





## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION		PAGI	<u> </u>
1	General	1	
п	Conclusions	2	
ш	Recommendations	3	
ANNEX			
1	Attendees	æ	*7
2	Agenda	10	9
3	Summary of Discussions	12	11
4	Internal Recommendations	21	20
5	Proposed DASA NET Organization	22	23
6	JNACC Report	<b>.2</b> 3	1 6
7	Nuclear Accident Procedures	-27	<b>?</b> :

NTIS GRAŁI
DTIC TAB
Unaunounced
Justification

By\_\_\_\_\_
Distribution/
Availability Codes

Avail and/or
Dist Special


Accession For

THIS EXCHINENT COMBISTS OF 35 NO. 1 of 30 copies series A.

UNANNOUNCED









THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.





#### I - GENERAL

- A. This report summarizes the considerations of the critique of the B-52 aircraft accident which occurred at Thule, Greenland, on 21 January 1968. The critique was conducted at Headquarters Field Command, DASA, Sandia Base, New Mexico, on 28-29 March 1968.
- B. The purpose of the critique was to review DASA's overall participation in the recovery operations associated with this accident (designated Project Crested Ice) to determine what changes are required, or would be desirable, in the following:
  - 1. Mission.
  - 2. Concept.
  - 3. Organization.
  - 4. Training.
  - 5. Equipment.
  - 6. Procedures.
- C. Each of the major subjects identified in paragraph B, above, was discussed, and recommendations were developed as determined appropriate. While changes are recommended in each subject area, the more significant changes pertain to Equipment and Procedures. Annex 3 contains a summary of discussions.
- D. The critique was of a high-level working nature, and participation from Field Command Staff activities was limited accordingly. See annex 1 for list of attendees.






E. Annex 2 contains the agenda with parenthetical entries indicating the staff activity or individual responsible for each presentation.

#### II - CONCLUSIONS

Following the Introduction and Summary of Operations phases of the critique, a series of discussions resulted in the following conclusions:

- A. The DASA NET mission statement should be changed to be more definitive in the services it is intended to provide the onscene commanders.
- B. More effective communication and coordination is needed within DASA and with the Services.
- C. NET organization should be changed to provide more internal capability in areas of supply, surveying and administration, and more flexibility in key positions.
- D. Present standard of training within the NET is adequate, but additional training in field surveying and sampling procedures would enhance the overall capability of the team.
- E. Newly developed Radiac equipment should be purchased, and additional personal-type clothing is needed to provide a self-contained capability within the NET under all climatic variations.
- F. Knowledge of location and authority for acquiring critical supporting equipment and personnel on a loan basis is necessary for effective NET operations.





- G. DASA Directive 70-7 should be changed to authorize termination of accountability for contaminated or damaged equipment without the need for a Report of Survey.
- H. The Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center (JNACC) mission should be expanded to more areas of information control.
- I. An effective organization in the form of a command center within Hq FCDASA (FCSM) would preclude many of the initial problems encountered during Project Crested Ice.


#### **III - RECOMMENDATIONS**

Detailed presentation of problem areas resulted in recommendations being made in two separate areas for consideration as follows:

- A. Internal Field Command problems which are capable of being resolved within FCDASA. See annex 4.
- B. Proposed solutions to problems which are beyond the present prerogatives of Field Command. These recommendations follow.
  - C. It is recommended that:
- The DASA NET MISSION statement in paragraph 5, DASA Circular
   23-18 be amended to read as follows:

"The DASA NET will respond to nuclear weapon and nonweapon radiological accidents as directed by Director, DASA, and provide staff assistance to the onscene commander specifically in the following areas:

- "a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
- "b. Render-Safe Procedures.





"d. Radiological monitoring of the accident site, personnel, and equipment to determine the degree and extent of the contamination.

- "e. Technical advice on long-range decontamination."
- 2. Paragraphs 4 of the following memorandums (a) HQ DASA

  Memorandum OPWS dated 31 March 1987 to Director, Joint Staff, subject:

  DASA NET Capability. (b) HQ DASA Memorandum OPWS dated 31 March 1987 to Chief of Staff, USAF; Chief of Staff, USA; and Chief of Naval Operations, subject: DASA NET Capability, be revised to read as follows:

"The DASA NET, when deployed to the scene of a nuclear accident will be under the operational control of the onscene commander.


The team will be capable of providing staff support and assistance specifically in the following areas:

- "a. Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
- 'b. Render-Safe Procedures.
- "c. Health Physics.
- "d. Radiological monitoring of the accident site, personnel, and equipment to determine the degree and extent of the contamination.
  - "e. Technical advice on long-range decontamination."
- 3. The following billets and personnel be assigned to DASA NET with primary duty of

Operations Officer (1)

Supply Officer (1)

Supply NCO (1)









## Clerk-Typist (1)

## and Instrument Repairmen (2)

These will be the primary duties of each individual concerned. It is also recommended that a study be conducted to determine the feasibility of utilizing personnel from the Radiological Safety Branch, Test Command, to be permanently assigned as primary duty to the DASA NET. Further, recommend that the study consider the permanent transfer of the Rad Safe Branch to FCDASA, Nuclear Training Directorate. See annex 3, paragraph III, B, 1f for rationale.

- 4. DASA personnel associated with NET operations at the scene of an accident be exchanged periodically to gain needed depth of knowledge and experience of nuclear accident operations.
- 5. FCDASA be assigned responsibility for monitoring Radiac equipment research and development activities, both within the Services and within civilian industry, establishing the military characteristics for items required by FCDASA and/or the DASA NET.
- 6. FCDASA exercise integrated-programing, budgeting, and procurement management over selected DASA radiation-detection equipment. This function could be expanded to include service-wide and worldwide implementation should DASA be assigned this responsibility.
- 7. Paragraph 5g(2), DASA Circular 70-7, be changed to read as follows: The Commander, Field Command; the Commander, Joint Task Force

Eight; the Commander, Test Command; and the Director, Armed Forces
Radiobiology Research Institute, who may further delegate, are authorized
to designate nonexpendable items as expendable for purposes of terminating
accountability when such property is lost, damaged, or destroyed in connection
with atomic tests, and those operations of the DASA NET involving actual
participation of the team in a radiological accident or incident, and pecuniary
liability is not involved. A listing of the nonexpendable items designated as
expendable will be prepared and certified that the property was lost, damaged,
or destroyed in connection with atomic tests or a radiological accident or incident.
A copy of this list will be furnished the Director. Defense Atomic Support Agency.

8. A current roster of Health Physicists be maintained by JNACC. - Description

an pron

SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA, is assigned to protect the compilation of information.







## **ATTENDEES**

## **HQ DASA:**

RADM Dare

CDR Lafferty

LTC McKenzie

LCDR Kolb

## **HQ FCDASA:**

COL Golladay (Chairman)

COL Buckingham

COL Conarty

COL Carson

CAPT Delaware

COL Fitzpatrick

COL Langley

CAPT Maiden

CAPT McElwee

COL McMillin

CAPT Oliver

COL Servis


LTC Larson


LTC Myers

LTC Narrell

LTC Parlette

7









# **HQ FCDASA (Continued):**

LTC Patton

LTC Rucker

MAJ Aukerman


MAJ Dunnam

Mr. Trimberger

## TEST COMMAND:

MAJ McNulty

CPT Brown









## AGENDA FOR CRITIQUE OF

#### DASA PARTICIPATION IN "PROJECT CRESTED ICE"

- I. INTRODUCTION (Chairman).
- II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS (NET OIC): Briefing of the entire DASA NET participation at the scene, to include pictures and a discussion of operational problems.

#### III. NET OPERATIONS.


A. Mission and Concept (OIC NET & DASA): What the DASA NET mission and concept of operations is, should be, and coordination with the Services and/or onscene commander.


### B. Organization:

- 1. Personnel (OIC NET): Present and proposed personnel requirements. Problems in personnel matters, such as orders, pay, replacements, etc.
- 2. Training (OIC NET): Present and proposed training requirements (both individual and team).
- 3. Equipment (OIC NET): Present and proposed standard equipment for the NET. (Climatic variations and developmental requirements will be discussed separately as item  $V_{\bullet}$ )

## C. Logistics (FCLG):

- 1. Transportation (FCLG): Procedures in obtaining required transportation.
- 2. Equipment (FCLG & FCNM): Additional equipment, replacement equipment, and equipment pools (location).










- 3. Supply management and accountability (FCLG): Accountability and report of survey procedures.
  - 4. Funding (FCCT): Funding of NET operations.
- IV. COMMAND POST OPERATIONS.
  - A. HQ DASA (DASA): Briefing on how HQ DASA operates.
- B. FCDASA (FCSM): JNACC mission. Operations at FCDASA during Crested Ice. Proposed procedures during NET operations.
- V. PREPARATION FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS (FCSM): Roundtable discussion of developmental or procurement requirements for supplies and equipment for all climatic variations.
- VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Chairman).








#### PROJECT CRESTED ICE

#### SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS

- I. Summary of operations at Crested Ice given by Captain McElwee for the period 21 January 1968 to 26 February 1968.
- II. Summary completed by Colonel Fitzpatrick for the period 27 February 1968 to 19 March 1968.

#### III. NET OPERATIONS.

- A. Mission and Concept: Concept of operations: Prior to Crested Ice, the DASA NET concept of operations was thought of in terms too small to fit this situation. The NET has the capability of EOD (monitoring/decontamination), setting up a Hot Line, communications, etc.
- 1. When the NET reports to the onscene commander, they become part of his team in the overall effort, and the magnitude of this effort is much greater than can be supported just by the DASA NET.
- 2. Original directives which set up the team stipulated that staff support would be supplied to the onscene commander. Operational support was required of the NET at Crested Ice. Within 2 weeks, the mission of the DASA NET was accomplished; after that, the NET became a part of the work force to clean up the debris, with no relief in sight.
- 3. The initial team deployed with 10 people. When 19 additional personnel were requested by name, 47 were received, including two additional 0-6's. The communication requesting this larger number of personnel was from the SAC Disaster Control Team to HQ SAC, then to DASA. JNACC was informed






by phone of the requirement for 19 additional people, but the SAC message overrode this phone request.

- 4. Information provided to the Services concerning the capability of the DASA NET is too broad.
- 5. The DASA NET is trained to do a very specific job and will do it as long as it is necessary at the scene; but, at the same time, the ultimate support for the accident is provided for by the service who has custody of the weapon.
- 6. Without some specific limitations on the utilization of the team, the emergency mission of the NET is jeopardized.
- 7. There is a communications problem when working for the onscene commander. As members of his staff, the NET provides only an input to composite messages that are being sent. The NET OIC on the spot should be responsible directly to the Director, DASA. This would provide a means of communications directly to the Director, DASA, if needed.
- 8. Decontamination should be accomplished by Service-designated construction personnel. Consideration should be given to earmarking a specific construction battalion for cleanup action.

### B. Organization:


1. Personnel: Troublesome problem areas encountered concerning
NET personnel were pay and replacements.





- a. Negotiation of a pay schedule was difficult. Pay schedules were worked out for Air Force and Army personnel, but for some reason, delay was encountered for Navy personnel.
- b. Once the team reported to the onscene Commander, its membership became fixed, and replacements were not authorized by the onscene Commander, even though qualified replacements were available.
- c. The team should have a contingency fund in the form of advance per diem to pay troops and an imprest fund to buy needed supplies and expendable equipment.
- d. The team OIC should have authority to cut orders returning individuals to home stations in the event of a personal emergency or hardship without having to go through the onscene Commander's staff.
- e. The primary mission of Test Command Radiological Safety
  Branch should be changed to be direct support of the DASA NET.
- f. The NET organization should be augmented by the addition of primary billets for an operations officer, a supply officer, and a noncommissioned officer (supply), two instrument repairmen, and a clerktypist. Training and planning for deployment demand continuity and the fulltime services of an operations officer. When deployed, the operations officer is desperately needed to plan, coordinate, and schedule the daily operations of the NET with the overall operation order of the onscene Commander. The quantity of material and equipment in the custody of the DASA NET requires the maintenance of adequate property records to assure proper accountability






and security of all items. Knowledgeable and properly qualified supply personnel should be assigned for this responsibility on a fulltime, primary-duty assignment. Deployment of the team attested to the need to perform instrument repair at the scene of the accident. It is only prudent to assume this need will occur on any deployment. In addition, during the training cycle of the NET, instruments are in need of constant care, adjustment, or repair to assure their reliability. Two instrument repairmen are considered minimal to provide proper support. Paperwork—schedules, plans, reports, memorandums, etc.—requires the fulltime services of one clerk-typist.

The Radiological Safety Branch, Test Command, is structured and manned to provide the additional billets requested. The Branch now provides, as part of their mission, support for the DASA NET. However, it is considered that a more efficient use of material and manpower would result if this Radiological Safety Branch could be transferred to FCDASA, assigned to the Nuclear Training Directorate with the primary duty as members of the DASA NET. This would, in effect, provide the necessary resources to augment the NET as recommended and allow for the reorganization as shown in annex 5.

- 2. Training: The team, as individuals and collectively, is well trained; however, some additional qualifications should be considered.
- a. Selected team members should be trained in field surveying procedures with the theodolite or transit, and the team equipped accordingly.



- b. Selected team members should be qualified in sampling procedures and equipped accordingly.
- c. Knowledge of location of certified health physicists within the Services should be acquired from the Surgeon General of each service. This list should be updated every 6 months.
- d. JNACC should be able to identify, on a nationwide basis, all assets which would be of value to the NET.
- e. Onscene personnel could have been trained as monitors, using the SPA-3 Probe and the PRM-5 Instruments, at Thule by the Net Team. This training was offered, but the onscene staff was not receptive.
- f. The team must retain members even though they cannot pass one of the NET courses. These people are onboard, filling billets at Test Command. Replacements are not available. They did an excellent job, even though they were unable to complete their courses.
- g. Training in surveying procedures. Good quality, accurate instrumentation is a necessity in plotting and geographically identifying the location of the accident scene where no reference points are available, such as in Thule. This capability might have reduced the time required to complete the mission at Thule. Other systems are impractical because they cannot be plotted for reference on a chart or map.
- h. There is no substitute for training in the field, and the team should be authorized to rotate its personnel to field locations to obtain depth of training from actual experience.








## 3. Equipment:

- a. Radiac Equipment:
- equipment in the Services, but under Crested Ice environmental conditions, this equipment could not do the job. Lawrence Radiation Laboratory personnel arrived with some new laboratory equipment that was more functional in this environment and could perform more operations than equipment on hand in the DASA NET. Some of this new equipment should be available to the DASA NET. Being the only team with a worldwide commitment, the team should be able to perform under any conditions.
- (2) The PRM-5 and PRM-5X with the SPA-3 Probes are commercially available instruments built by Eberline Instrument Company.

  The Fidler probe is strictly a laboratory, custom-built item at the present time.
- (3) Presently, there is no agency in DASA or Field Command which monitors Radiac development.
- (4) Most of the service Radiac instruments are designed on the basis of a wartime criteria, where alpha contamination is not a consideration. However, this problem is very pertinent in a peacetime situation in another country.
- (5) The PRM-5, as it arrived in Thule, was modified to relocate the batteries inside the operator's clothing. The only equipment problem encountered was the power supply of the instrument, not the instrument itself. Procedural changes answered the rest of the team's needs.











- (6) Without shop calibration, a PAC-1S is limited in quantitative measurements. The PRM-5 is more versatile, and it would be a new capability for the team. Alpha radiation cannot be detected **f** it is subsurface. However, with proper instruments and detectors, the emitter substance can be detected. To be effective, the NET should be provided with 15 PRM-5 instruments. This will provide three instruments per each of the four technical teams, plus three instruments as backup replacements.
- b. Mine detectors: Mine detectors were used quite successfully, and these were the modular type. This type detector is the best presently available. The metal-detecting capability has an application in areas where contamination is covered and recovery operations are necessary. Four mine detectors are considered adequate to meet the needs of the NET. This would provide one for each of the four technical teams.
- c. Large, complex equipment which requires constant maintenance and trained technicians is available through other sources, and it need not be purchased for the DASA NET.
- d. The team should increase its capability in terms of clothing for all environmental conditions, and the clothing should be standardized. This clothing should not only be field gear, but personal clothing to replace that which is contaminated.
- e. Clothing and equipment must be budgeted for by the NET and funded by DASA.







f. The M17 Mask with winterizing kit is the best available for use in contaminated areas. Several kits were acquired in Thule, and the team should maintain the availability of these.


## C. Logistics:

- 1. Transportation: FCLG has an SOP prepared on the basis of a 24-hour-day, 7-day-a-week operation. The Duty Officer will notify FCLG at the time the NET Team is alerted. This SOP is prepared to take care of anything and ship it anywhere.
- 2. Equipment: Subjects discussed were equipment, additional equipment, and equipment pools.
- a. It was resolved that once the NET acquires the additional equipment it has requested, it will be fully equipped as far as needs are presently known.
- b. The subject of equipment pools was discussed, and considering the large sum of money involved, together with the probable obsolescence of this equipment over a period of time, the concept was rejected in favor of a procedure to make these items available on demand from the Services. Firm details of this procedure were not resolved at this critique.
- c. Arrangements were discussed to provide maintenance support within FCNM and the NET itself for the new equipment to be purchased.

#### 3. Supply management:

a. Proposals were made and discussed concerning methods of authorizing and accounting for Radiac equipment internally within HQ FCDASA.











Since this was a question of procedures not directly related to the critique and to which there were directly opposing points of view that could not be resolved by the critique participants, it was decided to recommend the question be referred to HQ FCDASA for resolution.

- b. Report of Survey requirements as pertains to NET equipment were discussed and a proposed change to DASA Directive 70-7 was included that would authorize the NET to drop accountability for items lost, contaminated, or damaged as a result of deployment.
  - 4. Funding: Funding of NET operations.
- a. A DOD-AEC agreement establishes that response to accidents involving radioactive material is a reimbursable action. The military service or agency having physical possession of the material is responsible for reimbursing the supporting Services or Agencies for services rendered. It is currently planned to bill the Air Force \$14,000 for travel and \$3,500 for equipment and supplies. Any equipment lost and/or contaminated should be submitted to FCCT in order that the Air Force can be billed and the replacement items can be placed on procurement.
  - D. Command Post Operations:
- Headquarters, DASA. CDR Lafferty presented a briefing on
   HQ DASA operations during and after duty hours as pertains to NET alert. A
   brief discussion was conducted on the exact function of DASA during Crested Ice.
  - 2. FCDASA:









- a. Major Aukerman presented a briefing on the JNACC mission and responsibility. (See attached annex 6 for copy of JNACC log during Crested Ice.) A major point brought out was than JNACC was not kept advised by the Services of the details concerning action being taken on JNACC requests for assets within the Services.
- b. Captain Delaware presented his proposal for a formal Command Post operation within FCSM to be activated at the same time the DASA NET is alerted. This Command Post operation would preclude many of the initial problem areas that occurred during Crested Ice. (See annex 7 for details of the organization and function.) This CP would function during the alert period, even though the NET did not deploy.
  - E. Preparation for Future Operations:
- 1. The probability of deployment was discussed in terms of location and existing climatic variations. It was resolved that the NET could be deployed to all areas with the possible exception of a deep-sea situation. The operation could encompass various types of locations from desolate, remote areas to high-population-density areas, and the NET should be equipped and trained to handle all facets of these extremes. Team equipment and clothing should be provided to enable the NET to function properly under hot, cold, wet, dry, and salty environments.
- 2. The responsibilities of HQ DASA and FCDASA in the field of Radiac equipment are not clearly identified in current directives. It appears that FCDASA should properly be assigned overall responsibility for monitoring research and development in Radiac equipment and to establish requirements for such equipment to be acquired by FCDASA.



It is recommended that:

- 1. Arrangements be made to provide a system for team members to be paid advance per diem against authorized orders. Travel orders to be effective for at least 12 months.
- 2. Arrangements be made to establish an imprest fund which would be used to buy miscellaneous supplies and minor expendable equipment at the site of the accident.
- 3. Proper format and authority to cut orders be given to the OIC to utilize in the event of a personal emergency.
- 4. JNACC acquire knowledge of the location of all certified health physicists within the Services.
- 5. Field Command, Joint Table of Distribution, be changed to identify two or more health physicists by MOS.
- 6. Desirability of establishing program management system for Radiac equipment within DASA and/or Services be resolved.
  - 7. Immediate action be taken to procure the following equipment:
    - a. One transit-type instrument for work in general survey.
- b. Fifteen PRM-5 or 5X instruments with SPA-3 Probes.


  Instruments to incorporate design specifications desired by the DASA NET.

  See annex 3, paragraph IIIB3a(6) for discussion.











- c. Tools for taking samples of earth, snow, ice, water, etc.
- d. One standard typewriter.
- e. Four mine detectors. See annex 3, paragraph IIIB3b for discussion.
- f. Personal clothing for NET members to provide for all-weather conditions.
- 8. When the DASA NET is alerted, a Command Post be established for FCDASA Staff actions.












## JNACC REPORT


At 1450 hours, Headquarters, DASA, Duty Officer called the JNACC Duty Officer and reported a B52 crashed about 7-1/2 miles from

Thule in North Star Bay. CAPT McElwee, the NET OIC, was alerted and started the NET recall. At 1715, DASA notified Field Command that the team would be deployed, and a C-141 would be in from Norton Air Force Base in about 3 hours. As soon as weapon serial numbers were obtained from DASA, FCSM4 initiated a compilation of componen with serial numbers. The information was transmitted to DASA at 0100, 22 January. DASA had also requested pit type and plutonium content of weapons. The request had been passed to AEC-ALO and that information was also transmitted at the above time. The team departed Kirtland AFB via C-141 at 2310 that evening.

22 Jan The team arrived Thule Air Base at 1142.

A telephone call was received from the team and they stated the batteries in their instruments were not suitable for the temperatures encountered. Training Directorate EOD Section was asked to locate local sources of alkaline magnesium cells. They reported 1,000 were available on the local market.









Information was received that the PAC-1S Radiac Probe Cables were breaking due to the extreme cold temperatures. The Eberline Instrument Company was asked to conduct tests on available cables at -40° F. Concurrently, a PAC-1S with alkaline magnesium E-95B cells was tested to a -40° F. by the Sandia Corporation. The test indicated the cables and "D" cells were satisfactory, and 33 cables were ordered from Eberline Instrument Company and 300 batteries were purchased on the local market. Information was also received that indicated a possibility that augmentation personnel would be requested. Twelve PAC-1S Radiacs were checked and packed for

SAC requested the personnel and additional Radiac instruments.

Forty-seven personnel departed Kirtland AFB via C-135 at 1900
hours. Tweeve Radiacs, 300 E95D Batteries, 33 probe cables, 20
battery boxes, 25 special battery cables, and miscellaneous Radiac equipment accompanied the team.

possible shipment with the augmentation personnel.

Augmentation personnel arrived at Thule 0630. Onscene records of reservoirs installed in the weapons did not agree with the information forwarded from Field Command DASA on the evening of the accident.

FCSM4 researched all available logistic change reports and records and verified the initial information.








- 28 Jan Telephone call from Thule indicated a possible need for additional PAC-1S instruments and PG-1 Probes. Numerous calls were made to locate the instruments and probes in case a request was received.
- SAC requested 30 PAC-1S Radiacs from SAAMA; however, the Air Force had no PG-1 Probes. Field Command DASA was requested to locate the required probes. Three probes and 11 additional probe cables were purchased from the Eberline Instrument Company and mailed 31 January. Eleven probes were mailed from the Vandenberg Hospital, 31 January. Two from the Indianhead EOD Facility were mailed 31 January, and seven AN/PDR-60 Radiacs with the PG-1 Probes were shipped from Edgewood Arsenal on 31 January. The NET had in their possession seven probes when they departed Sandia Ba Colonel Fitzpatrick, FCDASA surgeon, was requested to join the team at Thule and departed 31 January.
  - 1 Feb During nonduty hours, the Command Post function transferred to Staff Duty Officer with assistance on an oncall status.
  - The Sandia Corporation, at the request of AEC-ALO, began an analysis of possible weather factors influencing recovery actions.

    Requests for weather information were forwarded to Base Weather Station at Thule.

26





- 9 Feb Major Crim and Capt Brown returned as couriers for ice and samples destined for Dr. Langham, LASL.
- 22 Feb Colonel Buckingham and Capt Coleman returned as couriers for weapon material destined for Rocky Flats.
- Received a request for a Packard Tri-Carb Urinalysis Tester and a

  T-329A/T-289 Urinalysis Tester. Also requested an Eberline Instrument Company representative to proceed to Thule with an experimental

  PRM-5 Radiac instrument for tests under field conditions. Two of
  thes: T-329A/T-289 instruments were prepared by FCNM and shipped
  24 February. A Packard instrument was located at SCLL, and it, along
  with two technicians, departed Stockton via C-97 on 24 February.

  Mr. Jack C. Bentley, Eberline Instrument Company, departed on
  25 February with the requested instrument. All of the above were
  scheduled to depart McGuire AFB, 26 February.
- 27 Feb Team returned to Kirtland AFB at approximately 0030. Four members,

  Col Fitzpatrick, Capt Warren, GMT1 Chadborn, and PFC Brennaman,

  remained as members of the Technical Diversionary Group at Thule.





## DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY FIELD COMMAND SANDIA BASE ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87115

#### STAFF MEMORANDUM

1968


NUMBER


### **PLANS**

#### Nuclear Accident Procedures

- 1. PURPOSE. This memorandum prescribes staff actions to be taken when the DASA Nuclear Emergency Team (NET) is placed on alert or is required to participate in readiness exercises.
- 2. CONCEPT. Field Command staff activities will activate, operate, and support the Command Center whenever the DASA NET is alerted. The center will be manned on a reduced basis during periodic readiness exercises conducted by DASA, or other competent authority, and will not be manned during routine weekly readiness tests conducted by the Officer in Charge, DASA NET.
- 3. AUTHORITY. Chief, Stockpile Management Directorate, or his designated representative, is authorized to alert the DASA NET and to activate the Command Center upon receipt of a nuclear accident notification from any U.S. military or civilian agency or when directed by Director, DASA.
  - 4. NOTIFICATION.
- a. Chief, Stockpile Management Directorate, or his designated representative will:

- (1) Direct the Officer in Charge, DASA, NET, to assemble team members, report to the Command Center for a briefing, and report departure readiness of the team.
- (2) Direct the Chief. Plans and Programs Division. Stockpile Management Directorate, to activate the Command Center. (The Command Center is located in room 34, building 200.)
- Chief, Plans and Programs Division, Stockpile Management Directorate, will request designated staff activity chiefs to dispatch liaison officers immediately to the Command Center.
  - 5. RESPONSIBILITIES. Upon activation of the Command Center:
    - Chief, Stockpile Management Directorate, will:
      - (1) Serve as Director of Operations.
      - (2) Supervise the operation of the Command Center.
      - (3) Coordinate all staff actions in support of the DASA NET.
- (4) Keep Commander, Field Command, and Director, DASA. or their designated representatives, informed on the situation.
- (5) Coordinate required team access to classified areas at Kirtland Air Force Base and furnish the onscene commander with the security clearances of team members by an electrically transmitted message.
  - The Secretary to the Staff will: b.
    - (1) Dispatch a liaison officer to the Command Center.
- (2) Coordinate military air transportation requirements with Kirtland Air Force Base.










- (3) Provide the Director of Operations with copies of the SDO rosters of oncall personnel from the Research and Development Liaison Directorate, Staff Judge Advocate, Comptroller, Safety Engineer, Surgeon, and Information Office.
  - c. Chief, Logistics Directorate, will:
    - (1) Dispatch a liaison officer to the Command Center.
    - (2) Furnish appropriate logistic support.
  - d. Chief, Nuclear Materiel Directorate, will:
    - (1) Dispatch a liaison officer to the Command Center.
- (2) Furnish nuclear materiel support to the DASA NET upon request.
  - e. Chief, Intelligence and Security Directorate, will:
    - (1) Dispatch a liaison officer to the Command Center.
- (2) Provide the Command Center with maps of the accident scene.
- (3) Insure that classified information concerning the accident is released only to authorized personnel.
  - f. Chief, Personnel Directorate, will furnish support as required.
  - g. Chief, Nuclear Training Directorate, will:
    - (1) Dispatch a NET liaison officer to the Command Center.
- (2) Furnish the Command Center with a roster of the names, grades, and parent service of NET members.










- h. The Adjutant General will:
  - (1) Prepare and distribute travel orders as required.
- (2) Furnish the Command Center with copies of all message traffic concerning the accident.
- i. The Comptroller will provide required fiscal support and guidance to the Director of Operations.
- 6. COMMUNICATIONS. The Command Center will function as the single point of contact for communications concerning the accident.
- 7. RELEASE OF INFORMATION. Information concerning a nuclear accident will be disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. Releases to the press and other public news media will be made only by the Information Officer.
- 8. COMMAND CENTER MANNING. Field Command staff activities will be prepared to support continuous manning of the Command Center. If the situation fails to warrant continuous manning by designated liaison personnel, the Director of Operations may authorize liaison officers to maintain an oncall status. During DASA NET readiness exercises conducted by DASA or other competent authority, only the Control Section (inclosure 1) will be required to man the Command Center.

1 Incl
Command Center Manning












Incl 1, FC Staff Memo 320-3

## COMMAND CENTER MANNING


			NUMBER	
SECTION	STAFF ACTIVITY	OFF	EM	CIV
<u>OPERATIONS</u>				
Director of Operations	FCSM	1		
JNACC Representative	FCSM	1		
Duty Officer	FCSM	1		
Communications Officer	FCSM	*1		
Administrative NCO	FCSM		1	
Clerk-Typist	FCSM		1	
SUPPORT				
Secretary to the Staff	FCSS	*1		
Primary Project Officer	FCSM	1		
NET Liaison Officer	FCTG	1		
Logistic Liaison Officer	FCLG	1		
Nuclear Materiel Liaison Officer	FCNM			1
Intelligence & Security Liaison Officer	FCIS	1		


Incl 1





<sup>\*</sup>Function at normal duty locations







# SECTION

Incl 1

	00 A 720 A 00000000		NUMBER		
	STAFF ACTIVITY	OFF	EM	CIV	
ONCALL					
Personnel Liaison Officer	FCPS	*1			
Surgeon's Office	FCSG	*1			
R&D Liaison Officer	FCDV	*1			
Information Officer	FCPI			*1	
Safety Engineer	FCSE			*1	
Staff Judge Advocate	FCJA	*1			

<sup>\*</sup>Function at normal duty locations

UNCLASSIFIED

33

