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THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION, 1899-1902

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

GERALD H. EARLY, MAJ, USA
B.S., Arizona State University, 1965
M.A., Shippensburg State College, 1970

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1975

The United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection: 1899-1902

Gerald H. Early, MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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The United States Army's current approach to counterinsurgency is through internal defense and development campaigns intended to maintain or restore order while concurrently removing those social and economic conditions that contribute to the insurgency and provide the basis of its support. The study evaluates American experience in the Philippine Insurrection in light of these principles. The methods by which the insurgency was suppressed are isolated and analyzed to determine whether or not they support current counterinsurgency policy guidelines. Conversely, the guidelines are applied to the Philippine counterinsurgency effort to determine whether changes in procedures or policies might have resulted in a more rapid or efficient American success.

The experience of the United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 confirms the validity of today's counterinsurgency doctrine. Every present-day guideline that was thoroughly and carefully implemented by the American administration was successful. While some of the slowness in the pacification effort may have been caused by failure to adequately and promptly adopt others. The insurrection could not have been suppressed exclusively by force of arms--the Americans had to create the conditions under which the basis of insurgent support was removed and the Filipinos became willing to accept United States sovereignty. The United States was fortunate to have had wise and progressive Military Governors in the Philippines who came to grasp the essence of this problem and eliminated the insurgency using policies that are entirely consistent with contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.

ABSTRACT

The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was a case of successful United States elimination of an insurgency that had been developing for almost 25 years. By the time the United States assumed sovereignty over the Philippine Islands following the Spanish-American War of 1898, the objectives of the insurgent movement had changed from reform to independence. Active hostilities against the colonial regime had been going on intermittently for more than two years.

The situation in the Islands at that time had many of the characteristics of recent Asian insurgencies; however, it has been little studied as an aid in the development of today's counterinsurgency principles. Victory against an insurgent movement is far more complex and difficult than simply defeating the enemy by force of arms. The insurgent operates in his homeland and depends for his existence on the support of a sympathetic populace. Because he is generally dedicated to his cause and therefore highly motivated, he usually ceases to fight only when this support is withdrawn and his recruits, food, supplies, and intelligence are denied. The insurgent did cease to fight in the Philippines, and it is useful to find out why and how this occurred.

The United States Army's current approach to counterinsurgency is through internal defense and development campaigns intended to maintain or restore order while concurrently removing those social and economic conditions that contribute to the insurgency and provide the basis of its support. The study evaluates American experience in the Philippine Insurrection in light of these principles. The methods by which the insurgency

was suppressed are isolated and analyzed to determine whether or not they support current counterinsurgency policy guidelines. Conversely, the guidelines are applied to the Philippine counterinsurgency effort to determine whether changes in procedures or policies might have resulted in a more rapid or efficient American success.

The study's attention is directed to the United States Army's accomplishment of its missions in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902. As necessary to understand the Philippine revolution, it first discusses the defeat of the Spanish and the occupation of Manila. Then it describes and evaluates the military and civil components of the American counterinsurgency effort that reacted to the two separate phases of the insurgency: the first primarily involving an insurgent regular army, the next guerrilla warfare. The story of these endeavors is found in the official military reports of the period, in the records of hearings conducted by the Congress, and in organizational histories, biographical materials, and a number of scholarly and authoritative previous works on the period.

The United States ultimately suppressed the Philippine Insurrection by using many of the broad internal defense and development concepts that are in present-day Army doctrine. In the first phase of the insurrection, American forces handily defeated the revolutionary army in the field. However, the guerrilla warfare phase required the Americans to introduce civil programs that effectively separated and disaffected the people from the insurgents, while United States Army units defeated the guerrilla bands in hundreds of small engagements.

Successive United States Military Governors in the Philippines developed and implemented the eventual formula for victory. General Wesley Merritt proclaimed the American regime as uninterested in

disturbing the Filipinos so long as they did not interfere with American efforts, and willing to permit local self-government. His successor, General Elwell S. Otis, established a model municipal administration in Manila and an enlightened form of government for the remainder of the Islands, while at the same time he defeated the insurgent regular army in the field. General Arthur MacArthur established American-sponsored civil governments throughout the Islands while effectively prohibiting cooperation between the civilian populace and guerrilla forces in the occupied areas. This led to the defeat of the insurgents in most of the archipelago. The last Military Governor, General Adna R. Chaffee, removed the remaining pockets of rebel resistance by even stricter measures to isolate the revolutionaries, including the resettlement of Filipinos in some areas to physically remove them from insurgent coercion and influence.

The strength of the American effort was in its ability to show the people that its administration was efficient, nonoppressive, and preferable to a revolutionary regime that had often showed itself to be brutal, corrupt, and incapable of maintaining law and order. United States forces were eventually able to provide the security necessary for the villagers to confidentally cooperate in local American-sponsored governments and refuse to support the insurgents. Concurrently, through military strength and skill, the Americans defeated the guerrilla units that could be located and engaged. Contributing to United States success was the fact that by mid-1902 the people were tired of a war which had ravaged the Islands for over six years. They recognized that the United States intended to persist in the pacification effort, and

therefore all but the most stubborn became willing to accept American sovereignty as a means of preventing additional strife and dislocation.

The major American weaknesses were the inability to establish a nation-wide intelligence network and slowness in the strict application of rules for separating the population from the revolutionary movement. However, language and cultural limitations, as well as the threat of cruel insurgent reprisal, hindered the American ability to develop an effective intelligence network until the United States administration had proved itself through the success of its internal defense and development programs. American domestic political considerations may have prevented the Military Governor from applying the laws of war until after the Presidential election of 1900, in which anti-imperialism was a major campaign issue.

The experience of the United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 confirms the validity of today's counterinsurgency doctrine. Every present-day guideline that was thoroughly and carefully implemented by the American administration was successful, while some of the slowness in the pacification effort may have been caused by failure to adequately and promptly adopt others. The insurrection could not have been suppressed exclusively by force of arms--the Americans had to create the conditions under which the basis of insurgent support was removed and the Filipinos became willing to accept United States sovereignty. The United States was fortunate to have had wise and progressive Military Governors in the Philippines who came to grasp the essence of this problem and eliminated the insurgency using policies that are entirely consistent with contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Philippine Insurrection of 1899 to 1902, together with the Spanish-American War of 1898 that preceded it, are little understood events in American military history. Their purpose, strategy, and leading personalities are often seen as little more than historical filler between the cataclysmic struggles of the Civil War and World War I. This era is often recalled only as an early and brutal example of United States imperialism or to emphasize the atrocities allegedly perpetrated against the Filipinos by the American forces. Both of these interpretations are unfortunate as well as inaccurate. The first because failure to appreciate the conditions and events of this important transitional period limits understanding of both the nation and the Army. Limited understanding results in incorrect and inaccurate conclusions. The second because the record of the United States Army in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection was, on the whole, far from discreditable.

The activities of the United States Army in the Philippines from 1898 through 1902 are also noteworthy because the formation and deployment of a largely volunteer force for overseas Spanish-American War and Insurrection operations were themselves remarkable feats. The Army's limited combat actions against the Spanish were conducted with enthusiasm and technical skill. Its administration of Manila and later the remainder of the Philippine archipelago stand as models of colonial administration. Army operations against the insurgents were also well and efficiently

handled. These, in effect, comprised two separate and distinct efforts: the first against an insurgent regular army and the second against a wily and purposeful guerrilla foe. Especially significant was the Army command's realization that military victory alone was futile, even if attainable, unless the people were won over to the United States and the rebels thereby deprived of the basis of their support.

The Problem

The Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 was a case of successful United States elimination of an overseas insurgency. The Filipino example was not an insurgency in the precise sense of today's definition, "an attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population into forcibly overthrowing its existing [indigenous] government,"[1] but rather was an anti-colonial effort against an unknown and untrusted alien power to whom outside events had recently brought control of the Islands. Nevertheless, the situation in the Philippines at the time had many of the characteristics of recent Asian insurgencies, including similarities in the nature of the land and people, a history of foreign colonial domination, and nationalism manifested in a determination to attain independence. Conditions of social and economic change that give rise to higher popular expectations than could be attained is another and important similarity.

Although the United States Army was the principal agent in counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines, this experience has been little studied as an aid in the development of today's counterinsurgency doctrine. Instead, the more recent but far less successful American experience in Vietnam tends to be the primary source of lessons for the future. A study of the Philippine counterinsurgency experience of 1899-1902 may therefore be useful in evaluating present-day counterinsurgency methods.

Background of the Problem

The United States declared war on the Empire of Spain on 25 April 1898 for the express purpose of ending Spanish colonial abuses in Cuba. War came after three years of diplomatic efforts to end what Americans popularly perceived as brutal and inhumane Spanish treatment of the Cubans, who had been in revolution since 1895. By the spring of 1898, Spain was willing to make substantial concessions toward ameliorating the Cuban situation, but their proposals came too little and too late. American public opinion had been inflamed by Cuban propaganda, the newspapers and their "yellow journalism," and such spectacular events as the mysterious sinking of the battleship USS Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February. The publication of a private letter written by the Spanish Minister in Washington, Enrique Depuy de Lome, which disparaged President William McKinley, suggested a lack of sincerity in Spanish negotiations.[2]

A bellicose and chauvinistic attitude that showed itself in a policy of United States imperialistic expansion contributed also to the onset of hostilities with the Spanish. Among the adherents of this policy were Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt. Much of the basis for this position was found in the influential writings of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, United States Navy.[3] Since no nation was self-sufficient, said Mahan, economic well-being depended upon access to foreign raw materials and markets. Therefore, he believed a strong navy and merchant marine were essential to protect and conduct this foreign trade, and these seagoing forces in turn needed carefully distributed overseas bases for their support.[4]

The War Plan of the United States. Even as events in Madrid and Washington were moving the two nations toward war, American military and naval authorities were engaged in developing the strategy to be followed if armed conflict should occur. The dispersion of the Spanish overseas possessions was of paramount importance in developing United States plans. Besides Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, Spain's other significant overseas holding was the Philippines. The necessity of countering any threat from Spain's naval forces also played a large part in planning by the United States. Strategists held as essential the reduction of Spain's Atlantic and Pacific squadrons to prevent the possibility of bombardment of the United States seacoast and to insure the free passage of American ships and troops.[5]

Although ground action in the Caribbean was planned from the beginning, it was not immediately apparent that the war would also result in long-term American military involvement in the Philippine Islands. The planners decided that Cuba would be attacked first, followed by Puerto Rico, but no provision for a land force for the Pacific theater was in the original design.[6]

Action Against the Spanish. The Caribbean portion of America's grand scheme came surprisingly close to the planning in its execution. The only major variations were those caused by the unexpectedly quick collapse of the overestimated Spanish forces in Cuba and the termination of the Puerto Rican campaign by agreement on a peace protocol on 12 August 1898.[7]

The American Pacific Squadron under Commodore George Dewey had been alerted for naval action against Spain as early as 25 February 1898 by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, who acted in the absence

and without the knowledge or authorization of the Secretary of the Navy.[8] But it was not until after the declaration of war, 25 April 1898, that Dewey got his specific mission:

> War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor.[9]

He followed his orders with alacrity, moving from Hong Kong to Manila Bay and sinking the entire enemy squadron on 1 May 1898. Reports of Dewey's victory were wildly received in the United States, and he was congratulated by the President and promoted to admiral.[10]

Dewey's destruction of the Spanish Pacific squadron effectively ended the Spanish ability to resist in the Philippines by cutting off lines of supply to the Islands. However, ground troops would be necessary to consummate victory by occupying the capital city of Manila. Toward this end Dewey requested 5,000 men. The message arrived in Washington on 7 May, and the President responded immediately by authorizing 15,000.[11] This order began the history of the United States Army in the Philippine Islands, an association that was to continue in various forms for over forty years.

Inheriting an Insurgency. Succession of Spain's overlordship in the Philippines meant assuming Spain's battle with an indigenous movement that had been active since 1896 and had as its goal the independence of the Islands and an end to centuries-long foreign domination. The United States inherited a rebellion that was scarcely interrupted by a short period of Filipino-American coexistence, if not cooperation, early in the Spanish War. Once it became clear that the United States intended to retain the Philippines, the revived insurgency became the more intense because of rebel antagonism to what was perceived as American duplicity.

The result was a long and bloody American effort to end the insurgency. In the words of President McKinley's proclamation of 21 December 1898, the intent of the United States was to "win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples."[12] To this the Military Governor added:

> I am also convinced that it is the intention of the United States Government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full representation as the maintenance of law and order will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development, on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers, into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favored provinces of the world.[13]

But by this time, only speedy and unconditional independence would have satisfied the rebels.

The continuing insurgency had a divisive effect in the United States. Some Americans were pleased with the possession of the Islands as a demonstration of the nation's emergence as an international power, as well as for the usefulness of the Philippines as a strategic base in Asia and possible future source of profits. Those Americans opposed to United States possession of the Islands, thought it to be antithetical to the democratic and anticolonialist traditions of the country. This point of view held that the Islands should never have been taken and that independence should be promptly granted, in an effort to maintain the integrity of American traditions. As the insurgency progressed, with continuing costs to the United States in casualties and dollars, this attitude became increasingly popular.[14]

Statement of the Problem Situation

The problem centers around the question of whether or not the United States Army's efforts to suppress the Philippine Insurrection are

consistent with current counterinsurgency principles. Many reasons may be cited for the American counterinsurgency success in the Philippines, notably the defeat of the rebels on innumerable battlefields. However, as recent experience has shown, victory against an insurgent movement is a far more complex and difficult task than simply defeating the enemy by force of arms. The insurgent operates in his homeland and depends for his existence on the support of a sympathetic populace. Because he is generally dedicated to his cause and therefore highly motivated, he usually ceases to fight only when this support is withdrawn and his food, supplies, recruits, and intelligence are withheld. Since the insurgent did cease to fight in the Philippines, the important questions become how and why this occurred. Current Army guidelines on counterinsurgency will form the basis for any judgments or determinations.

The United States Army's current approach to counterinsurgency is through internal defense and development programs intended to maintain or restore order while concurrently removing those social and economic conditions that contribute to the insurgency and which provide the basis of its support.[15] This concept assumes that foreign insurgencies will be dealt with by their own governments, but these guidelines may also be used to better understand insurrections which are quelled by non-indigenous forces, as was the case in the Philippines. The policy guidelines associated with this approach are:

1. It is preferable to prevent an insurgent war rather than fight one.

2. The government must show the people that it is the better choice.

3. Internal defense and development should be characterized by the integration of all functions—security, sociopolitical development, and economic development—at all levels.

4. Planning, organization, and control of internal defense and development functions should follow the established political organization of the nation.

5. Internal defense and development must include the creation or strengthening of a spirit of nationhood among the people.

6. Internal defense and development must seek to create in the people both a desire and an ability for self-improvement.

7. Internal defense actions must be structured to promote the achievement of specific, constructive internal defense goals.

8. A nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network is a prerequisite for internal defense success.

9. The philosophy for neutralization or regaining of control over individual insurgents must consider their potential usefulness to the nation.

10. Regulations for suppressing insurgent violence should be formulated before violence occurs, be based on law, be published, and be enforceable.

11. The ultimate goal of internal defense operations must be the breaking down of an insurgent organization, not the infliction of the maximum number of insurgent casualties.

12. The primary responsibility for the internal defense of a nation rests with that nation.[16]

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to evaluate American experience in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 in light of today's United States Army counterinsurgency guidelines. The methods by which the insurgency was suppressed are isolated and analyzed to determine whether or not they support current counterinsurgency doctrine. Conversely, the policy guidelines are applied to the Army's Philippine counterinsurgency efforts to determine whether changes in procedure or policies might have resulted in a more rapid or efficient American success.

Objectives to be Investigated

The specific line of investigation addresses the nature of both the Philippine Insurrection and its American response. On the insurgent side, the study considers those elements essential to understanding the movement's inspiration, history, and objectives; how it operated, including the governing structure and the civil and military components; its strategy, tactics, and intelligence practices; and its membership and sources of support and resources. Many of the same factors are examined on the American side, with special attention to the civil and military organization; strategy, tactics, and intelligence; and the activities of individual American leaders, with assessment of their respective contributions.

Methodology and Procedures

The study directs its primary attention to the United States Army's accomplishment of its assigned missions in the Philippines between 1898 and 1902. The defeat of the Spanish and the occupation of Manila are studied first, since this information is necessary for an understanding of the developing Philippine revolution. Then the military and civil components of the counterinsurgency effort are described and evaluated. The history of these endeavors is found in the official records of the period, including correspondence, reports, and returns of the War Department and from Army field commanders from the Philippine Division level to individuals participating in unit actions; in the records of hearings conducted by the Congress; and in organizational histories and biographical materials; as well as in a number of scholarly and authoritative works on the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection.

NOTES

[1]Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, Internal Defense and Development--U.S. Army Doctrine, 28 November 1974, p. 3-1.

[2]H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 8-63; see also Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), pp. 10-39 and 96-145.

[3]Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Glouster, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1959), pp. 1-33; see also Morgan, op. cit., p. 15.

[4]Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), pp. 161-63.

[5]U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation, Appendix to Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898), pp. 363-64.

[6]U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain, Vol. 1, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 221 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 244-48.

[7]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the Same, including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, between the Adjutant-General of the Army and Military Commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippine Islands, from April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, Vol. 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. 157 and 383. (This document is hereafter referred to as Correspondence.)

[8]Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), pp. 44-46.

[9]U.S., Navy Department, Bureau of Navigation, op. cit., p. 67.

[10]John W. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 3-4.

[11]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

[12]U.S., Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, Vol. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 331 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), pp. 776-78.

[13]Ibid.

[14]James A. LeRoy, The Americans In the Philippines, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 271-73; see also Henry F. Graff (ed.), American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), pp. xiv-xv.

[15] FM 100-20, op. cit., pp. 4-1 to 4-13.

[16] Study materials on "Prevention of Insurgent War," Course 7, Security Assistance, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Academic Year 1974-75, pp. P1-10 to P1-18.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

By the time American ground forces arrived in the Philippines in the summer of 1898, the independence movement which had been developing for over twenty-five years had reached proportions which would later pose problems for the United States. Any appreciation of this Filipino movement requires an analysis of the Islands and their history, as well as an understanding of the economic, political, and military situation of its membership.

The Philippines and Its People

To the American public of 1898, the Philippines were little understood, but to the military, the Islands had great value. Only 2,000 miles from Tokyo and 1,500 from Singapore, and astride the sea lanes so important to the disciples of Captain Mahan, the Philippines were clearly a strategic prize.

The Philippine archipelago consists of more than 7,000 islands, with only about 1,000 of them inhabited in 1898.[1] The distance from the northernmost to the southernmost island is 1,152 miles and the greatest width of the island group is 682 miles. The two largest islands of Luzon and Mindanao together comprise 76,797 of the archipelago's 115,600 square miles. The islands are mountainous and of volcanic origin and have a climate that is tropical and hot, but subject to wide seasonal variations including monsoon rains.[2] Some of the few large rivers are navigable, but the absence of extensive railroad systems and serviceable roads made

Philippine Archipelago

travel in the 1890's generally difficult outside the most populated and well developed areas.[3]

The estimated 1898 population of some 7 million included 19,000 non-government Spanish, between 5,000 and 10,000 Chinese, and approximately 350,000 mixed-blood Spanish-Filipinos or Chinese-Filipinos, called mestizos. Most of the population resided on the islands of Luzon and Mindanao, and the capital city of Manila, on Luzon, had more than 300,000 residents.[4] The original inhabitants were primarily of the Malay race, of whom approximately 92 percent were Christian, 2 percent Mohammaden or Moro, with most of the remainder belonging to primitive pagan tribes.[5] There were more than 80 native dialects, and better educated Filipinos could speak Spanish as well as their ancestral tongue.[6] Captain John R. M. Taylor, the official historian of the Philippine Division during the period of the Philippine Insurrection, commented as follows on these heterogeneous people:

> The population of the area was culturally diverse and included many different ethnic groups living in a state of civilization that ranged from the Hispanized residents of Manila to the primitive pagan tribes in the mountains of Luzon. The Southern Islands -- the Jolo group -- were occupied by the Moros, a fierce and predatory Mohammaden race of pirates by avocation, who until the Spanish broke their power by establishing patrols of steam gunboats were the terror of the eastern seas.[7]

The Spanish Presence

Magellan discovered the Philippines in 1529, but it was not until 1565 that the Spanish took permanent possession of the archipelago. The Spanish occupation and administration was not by force of arms, but rather was done mainly through the influence of the members of the Roman Catholic religious orders who accompanied the early expeditions to the Islands and remained to convert and minister to the Filipinos. The

Church played a major part in controlling the Filipinos throughout the 333 years of Spanish rule that had passed by 1898. Because of this relatively stable and tranquil situation, the Spanish garrisons in the Islands never exceeded 3,000 officers and men in the period before 1890.[8]

In May 1898, the Spanish civil and military establishments in the Philippines were headed by Lieutenant General Basilio Augustin, the Governor General. He governed with the assistance of appointed advisory bodies, principally the Board of Authorities and the larger Council of Administration. The Governor General and the Archbishop of Manila were on both of these boards, together with various civil, military, and religious officials and other leading Spaniards. In consideration of the American threat, a Council of Defense was established on 29 March 1898, comprised of the Archbishop as president and four other high ranking civil officials. Local military and naval officers provided this Council with advice and assistance, and the heads of religious orders gave it information on provincial conditions. The islands were divided into approximately 50 provinces for administration, each with a Spanish civil administrator and resident Spanish clergy.[9]

Filipinos held no major decision-making offices in the colonial government and were not represented in any legislative body. However, educated natives held office in local administrations, were heads of towns, and acted as local judges and court officers. Filipino priests were coadjutors to the Spanish pastors.[10]

Spanish military forces in the Philippines in May 1898 numbered about 26,000, all but 3,000 of them in Luzon. These were augmented by 14,000 native soldiers under Spanish officers, the majority of whom were also in the main island.[11]

Origins of the Filipino Revolution

The approximately 150 years preceding the Spanish-American War had been a time of profound social and economic change in the Philippines. How this came about is described by John Gates in his excellent Schoolbooks and Krags:

> During most of the eighteenth century and before, three economies existed side by side in the Philippines: the native economy based on subsistence agriculture; the small Spanish bureaucratic, religious, and trading community centered in Manila; and a relatively small but extremely important Chinese community of merchants and artisans catering to the needs of the Spaniards. Because of their commercial activities, the Chinese stood as the link between the two economies of the Spaniard and the Filipino. In cultural affairs, members of the Spanish religious orders in the islands served a similar function. The friars were often the sole link between the Spanish bureaucracy in Manila and the Filipinos in the provinces.
>
> Starting in the middle of the eighteenth century, the colony began an economic transformation. . . . Spanish administrators tried to stimulate the development of commercial agriculture, industry, and trade. . . .[12]

Gates also explains the process by which economic and social life throughout the islands were altered when "numerous local subsistence economies were brought into some semblance of integration through the development of export crops such as sugar, hemp, indigo, and tobacco."[13] To further increase Spanish economic opportunity, most of the Chinese were expelled in 1755. Since the Spanish residents were largely preoccupied with the government and the Church, the advantage went to enterprising Filipinos, mostly *mestizos*, who came to constitute an elite among whom money and land became the symbols of success. The sons of this new class, educated in Manila or Europe and known as *ilustrados*, became increasingly Hispanized and affected by late nineteenth century ideas of liberalism and nationalism.[14]

Shortly after the middle of the nineteenth century, three important events occurred which were to lead to the first serious attempts to contest

Spanish authority in the Islands. First was the 1859 return of the Jesuits, who had been expelled by the Spanish in 1767-68. The result of this was a further disaffection of native priests, who were already held to subordinate positions in the Church structure and were now further displaced downward. Second was the Spanish revolution of 1868, which had its impact on the Philippines by leading to rapid changes in colonial officials over the following 30 years. Uninterested in local language and culture, and realizing they would not remain long in the Islands, many of these men tried to get what they could for themselves during their brief tenures. The lot of Spanish civil officials was not made easier by having reforms initiated by one regime being repealed by the next. And finally, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased the exchange of both commerce and information between the Philippines and Spain and thereby facilitated the proliferation of new ideas.[15]

These situations, with their resulting dissatisfactions, led the ilustrados to organize and lead a rebellion in 1872 with goals of acquiring civil rights for the Filipinos, achieving greater equality between the colony and Spain, and adjustment of the vast Church holdings and disproportionate Spanish clerical influence in the provinces. The revolution was betrayed in advance and was therefore easily put down by the Spanish. The subsequent investigation led to the trial, conviction, and execution by garroting of three Filipino priests and one layman, all of whom were popularly thought to be innocent of the charges against them.[16]

The Rise of the Katipunan. During the first stages of the organization of the rebellion after the first failure in 1872, persons with variously based dissident feelings had no unified organization and different groups coalesced around different issues, and there were numerous

groups and many issues. On one end of the spectrum was Dr. Jose Rizal, a respected patriot and intellectual and head of an organization called the Philippine League. Rizal was exiled by the Spanish and later shot for what appear to be trumped-up charges of treason. On the other end, there were loose groupings of adventurers and bandits who sometimes disguised themselves as anti-government militants. In between there were dissatisfied native priests and lower-level military personnel, whose advancement was blocked by the Spanish monopoly on top positions within their establishments, ambitious mestizos, who coveted the thousands of acres of desirable lands under Church control, and a variety of men-on-the-make whose futures were limited under the status quo and who thought they could profit from turbulence and change.[17]

In 1892, there appeared a secret society, the Katipunan, under the aegis of which a large number of the disaffected assembled. Its background was in the masonic lodges which began to appear in the Islands in the early 1890's. Its spread throughout the archipelago was aided by an anti-clerical orientation which appealed to the enterprising and a secret nature for the superstitious and those with a penchant for intrigue. The leaders of the lodges tended to be men of some education, ambition, and organizational ability. Later, when conditions were right, lodges became battalions and grand masters became captains. Later still, the Supreme Council of the Katipunan became the revolutionary government.[18]

Adding to the Katipunan's influence over the people was the peculiar situation in the Philippines, dating back to early tribal times, wherein persons of apparent wealth and position treated the poor and uneducated much as a feudal lord would act toward a serf. Those who were in power had great influence over the remainder of the populace. It was this

attitude that permitted the friars to control provincial Philippine affairs for 300 years, and it now helped create ready-made bands of followers for the revolutionary groups that began to be formed.[19]

As time went on, the professed long-range goal of the Katipunan changed from general reforms under the Spanish to total independence and a representative government for the Islands. However, exactly what this meant to the society's leadership and rank-and-file is open to wide interpretation. Most likely, the leadership's primary goal was simply to displace the Spanish as rulers, while all Katipunan members hoped to improve their personal situations and put an end to what were by then generally considered to be the repression and abuses of the Spanish.[20]

Originally, the most important Katipunan leader was Andreas Bonifacio of Manila, a poorly educated but courageous and intelligent man. After appealing unsuccessfully for Dr. Rizal's support, he personally undertook the role of leader and spokesman for the society. Meanwhile, in Cavite Province, a rival leader was oozing to prominence. He was Emilio Aguinaldo, born in 1871 of part Chinese, part Malay parentage. Competition between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo became fierce, and within the structure of the Katipunan, Bonifacio was arrested and tried for conspiring to kill Aguinaldo. He was convicted, but Aguinaldo sentenced him to exile rather than to death so as not to unduly alienate Bonifacio's followers. But Bonifacio was never heard from again, and with good reason, since years later Aguinaldo admitted that Bonifacio had been executed on his orders.[21]

The Revolution of 1896. After Spanish attempts to suppress the society in 1896, the Katipunan turned to guerrilla war and for the following year harassed and fought the Spanish with considerable success. They engaged the support of the local populace in the central Luzon areas in

which they operated and made forays against weak and isolated Spanish outposts and disrupted communications lines. However, as a result of vigorous Spanish suppression efforts, the revolution became stalemated by August 1897, when a large force of Katipunan was surrounded by government troops and neither side was able to defeat the other. Pedro A. Paterno, a Filipino businessman known and respected by both sides, proposed and negotiated a compromise settlement.[22] Aguinaldo demanded that the Spanish agree to a number of reforms before the insurgents would lay down their arms. His demands were:

> 1. Expulsion of the religious orders, or at least regulations prohibiting them from living together in cloisters.
>
> 2. Representation of the Philippines in the Spanish Cortes (Parliament).
>
> 3. Application of true justice in the Philippines, the same for the native as for the Spaniard. The same laws in Spain and the Philippines. The natives to have a share in the higher offices of the civil administration.
>
> 4. Adjustment of property, of taxes and parishes, in favor of the native.
>
> 5. Proclamation of the individual rights of the native, as well as his liberty to combine with others in associations and liberty of the press.[23]

The agreement which was finally reached, the Pact of Biac-na-Bato, included none of these reforms, although Aguinaldo claimed he had an understanding with the Spanish that certain of them would later be implemented. The Pact's only substantive provisions were that the Governor General would issue a general amnesty, pay the insurgents 800,000 pesos in three increments, and use an additional 900,000 pesos to indemnify Filipinos who had suffered from the revolt. In exchange, the insurgents would cease fighting and surrender at least 700 firearms and Aguinaldo and a number of his followers agreed to go into overseas exile.[24]

There was little effort on either side to honor the agreement. The insurgents turned in their quota of weapons, where possible by surrendering damaged or decrepit arms, but they retained many more for future use. The Spanish paid only 600,000 of the total of 1,700,000 pesos they had committed themselves to distribute. Of that which was paid, 400,000 pesos went with Aguinaldo and his companions to Hong Kong to be husbanded for future revolutionary activities. The remaining 200,000 pesos stayed with insurrectionists still in the Islands. No money went to those injured by the revolt, and the reforms for which the Katipunan had fought did not materialize.[25]

Revival of the Revolution. Shortly before the beginning of the Spanish-American War, and probably inspired in part by the likelihood of that conflict, the revolution began anew in the Philippines--albeit in a somewhat different and broader based form:

> The revolutionary activity that began slowly in March 1898 differed in some important aspects from that of 1896. For the first time in the Philippine Revolt, uprisings were not confined to Luzon, but took place in the Visayan Islands to the south as well. The revolt was losing its localized character. Many educated Filipinos who had previously refused to support the Katipunan were becoming more favorably disposed toward the idea of independence.[26]

Thus the revived movement had a fundamental difference from its predecessor. It was no longer an ilustrado-led, Manila-centered effort at reform within a Spanish colonial administration, but was now directed by intelligent and capable but often uneducated Filipinos, whose activity was centered in the Tagalog provinces of central Luzon, but spreading, and whose goal was independence and freedom from foreign control. The Filipinos would no longer be satisfied with an end to friar influence, moderately improved social, economic, and political status, marginal participation in the decision-making process, and redistribution of

Church lands. The objective was now independence and self-government, and the movement had truly become a revolution.

Early American-Insurgent Relations

In April 1898, Commander E. P. Wood, United States Navy, who said he represented Admiral Dewey, approached Aguinaldo in Hong Kong and asked him to return to the Islands and help mobilize the rebel forces against the Spanish.[27] Later, in Singapore, United States Consul General E. Spencer Pratt reportedly answered Aguinaldo's request for a written agreement on eventual Philippine independence by assuring him:

> You need not have any worry about America. The American Congress made a solemn declaration disclaiming any desire to possess Cuba and promising to leave the country to the Cubans after having driven away the Spaniards and pacified the country. As in Cuba, so in the Philippines. Even more so, if possible; Cuba is at our door while the Philippines are 10,000 miles away.[28]

Believing that insurgent cooperation with the Americans would result in prompt independence for the Philippines, Aguinaldo agreed to return. Too late to sail with the American naval attack force, at Dewey's direction he later went to the islands aboard the gunboat USS McCullouch.[29]

Later communications from Washington repudiated as unauthorized any commitments by Americans to the insurgents. These instructions made it clear that even if no decision had yet been reached on the ultimate disposition of the Islands, all options were being kept open.[30] As they learned of the new United States policy, the insurgents became increasingly suspicious of American intentions and all the more resolved to persevere over whatever foreign colonial power might temporarily be in control of their country.[31]

Insurgent Efforts to Defeat the Spanish

Before Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines there had been no overall insurgent leader in the Islands. Revolutionary elements were fragmented and operating more-or-less independently. Some were professing support for the Spanish in the face of the American threat, others were engaging in free-lance banditry, and still others were dormant and awaiting developments.[32] This changed immediately after Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite on the McCulloch on 19 May 1898.

Aguinaldo possessed the basic elements for gaining complete control of the insurgency. Having returned on a United States naval vessel and conferred thereafter with Dewey and other American officials, he appeared to have the support of the United States. Moreover, he had a program and a plan. The program was for independence, and toward this end he declared a republic on 12 June 1898.[33] The plan was originally to take over the Islands with American support, but when he learned that troops were on the way from the United States, he decided instead to get quick control of Manila and thereby present the arriving American forces with a fait accompli.[34]

Accordingly, as soon as he had acquired sufficient arms, he moved his forces into position around Manila. From then until the American assault on the city three months later there were continual but desultry exchanges between the insurgents and the Spanish, although the rebels made no concentrated efforts to break through the Spanish lines and enter the city. Their numbers and weaponry were inadequate to overcome the trained and fortified defenders.[35]

Realizing that he would not be able to reduce Manila before the arrival of the main American force, Aguinaldo resolved instead to gain

control of the remainder of Luzon and establish the revolutionary government in place of the Spanish in the provinces. In this he had considerable success, as the Spanish garrisons were badly outnumbered and isolated. However, there is a question as to the genuineness of insurgent control in the newly-captured areas. In some old-line rebel neighborhoods the revolutionary administration was firmly installed, but in many others it appears that little more than a fiction of a new government was in effect, with the people of necessity submitting to Aguinaldo's armed troops.[36]

Had the goal of the United States in the Philippines been only to liberate the islands and remove the Spanish, as in Cuba, an American land force would probably not even have been required. By the time the first American land forces arrived, the insurgents--numbering an estimated 25,000 or more and using weapons provided in part by Dewey--were in control of all Luzon except Manila and Cavite. The rebels also occupied all but two or three Spanish fortified towns on each of a number of the other islands.[37]

As events were to show, the American-assisted organization and equipping of the insurgent army, and rebel speed in seizing much of the archipelago, were to provide trouble for the United States Army from the moment the first American troops arrived in the Philippines.

NOTES

[1]Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 19.

[2]"Philippine Islands," Encyclopedia Americana (1964), XXI, pp. 748-51.

[3]Dean C. Worcester, The Philippine Islands (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899), p. 75.

[4]John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States--A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction," I (Washington: Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, 1906), p. 24. (Galley proofs from U.S. Army Military History Research Center.) (This document is hereafter referred to as "The Philippine Insurrection."); see also John W. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., pp. 9 and 55.

[5]U.S., Bureau of the Census, Census of the Philippine Islands, Taken Under the Direction of the Philippine Commission in the Year 1903, Vol. II, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), p. 15.

[6]Worcester, op. cit., p. 57.

[7]Taylor, I, p. 3.

[8]Ibid., p. 15.

[9]Taylor, II, pp. 4-11.

[10]Ibid., p. 4.

[11]Ibid., p. 11.

[12]Gates, op. cit., p. 8.

[13]Ibid., pp. 8-13.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Frederic A. Weed, "The Origins of the Philippine Insurrection Against the United States" (unpublished Master's thesis, Columbia University, 1941), pp. 5-6.

[16]Ibid., pp. 6-8.

[17]Taylor, I, pp. 51-53.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 56.

[20]For some American interpretations of the meaning of independence to the Filipinos see the testimony before the Senate Committee on the Philippines of Governor Taft, p. 340, General Hughes, pp. 623-25, and General MacArthur, p. 1743, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 331 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902).

[21]Taylor, I, pp. 51-62.

[22]Weed, op. cit., pp. 12-26; see also Taylor, I, pp. 57-66 and Exhibit 39, "Draft of Agreement of Biac-na-Bato," p. 217.

[23]Weed, loc. cit.

[24]Taylor, I, pp. 57-66; see also Gates, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

[25]Weed, loc. cit.; see also Taylor II, pp. 1-29.

[26]Gates, op. cit., p. 14

[27]Emilio Aguinaldo with Vincente Albano Pacis, A Second Look at America (New York: Robert Speller and Sons., Inc., 1957), pp. 29-31.

[28]Ibid., p. 34.

[29]The question of precisely what, if anything, Aguinaldo was promised in return for his movement's cooperation with the United States is one upon which there are at least two well-supported sides. For discussions see Weed, op. cit., pp. 28-60; Aguinaldo, op. cit., pp. 49-66; James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 178-88; and Henry F. Graff (ed.), American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), pp. 1-63.

[30]D. R. Williams, The United States and the Philippines (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1925), pp. 78-80; see also Weed, loc. cit.; and Taylor, II, pp. 30-59.

[31]Weed, op. cit., pp. 66-72; see also Taylor II, pp. 30-59.

[32]Taylor, II, pp. 30-59.

[33]Taylor, II, pp. 32-33.

[34]Taylor, II, pp. 33-34.

[35]Taylor, II, pp. 51-52.

[36]Taylor, II, pp. 50-51.

[37]Aguinaldo, op. cit., pp. 69-73.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SPANISH IN THE PHILIPPINES

The size of the United States Army at the declaration of the War with Spain was plainly inadequate for the overseas campaigns in two theaters that were to follow. The rapid formation and fielding of a large volunteer Army was a remarkable achievement. The country's ability to accomplish this feat was attributable to the tremendous national enthusiasm for the war and the existence within the states of the National Guard. To understand the American Army that went to the Philippines in 1898 requires consideration of the circumstances of its formation, its organization and training, and its deployment overseas.

The Pre-War Regular Army

At the beginning of 1898 the Regular Army of the United States consisted of only twenty-five regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and five of artillery, plus supporting services, totaling 2,006 officers and 27,706 men. Equally debilitating in terms of preparedness for large-scale conflict, the Headquarters of the Army had little capacity for the management of a sizeable force and there were no permanent field commands above the regimental level.[1] These conditions were well known and often had been lamented within the War Department and before the Congress. However, between the post-Civil War demobilization and the War of 1898 a small Indian-fighting Army, mostly stationed at outposts on the Great Plains and in the Far West, had been considered adequate.[2]

A major advantage of the United States in the War with Spain, and especially in the Philippine Insurrection, was the existence of a corps of highly talented and dedicated Regular Army officers. Most of these men had spent the preceding three decades in obscurity and were unknown outside the Service. The Army in which they had served was small, recognition was little, and advancement was next to impossible. However, through the variety of their duties and the individual programs of study and self-improvement they pursued during this quiescent period, they made themselves ready for the high responsibilities that were to be theirs in 1898 and thereafter.[3]

Organization of a Volunteer Army

Almost concurrent with the declaration of war, the Army was dramatically increased in size to meet the troop demands of the War with Spain. To avoid the statutory restriction on the overseas service of militia forces, Congress authorized the President to call for and organize such volunteers as might be necessary for the prosecution of the war. The President promptly used this authority in his 23 April 1898 call on the states for 125,000 volunteers. Congress also authorized the expansion of the Regular Army to a total of 62,597 officers and men.[4]

The National Guard, which Secretary of War Elihu Root was later to call "the great school of the volunteer soldier,"[5] comprised a semi-trained force that could be quickly mobilized. Therefore, the War Department requested that militia units first be mustered and that the state manpower quotas be met by furnishing equipped combat organizations rather than filling levies by providing individual soldiers.[6] Such units, upon entering the federal service, were known by their assigned numbers and the names of their states, in the form "23d Kansas Volunteer Infantry."[7]

Congress also provided for some volunteers to enter the federal service without state intervention. To deal with the anticipated problem of disease in tropical combat environments, it approved the formation of ten regiments of volunteer infantry which should be comprised of persons immune to tropical sicknesses. Four regiments of United States Volunteer Cavalry were also authorized. The most famous of these was the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, the "Rough Riders" of Colonel Leonard Wood and Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, which was to distinguish itself at San Juan Hill in Cuba.[8]

The various governors tendered commissions in the state volunteers, subject to validation by the federal government. United States volunteer commissions were awarded directly by the President. Of note in the formation of both state and federal volunteer units was the policy whereby officer and enlisted members of the Regular Army could be furloughed to accept commissions in volunteer regiments and the higher headquarters established for command and control of the volunteer army. This practice had generally beneficial results because of the degree of experienced leadership it brought to the volunteers and the individual opportunities for higher command and professional progression it gave to those selected.[9]

Beginning on 15 April 1898, even before the declaration of war, many Regular Army regiments moved to assembly points in the Southeastern United States. The state and federal volunteer regiments, once raised under the call of the President, were mustered into the federal service and ordered to these and other locations. Because speed was considered necessary to take advantage of the reported vulnerability of the Spanish army in the Caribbean, those combat regiments and supporting elements

determined to be fully prepared for war--mostly Regular Army--were formed into a corps, loaded aboard ships, and convoyed to Cuba on 13 June 1898, long before many of the volunteers had become part of the United States Army.[10]

The United States Army had grown to a total of more than 11,108 officers and 263,609 men by the end of the Spanish-American War. Each of the seven army corps created usually consisted of three divisions, which in turn had three brigades of three regiments. Only two of the corps ever went overseas: the V Corps which saw service in the Caribbean and the VIII Corps which went to the Philippines.[11]

Establishment of the VIII Corps. Admiral Dewey's call for troops to secure Manila resulted in the President's second call for volunteers, and he requested 75,000 additional men from the states on 25 May 1898. The VIII Corps was formed in part from these new soldiers. Unlike the force that embarked for Cuba, its composition was predominantly volunteer although its senior commanders were Regular Army officers, usually serving in higher volunteer grade.[12] The commanding general was Major General Wesley Merritt, who in his 20's had been a Civil War division commander and more recently had been an Indian fighter of high repute.[13]

The VIII Corps consisted of 13 regiments, which were initially formed into three brigades.[14] Its elements reported individually to Camp Merritt at the Presidio of San Francisco where, on arrival, their respective fitness for overseas service was evaluated. Some of the volunteers reported without uniforms or arms, and a number of units were woefully short of military experience or expertise. However, since the corps was to go to the Philippines in increments, the most combat ready deployed first, allowing more time for training the units that required it.

Some regiments conducted the basic and advanced individual training of soldiers and, concurrently, the unit drill and training of companies and battalions. Despite limitations in training areas and a generally confused and complicated situation, by the end of the San Francisco encampment the corps was in fighting trim. This fact was later demonstrated by its good performance in the Philippines.[15]

The American Army Arrives in the Philippines. The mission of the Army in the Philippines, as expressed in orders from President McKinley to the Secretary of War, was "for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States."[16] To move into position for its accomplishment, the corps traveled overseas in seven expeditions, only four of which reached the Islands in time to see action against the Spanish.[17]

The first increment, under Brigadier General Thomas M. Anderson and consisting of five companies of the 14th U. S. Infantry and the 1st California and 2d Oregon Volunteer Infantry Regiments, left San Francisco on 25 May and arrived in the Philippines on 30 June 1898. It landed unopposed on Cavite, with the assistance of the United States fleet, on 1 July 1898.[18] Too small for independent offensive operations, this detachment was to prepare a base camp for the remainder of the corps and gather intelligence for the forthcoming campaign. Shortly after arrival, Anderson established Camp Dewey, about three miles from the Manila suburb of Malate, from which most of the corps operated during the early phase of its Philippine experience.[19]

The second increment, under Brigadier General F. V Greene, left San Francisco on 15 June and arrived in the Philippines on 17 July 1898.

This element was comprised of four companies each of the 18th and 23d U. S. Infantry Regiments, the 1st Colorado, 1st Nebraska, and 10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiments, and two batteries of the Utah Volunteer Artillery. General Merritt, with three battalions of artillery, landed at Cavite on 25 July 1898.[20]

The next increment, under Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur, arrived off Cavite on 31 July and disembarked on 4 August 1898. This force consisted of an additional four companies each of the 18th and 23d U. S. Infantry Regiments, the 1st Idaho, 13th Minnesota, and 1st North Dakota Volunteer Infantry Regiments, a battalion of the Wyoming Volunteer Infantry, two batteries of the 3d U. S. Artillery, and a company of engineers.[21]

After MacArthur's landing, the United States Army in the Philippines numbered 470 officers and 10,437 enlisted men. Although additional troops destined for the VIII Corps were enroute to the Islands or still training and awaiting transport in San Francisco, this was the total American force that would soon go into action against the Spanish.[22]

The Spanish Dilemma

Lacking the means to occupy and administer the city of Manila after his 1 May naval victory, Admiral Dewey had arrived at a temporary modus vivendi with its Spanish commander. Dewey agreed not to shell the city if the Spanish did not interfere with his fleet. After testing this arrangement by sitting unmolested beneath the Spanish guns for a time, Dewey withdrew and remained off Cavite while he waited for the American troops.[23]

The Spanish were faced with an impossible situation in the Philippines. With their own fleet destroyed and an apparently unlimited American

potential for bringing troops to the Islands, they could hardly expect to stand against any kind of determined United States effort. Added to this was the threat from the Filipinos themselves, who might cooperate with the American invaders.

The Spanish Defensive Plan. The Council of Defense considered two basic plans for repulsing the expected American invasion. One was to concentrate all Spanish and loyal native troops in or near Manila, in effect abandoning the remainder of the archipelago. The other was the movement of the government to some stronghold of native loyalists in the interior. The Spanish decided that the first plan was preferable, because the other made them too dependant upon the actions of the unpredictable Filipinos. In practice, however, nothing was done in time to influence the military situation. When hostilities began the Spanish forces were mostly in Manila, as before, while throughout the islands there remained Spanish detachments of various sizes which were being cut off from communication and reinforcement and therefore could be defeated in detail.[24]

Contributing to Spanish uncertainty and indecision in making preparations for battle was the change in governors general that was ordered by Madrid for political reasons. On 10 April 1898, the popular and able General Primo de Rivera, a man with many years in the Islands and the suppressor of the Revolution of 1896-97, was succeeded by General Basilio Augustin. De Rivera's concern about the lack of local experience of his successor made him willing to remain and assist or serve as military commander under Augustin; however, the Government in Madrid refused his offers and he left the Philippines on 20 April.[25]

General Augustin decided to ring Manila with a series of 15 blockhouses along a 10-mile arc connected by a line of trenches. These he



SOURCE: Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), inside cover.

manned with 13,000 troops with orders to let no invader pass. Within the city was a walled inner citadel which became a hospital and headquarters area and the place of refuge for Spanish non-combatants.[26]

The islands' lack of defense had been reported to the home government long before 1898, and when war with the United States loomed, a succession of pleas for reinforcements--with reports of inadequate fortifications and obsolete coast artillery--was sent by the old and new governors general. These were without avail, and no relief or assistance of any kind reached the Philippines from the mother country from the time Dewey destroyed the Spanish Pacific Squadron until the Spanish surrender of Manila. The American blockade and telegraph cable cutting also impeded communication between the Philippines and Madrid, although at no time did this altogether stop.[27]

Despite the bleak and untenable situation portrayed to the home government, Madrid refused to authorise surrender at any time. However, it did advise that should defeat in the Philippines occur nevertheless, the surrender should be to the Americans rather than the insurgents.[28]

Spanish Attempts to Gain Filipino Support. The colonial administration realized from the first that its only chance to successfully combat the Americans would be to enlist the support of the natives. Accordingly, a number of steps were taken toward this end, some of which were leading toward reforms of the type the Katipunan had sought to force two years before. Other major reforms were under consideration, but were beyond the Governor General's authority to implement. A quasi-legislature comprised of Filipinos was announced, and generous postwar rewards in land were promised to those who would enlist in the native militia. Various colonial civil and religious authorities appealed for support of Spain,

warning that an American victory would result in the forcible change of native culture and religion.[29]

When first proferred these efforts met with considerable success, and there was widespread expression of popular support for the colonial regime. This support came from the educated and well-to-do, as well as from a number of influential insurgent leaders who seemed solid in their preference for a Spanish system that showed promise of liberalizing to an American regime with unknown policies. On a military level, a native militia of nearly 14,000 men was recruited, which considerably bolstered the Spanish capacity to fight the Americans.[30]

These early Spanish successes in rallying the Filipinos were short lived. From the time of Aguinaldo's return to the Islands, his movement began winning away many former supporters of the colonial regime. By the American Army's arrival, a large porportion of the Spanish native militia had gone over to the insurgents.[31]

American-Insurgent "Cooperation"

Based on Aguinaldo's early conferences with Consul General Pratt and Admiral Dewey, his actions in the Philippines were to be in cooperation with the United States against a common enemy. However, little actual cooperation occurred and no combined American-insurgent military operations were ever carried out.

Trouble between the insurgents and the Americans commenced when the first increment of United States troops under General Anderson landed on 1 July 1898. The rebels attempted to restrict American movements and were reluctant to provide assistance and supplies. Anderson acted with circumspection and skill in his dealings with Aguinaldo, and by insisting on free movement for his troops and offering money for provisions and

transport was able to peacefully accomplish his mission of establishing a base of operations. Part of Aguinaldo's desire to restrict the Americans may have been the fear that they would discover the fairly limited control the insurgents actually exercised over certain interior areas.[32]

Another aspect of United States-insurgent cooperation, or lack thereof, had to do with relations between the Spanish and the rebels during this period. Aguinaldo's goal was independence, and whether he got it through the cooperation of the Spanish or the Americans was of little consequence. Therefore, while maintaining the facade of cooperation with the Americans, and at a time when his troops were facing the Spanish around Manila, his representatives assisted the colonial authorities in several ways. For most of this period he permitted the free entrance of food and non-military supplies, and even after he ordered an end to supplying the city on 22 July 1898, there was little slowdown in this traffic.[33]

Having tried unsuccessfully to take Manila by force of arms, the insurgents later attempted to persuade the Spanish to surrender to themselves before the Americans would arrive in force. This also failed. Since they had not been able to occupy the city through a successful attack or negotiations, the insurgents concluded they would ultimately profit from injury to either the Spanish or the Americans. Therefore, on some occasions at least, they provided the Spanish with information on American troop dispositions and plans, some of which resulted in United States casualties.[34]

The Battle for Manila

The status and role of the insurgents was considered by the Americans from the beginning in developing the plan of action against

the Spanish. Commenting upon this matter, General Merritt said:

> As General Aguinaldo did not visit me upon my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and state that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operative upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparation for the attack on the city were pressed and the military operations considered without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. . . .[35]

Even before the final American tactical plans were prepared, the American command decided to secure a foothold opposite the Spanish intrenchments. This was for the dual purpose of ending the revolutionary monopoly on the siege line and to watch and possibly serve as a moderating influence on the rebels. On request, the insurgents in this sector reluctantly gave way to the Americans.[36]

The Americans had an element in their favor that the insurgents lacked in their earlier efforts to take Manila. This was the power of the United States Navy, which the Spanish feared more than they did the American land forces. The colonial authorities recognized that they had no effective defense against the firepower of the fleet, and they were concerned about the devastating effect of a bombardment of the unprotected city. To capitalize on this weakness, Dewey and Merritt informed the Spanish commander that:

> Operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part. This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all noncombatants from the city.[37]

The Spanish commander, when presented the ultimatum on 9 August, was faced with a cruel dilemma. Not only had Madrid refused a previous

request for permission to surrender unless reinforced, but the then-Governor General, Augustin, was relieved of command as a defeatist for making the request. The new commander effective 5 August 1898, General Fermin Jaudenes, agreed with Augustin's assessment of the city's indefensibility but was bound by his government's no-surrender policy. As to the removal of non-combatants, there was no place for them to go. The walled inner city offered some protection, but it could only accomodate 70,000 people. To Jaudenes, sending Spanish women and children into either the insurgent or the American lines was unthinkable.[38]

General Jaudenes consulted with his Council of Defense, which decided that the American demands could not be met. But the Council added the cryptic additional comment that "military honor was completely satisfied by the hundred combats so brilliantly delivered during the blockade and siege."[39] This caveat may have suggested the attitude adopted by the Governor General, for he apparently concluded that the Spanish had fought enough and he resolved to put up the form but not the substance of resistance.[40]

The 48 hours expired on 9 August, and the Americans prepared for battle. On the same day, General Merritt ordered that "all rapine, pillage, and violence committed by soldiers and others in the employ of the United States would be punished on the spot with the maximum penalty known to military law."[41] Aguinaldo was provided a copy of this directive so that any of his troops who might enter the city would know the required standard of behavior. Although the Americans in the trenches had suffered casualties during the preceding week, there was no shooting on either side between 7 and 13 August. It required the American use of persuasion and some force to restrain their rebel neighbors.[42]

On 11 August, the American brigade commanders were told that the assault on Manila would take place on 13 August, with General Anderson in field command. According to General Merritt, it was "intended that these results shall be accomplished without loss of life."[43] General MacArthur's 1st Brigade was to take and hold the city south of the Pasig River, and General Greene's 2d Brigade to the north. The Navy was to bombard the key Spanish positions and trenches facing the brigades on line: Spanish Blockhouse No. 14 in front of MacArthur and Fort San Antonio Abad before Greene. Once the Spanish fortifications had been reduced by the Navy, the brigades were to:

> . . . move forward as rapidly as possible and occupy the city after having passed the line of trenches, and in passing them guards were to be posted to hold them and all bridges "with instructions to permit no armed bodies other than American troops to cross the trenches in the direction of Manila."[44]

The expedition's chief of staff advised the brigade commanders that:

> Forcible encounters with the insurgents . . . would be very carefully guarded against; but pillage, rapine, or violence by the native inhabitants or disorderly insurgents must be prevented at any cost.[45]

Early on 13 August, the American troops took up their assault positions. The Navy opened fire on Fort San Antonio Abad and the trenches at 9:30 AM, while Army artillery shelled Blockhouse No. 14 and other Spanish strongpoints. The Navy ceased firing at 10:25, and on command the American troops moved forward toward their objectives. MacArthur's force occupied Blockhouse No. 14 and moved past into the Manila suburb of Singalon, where it encountered the most serious Spanish opposition of the day. Four of the brigade were killed and 36 wounded in this engagement, but after about half an hour of determined fighting the Spanish fell back and MacArthur again advanced, took his objectives, and posted guards over all bridges and Manila access roads.[46]

Meanwhile, Greene's 2d Brigade had taken Fort San Antonio Abad and moved through the suburbs of Malate and Ermita. By 1:00 PM they had reached the front of the walled city, where they found a white flag displayed and inside officers from Dewey's and Merritt's staffs engaged in surrender negotiations with Spanish officials. Greene thereupon secured the bridges and roads into his sector and began to disarm the Spanish soldiers who by now were coming in from the city's outskirts.[47]

While occupying the trenches before Manila from 1 to 13 August, the Americans suffered 15 killed and 60 wounded. On 13 August, the strength of MacArthur's brigade was 139 officers and 3691 men, and it had 5 killed and 35 wounded. Greene's brigade, with 196 officers and 4905 men, suffered casualties of 1 killed and 44 wounded. Spanish casualties are unknown; however, an estimated 13,000 Spanish and loyal native soldiers surrendered in Manila, with some 20,000 rifles.[48]

The Spanish Surrender. Ironically, the Battle of Manila took place after the peace protocol between the United States and Spain was signed at Washington on 12 August. Because the cable between Hong Kong and Manila had been cut, it took four to five days for dispatches to go from Washington to Manila Bay.[49]

The surrender instrument agreed to in Manila on 13 August and formally signed on the following day was negotiated and executed exclusively by American and Spanish authorities. The insurgents took no part in the deliberations and were unmentioned in the articles of capitulation.[50]

Aftermath of the Battle. The Army quickly established order in Manila. The 2d Oregon Volunteer Infantry was landed after the battle and its commander had no difficulty in disarming the Spanish and securing their weapons.[51]

There was some immediate but limited trouble with the insurgents. Because of their knowledge of the area, and with the cooperation of friends in the city, some rebels were able to get inside the American lines during the first two days of the occupation. These were mostly individuals rather than groups, but still it was only with firmness and some difficulty that the Americans were able to stop their looting. There was some insurgent firing toward the city until the Americans notified the local insurgent commander that the United States now controlled Manila and the rebel forces should therefore be prevented from further shooting in that direction. On 14 August, two insurgent companies attacked an American outpost. The Americans were reinforced and captured the rebels, who claimed to believe they had been attacking the Spanish.[52]

General Merritt's extreme satisfaction with the performance of the American forces was reflected in his official report, in which he said his troops:

> . . . had entered under fire a town covering a wide area, had then rapidly deployed and guarded all the principal points in the extensive suburbs, had kept out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, had quietly disarmed a Spanish army more than equal in numbers to the American troops; that by these steps they had entirely prevented all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and had gained entrance and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to the European interests and stirred by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches.[53]

As Merritt well knew, it was those people in the outside trenches who were likely to give him trouble, and hearing from them would only be a matter of time.

NOTES

[1]Graham A. Cosmas, An Army for Empire (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press., 1971), pp. 14-68.

[2]Ibid.; see also Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), p. 4.

[3]Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), pp. 265-92; see also Cosmas, op. cit., pp. 5-13.

[4]William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1943), pp. 372-73; see also Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1901),

[5]Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), p. 161.

[6]Alger, loc. cit.

[7]Weigley, op. cit., pp. 296-98.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ganoe, loc. cit.; see also Alger, loc. cit.

[10]Ganoe, op. cit., pp. 371-77.

[11]U.S., Congress, Senate, Report of the Commission Appointed by the President to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain. Vol. 1, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 221 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900), pp. 306-08.

[12]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Correspondence, pp. 244-48; see also Weigley, loc. cit.

[13]Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 92.

[14]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, op. cit., pp. 258-59.

[15]Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 158-72.

[16]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, ip. cit., p. 676.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid.

[23]U.S., Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, Vol. 3, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 331 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 2927; see also John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, 60-71.

[24]Taylor, II, p. 12.

[25]Ibid., pp. 5-26.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid., pp. 50-54.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., p. 71.

[36]Ibid., p. 52; see also Emilio Aguinaldo with Vincente Albana Pacis, A Second Look at America (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Inc., pp. 74-76.

[37]Taylor, II, pp. 25-29 and 67.

[38]Ibid., pp. 25-29, 51-52, and 67-68.

[39]Ibid., p. 26.

[40]Ibid., p. 68.

[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., p. 69.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid., p. 72

[50]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

THE INSURGENTS SET THEIR COURSE

Aguinaldo decided upon another course after his movement failed to take part in the assault on Manila. This was to seal off the Americans in the capital while his forces expanded the government of the Philippine Republic throughout Luzon and the other major islands.[1] In this way he believed any American attempt to gain control outside Manila could be frustrated. He hoped the foreigners would tire of the occupation of an isolated city, recognize the impossibility of extending their administration, and therefore would finally grant independence to the islands and recognition to his government. If this plan failed, he would take armed action to defeat the Americans in Manila.

Aguinaldo's conviction of the feasibility of this scheme was based in part upon misconceptions about the United States and the nature of the Americans. The Spanish had told the Filipinos, who knew little of American history or government, that the United States was a merchant country that could or would not fight. Accordingly, the insurgents interpreted as weakness some of the early American efforts at civility, humaneness, and due process of law. And, probably most important, the rebels considered that their actions could have decisive effect on American domestic politics, an effect which could influence Presidential and Congressional actions on the Philippines. They were eventually proved wrong in all these assumptions.[2]

Membership and Motives of the Revolutionary Movement

By the surrender of Manila, Aguinaldo had gathered about himself a talented and dedicated corps of subordinate leaders. Some of these men had accompanied him into exile in Hong Kong a year before, and with him had safeguarded the movement's assets and worked diligently to establish connections with international dealers in arms and ammunition. The rebel leaders who had remained in the Philippines after the Pact of Biac-na-Bato also rallied to the returned leader, as did some former Filipino emigres who came back from Europe and elsewhere during the spring and summer to find their places in an independent Philippines or, if necessary, to fight to gain this independence. Also in the new revolutionary leadership were some who had not previously been active in anti-Spanish affairs, but who saw in the end of Spanish domination the possibility for Philippine independence and who wished to establish their positions before any changeover in government. In short, the Katipunan heirarchy of 1897 remained virtually intact but was now augmented by new groups of dissidents or opportunists.[3]

The insurgent leadership was united in a desire for freedom from foreign control of the Islands. Most wanted absolute independence, but since their primary concern at this time was domestic, it appears that some would not have been averse to independence under American protection and a few would have accepted independence under American suzerainty.[4] The insurgent high command, therefore, were genuine patriots and nationalists, although there was a tendency for the American administration to think of them as acting primarily for reasons of self-aggrandizement or financial gain.

The rank-and-file also wanted independence, although probably they had less well-defined ideas of what this would mean to the Philippines or themselves. All were aware of the advantages the Spanish had enjoyed at their expense, and none would agree with the notion that they were incapable of doing as well at self-government as a foreign colonial administration could do at governing them. Many of the followers were not zealots, but rather were men and women who under the age-old Filipino system were used to taking orders from their betters. Or they were poor people who felt they could serve both their country and themselves by enrolling in the rebel cause. Unfortunately for the movement, there was also a large number whose enlistment was for the opportunities for plunder and extortion such service might provide.[5]

The American-Insurgent "Understanding"

The issue of Aguinaldo's understanding with Pratt and Dewey embittered the insurgents against the Americans from the beginning. Aguinaldo claimed to have been deceived by the Americans, whom he said had tried to trick him into fighting the Spanish with false promises of prompt independence. Both Pratt and Dewey later insisted that there was no understanding on independence with Aguinaldo and that the insurgents' agreement to cooperate with the United States was for the sole purpose of ridding their home islands of a hated colonial regime.[6]

It seems unlikely that the insurgents would have willingly agreed to cooperate with the United States against the Spanish if they expected that afterward the Philippines would remain a colonial possession, albeit with a different mother country. The United States at this time had no colonial experience that would suggest to the Filipinos that her administration would be superior to that of the Spanish. Regardless of whatever

misunderstanding or dissembling may have occurred in Singapore, Hong Kong, or Cavite, from the time of his return to the Islands Aguinaldo was aware that American ground forces were on the way, and from this he correctly inferred that the United States meant to hold part or all of the Islands. On the American side, it was clear at least from the time of Anderson's arrival on 30 June 1898—at a time when the Filipinos had been attempting the unilateral capture of Manila—that the rebels wanted the archipelago for themselves.

The most important aspect of the "understanding" was in its propaganda value to Aguinaldo. At first this was principally in inciting the Filipinos, but later it also helped develop anti-imperialist support for his movement in the United States, where the case was made that America had reneged on an agreement. This had something of a snowballing effect, for the "understanding" plus the existence of an insurgent government elicited sympathy for the Katipunan cause among American anti-imperialists, and this in turn encouraged and sustained the Filipino revolution.[7]

The Revolutionary Civil Administration

According to his plan, Aguinaldo aggressively organized his government beyond the small area of central Luzon then under his control. In the months between the fall of Manila, in August 1898, and the eventual insurgent attack on the Americans in Manila, in February 1899, Aguinaldo introduced a detailed and comprehensive revolutionary government for the Islands.[8]

The Constitution and Central Government. The government of the Republic of the Philippines culminated at the national level in a parliamentary system comprised of Aguinaldo as president and head of state and

a representative congress whose leader was head of cabinet and of government.[9] The constitution under which the government was organized was prepared by a convention only 19 of whose 81 members were elected, and was never ratified or promulgated.[10] The constitution, like the title "president" and the other republican trappings of the central administration, may have been largely for cosmetic effect.[11] Certainly few of the members of the government, and fewer of the masses it proposed to represent and govern, had any real idea of the theory or operation of a genuine republican or democratic system. Most likely, the leadership envisioned their government as a centralized benevolent dictatorship, with provisions for local self-government and popular advice to the national authority. Despite its formal organization and titles, in the last analysis the government was the Katipunan, and the importance of the secret society in insurgent-controlled areas cannot be overemphasized.[12]

On 15 September 1898, the republican congress was assembled at the rebel capital city of Malolos, north of Manila. Pedro A. Paterno was elected president of the congress and head of the cabinet. On 2 January 1899, he was succeeded by Apolinario Mabini.[13] The revolutionary government attempted to establish programs that in more normal times might have resulted in an improved situation for the people. The government realized the high value of education, and great emphasis was given to it. Departments such as mines, forestry, postal, and telegraph were established to operate in their areas of jurisdiction. The new department of foreign affairs was to work diligently but unsuccessfully to gain foreign recognition throughout the life of the Republic.[14]

Local Government. In theory, the local and provincial government structure was sound and well-conceived. It provided for the election of

village presidents and other local officers, as well as provincial governors and assemblies. However, in practice, the right of franchise was often severely restricted, an abnormally small number of the eligibles voted, and candidate selection was sometimes limited. In many cases, rebel officers simply appointed civil officials, or these military men themselves took on the civil functions. Among many of the people there had been little enthusiasm for the Spanish, but there was not a great deal more for the revolutionary regime.[15]

Religion. Aguinaldo's efforts in the area of religion were very successful. His long-time supporter, Father Gregorio Aglipay, rose first to the chaplain-generalcy of the insurgent army and then, partly in an effort to counter the continuing ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Spanish Archbishop of Manila, established an independent Filipino Catholic Church with himself at its head. Many native priests associated themselves with Aglipay and the new church, which to individual parishoners was unchanged from the old. In this way the insurgents could exert some control through the traditional method of clerical influence.[16]

Propaganda. Aguinaldo engaged in a concentrated propaganda effort, which tied together the various themes with which he sought support for his regime both at home and abroad. Domestically, he was himself a public relations asset. A persuasive and fluent speaker and writer in the vivid Filipino style, he could captivate and hold the imagination of the people. Many Filipinos saw in Aguinaldo--a native-born man of limited education but great natural ability who rose on his merits to national leadership--the personification of their highest aspirations. By acting against the Church, or turning it to his advantage, Aguinaldo capitalized on resentment against the friars and helped make Church lands available to the ambitious,

who then became obligated to his cause. His republican form of government served both domestic and foreign propaganda purposes. In the United States, especially, there grew among the anti-imperialists a notion that its existence was evidence of the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government.[17]

The Insurgent Military Situation

Aguinaldo's decision on the organization and use of the revolutionary military forces was controversial and never entirely successful. The overall strategic plan of the insurgents—to consolidate the Islands while confining the Americans to Manila—was clearcut and easily accepted by the rebel leadership. But although conflict with the Americans was clearly approaching, the means of best organizing and employing the movement's military component created controversy and factionalism within the high command of the insurgent movement.

The Decision to Emphasize a Regular Army. On one side was Aguinaldo's group, whose previous military experience had been in guerrilla warfare against the Spanish in 1896-97. Adept at raising, training, and employing irregular forces, they considered their best chance of success against any American venture outside Manila to be the same tactics that had worked against the Spanish. This method reduced problems of command and control, for local commanders could operate almost independently against intruders in their areas, subject only to the broad policy guidance and general strategic direction of the government. Equally important, the requirement for logistically supporting a large and highly organized regular force was much reduced, since smaller and decentralized guerrilla units could more readily live off the land.[18]

At the other extreme were those who favored regular military formations to fight the Americans. This group came to be led by the newcomer Antonio Luna, a European trained chemist and scion of a distinguished ilustrado family. Luna had been in Paris when the Spanish-American War began, and he returned to the islands to find a place in the insurgent forces. Fluent in several languages, he had as an avocation devoted himself to the study of European armies and their methods of warfare. On returning to the Philippines, he quickly rose to the post of Director of War in the revolutionary government, and he later took a field assignment as a general officer.[19] Luna and his partisans argued that in addition to the potentially greater speed of favorable decision in fighting the Americans in regular military formations, such an effort would be still another demonstration to the world of the republican government's adherence to recognized methods of conducting its affairs.[20]

Aguinaldo reluctantly acceeded to Luna's propositions. They decided to continue the insurgent ring around Manila, while developing and training additional forces to counter any American effort to extend control outside the city.[21] Luna published drill manuals, on the Spanish model, and even established a military academy to train cadets as army officers.[22]

The Guerrilla Potential. At the same time, however, Aguinaldo's predilection for guerrilla warfare was indulged. He ordered the establishment in Manila of a secret militia, called the sandathan, which would rise up with knives and fire to kill the Americans and destroy their facilities while the regular insurgent forces were breaking through the American lines and completing the capture of the city. Teodoro Sandico organized the sandathan in Manila, under the guise of "clubs for the people" for the

"instruction of the masses and to train them in athletics," at a time when he was employed by the American administration. Aguinaldo also approved plans for the assassination of the Military Governor and other senior American commanders, but these were never seriously attempted.[23]

Terror. Throughout its history the insurgency showed the capacity for dealing harshly with dissenters. At the beginning this took the form of eliciting the involuntary provision of food and lodging for rebel troops, drafting men in the villages, and requiring the contribution of money or valuables to support the insurrection or, as more than occasionally happened, for the personal profit of insurgent leaders. In some areas the revolutionary regime introduced restrictions on personal freedom, including a passport system whereby persons required government permission to travel outside their villages. The insurgents also had a tendency toward violence and a potential for cruel reprisal. This they impressed upon the people in the early period by the torture and execution of captured Spanish friars and Filipinos who had cooperated with the Spanish against them. Later, these same tactics would be employed against those sympathetic to the Americans.[24]

Intelligence. The insurgents were able to proceed with their activities in Manila because of the language barrier. Most of the inhabitants of Manila spoke only Tagalog, and the few who were fluent in Spanish, English, and Tagalog and who acted as interpreters for the Americans, were often insurgent agents. Their explanation of events or translation of reports were systematically colored to mislead the authorities. The language situation also permitted the rebels to set up an effective apparatus for spying and reporting on the Americans and to enforce Katipunan discipline within the city without the knowledge of the occupiers.[25]

Arms and Ammunition. Regardless of the form of military organization and tactics undertaken by the insurgents, one continuing problem was that of securing weapons and ammunition. Men and money they could raise in the countryside, sometimes voluntarily and when necessary by force, but the materiel of war was unavailable in the islands and difficult to obtain from outside. Throughout its history, the revolutionary regime was engaged in a desperate search for the instruments of war with which to impose its rule in the Islands and confront the Spanish and later the American occupiers.[26]

The Movement on Balance

Aguinaldo and his senior officials knew the necessity of gaining and keeping the allegience of the people if his government was to survive and his movement prevail against the Americans. However, local insurgent commanders often resorted to high-handed and abusive methods to get food and lodging for their troops, or engaged in shakedowns or outright plundering.[27] Many Church assets and lands were taken over at the local level, especially those of the friars, and new taxes on religious institutions were imposed, but the proceeds never got to the central government and were generally unaccounted for.[28] In all, the revolutionary government was hampered by the ill-behavior of its agents, or brigands posing as its agents.

Filipino opposition to Aguinaldo's movement existed from the beginning. Many of the wealthy and conservative, in Manila and elsewhere, preferred life under the Spanish or the Americans to what they feared would be a radical revolutionary regime with little capacity for good government or the maintenance of law and order.[29] Some anti-Katipunan groups, such as the Guards of Honor sponsored by the "old" Roman Catholic

Church, in the geographical areas of their strength practically excluded the Katipunan.[30] Certain tribes, like the Macabebe clan, had been Spanish loyalists and remained in opposition to the insurgents after the fall of Manila.[31] But it may be that Aguinaldo's greatest enemy was the indifference of the people and their apparent willingness to go toward whichever administration was currently represented in their area by men at arms.[32]

The success of the republican government was spotty and in direct proportion to the altruism and skill of local insurgent leaders. Where the revolutionary government was conscientiously installed and administered, the people were supportive. But where insurgent leaders were dictatorial and high-handed, or where they extorted money and property for personal profit, the situation tended to be one of reluctant public acceptance. However, in the last analysis, the insurgents were fellow Filipinos; therefore, whether the revolutionary regime was good or bad, the people tended to presume that its administration was preferable to foreign rule, especially when they perceived the only colonial government they had known--the Spanish--as having been repressive and unjust.[33]

By late 1898, the insurgents had established their governments throughout most of the archipelago. In some areas their administration was truly representative and functioned efficiently and well. Elsewhere, representative government was a fiction and rebel leaders acted as local dictators. The revolutionaries had also fielded a regular army of approximately 50,000, about 30,000 of whom surrounded Manila. Some of the Army's elements were capably led and well trained, others rag-tag and undisciplined.[34] The basic civil and military components of the Philippine Republic were operative and eager, if not altogether ready, to eliminate the new citadel of colonialism in Manila.

NOTES

[1]John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, 72-73.

[2]Ibid., pp. 103-4.

[3]Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[4]Ibid., p. 138; see also Note 20, Chapter II, p. 26, regarding Filipino interpretations of independence.

[5]Ibid., p. 252.

[6]See Note 29, Chapter II, p. 26, regarding promises allegedly made to Aguinaldo in exchange for his movement's cooperation with the United States against the Spanish.

[7]Emilio Aguinaldo with Vincente Albano Pacis, A Second Look at America (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 82-94; see also Taylor, II, pp. 196-97.

[8]Aguinaldo, op. cit., pp. 71-73.

[9]Taylor, II, pp. 98-106.

[10]Ibid., p. 105

[11]Ibid., p. 44.

[12]Ibid, p. 86.

[13]Ibid., pp. 98-102.

[14]Ibid., pp. 88-89.

[15]Ibid., pp. 48, 83-84, 97.

[16]Bonifacio S. Samaniego, The Filipino Reaction to American Rule (Hamden, Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1968), pp. 20-22.

[17]Taylor, II, p. 98.

[18]Ibid., p. 149.

[19]James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), p. 349; see also Taylor, II, pp. 145-47.

[20]Taylor, II, p. 223.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 149-50.

[23]Taylor, II, pp. 103-04, 114, 117-18, 124-30.

[24]LeRoy, op. cit., pp. 329-31; see also Taylor, II, p. 74, 80.

[25]Taylor, II, pp. 125, 309-10.

[26]Aguinaldo, op. cit., p. 107; see also LeRoy, op. cit., p. 350; and Taylor, II, pp. 143-45, 178-81, 276.

[27]LeRoy, op. cit., 310-12; see also Taylor, II, 199-200, 254.

[28]Taylor, II, p. 78.

[29]Ibid., p. 182.

[30]Ibid., pp. 80-81.

[31]Ibid., p. 208.

[32]Ibid., p. 230-31.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid., p. 150.

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNING OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION

Next came the period of waiting and preparation for whatever was to come. Although no final decision had yet been made by the President on the disposition of the Philippines, both the insurgent leadership and the American command were well aware of the likelihood that the Spanish-American peace treaty would result in the cession of all or part of the archipelago to the United States. Anticipating this result, both sides took deliberate steps to improve their future positions.

Merritt's Proclamation

Upon the surrender and occupation of Manila, General Merritt made his headquarters in the former offices of the Spanish Governor General.[1] On 14 August, he issued a proclamation in English, Spanish, and Tagalog, which announced the objectives and intentions of the American regime:

> This proclamation was addressed to the people of the Philippines and informed them that the Army of the United States had not come to wage war upon them nor any part or faction of them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. It informed them that the government established by the Americans was a government of military occupation; it stated through whom its powers would be exerted, and it warned them that as long as they preserved the peace and performed their duties toward the representatives of the United States they would not be disturbed in their persons or property, except in so far as might be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and for the benefit of the people of the Philippines.[2]

United States Policy

The role of the American administration in the Philippines was to implement policies made in Washington concerning the Islands. These

focused on two major issues: whether or not the Philippines would be retained, and for how long; and if retained, what degree of self-government would be permitted. While decisions on these matters were ostensibly made over a period of several months in the United States, in fact the American Army in the Philippines implemented from the beginning what came to be the final decisions: that the Philippines would be retained in their entirety, at least temporarily, and that the maximum in local self-government would be permitted.

From the viewpoint of the American Army, both issues coalesced in the Army's previously-cited charter from the President. The Army was to expand American control throughout the archipelago as quickly as possible, and initially the form of government was largely at the discretion of the Military Governor.[3] Even later, the form introduced at the recommendation of two civil commissions appointed by the President only complemented and extended the Army's earlier programs. The essential differences between this and what the insurgents sought were, of course, the issues of independence and control at the national level, and the question of its timing. American inability or unwillingness to give definite promises of future independence at some specific time made the controversy open-ended.

Reorganization of the Army

Immediately after the American occupation of Manila a number of important changes were made in the United States forces. These resulted in the military establishment that would face the insurgents in early 1899.

Command Changes. On 29 August 1898, the President detailed General Merritt to duty with the United States delegation negotiating a

peace treaty with the Spanish at Paris.[4] Succeeding Merritt as Commanding General of VIII Corps, with the additional title and responsibilities as Military Governor, was Major General Elwell S. Otis, graduate of Harvard Law School, Civil War brigadier general, and distinguished veteran of the Indian Wars. In addition to having one of the best combat records among the Army's senior officers, Otis had a strong executive background that included service with the War Department staff in Washington, direction of the Army's recruiting service, and organization of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth.[5]

Troop Status. With the arrival of the remainder of the VIII Corps, and further reinforcement, the size of the United States Army in the Philippines grew rapidly from the 10,900 that had faced the Spanish in mid-August 1898. On 17 September, with evidence of increased and aggressive rebel activity, Otis asked the War Department for an additional 5,000 troops "as the demands of the city government and the sick list were drawing heavily upon the armed organizations."[6] By February 1899, the total American ground force in the Islands was 20,851, almost all concentrated in Manila and environs, as well as in nearby Cavite.[7]

Administration of the City

Having secured the defenses of Manila, and considering himself too strong to fear any attack from insurgent forces facing his lines, the American commander next acted to bring the city administration under American control. This was an important undertaking, for it provided a laboratory in which lessons could be learned which could later be applied throughout the Islands. Moreover, if efficiently handled, the American administration of Manila could help convince the Filipinos of the benevolence and

enlightened attitude of the Americans and thereby do much to erode popular support for the insurgents.[8]

MacArthur as Provost Marshal General. General Arthur MacArthur's appointment as Provost Marshal General of Manila, a duty in addition to his field command, was one of the first actions of the American administration with large civil effect. MacArthur was a remarkable officer, whose unique background as a soldier and an administrator enabled him to make a great contribution to the American effort in the Philippines. A 19-year old colonel and Medal of Honor winner in the Civil War, he served faithfully but with little recognition as an infantry captain throughout the period of the Indian Wars. Through off-duty study, he earned a law degree from the National Law School in Washington, D.C., and he developed his executive skills during the 1890's in a succession of adjutant general positions. After the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, as a newly promoted brigadier general, he took command of a brigade in the Philippine expeditionary force.[9]

As Provost Marshal General, MacArthur was in charge of the military and civil components of public safety for the city, including the ring of blockhouses and intrenchments facing the insurgents. He directed American and Filipino police forces and confinement facilities, monitored anti-American activities, and protected the city against uprisings or subversion. He worked quietly and well in insuring the security of Manila. As a soldier, he knew the danger from the insurgents and their supporters, but as a student of law and politics he scrupulously protected individual rights and introduced humane methods of police administration and penology.[10]

A Model Administration. The Army officers in charge of the various departments of the city government acted quickly to introduce the greatest possible degree of honesty and efficiency. Retaining insofar as possible capable Filipinos who had worked under the Spanish administration, they acquainted themselves with local conditions, learned customary procedures, and then integrated into these modern and improved management techniques.[11]

While probably no worse than most contemporary Asian cities, Manila's state of cleanliness and health was far inferior to that acceptable in cities of the United States at that time and below the standards long known to Army engineer and medical officers. One of the most dramatic and rapid changes was in this area of sanitation and public health. The city was generally cleaned up, the open sewers replaced, and systematic trash collection and disposal services introduced. To combat the threat of disease, the Army immunized the Filipinos and trained them in personal hygiene. The result was that Manila became a place changed in appearance and a much healthier and more pleasant city.[12]

The Filipinos were keenly aware of the advantage of education and especially welcomed efforts to establish and improve schools. Otis wisely assigned the educational program to Chaplain W. D. McKinnon, a Catholic priest, who was able to enlist the cooperation of the religious orders which had previously operated the Manila school system. Although higher education was left to religious control, McKinnon secularized the primary and intermediate schools and soon had increased the number in operation from seven to 39. Despite language differences, since the problem was largely a matter of policy and administration, and making use of the wide range of civilian talents in the largely volunteer VIII Corps, the United

States effort to expand and improve the city's educational system was a resounding success. More than possibly any other single American endeavor this was accepted by the Filipinos as a demonstration of the good will of the Americans.[13]

American-Insurgent Relations

As might be expected, relations between the United States administration in Manila and the insurgents at Malalos deteriorated steadily after 13 August 1898. The American Military Governor refused insurgent proposals for the joint occupation of Manila, citing his inability to deal with the revolutionary regime as a government.[14] Fearing insurgent plunder of Camp Dewey, the American forward base outside Manila, immediately after the Spanish surrender the Americans moved the camp's stores inside the American defensive perimeter.[15] Later, Otis asked Aguinaldo for rebel cooperation in the establishment of an American rest camp outside the city. Aguinaldo's answer was that creation of the camp required "a friendly convention between your government and mine," or recognition of his regime, so Otis dropped the proposal.[16] As the year progressed, the exchanges between Otis and Aguinaldo became increasingly more pointed.

By the fall of Manila, the insurgents claimed to have captured more than 6,000 Spanish prisoners. They decided to use these people to bargain for recognition with the Spanish and United States Governments. At the direction of the War Department, General Otis attempted to arrange the prisoners' release. His efforts failed because the insurgents intended to use the prisoners, especially the members of the Spanish religious orders, to coerce the recognition of the revolutionary government, and they even sought Vatican intercession for this purpose. The insurgents

released only a few sick and injured Spanish at this time, and most of the prisoners remained in their hands for the duration of the insurrection.[17]

As under the Spanish, most of the necessities of life in Manila came in from the countryside. Early in 1899 the insurgents attempted to apply pressure to the city by cutting off its food supplies. Aguinaldo relented in this effort after Otis protested.[18]

For most of late 1898, an uneasy peace prevailed although there was a series of minor clashes between the insurgents and the Americans. In the most serious incident, the rebels killed two American soldiers at Cavite on 24 August.[19] After the Spanish surrendered, insurgents in considerable numbers infiltrated the suburbs of Manila. On 8 September, Otis requested Aguinaldo to move these forces outside the American lines. After some delay, the rebel commanders marched their men away.[20]

The provision of the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898 that for the payment of $20 million the United States would succeed to Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines came as no surprise to either side in the Islands. Aguinaldo decided to act against the Americans in Manila before the scheduled Senate consideration of the treaty on 6 February 1899. He therefore stepped up preparations for an all-out assault, with a concurrent sandathan uprising within the city.[21]

Also exacerbating American-insurgent relations, and in part precipiting the attack on the American forces, was an American expedition sent to occupy Iloilo, the principal city of the Visayan Islands, at the request of some prominent Filipinos of the area. The insurgents resolved to combat this first American effort to extend control beyond Manila, and this rebel determination prompted Otis to direct the expedition commander to avoid doing battle in the Visayans.[22]

On 4 January 1899, President McKinley issued a proclamation concerning the status and provisional government of the Philippines. Its thrust was that the American administration would be extended throughout the Islands, which would be given limited self-government. To soften the effect of McKinley's suggestion of the extension of American occupation and a long period of American rule, Otis modified the wording of the proclamation before issuing it in Manila. The commander of the force in the Visayans, unaware of Otis' action, published the original version. The insurgents saw this as further evidence of American duplicity, as well as an official threat to expand United States government into their areas of control.[23] This Aguinaldo considered as an effective declaration of war.[24]

On the following day, 5 January 1899, Aguinaldo responded with his own statement, which conveyed to all the imminence of conflict between the American and insurgent forces.[25] The only remaining question was which side would make the first move.

NOTES

[1]John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, p. 72.

[2]Ibid.

[3]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 676-77.

[4]U.S., Congress, Senate, Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, Vol. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 331 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 807.

[5]William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939), pp. 63-64; see also "Elwell S. Otis," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (1947), XXXIII, pp. 30-31.

[6]Taylor, II, p. 115.

[7]Ibid., p. 124.

[8]John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973), pp. 70, 82-85.

[9]D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 12-31.

[10]Gates, op. cit., p. 57; see also Taylor, II, pp. 107-110.

[11]Gates, op. cit., pp. 57-62.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Gates, Op. cit., pp. 60-64, 86-87.

[14]Taylor, II, pp. 107-08.

[15]Ibid., p. 72.

[16]Ibid., p. 121.

[17]James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 320-24; see also Taylor, II, p. 121.

[18]Taylor, II, p. 103.

[19]Ibid., p. 141.

[20]Ibid., pp. 108-11.

[21]Ibid., pp. 157-59.

[22]Ibid., p. 123.

[23]U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings, op. cit., pp. 776-88.

[24]Gates, op. cit., pp. 35-36; see also Taylor, II, pp. 103-04, 123-24.

[25]Taylor, II, pp. 103-04, 123-24.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERIOD OF CONVENTIONAL WAR, FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1899

On the evening of 4 February 1899, the insurgents made their long-expected attack on Manila. The stalemate was now ended and the action of the United States Army quickly decided the military outcome of this first phase of what came to be officially called the Philippine Insurrection. Going on concurrently was another and a more important battle--for the support of the Filipino people--the battle that in an insurgency will ultimately decide the outcome. By mid-November 1899, the Americans had reason to think they had won both campaigns.

The Insurgents Make Their Move

During the months of December and January, Aguinaldo and his advisors made final plans for the assault on Manila. This was to be the coordinated guerrilla-regular operation previously discussed. The mandathan would rise in a body and kill all Americans possible, military and civilian, while the regular insurgent force outside would rush forward, penetrate the American lines, and enter and capture the city.[1] The potential for terror in this plan was especially great because many American military men had brought their wives and children to the Islands.[2] The rebels expected the awesome effect of the attack to end American enthusiasm for further Philippine adventuring, and therefore result in the toleration if not the immediate recognition by Washington of the republican government.[3]

It appears that the insurgent army at this time had fallen victim to its own propaganda. Frustrated at being held outside Manila and away from its treasures, successful against the Spanish outposts, and taking satisfaction in the organization of local revolutionary governments in many areas, it believed the Americans would be easily defeated. It was therefore eager for battle, and only with difficulty could Aguinaldo restrain his commanders until a proper moment for the attack. Additionally, factionalism in the insurgent movement, especially the group around Luna, put Aguinaldo in a position where he almost had to fight the Americans to unify the movement and prevent his own deposition.[4]

During January 1899, the insurgents strengthened and improved their positions outside Manila in preparation for the assault and uprising. The Filipino force in the lines outside the city now totaled about 30,000.[5] The residents of Manila knew that something was afoot, as evidenced by the exodus from the city of over 40,000 Filipinos on 3 and 4 February. This put the already alert Americans even more on guard.[6] To place the onus for actually starting the fight on the Americans, the insurgents planned to provoke the defenders into shooting first.[7] It may be that the difficulty of precisely timing the provocation was at fault, but when the battle began most of the insurgents were unready. Some key commanders were away from their units, there was no coordinated assault on the American line, and few of the sandathan went into the streets.[8]

The Attack on Manila. At about 8:30 PM on 4 February 1899, a patrol of Filipinos approached a patrol of the 1st Nebraska Volunteers, part of MacArthur's 2d Division which was encamped in the bend of the junction of the San Juan and Pasig Rivers. After ignoring orders to halt,



SOURCE: Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), inside cover.

the rebels were fired upon. Thereupon the Filipinos attacked American positions in the immediate area, but with reinforcements the lines were held. For the remainder of the night there was general firing on both sides, but there was no forward rebel movement and few casualties.[9]

The American countermove began the following morning. United States naval gunfire and Otis' artillery bombarded the insurgent strongpoints, and then three regiments of MacArthur's command cleared the rebel trenches to their front and continued advancing into the hills beyond. At midday, MacArthur committed his reserve forces and attacked the rebel position on Loma Hill, overlooking the original American lines. The advance was slow and tortuous through a cemetery and up a two-mile slope toward the Chinese and Catholic churches on the hilltop that were the insurgent strongholds. Two of MacArthur's volunteer regiments attacked after an artillery preparation but were stalled for two hours until regular troops came to their assistance and took the hill from another side.[10]

Colonel Fredrick Funston's 20th Kansas Volunteers, also of the 2d Division, took heavy casualties while attacking fortified insurgent positions along the Lico Road. Finally, using the bayonet, they moved through the enemy trenches. The Kansans pursued the insurgents for two miles before being ordered to return to the captured positions.[11]

In all, the Americans on 4-5 February lost 59 killed and 278 wounded. General Otis estimated insurgent losses as up to 4,000.[12] This had been a bitter and serious defeat for Aguinaldo's movement, not the least because the aggressive and skilled performance of the Americans made the rebels more reluctant thereafter to close and do open battle with their opponents.[13]

Post-Attack Activities. The insurgent defeat seemed so serious that the United States command, as well as many influential Filipinos in Manila, believed it had taken the fight out of the revolutionaries.[14] Indeed, there were prompt representations from the insurgents concerning an armistice during which peace terms might be discussed. This Otis rejected, unless it would be for the purpose of the insurgents' final laying down of arms. In any case, the armistice proposal was probably a rebel tactic for buying time, as they were by no means finished with fighting for their cause.[15]

On the evening of 9 February, Otis warned MacArthur of reports that the insurgents would attack the American lines that night, with a simultaneous uprising in Manila. MacArthur had previously asked permission to straighten his lines by taking the town and rail center of Caloocan, but had been told to wait. Now the threat of an imminent attack, plus intelligence reports that Luna had 4,000 troops in the area, caused Otis to give the go-ahead.[16]

Once again naval guns made the preliminary bombardment, followed by a brisk and successful American infantry assault. The Filipinos fought stubbornly for a time, but finally broke and ran. After taking Caloocan, MacArthur's line was excellent, with good visibility and on easily defensible ground.[17]

Not discouraged by the Caloocan defeat, the insurgents made plans for another attempt on Manila, again with concurrent outer and inner operations. The revolutionary high command cancelled the attack at the last moment, but the new instructions apparently did not reach all units. On 22 February 1899, about 1,000 rebel troops managed to slip through the American lines into Manila, and some sandithan took to the streets. The

Provost Marshal General's guard handily cleared both forces, with insurgent casualties in excess of 500.[18]

The American Strategy

General Otis had been waiting for the opportune time and circumstances to began expanding the American occupation of the Islands. He knew that military victory alone would be insufficient: there could never be enough American troops available to permanently garrison and control the archipelago. Therefore, his operations had to deal with the insurgent military forces in the field while also installing in captured areas a civil government that would win the support of the people for the American administration.[19]

Except for minor skirmishing, the next month was relatively quiet. The only significant action mounted by the Americans was an expedition under Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton that cleared the east bank of the Pasig River, east of Manila, and thereby opened navigation on the river for 20 miles and further improved the American advantage in lines of communication.[20]

Reinforcement of the VIII Corps. Otis, with a reputation for caution, preferred to await further operations until his command was reinforced. The volunteers enlisted for the War with Spain had agreed to serve only for the duration of that war, and most outside the Philippines had been quickly demobilized after the Spanish-American peace protocol of 12 August 1898.[21] The situation in the Islands, however, had not permitted the return home of the volunteers serving in the VIII Corps. Since a large residual force would obviously be required in the Philippines, at least for the immediate future, and with upcoming Senate approval of the Treaty

of Paris ending the legal authorization for continuing Spanish-American War volunteers in the Islands, on 2 March 1899 Congress authorized the raising of 35,000 volunteers specifically for service in the Philippines, and provided for a temporary increase in the Regular Army to 65,000 men.[22] During the spring and early summer of 1899, Otis exchanged much of his old army for new troops from the United States. No less than 30 percent of his infantry, cavalry, and artillery soldiers were replaced during this period. Only when the new forces had arrived, and been organized and trained, would he be ready to continue offensive operations against the insurgents.[23]

The first reinforcements arrived in March, when two Regular Army regiments, together with Major General Henry W. Lawton, landed in the Islands. MacArthur, who had been promoted to major general after the Battle of Manila, remained in command of the 2d Division. Lawton became Commanding General of the 1st Division.[24] Otis was now ready to begin dealing with the insurgents.

The Initial Military Plan. In the tactical plan then decided upon, MacArthur's division got the principal assignment of crushing the main rebel army under Luna and capturing the revolutionary capital at Malolos. He started his advance on 24 April 1899, but the Bagbag and Calumpit Rivers, the bridges over which had been partially destroyed, were between him and the objective. Much of the terrain was swampy and difficult, and the insurgents held strong positions along the riverbank. One of MacArthur's three brigades crossed upriver and took the enemy's trenches from the rear after a hard fight. Another fought its way across a repaired bridge and took the suburb of Calumpit. On 28 April, against 4,000 of Luna's troops to his front and another 3,000 to the east, MacArthur drove forward for some two



SOURCE: Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961), inside cover.

miles and took Malalos. General Lawton assisted by operating on Luna's flank with a strong force. The rebels fell back under the pressure of both American commands.[25] Luna later claimed that his men withdrew only because of ammunition shortages, and he complained that Aguinaldo had never answered his requests for reinforcements.[26]

MacArthur requested authorization to pursue and destroy Luna's force. Otis refused permission. He had decided to establish and hold a line north of Manila, from San Fernando on the left to Baliwag on the right, from which he could resume offensive operations after the upcoming rainy season, once his volunteer forces had been completely replaced by new troops from the United States. MacArthur was reportedly enraged at Otis' lack of initiative and considered the failure to pursue Luna's army to be a tragic mistake.[27] Nevertheless, major military operations were halted at this point for the present.

The Civil Plan. The civil component of Otis' scheme was a continuation and projection of the general form of administration which, by this time, was working smoothly in Manila. Added to this would be provision for limited self-government. As United States troops secured former insurgent areas, American-sponsored administrations were installed which:

> . . . would conform with the views of the United States upon the subject and which, at the same time, would not be too wide a departure from the government to which the people had been accustomed under Spanish rule. . . . The simple form of municipal government therein provided for, [was] based on Spanish orders and precedents . . . .[28]

The Rainy Season Respite

The next few months were a time of relative quiet, during which both the Americans and the insurgents improved their respective military situations and prepared for the resumption of conflict.

Insurgent Activities. For the insurgents, the respite was an opportunity to regroup their hard-pressed troops. This was especially important at this time to correct the low morale that had resulted from their unrelieved series of defeats by the Americans.[29]

In April and May 1899, insurgent commissions visited Manila to discuss peace terms. One commission was so favorably impressed with American plans for local self-government that its head recommended that the rebel regime consider it instead of insisting on immediate independence. The revolutionary cabinet disagreed, but on 8 May it fell and the uncompromising Mabini was replaced as head of government by the moderate Pedro A. Paterno, the erstwhile negotiator of the 1897 Pact of Biac-na-Bato. The Paterno cabinet considered a negotiated settlement with the Americans, but their efforts were blocked by a strong military faction.[30]

To mask its defeats and maintain popular support, the insurgent regime engaged in a continuous propaganda program. It issued false statements of massive victories over the Americans, whom it appears they did believe had been badly injured. Believing also in the existence of strong pro-insurgent feelings among the American troops, they attempted to encourage desertions, especially by the black soldiers to whom they pointed out examples of racial injustice in the United States. They also circulated reports of alleged American atrocities against the Filipinos.[31]

Jealousy and dissention among rebel leaders had always interfered with the operations of the revolutionary military forces, sometimes causing nearby commanders to refuse to aid their beleaguered neighbors. As the defeats by the United States progressed, and American civil administrations were introduced in the provinces, there began to develop a serious movement to replace Aguinaldo. This effort centered on Antonio Luna, whom

Aguinaldo therefore arranged to have shot while resisting arrest. Thus, for a second time, one of Aguinaldo's principal rivals met a violent end.[32]

The American Situation. During the summer, the insurgents operated against MacArthur's northern lines and the American positions around Manila. On 3 June, General Lawton moved against a rebel force of 2,500 near the city. After some vigorous action, by 13 June he had cleared a large area and removed the revolutionaries from the American flanks.[33]

Summarizing his view of the situation in August, Otis wrote:

> Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and temporarily holding any section of the country. A column of 3,000 men could march through and successfully contend with any force which the insurgents could place in its route, but they would close in behind it and again prey upon the inhabitants; persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops. The policy of the insurgent authorities has been to arm the bandits of the mountain sections and the natives who have formerly lived on the proceeds of crime. Many of these men have deserted the ranks and, now armed, plunder their countrymen who have property or money without discrimination. If communities could be protected against this source of danger and be assured of protection from the outrages which have been committed by the organized insurgent force, formidable opposition to American supremacy would cease. The inhabitants have confidence in the American troops. Even the insurgent leaders take advantage of the humane and charitable policy which the United States authorities have thus far pursued. They seek to place their families and property in Manila, where a number of the families of the most noted of their chiefs are now living in comfort and luxury, believing, notwithstanding their conduct and offenses, which, under approved rules of law, would subject their families to removal and all their property to confiscation, and which rules it may yet be to our interests to apply, that they can pursue rebellion as long as they desire and in the end escape all punishment. So confident are they of the nature and scope of American charity that their ill-gotten gains—acquired through robbery in fact, but under the guise of pretended government contending, they say, for liberty against oppression--are deposited in our banks or are invested in our trade. And still, while they manifest this absolute confidence by their individual acts, they publically circulate the most malicious statements their active imaginations can invent regarding United States intention and the horrors of war which our troops indulge in. An active society in Hongkong, composed of their people and certain Europeans retained under high pay, and in which American membership is believed to exist, which feeds and

> fattens upon the corruption it is able to produce, fills the islands and the world with its invented published statements of abuse.
>
> The insurgent armed forces are not to be feared except as they oppress their own people and delay return to conditions of peace. The length of time which they have been in the field, and their conduct, has given the practical lesson to the inhabitants that they can not expect security under Tagalog rule. The lesson is deeply impressed and required time to produce conviction. Had the rebellion been crushed immediately upon its open defiant demonstrations of last February, it would soon have appeared in a new form; for the mass of the people were intoxicated with the cry for independence and self-government which the reflecting classes now realize is impossible until true political education is more generally diffused.[34]

The American Fall Campaign

While waiting for new troops to arrive and be trained, the American command formulated a grand tactical design for ending the war. This was a vast three-division pincer movement, by which they hoped to capture Aguinaldo's government, occupy all of north-central Luzon, sieze the major ports in northern Luzon, and establish a blocking force across central Luzon to prevent any insurgent escape to the south. Divisions under Generals MacArthur, Wheaton, and Lawton were involved, and MacArthur once again got the major role. He was to move north on the new revolutionary capital at Tarlac, in the heart of strong insurgent territory, and drive the enemy toward the Gulf of Lingayen. Lawton would go up the Rio Grande de Pampanga, on MacArthur's right, and swing toward the Gulf. Wheaton's force of 2,500 would travel by ship to Dangupan, on the Gulf, and thereafter occupy the coast and participate in the entrapment of the rebel army, which would be squeezed between the three American columns.[35]

Aguinaldo learned of the American plan from spies and acted with speed to foil it. On 5 October, he abandoned the capital at Tarlac and moved toward Bayambang, even farther to the north. He was intent upon maintaining his government, at least through December when the United

States Congress would reconvene, in hopes the anti-imperialists would persuade that body to grant Philippine independence.[36]

As a delaying effort and to win the good will of the American public, Aguinaldo decided to release his American and Spanish prisoners. His representatives approached Otis with a plan for exchanging Spanish captives, but its terms would have resulted in de facto recognition of the revolutionary regime. Otis counterproposed alternative terms of exchange, which avoided the recognition issue, but Aguinaldo refused. Most of the Spanish prisoners remained with the insurgents for the duration of the insurrection. Later, an insurgent general approached MacArthur at San Fernando with an offer to free some American prisoners. Otis permitted an insurgent delegation to come to Manila to discuss the terms and, as a result of these deliberations, the rebels eventually released some Americans.[37]

American troop strength grew from about 31,000 in August 1899 to 41,000 in November. By September, General Otis decided he had sufficient trained men to put his campaign into motion. He directed MacArthur to occupy Angeles, repair the railroad between there and Manila, and prepare for a further advance. By 20 September, MacArthur had accomplished this preliminary mission and he was receiving supplies over the repaired railroad. His division then cleared the rebels from the nearby Pocac area and, after repulsing periodic insurgent attacks for a month, began moving northward on 30 October. The pincer movement was now underway.[38]

MacArthur's force took Magalang on 5 November, in one of the major battles of the campaign, and continued to hit and press the insurgents back in a series of fast and sharp engagements. Next his forces took Bamban and Concepcion, fighting groups of insurgents at and between these locations.

On 12 November, elements of the division reached the former capital at Tarlac. Pushing on beyond, they caught an insurgent bullcart train that was transporting official republican records and the presses for the rebel newspaper, Herald of the Revolution. On 16 and 17 November, MacArthur reached El Benido and Paniqui with little opposition. As he went, he restored the railroad to operation, thereby further improving American communications and supply routes. On 20 November, he established his headquarters at Bayambang, from where he conducted reconnaissance and local operations. On 22 November, his forces occupied Calasiao and San Carlo, and on 23 November he captured Pedro Paterno and all but one of the republican cabinet.[39]

MacArthur's drive was altogether successful in bringing geographical areas under American control, but he was aware that large numbers of the enemy were still available for further combat. Therefore, in midcampaign he began to offer 30 Mexican dollars and amnesty to any insurgent soldier who would surrender a rifle. He secured a fund of $5,000 from Manila for this project, but after several days the experiment had netted a disappointing 14 weapons.[40]

Meanwhile, Lawton's arm of the pincer had become bogged down by flooding rivers, so he sent a mobile force under Brigadier General Samuel Young to complete his portion of the operation. Young's force traveled over 120 miles of exceptionally rough terrain and engaged in hard fighting for six weeks, but it failed to capture Aguinaldo, who slipped past in the night. Wheaton's command landed on the Gulf of Lingayen to little resistence. His slow response to Young's request for aid may have permitted Aguinaldo's escape. Afterward, part of Wheaton's force gave chase to Aguinaldo, but the effort was unsuccessful and they eventually pulled

back. Then Young's command made a forced march to Tirad Pass in yet another attempt to intercept Aguinaldo. An insurgent force valiantly delayed Young while their leader escaped into the mountains. Although Young did not find Aguinaldo, he did manage to capture the revolutionary president's mother, young son, and others of the party.[41]

The grand design, while missing Aguinaldo, had succeeded in most of its mission. The Americans had captured or destroyed the organs of the insurgent government, and most of north-central Luzon was under American control. MacArthur then recommended that Otis issue a proclamation announcing the end of the revolutionary government and declaring that further insurgent military activity would be treated as outlawry. Otis demurred. He was afraid the remaining insurgents would be encouraged to fight to the bitter end if they knew they would be treated as criminals if captured, and he feared rebel retaliation against their American and Spanish prisoners.[42]

Efforts to Win the People

As early as 7 December 1898, Admiral Dewey and General Otis agreed that arrangements should be made for the eventual transfer from military to civilian control of the American administration in the Philippines. They jointly suggested that the President appoint a commission to come to the islands, assess its needs, and make recommendations on the form and institutions of civil government.[43]

The Schurman Commission. Such a Commission was appointed by the President, and its members arrived in the Islands between January and March 1899. The chairman was Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, and the other members were Charles Denby, former United States

minister to China, and Professor Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan, who had traveled in the Philippines and written a book about his experiences. Dewey and Otis also became members. The Commission did not interview Aguinaldo personally, but it met with his representatives as part of the inquiry. It also conferred with members of the American administration and conducted an extensive examination of existing plans for the governance of the Philippines. The Commission's report, dated 31 January 1900, in effect approved and recommended the extension of the forms of government for the Islands already developed by Otis and being implemented by the military establishment.[44]

The Illusion of Civil Success. The institutions of local government installed by the United States forces were so successful that the insurgent leadership became alarmed. The Americans appeared to be gaining the confidence and support of the people, which would inevitably mean an end to the revolutionary movement. In most areas, the impartial American governments, with few restrictions on the freedom of the people, no demands for food or money other than normal taxes, and no interest in drafting the young men, was in marked contrast to the previous insurgent administration. As in Manila, the prompt and purposeful establishment of schools and improvement in public services won adherents among the people.[45]

However, all was not as sanguine as it appeared on the surface in the occupied areas. The local revolutionary leadership was nowhere completely destroyed, but had only gone underground or joined insurgent bands operating in nearby areas. At the direction of Aguinaldo's headquarters, the revolutionaries steadily but quietly combated American efforts. The insurgents in these areas were no longer in much of a position to gain

adherents through attraction, for only those who were ideologically committed to the idea of an independent Philippines, or who could expect to profit from upsetting the existing administration, were likely to actively oppose the Americans. Therefore, the rebels turned more to the tactics of coercion. By threats, enforced when necessary by kidnapping, torture, and murder, they elicited cooperation and silence from the people. While many Filipinos submitted of necessity to this abuse, it alienated growing numbers of people from the Katipunan.[46]

In most American-controlled areas there were in fact two governments, usually comprised of the same members, who by day worked diligently and apparently willingly for the Americans while at night they served the insurgents. A village president, therefore, might hold office under both the Americans and the insurgent shadow government, and he often served both with equal zeal. As a result, the Americans often perceived a pacified and even pro-American population, while in actuality insurgent agents were everywhere and the revolutionary government could have resumed full and open control on a moment's notice.[47]

Aguinaldo Orders Guerrilla War

The series of stunning defeats the rebels suffered between February and November 1899 had reduced their army to scattered and largely uncoordinated bands. Yet while they had been steadily driven back by the American Army, the insurgents had never been decisively defeated.

Aguinaldo then did what he had preferred all along, and now he could do no other if his movement was to survive. On 17 October 1899, he directed guerrilla war against the Americans. Emphasizing the importance of continued resistence to the Americans, he said in an address to the country that:

> The day for final judgment of our cause approaches. Over in the United States in the month of December next the great assembly will meet which is to judge this cruel contest which the Filipino people are maintaining against the imperialist party, presided over by McKinley.[48]

He then called on the people to rally and resist the enemy. He ordered the army to step up the action of "flying columns" and attack American outposts on its own initiative. He directed the establishment of guerrilla bands to promote disturbances. "to cut the railroad, destroy the bridges, and keep the enemy busy trying to locate . . . and run them down."[49] He also ordered the sandathan to conduct a terror campaign in Manila, "according to the instructions sent by me some time ago."[50]

On 1 November, Aguinaldo told some civilian municipal leaders that it would be necessary to:

> . . . impress upon all residents the capture of enemies who wander in small numbers at distant points, going to the extent of killing them. Remember that if only a few are killed at each place, if there are many places where they are killed the total number gotten rid of will be large and we shall obtain victory and our desire.[51]

This latest insurgent decision would come as a surprise to the Americans, who by now considered the long-term task of pacification to be progressing nicely. Once again, the next move was up to the insurgents, and this time events would take an especially ugly turn.

NOTES

[1]John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, pp. 138-39.

[2]Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 177-78.

[3]Taylor, loc. cit.

[4]Taylor, II, p. 151.

[5]Ibid., p. 50.

[6]Ibid., pp. 130-31.

[7]Ibid., pp. 139-40.

[8]Ibid., pp. 157-58.

[9]William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939), pp. 90-92; see also Taylor, II, pp. 139-40.

[10]Henry A. Fant, "Arthur MacArthur and the Philippine Insurrection," (unpublished Master's thesis, Mississippi State University, 1963), pp. 30-31; see also Taylor, II, pp. 160-61.

[11]Funston, op. cit., pp. 188-98; see also Fant, op. cit., p. 31.

[12]Taylor, II, pp. 160-61.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., pp. 161-62.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 160, 188.

[17]Fant, op. cit., pp. 31-32; see also Sexton, op. cit., p. 98; and Taylor, II, p. 168.

[18]Taylor, II, pp. 168-71.

[19]John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 77-78.

[20]Fant, op. cit., p. 35; see also Sexton, op. cit., pp. 106-08.

[21]James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 49-52.

[22]Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1967), p. 308.

[24]Sexton, op. cit., pp. 122-24; see also Taylor, II, p. 172.

[25]Taylor, II, pp. 179-81.

[26]Ibid., p. 182.

[27]Fant, op. cit., p. 38.

[28]Taylor, II, p. 202.

[29]Ibid., p. 188.

[30]Ibid., pp. 182-88.

[31]Ibid., pp. 195-98.

[32]Ibid., pp. 188-92.

[33]Ibid., pp. 192-94.

[34]Ibid., p. 201.

[35]Ibid., pp. 204-05.

[36]Ibid., pp. 205-08.

[37]Ibid., pp. 205-07.

[38]Ibid., p. 203.

[39]Fant, op. cit., pp. 43-49; see also Taylor, II, pp. 208-10.

[40]Fant, op. cit., p. 45.

[41]Ibid., pp. 49-51.

[42]Sexton, op. cit., p. 198; see also Taylor, II, pp. 215-17.

[43]Taylor, II, pp. 134-35.

[44]Ibid., pp. 173-74, 185-86.

[45]Ibid., pp. 173-76.

[46]Ibid., pp. 228-29.

[47]Ibid., pp. 229-30, 268.

[48]Ibid., p. 211.

[49]Ibid., p. 212.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Ibid.

CHAPTER VII

THE PERIOD OF GUERRILLA WAR, NOVEMBER 1899-JULY 1902

Defeating the regular insurgent formations in the field was a precondition to the pacification of the Philippines. But contrary to what some Americans believed in November 1899, there was still much more to be done. Somehow the mass of the people had to be converted from apathy or insurgent support to the pro-American attitude that would mean an end to popular cooperation with the revolutionary movement and its guerrilla bands. At the same time, the remaining insurgent forces had to be eliminated. The insurrection would not be over until the people were won over and the insurgents suppressed.

The Counterguerrilla War

With Aguinaldo driven into the mountains and out of contact with many of his subordinate leaders, sporadic battles continued between the American troops and small insurgent regular forces operating at the initiative of their own commanders. Most American attention thus far had been directed toward northern Luzon, leaving relatively unmolested the insurgents in the south. During the next several weeks the Americans moved against the remaining insurgent formations, successfully breaking up the enemy forces in many areas. On 19 December 1899, General Lawton was fatally wounded at one such engagement at San Mateo, near Manila.[1]

Although the insurgent emphasis had previously been on regular warfare, the use of guerrillas against the Americans was nothing new. Throughout the February-November 1899 period of conventional war, the

insurgents had guerrilla contingents acting in cooperation with their field army.[2] But now the primary insurgent military effort was devoted to guerrilla warfare, with their forces operating directly against vulnerable United States installations and forces and indirectly in undermining American efforts at organizing effective and popular local governments.

The Dictatorship of the Katipunan. After his cabinet was captured, Aguinaldo abandoned all pretense of republican government and his regime became a dictatorship. However, because of his isolation and the extreme difficulty of communication, his role during the period of guerrilla war was limited primarily to exhortation and inspiration. Local insurgent commanders, who in the past had displayed independent tendencies that had disrupted conventional military operations, were now declared by Aguinaldo to "have complete and absolute power in the government of the provinces."[3]

These local leaders may have had military forces and full freedom of action, but they were faced with a difficult situation nevertheless. The Americans now occupied the major population centers in most of central and northern Luzon and were steadily expanding this area and exporting their administration to the other islands. While not pro-American, most of the people were neither pro-insurgent. After three years of turmoil and warfare, most seemed willing to cooperate with any regime operating in the area. They simply wanted to be left alone to pursue their lives and private interests.[4]

The insurgents had two other problems which plagued them and restricted their activities during this period. One was the chronic shortage of arms and ammunition, which grew more acute with the northward displacement of Aguinaldo's headquarters. This caused situations

where--for lack of arms--the guerrillas had to bypass good opportunities for assailing American detachments. Sometimes they even had to pretend to the villagers that they were stronger and better armed than was actually the case.[5] The other problem was the increasing number of desertions and the general state of poor discipline among the rebel troops. This, too, had been troublesome before, but it now reached almost unmanageable proportions. The corrective was harsh discipline, including summary execution for captured deserters, but still the desertions went on.[6]

Insurgent Propaganda Efforts. The revolutionary government continued vigorous propaganda efforts for consumption abroad and at home. At the beginning of the period of guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo was sustained by the prospect that the United States Congressional session beginning in December 1899 would mean independence for the Islands. When this failed to occur, his next hope was that the November 1900 United States Presidential election would result in the victory of the Democratic candidate, William Jennings Bryan, an anti-imperialist who had reportedly referred to Aguinaldo as "one of the heroes of the world."[7] The insurgent theme was that their movement was fighting against an imperialist party, not the people of the United States. Knowing that membership in the American Army was voluntary, Aguinaldo also hoped that the people of the United States would eventually so tire of the war that enlistments would stop, resulting in a weakening of American forces in the Philippines.[8]

Filipino morale was bolstered by reports of fictitious insurgent battlefield successes, false information on the recognition of the rebel government by European countries, stories that the German fleet had sunk the American Pacific Squadron and that a force of German troops was on the way to the insurgents' aid, and reports that troubles in China would cause

most of the American Army to be withdrawn from the Philippines for service in the Boxer Rebellion. The insurgent leadership also continued to tell the people lurid stories of American brutality.[9]

Progress of the American Attraction Program. The American policy of introducing local self-government, expanding government services, and not interfering in the personal affairs of the people, was enormously attractive. By continuing the practice begun in Manila of using Spanish colonial government forms and experienced Filipino administrators, but avoiding the abuses of which the natives accused the Spanish, the American position was doubly strengthened. The Americans also won adherents by operating aggressively against the roving bandits who had long been the bane of rural Philippine existence.[10]

But in spite of the American policies, the insurgents were still the countrymen of the villagers, and many of them were known to have made great sacrifices in the cause of national independence.[11] Moreover, the insurgent leaders were far better able than the Americans to capitalize on the predilection of lower class Filipinos to submit to the authority of their betters. The rebels also continued to take advantage of the language barrier and the dissembling that permitted local officials to concurrently serve both the American and the revolutionary regimes.[12]

However, Filipino opinion leaders in Manila and the provinces were becoming more and more convinced of the desirability of American rule. They considered the behavior of the revolutionary government as irresponsible in many of the areas where it had been in control, and few persons of property anticipated with favor the idea of such behavior on a country-wide basis.[13] This change in attitude, combined with the comparative success of the American-sponsored administrations, began to

undermine insurgent efforts to retain their shadow governments and continue the supply of resources and information on which they survived.

The Insurgent Terror Campaign. Since the insurgent capacity to practice a policy of attraction was impaired by the efforts of the American Army, Aguinaldo sanctioned a program of deliberate terror which was to be the source of much of the revolutionary success during the early guerrilla war period. Previously practiced intermittently and with some restraint, terror now became institutionalized and all-pervasive. Aguinaldo ordered the formation of special Katipunan enforcement groups whose function was to deal viciously with those who had showed pro-American attitudes. The result was a reign of terror, practiced largely in the vicinity but without the knowledge of American officials.[14]

The Katipunan terror campaign against the villagers, while doubtless necessary to intimidate those who were being attracted to the Americans in increasing numbers, can be viewed as the last violent spasm of a dying organism. The wealthy and conservative Filipinos in the cities were at this time accomodating themselves to the American administration, which they considered more capable, orderly, and fair than the revolutionary regime. Moreover, these people were critical of what they considered as the cowardice and ineptitude of the rebel armed forces, which by now avoided open battle with the Americans and, when drawn into fighting, took disproportionate numbers of casualties.[15] Many of the mestizos, who thought of themselves as "white," found it easier to accept United States sovereignty when they considered the increasingly pure Malay membership of the insurgent movement. As Taylor notes, they feared "a dark deluge."[16] The people in the provinces, where previously lay the rebel strength and loyalty, were becoming alienated by a growing bill of indictment against the revolutionary

governments and the insurgent bands. Where the rebel government openly operated, its officers showed little respect for life and property and their administration was frequently corrupt, autocratic, and inefficient. There was scant democracy exhibited in the selection of civil officers, and when in office these leaders were frequently harsh and dictatorial.[17] The villagers increasingly opposed the levies of young men for the rebel army, as well as the extortion of money and property for its support. Also resented were the many insurgent restrictions on personal freedom, including the requirement for passports while traveling in rebel-controlled areas, the prohibition of private firearms possession, and jailings for suspicion of hostility to the regime. Bandit gangs ravaged the countryside, and the revolutionary governments were ill-equipped to prevent it. In many cases the villagers suspect d, sometimes with good cause, that the raiders of one area were the insurgent garrisons of others. To protest these unsatisfactory conditions, some municipal officials in rebel governments attempted to resign, but this was forbidden by the Katipunan.[18]

The penalties for failing to support the Katipunan--which was declared by Aguinaldo in September 1900 to be the duty of all Filipinos--were so vicious as to repel even the stoic peasants. Kidnap and assassination were commonplace, and burial alive and torture by fire, beating, and mutilition were also used.[19]

Beyond the matter of rebel abuse and maladministration, there were many who opposed the Katipunan for other reasons. The Tagalog orientation of the movement offended some groups, and the short-lived effort to make Tagalog the official language of the Philippine Republic was much resented. In some areas the Macabebes, the Guards of Honor, and other groups were militantly anti-revolutionary. In others, Filipino priests who still

recognized the authority of the Archbishop in Manila aroused the people against the Katipunan and its rival Catholic Church.[20]

The combination of these forces created a large number of Filipinos who were moving toward disaffection and open hostility to the insurgent movement. The American administration, by contrast, was giving the people many of the things the Katipunan had originally been formed to achieve. More importantly, the Americans did not exploit the people or knowingly permit Filipino officials in their administration to do so. It increasingly appeared to the villagers that the vaguely-understood independence sought by the Katipunan was far outbalanced by immediately available justice under American sovereignty. It is for these reasons that the only option left to the insurgents was terror, which under the circumstances repelled the people and was ultimately self-defeating.

The American Military Effort. If the Americans did not see the insurgent terror campaign in operation, they well knew its effects. Once again the center of rebel activity was the Tagalog provinces of central Luzon, but there was no particular geographic plan of action. The pattern was the same throughout the islands.[21] Based on information provided by the villagers, the guerrillas would fall upon small American detachments, columns, or individual soldiers. This was not a war wherein cities fell or large forces were engaged, but rather a continual series of small but violent episodes. Captain Taylor estimated that between 5 May 1900 and 30 June 1901 alone, American forces engaged in more than 1,026 separate battles in the Philippines--most involving company sized or smaller units.[22]

Small groups of Americans were never safe. The villagers gave information on their plans and movements to the insurgents, who ambushed

them in the field or destroyed their headquarters when most of the troops were away. Local civilians sometimes attacked isolated Americans, and it was a foolish soldier who got drunk or went with a prostitute in a Filipino village. This situation was extremely frustrating to the small American garrisons, and this frustration bred brutality. American troops, fully aware by now that many friendly seeming natives were actively cooperating with the enemy, sometimes turned to abuse to get information and confessions from the Filipinos. The American command never officially condoned this practice, but its extent became the basis for considerable criticism of the quality of the Army's performance in the Philippine Insurrection.[23]

The near-monopoly of the insurgents on intelligence information seriously hindered the Americans through most of the early part of the insurrection. Operating in a country whose natives were largely hostile or indifferent, and who spoke a different language, restricted American efforts to gather information to primarily military reconnaissance, prisoner interrogation, and the analysis of captured documents. Even the fruits of these efforts were not at first efficiently handled, and it was not until September 1901 that orders were issued for all Army posts to have an intelligence office.[24]

American effectiveness against the guerrillas improved with the increasing use of loyal natives in the service of the United States. Filipinos of the Macabebe clan formed organized units within the American Army beginning in September 1899. Known as the Macabebe Scouts, and the forerunners of the later Philippine Scouts, these troops performed exceptionally well during the period of guerrilla war.[25] In July 1901, the para-military Philippine Constabulary was formed to deal with bandits. Its success contributed to the improved state of law and order which helped bring the people closer to the American administration.[26]

MacArthur as Military Governor

On 5 May 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur succeeded Otis as Military Governor and Commanding General of the Philippine Division. Otis had asked to be relieved of his duties, ostensibly for reasons of pressing family business. However, the real cause was reportedly his discouragement at the lack of definitive progress against the revolutionary movement and his distaste for the nature of guerrilla war.[27] Since September 1899, MacArthur's new command had an average strength of 54,204 officers and men--the largest American field army since the Civil War.[28]

As Commanding General, MacArthur administered the Army and directed the archipelago-wide actions of the American forces in the field. But it was as Military Governor that he made the decisions that would eventually lead to the successful conclusion of American operations in the Islands. Shortly after becoming Military Governor, he recommended to the War Department the issuance of a proclamation of general and complete amnesty. This was approved by the President and the proclamation was issued on 21 June 1900. In it, the Americans announced:

> . . . immunity for the past and absolute liberty for the future to all persons who were then or who had at any time since February 4, 1899, been in insurrection against the United States if they would within ninety days subscribe to a declaration acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty and authority of the United States in and over the Philippine Islands. . . .[29]

The results were disappointing. During the period of the proclamation's effect only 5,000 insurgents surrendered--merely a small fraction of the number suspected to be still at large.[30]

The issuance of this proclamation was, in effect, MacArthur's partial implementation of the recommendation he had made unsuccessfully to Otis six months before. Although he arranged with the War Department to issue a follow-up proclamation including provision for the treatment

as outlaws of rebels remaining under arms after the period of amnesty, this second proclamation was never announced.[31] This was probably due to MacArthur's increasing recognition that the insurgents were not bandits with a "pretended government," as he and Otis had believed, but rather were people determined to free their country from alien domination.[32] Once the Americans appreciated this vital fact, they understood the genuine attractiveness to the Filipinos of much of the revolutionary program and the corresponding necessity for firm and systematic methods for separating the insurgents from the people.

The Taft Commission. The President appointed a second Commission to the Philippines on 7 April 1900, in the belief that conditions in the Islands had progressed to the point where civil government could soon be installed. The Commission was comprised of Judge William Howard Taft as chairman, Professor Dean C. Worcester, the only member of the earlier Commission, General Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont, and Professor Bernard Moses of California. The Commission's instructions were to "continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil government already commenced by the military authorities, subject in all respects to any laws which Congress may hereafter enact."[33]

The President directed cooperation between the Commission and existing military authority. He further specified that the Commission would begin with the organization of municipal governments and proceed from there to larger divisions. Whenever it believed that conditions in the Islands permitted the overall transfer of government from military to civil control, it was to report that fact to the Secretary of War. In any case, it was to take over all legislative responsibilities and certain other functions in the pacified areas on 1 September 1900.[34] After

arriving in Manila on 3 June 1900, the Commission issued the following statement:

> The military governor, General MacArthur, until we assume our own full authority, will continue to perform the duties and exercise the general powers heretofore discharged and wielded by General Otis; and even after we take full, active part in the government, he will continue to be its executive head, until on our recommendation it shall seem to the President that the time has arrived for the appointment of a civil executive and the making of the military forces of the United States merely auxiliary to the carrying on of the civil government, and available only in cases of emergency for the suppression of lawless violence too formidable to be overcome by the regularly organized police force. . . .[35]

The Commission vigorously and promptly undertook its work, although relations were strained from the start between the Military Governor and the Commission Chairman. Despite the attitude of his predecessors, MacArthur's assessment of the situation in the Philippines made him believe that a great deal of additional military effort would be required before large areas of the archipelago would be ready for government under civil control. Moreover, there were contradictions and overlaps in the charters given by the Secretary of War to the Military Governor and the Commission Chairman--contradictions that would have almost assured problems between even the best intentioned of men. MacArthur was therefore cool toward the Commission from the first, although with military correctness if not enthusiasm he cooperated with its efforts.[36] Taft complained frequently and at length to the Secretary of War about this matter. However, his complaints were related to MacArthur's attitude rather than his performance, and Taft later admitted that MacArthur had done "everything in his power" to assist the Commission in its responsibilities.[37] Although the split in military-civil responsibility for the pacified areas was mutually annoying, it appears not to have impeded the organization of civil governments throughout the archipelago.

The Americans Tighten the Screws. MacArthur eventually concluded that his policy of treating the insurgents with consideration was not having the desired effect. He could take satisfaction in the gradual improvement of the condition of the people under the American administration, with schools, sanitation, and public health coming to be even more emphasized by his office. However, the actual pacification of the Islands, his primary mission, was being blocked by the stubborn and bloody insurgent resistance. He was also aware that many of the American methods were interpreted by and to the Filipinos as evidences of weakness. Among these were the slow and deliberate judicial procedure which often resulted in known murders being freed because of an understandable absence of incriminating testimony, the unaccustomed freedom of the press in Manila, and the situation described by General Otis wherein the assets and families of rebel leaders in the field were comfortably ensconced in Manila. Moreover, until now rebels who were either captured or voluntarily surrendered were almost immediately freed upon taking the oath of allegience to the United States. This had manifold benefits in quickly reintegrating these former enemies into useful society, but it provided no incentive for rebels to give up before they were cornered.[38]

The Military Governor decided to take a new and tougher line. In December 1900, MacArthur announced the imposition of General Orders 100, of 1863, originally promulgated by Abraham Lincoln to help control guerrilla warfare in the border states during the Civil War. Again according to Captain Taylor, MacArthur:

> . . . described the duties of noncombatants residing within territory occupied by organized combatant forces in consequence of regular military operations. He cited the laws of war which govern their relations with such forces and warned the people that the violation of them would meet exemplary punishment.

> . . . all persons suspected of contraband traffic with insurgent organizations were ordered to be arrested and sent to Manila. Commanding officers were informed that in carrying out this injunction they would find it safe to assume that all prominent families which had not by some public action or declaration committed themselves to American interests were engaged in supplying the insurgents or at least knew who was doing it, and accordingly if they were not principals themselves they were accessories.
>
> . . . all prisoners of war captured in the field or arrested in the towns should be held in custody until the cessation of hostilities; all men who surrendered were disarmed and released at once.[39]

American officers and soldiers in the field were delighted with this decision, the timing of which many interpreted as having been delayed until after McKinley's reelection victory over the anti-imperialist Bryan in the November 1900 Presidential election. They believed that United States domestic political considerations, especially the fear of fueling the anti-imperialist propaganda machine with reports of American repression of the Filipinos, no longer applied. The American military felt they now had the means to effectively combat the insurgents and were eager to begin putting it to the test.[40] The proclamation began to take effect after having been proved by the deportation to Guam of 26 insurgents on 7 January 1901. From that time forward, "secret resistence and apathy began to diminish, and kidnapping and assassination were much abated."[41]

The Formation of the Federal Party

The combination of the American policy of attraction and stepped-up military action against the insurgents in the field was having its effect. Nonetheless, most of the countryside could not yet be called pacified. However, by now most prominent Filipinos in Manila, including a number of important former insurgent leaders such as the ubiquitous Pedro A. Paterno, recognized the impossibility of realizing the aim of independence through violence and accepted the necessity of reaching

some accomodation with the Americans. This group, striking a balance between what they preferred in self-government and what the American authorities would permit, founded the Federal Party on 23 December 1900.[42] Its platform was approved by MacArthur and the United States Civil Commission. Its main provisions were:

> 1. The recognition of the sovereignty of the United States, which shall be represented in the islands by a liberal, democratic, and representative government.
>
> 2. Individual rights, liberties, and the guaranty of personal rights, the rights of property and of the home, with liberty in the matters of religion and entire separation of church and state.
>
> 3. Without peace the enjoyment of individual rights, liberties, and the guaranty to which every educated citizen is entitled would be impossible, and consequently the founders of this party promise to cooperate with the established government, using all the means in their power to procure the pacification of the country, in order that the Filipinos in arms may acknowledge said government, as their resistance is bringing this country to ruin and desolation and gives rise to the commission of a multitude of crimes and abuses which discredit the Philippine people in the sight of civilized nations.
>
> 4. Municipal government, or self-government, substantially as it exists in the United States, and provincial or departmental government, subject only to the high inspection of the central government.
>
> 5. Primary elemental education shall be gratuitous . . . Furthermore, it shall be one of the aims of the party to obtain the passage of a law which will require children of both sexes to be educated in public or private schools. . . .
>
> 6. The creation of armed militia for the purpose of preserving the peace and insuring persons and property against criminals.
>
> 7. The awarding of public employment shall be on the basis of ability, loyalty to the established government, and strict morality according to the civil-service laws in force at present.[43]

Additional provisions pertained to the desired form of island-wide government and the representation of the Philippines in the United States Congress.[44] These were not matters within the jurisdiction of the existing American administration, but they were legitimate goals for the Federal Party within the framework of American sovereignty.

The objectives of the Federal Party were not substantially different from the type of government the American military and civil authorities were attempting to implement. However, the American program was now being promoted by influential Filipinos who were able to make their appeals to the insurgents on the basis of "surrender without dishonor" and who could effectively explain to the people the meaning and conditions of the American-sponsored form of government.[45]

The effectiveness of the Federal Party, as its agents traveled throughout the Islands and won adherents to its cause, could be measured in the viciousness of Aguinaldo's response. A succession of anti-Federalist decrees eminated from the insurgent mountain headquarters authorizing the summary execution of anyone proposing surrender to the Americans or association with the cause of the Party.[46] Notwithstanding Aguinaldo's efforts, by May 1901 the Party had 150,000 members.[47]

The Capture of Aguinaldo

The revolutionary movement was dealt another crippling blow in Brigadier General Frederick Funston's daring capture of Aguinaldo on 23 March 1901. Funston and several other Americans pretended to be captured by rebels, who were actually Macabebe Scouts in disguise. Through a series of ruses, the party arrived at Aguinaldo's small headquarters area, where they scattered or killed the small garrison and arrested the rebel leader.[48] Funston brought Aguinaldo to Manila, where MacArthur treated him with the dignity appropriate to the man who for four years had been symbolic of the Filipino fight for independence. After conferring with other ex-leaders of the insurgency, Aguinaldo on 19 April announced that "he believed that he was serving his beloved country in acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United States."[49]

Since at the end Aguinaldo had been more the figurehead and propagandist of the revolutionary movement than its operating chief executive or commander, his capture and subsequent oath of allegience did not mean the end of the insurrection. Yet it was a serious loss to the revolutionary movement, for now the Katipunan was comprised of individual chiefs operating without any leader of stature or semblance of genuine central direction.[50]

Beginning of the End

The combination of recent American programs now began to pay off. Having their effect were the obviously stable, orderly, and nonoppressive American administrations; the reduction in terrorism through the imposition of General Orders100, with its consequent reduction in the insurgents' ability to enforce their will on the populace; the success in the field of American units against rebel guerrilla bands, made possible in part by the increase in United States Army stations in the archipelago from 53 in November 1899 to 502 in March 1901;[51] and the adoption and salesmanship of the American program by the Federal Party.

However, the cost of pacification to the opposing military forces had been high:

> . . . from November 1, 1899, to September 1, 1900, 268 Americans were killed, 750 were wounded, and 55 were captured. According to the American reports, during the same period 3,227 Filipinos were killed, 694 wounded, and 2,864 were captured. From 5 May 1900 to 30 June 1901 . . . the Americans lost 245 killed, 490 wounded, 118 captured, and 20 missing. According to the American reports the Filipinos lost 3,854 killed, 1,193 wounded, 6,572 captured, while 23,095 surrendered. . . . Up to July 4, 1901, 23,000 firearms of various types had been reported as captured from the insurgents.[52]

Unreported in the statistics is the fact that the entire population of the archipelago had suffered from a war that in some areas had been going on for 6 years by 1902. Leon Wolff, whose Little Brown

Brother is extremely critical of the American effort in the Philippines, puts the number of Filipino deaths as a result of the insurrection at 250,000, for which he cites no authority.[53] Author Gore Vidal recently mentioned an astonishing but also unsubstantiated figure of 3 million Filipino deaths, in a total population of 7 million.[54] Whatever the true number, it is understandable that by 1902 most Filipinos were eager for an end to the conflict and an opportunity to return to a more orderly manner of life. This factor cannot be discounted in any assessment of the decline of the Katipunan movement.

Chaffee Replaces MacArthur as Commanding General

Taft's complaints about MacArthur to the Secretary of War, and the decision to elevate Taft to Governor General and end the office of Military Governor on 4 July 1901, led to MacArthur's reassignment effective the same day. His successor as Commanding General of the Philippine Division was Major General Adna R. Chaffee, who with the new governmental arrangements had a much restricted sphere of action.[55]

The highly regarded General Chaffee had served in the Civil War as private, sergeant, and lieutenant, followed by twenty years in the West as one of the Army's premier Indian fighters. His administrative experience included service as an inspector general and on the staff of the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth. Chaffee came to the Philippines fresh from triumphs in Cuba, where he was acclaimed as "The Hero of El Caney," and China, where he headed the American force in the Boxer Rebellion.[56] Mindful of the controversy between MacArthur and Taft, Secretary of War Root gave Chaffee specific instructions as to the primacy of the Civil Governor after 4 July 1901.[57]

The best summation of the status of the Islands and MacArthur's success in accomplishing his objectives in pacification by the time of his departure is in his own final report of 4 July 1901:

> . . . the armed insurrection was almost entirely suppressed as a result of cooperation between the army and the people, who had accepted the invitation to combine for mutual protection and for the welfare of the country. At that time there was no organized insurgent force above the Pasig River. All of the islands in the Visayas were at peace, except Samar. In southern Luzon disorders still continued, but were diminishing so steadily as to encourage the belief that the provinces there would soon be pacified.[58]

The Last Year of the Insurgency

As mentioned in MacArthur's final report, the remaining major areas of insurgent resistance were in southern Luzon and on the island of Samar. The principal rebel leader in Luzon after the capture of Aguinaldo was General Miguel Malvar, who remained in the field in Batangas Province with a force of at least 4,000. His soldiers had always outnumbered the Americans in the area and some of his revolutionary governments had been in operation since 1896.[59]

Positions had by now hardened all around. The insurgents acted with savagery against the Americans, or toward their own people when necessary to maintain cooperation. The American tendency was to reply in kind. Only through close supervision could Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, the American commander in Batangas, keep his forces under control and insure they applied only legal and appropriate force. The American troops were fired by reports of the massacre by villagers on Samar of 48 members of Company C, 9th Infantry. And the troops were still frustrated by their inability to tell friend from foe among the Filipinos.[60]

General Bell decided that the insurgents must be separated from the people quickly and completely. This concept was not new; indeed, it

had been the basis of MacArthur's successful tightening-down policy of a year earlier. However, previous separation methods were inadequate for the job at hand, so Bell resolved on a new approach that he believed would both eliminate popular support for the guerrillas and protect the people from insurgent pressures. He announced a program of "zones of concentration" whereby the Filipinos were moved into fortified and controllable areas beyond which they could not travel without American knowledge and supervision. Nothing was to be left outside these zones that could be of use to the insurgents. Bell practiced a strict application of General Orders 100. Captain Taylor reports that he "announced his intention to retaliate by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more persons were assassinated by the insurgents for political reasons. It was not found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once."[61] The American forces confiscated or destroyed stores of food found outside the zones, and the houses of those cooperating with the insurgents were burned. Meanwhile, Bell's troops relentlessly pursued the guerrillas in the field, scattering and defeating them in dozens of small combats.[62]

Bell's policy worked. Malvar's forces, already short of ammunition and troubled by desertions, now had difficulty locating adequate food. Cut off from its sources of information, the insurgents were frequently found and engaged by the pursuing Americans. The people, now securely under United States protection, cooperated with the American administration to such an extent that thousands of them joined in the search for Malvar and his guerrillas,[63] and now the Americans were benefiting from the work of spies among the insurgents.[64] Once again, agents of the Federal Party were effective in urging the revolutionary forces to surrender without abandoning their ideals. On 16 April 1902,

Malvar and his followers gave up. Throughout Bell's campaign, 8,000 to 10,000 insurgents or sympathizers were captured or surrendered; by July all of them had taken the oath of allegience and were released.[65]

The efforts of Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith on Samar, where he was attempting a mission similar to Bell's, were far less successful. Smith eschewed the notion of attracting the Filipinos, and he set an example of brutality toward innocent villagers and insurgents alike that was followed by many of his men. As a result, the Samar pacification took substantially longer and was far more difficult than in Batangas. It was not completed until Smith adopted Bell's methods and began to deal more even-handedly with the Filipinos that he began to make progress. The rebels finally surrendered in Samar in late April 1902.[66]

Summary of Insurgent and American Tactics

The tactics used by both the insurgents and the Americans were developed over a period of time, but both were in full operation during the period of guerrilla warfare. After November 1899, the Katipunan had only policy guidance from Aguinaldo's headquarters, with local rebel leaders dealing almost independently with matters in their areas. Where possible, the revolutionary government set up local regimes, the success and representative nature of which depended upon the talent, attentiveness, and attitude of the insurgent commanders in the area, as well as the degree of their freedom from American intervention. The people--either voluntarily or under duress--supplied the resources to these governments and the Katipunan. Meanwhile, the guerrillas acted as a military force against small and vulnerable American detachments and encouraged the people to kill individual Americans in the hope that the

cumulative effect would be the decimation of the United States force or, more likely, the disheartening of the American public and military for perseverance in the Philippine policies of the United States Government.

The American policy toward the Filipinos was announced by Merritt, structured by Otis, and refined and carried into effect by MacArthur and later Chaffee. Merritt proclaimed United States intentions and told the people they would not be interfered with unless they opposed the American regime. While defeating the insurgent regular army, Otis created the basis for the introduction of a civil government appropriate to the experience and political development of the people. During the period of guerrilla war, MacArthur recognized that he could only defeat the insurgents by separating them from the people. He did this by continuing and improving local government, while increasing the penalties for cooperation with the insurgents. At the same time, his troops continued to pursue and defeat the guerrillas in the field. Chaffee, left with small but stubborn areas to pacify, adopted even stricter policies to cut off rebel support, while his troops operated aggressively against the remaining revolutionary guerrilla bands.

The End of the Insurgency and Later Political Developments

On 4 July 1902, at the recommendation of Governor Taft and General Chaffee, President Theodore Roosevelt issued a proclamation of amnesty which marked the official end of the Philippine Insurrection:

> The amnesty proclamation gave full pardon to all Filipinos who had participated in the revolt. The only exception was for those who had committed crimes subsequent to May 1, 1902 or had been convicted at a prior time for crimes of murder, rape, arson, or robbery. Provision was made, however, for special pardon by the insular authorities of revolutionaries already under sentence. . . .[67]

The United States Government started the Philippines toward self-government and eventual independence even before the end of the insurrection when the United States Civil Commission included Filipino membership in 1901. In the following year, an elected Philippine Assembly began to share legislative power in the Islands, and two non-voting commissioners represented the Philippines in the United States House of Representatives. The Filipinos got full control of both houses of the Assembly in 1913. The Governor General, who continued to be appointed by the President with Senate approval, exercised the executive powers until November 1937. Meanwhile, general legislative authority with a few specified exceptions, "mainly designed to ensure the constitutional rights of the people and the sovereignty of the United States," went to the Assembly. The Islands were granted Commonwealth status in 1935, and on 4 July 1946 the President of the United States declared an independent Republic of the Philippines.[68]

NOTES

[1]James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), pp. 157-60; see also John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, pp. 219-20.

[2]Taylor, II, pp. 153-54, 290.

[3]Ibid., pp. 255, 260-62, 277, 304.

[4]Ibid., p. 288

[5]Ibid., pp. 307-08.

[6]Ibid., pp. 296, 304-05.

[7]Ibid., p. 292.

[8]Ibid., pp. 257-58, 283.

[9]John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport: Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 226-27; see also Taylor, II, pp. 154, 256, 276, 307-308.

[10]Gates, op. cit., pp. 85-86, 94-95.

[11]Taylor, II, p. 230.

[12]Ibid., pp. 231, 252.

[13]Ibid., pp. 114-15.

[14]Ibid., pp. 261-62.

[15]Ibid., pp. 114-15.

[16]Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[17]LeRoy, op. cit., pp. 302-06.

[18]Gates, op. cit., p. 227; see also Taylor, II, pp. 84-92, 199-200.

[19]Taylor, II, pp. 228-29.

[20]Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[21]Gates, op. cit., pp. 157-58; see also LeRoy, op. cit., p. 161.

[22]Taylor, II, p. 238.

[23]Ibid., p. 250.

[24]Gates, op. cit., p. 249.

[25]Taylor, II, p. 208.

[26]Gates, op. cit., pp. 239-40.

[27]Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 309-10.

[28]Taylor, II, p. 222.

[29]Ibid., p. 224.

[30]Ibid.

[31]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office. Correspondence, Vol. II, pp. 1175-78.

[32]Taylor, II, p. 236.

[33]Ibid., p. 227.

[34]Ibid., pp. 227-29.

[35]Ibid., p. 228.

[36]D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1970), pp. 36-40.

[37]Gates, op. cit., p. 238.

[38]Taylor, II, pp. 122, 231-32.

[39]Ibid., p. 232.

[40]Charles J. Crane, The Experiences of a Colonel of Infantry (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1923), pp. 360-61.

[41]Taylor, loc. cit.

[42]Ibid., p. 223.

[43]Ibid., pp. 233-34

[44]Ibid., pp. 234-35.

[45]Ibid., pp. 236-37.

[46]Ibid., pp. 259-60.

[47]Ibid., p. 237.

[48]Frederick Funston, Memories of Two Wars (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911), pp. 384-426.

[49]Taylor, II, pp. 260-61.

[50]Ibid., p. 261.

[51]Ibid., p. 238.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Wolff, op. cit., from dust jacket, not repeated in volume.

[54]Wolff and Vidal are doubtless including in their totals the 200,000 people who died in the cholera epidemic of 1902. See "Philippines, Republic of the," The Encyclopedia Americana (1964), XXI, p. 759.

[55]Taylor, II, pp. 239-40.

[56]"Adna R. Chaffee," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (1943), XXX, 6-7.

[57]James, op. cit., p. 38.

[58]Taylor, II, p. 238.

[59]Gates, op. cit., pp. 257-62.

[60]Ibid., pp. 248-49; see also Taylor, II, p. 239.

[61]Taylor, II, p. 246.

[62]Gates, op. cit., pp. 257-62; see also Taylor, II, pp. 240-48.

[63]Taylor, II, pp. 240-48.

[64]Gates, op. cit., p. 228.

[65]Taylor, loc. cit.

[66]Gates, op. cit., pp. 254-56.

[67]Taylor, II, pp. 248-49.

[68]"Philippines, Republic of the," The Encyclopedia Americana (1964), XXI, pp. 759h-759

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In a peculiar way both sides won in the Philippine Insurrection: the United States established its sovereignty throughout the archipelago, and the Katipunan got most of the reforms for which it had fought--less that of immediate independence. However, these results were achieved only after a long, costly, and bitter conflict. Several matters need to be considered in any overall assessment of the United States effort in the Philippines. The first is the issue of how the American administration developed its counterinsurgency response. Then, to test the validity of present-day United States Army counterinsurgency doctrine, next is an evaluation of the American counterinsurgency methods in light of today's internal defense and development guidelines, and a determination of the strengths and weaknesses in their application. Finally, there is need for final conclusions on the quality of the total United States effort in the Philippine Insurrection.

The Development of the American Counterinsurgency Response

Throughout the insurgency both sides recognized the importance of popular support to the success of their respective efforts. The United States never envisioned a permanent garrison and occupation of the Islands. The rebels had to have popular support to survive American actions against their movement, since their manpower and supplies depended on the cooperation of the people. Matters were less than clear-cut during the May-November 1899 period of regular warfare, when at first it appeared to the

Americans that whichever side controlled an area as a result of military action could install an administration favorable to its interests. The issue then seemed to be primarily one of defeating the insurgents in the field, scattering the revolutionary government, and then consolidating the gains by setting up loyal municipal governments. This, of course, proved to be inadequate. Contributing to the American lack of appreciation for the complexity of the problem was a tendency to think of the insurgents as motivated principally by greed. This attitude caused the Americans to underrate the commitment and tenacity of the rebels, many of whom were patriots and nationalists. Moreover, it failed to recognize the genuine attractiveness of the notion of national independence to the Filipino people, who had spent more than three centuries under Spanish rule.

All of this changed with the advent of full-fledged guerrilla war as a matter of official insurgent policy after November 1899. From then on the United States Army could no longer find and fix large insurgent military units in the field. Additionally, rebel intimidation of the villagers in areas under ostensible American control was permitting the Katipunan to get intelligence on American activities and the money, manpower, and supplies without which any revolutionary movement cannot long survive.

Once the United States command realized that the independence movement was genuine and widespread, its strategy changed from an effort to primarily defeat the insurgent army in the field or chase it down as bandits to a more realistic combination of engaging small guerrilla units in combat while concurrently removing the sources of insurgent sympathy and support; in contemporary terms, an internal defense and development campaign.

Counterinsurgency Guidelines Applied in the Insurrection

The efforts of the United States Army, later supplemented by those of the United States Civil Commission, finally succeeded in pacifying the Philippines. The story of the elimination of the insurgency has been told in narrative, and it is now appropriate to evaluate this effort in terms of today's counterinsurgency guidelines:

1. It is preferable to prevent an insurgent war rather than fight one.

Since the United States inherited an ongoing insurgency when it assumed sovereignty over the Philippines from Spain, this guideline is not precisely applicable to the Philippine Insurrection. President McKinley said that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operative upon the political condition of the inhabitants,"[1] and he ordered the Army to extend the United States administration throughout the archipelago. Given this policy of the United States Government to retain the Islands, and the determination of the Filipinos to fight if necessary for independence, it appears that the United States Army could not have prevented an insurgent war.

Regardless of misunderstandings between Aguinaldo and American officials in Asia, the Philippine Insurrection was foreordained when the President issued and never altered Merritt's orders to occupy and govern the Islands. It may have been that American ability or willingness to announce a specific date for Philippine independence would have placated the rebels, but this is conjectural and it remains that most authoritative American observers of conditions in the Philippines, military and civilian, felt the Islands would not be ready for complete self-government and independence for an indeterminate period of time.

2. The government must show the people that it is the better choice.

This was the key element in the eventual American victory in the Philippines. Had the United States administration not been demonstrably more efficient and less repressive than that of the revolutionary regime, and had not the people been persuaded of this fact, the insurrection could not have been ended when it was. The positive effects of the American policy of attraction, with its programs of education, government services, and personal freedom, greatly contributed to winning the Filipinos to the United States cause. Conversely, the negative effects of the few and increasingly harsh options left to the revolutionaries, combined with Filipino observation of abuses, maladministration, and disorder in areas under rebel control, caused the revolutionary movement to become unpopular. When the threat of insurgent reprisal was removed by other American programs, and the people became free to indicate their preference, the United States administration profited from these positive and negative impressions on the Filipinos. Eventually, native opinion leaders decided that an American government would be preferable to a nation-wide revolutionary regime, and they were able to successfully convey this notion to a country that was both accustomed to following authority figures and exhausted by war.

3. Internal defense and development should be characterized by the integration of all functions--security, sociopolitical development, and economic development--at all levels.

Here the American administration had an advantage, in that until 4 July 1901, by which time the worst of the insurgency was over, the Military Governor combined within himself both military and civil authority. Even when the Civil Governor became paramount in the pacified areas, his program represented no departure from that which had preceded it--rather

only its extension, refinement, and codification. The United States was fortunate to have had four successive supreme military commanders in the Philippines--Merritt, Otis, MacArthur, and Chaffee--who from the start and throughout recognized the necessity for civil-military program integration.

Merritt's proclamation after the fall of Manila set the theme and tone of American policy as it would affect the populace: ". . . as long as they preserved the peace and performed their duties toward the representatives of the United States they would not be disturbed in their persons or property."[2] Otis' preparation for battle while improving the administration of the city of Manila, and his systematic introduction of civil government and the benefits of orderly administration in the captured areas, provided a workable framework for the introduction of American internal defense and development programs. During the period of guerrilla war, MacArthur arrived at the formula for victory when he found the means to separate the people from the insurgents and was able to convince the Filipinos, who were by then becoming increasingly affected by the benefits of American programs, to rid themselves of what by 1901 had become an unpopular revolutionary movement.

4. Planning, organization, and control of internal defense and development functions should follow the established political organization of the nation.

In that the existing political organization in the Philippines before the fall of Manila had been the Spanish colonial administration, this guideline is not applicable in the usual sense. The government of the Islands at the beginning of the insurrection was, in effect, the United States Army; therefore, the planning, organization, and control

of internal defense and development operations was done in Army channels, and later shared with the United States Civil Commission.

In the civil government of the Islands, the Army deliberately sought to use the forms that had existed under the Spanish and to which the people were accustomed. Also, competent Filipino civil servants from the Spanish regime continued in their positions under the Americans. These policies made the American-sponsored administration more congenial to the Filipinos and reduced the trauma that might otherwise have been associated with the changeover in administration from the Spanish to the Americans.

5. Internal defense and development must include the creation or strengthening of a spirit of nationhood among the people.

The American administration, as a colonial power, was on the wrong side of this guideline and the insurgents had all the advantages. The appeal of the revolutionaries was directly to Filipino nationalism, while the United States administration represented its antithesis. It can even be argued that to the extent the Americans were successful, the spirit of Filipino nationalism would be diffused. However, as the United States administration gained credibility when its programs proved to be for the well-being of the Filipinos, and as insurgent programs broke down, the prospect of eventual self-government may have somehow fostered a spirit of delayed nationhood. If so, this was at best a corollary and unsought effect.

6. Internal defense and development must seek to create in the people both a desire and an ability for self-government.

The desire for self-government was plainly extant throughout the American experience in the Philippines; it was with the issue of ability

that there was a question. American officials in the Philippines were agreed that the Filipinos were not ready for independence and national self-government, but that to the extent possible local self-government should be introduced, encouraged, and expanded upward to successively higher levels. Their attitudes became national policy through recommendations made to and accepted by the Secretary of War and the President. This was the program adopted, and it was successful.

7. Internal defense actions must be structured to promote the achievement of specific, constructive internal defense goals.

The United States Army's internal defense actions efficiently met this criterion during the period of guerrilla war. Earlier, when the rebels fought in regular military formations, the American response was primarily in the conventional military mode. The plan at that time was simply to defeat and clear the insurgents and install American-sponsored governments in the pacified areas.

Not until it became apparent that the insurgents were continuing to elicit popular support and operate clandestinely in these occupied areas did the Americans formulate and implement a comprehensive and systematic program for internal defense. This took the form of establishing American garrisons throughout the country to provide security for the people, while Army units continued to seek out and destroy rebel bands in the outlying areas. Thus there was the increase in American garrisons from 53 in November 1899 to 502 in March 1901. This by itself proved inadequate in the face of the coercive tactics employed by the insurgents against the Filipino villagers. It was not until the American Army tightened military control and effectively separated the people from the insurgents--by punishing those who cooperated with the rebels and later by physically

isolating the people and resources--that the United States administration achieved the conditions under which the insurgency could be demoralized and defeated.

American internal defense goals by the end of the period of guerrilla war were related to area security, with the objective of providing the basis for a normal and orderly life by the villagers and an environment in which they could come to trust and cooperate with the American administration. This was appropriate and ultimately successful.

8. A nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network is a prerequisite for internal defense success.

American failure to develop and capitalize on the possibilities of more thorough and systematic intelligence gathering and analysis may have impeded the pacification effort. This is another area in which, through most of the insurrection, the advantage lay almost completely with the rebels. There is no evidence of a systematic American-directed national intelligence network until September 1901, when the United States administration organized military intelligence offices down to the post level. At Philippine Division headquarters, the analysis of captured documents and reports was hindered by the volume of material processed and the fact that at the beginning virtually no Americans spoke or read Tagalog or the other Filipino languages.

Throughout the insurrection the revolutionaries had multilingual agents in the American administration who were most successful in both distorting translations to insurgent advantage and spying and reporting on United States plans and activities. This led to the situation wherein the insurgent shadow governments could operate in areas under ostensible American control. The intelligence reported by spies in Manila to

Aguinaldo's headquarters, and in the provinces to local rebel leaders, had a debilitating effect on the American effort. Only in 1901, when the Americans were able to provide security for the villagers while winning them over through successful local government programs, did sufficient loyal Filipinos become available to assist in the collection of intelligence. At this point the intelligence balance shifted in favor of the United States.

The closest the United States administration came to a nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network was the efforts of the Federal Party. With its establishment and spread, beginning in early 1901, the Americans could work with sophisticated and capable Filipinos who were alert to local and country-wide developments and willing to transmit useful information to the United States administration. However, even this was not the high-level intelligence apparatus visualized in current-day internal defense and development operations, the use of which might have substantially benefitted the American cause.

Related to the intelligence effort was the matter of propaganda. Here again, the insurgents had the advantage until the almost simultaneous imposition of the highly effective General Orders 100 and the birth of the Federal Party. The revolutionary propaganda themes were ready-made and highly appealing, both in the Philippines and the United States. For home consumption, there were exhortations on the basis of patriotism, religion, and race, as well as spurious reports of expected friendly foreign intervention, battlefield defeats turned into victories, and representative government where none in fact existed. For overseas effect, the rebels emphasized the ideas of an independence movement betrayed and legitimate self-government and democratic aspirations denied.

The American propaganda effort tended to take the form of performance rather than protestation. The United States administration proclaimed policies of benevolence toward and noninterference with the people from the beginning, but it was not until these attitudes were proved, and the number of loyal Filipinos grew in consequence, that the Americans achieved success in the area of Filipino public opinion.

9. The philosophy for neutralization or regaining of control over individual insurgents must consider their potential usefulness to the nation.

In this the American administration was wise and far-seeing. The policy throughout was that insurgents who voluntarily surrendered would be disarmed and released after taking an oath of allegience to the United States. Until December 1900, even those captured in battle were permitted to return to their homes after taking the oath. The rules were changed in late 1900, so that captured insurgents--as opposed to those who voluntarily surrendered--would be held prisoner until the cessation of hostilities. However, the official policy still permitted those who voluntarily gave themselves up to return immediately to private life. In that many of the returning insurgents were intelligent and able men, their return to productive civil pursuits had an overall beneficial impact on the United States effort.

The fair and moderate treatment afforded to former leaders of the insurrection persuaded many of them to support the United States in the later stages of the insurrection. This, in turn, helped make possible the development and wide popularity of the Federal Party, which was instrumental in ending the insurrection. It is doubtful whether the Federal Party would have been formed, or if its success could have been

as great, had it not been for the American practice of promptly reintegrating former insurgents into Filipino society at all levels.

10. Regulations for suppressing insurgent violence should be formulated before violence occurs, be based on law, be publicized, and be enforceable.

Here again, the United States administration was deficient. Due to a lack of recent experience with insurgent war, and in consequence of originally thinking of the rebels as more bandits than true revolutionaries, the American administration at first adopted an insufficiently comprehensive policy. Once it became obvious that the combination of rigorous military action and local self-government could not defeat the highly successful insurgent policy mix of patriotic attraction and ruthless intimidation, more stringent methods were employed to cause the necessary separation of the insurgents from the people. In December 1900, MacArthur announced the application of General Orders 100, which he implemented only partially but with great success through most of the Islands. Chaffee's even more stringent application of General Orders 100, in early 1902, provided the basis for American pacification of the remaining pockets of stubborn insurgent resistance.

There is the question of whether MacArthur was constrained by United States domestic political considerations from earlier taking a harder line against the insurgents. The official reports do not comment on this matter, but American officers in the Philippines believed that the timing of the crackdown was caused by the necessity of avoiding any appearance of American repression of the Filipinos before the Presidential election of 1900. They viewed MacArthur's announcement of General Orders 100 in December 1900, a month after McKinley's victory over the anti-imperialist Bryan, as proof that previous political restraints were removed.

It may have been that the announcement and imposition of General Orders 100 at the beginning would not have brought earlier success to American efforts in the Philippines. This cannot be answered definitely, because it took time for the Americans to prove to the Filipinos that their administration was preferable to that of the revolutionaries, and to continue to wear down the insurgent military establishment. However, it cannot be denied that only when General Orders 100 was introduced did the United States begin to make clear and continuing gains against the insurgents.

11. The ultimate goal of internal defense operations must be the breaking down of an insurgent organization, not the infliction of the maximum number of insurgent casualties.

The American leadership recognized this principle from the first, but this knowledge was applied in different ways in different periods. During the May-November 1899 period of regular warfare, the United States command believed that the defeat of the insurgent army and the capture of the revolutionary government would end the insurrection. The rebels were never decisively defeated during this time, and the capture of the organs of formal government had little but a demoralizing effect on the Katipunan movement. This initial American attitude was too narrow and showed a lack of appreciation for the complexity of the issues involved and the dedication and tenacity of the insurgents.

This guideline was later adopted by the American administration in its contemporary sense. The United States military and civil governors preferred to eliminate the insurgent movement to killing its adherents in battle which, given the size of the archipelago and the potential for protracted small unit combat, was a near-impossible task. Thus American amnesty proclamations and appeals to the insurgents to lay down their arms

were unsuccessful until the adoptic of the American line by the Federal Party, which could credibly induce the insurgents to surrender with honor.

12. The primary responsibility for the internal defense of a nation rests with that nation.

Because of the colonial nature of the American effort in the Philippines, this guideline is inapplicable in the usual sense. However, it should not be forgotten that the American administration formed the Macabebe Scouts, which later became the Philippine Scouts and a regular part of the United States Army. The para-military Philippine Constabulary, formed to combat the bandits who plagued the islands from time immemorial, was also enormously successful. In addition, the Federal Party platform, which was approved by the American military and civil governors, included recognition of the necessity for local police and militia for self-protection.

American Strengths and Weaknesses in Applying the Guidelines

The mix of internal defense and development options applied in a particular insurgency are obviously influenced by the nature and objectives of the revolution, the history and condition of the area, and the infinitely variable combinations of social, economic, political, and military factors that may apply. The situation in the Philippines was especially complicated by the fact that the United States was in the position of an outsider attempting to impose a colonial administration on people of a different race, culture, and language. This limited the American adoption of some of today's counterinsurgency guidelines.

The United States ended the Philippine Insurrection by using many of the broad internal defense and development concepts that are present

day Army counterinsurgency doctrine. The strength of the American effort was in demonstrating that the United States-sponsored administration was efficient and benevolent, and in convincing the people that it was preferable to a revolutionary regime which, in the areas under its control, had often showed itself to be brutal, corrupt, and incapable of protecting the people. The American command was wise in directing its actions against the insurgent organization rather than the Filipino people, and in returning surrendered insurgents to useful society as quickly as possible. After the Filipinos became convinced that the American administration was preferable to that of the revolutionaries, United States forces were able to provide the degree of security required to enable the villagers to confidentally show their preference for the American cause--both by cooperating in local government and in refusing to support the rebel shadow governments and guerrilla bands.

The major American weaknesses were in not more vigorously working to establish a nation-wide intelligence network and slowness in strictly applying General Orders 100. However, language and cultural limitations hindered the American ability to develop an effective intelligence network until the United States administration proved itself through the success of its internal defense and development campaign. And, as American officers in the Philippines suspected, it may well have been that domestic political concerns explicitly or implicitly limited the freedom of the Military Governor to impose General Orders 100 until after the election of 1900.

Final Conclusions

The experience of the United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902 confirms the validity of today's counterinsurgency

guidelines. Although the Katipunan movement was an anti-colonial effort rather than a true insurgency, the nature of the Filipino revolution was not much different from many recent insurgencies. The same principles applied then as now in the counterinsurgency effort. Every present-day counterinsurgency guideline that was thoroughly and carefully implemented at the turn of the century by the American administration in the Philippines was successful, while some of the slowness in the pacification effort may have been caused by failure to adequately and promptly adopt others.

A great advantage to the Americans in the Philippines was that the form of administration they sought to introduce was developed by knowledgeable and prescient men on the scene. These officials were not interested in personal profit or exploiting the people, but tried to insure their well-being--albeit within the policy decision of the United States Government to retain the Philippines for an indefinite period. Once the genuineness of this concern became apparent to the Filipinos, and the contrast between the character of the American administration and its Spanish predecessor and revolutionary competitor became clear, the way was open for the final pacification of the archipelago.

NOTES

[1]U.S., War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Correspondence, Vol. 2., pp. 676-78.

[2]John R. M. Taylor, "The Philippine Insurrection," II, p. 72.

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