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The West German Territorial Army in Support of NATO

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The objective was to determine the feasibility and desirability of assigning tactical missions to German territorial units, beyond the scope of rear combat zone security missions.

The purpose of this research is to present a view of the Territorial Army at its tactical interface with the corps forces in the forward defense zone. The study is focused on the tactical employment, command and control and Zusammenarbeit (cooperation) between the TA and NATO forward defense forces. The complexity of welding an effective force from NATO and National forces is extremely difficult and requires the utmost of trust and confidence from all participants. If this study can contribute even a small part towards that goal it will have achieved its purpose.

Assumptions that were made are:

(1) Political obstacles to the use of the German Territorial Army (TA) in support of NATO Field Armies in a role beyond the scope of Rear Area Security can be overcome.

(2) Mutual Balanced Force Reductions will not reduce or limit Territorial Forces.

The assignment of tactical missions beyond the scope of rear combat zone security to German Territorial units is both feasible and desirable. Based on the experiences of the German Volksturn, a form of Territorial Army in WWII, the concept is valid when the units are capably led, employed within their capabilities, and integrated into the total combat force effort.

The Territorial Army is composed essentially of reservists with only 15 months formal military training and approximately 28 days reserve training per year for the duration of their commitment. The TA combat forces are lightly armed with infantry, antitank, and mortar weapons. Motor transport is the primary means of mobility.

TA commanders must be integrated into forward defense force staffs from brigade to corps level to achieve unity of effort. Forward defense commanders must be fully cognizant of the training and equipment potential of a TA unit. Additional combat support, especially artillery, helicopters and tanks, should be provided to support TA units when engaging mechanized forces.

The study concludes:

a. That NATO and FRG should agree upon an expanded tactical role for TA units in the Forward Defense Area.

b. That the staffs of NATO forward deployed forces and FRG Territorial Army Forces in the RCZ should authorize a special staff position for TA unit commanders or NATO unit commanders, respectively, to insure proper employment of units within their assigned areas.

See attached

c. That joint training between NATO and TA units should emphasize tactical employment and the requirement to provide additional combat support units to the TA.

d. That NATO commanders should be made aware of the roles of the TA, its capabilities and limitations, by all information means available.

e. That NATO war plans should be reviewed with the purpose of shifting rear area security missions within the Forward Defense Force Area to suitable TA units wherever and whenever feasible.

## PREFACE

This report is concerned with the employment of the German Territorial Army in a tactical role beyond the scope of rear combat zone security. Since 1954 and the reconstitution of the German Army in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) numerous studies were undertaken to develop the optimum combination of forces, regular and reserve, required by the Bundeswehr.

The Bundeswehr is currently composed of the Feldheer (Field Army) (FA) and the Territorial Heer (Territorial Army) (TA). The Field Army is primarily concerned with forward defense and so is composed of traditional mechanized forces prepared to meet the enemy's front line forces and engage him in conventional or nuclear combat. The Territorial Army is much lighter equipped and primarily concerned with maintaining the freedom of action for all NATO forces in the FRG within the rear combat zone. It also has a number of other important missions regarding the civilian populace, resource control, civil military cooperation and damage control which will not be dealt with in detail by this study.

The purpose of this research is to present a view of the Territorial Army at its tactical interface with the forces in the forward defense zone. Because of certain first hand experiences with Wehrbereich Kommando IV in Mainz Germany, the author will direct his comments to that specific area

between Frankfurt and Fulda. This study is limited to approximately 80 hours allocated for writing and research at the Command and General Staff College.

This study is not intended to restructure or reform the Territorial Army. It is focused on the tactical employment, command and control and Zusammenarbeit (cooperation) between the TA and NATO forward defense forces. The complexity of welding an effective force from NATO and National forces is extremely difficult and requires the utmost of trust and confidence from all participants. If this study can contribute even a small part towards that goal it will have achieved its purpose.



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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### THE PROBLEM

Is it feasible and desirable to assign tactical missions beyond the scope of rear combat zone security to German Territorial units committed to the protection of the NATO Central Region rear combat zone?

#### ASSUMPTIONS

- a. Political obstacles to the use of the German Territorial Army (TA) in support of NATO Field Armies in a role beyond the scope of Rear Area Security can be overcome.
- b. Mutual Balanced Forced Reductions will not reduce or limit Territorial Forces.

#### BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

- a. NATO military authorities (including U.S.) tend to measure the alliances capacity to defend in terms of standing strike forces, and therefore disparage substituting latent territorial forces regardless of their quality.
- b. German authorities see a distinct dichotomy of roles for the Field Army (FA) and the Territorial Army (TA). The former is assigned/earmarked to NATO and conducts a

forward defense. The TA is restricted to fighting in the rear combat zone with the tactical missions of area and object protection.

c. The Volksturm, organized during the latter part of World War II for defense of the homeland, provided the German government with a bitter memory of the effectiveness of militia units. Nevertheless, a study of Volksturm activities provides combat proven insight into the tactical use of militia on German territory.

#### DEFINITIONS

a. Army--The land forces of the Bundeswehr.

b. Army Field Forces--Army forces earmarked for assignment to NATO in times of tension or war which are to conduct defensive operations jointly with allied forces according to the concept of Forward Defense (FA).

c. Territorial Army--A component of the Army which will remain under national command even in wartime. Its primary mission is to maintain the freedom of maneuver of the allied forces in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (TA).

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS: THE VOLKSTURM

During the last year of World War II the German nation found itself in a desperate plight. Almost every able-bodied man was fighting in the army at the fronts leaving scant resources left to defend the homeland if the deployed forces were penetrated. On September 25, 1944 an official decree established the Volksturm,<sup>1</sup> the forerunner of today's Territorial Army. Admittedly, there is a risk in comparing the Volksturm and the Territorial Army (TA) because of the vast differences in political orientation, weaponry, organization, personnel and training which separate the two organizations. However, some of the lessons learned by the Volksturm in combat are still meaningful to the tactical employment of today's Territorial Army and provide valid insights for a study of Territorial Forces.

In the final analysis, the tactical employment of the Volksturm against the Western allies contributed little to the German war effort in that area. In the east, however more substantial results were achieved from the employment of the militia. The relatively good showing of the militia against the Russians perhaps prolonged the struggle for a short time.<sup>2</sup>

In the course of the combat commitment of the Volks-  
turm, a number of serious problems emerged which transcended  
the elementary deficiencies in training, equipment and  
physical condition of the militiamen. The lack of coordination  
between the Volksturm and the commanders of the field army  
resulted in a fantastic waste of man hours. In East Prussia  
the Volksturm dug enough antitank ditches to reach from  
Koenigsberg to Lisbon. Unfortunately these fortifications  
were not coordinated with the military defense plans of the  
area so their usefulness must remain in doubt.

The lack of coordination is further underscored by  
Oberst Wilhelm Willemar:<sup>3</sup>

. . . The territorial authority of the Army ended ten  
kilometers behind the battlelines. To the rear of this  
line, all measures not of a purely military nature . . .  
even the construction of field fortifications by civilian  
labor . . . were subject to the approval of the Reich  
Defense Commissioner. He was also responsible for  
carrying out these measures with the aid of the civilian  
population and the Volksturm.

This dualism had serious consequences. In many  
instances, especially in the construction of field  
fortifications, the army attempted to take matters into  
its own hands . . . . The atmosphere between the two  
authorities became highly strained.

Yet another factor in the lack of success of the  
Volksturm was the practice of employing the unit far from  
their homes. A study prepared after the war indicates:

Only when actually committed to combat was the  
Volksturm to be placed under the tactical control of the  
Army and fight in conjunction with the regular field  
forces. The call to arms for an extended period was  
to be locally restricted. The men were to be called on

only if the enemy threatened their home county and even then they were to be exclusively for local defense. In practice the Volksturm battalions were committed far away from their homes on the Eastern front.

The leadership of the Volksturm units at all levels detracted further from it becoming an effective fighting force. Many of the Volksturm units were abandoned to their fate as enemy forces approached. Characterizing the conduct of these men, Goerlitz states:<sup>5</sup>

In almost every case the Gauleiters and high party functionaries fled or committed suicide.

In the final analysis, political sagacity and party loyalty were not suitable substitutes for military knowledge and combat experience.

In viewing the failure of the Volksturm, the time element emerges as the most important single factor. Undoubtedly, a much earlier activation date would have permitted the implementation of a coordinated military, political and economic plan of action for establishing the militia.<sup>6</sup>

#### SUMMARY

The German experience with the Volksturm during the closing months of World War II indicates that: (1) a continuing program of reserve training is a prerequisite to the successful activation, in time of war, of homeguard tactical units; (2) the activities of the regular defense forces must provide for training and [incorporation] of the militia in its war plans; (3) the material support of militia units must be provided in the nations overall defense budget; (4) the militia when called to active duty should be under



the control of the nations military leaders; (5) if the militia is to be considered a part of the nation's defense forces, then no restrictions should be placed on the time and place of its employment; and (6) political leaders below the national level should not be permitted to control the militia leaders and their units.

## CHAPTER III

### TERRITORIAL ARMY.

In 1969, a decision was made to merge the army and the Territorial Defense component, and both organizations were placed under the Chief of Staff, Army. The streamlining of the command structure initiated by that merger will be continued<sup>7</sup>(Figure 1).

#### MILITARY MISSIONS OF THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

In peacetime, the Territorial Army has only a limited degree of readiness although it is largely equipped with material. On mobilization, it has to be brought up to full personnel and material strength.

In the event of a defense emergency, the assigned forces of the armed forces carry out land, air or naval operations as directed by NATO commanders. The Territorial Army remains under national command; its primary function is to ensure the operational freedom of action of the Bundeswehr and those of the NATO allies in the rear area.<sup>8</sup>

#### FUNCTIONS OF A TERRITORIAL COMMANDER

To appreciate the numerous roles required of a Territorial commander we will examine the missions assigned

as of November 1, 1973




FIGURE 1. COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY

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to the commander of Southern Territorial Command in the FRG.

The TA commander in Southern Germany has three important functions: (1) He is a national commander within the scope of National Military Defense; (2) He is the permanent representative of the Minister of Defense Bonn towards allied National commands in all matters pertaining to stationing of guest forces on FRG territory, i.e., U.S. Army Europe, Canadian Forces in Europe and French Forces in the FRG; and (3) He will be responsible for the Central Army Group (CENTAG is a NATO Command), Rear Combat Zone (RCZ) at a specified time during a period of tension or in case of defense. In this capacity he will have directive authority over all troops in the RCZ for specific territorial missions.

#### WARTIME MISSIONS

This study will concern itself with the wartime tactical missions of the TA. Lieutenant General Albert Schnez, Inspector of the German Army until late 1971 listed these missions as follows:<sup>9</sup>

1. To maintain the operational freedom of action for NATO forces in the FRG, and thus support forward defense.
2. To prevent or annihilate enemy military action in the rear combat zone (behind the forward corps) and in exceptional cases in the corps rear areas (Objective and Area security).<sup>10</sup>

3. To ward off, in cooperation with civil defense forces, covert enemy action.
4. Damage control in operationally important areas, especially on the main supply routes, NATO airfields and pipelines.
5. Conduct military traffic control.
6. Provide NBC alert and warning.
7. To ensure cooperation between NATO forces and the German civil defense authorities and to coordinate their requirements or measures.
8. To support civil defense measures for the survival of the population.
9. To safeguard the personnel and material requirements as well as the medical support of the German forces.
10. To represent the German interests in the NATO command authorities.

These ten missions can be grouped in three categories: tactical (1 and 2), logistics support and international linkage (4, 5, 7, 9, and 10), and civil-defense related (3, 6, and 8).

#### PERSONNEL

The numerical strength of the armed forces of the FRG is established at 495,000 men. Part of this strength

will be provided by personnel in standby readiness.<sup>11</sup> The wartime strength of the armed forces will remain at approximately 1.2 million and will be established by mobilization.

The Territorial Army is at approximately 55,000 men and will be expanded to approximately 240,000 men in wartime.<sup>12</sup>

The characteristic feature of this force structure is the qualitative division of the army into a modernly equipped and intensely trained first line force of long serving volunteers for large scale operations (essentially the Field Army), and a numerically strong supplementary (second line) component of short serving conscripts (standby reservists and the Territorial Army).

#### RESERVISTS

The bulk of the Territorial Army will be composed of reservists. Therefore, it is worth examining who we mean by the term reservist in the Bundeswehr. After serving 15 months in the active army the conscript may be mustered out to the standby reserve force.

The operational capability of the Standby Reserve has a great impact on the combat effectiveness of the Territorial Army. Reservists are recalled for a period of up to 28 days per year primarily to enhance the proficiency of the individual reservist. Unit mobilization exercises

are conducted annually, particularly for reservists of equipment holding companies. Many conscripts who were trained as tank drivers or gunners during basic military service must, as Territorial Army reservists, be qualified chiefly for infantry combat in the home defense force. To the extent that the Territorial Army receives heavy equipment i.e., tanks, these reservists will be placed in their original specialties.

#### EQUIPMENT

In the 1980s, even more than today there will be two distinct basic classes of weapons. The first class will comprise systems which are complex and have a wide variety of uses. Conscripts with a 15 month term of basic service can be used on such systems in only peripheral functions. Complex weapons will be utilized primarily by the Air Force and the Navy.

A second class of weapons will offer basic functions primarily found in an individual weapon. Conscripts can be trained to operate these simple yet effective weapons in a relatively short time. However, with the employment of simple weapons, individual fighting qualities, formerly of high importance, will again assume greater value. These simple weapons will require less extensive technical training than do complex weapons, but more intensive combat training. Examples of weapons in this second class are:

second generation antitank missiles, mortars, 105mm field howitzers and 20mm automatic antiaircraft guns.<sup>13</sup>

The basic fighting units of the Territorial Army belong to the Home Defense Command. Each territorial command of the TA has one Home Defense Group (Figure 2). Within each Home Defense Group are two Home Defense Motorized Rifle Regiments, two tank destroyer companies, two heavy mortar companies, a combat engineer battalion and other combat support and service support units (Figure 3).

The weaponry of Home Defense units include light antitank rockets, antitank missiles, light and heavy machine-guns, heavy mortars, light infantry weapons and mines. Approximately 215 M48 battle tanks will be allocated to tank battalions in the Jager brigades and to equipment holding units in the home defense groups.

#### SUMMARY

The Territorial Army is tasked with a wide variety of missions. To accomplish them all within the scope of its two major tactical missions; maintenance of the operational freedom of action for NATO forces in the FRG; and the engagement and annihilation of enemy units in the rear combat zone, there is sufficient latitude to interpret a meaningful tactical employment of the TA in closer cooperation with the forward defense forces.



(Schema - Stand Juli 1974)

Organizational Chart of German Territorial Southern Command  
(July 1974)





FIGURE 2. ORGANIZATIONAL CHART TERRITORIAL COMMAND SOUTH

NOTE: Key to symbols at Figure 4.



Gliederung Heimaltschutzkommando 18

Anmerkung:  
 Die mit ▲ gekennzeichneten Verbände und Einheiten sind Geräteeinheiten; die Aufstellung der punktiert gezeichneten Geräteeinheiten und Ausbildungszentren ist zur Zeit noch nicht vorgesehen.

FIGURE 3. HOME DEFENSE COMMAND

The bulk of the Territorial Army will be comprised of conscripts with 15 months basic military service and a few years of reserve training consisting of 28 days per year. Commanders employing troops with such limited military experience must keep this factor in mind and not assign them missions beyond their capability to fulfill. This is not to infer that a simple tactical plan, taking full advantage of the terrain and weapons of the Home Defense unit should not succeed against a more powerful mechanized force.

The weapons of the Territorial Army are primarily light and simple to operate. Basically they are comprised of infantry weapons (small arms, machineguns and mortars), light artillery and a variety of antitank weapons. They are suitable for defensive operations, patrolling, and limited objective attacks.

Considering the missions, personnel and equipment of the Territorial Army it is evident, that if it is to take on a wider tactical role, the Forward Defense forces must plan to reinforce or supplement the TA's present capabilities.

## CHAPTER IV

### TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF TERRITORIAL FORCES

In terms of territorial geography, the tactical combat missions of the TA stay clear of "forward combat areas." These areas are assigned to the NATO units, German or Allied. Only in exceptional cases shall the TA concern itself with combat actions in the rear of a NATO Corps or a NATO division. Delaying enemy action in the forward area, even object security in it, thus falls outside the TA's responsibility.<sup>14</sup>

It would seem the geographic delimitation of responsibilities is dictated above all by a desire to avoid jurisdictional conflict between NATO and national authorities, and not by military considerations. In effect the TA continues to adhere to one of the major weaknesses identified in our examination of the Volksturm. "If the militia (TA) is to be considered a part of the nations defense forces, then no restrictions should be placed on the time and place of its employment."

Viable command and control during combat should not rely so completely on Zusammenarbeit (cooperation). The professional soldiers mind asks, "can I count on their (TA) help in a difficult and dangerous situation, or, will their help depend on the whim of the TA commander at the time?"

The answer to such a question raises doubts and uncertainties, which undermine the basic working relationship between the TA and FA or NATO force.

To digress a moment, let us address the larger question of Forward Defense. According to the 1973/1974 White Paper:

The Federal Republic of Germany can assure her viability only if the combat forces of the Army are put in a position to fulfill their mission of Forward Defense, together with the forces of our allies and the air forces.

If this strategy is valid, then why is the bulk of the Territorial Army concentrated in areas far behind the Forward Defense Forces? The major role of the TA is to insure the operational maneuver of the Forward Defense Force is maintained. Under current geographical restrictions it appears that the TA has divorced itself from the Forward Defense Force upon outbreak of hostilities. In fact, the Territorial Army withdraws from the Forward Defense Areas upon outbreak of hostilities and leaves the problems of population control, defense of vital civilian installations, traffic control and enemy sabotage completely in the hands of the Forward Defense Forces. There is an urgent need for the assets and expertise of the TA in the forward areas; at least as urgent as the requirements for TA support in the extreme rear of the combat zone. The point to be made is clear, let us put the bulk of our meager assets where the war is to be fought rather than so far behind the lines,

that it squanders the TA on fears and assumptions about the enemy which may never materialize.

The balance of forces between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces has never favored the alliance. Current NATO dispositions have Forward Defense Forces spread thin on extended frontages. If the Forward Forces are to conduct a meaningful defense against superior odds it becomes incumbent on the Territorial Forces to take up more of the slack within the corps and division rear areas.

Assuming that our aim is to win the first battle and end the hostilities as soon as possible, it only makes sense to use the majority of NATO and National combat forces in the main battle area. This does not mean to denude the entire rear combat zone of Territorial assets. It does mean to realign the Territorial Forces to provide a portion of their strength in the forward combat zone where the main defense effort is to be conducted. Under current arrangements, it is not unrealistic to assume that a significant portion of a NATO corps' reserve is tied down with rear security tasks that are suited for Territorial Defense units. This situation should be rectified if the alliance is to achieve maximum benefit from its critical mobile reserve forces.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

The need for national forces under national control is quite understandable and not disputed in this study.

What is needed, however, is a responsive relationship between the TA and Forward Defense Forces. The system which seems most adaptable to current European force structure is currently in use by the Israeli Army.

The Israeli Territorial Army maintains its own units and chain of command from the National level through local area commands during peacetime. Upon mobilization, the TA units located in the Forward Defense Area report to the area commander of the forward area for orders. The senior Territorial Army commander in each area functions as both a commander and also as a special staff officer on the Area Commanders staff. The same system applies at the division and brigade level. The primary mission of the Israeli Territorial Defense Force (TDF) is to defend the villages and areas behind the Forward Defense Forces. The TDF maintains traffic control, population and movements control, requisitions civilian resources for defense purposes, eliminates saboteurs in the area, provides first aid to the people and builds fortifications and minefields in depth within the rear area. Its second mission is to fight together with the Regular Army against enemy attacks which penetrate into the rear areas. Because the TDF is equipped with compatible radios, weapons and has had experience in the basics of soldiering skills, it is not unusual to expect it to fight. The Area Commander, however, normally reinforces

the territorial force with heavy weapons support, additional troops and tank support when necessary. As soon as the situation is stabilized, the territorial force returns to its main mission of protecting the population.<sup>15</sup>

To adapt the Israeli model to the FRG Territorial Army directly may not be possible. There are certain National versus NATO considerations which must be solved independently of each other. Specifically, of the three mission categories mentioned in Chapter II, the tactical missions (1 and 2) require the closest working relationship possible if the total defense effort is to succeed.

The Israeli system above would provide a Territorial Army commander/Special Staff officer at each command level from corps to brigade in the Forward Defense Area. In practice, the TA commanders in the Forward Area would operate in the same manner as an engineer unit commander, who also normally wears two hats. To the rear of the corps areas the current organization and command structure of the Territorial Army would remain unchanged. Combat units operating in (not just passing through) the Rear Combat Zone should provide a commander/special staff officer to the appropriate territorial commands in the RCZ. In this manner unity of action taken against enemy threats will be facilitated and the chances for success enhanced.

Unity of command is the single most important objective to be achieved by the system proposed above. Once



unity is accomplished the difficulties of tactically employing the TA either independently or in conjunction with the FA or NATO forces will be significantly overcome.

#### TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT TASKS

Before considering what tactical tasks the TA should handle the reader should review the TA's shortcomings in personnel and equipment listed in Chapter II. These considerations have a direct bearing on the capabilities of the Territorial Army to fight the enemy. The Home Defense Forces of the TA are lightly equipped, defensive in nature and well-suited for patrolling defense tasks and gathering intelligence.

Terrain plays an important role in selecting tactical missions for the TA. Infantry terrain, heavily wooded, canalized by obstacles, builtup areas and non-trafficable terrain (marshes, steep hills or mountains) are ideally suited for employment of TA units. Such terrain provides the cover and concealment advantage required for a light infantry force to fight mechanized forces with a reasonable chance of success.

Time is critical. Motorized infantry need time to organize the terrain to the best advantage. If the TA is reinforced by regular units or armored forces they need to have time to coordinate, organize the force and develop a workable plan under the new organization. Employment time will normally be more than that required to order a mechanized/tank force into action.

The lack of artillery and tanks in a TA unit is most critical. The Field Army commander must provide, as a minimum, artillery and/or air support to a TA unit engaging mechanized forces. If at all possible, a tank unit should be sent to reinforce the TA unit. Helicopter gunships, and antitank helicopters are excellent fire support elements to work with TA units in the rear areas. If the support is provided by a NATO ally then a German linguist available to the supported unit is a real consideration in order to effect smooth coordination. The headquarters responsible for the operation should establish who is to be in command at the operational end and notify all concerned.

The following tactical tasks are appropriate for Territorial Army units:

1. Point and area security.
2. Combat and intelligence patrols.
3. Flank security in infantry terrain.
4. Counter-guerrilla operations.
5. Antiair land operation.
6. Antitank blocking force in infantry terrain.
7. Construction and protection of mine fields and obstacles.
8. Limited antiair defense of point targets.
9. Preparation of fortifications with civilian resources.
10. Support of tactical river crossings.

11. Military demolition and destruction (abatis, cratering, etc.).

12. Refugee control assistance.

The above list is not meant to be all inclusive. Like all other military assets the use of the TA is limited only by the imagination of the commander and the units capabilities. Noticeably lacking from our list is the use of the TA in a behind the lines, guerrilla role. Psychologically the German people, perhaps based on past experience, have learned to abhor guerrilla style methods. This fact and the military inexperience of the conscript reservist in the TA are sufficient reasons to be cautious about casting the TA in a guerrilla role. This does not preclude a Special Forces unit being organized in Germany.

#### SUMMARY

The Territorial Army has a role to play in the forward combat zone. A TA unit commander should become a special staff officer on the staff of each Forward Defense unit in the forward zone from brigade to corps level. This would insure unity of command and action during the tactical employment of the TA. Likewise, in the Rear Combat Zone the senior FA or NATO unit commander in each area should serve as the special staff officer at each TA level of command. Arbitrary time and geographic restrictions to the employment of TA units should be lifted.

Terrain, time available and unit capabilities all play a key part in deciding the appropriate tactical employment of TA units. The provision of combat support assets and tanks are critical to the successful employment of TA units against enemy main force mechanized units. Considerations effecting the employment of a light infantry force are appropriate to the employment of TA units in combat. Guerrilla operations are not appropriate for the TA as it is currently organized and trained.

The ability of TA units to organize civilian resources for mine laying, fortification construction and erecting obstacles should be fully exploited by the tactical commander in the Forward Defense Area.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION

The assignment of tactical missions beyond the scope of rear combat zone security to German Territorial units is both feasible and desirable. Based on the experiences of the German Volksturm, a form of Territorial Army in World War II, the concept is valid when the units are capably led, employed within their capabilities and integrated into the total combat force effort.

The wartime missions of the Territorial Army commander are numerous. However, by consolidating them into the functions of tactical, logistics support and international linkage and civil defense related they can be managed. In the Forward Defense Area the tactical mission of the TA requires more clarification.

The Territorial Army is composed essentially of reservists with only 15 months formal military training and approximately 28 days reserve training per year for the duration of their commitment. The TA combat forces are lightly armed with infantry, antitank and mortar weapons. Motor transport is the primary means of mobility.

In order to successfully employ the TA in Forward Defense Areas we must achieve unity of command. By

incorporating the senior TA commanders into a special staff position from brigade to corps level this requirement can be achieved.

Forward Defense Area Commanders must be fully cognizant of the training and equipment capabilities of a TA unit. Full advantage must be taken of terrain and time to successfully employ the TA in combat engagements. Artillery, air support or helicopter support is required to offset the lack of heavy weapons in TA units. Where possible, tanks should be sent to support the TA unit when engaging mechanized forces.

The number and types of tactical missions appropriate for the TA is limited only by the commander's imagination.

It is evident from the comments in the 1973/1974 German White Paper, that the Territorial Army will be further merged into the total force concept of the FRG. The prime concern of this report is that as the TA merges, more consideration be given to tactical employment of TA units in the Forward Defense Area, where in the opinion of this writer, its combat capabilities can do the most good.

The following recommendations flow from this study:

1. That NATO and FRG agree upon an expanded tactical role for the Territorial Army units in the Forward Defense Area.

2. That the staffs of NATO forward deployed forces and FRG Territorial Army Forces in the RCZ authorize a

special staff position for Territorial Unit Commanders or NATO Unit Commanders respectively to insure proper employment of units within their assigned areas.

3. That joint training between NATO and Territorial units emphasize tactical employment and the requirement to provide additional combat support units to the TA.

4. That NATO commanders be made aware of the roles of the TA, its capabilities and limitations by all information means available.

5. That NATO war plans be reviewed with the purpose of shifting rear area security missions within the Forward Defense Force Area to suitable Territorial Defense units wherever and whenever feasible.







































-  German Territorial Southern Command
-  VI Headquarters, VI Military District
-  61 Military Region Headquarters 61
-  610 Military Subregion Headquarters 610
-  Munchen Munich Garrison Headquarters
-  Daaden Headquarters, Daaden Training Area
-  Munsingen Liaison Team, Munsingen Training Area
-  760 MP Battalion 760
-  741 Movement Headquarters 741
-  4321 Security Company 4321 (equipment holding unit)
-  411 Aufkl Motorized Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon 411 (equipment holding unit)
-  850 Army Mobilization Assembly/Replacement Battalion 850 (equipment holding unit)
-  714 Psychological Defense Company 714 (equipment holding unit)
-  II 4321 2nd Platoon Security Company 4321
-  2 II/4321 2nd Section, 2nd Platoon, Security Company 4321
-  Headquarters, Movement Control
-  Topographic Battery

FIGURE 4. KEY TO SYMBOLS



- 18  Home Defense Group 18
- 53  Motorized Infantry Regiment of Home Defense Group 18
- 61-2  Basic Training Center 61 - 2
- 540  Tank Destroyer Company 540
- 531  Motorized Infantry Battalion 531
- 530  Mortar Company
- 531  Motorized Infantry Battalion (equipment holding unit)
- 18  NBC Defense Company 18
- 760  Supply Company
- 18  Service Battalion 18 (equipment holding unit)
- 760  Maintenance Company 760
- 762  Maintenance Operations Steering Group, Type B
- 763  Maintenance Operations Steering Group, Type A
- 470  Armored Mortar Company 470
- 18  Engineer Battalion 18
- 85  Heavy Engineer Regiment 85
- 860  Float Bridge Battalion 860
- 881  Engineer River Company 881
- 890  Pipeline Engineer Company 890
- 370  Engineer Company
- 542  Denial Engineer Team 542



ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup>Wilfred K. White, The Volksturm, A Study of the German National Militia: 1944-1945, Graduate Thesis Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, May 1963, p. 11.
- <sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 160.
- <sup>3</sup>"What It Means: Volksturm or Home Army," Time, December 25, 1944, p. 21
- <sup>4</sup>United States, Department of Defense, Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign, DA Pamphlet No. 20-201 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 95.
- <sup>5</sup>Walter Goerlitz, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 2 vols., Stuttgart: Steingruben Verlag, 1952.
- <sup>6</sup>White, pp. 164.
- <sup>7</sup>Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1973/74 The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, Published by MOD Bonn, West Germany, January 14, 1974.
- <sup>8</sup>Force Structure Commission of the Government of FRG, The Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany. Analysis and Options, Published 1972/1973 by the Force Structure Commission of the Government of FRG, Bonn, November 28, 1972.
- <sup>9</sup>Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe. Rand Corporation (R-1184-ISA), February 1973, pp. 52-53.
- <sup>10</sup>"Territorial Heer," Truppen Praxis, September 1973, Frankfurt, West Germany, pp. 653-657.
- <sup>11</sup>Reservists Capability of Being Rapidly Mobilized in three days. White Paper 1973/1974, pp. 70-71.

<sup>12</sup>Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO Europe, pp. 93.

<sup>13</sup>White Paper 1973/1974, pp. 196-198.

<sup>14</sup>Mendershausen, pp. 53.

<sup>15</sup>Colonel N. Nir, Israeli Defense Force, Tape Recorded personal interview, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 21 March 1975.

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