal targets, including identical claims by Admiral Gorshkov in July 1960 and by a naval political admiral in July 1961 (Appendix F, paras. 2 and 3). In January 1962, Rear Admiral Prokof'yev implicitly argued the fitness of Soviet SSBNs for a share in strategic strike (and appeared to be either advocating or announcing a corresponding end to withholding the SSBNs, or at least of all of them). He cited their supposed "low vulnerability" due to the "sharply increased endurance, high submerged speed and great submergence depths" of nuclear-powered submarines which, he noted, had "complicated combat with submarines and impeded [their]

detection and attack on them". He also asserted that nuclear-powered missile submarines were "basically new ships with unprecedented combat capabilities" stemming from their "covertness and mobility, unlimited operational range and concentrated striking power, great endurance and low vulnerability" (App. C, para 1). From these three statements alone there would seem to be adequate grounds for concluding that the Navy either already had been authorized or was eager to be authorized to start forward deployment of at least some of its SSBNs to share in the initial nuclear exchange with which any war presumably would start and, according to Soviet military doctrine of the '60s, in all probability would end.

Gorshkov cannot have failed to recognize the obvious fact that only by securing the unleashing of his SSBNs from their withholding tether could the Navy qualify under the prime nuclear criterion of sharing in the initial nuclear exchange and so hope to obtain not only a larger SSBN force but the large general purpose forces of surface ships, long-range aircraft, and torpedo-attack submarines needed to protect them against NATO's highly developed ASW capabilities -- but also useful for all of the other missions which a navy may be called on to perform in the exigencies of war.

However, from a 1960 Navy Day article in the provincial press by a Soviet Rear Admiral, it would seem that the reassignment of military and naval missions made incident to the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces (and formalized by the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960) had denied the Navy's SSBNs

any role in the initial strategic nuclear strike. The Navy had been "assigned" the missions of "defending the coasts from assault from the sea and from strikes by missile submarines, and also for carrying out a defense of maritime communications" (App. F, para. 1).

Moreover, as late as May 1962, when there appeared the first of the three editions of Military Strategy (the first comprehensive Soviet book on the subject since 1926), it was clear that the Soviet SSBNs had been given no greater role in strategic strike than against coastal (probably largely if not exclusively naval-related) targets (App. F, subpara. 4B). However, Marshal Sokolovskiy and the "collective" of Army officers on the Armed Forces' General Staff who had prepared Military Strategy emphasized the primacy of the SMF in strategic strike. Thus, the SMF was said to be "the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (App. F, para. 4C), to have "the highest degree of combat readiness" of any of the services and the capability of "destroying in the briefest period an enormous number of objectives" and so "to cause the enemy irreparable losses and in certain cases even to cause his capitulation" (4D), and to constitute "the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole" (subparagraph 4E).

In addition, the SMF was to "destroy the military capacity of an aggressor, his strategic means of struggle and the basic groupings of his armed forces, and to destroy his command and control" while the other services would only play an important

role subsequently "to smash the armed forces of the enemy, seize his military bases if for any reason they have not been obliterated, and to occupy strategically important territory" in order to gain "final victory" (4F). It was conceded that the Long-range Air Force would share with the SMF in the "retaliatory" strikes of the initial period (4H). The Navy's SSBNs, it should be noted particularly, were not given a share in this most prestigious of all missions, the embodiment of the nuclear criterion for which the Navy so evidently aspired to qualify by gaining authorization to deploy some of its SSBNs forward in peacetime.

Not only were the Navy's SSBNs not accorded membership in the "nuclear club" by the first edition of Military Strategy, they were explicitly excluded by several of the statements of the Navy's missions scattered throughout the work. One such formulation announced that "the basic mission of our Navy in a modern war will be to combat the forces of the Navy of the opponent at sea and at [their] bases" and to conduct an anti-SLOC campaign. Only in a contingency ("if necessary") would the SSBNs be called on "to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on shore objectives too" (4G). This "if necessary" indication that at least a portion of the USSR's strategic missile submarines were to be held in reserve as a contingency backup force if the SMF proved unable to completely carry out its main mission for destruction of the key counter-value targets in the U.S. was to be the first of a long series of comparable indicators of such a reserve backup role for the SSBN force.

Thus, in quite a variety of ways, it was made unmistakably clear by this work of the General Staff of the Armed Forces that the Navy had no assigned share in the initial "retaliatory" strike and only a contingency backup role to the SMF and some sort of authorization for striking enemy ships in port as part of the "operational" mission of destroying the enemy's naval forces.¹

Two months after the appearance of the first edition of Military Strategy a Navy Day article by Admiral Kharlamov implicitly acknowledged that the Navy's only real share in strategic strike was against those (presumably only high-value) naval forces that might be caught in port. Navy Day claims are usually exaggerated for home consumption and often claim capabilities that will only result some years later when drawing-board plans have been translated into weapons platforms. In this case, Kharlamov asserted that the Soviet Navy could destroy "the strong naval enemy" (a much-used euphemism for the NATO naval forces) not only while "at sea" but also "in distant ports and bases".² And even in this case, the claim was only to a capability rather than to an official mission assignment to the Navy. So any such assignment in wartime may have been contingent on a decision to initiate an anti-SLOC campaign.

1

As for the quasi-authorization for the SSBNs to strike "naval bases and ports, canals and narrow straits, and the shipbuilding and ship-repair industry" right at "the very outset of a war", the unusual, conditional phrasing that such targets "should" be struck at the start of a war as part of an anti-SLOC campaign has been interpreted by the preparing analyst of this study as a statement of just the preference of the Army Ground Forces, as expressed by the Army authors of the work, for an immediate anti-SLOC campaign to prevent delivery of U.S. reinforcements to its NATO allies in a replay of World Wars I and II. See Part I of this series of mission monographs, Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike, pp. 25-26.

²Admiral Kharlamov, Labor, 29 July 1962.

A general interest in the withholding of a "strategic reserve" of nuclear strike forces was implied in Military Strategy by a discussion of the lessons to be drawn from the USSR's World War II experience in that regard. One such lesson was the necessity of paying "special attention to the problems of the formation, employment, and replacement of strategic reserves" (Appendix A, para. 3A). Another lesson was to be learned from the "serious errors" attributed to the Soviet command in having allowed the strategic reserves to be "dissipated" with the adverse result that failure to withhold all of the strategic reserves "prevented gaining supremacy in even a single direction" (3B). This statement may have been intended to advocate withholding the entire SSBN force rather than authorizing some portion of the force to be deployed forward in peacetime so as to be ready to launch their missiles at the very start of a nuclear war. This seems likely when one considers both the hostile ASW environment in which the deployed part of the SSBN force would have to operate in the event of a non-nuclear starting phase to any general war. Moreover, since both the leadership of the SMF and the Armed Forces' General Staff authors of Military Strategy seemed to be opposed to assigning any portion of the Navy's SSBNs to a share in the initial deep strike against the continental United States, it seems even more justified to conclude that the above passage from the Sokolovskiy work did indeed have the SSBNs partly, if not exclusively, in mind.

Another passage in Military Strategy characterized "employment of the strategic reserves" as one of the "most important problems of strategic defense resolved by Soviet military strategy in the years of the last war" (3C). A further passage related that it had been "only the availability of strategic reserves" that had enabled the Russians to stop the major German breakthrough at Bryansk in October 1941 (3D). Obviously the Army General Staff officers who authored Military Strategy held a more traditional and conservative position that was diametrically opposed to the view expressed a year earlier by Admiral Sisoyev (quoted above) that the withholding of reserves, particularly of strike forces, was no longer "expedient" in the nuclear era when, in effect, the initial nuclear exchange was expected to predetermine its final outcome.

For later reference in this study, notice is taken here in passing of another passage in Military Strategy which explains that Soviet usage distinguishes two significantly different categories of reserves: 1) the "state reserves" and 2) the "Reserve of the Supreme High Command" (or RVGK from the first letters of the Russian). The "Strategic Reserve" is explicitly defined as "that part of the state reserves which is made available to the Supreme High Command". To make clear to all the Party supremacy over the military in the matter of the Party-dominated Military Defense Council doling out reserves for use by the military, the above definition concludes with the assertion that "all other reserves constitute state reserves" (Appendix A, subpara. 3E; see also para. 6 for the RVGK abbreviation).

Another possible sign contained in the first edition of Military Strategy that Marshal Sokolevskiy and the other Army authors of it considered, in effect, that Admiral Sisoyev was wrong and that even a nuclear war might last long enough for withheld SSBNs to be brought into action (and more importantly in their view, no doubt, the Army Ground Forces) was the adjuration: "...it must be kept in mind that the first massive nuclear-missile strike may not tell on the course of the war right away" (Appendix B, para. 1). (This, however, was wholly inconsistent with several other explicit statements to the contrary and was dropped from the 2nd (1963) edition).

Be that as it may, statements made six months before the publication of Military Strategy by both Khrushchev and Defense Minister Malinovskiy in their accountability reports to the XXIIInd Party Congress in October 1961 did not point explicitly to the existence of any requirement for the forward deployment of SSBNs in peacetime to enable them to share with the SMF and LRAF in the initial "retaliatory" strike. Khrushchev's comments on naval matters in his report on the 17th mentioned that the USSR was "obligated" to build ballistic-missile submarines to offset, in effect, President Kennedy's crash program to close the mythical "missile gap" in part by authorizing construction of 27 more Polaris submarines (in addition to the 14 authorized) over a three year span. As the Soviet leader put it: "Our enemies of the military blocs are preparing to fire from submarines on the territory of both our country and the socialist countries". He added

directly, with notably greater emphasis on preventing (or damage-limiting) nuclear strikes from U.S. aircraft carriers by means of cruise-missile submarines than on employing the strategic-strike capabilities of Soviet ballistic-missile submarines:

We are ready to reply to them by firing on surface water targets as well as on land targets. The Soviet Union is a continental power. Those who wish to unleash a war against us will be required to cross expanses of water. That is why we are creating a powerful submarine fleet armed with cruise missiles in order to be able to destroy ships hundreds of kilometers away as they approach the borders of the socialist countries.

The Soviet submarine fleet /fitted/ with nuclear propulsion plants and armed with ballistic and cruise missiles vigilantly stands guard over our socialist achievements. It will retaliate against aggressors with overwhelming strikes, including against their aircraft carriers which, in the event of war, will not be bad targets for our submarine-launched missiles.¹

Marshal Malinovskiy, in his report on the 23rd of his stewardship as Defense Minister, quoted Khrushchev to the effect that it was within the state-of-the-art for "submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles" to bring an enemy's "vital centers" under fire, especially from the Arctic.² However, he went on to imply that missile-submarine strikes were not necessary for the USSR and thereby indirectly to reveal the essentially deterrent propaganda nature of this portrayal of a submarine threat of

¹The XXIInd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Record, Vol. 1, State Press for Political Literature, 1962, p. 55.

²"...our missile submarines have learned how to navigate well under the Arctic ice and to take up missile-launching positions precisely -- which is very important for accurate strikes at objectives on land or at sea." The text of Malinovskiy's report was carried in Pravda, 25 October 1961. pp. 4-5.

strategic strike from Soviet missile submarines. He did this by claiming that the SMF (alone) had enough missiles already to defeat any enemy.

Another potential indication of the official existence or non-existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy is the degree of interest that has been shown in SSBN protection by other naval forces during the three periods into which this study has been divided. The seemingly most revealing statements in this regard published in the Soviet military and naval literature have been selected from the more complete compilation of such statements in the second monograph in this series of studies of possible Soviet naval missions for any general nuclear war. That is Part II, The SSBN-Protection Mission of 13 July 1979. These most significant statements have been reproduced in Appendix H of this report.

There are only three such statements which fall within the early period of 1955 through the publication of the first edition of Military Strategy in May 1962. The first and most meaningful of these statements is to be found in an article in the December 1961 issue of the Naval Digest. It bore the title "Protection for the Deployment of Submarines in the Course of Military Action" (App. H, para. 1). Written by a Captain First Rank Stepanov, the very title of the article, or of its last phrase at least, suggests that there was no significant Soviet naval interest in protecting SSBNs with other naval forces until after the outbreak of war. Therefore, in the final phrase "in the Course of

Military Action", seems to be suggestive of a policy of retaining all of the Soviet SSBNs in reserve until after the initial nuclear exchange presumably had degraded the U.S./NATO ASW capability, including the SOSUS system.¹

The contents of the Stepanov article demonstrated, by their unusual length and comprehensive treatment of the subject, that obtaining approval of the Party and Defense Ministry leaders for larger general purpose naval forces for providing protection to the Navy's SSBNs was a matter of highly topical concern for the naval leadership. To that end, virtually every conceivable argument was adduced. (The interested reader is referred to the five lengthy extracts from the Stepanov article that have been translated and included in sub-paragraphs A through G of para. 1 of Appendix H to this report.) Inter alia Stepanov called for an on-the-scene "presence of forces capable of being employed against the ASW forces opposing transit" (1A). This requirement accounts for subsequent addition of surface missile ships as well as surface, air, and submarine ASW forces to the composition of the SSBN-protection forces assigned to protect Soviet submarines in effecting the "breakthrough" of the

¹In a declassified Secret article entitled "The Soviet Navy in 1961", the U.S. naval intelligence publication The ONI Review of April 1962, it was stated: "There is a continued lack of evidence of deployment by Soviet missile submarines out of normal coastal operating areas". Considering the naturally strong U.S. interest in the subject and the substantial intelligence collection capabilities at the disposal of the U.S., including its extensive SOSUS system, this estimate by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence may be assumed with confidence to have been a guarded understatement of certainty that no Soviet SSBNs had been forward-deployed out of Soviet coastal waters.

GIUK Gap during Soviet naval maneuvers and training exercises.

As Admiral Gorshkov and other naval leaders and theoreticians subsequently were to do repeatedly, Stepanov cited the German failure "to pay sufficient attention to developing the requisite forces for protecting submarines while deploying" (1B). He attributed this failure to Germany having overrated its "strategic position" (1B) and observed pointedly that Germany's failure to build adequate ASW forces between the wars to reliably protect their submarines was due to their leaders' inability "to correctly evaluate the significance of submarines for combat at sea" (1C).

As further testimony to the importance attributed to gaining approval of a large force of general purpose naval forces for SSBN protection, Stepanov took the rather unusual step in concluding his article, of dropping the last vestige of any pretense to writing history for history's sake. He asserted openly and unequivocally that the only way that the Soviet Navy could have available in wartime the means for "systematically combating the antisubmarine forces of an enemy" would be for the USSR to authorize the peacetime construction of (large numbers of) "heterogeneous forces" (i.e., surface ships, submarines, and aircraft with ASW, ACW, AAW and reconnaissance capabilities) and provide for their constant modernization (1G).

Despite the fact that the last phrase of the title of the Stepanov article seemed to point to the retention in reserve of the entire SSBN force until after the initial nuclear exchange

had degraded NATO's ASW forces and SOSUS installations and despite the undoubtedly high level of naval interest in obtaining much larger general purpose naval forces for SSBN protection, this evidence still cannot logically be interpreted to have any great significance for contributing to answering the central question of whether or not a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy (rather than one merely deferred until the initial nuclear exchange had ended) was in effect at the time (for providing deterrence during the course of the war and a surviving fleet-in-being of strategic strike forces able to influence the course and final outcome of the war in the USSR's favor). All that the evidence from the Stepanov article may be said to contribute is that it is not inconsistent with a protracted withholding hypothesis.

Four months after the Stepanov article, another article in the Naval Digest made a complementary pitch for more general purpose forces, particularly for antisubmarine submarines. On this occasion, retired Captain First Rank Lan wrote in the April 1962 issue using a foreign-navy surrogate so patently fallacious that every informed reader must have quickly realized that the author was discussing Soviet naval requirements. Captain Lan stated, in particular, that the U.S. Navy was giving "great attention to the matter of protecting missile submarines during their sortie from base" (Appendix H, para. 2). "To this end", he added, "it is proposed to employ surface ships, antisubmarine submarines, and aircraft". He seemed to have reached the main point of his implicit advocacy when he continued: "For the

antisubmarine defense of missile submarines, it is considered feasible to employ torpedo-attack submarines". Again, however, as concluded with regard to the Stepanov article, although the Lan article showed a continuing active naval interest in obtaining more pro-SSBN forces, this scarcely constituted evidence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy being in force in the USSR.

Two passages in the first edition of Military Strategy, which was released for publication a month after the Lan article also reflected some appreciation on the part of Marshal Sokolovskiy and his team of Army officers from the Armed Forces' General Staff of the need, as the book expressed it, for the Navy to have "a certain number of ships" as "necessary to protect submarine operations" (Appendix H, para. 3). A second passage acknowledged the well-known fact that submarines were accorded pride of place as "the basic combat means of the Navy"¹. However, Military Strategy appeared to be deliberately deemphasizing the usual importance accorded to ballistic missile submarines that had been accomplished previously by naming them first or alone in such

¹Such is the fine-tuning of Soviet terminological distinctions that submarines and aircraft together are considered "the main striking forces of the Navy". Surface ships still occupy an "also-ran" position in the official sea-denial strategy of the USSR despite Admiral Gorshkov's not inconsiderable success on one theoretical grounds or another (like requiring large forces for SSBN-protection) in securing authorization for the construction of a substantial number of large surface ships. The terminological rubric under which he has accomplished this has been his frequent call for "balanced forces", clearly a euphemism in his usage for more surface ships.

formulations. The Sokolovskiy work instead departed from this normal formula and referred to "submarines of various /mission/ designations" as constituting "the basic combat means of the Navy".

The same paragraph referred to "the new missions which are assigned the Navy to carry out, especially for the struggle with the navy of an aggressor at sea and in port". These "new missions", it was stated, would determine "the significance of the Navy as a whole for a future war". While this probably was a reference to the same "new missions" assigned to the Navy formally at the IVth Supreme Soviet session of 14 January 1960 (as discussed above), the pro-SSBN mission, as the newest of the new missions, certainly must have occupied a prominent place along with the anti-SSBN mission and perhaps the anti-CVA mission (although the latter was well established before 1960 and does not seem to have been included in the description noted previously that was provided by Rear Admiral Lizarskiy (App. F, para. 1; see pp. 6-7).

In summation of the foregoing three pieces of evidence emphasizing the pro-SSBN mission and its requirement for large general purpose forces, roughly the same comment is applicable to the statements on the subject just described from the first edition of Military Strategy as was made with regard to the Naval Digest articles by Captains Stepanov and Lan. While the Sokolovskiy work evidenced an inclination on the part of the Armed Forces' General Staff to deemphasize ballistic-missile submarines

(and hence their strategic strike capabilities) and to place some emphasis on the pro-SSBN mission, this still does not add up to anything substantial as far as supporting or refuting a hypothesis that the SSBN force was subjected at the time to a protracted withholding strategy calculated to provide deterrence during the course of a war and to favorably influence its course and final outcome.

Two possibly valid terminological indicators relevant to the existence or non-existence of an official protracted SSBN withholding strategy during this earliest 1957-1962 period remain to be investigated before tabling the final pieces of evidence and drawing the indicated conclusions. These involve the meaning to be attached to widely differing statements of the importance attributed to the Navy on various occasions for 1) playing a direct role in "defense of the country" rather than just indirectly as a service of the Armed Forces, and 2) for exerting varying degrees of influence on the "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war or for "the achievement of the aims of a war". The relevant statements for each of these two possible indicators of SSBN withholding have been winnowed out of the Soviet military and naval literature from 1955 up through December of 1979 and collated in Appendices I and J respectively. They will be examined in turn in the immediately following paragraphs. Let us turn first to the terminological distinction that Soviet military and naval writings exhibit between the influence that individual military services are

sometimes accorded within the more political sphere of "the system of defense of the country" (or just in "the defense of the country") rather than in the normal, less exalted, confines of "the system of the Armed Forces" (or often simply "in the Armed Forces").¹ For the 1955-1962 period, four such references, all from naval sources, have been turned up. The earliest of these (February 1956) and the last published (January 1962), both referred to the importance of the Navy (1956) or specifically its SSBNs (1962) as being merely within the mundane realm of the Soviet Armed Forces (Appendix I, paras. 1 and 4). In the second and third examples, in 1957 and 1960 respectively, the Navy claimed that it was playing a key role directly in "the defense of the country". In the Navy Day 1957 article, published in the Navy newspaper The Soviet Navy (for political instruction for Navy Day reports and group discussions), the Navy was claimed to have "enormous significance in the system of defense of our state" (para. 2). In an article in the provincial press for

¹This distinction was first noted over five years ago by Dr. James McConnell of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and his initial research on the subject was published in CNA Research Contribution No. 257 (CRC 257) of September 1974, pp. 89-98. The results of his subsequent research on this subject were included in an article which he contributed to Soviet Oceans Development, a study sponsored by the Senate Committee on Commerce and published in October 1976 by the Government Printing Office. The relevant parts are to be found on pages 197 through 209. McConnell's in-depth research on the matter began in 1963, so the following analysis on the "defense" indicator for this initial period has not had the benefit of prior work on the subject (i.e., Dr. McConnell shares no responsibility for them).

Navy Day 1960, a Rear Admiral asserted that "a great role is accorded to the Navy in the system of defense of our country" (para. 3). Disregarding the difference between "enormous significance" in 1957 and "great role" in 1960 (as more likely to be correctly accounted for by variations in the normal Navy Day hyperbole due to individual proclivities than any diminution of the Navy's claimed role as a direct instrument of state policy), the essential facts are that in February 1956 and January 1962 the Navy claimed merely to be just another service of the Armed Forces while in July 1957 and again in July 1960 articles written (or at least approved) by naval political officers (i.e., the Party's official representatives in the Navy) proclaimed in effect that the Navy had been assigned some direct role in national defense that was external to the general war missions which it was normally assigned to carry out as a service of the Armed Forces, i.e., within "the system of the Armed Forces". If the further analysis of this distinction for the 1962-1979 period shows it to be a valid indicator related to SSBN withholding, we will return in our final summary analysis to these "defense-of-the-country" indicators of July 1957 and July 1960 and credit them as probably-reliable indications of the existence of a protracted missile-submarine withholding strategy from at least mid-'57 to mid-'60.

Similarly, if this distinction proves itself to be reliable in the further course of this study, the "system-of-the-Armed-Forces" statement of February 1956 and January 1962 may then

be accepted respectively as "before" and "after" dates bracketing an initial period of existence of a missile-submarine withholding strategy in the Soviet Union. Pending such an analytically fortuitous development, the potential results of this distinction for the 1955-1962 period must be held in abeyance and not considered in our first tentative evaluation of this early period. This will follow as soon as we have considered the second of the two possibly valid terminological indicators mentioned above -- that of the varying degrees of importance accorded to the Navy for influencing "the course and outcome" of a general nuclear war or for the "achievement of the aims of a war".

Like the "defense-of-the-country" indicator just discussed above, crediting the Navy with the potential for exerting a major influence on the "course and outcome" of a war or for "achievement of the aims of a war" (or its "general" or "political" but not "strategic" aims) may be (hopefully) shown by the analysis of the subsequent periods of this study to be a valid indicator of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy being in official existence in the USSR. As in the case of the "defense-of-the-county" indicator, the relevant evidence will be merely noted here for taking into account in the final summary analysis if the indicator is found to be valid after testing over the further 18 years from 1962 through 1979.

The "course-and-outcome" and "achievement-of-the-aims-of-a-war" indicators were first noted in the Soviet open literature (based on the preparing analyst's study of all of the available naval material since 1917) in 1959 and 1960 respectively. Apparently, therefore, they are formulas that evolved in the nuclear-missile era as the SMF, LRAF, and the Navy contested for the maximum-possible roles in strategic strike that would qualify them under the nuclear criterion for the largest possible slices of the military budget pie.

The first use noted of the "course-and-outcome" indicator was not a direct claim to the Navy's separate importance in this regard as the numerous subsequent claims were to be. Rather, it made a claim that contradicted all postwar military historiography which insisted on the Navy's minor role in World War II as merely "the faithful assistant" of the Army Ground Forces. This had been accomplished normally by claiming that "the Army and Navy [Emphasis supplied] played a decisive role in determining the course and outcome of the Second World War" (Appendix J, para. 1). This remarkable claim appeared in the Party-controlled (if not prepared) "Materials for Reports and Discussions" for political indoctrination use for Navy Day 1959 and was published in Red Star two weeks before that event in late July of 1959. If, as appears likely, this claim was intended to serve notice that the Navy's importance in the scheme of things political and military was growing, it would have been difficult to find a more persuasive way of accomplishing this than by so radically

and falsely rewriting the history of the Navy's objectively secondary role in World War II to accord it honors right along with the Army as having played a "decisive" role in defeating Germany in World War II.

This Navy Day 1959 "attention-getter" may not unreasonably be viewed as having set the stage and prepared the informed reader for the specific claim to the Navy's individual importance in determining the outcome of a war that Gorshkov was to register the following year in Agitator the Party "propaganda and agitation" journal for the Armed Forces. In the early July 1960 issue of this bimonthly compendium of material for political instruction of the troops, the Navy Commander-in-Chief made the following unprecedented claim:

The Soviet Navy...is capable of conducting combat against a strong naval opponent, destroying his strike forces, disrupting his oceanic and sea communications, destroying his ports, naval bases and other objectives on the coast and thereby of exerting a substantial influence on the achievement of the general aims of an armed struggle (para. 2).

There are a number of analytically noteworthy points that should be made about this initial Navy claim to exerting a substantial influence on achieving the aims of a war. First, it was modest in terms of claims to come, asserting only an "essential" or "material" (sushchestvennoye) influence (although the word has a secondary meaning of "vital" which is more normally rendered as "zhiznennoye"). Secondly, despite the patently false but normal Navy Day exaggeration of the extent of Navy capabilities

for accomplishing each and every mission that a good navy should be able to accomplish, the essential claim being made (and it would have been readily apparent to informed readers) was that, within the military-strategic framework of the "armed struggle" (but not in the military-political framework of "the war as a whole" as was to be claimed on some later occasions),¹ the Navy was claiming, with Party approval, to be occupying an important position. Thirdly, this position was the result of the aggregate of the Navy's mission capabilities, if not assignments, and included but was not limited to its capabilities for strikes at coastal targets.

Thus, Gorshkov may be seen as having placed on the record at this relatively early date in his long leadership of the Soviet Navy a claim to the Navy's importance that he was to expand steadily with the growth of naval capabilities (although not as slowly as the frustratingly snail's-pace growth in actual mission assignments). This was not a sensational claim nor one unwarranted on the basis of the Navy's "objective" capabilities (as Gorshkov sometimes was to express it) but it clearly was not based on officially-approved mission assignments and hence

¹This distinction between the "military-political" framework of "a war as a whole" (which involves the political, economic and population morale factors as well as military ones) and the "military-strategic" framework of "the armed struggle" (which is limited strictly to war-fighting matters) is also based on Dr. McConnell's pioneering work in Soviet terminological usage and may be found in his extensive investigation of these and related distinctions in the two of his published works previously cited (p. 21).

was not one that the leadership of the newly-formed Strategic Missile Forces or that the marshals in the Defense Ministry or Armed Forces' General Staff could be expected to endorse. Most importantly, for the analysis at hand, apparently neither the Navy's potential capabilities for sharing with the SMF in the initial strategic strike (if deployed forward to within launch range of the U.S. in peacetime so as to be ready) nor its capabilities for such strike (if either deferred until after the initial nuclear exchange or withheld for deterrence-in-war and to exercise a fleet-in-being effect on the course and outcome of a general nuclear war) were considered by Gorshkov in mid-1960 to be great enough to warrant the claim that eventually was to follow that the Navy could exert a "decisive" influence on "the course and outcome of a war as a whole" or on the "political aims of a war as a whole". Consequently, nothing of analytical value can be deduced from Gorshkov's initial claim using the "course and outcome" indicator.

As a further indication of Party approval of Gorshkov's 1960 claim to a "substantial" war-fighting capability, which very likely was considered by the Party leadership as useful for enhancing strategic deterrence (even if it irritated the Army marshals), this claim was repeated verbatim the following year on the occasion of Navy Day by the political vice admiral for the unique Leningrad naval complex of shipyards, naval base and logistics support facilities, and training and educational establishments (para. 4).

What seemed at first glance like an Armed Forces' General Staff rebuttal of this claim to "substantial" importance accorded the Navy for achieving the "general aims of an armed struggle" was contained in the first edition of Military Strategy when it made its appearance in the spring of 1962:

"Military actions in naval theaters in a future war will acquire wide scope, although these actions hardly will have a decisive influence for the outcome of a war" (para. 5). The operative distinction here is the phrase "in naval theaters". Soviet military doctrine holds that, in the nuclear-missile era, only the cumulative effect of operations in military (including naval) "theaters of military action" (TVDs) or operations on the main fronts (or in "the main directions" or "along the main axes") can have a major influence on the course and outcome of a war in supplement to the greater influence of strategic strikes at both counterforce and, especially, at countervalue targets. Accordingly, to deny that the Navy would have a "decisive" influence in theater warfare skirted the subject of what the capabilities of the Navy's SSBNs for strategic strike might be. Since Marshal Sokolovskiy and his Army-officer team of writers on the Armed Forces' General Staff did not see fit (perhaps not considering it important or relevant enough) to include in Military Strategy their estimation of the potential of Soviet SSBNs for influencing the course and outcome of a war, their silence on the subject may be construed as indicative of either

their low regard for that potential or (seemingly less likely in view of the General Staff's elevated position in the military hierarchy) an unwillingness to offend proponents of letting the SMF continue to exercise the uninfringed prerogative for the initial "deep" strategic strikes against the U.S. with which it had been endowed at birth. Perhaps of even more significance is to note that the remark quoted from Military Strategy came in context as a wholly gratuitous and invidious one that likely reflected an "in-house" dispute within the military establishment over roles and missions (and hence budget allocations) and was designed to "put the Navy in its place". Regardless of the truth of this matter, the quoted sentence from Military Strategy did serve to indicate that the Army marshals were "odd-men-out" in the estimate of the Navy's capabilities shared with the Navy by the Party leaders.

On this note of bureaucratic discord, this study now turns to taking note of the evidence from the Soviet open literature of the 1961-'62 period that the expedient practice (if probably not a very calculated strategy) of withholding all of the Soviet missile submarines from the initial nuclear strike was reversed not only in practice by late 1961 (as evidenced by the first Soviet SSBNs being sent out on peacetime combat patrols at that time) but also in theory. As will be seen in the next chapter of this study, the evidence in the Soviet military and naval writings from 1962 to March 1971 provides reasonably convincing

confirmation that the practice of withholding all missile submarines was not in existence during that period. Here, it is only intended to take as close a look as the available evidence permits to determine at what point in time the change took place.

The first piece of information to be offered in evidence is one dated January 1961 that appears in retrospect to have been a portent of things to come later that year. An article in the January issue of the Naval Digest by Engineering-Captain First Rank Belyayev showed remarkable prescience (or inside knowledge) about the pending alteration of the missile-submarine withholding policy. Belyayev couched his advocacy (or announcement) of the policy being amended in a foreign-navy surrogate that scarcely could have been hard to see through for readers of the Soviet military and naval press (who scarcely can fail to be aware of the habitual use by Soviet publicists of such superficially esoteric foreign-navy or historical surrogates to satisfy the censors, who in turn must be perfectly aware of the practice but condone it as an acceptable means of useful communication). The Belyayev article made the following statement of relevance to this study:

It is often reported in the foreign press, especially the American, that, with modern conditions of science and technology, there exists a real potential for a sharp increase in the role of submarines, not only for combat action at sea but also for carrying out the missions of a war as a whole (Appendix J, para. 3).

If this statement, in fact, reflected either advocacy or announcement based on advance knowledge of an imminent change in the withholding policy, the key part of the statement that "there exists a real potential for a sharp increase in the role of submarines...for carrying out the missions of a war as a whole" may be interpreted as having constituted a reference to the increased potential that the Soviet SSBNs which would be deployed could exert presumably on the outcome of "a war as a whole" by taking part in the initial nuclear strike -- which Soviet military doctrine then held would in all probability predetermine the outcome of any general nuclear war.

Another possible indication that missile-submarine withholding had been modified to permit some role in the early strikes was to be found in a Red Star article in September 1962. Signed by a naval historian who was then an instructor (and subsequently a full professor) probably at the Naval War College, the article employed a transparently false foreign-navy surrogate to advocate such a high requirement for more nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines to provide SSBN protection that it scarcely could have been made during the prior period of withholding without running considerable risk of damaging the Navy's seemingly determined efforts to have the withholding policy abolished. Captain First Rank, Dotsent (instructor) Potapov

formulated his advocacy of constructing more SSNs at a greatly accelerated rate as follows:

For screening nuclear-powered missile submarines during their activity at sea, American military officials have proposed to accomplish this, too, with nuclear-powered submarines -- but with ones with torpedo armament. It is considered that the antisubmarine defense of each such missile submarine must be supported by two nuclear-powered torpedo-attack submarines (Appendix B, para. 2)

Having taken note of these last two pieces of rather tenuous evidence that at best tend to suggest that January 1961 and September 1962 were the time parameters for the suspension of the policy and practice of withholding all strategic-missile submarines from forward deployment, let us turn to an analysis of the evidence already presented in order to draw such conclusions as it seems to warrant. First it should be noted that the previously-described long article by Captain Stepanov in the December 1961 Naval Digest entitled "Protection for the Deployment of Submarines in the Course of Military Action" (Appendix H, para. 1) shared a basic attribute in common with the advocacy by Captain Potapov of building two SSNs to protect each SSBN that appeared in Red Star nine months later: the requirements stated in both articles were so extensive (although explicit in the Potapov article and only implicit in Stepanov's) that the publication of either, as already remarked in the case of the Potapov article, quite likely would have had adverse effects on the Navy's efforts to have withholding dropped as an exclusive policy and the Navy authorized to begin operating at least a part of its SSBN force within range of the continental U.S.

If this deduction is valid, then our search for the point in time at which the withholding policy was terminated can be narrowed to 1961 and to the eleven months between the appearance of the Belyayev article in January and the Stepanov article in December.

Since the outstanding event of the year 1961 was easily the XXIInd Party Congress held in October and in view of the widely prevalent beliefs that not only are major changes of strategy, policy, and doctrine as well as the military procurement plans for the ensuing five years generally given final approval by the successive Party congresses held at five-year intervals but also that the XXIInd Congress did make significant modifications to the military mission assignments that had been endorsed by the IVth session of the Supreme Soviet in mid-January 1960, therefore, October 1961 must be considered a prime suspect. With this thought in mind, let us reexamine the statements made at the XXIInd Congress by Khrushchev and Marshal Malinovskiy with regard to the Navy. It was commented earlier in this study (when the relevant excerpts from the Khrushchev and Malinovskiy reports were considered) that Khrushchev's speech had given notably greater emphasis in his remarks on the Navy to preventing (or damage-limiting) strikes from U.S. aircraft carriers by means of cruise-missile submarines than he gave to the strategic-strike capabilities of the USSR's ballistic-missile submarines. While this initial observation was correct as far as it went, revisiting

the XXIInd Congress at this point reveals that there was more than first met the eye in what Khrushchev was quoted as having said.

In the first place, the Party leader did imply that the USSR was being forced to build ballistic-missile submarines (the newly-approved Yankee Class) to offset (provide a strategic counter to) the Polaris SSBN that the U.S. was then building at an accelerated rate. Since Khrushchev went on to assert that the USSR's ballistic and cruise-missile submarines were "vigorously standing guard" to "retaliate against aggressors", his statements lend themselves to the interpretation that at least some of the USSR's SSBNs already might have been exercising their vigilance in forward missile-launch areas where they could be on-station and ready to contribute to the initial nuclear exchange if and when assigned some strike targets. They then would have been in areas where their sure-to-be-detected presence by SOSUS alone would have lent credibility to the USSR's nuclear-deterrent strength in Western perceptions.

Similarly, upon reexamination, Malinovskiy's previously cited remarks in his report to the XXIInd Congress may be seen to have been following Khrushchev's line on the deterrent-propaganda capability to be accorded to ballistic-missile submarines for strategic strike. Or, Malinovskiy, who was known to have been differing with Khrushchev over other defense policy matters at this time, at least paid lip service to the Party leader's line by quoting its major points that Soviet missile-submarines

could strike the "vital centers" of the U.S. and that they could do so from launch positions in the Arctic (where they would be far less accessible to U.S./NATO ASW efforts). But then, as noted before, Malinovskiy shot down this deterrent-propaganda balloon before it had time to gain any altitude by the well-aimed (and probably premeditated) shot that the SMF (alone) had all the missiles necessary to solve all of the USSR's military requirements in the event of a general nuclear war.

Having taken a somewhat cart-before-the-horse approach to determining (as nearly as the evidence would allow) the point in time at which the policy of withholding all of the USSR's strategic strike-capable missile submarines most likely was formally abandoned,¹ let us make a further revisitation of the evidence accumulated earlier in this chapter. From it we may expect to be able to determine both what degree of confidence can be accorded to our working hypothesis that such a policy actually was in effect in the late '50's and up to October 1961.

It must be recognized that the analytical problem of determining whether or not Soviet SSBNs were being subjected to protracted withholding during this 1957-1961 period is enormously complicated by the fact that most of the pieces of evidence

¹This was done deliberately, however, with the thought that the indications pointing to an end of a withholding policy would in themselves constitute useful evidence of the prior existence of such a policy.

adduced above, which otherwise might support an affirmative answer to that question, may be satisfactorily accounted for merely by the well-documented Soviet practice during the pre-XXII Congress period of retaining all of the SSBNs in reserve in home waters at least until the USSR's "retaliatory" strike had achieved what damage it could to degrade Western ASW. This unfortunate circumstance applies specifically to the only three pieces of evidence from the pre-Congress period which, upon review, showed any substantive potential for otherwise having contributed to a convincing answer to the question:

- the 8 January 1960 article by Captain Nikolayev which implicitly advocated that Soviet SSBNs be deployed forward in peacetime so that they would be in position if war came to take part in the initial nuclear exchange;
- the 14 January 1960 remark by Khrushchev that the USSR had strategic reserves that could be employed to retaliate for any surprise nuclear attack; and
- the April 1961 article by Rear Admiral Sisoyev, which was interpreted above as constituting further advocacy to the same end as Captain Nikolayev's in the first of these entries above.

As for the statements at the XXIIInd Congress itself by Khrushchev and Malinovskiy in October 1961, they have been shown to serve only to indicate that the USSR might be sortieing a few SSBNs out on combat patrol, perhaps in the Arctic, although mainly to lend credibility to them for nuclear deterrence rather than actually to share in any initial nuclear exchange.

As for the evidence given earlier in this chapter for the immediate post-Congress period up to the May 1962 publication

of the first edition of Military Strategy, even the potentially useful pieces of evidence seen in retrospect as having otherwise held substantive promise for throwing a retroactive light on the nature of the pre-Congress SSBN-withholding policy (as both deferred and protracted or deferred only) have been negated by the analytical complications caused by the mere existence of the deferred-strike strategy. This situation is applicable to the two following data in particular:

- the January 1962 paragraph of praise by Rear Admiral Prokof'yev especially for their "low vulnerability", contributed only to substantiating the end of the policy of withholding all of the Soviet SSBNs during at least the initial nuclear exchange;
- the May 1962 contributions of Military Strategy merely served to complicate the analytical effort since the omission of the SSBNs from the strategic "retaliatory" forces seemed to constitute an indication of at least deferred strike and possibly of protracted withholding.

In bringing this first chapter to a close, it should be remarked that it would have been most helpful to the subsequent analysis if the evidence had supported the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding policy and so established a credible precedent for positive subsequent resumption of such a policy-cum-strategy. Unfortunately, however, the available evidence cannot be shown to be strong enough to carry such a burden of proof. What that evidence does show well is that whatever the content of the policy vis-a-vis SSBNs, whether deferred only or protracted too, it probably existed from at least mid-'57 until formally modified in October 1961 at the XXIIInd Party

Congress to at least provide for the forward deployment of a small part of the SSBN force and possibly to implement a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy if such a strategy were not already in official existence.

Pending acquisition of further evidence, we must live with this inconclusive result for the initial period of this study. Let us now turn our attention to the next chapter and the ensuing decade that will take us up to XXIVth Party Congress in 1971.

II. PROTRACTED-SSBN WITHHOLDING BETWEEN THE XXIIND AND XXIVTH PARTY CONGRESSES (1961-1971)

In view of the considerable volume of information available for this period, the procedure employed will be one of systematically reviewing in turn the material for the period contained in each of the ten appendices but commenting specifically only on those items that merit individual analysis. In this way, the reader is freed of the burden of reading the bulk of the material that is not of direct relevance.¹

The only pieces of evidence for the period up to the convening of the XXIVth Party Congress on 30 March 1971 that lend themselves to the interpretation that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect during the period are to be found in an article by Marshal Krylov in 1968 and another by Rear Admiral Stalbo in 1969 (Appendix B, paras. 3 and 4). Krylov, CinC SMF, acknowledged that the Navy's might was based on SSBNs but in a context of the SMF, in effect, being charged with all important missions in the earlier stages of the war and the other services only getting into the act "to achieve final victory". So there is a potential indication that the SSBNs were to be withheld² while the SMF carried out its chartered role, as

¹The appendices containing all of the possibly relevant data have been supplied for those wishing to perform their own analysis as well as to limit the length of the main body of this report to the essentials.

²It is quite possible that Krylov was only speaking of the general purpose "Navy" and was implicitly excluding the SSBNs. However, there is no precedence or other evidence to either support or refute such a theory.

Krylov expressed it, as "the main nuclear striking force". Without attempting to pronounce on the validity of this indication in isolation from the many others to follow, it is worth remarking that the numerous other Krylov articles and SMF-Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions" articles reflect an even greater degree of service chauvinism than to be found in Navy Day articles and invariably gave extremely short shrift to the capabilities of the other services. In this case, Krylov made a point of mentioning that SSBNs were the main force (just) of the Navy¹ and in a context in which all of the other services had been relegated to the minor role of mopping up after the SMF had done the main job. His intention to assert for the public record that the Navy had not succeeded in winning a share in the initial deep strike seems quite apparent. The relevant question, however, is whether or not in so doing he inadvertently provided a valid indication that the SSBNs were being subjected to a protracted-withholding strategy. We shall return to this and the following positive indication of withholding in the analysis for the entire period that will bring this chapter to a close.

The other quasi-positive indication of withholding, that by Professor Stalbo in the December 1969 issue of Naval Digest, was brief, convoluted, and tenuous:

It is precisely the basic naval operations which, in the new conditions, can be carried out /only/ in the oceans...At the same time, obviously, it is required to conduct operations in coastal waters too...

¹Krylov scarcely could have made such a statement if the SSBNs were not (still) subordinated to the Navy at the time rather than under the operational control of the Supreme High Command, as the Strategic Missile Forces apparently were.

Stalbo's mention of the need for coastal operations was not customary in the post-Stalin era. The whole thrust of Soviet naval development had been to push steadily beyond coastal confines further and further out into the oceans. Accordingly, it may logically be hypothesized that Stalbo had a particular reason for mentioning the subject of coastal operations. The most plausible answer that suggests itself is that some high-value targets requiring protection that had not been there before were either already to be found in coastal waters or soon would be. Since there was no evidence of any change in coastal SLOC protection requirements or in those for coastal operations for Army-flank support or defense against amphibious invasion and since none of these three naval missions involved any aspects of high strategic significance comparable to that of the newest coastal-waters mission, that for protecting the Delta Class SSBN that was programmed by 1969 and would have the range to launch its missiles from coastal waters, the conclusion that Stalbo's highly unusual reference to the need to "conduct operations in coastal waters too" seems most likely to have referred to the need to develop better SSBN-protection capabilities in SSBN sanctuaries in coastal waters. Here, too, we seem to have a possibly valid indication of SSBN withholding, either for December 1969 when Stalbo's article appeared or for some subsequent date when enough Delta Class SSBNs would be operational to make such a strategy expedient.

One of the potentially most clear-cut positive indicators of SSBN withholding in Soviet military and naval writings are statements

of SSBN invulnerability. No such claims are to be found prior to the termination of the policy of withholding all missile submarines until at least the end of the initial nuclear exchange that we have fairly well shown took place in 1961, most likely at the XXIInd Party Congress in October of that year. As already noted in Chapter I, Rear Admiral Prokof'yev credited nuclear-powered submarines with "low vulnerability" in a Red Star article in January 1962. This was less than three months after the XXIInd Congress and was the first of seven such claims made before the XXIVth Congress was convened in March 1971.¹ In addition, there were six comparable claims between July 1968 and June 1970 to the SSBNs possessing "combat stability"²-- a Soviet military term for "survivability" in a hostile environment, most often due to an "in-house" defensive capability of a weapon system supplemented by the protection of forces composed of other types of weapons systems.

Of particular note was Admiral Alafuzov's January 1963 rejoinder to Marshal Sokolovskiy and the other Army officers of the Armed Forces' General Staff who had authored Military Strategy. He refuted their work's claim that "nuclear-powered missile submarines were, in reality, vulnerable" as "without any basis whatsoever" (Appendix C, para. 3).

¹See Appendix C, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 10, 23, 37, and 45.

²See Appendix C, paragraphs 32, 37, 40, 41, 42 and 45. In addition, there were ten mentions of the "stealth" and other qualities of submarines which implied that they were highly survivable, even in a hostile ASW environment (paras. 8, 11, 24A, 29A, 31, 32, 34, 35A, 38 and 39).

The third of these claims was by Admiral Gorshkov on the occasion of Armed Forces Day in February 1963; writing in Labor, he asserted that Soviet SSBNs were "practically invulnerable" (para. 4).

The fourth of these six blanket claims that Soviet missile submarines were largely invulnerable came in an article in the Military-Historical Journal in November 1963 by an active-duty Captain First Rank Kvitnitskiy (para. 10). Although he resorted to a foreign-navy surrogate, it was clear that he was arguing that the USSR should take a lesson from the alleged fact that "American military policy and strategy" placed "basic" dependence on SSBNs for "surprise nuclear strikes".

The fifth item was a Navy Day-'66 Radio Moscow interview in which the Navy's Chief of Main Staff, Admiral Sergeyev, asserted that Soviet nuclear-powered submarines were "practically invulnerable" (para. 28). This was the identical description that Admiral Gorshkov had used for Soviet SSBNs more than three years earlier, as described above. Unlike Gorshkov in February 1963, however, Sergeyev also stated that the Soviet Navy had been equipped "in the past few years" with "new missile ships equipped with up-to-date means for hunting, locating and destroying any modern submarine". While this latter statement lent itself to the interpretation by uninformed readers that Soviet

ASW forces could manage the Polaris/Poseidon SSBN threat, it is notable that Sergeyev avoided making any such patently unwarranted claim. Moreover, those of his better informed readers who were aware of the general superiority of U.S. ASW were likely to have interpreted Sergeyev's claim that Soviet SSBNs were "practically invulnerable" as an esoteric way of saying that the Soviet Navy's anti-SSBN mission remained as intractable as ever.

The sixth of the pre-XXIVth Party Congress claims to SSBN invulnerability or near-invulnerability appeared in Naval Digest in June 1969. Vice Admiral Surabekov listed "low vulnerability" among the characteristics of nuclear-powered submarines in general and made frank acknowledgment of the fact that ASW against such submarines was a "most difficult" as well as a cost-ineffective ("labor-consuming") task (para. 36).

The seventh and final claim was one of "virtual invulnerability" for Soviet SSBNs which appeared in Communist of the Armed Forces in the "Materials for Reports and Discussions" for Navy Day in June 1970 (para. 44). The fact of the appearance of such a statement in the Party journal for the armed services may be interpreted reasonably as indicating that assertion of the invulnerability of Soviet SSBNs had become a part of the Party line on strategic matters by mid-1970.

These seven claims to relative invulnerability for the USSR's nuclear-powered submarines in general and for Soviet SSBNs in

particular were supplemented, as already mentioned briefly above, by six comparable claims to "combat stability" for the country's SSBNs. The first of these appeared in mid-'68 (para. 33) and became the common denominator for Navy Day-'69 descriptions. This claim appeared four times on that occasion (paras. 37, 40, 41, and 42) and once more in Naval Digest in June 1970 (para. 45).

One point is of particular note: these thirteen claims to "low vulnerability" or high "combat stability" for the USSR's SSBNs were accompanied by a counterpoint of claims that the U.S. Polaris submarine was vulnerable to destruction not only at its bases but even at sea. There were at least 16 such claims made between May 1962 and Navy Day in late July 1968 (paras. 2, 5-7, 9, 12, 14-21, 27, and 30). However, these counter-claims should not be interpreted as stemming from opposition elements to contradict, by use of foreign-navy surrogates, the claims to invulnerability for Soviet SSBNs.¹ Rather, they seem to have been made with the common aim of convincing the Defense Ministry marshals and the Party leaders that the anti-SSBN mission was not hopeless and that it would not be a waste of money to provide the Navy with more ASW submarines, surface ships, and aircraft and with sensors that actually could detect submarines in open-ocean areas.

¹Supporting evidence for such a conclusion is to be found in the fact that in several cases the identical source would both claim or imply invulnerability for Soviet nuclear-powered submarines and vulnerability for U.S. SSBNs. For examples see the 1964 and 1967 editions of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy (paras. 11 and 29) or the 1966 and 1968 editions of Vice Admiral Yakovlev's The Soviet Navy (paras. 24 and 35).

At any rate, the fact of these claims having been made in the first place does not seem to have any intrinsic significance for determining whether or not a protracted SSBN withholding strategy was in effect during the 1962-1971 time span that these thirteen claims to relative SSBN invulnerability were made. Any significance that they might have had is obscured by the existence of the deferred-strike role of Soviet SSBNs and the concomitant requirement that the SSBNs be relatively invulnerable in a conventional phase. Nevertheless the fact of their having been made will be kept in mind and taken into consideration in the final reckoning.¹

Like SSBN-invulnerability claims, ones that the Soviet Navy or SSBNs (or the SMF exclusively) were required to be "in constant readiness" suggest a potential for revealing or at least reflecting the existence of the Navy's assignment (or non-assignment) to share in the initial nuclear exchange. In view of the fact of the Navy's requirement during this period for being "ready" to perform its reserve, backup role to the SMF should the latter fail to take out all of its assigned targets in the initial nuclear exchange, this fact (as demonstrated in the first monograph in this series on Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike)² must be

¹Although not meriting individual discussion above, among the statements re SSBN invulnerability to be found in Appendix C are statements by Gorshkov and Captain First Rank V'yunenkov in 1964 and 1965 respectively to the effect that the "main part" of the Soviet SSBN force would be invulnerable to a US first strike (paras. 13 and 22). Finally of note, there were statements by Admirals Kharlamov and Sergeyev in February 1968 and April 1970, respectively, which made obvious use of U.S. surrogates to claim that Soviet SSBNs were less vulnerable than the SMF's land-based ICBMs (paras. 31 and 43).

²See footnote on page 97 for a listing of page references to this monograph which treat the evidence supporting the existence of this reserve, backup role to the SMF for the "main part" of the SSBNs not maintained on combat patrol.

taken into account when appraising statements claiming the need for readiness of the Navy in general or the SSBNs in particular. Assertions that the SMF alone or with the LRAF are the sole forces required to be in "constant" and/or "high" readiness are easier to evaluate, of course, since their exclusion of the Navy and its SSBNs are directly suggestive of SSBN withholding, although not necessarily for any longer than until after the initial exchange when they could be used for deferred strikes rather than further withheld in a real SSBN-withholding strategy to provide deterrence-in-war and perhaps in this manner rather than by sharing importantly in the "mass nuclear strikes" to influence the "course and outcome" of a war.

Having thus reduced to realistic proportion our ideas of what to expect from readiness indicators, the seventeen potentially significant statements collected in Appendix D for the period from Oct. 1961 through March 1971 will be considered. Within three months after the XXIInd Party Congress in October 1961 seemingly had terminated the policy of withholding all of the USSR's SSBNs, Gorshkov wrote in the Naval Digest that "the importance of the factor of surprise increases the significance of combat readiness; now it is a matter to be accomplished not in minutes but in seconds..." (para. 3). Since research has uncovered no prior naval statements giving such stress to the need for high combat readiness, this emphasis by the Navy CinC suggests that something had changed as far as the requirements for readiness laid on the Navy. That the change involved the Navy's SSBNs was indicated by another

article which Gorshkov published in Red Star in October of the same year (para. 6). In it he stated:

Speaking of the need for the highest combat readiness, I wish to again call attention to Marshal Malinovskiy's words in a speech of a few days ago to the All-Army Conference on Ideological Matters, especially: 'All the might of our Armed Forces must be brought into immediate action against the enemy at the first signal, against his military-strategic, economic and political centers, and also against his main concentration of forces'.

Gorshkov was talking about the need for combat readiness of the Navy in general and obviously about the need for readiness of the SSBN force in particular since they were the only one of his forces capable of carrying out strikes against "military-strategic, economic and political centers". Since his statement, and that which he quoted the Defense Minister as having recently made, reflected an unprecedented requirement for instant readiness of all of the nuclear strike-capable services of the Armed Forces (including the Navy's SSBNs), this notable October 1962 statement of Gorshkov's stands as the most specific individual indication up to the fall of 1962 that the policy of withholding all of the SSBNs at least for deferred strike indeed had been abandoned and at least some of them assigned targets in the initial period. (From the first mission monograph of this series, Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike, it appears that the mission involved was only against coastal military targets, largely those of a naval-related nature.)

In the interval between Gorshkov's two articles in January and October of 1962, the first edition of Military Strategy had been released for publication by the censors and contained a

passage that explicitly stated that the SMF still was required to have the "highest degree of combat readiness" of all of the military services and would still play the "main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" and by implication specifically that for the initial deep strike for which the SMF was said to be capable of carrying out "in the briefest period" and with the results of "annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth". This initial deep strike against the continental U.S., it was further asserted, would "cause the enemy irreparable losses and, in certain cases, even force his capitulation" (para. 5B). This indicates how relatively unimportant was the "share" in the initial nuclear exchange assigned the Navy's SSBNs but, more importantly for this analysis, also gave further evidence of the abandonment of the policy that had been in effect prior to 1962 of withholding all of the Navy's SSBNs for at least deferred strike. That nothing had changed in this regard by the end of November 1967 was indicated by the fact that the identical paragraph quoted from above was to reappear unchanged in the second and third editions of Military Strategy (paras. 8B and 15B).

At this same time (1967), Marshal Krylov in Military Thought, the restricted-distribution journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff, was even more emphatic in asserting the unique importance of the SMF's "constant readiness." Krylov touted it as a "decisive 'factor' in the course and outcome of a nuclear war" (para 14). This stress by senior military officers on the SMF's unrivaled "constant readiness" was to continue throughout the period (although only one additional example of the many that could be adduced has been given; see para. 20 by Major General Cherednichenko in June 1970).

Gorshkov had reaffirmed the need for SSBN readiness for strikes at land targets in a July 1963 article in Communist of the Armed Forces (para. 7). Although he did not personally return to the subject of readiness until the fall of 1969, the Navy Chief of Main Staff in mid-'64, Vice Admiral Sergeyev, did so in a Navy Day article which specified that the SSBNs' requirement for readiness in a strategic strike context (or at least the one he considered of such primary importance that he found it worth mentioning) was that against coastal targets. Sergeyev, asserted that the Navy was "ready for carrying out the missions of delivering nuclear strikes on the warships and coastal targets of an aggressor" (para.11).

When Gorshkov returned to the subject of readiness in September 1969 after a five-year lapse on the Navy's part¹, he brought up the subject three times in a period of eight months. In the first, he made a seeming reference to the Navy's reserve, standby role for the contingency that the SMF failed to destroy all of the targeted U.S. objectives in its initial deep strike (para. 17). In the second, in Izvestiya in February 1970, the Navy chief gave a wholly unprecedented emphasis to the importance of "all of the Navy's forces" being "in constant combat readiness" for "insuring the striking of crushing blows on the enemy in the first minutes of a war" so that the aggression would be "nipped in the bud" (para. 18). In addition to the SSBNs themselves,

¹That this lapse was no mere happenstance is suggested by the fact that the positive requirement for combat readiness of the Navy (if only against maritime targets) which was contained in the 1964 edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy (para. 9) was deleted from the 1967 edition, with the only mention of the subject being the innocuous one quoted (para. 13).

Gorshkov's use of the phrase "all of the Navy's forces" probably was meant to embrace forces for pro-SSBN, anti-SSBN, and anti-CVA, which in turn could include virtually all of the Navy's surface strike and ASW ships, missile aircraft, and SSNs. This statement, considering Gorshkov's stress on the significance for the Navy of "high combat readiness" as important "as never before", provided a reasonably good indication that the SSBN force still was as much involved in strategic strike as it ever had been.

In his third and final article mentioning readiness, made at the turn of the decade, he repeated his "as-never-before" emphasis on his forces' "constant combat readiness" from his Izvestiya article of two months earlier. Gorshkov not only repeated his Izvestiya article's stress on the alleged necessity to have "all" of his forces ready for action but advocated on this occasion that the Navy's "entire force" (i.e., of SSBNs) should be enabled (presumably by forward deployment in peacetime) to be in constant readiness to "launch against an aggressor" (para. 19)

Collected in Appendix E are all of the statements of Soviet naval and military leaders turned up (for the 1962-1971 period under consideration in this chapter) which tend to suggest opposition to SSBN-withholding. Most notable among these are a historical surrogate against SSBN-withholding in a 1964 book by Professor, Rear Admiral Belli (para. 6) and another in a 1969 issue of the closely-held General Staff journal Military Thought by Gorshkov's First Deputy CinC, Admiral Kasatonov (para. 12). Once in the fall of 1962 and twice more in the spring of 1970, Gorshkov himself restated the obverse side of the withholding coin, that "all" of the Armed Forces including the Navy which were capable of

strategic strike should be employed in the initial exchange (paras. 3, 14 and 15). The Navy chief took another but complementary track in May 1963 and July 1964 that seemed to warn against the danger of a long-term policy of SSBN withholding as likely to be vitiated by the improvements in ASW he claimed to expect (paras. 4 and 7). In March 1965 a Captain First Rank Filonov raised the specter that reserve forces might not survive the initial nuclear exchange and, even if they did, couldn't be depended on in view of the time lag that would be involved in "bringing them up from the rear" (para. 10).

Gorshkov's implicit advocacy that his entire SSBN force be forward-deployed in peacetime and assigned to share in the initial nuclear strike seemed to gain support from the military from an article in Red Star in April 1964 by Colonel Larionov (para. 5), two more in August 1964 by Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko (paras. 8 & 9), by a 4th article in November 1965 (para. 11) and a 5th in July '69 by General Zemskov in Military Thought (para. 13). It appeared that the "modernists" among the military, in effect, were affording Gorshkov support by their assertions that the initial nuclear-exchange period of a war would be decisive and so all of the USSR's strategic-range nuclear missiles should be fired off as rapidly as possible after the outbreak of war.

From all of the foregoing, it would appear that Gorshkov used Professor Belli and Admiral Kasatonov to carry the ball in direct, positive opposition to SSBN withholding by publishing carefully

elaborated theoretical arguments in historical-surrogate form while he himself (likely from appreciation of his politically more exposed position as head of the Navy) took the indirect tacks of alleging the vital importance of using all of the SSBNs for the initial nuclear exchange and of guardedly suggesting that it would be foolish to adopt (or to continue?) a protracted withholding strategy for any portion of the SSBN force since anticipated ASW improvements would be likely to make protracted withholding ineffectual (and tantamount to a death sentence for the crews of the withheld SSBNs). All of this seemed to be part of a monologue of opposition to withholding being voiced against the silent but controlling opposition of the "conservative" marshals and Party leaders who, if our working hypothesis is correct that no withholding was in effect 1961-'71, quite possibly were contemplating the eventual reintroduction of SSBN-withholding at some favorable future date (or insisting on the continuance of such a strategy?)

In the next group of possible indications of the nonexistence (or existence?) of an SSBN-withholding strategy, we come to 20 items for this period which have been assembled in Appendix F (paras. 4 through 23) concerning the non-assignment (or assignment) of SSBNs to a major share in the initial deep strike. Like the previous set of indicators analyzed earlier (those related to SSBN readiness for immediate participation in any initial nuclear exchange), the most these 20 items can add to the analysis is further negative evidence of the existence of a policy like that before 1961 of withholding all SSBNs from the initial strike. That is, they could not be expected to provide any positive evidence of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

Nevertheless, they are worth scrutinizing, although as briefly as possible, as potential confirmation for the working hypothesis that there was no return to a policy of protracted withholding of all or the major share of SSBNs during the decade from October 1961 through March 1971.

All three editions of Military Strategy were published within the first six years of the decade under review, the first edition having been released in May 1962, the 2nd in August 1963, and the 3rd in November 1967. Since the continuities and changes in the 2nd and 3rd revised editions have much to say about the respective missions of the SMF and the Navy, we will first inspect the evidence in this area from all three editions before looking at the additional evidence that accompanied them as well as the indications that followed them in the last four years of the decade.

Examining first what the three editions of the Sokolovskiy-edited work had to impart concerning the strategic strike role of the Navy, sub-paragraph A of paragraph 15 in Appendix F shows that the "navy-against-navy" mission (which was stated in the first two editions as "especially" the one that would determine the importance of "the Navy as a whole in a future war") yielded pride of place in the third edition to "navy-against-the-shore" ("destruction of objectives on land") but followed immediately by the "navy-against-navy" mission ("as at sea"). Another passage that appeared about 60 pages later in the 3rd edition (para. 15. sub-para. G) showed every sign of having been intended

to place "strikes against the shore" in unquestioned first place and the "navy-against-navy" mission in an "also-ran" second place by the statement: "At the same time, the Navy also retains such important missions as combat with the forces of the navy of an opponent at sea and at their bases". However, the key sentence had been deleted, leaving an obvious gap which Marshal Sokolovskiy, as the Editor of Military Strategy, failed to fill. It is hard to believe that such a critical and glaring error was inadvertent. It seems quite likely, considering that Gorshkov had been advocating such a change in naval mission priorities ever since his 19 May 1963 article in Izvestiya, that (when it came right down to endorsing a statement that would have effected such a revolutionary change) the marshals of the Defense Ministry and Marshal Sokolovskiy could not bring themselves to give the Navy such a clear-cut mandate, one under the highest nuclear criterion, for a major share in the initial deep strike that such an unqualified mission assignment to strategic strike logically would have constituted.

Whatever the truth of the matter, and the preparing analyst's comment above is informed speculation at best, some credence is lent to the speculation (which actually had helped prompt it) by the fact that changes were made to two other key passages in the third edition which had the effects both of lifting (if rather ambiguously) the coastal-area restriction on SSBN strikes and of adding the SSBNs after the SMF as sharing the honors with the latter (and without the LRAF) of being among "the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor". This second change is shown in sub-paragraph C of para. 15, with the

comparable sentences from the 1st and 2nd editions shown in the same lettered sub-paragraphs of paragraphs 4 and 5. It needs only be mentioned that this change apparently was not intended to admit the Navy's SSBNs to the elite "initial-retaliation club" -- that continued unchanged in the 3rd edition to be limited to the SMF and LRAF (sub-paragraphs H of paragraphs 4, 5, and 15).

However, the first of these two changes above, the seeming lifting of the coastal restriction on SSBN strike targets, is not so straightforward and requires explanation. The area restriction on SSBN strikes to coastal targets was imposed in the 1st edition and retained in the 2nd (sub-paragraphs B of paras. 4 and 5). This was accomplished by the use of a Russian adjective for "coastal" (pribrezhnaya) whose meaning unequivocally restricted the target area to installations directly on the coast or targets just offshore, especially coastal straits. In the same passage in the 3rd edition (subpara. B, para. 15), a Russian word was used (whose corresponding adjectival form is "beregovaya") which has a secondary meaning of "coastal" but a more commonly used first meaning of "on the shore" or "ashore" that does not impose any specific limitation on the depth of the coastal sector implied.¹ Military Strategy only distinguishes between targets "on the shore" (na poberezh'ye) and "in the depths" ("v glubinye"), as shown by a passage in the 3rd edition (p. 307) describing LRAF targets. Apparently, there are some limits to the "shore" zone's

¹The preparing analyst is also indebted to Dr. James F. McConnell of the Center for Naval Analysis for bringing this key analytical distinction to his attention.

depth but probably flexible ones to be determined ad hoc in each case by a number of factors not the least of which would be the SMF's jealous guarding of its prerogative to conduct the initial deep strike considered likely to determine the further course if not the outcome of a nuclear war.

Now turning to what the three editions of Military Strategy had to say about the roles and missions of the SMF as it can contribute to our understanding of the limitations still placed on the strategic strike roles of the Navy's SSBNs as enhanced by the 3rd edition of the Sokolovskiy work. It has already been noted that the SSBN force still was excluded by the 3rd edition from the most-prestigious role of sharing in the initial "retaliatory" strike (sub-paragraphs H of paragraphs 4, 5, and 15). In addition, as noted in the earlier consideration of "combat readiness" as a potential indicator re. SSBN withholding, (pp. 46-51), the 3rd edition retained the statement (sub-para. 15D) of the first two editions (sub-paras. 4D and 5D) that:

In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses, and in certain cases even to force his capitulation...to the Strategic Missile Forces belongs the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war.

From the foregoing quotation it can be seen that the SMF was asserted to be capable of delivering an "enormous" number of missiles and in such short order that there was little need for help by the LRAF or SSBNs. And although the Navy's SSBNs may

have been acknowledged to share honors with the SMF as a second of "the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes", this acknowledgement did not basically change the fact that the SMF still was accorded a status far above that of primus inter pares which seemed to constitute the minimum for which Gorshkov was campaigning.

In addition to the above quotation, the 3rd edition also retained two other reservations along the same line. One of them, although worded to make the distasteful implication as palatable as possible for the other services besides the SMF, stated that, although "missile weapons" were "the basic means of combat for each of them", the SMF (still) was "the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole" (sub-para. E). The other similar statement also found an indirect and superficially less offensive way of stressing the SMF's undiminished primacy for both the initial and mid-course periods of the war. The statement was worded cleverly to first concede modestly that the SMF could not single-handedly "carry out all of the missions of a war" but then went on to list all of the most important ones as reserved to the SMF: "to destroy the military capacity of the enemy [that is, his defense industry], his strategic means of combat and the basic groupings of his armed forces, and to destroy his command and control". To the other forces were left what were essentially little more than mopping-up operations and occupying such territory as might be necessary for securing final "victory" (sub-paragraphs F of paragraphs 4, 5, and 15).

All in all, it is apparent that the quasi-doctrinal enhancement of the Navy's role in strategic strike reflected in the 3rd edition of Military Strategy had been so carefully hedged with reservations spelling out the SMF's continued dominance in strategic strike that one is warranted to conclude that, despite the paper gains which gave the impression of the SSBNs having been accorded a major share in strategic strike analagous to that enjoyed by the Polaris-Poseidon SSBNs, the gains were more seeming than real and quite possibly were made largely to enhance Western perceptions of the deterrent credibility of the Soviet SSBN force.

Continuing now to examination of the evidence regarding the non-assignment of SSBNs to any significant share in the initial deep strike role as that evidence might refute our working hypothesis that no protracted SSBN withholding was in force (or alternatively merely to confirm the continuing existence of the SSBN force's reserve backup role to the SMF), the first piece of seemingly significant evidence is to be found in a book entitled On Soviet Military Science, which appeared in December 1963. Written by four senior Army officers (three colonels and a major-general), the book carried the following pregnant passage regarding the Navy's role in any nuclear war:

The nuclear-missile strike...is becoming the basic method for the action of the Navy's forces in a nuclear-missile war [and...] is to be conducted both independently and by joint action with the Strategic Missile Forces, but sometimes by [strikes of] operational-tactical [mission]-designation, too. (Emphasis supplied)

An important role in the combat action of the Navy is played by the offensive and defensive methods of warfare. The offensive is conducted at sea by all of the forces and means of the Navy and for decisive aims -- to annihilate the naval forces of the opponent. The defensive is taken for covering one's own targets at sea and on the shore, and also for the protection of sea communications (Emphasis supplied). (Appendix F, para. 6).

This prime example of the semantic games that Soviet military writers play gives a first impression by the lead paragraph that the Navy's SSBNs had been accorded a significant role in strategic strike beyond just against ships in port and coastal targets. It then effectively negates that impression by inserting the little word "all" in the second paragraph to imply that "all" of the Navy's forces will be engaged in carrying out the traditional naval mission against an enemy's naval forces at sea or in port and his coastal naval facilities. This initially misleading impression is heightened by using the word "basic" with regard to (just) the method used by the Navy to conduct naval warfare (which is equally applicable to "navy-against-navy" action as it is to "navy-against-the-shore" strikes and by using "important" (a word well established in Soviet terminology as being of a lesser order of significance) in the second paragraph describing the Navy's non-strategic strike roles. Very clever! -- good for deterrence propaganda but with an intended meaning that would be apparent to the "insiders" in the Soviet defense establishment for whom the message was written.

Further evidence, but of a far less convoluted nature, is

to be found in the first edition of a popular account of the development of the Soviet Navy (one which has been followed by two revised editions). Entitled Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, it appeared in January 1964, not long after the publication of the 2nd edition of Military Strategy, and contained the relevant statement of the Navy's main mission as a requirement for responding to any NATO attacks by "strikes on sea targets throughout the World Ocean" (Appendix F, para. 8).

The continued tenuousness of the Navy's strategic strike role not only was implied by this surprising omission even to mention striking enemy ships "at their bases" as well as at sea, it was further reflected in an article that was published later that year in Communist of the Armed Forces. It contained a sentence which formulated the Navy's assigned mission as one for "destruction of the submarine, surface-ship, and missile forces of the enemy navy, especially in the initial period of the war" and then credited the Navy "additionally" with just the capability for missile strikes at "the bases, ports and shipbuilding centers of an enemy navy" (para. 9).

This highly unusual mention of a role for the Navy in "the initial period" of a war seems likely to have been intended to imply that the Navy's general purpose forces would be too busy in the initial period of a war with managing what damage-limitation they could against U.S./NATO SSBNs and CVAs to be able to provide the large SSBN-protection forces that would be

required (and that likely would be unavailing, anyway) were the SSBNs largely to be predeployed into the open oceans in peacetime so as to be within missile range of the U.S. for launching their missiles at the same time that the SMF and LRAF delivered the main "retaliatory" strike. Accordingly, the above formulation suggests that, as of the fall of 1964 when the item quoted from above made its appearance, it was the Soviet strategy to withhold the plurality of the SSBNs until at least after the initial nuclear exchange, merely deploying the minimum number to lend deterrent credibility to the Soviet SSBN force (and perhaps to partially placate Gorshkov and to afford essential operational training for the SSBN crews in operating in the hostile ASW environment that might well still continue to exist even after the initial nuclear exchange).

During the 1961-1971 period under review Gorshkov made two significantly different claims 30 months apart as to just what had been the main thrust of Soviet naval development during the decade he had been Navy Commander-in-Chief. In his annual Pravda interview for Navy Day in 1965 he stated:

The Navy is called on to defend the Homeland from an aggressor's assault from the sea. All of the Navy's development for the past decade has been subordinated to this end (para.10).

Then in January 1968, in the limited-distribution General Staff journal Military Thought, he expressed what logically might perhaps be expected to be a more candid and complete opinion since the readership of that journal was restricted to senior

military officers and Party officials. In these circumstances, he revised the version of the Navy's course of development in the nuclear-missile era from what he had presented to the world at large in Pravda on Navy Day 1965. On this occasion he stated that the mid-'50s decision had been to build "an oceanic navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive nature", that is, one possessing:

warships of great range and endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, great striking power and combat stability, and /consequently/ capable of delivering strikes at an enemy at sea and in his coastal areas (para. 16).

Gorshkov continued on to remark directly: "Such a navy has been built, the first generation of multipurpose submarines rightly constituting the basic striking forces of the Navy". Most notable for the analytical purpose at hand was the fact that neither formulation included any claim to a role in strategic strike beyond that implicit in his Military Thought re-formulation of strikes against enemy ships in their own "coastal" areas, perhaps understood as including at least the enemy navy's bases and other coastal support facilities. Be that as it may, such strikes at coastal naval facilities would have been considered merely "operational" incident to theater warfare against the enemy navy and so was a far cry from any claim to a share in "strategic" strike.¹

¹It merits a footnote to mention that in between Gorshkov's 1965 and 1968 formulations, he published an analogous one in a major article published in the Naval Digest in October 1967 -- but one which does not affect the above analysis other than to suggest that coastal targets were included in the Navy's (contd)

In 1967 Marshal Krylov again took up his pen to unequivocally reassert the primacy-by-charter of his Strategic Missile Forces. Appearing in the November 1967 issue of Military Thought, the article insisted, in effect, that the SMF's dominant role in strategic strike should be considered inviolate because, he claimed, the SMF had only been formed in the first place and assigned the key role in strategic strike as the result of "a deep, scientific study". Krylov also expatiated on the dominant scope of the SMF's assigned deep-strike role in terms of the results its fulfillment was expected to achieve -- nothing less than to "predetermine the course and outcome of a war". He added that the SMF had become "the main striking force and the main service of our Armed Forces" (para. 14).¹ To what extent publication

(Contd) targets for "operational" strikes incident to combatting the enemy navy at sea and ashore: "...in the mid-'50s, the course was chosen to create in a short time a fully modern oceanic navy...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy in the oceans and on his coastal territory as well as of defending the USSR's own objectives from oceanic directions -- and such a navy is being built" (para. 13).

¹ Marshal Krylov published another article three months later in Rural Life on the occasion of Armed Forces Day on 23 February 1968. He hailed the SMF as "the embodiment of our Motherland's nuclear might" and mentioned, as he had before, that the Navy's might was based on its SSBNs. The only new note was the assertion that the Navy already had "everything necessary to carry out the missions assigned it" -- which may well have been a way of saying the Navy didn't need all the Yankee Class SSBNs then building or the Delta Class, especially if it meant a reduction in the SMF's share of the military budget (para. 17).

of Marshal Krylov's reassertion of the SMF's "rights" in the theoretical journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff signified official support is unfathomable but both the tenor of the article and the venue of its publication suggested that it was anything but a routine potboiler and probably reflected some disagreement within the General Staff as to the advisability of continuing to put all of the USSR's strategic-strike eggs in the SMF basket.

Two of the best pieces of evidence available (in the remaining four years of the decade under scrutiny subsequent to the publication of the 3rd edition of Military Strategy) that the Navy had not been assigned any major role in the initial nuclear strike, despite the textual changes in the 3rd edition of the Sokolovskiy work that gave every appearance of an enhanced SSBN role in that regard, made their appearance in two books that appeared in December 1968 and August 1969. The first, a booklet by Rear Admiral Yakovlev intended for use primarily by DOSAAF, the USSR's paramilitary youth organization, described the Navy's mission solely as navy-against-navy:

Just as the Strategic Missile Forces will destroy the most important nuclear-strike weapons of an enemy on the ground, the Navy's strike forces, especially the nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft, will destroy his nuclear-missile platforms at sea (para.13).

Although one might logically expect that the foregoing was merely an over-simplification in view of the young audience for which it was published, experience indicates that even in such publications statements of naval missions have proven to

be quite accurate. If one assumes that this statement was no exception, then the lack of any mention whatsoever of a strategic strike mission for the Navy could provide the basis for an hypothesis that all of the Navy's SSBNs were then being subjected to protracted withholding (since the deferred-withholding role logically still qualified for mention as a bonafide strategic strike role for the Navy). The second book, prepared as a textbook edited by Admiral Zakharov for higher naval educational institutions (and hence presumably free of any seriously misleading "dezinformatsiya") finally made it clear that the Navy's roles in strategic strike were all of a contingency nature (i.e., "if required", which was remarked in a war-fighting context so could not have meant only in the event of war). The textbook titled A History of Naval Art, developed this point after making it clear that the Navy's most important missions were anti-CVA and anti-SSBN:

The Navy of the Soviet Union was created based on the fact that the main threat for us at sea was constituted by the navies of the NATO countries, and basically by nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines and aircraft carrier strike forces...The Navy has been assigned to combat precisely these forces. If required, our submarine-aircraft Navy could destroy ground objectives in any territory of an enemy (para. 19).

Here again, as in the case of the DOSAAF booklet just described above, one could reasonably hypothesize, in view of the implication contained in the textbook, that the Navy's SSBNs had no assigned strategic strike role, but either were being subjected to protracted withholding in addition to deferred strike or at least to the latter. The evaluation of these

two positive indications of protracted withholding will be taken up in the concluding part of this chapter. Let us now look at the remaining evidence of relevance up to the XXIVth Party Congress in March 1971.

Within a month after the publication of A History of Naval Art, Admiral Gorshkov repeated a formulation he had used in 1960 that the Navy had a mission to be "ready.....to deliver strikes at the most important strategic targets deep within an aggressor's territory" (Appendix F, para. 20). This seems to be an unmistakable reference to the SSBNs' reserve, backup role to the SMF in the contingency that the latter failed to destroy all of its assigned targets during the initial "retaliatory" strike and required help from the Navy in the post-exchange period. Unquestionably, the mission-description of being "ready" to carry out a mission was an apt one to describe the contingency nature of the Navy's only vestige of a role in deep strike against the continental U.S. What is most significant is that Gorshkov said nothing about any other SSBN role in strategic strike that might indicate that there was even a coastal mission that would enable any significant part of the SSBN force to share in the "mass nuclear strikes" in which the 3rd edition of Military Strategy nominally had accorded the Navy a share with the SMF.

Again, in his annual Pravda interview for Navy Day 1970, the Navy chief not only avoided repeating any of his earlier claims to at least a capability for strategic strike but even

avoided mentioning his SSBNs specifically. He chose instead to describe as "the pride of the Navy" all of his "nuclear-powered submarines with missiles of various /mission/ designations" (para. 21). Although this description taken by itself would not have been at all exceptional, coming after Gorshkov's prior emphasis on SSBN capabilities it seemed to reflect the same seeming lack of any definitely assigned role for SSBNs already noted in the last several pieces of evidence.¹

The final piece of evidence for the pre-XXIVth Congress period regarding the Navy's non-assignment to a significant role in deep strike was provided by Marshal Grechko, who had succeeded Malinovskiy as Defense Minister. On the occasion of Armed Forces' Day Grechko wrote (in Pravda of 23 February 1971) the following about the Navy:

Time has fully confirmed the validity of the course chosen for the further development of our Fatherland's Navy. Nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines with missile armaments, surface missile combatants, and missile-carrying aviation today constitute the main strike potential of our Navy. Soviet naval personnel have mastered the expanses of the World Ocean and possess everything necessary for the simultaneous and protracted conduct of combat actions on the waters of the various oceans and seas (para. 23).

Among the several possible implications of this statement for our subject, the potentially most significant was the wholly

¹The same was true of an article published in Izvestiya at the same time by the Navy's top political admiral, Admiral Grishanov. He spoke only of the Navy having nuclear-powered submarines armed with "missiles" of unspecified types (para. 22).

new claim that the Navy had "everything necessary for the... protracted conduct of combat actions on the oceans". This appears at first glance to mean nothing more than a claim that the Navy had developed enough endurance and "staying" capability to fight a protracted war at sea. Particularly since Grechko was not given to wasting his breath on routine claims, it cannot be excluded that his statement was intended to be suggestive of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy, especially of the resultant capabilities of such a strategy for deterrence-in-war and, whenever found expedient, for launching SLBMs from "the waters of the various oceans and seas". Additionally, it might be noted that, like Gorshkov's recent statements, Grechko seemed to go out of his way to avoid any specific mention of SSBNs and so to deemphasize their potential for strategic strike. His totally unprecedented inclusion of a reference to diesel-powered missile submarines (whose unsuitability for deep strike against the U.S. requires no explanation) may have been a calculated device to further deemphasize the strategic strike capabilities inherent in SSBNs. The same end, whether calculated or not, was served by listing surface ships and aircraft (as well as diesel-powered submarines) along with SSBNs as all constituting "the main strike potential of our Navy".

The next of the ten possible indications of possible SSBN withholding to be checked is that regarding the role credited to the Navy, or directly to its SSBNs, in either strategic strike

and deterrence together or in deterrence alone. For the 1962-1971 period under consideration in this chapter, seventeen relevant examples have been found (Appendix G, paras. 1 through 17) and will now be considered.

As may be seen (para. 3), beginning with Marshal Malinovskiy's accountability report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress on 1 April 1966, the SSBNs began to be accorded a role with the SMF in both the deterrence of a nuclear first strike by the United States and, should deterrence fail, in defeating the U.S. in the ensuing general nuclear war. As Malinovskiy phrased it both at the XXIIIrd Congress and again in mid-January 1967:

The Strategic Missile Forces and missile-carrying nuclear-powered submarines...are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in war (paras. 3 and 6).

This was repeated on 14 more occasions, right up to the XXIVth Party Congress in March 1971, including by seven Defense Ministry and Armed Forces' General Staff sources (paras. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). The last of these to appear, however, were in February 1969 (by Marshals Grechko and Bagramyan, paras. 10 and 11). The Navy presumably considered such a role eminently desirable but appeared to doubt its assignment, likely considering it nothing but deterrence propaganda. It was not mentioned by the Navy at all for 15 months but finally was repeated by Admiral Kasatonov in Red Star in his 1968

Navy Day article (para.12). At the same time, a political admiral reiterated the statement, thereby confirming the Party's approval of the assignment, whether real or only propaganda (para. 13). Next Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo included the statement in the naval academy-level textbook, The History of Naval Art, which appeared in August 1969 (para. 15). Finally, a year later, Gorshkov himself approved or acquiesced by repeating the claim in October 1969 and February 1971 (para 16 and 17). However, he only did this in articles in the foreign and provincial press, never having endorsed the statement in his five Pravda articles from 1966-1970. This suggests, at the least, that he did not set much store by Malinovskiy's seeming concession to the Navy and the SSBNs.

The very fact that the SSBN force generally was credited between the XXIIIrd and XXIVth Party Congress with sharing with the SMF in strategic strike (although still not in the initial "retaliatory" strike with the SMF and LRAF) logically could be considered as evidence indicating the non-existence of a protracted SSBN withholding strategy from April 1966 nearly through February 1971 when Gorshkov made the last assertion prior to the XXIVth Congress. Yet, in view of the reluctance with which the Navy picked up and repeated the Malinovskiy statement, one tends to discount the public statements in this regard. However, the logical implication of this general crediting of the Navy with a role in "mass nuclear" strikes will be kept in mind to determine how it tracks with comparable evidence in the remainder of this study.

Next in order to consider as a possible indication of SSBN withholding is the emphasis placed on providing other naval forces for protecting the SSBNs. Analyzing such indications, which have been collected in Appendix H, is complicated by the fact that Gorshkov obviously felt the need for large general purpose forces just for supporting the contingency role assigned the SSBN force, or some unreported share of it, to serve as a reserve, back-up to the SMF should the latter fail to take out all of its assigned targets in the initial nuclear exchange and be so disabled as to require Navy help subsequently. And although one can't be sure from the open literature, it seems logical to assume that the Navy Commander-in-Chief also exploited the possibility that there might be a non-nuclear, conventional phase at the outset of any general war as a justification for the large general purpose forces that would be required to give choke-point "breakthrough" and open-ocean protection to the SSBNs (as well as carry out many of the other missions of a general war). Unfortunately, these requirements for SSBN protection short of those for a protracted withholding strategy greatly complicate the analytical problem of deciding just what constitutes over-emphasis on SSBN protection. The analyst is forced to take into account these pre-nuclear war requirements for SSBN-protection forces in making judgments as to what might constitute actual over-emphasis on SSBN protection. The evidence is insufficient to do this and establish reasonable grounds for concluding that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in force. With this major caveat in mind, let us now turn to the evidence on this score between the XXIInd Party Congress in October 1961 and the XXIVth in March 1971.

The Stepanov article in the December 1961 issue of Naval Digest has already been given the necessary analysis in the first chapter so it will suffice to note that the timing of its appearance (within three months after the XXIIInd Congress seemingly modified the policy of holding all of the SSBNs in reserve until at least the initial nuclear exchange was over) and its unusual length and comprehensiveness merely suggest that the problems of protecting SSBNs during their deployment had become acute with the assignment of a small part of the SSBNs to be kept out in the oceans on combat patrol in peacetime -- which entailed "running the gauntlet" of the GIUK Gap against US/NATO ASW forces that could be expected to be avid for practice against "live" targets.

Like the December 1961 Stepanov article, that by retired Captain First Rank Lan of April 1962 (also in the Naval Digest) was commented on earlier (pp. 17-18 above) in the analysis of Chapter I. Now, however, it can be concluded that his patently false claim that the U.S. Navy was according "great attention to the matter of protecting missile submarines during their sortie from base" not only constituted the implicit advocacy remarked earlier that the USSR build more general purpose naval forces for SSBN protection (and especially more SSNs for ASW),¹ but in all likelihood was an announcement, in foreign-navy surrogate form, that the Soviet Union was taking a sudden great interest in the

¹A variation on this theme of justifying Soviet construction of more SSNs for pro-SSBN ASW appeared in the Naval Digest in July 1964. Written by a Captain First Rank Pavlov, it used such a negative formulation, saying that use of SSNs for pro-SSBN was "not excluded" by the U.S., that it effectively gave the lie to Captain Lan's claim of two years earlier (para. 7).

subject due to the end of the policy of at least initially withholding all of its SSBNs in favor of a policy of deploying a few of them on peacetime combat patrols. This further analysis of the Lan article, consequently, provides additional evidence that the apparent pre-XXIInd Congress policy of withholding all SSBNs actually had been moderated and that by April 1962 when the Lan article made its appearance the emphasis was all on the small part of the SSBN force to be forward-deployed in peacetime. All three editions of Military Strategy included the same statement acknowledging that the Navy had a requirement for "a certain number of surface ships...to protect the operations of submarines and to carry out secondary missions.." (paras. 3,5 and 15). However, this formulation was so unspecific that it not only left the Navy dissatisfied, as reflected in Admiral Alafuzov's acid criticism that Military Strategy's formulation was "too vague" and so "of little use" (para. 4), but it certainly did not sound like the marked over-emphasis for which we are watching as a likely indication of protracted SSBN withholding strategy.

A 1964 Navy Day editorial in the Naval Digest reiterated the point quoted just above and made in the previously-published 1st and 2nd editions of Military Strategy that the SSBN-protection mission was considered to be the primary mission for surface ships (para. 6). However, suspecting that Gorshkov was using the nuclear criterion-qualified pro-SSBN mission to justify the large general purpose surface forces that are required by any major navy for a large variety of missions but that had been previously unsupportable

under the sea-denial strategy with (less-costly) submarine and aircraft forces, it seems advisable to stop well short of any conclusion that this professed priority of SSBN protection as primary for surface ships constitutes an example of such an over-emphasis on the pro-SSBN mission as to signify the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

In January 1966, Admiral Kharlamov contributed an article to Naval Digest which hinted at the SSBN-protection requirement by asserting that both sides would try to create conditions favorable to its own strategic strike forces against shore targets (para. 8). He clearly was referring to the SSBN-protection mission but, taken in context, his statement did not warrant concluding that it constituted an example of the marked over-emphasis on SSBN protection for which we are on the lookout.

A similarly negative conclusion obviously is in order for the two statements referring to SSBN protection in the popular account of Soviet naval history, Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, which appeared in May 1967 (para.12). Diesel-powered submarines were given a rare good word by the assertion that they could be cost-effectively employed for missions on which it was "inexpedient to use the expensive nuclear-powered submarines". Considering the time and circumstances of the appearance of this statement (when SSBN protection was a highly topical subject), it seems quite likely that the author(s) had that mission uppermost in mind -- and for coastal-area sanctuaries from where the 4,200 n.m. SLBMs of the newly-programmed Delta Class SSBN would be able to

reach the U.S. while being given protection in home waters by the Soviet Navy's extensive coastal forces and the diesel-driven torpedo attack submarines of the Foxtrot Class which the USSR was producing to the puzzlement of many Western analysts.

A month after Combat Course of the Soviet Navy was published, an article in the Naval Digest issue for June 1967 carried a noteworthy statement of the ASW threat to Soviet SSBNs by a Captain First Rank Titov. He claimed that the alleged former goal of the U.S. Navy of ambushing each and every Soviet SSBN as they were sortieing from their bases had been acknowledged to be "unrealistic". However, he continued, the U.S. Navy had not given up such a mission "completely" but rather had undertaken to "saturate with antisubmarine forces" and positional means, (i.e., ASW mines and SOSUS installations) "deeply-echeloned ASW zones" which Titov asserted were being established "off our coasts". Moreover, the U.S. was said to have begun to create "antisubmarine barriers on the probable movement routes of our submarines" (para. 13).

The obvious implication of these assertions was that the USSR required more general purpose naval forces for escorting Soviet SSBNs safely out of port and through the choke-point ASW barriers which the U.S. and other NATO naval forces were capable of establishing whenever deemed desirable, whether during a protracted war or just in periods of international crises or high tension. In this case, the Soviet requirement for ACW, AAW, and ASW forces to combat US/NATO forces conducting anti-SSBN ASW can be appreciated to exist just for SSBN sorties and deployments in periods of

crises or during an initial non-nuclear phase to a general nuclear war without positing the further requirement for deployments that might be required subsequently under a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy to give credibility to the deterrence-in-war capability of the SSBNs. Accordingly, the Titov statement does not tell us anything pro or con regarding the existence of a protracted SSBN withholding strategy as of June 1967.

In July 1967 and again in October 1969, there appeared the two editions of an Army-authored work edited by Colonel General Zheltov, V. I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, which both contained the same (and unique) dissenting view as to the need for providing protection to the USSR's SSBNs:

Submarines possess the greatest self-reliance, so additional forces do not have to be provided for their protection (paras. 14 and 18).

This statement, which contradicted the one carried in all three editions of Military Strategy that a "certain number of surface ships" would have to be provided the Navy for SSBN protection appears to reflect a difference of views that seems likely to be a reflection of an internal dispute that had started up by 1967 and continued through October 1969 about the expediency of establishing (or maintaining) a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy. If this actually were the case, it can be hypothesized that the Zheltov work spoke for the conservative-traditionalist forces of the Army which dominated the Defense Ministry and that they were flatly contradicting the assertion in all three editions of Military Strategy that a "certain number" of surface ships would

be required for that purpose. In such a situation, one could further surmise that the Navy and General Staff "modernists" like Marshal Sokolovskiy enjoyed Party support in the matter over the opposition of the Defense Ministry marshals. Whatever the truth of the matter, the mere fact that such flat opposition was asserted in mid-'67 and reasserted in October 1969, despite the common knowledge of the great superiority of the U.S. and other NATO navies in both sea-control and the derivative feasibility of conducting oceanic ASW, suggests that the denial that Soviet submarines required any protection was based on the knowledge that the plurality of SSBNs were to be kept in coastal waters rather than exposed to the hazards of detection by U.S. SOSUS and destruction by the numerous NATO ASW forces.

In July 1968, the Soviet Navy's best-known submarine admiral of the '60s, Admiral Chabanenko, added his voice to the protest of the two editions of General Zheltov's book against assigning naval forces, at least surface ships, to providing direct protection to SSBNs. He used the seemingly cogent argument that had been first raised in the Stepanov article (although not quoted previously) that the presence of escorting forces (surface ships in particular, obviously) gave away the presence of the SSBNs to enemy ASW forces.¹ The solution proposed by Stepanov to depriving the submarine of its greatest asset of stealth by the presence of escorting forces -- to have a number of similar escort forces as decoys -- was not mentioned by Chabanenko. His comments

¹Quoted in para. 12, p. 5 of The SSBN-Protection Mission, Part II of preparing analyst's monograph series on "Soviet Naval Mission Assignments".

essentially argued that Soviet submarines were able to "go-it-alone" without surface and air escorts. This had all the earmarks of dissenting from Gorshkov's seemingly staunch insistence that Soviet submarines must be escorted, at least while sortieing from base, transiting choke-points, and returning to base. Taken in toto, these statements asserting or disputing the alleged requirements for providing other naval forces to afford protection to the SSBNs failed to either support or contradict our working hypothesis that no protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect from 1961-1971. Chabanenko went on to describe how the U.S. allegedly was employing SSNs for anti-SSBN ASW and the implication of all of what he said seemed to be that nuclear-powered torpedo attack submarines equipped for ASW were the only suitable weapon system for SSBN protection. Be that as it may, Chabanenko's remarks must be considered to be ambiguous as concerns the existence or non-existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

An indication that Gorshkov still insisted on providing surface escorts for Soviet submarines despite Admiral Chabanenko's criticism of so doing was provided in the Soviet reportage of the global OKEAN naval exercises in April 1970. As reported by Izvestiya, the description of what is recognizable as a pro-SSBN exercise read as follows (Appendix H, para. 19):

Today the Navy sortied for the big OKEAN maneuvers. As always, the first to leave their homeports were the anti-submarine ships and the fleet minesweepers. They have already been several days at sea and are reliably "furrowing the waves", clearing a path for the cruisers, destroyers, missile ships, and submarines. In sailor's parlance, this operation is called a "breakthrough".

The penultimate indicator to be considered for the 1962-1971 period in this second chapter is that of the terminological distinction made by Soviet military writers between according the Navy (in the form of its SSBNs) a seemingly higher role as a direct instrument of state policy in "the defense of the country" or, alternatively, as merely another one of the military services in the "system of the Armed Forces" (or as just "an important means" of the "Supreme High Command" that is available for war fighting and hence attrition). It will be recalled from the consideration given in the first chapter to the "defense" versus "Armed Forces" indicators between February 1956 and January 1962, that from July 1957 through July 1960 the Navy had been credited with the "defense" role. This was taken as a possible indicator of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy. It will be further recalled that the appearance in Red Star on 13 January 1962 of Rear Admiral Prokof'yev's article was seen as marking the reversion of the Navy to its February 1956 status of playing only a role within the "system of the Armed Forces". This latter status, it was remarked, was consistent with the apparent Soviet abandonment at the XXIIInd Party Congress in October 1961 of the policy of withholding all of the SSBNs until at least after the initial nuclear exchange.

Including the just-mentioned Prokof'yev article in Red Star of 13 January 1962, a total of 33 uses of the "defense" versus "Armed Forces" indicators for the 1962-1971 period have been compiled (Appendix I). In addition the "Supreme Command" variation on the "Armed-Forces" indicator first appeared in February 1967 and was repeated 11 times before the XXIVth Party Congress in March 1971.

Even while the "Armed-Forces" and "Supreme-Command" indicators were appearing in the literature for a total of twenty-eight times during the 1962-1971 period, the "defense" indicator continued to appear with high frequency (17 times). From this fact of the simultaneous appearance of both of these sets of indicators throughout the decade under study it is clear that we are not dealing with sets of indicators that are mutually exclusive. This raises the logical probability (which we shall adopt as a working hypothesis to check against the comparable data in the final chapter) that the "defense-of-the-country" indicator refers to SSBN withholding while the "Armed-Forces"/"Supreme-High-Command" indicator pair refers to the SSBNs' single assigned mission for war-fighting, namely its "operational-strike" mission against naval bases, ports, shipyards and other naval-related targets in re. its anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions.

A review of the context in which each of the 17 "defense-of-the-country" indicators appeared makes it seem as though it was the Navy's anti-SSBN mission against our Polaris submarines rather than withholding of Soviet SSBNs to which the "defense" indicator was being applied. Specifically, while ten of the 17 "defense" indicators were so vague as to be meaningless¹ and while only one of them was suggestive of any role for Soviet SSBNs², six of the statements indentified the anti-SSBN mission

¹The ten meaninglessly vague indicators were those given in Appendix I in paras. 5 and 33 (the Navy's "growing role"), 6, 28 and 32 (Navy's role in strengthening the USSR's defense capabilities) and 9, 22, 34 and 35 (just the Navy's "important" role).

²Para. 20, by Admiral Kasatonov in Red Star of 30 July 1967, mentioned the Navy's alleged capability for "strategic missions of an offensive nature" in the same sentence with the statement that the Navys "place in the defense of the country" had been defined by the Party. However, he joined the two statements with an "and" leaving its meaning ambiguous.

as the raison d'etre for the "defense" indicator.¹ We will postpone further consideration of this indicator and of its opposite "Armed-Forces" and "Supreme-Command" indicators² for the 1962-1971 period until the evidence on this score is in for the 1971-1979 period to aid in a definitive evaluation.

The last potential indicator of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy required to be investigated in this second chapter concerning the 1962-1971 decade is that of the importance accorded to the Soviet Navy for exerting an influence on the "course and outcome" of a general nuclear war or for the achievement of the "general" or "political" aims of a nuclear war. As noted in the first chapter, Gorshkov had claimed in July 1960 that the Navy, by carrying out general nuclear-war missions for combatting an enemy's naval forces, for interdicting his merchant shipping, and for striking coastal targets could exert a "substantial" influence on the "achievement of the gen-

¹ Paras. 8, 10, 15, 18, 19 and 32 all used one of three phrases commonly associated with the anti-SSBN mission -- para 10 (protection against "attack from the sea"), paras. 15 and 21A (the Navy's role in "defense of the Homeland"), paras. 8 and 18 (the Navy's role in defense of the USSR's "borders" or "maritime boundaries", and para. 22 (the Navy's role in "rebuffing" or "repelling" aggression).

² A comparable review of the 17 statements containing "system-of-the-Armed-Forces" indicators showed that, aside from eight that were so vague as to be analytically meaningless (paras. 12, 16, 23, 24, 26, 30, 37 and 45), it was the Navy's various war-fighting capabilities that made it a valued member of the Soviet Armed Forces: para. 4 (due to Navy's possession of SSBNs), paras. 7 and 11 (due to Navy's possession of "nuclear missiles", para. 30 (due to the Navy's possession of aircraft-launched as well as submarine missiles), and paras. 35 and 37 (the "qualitative change" or "revolution in military affairs" -- which was important mainly for giving the Navy nuclear power/missiles). Similarly, the eleven "Supreme-Command" indicators found in paras. 19, 20, 21B, 25, 28, 29, 33, 36, 38B, 39, and 40 are all negative indicators of SSBN withholding since, by definition, they connote SSBN forces "placed at the disposal of the "Supreme High Command" for war-fighting purposes rather than retained in the "State Reserves" under protracted withholding strategy to influence the "course and outcome of a war."

eral aims of an armed struggle". This claim was evaluated as reasonably accurate in terms of the Navy's objective capabilities but not as indicative of actual mission assignments. It was also commented that this claim subsequently was to be expanded by Gorshkov to less modest pretensions with the growth of Soviet naval capabilities.

For the 1962-1971 period being covered in this chapter, 39 examples of the "course-and-outcome" or "political-aims" types were found and have been collated in Appendix J. Of these, 27 are from naval sources and the remaining 12 are from military sources. Soviet naval usage of the expressions will first be examined and then that of the military.¹

Of the 27 naval statements, 18 claim only that the Navy could influence events in the "theaters of military action" (TVDs). Since the U.S. apparently is not included in the Soviet definition of TVD,² and since it would be the U.S. that the USSR might hope to hold hostage to a force of SSBNs subjected to withholding during the "course" of a nuclear war and until an "outcome" favorable to the Soviet Union had been reached, these 18 statements specifying TVDs as the limit of naval action may be excluded from further consideration.³ The remaining nine naval statements require closer scrutiny.

¹As stated in the first chapter, the identical comment that appeared in all three editions of Military Strategy in 1962, '63 and '68 (paras. 5, 7 and 25) that naval theater warfare "would hardly have a decisive influence on the outcome of a war" will not be considered further here since it was determined that this statement referred only to theater warfare and avoided any pronouncement on the Navy's influence on the "course and outcome" of a war -- which is the indicator with which the subsequent analysis is concerned.

²Military Strategy, 3rd edition, 1968, p. 340.

³The 18 statements from naval sources that claim only that the Navy could influence events in the TVDs are to be found in Appendix J, paras 15, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

Five additional statements can be eliminated on one grounds or another.¹ Of the other four statements, the first (by Captain First Rank Nikolayev in February 1965, para. 13) claimed that missile submarines could "exert a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war". The second statement (by Captains First Rank Kozlov and Schlomin, para. 19) claimed that the Navy could "greatly influence the course and outcome of a war". Were it not for the remaining two statements, the above two claims might at least lead one to conclude that either the authors had withheld SSBNs in mind or were thinking of ones to be employed with the Strategic Missile Forces in the initial exchange of nuclear strikes which by themselves could "predetermine the course and outcome of the war". Although the last two statements were by the same author (Vice Admiral Yakovlev) and appeared unchanged in a revised 1968 edition (para. 32) from a 1966 1st edition

¹The statement by Vice Admiral Sychev in February 1964 (para. 11) only claimed that the advent of missiles in the Navy would enable it to have a decisive influence on the "character" of a war at sea, not on its course and outcome. The statement in the 1964 book Aircraft Carriers (para. 12) lumped ICBMs in with SLBMs without clarifying the influence of the latter by itself. Gorshkov in May 1965 (para. 14) only claimed that each service had exerted a "certain" or "definite" effect on the course and outcome of World War II. While this likely was an historical surrogate use of "the Great Patriotic War" to assert that the Navy could exert such an influence in a war at present employing nuclear weapons, the degree of influence claimed was too small and too vague to lend itself to analysis. Admiral Kasatonov (in February 1968, para. 27) claimed only that the Navy could exert a decisive influence on the "course" of an armed struggle and only "over vast distances". This formulation left the statement analytically defective on two counts: in not including the "outcome" of a war along with its "course" (which withheld SSBNs logically would be expected to influence) and by use of "over vast distances" (which likely was a euphemism for TVDs as he had specified a month earlier, para. 26). Finally, Rear Admiral Rodionov, in his 1970 booklet, The Striking Force of the Navy (para. 37) only claimed a "substantial" influence on just the "course" of a war and made no claim at all to any influence on a war's "outcome".

(para. 17), his reiterated statement was of such a nature as to vitiate the two earlier statements just described above. Yakovlev made it clear that the Navy's "direct influence on the course and outcome of a war" not only was due to missile aircraft and nuclear submarines but he specified that this influence was derived from the Navy's capability to "cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions" by destroying "his nuclear-missile weapons platforms at sea". This statement, seemingly eliminates the possibility that the Navy's alleged capability for being able to "decisively influence the course and outcome of a war" was due to SSBN withholding. Moreover, the fact that Vice Admiral Yakovlev could repeat the same statement in an otherwise revised edition of The Soviet Navy nearly three years after the first would seem on the face of it to exclude the chance that the first statement was a maverick one that had slipped by the censors.

Since it has been shown above that the "course-and-outcome" indicator usually did not refer to SSBN-withholding but rather to the defense of the Homeland from seaborne nuclear strikes, the 12 military statements found for the 1962-1971 period¹ might be expected to require only a perfunctory inspection to ensure that they are not inconsistent with this finding. However, this expectation is not fulfilled by even a cursory reading. Most significantly, and

¹The 12 military statements involved are to be found in Appendix J, para. 6, 8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 23, 24, 33, 44, 45 and 46.

in contradiction to the evidence above from naval sources, two of the military statements specifically included the Navy's nuclear-powered submarines along with the SMF and LRAF as playing a role in determining the course and outcome of a war. In addition, three other military statements employed the "mass-nuclear-strike" formula in a way that implicitly included the SSBNs as contributing to either "decisively influencing the course and outcome of a war" or for achieving the "political aims" of a war. Let us examine the five relevant quotations in detail.

Major-General Kozlov, writing in the restricted-distribution monthly journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff, Military Thought, asserted in the February 1964 issue that "the strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces supplemented by strikes of Long-range Aviation and the Navy's missile-submarine forces...will be basic to the course and outcome of a nuclear-missile war....the war will most likely be of short duration..." (para. 10). A closely comparable statement was made in a book by Doctor of Historical Science, Colonel Azovtsev, in his 1971 book V.I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science: "The main missions of a war under modern conditions must be carried out by the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-range Aviation and nuclear-powered submarines....The delivery of mass nuclear strikes with the aid of strategic means permits the achievement of the political aims /of a war/ in short periods" (para. 46). (Emphasis supplied for reasons to be discussed shortly.)

The three statements which involve the "mass-nuclear-strike" formula and thus implicitly involve the Navy's SSBNs (since Military Strategy, as was noted earlier,¹ at least nominally attributed a role in such mass strikes to the Navy) are from the 1966 (1st) and 1969 (2nd) editions of Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice (Major-General Sushko and Colonel Kondratkov, editors) and the 1967 book 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, a commemorative work by a "collective" of authors under an editorial commission headed by Marshal Zakharov, the long-term chief of the Armed Forces' General Staff. Both the 1966 and the 1969 editions of Methodological Problems stressed the primacy of the SMF as assigned by Soviet military doctrine to "deliver nuclear strikes on the most important objectives of the enemy in his territory" and thereby play "the decisive role" in any nuclear war. However, the door was left open a crack to admit the LRAF and SSBNs by continuing directly to add: "Massive nuclear strikes can, to a significant extent, predetermine the entire course and outcome of a war" (paras. 16 and 33). Similarly, in 50 Years, which was released for publication in November 1967, we find a reasonably comparable formula: after the Strategic Missile Forces had been credited with the capability for "destroying practically any region on earth", the text added without pause: "In this connection, the main and decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war will be played by the mass employment of nuclear weapons" (para. 24). This vague "mass-strikes" formula might have been chosen so as not to specifically exclude the LRAF and SSBNs.

¹See Appendix F, subparagraph 4A.

In essence these five military passages strike the preparing analyst of this study as an effort on the part of some of the revisionist "modernists" among the top military officers and theoreticians to win official approval for a change in military doctrine that would require employment of the maximum feasible number of strategic nuclear strikes by the USSR's strategic triad at the very outset of a nuclear war (which they held in all probability would begin and end with the initial nuclear exchange).

Surely it is safe to assume that, if these five statements reflected the prevailing strategic doctrine (rather than advocacy of its revision), the Navy statements already reviewed above would have enthusiastically proclaimed its admission to the "retaliatory-strike club" along with the SMF and LRAF by asserting at every opportunity that the Navy through its SSBNs would share in "decisively influencing the course and outcome of a nuclear war". That this has been noted not to have been the case would seem to constitute reliable evidence that the five military statements considered above indeed were revisionist attempts. It need only be added that in the case of Colonel Azovtsev's book his choice of the word "must" ("dolzhen" in Russian) rather than "will be" ("budet") bears the clear stamp of advocacy rather than of any announcement of official policy and can be interpreted as saying "Look gentlemen, this is the way we should do it rather than counting on the war lasting long enough for deferred strikes by reserve or withheld forces". Since Doctor Azovtsev's work was released for publication just three weeks before the XXIVth Party Congress was to convene at the end of March 1971, his advocacy of putting

all of the USSR's nuclear eggs in one basket for immediate delivery quite likely was intended to influence a debate and imminent ratification at the Party Congress of a decision with regard to strategic reserves that would be significant for the employment of the Navy's SSBNs--perhaps whether their share in the initial strategic strike phase of the war should be increased to a more meaningful level in consonance with the rapidly growing force of Yankee Class SSBNs or whether an SSBN-withholding strategy should be adopted (or continued?) for the major share of the SSBN force.

Let us turn now to a summary analysis of the foregoing SSBN-withholding indicators from each of the relevant appendices covering the decade from the XXIInd Congress in October 1961 to the XXIVth Congress in March-April 1971:

A. SSBN Assignment to the "Reserves of the State" Vice to Those of the "Armed Forces" -- None of the data of Appendix A were relevant to the intermediate period under study in this chapter.

B. The Quasi-positive Indications -- There were only two possibly positive indications that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy might be in effect. The first, by Marshal Krylov in 1968, implied that the other Armed Services would play no significant roles until the latter stages of a war after the SMF had done everything but occupy the radioactive wastelands remaining after the SMF had done its work. This suggests the possible assignment to the SSBNs of a protracted-withholding role rather than supporting our working hypothesis that the Navy was not assigned such a role from 1962 to 1971.

The second potentially positive indication was that by Professor Stalbo in December 1969. It's rather unusual emphasis on the requirement for the USSR's new oceanic Navy to continue to "conduct operations in coastal waters too" was remarked as conceivably indicative of a requirement recently laid on the Navy to protect the new Delta-Class SSBN in the USSR's "coastal waters" from whence its missiles had sufficiently long range to strike the continental U.S. However, the related data that might make possible a convincing analysis of this statement is lacking. As previously remarked, the analytically unfortunate fact is that even a requirement for SSBN-protection in coastal waters is not necessarily a valid indicator of a protracted SSBN-protection strategy per se since special attention to protecting Soviet SSBNs against U.S. SSNs attempting to trail them out of port during period of high international tension would be required even in coastal waters.

C. Claims to SSBN "Invulnerability" or "Combat Stability" -- On balance the weight of evidence in Appendix C lends itself far more to the conclusion that the many statements noted resulted primarily from Gorshkov's insistent campaign to win a major share for the SSBNs in the initial deep strike against the continental U.S. Evidence to this effect may be found in the 13 specific claims to "low vulnerability" and high "combat stability" (as well as the implicit claims to the same effect contained in the footnoted ten references to the "stealth" of Soviet submarines) but also in the facts (also footnoted) that two of Gorshkov's staff admirals claimed

that SLBMs were less vulnerable than ICBMs. There were four cases in which the same sources claimed or implied both the invulnerability of Soviet submarines and the vulnerability of Polaris submarines.¹ These could reasonably be interpreted to mean that this claim was based on the fact that Soviet SSBNs were being retained in coastal waters where they could be better protected than Polaris on patrol in the open oceans. It appears equally likely that these quasi-contradictory claims are to be accounted for by the fact of the USSR's consistently exhibited penchant for publicly minimizing the vulnerabilities of their own SSBNs and exaggerating those allegedly characteristic of U.S., British, and French SSBNs, presumably for purposes of morale-building and strategic deterrence-enhancement as well as for persuading the marshals in control of defense matters that money spent for general-purpose naval forces capable of anti-SSBN ASW would not be wasted.

D. The "Combat Readiness" Required of the Navy as Compared to the SMF -- As already noted in the preceding treatment of the 17 items on the "combat readiness" of the Navy and the SMF that Appendix D contains for the decade between the XXIInd and XXIVth Party Congresses, the SMF continued to be credited with a higher degree of "combat readiness" than was the Navy. And although Gorshkov personally mentioned the subject a few times between 1962 and 1964, seemingly as a spinoff of the 1961 assignment of a small share of the SSBN force to a share in the "mass nuclear strikes" of the immediate post nuclear-exchange period, he then remained mute on the subject for five years (until the fall of 1969). This long

¹Appendix C, paras. 11, 24, 29 and 35.

silence taken in isolation from the other evidence lends itself better to the evaluation of the existence of a protracted SSBN withholding strategy than it does to supporting our working hypothesis that no such strategy was in effect during the 1962-1971 period with which we are presently concerned. When Gorshkov broached the subject a few times in 1969 and 1970, it was only to speak of the need for overall naval readiness. Whether his two public references in 1970 to a need for naval readiness "as never before" was indicative of some increase in the mission requirements laid on the Navy or was merely a rhetorical flourish (which is possible but seems less likely), the readiness indicators give no support to the existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy during the decade under study. Accordingly, it can be appreciated that analysis of the requirements from 1962 to 1971 for combat readiness of the naval forces in comparison with the readiness requirements for the SMF tells us only that the latter continued to maintain the highest readiness (i.e., "combat alert") but reveals nothing definitive as concerns the non-existence (or existence) of an officially-approved protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

E. Evidence of Opposition to Any SSBN-Withholding Strategy --

The 1962-1971 decade yielded 13 statements which appear to reflect opposition in one way or another to the strategy of withholding any SSBNs. Eight of these stemmed from naval sources

and, rather surprisingly at first thought, the remaining five were from military sources. This fact prompted the preparing analyst to speculate that these five Army comments had originated with the "modernists" who opposed the "traditionalists" who dominated the Defense Ministry (and hence military policymaking) and who favored an SSBN-withholding strategy for one or more reasons. Among the grounds of the "traditionalists" for preferring such a strategy were that it preserved the SMF's chartered monopoly of deep (especially countervalue) strikes and it obviated the necessity of building up the Navy's general purpose forces to the point that they would be of such great size as to enable the Navy to provide protection to its SSBNs in the open oceans as well as when leaving and returning to base and transitting choke points. At the theoretical level at which such military policy issues customarily are debated in the Soviet Union, the "modernists" held that a general nuclear war would be brief and that, consequently, any strategic forces not employed in the initial exchange of nuclear strikes would be wasted, perhaps with the consequence of losing the war. Experience suggests, however, that these policy positions are more often than not taken for more practical reasons -- such as, in this case, the bureaucratic struggle to preserve the SMF's monopoly of deep strike or to avoid having to give the Navy more of the military budget.

Gorshkov led a carefully orchestrated performance in his opposition to SSBN-withholding, aided by his First Deputy, Fleet Admiral Kasatonov and the Navy's leading theoretician, Rear Admiral

Belli. While the latter two published esoteric historical objections to withholding as "decreasing the influence of naval warfare" (Kasatonov) or as having "pernicious effects" by "the attempt to protect forces for the future while renouncing their correct employment in the present" (Belli), the Navy CinC took the parallel track that "all" of the strategic strike forces should be employed in the initial nuclear exchange, particularly since improvements in ASW would make withheld SSBNs increasingly vulnerable.

The five military statements afforded major support to the Navy's arguments. In the restricted-distribution journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff, General Zemskov argued that the USSR would be "compelled" by the decisiveness of the initial exchange to "expend" its strategic missiles "in full", including those of the SSBNs. Colonel Larionov asserted it was "especially critical" to use "the maximum power of the state at the very beginning". Marshal Sokolovskiy and General Cherednichenko added that "in our view a war cannot be protracted".

F. Navy's SSBNs Not Assigned a Major Strike Role vs. U.S. -- It was noted in the foregoing analysis on the 20 items for the 1962-1971 period collated in Appendix F that the 3rd edition of Military Strategy that had been released for publication in November 1967

seemed to accord the Navy a share with the SMF and LRAF in delivering the "mass nuclear strikes" that would characterize the early days of a nuclear war. At the same time the Navy was excluded from sharing in the delivery of the initial "retaliatory" strike which was specifically reserved to the SMF and LRAF. This appeared to amount to just an esoteric way of acknowledging that the Navy's roles in strategic strike in the initial phase of a nuclear war had been limited to two secondary ones:

- 1) As a reserve, backup to the SMF should the latter be unable to destroy all of its assigned targets; and
- 2) As part of carrying out its "operational" mission in the "sea and ocean theaters of military action" to destroy any major naval combatants (especially SSBNs or CVAs) that might be caught by surprise in port.

Whatever the exact details might be, it seems clear that the Navy had been assigned some small piece of the action in the opening phase of a general nuclear war. This only confirms all the other evidence that the pre-1961 practice of withholding all of the SSBNs had been discontinued about the time of the XXIIInd Party Congress in October 1961 and replaced by a strategy that would maintain at least a small part of the SSBN force on combat patrol in readiness to play the Navy's modest roles in the early period of a nuclear war. As noted at the outset of the analysis of the data in Appendix F, this was the most that could be expected from this particular data set. Left unanswered was the question as to whether

the larger part of the SSBN force was only being kept in reserve until after the initial nuclear exchange had degraded NATO ASW capabilities with the expectation of then using them all rather quickly for deferred strikes or whether the overall strategy actually involved protracted withholding of a significant part of the SSBNs to exert a favorable influence on the course and outcome of the war.

G. Whether the Navy Credited with Roles in Both Strategic Strike and Deterrence or in Deterrence Alone -- Despite Military Strategy having publicly accorded the Navy a share with the SMF in the "mass nuclear strikes" expected to characterize the opening days of a nuclear war, the evidence adduced in Appendix G suggested that this was largely a paper assignment made to enhance strategic deterrence. It was pointed out in the conclusion of the analysis of the nine statements from naval sources and the eight from military sources that they had added nothing of use to our evaluation of the 1962-1971 period.

H. Apparent Over-Emphasis on SSBN-Protection Beyond That Appropriate for the Deferred-Strike Role -- As noted in the earlier analysis of the indicators in Appendix H showing a Navy requirement for affording the protection of other naval forces to their SSBNs, the analysis was greatly complicated by the analytical difficulty of deciding how much emphasis on SSBN protection would be too much to be accounted for merely by that required for their reserve, backup role to the SMF for deferred strike and therefore would be indicative of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

For any reader inclined to doubt the existence of the reserve, backup contingency role of the SSBNs, the substantial evidence set out on this score in Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike should be consulted.¹ If the SSBNs' reserve, backup role is ignored, the data provided in Appendix H might be considered to implicitly support the case for the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy between the XXIInd and XXIVth Party Congresses.

I. Whether the Navy Credited as an Instrument for the Direct "Defense of the Country" or Just as an "Important Means of the Supreme High Command"-- While the "defense-of-the-country" indicator bid fair to provide further useful confirmation that no protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect from 1962 to 1971, the early promise shown by this indicator in the 1956-1962 period proved illusory. This was due to the fact that the context of only one of the seven meaningful statements compiled in Appendix I was even suggestive of any role for SSBNs while six of them seemingly pointed to the anti-SSBN mission as the one of the Navy's missions considered of such strategic importance as to transcend the overall missions of the "system of the Armed Forces" or those charged to the "Supreme High Command" so as to be one of state significance for "defense of the country". However, since the evidence was not definitive in this regard, the question of the relevance and significance of these apposite indicators was left open for further consideration in the light of the additional data on these indicators to be adduced in the next chapter for the 1971-1979 period.

¹See especially the following pages of Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike: 8-9, 14, 16, 27-28, 34, 36-38, 41, 50, 62, 67, 72, 74, 81, 85, 101-102, 103, 105, 107, 126-127, 129, 141-142, 151, 185-186, 198, and 200.

J. The Navy's Influence on the "Course and Outcome" of a War or on Achieving its Aims -- Of the 27 naval-sourced statements among the 39 in Appendix J, inspection showed only four of them to be of analytical value. Of these only one came close to making the flat assertion that Soviet SSBNs could "decisively" influence the "course and outcome" of a war. Such a statement might possibly have been interpreted as indicative of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy. However, the statement under discussion (that of Captain First Rank Nikolayev in February 1965, para. 13) only made the more general statement that "missile submarines" could exert "a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war". This formulation not only embraced U.S., British and French SSBNs, as well as those of the USSR but, by not specifying "ballistic" missile submarines, also admitted Soviet SSGNs.

The second potentially meaningful statement (that by Captains First Rank Kozlov and Schlomin, para. 19) claimed that "the Navy" could "greatly influence the course and outcome of a war." While "the Navy" could have been intended to be synonymous with "SSBNs", as it often but not invariably is used, there was no adequate contextual support for such an assumption. Moreover, the claim to (just) "greatly" influencing the course and outcome of the war does not seem to be more than could be claimed reasonably on the basis of successful fulfillment of the Navy's other mission assignments.

Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out on the basis of the foregoing evidence that use of "outcome" in connection with the influence

claimed for the Soviet Navy in any general nuclear war still might constitute an esoteric indicator to refer to a protracted withholding strategy for the SSBNs. This possibility will be continued as an assumption for further testing in the next chapter.

The other two statements were by Admiral Yakovlev in the 1966 first edition of his The Soviet Navy (para. 17) and in his revised (1968) 2nd edition (para. 32) that the Navy's "direct influence on the course and outcome of a war" not only was due in part to the Navy's missile aircraft but was based on the Navy's capability to "cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions" by destroying "his nuclear missile weapons platforms at sea". Here the discussion clearly was not about the Navy's deep strike capabilities with its SSBNs but concerned the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions in "joint use" of the Navy's "nuclear-powered missile submarines" (e.g. SSGNs largely) and "missile aircraft". However, this statement does provide us with reliable evidence that published Soviet writings include discussion of two separate and distinct sets of capabilities of the Soviet Navy that are claimed to influence the "outcome" of a war as well as its "course": 1) the capabilities of the SSBNs for strikes against shore targets; and 2) the capabilities of the general-purpose forces against seaborne nuclear strikes by U.S./NATO SSBNs and CVAs. As will be seen, this evidence will prove of considerable analytical importance, in the next chapter for interpreting the "course and outcome" indicators for the post-XXIVth Party Congress period since April 1971.

Having completed our summary of the evidence compiled in the ten appendices, it is appropriate to test this evidence against our working hypothesis for this 1962-1971 period that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was not in effect during this decade. Reviewing the summaries of the evidence presented in each appendix in turn, leads to the conclusion that, contrary to our working hypothesis, a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect from 1962 to 1971.

A - SSBN Assignment to the "Reserves of the State" Vice to Those of the "Armed Forces" - No data for 1962-1971.

B - The Quasi-positive Indications - the one of the two statements which proved susceptible to any analysis not only failed to support our working hypothesis but seemed to contradict it.

C - Claims to SSBN "Invulnerability" or "Combat Stability" -- During the decade there were no less than 23 statements stating or implying that the Soviet SSBNs were invulnerable (including four that maintained simultaneously that the U.S. Polaris SSBN was vulnerable). It was noted that the four attempts to have it both ways could have been simply deterrence propaganda or might have been based on the fact that Soviet SSBNs of the (newest) Delta Class were being kept in coastal waters where they could best be protected. At any rate, it was concluded that these numerous claims to "invulnerability", "combat stability" or "stealth" for Soviet SSBNs were best accounted for as part of Gorshkov's persistent campaign to wrest a major share in deep strike from the SMF. As such, they must be considered to be more suggestive of the existence of a protracted-withholding strategy than of the non-existence of such a strategy during the decade under review in this chapter.

D - The "Combat Readiness" Required of the Navy as Compared to the SMF -- It was seen from the 17 statements on the "combat readiness" of the Navy and the SMF that the latter continued to be credited with maintaining the highest degree of readiness while the statements from Gorshkov and other naval sources only referred in general terms to the need for readiness -- as could be expected from accounts of any navy in the nuclear-missile era. Accordingly, it may be seen that the "readiness" indicators are not supportive of our working hypothesis and, if anything, are consistent with the opposite hypothesis that an SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect during the period between the XXIInd and XXIVth Party Congresses.

E - Evidence of Opposition to Any SSBN-Withholding Strategy -- The 13 pieces of evidence indicated a concerted effort by the Navy supported for their own reasons by five military sources to discredit SSBN withholding as a strategy for the USSR. While it would be possible to fit this corpus of evidence into the procrustean bed by arguing that this was all accounted for by merely the threatened adoption of an SSBN-withholding strategy, a much more rational explanation would seem to be that the Navy and the military "modernists" who held that a war would end with the initial exchange were opposing a policy then in force which required the protracted withholding of some significant share of the SSBNs. The highly esoteric manner in which were expressed the two examples of direct opposition to withholding of a navy's main forces supports such a conclusion.

F - Navy's SSBNs Not Assigned a Major Strike Role vs. U.S. -- The 20 pieces of data considered appeared to indicate that the Navy had been given a modest share in the initial "mass nuclear strikes" but only against major naval combatants that might be surprised in port. In addition, the SSBN force were to serve as a reserve, backup to the SMF for deferred-strikes if the latter required help. The very fact of the SSBN force not having been given a major share in the deep strike indicated, at least, that any SSBNs not used for deferred strikes would remain in a protracted-withholding mode.

G - Navy Credited with Roles in Both Strategic Strike and Deterrence or in Deterrence Alone -- Although the Navy was credited 15 times from 1966 to 1971 with sharing in both strategic strike and deterrence, the knowledge of the very limited share in the former garnered from Appendix F affords ample reason not to interpret these indicators as implying the non-existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy.

H - Apparent Over-emphasis on SSBN Protection Beyond that Appropriate for the Deferred-strike Role -- The substantial requirements for SSBN protection by other naval forces stated in the evidence on this point and even the flat contradiction by the Army "traditionalists" was analyzed as tending to support the view contrary to our working hypothesis but rendered meaningless for this period by the existence of the SSBNs' deferred-strike role which, alone, could account for the evidence.

I - Whether Navy Credited as an Instrument for the Direct "Defense of the Country" or Just as an "Important Means of the Supreme High Command" -- Since six of the eight potentially meaningful statements indicated the anti-SSBN mission vice SSBN strikes or withholding as the one of importance for "defense of the country", this indicator proved to be irrelevant for 1962-1971.

J - The Navy's Influence on the "Course and Outcome" of a War or on Achieving its Aims -- Here too the indicator involved was found to refer not to SSBN strike or withholding but to the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions. Five of the statements from military sources were interpreted as more lobbying by the Army "modernists" to employ all of the USSR's strategic strike forces in the initial period of any war.

III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE XXIVTH PARTY CONGRESS IN MARCH 1971

In this third chapter the same methodology will be employed as in the preceding one of systematically reviewing in turn the materials collated in the ten appendices but of lightening the burden on the reader by only commenting on those items that merit individual analysis. Accordingly, Appendix A's contents will be examined first.

Only two statements were to be found on the indicator involved, "SSBN Assignment to the 'Reserves of the State' vice to those of the 'Armed Forces'." Both of them are worthy of comment. The first, that by Captain First Rank Aleshkin in the January 1972 issue of Naval Digest (para. 4), states that "In the event of a non-nuclear start to a war...the strategic forces of navies...will always be found in the reserve". This unsurprising statement takes on significance in light of Khrushchev's statement of January 1960 (see page 3 above) that, in the event of a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR, the Supreme High Command would "always" find it "possible to bring reserve means into operation and strike targets from reserve positions". Aleshkin's 1972 statement indicates that "the reserve" was still an operative concept in Soviet doctrine and that the SSBNs, in the event that a general war should begin with a conventional phase, would either then be assigned to "the reserve" or be retained in what would have been their normal status of being assigned to "the reserve". It may be that by making such an assignment to "the reserve" the error of the Second World War of permitting the reserve to be "dissipated" that was mentioned in Military Strategy (p. 10 above) would be avoided. Since Aleshkin

did not specify whether the SSBNs would be found in the "State Reserves" or the "Strategic Reserve" available to the Supreme High Command for war-fighting, it is not possible to conclude from Aleshkin's statement alone whether he was referring, respectively, to a reserve for protracted SSBN withholding or to the "Strategic Reserve" of the Supreme High Command. However, it seems likely that Aleshkin had the latter in mind; at least by November 1973 an article in Naval Digest stated that navies had become a "strategic means of the Supreme High Command" (Appendix J, para. 60). If one accepts that Aleshkin most likely was referring to SSBNs available to the Supreme High Command for war-fighting, then we most probably are dealing with SSBNs being kept in reserve merely for deferred strike (if required after the initial strategic strikes by the SMF) rather than with a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The second and last of the statements from Appendix A to be considered is one from the July 1974 issue of Naval Digest (para. 5) which spoke of a nuclear-war task of delivering strikes on "targets which have not been destroyed by other strategic forces". Although the author was referring to U.S. CVAs, he could well have been using them as a surrogate for Soviet SSBNs that were assigned to the deferred-strike role. While this statement in itself does not tell us anything definitive, it does suggest the likelihood that at least the SSBNs' deferred-strike role as a reserve backup to the SMF continued to exist and that, consequently, this vastly complicating factor in our analysis still continues to pose the problems noted in the preceding chapter.

Thus, the available data on "reserves" for the post-XXIVth Congress, referring as they seemingly do only to the "Strategic Reserve" of the Supreme High Command, do not bring up the subject of "State Reserves" or give any other hint that such a strategy as protracted SSBN-withholding might even exist.

Next to be considered are the pieces of evidence selected for Appendix B because they appeared on first inspection to constitute possible evidence of an SSBN-withholding strategy. Eight statements are involved and require individual consideration. The first, by a naval engineering officer in January 1972 (para. 6) almost surely had in mind the Delta-Class SSBN (then beginning construction) with its SLBM of trans-oceanic range when he wrote of submarines with such long-range missiles that it was possible to launch them "close to one's own shores" including "when leaving their own bases". The pro-SSBN requirement was also mentioned by describing the SSBNs as being "reliably screened by surface ships and aviation". However, as with so much of the evidence from the earlier period of the '60s, the existence of a deferred-strike role for the SSBNs as a reserve, backup to the SMF prevents concluding that this article was referring to a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The second of the eight items was a brief statement by Admiral Gorshkov in February 1973 that said, in effect, that Soviet SSBNs served as a backup to the SMF "to insure a capability" for destroying the targets deep in enemy territory (para. 7). This is about as clear a reference to the SSBNs' reserve, backup role as one might

expect to find. Again, however, it tells us nothing explicit about a protracted SSBN-withholding role even though "insuring a capability" for deep strike theoretically could be applied to such a role too.

The third of the eight statements was one which appeared in International Affairs in April 1973 that seemed to be making obvious use of a foreign-navy surrogate to describe either an actual or advocated Soviet practice of retaining the Delta-Class SSBNs in home waters where they could best be protected and even used as a "first-strike" weapon (para. 8). Yet again, however, both the references to SSBN protection and to their use as a "first-strike" weapon could merely have been voiced having in mind just the deferred-strike requirement laid on some share of the Soviet SSBN force for the reserve, backup role to the SMF.

The fourth item was one that could at least be applied equally well to a protracted withholding role as to one intended for deferred strikes beginning very shortly after the initial nuclear exchange. The statement, by the political officer of the Black Sea Fleet at the time, indicated that only "in the event of necessity" would SSBNs "cover a great distance and take up an advantageous position for inflicting a strike on an aggressor (para. 9). Since the SSBNs' reserve, backup role to the SMF was contingent on the SMF's failing to destroy all of its assigned targets in the initial nuclear exchange and being unable to do so soon enough subsequently as to make it expedient to wait until SSBNs could "cover a great distance" to reach launch positions, it seems clear that the "in-event-of-necessity" phrase would apply to the SSBNs' protracted-withholding role equally well as to one for deferred strike.

The 5th and 7th items (para. 10 & 12) are in the two editions of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State in which he described the advantages of a "fleet-in-being" strategy (although he did not use the term) for influencing "the outcome of an armed struggle in ground theaters" by a navy's "presence alone or even by its mere existence". Since the essence of a "fleet-in-being" strategy was the withholding of the highest-value type of ships and since the highest-value ship-type in the Soviet Navy unquestionably is considered by Soviet naval and military writers to be the SSBN, it is eminently reasonable to assume that Gorshkov was implicitly referring to SSBNs. If this is granted, then the reference to a protracted-withholding role for them is unmistakable: the "very substantial" influence on the outcome of a war which Gorshkov said sometimes accrued to a navy by being present (on the strategic scene) or merely by the fact of its existence (somewhere in the world within strategic-transfer range) was implied to not necessarily require their actual employment in combat but only that they be "perceived in the capacity of a potential threat of further prolonging the war or of changing its character in favor of the state possessing the stronger navy". Since Soviet military and naval leaders and "specialists" almost invariably express their strategic views in esoteric language, this seems to be as specific a description of protracted SSBN-withholding as one reasonably could hope to find.

The residual analytical question, however, is to determine whether Gorshkov was describing (and perhaps announcing for the first time) an official Soviet strategy of protracted SSBN-withholding of at least a significant share of the SSBN force or whether he might have been advocating the adoption of such a strategy. Since Gorshkov's institutional interests lay in justifying the maximum

share of the military budget for naval construction and since the way to do that rather obviously was to qualify under the nuclear criterion by having the maximum part of the SSBNs assigned to participate in the initial "mass nuclear strikes", it seems well warranted to conclude that Gorshkov was describing existing policy rather than advocating that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy be adopted.

The last of the eight post-XXIVth Congress indicators that seemed on their face to provide possible evidence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was found in the 1977 book Scientific and Technological Progress and the Navy by a Naval War College professor (para. 11). Quite obviously using a foreign-navy surrogate to express Gorshkov's views, he claimed with apparent falsity that "American specialists" considered the oceans the best medium for nuclear-weapons to be withheld for "employment after the exchange of first strikes". One cannot tell from the Russian wording or from the context whether the passage was intended to limit the SSBN strikes to a relatively brief period immediately after the initial exchange or whether an indefinite period was in the author's mind. Whether this vagueness was inadvertent or intentional, it had the analytical result of reducing the potential value of this statement to a category of being merely a possible indicator of SSBN withholding since the description applied equally or better to the SSBNs deferred-strike role.

So, all in all, the eight outwardly promising items in Appendix B are reduced by the foregoing analysis to considering two pieces

of fairly convincing evidence -- that by Gorshkov in the two editions of Seapower of the State (paras. 10 and 12). However, these two pieces of evidence are of seeming importance and will be considered in the final conclusions of this chapter in connection with a summary evaluation of the other equally credible statements that tend to support or refute the existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy in the period since October 1971.

Turning now to the claims to SSBN "invulnerability" or "combat stability" collected in Appendix C, it is found that there are 30 pieces of evidence as a data base of which seven claimed or implied clearly that the nuclear-powered submarine is invulnerable¹ while seven more attributed high "combat stability" or "great survivability" to nuclear-powered submarines.² Six statements attributed the combat characteristic of "stealth" or covertness to submarines³ and three others noted they were able to use the water medium in which they operate for concealment.⁴ Two entries merely noted that submarines were less vulnerable than other types of ships (i.e. surface ships).⁵ Three other items implied that the state-of-the-art of submarine warfare was well ahead of that of antisubmarine defense.⁶ Another three statements stressed the cost-ineffectiveness

¹Appendix C, paras. 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 68 and 71.

²Paras. 46, 53, 56, 58, 60, 66 (sub-paras. B and E), and 70.

³Paras. 50, 59A, 62, 66D, 67 and 68.

⁴Paras. 50, 58, and 66E.

⁵Paras. 69 and 72.

⁶Paras. 54, 57, and 73.

of antisubmarine warfare relative to submarine warfare.¹ Finally, six statements included the assertion or obvious implication that submarines and/or their SLBMs were less vulnerable than the other strategic forces.²

Only four of the entries stated or implied that enemy submarines were vulnerable to Soviet ASW.³ This reflected a marked change from the decade of the '60s when such claims outnumbered those to "low vulnerability" or "high combat stability"⁴.

The seemingly contradictory claim that Soviet SSBNs were largely invulnerable while Soviet ASW forces could successfully locate and destroy Polaris-type SSBNs (which had appeared in the two editions of Admiral Yakovlev's DOSAAF booklet The Soviet Navy in 1966 and 1968 and the first two editions of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy in 1964 and 1967)⁵ reappeared in the post-XXIVth Congress period in 1974 in the 3rd edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy⁶. As commented earlier in the summary conclusions

¹Paras. 52, 63, and 66A.

²Paras. 47, 56, 58, 65, 66E, and 74.

³Paras. 59 (subparas. B and C) and 64 indicated that enemy submarines could be detected and destroyed while one statement by an Army general (para. 75) may have been implying that Soviet SSBNs are vulnerable to NATO ASW by asserting that the Strategic Missile Forces are the (only) "practicable means for the deterrence of an aggressor" (Emphasis supplied).

⁴See page 45 above.

⁵See page 91 above.

⁶Appendix C, para. 59.

to Chapter 2,¹ such claims can be accounted for as other than pure propaganda by the fact that the plurality of Soviet SSBNs are being held in reserve in home waters (or in "maneuvering bases") until after the initial nuclear exchange has degraded NATO ASW forces and SOSUS systems. However, as so often noted in the analysis of earlier and otherwise valid indicators of protracted SSBN withholding, the mere existence of the SSBNs' reserve, backup role to the SMF (as a deferred-strike force to be put to use if, but only if, the latter is unable to destroy all of its assigned targets for the initial strike) vitiates this and virtually all other claims to SSBN invulnerability or "combat stability" (or "survivability").

With this inconvenient fact uppermost in mind, the context of the 30 statements collected in Appendix C for the post-XXIVth Party Congress period may next be examined for anything warranting more helpful analytical conclusions -- whether in support or refutation of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy at any time during the period. Examining each statement in turn with a view to commenting on only those which have something apparently valid to contribute toward proving or disproving the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy, we find only four items of interest.

In General Lomov's 1973 book (para. 57) he states inter alia that submarines currently enjoy "superiority" over ASW in "the constant rivalry between the means of attack and the means of defense". Although he avoids the description of "invulnerability" or any of the equivalents we have noted in listing the "inherent qualities" to the possession of which he credits nuclear

¹See page 91 above.

submarines' "superiority" over ASW at the present juncture of history, he goes on to recommend an "acceleration of scientific progress" to help solve the ASW problem created by submarine "superiority", which he describes as one of "strategic" importance. Contained in this seemingly unequivocal assertion that all nuclear-powered submarines (i.e., whether those of the USSR or of NATO) are largely invulnerable due to the technological lag in ASW lies the implicit idea that US/NATO SSNs hunting Soviet SSBNs even in their home waters would be sufficiently invulnerable to the USSR's coastal ASW forces to accept the undoubted risks involved.

Although this stretches acceptable analysis procedures at least to their rational limits, Lomov's statement could be viewed as implying opposition to any SSBN-withholding strategy. And if one assumes for discussion purposes that this, in fact, was his intention, it still remains to be determined whether he was opposing an existing SSBN-withholding strategy or just one that had been proposed. The fact that Lomov employed such "deep cover" as that of the highly esoteric formula to which he resorted might be speculated to indicate that he was opposing existing policy. However, this is scarcely more than a straw-in-the-wind as a positive indicator that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect around the time his study appeared in the spring of 1973.

Another statement which appears of potential value is that in the third edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, which appeared in 1974 (para. 59). Specifically of seeming promise

is the downgrading from the 2nd (1967) edition of the "high stealth" attributed to nuclear-powered submarines to just "stealth". However, comparison of the entire text of the 3rd edition with the 2nd reveals that it had been edited specifically to remove non-essential adjectives and adverbs, in all probability the "high" among them.¹

A third statement, one which appears on the face of it to hold great promise of revealing something of significance for the analysis at hand, is that by Gorshkov in which he asks in 1975 and again in 1979: "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of antisubmarine defense means, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea?" (subparas. 66C and 76C). The Navy Commander-in-Chief's answer, it is noted for ease of reference, ran as follows:

A great deal of research has affirmed the high combat effectiveness of submarines when properly employed and provided with combat support.

In this sentence Gorshkov has specified two particular conditions that must be met in order for a submarine to "achieve strategic aims at sea" (which, by Soviet usage of "strategic" in regard to the various possible missions his forces could be

¹ Among the several dozen instances noted throughout the text of the book of this deletion of superfluous adjectives and adverbs, two additional examples are to be found in subparagraph 59A alone: the deletion of "highly mobile" as used in the 2nd edition to characterize "formations of surface warships" (e.g., primarily CVA task forces or groups) and "completely" as applied to the claimed capability to "destroy" the aforementioned "formations of surface warships".

assigned, applies not only to strategic strike, but to pro-SSBN ASW, anti-SSBN ASW, anti-CVA, and anti-SLOC). These two prerequisites for effective use of submarines were formulated by the Navy chief as necessitating that they be: 1) "properly employed" and 2) "provided with combat support". As to the first, Gorshkov might well be referring only to their proper tactical employment in combat. However, since he is primarily concerned with strategy, it seems far more likely that he had in mind some "strategic" factor. The most probable candidate for such a "strategic" factor that suggests itself is that of retaining the maximum number of Soviet SSBNs in coastal waters or "maneuvering bases" throughout the entire course of a war. Of course, since neither he nor any other Soviet source has been obliging enough to provide us with a definition or credible description of what is considered to constitute the proper employment of either Soviet SSBNs for strategic strike or of Soviet SSNs for pro-SSBN, anti-SSBN or other lower-priority ASW missions, it is conceivable that "proper employment" in Gorshkov's thinking referred only to retaining the SSBNs under the optimum available protection of Soviet naval forces in coastal waters just long enough to preserve them to perform their deferred-strike role as a contingency-backup reserve for the SMF. This possibility again deprives this analysis of an otherwise usable positive indicator of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

Gorshkov's second prerequisite for successful operation of submarines, that they be "provided with combat support", affords confirmation that, as of March 1979 when the 2nd edition of Seapower of the State appeared, he still holds that Soviet submarines operating alone would be unacceptably vulnerable to detection and destruction in the event of war. In view of the vastly greater NATO ASW capabilities, such a position was not illogical. However, since in peacetime practice at least, the combat support afforded Soviet SSBNs in normal operations and particularly in naval exercises has been limited largely to escorting them in and out of ports and in transit through choke points such as the GIUK Gap, it appears that Gorshkov has accepted as valid the argument voiced publicly by Admiral Chabanenko in 1968 that, "in the course of combat training", the operation of missile submarines "out of contact with /surface/ antisubmarine ships which reveal their /the missile submarines/ presence" requires "very serious consideration" (Appendix H, para. 16). Whatever the case, there seems to be no SSBN-withholding ramifications.

The fourth and final statement to be considered is one by the general in command of the Ground Forces' Missile and Artillery Forces (para. 75) which asserts that the SMF is "the real and the practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor". The implication seems intended that the USSR's other strategic forces (i.e., the LRAF's strategic bombers and the Navy's SSBNs) are both ineffective and impractical as strategic deterrents. While rational grounds may exist for so viewing piloted aircraft

from largely unprotected and easily targeted airfields, no such prima facie case can be made against SLBM-firing submarines concealed in the vastness of the "World Ocean".

What most logically could have served as a basis for casting such aspersions on the SSBNs would seem most likely to have been the known superiority of the NATO navies, not only in ASW but in exercising sea control over the open oceans and the resultant unique ability for the open-ocean surveillance and submarine detection (especially by means of the extensive SOSUS systems so often described in great detail in the Soviet naval literature) that holds the key to successful ASW -- a key denied to the USSR by unfavorable geography in general and in particular by the lack of waterfront real estate on the Atlantic seaboard of Europe and on the Pacific side of the Japanese home islands on which to install and operate a Soviet version of SOSUS. Whatever the general's rationale, however, his argument seemed only to assert the superiority of the SMF and have no meaningful implication for SSBN withholding.

The foregoing concludes our initial consideration of the data on Soviet statements on the invulnerability of nuclear-powered submarines in general and SSBNs in particular. The significance of this data in the context of the other evidence re. SSBN-withholding for the 1971-79 period will be considered in the summary conclusions to this third chapter. Now let us turn our attention to the data on the "combat readiness" required of the Navy as compared to the SMF to see what if any light they can throw on the murky subject under investigation.

For the period of eight years since the XXIVth Party Congress ended in early April 1971, a total of 18 "combat readiness" indicators have been found in Soviet military and naval writings and reproduced in paras. 21 through 38 of Appendix D. Six of the 18 were by naval sources, while five were from the statements of Army marshals and generals, and the remaining seven were from the "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day" that have appeared annually in an October issue of Communist of the Armed Forces (except for a one year interruption in 1973).

Of the six statements from naval sources, four were made by Gorshkov himself (in 1971, '73, '74, and '76) while the other two were found in the 3rd edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy ('74) and in a July 1979 article in the Military-Historical Journal by Gorshkov's First Deputy, Fleet Admiral Smirnov. A number of relevant points about these six "combat-readiness" indicators merit noting:

- 1) Not one of them listed the SSBNs' strategic-strike role specifically as the reason for the requirement for "high" readiness stated by all but one of the naval sources (and that was the one by Fleet Admiral Smirnov, which is discussed separately in subpara. 3 below).
- 2) Five of the six statements indicated that the "high readiness" requirement applied to all of the Navy's forces (paras. 21, 24, 27, 28, and 33) and four of them gave as the mission for which the "high readiness" requirement existed some version of defense of the Homeland from seaborne attack. The more interesting of the two exceptions was Gorshkov's 1976 article which seemed to have in mind the deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation by SSBNs when he stated that the "high combat readiness" of the Navy was "our answer to those militaristic circles of imperialism which continue to oppose a reduction of tension in the world" (para. 33).

The other exception was contained in the 3rd edition of Combat Course of the Soviet Navy (1974) in a passage which said "a strong oceanic Navy" was required with "constantly high combat readiness to promptly deliver destructive strikes on an aggressor" (para. 28). While for deterrence-enhancement the phraseology may have the ring of deep strategic strike at the continental U.S., Soviet naval usage suggests that SSBNs and CVAs at sea and in port and ASW forces in position to attack Soviet SSBNs were more likely the targets for the Navy's "prompt" strikes.

- 3) The sixth and last article, that by Fleet Admiral Smirnov in July 1979 (para. 37), was unique among the 18 "readiness" statements in that it resorted to an historical surrogate (World War II) to opaquely screen his references to the Navy's current situation in re. "readiness" for instant combat. Smirnov names five of the Navy's roles and missions of which the last four were coastal defense, Army-flank support, pro-SLOC, and anti-SLOC. Listed in first place was the role of "readiness for active, offensive operations in the open sea, in the air, and off the coast and bases of an enemy". This role is similar to a number of historical-surrogate formulas for strategic strike by other naval writers, including Gorshkov. They frequently revise the list of missions (esp. those of the Navy in World War II) to be more like those of a modern Navy.

Smirnov's use of "offensive-operations-at-sea-and-off-the-enemy's-coasts" is of a piece with a number of earlier such attempts and like them seems intended to infer strategic strike without actually coming right out and saying so. If the foregoing analogy with the earlier historical-surrogate use of World War II to imply strategic strike is valid, it would seem well warranted to conclude that Smirnov was (merely) advocating that all of the SSBNs, or at least a much larger share of them, be assigned to participate in the "mass nuclear strikes" of the initial period of a war. If this analysis subsequently shows that a protracted SSBN withholding strategy is in effect at present, then Smirnov's surrogate statement might reasonably be interpreted as esoteric opposition to that strategy.

- 4) Turning our attention now to the five statements by Army field-grade officers included in Appendix D, their most notable feature was that they all stressed directly or by clear implication the SMF's requirement for constant readiness (paras. 23, 25, 26, 29 and 31) while failing to credit the Navy or its SSBNs with any requirement at all for readiness. General of the Army Kulikov, Chief of the Armed Forces' General Staff, stated in a 1972 article that the USSR's missile submarines were merely "the basis of the striking power of the Navy" (para. 23); Professor Lomov, a colonel-general, stated in a 1973 book only that "nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft are the main strike forces of the Navy", adding that "these means, and above all the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, can strike important enemy objectives located deep in his territory as well as groupings of enemy forces" (para. 25); General Grigoryev, in a Radio Moscow broadcast, failed to even mention the Navy (para. 26); and finally Marshal Grechko, then Defense Minister, stated in both editions of The Armed Forces of the Soviet State in 1974 and 1975 that "nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy" and added: "They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (paras. 29 and 31). As can be seen from the foregoing, both Lomov in 1973 and Grechko in 1974 and again in 1975 explicitly stated a Navy role in strategic strike but without indicating any requirement at all for high combat readiness. However, while this fact provided more evidence for the continued existence of a deferred-strike role for the plurality of the SSBNs, it carried no discernible implications for the concurrent assignments of some portion of the SSBN force to a protracted withholding role.
- 5) Finally, as concerns the "readiness" indicators, the seven entries from the annual SMF Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions" remain to be considered (paras. 22, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36 and 38). All seven of them expressly stated that the Strategic Missile Forces were maintained in "constant combat readiness" and in an "uninterrupted combat alert" status. The "other services" were mentioned as either required for "final victory" or merely as possessing nuclear-missile weapons too -- but no mention was made of any "constant combat readiness" requirement

let alone one for being held in "combat alert" status. Although the requirement for the existence of the other services besides the SMF to achieve final victory might superficially be suggestive of a protracted SSBN-withholding role for SSBNs to favorably influence the final outcome of a war, there is no indication that anything like this was in mind. To the contrary, it was made clear that the other services would only be required to sweep up the ashes after the SMF had done the heavy work. From the foregoing, it can only be concluded that at least there is nothing in the consistent attributing to the SMF of the requirement for a much higher degree of readiness than the SSBN force and even the long-range Air Forces strategic bombers that would go against a working hypothesis that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy continued in effect after the end of the XXIVth Party Congress in early April 1971.

Next in line to be considered are the statements since the XXIVth Party Congress which were selected for inclusion in Appendix E because they appeared to be in opposition to any SSBN withholding. Five such statements (including that in July 1979 by Fleet Admiral Smirnov just discussed above) have been turned up by the literature search of the past eight years. Each of these four items requires separate consideration.

The first statement, by Professor (and Rear Admiral) Stalbo, seemed to be taking issue with either an existing or anticipated strategy of protracted SSBN withholding that envisioned the possibility of retaining the SSBN force intact to favorably influence negotiations to end any general nuclear war. As Stalbo put it: "Now after the creation of strategic weapons, it is impossible to imagine that the delivery of powerful nuclear strikes by the naval forces could be avoided in such a war" (para. 16). This view appeared in Military Thought in March 1971 on the very eve of the XXIVth Party Congress, so

strict adherence to chronological order would have called for its consideration in the preceding chapter. However, it was (mistakenly) reserved for consideration in this third chapter in case it might prove to be a last-ditch Navy protest against the pending adoption of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy and, as such, primarily important as a prologue to the post-XXIVth Congress period.

Two pieces of evidence in seeming opposition to any protracted SSBN-withholding strategy are found in the two editions of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State (paras. 17 and 18). The first was a passage already considered as part of the analysis of the data on SSBN invulnerability in Appendix C (pp. 111-112). Both editions had an assertion by Gorshkov that submarines could achieve "strategic aims in a war at sea, despite the constant modernization of ASW", provided only that they were "correctly employed and given the proper combat support". In considering this statement during the analysis of the data on the present period in Appendix C, (pp. 112-113) the possibility was canvassed of the "correct employment" held in view by Gorshkov being the protracted withholding of SSBNs in coastal waters or "maneuvering bases" throughout the entire course of a war (to limit their exposure to NATO ASW to manageable proportions). Now, however, an alternative possibility must be considered -- that the Navy chief more likely was continuing his campaign of the previous 15 years to gain for the SSBN force a major share with the SMF and LRAF in the initial deep strikes against the continental U.S. by arguing that only such employment

of the SSBNs could insure that they would be put to good use. This alternative seems even more credible due to the fact that Gorshkov mentioned in the same sentence the requirement for appropriate combat support for nuclear-powered submarines. While the requirement for SSBN-protection exists whether the submarines are in or out of coastal waters, had Gorshkov been thinking only of protracted SSBN withholding in coastal waters, where the large forces of small ships for their protection already exist, it seems much less likely that he would have given "combat support" equal billing with "correct employment" than if he were talking about the requirement for much larger general-purpose forces of all kinds to support Soviet SSBNs in the "breakout" of the choke points against NATO ASW forces aided by SOSUS and U.S. CVAs as covering forces. If the foregoing considerations could be shown to reflect Gorshkov's perceptions of the situation, it then could be concluded that Gorshkov was, in fact, voicing esoteric opposition to any protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The second piece of seeming opposition to any protracted SSBN withholding that was contained only in the first edition of Seapower of the State (para. 17B) was considerably less esoteric and would seem to indicate Gorshkov's opposition to such a strategy as late as the end of 1975 (when the book was passed by the censors):

The influence of combat at sea on the course of a war as a whole manifests itself above all to the extent that a navy's capability is realized for destroying ground objectives and for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea.

This passage was notable, it should be mentioned in passing, for making clear that in the Soviet strategic lexicon SSBN strikes are included under the rubric of "combat at sea" -- a term that logically might seem to exclude "navy-against-the-shore" actions. More immediately relevant is the Navy chief's listing of the SSBNs' capability for strategic strikes ("for destroying ground objectives") ahead of his service's capabilities for the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions ("for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea") in enumerating the combat capabilities which determine the extent of a navy's influence on "the course of a war". Gorshkov appeared to be protesting to his readers among the top Party and military leadership against continuing to employ the Navy primarily for the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions while neglecting to exploit the even more important capabilities of the Navy for strategic strike that already existed and resided in the SSBNs.

This passage was conspicuously absent from the 2nd edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State when that otherwise only slightly revised work appeared in the spring of 1979 (para. 18B). Gorshkov mentions in the Preface to the 2nd edition that his book had been revised in the light of the many comments that he had received on the 1st edition. The preparing analyst would hazard the guess that the main reason for the omission of the above passage from the revised edition was that some of his senior military readers in the Defense Ministry (and in the SMF) had found the Navy chief's not-too-esoteric advocacy too transparently obvious and had demanded its omission from the revised edition of his book.

The third and final evidence of possible opposition to such a strategy is to be found in a statement in 1979 by Fleet Admiral Yegorov, in an article in the May issue of the Military-Historical Journal (para. 19). Resorting to an obvious historical surrogate, the Navy's Chief of Main Staff implicitly criticized the Armed Forces' General Staff for failing to provide the Navy with "clear and specific" mission assignments, for its inability to anticipate and designate the "main axes" for carrying out those missions, and for neglecting to make adequate plans for insuring the "timely" deployment of Soviet naval forces. Since SSBNs are still frequently acknowledged in Soviet military and naval writings to be the basic strike force of the Navy, it seems reasonable to proceed analytically on the assumption that Yegorov had the SSBN force primarily in mind. At any rate, the clincher that Yegorov was esoterically opposing the concept of protracted SSBN-withholding came when he expressed the view that the Soviet high command is "obligated to concentrate the strength of all cooperating forces for the fastest possible accomplishment of the assigned missions". Taken in the context of Soviet naval writings over the past quarter century, Yegorov's injunctions evoke a scenario in which the SSBNs are sortied en masse with maximum "combat support" by other naval forces. The mention of "timely deployment" suggests that the SSBNs would be on launch station prior to any initial nuclear exchange.¹ In view of this statement by Yegorov, it seems well warranted to conclude that he left no leeway for holding back any significant share of the SSBN force, whether just briefly for deferred

¹In addition, the SSNs and SSGNs plus any surface missile forces designated for the anti-CVA mission would be stationed at or near the perimeter determined by the maximum nuclear-strike range of CVA aircraft while whatever naval forces had been earmarked for anti-SSBN use would be out searching the least unlikely areas of the World Ocean for their quarry.

strikes or indefinitely to favorably influence the outcome of a war.

The next set of indicators to be considered are those containing evidence as to whether or not the SSBN force has been assigned a major share with the SMF in the deep-strike role against the U.S. That it had not been as late as the spring of 1979 was the major conclusion of the first of these Soviet Navy mission monographs, Soviet SSBN Roles in Strategic Strike 1955-1979. To make this present study complete in itself so as to obviate any need to refer extensively to the first mission monograph and also to update it, the most relevant data from that study has been compiled in Appendix F. These total 59 entries from para. 24 (June 1971) through para. 81 (October 1979) which, while a relatively large data base in comparison with most of the other appendices, are almost evenly divided into 29 statements from military sources and 30 from naval sources.

Considering the military statements first, a plurality of them ascribed a predominant role to the SMF in strategic strike.¹ Four of these even made it clear that all of the key targets for deep strategic strike had been reserved to the SMF (paras. 24, 30, 71C and 79).

¹Out of the total of 29 military statements, 22 stated that the SMF comprised "the basis of the combat might of the Armed Forces" or accorded the SMF a comparably elevated status (Appendix F, paras. 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 50, 52, 58, 60, 61, 71C, 74 and 79).

One military statement (by Marshal Grechko in Dec. '72) even went so far as to credit the SMF not only with constituting "the basis of the Armed Forces' combat might" and having the wartime "aim" of conducting the deep strikes against the enemy's rear, transportation and "organs of state and military control" but also strikes against "the enemy's means of nuclear attack" and even against "troop and naval groupings in theaters of military action on land and at sea" (para. 30).¹

Although the data suggests that the SMF's influence had been reduced, there was no concomitant evidence that this had redounded to the benefit of the SSBN force. While the SMF was still being accorded the accolade of "basis of the combat might" of the Armed Forces as recently as 1977 and 1978 (paras. 71B and 74), in those same years it was verbally cut down to life-size or less by the normally over-adulatory annual SMF Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions" in Communist of the Armed Forces by being described merely as an "important, integral part of the Armed Forces" (paras. 68 and 78). In October 1979 it was reduced to merely "a branch of the Armed Forces" (para. 82). This seemed a very far cry indeed from the start of the period. For example,

¹This claim by no less a personage than the Defense Minister himself that the SMF was charged with conducting strikes against "...naval groupings...at sea" has never been repeated in public print, leaving one to speculate on whether it was an error or possibly a security breach revealing that the Soviets were planning to use the SMFs ICBMs against aircraft carrier task forces/groups whenever their location was reported.

in the October 1971 SMF Day "Materiels", the SMF was hailed as "the main striking force of our Army [i.e., the Armed Forces], the basic combat power of the USSR, and the reliable means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for his defeat in the event of war" (para. 26).

Despite this seeming reduction in the SMF's former prestige as the leading military service, there was no discernible upgrading of the strategic strike roles of the LRAAF or the Navy in either military or even naval statements. For example, the Navy's "main mission" for a general nuclear war has continued up to the present to be indicated in one formulation or another as defending the USSR against seaborne nuclear strike, ie., primarily the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions (paras. 29, 31D, 43, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 63 and 73).

Moreover, the strategic strike capabilities of the Navy's SSBNs has been greatly minimized or ignored altogether by the Army marshals, general, and colonels who have spoken publicly or published articles on Soviet military affairs. They have rarely referred directly to SSBNs (i.e., "ballistic" missile submarines)¹ and never once in terms of an actual mission assignment. Rather

¹One military source mentioned "ballistic missile submarines" but as just the "main strike force of the Navy" (para. 40). Another actually credited the Navy with at least the capability for strategic strike (para. 46) but the only statement to mention the Navy's main mission assignment stated it to be for defending the USSR against seaborne attack (para. 71D).

they have found various formulations for derogating the Navy's strategic strike capabilities. For example, the Coastal Missile Forces were mentioned in the same breath with the SSBNs as together constituting the Navy's "missile-delivery systems" that allegedly constituted the basis of the Navy's might (50). Similarly, two other military sources effectively eliminated any possibility that their formulations might be interpreted to imply any strategic strike role for the Navy's SSBNs by lumping "nuclear-powered submarines" together with "missile aviation" as the Navy's "main strike force" (paras. 34 and 71D). Another military source threw in surface ships for good measure and credited all three naval forces with merely the capability for "a wide range of missions" (para. 33). The most frequent formula used by the military sources that avoided any direct reference to SSBNs or any role for them in strategic strike was that of "nuclear-powered submarines of various designations" or "with missiles and torpedoes" (paras. 24, 28, 30, 41 and 52).

Finally on this score, the annual SMF Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions" and the SMF Day speeches of SMF leaders reflected the adamant opposition of that leadership to any diminution of its originally chartered monopoly of deep strategic strike. They habitually credited to the SMF all the major roles in strategic strike and reduced all the other services (the Navy's SSBNs not excepted) to the "also ran" role of consolidating the gains of the

SMF's strikes to achieve the final victory (paras. 26, 44, 50, 68, 78 and 81).¹

The 30 naval statements claim nothing substantial to alter the impression that the Navy still has not been assigned any major role in deep strike.² To the contrary, it contained four statements that seem to constitute esoteric implications that the main roles for the USSR's SSBNs involve their non-use so as to continue to be available for "insuring" that the USSR would retain a capability for strategic strike (paras. 31A, 51, 57 and 81).

¹Insult was added to injury in these SMF Day "Materials" and speeches by first extolling the SMF's strategic strike capabilities and then passing off the (admittedly limited) strategic strike roles of the LRAF and the Navy's SSBNs by frequently referring only to the other services as an entity whose capabilities were stated vaguely to have increased "immeasurably" (paras. 26, 27, 36, 58 and 82).

²Had the Navy been assigned a major deep-strike mission, it certainly would have been accorded top-priority status as the Navy's main mission. However, 10 of the 29 naval statements made it clear that defense against seaborne attack was still considered to be the Navy's main mission (paras. 29, 31D, 43, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 63 and 73). There were naval statements claiming (quite credibly) that the Navy (together with the SMF and LRAF) had become part of "the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Country" (para. 71A and B) or, more simply, of "the Strategic Forces" (para. 76) but this claim does not necessarily imply anything more than the Navy's anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions. Similarly, Marshal of Naval Aviation Borzov claimed a deep-strike capability for the Navy in 1973 (para. 35) and Gorshkov in 1974 a capability for strikes "at ground targets" (para. 65A) but no naval source as much as hinted at a mission assignment for deep strike. In fact, the Navy sources were almost as chary as the military ones in eschewing any specific mention of SSBNs. In seven cases in which earlier years saw uninhibited reference to "ballistic missile submarines", the post-XXIVth Party Congress period heard only references to "nuclear-submarines" or to such naval combatants with "missiles of various designations" and, sometimes, to nuclear submarines with torpedo armament (paras. 53, 54, 64, 66, 67, 75 and 80).

Additionally, in February 1973, Admiral Gorshkov used the unprecedented phraseology that the Navy was "objectively" capable of deep strike (sharing in the destruction of an enemy's economy), thereby seeming to imply that it was being "subjectively" barred from being assigned a significant role in any deep strike (para. 31B). He also spoke on one occasion about the increasing "pressure" that improved SSBNs could exert on an opponent by their enhanced capabilities for the "destruction of ground objectives" (para. 45B). This sounded very much like a description of an effect that could be expected from SSBNs that were being withheld.

In preliminary summary of this data on the Navy's obvious lack of any significant share with the SMF in deep strike against the continental U.S., it merits noting that some of this evidence just described above seems to imply an SSBN-withholding role of indefinite duration. This evidence will be examined more closely at the end of this chapter so that it can be correlated with the remaining evidence, pro and con, of the existence of such a protracted withholding role for Soviet SSBNs in the last eight years of the post-XXIVth Congress period.

Next to be considered is the data collected for this period since early April 1971 that pertains to the roles credited to the Navy for strategic strike with regard to deterrence. Specifically, the 32 relevant statements that have been found for this period (and reproduced in Appendix G) will be analyzed to determine whether the Navy's being credited just with a deterrent role rather than a strategic strike role, too, in the "defeat" of any nuclear-war opponent carries any valid implication useful for determining whether or not the Navy's SSBNs are assigned to a

protracted withholding role. After first examining the data quantitatively, this question will be further examined qualitatively on the basis of four particularly revealing statements among those in Appendix G.

Marshals Grechko, Vasilevskiy and the other spokesmen for the Defense Ministry dropped the "defeat" category from their public discourse soon after the XXIVth Congress in 1971¹ and subsequently accorded the SMF exclusive credit for playing the main role in nuclear deterrence.² They credited the SSBNs (when they were not simply ignored) with nothing more than being the "main striking force of the Navy" or simply "the main force of the Navy".³

Even Navy claims re. the importance of the naval forces in general or the SSBNs in particular have not exceeded the bounds

¹The "SMF-equals-deterrence-plus-defeat" equation appeared once (in July 1971) in an article by Marshal Grechko that was written for the Navy's professional journal, Naval Digest (para 19). It appeared one last time in the writings of a non-SMF general officer in 1975 when Major-General Zemskov, the editor of the General Staff journal Military Thought, included it in a book on the Armed Forces (para. 37). However, this single exception to the rule that only SMF sources continued to employ the formula once in a while lends credence to a conclusion that mention of "defeating" the aggressor had been dropped from the Soviet central press as impolitic in an era of burgeoning detente but was not specifically proscribed from use.

²See paras. 18, 25, 33, 34, 44, and 47.

³See paras. 18, 25 and 33.

delineated by the Defense Ministry marshals and their publicists. From Navy Day-'71 through Navy Day-'73 Gorshkov and his deputies frequently claimed that the Navy, along with the SMF, comprised "the main means" for the deterrence of nuclear war.¹ Even this claim apparently was more than the traffic of inter-service rivalry would sustain any longer and in May '74 Gorshkov found it expedient to concede publicly that the SMF (alone) had come to be considered "the reliable nuclear shield of the Homeland" (para. 36).

From that time on, including since the XXVth Party Congress in February-March 1976 and right down to the present (1 January 1980), the Navy has claimed only to be "an important" or "a very important" means or "factor" in nuclear deterrence.² In a Navy Day-'75 article, one political admiral provided evidence that the Party line on the Navy's role in strategic deterrence might have reduced that role to an all-time low (since the beginning of the nuclear-missile era in the mid-'fifties) by characterizing the

¹ Paras. 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32.

² Paras. 39, 40, 43, 44, 47 and 49. (In view of the fact that the article appeared in the Naval Digest, the "colonel" whose name appears on this final article is assumed to be a naval aviator, naval infantryman, or one of the several other naval specialities whose officers bear Army ranks; especially since Naval Digest has few guest authors and then only those of field-grade rank.)

Navy as nothing more than (just) "an important means" for deterrence "together with the other services of the Armed Forces" (excluding the SMF).¹ By Navy Day-'78, however, the Navy appeared to have recovered some ground when the top political admiral credited the service to which he had been assigned by the Party as "one of the most important factors" in nuclear deterrence.² Nevertheless, the Navy has not regained its previous stature in Soviet declaratory policy as constituting one leg with the SMF in the USSR's strategic-deterrent diad.

Although the more closely Party-supervised SMF Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions" published in Communist of the Armed Forces each year (except 1973, inexplicably) dropped the formula after the October 1972 "Materials" that claimed the SMF was assigned the main role in both deterrence and defeat of any nuclear aggressor, SMF officers continued sporadically to repeat the claim in the same or equivalent forms as recently as November 1978.³ In '74 the SMF Day "Materials" substituted the peaceful-coexistentialist line that the SMF constituted "the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and the preservation of peace" (para. 37). Brezhnev

¹Para. 40.

²Para. 47.

³See paras. 27, 33, 39, 42 and 48. Paras. 27, 39 and 42 retained the "deterrence-and-defeat" formula while para. 33 substituted "launching retaliation" in a markedly less bellicose variant of "defeat" while 48 made the only reference ever found to the SMF constituting the "sword" as well as the (frequently employed) "shield" of the "Homeland".

quite likely was enunciating the political guideline for such statements when he asserted in his 24 February 1976 speech to the XXVth Party Congress that the USSR was developing its "Strategic /Nuclear/ Forces" so as to constitute a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor" (para. 41).

Since it may be seen from the above material that post-XXIVth Party Congress statements ascribing to the SMF the sole role in the "defeat" of an aggressor were largely found in SMF sources (and then only sporadically) and since the mainstream Defense Ministry and Navy statements accorded both the SMF and Navy important roles (only) in deterrence, it is concluded (in answer to the first question posed at the outset of the foregoing consideration of the data assembled in Appendix G) that the fact of the Navy's just being credited with a role in deterrence alone carries no persuasive implication one way or another regarding the Navy's possible assignment to a protracted SSBN-withholding role.

This conclusion does not mean, however, that the statements in Appendix G do not contain some relevant data of value. To the contrary, analytically useful information is particularly evident in paras. 24, 26, 44 and 45B and will be noted in turn. In para. 24, Gorshkov may be seen to have made an unprecedented (and as yet never repeated) reference to "the Strategic Counterforces of Defense" which were said to consist of the SMF and "the oceanic Navy" with the latter's "main mission" being "defense of the

country from an attack by an aggressor from oceanic directions". This "main mission" was implied by the context and the use of the present imperfect tense (in asserting that the "Navy is carrying out" the mission at present, i.e., in peacetime) to be one of strategic deterrence, at least until a nuclear conflict began.

In para. 26, Gorshkov may be seen to have been claiming that SSBNs are more effective than ICBMs for strategic deterrence. Quite conceivably the Navy CinC might have been stating a rationalization for SSBNs then being given priority in a protracted withholding strategy for strategic forces intended to provide "deterrence in war" and to favorably influence its "outcome". Alternatively, and seemingly far more likely since the context was that of peacetime, Gorshkov was merely implying that the forward-deployed and properly protected SSBNs would have greater survivability in an initial nuclear exchange and hence more funds should be devoted to construction of SSBNs and to the large number of ocean-going general purpose naval forces he deems necessary for SSBN protection. If the latter conclusion is accepted, there remains nothing on which to predicate a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

In para. 44, Gorshkov is found to have stated in a booklet published in December 1977 that it was "the Navy's sortie into the World Ocean" and "extended stay there" which accounts for its having become "an important factor" in deterrence. While this statement would apply equally well to peacetime deterrence of limited war and intervention (especially since the Navy CinC used the formula "deterrence of the aggressive strivings of the

imperialists" rather than "deterrence of nuclear war"), this formula also encompasses strategic deterrence too and, consequently, may be interpreted reasonably as having the connotation that only SSBNs maintained constantly in or near missile-launch range of the continental U.S. are perceived by the U.S. as contributing to the USSR's deterrent capabilities. This, if anything, is an argument against holding in reserve such a large share of the Soviet SSBN force in peacetime. Whether this seeming argument against SSBN withholding stems from opposition to an existing protracted SSBN-withholding strategy, or one that seemed imminent of adoption and that Gorshkov was attempting to forestall, or was just an argument to forward deploy a larger share of the part of the SSBN force held in readiness to sortie for deferred strikes as a reserve, backup to the SMF is a moot point. It will be left to the summary conclusions at the end of this chapter for correlation with all the other findings of the current post-XXIVth Party Congress period before trying to interpret its most probable meaning.

Finally, to turn to subpara. 45B and the last of the four statements found to be revealing of the nature and operational requirements for the Navy's allotted role in strategic deterrence, we come to the only one of the four statements to have been found in a Defense Ministry source. This is a 1977 book on the organizational evolution of the Soviet Armed Forces and its mission structure by the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History.

The passage of interest employed the same formula that naval sources had been using for over two years to claim an important role for the Navy as a "means" or "factor" in deterrence.¹ The very fact that the formula was used in what was predominantly if not exclusively an Army production suggests either that the Navy had been following a Defense Ministry line all along or that the Navy had originated the formula and that sooner or later it had met with Defense Ministry approval. Any further discussion of this point will also be reserved to the summary conclusions part of this chapter.

It is appropriate now to turn to the evidence for the period since the XXIVth Party Congress ended in early April 1971 that has been compiled in Appendix H in an effort to detect any obvious over-emphasis on SSBN-protection beyond that appropriate for the deferred-strike role to which a share of the Soviet SSBN force appears to be dedicated for prompt sortie and use after the initial nuclear exchange if required for use against U.S. targets which the SMF had failed to destroy. As determined in the previous chapter on the 1961-1971 decade, the problem of judging how much emphasis constituted too much proved unresolvable for the evidence available. Nevertheless, each of the 17 items of seeming relevance that have been collected for the 1971-1979 period and reproduced in Appendix H will be briefly scrutinized

¹Paras. 40, 43, and 44.

in chronological order on the off chance that by so doing we may find some evidence on SSBN protection embedded in a context that makes it clear that the source was discussing protracted SSBN-withholding.

The first statement appeared in September 1971, five months after the XXIVth Party Congress. Written by a Captain First Rank Sokha and published in the Naval Digest, the statement of interest is a single sentence:

 Their /"nuclear-powered, torpedo-attack submarines"/ basic missions are considered to be combat with submarines /i.e. SSBNs and SSNs/ and the protection of their own missile submarines (para. 20).

Here we find a senior Navy captain asserting that the protection of the USSR's missile submarines is a top priority assignment of Soviet SSNs. Since "nuclear-powered submarines" have repeatedly been stated by Soviet naval and military leaders to be the "basic" arm of the Navy, the fact that SSNs would have SSBN-protection as a "basic" role (while not surprising in view of the nuclear-strike capabilities of SSBNs and the very substantial anti-SSBN ASW capabilities of U.S. SSNs) provides a good indication of just how great is the Soviet concern for protecting their SSBNs. However, it does not per se seem to imply a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy rather than just one of holding SSBNs in reserve for use after the initial exchange for the contingency that the SMF cannot destroy all of its assigned targets.

The second statement to be considered is one contained in an article in the January 1972 issue of Naval Digest, by a

Captain First Rank Aleshkin. It too involved a single, brief sentence:

...the strategic forces of navies...are not capable of realizing their capabilities in full measure in nuclear war without the appropriate support of other forces (para. 21).

While this item is essentially nothing more than a re-statement of the Soviet requirement for protecting their SSBNs against the formidable ASW forces of NATO, it is of modest interest for its use of the phrase "in full measure" which appears in the same context in the 1979 2nd edition of Seapower of the State as an addition to a comparable passage in the 1st (1976) edition which lacked it. This had the seeming effect (as will be discussed in more detail when the two editions of Seapower of the State are considered) of minimizing the pro-SSBN support requirement. That is, when the "in-full-measure" phrase is not included, as in the 1st edition of Gorshkov's book, the assertion of the pro-SSBN requirement is unequivocal -- without such protection the SSBNs cannot survive to launch their missiles. Conversely, inclusion of the phrase in Captain Aleshkin's above statement makes it clear that he certainly cannot be considered to have been over-emphasizing SSBN protection to the point that we might conclude that he was referring to protracted SSBN withholding.

Next we find a third brief passage, one by a naval-engineering officer which appeared in the same January 1972 issue of the Naval Digest as the one just considered by Aleshkin:

Arming submarines with long-range missiles enables them to operate...at a considerable distance from the shores of a probable enemy, reliably protected by surface ships and aviation (para. 22).

Nominally referring to the U.S. Trident missile but in all likelihood really talking about the then-building Delta I-Class SSBN with its 4,200 nm missile which can reach the U.S. from launch points in Soviet coastal waters, the author seems likely to have had in mind that the "reliable protection" of Soviet SSBNs "by the "surface ships and aviation" of which he spoke would be effected in the USSR's home waters employing the Navy's numerous coastal ASW surface craft, diesel-powered (and hence quieter) ASW submarines, and shore-based ASW airplanes and helicopters. However, in view of the USSR's present construction of several new classes of large VTOL-capable ocean-going surface ships (including reportedly an "aircraft carrier" and a "heavy cruiser" to have the first nuclear-power plants of any Soviet surface combatants), the above quotation may have additionally had in mind providing open-ocean protection to the Yankee-Class SSBN with VTOL carriers and large-ship cover and screening forces to provide the necessary SSM, SAM, and ASW support in periods of heightened tension or conventional war to increase the percentage possibilities of the Yankees surviving long enough to fire their missiles at the outset of a nuclear war. Here again, there is nothing to indicate a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The fourth item is a three-paragraph passage taken from the eleventh and final installment of the Gorshkov "Papers" series published in the Naval Digest in February 1973 (para. 23). He clearly was addressing those of the Defense Ministry marshals and Party leaders who still held to the view advocated by Marshal Zhukov and implemented by Khrushchev in the post-Stalinist 'fifties that the best navy for a continental power faced by an economically more powerful coalition of naval powers would be a relatively inexpensive one consisting basically of submarines, but with a strong naval air arm, able to pose a credible deterrent threat to the "strong opponent" as Gorshkov referred to the U.S./NATO naval forces using a standard Soviet euphemism. The Navy CinC argued that the Soviet Navy could not be "just a submarine navy" but must include the aircraft and particularly the surface ships required "for support of the operations of submarines". He cited the German neglect to provide such support as "one of the reasons for the failure of 'unrestricted submarine warfare'" which, he noted "forced them to act alone without the protection of other forces". He concluded that, although he was not taking issue with continuing to give first-priority attention to submarine development, there did exist a need for surface warships "of various designations". Gorshkov added that "apart from affording combat stability to the submarines", these surface ships were required for a wide range of missions in peace and war". He seemed in all probability to be saying that the Navy

needed not only ASW ships but those of other "designations" that could provide the SAM and SSM firepower that would permit open ocean operations against a "strong opponent", that is one with attack carrier forces. Interesting as this is for understanding Gorshkov's thinking on the USSR's "objective" requirements for large general purpose naval forces for protecting nuclear-powered submarines, it still does not constitute an obvious over-emphasis on pro-SSBN that indicates an SSBN withholding strategy.

Proceeding to the next item, we find Captain First Rank Kvitnitskiy, a frequent and well-informed writer on ASW, telling us in 1973 that the missions assigned nuclear-powered missile submarines are the predominant consideration in devising the most suitable tactics and equipment for "antisubmarine defense", as the Soviets phrase their closest equivalent to the western term "antisubmarine warfare":

Tactical methods for the combat employment of the antisubmarine /defense/ forces and means are being worked out in direct relation to the missions carried out by modern, nuclear-powered missile submarines (para. 24).

If one assumes that Kvitnitskiy was concerned primarily with NATO's SSBNs, even though he didn't specify whose nuclear-powered missile submarines he had in mind, one would be led to the conclusion that the USSR's priority efforts in ASW were being concentrated on the anti-SSBN mission. However, there is nothing in the context to suggest that such an assumption is

warranted. Accordingly, "antisubmarine defense" for Soviet SSBNs (ie. the pro-SSBN mission) must be considered an equally logical additional or alternative interpretation. Otherwise, we would be confronted with a negative indication of over-emphasis on SSBN protection that would run counter to a considerable body of other evidence to the effect that pro-SSBN ASW was of very great concern to the USSR by the time Kvitnitskiy wrote in 1973. Even so, there is no exceptional emphasis to suggest SSBN withholding.

The next item comes from the March 1973 issue of International Affairs (an English-language version of a monthly Soviet journal published under the title Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' which translates more accurately as "International Life"). The article resorts to the U.S. Navy's Trident missile, in a patently false surrogate, to tell his elite Soviet readers that the newest Soviet SSBNs (of the Delta Class) have missiles of such long-range that they can be launched against the U.S. from the relatively great safety of Soviet coastal waters where the USSR's numerous coastal ASW craft, diesel-powered, torpedo attack submarines, and shore-based helicopters and other ASW aircraft can provide infinitely better protection to them than out in the open ocean. The reader is informed that the the combat patrol regions for these new Soviet submarines are established in "separate, contiguous zones" in Soviet coastal waters where the Navy's ASW forces can carry out the "new role" of SSBN protection. Again, although interesting and not irrelevant, the statement provides

no prima facie evidence of an over-emphasis on SSBN protection that might be taken as evidence of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The seventh piece of evidence to be considered is taken from the 3rd edition of the popularized history Combat Course of the Soviet Navy which was released for publication in February 1974 (para. 26). Like the 2nd edition of May 1967 (para. 12 above), the relevant passage makes the points that:

1) Diesel submarines can be used for missions for which it is inexpedient to use the more expensive nuclear-powered boats; and

2) Among the missions of Soviet submarines in a future war will be ASW against "the submarines of the enemy".

Since the USSR's modern diesel-powered, torpedo-attack submarines are generally known to be much quieter than the nuclear-powered ones, they are better suited for ASW in Soviet coastal waters where their relatively short submerged endurance is not the virtually insuperable handicap that it would be for oceanic ASW. The first point above on the continued utility of diesel-powered submarines was juxtaposed with the second one despite several intervening paragraphs in the 2nd and 3rd edition just in order to suggest the probability that the diesel attack boats mentioned in the first point are intended for ASW against NATO SSNs in the coastal areas of the USSR. The single textual change to the 3rd edition was the dropping of the phrase "at sea" as a venue for wartime operations of Soviet

ASW submarines so that the shortened passage has them operating (only?) in "coastal areas and in regions distant from our shores". This may have been only an editorial change to reduce verbiage but, alternatively, it could reflect a heightened Soviet awareness over seven years earlier that the ASW breakthrough is not imminent that will make the oceans transparent and, consequently, the utility of using ASW submarines to attempt to locate enemy submarines "at sea" (i.e. in the Mediterranean or open oceans) is very low indeed and wholly unprofitable in comparison with search for them in the USSR's coastal waters or in ours -- which latter seems like the likely meaning of the phrase "in regions distance from our shores" as distinguishable from "at sea".

The eighth of the 17 statements on SSBN protection to be considered is one by a Captain First Rank Vlasov that appeared in an article in the Naval Digest issue of March 1974. It invoked the experience of military history, specifically the same unsuccessful "unrestricted submarine warfare" of Germany in both world wars that Gorshkov had cited for the same purpose in the last of his "Papers" a year before, to argue that even "the most powerful forces", namely the nuclear-powered missile submarines that the "revolution in military affairs allegedly had "brought to the fore" as the "main striking forces of navies", could not hope to "achieve success" without "proper protection for the submarines" (para. 27). Moreover, as Vlasov claimed twice in the course of the article, surface ships have been justified and are being procured for a wide range of essential missions "quite apart"

from providing the combat support to Soviet submarines that can give them the requisite survivability ("combat stability"). This statement reverses Gorshkov's argument in his "Papers" article described above in that the SSBN-protection role is portrayed as second in importance to the "other missions". It is quite conceivable that this actually reflects Gorshkov's true views but that in his "Papers" (and subsequently in both editions of Seapower of the State, as will be described shortly) he felt it would be far more persuasive to justify the large general purpose forces he would like under the SSBN-protection role since the latter mission is the only one besides the strategic strike roles of SSBNs that can qualify under the "nuclear criterion" for greater funding for ship construction. Be that as it may, the effect of Vlasov's approach is to deemphasize the importance of the SSBN protection role and consequently constitutes, if anything, a negative indication of the existence of a protracted SSBN withholding strategy.

Rear Admiral Professor Pavlovich, one of the USSR's leading naval theoreticians, contributed the next statement on SSBN protection. In the December 1974 issue of Military-Historical Journal he commented that the initial period of a war could be decisive and that consequently there was a military requirement for "an increase in the individual weight and size of all types of support, in the first place, for operational and combat support" (para. 28).¹ Although this statement was couched in such

¹This statement is the only one to be found which (cont'd. p.146)

general terms as to be applicable to the entire spectrum of military missions and the supporting forces that would be applicable to each, it seems likely that the author had SSBNs in mind since he had remarked a page earlier that their development into a highly effective weapons system required that they be given greater "defense-in-depth", including longer-range reconnaissance. Whatever the case, it is noteworthy that the greater support demanded did not extend beyond the initial period of the war -- or, at least, any requirement that might have existed for SSBN protection after the initial nuclear exchange period of a war was not considered by Pavlovich as suitable for mention. Thus his statement appears to be a negative indication of protracted SSBN withholding, although a vague and weak one.

The next item on SSBN protection was one by Captain First Rank V'yunenکو, one of Gorshkov's top naval theoreticians. In the October 1975 Naval Digest V'yunenکو asserted that since SSBNs have become "the main striking force of a modern Navy", they have become the focus of ASW efforts ("the basic object of retribution by all other naval forces") and that, in effect this was being compensated for by increasing use of SSNs for SSBN protection (para. 29). This expanding assignment of SSNs to the pro-SSBN mission, Pavlovich added, "significantly increases"

(cont'd. from p. 145) distinguishes between "combat" and "operational" support. Applied to SSBNs the terms suggest support limited just to actual war-fighting in the case of "combat support" but extended to peacetime too for all out-of-port movements in the case of "operational support".

the survivability of SSBNs. Unfortunately for the subject of present inquiry, the article gave no hint that this enhanced SSBN survivability made SSBNs particularly well-suited for a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The eleventh of our pro-SSBN indicators to be examined is comprised of four paragraphs from the 1st (1976) edition of Admiral Gorshkov's book Seapower of the State (para. 30). He made the key point that (Soviet) submarines require the support of other naval forces, basing this assertion on the failure of the German submarine anti-SLOC campaigns in both world wars. These unsuccessful campaigns, he claimed, "demonstrated the error of the opinion [apparently held by some of the Ground Force Marshals who still dominate defense policy-making] that the submarine, due to the covertness of its movements after departing base, can insure its own invulnerability by itself" (subpara. D). He mentioned one thing already being done to the end of meeting this requirement -- the construction of surface ships to provide "combat stability" for Soviet submarines (subpara. B). And he called for another step of comparable or greater importance -- planning "organized counteraction" against the putative enemy's ASW forces (subpara. A). By this he probably meant a strategic-scale campaign against NATO ASW forces wherever they could be found rather than just on a tactical scale of point defense for Soviet SSBNs.¹

¹See Appendix H, paras. 1D and 1G for an example of a comparable call made 15 years earlier.

Gorshkov dramatized his insistence that "proper combat support" be provided for Soviet submarines with the rhetorical question: "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW, carry out their strategic aims in a war at sea?". He answered the question in the affirmative but conditioned on the submarines being provided the support of other naval forces.¹

The substantial attention paid to SSBN protection in Seapower of the State compared to the relatively scant treatment he had accorded the subject in his earlier writings would seem to at least approach the minimum one might logically expect if the main wartime role of his SSBNs were to be protracted withholding. Nevertheless, it still was not so emphatic, extensive, or insistent in tone that one could reasonably conclude that it constituted over-emphasis compared to what might be expected based on just the deferred-strike role of Soviet SSBNs.

In the next item professor and Captain First Rank Potapov contributed an article to the February 1976 issue of the Military-Historical Journal in which he alleged that "covering the regions of patrolling of the strategic missile submarines of the U.S." was "one of the missions of U.S. aircraft carriers" (para. 31). Since this is generally known not to be the case, it seems well warranted

¹Gorshkov stipulated "correct employment" of submarines as another condition for enabling Soviet submarines to survive and carry out their assigned wartime missions. This requirement has been discussed previously and is not of enough relevance to be repeated here. (See pp. 112-113 and 120 above)

to conclude that Professor Potapov was resorting to the much-used surrogate form of esoteric communication to either announce that the USSR had recognized a requirement for air-capable ships (like the Kiev-Class VTOL "ASW cruiser") to provide open-ocean "combat support" for Soviet SSBNs or to advocate that such a requirement be accepted and the requisite naval forces to meet it be approved and built.

In this case the context, with its specification of forces for supporting submarines on patrol in oceanic areas where "aircraft carriers" could be employed, points away from a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy. At least this would seem to be the case if one assumes that any SSBNs to be withheld would be retained in coastal waters or "maneuvering bases" where they could be given far better protection than out in the open ocean. At any rate, this statement cannot remotely be construed as exhibiting such an over-emphasis on SSBN protection as to constitute an indicator of a protracted withholding strategy.

In the same month of February 1976 an article in the Naval Digest by a Captain 2nd Rank Rakitin alleged that one of the vulnerabilities of Polaris-Poseidon SSBNs was "the weak defensibility of their combat patrol regions against the action of ASW forces" (para. 32). Since none of these U.S. SSBNs have ever been detected while out on patrol and since the USSR lacks any means of making initial detection of them while they are concealed in the vastness of the oceans, we have a particularly open-and-shut

case of a Soviet naval writer using a (false) foreign-navy surrogate to discuss a problem of his own service. Again, as in the case of the preceding item by Professor Potapov, the context is one of open-ocean patrolling of SSBNs that, in all probability, have been assigned some role during the initial period of a war. A possibly significant difference between the two is that Rakitin was markedly less positive than Potapov. While the latter had spoken of aircraft carriers allegedly engaged in providing support to SSBNs, Rakitin took the negative approach that SSBN patrol areas were only "weakly defensible", perhaps suggesting that efforts at defense would be fruitless or perhaps that larger ASW and other general purpose forces would have to be provided the Navy if it were to hope to be able to overcome the "weak-defensibility" handicap. Whatever Rakitin intended, it bears no resemblance to the unprecedented heavy emphasis on SSBN protection for which we are on the lookout.

The 14th of the 17 items was found in the March 1977 issue of the Naval Digest in an article by Professor (now Vice Admiral) Stalbo. He cited Gorshkov's Seapower of the State as having shown that the German submarine anti-SLOC campaign had failed in World War II because of the twin failures to provide "the necessary measures of support" for the Nazi U-boats or to carry out "special measures" to destroy the opponent's antisubmarine forces (para. 33). Stalbo, who was acknowledged by Gorshkov in Seapower of the State to have been one of several collaborators

in preparing that book, presumably was well aware of his chief's views on the subject and was giving emphasis to points which Gorshkov considered of particular importance. If this is the case, we might reasonably consider that Stalbo's emphasis on SSBN protection (incalling not only for point defense of SSBNs but also for a strategic-scale campaign against ASW forces whenever they could be attacked at sea or in port) is so marked as to at least suggest the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

In the next item, Professor Potapov appears a second time as author of a 1977 book titled Scientific-Technological Progress and the Navy which argues that "the oceans are the most suitable medium for the creation of nuclear might and for its use after the exchange of the first strikes" (para. 34). While the reference to use "after" the initial nuclear strikes sounds a note of promise at first glance that SSBN withholding might be involved, a closer reading suggests that this is not the case. The wording implies that Potapov is arguing that SSBNs are less vulnerable than ICBMs to a first strike and that the oceans offer a less vulnerable "medium" for a more secure second strike. Specifically, the wording indicates that the SSBNs would launch their missiles shortly after the first strikes rather than after a protracted period. Consequently, it appears that this cited passage is concerned only with the SSBNs on patrol in order to be sufficiently ready to either take part in the initial exchange or to carry out its reserve, backup role to the SMF in the event the latter fails to destroy all its assigned targets during the initial nuclear exchange and subsequently requires Navy help to do so with enough

dispatch. If this interpretation of Potapov's statement is accepted, it follows that it had nothing to infer one way or another regarding protracted SSBN withholding because it did not address that subject.

Gorshkov's 1977 booklet The Navy provides the penultimate item for consideration regarding SSBN protection. In the three paragraphs quoted in Appendix H (para. 34), we find the Navy chief stating that properly-configured surface ships and aircraft are being provided the Navy to enable it to provide "comprehensive protection" for the main types of forces of the Soviet Navy -- submarines and aircraft -- for combating "the submarines and antisubmarine forces of an opponent". Although Gorshkov does not define what he has in mind by "comprehensive protection", it seems reasonable to hypothesize that he is concerned both with protecting them and their supporting forces at all times and places against all weapons likely to be used against them. Applied to the SSBN protection mission, this would require protection in port and in coastal waters, providing escort forces for SSBNs in or near missile-launch stations (at least in periods of heightened international tension and in limited or conventional war) as well as when the missile boats are leaving or returning to port and transiting "narrows and straits' zones"). As concerns protecting their SSBNs and their escort or covering forces from all the types of weapons systems likely to be turned against any of the forces involved, as we have noted earlier, not only are

submarines, surface ships, and aircraft required for ASW but for ACW and air defense.

Here finally, it seems to the preparing analyst, we have found in Gorshkov's "comprehensive-protection" formula a potentiality in which one can logically suspect that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy as well as the deferred-strike role combined to cause such emphasis. We shall return to this piece of evidence shortly in the summary conclusions to this chapter.

The 17th and most recent statement on SSBN protection requiring consideration is to be found in the 2nd edition of Gorshkov's book Seapower of the State (para. 36). Although released for publication in March 1979, it did not become available in the West until November. Except for one relatively minor textual change, the 1979 revision of the Navy chief's magnum opus carried over to the 2nd edition all four of the relevant paragraphs from the 1st (para. 30). Since these statements have just been considered a few pages before, it remains only to supplement what has been said already about it in anticipation of its appearance here. By adding the phrase underlined below to a statement stating that the submarines cannot "insure its own invulnerability in full measure by itself", Gorshkov appears to have backed off a step from his unequivocal assertion of the high vulnerability of the Navy's "basic striking force" unless escorted. There are practical, political, and propaganda reasons which singly or in combination could be responsible for this

textual change. Whatever the reason, the change may reflect a recognition on Gorshkov's part that there is little reason to hope that the Party and government will ever be willing to provide the outsize escort and covering forces for "comprehensive support" even if the economy could be further stretched to sustain the enormous increase in the construction of the heavily-armed ocean-going surface ships that would be required. However, if the textual change reflects merely a recognition of the limits of the practicable, as suggested above, it does not seem to carry any necessary implication that Gorshkov's interest has waned in providing the maximum of SSBN protection as indicated by the "comprehensive-support" formula.

As in the previous chapter covering the 1962-1971 period, the penultimate indicator to be considered for the 1971-1979 period in this third chapter is that of the terminological distinction made by Soviet military writers between according the Navy (in the form of its SSBNs) a seemingly higher role as a direct instrument of state policy in "the defense of the country" or, alternatively, as merely another one of the military services in "the system of the Armed Forces" (or as just "an important means" of the "Supreme High Command"). As concluded in the previous chapter from the 33 uses of the "defense" versus "Armed Forces" indicators compiled in Appendix I for the 1962-1971 period, it was the Navy's anti-SSBN mission against our ballistic missile submarines rather than the withholding of Soviet SSBNs to which

the "defense" indicator was applied. Accordingly, further consideration of this indicator and of its opposite "Armed Forces" and "Supreme High Command" indicators was postponed with the hope that the additional data for the 1971-1979 period would permit clarification and interpretation of these two sets of indicators.

Accordingly, it would seem appropriate first to inspect the 29 indicators for the 1971-1979 period compiled in Appendix I to see if they might not prove more definitive. Eleven of the statements use the "Armed Forces" indicator¹ and three more the comparable "Supreme High Command" indicator.² These are used in a straightforward manner in a context that in two cases makes it unmistakably clear that it is the capabilities of the SSBNs for strategic strike that caused its authors to stress the Navy's importance as "a strategic service of the Armed Forces" or "in the system of the Armed Forces". The first of these two cases was an article in the February 1977 issue of the Naval Digest by an active-duty Captain First Rank which stated:

The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering powerful strikes not only on sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an opponent. For the first time in its history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the Armed Forces, capable of influencing in decisive form the course and outcome of a war as a whole. (para. 60)

The second example was provided by the top political admiral of the Navy, Admiral Grishanov in an article in the Military-Historical Journal in July 1978 that contained the following

¹Paras. 46, 47, 49, 51, 52, 58, 60, 61, 68, 69 and 72.

²Paras. 48, 53 and 65.

passage:

The creation in our country of an oceanic, nuclear-missile navy worked a deep change in the views on its role in the system of the Armed Forces and the strategy and tactics for its employment. It has become one of the most important factors capable, by means of direct action against the objectives located on the coast and in the deep rear of an enemy as well as against targets at sea, of exerting a very significant, and at times decisive, influence on the course of a war. (para. 68)

By fortunate coincidence, Admiral Grishanov had published an article only four months earlier in which he employed the "defense" indicator. This seems to validate our tentative conclusion in the last chapter (p. 81) that the two sets of indicators are not mutually exclusive inasmuch as we now have evidence to that effect by virtue of the fact that both sets of indicators were used by the same individual within a brief interval.

Let us examine the second statement of Admiral Grishanov's along with the first to see if taken together they either support or refute our working hypothesis formulated in the preceding chapter (p. 81) that the "defense-of-the-country" indicator refers to SSBN withholding while the "Armed-Forces"/"Supreme-High-Command" indicator pair refers to the SSBNs' war-fighting role for strikes against naval-related "operational" targets. Grishanov's roughly simultaneous use of the "defense-of-the-country" indicator had appeared in the DOSAAF newspaper Soviet Patriot in early March of the same year (1978) and had stated:

These qualitative changes carried out in the Navy have led to its becoming an essentially new strategic instrument for insuring Soviet capabilities for the defense of the country and for vitally influencing the course of an armed struggle in all of the oceanic and sea theaters of military action...

Here Grishanov speaks of the Navy's role in "defense of the country" in apposition to its role "in the system of the Armed Forces" that he was to employ only four months later (as already quoted above). In the latter case, the top Party admiral assigned to the Navy manifestly was speaking of the immediate war-fighting role of that small share of the SSBNs maintained on combat patrol in peacetime -- as evidenced by his wording that the USSR's "oceanic, nuclear-missile navy" was capable of "direct action" against deep-strike targets as well as ones on the coast and at sea.

Note the marked distinction between this and his earlier statement quoted just above. In this case no "direct /active/ action" is involved; rather the Navy's role is the passive one of constituting a "strategic instrument" for "insuring" the "defense of the country". Although Grishanov does not spell out just how the Navy plays this role, we know from the first appearance of the "insuring" phrase in the Soviet naval literature five years earlier that it is the Navy's SSBNs and their deep-strike capability that is intended.¹ As commented in Chapter II

¹In the last installment of the Gorshkov "Papers" in the February 1973 issue of Naval Digest it was stated: "...the ballistic missiles of submarines insure a capability for destroying... the strategic objectives of the opponent located in the depths of his territory" (para. 7, Appendix B).

(pp. 103-104) in discussing Gorshkov's introduction of this naval formula, it constitutes about as clear a reference to the SSBNs' reserve backup role to the SMF as one might expect to find (considering the esoteric nature of the communications involved). And as also concluded in the previous chapter (p. 104) there is no logical implication of protracted SSBN withholding since the "insuring" phrase can be adequately accounted for by the existence of the SSBNs' deferred strike role.

Let us now undertake consideration of the indicators for this final period regarding the Navy's purported influence on the "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war. A total of 33 statements employing this indicator since the XXIVth Party in early April 1971 have been identified and reproduced in Appendix J. As observed in the preceding chapter (p. 99), it became apparent from analysis of the "course-and-outcome" indicators for the 1961-1971 period that those indicators were used variously to discuss:

- 1) the capabilities of the SSBNs for strikes against shore targets;
- and 2) the capabilities of the Navy's general purpose forces against seaborne nuclear strikes by US/NATO SSBNs and CVAs.

While we will turn in a few moments, in accordance with our working hypothesis from the preceding chapter (p. 98), to consider the three statements most likely indicative of SSBN-withholding which assert that the Navy can exercise an "enormous" or "decisive" effect on the "outcome" of a war, let us first check through the statements and eliminate those which actually can be accounted for either as identified with the SSBNs' deep-strike capabilities or

with the general-purpose naval forces' capabilities for the anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions. Here three analytical assumptions are in order concerning the logical implications of an SSBN-withholding strategy for the "course-and-outcome" statements; they are that:

- 1) The "outcome" of a war would be affected, not just the "course" (since obtaining favorable peace terms lies at the heart of the concept of protracted withholding of strategic forces);
- 2) The influence would extend to any "war as a whole" and not be limited to the TVDs (since by definition the continental U.S. is still excluded from them, according to the best evidence); and
- 3) The effect would be indirect rather than "direct" as the influence of a number of the Navy's claims are phrased, including quite a few in which it is indicated that the "direct influence" claimed is based on the capabilities of SSBNs for strikes against ground targets.

Using these three assumptions to eliminate those of our 33 "course-and-outcome" statements for 1971-1979 which 1) employ only "course" (without "outcome"); 2) specify TVDs; or 3) describe the influence as "direct", we reduce the number of statements requiring further consideration to a more manageable magnitude.¹ No less than 23 of the 33 statements are ruled out, leaving only ten for our further analysis.²

¹This process eliminates from further consideration paras. 47 through 54, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67 (C, D, E, F, G, H and I) 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76 and 77.

²The 10 paragraphs that survived the winnowing process are 55, 56, 58, 63, 64, 67 (A and B), 70, 73, 78 and 79 (A, B, G and J).

Three of the remaining ten "course-and-outcome" statements can be eliminated on the basis that their formulations are so vague as to make them of no analytical value.¹ Still a fourth statement, by Admiral Gorshkov in 1976, in Volume 2 of the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (para. 70), formulated his claim for the Navy as exerting "a decisive influence on the achievement of the strategic aims of a war" (Emphasis supplied). The Navy chief had indicated that the source of this influence was his service's "capability to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on the territory of an opponent, on his navy and bases". Since this formula is broad enough to cover SSBN strikes, as well as protracted SSBN withholding, we are left none the wiser. However, re. Gorshkov's use of "strategic" to describe the "aims" whose attainment were being claimed, it is relevant to note that both before and after this claim (in late 1975 and early 1979) Gorshkov wrote in the two editions of Seapower of the State that navies are "powerful means for achieving...the political aims of an armed struggle" (paras. 67B and 79B). It seems more likely that "political" rather than "strategic" would be used to

¹Admiral Amel'ko claimed only that "combat on the oceans" would have a "major" effect on the outcome of a war (para. 81). As this formula includes not just the Soviet Navy but the NATO navies too, the claim to exerting even just a "major" effect could have been considered largely a result of the much stronger NATO navies, as both Grechko and Gorshkov had intimated in previous statements. An article in the June 1975 issue of Naval Digest (para. 64) by an author unheard of before or since used a formulation equally unheard of before or since -- that the Navy could "strategically influence" the course and outcome of a war (due to having "missile submarines"). The "strategic" influence of the "missile submarines conceivably might be discriminated in Soviet military thinking from the "political" influence that SSBNs might exert if protracted SSBN withholding were in mind. However, this is too speculative for analytical use. The third additional item to be discarded also appeared in the Naval Digest (January 1979) and by another phantom author (para. 78). This statement was the first one by a naval source in the post-XXIVth Party Congress period to lump the Navy along with the SMF as jointly capable of exerting a "decisive" effect on the course and outcome of a nuclear-missile war. This formula, of course, tells us nothing more that the Navy was considered to have some (unspecified degree of) influence on a war.

describe the aims had in view by an SSBN-withholding strategy.¹ However, his use of the phrase "armed struggle" rather than of "a war as a whole" carries the connotation of war-fighting vice withholding -- and consequently seems most likely to refer to the Navy's anti-SSBN and anti-CVA missions and/or its modest share in the initial "mass nuclear strikes" against naval bases, ports and other naval-related "shore" installations.

A passage that appeared in the 1st edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State (para.67A) and in significantly revised form in the 2nd edition (para.79A) requires individual attention, both for its intrinsic value and for the change in the 1979 edition. In the 1976 edition the relevant sentence had stated that "the Navy is capable, by its strikes from the sea, of changing the course and outcome of an armed struggle even in continental theaters of military action". Since the best evidence available indicates that the continental U.S. is not included by Soviet definitions of TVD, it is assumed that the reference to "continental" TVDs refers primarily to the West European TVD. If this in fact is the case, it suggests that Gorshkov's aspirations for a greater role in strategic strike are now centered in Western Europe rather than in the U.S. as had previously seemed to be the case. Be this at it may, it may be seen from a comparison with the revision of this passage in the 2nd edition, that the claim to influencing the "outcome was moderated from one of "changing" it, which sounds more "decisive", to merely "influencing" it to some unspecified degree -- which scarcely sounds like a description of the influence that would be expected from an SSBN-withholding strategy.

¹The Navy chief had first used this formulation in February 1973 in the last of the "Gorshkov Papers" series on "Navies in War and Peace" that had run for ten issues in the Naval Digest in 1972: "...the Navy fulfills the important role in wartime of a powerful means for achieving the political aims of the armed struggle" (para. 56).

The three remaining statements, which seem to hold the most promise of indicating the existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy, are reproduced together below from Appendix J for ease of reference and analysis:

55) Admiral Alekseyev, Labor, 30 July 1974:

"The nuclear-missile Soviet Navy reliably protects the interests of our country...It is capable of exerting an enormous influence on the course and outcome of a modern war."

63) Gorshkov, Problems of Philosophy, May 1975, pp. 26-38.

"The Navy has advanced to the ranks of strategic forces capable of exerting a decisive influence not just on the course and outcome of major operations in large theaters of military action but also on the war as a whole."

73) Captain First Rank Makeyev, Naval Digest, February 1977, p. 17:

"The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering powerful strikes not only on sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an opponent. For the first time in its history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the Armed Forces, capable of influencing in decisive form the course and outcome of a war as a whole."

In the first of these statements above, Admiral Alekseyev is found to be unequivocally stating that the Soviet Navy "is capable of exerting an enormous influence on the course and outcome of a modern /i.e., in Soviet usage, a nuclear-missile/ war". Here we have the one statement of the 33 that appears to lend the most credence to our working hypothesis that crediting the Soviet Navy with playing a key role in determining the "outcome" of a general nuclear war rather than just its course

constitutes an indicator of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

The second statement above, that by Gorshkov in, of all places, Problems of Philosophy in May 1975 is somewhat less straightforward and unequivocal. While he seems to be saying that the Soviet Navy is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a "war as a whole", his inclusion of "major operations in large theaters of military operations" and reference to the Navy having been "advanced to the ranks of strategic forces" (i.e., war-fighting forces available for use by the Supreme High Command immediately on the outbreak of war) tends to diminish the likelihood that it refers to protracted SSBN withholding. It requires mentioning in this regard that if Gorshkov's SSBN forces were assigned in large part to an SSBN-withholding role and if he were willing to even hint at it in public, it seems highly likely that he would have done so among the strikingly numerous times he made use of the "course-and-outcome" indicator in the two editions of Seapower of the State (paras. 67 and 79).

The third and last statement above (by an active-duty Captain First Rank in Naval Digest of February 1977) used phraseology that was consistent with our working hypothesis in its basic claim that "The Navy... [is] capable of influencing in decisive form the course and outcome of a war as a whole". However, like Gorshkov in Problems of Philosophy nearly two years earlier, his

senior captain brought in the fact that the Navy had achieved "strategic-forces" status and went on to specify that the locus of those forces was within the organization of the Soviet "Armed Forces". Since strategic forces subjected to protracted withholding are believed to be sited in the "reserves of the state" rather than the Armed Forces' Supreme High Command, the conclusion seems warranted that this last statement was not penned with protracted SSBN withholding in mind.

So what are we left with from the foregoing consideration of the 33 "course-and-outcome" indicators for the 1971-1979 period? Rather little. Only Admiral Alekseyev's 1972 article (para. 55) seems to fill the bill for our working hypothesis -- but one out of 33 items is too little to warrant any confidence. While it is conceivable that Alekseyev's statement in 1972 (para. 55) was the only reference to a proscribed subject to find its way into print, there is no evidence to support such speculation.

With this limited result from our consideration of the course-and-outcome" indicators, we now turn to a summary of the evidence in the ten appendices for the period since 1971.

A. SSBN Assignment to the "Reserves of the State" Vice to Those of the "Armed Forces" ^{1/} -- The two items on "reserves" both seemed to be referring to the war-fighting "strategic reserves" of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces rather than to the "state reserves" to which SSBNs designated to play a protracted withholding role might be expected to be assigned. Accordingly, this scant evidence on "reserves" tells us nothing of use.

^{1/} See pp. 101-104

B. The Quasi-positive Indications^{1/} -- A statement made in the first (1976) edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State and repeated in the second (1979) edition was construed to indicate that the Navy chief was esoterically describing the official existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy (pp. 106 and 107 supra). The remaining five pieces of evidence considered were either satisfactorily explainable by the SSBNs' deferred-strike role or were too vague to contribute anything to this analysis. Nevertheless, the statement referred to just above that had been contained in both editions of Gorshkov's book is of obvious importance and will be further considered at the end of this summary of the evidence found in each of the appendices when the individually persuasive statements both pro and con can be collated and final conclusions drawn.

C. Claims to SSBN "Invulnerability" or "Combat Stability"^{2/}
The four out of the 30 statements including this indicator that were found worth closer examination (pp. 108-115) produced no definitive evidence either supporting or refuting the existence of an SSBN-withholding strategy. While a statement in General Lomov's 1973 book could be interpreted as implying opposition to SSBN withholding, such an interpretation seems strained. Nevertheless, this possibility will be kept open for consideration in the concluding analysis for this period in the event such an interpretation tallies closely enough with evidence from any of the other appendices.

^{1/}See pp. 104-108

^{2/}See pp. 108-115.

D. The "Combat Readiness" Required of the Navy as Compared to the SMF^{1/} -- Five of the six "readiness" statements from naval sources compiled in Appendix D for the 1971-79 period made it clear that the term "combat readiness" was being applied to the Navy's forces in general; the result was that nothing of immediate use could be deduced from them regarding SSBN withholding. The sixth statement, by Fleet Admiral Smirnov in July 1979, was seen to reflect possible opposition to an SSBN-withholding strategy (providing it is found that such a strategy is in existence) so this possibility will be kept in mind in case it should prove to be congruent with related material carried over to the summary analysis with which this chapter will be concluded.

In addition to the six "readiness" statements by naval sources, as just discussed above, there were five by Army field-grade officers which all pointed to the SMF's requirement for constant readiness and contextually suggested the continued existence of a deferred-strike role for the SSBNs. Although the Navy was mentioned, there were no references to any requirements for readiness by the Navy or its SSBNs -- a fact at least consistent with our working hypothesis that an SSBN-withholding strategy was in official existence and affording it a degree of negative support.

Additionally, there were seven statements from the annual SMF Day speech "Materials" which all noted the SMFs "uninterrupted combat alert" status and gave scant mention to the other services. It was noted in the accompanying analysis that the failure to accord a high state of readiness to the Navy should not be interpreted as indicating that the SSBN force was being subjected

^{1/} See pp. 116-119.

to protracted withholding since the other services were credited only a minor role in sweeping up the rubble in the path of the SMF's devastation. It was concluded that the "readiness" indicators at least were consistent with our hypothesis that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy had been in effect since (at least) 1971. Accordingly, they may be considered to provide indirect support for our working hypothesis.

E. Evidence of Opposition to Any SSBN-Withholding Strategy^{1/}--

The five items for the 1971-79 period which seemed to voice strong opposition to a strategy involving the protracted withholding of at least a significant part of the Soviet SSBN force may be seen to have stemmed from the biggest guns in the Soviet Navy: Gorshkov himself, his First Deputy, Fleet Admiral Smirnov (as just described) the Chief of Main Naval Staff, Fleet Admiral Yegorov, and the Navy's leading theorist, Professor Stalbo. The facts that their opposition was couched in such esoteric terms and, in Stalbo's case, only in a restricted-distribution military journal, is interpreted as indicating that they had resorted to such deep cover because they were opposing an officially approved policy of protracted SSBN withholding. That Gorshkov dropped the most obvious of the implicit arguments against such a strategy from the second (1979) edition of Seapower of the State was interpreted (admittedly quite speculatively) as the result of Army opposition (rather than as a result of any radical changes in either Gorshkov's often-expressed antipathy toward such a strategy or in the officially-approved strategy regarding protracted withholding of SSBNs). Taken together, the preparing

^{1/}See pp. 119-124.

analyst considers the evidence in this category as very substantial, if not fully conclusive, evidence of the existence of an officially-approved strategy of protracted SSBN withholding during the period covered by the four statements -- that is from March 1971 up through at least the appearance of the 2nd edition of Gorshkov's book in May 1979.

F. Navy's SSBNs Not Assigned a Major Strike Role vs. U.S.^{1/}--

The 58 pieces of data on this subject for the 1971-79 period not only provided convincing reassurance that the availability of the bulk of the SSBN force for protracted withholding has not been precluded since the XXIVth Party Congress in March-April 1971 by its assignment to a major share with the SMF in the deep strike mission but also yielded five statements to support the conclusion suggested by the evidence in the previous appendices that the USSR has had a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy in effect throughout the past eight years. These five statements included three by Admiral Gorshkov which seemed to be asserting that the Navy's main role was "insuring" that the USSR retain a residual deep-strike capability throughout any general nuclear war (p. 128).

The remaining two statements were both by the Navy chief. One of them made in 1973 contained the unprecedented remark that the Navy was "objectively" capable of deep strike, suggesting that the objections preventing SSBNs from being assigned a major share with the SMF were subjective. The other statement had

^{1/}See pp. 124-129.

Gorshkov in 1974 using his SSBNs as a means of increasing the "pressure" on an enemy by virtue of their improving capabilities (i.e., with the Delta Class SSBN) for deep strike (p. 129).

Both of these statements include overtones of protracted SSBN withholding that add additional weight to the evidence indicating the official existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy from 1971 down to the present time (December 1978).

G. Whether the Navy Credited with Roles in Both Strategic Strike and Deterrence or in Deterrence Alone^{1/} -- The 32 statements on this subject incorporated into Appendix G to cover the 1971-79 period were analyzed above (pp. 129-136) with the result that only some interesting contextual data on the nature and operational requirements for the Navy's allotted role in strategic deterrence were developed. But as to the question of main interest to determine whether or not the Navy's having been credited during the past eight years with just a deterrent role rather than with a strategic strike role, as the data clearly showed to be the case, it was concluded that the data connoted nothing one way or another regarding the seeming assignment of the greater share of the SSBN force to a protracted SSBN-withholding role.

H. Apparent Over-Emphasis on SSBN Protection Beyond That Appropriate for the Deferred-Strike Role^{2/} -- The 17 items on this subject compiled in Appendix H for the 1971-79 period did yield two pieces of evidence (paras. 33 and 35) that could be interpreted reasonably as giving more emphasis to SSBN protection than would

^{1/}See pp. 129-136.

^{2/}See pp. 136-154.

be expected had the authors only had the SSBNs' deferred-strike role in mind. The first of these was Professor Stalbo's call, in effect, for both a point-defense escort for Soviet SSBNs by other naval forces as well as for a strategic-scale campaign against the putative enemy's ASW forces wherever they were to be found (in port as well as at sea). Stalbo's statement, which was an interpretation of statements in the first edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State, was viewed as having accorded sufficiently marked emphasis to SSBN protection to at least suggest the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy rather than just the deferred-strike role.

The second statement, which was taken from Admiral Gorshkov's 1977 booklet The Navy, found a different approach to the same end. He claimed that Soviet naval construction was enabling Soviet submarines and aircraft to be provided with "comprehensive support" for combating "the submarines and the antisubmarine forces of an opponent". Despite the seeming elements of exaggeration and wishful thinking in this statement, the formula itself, that for providing "comprehensive support" to Soviet submarines (SSBNs to begin with, obviously), suggested a much higher level of "operational" support as well as of "combat" support than would be expected from what would seem reasonable requirements for protection of submarines for deferred-strike alone.¹

¹This is a qualitative judgment, of course, and a highly tentative one. The reader, having all the relevant evidence available herein, can draw his own conclusions.

I. Whether the Navy Credited as an Instrument for the Direct "Defense of the Country" or Just as an "Important Means of the Supreme High Command"^{1/} -- Our previous analysis (pp. 155-158) of the 29 statements assembled in Appendix I for the 1971-1979 period concerning the "defense-of-the-country" indicators versus those for the "Armed Forces"/"Supreme High Command" lead to the conclusions that:

- 1) The two sets of indicators are not mutually exclusive as would be necessary for them to be of real analytical use; rather their selection for use depends on which SSBN role is being discussed;
- 2) The "Armed Forces"/"Supreme High Command" indicator pair is used to refer to the SSBNs' war-fighting capabilities for strategic strike against naval-related "operational" targets; and
- 3) The "defense-of-the-country" indicator is used to refer to the SSBNs' deferred-strike role as a reserve, backup to the SMF for deep strike against the continental U.S.
- 4) Neither of these two indicators apply to the protracted SSBN withholding role.

While the "defense-of-the-country" indicator theoretically could be applied equally well to refer to a protracted-withholding strategy for the SSBNs (as per our working hypothesis), there was no contextual evidence in any of the 29 statements to support a conclusion that it is actually being so used. Accordingly, it is clear that we have drawn a blank with these indicators, both for this period and for the previous period from 1962-1971.

^{1/}See p. 154-158.

J. The Navy's Influence on the "Course and Outcome" of a War or on Achieving its Aims^{1/} -- Out of the 35 "course-and-outcome" statements for the 1971-79 period assembled in Appendix J, only one (by Admiral Alekseyev in 1974, para. 55) gave full support to the working hypothesis that statements claiming that the Navy could exercise a "decisive" or "enormous" influence on the "outcome" of a war constituted an indication of the existence of an official SSBN-withholding strategy. The other 32 claims regarding the Navy's degree of influence on a general nuclear war were found to be defective in one way or another. Since it seems unwarranted to accord much analytical credence to a single isolated statement among so many, the effort to compile and analyze these initially most promising of indicators appears so far to have been largely in vain.^{2/}

At this juncture, the results from the preceding analysis of all ten sets of the indicators compiled in the appendices may be thrown onto the scales to see where the weight of evidence lies. First a rough balancing will be made by merely listing the results from each appendix for the 1971-79 period in tabular form. Then, this gross summary will be used as an outline for an appraisal of the overall significance of the data covering the 1971-79 period.

^{1/}See pp. 158-164.

^{2/}In view of the multiplicity of variations in the "course-and-outcome" formulations, it may be that the data contains more significance for SSBN withholding than the preparing analyst has been able to fathom. Any suggestions to this end would be welcomed.

APPENDIX		CONTRADICTORY INDICATIONS	DATA NOT APPLICABLE	CONFIRMATIVE INDICATIONS	CONSISTENT INDICATIONS
A.	RESERVES	-	X	-	-
B.	POSITIVE	-	-	X	-
C.	INVULNERABILITY	-	X	-	-
D.	READINESS	-	-	-	X
E.	OPPOSITION	-	-	X	-
F.	STRATEGIC STRIKE	-	-	-	X
G.	DETERRENCE	-	X	-	-
H.	SSBN PROTECTION	-	-	X	-
I.	DEFENSE-OF-THE-COUNTRY	-	X	-	-
J.	COURSE-AND-OUTCOME	-	X	-	-

TABLE 1. GROSS SUMMARY BY APPENDIX OF RESULTS RE. WORKING HYPOTHESIS THAT AN SSBN-WITHHOLDING STRATEGY WAS IN EFFECT 1971-1979

From the first vertical column in Table 1, that for "contradictory indications", it is noted that none of the appendices provided evidence contradicting our working hypothesis that an SSBN-withholding strategy was in official effect from April 1971 to the present. The second ("data-not-applicable") column shows that five of the ten appendices provided no useful information of any kind. The third ("confirmative-indications") column indicates that three appendices (B, E, and H) did provide positive support for our working hypothesis. In the fourth ("consistent-indications") column, two appendices (D and F) are checked as having yielded such strong negative indications of the SSBNs' readiness for, or assignment to,

strategic strike as to lend further credence to the existence of such a strategy, provided that the existence of SSBN withholding could be established in the first place.

Now to pull together and evaluate qualitatively the sum total of evidence in support of our working hypothesis, let us first concern ourselves with the confirmative indications of the three appendices found to contain such evidence, as checked in the third column of the foregoing table. Appendix B, the first of these three, contained a statement from the 1st (1976) edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State which was repeated basically unchanged in the 2nd (1979) revised edition that stated in essence that the "presence" or "mere existence" of naval forces that are perceived as a "potential threat of further prolonging a war or of changing its character in favor of the state possessing the stronger navy" can exert "a sometimes very substantial influence on the outcome of an armed struggle in ground theaters". Here Gorshkov (in effect) has stated the case for withholding strategic forces to favorably influence the "course and outcome" of any general nuclear war. That he had the SSBN fleet in mind as the Navy's only "strategic" force technologically capable of exerting "a sometimes very substantial influence on the outcome of a war in ground theaters" would seem to be a reasonably certain deduction. Since Gorshkov was writing a book clearly intended to be a comprehensive exposition of the Soviet Navy's proper roles and missions in peace and war, it is not surprising if he felt obliged to acknowledge the existence of such an important aspect of Soviet

strategic doctrine as the SSBN-withholding strategy. That he did so esoterically is equally unsurprising since the subject of military mission assignments is usually a sensitive one that is circumscribed by security restrictions. Having given the SSBN-withholding strategy at least its minimum due as established policy, Gorshkov went on in the book to express his opposition to that strategy -- as indicated in the following paragraph.

The second of the three appendices to contain confirmative evidence was Appendix E which was found to contain four more esoteric expressions of opposition to any SSBN-withholding strategy in addition to the one just discussed above by Fleet Admiral Smirnov, the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief. Gorshkov, Fleet Admiral Yegorov, the Chief of Main Staff, and the Navy's leading theoretician, Professor Stalbo, all were shown to have reflected such opposition in their writings in the post-XXIVth Party Congress period. The fact that Gorshkov dropped from the 2nd (1979) edition of Seapower of the State one of the less opaque indications of opposition to withholding was interpreted as more likely due to Army opposition rather than to any change of view on his part. Central to the analysis here was the conclusion that the statements involved were so esoteric, in general, that they probably reflected opposition to an existing, officially approved strategy rather than to one whose adoption was merely being contemplated. The fact that all of the top naval personages had participated in what with only slight exaggeration could be called a chorus of opposition to SSBN

withholding was evaluated as very substantial evidence in support of our working hypothesis that an SSBN-withholding strategy continued in effect from 1971 up to the present.

As can be seen from the third vertical column of the foregoing table, the third set of data evaluated as a "confirmative indicator" of an SSBN-withholding strategy was found in Appendix H. This was mainly a statement from Gorshkov's 1977 booklet The Navy in which he claimed that the Navy was being provided with the forces required to provide "comprehensive protection" for other forces requiring such support -- obviously to his SSBNs as considered generally in the Soviet Union as by far the highest-value forces in the Navy. This claim by the Navy chief that such extensive support actually was being provided the SSBNs was interpreted as constituting greater emphasis on SSBN protection than seemed likely to have resulted merely from the requirements for protecting the deferred-strike, reserve backup force to the SMF since submarines so assigned could be protected with relative ease and effectiveness in the USSR's home waters or in "maneuvering bases" employing the large coastal ASW forces built for the Soviet Navy since the '50s. Gorshkov's statement in The Navy had been preceded by six months by a Naval Digest article by Professor Stalbo in March 1977 in which the Navy's most prominent theorist and acknowledged contributor to the preparation of Seapower of the State professed to be interpreting Gorshkov in the first edition of that work on the matter of the "necessary measures" for point defense of submarines and the "special measures" required against an enemy's ASW forces --

which all sounded like a fair description of what Gorshkov is likely to have had in mind in using the "comprehensive-protection" formula. Admittedly, as footnoted in the summary evaluation of Appendix H above (pp. 169-170), the judgment that Gorshkov's views, as expounded by himself and interpreted by Stalbo, actually constituted such an over-emphasis on SSBN protection beyond any reasonable requirement for the SSBNs' deferred-strike role as to betoken a protracted withholding strategy is a rather tentative one -- but is nevertheless considered by the preparing analyst to contribute to the weight of evidence supporting our working hypothesis.

Moving on to the two appendices indicated in the fourth column of the table, we note that the convincing evidence contained in them that the SSBNs were neither being maintained in high readiness nor had been assigned a major role in strategic strike was evaluated as lending additional credence to the existence of a withholding strategy, provided only that the existence of such a strategy be established in the first place. This the "confirmative indications" just evaluated above are considered by the preparing analyst to have done reasonably well, although not with the complete certainty that is ideally desirable. Accordingly, this seemingly confirmative evidence from the two appendices checked in the fourth column of the preceding table will next be examined to determine just how much confirmation they actually afford our working hypothesis.

The potentially confirmatory evidence from the "readiness" indicators in Appendix D included a July 1979 statement by Gorshkov's First Deputy CinC, Fleet Admiral Smirnov, who employed the deep esoteric cover of a World War II historical surrogate to assert that "the Navy of the USSR must be held in readiness for active offensive operations in the open sea...". This strikes the preparing analyst as very similar to the opposition to protracted SSBN-withholding stated in historical surrogate form by Professor Belli in 1964 (Appendix E, para. 6) and by Admiral Kasatonov in 1969 (Appendix E, para. 12). Consequently, it appears to add significant support to our working hypothesis and constitutes the most recent evidence that a protracted SSBN withholding strategy was still in effect as of mid-1979. The readiness indicators in Appendix D may now be seen to be fully consistent with the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy in that the SMF continued to be credited with the highest possible degree of readiness -- that of a constant "combat alert"--- while the Navy and its SSBNs were only charged with the same normal degree of readiness required of any modern military force.

Similarly, the statements in Appendix F amply make the case for the SSBNs not having been assigned any increased role in strategic strike that might have reduced the availability for protracted withholding of whatever share of the SSBN force that had been earmarked for such purpose during the earlier 1961-1971 period. Accordingly, the data in Appendix F may be seen not only to be fully consistent with our working hypothesis that

a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy remained in effect during the 1971-1979 period but also to constitute the basis for the conclusion that, since the SSBNs do not have a major role in deep strike, the probability that they are assigned to be withheld to provide deterrence-in-war and to insure as favorable an outcome as possible is greatly increased.

In view of all of the foregoing, it is the conclusion of this chapter that protracted SSBN withholding has been in effect since the end of the XXIVth Party Congress in early April 1971 and that this strategy has been continued unchanged up to the present. Now let us turn to the final chapter with its summary of the entire 1955-1979 period and the final overall conclusions.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

To bring into better focus the volume of disparate data considered in the preceding three chapters, a summary of the evidence will first be given before the final conclusions are stated. In the process of summarizing the evidence in each appendix for the entire time span covered, this final chapter will endeavor to insure that the methodology employed has not resulted in overlooking some evidence or committing any errors.

It will be recalled that this study treated the evidence in three parts according to the working hypotheses that such a strategy had existed from at least 1955 to 1960 and 1971 up to the present but not during the middle period 1961-1971. Since we have shown that our working hypothesis for the entire middle period was in error and that, in effect, a withholding strategy enjoyed an unbroken existence for most of the quarter of a century under study, it is appropriate at this juncture to reexamine the evidence in each appendix in turn and as a whole over the entire twenty-five years to insure that there are no significant inconsistencies that were missed by the tripartite periodization employed. This possibility arises from the fact that the 1960-'61 and 1971 junctures were ones at which key changes in military policy occurred. The reader may have noted already that there were major changes in the treatment of a number of the ten sets of indicators considered on the one hand during the 1960-'61 period incident to the IVth Supreme Soviet session in January 1960 and the XXIInd Party Congress in October

1961 and on the other hand at the time of the XXIVth Party Congress in March-April 1971 -- the points in time at which the first and second chapters of this study were terminated. By making the effort to insure that there are no unreconcilable inconsistencies over the entire 25-year span of the study, we can guard against any chance that our methodology of studying the evidence in three parts has introduced errors into the analysis. Providing that this check for consistency supports our findings, we will be able to feel more confident of their validity.

Summarizing our analysis for the entire corpus of data in each appendix in turn, the results for each are as follows:

A. SSBN Assignment to the "Reserves of the State" Vice to Those of the Armed Forces^{1/} -- As noted, Military Strategy (para. 3E) provided the distinction between "state reserves" and "strategic reserves" which provided the rationale for both this appendix and the anticipation that some evidence might be found that would equate protracted SSBN-withholding with the "state reserves" and the SSBNs assigned as a contingency backup to the SMF with the "strategic reserves". Had such evidence been found and had it associated SSBNs with the "state reserves" consistently throughout the 25 years, it would have been possible to positively distinguish between the SSBNs assigned to protracted withholding and the analytically complicating SSBN role in deferred-strike as a contingency backup to the SMF. But we only found Khrushchev in January 1960

^{1/}See pp. 10-11, 89, 102-104, 164 and 173 (Table 1).

(para. 1) speaking of the "Supreme High Command" bringing up (strategic) "reserves" for, in effect, deferred strike employment and Captain Aleshkin a dozen years later referring to the "strategic forces of navies" being held in "the reserve" in the event of a non-nuclear start to a war. The latter did not specify which reserve, whether "state" or "strategic", but seemed most likely to have the latter in mind (cf. p. 103). In general the lack of sufficient data left us in the dark even as to the correctness of our analytical assumption that SSBNs assigned to protracted withholding would be retained in the "state reserves" to keep them safely in Party hands away from the Supreme High Command and its proclivity for "dissipating" the strategic forces allocated to them for war-fighting to the extent that they could not "gain supremacy in even a single direction". As a result of the lack of a sufficient data base, this initially promising "indicator" failed to contribute materially to our study.

B. The Quasi-Positive Indications^{1/} -- While the clearest references to the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy were those by Gorshkov in the 1st (1976) and 2nd (1979) editions of Seapower of the State (so that no comparison of data taken from more than one of the three periods was possible), there were two other statements which employed the same formulation even though they spanned our methodological breakpoint between chapters II and III at the XXIVth Party Congress of March-

^{1/} See pp. 39-41, 89-90, 104-108, 173 (Table 1), and 174-175.

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April 1971. The first of these two statements was by the CinC of the SMF and came in 1968 (App. B, para. 3) while the second one, an SMF-Day article, came seven months after the congress. Both of them employed the same assertion that the SMF would take care of strategic strike and the other services would only be required for consolidating these gains for final victory. This continuity not only demonstrates that the methodological break in the analysis did not damage it as far as concerns the "quasi-positive indicators" of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy, but even added some additional support to our conclusion that the withholding strategy was not terminated around the time of that Congress as some earlier analyses had concluded.

C. Claims to SSBN "Invulnerability" or "Combat Stability"^{1/}-- The statements involving these initially promising indicators were found to have been either associated with implicit pleas for more forces to prosecute the anti-SSBN mission or their potential significance was obscured by the fact that they could be accounted for adequately just by the existence of the SSBNs' deferred-strike role as a contingency backup to the SMF. Accordingly, they contributed nothing to our analysis.

D. The "Combat Readiness" Required of the Navy as Compared to the SMF^{2/} -- The data on this subject was determined to be persuasive that the SSBNs were not being held in a state of

^{1/} See pp. 37, 41-46, 90-91, 108-115, 165, and 173 (Table 1).

^{2/} See pp. 46-51, 57, 91-92, 116-119, 166-167, 173 (Table 1) and 176-177.

readiness beyond that required for the naval forces of any major power in a nuclear-missile era -- and certainly nothing akin to the constant "alert" status of the SMF's ICBMs. This conclusion was seen as fully consistent with the existence of a protracted SSBN withholding strategy although by no means confirmative of such a strategy. Of particular note here is that there was a high degree of consistency throughout the '60s and '70s in the essence of the "readiness" indicators. The SMF continued to be reported in a uniquely high state of combat readiness. The normal readiness implied for the Navy in general was applied to all naval forces with no exception made for the SSBN force. Accordingly, we may conclude that no significant errors were introduced into our analysis of the statements on naval readiness as a result of our methodology.

E. Evidence of Opposition to any SSBN-Withholding Strategy.^{1/} -- In both the '60s and '70s we find protests against SSBN withholding by Admiral Gorshkov, one of his top deputies, and his leading theoretician of the decade (Belli in the '60s and Stalbo in the '70s). While the deep cover of historical surrogates used by Belli in '64 and Fleet Admiral Kasatonov in '69 has not been employed in the '70s as far as reading all of the available literature can determine, this may be accounted for by a number of reasons without reading any significance for our analysis into it. The key fact is that the expressions of esoteric opposition have continued and

^{1/}See pp. 51-53, 92-94, 119-124, 167-168, 173 (Table 1) and 175-176.

seem to point most logically to opposition to an existing strategy of protracted SSBN withholding. The only other difference discernible between the pre-XXIVth Party Congress in March-April 1971 and the period since then is the absence of any comparable expressions of opposition to SSBN withholding on the part of the Army "modernists". Again, however, this could be explained by a variety of reasons so that there is no grounds for interpreting this discontinuity as of significance either for our conclusions or for the methodology employed. Consequently, if one grants the preparing analyst's assumption that this continued esoteric opposition by the leading "naval persons" over two decades can only be due to an officially established policy rather than one that has been continuously threatened for 20 years but never adopted, then it would seem that we have very convincing evidence in this one data set alone that such a strategy has been, and remains, in effect.

F. Navy's SSBNs Not Assigned Major Strike Role vs. U.S.^{1/}--

The statements on this subject (with one exception to be mentioned) are highly consistent over the entire quarter century in their insistent implication both that the SMF has retained the major share of the deep strike mission against the continental U.S. and that the Navy's SSBNs have not been given any share in that role beyond a contingency backup role in the obviously unexpected event that the SMF cannot destroy all of its assigned deep-strike targets in the initial nuclear exchange and subsequently requires help from the SSBN force. The sole

^{1/}See pp. 1-2, 4-9, 12-14, 30-31, 34-37, 54-69, 94-96, 119-129, 167-168, 173 (Table 1), 176-177.

exception to the above were the changes made to the 2nd (1963) and 3rd (1968) editions of Military Strategy which gave the superficial impression that the SSBW force actually had been assigned a major role in deep strike. The preparing analyst believes that the inconsistencies of such claims both with other statements contained first in the last two editions of the Armed Forces' General staff study edited by Marshal Sokolovskiy and secondly in statements from other naval and military sources have adequately supported the conclusion that these statements were indeed an effort at "dezinformatsiya" to enhance the USSR's deterrent credibility by portraying Soviet SSBNs in the mirror image of U.S. SSBNs that the Soviet leadership believed (correctly) would find easy acceptance by the U.S. and other NATO allies. The preparing analyst also considers that the numerous statements of the period between the XXIIIrd Party Congress in 1966 and the XXIVth in 1971 that the SSBN force shared in defeating as well as in deterring the enemy have been adequately explained as referring primarily to the Navy's anti-CVA and anti-SSBN missions plus their modest mission for "operational" strike at naval-related "shore" targets rather than as a valid indication that the SMF had been forced finally to share its birthright of a monopoly on deep strategic strike with the Navy. Consequently, the data in Appendix F is considered to be of such high consistency for the entire period under review as to alleviate any concern that our three-period methodology had introduced any significant error into this analysis. Even more importantly, the demonstrated

lack of any assignment to the SSBN force of a major share in deep strike was evaluated as greatly increasing the probability (despite the deferred-strike role as contingency backup for the SMF "if required") that a substantial share of the SSBN force is officially assigned to a protracted withholding role. In such a role they could be expected to continue to provide what Thomas Schelling has termed "deterrence-in-war" and to exert both a critical influence on any political bargaining conducted during the "course" of a war as well as to serve as a surviving force-in-being to influence any war-termination negotiations in the USSR's favor.

G. Whether Navy Credited with Roles in Both Strategic Strike and Deterrence or in Deterrence Alone^{1/} -- The data bearing on this indicator was assembled and analyzed in the hope that at least the Navy's just being credited with a deterrent role after the XXIVth Party Congress in 1971 while the SMF continued to be credited with both roles in deterring and, if need be, in defeating an enemy (as had been concluded in earlier analyses) would provide a valid indication that the primary role of the SSBN force had become that of deterrence in war as well as in peace by means of being subjected to protracted withholding. As the evidence showed, however, the earlier analyses were grounded on too narrow a data base and had missed evidence that showed that only SMF sources continued to credit their service with playing a

^{1/}See pp. 3, 69-71, 96, 129-136, 169, and 173 (Table 1).

continuing role in defeating the opponent in a general nuclear war while the Defense Ministry marshals and the Navy followed Brezhnev's line of detente-cum-peaceful coexistence and ceased speaking publicly about anything as likely to unsettle its desired detente partners as talk of "defeating" them. Consequently, this indicator proved invalid and so contributed nothing to the analysis per se (although the collected data did contain much of peripheral interest). For this reason, the question as to any adverse effect that the choice of methodology might have had on the analysis does not arise.

H. Apparent Over-Emphasis on SSBN-Protection Beyond that Appropriate for the Deferred-Strike Role^{1/} -- Two pieces of evidence related to providing general-purpose forces for SSBN protection were evaluated previously as giving such great implicit emphasis to the requirement for a far larger effort to provide "combat stability" to the SSBNs as to at least strongly suggest that not only the contingency deferred-strike role but the assigned protracted withholding role lay at their basis. The first of these was an interpretation in March 1977 of the 1st (1976) edition of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State by Professor Stalbo who called not only for enough forces to provide point defense for all of the USSR's SSBNs but also for a strategic-scale campaign to destroy an enemy's ASW forces wherever they might be found at sea or in port. The second item was from Gorshkov's booklet The Navy which appeared

^{1/} See pp. 3, 14-19, 31-32, 72-79, 96-97, 136-154, 169-170, and 173 (Table 1).

in September 1977 and contained the assertion that the Navy was being supplied with enough ships to provide "comprehensive protection" to Soviet SSBNs. Such protection, of course, logically would involve SSBNs in home waters or "maneuvering" bases, those sortieing and returning to base through the GIUK Gap or other choke points, and those SSBNs maintained on combat patrol near or within launch range of their coastal targets. After reviewing all the evidence on the pro-SSBN indicator (on the pages listed in the footnote to the heading for this section), the preparing analyst was satisfied that the methodology employed in this study had not introduced any significant error but was struck with the likely invalidity of his underlying assumption that greater forces would be provided for the protection of withheld SSBNs than for those held in reserve for possible use for deferred strikes. This assumption had been based on the fact that the withholding role was an officially assigned one which could be expected to be accorded greater support than the contingency one for deferred strike in the event that the SMF fails to destroy all of its assigned deep strike targets. However, in reviewing the evidence it was noted that in Professor Pavlovich's 1974 statement (p. 145) he made his call for "support" forces of all kinds in the context of a war whose initial period would be decisive -- thus implying that the greater basis for the requirement for pro-SSBN forces is the deferred-strike role rather than the withholding one. When this possibility is considered in light of

Gorshkov's long-standing opposition to protracted withholding and his concomitant desire for a major or even predominant share with the SMF in the single most-prestigious and best-funded mission in the USSR's military mission structure, that for the initial deep strike against the continental United States, then it seems more likely that Gorshkov would give greater attention to obtaining the general-purpose forces that could be used for carrying out such a share in the deep strike mission. For all practical purposes in Soviet calls for larger pro-SSBN forces, the deferred-strike role has stood in loco parentis for the as-yet unborn deep-strike mission for the SSBNs. In view of this situation, the preparing analyst now considers it unwarranted to place any great credence in the statements by Stalbo and Gorshkov cited above as providing any significant degree of confirmation of the existence of the SSBN withholding role. Fortunately for the analysis, this evidence is not necessary to supplement that previously presented from the "positive" and "opposition" indicators contained in Appendices B and E to adequately ground the existence of such a role for some significant part of the SSBN force.

I. Whether the Navy Credited as an Instrument for the "Direct Defense of the Country" or Just as an "Important Means of the Supreme High Command"^{1/} -- In the first chapter these indicators bid fair to constitute substantial evidence that a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in effect from

^{1/} See pp. 20-23, 80-82, 97, 154-158, 171, and 173 (Table 1).

at least mid-'57 to mid-'60 provided only that analysis of these indicators for the subsequent two periods substantiated the initial evidence that the "defense-of-the-country" indicator was used to refer to the protracted-withholding role. This was not to prove the case, as was initially demonstrated by the evidence for the 1962-1971 period considered in the second chapter. That evidence showed that six of the seven meaningful statements employing the "defense" indicator did so with reference to the anti-SSBN mission while only one was even suggestive of an SSBN role. From the data for the 1971-1979 period treated in the third chapter we learned, by the fortunate coincidence of Admiral Grishanov having used each indicator in a different article only four months apart, both that their use is not mutually exclusive and that the "defense" indicator is used to refer to the SSBNs' reserve backup role to the SMF rather than to their protracted-withholding role as we had hypothesized (p. 81). It was also evidenced that Grishanov's use of the "Armed-Forces" indicator referred to the SSBNs' "operational" strike role against those coastal targets directly related to the Navy's assigned theater missions for anti-CVA and anti-SSBN (and also to anti-SLOC when and if the mission were assigned). Consequently it was obvious that the "defense" and "Armed-Forces" indicators would be of no help in our quest for evidence on protracted SSBN withholding.

J. The Navy's Influence on the "Course and Outcome" of a War or on Achieving Its Aims¹ -- These two indicators, which right up to the recent past continued to appear as promising as they are perplexing, were finally evaluated as "not applicable" to protracted SSBN withholding. The clearest evidence of this in the '60s was found in Vice Admiral Yakovlev's 1966 and 1968 editions of The Soviet Navy in which he made it clear that the Navy's "direct influence on the course and outcome of a war" was derived from its anti-SSBN mission and not from protracted SSBN withholding as postulated. In the '70s, only one statement out of 33 (by Admiral Alekseyev in 1974) proved to be an unequivocal assertion that the Navy was capable of exerting a high degree of influence ("enormous") on the "course and outcome" of a war. It was concluded that this was too little evidence considering that the other 32 statements avoided making a claim that the Navy would have been eager to make if it were at all warranted. Consequently, this indicator too had to be written off as of no analytical value.

The question to which this study was addressed, as stated in the Preface was:

Are the Soviets planning to withhold a significant part of their SSBN force beyond the initial period of a general nuclear war for intrawar deterrence/bargaining and war-termination negotiations?

¹ See pp. 23-29, 82-89, 98-99, 158-164, 172, and 173 (Table 1).

From the foregoing summaries of the evidence in each of the ten appendices for the full span of years covered by each one, it may be concluded that the main evidence on which the answer to this question must be based is that drawn from the "positive" indications of the existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy in Appendix B and the esoteric expressions of "opposition" to such a strategy contained in Appendix E. In addition, the evidence on naval "readiness" in Appendix D and that in Appendix F on the Navy's continued lack of success in winning a major share with the SMF in the deep strike mission against the U.S. were seen to be fully consistent with the main finding that a protracted-withholding strategy for some significant part of the SSBN force had been in effect continuously for the 20 years from January 1960 to January 1980. Finally, for the reasons just stated on page 189-190, the data on SSBN-protection contained in Appendix H was found to be unreliable and dropped as the third of the three appendices initially evaluated as containing confirmative evidence of a protracted withholding strategy for some meaningful share of Soviet SSBNs (see Table 1, page 173). From the foregoing, a gross evaluation of the utility for this study of each appendix is shown in Table 2:

APPENDIX		CONTRADICTIONARY INDICATIONS	DATA NOT APPLICABLE	CONFIRMATIVE INDICATIONS	CONSISTENT INDICATIONS
A.	RESERVES	-	X	-	-
B.	POSITIVE	-	-	X	-
C.	INVULNERABILITY	-	X	-	-
D.	READINESS	-	-	-	X
E.	OPPOSITION	-	-	X	-
F.	STRATEGIC STRIKE	-	-	-	X
G.	DETERRENCE	-	X	-	-
H.	SSBN PROTECTION	-	X	-	-
I.	DEFENSE-OF-THE-COUNTRY	-	X	-	-
J.	COURSE-AND-OUTCOME	-	X	-	-

TABLE 2: GROSS SUMMARY BY APPENDIX OF RESULTS RE. WORKING HYPOTHESES THAT AN SSBN-WITHHOLDING STRATEGY WAS IN EFFECT 1960-1980

There remains still one analytical hurdle to clear. The existence of the SSBNs' deferred-strike role has negated such a large number of statements that otherwise would have provided conclusive evidence of a protracted withholding role for them that it seems only prudent to take a last, hard look at the evidence in the "positive" and "opposition" categories (App. B&E) to make certain that it cannot be satisfactorily accounted for too by just the deferred strike role -- and at the same time to double-check that the weight of evidence supports our conclusion that a protracted SSBN withholding strategy has been in effect since at least 1960.

First to be scrutinized is the "positive" evidence contained in Appendix B; the statement from the 1966² and 1969² editions of Gorshkov's Seapower of the State stating the "sometimes very substantial influence" on the "outcome" of a war that can be exerted by the "mere existence" of naval forces strong enough to be perceived as "a potential threat of further prolonging a war or of changing its character" in favor of, in effect, the state having such strong forces surviving into the later stages of a general nuclear war. This, of course, is not only a very apt description of the nature and likely consequences of a protracted withholding strategy, it is not in the slightest descriptive of the deferred-strike role. The hypothesis seems persuasive that Gorshkov was, in fact, giving protracted SSBN withholding its due -- and for the reason that he scarcely could fail to at least allude to such an

important part of the USSR's strategy for nuclear deterrence in a book of such comprehensive and highly policy-oriented nature (and his legacy to the next generation). This persuasiveness is not lessened in the preparing analyst's view by the evidence over two decades testifying to Gorshkov's persistent campaigning to secure a major role in deep strike for the SSBN force. This of necessity, could only be accomplished at the expense of either or both of the SSBNs' assignments to deferred-strike and protracted withholding.

Turning now to the "opposition" statements contained in Appendix E, the matter is somewhat less straightforward. The statements by Professor Belli and Admiral Kasatonov in the '60s using historical analogies, as Soviet military writers habitually do, particularly to express opposition to established policy positions, seem to the preparing analyst to be as clearcut evidence of opposition to an existing strategy of protracted SSBN withholding as one could hope to find in Soviet writings. It will be recalled that Professor Belli explicitly condemned the "idea of withholding forces" as "pernicious" in that it was tantamount to "renouncing their correct employment in the present" in an "attempt to protect forces for the future" (Appendix E, para. 6). Similarly, Admiral Kasatonov asserted that, although withholding the main striking force of a navy was "considered a severe lessening of the victor's chances of imposing his will on the vanquished" in war-termination negotiations, nevertheless the potential initial

results of such withholding were so dire as to greatly diminish a belligerent's chances from the outset of ever becoming the "victor". This situation, Kasatonov claimed, arises from two factors": 1) The failure to exploit the capabilities of the main striking force because it was being withheld from use "significantly restricted the ability of a navy to wage war", and 2) Such "considerable resources" in terms of the remaining naval forces were required to afford the "best possible defense against enemy strikes" that not only was the residual war-fighting capability of a navy whose main striking force was being withheld "significantly restricted" but the initiative of the naval high command was "frequently stifled". The result of SSBN withholding, as described by the admiral who was then Gorshkov's top deputy, was just the opposite of what proponents of SSBN withholding might hope to achieve by such a strategy: it "decreased the influence of naval warfare on the course and outcome of a war as a whole" (Appendix E, para. 12).

The general nature and disparaging tenor of such comments in the '60s as those just quoted from Belli and Kasatonov as well as the facts that these two were, respectively, Gorshkov's leading strategic planner and his top executive assistant but nevertheless found it expedient to resort to the deepest "cover" available in the Soviet military and naval practice of esoteric communication all combine to provide persuasive evidence that it was the official policy line of the Party leaders and Defense Ministry marshals

(that protracted SSBN withholding should be continued) which was being so roundly criticized. Gorshkov's earlier argument in 1962 that all of the strategic strike capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces should be employed in the initial nuclear exchange was essentially the same as far as it went as Kasatonov's implicit point in 1969: "We'll have our hands full even if we use all we have; let's not jeopardize our chances by agreeing with the withholding of the Navy's main strike forces, the SSBNs". Moreover, Gorshkov's point in 1963 and 1964 (that improvements in ASW, e.g. the elusive "breakthrough" that would make the oceans transparent, could be expected, in effect, to make protracted SSBN-withholding too risky) strikes one as a rather strained debating point made with the same aim of discrediting such a strategy as Belli's statement quoted above attempted to do a year later.

It is relevant to note that both of Gorshkov's points described above conceivably could only have referred to the SSBNs' deferred-strike role rather than to protracted withholding. However, the statements by Belli and Kasatonov were so explicit in describing continued withholding throughout the "course" of a war and until the very end when its "outcome" was decided that there seems virtually no reason to doubt that they were referring to a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy.

When one leaves the '60s for the '70s, and exchanges Professor Belli for his successor, Professor Stalbo, and Kasatonov for Fleet Admiral Yegorov, Chief of Main Staff, one finds, rather

ironically, that the evidence for the period for which previous analyses had concluded that a protracted SSBN withholding policy was in existence is not nearly as clear and convincing as for the '60s when those analyses had concluded that such a strategy was not in existence. This becomes particularly clear from our present line of inquiry, in part because the historical surrogate use by Yegorov (Appendix E, para. 19) to the effect that USSR would be "obligated" to employ its SSBNs for the "fastest possible accomplishment" of "the assigned missions" is somewhat better explained by the deferred-strike role than by a protracted-withholding one. Similarly, the assertion by Gorshkov in both editions of Seapower of the State (Appendix E, paras. 17 and 18) that submarines could "achieve strategic aims" given their "correct employment" could also apply equally well to deferred strike. Only Professor Stalbo's blunt characterization of not employing the SSBNs at all in a general nuclear war for the delivery of powerful nuclear strikes" as "impossible to imagine" provided an unmistakable objection to protracted withholding.

Having reasonably satisfied ourselves that at least some substantial evidence remains that cannot be explained away by the SSBNs' deferred-strike role, let us now turn finally to the overall conclusions to this study that our evidence warrants. Since the evidence already has been discussed in full detail, the final conclusions will merely be stated without further elaboration in the expectation that the reader of this study is by now so familiar with the evidence that it need not be repeated again.

Accordingly, the following conclusions are considered to be analytically supportable by the evidence adduced in the main body of this study:

1) A protracted SSBN-withholding strategy was in official force during the '60s and '70s without interruption and continues up to the present (mid-January 1980);

2) The existence of a protracted SSBN-withholding strategy in the late '50s cannot be substantiated from the available evidence. The very lack of any esoteric expressions of opposition to such a strategy (such as were found for the '60s and '70s) would require a considerable weight of evidence to overcome -- and no such evidence was found;

3) The protracted SSBN-withholding strategy in all probability was announced officially (although not publicly) by Khrushchev in January 1960 as part of the first nuclear-era mission structure for the Armed Forces (including the Strategic Missile Forces, whose formation at that juncture precipitated the reformulation of missions under the USSR's unified military doctrine and strategy);

4) The XXIInd Party Congress in October 1961 presumably ratified the new mission structure for the Armed Forces, including the role of some significant portion of the SSBN force to be withheld to favorably influence the course and outcome of any general nuclear war;

5) The protracted SSBN-withholding strategy remained in effect through the XXIIIrd Party Congress in 1966 and the XXIVth in March-April 1971, contrary to earlier analyses that held that no such strategy was adopted until around the time of the XXIVth Congress in 1971;

6) The protracted SSBN-withholding strategy continued through the '70s, remaining unchanged by the XXVth Party Congress in 1976, and gives every evidence of remaining in force as of the date of completion of this report (15 January 1980); and

7) Over the entire two decades from January 1960 to the present, Admiral Corshkov and his top aides and academicians have waged a persistent campaign to win a share with the Strategic Missile Forces in the initial deep strike at the continental United States. Persuasive evidence was turned up indicating that the Navy still has met with no success in this long bureaucratic struggle to at least half unhorse the Army marshals supporting the SMF's retention of its chartered sway over the deep-strike mission. This evidence is consistent with, and highly suggestive of, the continued existence of the protracted-withholding strategy. Only the existence of such a strategy would provide some semblance of an adequate mission for the SSBNs to at least superficially compensate for their having only a minor "operational" strike mission at coastal missile targets for the small part of the SSBN force maintained constantly on missile-launch station and a reserve, backup mission for deferred-strike in the contingency that the SMF fails to destroy its assigned targets for the initial nuclear exchange.

Appendix A

SSBN ASSIGNMENT TO THE "RESERVES OF THE STATE" VICE TO THOSE OF THE ARMED FORCES

1) Khrushchev, report to the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet, 14 January 1960, Stenographic Report, PolititIzdat, 1960, p. 38:

At this IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet in mid-January 1960 at which Khrushchev announced the formation of the Strategic Missile Forces and the first nuclear-era mission assignments for the five services of the Armed Forces, the Party leader also claimed that, in the event of a surprise nuclear attack on the USSR, the Supreme High Command would "always" find it "possible to bring reserve means into operation and hit targets from reserve positions".

2) Rear Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, April 1961, pp. 27-28:

"The necessity for the withholding /reservirovaniye/ of forces in former times appeared as an objective regularity for the conduct of each one of the branches of combat activity. The skill to consider /employing/ the reserve in good time and to use it to best advantage largely determined the success of battle. Therefore, for a long time, reserve groups were considered an inseparable part of the order of battle.

"At the present time, /however,/ in connection with the sharp change in the nature of combat action (especially with regard to the significant growth in its rapidity), withholding forces, especially those included in the composition of strike groups of the order of battle, is not expedient."

3) Military Strategy, 1st edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 24 May 1962:

A. "Soviet military theoreticians...in working out the theory of strategy paid special attention to the problems of the formation, employment and replacement of strategic reserves. In the concept of 'strategic reserves' was included not only the troop units at the disposal of the Supreme High Command but also the manpower and economic resources of the country for assuring the conduct of an intense and protracted war. However, in the practical resolution of this problem, mistakes were made as shown by the fact that, despite the permanent threat of a war's outbreak, we had not produced the essential supplies of armaments and combat equipment which would assure the mobilization requirements of our Armed Forces." (p. 154);

B. "However, there were also serious errors in the employment of the strategic reserves...when the Soviet command...permitted its forces and equipment to be dissipated, which prevented gaining supremacy in even a single direction" (p. 170);

C. "Among the most important problems of strategic defense resolved by Soviet military strategy in the years of the last war, the following should be included: determination of the direction of the main strike of the enemy, construction of a strategic defense and the methods for reestablishing a strategic front, methods for the conduct of a defense and for the employment of the strategic reserves, and the creation of the conditions for shifting to a counter-offensive" (p. 176).

D. "Thus, only the availability of strategic reserves to the Staff of the Supreme High Command /after the German breakthrough at Bryansk in October 1941/ afforded the possibility of reestablishing a strategic front of defense, to echelon it deeply...to form major strategic groupings in the main directions and thereby ensure the successful conduct of defensive operations" (p. 179); and

E. "...the reserves of material means are divided into... strategic and state reserves...by strategic reserves of material is meant that part of the state reserves which is made available to the Supreme High Command. All other reserves constitute state reserves" (p. 373).

4) Captain First Rank Aleshkin, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 25:

"In the event of a non-nuclear start to a war...the strategic forces of navies...will always be found in the reserve."

5) R. Tumkovskiy, Naval Digest, July 1974, p. 95:

"Many naval specialists of the U.S. and other NATO countries consider that aircraft carrier striking formations must carry out the following specific missions...delivery of nuclear strikes on targets which have not been destroyed by other strategic forces" (Emphasis supplied).

6) Materials for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1975, p. 31:

It is stated that in World War II some of the best units of the Army artillery were assigned to the "Reserve of the Supreme High Command" (for which the acronym "RVGK" is given after the Russian rendering: "Reserv Verkhovnogo Glavnogo Komandovaniya") and that these reserve forces were "employed in critical sectors for the offensive as well as for defense".

Appendix B

THE QUASI-POSITIVE INDICATIONS

- 1) Military Strategy, 1st edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 24 May 1962, p. 340:

"...it must be kept in mind that the first massive nuclear-missile strike may not tell on the course of the war right away."

- 2) N. Potapov, Dotsent, Red Star, 26 September 1962:

"For screening nuclear-powered missile submarines during their activity at sea, American military officials have proposed to accomplish this, too, with nuclear-powered submarines--but with ones with torpedo armament. It is considered that the antisubmarine defense of each such missile submarine must be supported by two nuclear-powered torpedo-attack submarines."

- 3) Marshal Krylov, Rural Life, 23 February 1968:

"The most significant expression of the reconstruction of our Armed Forces was establishment of the Strategic Missile Forces, which was the personification of our Motherland's nuclear might...While assigning our Strategic Missile Forces the role of the main nuclear striking force, Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the fact that, in order to achieve final victory over an aggressor, it is necessary to combine the efforts of all of the services of the Armed Forces.../After separate paragraphs on the Ground Forces, the PVO, and the Air Forces, the Commander in Chief, SMF continued/: "Our mighty Navy possesses everything necessary to successfully carry out the missions assigned to it. Its might is based on missile-armed, nuclear-powered submarines which are armed with long-range ballistic missiles for underwater launching". (Emphasis supplied).

- 4) Rear Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, December 1969, p. 34:

"It is precisely the basic naval operations which, in the new conditions, can be carried out only in the oceans...At the same time, obviously, it is required to conduct operations in coastal waters too..."

- 5) Materials for SMF Day-'71, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1971, pp. 27-28:

"This service of the Armed Forces has in its armament the most modern missiles of strategic designation...capable of reliably delivering on target nuclear warheads of colossal

5) (Cont'd)

power...The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, are interruptedly on combat alert, capable of immediately delivering an annihilating strike on any aggressor in any part of the planet...The high combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, however, does not lessen the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine holds that, for final victory in a modern war, it is necessary to employ the united forces of all services and service branches of the Armed Forces" (Emphasis added). (The SMF Day "Materials" go on to mention that the Ground Forces were being modernized and then disposed of the other services in short shrift: "The combat capabilities of the PVO, Air Forces and Navy have grown immeasurably.").

6) Engineering-Captain 2nd Rank Yerofeyev, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 89:

"...arming submarines with long-range missiles enables them to operate...at a significant distance from the shores of a probable enemy, reliably screened by surface ships and aviation. These submarines can launch their missiles both when transiting and when leaving their own bases, and even from points along the shores of the American continent...Arranging launch areas close to one's own shores considerably simplifies the organization of control and communications, and cuts down on the expenditure of fuel and the time spent in transit."

7) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 19:

"...the ballistic missiles of submarines insure a capability for destroying...the strategic objectives of the opponent located in the depths of his territory."

8) G. Svyatov and A. Kokoshin, International Affairs, April 1973, pp. 58-59:

"...commissioning of new submarines with the Trident missile system...will make it possible to deploy the submarines carrying them, U.S. experts believe, almost anywhere in the World Ocean. These will apparently be separate zones contiguous to the shoreline of the U.S. itself. U.S. specialists believe that this will also make it possible to concentrate there the main antisubmarine forces which will assume a new function, that of protecting the Strategic Missile Forces...

"Submarine ballistic missiles with virtually the same characteristics as the land-based missile systems...have the advantage of being able to operate covertly...Accordingly, many U.S. specialists have suggested that the sea-based offensive forces should be turned into a 'first-strike' weapon."

- 9) Vice Admiral Rudnev, Pravda of the Ukraine, 28 July 1974:

"Nuclear-powered submarines...are armed with long-range ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes. In the event of necessity, a nuclear-powered submarine could cover a great distance and take up an advantageous position for inflicting a strike on an aggressor."

- 10) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 1976, signed to press 27 November 1975, pp. 249-250:

"...history gives us examples in which a navy, by its presence alone or even by its mere existence on one of the contending sides, has exerted a tangible, sometimes a very substantial, influence on the outcome of an armed struggle in ground theaters, if only by being perceived in the capacity of a potential threat of further prolonging the war or of changing its character in favor of the state possessing the stronger navy."

- 11) N. Potapov, Professor, Scientific-Technological Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977, p. 103:

"According to the views of American specialists...the oceans are the most suitable medium for the creation of nuclear might and for its employment after the exchange of first strikes. For this reason, the second component of the missile forces /after the Minutemen ICBMs/, the 'Polaris' system began to be accorded obvious preference. Precisely it began to be represented by the military leadership of the U.S. as the sole practicable, invulnerable weapon system for general nuclear war..." (Emphasis supplied).

- 12) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979, p. 221:

"...history gives us examples in which a navy, by its presence alone or even by its mere existence /omitted: "on one of the contending sides"/ has exerted a tangible, sometimes a very substantial influence on the outcome of an armed struggle in ground theaters, if only by being perceived in the capacity of a potential threat of further prolonging the war or of changing its character in favor of the state possessing the stronger navy."

Appendix C

CLAIMS TO SSBN "INVULNERABILITY" OR "COMBAT STABILITY"

- 1) Rear Admiral Prokof'yev, Red Star, 13 January 1962:

"...missile-carrying, nuclear-powered submarines are considered basically new ships with unprecedented combat capabilities. Their advantages over other naval forces are quite obvious: stealth and mobility, unlimited operational range and concentrated striking power, great endurance and low vulnerability...Sharply increased endurance, high submerged speed and great submergence depths have complicated combat with submarines and impeded [their] detection and attack on them."

- 2) Military Strategy, 1st ed., Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 24 May 1962

A. "In the foreign press there is much discussion of the nuclear-powered submarine armed with 'Polaris' missiles. Assertions have appeared that it is the most survivable means for the employment of missiles. In actuality, even this weapon is vulnerable. Effective means against nuclear-powered missile submarines are anti-submarine submarines with homing missiles and torpedoes, and also surface warships. Missile aviation can also carry on the struggle with them, exploiting certain weak sides of these submarines, in particular, the prolonged preparation of these missiles for flight. In addition, the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces can destroy the bases of submarines" (p. 340).

B. "Combat with submarines can be conducted successfully by ASW submarines with missile and torpedo armament, aircraft, ASW hydrofoil ships with missile armaments, and also destroyers, fast coastal craft and helicopters" (p. 355).

- 3) Admiral Alafuzov, Naval Digest, January 1963, p. 94:

Sokolovskiy's work was criticized for having "categorically asserted without any basis whatsoever that nuclear-powered missile submarines were, in reality, vulnerable". "In fact", Alafuzov noted, "nuclear-powered missile submarines...have the capability of occupying missile-launch positions with expedition and stealth and of then departing quickly, thus avoiding enemy retaliation".

4) Gorshkov, Labor, 22 February 1963:

"Our Navy...has changed radically. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missiles of various [mission] designations now constitute the basis of its striking power... Being practically invulnerable, they can search out and track an opponent's warships for protracted periods and, without surfacing, employ their missiles against them in any, even the most distant, region of the World Ocean."

5) Captain First Rank Mamayev, Red Star, 4 April 1963:

"Our nuclear-powered submarines, equipped with...torpedoes with nuclear warheads of great power can conduct combat activity successfully against... enemy missile submarines, destroying them in any part of the World Ocean."

6) Gorshkov, Izvestiya, 19 May 1963:

"The assertions of U.S. military specialists about the invulnerability of American nuclear-powered submarines are without foundation. Nuclear-powered American submarines, just as submarines with conventional[diesel] propulsion, have been detected by Soviet naval forces more than once in various regions of the oceans. These submarines, no less than conventionally-powered ones, require shore bases and spend a great deal of time at them correcting various deficiencies in their machinery and systems. All of this enables us to assert that the reliance that the American imperialists are placing on nuclear-powered submarines will be refuted just as was the Pentagon's reliance on the large aircraft carrier and that the myth of the almighty system of 'Polaris' will be disproved by life itself. In general, from the military-strategic point of view, it is untenable to hold that any weapon, even the most modern, is universal. It must not be forgotten that, in the measure of the development of submarines, the measures for combating them are being modernized. The many centuries of experience of military history teach that each weapon, no matter how perfected it may be, is not capable of carrying out all of the missions in a war."

7) Aviation Major General Ruban and Colonel Antonov, Red Star, 5 June 1963:

"Polaris missile submarines...are vulnerable. Our Navy, in cooperation with the other services of the Armed Forces, will be able to cope with both land bases of submarines and submarines at sea."

- 8) Vice Admiral Ivanov, Labor, 28 July 1963:

"Practically unlimited cruising radius at great depth in combination with the stealth and high speed of submarines enables nuclear-powered submarines to search for the enemy in the broad expanses of the seas, to trail them for long periods, and to attack them repeatedly both in the open ocean and under the Arctic ice."

- 9) Military Strategy, 2nd ed. Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 August 1963.

A. "In the foreign press there is much discussion of the nuclear-powered submarine armed with 'Polaris' missiles. Assertions have appeared that it is the most survivable means for the employment of missiles. In actuality, even this weapon is vulnerable. Effective means against nuclear-powered missile submarines are anti-submarine submarines with homing missiles and torpedoes, and also surface warships. Missile aviation can also carry on the struggle with them, exploiting certain weak sides of these submarines, in particular the prolonged preparation of these missiles for flight and their great vulnerability to underwater nuclear explosions. In addition, the Soviet missile forces can destroy the bases of submarines" (p. 381).

B. "Combat with submarines can be successfully conducted by ASW submarines with missile and torpedo armament, aircraft, ASW hydrofoil ships with missile armaments, and also by destroyers, fast [coastal] craft and helicopters. (p. 399).

C. "Nuclear-powered submarines with 'Polaris' missiles can be destroyed at their bases by strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces and Long-range Aviation, and during sea transits and in regions of /missile launch/ positions by the actions of ASW submarines, Long-range Aviation, and other ASW forces and means" (p. 399).
(NOTE: This passage was added new to the 2nd Edition)

- 10) Captain First Rank Kvitnitskiy, Military-Historical Journal, November 1963, p. 49:

"With the development of nuclear-missile weapons, the vulnerability of stationary launch areas for global and intercontinental missiles became apparent -- which did not exclude the possibility of their suppression by the very first strikes at the start of a war. The comparatively long time of flight for ICBMs increased the probability of their interception and destruction...

"In the U.S. it is considered that missile submarines have low vulnerability and that, due to their great submerged endurance, they can deliver surprise nuclear strikes. Consequently, nuclear-powered missile submarines are considered one of the basic means of combat on which American military policy and strategy depend."

11) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 1st edition, signed to press 14 January 1964:

A. "Possessing unlimited cruising range, high submerged speed, great endurance and depth of submergence, they /Soviet submarines/ can operate at vast distances from their bases, remain submerged for prolonged periods, and accurately hit any objective with their missiles from underwater" (p. 598) (Note: This edition lacked any claim to invulnerability or even "stealth"; a claim to the latter quality in Soviet submarines was added to the comparable paragraph in the 2nd (1967) edition. See para. 28A following.)

B. "/Soviet/ submarines today are capable of...destroying the missile submarines of an opponent....Along with submarines...further development is also being given to other forces of the navy: surface ships and...aviation, which are capable of delivering powerful nuclear strikes on...submarines of the enemy in distant regions of the oceans..." (p. 598). "The Soviet Navy is an oceanic navy, one capable of successfully fighting an enemy at great distances from its /the Soviet Navy's/ bases and of destroying surface ships and submarines in the oceans" (p. 606).

C. "Today there are no invulnerable objectives on a /ny/ continent just as there are also no regions in the World Ocean where, in the course of combat, the combatant ships /both surface and submarine/ and merchant ships of an opponent are not subject to the threat of destruction" (p. 600).

12) Radio Moscow in English to North America, 30 January 1964:

"The speed of our nuclear-powered submarines is greater than the speed of U.S. nuclear-powered submarines and their number is no less than yours...their range is practically unlimited. They sail at great depth and great speed. They can find and strike the enemy anywhere in the world, even under the Arctic ice. They can stay at sea for long periods and can successfully seek and attack fast-moving enemy surface vessels in faraway places. They can pursue and destroy enemy submarines in the ocean depths or under the Arctic ice."

13) Gorshkov, Economic Gazette, 22 February 1964:

"McNamara was forced to admit that one could not cherish any real hope of being able to destroy the main part of the Soviet missile submarine fleet by means of a first strike."

14) Gorshkov, Red Star, 21 March 1964:

"In a number of cases our ships and naval aviation have given examples of operational and active actions as a result of which some foreign states have been persuaded that they cannot count on their aircraft carriers and submarines being invulnerable in a war, regardless of what region they may be in."

15) Y. Shvedkov, International Affairs (in English), May 1964, pp. 57 & 60:

"U.S. Polaris submarines (at the beginning of 1964 twelve were operational; by 1970 the figure should be over forty) are by no means an isolated autarchic system...on the contrary, their efficiency depends entirely on the work of surface bases and installations..."

"In addition to logistic, intermediary, and advanced bases, the U.S. Navy in general and its missile-carrying submarines in particular need an extensive communications system and control and navigation systems..."

"Naturally, surface installations servicing submarine missile carriers cannot avoid a retaliatory blow. American military specialists themselves note that the radio stations which guide atomic submarines and help them train their missiles on the targets is one of the weakest points of the entire system."

16) Gorshkov, chapter in The Nuclear Era and War, Marshal Grechko (Ed.), Izvestiya Press, signed to press 15 July 1964, pp. 65-66. (Note: This is a reprint of Gorshkov's article from Izvestiya of 19 May 1963 with additions as underlined and omissions as bracketed):

"The assertions of U.S. military specialists about the undetectability and the invulnerability of American nuclear-powered submarines are without foundation. Nuclear-powered American submarines, just as submarines with conventional [diesel] propulsion, have been detected and trailed by Soviet naval forces more than once in various regions of the oceans. These submarines, no less than conventionally-powered ones, require shore bases and spend a great deal of time at them [correcting various deficiencies in their machinery and systems]. By admission of the American press, of three submarines sent out on combat patrol in the Mediterranean, only two are constantly on station while the third is forced to be in port correcting various deficiencies in their machinery and systems.

"The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, Vice Admiral Griffin correctly states that 'missile submarines require seagoing bases for their resupply, minor repairs, and change of crews but the seagoing bases require shore bases'. This is obviously the case. The nuclear-powered American submarine SAM HOUSTON, for example, was forced to dock in the Turkish port of Izmir less than two months after her arrival in the Mediterranean.

"All of this enables us to assert that the reliance that the American imperialists are placing on nuclear-powered submarines will be refuted just as was the Pentagon's reliance on the large aircraft carrier and that the myth of the almighty system of 'Polaris' will be disproved by life itself. In general, from the military-strategic point of view, it is untenable to hold that any weapon, even the most modern is universal or 'absolute'. It must not be forgotten that, in the measure of the development of submarines, the measures for combatting them are being modernized. The many centuries experience of military history teach that each weapon, no matter how perfected it may be, is not capable of carrying out all of the missions in a war. As concerns the Soviet Armed Forces, they possess a heterogeneous arsenal of means for the timely detection and destruction of the nuclear-powered warships of the enemy. With these means, our /Strategic/Missile Forces, /Long-range/ Aviation, and forces of the Navy can annihilate these submarines in their home ports, and forward bases as well as in their oceanic stations."

17) Admiral Grishanov, Agitator No. 13, July 1964, p. 15:

"Already now the aircraft carriers and submarines of some foreign states no longer may be considered 'invisible', 'in-accessible', and in the event of war 'invulnerable' regardless of in what sea or ocean they may be."

18) Admiral Sergeyev, Soviet Russia, 26 July 1964:

"Our submarines are ready to act not only against surface warships, convoys and shore targets but...to conduct search, detection, and destruction of the opponent's submarines, those equipped with Polaris among them".

19) Marshal V. Sokolovskiy and Major-General M. Cherednichenko, Red Star, 28 August 1964:

"The American press extolls in every way possible their submarines with 'Polaris' missiles, proclaiming them invulnerable. In actuality, these ballistic missiles have substantial inadequacies; low missile-warhead power, low reliability and accuracy of the

control system and, as a result, low accuracy of fire. The 'Polaris' are sufficiently vulnerable and it is possible to successfully combat them -- which even the Americans have been forced to admit. Missile submarines can be destroyed /only/ in the regions of their basing by strikes of the [Strategic] Missile Forces, submarines, and aviation. Such means of combat as ASW submarines, aviation, and also helicopters, surface ASW ships, after their detection of an enemy submarine, are capable of destroying it quickly."

20) Aviation Major-General Nevzorov, Naval Digest, September 1964, pp. 27-28:

"The threat from modern missile submarines already acquires strategic significance. However, it must not be concluded (as for example is done by certain illustrious American military specialists) that missile submarines are invulnerable overall and moreover to list them as what is termed an 'absolute weapon'. Even modern submarines are unquestionably vulnerable. For example, they are not such that they can remain out in the oceans all the time but must be at base (floating and stationary) where they can be destroyed despite their very high tactical-technical qualities. Modern submarines can be detected and subsequently destroyed by ASW forces (among them aviation) not only at base but in the ocean. In the military press of various countries it is noted that it is very dangerous for example, for submarines to penetrate straits and narrows which can be reliably closed by positional means of obstruction and kept under constant ASW surveillance."

21) V. Polanskiy, Red Star, 27 December 1964:

"But in our time there are no invulnerable means of combat. The Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary, in case of need, to render harmless the nuclear-powered missile submarines of an aggressor as well as his fixed and mobile bases."

22) Captain First Rank V'yunenko, Naval Digest, January 1965, p. 82:

"McNamara...admits that the U.S. would not be able to 'destroy the basic part of Soviet missile submarines'."

23) Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, July 1965, p. 7:

"Submarines with nuclear propulsion have been built... These powerful nuclear-powered submarines, which are invulnerable to an enemy, rightfully occupy the leading place in the composition of our Navy... Such submarines are capable of carrying out successfully combat missions in conflict with

the striking forces of an enemy, against both submarines as well as surface ships, and to destroy from great distances vitally important objectives on his territory."

24) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, DOSAAF Press signed to press 8 January 1966:

A. "Nuclear-powered submarines, thanks to their high mobility, high stealth and unlimited distance of cruising have spread the threat of the delivery of strikes throughout the entire /World/ Ocean. In this connection, the concentration of antisubmarine defense forces in one region or another not only does not hamper their /nuclear-powered submarines/ activities but to a certain degree facilitates the carrying out of their missions. Meeting with organized opposition in one region, nuclear-powered submarines can quickly depart from it and concentrate its power in another where the antisubmarine defense of the opponent is less developed" (p. 47);

B. "The high speed of antisubmarine ships, the good seakeeping quality, and also the great cruising range enables them successfully to carry out searches for modern submarines at great distances from their bases. They are equipped with modern means of hydroacoustic observation and armed with long-range, powerful homing torpedoes and also depth charges, which give them a capability for reliably detecting and destroying the submarines of an opponent while submerged" (pp. 52-53).

25) "Naval Holiday of the Soviet People", Editorial, Naval Digest, July 1966, p. 4:

"In modern conditions the /U.S./ Navy, according to the views of U.S. military leaders, constitutes a basic component of the strategic strike force which, due to its great striking power and high mobility, is able to deliver surprise nuclear strikes on chosen targets and at the same time have a high probability of escaping the retaliatory strike of the defender."

26) Captain First Rank Penzin, Naval Digest, July 1966, p. 41:

"...the main strike forces /of navies/ have required ever greater support from other forces....At present this trend continues despite, it would seem, the great independence and lesser vulnerability /than of other naval forces/ of nuclear-powered submarines."

27) Brezhnev speech to military academy graduates at Kremlin reception, Tass in English, 1 July 1966:

"There have been many yarns in the U.S. that it has 'all-seeing' spy satellites, the greatest number of missiles, and the most invulnerable submarines, and so on and so forth. But all this, to put it mildly, is not true to fact. These yarns are clearly intended for simpletons who know nothing about what missiles, what satellites, what submarines, and other modern equipment the Soviet Union has."

28) Admiral Sergeyev, Radio Moscow interview in Russian with Ogonyek correspondent, 0630GMT, 31 July 1966:

"In the past few years, our Navy has received new missile ships equipped with up-to-date means for hunting, locating, and destroying modern submarines....Nuclear-powered submarines are capable of submerged launching of long-range ballistic missiles against an enemy. Nuclear-powered submarines are very formidable weapons. They are practically invulnerable and highly mobile."

29) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, signed to press 25 May 1967:

A. "The high mobility of nuclear-powered submarines enables them to successfully operate against highly mobile formations of surface warships of an opponent. Not lacking in speed, nuclear-powered submarines, having detected the enemy, can trail it for a prolonged period and repeatedly attack it until it is completely destroyed. Another valuable quality of nuclear-powered submarines is their high stealth of action....In addition /to not having to surface to fire their missiles/, nuclear-powered submarines, possessing high speed, good maneuvering qualities and the capability of operating at great depths, can successfully penetrate antisubmarine defense barriers" (pp. 546-547);

B. "The antisubmarine forces of the Navy include special surface ships, submarines, airplanes, and helicopters. They are capable of carrying out search and destruction of enemy submarines not only in our coastal zone but also in distant regions of the seas and open oceans....Joint use of antisubmarine ships, antisubmarine airplanes and helicopters are effective in the struggle against submarines, including against nuclear-powered ones" (p. 550);

C. "Today there are no invulnerable objectives on the continents just as there are also no regions in the World Ocean where, in the course of combat, the combatant ships /both surface and submarine/ and the merchant ships are not subject to the most real threat of routing and destruction" (p. 522). (Underlined words added to the 2nd edition; see para 11C above).

30) Military Strategy, 3rd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 November 1967:

The three entries in the 2nd edition of August, 1963 (para. 9. above) which appeared on pages 381 and 399 appeared verbatim in the 3rd edition on pages 350 and 365-366, respectively.

31) Admiral Kharlamov, Technology-Youth, February 1968, p. 15:

"...McNamara...has asserted that missile submarines, due to their great mobility and stealth, are practically 'unlocatable', and therefore are more reliable than batteries of intercontinental ballistic missiles (including even those in underground silos)."

32) Navy Day-'68 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1968, p. 32:

"The most powerful warships of the Navy are the nuclear-powered submarines. They are armed with long-range missiles and homing torpedoes with nuclear warheads and are equipped with modern means for navigation, observation, detection, and communications. [These] nuclear-powered warships have unlimited radius of action, possess stealth and mobility, an enormous concentration of striking power, and great endurance."

33) Admiral Kharlamov, Moscow Pravda, 28 July 1968:

"Obviously, the Soviet Navy has become a genuinely global, oceanic, submarine - aviation navy of long-range action. Modern Soviet warships [i.e., submarines with nuclear propulsion (only)] are distinguished by their great endurance for cruising, unlimited seaworthiness, high striking power and combat stability [Emphasis supplied]. They are capable of delivering strikes on an enemy in the ocean and in his overseas territory, and of successfully protecting our own objectives from oceanic directions."

34) Engineering Admiral Kotov, Labor, 28 July 1968:

"...nuclear-powered submarines, possessing great striking power, high submerged speed, unlimited range of underwater cruising and together with that, great stealth, together with Naval Aviation have become the main striking force of our Navy."

35) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 9 December 1968:

A. "Nuclear-powered submarines, thanks to their high mobility, good stealth /Underlined word changed from "high" in 1st edition/ and unlimited distance of cruising have spread the threat of the delivery of strikes throughout the entire /World/ Ocean. In this connection, the concentration of antisubmarine defense forces in one region or another not only does not hamper their /nuclear-powered submarines'/ activities but to a certain degree facilitates the carrying out of their missions. Meeting with organized opposition in one region, nuclear-powered submarines can quickly depart from it and concentrate its power in another where the antisubmarine defense of the opponent is less developed" (p. 63);

B. "The high speed of antisubmarine ships, the good sea-keeping quality, and also the great cruising range enables them successfully to carry out searches for modern submarines at great distances from their bases. They are equipped with modern means for hydroacoustic observation and armed with long-range, powerful homing torpedoes and also depth charges, which give them a capability for reliably detecting and destroying the submarines of an opponent while submerged" (p. 71).

36) Vice Admiral Retired Surabekov, Naval Digest, June 1969:

A. "The struggle with nuclear-powered submarines, and with missile submarines in particular, is the most difficult and labor-consuming which is the result of their high submerged maneuvering and combat capabilities. If account is taken of the colossal expanses and depths of the oceanic theaters of military action, and also the /comparatively small/ capabilities of contemporary antisubmarine forces and means, then the difficulties inherent in this struggle become fully understandable" (p. 29).

B. "The high mobility of /nuclear-powered submarine/ fleets, their enormous radius of action, their capability to carry out missions with a limited composition of forces, their low vulnerability and great endurance, and also the long-range and destructiveness of modern weapons warrant the assertion that there is no place on earth beyond the range of naval weapons" (p. 30).

37) Navy Day-'69 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1969, p. 42:

"...a completely new, modern, oceanic navy has been created in our country in recent years, one that corresponds fully with the requirements for nuclear-missile war. The Navy now has warships with great cruising endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, enormous striking power and combat stability /Emphasis supplied/, capable of delivering strikes on an enemy both in his overseas territory and on the oceanic expanses."

38) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 27 July 1969:

"Our country possesses a mighty oceanic Navy. Its main force and the basis of its combat power are its nuclear-powered submarines. They combine in themselves great striking power and stealth of action."

39) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 27 July 1969:

"The Navy is reliably insuring the security and state interests of the Homeland on the seas and oceans. Its basis are the most modern warships of contemporaneity -- nuclear-powered submarines, which combine in themselves enormous striking power, mobility and stealth of action. They possess unlimited endurance and can operate submerged for months on end. They are capable of striking both maritime targets and objectives situated on transoceanic territories."

40) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Soviet Kirgiziya, 27 July 1969:

"There has been created in our country in recent years a completely new, modern oceanic Navy which corresponds in full measure with the requirements of nuclear-missile war. It now possesses warships with great cruising endurance, unlimited seaworthiness and practically full independence from weather conditions, high striking power and combat stability /Emphasis supplied/ with the capability to deliver strikes on an enemy in his overseas territories or in the oceanic expanses."

41) Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1969, p. 3:

"Soviet warships [i.e., nuclear-powered submarines] are distinguished by their great cruising endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, and their great striking power and combat stability /Emphasis supplied/. They can deliver strikes on an opponent in the ocean and on his transoceanic territories and successfully protect one's own objectives from [nuclear strikes from] oceanic directions."

42) Vice Admiral Yegorov, Labor, 27 July 1969:

"Our Navy now has warships with great endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, and high striking power and combat stability /Emphasis supplied/, capable of delivering strikes on an opponent in his overseas territories and on the oceanic expanses."

43) Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, April 1970, p. 20:

"American strategists accord their naval forces an important place in plans for nuclear war. The military leadership of the U.S. considers them the most mobile and invulnerable striking force, one capable of hitting the basic strategic objectives in the territories of the socialist states in a short period."

44) Navy Day-'70 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1970, p. 32:

"Our submarine cruisers are capable of completing long, multimonth cruises in submerged condition without surfacing. While in submerged condition thousands of kilometers from the targets and remaining virtually invulnerable, such warships can deliver devastating nuclear-missile strikes on enemy objectives."

45) Navy Day-'70 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Naval Digest, June 1970, p. 13:

"In the mid-'50s the course was taken of creating an oceanic navy capable of successfully carrying out strategic missions in modern war. For this were required ships with great cruising endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, and high striking power and combat stability /Emphasis added/."

46) Unsigned article, "The Nuclear-powered Missile Submarines of the Naval Forces of the Capitalist Countries", Naval Digest, April 1971, p. 89:

"The military commands of the U.S. and NATO countries consider that nuclear-powered missile submarines, due to their high combat stability /Emphasis supplied/ are at present a most important component of the strategic offensive forces of the bloc. Precisely because of this, first priority attention has been given over the past decade to construction of the nuclear-powered, missile submarine fleet."

47) Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1971:

"It is appropriate to draw attention to the 'oceanic strategy' of the U.S...which envisages transferring the main nuclear capability from land to the World Ocean. Militarist U.S. circles are giving priority to the development of submarine missile systems, considering them less vulnerable than missiles based on the ground or underground."

48) Admiral Oleynik, Labor, 25 July 1971:

"Nuclear-powered submarines have become the most powerful ships of our Navy...and are themselves practically invulnerable."

49) Captain First Rank Sokha, Naval Digest, September 1971, p. 28:

"Nuclear-powered submarines...constitute a very 'difficult' target for antisubmarine forces."

50) Captain First Rank Aleshkin, Naval Digest, January 1972:

"Here clearly apparent is the striving of the American leadership to shift the basic strategic means from the land to the oceans and thereby...resolve the problem of invulnerability for these means..." (p. 24).

"The orientation of the U.S. is on the development of the nuclear-powered submarine fleet in the first place. And this is understandable because it incorporates the most in itself of the latest achievements of scientific-technological progress, due to which it has become the most modern force of navies, combining in itself great striking power, high mobility, endurance, stealth and it uses for protection the medium in which it operates and which is difficult to 'illuminate' by contemporary means of detection." (p. 25).

51) Engineer-Captain 2nd Rank V. Yerofeyev, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 88:

"Considering the weak sides of the "Polaris" and "Poseidon" systems and the steady progress in the development of antisubmarine forces, it is feared in the United States that they will soon lose their invulnerability."

52) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, May 1972, pp. 17-18:

"...the cost of combat means required for overcoming submarines /in World War I/ exceeded the expenditures required for constructing submarines by a factor of nineteen."

53) Gorshkov interview, Narodna Armiya (in Bulgarian), 29 July 1972:

"To be able to successfully carry out the missions assigned them, a modern Navy must have great striking power, high combat stability, /Emphasis supplied/ and the capability of delivering strikes against land and sea objectives that comprise the enemy's basic military strength. At present, /our/ nuclear-powered missile submarines and missiles of various types and the missile-carrying Naval Air Force exhibit maximum response to these requirements".

54) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, November 1972, p. 26:

"If even the pre-nuclear submarines had enough capability to overcome the superiority developed in antisubmarine forces successfully, then what superiority is required now to counter nuclear-powered submarines whose superiority cannot be compared with that of submarines of the World War II period?"

55) General of the Army Kulikov, Communist No. 3, February 1973:

"The combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on the Strategic Missile Forces....The Navy is a formidable force. Its main striking arm, nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles, combines great destructive power, mobility, and virtual invulnerability. The Navy also has /surface/ ships for various purposes and modern missile-carrying naval aircraft. This enables the Navy to carry out a vast range of missions."

56) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 21:

"...missile submarines, due to their great survivability in comparison with land-based missiles, are an even more effective means of deterrence. They constitute a permanent threat to an aggressor who, understanding the inevitability of nuclear retaliation from oceanic directions, can be faced with the necessity of refraining from unleashing a nuclear war."

57) Colonel-General, Professor N.A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Military Press of the Ministry of Defense, Spring 1973:

"The constant rivalry between the means of attack and the means of defense is characterized at present, due to current level of development of nuclear-missile weapons, by the superiority of the former... The problems of countering submarines are very important since submarines hold an important place among the strategic weapons of modern war. Powerful weapons, great range and high maneuverability comprise inherent qualities of this means of modern combat in the sea and ocean theaters of military action. To parry these qualities of the submarines of an opponent amounts to solving a problem of strategic significance, and the possibilities of solving it depend directly on the acceleration of scientific-technological progress."

58) Captain First Rank V'yunencko, Naval Digest, November 1973, p. 25:

"Bourgeois military theoreticians say that missile submarines are able to patrol in launching positions in areas 20 times greater than land missile forces. Missile submarines, moreover, possess, in their opinion, the capability to maneuver in the depths, using the water cover for masking and protection against counteraction of the opponent, which increases the survivability of the strategic weapons systems of a navy."

59) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 3rd edition, signed to press 13 February 1974:

A. "The high mobility of nuclear-powered submarines enables them to successfully operate against highly mobile formations of surface warships of an opponent. Not lacking in speed, nuclear-powered submarines, having detected an enemy, can trail it for a prolonged period and repeatedly attack it and destroy it completely destroy it. Another valuable quality of nuclear-powered submarines is their high stealth of action in 2nd edition....In addition to not having to surface to fire their missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, possessing high speed, good maneuvering qualities and the capability to operate at great depths, can successfully penetrate antisubmarine defense barriers" (p. 494);

B. "The antisubmarine forces of the Navy include antisubmarine cruisers, large and small antisubmarine surface ships, submarines, airplanes, and helicopters. They are capable of carrying out search and destruction of enemy submarines not only in our coastal zone but also in distant regions of the seas and oceans....Joint use of antisubmarine ships, antisubmarine airplanes and helicopters are effective in the struggle against submarines, including against nuclear-powered ones" (p. 496);

C. "Today there are no invulnerable objectives on the continents just as there are also no regions in the World Ocean where, in the course of combat, the combatant ships /both surface and submarine/ and the merchant ships are not subject to the most real threat of routing and destruction" (p. 498).

60) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for Navy Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1974, p. 35:

"Our Navy has sortied into the expanses of the World Ocean. Its modern warships have great cruising range and high seaworthiness and combat stability /Emphasis supplied/. The bases of the striking forces of the Navy now are the nuclear-powered submarines together with missile aviation".

61) Admiral Alekseyev, Labor, 28 July 1974:

"Nuclear-powered submarines obviously are one of the basic strike forces of our Navy due to their high combat capabilities -- powerful weapons, high mobility, the capability for a protracted, covert stay at sea..."

62) Admiral Bondarenko, Soviet Patriot, 28 July 1974:

"Nuclear-powered submarines now constitute the basis of the strike forces of the Navy. In the submarines' arsenals are underwater-launchable ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes. The high cruising speed and the stealth of movement permits the nuclear-powered submarines, in a concise period of time, to take up an advantageous position and inflict an accurate strike on targets."

63) Captain First Rank V'yunenکو, Naval Digest, January 1975:

"In 1917 against the /maximum of 40/ German submarines there operated 3,000 British destroyers and auxiliary ships not counting the small craft, that is, 27 combattant and merchant ships for every submarine" (p. 28).

"At the end of the /Second World/ War, there were 30 combattant ships and 40 ASW aircraft for every Fascist submarine" (p. 33).

64) Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, July 1975, p. 7:

"In having such a navy, the Soviet Armed Forces have gained a new quality: universality, the capability to repel aggression from any, including from oceanic, directions. Equipped with modern combat means, the Navy, for the first time in the history of its development, has gotten the technical capability to destroy, undetectedly from underwater, military and economic centers located in the depths of the continents, influencing in a most decisive way the military-economic capabilities of an aggressor nation."

65) Rear Admiral Yashin, Naval Digest, September 1975, p. 94:

"The increase in the role of the U.S. Navy in the system of strategic forces took place, and is still taking place, because nuclear-powered missile submarines are less vulnerable than other components of The Strategic Forces."

66) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, signed to press 27 November 1975 :

A. "There were 5,500 specially built /British and U.S./ antisubmarine ships and 20,000 small craft operating against German submarines /in World War II/ For every German submarine 25 surface ships and 100 aircraft were required and for each German submarine at sea, /there were/ 100 British and Americans" (p. 196);

B. "Various types of surface combatant ships and aircraft have entered our naval service for affording combat stability to the submarines and for giving them around support, for combat with the submarines and antisubmarine forces of an opponent, and for carrying out other specific tasks" (p. 307); (Emphasis supplied);

C. "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of antisubmarine defense means, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea? A great deal of research has affirmed the high effectiveness of submarines when properly employed and provided with combat support" (p. 309);

D. "Thus, in nuclear-powered submarines are concentrated all of the basic indices which characterize the power of a navy: great striking power, high mobility and stealth, the capability for conducting combat actions on a global scale for destruction of important ground objectives /and/ the submarines and surface ships of an opponent" (p. 312);

E. "...the launching positions for them /...submarines/ are virtually the whole World Ocean. The Navy concentrates in itself numerous mobile strategic-weapon platforms, each of which can carry

a very large number of missiles and is capable of shifting its launching position to areas many times larger than can be used by land-based missiles. Sea-based strategic weapon platforms also possess the capability of maneuvering in the depths, covered by a thickness of water and using it not only for protection but also for masking, which to a high degree increases the survivability of sea systems of strategic weapons. Thus, the objective conditions of armed conflict for a nuclear war advance the nuclear-missile navy to the role of nuclear-missile striking forces" (p. 454).

67) Captain First Rank Yuryevich, Naval Digest, February 1976, p. 86:

"...the superiority of the submarine nuclear-missile system consists of the stealth of missile submarines when patrolling the World Ocean, which raises their reliability over that of land-based and air missile systems....According to the opinion of officials of foreign states and military specialists, in the future, too, the basic nuclear-missile forces must be situated in the World Ocean."

68) Editorial, "Sea Shield of the Homeland", Naval Digest, July 1976, pp. 5-6:

"The construction of the Soviet Navy always has been closely tied to the latest achievements of science and technology... Nuclear-powered submarines were built which incorporated such qualities as stealth, mobility, practically unlimited cruising range and colossal striking power. These powerful nuclear powered submarines, which are invulnerable to an enemy, rightfully have taken the leading role in our Navy."

69) Gorshkov, Navy Day Speech, Radio Moscow in Russian, 24 July 1976:

"Our balanced Navy includes ships and combat equipment for various missions. There are completely modern nuclear-powered submarines possessing tremendous striking power and meeting the requirements for modern war to the greatest extent. The great striking power of the Soviet submarine fleet is successfully combined with the increased combat capabilities of Naval Aviation....".

70) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 25 July 1976:

"Now our Navy incorporates new ships with great cruising endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, and great striking power and combat stability Emphasis supplied."

71) Captain First Rank Potapov, Scientific-Technological Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977, p. 103:

"The significance of sea-based strategic striking forces grew still more in connection with the new strategic concept of 'realistic deterrence' adopted by the U.S. in the spring of 1971. It tilts toward what is called 'the oceanic strategy'. Its substance is that all future strategic systems must be oceanic because this raises their mobility and invulnerability. The nuclear-missile submarine system Poseidon-Trident is the basis for this strategy."

72) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Technology and Armaments, July 1977, p. 2:

"The leading role in the composition of the Navy is played by submarines. Of all classes of warships, they correspond most fully to the requirements for modern war...By far the most powerful and modern among them are the nuclear-powered missile submarines.... They are capable of remaining submerged for long periods of time and, without surfacing, of delivering strikes with ballistic missiles on objectives located on the territory of an enemy and also of conducting combat actions against surface or underwater warships."

73) Gorshkov, The Navy, Knowledge Press, signed to press 22 September 1977:

"...nuclear-powered submarines...can overtake fast surface warships, trail them for a long time and attack them repeatedly... and successfully evade antisubmarine forces."

74) The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction, by a 10-author "Collective" of the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History, S.A. Tyushkevich (Ed.), signed to press 22 November 1977, p. 443:

"In the construction of the U.S. Armed Forces, particular attention is being given to what is termed 'the oceanic strategy'-- the shifting of the basic power of the strategic offensive forces out onto the expanses of the World Ocean. According to the view of American military officials, this permits dispersing and making less vulnerable the systems of strategic armaments and also reduces the number of targets on U.S. territory subject to retaliatory strike."

75) Lt. General Stroganov, Chief of Staff of Ground Forces' Missile and Artillery Forces, Radio Moscow in Russian, 18 November 1978:

Asserts that "the Strategic Missile Forces are the shield and the sword of our Homeland. They are the real and the practicable means /Emphasis supplied/ for the deterrence of a potential aggressor".

76) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979:

A. "There were 5,500 specially built /British and U.S./ antisubmarine ships and 20,000 small craft operating against German submarines /in World War II/. For every German submarine 25 surface ships and 100 aircraft were required and for each German submarine at sea, /there were/ 100 British and Americans" (p. 174);

B. "Various types of surface combatant ships and aircraft have entered our naval service to afford combat stability to the submarines and to give them comprehensive support, for combat with the submarines and antisubmarine forces of an opponent, and for carrying out other specific tasks" (p. 173);

C. "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW means, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea? A great deal of research has affirmed the high effectiveness of submarines when properly employed and provided with combat support" (pp. 274-275);

D. "Thus, in nuclear-powered submarines are concentrated all of the basic indices which characterize the power of a navy: great striking power, high mobility and stealth, the capability for conducting combat actions on a global scale for destruction of important ground objectives /and/ the submarines and surface ships of an opponent" (pp. 277-278);

E. "...the launching positions for them /...submarines/ are virtually the whole World Ocean. The Navy concentrates in itself numerous mobile strategic-weapon platforms. Each of these can carry a /very/ large number of missiles and is capable of shifting its launching position to areas many times larger than can be used by land-based missiles. Sea-based strategic weapon platforms also possess the capability of maneuvering in the depths, covered by a thickness of water and using it not only for protection but also for masking, which to a high degree increases the survivability of sea systems of strategic weapons. Thus, the objective conditions of armed conflict for a nuclear war advance the nuclear-missile navy to the role of nuclear-missile striking forces" (pp. 409-410).

Appendix D

THE "COMBAT READINESS" REQUIRED OF THE NAVY AS COMPARED TO THE SMF

- 1) Admiral Fokin, Soviet Navy, 14 July 1957:

"The state interests of the Homeland require the constant raising of the Navy's combat readiness."

- 2) Admiral Kasatonov, Speech to IVth Session of Supreme Soviet, 15 January 1960, Stenographic Record, p. 170:

The First Deputy Navy Commander-in-Chief asserted that the Navy needed to be in a state of "high combat readiness".

- 3) Admiral Gorshkov, Soviet Navy, 23 February 1960:

Marshal Malinovskiy is cited as having called for readiness on the part of the Armed Forces as their main task to cut off a surprise attack and to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike."

- 4) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, January 1962, pp. 8 and 15:

"The importance of the factor of surprise increases the significance of combat readiness; now it is a matter to be accomplished not in minutes but in seconds.... personnel of ships and units must always be in such a condition of readiness that they will be able to carry out their assigned missions at any moment."

- 5) Military Strategy, 1st ed, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.) signed to press 24 May 1962:

A. "At the present time, bringing forces into combat readiness cannot be measured by days and, in a number of cases, not even by hours. For many units and forces, it is now a matter of minutes. This applies particularly to the Strategic Missile Forces, the main means of inflicting mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 232).

B. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses and, in certain cases, even force his capitulation...to the Strategic Missile Forces belong the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (p. 266).

C. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Forces, and their nuclear means" (p. 341).

6) Gorshkov, Red Star, 31 October 1962:

"Speaking of the need for the highest combat readiness, I wish to again call attention to Marshal Malinovskiy's words in a speech of a few days ago to the All-Army Conference on Ideological Matters, especially: 'All the might of our Armed Forces must be brought into immediate action against the enemy at the first signal, against his military-strategic, economic and political centers, and also against his main concentration of forces'."

7) Gorshkov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1963, p. 20:

"We must be ready, by means of wide offensive operations, to inflict devastating strikes on...land objectives of the imperialists at any point of the World Ocean and territories littoral to it."

8) Military Strategy, 2nd ed., Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 August 1963:

A. "At the present time, bringing forces into combat readiness cannot be measured by days and, in a number of cases, not even by hours. For many units and forces it is now a matter of minutes. This applies particularly to the Strategic Missile Forces, the main means for inflicting mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 252);

B. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses, and in certain cases even to force his capitulation... to the Strategic Missile Forces belong the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (pp. 302-303).

C. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces and the Long-range Air Forces and their nuclear means" (p. 382).

9) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 1st edition, signed to press 14 January 1964, p. 596:

"The Soviet Navy must be ready to reply to them the navies of "imperialist aggressors" planning "nuclear attack on the socialist countries" with devastating strikes on maritime targets in the whole territory of the World Ocean."

10) Gorshkov, Red Star, 21 March 1964:

"The first priority of all of the Navy's tasks is to maintain constant readiness for long cruises and for the unquestioned achievement of the aims which they are assigned."

11) Admiral Sergeyev, Soviet Russia, 26 July 1964:

The Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy asserted that the Navy was "ready to carry out the missions of delivering nuclear strikes on the warships and shore targets of an aggressor."

12) Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, July 1964, p. 8:

"In modern conditions, the significance of the factor of surprise is growing ever greater. While in past world wars surprise afforded a relatively short-lived advantage to the attacker, now sudden strikes with nuclear-missile weapons are fraught with catastrophic consequences. This circumstance is also taken into account by the U.S. military leadership which considers the achievement of surprise for the first nuclear strikes in a war as the key to gaining victory. Accordingly, maintenance of the forces of the Navy in constant combat readiness to deliver prompt answering strikes on an aggressor with the aim of cutting off his surprise attack is the constant concern of the command, staff, Party, and Komsomol."

13) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, signed to press 25 May 1967, pp. 544-545:

"As a result of this thorough review of the strategy, tactics, and methods of an armed conflict, great attention is being given to the theory of the conduct of a modern war, which now provides timely and reliable detection of the indications of a nuclear attack of an opponent and of one's own combat readiness for a timely seizure of the strategic initiative."

14) Marshal Krylov, Military Thought, November 1967:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have become the main striking force and the main service of our Armed Forces because the course and outcome of a nuclear war will depend to a decisive extent on their...constant readiness."

15) Military Strategy, 3rd ed., Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 November 1967:

A. "At the present time, bringing forces into combat readiness cannot be measured by days and, in a number of cases, not even by hours. For many units and forces it is now a matter of minutes. This applies particularly to the Strategic Missile Forces and to nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines, the main means of inflicting mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 247). (The underlined sentence was added new to the 3rd edition; see sub-paragraphs 5A and 8A above.)

B. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses, and in certain cases even to force his capitulation... to the Strategic Missile Forces belongs the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (pp. 297-298)

C. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces and the Long-range Air Force and their nuclear means" (p. 351).

16) Armed Forces Day-'69 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 2, January 1969, pp.42-43:

"For strengthening the might of the Soviet state, principal significance is accorded to the creation of a completely new service of the Armed Forces -- the Strategic Missile Forces which have grown into an exceptionally powerful force. It is the main service of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union and is always to be found in a high state of combat readiness. Soviet missiles are able to destroy any targets with great accuracy using nuclear missiles. Great qualitative changes have also taken place in the Ground Forces, in the Air Defense Forces of the Country, in the Air Forces and in the Navy."

17) Gorshkov, Rabotnichesko Delo (Bulgaria), 19 September 1969:

"The Navy has been assigned the missions of being ready not only to repel attacks from seaward by any aggressor but also to deliver crushing strikes against his navy in distant areas, and at his most important strategic targets deep within the aggressor's territory."

18) Gorshkov, Izvestiya, 27 February 1970:

"The interests of strengthening the country's defense capability required an improvement of the Armed Forces and a considerable increase in the Soviet Navy's might and its readiness to oppose the navies of the aggressive powers.... High combat readiness is a combination of all of the qualities insuring the striking of crushing blows on the enemy in the first minutes of a war... It is a real capacity, by taking decisive action, for nipping aggression in the bud from the very start. Now, as never before, the maintenance of all of the Navy's forces in constant combat readiness, so as to be able at the first command of the Homeland to bring all of its power to bear quickly on an aggressor, is of particular importance."

19) Gorshkov, Narodna Armiya (Bulgaria), 7 May 1970:

"...today, as never before, special significance is attached to the maintenance of all naval forces in constant combat readiness so as to be able at the first call of the Motherland to launch immediately their entire force against an aggressor. High combat readiness means a combination of all factors which insure the delivery of a crushing blow against an enemy in the first moments of a war...It means the realistic ability to halt an aggression at its very beginning with decisive actions."

20) Major General M. Cherednichenko, Military-Historical Journal June 1970, (pp. 28-29):

"For delivering a devastating answering strike on an aggressor, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed and are held in constant readiness. They have become the main service of the Armed Forces, a reliable means for deterrence in the path of the aggressive undertakings of imperialism... The submarine fleet has become the basic forces of the Navy, its main striking means. The development of long-range naval aviation with missile armament is continuing, and also missile surface ships... The Navy has been transformed into an oceanic one."

21) Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1971:

"Our Navy demonstrated its high readiness to repel an attack from the sea in the course of last years' OKEAN maneuvers."

22) "Materials for SMF Day-'71 Reports and Discussions," Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1971, pp. 27-28:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, are uninterruptedly on combat alert, capable of immediately delivering an annihilating strike on any aggressor in any part of the planet... The high combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces do not lessen the importance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine holds that for final victory in modern war it is necessary to employ the united forces of all services and service branches of the Armed Forces...The combat capabilities of the PVO, Air Forces, and Navy have grown immeasurably."

23) General of the Army Kulikov, Party Life No. 24, December 1972:

"The main striking power of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which are armed with modern weapons unprecedented in history--powerful strategic inter-continental and intermediate-range missiles and modern means of automated control. These forces, which are in a state of constant readiness and in which is concentrated colossal striking power, are capable of delivering an annihilating strike at any aggressor. These forces will play the main and decisive role in a nuclear war....The role and power of the qualitatively new, ocean-going Navy have increased immeasurably. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with a variety of powerful missile weapons are now the basis of the striking power of the Navy."

24) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 25:

"Soviet naval personnel consider their top priority responsibility to be maintenance of a high readiness by all of the forces of the Navy for carrying out the mission for the defense of the state from oceanic directions...to be a reliable shield against enemy strikes from the sea."

25) Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Colonel-General Lomov (Ed.), Published in Spring 1973:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces are the basis of the military might of our Armed Forces.../its/ missile strikes will be directed mainly at objectives and targets which are deep in the enemy rear /and/ to the entire depth of the theaters of military action....One thermonuclear warhead is sufficient to obliterate an entire city. This means that not only individual targets and objectives on enemy territory can be destroyed but also entire military-economic regions....The high dependability of reaching the target is also an important characteristic of strategic missiles.... Their enormous combat strength and constant readiness...make them

the main means for thwarting the aggressive inclinations of the imperialists....At present, nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft are the main strike forces of our Navy. These means, and above all the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, can strike important enemy objectives located deep in his territory as well as groupings of enemy forces."

26) General Grigoryev, Radio Moscow, in English, 18 November 1973:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force and the chief means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for launching retaliation in case of an attack on this country.... The Strategic Missile Forces are always ready for action and they are the main strike force of the Soviet Armed Forces and the chief barrier in the way of aggressive imperialist schemes."

27) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1974, p. 25:

"Soviet sailors consider it their first obligation to constantly support a high readiness for all of the forces of the Navy to carry out the mission for defense of the state from seaward... All of this must insure the protection of the state interests of the Soviet Union."

28) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 3rd edition, signed to press 13 February 1974, p. 490:

"A strong oceanic navy is required by the Soviet Union, one possessing great striking power and having constantly high combat readiness to promptly deliver destructive strikes on an aggressor."

29) Marshal Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 1st edition, signed to press 9 April 1974:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy now is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which most fully /of all the military services/ incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range...are constantly on watch and ever ready for a retaliatory strike on an aggressor (p. 95)....At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (p. 98).

30) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 21, November 1974:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, possessing missiles of various yields and /mission/ designations...constitute the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces. Even in peacetime, they are in constant readiness, which makes them the reliable shield of the security

of our Homeland...the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and the preservation of peace. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, assigned to carrying out strategic missions, and their role in modern war do not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Soviet military doctrine assumes that the aims of a war can be gained only by the united forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces" (p. 32).

31) Marshal Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 2nd edition, signed to press 26 March 1975:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which most fully /of all the military services/ incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range...are constantly on watch and ever ready for a retaliatory strike on an aggressor (p. 102)...At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (p. 105).

32) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1975, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, which have missiles of virtually unlimited range, basically determine the defensive might of our state. In peacetime, they are in constant combat readiness and serve as the reliable shield of the land of the Soviets...The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces and their role in modern war do not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. In modern war, victory over an aggressor can be won only by the joint forces of all the services of the Armed Forces and all branches of the services....In the Navy this /basis of its might/ are modern missile delivery systems, nuclear-powered submarines armed with underwater-launchable ballistic missiles and the Coastal Missile Forces."

33) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1976, p. 9:

"The further strengthening of the Navy, maintenance of its high combat readiness -- this is our answer to those militaristic circles of imperialism which continue to oppose a reduction of tension in the world...".

34) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1976, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant combat readiness. Even in peacetime they perform a combat mission of state importance; they are uninterruptedly on combat alert....The combat capabilities of the PVO, Air Forces, and Navy have grown immeasurably."

35) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1977, p. 80:

"The Strategic Missile Forces...are held in constant readiness and even in peacetime are performing a combat mission of state importance; they are uninterruptedly on combat alert....The other services of the Armed Forces are equipped with nuclear missile weapons too."

36) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1978, pp. 61-62:

"The Strategic Missile Forces...even in peacetime are in constant readiness, uninterruptedly on combat alert....The other services of the Armed Forces have nuclear-missile weapons too."

37) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1979, p. 12:

"In them /pre-World War II instructions for conducting naval operations/ it was pointed out that the Navy of the USSR must be held in readiness for: active offensive operations in the open sea, in the air, and off the coast and bases of an enemy, for active defense of one's own /coastal/ and naval bases, for mutual cooperation with the Ground Forces and aviation for the support of operations in the coastal regions, for the protection of one's own maritime shipping, and for the interdiction of the /maritime/ communications of the enemy."

38) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1979, p. 37:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are forces of constant combat readiness. They maintain a constant combat watch. Such readiness is obligatory -- a necessary measure for the deterrence of the aggressive strivings of imperialism and its accomplices."

Appendix E

EVIDENCE OF OPPOSITION TO ANY SSBN-WITHHOLDING STRATEGY

- 1) Captain First Rank Nikolayev, Soviet Navy, 8 January 1960:

"...because stationary bases have become ever more vulnerable with the development of missile weapons, some naval specialists assert that aircraft carriers and the nuclear-powered submarine fleet can play even a decisive role in modern war. So, reliance is placed on surprise and the mass employment of nuclear-missile weapons, that is on the resolution of the basic strategic missions in the initial period of a war."

- 2) Rear Admiral Sisoyev, Naval Digest, April 1961, pp. 27-28:

"The necessity for the withholding /rezervirovanie/ of forces in former times appeared as an objective regularity for the conduct of each one of the branches of combat activity. The skill to consider the reserve in good time and to use it to best advantage largely determined the success of battle. Therefore, for a long time, reserve groups were considered an inseparable part of the order of battle."

At the present time, in connection with the sharp change in the nature of combat action (especially with regard to the significant growth in its rapidity), withholding forces, especially those included in the composition of strike groups of the order of battle, is hardly expedient."

- 3) Gorshkov, Red Star, 31 October 1962:

"Speaking of the need for the highest combat readiness, I wish to call attention again to the words of Marshal Malinovskiy in a speech a few days ago to the All-Army Conference on Ideological Matters, especially: 'All the might of our Armed Forces must be brought into immediate action against the enemy at the first signal, against his military-strategic, economic, and political centers, and also against the main concentrations of his forces'."

- 4) Gorshkov, Izvestiya, 19 May 1963:

"It must not be forgotten that, in the measure of the development of submarines, the means for combatting them are also being modernized."

- 5) Colonel Larionov, Red Star, 8 April 1964:

"In modern conditions, war can be initiated in the very first minutes by the use of decisive strategic means of armed combat. Consequently, even victory in war will come about now not so much from the cumulative effect of partial successes but more as the result of the effective application of the maximum power of the state at the very beginning of the armed struggle...The problem of the most effective use of the entire might of the state for achieving strategic aims in a nuclear war has become especially critical."

- 6) Rear Admiral Belli chapter in The Navy in the First World War, Vol. 2, p. 323, signed to press 7 July 1964:

"Thus arose the general idea of withholding forces, which pervaded the whole activity of navies. This fact was one more bit of evidence of the pernicious effects, in the operational-strategic sense, of the attempt to protect forces for the future while renouncing their correct employment in the present."

- 7) Gorshkov chapter in Nuclear Era and War, Marshal Grechko (Ed.), p. 66, signed to press 15 July 1964:

"It must not be forgotten that, in the measure of the development of submarines, the means for combatting them are also being modernized."

- 8) Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko, Red Star, 25 August 1964:

"It can be posited that in a nuclear-missile war there will be an initial period and a subsequent period. The initial period, in the course of which both sides can expend the supplies of nuclear weapons accumulated in peacetime, will have decisive significance for the course and outcome of the entire war. It is entirely possible that the war will end in this period since, after the exchange of nuclear strikes, further military action will hardly be required. However, theoretically it may be assumed that a war will continue after the exchange of nuclear strikes. Let us say that one side retains a capability for offensive action and the other for defensive action. The war could enter a new phase."

- 9) Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko, Red Star, 28 August 1964:

"In the U.S., strategic missiles, strategic aviation, and nuclear-missile submarines essentially are unified in a single strategic force that is assigned for world nuclear war..."

9) (Cont'd)

"The distinguishing feature of this /initial/ period will be the conduct of active, decisive military action at the very beginning of a war with the involvement of the maximum possible number of ready forces and means and the expenditure of the nuclear weapons accumulated in peacetime."

"Time will have a decisive significance for victory. Those missions which in the past took months and years will be resolved in a nuclear-missile war in a matter of minutes, hours, or a few days. From this it follows in our view that a war cannot be protracted."

10) Captain First Rank Filonov, Naval Digest, March 1965, p. 39:

"In the opinion of many military authors, it is hardly possible to count on the rapid replacement of forces by bringing them up from the rear, or on the delivery of reserves from rear areas (even if such reserves /still/ exist /after the destruction of the initial nuclear exchange/."

11) Colonel Malyachikov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 21, November 1965, p. 11:

"Characteristic of the war's initial period is the conduct of the most active and decisive actions for repelling the enemy's attack and for delivering strikes on him with the maximum use of the stockpile of nuclear weapons."

12) Admiral Kasatonov, Military Thought, February 1969:

"The loss of battleships at sea was considered a severe lessening of the victor's chances of imposing his will on the vanquished in the course of peace negotiations after the cessation of hostilities..."

"Each of the belligerents wanted to afford his battleships the best possible defense against enemy strikes, allocating for this purpose considerable resources...It developed that the very nature of a powerful battleship force, representing only a potential threat...significantly restricted the ability of a navy to wage war at sea. It frequently stifled the initiative of the naval high command and, naturally, decreased the influence of naval warfare on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. So, instead of actually playing the primary role intended for them, battleships increasingly became an impediment to the deployment of the navy."

13) Major-General Zemskov, Military Thought, July 1969:

"In a nuclear war, if one breaks out, the combatants will expend all of the available forces and means at their disposal at its very beginning, above all, the strategic nuclear means...

"The decisive act of a nuclear war in all conditions is the infliction of a strike by strategic nuclear means, in the course of which both sides obviously will expend the main part of their most powerful nuclear ammunition...

"A decisive role in a nuclear war, especially at the start, is played by the results of the effect of strikes against the most important deep regions of the states, above all the territories of the main countries of the combatant coalitions...

"A most intensive exchange of nuclear strikes will occur, evidently, during the first days of a war. Subsequently, as a result of the great expenditure of the means of destruction, it is possible that there will be a decrease in effort against deep regions with continuation of an extremely active nuclear conflict in the theaters of military operations. At this time, individual strikes can be inflicted by the surviving strategic forces (by aircraft and by the nuclear submarines which did not succeed previously in entering the regions of launching positions)...

"The Soviet Armed Forces...will be compelled to expend their nuclear-missile weapons against an aggressor in full force and, above all, the Strategic-Missile Forces, the missile submarines, and the strategic aircraft."

14) Gorshkov, Izvestiya, 27 February 1970:

"High combat readiness is a combination of all of the qualities which insure the delivery of crushing strikes on the enemy in the first minutes of a war...It is a real capacity for nipping aggression in the bud from the very start by decisive actions...Soviet naval personnel do not forget the threat of a new world war...Now, as never before, the maintenance of all of the Navy's forces in constant combat readiness so as to be able at the first command of the Homeland to bring all of its power to bear quickly on the aggressor is of particular importance."

15) Gorshkov, Peoples' Army (Bulgaria), 7 May 1970:

"...Today, as never before, special significance is attributed to maintenance of all of the Navy's forces in constant readiness in order to be able, at the first call of the Motherland, to immediately launch their entire force upon the aggressor."

"High combat readiness means a combination of all factors which insure the delivery of an annihilating strike against an enemy in the first moments of a /nuclear/ war which he may start. It means the actual capability, by decisive actions, to halt the aggression at its very start."

16) Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, Military Thought, March 1971, p. 48:

"Now, after the creation of strategic weapons, it is impossible to imagine that the delivery of powerful nuclear strikes by the naval forces could be avoided in such a general nuclear war."

17) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, signed to press 27 November 1975:

A. "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea? To answer that question it was necessary to carry out a great deal of research. All of it invariably supported the high effectiveness of submarines given their correct employment and the appropriate combat support. This conclusion applies particularly to nuclear-powered submarines" (p. 309). (Emphasis supplied).

B. "The influence of combat at sea on the course of a war as a whole manifests itself above all to the extent that a navy's capability is realized for destroying ground objectives and for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea" (p. 455).

18) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979:

A. "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW, achieve strategic aims in a war at sea? To answer that question it was necessary to carry out a great deal of research. All of it invariably supported the high effectiveness of submarines given their correct employment and the appropriate combat support. This conclusion applies particularly to nuclear-powered submarines." (pp. 274-275) (Emphasis supplied).

B. "The influence of combat at sea on the course of a war as a whole manifests itself above all to the extent that a navy's capability is realized for destroying ground objectives and for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea" (p. 410).

19) Fleet Admiral Yegorov, Military-Historical Journal, May 1979, p. 24:

"In these documents Instructions for the conduct of naval operations issued in 1940 it was noted that the art of command lays in clear and specific assignment of missions, in the correct choice of the direction for the main strike, in the timely...deployment of forces; it was emphasized that the command was obligated to concentrate the strength of all cooperating forces for the fastest possible accomplishment of the assigned missions..."

APPENDIX F

SSBNs NOT ASSIGNED MAJOR STRIKE ROLE VS. U.S.

- 1) Rear Admiral Lizarskiy, Turkmenian Spark, 31 July 1960:

"The Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet...assigned the Armed Forces a number of important missions.-..Together with /certain unspecified/ other services of the Armed Forces, the Navy has been assigned /missions/ for defending the coasts from assault from the sea and from strikes by missile submarines, and also for carrying out a defense of maritime communications."

- 2) Gorshkov, Agitator No. 13, July 1960, p. 24:

"The Soviet Navy is capable of ...destroying ports, naval bases, and other objectives on the coast..."

- 3) Vice Admiral Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 29 July 1961:

"The Navy is capable of destroying ports, naval bases and other objectives on the coast."

- 4) Military Strategy, 1st edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 24 May 1962:

A. "In a future war the significance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the character of the new missions assigned it to carry out, especially for combat with the navy of an aggressor at sea and at their bases....our Navy...has become capable of carrying out the active missions assigned it far beyond the limits of Soviet waters. Modern submarines have the capability for firing on vital centers and for destroying the ships of the naval forces of any aggressor by means of ballistic and homing missiles....The basis of the conduct of nuclear-missile war will be the mass employment of nuclear missiles by all of the services of the Armed Forces, but in the first place and mainly by the Strategic Missile Forces" (pp. 227-228).

B. "In a future war, missions for...the destruction of important objectives in coastal regions will be carried out by strikes of the /Strategic/ Missile Forces and patrolling missile submarines with the cooperation of missile aviation" (p. 231);

C. "...the Strategic Missile Forces -- the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 232);

D. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses and, in certain cases, even force his capitulation... to the Strategic Missile Forces belong the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (p. 266);

E. "While the Strategic Missile Forces are the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole, missile troops and missile weapons are the basic means of combat for each of them" (p. 266)

F. "It is completely understandable that, no matter how significant may be the role of the Strategic Missile Forces in a future war, they cannot carry out all of the missions of a war. For gaining victory in war, it is still not enough to destroy the military capacity of an aggressor, his strategic means of combat and basic groupings of his armed forces. and to destroy his command and control. For final victory, it is absolutely necessary to smash the armed forces of the enemy, seize his military bases if for any reason they have not been obliterated, and to occupy strategically important territories. Additionally, it is necessary to defend one's own territory from invasion by ground armies or by air or sea landings by the aggressor" (p. 267);

G. "...the basic energies in naval development /of the "imperialist states"/ is directed to the construction of offensive forces, and in the first place aircraft carriers and missile submarines capable of delivering nuclear strikes on the most important objectives in the depths of the territory of the Socialist countries. Consequently, the basic mission of our Navy in a modern war will be to combat the forces of the navy of the opponent at sea and at /their/ bases. The second, and a no less important mission of the Navy in a future war, will be the destruction or interdiction of the oceanic and sea shipping of the opponent....These qualities enable submarine forces to carry on successful combat with the navy of an opponent and, if necessary, to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on shore objectives too" (p. 276);

H. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Forces, and their nuclear means" (p. 341).

5) Military Strategy, 2nd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 August 1963:

A. "In a future war the significance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the character of the new missions assigned it to carry out, especially for combat with the navy of an aggressor at sea and at their bases....our Navy...has become capable of carrying out the active missions assigned it far beyond the limits of Soviet waters. Modern submarines have the possibility to fire on vital centers and to destroy the ships of the naval forces of any aggressor by means of ballistic and homing missiles" The basis for the conduct of nuclear-missile war will be the mass employment of nuclear missiles by all of the services of the Armed Forces, but in the first place/and mainly" omitted/ the Strategic Missile Forces" (p. 248).

B. "In a future war, missions for...the destruction of important objectives in coastal regions will be carried out by strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces and patrolling submarines with the cooperation of missile aviation" (pp. 251-252);

C. "...the Strategic Missile Forces -- the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor" (p. 252);

D. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses, and in certain cases even to force his capitulation... to the Strategic Missile Forces belong the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (pp. 302-303);

E. "While the Strategic Missile Forces are the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole, missile troops and missile weapons are the basic means of combat for each of them" (p. 303);

F. "It is completely understandable that, no matter how significant may be the role of the Strategic Missile Forces in a future war, they cannot carry out all of the missions of a war. For gaining victory in war, it is still not enough to destroy the military capacity of an aggressor, his strategic means of combat and the basic groupings of his armed forces, and to destroy his command and control. For final victory it is absolutely necessary

to smash the armed forces of the enemy, seize his military bases if for any reason they have not been obliterated and to occupy strategically important territories. Additionally, it is necessary to defend one's own territory from invasion by ground armies or by air or sea landings by the aggressor" (p. 303);

G. "...the basic energies in naval developments /if the "imperialist states" is directed to the construction of offensive forces and in the first place aircraft carriers and missile submarines capable of delivering nuclear strikes on the most important objectives both in the coastal zone and in the depths of the territory of the Socialist countries. Consequently, the basic mission of our Navy in a modern war will be to combat the forces of the navy of the opponent at sea and at /their/ bases. The second, and a no less important mission of the Navy in a future war, will be the destruction or interdiction of the oceanic and sea shipping of the opponent...These qualities enable submarine forces to carry on successful combat with the navy of an opponent and, if necessary, to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on shore objectives too" (p. 313);

H. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Forces, and /their/ nuclear means" (p. 382); and

6) Colonel Kozlov, Major-General Smirnov, Colonels Baz' and Sidorov, On Soviet Military Science, signed to press 24 December 1963, pp. 374-375:

"The nuclear-missile strike...is becoming the basic method for the action of the Navy's forces in a nuclear-missile war /and .../ will be conducted both independently and in joint action with the Strategic Missile Forces, but sometimes /will be conducted as strikes/ of operational-tactical /mission/ designation too. An important role in the combat action of the Navy is played by the offensive and the defensive /methods of warfare/. The offensive will be conducted at sea by all of the forces and means of the Navy for decisive aims -- to annihilate the naval forces of the opponent. The defense will be conducted for covering one's own targets at sea and on the shore, and also for the protection of sea communications."

7) "Materials" for Armed Forces Day, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 2, January 1964, pp. 34 and 35.

"The combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces is exceptionally great. Their strikes enable them not only to insure a lightning-quick destruction of the most important groupings of the enemy but also to smash his military-economic potential,

disorganize his state and military command and control, and to annihilate the enemy's strategic means of attack....The combat might of the Navy is based above all on submarines with nuclear-propulsion plants armed with missiles and guided torpedoes. The auxiliary fleet has grown in numbers and quality."

8) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 1st edition, signed to press 14 January 1964, p. 596:

"The Soviet Navy must be ready to respond to them /"imperialist aggressions"/ with annihilating strikes on sea targets throughout the World Ocean."

9) Colonels Palevich and Posniak, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1964, p. 80:

"The Navy is assigned the responsibility for the destruction of the submarine, surface-ship, aircraft, and missile forces of an enemy navy, especially in the initial period of a war. Additionally, the Navy can destroy by missile strikes the bases, ports and shipbuilding centers of an enemy."

10) Gorshkov, Pravda, 24 July 1965:

"The Navy is called on to defend the Homeland from an aggressor's assault from the sea. All of the Navy's development for the past decade has been subordinated to this end."

11) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, 1st edition, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 8 January 1966, p. 50:

"Just as the Strategic Missile Forces will destroy the most important nuclear strike weapons of an enemy on the ground, the Navy's strike forces, especially the nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft, could destroy his nuclear-missile platforms at sea."

12) "Materials" for November 7th Anniversary speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 19, October 1966, p. 49:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness...to deliver immediately an all-destroying retaliatory strike on an aggressor...Nuclear-powered missile submarines have become the basic striking force of our Navy. They are now in condition to carry out very important missions."

- 13) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, October 1967, pp. 11-12:

"...in the mid-'50s, the course was chosen to create in a short time a fully modern oceanic navy...capable of delivering strikes at an enemy in the oceans and on his coastal territory as well as of defending the USSR's own objectives from oceanic directions -- and such a navy is being built."

- 14) Marshal Krylov, Military Thought, November 1967:

In this restricted-distribution journal of the Armed Forces' General Staff, the CinC of the SMF reminded his readers, in effect, that the established doctrine of the USSR, which he claimed had been derived from "a deep scientific study", was that the SMF had been created explicitly to carry out "the main strategic missions" whose successful fulfillment would "predetermine the course and outcome of a war". Krylov went on subsequently to state: "In modern conditions, the Strategic Missile Forces have become the main striking force, the main service of our Armed Forces, because the course and outcome of a war will depend to a decisive degree on their combat capabilities..."

- 15) Military Strategy, 3rd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (ed.). signed to press 30 November 1967:

A. "In a future war the significance of the Navy as a whole will be determined by the character of the new missions assigned it to carry out for the destruction of objectives on land as at sea /the underlined phrase replaced "especially for combat with the navy of an aggressor at sea and at their bases"/our Navy has become capable of carrying out the active missions assigned it far beyond the limits of Soviet waters. Modern nuclear-powered missile submarines are equipped with ballistic missiles with underwater launch and a great firing range /the underlined phrase replaced "Modern submarines have the capability to fire on vital centers and to destroy the ships of the naval forces of any aggressor by means of ballistic and homing missiles"/....The basis of nuclear-missile war will be the mass employment of nuclear missiles by services of the Armed Forces and in the first place the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines /the underlined part was added new to the 3rd edition and the "and" replaced a "but"/ (pp. 242-243).

3. "In a future war missions for the destruction of objectives on the shore...will be carried out by strikes of the /Strategic/ Missile Forces and patrolling submarines with the cooperation of missile aviation" (p. 246) (Note: "on the shore" had read "in coastal regions" in the first two editions.)

C. "...the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines -- the main means for the delivery of mass nuclear strikes on an aggressor (p. 247). (Note: The underlined phrase was added new to the 3rd edition; compare sub-paras. 4(C) and 5(C) above.)

D. "In comparison with the other services of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Missile Forces have the highest degree of combat readiness and are capable in the briefest period of annihilating and destroying an enormous number of objectives over a broad area and to any depth, to cause the enemy irreparable losses, and in certain cases even to force his capitulation...to the Strategic Missile Forces belongs the main role in carrying out the basic missions of a future war" (pp. 297-298);

E. "While the Strategic Missile Forces are the decisive means of the Armed Forces as a whole, missile troops and missile weapons are the basic means of combat for each of them" (p. 298);

F. "It is completely understandable that, no matter how significant may be the role of the Strategic Missile Forces in a future war, they cannot carry out all of the missions of a war. For gaining victory in war, it is still not enough to destroy the military capacity of an aggressor, his strategic means of combat and the basic groupings of his armed forces, and to destroy his command and control. For final victory it is absolutely necessary to smash the armed forces of the enemy, seize his military bases if for any reason they have not been obliterated, and to occupy strategically important territories. Additionally, it is necessary to defend one's own territory from invasion by ground armies or by air or sea landings by the aggressor" (pp. 298-299);

G. "...the basic energies in naval developments /of the "imperialist states"/ is directed to the construction of offensive forces, and in the first place aircraft carriers and missile submarines capable of delivering nuclear strikes on the most important objectives both in the coastal zone and in the depths of the territory of the Socialist countries. /The 3rd edition here omitted the sentence that had been included in the first two editions: "Consequently, the basic mission of our Navy in a modern war will be to combat the forces of the navy of the opponent at sea and at bases". Judging from the ensuing sentence in the 3rd edition (also new), which states that the Navy "at the same time"... "also retains" certain missions, it seems that a sentence had either been inadvertently omitted or, perhaps censored out or omitted because no agreement could be reached. Judging from the change in sub-para. A above from combat with the enemy navy to strikes against the shore as the Navy's first-listed mission, the sentence omitted

is most likely to have said that the "basic" or "most important" mission of the Navy, or of its SSBNs, was to make strikes against the shore⁷. At the same time, the Navy also retains such important missions as combat with the forces of the navy of an opponent at sea and at /their/ bases, and also the interdiction of his sea and oceanic communications. The carrying out of these missions can be accomplished with the greatest effect by submarines and aviation armed with nuclear-missile weapons and torpedoes" (p. 308). (Note: The two new sentences in the 3rd edition underlined immediately above replaced the one quoted above and the following additional two sentences: "The second, and a no less important mission of the Navy in a future war, will be the destruction or interdiction of the oceanic and sea shipping of the opponent...These qualities enable submarine forces to carry on successful combat with the navy of an opponent and, if necessary, to deliver nuclear-missile strikes on shore objectives too").

H. "Thus, the unlimited war of total destruction and annihilation being prepared by the imperialists undoubtedly will be turned against them. To do this, it is essential to have the means of retaliation in constant readiness: the Strategic Missile Forces, the Long-range Air Forces, and /their/ nuclear means" (p. 351).

16) Gorshkov, Military Thought, January 1968:

Stated that the mid-'50s decision to build "an oceanic navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive nature" created a requirement for "warships of great range and endurance, unlimited seaworthiness, great striking power and combat stability, and capable of delivering strikes at an enemy at sea and in his coastal areas. Such a navy has been built, the first generation of multipurpose submarines rightly constituting the basic striking forces of the Navy".

17) Marshal Krylov, Rural Life, 23 February 1968:

"The most significant expression of the reconstruction of our Armed Forces was the establishment of the Strategic Missile Forces, which are the embodiment of our Motherland's nuclear might... While assigning our Strategic Missile Forces the role of the main nuclear striking force, Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the premise that, in order to achieve final victory over an aggressor, it is necessary to combine the efforts of all of the services of our Armed Forces....Our powerful Navy has everything necessary to successfully carry out the missions assigned to it. Its might is based on nuclear-powered submarines which are armed with long-range ballistic missiles for launching from underwater."

18) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, 2nd ed., DOSAAF Press, signed to press 9 December 1968, pp. 65-66.

"Just as the Strategic Missile Forces will destroy the most important nuclear strike weapons of an enemy on the ground, the Navy's strike forces, especially the nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft, could destroy his nuclear-missile platforms at sea."

19) A History of Naval Art, Admiral Zakharov (Ed.), signed to press 19 August 1969, pp. 561-562:

"The Navy of the Soviet Union was created based on the fact that the main threat for us at sea was constituted by the navies of the NATO countries, and basically by nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines and aircraft carrier strike forces... The Navy was assigned to combat precisely these forces. If required, our submarine-aircraft Navy could destroy ground objectives in any territory of an enemy..."

20) Gorshkov, Rabotnichesko Delo (Bulgaria), 19 September 1969:

The Soviet Navy was said to have been "assigned the mission of being ready to...deliver strikes at the most important strategic targets deep within an aggressor's territory."

21) Gorshkov, Pravda, 26 July 1970:

"Nuclear-powered submarines with missiles of various mission designations are the pride of the Navy. These submarines, together with naval-missile and ASW aviation, comprise the basis of the Soviet Navy's striking power."

22) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 26 July 1970:

"Our Navy includes nuclear-powered submarines...armed with missiles launched from underwater and high-speed aircraft...capable of carrying out their missions at any point in the World Ocean...capable of a wide range of strategic and operational-tactical missions."

23) Marshal Grechko, Pravda, 23 February 1971:

"Time has fully confirmed the validity of the course chosen for the further development of our Fatherland's Navy. Nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines with missile armaments,

surface missile combatants, and missile-carrying aviation today constitute the main strike potential of our Navy. Soviet naval personnel have mastered the expanses of the World Ocean and possess everything necessary for the simultaneous and protracted conduct of combat actions on the water expanses of several oceans and seas".

24) Marshal Grechko, On Guard Over Peace and the Construction of Communism: Implementing the Decisions of the XXIVth Party Congress, signed to press 14 June 1971:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, which comprise the basis of the combat strength of our Armed Forces, are assigned the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack, the major grouping of his troops and military bases, the destruction of military-economic installations, the disorganization of state and military command, and the work of the rear and of the transport of an aggressor....this branch of the Soviet Armed Forces is now the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor /p. 41/. The main force of our Navy -- nuclear-powered submarines -- are capable of destroying from great distance both sea targets and important objectives situated on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy" (p. 48).

25) Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, August 1971, p. 95:

"Our oceanic Navy...together with the Strategic Missile Forces, became a most important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action..."

26) Materials for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20 October 1971, pp. 27-28:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have become now the main striking force of our Army, the basic combat power of the USSR, the reliable means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in the event of war. This service of the Armed Forces has in its armament the most modern missiles of strategic designation...capable of reliably delivering on target nuclear warheads of colossal power...The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, are uninterruptedly on combat duty, capable of immediately delivering an annihilating strike on any aggressor in any part of the planet...The high combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, however, does not lessen the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine holds that, for final victory in a modern war, it is necessary to employ the united forces of all services and service branches of the Armed Forces." The SMF Day "Materials" go on to mention that the Ground Forces were being modernized and then dispose of the other services in short shrift: "The combat capabilities of the PVC, Air Forces and Navy have grown immeasurably".

27) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 19, October 1972, pp. 37-38:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force of our Armed Forces, the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in case of war. ...In recent years, the firepower, striking force, and mobility of the Ground Forces have increased significantly...The combat capabilities of the PVO Forces of the Country, the Air Forces, and of the Navy grew immeasurably."

28) General of the Army Kulikov, Party Life No. 24, December 1972:

"The main striking power of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which are armed with modern weapons unprecedented in history -- powerful strategic intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles and modern means of automated control. These forces, which are in a state of constant readiness and in which is concentrated colossal striking power, are capable of delivering an annihilating strike at any aggressor. These forces will play the main and decisive role in a nuclear war...The role and power of the qualitatively new, ocean-going Navy have increased immeasurably. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with a variety of powerful missile weapons are now the basis of the striking power of the Navy."

29) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, December 1972, pp. 20-21:

"Realistically appraising the threat to the security of our country, the Central Committee of the CPSU saw that the way out of the situation which had been created lay in opposing the forces of aggression in the World Ocean with the Strategic Counterforces of Defense whose basis is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces and the oceanic Navy...In our modern Navy the Armed Forces have acquired a powerful instrument of defense in the oceanic areas, a formidable force for the deterrence of aggression which is constantly ready to deliver devastating retaliatory strikes and thwart the plans of the imperialists. And that is their [the naval forces'] main mission--defense of the country from assault by an aggressor from oceanic directions--which the Navy is carrying out successfully together with other services of the Soviet Armed Forces."

30) Marshal Grechko, Red Star, 17 December 1972:

"The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the Armed Forces' combat might. They are equipped with intercontinental and intermediate-range missiles and the latest automated means of control. Their aim in a war...is to deliver an accurate and annihila-

ting strike against the aggressor, against the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against troop and naval groupings in theaters of military action on land and sea, and to disorganize the activities of the rear, and of transportation and organs of state and military control. Under modern conditions, the Strategic Missile Forces are the most important means for curbing the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist forces and a reliable guarantee against all contingencies...The Navy has evolved into a formidable force. The main strike force of our Navy consists of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missile and homing torpedoes...Soviet naval personnel have repeatedly demonstrated on long cruises their readiness to carry out the most complex missions."

31) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973 (Emphasis supplied):

A. "...nuclear weapons...enabled the submarine forces of the Navy to become part of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Country. The ballistic missiles of submarines insure the capability for destroying from different directions the strategic targets of an enemy located in the depths of his territory" (p. 19).

B. "Thus, in regard to its equipping with strategic nuclear weapons, the Navy objectively acquires the capability ...of sharing in the destruction of the military-economic potential of an aggressor..." (p. 21).

C. "The basic mission assignments of the great powers' navies in a world nuclear war under modern conditions are sharing in the strikes by the strategic nuclear forces of a country, damage-limiting of the nuclear strikes of the enemy navy from oceanic directions, and participating in the operations conducted by ground forces in continental theaters of military action" (p. 21)

D. "Soviet naval personnel consider their top priority responsibility to be maintenance of a high readiness by all of the forces of the Navy for carrying out the mission for the defense of the state from oceanic directions...to be a reliable shield against enemy strikes from the sea" (p. 25).

32) Grechko, Pravda, 23 February 1973:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have taken the leading place in the structure of our Armed Forces. The country's Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy have acquired new capabilities."

33) General of the Army Kulikov, Communist No. 3, February 1973:

"The combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is based on the Strategic Missile Forces....The Navy is a formidable force. Its main striking arm, nuclear-powered missile submarines armed with ballistic missiles, combines great destructive power, mobility, and virtual invulnerability. The Navy also has /surface/ ships for various purposes and modern missile-carrying naval aircraft. This enables the Navy to carry out a vast range of missions."

34) Scientific-Technological Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, Colonel-General Lomov (Ed.), signed to press spring 1973:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces are the basis of the military might of our Armed Forces.../its/ missile strikes will be directed mainly at objectives and targets which are deep in the enemy rear /and/ to the entire depth of the theaters of military action.... One thermonuclear warhead is sufficient to obliterate an entire city. This means that not only individual targets and objectives on enemy territory can be destroyed but also entire military-economic regions....The high dependability of reaching the target is also an important characteristic of strategic missiles....The enormous combat strength and constant readiness...make them the main means for thwarting the aggressive inclinations of the imperialists /p. 105/....At present, nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft are the main strike forces of our Navy. These means, and above all the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, can strike important enemy objectives located deep in his territory as well as groupings of enemy forces" (p. 111).

35) Marshal of (Naval) Aviation Borzov, PVO Herald, July 1973, p. 13:

"Nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range underwater-launched ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes are the pride of the Soviet people...Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying from great distances both sea targets and important targets located in the coastal area and in the rear of an enemy. Together with the Strategic Missile Forces they are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor" (Emphasis supplied).

36) General Tolubko speech, Tass in English, 16 November 1973:

"General of the Army Vladimir Tolubko noted that Soviet strategic rockets have a practically unlimited range of operation. The Ground Forces, the Air Force, Navy and anti-aircraft defense forces are armed with powerful rockets...The creation of the Strategic Missile Forces became the most substantial expression of the cardinal

reorganization of the Soviet Armed Forces', Tolubko stressed. 'They now form the backbone of the Soviet Army's /i.e., the Armed Forces' combat might...'"

37) General Grigoryev, Radio Moscow, in English, 18 November 1973:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force and the chief means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for launching retaliation in case of an attack on this country... The Strategic Missile Forces are always ready for action and they are the main strike force of the Soviet Armed Forces and the chief barrier in the way of aggressive imperialist schemes."

38) Marshal Grechko, Communist No. 3, February 1974, p. 10:

"The services of the Armed Forces and the branches of the services have changed out of all recognition and the correlation between them /Of missions assigned has been altered. The decisive service of the Armed Forces is the Strategic Missile Forces. The combat capabilities of the Ground Forces, the country's Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, and the Navy have increased considerably."

39) Gorshkov, Soviet Patriot, 20 February 1974:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are being modernized. They are equipped with weapons of enormous destructive force, high accuracy, and now constitute the basis of the military might of the USSR. Our Navy...is carrying out its mission for defense of state interests and the maritime boundaries of our Homeland..."

40) Marshal Vasilevskiy, Speech for Armed Forces Day, Tass in Russian, 22 February 1974:

"The Marshal stressed the role of the Strategic Missile Forces as the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor; 'They have been developed in recent years', he said. The Marshal noted the improvement of the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy. 'The Navy's main strike force -- the nuclear-powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles -- has tremendous destructive power and great mobility', said the Marshal."

41) Marshal Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 1st edition, signed to press 9 April 1974:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy now is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which most fully /of all the military services incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range...are

constantly on watch and ever ready for a retaliatory strike on an aggressor /p. 95/.At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (p. 98).

42) Gorshkov, Navy Day speech, Tass in English, 28 July 1974:

"Judging from the development trends of navies and their armaments, action against ground targets is becoming a navy's foremost objective today. Of course, the task of combatting the enemy's fleet still remains...If need be, Soviet naval seamen will successfully manage to solve both these tasks" (Emphasis supplied).

43) Gorshkov, Pravda, 28 July 1974:

"A Navy has always had two main missions: to counter the enemy's navy and /to take/ actions against the shore. The first of these missions had priority for many centuries. But since the Second World War the situation has begun to change. Judging from the development trends of navies and their weapons, action against ground targets is becoming a navy's foremost objective today. Therefore, defense of the country against assault from the sea assumes even more important significance for our armed forces. This is...the result of the development of submarines which, in a number of navies, now are the main delivery systems for strategic nuclear missiles. Of course, the mission of combatting the enemy's navy still remains...If need be, Soviet naval seamen will successfully manage to carry out both of these missions" (Emphasis supplied).

44) SMF Day "Materials" for speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 21, November 1974, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, possessing missiles of various yields and /mission/ designations...constitute the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces. Even in peacetime, they are in constant readiness, which makes them the reliable shield of the security of our Homeland...the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and the preservation of peace. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, assigned to carrying out strategic missions, and their role in modern war do not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Soviet military doctrine assumes that the aims of a war can be gained only by the united forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces."

(45) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, December 1974:

A. "Considering the scale of conflict in its strategic aspect, it is necessary to take note of the constantly growing capabilities of the navies of the great powers to achieve ever more decisive aims. In particular, this applies to the actions of the strategic offensive forces /of navies/ for the destruction of major groupings /of forces/ of an enemy and, first of all, for knocking out his military-economic capability, which can exert an immediate effect on the course and even the outcome of an nuclear war" (p. 24) (Emphasis supplied).

B. "...the increase in the capabilities of strategic-missile submarines for carrying out missions for the destruction of ground objectives permits widening the front and increasing the depth of their pressure on an enemy..." (p. 25) (Emphasis supplied).

(46) Marshal Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, 2nd revised edition, signed to press 26 March 1975:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces which most fully /of all the military services/ incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range...are constantly on watch and ever ready for a retaliatory strike on an aggressor /p. 102/....At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines are the main means capable of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy. They can deliver strikes from great distances on land targets located on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy as well as on sea targets" (p. 105).

(47) Gorshkov, Problems of Philosophy, May 1975:

"As an important part of the Armed Forces, the modern ocean-going Navy gives them universality, increases their mobility and striking power, and makes them capable of cooperating with other branches of the Armed Forces, firmly stopping aggression and repelling assaults on our country no matter where they may originate. This is of paramount importance if we consider the fact that the imperialist powers have concentrated the lion's share of strategic weapons, which are directed against the Soviet Union, in the sphere of naval action".

(48) Gorshkov, Soviet Military Review (in English), June 1975:

"A Navy has always had two cardinal tasks: fighting the naval forces of the enemy and operations against the enemy's shores. For a long period of time the first mission had priority over all other missions. But from the Second World War onwards the situation began to change. Judging by the trends in the development of the navies and their weapons in the major countries, we see that the main task of a navy today is to deliver attacks on ground targets.

Therefore, the defense of the country from attacks from the sea has acquired increased importance for the Soviet Armed Forces. This is...the result of submarine development. In several navies submarines are the main carriers of strategic nuclear weapons. However, the mission of fighting the enemy navy still remains...Its' /the Navy's/ main striking force consists of nuclear-powered submarines and missile-carrying aircraft" (Emphasis supplied).

(49) Gorshkov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 14, July 1975, p. 13:

"It /the Navy/ is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations which take place in theaters of military actions of vast extent and depth. The modern /Soviet/ Navy, possessing all different kinds of missiles, can carry out combat missions not only in the /World/ Ocean but also even can exert an influence on the land territories of distant continents. This is one of the important factors for the deterrence of aggression by the imperialists and for the stabilization of situations. ...At the present time, nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes...are the main means of carrying out the basic missions of the Navy" (Emphasis supplied).

(50) SMF Day "Materials" for speeches. Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1975, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, which have missiles of virtually unlimited range, basically determine the defense might of our state. In peacetime, they are in constant combat readiness and serve as the reliable shield of the land of the Soviets...The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces and their role in modern war does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. In modern war, victory over an aggressor can be won only by the joint forces of all the services of the Armed Forces and all branches of the services...In the Navy this /basis of its might/ are modern missile delivery systems, nuclear-powered submarines armed with underwater-launchable ballistic missiles and the Coastal Missile Forces."

(51) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, signed to press November 1975, p. 354:

"If before the basic part of the forces of a navy was directed against the naval forces of the enemy, then today the

main aim of a navy becomes insuring the carrying out of all missions related to actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and of actions for the defense of one's own territory from the strikes of his navy" (Emphasis supplied).

(52) Colonel-General Alekseyev, Red Star, 28 January 1976:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are the main component of the Armed Forces. They are equipped with missiles capable of carrying warheads of colossal yield, of covering any distance, and delivering accurate and inescapable strikes against an aggressor...Nuclear submarines equipped with various missiles and homing torpedoes are now the main means for carrying out the Navy's basic missions."

(53) Professor, Captain First Rank Potapov, Military-Historical Journal, February 1976, p. 81:

"Thus, the 'Polaris' submarine-missile system became a most important component part of the strategic nuclear forces of American imperialism and, together with that, the basic strike force of the Navy in nuclear war. Accepting the nuclear-missile submarine system as one of the main components of the strategic offensive forces, the ruling circles of the U.S. gave special attention to the accelerated construction of their missile submarines" (Emphasis supplied).

(54) Gorshkov, Red Star, 11 February 1976:

"In the Navy's composition are modern nuclear-powered submarines with various missiles..." (Emphasis supplied).

(55) Captain First Rank Zhuravlev, Naval Digest, May 1976:

"The Soviet Navy has been turned into an important strategic factor, into a force capable of countering aggression from the direction of the sea and carrying out large scale operational and strategic missions in the World Ocean" (Emphasis supplied).

(56) Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1976:

Of most importance, seapower means the capability of our Armed Forces to defend the country from the threat of assault from the oceans".

(57) Captain First Rank Shul'man, Naval Digest, August 1976, p. 19 quotes (correctly) from Gorshkov's Seapower of the State, p. 354:

"If before the basic part of the forces of a navy was directed against the naval forces of the enemy, then today the main aim of a navy becomes insuring the carrying out of all missions related to actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and of actions for the defense of one's own territory from the strikes of his navy" (Emphasis supplied).

(58) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1976, pp. 31 and 32:

"...now the Strategic Missile Forces are the main...part of the Soviet Armed Forces....The Strategic Missile Forces are held in constant combat readiness. Even in peacetime, they are fulfilling a combat mission of state importance, uninterruptedly stand a combat watch."

"Not only the Strategic Missile Forces but also the other services of the Armed Forces are equipped with nuclear-missile weapons. In recent years the firepower, striking force and maneuverability of the Ground Forces have increased significantly.... The combat capabilities of the National Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy have grown immeasurably."

(59) "Faithful Guard of the Gains of October". Editorial article for use in political indoctrination of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 3, February 1977, p. 7:

"Now the basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces, which most fully incorporate the achievements of modern scientific and technological progress...the Navy has become qualitatively different. Its basis is constituted by nuclear-powered submarines, naval missile and anti-submarine aviation, and various types of missile and anti-submarine surface ships. All of this has raised its capabilities radically and has strengthened the seapower of our state still more."

(60) Marshal Chuykov, Armed Forces Day speech, Tass in Russian, 21 February 1977:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads of colossal power and of inflicting annihilating strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be." (The Navy's SSBN capability went unmentioned.)

(61) General of the Army Tolubko, Armed Forces Day speech, Radio Moscow, 22 February 1977:

"The current basis for the combat might of the Armed Forces is the Strategic Missile Forces, which have assimilated most fully the achievements of the latest scientific and technological progress."
(No mention was made of the Navy's capability for strategic strike.)

(62) Marshal Moskalenko, Baku Worker, 23 February 1977:

"It must be noted that it is precisely the Strategic Missile Forces, the nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and missile-carrying aviation which now occupy the key positions in the system for the protection of the security...of our people" (Emphasis supplied).
(SSBNs apparently not considered worth explicit mention, even on Armed Forces Day.)

(63) "Material" for Navy Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1977, p. 43:

"...the new Navy was created in a short time, being changed into an important strategic factor having the forces to counter aggression from seaward directions and to resolve major operational and strategic missions in the World Ocean...The pride of the Navy are its nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range, under-water-launched missiles and homing torpedoes" (Emphasis supplied)

(64) Fleet Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1977, pp. 2-3:

"Our Navy truly is the country's military shield...The combat might of our Navy is based on various classes of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missiles."

(65) Gorshkov, The Navy, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 11 July 1977:

A. "The Navy is an important service of the Armed Forces assigned to carry out strategic and operational missions in the oceanic and sea theaters of military action...The Navy is capable of destroying important ground objectives of the enemy and of defeating his forces at sea and at their bases....Submarines and aviation, and their main weapon -- missiles of various /mission/ designations with nuclear warheads, have become types of forces of the Soviet Navy" (p. 39).

B. "Our oceanic Navy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action" (p. 47).

(66) Vice Admiral Chernavin, Navy Day interview, Tass in English, 28 July 1977:

"At present, the main means of accomplishing the fundamental tasks of the Navy are nuclear submarines carrying various missiles and homing torpedoes. The Navy has missile, antisubmarine, mine-sweeping, landing, and other surface ships. The naval missile-carrying and antisubmarine aviation have opened up new opportunities for strengthening the combat might of the Navy and for increasing the mobility of its forces...The USSR is a great seapower. It is but natural that a strong Navy...is essential for the reliable defense of the sea borders" (Emphasis supplied).

(67) Admiral Mikhaylin, Rural Life, 31 July 1977:

"Nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons combined with missiles of various types and radio-electronic equipment have imparted new qualities to the Navy and advanced it to the level of strategic forces. This is one of the important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression and for stabilizing the situation and strengthening the peace...At present, the main means for carrying out the Navy's basic missions are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and homing torpedoes" (Emphasis supplied).

(68) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1977, p.80:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. These Forces now possess powerful missiles...which are capable of rapidly delivering on target nuclear warheads of great force, of delivering undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war, do not in any way detract from the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military theory and practice proceeds from the premise that victory in modern war...may be achieved only with the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces. The other services of the Armed Forces are also equipped with nuclear-missile weapons."

(69) Gorshkov, Military-Historical Journal, October 1977, p. 47:

"...Soviet naval art was enriched /In World War II/ by the working out and use of methods for delivering strikes on strategic targets on the territory of the enemy and in naval theaters" (Emphasis supplied).

(70) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, November 1977, p. 16:

"The Soviet Navy became an oceanic navy, and important strategic means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exercising a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent. It now possesses colossal operational-strategic capabilities.

(71) The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction, by a 10-author "collective" of the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History, S. A. Tyushkevich (Ed.), signed to press 22 November 1977, (Emphasis supplied);

A. "Soviet nuclear-powered submarines...are capable of carrying out a wide circle of missions in the World Ocean...Nuclear-powered submarines have become weapons of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Country" (p. 462)

B. "The basis of the combat might of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the USSR is comprised of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines. 'We have created strategic forces', said L.I. Brezhnev, 'which are a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor'." (p. 465);

C. "The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Army is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). They are assigned for carrying out strategic missions in a nuclear war...the RVSN is capable of delivering on target with great accuracy nuclear warheads of enormous destructive force. These high combat capabilities account for the leading role of the RVSN in the Armed Forces of the USSR. They are the main and decisive means for the accomplishment of the aims of a war because they can in a very brief period complete the missions of degrading the strength of the military-economic capabilities of an aggressor, of annihilating his strategic means of nuclear-missile assault, and of smashing his main military forces" (p. 466);

D. "The Soviet Navy is capable of countering aggression from seaward directions and of carrying out major operational and strategic missions in oceanic and sea theaters of military action...The Navy constitutes a balanced system of the various branches of forces including submarines, surface ships, naval aviation, coastal missile forces, naval infantry...Submarines and the Naval Air Force, armed with missiles of various classes and designations, are the main branches of the forces of the Navy and are being continuously modernized" (pp. 469-470); and

E. "The Soviet Navy corresponds to the position of the USSR as a great seapower and is an important factor for stabilizing situations in various regions of the world...and for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states" (p. 470).

(72) Captain First Rank Viktorov, Naval Digest, January 1978, p. 104:

In a review of Gorshkov's 1977 monograph The Navy, it is stated that the Navy CinC "portrayed well the role of our Army and Navy in the system of defense of the country and, in particular, for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of imperialism".

(73) Gorshkov, Shipbuilding, February 1978, p. 5:

"The Soviet Navy was transformed into a formidable force, which enables it, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, to carry out strategic missions in the ocean theaters. It reliably shields the maritime boundaries of the countries of socialism" (Emphasis supplied).

(74) "The Strategic Missile Forces." Unsigned feature article, Technology and Armaments, February 1978, p. 14:

"On 14 February 1960, at the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed... Now they constitute the basic combat might of the Army and Navy. They are equipped with missiles of intercontinental and intermediate range."

(75) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Shipbuilding, July 1978, p. 1:

"At the present time, the main means for carrying out the basic missions on the seas and oceans are nuclear-powered submarines armed with various missiles and torpedoes... Soviet nuclear-powered submarines have demonstrated their high seagoing qualities under the ice at the North Pole, and in tropical climates during their round-the-world cruises" (Emphasis supplied).

(76) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 30 July 1978:

"Atomic power and nuclear weapons, together with missiles designated for various purposes... have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the category of strategic forces that are capable of exerting a decisive influence on an armed conflict. Our Navy has become one of the most important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression and for stabilizing the consolidation of a peaceful situation" (Emphasis supplied).

(77) Captain First Rank Skryl'nik, Candidate of Philosophical Science, "Materials" for the political instruction of military personnel, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 15, August 1978, pp. 77-78:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is constituted by the Strategic Missile Forces...in a principally new approach to the problem of raising the defense capability of the USSR under the conditions of the scientific technological revolution in military affairs...Now the Strategic Missile Forces have in their armament missiles of intercontinental and intermediate ranges capable of delivering accurate and undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may appear."

"The Soviet Air Forces today... are capable of influencing the course of major operations in both ground and sea theaters of military action" (p. 78)...

"Our Navy is a mighty oceanic missile navy capable of reliably protecting the state interests of the USSR in the seas and oceans...submarines are capable of carrying out a wide range of missions in any region of the World Ocean" (Emphasis supplied).

(78) "Materials" for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1978, pp 61-62:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. Even in peacetime they are in constant readiness, standing combat watches uninterruptedly. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces their role in modern war, does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Victory over an aggressor now may be gained only by the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces...The other services of the Armed Forces have nuclear-missile weapons too...

(79) Lt. General Stroganov, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces' Missile and Artillery Forces, Radio Moscow in Russian, 18 November 1978:

Asserts that "the Strategic Missile Forces are the shield and the sword of our Homeland. They are the real and practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor" (Emphasis supplied).

(80) Colonel Pletushkov, Naval Digest, February 1979, p. 75:

Quotes Brezhnev at the XXVth Party Congress in 1976 as having said: "We are creating strategic forces which are reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor." The article later on states: "The basis of the combat might of the Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles of various designations... Now our Navy fully corresponds to the position of our country as a great seapower and is an important factor for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states, for the stabilization of situations in various regions of the world" (Emphasis supplied).

81) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979, p. 324:

"If before the basic part of the forces of a navy was directed against the naval forces of the enemy, then today the main aim of a navy becomes insuring the carrying out of all missions related to actions against the ground objectives of the enemy and of actions for the defense of one's own territory from the strikes of his navy" (Emphasis supplied).

82) "Materials" for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 20, October 1979, pp. 37-38:

"Possessing automated missile complexes with missiles of various ranges that are capable of delivering missiles of enormous destructive power, they the SMF are a branch of the Armed Forces, the reliable shield of our country and of all of the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth.

"The Strategic Missile Forces are forces of constant combat readiness. They maintain a constant combat watch. Such readiness is obligatory -- a necessary measure for the deterrence of the aggressive strivings of imperialism and its accomplices.

"Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the premise that final victory in a modern war requires the united forces of all services and arms of services. Therefore, the other means for the conduct of war are also modernized and developed constantly....

"Due to their equipping with missiles and other modern weapons and equipment, the combat capabilities of the National PVO, the Air Forces, and the Navy have grown immeasurably."

Appendix G

ROLES IN BOTH STRATEGIC STRIKE AND DETERRENCE OR IN DETERRENCE
ALONE CREDITED TO NAVY

- 1) Gorshkov, Communist of Tadzhikistan, 25 July 1965:

"We will understand that if an aggressor succeeds in unleashing a nuclear war the conflict will be the most grave and most destructive of all wars conducted by mankind in its entire history. Building up the strength of the Soviet Navy, we stand in guard of peace doing everything to prevent this tragedy."

- 2) Admiral Sergeyev, Naval Digest, July 1965, p. 9:

"The Soviet Government undeviatingly conducts a policy of peace. In its noble struggle for peace, it is supported by the might of the Armed Forces as a factor capable of deterring any unrestrained aggressor. And our Navy makes its contribution to this great matter."

- 3) Marshal Malinovskiy, Accountability Report to the XXIIIrd Party Congress, 1 April 1966, Stenographic Record, Vol. 1, p. 412:

"These forces [SMF and missile submarines] are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in a war."

- 4) Marshal Sokolovskiy and Major-General Cherednichenko, Communist of the Armed Forces, July 1966, p. 64:

"These forces [SMF and missile submarines] are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in a war."

- 5) Navy Day-'66 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1966, p. 56;

"Much attention has been given to the development of the Strategic Missile Forces and of nuclear-powered missile submarines -- the main means for the deterrence of imperialist aggressors and for their defeat in case they ignite a war."

6) Marshal Malinovskiy, quoted by V. Razumov in Red Star article of 25 February 1967 as having just repeated in mid-January 1967:

"The Strategic Missile Forces and missile-carrying nuclear-powered submarines...are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for destroying him in the event of war."

7) N. Kiryayev, E. Nikitin, and Yu. Korablev (Eds.), The CPSU and the Construction of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1967, p. 392:

"These forces [SMF and missile submarines] are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in a war."

8) Lt.-General A. E. Khmel' (ed.), Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces, signed to press 21 November 1967, p. 16:

"The Strategic Missile Forces together with nuclear-powered missile submarines are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in a war."

9) Military Strategy, 3rd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 31 November 1967, p. 235:

"The nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarine fleet, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is the main force for the deterrence of an aggressor and his complete defeat in a war." (This sentence was added new to the 3rd edition).

10) Marshal Grechko, Military-Historical Journal, February 1968, p. 13:

"The basic means for the deterrence of aggression are the Strategic Missile Forces. They are equipped with powerful nuclear-missile weapons capable of destroying targets at any distance... The Navy is equipped with missile submarines and surface ships, with the forces and means for antisubmarine defense which are capable of carrying out the missions assigned them."

11) Marshal Bagramyan, Communist (Yerevan), 22 February 1968:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are...the main military means for deterrence of an aggressor and for his defeat in a war...The basis of the Navy's striking power is the nuclear-powered submarine and the missile-carrying aircraft."

12) Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 28 July 1968:

"The main means for the deterrence and, if need be, for the defeat of an aggressor are now our Strategic Missile Forces and the missile-carrying submarine."

13) Rear Admiral Shablikov, Soviet Patriot, 28 July 1968:

"These forces /SMF and missile submarines/ are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for decisively defeating him in a war."

14) Admiral Kharlamov, Moscow Pravda, 23 July 1963;

"...the basic means for the defeat of an aggressor -- the Strategic Missile Forces and missile-carrying, nuclear-powered submarine fleet."

15) Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, The History of Naval Art, Admiral S. E. Zakharov (Ed.), signed to press 19 August 1969, p. 565:

"Submarines armed with ballistic missiles have become an integral part of the forces assigned to the execution of important strategic tasks together with the Strategic Missile Forces."

16) Gorshkov, La Revue Maritime, October 1969, p. 1141:

"The might of these /Soviet/ Armed Forces rests on a firm socio-economic and scientific-technological base which enabled the Soviet Union rapidly to create the basic means capable of deterring and defeating an aggressor -- the Strategic Missile Forces and nuclear-powered missile submarines."

17) Gorshkov, Soviet Moldaviya, 23 February 1971:

"The Strategic Missile Forces...together with the Navy's nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines have become the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for his decisive defeat in a war..."

13) Marshal Grechko, On Guard Over Peace and the Construction of Communism: Implementing the Decisions of the XXIVth Party Congress, signed to press 14 June 1971:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, which comprise the basis of the combat strength of our Armed Forces, are assigned the destruction of the enemy's means for nuclear attack, the major grouping of his troops and military bases, the destruction of military-economic installations, the disorganization of state and military command, and the work of the rear and of the transport of an aggressor....this branch of the Soviet Armed Forces is now the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor /p. 41/. The main force of our Navy -- nuclear-powered submarines -- are capable of destroying from great distance both sea targets and important objectives situated on the sea coast and in the rear of an enemy." (p. 48).

19) Marshal Grechko, Naval Digest, July 1971, p. 5:

"The new weapons and combat equipment have sharply increased the scope for the employment of the forces of the Navy and enable it to deliver powerful strikes at military objectives and on groups of forces at any point on earth. The Strategic Missile Forces, together with the nuclear-powered, missile-armed submarines, constitute the main means for deterrence of an aggressor."

20) Gorshkov, Pravda, 25 July 1971:

"The Navy has received nuclear-missile weapons capable of reaching any point on earth. Nuclear-powered submarines armed with such weapons, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of any aggressor--the reliable shield of the world socialist system."

21) Materials for SMF Day, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1971, pp. 27-28:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have become now the main striking force of our Army, the basic combat power of the USSR, the reliable means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in the event of war. This service of the Armed Forces has in its armament the most modern missiles of strategic designation...capable of reliably delivering on target nuclear warheads of colossal power...The Strategic Missile Forces are in constant readiness, are uninterruptedly on combat duty, capable of immediately delivering an annihilating strike on any aggressor in any part of the planet...The high combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, however, does not lessen the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces. Soviet military doctrine holds that, for final victory in a modern war, it is necessary to employ the united forces of all services and service

branches of the Armed Forces." The SMF Day "Materials" go on to mention that the Ground Forces were being modernized and then dispose of the other services in short shrift: "The combat capabilities of the PVO, Air Forces and Navy have grown immeasurably."

22) Gorshkov, Pravda, 30 July 1972:

"Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor...the presence of Soviet warships in the World Ocean serves as an impressive deterrent factor against any attempts at surprise aggression against our state and against the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth."

23) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces, No. 19, October 1972, pp. 37-38:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force of our Armed Forces, the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and his decisive defeat in case of war. ...In recent years, the firepower, striking force, and mobility of the Ground Forces have increased significantly... The combat capabilities of the PVO Forces of the Country, the Air Forces, and of the Navy grew immeasurably."

24) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, December 1972, pp. 20-21:

"Realistically appraising the threat to the security of our country, the Central Committee of the CPSU saw that the way out of the situation which had been created lay in opposing the forces of aggression in the World Ocean with the Strategic Counterforces of Defense whose basis is comprised of the Strategic Missile Forces and the oceanic Navy...In our modern Navy the Armed Forces have acquired a powerful instrument of defense in the oceanic areas, a formidable force for the deterrence of aggression which is constantly ready to deliver devastating retaliatory strikes and thwart the plans of the imperialists. And that is their /the naval forces/ main mission--defense of the country from attack by an aggressor from oceanic directions--which the Navy is carrying out successfully together with other services of the Soviet Armed Forces."

25) Grechko, Red Star, 17 December 1972:

"The Strategic Missile Forces constitute the basis of the combat might of the Armed Forces....Their aim in a war...is to deliver an accurate and annihilating strike against the aggressor, against the enemy's means of nuclear attack, against troops and groupings in theaters of military action on land and sea, and to disorganize the activities of the rear and of transportation, and of the organs of state and military control. Under modern conditions,

the Strategic Missile Forces are the most important means for curbing the aggressive aspirations of the imperialist forces and a reliable guarantee against all contingencies...The main striking force of our Navy consists of nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range missile and homing torpedoes..."

26) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 21:

"Thus, in regard to its equipping with strategic nuclear weapons, the Navy objectively acquires the capability not only of sharing in the destruction of the military-economic potential of an aggressor but also is becoming one of the most important factors for deterrence of nuclear attack. In this connection, missile submarines, due to their greater survivability in comparison to land-based missiles, are an even more effective means of deterrence. They constitute a permanent threat to an aggressor who, appreciating the inevitability of nuclear retaliation from oceanic directions, can be confronted with the necessity of refraining from unleashing a nuclear war."

27) General of the Army Tolubko, CinC SMF, Rural Life, 23 February 1973:

"These forces /the Strategic Missile Forces/ have become the main strike forces of our Army /i.e., of the Soviet Armed Forces/ and the main means for deterring an aggressor and for defeating him in the event of war."

28) Gorshkov, Soviet Warrior, No. 13, July 1973:

"Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor and a reliable shield for the world socialist system."

29) Admiral Amel'ko, Military Knowledge, July 1973:

"Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor...Nuclear-powered submarines, armed with underwater-launched ballistic missiles and homing torpedoes, and Naval Aviation are the main strike forces of the Navy;

30) Admiral Oleynik, Rural Life, 29 July 1973:

"Submarine-borne ballistic missiles now can hit important targets from long range. Missiles...have become an important means of combatting surface ships...Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of an aggressor and a reliable shield for the world socialist system."

31) Vice Admiral Novikov, Socialist Industry, 29 July 1973:

"The new material and technical base has sharply improved the Navy's capabilities for waging an armed conflict at sea. Nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, are the main means for deterrence of an aggressor and constitute a reliable shield for the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth"

32) Marshal of (Naval) Aviation Borzov, PVO Herald, July 1973, p. 13:

"Nuclear-powered submarines armed with ballistic missiles are capable of destroying from great distances both sea targets and important targets located in the coastal area and in the rear of an enemy. Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, they are the main means for the deterrence of any aggressor."

33) General Grigoryev, First Deputy CinC of the SMF, Radio Moscow, in English, 18 November 1973:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces...have become the main strike force and the chief means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for launching retaliation in case of an attack on this country... The Strategic Missile Forces are always ready for action and they are the main strike force of the Soviet Armed Forces and the chief barrier in the way of aggressive imperialist schemes."

34) Marshal Vasilevskiy, Speech for Armed Forces Day, Tass in Russian, 22 February 1974:

"The Marshal stressed the role of the Strategic Missile Forces as the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor; 'They have been developed in recent years', he said. The Marshal noted the improvement of the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy. 'The Navy's main strike force -- the nuclear-powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles -- has tremendous destructive power and great mobility', said the Marshal."

35) Army General Kulikov, Pravda, 9 May 1974:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, which are the main means for the deterrence of an aggressor, constitute the basis of our Armed Forces' combat might. They are armed with intercontinental missiles...and are capable of dealing the enemy a crushing blow. The Ground Forces, Navy, and the Air Forces are also equipped with first-class military equipment and armaments."

36) Gorsnkov, Labor, 9 May 1974:

"...the Strategic Missile Forces constitute the reliable nuclear shield of the Homeland."

37) SMF Day "Materials" for speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 21, November 1974, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces, possessing missiles of various yields and /mission/ designations...constitute the basis of the combat might of our Armed Forces. Even in peacetime, they are in constant readiness, which makes them the reliable shield of the security of our Homeland...the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and the preservation of peace. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, assigned to carrying out strategic missions, and their role in modern war do not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Soviet military doctrine assumes that the aims of a war can be gained only by the united forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces."

38) Major-General Zemskov, The Services of the Armed Forces and Force Arms, 1975, p. 8:

"The Strategic Missile Forces...are now the main means for deterring and defeating the aggressor."

39) Gorshkov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 14, July 1975, p. 13:

"It /the Navy/ is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of major operations which take place in theaters of military actions of vast extent and depth. The modern /Soviet/ Navy, possessing all different kinds of missiles, can carry out combat missions not only in the /World/ Ocean but also even can exert an influence on the land territories of distant continents. This is one of the important factors for the deterrence of aggression by the imperialists."

40) Vice Admiral Shablikov, Soviet Lithuania, 27 July 1975:

"The Soviet Navy, together with the other services of the Armed Forces, has become an important means for the deterrence of an aggressor, a reliable shield covering the system of socialism."

41) Party General Secretary, Chairman of the Council of Defense Leonid Brezhnev, report to the XXVth Party Congress, 24 February 1976, Stenographic Record, p. 100:

"We are creating strategic forces which are reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor."

42) Colonel-General Levchenko, Soviet Patriot, 17 November 1976:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have been created and become the main striking force of our Army and the basic means for the deterrence of an aggressor and for his decisive defeat in the event of war."

43) Admiral Mikhaylin, Rural Life, 31 July 1977:

"The Navy...is one of the important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression."

44) Gorshkov, The Navy, Knowledge Press, signed to press 22 September 1977, p. 56:

"The Navy's sortie into the World Ocean and the extended stay there of our combatant ships has become an important factor for the deterrence of the aggressive strivings of the imperialists."

45) The Soviet Armed Forces: History of Construction, by a ten-author "collective" of the Defense Ministry's Institute of Military History, S. A. Tyushkevich (Ed.), signed to press 22 November 1977:

A. "The basis of the combat might of the Strategic Forces of the USSR is comprised of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines. 'We have created the Strategic Forces', said L.I. Brezhnev, 'which are a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor'."

B. "The Soviet Navy is an important factor...for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states" (p. 470).

46) Captain First Rank Viktorov, Naval Digest, January 1978, p. 104:

In a review of Gorshkov's 1977 monograph The Navy, it is stated that the Navy Commander-in-Chief "portrayed well the role of our Army and Navy in the system of defense of the country and, in particular, for the deterrence of the aggressive undertaking of imperialism".

47) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 30 July 1978:

"Atomic power and nuclear weapons, together with missiles designated for various purposes...have imparted new qualities to the Navy and have advanced it to the category of strategic forces that are capable of exerting a decisive influence on an armed conflict. Our Navy has become one of the most important factors for the deterrence of imperialist aggression."

48) Lt. General Stroganov, Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces' Missile and Artillery Forces, Radio Moscow in Russian, 18 November 1978:

Asserts that "the Strategic Missile Forces are the shield and the sword of our Homeland. They are the real and practicable means for the deterrence of a potential aggressor".

49) Colonel Pletushkov, Naval Digest, February 1979, p. 75:

Quotes Brezhnev at XXVth Party Congress in 1976 as having said: "We are creating the Strategic Forces which are a reliable means for the deterrence of any aggressor". The article, in a later paragraph states: "The basis of the combat might of the Navy is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines armed with missiles of various designations...now our Navy fully corresponds to the position of our country as a great seapower and is an important factor for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of the imperialist states..."

Appendix H

APPARENT OVER-EMPHASIS ON SSBN-PROTECTION BEYOND THAT APPROPRIATE FOR THE DEFERRED STRIKE ROLE

1) Captain First Rank Stepanov, Naval Digest, December 1961:

(A) World War II showed that success in protecting submarine deployments depended to "a large extent" on the on-the-scene "presence of forces capable of being employed against the ASW forces opposing the transits" (p. 41);

(B) In the period between World Wars I and II, Germany overrated its "strategic position" and so failed to pay sufficient attention to developing the requisite forces for protecting submarines while deploying (p. 41).

(C) The (alleged) failure of the "capitalist" naval powers between the world wars to build adequate ASW forces to protect their submarines during deployment was due to their leaders' failure "to correctly evaluate the significance of submarines for combat at sea" (p. 42)

(D) Germany's failure to foresee the rapid buildup of ASW forces by Great Britain and the United States once the U-boat anti-SLOC campaign had been initiated and to have available enough naval forces not just to provide point-defense of the U-boats but also for destroying the burgeoning ASW fleets of the enemy "seriously handicapped" the deployment of the U-boats out into the open Atlantic" (p. 42);

(E) Sufficient naval forces of all useful types are required to destroy enemy ASW forces in position at any given time to oppose a "breakthrough" of one's own submarines for running a blockade or penetrating an ASW barrier. This requirement for adequate force levels to provide support to one's submarine striking forces was demonstrated in both world wars (p. 45);

(F) In World War II, the German Naval Command did what little it could under the difficult circumstances by way of providing air and surface-ship protection to its submarines while they were deploying. A major reason for this effort being so inadequate, according to Stepanov, was that even those aircraft which were not commandeered for fighting on the ground fronts were not under the Navy's command and requests for air support were either honored in the breach or too slowly to be effective (p. 46); and

(G) "Reliable protection" of deploying submarines, the author says in summary in the final paragraph of the Stepanov article, "Protection for the Deployment of Submarines in the Course of Military Action", can be achieved only at the price of building "heterogeneous forces" (i.e., submarines, aircraft, and surface ships) that are constantly and promptly modernized with the latest developments in ASW. Only in this way, Stepanov

asserted, could the Soviet Navy have available the naval forces capable of "systematically combatting the ASW forces of an enemy" (p. 48).

2) Captain First Rank (Retired) Lán, Naval Digest, April 1962 p. 76:

"Great attention is being given by the U.S. Naval Command to the matter of protecting missile submarines during their sortie from base. To this end, it is proposed to employ surface ships, antisubmarine submarines, and aircraft...For the antisubmarine defense of missile submarines, it is considered feasible to employ torpedo-attack submarines. In the composition of the ASW forces of the Atlantic Fleet there are already eight such submarines."

3) Military Strategy, 1st edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 24 May 1962:

A. "In a future war, the significance of the Navy in general will be determined by the character of the new missions which are assigned it to carry out, especially for the struggle with the navy of an aggressor at sea and in port" (p. 227);

B. "The basic combat means of the Navy of the USSR are submarines of various /mission/ designations..." (p. 227); and

C. "A certain number of surface ships are necessary to protect the operations of submarines and to carry out secondary missions..." (p. 276).

4) Admiral Alafuzov (Retired), Naval Digest, January 1963, p. 9:

"Military Strategy's statement that "a certain number" of surface ships would be required to protect submarine operations was criticized as "too vague" and "of little use".

5) Military Strategy, 2nd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 August 1963:

A. "In a future war, the significance of the Navy in general will be determined by the character of the new missions which are assigned it to carry out, especially for the struggle with the navy of an aggressor at sea and in port" (p. 248);

B. "The basic combat means of the Navy of the USSR are submarines of various /mission/ designations..." (p. 248); and

C. "A certain number of surface ships are necessary to protect the operations of submarines and to carry out secondary missions..." (p. 313).

6) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 1st edition, signed to press 14 January 1964, p. 600:

"For the protection of our own maritime communications, for cooperation with the Ground Forces in coastal directions, for the screening and defense of base regions and of coastal waters, and for carrying out the other missions of the Navy, it is not possible to go without warships /ie submarines as well as surface ships/ with conventional power plants" /Emphasis supplied/" (p. 600).

7) Editorial, "Mighty Navy of the Socialist Power", Naval Digest, July 1964, p. 6:

"Along with submarines and aviation, we are building surface ships...capable of carrying out the combat missions assigned them: supporting the operations of submarines, insuring the destruction of enemy submarines and surface ships, and the defense of our own coasts against strikes from the sea."

8) Captain First Rank Pavlov, Naval Digest, July 1964, p. 81:

"With the aim of protecting the operation of their missile submarines, the Americans do not exclude supporting their operation with nuclear-powered antisubmarine submarines."

9) Admiral Kharlamov, Naval Digest, January 1966, pp. 32-33:

"Carrying out both missions /strategic strike against shore objectives of the enemy and anti-SSBN ASW/ contributes to the same aim -- not to permit nuclear strikes on targets located in the depth of the territory of our country. In this regard, both of the contesting sides will try to create conditions favorable for their strike forces and unfavorable for the enemy."

10) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 8 January 1966, p. 50:

"Additionally, it /the Soviet Navy/ will be required to conduct search and destruction of the submarines of the enemy in coastal areas and in regions remote from our coasts."

11) Captain First Rank Penzin, Naval Digest, July 1966, p. 41:

"...the main strike forces /of navies/ have required ever greater support from other forces....At present this trend continues despite, it would seem, the great independence and lesser vulnerability /than of other naval forces/ of nuclear-powered submarines."

12) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, signed to press 25 May 1967, p. 548:

"Modern diesel submarines can successfully conduct reconnaissance, act against enemy convoys, destroy shore objectives of an opponent with missiles and carry out other combat missions for the fulfillment of which it is inexpedient to use the expensive nuclear-powered submarines....

"Together with carrying out the mission for combating the strike forces of the enemy navy and his shipping in distant sea and oceanic regions with submarines and naval aviation, the Navy in a future war will be required to carry out missions for cooperation with the Ground Forces in offensive operations in coastal sectors. Additionally, it will be required to conduct search for and destruction of the submarines of the enemy at sea, in coastal areas and in regions distant from our shores..." (Emphasis supplied).

13) Captain First Rank Titov, Naval Digest, June 1967, p. 83:

"Before the appearance of nuclear-powered /torpedo attack/ submarines in the composition of the Soviet Navy, the U.S. Navy had been assigned the mission of completely preventing our submarines from reaching the /open/ ocean by destroying them in their bases and at the outset of their deployments. In subsequent years, such a requirement was acknowledged to be unrealistic. While not completely giving up the mission of destroying /our/ submarines at their bases and while sortieing from them, the Americans began to saturate with antisubmarine forces and /positional/ means /e.g., ASW mines and SOSUS systems/ deeply-echeloned antisubmarine zones off our coasts and antisubmarine barriers on the probable movement routes of our submarines...".

14) V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, Colonel-General Zheltov (Ed.), signed to press 1 July 1967, p. 269:

"Submarines possess the greatest self-reliance, so additional forces do not have to be provided for their protection."

15) Military Strategy, 3rd edition, Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 November 1967, p. 307:

A. "In a future war, the significance of the Navy in general will be determined by the character of the new missions which are assigned it to carry out for destruction of enemy objectives on land or at sea" (Underlined phrase a change from the 2nd edition; see para. 5(A) above.)

B. "The basic combat means of the Navy of the USSR are submarines, which in the circumstances of nuclear war are incomparably more effective than surface ships" (see 5(B) above).

C. "A certain number of surface ships are necessary to protect the operations of submarines and to carry out secondary missions...".

16) Admiral Chabanenko, preface to Undersea Victory, translated into Russian from book of that title by Captain W.J. Holmes, U.S. Navy, signed to press 9 July 1968, pp. 17-18:

"The American command considers the quality of combat training of submarines to be one of the most important components of the development of submarine forces. It is significant that, in the course of combat training, the concealment of missile submarine operations is worked out with special intensity and very serious consideration is given to missile submarine operations out of contact with /surface/ antisubmarine ships which reveal their /the missile submarines'/ presence...

"Annually /the U.S. Navy/ conducts a large number of anti-submarine exercises. Multipurpose and missile submarines are widely used in these exercises. The missile submarines are designated the 'enemy'."

17) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 9 December 1968, p. 67:

"Additionally, it /the Soviet Navy/ will be required to conduct search and destruction of the submarines of the enemy in coastal areas and in regions remote from our coasts."

18) V.I. Lenin and the Soviet Armed Forces, 2nd edition, Colonel-General Zheltov (Ed.), signed to press 8 October 1969, p. 237:

"Submarines possess the greatest self-reliance, so additional forces do not have to be provided for their protection."

19) V. Goltsev, Izvestiya, 19 April 1970, p. 5:

"Today the Navy sortied for the big 'OKEAN' maneuvers. As always, the first to leave their homeports were the antisubmarine ships and the fleet minesweepers. They have already been several days at sea and reliably 'furling the waves', clearing a path for the cruisers, destroyers, missile ships, and submarines. In sailors' parlance, this operation is called the 'breakthrough'."

20) Captain First Rank Sokha, Naval Digest, September 1971, p. 28:

"Their /nuclear-powered, torpedo-attack submarines'/ basic missions are considered to be combat with submarines and /thereby/ the protection of their own missile submarines."

21) Captain First Rank Aleshkin, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 25:

"...the strategic forces of navies...are not capable of realizing their capabilities in full measure in nuclear war without the appropriate support of other forces."

22) Engineering-Captain 2nd Rank Yerofeyev, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 89:

"Arming submarines with long-range missiles enables them to operate...at a considerable distance from the shores of a probable enemy, reliably protected by surface ships and aviation."

23) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, pp. 20-21:

"As is known, the course was taken in our country, by the will of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, of building an oceanic navy, the basis of which is comprised of nuclear-powered submarines of various designations.

"However, our modern Navy, which is assigned to carry out combat against a strong opponent, can not be just a submarine navy. Underrating the necessity for support of the operations of submarines by aviation and surface ships in the previous two world wars cost the German command dearly. In particular, as already related above, one of the reasons for the failure of 'unrestricted submarine warfare' conducted by the Germans was the lack of such support for the submarines, which forced them to act alone without the protection of other forces.

"Consequently, while according priority to the development of the submarine forces, we consider that we require not only submarines but also surface warships of various designations. The latter, apart from affording combat stability to the submarines, are assigned to a wide circle of missions both in peacetime and in a period of war."

24) Captain First Rank Kvitnitskiy, Antisubmarine Weapons and Their Delivery Systems, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 15 February 1973, p. 78:

"Tactical methods for the combat employment of the anti-submarine defense forces and means are being worked out in direct relation to the missions carried out by modern, nuclear-powered missile submarines."

25) G. Svyatov and A. Kokoshin, International Affairs, March 1973, pp. 80-81:

"...the Trident missile system...will make it possible to deploy the submarines carrying them, U.S. experts believe, almost anywhere in the World Ocean. These combat patrol regions apparently will be separate, contiguous zones on the coastline of the U.S. itself. U.S. specialists believe that this will make it possible, too, to concentrate there the main ASW forces--which will assume a new role, that of protecting the strategic missile force."

26) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 3rd edition, signed to press 13 February 1974, p. 495:

"Modern diesel submarines can successfully conduct reconnaissance, act against enemy convoys, destroy shore objectives of an opponent with missiles and carry out other combat missions for the fulfillment of which it is inexpedient to use the expensive nuclear-powered submarines...

"Together with carrying out the mission for combating the strike forces of the enemy navy and his shipping in distant sea and oceanic regions with submarines and naval aviation, the Navy in a future war will be required to carry out missions for cooperation with the Ground Forces in offensive operations in coastal sectors. Additionally, it will be required to conduct search for and destruction of the submarines of the enemy /"at sea," omitted from 2nd edition--see para. 12 above/ in coastal areas and in regions distant from our shores..." (Emphasis supplied).

27) Captain First Rank Vlasov, Naval Digest, March 1974, pp. 22-23 and 27:

"The revolution in military affairs, which took place in the postwar period, brought nuclear-powered missile submarines to the fore as the main striking force of navies...However, as is known from history, /even/ the most powerful forces are not such that they can achieve success without the cooperation with other forces...one of the reasons for the failure of the 'unrestricted submarine warfare' conducted by the Germans in two world wars was precisely the lack of such support and the proper protection for the submarines.

"Together with this, the experience of the wars and of the postwar period demonstrates that submarines yield to surface warships (and, of course, to aircraft carriers) in the protection of convoys and landing operations. Consequently, in addition to submarines, surface ships of various /mission/ designations have of necessity entered the composition of navies. Quite apart from combat support for submarines, surface ships have a wide circle of /other/ missions. And, this has necessitated the building of warships of special construction and with particular armament complexes....

"Submarine forces have become the main strategic strike forces of the navies of the major seapowers. However, a modern navy cannot be just a submarine navy. The result of the underestimation of the necessity for support of submarines by aviation and surface ships is known from the history of the two world wars. Consequently, Soviet naval science, /while/ according priority to the development of the submarine forces, considers that our Navy also requires surface ships of various designations. The latter, apart from affording combat stability to /our/ submarines, are assigned to carry out a wide circle of missions both in peacetime and in the course of a war."

28) Professor, Rear Admiral Pavlovich, Military-Historical Journal, December 1974, p. 48:

Argues that the development of SSBNs into a highly effective weapons system requires that they be given greater "defense-in-depth", including a more extended range of reconnaissance. (p. 48);

"The growing power of the means of destruction have guaranteed the rapid achievement of decisive results in actions against an enemy. In connection with the further expansion of the offensive capabilities of all services of the Armed Forces, the theoretical importance of the initial period of a war has grown... /nuclear/ strikes in this period can be decisive. The requirement has arisen for an increase in the individual weight and size of all types of support, in the first place, for operational and combat /support/" (pp. 49-50).

29) Doctor of Naval Science, Captain First Rank V'yunenکو, Naval Digest, October 1975, p. 21:

"Nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles, having received recognition as the main striking forces of a modern navy, have attracted attention to themselves as the basic object of retribution by all other naval forces...

"Submarines of operational-tactical designation /that is, torpedo attack submarines/ are increasingly...being employed for the protection of the combat patrolling of strategic submarines. In the opinion of foreign specialists, this basically strengthens /these/ units and significantly decreases the degree of threat to them of /enemy/ submarines."

30) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, signed to press 27 November 1975:

(A) "The experience of World War II gives us a graphic portrayal of the role which support of submarines directly on the seas was supposed to play. As far as their mass employment was concerned, the German command left them to their own resources. Throughout the war, they did not make a single attempt to employ organized counteraction against the Allied antisubmarine forces which operated with complete impunity. This obviously explains why 70% of German submarines were sunk in transit to the combat areas (p. 197);

(B) "For providing combat stability to the submarines... for combat with the submarine and antisubmarine forces of the enemy, and for carrying out other specific missions, various types of surface ships are entering the composition of the Navy (pp. 307-308);

(C) "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW, carry out their strategic aims in a war at sea? To answer that question, it was necessary to conduct a great deal of research. All of it invariably supported the high effectiveness of submarines given their correct employment and proper combat support. This conclusion especially applies to nuclear-powered submarines (p. 309); and

(D) Asserts that both world wars had "demonstrated the error of the opinion that the submarine, due to the covertness of its movements after departing base, can insure its own invulnerability by itself". (p. 319).

31) Professor, Captain First Rank Potapov, Military-Historical Journal, February 1976, p. 84:

Alleges that one of the missions of U.S. aircraft carrier task forces was "to cover the regions of patrolling of the strategic missile submarines of the U.S."

32) Captain 2nd Rank Rakitin, Naval Digest, February 1976, p. 90:

Alleges that one of the vulnerabilities of the Polaris-Poseidon SSBNs was "the weak defensibility of their combat patrol regions against the action of ASW forces." The article continues directly to state that with "the development of a longer-range ballistic missile and a new submarine to carry it, new capabilities for submarine protection were being sought by the U.S."

33) Professor, Vice Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, March 1977, p. 22:

"In the work /Gorshkov's Seapower of the State/ it is... shown that they /the Germans/ employed their submarines /without the necessary measures of support/ and took no special measures during the war for combatting the /enemies'/ antisubmarine forces."

34) Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Captain First Rank Potapov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Navy, signed to press 27 June 1977:

"...According to the views of American specialists...the oceans are the most suitable medium for the creation of nuclear might and for its use after the exchange of the first strikes. For this reason, the second component of the missile forces /after the Minuteman ICBMs/, the "Polaris" system, began to be given obvious preference.

35) Gorshkov, The Navy, Knowledge Press, signed to press 22 September 1977:

"The main types of forces of the Navy of the Soviet Union have become submarines and naval aviation, and the main weapons--missiles of various /mission/ designations with nuclear warheads. Various types of surface warships and aircraft are coming into the Navy to provide them with comprehensive protection in the struggle with the submarines and antisubmarine forces of an opponent and for carrying out other specific missions" (pp 39-40);

"At the present time, the surface forces of our Navy, which are comprised of various oceanic ships and ships of coastal action, are capable independently and in joint action with submarines and aviation of carrying out a large circle of missions in the oceans and in closed sea theaters."

"The most numerous group are the antisubmarine surface forces of oceanic and coastal action...capable of successful search and destruction of nuclear-powered and diesel submarines in closed sea and coastal regions fronting on the oceans" (p. 44).

36) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979:

(A) "The experience of World War II gives us a graphic portrayal of the role which support of submarines directly on the seas was supposed to play. As far as their mass employment was concerned, the German command left them to their own resources. Throughout the war, they did not make a single attempt to employ organized counteraction against the Allied antisubmarine forces which operated with complete impunity. This obviously explains why 70% of German submarines were sunk in transit to the combat areas (p. 175);

(B) "For providing combat stability to the submarines... for combat with the submarine and antisubmarine forces of the enemy, and for carrying out other specific missions, various types of surface ships are entering the composition of the Navy (p. 273);

(C) "Can submarines, despite the constant modernization of ASW, carry out their strategic aims in a war at sea? To answer that question, it was necessary to conduct a great deal of research. All of it invariably supported the high effectiveness of submarines given their correct employment and proper combat support. This conclusion especially applies to nuclear-powered submarines (pp. 274-275);

(D) Asserts that both world wars had "demonstrated the error of the opinion that the submarine, due to the covertness of its movements after departing base, can insure its own invulnerability in full measure by itself" (p. 284). (The underlined phrase was added to the 2nd edition--see subpara. 30D above.)

Appendix I

THE NAVY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE DIRECT "DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY" RATHER THAN JUST "AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND" OR MERELY ONE COMPONENT OF "THE SYSTEM OF THE ARMED FORCES"

- 1) Gorshkov, Soviet Fleet, 23 February 1956:

The Soviet Navy "plays an important role in the composition of the Armed Forces".

- 2) Navy Day-'57 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Soviet Navy, 2 July 1957:

"The Navy has enormous significance in the system of defense of our state.

"It is sufficient to draw attention to the geographic situation of the Soviet Union to realize this clearly."

- 3) Rear Admiral Lizarskiy, Turkmenian Spark, 31 July 1960:

"In the defense of our state, a great role is accorded to the Navy."

- 4) Rear Admiral Prokof'yev, Red Star, 13 January 1962:

The fact of possessing SSBNs was said to have increased the importance of the Navy "in the system of the Armed Forces".

- 5) Gorshkov, Red Star, 5 February 1963:

The Party was praised for allegedly having taken "all measures so that the armaments and organization of our Navy would correspond to its growing role in the defense of the country and for the protection of its state interests".

- 6) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 28 July 1963:

Navy Day "constitutes national recognition of the important role and great merit of the Navy in the protection of the world's first socialist state and in strengthening its defense capability".

- 7) Vice Admiral Sychev, Naval Digest, February 1964, p. 20:

"...Missile weapons have emerged in first place among the weapons of the Navy. They have changed the Navy significantly, have raised its role in the system of the Armed Forces, and have influenced in decisive form the character of the armed struggle at sea."

8) Candidate of Historical Science, Lieutenant-Colonel B. I. Zverev, Naval Digest, January 1965, p. 26:

"As concerns the general estimate of the role of the Navy in the general system of defense of the country...we cannot conceive of the possibility of a firm defense of the borders of Soviet soil without the presence of a sufficiently strong navy." (p. 26) (Quoting Frunze).

"...the XIth Party Congress observed that the RKKF was a necessary integral element in the system of defense of the Soviet state." (p. 26).

9) "Materials for Reports and Discussions" for Navy Day, Red Star, 13 July 1965:

"...our Navy is developing in full correspondence with the aims and missions of a great seapower and is playing an important role in the defense potential of the Homeland."

10) Gorshkov, Pravda, 24 July 1965:

"...in the strengthening of the defense might of our country, the Navy, which is assigned to protect the Homeland reliably against an attack by an aggressor from the sea, is playing an ever greater role."

11) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Radio Moscow in English to Southeast Asia, 0720 Moscow time, 24 July 1965:

Interviewer: "Has there been any lessening of the importance of the Navy as a service of the Armed Forces?" (Emphasis supplied).

Kasatonov's answer: "Not by any means. On the contrary, the role of the Navy has increased since its main weapon also has become the missile. Soviet naval personnel now have everything they need to repulse any aggression in cooperation with other services of the Armed Forces. The main striking forces of the Navy are submarines armed with atomic missiles, capable of being fired from underwater...The submarines and also naval missile-carrying aircraft are capable of successfully fighting the enemy in any ocean and striking blows at ground targets....Ballistic rockets launched from underwater...can find and destroy targets situated thousands of kilometers away."

12) Admiral Sergeyev, Soviet Kirgiziya, 25 July 1965:

"...the Navy is accorded an important place in the system of the Armed Forces."

13) Admiral Zakharov, Radio Vladivostok, 0725 Moscow time, 25 July 1965:

"...our Navy today is stronger than ever. It is being developed and perfected in full correspondence with the aims and missions of a great seapower and represents a formidable strike force in the system of the Armed Forces of the Soviet state."

14) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 8 January 1966. p. 50:

"Due to the potential for the joint use /with nuclear-powered missile submarines/ of such powerful striking forces as naval missile aviation, the Navy is becoming one of the most important services of the Armed Forces, one capable of exerting, by its successful action, direct influence on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Just as the /Strategic/ Missile Forces will destroy the most important enemy means of nuclear-missile attack on land, the striking forces of the Navy, first of all its nuclear-powered submarines and missile aircraft, will be able to destroy the nuclear-missile weapon platforms at sea and in this way cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions."

15) Navy Day "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1966:

"In the system of defense of the Soviet state, a significant place is accorded the Navy (p. 53);

"The Navy...is being developed in full correspondence with the aims and missions for insuring the defense of the Homeland" (p. 56).

16) Gorshkov, Pravda, 31 July 1966:

"The role and place of the Navy in the system of the Armed Forces of the country was carefully defined by the Central Committee of the Party and the course was indicated for building a modern oceanic navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive character."

17) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 31 July 1966:

"The Communist Party and Soviet government are paying unflagging attention to the Navy as one of the services of the Armed Forces charged with carrying out complex and responsible missions in an armed conflict."

18) Admiral Zakharov, Soviet Russia, 31 July 1966:

"Since ancient times our country has been considered not only a great land power but also a great seapower. She has the longest seacoast in the world."

"It is understandable, therefore, what an enormous role is accorded our Navy in the protection of the maritime boundaries of the USSR, in the whole system of defense of our country."

19) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1967, p. 20:

Asserts that the Navy has become "a most important means of the Supreme High Command, together with the Strategic Missile Forces".

20) Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 2nd ed. signed to press 25 May 1967:

A. "For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy has become a navy of long-range action, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command..." (Gorshkov in "Forward") (p. 11); and

B. "The struggle with them [SSBNs] extends beyond the confines of a mission of the Navy alone and develops into a mission of defense in the interests of the whole country" (p. 545).

21) Navy Day - '67 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1967, p. 49:

A. "The Navy is being developed in full consonance with the aims and missions of a great seapower and constitutes an important factor in the defense capability of the Homeland.

B. "As a result of its recent military and technological reorganization, a totally new Navy has emerged, both in its qualities and its combat capabilities. It has become a navy of long-range action and an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command..."

22) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 30 July 1967:

The Central Committee of the Party has "defined the Navy's place in the defense of the country and indicated the course for developing a modern, ocean-going, nuclear-missile navy capable of carrying out strategic missions of an offensive nature in modern [i.e., nuclear] war".

23) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 30 December 1967:

"The Soviet Navy...has become an oceanic, nuclear-missile, submarine-aviation navy. It is now an offensive service of the Armed Forces, [a service] for long-range operations capable of decisively influencing the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military operations."

24) Gorshkov, Military Thought, January 1968, p. 22:

"...the young Soviet Navy radically differed from the Tsarist Navy. This was a qualitatively new navy, an important component of the Armed Forces of the Republic..."

25) Admiral Kasatonov, Military-Historical Journal, January 1968, p. 40:

"In 1955 a ballistic missile was launched from a Soviet submarine for the first time. This meant that the submarines armed with long-range missiles were able to destroy not only enemy combatant and merchant ships at sea but also ground objectives in distant regions. The submarine forces, which previously carried out missions of an operational-tactical nature, held real promise of becoming a very important strategic means of the Supreme High Command. In the mid-'50's construction was started on a modern, ocean-going nuclear-missile navy...the Navy became, in the full sense, a modern oceanic one capable of successfully fulfilling strategic missions and of reliably defending the state interests of the Soviet Union on the seas and oceans."

26) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Izvestiya, 8 February 1968:

"By the will of the Party, in a short time there was created a ... new kind of armed force -- a nuclear-missile, submarine-aircraft oceanic navy. This service of the Armed Forces is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle over vast distances and of reliably defending the state interests of the Soviet Union."

27) Gorshkov, Pravda, 28 July 1968:

Speaks of the Soviet Navy's "role in the defense of the state" as "increasing even more" in the postwar period of transformation "on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology".

28) Admiral Lobov, Rural Life, 28 July 1968:

"Now our Navy has been transformed in the full sense of the word into an offensive type of armed force of long-range action and has become an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command..."

29) Gorshkov, Neues Deutschland (East Germany), 3 August 1968:

"Next to the Strategic Missile Forces, our Navy has become the most important means in the hands of the Supreme High Command for exerting a decisive influence in the vast theaters of military action of an armed conflict."

30) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, revised (2nd) edition, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 9 December 1968, p. 65:

"Due to the potential for the joint use /with nuclear-powered missile submarines/ of such powerful striking forces as naval missile aviation, the Navy is becoming one of the most important services of the Armed Forces, one capable of exerting, by its successful action, direct influence on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Just as the /Strategic/ Missile Forces will destroy the most important enemy means of nuclear-missile attack on land, the striking forces of the Navy, first of all its nuclear-powered submarines and missile aircraft, will be able to destroy nuclear-missile weapon platforms at sea and in this way cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions."

31) Vice Admiral Surabekov, Naval Digest, June 1969:

A. "The sharp change in the qualitative composition of navies and their weapons, their growing potential, the capability for joint and independent action in the distant regions of the World Ocean, the substantial complication of missions -- all of this testifies to the significant growth, in comparison with the last /world/ war, of the individual weight of the armed struggle at sea, and consequently also of the role of navies in the system of the armed forces" (p. 30), and

B. "The basic missions of navies have undergone changes... strategic missions now have been added to them, which significantly raises the individual weight and significance of navies in the general system of the armed forces" (p. 32).

32) Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1969, p. 3:

"The Communist Party and Soviet government are doing everything necessary in order to give a decisive rebuff to... any aggressor. This aim is also served by measures directed at the further raising of the role of the Navy in the system of defense of our country."

33) Navy Day-'69 Radio Moscow commentary in Russian, 1200 GMT, 25 July 1969:

"Our Navy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is a most important arm at our Supreme High Command's disposal, one capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of military action in huge theaters."

34) Gorshkov, Turkmenian Spark, 27 July 1969:

"The Communist Party and Soviet Government are devoting enormous attention to the uninterrupted increase in the defense power of our state. And in this program, an important place is accorded the Navy."

35) Vice Admiral Oleynik, Soviet Patriot, 27 July 1969:

"In the postwar years, our Navy, as an integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces, has undergone an enormous qualitative change."

36) Rear Admiral Stalbo, History of Naval Art, signed to press 19 August 1969, p. 567:

"Like the Strategic Missile Forces, the Navy too has become a maximum-range means of the Supreme High Command, capable of conducting activity on a global scale."

37) Gorshkov, Izvestiya, 27 February 1970:

A. "In connection with the revolution in military affairs, the Central Committee of the Party determined the course for the development of the Navy and also its role and place in the system of the Armed Forces of the country."

B. "Our Navy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, has become a most important means of the Supreme High Command for carrying out strategic missions."

38) Gorshkov, Red Star, 16 April 1970:

"In the harmonious family of giants constituted by the various services of our Armed Forces, a worthy place is occupied by the Soviet Navy."

39) Anatoliy Elkin, Little Flame (Ogor.yek) No. 9, May 1970, p. 5:

"For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy has become a navy of long-range action, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command." (Gorshkov's views were being stated in this article about him.)

40) Gorshkov, Narodna Armiya (Bulgaria), 7 May 1970:

"Our Navy with the Strategic Missile Forces has become a most important factor at the Supreme High Command's disposal for the carrying out of strategic missions."

41) Gorshkov, Pravda, 26 July 1970:

"V. I. Lenin regarded highly the...role of the Navy in insuring the defense capability of our state...."

"In the friendly family of the various services of the Soviet Armed Forces, a worthy place is occupied by the oceanic Navy."

42) Vice Admiral Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 26 July 1970:

"In the postwar period...the individual weight of the Navy in the general system of defense of the country grew significantly..."

43) Admiral Sergeyev, Soviet Latvia, 26 July 1970:

"... the Navy is developing in complete consonance with the aims and missions of a great seapower and is an important factor in the defense capability of the Homeland."

44) Admiral Yegorov, Rural Life, 26 July 1970: ...the Navy is developing in complete consonance with the aims and missions of a great seapower and is an important factor in the defense capability of the Homeland."

45) Admiral Lobov, Starshina Serzhant, 26 July 1970:

"The Navy is an important component of the Soviet Armed Forces. The role of the Navy in the defense of the Soviet Union increased significantly in the postwar years."

46) Vice Admiral Schedrin, Military Knowledge, July 1971:

"The Soviet Navy...is now an offensive service of the Armed Forces, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle across extensive theaters of military action."

47) Rear Admiral Shablikov, Soviet Patriot, 25 July 1971:

"In the matter of protection of the Homeland, our Navy, as a component part of the Armed Forces, must play a very important and ever-increasing role."

48) Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, August 1971, p.95:

"Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, it [our oceanic Navy] became a most important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent."
(Quoted from Gorshkov's February 1967 article in Naval Digest, p.20).

49 Captain First Rank Aleshkin, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 25:

"The role and significance of the strategic nuclear forces in the composition of navies of the leading imperialist seapowers and, consequently, also in the composition of their armed forces as a whole, will grow steadily."

50 Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 25:

"Soviet naval personnel consider their top priority responsibility to be maintenance of a high readiness by all the forces of the Navy for carrying out the mission for the defense of the state from oceanic directions...to be a reliable shield against enemy strikes from the sea."

51) Navy Day - '73 "Materials for Reports and Discussions",
Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1973, p. 41:

"The Navy occupies a worthy place in the system of the Soviet Armed Forces."

52) Gorshkov, Pravda, 29 July 1973:

"Our Navy occupies a worthy place in the constellation of the services of our Armed Forces, each of which makes its own contribution to insuring the reliable protection of the Soviet people's peaceful labor."

53) Gorshkov, "Forward" to Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 3rd Edition, signed to press 13 February 1974, p. 7:

"For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy has become a navy of long range action and an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command that is capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast oceanic and continental theaters of military action

54) Gorshkov, Pravda, 28 July 1974:

"Thus, defense of the country against attack from the sea assumes still more important significance for our Armed Forces. This...is the result of the development of submarines which in a number of navies are becoming now the main delivery system for strategic weapons."

55) Admiral Grishanov, Kazakhstan Pravda, 28 July 1974:

"Now the role and significance of the Navy in the protection of the Homeland have grown greatly."

56) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 27 July 1975:

The First Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Navy asserts that the Navy's "role in the defense of the country has been enhanced".

57) SMF Day "Materials" for speeches. Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1975, p. 32:

"The Strategic Missile Forces have achieved a new qualitative level of development.../and/ have been transformed into a main integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces."

58) Gorsikov, Seapower of the State, signed to press 27 November 1975:

A. "In the composition of the armed forces of a country, a Navy is a powerful instrument for achieving the political aims of an armed struggle in war" (p. 249);

B. " In resolving problems of the structure of the Armed Forces in all stages of the development of Soviet military doctrine, the requisite attention was given and is given to the Navy, which is invariably considered as an important service of the Armed Forces" (p. 295);

C. "As the result of a broad and comprehensive scientific-research effort, views were worked out on the place and role of the Navy in the composition of our Armed Forces..." (p.306);

D. "...nuclear-powered submarines are strategic means of our Armed Forces" (p. 312)

59) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1976, p. 31:

"...now the Strategic Missile Forces are a main, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces."

50) Captain First Rank Makeyev, Naval Digest, February 1977, p. 17:

"The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering powerful strikes not only on sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an opponent. For the first time in its history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the Armed Forces, capable of influencing in decisive form the course and outcome of a war as a whole."

51) Gorshkov, The Navy, Knowledge Press, signed to press on 11 July 1977:

A. "The Navy is an important service of the Armed Forces /and/ is assigned to carry out strategic and operational missions in the oceanic and sea theaters of military action" (p. 39); and

B. "For the first time in history, our Navy has been transformed, in the full sense of the word, into an Armed Forces' service of long-range action. Today, along with the Strategic Missile Forces, it is capable of decisively influencing the course of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action" (p. 47).

62) "Materials" for SMF Day speeches, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, Oct. 1977, p. 80):

"The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. These Forces now possess powerful missiles...which are capable of rapidly delivering on target nuclear warheads of great force, of delivering undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may be. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war, do not in any way detract from the significance of the other services of the Armed Forces, Soviet military theory and practice proceeds on the basis that victory in modern war... may be achieved only with the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces. The other services of the Armed Forces are also equipped with nuclear missile weapons."

63) Captain First Rank Schumikhin, Candidate of Philosophical Science, "The Character and Particularities of Modern War" (material for the political instruction of military personnel), Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1977, p. 87):

"The Strategic Missile forces now comprise an important part of the combat might of the Armed Forces. The character of modern war, it is assumed, requires that these forces be the reliable means for the annihilation of the enemy's forces for a nuclear assault, of the major groupings of his forces and military bases, the destruction of military-industrial objectives, the disorganization of state and military control, the work of the rear and of the transportation of an aggressor. The modernization of this service of the Armed Forces is taking all of this specifically into account."

64) Lt-General Gareyev, Military-Historical Journal, November 1977, p. 24:

"The role and significance of the Soviet Navy in the general strengthening of the system of the defense potential of the Soviet state has grown even more."

"Its main missions have become the delivery of nuclear-missile strikes on military objectives in the territory of an opponent, the destruction of aircraft carrier strike groups and nuclear-powered submarines, a struggle on communications with the aim of interdiction of sea and ocean shipping. In more difficult circumstances, it would be necessary to carry out missions along coastal axes jointly with the Ground Forces."

65) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, November 1977, p. 9:

"The Soviet Navy became an oceanic Navy, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command capable of influencing the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent."

66) Captain First Rank Viktorov, Naval Digest, January 1978, p. 104:

In a review of Gorshkov's 1977 monograph The Navy, it is stated that the Navy Commander-in-Chief "portrayed well the role of our Army and Navy in the system of defense and, in particular, for the deterrence of the aggressive undertakings of imperialism".

67) Admiral Grishanov, Soviet Patriot, 5 March 1978:

"These qualitative changes carried out in the navy have led to its becoming an essentially new strategic instrument for insuring Soviet capabilities for the defense of the country and capable of vitally influencing the course of an armed struggle in all of the oceanic and sea theaters of military action..."

68) Admiral Grishanov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1978, p. 18:

"The creation in our country of an oceanic, nuclear-missile navy worked a deep change in the views on its role in the system of the Armed Forces and the strategy and tactics for its employment. It has become one of the most important factors capable, by means of direct action against objectives located on the coast and in the deep rear of an enemy as well as against targets at sea, of exerting a very significant, and at times decisive, influence on the course of a war".

69) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 30 July 1978:

"Our Navy is carrying out responsible missions in the system of defense of the country."

70) Captain First Rank Skryl'nik, Candidate of Philosophical Science (material for the political instruction of military personnel), Communist of the Armed Forces No. 15, August 1978, p. 77:

"The basis of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is constituted by the Strategic Missile Forces....in a principally new approach to the problem of raising the defense capability of the USSR under the conditions of the scientific technological revolution in military affairs....Now the Strategic Missile Forces have in their armament missiles of intercontinental and intermediate ranges capable of delivering accurate and undeflectable strikes on an aggressor wherever he may appear."

71) "Materials for Reports and Discussions for SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1978, p. 61-62:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are an important, integral part of the Soviet Armed Forces. Even in peacetime they are in constant readiness, standing combat watches uninterruptedly. The enormous combat capabilities of the Strategic Missile Forces, their role in modern war, does not mean that the other services of the Armed Forces have lost their significance. Victory over an aggressor now may be gained only by the joint forces of all of the services and service branches of the Armed Forces....The other services of the Armed Forces have nuclear-missile weapons too..".

72) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979:

A. "In the composition of the armed forces of a country, navies are /a navy is/ a powerful instrument for achieving the political aims of an armed struggle in war" (p. 221);

B. "In resolving problems of the structure of the Armed Forces in all stages of the development of Soviet military doctrine, the requisite attention was given and is given to the Navy, which is invariably considered as an important service of the Armed Forces" (p. 262);

C. "As the result of a broad and comprehensive scientific-research effort, views were worked out on the place and role of the Navy in the composition of our Armed Forces..." (p. 272);

D. "...nuclear-powered submarines are strategic means of our Armed Forces" (p. 278).

73) "Materials for Reports and Discussions on SMF Day", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 20, October 1979, p. 37:

"Possessing automated missile complexes with missiles of various ranges that are capable of delivering missiles of enormous destructive power, they /the SMF/ are a branch of the Armed Forces, the reliable shield of the country and of all of the countries of the Socialist Commonwealth."

74) Colonel-General P. Gorchakov, Chief of SMF's Political Directorate, Red Star, 19 November 1979:

"The Strategic Missile Forces are carrying out responsible tasks in the system of defense of the country."

Appendix J

THE NAVY'S INFLUENCE ON THE "COURSE AND OUTCOME" OF A WAR OR ON ACHIEVING ITS AIMS

- 1) Navy Day-'59, "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Red Star, 17 July 1959:

"The Army and Navy played the decisive role in the course and outcome of the Second World War".

- 2) Gorshkov, Agitator No. 13, July 1960, p. 24:

"The Soviet Navy...is capable of conducting combat against a strong naval opponent, destroying his strike forces, disrupting his oceanic and sea communications, destroying his ports, naval bases and other objectives on the coast and thereby of exerting a substantial influence on the achievement of the general aims of an armed struggle."

- 3) Engineering Captain First Rank Belyayev, Naval Digest, January 1961, p. 92:

"It is often reported in the foreign press, especially the American, that, with modern conditions of science and technology, there exists a real potential for a sharp increase in the role of submarines, not only for combat action at sea but also for carrying out the missions of a war as a whole."

- 4) Vice Admiral Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 29 July 1961:

"The Navy is capable of conducting combat against a strong naval opponent, destroying his strike forces, disrupting his oceanic and sea communications, destroying his ports, naval bases and other objectives on the coast and thereby of exerting a substantial influence on the achievement of the general aims of an armed struggle."

- 5) Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), Military Strategy, 1st ed., signed to press 24 May 1962, p. 353:

"Military actions in naval theaters in a future world war will acquire wide scope, although these actions hardly will have a decisive influence for the outcome of a war."

6) Marshal Malinovskiy, Stand Vigilantly on Guard Over Peace, signed to press 28 November 1962, p. 37:

"The appearance of intercontinental missiles, which serve in the hands of the leaders of the state as most powerful means for exerting an influence on the course of a war as a whole, created the necessity for the creation of a new kind of armed force -- the Strategic Missile Forces...The traditional services of the Armed Forces were also modernized: the Ground Forces, the Navy, and Aviation."

7) Military Strategy, 2nd ed., Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), signed to press 30 Aug. 1963, p. 396:

"Military actions in naval theaters in a future world war will acquire wide scope, although these actions hardly will have a decisive influence for the outcome of a war."

8) Major-General Kozlov (Ed.), On Soviet Military Science, 2nd ed., signed to press 24 December 1963:

A. "...the initial period of a modern war...will exert a decisive influence on the subsequent course and outcome of the war" (p. 348);

B. "The Strategic Missile Forces by itself can achieve direct strategic results that influence the war's outcome" (p. 352);

"With the aid of these nuclear-missile strategic strikes the most important political aims of a war are accomplished and the main strategic missions are carried out" (p. 360);

C. "Soviet military doctrine...considers that a nuclear-missile war...will be of short duration/but at the same time considers that the Armed Forces and the country as a whole must be ready also to conduct a more or less protracted war....It is not excluded that a war may begin by the transformation, more or less gradually, of a limited conflict into a global one. However a war starts, the first strikes of nuclear-missile weapons can be decisive. Accordingly, Soviet doctrine views the initial period of a war as an exceptionally important stage in its conduct. The developments of the initial period can exert a decisive influence on the further course of a war and its final results" (p. 388); and

D. "Soviet military doctrine considers that success in a modern armed struggle is not achieved by one single means or service of the Armed Forces but by the united forces of all services of the Armed Forces and service arms, with the Strategic Missile Forces playing the key role" (p. 389).

9) P. T. Astashenkov, Soviet Missile Forces, Military Press of the Ministry of Defense, 1964, p. 67:

"...today, strategic aims can be achieved with nuclear-missile weapons in a short period and in any theater of military operations. Thus, the Strategic Missile Forces can exert a considerable influence not only on the course of a war but also on its outcome."

10) Major-General Kozlov, Military Thought, February 1964, pp. 65-66:

"The strikes of the Strategic Missile Forces supplemented by strikes of Long-range Aviation and the Navy's missile-submarine forces...will be basic to the course and outcome of a nuclear-missile war....the war most likely will be of short duration...If the war is protracted, the economic factor will assume even greater importance....the initial period will be of utmost importance for its outcome."

11) Vice Admiral Sychev, Naval Digest, February 1964, p. 20:

"...Missile weapons have emerged in first place among the weapons of the Navy. They have changed the Navy significantly, have raised its role in the system of the Armed Forces, and have influenced in decisive form the character of the armed struggle at sea."

12) Korotkin et al, Aircraft Carriers, signed to press 22 June 1964, p. 235:

"U.S. strategic missiles /"Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris"/, according to the views of American military officials...will enable them at any time to predetermine to a considerable degree both the course and outcome of a war as a whole."

13) Captain First Rank Nikolayev, Naval Digest, February 1965, p. 22:

"While in the past successful action by torpedo submarines influenced to a significant degree the course of an armed struggle as a whole, now missile submarines, which can achieve strategic results with their strikes, can exert a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war."

14) Gorshkov, Literary Gazette, 6 May 1965:

"Acting in its own sphere, each of our Armed Forces carried out its own operational missions, exerting a certain /or "definite"/ effect on the course and outcome of the armed conflict /in World War II/."

15) Navy Day-'65, "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Red Star, 13 July 1965:

"Combat in naval theaters in a war...will have a great influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle in general and it is known too that the military and economic might of the major imperialist states are dependent to a significant degree on sea and ocean shipping."

16) Major-General Sushko and Colonel Kondratkov (eds.), Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, Military Press of the Ministry of Defense, 1966, p. 288:

"Our doctrine considers that the decisive role in such a /nuclear-missile/ war will be played by the Strategic Missile Forces. They will deliver nuclear strikes on the most important objectives of the enemy in his territory. Massive nuclear strikes can, to a significant extent, predetermine the entire course and outcome of a war."

17) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, DOSAAF Press, signed to press 8 January 1966, p. 50:

"Due to the potential for the joint use /with "nuclear-powered submarines"/ of such powerful striking forces as naval missile aviation, the Navy is becoming one of the most important services of the Armed Forces, one capable of exerting, by its successful action, direct influence on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Just as the /Strategic/ Missile Forces will destroy the most important enemy means of nuclear-missile attack on land, the striking forces of the Navy, first of all its nuclear-powered submarines and missile aircraft, will be able to destroy the nuclear-missile weapon platforms at sea and in this way cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions."

18) Armed Forces Day-'66 "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 2, January 1966, p. 41:

The Strategic Missile Forces (alone) was credited with the capability for "insuring the achievement of the political aims of a war" while strategic-range missiles were said to possess "a real capability to achieve decisive aims in a limited period".

19) Captains First Rank Kozlov and Schlomin, The Northern Fleet, signed to press 6 April 1966, p. 249:

"In a future war, the Navy will play a very important role, greatly influencing the course and outcome of the war as a whole."

20) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1967, p. 20:

"For the first time in its history, our Navy has been transformed fully into an offensive service of the Armed Forces, /a service/ for long-range operations. The Navy, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, has become a most important means of the Supreme High Command and is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in theaters of military action of vast extent."

21) Gorshkov, Foreward to Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 2nd edition, signed to press 25 May 1967, p. 11:

"For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy has become a navy of long-range action and an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command that is capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action."

22) Navy Day-'67, "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1967, p. 49.

The Soviet Navy has "become a navy of long-range action, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of a conflict in the vast theaters of military action."

23) Marshal Krylov, Military Thought, November 1967, p. 15:

"The creation of the Strategic Missile Forces was prompted by the need to counter the nuclear-missile and air power of the imperialist states...with powerful nuclear forces of our own capable of carrying out the basic strategic missions in the shortest period and of /thereby/ predetermining the course and outcome of a war."

24) 50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR, signed to press 6 November 1967, p. 521:

"...with the creation of the Strategic Missile Forces and the appearance of the intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of destroying practically any region of the earth by nuclear warheads, it became very clear that a war, if it is not prevented, will be conducted with qualitatively new means. In this connection, the main and decisive influence on the course and outcome of a war will be played by the mass employment of nuclear weapons."

25) Marshal Sokolovskiy (Ed.), Military Strategy, 3rd ed., signed to press 30 November 1967, p. 362:

"Military actions in naval theaters in a future world war will acquire wide scope, although these actions hardly will have a decisive influence for the outcome of a war."

26) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 30 December 1967:

"The Soviet Navy...has become an oceanic, nuclear-missile, submarine-aviation navy. It is now an offensive service of the Armed Forces, /a service/ for long-range operations capable of decisively influencing the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military operations."

27) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Izvestiya, 8 February 1968:

"By the will of the Party, in a short time there was created a... new kind of armed force -- a nuclear-missile, submarine-aircraft oceanic navy. This service of the Armed Forces is capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle over vast distances and of reliably defending the state interests of the Soviet Union."

28) Navy Day-'68, "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Communist of the Armed Forces No. 13, July 1968, pp. 31-32:

"In a modern war...combat operations in sea and oceanic theaters will have an unquestionably great influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in general...The Navy is capable of exerting a considerable influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast theaters of combat action."

29) Gorshkov, Soviet White Russia, 28 July 1968:

"A modern war cannot occur without combat actions on a vast scale in the sea and oceanic theaters, without their having a serious influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle as a whole."

30) Admiral Grishanov, Izvestiya, 28 July 1968:

"The Navy is ready to fulfill a wide circle of strategic and operational-tactical missions and, being one of the most universal types of armed forces, is capable of decisively influencing the course of the struggle in vast theaters of military action."

31) Engineering-Admiral Kotov, Labor, 28 July 1968:

"One may unhesitatingly say that our Navy has made an enormous stride in its development in a very short time and is capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle throughout vast theaters of military action."

32) Vice Admiral Yakovlev, The Soviet Navy, revised (2nd) ed., DOSAAF Press, signed to press 9 December 1968, p. 65:

"Due to the potential for the joint use /with nuclear-powered missile submarines/ of such powerful striking forces as naval missile aviation, the Navy is becoming one of the most important services of the Armed Forces, one capable of exerting, by its successful action, direct influence on the course and outcome of a war as a whole. Just as the /Strategic/ Missile Forces will destroy the most important enemy means of nuclear-missile attack on land, the striking forces of the Navy, first of all its nuclear-powered submarines and missile aircraft, will be able to destroy nuclear-missile weapon platforms at sea and in this way cut off an aggressor's attack on our country from seaward directions."

33) Major-General Sushko and Colonel Kondratkov (Eds.), Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 June 1969, p. 287:

"Our doctrine considers that the decisive role in such a /nuclear-missile/ war will be played by the Strategic Missile Forces. They will deliver nuclear strikes on the most important objectives of the enemy in his territory. Massive nuclear strikes can, to a significant extent, predetermine the entire course and outcome of a war."

34) Admiral Sergeyev, Military Knowledge, July 1969, p. 3:

"We cannot fail to consider that modern war...will be distinguished by its vast scope of combat actions in sea and ocean theaters too, which seriously influences the course and outcome of an armed struggle as a whole."

35) Vice Admiral Oleynik, Soviet Patriot, 27 July 1969:

"Due to the attention and concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening the defense potential of the country, our Navy has become a navy of long-range action, a nuclear-missile navy which, together with the Strategic Missile Forces, is capable of exerting a decisive effect on the course of an armed struggle in theaters of military action of enormous extent."

36) Gorshkov, La Revue Maritime, October 1969, pp. 1139-1143:

"A modern war...necessarily will involve extensive combat actions on the seas and oceans that will have a decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war."

37) Rear Admiral Rodionov, The Striking Force of the Navy, DOSAAF Press, Signed to Press 1 April 1970, p. 4:

"The level of development of today's production and technical base has permitted the creation of submarines with high tactical and technical characteristics, due to which their skillful use in a future war can have a substantial influence not only on military operations on individual seas and oceans but also on the course of a war as a whole."

38) Gorshkov quoted in Little Flame (Ogonyek) No. 9, May 1970, p. 5:

"For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy became a long-range navy, an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in the vast theaters of military action."

39) Navy Day-'70, "Materials for Reports and Discussions", Naval Digest, June 1970, p. 13:

"...in a modern war...combat actions in the sea and oceanic theaters undoubtedly will exert a great influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle as a whole."

40) Gorshkov, Technology and Armaments, July 1970, p. 1:

"Today the Soviet Navy is capable of exerting a very substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle over vast theaters of military action."

41) Gorshkov, Pravda, 26 July 1970:

"In the severe test of the Great Patriotic War, our Navy recommended itself as a mighty striking force capable of changing the situation in maritime theaters or in the coastal sector of action of the Ground Forces."

42) Engineering Admiral Kotov, Labor, 26 July 1970:

"In a modern war...combat actions in the sea and oceanic theaters unquestionably will have a very great influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle."

43) Vice Admiral Kulakov, Leningrad Pravda, 26 July 1970:

"Undoubtedly, in a modern war...combat action in the World Ocean can exert a serious influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle as a whole."

44) Marshal Grechko, Okean, signed to press 12 October 1970, p. 8:

"...the actions of naval forces can exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a modern war."

45) Marshal Krylov, Soviet Moldavia, 10 November 1970:

"...in a nuclear war...the main strike force of the Soviet Army /i.e., Armed Forces/ will be the Strategic Missile Forces. The course and outcome of the armed struggle will depend mainly on their potential and constant readiness."

46) Doctor of Historical Science, Colonel N.N. Azovtsev, V.I. Lenin i Sovetskaya voennaya nauka (V.I. Lenin and Soviet Military Science), Moscow, Science Press, signed to press 9 March 1971:

"The main missions of a war under modern conditions must be carried out by the Strategic Missile Forces, Long-range Aviation, and nuclear-powered submarines....The delivery of mass nuclear strikes with the aid of strategic means /of delivery/ permits the achievement of the political aims /of a war/ in short periods" (p. 297).

47) Marshal Grechko, quoted in Communist of the Armed Forces No. 12, June 1971, p. 39:

"Conditions have been created in which the actions of naval forces can exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a modern war."

48) Marshal Grechko, Naval Digest, July 1971, p. 5:

"Under modern conditions, combat actions on the oceans and seas are acquiring special significance. Navies can exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a future war."

49) Vice Admiral Schedrin, Military Knowledge, July 1971:

"The Soviet Navy...is now an offensive service of the Armed Forces, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle across extensive theaters of military action."

50) Marshal Grechko quoted by Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 25 July 1971:

"...conditions have been created under which the actions of naval forces can exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a modern war."

51) Doctor of Naval Science, Professor, Rear Admiral Stalbo, Naval Digest, August 1971, p. 95:

"Together with the Strategic Missile Forces, it /Four oceanic Navy/ has become a most important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent". (Note: The foregoing was cited by Stalbo (correctly) as a verbatim quote from Gorshkov's February 1967 Naval Digest article, p. 20; (see para. 20 above).

52) Colonel-General Grigor'yev, chapter in Strategic Sovereigns, Colonel A. N. Kulakov (Compiler), Military Press of the Ministry of Defense, 1972, p. 5:

"Our /SMF's/ readiness for combat is a readiness of all units for delivery of a powerful retaliatory strike on an aggressor in order to achieve the decisive aims of an armed struggle. A retaliatory strike of such force can have a decisive influence on the entire course of a war."

53) Captain First Rank Aleshkin, Naval Digest, January 1972, p. 30:

"...the navies of the leading seapowers will retain and expand their role as a most important strategic factor in war, /one/ capable of exerting a great influence on the course of an armed struggle as a whole."

54) Fleet Admiral Kasatonov, Red Star, 30 July 1972:

"The combat capabilities of modern navies have risen considerably. They are capable of operating and delivering strikes at virtually any point of the globe. This means that the actions of naval forces can exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a war..."

55) Admiral Alekseyev, Labor, 30 July 1972:

"The nuclear-missile Soviet Navy reliably protects the interests of our country...It is capable of exerting an enormous influence on the course and outcome of a modern war."

56) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, February 1973, p. 24:

"...the Navy fulfills the important role in wartime of a powerful means for achieving the political aims of the armed struggle."

57) P. N. Ivanov, Wings Over the Sea, signed to press 29 June 1973, p. 298:

"Our modern Navy has become a nuclear-missile, submarine-aviation, oceanic navy. Its main striking forces are nuclear-powered missile submarines and naval aviation. They have broadened the sphere of activity of the Navy and raised it to the ranks of forces capable of fulfilling strategic missions of an offensive character and thereby of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed struggle in theaters of military action of vast extent."

58) Admiral Amel'ko, Military Banner, July 1973, pp. 6-7:

"...in a modern war...combat action on the oceans will undoubtedly have a major effect on the outcome of the armed struggle as a whole."

59) Captain First Rank V'yunenkov, Naval Digest, November 1973, p. 25:

"In their opinion [that of "foreign specialists"], a navy has become a strategic factor that is capable, by actions against vitally important enemy targets, of directly influencing the course and even the outcome of a war..."

60) Gorshkov, Foreward to Combat Course of the Soviet Navy, 3rd edition, signed to press 13 February 1974, p. 7:

"For the first time in its history, the Soviet Navy has become a navy of long-range action and an important strategic means of the Supreme High Command that is capable of exerting a substantial influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle in vast oceanic and continental theaters of military action." (The underlined part was added to the comparable sentence in the 1st edition of 1969--See para. 21)

61) Admiral Bondarenko, Naval Digest, July 1974, p. 3:

"Now the Navy is capable of exerting a substantial influence over vast theaters of military action on the course and outcome of an armed struggle."

62) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, December 1974, p. 24:

"In considering the scale of a conflict on the strategic level, it is necessary to note the constantly growing capabilities of the navies of the great seapowers for achieving ever more decisive aims. This particularly pertains to actions of strategic offensive forces with regard to destroying the major forces of an enemy and, above all, to crushing his military-economic potential, which can have a direct influence on the course and even outcome of a nuclear war. It is logical to surmise that the further development of navies will allow them to wage an armed struggle on an even greater scale."

63) Gorshkov, Problems of Philosophy, May 1975, pp. 26-38.

"The Navy has advanced to the ranks of strategic forces capable of exerting a decisive influence not just on the course and outcome of major operations in large theaters of military action but also on the war as a whole."

64) Colonel Lukava, Naval Digest, June 1975, p. 10:

Naval maneuvers have "demonstrated that, with the acquisition of missile submarines, the Navy is capable of strategically influencing the course and outcome of a modern war".

65) Admiral Bondarenko, Radio Moscow in Russian, 0830 GMT, 27 July 1975:

Nuclear propulsion, nuclear missiles and electronics "have advanced the Navy to the ranks of strategic forces capable of decisively influencing the course of major operations not only in the oceans but also on the continents".

66) Gorshkov, Communist of the Armed Forces No. 14, July 1975, p. 13:

"...in a modern war...combat actions in sea and oceanic theaters unquestionably will exert great influence on the course and outcome of the armed struggle as a whole /but the Soviet Navy alone is only/ capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of large-scale operations which can occur in the vast extent and depth of the theaters of military action."

67) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, signed to press 27 November 1975:

A. "Right now we are threatened by a coalition of naval powers which, along with ground armies, aviation, and missile forces, disposes of powerful, modern naval forces.

"The role of struggle in oceanic directions...has grown a lot, and could become the main axes in certain circumstances. Today the Navy is capable, by its strikes from the sea, of changing the course and outcome of an armed struggle even in continental theaters of military action" (p. 5);

B. "...a navy is a powerful instrument for achieving, in a period of war, the political aims of the armed struggle" (p. 249);

C. "...in the postwar period...the general direction of the development of navies lay not just in the sphere of contesting with the fleets of the opponent but became the creation of forces and means capable of exerting a direct influence not only on the course but also on the outcome of an armed struggle on the ground fronts" (p. 252);

D. "The main thing is that they /navies/ have acquired a qualitatively new strategic means -- nuclear-powered missile submarines. Thanks to them, the capabilities of navies have multiplied many times for conducting actions against the shore and for exerting direct influence on the course of a modern nuclear war" (pp. 277-278);

E. "In our times, a navy acting against the shore acquires the capability not only to carry out missions related to territorial changes but also to directly influence the course and even the outcome of a war" (p. 360);

F. "...it is necessary to note the constantly growing capability of nuclear navies for achieving ever more decisive aims in modern war. This applies especially to actions by the forces of a navy directed at smashing the military-economic potential of an opponent, which can exert a direct influence on the course and even the outcome of a war" (p. 363);

G. "In perspective, therefore, the combat activity of a navy is a complex combination of rapid, fleeting, simultaneous and successive combat actions which are concluded by the achievement of decisive aims and which, in certain circumstances, exert a direct influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle as a whole" (pp. 370-371);

H. "In the course of the scientific-technical revolution, naval forces acquired the significance of one of the most important strategic factors, of being capable by way of direct action on groupings of troops of an opponent and on vitally important objectives on his territory of exerting a highly significant and at times even a decisive influence on the course of a war.

"The influence of combat at sea on the course of a war as a whole manifests itself above all to the extent that a navy's capability is realized for destroying ground objectives and for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea" (pp. 454-455); and

I. "...introduction of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution has changed the missions of navies radically. Their basic mission assignment has become /delivering/ strikes from seaward on objectives on the territory of an opponent. They have become capable of rapidly and decisively acting directly on the course of an armed struggle in practically all of the theaters of military action. Naval forces are gradually becoming the main delivery system for nuclear weapons capable of destroying an opponent on all the continents and seas" (p. 461).

68) Fleet Admiral Lobov, Naval Digest, April 1976, p. 103:

"Fundamental changes in the military and technological base have transformed modern navies into a most important part of the strategic nuclear forces capable, by direct action against groupings of troops and vitally important objectives in the depths of enemy territory, of significantly and at times even decisively influencing the course and outcome of a war."

69) Vice Admiral Savel'yev, Red Star, 25 May 1976:

"Combat actions on the oceans in a future war...will comprise an important part of the armed struggle as a whole. Today navies embody the threat of devastating strikes into the depths of countries and continents. Emphasis is put on a navy's potential, through direct action against an opponent's troop groupings and the vitally important objectives in his territory, for exerting a highly significant, and at times even decisive, influence on the course of a war."

70) Gorshkov, Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, signed to press 20 July 1976, p. 234:

"The Navy has acquired the capability to deliver nuclear missile strikes on the territory of an opponent, on his navy and bases from great distances and, by /these/ combat actions at sea, exert a decisive influence on the achievement of the strategic aims of a war."

- 71) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Military-Historical Journal, July 1976, p. 3:

"The widespread introduction of atomic energy, nuclear-missile weapons, and radioelectronics essentially changed the combat capabilities of the Navy. Now, by its strikes, it is capable not only of determining the fate of combat at sea, but also of influencing in significant measure the course and outcome of armed conflict in continental theaters of military action."

- 72) Fleet Admiral Smirnov, Red Star, 25 July 1976:

"In modern circumstances, the combat capabilities of navies have multiplied. They are in condition to exert an enormous influence on the entire course of a war..."

- 73) Captain First Rank Makeyev, Naval Digest, February 1977, p. 17:

"The Navy has acquired the capability for delivering powerful strikes not only on sea targets but also on objectives in the depth of the territory of an opponent. For the first time in its history, the Navy has been transformed into a strategic service of the Armed Forces, capable of influencing in decisive form the course and outcome of a war as a whole."

- 74) Gorshkov, The Navy, Knowledge Press, signed to press 11 July 1977:

"For the first time in history, our Navy has been transformed, in the full sense of the word, into an Armed Forces' service of long-range action. Today, along with the Strategic Missile Forces, it is capable of decisively influencing the course of an armed struggle in vast theaters of military action" (p. 47); and

"A modern oceanic navy, by acting against targets ashore, can influence directly the course and even the outcome of a war" (pp. 48-49).

- 75) Gorshkov, Naval Digest, November 1977, p. 9:

"The Soviet Navy became an oceanic navy, an important means of the Supreme High Command, capable of exerting a decisive influence on the course of an armed conflict in theaters of military action of vast extent."

- 76) Admiral Grishanov, Soviet Patriot, 5 March 1978:

"These qualitative changes carried out in the Navy have led to its becoming an essentially new strategic instrument for insuring Soviet capabilities for the defense of the country and capable of vitally influencing the course of an armed struggle in all oceanic and sea theaters of military action."

77) Vice Admiral Solov'yev, Naval Digest, June 1978, p. 21:

"In the opinion of the American command, in the event of war navies are capable of decisively influencing the course and outcome of the armed struggle not only in the oceans but also in continental theaters."

78) N. Zhukov, Naval Digest, January 1979, p. 69:

"Primary attention has been devoted in /U.S./ naval development to offensive forces intended for taking part in a nuclear-missile attack on the USSR....Over the past decade these have come to be viewed by the U.S. military-political leadership as a most powerful strategic force intended to exert a decisive influence on the course and outcome of a nuclear-missile war."

79) Gorshkov, Seapower of the State, 2nd edition, signed to press 6 March 1979: (Note: Bracketed parts denote omissions from 1st edition and underlined portions indicate new additions.)

A. "Right now we are threatened by a coalition of naval powers which, along with ground armies, aviation, and missile forces, disposes of powerful /modern - see para. 67A above/ naval forces.

"The role of struggle in oceanic directions...has grown a lot, and could become the main axes in certain circumstances. Today the Navy /or, alternatively, just "a navy"/ is capable, by /its/ strikes from the sea, of changing the course /and outcome/ of an armed struggle even in continental theaters of military action and of exerting an influence on its outcome" (p. 6);

B. "...navies /the Navy/ are /is/ powerful means for achieving, in a period of war, the political aims of an armed struggle" (p. 221);

C. "...in the postwar period...the general direction of the development of navies lay not just in the sphere of contesting with the fleets of the opponent but became the creation of forces and means capable of exerting a direct influence not only on the course but also on the outcome of an armed struggle on the ground fronts" (p. 223);

D. "The main thing is that they /navies/ have acquired a qualitatively new strategic means -- nuclear-powered missile submarines. Thanks to them, the capabilities of navies have multiplied many times for conducting actions against the shore and for exerting direct influence on the course of a modern war" (p. 247);

E. "At present /In our times/, a navy acting against the shore acquires the capability not only to carry out missions related to territorial changes but also to directly influence the course and even the outcome of a war" (p. 329);

F. "...it is necessary to note the constantly growing capability of nuclear navies for achieving ever more decisive aims in modern war. This applies especially to actions by the forces of a navy directed at smashing the military-economic potential of an opponent, which can exert a direct influence on the course and even the outcome of a war" (p. 331);

G. "In perspective, therefore, the combat activity of a navy is a complex combination of rapid, fleeting, simultaneous and successive combat actions which are concluded by the achievement of decisive aims and which, in certain circumstances, exert a direct influence on the course and outcome of an armed struggle as a whole" (p. 338);

H. "In the epoch /course/ of the scientific-technical revolution, naval forces acquired the significance of one of the most important strategic factors, of being capable by way of direct action on groupings of troops of an opponent and on vitally important objectives on his territory of exerting a highly significant and at times even a decisive influence on the course of a war.

/The influence of combat at sea on the course of a war as a whole manifests itself above all to the extent that a navy's capability is realized for destroying ground objectives and for degrading the strategic nuclear potential of the opponent at sea"/ (p. 410);

I. "...introduction of the achievements of /the/ scientific-technical progress /revolution/ has changed the missions of navies radically. Their basic mission assignment has become /delivering/ strikes from seaward on objectives on the territory of an opponent. They have become capable of rapidly and decisively exerting an influence /acting/ directly on the course of an armed struggle in practically all of the theaters of military action. Naval forces are gradually becoming the main delivery system for nuclear weapons capable of destroying an opponent on all the continents and seas" (p. 414); and

J. "An important task of Soviet military strategy is to unite all components of the military power of the state because an organic whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

"The special and still growing significance of the missions carried out by navies, the widening of the sphere of their employment, the increasing capabilities for exerting a decisive influence on the course and even the outcome of a war as a whole call for an intensive and comprehensive development of the forms of strategic employment of the Navy" (p. 317).