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
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Chapter XI - Information and the Press (Page XI-1 - XI-20).

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Chapter XIII - Inspector General Activities (Page XIII-1 - XIII-30).

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
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VOLUME II

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CHAPTER VII

VIETNAMIZATION: RVNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION

INTRODUCTION

(S) Although the term "Vietnamization" did not become a formal part of the vocabulary of United States policy in Vietnam until November 1969,* the basic guidelines and plans for the program were organized in 1968 and early 1969. During 1968-69, US policy increasingly emphasized the necessity to develop the self-sufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to the point where they would be minimally dependent on US support. In April 1969, the DEPSEC-DEF said:

Vietnamizing the war should have the highest priority. Providing needed equipment for the RVNAF is therefore of the greatest importance. To assure that equipment turned over to the RVNAF can be used effectively it must be supported by training and logistics support. (1)

(S) In 1970, with the Vietnamization program in its second year and US redeployment cutting manpower by almost one quarter, many changes had occurred and were occurring within the Vietnamese forces. Vietnamization had become the focal point of a US policy which had gone from massive involvement to the carefully planned phaseout of US combat operations. In April 1970, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker presented a series of briefings in Washington on the status of the war. He said:

... we have created an alternative course to follow (alternative to bombing of the North and escalation of US combat strength) so long as the Communists refuse to negotiate in Paris. This, of course, is Vietnamization. It is a course which not only is reducing our own involvement in the war, but carried out to its logical conclusion will leave the South Vietnamese fully capable of resisting Communist aggression on their own. (2)

(S) Planning for the improvement and modernization of RVNAF was contained primarily in the Phase I & II Improvement and Modernization (I & M) Programs and the Phase II Accelerated I & M adopted by the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) in 1968-69. The programs increased the Vietnamese force structure and concentrated on improving training and logistics support. The Phase I program aimed at providing the maximum possible RVNAF ground combat capability at the expense of a balanced, self-sufficient RVNAF. Subsequent modifications of the 1968 Phase I program aimed at expansion of the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) and RVNAF force structure increases to aid the pacification drive.

*President Nixon first used the term publicly in a speech on 3 Nov 69 when he said: "... In the previous administration we Americanized the war; in this administration we are Vietnamizing the search for peace."

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(S) The Phase II program, adopted in late 1968 and revitalized in 1969 under the Accelerated Phase II, aimed at developing a self-sufficient RVNAF capable of coping with an insurgency threat which might remain in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) after mutual US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) withdrawal. The plan necessitated balancing the RVNAF services, army, navy, air force, and increasing the logistical base of each. In addition to the Accelerated I & M, Vietnamization was spurred in August 1969 by the Midway agreements which concentrated on further force structure increases, equipment modernization, and improvement of living conditions for RVNAF personnel and their dependents.

(S) On 13 Mar 70, the Consolidated RVNAF I & M (CRIMP) was approved for FY70-71. Its objective was to achieve qualitative as opposed to quantitative improvement of the RVNAF. This was to be achieved by reorganizing military initiatives more completely under the RVNAF (to eliminate responsibilities of such paramilitary forces as the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups [CIDG] and the People's Self-Defense Force [PSDF]). There would also be continuing emphasis on increasing RVNAF force levels and improving logistics and personnel/dependent living conditions.

(S) By the end of 1969, with the enemy threat somewhat diminished and US redeployments going faster, SECDEF directed COMUSMACV to submit a phase III improvement and modernization plan. Entitled "Vietnamization-RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (Phase III) and Related US Planning," it was submitted in December 1969. The plan assumed US Forces would phase down to a support force by 1 Jul 71 and to an advisory force (Military Assistance Advisory Group [MAAG]) by 1 Jul 73. * It was estimated that the optimum use of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) resources for RVNAF would be 1,061,505. MACV estimated that RVNAF strength would level off at 1,100,000 by FY73. In October 1970, SECDEF requested that MACV study the feasibility and cost savings of reducing the RVNAF force ceiling to 1 million by the end of FY73. COMUSMACV responded with a study showing a considerable savings** but noted: "Any reduction in the RVNAF forces should be largely a function of the enemy threat vis-a-vis RVNAF effectiveness." (3)

(S) Optimism about the eventual success of the Vietnamization policy increased during 1970. However, COMUSMACV and Ambassador Bunker warned that the program was subject to the vicissitudes of war and the customs and culture of the Vietnamese. *** Ambassador Bunker cautioned about asking too much too soon of the Vietnamese: (4)

We must avoid providing more resources than the Vietnamese can digest.

We must avoid compounding an already serious situation with innovations which further dilute the claims on available Vietnamese leadership.

New habits of thinking have yet to be institutionalized, and until this happens, the fabric of Vietnamization remains fragile and subject to disintegration in the face of some traumatic event... Experience requires time, and the risks of Vietnamization within any given time frame must be assessed. (4)

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for projected strength figures.

**See TOP SECRET Supplement for estimated cost savings.

***See TOP SECRET Supplement for comments made by COMUSMACV in October 1970.

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PLANNING OF THE RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE

(S) On 12 Jan 70, President Thieu presented a series of GVN proposals for overhaul of the RVNAF. Included in the proposals, made to Ambassador Bunker and COMUSMACV, was allowance for a force structure of 1.1 million personnel which would permit activation of new combat units for all RVNAF services and require increased training and logistics support. (5)

(S) These proposals were analyzed in the light of SECDEF planning factors of 19 Nov 69. It was assumed that progress in Vietnamization and the level of enemy activity would permit a major reduction of US Forces during FY 71-73 with RVNAF assuming increased responsibility for conduct of all operations. US support in the form of B-52 strikes, air interdiction, coastal aerial surveillance, aerial reconnaissance, naval-gunfire support, and air defense would continue to the degree needed.

(S) It was agreed that GVN resources would be sufficient to support the 1.1 million RVNAF force through FY72, assuming current levels of combat, with marginal capability to sustain the force in FY73.

(S) The MACV breakdown of the 1.1 million force structure for the 3-year period approved for execution or planning on 5 Jun was: (6)

RVNAF	*End FY70	*End FY71	*End FY72	*End FY73
ARVN	390,824	434,019	441,829	447,456
VNN	31,645	39,611	39,611	39,611
VNMC	13,070	13,462	13,462	13,462
VNAF	35,786	38,780	44,712	46,998
RF	275,645	294,446	294,446	294,446
PF	<u>239,390</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>	<u>258,027</u>
TOTAL RVNAF	986,360	1,078,345	1,092,087	1,100,000

ARVN Force Structure

(S) By December 1970, the MACV authorized force ceiling for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) of 390,824 was attained. MACV had approved, in part or whole, increases in the following areas: the addition of two armored brigade headquarters to provide a command and control element for armored cavalry squadrons and infantry, artillery, and engineer units in Military Region (MR) 2 and MR 3; the addition of 176 fire support platoons (105mm), to replace

* Approved for FY70 thru FY72; FY73 approved for planning.

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VII-3

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Order Sec 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.0, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 3.0, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 4.0, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 5.0, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9, 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 7.9, 8.0, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9, 10.0, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 11.0, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, 11.6, 11.7, 11.8, 11.9, 12.0, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8, 12.9, 13.0, 13.1, 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 13.9, 14.0, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, 14.9, 15.0, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, 15.7, 15.8, 15.9, 16.0, 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, 16.8, 16.9, 17.0, 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 17.5, 17.6, 17.7, 17.8, 17.9, 18.0, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 18.5, 18.6, 18.7, 18.8, 18.9, 19.0, 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35.7, 35.8, 35.9, 36.0, 36.1, 36.2, 36.3, 36.4, 36.5, 36.6, 36.7, 36.8, 36.9, 37.0, 37.1, 37.2, 37.3, 37.4, 37.5, 37.6, 37.7, 37.8, 37.9, 38.0, 38.1, 38.2, 38.3, 38.4, 38.5, 38.6, 38.7, 38.8, 38.9, 39.0, 39.1, 39.2, 39.3, 39.4, 39.5, 39.6, 39.7, 39.8, 39.9, 40.0, 40.1, 40.2, 40.3, 40.4, 40.5, 40.6, 40.7, 40.8, 40.9, 41.0, 41.1, 41.2, 41.3, 41.4, 41.5, 41.6, 41.7, 41.8, 41.9, 42.0, 42.1, 42.2, 42.3, 42.4, 42.5, 42.6, 42.7, 42.8, 42.9, 43.0, 43.1, 43.2, 43.3, 43.4, 43.5, 43.6, 43.7, 43.8, 43.9, 44.0, 44.1, 44.2, 44.3, 44.4, 44.5, 44.6, 44.7, 44.8, 44.9, 45.0, 45.1, 45.2, 45.3, 45.4, 45.5, 45.6, 45.7, 45.8, 45.9, 46.0, 46.1, 46.2, 46.3, 46.4, 46.5, 46.6, 46.7, 46.8, 46.9, 47.0, 47.1, 47.2, 47.3, 47.4, 47.5, 47.6, 47.7, 47.8, 47.9, 48.0, 48.1, 48.2, 48.3, 48.4, 48.5, 48.6, 48.7, 48.8, 48.9, 49.0, 49.1, 49.2, 49.3, 49.4, 49.5, 49.6, 49.7, 49.8, 49.9, 50.0, 50.1, 50.2, 50.3, 50.4, 50.5, 50.6, 50.7, 50.8, 50.9, 51.0, 51.1, 51.2, 51.3, 51.4, 51.5, 51.6, 51.7, 51.8, 51.9, 52.0, 52.1, 52.2, 52.3, 52.4, 52.5, 52.6, 52.7, 52.8, 52.9, 53.0, 53.1, 53.2, 53.3, 53.4, 53.5, 53.6, 53.7, 53.8, 53.9, 54.0, 54.1, 54.2, 54.3, 54.4, 54.5, 54.6, 54.7, 54.8, 54.9, 55.0, 55.1, 55.2, 55.3, 55.4, 55.5, 55.6, 55.7, 55.8, 55.9, 56.0, 56.1, 56.2, 56.3, 56.4, 56.5, 56.6, 56.7, 56.8, 56.9, 57.0, 57.1, 57.2, 57.3, 57.4, 57.5, 57.6, 57.7, 57.8, 57.9, 58.0, 58.1, 58.2, 58.3, 58.4, 58.5, 58.6, 58.7, 58.8, 58.9, 59.0, 59.1, 59.2, 59.3, 59.4, 59.5, 59.6, 59.7, 59.8, 59.9, 60.0, 60.1, 60.2, 60.3, 60.4, 60.5, 60.6, 60.7, 60.8, 60.9, 61.0, 61.1, 61.2, 61.3, 61.4, 61.5, 61.6, 61.7, 61.8, 61.9, 62.0, 62.1, 62.2, 62.3, 62.4, 62.5, 62.6, 62.7, 62.8, 62.9, 63.0, 63.1, 63.2, 63.3, 63.4, 63.5, 63.6, 63.7, 63.8, 63.9, 64.0, 64.1, 64.2, 64.3, 64.4, 64.5, 64.6, 64.7, 64.8, 64.9, 65.0, 65.1, 65.2, 65.3, 65.4, 65.5, 65.6, 65.7, 65.8, 65.9, 66.0, 66.1, 66.2, 66.3, 66.4, 66.5, 66.6, 66.7, 66.8, 66.9, 67.0, 67.1, 67.2, 67.3, 67.4, 67.5, 67.6, 67.7, 67.8, 67.9, 68.0, 68.1, 68.2, 68.3, 68.4, 68.5, 68.6, 68.7, 68.8, 68.9, 69.0, 69.1, 69.2, 69.3, 69.4, 69.5, 69.6, 69.7, 69.8, 69.9, 70.0, 70.1, 70.2, 70.3, 70.4, 70.5, 70.6, 70.7, 70.8, 70.9, 71.0, 71.1, 71.2, 71.3, 71.4, 71.5, 71.6, 71.7, 71.8, 71.9, 72.0, 72.1, 72.2, 72.3, 72.4, 72.5, 72.6, 72.7, 72.8, 72.9, 73.0, 73.1, 73.2, 73.3, 73.4, 73.5, 73.6, 73.7, 73.8, 73.9, 74.0, 74.1, 74.2, 74.3, 74.4, 74.5, 74.6, 74.7, 74.8, 74.9, 75.0, 75.1, 75.2, 75.3, 75.4, 75.5, 75.6, 75.7, 75.8, 75.9, 76.0, 76.1, 76.2, 76.3, 76.4, 76.5, 76.6, 76.7, 76.8, 76.9, 77.0, 77.1, 77.2, 77.3, 77.4, 77.5, 77.6, 77.7, 77.8, 77.9, 78.0, 78.1, 78.2, 78.3, 78.4, 78.5, 78.6, 78.7, 78.8, 78.9, 79.0, 79.1, 79.2, 79.3, 79.4, 79.5, 79.6, 79.7, 79.8, 79.9, 80.0, 80.1, 80.2, 80.3, 80.4, 80.5, 80.6, 80.7, 80.8, 80.9, 81.0, 81.1, 81.2, 81.3, 81.4, 81.5, 81.6, 81.7, 81.8, 81.9, 82.0, 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.4, 82.5, 82.6, 82.7, 82.8, 82.9, 83.0, 83.1, 83.2, 83.3, 83.4, 83.5, 83.6, 83.7, 83.8, 83.9, 84.0, 84.1, 84.2, 84.3, 84.4, 84.5, 84.6, 84.7, 84.8, 84.9, 85.0, 85.1, 85.2, 85.3, 85.4, 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101.8, 101.9, 102.0, 102.1, 102.2, 102.3, 102.4, 102.5, 102.6, 102.7, 102.8, 102.9, 103.0, 103.1, 103.2, 103.3, 103.4, 103.5, 103.6, 103.7, 103.8, 103.9, 104.0, 104.1, 104.2, 104.3, 104.4, 104.5, 104.6, 104.7, 104.8, 104.9, 105.0, 105.1, 105.2, 105.3, 105.4, 105.5, 105.6, 105.7, 105.8, 105.9, 106.0, 106.1, 106.2, 106.3, 106.4, 106.5, 106.6, 106.7, 106.8, 106.9, 107.0, 107.1, 107.2, 107.3, 107.4, 107.5, 107.6, 107.7, 107.8, 107.9, 108.0, 108.1, 108.2, 108.3, 108.4, 108.5, 108.6, 108.7, 108.8, 108.9, 109.0, 109.1, 109.2, 109.3, 109.4, 109.5, 109.6, 109.7, 109.8, 109.9, 110.0, 110.1, 110.2, 110.3, 110.4, 110.5, 110.6, 110.7, 110.8, 110.9, 111.0, 111.1, 111.2, 111.3, 111.4, 111.5, 111.6, 111.7, 111.8, 111.9, 112.0, 112.1, 112.2, 112.3, 112.4, 112.5, 112.6, 112.7, 112.8, 112.9, 113.0, 113.1, 113.2, 113.3, 113.4, 113.5, 113.6, 113.7, 113.8, 113.9, 114.0, 114.1, 114.2, 114.3, 114.4, 114.5, 114.6, 114.7, 114.8, 114.9, 115.0, 115.1, 115.2, 115.3, 115.4, 115.5, 115.6, 115.7, 115.8, 115.9, 116.0, 116.1, 116.2, 116.3, 116.4, 116.5, 116.6, 116.7, 116.8, 116.9, 117.0, 117.1, 117.2, 117.3, 117.4, 117.5, 117.6, 117.7, 117.8, 117.9, 118.0, 118.1, 118.2, 118.3, 118.4, 118.5, 118.6, 118.7, 118.8, 118.9, 119.0, 119.1, 119.2, 119.3, 119.4, 119.5, 119.6, 119.7, 119.8, 119.9, 120.0, 120.1, 120.2, 120.3, 120.4, 120.5, 120.6, 120.7, 120.8, 120.9, 121.0, 121.1, 121.2, 121.3, 121.4, 121.5, 121.6, 121.7, 121.8, 121.9, 122.0, 122.1, 122.2, 122.3, 122.4, 122.5, 122.6, 122.7, 122.8, 122.9, 123.0, 123.1, 123.2, 123.3, 123.4, 123.5, 123.6, 123.7, 123.8, 123.9, 124.0, 124.1, 124.2, 124.3, 124.4, 124.5, 124.6, 124.7, 124.8, 124.9, 125.0, 125.1, 125.2, 125.3, 125.4, 125.5, 125.6, 125.7, 125.8, 125.9, 126.0, 126.1, 126.2, 126.3, 126.4, 126.5, 126.6, 126.7, 126.8, 126.9, 127.0, 127.1, 127.2, 127.3, 127.4, 127.5, 127.6, 127.7, 127.8, 127.9, 128.0, 128.1, 128.2, 128.3, 128.4, 128.5, 128.6, 128.7, 128.8, 128.9, 129.0, 129.1, 129.2, 129.3, 129.4, 129.5, 129.6, 129.7, 129.8, 129.9, 130.0, 130.1, 130.2, 130.3, 130.4, 130.5, 130.6, 130.7, 130.8, 130.9, 131.0, 131.1, 131.2, 131.3, 131.4, 131.5, 131.6, 131.7, 131.8, 131.9, 132.0, 132.1, 132.2, 132.3, 132.4, 132.5, 132.6, 132.7, 132.8, 132.9, 133.0, 133.1, 133.2, 133.3, 133.4, 133.5, 133.6, 133.7, 133.8, 133.9, 134.0, 134.1, 134.2, 134.3, 134.4, 134.5, 134.6, 134.7, 134.8, 134.9, 135.0, 135.1, 135.2, 135.3, 135.4, 135.5, 135.6, 135.7, 135.8, 135.9, 136.0, 136.1, 136.2, 136.3, 136.4, 136.5, 136.6, 136.7, 136.8, 136.9, 137.0, 137.1, 137.2, 137.3, 137.4, 137.5, 137.6, 137.7, 137.8, 137.9, 138.0, 138.1, 138.2, 138.3, 138.4, 138.5, 138.6, 138.7, 138.8, 138.9, 139.0, 139.1, 139.2, 139.3, 139.4, 139.5, 139.6, 139.7, 139.8, 139.9, 140.0, 140.1, 140.2, 140.3, 140.4, 140.5, 140.6, 140.7, 140.8, 140.9, 141.0, 141.1, 141.2, 141.3, 141.4, 141.5, 141.6, 141.7, 141.8, 141.9, 142.0, 142.1, 142.2, 142.3, 142.4, 142.5, 142.6, 142.7, 142.8, 142.9, 143.0, 143.1, 143.2, 143.3, 143.4, 143.5, 143.6, 143.7, 143.8, 143.9, 144.0, 144.1, 144.2, 144.3, 144.4, 144.5, 144.6, 144.7, 144.8, 144.9, 145.0, 145.1, 145.2, 145.3, 145.4, 145.5, 145.6, 145.7, 145.8, 145.9, 146.0, 146.1, 146.2, 146.3, 146.4, 146.5, 146.6, 146.7, 146.8, 146.9, 147.0, 147.1, 147.2, 147.3, 147.4, 147.5, 147.6, 147.7, 147.8, 147.9, 148.0, 148.1, 148.2, 148.3, 148.4, 148.5, 148.6, 148.7, 148.8, 148.9, 149.0, 149.1, 149.2, 149.3, 149.4, 149.5, 149.6, 149.7, 149.8, 149.9, 150.0, 150.1, 150.2, 150.3, 150.4, 150.5, 150.6, 150.7, 150.8, 150.9, 151.0, 151.1, 151.2, 151.3, 151.4, 151.5, 151.6, 151.7, 151.8, 151.9, 152.0, 152.1, 152.2, 152.3, 152.4, 152.5, 152.6, 152.7, 152.8, 152.9, 153.0, 153.1, 153.2, 153.3, 153.4, 153.5, 153.6, 153.7, 153.8, 153.9, 154.0, 154.1, 154.2, 154.3, 154.4, 154.5, 154.6, 154.7, 154.8, 154.9, 155.0, 155.1, 155.2, 155.3, 155.4, 155.5, 155.6, 155.7, 155.8, 155.9, 156.0, 156.1, 156.2, 156.3, 156.4, 156.5, 156.6, 156.7, 156.8, 156.9, 157.0, 157.1, 157.2, 157.3, 157.4, 157.5, 157.6, 157.7, 157.8, 157.9, 158.0, 158.1, 158.2, 158.3, 158.4, 158.5, 158.6, 158.7, 158.8, 158.9, 159.0, 159.1, 159.2, 159.3, 159.4, 159.5, 159.6, 159.7, 159.8, 159.9, 160.0, 160.1, 160.2, 160.3, 160.4, 160.5, 160.6, 160.7, 160.8, 160.9, 161.0, 161.1, 161.2, 161.3, 161.4, 161.5, 161.6, 161.7, 161.8, 161.9, 162.0, 162.1, 162.2, 162.3, 162.4, 162.5, 162.6, 162.7, 162.8, 162.9, 163.0, 163.1, 163.2, 163.3, 163.4, 163.5, 163.6, 163.7, 163.8, 163.9, 164.0, 164.1, 164.2, 164.3, 164.4, 164.5, 164.6, 164.7, 164.8, 164.9, 165.0, 165.1, 165.2, 165.3, 165.4, 165.5, 165.6, 165.7, 165.8, 165.9, 166.0, 166.1, 166.2, 166.3, 166.4, 166.5, 166.6, 166.7, 166.8, 166.9, 167.0, 167.1, 167.2, 167.3, 167.4, 167.5, 167.6, 167.7, 167.8, 167.9, 168.0, 168.1, 168.2, 168.3, 168.4, 168.5, 168.6, 168.7, 168.8, 168.9, 169.0, 169.1, 169.2, 169.3, 169.4, 169.5, 169.6, 169.7, 169.8, 169.9, 170.0, 170.1, 170.2, 170.3, 170.4, 170.5, 170.6, 170.7, 170.8, 170.9, 171.0, 171.1, 171.2, 171.3, 171.4, 171.5, 171.6, 171.7, 171.8, 171.9, 172.0, 172.1, 172.2, 172.3, 172.4, 172.5, 172.6, 172.7, 172.8, 172.9, 173.0, 173.1, 173.2, 173.3, 173.4, 173.5, 173.6, 173.7, 173.8, 173.9, 174.0, 1

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US 1st Inf Div Base camp in MR 3 is turned over to the Vietnamese during ceremonies in February. From left to right: LTG Do Cao Tri, ARVN MR 3 commander; MG Hieu, ARVN 5th Inf Div commander; MG Albert E. Milroy, CO, 1st Inf Div; and LTG Julian J. Ewell, CO, US II FFV.

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ARVN artillery located in static firing positions in order to provide fire support for RF/PF, population security and protection of key land and water lines of communications (LOCs) (it would also free ARVN artillery for mobile operations); increase of two 175mm gun battalions to replace US 175mm units along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); and two air defense artillery battalions.

(S) Analysis of the ARVN combat capability, absorption of materiel, and expertise (training) in operating it, revealed that shortfalls would occur in artillery: (7)

FY71	FY72	FY73
Medium artillery	Medium artillery	Medium artillery
Heavy artillery	Heavy artillery	Heavy artillery
Long range artillery		
Combat force to adjust to contingencies	Combat force to adjust to contingencies	

(S) Major ARVN Units (as of 1 Jan 71) (8)

Combat Units	Auth	Act	Deployed	Unit Strength	Total Strength
Inf Bn	133	133	133	605	89,394
Abn Bn	9	9	9	834	7,506
Ranger Bn	17	17	17	655	11,135
Ranger Bn (5th Gp)	3	3	3	745	2,235
Cav Sqdrn	17	17	17	698	11,876
Combat Support					
105mm How Bn (Div)	30	30	30	503	15,090
105mm How Bn (Abn)	3	3	3	485	1,455
105mm How Bn (Sep)	7	7	7	511	3,577
155mm How Bn (Div)	10	10	10	532	5,320
155mm How Bn (Sep)	5	5	5	540	2,760
175mm Gun Bn (Sep)	2	0	0	613	1,226
ADA Wpns Bn (Sep)	2	0	0	572	1,144
Sector Arty Plts	176	100	53	29	5,104
Combat Services Support					
Signal Support Bn	3	3	3	431	1,293
Engineer Const Bn	17	17	14	605	10,285
Land Clearing Co	3	3	2	200	600
Truck Co					
Dump Trk	4	4	4	111	444
Lt Trk (Sep)	32	32	32	180	5,760

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	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Unit Strength</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
Truck Co					
Lt Trk (Div & Abn)	11	11	11	152	1,672
Mdm Trk	8	7	7	180	1,440
Ord Co DS	28	26	23	200	5,600
Mdm Boat Gp	5	5	5	181	905
Hvy Boat Gp	1	1	1	143	143
Craft Maint Gp	1	1	1	228	228
				TOTAL	186,192*

VNN Force Structure

(S) By December 1970, the MACV authorized Vietnamese Navy (VNN) force ceiling of 31,645 was reached. The GVN asked for a 1971 force ceiling increase of 4,915 which was increased by MACV to 7,966 to provide personnel for support functions for the enlarged tactical units. This raised the 1971-73 force ceiling to 39,611. (9)

(S) The rationale for the VNN increase was contained in the Accelerated Turnover Plan (ACTOV) developed in November 1968 to provide the VNN with a base to meet the threat posed by the TET offensive. Even the combined USN/VNN force approved in the Phase II I & M of 1969 was insufficient to meet the threat posed in all parts of the country. The Phase III I & M, with its emphasis on overall assumption of combat responsibilities by PVNAF, provided for the equipping and manning of the VNN to the point where it would require no USN support except tactical air and airlift.

(S) By the end of CY70, all but six of the operational craft authorized for turnover under ACTOV had been transferred. Over 1,300 operational and 127 support boats were transferred. This completed the first phase of ACTOV which called for VNN receipt of operational assets. The second phase covered turnover of support craft and the third, termination of the USN advisory effort.

VNN (as of 1 Jan 71, (10)

(S) Type of Craft

<u>Riverine</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Transferred</u>
**RAC	224	224
**PBR	293	293
**LCM	6	6

*This figure does not include personnel in training and in the pipeline.

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<u>Riverine</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Transferred</u>
**LCVP	68	68
**LST	5	5
**LSSL	6	6
**MLMS	10	10
**MON (LCM-6)	32	32
**ST CAN	16	16
**LCM-6	64	64
**LCM	14	14
**RPC	29	29
**VEDETTE	<u>24</u>	<u>24</u>
TOTAL	791	791

<u>Coastal</u>		
*MSC	3	3
*PGM	20	20
*JUNKS	246	246
**BOSTON WHALER	26	26
**LCM 3/6 (MINE)	19	19
**LCPL	24	24
**MSM	8	8
**MSR	6	6
**PICKETS	<u>26</u>	<u>20</u>
TOTAL	378	372

<u>Offshore</u>		
*DER	2	0
*PCE/PC	9	9
*PCF	107	107
*WHEC	2	2
*WPB	<u>26</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	146	144

<u>Support</u>			<u>Transfer Date</u>
AGP	2	1	Apr 71
APL	2	0	3/71
ARL	2	1	8/71

*Blue Water 415
**Brown Water 900

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A US Coast Guard captain signs documents turning over Coast Guard cutters to the Vietnamese.
A lieutenant commander accepts the boats for the Vietnamese Navy.

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<u>Support</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Transferred</u>	<u>Transfer Date</u>
CSB	4	3	2/71
BOSTON WHALER	57	6	TBD
LCM-3 (FIRE)	2	2	
LCM-6 (FUEL)	8	7	6/71
LCM 3/6	62	16	Last 6/71
LCM-8	46	25	1/71-6/72
LCM 3/6 (PUSHER)	6	0	4/71
YFR	1	0	2/71
YLLC	3	2	6/71
YR	2	1	
YG	1	1	
YWN	3	3	
YRBM	2	1	10/71
YTL	8	7	2/71
YTM	3	0	6/72
UTB (100)	6	4	6/72
YD	2	0	4/72
LCVP (FIRE)	1	1	
LSM-H	2	2	
TRANSPORT BARGE	7	7	
YRPM	1	1	
OIL BARGE	7	7	
LCU	16	12	1/71, 7/71
			1/72, 4/72
YOG	6	4	3/71, 4/72
LST	6	6	
AKL	1	1	
LSM	5	5	
YON	1	1	
TOTAL	275	127	

VNMC Force Structure

(S) By December 1970, the MACV authorized Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) force ceiling of 13,070 was attained. The GVN proposed an increase of 171 for 1972 which was raised 392 to 13,462 for FY71-73 by MACV. The increase was for engineer support and an additional brigade headquarters. In 1970, two infantry battalions and a 105mm artillery battalion were activated; this completed the VNMC's programmed unit increase.


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
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Vietnamese sailors take possession of river patrol boats turned over to the Vietnamese Navy by the US early in 1970.



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VNMC (as of 1 Jan 71) (11)

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Deployed</u>	<u>Unit Strength</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
<u>Combat</u>					
Inf Bn	9	9	9	876	7884
<u>Combat Support</u>					
Art Bn (105)	3	3	3	510	1530
<u>Combat Svc Spt</u>					
Hqs Bn	1	1	1	1230	1230
Svn Bn	1	1	1	662	662
Med Bn	1	1	1	568	568
TOTAL					11,874*

VNAF Force Structure

(S) The FY70 MACV authorized Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) force ceiling of 35,786 was realized by December. The GVN proposed an increase of 6,437 over the 1970 force ceiling for 1973; this was increased by MACV to 11,212. The FY71 force structure was set at 38,780; FY72, 44,712; and FY73, 46,998. Analysis of air defense and combat support requirements showed a need for expansion in air assault, forward air control (FAC), transport, attack/fighter, and reconnaissance/surveillance.

(S) Additional helicopter squadrons (UH-1) were required to provide air assault capability for rifle companies, search and rescue, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Additional A-1 and A-37 squadrons were required for fire power support to maneuver battalions. An average of 2 1/4 sorties were required daily for each maneuver battalion during May-September 69. To meet the sortie level for 1970 of one sortie per aircraft per day, 254 fighter aircraft would be needed. Additional FACs were necessary due to the increase in fighter aircraft. USAF experience in Southeast Asia (SEA) showed that the ratio of tactical fighters to FACs was 8 to 1. Although the VNAF would not attain this standard, the recommended force increase was considered the minimum necessary and maximum attainable by the end of FY73. Two C-7 squadrons would have to be added to provide economical short-field airlift capacity for resupply and troop movement. The C-7 was the only fixed-wing aircraft operable in many of the small airfields in remote areas. Without the C-7, VNAF would be unable to resupply units serviced by airfields with runways less than 2,000 feet. One squadron of EC-47 was recommended to provide an airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) capability. Basic airframe maintenance and supply would present no new problems since C-47s and AC-47s were already in the VNAF inventory. Absence of ARDF would limit intelligence gathering by RVNAF.

*This figure does not include personnel in training and in the pipeline.

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
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Top: GEN Cao Van Vien, Chief of the RVNAF Joint General Staff, and Robert C. Seamans, Secretary of the US Air Force, shake hands during turnover ceremonies at Soc Trang airfield which was transferred to the Vietnamese late in 1970. Behind GEN Vien is GEN Creighton W. Abrams, commander of US Forces in Vietnam. Bottom: American and Vietnamese pilots celebrate the transfer of 40 A-37 jets from the US Air Force to the Vietnamese Air Force at Bien Hoa airbase in October.



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units. MACV also established a requirement for additional photo reconnaissance. Additional RC-47s were to be provided for this operation.* (12)

VNAF (as of 1 Jan 71) (13)

Type Aircraft	Total Authorized Sqs/Acft	Squadrons Currently Activated	Squadrons Operation- ally Ready	Remarks
Helicopters				
UH-1	16/496	10	4	Last activation June 72 Last O/R Mar 73.
CH-47	2/32	1	0	Last Activation May 72 Last O/R Feb 73. To convert to UH-1 Jun 72.
H-34	0/0	1	1	
Fighter Attack				
F-5	1/18	1	1	
A-1	4/96	3	2	Last activation Nov 72 Last O/R May 73.
A-37	6/144	5	3	Last activation Oct 72 Last O/R Apr 73.
Gunships				
AC-47	1/18	1	1	
AC-119	1/18	0	0	Activation Sep 71 O/R May 72.
Liaison Composite				
O-1/U-17	8/256	5	4	Last activation Dec 72 Last O/R May 73.
Recon Composite EC-47				
RC-47, U-6,				
RF-5	1/27	1	1	
EC-47	1/20	0	0	Activation Dec 72 O/R May 73.
Transport				
C-47	1/16	1	1	
C-119	1/16	1	1	
C-123	2/48	0	0	Last Activation Jul 71 Last O/R Apr 72.
C-7	2/48	0	0	Last activation Jun 72 Last O/R Mar 73.

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for information on MACV anticipated shortfalls for VNAF, 1971-73.

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Vietnamese Air Force crewmen stand before one of 62 UH-1 "Huey" helicopters turned over to the Vietnamese in November at Soc Trang airfield.

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<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Authorized Sqs/Acft</u>	<u>Squadrons Currently Activated</u>	<u>Squadrons Operation- ally Ready</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Air Defense MAP Fighter	1/18	0	0	Activation Jun 73 O/R Jan 74.
<u>Special Air Missions</u>				
Composite VC-47 UH-1, U-17	1/10	1	1	
<u>Training Squadron</u>				
T-41	1/18	1	1	
TOTALS	50/1299	32	21	

RF/PF Force Structure

(S) The RF were understrength at year's end. The MACV 1970 authorized force ceiling for the RF was 271,634 for December; there were 206,517 personnel on duty at that time. The PF were slightly overstrength at 246,336. The authorized PF ceiling in December was 239,390.

(S) The GVN proposed a force structure increase of 49,983 for FY71 whereas MACV recommended 37,438. The authorized force ceiling for the RF from 1971-73 was set by MACV at 294,446 and for the PF at 258,027. (14) The major differences between the GVN and MACV proposals were deletion of 25 RF battalions and 20 RF/PF group headquarters by MACV, plus the addition of 1,527 spaces for the RF pipeline. MACV recommended 19 RF battalions be activated. In December, 26 out of a total of 29 RF battalions authorized were operational, and all 1,697 RF rifle companies authorized by the end of 1970 were operational. (15) MACV approved 508 additional PF platoons to meet GVN pacification and development requirements. (16) Recruiting for the platoons began on 1 Jun 70; in December, of a total of 7,479 authorized, 7,113 PF platoons were operational. (17)

Summary of RVNAF Force Structure

(S) The MACV recommended force structure for CRIMP was approved by SECDEF on 5 Jun 70.* It established an improved balance of RVNAF forces with increased firepower and tactical mobility, introduced sensors and a target acquisition radar system into ARVN, increased artillery support for RF/PF operations, and added 175mm heavy artillery gun battalions. A limited

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for statistics on GVN force structure requests, 1970-73, and subsequent MACV authorizations.

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air defense capability, beginning in FY72, was to consist of two anti-aircraft battalions and one squadron of air defense aircraft. The VNN was provided the capability to assume full control of riverine and coastal operations, less aerial surveillance. Consideration was also given to logistical self-sufficiency in all services by FY73.

(C) The strength figures cited on preceding pages represent only those authorized by MACV for the JGS to enroll and which, therefore, were covered by US military funding. In all branches except the RF, the JGS reported that the force ceiling was higher than authorized. For instance, in the 3d Qtr of 1970, the ARVN were reported as having 412,571; this was 21,967 more than the ceiling approved by MACV. (18) Whether this excess was actually on duty, trained, equipped, and paid was questionable.

REORGANIZATION OF RVNAF

(C) President Thieu, in guidance to the JGS on 22 Jun, stated the RVNAF would consist of three armed services, ARVN, VNAF, and VNN; the RF and PF would no longer be separate services, but would become ARVN components with no change in organization and employment. The RF would be the main force at province and district level. After cessation of hostilities, the PF would revert to the Ministry of Interior.

(C) On 2 Jul, President Thieu signed two decrees which made the above and following changes effective 1 Jul: (19)

1. Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs) were renamed military regions (MRs).
2. The corps/CTZ commander became the corps/MR commander and was subordinate to the Chief of the JGS. He would have a corps deputy commander and a military region deputy commander.
3. Division tactical areas (DTA) were disestablished, with each infantry division assuming a tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) initially conforming to old DTA boundaries but subject to later change depending upon the tactical situation.
4. The Quang-Da and 44th Special Tactical Zones were initially retained, but would disband and be incorporated into existing MRs.
5. The Capital Military District was subordinated to MR 3.
6. Subsectors became subordinate to sectors, sectors subordinate to MRs.
7. The title RF/PF commander at JGS, corps, and sector levels was abolished.

(C) These changes were intended to improve territorial security, unity of command, and to strengthen the pacification and development program. Under this new organization, the training and leadership of the RF/PF and logistics support to RF/PF units were expected to improve.

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(C) Based on President Thieu's instructions and the RF organization, the mission of corps and MRs was established as follows: (20)

1. Mission of corps:

- a. Conduct operations to destroy enemy main force and disrupt base areas.
- b. Coordinate with the MR in planning and conducting operations in support of pacification and development programs.
- c. Conduct reaction operations in support of the MR to relieve enemy pressure and reinforce territorial forces.
- d. Attach forces to the MR when the situation so requires.
- e. Provide fire support (air, artillery, naval gunfire) and other support to the MR.
- f. Command and control organic assigned and attached units.

2. Missions of the MR:


- a. Territorial defense: plan and conduct search and destroy operations against enemy main and local forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure, and border defense responsibilities.
- b. Territorial security: protect LOCs, sensitive points, administrative and economic installations, consolidate outpost systems and national resources.
- c. Pacification/development: conduct military efforts, operations, and provide forces in support of the pacification and development program.
- d. Civil defense: advise and assist local governments in organization of the PSDF and assist the government in counter riot operations to maintain public security.
- e. Plan and manage territorial intelligence systems and area communications.
- f. Manage defense manpower and material resources and organize and train home reserves.
- g. Command, training, and administration of territorial forces and command of subordinate units and other attached units.

(S) Creation of the four MRs on 1 Jul was possibly the first step toward establishment of six MRs by dividing the MRs 2 and 4 into two MRs each (the creation of six MRs was formulated by President Thieu and developed by the JGS). (21)

(U) On 7 Jul, the Minister of Defense (MOD) signed a decree on JGS reorganization complementing the decrees of President Thieu. This formalized the existing dual structure of the JGS, i. e., the Chief of the JGS was also the Commander of ARVN, and various echelons of JGS were ARVN staff elements. The major changes made RF and PF part of ARVN; disestablished the title and office of Vice Chief of the JGS (who was also the RF/PF commander); established an

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Assistant for Pacification and Development under the Chief of the JGS; placed the Inspector General (IG) Directorate under the Chief of the JGS, with the RF/PF IG incorporated into the IG Directorate; assigned the National Defense College to the MOD; disestablished the Special Forces Command, converting some functions and personnel to ARVN and incorporating the rest in an unconventional warfare task force; activated the Special Operations Center for JGS J3 as a counterpart of the MACV J3-04 Special Operations Division. (22)

(C) As reported to SECSTATE on 13 Jul, MACV did not expect the reorganization of the RF and PF to impact with adverse effect on current or planned operations and foresaw no significant disadvantages from the changes. Consolidation of the RF/PF with ARVN was seen as a means of improving the "second class" image of the RF/PF. A possible danger was the RF/PF becoming a manpower source for regular ARVN units to the detriment of RF/PF missions. (23)

(U) On 3 Aug a MACV directive authorized a revision of references to correspond to JGS terminology:

The Corps numerical designator is written in Roman numerals and precedes Corps; the Military Region numerical designator is written in Arabic numerals and follows Military Region, e. g. "II Corps and Military Region 2"... II Corps/II CTZ Commander is changed to "II Corps and Military Region Commander" or "II Corps & MR 2 Commander". (24)

RVNAF STRENGTH

(C) This section deals with the specifics of RVNAF force ceilings as part of the 1970 I & M program (see chart). During the first half of the year RVNAF strength increased at a satisfactory rate; by the end of June all forces except the RF exceeded the authorized strength, because JCS was recruiting on the basis of the FY71 program. However, there were large numbers in the pipeline which reduced the number actually in combat and support organizations.

(C) The VNAF continued to have a higher percentage of its personnel in pipeline (43 percent) than any of the other services. This was due to the large number in training and the lengthy training cycles.

(C) The VNN pipeline reached 39 percent due also to the large number in training.

(C) ARVN strength decreased approximately 2,700 personnel by mid-year due to low recruiting, high desertion rates, and increased combat losses. Although the ARVN pipeline decreased approximately 2 percent (due to graduates in training centers and service schools), it still contained approximately 94,000 personnel. Of this number, approximately 49,000 were in training, 32,000 were medical cases, and more than 12,000 were administrative cases [in and out processing, awaiting trial, prisoners of war (PW), and missing in action (MIA)].

(C) The VNMC increased by approximately 700 personnel and added one maneuver battalion.

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(C) RF/PF strength increased approximately 5,000 by mid-year, and the force structure changed, adding 72 RF companies and 296 PF platoons. Personnel in the pipeline stayed at about 44,000; medical and administrative cases, rather than training, made up the bulk of the pipeline. (25)

(C) RVNAF Recruitment Figures CY 1970 (26)

	Jan	Jun	Dec	Cumulative thru Dec
Volunteers	17,743	20,430	15,305	244,004
Conscripts	4,474	2,750	3,498	<u>43,603</u>
Total for year thru December				287,607


MORALE

(S) TET 1968 was the first major event that indicated RVNAF morale was improved and capable of bearing up under the harshest pressure the enemy could muster. Since 1968, RVNAF morale has been effected by many other developments, victories on the battlefield, stable government, a stronger economy and the receipt of the same war materiel that the US provided to its own fighting men. Morale improved from all this but still remained a problem. The lowest paid sector of the economy continued to be the government employee. The RVNAF soldier had received a series of pay raises, but his stock in South Vietnamese society was still one of the lowest. With a majority of the country mobilized in the armed forces, it became a major problem for the GVN to provide them with a comfortable manner of daily living. (27)

(C) MACV aided the GVN in its efforts to improve the welfare of the RVNAF and their dependents by organizing a study group in January 1970 to conduct an in-house survey of RVNAF morale to complement JGS/GVN studies also underway. Those areas found to have the greatest impact on RVNAF morale were: leadership, hygiene and medical care, transportation, initial reception into service, entertainment and recreation, leave, social benefits, veterans' benefits, pay entitlements, term of service, awards and decorations, religious affairs, food, clothing, and family shelter. Food, clothing, and family shelter were pinpointed as most important.

(C) COMUSMACV concurred with the findings of the study group and directed MACV to work in conjunction with JGS to improve RVNAF morale. The US commitment was to be realistic in terms of the budgetary, personnel, and material resources available to the RVN. The solutions would have to be developed in the context of Vietnamese customs, avoiding US measures that might be unsuitable. Self-help programs would be the main impetus of the US involvement in this area. The ACofS, J1, (MACJ1) was assigned to monitor progress and report on a quarterly basis. (28)

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(C) At the end of 1970 the status of major areas affecting morale was: (29)

Food: DOD approved Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) support for canned meats and shortening over a 3-year period. MACV delayed initiation of the program until an RVNAF distribution plan was approved. MASF support of food service equipment for the RVNAF mess halls was approved and equipment procured. (See Chapter IX for a description of the program.)

Housing: The construction program for upgrading housing conditions at training centers and schools was proceeding on schedule. An RVNAF facilities inventory to determine bachelor officer quarters (BOQ) and barracks requirements was about 40 percent complete. JGS established an RVNAF dependent shelter management office to provide centralized direction and control over planning, programming, and execution of the dependent shelter program. An 8-year dependent shelter program providing for 200,000 units was underway. Of 16,000 scheduled for completion in CY70, 7,700 were completed with 5,600 under construction. (See Chapter IX for a description of the program.)

Clothing: Sufficient sateen for 408,105 sets of fatigues and nylon netting for 376,342 mosquitos nets was procured with MASF funds for the RVNAF clothing production centers.

Pay: Pay was increased approximately 19 percent on 1 Oct for servicemen. A new RVNAF pay manual was being prepared.

Leave: A JGS memorandum dated 30 Jul 70 provided guidance and responsibilities for uniform implementation of a program for providing transportation in an effective manner to RVNAF personnel going on or returning from leave.

Entertainment and Recreation: JGS was establishing rest camps. Because of funding shortages the program encouraged conversion of existing facilities and local self-help projects.

Summary: The ongoing programs outlined above have had a beneficial effect. However, they must be viewed in the context of the changing RVNAF role. Many factors were counter productive to improved morale during 1970. The RF/PF and RVNAF assumed a greater responsibility for combat missions. Cross-border operations, increased time away from base camps and home, decreased US assistance, all have tended to degrade morale.

(C) On the other hand, increased combat activity leading to increased success on the battlefield tended to improve morale. As the combat situation stabilizes, morale programs approach their goals, and RVNAF commanders at all levels demonstrate increased concern for the welfare of their men, morale should improve. The most positive indication of improvement in morale was the increased effectiveness of the RVNAF units in combat.

RVNAF LEADERSHIP

(S) RVNAF leadership left much to be desired in the years prior to the 1968 TET offensive. Since TET there was gradual improvement in the calibre of leadership at all ranks and in the

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training given to leaders. This was a particularly pressing point for MACV because studies of deserters showed that most came from units with notably poor direction. Some commanders were unmindful of the needs of personnel, venal, corrupt, and inept in combat. ARVN had some outstanding leaders, but poor performers often were replaced only after much hesitation. This stalled promotion of younger, better qualified personnel.

(S) Early in FY70, MACV, using the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER), evaluated 243 officers commanding divisions, regiments, and battalions, rating 59 percent above average in leadership, 23 percent as average, and 13 percent below average; 5 percent were not rated because they were of recent assignment. For those rated above average, US advisors described them as aggressive, courageous, responsive to their men, and able to motivate. Those rated below average were unaggressive, indifferent to the mission and personnel, and without motivation and initiative.

(S) The evaluation concluded that improvement of leadership in combat would yield more than four times the improvement in combat effectiveness that an equivalent increase in quality of personnel would. Adequate leadership potential appeared to exist in ARVN, but more effort was required to replace the mediocre with more aggressive, intelligent leaders.

(C) By mid-1970, leadership had generally improved but continued to be a problem especially among lower ranking officers and NCOs. Specialized courses at division training centers and increased numbers of small unit operations were serving to correct this deficiency. Lack of aggressiveness continued to be the big problem. (30)

(C) At the end of 1970, a MACV report summarized the status of RVNAF leadership as follows:

Leadership in the Vietnamese Armed Forces is improving at a satisfactory rate quantitatively and qualitatively. The Chief, Joint General Staff and the JGS as a unit are performing in an eminently satisfactory manner. The appointment of new commanders of MRs 2 and 4 during 1970 makes all four MR commanders excellent choices who are performing well. With few exceptions division and regimental commanders are considered satisfactory. The quality of leadership at battalion and lower levels in both regular and territorial forces is expected to improve as projected force levels are reached. More selectivity will be possible for procurement and promotions and qualified replacements will become available to relieve the ineffectiveness. Current JGS programs of inspections and visits are causing all forces to become more responsive to orders and directives from higher headquarters. (31)

(S) Another problem was the availability of qualified leaders of sufficient rank for the job. In 1969 little progress was made in increasing the number of battalion commanders holding the rank of lieutenant colonel. Infantry divisions were most deficient; about 54 percent of maneuver battalion commanders were captains in January 1970 (no change since the 1st Qtr of 1969) and only three battalions were commanded by lieutenant colonels. In December the situation had improved with 37 percent of maneuver battalions still commanded by captains. The ARVN, VNMC, and

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RF/PF all showed satisfactory improvements in grade balances by the end of the year. The VNN and VNAF, however, still had acute grade imbalances. A JGS committee recommended special actions to alleviate this problem, but satisfactory grade fills were not expected until after 1971. (32)

(S) In November, MACV reorganized its advisory effort as it related to leadership. At each advisory level advisors were charged with a continuing analysis using support documentation of inadequate Vietnamese command performance. When completed, the advisor evaluations were to be forwarded through US advisor channels until they reached the level of GVN authority that could be expected to act on the matter. A formal recommendation for removal would be made to the appropriate official at that level. In the case of senior GVN officials such action would be personally handled as in the past by the Ambassador, COMUSMACV, or the Deputy Ambassador.

(S) In a message to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV commented on the importance of leadership in the Vietnamization program and the then current situation in the senior ranks:

The direct relationship between effective GVN leadership and the Vietnamization program is appreciated and this matter will continue to receive command attention. Heartening progress has been made in this regard during recent months. The Chief, JGS, and the JGS, as a unit, are performing in an eminently satisfactory manner. The four MR commanders are excellent choices and to date have been performing well. Based upon a 10 Nov assessment by US field commanders, one of the twelve division commanders is considered unsatisfactory and his relief has been recommended to the GVN. One is considered marginal and his performance will continue to be closely monitored. Of the 33 infantry regiment commanders, US field advisors report marginal performance by only two as of 10 Nov. (33)

RVNAF Officer and NCO Strengths (34)

Regular Forces			Regional Forces		
30 Nov 70			30 Nov 70		
<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	
875	338	O-6	57	8	
2,555	1,369	O-5	499	144	
6,182	3,420	O-4	1,224	645	
13,780	8,040	O-3	5,025	3,490	
<u>29,179</u>	<u>33,224</u>	<u>LT/ASP</u>	<u>15,616</u>	<u>15,659</u>	
52,571	46,391	TOTAL	23,321	19,934	
6,539	4,287	E-8	2,948	1,466	
18,716	11,294	E-7	4,213	3,336	
35,877	33,143	E-6	17,190	17,988	
<u>81,191</u>	<u>69,543</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>32,832</u>	<u>30,779</u>	
142,323	118,267	TOTAL	57,183	53,569	

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RVNAF PROMOTION SYSTEM

(S) There had been no major renovation in the RVNAF officer promotion system since 1965, but some reform took place in 1968 and 1969. In October 1968, the JGS published a directive which incorporated into one document numerous policy and procedural memorandums issued over the years. It was an administrative step forward and established a promotion system which should have increased the overall responsiveness to force demands.

(S) In 1968, the JGS established a series of promotion goals to achieve 90 percent of authorized strength in all officer and NCO grades for the combined regular and regional forces by the end of 1970. The goals for 1968 and 1969 were not met; continued force structure increases and a lack of eligible and qualified personnel for promotion goals for all grades prevented attainment of the goals in 1970 as well.

(C) In September 1970 the percentages of officer and NCO fill by grade for the respective services were: (35)

	COL	LTC	MAJ	CPT	E-8	E-7	E-6
ARVN	52%	62%	80%	60%	83%	72%	100%
VNAF	10	13	18	40	45	29	79
VNN	20	44	31	25	40	63	53
VNMC	29	50	53	55	215	81	69
RF	16	22	46	53	51	79	101

NOTE: RVNAF goal for end CY70 was 90 percent in all grades.

RVNAF Promotion Goals

(Percent of Authorized Strength in Grade) (35)

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>End 1969 (actual)</u>	<u>1969 Shortfall</u>
COL	40	60	90	39	-21
LTC	60	70	90	53	-17
MAJ	65	80	90	64	-16
CPT	70	90	90	63	-27
E-8	70	80	90	70	-10
E-7	40	85	90	73	-12
E-6	80	90	90	103	+13
E-5	109	123	100	98	-25

(C) The RVNAF promotion system was well-defined by the JGS in 1968. The promotion system was centralized within the JGS for all of the armed services; a selection board was convened annually for all officer and NCO grades. Even though well-defined, there was a continual

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shortfall in reaching promotion quotas and goals, particularly in the officer ranks. The shortfall in promotions for personnel in the VNAF and VNN was particularly noticeable. For example, the results of the RVNAF annual promotion board (held in 1969 and announced in February 1970) showed that approximately 7,000 officer promotions had been approved. However, only about 1,700 were actual grade changes. The remaining promotions were conversions from temporary to permanent grades.

(C) Results of the RVNAF promotion board which convened in May 1970 to consider officers for functional promotion to O-6 and below were announced in September (promotions were effective 1 Jul 70): (37)

	<u>Recommended</u>	<u>Approved</u>
COL	120	71
LTC	467	205
MAJ	863	277
CPT	1,712	794

(C) On 1 Aug 70 President Thieu signed a decree promoting 28 high ranking officers. The promotions consisted of promoting to the functional rank commensurate with duty and in a number of cases making permanent the functional rank already held. There were 21 actual grade changes, 2 LTC, 9 MG/RADM, and 10 BG/commodore. (38)

(C) On 22 Aug, the Ministry of National Defense requested the JGS to consider and promote to the next higher grade those battalion and company or equivalent commanders who were permanent captains or lieutenants. The JGS expanded this guidance to include second lieutenants and aspirants commanding platoons. On 18 Jan 71, 577 were promoted effective 1 Jan 71. (39)

(C) During 1970 officer and NCO (E5 and above) strengths increased by 8,480 and 17,934 respectively. A total of 31,381 officers and 51,390 NCOs were promoted. (40)

(U) A comprehensive evaluation of RVNAF personnel systems, published in April 1970, concluded the promotion system needed major improvement, citing specifically that the officer and NCO promotion selection procedures were especially inadequate for VNN and VNAF. A study to determine the feasibility and desirability of establishing separate promotion selection boards for those two services was recommended. (41)

(U) Other problems and recommended actions were:

1. There was inadequate consideration of skill levels and qualifications in the promotion of VNAF and VNN enlisted personnel. For promotion of enlisted personnel, the basic eligibility criterion was time in grade. Promotion considerations included nature of the unit to which assigned and formal training, evaluation by commanding officers, and awards for meritorious or valorous service. While all were significant, none of the criteria reflected the actual skill level and degree of qualification the man attained. The RVNAF promotion system did not ensure, therefore, that personnel who were promoted had the skills and qualifications required for their grade. This created problems for the VNAF and VNN in many technical areas. Personnel attaining senior NCO status in the VNN or VNAF were frequently required to supervise the operation and care of sophisticated equipment or to be responsible for complex and important

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operations. If the senior NCO lacked the skills required of his grade, the operational effectiveness of his unit was seriously reduced. It was recommended that grade to skill qualification standards be developed, used as minimal prerequisites for promotion to E4 and above, and the degree of qualification be given major weight in the promotion point system for the VNN and VNAF.

2. There were inconsistencies in the promotion system as it applied to Women's Armed Forces Corps (WAFC) personnel. While WAFC personnel were supposed to be considered with all other RVNAF personnel in the annual promotion selection, there were cases where WAFC personnel were apparently considered, selected, and listed separately. It was recommended that all promotion selection boards be instructed to consider them at the same time, under the same criteria as other RVNAF personnel, and that WAFC selectees be listed in the consolidated selection lists. This action would help to provide fair promotion consideration and would provide correct promotion dates for WAFC selectees.

3. The manner in which the prerequisite for eligibility for promotion to major (a ninth grade level diploma required) was applied had caused discontent. The requirement was designed to raise the educational level requirements for field grade officers without penalizing those field grade officers who had already achieved their rank without it (the diploma was not required for higher level promotion). Many officers believed this was an inequity in the system. It was recommended that the prerequisite be retained but an explanation of its rationale be disseminated and provision be made to take educational level equivalency examinations for personnel desiring to qualify for major. It was also recommended that the CofS, JGS, be empowered to waive the educational requirement in exceptional cases.

4. There was a need to establish separate RF and regular force battlefield promotions for NCOs and enlisted men (EM). The system, as it had existed, allocated quotas to each MR, the VNAF, VNN, Special Forces, Airborne, and VNMC. The four MRs and the VNN were allocated quotas which included RF personnel as well as regular force personnel. Results from 1969 showed that for the most part, field commanders had not taken maximum advantage of battlefield promotion quotas; during the last 6 months, for example, only 32 percent of the total allocated quota for enlisted personnel had been used. By far the greater number of battlefield promotions went to the regular forces. To ensure fair and equitable consideration of RF personnel, it was recommended that two separate quotas be given to the designated commanders, one for the regular forces, and one for the RF. (42)

DESERTION

(C) The problem of desertion in the RVNAF and particularly within the ARVN and VNMC, was a matter of continuing command concern to MACV and the JGS. Total RVNAF gross desertions for 1968 were 139,670, the largest single cause of manpower loss. As a result of JGS anti-desertion programs in 1969, some progress was made; the number of deserters dipped to 123,363. In 1970, however, gross desertions were already 138,152 by 30 Nov. (see 1970 desertion summary in this section). * (43)

*The net desertion loss by 30 Nov was 117,159. This lower figure is obtained by subtracting from gross desertions the number of deserters who eventually return to duty.

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(C) In 1969, the Vietnamese high command initiated a number of measures aimed at reducing desertion. Two actions were particularly noteworthy. Desertion control committees were organized at each echelon from JGS to regimental level. These committees conducted regular meetings and submitted reports through commanders of the units to the JGS. The committees stimulated command interest, performed studies of causes of desertion, and provided an exchange of ideas on methods to reduce desertions. A basic cause which surfaced in all studies was a lack of motivation on the part of some leaders to understand all responsibilities associated with command, particularly as concerned the personal welfare of the servicemen.

(C) The second major anti-desertion effort was the initiation of the "New Horizons" campaign by the General Political Warfare Department. This program was designed to improve the administration, intelligence, operations, training, logistics, leadership techniques, indoctrination and motivation of selected units in RVNAF. Detailed discussion of this campaign was presented in the 1969 MACV Command History, Vol II.

Causes of Desertion

(C) The causes of desertion were numerous. Surveys conducted by agencies of the JGS, JGS interviews with deserters in military prisons, US advisor estimates, and correlational analyses of SEER ratings revealed that desertions were more likely to be caused by socio-economic rather than military factors. For example, cowardice or fear of death or danger was not a prime factor in most desertions. The predominant cause appeared to be concern for family; most other causes could be related directly or indirectly to this. Poor leadership appeared to be the main, purely military cause. The JGS presented an extended list of desertion causes which fell into six groups: (44)

1. Deficiencies in leadership at the small-unit level.
2. Homesickness.
3. Concern for the welfare of the soldier's family.
4. Poor quality of military life (poor troop mess and housing facilities, too little leave, lack of transportation, failure to receive entitlements, etc.).
5. Fear of hardship and danger.
6. Inability to enforce laws against desertion and lenient treatment of deserters.


(C) Interviews of 520 imprisoned deserters revealed that nearly 70 percent left their units because of homesickness or the financial hardship of their family; only 15 percent felt fear of death was a reason for desertion. The interviews also showed that the soldier was more likely to desert while in camp than on leave; 58 percent of the prisoners deserted while in camp, 4 percent on operations, and 38 percent while on TDY or leave. The deserter was usually caught or reported in his home corps. Seventy-five percent of deserters had more than 6 months of service, while only a fourth had served less than 6 months. These findings tended to support homesickness and concern for family as the major desertion causes. (45)

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RVNAF
GROSS DESERTION RATE
1970



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(C) According to MACV analysis, there appeared to be no relation between the rate of pay and desertion. Although all regular force personnel were on the same pay scale, a comparison of desertion rates showed that the rate of desertion varied by service and component. The PF had the lowest pay scale of the three RVNAF forces (regular and RF/PF); however, they had the lowest desertion rate. Increased pay was apparently not of itself the way to reduce desertion. (46)

(C) According to US advisor estimates, the major military causes of desertion were protracted operations, isolated location, and poor leadership. Advisors considered only poor leadership a purely military factor. Protracted operations (since they reduced the amount of time a soldier could spend with his family) and isolated location (since the serviceman often had to leave his family behind) were considered more socio-economic in nature; (47)

<u>Military Factors</u>	<u>US Advisors Estimate (Percent)</u>
Protracted Operations	35
Isolated Location	26
Poor Leadership	16
Excessive Patrols w/o Contact	8
Low Unit Morale	8
Intense Combat	4
Inactivity	2
Excessive Punishment	2

1970 Desertion Summary

(C) Desertion rates were higher in 1970 than 1969. There were higher desertion figures in 9 months in 1970 than in 1969. The VNMC continued to be most deficient, reaching a record high of 47.6 desertions per thousand men in January 70; the number dropped to 34.1 by December. Other December figures were: ARVN, 15.8; VNN, 2.8; VNAF, 2.5; RF, 12.3; PF, 6.3. (48)

(C) Despite efforts by the JCS to correct the aforementioned practices which abetted desertion, many were still prevalent in large degree throughout the year. Additional causes cited by numerous MACV and JCS agencies were: a large increase in force strength (the average monthly strength for 1970 increased 14.3 percent over that of 1969); initiation of Cambodian operations; and an increase in assumption of responsibilities for combat and defense activities with the withdrawal of US Forces. (49)

RVNAF PERSONNEL SYSTEMS EVALUATION (PSE)

Background

(U) The lack of an adequate occupation specialty code management system had long hampered personnel support of the RVNAF. Increased assumption of responsibility for combat operations

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highlighted the need to improve the capability of personnel systems to determine requirements and process and distribute appropriately trained replacements, especially in response to combat losses. Accelerated activation, improvement and modernization of RVNAF units, increases in the RF/PF, and the transfer of RVNAF personnel to the National Police on an attached basis placed excessive demands on available manpower resources. To cope with these complex requirements it was determined all RVNAF personnel systems required evaluation in depth. Through the combined efforts of JGS/J1 and MACJ1 and a combined JGS/MACV committee, a 3-month study was conducted in late 1969. The results were published in April 1970 as a joint document and distributed throughout RVNAF and MACV echelons of command. (50)

Implementation of PSE

(U) On 30 Apr, MACV membership on the combined JGS/MACV Implementation Committee was established. A MACV directive emphasized the importance of effective implementation and established the modus operandi as follows:

To be effective, PSE implementation must be approached systematically by all participating MACV and RVNAF agencies. Therefore, each MACV member of the combined committee is to serve as the MACV point of contact in PSE matters for his agency and its RVNAF counterpart agency. In addition, each MACV member is to assist his RVNAF counterpart and insure that for each problem for which it is the designated action agency, his counterpart RVNAF agency establishes long-term objectives, methods of achievement, and insurance that short-term solutions are compatible with long-term objectives. (51)

MACV staff agencies of personnel (MACJ1), Military Assistance (MACMA), Training (MACT), Adjutant General (MACAG), and Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (MACCORDS) were designated primary monitors under supervision of MACJ1 for the implementation of actions required in each of the seven major functional systems evaluated: (52)

<u>RVNAF System</u>	<u>Function Definition</u>	<u>MACV Monitor Agency</u>
Programming	That system which forecast personnel requirements in quantity and quality consistent with GVN goals and objectives.	MACMA
Procurement	That system which provided manpower to meet RVNAF requirements; its chief function was to bring eligible personnel into the military service, either through recruitment or conscription.	MACJ1
Individual Training	That system which trained the recruit in necessary skills and specialties that qualified him as a suitable replacement, which qualified him to perform effectively.	MACT

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<u>RVNAF System</u>	<u>Function Definition</u>	<u>MACV Monitor Agency</u>
Distribution	That system which provided personnel assets to satisfy the requirements set by manpower programming.	MACJ1
Personnel Management and Services	The extensive system which implemented policies and procedures whereby the serviceman was administered and sustained throughout his period of active service and which terminated following separation.	MACAG
Separations and Veterans Affairs	The system in which the Ministry of War Veterans replaced the Ministry of National Defense in caring for the veterans and in providing a pension, rehabilitation, vocational training or job placement.	MACCORDS
Reporting System	That system which provided personnel information to all users and was the feedback process of the total RVNAF personnel system.	MACJ1

TRAINING

(U) The 8-year period of the Indochina War (1946-1954) saw the establishment of practically all of the RVNAF service schools. The partition of Vietnam and the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords brought about the end of French colonial rule. The lack of historical foundation and continuity caused by French rule, the partition of the country, and the serious hardships inherent in conducting training in a combat environment were major obstacles in the development of the RVNAF training facilities.

(U) The RVNAF military education system developed into a centrally controlled system of 32 army training centers and 25 schools, as well as separate training facilities operated by the navy, marine corps, and air force. At the close of 1969, there were deficiencies throughout the training program. The primary problems were inadequate facilities and lack of sufficiently qualified instructors. Accelerated buildup of the RVNAF, the requirement to improve its quality and develop its capability to assume roles heretofore accomplished by US Forces made it paramount that combined efforts of the JCS and MACV be focused on improvement and modernization of the entire training base. The degree to which Vietnamization would succeed hinged on how rapidly and how well the Vietnamese could be trained to accomplish the task. It was clear that there would be simultaneous requirements to train more units and more individuals in an increasing range of subjects and to improve the quality of training.

(U) RVNAF training was accomplished at in-country RVNAF centers and schools, on-the-job training (OJT) with US and Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) units, and to a

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very limited extent offshore in CONUS. The impact of Vietnamization and the resultant increase in RVNAF force structure made OJT even more important and expanded its role over previous years. A MACV directive expressed the importance of the role of OJT in the total RVNAF training program:

All facets of the improvement and modernization of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are being closely monitored and evaluated at the highest levels of the United States Government. The status of training in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is the key indicator of the progress being made toward self-sufficiency, and on-the-job training is one of the most vital areas within the training program. (53)

RVNAF Training Capability

(C) During the first 3 months of 1970, MACT surveyed training centers and service schools (commanded or monitored by the Central Training Command [CTC]) to evaluate the capability of each. Results published in April provided data for developing new upgrading programs, improving existing programs, and setting priorities for all upgrading programs. (54)

1. Favorable Areas:

a. Instruction was generally satisfactory in service schools and adequate in training centers.

b. The availability of all types of equipment, particularly training equipment, was adequate. Major shortages generally existed only in service schools requiring many sophisticated and expensive items, e.g., Intelligence School, Signal School, Transportation School.

c. Overall, the availability of training aids was adequate.

d. Security requirements, although requiring a major effort by most training facilities, were being met satisfactorily without effect on accomplishment of the training mission.

2. Unfavorable Areas:

a. Most of the programs of instruction (POIs) had been translated into English but few of the lesson plans. This was due to the very limited translation capability available to most field advisory elements and the feeling among many advisory personnel that translation of lesson plans was unnecessary.

b. Testing of recruits in training centers was not consistent throughout and was not meeting minimum requirements in a number of cases. It varied from well-organized "country-fair" type series, to oral and practical exercise tests, to nothing but weapons qualification.

c. Physical facilities did not meet minimum requirements in a number of schools and training centers. An unwarranted amount of advisory effort was devoted to improvement of facilities at the expense of the conduct of training. The lack of adequate utilities (water, electricity, and sewerage) was the major deficiency. Billeting of students and trainees met only

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minimum requirements. In the case of training centers, minimum requirements were met only because a large percentage of trainees slept on the perimeter each night. The lack of adequate dependent quarters was acute and adversely influenced the training mission by promoting low cadre morale.

d. The authorized cadre strength at training centers was insufficient in many cases, and authorized and assigned strengths differed considerably among training centers of approximately the same trainee population.

e. Offshore trained personnel assigned to training centers were inadequately and inequitably distributed.

f. Problems continued both from shortfall and overfill resulting from the inability of provinces and districts to supply trainees in accordance with published schedules.

g. Audio/visual aids (movie projectors, viewgraphs, training films) were in adequate supply but were not being utilized.

h. Student handouts were not being used sufficiently to reinforce instruction, particularly in training centers.

i. Allocation of all funds, to include funds for training support, maintenance and repair of facilities, and subsistence was inadequate.

(U) The majority of these problems had been addressed and were in various states of progress by the end of 1970.

RVNAF Central Training Command (CTC) Training Centers

(S) Training centers became overcrowded following enactment of the 1968 GVN mobilization decree and the influx of volunteers following the TET offensive. The expanded role of the RF/PF precipitated training load increases which were handled by developing training sites on already available facilities such as garrisons; these were often inadequate and austere. Overcrowding deteriorated the quality of training. To correct this, the JCS implemented the Popular Force Training Center (PFTC) Consolidation Plans in 1969-69. The number of PF training centers were reduced and control was centralized under the CTC. The CTC introduced the Training Center Improvement Plan aimed at upgrading training center physical plants. Implementation of the plan was very slow and on a very small scale; lack of resources and time precluded large efforts, except on a self-help basis.

(S) The national training centers (NTC) included programs of training for NCO and Officer Candidate School (OCS); PSDF; RF/PF reconnaissance units; new RF companies and RF company refresher courses; long range reconnaissance patrol; jungle/mountain/swamp course; navy basic training; ARVN/RF CCI infantry course; ARVN/RF combat training; and advanced individual training. The Ranger Training Center and the five national training centers were: (55)

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
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RVNAF TRAINING CENTERS

LEGEND

- NTC - NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
- RFTC - REGIONAL FORCE TRAINING CENTER
- PFTC - POPULAR FORCE TRAINING CENTER
- RTC - RANGER TRAINING CENTER



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<u>National Training Center</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Rated Capacity</u>
Dong Da	1	Thua Thien	3,500
Lam Son	2	Khanh Hoa	7,200
Duc My(Ranger)	2	Khanh Hoa	1,800
Quang Trung	3	Gia Dinh	12,000
Van Keip	3	Phouc Tuy	3,500
Chi Lang	4	Chau Doc	3,500*
			<u>31,500</u>

(S) The regional force training centers (RFTC) included programs of instruction for new RF company basic unit training and refresher training, ARVN/RF basic combat and advanced individual training, RF NCO refresher courses, and ARVN RF CCI infantry courses: (56)

<u>Regional Forces Training Center</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Rated Capacity</u>
Phu Cat	2	Binh Dinh	2,200
Cao Lanh	4	Kien Phong	4,200
			<u>6,400</u>


(S) The PFTC conducted programs almost exclusively for the PF basic combat training, advanced individual training, platoon leadership, squad leadership, political warfare, aidman instruction, radio operation, platoon basic unit training, and platoon refresher. PFTCs also had courses for ARVN/RF basic combat training and advanced training: (57)

<u>Popular Forces Training Center</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Rated Capacity</u>
Thua Thien**	1	Thua Thien	1,500
Quang Nam	1	Quang Nam	2,000
Quang Ngai**	1	Quang Ngai	1,500
Binh Dinh**	2	Binh Dinh	1,500
Ninh Thuan**	2	Ninh Thuan	1,500
Pleiku	2	Pleiku	1,500
Darlac	2	Darlac	500
Tuyen Duc**	2	Tuyen Duc	500
Binh Duong**	3	Binh Duong	1,500
Tay Ninh	3	Tay Ninh	1,500
Phouc Tuy	3	Phouc Tuy	1,500
Vinh Long	4	Vinh Long	2,000
Dinh Tuong**	4	Dinh Tuong	2,000
Bac Lieu	4	Bac Lieu	1,500
			<u>20,500</u>

*Projected facilities upgrade program would revise capacity to 10,700.

**Substandard and would not meet training requirements without extensive investment of funds and materials.

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Graduation ceremonies at the Vietnamese Naval Training Center, Cam Ranh Bay.

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
(S) The average training center population was consistently above the rated capacity. Excluding the five NTCs, the majority lacked adequate training areas and facilities. A study of RVNAF requirements for FY70-75 revealed training center capacity inadequate to support requirements without a major construction and rehabilitation program. To avoid costly construction and rehabilitation programs, a plan was developed to consolidate training centers. Studies showed improvement and modernization of 10 selected centers would be far less costly than rehabilitation of all 22 centers: (58)

<u>Training Center</u>	<u>Capacity as of Sep 70</u>	<u>Capacity After Consolidation</u>	<u>Inactivation Date (as of Feb 71)</u>
1. Dong Da*	3500	5000	N/A
Thua Thien	1500		Nov 70
2. Quang Nam*	2000	3500	N/A
Quang Ngai	1500		Feb 71
3. Pleiku*	1500	2500	N/A
Darlac	500		Feb 71
Tuyen Duc	500		Jan-Jun 71
4. Lam Son*	7200	8700	N/A
Ninh Thuan	1500		Jul-Dec 72
5. Phu Cat*	2200	3700	N/A
Binh Dinh	1500		Nov 70
6. Quang Trung*	12000	15000	N/A
Tay Ninh	1500		Mar 71
Binh Duong	1500		Jan-Jun 72
7. Van Keip*	3500	5000	N/A
Phuoc Tuy	1500		Jul-Dec 71
8. Cao Lanh*	4200	4200	N/A
9. Chi Lang*	3500	5000	N/A
Dinh Tuong	2000		Jan-Jun 71
Bac Lieu	1500		Jan-Jun 72
Vinh Long	2000		Jul-Dec 72
10. Duc My Ranger TC*	1800	5000	N/A

*Residual Training Center

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ARVN DIVISION TRAINING CENTERS



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(S) Advantages of the consolidation plan were: elimination of centers with marginal growth potential and concentration of resources in centers with potential as permanent training installations; large savings in the long run; reduced cadre requirements making for more highly qualified instructors; more centralized control; increased standardization of training programs and instruction techniques; and reduced requirements for US advisors. (59)

(S) Disadvantages of the consolidation plan were: possible increase of desertion and AWOL rates (existing locations minimized the adjustment of the homesick recruit since he was often within a few kilometers of his home and could be visited by family on weekends); and LOCs were inadequate to cope with the relatively greater distances involved in the movement of trainees (shortfalls in input at training centers were often attributable to transportation inadequacies). (60)

(S) Division training centers (DTC) provided ARVN/RF basic combat and advance individual training, a Tae Kwon Do (form of karate) program, ARVN battalion refresher training, and other courses as required by the needs of the division. Each of the 10 ARVN divisions had its own training center with a capacity of 600:

<u>Division Training Centers</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>Province</u>
1st	1	Thua Thien
2d	1	Quang Ngai
22d	2	Binh Dinh
23d	2	Da Nang
5th	3	Binh Duong
18th	3	Long Khanh
25th	3	Tay Ninh
7th	4	Dinh Tuong
9th	4	An Giang
21st	4	Ba Xuyen

RVNAF Offshore Training 1971-73

(S) The US Military Assistance Training Program (MATP) sponsored offshore training for the RVNAF which included training at US installations in CONUS and overseas; in military service schools; observer training, orientation tours, and attendance at US civilian universities. The estimated RVNAF offshore requirements indicated below were those required to assist RVNAF in attaining self-sufficiency by 1 Jul 73; (61)

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>
ARVN	1,072	1,010	948
VNAF	2,012	1,171	374
VNN	1,671	344	389
VNMC	36	35	39
TOTAL*	4,791	2,560	1,750

*Includes spaces for English language instructor training at the Defense Language Institute.

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(S) The JGS/MACV Combined Campaign Plan 1971 indicated that the development of intermediate and advanced training in specialized areas at RVNAF training facilities would be emphasized in 1971 to replace offshore courses. (62)

(C) ARVN In-Country Training (63)

	Programmed (CY70)		Actual (CY70)	
	1st Half	2d Half	1st Half	2d Half
ARVN/RF Recruit	75,258	103,399	89,253	73,917
OCS Prep	6,840	4,140	4,801	2,437
OCS	8,510	2,500	6,216	7,042
NCO Prep	2,700	2,300	2,945	3,037
NCO	9,600	11,850	8,960	9,163
PF Plt Ldr	2,205	2,825	1,518	2,435
PF Squad Ldr	3,125	4,205	4,089	3,031
PF Recruit	11,410	17,967	13,353	15,936
Cmd & Staff College	500	500	409	434
Nat'l Def College	40	0	25	1
English Language	5,177	6,059	4,692	4,930

ARVN Offshore Training

(C) During CY70, 832 ARVN personnel were programmed to receive offshore training at US military schools and installations in CONUS and overseas. The actual input was 792, a program effectiveness of 95.2 percent. Courses were available in: signal equipment maintenance repair, harbor craft engine operator, microwave radio repair, radio systems officer, topographical engineer officer, dial central repair officer, weapons support battery maintenance, fixed plant carrier equipment, map compiling, seaman, automotive repair, teletypewriter equipment repair. (64)

ARVN OJT

(C) The ARVN did not have an official OJT program. On 23 Jan 70, the ARVN published JGS Memo #0711, Personnel Designated for On-The-Job Training with US Personnel, to provide policy guidance for ARVN commanders with personnel being trained by US units. The RVNAF

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PSE recommended the CTC establish a directive which would define OJT procedures for RVN. A proposed RVNAF OJT memo was presented to the CTC by MACT in late December 1970 for review and consideration for implementation into their system. From 1 Jan 70 to 31 Dec 70, 46,916 RVNAF personnel were trained on-the-job by US Forces. (65)

ARVN Artillery Training

(C) The RVNAF Artillery Command implemented a new training program entitled "The Reorganization Technique Plan." It was developed to raise the technical proficiency level of all ARVN artillery units. It was a three-phased program on an 11-month time frame: (66)

1. Phase I (1 Jan to 28 Feb 70)--The Artillery Command developed the concepts and disseminated instructions to artillery units. Lesson plans were developed and disseminated. Mobile instruction teams were formed by each artillery battalion.

2. Phase II (2 Mar to 28 Mar 70)--The division artillery headquarters and/or corps artillery headquarters consolidated the mobile training teams from each artillery battalion, issued instructions, and conducted instructor training.

3. Phase III (6 Apr to 30 Nov 70)--Mobile training teams conducted a 2-week training program at each firing position and administered a test. This was followed by a unit test administered by division artillery and/or corps artillery headquarters 30 days after the mobile training teams completed the training and testing of all firing elements.

VNAF Training Program

(U) Schools were operated by the VNAF for air force personnel at Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Binh Thuy, and Tan Son Nhut. The Air Training Center (ATC) at Nha Trang operated schools for NCOs and officers, a language school, and courses in flight training, technical helicopter, jet engine, and communications/electronics. At Bien Hoa, the VNAF 23d Wing conducted courses in jet engine mechanics/jet maintenance, ground safety, munitions, power production, administration, personnel, rescue and survival, NCO training, base defense, and basic military courses. The Air Logistics Command conducted courses at Bien Hoa in air frame repair, construction and utility, supply, and special vehicle maintenance. At Binh Thuy, the 74th Wing conducted courses in flight engineering and base defense. Headquarters VNAF and the 33d Wing at Tan Son Nhut conducted courses for weapons technician, flight nurse, transportation officer, security officer, reciprocating engine mechanics, AC-47, transition flight engineering training, first pilot C-119, AC-47 gunner and weapons technician, weather, and NCO training.

(U) The overall problem at the VNAF training centers was that the student load far exceeded the capabilities of the available cadre/instructor personnel. As in RVNAF training centers, this was due to the rapid buildup of forces under the Accelerated I & M program. Increases in the unit manning document for the training centers were approved, but assigned strength was inadequate. (67)

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
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Classes in flight training and jet fighter maintenance at the Air Force Training Center, Nha Trang.



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Formal In-Country VNAF Training

(C) Through September, 41,160 VNAF personnel completed some type of formal training. This was 95.1 percent of the programmed 43,098 input for that period: (68)

1 Jan - 1 Oct

<u>Program</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Military Tng	12,656	11,772	91
General Services	8,454	7,009	82
Civil Engineering	1,680	1,410	84
C/E	1,445	1,363	92
Technical	7,639	6,237	73
English Language	10,639	12,923	129
ALO/FAC	396	266	66
Liaison Pilot	189	180	99
Total	43,098	41,160	95.1

VNAF Offshore Training

(C) There were seven types of training: flying, including A-37, F-5, T-28, UH-1, and navigator training; maintenance, including electronic navigational repairman, helicopter mechanics, aircraft radio repairman, and weapons mechanic; communications/electronics training, including aircraft control and warning (AC&W) radar repairman, air traffic control, communications and relay equipment repairman, ground radar systems cable splicing, ground radio communications equipment repairman, and telephone switch; support training, including accounting and finance, budget, base and staff civil engineering, data automation, supply management, transportation, personnel, precision photo processing, and manpower procedures; operations training, including air intelligence officer, altitude chamber, flight safety officer, weather technician, weather equipment repairman, and special intelligence collection; professional training, including aeromedical, squadron officers' school, preventative medicine technician, training instruction officer, English language instruction; and liaison/orientation. Status of offshore training for the first and second quarters of CY70 was: (69)

<u>Type of Training</u>	<u>Programmed</u>		<u>Actual</u>	
	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
Pilot/Flying	574	523	506*	391
Maintenance	262	153	252	153
Comm/Elec	62	114	49	114
Support	32	36	26	36
Operations	58	77	60	77
Professional	17	17	13	17
Liaison/Orientation	23	7	23	7
Total	1,028	954	929	795

*Shortfall in UH-1 pilots occurred due to lack of English language qualified students.

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(U) On 5 May 70, the final class of VNAF enlisted personnel completed UH-1 mechanic training at Fort Eustis. Of 436 students programmed, 431 completed the training (419 UH-1 mechanics and 12 turbine engine repair instructors). A shortfall of five resulted from input being short four and one student who was returned to RVN because of academic and disciplinary problems. Twenty-three graduates of the mechanics course received additional training as aircraft power-train repairmen and 63 as aircraft prop and rotor repairmen. (70)

VNAF OJT

(U) The VNAF OJT program was modeled after the US Air Force (USAF) OJT program. It was well-organized; however, less than 5 percent of assigned airmen were in OJT. Expansion was restricted by shortages of qualified instructors and training materials. Heavy recruiting caused a large influx of untrained airmen and resulted in an unfavorable ratio of trained to untrained personnel. The high level of military activity placed a greater work burden on the limited numbers of trained people, making it more practical to rely on formal training rather than OJT. Integrated training with Seventh Air Force (7AF) personnel as trainers developed broader VNAF understanding of USAF OJT methods and added to the output without tying up VNAF trainers.

(U) VNAF actively sought ways to improve the program. Individual units developed training materials for OJT, but there was a lack of standardization. VNAF received copies of all applicable USAF job training standards for use in a project underway to develop VNAF standards. With the assistance of 7AF advisory group personnel, the basic VNAF OJT directive was revised and updated. Another major project, begun in the middle of the year, reorganized OJT administration to decentralize OJT management.

(U) Some differences existed between the VNAF and USAF systems. Although the differences tended to limit training, they were, in general, appropriate to VNAF conditions. For example, entry into individual OJT was not automatic; rather, OJT courses were organized for groups (necessary because of lack of trainers and training materials). Also, upgrading OJT required prior approval of VNAF, and approvals were minimal due to budgetary limitations. (71)

(U) By mid-year, OJT reports showed a smaller number in training but in a wider variety of specialties. This was a favorable trend from group classes to individual training. Increased interest by VNAF enhanced prospects for improvements in the program. However, short range results were more likely in organization and management rather than in increased output and quality. (72)

VNAF - 7AF Integrated Training

(C) This program provided formal training and OJT for VNAF officers and airmen. It was conducted by 7AF and units under its operational control. Most training was carried out at bases where VNAF and USAF units were collocated, resulting in no additional requirement to provide messing, billeting, administrative control, or other support. It was in most cases no-cost training, because special facilities, equipment and instructors were not needed. Conventional OJT methods were used with courses tailored to fit VNAF needs and requests. Courses varied from a few weeks to over 2 years. There was no English language prerequisite; if trainees did not understand English, one of their number acted as an interpreter.

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(C) Training emphasis was placed on base operating support functions which had not received as much attention in the past as hard core operational support training. Some individual skill upgrading resulted from the integrated program, but most training was of a proficiency nature, designed to expedite VNAF self-sufficiency in functional areas.

(U) This training began in January 1970. The program was translated into Vietnamese and distributed to VNAF units which had the English version. By 31 Jan, over 900 trainees were enrolled. By 30 Jun, this increased to 1,245 officers and airmen training in over 30 different specialties at six bases. Largest enrollments were in security, fire protection, weather, communications/electronics, air traffic control, and civil engineering. During the first 6 months, 538 completed training. (73) Significantly, the program replaced in-country MASF training for the VNAF and reduced offshore MASF training at a dollar savings to the US Government.

VNN Training Program

(U) The VNN had three naval training centers, located at Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon. The center in Saigon had classes for petty and warrant officers, and provided courses in refrigeration, electronics equipment, and various engines. At Cam Ranh Bay there were courses for boatswain's mate, gunner's mate, yeoman, disbursing clerk, and commissaryman. The Nha Trang Center conducted courses for engineman, damage controlman, quartermaster, electrician's mate, radarman, radioman, and electronic's technician. Nha Trang also was the home of the Naval Academy.

(U) The major problems in the VNN specialty schools were the same as at ARVN and VNAF schools, overcrowding and understaffing due to accelerated Vietnamization of Navy material assets and an urgent requirement for skilled operators. (74)

VNN In-Country Training

(C) By 1 Oct, 33,095 had participated in VNN in-country training. This was 80 percent of the 40,052 programmed for that period: (75)

1 Jan - 1 Oct

<u>Program</u>	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Recruit	10,200	8,042	78
"A" School (Basic)	6,185	5,460	88
"C" School (Advanced)	1,100	863	78
Petty Officer	2,660	1,666	62
English Language	1,350	1,307	96
Midshipman	3,102	1,595	51
Boat School	2,530	2,392	96
OJT Crews	<u>12,925</u>	<u>11,770</u>	<u>89</u>
Total	40,052	33,095	80


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
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Top: A gunnery class learning the 40mm gun at the Naval Training Center, Cam Ranh Bay.
Bottom: Vietnamese Navy engineers examine the engine room aboard a US LST.



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(C) The serious shortage in the petty officer program resulted from the reluctance of commanding officers to provide as instructors experienced petty officers who were on duty and in short supply.

(U) The Naval Academy course of instruction ran 44 weeks. The three specialist schools in Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon were jointly established by the VNN and US Navy (USN) with instructors from both navies teaching all aspects of boat work, seamanship, maintenance, logistics, radio and engineering skills. Courses varied from 3 to 12 weeks.

(U) Outside the formal training structure was Saigon's Small Boat School operated by the USN in consultation with an American firm called International Training Consultants. This program was established specifically for the ACTOVPLAN.* Students came to school after boot camp for a 12-week course in the basics of seamanship. From the school, the graduates went to US vessels for OJT. When the river group's commander considered the Vietnamese sailor qualified, usually after 12 weeks, his US counterpart left. Gradually the proportion of Vietnamese sailors increased until the crew was entirely Vietnamese. Then the ship was turned over to the VNN.

VNN Offshore Training

(U) The US Navy MATP sponsored offshore training for VNN and VNMC personnel. Training available through the US Navy MATP included attendance at US military schools, observer and OJT at US installations, orientation tours of US facilities, and training at the university level. In addition, military training teams (MTTs) and field training services (FTS) provided training and/or training support. The VNN obtained personnel to be trained offshore from operational units and the VNN training schools. The individuals entered language training (prerequisite for selection required the candidate to be English-qualified between 90 and 60 days prior to the course report date). Besides language qualification, all candidates had to have a good disciplinary record, pass US and Vietnamese security checks, be physically healthy, and generally meet the same course prerequisites outlined for US students. (76)

VNN Offshore Training 1 Jan - 1 Oct 70 (77)

Programmed	Actual	Percentage
1,407	1,376	94

VNMC Training Program

- (C) During the first half of the year in-country and offshore training continued to meet the needs of the VNMC in a satisfactory manner. Despite periods of prolonged operational commit-

*The Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese Plan (ACTOVPLAN) was begun in 1968. The USN began providing the VNN with operational and support craft to patrol MARKET TIME and interdiction barriers. Each ship turned over was commanded by Vietnamese but retained one US advisor.

- See section on VNN assessment for further discussion of ACTOV.

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ment, the VNMC conducted substantial training during periods of reserve employment.

(C) A "quick kill" course was built at the VNMC Training Command to improve marksmanship standards. Training during reserve periods was improved by providing mobile teams to instruct in first aid, political warfare, personal affairs, engineering, communications, and intelligence matters. A new leadership syllabus for the VNMC NCO school was approved and implemented. The VNMC Training Command continually upgraded its courses with additional training in night tactics, mine/booby trap countermeasures, and river crossing techniques. A mine/booby trap training complex was built. In addition, four covered classrooms (each with a capacity of 150), a reception center, and a training area incorporating sight alignment, sight picture, and marksmanship were completed. (78)

VNMC In-Country Training (79)

<u>Program</u>	<u>Programmed</u>			<u>Actual</u>		
	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr
VNMC Training Center						
Recruit	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,313	2,087	2,251
NCO	150	0	0	156	41	60
RVNAF Service Schools						
Adjutant General	9	0	10	13	13	11
Administration/Finance	0	0	12	0	25	18
Artillery	6	11	10	5	10	10
Engineer	12	11	5	37	33	7
Infantry	0	0	0	0	0	10
Jungle Warfare	4	0	0	4	0	4
Logistics	17	13	15	22	10	28
Medical	20	22	17	30	29	17
Intelligence	5	3	5	3	3	9
Ordnance	0	20	10	9	16	8
Quartermaster	8	9	7	25	9	10
Signal	35	0	50	44	0	64
Driver	48	60	58	87	117	69

(C) The 7th VNMC Inf Bn completed 7 weeks of initial unit training at Van Kiep NTC on 24 Jan 70 and was formally activated on 11 Feb at the VNMC Thu Duc Training Command. The 8th VNMC Inf Bn commenced training at the Vien Kiep NTC and was finished on 9 May. The 9th Bn began initial training on 29 Jun and was finished on 15 Aug. (80)

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Enrollments and Improvement at the RVNAF Schools and Academies*

Armor School

(C) The Armor School trained 5,605 students in 1970. This was in excess of the authorized 5,225. (81)

(C) Progress was made in formulating the Armor Officers' Advanced Course which began in July. The capability of the Armor School to conduct weapons and tactics training was greatly increased with completion of the Trang Bom tank range. Refresher training programmed for 12 cavalry units during CY70 got off to a poor start, however. The units were committed to operational missions in their areas and corps commanders were reluctant to release them for a 4-week period. (82)

(C) Significant progress was made in upgrading and constructing school facilities. A BOQ and a 70-man barracks were completed. Improvements to the living areas of the NCO and EM cadre received special emphasis. (83)

Infantry School

(C) Like the Armor School, the Infantry School enrolled an excess of students. Actual input was 11,925; there were 10,762 programmed for CY70. (84)

(C) The Infantry School was beginning to realize the benefits of the special construction program to upgrade facilities. Nine classrooms were constructed; furniture was received to accommodate 200 students in each of the nine classrooms. Increased emphasis was placed on instructor training. The Method of Instruction course (MOI) was revised to emphasize practical application as opposed to the lecture system. The first of the two programmed MOI courses at the Infantry School graduated 87 students. (85)

(C) Considerable progress was made in new construction, rehabilitation of barracks and messes, development of specialized training areas and competition among units. A signal training area was constructed to provide more practical application in communications training. Terrain models, mock-ups and bleachers were constructed to improve map reading and weapons training. Work was started on a VC hamlet, a physical fitness combat proficiency test area and a platoon defensive area. A unit competition program was implemented encompassing academic scores, barracks and unit area inspections, physical training, marching, and intramural sports. (86)

Artillery School

(C) The Artillery School enrolled 2,527 students, well above the 1,715 programmed for the year. (87)

*For detailed description of each school/academy see MACV Command History 1969, Vol II.

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(C) Several new gun emplacements with concrete personnel shelters and ammo bunkers were built in the battalion demonstration area through a self-help project. New POIs were prepared for a survey officer course and a survey instructor course. A copy of the US Artillery Advanced Course was obtained from Fort Sill, edited to delete unusable portions, and provided to the director of instruction for updating the Battalion Commanders' Course. There were noticeable improvements in training and supervision of students after the commandant directed that classes be inspected daily and written reports submitted. (88)

(C) One of the most significant improvements to training occurred during April-June. In the past, no attempt was made to coordinate the training of forward observers, fire direction center personnel, and gun crews during live fire exercises. During June, schedules and POIs were completed to allow these classes to be conducted simultaneously. The concept saved ammunition, training time, and released support troop gun crews to perform maintenance. ARVN constructed two permanent classrooms. A visitors' pavilion was also constructed. (89)

Signal School

(C) The Signal School enrolled 5,702 students, only 64 percent of the 3,931 scheduled for 1970. (90)

(C) On 28 Feb, a large portion of land formerly occupied by US elements of the Vung Tau Subarea Command was turned over to the Signal School. Located about 1,000 meters from the main compound, the area had room for 1,200 personnel and was complete with buildings. The complex was used to billet the Language School students preparing for entrance into the Integrated Communications System (ICS) training program. (91)

(C) Training quality improved due to expanded use of training aids and a moderate increase in student handouts. However, shortages in numerous line items, particularly electronic test equipment, still existed. (92)

(C) In December, the first Fixed Station Microwave Repair Course graduated. The military occupational specialty (MOS) involved was considered to be the most complex of the ICS MOSs. The course was 13 months long and was conducted by the 369th US Sig Bn. (93)

Military Police School

(C) The Military Police School had the highest enrollment average (percentage) entering 1,908 students; the programmed input was 1,222. (94)

(C) On 28 Feb, an 18,000 square meter tract was transferred to the Military Police School by US elements of the Vung Tau Subarea Command. The land adjacent to the school was used for riot control training, an enlarged motor pool, recreation facilities, and a hardstand helicopter pad. An instructor training course was held during off-duty hours. Survey work on a project to upgrade the water system, and a self-help project to retile the mess hall floor were completed. (95)

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Engineer School

(C) There were 6,571 students enrolled in the Engineer School; the programmed input for 1970 was 5,673. (96)

(C) A mess hall was constructed and a tent city was erected to house 400 advanced students; the commandant decided to continue the tent city to give field training. MACV approved the addition of \$387,000 worth of soils and maintenance training aids to provide the school with 3d and 4th echelon maintenance and soil training. (97)

Political Warfare College

(C) In CY70, 304 out of a programmed 505 students attended the Political Warfare (POLWAR) College. (98)

(U) The first intermediate POLWAR officers' course, which commenced 3 Nov 69, graduated 77 students in February 1970. The fourth basic chaplains' course began on 18 Feb to orient newly commissioned officers of the RVNAF Chaplains' Corps to military life. On 1 Apr, the POLWAR College was attacked by a force of VC/NVA troops who inflicted heavy damage and casualties (16 chaplains were killed, 11 Buddhist, three Protestant, and two Catholic, and 13 were wounded).

(U) As a result of the April enemy attack, many classrooms and barracks were rendered unusable. Previously scheduled officer courses were postponed until facilities were repaired. (99)

National NCO Academy

(C) There were 16,522 students for the year at the NCO Academy; the programmed input was 20,960. (100)

(C) Significant progress was made in improvement of facilities and upgrading of training. The self-help program provided one 800-man mess hall and 175 eight-man mess tables. Construction continued on 15 student barracks and three latrines. A preliminary construction survey recommended construction of eight 200-man mess hall/kitchens, three student barracks, two ammunition storage bunkers, a paved roadway, renovation of 11 existing buildings, and five live-fire ranges. The academy received 49 M-60 machine guns bringing the total to 100. With MACV approval, the academy's allocation of M16 rifles was increased from 1,000 to 3,000; Central Logistics Command (CLC) directed the issue of 2,000 to the academy through the III Area Logistics Command (ALC) as soon as available. The student daily food allowance was increased and the receipt of a favorable contract for civilian supplied foods provided adequate rations. (101)

(C) By May the M16 rifles were issued which brought the total on hand to 3,000. The 15 new barracks were completed which increased the capacity from 3,320 men to 4,520. Increased command advisor emphasis resulted in major improvements in the quality of leadership training and day and night practical exercises. Detailed inspections of training were conducted by ARVN staff and US advisors. Inspection reports were forwarded through ARVN channels, and follow-up

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corrective actions taken. US training teams from the 4th Inf Div and 173d Abn Bde visited the academy to assist in improving the quality of mine and booby trap training. (102)

Women's Armed Forces School

(C) Of the 1,400 women scheduled to enter the WAFC School, 1,025 were actually enrolled. (103)

(C) A major objective achieved during the 1st Qtr was the formation of English classes with advisor teachers. Construction was started on a BOQ. The enrollment shortfall was due to recruiting problems. (104)

Vietnamese Military Academy (VNMA)

(C) A goal of 1,000 approved applications to compete for entrance to the Academy in December 1970 was exceeded at mid-year. Actual enrollment for CY70 was 191, 76 percent of the 250 authorized. (105)

(C) A cadet in his second year at the VNMA became the first Vietnamese to be accepted for entrance to the USMA, West Point. (106)

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School (RVNAFLS)

(C) Total input for CY70 was 9,622 at the RVNAFLS; there were 11,236 programmed spaces. (107)

(C) The RVNAFLS established a MACV Test Control Office to centralize control, security, and administration of English language comprehension and aptitude tests. Prior to organizing this office, the English Comprehension Level (ECL) test was often compromised, and there was approximately a 30-point drop in a student's ECL score between the final test administered at RVNAFLS and the entry test administered at the Defense Language Institute, English Language School, Lackland AFB. The Test Control Office eliminated test compromise, making students legitimately achieve the ECL score required for graduation.

(C) CINCPAC approved and MACV ordered automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) for RVNAFLS. The RVNAFLS was authorized 30 local national civilian positions to include one card punch operator to be used for the ADPE.

(C) Annex 1 (Dong Khanh) of the RVNAFLS was transferred to the Adjutant General School on 16 Jan 70. The capacity of the annex was thereby increased from 420 to 1,000 students. Annex 2 (Tan Son Nhut) of the RVNAFLS commenced training on 19 Jan 70 to train VNAF airmen. It had a capacity of 1,081 students. (108)

Adjutant General School

(C) There were 4,959 students in CY70 out of a programmed input of 5,210. (109)

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(C) The school's first AG Officer Advanced Course graduated 56 officers on 29 Jan 70. The expanded curriculum devoted time to command and staff procedures, eliminating the need for both a career and an advanced course. (110)

(C) Several self-help projects were completed. To alleviate water shortage, the school constructed a 250-gallon water tank; this was an interim measure until a water system upgrade project could be completed. In addition, instructor platforms, training aid stands, a covered motorbike park, and a facility to house recently purchased cows were constructed. (111)

Military Intelligence School

(C) There were 2,199 students enrolled in CY70, well above the 1,523 programmed. (112)

(C) A new table of equipment (TOE) included the personnel and equipment to raise the student enrollment to 600. Three new courses were developed dealing with collection, intermediate intelligence, and intermediate security. The collection course of 30 officers assigned to province units was conducted during January. The first intermediate intelligence officer mid-career course started on 30 Mar. (113)

(C) Significant self-help projects in support of training were accomplished. These included construction of 15 classroom tables and seven aerial photo interpretation light tables. All construction programs, except a water upgrade project, were delayed pending a decision by CTC regarding school relocation. (114)

The Military Medical School

(C) This school conducted all battalion surgeon assistant, medical supply, and enlisted formal technical training, with the exception of basic medical training of aidmen for RF/PF units. It did not provide training for physicians or dentists. In 1970, 3,517 students received training; there were 2,300 programmed for input. (115)

(C) The teaching method used at the school was practically 100 percent didactic. Graduates lacked practical experience. Some improvement in teaching techniques, including additional use of training aids and group discussion, was anticipated. Plans were submitted to expand the capacity of the school from 1,100 students to 3,000 to include additional billeting and classroom facilities. It was also proposed to establish an RVNAF teaching hospital on the grounds where selected graduates would receive advanced training in a controlled teaching environment under surgical, laboratory, X-ray, operating room and nursing specialists. (116)

Transportation School

(C) The programmed input for CY70 was 8,894; the actual input was 11,029. (117)

(C) The first survey for building projects was initiated in June. A revised TOE, incorporating a 50-percent increase in instructors, was submitted to the CTC/JCS for approval. (118)

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RVNAF Training School Enrollments CY70 (119)

<u>(C) School</u>	<u>Programmed Input**</u>	<u>Actual Input</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
AG*	5,210	4,959	95
Admin & Fin	1,270	921	73
AFLS*	11,236	9,622	86
Armor*	5,225	5,605	107
Arty*	1,715	2,327	136
Band	475	342	72
C&SC	1,000	843	84
Engineer*	5,673	6,571	116
Infantry*	10,762	11,929	111
Intelligence*	1,523	2,199	144
JMA	1,400	1,371	98
Log Mgt	810	873	108
Mil Dog Training Ctr	310	308	102
MP*	1,222	1,908	156
Medical*	2,300	3,517	153
NDC	40	26	65
NCO Acad*	20,960	16,522	79
Ordnance	2,918	2,570	88
POLWAR*	505	304	60
QM	1,539	1,436	93
Signal*	8,931	5,702	64
Social Welfare	580	199	34
Trans*	8,894	11,029	124
VNMA*	250	191	76
WAFC*	1,400	1,025	

End of Year Evaluation of RVNAF Training

(C) An evaluation of RVNAF training programs for CY70 was accomplished for the first time using the Training Objective and Measurement Management System (TOMMS). In CY70, RVNAF trained 503,740 personnel in 32 national, regional force, popular force, and division training centers and 87,197 personnel in 15 technical, four academic, and four combat arms schools.

(C) The TOMMS was developed by MACT and implemented during the 4th Qtr CY70. This new management system measured the status and progress of training in nine areas, among them, percentage of assigned to authorized strength and ratio of students to cadre; each area was numerically valued with three to eight indicators. The indicators were weighted according to their importance and the criteria on which they were measured were based on US standards of

*See commentary preceding pages.

**Programmed input figures were determined by deducting from the original 1970 figure, input to courses cancelled or modified prior to the starting date of the course. Input modified after the starting date was not deducted.

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performance. The ratings were: outstanding, excellent, very satisfactory, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory.

(C) Some of the more important year-end ratings were: cadre, satisfactory; improvement of training quality, very satisfactory; improved use of training aids, excellent; facilities upgrade, very satisfactory.

(C) Overall, training was rated very satisfactory; the training centers were rated very satisfactory and the service schools were rated excellent.

(C) The TOMMS indicated that numerous problems remained in the training program: deficiencies in the quality of cadre, lack of training standardization, personnel programming shortfalls, lapses in training quality especially in marksmanship, deficient logistics support of training schools and centers, and school mismanagement. (120)

Combined Campaign Plan 1971: Training

(S) In October, the JGS released the Combined Campaign Plan (CCP) for 1971. Regarding the training effort, emphasis was to be placed on improving the training cadre by assigning combat experienced personnel as instructors. A combined arms school, armor, infantry, and artillery, would be established for better coordination of the combat services and a streamlining of their functions.

(S) ~~_____~~ training would be stepped up in intelligence, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), and guerrilla warfare. Increased attention would be given to defense against sapper activity and standoff attacks. AS

(S) The higher level of achievement required for the RVNAF assumption of all fighting responsibility necessitated lengthened training programs. The CCP extended training courses a total of 19 weeks:

	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
ARVN & RF recruits	9 wks	10 wks
ARVN & RF NCOs	18 wks	22 wks
ARVN & RF officers	31 wks	32 wks
PF recruits	9 wks	12 wks
PF squad Ldrs	9 wks	14 wks
PF platoon Ldrs	9 wks	14 wks

(S) As shown, most of the increases were for the PF which would be upgraded to a level equal with the RF. In 1971, RF/PF would also receive refresher training from mobile training teams.

(S) All RVNAF components would receive refresher unit training once every 2 years to improve efficiency and train for new developments in equipment. (121)

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RVN Training For The Integrated Communications System SEA (ICS-SEA)

(C) In 1969 the Army was tasked to prepare a training plan for Vietnamese and Thai personnel to assume control of a portion of the ICS-SEA (see Chapter VI, page 98, 1969 MACV Command History). On 12 Jan 70, the DEPSECDEF approved the concept and directed immediate initiation of training. The training was divided into soft and hard skills. Soft skill training was to be conducted by the RVNAF Signal School and hard skill training by the 1st Sig Bde at the ICS facilities at Vung Tau and Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Those Vietnamese selected for intensive training in CONUS would, upon return to RVN, be integrated into the faculty of the training facility. (122)

(S) Training was envisioned in three phases: English language, formal electronics instruction, and OJT. The 1st Sig Bde commenced OJT for RVNAF personnel in four skills and by March, 303 personnel were enrolled: (123)

<u>Skill</u>	<u>Number OJT</u>
Strategic Microwave Systems Repairman	31
Fixed Station Technical Controller	76
Fixed Plant Carrier Repairman	170
Dial Central Office Repairman	26
TOTAL	303

(S) The approved plan also called for the establishment of an appropriate training facility in the RVN. Headquarters, United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) was given the responsibility to establish, operate, and maintain the facility with technical support assistance provided by the United States Army Strategic Communication Command (USASTRATCOM). (124)

(S) The training facility interior construction at Vung Tau was completed on 5 Aug; installation of classroom radio equipment was complete by the end of the year. (125)

(S) As of December the status of training was: (126)

	<u>In-Country</u>	<u>Offshore*</u>	<u>OJT</u>	<u>Qualified</u>
Strategic Microwave Systems Repairman	25	2	41	4
Fixed Station Technical Controller	0	0	87	48
Fixed Plant Carrier Repairman	12	3	23	6
Dial Central Office Repairman	0	2	32	3
TOTAL	37	7	183	61

*Note: Personnel at Fort Monmouth eventually to be assigned as instructors in the ARVN Signal School.

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Training of Cambodian Forces by RVNAF

(S) RVNAF assumed a training mission in support of the Cambodian Government in June and commenced training of 80 FANK (Forces Armees Nationale Khmer) companies. It was reported RVNAF had the capability of training additional FANK companies, if required but with the US providing equipment, individual weapons, and ammunition. (127)

(S) On 2 Jul the RVNAF JGS/CTC was given the responsibility for training 13,406 FANK as follows: (128)

50 Inf Cos	EM 8 wk Recruit Training	4,950
	Training Cadre to Accompany EM	360
	Officer and NCO (13 wks) Cadre Training	1,200
	Extra Cadre Training	60
30 Inf Cos	5 wk Refresher Training	3,330
5 Inf Bns	4 wk Company-Level Refresher	2,885
40 Bde Staff Officers	4 wk Bde Staff OPS	40
1 Cbt Engineer Bn	4 wk Engineer Refresher	430
100 Bn Staff Officers	3 wk Bn Staff Operations Training	100
51 Drivers and Mechanics	1 wk Refresher Training	51
	TOTAL	13,406

(S) Recruit and unit cadre training was conducted at the Lam Son NTC; refresher and battalion staff officer training at the Chi Lang NTC; driver and mechanics training at the RVNAF Transportation School; engineer training at the Engineer School; company refresher training at the Duc My RFTC. (129)

(S) To accomplish this task, CTC began an intensive campaign to identify all bilingual (Vietnamese/Cambodian) instructors and interpreters to be moved to the various training sites for the duration of FANK training. Additional instructors were diverted from instructor training classes. The effects of FANK training on Vietnamization were expected to be: (130)

1. Diversion of instructors from RVNAF to FANK training program would further aggravate the current critical shortage of combat-experienced, school-trained instructors throughout the RVNAF training base.

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2. Additional FANK training requirements would cause an additional overload at the designated centers, or cause a cutback in the RVNAF training program (many of the CTC controlled training centers were already programmed at or above their rated capacity during 1970).

3. The complexity of the FANK training operation was such that considerable time was required of key RVNAF staff and US advisory elements to insure success of the program. This resulted in a corresponding decrease of attention to RVNAF training.

(S) Training of FANK forward air guides by 7AF and VNAF personnel commenced 5 Jul at Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa. The purpose of the training was to familiarize FANK personnel with allied tactical air control systems and procedures to enable FANK to set up their own. * (131)

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for complete discussion of RVNAF contribution to FANK.

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ADVISORY EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Reflections of a Senior Advisor

The advisor provides advice and assistance to his Vietnamese Counterpart in all matters pertaining to command, administration, personnel, training, logistics, staff procedures, and tactical operations, with the objective of establishing a combat ready, self-sufficient armed force.

The advisor must have technical and professional skill, but just as important, he must have understanding and appreciation for human beings and human relations. Human relations have many meanings and pose many problems to the advisor. These relations concern the ability to get action on the part of the Vietnamese and yet leave the impression with all concerned that it was the counterpart's idea or decision. It means the advisor must be an active member of a staff and the Vietnamese counterpart must be the commander. It means the advisor must understand and appreciate the Vietnamese customs, traditions, and way of life. The advisor must have a feeling for Vietnamese feelings, examining every action to avoid embarrassment of the Vietnamese. It required putting into practice every principle of leadership and plenty of common sense. Fighting is important, but solving problems in human relations is equally important to the success of the advisor.

As US forces redeploy, the role of the advisor and his qualifications to fill that role become increasingly important. This does not necessarily require the advisor to know all things and be everywhere at once, but in order to make the Vietnamization program succeed, the advisors must be of the highest caliber and be dedicated to the program. (132)

Background

(C) The original United States military assistance effort, MAAG Indochina, was established in 1951 to report on the disposition and use of equipment sent to the French and their indigenous allies. From 1951 until 1954 the MAAG Indochina was primarily a small logistics group. In 1954, with the signing of the Geneva Accords and ceasefire in Indochina, the French began withdrawing their combat forces and the GVN took command of its own troops. The total strength of the South Vietnamese armed forces was just in excess of 200,000 men, the majority being in the army. The air force was practically nonexistent and the very small navy had no independent administrative or operational capability.

(C) At that time MAAG Indochina was replaced by MAAG Vietnam which consisted of 342 officers and men. MAAG Vietnam's mission was to assist the Vietnamese Government in improving the military capability of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. In agreement with the

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French, a separate transitional organization known as the Training Relations and Instruction Mission (TRIM) was established. TRIM was composed of French, Vietnamese, and American personnel. Its mission was to assist the GVN in the organization and development of an effective armed force. TRIM was terminated in 1956 when the French advisors withdrew. However, French missions for the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force were retained until 1957.

(C) In 1961 Vice President Johnson visited South Vietnam and issued a joint communique with President Diem announcing the expansion of defense and economic development programs. Shortly thereafter General Maxwell D. Taylor was sent by the President on a special mission to Vietnam. Near the end of that year, President Kennedy decided to increase US support for the South Vietnamese. From a strength of less than 700 at the end of 1960, MAAG Vietnam increased to over 3,000 US military personnel by the end of 1961.

(C) MAAG Vietnam was authorized to provide an advisor to each province chief and advisor teams down to battalion level for operational RVNAF units in the field. The South Vietnamese armed forces grew from about 200,000 in 1954 to a force of over one million by the end of FY 70. The total advisory strength grew from about 340 in 1954 to approximately 14,000 in 1970. Of the latter figure, approximately one-half were military advisors to the regular armed forces.

Mission

(C) The advisory mission of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was to develop military assistance plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the US Mission and other US governmental agencies in the Mission and provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the Republic of Vietnam on military assistance matters.

COMUSMACV's Guidance on Selecting Advisors

(C) During the years of troop build-up, the prestige and potential for advancement attached to service with command and tactical units attracted many of the better suited officers away from advisor assignments. By 1970, however, the advisory role was considered of primary importance and COMUSMACV addressed the type of officer he wanted for the job:

Commanders, in picking officers to be advisors to ARVN regiments and divisions, are often "hung up" on quality criteria such as "must be War College or CGSC graduate," "must have command experience as a battalion or brigade commander," etc.

What we really need are guys who can lead/influence the business of pacification.

This is a human relations problem. Advisors must understand and appreciate human beings.

The advisor must feel empathy toward the Vietnamese; he must appreciate their good points and understand their weaknesses.

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Above all, an advisor must have a sensitivity to humans. He should have a natural human respect toward other humans, just because they are humans.

In addition, the advisor should be the kind of fellow who can pull ideas and actions out of the Vietnamese...giving them the impression that the actions are theirs. Put another way, the guy influenced by the advisor thinks that he did it all by himself. (133)

Organization and Functions


(C) The advisory organization was tailored to the RVNAF structure, and each US military service contributed to the MACV advisory effort.(134)

HQ MACV Staff Advisors

(U) At the beginning of 1970, there were 397 staff advisors authorized at HQ MACV. They were allocated to staff agencies providing advisory assistance to the GVN and the RVNAF/JGS. For example, in the HQ MACV Command Group, three out of the 60 authorized spaces were designated "advisor." Including and under the ACoS for Personnel (MACJ1), 33 out of the 71 authorized spaces were involved directly with the advisory effort. The MACJ1 was the principal US advisor to the Minister of War Veterans, GVN; the Director of Mobilization Office of the Minister of National Defense; and on personnel matters, to the RVNAF. The ACoS for Intelligence (MACJ2) was the principal US advisor to his counterpart JGS, J-2, on RVNAF intelligence programs, training, and actions relating to the I&M of RVNAF intelligence elements. The ACoS for Operations, (MACJ3), was the principal US advisor to the JGS on all matters pertaining to operations and current plans. He exercised supervision and control over the Railway Security Advisory Detachment and airborne advisors to the ARVN Airborne Division, served as the contact between MACV and the Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, and provided primary liaison and assistance to the RVNAF General Political Welfare Department (GPWD). The ACoS for Logistics (MACJ4) was the principal advisor to RVNAF on materiel systems development, logistics operation, organization, and plans, and directed the advisory effort of the RVNAF Central Logistics Command, the Technical Service Advisory Divisions, and the Area Logistics Commands (ALC) advisory teams. The ACoS for Plans (MACJ5) provided advisory assistance, conducted combined contingency planning with the JGS, and exercised joint staff supervision for the Free World Military Assistance Office (FWMAO). The ACoS for Communications-Electronics (MACJ6) was the senior US military advisor to the GVN and RVNAF on matters pertaining to the I&M of communications-electronics (C-E) and provided direct advisory assistance to ARVN C-E staffs and signal units directly under the operational control of the JGS and ARVN Signal Department. The Comptroller (MACCO) acted as the senior military advisor to the RVN on the development and execution of the defense budget and as senior advisor to the GVN Ministry of National Defense on accounting and finance matters (see MACV Directive 10-21 for advisory functions of MACV special staff such as MACPM, MACMD, MACC, and MACIG). (135)

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MACV HEADQUARTERS STAFF ADVISORS
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- INCLUDES MACPM
- INCLUDES DATA MANAGEMENT AGENCY

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(U) There were three MACV staff agencies in which mission and functions were exclusively involved in advisory and support efforts: the Office of AC of S for Military Assistance (MACMA), the principal staff assistant to COMUSMACV for the US advisory program, was the central office for all advisory matters for the Army, Navy, and AF advisory groups; the Director of Training (MACT), under the general staff supervision of MACMA was the principal US advisor to the Central Training Command/Joint General Staff (CTC/JGS). He was primarily responsible for the development of an effective military training system for the RVNAF (the development of the Training Directorate is of particular historical interest, because it parallels the history of the US training effort in Vietnam as far back as January 1955; further historical details, including the source documents, are found in: Blkt (S), MACT, May 1970, Subj: History of the US Training Effort-Development of the Training Directorate (U), Gp-1.

(FOUO) The ACofS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was the principal staff assistant to COMUSMACV on US civil/military support for the GVN Pacification and Development Program. Within CORDS there were staffs for each element of the program. Those concerned with civil oriented programs (refugee, Chieu Hoi, public safety and community development) were staffed mainly by civilians, and the directors advised their counterpart GVN agencies. For example, the Refugee Director worked with the Minister of Social Welfare, the Chieu Hoi Director with the Minister of Chieu Hoi, etc. The Territorial Security Directorate was mainly military in staffing because of its advisory mission to the RF/PF. There were 883 civilian officers from AID and Department of State assigned to CORDS and distributed throughout the corps' areas, working primarily with community development, Chieu Hoi, and refugee programs. Another 242 civilian personnel (USAID technicians, USIA, and State Dept.) worked in education, health, agriculture, engineering, economics, and logistics. There were 65 DOD civilians, grades GS-15 to GS-5, working with RD cadre and in the PHOENIX program at headquarters and in the field. Military advisors assigned to CORDS totalled 6,437. (136)

(FOUO) At corps level, the US Field Force Commander (also the US Senior Advisor) had a CORDS deputy to carry out the pacification and development advisory effort. The deputy was the principal US advisor to the ARVN corps commander, as chairman of the Corps' Pacification and Development Council. The deputy advised on military functions concerned with territorial security, i.e., improving the effectiveness of the RF/PF, National and Field Force Police, and armed RD cadre and PSDF. He was also the direct supervisor of the senior advisor assigned in each province. (137)

(FOUO) At the province level, the senior advisor (PSA) was either military or civilian depending on the security situation. Of the 44 province advisors, 25 were military and 19 were civilian. If the PSA was military, his deputy was a civilian and vice versa. The PSA's counterpart was the province chief, usually a military commander, who commanded the RF/PF as well as GVN administrative personnel. The PSA also maintained direct control over each of the district senior advisors (DSA) and with his staff provided support services and guidance to district and mobile advisory teams. (138)

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CORDS US Manpower Structure*

<u>SAIGON</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Aid-Funded Civilians</u>	<u>USAID Technicians</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>US Infor- mation Agency</u>	<u>Department of Defense Civilian</u>
HQ	205	156	0	7	0	27
SAIGON FIELD	<u>167</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>13</u>
TOTAL SAIGON	372	249	12	8	0	40
<u>MR1</u>						
HQ	37	35	28	0	2	6
PROVINCES	488	63	18	0	0	0
DISTRICTS	<u>252</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MR 1	777	102	46	0	2	6
<u>MR2</u>						
HQ	87	41	39	1	2	7
PROVINCES	1,071	79	8	0	2	0
DISTRICTS	<u>399</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MR 2	1,557	137	47	1	4	7
<u>MR3</u>						
HQ	60	40	34	1	1	6
PROVINCES	997	78	13	0	4	0
DISTRICTS	<u>422</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MR 3	1,479	145	47	1	5	6
<u>MR4</u>						
HQ	64	43	42	1	1	6
PROVINCES	1,554	116	17	0	8	0
DISTRICTS	<u>634</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL MR 4	2,252	200	59	1	9	6
<u>TOTAL</u>						
HQ	453	315	143	10	6	52
FIELD	5,817	518	68	1	14	13
FSO Tng Comp	<u>X X X</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>X X</u>	<u>X X</u>	<u>X X</u>	<u>X X</u>
GRAND TOTAL	6,437	883	211	11	20	65

* As of 1 Feb 1970

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(FOUO) There were 236 districts in RVN authorized a DSA and staff. Most of the DSAs were military. The advisory staff at district level usually had eight members, but the size varied according to the district's particular needs and situation. For example, the DSA for Binh Chanh District (Gia Dinh Province) had a 14-member team to advise and assist the district chief on military and civil aspects of the counterinsurgency program. For this mission, key members of the advisory staff were: the Deputy Senior Advisor (Foreign Service Officer from the State Department); a military police 1LT for the PSDF; a military intelligence 1LT for the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC); a community development advisor; and an operations section. In addition to the advisory relationship with the district chief, the DSA had operational control of the mobile advisory teams (MAT) working in the villages and hamlets of that district. (139)

(S) The largest single advisory element most closely related to Vietnamization and US troop redeployment, was the MAT. In 1969 there were 353 five-man MATs within the RVN. In February 1970, authorization increased to 487 MATS to further accelerate development of RF and PF forces: (140)

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
MR 1	45	88
MR 2	96	116
MR 3	96	123
MR 4	<u>116</u>	<u>160</u>
	353	487

Each team was authorized two officers of the combat arms and three NCOs who specialized in light weapons and medical training, respectively. The teams rotated among the RF and PF to upgrade their effectiveness in assisting the village chief to improve the level of security, train PF platoons, and help formulate and train PSDF in each of the hamlets.

(S) Personnel to man the additional MATS started to arrive in July. Captains for assignments as MAT senior advisors were in short supply. In October there were less than 80 assigned. (141)

(U) Sector Management and Direct Support Logistic Center (SM&DSL) advisory teams were another CORDS advisory effort. SM&DSL Centers provided administration and support to RF/PF at sector/province level. Each had advisors in ordnance maintenance, finance, supply, communications, armament maintenance, and personnel. In December, there were severe shortages of armament maintenance, personnel and quartermaster advisors. (142)

US Army Advisory Effort


(C) MACV assigned Army advisors to all echelons in the Vietnamese JGS and to corps areas (after 2 July known as military regions (MR)) under operational control of corps senior advisors. The US senior advisor in each corps area was also the commander of US Army and/or Marine

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MACV MISCELLANEOUS FIELD
ADVISORS ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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units in that geographical area. US Army advisors were also assigned to all ARVN combat and combat-support units down to battalions and depots, area logistics commands, and subordinate support units in administrative and logistics support areas.

(C) The requirements for advisor skills were broad, ranging from detailed knowledge of the M16 rifle, to the operation of an automotive rebuild plant, employment of a rifle squad in combat, and application of all types of combat power in a corps against guerilla and conventional enemy forces. Many of the Army advisors worked at training centers and schools throughout South Vietnam. (143)

(U) The mission of the Army advisory groups at corps level was to provide advice and assistance to the ARVN corps commander and his staff in command administration, training, field operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and psychological warfare/civil affairs. The senior advisor supervised the MACV advisory effort in the MR and was responsible for:

1. Providing liaison between the ARVN MR commander and US/FWMAF.
2. Establishing and operating US advisory tactical communication networks and providing advisory assistance for the operation of ARVN networks.
3. Determining requirements for and coordinating US tactical air, airlift support, helicopter, and artillery support.
4. Coordinating with US and FWMAF on joint plans, operations, and training.
5. Establishing, maintaining, operating and providing advisory functions for a combined Corps Tactical Operations Center/Direct Air Support Center (TOC/DASC) in conjunction with RVNAF elements.
6. Accompanying the ARVN MR commander and his staff, as appropriate, on field inspection trips and operations as required.

(C) The senior advisor had two deputies, a deputy senior advisor who exercised direct control over the division, regimental, and battalion teams, and a deputy for CORDS who exercised direct control over the province advisory teams. In November there were 3,074 Army personnel authorized as advisors to ARVN units: (144)

MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4	Total
625	654	823	972	3,074


(U) The division advisory team's mission was to advise and assist the ARVN division commander and his staff in command, administration, training, tactical operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and appropriate elements of political warfare (POLWAR). The objective was improvement of division capability to destroy the enemy. The team assisted the ARVN commander in obtaining US combat support. It obtained necessary combat support and Military Assistance Program (MAP) materials and equipment for ARVN and kept higher headquarters informed on the combat effectiveness of the division, submitting evaluation and operations reports. It also assisted in the operation of the division TOC.

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ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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(U) The mission of the regimental and battalion advisory teams was the same as for the division except for the added function of accompanying the ARVN regiment/battalion on field operations.

USAF Advisory Effort

(C) The US Air Force advisor worked with the highest Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) echelon in air division, combat wings, squadrons, and training centers, and in forward air controlling, air liaison, and air logistics commands. The US Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) collocated with HQ VNAF at Tan Son Nhut air base, was established in 1964 to provide advice and assistance to the VNAF in all matters pertaining to command, training, administration, tactical operations, logistics, and personnel. Command, less operational control, of the AFGP was exercised by COMUSMACV. The commander, 7th Air Force, exercised operational control of the group. The chief, AFGP, was the advisor to the commander, VNAF, and exercised command of the group and air force advisory teams (AFATs). In January 1970 the number of advisors in the AFGP and AFATs were: (145)

<u>Location</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>OFFICERS</u>		<u>ENLISTED</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	
		<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>
Tan Son Nhut	HQ AFGP	90	90	119	110	209	200
Tan Son Nhut	AFAT 1 (5)	18	14	22	21	40	35
Bien Hoa	AFAT 2 (3)	29	15	35	26	64	41
Bien Hoa	AFAT 3 (6)	26	23	41	41	67	64
Nha Trang	AFAT 4 (7)	15	10	66	80	81	90
Danang	AFAT 5 (1)	30	20	38	19	68	39
Nha Trang	AFAT 6 (2)	34	22	55	32	89	54
Bien Thuy	AFAT 7 (4)	<u>34</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>44</u>
TOTAL		276	214	425	353	701	567

Numbers in parentheses are corresponding VNAF air divisions.

(C) In June authorizations for the AFGP increased from 701 to 1059 primarily to provide more maintenance personnel during conversion/activation of the VNAF UH-1 and CH-47 squadrons. In December the AFGP was manned overall at 90 percent of authorized strength; of 1,148 authorized, there were 1,011 assigned. (146)

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
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AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP
ORGANIZATION CHART



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Organizational Doctrine

(U) The AFGP was not organized to provide all advice and assistance which the VNAF required. When services beyond AFGP capability were needed, assistance was obtained from other US sources. The chief, AFGP, monitored the aid provided by those sources. Temporary duty (TDY) augmentation was obtained for one-time assistance projects of short duration, and agreements negotiated for 7AF or other in-country organizations to assume functions of indefinite duration. Among agreements of this type were: USARV helicopter training; 30th Weather Squadron (USAF) weather functions; OSI District 50 investigations; 1964th Communications Group (USAF), communications-electronics; and 505th Tactical Control Group aircraft control & warning. (147)

Air Force Advisory Teams (AFATs)

(C) Advisory teams were located at each VNAF tactical air base. In early 1970 the teams were renumbered as shown to correspond to the corps and MR and numbered VNAF air division: (148)

MR	AFAT	BASE	ADVISORY RESPONSIBILITY TO
1	AFAT-1	Danang AB	VNAF 41st Tact Fighter Wing (TWF) (1st Air Div)
2	AFAT-2	Nha Trang AB	VNAF 62d TFW (2d Air Div)
	Det 2, AFAT 2	Pleiku AB	VNAF 72d TFW
3	AFAT-3	Bien Hoa AB	VNAF 23d TFW (3d Air Div)
4	AFAT-4	Binh Thuy AB	VNAF 74th TFW (4th Air Div)
	Det 4, AFAT 4	Soc Trang AB	VNAF 84th TFW
	AFAT-5	Tan Son Nhut AB	VNAF 33d Tactical Wing (5th Air Div)
	AFAT-6	Bien Hoa AB	VNAF Air Logistics Command (ALC)
	AFAT-7	Nha Trang AB	VNAF Air Training Center (Counterpart to USAF Air Training Command)

In addition to advising and assisting the VNAF units to increase operational effectiveness, the AFATs were liaison between tenant US units and VNAF units on all matters of common interest.

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US Navy Advisory Effort

(U) The mission of the Naval Advisory Group (NAG) was to provide advice and assistance to the Vietnamese Navy and the Vietnamese Marine Corps in all matters of command, administration, logistics, tactical operations, training, and combat readiness. The objective of NAG was to establish a Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and a Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) capable of conducting effective operations without US assistance. (149)

(U) The NAG functioned as a staff headed by the chief, NAG, under the command of COM-USMACV and under the operational control of COMNAVFORV. The NAG was composed of two segments assigned to support the VNN and VNMC under the direction of the senior naval advisor and the senior marine advisor, respectively. There were no subordinate commands within the NAG. Under the senior Marine advisor, the US Marine Corps Advisory Group dealt primarily with the VNMC division. The advisory effort extended from HQ VNN through subsequent echelons to individual small craft. (150)

(FOUO) In January 1970 there were 964 personnel (officers 360, enlisted 604) authorized in the naval advisory effort with 1,065 assigned. To overcome the VNN lack of middle management skills, however, particularly in the logistics system, authorized strength for the NAG was projected to go 2,697.

(C) The number and type of Navy advisors in January 1970 were: (151)


ADVISORY UNITS	OFFICERS		ENLISTED		TOTAL	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
HQ, NAG	68	108	93	126	161	234
USMC Fld Units	37	35	6	10	43	45
Training Center	36	10	146	45	182	55
Fleet Command	62	53	39	25	101	78
CTF 211 (RAIDs)	19	20	32	51	51	71
CTF 212 (PBRs)	3	13	38	148	41	161
CTF 213 (PCFs)	2	5	19	55	21	60
CTF 213 (Misc)	9	5	22	25	31	30
CTF 214 (Riverine Areas)	20	20	21	34	41	54
Rung Sat SZ	13	12	20	21	33	33
Coastal Zones	80	68	103	69	183	37
Logistics Cmd	11	7	65	100	76	107
TOTAL	360	356	604	709	964	1,065

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NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP
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(U) A small, specialized aspect of the naval advisory effort involved a team of Navy dentists organized to teach the Vietnamese facila rehabilitative work. The team estimated that by the time the 2-year program was concluded in the summer of 1972, it would have trained 25 oral surgeons and prosthodontists and 75 technicians.

Republic of Korea Advisory Effort

(FOUO) The Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROK FV), provided indirect adviscry support to RVNAF by training RF and PF units associated with the Capital Div., 9th Div., and 2d Marine Bde. The type of training given to RF and PF units primarily emphasized basic training and small unit tactics for enlisted personnel (1 week), mobile training at battalion level (1 week), and NCO training (6 weeks) designed to develop NCOs into small unit commanders and instructors.

(FOUO) The ROK FV advisor maintained close liaison with each RF/PF unit being trained and with the province chief. The ROK FV was capable of all training programmed; however, the personnel input by RVNAF was low, particularly in mobile training. During the period from 1 Jan 70 to 30 Oct 70, the number of RF/PF programmed for training by ROK FV compared with those actually trained was: ⁽¹⁵²⁾

1. Enlisted Personnel Group Training:

	<u>RF/PF Programmed</u>	<u>RF/PF Trained</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Capital Div	5,955	3,903	66%
9th Div	5,885	2,996	59%
2d Marine Bde	3,000	2,871	96%
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	14,840	9,770	74%

2. Mobile Training:

	<u>RF/PF Programmed</u>	<u>RF/PF Trained</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Capital Div	21 Plt	18 Plt	86%
9th Div	150 Plt	69 Plt	46%
2d Marine Bde	---	---	---
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	171	87	68%

NOTE: Figures for November/December were not available for the 1970 History.

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Australian Advisory Effort

(C) The Australian effort was accomplished by the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (AATTV), headquartered in Saigon. The 99 personnel were located in each MR with the majority in MRs 1 and 2. In MR1 Australian advisors worked primarily with ARVN units such as the 1st and 2d Divs, 51st Regt, ranger battalions, and cavalry. In MR2 the majority of advisors were with the special forces and some were deployed as advisors to provincial reconnaissance units (PRUs). In MR3 members of the AATTV worked as advisors and instructors with the RF and the PF at Phuoc Tuy PF Training Center, and a few were with PRUs. In MR4 the senior Australian was a member of the staff of CORDS, and advisory activities were mostly associated with pacification and development efforts.

(C) AATTV personnel were assigned to a MACV detachment/activity by the commander AATTV, in conjunction with MACV policies. Once assigned, they were under operational control of MACV. (153)

(C) An initial meeting of a combined study group to coordinate an expansion of the Australian advisory effort was conducted on 21 Apr. The Australian Force Vietnam proposed establishment of additional MATs and a leadership training center for RF/PF leaders in Phuoc Tuy Province. A subcommittee met on 2 May to develop a program of instruction for the leadership course. The first class to attend the leadership course consisted of instructor/cadre personnel and began in December 1970. (154)

Republic of China Advisory Effort

(FOUO) The Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam (ROCMAGV), provided assistance to RVNAF in POLWAR and psychological operations (PSYOP) programs. Specifically, ROCMAGV assisted RVNAF in establishing POLWAR units and cadre training agencies, forming a central anti-Communist ideology and developing joint military-civilian operations. Additionally, ROCMAGV assisted RVNAF in formulating POLWAR manuals and SOPs, and provided recommendations and assistance on Open Arms (CHIEU HOI) and RD programs.

(FOUO) There were 30 ROCMAGV personnel in Vietnam (tour of duty two years). They were utilized as POLWAR and PSYOP advisors on non-combat missions and were located at each military region headquarters, at the Dalat POLWAR School, and in Saigon. The placement of the advisors was determined jointly by the commander of the ROCMAGV and of the RVNAF. (155)

Review of US Advisor Programs

(C) On 16 Dec 69 the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) asked the JCS to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of advisor programs and policies in Vietnam. The Secretary sought identification of functions from which the Americans and Vietnamese felt advisors could be withdrawn. He emphasized that as Vietnamization reduced US combat forces, the force structure and quality of the advisory effort became increasingly important. He said the most highly qualified personnel must be assigned to advisory duty if Vietnamization was to be effective. The

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number of advisors would be significantly reduced, and he suggested the term "advisor" be dropped as a step toward recognizing increased Vietnamese self-sufficiency, since most advisory personnel served in liaison or training functions.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾

(C) The Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and COMUSMACV were asked to evaluate and submit an assessment of the programs. Response from COMUSMACV included the following comments concerning roles and functions, reduction, quality, and training of advisors:⁽¹⁵⁷⁾

Roles and Functions of US Advisors

(C) The advisor was a combat and service support coordinator, observer, and evaluator in addition to be an advisor to his counterpart. As Vietnamization in all its aspects progressed his role would shift. Fewer advisors at higher levels would concentrate on improvement of military and civil training, organization, and management. In the regular force tactical elements, COMUSMACV foresaw gradual reduction and phaseout of advisors below division/wing level.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ A long-term advisor requirement was forecast in all services at most logistical, administrative, and training levels. As security improved, CORDS advisors would become increasingly involved with local development and civilian officials; advisors at the province level would be reduced to approximately 35 by FY73, while district and RF/PF advisors would phase down in FY72. However, expansion of the National Police, to meet growing responsibilities to maintain law and order, would require additional advisors.

Reduction of US Advisors

(C) The following actions were planned to reduce the number of advisors:

1. Division and CORDS advisor teams would be selectively reorganized into division combat assistance teams and later reduced to liaison teams.
2. Advisor teams with artillery and engineer battalions would be eliminated (a program which was initiated in the I CTZ FY69).
3. Resident advisory detachments at training centers, command, and schools would be selectively eliminated, reduced, or replaced by centralized advisory detachments.
4. CORDS advisors, except for those with the National Police and RF/PF, would be phased down, commencing in FY71. The reduction in the CORDS advisory effort would result in a gradual decrease in the size of CORDS staffs at MACV and MR headquarters.

(C) The Phase III RVNAF I&M Program would require a modest increase in advisors to the ARVN, VNN, and VNAF in FY71 due to: expansion of the VNN and rapid growth of a heretofore limited logistics system; activation of additional squadrons in VNAF, with attendant requirements for advisors in the technical and middle management levels; and activation of additional ARVN units and increased emphasis on growth of the ARVN logistical capability. Those increases, however, would be partially compensated for by reduced advisory requirements, resulting from the phaseout of paramilitary forces (CIDG, PRU, etc.).

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Quality of US Advisors

(C) COMUSMACV decided the first action needed to improve quality was the assignment of officers who met the grade criterion. Suggested incentives and rewards for officers assigned to repetitive tours included 30-day mid-tour leave in addition to R&R after completion of the third and ninth months and appropriate credit for a command tour as assurance that work as an advisor would enhance prospects for promotion.

(C) With regard to training of advisory personnel, there were two important considerations in training advisors: first, the services should not separate officers coming to Vietnam from their families to attend special CONUS orientation/training courses, because it detracted from the desirability of an advisor assignment; second, because the CONUS orientation programs were normally a year or so behind the situation in Vietnam (the one exception was language training of 6 months or longer), COMUSMACV considered it preferable to accomplish as much training as possible in Vietnam.

(C) As concerned the SECDEF's suggestion to drop the term "advisor," COMUSMACV concluded there were no overriding benefits to be derived from a title change. This matter was examined during 1969. Proponents of the change asserted "advisor" was offensive or irritating to Vietnamese counterparts who might resent the connotation of superiority implied in its Vietnamese translation. Those who were opposed or indifferent to the change believed the Vietnamese accepted the superiority implication without offense, recognized the English meaning, or translated it as Dai Dien (representative). In the final analysis, it was not established that the proposed change had any immediate bearing on accelerating Vietnamese self-sufficiency. In terms of follow-on phase-down planning of the advisory effort, however, the possibility of title change would be a matter of consideration. (158)

Improvement of the District Senior Advisors' (DSA) Program

(FOUO) On 21 Apr the Secretary of the Army informed the SECDEF of the Army plan to attract talented officers for duty as DSAs and improve the incentives of the DSA program.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ Details of the approved program were:

1. Twelve-month tour incentives: special pay of \$50 per month; special instructions provided to selection boards to ensure the importance of their advisory job was fully understood; offer of excess family quarters at CONUS post; two R&Rs against in-country tour time; preference for assignment to a specific province/district in RVN to the extent possible; selection of next assignment within practical limits; consideration within practical limits for civil schooling upon completion of tour; a letter from the DA Chief of Staff welcoming the officer into the 12-month program and inviting him to participate in the 18-month program. (161)
2. Eighteen-month tour incentives: 12-month tour benefits; assured quarters for families in CONUS, Hawaii, or Clark Air Force Base, Philippines; 30-day leave authorized upon completion of 12 months in-country; 14-day TDY with family to any one of the R&R centers in Hawaii, Hong Kong, or Japan (the family issued invitational travel orders with travel at government expense and \$30/day per diem authorized each dependent, \$23/day per diem for officer); guaranteed secondary zone consideration for promotion to LTC; invited to join the Military Assistance Officers' Program; no involuntary unaccompanied tour for 5 years, except in time of national emergency; and, if Clark Air Force Base housing was elected, the DSA would be

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authorized a monthly 3-day trip to visit family, free mail pouch service from dependents to RVN, free after-duty phone calls to Clark, and safehaven visits by wife to RVN. (162)

(FOUO) The following qualifications were required for DSA selection (waivers were considered on an individual basis): grade of major; prior or current service in RVN; C&GSC graduate or equivalent; career branch Infantry, Field Artillery, Armor, Air Defense Artillery or Engineer (officers of other branches were considered on a case basis when nominated by career branch); prior company command duty; ability/aptitude to speak Vietnamese; suitable personality/temperament; available for 1-week overlap with incumbent.

(FOUO) Duration of pre-deployment training was to consist of approximately 18 weeks of instruction administered by the Foreign Service Institute in Washington D.C. Instruction included seven weeks of advisory training and 11 weeks of language in concert with additional instruction in district operations. (163)

(U) Steps taken to improve the incentives for the DSA program and the importance of the advisory role were stressed by the Secretary of the Army in an address to advisors in training at the Foreign Service Institute:

I know of no assignment of greater importance to achieving our objective in Vietnam...As we continue to phase down United States forces, you who are to be advisors become more and more the essential ingredient of our success in Vietnam. For this reason the Chief of Staff and I are determined to make these assignment as attractive as possible, and to be sure that those who fill them are properly recognized and advanced in their careers...I have directed that henceforth officers selected as advisors will be of equal quality with officers assigned as commanders of United States troop units in Vietnam...Our overall objective is to see that the officers best qualified for advisory duty are selected, that they receive the finest and most up-to-date training possible, and that they are utilized as intended in Vietnam...Our basic policy is that no officer's future should suffer in any way from the fact that he served as an advisor instead of in some other assignment.... (164)

Vietnamese Involvement in US Advisory Program Planning

(C) Because of the complexities of the RVNAF I&M planning, a combined JCS Central Pacification and Development Council/MACV RVNAF I&M Planning Committee was formed, jointly chaired by the MACJ3, and the JCS Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. This instrumentality provided a useful way to obtain Vietnamese views on planning the future US advisory program. The committee was asked to give particular attention to possible reductions in the program and improvement of advisor quality.

Intelligence and Operations' Coordinating Center Advisors

(U) Effective 19 Aug, the DA approved a program for Province and District Intelligence and Operations' Coordinating Center (PIOCC/DIOCC) advisors. The program included 393 military

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positions. Personnel currently serving in PIOCC/DIOCC positions could be nominated by COM-USMACV for entry into the program. Qualifications for consideration included: outstanding record; prior service in Vietnam desirable, but not mandatory; grade of major for PIOCC and captain for DIOCC, desirable for majors to be graduates of Command and Staff College, and for captains, desirable they be graduates of the advanced course; must be from the Military Intelligence branch (although officers of other career branches would be considered on a case-by-case basis if the MI branch could not satisfy requirements); speak or have the aptitude to learn Vietnamese; have suitable qualities of temperament and personality.

(U) To increase the attractiveness of the program, the following incentives were provided: a letter from the DA, Deputy CofS for Personnel; the selectee's preference for a specific location in RVN, would be granted, if possible; two R&Rs; special instructions to selection/promotion boards to ensure the importance of their advisory job was fully understood; offered excess family quarters at designated CONUS posts. (165)

Advisory Effort in Pacification

(S) The advisory effort necessary to continue progress in pacification and development was substantially assisted by the special program for DSA, complementing the earlier program for PSAs which proved most effective. The MAT teams were providing important assistance to RF and PF and were being extended to develop comprehensive village defense plans to include all elements of pacification, a program which showed considerable success in its IV CTZ tryout. The civilian side of the advisory structure was going through a difficult period which would be ameliorated in coming months as a result of additional attention given to personnel selections by the Director General of the Foreign Service. (166)

MAAGV Plan

(S) The development of the MAAGV concept into MACV Oplan No. J198 was initiated on 25 Feb. On 25 Jun, the concept, developed by MACJ5, was approved by DEPCOMUSMACV. In November, the project was transferred to MACJ3 for additional study. It described the prospective mid-1973 US military role in the RVN as follows:

1. The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, would be reorganized into the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, a joint military advisory group as defined in JCS Pub 2.* Ultimately, the MAAGV would phase down and be eliminated. The US military would provide advice and assistance to the RVNAF and the GVN, manage the Military Assistance Program/Military Assistance Service Funded (MAP/MASF) program, and conduct limited support operations in intelligence, communications, and strategic air support. Pacification efforts on a reduced scale would continue. The RVNAF would have overall responsibility for combat operations, combat support, and combat service support operations, with limited support in the latter two provided by US forces. Two ROK infantry divisions, with their supporting force, would remain in-country to assist the RVNAF in providing required security in MR2. The US would continue to provide logistical support to the ROK forces if required by military working agreements.

* See TOP SECRET Supplement for long range planning for MAAGV.

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NOTES:

- (1) ~~CORDS~~ ELEMENT OF MAAGV STAFF MONITORS CORDS PROGRAMS & MAINTAINS LIAISON WITH MR DEPCORDS
- (2) ~~OPCON~~ TO NSA; ~~CMD~~ LESS ~~OPCON~~ TO NSA THEATER HQ
- (3) SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS ALSO CONTAIN SPECIAL ADVISORY UNITS FOR RYNAF TRAINING CENTERS, SCHOOL COMMANDS, LOGISTIC COMMANDS, ETC.
- (4) ~~CMD~~ LESS ~~OPCON~~ TO USARPAC
- (5) ~~CMD~~ LESS ~~OPCON~~ TO AF COMMAND DESIGNATED BY PACAF
- (6) MR SENIOR ADVISORS STAFF INCLUDES A DEPCORDS FOR THE MR
- (7) ~~CMD~~ LESS ~~OPCON~~ TO USASTRATCOMPAC

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Within RVN most of the enemy local forces would have been destroyed, and the main forces (in remote areas in RVN) would be unable to assemble into larger than company strength. Links between VC Infrastructure (VCI), local guerrillas, and enemy main forces would be severed in most of the countryside, with RVN citizens frequently providing information on enemy activities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) would provide civilian assistance AS to GVN agencies, assist the GVN in national development programs and insure that GVN programs provided the necessary information to facilitate the CORDS advisory effort at the province level and below.

2. The advisory effort would be heavily weighted in favor of communications, supply, medical, transportation, facilities engineering, construction, and resource management. Operational assistance would still be required for some units and organizations in the RVNAF. The MAAGV staff would monitor and coordinate the advisory effort of the three military advisory groups (AFGP, NAG, AAG), the CORDS advisory effort at the MR level and below and provide advisor liaison to the RVNAF JGS on joint service matters. The relationship between the MAAGV staff and their JGS counterparts would be one of liaison and mutual assistance. Advising on the single service matters would be left to the appropriate service advisory group, as follows:

a. Chief, Army Advisory Group (CHAAG): serve as senior Army advisor to ARVN and advise the JGS on purely ARVN matters; advise the chief, MAAGV, on ARVN and RF/PF paramilitary operations, force structure, training and material requirements; monitor the CORDS advisory programs; prepare recommendations for and supervise the execution of approved MAP/MASF programs in support of the ARVN, RF/PF, and paramilitary forces; command subordinate AAG advisory teams; administer military discipline for US Army personnel assigned or attached to HQ MAAGV and AAG.

b. Chief, Naval Advisory Group (CHNAG): act as naval component commander for unservice matters in the RVN; command subordinate naval and Marine Corps advisory teams; serve as senior naval advisor to the VNN; advise the Chief, MAAGV, on matters pertaining to VNN and VNMC operations, force structure, training and material requirements, support, and force objectives; prepare recommendations for and supervise the execution of approved MAP/MASF programs in support of the VNN and VNMC; administer military discipline for USN and USMC personnel.

c. Chief, Air Force Advisory Group (CHAFGP): command subordinate Air Force advisory teams; serve as senior Air Force advisor to the VNAF; advise the Chief, MAAGV, on matters pertaining to VNAF operations, force structure, training and material requirements, support, and force objectives; prepare recommendations for and supervise execution of approved MAP/MASF programs in support of VNAF; administer military discipline for USAF personnel assigned or attached to HQ MAAGV in addition to those in AFGP; advise the JGS on purely VNAF matters.

d. Commander, US Army Military Assistance Advisory Group Support Command (COMUSAMAAGSUPCOM): act as the Army component commander for unservice matters in RVN; provide financial service support for MAAGV except for Navy and Air Force service peculiar items; control reproduction and training aid facilities for the MAAGV, support the ROK and other FWFs as required by agreements, support RVNAF OJT and local national personnel as required; operate a replacement and R&R processing facility at Tan Son Nhut air base for all MAAGV forces, an in-country R&R site at Cam Ranh Bay, and an in-country confinement facility for

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short duration pre-trial and/or post-trial detention; exercise command less operational control over the Technical Analysis Group and conduct, through that group, the US military intelligence effort in support of MAAGV, SEATO, the Pacific Command (PACOM), and the U.S. Government; supervise the counterintelligence effort for MAAGV; provide, through the Technical Analysis Group, intelligence qualified advisory personnel for designated RVNAF organizations; exercise operational control over the signal element and provide, through that element, integrated C-E support to all MAAGV agencies, provide technical assistance to the RVNAF and the GVN in matters relating to C-E fixed facilities previously provided, and recover US provided C-E equipment excess for issue to other PACOM facilities; maintain, under the control of the signal element, the necessary C-E facilities to assure rapid/reentry of US and/or FWFs if required; and provide a processing site for US PWs. (167)

e. Commander, Air Support Element (COMASE): act as the Air Force component commander for uniservice matters in the RVN; command the USAF roll-up force, logistics airlift units, and combat support units; maintain designated reentry facilities at Cam Ranh Bay; coordinate the airlift system; provide Air Force peculiar supply.

3. Specific efforts in the functions of intelligence, communications, medical support, air support, command post locations, and the selected bases for advisors of RVNAF units for each of the services, are found in the MACV OPLAN J198. The personnel density in each MR was estimated as (estimate does not include the people for MAAGV support command elements, Air Force support elements, or the various advisors to RVNAF schools and training commands): (168)

Personnel Density Estimates

	MR1	MR2	MR3	MR4
HQ MR Senior Advisors	100	100	100	100
Army Advisors	252	258	2,570 ¹	252
Signal Elements	708	669	3,832	751
Technical Analysis Group	40	95	1,164	111
Naval Advisors	371	503	1,393 ²	1,260
AF Advisors	73	182	464 ³	79
NSA/SCA Elements	2,150	1,559	2,532	459
USMC Advisors				45
CORDS Advisors ⁴	<u>200</u>	<u>480</u>	<u>440</u>	<u>640</u>
Total	3,894	3,846	12,495	3,697

¹Includes HQ MAAGV (1211) and Army Advisory Group (806)

²Includes Navy Advisory Group (200)

³Includes AF Advisory Group (229)

⁴Based on 40 advisors to each province

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RVNAF LOGISTICS IMPROVEMENT

Background

(U) The RVNAF CLC, under the command of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCS/LOG), provided logistical support to ARVN and common item support to the VNAF and VNN. Each service had its own logistics command and system for service peculiar items. Under the CLC were five ALCs. Each MR was supported by one ALC, except MR 2 which was supported by two ALCs due to its size. Also under the CLC were eight logistics service agencies (procurement, commissary, transportation, ordnance, engineer, signal, quartermaster, and medical) and the Logistics Management School. With the exception of transportation, procurement, and commissary, each of the other technical departments operated supply and maintenance base depots (see 1969 MACV Command History, Vol II for detailed description of RVNAF logistical organization including the VNAF, VNN, and VNMC).

(S) As structured, the RVNAF was capable of providing marginally adequate logistics support to their forces-in-being in 1969. The support was provided without US in-country support, except in the areas of sealift, port operations, airlift, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) line haul, and equipment overhaul. In 1969, approximately 70 percent of the airlift requirement was provided by the USAF. Although ARVN handled over 90 percent of their own cargo at shallow draft ports, the majority of deep-draft discharge was performed by the US. Some out-of-country equipment overhaul was provided by the US in the form of rebuilt armored personnel carriers, power trains, marine maintenance, and depot level aircraft maintenance.*

(U) There were many problems throughout the RVNAF logistics system and during 1969 MACV initiated several programs to improve the system with the ultimate goal of self-sufficiency:

1. The Combined Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP) was developed to initiate and accelerate programs to substantially and immediately improve troop support, energize the logistics base structure, and develop an aggressive spirit in the conduct of logistics operations. A total of 121 problems were identified, 73 applicable to ARVN, 27 to VNAF, and 21 to VNN. Problems were documented in a manner which clearly specified the required solutions, the responsible agencies, both US and Vietnamese, and the desired time for action to be completed. A combined RVNAF/MACV coordinating committee composed of senior RVNAF/MACV staff officers was established to administer, evaluate, and provide continuing direction to the logistics offensive. To assist the committee, both RVNAF and MACV established Logistics Offensive Coordination Committees (LOCCs) to collect, analyze, and present information reflecting the effectiveness of RVNAF logistics.

2. Other programs initiated in 1969 were: the Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP), a medium to long range coordinated program of major objectives and courses of action for improving logistics operations and actions which required emphasis in the advisory effort; the Administrative and Direct Support Logistics Company (A&DSL) study (note: these companies were retitled Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Centers (SM&DSL); the Depot Upgrade Plan, which addressed the inadequate facilities of the ordnance, engineer, and signal base depots located in the greater Saigon area; ACTOVLOG (the accelerated turnover of Navy support assets to VNN); Project Buddy, a combined effort by MACV, the US 1st Logistical Com-

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for discussion of long term support for RVNAF logistics.

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A Vietnamese truck convoy carrying ammunition heads south from Saigon on Route 4 bound for the Area Logistics Command at Can Tho in the Mekong Delta.

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mand, and RVNAF to provide OJT in special skill areas; and a program to provide RVNAF with an automated capability to manage logistics at the national level. *

3. The CLIP provided a valuable management tool in the achievement of needed improvements in the RVNAF logistics system and would provide successive generations of advisors with the background, goals, and progress towards RVNAF self-sufficiency. The FY70 CLIP contained 81 projects with 413 courses of action; by the end of December, most of these were completed. It was found that many projects in CLIP were also included in the CLOP; this caused duplicate efforts in reporting and recording progress. Therefore, a FY71 CLIP was prepared which eliminated those projects identified in CLOP. As a result, the new version contained 56 projects with 298 courses of action. (169)

Combined Logistics Offensive (CLOP)

(U) The second quarterly meeting of the combined LOCCs was held on 27 Feb 70 at which time the personnel of the RVNAF LOCC reported that CLOP, with some exceptions, was progressing on schedule. Also at that meeting it was disclosed that the RVNAF CLC had initiated preparation of an RVNAF Logistics Improvement Plan 1970 (Logistics Offensive II) on 13 Jan. This differed from the CLOP in that the impetus for its preparation, implementation, and measurement was Vietnamese. The plan was essentially a follow-up to CLOP and would contain the 1969 logistical improvement projects to be continued during 1970 and new problems reported from ALCs, technical services, VNAF, and VNN. The Commanding General, RVNAF Central Logistics Command, asked all Vietnamese units to immediately study and recommend logistical improvement projects for 1970. (170)

(U) Following the RVNAF briefing, the CofS, MACV, asked that advisors at all echelons assist and advise RVNAF in identification of logistics deficiencies within their areas of responsibility. He also stressed that every effort be made to insure that the plan remained a Vietnamese project. (171)


(U) The plan for Logistics Offensive II was published by the RVNAF on schedule in bilingual form. As a result, CLOP was terminated on 15 Jun. Of the 121 original problems identified in CLOP, 101 were completed, 17 deleted, and only three required transfer to Logistics Offensive II. The new plan was effective 1 Jul 70 through 30 Jun 71. Sixty-five problems were identified and specific corrective actions proposed. The RVNAF plan assigned all actions to RVNAF elements. It invited US advisors to participate as members of committees and working groups to implement the plan and monitor progress. The CofS, MACV, directed advisors at all levels to assist their counterparts in execution of the plan through active participation on committees, assisting in preparation of progress reports, and encouraging them to complete corrective actions on schedule. (172)

(U) Independent programs were established from the CLOP, i.e., the Base Depot Upgrade, the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS), and the SM&DSL Center Facilities Upgrade.


*See TOP SECRET Supplement for discussion of ARVN and VNAF Logistical support personnel increases, 1970-73.

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Top: Additional facilities under construction at the 60th Signal Rebuild Depot, Saigon. Bottom: ARVN soldiers receiving vehicle maintenance instruction at the 80th Ordnance Rebuild Depot, Saigon.



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RVNAF Base Depot Upgrade Program

(U) The objective of this program was the improvement of depot maintenance facilities, utilities, technical equipment and skills. Also it was to provide in-country overhaul capability for selected engineer, signal, and ordnance items (see 1969 MACV Command History, Vol II, for improvement requirements).

(U) Funds were approved and the program began in January 1970. Construction commenced on the 40th Engineer Base Depot water systems, drainage, open storage, and roads; work was almost complete by December. Formal and OJT programs were established under a Vinnell training contract. Personnel learned engine rebuild, crane/tractor repair, basic electricity, machinist skills, and supply storage. In addition, an OJT program was prepared to train engineer depot personnel plus 16 personnel from the 80th Ordnance Depot in generator operation and organizational maintenance. This program was completed in August. (173)

(U) At the 60th Signal Base Depot work was underway on the electrical distribution system and building rehabilitation. By December work was 59 percent finished; completion of the project was expected by July 71. The major area of progress was rehabilitation of the large consolidated maintenance building which was completed in September. Construction of five new warehouses was also completed in September. Filipino technicians conducted maintenance training on the new series of signal equipment. During October and November preparation of POIs for advanced skill training which began in July was completed.

(U) At the 80th Ordnance Rebuild Base Depot, construction on civil works and building rehabilitation was underway with completion scheduled for July 1971. Construction of a power plant was almost finished. Sixteen personnel received OJT at the Saigon Power Plant and later attended the generator course at the 40th Engineer Depot. OJT in the mechanical skill trades for 500 military personnel was completed by September. By 30 Jun, fifteen selected personnel had completed the Basic Supervisor's Development Course and developed their own program to instruct other personnel at the depot. (174)

RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS)

(U) The RAMMS plan was developed by MACV/RVNAF to automate the RVNAF logistics system.

(U) The plan was published on 20 Jan 70 and was effective for implementation on that date. Formerly, manual systems were used by the RVNAF CLC for stock control and accounting. The manual systems were not standardized among the technical services, and there were no effective management information reports available at the CLC level for proper control of assets. The large amount of new complex weaponry and equipment, in conjunction with the need to support the resources already in the system, had created a situation in which the amount of interrelated data had grown too large to be handled effectively on a manual basis. Analysis of the RVNAF CLC data automation requirement and establishment of a national materiel management agency were documented in the MACV CLIP and the CLOP. The analysis substantiated the requirement to automate the system in order to preserve the large US investment in RVN equipment and to assure proper future interface with the US supply system. (175)

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(C) As part of the RAMMS implementation plan, punch card machinery was installed in four of the five base depots and in the 80th Ordnance Rebuild Depot in Saigon. Rental of the equipment was financed by US MASF funds. Parallel operation started in February 1971. This operation would assist depots by mechanizing basic stock control functions, placing basic depot files in machine readable format, and facilitating conversion to the central automated system. (176)

(U) The computer (IBM 360/40) was ordered by the RVNAF from the IBM World Trade Corporation for delivery by 1 Jul 71 and would be funded by the Ministry of Defense, GVN budget. (177) The JCS approved funds in the amount of \$13 million to support this system. Construction of the US-funded Data Processing Center facility started in June 1970, to be completed by March 1971. During the summer of 1970, a decision was made to contract the design and programming of the central data processing system. On 28 Oct 70, a fixed price contract of \$800,000 was signed with the Computer Science Corporation to design and program a central data processing system to support RVNAF. The contract called for delivery of a completed package by 28 Jan 72. This was a target date for assumption of logistical operations by the National Material Management Agency. (178)

Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Centers (SM&DSL)

(U) The SM&DSL Centers directly supported the RF/PF in personnel management, administration, finance, supply, maintenance, and transportation. In 1969, the centers were not capable of providing satisfactory support. While improvement in the organizational and operational aspects was encouraging in 1970, the centers faced problems in keeping pace as the RF/PF grew and saw more combat. Continuing difficulties were shortages of qualified officers, NCOs, school trained specialists, and inadequate facilities. In an August letter to the CofS, JGS, the CofS, MACV, pinpointed the efforts needing priority treatment and command emphasis:

The Regional and Popular Forces this year will reach a force level of some 550,000 personnel, while continuing to be the backbone of the GVN's pacification effort. It is apparent that the accomplishments of these forces will depend to a great degree on the effectiveness of the support they receive from the Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics (SM&DSL) Centers.

The first order of effort should be the assignment of qualified officers and noncommissioned officers by Central Logistics Command and recruitment of enlisted personnel by the sectors to fill known vacancies... Command emphasis in this area by the sector commanders is mandatory. (179)

To alleviate the severe shortage of school trained specialists, the CofS, MACV, recommended that JCS take the following actions: survey individual centers to determine the exact training needs based on occupational specialty codes; establish specific quotas for SM&DSL Center personnel; insure province quotas were met; return personnel to their parent centers after training; and arrange OJT with appropriate ARVN support units when requirements exceed service school capabilities. Concerning center facilities, the CofS, MACV, stated:

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Of no less importance is the current status of the centers' facilities. Inadequate storage, maintenance, and office areas hamper efficient, thorough operations and create safety hazards. A review of the requirements for each center was recently completed by the Central Logistics Command in conjunction with this headquarters. Based on the review, positive action should be taken as soon as possible to upgrade the sites. Many improvements can be readily accomplished by the provinces using local resources or on a self-help basis, while JGS must provide support for major construction... (180)

Selected Items of Equipment for RVNAF Improvement and Modernization

(C) To improve the status of mission essential equipment was one of the goals to enhance the effectiveness of RVNAF. By November, progress in this area was considered satisfactory. Of 20 selected items, FY70 requirements were met for all except: (181)

<u>Equipment Item</u>	<u>Status (No. behind schedule)</u>
Grenade Launchers (M79)	4,124
Crane, TRK (MTD, 20 T)	14
Semi-Trailer	179
*1 T Truck (M601) & 3/4 T (M37)	2,399
Utility Trucks, 1/4 T	2,203
5T Truck	40

Of the above shortfalls, only the 3/4-ton and 1-ton trucks were a major combat supply shortage. (183) This shortage was partially offset with an overage of 2 1/2 ton-trucks. Based on shipment schedules, it was estimated there would be a continued lack of 3/4-ton vehicles until the 3d Qtr of CY71 (see chart on pages 93 and 94). (184)

RVNAF Commissary System


(U) The commissary/exchange department was responsible for resale items only. There was no supply support or mission relationship between the RVNAF quartermaster and commissary departments. The commissary financed its operations under a revolving fund concept. The fund was derived originally from a 1967 US \$42 million grant. As of 1 Jul 70, remaining stocks from that grant were valued at approximately US \$0.5 million, and net worth was approximately US \$38.0 million. This represented a significant growth in net worth especially since items in the original grant were sold at approximately two-thirds of their cost (approximately US \$28 million) to give commissary patrons a meaningful savings. With this favorable status,

*Problem area

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ARVN technicians repair 50-caliber machine guns and field communications equipment at rebuild depots in Saigon.



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Status of Selected Items of Equipment for RVNAF 1 & M (182)

(As of 4 Dec 70)

	CUM QM'T THROUGH		TOTAL SHPD	TOTAL NET QM'T REMAINING	FINAL RDD CURRENT	SHPD WEEK ENDING +Dec70	CURRENT STATUS VS PROGRAM	REMARKS
	FY70	FY71						
Grenade launcher M79	46,578	51,509	53,674	45,908	FY75	0	1,097 behind schedule	The M203 grenade launcher is now being shipped to USARV freeing M79s for in-country transfer. Program shortfall is expected to be alleviated by in-country transfers during 2d Qtr FY71.
Howitzer, Lt 105mm, M101A1	725	1,054	1,274	876	FY75	0	On schedule	
Helicopter, UH-1H (VNAF)	128	376	506	211	FY75	0	On schedule	
Radio set, AN/ VRC-12 (45-47)	5,513	8,240	9,225	7,134	FY75	124	On schedule	
Radio set, AN/ PRC-25	29,896	41,048	42,940	32,568	FY75	187	1,657 behind schedule	Shortage projected through FY71. Shortfall will be met by CONUS shipments of PRC-25 and in-country transfer as PRC-77 radios are shipped to USARV.
Crane, trk. MTD, 20 T	701	349	418	342	FY75	0	On schedule	
Semi-trailer, Stake, 12 T M127AC	1,207	1,306	1,402	1,307	FY75	0	On schedule	
Truck, 1 T M601 / M74 F, M17 series	11,886	14,001	20,361	9,727	FY75	0	2,705 behind schedule	M601 models no longer available. Rqmts will be met from overhauling M37 series in TMA, USAREUR, USARHAW and CONUS. In-country transfers will be completed as assets become available. Expected on schedule date is end FY72. 300 vehicles in transit.

	CUM RQMT THROUGH FY70	FY71	FY75	TOTAL SHPD	TOTAL NET RQMT REMAINING	FINAL RDD CURRENT	SHPD WEEK ENDING 4Dec70	CURRENT STATUS VS PROGRAM	REMARKS
Truck, Util, 1/4 T, M151A1 & M151A2	22,319	26,266	36,393	24,284	12,109	FY75	3	On schedule	
Truck, CCO, 2-1/2 T, M151A2	15,345	18,326	22,777	16,993	5,784	FY75	143	On schedule	
Truck, CCO, 5 T, M54A2	604	644	842	638	204	FY75	0	On schedule	
Office, M16A1	790,848	817,437	865,460	806,592	58,868	FY75	0	On schedule	
Machine gun, M60	13,274	15,958	14,343	13,505	888	FY75	0	On schedule	
Carrier, Murt, 21mm, M125A1	133	135	147	136	12	FY75	0	On schedule	
Howitzer, Med, 155mm, M114A1	293	322	366	319	47	FY75	0	On schedule	
Tank, Lt, M41A1	267	289	385	293	92	FY75	0	On schedule	
Carrier, Pers, M113	1,109	1,209	1,540	1,135	405	FY75	0	On schedule	
Tractor, Ft, 15.5 Med	367	429	740	466	272	FY75	0	On schedule	

An additional 33 assets have been transferred in-country but have not yet been formally reported as shipped. Seventy additional in-country transfers from ARVN land clearing companies are forecast in FY71. Remaining shipments will be from overhaul or in-country transfers.

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neither additional US funds nor US food items in kind were deemed necessary to support the RVNAF Commissary/Exchange Department.

(U) The 1970 RVNAF program included the construction of one main commissary depot and six subdepot retail centers. By June, two subdepot retail centers were constructed and the remainder were under construction. The main depot was completed in September. (185)

RVNAF Farm, Garden, and Livestock Program

(U) The purpose of this program was to propagate a self-help and self-reliance effort on the part of military units to meet the subsistence needs of RVNAF. The Food Supplement Program and the Farm, Garden, and Livestock Program were both intended to augment the inadequate administrative ration to the troops. The RVNAF had a 5-year program which commenced in 1967. As of 1970, 16 of the programmed 21 regional and sector livestock farms were established, and efforts were being directed toward increasing production of fodder. The construction and operation of feed mills were increased. A total of 500 hectares was scheduled for cultivation by the end of 1970; in July, 41 organizations and activities had gardens encompassing 31.7 hectares. (186)

Material Transport

(U) By 1970 RVNAF was self-sufficient in highway transportation and at times transported cargo for US Forces and other FWMAF. They were also transporting the major portion of their waterlift requirements and some cargo for US Forces. The capability of the VNN and ARVN crews and the management of vessels to increase the capability to handle cargo was increasing at a steady rate. The VNN had landing craft and ships which transported loads of 120 to 1,000 tons of cargo from deep water ports to the Delta region and shallow draft ports throughout RVN. ARVN operated landing craft of smaller size but in greater quantity than the Navy to carry cargo to RVNAF installations over the inland waterway system. (187)


(U) In spite of constant harassment by enemy forces, the RVN national rail system continued to provide service to the armed forces as well as the civil population. Because of the large capital investment required by the GVN, the feasibility of full restoration of rail lines to connect all regions of RVN was under study. A MACV study, released in late December, recommended that the railway be abandoned because it was antiquated, expensive beyond its worth to operate, and too susceptible to sabotage.

Port Operations

(U) Prior to 1970, RVNAF terminal operations were small in terms of the total port requirement. The discharge of deep-draft vessels carrying military cargo was conducted by US military or US sponsored civilian stevedore contractors. During 1970 ARVN was gradually assuming this responsibility. The ARVN Saigon Transportation Terminal Command handled all RVNAF general cargo arriving and departing the Saigon area. ARVN was also operating the ammunition barge discharge sites at Binh Thuy and Saigon Newport. The US Army, however, continued to handle cargo discharge from deep draft vessels and operate the ammunition barge

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Top: A trooper provides security as 107mm Howitzer ammunition is removed from barges at an ARVN port. Bottom: Drums are filled with gasoline at the Area Logistics Command in Nha Trang for convoy shipment to sub-depots in central Vietnam.



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site at Cogida. The ammunition barge discharge point at Buu Long was operated by the USAF. The ARVN Can Tho Transportation Terminal Command was conducting all port operations and the inland waterway distribution of cargo in the Delta. (188)

Logistics Assessment

(S) A firm foundation was established for the RVNAF logistics system (see RVNAF logistics section, this chapter). Shortfalls and deficiencies were identified in the areas of airlift, marine maintenance, materiel rebuild, technical training, and supervisory skills; corrective programs were developed. In most cases, the controlling factor for elimination of deficiencies was training lead time which ranged up to 24 months. RVNAF was near self-sufficiency in port operations, national materiel management, surface transportation, LOC maintenance, and base level aircraft maintenance. The operations in Cambodia were successfully supported by the RVNAF logistics system. If continued US advisor and technical assistance, funding, materiel, and air/sealift support were provided, it was believed the RVNAF logistics system could support planned ARVN increases in troop structure and missions. (189)

(C) It is important to note, however, that the Accelerated I & M Plan, which was ahead of schedule in 1970, placed a serious burden on the logistics system. Although it was expanding and improving in most areas, there were serious deficiencies. Requisitioning and distribution of major items of equipment and spare parts were poorly exercised. Each MR reported at least one serious problem resulting from the unresponsiveness of the RVNAF supply system. The RVNAF supply system frequently remained unaware of the requirements of many of the units it supported. (190)

Combined Campaign Plan 1971: Logistics Improvement and Modernization

(S) The CCP 1971 detailed improvement and modernization for numerous parts of the RVNAF logistics system. What follows pinpoints the weakest areas remaining in that system in 1970: (191)

1. Improve organization of food service and messing facilities and the system for distributing the administrative portion of the garrison ration.
2. Intensively develop the military agriculture and husbandry program to be self-sufficient for the supply of fresh foods for mess services and military dependents.
3. Improve management of and expand the commissary/exchange system.
4. Increase clothing production of the quartermaster clothing factories and subcenters.
5. Insure commanders make efforts in the economy of ammunition, especially for artillery, and return shell casings and packing material from supporting depots.
6. Expand ammunition depots.
7. Intensively carry out all aspects of preventive maintenance of equipment at all echelons.

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8. Increase land and water transport capabilities to avoid overdependence on air transport.
 9. Improve organization and operation at water ports as well as transport terminals.
 10. Carry out dependent shelter program.
 11. Carry out the repair and construction of strategic LOCs.
 12. Reduce present construction to maximum extent possible for units that will receive or are receiving installations or facilities transferred by FWMAF.
 13. Continue to improve systems and facilities for evacuation and treatment of wounded.
 14. Continue to develop in-country procurement of materiel.
 15. Emphasize the use of surface LOCs from base logistic complexes to advance complexes and forward support areas with a lesser dependence upon airlift capability.
 16. Make general improvements in medical support, quartermaster, transport, and communications.

APPRAISAL OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES

General

(S) Although RVNAF demonstrated increased effectiveness, it could not meet the overall enemy threat without US and FWMAF assistance. While RVNAF was assuming a greater share of the burden of combat operations, accelerated activation of new ARVN and territorial force units was weakening an already limited personnel base. Further improvement in equipment, force structure, training, and leadership was essential to enhance RVNAF effectiveness. (192)

ARVN/VNMC Assessment

(C) Improvement in effectiveness is difficult to project on the basis of past performance. Many variables influence the continuing combat effectiveness of a unit. The operational results of ARVN/VNMC units are strongly correlated with the leadership capabilities of their commanders. Consequently, a change in commanders may cause a decided change in effectiveness for either better or worse. (193)

(C) The environment in which an organization works influences its results, and a lack of enemy activity develops complacency as does time spent on security type missions.

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(C) The increase in enemy activity during the 2d Qtr led to improved operational results for almost all ARVN/VNMC organizations, but the lessening of enemy activity lowered 3d and 4th Qtr performance. MR 1 units have traditionally operated in the area of greatest enemy activity and have been among the leading ARVN/VNMC units; the 2d Qtr country-wide increase in enemy activity, plus the operations in Cambodia, allowed other ARVN/VNMC units to achieve results comparable to MR 1 units which continued to perform well. The 3d and 4th Qtrs found MR 1 units back on top as enemy activity continued in their areas at a high level.

(C) A temporary change in an organization's area of operation frequently improves its effectiveness as long as the environment does not change too drastically. The Cambodian operations showed that ARVN units were capable of operating effectively outside their base areas. A more permanent change in an organization's area of operation, however, may lead to severe morale problems; the desertion rate for ARVN/VNMC maneuver battalions increased significantly during the 2d and 3d Qtrs as the Cambodian campaign increased in duration.

(C) A summary analysis of ARVN/VNMC unit performance by MR follows:

MR 1 -- The 1st Div, which was the top performer during the 3d Qtr, obtained only average results during October and November as the enemy avoided contact. Friendly losses decreased, but the 1st Div had the highest percentage of KIA due to mines and booby traps. The operational effectiveness and leadership assessments of the division continued to be highest in the ARVN/VNMC.

The 2d Div was the ARVN/VNMC's top performer in October-November; it eliminated the most enemy and captured the most weapons per battalion of any ARVN/VNMC unit and also had the best casualty ratio. Friendly losses were average, but the percentage of friendly KIA due to mines and booby traps was second only to the 1st Div.

The 51st Regt improved its relative standing among ARVN/VNMC units during the year. It eliminated the third most enemy per battalion and its weapons captured per battalion was second best. However, friendly losses were also so high that the casualty ratio was only average. Operational effectiveness and leadership was rated very high by advisors.

MR 2 -- The 22d Div obtained average results during the year. There was little enemy activity in its area of operation. Friendly losses were so low that the division's casualty ratio was third highest. The division spent 2 percent of its time in Cambodia where it located one of the largest caches.

The 23d Div, which had constantly been one of the poorest performers, obtained average results despite spending 25 percent of its time training. Friendly losses were low (the division lost only one man to mines and booby traps) resulting in an excellent casualty ratio. The division's ratio of enemy eliminated per hour of contact was the best in-country.

MR 3 -- The 5th Div had been substantially below average in operational results. The division spent 14 percent of its time in Cambodia and obtained better results there than in RVN. It had the best ratio of weapons captured and enemy eliminated in Cambodia during the 3d and 4th Qtrs.

The 18th Div during early 1970 showed improvement in operational results. During the first quarters the division had a very low friendly casualty rate which resulted in a very

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Top: ARVN armored personnel carriers (APCs) on a combat mission in the coastal lowlands.
Bottom: ARVN scouts on patrol in the Central Highlands.



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favorable casualty ratio. During the latter part of 1970, however, friendly losses increased to an average rate and the casualty ratio fell below average. Fifty-three percent of the division's effort during the last quarter of the year was spent in Cambodia, more than any other ARVN/VNMC unit. The 18th Div slipped during the year but remained average in its rating.

The 25th Div improved greatly during the year. It became one of the best units in operational effectiveness and overall results. The division spent 44 percent of its time in Cambodia during the 4th Qtr. The second lowest number of friendly losses resulted in the second best casualty ratio in-country.

MR 4 -- During the latter part of 1970, the 7th Div became one of the ARVN/VNMC's outstanding performers. It had the second highest number of enemy eliminated per battalion in the 4th Qtr and the most enemy captured and surrendered per battalion, an outgrowth of the highly successful Kien Hoa pacification program.

The 9th Div also showed improved performance during 1970; however, it lapsed in the last quarter and fell in its rating. In October and November the number of enemy eliminated, weapons captured, and the casualty ratio all decreased sharply, reversing the yearlong uptrends. In the last quarter the division had more friendly casualties per battalion than any other ARVN/VNMC unit; this resulted in the least favorable casualty ratio in-country. The division spent about 5 percent of its time in Cambodia; its results there were comparable to those in RVN.

The 21st Div became one of the better organizations during the latter part of 1970. It had the second highest number of enemy KIA per battalion in-country as well as the second most hours of contact. The division spent 20 percent of its time on reserve and rehabilitation during October and November.

Assessment of Special Units

(C) The Airborne Division historically had been required to have a large part of its force in close proximity to Saigon. This, plus spending half the year in training, gave the Airborne Division the lowest operational results of all ARVN/VNMC units. The division was committed on a relief operation in Cambodia in December where it performed well.

(C) During the latter part of 1970, the VNMC had battalions operating in Cambodia, MR 1, MR 4, and the Saigon area. Forty-six percent of its effort was in Cambodia during the 4th Qtr, but the results there were not substantially better than those obtained in-country. The VNMC results, however, compared favorably with those of the ARVN divisions.

(C) The 17 armored cavalry squadrons operated throughout the four military regions. One squadron was organic to each of the 10 ARVN infantry divisions, and the remaining seven operated under corps control. Total armored cavalry squadron operational results compared favorably with infantry battalions, even though they spent one-third of their time on security missions. The cavalry spent 22 percent of its time in Cambodia on combat missions where it achieved substantially better results than in RVN.

(C) At midyear the 20 ranger battalions were joined by 32 CIDG camp groups which were converted to ranger battalions. The resulting 52 battalions were located throughout the military

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Top: Carrying plastic water jugs, ARVN troops board UH-1 helicopters for an air assault in the Mekong Delta. Bottom: LTG Arthur S. Collins, commanding general of the US I Field Force, awards Bronze Star Medals for valor to troops of the ARVN 47th Inf Regt.



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(S) ARVN/VNMC forces performed well, especially in Cambodia. The Cambodian operations enhanced troop morale and the spirit of the offensive on the part of leadership which if carried over to in-country operations, would contribute greatly to ARVN/VNMC command and control procedures, combined arms employment, and logistics support. Problems, however, continued to exist in maintaining combat personnel strength, overcoming excessive desertions, improving leadership, and developing a more responsive supply system. (194)

RF/PF Assessment

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ARVN troops providing security for a train on a run north of Saigon. The flat car is pushed ahead of the locomotive to detonate VC pressure mines.

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(C) Comparison of RVNAF and US Large Unit Operations in the RVN (197)

	1969		1970		
ARVN/VNMC	Jan	Aug	Jan	Aug	Dec
RF/PF:					
Combat Opn	732	714	658	922	1068
Security Opn	114	79	11	98	110
Training Opn	8	31	43	45	34
Reserve Opn	79	56	96	72	75
Pacification Opn	229	296	167	60	29
Other Opn	0	0	108	0	7
US:					
Combat Opn	710	634	448	490	287
Security Opn	57	31	83	14	35
Training Opn	0	0	7	7	14
Reserve Opn	0	0	2	0	7
Pacification Opn	0	42	36	35	35
Other Opn	4	7	35	0	14

Note: The above figures represent battalion days of operation which are the number of days a battalion is on an operation or a figure obtained by dividing the number of companies employed on a large unit operation by three and multiplying the result by the number of days the operation lasted.

VNN Assessment

(C) As cited in the section on force ceiling, the VNN had received over 1,300 US naval operational craft under ACTOV and the accelerated ACTOV which began in late 1969. The turn-over also included 127 support craft with more than 100 boats still to be transferred.

(C) The VNN by year's end was one of the 10 largest in the world. Operationally it had taken over responsibility for the inner MARKET TIME barrier. All interdiction barriers and special areas of operations were either fully VNN operational or were planned for complete turnover early in 1971. These included: BREEZY COVE, Rung Sat Special Zone, TRAN HUNG DAO V/READY DECK, BARRIER REEF, TRAN HUNG DAO IV/SOLID ANCHOR and TRAN HUNG DAO VI/SEARCH TURN.*


(C) ACTOV had doubled the personnel structure of the VNN and increased its inventory many times over. The National Training Center at Cam Ranh had difficulty supplying enough qualified personnel to man the ships. There was a shortage of officers and petty officers, a middle management problem endemic to RVNAF as a whole. This shortage was expected to last into 1972 when the training schools would be graduating personnel in sufficient numbers to catch up with ACTOV.

*See Annex F, Naval Operations, for map and further discussion.

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68.9, 69.0, 69.1, 69.2, 69.3, 69.4, 69.5, 69.6, 69.7, 69.8, 69.9, 70.0, 70.1, 70.2, 70.3, 70.4, 70.5, 70.6, 70.7, 70.8, 70.9, 71.0, 71.1, 71.2, 71.3, 71.4, 71.5, 71.6, 71.7, 71.8, 71.9, 72.0, 72.1, 72.2, 72.3, 72.4, 72.5, 72.6, 72.7, 72.8, 72.9, 73.0, 73.1, 73.2, 73.3, 73.4, 73.5, 73.6, 73.7, 73.8, 73.9, 74.0, 74.1, 74.2, 74.3, 74.4, 74.5, 74.6, 74.7, 74.8, 74.9, 75.0, 75.1, 75.2, 75.3, 75.4, 75.5, 75.6, 75.7, 75.8, 75.9, 76.0, 76.1, 76.2, 76.3, 76.4, 76.5, 76.6, 76.7, 76.8, 76.9, 77.0, 77.1, 77.2, 77.3, 77.4, 77.5, 77.6, 77.7, 77.8, 77.9, 78.0, 78.1, 78.2, 78.3, 78.4, 78.5, 78.6, 78.7, 78.8, 78.9, 79.0, 79.1, 79.2, 79.3, 79.4, 79.5, 79.6, 79.7, 79.8, 79.9, 80.0, 80.1, 80.2, 80.3, 80.4, 80.5, 80.6, 80.7, 80.8, 80.9, 81.0, 81.1, 81.2, 81.3, 81.4, 81.5, 81.6, 81.7, 81.8, 81.9, 82.0, 82.1, 82.2, 82.3, 82.4, 82.5, 82.6, 82.7, 82.8, 82.9, 83.0, 83.1, 83.2, 83.3, 83.4, 83.5, 83.6, 83.7, 83.8, 83.9, 84.0, 84.1, 84.2, 84.3, 84.4, 84.5, 84.6, 84.7, 84.8, 84.9, 85.0, 85.1, 85.2, 85.3, 85.4, 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Top: John H. Chafee, Secretary of the US Navy, congratulates Nguyen Van Vy, South Vietnamese Minister of Defense, after signing papers transferring 273 naval craft. At left is Jerome H. King, Jr., commander of US Naval Forces, Vietnam; at the right is Commodore Tran Van Chon, Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations. Bottom: Carrying US flags lowered moments earlier, US sailors depart some of the 273 transferred boats.



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(U) The actual ability of the VNN to prosecute the operations begun by the USN Brown Water fleet will be tested by time. Most of the canals and waterways in the Delta and southern MR 3 were open to traffic in relative safety for the first time in several years. The VNN with the USN in a purely advisory role except for tactical and logistics air support, was responsible for maintaining this security and eliminating the few VC strongpoints remaining in the Delta.

(C) Shipyard and civilian repair facilities personnel were below satisfactory strength levels. In June the VNN resumed hiring civilians to fill authorized vacancies; however, the shortage of skilled personnel raised the possibility of augmentation with military personnel. (198)

(C) The various ACTOV programs and their status at the end of CY70 were: (199)

ACTOVOPS: objective was to aid the VNN in assuming responsibility for all operations initiated by the USN. This program was almost complete by the end of CY70.

ACTOVLOG: included not only the turnover of logistics support craft and supply bases, but also training of supply crews, and base maintenance and transportation personnel. This program was in full operation at the end of CY70 as the VNN attempted to provide necessary support for its greatly enlarged tactical fleet.

ACTOVCOMM: provided for the turnover of C-E assets fundamental to the successful prosecution of mobile riverine, river patrol, and coastal surveillance operations. It established communications requirements, training, distribution of materiel, inspections, inventories, and procedures for turnover of USN equipment. As with C-E programs in the other services, the VNN was experiencing some difficulties due to shortfalls in personnel qualified for technical training.

ACTOVINT: provided for the organization and training of field intelligence personnel.

ACTOVCARD: development of an ADP center to support VNN records keeping.

ACTOVRAD: program to plan and coordinate construction and operation of 16 coastal radar units. Planning was begun in April 1970. The project was expected to be complete in January 1972. The system will replace the USN air surveillance barrier which will be eliminated under the redeployment phaseout.

(C) Other ACTOV programs included ACTOVMED/DENT and ACTOVPOW.

(C) The VNN was undergoing training to assume responsibility for the unattended sensor operations in MR 3 and MR 4. Monitoring and accessory equipment was being turned over. By December all but one was under control of the VNN.


(C) The VNN also assumed responsibility for harbor defense at most major ports during 1970.

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Vietnamese Navy river patrol boats on patrol in the Mekong Delta.



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VNAF Assessment

(S) The improvement and modernization of VNAF was ahead of schedule and effectiveness was increasing in the use of aircraft and crews. Combat performance was on a par with corresponding US units. Competence and professionalism were particularly demonstrated during VNAF operations in Cambodia in support of ARVN and FANK units. (200)

(S) As a result of new force structure authorizations, massive recruitment campaigns, and increased strength, a complete reorganization was programmed and approved to accommodate a 45-squadron force by 1972. To enhance management and ensure effective command and control, the VNAF was reorganized into five divisions, 10 tactical wings, five maintenance and supply wings, and seven air base wings. (201) The initial air division (4th) was activated at Binh Thuy on 1 Mar 70. The 84th Tactical Wing and the 3d Air Division (AD) were activated on 1 May, the 2d AD in June, and the 1st AD in September. Also, because of significant progress in 1969, an additional liaison squadron (122d) was activated at Binh Thuy on 1 Jan, a unit originally programmed for activation in FY71. (202)

(S) Rapid progress was made in the VNAF assumption of responsibilities for the Tactical Air Control System, with MR 4 completely Vietnamized by March with USAF personnel in an advisory capacity. In the remaining MRs, Direct Air Support Centers (DASCs) were operating on a collocated basis. (203)

(S) The Air Logistics Wing was reorganized into an Air Logistics Command. This action established a materiel management function charged with responsibility to maintain overall control of inventory assets. By the end of March it had a supply inventory of some 112,000 line items and performed major overhaul on 0-1 aircraft, J-85 engines (used in F-5s and A-37s), and aerospace ground equipment. To further improve the air logistics system, the VNAF introduced daily air logistics (LOGAIR) service to ensure expeditious delivery of high priority cargo. In addition, the Air Logistics Command was equipped with a UNIVAC 1050-II computer to maintain supply records for more efficient and accurate inventory control and management. (204)

(C) Under the VNAF I & M a total of 310 UH-1 helicopters were transferred in 1970 from USARV assets to VNAF. Four squadrons were operationally ready; 10 were already activated out of an authorized 16. Each squadron was authorized 31 aircraft. (205)

(S) Assisted by the USAF Advisory Group (AFGP) and Air Training Command, the VNAF began expansion of the Air Training Center at the Nha Trang air base. The expansion would eventually allow the transfer of several of the most critical basic maintenance courses from the CONUS to Vietnam with specially selected VNAF instructors (trained at CONUS facilities). When fully implemented, the program would accomplish considerable dollar savings while reducing training lead times and fostering training self-sufficiency. (206)

(S) A greatly expanded OJT program was implemented to supplement in/out-of-country formal training. The goal of this program was to accelerate the attainment of VNAF self-sufficiency in each functional area, with particular emphasis on base operating support functions. The VNAF capability to conduct OJT was limited, however, due to insufficiently qualified personnel and the lack of standard training material (see training section, this chapter, for further discussion). (207)

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A Vietnamese Air Force cadet pilot gets a traditional dousing by comrades after completing his first solo flight.

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(S) By the end of FY70 the number of rated squadrons increased. However, the number of fully operational ready squadrons decreased. This was due to three factors: fighter squadrons overflowed their programmed sorties by almost 30 percent due to Cambodian operations, which effected the maintenance capability; the increase from 20 to 31 UE aircraft in the four UH-1 squadrons caused a temporary shortage of aircrews; and the Special Air Mission Squadron started receiving ratings in May and was short of aircrews.

(S) Five hundred and twenty-five aircrews were formed, 18 percent below the authorized. However, of those formed, the number of combat ready exceeded the end of June goal by 6 percent. Tactical air support for ARVN/VNMC increased. The number of helicopter lift sorties flown in support of RVNAF increased approximately 86,000 over the first 3 months of the year (22 percent). However, the number of these sorties flown by VNAF decreased 4 percent, due to the increased flying time per sortie involved in the Cambodian cross-border operation. VNAF helicopter combat assault sorties increased 4 percent also due to cross-border operations, but fewer troops could be carried because of the increased weight of fuel necessary for the longer missions. (208)

(S) During the first 6 months there was an increase of 246 percent in the number of enemy structures damaged or destroyed, and secondary explosions increased 32 percent. There was also a significant increase (33 percent) in the number of aircraft which received battle damage with a corresponding increase of 41 percent in the combat loss rate. There was a 10.4 major accident rate for each 100,000 hours flown; this compared favorably over 1969 in which the rate was 14.5.(209)

(S) Significant progress was made in establishment and reinforcement of a self-sufficient air effort. It was estimated that by the end of FY71, VNAF would have the capability to control all air assets in RVN. Programmed activations would provide greater capacity in air assault, movement of organic ARVN artillery, shortfield attack, and FAC. On the other hand, with reorganizations and new squadron activations, the limited number of experienced personnel could cause a lowering of capability until newly trained individuals gained experience. Major problems encountered by VNAF were the long training lead time required to develop aviation skills and the shortage of experienced middle-management personnel. (210)

(S) Comparison of US and VNAF Attack and Helicopter Sorties, 1969-70 (211)

Attack Sorties

	1969				1970			
	Jan	Jun	Nov	Annual Total	Jan	Jun	Nov	Annual Total*
US	15,503	17,176	9,638	168,019	9,234	7,774	2,540	79,130
VNAF	2,052	2,743	3,491	33,187	3,532	1,975	1,473	26,363

*All 1970 annual totals are for January through November. Totals for 1969 include December.

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A Vietnamese jet pilot, aided by a crew member, prepares for take off on a combat mission.

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	Jan	Jun	Nov	Annual Total	Jan	Jun	Nov	Annual Total*
Attack Sorties in Cambodia								
US					0	3,842	548	
VNAF					0	1,208	1,445	

Helicopter Sorties (Thousands)								
US								
Armed	73.8	81.4	74.2	915.4	77.1	68.5	49.5	748.6
Support	378.4	407.7	369.6	4668.5	401.7	346.0	247.3	3802.7
VNAF								
Armed	.0	.7	.0	4.9	.0	.2	1.1	4.3
Support	3.2	6.5	7.7	65.4	10.8	7.3	10.5	109.6

*All 1970 annual totals are for January through November. Totals for 1969 include December.

New Horizons Plan 1970

(U) This was an RVNAF command program designed to improve the overall efficiency of RVNAF in seven fields: leadership and command, personnel management, intelligence, training, operations, logistics, and POLWAR. Pinpointed for participation in the program were: one regiment per ARVN division (10), one RF company per sector (44), one PF platoon per subsector (241), and other units from special commands, the VNAF, and VNN (8). (212) A committee was established at each level of command to monitor and report on the progress of the pilot units involved. At the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) level, the committee chairman was the Deputy Chief for Civic Action and Enemy Action. The preparation phase for the plan took place from 2 May through 30 Jun; the implementation phase was from 1 Jul through 31 Oct; the evaluation phase began 1 Nov. (213)

Communications-Electronics Assessment

(S) RVNAF signal units were not able to satisfy communications requirements without US assistance. This low capability was due to a shortage of communications resources under existing TOEs, lack of qualified operations and maintenance personnel, and lack of managers and engineers. Training of a technically qualified manpower base would be critical to successful Vietnamization of communications-electronics (C-E).

(S) The ARVN communications system was still inadequate. Within each MR, ARVN operated a low-capacity multi-channel system, consisting predominantly of obsolete four-channel equipment. C-E support within combat units was limited to voice and continuous wave radio. The lack of a long line capability rendered ARVN dependent on US communications support, either through advisory communications support or the ICS-SEA.

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Top: An A-37, primary tactical jet of the Vietnamese Air Force, takes off from Nha Trang airfield. Bottom: Vietnamese UH-1 helicopters carrying ARVN troops on a mission in the Mekong Delta.



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(S) The VNAF C-E capability was confined to USAF/VNAF beddown areas/air bases and remained considerably ahead of ARVN. Training of VNAF personnel in operations and maintenance of control towers, approach control radar, base dial telephone exchanges, and associated outside cable plants, progressed according to program. (214)

(S) Communications within the VNN was marginally adequate to control the force.

RVNAF Sensor Program

(S) The combined US/RVNAF border surveillance and anti-infiltration program established by COMUSMACV OPLAN 103-69 (TIGHT JAW) in April 1969 was expanded significantly in scope and size in 1970. The RVNAF was applying sensors for intelligence gathering, area surveillance, target acquisition, ambushes, and perimeter defense and was responsible for approximately 18 percent of the total active sensor population in RVN. Equipment being released to RVNAF was limited to less sophisticated sensor and readout devices.

(S) A total of 624 RVNAF personnel completed the 2-week sensor course at the Combined US/RVNAF Sensor School; this included 22 VNAF and 73 VNN personnel. All divisions, separate regiments, and special tactical zones were considered operational. Through October, 479 RVNAF personnel from all major headquarters and field units were scheduled for training. As additional RVNAF personnel were trained and the supporting organization established, the number of active sensors employed and monitored by RVNAF was expected to increase to approximately 2,500 by the end of FY72. The VNN established seven 20-man teams to be used in riverine operations. VNAF involvement was limited to participation in the operation of the Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART) at Pleiku.

(S) A significant problem was the lack of command emphasis and a corresponding absence of staff level acceptance and support of the sensor program in some ARVN units. JGS was aware of these problems and started the necessary management structure at JGS and MR level to emphasize the importance of TIGHT JAW operations. A 3-day RVNAF staff officers' orientation course was programmed. Sensor trained RVNAF personnel, working closely with US advisors, were capable of handling all operational aspects of the program assigned to them. As RVNAF units became more involved in the use of sensors, confidence in the program grew. This concept/acceptance trend was already noted in units having the larger sensor inventories. Management of assets and logistics support remained a US responsibility. However, JGS levied requirements for several sensor management oriented reports from field units. Also, an initial cadre of two officers received training and were assigned to the Cam Ranh Bay Processing and Maintenance Facility. Vietnamization of this facility would not be likely until mid FY73, due to skill and training requirements. (215)

(C) During June, the USN turned over responsibility for approximately 500 sensors to VNN sensor-trained personnel. Coupled with a slight expansion in the number of ARVN managed sensors, this resulted in RVNAF being responsible for more than 32 percent of the total active sensor population in the RVN by September. Formal training of additional ARVN, VNN, and VNAF personnel continued. (216)

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Vietnamization of Project Delta

(S) Under Project Delta a joint Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) and US Special Forces operation detachment conducted long-range, cover, reconnaissance, and search-and-clear operations against limited targets. At a decision briefing on 18 Jan, COMUSMACV determined Project Delta could be Vietnamized by 30 Jun. The 5th Special Forces Group and the Chief, JGS, requested joint operations be extended beyond that date. However this was disapproved on 25 Jun, and US support terminated on 30 Jun. As a result, RVNAF forces returned to Nha Trang for a 2-month standdown in preparation for future operations under Vietnamese Special Forces control.* (217)

Assessment of RVNAF Medical Service

(C) The Republic of Vietnam Medical Service continued to be tri-service with the ARVN, VNN, and VNAF medical services functioning under the RVNAF Surgeon General. Except for unique service-oriented specialty requirements and base dispensary service, the RVNAF Medical Service provided all facets of health care.

Analysis of RVNAF Medical Service Requirements

(C) Qualitative and quantitative gains were made in 1970 in field treatment, MEDEVAC, diagnostic services, surgical specialties, pre and postoperative care, physical rehabilitation, and nursing. Preventive medicine (PM) capabilities improved with the training of ARVN PM units. Facilities were improved at a number of hospitals. The US provided funds for 32 facility upgrade projects, seven of which were started and three completed during the year. There existed some inadequacies in sewerage and electrical systems.

(C) There was continued reliance on offshore resources for medical supplies. Little improvement was made in the Vietnamese capacity to produce medical supplies and equipment.

(S) The Medical Service was authorized 2,892 professional medical spaces of which 2,301 were filled at the end of CY70. These spaces included authorizations for physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and other specialists; the clinical field was short 232 physicians.

(S) By 1973 the Hue and Saigon medical schools planned to graduate 200 physicians. This would bring the number of physicians in RVNAF nearer the authorized level, because 80 percent of those graduates were expected to enter military service. There were 844 Medical Service Corps officers authorized and 687 actually assigned. The staff to patient ratio within the RVNAF hospital system was approximately 0.45:1 as compared to a CONUS ratio of approximately 2.0:1.

(S) Force structure increases were programmed as follows: FY71, 1,979 spaces; FY72, 2,039, and FY73, 1,780. Increases for FY71 included medical spaces for the enlarged RF/PF and for raising the hospital staffing ratio to 0.6:1. FY73 spaces provided staffing for additional

*See TOP SECRET Supplement for reorganization of VNSF in 1971.

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US military hospitals to be transferred to RVNAF and for a qualitative increase in the staffing ratio to 0.8:1. (218)

Medical Facilities Turnover

(U) Two hospital complexes were turned over by the US to RVNAF during 1970. The US 8th Evacuation Hospital in Nha Trang became the Nguyen Hue Station Hospital on 15 Oct 70. A major problem encountered after the turnover was facility engineering service and maintenance.

(C) The same problem occurred after turnover of the US 36th Evacuation Hospital at Vung Tau on 18-19 Nov 70. The facility was renamed Nguyen Van Nhut Station Hospital; it had 100 beds. Some building and utility repair was necessary because the hospital had been used as a US BOQ just prior to turnover.

(C) When the US 12th Evacuation Hospital deployed from Cu Chi, the RVNAF Surgeon General stated that the Vietnamese would not occupy the facility. Lack of personnel and equipment influenced the decision. (219)

Improvement of Medical Facilities

(U) US funding of upgrading projects at 28 hospitals led to improvements in water plants, sewerage systems and electrical systems. At the end of the year three hospitals still had inadequate electrical systems, 13 needed additional work on the sewerage systems, and 18 had poor or inadequate water systems.

(C) The 1970 budget included plans to enlarge the RVNAF Rehabilitation Center by constructing a 70-bed facility with physiotherapy and occupational therapy capabilities. However, the plans provided for only the barest minimum of space and equipment. The backlog of rehabilitation patients in RVNAF medical facilities required early expansion of the program at the center. Little was accomplished in this area in 1970. (220)

RVNAF Military Medical School

(U) The RVNAF Military Medical School (MMS) located in Saigon/Cholon was charged with basic aidman instruction at station and province hospitals for the National Police and the RVNAF. The MMS achieved noteworthy progress in improving and modernizing its instructional programs and physical plant in CY70. A new TOE for the MMS was approved in December increasing personnel spaces by 50 to a total of 282. A MASF/MILCON construction project costing \$660,000 was underway. It would expand resident capacity from 1,100 to 2,000 students. The project included construction of twelve 100-man classrooms, eight two-story barracks, and a 500-man mess hall/kitchen. Completion of the project was expected by December 1971.

(U) The Tran Ngoc Minh Military Hospital, which occupied a portion of the MMS, was considered for relocation in a new structure within the MMS compound. Construction of the new 450-bed hospital was energetically supported by the RVNAF Surgeon General as it would provide RVNAF with a modern permanent facility capable of supporting the RVNAF population of the Saigon metropolitan area and serving as the site for practical application training of MMS students. It

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Vietnamese dental technicians make dentures in the dental ward at Cong Hoa Hospital, Saigon.

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would also serve as an augmenting facility for the Cong Hoa General Hospital. (221)

Dental Service

(U) The RVNAF dental service was given an increased authorization of dental officers from 128 to 156 in 1970.

(U) There was a critical shortage of dental equipment. To utilize the professional capabilities of the assigned dentists plus the 28 new dental draftees, a concerted effort to procure dental equipment was underway. This would permit establishment of a dental training center at the Cong Hoa Hospital, Saigon. Postgraduate clinical training programs were to be conducted in the hope that a nucleus of clinician teachers would carry on after US redeployment. Additional offshore training programs were requested to augment this program.

(U) The Cong Hoa dental clinic began to fabricate chrome-cobalt prosthetic appliances; this was the first operational laboratory of its type in the RVNAF dental service. (222)

Offshore Training of Physicians

(U) Since no formal in-country program existed for graduate medical training, offshore university training was essential. RVNAF Medical Service personnel completed a wide variety of offshore training to include formal, observer, OJT, and university courses. During FY70, 15 ARVN physicians and dentists completed CONUS university training and 10 began offshore training. Thirteen ARVN physicians were programmed for offshore training in FY71-72. This graduate level specialization improved professional qualifications of selected ARVN medical officers who occupied key staff and clinical positions. (223)

Nurse Corps

(C) On 1 Jan 70, the MOD issued a decree establishing a RVNAF Nurse Corps. The corps existed only on paper until a review of the personnel records of 735 battalion surgeon assistants was completed in October. The purpose of the review was to identify graduate nurses known as nurse or health technicians. The review showed that 66 of the 735 surgeon assistants were health or nurse technicians.

(C) A regional chief nurse was assigned to each MR in October. One nurse was assigned to the MMS as chief nurse, and the key nurse positions in each military hospital were filled by those battalion surgeon assistants who qualified as either nurse technicians or health technicians.

(U) Staff development courses were designed for RVNAF nurses in the clinical specialties of nursing service administration, operating room supervision, intensive care and recovery room supervision, and in-service education. The courses were 1 month in length and were presented between May and August 1970. The course covered a 16-day class in supervisory development and instruction methods at the Central Training Institute, Saigon and 14 days of combined didactic and OJT at Cong Hoa General Hospital. Seventy-nine nurses completed the staff development courses in 1970.

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Assisted by a US Navy doctor, ARVN dental surgeons fit dentures at the denture and artificial eyes ward in Cong Hoa Hospital, Saigon.

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(C) The Nurse Corps applied for and received a CORDS grant of \$2 million for construction of a special building to house a steam generator (cyclotherm) and the necessary pipe fittings to install six sterilizers at Cong Hoa General Hospital. (224)

ARVN Preventive Medicine

(C) The ARVN PM capability expanded rapidly in 1970. Five PM units were authorized throughout RVN to provide area PM service to the RVNAF. Detachments consisted of 33 personnel including four officers, 15 NCOs, and 14 EM. During the year ARVN PM detachments were engaged in providing field sanitation training to representatives from field units. They conducted sanitary inspections and provided area control of insects and rodents when requested. Medical personnel for the detachments were trained for 4 weeks at the MMS and by OJT in US PM units. Approximately 50 personnel received OJT during CY70.

(C) Personnel shortages existed, particularly in officers. Five officer positions of the 20 authorized in 1970 were filled. (225)

RVNAF Medical Evacuation

(U) Limited RVNAF air assets and the need to use all available air transport for combat and combat support moved the AFGP to reject a request from the RVNAF Surgeon General for 50-50 helicopters for MEDEVAC. (226)

(C) The VNAF did not have sufficient MEDEVAC helicopters except for emergency patients (danger to life or limb). The RVNAF Medical Service realized in 1970 that full advantage would have to be taken of improved and secured LOCs for ground evacuation of combat troops. The role of VNAF medical evacuation was being reviewed at year's end by MACV. The absence of a VNAF MEDEVAC was cited as a cause of low morale among combat troops. (227)

(C) A VNAF regulation was staffed that tasked each VNAF utility helicopter squadron (UH-1) to place two aircraft on 24-hour MEDEVAC standby. The regulation would allow for 20 aircraft on MEDEVAC standby in CY70, 28 in CY72, and 32 in CY73. It was estimated that 32 MEDEVAC helicopters would satisfy the RVNAF urgent patient evacuation requirements if the war in SEA remained at the present level. The evacuation of less than urgent RVNAF casualties could not be accommodated by these minimal assets.

(C) ARVN medical groups were receiving communications equipment that would create a medical regulating system. The system would include equipment for ground-to-air communications. (228)

VNN Medical Department

(C) The VNN Medical Department gained in proficiency in all fields. During the year, 313 VNN personnel were trained in-country and/or offshore. The VNN Medical Department was authorized 42 medical officers of which 38 were on duty at the end of the year.



(C) Planning for the VNN Medical Department included construction of eight 20-bed dispensaries and a 40-bed addition to the VNN Naval Hospital. (229)

(C) With the assignment of 22 PM apprentices from the ARVN MMS and four technicians trained in CONUS, the quality of VNAF PM improved. The USAF continued to provide water surveillance and sewerage and sanitary inspections of bases jointly used by USAF/VNAF. VNAF initiated its own food inspection program in base dining halls.

(U) The USAF dispensary at Pleiku became a combined facility in 1970. USAF medical facilities at Nha Trang and Binh Thuy were made available for VNAF use. Where combined usage was in effect, relationships between USAF and VNAF medical personnel were harmonious despite differences in standards of care and methodology.

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CHAPTER VIII

PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Pacification is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening, securing, and improving lines of communication important to economic and military activity. (1)

INTRODUCTION

(C) As 1970 started, the impetus provided by the 1969 pacification and development program was reported by DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS:

For the Pacification Program, 1969 can only be rated as a highly successful year. While certain elements of the total program fell substantially short of their goals as well as their hopes, there is little doubt that the program developed momentum and produced a totally new atmosphere in much of the countryside. In statistical terms, our Hamlet Evaluation System showed that some 2,628 hamlets and 2,931,400 people were raised past the mid-point on the HES security scale to join the ABC category Whether the HES is fully accurate or not, it proved of inestimable value as a means of organizing and focusing this campaign.

Examining the components of the Pacification Program, it is clear that the key territorial security effort made perhaps the greatest contribution to the expansion of pacification during 1969

Another bright light in the year was the growth of the People's Self-Defense Force. While its contribution to security is at best spotty and its statistical accomplishments perhaps squashy, there is little doubt that it stirred imaginations in the countryside and performed its political role of stimulating participation in the over-all national effort. It has certainly been more effective in ceremonial ritual than fire-fights, but the government supplying almost

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400,000 weapons to its citizens had certainly helped it to achieve greater legitimacy among these same citizens.

The PHUNG HOANG or PHOENIX effort against the VC Infrastructure is perhaps the least satisfying program. Against an apparatus with years of experience in covert operations, the government has labored to develop an awareness of this aspect of the enemy, press its intelligence services to collaborate, improve its legal and penal machinery, and stimulate all government services and even the population itself to participate in the effort. Perhaps the most difficult program in pacification, it suffered in competition with the more glamorous, practical and familiar programs of expanding territorial security, Chieu Hoi, PSDF, etc. . . .

Statistically the Chieu Hoi program experienced its greatest success in its history, some 47,000 individuals leaving the enemy side and formally rejoining the national cause. The concentration of a high percentage of these ralliers in the Delta is a tribute to the expansion of pacification there and quite apparently caused enemy alarm over the reliability of the traditional population base of his revolution

The refugee program made a substantial contribution to the overall pacification effort. Some 488,000 people were assisted in returning to the villages from which they had fled in fear of the enemy or military operations. Another 586,000 were paid their final benefits in place. The case load of refugees thus descended from 1.4 million in February to 268,000 at end-December

The information program performed its established functions, but was not infected with the dynamism which caught much of the rest of the pacification effort. At year's end, the government decided on a new approach of depending on its leadership and its civil and military personnel to inform and mobilize the population. We are hopeful that this will be more effective than film, leaflets and loudspeakers, but must await performance to see.

A key area of the 1969 pacification plan was the revival of the rural economy. The evidence is clear that it revived. An excellent crop of rice is forecast, IR-8 miracle rice planting has more than met its goals thanks to some private enterprise planting to supplement that of the government, the lines of communication have been opened in great part, and more land was distributed under the land reform program during 1969 than in the past seven years

As the principal strategist of the pacification program, President Thieu has focused clearly on its requirements for 1970 He has outlined an ambitious, perhaps even unrealistic, goal of 90 percent of the population in the AB categories. He has called for

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dramatic progress in economic and social development, to supply that same sense of excitement that was provided by the expansion of territorial security during 1969

While the program is venturesome, it is also difficult, as it attempts to establish rigorous standards of performance in parts of the government previously unaffected by pacification freneticism. In addition, it calls for the psychological and political mobilization of the nation, rather than less subtle and difficult physical expansion and construction(2)

PLANS

(U) During 1970 there were three major pacification and development plans which concentrated military and civil action in two basic areas: security (military, territorial, and internal); and development (political, social, and economic). All programs were designed to gain the active support of the people.⁽³⁾ See Figure VIII-1 for a graphic presentation of the relationship of the plans described below.




FIGURE VIII-1

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Government of Vietnam (GVN) 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

(U) The cornerstone of the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development (P&D) Plan was laid by President Thieu on 10 Nov 69. At that time distribution of the plan was made to the province pacification and development councils for preparation of the supporting province plans. The plan included the basic guidelines published by the Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) and 18 supporting annexes, which contained inputs from the ministries chiefly responsible for the program involved. The plan, with annexes, was approved by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the entire Cabinet, and thus superseded any conflicting earlier ministerial directive.

(C) The 18-page basic document established, among other items, one principle and eight objectives, along with eight special programs. The one principle was stated as:

In 1969 we employed the principle of community cooperation as the basic tenet for all national activities. This principle is realized through three relationships: cooperation among the people, between the people and government, and among the various government agencies.

In 1970 we will expand these relationships. We will reemphasize the bond between the city people and their rural compatriots, between the soldiers and the people who support them, and between the citizens and the officials who serve them. It must be assured that all government organizations support one another enthusiastically, with a sense of responsibility for serving the interest of the people.

Within the spirit of unity, all the people of South Vietnam, together with their government, will succeed brilliantly in the struggle to protect the Fatherland and to restore peace and prosperity.

(C) The eight objectives of the 1970 P&D Plan were a rational extension of the eight objectives employed in 1969, and they were as follows:

1. Territorial Security: Security is a prerequisite to insure that social, economic, and political development progresses rapidly and yields good results.

Therefore, . . . 100% of the people must be in A, B, C hamlets with a minimum of 90% of the people enjoying complete security in the A and B hamlets.

Enemy attacks, shellings, terrorism and sabotage actions must be reduced by at least 50%, compared to 1969, in those areas which are undergoing pacification, and 75% in those areas which are completely secure

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The National Police will be expanded and their quality increased in order to help the local governments maintain law and order in both rural and urban areas.

2. Protection of the People Against Terrorism: Neutralize the VC Infrastructure and expand the rule of law and order Increase the pressure with sharp attacks on the enemy infrastructure by the effective use of the PHUNG HOANG organizations at every level. Improve the leadership, organization, and procedures of the PHUNG HOANG committee at each level

3. People's Self Defense: Perfect the organization, training and equipment of the People's Self Defense Forces in order to increase their capability of protecting the villages and hamlets and to discharge their responsibility of helping to identify the VC Infrastructure. . . .

4. Local Administration: . . . Develop a local administration with the capability of self-management in the administrative, economic and financial spheres consistent with the viewpoint that "the people do, the people reap the benefits."

Complete the election of 100% of village, hamlet, municipal, and provincial councils. Provide replacements of village and hamlet officials to bring them up to strength, especially information, land reform, and technical cadre

Complete the training of village and hamlet officials with respect to both the technical aspects and political warfare.

The responsibility of the deputy province chief for administration will be increased to enable him to help local village and hamlet administrations to operate more effectively. Pay special attention to development tasks for provinces, villages, and hamlets. A political objective of the government is to push strongly and rapidly the concept of strength of local administration organizations. Along with this objective, programs are being established to increase tax revenues of villages, and increase the authority of villages to spend tax revenues for village development projects.

5. Greater National Unity: Rally 40,000 Hoi Chanhs. Continue vigorous implementation of the Chieu Hoi program. Place greater emphasis on quality, i. e., on the rallying of high and middle ranking enemy cadre to our ranks

Getting enemy cadre and soldiers to return is only the first small step. We must emphasize training them, use them according to their capabilities and help them return to a normal life within the national community.

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6. Brighter Life for War Victims: Employ such emergency measures as are effective to encourage temporary resettles to return to secure areas so they can participate in local economic development. People temporarily settled outside of camps will receive monetary assistance, after which their names will be deleted from the refugee rolls and they will be encouraged to return to a normal life. Temporary camps established over six months ago must be organized so as to have the characteristics of a local community and eventually become a local community no different from any other. They will then be regarded as any other hamlet, and will rapidly receive such assistance from the various ministries as is authorized for any similar community.

Establish an equitable social welfare and recovery program, and use such special methods as are necessary to rehabilitate crippled civilians, wounded soldiers, as well as widows and orphans, in order that these people can continue a normal and useful life.

7. People's Information: Establish an effective information system based on the close coordination between government agencies and between the various people's organizations.

Every ministry is responsible to organize information campaigns designed to let the people clearly understand their program and activity, and to appeal to the people to participate in the ministry's program. According to the same idea, every province chief, district chief, mayor or village chief must organize campaigns to motivate the people to participate in government programs established to serve the people.

8. Prosperity for All: This objective aims at bringing a brighter, happier life for everybody through the following programs.

a. Program to Help the Rural People:

(1) . . . continue the distribution of expropriated land and implement the program "Land-to-the-Tiller" in order to increase the area under cultivation and thus increase the production of rice and secondary crops.

(2) The development of agriculture and fishing industries includes technical guidance for farmers and fishermen to enable them to increase their productivity and thus raise their income.

(3) Expand services rendered by the Agriculture Development Bank and establish rural banks at district level in order to expand the rural program.

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(4) Help the farmers and the fishermen to expand their people's cooperative groups and help them to improve both operations and organization so as to increase their present efficiency.

(5) Improve the distribution system, boost trade, and improve supply by eliminating useless economic restrictions and thus facilitating the transport of goods.

b. The Program to Develop the Community Spirit in the Urban People:

(1) Conduct development programs, particularly in the poorer or fringe areas of the cities.

(2) Establish community organizations (special offices) to support both urban individuals and groups in the improvement of their lives

(3) Improve public services, develop low-cost housing, and hold down the cost of living in urban areas.

(C) In addition to the foregoing eight objectives, the 1970 P&D Plan placed special emphasis on various supplementary programs which were closely interwoven with the eight basic objectives. Each of these supplementary programs, aimed at increasing the expansion and development efforts, was afforded its own annex. They were:

National Police
RD Cadre
Village Self-Development
Provincial and Municipal Development
Land Reform
Development of Ethnic Minorities
Urban Programs
Youth Programs

(C) The plan then went on to define the execution of the plan, with its priorities of effort, and the phasing of the plan. The plan was divided into three phases:

Phase 1 - From 1 Jan to 30 Jun 70.

Phase 2 - From 1 Jul to 31 Oct 70.

Supplementary Phase - The last two months of the year, as a link between the 1970 and the 1971 plan. (4)

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GVN Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

(S) On 8 May 70, Presidential Guidance Number 31, which supplemented Presidential Guidance Number 270, dated 1 Sep 69, on the 1970 P&D Plan, was promulgated by President Thieu. This directive was based on P&D results obtained in the first three months of 1970 and:

1. Provided supplemental guidance for Phase I, to 30 Jun 70.
2. Directed the initiation of a "Special Pacification and Development Plan" to be conducted during the period 1 Jul - 31 Oct 70, i.e., Phase II of the 1970 P&D Plan. (5)

(S) Presidential Guidance Number 31 stated:

Generally speaking, implementation of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan during the initial three months has lacked the unremitting effort and enthusiasm that characterized both the 1968 and 1969 Pacification and Development Plans. Given that many objectives of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan are aimed more toward quality and development than they are to attainment of quantitative achievement, we must nevertheless recognize that most objectives are running below average or less than the determined goal.

Therefore, in order to insure that continuity of effort and a new vitality characterize the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan . . . both the central government and the field must vigorously push the correction of deficiencies and the restoration of such enthusiasm and continuous effort to insure our retention of the initiative . . . (6)

(C) The Prime Minister's Special 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, developed in response to the Presidential guidance described above, was distributed to all region and province pacification and development council coordination center chiefs at a meeting held in Saigon on 13 Jun. It stressed no new objectives nor any additional programs, but sought instead to re-establish enthusiasm and to provide the motivation necessary to attain the Phase II goals of the 1970 P&D Plan by 31 Oct rather than 31 Dec and to involve local communities in planning for their own and the nation's development plans for 1971. The same eight objectives contained in the 1969 and 1970 P&D Plans were included in the Special P&D Plan and were generally incorporated into three specific programs of the special plan. The three programs were:

1. A Special Self-Defense Program
2. A Special Self-Development Program
3. A People's Information Program

(C) The Special Self-Defense Program sought to upgrade all territorial forces, to improve the quality of Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) leadership and the operations of those units. Maximum use would be made of RF units to conduct mobile offensive operations against local Communist units rather than occupying defensive outpost positions. Night ambushes

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would be emphasized. Each RF company would conduct a minimum of 50 percent of its operations at night and would employ at least one-half of its personnel in night ambushes. PF platoons would also conduct night ambushes 7 days a week employing two squads. The People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) would be increased to 4 million, 1.5 million combat members and 2.5 million support members. Additional stress was placed on the organization, training, and positioning of 14,290 key interteams (KIT) and the timely distribution of 600,000 weapons to combat members. Under this program the PSDF was assigned the responsibility of a defensive role to provide security within populated areas, particularly at night.

(C) The Special Self-Development Program sought to establish a partnership between the people at the village level and the national government in economic and social planning for 1971. It stressed the participation of the village and provincial populace in the selection of development projects, local solutions to local problems, and the identification of development resources in order to promote long term, local and national economic self-sufficiency.

(C) The Self-Development Program was to be implemented in four separate phases:

Phase I (10 Jun to 15 Aug) - Dissemination of information concerning the Self-Development Program and the 1971 planning activities.

Phase II (15 Aug to 15 Sep) - Development of village goals and priority lists.

Phase III (15 Sep to 1 Oct) - Preparation of provincial development priority lists.

Phase IV (1 to 31 Oct) - Coordination of national activities.

(C) The People's Information Program was geared to gain popular support for the entire pacification and development effort and sought to provide all Republic of Vietnam (RVN) citizens with a broad understanding of the government's policies and to educate the masses politically. (7)

GVN 1970 Supplementary Pacification and Development Plan

(C) To cover the period from 31 Oct 70, when the Special 1970 P&D Plan ended, through the TET holidays, a transition campaign was developed. The period 1 Nov 70 - 28 Feb 71 was covered by the 1970 Supplementary Pacification and Development Plan. It focused on those programs which required additional emphasis and specific goals to be attained in preparation for the 1971 program. (8)

(C) Essentially the campaign involved four areas of interest:

1. A nationwide effort was to be made to destroy the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The National Police (NP) was tasked to play a leading role in the endeavor. RF and PF were to be targeted against specific enemy units and in conjunction with the PSDF participate in the destruction of the Viet Cong (VC) revolutionary councils. While military pressure was maintained, planning called for a simultaneous special Chieu Hoi campaign aimed at rallying VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) prior to TET. The identification (ID) card program was to be expedited, particularly in MR 4, where the goal was to complete the issuance of ID cards to all

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CENTRAL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL




FIGURE VIII-2

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persons by 28 Feb 71. A concentrated effort was to be made to raise the rating of all V hamlets in Military Region (MR) 4.

2. Directed Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) operations would hopefully raise levels of security in MRs 3 and 4, thereby freeing one or two ARVN divisions for redeployment to MR 1 or 2 or elsewhere to meet any NVA or Viet Cong main force threat.

3. A special information program was to be conducted at all levels for all government personnel (civil and military). Managerial personnel and technical cadre were to receive appropriate retraining so that optimum results could be obtained in 1971.

4. Resources required to meet the needs of 1971 were to be stockpiled and allocated. Organized elements and individual personnel would be reassigned if necessary to satisfy requirements of the NP, Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), Agriculture and Land Reform Cadre, and other key agencies in the 1971 plan. (9)

ORGANIZATION

Government of Vietnam (GVN) Organization

(U) The GVN organization responsible for pacification was the CPDC. Chaired by President Thieu, the CPDC included representatives from all cabinet ministries as well as various other agencies which were members due to their interest in the pacification program. (See Figure VIII-2.) The CPDC was established to provide central guidance and leadership to the various ministries and to assure a unified effort in achieving the established objectives. (10)

(U) Figure VIII-3 shows the GVN pacification organization. The Defense Ministry had the most sub-elements which were sub-divided down to province and district levels, shown as sector and sub-sector. The MACV Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organizational structure (on the right of the figure) had advisory elements at the MRs, provinces, and districts. (11)

US Organization

(U) Within MACV the pacification effort was organized as shown in Figure VIII-4 and Figure VIII-5.

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GVN PACIFICATION ORGANIZATION




FIGURE VIII-3

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM




FIGURE VIII-4

CORDS
HEADQUARTERS MACV




FIGURE VIII-5

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OBJECTIVES

Territorial Security

(C) Territorial security was the first prerequisite to the success of the 1970 P&D Plan, and as such received three priorities assigned by the plan. They were:

Priority 1: The upgrading of C hamlets to A and B to insure effective security for 90% of the population, which means 90% are in A and B hamlets to include people living in cities.

In order to evaluate the results obtained, the following three standards must be met before the population can be regarded as A or B population:

Decisive Standard #1: Effective Security:

- The PF must have full authorized strength and be capable of defending the hamlet.
- Organization, training and arming of the combat PSDF elements must be completed.
- Organization and training of the support PSDF (women, elderly people and youngsters) must continue.

Decisive Standard #2: Effective Administration:

- In villages having a number of A and B hamlets prior to 31 Oct 69 and newly upgraded A and B hamlets prior to 31 Dec 69, as well as both old and new A and B hamlets themselves, elections must be completed and the officials and personnel assigned as authorized by the new TO&E.
- All the village and hamlet officials must have been trained and be operating effectively and permanently in their posts.
- The following types of cadres must have completed their training and be operating effectively:

Village and hamlet information cadre;
Village and hamlet Chieu Hoi cadre;
Village Technical Cadre;
Village Land Reform, Agricultural and Fishing Development Commissioner.

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Decisive Standard #3: Law and Order is Enforced:

- In villages with a number of A and B hamlets to include the old and new (old, 31 Oct; new, 31 Dec):

The National Police must be present and operating effectively.

The important point is not only to complete organization and to have the officials present, but also to complete their training and to have these officials operating effectively in the three following fields: (1) Security, (2) Administration, and (3) Law Enforcement and preservation of order.

Priority 2: Continue consolidating the remaining weak C hamlets, upgrading them to strong C and preventing them from backsliding to D.

Priority 3: Upgrade D, E, and V hamlets to C. (12)

HES 1970

(C) The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) had been an effective tool for planning and managing pacification and related programs in RVN since 1967. Its ratings were not considered as absolute, but they were a valuable index of the pacification situation at different times and different places. Weaknesses in the system were relatively constant so data were useful trend indicators.

(C) Improvement in the system to make it more useful began in June 1968. This involved a 3-month trial period, November 1968-January 1969, followed by extensive revision and discussion. In July 1969, the revised system (HES 70) was implemented in all districts of RVN and completed simultaneously with the old HES. Since the GVN P&D Plan for 1969 utilized HES extensively, it was essential to continue HES trends and measurements through the completion of the 1969 plan. See Table VIII-1 for definitions of HES 70 pacification ratings.

(C) HES 70 differed from the old HES in that it:

a. Provided more objective questions to separately determine answers to specific conditions rather than a grading scale based on multiple factors.

b. Provided centralized mathematical scoring of replies rather than grading by a rater. Questions were categorized to give, when combined, security, political, and socio/economic ratings. Further combination provided the overall pacification rating.

c. Provided centrally available, precise data, not available elsewhere because of isolated specific questions on hamlets and villages throughout the country.

d. Posed separate questions at both hamlet and village level on a monthly and quarterly basis. HES 70 questions covered subjects not previously included. Because some were only answered quarterly, districts answered fewer questions per month under the new system.

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HES 70 PACIFICATION RATINGS

(U) Definitions are conditions that would normally be found in a hamlet with the given rating.

"A" Hamlet: No armed enemy military forces present in inhabited areas; during hours of darkness, friendly local security forces conduct adequate security operations; GVN authorities conduct adequate law enforcement during hours of darkness; PSDF conducts armed patrols and stands armed guard in hamlet; there is no known or suspected infrastructure in the hamlet or village; enemy does not collect taxes; hamlet chief resides in the hamlet day and night; most hamlet households have members active in the PSDF; GVN-approved medical services accessible in that or nearby hamlet; and children of hamlet residents are able to attend primary school located in the hamlet.

"B" Hamlet: No armed enemy military forces present in inhabited areas; during hours of darkness, friendly local security forces conduct adequate security operations; GVN authorities conduct adequate law enforcement during hours of darkness; PSDF conducts armed patrols and stands armed guard in hamlet or village infrastructure; possibly sporadic tax collection by enemy; hamlet chief resides in the hamlet day and night; about 25 to 50 percent of hamlet households have members active in the PSDF; GVN-approved medical services accessible in that or nearby hamlet; and children of hamlet residents are able to attend primary school located in the hamlet.

"C" Hamlet: No armed enemy military forces present in inhabited areas; during hours of darkness, friendly local security forces conduct marginal to adequate security operations; GVN authorities conduct marginal to adequate law enforcement during hours of darkness; PSDF stands armed guard in hamlet; sporadic to regular covert hamlet or village VCI activity, but only sporadic overt activity at night; sporadic tax collection by the enemy; hamlet chief resides in the hamlet by day and usually by night; less than 25 percent of hamlet households have members active in the PSDF; GVN-approved medical services accessible but possibly further than a nearby hamlet; and children of hamlet residents are able to attend primary school--possibly located in a nearby hamlet.

"D" Hamlet: Sporadic presence of armed enemy military forces in inhabited areas; during hours of darkness, friendly local security forces conduct only marginal security operations; GVN authorities conduct at best marginal law enforcement during hours of darkness; PSDF is inactive or not organized at all; regular covert hamlet and village VCI activity; sporadic overt activity at night; sporadic to regular tax collection by the enemy; hamlet chief resides in the hamlet by day, infrequently at night; less than 10 percent of hamlet households have members active in the PSDF; GVN-approved medical services accessible but probably further than a nearby hamlet; and children of hamlet residents are able to attend primary school but location may be further than a nearby hamlet.

"E" Hamlet: Sporadic to regular presence of armed enemy military forces in inhabited areas; during hours of darkness, friendly local security forces conduct at most marginal security operations; GVN authorities do not conduct law enforcement during hours of darkness; there is no PSDF in the hamlet; VCI is the primary authority in the hamlet and village; regular and systematic tax collection by the enemy; hamlet chief does not reside in the hamlet; no hamlet households have members active in the PSDF; GVN-approved medical services probably not accessible; and children of hamlet residents are not able to attend primary school.

"V" Hamlet: The enemy is considered to be in physical control of the hamlet.

Source: ANCPAC MOP

Table VIII-1

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(C) The 6-month dual run indicated HES 70 would make minor modifications in the percentage ratings. The new system was, nevertheless, jointly approved for use by the President of RVN, the US Ambassador, and COMUSMACV. (13)

(C) As expected, in January results reported under HES 70 showed a lower percentage (87.9) than heretofore under ABC conditions. The apparent decrease from December 1969 was 4.8 percent when comparing the new and old. In reality, it was an increase of 0.7 percent compared with the rating that would have been achieved in December under HES 70. (14)

(C) February results rated 88.5 percent of the population as ABC, an increase of 0.6 percent or about 94,200 people. ABC population was thus approximately 15,600,400 of an estimated population of 17,636,400. Due to changes in the population estimates, there was no change in the percent rated V, which remained at 2.2 percent. (15)

(C) In March the first of a new series of monthly messages was sent to point out actual or potential trouble areas to each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) commander. The CG XXIV Corps was advised:

Major problem areas for I CTZ are 27.1 percent rated DE in Social Welfare and 27.0 percent rated DE in Economic Activity. Specific areas in Social Welfare are 34.2 percent of the populace live in hamlets where eligible refugees have either not received authorized resettlement allowances, or these allowances have been delayed or less than full amount. Also, 24.7 percent of the populace live in hamlets where combat related damages have not been provided or have been insufficient or delayed. Specific problem areas in Economic Activity include 41.9 percent of the population live in villages subject to sporadic or regular VC taxation, and 27.2 percent of the population live in villages where there is farm land belonging to the village that is not cultivated due to bad security. (16)

(C) CG 1st Field Force, Vietnam (I FFV) was also advised:

Major problem areas for II CTZ are 22.7 percent of the population rated DE in Enemy Military Presence, 23.8 percent rated DE in Social Welfare, and 22.5 percent rated DE in Economic Activity. Specific items relating to Enemy Military Presence are that 21.3 percent of the populace live in villages with at least a platoon of guerrillas regularly present in the village, 40.4 percent live in villages with at least a platoon of local or main force units regularly present in the village or adjacent villages, and 36.7 percent live in villages with enemy base areas in or adjacent to the village. The Social Welfare grade is influenced by the number of households requiring assistance from others to maintain themselves, and the need for additional welfare assistance from both GVN and private agencies. Economic Activity grade is influenced by 23.8 percent of the population living in villages subject to sporadic VC taxation. (17)

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(C) CG II FFV was advised that:

Although no major problem areas exist in III CTZ, 22.0 percent of the population is rated DE in Social Welfare. This is due to the large number of families which require assistance from others to maintain themselves at a subsistence level. The answers to the other Social Welfare questions would indicate that additional support from both GVN and voluntary agencies is needed. (18)

(C) CG Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) was advised that the major problem areas for IV CTZ were:

. . . 32.8 percent of the population rated DE in Enemy Military Presence, and 34.3 percent rated DE in Social Welfare. In Enemy Military Presence 52.1 percent of populace live in villages with at least a platoon of local or main force units regularly present in the village or adjacent villages, and 41.8 percent of the populace live in villages with enemy base areas adjacent to the village. Social Welfare rating reflects part of the population requiring assistance from others to maintain themselves at a subsistence level. (19)

(C) HES reports for March showed 89.7 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 1.2 percent from February. ABC population was approximately 15,900,000; DE population decreased to 1,320,000; and the V population decreased to approximately 347,000 people. However, 0.9 percent, or approximately 156,400 people, could not be evaluated and were assigned to the N, or not evaluated category. (20)

(C) MACCORDS Reports and Analysis Directorate analysis of the March HES results reflected the following potential trouble areas in I CTZ:

Major problem areas in I CTZ are still in Social Welfare, 25.5 percent rated DE, and Economic Activity, 23.3 percent rated DE. Social Welfare: 18.3 percent live in hamlets where authorized resettlement allowances have not been paid, or have been delayed or not paid in full. 19.7 percent live in hamlets where combat related damages have either not been paid, been delayed, or been insufficient. Economic Activity: 28.9 percent of the populace subject to sporadic or regular VC taxation and 25.1 percent living in villages where there is farm land that is not cultivated due to bad security. (21)

(C) CG IFFV was advised:

Major problem areas in II CTZ are 28.5 percent of the population rated DE in Enemy Military Presence, 34.2 percent rated DE in Development Assistance, 22.4 percent rated DE in Economic Activity, and 23.0 percent rated DE in Social Welfare. Specific areas in Enemy Military Presence include 63.7 percent of the population living in villages with at least a platoon of enemy main or local force units regularly present and 45.6 percent living with enemy base areas

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nearby. In Development Assistance the lack of self-development projects is of primary concern. Specific area in Economic Activity is 30.5 percent of the population is subject to VC taxation. In Social Welfare, 30.7 percent live in hamlets where welfare is needed but not provided. (22)

(C) CG II FFV was again advised that a minor problem area in III CTZ was the 15.2 percent of the population rated DE in Social Welfare. The specific problem was the 20.3 percent living in hamlets where welfare assistance was needed but not provided. (23)

(C) CG DMAC was advised that the major problem area in IV CTZ was the 27.4 percent of the population rated DE in Military Presence. The specific areas were 48.1 percent of the population living in villages with at least a platoon of main or local force units regularly present and 35.0 percent living in areas with enemy base areas nearby. (24)

(C) The April HES results reflected the first regression, 0.8 percent, in ABC population since the inauguration of the HES 70 system report. The drop in ABC pacification to 88.9 percent was primarily due to lower Security category ratings. For example, using only the Security factor, II CTZ decreased 3.8 percent and IV CTZ 1.8 percent in ABC population, whereas the overall pacification decreases for these CTZs were 3.6 percent and 1.2 percent, respectively.

(C) Observers felt the overall decline in the pacification rating showed the capacity of the new HES to reflect actual conditions. Because April terrorist incidents were the highest since TET 1968, these affected the security ratings, especially in II CTZ.

(C) Under Phase I goals of the 1970 P&D Plan. President Thieu sought to raise the ABC pacification levels to 98 percent and the AB levels to 79 percent. These goals were set under the old HES report when it stood at 92.7 percent ABC and 57.5 percent AB in December 1969. With the new HES the ABC total drop 87.9 percent made it appear unlikely President Thieu's Phase I goals could be achieved. Therefore, revision of the Phase II goal of 100 percent ABC and 90 percent AB by the end of October was considered. (25)

(C) Analysis of the April HES results indicated to the CG XXIV Corps as possible trouble areas:

Major problem areas in I CTZ remain in Social Welfare, 25.4 percent classified DE and Economic Activity, 23.8 percent classified DE. Also, a problem may be developing in Enemy Military Presence, 14.8 percent classified DE. Social Welfare: 18.2 percent live in hamlets where authorized resettlement allowances have not been paid, been delayed or not paid in full. 29.5 percent live in hamlets where welfare assistance is needed, but not provided by RVN. 19.5 percent live in areas where combat related damages were not paid or were insufficient or delayed. Economic Activity: 29.1 percent are subject to VC taxation. 50.0 percent live in villages that have farm land that is not under cultivation. Enemy Military Presence: 31.7 percent of the populace live with at least a platoon of enemy main or local forces regularly present in their village or in an adjacent village. 19.1 percent live with enemy base areas nearby. (26)

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(C) CG I FFV/Senior Advisor II CTZ was advised the major problem areas in II CTZ were:

31.6 percent of the populace classified DE in Enemy Military Presence, 19.1 percent DE in Enemy Military Activity, 15.6 percent classified DE in PSDF, 22.8 percent classified DE in Social Welfare, 34.1 percent classified DE in Development Assistance and 22.4 percent classified DE in Economic Activity. (27)

(C) CG II FFV was advised that there were no major problem areas identified in III CTZ, but that 13.2 percent of the population was classified DE in Social Welfare due in part to 18.1 percent of the population living in hamlets where welfare assistance was needed but not provided by RVN sources. (28)

(C) The major problem areas in IV CTZ were identified as: ". . . 27.7 percent of the population classified DE in Enemy Military Presence and 30.1 percent classified DE in Social Welfare." (29)

(C) The initial HES reports of May reflected 89.7 percent of the population to be rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 0.8 percent from the preceding month or about 159,800 people. ABC population was thus approximately 15,952,100 out of an estimated total population of 17,789,700, while both the DE and V populations decreased to 1,445,600 and 254,900, respectively. The remaining 137,200 people could not be evaluated and were assigned to the N category. (30)

(C) Enemy action in Chau Doc Province during the latter part delayed submission and caused errors in original reports. As a result totals omitted 82,858 ABC category population. The addition of these to the overall RVN ABC population raised the May ABC percentage from 89.7 to 89.9 percent. (31)

(C) HES results of June pacification evidenced the GVN's ability to recover momentum after the VC "highpoint" challenges of April and May. They showed 91.1 percent of the population as ABC, an increase of 1.2 percent from the corrected May results. ABC population was approximately 16,296,100 of an estimated total of 17,897,300. Additionally the unevaluated N category decreased to approximately 71,200, or 0.4 percent of the population. (32)

(U) Further refinement of May's analysis of the effect of the Cambodian operations on HES ratings within RVN's border provinces became discernible with the June results. The analysis revealed that all provinces along the border, from III CTZ's Phuoc Long to IV CTZ's Kien Giang, with the exception of Binh Long, showed improvement or only slight loss in AB and ABC pacification ratings. Even Binh Long, while lower in ABC percentage, improved considerably in its AB ratings as reflected below. (33)

<u>Province</u>	<u>Percent rated ABC</u>	<u>Percent rated AB</u>
Phuoc Long	99.5 (plus 4.1)	91.0 (plus 7.7)
Binh Long	93.8 (minus 5.8)	74.6 (plus 8.4)
Tay Ninh	99.3 (plus 0.3)	95.2 (minus 0.6)
Hau Nghia	88.6 (plus 14.9)	49.8 (plus 10.7)
Kien Tuong	99.3 (minus 0.7)	90.8 (plus 16.9)

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<u>Province</u>	<u>Percent rated ABC</u>	<u>Percent rated AB</u>
Kien Phong	95.7 (plus 2.8)	90.6 (plus 19.5)
Chau Doc	93.3 (plus 2.3)	68.7 (plus 2.8)
Kien Giang	87.7 (plus 0.5)	72.1 (plus 8.2)

(U) CG XXIV Corps was advised the major problem area in MR 1 (formerly I CTZ) for June was Social Welfare with 26.4 percent of the population rated DE due to 35.6 percent of the hamlets requiring Social Welfare, but none being provided by the GVN. (34)

(U) The major problem areas of MR 2 (formerly II CTZ) were identified as:

. . . 28.9 percent of the population rated DE in Enemy Military Presence caused by 56.0 percent of the villages having at least a platoon of enemy main or local force units in the village or in an adjacent village and 47.1 percent having enemy base areas nearby; 19.3 percent of the populace is rated DE in Economic Activity due to 28.3 percent of the villages having goods moving to and from the village taxed by the enemy and 34.4 percent having uncultivated farm land due to bad security; and 18.0 percent of the populace rated DE in Land Tenure due to 65.9 percent of the villages not having an active Village Land Distribution Committee and 53.9 percent having uncultivated farm land. (35)

(U) Whereas MR 3 (formerly III CTZ) was not cited as having any major problem areas as a whole four provinces, Binh Tuy, Hau Nghia, Bien Hoa, and Phuoc Tuy, were identified as having potential trouble areas. (36)

(U) Possible trouble areas identified in MR 4 (formerly IV CTZ) were:

. . . 24.0 percent of the population rated DE in Enemy Military Presence due to 50.3 percent of the villages having at least a platoon of enemy main or local forces regularly present in the village or an adjacent village and 38.3 percent having enemy base areas nearby. Also, 29.1 percent of the populace was rated DE in Social Welfare due to assistance being required, but not provided in 35.5 percent of the hamlets. (37)

(C) Progress was made during Phase I of the 1970 P&D Plan although it was slower than previously and less than desired. As of 30 Jun, 91 percent of the people lived in relatively secure areas, up from 88 percent in January. The 91 percent level was considerably below the goal of 98 percent. (38)


(C) HES for July showed 92.5 percent of the population countrywide rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 1.3 percent from the June results or about 263,900 people. ABC population was approximately 16,560,000 out of an estimated total population of 17,928,000. V population was approximately 205,300 people. (39)

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HES POPULATION TRENDS



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-6

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(C) August showed another increase as 92.8 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 0.4 percent or 162,100 people. Remarks on the provinces showed Quang Nam, MR 1, regressed 3.4 percent in ABC population due to increases in military pressure. (40)

(C) HES for September showed 93.7 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 0.9 percent over the August results. ABC population was approximately 16,513,100 people out of an estimated population of 17,616,100. The month's decrease of almost 400,000 people in RVN stemmed from a new US survey in Saigon. The old estimate for Saigon was roughly 2.2 million and had been used since May 1968. A new survey of police and ward records by the Saigon Civil Assistance Group documented only 1.7 million. Reliable population figures in Vietnam had always been difficult to obtain and whether they were up-to-date or not varied from ward to ward and village to village. No conclusions were drawn from the revised figures except that hopefully they were more accurate. (41)

(C) In October the HES showed 94.3 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, a new high for 1970. It was the sixth consecutive month that an increase had been shown over the previous month. (42) A reflection of the security situation was the holding of the annual National Games in Saigon. A crowd of 20,000 attended the Laos-South Vietnam soccer game "... with fears of pickpockets replacing fears of grenades." There was also a clean-up campaign in Saigon which removed much of the old barbed wire and sandbags from public buildings. (43)

(C) Nevertheless, Phase II of the 1970 P&D Plan ended on 31 Oct with 94.3 percent of the population rated ABC, or 5.7 percent below the goal. (44)

(C) In November HES showed 95.0 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 0.17 percent over October and a new high for the year. It was the seventh consecutive month of progress. All four MRs hit new highs for the year in both AB and ABC population categories. The GVN effort to upgrade as many V hamlets as possible continued. They reduced the V hamlet total from 206 to 145 (41 in MR 1; 4 in MR 2; 0 in MR 3; and 100 in MR 4). (45)


(C) In December HES showed 95.1 percent of the population rated ABC in pacification, an increase of 0.1 percent over November and the eighth consecutive month that the category increased. The V hamlets hit a new low, 103 as compared to 612 at the beginning of 1970. (46) (See Figure VIII-6 for HES trends and Figure VIII-7 for 10 high and 10 low provinces in AB population as of 31 Dec 70.)

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HES/70 PROVINCE COMPARISON

AB POPULATION
31 DEC 70

TÊN NHỎ		TÊN LỚN	
AN GIANG	100.0%	BINH DINH	69.7%
PHUOC LONG	99.7%	QUANG NAM	68.2%
KIEN TUONG	99.5%	VINH BINH	67.1%
NINH THUAN	98.8%	QUANG NGAI	66.5%
THUA THIEN	98.1%	KIEN HOA	65.1%
GIA DINH	97.4%	PHU BON	64.2%
LAM DONG	97.0%	PLEIKU	62.4%
GO CONG	96.6%	AN XUYEN	60.2%
TAY NINH	96.3%	CHUONG THIEN	60.1%
QUANG TRI	93.5%	QUANG DUC	44.6%



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-7

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Regional Forces and Popular Forces

(C) The primary forces tasked with the responsibility for territorial security, under the 1970 P&D Plan, were the RF and the PF. (See Figure VIII-8 for missions of RF and PF units.) However, PF were scheduled on a selective basis to replace regular force units assigned to pacification and static territorial security missions within the consolidation zones and secure areas. (47) (See Figure VIII-9 for areas of responsibility.)

(C) In an attempt to compensate for the reduction of US forces in RVN, the Joint General Staff (JGS) unilaterally decided, on 11 Nov 69, to accelerate the activation of 670 PF platoons and 23 RF companies from FY71 to FY70 and requested each CTZ to recommend province allocations of their respective quotas. On 20 Dec 69, JGS Memorandum #4906/TTM/P313/3/K officially distributed the RF companies and PF platoons to the provinces and requested each CTZ accomplish the following:

1. To direct, urge, and help recipient sector headquarters to proceed with recruiting and organizing the RF and PF units, effective 1 Jan 70.
2. To study the transfer of the available numbers of cadres and specialists from existing units to the newly activated units based on the following requirements:
 - a. For each new RF company: 4 officers and 12 NCOs.
 - b. For each new PF platoon: 1 platoon leader, 3 squad leaders, 1 aidman, and 1 telephone operator.
 - c. Transfer of personnel to be accomplished prior to units reporting to the appropriate training cycle (Two-phased program: 1 Feb and 1 Mar 70.)
3. To recruit, equip, and train RF companies and PF platoons as determined by separate JGS publications. (48)

(S) SECDEF Memorandum of 6 Jan 70 approved the JGS acceleration and directed austere, temporary reallocations of equipment from within existing command resources. It also directed maximum use of equipment from redeploying US units to meet additional requirements. (49)

(C) During January, eight RF companies and 219 PF platoons were activated. They were part of the 23 RF company and 1,000 PF platoon FY70 force-structure increase (FSI) and 23 RF company and 670 PF platoon accelerated FY71 FSI. As of 31 Jan, all personnel for FY70 FSI and eight RF companies and 219 PF platoons of the FY71 program were recruited. (50)

(C) RF/PF forces were primarily utilized during January as follows: (51)

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TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES

REGIONAL FORCES

1. FULL TIME SOLDIERS
2. ORGANIZED INTO 123 MAN COMPANY SIZED UNITS
3. PRIMARY MISSION:
TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
4. OTHER MISSIONS :
 - a. SECURITY OF VILLAGES, HAMLETS, KEY MILITARY-ECONOMIC INSTALLATIONS AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION
 - b. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION

POPULAR FORCES

1. FULL TIME SOLDIERS
2. ORGANIZED INTO 32 OR 35 MAN PLATOONS
3. PRIMARY MISSION: SECURITY OF VILLAGES AND HAMLETS
4. OTHER MISSIONS:
 - a. SUPPORT OF PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
 - b. SECURITY OF CRITICAL POINTS WITHIN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

FIGURE VIII-8

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Regional Forces (1)

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Units Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Total Units (2)</u>
Village/Hamlet Security	605	40.6
District/Town Security	139	9.3
Offensive Operations and Reaction Forces	352	23.6
LOC Security	202	13.5

(1) RF rifle companies only.

(2) Totals reflect primary mission assignments only.

Popular Forces

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Units Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Total Units (1)</u>
Village/Hamlet Security	4,092	71.1
District/Town Security	503	8.7
Offensive Operations	135	2.3
LOC Security	613	10.6

(1) Totals reflect primary mission assignments only.

(C) During February an additional 19 RF rifle companies and 113 PF platoons were added to the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) reporting system. As in January, RF companies were more heavily committed to lines of communication (LOC) security and offensive operations while PF units drew more village/hamlet security and offensive operations assignments. (52)

(C) As an aid in standardizing CTZ usage of the newly authorized PF platoons, the JCS directed on 12 Feb that no PF platoon would be assigned to A hamlets, no more than one PF squad would be assigned to B hamlets, and no more than one PF platoon would be assigned to C, D, E, or V hamlets. (53)

(C) The continuing effects of the JCS directed FY70 and accelerated FY71 FSI, plus the conversion of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) units to RF, resulted in an additional 11 RF rifle companies and 101 PF platoons augmenting the territorial security forces during March. Total forces were deployed as follows: (54)


Regional Forces (1)

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Units Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Total Units (2)</u>
Village/Hamlet Security	589	38.8
District/Town Security	140	9.2

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AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

FIGURE VIII-9

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<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Units Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Total Units (2)</u>
Offensive Operations and Reaction Forces	363	23.9
LOC Security	217	14.3

- (1) RF rifle companies only.
 (2) Totals reflect primary mission assignments only.

Popular Forces

<u>Primary Mission</u>	<u>Units Assigned</u>	<u>Percent of Total Units (1)</u>
Village/Hamlet Security	4,170	69.8
District/Town Security	496	8.3
Offensive Operations and Reaction Forces	206	3.4
LOC Security	650	10.9

- (1) Totals reflect primary mission assignments only.

(U) Effective 1 Apr TFES III was put into effect. Although the old TFES was a valuable tool for assessing the status of RF/PF units, it focused on tactical units and provided no assessment of administrative and logistical aspects of the RF/PF forces. The TFES III questions and data elements were more precisely definitive and evaluated designated administrative and logistical units as well as tactical units. (55)

(C) RF/PF growth continued in April as 16 RF rifle companies and 151 PF platoons were added to the TFES report. Also, RF rifle companies were still heavily committed to village/hamlet security and offensive reaction force operations, while PF units assumed more village/hamlet, district/town, and LOC-security tasks. (56)

(C) On 1 Apr, 19 RF battalions were activated and three started a 7-week training program. These were part of the MACV recommended FY71 FSI authorized and distributed by JGS Memorandum #836/TTM/P313/K, 14 Mar. (57)

(C) Reported in the May TFES for the first time were 12 RF rifle companies and 97 PF platoons. These new units were utilized to augment existing forces in providing village/hamlet, district/town, and LOC security. (58)



(C) JGS Memorandum 1754/TTM/P313/K of 28 May distributed 508 MACV-recommended FY71 FSI platoons and directed recruiting start 1 Jun and be completed by 20 Jul. It further specified unit training commence on 1-7 Aug and be completed by 1 Jan 71. The allocation of these units was: (59)

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TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES



1970 RESULTS

	VC	RF, PF	RATIO
WPNS LOST	15,800	4,571	3.4:1

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-10

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<u>CORPS AREA</u>	<u>PF PLATOONS</u>
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I CTZ	80
II CTZ	84
III CTZ	51
IV CTZ	293

(C) An analysis of the July and August TFES reports revealed numerous instances where no assigned missions were reported for RF and PF units. That deficiency was present in all MRs. August TFES reports from subordinate units showed no assigned missions for 728 RF and 6,213 PF units and severely reduced the usefulness of the report. (60)

(C) COMUSMACV sent no TFES messages for July, August, and September because there was inaccurate reporting and programming difficulties. (61)

(C) During Phase II of the 1970 P&D Plan there was, in effect, a mission change for the RF/PF as the GVN leadership refocused attention on pacification. Orders were given to get the RF/PF out of their outposts and on operations, especially night operations. PSDF replaced RF/PF as guards of bridges, village offices, and other installations, thereby freeing the RF and PF to enter VC territory. (62)

(C) In assessing the territorial forces at year's end DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS said:

The territorial forces by end-December 1970 increased to a total of 283,106 RF and 250,889 PF, with 379,999 armed PSDF to supplement them in 11,312 special teams equivalent to local platoons. While countrywide these forces can be said to have made a substantial contribution to the security of rural areas, their very success has also lead on occasion to complacency and a lack of attention that enabled the VC to overrun some of them. This may be a problem of success but it is one which must be overcome. (63)

(U) Figure VIII-10 shows RF/PF strengths and operations.

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A National Policeman, on duty in a Kien Hoa Province marketplace, considers the possibility of crayfish for dinner.

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National Police

(C) The 1970 P&D Plan established the prime responsibility of the NP: "... to establish and maintain law and order in secure areas and consolidation zones, and to assist the PF in providing security in the secure areas." Annex IX of the plan further directed the continued establishment of NP sub-stations, as those established in 1969 had not been too efficient because of other urgent requirements. Also, the Directorate General of National Police planned a temporary project of increasing the personnel strength of the village NP sub-stations as follows: (64)

1. Villages with a population of over 10,000: 18 NP.
2. Villages with a population between 5,000 and 10,000: 12 NP.
3. Villages with a population under 5,000: 6 NP.

(C) In an attempt to achieve the 1969 manpower goal of 92,200, the GVN had, in September 1969, authorized the transfer of 13,000 men from the ARVN to the NP; however, as of 31 Jan only 11,178 transfers had been made to bring the total force strength to 87,145. The basic problem was a lack of authority for the NP to recruit personnel for its needs. It was apparent that, unless recruitment policies changed, the 1970 manpower goal of 108,000 would not be met. (65)

(C) As the year 1970 started, the GVN planned to deploy 50 percent of the NP, exclusive of the National Police Field Force (NPF), Marine Police, and those assigned to autonomous cities, to district level and below. The status in January was: (66)

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Available Police</u>	<u>District and Below</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Stationed in Villages Police / Villages</u>	
I	6,657	3,269	49	1,415	350
II	8,331	3,092	37	1,272	460
III	10,430	4,637	44	1,536	345
IV	12,904	6,085	47	2,580	520
TOTAL	38,322	17,083	44.6	6,803	1,675

(C) No ARVN transferred to the NP in February but normal gains increased the forces to 87,704, with 18,008 assigned at district level or below. (67)

(C) Little basic progress was made in March toward recruiting to achieve the 1970 goals. Attrition partially offset the additional 836 military personnel assigned, to make the net gain 694 and a total force 88,398. Advisory estimates, including attrition, projected the need as 10,548 new personnel to reach the authorization of 94,948. The GVN authorized recruitment of 7,000 persons in legal draft status, excluding students, previously deferred for physical or family reasons, but prospects of any success from this group were dim. (68)

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
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NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH



RESULTS OF OPERATIONS 1970

CONFISCATIONS	TOTAL
WEAPONS	2.398
GRENADES EXPLOSIVES	12.082
VC CAPTURED	3.180
VC KILLED	541
NATIONAL POLICE KILLED	151
NATIONAL POLICE WOUNDED	354

ID CARDS

	TOTAL TO DATE
REGISTRATIONS	6 528 727
FINGER PRINTS FILED	8 886 036
CARDS ISSUED	5 891 290
DESERTERS IDENTIFIED	89 372
VC IDENTIFIED	336
DRAFT EVADERS IDENTIFIED	7 702
MISC CRIMINALS IDENTIFIED	4 192
REGISTRATION IRREGULARITIES IDENTIFIED	21 339

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-11



A National Policeman chats with bus passengers who have reached Can Tho, the half-way point in the 145 mile trip from Saigon across the Mekong Delta to Ca Mau, in An Xuyen Province. Viet Cong, who do not carry valid identification cards, sometimes are found in routine checks of buses and sampan "taxis."

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(C) In April, 192 military were assigned, bringing the transfers to 12,805, 195 short of the planned for 13,000. The plan to deploy 50 percent of the NP to district level and below and the expansion of village substations to 1,849 progressed as follows: (69)

<u>Corps</u>	<u>Available Police</u>	<u>District and Below</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Stationed in Villages</u>	
				<u>Police</u>	<u>/ Villages</u>
I	8,120	3,884	48	1,743	338
II	9,578	3,767	39	1,706	470
III	10,478	4,797	46	1,819	340
IV	14,673	7,289	50	3,389	573
TOTAL	42,849	19,737	46	8,657	1,721

(C) An additional 84 military were assigned to the NP in May, and 141 were gained from other sources. However, losses from all causes numbered 251, reducing the total force to 88,519. (70)

(C) Assignment of 13,000 military personnel to the NP was completed in June. As of 30 Jun the force strength was 88,397 or 13,603 short of the Phase I goal.

(C) During Phase II of the 1970 P&D Plan, the NP began the difficult task of assuming responsibility for the PHOENIX Program. In appraising the status of pacification at the end of Phase II, COMUSMACV in a message to CINCPAC cited the "... need to improve the performance and status of the National Police. This point finally seems to be receiving some Presidential attention, but little has been done to date" (71)

(C) At the end of 1970 the NP was still undermanned with 87,884 of the 108,000 authorized personnel assigned. (See Figure VIII-11.) However, there was "... high-level GVN attention turned to put pressure behind PHOENIX and the National Police." (72)

PSYOP Support of Pacification


(U) A typical example of psychological operations (PSYOP) support of pacification occurred on 11 Jun after an estimated two enemy companies attacked Thanh My Hamlet in Quang Nam Province in MR I, destroyed over 75 percent of the hamlet's structures, and killed more than 70 men, women, and children. The psychological reaction of the surviving populace was reported to be initially a feeling of dismay that government security had failed them. However, effective PSYOP was applied immediately, including prompt medical assistance and civil organization for relief and recovery, which soon shifted the people's attitude to a realization that the VC were the perpetrators of the terror and the GVN was fulfilling its role in security and public welfare, even though the security force had initially been overwhelmed by a massed enemy force.

(U) XXIV Corps and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) PSYOP and political warfare (POLWAR) agencies undertook an investigation of the incident to determine what additional local PSYOP efforts could be employed to intensify the local people's alienations from the VC. It was also significant that the PSYOP and POLWAR agencies cooperated closely with all information agencies in publicizing the incident. (73)

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SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-12

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Protection of the People from Terrorism

Terrorism

(FOUO) Terrorism was the means by which the VC entered or reentered populated areas in RVN. Provinces which experienced high levels of terrorist activity had fairly large populations and had historically been the sites of enemy base areas. It was in those areas that the VC felt they could rekindle the fires of latent sympathy for their cause, negate the effect of GVN presence, and make inroads into GVN control. In contrast, terrorism applied to areas traditionally opposed to the VC (e.g., Catholic, Hoa Hao) was generally counterproductive, stiffening the resistance of the people.

(FOUO) The frequency of terrorist incidents remained high in 1970, but its intensity declined; incidents were up, but casualties were down. (See Figure VII-12.) More GVN officials were attacked (mostly in Binh Dinh province in MR 2) but little other change from the pattern of 1968 and 1969 was evident. Terrorism incidents remained about level in MRs 1 and 4 but were down in MR 3 and up sharply in MR 2 in 1970. Factors which undoubtedly contributed to the VC perception that terrorism was an effective strategy in MR 2 was the weakness of GVN leadership and anti-VC efforts in that area. (74)

(FOUO) There were 25,411 Vietnamese victims of VC terrorism in 1970 as compared to 32,364 in 1968 and 27,250 in 1969. Those levels indicated the extent terrorism played in the VC game plan for the war in RVN. (See Figures VIII-13 and -14.)

(FOUO) Resort to terrorism was the result of a deliberate VC policy. The Communists formulated a three-pronged strategy: military, diplomatic, and political, enumerated in their Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution #9 of July 1969. Military force was directed to exert pressure, to cause the US to speed its withdrawal thereby shortening the time available for strengthening GVN, and to keep GVN on a wartime footing. Diplomacy was used concurrently to marshal world opinion in their favor.

(FOUO) The political struggle was accelerated to lay the groundwork within SVN. Integral to the political struggle was the liberal use of terrorism to weaken and destroy local government, strengthen the party apparatus, proselyte among the populace, erode the control and influence of GVN, and weaken RVNAF. If positive benefits to the VC could not be gained, COSVN Resolution #9 indicated that they would settle for creating "fiercely contested areas." They intended to "motivate" the peasants in all rural areas, whether contested or controlled by either side. One observer noted that they sometimes settled for simply teaching the peasants how to remain neutral. (75)

(C) COSVN Resolution #14 of October 1969 reemphasized the basic thrust of #9. There was a significant increase in terrorist incidents in April 1970 which were concentrated in VC Military Region 5 (GVN Provinces of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, and Phu Yen). That was apparently a major application of COSVN Resolutions #9 and #14. Particular concentration on abductions were primarily for proselyting, but they also provided the VC with badly needed labor resources and replacements for military units. (76)


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TERRORIST VICTIMS STATISTICAL SUMMARY
YEAR TO DATE 31 DEC 70

CATEGORY	KILLED	WOUNDED	ABDUCTED
PROVINCE CHIEF	1		
DISTRICT CHIEF		2	
DISTRICT OFFICIALS	4	1	1
VILLAGE CHIEFS	27	25	9
VILLAGE OFFICIALS	91	89	36
HAMLET CHIEFS	155	68	45
HAMLET OFFICIALS	184	78	66
NATIONAL POLICE	117	219	6
NPFF OFFICIALS	43	143	5
RD CADRE	234	518	54
PSDF	771	1,202	1,158
REFUGEE	20	79	16
HOI CHANH	95	51	36
GENERAL POPULACE	4,209	10,113	5,440
TOTALS	5,951	12,588	6,872
SELECTIVE ASSASSINATIONS 1,568			

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-13



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-14

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The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

(C) The VCI could be likened to the "underground." It was not a defined Communist organization; it was a working concept for GVN, uniting as one target the variety of organizational and political efforts the Communists carefully compartmented and manipulated separately. It included only the leading cadres, not all Communist functionaries in South Vietnam. The cadres were broken down by government decree into categories A (executive level, including all People's Revolutionary Party members) and B (cadre level leaders of front organizations). They were defined in specific terms. The VCI concept did not include C level (others in the political apparatus) or other supporters of the Communist effort in a variety of military, political, logistics, espionage, or paramilitary activities. The Communists had a totally different breakdown into members of the party, members of the National Liberation Front, members of the Alliance of National Democratic and Peace Forces, the Revolutionary Committees, and the various associations such as farmers, youth, and women. Over the past 3 years the number of total VCI steadily declined. However, most of the changes in strength were as a result of reassessments and re-estimates, which frequently used changed definitions or ones inadequately understood at the field level where the figures were compiled, e.g., the tendency to include C level in the total estimates and the maintenance of identified VCI individuals on whom no report had been received for several years. A variety of steps were taken to improve accuracy; among them were use of VC geographic boundaries to prevent duplication when more than one GVN subdivision was included within the same VC unit, and centralizing VCI identifications by computer to prevent repetition in several district centers. (77)

(C) Two overall conclusions were drawn about VC strength statistics:

1. VCI strength has actually declined in most areas of South Vietnam over the past two years. This is reflected in intelligence reports, Hoi Chanh debriefings, etc., outlining the VC difficulties in maintaining a command and control structure. For example, in VC Soc Trang Province the Deputy Chief of the Administrative Staff Office, Current Affairs Committee, defected and stated that the VC apparatus had lost some 1,500 party members over the past two years but had only been able to recruit 100. In Long An province, the VC established a zone structure to provide political leadership to two or more villages as it was unable to maintain the full village structure in each village. SR-2 and SR-3 have recently merged to form the Long An sub-regions This decline in strength is the reflection of the total impact of the GVN's pacification program, especially the isolation of the VCI from much of the countryside which it formerly ruled unopposed.

2. VCI strength figures are undoubtedly still too high, if they are taken, as intended, to reflect leadership elements only. Also there is very little doubt that the qualitative value of the VCI apparatus has been reduced as a result of losses during 1968, 1969, and 1970 and replacement by less experienced cadre. Thus the figures can give a false impression as to the strength of the VC apparatus. This perception, however, must be supplemented by the existence of followers, sympathizers and neutralists, all of whom can be a

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reservoir of support for the VC. These could provide new leadership and flesh out the VCI framework if stimulated by social problems, GVN ineptness or a revival of a Communist main force threat. (78)

(C) The best indicator of VCI activity was the statistics on terrorism which are shown for a 3-year period in Figure VIII-13. Figure VIII-14 provides a statistical summary of terrorist victims.

PHUNG HOANG STRUCTURE




FIGURE VIII-15

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Neutralize the VCI (PHUNG HOANG)

(C) GVN Presidential Decree 280-a TT/SL of 1 Jul 68 promulgated the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Plan to centralize and coordinate military and civilian-agency efforts to destroy VCI organizations in-country. (79) The Commanding General of the NP, working through the PHUNG HOANG structure of the NP (see Figure VIII-15), had overall responsibility for the PHUNG HOANG program. The program received increasing high-level attention and support throughout 1970 and modest progress was made toward the long-range objective of making the NP the primary operational and control element with support from various military and paramilitary organizations. (80)

(C) The general objective of the 1970 P&D Plan was the neutralization of 1,800 category A and B VCI per month. Known and identified VCI were the primary Phase I target. Identification of at least 30 percent of the estimated remaining but unidentified cadre, for targeting in Phase II, was an additional Phase I goal. Also the plan reiterated specific instructions regarding the disposition of apprehended VCI (see p. VIII-74, Volume II, MACV Command History, 1969). (81)

(C) During January, PHUNG HOANG operations reported 1,908 VCI killed, captured, or rallied. However, beginning in January, a new definition of neutralization was used. It said a VCI was not "neutralized" unless he was killed, sentenced, or rallied. Under the new definition individuals captured could not be counted as "neutralized" until sentenced to a meaningful jail term. Under those criteria, neutralizations credited for the month were 1,217. (82) (See monthly neutralization chart, Figure VIII-16.)

(C) The highly successful portion of the PHUNG HOANG Information Program, instituted in late 1969, using posters containing VCI blacklist names and/or photographs throughout the countryside, was reviewed by DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS and CTZ Senior Advisors in January 1970. After examining the merits and faults of the program, it was directed that use of US funds or facilities for poster production was authorized only after the province chief and province senior advisor, or his delegated subordinate, investigated and agreed the evidence substantiated the accusation and poster publication was warranted. (83)

(C) In February an additional 1,143 VCI, of which approximately 22.2 percent were serving in district or higher level positions, were neutralized. However, during the same period the estimated VCI strength rose from the preceding month's estimate of 76,398 to 78,336. (84)

(C) PHUNG HOANG operations in March accounted for 1,479 VCI neutralized. If the 1969 criteria for neutralizations had been used the total would have been 1,980. Not counted under the PHUNG HOANG program but also neutralized during the month were 1,402 VCI supporters, 1,073 guerrillas, and 802 VC/NVA soldiers. (85)

(C) During April, PHUNG HOANG operations accounted for 1,654 VCI killed, rallied, and sentenced, a 1970 high. VCI neutralizations under the 1969 criteria of counting all those captured rather than sentenced rose to a 1969-70 high of 2,226. Also, during the month the rate of province security committee (PSC) processing of the 1970 VCI captured continued to lag behind the capture rate as only 449 of the 958 captured were processed. This additional backlog raised the 1970 total of VCI captured and not processed to 2,286 and pointed out the need for accelerating PSC processing. (86)

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
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PROTECTION AGAINST TERRORISM (Phung Hoang)

THRU 31 DEC 70



VCI STRENGTH TOTAL	
63,082	
IDENTIFIED	ESTIMATED
34,864	28,218
TOTAL VCI NEUTRALIZATIONS	
FOR 1970	
22341	

	1970
SENTENCED	6405
RALLIED	7745
KILLED	8191
TOTAL	22341

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-16

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(C) On 4 Apr, DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS briefed representatives of State, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Agency for International Development (AID), and DOD on the GVN proposed change of the PHUNG HOANG staff from the Office of the Ministry of Interior (Prime Minister) to that of the Director General National Police (DGNP) and placing the primary responsibility for implementation of the program at the local level with the NP. SECDEF, in behalf of the Washington agencies, expressed their apprehension that such a move would be inopportune in view of the NP's managerial and staff limitations. However, by Joint Embassy/MACV/CORDS message, the Prime Minister's directive was concurred in by the Mission Council. (87)

(C) In May, another high point was reached by PHUNG HOANG operations as 1,719 VCI and an additional 956 VCI supporters were neutralized. However, PSC processing continued to fall further behind as 530 cases were processed while 933 were captured. In an attempt to alleviate the backlog of cases awaiting processing by the PSCs, the Prime Minister, on 13 May, sent a letter to the Minister of Justice outlining the role of the public prosecutor in the process. It required the public prosecutor, in addition to urging weekly meetings of the PSC, to review all dossiers and evidence presented for conviction prior to submission to the PSCs so that if they were incomplete or based only on confession, they would be returned to the Province Interrogation Center. In more far-reaching action, the prosecutor was also urged to meet the suspects, hear their statements, and present the case before the PSC. The prosecutor was also required to inspect the detention center facilities and see that people were not illegally detained and further to encourage consideration in cases of low-level offenders to release them on their pledges in order to keep centers from being overcrowded and to keep them away from hard-core criminals and VC cadre. The Minister of Justice was further directed to arrange for each PSC to have one public prosecutor. (88)

(C) In June VCI neutralized reached 2,157; it was the year's best month to date. This was followed by a decline to 1,629 in July. (89)

(C) During August 2,539 VCI were neutralized. The sharp increase in neutralizations for August was attributed to the increase in the number of VCI reported as processed. July processing reports totalled 553. This figure was more than doubled in August with 1,466 (1,116 sentenced and 330 released). The increase in reporting was principally the result of a by-name demand for information on the status of captured VCI on whom processing had not been reported. Early in August a list was forwarded to each GVN province requesting the disposition of each individual. The response to this request included previously unreported dispositions of VCI/ sentenced or released during the period January through August 1970. The total of VCI captured on whom processing had not been reported by PSCs fell for the first time in 1970, leaving the dispositions of approximately 2,600 remaining to be reported.

(C) A captured VCI circular, dated 29 Mar 70, which was believed to have originated with the Security Section, VCI Region 6 Party Committee, outlined the mission, organization, and activities of PHUNG HOANG, principally at village level. (VCI Region 6 included 5 GVN provinces: Lam Dong, Binh Thuan, Tuyen Duc, and Ninh Thuan in MR 2 and Binh Tuy in MR 3.) The circular, addressed to security sections of subordinate provinces, provided guidance for the intensification of activities countering PHUNG HOANG. It emphasized the importance of the struggle against PHUNG HOANG in the villages and clearly drew the line between success and failure at that level: "Our task of frustrating the enemy's 'accelerated pacification plan' and his plan of 'Vietnamizing the war', as well as the destruction of his village PHUNG HOANG intelligence organization, has the most vital significance." VCI village cadre accounted for 57

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percent of total PHUNG HOANG neutralizations. This was a statistic which gave the VCI good reason for concern.

(C) In a continuing effort to extend an effective judicial system into all the provinces of Vietnam and to insure prompt processing of captured VCI, the Ministry of Justice appointed 10 additional prosecutors to provincial posts. Each prosecutor, in addition to other duties, was to inspect the local detention facilities and was to be the legal advisor to the Province Security Committee. (90)

(C) PHUNG HOANG accounted for 2,028 VCI neutralized during September. The reporting of judicial processing dropped to 692 (615 sentenced and 77 released) from the high of 1,446 reported in August. It was expected that processing reports would increase as a result of the distribution of the capture suspense listing through GVN channels. A similar listing distributed through US channels requesting information on the processing status of VCI captured, prior to the assumption of machine reporting by the Vietnamese in July, met with considerable success. This success was reflected in the large number of dispositions reported in August. The suspense listings were scheduled to be distributed monthly.

(C) Some reports indicated that VCI strength may have been as difficult for COSVN to estimate as it had been for MACV. A VCI rallier in Binh Duong Province indicated that reports in his district were submitted to subregion, and on to COSVN, claiming "X" number of VCI party chapters. This was done, when in fact, as in the source's case, there was only one member in the chapter. Such reporting may have been brought about by shortages in qualified cadre and the related difficulties experienced in meeting quotas imposed by higher levels.

(C) In Quang Nam (MR 1) a VCI District Party Committee issued a directive that cadres would each fill two or three positions due to the shortage of cadre. Similar problems were experienced by the VCI in Vinh Long Province (MR 4) where no National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) Village Committees had been formed and the district and province committees contained only one and three personnel, respectively. VCI recruiting in Tay Ninh (MR 3), only 30 percent effective, painted a similar picture which would have displeased COSVN and, therefore, as in the case cited, may have obscured the reports submitted.

(C) VCI Tra Vinh Province (GVN Vinh Binh, MR 4) revealed a COSVN plan to counter the PHUNG HOANG Program by sponsoring a contest that offered rewards to any VC who killed three or more GVN penetration agents. From this report it appeared that the VCI were not only interested in effectively countering PHUNG HOANG but were also engaged in initiating a comparable effort. For the first time, VC efforts to counter PHUNG HOANG entered a new dimension when tangible rewards were offered as opposed to dependence on ideological motivations alone. (91) A 5

(C) During October 2,100 VCI were killed, rallied, or sentenced. The total Phase II (July through October) neutralizations of 8,236 exceeded the goal of 7,200 by 1,126. Phase II results showed a substantial gain in all categories over Phase I (January through June). (92) See Table VIII-4 for a comparison.

(C) VCI neutralized in November totalled 1,974, or 174 over the 1,800 monthly goal. (93)

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(C) During December a new record was set when 2,595 VCI were neutralized. The apparent increase in the momentum of the program apparently caused concern by the enemy.

(C) Hoi Chanhs in MRs 2 and 4 gave information indicating that COSVN was gravely concerned with the success of the GVN PHUNG HOANG Program. COSVN directed the VCI to isolate themselves as much as possible in order to avoid compromise. Cadres were told to have only minimal contact with their families. Guidance on frequent shifting of cadre suspected of harboring GVN sympathizers was also given in a COSVN directive. Persons found to be active in the PHUNG HOANG Program were to be targeted for assassination, and those giving token support were to be sent away for 6 months of "thought, reform, and reindoctrination."

(C) Briefings on "Resolution 8" of VC Military Region 5 were given to Mo Duc District, Quang Ngai Province (MR 1) cadres in early September 1970. "Resolution 8" analyzed three GVN campaign plans, described as being the PHUNG HOANG Program. The resolution outlined a VC plan to counter the GVN Pacification Program. The VC were to attack cities, towns, and communication lines; sabotage refugee areas; and use all means to regain control over the population. However, a captured VCI from Mo Duc District pointed out that the VC had no chance of defeating the GVN, as there was no workable plan to counteract pacification. The Mo Duc District (VCI) Committee headquarters had to be moved constantly, and the District Committee was broken into separated sections. The District Committee had a serious lack of cadres and was unable to obtain replacements. The morale of the District Committee members was low because they were tired of hiding and working only at night, lacked food, and had been flooded in their tunnels during the monsoons. Since the PHUNG HOANG Program was initiated, the VC had suffered heavy losses, especially in cadres and local organizations. Most remaining cadres had become confused and lacking in motivation; many did not believe the VC had the ability to defeat the GVN. (94)

(C) In 1970 the PHUNG HOANG program produced a total of 22,341 VCI neutralized or 741 more than the goal of 21,600. For a detailed look at the types of action forces responsible for the neutralizations and captures during 1970 see Table VIII-2. Table VIII-3 shows monthly neutralization results. (95)

	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>CMD</u>	<u>RVN</u>
Military	20.5	15.6	13.8	3.7	1.5	11.8
RF/PF	43.3	28.3	37.7	42.6	16.1	39.3
PRU	7.2	5.9	4.8	6.9	13.9	6.7
Police	10.4	20.3	9.3	15.0	54.5	14.5
<u>Chieu Hoi</u>	12.4	21.5	29.4	24.6	7.7	21.2
Other	<u>6.2</u>	<u>7.4</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>7.0</u>	<u>6.3</u>	<u>6.5</u>
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE VII-2

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(C) Monthly PHUNG HOANG Neutralization Results for 1970(96)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>Sentenced</u>	<u>Rallied</u>	<u>Total Neutralized</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Percent District Level and Higher</u>
Jan	595	64	559	1,218	754	24.0
Feb	523	84	536	1,143	741	22.2
Mar	595	322	565	1,482	820	24.0
Apr	694	423	574	1,691	958	22.0
May	610	508	667	1,785	933	28.3
Jun	699	759	699	2,157	1,250	27.7
Jul	542	510	577	1,629	764	26.8
Aug	660	1,141	738	2,539	862	23.1
Sep	708	595	725	2,028	994	23.0
Oct	864	514	722	2,100	897	27.2
Nov	816	484	674	1,974	798	23.3
Dec	<u>885</u>	<u>1,001</u>	<u>709</u>	<u>2,595</u>	<u>918</u>	<u>25.4</u>
TOTALS	8,191	6,405	7,745	22,341	10,689	24.7

SOURCE: MACCORDS

TABLE VIII-3

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Special Review of Internal Security in South Vietnam and PHOENIX

(S) On 7 Nov 70 SECDEF forwarded a memorandum to CJCS concerning the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program. He said:

... My review of the current effort to neutralize the VCI indicates that:

- Although PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program must be primarily a GVN effort, that effort is badly fragmented at present. The National Police (NP) who are responsible for PHOENIX are one of the smallest and weakest of GVN agencies. As presently organized, staffed, and supported, the NP are incapable of mounting a PHOENIX effort commensurate with the need.

- Despite several years of effort, the anti-VC effort is not receiving the level of support, resources and energetic leadership from the GVN which its critical importance currently warrants.

- PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX devotes a disproportionate effort to identification, reporting and an accounting measure rather than the operational effort it should be.

- A considerable fragmentation of effort exists on the US advisory side.

In light of the above, the purpose of this memorandum is two-fold:

- To approve the specific recommendation contained in your 15 August 1970 memorandum. . . that COMUSMACV, in consultation with the US Embassy, Saigon, strongly urge the Government of Vietnam to take those necessary measures which will significantly upgrade the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program; and,

- To request that a directive be sent to General Abrams asking him to set up a special review group, selected from among his best people, to examine the entire issue of how internal security in South Vietnam, and in particular, the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX Program can be significantly improved, and to furnish Washington with a program of action-oriented recommendations together with resource implications within the next 45 days. I expect this review to be a fresh, unconstrained look that goes to the heart of the problem and develops an action program designed to solve the basic GVN and US deficiencies on a top priority basis. I am hopeful that Ambassador Colby may be allowed to head up this special review and to present the recommendations here in Washington.

I wish to stress the extreme importance that I place upon the need to improve internal security matters within South Vietnam. I further wish to stress the urgency of this issue, and in doing so, express my agreement with your assessment that the objective of

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neutralizing the infrastructure is equal in priority to the objectives of tactical operations. In order to ensure that General Abrams has full support in making this review, I will apprise both Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Helms of this undertaking and solicit their cooperation. Further, it is my intention to discuss the recommendations furnished by General Abrams with the President to ensure that any questions of priorities, resources, and US interests receive the highest USG attention. (97)

(S) JCS directed that the head of the special review group be prepared to brief the CJCS during the week of 14-18 Dec and that " . . . additional briefings for very senior officials should be anticipated." (98)

(S) COMUSMACV appointed the special review group as follows: (99)

DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS, Chairman

ACofS, J2, MACV

ACofS, CORDS, MACV

Director of PHOENIX, CORDS, MACV

Director of Public Safety, CORDS, MACV

(C) The conclusions of the group reported on 12 Dec 70 are quoted verbatim.

1. The VCI is being reduced in numbers and in qualitative strength. It remains a threat, however, to Vietnam, both in the short-term process of Vietnamization, and in the longer term as a framework which could be fleshed out by additional manpower. This could be generated by a reappearance of large-scale NVA forces providing a band wagon, by GVN ineptness or overreaching causing a revulsion and search for alternatives, or a breakdown of GVN society caused by political, social or economic contradictions and chaos. The VCI can be reduced to a manageable long-term threat but can probably not be eliminated entirely. Its efforts to achieve legal status and penetrate GVN society are not likely to have great success in the absence of some overall settlement with North Vietnam.

2. The reduction of overall VCI strength has been a result of the entire GVN and allied war effort. This has included the military success against the VC/NVA, the pacification program, as a whole, the constitutional political structure and the economic revival in the countryside of Vietnam. Phoenix has to date contributed little to this reduction, although it has been an element of the overall program and during the past year has substantially increased its role against the VCI target.

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3. Phoenix suffered considerable growing pains as a concept and a program, but its perception of the VCI threat is achieving GVN and public acceptance, with a concomitant understanding of the need for a proper counter program.

4. The National Police in Vietnam has been behind the power curve in this military society for many years. Despite handicaps, it has contributed to the security of the nation and is slowly rising (albeit from the cellar) in public and GVN esteem. The importance of its contribution has become more obvious as the focus of the struggle has moved to the VCI and public perception thereof has grown. Thus there is not only a requirement, there is now an opportunity, to improve the National Police to fill its full role in a free Vietnamese society.

5. The US advisory program for the Phoenix program and for internal security in Vietnam generally, including the National Police, has had a variety of bureaucratic and substantive weaknesses. A number of these are being remedied. Others probably are in the nature of facts of life, e.g., the military one-year tour and the civilian staffing limitations. Nonetheless a number of improvements are called for in the US advisory effort.

6. Many steps need to be taken to improve the GVN internal security program and US assistance therefor. At the same time, no dramatic and sweeping actions can promise a rapid change in the overall atmosphere. The most important steps that can be taken are to increase understanding in both the GVN and the public of the nature of the VCI threat and the necessity for operations to protect the people and nation from it. This must be accompanied by a sustained effort to select and train proper personnel and engage in the patient and precise operations called for in the internal security field. This effort should be encompassed in a program to build a professional and responsive National Police, to contribute over the years to the internal security of South Vietnam. (100)

(C) The following are the 27 recommendations of the special review group.

1. The National Police should be headed by a two-or three-star General, personally selected and close to the President and Prime Minister. He should be directed to develop a plan to strengthen the National Police and to make it a full and accepted partner of the RVNAF as one of the national security forces of Vietnam. Full support should be provided to this effort from the American side.

2. The National Police statute should be passed and an interim decree utilized to implement its recommendations. It should include appropriate draft deferment for operational police. This is under consideration and will be pressed.

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3. The National Police should be given the leading role in the Phoenix Program, but the Phoenix committee structure should be continued as a mechanism for the organization of support by other services. At the same time, the Phoenix program should be kept as a major command responsibility of Region Commanders, Province Chiefs, District Chiefs and Village Chiefs. It is included in the draft of the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. The Phoenix Bloc of the National Police Headquarters should be matched at region, province and district to supervise National Police performance in the program and coordinate contributions from other agencies. To the extent feasible the DIOCCs and PIOCCs should be moved to National Police compounds and become the center for all anti-VCI operations.

4. The National Police should be increased to a force level of 112,000 by end-July 1971 and 122,000 by end-December 1971. Draft exemption should be extended to operational National Police. 2,000 officers should be transferred from RVNAF to the National Police. A detailed JTD for the National Police should be established by province, district and village, following an overall formula reflecting the population density, territory and the security situation. This will serve as a basis for the allocation of Police and reallocation of RF/PF, coordinated with PSDF. This must be a joint DGNP/JCS/PSDF staff exercise.

5. Public Information. An energetic Phoenix public information campaign must be continued. Names, aliases, photos, and other available information must be publicized with respect to 100 percent of identified VCI, in order to secure maximum public participation in their capture. This must be supplemented by an energetic public information program on the importance of the Phoenix program as a whole, and its contribution to protecting the population against terrorism and any revival of VC strength. The People's Information program must be used to inform and stimulate the active participation of all GVN civil and military personnel (officials, teachers, etc.) in Phoenix, outlining not only why they should collaborate but the specific steps they should take to help. Phoenix has been made the No. 1 MACV psyops priority in support of pacification, and a detailed public information program has been developed between JUSPAO, MACV and CORDS for discussion with the Ministry of Information, JCS/PolWar and the People's Information Committee. The National Police public information program must be expanded to improve the police image with the population.

6. PSDF. Maximum participation in the Phoenix program must become a primary responsibility of all PSDF members, both combat and support. All PSDF must be trained in the Phoenix program and their contribution to it per attached lesson plans. Specialist PSDF Phoenix and National Police auxiliaries must be developed within the PSDF, to support the National Police and the Phoenix program.

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A monthly seminar should be held by all PSDF units to discuss the overall Phoenix program, the identity and activities of the VCI in the neighborhood, and actions which could be taken by the PSDF to assist the struggle against the VCI. These seminars must be attended by National Police representatives in the village and by National Police representatives from the district or province to the extent feasible. The PSDF will be requested to report such information upwards, but the National Police must take the positive responsibility of going to local PSDF units to search out the information available there by interrogation.

7. The full protections of Article 7 of the Constitution must be included in the legal procedures applied to VCI. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice must determine a method of granting a confrontation or hearing for the accused, defense counsel, and protection against improper methods of interrogation or detention. Prosecutors should be settled in all provinces. The Province Security Committee vote should be restricted to the Province Chief, the Province Council Chairman and the Prosecutor, pursuant to the recommendation of a Province Council Chairman at the Vung Tau meeting October 24. Close attention must be given to the workings of Province Security Committees, in terms of expedition of processing, accuracy of sentences, etc.

8. A reward program must be developed and specific terms thereof disseminated through National Police channels. This should include rewards in substantial figures for information leading to the arrest and conviction of most wanted individuals. These rewards should be handled through GVN channels rather than American, although US funds should be inserted to support the program at the national level, if needed.

9. Intelligence collection must become a positive obligation of each level of command and all GVN services, not merely an intelligence service responsibility. This must be obtained by personal visits to subordinate levels and the collection there of available information to be carried to the upper level for consolidation into files there. The Phoenix tradition of collating reports received must be replaced by a vigorous program of visiting subordinate levels and collecting information there, oral or written, for return to the central file at the next level. This must be a major responsibility of the National Police Phoenix Bloc at each level and the units contacted must include PSDF, village and hamlet offices, teachers, RF/PF units, village officials, etc.

10. Collation of intelligence on the VCI should be assigned to the Phoenix Center at district, province and region. These centers must act as staff sections for the appropriate commanders to keep them fully informed on the "VCI OB," i.e., the identities and organization of VCI in the area. The objective is to make each chief as aware of the details of the VCI structure and personalities as he is currently

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aware of the activities of local force and main force units. This information must be circulated and publicized so that all citizens may be aware of the opposition individuals and structure. Special arrangements will be needed to assign clear responsibility for coverage of VC boundaries which do not coincide with GVN and for coverage of regional organizations which frequently do not have a GVN counterpart, e.g., MR 5. Detailed intelligence on the VCI is still short and must be improved and made a working tool for the Police and other services.

11. A system of evaluation of the performance of Phung Hoang centers at district, province and region must be developed. This could be based on the ratios between population, estimated VCI, identified VCI, neutralizations, different ways in which neutralization was accomplished (KIA, rally, sentence), the responsible service (military, police, or other), etc.

12. Training. All National Policemen must be trained in Phoenix and participation in its operations. In addition, all services which have a contribution to make to Phoenix must appoint designated officials for Phoenix liaison and these individuals must be given Phoenix training. This must be supplemented by overall orientation material for the entire government structure to be circulated through People's Information channels. The JCS, in coordination with the MOI, has developed a special intelligence training program which concentrates on Phoenix, to be implemented in early 1971. The program envisages the training of at least one member of each RF company and one member of each PF platoon. At least three members of each PSDF Key Inter-team are to be trained. Recommend that this training program be expanded subsequently in order to encompass all PSDF elements and to give greater depth of trained personnel in RF/PF units.

13. The NPFF must be utilized by the National Police as a leading enforcement arm for Phoenix operations. Their work must be fully coordinated and to the extent feasible merged into joint operations with PRU, APT, Special Police, RD Cadre, VIS, and PSDF, supplemented as necessary by RF/PF.

14. All Phoenix operations must be reported through Phoenix channels to remove duplication and inaccuracy in individual agency reports of Phoenix operations.

15. Two FBI officers should be invited to Vietnam for a review and recommendation with respect to improving the Phoenix effort. Their recommendations would be appropriate in the fields of positive operations against the VCI, employee security within the GVN, fingerprint and other identification programs, coordination with local police, etc. They should work under CORDS.

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16. A comprehensive program of upgrading the detention and correction system of Vietnam should be undertaken as outlined in the attached. This should be supplemented by an energetic system of inspection through the Ministry of Justice reporting independently to the Prime Minister on the performance of the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Corrections and DGNP.

17. An intensified program of reorientation and rehabilitation must be developed in correction and detention centers. This must primarily focus on re-education of middle level Communists and countering efforts of the VC to maintain shadow governments within these institutions. It must consist of individual consultation with detainees and a careful analysis of their attitudes, combined with incentives to encourage them to reject their prior allegiance. A trained corps of officers must be developed for this operation.

18. A qualified member of the Federal Bureau of Prisons should be requested for assignment to CORDS Public Safety staff to handle liaison and support of the Directorate of Corrections of the Ministry of Interior.

19. A parole system should be instituted as outlined in the attached proposal.

20. All DIOCCs should be supplied with thermofax or other automatic reproduction equipment. A review should be made of their transportation requirements and these filled as needed.

21. The Big Mack collection system as it affects VCI should be made into a National Police system for implementation through National Police channels with US advisory assistance. The US classification of VCI estimated and identified (one report within past year showing name and position) should be supplemented by the GVN confirmed category (three separate reports). The GVN should be urged to require that one of these last reports be within the past year.

22. Internal security should be added to the curriculum of the US Army Military Assistance Institute, Fort Bragg. This should include training in internal security intelligence, to include collection, interrogation, substantive knowledge of Communist apparatus and fronts; Police operations, detention procedures, rehabilitation procedures, etc. It should receive contributions from the International Police Academy, the Military Police School

Greater coordination should be established between the training of civil and military advisors coming to Vietnam to work on the Police and Phoenix programs so that they come with a common basis for understanding their major responsibilities.

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23. The first class of the US Army Military Assistance Institute, Fort Bragg, special Phoenix course has the following participants in its first session: 24 Lieutenants, 3 Captains, 1 Major. It is recommended that this course be given to a majority of Captains so that they can fill the Captain spaces called for at the DIOCCs in Vietnam or aspire to the PIOCC spaces which should be filled by Majors.

24. Develop a system of HES scoring which will better reflect the presence and activities of the VCI. The present scoring system weighs most heavily the military component of overall security and pacification. In a new system, a score will give full weight to the VCI as an element of a security rating. This will effectively establish the overall hamlet rating in the absence of a very wide variation on the development side. The attached fact sheet outlines the current state of this re-examination, which is being discussed with the GVN.

25. A strong effort must be made to eliminate the backlog in handling of fingerprints and issuing ID cards and an extensive program of application of this resource to Phoenix operations must be instituted.

26. The National Police should be included within the following programs of special assistance to RVNAF personnel, as equivalent members of a national uniformed security force. From the US side, these should be funded by DOD as an integral part of the appropriate RVNAF program:

- a. Food supplement
- b. Commissary privileges
- c. Food allowances during training
- d. National Police hospital

These proposals are being staffed in MACV.

27. The Maritime Police, a branch of the National Police, have a requirement for an additional 40 craft of the PBR type. All US Navy PBR's are being transferred to the VNN. Some US Army craft are a possible source. Action is required to provide these additional craft from US in-country resources or by additional procurement. This is being further staffed at MACV. (101)

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People's Self Defense

(C) The GVN 1970 P&D Plan established the essential tasks of the PSDF as a requirement to constantly develop and raise the quality of the PSDF by:

1. Constantly developing and perfecting the organization.
2. Completing the training and arming.
3. Increasing the efficiency of security activities, and destroying the VCI.
4. Encouraging PSDF in:
 - a. Actively participating in people's welfare, primarily in self-help development projects.
 - b. Participating in political efforts to expand the governments policy concerning benefits of village/hamlet.
5. Speeding up educational activities to form a steady national spirit for members.

(C) The plan further called for an organization of 4 million PSDF members, 1.5 million combat and 2.5 million support, and the organization of at least one key interteam (KIT), consisting of 35 fully armed men of the combat group, in each A, B, and C hamlet. The KIT personnel were to be trained at national and inter-provincial PF training centers and then return to their hamlet to instruct other PSDF members. (102)

(C) As of 31 Jan, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported 402,970 weapons issued to combat PSDF members, an increase of 4,481 since 31 Dec 69. Also, 1,347,028 members, including 186,577 females, were organized into the PSDF, of which 1,301,315 (96.9 percent) were reported as trained. Countrywide status of the combat PSDF at the beginning of the year was:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>WEAPONS ISSUED</u>
I	186,570	171,665	82,260
II	220,452	258,559	83,687
III	473,570	424,772	131,760
IV	<u>466,436</u>	<u>446,319</u>	<u>105,263</u>
TOTAL	1,347,028	1,301,315	402,970

(C) Support PSDF personnel were reported by the MOI as 1,934,593 organized but only 840,125, 43.4 percent, as having received training. However, even these figures were suspect since a number of village chiefs were unaware of the support category of PSDF and had far fewer total organized than the reports indicated. (103)

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(C) January marked the initial implementation of the PSDF Improvement Plan when the first increment of KIT leaders from each province was scheduled to begin a 6-week training course at selected training centers on 16 Feb. The MOI set a goal of organizing and training 304,500 personnel into 8,700 KITs of 35 men each by 30 Jun, of which the first course broke down as: (104)

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>GOAL</u>	<u>ATTENDING TRAINING</u>
I	2,000	2,028
II	2,931	2,466
III	1,396	1,213
IV	<u>1,939</u>	<u>1,938</u>
TOTAL	8,266	7,645

(C) In January 1969 the GVN MOI initiated a computerized reporting system to provide data on PSDF participation in the program and weapons distribution. The printout was interfaced with HES security ratings and population figures, and provided data for decision making at the central, corps, province, and district levels. During the first few months of operation a variety of problems were encountered, but commencing in October 1969, the report became reasonably reliable and subsequently improved each month. By February 1970 it covered 94.5 percent of the hamlets in the HES reporting base and over 96 percent of the population base. Figures reported before February 1970, and used in previous MACV Command Histories, came from the MOI manually prepared report derived from information submitted by the province chiefs.

(C) The figures derived from the February 1970 PSDF Management Report, the new official source document, when compared with the MOI report showed lower numbers for both support and combat members. The MOI report showed a total of 3,335,858 PSDF organized, while the Management Report showed 3,250,453, a difference of 85,405. For combat members, the MOI report reflected 1,306,539 while the Management Report showed 1,288,697; a difference of 17,842. Basically the difference resulted from more hamlets being included in figures reported by province chiefs than were in the Management Report. Therefore, the new base to chart PSDF growth from February 1970 was: (105)

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<u>CTZ</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>WEAPONS IN PSDF HANDS</u>
I	173,475	152,415	62,892
II	207,670	180,227	72,323
III	474,752	354,010	114,543
IV	<u>432,800</u>	<u>401,139</u>	<u>89,621</u>
TOTAL	1,288,697	1,087,791	339,379

(C) The first group of KIT leaders completed the initial 6-week course in March. President Thieu and the Prime Minister presided at the graduation ceremony at the Lam Son Training Center. The second training course, scheduled for 6 Apr, was shortened to four weeks and the instruction revised to eliminate those subjects considered too advanced or not immediately applicable to the hamlet security mission of the KIT units. (106)

(C) As of 15 Apr, the Management Report listed 2,041,407 PSDF support group members with 1,071,393, or 52.5 percent, trained. However, due to the lack of specific criteria for support training, these figures could not be relied on as accurate. In an attempt to rectify this discrepancy, the PSDF Directorate General published guidance on the criteria for reporting training of both combat and support members. The message identified three distinct combat training courses and explained that an individual, even if completing more than one course, should only be counted once. Two categories listed as acceptable for support member training were first aid and medical evacuation and fire fighting and prevention. (107)

(C) The organization and training of KITs had progressed to an end-April level of: (108)

	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>IN TRAINING</u>
Interteams	7,529	2,287	1,268
Members	258,064	78,324	41,789

(C) The PSDF continued its slow growth throughout May, although statistics reflected the PSDF continued to be regular targets of VC terrorism. In the first 4 months of 1970 they suffered 188 killed, 348 wounded, and 345 abducted. These figures in terms of overall numbers of PSDF were not as significant as losses to rural development (RD) cadre and NP because of their smaller membership base. The total VC effort, on PSDF, RD cadre NP and village and hamlet officials, constituted a major thrust to disrupt the GVN's relations with the people and to discourage participation in GVN activities. Additionally, the PSDF, according to the May HES data, were acting as the primary security force in some 2,091 hamlets.

(C) May also reflected a sharp increase in the organized, and a corresponding decrease in the percentage trained, support element of the PSDF. This resulted from a decision to extend support membership to include children 7 years of age and over. The rapidity of the increase further displayed the unreliability of the statistical data supplied by the GVN MOI. (109)

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A PSDF member talks to a National Policeman about defense plans for Truong Khanh Village in Ba Xuyen Province as villagers go by on a motorized sampan.



Two members of the PSDF guard a road in a Saigon suburb.

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(C) At the end of Phase I of the 1970 P&D Plan (30 Jun) the PSDF had attained the following results.

a. Combat PSDF

<u>MR (Formerly CTZ)</u>	<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>TRAINED</u>	<u>WEAPONS ON HAND</u>
1	173,873	157,185	67,438
2	184,911	168,208	72,228
3	502,788	389,434	116,708
4	<u>435,510</u>	<u>404,780</u>	<u>357,960</u>
TOTAL	1,297,082	1,119,607	614,334

b. Key Interteams (KIT)

<u>ORGANIZED</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Interteams	1,388	2,320	1,955	3,075	8,738
Members	47,526	73,739	68,286	103,730	293,281
<u>TRAINED</u>					
Interteams	958	1,632	1,277	2,125	5,992
Members	31,641	42,812	42,076	71,306	187,835

(C) Although the PSDF continued to show a statistical growth in both numbers trained and organized, their efficiency left much to be desired as reflected by their weapons lost/captured figures of 1,005 to 394 through Phase I (to 30 Jun 70).


(C) The support PSDF grew to a reported end-Phase I strength of 2,176,749, with a doubtful 55.5 percent (1,217,043) reported as trained. (110)

(C) During Phase II (July to October 1970) GVN leadership, from the President to district chiefs, refocused attention on pacification. Orders were given to get the RF and PF out of their outposts and on operations, especially night operations. PSDF replaced RF/PF as guards on bridges, village offices, and other installations, thereby freeing RF/PF to enter VC territory. (111)

(C) At the end of Phase II the combat force was short of the 1,500,000 year-end goal by more than 400,000 personnel and almost a million short of the goal in the support force. (112) See Table VIII-4 for program and accomplishments.


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SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-17



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FIGURE VIII-18

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(C) The MOI implemented a new training program for support members on 1 Aug 70. The program was within the framework of the 1970 Special P&D Plan. The first lesson concerned basic information on the 1970 P&D Plan, political indoctrination, and PSDF objectives and missions. The lessons were designed for women and elders, with a simplified version for youngsters which constituted a kind of "civic" class. The lesson plans were evaluated as being balanced between political and substantive content. (113)

(C) At year's end the PSDF was over 200,000 short of the 1,500,000 goal in the organized and trained combat force and over 700,000 short in support force. (See Figure VIII-17.) In the arms-issued area, the 560,699 weapons issued to province logistics centers almost made the 600,000 goal. (114) (See Figure VIII-18 and Table VII-4 p. VIII-101) Weapons issued to PSDF members totalled 444,537. (See Figure VIII-18)

Local Administration

Village and Hamlet Elections

(C) Village elections in RVN were suspended in 1956 when it became apparent that the government's administrative control was insufficient to prevent VC manipulations of the elections. Since the overthrow of President Diem in November 1963, succeeding governments sought to return to a measure of village autonomy. A May 1964 decree provided for electing village councils with only advisory powers. In December 1966, Decree Laws 198 and 199 were issued calling for election of village councils, which in turn would select village chiefs from among their members, and for election of hamlet chiefs. The Decree Laws gave village councils increased authority over budgets, taxes, land transfers, public services, and internal legal matters, and lessened the possibilities for provincial and district interference in village affairs. The first round of elections under the laws took place in April, May, and June 1967, and continued, as security conditions improved, through 1968 and 1969. By June 1969 almost all villages and hamlets in RVN had elected village councils and hamlet chiefs.

(C) The term for village council members and hamlet chiefs was 3 years; therefore, all those elected in 1967 were scheduled by the Ministry of Interior for re-elections during the months of March, April, May, and June 1970. It was the goal of the 1970 P&D Plan that elections would be 100 percent complete for each village, hamlet, municipal, and provincial council in the course of the year. (115)

(C) In February, the month prior to village and hamlet elections, the status of existing governments was: (116)

1. Villages with elected governments working in place	1,981
2. Villages with elected governments in exile	57
3. Villages with appointed governments working in place	38
4. Villages with appointed governments in exile	62

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ARVN troops have the children's attention while on a mission to get out the vote for the Long An Village councilmen's election.



A Ninh Thanh villager voices his opinion in a meeting called to discuss use of central government funds for village-chosen development projects.

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5. Villages without governments	<u>13</u>
Total Villages	2, 151
6. Hamlets with elected governments working in place	9, 689
7. Hamlets with elected governments in exile	178
8. Hamlets with appointed governments working in place	180
9. Hamlets with appointed governments in exile	197
10. Hamlets without governments	<u>275</u>
Total Hamlets	10, 519

(C) Elections and re-elections in March accounted for 383 village councils and 484 hamlet chiefs. For the most part, the villages and hamlets electing officials in March were those which had first elected their local authorities in 1967, so there was little overall change in total statistics from February. (117)

(C) Elections continued at a high level during April. First-time elections increased the elected-village governments by four to 2,042 and hamlet governments by one to 9,876. In addition, the elected hamlet governments included nine in-place governments that were formerly living in exile. Working hamlet governments were also increased through appointments and the hamlets without governments were reduced to 246. (118)

(C) During May, there were three new village elections reported and 23 re-elections of councils whose terms had expired, which raised the national percentage to 95.1 of the 1970 P&D Plan goal. At the hamlet level, there were 28 new first-time elections, 1,732 re-elections, and some 37 interim elections to fill vacancies before terms expired, bringing the national level up to 94.1 percent.

(C) On the basis of elections held, more than the mere process of vote casting had become a part of the political life of the rural Vietnamese. Political rallies were organized and candidates presented programs and ideas to the assembled residents. Also, performance since elections in 1967 was a major criterion for re-election seekers, particularly in terms of their village self-development activities. (119)

(C) By the end of Phase I (30 Jun) of the 1970 P&D Plan, 2,048 of 2,151 villages and 9,949 of 10,522 hamlets, 95 percent each, had elected governments. Re-elections accounted for 39 percent of all elections, in which 75 percent of the registered voters voted. (120)

(C) There continued to be steady progress. By the end of Phase II (31 Oct), 2,079 villages and 10,084 hamlets had elected governments. Of villages and hamlets scheduled for re-elections, a total of 68 of the 83 villages held re-elections and all 196 of the hamlets. (121) At year's end 2,094 villages (57 short of the goal) and 10,187 hamlets (335 short of the goal) had elected governments. (See Figure VIII-19.)

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT

<u>ELECTIONS</u>			<u>VUNG TAU NATIONAL TRAINING</u>		<u>YEAR TO DATE</u>
	<u>VILLAGES</u>			<u>1969</u>	<u>31 DEC</u>
	TOTAL	WITH ELECTED GOVERNMENT			
1969	2.151	2.033	PROVINCE CHIEF		44
			DISTRICT CHIEF		326
			VILLAGE CHIEFS	1.862	628
			HAMLET CHIEFS	8.532	3.354
			OTHER VILLAGE & HAMLET OFFICIALS	5.554	2.769
31 DEC 1970	2.151	2.094	VILLAGE TECH CADRE	327	1,385
			INFO & CHIEU HOI CADRE	1.326	983
			RDC	10.577	12,634
			APT	1.864	1,741
			PSOF CADRE	725	592
			PF PLT & SQD LDRS	370	4,746
			CIVIL SERVANTS		3,490
			AGRICULTURAL COMMISSIONERS & LAND AGENTS		3,664
			OTHER	332	55
			TOTAL	31.469	36,411

1970 ELECTION GOAL
100% ELECTED GOVERNMENTS

1970 ELECTION GOAL
100% ELECTED GOVERNMENTS
AT THESE LEVELS

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-19

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Province/Municipal Council Elections

(U) On 5 Mar 70 the GVN National Assembly passed a law providing for election of pre-fectural, municipal, and provincial councils throughout RVN. It prescribed the current internal administrative units (districts) as the constituencies for council candidates with the number of seats per district apportioned by population. There would be no subdivision of districts into electoral units and elections would be district-wide.

(U) Under GVN Decrees 31 and 32, of 18 Mar, the election procedures were set down and the number of seats apportioned to the various electoral units. The decrees also established 13 Apr as the last date for filing candidacies and 21 Apr as the date of first posting of candidates. From 21 Apr to 30 May the GVN at city, prefecture, and province administrative levels, along with the General Election Board, would review the candidacies. Those removed from the initial posting would be notified by 11 May and would have the opportunity to apply for reinstatement, with the final approval resting with the Central Election Board. The second and final posting of candidates was scheduled on 8 Jun. The period of official campaigning was set to run from 14 Jun to 1200 hours on 27 Jun, with the elections on 28 Jun.

(U) Nationwide there were 554 council positions, divided among 267 voting constituencies. The first posting of candidates, from the Ministry of Interior, listed 2,163 candidates for the 554 positions, or a ratio of 3.9 candidates per seat. This was broken down for the various regions as follows: (122)

<u>Cities/ CTZ</u>	<u>Voting Constituencies</u>	<u>Council Positions</u>	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
I	42	68	269	4.0
II	58	111	393	3.5
III	53	113	462	4.1
IV	94	186	689	3.7
Cities	<u>20</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>350</u>	<u>4.6</u>
Totals	267	554	2,163	3.9

(C) Most political groups and parties demonstrated a high degree of interest in the elections. Although almost half of the candidates could be identified as members of a political organization, most candidates preferred to campaign solely on the basis of their own local reputation and achievements. Further, a majority of all candidates were employees of the local or national government, either as civil servants, local officials, military, teachers, or RD cadre. (123)

(U) The elections were held throughout the country on 28 Jun. A revised total of 1,930 candidates competed for the 554 available seats, a ratio of approximately 3.5 candidates per seat. Although a very small number of VC terrorist incidents did occur around polling places in the provinces, enemy forces did not mount a concerted nationwide campaign to interfere with the elections. An MOI report indicated that the turnout of eligible voters averaged between a high

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of about 79 percent in I and II Corps and a low of 66 percent in III Corps, with the nationwide average being 72.5 percent. (124)

(C) On 9 Sep President Thieu brought in 550 of the newly elected province council members for a 1-day meeting at the Palace. This was the first time a meeting of this type had occurred. (125) The day consisted of a briefing, lunch, and discourse. It was comparable to all members of state legislatures in the US being invited to the White House for a day of exposure to major government programs and an extensive explanation of the basic philosophy and hopes of the administration. (126)

Senate Elections

(U) On 27 Jun President Thieu promulgated Law No. 007-70, "Establishing Procedures for the Election of One-Half of the Total Membership of the Upper House." The principal features of the law were:

1. The election was set for 23 Aug. It was subsequently changed by the Prime Minister's decree of 29 Jun to 30 Aug.
2. Deadline for filing candidacies was 13 Jul.
3. Candidates would run on 10-man slates.
4. Each voter would vote for up to three slates.
5. A Central Election Council, headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, would determine eligibility of candidates and publicize the election results.
6. Central and local election campaign committees, composed of representatives of competing lists, would arrange the details of the elections in which all facilities accorded to candidates, such as posters, meetings, radio and TV time, etc., had to be exactly equal. (127)

Greater National Unity

Chieu Hoi (Open Arms)

(C) The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program was initiated in February 1963 by the GVN. The program was designed to induce enemy personnel to rally to the GVN. The rationale was that defections weakened enemy forces and provided valuable intelligence information. Information derived from the Hoi Chanh (rallier or returnee) was used for propaganda purposes to cause dissension and create distrust within enemy ranks as well as to encourage other enemy personnel to rally.

(C) The over-riding purpose of the program was to convert Hoi Chanhs into useful citizens. Any person who had given active support to military, political, or economic activities of the Viet Cong or the NVA and who voluntarily decided to return to the side of the government came under the Chieu Hoi Program. The service with the VC/NVA may have been voluntary or involuntary; however, the act of return had to be voluntary.

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(C) The reasons for rallying to the GVN varied. Fear was a major factor. Fear of never seeing his family again and fear of being left on the battlefield without a proper burial had a strong effect on the young soldier. The hard-core ideologically motivated party man, while also vulnerable to fears, was less likely to rally because of the depth of his convictions. Food was often scarce and of poor quality for the enemy soldier. The same was commonly true of the medical service available. Declining faith on the part of the enemy soldier in an ultimate Communist victory provided further motivation to rally. Many VC became disillusioned with the NLFSV movement. They thought of the promises that were made and not kept. They began to realize that they and their families actually had not benefited from the so-called VC land reform. They sometimes doubted whether the VC were in fact fighting for the freedom and sovereignty of Vietnam. The peace, prosperity, and happiness promised by the Communists seemed very remote.

(C) Reception centers were established all over Vietnam to receive incoming VC. The centers contained facilities for processing returnees, living quarters, and classrooms for indoctrination and some vocational training. While at the Chieu Hoi Center, each Hoi Chanh was required to attend a course in political education. Topics covered in the course included: democratic processes of government; GVN policies and programs for combating Communist insurgencies; rights and duties of a citizen in a democratic society; successes of the GVN contrasted to the failures of the VC; and inconsistencies in Communist policies and programs.

(C) After the period of indoctrination, the Hoi Chanh was given the option of returning to his home village if it were secured from the Communists, going to a Chieu Hoi resettlement village if there were one in his province and it had room for his family, or making his way elsewhere in an area of his choice. Vocational training was available to those who desired it.

(C) Hoi Chanhs were also encouraged to serve on an armed propaganda team (APT). The function of the APTs was to operate in VC-controlled and contested areas to conduct propaganda operations to induce defections. The APTs were armed to defend themselves since they operated in contested and VC areas and because they were called upon to provide security for Chieu Hoi installations.

(C) Many US units and some ARVN units realized the value of returnees in tactical operations and recruited them for full time employment. These returnees were called "Kit Carson Scouts" and were used in locating and capturing stores of materiel, locating VC units, guiding military forces on expeditions in unfamiliar terrain, locating mines and booby traps, and identifying VC during search and clear operations. The Hoi Chanh could enter the GVN military service, or he could take a year's draft deferment. If he were a land owner, as in the case of a settler deeded government land in or near a Chieu Hoi village, he could receive further draft deferments because he was producing food needed by the nation. If he were a teenager, and many Communist defectors were of school age, he became subject to the draft on reaching age 20.

(C) The Hoi Chanh was provided with a 6-month subsistence allowance for food and provided with a plot of land and building materials for his home. By insuring that the Hoi Chanh got a good start on his new life, the GVN gained a more valuable asset; that made it less likely that the Hoi Chanh would return to the Communists.

(C) The effectiveness of the GVN program was underscored by the VC reaction to it throughout the country. Individual Hoi Chanhs and Chieu Hoi centers were targets for enemy attacks.

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A captured VC document described the Chieu Hoi Program as a "... dangerous tactic which is having a great influence on our struggle..." The Communists had indoctrination programs of their own to warn the troops about "... the horrible fate that awaits you in government hands..."

(C) In addition to the possibility of attacks against the program, there was also another important security consideration. In many instances the enemy introduced "false ralliers" into the system. Those personnel then conducted intelligence-gathering operations against the GVN or joined the military forces. When the opportunity arose the "false ralliers" broke their cover and assisted the overt enemy forces. There were several instances where outposts were overrun using that tactic. (128)

(C) Based upon the highly successful Chieu Hoi Program--which produced a record 47,023 Hoi Chanhs in 1969--the 1970 P&D Plan established a goal of 40,000 Hoi Chanhs to be rallied during the year with a Phase I goal of 25,000 apportioned among the MRs as follows: (129)

MR 1	3,000 <u>Hoi Chanh</u>
MR 2	3,100 "
MR 3	5,100 "
MR 4	13,800 "

(C) The returnee rate for January of 2,347 was significantly short of the monthly goal of 4,167. However, the decline was attributed to the discontinuance of the Third Party Inducement Awards Program, slower GVN movement into new areas (particularly in IV CTZ which provided some 70 percent of the 1969 ralliers), a general slowdown in the momentum of pacification, increased enemy discipline, and a general reluctance to rally before TET. (130)

(C) During February the Chieu Hoi rate followed the pattern that was expected; that is, after a period of declining weekly rates during December and January, it fell to an extreme low point during the week of TET itself and then increased significantly in subsequent weeks, stabilizing at a level of about 800 per week.

(C) The decline immediately preceding TET and the nadir at TET itself resulted from traditional and psychological reluctance among low-level VC, who were most prone to rallying, to take any decisive action at that time. Also on the allied side military pressure abated with a cease-fire and there was less military pressure from ARVN and less PSYOP pressure from Chieu Hoi service personnel.

(C) Immediately after TET, however, particularly in I and IV CTZs, friendly operations increased, putting pressure on potential returnees. The extension of pacification, increased PSYOP pressure, and lack of a VC offensive were all factors behind the rallying of 2,191 Hoi Chanh. Although totals were still behind 1969's record pace, there was an improvement in the quality of the returnees as 66 NVA rallied in the first 2 months of 1970, three times the number for the same period of 1969. (131)

(C) The number of ralliers for March was 2,957 (up 566 from February) of which there were 25 NVA and two regroupes. The slight increase in returnees was attributed to intensified PSYOP in conjunction with the spring campaign of the Ministry of Chieu Hoi and the heightened pacification activities following the TET lull.

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(C) In March the GVN program to convert 313 VC prisoners of war (PWs) to Hoi Chanh began. The first group of 74 received Hoi Chanh status at Danang on 26 March. A heavy PYSOP campaign, guided by MACV PSYOP Division (MACJ3-11), was conducted in conjunction with the program stressing the generosity of the GVN and its desire for peace and the well-being of all its citizens. (132)

(C) The number of ralliers in April declined to 2,803. The decline was not necessarily significant of itself but further indicated the problem of attaining the 1970 goals with rates below 4,167 needed each month to reach the Phase I (30 Jun) goal of 25,000. However, on the brighter side was the continued increase in the number of NVA and regroupee returnees as 33 NVA and six regroupees rallied. (133)

(C) The returnee rate of 3,425 for May was the highest 1970 monthly total yet recorded, with allied operations in Cambodia providing most of the impetus. Although many of the ralliers were generated by the Cambodian operation, very few actually rallied inside Cambodia. Most crossed the border to escape the heavy military action and rallied in GVN provinces adjacent to the border.

(C) On 11 May a man who claimed to be a banking expert from COSVN and engaged in research on the financial, economic, and monetary situation of GVN rallied to Chieu Hoi authorities in Binh Duong Province, III CTZ. He claimed a civilian-rank equivalent to a Brigadier General and was thus the highest ranking Communist to rally to the GVN since the inception of the Chieu Hoi program in 1965. (134) However, later investigation proved him to be a fraud.

(U) The month of June produced the lowest monthly total yet recorded in 1970 as only 2,299 enemy personnel chose to Chieu Hoi. Thus Phase I ended 8,778 short of the 25,000 goal. The rather sudden decrease was attributed for the most part to the steadily declining rate of enemy contact by allied units in the Cambodian area adjacent to III and IV CTZs and the relative absence of ARVN units from contested areas in IV CTZ. (135)

(U) The monthly rate improved slightly in July as 3,116 returnees were registered. Of these were the 313 VC PW who had been converted to Hoi Chanh but were not included in previous totals. The breakdown of the converted PW was: (136)

<u>MR</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Other Elements</u>	<u>Subtotal</u>
1	62	12	0	74
2	44	3	30	77
3	61	5	25	91
4	<u>65</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>71</u>
Total	237	26	55	313

(U) Kien Hoa Province in MR 4 with 701 returners in August lead all provinces. It had more ralliers than any of the other three military regions. The record came about as the 7th ARVN

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
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
**GREATER NATIONAL UNITY
(CHIEU HOI - OPEN ARMS)**



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-20

HOI CHANHS BY YEAR
(THOUSAND)



* PROGRAM INITIATED 18 FEB 63

SOURCE: 7AF

FIGURE VIII-21

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Div added a regiment to the one already operating in Kien Hoa. The two regiments joined all available sector military and paramilitary sources in concentrating first on Mo Cay District and then on the Ba Vat area of Don Nhon District, both of which had been under enemy military and political domination ever since 1964. In a 2-week period ending 31 Aug, over 200 returnees were received in the Ba Vat area alone. In order to process such large groups of returnees without straining already overcrowded Chieu Hoi facilities, the MR 4 Chieu Hoi representative formed a mobile team composed of cadre from Go Cong and An Giang Provinces to perform on-the-spot administrative processing and political indoctrination in Ba Vat. (137)

(U) Kien Hoa Province continued to be the big success story of the Chieu Hoi program. That MR 4 province at the end of October had been the nation's leading producer of returnees for 14 consecutive weeks. In October Kien Hoa had 596 returnees or slightly more than a fourth of the national total. (138)

(U) November continued the downward trend which started in October. After the typhoon rains abated, MR 1 in November recovered from its worst month in 2 1/2 years to record 414 returnees. Nationwide there were 2,186 returnees, the lowest monthly total since September 1968. (139)

(C) The year ended with a total of 32,661 returnees, 7,339 short of the 40,000 goal. (See Figure VIII-20.)

(C) In numerical terms, the Chieu Hoi Program deprived the VC/NVA of over 170,000 members. Even more important than numbers was the significant contributions made to the allied war effort by the returnees in the form of intelligence and assistance in tactical operations. (140)

(C) Since the inception of the program in 1963, there have been 173,064 returnees (see Figure VIII-21). The most successful year for the program was 1969 when 47,023 rallied. During 1970 the number of ralliers decreased to 32,661. (See Figure VIII-22 for a month/MR breakout for 1970.) A partial reason for the decline was a decrease in the level of ground combat in South Vietnam. Exposure to government forces gave the enemy a chance to rally, but this opportunity lessened as the enemy remained out of contact.

(C) Another reason for the decline was the enemy's three-man cell concept. By making each man responsible for the others in his "cell," the chance for the individual to rally was extremely limited. Threats against a man's family also served to discourage rallying to the GVN. As manpower became more critical to the enemy, his efforts to control his personnel became more intense. Since the inception of the program, only 1,041 of the total Hoi Chanhs have been North Vietnamese (see Figure VIII-23). The primary reason was that the NVA soldier had all of his family ties in the north, and to rally to the GVN erased all hopes for him to ever return to his home.

PSYOP Support for Chieu Hoi


(C) In addition to directing the design, development, production, and delivery, in concert with GVN, of billions of Chieu Hoi leaflets per year, MACV PSYOP Division (MACJ3-11) conducted studies to determine the effectiveness of the program. One such study of the declining

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
HOI CHANH BY MONTH



SOURCE: 7AF

FIGURE VIII-22

NVA CHIEU HOI TREND



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-23

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number of Chieu Hoi ralliers in IV CTZ was prepared in January. It concluded the primary contributing factors were increased enemy activity coupled with increased enemy security which provided fewer opportunities to rally. Also, as pacification programs focused on consolidating controlled areas, rather than opening new territory, the number of Chieu Hoi decreased. (141)

(U) In February a Human Sciences Research (HSR) team, contracted to ARPA and serving Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and MACJ3-11 as clients, completed an initial task of studying obstacles to enemy defection. Extensive literature surveys and field research in the form of interrogations identified 58 obstacles of varying degrees of importance. Two major obstacles identified were: fear of harm to self by either side and fear of punitive action against one's family. A secondary obstacle identified was a strong belief in the enemy cause. (142)

(C) PSYOP effectiveness was attested to in a captured VC document, originated by the Political Bureau of Military Region 2 (IV CTZ), which stated that the Open Arms (Chieu Hoi) Program was especially troublesome because of the nostalgic-home-sickness theme. It attributed VC difficulties to deficiencies in their own forces, especially the political cadre. Enemy countermeasures outlined in the document included more ideological orientation and a tightening of the rules on exposure to PSYOP material. Of special interest was the recommendation to "positively motivate the soldiers' dependents to participate in activities to counter enemy PSY-WAR and Chieu Hoi." (143)

(U) Based upon the highly successful results of the 1969 Nguyen Trai I and II Campaigns, designed to induce the enemy to rally under the Chieu Hoi Program, the GVN General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), in conjunction with MACJ3-11, planned a new nationwide campaign called Nguyen Trai III. The campaign was initially planned to run from 1 May to 30 Aug 70, but later altered to 16 Apr to 16 Aug 70 and again extended to 16 Oct because of the diversion of RVN resources in Cambodia. The total programmed US support included 430 million leaflets of which all but 177 million were developed by the GVN GPWD.

(U) The campaign was off to an auspicious start as two FRANTIC GOAT missions were flown in April dispensing approximately 24 million leaflets. By 20 Jul RVNAF aircraft had disseminated 482 million leaflets resulting in 7,115 ralliers of the 12,000 rallier goal. Also, because of the extended campaign, the GPWD printed an additional 20 million leaflets, while MACV directed the 7th PSYOP Group to print and disseminate an additional 36 million leaflets and the 4th PSYOP Group to print and deliver 64 million leaflets to the GPWD for dissemination. (144)

Lac Luong 66 (Kit Carson Scouts)

(U) A valuable offshoot of the Chieu Hoi program, dating back to the summer of 1966, consisted of integrating certain experienced VC/NVA ralliers into US and Free World combat units, where the highly qualified volunteers were invaluable as guides and scouts in locating and identifying enemy units, installations, booby traps, assembly areas, and routes of movement. Understanding the VC/NVA modus operandi because they had participated in it, they assisted in the search for enemy equipment and supplies; joined in psychological operations; assisted in the interrogation of captives, suspects, or other returnees; assisted in the identification of VC and VCI; and last, but not least, helped in identification of dead and wounded enemy. By the end of 1969, 2,245 Kit Carson Scouts were employed by all Free World Forces.

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(U) To promote a better understanding between GVN officials and the scouts, the name Kit Carson Scout was changed in January 1970 to the title Luc Luong 66 which was selected by the Minister of Chieu Hoi. The new name translated to Force 66.

(U) The valor, resourcefulness, and dedication of the Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) continued to be their hallmark. Personal acts of bravery were the rule rather than the exception. However, despite the gradual growth of the KCSs to a force of 2,275 in January, 2,288 in February, and 2,341 in March, the recruiting and retention of qualified personnel became a matter of command concern. CG, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) concisely stated the problem in February 1970 reporting:

The rising cost of living, coupled with increased pay for ARVN soldiers, makes it increasingly difficult to retain scouts. Scouts are joining the ARVN with a slight reduction in pay with a possibility of getting more time off and having less dangerous jobs. An across-the-board pay raise of \$VN2,000 is considered the minimum necessary to keep the job of KCS economically attractive.. (145)

(U) This position was further amplified by the CG, III MAF and CG, USARV.

(C) The KCS-pay problem was resolved on 31 May as an across-the-board pay increase of \$VN2,500 per month was granted retroactive to 1 May. The pay of the KCS therefore became:

1. Scout Leaders - \$VN12,500 Division/Separate Brigade/Region/NAVFORV

\$VN 10,000 Brigade/Regiment

\$VN 9,000 Battalion/Province

\$VN 8,000 Company/District

2. Scout - \$VN7,500

(C) Scout authorizations for the remainder of calendar year 1970 were also established as: USARV - 2,510; NAVFORV - 100; III MAF (1st Mar Div) - 156; Australian Forces - 50; Royal Thai Volunteer Forces - 50; and Republic of Korea Forces - 50. Also, to provide a phaseout of scouts as US units redeployed, a ceiling was established that would not be exceeded unless approved by COMUSMACV. It was:

	<u>Scout Ceiling</u>
Per US Division	350
Per US Brigade	150
Per US Separate Battalion	30
Per CTZ on Province Advisor Teams	100

(C) As US forces withdrew there were adjustments to the Luc Luong 66 program ceilings. In November COMUSMACV proposed the following ceilings for CY71: (147)

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	<u>First Half CY71</u>	<u>Second Half CY71</u>
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USARV	1,900	1,100
III MAF	150	150
NAVFORV	50	50
ROKFV	50	50
RTAFV	50	50
ATFV	50	50

Brighter Life for War Victims

(C) The 1970 P&D Plan established two goals within the "Program of Improving War Victims' Welfare." The first was settling the status of the 1968-1969 evacuees by continuing resettlement in proper localities, and especially promoting return of evacuees to their native villages insofar as pacification progress would permit. Secondly, those whose families were disrupted or properties were damaged by war (houses destroyed, relatives died, wounded, disabled, and war orphans and widows) were to receive timely aid and be assisted efficiently to establish normal lives. (148)

Refugees

(U) Over three million people, almost 20 percent of RVN's total population, sought refuge during 1964-69. Refugees were defined as those forced to leave their homes and means of livelihood to escape Communist pressures, artillery or bombardment, or the crossfire of war. In March 1969, 1,450,000 were still on GVN's refugee rolls; by 30 Dec 69 the payment of allowances reduced this number to 270,000. Improvement in security in most areas of RVN during 1969, as a result of the pacification program, was the single most important factor in making possible the payment of allowances and thereby assisting refugees to once more become established.

(U) In furtherance of the GVN policy to reduce the numbers of refugees, COMUSMACV reaffirmed to the command on 8 Feb all pertinent directives pertaining to the generation of refugees by stating:

The policy of the GVN and this command requires that the relocation of people to regroup them for greater security or to remove them from enemy control be kept to an absolute minimum. Such relocations generally work against US and GVN policy objectives. Not only do the people become a burden on the Government, which must house, feed, and resettle them, but their allegiance or potential

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A nurse provides medicine for a child in a clinic operated for the 800 residents of a refugee camp in Ninh Loi Hamlet. The village and the Cao Dai Church jointly meet welfare needs of the ethnic Vietnamese who fled to Tay Ninh from the war in Cambodia.

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allegiance to the GVN is undermined by the hardships which they undergo. At the same time the hamlet structure is destroyed and usable land is taken out of cultivation.

It is therefore GVN policy that civilians are not to be relocated, except when special circumstances exist, and then only after approval by the Central Pacification Development Council (CPDC). (149)

(U) The message then provided guidance for US commanders faced with a refugee generation situation.

(C) Although 7,370 new refugees were generated or newly registered during January, the overall refugee population declined to 249,398. This included 157,395 temporary refugees, 47,560 in resettlement process, and 44,435 out-of-camp. (150)

(C) The caseload decreased further during February everywhere except IV CTZ where operations in the U Minh Forest generated new refugees in Kien Giang, An Xuyen, and Chuong Thien Provinces. Thus, the nationwide population increased by 9,170 to 258,568, including 179,820 temporaries, 29,306 in the resettlement process, and 49,442 out-of-camp. (151)

(C) Despite reestablishment of 25,246 refugees, 17,509 by return to their original villages and 7,737 by payment of benefits at new locations, the overall population rose by 65,264 to total 323,832, in March. More than 43,000 of the increase were out-of-camp refugees reinstated in Phu Yen Province (II CTZ) after they were erroneously removed from the rolls in 1969. Additionally, I CTZ reported 35,416 newly registered refugees, II CTZ 1,079, and IV CTZ 7,125. The I CTZ total included those generated during previous months but not registered until a particular point was made of the need to assure refugee benefits despite the impact on statistical totals. (152)

(C) In March, two pilot community development projects were initiated at Binh Thuong and Go Mit refugee sites in Binh Dinh Province, II CTZ. The program was conceived after the Ministry of Social Welfare stated in a communique it planned to execute "a test site project. . . aimed at motivating refugees to support the local administration to implement development programs through community centered activities." If the project succeeded, the communique continued, similar programs would be tried throughout the country. The sites were chosen because they were secure and had adequate communication facilities, yet lacked sufficient economic development. (153)

(C) March also witnessed the end of the US Automatic Data Printout (ADP) reporting system. Starting in April, all data received from the field was transmitted under the Refugee Field Program Management Information System (RFP/MIS), or Automatic Reporting System (ARS). The new system was designed to shift considerable responsibility to the GVN service chief and reduce advisory reporting requirements. It would also identify refugees in somewhat different classifications to reflect an increase in the total number of refugees previously carried on the rolls who did not appear under the old system. For example, out-of-camp refugees who returned to their homes and were then dropped from refugee rolls but still were due a 1-month rice allowance and those carried under the "returned to village statistics" without receiving all of their benefits were added to the new report. (154)

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(C) In April a significant increase in the active caseload appeared as the new reporting system was put into effect. The new refugee population broke down to 345,224 refugees both in-and out-of-camp and 239,570 in the new major category of "in return-to-village process" for an active caseload total of 584,794. Although the new system continued to report all refugees on the active rolls until final benefits were paid, it did not indicate former refugees paid in full who continued living in the camps. (155)

(C) With further division of the caseload of refugees into the distinctly different problems of in-camp and out-of-camp refugees and the return-to-village program for displaced persons, May totals stood at 332,016 and 270,008, respectively. These figures represented a decrease of 13,208 in the refugee category and an increase of 30,438 in the return-to-village category. Also, during the month, Ministry of Social Welfare representatives paid final benefits to 16,548 in-and out-of-camp refugees and resettled, with full payment, 30,987 individuals in their home villages. (156)

(C) During June 19,919 refugees were added to the rolls, 45 percent of the year's total to date of 44,636. However, the in-and out-of-camp totals dropped to 287,753 as final payment were made to 26,456 refugees, while the return-to-village group grew to 282,672, despite the payment of final benefits to 48,165, for a total national caseload of 570,425.

(C) On 30 June, Phase I of the 1970 P&D Plan ended with the refugee program far short of its established goals. The results were:

	<u>Phase I Goal</u>	<u>Attained</u>
Benefits-Paid-in-Place	101,825	44,591
Return-to-Village	273,514	105,448

(C) The return-to-village status for Phase I was: (157)

<u>MR</u>	<u>In Return-to-Village Process</u>	<u>Returned to Village</u>
1	43,507	52,662
2	92,003	23,615
3	5,520	2,607
4	<u>141,642</u>	<u>26,564</u>
Totals	282,672	105,448

(C) Twice during Phase II (1 Jul - 31 Oct), GVN proved it could organize and carry out relief efforts. First was the generally expeditious transporting, processing, and resettling of refugees from Cambodia. (See Annex C for a more thorough discussion of Cambodian refugees.) Second was the fairly prompt and effective reaction to the October flood in Central Vietnam. In both instances Vietnamese officials led the way, with Americans far in the background providing mainly logistical support. However, it was estimated the floods would set the refugee operation back 3 to 6 months.

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(C) At the end of Phase II (31 Oct), the benefits-paid-in-place program was about 30 percent behind the goal, with 70,155 persons paid as compared to a goal of 101,856. However, the return-to-village program was about 47 percent ahead of the 100,000 goal with 147,213 benefits paid. (158)

(C) The end-of-year report reflected a similar situation. The benefits-paid-in-place program showed 139,709 persons paid with the goal being 203,681. Again the return-to-village program was ahead of the goal with 388,003 paid return-to-village benefits; the goal was 373,514. (159) (See Figures VIII-24 and 25.)

War Victims

(C) In addition to the regular refugee program, the 1970 P&D Plan included a program to expand and improve assistance to those suffering property damage, injury, or loss of life from war-related causes. The GVN Ministry of Social Welfare, assisted by MACV CORDS Refugees Directorate, started the year by refining caseload statistics on war victims, including war orphans, widows, and the physically disabled. The initial report identified 572,000 victims, both military and civilian as follows: (160)

War Orphans - 258,000

Civilian - 105,000 with 20,000 in registered orphanages and the remainder in unregistered orphanages.

Military - 153,000 with 108,000 wards of the nation and the remainder awaiting processing.

War Widows - 131,000

Civilian - 50,000 apparently receiving no benefits.

Military - 81,000 with 61,000 receiving benefits and the remainder awaiting processing.

Physically Disabled - 183,000

Civilian - 132,000 with 23,700 paraplegics, 25,600 blind and/or deaf, 82,700 amputees and others seriously disabled.

Military - 51,000 with 6,400 paraplegics, 6,600 blind and/or deaf, 21,000 amputees, and 17,000 others listed as serious.

(C) The plight of the Veterans Program came to public attention during March as dissatisfied disabled veterans set up squatter shacks, demonstrated, and clashed with police in Saigon. Despite presidential backing, veterans' legislation did not become a fact until 9 Jul when President Thieu signed the new War Veterans' Law. He also spoke on radio/TV on 10 Jul explaining major provisions of the law and announcing disabled veterans would be allowed to occupy squatter shacks until permanent housing was assigned. Major and interesting articles of the law were: (161)


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WAR VICTIMS

31 DEC 70




SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-24

BRIGHTER LIFE FOR WAR VICTIMS

1 JAN-31 DEC 70



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-25

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1. Article 7 - Compensation for disabled veterans and allowances for dependents.
2. Articles 12 and 40 - Reserved a number of jobs and places of employment in Government and private offices for disabled veterans and gave priority for being recruited to war widows, wards of the nation, and war orphans.
3. Article 15 - Admitted disabled soldiers to veterans' villages; allocated land and materials to construct houses; included disabled soldiers in priority one (next to farmers who were presently cultivating their land) to be allocated land based on the "Land to the Tiller" Law.
4. Article 17 - Provided free vocational training for disabled soldiers.
5. Article 59 - Provided rights and benefits for paramilitary forces and other forces.

(C) The Ministry of Social Welfare estimate showed the new law affected war victims as follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Estimated Number (Civ/Mil)</u>	<u>Current Case Load of Ministries*</u>	<u>Estimated No. of Cases Covered Under Vets Law</u>
Physically Disabled	183,000	51,000	50,000
War Widows	131,000	61,000	81,000
War Orphans	258,000	108,000	153,000

*Includes both Ministry of Social Welfare and War Veterans.

People's Information

(C) The principal objectives of the 1970 P&D Plan, in the People's Information area, were to:

1. Motivate the people to unite them into a solid national force capable of insuring a decisive victory by the people in the political war against the Communists.
2. Intensively materialize the community spirit in the provinces to create and develop a democratic life in daily activities.

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Phan Thiet Vietnam Information Service cadres talk to an old woman in Phu Long new life hamlet.



The PHUNG HOANG program receives high priority in the People's Information program. This PHUNG HOANG team is operating in Tay Ninh Province.

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3. Build on the results of the 1969 program in order to secure success, and at the same time, widely publicize and explain the GVN's 1970 P&D Plan.

(C) Major propaganda themes for the year were established as:

1. In secure areas:

- a. The success of the Republic of Vietnam in all fields: military, political, and foreign affairs.
- b. Increased combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
- c. Achievements of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan.
- d. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan (significance and purpose of action).
- e. Neutralization of enemy infra-structures (PHUNG HOANG Plan).
- f. Resettlement of refugees in new hamlets and their return to their old villages.
- g. Land reform policy, development of agriculture and fishery, organization of associations and cooperatives, etc.
- h. Merge and intensively develop popular forces such as People's Self Defense Force, Farmers' Groups, Women's Groups, Young Men's Groups, etc.
- i. In urban districts, efforts will be made to rebuild damaged areas and to root out corruption, etc.

2. In unpacified areas:

- a. Denunciation of communist oppression and exploitation maneuvers.
- b. Condemnation of communist intransigence in peace talks (they continue to fight while negotiating Paris peace talk).
- c. Appeal to VC soldiers and cadres to rally to the just cause.
- d. Call on the population to fight courageously against the communists and to assist the authorities when our troops come to pacify their hamlets. (162)

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(C) While there were no meaningful measurable goals established for the People's Information Program to measure progress against, certain efforts of the GVN and MACV staff support were worthy of note. GVN required Mobile Information Teams be formed to travel throughout the countryside to supplement the work of the resident village and hamlet information cadre. For the period 25 Dec 69 and 25 Jan 70, the Ministry of Information reported 116 teams visited 159 villages, 91 hamlets and 28 khom (family settlements). The local cadre, primarily required to engage in face-to-face contacts with the people to explain GVN policies, reported 10,360 such contacts with 116,561 people contacted during the same period. Additional work included 235 reading rooms opened, 286 information posts, 16 new public TV sets, and the formation of three new 16-man culture/drama teams. (163)

(C) An early examination of the results of the Information Program required a new emphasis on its objectives. While there were reports of meetings conducted at province level for cadre and officials, the emphasis failed to catch on in lower echelons. Reports from the village level indicated only 16 to 25 percent of the required meetings were held. Similarly, the face-to-face meetings by hamlet cadre varied from 10 to 40 percent of achievement.

(C) On 30 Mar, the Prime Minister redetermined the program's objectives on the basis of observation of the earlier problems. As a result, all provinces and cities were to publish local monthly news and public information magazines and to set up significant subject campaigns for their areas. Province chiefs or deputy province chiefs were instructed to direct one village meeting per week to assist in solving urgent pacification problems and monitor the program's operations. The district information chief was to hold one village meeting per week and his village-level cadre one hamlet meeting per week. Visits to families, for face-to-face contact, were again emphasized as the primary operational tactic for village and hamlet-level cadre. (164)

(C) Through April it was apparent that the People's Information activities were limited by the amount of effort spent by the Vietnam Information Service (VIS) cadre on preparing and distributing materials on local elections. From reports sent by provincial advisors, it appeared only five provinces had exemplary information efforts, four provinces were totally unresponsive to the program, and the remainder were making attempts to comply, with varying degrees of success. (165)

(C) People's Information activities continued to be affected by the concentration of VIS activity on local elections, province or municipal council elections, and Cambodian refugees/repatriates. Province advisors rated seven of the 16 provinces in MR 4 as having superior People's Information programs, where visits to the hamlets, face-to-face contacts between cadre and residents, and seminars were reported "outstanding." The nine others were either poor or doing nothing. Throughout the rest of the country, an additional five provinces were rated as having excellent programs with the remainder being rated as "poor."

(C) Through May, the Minister of Information traveled throughout the country explaining the programs of GVN as advisors concentrated on the training seminars for the cadre and officials. As a result of the visits, two problem areas were identified, insufficient funding and the lack of qualified cadre because of the draft laws. To alleviate the latter problem, the Ministry proposed the assignment of draft-exempt RD cadre, scheduled for phasedown, to village and hamlet VIS cadre slots. (166)

(C) Phase I of the 1970 P&D Plan ended 30 Jun with the People's information Program rated as a problem area, barely underway, and lacking direction. (167)

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(U) Phase II (31 Oct) and the year-end reports showed no significant change in the overall effectiveness of the program.

Prosperity for All

(C) Though somewhat overwhelming in the scope implied by the title, "Prosperity for All," the objective was gauged to continue the 1969 GVN efforts for economic development.

Land Reform

(C) The goal of land reform to complete distribution of former French-owned and other government-owned lands, hinged on the Land-to-the-Tiller Law. The law was passed and the cadres started training to implement it. President Thieu issued the first new title under the program on 28-29 Aug 70 in Bac Lieu and Kien Giang Provinces. There was, as was expected, some resistance to the program from landlords and particularly from loyal absentee military men, but the program was started. At year's end slightly over 125,000 hectares of the programmed 345,000 hectares had been distributed. (168) (See Figure VIII-26 and Table VIII-4, p. VIII-101.)

Rice Production

(U) Since rice was the basic agricultural commodity it was singled out for particular attention in production methods. A great amount of progress was realized by the introduction of the "miracle rice" (IR 5, 8, 20, and 22). Although the taste was quite different from paddy rice and less desirable to the oriental palate, the new rice had up to five times more yield per hectare. The goal was to plant 500,000 hectares; the year-end total reached 306,174 hectares. See Figure VIII-27 for a breakdown by MRs. (169)

Other Quantifiable Goals

(C) Other established goals and results were: (170) (See Table VIII-4)

1. Sorghum was approved for initial efforts with a goal of 6,000 hectares; 1,500 hectares were planted.

2. The extension of rural credit, through the Agriculture Development Bank (ADB) was set at an additional \$VN1 billion or \$VN6.6 billion for the end of 1970. A level of \$VN5.9 billion was reached.

3. Establish 25 additional Rural Credit Banks to a year-end total of 29. (These banks were funded on a 50-50 basis by the GVN and local resources.) Only six were established.

4. The Village Self-Development fund was continued in 1970 but under a new formula whereby \$VN400,000 was given to every village. For each 500 people above 2,500, the village

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Duck feathers now are RVN's No 2 export. No. 1 is rubber and wood shows great promise. In 1970 RVN was importing 55 times more than it was exporting.



With the help of "miracle rice" strains which have yields of up five time local varieties, RVN is expected to achieve self-sufficiency in rice production by mid-1972.

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Vietnamese handicrafts already have won limited markets in Europe and the United States. Skilled artisans make ceramics and lacquerware of high quality.


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RURAL ECONOMY

31 DEC 70



SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-26

**IR/ 5/8 IR 20/22
RICE PROGRAM 1970/71
15 JANUARY 1971**

	1970/71 FIRST CROP PLANNING GOAL	1970/71 SECOND CROP PLANNING GOAL	1970/71 TOTAL PLANNING GOAL (Ha)	PLANTED TO DATE (Ha)	% OF FIRST CROP GOAL PLANTED	EST YIELD OF PLANTED (MT)
MR 1	28,800	16,000	44,800	22,829	51%	90,516
MR 2	28,800	28,770	77,570	71,771	92%	287,084
MR 3	76,420	29,800	106,220	94,000	88%	276,000
MR 4	206,000	95,800	301,800	320,288	106%	1,281,182
TOTAL	340,020	170,370	510,390	608,888	98%	2,014,782

HARVESTED TO DATE 882,197 M.T.

(Ha = 2.47 acres

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-27

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received an additional \$VN50,000. Also, the distinction between elected and appointed village governments was abolished as a criterion in determining eligibility for self-development funds. At the end of the year \$VN1.9 billion had been obligated as compared to the \$VN2.15 billion allocated.

(C) Nearly all designated roads, railroads, and waterways were opened (see Chapter IX for a detailed discussion of the status of LOCs). DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS summed it up: "Not quantifiable, but clearly evident, were the reopened roads, busy markets and solvent farmers, especially in the populous Delta, which marked the atmosphere resulting from expanded security, revived production and reopened circulation."

EVALUATION

Phase I Summary

(C) Phase I (1 Jan to 30 Jun) of the GVN's 1970 P&D Program was characterized by a general letdown nationwide on the part of the GVN. There were two reasons: the natural tendency toward complacency after a year of success; and the distractions of Cambodia and local political and economic problems. The problems of pacification were thus temporarily put on the back burner. The enemy in April and May stepped up his small-unit attacks on territorial forces' outposts and increased terrorist attacks. April was the first month since the TET attacks of February 1968 that the HES showed a national regression (0.8 percent). By June, however, the enemy pressure had subsided a bit, and with a few local exceptions, the enemy found that he had not been able to regain the initiative.

(C) Progress during Phase I, albeit at a slower rate than in previous years, actually occurred in the areas of population control, RF/PF assigned strength, and local government (province, village, and hamlet elections).

(C) Problems persisted in the PHOENIX program (targeting and legal processing of VCI remained poor), the refugee program (Quang Nam Province being the problem with over 50 percent of all refugees in Vietnam), and the People's Information Program, which was barely underway and still lacked direction.

(C) Phase I ended 30 Jun with an emphasis at all levels of the GVN on regaining the momentum and the sense of urgency of 1969. To do this, on 13 Jun the GVN decreed that a Special Pacification and Development Campaign would be run from 1 Jul to 31 Oct. The main thrust of the campaign was to make a reality of the process of consolidation of 1969 gains called for in the 1970 plan. (171)

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A meter is being installed and this family will have electricity tonight; electricity to light the house and operate the newly-purchased fan, iron, and radio. Three pilot cooperative projects were started in An Giang, Duc Tu, and Tuyen Duc Provinces in 1965 and now serve over 115,000 people. Membership costs \$VN100 (about 85 US cents at the official exchange rate) and the kilowatt-hour rates vary from \$VN 8 to 10. Rural electrification is not limited to large-scale cooperatives in RVN, however. Individual hamlets and villages frequently choose local electrification, using small gasoline or diesel-powered generators, as one of their self-help community development projects. In 1970 there were an estimated 40 projects serving 8,000 homes.

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Electricity brings not only comforts, but also entertainment. Since rural electrification came to An Giang Province, more than 5,000 privately owned television sets have been purchased, and appliance stores and repair shops spring up weekly.



The advent of electricity in rural RVN has lengthened the productive period of cottage industries, and profits in one area served by a pilot rural electrification project have increased by more than 30 percent.

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
In October 1970 thousands of South Vietnamese passed through this entrance to view the largest trade fair in their country's history. The theme of the fair was "higher productivity and better quality." Exhibits were set up on 3 hectares of land in the midst of Saigon University campus and 170 factories and business enterprises, Vietnamese and foreign, sponsored exhibits.



On display at the Saigon fair is this utility vehicle called "La Dalat." It has been assembled in Vietnam since mid-1970 with a Vietnamese-made body and French-built chassis and motor by the Citroen company.

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Pretty girls sell fairgoers dry-cell batteries produced by a Vietnamese company that also makes flashlights and voltage regulators.



Admirers cluster around Vietnamese handicraft at its finest, lacquer vases and lamp bases formed on a silk base, with traditional inlaid mother-of-pearl designs.

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Phase II Summary

(C) Phase II (1 Jul to 31 Oct) produced some overdue GVN activity in pacification programs in the provinces. Better security prevailed nationwide, especially in MRs 3 and 4, thanks to the operations in Cambodia, and the number of VC-controlled hamlets was reduced. Enemy activity continued to decline, despite exhortations from COSVN to press on. The GVN moved forward, but at a slower pace than last year. The GVN remained ahead of the VC, but was not as far ahead in internal security programs as it was in territorial security programs. The key question was whether GVN's rate of improvement would be sufficient both to prevent regression while the US withdrawal continued and to stay ahead of the enemy's slow but apparently serious adoption of the new tactics of small-unit action, increased terrorism, and proselyting. (172)

Looking Back on 1970

Summary

(C) In a message to the US/VN Delegation in Paris, DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS summarized the pacification program for 1970. His summary follows:

The effective cross-border operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia helped the GVN to improve its position over 1969 in the field of pacification. The resultant weakness of the enemy effort within Viet Nam coincided with the growth to maturity of many of the territorial forces and PSDF. The enemy's protracted war tactics failed to stall the pacification drive, although the GVN did not progress as much in 1970 as it did in 1969. During 1970 the nature of the war began to change from a territorial struggle to an internal security struggle. This struggle will continue in 1971 and will be supplemented by a political contest. The national elections could affect pacification by diverting the attention of the national leadership from the pressing problems to be solved. (173)

Appraisal

(C) DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS offered the following appraisal of the 1970 pacification program.

The new decade began with the hope that the pacification momentum that had been built up during 1969 could be sustained during 1970. The enemy had made the mistake of concentrating on military attacks during 1969, thereby failing to prevent the GVN's territorial expansion. The GVN therefore designed the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan to be in general an improved version of the 1969 Plan, providing for continuity of 1969's effort plus some next-to-impossible goals such as 100 percent of the population in ABC categories and

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90 percent in AB categories of a new and more stringent Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). Meanwhile COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14 indicated that the enemy intended to try to thwart pacification by reverting to the protracted war tactics of guerrilla attacks, terrorism, and covert political penetration. Internal security needs to be strengthened, so the 1970 Plan stressed the Phoenix and National Police programs. Political development at the local level was to be encouraged by holding re-elections in the villages and hamlets that had held elections in 1967, and by holding elections for province councils and the Senate, preparatory to the Presidential and Lower House elections of 1971. Economic difficulties, which the austerity measures of November 1969 did not remedy, were a continuing matter of concern. Nevertheless, 1970 began with a sense of satisfaction over most of the results of 1969 and a hope for steady, if slower, progress during 1970.

A year later, there is another sense of satisfaction at the improvement during 1970. Much of the improvement came as a result of the unexpected change in the Cambodian Government and the effective cross-border operations against the enemy sanctuaries. During the first few months of the year, many GVN officials coasted with respect to the pacification program. The coasting was partly because of a diversion of the President's and the national leadership's attention from pacification to problems of Cambodia, the economy, and political unrest of students and veterans in Saigon. Meanwhile the enemy generated some pressures in conformity with his new tactics, and March and April saw a surge of terrorism throughout the country. That was his high point for the year, however, as the impact of the operations in Cambodia and revived attention to pacification by GVN management at all levels set him back the rest of the year in almost all parts of the country.

A special effort to regain momentum in pacification and development was made from July through October, which was also the period of maximum impact of the anti-sanctuary operations. The resultant weakness of the enemy effort within Viet Nam coincided with the growth to maturity of many of the territorial forces, PSDF, and other elements that had been assembled and crudely trained during 1969, but which began to show a degree of confidence and competence by mid-1970.

Thus the enemy's protracted war tactics failed to achieve the goal of stalling the pacification drive. Unfortunately, on the GVN side there was slower than desired improvement in the Phoenix and National Police programs. It was not until late in the year that high-level GVN attention turned to put pressure behind Phoenix and the National Police.

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The GVN's political program for 1970 proved to be highly successful, however. Ninety-five percent of all villages and hamlets in the country now have elected officials. Once elected, those officials were trained and, hopefully, motivated by the GVN's massive training program. All provinces have elected province councils which are now participating in decision making. The Senate elections went smoothly, as did the Self-Development Campaign by which each village was consulted on its desires for development projects for 1971. Thus popular preferences are now being expressed from the villages up to the national level.

Military momentum resumed throughout the country during the latter half of the year with the penetration of the few remaining VC base areas, such as the U Minh Forest and portions of Kien Hoa Province in Military Region (MR 4), and portions of Quang Ngai and Quang Nam Provinces in MR 1. Here the effective and proven technique was applied, entering in force with Regular Forces to push away large enemy units, following up with territorial forces to provide local security, resettling the population, opening roads, establishing markets, etc.

There are imperfections in this overall picture, especially in MR 2, where the enemy was not knocked off balance and in fact applied his intended tactics. In Binh Dinh and Phu Yen Provinces he abducted citizens for indoctrination sessions and assassinated their elected representatives. There the internal security struggle did take place and is going on today, and the slow GVN development of the Phoenix and National Police programs, plus some weaknesses in territorial security forces and political collusion, caused concern. At the same time, in most of the country, improved security produced a momentum of its own and the enemy's difficulties in manpower, supplies and freedom of movement mounted as the population became content with the new atmosphere of safety. The flow of ralliers continued, totalling 32,661 by year's end who had left the enemy camp.

If 1968 was a military year and 1969 one of territorial expansion, 1970 turned out to be dominated by Cambodia, although it was anticipated to have been a period of internal security struggle. This struggle will now take place in 1971. It will be supplemented by the political contest expected for 1971. Thereafter, of course, the struggle will continue; if all goes reasonably well, the situation should be dominated by the GVN's initiatives in development in 1972 and after.

A few specifics can highlight these events of 1970:

1. HES ABC moved from 87.9 in January to a new high of 95.1 percent at end-December 1970 (short of the 100 percent goal, set under the easier old HES). More significantly, AB moved from

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Tay Ninh Province had an extensive road network before the war intensified, and province officials have stepped up efforts to restore roads that deteriorated. Rural-development funds are being used to repair Inter-Provincial Route 13 and two provincial routes.



A self-development project, these two new elementary-school classrooms in Long Van Hamlet are being built for a school that educates 750 children in two shifts. Thirty-three classrooms have been built in this district during 1970.

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6. Not quantifiable, but clearly evident, were the reopened roads, busy markets and solvent farmers, especially in the populous Delta, which marked the new atmosphere resulting from expanded security, revived production and reopened circulation. (174)

Statistics

(C) Table VIII-4 shows the goals and the attainments for Phase I and Phase II and the year-end attainments along with the plan objectives which were to be accomplished by 28 Feb 71. (See p. VIII-101.)

Looking Ahead

DEPCORDS Assessment

(C) In looking ahead DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS saw problems which the pacification program faces.

1. The VC will continue to use the protracted war tactics of small-unit guerrilla action, terrorism, and political penetration. The VC have had substantial difficulties in maintaining their manpower and their threat, but they are still ready to take advantage of GVN failure or complacency.
2. The enemy main force buildup in southern Laos could result in a resumption of main force efforts in Cambodia or perhaps in South Viet Nam. Pacification must be protected against such depredations by ARVN main forces released from local security responsibilities by more effective territorial forces and the PSDF.
3. Political problems will inevitably affect the momentum of pacification. Some of these will arise during the national Presidential campaign, caused by diversion of leadership attention and the frictions aroused. The many real social and economic problems of Viet Nam, some antedating the war itself, must be the subject of serious GVN effort, failing which resulting unrest can disrupt political, economic and security growth(175)

1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan

(C) DEPCOMUSMACV for CORDS commented on the plan for the coming year as follows:

The GVN seems aware of these problems and its government wide and carefully structured 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan contemplates a continued drive to improve territorial security, a major effort in internal security through a

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strengthened National Police and a more effective Phoenix program, a continued program of political development from the local communities upward, and an extensive effort at local economic and social development throughout the country to convince the population of the better life that lies ahead through the GVN. This plan will begin on 1 March after the Lunar New Year lull. President Thieu is obviously resolved to press it as a part of his overall program of demonstrating the increased security and benefits his administration has brought to Viet Nam. (176)

COMMUNITY DEFENSE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 1971			
SELF - DEFENSE	SELF - GOVERNMENT	SELF - DEVELOPMENT	
TERRITORIAL SECURITY PEOPLE'S SELF- DEFENSE FORCE NATIONAL POLICE PHUNG-HOANG CHIEU HOI	PEOPLE'S ADMINISTRATION PEOPLE'S INFORMATION PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS YOUTH	LAND REFORM AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY VETERANS WAR VICTIMS HEALTH EDUCATION	MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC WORKS TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS RURAL CREDIT NATIONAL FUND FOR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROVINCE/MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT FUND VILLAGE SELF- DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
URBAN PROGRAM		ETHNIC MINORITIES	

SOURCE: MACCORDS

FIGURE VIII-28

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PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM GOALS

OBJECTIVE	PHASE I ended 30 Jun		PHASE II ended 31 Oct		Attainment 31 Dec 70
	Goal	Attainment	Goal	Attainment	
1. <u>Expand Territorial Security</u>					
Population 17,873,400 estimated	98%ABC 79%AB	91% 77%	100%ABC 90%AB	94.3% 83.3%	95.1 % 84.6 %
2. <u>Protection Against Terrorism</u>					
a. Neutralization of VCI	10,800	9,098	7,200	8,326	22,341
b. Reduce Terrorist Incidents	2,575 *	6,374	1,720 *	3,758	11,680
	*Goal was to reduce incidents to the maximum stated.				
c. Expansion of National Police	102,000	88,397	108,000	87,774	87,884
d. Redeploy National Police	**	48.5%	**	50%	50.7%
	** Goal was to redeploy 50% of the police available in the provinces to district level and below during 1970.				
3. <u>People's Self-Defense Force</u>					
a. Organized and Trained Combat Force.	1,500,000	1,119,537	1,500,000	1,083,037	1,292,931
b. Organized and Trained Support Force	2,500,000	1,216,764	2,500,000	1,575,967	1,736,875
c. Arms issued to province logistics centers	460,000	357,960	140,000	102,839	560,699
d. Key Interteams Formed	8,700	8,397	5,590	2,898	12,779

SOURCE: MACCORDS

TABLE VIII-4

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PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM GOALS

OBJECTIVE	PHASE I ended 30 Jun		PHASE II ended 31 Oct		Attainment 31 Dec 70
	Goal	Attainment	Goal	Attainment	
4. <u>Local Administration</u>					
a. Elected Village Governments	2,151	2,048	2,151	2,079	2,094
Village Re-elections	1,008	972	83	68	1,059
b. Elected Hamlet Governments	10,522	9,949	10,522	10,084	10,187
Hamlet Re-elections	3,867	3,652	196	196	4,001
c. Province/Municipal Council Elections	50	50	0	0	50
5. <u>Greater National Unity</u> (Chieu Hoi)	25,000	16,222	15,000	11,678	32,661
6. <u>Brighter Life for War Victims</u>					
a. Benefits-Paid-in-Place	101,825	44,591	101,856	70,155	139,709
b. Return-to-Village Benefits			100,000	147,213	388,003
7. <u>People's Information</u>					Not Quantifiable
8. <u>Prosperity for All</u>					
a. Land Reform					
(1) French owned/ Expropriated Land	34,624ha	32,730ha	75,000ha	49,990ha	34,425ha
(2) Land-to-the-Tiller			120,040ha	14,604ha	50,935ha

TABLE VIII-4

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PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM GOALS

OBJECTIVE	PHASE I ended 30 Jun		PHASE II ended 31 Oct		Attainment 31 Dec 70
	Goal	Attainment	Goal	Attainment	
(3) Land Development Resettlement Centers Squatter Land	16,600ha	8,393ha	5,952ha	1,763ha	16,879ha
(4) Survey, Distribute Land to Montagnards	18,450ha	5,846ha	22,520ha	8,967ha	22,171ha
b. Village Self Development	\$VN1.895 billion allocated	\$VN1.575 billion obligated	\$VN2.081 billion allocated	\$VN1.543 billion obligated	\$VN1.901 billion obligated
c. Miracle Rice Cultivation	500,000ha	100,000ha	500,000ha	304,000ha	306,174ha
d. Sorghum Cultivation	10,000ha	4,600ha	6,000ha	1,600ha	1,500ha
e. Establishment of Rural Banks	29	4	29	4	6
f. Rural Credit (ADB loans for agricultural development)	\$VN6.6 billion	\$VN3.6 billion	\$VN6.6 billion	\$VN5.9 billion	\$VN5.9 billion

TABLE VIII-4

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CHAPTER IX

LOGISTICS

...logistics is "the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with (a) design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; (b) movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; (c) acquisition or disposition of facilities; and (d) acquisition or furnishing of services." (1)

INTRODUCTION

(U) The year 1970 was similar in matters of logistics to 1969, yet different in many respects. During both years, resources were more than adequate although force level reductions and fiscal restraints had an impact on operational capabilities during the latter part of 1970. No operation was cancelled, however, or curtailed because of a lack of supplies.

(U) The US experienced a lower level of combat in 1970; the Vietnamese assumed a greater burden of the war. Vietnamization was the focus of concentration in all phases of logistics and medical activities throughout the year. Redeployment of units and equipment out-of-country as a result of President Nixon's announcement of 3 Jun concerning a reduction-in-force had an immense effect on timely and efficient transfer of real property and equipment to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Problems and setbacks were encountered but steps were taken to insure RVNAF had sufficient trained manpower and resources to operate and maintain transferred facilities and sophisticated equipment.

(U) Redeployment of US Forces and Vietnamization caused concern about the impact of those events on the Vietnamese economy. Positive economic programs were initiated during the year to assist other US and Government of South Vietnam (GVN) efforts to stabilize the economy.


(U) The cross-border operation in Cambodia was a major challenge to the logisticians during the year. Concentrated planning and precise coordination were the keystones of the success of the logistical support for that operation. In addition, military and financial assistance to the Cambodian Government became one of the primary matters of importance in the planning and execution of programs. The establishment of austere financial programs and procedures to aid that government required decisive, prudent, and imaginative judgment by all concerned.

(U) During 1970 support continued to come from the facilities already established at Danang for Military Region (MR) 1, Qui Nhon and Cam Ranh Bay in MR 2, and Long Binh for MRs 3 and 4 (see Figure IX-1). An examination of the location of the four facilities clearly demonstrated US dependence on maritime supremacy because each was located adjacent to the South China Sea. Each also had airfields large enough to accommodate abundant aerial resupply. The supplies were brought to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) without interference in unmolested sea and air space.

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LOGISTIC COMMANDS



SOURCE: MACV

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FIGURE IX-1

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Once in-country, however, the onward movement of the supplies lost immunity. Even by the close of the year, US Forces failed to completely control QL 1 (Vietnamese national highway), the main surface artery connecting the four logistical "islands"; nor was the rail line Danang-Quy Nhon-Cam Ranh-Saigon secure. Movement of supplies by truck was accomplished either by echelon or by employment of armed convoys, dependent on the need, time, and destination. In-country air transport capabilities continued their previously established role of dependable, responsive delivery when and where the need existed. To write that the enemy dominated the roads and rails would be incorrect, however; he had only the ability to interdict by hit-and-run tactics. Vietnam in 1970 was not a secure-and-hold type of war, but rather a war of attrition. The US could and did deliver the supplies where and when needed despite concentrated efforts to the contrary by the enemy.

Logistical Support Responsibilities

(U) The responsibility for logistics support established over the years underwent modification with the consolidation of HQ 1st Logistical Command (1st LOG CMD) on 26 Jun 70 with HQ, US Army, Vietnam (USARV), and the assumption of common service support for MR 1 on 1 Jul by USARV (discussed later in this section). The realignment of responsibilities and functions in early April reaffirmed adherence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publications 1, 2, and 3 as well as to the concept of a service's responsibility for its own logistical support in a unified command except when provided by agreement or assignment as common-servicing or cross-servicing. The 1970 MACV Directive 10-11 clearly delineated:

1. CG, USARV-- to direct and supervise the US Army logistics support system in RVN, to include common supply and service support for all US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) in MRs 2, 3, and 4 (MR 1 on 1 Jul). Service-peculiar items were provided from the applicable service resources. Support to FWMAF in accordance with established agreement was continued.

2. Commander, Naval Force, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV)-- to conduct US military logistical support operations at ports and beaches in MR 1 and provide common item support for all US and FWMAF in that MR (until relieved of that function by USARV on 1 Jul).

3. Seventh Air Force (7AF)-- was logistically supported by USARV except for service-peculiar items provided from other service resources.

4. Third Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) and Twenty-fourth Corps, Vietnam (XXIV Corps)-- were given logistical common item and common service support by COMNAVFORV (until relieved of that function by USARV on 1 Jul) except for service-peculiar items which were provided from own services' resources.

5. I and II Field Force, Vietnam (I and II FFORCEV)-- were logistically supported by USARV.

(U) A great deal of thought and effort were necessary to accomplish the modifications of logistics support responsibilities noted previously. Some of the changes were not without problems but were necessary in order to meet all demands with less personnel.

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Reorganizations/Deactivations of Logistical Activities

1st LOG CMD

(U) The 1st LOG CMD Headquarters was consolidated with HQ USARV during June. The elimination of the 1st LOG CMD Headquarters caused no drastic change in command relationships and the affected commands converted with ease. USARV relationships with higher headquarters remained the same and no ineffectiveness of logistical effort surfaced; in fact, direct lines of communication between support commands and USARV facilitated responsiveness. The effective and efficient consolidation of effort resulted in a 25-percent reduction in personnel of the two headquarters.

(U) Planning for the consolidation dated back to 1966. In November of that year, a study was directed by the Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) to determine the feasibility of consolidation. The study revealed that most staff sections within the two headquarters were performing some duplicatory functions although oriented toward different objectives. The merger of selected staff elements could be accomplished without degradation of individual staff mission, but the merger of certain personnel, operations, and logistical functions was undesirable. The conclusion of that study was not to consolidate. In view of the escalation of hostilities, the increase in US troop strength in RVN, and the complex nature of the logistical situation, the conclusion appeared valid.

(U) In May 1968 a study conducted by a Department of the Army (DA) management review team was completed. That study considered alternate organization structures and recommended the merger of USARV and 1st LOG CMD Headquarters. It was concluded that any major change in the Army command and control structure would be too disruptive at that time, however.

(U) In September 1968 the Deputy Commanding General (DEPCG), USARV, directed the Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS), Comptroller, to develop a plan for consolidation of the two headquarters. A working committee developed an organizational plan which was generally concurred in by the USARV staff with one exception. The CG, 1st LOG CMD, concurred with the plan, but felt it should be implemented and phased in with a T-Day operation (termination of hostilities). In addition, it was noted that even a partial consideration of logistics functions of USARV had to be accompanied with other improved organizational concepts and structures. Although the plan was tendered to the DEPCG, USARV, in December 1968, it was not implemented, solely because enemy activity had not decreased sufficiently to warrant a risk of possible disruption of support operations.

(U) In June 1969, consideration was again given to combining the two headquarters. Reductions in troop strengths appeared inevitable and as combat and combat support forces were withdrawn, source reduction in the administrative and logistical units servicing those forces appeared feasible, along with a reduction in the number of command and control headquarters. The logical element for inactivation appeared to be the 1st LOG CMD. A considerable amount of duplication existed at the same compound. The existence of two headquarters whose primary missions were administrative and logistical support, collocated across the street, was difficult to justify. In reality, an intermediate headquarters between HQ USARV and the support commands decreased timeliness and effectiveness. An organization was desired that was simple to understand, least disruptive to implement, responsive throughout redeployment increments, and one that recognized the major importance of the USARV logistical mission. It was concluded the

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existing USARV general and special staff organization with the Chief of Staff and two deputy chiefs most nearly met the requirements. To simplify and reduce the number of commanders reporting directly to the DEPCG when HQ 1st LOG CMD was inactivated, the position of Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff (ADEPCG) for Logistics (later changed to ADEPCG, Materiel) was established. By establishing that position, the logistical mission was guaranteed proper emphasis. In February 1970 the plan was approved by the DEPCG, USARV, and completed by 26 Jun 70. (2)

The Turnover of Common Service Support in MR 1

(S) In order to allow the Naval Support Activity (NSA), Danang, to meet its commitment for Phase III redeployments (1,650), service components were directed in January 1970 to accomplish the following:

1. Commence closure of Dong Ha and Cua Viet lines of communication (LOC).
2. Close Sa Huynh shallow water port.
3. Transfer all petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) operations to USARV.
4. Transfer port operations at Tan My and Chu Lai to USARV.
5. USARV to assume facilities support at Phu Bai combat base.
6. Commence phasing USARV personnel into NSA Danang depot and deep water piers. (3)
7. Reduce NSA Danang hospital by 200 beds by 15 Apr with final closure on 15 May. (4)

The transfer of responsibility for overall support to USARV was set for 1 Jul. A coordination plan submitted by USARV was approved by the MACV CofS in March. (5)

(S) In addition to all POL operations in MR 1, Navy common support functions at Danang and Chu Lai (except ACTOVLOG (accelerated turnover to Vietnamese logistics) base cantonments) were to be assumed by USARV. (6) The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed that all stocks be transferred on a nonreimbursable basis including POL and Navy stock fund depot stocks required by the Army to assume the complete support role in MR 1. MACV guidance for transfer of common service support from Navy to Army was to assume that USMC combat units were deployed by 1 Jul 70. It became clear in May the assumption had to be changed to permit continuous uninterrupted common service support to US Forces in MR 1. MACV revised the basic assumption to one in which a III MAF(-), consisting of two regimental landing teams (RLT) with support, would remain in MR 1 until redeployment during the period 1 Jan to 1 May 71. (7)

(C) After the Army took over the port operations at Danang, there was a substantial drop in capability, particularly in utilization of watercraft. When the Navy operated the craft, over 34,000 tons were hauled in June, for example. The first month under Army operation, the amount dropped to 15,000 tons. The backlog of ships was a significant problem and resulted in additional costs. The lesser capability was caused by personnel problems, i.e., lack of trained crews. (8) By the end of September, however, capability had been restored significantly by the increased emphasis placed on provision of boat crews and more aggressive utilization of

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self-propelled lighterage by the Army Support Command, Danang. Additional relief was provided by use of direct loading into landing ship tanks (LST) to support the outports of Tan My and Chu Lai. (9)

US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (Provisional)

(FOUO) Another major reorganization took place during the year which reduced responsibility overlap and saved manpower spaces. Engineer Troops, Vietnam (including the 18th and 20th Eng Bdes), the US Army Construction Agency, Vietnam (USACAV), and the engineer staff element of USARV were merged on 1 Feb. The new command was designated the US Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (USAECV) (Provisional), with an authorized strength of 26,000 men headquartered at Long Binh. The resource management implications of the reorganization were significant. Consolidated under the new command were numerous functions previously accomplished by two separate organizations, USACAV and the engineer staff element at USARV. The consolidation reduced areas of functional overlap and better defined lines of responsibility, while eliminating 80 manpower spaces. Additionally, the reorganization improved overall command and control by subordinating all nondivisional engineer units and activities to the jurisdiction of a single command. As the command was initially organized on a provisional basis, a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) for the new headquarters was staffed within USARV during March. After staffing, the TDA was forwarded through US Army Pacific (USARPAC) to DA for final approval. (10)

Force Logistics Command

(C) Also highly important from a logistical aspect was the deactivation of the main element of III MAF's Force Logistics Command (FLC), Force Logistic Support Group-Bravo (FLSG-B), on 15 Sep. The deactivation of the group was part of the fourth increment troop redeployments from RVN and resulted in a reduction of approximately 500 spaces. The group had supported the 1st Marine Division in the Chu Lai-Danang area, MR I, and had operational control of logistical support units at An Hoa, Landing Zone (LZ) Baldy, and Hill 37. (11)

PROCUREMENT/PROPERTY DISPOSAL

Procurement

Purchase of Commodities

(FOUO) In 1966 the US recognized the need to implement measures designed to strengthen the GVN and preserve economic stability. In support of that objective, SECDEF instituted the Plaster Limitation Program (SECDEF Memorandum of 13 Jul 66), subsequently designated the DOD Plaster Expenditure Program. The memo establishing the system also provided for assessing expenditure ceilings and reporting of monthly expenditure data. In-country management actions focused on three major categories of expenditures: personal spending, operation and maintenance (O&M) and other, and construction. COMUSMACV and component commands developed in-country action programs to reduce both official and personal spending. The programs included: restriction of general use items procured in-country, development of austere contractor construction projects, movement of DOD personnel from leased facilities to military

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cantonments, and active encouragement of personnel to limit personal spending on the local economy by diverting pay to military exchange and recreational facilities and to the several US-sponsored savings programs. (12)

(FOUO) Restrictions on the purchase of commodities by DOD were lifted by SECDEF in his memorandum dated 16 Apr 70 to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In his memorandum the Secretary announced the Vietnamese economic situation which previously had caused the US to place a ceiling on piaster purchases had changed. He stated that the Vietnamese economy was able to absorb higher levels of imports and it was in the US interest to support those imports into Vietnam. Further, more in-country purchases by DOD agencies would assist RVN in obtaining needed dollar earnings for additional imports. Taxes and duties derived from imports represented the largest RVN revenue source and thus combated inflationary deficit financing.

(FOUO) Prior to the memorandum by SECDEF, MACV restricted in-country commodity purchases to procurements to meet emergency operational requirements or single purchases of not more than \$250. Additionally, a list of exceptions was published and commodities on the list were bought without restrictions. Excepted items were those required in continuous support of US troops in-country and included such items as selected mineral products (rock and sand), bakery products, fresh fruits and vegetables, ice, and potable water.

(FOUO) Although previous commodity restrictions were removed, DOD purchases from Vietnamese sources using appropriated funds still had to be in accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). No special privileges outside that regulation could be granted. As a general rule, Vietnamese suppliers had to meet the competition from other countries to qualify for an award in a multi-country solicitation. Due to the extremely unfavorable rate of exchange (118 piasters to \$1) imposed on US Forces activities, it was extremely difficult for Vietnamese suppliers to meet the competition. When that rate was used to compare bids received in RVN with those received in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, for example, the VN supplier rarely got the award. (13) (The RVN economic situation is discussed later in this chapter.)

MACV Directive 715-6

(U) MACV Directive 715-6, Procurement Policies and Procedures, was published during July. The new directive consolidated information previously contained in five separate procurement-related directives. It set forth essential procurement policies not published in directive form and served as a primary reference source document for all DOD activities entering into contracts for performance in RVN. It established special restrictions and procedures designed to protect RVN economy and to control illicit transactions by contractors and their employees in RVN. The bulk of the directive was guidance which had not appeared in previous directives and contributed to more effective procurement management and standardization among component commands' procurement operations. (14)

Analysis of Fiscal Year 1970 Procurement

(U) An analysis of FY70 procurement in RVN was made during 3d Qtr CY70. Analysis of the DD-350 (Individual Procurement Action Report) machine printout provided by the Assistant

Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Installations and Logistics (I&L) showed there were 317 prime DOD contractors with contracts over \$10,000 performing in RVN during FY70. Those contractors were awarded 1,748 contracts for a total face value of \$736,042,000. The figure represented a reduction of \$112 million over FY68 expenditures.

(U) During FY70, 62 procurement activities wrote contracts for performance in RVN; 46 of those were located in either the Pacific Command (PACOM) or Continental US (CONUS). The predominant type of contract was Fixed Price, which represented 84 percent of the total. Time and Materials and Labor Hour contracts accounted for 10 percent, and Cost-Type contracts accounted for the remaining 6 percent. When viewed from a dollar value viewpoint, however, the picture changed. Cost-Type contracts (6 percent) accounted for 54 percent of the total dollars. Fixed Price (84 percent) and Time and Material and Labor Hour (10 percent) contracts accounted for 37 percent and 9 percent of dollar costs, respectively. As in previous years FY70 procurements were primarily services oriented.

(U) With the existing and forecasted austerity and troop withdrawals, it was anticipated that FY71 procurement would peak at approximately \$500 to \$600 million. (15)

MACV Piaster Expenditures

(FOUO) SECDEF eliminated the ceiling on official MACV piaster expenditures and rescinded policies limiting official DOD piaster spending in RVN on 16 Apr 70. Policies limiting personal piaster expenditures, however, remained in effect until October (discussed later in this chapter).

(FOUO) The piaster expenditure ceiling for MACV was originally imposed in July 1966 as an anti-inflationary measure. At that time, large piaster expenditures would have increased demands in Vietnam, satisfied only by increased import. Imports could not, however, be increased because of port facility limitation and congestion. Without a limitation on piaster spending, greater inflation would have ensued. By 1970, significant improvements in port facilities and the internal distribution system permitted higher levels of imports, having a two-fold deflationary impact. Pasters were absorbed by providing additional goods for the economy. Tariffs for imports and taxes on ensuing transactions provided an increase in GVN revenue, thereby reducing deficit financing. Since RVN's export earnings were very small, one of the main sources of dollars for purchase of imports was the sale of pasters to DOD. Thus, the ceiling on DOD piaster spending was a principal restraint limiting the quantity of goods available, which in turn hindered anti-inflationary measures.

(FOUO) SECDEF emphasized elimination of piaster expenditure did not imply DOD expenditures for the Vietnam effort would be increased, or that any significant increase would be made in any area of current DOD piaster expenditures. However, in collaboration with the Agency for International Development (AID) Mission, Saigon, MACV would identify areas where current DOD off-shore purchases could be transferred to Vietnamese suppliers without exceeding the capacity of the industries involved. Any opportunity for increased DOD purchase of goods and services in RVN would be adopted in accordance with the existing ASPRs. (16)

(FOUO) Total piaster expenditures reported for the first 6 months, CY70, were \$VN19.768 billion, 94.2 percent of the \$VN20.995 billion projected for the period. (17) Total piaster expenditures for the year were \$VN43.019 billion, an increase of \$VN2.727 billion over CY69. (18)

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Military Assistance Service Funded Procurement in RVN

(S) The Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) procurement in 1970 for RVNAF was almost entirely from US sources. The major exception -- procurement of jungle boots in the Republic of Korea (ROK)--developed out of special US-ROK agreements concerning the deployment of ROK forces in RVN. The major commercial consumables to be provided RVNAF under FY71 MASF were as follows (dollar amounts were estimates only): (19)

Individual Clothing and Equipment	\$25.0 million
Jungle Boots	3.1
Textiles	1.3
Textile Retransfers (Sateen, Nylon Netting)	1.9
Paper Products	.5
Pharmaceuticals & Medical Supplies	16.5
Training Manuals	.425
Printing of Technical Manuals	.2
Operational Rations	26.412
Ration Supplement Program	49.0*
Animal Subsistence	.106
Dry Cell Batteries	16.656
Automotive Batteries	.567
Commodity Support for Dependent Shelters	6.0*
Lumber	1.571
Plywood	.547
Cement	1.352
Asphalt	1.229
Paints	.240
Steel Sheets, Plates, Bars, Angles	3.876
Pipes and Culverts	1.602
Wire and Cable	1.067
Sandbags	13.692
Barbed Wire and Concertina	12.1
Steel Pickets	6.493
Tires	2.383
Tubes	.341
POL	25.0
Off-shore Overhaul and Maintenance	0.0
TOTAL	\$225.159 million

*Indicates program ceiling

(S) In August National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-80 directed DOD to explore ways to increase on-shore procurement of items purchased outside of RVN as a means of increasing dollar expenditure in RVN and promoting economic development of the country. COMUSMACV was tasked by SECDEF in October to identify specific areas for additional in-country procurement, MASF requirements which could be met with in-country sources, and specific obstacles impeding such shifts in procurement.

(S) In November, COMUSMACV reported to SECDEF that commodities with some potential for in-country procurement include table of allowance (TA) clothing and equipment items, paper

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products, human subsistence items, construction supplies, textiles, jungle boots, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, and batteries. It was further stated that the procurement of a significant range of commercial consumables, including ponchos, jungle boots, rucksacks, canvas products, boot socks, raincoats, and various subsistence items could be shifted to the local economy within 1 to 2 years. Other commodities, such as cement, lumber, paint, sandbags, and canned goods, could be shifted gradually over a period of 2 to 3 years. In-country procurement of cement and lumber at that time was inhibited by high costs. Pharmaceuticals were of limited attractiveness because the local industry was largely based on limited processing of semi-finished imports. The revision of specifications for items such as ponchos, raincoats, or rucksacks would allow local industries to rely more on domestic (vs imported) raw materials and would provide, by itself, new opportunities for in-country procurement in the near future. The expansion of in-country procurement also would be encouraged if US/GVN agencies developed specific medium or long-term plans for procurement of commercial consumables, since local producers needed adequate assurance concerning levels of procurement activity to justify new investment and plant.

(C) An estimate of the commercial consumables procured for RVNAF under the MASF program which could be procured in-country during CY71 was given in the report. It was established that the potential in-country procurement in CY71 would cost an estimated \$19.129 million \$VN275 to \$1. The American Embassy (AMEMB) had indicated that GVN agreed that the parallel market rate of 275:1 would apply to new US procurement of goods from local national contractors. However, even at 275:1 there was no assurance that all commodities which could be shifted to in-country procurement would be competitive and qualify for off-shore procurement (OSP) under existing regulations. There was a reasonable prospect that total procurement costs would not increase.

(C) In his report, COMUSMACV stated that existing barriers to MASF in-country procurement were substantial. Under Section 604 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, off-shore procurement could be authorized if:

... The President determines that such procurement will not result in adverse effects upon the economy of the United States or the industrial mobilization base, with special reference to any areas of labor surplus or to the net position of the United States in its balance of payments with the rest of the world, which outweigh the economic or other advantages to the United States of less costly procurement outside the United States. (20)

A Presidential Determination under Section 604 (a) on 18 October 1961 further limited OSP "to procurement of items required for military assistance which are not produced in the United States, to make local purchases for administrative purposes, and to use local currency available for military assistance purposes," but authorized SECDEF to approve exceptions to those limitations. The necessary determination and exception would be required. DOD Directive Number 2125.1, 18 June 1970, implemented executive requirements for OSP. Section IV (A) provided that, upon certification by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), exclusion of OSP would "seriously impede the attainment of Military Assistance Program objectives," OSP could be authorized for:

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1. Fulfillment of U.S. commitments of government-to-government cost sharing projects.

2. Procurements required to be made from indigenous sources pursuant to a treaty or executive agreement between governments.

3. Procurement required to support overriding foreign policy objectives as approved by Secretary of State.

4. Procurement required to support overriding military logistical considerations which are important to the defense capability of the Free World. (21)

It appeared that foreign exchange levels prescribed in NSDM-80 could justify OSP certification under Section IV(A)3. Section 604 (a), Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, required that OSP contracts be for "less costly procurement." The price of any commodity procured in bulk had to be "lower than the market price prevailing in the United States at the time of procurement." Section IV(B)2, DOD Directive 2125.1, required that OSP "conform to sound procurement practices," as outlined in ASPR and other implementing instructions. Section IV(B) also imposed additional cost and pricing criteria on OSP. ASPR 1-302.2 required competitive purchases from qualified sources "for the most advantageous contract, prices, quality, and other factors considered." ASPR Section VI, Parts 7 and 8, imposed additional restrictions on OSP.

(C) In his summation, COMUSMACV stated that it appeared that one of the following courses of action should be followed:

1. Authorize competitive solicitations, restricted to South Vietnamese bidders, for MASF procurement of commercial consumables for RVNAF. That approach would probably require the insertion of sections within the ASPR establishing a "Vietnam Set-Aside Procurement" program.

2. Enter into a US/GVN executive agreement to procure selected commercial consumables, now procured under the MASF program, from local national contractors in RVN.

(C) COMUSMACV further stated that as a general principle, MASF procurement in-country would be by the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV). Some adjustment of commodities into and out of the GVN budget might be advisable to minimize situations in which both USAPAV and RVNAF were procuring identical items. Over time, commodities should be shifted progressively and selectively to RVNAF procurement to further Vietnamization. That might require the establishment of a counterpart fund created by use of MASF appropriations. Obligations from that fund would require US approval, as was then the case with joint support funds. If in-country procurement of commercial consumables for RVNAF using MASF was authorized, and if the situation warranted and additional MASF funds were made available, those former MASF commodities which were then in the GVN budget could also be procured in-country with MASF. It would greatly increase foreign exchange deliveries and decrease the GVN budget deficit, but at the cost of extra US expenditures.

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(U) At the end of 1970, MACV was continuing analysis of MASF in-country procurement to refine the estimates and study problems associated with specification revisions and commodity substitutions. (22)

Property Disposal

Background

(C) USARV was charged with the responsibility of receipt and disposal of all armed forces-generated scrap within RVN. The principal areas through which excess property was removed from RVN were Danang, Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon, and Saigon. Sale of excess property in RVN proved more difficult in 1970 than anticipated. After signing a disposal agreement in November 1968, GVN did not issue orders implementing the agreement to ministries and agencies concerned. As a result, over a period of time a series of widely differing ad hoc arrangements were worked out. At the time the agreement was signed, neither GVN or the US realized the extent to which cooperation of numerous GVN ministries and agencies was necessary to make the arrangement work. Included were the Ministries of Economy, Finance, Defense, Interior, National Bank, Customs, and the Directorate General of Ports. In addition, some highly placed GVN officials regarded US excess property as "Vietnamese," i.e., potential national treasures were being removed.

(C) During most of 1969, the AMEMB Saigon reacted to minor difficulties on a case-by-case basis. In early 1970 the AMEMB, MACV, and USARV took concerted action to address the disposal problem as a whole. Property disposal operation (PDO) yards received far more material than could be disposed and major contractors involved in export began to complain of GVN harassment and delay. (23)

Removal of Scrap

(C) During the spring of 1970, a joint AMEMB/MACV/USARV position on the removal of scrap was established and presented to the Minister of Economy. Some officials in GVN were concerned that scrap contractors were engaged in black market currency transactions. The new position was the US would assume complete responsibility for shipments and would retain title until material reached international waters. Also, US military ports would be used as ports of exit for the material. The position was formally presented to the RVN Prime Minister on 2 Jul.

(C) On an interim basis, adequate procedures were worked out for all ports except Danang. At that port removal came to a halt because shippers and scrap purchasers considered conditions at the commercial port unacceptable. The Dock-Workers Union demanded all scrap leave through the commercial port and be loaded by union labor. GVN was unwilling to challenge the union's demands. Apparently in late August, the Office of the Prime Minister issued an order to port authorities, Danang, saying the US had agreed that all scrap would go through the commercial port and be loaded by union labor. The AMEMB had not made such a sweeping agreement but only had indicated willingness to use the commercial port to the extent feasible. The port was limited in capacity and antiquated in labor practices. Also, there was considerable evidence of corruption in the port's management. A scrap purchaser, Schiavone-Chase Corporation, New York, alleged taking a heavy financial loss as a result of the difficulties. The AMEMB delivered

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a new letter to the Prime Minister urging him to allow the use of the US Military Port, Danang, by commercial scrap vessels and establish the necessary conditions for limited use of the commercial port and requesting a permanent resolution of all problems within the framework of the 1969 agreement. (24)

(C) By the end of the year, although not completely resolved, ships loaded with scrap were leaving the military deep water port of Danang without difficulties or apparent harassment.

(U) As of 25 Dec, an estimated 364,500 short tons (STON) of scrap were on hand within PDO yards throughout RVN. Of that amount, 20 percent had been sold and was awaiting pickup by the various contractors. Receipts of scrap had been averaging 15,000 STON per month. By July 1971 it was projected that the scrap inventory would be approximately 274,000 STON. (25)

(U) During the latter half of the year, numerous actions were taken to improve the sale and removal of scrap. A scrap baler was installed at Long Binh disposal yard to improve the marketability and transportability of the scrap. Offshore test sales were conducted by DA. By the end of the year, two shipments had been made to Okinawa and another shipment was to be made to the Philippines. In addition, barter negotiations were being conducted with the Republic of China and ROK for future scrap generations. Payment for scrap through barter negotiations was intended to offset US obligations for recurring services rendered within those countries. (26)

Recovery of Ammunition Brass

(C) The recovery of scrap ammunition brass was a problem during the year. Battlefield brass offered a lucrative business for local scavengers in RVN. Although a 1955 country-to-country agreement between the US and GVN required all scrap from US-furnished material to be returned to US agencies, battlefield brass litter was considered by the public as abandoned and free for the taking.

(C) Export of scavenged brass caused considerable embarrassment to the US and RVN Governments. When the Minister of Defense banned export of copper alloy scrap, battlefield brass became a leading commodity in illegal brass export. At the end of the year, MACV was exploring a program to recover the brass and tasked USARV to develop a draft service contract for its recovery. The AMEMB Saigon was collaborating with studies on reasonable recovery costs. Studies were also underway to assess the capability of USARV support command depots to accommodate the workload of such a program. MACV also requested the AMEMB to negotiate with the Ministry of Defense to declare scrap ammunition brass as contraband. It would reduce the incentive for local nationals to hold brass and would provide the National Police a stronger means of reducing illegal export activities.

(C) Recovery of brass from military installations was improved during the year through command and logistical efforts. Letters were dispatched to the commanders of US Forces and to the RVN Joint General Staff (JGS), soliciting personal attention to recovery efforts. Similar actions were taken with FWMAF. (27)

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Excess Property

(U) The Utilization of Excess in Rural Development Program, under which many items declared excess to in-country US components could be utilized by GVN officials in furtherance of civil operations and rural development, was developed in August. At HQ MACV a committee chaired by the ACofS for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (MACCORDS) and consisting of representatives of each directorate and MACV ACofS, J4 (MACJ4) was established in August when MACCORDS received authority to requisition DOD excesses on a non-reimbursable basis. The committee was responsible for determining sources and types of equipment and supplies declared excess to US Forces needs and country-wide pacification and development program requirements for equipment and supplies; matching available excesses with established requirements according to pacification priorities; and coordinating the transfer of property from depots to users.

(U) At the MR level, a CORDS committee reviewed province requirements and approved/disapproved requests for materiel. At the province level a combined US/RVN committee established requirements, designed projects, screened excess lists, and visited local property disposal activities. Upon approval property was transferred from the supply source to the using agency represented by the province senior advisor or equivalent who maintained informal accountability.

(U) The material requirements for the program potentially included all excess US supplies and equipment. Due to great diversity in the pacification programs and the variety of substitutable items which could complete a given project, definitive materiel requirements could not feasibly be provided. For that reason a MACCORDS committee of personnel familiar in detail with CORDS needs was necessary to manually compare requirements with all available excesses. Priority of issue would immediately follow US and RVNAF requirements.

(U) On 1 Aug the Interservice Excess Screening System (IESS) was established for the purpose of providing a method by which US Forces in RVN could obtain assets which were in excess to their sister services. Items required by one service but in excess to another were transferred to the requiring service. During the period 1 Aug through 31 Dec, approximately \$7 million worth of secondary items were transferred between the US service components in RVN. The system was established as an interim measure until the PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA) system was able to handle the redistribution of excess within RVN. IESS was terminated in December when all services reported excess and requirements to the PURA system for redistribution. (28)

(U) The US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam (USAPDAV) was responsible for receipt, storage, and disposition of all armed forces excesses. Items could be defined as equipment or supplies which retained their identity as end items and were in reparable/usable condition, or could serve as major end items for vehicles, such as engines, transmissions, and axles.

(U) As of 25 Dec, the property disposal activities in RVN had an inventory of excess items valued at approximately \$57.7 million, in terms of original acquisition cost. Receipts of excess items averaged \$10 million per month. The USAPDAV projected future item sales per month to be valued at \$15 million, leaving an inventory of approximately \$36 million by July 1971.

(U) Excess item releases from January through December 1970 for Military Assistance Program (MAP) countries of China, Philippines, and ROK were valued at approximately \$14.9

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million. In addition to the releases to the aforementioned countries, excess items valued at \$7.9 million were released to RVNAF during the period July through Dec 1970. (29)

(U) In October SECDEF established priorities which would be applied in the selection of defined unfunded requirements for the release/redistribution of those DOD assets in PACOM which were determined excess to requirements of US Forces. Worldwide claimant conflicts within the priorities were to be resolved by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). The priorities were listed as follows: (30)

1. MASF supported forces of country in which excess was located (Vietnam or Thailand-Laos)
2. Cambodia MAP
3. Other MASF supported forces
4. Specified USAID programs in Vietnam
5. Trust Territories, Pacific Islands
6. Korea MAP
7. Other USAID
8. Other MAP
9. Other federal agencies

(U) In December SECDEF approved and authorized COMUSMACV to determine priorities of PDO assets which were in excess and wanted by both RVN and Cambodia. Also in December, SECDEF authorized Military Assistance Program Excess Program (MAPEX) regulations that gave COMUSMACV the authority to release excess property needed by the Cambodians, and to make the MAPEX release from HQ MACV. (31)

TRANSPORTATION

Overview

(U) Transportation of US and US-sponsored cargo and passenger movement within and out of Vietnam continued to be a great challenge during 1970. While 1968 was the high point of the transportation buildup in Vietnam, the decrease in input and the increase of outward movement requirements during 1970 taxed the imagination of the planners. The major problem addressed and resolved was the transportation impact resulting from President Nixon's announcement on 3 Jun of a reduction-in-force. Meeting the political deadlines meant arranging for additional contract aircraft and assembling surface transportation needed to move the men and material out of Vietnam. Contracts had to be negotiated, aircraft obtained, and surface ships scheduled

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C-130 Hercules being on-loaded with cargo for delivery to Danang.

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months in advance. To those imposed dates were added the problems of any exit: the in-country transportation of the selected units and individuals; housing of personnel at the exit sites; the detailed paper work involved in processing individuals; and the final movement to the point of embarkation. Allied with those details was the problem of the return of equipment organic to the unit and individual. The effort required exact planning and coordination. Meanwhile the normal routine supply efforts continued.

(U) The amount of incoming cargo by the end of June totaled 1.57 million STONS, of which 90.4 percent arrived by surface means. (32) A total of 2.5 million STONS were moved in 1970 compared with 4 million in 1969. (33) (34) Surface cargo amounted to 93.2 percent in 1970 contrasted to 90.4 percent for 1969. (35) (36)

(U) Total combined tonnage moved in-country by highway, rail, water, and air decreased as the input was reduced. By the end of June, an average of approximately 1,561,950 STONS of cargo was moved monthly; 63.5 percent by highway, 29.6 percent by water, 3.5 percent by air, and 3.4 percent over the rails. (37) By the end of 1970, it averaged 1,125,615 STONS monthly with 64.6 percent by highway, 30.4 percent by water, 3 percent by air, and 2.5 percent by rail. (38) Tonnage moved in-country by tactical units could not be calculated.

(U) A total of 264,966 passengers arrived by Military Airlift Command (MAC) and MAC-contract aircraft in Vietnam during the first 6 months. (39) By the end of the year, 511,393 arriving passengers were hauled as opposed to 519,200 inbound during 1969. (40) (41) Departures, including KEYSTONE redeployment personnel, totaled 319,859 by the end of June with an end of year total of 658,843 contra the 663,704 the year before. (42) (43) The average number of personnel moved per month was 97,512; January was the peak month with 126,431 passengers, with May the lowest at 76,422. (44)

(U) A considerable increase over 1969 occurred during 1970 in the number of passengers moved by rail. As a comparison, in January 1969 the rails accounted for 6 percent of the passengers moved; in December 1970, the rails accounted for in excess of 25 percent. (45) (46) The increase was attributable to the Vietnamese civilians employed by American contractors and the US Government commuting between Saigon and Long Binh, a secure area with American presence and under RVN control.

(U) Emergency air in-country movement was immediately responsive to the demands levied. While the cargo percentage appeared comparatively small, the urgency was paramount at the time. Often due to instant reaction by an established emergency air cargo capability, an attack on a fire support base was repelled, deterred, or supported.

(U) All told, the 1970 transportation effort in Vietnam amounted to moving 14,658,000 STONS of cargo and 9,235,800 personnel by various modes. (47) This is further discussed in this section.

Highway Performance

(U) Highway performance in 1970 was similar to that of 1969. During the last quarter, however, US phasedown and severe floods caused a considerable decrease in tonnage transported. The total tonnage moved by highway transportation was as shown below (in thousands). (48)

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STONS*</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>STONS*</u>
JAN	981.4	JUL	869.9
FEB	1,017.8	AUG	890.3
MAR	1,014.4	SEP	957.5
APR	1,024.2	OCT	641.3
MAY	1,010.8	NOV	648.1
JUN	1,037.3	DEC	554.2
		Total	10,647.2

*Includes only MACV TMA controlled movement to, within, and from Delta.

Water Transportation

(U) The Traffic Managment Agency (MACTMA) established and implemented improved procedures during 1970 for monitoring RVN port traffic to prevent long and costly backlogs of vessels awaiting off-loading at any port. Under TMA monitoring, ships (especially those carrying ammunition) were occasionally placed in "hold" at ports outside Vietnam until the port backlog was eliminated, instead of allowing them to remain for a long period of time in the more dangerous RVN waters. Vessels also were rerouted to other Vietnamese ports if immediate use of their cargo could be made at another destination. Because of that, ship waiting times were reduced by approximately 50 percent, resulting in significant cost savings. (49)

(S) Total Cargo Handled by Ship Less Unit and Delta Transportation Plan
(STON) (50)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DISCHG PACOM & CONUS</u>	<u>INTRA-RVN</u>	<u>TOTAL OUTLOAD</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
JAN	414,900	192,900	219,800	827,400
FEB	409,500	177,700	156,500	743,500
MAR	419,502	199,329	188,200	807,031
APR	435,907	212,579	195,310	843,796
MAY	444,100	222,000	231,800	897,500
JUN	409,558	199,126	140,360	749,044
JUL	443,400	167,100	115,900	736,600
AUG	325,200	186,500	121,400	631,400
SEP	326,608	170,165	107,500	603,753
OCT	245,000	154,300	11,900	513,700
NOV	231,309	129,531	97,350	458,190
DEC	180,602	87,830	97,900	366,332

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(S) Unit Moves via Sealift (51)

<u>Month</u>	<u>No. of Units</u>	<u>Passengers</u>	<u>Cargo (STON)</u>
JAN	12	426	20,792
FEB	11	188	13,114
MAR	11	143	13,470
APR	12	153	22,689
MAY	24	415	8,978
JUN	13	856	22,581
JUL	9	131	4,213
AUG	14	113	3,680
SEP	17	198	6,670
OCT	7	94	3,643
NOV	8	139	1,960
DEC	7	32	1,039

Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS)

Background

(U) The VNRS consisted of 1,109.3 km of meter gauge mainline from Saigon (MR 3) to Dong Ha (MR 1) and approximately 130 km of branch line trackage. (Railroad restoration and security are discussed later in this chapter.) The system had its inception in 1885 with the opening of the line from Saigon to My Tho (MR 4). The line was abandoned in 1958; consequently there was no railroad in MR 4. The material power of VNRS ranged from 85 steam locomotives to 56 comparatively new diesel-electric locomotives. Freight car assets numbered approximately 1,124 cars ranging from two-axle 10-ton capacity to four-axle cars of 50-ton capacity. In 1965, due to a shortage of freight equipment, DA approved the offshore procurement of 200 Army-owned railway cars for use in Vietnam. The purchase consisted of 111 flatcars, 61 gondolas, twenty-eight 40-ton mechanical refrigerator cars, and 10 diesel switching engines.

(U) The VNRS was divided into three operation divisions: Danang, Nha Trang, and Saigon. Line shop facilities of the VNRS were adequate to handle all types of minor repairs to motive power and rolling stock. Major repair shops were located in Saigon, Di An, Thap Cham, and Danang. The principal customer was the US military.


(U) The VNRS transported more cargo and passengers in 1970 than ever before, in spite of stepped-up enemy-initiated action against the railroad. The amount of railroad cargo hauled was dependent on the cargo discharged at the ports, the availability of military and commercial vehicles to load/unload and transport, and the time and destination of need. During the latter half of 1970, military phasedown, inclement weather, and cessation of aggregate requirements for highway construction projects in some areas caused a decrease in rail requirements for US military owned/sponsored cargo. (52)

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FIGURE IX-2

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(C) Passengers and Cargo Hauled in 1970 (53)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>CARGO (STONS)</u>	<u>POL (Gal)</u>	<u>TOTAL STONS (PAX, CGO, POL)</u>
JAN	240,674	51,490	320,000	83,565.2
FEB	177,039	38,652	256,000	59,892
MAR	235,160	42,471.9	449,010	70,650.9
APR	265,060	48,297.2	403,543	68,176.7
MAY	283,700	60,825.6	267,200	82,095.7
JUN	295,851	49,764.9	365,080	71,953.7
JUL	311,943	71,349	545,380	94,735.1
AUG	244,311	51,713.4	314,470	70,036.7
SEP	190,621	47,558	220,689	61,858
OCT	168,988	22,470.5	372,944	35,144
NOV	161,516	12,432.9	418,450	24,546.7
DEC	169,400	26,442.8	394,635	39,147.8

Air Operations

USAF Aerial Port System

(U) The USAF aerial port system in RVN was the foundation for all in-country airlift operations of the Common Service Airlift System (CSAS). It provided terminal service support for all military aircraft in RVN, including loading and off-loading cargo and the processing and manifesting of passengers. The entire operation was under the direction of the 834th Div, activated in October 1966 to assume overall management of in-country tactical airlift operations. The system of USAF aerial ports in July 1962 consisted of four detachments of the 7th Aerial Port Squadron (APS) located at Pleiku, Tan Son Nhut, Danang, and Nha Trang air bases. The 7th APS was a subordinate unit of the 315th Air Div, headquartered in Tachikawa, Japan. By 1 Jun 70, the system had evolved into an organization with more than 30 units operated by the 8th, 14th, and 15th APSs of the 2d Aerial Port Group (APOG), a subordinate of the 834th Air Div. Figure IX-2 depicts locations of these units. Squadron mobility teams provided loading and off-loading capability where no aerial port was established. They assisted in the preparation and planning of unit moves and augmented aerial ports during surge operations.

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
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One of the smallest operating locations of the USAF's 15th APS, the crew at An Khe consists of less than a dozen men.



A load of tires being picked up by a forklift in preparation of loading on an 834th Air Div cargo plane.

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(U) In 1970 fixed facilities ranged from large, fully equipped terminals at major air bases to very austere terminals at remote airfields. A new major aerial port complex was opened at Bien Hoa on 5 Jan. It included air freight and passenger terminals, airlift control element building, MAC command post (CP), snack bar, outside storage area, and a 40,000-pound pit scale. Major terminals, such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Cam Ranh Bay, and Danang, could handle more than 1,000 tons of cargo and over 3,000 passengers per day. A number of intermediate-size terminals, such as Chu Lai and Vung Tau, could move 200 tons of cargo and 1,300 passengers per day. The small, austere terminals at remote airfields were constructed principally on a self-help basis to provide storage space and passenger protection during adverse weather conditions. Manning of such units was normally limited to less than 10 personnel, but could quickly be augmented for heavy workloads.

(U) The vital element of the aerial ports was the 463L Materials Handling Support System. Its equipment was designed for worldwide deployment to provide a system compatible with all modes of transportation required to accomplish the DOD Logistics and Aerial Delivery System. The 463L Materials Handling Equipment (MHE) was introduced in 1964 and thereafter was plagued with poor in-commission rates and shortages of pallets and restraint equipment. Many MHE authorizations were developed only after experience in the field revealed a shortage. Deliveries normally followed authorizations by 9 to 18 months. MHE operating in RVN was vulnerable to combat damage. Ground fire and shell fragments took a heavy toll of tires, hydraulic lines, and radiators. Often forklifts were inoperable solely because of blown tires. In May, for example, nineteen 10K(AT) forklifts required 24 tire changes during Cambodian operations. Cost of replacement tires was \$4,853 and a total of 408.5 hours of MHE out-of-commission time was experienced. A total of 33,600 pounds of airlift costing \$6,782 was required to transport tires to forward locations and return unserviceable tires for breakdown. The first sets of battle-damage-proof tires were received in RVN in June and installed on 10K(AT) forklifts and 25 K-loaders for deployment to the field.

(U) The Commander, 834th Air Div, recommended that compatibility between Army and Air Force MHE be developed. Considerable time and effort was expended in transferring cargo from one airlift system to another, even though Army helicopter pads usually adjoined runways at forward airlift fields.

(U) Maintenance of MHE caused great difficulty. Transportation squadrons were usually short of equipment maintenance skills. The in-commission rates were far below the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) standard. Vehicle-deadlined-for-maintenance had a direct effect on operational rates.


(U) The 463L pallets were essential to rapid and efficient handling of cargo. They permitted preparation of cargo for airlift prior to arrival of aircraft and processing of terminating cargo after aircraft departure. Their use enabled a C-130 to be completely off-loaded and re-loaded in 15 minutes. The ability to off-load rapidly was of overriding importance when cargo was delivered to forward high-threat airfields. A high loss rate of pallets and restraint equipment occurred in those areas, however. The losses occurred principally at the more than 100 airlift fields without permanent port representation. Cargo was delivered on pallets which were left for later recovery. They were often diverted to other uses by military forces or local nationals. A concerted pallet recovery program was initiated in late 1968. Directives were issued establishing policies, responsibilities, and procedures for the control, recovery, and return of pallets and restraint system. Progress was made in 1970. Equipment valued at \$3,152,353 was recovered during the first 4 months, for example.

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The Qui Nhon Airfield handles approximately 1,000 missions monthly carrying an average of 2,000 tons of cargo and mail and 25,000 passengers per month.



A C-123 Provider making a resupply mission into Kham Duc Base Camp.

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(U) A continuing deficiency in weighing capability harassed aerial ports for years. Such capability was needed throughout the port system so aircraft could be safely loaded. It was particularly important for mobility teams operating at austere forward airfields. In August 1968 the Mobile Electronic Weighing Machine was introduced in RVN. It was a self-contained, self-powered, mobile weighing unit designed to operate under austere conditions. Each trailer unit was air transportable and could be palletized on a single 463L pallet. Calibration and spare parts proved to be problems and avionics personnel were often not fully qualified to perform maintenance. During June 1970, for example, 10 units were on hand in RVN and only four were in commission.

(U) Calibration and maintenance of other port weighing equipment also presented problems. The 13 MA-1 vehicle weighing kits were used to weigh all types of cargo. The kits were easily damaged in the field and had to be returned to CONUS for repair. Pipeline time was long because they were shipped by sea transport. On 1 Jun only five of 13 kits were in commission. At the same time, only two of six 60,000-pound capacity pit scales were in commission. Calibration was the chief difficulty and could only be performed by Fairbanks Morse personnel from the US, taking many months to obtain service.

(U) Until mid-1970 the lack of adequate communications between port locations caused a waste of valuable airlift because essential traffic information from outlying users could not be coordinated on a timely basis. Nondedicated land line communications were used, though unsatisfactorily. In late 1969 installation of 37 high frequency single-side band (HF/SSB) was started. The network consisted of four segments and each of the three aerial port squadrons possessed a net connecting nearly all of the squadron's detachments and operating locations on an assigned dedicated frequency. A fourth net connected the three squadrons with the 2d APOG Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut on still another assigned dedicated frequency. The system was 100 percent operational by the end of 1970.

(U) During the summer of 1970, the Airlift Management System, a computerized aircraft scheduling system, was introduced in RVN. The ports submitted their cargo backlogs daily to the system and received a fragmentary order covering the next day's missions. The order was to identify the amount and type of cargo scheduled to move from each port, as well as cargo to be received.

(U) Approximately 100 airfields did not require an aerial port facility on a sustained basis. When a sizable tactical airlift operation developed, a mobility team deployed to support the effort. The team included a loadmaster and five air freight specialists with enough equipment and rations for a 5-day operation. Team assignments included move planning, load marshaling, loading and offloading, and pallet recovery. The Cambodian operation was heavily supported by the teams. Teams moved 16,000 tons of cargo in May as compared with 25,000 tons normally handled each month by the permanently located 8th APS at Tan Son Nhut. Mobility operations were smoothest when teams were experienced and well trained. Aerial port personnel wanted men with combat-mobility team experience identified in the event they were needed in future contingencies. The identification and need for more intensive training for the specialized tasks were of primary concern in 1970. (54)

Air Operations Summary

(U) To accomplish airlift operations intra-country, a CSAS C-130 Hercules, C-123 Provider,

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RVN AIR OPERATIONS SUMMARY-1970

			Passengers	Cargo (STON)
JAN	MAC:	IN	70,239	14,553
		OUT	56,192	6,429
	CSAS:		360,501	56,592
FEB	MAC:	IN	38,441	11,988
		OUT	48,730	5,787
	CSAC:		302,165	52,586
MAR	MAC:	IN	38,754	12,850
		OUT	59,949	6,321
	CSAS:		356,796	62,115
APR	MAC:	IN	37,078	11,038
		OUT	58,093	5,577
	CSAC:		303,379	57,453
MAY	MAC:	IN	36,325	12,510
		OUT	40,097	4,930
	CSAS:		336,868	69,920
JUN	MAC:	IN	44,039	11,362
		OUT	56,798	5,589
	CSAS:		363,698	54,421
JUL	MAC:	IN	357,644	11,272
		OUT	378,268	5,879
	CSAS:		356,574	47,369
AUG	MAC:	IN	44,768	10,214
		OUT	54,173	5,475
	CSAS:		333,796	39,676
SEP	MAC:	IN	47,633	10,130
		OUT	55,437	4,761
	CSAS:		318,644	34,547
OCT	MAC:	IN	39,571	11,632
		OUT	54,016	4,923
	CSAS:		289,428	26,383
NOV	MAC:	IN	35,555	10,162
		OUT	58,442	5,119
	CSAS:		287,856	29,857
DEC	MAC:	IN	30,327	7,566
		OUT	58,426	4,847
	CSAS:		285,067	32,783

TABLE IX-2

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or C-7A landed and took off somewhere in-country approximately every 35 seconds, transporting an average of 6,000 pounds every minute around the clock. More than 4 million passengers and troops were airlifted annually. (55) Flights in and out of country were accomplished by MAC or MAC-contract planes. The huge C-141s carried most of the in-country and outgoing load with the aid of some C-5s and C-133s. During the first part of 1970, the number of combat cargo sorties for the USAF remained similar to that of 1969. From June through December, however, the number declined as the resupply requirements decreased because of the low level of combat activity. (56) See Table IX-1 for the monthly summary of cargo and passengers hauled by MAC and CSAS and Figure IX-3 for locations of selected airfields. Figure IX-4 gives the monthly status of USAF tactical airlift.

Emergency Airlifts

(S) Emergency airlift operations assumed an important role during 1970, but overall activity decreased during the latter part of the year after the Cambodian cross-border operation ceased. Included were tactical emergency, emergency resupply, and combat essential flights. The total number of such flights was 3,976, with 210 tactical emergency, 444 emergency, and 3,325 combat essential. The passengers hauled numbered 53,352. (57) See Table IX-2 for a recapitulation for the year.


C-130 Surge Requirements

(S) In September 1970 CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to review all RVN airlift requirements and provide an updated estimate of the minimum number of C-130 aircraft needed in RVN to satisfy surge requirements which could not await arrival of support from CONUS. COMUSMACV was the dominant user of C-130 airlift in PACOM and had previously specified a need of 81 airframes to satisfy a contingency surge requirement; these formed the basis for a 10-squadron posture within PACOM. (58) Upon review of the programmed requirements, COMUSMACV provided an updated estimate with rationale which identified a minimum requirement of 58 aircraft plus at least 10 airframe equivalents as maintenance spares. The limiting requirement was that of rapidly reinforcing MR 3 with an Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) division from MR 1. Such a division consisted of 14,448 men and approximately 7,225 STON of equipment. The rate of closure was one regiment within 36 hours and the entire division within 5 days. In arriving at the estimate, COMUSMACV made several assumptions, among them being:

1. The decision to reinforce would be announced not less than 48 hours prior to execution.
2. PACAF could augment with offshore C-130 aircraft at a rate of 18 in 25 hours and 12 more in each following 12-hour period until the surge was terminated.
3. PACAF could provide two C-124 aircraft within 6 hours.
4. With JCS approval STRICOM could provide 16 C-130 aircraft positioned at Okinawa within 114 hours, and an additional squadron of 16 C-130 aircraft each 24 hours thereafter for a total of three to five squadrons.

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


SOURCE: 7AF

FIGURE IX-1

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USAF TACTICAL AIRLIFT SOUTH VIETNAM



32515	33518	33522	32216	34650	29516	27186	26108	23913	21887	22878	24159
342	283	347	324	335	321	333	309	290	261	275	269
53375	50130	57420	52564	68277	56006	45679	35412	32940	26106	28906	32308

Sorties	33388
PAX	351
CARGO(T)	59832

(1000)

SOURCE: USAFTIA

FIGURE IX-4

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Emergency Airlift by MACV-1970

Month		Tactical Emergency	Emergency Resupply	Combat Essential	Total
JAN	REQS	0	4	40	44
	Sorties	3	1	124	128
	PAX	0	743	0	743
	CGO	0	346.3	11.1	937.4
FEB	REQS	1	3	39	43
	Sorties	17	6	63	86
	PAX	482	4	1,095	2,181
	CGO	36.1	33.4	1,134.2	1,203.7
MAR	REQS	0	4	50	54
	Sorties	2	3	125	130
	PAX	0	0	1,531	1,531
	CGO	0	219.46	1,396.34	1,615.8
APR	REQS	3	36	79	118
	Sorties	4	89	121	214
	PAX	540	0	4,181	4,821
	CGO	60.35	435.76	2,469.62	2,965.7
MAY	REQS	14	49	293	357
	Sorties	156	228	1,377	1,761
	PAX	3,923	777	13,382	18,082
	CGO	288.3	1,629.9	11,040.3	12,958.5
JUN	REQS	1	20	137	158
	Sorties	25	89	798	909
	PAX	850	1	12,856	13,707
	CGO	12.05	402.4	4,931.7	5,246.6
JUL	REQS	0	12	52	64
	Sorties	1	11	228	240
	PAX	0	0	4,054	4,054
	CGO	0	77.1	1,018.2	1,095.3
AUG	REQS	0	6	48	114
	Sorties	0	5	118	123
	PAX	0	0	3,983	3,988
	CGO	0	122.57	617.57	740.14
SEP	REQS	0	4	38	42
	Sorties**	1	7	119	127
	PAX	0	0	2,917	2,917
	CGO	0	20.8	708.6	729.5
OCT	REQS	0	4	31	35
	Sorties	0	0	37	37
	PAX	0	0	348	348
	CGO	0	19.0 (sic)	284.0	303.0
NOV	REQS	0	3	26	29
	Sorties	0	0	102	102
	PAX	0	0	1,094	1,094
	CGO	0	29.6 (sic)	527.2	556.8
DEC	REQS	0	5	47	52
	Sorties	1	5	113	119
	PAX	0	1	285	286
	CGO	0	37.2	976.6	1,013.8

*Cargo is shown by STON.

**Nadevac

SOURCE: MACV

TABLE IX-2

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5. MAC would have an average of 42 C-141 aircraft in the PACOM area which with proper authorization could be diverted for intra-RVN airlift.

(S) In identifying the surge requirement, COMUSMACV stated that since 15 Apr 70 two PACAF C-130 aircraft were used as airborne communications reconnaissance platforms and if applied against the MACV C-130 surge level, the requirement would be increased by two. A recommendation was also submitted to request JCS to direct deployment of two STRICOM C-130 squadrons to Southeast Asia (SEA) concurrent with the surge decision to insure optimum recovery of C-130 in-theater resources and provide for probable increased airlift requirements in the post-surge time frame. (59)

(S) Because of a SECDEF-approved inactivation of three squadrons of the 734th Tactical Airlift Wing at Naha Air Base (AB) in Okinawa, CINCPAC reviewed all PACOM forecasted requirements, including MACV's revised surge level. The estimate of the revised surge level was approved by CINCPAC, including 58 aircraft during the first 36 hours and 48 during the remainder of the deployment. The requirement for the 10 additional airframes for maintenance spares was not concurred in based on PACAF's basic maintenance concept of main-support-base/forward-operating-location support arrangement; this provided that all C-130s at the forward operating location be in an operationally ready status, obviating the necessity for in-place spares. Application of available MAC resources to support contingency airlift requirements in SEA was subject to JCS/CofSAF approval and was pursued by separate action by CINCPAC. (60) JCS anticipated staffing of all considerations would be completed by 15 Jan 71. (61)

Delta Transportation Plan

General

(U) The Delta Transportation Plan (DTP), approved in December 1967, coordinated the production and distribution of construction rock between quarries and Delta barge discharge sites operated by four contributors: USARV, ARVN, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC). (The OICC was the DOD construction agent and was responsible for design and construction, by contract, of facilities for all DOD agencies and activities in RVN.) The first shipment of rock was made in January 1968. The Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) provided a fleet of tugs and barges with movement controlled by the MAC TMA in accordance with the MACV Construction Directorate (MACDC) management of rock requirements and loading and discharge sites and the capabilities of the quarries and discharge sites. Rock was used for US/GVN nation-building programs in the Delta. Base camp facilities and major secondary road construction were included in the program. The programmed production and distribution goal was 240,000 STON per month.

Performance

(U) The production and distribution of rock improved greatly during 1970, although pilferage was a great problem. Progress made during the year was due to the development of both physical facilities and coordination among operating elements. The MSTS assets were increased in order to provide transportation for increased tonnage and the growing number of delivery sites.

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(U) January 1970 performance was a total of 191,515 STON of rock shipped. The previous high had been in December 1969 with a total of 186,864 STON. Performance in February, March, and April was lower due to the TET holiday period and labor problems with local nationals employed by the contractors, along with a lack of engineer construction and dredging action. June performance of 245,098 was a considerable increase in production and represented a 4-percent greater delivery than the allocated requirement for the month.

(U) Rock pilferage during July reached such proportions that command correspondence was initiated from MACJ3, MACJ4, and MACDC to the RVNAF JGS. Determination that a ton of rock delivered from the quarry to user-surge pile represented a cost of \$10.45 to the US Government made tightening of the security aspects all the more essential. Estimates made in August indicated as much as 10,000 STON destined for Soc Trang failed to arrive due to actions attributable to VN civilians. Sampans were tied along barges while at anchor or underway and as much as 300 STON were removed from a single barge. There was a great reluctance to stop the pilferage on the part of the VN National Maritime Police, charged with the responsibility at the port of Can Tho, and ARVN who provided the only real law enforcement agency over much of the Delta. There were instances reported concerning ARVN troops pilfering the barges they were supposed to be guarding. A real-time reporting system was developed whereby a tug operator witnessing pilferage could radio to the Military Sealift Command Unit, Can Tho, which would in turn telephone the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) tactical operations center (TOC) for notification to ARVN. In mid-November, the provinces supplied guards on the barges, and by the end of the year, pilferage was almost eliminated.

(U) Increased activity on the part of sappers at Vung Tau also required attention during the year. Progress was made in August by moving military police into the port areas, providing an organized reaction force, while at the same time deterring overt action by their presence. Although the rock production at Nui Sap quarry had doubled in June, repairs to the fenders on the bridge at Long Xuyen and over the Nui Sap Canal prevented use of 570-ton barges in August, thereby reducing the shipping capability of that quarry. The fenders were repaired in September, however, increasing the production for that month.

(U) Rock production was again seriously hampered in October and November by a strike of Vietnamese laborers from the Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen/Brown-Root-Jones (RMK/BRJ) Construction Firm. A decrease for both months resulted.

(U) As of 31 Dec 70, a total of 4,382,130 STON of rock had been produced and distributed through the DTP since its inception in January 1968. The Military Sealift Command assets at the end of the year were 25 tugs and 103 barges, at a cost of \$1 million per month. (62) A recapitulation of rock STONs produced for the year follows. (63)

Recapitulation

JAN	191,515	JUL	224,771
FEB	150,948	AUG	201,504
MAR	158,584	SEP	223,360
APR	172,432	OCT	194,769
MAY	197,043	NOV	172,546
JUN	245,098	DEC	208,282

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Retrograde Movements

(C) Three phases of troop redeployments and inactivations occurred during 1970 under the basic code KEYSTONE. KEYSTONE EAGLE and KEYSTONE CARDINAL had taken place in 1969; retrograde movements during 1970 went more smoothly with no serious difficulties. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY was the first redeployment of the year and KEYSTONE ROBIN was the code for movements under the 150,000 reduction in US authorized strength by 1 May 71. (KEYSTONE movements are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.) A recapitulation of personnel and cargo retrograded follows.

<u>PHASE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>CARGO (STON)</u>
KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (64)	22 Jan-15 Apr 70	7,239	28,904
KEYSTONE ROBIN (ALPHA) (65)	28 Jun-13 Oct 70	34,495	23,780
KEYSTONE ROBIN (BRAVO) (66)	15 Oct-30 Dec 70	20,099	670

MILITARY WATER SUPPLY

(U) Developing military water supply systems has been an omnipresent problem in any war. Vietnam was no exception.

(U) During 1970 a study concerning problems of military water supply systems was sponsored by the DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and monitored by the US Army Missile Command. Conducted by Control Data Corporation, the report was filed 1 Aug. It examined certain problems associated with development of military water systems in Vietnam and means of improvement. It also sought to relate those problems to other MAPs worldwide. Selected situations illustrated specific problems believed common in RVN. No attempt was made to describe, evaluate, or provide data on system performance except as related to selected problems. A summary of the report follows.

Characteristics of Water Systems

(U) ARPA reported that, fundamentally, two basic water systems were developed in Vietnam; that planned for generally large and more permanent bases under the military construction (MILCON) program, and that developed expeditiously for small, isolated camps. ARPA found that the policy for development was characterized by a delegation of responsibility to component commands for planning, construction, and operation phases and in logistical support.

(U) The characteristics of water systems described in the ARPA study were representative of US military systems in Vietnam. No particular problems with regard to sources were indicated except locally where high turbidities (sediment disturbance) occurred. Most water treatment equipment in use in RVN was taken directly from the Army inventory; it was designed specifically for mobility in support of combat troops. An important requirement noted by ARPA

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was for a low-capacity, small-camp treatment system. Systems available from military laboratories or industry were inadequate, but advances in the state of the art suggested such systems were feasible.

(U) Water requirements were prescribed in MACV Directive No. 415-2-4, Standards for Water and Sewage Disposal Systems, dated 22 Jan 69. The actual amount of water consumed was that which was available. Generally, the small camp systems were inefficient, commonly relying on delivery of water by truck or helicopters. In most cases far less water was supplied than was required. The permanent base systems generally were adequate to accomplish the military mission, but there was inefficiency and need for management control.

Water Resources Evaluation

(U) Water resources evaluations and other terrain intelligence were of manifest interest to planners. Detailed data on the hydrologic processes were particularly important because they were scarce and historically valuable. According to the ARPA report, the failure to evaluate resources in RVN was extremely costly. Problems were illustrated by the US naval facility at Nha Be, Fire Support Base Barbara in the Mekong Delta, and various CORDS advisory team camps, where knowledge of annual encroachment of sea water would have permitted the anticipation of a desalination requirement. Other problem areas were the Navy base, Cat Lo, and the Army base at Dong Ba Thin, where an early recognition of the lack of resources would have dictated more appropriate water system designs, and Cam Ranh AB, where an initial delineation of ground-water storage and occurrence would have resulted in shallow rather than deep well systems and a better distribution of sites for withdrawals.

Development of Systems

(U) Water and other utilities for most large bases were initially planned by one agency, designed and constructed by another, and operated and maintained by still another. The component command approach to systems development tended to prevent the unity between phases of development necessary for efficient management.

(U) Temporary rather than permanent systems were prevalent because austerity demanded lower standards of construction. The advantage of permanent over temporary systems was shown by a comparison of water treatment costs for pond and for shallow well waters at the 1st Australian Logistics Support Group and in comparison of distribution costs by vehicle and pipeline for several bases. The data suggested permanent pipeline distribution systems to provide the same service cost about the same or less than truck-hauling for 1 year.

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Conclusions of Water Systems Study

- (U) The ARPA study concluded that experience gained from developing water systems for US Forces in Vietnam should prove extremely useful for improvement and avoiding similar problems where counterinsurgency and civic action operations could develop. The total effect of policies regarding military water utility prevented efficient management because of duplication of effort and lack of coherence in various phases of development. The causes were seen as a result of the inter-relationships of four factors: a lack of an adequate hydrologic data base; a rapid escalation of the conflict which prevented better planning; water treatment equipment outmoded in terms of counterinsurgency warfare; and erroneous concept of the economy of temporary water system designs in the context of Vietnam.

(U) The report recommended that DA sponsor a general reevaluation of the capability of US military forces to develop water supply systems. Included should be special projects to determine the impact of counterinsurgency warfare on current techniques and the feasibility of the military water utility authority concept and projects for contingency planning for water resources development in potential theaters of operations. Also recommended was a review of means for improving US military water systems in Vietnam sponsored by MACV. (67)

TRANSFER OF EXCESS REAL PROPERTY TO RVNAF

General

(U) Because of troop redeployments, many bases, ports, and other facilities constructed and/or used by US Forces became excess to US needs. Gaining the optimum use of the facilities was of major concern to MACV during 1970. Timely and efficient transfer of real property to the RVNAF was particularly critical in view of severe constraints on MASF. Those constraints required off-setting new construction by using existing facilities where possible and assuring that RVNAF capabilities to operate and maintain transferred facilities were not overburdened. To monitor base transfer actions and coordinate solutions to the attendant problems, a new division, the Real Property Management Division, was created in MACDC in November 1969.

Review of 1969

- (U) Transfer of the US 9th Inf Div base camp at Dong Tam to the ARVN 7th Div on 1 Sep 69 was the first major disposal of real property in RVN. Policies and procedures were developed as each transfer progressed. The next transfer of a major base camp was Blackhorse, completed in October 1969. Subsequently Lai Khe involved transfer of a portion of the base to the ARVN 5th Div and return of facilities to the Rubber Research Institute. Camp Enari required a determination by MACV concerning high or low voltage assets left to RVNAF. It resulted in additional guidance by MACV for future transfers of generator assets. Finally, poor maintenance at Dong Ha, a transfer that initially went well, developed action to determine problems of the RVNAF in operating and maintaining the transferrals.

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(U) In November 1969, a combined MACV-JGS Central Committee for Base Transfers was established. It consisted of working level JGS officers and their MACV counterparts. The committee provided a line of direct communication on property transfers, and supervision was accomplished through normal staff and command procedures. Similar regional committees were established by the US senior advisor and Vietnamese commanding general in each MR.

(U) In order to develop RVNAF independence of US funds and advice, an architect and engineer service contract study to develop an effective RVNAF facilities maintenance management system was started on 1 Dec 69 for completion in January 1971. The study included a representative inventory of RVNAF facility assets; the conversion of the inventory quantities to requirements for supporting personnel, funds, and materials; and the development of procedures and facilities management organizations for accomplishing effective management. (68)

Facility Transfers in 1970

General

(U) The RVNAF facilities management system in 1970 was largely ineffective. Maintenance and repairs were accomplished mostly on a unit self-help basis with little attention given to preventive maintenance. Budget estimates to support an effective maintenance program were unrealistic. The standards of maintenance did not provide for an adequate level of support to preclude deterioration of real property assets. (69) The ARVN budget for facilities management for 1970 was approximately \$US2.5 million in contrast to the US Army budget of almost \$US200 million. (70) (71) The need to develop an effective facility management system for RVNAF use was compounded by the transfer of a large number of comparatively sophisticated US facilities.

Policies and Procedures for Disposal

(U) In March MACV Directive 735-3 was revised to incorporate experience gained from the large transfers to date. It contained the policies and procedures for disposal of excess US Armed Forces real and related property. The directive contained a priority listing for transfers, policy on the types and required condition of facilities and equipment that could be transferred, delineation of security responsibilities, and instruction on written agreements which had to be negotiated. Approval for transfers to agencies other than the US military was retained by COMUSMACV. All transfers to the RVNAF required direct coordination with JGS. (72)

Transfers and Problem Areas

(U) By 31 Dec 70, 38 separate actions were in the process and 77 transfers were completed. See Table IX-3 for a list of the completed transfers. (73) Some of the major problems encountered as a result of the transfers were: selection of facilities engineering trainees and scope of instruction; insufficient ARVN manpower to provide minimum facilities maintenance; inability of operations and maintenance personnel to operate and maintain sophisticated equipment such

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INSTALLATION PROPERTY TRANSFERS TO RVNAF				NEW OCCUPANT		PERIOD OF TRANSFER	
BASE	MS	PREVIOUS OCCUPANT					
Camp Tamiet	2	4th Bn, 6th Army		22d Div (ARVN)		13 Jun 68-28 Jun 68	
Duong Dong	4	40th TAC Com Gt		Phy Quoc Sub Sec		6 Jan 69-8 Jan 69	
Camp An Hoa	1	Amertal Div		24 Inf. Div (ARVN)		11 Jul 69-29 Jul 69	
Dong Tam	4	4th Mar Div		7th Div (ARVN)		18 Jun 69-31 Aug 69	
Dong Lam	1	1st Mar Div		17th Cav Sqdn (ARVN)		10 Sep 69-20 Sep 69	
Tan My	1	1st Mar Div		1st ALC (ARVN)		5 Sep 69-26 Sep 69	
Phu Loc Quarry Site	1	124 NCR		RF/PF		3 Oct 69-7 Oct 69	
Blackburn	1	11th ACR-109th LIR		18th Div (ARVN)		2 Sep 69-24 Oct 69	
Duong An (RED HOLE)	1	7th AT		4th Air Wing (VNAF)		12 May 69-28 Oct 69	
Vinh Dien Rock Crusher Base	1	1st Mar Div; 1st NCR, USMC					
Dong Ha USAF	1	44th Army		1st Div (ARVN)		24 Oct 69-1 Nov 69	
Camp Red Bull	1	Det 2, 620th TAC Com Sqdn		1st Div (ARVN)		31 Oct 69-11 Nov 69	
Dong Ha Combat Base	1	1st Bn 724 Div		GVN		47 Sep 69-16 Nov 69	
FLSC-B Dong Ha	1	Force Log Sq		1st Div (ARVN)		15 Oct 69-26 Nov 69	
LT Valley	1	1st Mar Div		1st Div (ARVN)		5 Nov 69-29 Nov 69	
My Tho	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		27 Nov 69	
Camp Barnes	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		29 Nov 69	
LT Station	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		Nov 69-5 Dec 69	
Camp Copperhead	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		1 Jan 70	
Bien Hoa	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		20 Jan 70	
The Kien An Area	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		20 Jan 70	
20th Viet Det Area of	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)		25 Jan 70-2 Feb 70	
1st Eval Group	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
1st Eval Group	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Dong Ha (Force Log Group)	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
NSA Dong Ha Camp	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Camp Ma	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Vung Tau (M-10)	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Hill 17	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Phung Loi	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Hill 17	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Vung Tau (North Coast Area)	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			
Camp Vung Tau	1	1st Div (ARVN)		1st Div (ARVN)			

SOURCE: MACV

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INSTALLATION PROPERTY TRANSFER (CONT.)			PERIOD OF TRANSFER	
BASE	PREVIOUS OCCUPANT	NEW OCCUPANT		
Can Tho Binh Thuan Prov Complex	4th Term Cont	Can Tho Trava Term Cont	19 Mar 70	
Lai Khe (Phase II)	1st Inf Div	5th Div (ARVN)	25 Feb 70-19 Mar 70	
Camp Barker	1st Inf Div	III Corps (ARVN)	23 Mar 70	
NSAD Post, Sa Huyen	NSAD Impact Det	Quang Ngai Sect	28 Mar 70	
Camp Sally	101st Air Div (ARVN)	1st Elem, 3rd Inf Regt (ARVN)	30 Mar 70	
PSB Gator	American Div	24 Div (ARVN)	10 Apr 70	
PSB Fat City	2nd Regt Div	RF	14 Apr 70	
LZ Da Nang	192nd Inf (ARVN)	5th ARVN Reg 23d Arty	14 Apr 70	
Camp Kinas	4th Inf Div	2nd 2nd Inf Div ARVN	15 Apr 70	
Da Nang Mountain	4th Inf Div	22d Div (ARVN)	15 Apr 70	
LZ Ma	American Div	22d Div (ARVN)	18 Apr 70	
Camp Kinas	ADV Co	RF	25 Apr 70	
Camp Barker	5th Spz Cont	Binh Duong Recruiting and Inducting Bn (GVN)	24 Apr 70	
Vung Tay, Ha Nam (Phase I)	5th Spz Cont	Sgt Trans Term.	12 Apr 70-30 Apr 70	
Camp Kinas	5th Spz Cont	OCO, OCT (ARVN)	2 May 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	211 Transport Co (ARVN)		
Camp Barker	5th Spz Cont	201st Trans Term. Ser Co	2 May 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	4th Inf Regt (ARVN)	15 May 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	HQ Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	22 May 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	5th Div (ARVN)	11 Jun 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	21 Jun 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	3rd Regt Port Authority	24-26 Jun 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	24th Comm. Sqdn (41st Wing)	24 Jun 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Ministry of Health World Rec	30 Jun 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Comm. Inc		
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Land Retained by USA-Bldgs	10 Jul 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Disassembled and given to		
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Phu Yen Sect	15 Jul 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	20 Jul 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	1st RF Co.	24 Jul 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	ARVN	1 Aug 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	3 Aug 70	
5th Spz Cont	5th Spz Cont	Thang Binh Sector (RF)		

SOURCE: MACVDC

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INSTALLATION PROPERTY TRANSFER (CONT.)				
BASE	MR	PREVIOUS OCCUPANT	NEW OCCUPANT	PERIOD OF TRANSFER
Engineer Hill	2	(USA)	65th Engr Bn (ARVN)	3 Aug 70
II ALC Training Center- Q.in	2	(USA)	II ALC Training Center Binh	20 Aug 70
Nhon			Dinh Sector HQ	
LST Beach	2	(USA)	203d Trans Medium Boat Gp (ARVN)	20 Aug 70
Hue Lcu Ramp	1	32nd NCR (USA)	Thua Thien Log Mgt Ctr	28 Aug 70
Tay Ninh	3	25th Div (USA)	25th Div (ARVN)	4 Sep 70
Nam O Bridge	1	3rd Bn 1st Mar Div (USMC)	Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	5 Sep 70
Liberty Bridge	1	(USMC)	Quang Da Special Zone (RF)	7 Sep 70
An Hoa C. 9.	1	Air Base (USMC)	51st Reg (ARVN)	7 Sep 70
8th Field Hosp	2	8th Field Hosp (USA)	RVNAF	8 Sep 70
Marble Mt Transmitter Site	1	(USN)	41st TACAIR Wing 1st Air Div	9 Sep 70
Camp Keaton	3	6/31st Inf D Batt 2/4 Field Arty	50th Reg	10 Sep 70
Camp Hoover	1	101st ABN Div (USA)	Danang 8th Const Gp	11 Sep 70
Tan An	3	3rd Bde/9th Inf	303d RF Bn 627th RF Co	20 Sep 70
L2 Artillery Hill	1	23d Div	6th Inf Reg	10 Oct 70
9th Engr Compound	1	9th Engr Bn	Danang 8th Const Gp	14 Oct 70
Dau Tieng II	3	25th Inf Div	One Bn of 49th Reg 25th ARVN Div	15 Nov 70

SOURCE: MACJ4

Table IX-1 (b)

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as high-voltage generators; time duration and extent of US responsibility to assist ARVN units not clearly understood; authorizations for MASF not keeping up with actual quantities of equipment transferred to ARVN; some non-standard items transferred (especially electric generators in MR 1); and inadequate information on need for spare parts.

(U) Any solution for training ARVN personnel to operate and maintain facilities was considered as short range and had to be flexible enough to be adapted to the facilities maintenance study underway. The training involved included only those skills not readily available to ARVN, e.g., generator operators, and not traditional skills such as carpenters and plumbers. The proposed training program included the following factors: identification of manpower spaces to operate and maintain facilities; identification and selection of personnel for those spaces; and extent of on-the-job (OJT) and formal training of selected personnel. Two possible means evolved by which ARVN could gain the capability to operate and maintain transferred facilities. Both were easily implemented and readily available. Under one plan, the ARVN unit receiving transferred facilities was tasked by JGS to provide USARV sufficient personnel for training to operate and maintain the facilities. Basically, it was a formalized OJT program. Under the second plan, ARVN identified manpower spaces and assigned personnel from the Military Property Construction Office (MPCO), and USARV provided contractor instructors to prepare men for their eventual assignment.

(U) Added to the requirement for trained personnel to operate and maintain transferred facilities was the problem of providing sufficient spare parts. The desired level for depot-type items was 180 days supply, with a 90-day-level for those items required for bench stock by the local post, such as light bulbs. MACJ4, with its advisor capability, assisted ARVN in identifying the spare parts level required for maintenance.

(U) The immediate objective of RVNAF was development of the facilities engineering capability adequately manned and trained to provide minimum operation and maintenance services for transferred facilities. The Area Logistics Command (ALC) had the organization capability to accomplish the objective with the MPCO for ARVN bases. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) organized and trained facilities engineering detachments at their larger bases, primarily through the large facilities engineering contractors.

(U) Related closely to the question of capability to operate and maintain facilities was the question of need. As additional facilities became available, care was taken to assure that RVNAF did not assume responsibility for more facilities than required. Military efficiency of RVNAF would have suffered had they accepted too many. In addition to the combined MACV/JGS Central Committee for Base Transfers discussed previously, close relations were established between MACV staff, MACV field advisors, and USAID to consider all possible uses of real and related property excess to needs of US Forces so it would be used most effectively in satisfying US Mission objectives. (74)

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Communications Continuity

(U) Communications systems continuity had to be maintained throughout the period of transfer of a US base to an operational RVNAF base. For equipment of Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), Table of Allowance (TA) and Table of Equipment (TE) required and authorized to be left in place by a redeploying unit, required replacements had to be made as early as possible. All items of the following communications-electronics (C-E) equipment used at a US base to be transferred were reported to MACV either as items proposed for transfer to RVNAF or items to be removed prior to transfer:

1. Perimeter security equipment and systems.
2. Administrative communications systems.
3. Longhaul access communications.
4. Navigation aids.
5. Radars and assorted equipment.
6. Other C-E systems, including outside plant.

(U) Only items specifically approved by MACV were transferred to RVNAF. MACV conducted a survey to determine the requirements of transfer bases using lists of equipment furnished by component commanders. Only the minimum equipment absolutely required for operation of the facility was authorized. RVNAF organization TOE/TA equipment was used whenever practicable for base operation rather than authorizing additional TA equipment. Also wherever practicable, communications, weapons, and other equipment required and authorized as TA equipment for the base camp mission consisted of excess non-preferred items on hand in RVNAF and were shown on authorization documents. As an example, base camp or perimeter defense requirements could be satisfied with AN/PRC-10 radio ILO AN/PRC-25, EE-8 telephone ILO TA-312, and M1919 Cal .30 MG ILO M60 MG. In determining the amount of rehabilitation or repair needed to return a facility to usable condition, austere standards and health, safety, and physical security were considered. Beautification was not a consideration. (75)

Turnover of Port Facilities

Background

(U) On 26 May 69, COMUSMACV approved the concept of Vietnamization of ports. A joint US/Vietnamese committee was appointed to study the entire picture and identify ports or portions thereof which could be turned over to RVNAF or converted to joint operation. In November 1969, the committee announced the following schedule for Vietnamization of US military-operated ports:

1. Can Tho: Complete turnover and signed agreement by 1 Jan 70.
2. Saigon Port (Messagerie Maritime (MM) piers only): Complete turnover of that area and a signed agreement by 1 Jan 70. Withdrawal from Camp Davies and turnover of piers K11 and K12 by 31 Mar 70.
3. Vung Tau: Complete turnover by 1 Jul 70.

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Vung Tau Port

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4. Nha Trang: Joint usage was accomplished 1 Dec 69. RVNAF would assume complete takeover by 1 Jul 70, dependent upon their capabilities.

5. Qui Nhon: RVNAF would assume off-loading of their ammunition by civilian contractor on 1 Jan 70.

6. Danang: No date was established for turnover. (76)

Turnover in 1970

(U) During January, ARVN worked ARVN cargo through the shallow out-ports of Hue, Dong Ha, and Chu Lai. ARVN had one transportation terminal service company assigned to MR 1, at approximately 50 percent TOE. In order for the ARVN to become self-sufficient, the company had to be at 100 percent TOE.

(U) ARVN's long-range plan in MR 1 was to operate one pier at Danang and be capable of supporting the out-ports of Dong Ha, Tay Thuong, Tien Sha, Trinh Minh, and Chu Lai. To support the shallow ports, ARVN would station small port detachments which could move from port to port, dependent upon projected incoming cargo to be discharged. ARVN requirements were approximately 4,000-6,000 STON of ammunition per month at Vung Tau. ARVN was willing to assume that mission dependent upon a change to the MACV/RVNAF ammunition agreement and receipt of certain items of equipment. Their modus operandi was to put the port at Vung Tau on a standby status, using it only in emergency situations. A small housekeeping detachment would be stationed there. Personnel and equipment from ARVN's Saigon Transportation Terminal Command would be moved to Vung Tau on an as-required basis. (77)

(U) In February the ARVN worked the MM piers in Saigon, discharging and backloading both US and ARVN cargo. The first turnover of a US military operated port to ARVN, Can Tho, took place in March 1970. The formal agreement was signed by MACJ4 and the DepCofS for Logistics, JGS, in February for the turnover of the port's mission, facilities, and operations. An agreement was finalized in May for the turnover of the MM area of the Saigon port. The formal transfer of the MM area had been delayed by a shortfall in GVN transportation budget and repairs on pier facilities. All aspects were satisfactorily resolved and an agreement was signed on 9 Nov 70, transferring operational control from the US Army to ARVN.

(U) Before the Nha Trang outpost could be turned over to ARVN, the ROKFV troop rotation embarkation/debarkation mission had to move from Nha Trang to Cam Ranh Bay. In July a meeting of US interested commands was held at HQ MACV to resolve problems associated with the move. A MACV message set 1 Oct as the effective date, with the turnover on a date mutually agreeable to USAF and RVNAF, but no later than 1 Oct. The agreement transferring the water port at Nha Trang to ARVN was signed 27 Oct with all aspects of the transfer satisfactorily resolved. The first troopship, USNS Barrett, called at Cam Ranh Bay on 11 Oct. All indications pointed to more efficient, expedient, and acceptable debarkation/embarkation through Cam Ranh Bay for ROK Forces, Vietnam (ROK FV). (78)

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM STATUS (As of 31 Dec 70) (Millions)

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FY65MCP PL88/390	12.8	9.4	15.9	38.1
FY65SUP PL89/18	36.1	17.4	21.5	75.0
FY66MCP PL89/213	29.1	30.3	13.5	72.9
FY66ADD PL89/213	35.8	32.9	39.2	107.9
FY66SUP PL89/374	424.4	189.0	178.2	791.6
FY67SUP PL90/5	217.5	76.1	98.6	392.2
FY68REG PL90/110	72.4	31.9	24.7	129.0
FY68SUP PL90/392	16.4	8.7	13.7	38.8
FY69REG PL90/408	77.5	50.9	-0-	128.4
MILCON TOTAL	851.2	435.2	375.5	1661.9
MAP TRANSPERS	70.8	11.4	29.8	112.0
TOTAL FUNDED	922.0	446.6	405.3	1773.9
	<u>TOTAL FUNDS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE COMMITMENTS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS</u>
ARMY	922.0	921.1	395.1	782.9
NAVY	446.6	444.6	431.1	399.7
AIR FORCE	405.3	403.9	402.0	390.2
TOTAL	1773.9	1769.6	1728.2	1573.0

SOURCE: MACDC

TABLE IX-4

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MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

(U) A diminishing requirement for US facilities changed the emphasis on construction in support of US Forces to that of Vietnamization improvement and modernization (I&M) in 1969. During 1970 the emphasis on Vietnamization continued with funds released by SECDEF for Vietnamization or LOC construction. More stringent controls were applied in order to stretch available construction funds to provide critical requirements for the I&M program. An emergency had to exist to obtain approval of new construction for US Forces.

Program Status

MILCON Funding

(U) At the end of December 1969, SECDEF released \$15.5 million in Navy FY69 Unapportioned Funds for urgent requirements. In March 1970, \$12.4 million, also Navy money, was released. Receipt of those funds depleted the Navy's unapportioned balance and raised the total of the Navy program to \$446.6 million. In April and October 1970, \$20.2 million and \$15 million, respectively, of Army FY69 Unapportioned Funds followed, increasing the Army fund assignment to \$992.0 million. (79) (80) Each of the releases permitted construction on urgent, validated projects to support Vietnamization or LOC construction. The Air Force's share of the MILCON program was \$405.3 million. Total cumulative MILCON funding through CY 70 was \$1.7739 billion. (See Table IX-4 for the status of the MILCON funding as of 31 Dec 70.) The total programmed MILCON requirements as of 31 Dec 70 totaled \$241.3 million (see Figure IX-5). (81)


Obligations and Work-in-Place

(U) Obligations had been extremely erratic during early 1969 as initial efforts to turn the MILCON program from US support to Vietnamization got under way. The obligation rate settled down somewhat after July 1969 and progressed steadily through the latter part of 1969 and through 1970 as the program requirements became better refined. (82) By the end of 1970, a total of \$1.728 million had been obligated (see Figure IX-6). (83)

(U) Work-in-place (WIP) advanced at a steady rate through April 1970. From 1 Jul to 31 Dec 69, work went into the ground at a \$15 million per month rate, dropping off to \$13 million per month through April 1970. A negative placement of \$11 million occurred in May, a result of reductions in working estimates by the OICC in overhead costs. The reductions were made possible by reduced contractor overhead and indirect costs, advanced equipment amortization, completed material capitalization, and improved management by the contractor. The net result of the reductions was that \$30 million was realized for application to existing unfunded requirements. (84) The cumulative value of WIP at the end of the 1970 totaled \$1.609 billion (plotted in Figure IX-6). (85)

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
SOURCE: MACDC

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FIGURE IX-5

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MILCON FUNDS




SOURCE: MACDC

FIGURE IX-6

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DISTRIBUTION MILCON WORK-31 DEC 70
(\\$ MILLIONS)



SOURCE: MACDC

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FIGURE IX-7

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Vietnamization

(U) The effectiveness of efforts to turn the construction program toward Vietnamization is shown on Figure IX-7. The distribution of \$1.609 billion WIP completed by major facility categories as of 31 Dec 70 is given. In addition, the funded and unfunded Work-To-Place (requirement) is shown, totaling \$379 million. The work-to-place remaining for US Forces totaled \$89 million; work in support of Vietnamization totaled \$212 million. (86) The LOC program distribution is also shown.

Phase III, I&M Plan Requirements.

(U) In December 1969, the Phase III, I&M Plan was submitted to CINCPAC. Annex K to the plan identified \$405.3 million in unfunded construction requirements. Those requirements were identified by line items in the plan and were categorized by Vietnamization (including advisor facilities), LOC, and US support. For the first time, the total remaining construction requirements had been defined in detail. The unfunded requirements were reduced through funding actions and continuous review by the service components. During the first 6 months, the component services and MACV deleted \$214.5 million in unfunded requirements by a hard approach to "making do or doing without" for US support, and by making maximum use of facilities vacated by redeploying US units to fill RVNAF requirements. (87) By 31 Dec unfunded requirements totaled \$81.8 million (see Figure IX-8 for the total unfunded program for 1970). The potential funding sources were \$19.5 million of available in-country funds, \$19.2 million of unapportioned FY69 Army MILCON funds, \$25 million FY71 unapportioned Army MILCON funds, and \$20 million of OSD Worldwide Contingency Funds for a total of \$62.7 million. (88)

(U) Certain construction projects for the RVNAF were funded through MASF. A review of the various funding programs follows.


Army MASF Construction Program

(U) The Army MASF program was subjected to an intensive review during the final quarter of 1970. All unfunded projects totaling \$143 million were reviewed and the following decisions concerning the projects were given:

1. Funded projects-retained \$39.0 million; cancelled \$4.2 million.
2. Unfunded projects-retained for future funding, \$80 million; deleted from program, \$20 million. (89)

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SOURCE: MACDC

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FIGURE IX-8

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(U) The review defined the existing program at the end of the year. The overall status of the Army MASF program by major project grouping on 31 Dec was as shown below. (90)

	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Funded Not Comp</u>	<u>Unfunded</u>
Regional Forces (RF) Company Cantonments	222	3	0
Regular Force Company Cantonments	196	52	69
Hospitals New/Upgrade	8	5	4
Communication Facilities	26	25	17
Training Centers and Schools	23	24	4
Sector Management Direct Support Logistical Centers	0	41	3
Base Depot Upgrade	0	3	0
School/Training Centers Water Upgrade	0	18	2
Ammunition Depot Program	0	3	9

Navy MASF Construction Program

(U) During the 1st Qtr CY70, construction progressed at 22 out of 29 programmed ACTOV bases. Construction of the Cho Moi VNN base under the ACTOV-expanded program was placed on directive as were construction line items totaling \$3.8 million for the Vietnamese Naval Shipyard in Saigon. The latter included construction, rehabilitation, or repair of all maintenance and production shops, hardstands, reefs, berthing piers, and all utilities of the naval shipyard. When completed, the shipyard facilities would accommodate all large ships of the expanded VNN fleet for major overhaul and repair.

(U) During the 3d Qtr, construction directives were approved for two new Navy ACTOV bases at Hoi An (\$48,000) and Moc Hoa (\$1,452,000) with realigned requirements at several other installations. The VNN Hospital at Saigon and the last FY70 increment of VNN and Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) dependent shelters and community shelters were approved.

(U) Construction directives were issued during the 3d Qtr for 12 of 16 VNN radar sites located throughout RVN, the Vung Tau VNMC camp, VNN Headquarters, Public Works Center, and a receiving and processing center in Saigon. The final four VNN radar sites were funded in the 4th Qtr.

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(U) Three other projects were funded in the 4th Qtr: classrooms at Cam Ranh Bay (\$259,000); overhaul/rebuild of generators and engines used by VNN (\$1,716,000); and VNN base facilities at Chu Lai (\$83,000). All three projects were vitally needed to support the rapid expansion of VNN. (91)

Air Force MASF Construction Program

(U) The VNAF I&M Program for Phase III was greatly reduced during the 1st Qtr CY70 with a 7AF decision not to build duplicate facilities for the expanding VNAF on joint-use bases because existing US facilities would eventually be turned over to the VNAF. Accordingly, 11 MASF projects totaling \$2,553,000 were cancelled at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Da Nang. During the 2d Qtr, a 2,400 unit dependent shelter program (\$1,440,000) and repair of the Nha Trang runway (\$937,000) were approved. The latter was completed during the 3d Qtr.

(U) A total of \$2 million was withdrawn in Oct from Air Force SEA MILCON appropriations assigned to MACV in support of RVN. In November construction and repair of airfield facilities at Soc Trang were authorized. The \$966,600 project included the repair or construction of runways, aprons, ammunition storage, electric prime power, water wells, dormitories, supply facilities, and runway lights. Construction was to be a combination of troop and contractor effort, and it was planned to start in the 1st Qtr CY71. (92)

Upgrade Programs

(U) Notwithstanding funding deficiencies, progress was made in improving and upgrading bases, roads, and railway lines. The latter two subjects are covered later in this chapter. See the Army MASF program in this chapter for the status of the Base Depot Upgrade Program and Chapter VII for discussion of that program; the Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP); the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS); and the Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP). In addition to the aforementioned programs, other actions were taken for the improvement of facilities in RVN.

Airfields

(U) Airfields were a target for upgrading. The rapid deterioration of Type I and II forward airfields and requests of the 234th Air Div for repair and maintenance of the fields resulted in an in-depth study. The study by MACDC and MACJ3 identified a list of 43 airfields which were to receive a permanent surface. Twenty of the 43 were scheduled for paving during CY70 and CY71 in conjunction with paving for the LOC program. Paving of the remaining 23 was planned after CY71. In view of the changing operational requirements and limited maintenance and paving assets, field force commanders were requested to revalidate the listing of airfields to be retained, including those scheduled for resurfacing. Completion of the review in the 3d Qtr resulted in identification of 101 airfields to be retained with resurfacing required on 11 airfields. Selections were based on responses by the respective area coordinators, consideration of the availability of construction resources, limited funding availability, and accessibility of airfields in relation to the location of construction assets, including labor and material. As of 31 Dec, all 11 of the airfields requiring rehabilitation were funded. (93)

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(U) In addition to the upgrade of airfields, the Air Force and the Navy developed programs for erection of covered aircraft shelters.

Air Force Program- "Project Concrete Sky"

(U) On 13 Jan 70 Air Force Red Horse units (Rapid Engineering Deployment and Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons, Engineering) completed the erection of corrugated steel shelters at the air bases at Danang, Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Phu Cat, Phan Rang, and Tuy Hoa. The original program had called for the erection of 408 units for \$8,775 million, but 16 units for Phu Cat were cancelled for a final total of 392 units constructed with \$7,992 million allocated. The final breakdown of the program was: Danang-98; Bien Hoa 75; Tan Son Nhut-62; Phu Cat-40; Phan Rang-61; and Tuy Hoa-56.

(U) In addition to the steel shelters, the OICC contractor placed concrete covers on Danang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. The concrete covers were 15 inches thick on ridges and 29 inches thick in valleys. Extensive apron construction and revetment relocation as well as limited dispersal aprons were also involved.

(U) During the 1st Qtr CY70, the Air Force received approval to construct 12 shelter closures as a combat field test program. The closures consisted of a nylon ballistic curtain dropping over the front of the shelter. The system was motorized with a manual override. The follow-on project of eight alert shelters at Phan Rang and four at Danang was started in January and completed on 31 Mar. (94)

Navy Aircraft Shelter Program

(U) The Navy Aircraft Shelter Program originally consisted of two phases for 170 and 129 units, respectively, at five bases. Construction of the shelters began in July 1969. In December 1969 the shelter program was reduced to one phase of 170 units, and in April 1970 an additional 48 units were cancelled. By the end of 1970, 114 of the 122 units were erected and covered. The Navy program comprised the following: Danang-57; Marble Mountain-32, and Chu Lai-33. Originally it was planned to erect eight over-sized shelters at Danang for Fleet Air Support Unit aircraft. The program was subsequently reduced to two. Construction was in progress on one by the end of 1970. (95)

Staging Areas

(U) In order to meet the rigid health standards of US Department of Agriculture and the US Public Health Service, it became necessary in early FY70 to upgrade staging areas at ports and marshaling yards. The facilities, including wash racks, parking areas, grease racks, maintenance shops, and lighting systems for 24-hour operation were required to clean, prepare, and stage vehicles and equipment prior to shipment. The required facilities at Newport and Long Binh were completed the 1st Qtr, CY70; those at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay during the 3d Qtr; and that in Qui Nhon was scheduled for completion on 31 Jan 71. (96)

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MACV Advisor Facilities

(U) The upgrading of MACV advisor facilities was started in 1968. A total of 293 projects involving vertical construction and water supply for 215 advisor locations was identified with project accomplishment by both troop and contractor forces. As of June 1970, 90 sites were completed with 89 and 36 sites in progress or awaiting start of construction, respectively.

(U) During the 3d Qtr nine additional projects at nine locations were identified. By the end of 1970, a total of 244 sites were identified with 191 completed, 27 in progress, and 26 awaiting start of construction. (97)

Screening and Detention Facilities

(U) In September 1969 a three-phase construction program for screening and detention facilities was implemented. Twenty-nine facilities with a total of 8,300 spaces were planned at that time. Phase I consisted of eight sites with 3,400 spaces and was completed during the 2d Qtr CY70. Phase II consisted of 17 sites with 4,100 spaces. Contracts for the construction of 15 sites were awarded to lump sum contractors. By the end of June, 12 sites were completed and a total of 14 were finished by the end of December. Phase III initially consisted of four sites with 1,400 spaces. Projects for Long An and Khanh Hoa Provinces were cancelled by the MACV CofS. The completion of the construction for the remaining two was delayed by real estate procurement and construction had not started by the end of the year. (98)

RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program

(U) A very large and important construction program was for the benefit of RVNAF dependents. The RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program represented \$28 million of the unfunded requirements shown on Figure IX-8. An 8-year program developed jointly by MACV and JGS is discussed below. This long-range program was based on a total estimated requirement of 200,000 shelters for RVNAF and RF forces.

Resume' of RVNAF Programs

(U) 1961-1963. The dependent housing program was initiated to provide approximately 64,000 family units for servicemen below the grade of sergeant. The austere design did not include water, electricity, or sanitary facilities. From April 1961 to December 1963, approximately 18,700 family units were completed. Fund allocations were approximately \$VN78 million.

(U) 1964. The CY64 goal was construction of 40,000 family units costing approximately \$VN333 million. The improved design included a concrete floor, added kitchen space, and made provisions for addition of interior partitioning, potable water, electricity, and sanitary facilities. By mid-year, deterioration of existing dependent housing and expanded requirements caused a program reevaluation. The program was changed to provide prefabricated housing for all regular force NCOs and enlisted families. A revised total program objective of 143,000 dependent shelter units was established. The program was hampered by a lack of contractor interest; difficulty in obtaining land and local labor; diversion of materials to civilians for flood relief in late 1964; and a critical shortage of transportation.

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(U) 1965. In early 1965 material storage capability and shortage of longhaul transportation became serious problems. By late 1965 most of the problems were resolved and all 40,000 units programmed were received from contractors. The program in 1965 provided for 24,000 units of the 1964 design at a cost of \$VN969 million. In September a revised total program of 200,000 units was approved by JGS and execution of the program was decentralized. Each corps tactical zone (CTZ) and the Capital Military District (CMD) received \$VN116.2 million for a total of \$VN581 million to procure and construct housing. The entire allocation was returned to the Ministry of Finance because of failure to obligate funds by 31 Dec 65. In addition a lumber shortage caused a reduction from 24,000 units to 18,500. Of the 18,500 units placed under contract, only 6,500 were delivered. Contracts for the remaining units were cancelled in March 1966 for failure to deliver. A separate RF 1965 program of \$VN337 million produced 7,221 units by the end of 1966.

(U) 1966. Early in the year the Ministry of Defense directed the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) to assume general staff responsibility for dependent housing planning. Of the \$VN400 million in the budget, \$VN200 million was allocated for completion of the 1964 and 1965 programs. The remaining \$VN200 was distributed so the CTZs and the CMD each received \$VN39 million. The GPWD Political Warfare (POLWAR) School received \$VN5 million for new housing at Dalat (37 units). Plans for the 10-family units were increased from a 6X30 meter building to 8X30 meters. Due to increased costs only a total of 2,150 family units were built. A separate RF program of \$VN5 million resulted in 176 units.


(U) 1967. In January JGS transferred program responsibility from GPWD to its Base Development Division, Central Logistic Command. For CY67 the Ministry of National Defense requested appropriations of \$VN400 million for new housing for both regular and regional forces. Because of economy measures, that was reduced by the National Assembly to \$VN300 million. The funded program contained 2,443 units. A total of 2,408 units were completed. Contracts for the remaining 35 units were cancelled.

(U) 1969. The CY68 program provided for the construction of 5,151 units at a budget cost of approximately \$VN379 million. The program was accomplished by contract. A total of 4,951 units was completed and 200 units were under construction as of 31 Dec 68.

(U) 1969. In December 1966 a pilot program for self-help dependent housing in III CTZ had been approved by SECDEF and funded with \$2.8 million of Operations and Maintenance Army (O&MA) funds for construction of 9,130 units. The program was self-help with supplies and materials provided by the US. Due to the frequency of tactical operations, combat units were unable to find sufficient time to complete the shelters. In late 1968 the program was reoriented to provide materials for self-help and materials for contracts funded by the GVN. Of the original \$2.8 million, \$800,000 was set aside for ARVN self-help materials. Of the 1,378 units programmed, 1,168 units were completed by 31 Dec 69. The remaining \$2.0 million (\$1.35 million CY69 and \$.65 million in CY70) was set aside for materials as part of a commodity support effort with GVN. GVN provided \$VN209.5 million in CY69 and \$VN45.8 million in CY70 for contracts with US furnished materials. A total of 4,620 family units were included in the CY69 program and 2,230 in CY70 program. As of 31 Dec 69, 1,240 of the 1969 units were completed.

(U) In addition to the 1969 US-GVN commodity support program GVN budgeted for construction of 2,640 units costing approximately \$VN155.5 million.

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SOURCE: MACDC




FIGURE IX-9

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STANDARD DEPENDENT SHELTER AS APPROVED BY THE DSPG FEB 70

Notes: 1. Shelters are to be built in row form, 10 families shelters to a building.

2. Living area	SQ FT	SQ M
Room, roofed	265	24.5
Yard, unroofed	150	14.0
Kitchen and latrine, roofed	57	5.25
Porch, roofed	57	5.25
Total	529	49.00

3. At occupant's expense a loft can be constructed to provide 132 sq ft (22.3 sq m) additional useable area.

4. Shelter has indoor toilet, flushed by bucket, and an earthen floor. Water supply is from outside the shelter from a well or a water tap. Electrical service is not provided.

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(U) The 1969 Revolutionary Development Commodity Project (Popular Forces (PF) dependent housing) of the USAID/DOD Program Realignment for Operations in Vietnam authorized \$3.5 million (US) for PF dependent housing. Reprogramming actions reduced that to \$1.3 million to provide materials for 6,045 units. The self-help program was implemented by MACV Directive 405-4. FY69 MILCON funds in the amount of \$1.5 million were provided for construction of 2,420 units for VNN. The program was in two phases. Phase I included \$900,000 for 1,500 units and Phase II \$600,000 for 920 units. In Phase I, 75 family units were completed and 136 under construction as of 31 Dec 69.

(U) 1970. The CY70 GVN Dependent Housing Program provided for construction of 6,190 family units at a budget cost of \$VN300 million. Included were 2,230 units for which materials were provided by FY67 O&MA funds. Construction was accomplished by self-help, ARVN troop labor, and contractors.

(U) FY70 USAID/DOD realignment funds in the amount of \$3.541 million were programmed to provide self-help construction of 15,742 family units for the PF. (99)

MACV/JGS Dependent Shelter Program Group (DSPG)

(U) The DSPG was established in November 1969 to manage the jointly funded dependent shelter program. By April 1970 the DSPG had determined future requirements for the RVNAF other than the PF; developed a program to meet established requirements; and set design, standards, costs, and priorities for construction.

(U) The DSPG agreed that the objective for the future program should be:

To provide shelters for the immediate families of service personnel excluding those whose sponsors have not completed their basic phase of training and those families whose sponsors voluntarily elect to locate them elsewhere. (100)

(U) The DSPG estimated the long-range unsatisfied requirement, as of December 1969, was 240,000 shelters for the RVNAF, other than PF. It assumed 40,000 families could be sheltered using US facilities vacated upon redeployments; thus, the requirement for new construction was 200,000 shelters. The latter figure was based on available data, i.e., marital ratio, number of personnel in a training status and existing shelters, and certain assumptions such as manning levels and percentage of those not desiring shelters.

(U) The DSPG considered four programs, ranging from 5 to 10 years in length. The group decided upon an 8-year program (1970-1977) to meet the new construction requirements.

(U) Twenty-two different designs for the units were compared and analyzed. The one selected was in accordance with cultural standards of the Vietnamese, was functional and austere (see Figure IX-9). The DSPG approved a set of standards which incorporated the selected design. Under those standards, the cost could be held to \$600 per family shelter. The US principally provided cement, lumber, and corrugated metal; GVN provided the rest of the materials and the construction force. The cost covered all work normally chargeable to a

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BILL OF MATERIALS CY 1971 DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM

US COMMODITY SUPPORT MATERIALS*

NOMENCLATURE	UNIT OF ISSUE	TOTAL QTY FOR 10 UNIT SHELTERS
Cement, Portland, Gray, Type 1, 50kg	BAG	740
Sheet Stl, Galv, Corr, ga 26, 27 1/2 x 96"	HT	380
Lumber, 1" x 8" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	460
Lumber, 1" x 10" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	285
Lumber, 1" x 4" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	530
Lumber, 2" x 4" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	3,200
Lumber, 2" x 6" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	55
Lumber, 4" x 4" x RL, sft, S4S	BF	1,665
Nail, Common, 4d, wire	LB	35
Nail, Common, 10d, wire	LB	85
Nail, Common, 20d, wire	LB	20
Nail, Roofing, Drive Screw, ga 14 x 4" lg	LB	110
Nut, Stl, 1/2" Hex	HD	1
Bolt, Stl, 1/2" x 12", Sq Hd	EA	95
Washer, Stl, 1/2", Flat	LB	2
Hook & Eye, 3" Long	EA	33
Lockset, Mortise, 3 1/4" x 3/4" for 1-3/8" Door	SET	10
Barrel Bolt, Stl, 4" w/Screw	EA	85
Lime, Hyd Wp, 50lb, bag	BAG	26
Paint, Anti-termite	CAN	2
Enamel, White, Semi-gloss, 1 gal can	CAN	15
Sand, MR 3	CM	118,150
Sand, MR 4	CM	131,400

* 10% Loss Factor Included

SOURCE: MACDC

TABLE IX-5

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military construction project, including utilities and site development. In locations where foundation problems were unusually difficult, unit costs could be higher. However, the DSPG would exercise control to keep the average cost in each annual program within the \$600 figure.

(U) The DSPG agreed the JGS would designate priorities for new construction generally assigned to meet needs in the following order: combat units of all services, with preference to units located away from locales that could support the dependent housing needs; combat support units; logistical units; regional units; other VNN, VNMC, VNAF forces. (101)

(U) The DSPG directed a plan be prepared for a pilot model logging and sawmill operation. In July 1970, ARVN presented a study that concluded two sawmills operated by ARVN at Gia Rai and Ban Me Thout could produce the required lumber for 20,000 dependent shelters. On 10 Nov MACV presented an analysis of the ARVN logging and sawmill study which concluded that the combined costs of procurement of logs, taxes, purchase of equipment, and operational expenses exceeded the cost to the US of importing US lumber. The DSPG stated that US lumber would be used in CY71 and CY72, but in CY73, the study would be reconsidered in light of the possible increased security in forests and the corresponding reduction of costs to harvest logs.

(U) The ARVN 12th Inf Reg at Dong Tam was selected as the test unit to be used for an anti-desertion effectiveness test. The test would enable figures to be compiled for a period 6 months before construction completion (starting 1 Dec 70) and for 6 months after completion. Comparison figures would be kept for the 11th Regt at My Tho, and the 31st and 42d Regt at Chuong Thien.

(U) MACCORDS conducted a study to determine the objectives of the PF Dependent Shelter Program and to identify problem areas and possible courses of action for conduct of the program. It was estimated that the study would be completed in January 1971 with a definite recommendation on the future of the PF program.

(U) The DSPG approved a bill of materials which the US would furnish to support the CY71 Dependent Shelter Program. Table IX-5 lists the materials. A study was conducted on the blockmaking machines required for the shelter program and ways the machines would be obtained. It was determined that 42 block-making machines would be required for the program and that they would be built by ARVN engineers with US-furnished salvage material. (102)

Joint MACV/JGS RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program

(U) The significant features of the new program were: the level of funding for the US was fixed at \$6 million per year for 8 years, except 1970 (\$4.3 million), whereas the level of funding for GVN increased gradually. The US support, relative to GVN funding, would decrease after the first 2 critical years (see Table IX-6). US financial assistance after CY70 would be of commodity support, principally cement, corrugated metal roofing, and lumber. The problem's urgency was recognized but the program length permitted adjustment in requirements, stationing, and costs. The shelters planned each year increased moderately throughout the period in accordance with forecast construction capability of ARVN engineer units and private contractors and the self-help capability of troop units. To stay within the average unit cost, most of the construction would be by RVNAF personnel. Additional funds

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RVNAF DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM

CY	UNITS (000)	COST		
		U.S. (\$MIL)	(\$MIL)	GVN (\$VN MIL)
70	16	4.3	5	590
71	20	6	6	708
72	25	6	9	1,062
73	25	6	9	1,062
74	26	6	9.4	1,104
75	26	6	9.4	1,104
76	30	6	12	1,416
77	<u>32</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>13.2</u>	<u>1,558</u>
	200	46.3	73.0	8,604

- NOTES: 1. To the stated cost must be added funds for community facilities (school, dispensary, other), for real estate acquisition, and for relocation or conversion of excess facilities. U.S. may pay part of school, dispensary and housing office but no other of the additional costs.
2. This program provides for RVNAF not including the Popular Forces.

SOURCE: MACDC

TABLE IX-6

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were required for community facilities such as schools, dispensaries, and housing offices, and for real estate acquisition. The US limited its support to the shelters, children's schools, dispensaries, and housing offices serving the dependent shelter communities. (103)

Plan for CY 1970

(U) The plan for 1970 identified approximately 16,000 dependent shelters for construction. Some of them were carried forward from uncompleted previous years' programs. Funding for CY70 was from the GVN Budget, Chapter 18, Article 7; US Army O&MA; US Air Force O&MF; and US Navy Military Construction Program (MCN) funds totaling US \$4.3 million and the GVN equivalent US \$5.0 million. (104) Of the 16,000 shelters in the program for 1970, the US was to build 4,000 for VNN, VNMC, and NVAF, using a mix of US and Vietnamese military labor. The other 12,000 were to be built by GVN. (105) The Navy identified its CY70 and CY71 program as \$3.5 million for 5,833 shelters; 2,257 for CY70 and 3,576 for CY71. The 7AF Dependent Shelter Executive Plan identified 2,460 shelters to be constructed at seven VNAF bases with an anticipated completion date of 31 Dec 71. (106)

(U) In May 1970 President Thieu wrote President Nixon requesting assistance in completing the program in 4 years. (107) Because of President Thieu's interest in the RVNAF Dependent Shelter Program, RVNAF made a maximum effort in support of the program. The equivalent of four ARVN engineer construction groups were committed in support of the CY71 program. (108) During June the Chief, JGS, requested acceleration of the 8-year program to 4 years and a 1971 program increase of 20,000 units. The MACV reply indicated a willingness to explore the feasibility of some acceleration, but pointed out that GVN limits of funding and construction were serious ones. The reply further emphasized that any increase in US funding support would have to result in corresponding adjustments in other Vietnamization programs. (109)

(U) In July President Nixon replied to President Thieu's request, identifying US financial support of construction of 20,000 dependent shelters per year for 5 years. (110)

(U) By the end of 1970, a total of 7,909 shelters were completed with 5,739 under construction. In addition 1,121 ARVN families were reported as being housed in excess US facilities. (111) Table IX-7 shows the construction and funding plan for the 8-year program.

Problems Hindering Progress

(U) Besides funding, the main problems hindering the progress of the dependent shelter program were:

1. Lack of material. USARV was unable to satisfy the 1969 and 1970 requirements and to provide firm delivery dates for outstanding shortages. It was approximately mid-1970 before materials arrived in-country in large amounts. Approximately 80 percent of the materials were received by the end of June; fortunately, the remaining 20 percent were not critical items.

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RVNAP DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM

1. CONSTRUCTION BY ARVN TROOPS OR ARVN CONTRACT

	Program	1970 Completions	Under Const	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
ARVN	8,240	4,550	3,760	17,150	17,500	17,500	18,200	18,200	21,000	22,400
VNN/VNMC	1,345	485	190		2,500	2,500	2,600	2,600	3,000	3,200
VNAP	340	140	60		2,500	2,500	2,600	2,600	3,000	3,200
RP	1,980	790	600	2,350	2,500	2,500	2,600	2,600	3,000	3,200

2. FUNDING PLAN (IN MILLION DOLLARS)

US ARMY	6.0	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8
US NAVY		0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
US AIR FORCE		0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6

3. NAVY PROGRAM (Construction by US Seabees)

	Program	Completions	Under Const
1970	2,257	1,884	373
1971	3,576	0	756

* Navy to receive \$3. million for construction of 5,000 more shelters in 1972. It was planned that if the shelters were constructed, the Navy portion of the construction in para 1 above would be reduced accordingly.

4. AIR FORCE PROGRAM (Construction by VNAP self-help)

	Program	Completions	Under Const
1970	2,460	60	20

SOURCE: MACDC

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Table IX-7

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2. Lack of multi-year funding by GVN. Piaster credits released by the GVN Ministry of National Defense were allocated on a yearly basis and were not available before January of each year. Approval of the release of funds was a time-consuming process. As an example, funds for the local purchase of sand and gravel were not released until the latter part of May. That delayed construction of the 1970 program for 5 months. In addition, mid-year was not a desirable construction season. (112)

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

General

(S) The full development of land LOCs in Vietnam was an integral part of Vietnamization of the war effort. Lacking an airlift capability, the RVNAF were dependent upon land and waterway LOCs. The RVNAF and FWMAF (including US) conducted unilateral and combined operations to provide adequate security for opening, supporting improvements, and protecting the LOCs throughout RVN. RVNAF had the primary responsibility for combat operations and for security of the LOCs. FWMAF assisted and reinforced RVNAF as necessary. Special emphasis was given to the use of day and night patrols, ambushes, and to the neutralization of VC tax collection agencies along the LOCs. Land clearing operations were conducted along LOCs in heavily vegetated areas, but only after coordination with civil authorities.

(S) The 1970 Combined Campaign Plan (AB 145) established restoration and security goals for the highways, railways, and waterways. The goals, as defined in the plan were categorized as:

1. Green--"...physically open...traffic can move during daylight hours with relative freedom...armed escort is not required."
2. Amber--"...physically open...thorough security measures, including armed escort, are required."
3. Red--"...closed by enemy control or by extensive physical interdiction...requires tactical operations and/or engineering efforts to open and/or restore to traffic." (113) Specific goals for the different types of LOCs are discussed later in this section.

Highway Restoration and Security

General

(U) The highways of the LOC program contributed greatly to the pacification and economic development of RVN, particularly in the Delta. They were also the backbone for the secondary roads which projected outwards and bound the nation with closer ties. The priority assigned to the program was reflected in the fact that in 1970, 40 percent of US engineer troop effort, 25 percent of contractor effort, and 25 percent of RVNAF engineer troop effort were devoted to the construction of roads. (114)

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
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LOC CONSTRUCTION

As of 31 Dec. 70

LOC COMPLETE ———
2351 KM



SOURCE: MACJ3

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FIGURE IX-10

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IX-64

Road Construction

(S) The planned road restoration program for 1970 approximated 4,418 km of national and interprovincial roads considered important to military operations. By the end of the year, 2,351 km of the road net had been completed with the total US program scheduled for completion in 1972 and the ARVN program scheduled for completion in 1973-1974. The cost ceiling of the LOC program was set at \$447 million, of which \$442 million was funded by the end of December. (115)

(U) Figure IX-10 and Table IX-8 depicts the progress made toward completion of the program during the year.

Road Construction Program Review

(S) The highway LOC program progressed slowly during 1970. In July SECDEF requested a thorough review be made of the program and impact statements be provided for various revisions. The following is an extract of his message relative to the request:

...the FY71 RVN Military Construction Program, involving primarily a continuation of the MACV/CENCOM* LOC restoration program, has suffered a tentative... cutback at House Armed Services Committee Hearings. A similar fate for other funding requests which support the LOC program... would doubtlessly force curtailment of the LOC restoration effort as now defined. Confronted with a probable funding short fall for LOC restoration of unknown extent at this time, it is requested that impact statements be provided for reduction/referral to GVN of the presently defined CENCOM LOC restoration program (about 4,100 km) in the following quantities:

- a. Reduction of 1,500 km (Revised total program of about 2,600 km).
- b. Reduction of 1,200 km (Revised total program of about 2,900 km).
- c. Reduction of 600 km (Revised total program of about 3,500 km).
- d. Reduction of 240 km (Revised total program of about 3,860 km). (116)

*Central Highways and Waterways Committee

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CONSTRUCTION
MACV LOC RESTORATION PROGRAM-RVN
(AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1970)

AGENCY	CY-69 & BEFORE		CY-70		CY-71 & BEYOND		TOTAL		ACCEPTED BY RVN DGOH(1)
	COMPLETE	PROGRAM	COMPLETE	PROGRAM	% COMPLETE	PROGRAM	COMPLETE	PROGRAM	
ARMY (TROOP)	618	-	480	-	-	575	1671	1671	65
CONTRACTOR	598	-	243	-	-	198	1039	841	81
NAVY	391	-	-	-	-	459	391	391	100
ARVN(2)	1805	-	23	-	-	1232	482	23	5
TOTAL			746				3583	2351	85
									1091.0

(1) ROAD TURNED OVER TO THE SVN-DGOH (DIR. GEN. OF HIGHWAYS)
(2) NUMBER OF ARVN CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS TO INCREASE FROM 3 TO 5 IN CY-71. ARVN PROGRAM INCREASED FROM 165 KM TO 518 KM IN JUL 70

FUNDING FOR MACV LOC RESTORATION (\$ MIL.)(1)

FISCAL YEAR	MCN	MCA	OMA	OPN	AID/DOD	OTHER(2)	TOTAL
ALLOCATION THRU 31 OCT 70	20.0	97.1	129.1	32.3	102.8	22.3	403.6
PROGRAMMED FY-71			3.7		34.7		38.4
REQUESTED FY-72							
TOTAL	20.0	97.1	132.8	32.3	137.5	22.3	442.0

(1) DOES NOT INCLUDE DIRECT SUPPORT TO DGOH BUDGET
(2) MAP, AID

SOURCE: MACDC

TABLE IX-8

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(S) Priority lists were provided by the CGs, I&II FFORCEV; the CGs, DMAC & XXIV Corps; and the OICC. COMUSMACV, based on their recommendations, placed roads in four packages in priority order and submitted impact statements to CINCPAC in accordance with the Secretary's request. The statements were as follows:

1. Reduction or deferral of 1,500 km or 1,200 km would leave essential parts of the LOC unfinished and would render suspect our desire to contribute to development of a viable nation.
2. Reduction of 600 km would delete some essential roads that are required to enable rapid shifting and resupply of RVNAF.
3. Reduction of 240 km would not seriously affect the war effort, pacification, or economic development.

(S) At the same time, it was noted that good results were being achieved in development of ARVN engineer construction battalions. Within 1 year ARVN should be capable of restoring about 200 km of highway per year. (ARVN engineer units constructed roads for the first time during 1970 and their performance exceeded all expectations.) It was recommended that if withdrawal of US Army engineer units and reduction of expenditures dictated reduction in the LOC program, portions deleted from assignment to US Forces be programmed for construction by ARVN units and funded accordingly. (118)

(S) On 14 Sep SECDEF directed the funding ceiling of the LOC program be reduced from \$496.7 million to an interim \$447 million by deferring \$21 million of FY70 Military Construction Army (MCA) LOC funds and \$28 million from FY72 AID/DOD LOC funds. SECDEF pointed out an additional LOC funding reduction could result from a study of civilian contractor phaseout alternatives which would be addressed in the 2d Qtr FY71. Thus, the \$447 million would not be considered a final commitment. SECDEF, while extending CENCOM and MACV flexibility in determining the relative priority of road construction, specified that implementation of the reduction would include provision for: funding all revised ARVN engineer LOC assignments; retaining military-essential LOC projects in the program; and reducing the civilian construction (estimated to be \$24.6 million). (119) As a result of the reduction, a total of 492 km of roads was deferred, to be constructed by GVN at a later date. (120) At the end of 1970, the overall LOC funding ceiling remained at \$447 million. (121) See Table IX-8 for status of funding.

Security Problems

(U) Restoration of roads was not accomplished without difficulties. During the year, enemy action caused significant losses in both equipment and time to the contractor engaged in LOC construction. From September 1968 through July 1970, 89 pieces of construction equipment worth \$875,000 were lost. Nine civilians were killed and 44 injured. The results were a loss of equivalent of 177 productive days at a direct cost of over \$1,000,000 and the delay of \$15.2 million worth of work.

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(U) The majority of the accidents were caused by mines which were either undetected or not searched for. All of the lost production time occurred while waiting for mine detection teams to complete their tasks. It was discovered that production time lost in a 9-hour on-the-job day ranged from 1 to 4 hours, depending on the character of the work, distance from the camp site, and level of enemy activity in the area.

(U) The reasons most regularly cited for minesweeping/mining problems were insufficiently trained and properly equipped mine detection/detonation teams in adequate numbers on site at first light; insufficient night patrols with personnel competent in night defense tactics and equipped with modern sensing devices and weapons to deny the area to enemy mine sowers; and imprecise assignment of responsibility to commanders with instructions that contractor security was to have a high priority in their mission tasks.

(U) The lack of sufficient security degraded the activity of the OICC to perform his mission of constructing high quality roads in a timely fashion at reasonable cost. The OICC advised MACV at mid-year that he would billet and mess the ambush and detection personnel in contractor camps if requested; would provide and maintain mobile equipment required; would have site personnel report daily on the following day's work plans so that defensive and detection tactics could be scheduled economically; and would cooperate in any other way to insure rapid, quality, safe road building. (122) MACV requested the assistance of CGs of I FFV, II FFV, and DMAC in improving the security on LOC construction; an alternative was tasking USARV Eng Comd to provide the support with resultant further degradation of the highway building capability. (123)

(C) The Song Cau area was particularly hard hit by security problems. In September COMUSMACV ordered CG, IFFORCEV, to conduct an informal investigation on the attacks on RMK (private contractor) equipment at Song Cau and the area's subsequent security posture. In his report of the investigation, CG, IFFORCEV, gave a summary of the background and action taken, as described below.

(C) In December 1969 ROK forces had agreed to provide security elements for equipment parks and work sites, provided the contractor kept ROK units well informed of plans and projected equipment parks. In April 1970 the contractor agreed to accept territorial forces for internal security on a permanent basis in lieu of ROK personnel. During the period subsequent to the agreements, 11 incidents occurred of which all but four were minings. In one incident during July, 37 persons on a truck used to transport RMK employees from the containment area in Binh Thanh to the construction site near Song Cau were injured when the truck hit a mine. That incident prompted a reevaluation of security provided RMK in that area. As a result, OICC/RMK personnel visited HQ IFFORCEV to discuss the security provided, and CG, IFFORCEV, requested DEPCORDS and the Phu Yen Province Sector Advisor to effect counterpart coordination to improve route and site security.

(C) During the latter part of August, the RMK site supervisor moved his equipment parking area from the top of Cao Phing Hill to the bottom, where it was destroyed on 2 Sep. The move had not been coordinated with officials and went unprotected for 1 night until discovered and reported by district security forces. RMK personnel had advised against the move but were overruled by the supervisor. The area selected was tactically indefensible with less than a full RF company; the local forces were over-taxed and a lucrative target was presented to the VC. On 8 Sep another attack took place on a point of land not recommended for a parking area. Equipment was dispersed and no attempt was made to consolidate to reduce the size of the area to be secured. Personnel guarding the site were inexperienced and under poor leadership. It appeared that the main security force ran at the first sign of trouble.

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(C) As a result of the attacks on 2 and 8 Sep CG, IFFORCEV, requested all interested agencies to give maximum emphasis to security of RMK construction sites to insure timely completion of construction efforts on QL-1. Two ROK platoons were provided for security of RMK site approaches and two RF companies provided site security. CG, 18th Eng Bde, assigned the 299th Eng Bn to monitor and assist coordination of the security effort in the Song Cau area. The 4th Inf Div deployed one flame track to Song Cau District in late September to burn critical areas of vegetation to enhance security of work forces. IFFORCEV deployed "Duster" 40mm tracks to provide security to work parties and equipment. "Dusters" remained until construction was completed. (124)

Security Status

(S) During 1970 a total of 4,418 km of roads was designated in AB 145 to reach 100 percent Amber security status and 80 percent Green status. At years' end, 1966 through 1969, the designated roads were in the following status: (125)

	<u>AMBER</u>	<u>GREEN</u>
1966	1,948 km	743 km
1967	2,795	1,707 km
1968	3,692	2,222 km
1969	3,785	2,596 km

(S) The status of progress made in 1970 in assisting GVN to open and secure the designated roads were measured by the below security goals. It should be noted that for measurement purposes, total roads considered in an Amber status also include those in a Green status.

(Percent)

	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>AMBER</u> <u>**Actual</u>	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>GREEN</u> <u>**Actual</u>	<u>RED</u> <u>**Actual</u>
1st Qtr	98.4	95.0	68.2	63.3	5.0
2d Qtr	98.9	95.0	72.0	63.6	5.0
3d Qtr	99.4	96.5	76.0	70.0	3.5
4th Qtr	100.0	97.0	80.0	71.4	3.0

* (126)

** (127)

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
IX-69

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STATUS OF SECURITY GOALS FOR ESSENTIAL ROADS AS OF 31 DEC 70

4418 KM
 ■ GREEN 71.4
 --- AMBER 97.0
 RED 3.0



SOURCE: MACJ3

FIGURE IX-11

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IX-70

(C) Although road security goals were not achieved during the year, adequate roads were open to support essential civilian and military operations. See Figure IX-11 for the portions of the AB 145 designated roads that were Green, Amber, and Red at the end of 1970.

Railroad Restoration and Security

General

(C) Another important aspect of the LOC program was restoration of railroad lines. The restoration of the 1,109 mile railroad continued slowly during 1970 until the 4th Qtr, CY70. Limiting factors included GVN priorities and labor and security resources. GVN managed railroad restoration as a low priority program in comparison with others. During the 4th Qtr, President Thieu stated that all restoration would cease and that none would be accomplished in 1971. (128) See Figure IX-12 for the operational status of the VNRS at the end of the year.

Security Status

(S) During 1970 a total of 613 km of railroads was designated in AB 145 to reach 100 percent Amber status and 90 percent Green status. At years' end, 1966 through 1969, the railway was in the following status: (129)

	<u>AMBER</u>	<u>GREEN</u>
1966	532 km	272 km
1967	466	385 km
1968	534	224 km
1969	546	359 km

(S) The status of progress made in 1970 towards the CY70 security goals were measured by the below security goals. Total kilometers considered in an Amber Status also include those in a Green status.

(Percent)

	<u>AMBER</u>		<u>GREEN</u>		<u>RED</u>
	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>**Actual</u>	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>**Actual</u>	<u>**Actual</u>
1st Qtr	95.9	97.8	68.1	60.8	2.2
2d Qtr	97.3	98.1	72.0	53.9	1.9
3d Qtr	98.7	98.1	76.0	63.0	1.9
4th Qtr	100.0	98.2	80.0	78.5	1.8
* (130)					
** (131)					


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**VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM
OPERATIONAL STATUS
(31 JAN 71)**



SOURCE: MACDC

FIGURE IX-12

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(C) Sufficient railroads were open during the year to support essential civilian and military operations. See Figure IX-13 for the portions of the AB 145 designated railroad kilometers that were Green, Amber, and Red at the end of 1970. See Figure IX-14 for the security status of the entire railway system.

Security Problems

(C) Rail security was provided by RF/PF forces specifically designated for that duty. The VNRS was divided into four rail security zones, numbered I, II, III, and V (see Figure IX-12). Each zone was provided security by one railway security battalion. The total authorized strength of the four battalions was 2,188. Provision of security forces for restoration and operation of the entire rail system required an estimated 124 RF/PF company-sized units. RF/PF requirements in support of pacification programs took precedence over rail security missions and reduced the availability of security forces. Extensive development and expansion of facilities supporting travel by air, road, and inland coastal waterways reduced the urgency for providing an operational rail system. VNRS also had to compete with other GVN requirements, including the military draft, for its labor force. Relatively low civil service pay scales and higher priority manpower requirements restricted resources available to it. US support was limited to funding of immediate repairs required as a result of sabotage damage. US funding assistance was provided for restoration of previously closed sections of the system. (132)

Resume' of Restoration

(C) During the 1st Qtr CY69 restoration was undertaken only at two locations, Hue to Dong Ha and Thap Cham to Song Pha. The Office of RVN Prime Minister curtailed further restoration because of a lack of security forces. In Zone I, work had begun on 2 May 69 to restore the railroad line between Hue and Dong Ha, a stretch of 68 km. Plagued by labor shortages, heavy rains, and a lack of sufficient suitable construction equipment, the VNRS had restored only 4.5 km of rail from Hue north by 31 Dec 69. The same difficulties caused a further lag with only 1 additional kilometer restored by the end of the 1st Qtr 1970. As a result of a decision by President Thieu, restoration was ordered discontinued in April.

(C) In Zone II, no restoration efforts were made during the 1st half of 1970. In the 3d Qtr, construction began on a spur connecting the De Long pier and the existing track in Qui Nhon. At the end of September, all work on the spur was virtually finished except for one bridge which was completed in December. (133) Real estate problems on the Qui Nhon Ammo Spur were alleviated in July and work resumed on that project after a 1-month delay. By the end of the 3d Qtr, 100 percent of the rail bed was complete. (134)

(C) Repair work on the Ho Nai-Xuan Loc line in Zone III was discontinued in January 1970 due to inadequate security in the vicinity of Ba Ca. After assurance was obtained from II Corps that sectors and sub-sectors concerned would assist security units in providing security in the area, the work commenced in February. Repeated enemy sabotage frustrated attempts to reach restoration sites and less than 10 days later the work was discontinued again. In the same zone, restoration efforts were begun in June to open the rail segment 16.2 km between Trang Bom and Dau Giay. There too, heavy interdiction was encountered. The work was completed, however, on 9 Jul and rock trains continued to run from Bien Hoa to the drop point at Dau Giay until 31 Jul when road building requirements for rock were satisfied. Also in Zone III, construction


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SOURCE: MACJ3

FIGURE IX-13

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IX-74


SECURITY STATUS VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM

MAIN LINE
SAIGON TO DONG HA 1,109 KM

BRANCH LINE
THAP CHAM TO DALAT 84 KM
BA REN TO AN HOA 20 KM
MUONG MAN TO MAN THIET 12 KM
DIEU TRI TO QUI NHON 10 KM
NGA BA TO BA NGOI 5 KM
TOTAL 1,240 KM

BRIDGES
50 METERS & OVER 180
20 - 49 METERS 179
10 - 19 METERS 244
UNDER 10 METERS 801

LEGEND
GREEN 545 KM - 44%
AMBER 129 KM - 10%
RED 564 KM - 46%



SOURCE: MACDC


FIGURE IX-14

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Viet Cong improvised bucket mines floating with contact fuses exposed.



A Fast Patrol Craft (PCF), Swift boat patrolling to insure waterway security.

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started in September on the Newport spur and on 25 Aug on a 28 km spur from Ho Nai into Long Binh. Construction was maintained in progress during the 4th Qtr on both projects with completion estimated in January 1971.

(C) In Zone V restoration began in February on the line between Dalat and Thap Cham. By the end of April, the line was completed. It had been hoped that when restoration of the line was completed, that the main line between Thap Cham and Phan Thiet would also be restored. Plans, however, received a sharp setback when President Thieu suspended reestablishment of the line between Song Long Song and Long Khanh (in Zone III). One of the major factors in the decision was the non-availability of province-level forces to assist security personnel in security missions.

(C) Because of the intense flood and typhoon damages in Zone II during the 4th Qtr CY70, VNRS personnel had to be taken off most major permanent repair activities in the country in order to repair the Qui Nhon and Tuy Hoa line. It had been recommended to GVN that the line from Hue to Quang Tri and that portion of rail which ran from Long Khanh to Song Long Song be restored, but President Thieu did not want to venture into any restoration in 1971. No final action was taken by GVN on the proposals concerning restoration by the end of the year. (135)

Waterway Security

(S) A total of 1,801 km of waterways was designated in AB 145 to reach 100 percent Amber status and 70 percent Green status during the year. (For a discussion of opening and patrolling waterways, see Annex E.) At years' end, 1967 through 1969 waterways were in the following security status: (136)


	<u>AMBER</u>	<u>GREEN</u>
1967	534 km	259 km
1968	1,485	974
1969	1,694	1,171

(S) The status of progress made in 1970 towards the CY70 security goals were measured by the below security goals. Total kilometers considered in an Amber status also include those in a Green status.

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STATUS OF SECURITY GOALS FOR ESSENTIAL WATERWAYS

AS OF 31 DEC 70



SOURCE: MACJ3

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IX-78

FIGURE IX-15

(Percent)

	<u>AMBER</u>		<u>GREEN</u>		
	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>**Actual</u>	<u>*Goal</u>	<u>**Actual</u>	<u>*Actual</u>
1st Qtr	100.0	100.0	70.0	74.8	0
2d Qtr	100.0	100.0	70.0	78.1	0
3d Qtr	100.0	100.0	70.0	80.6	0
4th Qtr	100.0	100.0	70.0	80.6	0
* (137)					
** (138)					

(U) See Figure IX-15 for the portion of the AB 145 designated waterways that were Amber, Green, and Red at the end of 1970.

OTHER LOGISTICAL PROGRAMS TO AID RVNAF

Equipment Transfer Program

(C) Other actions/plans/programs to aid RVN and improve and modernize RVNAF existed in addition to those already mentioned. One such program was to maximize transfer of major items of equipment to RVNAF, preventing expensive retrograde and accelerating Vietnamization.

KEYSTONE Transfers

(C) As mentioned previously, the phases of redeployments and inactivations directed by President Nixon were referred to under the basic code name KEYSTONE. The first increment in 1969, KEYSTONE EAGLE, covered redeployment of elements of the 9th Inf Div. No equipment transfer procedures existed and rapid redeployment made transfers minimal. Under KEYSTONE CARDINAL, also in 1969, elements of the 52d Abn Div departed RVN, transferring property valued at \$710,623.

(C) KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, January through April 1970, was more effective in providing assets for RVNAF. Procedures for transfer from US depot to RVNAF depot were well established by that time and a dedicated maintenance battalion was assigned the USARV mission of upgrading material to make the equipment acceptable for transfer. (139) From the start of BLUEJAY through 31 Jul 70, 1,900 major engineer, ordnance, and signal items, valued at \$5,071,114, were transferred to RVNAF. (140)

(C) KEYSTONE ROBIN was the fourth redeployment movement starting 3 Jun 70. In addition to depot-to-depot transfers, there were unit-to-unit transfers, where elements up to the size of artillery battalions accomplished equipment turn-overs. Lack of adequate reimbursement procedures had previously hampered interservice transfers to RVNAF, but the JCS established procedures for reimbursement at US departmental level, resulting in an increased rate of transfer. (141) The large influx of material resulting from KEYSTONE ROBIN further taxed the maintenance capability of USARV to raise equipment to a condition which would meet established transfer criteria. US Army Pacific (USARPAC) recognized the problem and directed that sufficient maintenance units remain in-country to upgrade equipment scheduled for transfer. (142)

(C) By the end of 1970, a total of 16,180 individual major items valued at over \$14.38 million had been transferred to RVNAF throughout the year. (143) The type, source, and value of the equipment were as shown below:

Transfers of Major Items to RVNAF
(Depot-to-Depot and Interservice)

Number of Items/\$ Value

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>VALUE</u>
C-E	USARV	2,917	\$2,402,774
	III MAF	429	419,644
		3,346	2,822,418
Engr	USARV	166	325,932
	III MAF	89	42,875
		255	368,807
Ord	USARV	5,575	9,346,589
	III MAF	6,508	1,683,021
		12,083	11,029,610
QM	USARV	-----	-----
	III MAF	496	168,188
Grand Total		16,180	\$14,389,023

Condition Criteria

(U) The condition criteria for transfer of material to RVNAF was established in MACV letter, MACJ464, Subj: Equipment Turnover Procedures, dated 14 Feb 70, based on recommendations of USARPAC.

(C) The mileage criteria for vehicles were as follows:

Truck, less than 2 1/2 ton	10,000
Truck, 2 1/2 and up, but less than 5 ton	17,000
Truck, 5 ton and up, but less than 12 1/2 ton	12,000

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RVNAF Equipment Authorizations

5. COMUSMACV had the authority to add to RVNAF authorization that equipment gained as a result of base turnovers. (147)

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came available from the phasedown. The report further stated that responsible officials took reasonable action to preclude accumulation of excesses such as those left in Korea at the end of that conflict. GAO did, however, identify a number of opportunities for improvement. Among the problems identified were:

1. Difficult and cumbersome funding procedures which inhibited interservice coordination in filling RVNAF requirements.
2. Restrictive Army criteria in taking over Navy supplies which could result in uneconomical disposal of shipment.
3. Army's problems with inadequate facilities to clean equipment to meet US Public Health Service and Department of Agriculture standards.

(U) A more reliable reporting and accounting system was needed to assure positive control over major Army equipment being turned in or transferred during the phasedown. Also more positive controls were needed over the transfer of components and repair parts to the RVNAF. In addition, improvement of procedures for identification and cancellation of requisitions for unneeded supplies was necessary. The Army had a significant backlog of equipment in RVN requiring repair, principally due to limited organizational and intermediate level maintenance capabilities. GAO recommended SECDEF provide for review of service plans to insure that the incremental nature of the withdrawals would be supported; establish procedures and criteria for transfer of excess materiel to RVNAF and reimbursement of the appropriate service; and require cleaning of only those items scheduled to be returned to CONUS.

(U) As a result of the study procedures were established for interservice identification and transfer of excesses to fill RVNAF requirements and the Army took action to broaden the criteria for accepting Navy stocks. Actions taken in upgrading staging areas have been previously discussed. (148)

ARVN Ammunition System Improvement Plan

Background

(C) The ARVN Ammunition System Improvement Plan was designed to improve ARVN systems and procedures, ammunition and maintenance capabilities, and surveillance and training programs to achieve self-sufficiency in Class V supply and at the same time protect a US investment of approximately \$800 million per year.

(C) MASF ammunition cost for RVNAF was \$800 million in 1970. (149) The majority (65 percent) of the RVNAF stocks were maintained in the open while the remainder was in temporary storage providing little long-term protection. From approximately March 1969 through August 1970, for example, over \$33 million dollars worth of ammunition was lost to hostile action. An additional \$12.5 million was lost each year from environmental causes.

(C) On 21 Aug, CINCPAC forwarded to DOD a MACV plan providing the necessary improvements to give RVNAF a capability to completely support their existing and anticipated ammunition shortage, inventory management, surveillance, and maintenance requirements. (150) The plan

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operated through the ARVN Chief of Ordnance with assistance from Army Materiel Command ammunition management and technical specialists. The plan viewed present and prospective requirements, improvements in each functional area, cost analysis, and an implementation schedule for upgrading the ARVN system. The system had sustained ARVN tactical operations and showed improvement during 1970. While depots stored the required amount of ammunition throughout the country, protection from overhead fire was lacking. Renovation and maintenance were continuing problems, and the first two renovation detachments were activated in FY70. Asset visibility at the national level was lacking, since timely information was not available. Several management systems were added which improved the visibility.

(C) In 1968 ARVN ammunition operations increased 250 percent over 1967 and continued to increase at a less rapid rate through 1969 and 1970. Force structure increases made the stockage objective outlook for 1973 around 175,000 tons. Storage showed a deterioration rate of about 10 percent per year in 1970, and at the end of hostilities, a rate of from 25 to 30 percent could be expected. The 1970 rate of deterioration was calculated at about 7,000 tons per year, beyond RVNAF surveillance and renovation capability. A computer control system would aid in product identification for surveillance at the national level. (151)

Proposed Improvements

(C) Improvements proposed by MACV in July, estimated to cost \$38.5 million, are summarized as follows:

1. Construction of Stradley earth-covered magazines throughout the ARVN system to include ancillary facilities such as security fencing and lighting, water storage tanks, and administrative/warehouse buildings. Long-term facilities would cost \$33.5 million with a 60-day stockage objective or \$58 million with a 90-day stockage objective.
2. Improvements in ammunition maintenance facilities, equipment, and gauges required to rework unserviceable ammunition, costed at \$2.6 million, would save the US approximately \$12.6 million yearly.
3. Improvements in the ammunition surveillance program to include facilities, equipment, and training of ammunition inspectors. Such improvements would cost \$1.3 million, but were the cornerstone upon which the storage, maintenance, and safety programs were built.
4. Development of a permanent ARVN training base capable of meeting future ammunition training needs (\$.09 million). (152)

(C) The upgrade program should permit a reduction in ammunition stockpiled from the current 90-day level to a safe and economical stockage level of 60 days with a one-time savings of \$100 million. In addition, the annual losses attributed to deterioration and enemy attack over a 2-year period would offset the cost of improvements. (153)

(C) Resources required were within the capability of MACV, except for \$23 million in MILCON programmed for FY72. Dollar loss to the US would be substantially less if construction were to commence during FY71. (154)

ARVN AMMUNITION UPGRADE PROGRAM

Priority	Location	Replaced	No STRAD	Type Depot	Facilities	Covered Store Cap After Upgrade
1	Dong Ba Thien	Nha Trang	29	GS	Maint/Surv	10,150
2	Qui Nhon	-	24	GS	Renov/Surv	10,550
3	Bien Hoa	Thanh Tuy Ha	79	GS	Renov/Surv	38,750
4	Can Tho	-	37	GS	Maint/Surv	16,450
5	Danang	-	17	GS	Maint/Surv	12,050
6	Pleiku	-	12	DS	Storage only	5,005
7	Soc Trang	New	7	DS	Storage only	2,340
8	Tay Ninh	New	8	DS	Storage only	2,810
9	Phu Bai	-	8	DS	Storage only	3,340
10	Quang Tri	-	3	DS	Storage only	1,270
11	Kontum	New	3	DS	Storage only	1,005
12	Tuy Hoa	New	3	DS	Storage only	1,405
*	Chu Lai*	Tam Ky/Quang Ngai	-	DS	Storage only	4,220

* Facility satisfactory - No construction required.

SOURCE: MACJ4

TABLE IX-9

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Summary

(U) The Ammunition System Improvement Plan was approved by JCS in September, and by the end of the year all phases of the plan with the exception of construction were progressing according to schedule. There were no anticipated problems in accomplishment of non-construction portions, but problems were encountered in the construction area.

(U) The original plan called for the upgrading of 19 ARVN/US ammunition facilities and the construction of surveillance and renovation of maintenance facilities. It was based on 60 days of supply at existing approved ammunition rates and provided covered storage for approximately 131,000 STON of stocks. Monetary constraints caused a reevaluation of the program and resulted in a reduction in the overall upgrade program from 19 facilities to 12 at a cost of \$34.1 million. Phase I portion of the program consisted of construction of five general support depots and one direct support depot. That portion of the construction effort would provide covered storage for approximately 95,000 STON of ammunition stocks. Phase II was construction of the remaining six direct support depots. Shown on Table IX-9 are the depots to be upgraded, the number of magazines to be constructed, facilities to be located at each site, and the covered storage capacity. (155)

RVNAF Food Supplement Program

Background

(U) When President Nixon and President Thieu met at Midway in late 1969, they discussed, among other things, increased logistical support to RVNAF. They agreed programs were necessary to enhance RVNAF morale and effectiveness.

(U) On 2 Dec 69 COMUSMACV received a letter from the Chief, JGS, requesting subsistence support. JGS requested 277,200 tons of rice per year during CY70 and 71 for gratuitous issue to all RVNAF at a rate of 21 kilograms per man per month (based on an RVNAF strength of 1,100,000 men). JGS also requested 33,906 tons of canned food, including fish, meat, and cooking oil, per year for the 2 years in order to support 788,536 personnel: 686,517 enlisted men eating at unit messes; 51,283 servicemen training in-country; and 50,736 recruits, NCO, and officer trainees undergoing their first in-country training.

(U) While the requests were being considered, President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker, and COMUSMACV received a briefing on 12 Jan 70 from the JGS DCofS, Logistics/CDR, Central Logistics Command (DCofSLOG/CDRCLC) in which he requested MASF support for one of three plans. Each plan covered a 2-year program to provide additional subsistence support to RVNAF. The requirements for each year were:

Plan A. Based on 1,100,000 men (all officers, NCOs and EMS): 227,200 tons of rice, 52,800 tons of sugar, and 47,300 tons of canned food.

Plan B. Based on 686,517 enlisted men below the rank of NCO: 173,002 tons of rice, 32,952 tons of sugar, and 29,520 tons of canned food.

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Plan C. Based on 432,517 enlisted men in the regular and regional forces only (excluding PF personnel): 108,994 tons of rice, 20,760 tons of sugar, and 15,598 tons of canned food.

(U) In another proposal, the DCofSLOG/CDRCLC requested the US provide a monetary allowance of \$VN100 per RVNAF serviceman per day.

Ration Supplement Plan

(U) Both proposals of the Chief, JGS and the DCofSLOG/CDRCLC were considered concurrently in MACV's "RVNAF Morale Study" conducted in January and February 1970. Pertaining to the subsistence support, the study recommended that:

1. MACV provide MASF support for canned meats and shortening for 1,100,000 men for a period of 2 years at an estimated annual cost of \$42.7 million. The support should be provided under the RVNAF Ration Supplement Program and two existing subsistence programs, the Rural Development Ration Supplement Program and the Administrative Ration Supplement Program, melded into a single plan. Both programs would continue unchanged until the first issues under the new program were ready to be made and then both discontinued. The Ration Supplement Program applied to all military services. RF/PF would no longer receive a separate food allowance as they had in the past.

2. RVNAF develop a controlled distribution plan for the items provided by the program. (That recommendation was in keeping with COMUSMACV's initial guidance "The US would not be a Santa Claus"; if the RVNAF could not insure a controlled distribution plan which would "give each RVNAF serviceman his fair share," it would be better to end the entire program.)

3. The request for additional rice and sugar support be disapproved as adequate resources of both were available in-country.

4. The request for a monetary food allowance be disapproved as inflationary.

5. MACV not requisition any foodstuffs under the proposed program until it reviewed and concurred in RVNAF's controlled distribution plan.

(U) In reviewing the proposed Ration Supplement Plan in March, the AMEMB (USAID) representatives recommended the proposed supplement support be spread over a 3-year period with 100 percent of the requirement supported the initial year, 70 percent the second year, and 30 percent the final year. During those 3 years, projected expansion of RVN's canning industry, improvement and growth of RVNAF's farm and garden program, coupled with a rising national economy, should permit the GVN to attain self-sufficiency in furnishing adequate subsistence to RVNAF. The GVN portion of the requirement would be inverse ratio to the MASF program; no sizable support furnished the first year, 30 percent the second year, 70 percent the third year, and 100 percent upon the conclusion of the MASF program.

(U) MACV approved the proposed 3-year program and forwarded it for DOD approval. Approval was given, with the stipulation that MACV review and concur in the RVNAF-devised controlled distribution plan prior to submission of any requisitions. Funds would not be released by DA until the stipulation was met.

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(U) The Chief, JGS, approved the final distribution plan on 20 Aug; it was formally presented to MACV on 26 Aug for review and evaluation. On 8 Sep, COMUSMACV concurred with the RVNAF plan, with one major exception concerning JGS reserving the authority to redesignate the program beneficiaries in CY72 and 73. COMUSMACV requested JGS amend the plan to include equal support to all servicemen in each of the 3 years the program would be in effect. The plan was so amended.

Resume¹ of the Distribution Plan

(U) During CY71, all RVNAF servicemen would benefit from the program. A total of 43.09 kilograms of canned foods would be provided each man per year in the items and quantities as shown below. Other acceptable and cost comparable items could be substituted as the situation dictated.

1. Fish--jack mackerel, chum salmon, tuna, or sardines would be issued; 5.27 kilograms per man per year.

2. Meat--ham chunks, beef chunks, beef with gravy, luncheon meat, or pork sausage links would be issued; 17.79 kilograms per man per year.

3. Poultry--boned chicken, boned turkey, or dehydrated chicken would be issued; 5.49 kilograms per man per year.

4. Shortening--a hydrogenated vegetable and animal fat mixture issued in either 5 1/2 or 33 pound cans; 14.55 kilograms per man per year.

(U) Issues for individuals or mess halls would be on a monthly basis. The basic issue was one can (approximately 15 to 16 ounces) of fish and two cans (approximately 21 to 29 ounces each) of meat per man per month, and one can (29 ounces) of poultry and one can (5 1/2 pounds) of shortening per man every other month. The cans would be of two sizes or types: consumer size or small cans used for individual issues or for small mess halls; institutional or large size cans used for large mess halls, hospitals, training centers, and military schools. The proportion of the initial mix was 75 percent in consumer-size cans and 25 percent in institutional-size cans; the mix was subject to revision as the situation warranted.

(U) The foodstuffs would be distributed and stocked in unit and depot stockage. Each troop unit and organization would be allowed to draw an initial issue of supplemental food based upon the payroll strength of the unit plus a safety level of 10 percent for hospitals, training centers, and military schools, or a 5-percent safety level for all other units. Normal requisitioning would be used to order depot stocks; the RVNAF Quartermaster would initiate the requisitions and the US advisors would authenticate them before submission; all shipments would be requested to be containerized, i.e., Sea Land vans or Containers Express (CONEXs). Shipments would be made directly to the main Quartermaster field depot in each of the five ALCs, i.e., Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Saigon, and Can Tho, except shipments to Can Tho would be consigned via Saigon for onward movement because of a lack of a deep water port. Each ALC would be authorized to stock an overall level of 60 days of supply. The 60-day level was composed of 45-day operating and 15-day safety levels. Division logistics battalions and separate military services would be authorized to stock part of the overall ALC stock level; such stocks to be part of the overall 60 days of supply level of the appropriate ALC.

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(U) On payday each month, each serviceman would be issued food ration tickets by the finance officer or paymaster along with his normal pay. The tickets would be numbered, color coded (changed quarterly), expire 90 days after issue, and entitle the bearer to either one can of fish and two cans of meat or one can of poultry and one can of shortening every other month. Tickets could be redeemed only in the unit in which they were issued unless the man had just been transferred and only by the individual to whom they were issued. Each ticket would be signed by the individual serviceman at time of redemption. The finance officer would maintain a listing of serial numbers of tickets issued each month and to whom they were issued. A copy would be furnished to the supply officer of each unit so he would have a record of tickets to be honored and to whom they belonged. The control of tickets would be a Finance Department responsibility, not that of the Supply Department. Individuals who ate in the mess hall would give their tickets to the unit supply officer as required. A daily status of rations drawn and consumed versus tickets received would be posted in a conspicuous place in each mess hall. Individuals who did not eat in the mess hall would be allowed to take the foodstuffs home or otherwise consume as they saw fit. Beneficiaries were, however, prohibited from disposing of the items by any means other than their own or their families' consumption.

(U) Each unit would be required to keep supply-point-type stock records on the foodstuffs drawn, issued, and on hand in the unit. The records would be subject to inspection and kept by the unit for 12 months from the date they were completed. Replenishment requisitions would contain a certified statement from either the finance officer or paymaster concerning the actual current payroll strength of the unit concerned and all the redeemed tickets for the last 30 days. Depots would issue one ration for every ticket turned in. Units would not be allowed to retain excess stocks on-hand; such stocks would either be turned in to the appropriate depot immediately or a corresponding decrease would be made in the requirement for the succeeding month; the latter procedure would be appropriately documented.

(U) Lost tickets would be considered as lost foodstuffs. Those individuals who were responsible for losses of either foodstuffs or ration tickets through cupidity or negligence would be fined a sum equal to five times the MASF value of items involved; the penalty would be in addition to other punitive measures authorized. The pecuniary liability applied to all commanders negligent in safeguarding the items in their care, including convoy commanders, senior crew members on ships and planes, and troop unit and depot commanders. It also applied to all individuals concerned, such as forklift operators, truck drivers, stevedores, laborers, warehouse foremen, etc.

(U) While the plan was basically conceived by the RVNAF Quartermaster, other staff agencies such as Transportation, Finance, Inspector General, and Political Warfare Department, were tasked to develop and implement procedures applying to their areas of responsibility. In addition, the Political Warfare Department was tasked with giving maximum publicity to the entitlements of the individual serviceman so that all would know just what each was to receive. (156)

Status at the End of 1970

(U) By the end of 1970, food items to be used for the initial issues and stockage were on requisition and had started to arrive in-country. It was planned to begin issues when there were sufficient quantities of each of the different food groups on hand to satisfy initial requirements; a tentative starting date was 20 Mar 71. Cost to the US was \$49.1 million for the first year, \$39.6 million for the second, and \$17.1 million for the final year.

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(U) It was planned that a joint MACV/JGS Inspector General team would monitor the program from the time the food items arrived at the in-country port until the individual serviceman received his share. RVNAF had initiated during the latter half of 1970 a campaign entitled Cuong Quyet which was to prevent the purchase and sale of military and commissary goods on the open market. (157)

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

(U) It was not only the transfer and upgrade of facilities and construction of roads and rail-road lines that were of great concern to MACV during 1970. It was equally important that the Vietnamese be trained in the C-E field so they could assume those functions upon the eventual departure of US troops.

The C-E System in RVN

(U) The C-E system in RVN served MACV, RVNAF, and US and RVN civil agencies. The collective mission was to provide a viable telecommunications network to satisfy current military needs as well as Vietnamese military and civilian requirements in the future.

(S) The C-E system was cataloged in three separate parts. (See the 1969 MACV Command History Vol II, p IX-121, for a detailed description of the systems.)

1. The Integrated Communications System-Southeast Asia (ICS-SEA) composed of wide-band tropo/microwave equipment and submarine cable. The system was augmented where required with transportable communications equipment. See Figure IX-16 for a diagram of the system.
2. The Area Communications System extended, as necessary, the ICS circuits within each MR.
3. Tactical systems organic to the US military services. (158)

Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland

(U) The Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland (DAC-SAM) started in 1965 as DCA-Saigon with five officers and four enlisted men. During 1970, the manning level totaled 190. It provided management control and operational direction to the Defense Communications System (DCS) into and within Vietnam and Thailand, in support of both MACV and Military Assistance Command, Thailand.

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
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SOUTH VIETNAM

ICS-SEA
DECEMBER 1970



SOURCE: PACOM

FIGURE IX-16

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(U) DCA-SAM also served as headquarters for its counterpart, DCA, Vietnam (DCA-V). Vietnamization of DCA-SAM began in 1967 with a single liaison officer. DCA-V came into being in September 1970, when the staff of more than 35 RVNAF personnel joined the agency. They organized parallel to DCA-SAM, worked side-by-side, and were to assume more and more control of RVNAF circuitry, building an organization for RVN and its Armed Forces which would remain after DCA-SAM and DCS circuitry had been phased down. By the end of 1970, DCA-V controlled over a thousand RVNAF circuits using DCA-type management, including system control techniques similar but not identical to those of their counterparts in DCA-SAM. The techniques and procedures of DCA-V were tailored to specific needs of the RVNAF.

(U) During 1969 and 1970 major strides were made in several main areas. Those areas, especially towards the end of 1969 and during 1970, were automation, Vietnamization, and withdrawal of US Forces. DCA-SAM, by the end of 1970, had reduced its manning and returned allocated funding, while at the same time expanded its training, added more controlled circuits, and greatly increased volume of data handled and listed. (159)

Communication-Electronic Improvement and
Modernization Plan (CEIMP)

General

(S) On 20 Mar 70, a plan providing C-E planning and implementing instructions for the RVNAF I&M Program (Phase III) and related US planning was approved by COMUSMACV. The plan was designed to complement the US/FWMAF/RVNAF Combined Campaign Plan and serve as a reference document for major C-E assets and facilities installed, operated, and maintained within RVN. That plan, the COMUSMACV J-195 Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP), also provided detailed implementing instructions supplementing JCS/CINCPAC policy for communications-electronics support of RVNAF during 1970 through 1973. J-195 was prepared by a joint committee composed of representatives of MACV, USARV, 7AF, the AF Advisory Group, COMNAVORV, 1st Sig Bde, DCA/SAM, and USAID. It was coordinated with the US country team, and the RVNAF provided extensive inputs in the form of existing systems and assets and overall C-E requirements. Envisaged was the eventual turn-over of substantial US ICS facilities, including both tropo and off-shore cable, to the Vietnamese. For the period covered, continued US management and control was foreseen for most facilities, but with increased Vietnamese manning as training proceeded. In the absence of significant US assistance, the GVN could not afford to support a telecommunications system which might, at least initially, be unprofitable. The plan anticipated an increase in contractor support for operation and maintenance of the ICS.

(S) A thorough review of all US, Vietnamese military, and significant Vietnamese civil in-country communications was made. Within the framework and context of explicit guidance, J-195 identified, planned, time-phased, designed, tasked, and developed recommended cost-out actions necessary to enable the RVNAF to assume a larger role concurrent with the phase-down of US Forces. It further provided a detailed plan for follow-on actions necessary through 1973 and training schedules through 1978. The fundamental guiding principle was to design a minimum (but adequate) C-E system and environment to provide US and RVNAF the necessary command, control, logistic, administrative, and specialized communications in-country. The approach was to examine C-E requirements for the various time frames; configure an adequate system as

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much as possible from existing assets, integrating sub-systems where possible to eliminate unnecessary duplication. The plan fundamentally considered two types of C-E equipment: those normally employed while actually moving and during brief stops, and those which may be fixed, transportable, portable, or mobile but were customarily used as fixed or semi-fixed.

Fixed Wide-Band Longhaul Communications System

(S) The US owned and operated a fixed wide-band longhaul communications systems extending generally along the coast northward from the Delta to Hue. Spurs and fringes extended west and formed an interlocking pattern. Off-shore submarine cables complemented overland facilities. Longhaul out-of-country communications interfaced the system, composed of many kinds of equipment, all employed in a fixed mode. Many existing fixed links could be time-phased out during the period through 1973. Some of the phased-out assets were identified in the plan for service disposition; others were reused to provide the necessary fixed communications to the changing force structure and stationing. US control was essential at facilities and terminals providing important US command and control communications. There were some facilities not providing such communications and some reductions to the US fixed system would occur by the end of 1973. The fixed wide-band US system south of Saigon would be phased out and replaced by Vietnamese post and telegraph (P&T) communications links. That necessitated increasing the channel capacity and reliability of existing P&T systems. It was anticipated the P&T would be willing to add the necessary channels as quid-pro-quo for the allocation of long-haul circuits over the US fixed wide-band system. The US fixed wide-band stations at Hue, Phu Bai, and the Vung Tau-Phan Thiet training link would be turned over to Vietnamese operations and maintenance at the end of FY73 provided trained manpower was available.

(S) In-country extensions of the longhaul communications system to operating locations were provided by a variety of equipment, largely tactical type transportable equipment employed generally in a static role. Some were US-owned and operated, providing service to the US and RVNAF. During the period of US Force redeployment and concurrent changes in Vietnamese force stationing, the pattern of those systems changed dramatically. Such changes, however, could be accomplished almost completely with in-country equipment.

Impediments to RVNAF Communications Support

(S) The basic impediments to rapidly increase RVNAF communications support were the shortage of trained manpower and the almost complete absence of engineers and capable managers. The existing training programs (both Vietnamese and US) provided reasonable quantities of personnel skilled enough to operate and maintain the small employed-while-moving equipment; some short-fall support was required and provided by the US. The very large impediment and short-fall was the lack of personnel trained to operate, maintain, manage, and support the fixed wide-band longhaul communications system, extensions thereto, and associated-fixed plant and terminal equipment. Another impediment was the lack of personnel with communications construction capability. The US personnel who accomplished those functions for both the US and RVNAF comprised the largest group of US C-E personnel in-country. Training those skills was generally lengthy and significant Vietnamese capability would not exist prior to end of FY73. To make up for the short-fall, significant numbers of US (or US-provided) personnel would be required in-country for an extended period. A possibility of a trade-off of contractor personnel for US military existed. The J-195 plan established a high-dollar, long-term Vietnamese training program to eliminate the short-falls.

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Other RVN Communications Needs

(S) There was a relatively small grouping of communications equipment that was not programmed for RVNAF but which would be needed when forces were moved into locations vacated by US Forces. In general, it would consist of an administrative telephone system, the perimeter defense network that inter-netted perimeter defense facilities with a central facility, and access to the in-country longhaul communications system. Based on a validated operational requirement, the least complex equipment that met the requirement in each case would be selected, provided (from existing in-country assets as much as possible), and documented as an MASF program. No high-dollar buy was foreseen for that grouping of equipment.

Summary of Planning

(S) Many aspects and approaches were considered in evolving the final communication I&M plan and related actions. Alternatives were examined for feasibility, equipment availability, equipment complexity, manning requirements, variations in training complexity, and costs. The most attractive options in terms of cost effectiveness meeting the operational requirements and conforming to guidance and tasking criteria were selected. The goals and needs of nation-building were considered. In some cases there were several possible courses of action meeting military requirements with the same assets. In those cases, the approach that best aided or complemented the nation-building goals was selected.

(S) Anticipating that transfer of title to equipment of the fixed wide-band longhaul communications system would be under MASF procedures, RVNAF recipients were identified. Equipment and personnel changes to the authorizing documents (TOE/TA/TD) would be made within 2 years in advance of such transfers. MASF programs to document the transfer of in-country assets would be initiated when appropriate.

(S) As site-by-site studies continued and systems engineering was accomplished, a Communication-Electronics Management Information System (CEMIS) was planned. The CEMIS, utilizing a detailed data base, would provide timely information concerning C-E systems/facilities scheduled for turnover to RVNAF and would measure progress against established goals. (160)

Approval of CEIMP

(S) On 12 Jun, JCS approved the J-195 plan, changed the name to Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan (CEIMP), and forwarded it to SECDEF for approval. On 8 Sep DEPSECDEF approved the objectives and concepts of the program for implementation and designated the CEIMP as the single source document for RVNAF C-E I&M. (161)

Vietnamization of US Advisor Communications Support

(C) The Vietnamization of US advisor communications support as outlined in CEIMP began in the spring of 1970. The 7th ARVN Div Combat Assistance Team, MR 4, became the first major US advisory element below MR to experience the Vietnamization of its communications support. It was prompted by the movement of the 7th ARVN Div from My Tho to Dong Tam to occur as the departing US 9th Inf Div's base camp. ARVN relieved the 1st Sig Bde of communications support responsibility for 7th Div Combat Assistance Team on 15 Jul.

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(C) On 8 Sep the transfer of communications responsibility for the province senior advisor of Go Cong Province, MR 4, to RVNAF was completed. By the end of October projects were implemented in all four MRs. On 15 Nov ARVN relieved the 1st Sig Bde of responsibility for the province advisory team at My Tho; it was followed in December by ARVN assuming responsibility for advisory teams at Gia Nghia (MR 2), Phuoc Lei (MR 3), Moc Hoa (MR 4), and Chau Doc (MR 4). At the end of the year, it appeared that the 1st Sig Bde would be relieved of all advisory communications support responsibility below MR-level by 30 Jun 71. (162)

Integrated Communications System

(U) See the 1969 MACV Command History, Vol II, p IX-21, for a detailed description of the system.

Replacement of Military Operators with Civilians

(C) In early February, the Secretary of the Army (SA) requested a plan to replace as many US military personnel operating the ICS-SEA with civilians as soon as possible. The SECDEF agreed with the concept and stated that DOD would pay more than the then-existing military cost for civilian contractor operations and maintenance. Planning guidance given by SA included the policy that all spaces withdrawn from SEA, including transients, would be deleted from the force structure, and civilians would operate the sites until the RVNAF had trained sufficient personnel. The plan was to provide several alternative strength levels for conversion to civilian contractor operation and maintenance. Each was to consider the maximum number of civilians who could be trained and phased into the operation. In addition, the plan was to include sustaining base military and civilian space reductions resulting from military reductions in SEA. Total cost was to be reflected by fiscal year including incremental costs above FY70 and 71 budgets. A statement of impact of delaying the conversion 30 to 60 days after 15 Mar was to be included. (163) The plan was developed by DEPCG USARV and submitted to DA.

(S) The concept of the plan was initial manning of the ICS by a combination of contractor personnel, US military, and RVNAF. Reduction of US military personnel would be phased to coincide with availability of contractor personnel and trained RVNAF replacements. The total implementation cost in FY71 was \$53.2 million, \$20.7 million more than budgeted for military operation in FY71. The initial cost increase, resulting from contractor operation, was expected to be partially offset by future savings in operating the CONUS training base. Subsequent replacement of contractor personnel by RVNAF would further reduce overall costs as Vietnamization progressed.

(S) The plan gave the contractor responsibility for internal site security; operation and maintenance; and RVNAF hardskill military occupational speciality (MOS) and OJT programs. Control, direction, and management were retained by the 1st Sig Bde's Regional Com Gp. (164) Envisioned was contractor manning of 41 sites, 16 dial telephone exchanges, two Army maintenance support facilities, and test and evaluation activities. DA approved the concept on 21 Mar and directed the following actions: initiation of procurement; submission of industry responses to procurement actions, after evaluation, to DA for review prior to awarding the contract; and submission of the plan to JCS for their views on operational impact prior to solicitation of bids. The CG US Army Strategic Communication Command (USASTRA TCOM) was tasked with the procurement actions. On 30 Mar the plan was submitted to JCS. (165) The plan was approved and on

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20 Oct the DA awarded a contract to the Federal Electric Corporation, a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph, for the operation and maintenance of the RVN portion of the ICS-SEA. A \$14.9 million contract for the first year operation included operation and maintenance of 41 ICS sites, 14 dial telephone exchanges, and other ancillary facilities and equipment. In addition, the contractor would be responsible for providing engineering services, OJT for US and RVNAF personnel, site custodial services, and local security. The contractor would employ 1,600 personnel to replace 1,964 personnel from the 1st Sig Bde as follows: 623 US civilians, 895 local Vietnamese nationals, and 82 third-country nationals (TCN). The contractor was to be phased in and fully responsible for his obligation by 9 Jan 71, 81 days from the award date of the contract. (166)

Phasedown of ICS-SEA

(U) During the latter part of the year, the ICS-SEA was in a period of phasedown in accordance with CEIMP and troop withdrawal. The redeployment of both the 4th Inf Div and the 25th Inf Div in early December called for accelerated removal of several fixed-station radio systems. The removal was in process at the end of the year. The completion of the action would eliminate four systems and bring the total to six fixed-station systems deactivated since May 70. In addition, several tactical augmentation ICS-SEA systems were deactivated during the period. No significant problems were encountered and actions were on schedule on 31 Dec. (167)

Single Integrated Telecommunications System (SITS)

General

(U) In order to provide RVN a basis for an orderly development of economically viable public telecommunications facilities, it was necessary to establish a planned program to meet national needs. Also, because of high costs and limited resources, the telecommunications potential should be brought to bear to provide services without unnecessary duplications. To serve those ends, the US and GVN acted to create a single integrated telecommunications system for RVN (SITS).

Development of SITS

(U) Combined VN/US C-E staffs developed a plan for SITS. A memorandum of agreement promulgating the definition and description of SITS, agreed to by both US and Vietnamese C-E staff committees, was signed on 6 July. (168) The US committee was established by the AMEMB Saigon in 1964 to report to and advise the US Mission Council concerning C-E matters. In addition, it was to serve as a coordinating body for US agencies which advised GVN in planning and implementing its C-E program. It was composed of representatives from the AMEMB, MACV, USAID and the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). (169) The general definition of SITS as given was: "A single organized system to serve Vietnam supplying domestic and international telecommunications services through the use of interconnected equipment that transmits, switches, and receives electromagnetic signals to carry information between users." (170) The system would be operated by a single manager with an organizational structure as determined by GVN law. Telephone, teletype, leased circuit, telex, and other public telecommunications services would be provided to all subscribers, both domestic and international, commercial, and private users. The technical standards would be those minimums as determined by the International Telecommunications Union and would apply to both domestic and international operations. Transmissions of signals would be by radio, cable, and wire systems selected on a basis of such factors as availability of equipment, security of operating locations, costs versus economic

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potential, capital requirements, and other operations and engineering considerations. Various switching devices would be employed including telephone and teletype, both automatic and manual, determined on a basis of customer requirements according to standard engineering practices. The system could also include customer-owned end-user switching devices and instruments that satisfy stated technical standards as established. Original system equipment would evolve from various sources to include surplus military facilities; US and GVN-owned and operated systems and equipment; equipment on order by various agencies due to be incorporated into the SITS; Free World Allies and United Nations Development Program donations; new purchases; and also equipment and facilities as may be installed and initially operated by a contractor under contract to GVN. Although SITS included all public telephone services and all outside plants using public areas, and was to be the sole supplier of leased longhaul and local circuits, the following systems were excluded from SITS: those command and control communications facilities and systems in support of US/RVNAF/FWMAF designed for combat, combat support, and tactical-type situations; special purpose GVN nets, such as police, public utility, and other communications systems engineered for specialized use and not designed for entering SITS; GVN-authorized sole-user facilities to include private telephone exchanges, digital data equipment and supporting switching facilities; and other special purpose radiating equipment used for such purposes as radio and TV broadcasting, navigational aids, meteorological purposes, etc. (171)

(S) MACV planning progressed under two principles established by combined State Department and JCS guidance. First, there would be no abrupt turnover of US communications facilities or equipment to RVNAF. The Vietnamese systems would evolve from present US and GVN civil and military systems which had to continue furnishing services to all agencies. Secondly, the evolved SITS was anticipated to include selected dial telephone exchanges and other ancillary facilities not usually considered a part of the US-ICS, but which were necessary for the postwar GVN system.

(S) JCS stipulated three additional points. First, JCS would determine when and to what extent portions of the US military fixed wide-band communications system would be made available to GVN; secondly, the Area Communications System, as a system, was not a candidate for Vietnamization, but some of the less complex tactical equipment utilized could be turned over to the RVNAF as their capability to operate and maintain them was attained; and thirdly, the US would recommend to GVN that the initial operation and maintenance of US assets be by RVNAF because of the limited Vietnamese civilian communications manpower base. The RVNAF had greater capability to acquire, train, and retrain personnel. (172)

Establishment of SITS

(S) By the end of 1970, the US Ambassador and the GVN Prime Minister had signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the establishment of an autonomous Vietnamese telecommunications organization responsible for SITS. The US and RVN C-E staff committees had agreed upon and promulgated a definition of SITS, its characteristics, the services it would provide, and the facilities that were to be excluded. In addition, the Prime Minister had directed the development of legislation establishing the National Communications Commission (NCC) and the Vietnamese Telecommunications Organization (VTO). The NCC was to formulate, promulgate, implement, and enforce national telecommunications policy, much like the US Federal Communications Commission. The VTO was to be an autonomous public organization in commercial form with a corporate body and an independent management of operation, maintenance, and management of SITS. The VTO could be compared to the US American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

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(S) General Telephone and Electronics Corporation was the successful bidder on a USAID contract for planning and developing telecommunications with RVN. (173)

Defense Satellite Communications System

(U) Satellite communications to SEA were provided by DCA from the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) or leased by DCA from the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). In communications provided by DSCS, only Phase I was operational, utilizing 23 satellites in random, near synchronous, equatorial orbits. Any satellite that was mutually visible to two earth stations could provide a multi-channel radio link between stations; DCA handled assignment of the satellites to specific users. The COMSAT circuits were provided over synchronous satellites.

(U) The DSCS MSC-46 terminals in RVN operated from Ba Queo to Hawaii and from Nha Trang to Guam. They theoretically were capable of operating in modes providing two, five, 12, or 24 channels. Due to power limitations of Phase I satellites, the 24-channel mode was not usable. The 12-channel mode would provide "tactical" quality channels having a signal to noise ratio of 28 decibels (db) or less. The five-channel mode would provide good quality channels having a signal to noise ratio of approximately 36 db. DCA directed both links from Vietnam be operated in the latter mode. The two-channel mode was used only when the diffraction effects of heavy rain forced a reduction of channels to maintain an acceptable power level in remaining channels.

(U) Twenty leased COMSAT channels entered through the Sirachi, Thailand, terminal and interfaced with the ICS-SEA at Bang Pla. Nine channels were extended via 439L submarine cable to Vietnam.

(U) Future plans called for the deactivation of the Nha Trang satellite terminal by early 1971 because the Ba Queo terminal was capable of handling the entire load and the Nha Trang satellite was needed in other parts of the world. (174)

Automatic Digital Data Network

(U) The Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) was a defense communications worldwide high-speed, common-user data communications system (DCS) operated for and managed by the DCA to provide direct user-to-user and store-and-forward message service for DOD and other government agencies. SECDEF approved a DCS plan for expansion of AUTODIN in RVN in April 1966 providing for two 100-line automatic switching centers (ACS) located at Phu Lam and Nha Trang. CG USASTRATCOM was assigned responsibility as "principal manager" for implementing, operating, and maintaining the ACSs. Each military department was responsible for implementing, operating, and maintaining its own subscriber terminal equipment. (175)

(U) With the advent of AUTODIN into RVN in 1968, a new plateau for communications in a combat zone was achieved. Never before had a field commander had at his disposal a communications media with the sophisticated capabilities found in AUTODIN. The system was very effective in a combat area and was considered essential for the command, control, and support of combat operation. (176)

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(U) The three interim AUTODIN terminal configurations utilized in RVN were the high speed leased Mode-I terminal (UNIVAC 1004 or IBM 360/20-100 CPM/1600 WPM); the 75-band CFE Mode-II teletype terminal (100 WPM-no channel control); and the 75-band CFE Mode-V teletype terminal (100 WPM-limited channel control).

(U) Digital subscriber terminal equipments (DSTE) (part of Mode-I) were programmed to replace the existing terminals at the majority of AUTODIN subscriber locations. The DSTE was a series of GFE AUTODIN terminal configurations ranging from 60-band teletype only (AA), to a 1,200 band card and paper tape (BE) terminal. (177)

(U) During 1968 and 1969, AUTODIN restoral plans were first developed, with the final restoral plan promulgated in March 1970. The plan was necessary in the event that if one ASC or tributary failed, high precedence traffic would not be delayed or lost but would be delivered expeditiously. The final plan implemented a software contingency alternate routing program allowing ASCs to recognize the routing indicators of subscribers of other ASCs. The program automatically permitted routing of messages for a failed ASC or subscriber to alternate delivery stations.

(U) AUTODIN requirements were under continual evaluations. As a result many programmed DSTE installations were cancelled and duplicate terminals at the same physical locations were eliminated. Also, certain terminals were downgraded due to the lack of requirements for the high speed maximum capability terminals. In addition redeployments and reduction of forces had a significant impact on DSTE cancellations.

(U) A major outcome of evaluations was the determination to phase out one of the in-country ASCs. Analysis had shown that one ASC in RVN would be adequate and responsive to the user's needs on a continuous basis. The one switch could support all the RVN subscribers' requirements with most subscribers rehomed to an out-of-country ASC to provide the necessary AUTODIN restoral in the event of ASC or terminal failure. It was decided to phasedown the Nha Trang switch. Basically the phase-out was divided into four phases with the final phase completed in October 1970.

(U) By the end of 1970, there were 24 operational DSTE terminals and another 15 programmed for completion in early 1971. The AUTODIN system was not scheduled for inclusion within Vietnamization. Plans called for it to remain within the jurisdiction of US Forces until such time as the entire system was removed from RVN. (178)

Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON)

Background

(FOUO) Prior to 1969 long distance telephone calls in the Pacific area were made by operators at joint overseas switchboards. In November 1969 the AUTOVON switch at Clark AFB was activated, linking SEA with the world-wide AUTOVON system. Service to RVN was provided in three cuts. Cut I was made in March 1969 providing seven circuits from Phu Lam Joint Switching Center to Wahiawa, Hawaii. In November 1969 Cut II provided 13 additional circuits, 10 to Clark AFB, and three strapped to Wahiawa. Additionally, a sole-user circuit was made available to MACV Emergency Actions Center (EAC) to the Clark AFB switch (DAU).

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Configuration in 1970

(FOUO) Cut III or the final configuration was made in March 1970. Initially no additional changes or additional lines were planned in the cut. The cut was to provide an alternate route through the Fuchu switch in Japan. During 1970, however, additional circuits were put in service in RVN. A total of seven lines from Nha Trang to DAU; 10 via "wet wash" cable from Phu Lam to DAU; three COMSAT from Phu Lam to Wahiawa, Hawaii; and five additional lines to individual subscribers in the Saigon area were available by 1 Dec 70.

(U) The extensive administrative and operational reporting and the necessary calls concerning logistic support taxed the capability of the system. Because of the heavy traffic and the desire and need for transpacific calls, it was necessary to establish strict controls on the use of the AUTOVON system. The system as configured on 31 Dec 70 met the needs of US Forces and was expected to continue to fill requirements until major headquarters were phased down and the number of circuits reduced. (179)

Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVCOM)

(C) The AUTOSEVCOM program was a DCA-managed worldwide network which, as a dedicated portion of the DCS, provided means for establishing encrypted voice communications among US Forces and government agencies. (See 1969 MACV Command History, Vol II, pp IX-129, 130, for background.)

(C) At the end of 1969, the network served 78 subscribers off the primary AN/FTC-31 switch in Saigon. During 1970, the primary switch reached maximum capacity serving 80 subscribers. (180)

(C) At the end of 1969 a total of 140 subscribers were served through the various small secure voice cordboards (SECORDS) located throughout RVN. (See Figure IX-17 for location of SECORDS at the end of 1970.) A SECORD had the capability of 16 subscribers and when installed in tandem, 32 subscribers. During the peak period the number of active subscribers had grown to 218. Because of redeployment of units, the number was reduced to 191 as of 31 Dec, and it was expected that the downward trend would continue.

(C) AUTOSEVCOM proved to be an indispensable asset in RVN. However, because of inherent electronic voice reproduction limitations over longhaul trucks and extremely critical line conditioning requirements, AUTOSEVCOM reliability was below desired standards. (181)

NESTOR Tactical Secure Voice Program

General

(C) The NESTOR Tactical Secure Voice Program was the first family of tactical secure voice equipment to serve in the field. The equipment included KY-8, KY-28, and the KY-38 tactical voice equipments.


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AUTOSEVOCOM



SOURCE: MACJ6

FIGURE IX-17

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NESTOR Utilization

(C) From January through December 1970, the NESTOR achieved 20 percent increase in the amount of equipment available for use; 64 percent in January 1970 to 84 percent in December 1970. The statistics were based on over 13,000 total pieces of equipment valued at \$70 million. A general break-down showed approximately 3,043 KY-8s, 5,116 KY-28s, and 4,877 KY-38s in-country on 31 Dec 70. The 20 percent increase during the year was due primarily to receipt of NESTOR-compatible AN/PRC portable radios, installation of modification kits in aircraft for the KY-28s, and receipt of several hundred X-mode and interconnect cables required to interface the equipment with associated radios. Redeployment of units allowed a redistribution of assets to fill previously identified shortages. (182)

(C) From a purely technical standpoint, the NESTOR equipment was outstanding as far as reliability and security were concerned. It was slow to gain acceptance by tactical units due to its added weight (24.7 pounds for the KY-38 in addition to 22.3 pounds for the AN/PRC-77). Additionally, misconceptions regarding a reduction of radio range when using NESTOR and indifference on the part of units to the use of NESTOR for communications security (COMSEC) contributed to a low utilization rate. A vigorous educational program was instituted and by the end of December 1970, the utilization rate of the equipment was 85 percent of the total assets available. (183)


(C) At the end of the year, the only significant problems still hampering greater utilization of NESTOR equipment were the large number (approximately 1,368) of Army aircraft awaiting NESTOR modification kits and the shortage of several hundred vehicle installation kits for use with the KY-38. Previous problems with defective batteries and gas buildup in batteries used with the KY-38 were eliminated by receipt of a new series of batteries and a modification to battery cases. Complaints of decreased range when in the secure mode were still made, but all evidence showed the problem resulted from improperly tuned radios or, with the KY-38s, weak batteries.

(C) With the redeployment of US Forces from RVN, statistics with respect to the NESTOR program were erratic at the end of the year. It was a result of the removal of equipment from naval craft turned over to the VNN, redeployment of AF NESTOR-modified aircraft, and withdrawal of NESTOR-equipped Army and Marine Corps units. (184)

Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam

(S) The Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam (MTNV) was a grouping of communications equipment provided to RVN by MAP/MASF programs in the early 1960s. On 5 Jun 70, the ASD (I&L) approved a re-engineering project to align the MTNV with SITS planned in Vietnamization. The program would require 2 years and cost an estimated \$800,000. DA was designated as the overall military department manager for support of combined C-E engineering in RVN. The combined telecommunications Engineering Agency (ad hoc), composed of US military, Vietnamese, and contractor personnel, was formed at MACV to monitor the program. Funding for FY71 was provided from available O&MA resources, including those provided for the combat readiness of RVNAF. Funding beyond FY71 was to be handled in normal budgetary channels. (185)

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Shown here is selector equipment in the DTE at the JUSMAG compound.

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Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS)

(U) By the end of 1969, the entire SEA-ATS was activated. See the 1969 MACV Command History, Volume II, pp IX-126, 127 for background. The heart of the system for most of 1970 was nine long distance tandem switching centers. During November one switching center in RVN was deactivated with five remaining in RVN and three in Thailand. Of the five in RVN, three were operated by the USAF and two by the Army. Each of the centers were interconnected in a like manner to all other switching centers throughout RVN and Thailand. Thus, the customer had direct dialing to another dial telephone in RVN or Thailand. The tandems were installed at Tan Son Nhut, Can Tho, Nha Trang, Vung Chua Mountain, and Danang in RVN (Pleiku was deactivated in November), and Bang Pla, Warin, and Korat in Thailand. The tandem switches were collocated with dial telephone exchanges (DTE) at Can Tho and Danang AB and collocated or adjacent to the ICS at the others. (186) See Figure IX-18.

The Dial Telephone Exchanges

(U) The DTE systems in RVN were begun in 1967. By the close of 1969 there were 54 DTEs with a total of 95,825 lines. See 1969 MACV Command History, Volume II, p IX-127 for the background of the system. By the end of 1970 the DTEs were handling approximately one-half million calls per day with 42 DTEs. The service breakout was as follows: (187)

<u>Service</u>	<u>No. of DTEs</u>	<u>Lines</u>
US Army	22	32,500
USAF	17	41,900
US Navy/Marine Corps	1	600
State Dept	<u>2</u> 42	<u>2,600</u> 160,400

Air Force Tactical HF Networks (Out-of-Country)


(U) Two AF tactical HF networks had stations within RVN that could be used to establish emergency communications to Clark AFB or beyond if required. The nets were dedicated, special purpose networks controlled by units outside RVN. Telephone circuits could be electronically patched into the network, enabling authorized users to use their own telephones; however, the tactical nets operated in the simplex mode and radio procedures had to be used.

(U) The PACAF Command Control SSB Radio Network (COMMANDO ESCORT) provided voice communications between PACAF command and control elements. Authorized users were CINCPACAF; senior staff, PACAF CPs; PACAF unit commanders; designated aircraft; and other agencies receiving approval from CINCPACAF. (See Figure IX-19 for network diagram.) The network used Collins Universal radio group equipment primarily. MACV entry to the network to access CINCPAC command center was through the EAC to Tan Son Nhut station.

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TANDEM SWITCH INTERCONNECTING TRUNKS




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FIGURE IX-18

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AIR FORCE TACTICAL HF NETWORKS (OUT-OF-COUNTRY)



SOURCE: MACJ6

FIGURE IX-19

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(U) The 1st Mbl Com Gp Liaison Network was controlled out of group headquarters at Clark AFB and used primarily KWM-2A equipment. MACV entry to the network in emergency situations was also the Tan Son Nhut Station, using a different call sign. (188)

Military Affiliate Radio System

(U) The Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) was authorized by GVN Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 Nov 65 as requested by the AMEMB. At the end of 1969, the number of stations authorized and operated in RVN totaled 78. During 1970, MARS continued to be of great service; however, the number of stations in operation decreased to 68 due to redeployments.

(U) In April, as an economy measure, USARV directed cessation of all Army MARSGRAM service in RVN and between RVN and CONUS. The Army message traffic immediately dropped from a monthly average of over 7,000 to 202 messages in May. The impact on the Air Force and Navy MARS stations in having to absorb the tremendous Army traffic was immediately felt, but there was no loss of customers. In July USARV rescinded its directive and the MARSGRAM service built up again (3,824 messages in August, 10,349 messages in December). (189) (190)

(U) In May, Army MARS stations established phone patch service with Korea for US servicemen who had families in Korea. Approximately 10 messages per month were passed.

(U) In July, MARS, Vietnam passed the 3-million mark in overall traffic passed by the three component services since the inception of the program. (191) By the end of the year, over 3.4 million messages were passed. (192)

(U) During the year, the Army deactivated three stations due to redeployment of troops, and the Navy deactivated seven for the same reason.

(U) MARS stations by services are shown below: (193)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Operational</u>
Army	48	45
Air Force	11	11
Navy/Marine/MCB	<u>19</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	78	68

(U) 1970 traffic summary: (194)

<u>Service</u>	<u>Phone Patches</u>	<u>MARSGRAMS</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Army	447,567	57,610	505,177
Air Force	184,313	29,866	214,179
Nav/Marine/MCB	<u>128,087</u>	<u>104,853</u>	<u>232,942</u>
TOTALS	759,969	192,329	952,298

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509th Radio Research Group

(C) Important aspects of the Vietnam War were signal intelligence and Communications Security (COMSEC). The 509th Radio and Research Group (509th RR Gp) was charged with providing COMUSMACV with both elements and for providing training and technical assistance in signal intelligence and COMSEC to ARVN during the year. The group was organized as follows: (195)

UNIT

SUPPORTED UNITS

Hq, 509th RR Gp
HQ & HSC
RRCUV
335th RRC
101st RRC
403d SP OPN DET

MACV-USARV
509th RR Gp, HQ
509th RR Gp, HQ
DMAC
MACV-USARV
5th Sp Forces Gp

303d RR Bn
175th RRC
371st RRC
372nd RRC
409th RR Det
856th RR Det

IFFORCEV
IFFORCEV
1st Cav Div (Ambl)
25th Inf Div
11th ACR
199th Lt Inf Bde

313th RR Bn
328th RRC
330th RRC
374th RRC
404th RR Det

IFFORCEV
23rd Div
IFFORCEV
4th Inf Div
173d Abn Bde

8th RR Field Station
265th RRC
407th RR Det

XXIV Corps
161st Abn Div (Ambl)
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div

224th Avn Bn (RR)
138th Avn Co (RR)
144th Avn Co (RR)
146th Avn Co (RR)
156th Avn Co (RR)
1st RR Co (Avn)


MACV-USARV
MR 1
MR 2
MR 3
MR 4
MACV

See Figures IX-20 and IX-21 for organizational chart and location of units.

(C) The contributions and accomplishments of the 509th RR Gp aided tactical commanders greatly in combating the enemy. Due to the highly sensitive classification of its technical mission, security regulations prohibit specific accomplishments being cited; however, a two volume FY70 historical report (one classified confidential; the other Top Secret) was published by the group containing more detailed information. A few sanitized examples of the unit's contributions, extracted from HQ USARV, Combat Intelligence Lessons follow.

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SOURCE: 509th RR Gr


FIGURE IX-20

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SOURCE: 509th RR Gp

FIGURE IX-21

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On 17 April 1970, the ARVN/US command and control facilities and artillery units at Tan Canh received mixed 122 mm rocket and 82mm mortar fire covering the entire camp with devastating accuracy. As a result of prior liaison and coordination between members of the Processing and Reporting Branch (PRB), 330th Radio Research Company, the 330th RR Company entered the 52d Arty Gp communications net in cipher mode and passed possible coordinate locations of enemy firing units to the 52d Arty Gp TOC. Within five to eight minutes after receiving the grids, counter-battery fire was placed into the locations reported by the PRB, 330th RR Company. Three large secondary explosions were observed and incoming fire ceased.

On 19 April 1970 the PRB again passed a grid to the 52d Artillery Group TOC, only minutes after processing the information. Immediate reaction with artillery, as well as with gunships and available tactical airstrikes, uncovered a storage area and resulted in several secondary explosions.

Above outstanding results clearly demonstrate the significant advantage that can be attained through prior coordination and planning, and direct communications, between intelligence units and supported tactical commands. (52d Arty Gp) (196)

(C) Another example was the 407th RR Det providing timely and accurate combat intelligence to the Joint Task Group, Guadalcanal, enabling it to rapidly react against an NVA regimental size force. Through the efforts of the detachment, the group made a rapid assessment of the enemy's intentions and inflicted maximum casualties while minimizing friendly casualties.

(C) Common support was usually in the form of early warnings pattern analysis and secure communications. Because of valuable combat intelligence derived from the group's efforts, tactical units were often able to hit the enemy in initial stages of operations causing him severe losses. (197) AS

FUNDING

(U) It was previously noted that funding was austere during 1970. Each program and action taken by MACV had to be weighed against the amount of money available for support. The financial support of the war came from several budgets. The MILCON budget was discussed previously and is excluded in this review of budgets for 1970.

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O&MN Funds - Support of HQ MACV

(U) Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&MN) funds supported HQ MACV. The total amount of funds, \$9,832,745, authorized by CINCPAC for HQ MACV from the O&MN appropriation FY 70 was fully obligated at the end of the fiscal year. Not included in that amount was \$678,000 which was returned to CINCPAC to finance other PACOM requirements. (198) During the 1st Qtr CY70 a budget of \$9,375,300 was requested for the FY71 headquarters requirements, compared with a ceiling of \$10,511,000. (199) The amount reflected a reduction of approximately \$460,000 from the FY70 annual funding program. (200) There were increases in civilian pay due to more authorized TD spaces filled. That was more than offset by a reduction of the hardware and software contracts pertaining to CORDS and the Director, Military Assistance, however. Funds finally authorized for FY71 amounted to \$8,432,000, a reduction of \$943,300 of that requested. (201)

O&MA Funds - Rural Development Cadre Program

(U) O&MA funds supported the Rural Development Cadre (RDC) program. The final FY70 funding program for the RDC program was \$31,390,540. The amount was approximately 77.7 percent of the original FY70 annual funding program of \$40,600,000. A total of \$9,209,460 of unused funds were returned to DA as a result of separate program reviews in February, May, and June. Funds were returned in sufficient time for utilization in other DA programs. The excess funds were identified as a result of certain conditions. Actual strength levels of the Rural Development and Son Thon Cadre had averaged approximately 10 percent below authorized and budget strengths. That factor significantly reduced the planned expenditures for personnel compensations and supplies. Actual billings for the Air America contract services were only 16.7 percent of the estimated value of the contract for FY70. One major procurement action for supplies and equipment was reprogrammed for FY71 funding due to non-receipt of an international balance of payments determination in sufficient time for utilization of FY70 funds. (202)

(U) During February 1970, the FY71 Command Operation Budget was finalized for submission to USARPAC. The FY71 fund ceiling for the RDC program was the same as FY70 (\$40,600,000). The submission exceeded the ceiling substantially (\$52,301,900). The Budget Execution Review for the FY71 funding program was completed in November 1970. The review indicated unfinanced requirements of \$4.675 million against a total requirement of \$45.2 million. Most of the shortfall lay in the area of personnel compensation for Rural Development and Son Thon Cadre at the National Training Center, Vung Tau. The decision was still pending at the end of December. (203) The RDC/National Training Center budget program for FY71 was as follows: (204)

	<u>Annual Program</u>	<u>Estimated Obligations</u>	<u>2d Quarter Obligations Percent of Program</u>
RD/STRD Cadre	\$38,628,250	\$19,113,600	50%
NTC	6,571,750	2,612,450	40%
TOTALS	45,200,000	21,726,050	48%

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Rural Development Cadre at work.



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O&MA Funds - Support of MACV Field Advisors

(U) Total FY70 O&MA funds pertaining to the MACV advisory budget amounted to \$2,174,000. The entire amount was obligated. Two items that used the majority of funds were the special leave program which totalled over \$1.1 million and the rental of USAID housing for advisor personnel which totalled \$327,000. (205)

(U) During February 1970, the FY71 Command Operating Budget was finalized for submission through USARV to USARPAC. The FY71 fund ceiling for the support of field advisors was \$2,175,000. The requirements (\$2,972,800) substantially exceeded the ceiling by \$797,800. (206) Subsequent to the FY71 budget submission, additional requirements arose bringing the total requirements to \$3,260,000. During the mid-year review in November, the budget was increased to \$3.458 million to compensate for additional civilian payrolls. (207)

Assistance-In-Kind

CY70 Funds

(U) The 1st Qtr CY70 fund allocation for Assistance-in-Kind (AIK) was \$VN1,373,700,000. An intense review was made of FY68 and FY69 obligations in order to free funds tied against obligations that were no longer valid. Approximately \$VN 65,500,000 was de-obligated and made available for reuse. The III MAF AIK Class B Agent, Danang, was terminated in February with finance support transferred to the US Navy until 1 Apr, when it was assumed by the Army. (208)

(U) The AIK 2d Qtr fund allocation was \$VN 1,078,500. Based on a mid-year review, an adjustment of \$VN 13,630,000 was made between the various program managers. Fund allocation for the 3d Qtr was \$VN 1,029,800,000. The CY71 budget for \$VN 5.4 billion was approved by COMUSMACV and the U. S. Mission Council and forwarded to GVN Ministry of National Defense during that period. (209)

(U) The AIK 4th Qtr fund allocation was \$VN 1,063,000,000. During November 1970, MACCO completed the end-of-year review. As a result, \$VN 135 million were redistributed from MACCORDS and 7AF to USARV, NAVFORV, and FWMAF. (210)

FY71 AIK Funding Level

(S) In August 1970 SECSTATE notified appropriate commands of a decision contained in NSDM-80 that the FY71 AIK funding level for Vietnam was set at \$US 20 million. AIK was a calendar year program in which the CY70 program was \$39.2 million expended at the rate of approximately \$10 million per quarter. The National Security Council (NSC) decision meant a drastic decrease in funds with requirements for \$45 million. MACV sent a reclama in September, giving four problems the AIK funding posed for MACV:

1. FY71 O&M budgets of all component commands were submitted on the premise AIK funds would be available for authorized purposes. As an example, 13,000 direct hire local national employees of MACV were paid with AIK funds. The component commands and MACV used an average of 7,000 daily hire laborers monthly, and the combat units used 3,000 Kit Carson Scouts.

2. MACV advisory teams purchased potable water, firewood, ice, and local subsistence through approximately 100 imprest funds established in the AIK financial network.

3. CY71 AIK requirements presented to the GVN budget advisory committee were \$46 million. The funding limitation placed by SECSTATE required either return of \$10 million CY70 AIK funds to GVN with a request for \$10 million for the first half of CY71, or MACV and component commands use \$20 million in CY70 and request no funds for the first half of CY71.

4. Continuance of existing programs financed with AIK funds was implied in all references. Substitution of appropriated funding to MACV and the component command would require new budget submissions for FY71, development of a financial network of US imprest funds, and disclosure of US intent to reduce AIK requirements at an early stage of negotiations with GVN for economic reform.

(S) To avoid those problems and to conform to the NSC intent of reducing AIK to \$20 million, MACV proposed the following course of action:

1. MACV be granted the authority to use the CY70 AIK fund in its entirety. AIK expenditures included disbursements against CY69 and CY70 programs. Less than one-half of the CY70 program had been expended by 1 Jul. Expenditures occurring against both active programs would exceed \$20 million, but there would be 4 months to develop administrative and funding procedures. Further, immediate disclosure to GVN of US intention of reducing requirements for joint support funds would be eliminated.

2. DOD to transfer funds at departmental level to the State Department, augmenting joint support funds provided GVN by \$25 million. The CY71 AIK GVN chapter would remain at \$46 million. That method would eliminate the necessity for MACV and the component commands to submit new 1971 appropriated and AIK budgets and establish a new imprest fund network subordinate to a US disbursing office, and would permit utilization of the current GVN AIK Finance and Accounting Office. Since all AIK funds were piaster funds, no command could inadvertently use the funds for dollar expenditures. (211)

(S) Based on the MACV reclama, SECDEF presented a revised plan to the NSC for AIK funding for CY71 at \$35 million, \$20 million for the first half and \$15 million for the second half of the year. (212) The revision was approved. Guidance received from DOD necessitated the GVN budget be reduced by \$11 million and provided for modest cutbacks in AIK financed programs. (213)

Military Assistance Service Funded Program

(U) The MASF Program was started in 1966 when SECDEF removed the responsibility for support of RVNAF from MAP and placed it on the respective US military services. (See 1969 MACV Command History, Volume II, p IX-118 for a further review of the program.) During 1970 the MASF program continued to function smoothly with equipment, supplies, and services furnished to RVNAF units. The MASF program was substantially aided by the transfer of items of equipment of redeploying units throughout the year.

(S) On 13 Mar 70 SECDEF directed the military service secretaries to identify reprogramming of FY70 and FY71 MASF to accommodate the essential CRIMP requirements within the approved FY71 budget. The approved FY71 budget was as follows: (214)

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(Millions)

ARVN	\$1,069.4
<u>Ammunition</u>	<u>616.6</u>
VNAF	321.5
<u>Ammunition</u>	<u>48.0</u>
VNN	141.4
<u>Ammunition</u>	<u>12.1</u>
VNMC	1.3 (includes ammunition)

CY 1970 GVN Defense Budget

(U) While not applicable to US funding, GVN defense budgets were pertinent and important to the total financing of the war. The RVN Legislature approved the CY70 Defense Budget in the amount of \$VN 109.9 billion. Review of the budget revealed significant variations between it and US Mission Council guidance. That guidance, when adjusted for actual RVNAF strength and for underfunded pay and allowance compensations, amounted to \$VN 131.3 billion. The review indicated that approximately \$VN 2.6 billion of the total \$VN 14.0 billion joint support funds to be included in the CY70 defense budget would remain unused if the criteria and distribution of those funds stated in the US Mission Council guidance remained unchanged. The review also resulted in several budget project officers requesting sufficient joint support funds to assume total funding of an activity to insure its accomplishment at the reduced level. Inadequacies in the GVN defense budget indicated \$VN 1.6 billion joint support funds originally programmed for PF pay and allowances should be applied to other purposes to achieve more effective use. MAC- CO developed the CY70 RVNAF Operating Budget, which was approved by the MACV Budget Advisory Committee in February.

(U) In March, the Minister of Defense forwarded a proposed supplement for the defense budget to the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid (DGBFA). The supplement increased that budget by \$VN 21.7 billion for a total of \$VN 131.6 billion. (215) After review, the DGBFA returned it requesting the budget ceiling be reduced to \$VN 121.5 billion. During the latter part of May, the Minister of Defense returned the \$VN 121.5 billion revised budget. The revised budget was consolidated into a Revised National Budget at DGBFA level and presented to the RVN Legislature for approval in July. (216) Pending approval of the revised budget, over-allocation of funds in some areas was made by the Ministry of National Defense, (MOND) with prior concurrence of DGBFA, to meet essential requirements of RVNAF. (217)

(U) The RVN Legislature approved the Revised National Budget during the last quarter of CY70. The budget provided an additional \$VN11.5 billion to the MOND. A transfer of \$VN4.1 billion from the National Budget Contingency Fund was also authorized in order to allow offsetting the 1 Oct 70 pay raise for military and civilian personnel of the MOND. (218)

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CY 1971 GVN Defense Budget

(U) The development of the CY71 GVN Defense Budget began in January 1970 when the Director General of Finance and Audit (DGFA) presented draft guidelines for review by MACV. In March, MACV replied with recommended changes which were included in the guidelines distributed to RVNAF agencies. The guidelines were developed in a simplified manner that was developed in coordination with DGFA. In prior years the process required at least 3 months and involved drafting and staffing very detailed instructions within MACV, USAID and the AMEMB prior to transmissions to DGFA. The procedures used eliminated initial US involvement and allowed DGFA to exercise greater initiative. MACV and US Mission Council provided only minimum essential information and recommended changes to DGFA's draft guidelines. (219)

(U) During April and early May, the VN budget project officers prepared their individual chapters for the CY71 budget. MOND conducted a review of the proposals and forwarded a recommended budget of \$VN149.3 billion divided roughly as follows: (220)

	(billions)
Pay and Allowances	\$VN103.077
Subsistence	13.325
Clothing and Equipment	8.862
Logistics and Operating Expenses	12.587
Construction and Maintenance of Real Estate	4.844
Training, POLWAR, Miscellaneous	1.952
MACV Expenses	4.625
	\$VN149.272

(U) During August the MACV Budget Screening Board reviewed the MOND proposal in depth and developed a MACV recommended budget. The board's recommended budget by functional areas included:

	(billions)
Pay and Allowances	103.1
Subsistence	9.1
Clothing and Equipment	10.1
Logistics & Operating Expenses	13.2
Const., Maint. & Real Estate	6.5
Training, POLWAR, Misc.	1.9
Assistance-in-Kind	5.4
	\$VN149.3

COMUSMACV approved the recommendations in late September and the US Mission Council approved the budget guidance in October. (221) The total budget guidance of \$VN165.3 billion, of which \$VN20.0 billion was joint support funded, included \$VN16.0 billion for the increase in pay for military and civilian personnel of the MOND. However, the Directorate General for Finance and Audit, based on DGBFA guidance, submitted a CY71 budget for \$VN130 billion to the RVN legisla-

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ture. In November, the Lower House approved it for \$VN129.5 billion. In December, the Upper House voted for a cut of \$VN3 billion which required another action by the Lower House. At year's end, the final budget had not been approved. (222)

MACV ACTIONS RELATED TO GVN ECONOMIC SITUATION

Background

(U) The impact on the Vietnamese economy of redeployment of US Forces and Vietnamization became an important consideration during 1970. COMUSMACV foresaw the need for positive programs to assist other US and GVN efforts to stabilize the economy.

(C) In April COMUSMACV directed MACCO to work closely with the Joint Economic Office of the AMEMB Saigon and assist US and GVN efforts in stabilizing and creating growth in the GVN economy under guidelines recommended by the Embassy. (223) To analyze the economic impact and make recommendations to COMUSMACV, the position of Economist was established within MACCO. (224) On 22 May 70 a US Army major with a masters degree in economics was assigned the position. (225) In July, because of the magnitude of tasks to be performed, an economics division was organized within MACCO's office. MACV Headquarters and USARV were screened for officer and enlisted personnel with graduate education and experience in economics. The effort resulted in seven economists assigned to the division. (226)

(C) In late August, SECDEF advised the Chairman, JCS, that because of "...implications of the economic situation in South Vietnam for the success of Vietnamization, the impact of military aspects of Vietnamization upon the economy, and the possible contributions of DOD to economic development in Vietnam through US military presence, programs, and assets..." he believed it imperative that COMUSMACV be assisted by a military economic advisor. The advisor would work closely with other elements of the US Mission in RVN and SECDEF, through the organization of the JCS, on economic matters. (227) SECDEF requested a recommendation on how the position might be best included organizationally within MACV. JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments concerning the grade, special qualifications, and organizational alignment for the position. CINCPAC, in turn, asked COMUSMACV for information upon which to base an answer. COMUSMACV proposed placing the position at deputy chief of staff level and recommended certain qualifications. (228) Upon receipt of approval, COMUSMACV directed the establishment of a new staff organization, the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic Affairs (MACEA), on 4 Sep 70. The organization was headed by an Army brigadier general and consisted of 12 other officers with advanced degrees in economics or business administration (four with Ph D's). See Figure IX-22 for the organization chart.


(U) The DCofS, Economic Affairs was the principal staff assistant to COMUSMACV on RVN economic matters of significance to DOD. He was responsible for providing special studies and overall program analysis; evaluating, monitoring, and reporting services; coordinating and assessing economic impact of program activities of MACV staff agencies; and performing liaison, assessing, and reporting on economic programs of USAID and AMEMB agencies. He had primary staff responsibility for:

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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS



SOURCE: MACEA

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FIGURE IX-22

- [REDACTED]
1. Advising COMUSMACV on all matters pertaining to economic stability and growth of RVN.
 2. Analyzing economic trends, evaluating the impact of Vietnamization on RVN economy, and recommending policies and actions to be taken.
 3. Examining the impact of US military programs on local economy in terms of claims on resources, inflationary pressures, and foreign exchange reserves.
 4. Providing COMUSMACV and DOD with timely and periodic reviews of the Vietnam economic situation to insure effective and efficient application of DOD resources.
 5. In conjunction with the US Mission, indicating and determining feasible counter-measures to assist RVN in achieving and maintaining a balanced economy.
 6. Coordinating MACV staff activities having impact on the economy of RVN.
 7. Acting as chairman of the MACV Military Economic Action Committee (MEAC).
 8. Maintaining contact and liaison with all appropriate civil and military agencies of the US Government.
 9. Prescribing and developing economic data, functions, and changes in organizations to meet MACV and DOD objectives.
 10. Exercising staff supervision over the office of MACEA.
 11. Performing such other duties and tasks as assigned by the CofS MACV or higher authority. (229)

(C) In order to improve coordination on matters pertaining to the economic aspects of Vietnamization, COMUSMACV established the MACV MEAC in September. MEAC was chaired by MACEA; and members included MACJ1, MACJ3, MACJ4, MACJ5, MACJ6, ACoS, Military Assistance (MACMA), Command Surgeon (MACMD), MACDC, MACCO, and MACCORDS. (230)

Economic Situation in RVN

Problem Areas and Recommendations

(S) The problems in insuring RVN economic stabilization were numerous and required firm, positive, and direct action by many agencies. A major problem was the inability of the GVN production base to produce and fulfill both military and civil requirements. It was MACV policy to limit procurement in RVN in order to assist in controlling inflationary trends in the GVN economy. One way the problem could be alleviated was to increase industry and agriculture efficiency so more items could be produced with the same effort. That could be accomplished with improved management and providing equipment to the industries of interest. However, improvement of industry was a long-range project. USAID (Industry) identified additional items valued roughly at \$40 million which could be produced in-country rather than imported through MASF. On the

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Limited Parallel Foreign Exchange Market

(U) The Limited Parallel Foreign Exchange Market was established on 5 Oct at an exchange rate of \$VN275 to \$US1. A variety of foreign exchange transactions were to be carried out at the parallel market rates, but the rate did not apply to US Government piaster expenditures. Such expenditures continued to be carried out at the exchange rate of \$VN118 per US dollar.

(U) The parallel market rate applied to the personal expenditures of American troops and civilians and other non-Vietnamese employed by the US Government and US Government contractors. The problem of defining "personal expenditure" was difficult and it was felt that there would be a tendency for US Government agencies and instrumentalities as well as contractors and other companies employed by the US to transfer piaster expenditures made in their names to the name of their employees. A major reason for establishing the parallel exchange market was to provide an exchange rate with reasonable value in piasters to American troops and civilians in RVN. It was not intended to reduce overall US Government expenditures in RVN. All requests for changes from "official" to "personal" category were routed through COMUSMACV to the Minister/Counselor of Economic Affairs, AMEMP, for evaluation prior to any change in the rate being applied. (232)

(U) Exceptions to the "official" category were requested by COMUSMACV for MACV instrumentalities and agencies as follows: (233)

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Status</u>
Chaplain's Fund	Approved 10 Nov 70
Domestic Hire Funds	Approved 10 Nov 70
Sancta Maria Orphanage Fund	Approved 21 Nov 70
Phan Rang Community Relations Fund	Approved 1 Dec 70
Vietnam Regional Exchange (VRE) Concessionaires and VRE purchases of Vietnamese goods for resale	Approved 3 Dec 70
4th Transportation Command Civic Actions Fund	Submitted 3 Dec 70
USO Concessionaires	In staffing

(U) For control purposes and to establish an audit trail, all activities utilizing piasters were required to establish dual piaster accountability records and be able to account for the receipts and expenditures of all piasters at the two rates of 118 to \$1 and 275 to \$1. Military banking facilities and military disbursing officers were required to provide a piaster sales slip to all activities that procured piasters (but not to individuals). In addition all audit, inspection, and investigative agencies were requested to incorporate the control of piasters into their checklists and procedures. (234)

Progress in RVN Economic Stability

1. October Report

(C) In October COMUSMACV reported to CINCPAC on progress in the RVN economic stabilization program. GVN had established the parallel rate market to apply to accommodation exchange to purchases, exports, and to a selected list of imports. The new personal accommodation rate \$VN275 to US\$1 provided an equitable rate of exchange for allied personnel, civilian

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An example of primitive methods used in cultivating the rice paddy.

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and military. It also benefited GVN exchange reserves by encouraging legal piaster purchases, as opposed to black market. It was felt a major stimulus would be given to existing and potential export industries and a start made toward an eventual self-sustaining economy. Application of the parallel rate to some \$150 million (at an annual rate) of imports would increase the government's revenues from imports and, given the preponderant proportion of luxury goods included in the parallel market, would tend to encourage imports of necessities. Imposition of relatively high advance deposits on luxury goods would reinforce that effect. The designation of goods to which the parallel rate applied would be subject to change as circumstances dictated.

(C) The perequation tax, one of three categories of import tax in use in Vietnam, was increased for a selected list of goods. The list contained mostly luxury products, but also included farming and fishing industries.

(C) Interest rate reform was undertaken in early September and was a key element in the reform program. As an anti-inflationary measure and in an effort to bring the savings of individuals and business firms into the banking system, bank savings rates were increased to a maximum of 20 percent; the prime lending rate was raised to a maximum of 24 percent, partly to encourage more efficient allocation of lendable funds and partly to discourage the hoarding of goods. At the same time, a system of advance deposits was put into effect, whereby an importer had to deposit up to 500 percent of the value of the imported goods at the time of application for his import license.

(C) An open licensing of imports was established. Import licensing was largely restricted to eligible goods and the list of importers expanded to encourage competition.

(C) A wage increase for the military and civil servants became effective in October. Concurrently, the US agreed to supply some \$42 million of foodstuffs for distribution to the RVNAF in CY71.

(C) Reform of rice trade began with placing of rice sales on a cash-and-carry basis in September and starting to eliminate burdensome restrictions on the movement of rice within Vietnam. In the reform package proper, the GVN announced an increase in the price of rice in central Vietnam to the Saigon price level, as a step toward a more rationally based rice market and a removal of subsidies.

(C) While domestic tax reform was not a part of the reform program per se, the GVN recognized the need both for increased domestic taxes and for a rationalization of the existing tax structure. Accordingly, a comprehensive tax reform package was prepared for the National Assembly.

(C) Although the reforms would be helpful to the economy, they were long overdue and provided only short-run relief for some of the country's economic problems. The black market rate for Military Payment Certificates (MPC) in October was above \$VN300 to \$US1. Due to the raise in the accommodation rate, however, the spread between the parallel market rate and the black market rate decreased considerably. CIP license applications fell off because of a required deposit of up to 200 percent. A GVN wage increase of 35 percent was needed; the increase given was only about 17 percent. (235)

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2. November Report

(C) In a report to JCS in November covering September and October, COMUSMACV elaborated on his earlier October report to CINCPAC. He stated the Vietnamese economy did not appear to be headed towards any crisis situation during the next 3 to 4 months, although many chronic economic problems persisted. There was great concern among the populace about continuing inflation and a strong tendency to hoard commodities as a hedge against inflation. There was a serious disparity in the economic status of various groups and a strong basis for discontent among the military, the civil servants, and the low income city dwellers whose income was relatively low and who were taxed relatively more heavily than the agrarian sector or the wealthy.

(C) Since the establishment of the parallel market rate, the black market price of green dollars had fluctuated only slightly and in early November was \$VN420 to \$US1, essentially the rate prevailing before the devaluation. That indicated a considerable closing of the gap between the legal rate and the black market price.

(C) The relaxing of the import licensing restrictions had a favorable result, although there was still a list of prohibited items and aggregate dollar ceilings on certain other items. The GVN placed a ceiling of \$US100 million on total licensing during the final quarter of CY70. The rate of licensing for GVN-financed imports for October was high, reaching the hoped-for goal of \$35 million.

(C) Since interest rates were increased early in September, time and savings deposits had increased from \$VN17 billion to 19 billion. The net effect of increased interest rates was obscured, however, by the fact importers had to produce over \$VN10 billion for advance deposits on imports during the same period.

(C) The money supply was held rather constant and in late September was only 9.3 percent above 1 Jan 70 level. The effects of the pay increases and the historic surge of spending in advance of TEET had not yet been felt, but USAID was confident the total increase for the year would not exceed 15 percent.

(C) The USAID retail price index of Saigon rose by a total of 5 percent during the 5 weeks following the 5 Oct institution of the economic reform. Most of the increase occurred during the week of the National Holiday (1-2 Nov) and was attributable to the holiday and in part to heavy rains which destroyed some vegetable crops. Rice prices in Saigon were stable to slightly declining, with 38,000 tons arriving from the Delta during October, the high for the year. The high October rice receipts were largely attributable to the need of storage space for the impending harvest.

(C) Rice production for the 1970-1971 season was predicted by the GVN Ministry of Agriculture at 5.65 million tons of paddy rice, a 10-percent increase over 1969-1970. If the severe flooding in MR I caused serious loss of stored rice, despite the completion of the harvest prior to the flood, that prediction would require modification.

(C) On the recommendation of USAID, GVN standardized the price for US medium grain rice at \$VN30 per kilo. That required a \$VN9 per kilo increase in price for the central region of RVN, which in turn resulted in numerous protests. USAID felt there was still too large a differential between US rice and local rice (\$VN45 per kilo) and obtained GVN agreement to

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raise the price of US rice to \$VN40 per kilo by 15 Dec. Rice sales were placed on a cash-and-carry basis and a start was made toward eliminating the burdensome restrictions on movement of rice among regions.

(C) With the assistance of US Internal Revenue Service advisors, a substantial effort was made to improve tax collection. Assessments were made in 12,000 cases of tax evasions which had been detected.

(C) COMUSMACV reported the favorable effects of the economic reform program would gradually diminish and disappear with continued inflation, unless periodic, realistic adjustments were made in the parallel rate and in interest rates. USAID reported a joint US-GVN review of the program would be held before the end of 1970, during which further adjustment in the parallel rate, as well as other policy changes, could be raised. Realization of the full foreign exchange potential of non-official piaster purchases depended on pegging the accommodation rate as close as possible to the free market rate. Hopefully, that could be achieved through regular upward adjustments.

(C) A tax reform bill drafted by GVN would be of limited benefit because it would increase revenues only by an estimated \$VN2 billion per year. USAID hoped to get the bill strengthened prior to submission to the National Assembly.

(C) Price controls existed on practically all commodities. Theoretically, the controls were designed to eliminate windfall or excess profits by regulating very narrow profit margins for wholesalers and retailers. Factually, the controls were sporadically and selectively enforced and provided a major area for graft. Most wholesalers and retailers continued to sell illegally at free market prices; moreover, the uncertainty regarding enforcement was an important barrier to needed foreign investment.

(C) Issuance of licenses for CIP imports was at a low level since the GVN instituted requirements for advanced deposits on selected commodities. Total licenses issued from 1 Oct to 29 Oct approximated only about \$3 million. It was a matter of continuing interest that the FY71 total reach the projected \$300 million, due to the requirement placed on DOD under NSDM-80.


(C) A low level of economic growth occurred during September and October, even in sectors where resources were available. Substantive tax reform, additional exchange rate reform, incentive programs, selective subsidies, and other aggressive programs to provide both foreign and domestic investment capital would be required to facilitate a higher rate of growth.

(C) A substantial manpower squeeze was experienced as RVNAF approached its authorized strength and as lowered levels of combat action and increased physical security brought revived interest in private sector economic activity. It was felt that reductions in US Forces levels and associated contracting activities would make significant numbers of trained personnel available for other employment. Plans were prepared to undertake a major manpower study to address the problems of improving identification of assets and requirements, training, mobility of the work force, and management. Particular attention was directed toward the feasibility of a fixed term of service for RVNAF personnel, to provide programmed flow of personnel through the military services with a predictable return flow to the civil sector.

(C) The problem of keeping the growth in money supply for expanding during CY71 appeared formidable. The 1971 GVN budget expenditures were forecast at \$VN267 billion and it would be

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Vietnam produces enough beer for its own needs and has been selling an export brand overseas for years.

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difficult to hold the line at that figure. Revenues of 1970 were forecast to be \$VNI71 billion. Although revenues would increase in 1971, a major problem would be to control the 1971 deficit and move towards a goal of reducing total US foreign exchange commitments and decrease dependence of US imports. If a strike by RMK employees resulted in any significant wage increases, it would aggravate the control of inflation in 1971 and would intensify the disparity of income between public and private sector workers.

(C) In addition to economic stability actions by USAID, GVN, and MACV noted previously, the following actions were taken or monitored by MACEA.

1. In conjunction with USAID and GVN, planned for best end-use of excess DOD installations for public health and welfare purposes and for private industrial and commercial use. GVN would have an opportunity to derive budget revenues through the lease or sale of some of the installations to private enterprise commercial or industrial operations.

2. Monitored work of MACDC; OICC, RVN; and USAID to develop a viable RVN construction industry to fill the gap when US construction agencies departed. It involved careful consideration of the quantity and types of US-excess construction equipment which could be properly employed and maintained and the institutional arrangements into which it could fit. As an associated matter, MACDC, in conjunction with USAID, worked on the vitally important function of building into the GVN Directorate General of Highways the capability to maintain LOCs and extend the secondary road network after US withdrawal.

3. In conjunction with USAID, examined other possible uses of excess equipment which would facilitate RVN industrial development.

4. Examined the possibility of disposal of scrap and surplus items managed in a way which would provide increased revenues and foreign exchange to GVN.

5. Examined the feasibility of using US, ARVN, and RF/PF forces to more effectively secure key areas needed for logging and for production of rubber, sugar cane, and diversified agricultural products.

6. Reviewed and analyzed RVNAF proposals to have military units:

a. Expand operations in the agricultural sector to add crop farming to their current poultry and livestock production activities as a means to provide supplementary compensation, improve morale, and reduce desertion rates.

b. Undertake lumber production operations to help meet needs of the dependents housing program.

7. In accordance with guidance provided in NSDM-80 and in coordination with MACJ4, MACDC, MACMA, MACCORDS, and USAID analyzed opportunities for increased in-country procurement and identified the existing impediments to such increased procurement. The task proved more difficult than anticipated. The area appearing to offer the greatest possibilities was MASF in-country procurement of commercial consumables. Another area to be examined closely was lump-sum construction contracting.

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8. In coordination with MACCO, refined DOD piaster expenditure reporting and projections. As pertained to CY72 and CY73, new criteria were developed, in coordination with USAID, which included price increases, local national pay increases, and projected exchange rates. Projections were made based on dollar availability as well as piaster requirements.

9. With the assistance of an OSD systems analyst, a monetary gap analysis model was set up on the MACV computer, with further development and refinement of the model planned.

10. A study was started to support the establishment of a periodically negotiated flexible exchange rate for the piaster and to investigate the practicality of eliminating MPCs.

11. A bibliography was compiled on RVN fiscal and monetary policies, procedures, and problems. Areas of special interest included taxation, exchange rates, price controls, inflation, and the banking system. (236)

3. End of year Report

(C) In the final report of the year to JCS, COMUSMACV reported that the economic situation continued to respond favorably to reform measures instituted previously. Prices had increased only slightly during December and the rate of expansion of the money supply had slowed perceptively. Import licensing had increased and an increase in customs revenues during the latter part of the year contributed to a reduction in the CY70 budget deficit. Additionally, the change in the accommodation rate had resulted in considerably increased GVN foreign exchange receipts from personal piaster purchase. In COMUSMACV's view, the economic situation remained good for the short term but depended on the following:

1. Amount and timing of changes in the official exchange rate.
2. Effectiveness of DOD programs in off-setting foreign exchange shortfalls resulting from any rate changes.
3. Validity of CY71 budget gap projections.
4. The intensity of enemy activity during the TET holiday period. (237)

(C) Eight favorable and three unfavorable factors concerning GVN economy were listed by COMUSMACV. The favorable factors were given as follows:

1. Legal per capita personal piaster conversions by civilian and military personnel increased from 1779 piasters in October (\$6.45 @ 275:1) to 3187 piasters in November (\$11.59 @ 275:1). Total legal personal conversions arose by \$VN 593 million to \$VN 1.418 billion, indicating the greater amount

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5. Though money supply showed an expected year-end increase, the rate of expansion was well below that experienced throughout the year. Money supply levels stood at \$VN 154.5 billion on 5 December after an increase during the year of 9.8 per cent.

6. The USAID retail price index for Saigon is showing signs of stabilization and increased only 1 per cent during the four week period ending 21 December. Food prices, which comprise the bulk of the index, remained steady during the period. As of 21 December, the overall 1970 price increase was 32.0 per cent, compared with increases of 41.7 per cent, 33.8 per cent and 32.1 per cent in 1967, 1968 and 1969.

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These cabbages growing on an An Giang demonstration farm were introduced by members of the Chinese Agricultural Technical Group from Taiwan. The CATG has introduced 31 kinds of new vegetables to Vietnam in 11 years.

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ventures from the present 2-3 years; would allow unlimited repatriation of profits as opposed to the present 20% limit; would guarantee against both nationalization and establishment of government competition with new businesses; and would eliminate current restrictions on the foreign composition of management.

8. GVN approved a supplementary budget for CY70 which authorizes total expenditures of \$VN 197.1 billion against revenues of \$VN 157.7 billion. Actual expenditures, however, are expected to approximate \$VN 185 billion and produce a deficit of approximately \$VN 35.0 billion. Customs revenues showed the largest increase on the receipts side of the revised budget. The CY71 budget, also approved in December, provides for expenditures of \$VN 255.7 billion against revenues of \$VN 224.6 billion for a deficit of \$VN 31.1 billion. The budget contains provisions for the civil sector wage increase anticipated for later this year but supplementary budget action is certain to alter these figures as the year progresses. Current projections see total CY71 expenditures rising to \$VN 267 billion. The budget law was changed significantly this year particularly with regard to providing more flexibility. Funds may now be transferred freely within chapters of the same title and, in a political gesture to the strong military constituency, approval was granted to transfer excess funds from any title to the title and chapter of War Veterans, if needed. (238)

(C) The unfavorable factors listed were:

1. Though increased revenues will be sorely needed in CY71, no action is expected on a tax reform measure until after the 1971 GVN elections. Work has begun on a bill, however, designed to reduce the tax burden on individuals and businesses with small incomes and to increase taxes of those with large incomes. Consolidation of various taxes, provisions for tough enforcement of tax laws, progressive tax rates and more efficient methods of collection are expected to be included in the final draft of the measure.

2. Budgetary pressures still dim the outlook for continued employment by USARV of some 2800 local national employees who were to be released on 31 December and of an additional 13,000 employees scheduled for release by 1 April 1971. Relief will come, however, if an agreement is reached with GVN for a change in the official piaster exchange rate. Such a change would enable MACV to buy more piasters and still remain within its current dollar budget. Presentation of dismissal notices to the 2800 employees due for release in 1970 was postponed until late February, in view of the negotiations for a new rate and the potential political ramifications of a large scale pro-TET layoff.

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Swine and similar animal protein products should make excellent Vietnamese exports once the domestic feed-growing industry expands.

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3. Direct hire employees of US Forces and their non-appropriated fund activities received an average 11.2 per cent wage increase on 20 December and US contractors were given the go-ahead to renegotiate labor contracts for wage increases not to exceed that amount. Nearly 120,000 local national employees are involved. The inflationary effects of these increases will not be fully felt until next month. (239)

Major Problem Areas at the End of 1970

(C) At the end of 1970, the major economic problems reported by COMUSMACV were still applicable, though the draft investment law, if enacted, would be a significant step towards alleviating the problem of limited investment capital. Excess profits continued to accrue to private importers as a result of the spread between the equivalent exchange rate and the actual market value for many commodities. The move of some import commodities to the parallel rate and adjustments in import taxes materially reduced opportunities for excess profits and corruption, but further action was necessary. MACV programs requiring payment in piasters were still threatened under existing budget ceilings and the existing official piaster exchange rate. Layoffs of up to 17,000 local national employees and curtailment of essential programs might be necessary in the 3d Qtr of FY71 if the existing budget limitations and exchange rate continued. US economic interest in RVN was generally focused on the short run. As Vietnamization increased more rapidly, however, the need for longer term economic programs and concrete plans for economic development and development funding was apparent.

(C) To cope with the problems existing at the end of the year, a change in the official piaster exchange rate was under serious consideration. The idea at that time was that a change, on or about 1 Apr 71, to an official rate of 275 piasters to \$1 would reduce excess profits, enable MACV to purchase its piaster requirements within its budgetary ceilings, and eliminate existing complexities associated with the parallel rate structure. If revaluation took place without complementary actions, however, MACV piaster requirements could be purchased with fewer dollars than then programmed and a shortfall from the NSDM-80 foreign exchange objective of \$750 million would result. To compensate for the resultant reduced piaster purchase, the US Mission was considering at the end of the year a package which would provide more USD dollars through new programs which were within MACV's capability to implement if necessary authorities were provided. The package included increased in-country procurement of commercial consumables, increased reliance on local construction contractors, and donation to GVN of piaster revenues from the sale of scrap and excess materials. It was felt that not only would the programs prevent a shortfall from NSDM-80 objectives, but they could also provide budget gap relief and impetus to the development of local industries. (240)

Project MOOSE

Background

(U) A program which had been established, not to directly aid the RVNAF per se but to improve RVN/US relationship, was continued in 1970.

(C) Project MOOSE (Move Out of Saigon Expeditionously) started in 1966 when the US Ambassador,

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PROJECT MOOSE




FIGURE IX-23

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Saigon, and COMUSMACV recognized the need to reduce US presence in the greater Saigon area. The primary goal of the program was to alleviate the tense and overcrowded conditions by reducing the American presence in the Saigon/Cholon area. At the completion of Project MOOSE I in June 1969, the US population had decreased from 35,011 in September 1966 to 25,297, a reduction of 9,714. (241) In addition, 126 leases were terminated. (242)

(S) Project MOOSE II was launched in December 1969. During 1970, greater interest was generated by the State Department. With the announced troop reduction underway and Vietnamization an attainable reality, MACV did decisively reduce its physical holdings throughout Saigon. Special emphasis was placed on reducing the conspicuousness of American personnel, installations, and activities in the Saigon/Cholon area south of the "MOOSE" line as shown on Figure IX-23.

(S) Actions taken by MACV to make further reductions fell into three categories. The first was the relocation of units and activities out of the metropolitan area unless precluded by mission requirements. The second involved the consolidation of activities into military compounds whenever feasible and the cancellation of leases for individual facilities. The third action involved control over the movement of military personnel from outlying areas into the metropolitan area. Service components and the MACV staff were tasked with screening units and activities under their cognizance/control to identify those in the first category. Relocations were directed as facilities became available. All units and activities in the metropolitan area were considered, but emphasis was on movement out of the Saigon/Cholon district.

(S) Relocations from the Saigon metropolitan area were limited by the availability of existing facilities made vacant through redeployments. Budgetary constraints, contractor and troop labor commitments to operational support requirements, and the LOC program precluded the construction of additional facilities.

(S) Traffic check points were established periodically on main arteries into Saigon to keep non-duty personnel out of the city. Personnel from outside areas were required to have written authorization to enter. (243)

(C) Recreational facilities on bases and in leased billeting properties were improved with a view toward keeping US personnel out of the community. A regular bus system operated between billets and working areas, reducing the number of US personnel on the streets. Also a system of vehicular and walking patrols operated throughout the city to check the appearance and conduct of military personnel. Truck routes were established for convoys traveling through Saigon. (244)

Progress in 1970

(C) From 1 Jan to 31 Dec 70, 26 units/activities in the Saigon/Cholon area containing approximately 3,600 personnel were reduced in strength, consolidated or relocated. A total of 884 personnel were consolidated or relocated within the greater Saigon area and 2,705 personnel were completely removed. In addition, 55 leases with a total annual lease cost of \$1,774,447 were terminated. (245)


(U) The preponderance of the activities and component units remaining in the greater Saigon area at the end of the year provided either direct or general support to MACV Headquarters. Additional large-scale relocations, inactivations, or reductions of those units were dependent upon relocation or reduction of that headquarters.

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US MEDICAL TREATMENT FACILITIES & UNITS - RVN



SOURCE: MACMD

FIGURE IX-24

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MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

General

(U) As with all activities in MACV, medical activities in 1970 were affected by redeployments and the greater concentration on Vietnamization. As the Vietnamese assumed a greater burden of the war and US units redeployed out-of-country, the need for medical units decreased. The year saw a decrease in hospital beds and battle casualties due to the lowered levels of combat and strength. Much of the MACV Command Surgeon's effort was placed on advisory assistance to the RVNAF medical service. See Chapter VII for an assessment of that assistance.

Medical Support Activities

Operational Hospital Beds

(U) At the end of 1969, the number of in-country operational hospital beds totaled 7,223. During the first six months of 1970, they decreased to 5,303 as compared with a total of slightly over 8,000 in June 1969. During the last 6 months of 1970, the total was even further reduced to 4,213 by the end of December. A recapitulation of operational beds each month in 1970 by service follows: (247)


<u>MONTH</u>	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JAN	4,813	1,720	400	400	7,333
FEB	4,593	1,720	300	400	7,013
MAR	4,103	960	240	400	5,703
APR	4,103	760	300	400	5,563
MAY	4,103	560	240	400	5,303
JUN	4,103	560	240	400	5,303
JUL	4,103	560	240	400	5,303
AUG	3,913	560	240	400	5,113
SEP	3,848	560	180	400	4,988
OCT	3,848	560	180	400	4,988
NOV	3,073	560	180	400	4,213
DEC	3,073	560	180	400	4,213

Facilities Departing RVN or Changing Strength

(U) The reduction in the number of operational hospital beds was caused by facilities/units leaving Vietnam or changing operational strength. See Figure IX-24 for the location of treatment facilities and medical units in RVN at the end of 1970. Listed below are actions that affected the number of hospital beds. (248)

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USS Repose

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<u>1970</u>	<u>Activity</u>	<u>Decrease</u>	<u>Increase</u>
01 Jan	Long Binh PW Hosp	Closed	
	24th Evac Hosp		80
06 Jan	18th Surg Hosp		40
15 Feb	8th Fld Hosp	200	
19 Feb	1st Hosp Co	Departed	
28 Feb	2d Surg Hosp	Closed	
01 Mar	1st Med Bn	60	
	NSA Hosp	200	
02 Mar	17th Fld Hosp		25
12 Mar	6th Conv Ctr	500	
15 Mar	USS <u>Repose</u>	Departed	
16 Mar	NSA Hosp	200	
15 Apr	1st Med Bn		60
12 May	NSA Hosp	Closed	
14 May	1st Med Bn	60	
28 May	91st Evac Hosp	25	
	27th Surg Hosp		25
31 Jul	17th Fld Hosp	Closed	
	45th Surg Hosp	Closed	
	8th Fld Hosp		25
10 Aug	71st Evac Hosp	60	
16 Sep	1st Med Bn	60	
20 Sep	12th Evac Hosp	65	
04 Nov	12th Evac Hosp	139	
07 Nov	8th Fld Hosp	75	
08 Nov	12th Evac Hosp	75	
	71st Evac Hosp	45	
10 Nov	8th Fld Hosp	25	
	12th Evac Hosp	36	
11 Nov	12th Evac Hosp	Closed	
25 Nov	71st Evac Hosp	Closed	
	67th Evac Hosp		25


(U) During February 1970, facilities of the US Army's 283d Med Det based at Pleiku were transferred to ARVN. The facilities were converted into a preventive medicine clinic. The compound also housed the 72d ARVN Med Gp, 277th ARVN Med Co, and the 2d ARVN Amb. Co. (249)

(S) The hospital ship, USS Repose (AH-16), departed for CONUS during March. Having served in combat zones twice before (evacuating British and American civilian casualties from Shanghai in 1949 and providing hospital facilities during the Korean War), the Repose was reactivated during late 1965 and arrived on-station, just off the Vietnam coast, during February 1966. The 15,000-ton ship, equipped with a helicopter platform to expedite casualty receiving, was designed originally as a 750-bed hospital, but refinements to ensure more effective patient care and installation of modern equipment reduced that capacity to 560. Staffed by 23 medical officers, eight medical service officers, 35 nurses, and 288 enlisted corpsmen, the Repose, from February 1966 to the middle of March 1970, treated 9,139 battle casualties, 2,611 non-battle injuries, and 12,963 disease cases, for a total 24,713 admissions. Spending 1,128 days of her 4 years in WestPac on the line in support of III MAF operations, the USS Repose provided medical care to 19,421 Marine and Navy personnel before departing in March 1970, for CONUS and future deactivation. (250)

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US. HOSPITALIZATION-1970

(RATE PER 1,000 PERSONNEL PER YEAR)



SOURCE: MACMD

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FIGURE IX-25

FORMULA: (NO. OF CASES OCCURRING IN PERIOD) (365 DAYS) (1,000)
(AVERAGE TROOP STRENGTH FOR TIME PERIOD) (NO. OF DAYS WITHIN PERIOD)

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(U) The first transfer of a US field hospital to ARVN took place at a formal ceremony on 8 Sep. The 8th Field Hospital (300 beds) was transferred to Nguyen Hue ARVN Hospital in Nha Trang. (251) A total of \$357,307 in equipment and Free World issues was involved; \$316,375 and \$40,932, respectively. (252) The transfer, originally scheduled for 1 Aug, was not completed without problems. Lack of specific direction on applicable procedures caused important reports to be submitted late. Considerable delay of transfer of equipment was caused by ARVN's requirement to immediately transfer equipment and real estate internally to the using agency within the facility, i.e., depot to hospital to ward. It was strongly recommended by the Project Officer, 6th Convalescent Center, that future transfers be from the US facility to the ARVN depot system with internal distribution delayed until completion of transfer actions. The 8th Field Hospital's flag was officially transferred to An Khe on 1 Aug. Joint inventories began on 10 Aug and were completed 5 Sep. (253)

Admissions

(U) The number of IRHA (Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action) admissions to US medical facilities showed a marked decrease during the year. During the previous year, they averaged over 2,652 monthly for a total of 31,820. In 1970, they averaged 1,275 per month for a total of 15,296. During the months of April, May, and June the numbers increased, but then dropped again after Cambodian operations ceased.

(U) Disease admissions and non-battle admissions in 1969 averaged 9,536 per month. In 1970 the number of disease and non-battle admissions decreased to 7,750 per month.

(U) Figure IX-25 details the types of admissions to all US medical facilities in terms of incidence rates, adjusted for reduced personnel strengths, therefore permitting relative comparisons. (254)

Evacuations

(U) The number of medical evacuations out-of-country also decreased during the year reflecting the decreased level of combat and the number of redeployments. There was a significant increase in May and June because of the Cambodian operations. Nevertheless the total of 33,077 for the year was more than 22,000 less than the figure for 1969 (55,906). (See Table IX-10.) (255)

(U) Table IX-11 shows the number of in-country evacuations. The 903d Aeromed Evac Sqdn evacuated a total of 54,285 individuals during the year from one medical facility to another for further hospitalization or evacuation from country. (256)

(U) While each service had tactical evacuation units, the largest was USARV's Dustoff program. Essentially, the Dustoff made pick-ups from the field, and transported patients to hospitals or centers for further evacuation. They did not confine evacuations to military, however. A noticeable increase in the number of patients occurred during May and June caused by the Cambodian operation. The large number of RVNAF patients attested to their increasing activity in the war. Listed below is the breakout of the Dustoff program for the year. (257)

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OUT-OF-COUNTRY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATIONS

	ARMY			NAVY/MARINE			AIR FORCE			FWMAF			OTHER			TOTAL
	WIA	DIS	NBI	WIA	DIS	NBI	WIA	DIS	NBI	WIA	DIS	NBI	WIA	DIS	NBI	
1970																
JAN	734	766	460	328	453	195	1	94	9	106	60	14	5	20	8	3253
FEB	596	646	431	281	304	202	-	32	6	66	48	19	-	23	7	2721
MAR	735	672	483	244	305	228	1	94	9	79	50	31	1	21	17	2970
APR	1061	632	423	264	336	170	6	116	11	116	49	31	-	22	7	3243
MAY	1338	641	503	227	345	209	3	87	19	103	65	20	1	18	11	3590
JUN	943	684	424	202	241	169	2	66	18	97	55	15	14	15	11	2956
JUL	747	675	435	196	292	175	1	98	16	70	42	17	-	11	5	2780
AUG	627	632	355	183	256	120	-	110	16	105	54	20	1	16	4	2499
SEP	522	671	356	149	261	140	-	79	13	106	69	18	-	21	5	2410
OCT	365	896	312	105	261	70	1	97	12	57	79	17	1	24	6	2303
NOV	387	923	297	58	198	63	8	113	9	67	63	13	1	18	4	2222
DEC	334	781	280	91	229	98	3	142	14	47	61	24	1	15	11	2131
TOTAL	8389	8619	4759	2328	3481	1839	26	1187	152	1019	695	239	25	224	96	33078

WIA: Wounded in Action DIS: Disease NBI: Non-Battle Injury

SOURCE: MACMD

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TABLE IX-10

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IN-COUNTRY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATIONS (FIXED WING) - 1970

1970	AF	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE	Total US Military	US CIV	VN CIV	RVNAF	OTHERS	TOTAL
Jan	268	3,548	82	34	3,932	17	153	623	371	5,096
Feb	238	2,690	65	32	3,025	24	116	529	323	4,017
Mar	255	2,894	52	38	3,239	18	184	641	395	4,477
Apr	224	3,141	85	154	3,604	16	114	760	441	4,935
May	232	4,129	72	191	4,624	12	310	885	544	6,375
Jun	172	3,557	90	199	4,018	8	138	553	594	5,311
Jul	217	3,258	100	312	3,887	14	124	389	430	4,844
Aug	197	2,890	88	208	3,383	10	254	531	528	4,706
Sep	159	2,519	71	360	3,109	16	79	585	451	4,240
Oct	146	2,424	48	268	2,886	16	87	392	461	3,842
Nov	177	2,261	40	85	2,563	17	90	257	632	3,559
Dec	172	1,753	48	18	1,991	14	91	431	356	2,883
TOTAL	2,457	35,064	841	1,899	40,261	182	1,740	6,576	5,526	54,285


SOURCE: NACND

TABLE IX-11

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MALARIA IN US FORCES IN VIETNAM
(RATE PER 1000 PERSONNEL PER YEAR)



SOURCE: MACMD

FIGURE IX-26

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>US MIL</u>	<u>FWMAF</u>	<u>RVNAF</u>	<u>VN CIV</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
JAN	5,164	412	5,557	4,095	637	15,865
FEB	5,125	478	5,058	4,183	885	15,729
MAR	4,789	643	5,407	4,067	790	15,696
APR	4,937	524	7,547	4,674	1,406	19,088
MAY	6,661	681	8,532	4,947	1,232	22,053
JUN	6,402	474	6,723	4,174	659	18,432
JUL	6,359	308	5,036	3,528	489	15,720
AUG	4,476	418	5,239	3,475	457	14,065
SEP	3,820	445	5,225	3,035	430	12,955
OCT	3,027	463	4,665	2,382	235	10,722
NOV	2,341	459	3,286	2,306	439	8,831
DEC	<u>2,367</u>	<u>259</u>	<u>4,442</u>	<u>1,888</u>	<u>176</u>	<u>9,132</u>
TOTAL	55,468	5,564	66,717	42,754	7,835	178,336

Malaria Rate

(U) Malaria continued to be a problem during the year as in the past. The rate per thousand for the first 5 months was far below the mean of the previous 4 years. It increased considerably, however, during July, August, and September, caused perhaps by a late rainy season.

(U) A breakdown of malaria rates by month for the years 1966 through 1970 is shown below. (258) Figure IX-26 shows graphically the rates of the past 3 years.

Malaria in US Forces in Vietnam (Rate per 1,000 personnel per year)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
JAN	12.7	19.7	15.7	18.5	12.6
FEB	6.5	14.4	11.6	16.5	8.1
MAR	11.1	14.8	9.2	17.0	12.6
APR	38.1	18.6	12.7	19.8	16.9
MAY	24.7	22.1	18.9	28.4	17.1
JUN	35.7	26.2	37.2	22.6	27.3
JUL	29.2	25.5	40.8	20.9	27.6
AUG	17.5	19.8	40.3	15.6	32.5
SEP	42.5	23.3	38.5	28.1	40.1
OCT	31.8	36.0	25.7	21.0	42.9
NOV	30.2	30.4	23.6	23.7	24.6
DEC	<u>36.0</u>	<u>23.2</u>	<u>21.6</u>	<u>19.7</u>	<u>19.2</u>
MEAN	28.2	23.1	25.0	21.0	22.9

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Civilian War Casualty Program

(U) The Civilian War Casualty Program (CWCP) remained in effect during 1970. See MACV Command History 1969, Volume II, p IX-117 for background. During the year, a total of 15,250 direct admissions were made. (259) A recapitulation by month is shown below.

Civilian War Casualty Program

<u>1970 Month</u>	<u>IRHA Admissions</u>	<u>Disease and Nonbattle Admissions</u>	<u>Total Admissions</u>
JAN	487	923	1,410
FEB	448	887	1,335
MAR	431	1,031	1,444
APR	548	899	1,447
MAY	552	1,037	1,589
JUN	459	937	1,396
JUL	279	878	1,157
AUG	371	1,007	1,378
SEP	483	808	1,291
OCT	278	830	1,108
NOV	211	594	805
DEC	168	722	890
TOTAL	4,715	10,535	15,250

DATA MANAGEMENT

(U) During 1970 data systems developed and run by the MACV Data Management Agency (MACDMA) shifted from combatant systems to systems of Vietnamization, troop withdrawals, transportation (retrograde), and management. MACDMA was equipped with the IBM 360/501 computer system. At the end of the year a total of 4,744 jobs were being run, with computer time averaging 655 hours per month. During FY70 MACDMA had two contracts with International Business Machine Company and the Computer System Corporation (CSC). By improved training and better management controls, a reduction to one contract with CSC was possible during the latter half of CY70, at a savings of \$853,000.

(U) Systems to support Vietnamization and which would eventually be turned over to RVN comprised the largest effort of MACDMA. A total of 11 systems were developed, ranging from one to support student placement at the RVN language school to a multitude of logistics systems which supported the various branch depots. The logistics systems were to be used as a nucleus for the RVN Automated Material Management System (RAMMS). It was planned that the RAMMS would be run on an IBM 360/40 computer configuration at the JCS compound. A feasibility study was also started for the Mobilization Directorate of GVN (a rough equivalent to the US Selective Service System). The study was to result in a recommendation for the best way to manage the military draft in Vietnam. (260)

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(U) An Historical Information Management System (HIMS) was developed in coordination with the Military History Branch, Office of the Secretary of the Joint Staff, MACV. (261) HIMS allowed quick reference or inquiries into all documents, studies, and letters maintained in MACV historical documents files. The final objectives of the system were to automate the catalog of MACV historical documents, allow retrieval of selected document identifiers from the catalog, and produce an automated listing of all documents stored in the MACV historical document repository. (262)

CAMBODIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

For discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.

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CHAPTER X

PRISONERS OF WAR

OVERVIEW

(U) The question of prisoners of war is not only a burning humanitarian question but also a question of your solemn legal obligation. Its solution must not await an overall settlement of the political and military issues involved here. World opinion demands no less. (1)

Ambassador Habib
5 Feb 70

(U) The continued refusal of the Communists to discuss the prisoner of war issue during 1970 made their intent to exploit PWs for propaganda purposes increasingly clear. Entering 1970 there really was no doubt of their intent; however, a variety of new pressures were added to the free world effort on behalf of the PWs during the year. A full review of the history of PW negotiations in SEA prior to 1970 is already available; therefore, this chapter is devoted to the changes which took place in 1970. (2)

SITUATION

(U) Despite allied efforts to ease the plight of the PWs there was little progress toward any substantive decisions in early 1970. Efforts to seriously discuss release of PWs were continually rebuffed at the Paris Conference table. Not only did the enemy refuse to discuss allied PWs but he also declined to discuss repatriation of his own sick and wounded prisoners held by the RVN.

(U) After a shift in the US approach to the PW situation in 1968 when the US began to discuss the plight of the prisoners in public forums, many voices were added to the efforts of the US and RVN governments to get some positive commitments from the enemy. Details of those efforts are related in subsequent sections of this chapter.

(U) On 2 Apr, the US made it clear that it intended to continue its policy of public discussion of the PW issue when Ambassador Habib told the 61st Plenary Session of the Paris Meetings:

Your attitude toward discussion of relevant issues remains negative and unreasonable. This is clearly evident in your silence in response to our efforts to open the way to some meaningful discussion of the treatment and disposition of prisoners of war.

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Your attitude toward the prisoner of war question is absolutely lacking in any humane consideration for the prisoners or their families. Your stubborn refusal to discuss this humanitarian question is appalling. It seems that you have no interest even in the fate of your own soldiers who have been wounded and captured while fighting for your side.

Let the record show the plain evidence that your policy toward prisoners and the families of missing or captured men is utterly lacking in humanitarian consideration.

Let the record show that you callously turn aside an unconditional offer by the government of the Republic of Vietnam to repatriate back to North Vietnam 343 seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war.

Let the record show that you have refused to identify all the prisoners of war you hold or to provide what information you have to families about the fate of other men.

Let the record show that despite your announcement last December that prisoners in North Vietnam would be allowed to send and receive letters once every month, three months have passed and still most prisoners have not been heard from even once during that period.

Let the record show that not even one prisoner of war you hold in South Vietnam has ever been allowed to write a letter to his family.

Let the record show that eye-witness accounts, photographs and other evidence demonstrate that Americans who fall into your hands face prolonged solitary confinement, inadequate diet, improper medical treatment, and oftentimes death -- to be plain: uncivilized and inhumanitarian treatment.

Let the record show that you refuse to give impartial observers access to your prisoner camps in order to see what kind of treatment your prisoners are in fact accorded.

Let the record show that your side holds many seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war, as well as many prisoners who have been in captivity for extremely long periods of time -- up to six years -- and that you refuse to release these prisoners.

Let the record also show that you follow a policy of callous whimsy in dealing with the prisoners and their families. You allow some prisoners to write, you deny the same right to others. You receive some families who come to Paris, rebuff others. You answer a few requests for information from families or third parties, you

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ignore others. You are even capable of turning a deaf ear to appeals from young women trying to determine whether they are wives or widows.

We intend to keep this sorry record before you and before the world. We will not let you forget the plight of these prisoners or their families. You have a responsibility to them -- both a legal responsibility under the 1949 Geneva Convention and a humanitarian responsibility which goes far beyond legal requirements. These are responsibilities which you cannot escape. (3)

Correspondents

(U) A new dimension was added to the PW problem in SEA even before the allies crossed the Cambodian border on 1 May to attack the enemy sanctuaries along the border. On 6 Apr shortly after the removal of Prince Norodom Sihanouk as the Cambodian Chief of State, two American correspondents, Dana Stone of CBS and Sean Flynn of Time, were captured by Viet Cong forces operating in the neutral country. By 15 May, that total had increased to 15 including one woman.

(U) Although the correspondents were not the responsibility of the military, five were Americans and the JPRC included them in their reporting system along with military personnel. The wisdom of that was later questioned by three reporters released. The reporters comments are related in detail later in this chapter.

(U) By and large, the early months of 1970 were a period of sheer frustration to the allies, to the diplomats, and to organizational and individual efforts to break the PW deadlock brought on by the Communists' refusal to separate the PW issue from peace negotiations.

Planning

(U) Despite the stalemate in negotiations on PW release, MACV continued to plan for receiving PWs when they were returned. On 13 Jan 70 COMUSMACV Operation Plan J190, Repatriation of US Prisoners of War (U), short title EGRESS RECAP (U), was promulgated. The plan, discussed in some detail in the MACV Command History 1969, Chapter X, provided the framework for processing any PW returned by the enemy.

(U) Two changes were promulgated during the first half of 1970. Change 1, issued 16 Apr, was largely technical. Change 2, dated 27 May, incorporated changes directed by CINCPAC in his approval of the basic plan. Neither of the changes made any substantive modifications to the original plan.

(U) In accordance with directions contained in EGRESS RECAP each of the component commanders submitted supporting plans as required. The plans detailed the services' basic responsibilities set forth in the basic MACV plan.

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US POLICY

(S) On 31 Oct a joint policy on enemy prisoners of war in Vietnam was promulgated after approval by the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The policy paper said:

1. Objectives

The objectives of the US policy with respect to enemy prisoners of war (PW) in Vietnam are to:

- a. Insure that the US and its allies continue to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war (GPW).
- b. Facilitate to the maximum extent, the earliest possible return of US, RVN and Free World Military Assistance Forces PW and, to this end, to avoid creating circumstances with regard to the treatment, processing, release, or repatriation of enemy PW which might hamper the return of US PW or make a final settlement more difficult.
- c. Reduce the enemy PW population, through early release for the purpose of: (1) furthering the interests of humanity, (2) supporting negotiation activities, (3) decreasing the logistic burden on the government of Vietnam (GVN), (4) improving PW camp security, and (5) presenting forthcoming public image on this subject.

2. Considerations

- a. The United States is a party to, and honors the provisions of, the GPW.
- b. US Forces do not intern enemy PW, except for the initial processing, intelligence exploitation, and required hospitalization of wounded PW. All enemy PW captured by US Forces are transferred to the custody of the GVN, which is also a party to the GPW. The GVN, as the detaining power, has the primary responsibility for the application of the GPW to all PW under its control. The United States, however, has a residual legal responsibility for all PW captured by it who are turned over to the GVN.
- c. The GVN currently holds about 37,000 PW in six camps, over 8,000 of whom are North Vietnamese Army (NVA) personnel. About 39 percent of the PW now held were initially captured by US Forces.
- d. About 1,550 US military personnel and about 40 civilians are missing or held captive in Southeast Asia. The number of known prisoners is around 500, the majority of them pilots in North Vietnam.

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The GVN does not have an accurate estimate of the total Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces PW held by the enemy but has furnished the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with a partial list of 3,100 personnel who are missing and believed to be PW. Approximately 30 personnel of other Free World Military Assistance Forces are missing or captured. The interests of these missing and captured personnel will best be served by insuring that the treatment of enemy PW is strictly in compliance with the GPW.

e. As stated in part 1b above, a primary objective of the United States is to facilitate the earliest possible return of its PW held by the other side. North Vietnam (NVN) and the Vietnamese Communists/Provisional Revolutionary Government have indicated that they consider the return of US PW an issue to be settled as part of the overall military and political settlement of the current conflict. They consider US PW as a valuable bargaining asset and can be expected to try to use this issue to gain concessions. These divergent views of the United States and NVN, coupled with the fact that all enemy PW are in the custody of the GVN, necessitate close coordination between the United States and the GVN in the event of a proposal for exchange of PW.

f. US policy has been one of nonforcible repatriation. Whether or not the US should continue to adhere to this policy may pose a critical issue in negotiations at the termination of the Vietnam conflict. The considerations which will influence a decision on this matter are not apparent at this time. Hence, decisions should be reserved and a reevaluation of this policy should be undertaken, in concert with GVN authorities, as the time for negotiation on repatriation of PW draws near.

g. No action should be taken which would prejudice US flexibility in making a reevaluation of its past nonforcible repatriation policy, if such becomes an issue in negotiations with NVN.

3. Policies

a. General: The GPW is the basic international agreement concerning PW. Article 4 of the GPW sets forth a definition of persons who must be accorded PW status. A conservative application of the provisions of Article 4 could justify denial of PW status to many captured guerrillas. The US and the GVN have accorded PW status in all cases required under the convention, and in many cases where not clearly required, such as most guerrillas. This is done as a matter of policy.

b. Responsibilities of the United States:

(1) The GVN has assumed the role of detaining power as set forth in Article 12 of the GPW, and as such, has the primary responsibility for the application of the GPW to all PW under its control. Nevertheless, the United States has residual legal obligations for its captured

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PW as set forth in the GPW. If the GVN fails to comply with the provisions of the GPW in any important respect, the United States is obligated, upon becoming aware of such a situation, to take effective measures to correct the situation or to request the return to US custody of enemy PW previously transferred to the GVN. It is preferable that the United States obtain VN compliance with the GPW and, only as a last resort, seek the return of enemy PW in order to insure compliance with the GPW by the GVN and promote unity of effort in this regard. It is essential that the United States and the GVN closely coordinate all matters pertaining to enemy PW. To this end the United States will provide advice and assistance to the GVN in the PW area until disposition has been made of all enemy PW.

(2) In order to provide valid information in support of negotiations and to meet the requirements of international law, the United States must make every effort to insure that accurate accountability data are maintained on enemy PW, particularly those initially captured by US Forces. The GVN, as the detaining power, will continue as the primary source of international reports concerning enemy PW accountability; however, any US reports should correlate to the greatest extent possible with GVN data. Accountability must include release, repatriation, death, or escape in order to provide a written chronology on each enemy PW and his ultimate disposition.

c. Repatriation of Sick and Wounded PW: The United States and the GVN should continue to seek direct repatriation, in accordance with Article 109 and 110 of the GPW, of seriously sick and wounded PW held by both sides.

d. Reduction in Number of Enemy PW held by the GVN:

(1) In the past, the GVN has made selective releases of enemy PW in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and repatriated enemy PW directly to the NVN. These releases had a favorable impact on US and world public opinion by showing the readiness of the GVN to take humanitarian steps with respect to PW problems.

(2) Substantial advantages could accrue from taking prompt action to reduce the number of PW held by the GVN. To this end, the United States should encourage the GVN to reduce the number of PW by releasing as many Viet Cong (VC) as practicable.

(3) The first stage in reducing the number of PW held by the GVN should consist of physical separation of South Vietnamese from North Vietnamese and regroupees. (Regrouped is a GVN political term which denotes those residents of the Republic of Vietnam who, as a result of the 1954 Geneva Accords, elected to go to North Vietnam but were later captured fighting in the South.)

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Such a separation is already being carried out in the camps, and this pattern should be continued. Previous experiences indicate that separation of 'hard core' prisoners in separate enclosures is also desirable. All such separations help to undermine the efforts of the enemy to control or influence enemy PW and will improve the prospects for release of those who can be assimilated by the RVN without significant political risks.

(4) Those VC PW who desire release in the South and whom the GVN is prepared to release should be released at an early date, with ICRC invited to observe such releases. While some VC have already been released, it is believed that an expanded program should be encouraged and should include as many eligible and acceptable VC PW as possible.

(5) It is assumed that all or nearly all NVA and regrouped PW will ultimately be returned to North Vietnam. Any NVA/regrouped PW who make clear their desire to remain in the South may be separated from others. Care must be taken in this process to insure that no promises of political asylum are made and that no other actions are taken which would prejudice US/GVN flexibility regarding nonforcible repatriation.

(6) The GVN should not be pressed to release NVA and regrouped PW on parole. If the GVN wishes to go forward with such a program, it should be in accordance with GPW requirements.

(7) The early release of substantial numbers of enemy PW for return to North Vietnam or perhaps for internment in a third country are promising initiatives available to the US and the GVN in efforts to obtain an ultimate resolution of the PW issue. Such release could highlight the failure of North Vietnam to deal with PW problems in humanitarian terms and could generate pressures in world opinion which would oblige NVN to adopt a more forthcoming position with regard to US PW. The United States should continue to explore this possibility with the GVN. Any releases should receive maximum press coverage, and the ICRC should be invited to observe them.

e. Repatriation: The basic responsibilities of the United States concerning the release and repatriation of enemy PW upon the cessation of hostilities are defined in Articles 12, 118, and 119 of the GPW. The United States will assist the GVN in the release and repatriation of PW, insisting on full compliance with the GPW. The US view is that the GPW does not require forcible repatriation, and US policy has been to grant to PW a freedom of choice to return or not to return to their own country. Whether or not the US should apply this policy to NVA PW at the conclusion of the Vietnam conflict should be the subject of separate addressal if and when it appears that such will become an issue in negotiations. (4)

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(U) The overall policy of the US on PW problems was contained in the classified document cited above. Public pronouncements by government officials stayed with the classified policy although they did go so far as to indicate that other raids similar to the one at Son Tay on 26 Nov were possible. On 3 Dec, Defense Secretary Laird, in a planeside press conference, told newsmen the US "...will make further efforts to free our prisoners" in North Vietnam and this includes possible military action. "I would not rule out any action," he told the newsmen. (5)

(U) On 10 Dec the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs issued the following guidance to information personnel on discussion of Son Tay and speculation on future such missions:

The Secretary of Defense and others have provided to the public, the press, and the Congress in a timely fashion as much unclassified information as possible, consistent with safety and security, about the Son Tay search and rescue mission.

In order to enhance and safeguard the safety of US personnel and the planning and operational security of any future search and rescue missions which may become possible in an attempt to return to freedom US servicemen held captive in SEA, the following policy guidance will be strictly adhered to by all personnel of the Department of Defense:

There will be no public discussion of any kind or discussion in unclassified Department of Defense publications of any details or information about the Son Tay search and rescue mission other than those details and that information discussed publicly by the Secretary of Defense before Congress and the news media.

In any case of doubt about the extent of facts made public, questions will be referred for security review to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

It is emphasized that this action is taken for safety and security reasons and to protect American lives. (6)

(U) At year-end there was much solid evidence the efforts to publicize the plight of the PWs was bearing fruit.

(U) Time magazine as an example devoted seven pages and a cover to the PWs in December. A portion of the treatment pointed up the difference. "In 1968," Time said, "when demonstrations were the mode, no one took a second look at a tiny group of P.O.W. wives with their little hand-lettered placards forlornly picketing the State Department's main entrance." (7)

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REPATRIATION EFFORTS

US Government

(U) Efforts by the US to bring the PW problem to the attention of the free world took many forms. On 5 Feb a resolution introduced in Congress sought placing of PW negotiations as the first priority item on the peace talks agenda. The text of the Rivers Resolution said:

Whereas the treatment of American prisoners in North Vietnam has been one of the most shameful chapters in the anguished history of the Vietnam war; and

Whereas the government of North Vietnam has not only violated the Geneva Convention concerning prisoners of war but has shown itself in the past to be indifferent to even the most elemental standards of humane consideration by refusing to reveal the names of those held prisoners, refusing to allow communications with their families, and refusing to allow even the simplest ministrations to the prisoners by the International Red Cross; and

Whereas the solution of the prisoner issue would be an important first step toward engendering the kind of trust which must be exchanged before any meaningful progress can be made in negotiating a settlement to the war; now, therefore, be it

Resolved, that it is the sense of the Congress that the American negotiators at the peace conference in Paris should be instructed to insist that the matter of prisoners be given first priority on the peace talks agenda; and

That negotiations should seek improved treatment of prisoners, release of names of prisoners, inspection of prison conditions by the International Red Cross or other international bodies, and the assurance of continuing discussions looking toward the eventual exchange or release of prisoners; and

That no other negotiations should proceed until there is substantive progress on the prisoner of war issue. (8)

(U) Before congressional action on the Rivers Resolution was completed, President Nixon issued a proclamation on PWs designating 3 May as a Day of Prayer for PWs. The President's action was taken in response to another congressional resolution. It read:

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Day of Prayer
By the President of the United States of America
a Proclamation

One of the cruelest tactics of the war in Vietnam is the Communists' refusal to identify all prisoners of war, to provide information about them and to permit their families to communicate with them regularly. This callous policy is in violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, to which North Vietnam acceded in 1957. And it is in contempt of established customs among civilized nations and of ordinary human decency.

The Government of the United States of America is making and will continue to make every effort to alleviate the anxiety of the families of these prisoners by working to change this situation. The Congress by a House concurrent resolution on April 28, 1970, has resolved that Friday, May 1, 1970, be commemorated as a day for an appeal for international justice for all the American prisoners of war and servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia and has requested the President to designate Sunday, May 3, 1970, as a National Day for Prayer for humane treatment and the safe return of these brave Americans.

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, May 3, 1970, as a National Day of Prayer for all American prisoners of war and servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia. I call upon all of the people of the United States to offer prayers on behalf of these men, to instill courage and perseverance in their hearts and the hearts of their loved ones and compassion in the hearts of their captors.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-ninth day of April, in the year of Lord nineteen hundred seventy, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fourth. (9)

(C) Hearings on the Rivers Resolution were held 6 May. The State Department agreed with the general thrust of the proposed resolution but advised against attempting to restrict negotiations solely to PWs. (10)

(C) Still another approach through congressional channels was made on 26 Jun when three members of a House Select Committee visiting SEA were in Vientiane and approached the North Vietnamese Embassy there seeking permission to visit US prisoners held in Hanoi. In its report of the rebuff the trio received the American Embassy in Vientiane said:

Codel Montgomery called on DRV Embassy Vientiane, 1000 local June 26. During course of brief visit here, Codels had expressed desire to visit DRV Embassy in regard to US POW question. Congressman Montgomery told us that committee had sent telegram from Washington to Hanoi seeking permission for visit for all or

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part of committee to US POWs in North Vietnam after learning that three ladies (visiting wives and mother of US POWs and MIA over North Vietnam) had been rebuffed in their efforts to meet North Vietnamese officials, Embassy advised Codel no rpt no harm could come of Codel attempting unofficial call on basis humanitarian interest. Embassy assisted Codels prepare French text of following unofficial and unsigned note delivered to DRV Embassy:

Begin quote. Three members of the House of Representatives of US are now visiting Vientiane. They are Congressman Montgomery of Mississippi, Mr. Adair of Indiana and Mr. Anderson of Tennessee. These three gentlemen are part of a select twelve-man committee of the House of Representatives. The committee has already asked your Government to allow the members or at least part of the committee to visit American prisoners in Hanoi. Mr. Adair is also carrying a petition signed by 50,000 citizens from a community in his district in the state of Indiana. This petition that he will leave at your Embassy to be transmitted to your Government expresses the wishes of the citizens that your Government respect all of the stipulations of the Geneva Convention of the International Red Cross toward American prisoners of war in your country. The three representatives and their interpreter will call at your Embassy at 1000 to learn if they have received permission to visit American prisoners of war in your country. End quote.

Codels with Lao interpreter provided by Embassy called at DRV Embassy 1000 local and met briefly with NVN third secretary who refused to give his name. (We assume he was third secty Truong Tien). Codels repeated request for permission committee members (or International Red Cross Rep) to visit US POWs in North Vietnam. Codels also asked Embassy to transmit to DRV petition signed by 50,000 US citizens from Congressman Adair's district in Indiana. NVN third secretary rather emotionally told Congressman US pilots had killed Vietnamese citizens and noted that no rpt no North Vietnamese were attacking America. He accused Congressmen of having voted to send American troops to Vietnam and appropriating money to support war. Congressmen noted that everyone wanted peace and pointed out President had said if North Vietnamese withdraw from South Vietnam, America would also withdraw its forces. Third secretary having avoided or rejected Codel requests then announced that interview was ended and left.

Codels had no rpt no press with them and visit carried out in low key and most dignified manner. Congressmen did not rpt not discuss subject their visit with press here although we are not rpt not sure their visit was unobserved. Codels will make note of visit in their report and word may get to press whether or not Congressmen make statements.

Comment: We think the experience proved of interest to Codel and may help underscore to North Vietnamese seriousness of prisoner questions for American people and their representatives. (11)

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(U) The total government effort for the PW was directed from Washington, not from Vietnam. MACV assisted all groups who were pressing for improvement in the PW situation but confined its direct efforts to the military problems involved. There were a variety of individuals and groups who visited Vietnam as they pursued their own courses of action and most who requested assistance of one form or another were accommodated by MACV.

(U) The effort from Washington included a display of items taken from PW camps installed in the Capitol, gentle nudging of many governments to take up the PW question whenever the opportunity was presented, a worldwide tour by Astronaut Frank Borman, and a Borman speech before a Joint Session of Congress.

(U) The spectacular Son Tay raid in late November to release PWs held near Hanoi was not an operation under MACV's aegis. MACV personnel did not participate. There were various recovery missions carried out in RVN during 1970; however, none were successful as far as recovery of US personnel. Details are contained in the section on the Joint Personnel Recovery Center.

Red Cross

(U) The International Committee of the Red Cross was active in its efforts to gain release of the prisoners and to identify those held and gain any possible information on the missing. Acting through many of its various national societies, the ICRC as a group or the societies as individual entities made attempts to gain information. They, however, suffered the same frustrations which were the lot of the individuals who trod the same path. Nothing substantial was gained.

Individual Efforts

(U) During 1970 a variety of individuals made personal attempts to establish contact with US PWs held by Hanoi. Many of them were relatives of men missing or known to be captives. Perhaps the most persistent, however, was that of H. Ross Perot, Dallas, Tex., businessman. Perot continued his 1969 efforts, during which he attempted to deliver holiday meals to Hanoi's captives, on into 1970. Though continually rebuffed by Hanoi in his attempts, Perot brought world attention to the prisoners' plight through his continuing effort. After his campaign to deliver the gift material to prisoners in NVN was frustrated he sought to deliver the material in February to NVN prisoners held by SVN.

(C) That effort was not welcomed by RVN's government. Although they understood the rationale, they were afraid that it might become a propaganda item for NVN by inferring the NVN prisoners were not properly treated.⁽¹²⁾ Having failed to arrange for delivery to PWs, Perot ultimately delivered the packages to SVN orphans and other war victims.⁽¹³⁾

(U) In early April, Perot returned to Saigon with more than 60 journalists representing US and foreign media. During their 3-day stay in RVN they visited PW camps and various RVNAF military installations to view conditions in the camps and see RVN forces. Perot sponsored the trip and picked up the bill for all aboard the chartered aircraft.

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(C) Following the visit, Ambassador Godley in Vientiane noted that Radio Hanoi had called Perot's efforts "Psychological Warfare" or "Propaganda Campaigns" rather than calling them a "Humanitarian" effort. Godley commented, "The communique and especially the (Radio Hanoi) Vietnamese language broadcast to SVN strongly suggest Perot's efforts are causing at least some irritation and perhaps perplexity in Hanoi." (14)

(U) Throughout 1970 a number of other private individuals made attempts to establish contact with men reported missing or known to be PW. Individual citation of those efforts in this history would serve no useful purpose; however, the efforts followed two distinct patterns. Some involved visits to a series of world capitals where NVN diplomatic representatives were stationed. Others were "one-shot" attempts by the individuals to contact NVN diplomats either by letter or personal visit. Many of the efforts, particularly those of the individuals who visited a series of NVN diplomatic delegations, received considerable press coverage around the world. None were established as having directly contributed to production of any new information on the men missing or known to be PW. Individually and collectively, however, those private efforts did serve to bring the plight of the PW before citizens of many countries.

Group Efforts

(U) In addition to the individual's efforts to relieve the plight of the PW, several group efforts were also mounted. Some were recognizable church groups, e.g. American Friends Service Committee and the World Council of Churches. Others were groups of individual clergymen or citizens. Some devoted their efforts to obtaining releases while others tried to improve communications with families.

(U) Various press groups around the world also mounted efforts, slanted towards the release of journalists detained in Cambodia, to effect release of their members.

Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)

(C) The primary activity within MACV responsible for friendly PW recovery matters was the JPRC. Its functions were outlined in a message from COMUSMACV to subordinate commands:

1. The JPRC element of MACV remains the focal point for PW recovery operations. Sustained and successful operations will provide a significant psychological impact on the enemy and obvious increased morale of our forces. Prior approval of JPRC for a recovery operation is not repeat not required and commanders are strongly encouraged to initiate unilateral actions; however, JPRC must be kept informed of recovery operations and their results through the use of situation reports and an operation summary.
2. Request commanders give renewed emphasis and increased priority to recovery of allied PWs in their respective areas of operation. The forwarding of intelligence concerning allied and US prisoners and missing personnel by the most rapid and secure means consistent with time-sensitivity of the information is essential. Past recovery raids prove

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that commanders must initiate immediate response to the intelligence obtained in order to conduct a successful PW recovery operation. This rapid reaction is essential in order to achieve the desired element of surprise; a reaction time on the order of hours, not days, is required.

3. The following furnishes necessary action and planning guidance.

a. Addressees will appoint a JPRC contact officer down to division level or whatever element of command deemed necessary by the addressee. Names of the incumbents plus phone numbers will be furnished to JPRC with update information as changes occur. The contact officer will be charged with local coordination of recovery operations and rewards payments in concert with JPRC.

b. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center is prepared to provide the following additional assistance:

(1) A small element of specially trained forces if requested;

(2) Air reconnaissance;

(3) A representative to facilitate coordination, debriefing, identification of missing personnel in the area, and suspected PW camp locations.

c. Messages and reports concerning prisoner intelligence or prisoner recovery operations (successful or unsuccessful) will include an information copy flagged BRIGHT LIGHT to COMUSMACV for JPRC. BRIGHT LIGHT is the unclassified nickname for all PW related matters; the meaning is classified Confidential.

4. Request action addressees take appropriate action to re-emphasize the above guidance to subordinate commands. The factors of continuing high level national interest, and growing international interest, in all aspects of PW matters dictates a high priority for the conduct of recovery operations and the immediate reporting of all information or intelligence pertaining to US or allied PWs. The following comments indicate problem areas which consistently recur.

a. The JPRC is often not advised that a PW camp raid is imminent. Although JPRC approval is not required, additional significant PW intelligence information may exist of which the field commander may not be aware.

b. After-action reports are often not submitted on a timely basis, and sometimes not at all. Negative results may be as significant as positive, thus all information is desired. Lessons learned have an important place in the planning of future PW recovery operations.

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c. JPRC is seldom advised of a change in liaison/contact officers and their telephone numbers. The system of name contacts has proven exceptionally valuable and up-to-date listings are vital. (15)

(S) JPRC's basic function was to recover prisoners alive. It was prepared to make armed insertions into areas where PWs were located as well as to pay individuals for returning prisoners alive.

(U) Rewards were offered for information regarding prisoners. Announcement of the awards was made by leaflet drops along the Cambodian border areas where many of the PW camps were known to be located. Any civilian or enemy who provided information was eligible to receive an award. No US or allied military personnel were eligible.

(U) The amount of the award depended on the type of information. For physical return of a live prisoner the award was \$5,000. Up to \$400 was paid for information leading to location and recovery of the remains of a PW or individual missing in action. Payments for other types of information varied from \$50 to \$200.

(S) On 8 Dec the JPRC summarized its recovery and awards program results since its formation in September 1966. The record showed:

US military PWs recovered	7
US civilian PWs recovered	2
RVN military PWs recovered	444
US evadees recovered	10
Rewards paid for assistance to evadees	10
US personnel bodies recovered	88
Total rewards paid	\$12,149
FWMAF PW/Evadees recovered	none (16)

(S) JPRC maintained records on all personnel known to be prisoners or reported missing in action. Their records from 1963 forward were quite complete. Earlier losses were recorded but information on the individuals was sometimes rather sketchy.

(S) The individual records were filed by location where the individual was reported to be missing or captured, by the time of capture, and by name. Reasonably accurate estimates of the speed of movement of personnel were based upon the experience factor. Using that information it was often possible, by the process of elimination, to establish with reasonable certainty the identity of individuals on whom reports were received. (17)

(C) Recovery efforts initiated through JPRC were sometimes hampered by failure of units in the field to properly interrogate for and quickly report on information on PWs. The message cited noted the problem. (18)

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(U) Subsequent to the capture of Sean Flynn in Cambodia while working for Time on 6 Apr the publisher of Time sent an employee of his Paris bureau to Vietnam to search out information on Flynn and others captured at or near the same time. The investigator, Zalin B. Grant, was assigned only to investigative duties. He was not in-country as a writer. He was a veteran intelligence officer who had served in Vietnam prior to his discharge. He spoke Vietnamese and French and worked with representatives of the Vietnamese Government.

(U) On 24 May, Grant reported to the Chief, MACV Office of Information, the results of an interrogation of a man who rallied to the RVN on about 8 May 70. The interrogation was carried out with a member of the RVN Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) at the Chieu Hoi Center, Tay Ninh City, on 23 May.

(U) Grant's report indicated the rallier had, on 4 May, seen 11 US PWs at a camp in Cambodia. Plans were then drawn to move them to a new camp which the rallier had helped build. He had been interrogated by the 25th Inf Div for information on caches but not on PWs, according to Grant's report. (19)

(S) JPRC moved swiftly on Grant's report. Within 24 hours of its receipt by JPRC, on 24 May, a team was inserted into the area described by the rallier and the camp he reported was located. The prisoners, 11 US and approximately 80 ARVN, had been moved. A similar insertion was made at the new site but none were found there either. (20)

(S) Citing the need for questioning of Hoi Chanhs regarding PWs, CG II Field Force Vietnam noted "... failure to include such questions probably resulted in losing an opportunity to liberate 11 US and about 80 ARVN PW." (21)

Summary

(S) Despite all the government, military, and individual/group efforts to gain release of US PWs during 1970 there was no apparent progress in gaining any PWs' freedom. Despite the frustrations of the year, the USC continued its efforts and expected the private efforts to continue. The frustrations of the year were summarized by the State Department thus:

With approach of Thanksgiving and Christmas, families of US PW's and MIA's are making known their strong hope that NVN, VC, and other Communist authorities may release US prisoners during the holiday season. We have seen no repeat no sign that Hanoi contemplating such a move and have no reason to expect one. Most recent PW release from North Vietnam was in August, 1969, and it has been almost as long since last significant release by VC.

With a view of this bleak record, we are presently considering what actions could be taken to stimulate sizable release of US PW's, as well as to highlight plight of all prisoners, especially the ill and injured and those long held. Families of men and wide range of civic and patriotic groups in US (Red Cross, VFW, American Legion, Jaycees, Disabled Vets, etc.) have launched letter and petition campaigns directed mainly at NVN. Congressmen and senators have continued to

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Speak regularly on this subject in wide effort to bring pressure on Hanoi authorities to treat prisoners properly and release them soon. These actions can be expected to increase between now and Christmas, culminating in travel to Paris and elsewhere by delegations hoping to appeal directly to NVN officials there.

Hopes of families have been further kindled by the President's proposal in Oct 7 Indochina peace initiative for release of all PWs on both sides. Families are aware of NVN/VC open rejection of President's proposals, but hope remains that such prisoner releases will in fact come soon.

In light of this climate of expectation, we consider it most important and timely that GVN with US support release sizeable numbers of PW's between now and Christmas. While we recognize other side unlikely to respond directly to such actions, such releases by our side, in our judgment, would help bring pressure on other side on PW question, and would help create climate in which releases by other side are expected and demanded. (22)

The 1969-70 Record

(U) On 19 Dec the Secretary of State summarized the efforts of the past two years in a message to more than 30 embassies and missions around the world. He assessed the situation in mid-December thus:

During the past two years a wide range of efforts have been made on behalf US Prisoners of War and missing in action personnel in Southeast Asia. Many of these efforts have been public in nature with objectives of demonstrating concern and arousing support on this issue both at home and abroad. Commencing in May 1969, there have been numerous public pronouncements by administration officials and members of congress.

The thrust of public discussion has been to highlight the other side's intransigence on this issue, its disregard of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949 and generally accepted basic values of human decency, and to seek release of names of prisoners held, immediate release of sick and wounded and long term prisoners, impartial inspection of camps, proper treatment, and regular flow of mail. USG has consistently sought to treat subject on humanitarian basis separate from military/political aspects of conflict in Southeast Asia.

High points of congressional effort began with house special order in September 1969 condemning enemy policy towards and treatment of PWs. Hearings have been held by armed services and foreign affairs committee, and in May 1970 bi-partisan Senate-House Group sponsored an appeal for international justice at Constitution Hall. Since September 1970, number of senators and representatives have met with PRG and DRV delegations in Paris on PW/MIA situation.

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USG has approached wide range of foreign governments and organizations to seek their assistance on this subject. Approaches include top-level discussions with heads of governments and foreign ministers, as well as numerous lower-level contacts. Astronaut Frank Borman's trip to 12 countries reinforced this diplomatic effort. USG has appreciated actions by many governments to intercede directly or indirectly with Hanoi authorities.

International concern on this problem was recently demonstrated in United Nations. On December 9 UNGA approved widely-sponsored POW resolution calling for inspection of camps and compliance with Geneva Convention requirements for prompt repatriation of long term prisoners, as envisaged by convention. Main US speech on PW/MIA situation was made this year by Senator Claiborne Pell, Dem-RI, in capacity as member of US delegation to UNGA.

PW/MIA question has been raised repeatedly in Paris by US and GVN delegations. Ambassador Bruce made subject one of his principal concerns in first presentation, and has returned to subject repeatedly. On December 10 GVN and US deis proposed immediate release of all 8,000 NVN PWs held in SVN, in return for release by Communist side of all US and Free World prisoners in Indo China, and all Republic of Vietnam prisoners held outside SVN. Communist response was negative to this proposal, as it had been earlier to President's October 7 Indochina peace initiative, which proposed unconditional release of all PWs on both sides. Total Communist PWs in SVN now over 37,000. Approximately 1,600 Americans are missing or captured in Indochina. At least 500 and possibly more are prisoners. Total number of US PWs and the number of RVN PWs held by Communist side are not known due to other side's refusal to identify all PWs, as required by Geneva Convention.

Also important has been wide range of private efforts by civic groups, Red Cross, families of PW/MIAs and other individuals, in US and abroad. Private efforts have generated publicity, sponsored petition and letter writing programs and financed trips abroad for PW/MIA wives. The National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia is principal and most active family organization. They are headquartered in Washington, D.C. and membership includes majority of families. Most publicized and significant activity of wives has been trips to Paris, Vientiane and elsewhere seeking information and support. Families have met with DRV, PRG and Pathet Lao representatives, but have received little satisfaction.

As of January 1969, there had been 620 letters total from 103 PWs. By December 1970, some 3,000 letters and cards had been received from 332 writers, all but one in North Vietnam. In February 1970, Hanoi announced that families could send a package every other month to PWs, and at Christmas 1970 they said each man could receive one 11 lb. Confirmation remains lacking that all men receive packages

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sent to them. Also in December 1970, Swedish government transmitted info on over 200 men, on whom word had been requested from NVN at request of families. Of the total, 45 were acknowledged as PW in NVN, 4 were reported "dead", 147 "never captured in NVN," and a few "un-identifiable for lack of detail."

While there has been some improvement, principal goals have continued to elude US. Enemy persists in refusal to provide full accounting of all personnel especially those PW/MIA in SVN or Laos, has not released sick and wounded, has not permitted inspection of camps or a regular flow of mail from all prisoners, and has refused to discuss the release of all PWs. With many prisoners held four, five, and even six years, and with recent word that some have died, presumably in captivity, USG concern remains intense. (23)

Post Son Tay Reactions

(C) Following the Son Tay raid there was a spate of activity on the part of Hanoi regarding prisoners. There were the expected propaganda reactions condemning the raid as a bombing resumption and invasion, however there was also action on the release of information on PWs. On 10 Dec Sweden received a list of 205 men with information concerning each. Although the list added no new information on those listed as dead or "in camp" it did indicate that 156 men on the list had never been captured in NVN. A similar, but shorter, list was provided the French in Hanoi the same day it was delivered to the Swedish representative. The State Department noted in its message, "...both lists transmitted by NVN authorities some five days after Son Tay rescue attempts and protective reaction raids." (24)

(C) On 22 Dec the State Department announced it had word Hanoi had provided expanded lists to Senators Fulbright and Kennedy. The announcement said:

We have been notified by Senator Fulbright and by Senator Kennedy that they have each been given a list of names of US prisoners of war in North Vietnam. Both senators had received telegrams asking them to send a representative to Paris to receive the lists, which was done earlier today. We understand the lists are being brought back to the United States at the present time.

According to both senators, the lists comprise 368 names broken down as follows: 339 captured in North Vietnam, 9 released from North Vietnam, and 20 dead. Although we have not yet been able to compare the lists, we assume they are identical to each other. In the case of the men described as dead, we understand that a date of death is given in each case.

Regarding the 339 names of men held in North Vietnam, we would note that this is the same number that has already been openly identified by the Hanoi authorities as held in North Vietnam. Families have received letters from 311, and 8 others have been identified through other channels, including the Swedish government and private organizations.

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I would also point out that the Defense Department lists 378 men as captured in North Vietnam, which is 39 higher than the 339.

We do not know for certain whether the North Vietnamese authorities have categorically described the list of 339 as complete, although we understand from the offices of the two senators that this was indicated to their representatives in Paris.

Both senators have advised us that they will give the State Department the lists as soon as they receive them here. We and the Defense Department will, of course, advise the families concerned immediately of any new information on the lists. Until we receive the lists and have an opportunity to analyze them we cannot say whether they contain any new names.

I would note that the dates of death reportedly on the list would appear to be new information.

Let me observe that while it is good to have any additional information, this entire problem of identifying prisoners could have been avoided if North Vietnam and the other Communist authorities in Southeast Asia had provided this information when the men were captured -- which in many cases is as long as 4, 5, and 6 years ago.

I would also emphasize that we have received no information whatever about American prisoners held in South Vietnam or Laos. We have sought repeatedly to obtain such information from the NLF and Pathet Lao authorities but have had no response to these requests. Many men have been lost in those areas for as many years as those lost in North Vietnam. We call on the other side again to provide this information about men held in other parts of Indochina.

Spokesman also provided this additional info: nine released from NVN; three each in February 1968, September 1968, and August 1969; total missing and captured in NVN: 781 (includes the 368 on the senators' lists); total missing and captured in Southeast Asia: 1,560 military plus about 40 government and private organizations: about 25, with one exception, no info provided on date and cause of death. (25)

(C) Some additional information on Hanoi thinking was provided through the French, according to a report from the US delegation to the Peace Talks. The GOF Political Director was reported to have attempted on 11 Dec to persuade Mai Van Bo to have Hanoi make some gesture "that won't cost you much," such as publishing a list of prisoners. In response Mai Van Bo at the 23 Dec meeting remarked that Hanoi had taken into account suggestions from the GOF and others; he then provided a "complete" PW list, reiterating that the DRV was under no obligation to make this gesture. The lists were identical to those given Senators Fulbright and Kennedy. In commenting on those listed as dead, Mai Van Bo was reported to have said that 15 had died within 2 or 3 days after their capture because of very serious wounds incurred when their aircraft had crashed, and the remaining five had died of illness. Of those prisoners now being held, "... despite the destruction and loss of life they caused, the DRV was treating them as humanely as possible and was doing everything it could to look after their health." (26)

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(C) Some governments and Red Cross activities expressed concern regarding the possible impact of the Son Tay PW rescue attempt on diplomatic and humanitarian efforts by third countries to aid US PWs in SEA. On 19 Dec the State Department provided basic guidance to a number of posts on how to handle such comment. It said:

USG believes rescue attempt fully justified by prolonged detention of PW's under what are clearly inhumane conditions, and other side's adamant refusal to negotiate constructively on release of PW's as was proposed in President Nixon's Oct 7 Indochina Peace Initiative. In Paris Meetings on Vietnam Dec 3 US Spokesman reviewed proposal for inspection of prisoner facilities on both sides by ICRC or other humanitarian organization. On Dec 10 US and GVN Dels proposed immediate release of all NVN PW's in SVN in return for release of US/FW prisoners in Indochina, and RVN prisoners held outside SVN. DRV/PRG summarily rejected these proposals.

Under these circumstances, USG hopes that govts and organizations throughout the world will continue their efforts to appeal to NVN and other communist authorities in Southeast Asia, on a humane basis, for decent treatment and early release of PW's. We believe such efforts have helped make Communist authorities realize that there is wide international concern about their handling of PW's. We hope continuation of such efforts will help convince them that best way to end criticism to which they being subjected on PW issue would be to comply fully with Geneva PW Convention, and to agree to early release of all PW's on both sides.

USG deeply appreciate efforts by wide range of govts and organizations in this area. We believe subject should continue to be approached on humane basis, separate from political and military issues of Vietnam conflict. We have welcomed action by UNGA Dec 9, 1970 approving POW resolution by vote of 60-16-34. Resolution endorses Geneva POW Convention, support work of ICRC, and urges early release of PW's.

We hope efforts by govts and organization to intercede on behalf of US POW's will continue and be renewed, and that new initiatives will be taken, particularly with aim of convincing Communist authorities to agree to early release of PW's. Aftermath of Son Tay rescue attempt has seen widespread publicity and discussion on PW problem, in this country and throughout the world. We believe this situation provides good opportunity for new approaches to govts and other intermediaries.

Accordingly, request action posts, at discretion and as appropriate, make new appeal to appropriate host officials for action to intercede with Communist authorities, or appropriate intermediaries, to help convince Hanoi leadership to treat men decently and to release them soon. Host officials should be informed of USG and public concern on this problem, and may be assured of lasting USG gratitude for any efforts they make.

Suggest USIS and military attache components of country team also be instructed to pursue this subject, as appropriate, with host contacts. (27)

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(U) The public affairs guidance provided by the Department of Defense following the Son Tay rescue attempt is quoted on pg X-28. (28)

RVN PRISONERS OF WAR

(S) While the US had accurate figures on the number of its PW/MIA personnel, the GVN did not have accurate information on which to establish its figures. The question which created the problem in classification was whether the individual missing was really a prisoner or whether he had joined the enemy. Additionally, the lack of dialogue on PWs with Hanoi and the VC prevented the GVN from establishing how many personnel were held in captivity.

(C) Attempts by the ICRC to resolve the problem met with frustration because the DRV regarded the PWs as a part of the political situation and refused to discuss them. Attempts to have the sick and wounded interned in a neutral country were also rebuffed. On the occasions of the ICRC approaches on the question Hanoi usually launched into its propaganda line that the ICRC was too interested in the PWs and not paying any attention to the civilian casualties caused by bombings in NVN. (29)

(S) On 2 Dec MACV summarized the situation regarding RVNAF prisoners by pointing out various GVN estimates. The consensus of the summary was that somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000 GVN military and civilians were missing but there was no firm estimate of how many were actually captives. One estimate said there were about 3,000 who were held by the NLF. The RVNAF JGS/J1 estimated, on 2 Dec, the number of RVNAF PWs held in NVN was probably about 100-200. How many were held by the VC/NVA in SVN or Cambodia was not known. (30)

(U) The GVN's permanent representative at Geneva regularly transmitted the names of SVN personnel missing and presumed prisoners of NVN or its "auxiliary" forces in SVN to the ICRC in Geneva. Periodically the GVN representative asked the ICRC to determine the health and welfare of the prisoners; require that detention conditions conform to the GPW; visit camps where the PWs were detained; arrange repatriation of sick and wounded; and arrange mail privileges for the PWs. (31)

CAPTURED CORRESPONDENTS

General

(U) In the strictest sense, correspondents were not combatants and they therefore could not be classed as prisoners of war when detained by the enemy. Until the release of Richard Dudman, Michael Morrow, and Elizabeth Pond, the military actively tried to locate correspondents who were taken prisoner by the enemy. After the release of that trio, the overt efforts were discontinued at the request of the correspondents themselves.

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(U) When possible, JPRC did acquire information on the correspondents for its files. That was necessary because the complete lack of enemy-originated information on any prisoners forced JPRC to rely on various scraps of information in an attempt to identify personnel who were the subject of reports. The process frequently evolved into eliminating those who could not possibly be the subject of a particular report.

(U) Because many of the captured correspondents were Caucasians, JPRC needed basic information on them in order to apply it in the process of elimination. Subsequent to the capture of Sean Flynn and Dana Stone in Cambodia on 6 Apr, a total of 29 additional correspondents were captured in Cambodia. They included nine Americans but all were included in JPRC records.

Detained, Killed, and Missing

(U) A recapitulation of "casualties" among the correspondents assigned to SEA was contained in the 1969 MACV Command History. During 1970, there were 31 correspondents who were captured by the enemy, all in Cambodia. Of those, nine were Americans and the remainder other nationalities. Two Americans were killed, four were released, and three were missing at the end of 1970. From among the other nationalities, three were killed, three were released, and 16 were missing.

(U) The list of correspondents who met the enemy face-to-face was compiled from records of the Correspondent's Associations in Phnom Penh and Saigon and from those of MACOI's Special Projects Division in Saigon. In addition to the 1970 listing it included three others who were captured in Vietnam prior to 1970--two of those had been previously released and the third was believed to be a prisoner. The list included:

Captured in Vietnam

NGUYEN, Ba Linh, Chunichi Shimbun (Tokyo), believed captured in An Xuyen Province 25 Dec 68. (M)

Ray, Michele, Le Nouvel Observateur, captured near Bong Son 17 Jan 67; released approx. 22 Mar 67. (R)

SAHASHI, Yoshihiko, Chunichi Shimbun (Tokyo), captured by Viet Cong 25 Dec 68, near Ca Mau; released 4 Jun 69. (R)

Captured in Cambodia

American

Anson, Robert, Time, captured 3 Aug 70; released 23 Aug 70. (R)

Dudman, Richard, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, captured 7 May 70 near Svay Rieng City; released 15 Jun 70. (R)

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Flynn, Sean, Time, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Hangen, Welles, NBC News, captured 31 May 70. (M)

Miller, Gerald, CBS News, captured 31 May 70; killed. (K)

Morrow, Michael, Dispatch Inc, captured 7 May 70 near Svay Rieng City; released 15 Jun 70. (R)

Pond, Elizabeth, Christian Science Monitor, captured 7 May 70 near Svay Rieng City; released 15 Jun 70. (R)

Stone, Dana, free lance, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Syvertsen, George, CBS News, killed 31 May 70. (K)

Austrian

Gensluckner, George, free lance, captured 8 Apr 70. (M)

Canadian

Dodman, Richard, free lance, captured 17 Apr 70. (M)

Martin, Richard, free lance, captured (date unknown). (M)

French

Arpin, Claude, Newsweek and La Revue Francaise, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Barron, Xavier, Agence France Presse, captured 11 May 70 and released. Also captured near Angkor Wat 11 Jul 70. (R)

Caron, Gilles, Agence Gamma, captured 5 Apr 70. (M)

Clement, Alain, ORTF French TV, captured near Angkor Wat 11 Jul 70; released 21 Jul 70. (R)

Colne, Roger, NBC News, captured 31 May 70. (M)

Hannottraux, Guy, l'Express, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Meyer, Raymond, ORTF French TV, captured near Angkor Wat 11 Jul 70; killed. (K)

Nicaise, Lydie, free lance, captured near Angkor Wat 11 Jul 70; released 21 Jul 70. (R)

Puissesseu, Rene, ORTF French TV, captured near Angkor Wat 11 Jul 70; killed. (K)

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German.

Bellendorf, Dieter, NBC News, captured 8 Apr 70. (M)

Indian

Lekhi, Rajmanik, CBS News, captured 31 May 70; killed. (K)

Japanese

Ishii, Tomoharu, CBS News, captured 31 May 70. (M)

Kusaka, Akira, FUJI TV, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Sakai, Kojiro, CBS News, captured 31 May 70. (M)

Takagi, Yujiro, FUJI TV, captured 6 Apr 70. (M)

Waku, Yoshihiko, NBC News, captured 31 May 70. (M)

Tanagishwa, Takashi, Nihon Denta, captured 7 May 70. (M)

Korean

Lee, Yo Sep, Visnews, captured 22 Nov 70. (M)

Swiss

Mettler, Willy, free lance, captured 14 Apr 70. (M)

(U) The trio of US correspondents, Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor, Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and Michael Morrow of Dispatch, Incorporated, captured by the Communists in Cambodia on 7 May were released in Cambodia on 15 Jun. They were the first of the detained correspondents to gain their freedom.

(U) They were released on Route 1 in Cambodia and hitchhiked back to Saigon. They were in good health, but tired on their return.

(U) The three reported they were well treated after the very early stages of their detention. All three lost weight during their period in captivity; however, they were in better physical shape on return to Saigon than when they left. (32)

(U) Upon their return they declined to talk to personnel from JPRC. JPRC wanted to interview them to determine the accuracy of intelligence reports on them received during their detention.

(U) During interrogation while detained, they were told that US military personnel visited areas where they had been and showed residents pictures asking if the residents had seen them. The three represented themselves as independent journalists in no way connected with the military. They felt any association with the military would delay their release.

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(U) Their rationale for declining to be interviewed by JPRC personnel was based on the feeling that if they did submit to interviews, such interviews might become public knowledge and harm the position of other journalists in captivity.

(U) Michael Morrow said his writing had always indicated he was opposed to US policy in SEA and that he did not want to do anything which would indicate he had changed his position. (33)

(U) No personnel from JPRC did in fact circulate in the area where the three were captured nor did they show pictures of the trio to any residents. Information in JPRC indicated intelligence teams from other commands did make such inquiries while the three were detained. (34)

(U) The returnees were not certain whether their captors did actually have reports of people circulating among the residents asking about them. Some credence to that part of the story was provided by the fact that Zalin Grant, an employee of Time-Life Inc. on assignment from the publisher of Time Magazine to search out any information on missing correspondents, was in the area of Svay Rieng where the trio was captured about 16 May. Grant had their pictures in his possession at the time. (35)

(C) The trio told embassy officials they were well treated except for one incident shortly after they were captured. On that occasion, Dudman and Morrow were tied by their wrists to a Honda, blindfolded, and run approximately one-half mile to a village. There, the two men were taken to a hut and each received a single blow to the head which knocked them down. After that incident an officer intervened and they were well cared for. Dudman reported on several occasions their captors protected them from irate villagers and commented civilians in the area where they passed were sometimes violently anti-American. (36)

ENEMY TREATMENT AND EXPLOITATION OF PWs

(U) During 1970 there was little apparent shift in the enemy attitude towards PWs. There was much talk, but little real action representing any significant changes. Throughout the year the Communists continued to exploit the PWs for propaganda purposes, maintained their previous position that pilots were war criminals, and maintained the facade their treatment of the men was humane.

(S) There were indications the Communists were watching activity by the US and by individuals closely for its effects on the American people.

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(S) At approximately the same time

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(S) On 7 Jan, Soth made a press statement denouncing Perot's efforts to deliver Christmas packages to Americans held by Hanoi.

PW Camps in Laos

(S) On 29 Jul there were 40 confirmed enemy prisons and/or PW camps in Laos. With the exception of the Ban Nakay Neua complex, none of those were believed used for the permanent detention of US PWs. Reports of Americans being sighted at several locations were considered indications the sites were being used as stopover points for US prisoners en route to NVN.

(S) Reports in January indicated four or five Americans were permanently held in a cave at Ban Nakay Neua. As many as 20 Americans had been reported at that location and additional reports indicated two Americans held there were transferred to Hanoi in 1968.

(S) Despite reports of inhumane treatment, PWs were generally reasonably well treated. The availability and quality of the food varied according to the economic and military situation in the area at any particular time. Most prisoners received the same food rations as their captors; however, some potentially troublesome prisoners were purposely undernourished to weaken their physical condition and discourage any escape attempts. Primitive medical treatment was provided, but due to crowding, an unbalanced diet, and poor sanitation, a large number fell victim of diseases.

(S) In the camps, the PWs were confined to stockades or caves during the night. They were permitted outside during the day for exercise and in some camps, were allowed outside the prison confines when foraging for food. A light guard accompanied them on foraging expeditions. Guards and escorts were usually Pathet Lao personnel unfit for regular military duty. Many of the camps had full or part-time NVA advisors and occasional questioning was conducted by NVA interrogators. Camp locations were changed frequently for security reasons. (40)

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(S) Prisoners were subjected to long periods of political indoctrination in attempts to convert them to Communism. Those who responded were sometimes integrated into rear service or other support facilities. Political prisoners were often confined at the same camp with PWs but were usually separated from the PW and received poorer treatment. Political prisoners and criminals from the enemy ranks usually received little sympathy from their captors. (41)

(S) A 25 Nov report indicated the US PWs believed held at the Ban Nakay Neua complex were probably transferred to another location further to the north. Personnel held at that location were believed to have been captured in Northern Laos, while Americans captured in the Panhandle were believed to be sent to North Vietnam via the infiltration corridor.

(S) The same report indicated American PWs were believed to receive better treatment than that provided to indigenous personnel. It also indicated the number of camps reported had increased to 45, guarded by about 1,000 enemy personnel. That was a net increase of five camps since August. (42)

VC TREATMENT OF US PW

(Material in this section is a reproduction in full of MACJ2 SRAP 2070, same title as above.)

Introduction

(C) One of the aims of the enemy is to persuade friendly troops not to engage in armed activities against the VC. This is the ultimate goal of the ongoing military proselyting efforts of the Communists in South Vietnam. Douglas Pike defines military proselyting as that set of activities seeking to destroy the friendly military structure by non-military means. Mr. Pike continues by saying that the techniques used range from offers of welcome into the ranks of the VC to intimidation.

(C) Although the bulk of the enemy's proselyting activities are carried out against the Vietnamese Armed Forces, significant amounts are directed toward United States and other Free World military personnel. This paper will examine the role played by the Communist's prisoner of war policy and actual prisoner treatment in the overall propaganda and proselyting effort. Information for this study is drawn from the experiences of former American PW, captured documents, enemy prisoner debriefings. This paper is solely confined to describing the situation of those Americans captured and held in South Vietnam and does not attempt to analyse the situation of those held captive in the North.

The Prisoner Of War Policy

(C) Since the beginning of the US advisory effort, 99 US military personnel are known to have been captured by the VC. Another 692 are officially listed as missing, some probably having PW

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status. With the exception of air crews, most Americans are captured either while wounded or in a situation where contact or coordination with parent unit is lost. Generally speaking, the individual is disoriented and confused at the time of his capture, thus making him an easier target for exploitation than normally would be the case. The objective of the enemy's prisoner of war policy is to facilitate propaganda and proselyting exploitation of a prisoner by taking advantage of his confused condition.

(C) Many stories have informally circulated concerning the atrocities committed against US PW. Some atrocities mentioned in these persistent rumors have occurred, but they stand out because they have been so few. The VC continue a policy of leniency towards captured Americans for the following reasons: first, a lenient policy creates favorable publicity in the worldwide press, which in turn, affects world public opinion. Secondly, the VC seek to advance the Revolution beyond the narrow context of Vietnam by making converts of their prisoners. Third, and last, the VC feel that a policy of leniency creates a climate in which Americans can be successfully exploited for various intelligence, propaganda and proselyting purposes.

(C) A recently captured leaflet, issued in the name of the South Vietnamese Liberation Army and printed in English, sets forth the following prisoner of war policy:

1. If soldiers of the United States surrender, they will not be killed and will be transferred to a safe place.
2. Prisoners of war will be well treated, receiving medical care if necessary. They will not be tortured or insulted.
3. Personal property of the prisoners such as money, gold, watches, pens and other souvenirs will not be kept by the captors.
4. Prisoners are allowed to write to their family and friends.
5. Wounded left on the battlefield will be treated by the Liberation Army.
6. The dead will be buried carefully.

(C) The above points are, in reality, part of the enemy's proselyting program. In practice some of the points are followed, but usually not on a regular basis. The most often adhered to tenets are the ones dealing with the giving of needed medical treatment (points 2 and 5). Generally speaking, if a man is not seriously wounded he will be given medical aid right on the battlefield or as soon after capture as possible. If battlefield treatment is not feasible, then the prisoner will be taken to a dispensary in a safer area or in the capturing unit's base area. Seriously wounded men are not taken prisoner by the VC as a matter of practice and instances do exist where men in this category have been treated and released. Instances where the VC have killed wounded Americans in lieu of taking them prisoner are extremely rare.

(C) Point number one of the enemy's prisoner of war policy, dealing with the proper evacuation of PW, is the next most often adhered to. Captured documents and prisoner debriefings consistently report that standing orders do exist to the effect that no prisoner is to be taken unless the capturing unit has enough people to quickly and properly evacuate him to a safer area. Americans taken are to be transported as quickly as possible to a higher headquarters or to the COSVN headquarters area where they can be better treated, fed, interrogated and the process of indoctrination begun.

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(C) The third point, calling for the non-confiscation of souvenir items, seems to be generally adhered to, but this adherence is spotty. Some former PW have stated that they were only given a cursory search at the time of capture and never searched again. Others report that all of their personal belongings were taken from them at the time of capture and never returned. This includes wallets, watches, pens, photographs, personal papers and other items of value. It is impossible to draw a general rule of thumb on this point as too much hinges upon the character of the individual captors.

(C) Point number four, which allows prisoners to write letters, is basically a propaganda ploy designed to gain the cooperation of captives. The VC encourage captured Americans to write one of two types of letters, both of which are never delivered. The first type of letter is addressed to the prisoner's family and usually tells of the good treatment he is receiving from the VC. The contents of this type of letter are used by the enemy as proof of their humane treatment of American prisoners. The second type of letter is addressed to the prisoner's friends in his former unit and tells the same type of story. The contents of this type of letter provide the enemy with both current unit intelligence information and the names of those who can be singled out for psywar appeals to defect. It is not infrequent that a prisoner is requested to write both types of letters in exchange for a promise that all letters will be delivered.

(C) Lack of hard evidence concerning point number six makes it quite difficult to determine whether the VC keep their promise of burying dead Americans after a battle. Perhaps it can be assumed that some are buried due to the animistic superstitions still prevalent among the Vietnamese.

Interrogation

(C) Attempts to elicit propaganda and intelligence information are made during interrogation sessions. Interrogation usually begins as soon after capture as possible. As mentioned earlier, American prisoners are removed to safe areas or higher headquarters not only to prevent their recovery, but to facilitate interrogation. Almost all operational VC units lack trained English-speaking interrogators. Consequently, captured Americans must be transported to a headquarters or base area where English speaking interrogators are more likely to be present.

(C) The length and intensity of interrogation varies according to rank, circumstances of capture, articles or documents found on the prisoner and the prisoner's emotional and physical condition. Completely resisting interrogation through appeals to international law of the Geneva Convention will usually be harshly rebuffed. The usual retort to these appeals is that the war is undeclared and that US troops are aggressors who are not entitled to the protection of international law. Constant threats of punishment usually accompany any attempt to elicit information of intelligence or propaganda value from a captured American.

Indoctrination

(C) Concurrent with interrogation is the indoctrination program, normally carried out by VC political officers fluent in English. Instances have been reported where PWs have been subjected to indoctrination from the moment of capture. Other reports have stated that wounded Americans have undergone a rudimentary form of indoctrination while being treated in VC dispensaries.

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(C) American prisoners are, in theory, slated to undergo the following four lesson indoctrination course:

2. The subject for the second lesson is the internal disruption in the United States caused by the war. Prisoners are told that the American people do not back their actions in Vietnam. The lesson continues with the allegation that the United States is facing economic ruin due to the billions of dollars spent propping up the Thieu government. The VC conclude the second lesson by saying that unemployment in the United States is on the increase because, as a result of the war, Americans are losing their traditional overseas markets to Japan and West Germany.

4. In the final lesson, the VC attempt to emphasize their humane policy toward American prisoners. Leaflets, similar to the one mentioned earlier, are passed out to fully capitalize on the favorable psychological impact such a declaration creates. The statements and photos of released prisoners also play an important role in this last lesson.

(C) Prisoner debriefings consistently stress the fact that the treatment given Americans in prison camps is generally better than that accorded ARVN captives. According to captured VC, Americans are given preferential treatment in that they are not expected to work and the food they receive is generally of better quality and in larger quantity. It should be pointed out that many of the details found in these debriefing reports are of a highly dubious nature since the sources, themselves prisoners, may also be trying to secure preferential treatment.

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(C) The actual quarters where Americans are confined vary a great deal depending upon the construction materials available and the local security situation. Examples of structures where Americans are kept are elevated multi-dwelling log structures, single lattice-work cells, semi-submerged compartments and tunnel rooms with interconnecting passages.

(C) The security arrangements provided for the protection of the various prison compounds also vary with the relative security of the area. Some reports mention rather elaborate defenses consisting of trench and tunnel complexes, anti-aircraft batteries, mine fields and a large guard component. Other reports detail only simple defenses with a skeleton guard force.

(C) A good indicator of the quality of the security forces assigned to VC prison facilities is provided by the large volume of captured documents criticizing the laxity of prisoner security. Most of these remind local units that an American will usually try to escape if not watched closely or bound while being moved. Sighting reports, however, point out that Americans are rarely watched very closely and have seldom been observed tied in any manner.

(C) Generally speaking, guards do not harass prisoners as a matter of course. On the contrary, their usual reaction to a prisoner's activities is indifference. Friendly gestures such as extra food or allowing extra freedom within the compound, though not unheard of, are rare. Captured VC directives state that guards have the power of life and death over prisoners if adequate security cannot be maintained, especially in time of attack. Experience has shown that guards are more concerned with their own safety than with the proper execution of their duties.

AS (C) Punishments and executions vary according to local circumstances and the character of the commandant in charge. The most frequently mentioned punishments are to force the PW to stand hatless in the sun or to stand at attention for periods as long as thirty minutes. Executions and the threat of such have been reported. A captured document dating from early 1969 states that a guard unit commander was forced to execute a captured American due to the "difficult situation." The substance of the "difficult situation" was not explained. Another tack taken by the VC to further exploit the propaganda value of captured Americans is in claiming to execute those who die in captivity from natural causes. [redacted] states that if a prisoner is known to be dying from a disease, then he is immediately separated from the other prisoners. After his death, the body is then either secretly buried or displayed as having been executed in reprisal for US or GVN "atrocities." It should be mentioned that claims of this type are strictly for local consumption and are never widely promulgated.

Release

(C) The outright release of captive Americans provides the VC with another fertile propaganda field, since these events attract worldwide publicity. Usually the prisoners chosen are returned as close to an American holiday as possible both to mimic the GVN's amnesty policy and insure maximum press coverage. The actual release takes one of two forms. The first, and most common, is for the VC to just let the prisoner go, leaving him to find the way to an American unit. The second form of release involves a formalized type of ceremony, with the PW returned to representatives of their former units. Ceremonies of this type can also be viewed as an attempt by the enemy to gain de facto recognition for their governmental apparatus since extensive bargaining

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is involved to establish procedures on time, date and circumstances of the release. All prisoners released by the enemy, regardless of the method used, are required to sign a statement attesting their humane treatment and a document of support for the VC cause.

Success

(C) The success of the VC prisoner of war policy in propagandizing Americans appears to be limited. American prisoners have proven extremely reluctant to provide current intelligence information for the enemy. Coupled with this, interrogation of Americans in the field is hampered due to the lack of English speaking personnel in VC operational units. Intensive indoctrination usually cannot be carried out because of three factors: first, the lack of trained English speaking propagandists and Political Officers. Second, the insecure military situation under which most VC units operate. Third, apathy on the part of many Political Officers. For example, the Political Officer attached to a prison camp in Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia talked with American prisoners on an individual basis more to keep his English pronunciation current than for any other reason.

(C) The VC appear to have had some success in exploiting a few Americans for their propaganda value. Some captured GI's have cooperated by writing propaganda tracts for the enemy. These tracts are usually promulgated in leaflets, but some tapes for broadcast are known to exist. Complete collaboration with the enemy on any score, according to the evidence available, is extremely rare.

The Future

(C) Although Americans held by the VC and the treatment they receive have not received the publicity accorded those held captive in North Vietnam, they may play an important role in a future cease fire. In a cease fire situation, US PW can possibly be used to alter a local situation by being exchanged for either the release of VC held by the GVN or political concessions. For example, local VC commanders holding US PW could conceivably trade a number of Americans for a predetermined number of VC. Further, the safety and continued humane treatment of American PW could be bartered for such local accommodations as greater VC access to a disputed area or de facto recognition of the areas controlled by the local PRG apparatus. (43)

PRISONER EXPLOITATION

(U) The Communist pattern of exploitation of PW for propaganda and other purposes continued in 1970. On 19 Jan Radio Moscow announced it would broadcast messages from PWs on its evening broadcast. That day the State Department called in the number-two official of the Russian Embassy in Washington and expressed its displeasure at the means used to convey information

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to the American people. Specific objection was made to the point that Moscow could get information from Hanoi for propaganda purposes but could not get it for humanitarian purposes. When the broadcasts were made they were found to add no new information to that already available in the US. (44)

(C) There was little question the Communists regarded the American PW as an asset in their fight to win. They used him in various ways for their purposes. Guards at one prison camp told a source a transistor radio and an honorable discharge were offered to VC who captured an American. In that case, the PW being guarded were taken to all VC camps near Que Non to show the VC what an American looked like. (45)

(S) Similiar reports of prisoners being displayed to the local populace for propaganda were received from the Delta in May. (46) In September the CG 4th Inf Div reported the body of an officer reported missing two days earlier was found with his hands and feet bound and multiple wounds on his body. (47)

(C) Those reports contrasted with others received which indicated PW were treated well. A report received in February quoted a deserter as saying she was working in a dispensary when a wounded American was brought in, treated for his wounds, and given extra rations. (48) A member of the 13th Sapper Bn, 2 Regt, 2d NVA Div, who was captured reported in November that while in training he was told never to hit an allied PW because it was against the Geneva Convention. (49) Still another report indicated PWs were being compelled to teach cadre English but had good rapport with their captors. (50)

(C) COSVN retained control over release of all US and allied PWs but ARVN PWs were a matter for the province committees, according to a directive captured in March. The directive specified that in any case a PW was released "...wide proselyting is requested concerning the VC policy towards PWs and is to be broadcast through the radio stations. If a PW is released on the front lines it is requested to report the PW name, service number, organization, pl. of birth, date, time and location of release. If possible, record the PW statement in writing in order to proselyte through the radio station." (51)

(C) Exploitation of the PW situation was not restricted to the VC/NVA. In May, an ICRC delegation was in Vientiane where they attempted to see the NVN representatives and were refused an audience. They did, however see Sot Pethrasi, a Pathet Lao representative, and endeavored to obtain information regarding US personnel held by the Pathet Lao or the NVN. They were rebuffed in those efforts too. During a lengthy conversation the ICRC delegates reported the PL representative made the following points:

Wives and relatives of PWs should demand the President stop bombing (in Laos). Until that occurred it was impossible to give any information regarding PWs.

The ICRC was not impartial in that it did not stop US atrocities and it condoned US forcefully moving refugees to Royal Laotian Government areas by helping refugees once they were in these areas.

The Pathet Lao could not assure adherence to the GPW because it could not accord the PWs housing, transportation and security against bombing. (52)

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DEFECTORS

(LOU) On 25 Aug, John M. Sweeney arrived in Stockholm from Moscow. He was traveling on a North Vietnamese passport and requested political asylum. The man was believed to be one Jon M. Sweeney, a Marine Corps private who disappeared from M Co, 3d Bn, 9th Mar on 19 Feb 69. Subsequent to Sweeney's disappearance Liberation Radio carried several messages from a man who identified himself as Sweeney. (53)

(U) In those messages the individual speaking said he was Sweeney and exhorted personnel in SVN to demand they be returned home. In a broadcast on 30 Dec 69, the voice calling himself Sweeney played on racism and addressed black GIs in South Vietnam saying, "How many of you think you're fighting for freedom in the 'Nam'? The answer is probably none. Most of you know where your fight is at. Most of you know that the place where the black man has to fight for freedom is not Vietnam but America." At the end of the recording played, the voice identified himself as a "deserter." (54)

(U) Upon arrival in Stockholm, Sweeney appeared at a press conference with a left-wing lawyer, Hans Goran Franck. He contended he had been left in the jungle, that he had been shot at by his battalion CO (whose name he did not know) and that he stayed with the Forces for National Liberation to engage in propaganda activities directed against US troops. At that time he said, "The reason why I do not want to return to the US is not only because punishment is waiting for me there. I have changed sides."

(U) A press source in Stockholm told the embassy there some Swedish newsmen and media were openly skeptical about portions of Sweeney's account. The embassy report indicated one TV channel apparently decided not to run a film strip of the interview because of gaps and inconsistencies in Sweeney's statements. The embassy commented they assumed the decision was "...made on the ground that Swedish radio did not want to run the danger of becoming a victim of a possible hoax, rather than because that body is suddenly taking a more objective coloration." (55)

(U) In early September Sweeney returned to the United States and was admitted to the US Naval Hospital, St Albans, NY. Upon his return he was classed as a returnee by the Marine Corps. He was debriefed by a team at the hospital.

(S) During his initial debriefings, Sweeney reported he was beaten on occasion for failure to bow to an interrogator. He reported he was interrogated daily for approximately two weeks after his arrival in NVN about 14 April 1969. He said the interrogations lasted about 8 hours each without break; that no reference to the US Code of Conduct was made by his interrogator; and he received no medical treatment for dysentery suffered during a portion of that time. He also reported that during his interrogation, he was shown propaganda material originating in NVN, China, North Korea, and the US. NVA material consisted of leaflets urging US servicemen to stop fighting in SVN and a movie based on TET 1968. The Chinese propaganda was a movie telling of the war in SVN and extolling the virtues of the Red Chinese. US propaganda consisted of publications such as the National Guardian, Black Panther material, and the Daily World, most from 1967. Radio programs played daily in cell were North Vietnam's Hanoi Hanna and, in Sweeney's words, China's "Peking Patty." (56)

(C) There were a number of reports of Caucasian deserters apparently working for the VC/NVA. In November, the CG III MAF reported the name Nguyen Chien Dau was thought to be the alias of Marine Private Robert Russel Garwood carried as missing in action since September 1965. He was said to be a member of the military proselyting section, VC, Quang Nam Province. (58) Two reports were received early in the year from CG 1st MARDIV indicating that Caucasians were sighted with VC/NVA. On 29 Jan he reported a Caucasian was sighted by a reconnaissance patrol and believed to have been killed in an ambush; however, positive identification was not made because the ambushing team had to be emergency-extracted due to other enemy in the area. (59) On 9 Feb another team sighted a Caucasian while on patrol. The man sighted fled when he met the team and was believed wounded by small arms fire but could not be found after the engagement. (60)

(U) Those reports were not new. In June 1969 the London Daily Express carried a story by Ian Brodie, which was printed in the New York Post (exact date unknown; however prior to 26 Jun), reporting American deserters were fighting with the VC in the Danang area and the Delta. (61) On 8 Dec 70, Stars and Stripes carried a similar story based on a Binh Dinh Province police report. (62)

PBR INCIDENT

(U) The night of 5 Feb, a USN PBR with five crewmen aboard strayed into Cambodia due to a navigational error. The crew was detained until 28 Feb when they were returned to US control in Bangkok.

(U) The group was returned to SVN the same evening and immediately transferred to Binh Thuy where they were delivered to their parent command. On arrival at Tan Son Nhut for a change of planes, they were not permitted to talk to the press although the press was invited to the airport for pictorial coverage of their arrival.

(C) The quintet reported they were well treated by Cambodian authorities, that after initial questioning they were not subjected to other interrogation, and that the security applied in their case was not severe. They also reported they opted against making an escape attempt because they were being detained by a neutral country and feared such an attempt might create an international incident. During their intelligence debriefing they reported their survival, evasion, rescue, and escape (SERE) training was of great value in preparation for their experience. They also stated SERE training should include what actions should be taken if individuals were detained by a neutral vice hostile country to preclude any over-reaction on the detainees part. They also felt SERE should also include basic information on Cambodia because of its proximity to the area of operations. COMNAVFORV concurred in those suggestions. (63)

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ENEMY PERSONNEL

PW Program in RVN

The Geneva Convention (GPW)

(U) The United States did not act as the detaining power for enemy PW captured in RVN. All prisoners taken by US and allied forces were transferred to the GVN for detention. That practice was in accord with the Geneva Convention on General Protection of PW, Article 12, which permitted the transfer of PW from one power to another for detention providing certain conditions were met.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The Article read:

Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.

Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rest on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.

Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.

(U) MACV Directive 190-6 was the basic document which provided assistance to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as it carried out its role as the Protecting Power under the GPW.

Discussion

(U) The MACV Provost Marshal was responsible for monitoring the overall PW program in the RVN. In August he issued a fact sheet which outlined the status of the program. It read:

Prior to September 1965, there was no formal PW program in the Republic. In September of that year, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) entered into an agreement which inaugurated a formal Prisoner of War Program. In accordance with this agreement, known as the

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Co-Westmoreland Agreement, Prisoners of War captured by United States Forces are transferred to the custody of the RVNAF for actual detainment. Similar procedures were later established for and adopted by the other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).

As a result of the Co-Westmoreland Agreement, the sovereign government of the Republic of Vietnam has been delegated the role of "Detaining Power" as defined by the Geneva Conventions. United States forces and all other FWMAF are considered "Transferring Powers" as they release their captured PW to the "Detaining Power". The role of "Protecting Power" has been assumed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is headquartered in Geneva. The ICRC maintains a Saigon-based delegation.

Even though US-captured PW are turned over to the Vietnamese, the United States still retains a "residual" responsibility for these PW under the provisions of Article 12 of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War.

The RVNAF operates six Prisoner of War Camps in the Republic. There are five camps on the mainland at Danang, Pleiku, Qui Nhon, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho, while the Central PW Camp is on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam.

1. The PW camps at Danang, Pleiku and Can Tho are one enclosure, two compound facilities. Each camp has a normally rated capacity of 2,000 with an emergency capacity of 2,500.
2. The Qui Nhon PW Camp is a one enclosure, one compound facility. This camp is the primary internment facility for female PW. It has a normally rated capacity of 1,000 and an emergency capacity of 1,250.
3. The Bien Hoa PW Camp is a one enclosure, three compound facility. It is the primary camp for internment of paraplegics, amputee, pregnant females and youths. A "youth" is defined as a male PW 17 years of age or younger. This camp has a normally rated capacity of 3,000 and an emergency capacity of 3,750.
4. The Central Prisoner of War Camp on Phu Quoc Island is a nine enclosure, 32 compound facility. A tenth enclosure lacks interior fencing and lighting fixtures to become operational. Enclosures number 11 and 12 have been started. The CPWC has a normally rated capacity of 18,000. The emergency rated capacity of 31,500 is based upon an approximate 75% overload which is considered allowable for a limited time due to the large size of the available security force and the secure location of the camp. Four Quan Canh (Military Police) Battalions and one separate QC Company support the CPWC.

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The MACV Provost Marshal is responsible for monitoring the entire PW Program in RVN. As functionally organized, the MACPM-Prisoner of War Division administers these responsibilities by:

1. Developing policy, procedures and guidance for use by the component and uni-service commands in implementing the US PW Program.
2. Providing liaison and coordination between and among the FWMAF in Vietnam to insure a unified PW Program.
3. Conducting studies and surveys of PW internment and requirements to insure timely implementation of measures to provide the required resources.
4. Escorting delegates of the ICRC to all PW facilities throughout the RVN.
5. Maintaining statistics on PW interned in Vietnam.

Responsibilities concerning the US PW Program in SVN as applicable to the US component services are as follows:

1. CG, USARV is responsible for operational supervision of the US PW Program in the Republic. This includes:
 - a. Processing, handling, and evacuation of all persons detained by units under USARV control until released to RVNAF control.
 - b. Maintaining records of all PW captured by or released to US authorities and forwarding copies of these records to the Central Prisoner of War Information Center, Fort Meade, Maryland.
 - c. Insuring that record accountability is maintained for all Returnees (individuals wishing to enter the Chieu Hoi Program), Civil Defendants, and Innocent Civilians from the time of capture/detention by US Forces until release to GVN control.
2. CG, III MAF is responsible for processing, handling, and evacuation of all persons detained by units under his control until released to GVN control in compliance with procedures established by CG, USARV.
3. COMNAVFORV and CDR, 7AF are responsible for evacuation of PW to the nearest US Army or US Marine collecting point and for establishing component service procedures to include the maintenance of PW records as required by USARV Regulation.

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MACV provides advisory elements comprised of Military Police officers and enlisted men at each of the six RVNAF PW Camps.

1. The CPWC element of Phu Quoc Island is authorized 10 officers and 27 enlisted men who are involved with both camp operations and with advising the four QC Battalions on the island.

2. The camps at Danang, Bien Hoa and Can Tho are each authorized a Captain and Sergeant First Class while the Pleiku and Qui Nhon camps are each authorized a Major and Sergeant First Class.

3. The mainland camps have personnel requirements and authorizations which are governed by their respective Military Region US Advisory Groups. MACV Team number 14, on Phu Quoc Island comes directly under the MACV Provost Marshal for command and operational purposes.

RVNAF personnel who have been and are directly involved in the administration of the Prisoner of War Program have achieved highly successful results in the accomplishment of their mission. Despite many international pressures, officers and men assigned to the PW system from the Office of the RVNAF Provost Marshal General have displayed an outstandingly professional knowledge and willingness to perform their functions within the spirit and meaning of the Geneva Conventions. Results of their efforts can be readily observed in the favorable reports rendered on the PW camps by the ICRC. MACV and, specifically, MACPM will continue to assist the RVNAF in every phase of PW operations until that future date when releases, repatriations and, most importantly, exchanges can be effected. (65)

(U) Specific responsibilities of various MACV staff agencies relating to the PW program were set forth in MACV Directive 190-3 dated 12 May 1970. The directive also established procedures for prisoners and a reporting system for the maintenance of records on the PW population.

Processing of Detainees/PW

(C) In January 1971, the MACPM summarized the 1970 procedures used in the classification and handling of detainees from the point of capture to final destination thus:

PW Handling/Processing: All personnel detained by capturing units are initially categorized as detainees. Accountability begins with the capturing unit and continues through ultimate disposition depending on the detainee's category. Innocent civilians are screened out at the lowest level and returned to place of capture. Civil defendants (persons who do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article IV of the GPW or MACV Directives) are released to GVN authorities. Returnees are transferred to Chieu Hoi Centers. US-Captured PW

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status is determined by joint US/RVNAF interrogation teams at division/separate brigade collecting points. Doubtful cases are brought before a US Tribunal for determination. US-captured PW are evacuated by US Military Police directly to ARVN PW camps. FWMAF/RVNAF procedures are compatible with US processing procedures.

Responsibilities: MACCORDS has advisory responsibility for the Chieu Hoi program. MACCORDS advisory personnel assigned to the Public Safety Division monitor the civil jails and GVN penal facilities in which those personnel classified as civil defendants are interned. MACPM is charged with monitoring the PW program in Vietnam to include developing policy, procedures and guidance for use by US/FWMAF as well as advising RVNAF in their implementation of the PW program. MACJ2 is responsible for developing policy for the interrogation, classification, and exploitation of detainees/PW.

PW in Chieu Hoi Program: A GVN program has existed since early 1969 to provide a method whereby PW can qualify for acceptance into the Chieu Hoi Program administered by the Ministry of National Defense. Camp commanders are routinely instructed to prepare and maintain current lists of prospective Chieu Hoi candidates. Various factors determine a PW's acceptance into this program to include close screening by Psychological Warfare units at the camps and receipt of formal requests for release submitted by families of PW. (66)

Con Son Island Prison

(U) The GVN operated a civil prison on Con Son Island in the China Sea roughly due south of Saigon and east of the southern tip of the country. PWs were not routinely held on that island; however, some PWs convicted of serious crimes (corresponding roughly to felonies under the US legal system) while in prison camps were sent there to serve their court sentences. A congressional visit to Con Son in July spotlighted some charges of prison cruelty in the American press and inferred PWs on the island were being mistreated. As a civil prison, Con Son was not a MACV responsibility. It was, however, established there were 29 PWs confined on the island while serving sentences for crimes committed in prison camps. Astronaut Frank Borman visited the prison while in RVN during a visit in August. At his departure press conference on 31 Aug he summed up the situation thus:

We visited Con Son Prison not because it's a prisoner of war camp. Obviously it's not. It's a civil prison. There are only 29 prisoners of war there. And they've all been convicted of felonies, murder and so on, in the camps, and they've been transferred to the civil prison for these felonies. I found Con Son was not up to the standards of the prisoner of war camp, although considering the conditions in the country, I think it's a reasonable prison. The famous "tiger cages" are not in use, although in my opinion, my honest opinion, their impact on the world was vastly overplayed. Of course, I didn't see them occupied.

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They're two-story buildings with bars on the top, and it seemed to me that they could be used for isolation for limited times even now. But, as I say, I didn't see them with people in them. (67)

Prisoners From Cambodian Operations

(C) During the 60-day Cambodian operation US and ARVN units captured 1,097 prisoners. Of those 215 were classified as NVA and 882 VC. Those PWs raised a series of legal questions which evolved into some dialog among COMUSMACV, AMEMB Saigon, CINCPAC, and JCS. (68) On 9 May, COMUSMACV noted questions and proposed methods by which the problem would be handled. The questions and proposals were:

At present, all NVA and VC prisoners of war are turned over to GVN, as soon as exploitation is finished, pursuant to a classified agreement between COMUSMACV and the Chief of the JGS, dated 27 September 1965.

The use of US forces in Cambodia has raised the following questions:

- a. What disposition should be made of Cambodian combatants who have joined forces with VC or NVA units and are captured by US forces?
- b. What disposition should be made of Cambodian noncombatants, including refugees, who fall into US hands as a result of combat operations?
- c. If US forces turn over captured Cambodians to a detaining power (e.g., South Vietnam), how will such prisoners be disposed of when the US withdraws its combat troops from Cambodia?

Unless advised otherwise, this Headquarters will act toward Cambodians captured by US forces as follows:

- a. Cambodians serving with VC or NVA units take on enemy character. They will be classified and processed as prisoners of war pursuant to present MACV directives.
- b. Cambodian noncombatants are entitled to, and shall be accorded, all benefits of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. They will be processed in the same manner as Vietnamese noncombatant civilians falling into US hands under present MACV directives.
- c. Disposition of Cambodian prisoners will be in accordance with arrangements and procedures approved by the US Mission Saigon, and the GVN. Such arrangements and procedures will be established in accordance with guidance furnished by DOD and State Department. (69)

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(C) The following day the embassy commented on the proposals and MACV concurred. In its message the embassy raised some additional questions which required resolution in Washington.

By reftel MACV has informed JCS of the policy it proposes to follow regarding Cambodians captured by US forces unless advised otherwise.

There are important political and legal aspects of this subject which Dept will wish to examine carefully with DOD. For example, it may prove very difficult at times to distinguish between Cambodians serving with VC/NVA units and others who may be involved in hostile acts separate from VC/NVA actions; there could be questions regarding advisability of transporting non-Vietnamese Cambodians across the border into Vietnamese PW camps; and there is also the matter of what GOC wishes US or GVN to do with captured Cambodians.

While these are only some preliminary reactions, we believe others may become apparent in Washington and require prompt resolution so that, if necessary, MACV may issue supplementary guidance to US forces. It will also be essential at some point to discuss any modifications of previous policy with GVN and RVNAF.

MACV concurs. (70)

(C) In response to a State Department request of 13 May, on 16 May COMUSMACV instructed USARV how to handle captured Cambodian citizens and established these reporting procedures:

Personnel responsible for interrogating and classifying personnel captured/detained in Cambodia will ascertain the individual's date of birth and citizenship at the initial interrogation point.

Personnel identified as citizens of Cambodia who are captured/detained by US Forces and subsequently classified as PW will not, repeat, not be released to GVN or GOC authorities.

Request that PW captured/detained by US Forces operating in Cambodia be telephonically reported to MACPM-PW NLT 0900 hours daily until further notice. (71) (72)

(C) The initial PW report on the operations was filed on 15 May. That report showed a total of 480 PWs, 191 Hoi Chanh and 847 Detainees. (73) On 21 May the AMEMB Saigon reported that procedures established were satisfactory and also noted that neither US nor ARVN forces had captured any ethnic Cambodian nationals. (74)

(C) Final instructions on classification and disposition of PW captured in Cambodia were issued on 8 Jun when COMUSMACV said:

Personnel who have been detained/captured by US Forces in crossborder operations will be processed as follows:

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View of the Central Prisoner of War Camp (CPWC) located on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Siam.

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1. Ethnic Vietnamese will be processed in accordance with current MACV and USARV directives and personnel classified as PW will be released to GVN authorities for internment.

2. Ethnic Cambodians who are Vietnamese nationals are to be treated as Ethnic Vietnamese.

3. Ethnic Cambodians who are not Vietnamese nationals can only be classified as non-PW or PW. Those identified as non-PW must be released. Captured Ethnic Cambodians classified as prisoners of war are to be held in US Forces custody until the USG can negotiate an agreement with the GVN for their internment.(75)

GVN PW Camp Facilities/Programs

Facilities

(C) The largest PW camp operated by the GVN was on Phu Quoc Island, located in the Gulf of Thailand about 50 km offshore from Ha Tien. Five other facilities were established on the mainland. The PM's year-end summary of the facilities and changes underway showed the following:

PW Camp Facilities: There are five mainland camps-Danang in Military Region 1 (capacity 2,000); Qui Nhon (capacity 1,000) and Pleiku (capacity 2,000) in Military Region 2; Bien Hoa (capacity, 3,000) in Military Region 3; and Can Tho (capacity (2,000) in Military Region 4. A Central PW Camp is on Phu Quoc Island, located in the Gulf of Thailand, approximately 50 km from Ha Tien on the mainland shore.

Central PW Camp, Phu Quoc Island: Construction continues. Enclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 have been completed; enclosure 9 is completed but not occupied. Enclosure 11 is approximately 90 percent completed and perimeter fencing for enclosure 12 has been erected. Total normal capacity for the ten completed enclosures is 20,000. By overcrowding enclosures and accepting the resultant problems, the capacity figure can be modified to 35,000 PW on a limited emergency basis. Of an authorized Quan Canh (ARVN Military Police) strength of 2,173 personnel, which includes a camp headquarters, four battalions, a separate attached company, and a scout dog ratoon, 2,111 were assigned as of 31 December 1970.


Specialized Camps: Female PW are held at the Qui Nhon Camp where productive work programs are being developed. All youths (male PW 17 years of age and younger) are transferred to Bien Hoa PW Camp for the purpose of rehabilitation and vocational training. They are given an equivalent grammar school education and taught a trade such as brick making, carpentry or gardening. The Bien Hoa facility also interns most PW paraplegic and amputee victims. (76) (77)

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Interior of a "New Life" barracks at the CPWC. "New Life" prisoners are more trusted than other prisoners; while their barracks are the same, they may decorate barracks and compound with religious and ethnic ornaments.



Vegetable garden in "New Life" compound. These gardens are being expanded to compounds other than "New Life".

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Work and Pay Program

(C) At the end of 1970 the Work and Pay Program on which action was initiated by the RVNAF JGS in the fall of 1969 was a year old. Started in January as a 6-month pilot program, it became a permanent part of the overall PW program. Prior to the inauguration of this uniform program, individual camps were encouraged to provide work programs on a minimal basis under the direction of the camp commander. The MACPM's year-end summary of the Work and Pay Program made this report:

At the Bien Hoa PW camp, current work programs include manufacturing uniforms from precut patterns, manufacturing concrete blocks and tile, and manufacturing artificial limbs for amputee PW. At the CPWC, carpenter shops have been established in most compounds. A small farm is in operation and will be expanded as additional land is cleared. Other camps have small scale work projects which include carpentry, tailoring, making of sandals, and gardening. Work details are made available to surrounding military units. PW perform routine housekeeping tasks as well as in-camp maintenance. The present PW pay system was approved by GVN in December 1967. This system established a standard rate whereby payment of eight piasters a day (approximately US \$0.07 at the official rate of 118 piasters to the dollar) is earned by each working PW per working day in accordance with provisions outlined in the GPW.(78)

Mail Privileges

(U) Enemy PW held by the GVN had mail privileges in accordance with the GPW. The privileges were given to both VC and NVA personnel with no differentiation among them as far as regulations were concerned. A summary of the extent to which the PWs used this privilege was included in each monthly report filed by MACPM. The PM's reports indicated a considerable increase in the use of mail from the early months of 1970 when about 1,200 letters were mailed each month to that during the last half of the year when the volume normally exceeded 20,000 per month.(79) (80)


(S) The reason for the increase in amount of mail passing between PWs and their families was apparently the GVN practice of providing form letters for use by the PWs which was instituted in early 1970. The volume of mail dispatched was primarily sent to families of VC. The Embassy Saigon noted, in a message detailing the mailing regulations, "... NVA prisoners are encouraged to write their families, but few do so and these receive no reply." The regulations applied by the GVN were (reference to "regulations in force" was to GVN postal regulations):

Authorization for VC POW's to Exchange Correspondence with Their Families. Reference: Circular Note No. 1710/QP/HCTV/1/K dated June 8, 1967.

Government has authorized: (a) VC POW's who have their families in SVN may exchange correspondence according to regulations in force. (b) VC POW's who have their families in NVN may exchange one letter and two postcards monthly. These letters (a and

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A carpentry shop in one of the compounds. Most compounds have similar facilities. Tools which could be weapons are permitted.



Every day is Visitors Day at CPWC. Relatives travel to Phu Quoc by sea or air to visit prisoners. Visitors give food and clothing to PWs.

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b) are free of charge (stamps, surtax and conveyance) and must correspond to pattern fixed in Annex IV (Article 71) of Geneva Convention (August 12, 1949) regarding letters and postcards of POW's.

Procedures for exchange of letters between VC POW's and families in NVN are fixed as follows: (a) Letters and postcards from VC POW's are censored before transmission to Red Cross Delegation in SVN with regard to security and psychological warfare and are centralized by Provost Marshal. From there they will be transmitted to Red Cross Delegation in SVN by special transmittal letter. (b) Letters in NVN transmitted by Red Cross Delegation in SVN will be forwarded to VC POW internment camps for censoring prior to delivery to addressees.

Provost Marshal will proceed quickly to printing of form letters (according to Annex IV (Article 71) of Geneva Convention) in Vietnamese for distribution to VC POW's and realization of procedures of transmittal defined in paragraph 2 above. (81)

Visits to PW Camps

(U) As the detaining power under GPW the GVN was responsible for the control of visitors to the camps. In general, the GVN permitted visits if properly approved and if they would not violate the prisoner's rights. During the early months of 1970 a number of visits were arranged for groups, including Ross Perot and the correspondents he brought to RVN, wives of US PWs, Congressional delegations, and correspondents.

(U) Although MACV did not specify the "policy violations" which occurred, a message originated by MACPM in July noted a GVN tightening of regulations governing visits. The MACV message said:

Recently there have been groups of visitors seeking permission to enter Prisoner of War Camps and other PW detention facilities throughout SVN. In some instances, these groups have, in effect, forced their presence upon the various PW facilities without having final approval from proper authorities at Headquarters, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.


As a result of these policy violations, JGS/RVNAF has directed their Corps Tactical Zones and PW Camp Commanders that no, repeat no, individual or group of individuals, will be authorized access to any PW facility without the prior consent of J1/JGS. Visits by foreign delegations, diplomats, Vietnamese National or foreign news reporters, and Allied Forces personnel were specifically singled out in the implementing instructions issued by JGS/RVNAF.

MACV Directive 190-3 clearly outlines those requirements for all US Forces personnel who wish to be granted permission to visit

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Rations, fresh fish, and vegetables are contracted for and brought daily to each compound. Here prisoners divide rations for the compounds. TB (for Tu Binh) on clothing is the Vietnamese for PW.



Prisoners are responsible for the preparation of their meals which consist of rice, fish, vegetables, and tea.

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an RVNAF PW facility. These requirements must be followed in order to preclude future directive violations.

Addressees are reminded that the government of South Vietnam becomes the responsible nation, or "Detaining Power", as defined in the Geneva Convention, following their acceptance of PW's into their custody. (82)

Statistics

Prisoner of War Camp Population⁽⁸³⁾ (84)

(C) The year-end PW camp population as reported by MACPM was:

Force Served	ARVN I Corps Da Nang	ARVN II Corps Pleiku/Qui Nhon	ARVN III Corps Bien Hoa	ARVN IV Corps Can Tho	Central PW Camp Phu Quoc	TOTAL	
NVN	139	25	52	1072	14	7054	8356
REGPE*	4	8	8	49	2	535	606
VC	1134	996	1249	3807	2701	18504	28391
TOTAL	1277	1029	1309**	4928***	2717	26093	37353

* REGPE=Regroupees. These are NVA who migrated to NVN from South VN under the provision of Geneva Accords of 1954. They subsequently came south to fight as VC cadre or NVA.

** Includes 1180 females

*** Includes 2110 males carried by RVNAF in the youth category for rehabilitation purposes.

Prisoner of War Release/Repatriation⁽⁸⁵⁾ (86)

(C) There have been 939 releases and 151 repatriations reported as of 31 December 1970 by the Government of Vietnam. Of the 939 releases in South Vietnam, 348 have been released to the Chieu Hoi program. Included in the 151 repatriations to North Vietnam are 19 NVN seamen who were unilaterally repatriated by the US.

Releases		Repatriations	
VC	914	VC	5
REGPE	6	REGPE	1
NVN	6	NVN	145
UNK	13	UNK	0
TOTAL	939	TOTAL	151

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JUNKS to carry the released prisoners ashore are brought near the LST into position for loading. South Vietnamese Navymen guide the boats.

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GVN RELEASE/REPATRIATION EFFORTS

Situation

(U) The GVN was the retaining power under the GPW for all personnel captured in RVN. Details of the confinement policies and facilities are contained earlier in this chapter. At year's end the GVN held 37,353 PWs in the various installations. They included 8,356 NVN and 28,391 Viet Cong.⁽⁸⁷⁾

(U) Reducing the number of prisoners was a goal of the over-all PW thinking of the US and GVN. They were expensive to maintain, both in economic and personnel resources. Repeated efforts by the GVN to repatriate prisoners or effect releases met with failure. The failures resulted from two basic reasons: the NVN refused to admit they had personnel fighting in SVN; and few of the prisoners held were interested in being released.

Repatriations

(U) In August 1969 the GVN announced its readiness to return 62 seriously ill or wounded PWs from NVN who were captured in RVN. The proposal was rejected at that time. In November 1969 the GVN again offered to release the men and was rebuffed. Also January 1970, the GVN offered to return the men, extending their offer to permit the relatives of the men to come to the DMZ to receive the repatriates.⁽⁸⁸⁾ Again the response was negative as far as concrete planning was concerned.⁽⁸⁹⁾

(U) The GVN effort continued when, on 26 Mar, it offered to return 343 PWs, including the 62 who were the subject of previous offers. That offer met with the usual propaganda-laden rebuff by the Hanoi delegation in Paris.⁽⁹⁰⁾

(U) On 11 Jun, at the 70th Session of Paris Talks, the GVN announced the 11 Jul repatriation would take place and gave details of the intended release. The GVN indicated it would send the prisoners home by sea, gave their point of departure from SVN and their destination in NVN, and the means by which they would be escorted to NVN waters for transit to NVN. It was also indicated they would be escorted by Red Cross personnel to the shore and the Red Cross personnel would return to the ships from which they debarked the prisoners.⁽⁹¹⁾

(U) The Chairman of the Joint General Staff on 4 Jul requested MACV to provide certain support requirements for the impending PW release.⁽⁹²⁾ MACV had anticipated the request and had previously tasked US forces to provide necessary support.⁽⁹³⁾

- (U) On 9 Jul, COMUSMACV notified all forces concerned that all offensive operations would temporarily cease in an area off the seaward end of the DMZ from 110600 to 112100 Jul while the repatriation was underway.⁽⁹⁴⁾

- (U) On 11 Jul, the 62 NVN PWs and 24 innocent fishermen were repatriated to NVN via boat. The successful repatriation was the result of months of effort and weeks of planning.

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Released POW's head for shore in Red Cross-marked junks. Accompanying the repatriated prisoners is a South Vietnamese Naval escort ship.



South Vietnamese officer assists POW's in their preparations to load onto junks that will carry them ashore to North Vietnam. The prisoners were given life-preservers, protective clothing and water for their trip home.

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(U) The operation went as planned except for a 6-hour delay caused by weather and the loss, prior to the release, of one of the three junks originally scheduled to transport the men to the beach. The two remaining junks were adequate for safely transporting the men to the shore. In summing up the operation, COMUSMACV reported that the PWs discarded their clothing and other personal effects which had been provided by the GVN. The group was met offshore by two small boats and after a brief delay the junks were beached and the personnel offloaded. Friendly units left the area as soon as the offloading was completed. (95)

Overland Repatriation Via the DMZ

(S) In August, the State and Defense Departments jointly proposed planning for repatriation of PWs through the DMZ. MACV had opposed such a plan and prepared a summary of the reasoning which was sent to the Embassy in early September. The thinking was:

The release of sick and wounded prisoners in significant numbers proposed by the Secretary of State (500 to 1,000) may not be feasible. In preparation for the 11 July release of PW, the ICRC experienced difficulty in confirming 62 qualified NVA PW that would agree to be returned to North Viet-Nam. A recent accounting by the ICRC of sick and wounded prisoners tallied 869 of which 269 were NVA. However, at the briefing for Colonel Borman on 30 August 1970 at Phu Quoc Island the briefer, Col Tam (Asst J-1, JGS) stated that the GVN had "2100 incurable" PW. He was unable to define criteria or explain the difference between his figures and the ICRC. However, ICRC is currently reviewing the number of sick and wounded prisoners with GVN authorities and a reconciliation or more exact figure on sick and wounded PWs may be forthcoming. Whatever the number, the GPW precludes the repatriation of PW, regardless of category, prior to the cessation of hostilities without the individual's consent.

The GVN is the Detaining Power for PWs in Viet-Nam. The JGS, who are responsible for the planning and conduct of repatriation, have indicated some jealousy of their prerogatives in this regard. Under these circumstances the method of repatriation and modes of transportation will probably be determined by the GVN commander involved, with policy decisions necessarily limited to deciding if a PW release should be made, and the number, time-frame and type of PW involved. Once the number of prisoners, dates, and cease-fire arrangements are completed, negotiations at the national level would be required to announce the repatriation and assure the necessary cease-fire arrangements.

The idea of repatriating prisoners via an overland corridor through the DMZ has been opposed by COMUSMACV as outlined in a memorandum to Ambassador Bunker on 9 March. The Ambassador concurred and reported to the Secretary of State that while DMZ repatriation was conceivable, logistical difficulties and security risks are such that it was not recommended. It is also impractical to repatriate a large number of PW using fishing junks. There are few, if any, PW that are qualified to man the junks and loss of the boats in past repatriations has proved the method to be expensive.

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Since the DMZ plan has been submitted by JCS to OSD for possible early implementation, COMUSMACV has requested CINCPAC to consider the following:

- a. Historically, tropical cyclones are more prevalent in the South China Sea during the months of September through December. Dense cloud cover, torrential rains, strong winds, extreme flooding, abnormal tides, high seas, swell and surf can occur during this period in the DMZ area.
- b. The swift current averaging 2.2km per hour of the Ben Hai river can be expected to be aggravated by heavy rains. The emplacement and use of river crossing equipment will be hazardous to combat engineer personnel, guard details and PW.
- c. Precipitation can be expected more than 50 percent of the time.
- d. Recommend that any overland repatriation operation in the DMZ be considered in a time frame after December.

It should be recognized by all concerned that overland repatriation over a period of six months or longer will require repeated cease fire agreements, mine sweeping, route repairs and emplacement of river crossing equipment. Without some assurance or likelihood of a reciprocal release of US PWs thru the DMZ, it is questionable that the risks and danger to personnel and prisoners of war in repeated overland operations are warranted as long as other less hazardous means of effecting a PW exchange are available.

Repatriation can best be accomplished by use of LCM or LCU craft operated by the VNN and landing prisoners on any predetermined place in the DMZ including the North Shore of the Ben Hai River. This method is well within the capability of the VNN and has the advantages of being accomplished on short notice and being available for repeated repatriation operations. A cease-fire agreement to effect repatriation using this method would be of shorter duration than one to establish an overland corridor and therefore less subject to unintentional violation by either side.

It is recommended that any release offer be held in abeyance until at least the following has been accomplished:

- a. Identification by ICRC of PW eligible for and willing to be repatriated.
- b. A review at the highest levels of the proposed overland DMZ repatriation corridor vs transportation of PW by sea or air.
- c. GVN plan to accomplish repatriation has been completed and approved. (96)

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Battlefield Release of PW

(S) Planning for release of enemy PW was not restricted to the release of personnel in large groups. In September MACV addressed the idea of battlefield release in a letter to the Embassy which said:

Battlefield release of prisoners of war is feasible. One such release is desirable as a test to determine whether it leads to the return of US prisoners to allied control or to some favorable development concerning US Prisoners held by the enemy

The following general observations concerning battlefield releases should be considered:

- a. The US should not release any PWs unilaterally-i. e., without GVN concurrence. Such a proposal by the US would require GVN assent and cooperation. Under the provisions of the 27 Sep 65 agreement between Generals Westmoreland and Co, enemy prisoners captured by tactical US forces are to be "turned over to the custody of the RVNAF as soon as tactical intelligence exploitation is completed". We have scrupulously observed this agreement and have encouraged and assisted the RVNAF in meeting their responsibilities in this regard. Unilateral deviation from this arrangement is not recommended.
- b. In keeping with President Thieu's policy, GVN probably would agree to release of only sick or wounded.
- c. Enemy concurrence in some form will be necessary. This may entail, if dealing with the NVA, a departure from the previously established NVN position denying their presence in SVN.
- d. The offer to release PW should be addressed to enemy commanders suspected to hold US prisoners in the hope that they would reciprocate.
- e. The offer should be low key, avoiding propaganda and exploitation of returnees, if any.
- f. Announcement of offer over Vietnamese local radio station rather than AFVN would probably be more appropriate and effective.
- g. The initial release offer probably should be related to some Vietnamese or US holiday.

The successful 1 January 1969 release suggest a scenario for battlefield release. Our recommendation concerning a scenario for the initial release would include:

a. Obtain GVN concurrence and support for the plan and determine the number of PW to be released.

b. Request the ICRC to identify those PW captured by US forces and eligible for release and obtain PW consent to exchange (repatriation).

c. Select and thoroughly brief the prisoner release team. The team should consist of five members (Team Chief, Asst. Team Chief, Interpreter, Commo/Photographer and Doctor) with the team Chief a LTC or higher. There is also a necessity for a highly qualified US interpreter to be a member of the team. The level of competence of the interpreter should permit him to understand asides and inferences made by the enemy representatives. If agreeable with the GVN, and they desire to participate, the Team should be jointly manned.

d. Select a date of release (R Day), time and place and plan to contact the enemy force to whom the PW will be released. Prepare a release message and select the way the message is to be transmitted to the enemy. The message could be preferably transmitted over local Vietnamese Radio Network and secondly AFVN Radio. (Alternatively leaflet and loudspeaker aircraft could be used to announce and arrange the exchange.)

e. Announce the intent to release the PW over radio on R minus 21 and that we desire to meet with military representatives from their side, NVA, VC, Pathet Lao or FUNK, to discuss the release of PW. The proposed date of the meeting would be R minus 14, at a suggested time and place. The enemy would be asked to reply via radio indicating acceptance of this offer.

f. The R minus 14 meeting should be to discuss the procedures that would be followed to effect the release. The selected PW should not be taken to the release point at this time. Once procedures have been agreed to their plans should be made to meet again on R day to effect the release. It is advantageous to allow the two weeks between the initial meeting and release to allow the enemy time to reciprocate with the release of US PW.

g. The PW release team would arrive at the time and place agreed on R Day with the PW and effect the release. The release team should be prepared to accept prisoners in exchange from the other side. (97)

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(U) At an 11 Dec press conference in Saigon the GVN spokesman indicated the GVN was considering releasing more PWs just prior to TET 1971. The pattern was to be similar to that followed in the 11 Jul release. (98)

(S) The planning date for the release was 25 Jan 71 with the basic plan predicated on a release by repatriation across the DMZ. Alternatives were airlift under ICRC supervision through Vientiane and sealift similar to the July format. MACV preferred the airlift proposal but agreed to support either of the other two. The problems seen with the DMZ release were the transportation of sick and wounded across the Ben Hai River and with the sealift the expected poor weather for small boats. A total of less than 50 repatriations was expected. (99)

(U) The problem of identifying prisoners for repatriation was highlighted in the November 1970 report of detainees and PWs. It noted the results of mixed medical team interviews of 1,067 PWs. Of those, 841 were determined to be eligible for release or repatriation. Of the latter, 275 wished to be released in SVN, 23 wished to be repatriated to NVN, and the remainder desired to stay in the PW camps. (100)

(S) Detailed planning for the release was developed in Saigon among the GVN, MACV, 7AF, and NAVFORV. The proposed release was announced in Saigon on 25 Dec with the release proposal scheduled to be made in Paris on 15 Jan 71. Although the air and sea releases were not ruled out, it was assumed repatriation through the DMZ would be the only form acceptable to NVN. As 1970 ended MACV was prepared to assist where necessary with arrangements, but indications were the repatriation would be handled completely by the GVN. (101)

Chinese Fisherman Case

(C) In December 1969, the German hospital ship Helgoland rescued a Chinese fisherman while on the high seas. All arrangements for his repatriation were handled by the Germans but they encountered difficulties in transporting the man from Danang to Hong Kong and requested MACV's assistance. MACV provided transportation for the man and his 700-pound sampan. The comments of the American Consul, Hong Kong, provided an interesting commentary on the Communist Chinese attitude to the humanitarian services provided by the Germans and the Americans. It said:

Chinese Fisherman Lin Kuo-Chen with American Red Cross (ARC) representative escorting him arrived Hong Kong 0910 today on US military aircraft. He was met by ARC Rep from Tokyo (no Congen Rep present) and by seven men from HK China Travel Service (CTS), including Asst Manager Tsai Fu-Chiu and interpreter Lai, who handled last repatriation. On orders of CTS men Lin divested self of American clothing (returned to ARC with thanks) and dressed in Chinese clothing from skin out, emerging in blue boiler suit with Mao Badge, and holding Mao Book. After shaking hands with everyone, Lin placed in car and immediately sent to border which he crossed about noon. After Lin entered China Hong Kong GIS issued prepared statement as reported.

When informed yesterday that fisherman was returning with his 700-pound sampan, CTS men were visibly shaken and took five hours

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before agreeing to accept craft. CTS showed up at airport this morning with truck and carted off sampan (described as "People's Property") to be shipped to Hainan by sea. Congen informed this was first sampan ever landed at Kaitak Airport.

CTS men all polite, accommodating, amiable, all shook hands with ARC men on departing. Fisherman seemed happy and was wreathed in smiles until ordered to take off American clothing, which seemed to depress and confuse him. CTS men much more friendly and forthcoming than on last repatriation, but as in all previous cases refused to give written statement acknowledging repatriate received in apparently good health. Instead, they gave unsigned note: "Chinese Fisherman Lin Kuo-Chen arrived Hong Kong March 19, 1970."

Entire transaction smooth and without hitch, and demonstrated good care and thoughtful planning of US military at Danang and also of ARC. (102)

ICRC

(U) The International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the body responsible for supervising the PW facilities of both GVN and NVN. The US interest in the prison camps operated by GVN stemmed from its residual responsibility for prisoners captured by its forces and turned over to the GVN as the detaining power. (103) (104)

(C) On 31 Aug, ICRC President Naville made a speech in Geneva during which he said:

In the conflict which is tearing apart the Indochinese Peninsula, our delegates are unceasingly trying to bring their assistance to prisoners of war to verify that they are humanely treated and to have the detaining authorities publish lists of the prisoners so that they may be put in contact with their families. It is profoundly regrettable that South Vietnam grants prisoner of war status to only a small part of its detainees and authorizes visits of ICRC Delegates to the others only under extremely restricted conditions. It is equally deplorable that North Vietnam refuses all intervention by ICRC on behalf of the prisoners it holds and does not even agree to provide a nominal roll. From the moment when, on one side or the other, a restrictive interpretation is given to the clauses of the international agreements, the job of the ICRC becomes more difficult but even more necessary. (105)

(C) That speech raised eyebrows in Saigon among the GVN and the US Mission. The embassy in Saigon requested full text of the statement with the comment, "Statements re GVN handling (of PWs) appear at gross variance with situation as known to Embassy." (106)

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(U) The GVN's reaction to the criticism was apparently based in part on its feeling that the ICRC was accomplishing nothing with regard to its duties relating to RVNAF PWs in NVN. The GVN's ideas were expressed in a meeting of Foreign Minister Lam with Under Secretary Johnson in Washington on 23 Sep. At that time Minister Lam indicated he felt the US placed too much emphasis on soliciting favorable behavior from the Communists instead of scoring them for unsatisfactory actions. He also felt the Communists should be attacked and exposed for failure to adhere to the Geneva Convention, for using the PWs as pawns in the bargaining, and their general lack of civilized conduct. (107)

(C) That line of thinking was again visible in December when the GVN appealed directly to the International Control Commission (ICC) to intervene with the NVN to accept the GVN PW exchange offer made on 13 Dec, release a list of all PWs, abide by the GPW, and accept letters and gift parcels from PW families at Christmas and TET. In addition to those appeals the GVN officially charged the NVN with violations of Articles 122 (PW lists), 126 (international inspection), and 15 (humane treatment) of the GPW. The note also listed 3,237 missing GVN personnel--civilian and military--presumably captured and detained by NVA and its auxiliary forces. The note also cited ICRC statements attesting to humane treatment by the GVN. (108)(109)

(U) On 14 Sep the GVN Foreign Office issued a communique rebutting the statements of Naville. The statement said:

In Geneva Aug 31 ICRC President Naville complained that North Vietnam has refused and strictly prohibited ICRC intervention and help to prisoners detained by North Vietnam.

Mr. Naville also expressed his regret that "it is profoundly regrettable that South Vietnam grants PW status to only a small part of its detainees, and authorizes ICRC delegates only with many restrictions to make visits to a large proportion of its other detainees."

Truth is that for many years ICRC has been given free and regular access to every PW camp; ICRC representatives and doctors often visit all six PW camps established in SVN. As for whether PW are treated and detained in accordance with Geneva Convention on PW, it is worth recalling that Republic of Vietnam, US, Allied countries with forces fighting in Vietnam, and even North Vietnam were signatories of Convention and are bound to respect it.

Republic of Vietnam and its allies have applied Geneva Convention with a more liberal spirit than standards prescribed by the Convention. A great number of PW who could not have benefited from PW status if criteria established by the Geneva Convention were strictly observed were classified into this category and have been detained in PW camps.

In SVN there is also a great number of civilian prisoners who are not PW, i.e., who do not come within scope of ICRC activity; however, GVN had authorized ICRC delegates and doctors to pay regular visits to prisons and places of detention of civilian prisoners.

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ICRC itself recently announced that between Dec 1969 and May 1970, its representatives had paid 77 visits to 70 places of detention, in which half the prisoners visited were civilian and other half military.

For humanitarian reasons and in coordination with ICRC, on July 11 1970, GVN released and repatriated 62 sick and disabled NVA PW to North Vietnam.

To date, North Vietnam and its auxiliary forces in the South have strictly prohibited ICRC help for PW under their detention in any form whatsoever. In addition, North Vietnam has adamantly refused to disclose names of PW to ICRC.

World opinion clearly realizes which side, Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam, respects Geneva Convention. (110)

(C) In September the ICRC protested the medical situation in particular and other items at the Phu Quoc Camp. The delegation noted that the doctor-prisoner ration dropped during the spring and summer and also reported on other complaints. (111)

(U) That message and other communications resulted in MACV summarizing the situation at Phu Quoc and noting differences with the ICRC on some portions of the report. MACV provided the following input to the AMEMB Saigon for consideration in preparing a response to ICRC:

On 16 September 1970, State/Defense message 151552, relative to an International Committee of the Red Cross report of treatment of prisoners of war at the Central Prisoner of War Camp, Phu Quoc Island (CPWC), was received at this headquarters. The following comments are in response to questions raised in this message.

RVNAF and MACV nonconcur that the camp is overcrowded or that prisoners are unduly exposed to undesirable living conditions. At the initial briefing, the ICRC Team was given a brief history of the camp. It was explained that the camp was originally planned for a capacity of approximately 10,000. It was further explained that since it opened, the camp has been enlarged to handle the increased load and additional construction is presently underway. At present, approximately ten percent of the PW lack sleeping pallets; however, construction of additional pallets is in process and should be completed in the near future.

At the time of the ICRC visit, there were insufficient quantities of medicine to treat a specific fungus. Advisors have since obtained additional quantities of the required medicine from US sources and are attempting to obtain more. The ICRC Team stated they would provide additional supplies of the required medicine, but as yet have not done so. The camp hospital has also requisitioned additional quantities of the needed supplies.

US MISSION Geneva message 3201 states that within the last week the Geneva ICRC Delegation notified the Detaining Power (GVN)

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of their concern over the limited number of qualified doctors assigned to the CPWC. MACV will closely monitor RVNAF actions to solve this problem. The shortage of trained doctors is common throughout the RVN and is not unique to either RVNAF military hospitals or the CPWC in particular.

Uniforms are an item of continuous requisition and issue. The uniform situation is aggravated by prisoners destroying their own uniforms. Uniforms are issued as rapidly as they become available. At present, the majority of prisoners have two uniforms.

Recreation facilities are adequate, but their use was restricted at the time of the visit because of a serious incident involving prisoners.

RVNAF and MACV nonconcur that PW are provided with insufficient food. Daily ration consists of fish, fresh vegetables, and rice. The prisoner complaint of inadequate food is an old and continuing one.

At the time of their visit, ICRC observed disciplinary cages (referred to in referenced message as "Tiger Cages"), but offered no criticism other than recommending that they be covered. Camp officials disagreed with this, stating that the cages were identical to those used to discipline Vietnamese soldiers. The new camp commander has removed all disciplinary cages in the PW enclosures. At the time of the exit interview, the camp commander emphatically denied that any prisoners had been beaten by guards or other QC (MP) personnel. He also denied that any effort had been made to conceal any PW's from the ICRC and stated that the group in question was actually a work detail in Enclosure 10. US Advisors have no knowledge of any prisoner beatings by guards, or of any prisoners being concealed from the ICRC.

At the time of exit interview, the ICRC advised the camp commander of only two criticisms not discussed above. These were that prisoners were not allowed to elect representatives and that they were not advised of the provisions of the GPW. The camp commander nonconcurred with both observations.

The implication in the ICRC report that no US advisors were present at the exit interview is erroneous. The Senior Advisor to the CPWC was physically present at the exit interview. He did not personally accompany the ICRC delegation during their tour of the facility because the GPW disallows any witnesses during personal interviews with PW's. This inspection party primarily concerned itself with such personal and private interviews. Enclosure advisors were at their places of duty, but again had no authority to become involved with the inspection party.

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It should be noted that many of the deficiencies mentioned in the ICRC report are allegations made by prisoners themselves and are not otherwise substantiated. Consideration must also be given to the fact that prisoners may fabricate complaints for the express purpose of embarrassing both the Vietnamese and US Governments.

It is the opinion of US advisors at the CPWC and MACPM that the GVN is complying with the intent and spirit of the GPW. Considerable improvements have been made at the CPWC since its beginning and more are continuing to be made. All improvements have been made with the health and welfare of the PW in mind.⁽¹¹²⁾

(U) The serious incident referenced in paragraph 6 of the above letter was an escape of prisoners from detention at Phu Quoc. MACV's summary of the 31 August incident said:

At approximately 1700 hours 40 PW's returning by truck from a work detail to central PW camp overpowered their guards and attempted to escape into jungle area north of An Thoi. Seven PW's were killed during escape, two were wounded and immediately recaptured. One guard was killed and another seriously wounded. Two weapons are missing and assumed taken by PW's during escape.

A combined force of Vietnamese MP's and Navy personnel cordoned off area. Two US Army helicopters assisted in initial search operation which was hampered by darkness.

At 1300 hours September 1, MP's recaptured one PW who had been slightly wounded during escape. Remaining 30 escapees have thus far avoided recapture.

Complete list of PW's who escaped or attempted escape has been sent to CINCPAC info Dept Army by MACV. Of total US-captured are three killed, one seriously wounded, 10 RPT 10 still at large.⁽¹¹³⁾

(C) On 19 Oct, a MACV team visited the island to assess the situation.⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Regular reports on the improvements at Phu Quoc were filed with CINCPAC. The 5 Nov report said:

Lists of medical equipment and critical drugs were submitted to the RVNAF Surgeon General who directed a 100% fill of shortages; 8 1/2 tons representing 115 line items were shipped by air for a 97% fill. An additional 1 1/2 tons of drugs and ten items of equipment will be shipped the week of 1-7 November and will complete the 100% fill.

A US Army Medical Service Corps officer is scheduled for shipment to Advisory Team 14, CPWC, between 7 and 10 November.

The RVNAF Surgeon General reported that all TOE personnel vacancies have been filled at the CPWC hospital.

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A medical supply team composed of US and ARVN members is scheduled to visit the CPWC Hospital 3-5 November. All stock record cards will be checked to determine if levels are satisfactory and to insure that all shortages have been satisfied.

A MACMD representative and the Surgeon, 5th Special Forces Group will visit the CPWC on 6 November. Purpose of the visit is to determine areas where Special Forces/CIDG medical personnel might possibly be used to assist in the medical effort.

Senior Advisor at CPWC estimates that 80,000 board feet of lumber and 1,300 lbs of nails are required to complete sleeping pallets for 5,500 PW. Plans are being made to supply this material from US stocks.

A recommendation has been accepted by the RVNAF Provost Marshal General that a vegetable farming project be started at Phu Quoc Island as a PW work program. The PMG has requested US assistance in the form of seed and technical advice. USAID has agreed to provide fertilizer, seed, and is investigating the possibility of furnishing a limited number of farm implements. Technical advice on soil conditions and the best agricultural methods to use to meet local circumstances will also be provided.

A Special Intelligence Collection Requirement has been initiated to detect evidence of VC propaganda exploitation of alleged mistreatment of PW at CPWC. (115)

(U) The status report filed in mid-December summarized further progress and indicated some proposed measures to further improve the situation. It said:

Action has been initiated with J46 to examine the feasibility of the ARVN establishing a system of canteens for both the PW and the QC guards located at the PW Camps and the CPWC.

There has been increase in the number of PW going on sick call. A MACMD representative visited Enclosure 4 dispensary and noticed an increase over a three week period from 30-40 daily visits to 95-105. Patient care at the hospital has improved with the assignment of additional medical personnel. The new physicians are enthusiastic and have adjusted well to their new assignment at the CPWC. Special mention is made of Doctor Dzi, who with personal funds, purchases fresh fruit daily for the PW patients. He also provides them with canned milk, sugar, canned meat and other miscellaneous food items. He procured two hundred meters of cloth and is furnishing each PW patient with a new uniform upon discharge from the hospital. A study was completed to determine the number of PW medical personnel, by category, that could possibly be used for conducting sick call at the dispensaries. At present there are 21 NVA physicians, 34 NVA aidmen, and 95 VC aidmen. There have been no VC physicians identified.

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Progress continues on the hospital construction. Bricking has started on the first building. Two ward buildings are 50% completed, cement flooring has been poured and the foundation was erected for the second building. Forms for flooring in the third building are in place; however, weather has prevented pouring cement.

Four additional tons of medical supplies have been shipped to CPWC.

The new dental chair and operating unit arrived. Installation will be accomplished by personnel from the 731st Medical Depot.

On 28 November the ICRC visited the CPWC. It is the opinion of the escort officer that Mr. Ott was very favorably impressed with the improvements and the progress that is being made.

A letter was dispatched to the ARVN Provost Marshal General recommending sick call be established on a daily basis available to all PW requiring medical attention.

A letter has been dispatched to the ARVN Provost Marshal General recommending that fish heads and fish tails, discarded from the daily ration, be used as fertilizer. If dried out and ground into coarse meal, it can be utilized for fertilization of the vegetable farm. This would reduce the overhead of maintaining the farm.

Action has been initiated to obtain recreation equipment from US stocks for the PW camps.

Letter has been dispatched to the ICRC requesting what articles of the Geneva Convention as a minimum should be posted in PW camps in order to comply with Article 41 of the Geneva Convention which requires the Articles be posted. (116)

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PRISONERS OF WAR - Chapter X

1. Embtel (C), Paris to SECSTATE, Paris 1340, 050935Z Feb 70, Subj: Final text of Ambassador Habib's opening statement to be delivered at 53d Plenary Session of Paris Meeting 5 Feb 70, Gp-Not stated.
2. See MACV Command History 1969 (TS) Chapter X for a complete review of the POW situation prior to 1970.
3. Embtel (U), USDEL FRANCE 3898 to SECSTATE, 021443Z Apr 70, Subj: Press Release of English text of Second Remarks by Amb Habib at 61st Plenary Session of Paris Meetings (U).
4. Msg (S), SECSTATE to AMEMB Saigon, 179722, 311930Z Oct 70, Subj: U. S. Policy on Enemy PW Matters in Vietnam (S), Gp-Not stated.
5. Article (U), Stars and Stripes 3 Dec 70, Subj: Laird Hints at POW Raids.
6. Msg (U), SECDEF to SECNAV et al., 102034Z Dec 70, Subj: Safeguarding of Search and Rescue Mission Information (U).
7. Article (U), Time, 7 Dec 70, Subj: Acting to Aid the Forgotten Men.
8. Embtel (U), SECSTATE 064994 to USDEL France, 300151Z Apr 70, Subj: Text of H. Con. Res. 499 Introduced 5 Feb 1970 by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers and Referred to Foreign Affairs Committee (U).
9. Embtel (U), SECSTATE 065840 to All Diplomatic Posts, 010117Z May 70, Subj: Presidential Proclamation of Prisoners of War.
10. Embtel (C), SECSTATE 069079 to USDEL France, 070116Z May 70, Subj: Congressional Hearings on PWs (U), Gp-Not stated.
11. Embtel (C), Vientiane 4425 to SECSTATE, 261030Z Jun 70, Subj: CODEL Montgomery (C), Gp-Not stated.
12. Embtel (C), Saigon 1323 to SECSTATE, 281110Z Jan 70, Subj: Ross Perot and Gifts to NVA Prisoners (C), Gp-Not stated.
13. Embtel (C), USIA Washington 1694 to AMEMB Saigon, 042315Z Feb 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-Not stated.
14. Embtel (C), Vientiane 2611 to SECSTATE, 131106Z Apr 70, Subj: DRV Response to Perot Visit and the POW Problem (C), Gp-Not stated.
15. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV et al., 211137Z Mar 70, Subj: PW Recovery Operations (U), Gp-3.

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16. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 080230Z Dec 70, Subj: Bright Light Part II Cumulative Summary Evadees/PWs Recovered (S), Gp-1.
17. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS, 240241Z Feb 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-3.
18. Gp. cit., # 15.
19. Synopsis (U), letter from Zalin B. Grant to COL Joseph F. H. Cutrona, 24 May 70, Subj: Journalists Missing on Assignment in Indochina (U).
20. Msg (S), COMUSMACV JPRC to CG II FFORCEV, 300240Z May 70, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), Gp-4.
21. Msg (S), CG II FFORCEV to CG 1st US Cav Div (AMBL) et al., 310725Z May 70, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), Gp-4.
22. Msg (S), SECSTATE 187074 to COMUSMACV et al., 140100Z Nov 70, Subj: PW Releases (S), Gp-Not stated.
23. Enbtl (U), SECSTATE to The Hague et al., 190053Z Dec 70, Subj: Prisoners of War
24. Embtel (C), SECSTATE 201707 to AMEMB Stockholm, 111611Z Dec 70, Subj: Information through Sweden on US PW/MIAs in NVN (C), Gp-Not stated.
25. Embtel (C), SECSTATE 207417 to AMEMB Paris, 221853Z Dec 70, Subj: New POW List, (C), Gp- Not stated.
26. Embtel (C), USDEL France 17901 to SECSTATE, 231920Z Dec 70, Subj: Mai Van Bo Meeting with French on POWs (C), Gp-Not stated.
27. Embtel (C), SECSTATE 206432 to the Hague et al., 190053Z Dec 70, Subj: Prisoners of War (C) Gp-Not stated.
28. Msg (U), SECDEF (ASD:PA) to SECNAV et al., 102034Z Dec 70, Subj: Safeguarding of Search and Rescue Mission Information (U), Gp-Not stated.
29. Embtel (S), US Mission Geneva 2846 to SECSTATE 201700Z Aug 70, Subj: Borman Visit PWs (S), Gp-Not stated.
30. Memo (S), MACV SJS to Mission Coordinator AMEMB Saigon, 2 Dec 70, Subj: RVNAF Prisoners in NVN (U), Gp-Not Stated.
31. Embtel (U), US Mission Geneva 285 to SECSTATE 271725Z Jan 70, Subj: POW's-Vietnam, Gp-Not stated.
32. Interview (U), CDR Bush with Daniel Southerland, Christian Science Monitor Bureau Chief, 17 Jun 70.


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- 33. Interview (U), CDR Bush with Michael Morrow, 19 Jun 70.
- 34. Interview (U), CDR Bush with LTC George Reinker JPRC, 19 Jun 70.
- 35. Interview (U), CDR Bush with Zalin Grant, 20 May 70. For additional details regarding Grant's activities see subsection earlier in this chapter concerning personnel recovery.
- 36. Embtel (C), Saigon 9620 to SECSTATE 18 Jan 70, Subj: Detention and Release of Three US Correspondents (C), Gp-Not stated.



- 43. Rpt (C), MACJ2, 2 Dec 70, Subj: VC Treatment of US Prisoners of War (U), (SRAP 2070), Gp-3.
- 44. Embtel (U), SECSTATE 008431 to EMB Saigon et al., 192240Z Jan 70, Subj: Excerpts from Dept's Press Briefing for 19 Jan (U).
- 45. Msg (C), DSA IC an MR 1 Danang to COMUSMACV, 080812Z Sep 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
- 46. Msg (S), CO Det B-43 Chi Lang to SA 44th SRZ Cao Lanh, 212305H May 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
- 47. Msg (C), CG 4th Inf Div to CG MACV, 211447Z Sep 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-3.
- 48. Msg (C), SA Quang Tin Sector, Tam Ky to COMUSMACV, 210500Z Feb 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
- 49. Msg (C), CG XXIV Corps to COMUSMACV, 120841Z Apr 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
- 50. Msg (C), TM2 Det B 4th En 252 MI GP Vinh Binh to JPRC, 290400Z Jul 70, Subj: Not stated Cite: 07/100.30 (C), Gp-1.

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51. Msg (C), CG DMAC to COMUSMACV, 210821Z May 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-3.
52. Msg (C), AMEMB Vientiane 3780 to SECSTATE, 291018Z May 70, Subj: ICRC Delegation to Southeast Asia (C), Gp-Not stated.
53. Embtel (C), Stockholm 2106 to SECSTATE, 251608Z Aug 70, Subj: Possible Military Absentee Arrives in Stockholm (C), Gp-Not stated.
54. Msg (U), FBIS Okinawa to COMUSMACV (JPRC), 311515Z Dec 69, Subj: Not stated, Gp-Not stated.
55. Embtel (U), AMEMB Stockholm 2138 to SECSTATE, 280905Z Aug 70, Subj: Military Absentee John M. Sweeney (U), Gp-Not stated.
56. Msg (S), CMC to CIA, et al., 081310Z Sep 70, Subj: Egress Recap Marine: Debriefing of Sweeney, Jon M. 2467056 Sgt USMC (S), Gp-3.
57. Article (U), Stars and Stripes, 6 Nov 70, Subj: Marines Say Sergeant Deserted.
58. Msg (C), CG II MAF to CDEC/MACV, 140430Z Nov 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
59. Msg (C), CG First Mar Div to COMUSMACV, 291325Z Jan 70, and 091133Z Feb, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
60. Msg (C), CG First Mar Div to COMUSMACV, 091133Z Feb 70, Subj: Bright Light (U), Gp-4.
61. Article (U), New York Post, prior to 26 Jun 69, Subj: GI Turncoats New US Target in Viet. (U)
62. Article (U), Stars and Stripes, 8 Dec 70, Subj: Report Caucasians in NVA Raider Unit.
63. Msg (C), COMNAVFORV to CNO, 060032Z Mar 70, Subj: Intelligence Debrief of PBR Detainees (U), Gp-4.
64. HQ MACV Directive 190-1 (U), 12 May 70, Subj: Military Police; Enemy Prisoners of War.
65. Memo (U), MACPM to Mission Coordinator AMEMB Saigon, 26 Aug 70, Subj: Detention Centers w/incl Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 26 Aug 70, Subj: Prisoner of War Program in RVN (U).
66. Fact Sheet (C), MACPM, 10 Jan 71, Subj: Paris Fact Sheet: Provost Marshal Input for PW Program (U), Gp-4.
67. Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon 14489 to SECSTATE, 041100Z Sep 70, Subj: Borman Comments on Gen Son (U).
68. Memo (C), MACJ2 to AMEMB Saigon, 6 Jul 70, Subj: Prisoners (U), Gp-4.
69. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS, 080146Z May 70, Subj: US Captured Cambodian Combatants (U), Gp-4.

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70. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 7132 to SECSTATE, 090150Z May 70, Subj: US Captured Cambodian Combatants (C), Gp-Not stated.
71. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV, 161055Z May 70, Subj: Classification of PW (U), Gp-4.
72. Msg (C), SECSTATE 072322 to AMEMB Saigon et al., 130004Z May 70, Subj: US Captured Cambodians (C), Gp-Not stated.
73. Memo (C), MACJ2 to AMEMB Saigon, 15 May 70, Subj: Prisoners Gp-4.
74. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 7843 to SECSTATE, 210408Z May 70, Subj: US Captured Cambodians (C), Gp-Not stated.
75. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV et al., 080708Z Jun 70, Subj: Classification and Disposition of PW (U), Gp-4.
76. Op. cit., #66.
77. Bklt (U), 1970, Subj: "The Central Prisoner of War Camp, Phu Quoc Island (RVN)".
78. Op. cit., #66.
79. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 160235Z Feb 70, Subj: Vietnamese Detainees/Prisoner of War (U), Gp-4. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 140658Z Mar 70, 150542Z Apr 70, 140013Z May 70, 180206Z Jun 70, 150845Z Jul 70, 110750Z Aug 70, 150040Z Oct 70, 220927Z Nov 70, Subj: Vietnamese Detainee/Prisoners of War, RCS: DD ISA (M), 1099.
80. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 170226Z Dec 70, Subj: Vietnamese Detainee/Prisoners of War, RCS: DD ISA (M), 1099.
81. Embtel (S), AMEMB Saigon 2841 to AMEMB Paris, 250950Z Feb 70, Subj: PWs Mail Privileges for PWs held by GVN (S), Gp-Not stated.
82. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV et al., 130154Z Jul 70, Subj: Visits to PW Camps/Facilities (U),
83. Op. cit., # 66.
84. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 201111Z Jun 71, Subj: 53d Monthly Report of Vietnamese Detainee/Prisoners of War.
85. Op. cit., #66.
86. Op. cit., #84.
87. Op. cit., #66.

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88. Embtel (U), AMEMB Paris 1041 to SECSTATE, 291030Z Jan 70, Subj: Text of GVN Statement on 62 NVA POW's and Opening Statement by Ambassador Lam at 52d Plenary Session of Paris Meetings 29 Jan 70.
89. Embtel (U), AMEMB Paris 1041 to SECSTATE 291030Z Jan 70, Subj: Text of GVN Statement on 62 NVA PWs.
90. Article (U), Philadelphia Inquirer (AP), 27 Mar 70, Subj: Hanoi Rejects Saigon Offer of 343 PWs.
91. Embtel (U), USDEL France 7615 to SECSTATE, 111217Z Jun 70, Subj: GVN Additional Statement at 70th Plenary Session of Paris Meetings.
92. Ltr (U), DEPCOMUSMACV to GEN Cao Van Vien, CJGS, 9 Jul 70, Subj: Support Requirements for Release of NVN Prisoners (U).
93. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CMDR 7AF, et al., 031252Z Jun 70, Subj: Support Requirements for Release of NVN Prisoners (U), Gp-Not stated.
94. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CMDR 7AF, et al., 090039Z Jul 70, Subj: Temporary Cessation of Offensive Operations of Area of GVN Repatriation Operation (U), Gp-Not stated.
95. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS, et al., 150415Z Jul 70, Subj: PW Repatriation (U), Gp-4.
96. Memo (S), MACJ5, 4 Sep 70, Subj: Enemy PW Repatriation (U), Gp-1.
97. Memo (S), MACJ5, 4 Sep 70, Subj: Battlefield Release of PW, Gp-3.
98. Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon 19527 to SECSTATE, 11 Dec 70, Subj: Press Conference FONMIN Lam (U).
99. Embtel (S) AMEMB Saigon 19539 to SECSTATE, 120500Z Dec 70, Subj: Holiday Release of PW (S), Gp-Not stated.
100. Op. cit., #80.
101. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV et al., 191557Z Dec 70, Subj: Enemy PW Release (U), Gp-4.
102. Embtel (C), AMCONSUL Hong Kong 0982 to SECSTATE, 190928Z Mar 70, Subj: Return of Fisherman (C), Gp-Not stated.
102. Op. cit., #64.
104. HQ MACV Directive 190-6 (U), 1 May 70, Subj: Military Police, ICRC Inspections of Detainee/Prisoner of War Facilities (RCS: MACPM-3).
105. Embtel (C), US Mission Geneva 2996 to SECSTATE, 021000Z Sep 70, Subj: August 31 Speech of ICRC President Naville (C), Gp-Not stated.

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106. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 14292 to SECSTATE, 2 Sep 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-Not stated.
107. Embtel (C), SECSTATE 157980 to AMEMB Saigon, 251323Z Sep 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-Not stated.
108. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 20014 to SECSTATE, 211140Z Dec 70, Subj: PW GVN Appeals to ICC (C), Gp-Not stated.
109. Embtel (C), AMEMB Saigon 20049 to SECSTATE, 220425Z Dec 70, Subj: Prisoners of War: ICC Reaction to GVN Appeal (C), Gp-Not stated.
110. Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon 15169 to SECSTATE, 18 Sep 70, Subj: GVN Reply to ICRC Criticism.
111. Msg (C), US Mission Geneva 3201 to SECSTATE, 171420Z Sep 70, Subj: Phu Quoc Detention Camp (C), Gp-Not stated.
112. Memo (U), MACPM to AMEMB Saigon, 19 Sep 70, Subj: Report of ICRC Visit to Central PW Camp, Phu Quoc Island.
113. Embtel (U), AMEMB Saigon 14490 to SECSTATE, 041100Z Sep 70, Subj: Escape of PWs from Phu Quoc Island.
114. Ltr (U), DEPCOMUS to CJS RVNAF, 18 Oct 70, Subj: Not stated.
115. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 051226Z Nov 70, Subj: Upgrading of CPWC, Phu Quoc Island (U), Gp-Not stated.
116. Msg (U), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 111655Z Dec 70, Subj: Upgrading of CPWC Phu Quoc Island (U), Gp-Not stated.

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CHAPTER XI

INFORMATION AND THE PRESS

OVERVIEW

(U) This chapter discusses the procedures and operation of the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) in performing its mission of providing factual, timely information on command activities to a variety of internal and external publics. Also included is a discussion of the complicated interfaces existing between MACOI, the news correspondents resident in the Republic of Vietnam, (RVN) the American Embassy (AMEMB) in Saigon, and other U. S. agencies involved in the dissemination of information on events of national and international interest occurring in RVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

THE PRESS

(U) The correspondents corps accredited to MACV as 1970 opened totaled 444. They included 172 from the US, 99 Vietnamese, and 173 from other nations. The size of the corps varied with the tempo of operation. During 1969 it averaged about 460. It had reached a high of more than 600 during TET 1968. By 14 Mar 70 it dropped to 402. It jumped sharply beginning in May with the opening of operations in Cambodia to a total of 497 on 30 May. Three weeks later, on 21 Jun, it had dropped back to 466. (1)

(U) On 1 Jun there were eight wire services, 17 radio and television networks, 26 major newspapers, nine news services, eight major magazines, and two film, photo, and newsreel services represented among the corps. With the exception of 36 free-lance writers, the remainder of those accredited represented at least one news outlet or publication.

(U) Including the US and Vietnam, 21 nationalities were represented in the corps. Japan and Korea each had 32, Great Britain had 21, France 17, Australian seven, China and New Zealand six each, and Germany and the Philippines five each. The remainder were from Ireland, India, Switzerland, Thailand, Canada, Italy, Singapore, Greece, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

(U) The US radio-TV networks had the largest staffs. CBS had 46 accredited, ABC 30, and NBC 24. Associated Press had 24 on the accreditation list while UPI had 21. (2)

(U) Most of the correspondents were based in Saigon. They moved about in RVN where they had almost free access to the military everywhere. Transportation was provided by US or RVN forces when available. (2)

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MACOI

General

(U) The mission of MACOI was to serve as the principal advisor to COMUSMACV and the staff on information matters; provide for a maximum flow of information on military matters to the free world press; initiate internal information programs designed to increase understanding among men and women in the component commands of the MACV missions, policies and programs; and to advise the RVNAF on information matters. (4)

Relationship Between US Embassy and MACOI

(U) Application of the "Country Team" concept established the US Ambassador to RVN as the senior US official in-country. As such, he exercised responsibility and authority over the total US public affairs function in RVN. The Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs at the AMEMB represented the Ambassador in public affairs matters.

(U) Under his guidance and that of the Commander in Chief Pacific, COMUSMACV, through his Chief, Office of Information, was the sole authority for clearance and release of information concerning US military operations in Vietnam and adjacent waters and of other items of general news interest. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD (PA)) retained releasing authority for clearance of military-produced motion picture material except for spot news in the nature of local interest only. (5)

(U) The operations conducted in Cambodia during May and June were in support of Allied forces in Vietnam. Therefore, MACOI exercised sole releasing authority on news of the US operations across the border.

(U) Authority to release non-combat news-feature material written primarily about individuals or groups for release in the area of their residence was delegated to local commanders. The delegation was in keeping with the policy of all services to provide such material to "home-town" news outlets. (6)

(U) A limited expansion of MACOI's releasing authority was ordered in March. Under the previous policy, MACOI's authority had been limited to operations which were in the RVN or a part of RVN operations in adjacent territory or waters. During February and early March considerable press attention was directed to increased Communist military activity in Laos. The press interest in operations in Laos resulted in questions regarding American military activity in that country.

(U) A State-Defense Department joint message directed MACV to begin releasing figures on aircraft losses associated with our support of the Laotian government. That information was provided after that time as a part of the weekly release of statistics on aircraft losses. (7)

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(U) The authority, however, was limited. In a separate joint message the AMEMB Vientianne was designated as the releasing authority for information on any ground casualties to US personnel in Laos. The same message, however, directed MACV to include a separate listing of those casualties with his weekly statistical summary. Input for that summary release was provided by the Defense Department. (8)

Relations with other US Agencies

(U) The total US information effort in Vietnam was administered through five organizations. Each had its specific dimension of action. All came under the direction of the Ambassador.

(U) Within that organization, the Embassy was responsible for political action. The Agency for International Development handled economic action. The Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which also included the former US Information Service operations, handled psychological action. MACV handled the military action.

(U) Each of the organizations cooperated on interfaces between their areas of action. MACOI represented MACV when joint planning or operations in the information field was necessary.

Relationships with US Military

(U) The basic policy guidance under which MACOI operated stemmed from the Department of Defense, specifically ASD (PA). Interfaces between State Department and Defense Department information interests were normally coordinated in Washington and transmitted to the U. S. Mission in Vietnam as joint State-Defense policy. Additional guidance or interpretation of policy on military matters was provided by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV's immediate superior in the military chain of command.

(U) Within the policy and guidance received from those sources, MACV was the releasing authority for all military produced information on operations or items of general interest. It applied to all copy which was prepared by the services themselves, with the already noted exception of information prepared on individuals for use in their home town outlets which required a signed authorization from MACOI. In cases where such release was not feasible, material was transmitted to MACOI over a network of dedicated teletype circuits. That permitted clearance of "hard copy" by MACOI reviewing officers.

(U) Direct press inquiries to individual services were handled by the service themselves with reference to MACOI if the material covered was a matter of record and did not involve any changes in established policy.

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Relationships with the Government of Vietnam

(U) Coordination of information releases on military matters between the RVNAF and MACOI was handled through the Information Advisory Division of MACOI. On occasions where it might be necessary for MACOI to coordinate with civilian agencies of the RVN the coordination was handled through the Director of JUSPAO who carried the coordination into the proper RVN channels.

(U) As a normal practice when matters which the press might properly address to either RVN or US agencies, in the absence of any overriding considerations, announcements or statements on the particular subjects were made by RVN. The procedure developed from the fact that at the daily joint press briefings held at the National Press Center the briefers appeared with GVN first, U. S. spokesman second, RVNAF spokesman third, and US military fourth.

(U) The sequence took note of the GVN "host country" status and permitted government spokesmen to make the initial statement if they desired. In all cases where the requirement for comment could be anticipated, the appropriate briefers were consulted before the daily briefings to insure that they would be prepared to comment on specific questions anticipated.

(U) Standing operating procedure within MACOI dictated the MACV spokesmen limit their responses to queries to subjects which were concerned with the US military forces unless an answer had been previously coordinated with the RVNAF. That same procedure was followed by the RVNAF, who deferred to US spokesmen on US matters.

(U) The sole exception to the pattern was the rocket attacks on Saigon. When those occurred MACOI responded with all available information as soon as possible. Information on those occurrences was received from the National Police. That arrangement was used because reporters frequently had difficulty contacting RVNAF spokesmen at night when the rocket attacks normally occurred. (9)

Operating Agencies

News Branch

(U) The News Branch was the principal source of "raw material" translated into news by the correspondents. Working within the framework of policy established within MACOI or by higher authority, source material provided to the press was made available by a variety of means. Those which followed a predictable pattern were:

1. Daily communiques, releases, and briefings. At 1615 hours daily, a communique was released to all interested parties. It was a narrative of the major military events which occurred during the 24-hour period which ended at 1300 hours. It included a summary of major actions, losses, and other information anticipated to be of interest to the press. Attached to the communique was an evening release. That included details of specific operations or actions of major importance, a summary of air activity, and an updating of material previously reported.

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At 0900 hours daily the morning release was made available to the press. It included information on combat activities since 1300 hours the previous day. Each day a briefer from the News Branch was available to the press at the combined briefing held at the National Press Center to answer questions from the press and to give any information available on major activity since 1300 hours that day.

2. Weekly strength, casualty, and aircraft loss statistics. Each Monday, figures on the in-country military strength were released with the communique. The release included the totals for all military, by service, as of midnight the previous Thursday. It included the figures for the current reporting period and the one just previous. On Thursday, figures on US casualties for the week ending at 2400 hours the previous Saturday were released. The totals were provided by the ASD (PA) from records of the ASD (Comptroller). Figures released included deaths, wounded -- hospitalization required and non-hospitalized --, and a total figure of missing and known PWs. In addition, enemy killed in action was reported. Cumulative totals for all casualty categories since 1 Jan 61 were also included. On Friday, aircraft losses for the week ending the previous Tuesday were reported. Weekly and cumulative totals by category of loss were included in each report.

(U) In addition to the releases and summaries which were published on a regular schedule, the News Branch provided information to correspondents through a variety of means which did not follow any predetermined schedule. They included:

1. Memoranda for correspondents which were published and released as situations warranted. They were designed to give correspondents information of news interest on specific subjects or to advise them of coming events, policy changes, or other items which would assist them in their work.

2. Correspondents call outs were used on items of spot news value. Several personnel were assigned to each call out and media representatives were given a preprepared statement on the particular subject. The order of notification was arranged so correspondents with the most urgent need for the information were called first. US and third country representatives of major news wire services, network electronic media, news magazines, and daily newspapers were included on the call lists.

3. Indoctrination briefings were given to correspondents who had just arrived in-country. They were planned to be given weekly; however, a strict weekly schedule was not used because of conflicts with other events and the lack of sufficient new arrivals to warrant briefing some weeks. Briefings included background on ground, air and naval operations, plus question and answer sessions.

4. Briefings on specific subjects of current interest to the correspondents. They were by invitation to those who had expressed interest in particular areas of news. Information provided was unclassified but was not attributable to any particular individual or to the command.

5. Query service was available from the News Branch on a 24-hour basis. It was provided to answer specific questions of one-time interest to individual reporters.

6. Press conferences were arranged for newsworthy personalities in-country. During the conference the individual holding it made opening remarks or read a statement and then

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answered direct questions from the correspondents.

7. Interviews were arranged with specialists on various subjects on request of individual reporters.

8. Special projects requiring coordination among various commands or requiring policy clearance from higher authority were initiated on request from correspondents.

9. Monthly and yearly summaries of operations and operational statistics were prepared and published for reference by correspondents.

(U) The sudden demand for extensive documentation of cache finds in Cambodia after the beginning of allied operations there on 1 May caused an increased workload for the Motion Picture News Branch. Because the branch itself was the only staff agency within MACV HQ which had any pictorial capability, the requirement for the documentation was placed on the branch.

(U) The branch, however, had no organic still picture capability. Its assigned photographers were all motion picture specialists. No still photographic equipment was provided in their allowances.

(U) To meet the requirement the Chief, Motion Picture News Branch, called upon component units in-country. Assistance was provided by the Army's 221st Sig Co (Pictorial), the Southeast Asia Pictorial Center (SEAPC) the AF 600th Photo Sqdn, and integral photo capability of the Army's 25th Div and 1st Cav Div (Ambl).

(U) Still photographic capability was augmented by the motion picture teams. The two Army teams were issued still picture equipment by the Army's 221st Sig Co (Pictorial). Team members also used privately-owned still equipment to help meet the requirement.

(U) The still photography capability thus established in a short time produced approximately 5,000 negatives between 1 May and 15 Jun. They were all screened in the Motion Picture Branch. Initial selections were furnished to the Chief of Information for final selection prior to release.

(U) Some problems were encountered in meeting the requirements because there had been little time for thorough planning before dispatching the teams. The execution of the Cambodian incursion was understandably closely held. The job had to be done with minimum advance notice. The task was accomplished through the ingenuity of personnel involved who were able to overcome transportation difficulties and delays in getting film back to Saigon for processing.

(U) Processing laboratories at Saigon and Long Binh were also involved in meeting requirements for operational and intelligence photography in addition to the added load posed by the cache photography. The laboratories in Saigon were not automated. All photo processing and printing had to be done by hand. The only automated facility was the SEAPC laboratory at Long Binh.

(U) The SEAPC facility was useful for exposed film which was routed through Long Binh en route to Saigon. It was not, however, satisfactory for film which arrived direct in Saigon because of the time lost in transporting unprocessed film to Long Binh and returning the processed work to Saigon. It had the additional disadvantage that the procedure precluded expeditious screening of negatives.

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(U) Despite the necessary rapid reaction and the complications of unpredictable transportation for the film, more than 200 photographs were released to the press during the first 20 days of May. Declining usage led to eliminating the requirement after that time.

(U) All of the photographs released plus negatives of those not selected were made available to MACJ2, the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) and to the JUSPAO. MACJ2 and CMEC screened them for internal use and JUSPAO selected pictures for public release outside the US through its third country branch. JUSPAO also met a requirement for prints laid on by the AMEMB Phnom Penh.

(U) MACJ2 and Chief of Information at MACV jointly selected pictures for transmission to Washington over the Compass Link high-resolution photographic transmission system. During the Cambodian operations that system, operated by the AF 12th Reconnaissance Tactical Sqdn (12th RITS), transmitted daily an average of 10 photographs of captured material to Washington. They were made available to the press in Washington.

Information Advisory Division

(U) The mission of the Information Advisory Division (IAD) was to assist the RVNAF in improving its capability to transmit, through public news media, timely, complete, and factual information concerning its mission, role, and accomplishments to the Vietnamese and worldwide public audiences as well as to internal and US/FWMAF. (10)

(U) To facilitate contact with IAD's counterpart organization, the Information and Public Relations (I&PR) Bloc, General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), Joint General Staff (JGS), IAD was located in the JUSPAO I Building, 145 Nguyen Hue Blvd., downtown Saigon. The division's major function was providing guidance and assistance to the RVNAF in developing their own information programs. Routinely, IAD was the agency through which their public affairs liaison between US and RVN military forces was conducted. Proposed releases produced by the forces of either country addressing combined operations were routed through the division for coordination and clearance prior to public release.

(U) IAD personnel reported significant progress in several areas of the RVNAF information program during 1970. The visit of H. Ross Perot in April provided one opportunity for the RVNAF to demonstrate their information capabilities. Perot, a wealthy Texan interested in the plight of US PWs, brought 66 American newsmen to RVN on a mission to publicize the PW situation. With practically no assistance from IAD, the RVNAF handled all arrangements for the visit. It included planning and executing a very complicated itinerary which permitted members of the press group to visit five camps where VC/NVA PWs were being held, plus all the transportation, billeting, and messing associated with the project. It was the first time the I&PR Bloc had undertaken such a complicated venture. Commenting on the operation, IAD said, "Mr. Perot, the correspondents who accompanied him and the Saigon press corps were extremely complimentary concerning the expert handling and excellent treatment received from RVNAF units at all levels." (11)

(U) During the Cambodian operations in May and June, noteworthy performances by Vietnamese information personnel at all levels were observed. RVNAF field commanders were more

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agreeable to providing resources and granting interviews to members of the press than they had ever been before. Prior to the Cambodia operations, there had been a distinct reluctance among RVNAF officers to meet the press, but during those operations the press handling left little to be desired. The IAD report for the period noted, "... The Press and Public Relations Bloc responded immediately and... continued... to handle information matters promptly and in a professional manner." Improvements noted included the release of information on combat operations in a timely manner, increased field trips and call-out arranged by I&PR Bloc, and increasing numbers of invitations by RVNAF field commanders to correspondents to accompany units into Cambodia. "This," the report said, "represents an abrupt change in the attitude of RVNAF commanders toward the international press corps." (12)

(U) With the assistance of IAD, the I&PR Bloc conducted its first 8-week basic information officers' course, graduating 30 RVNAF company and field grade officers in ceremonies held on 12 Sep. The course covered newswriting, public speaking, broadcast journalism, policy and plans, and photo-journalism. Sixty-nine hours of instruction were presented in English by members of the IAD staff, the Chief Information NCO of MACOI, and a broadcast specialist from AFVN. Although it was too early to cite specific gains by the end of the year, the assignment of the graduates to corps and division-level information offices appeared to be producing additional improvement in the public information program of the RVNAF. The RVNAF established as their ultimate goal the assignment of one Defense Information School (DINFOS) graduate at each corps and division headquarters. To date, five DINFOS graduates have been assigned as press officers. In addition, two graduates of the University of Wisconsin advanced public relations course were assigned to responsible public information positions in RVNAF.

Command Information Division

(U) As differentiated from the mission of the Public Information Division which was primarily concerned with the people outside the military, the Command Information Division's (CIDIV) mission was to support the US effort in Vietnam by providing information materials designed to increase the knowledge and understanding of personnel in uniform concerning Vietnam and the role of the US military in-country. (13)

(U) The CIDIV consisted of two branches, newspaper and material. Two officers were assigned, an O-5 and an O-3, both Army. The O-5 position was left vacant in June and was not filled until August. In the interim the O-3 assumed the duties of division chief assisted by an NCOIC and a Vietnamese secretary. The materials branch was staffed by Marine enlisted. The newspaper branch was divided into two sections, The Observer staff, and the composing center. The composing center was supervised by an Army enlisted E-6 and staffed by six Vietnamese. The Observer, published by the other section, was staffed by five Army and Air Force enlisted and one Vietnamese. (14)

(U) All of the production of the CIDIV was command oriented. It included publication of the command joint service newspaper, materials in support of the total command information program, and responses to selected letters received by the command.

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(U) In 1969 two major efforts were undertaken. They were keeping the troops informed regarding in-country strength reductions and a strengthening of support for Commander's Call and other troop information programs. Both were continued into 1970.

(U) During 1970, the division continued its efforts to keep all personnel informed on the progress and planning for troop reductions. Guidelines for the program were essentially the same as those used in 1969 (For details, see MACV Command History 1969 pp XI 21-22). Other subjects of special interest were anti-drug abuse, Vietnamization, Geneva Conventions, and currency control.

(U) In December 1969, the decision was reached to make bi-weekly Commander's Calls mandatory. (Details of that decision and the guidance which followed are on pages XI 22-23 of the MACV 1969 History).

(U) In the initial phases of the program, material in support of the program consisted mainly of a listing of reference sources which could be used in local preparation of materials. Experience showed that many of the references were not available in the field. That difficulty was attacked by providing textual materials which would provide the basis for locally prepared programs. The latter practice soon developed problems too. It was found that many local commands merely reproduced the textual material and distributed it to personnel for them to read. That defeated the intention of the program which was to bring officers and NCOs into discussion with their men. Finally, a major revision in format of the MACV Quarterly Command Information Guidance Letter succeeded in providing unit information officers and commanders with concise information synopses which, in turn, were used as points of departure only. Additional references were provided for those desiring to research the subject more fully.

(U) The newly instituted program called for a minimum of one Officer Call topic and three Commander's Call topics each quarter. The following topics were assigned for 1970:

1. First Quarter Officer's Call: Vietnamization and Redeployment
January -- Dissent
February -- Pacification - One - Way Ticket Home
March -- Currency Control
2. Second Quarter Officer's Call: Human Relations (Racial)
April -- War Trophies
May -- Malaria
June -- Drug Abuse
3. Third Quarter Officer's Call: Leadership in Command Relationships
July -- Geneva Conventions and Law of Land Warfare
August -- United States Agency for International Development
September -- The Economy and You
4. Fourth Quarter Officer's Call: Command Relationship to Drug Abuse
October -- Your Voting Obligation
November -- Redeployment and You
December -- The Role of the U. S. Serviceman in Vietnam

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(U) To reduce the tendency to use the supporting material as a "handout", guidance to commanders and information officers was provided in September. It said: "These summaries are not to be thought of as lesson plans...Maximum emphasis should be placed on informal discussions at the lowest organizational levels. In many cases a textbook or classroom-type approach is both impractical and ineffective." Unit information officers were told they "...must exercise initiative in getting maximum pertinent information across to all unit service men and women." (15)

(U) During the year, a variety of information pamphlets were developed and distributed by the division. They were used to support the internal information programs and the R&R program. More than two-million copies were distributed during 1970.

(U) To assist in the orientation of personnel coming to Vietnam, two special orientation editions of the MACV command paper, The Observer, were produced for distribution to MACV personnel. Material for the editions was supplied by the various in-country commands.

(U) In late 1969, the composing section installed an IBM type composing system. (Details are included in the MACV 1969 Command History pages XI 23-24.) At 1969's end, the section was serving The Observer and five unit newspapers. During early 1970 the Vietnamese staff efficiency increased rapidly. It permitted the section to add 14 additional newspapers and one monthly magazine during the 1st Qtr CY 1970. The dramatic increase, which brought the total papers served to 20 plus the magazine, could not be duplicated during the 2d and 3d Qtrs because of limitations on the equipment. By the end of the 3d Qtr, however, the section was serving 21 papers and five magazines. Additional equipment, ordered earlier in the year, arrived in November, but was not fully operational until late December. By January 1971, despite the impact of troop redeployments, the composing section was still serving 19 unit newspapers and four magazines. Plans were made to extend composing center support to smaller in-country units and other MACV components who were denied such support previously because of the workload.

Special Projects Division

(U) The Special Projects Division (SPD) existed to provide services and liaison for the news media representatives covering military operations in RVN. It was the first and last contact with MACOI for most correspondents during their tour in-country. Because of its close association with the press corps, SPD was located in the JUSPAO building in downtown Saigon.

(U) In a sense, SPD functioned as MACV's "administrative office" for the correspondents. Among the services provided were the accreditation of correspondents to MACV; making hotel reservations for incoming personnel; currency conversion; arranging and booking in-country travel; planning of itineraries; and the issuing of PX, commissary, and/or open mess cards. When asked, it arranged for escorts for newsmen in-country. When necessary, SPD made arrangements for medical treatment of correspondents at US facilities.

(U) Eligibility for the US-provided services hinged on accreditation to MACV. For such accreditation, a correspondent first had to be accredited to the RVN by the Minister of Information. SPD assisted with application for RVN accreditation. Once it was approved, MACV accreditation required the correspondent be an employee of a recognized news organization or that he have commitments from at least two publications other than Vietnamese agreeing to consider material he produced as a free-lance writer. The criteria did not permit accreditation of writers in-country solely to write books.

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(U) MACV accreditation was issued for varying periods -- 30, 90, or 180 days -- depending on the individual's intended stay in-country.

(U) US citizens and Vietnamese employees of US or free world media agencies, were required to provide a letter from their employer stating they were employees; that the agency accepted responsibility for their professional actions, financial responsibility, and personal conduct; and the agency agreed to inform MACV when employment was terminated. Free world correspondents were also required to present a letter from their respective embassy or diplomatic representative vouching for their identity. Those supporting documents for all personnel were required each year. Free lance writers were required to resubmit letters of "intent to purchase" each time accreditation was renewed. (16)

(U) Upon accreditation, the correspondent was offered a briefing on the general situation in Vietnam and was assisted in gaining information on his particular interests. If he desired, SPD worked up an itinerary making it possible for him to obtain maximum coverage in minimum time.

(U) SPD reserved seats for newsmen on six daily C-123 flights operating up-country from Saigon. In addition, special flights were arranged to take newsmen, when possible, to areas not served by the regular flight. When events of interest to a number of newsmen occurred, special aircraft were provided to accommodate groups.

(U) PX privileges were limited to American citizens, but all correspondents were permitted to use officer messing facilities in Saigon. The mess membership card also served as identification for check cashing at the messes. Correspondents were permitted to purchase combat clothing on a one-time basis while in-country. Limited money conversion facilities for changing US currency into MPC were made available by designation of one SPD officer as a Class "A" agent.

(U) Commissary privileges were extended to some US correspondents, mainly bureau chiefs.

(U) Emergency medical and dental treatment were authorized for correspondents. In the event of injury or death of a correspondent in-country, SPD became the military agency responsible for notification of his sponsoring agency. (17)

(U) SPD was the sole agency for accrediting correspondents to MACV. Procedures were kept as simple as possible to expedite the necessary processing. During the week ending 9 Jan 70 four men presented letters stating they were representatives of the "American University Press." The four, Howard B. Hethcox, William T. Tucker, Nguyen Van Khieu, and Nguyen Van Tam, were accredited on the basis of the credentials presented. Subsequently, one was identified as an intelligence agent by correspondents who recognized him. The accreditation of the four individuals was formally lifted during the week of 29 Jan. (18)

(U) Following the disclosure, a full review of the accreditation procedures was instituted. The weakness identified by the Hethcox-Tucker case was eliminated by procedural changes.

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After it occurred, accreditation of any individual representing an organization not readily identifiable was withheld until the validity of the request for accreditation could be checked.

(U) The practice of accrediting Stars and Stripes military reporters raised some special consideration. Because the paper was a news gathering organization, military reporters were accredited and accorded the same privileges given to reporters for commercial papers. They thus acquired a dual status--civilian newsman and uniformed reporter.

(U) MACV's guidelines on handling the Stars and Stripes reporters, however, said they were to be treated the same as the civilian correspondents; their military status was not to be construed as giving them any access rights different from those of the commercial media; and if priorities for services were necessary, civilian media would be served first. (19)

(U) Some of the commercial media reporting, in seeking out the sensational angle, tended to place the military in a bad light or to emphasize its shortcomings or problems. The conscientious Stars and Stripes reporter was thus faced with the problem of matching stories of that type, or run the risk of causing his editor to ask if he knew what was going on. Thus, problem stories seemed to many military personnel in Vietnam to get too much play in the Stars and Stripes during the early months of 1970.

(U) In May, Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Kelly, whose office was the "publisher" of the Stars and Stripes visited Vietnam. On his return to the US, he granted an interview which contained some guidance for the Stars and Stripes staff. Discussing the problem of keeping the military personnel informed on world affairs, Kelly said,

"I think we are doing a first-rate job of giving our military reader and our military listener, in the case of radio and TV, top professional news and entertainment. I think, however, we are failing to give him a good cross-sectional view of the good deeds of the military man.

Stars and Stripes, if I may use this example, would tend to headline the same thing which is headlined in the commercial newspapers back home. Frequently, the headline news in the papers back home is critical of the military or challenges our foreign policy. The news instinct is to seek out the sensational. And the sensational is not always good news.

The quiet good deeds of military people, I am afraid, are going unnoticed and unheralded. With all the anti-military talk to which the military man is exposed, I think he deserves also an exposure to his good deeds. And the good deeds of the military people in Vietnam today are legion.

Not only are they conspicuous in their valor and in their courage in combat assignments, but the humanitarian reactions of our military people in Vietnam, to the hamlets and villages and their pacification programs, are just a magnificent story of human heroism that needs to be told. And it needs to be told

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to the military people so they can appreciate the great job they are doing over there. In this respect, I think we have failed." (20)

(U) Following Secretary Kelly's return to the US, there was a perceptible change in the content of the Stars and Stripes. Less prominent play was given to the problem areas which involved military personnel. Stories based on conflict were less prevalent in the paper and more space was devoted to reporting the humanitarian deeds of the military personnel.

(U) Another group whose accreditation was under study was the free-lance writers. On 8 Oct, they comprised about 10 percent of the correspondents in country. Of the 39 accredited, 25 were US and 14 were foreign nationals. Their accreditation was established on a case-by-case basis. Criteria included the requirements that they derived more than half their income from writing and had commitments from at least two publishers who agreed to consider their material. (21)

(U) Accreditation could be revoked for violation of various conditions which were outlined to newsmen in memoranda delivered with their press cards, their evidence of accreditation. The memoranda stated:

1. The four most important policy matters affecting newsmen covering combat assignments in Vietnam are: (a) The ground rules established in the interest of national security, (b) Financial responsibility in case of personal injury, (c) Cooperation with military authorities in identification matters, (d) Breach of Vietnamese Law.

a. GROUND RULES: The release of military information is covered in the memorandums issued at the time of your arrival in country. These spell out the guidelines to be followed so that information of significant intelligence value to the enemy is not revealed through your material. Every effort has been made to keep these rules as realistic and workable as possible within security limitations. If these rules are not completely understood, we ask that you make inquiry as soon as possible through the Public Information Division of the MACV Office of Information. Officers there will be glad to assist you at any time. After working hours, a duty officer is always available to answer your questions. His name and quarters telephone number appears in the daily MACV news communique.

b. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: In the past, some misunderstandings have occurred concerning financial responsibility for medical treatment, both routine and as a result of injury from hostile fire. It is important for all correspondents to know that their employers are expected to be financially responsible for medical treatment received while on assignment in Vietnam. This is the primary reason for requiring the financial responsibility statement to be in written form addressed directly to MACV as a prerequisite to your accreditation. In case your employer does not honor this obligation, you as an individual are expected to assume this responsibility. All routine medical treatment, hospital care and medical air evacuation must be paid for at the standard government rates which are in effect at the time these services are rendered.

c. USE OF MACV PRESS CARDS: Your press card is probably your most valuable identification card while here in Vietnam. It serves many purposes beyond mere identification. It is your "airline ticket" and your access to military flights while on news gathering assignments. It permits you access to military installations and to attend news briefings. You are required to

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show this card when requested to do so by military police or other authorities. In this way accredited correspondents can be distinguished from members of the US Armed Forces in civilian clothing. The MACV press card authorized you to travel on regularly scheduled military flights as available on actual assignments. Government air transportation is not authorized for any other business or personal use. Abuse of this convenient travel authorization will result in withdrawal of accreditation.

d. VIETNAMESE LAW: The Government of the Republic of Vietnam is a sovereign government. MACV requires its personnel to obey Vietnamese law whether the personnel concerned are civilian or military. You are not an employee of the US Government, but your accreditation does entitle you to certain privileges provided by the US Government. These privileges are not a matter of right and are to be withdrawn if you fail to obey Vietnamese law. For example, accreditations have been withdrawn when correspondents committed crimes or when they were debarred by MACV for such things as money manipulations, black market dealings and similar infractions.

2. PROCEDURES FOR SUSPENSION OR DISACCREDITATION: The following procedures will be adhered to in connection with the suspension or withdrawal of MACV accreditation:

a. In cases of loss of employment, debarment, withdrawal of GVN accreditation, and financial irresponsibility, the correspondent will be notified in writing by the Chief of Information, MACV, and directed to promptly surrender all identification and privilege cards. Additionally, major unit information offices and all press camps will be notified, via teletype circuit, of the change in status of the correspondent and instructed to pick up and forward to Special Projects Division (SPD) all identification and privilege cards.

b. For other violations or suspected violations, the following procedures will apply:

(1) The correspondent and the appropriate bureau chief will be promptly notified by the Chief of Information, MACV, in writing, of the circumstances of the alleged violation and will be advised that suspension or disaccreditation action is being considered. The Chief of Information, MACV, will offer the correspondent an opportunity to discuss the alleged violation and to present any information which he feels would be pertinent.

(2) Upon completion of the procedure described, a determination whether or not to proceed with suspension or disaccreditation action will be made in joint consultation between the Chief of Information, MACV, and the Minister for Press Affairs, US Embassy.

(3) If the determination is made to proceed, the correspondent will be informed, and an ad hoc board of at least three members, with representatives from the Office of Information, MACV, the Mission Press Center, and the Saigon Press Corps will be convened. The representatives of the Saigon Press Corps will be designated by the President of the Foreign Press Association in Vietnam. The correspondent and his bureau chief will be invited to make representation to the board, but will not be required to do so. The recommendations of this board will be considered by COMUSMACV. Extracts or summation will also be transmitted, for information, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. COMUSMACV is the authority for approving suspension or disaccreditation and does so on behalf of the US Ambassador.

(4) The correspondent and his bureau chief will be notified, promptly and in writing, of the decision made by COMUSMACV. Unless otherwise specified, any suspension or

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disaccreditation will commence from the date the notification is delivered to competent address, whether or not actually placed in the hands of the correspondent.

(5) All major unit information officers and all press camps will be notified of any suspension or disaccreditation action, and instructed to provide no services or assistance to the correspondent and to pick up all MACV identification and privilege cards. It is not the intention of this paragraph that suspended or discredited correspondents should be stranded in the field; if reasonable commercial transportation back to Saigon is not available, SPD will authorize one-way, one-time travel for the individual.

(6) Correspondents who have been suspended or discredited under the foregoing provisions will be afforded the right to appeal. Requests for an appeal should be submitted in a timely manner to the Chief of Information, MACV. No prejudice will be attached to an appeal submitted after lengthy delay. Appeals will be considered by a panel of up to five persons designated by COMUSMACV and to include as a minimum the Minister for Press Affairs of the US Embassy, the Chief of Information, MACV, and a legal representative from the US Embassy or MACV.

(7) The recommendation of the appeal panel will be submitted to COMUSMACV for decision. His decision, made on behalf of the US Ambassador, will be forwarded promptly and in writing to the correspondent and his bureau chief. (22)

(U) The basic policy of the US Mission in the Republic of Vietnam regarding press relations is to provide media representatives maximum information consistent with requirements for security. To that end, and to insure common understanding, the following ground rules are established for discussions between US government sources and media representatives.

1. Discussions between Unofficial Sources and Media Representatives.

a. Definition of Unofficial Sources: Individuals, military or civilian, who conduct discussions with media representatives in an unofficial capacity and not speaking as official spokesmen for a government agency.

b. Rules: An unofficial source's remarks may be quoted directly or indirectly and attributed by name and position or by appropriate words so long as the words do not indicate the source to be an official spokesmen.

2. Discussions between Official Sources and Media Representatives.

a. Definition of Official Sources: Commanders or heads of government agencies, or their representatives, who conduct discussions with media representatives as official spokesmen.

b. Rules:

(1) On the Record: Remarks which may be quoted directly or indirectly, and which may be attributed by either one of the following:

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(a) Personal Attribution: Source identified by name and position.

(b) Attribution to Spokesmen: Source identified as US Embassy spokesman, military spokesman, and the like.

(2) Background: Remarks may be reported but the source may not be identified. Background discussions are held to give media representatives a better understanding of the situation, but circumstances make it inappropriate to indicate in any way that the information emanated from official sources. Media representatives are expected to understand that use of material given on background is on their own responsibility. They may use the material as if it were their own conclusion and the product of their own research. The attribution, "informed sources", may be authorized.

(3) Off the Record: Remarks which may not be used in any form. This type of information is furnished media representatives to add to their understanding of the situation, avoid inaccuracies, avoid inadvertent disclosures that could be harmful to an operation or program, or facilitate their news coverage of military operations or activities. (23)

(U) A MACOI memorandum to the press of 29 January 1968 reminded all press members of the ground rules involving ground combat to which they agreed when they were accredited by MACV. A follow-up memorandum of 26 Feb 68 further explained one of the rules.

1. Members of the press have been most cooperative in attempting to stem the flow of important intelligence information to the enemy. However, based both on logic and the many queries received from newsmen it is obvious that no set of ground rules can cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in number, "gray areas" cannot be eliminated.

2. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting any ground rule gray areas, MACV will provide 24-hour service to anyone who obtains information which he feels is subject to interpretation under the ground rules. Any newsman in the ICTZ who is concerned about the intelligence value of material he wished to use in a story should contact the IO at the MACV Press Center, Da Nang. Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries should be addressed to MACV Office of Information where someone able to make a decision will always be on duty.

3. This service will help ensure a maximum flow of information while insuring the necessary protection to our troops.

4. These are the key ground rules: The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV.

- a. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
- b. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
- c. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
- d. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved.

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- e. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
- f. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
- g. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
- h. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target areas. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
- i. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
- j. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
- k. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General description such as "low and fast" may be used.)
- l. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
- m. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.
- n. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.
- o. Aerial photos of fixed installations. (24)

Cambodian Offense Period

(U) From 1 Apr to 30 Jun SPD accredited 423 correspondents of whom 151 were US citizen; 30 were Vietnamese and 242 were third country nationals. In addition, 160 reaccredit-ations were issued. As of 30 Jun 70, 197 US citizens, 92 Vietnamese, and 210 third country nationals were accredited correspondents and present in-country.

(U) SPD reserved seats for 513 correspondents on US Air Force scheduled flights (C-123 and C-130) originating in Saigon. In addition, special flights were arranged on US Army un-scheduled UH-1 and U-21 aircraft to take newsmen to areas not served by the scheduled flights. The service was utilized by 1,145 correspondents. In cases where a large group of correspon-dents wished to cover a specific event, special airlifts were arranged. Twice in June 1970 a US Army CH-47 helicopter was provided, each time carrying approximately 30 correspondents to the RVN-Cambodian border to cover the withdrawal of US troops from Cambodia.

(U) On 17 Jun the accreditation of George Esper, a member of the Associated Press staff in Saigon was suspended for 30 days for violation of the MACV ground rules regarding public discussion of future operations. On 7 and again on 8 May Esper filed stories relating to a planned combined VNN-USN operation on the Mekong River in Cambodia.

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(U) The suspension was ordered after an investigation by an ad hoc committee composed of members from MACOI-PID, the Mission Press Center and MACOI-JAG. A representative of the Correspondents Association in Saigon was requested to attend, but the Correspondents Association declined the invitation to participate.

(U) The committee's findings were communicated to the AP Bureau Chief in Saigon, Dave Mason. The specific situation involved Esper's stories filed on 7 and 8 May in advance of MACV's announcement of the operation on 9 May. At the time the suspension was ordered, Esper was in the United States on home leave and AP noted its intent to file an appeal from the suspension on his return to Vietnam. The appeal was heard on 7 Aug and denied after consideration of additional information submitted by Mason and Esper. Notice of the denial was filed with Mason on 26 Aug. (25)

(U) SPD provided escort service for such correspondents as Joseph Alsop, Washington Post; Daniel DeLuce, Associated Press; Joseph Kraft, Washington Post; Frank Reynolds, ABC News; and Morley Safer, CBS News.

(U) Other important visitors were Reuven Frank, President, NBC News; Osborn Elliott, Editor-in-Chief, Newsweek; Mike Wallace, CBS News; and Prince Lowenstein, Voice of Germany.

(U) Special events included visits of H. Ross Perot and 80 correspondents, 1-5 Apr 70; a Presidential fact-finding group, 4-8 Jun; and the Congressional Select Committee Fact-Finding Group, 21 Jun - 23 Jul. SPD provided escorts as well as air and ground transportation to assist the press in their coverage of those visits.

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3. Memo (U), MACOI, 1970, Subj: Mission Statement/Functions. SPD mission statement provided to correspondents upon arrival in country.
4. SOP (U), MACOI, 1969, Subj: MACV Office of Information Missions and Functions.
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6. HQ MACV Directive 360-1 (U), MACOI, 27 March 70, Subj: Public Information Policies and Procedures.
7. Msg (U), SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 131456Z Mar 70, Subj: Public Affairs Policy--US Military Aircraft Losses over Laos and Casualties Related Thereto.
8. Msg (U), SECDEF to COMUSMACV, 131455Z Mar 70, Subj: Public Affairs Policy--US Military Casualties in Laos.
9. Interview (U), CDR Bush, MHB, with MAJ John Fontaine, MACOI, Chief Briefer, 24 Jun 70, Subj: Public Release of RVNAF and US Military Information.
10. Op. cit., #4.
11. Rpt (U), MACOI, 26 Jun 70, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report.
12. Ibid.
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15. Ltr (U), MACOI, 7 Sep 70, Subj: Command Information Guidance for 2nd Quarter FY 1971.
16. Memo (U), MACOI, 1 Jan 70, Subj: MACV Accreditation Criteria.
17. Op. cit., #3.
18. Rpt (U), MACOI, 12 Jan and 2 Feb 70, Subj: SPD Weekly Summary.
19. Op. cit., #6.
20. Article (U), Stars and Stripes, 3 Aug 70, Subj: Defense Department's Kelly Reviews Far East "Rap Session".

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21. Op. cit., #6 and Memo (U), MACOI, 8 Oct 70, Subj: Accreditation.
22. Memo (U), MACOI, 28 May 70, Subj: Conditions Under Which Newsmen Operate.
23. Memo (U), MACOI, 1970, Subj: Ground Rules for Discussion with Media Representatives.
24. Memo (U), MACOI, 28 May 70, Subj: Interpretation for Ground Rules.
25. Ltr (U), MACOI, 26 Aug 70, Subj: Ad Hoc Board Appeal of the Suspension of Accreditation of Mr. George Esper.

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CHAPTER XII

DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

BACKGROUND

(U) Unusual psychological pressures were placed upon US military personnel in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during 1970. US troops were being withdrawn, with some loss of a sense of mission by those remaining. Criticism from home of US policies and actions in Vietnam helped create dissidence. Activities of undisciplined soldiers attracted public attention. Many troops were bored or restless.

(U) As 1970 began, major combat units were being withdrawn. By April 1970, US troop strength was down 110,000 from the peak of 543,000 in April 1969. Additional troop reductions announced during 1970 brought the troop strength to under 344,000 by the end of the year. Reductions in workload did not always keep pace with reductions in personnel. Added functions and reduced facilities often meant more difficult conditions for those remaining. Since many facilities were consolidated or closed, housing did not generally improve nor did recreational areas become less crowded.

(U) Morale was not helped by news from the US. The vocal dissenters in and out of government raised doubts in servicemen's minds regarding the real value of what they were doing. The press, often at odds with the command and the administration, continued to play up the dissenters and problem soldiers without giving due credit to the vast majority of personnel who were serving with honor.

(U) For the unscrupulous there were great temptations to profit from US servicemen's privileges. A box of laundry soap bought for 40 cents in the post exchange (PX) was worth about \$1.75 on the black market. A \$3 bottle of whiskey could be converted to something between \$10 and \$14 when sold to unauthorized personnel. Some men wondered if it paid to be honest: until October, the individual who converted his money at the legal rate (VN\$ 118 per US dollar) was getting 40 to 50 percent less than those who obtained piasters on the currency black market at a rate of about VN\$ 220 per US dollar.

(U) Temptations of well-supported troops in a war-torn economy, changing standards, awareness of public criticism, lack of a sense of purpose: these were among the many pressures which contributed to problems in discipline, law and order. Evidences of these problems--black market activities, drug abuse, desertions, customs violations and mail abuses--are described herein, as are the command efforts to provide the morale and recreational activities which would encourage good discipline and respect for law and order.

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US CIVILIANS AND US-SPONSORED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

(U) MACV's very limited jurisdiction over US civilians and US-sponsored third country nationals presented continuing problems in 1970, particularly in connection with investigation of illegal activities and punishment of violators. Under a policy established in January 1970 by the US Ambassador, Saigon, persons engaged in black market activities could be debarred from employment under US-financed contracts; COMUSMACV was further authorized to withdraw all command-sponsored privileges (e.g., use of PX, clubs, and messes) from individuals engaged in black market activities, manipulation of military payment certificates (MPC) or other currency, or violation of MACV directives or Government of Vietnam (GVN) law. This policy was announced by a MACV letter of 22 Feb 70; the previous Staff Memorandum 190-1, 8 May 69, was revised as MACV Directive 190-13, 19 Nov 70. (Further discussed in Staff Judge Advocate section.)

(U) The MACV Provost Marshal Office (MACPM) received investigations on civilians from the GVN and initiated action to withdraw privileges when and if warranted. Over 800 persons were on the Withdrawal of Privileges list. They were given the opportunity to submit a statement in their behalf before final action was taken. After placement on the Withdrawal of Privileges list, the individual had the opportunity to appear before an appeal board. The procedures under the directive provided a means for action against law violators where courts could not, or would not, take action. No authority existed to move those individuals out of RVN after action was taken. Consequently, many remained in country and became more deeply involved in illegal activities. In late 1970, the AMEMB was working with GVN to find a solution to the problem.

MILITARY ABSENTEES AND DESERTERS

General Situation

(U) At the end of 1970 an estimated 2,500 military deserters were believed to be in RVN. Their numbers, based on statistics for the first 10 months of CY 1970, were increasing at a rate of over 100 per month. Of the total, about 1,300 were estimated to be "holdovers" from among men who deserted in 1968 and 1969. The remainder were 1970 personnel. (1)

(U) In RVN, deserters posed an unusual problem. They had a "salable" asset, their American identity, and they had little difficulty in finding places to hide. Most of the deserters were believed to be residing in Saigon where they could lose themselves in a relatively large military population and where they could find "employment" as functionaries in the blackmarket. There was no firm basis for an estimate of the "AWOL Community" in Saigon but the MACPM assumed it was about 2,000 on any given day--1,500 who had been declared deserters and another 500 who were AWOL. The information concerning deserters was based on reports received from component services.

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(U) The major reasons for desertion were believed to be women, easy money, vice, and narcotics. Deserters were already wanted criminals because they had deserted in a hostile fire area. That precluded legitimate employment. Hence, they were quickly attracted to the criminal underworld where they used their American identity in commodity and currency blackmarket operations.

Modus Operandi

(U) By far the greater number of deserters were believed to be organized into nets of three or four with a "Papa-San" or "Mama-San" who provided secure quarters, food, transportation, entertainment, and a "salary." In addition to those there were the "loners" who operated independently without a sponsor.

(U) The stock-in-trade of all the deserters was their ability to move in the piaster, MPC, and dollar economies. It was the ingredient the net operators could not supply themselves. For those services the deserters were paid about 10 percent of their U.S. dollar instrument production. Estimates indicated that living in the grey world where they existed cost the deserters about \$50 per day, therefore they needed to produce \$500 in dollar instruments daily to survive. In addition to their commissions they received a portion of the profits from the sale of commodities.

(U) Currency controls, rationing of PX items in great demand, and military security and uniform regulations combined to keep the deserters in uniform and to restrict them to small individual transactions. To overcome the problem, Papa-San provided the deserter with fraudulent identification, travel orders, ration cards, currency control plates, and currency conversion certificates. These permitted the deserter to assume different identities for each transaction. By remaining in uniform and adhering strictly to military regulations, he minimized the possibility of discovery in moving from transaction to transaction. In some cases, according to the MACPM, a deserter's typical day was concerned with Papa-San's involvement with the currency blackmarket. He might start by selling Papa-San's piasters to friends and acquaintances for MPC at a rate higher than the legal accommodation rate. He would then take the MPC to a bank and deposit them in one of his many accounts to establish their convertibility to dollar instruments. Then he might use fraudulent orders to convert them into "green" dollars or to traveller's checks which were readily convertible back into piasters for Papa-San. Another twist on the conversion to dollars was for the deserter to draw checks against his accounts in RVN and deposit them in stateside banks before turning the money over to Papa-San. In some cases he would buy postal money orders to accomplish the transition from MPC to dollar instruments.

(U) Refilling the "piaster pot" was accomplished by the deserter buying high-demand items in the PX, sometimes with advance tip-off on when they would be on sale, and immediately reselling them to blackmarket stalls along Saigon's streets. Rationing was no serious problem for the deserter was supplied with numerous ration cards by his "employer." One deserter apprehended in late 1970 had 19 ration cards and more than \$2,000 in MPC in his possession when caught.

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(U) The system worked as long as there was an illicit piaster market for MPC. Late in 1970, however, it appeared the raising of the conversion rate from \$VN118 to \$VN275 per \$1 US was putting a damper on the deserter's operations. During the initial weeks after the rate change in early October, the blackmarket piaster rate was slightly above the legal rate. However, by early December it dropped below the legal rate and was holding there. That meant the deserter's piasters were more expensive than those available legally so the incentive to buy from him was gone. The MACPM watched the situation carefully for it was estimated that if the legal rate remained close to or higher than the blackmarket rate for a prolonged period, the deserter would be forced out of piaster manipulation.

(U) The fact that most deserters were "employees" of professional operators made them difficult to apprehend. Their living quarters were accessible only to the Vietnamese police. They were schooled in how to avoid detection. Their identification documents were genuine even if filled in with false names.

(U) The deserter's major downfall in late 1970 appeared to be the use of military orders to convert currency. Most apprehensions at that time were the result of discovery of fraudulent orders, principally during routine checks.

(U) As 1970 closed, the MACPM recommended a reemphasis on the apprehension of deserters to reduce their increasing population. Among his recommendations was the institution of a plan which would provide rewards to the Canh Sat (local police) for deserter apprehensions; reemphasis of the USARV absentee and deserter apprehension program (AR 190-5); reactivation of the USAHAC PM special operations team by bringing in new personnel to infiltrate the deserter community; and training of military banking facilities (MBF) personnel and exchange personnel in the recognition of fraudulent documentation.

DRUGS

(U) There was a drug abuse problem in Vietnam before 1970. That was evidenced by the steadily increasing number of apprehensions of military personnel on drug charges from CY 1965 forward. In 1965 there were 47 apprehensions. It increased to 344 in 66, 1,722 in 67, 4,352 in 68 and 8,446 in 69. In 1970, the total was 11,058, despite the fact troop strengths were dropping. In early 1970 it became apparent apprehensions were not an accurate measure of the magnitude of the problem. In October Sen. Thomas Dodd launched an investigation into marijuana smoking by military personnel, principally those in Vietnam. Figures presented to the committee were in sharp contrast to those in official military files. The problem was that no exact statistics were available to either the military or the investigators. In both cases, figures presented were based on estimates and no solid basis for the estimates existed. The Dodd committee was told by one former medical officer an estimated 70 percent of men treated as outpatients in one unit were drug abusers. The military estimated the total to be about 10 percent.

(U) It thus became apparent better information was required. In August a Drug Abuse Task Force was formed at MACV HQ in an attempt to isolate the problem factors and to establish corrective measures.

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(U) Membership of the panel was drawn from the entire spectrum of staff groups. It included representatives of MACJ1, MACJ3, MACMD, MACPM, MACCH, MACOI, MACJA, MACCO, MACCORDS, Customs, US Embassy, USAID, each component command, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). The BNDD representative chaired the group which was in almost continuous session during September.

(U) Conclusions of the panel were embodied in MACV Directive 190-4, published in December. It noted the need for a many-faceted program including: eradication of sources; strengthening customs and postal procedures; improvement of detection facilities; coordinated drug abuse suppression programs; integrated law enforcement; improved statistical reporting; and introduction of certain rehabilitation policies.

(U) The directive recognized the existing programs within component units and noted the makeup of the programs varied from "service to service and unit to unit within each service." Under the expanded program established by the directive, MACV assumed responsibility for coordinating the total drug suppression effort, directing activities which could be best managed on a joint service basis and providing a centralized office to serve as an "information terminal" and point of contact among component commanders in matters relating to drug abuse suppression.

(U) To eliminate confusion among the various organizations concerned with drug abuse suppression, the directive used definitions set forth in AR 600-32 as standard terminology for the program. It also established a series of program elements for implementation within the command as part of the effort. Many of the elements were already in operation or already in the process of establishment when the directive was issued. They included:

1. Drug Abuse Suppression Councils in each component in RVN, not below the battalion/squadron level, to encompass all facets of the problem and to be staffed with expertise for development of realistic programs in suppression, education, and identification of all abusers. A council was also formed at MACV HQ.
2. Combined Anti-Narcotic Enforcement Committees in all MRs to be composed of Vietnamese and American forces to eliminate and prevent future trade, hoarding, and use of narcotics and drugs in the civilian community of RVN. (It was expansion of support to a program organized by the RVN through its JGS and begun in MR 1.)
3. Joint US/RVN Narcotics Investigative Detachment (Provisional) to cope with the large illicit drug supply and trafficking system in RVN and thus permit allocation of resources to locating and eradicating those large operations. The unit was formed with members from each investigative service in RVN, with operational control under CG, USARV.
4. Aerial and Ground Marijuana Search Program to conduct joint aerial search operations on an expanded, continuing basis in order to appreciably reduce the source of marijuana in-country and thus reduce total availability by destruction of growing marijuana in accordance with Vietnamese laws.
5. Drug Abuse Education in recognition of the fact no program for eradication of drug sources would be completely effective and personnel needed education regarding the dangers of each type of substance to which they could be exposed. The program included: production of a drug abuse film within MACV; production of pamphlets containing photos of locally available drugs, captioned in English and Vietnamese to assist troop leaders in identifying drug products.

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indigenous to their areas; and continued use of the Armed Force Radio and Television network to provide information on drug abuse to personnel throughout the RVN. The thrust of the education program was to: convince the non-user not to experiment; discourage the experimental/casual user to discontinue abuse; encourage the addict to seek professional assistance; and admonish the supplier to get out of the business.

6. Joint Customs Group to provide standardized procedures and overall management and supervision of customs operations including postal, household goods/unaccompanied baggage, and processing of accompanied baggage and personnel arriving or departing RVN.

7. Amnesty/Rehabilitation to: improve communication between the young and the old in military service; and provide a program which would encourage those with a drug problem to voluntarily seek counsel and appropriate assistance without facing punishment, under a short range program which would be available in Vietnam.

8. Drug Abuse Survey to establish, on a continuing basis, a survey which would provide a comprehensive sampling of the extent of drug abuse as an aid in evaluating the extent of the problem and the effectiveness of remedial measures taken.

9. Drug Abuse Reporting System to provide additional command-wide data from which statistical analyses could be made to assist in improvement and channeling of drug abuse programs in-country.

BLACKMARKET IN CURRENCY AND COMMODITIES

Currency Controls

(U) MACV moved slowly but steadily in tightening regulations and plugging loopholes which permitted currency manipulation. It was a never-ending task because more individuals were attempting to concoct ways of circumventing regulations than were available to enforce them. The overall problem of controls became a task for the MACPM.

(U) MACPM approached the problems from two angles. One was the "shotgun" approach which was a broad coverage. The other was the "rifle" approach which singled out individual situations.

(U) The broad approaches served two purposes. They acted as a deterrent to the "non-professional" who might attempt some form of manipulation on a one-time basis or as a lark. They also aided in the identification of potential "big-time" operators.

Currency and Black Market Control System

(U) CABOTS was the acronym for Currency and Black Market Control System. It was a computer program with individual records on MPC transactions by all military and DOD civilian

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personnel in Vietnam. It included records on all other civilians who had MPC privileges (i.e., press, civilian contractor employees, etc.) as well. The CABOTS input included a listing of: bank deposits; money orders; traveller's checks; bank draft purchases; and "green" conversion.

- (U) In itself, CABOTS did not identify "violators." It did, however, identify "suspects." Within the system a "suspect" was identified by the computer when: his transactions totaled more than \$200 per month without a commander's certificate; total transactions without commander's certificates totaled more than \$2,400 during a tour in RVN; or a total of four or more commander's certificates were used. There was no limit on the number of commander's certificates which could be used; however, when four or more were used the individual's record was reviewed. If indicated by the review, the legitimacy of the certificates was investigated.

(U) CABOTS automatically printed a Currency Transaction Report on individuals who fell within any of the above listed criteria. It was MACPM's investigative tool. During mid-1970 approximately 1,000 such printouts were reviewed weekly by MACPM. Reports of suspected violators were forwarded to component commands for review and/or investigation as required. In addition, CABOTS produced a monthly composite list of all known or suspected currency violators in RVN. Component commands were also provided transaction reports on request. (3)

(U) MACPM's currency control campaign gained momentum during 1970. During the final quarter of 1969, 390 currency offenders were investigated. US military strength in-country on 31 Dec 69 was 475,200. During the 2d Qtr 1970, a total of 439 investigations were conducted while strength dropped to 417,000. During the final quarter 1970, the totals were 247 and 335,794. (4) By late 1970 CABOTS printouts listed only about 100 suspected offenders weekly.

(U) A big assist in the problem of currency blackmarket control came in October when the GVN approved a \$VN275 to \$1 US piaster "accommodation" exchange rate. The rate was applied for the purchase of piasters by US personnel for their personal use. It did not apply to official transactions between the US and GVN.

(U) Prior to the establishment of the "accommodation" rate, a sizeable blackmarket in MPC existed in RVN. Though the price of piasters bought with MPC varied almost daily, it generally hovered near \$VN200 to \$1 MPC. It meant that prior to the establishment of the new rate, any holder of MPC who was willing to buy piasters on the blackmarket could get nearly two times as many for his MPC dollar as he could on the legal market. (For some detail of the effects the situation had on discipline, law and order, see this chapter's section on Military Absentees and Deserters.)

(U) As 1970 closed, it appeared the MPC blackmarket suffered a mortal blow with establishment of the 275 to 1 exchange rate. Although in the initial weeks following the new rate's establishment the piaster blackmarket paid a slight premium for MPC, the overall trend in prices was downward and by mid-December it appeared to have stabilized at around 270 to 1. That meant the MPC holder intending to convert his MPC to piasters was placed in the position of paying a premium for such conversion rather than collecting a premium.

(U) Thus, it appeared the new conversion rate had taken the "easy money" lure out of black-market manipulation of MPC. Law enforcement officials in RVN were hopeful the exchange rate would stay in the neighborhood of the legal rate and the MPC blackmarket would disappear within a few months. Economists, however, warned the accommodation rate needed close watching lest it get out of line with the MPC exchange rate and suggested that if any great differential in favor of the MPC holder reappeared the accommodation rate might have to be readjusted upward.

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Conversion to New Series MPC

(C) Another method of control was conversion of MPC. A C-Day to convert from series 681 MPC to a new series (692) was conducted on 7 Oct 70. An analysis of the conversion indicated it was highly successful and worthwhile.

(C) The status of the MPC balance as of C-Day plus 15 with a comparison to the same time frame of the 11 Aug 69 C-Day was as follows: (5)

	<u>7 OCT 70</u>	<u>11 AUG 69</u>	<u>Difference (-) or plus</u>
Total old series in circulation on C-Day	\$169,485,687	\$192,969,992	(\$23,484,305)
Less: Amount in hands of Disbursing Officers, C-Day-1	\$98,059,583	\$113,128,764	(\$15,069,181)
Total amount converted (C-Day plus 15)	\$67,770,404	\$75,427,831	(\$7,657,427)
Total amount confiscated and held on hand receipt.	\$104,530	\$1,161,147	(\$1,056,617)
Total amount unaccounted for as of C-Day plus 15	<u>\$3,551,170</u>	<u>\$3,252,250</u>	+\$298,920
Percentage of amount accounted for to total in circulation	2.1%	1.7%	

(C) Analysis of the above data by MACCO indicated:

1. Substantially less MPC were circulating on 7 Oct 70 than on 11 Aug 69. Nevertheless, black market operation suffered a great loss in the 1970 conversion.

2. Substantially less monies were held on hand receipt for Board of Officers determinations for the 7 Oct conversion. It was attributed to the distribution of the revised MACV Directive 37-10, dated 10 Jul 70, in sufficient time for the commands to implement the new procedures, coupled with the controls established for FWMAF.

3. Even with lesser amount of monies involved, the 1970 C-Day indicated a savings to the US Treasury of \$289,920 more than was experienced with the 1969 C-Day. A precise reconciliation would not be available until all destruction schedules were compiled.

(U) The status of FWMAF conversion was as follows:

	<u>MPC Balance</u> <u>7 Oct 70</u>	<u>Converted thru</u> <u>31 Oct 70</u>	<u>Ave Per Ind</u> <u>Oct 70</u>	<u>Ave Per Ind</u> <u>Aug 69</u>
ROKFV	\$2,078,874	\$2,087,362	\$ 43	\$104
RTFV	188,134	232,358	20	116
AFV	1,335,130	776,122	102	85
NZVF	314,149	65,788	116	86
PHILCONV	(7,365)	1,758	21	157
ROCMAGV	Unknown	1,434	49	Unknown

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Commodities

(U) The commodity blackmarket owed its existence to the general economic conditions and the scarcity of certain consumer goods on the legitimate piaster economy. Many of the scarce items were readily available through US commissaries, post exchanges and other military sources which operated on the MPC economy. The lack of goods on the piaster economy and their ready availability on the MPC economy were the ingredients which made blackmarketing a potentially profitable enterprise. The extent of the profit possible depended upon the location within RVN and the availability of goods at any given time. Mark-ups ranged from 40 percent to 600 percent according to a June sampling which showed the following price relationships (based on a \$VN118 to \$1 US conversion rate):

ITEM	PX PRICE	BLACK MARKET PRICE	
	\$US	\$US	\$VN
Towel	1.90	2.96	350
Coca-cola (can)	.15	.42	50
Hairdrrer	11.00	16.94	2,000
Recording Tape	2.45	3.81	450
Cigarettes (ctn)	1.50	6.77	800
Camera	77.00	135.59	16,000
Wristwatch (Seiko)	27.00	46.61	5,500
Detergent (Tide)	.30	1.69	200
Beer(case)	2.40	13.13	1,550
Gin	1.25	7.62	900
Bourbon	4.90	7.62	900
Martel Cognac	3.90	14.40	1,700

(U) The most common blackmarket goods were the small and relatively inexpensive goods such as cigarettes, canned foods, liquor, soaps, soft drinks, and beer. By mid-1970, however, there was a growing demand for high-value items such as televisions, radios, watches, fans, stereo equipment, etc. Quartermaster items such as raincoats, T-shirts, and footwear were also finding a market. (6)

(U) A major source of blackmarket goods was US personnel who gave them to Vietnamese nationals who performed services for them. Some were sold to VN nationals for a profit. Still another source was Free World forces, principally ROK and Thai troops. Merchandise owned by the Vietnamese Regional Exchange was the target of organized thieves. Several instances of collusion with truck drivers, guards, and laborers working in shipping areas were uncovered. The basic modus operandi was location of desired items by "inside" contacts who relayed the information to individuals on the outside. When the items were picked up, the proper paperwork was carried with the goods but later destroyed to preclude any record of the shipment having been dispatched. Frequently, such shipments were offloaded at an ARVN compound. (7)

(U) There was also considerable evidence that US AWOL personnel supported themselves by blackmarket dealings. In late 1969, a 2 hour check at the Free World Forces Concessionaire in Cholon resulted in the arrest of four individuals; two AWOL and two without authorization to be in

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Saigon. A spot-check of 10 individuals who purchased high value items the same day showed that two had given false unit assignment information. From this, MACPM concluded they were probably in AWOL status. (8)

(U) There was some question whether the restriction of the ROK and Thai forces to their own exchanges was an effective deterrent to diversion of goods. In February MACPM reported there was a significant reduction in the overt blackmarket activities in the exchange area at COFAT, Cholon. He assumed that the ROK and Royal Thai Forces merely shifted their activities from COFAT to their own exchanges, noting items of all types were still abundant on the Saigon black-market. (9)

(C) The blackmarket was not restricted to PX items. A report from the American Consul, Danang, told of a sizable operation in petroleum products in his area. His sources said the market there was apparently supplied by military officers, having the authority to sign for POL supplies, who drew them and diverted them to the blackmarket. The diversion was so great, according to the report, sales of legal gasoline in the area remained very low while sales of kerosene made up 90 percent of the legal POL market volume. The difference between military and commercial stocks was so significant it was possible to easily identify the source of the gasoline. The report indicated, however, there was no apparent GVN attempt to curb the illegal sales.

(C) The report indicated the size of the blackmarket operation in noting lubricating oil sales from legal sources were practically nonexistent because the legal price of \$VN10,000 per barrel was far above the blackmarket price of \$VN3,100 per barrel. No estimate of the cost of the blackmarket operation to the GVN was made although the report hinted it was great because of the loss of fuel paid for by the GVN and the loss of tax revenue of approximately \$VN10 per liter on gasoline. (10)

(U) A suspected source of blackmarket items was Hong Kong with the materials being introduced into RVN via the postal system. In July the Petty-Officer-In-Charge of the FPO in Hong Kong began keeping records of suspect shipments. Operating within the postal regulations, clerks in the FPO, Hong Kong, questioned mailers regarding content of unusual shipments. According to regulations, no customs declaration was required for shipments to APOs in RVN. However, when clerks suspected parcels might contain items intended for resale or when the weight and volume of a shipment appeared incompatible with the statement made by the mailer, spot-checks of shipments were made. (11) Where the suspicions of the clerks were substantiated by inspections, a report was filed with the Naval Investigative Service Resident Agent, Hong Kong, who introduced it into intelligence channels. The information was made available to MACPM and other investigative agencies in RVN, via the Naval Investigative Service.

(U) The items suspected of being introduced from Hong Kong were less visible in the black-market than those purchased in RVN. From records at the FPO, it appeared both military and civilians were involved in illegal use of the mails by using military postal facilities for resale items. A sampling of FPO records showed the variety of items apparently intended for resale. (12)

Case 1: Military to self; 700 long-playing phonograph records (5 each of 140 different records) and 20 food blenders.

Case 2: Military to self; 100 women's sweater and 130 purses.

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Case 3: Civilian to civilian; 32 dozen glasses frames and 300 yards of black nylon material.

Case 4: Civilian to self; 90 yards of shirting material and 300 yards of suiting material which the mailer claimed, in a statement to the postal clerk, to be suits, coats, and pants.

Case 5: Military to self; 1,450 yards nylon fabric, 100,000 lighter flints, and 72 dozen glasses frames, all which the sender said were brassware.

Case 6: Civilian to self; 105 packages and 52 rolls, estimated to contain approximately 3,500 yards of dress trimming material and stated to be brassware, old clothes, junk, and camera equipment.

Case 7: Military to civilian; 100 sport shirts, all same style and assorted sizes.

Case 8: Military to self and other military; 52 bolts of nylon (25 yards per bolt) and five bolts of polyester dress material with material for himself addressed at to two different APOs.

Case 9: Military to self; 96 bolts (25 yards each) of black nylon material.

Case 10: Military to self; 507 watches which were claimed to be candlesticks.

(U) Control of this type of commodity violations was difficult. It was a violation of postal regulations to use APOs for resale items. It meant resale had to be proved to produce convictions and the investigative staffs in Saigon and RVN were so limited in numbers that follow-up was difficult. The FPO personnel had no specific investigative mission other than to insure the mails were not used improperly. The seven clerks in Hong Kong handled approximately 250,000 pounds of parcel post each month so they were hard pressed to do any investigation at all.

(U) Adding to the control problem in RVN was the lack of MACV jurisdiction over civilians involved in the movement of goods through the mails. After the Averette decision (see page XII-16) which removed civilians from court martial liability, all handling of civilian violators was turned over to agencies outside MACV for administrative action, if feasible.

(U) Still another problem was the fact most violators were apparently one-time participants in the scheme. It was common knowledge in Hong Kong that some individuals would pay a man on R&R \$50 to mail a package to a given address in RVN. It was apparent, however, some form of organization existed in RVN to receive the commodities because the volume of goods involved indicated more than a casual demand. According to Hong Kong tailors, an average of three and one half yards of material was required for a man's two-piece suit and two or three ladies undergarments could be fabricated from a yard of nylon material. Thus, a bolt of material would make 15 to 18 suits and 25 yards of nylon was enough for 50 to 75 pants or brassieres.

Control Actions

(U) Studies made in 1969 indicated the FWF, principally Philippine, ROK and Thai, were buying far more than their share of high-value items through the exchange system. A sampling

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at the Tan Son Nhut exchange indicated Koreans and Thai bought approximately 10 times more per capita than that purchased by the Americans while the small number of Philippine forces purchased about 20 times more. Troops from those nations constituted less than 3 percent of the personnel surveyed but they purchased over 18 percent of the high-value items. A study in Danang indicated that there was collusion between ROK law enforcement personnel and ROK troops in diverting goods to the local black market. (13)

(U) In 1969, bulk sales for beer, liquor, cigarettes, and soda were halted to all except authorized clubs and messes or unit funds where payment was made by check. In addition, use of the commissaries was limited to those who did not have access to US messes.

(U) In early March COMUSMACV reminded all commanders about their responsibilities in connection with exchange operation. On 20 Jan FWMAF were restricted to use of their own specified exchanges for purchase of rationed and unrationed items. On 1 Feb a new series of ration cards was issued to replace those in use earlier. (14)

(U) On 1 Sep the option to use wine and liquor rations interchangeably was withdrawn. It was a device to restrict to some extent the diversion of high-demand wines to the black market.

Control Problems

(U) The problems of controlling the commodity blackmarket were myriad. They stemmed from the number of individuals on the piaster and the MPC economies willing to deal in the black-market, the number of transactions involved, and the readily available supplies of items for the illegal market.

(U) There was a highly organized effort to divert exchange goods into the market. MACPM reported several organized rings using dishonest personnel, both military and civilian, involved in diversion of goods. There were also reports of ARVN participation in the diversions, either through use of ARVN troops or diverting goods to ARVN installations. ROK personnel were known to be directly involved in the market in their areas of operation where, on occasion, they attempted to bribe US personnel to participate. There were also cases of theft of specific items of high value for diversion. (15)

(U) In June MACPM noted, "no major breakthrough can be expected in the future until the GVN institutes the prerequisite laws to deal with the problem in its total aspect and initiates a concurrent, sustained enforcement program." (16)

CUSTOMS

(U) Customs activities in Vietnam during 1970 were highly successful. Improvements in controls and expansion of the mission had a positive effect in reducing the flow of contraband in and out of Vietnam.

(U) During 1970 military customs inspections throughout Vietnam averaged over 7,000 per day. Most inspections occurred at the aerial ports and R&R centers. Increased emphasis on

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thorough baggage inspections to include hand-carried baggage just prior to boarding the aircraft, and body searches, when appropriate, served as a very strong deterrent to violators. Further deterrents to contraband movement were inspections of baggage/household goods shipments and the US Postal operations. Improved training procedures increased effectiveness of inspecting personnel. The air mail terminals used the Bucky Miniature X-ray equipment to examine parcels mailed through postal channels. Approximately 25 percent of all packages leaving Vietnam were x-rayed. Upon entry into the United States, a substantial number of packages were again examined. Violators detected in-country were subject to serious disciplinary action. Those detected by the US Postal or Customs Department were subjected to more serious federal penalties. Federal authorities worked very closely with military investigative agencies in improving controls. Military customs operations at Camp Alpha was an excellent example of progress in the R&R customs program. Predicated on a suspicion that an increasing number of US personnel were not declaring or exchanging all US monies in their possession upon entering RVN, a pilot program of currency customs control was initiated at Tan Son Nhut Airport at the Camp Alpha R&R Center on 16 Apr 70. During a 60 day test period it was proven conclusively that this was indeed true. Between 16 Apr and 16 Jun US personnel were detected with \$24,000, ranging from \$20.00 to \$1,980.00 in their possession. One civilian violator was detected with seventeen \$100.00 bills and \$VN73,600. MACPM recognized some violators may have "forgotten" they had \$20, but found it difficult to believe an individual "forgot" amounts of \$100, \$200, \$400, or \$1,000.

(U) The following figures and percentages show the currency range and grades of violators.

CURRENCY RANGE

NUMBER OF VIOLATORS

\$20	11
\$21-\$50	16
\$51-\$100	20
\$101-\$500	42
\$501-\$1,000	8
Over \$1,000	5

GRADE

TOTAL MONEYS

GRADE

TOTAL MONEYS

E-1	700
E-3	780
E-4	4,885
E-5	2,761
E-6	3,995
E-7	4,234
E-8	100
E-9	560
W-2	453

W-3	50
O-2	828
O-3	2,803
O-4	1,480
O-5	495
GS-6	230
GS-11	750
GS-12	2,105
GS-13	60

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GETTING THE SCENT--Mark, a "marijuana dog" for the 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) gets set to embark on a search at Phu Bai APO.

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<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VIOLATORS</u>
E-1 thru E-6	36.3
E-7 thru E-9	20.6
W-2 thru W-3	1.9
O-2 thru O-3	21.6
O-4 thru O-5	10.8
GS-6 thru GS-13	8.8

(U) During the pilot program the following areas were identified as favorite currency hiding places: secret compartments of wallets; between pictures in wallets; pockets other than where the wallet is normally carried; shoes worn by the individual; taped to bottom of the feet; clipped to underclothing; and in pockets of items of clothing in baggage.

(U) The "Amnesty Box" program utilized at aerial ports and R&R processing centers showed good utilization. Sizable amounts of weapons and ammunition, narcotics, pornographic literature, government property, illegal currency, and miscellaneous items were collected daily.

(U) Reports on violations detected by customs personnel through routine checks at the aerial ports and R&R centers indicated a strong and effective program. The customs violations reported thru October 1970 are as follows:

<u>VIOLATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Attempting to depart RVN with unauthorized weapons	59
Attempting to introduce privately owned weapons into RVN	191
Currency Violations	149
Marijuana	33
Narcotics/Dangerous Drugs	3
Pornographic or obscene material	73

(U) The future of the customs operation looked excellent at year-end. A Joint Military Customs Group was organized in Vietnam. Under the operational control of the USARV Provost Marshal, it was supported by manpower from all the services in proportion to the service personnel strength in-country. Before its organization no office or organization had overall responsibility for customs operations in RVN. Postal customs was handled by postal personnel; household goods/unaccompanied baggage for rotation and R&R were inspected by military law enforce-

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ment agencies at aerial ports and units in-country. Complete assumption of the functions by the Joint Customs Group stabilized, refined, and improved procedures. Additionally, the centrally controlled customs organization simplified identification of potential problem areas, provided timely information necessary to identify trends, and allowed easier adjustment in personnel resources and equipment. Establishment of the group placed trained law-enforcement-oriented personnel in a position to counteract the flow of marijuana, drugs, and other contraband to CON-US or the R&R locations. The Joint Military Customs Group was headquartered in Long Binh with operating detachments at Danang, Cam Ranh Bay, Tan Son Nhut, and Long Binh. Those locations were chosen because of their heavy customs activity. It was anticipated the Joint Military Customs Group would have a very positive effect on the overall customs mission in Vietnam.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

(U) The Staff Judge Advocate was the principal legal advisor to COMUSMACV and MACV staff elements, and other agencies of the US mission in Vietnam. His duties fell into three distinct divisions, represented by the three staff divisions within his office. They were: Civil Law and Military Affairs; Advisory; and International Law and Military Justice. A variety of events occurring during 1970 provided unusual legal problems for the Judge Advocate. Among those were: the decision of the US Court of Military Appeals which removed civilians from court martial jurisdiction; the challenge in federal court of COMUSMACV's authority to debar a civilian from employment by a US Government contractor; the challenge by a former newsman of COMUSMACV's authority to remove his accreditation for blackmarket activity; and international law problems involved in planning for post-hostility repatriation of prisoners of war.

Civil Law and Military Affairs

(U) The Civil Law and Military Affairs Division was concerned with: problems arising from currency controls; blackmarket operations; jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces; property disposal; purchasing and procurement directives and practices; property leases; GVN taxation affecting US Government and invited contractors; and a host of other basic legal problems.

(U) A serious blow to overall administration of justice within RVN was dealt on 3 Apr when the US Court of Military Appeals ruled that court martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the Armed Forces in-country did not exist. The ruling held that court martial authority for civilians under Art. 2 (10), UCMJ, 1969 (Rev.) existed only in time of declared war. (17)

(U) Although this decision affected only a small number of cases pending trial, it created a void in the administration of justice by opening the possibility that civilians charged with certain types of crimes might escape punishment. This decision came to be known as the Averette Decision.

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(U) The problems raised by the Averette case were many. They were summarized by MACV Judge Advocate thus:

1. The Pentilateral Agreement grants immunity from Vietnamese Criminal jurisdiction to all direct hire United States civilian employees in Vietnam as they are part of the United States mission. The loss of military jurisdiction over civilians does not change this immunity. Their immunity may, however, be waived by the United States. Those Americans not falling within the class granted immunity (i.e., contractor employees and all other American civilians) remain subject to Vietnamese criminal jurisdiction and are without benefit of such immunity.

2. There are some criminal acts that Americans may commit in Vietnam that can be tried by a Federal District Court because the specific law provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction (i.e., theft of Government property, counterfeiting of US currency, etc.) These are a minority, however, and do not include murder, manslaughter, assault with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, and violation of MACV directives concerned with curtailing blackmarket activity and money manipulation.

3. If our attempts in other countries to secure the cooperation of the host country in trying Americans where we have no jurisdiction are any criterion, the host country will normally refuse to spend its money to try cases where one American has murdered another, or where an American has stolen property from another American or from the US Government, or the like. On the other hand, they will take cases involving harm to Vietnamese persons or property.

4. The question whether all requests for waiver of jurisdiction by GVN for those civilians coming within the Pentilateral agreement will be granted, will not be granted, or whether each one should be considered on an individual basis involves political questions primarily for your (AMEMB) determination. (15)

(U) The Averette case caused some genuine problems for the MACV legal staff. When the decision was handed down, there were charges pending against several civilians whose status was affected by the ruling. Among those was one who engaged in the blackmarket and bribery with a military confederate. The military man's court martial had been concluded and he was confined. The civilian was freed by the Averette Decision. In another case, two civilians were involved in the killing of a Vietnamese national. One was a contractor employee, the other a direct-hire US employee. Neither of the men were brought to trial by the GVN. In general, the GVN declined to exercise its option and prosecute any US personnel for crimes committed in-country. The effect of the decision, therefore, was to create a group of US civilians who were not, in practice, liable for prosecution for any crime. That group was the contractor employees. Direct-hire US civilians were liable only to administrative disciplinary action by their employing agencies unless their crime was one which was covered by extraterritorial jurisdiction of US laws.

(U) MACV Staff Memorandum 190-1 was the basic document which set forth currency control regulations. It specified that persons violating currency regulations could be barred from certain privileges. Over the years a number of such debarments had been ordered. In January 1970, MACV Staff Memorandum 190-1 extended the penalties for currency violations to include ineligibility for employment on any United States-financed contract regardless of the date of debarment. The policy was announced by a letter dated 22 Feb 70. The action forced the firing of some civilian contractor employees previously debarred and denied privileges because of

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blackmarket activities. The individuals (the exact number was not clear) continued their civilian employment but lived strictly on the piaster economy. In a "class-action" filed in the US District Court, Northern District of California, R. L. Dillon charged that the action forcing his firing was illegal. (9) The legal staff assisted the US District Attorney in California in preparing the government's defense against the charges. The case did not come to trial during 1970.

(U) Another challenge to COMUSMACV's authority to regulate currency dealings came from a newsman. In late 1969 Craig Spence was engaged in currency manipulation. As a result, his accreditation as a newsman was lifted. After he was denied new accreditation in early 1970, Spence challenged COMUSMACV's actions in a suit filed in US District Court for the District of Columbia. Spence contended the operation of the regulation was, in effect, a denial of his right to work. The Judge Advocate's staff also assisted with the government's preparation for that case. (20)

MACV CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

History of the MACV Chaplain

(U) With the activation of MACV, a position for the Command Chaplain (MACCH) was authorized under the general staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel (MAC-J1). MACCH functions were focused on providing adequate denominational religious coverage for the US Forces operating within the purview of MACV. Concomitant with the buildup of US Forces in Vietnam, there was an increase in the number of MACV chaplains dispersed throughout the Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and, by October 1967, there were 13 chaplains and 13 chaplain's assistants assigned to MACV. The directional impetus of this ministry was an exclusive mission to and in support of MACV.

(U) In October 1967, the field elements of MACCH were transferred to HQ USARV. Justification for the reassignment was based on the contention that the chaplain team organization, i. e., a team comprised of one chaplain and one chaplain's assistant, would furnish the flexibility required by the widespread geographical location of the units to be supported. The function of the teams was to provide religious coverage to all US advisor personnel, inclusive of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) civilians, and the small isolated Army units within the respective CTZs.

(U) With the onset of the recovery and stabilization of the conflict in Vietnam, it became apparent that the American effort and emphasis would assume an advisory role instead of the tactical impetus previously observed. The alteration of function demanded that the mission of

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the chaplaincy in Vietnam be expanded to include advisory support and direct assistance to the three RVNAF Chaplaincies. Under the USARV structure there was no provision for the advisory function. Consequently, MACCH requested, in April 1969, that the transfer of chaplains and enlisted assistants from the USARV table of distribution (TD) to the MACV joint table of distribution (JTD) be effected. The administrative enactment of the request was jointly developed by MACV and USARV HQs and, subsequently, the force structure adjustment was recommended for approval by CINCPAC and forwarded to JCS. JCS approval was granted on 15 Oct 69 and the transfer was implemented. The mission of the MACV advisory team chaplains was expanded to include the requirement that they be given the additional duty as an advisor and become an integral part of the advisory program under the supervision of the MACV Chaplain.

(U) The MACCH and the Chaplain Advisor (MACJ3 PSYOP Division), working in concert with the Directorates of the three RVNAF Chaplaincies, developed and implemented a practical administrative channel to achieve the mission of providing direct support and advice to the RVNAF Chaplain Corps. It insured that the RVNAF Chaplains, at all levels, would be offered the same professional and technical assistance the RVNAF tactical and technical branches received from US advisory personnel. MACCH was designated as the Principal Advisor, assisted by his Deputy Command Chaplain for RVNAF chaplain affairs. Close cooperation was maintained between those chaplains, the Chaplain Advisor, and the Directorates of the three RVNAF Chaplaincies. As Vietnamization progressed, the quality of the advisory efforts assumed paramount importance.

(U) In 1969 it became apparent that additional chaplains were needed at MACV. The senior advisory chaplains in the Military Regions (MR) prepared a thorough staff study as justification for a requested increase of chaplains and their assistants. In August 1970, the approval for an increase of 11 chaplains was granted by JCS. By March 1971, the JTD for the field advisory elements authorized a total of 25 chaplains and their respective assistants. That enabled the MACV chaplains to meet their dual responsibilities of providing pastoral ministry and spiritual care to US Forces and ensuring that professional and technical assistance was proffered to the chaplains of the RVNAF Chaplaincies. (21)

The Chaplain Advisor to the RVNAF Chaplain Directorates

(U) In 1965 a chaplain was assigned for the first time to the MACV Chaplain office to serve as advisor to the RVNAF Chiefs of Chaplains. It was significant that at about that time, the JTD space for the function was moved from the MACV Chaplain office to the Psychological Operations Division of MACV. The transfer of that space and function was determined necessary because the RVNAF chaplaincy functioned under the supervision of the Chief of General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) of the RVNAF Joint General Staff. The Chaplain Advisor, like other US advisors, worked from the office that was the US equivalent of his counterpart. On 1 Oct 70, the JTD space for the position was moved back to the MACV Chaplain office. The move was prompted by a need for close coordination between the MACV Chaplain and the Senior Advisor, RVNAF Chaplains, and by a draw-down in strength in the MACJ3 Political Warfare

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(POLWAR) Advisory Branch. The move was a culmination of 2 years of study on the effectiveness of such a change initiated by MACCH.

(U) The mission of the Senior Advisor, RVNAF Chaplains, was to assist and advise the three RVNAF Chiefs of Chaplains in meeting the objectives of the RVNAF chaplaincies. The chaplaincies' functions were to provide for the spiritual welfare of the members of the RVNAF, their dependents, widows and orphans; provide educational facilities to organize, build, and operate schools for the dependents of military personnel; and provide social welfare services for military personnel, their dependents, and widows and orphans.

(U) As early as mid-1968 the Catholics had a flourishing system of schools. The Buddhists at that time were beginning work on the Vinh Nghiem Dispensary at the pagoda on Cong Ly Street in Saigon.

(U) Extensive work was carried on by all three directorates in the area of refugee relief which involved the advisor in securing aid.

(U) In 1968 the chaplaincies were operating at about 50 percent authorized strength due to difficulties in recruiting chaplains. The advisor's counsel in that matter was instrumental in getting the authorized strength of the directorates increased by 16 for 1971. In 1968 and early 1969 the advisor centered his efforts on establishing inter-directorate communication and on seeking active support for schools and coordination with social welfare.

(U) During the latter part of 1969, advisor emphasis was concentrated more on the RVNAF chaplains' establishing themselves within the respective commands. That was primarily done in two ways: by establishing a workable relationship with commanders, which for the Buddhists and Catholics were assigned down to regimental and tactical units whereas the Protestants, due to their smaller number, worked only to corps and division level; and by encouraging chaplains, through their respective chiefs (and directly when in contact on field trips), to disentangle themselves from civilian commitments in order to be with the troops.

(U) During the latter part of 1969 the advisor was making efforts to secure Hoa Hao and Cao Dai representation in the armed forces as well as expanding the Protestant Directorate to include denominations other than the Evangelical Church of Vietnam which dominated it exclusively.

(U) During the first half of 1970, the advisor's first project was securing a \$US5,000 MACCORDS civic action grant for use by the three directorates to provide comfort items to patients in military hospitals during TET. Meanwhile progress on the Roman Catholic Dong Tien School in Saigon reached 85 percent completion and the school began operation. Upon completion, the school would accommodate 10,000 students. The Buddhist Vinh Nghiem Dispensary was dedicated and began operation. The advisor's role in the completion of these projects was one of securing logistical assistance. Also during the period, after the advisor did extensive research into living conditions of RVNAF soldiers which revealed a poor standard

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of living, the Buddhist Chief of Chaplains, Thich Tam Giac, responded with plans for a community development near Vung Tau for disabled veterans, families of service members who had died, and service-connected personnel. The advisor was instrumental in securing fencing and bulldozing for the area and in coordinating with the Buddhist Chief in attempts to begin construction on the site.

(U) Tragedy struck the RVNAF chaplaincies on 1 Apr 70 when 16 chaplains were killed in an attack on the POLWAR College at Dalat. The advisor worked closely with the three chiefs and the MACV chaplain in paying proper tribute to the deceased chaplains and securing memorial funds, supplied by designated offerings from all US chapels in RVN, to further the work of the chaplaincies. The final accounting revealed close to \$US16,000 collected. Contrary to expectations, recruitment efforts after the Dalat tragedy continued on the upswing.

(U) The quarterly meeting of 30 May 70 with the Deputy of GPWD, the three Chiefs and the US advisor produced a new level of cooperation and agreement on such vital matter as: the need for common chaplain regulations and a manual; strategy with respect to securing proper facilities, transportation and command cooperation; training of chaplain assistants; counseling training for chaplains; and other mutual concerns.

(U) During the latter part of 1970, the advisor was actively coordinating efforts with US chaplains to insure that as US facilities were turned over to the RVNAF units, the chapels were reserved for use by RVNAF chaplains to conduct religious services. (22)

RVNAF Morale Study

General

(C) In March 1970 the Command Chaplain completed work on a study of RVNAF morale. The problem was to ascertain ways in which the three RVNAF Chaplain Directorates directly affected the morale of the RVNAF serviceman through religion and the promotion of certain social activities. Included in the study was the problem of determining ways to maximize the RVNAF Chaplain Directorates' contribution to the serviceman's morale. (23)

(C) MACCH was asked to participate in the study as a result of the first meeting of the project officers. Subsequently a MACCH project officer was appointed, who then worked closely with the RVNAF Chaplain Advisor in the preparation of the study. An in-depth study was undertaken and 18 short and long range recommendations (described later) were initially submitted. Subsequent staffing resulted in consolidation of recommendations in a more generalized form. However, the original recommendations still remain as viable goals to be pursued by MACCH in its relations to and with the RVNAF Chaplain Directorates.

Problem Areas Developed by the Study

(C) Three separate Chaplain Directorates, Roman Catholic, Protestant and Buddhist, were established by the RVN Minister of Defense in 1954, 1957, and 1964 respectively. Each directorate had its own regulations, Chief of Chaplains, organic administration, and logistical elements. The three Chaplain Directorates were directly responsible to the Chief, General Political Warfare Department. The Chiefs of Chaplains were nationally recognized leaders. Representation from the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, two sizeable sects each with up to two million adherents, was not included in the chaplaincies.

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(C) The mission and objectives of the three Directorates were:

1. To provide for the spiritual welfare of the members of RVNAF and their dependents, widows, and orphans.
2. To provide educational facilities by organizing, building, and operating schools for the dependents of military personnel.
3. To provide social welfare services for the military personnel and their dependents, widows, and orphans.

(C) The authorized strength for Buddhists and Roman Catholics was 179 each. That number provided chaplain support down to and including regiments. The Protestant authorized strength of 20, which was tailored to reflect a much smaller constituency, provided for coverage down to and including division level. However, actual strength at the time of the study was as follows: 89 Buddhists, 92 Roman Catholics, and 14 Protestants. The projection for new chaplains in CY 70 was 50 Buddhists, 30 Roman Catholics, and 6 Protestants. When compared with authorized RVNAF strengths as of 31 Dec 69, the assigned chaplain manning permitted a ratio of only one chaplain per 4,467 men. If all authorized chaplain spaces had been filled, chaplain manning would still have permitted only a ratio of one chaplain per 2,300 men. That strength was inadequate to fulfill the religious mission to the RVNAF serviceman and his dependents.

(C) Each directorate was actively engaged in educational and social welfare activities, but the time and efforts expended by chaplains in the fulfillment of their educational and social welfare responsibilities was a limiting factor in their capability to provide adequate religious services. The only GVN assistance provided to support those activities was in the form of land. In order to organize, build, and operate their institutions, the directorates then had to utilize whatever resources were available to them. Financial and material support came primarily from allied and voluntary agencies. The reduction in the US and other Free World forces' strength, would to a large extent eliminate the primary support for construction and furnishing of dependent schools and social welfare institutions initiated by the directorates.

(C) Most RVNAF servicemen (approximately 80 percent) insisted on their children receiving a full education. Fees charged at schools run by the directorates were lower than those operated by the Ministry of Education. Thus an education was offered for military dependents who might not otherwise have been able to afford it. The three directorates operated schools with a combined attendance of approximately 35,000 students.

(C) Since the token efforts of GVN sources were insufficient to prevent extreme hardships in virtually every case of a soldier's death, the directorates had urgent requirements in the area of social welfare services. Social welfare activities included the operation of two professional centers for wounded soldiers and their dependents, 15 dispensaries, and one orphanage. There were also plans to build a vocational school to assist military dependents to learn the skills of carpentry, cycle repair, blacksmithing, and sewing.

(C) Beyond civilian training, chaplain education consisted of a 1-week orientation (or less) at each directorate; a basic course which consisted almost entirely of military training at the Political Warfare College; and, for a limited number of chaplains, attendance at the basic course of the US Army Chaplain School, Fort Hamilton, New York. Professional chaplain training in-country was practically nonexistent, and training in counseling and interpersonal relations was

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nonexistent.

(C) Historically, there had been friction between and within directorates. During 1970, as evidenced in concerted staff actions and consultation on mutual problems, there appeared to be a commendable unity of action both within and between the directorates. However, that spirit had not adequately filtered down to the rather independently operating chaplains in the field.

(C) There was a general tendency among RVNAF chaplains to avoid giving a high priority to being with the troops. Apart from the very real difficulty of securing air transportation through Vietnamese sources when required to visit areas inaccessible by ground transportation, the problem centered around the chaplains being riveted to institutions, offices, or meditations or their being lacking in desire or awareness of the importance of making troop contact.

(C) Individual religious practice among RVNAF servicemen was generally limited to attendance at a church or pagoda on holidays, holy days and Sundays. In general, only 27 percent of the servicemen had the opportunity to attend religious services. Unless there were churches or pagodas located in the civilian community adjacent to areas inaccessible by ground transportation, no provision was made for the religious welfare of the serviceman. Those who were able to attend services mainly belonged to rear defense or support units. The percentage of servicemen participating in religious activities was relatively low for the following reasons: they were busy with daily tasks; their station posts were in remote places and they lacked means of conveyance; and not every religion required followers to participate regularly.

Study Results

(C) The various problem areas covered in the RVNAF Morale Study lead to the following 18 MACCH recommendations:

1. Long range recommendations

- a. Increase chaplain authorization for coverage down to battalions.
- b. Establish Chaplain's Board; also Chaplain's School with basic and advance courses; selected chaplains to US advanced course and Vietnamese Command and General Staff College.
- c. Initiate training in counseling for chaplains at chaplain's school.
- d. Prepare Chaplains' Field Manual and Armed Forces Regulations to delineate chaplains' role.
- e. Initiate religious conferences and retreats for chaplains and military personnel.

2. Short range recommendations

- a. Place Chaplain Directorates directly under Ministry of Defense.
- b. Provide government assistance for construction and maintenance of dependent schools, and government allowance to RVNAF soldiers for dependent education.

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- c. Fulfill authorized strengths by end of CY 71.
 - d. Provide Hoa Hao and Cao Dai chaplain representation.
 - e. Place command emphasis on integration of chaplain as staff member.
 - f. Use chaplain instructors for basic course at POLWAR College.
 - g. Prepare selected chaplains to teach counseling.
 - h. Place command and chaplain emphasis on joint activities by the three directorates.
 - i. Give command and chaplain emphasis on maximum troop contact.
 - j. Provide increased ground and air transportation for chaplain visitation.
 - k. Reduce American monetary and material assistance with emphasis on Vietnamese initiative.
 - l. Establish non-appropriated chaplain funds.
 - m. Increase number of worship facilities.

(U) As previously discussed these recommendations were not fully accepted.

REST AND RECUPERATION (R&R)

(U) During 1970, 358,466 personnel visited R&R sites under sponsorship of MACV. When the year opened, eight sites were in operation. The Singapore site closed 31 Jan. On 30 Jun the Manila site was closed down and on 30 Sep visits to Tokyo under the program were terminated. The remaining five sites--Hong Kong, Hawaii, Bangkok, Sydney, and Taipei--were in operation throughout the year. In addition to those five sites, where special reception and departure facilities and staffs were provided, R&R was also available in Okinawa and on Guam. Visits to Guam were restricted to those of Guamanian origin or those who had dependents or parents residing on the island. The program for Okinawa was administered by the CG III MAF and was available to Marines and those individuals who had an immediate family residing in Okinawa. Small quotas were made available to MACV for use of personnel of other services. (24)

(U) R&R was a funded program with costs paid from appropriated funds. The FY70 cost was approximately \$50 million and projected FY71 expenses were \$39 million. This cost was for charter aircraft used to transport personnel from RVN to the sites and return. Contract administrator for the program was the Military Airlift Command (MAC) which had an R&R liaison officer at Tan Son Nhut AB.

(U) R&R was conducted as a morale program for all US military and FWMAF assigned duties in RVN. Time spent was not chargeable as leave. (25) The program was also available to US

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civil service and certain other US citizens employed in RVN. In general, personnel were authorized 7 days R&R when ordered to duty in RVN for a period of 12 months. They became eligible after serving at least 3 months in-country. An additional R&R was authorized for each extension of 90 days or longer.

(U) The impact of troop reductions in-country was reflected in the program during 1970. The January quota was 39,726. During the final three months of 1970 the average quota dropped to about 26,000 per month. The reduced quotas resulted in higher usage rates as the year wore on. During the early part of 1970, about 91 percent of the quota was used. After 1 Jul the figure approached or exceeded 99 percent with the exception of October when heavy rains in the northern area prevented many scheduled passengers from reaching the airport. The result was a significant drop in usage rate from that departure point.

(U) The decision to close Singapore, Manila, and Tokyo as R&R sites improved the usage rate among the other locations. Personnel who might have gone to those areas diverted to others when the facilities were closed. The decision to close the three sites was based, to a degree, on usage rates and the need to conserve appropriated funds. It would have been possible to readjust quotas to improve the usage rate at each site; however, had it been done the fixed costs of operating the sites would have continued. The decision, therefore, was predicated on the reduction of fixed costs as well. In the case of each closing, the site's host government was notified of the intent to close by the State Department prior to the actual closing of the facility.

(U) The improvement in usage rates had a collateral effect on the leave program in SEA. When the usage rates for R&R aircraft were low, personnel taking leave were permitted to travel to the sites aboard R&R aircraft. As the usage rates for R&R increased, the number of space-available seats dropped correspondingly and, by September 1970, they became virtually non-existent. Priority for space-available seats was based on time-in-RVN. At one point in September, space-available travel to Hong Kong was open for those who had completed more than 53 weeks in-country. Similar situations occurred to other sites. When space-available travel was open aboard the R&R aircraft, it usually existed during the late part of the month as most of those travelling on space-required orders seemed to request space close to paydays.

FOURTEEN DAY LEAVE

(U) On 28 Oct 70 COMUSMACV approved a new leave policy which granted a 14-day leave during a normal tour and permitted individuals to go to the continental US (CONUS) if they wished. (26) The changing combat environment, increasing disciplinary problems, and special morale problems created by the Vietnamization program, and the phasedown period provided the basis for the change in the leave policy. The change in leave policy was part of a larger MACV morale and welfare improvement program. (27)

(FOUO) It was noted that less than 1 percent of the personnel took leave during their tour in RVN. To provide greater incentives for individuals to take leave and purchase commercial air tickets, a leave improvement program, based on recommendations submitted by component commanders and CG, III MAF, was developed. Specific objectives of the program were:

1. To increase the number of breaks in duty afforded the troops.
2. To occupy more of the individuals' free time.

3. To overcome the lack of space-available military air transportation by providing incentives to purchase commercial air tickets.

4. To increase the attractiveness of taking leave to a wide number of individuals of all grades.

5. To provide incentives without increasing costs to the government.

(FOUO) The leave improvement program was phased to provide for development of the necessary procedures and controls. Phase I provided for allowing a maximum of 14 days leave per normal tour and added CONUS as an authorized leave site. That phase was implemented 28 Oct. Phase II provided for expanding the authorized leave sites in the PACOM area and developing a charter flight service offering relatively inexpensive round trip fare to CONUS. Phase III conducted a feasibility study on combining leave and R&R to assist those individuals who were not otherwise able to finance a 14 day leave.

(FOUO) Rationale for the 14 day leave policy was as follows:

1. It would afford the individual additional time to "wait out" space available military aircraft through the tri-service Air Transportation Coordination Office system. Leave would begin when the individual signed out of his unit and would terminate upon his return.

2. It would provide greater incentive to purchase commercial air tickets.

3. It would allow individuals to participate in the increasing number of special morale programs which transported dependents by charter flights to overseas sites, privately sponsored or as sponsored by the Navy.

4. It would encourage an individual to take leave by affording him a longer break from his job.

(FOUO) Rationale for authorizing CONUS as a leave site was:

1. It would allow individuals to see their families who could not afford or arrange to transport them to Hawaii.

2. It would provide an incentive for individuals to take leave.

3. It had the greatest potential for favorable impact upon morale of the command.

4. There were increased numbers of second and third-tour personnel within the command.

5. It would contribute to reducing gold flow problems.

6. Proper controls would be established to preclude anticipated problems associated with the CONUS leave. Those controls would require confirmed return transportation and that such leave was completed during the fourth through eighth months of an individual's tour in RVN.

[REDACTED]

(FOUO) Implementation of the leave policy was discretionary with component commanders who could implement whatever controls or restrictions they wished to impose. It was anticipated that operational considerations and limits on availability of commercial air transportation would have a moderating effect on the total numbers of personnel taking advantage of this authorization.

(FOUO) No firm estimate on the number of personnel who would be able to take advantage of the new leave policy was available. At the time, less than 1 1/2 percent of the total force was out-of-country on R&R or leave at any one time. It was anticipated that figure might double with the policy change. Although the impact on the R&R program could not be accurately evaluated, it was expected that the current heavy demand for R&R at those sites where an individual could meet his family might diminish slightly.

(FOUO) Regulations governing issuance and use of dollar instruments in RVN permitted the purchase of airline tickets from international airlines with these instruments when required. Further, military banking facilities throughout RVN provided the banking services deemed necessary to handle anticipated currency transactions. No special arrangements such as withdrawal of Soldiers Deposits or advance pay for purposes of purchasing commercial air tickets were considered.

(FOUO) Those individuals desiring to avail themselves of the leave privilege were required as a matter of normal processing to be in the proper service uniform or appropriate civilian dress. Leave orders were prepared as a matter of routine for personnel taking leave.

(FOUO) Although MACV was considering other programs to improve morale, no consideration was given to the reintroduction of military dependents into RVN. The leave policy change was considered commensurate with conditions as they existed within RVN. (28)

(U) On 3 Dec the RVN granted landing rights for charter commercial air travel service to CONUS. The first charter departed on 5 Dec. During the month 16 charter flights left for CONUS with a total of 3,781 on board. (29)

(U) At years' end plans were underway to implement a quota system based on unit strength similar to the R&R system. It was felt that would prevent complaints arising from alleged inequity and preference to the rear area soldier located near the ticket agencies.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

(U) During 1970 the awards shown in Table XII-1 were made by MACV and USARV. There were 252 unit awards processed during the year. In addition two outstanding civilian awards were presented. One Presidential Unit Citation was also approved for Btry B, 2d Bn, 19th Arty, 1st Cav Div and attached units for action on 27 Dec 66. (30)

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DECORATIONS AWARDED

	<u>BSM</u>	<u>AM"V"</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>JSCM</u>	<u>ARCOM"V"</u>	<u>ARCOM</u>	<u>PH</u>
MACV	10,026	191	2,191	3,909	2,197	5,262	400
USARV	149,705	6,567	206,011	0	16,949	245,943	29,465
TOTAL	159,731	6,758	208,202	3,909	19,146	251,205	29,865

	<u>DSC</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>BSM"V"</u>	<u>TOTAL##</u>
MACV	0	276	373	46	107	2,476	27,454
USARV	69	2,899	1,231	5,078	1,095	15,413	680,425
TOTAL	69	3,175	1,604	5,124	1,202	17,889	707,879

RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED TO OTHER HQ (All Services)

	<u>*COM</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>BSM</u>	<u>**SM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>LM</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>DSM</u>	<u>#DSC</u>	<u>MH</u>
Army	6	0	5	0	1	1	0	16	5	23
Navy	72	0	86	2	0	8	1	1	0	0
Air Force	293	1	283	0	3	30	0	0	0	0
Marine	37	2	56	1	0	26	0	1	0	5
RVNAF	1	3	19	0	2	11	3	0	0	0
Third Country	0	0	10	0	0	11	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	409	6	459	3	6	87	4	18	5	28

* Incl Army, Navy and AF Commendation Medals.

** Incl Soldiers, Navy and Marine Corps, and Airman Medals.

Incl Distinguished Service, Navy, and AF Crosses.

Incl awards as follows:

	<u>VN</u>	<u>ROK</u>	<u>THAI</u>	<u>CHINESE</u>	<u>PHILIPPINES</u>	<u>SPANISH</u>
<u>Awards</u>						
SS	47	0	10	0	0	0
DFC	9	0	1	0	0	0
SM	4	0	1	0	0	0
BSM "V"	1,370	31	65	0	0	0
AM "V"	46	2	16	0	0	0
ARCOM "V"	1,482	18	226	0	0	0
BSM	84	36	17	2	2	0
ARCOM	819	96	569	4	7	2

Table XII-1

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DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER - Chapter XII

1. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 26 Nov 70, Subj: Military Absentee and Deserter Apprehension Program. Unless otherwise noted this is the source document for all information in this section.
2. HQ MACV Directive 190-4 (U), MACPM, 10 Dec 70, Subj: Drug Suppression Program.
3. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 26 Jun 70, Subj: Currency and Black Market System (CABOTS).
4. Rpts (U), MACPM, 15 Jan, 16 Jul 70, and 22 Jan 71, Subj: Provost Marshal Activities Report. Rpt (U), MACOI, 31 Dec 69 and 30 Jun 70, Subj: Strength Figures Reports.
5. Fact Book (TS), MACJ02, December 1970, Subj: C of S MACV Visit to CINCPAC 6-9 Dec 70 (U), Gp-1.
6. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 30 Jun 70, Subj: Commodity Black Market in RVN.
7. Rpt (U), MACPM, 13 Aug 70, Subj: Provost Marshal Activities Report for July 1970.
8. Rpt (U), MACPM, 15 Jan 70, Subj: Provost Marshal Monthly Report for December 1969.
9. Rpt (U), MACPM, 15 Mar 70, Subj: Provost Marshal Activities Report for February 1970.
10. Msg (C), AMCON Danang 312 to AMEMB Saigon, 050625Z Dec 70, Subj: POL Black Market (C), Gp - Not stated.
11. Interview (U), CDR Bush with R. W. Johnson, POIC, FPO, Hong Kong, 23 Nov 70, Subj: Possible Postal Violations.
12. Ibid.
13. Op. cit., #6.
14. Ibid.
15. Rpts (U), MACPM, Monthly Report Files for 1970, Subj: Provost Marshal Reports.
16. Op. cit., #6.
17. Decision (U), US vs Averette (No. 22457 - dec. 3 Apr 70), 19 USCMA 363. 41 CMR 363.
18. Memo (U), MACJA, 11 Apr 70, Subj: Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Vietnam.
19. R. L. Dillon, et al., vs Melvin R. Laird, etc., et al., No. C-70-686-RFP (N.D. Calif.). Memo (U), MACJA, 15 May 70, Subj: Dillon, et al., vs Laird, et al.,

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20. Spence vs William P. Rogers and Melvin R. Laird, Civil Action No. 929-70, US District Court for the District of Columbia.
21. Memo (U), MACCH, 8 Mar 71, Subj: History of the MACV Chaplain.
22. Rpt (U), MACCH, 20 Nov 70, Subj: A History of the US Chaplain Advisor to the RVNAF Chaplain Directorates. Memo (U), MACCH, 6 Mar 71, Subj: The Dalat Incident.
23. Ltr (C), MACCH, 24 Nov 70, Subj: Draft of Second Increment CY70 MACV Command History (U), Gp - Not stated. All material in this section comes from this letter and its inclosures.
24. HQ MACV Directive 28-2 (U), 20 Jul 69, Subj: Welfare, Recreation and Morale - R & R Activities Out of Country.
25. Msg JCS 101447Z Nov 64 granted authority to permit R & R without the charging of annual leave.
26. DF (C), MACJ1, 12 Nov 70, Subj: Monthly Historical Report for October 1970 (U), Gp - Not stated.
27. Msg (FOUO), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 091220Z Nov 70, Subj: Leave Policy Change (U).
28. Ibid.
29. DF (S), MACJ1, 13 Jan 71, Subj: Command Historical Program for December 1970 (U), Gp - Not stated.
30. DF (U), MACAG-PD, 11 Jan 71, Subj: Workload Data -- Decorations and Awards for January through December 1970.

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CHAPTER XIII

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

INTRODUCTION

Background

(U) The scope of MACV Inspector General (MACIG) activity was extremely limited from the formation of the command through CY66. An austere staff of from two to eight IG personnel was primarily responsible for IG visits, minor investigations, and the resolution of complaints. From 1967 to 1970, however, the requirements for IG capabilities in the areas of inspections, investigations, complaints processing, and advisory functions expanded dramatically.

Increase in IG Responsibilities

The Build-up of US Forces in RVN

(U) Prior to the introduction of the first combat troops into RVN in May 1965 the number of incidents and other situations requiring IG action was relatively small. During the initial phase of the influx of US combat forces into RVN the IG functions were performed by the component commands. The MACIG's role during that period was limited to IG visits to advisory elements, the resolution of complaints related to those elements, and a relatively small number of investigations directed by COMUSMACV.

(U) In 1967, as the troop level reached significant proportions, there was increased contact between US forces, RVNAF, and the civilian populace. Incidents arising from the increased contact required resolution at the MACV level. The previous concept, that component command IGs could resolve all difficulties, became outmoded. The requirement for an increased IG capability at MACV level was recognized, and through an evolutionary process the Office of MACIG was expanded in scope and manpower.

The Necessity to Establish an Effective IG System within RVNAF

(U) After the overthrow of the Diem regime and the series of coups that followed, there remained the major problem of assisting the Vietnamese in building an effective armed force capable of combating the enemy and providing an environment in which pacification could be accomplished. In addition to the immediate tasks of equipping and training the armed forces and providing combat and logistical support, there was a need to insure that the necessary checks and balances were established within the armed forces. In particular, the commander

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of the RVNAF needed a means of obtaining an independent appraisal of matters related to mission accomplishment, efficiency, economy, and discipline. Recognizing the need, COMUSMACV encouraged the Chief, JGS, to reorganize their inspectional activities and to create an IG system similar to that of the US Army. Initial planning for the system was started in 1966. COMUSMACV took note of the initial planning and offered in December 1966 to further JGS efforts by providing advisory support to the RVNAF Inspector General system. (1)

(C) On 3 Jan 67, an agreement between COMUSMACV and the Chief, JGS, RVNAF, established US IG advisory support to the JGS IG and at subordinate commands down to division level. The MACIG was designated senior advisor at the JGS level. A deputy senior advisor was assigned to serve in a full time capacity. (2)

(U) At the request of MACIG, a team of instructors from the Office of the Inspector General (OTIG), DA, was provided to assist in the training of the RVNAF IG personnel.

(C) The initial successes of the expanded RVNAF IG system and the increased capability of the MACIG prompted COMUSMACV to direct that the IG objectives be formalized and the full potential of the IG system be brought in support of the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan. He specifically directed that an Inspector General annex be developed for that plan. The stated objectives for CY68 were:

1. To complete the establishment of the IG system in RVNAF down to sector level to provide for maximum mission performance from available resources.
2. To conduct inquiries to resolve complaints of servicemen of all ranks in order to correct injustices and to assist commanders in raising disciplinary standards.
3. To establish IG technical channels between US, RVNAF, and other FWMAF for the passage of information involving the armed forces.
4. To bring about immediate improvement in mission performance and effectiveness of US advisory elements, ARVN units, and Regional Force and Popular Force (RF/PF) units.
5. To establish IG technical channels within corps, extending down to sector level and between US forces, US advisory elements, and ARVN.

(U) In addition to those objectives, the Combined Campaign Plan provided the basis for a unique system of combined investigations and inspections, conducted by the JGS and MACIG, in matters of mutual concern. (3)

Increased Stability Within RVN

(U) From the MACIG viewpoint, the national election of 7 Sep 67 was the turning point in terms of RVNAF stability. Increased stability within the armed forces produced a corresponding stability within the GVN. It created a greater sense of trust in both the government and the armed forces on the part of the civilian populace. One factor in bringing about that desirable situation was the increased effectiveness of the JGSIG activities. As the level of combat diminished, an increase in the number of IG investigations occurred. That was attributed to the relative calm associated with the decrease in fighting which gave the populace an opportunity to

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present grievances for resolution. During the period the JGSIG utilized the news media to explain to the people the means whereby complaints and claims might be submitted for consideration. As a result, previous injustices, inefficiencies, and acts which had previously been excused as expediencies of war surfaced for investigation.

Effects of the 1968 TET Offensive

(U) During 1968 greater emphasis was placed on all phases of IG activity. Early in the year, however, the TET offensive caused a major disruption in the development of the JGSIG system. Much of the early progress of the system was nullified when many skilled IG personnel were assigned as replacements for combat losses. Those personnel had initially been hand-picked to form the nucleus of the IG system and their loss was a serious setback.

Post-1968 TET IG Activity-General

(U) The influence of the 1968 TET upon the IG systems of MACV and JGS was not all bad. The JGSIG was promoted and made Vice Chief, JGS, and a Corps Commander was assigned as the IG, JGS. The OTIG orientation team returned to conduct instruction for newly appointed Vietnamese IG personnel at all levels, and within a short period of time the personnel were sufficiently trained to resume IG activities. The TET offensive led to a series of inspections of the defensive capabilities of units and installations in the Saigon area. Additionally, an increasing number of combined MACV/JGS inspections and investigations were conducted into incidents, occurring during TET, which involved combinations of US and Vietnamese personnel. Those combined efforts culminated in bilingual Vietnamese-English reports to the two commanders concerned. The prompt resolution of the investigations and the conduct of in-depth inspections which provided identical facts to both MACV and the JGS resulted in mutual cooperation and a growing respect for the IG system.

(U) The following chart depicts the level of MACV and JGS IG activity for the years 1968 and 1969:

	<u>Complaints Resolved</u>	<u>Inspections</u>	<u>Investigations</u>
MACV 1968	327	47	33
1969	824	98	60
JGS 1968	320	418	90
1969	1,429	365	279

Post-1968 TET JGS IG Activity

(U) Throughout 1968 the investigative ability of the RVNAF IG personnel continued to improve and the diversity of the problems referred to the IG indicated that the JGS recognized the value of an effective IG system. A comparison of inspection reports for the years 1967 and 1968 revealed that the 1968 inspections achieved greater depth and were more critical than those conducted during previous years.

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(U) An important milestone in the development of the JGSIG system came in August 1968 when the Prime Minister of Vietnam published an official decree formalizing the status of the JGSIG. The approval and publication of the decree could be attributed to the demonstrated professionalism and value of the RVNAF IG personnel to the JGS and the GVN. (4)

(U) The JGSIG directorate expanded from 41 personnel in 1968 to 103 personnel in 1969. An analysis of the complaints submitted to the JGSIG during 1969 indicated that extortion and corruption were the major causes for complaint. It was an indication of the growing willingness on the part of the Vietnamese to utilize the IG system. Inspections were conducted throughout RVN of combat units, combat support units, logistics centers, hospitals, schools, and training centers. MACIG advisory personnel accompanied RVN inspectors on many of the inspections. The entire scope of RVNAF IG activity indicated that RVNAF had made substantial progress in attaining its IG objectives.

Post-1968 TET MACIG Activity

(U) MACIG investigations increased from a previous 3-year total of 22 cases to 33 investigations completed in 1968 alone. Following the trend of increased workload, MACIG conducted 60 investigations during 1969. Many of them concerned incidents which had occurred 2 to 3 years prior to the time they were reported. It was apparent that the number of investigations grew as stability increased within RVN. It was anticipated that the trend of investigative activities would rise or at least reach a plateau for the next 2 or 3 years. Also of significance was the fact that over 50 percent of MACIG investigations were prompted by letters from individuals. Of those, approximately 30 percent were written by Vietnamese nationals.

(U) In 1967, 252 complaints were processed by MACIG. In 1968 the case load more than tripled to 827 cases. The increase did not reflect a general deterioration in morale or in the quality of service and support to military and civilian personnel. Rather, it reflected:

1. Personnel turbulence resulting from the rapid increase in troop strengths.
2. More frequent visits to units by MACIG inspections teams.
3. Increased capability of MACIG to accept and process cases.

(U) In 1969 the MACIG Complaints Division processed 824 cases. Major improvements were noted in the areas of assignment, retirement and tour curtailment, promotion, discrimination and prejudice, personal property and baggage, pay and allotments, and compassionate leave. Only two complaints concerning racial prejudice were registered, and in neither case were the allegations substantiated. It was considered a major accomplishment that of the approximately 2,400 complaints processed by the MACIG system, none resulted in congressional action after resolution.

(U) In March 1969 MACIG conducted IG orientation courses to further assist the RVNAF to develop and maintain an effective IG system. Approximately 110 officers completed the course of instruction.

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(U) The MACIG Inspections Division conducted 98 inspections in 1969, compared with 47 in 1968. The inspections covered all MACV advisory elements from mobile advisory teams (MATs) to province level area logistics commands, divisions, and corps and also including Navy and Air Force teams. Four special inspections of support complexes at Danang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh, and Saigon were directed by COMUSMACV in 1969. A vertical inspection of the entire MAT and mobile advisory logistics team structure was directed to identify strengths and weaknesses. RVNAF hospitals and medical facilities were inspected by combined inspection teams. As a result of a major investigation conducted by MACIG in 1969, corruption and unethical practices by military personnel and civilians were uncovered in the operation of open messes and non-appropriated fund activities. It resulted in the formation of a special inspection audit team for the purpose of inspecting messes under the direct control of MACV advisory elements.

(U) During the period 1967 to 1969 personnel requirements increased as the IG mission grew. Authorized and assigned strength for the period was as follows:

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
1967	8	12
1968	8	26
1969	21	56

(U) The required expansion of the MACIG staff was not a parallel growth solely based upon the expansion of American Forces in RVN. That would presuppose a reduction of mission requirements, concurrent with the reduction of American Forces. Rather, the growth was primarily dictated by the improvement and increased capabilities of the RVNAF IG system and the increasing stability within GVN. It was anticipated that maintenance of adequate advisory and investigative support would continue to be a requirement long after the proposed reduction of American Forces was effected.

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, MACV

General

(U) The Inspector General, a personal staff officer to COMUSMACV, was responsible for inquiring into and reporting on matters relating to the performance of mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of the command by conducting inspections, investigations, surveys and studies and by receiving, investigating, and reporting on allegations, complaints, and grievances of individuals and agencies. He was the principal US advisor to the IG, RVNAF.

(U) On 17 Jun 70, MACIG briefed the Chief of Staff of the Army on the MACV Inspector General system. The Chief of Staff of the Army decided that it would be beneficial for MACIG to appear before the Hebert Subcommittee, which was investigating the My Lai Incident, to provide them background information on the MACV IG system. Arrangements for the appearance

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were made by Chief of Staff of the Army and on 22 Jun MACIG appeared before the subcommittee which had reopened its hearings specifically to hear MACIG's testimony. MACIG explained the preventive and corrective nature of the IG system and the organization and scope of the system in Vietnam from August 1967 to June 1970. The testimony provided the subcommittee with an insight into the means available to personnel in RVN since 1967 to bring specific allegations or information of serious conditions to the attention of proper authority to obtain prompt, timely investigation and resolution of problems. The presentation provided background information on an aspect of the system of checks and balances within the armed forces which the subcommittee otherwise might not have understood.

Organization

General

(U) In January, a new MACV Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) was approved which provided MACIG with 50 spaces (37 officers and 13 enlisted). The new authorization formalized the approved overstrength under which the staff had been operating since August 1969. Prior to January only 21 spaces were authorized in the IG organization. (5)

(U) During the first quarter of 1970, the staff reorganized as reflected in Figure XIII-1 . The internal organizational change provided MACIG with a new structure which included five working divisions. The objective of the reorganization was to shorten the span of control within the subordinate offices and to provide greater supervision over the expanding MACIG activities. (6)

(U) In November 1970, the CofS MACV approved the transfer of 13 officer and two enlisted spaces from MACCORDS to MACIG. The addition of the spaces brought the total MACIG military personnel strength to 65 (50 officers and 15 enlisted). This transfer is discussed in greater detail in a subsequent paragraph dealing with the JGS/HQ MACV Realignment Study. (7)

Advisory Division

(U) During 1970, in compliance with MACV CofS guidance, the Advisory Division continued to monitor the JGSIG reorganization. The major goals of the plan were to:

1. Consolidate the then fragmented inspectional activities at the central agencies into the IG Directorate (RVNAF) for better economy, control, and quality.
2. Bring the sector RF/PF inspectors into the IG system.
3. Authorize sufficient inspectors general at each RVNAF command level to carry out IG functions. (8)

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**MACV
INSPECTOR GENERAL STAFF**




FIGURE XIII-1

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Territorial Forces Inspections Advisory Division

(U) The Territorial Forces Inspections Advisory Division was transferred from MACCORDS to MACIG in November 1970. The division advised and assisted the JGSIG in inspecting RF/PF units throughout RVN.

(U) The Territorial Forces then numbered approximately 500,000 personnel or about 50 percent of ARVN. Originally established in 1955 as a political, para-military self-defense force for the Saigon area, it numbered about 16,000 men. The force had been expanded in the intervening years until eventually it had units in all hamlets and villages in RVN.

(U) Beginning in January 1971, inspection teams consisting of four JGS Inspector General personnel, one Territorial Forces inspector from MACIG and an interpreter would inspect all sector headquarters, regional force groups, and battalion headquarters.

(U) The inspection of RF/PF units was a large undertaking since there were 1,600 RF companies and 7,300 PF platoons in RVN. There were numerous areas requiring corrective action, such as ghost soldiering, misappropriation of rice, etc., which had been brought to light by several combined investigations involving RF/PF units.

Investigations Division

(U) The MACIG Investigations Division conducted unilateral and joint inquiries and investigations and formulated and coordinated procedures for investigations by Inspectors General throughout RVN. COMUSMACV and CofS, MACV, continued to make full utilization of the investigative capabilities of the division to provide factual data concerning allegations or incidents which could have had grave impact upon the command.

(U) The trend of a steady increase in the number of incidents requiring inquiry or investigation and resolution at the MACV level continued. A total of 87 investigations were conducted during 1970. Normally, investigations were conducted by teams of two officers. In several cases, however, the complexity of the cases, coupled with relatively short suspense dates, required the assignment of as many as nine officer investigators to a particular case. Two specific cases required the use of officers with auditing expertise. There was also a notable increase in the number of combined investigations requiring participation of officers assigned to the RVNAF JGS Inspector General.

(U) It was anticipated that the investigative workload would continue unabated and perhaps increase. Contributing factors were:

1. Increased interest in corruption and illicit activities.
2. Low level of combat with attendant idleness and mischievous behavior of US troops.
3. The recall by individuals of past incidents, real or imagined, from which compensation and/or notoriety might be obtained.

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Combined Investigations Division

(U) The Combined Investigations Division of MACIG was organized on 21 Mar 70. It paralleled a similar organization established by the JGSIG Directorate to permit closer cooperation in the conduct of combined investigations. The combined investigation effort by MACV and JGS Inspectors General provided a capability to investigate items of common interest. The investigation findings contributed significantly to command decisions which had a profound effect on the military posture of both the US and Vietnamese Military Forces. The conduct of combined investigations created an awareness throughout the commands that irregularities, graft, and corruption would not be condoned and great efforts were made to correct those situations.

Inspections Division

(U) The MACIG Inspections Division provided COMUSMACV with a continuing assessment of the MACV advisory effort by inquiring into and reporting upon matters, which could conceivably impair mission performance, pertaining to the accomplishment of the mission and the state of discipline, efficiency, and economy of the command. All MACV advisory elements were inspected not less than annually. In contributing to the accomplishment of the MACV mission during CY70, the Inspections Division made a total of 122 inspections covering all MACV advisory elements. In addition, inspectors accompanied JGSIG teams as advisors/inspectors on 10 inspection visits of RVNAF units. Recommendations made from those inspections resulted in significant savings in manpower, material, and equipment resources. The visits also provided the MACIG with opportunities to identify unresolved problems and to follow up on corrective actions taken by units in response to observations and findings of previous inspections and visits.

Complaints Division

(U) The Complaints Division administered the Inspector General complaints system which was established for the basic purpose of correcting injustices affecting individuals and eliminating conditions determined to be detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the military. Complaints received by Inspectors General fell into two categories -- personal grievances and allegations concerning conditions. The first of those was a true complaint; an individual had actually been wronged or believed that he had been wronged. The second category, allegations or statements of conditions, included those cases in which the individual did not claim a personal grievance, but believed it was his duty to report what he considered to be unsatisfactory conditions. Many investigations were based on such reports from individuals. Another responsibility of the Complaints Division was the processing of requests for assistance, advice, or information. The resolution of personal problems that confronted individuals was an important function of the IG.

(U) In December 1970, the MACIG Complaints Division was expanded and reorganized into two branches -- a Corrective Action Branch and an Inquiry and Review Branch. The Corrective Action Branch received all military and civilian grievances, complaints, or requests for assistance. It resolved or requested necessary action to resolve those problems. Significant data indicating overall conditions within the command was assembled in a data bank within the Inquiry and Review Branch. The data consisted of Serious Incident Reports, Blue Bell Reports, reports of IG inspections, complaints, requests for assistance, and reports of investigations. A complete analysis of the data was accomplished and pertinent information extracted. The analysis

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
ACTION REQUESTS




FIGURE XIII-2

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formed the basis for providing MACIG with an evaluation of conditions throughout the command. Trends and indicators were quickly assembled which formed the basis for IG decisions in the form of preventive or corrective action.

(U) During the 4th Qtr, CY70, inquiries were initiated into the following:

1. The availability of plaster conversion facilities.
2. Alleged inequities in R&R procedures.
3. Mail delivery procedures.

(U) During CY70, a total of 752 cases were received by the MACIG Complaints Division. Of those, 236 were received during the 4th Qtr. It represented an increase of 11 percent over the previous quarter and a 19 percent increase over the average of the last three quarters. Of the 246 IG action requests received during the last quarter, 156, or 66 percent, of the actions were considered justified. Major categories are shown in the chart at Figure XIII-2.

ADVISORY ACTIVITIES

Reorganization of the JGS/RVNAF IG Directorate

General

(U) Since its organization in 1954, the RVNAF had lacked a unified and cohesive IG system. It was especially true in the inspectional area where a fragmentation of inspection responsibilities had existed at the JGS level. Separate inspection agencies had functioned in the Central Training Command, Central Logistics Command, Central POLWAR Agency, RF/PF Command, and the Inspector General Directorate.

(U) The fragmented inspectional effort resulted in uncoordinated and duplicative inspections of RVNAF units. Subordinate units were repeatedly diverted from their primary missions to prepare for numerous inspections, each with varying objectives.

(U) A major obstacle to the establishment of a single unified IG system within the RVNAF was the existence of the RF/PF Inspection Department of the RF/PF Command which inspected all RF/PF units, or approximately half of the Vietnamese armed forces. That arrangement denied the Chief, JGS, the independent IG appraisal of the performance of mission, efficiency, economy, and morale of the RF/PF units.

(U) The problem was clearly recognized by both MACV and the JGSIG. In July 1970, a series of Presidential and Ministry of Defense decrees directed a major reorganization of the JGS/RVNAF structure. One of the changes was the abolishment of the RF/PF Command and the transfer of responsibility for inspecting and investigating RF/PF units to the JGS/RVNAF IG.

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(U) To accomplish his expanded mission, the JGS/RVNAF Inspector General developed a new IG organization as shown at Figure XIII-3. Most significant was the establishment of the three Inspections Divisions: General Inspections, Territorial Inspections, and Technical Inspections. The total strength of the IG Directorate increased from 117 to 324.

(U) Chief of Staff Action Memorandum (CSAM) 70-92, dated 27 Jul 70, directed that the MACV Comptroller initiate and chair a study group to review the JGS/RVNAF organizational and functional changes, and to submit recommendations on realignment of functions and responsibilities within MACV to conform with the revised JGS structure.

(U) During July, August, and September 1970, members of the Realignment Study Group held meetings to prepare a response to CSAM 70-92. A major problem area was identified with regard to the transfer of RF/PF inspection advisory responsibility from MACCORDS to MACIG. Since MACIG was the principal US advisor to the JGSIG, it was MACIG's position that the abolishment of the RF/PF Command and the integration of the RF/PF inspectors within the JGSIG directorate required the immediate transfer of RF/PF inspection advisory responsibility from MACCORDS to MACIG. MACCORDS agreed to the transfer, but held that it should not be made until MACCORDS was satisfied that the scope, frequency, and level of the RF/PF inspections met its requirements.

(U) The proposed reorganization of the JGS/RVNAF IG Directorate was approved by the CJGS on 29 Oct and forwarded to the Ministry of Defense for approval. The approved reorganization plan differed from that submitted by the JGS/RVNAF Inspector General in the following areas:

1. The Complaints and Assistance Office was placed under the Investigations Division instead of being a separate entity responsible to the Deputy IG as requested by the JGSIG.

2. The administrative offices for each of the three inspection divisions and the investigation division, as proposed by the JGSIG, were deleted by the CJGS who directed that those administrative functions should be performed by the Report Analysis Division.

(U) In anticipation of an approved reorganization plan, the non-inspectional activities of the Territorial Forces Inspection Division were integrated into the Study and Plans, Report Analysis, and Administrative Divisions of the IG Directorate on 27 Nov. The proposed reorganization of the IG Directorate was still under review by the Ministry of Defense as of 31 Dec 70.

General Officer Assigned as JGS IG

(FOUO) As a result of a recommendation from MACIG, the CofS, MACV, discussed with the CofS, JGS, in February the need to have a general officer assigned as JGSIG. It was pointed out that Vietnamese custom required inspecting officers to be of equal or higher rank than the commander of the inspected unit. Lack of that element had seriously impaired the scope of IG inspections. In separate talks COMUSMACV discussed the problem with the Chief, JGS. The problem was solved in August 1970 when a lieutenant general was appointed JGS/RVNAF IG.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF THE IG DIRECTIVE / RVNAF




FIGURE XIII-3

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JGS/HQ MACV Realignment Study

(U) On 27 Jul 70, the CofS, MACV, established the JGS/HQ MACV Realignment Study Group for the purpose of analyzing recent changes in the JGS/RVNAF organization and recommending suitable adjustments to MACV's organization to compensate for any misalignments found. The Comptroller, MACV, was named chairman of the study group.

(U) After a detailed study of the decrees establishing the new JGS/RVNAF organization, which included a comparison of changed functions and organizational structures, the study group submitted a report to the CofS on 11 Oct. The report included two recommendations which were approved by the CofS on 27 Oct:

1. That the functions of advising and assisting in the conduct of RF/PF inspections should be transferred from MACCORDS to MACIG.
2. That those two staff agencies establish a mutual position as to the time personnel and other resources would be transferred.

(U) The CofS directed that recommendations to effect the transfer be presented to him, and on 3 Nov 70, MACIG submitted the following recommendations to the CofS:

1. That MACIG assume control of the RF/PF Inspections Advisory Division of MACCORDS effective 3 Nov 70.
2. That all US and RVNAF personnel as well as GVN civilians, with the exception of seven US personnel, be transferred to MACIG effective 3 Nov 70.
3. That all personnel spaces of the RF/PF Inspection Advisory Division of MACCORDS be transferred to the Staff Advisory Element (SAE) of MACIG JTD effective 3 Nov 70.
4. That all equipment and office supplies currently authorized and assigned to the RF/PF Inspection Advisory Division of MACCORDS be transferred to MACIG Joint Table of Allowances effective 3 Nov 70.
5. That vehicles and other equipment furnished the RF/PF Inspection Advisory Division be retained following its integration into MACIG.
6. That the RF/PF Inspections Advisory Division be exempt from mandatory space reductions until 1 Jul 71.

(U) The CofS, MACV approved the above recommendations on 4 Nov 70. The transfer of the RF/PF Inspection Advisory Division from MACCORDS to MACIG was completed before the end of November. (9)

Inspector General Conference

(U) An Inspector General Conference was hosted by MACIG on 11 Dec 70 for the IG and IG advisors of MACV and component commands. The purpose of the conference was to:

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1. Explain the ramifications of Annex R, Inspector General, to the Combined Campaign Plan for CY71 which provided the regulatory basis for cooperation between IGs of MACV, the service components, RVNAF, and the FWMAF.

2. Promote a greater understanding of the functions, strengths, and weaknesses of the RVNAF IG system.

3. Exchange information, ideas, and recommendations for improving unilateral and combined IG activities during CY71.

(U) COMUSMACV officially opened the conference. He stressed the necessity for conducting IG investigations at the proper level in order to achieve complete objectivity. He emphasized that all IG actions must be accomplished thoroughly and comprehensively since they were subjected to close scrutiny at all levels. It was emphasized that the IG complaints system must be sensitive to the problems of all personnel, and those instances where the system, or someone in the system, had failed must be identified and remedial action taken. COMUSMACV predicted that an increase in IG investigations would occur during the period of decreased combat activity. (10)

JCS IG Orientation Course

(U) The JCS/RVNAF IG Directorate conducted an IG orientation course for 64 officers either currently serving as IGs in the RVNAF or slated to serve as IGs in the very near future. The course consisted of 107 hours of instruction. It opened on 4 Dec and terminated on 20 Dec 70. The MACIG Advisory Division provided instructional and administrative support to the course.

Annex R to Combined Campaign Plan 1971

(U) Preparation of the Combined Campaign Plan 1971, AB 146, began on 25 Jun with the JCSIG Directorate being responsible for preparation of the Inspector General Annex (Annex R) to the plan. Assistance was given to the JCSIG Directorate on the project by the MACIG Advisory Division.

(U) The first meeting of the JCS and MACV action officers was held on 4 Jul. The IG Annex prepared by the IG Directorate was approved by JCSIG on 12 Sep and by MACIG on 14 Sep. The completed Combined Campaign Plan 1971, which included Annex R, was published on 10 Oct 70. Annex R prescribed the missions and actions to be taken by the RVNAF/FWMAF IGs in support of the Combined Campaign Plan. The concept for execution was that unilateral, joint and combined IG activities would be conducted to support all objectives in the combined plan.

(U) The only significant differences between the annexes of the 1970 and 1971 combined campaign plans was the fact that in 1971 the JCS/RVNAF IG became responsible for inspecting and investigating all units of the RVNAF to include the RF/PF. Through most of 1970, RF/PF units had been inspected by the RF/PF Command which was abolished in July 1970.

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INVESTIGATIONS/INSPECTIONS

Representative Investigations by MACIG

Alleged Censorship at AFVN, Saigon

(U) On 3 Jan 70, an enlisted newscaster, assigned to AFVN, alleged during a broadcast that censorship and news suppression were imposed upon AFVN newscasters. The allegation gained widespread coverage in the US news media. In the ensuing MACIG investigation of alleged censorship, an effort was made to determine if news had been altered or slanted by any individual or element of the Armed Forces in MACV and to further determine if there was any pattern to the deletion or restriction of news which would indicate some ulterior motive was being employed. The newscaster and those sympathetic to him were able to cite 23 cases of alleged censorship. An analysis of each case revealed that there was a relatively clear reason for the stories not being used or only partially broadcast. No evidence of news censorship or suppression existed. Basically, the young and inexperienced broadcast specialists felt that they were competent to edit their own material for dissemination and resented any selectivity of news by competent authority. The operation of AFVN was in accordance with DOD, CINCPAC, and MACV regulations, and as a result, news stories were screened for timeliness, violations of military security, and sensitivity to the host country. There was evidence of a lack of adequate command supervision at AFVN. Copies of the report of investigation were handcarried to SECDEF, JCS, and CINCPAC. Leadership positions were strengthened at the station, and the newscaster and others who did not conform to AFVN rules and regulations were transferred to non-radio/TV positions. The US news media ceased coverage of the allegations when confronted with the true facts of the situation. (11)

STAR

(C) It was alleged by the USARV Information Officer that Star Far East Corporation (STAR) was realizing excessive profits by importing large quantities of low quality magazines into the RVN at US Government (USG) expense. Investigation determined that STAR was abusing APO privileges in importing its publications into RVN and was utilizing USG transportation for distribution throughout RVN for personal gain. STAR's annual profit was estimated at between \$1 and \$4 million. The Vietnam Regional Exchange (VRE) was realizing an apparent profit of only \$750,000 which, in actuality, was costing the USG \$817,000 in postal and transportation fees. As a result of the investigation and recommended corrective action, the contract with STAR was terminated and action was taken by the VRE to insure the protection of USG interests in relation to contractor operations in RVN. In addition, the profit margin accrued to STAR and an estimate of the corporation's actual profit was determined. A copy of the report of investigation containing all financial data available on the company and evidence that the company was incorporated in the State of Nevada and subject to US corporate taxes, was forwarded to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office in Saigon. Subsequently, IRS, using the MACV report as a basis, investigated STAR and assessed the company \$2.6 million in taxes for FY66 and 67. Further, using its legal authority, IRS made a jeopardy assessment (IRS lien) for over \$2 million owed STAR by the VRE and other monies held by STAR in banks. It was anticipated that additional assessments would be made as a result of audits of the company's financial data for FY68 and 69. Those audits were still in progress at the end of the year. (12)

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CONCLUSIONS

(S) COMUSMACV was briefed on the results of the investigation on 1 Sep 70. Action on the recommendations was initiated that same day to effect a change to the US ROE prohibiting US helicopters, except those assigned to the US Navy, from attacking targets at sea. (13)

Hani Tan Rape

Allegations of Procurement Irregularities in Vietnam

(U) In compliance with the CofS directive of 16 Sep 70, the allegations were investigated by MACIG. During the course of the investigation 18 different military/government agencies were contacted.

[REDACTED]

(U) Five allegations were refuted, three could be neither substantiated nor refuted, and three were substantiated. Of the latter, the irregularities noted were minor in comparison to the broad allegations made by the anonymous writer. The investigation determined that all military/government agencies involved were acutely aware of the problems in their particular areas of interest and were making a concerted and fruitful effort to eliminate irregular practices.

(U) The investigation made appropriate recommendations in those areas where discrepancies were noted or where improvement could be made. (15)

Agent ORANGE

(S) In an article written for Time Magazine, a freelance correspondent alleged that Herbicide ORANGE, a defoliant which had been banned by DOD and MACV, had been used by elements of the 23d Inf Div. In compliance with the CofS's directive of 17 Oct 70, MACIG investigated the matter.

(S) The investigation substantiated the allegation and concluded that Agent ORANGE had been used on at least eight separate occasions during the period May through August 1970. The investigation further determined that the division chemical officer, in violation of the ban, ordered the use of the agent with the tacit approval of the division G-3 and that chemical officers of XXIV Corps and HQ MACV were aware of its use but took no action. It was also determined that, insofar as chemical matters were concerned, the division staff was ineffective in carrying out the commander's guidance for an aggressive herbicide control program. At the same time the staff was unable to provide the necessary safeguards to insure that the ban was enforced.

(U) As a result of a recommendation made by MACIG, appropriate action was taken against certain officers, and in-country stocks of Agent ORANGE were brought under stringent control.

(U) The investigation was considered to be particularly important in that it illustrated the necessity for selecting the proper level for conducting an investigation. The initial investigation of the allegations, conducted at division level, indicated that officers at brigade level and the chemical officer at division level were at fault. The higher level MACIG investigation showed weakness in the staff procedures not only within the division but also at the corps and MACV level. (16)

Representative Combined Investigations

Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG)

(C) A CIDG investigation was directed on 18 Jan 69 by the CofS, MACV, to check into allegations of undisciplined behavior by Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) personnel, CIDG personnel, and US Army Special Forces. The investigation evolved into a series of investigations that continued throughout 1969 and 1970. It was determined that the following type practices were prevalent throughout the CIDG program:

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1. The payment, out of US funds, of CIDG personnel who had deserted, were AWOL, or were otherwise absent from duty. The pay for the so-called "ghost soldiers" was allegedly being kept by various CIDG camp commanders.

2. The practice of selling leadership positions within the CIDG.

3. The payment of false death gratuities, out of US funds, to families of CIDG personnel supposedly killed in combat.

4. The murder and intimidation of witnesses who volunteered information regarding those allegations.

(C) COMUSMACV made the decision on 19 Jan 70 that 37 CIDG camps would be phased out by December 1970 and would be converted to ARVN ranger units funded and supplied by ARVN. It was believed the action would result in the savings of US funds previously lost through graft and corruption and would upgrade the combat effectiveness of certain previously ineffective CIDG units. Inspections of the progress of the conversion process were conducted in all military regions (MR) through the rest of the year.

Camp Katum (CIDG)

(C) A specific investigation of an individual CIDG camp was initiated as a result of a September 1970 editorial in a Vietnamese newspaper which alleged that a Vietnamese senator disclosed information of corrupt acts by a Vietnamese Special Forces camp commander. The article alleged the commander instigated an anti-American movement within his camp because his US advisor was preparing to report unethical practices on the part of the camp commander. CofS, MACV, directed an investigation of the allegations on 16 Sep 70. The investigation was still in progress in December. (17)

Rice

(C) The American Ambassador stated, in a Mission Council meeting on 25 May 70, that a report had been received from the US Department of Agriculture concerning the misuse of US rice in MRs 1 and 2. A combined investigation was made into the following allegations:

1. US rice was not reaching RVNAF personnel and their dependents through the proper channels, but was being diverted into the black market.

2. RVNAF was not reimbursing GVN for US rice that was entering their supply system for resale to RVNAF personnel.

3. ARVN quartermaster allocations were not receiving adequate supervision.

4. US advisors to the ARVN quartermaster were ineffective in examining rice stocks, collecting distribution/end use data, and uncovering potential illegal manipulations.

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(C) Investigative efforts were directed toward RVNAF agencies and ultimate consumers, ARVN, RF and PF units, to determine operational procedures, distribution, and accounting methods. The investigation concentrated on the seven southern provinces of MR 2. (18)

(C) Investigation of allegations one and three were completed during the 4th Qtr for the seven southern provinces of MR 2 which were supported by the 5th Area Logistics Command. A report of findings was prepared which indicated that:

1. US rice was reaching RVNAF personnel and their dependents through proper channels.
2. US rice in RVNAF supply channels was being diverted to the black market.
3. ARVN quartermaster allocations did not receive adequate supervision.

(C) An investigation of the above allegations was also initiated in the five northern provinces of MR 2 which were supported by the 2d Area Logistics Command. The investigation was to continue in MR 1 upon completion of the investigation in MR 2.

(U) Investigation of the second allegation was completed and a report was being prepared at the end of the year. The findings indicated that the RVNAF was reimbursing the GVN for the US rice. (19)

Tra Bong Investigation and Amnesty for CIDG Witnesses

(C) The Tra Bong Investigation of the allegations made by four CIDG witnesses charging VNSF camp commanders with graft and corruption was completed during the 4th Qtr CY70. In December 1968, a series of incidents occurred at Camp Tra Bong which involved threats against US military personnel and which culminated in the arson of a US Special Forces building complex in the camp.

(C) During the investigation of the incidents, four CIDG personnel provided damaging evidence against VNSF camp commanders and charged them with graft and corruption. When the CO, 5th Special Forces Group, Airborne (SFGA) received information of a plot to murder the witnesses, they were extracted from Camp Tra Bong in January 1969 and placed in protective custody. The witnesses subsequently testified before a combined MACV/JCSIG committee investigating the charges. They also requested aid in arranging identification documents and transfer to an ARVN unit or Ranger Border Surveillance Command. The combined report of investigation (ROI) substantiated the allegations and recommended the witnesses be granted amnesty, issued identification documents, and reinstated in an RF unit of their choice. Copies of the completed ROI were forwarded to the CJCS for approval. (20)

Bin Phuoc Base Camp

(C) An inquiry was generated by the remarks of a US advisor in Long An Province in family letters of 8 and 26 Sep 70 alleging that a valuable base camp abandoned by US Forces was being dismantled and that the salvage materials were sold for the personal gain of a Vietnamese official. It was determined that the base camp had been properly transferred to the

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control of Long An Province on 2 Sep 70. US installation engineers had classified the camp as a minor base as defined in USARV Regulation 700-20. All structures were nonstandard in size and construction. Materials similar to those taken from the camp appeared to have been sold by the district chief; however, insufficient information was presented to establish illegal disposition of the funds obtained.

(C) All allegations were unsubstantiated; however, in view of an apparent sale of material, it was recommended that a letter be forwarded to JGS/RVNAF requesting the legality of the Binh Phuoc district chief's actions be ascertained and, if warranted, corrective action taken. Moreover, it was determined that responsible US agencies had not received reports required for base transfers and that province advisory personnel were ignorant of applicable directives concerning base transfers. A report of inquiry was prepared. (21)

Phu Quoc Central Prisoner of War Camp (CPWC)

(C) As a result of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports in October 1970 of unsatisfactory conditions at the Phu Quoc PW Compound, the Secretary of State informed the American Ambassador, Saigon, and COMUSMACV that Washington senior officials were seriously concerned with the reported CPWC situation. On 13 Oct 70, MACIG was directed to coordinate the conduct of a combined JGS/RVNAF/MACIG investigation of Phu Quoc CPWC. However, as a result of a CJGS/DEPCOMUS conference, it was decided to conduct a staff visit before directing an IG investigation.

(C) On 16 Oct 70, the CofS directed MACJ1 to organize and conduct a staff visit to the Phu Quoc Prisoner of War (PW) Camp. The visit was accomplished from 20-23 Oct 70. While IG investigative efforts were not required, MACIG representatives did participate in the extensive complementary effort to determine GVN compliance with the material requirements of 29 articles relative to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (GPW). MACIG's findings and comments, furnished on 30 Oct 70, included information on CPWC's non-compliance with both the US standards pertaining to five articles and with GVN standards relative to two articles. Two of the articles pertained to housing, clothing, medical care, and the posting of the GPW in conspicuous locations. The remaining articles pertained to the PW pay system. (22)

PW Pay

(C) On 13 Nov 70, MACJ1 requested that MACIG examine the PW pay system and make recommendations to improve it. As the GVN was not strictly complying with GPW pay provisions, MACIG recommended on 14 Nov 70 that the JGS/RVNAF position on complying with the GPW regarding pay be obtained. Since it was anticipated that GVN would plead lack of funds, MACIG further suggested MACPM and MACCO determine the estimated PW pay funding requirements. On 22 Dec 70, after staffing action, MACJ1 dispatched MACIG's proposed letter to Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER), JGS, asking for a statement of the JGS position in relation to compliance with the GPW concerning PW pay. At year's end, the JGS response was still pending. (23)

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Special Inspections

(U) During the first three quarters of 1970, 52 special inspections of general coverage were made of advisory elements. Inspections included corps, provinces, area logistic commands, divisions, special sectors, Air Force and Navy advisory teams. In addition, 33 MACV open messes were inspected/audited. Of the 52 inspections of advisory teams, all received a rating of satisfactory; however, one province advisory team was rated unsatisfactory in the areas of administration, handling and safeguarding of classified material, supply, local security, and command supervision. Of the 33 open messes inspected/audited, eight were satisfactory and 25 were unsatisfactory. Inadequate internal controls and managerial supervision were the contributing factors for those open messes that were rated unsatisfactory.

(U) During the 4th Qtr CY70, 28 special inspections of general coverage were made by MACIG of advisory elements. In addition, one reinspection of the advisory team which had previously received an unsatisfactory rating was conducted. Corps, provinces, divisions, Air Force, and Navy advisory teams were included in the inspections. Also included were four advisory elements never before inspected. All units inspected received a satisfactory rating.

(U) The nonappropriated fund inspection/audit team inspected and audited only seven open messes during the 4th Qtr because of a special assignment. The team was detailed to MACIG Investigations Division for a 5-week period to assist in a special investigation involving audit and accounting procedures. Of the seven open messes audited, five were rated satisfactory and two were rated unsatisfactory. All the audits conducted were part of the second cycle of open mess inspection/audits.

CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECTS

The My Lai Incident

(C) During 1970, investigations into an incident allegedly occurring in 1968 and revealed in 1969 were continued, culminating in charges of 1st degree murder of Vietnamese civilians preferred against several individuals, with subsequent trials by courtmartial.

(C) On 16 Mar 68, elements of Task Force (TF) BARKER, operating under the control of the 11th Inf Bde, 23d Inf (Americal) Div, conducted a helicopter-borne assault against a suspected VC base camp in My Lai Hamlet, Son My Village, Son Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, MR 1. Co C, 1/20 Inf, supported by artillery and helicopter gunships, made the actual assault on the hamlet and later reported 128 VC killed. Following the attack, a series of reports submitted by US and RVN units described more detail, but asserted only inadvertent or unavoidable civilian casualties. The issue remained dormant until 29 Mar 69, when an ex-soldier submitted letters

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to various members of Congress and other government officials alleging that the mission of TF BARKER had been to destroy Son My Village and all inhabitants and that a massacre of unarmed civilians actually occurred in My Lai Hamlet.

(C) The allegations were investigated by the Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army (DA), from 23 Apr to 4 Aug 69, resulting in the case being transferred to the Provost Marshal General, DA, on 4 Aug 69. In November 1969, LTG William R. Peers was directed by the Secretary of the Army to determine the adequacy of the investigation conducted after the alleged incident and subsequent review. LTG Peers' report was published at the end of the 1st Qtr, CY70. (24)

(U) A summary/chronology of MACV involvement in the investigations was published by MACIG during 1970, with all pertinent records held in that office.

Violations Of The Geneva Conventions

(U) Inquiry into the subject of possible violations of the Geneva Conventions was a preventive measure and a means of early notification to the command of any acts or incidents which could be considered as violations of the Geneva Conventions. Inquiries by IGs during inspection of advisory teams within the 44 provinces of RVN revealed no information which indicated there were any acts of war crimes or atrocities committed in 1970 by US or RVN personnel which could be considered to be in contravention to the Geneva Conventions. It was considered to be valid negative information. The 44 provinces covered the entire country of Vietnam and the senior advisors and other key personnel should be the first to know of any acts or incidents involving US or Vietnamese personnel



THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS
AS A MEMBER OF THE US MILITARY FORCES, YOU WILL COMPLY WITH THE GENEVA PRINCIPLES OF WAR CONVENTIONS OF 1864 TO WHICH YOUR COUNTRY ADHERES. UNDER THESE CONVENTIONS:

YOU CAN AND WILL
DISARM YOUR PRISONER IMMEDIATELY SEARCH HIM THOROUGHLY REQUIRE HIM TO BE SILENT SEGREGATE HIM FROM OTHER PRISONERS GUARD HIM CAREFULLY TAKE HIM TO THE PLACE DESIGNATED BY YOUR COMMANDER
YOU CANNOT AND MUST NOT
MISTREAT YOUR PRISONER HUMILIATE OR DEGRADE HIM TAKE ANY OF HIS PERSONAL EFFECTS WHICH DO NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE REFUSE HIM MEDICAL TREATMENT IF REQUESTED AND AVAILABLE

ALWAYS TREAT YOUR PRISONER HUMANELY

THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS

1. HANdle THE ENEMY PRoMPTLY, BUT HUMANELY

The captive in your hands must be disarmed, searched, unroofed and searched. But he must also be treated as a human being. He must not be insulted, killed, mistreated or degraded, even if he refuses to talk. If the captive is a woman, keep her safe and respect due her sex.

2. TAnK THE CAPTIVE QUICKLY TO SECURITy

As soon as possible separate the captive in a place of safety and interrogation designated by your commander. Remove documents taken from the captive for him and send to the interrogators. But the captive will keep his personal equipment unless ordered.

3. MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE EVERY SEnIOR IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY IN HIS HANDS

It is both dishonorable and illegal to mistreat a captive. It is also a punishable offense. Not even a humane person will surrender. He brings his weapons off his back as he surrenders and must make his captor make every effort to ensure that the captive is safe.

4. TREAT THE SER AND WOUNDED CAPTIVE AS BEST YOU CAN

The captive must be treated as an enemy unless he can show he is a human being and must be treated like one. The soldier who ignores the act and committed against his victims.

5. ALL PERSONS IN YOUR HANDS, WHETHER SUSPECTS, CIVILIANS, OR CRIMINAL CAPTIVES, MUST BE TREATED HUMANELY AND RESPECTED IN ALL RIGHTS

Those punished for their crimes and judged. The soldier who has strength in his hands, strength, and knowledge in his hands.

KEY PHRASES

ENGLISH	VIETNAMESE
Hands	Thay tay
Lay down your gun	Đặt súng xuống
Put up your hands	Đưa tay lên
Keep your hands on your head	Đưa tay lên đầu
I will search you	Tôi khám bạn
Do not talk	Đừng nói chuyện
Watch them	Coi chừng họ
Turn Right	Chuyển bên phải
Turn Left	Chuyển bên trái

"The courage and skill of our men in battle will be matched by their magnanimity when the battle ends. And all American military officers in Vietnam will stop as soon as aggression by others is stopped."

21 August 1965

London B Johnson

MACV Guidance
on
Geneva PW Conventions

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Racial Matters

(U) Despite the adverse publicity that was published concerning racial problems in Vietnam, inquiries made into racial matters since 4 May 70 revealed no significant incidents or problems in any of the advisory units inspected. The reasons for not having racial problems were: the majority of personnel assigned to the teams were senior in grade; the personnel were relatively mature; the advisory teams were relatively small; and there was a more intimate relationship between personnel.

Marijuana/Drug Usage

(U) Because of the numerous articles published in US newspapers and magazines concerning the use of marijuana or drugs by servicemen in Vietnam, inquiries were made to determine if advisory teams had any problems which could be related to marijuana or drug usage. During the inspection of 30 advisory teams, it was determined that in so far as the senior advisors and other key personnel were concerned, there was no problem of marijuana or drug usage by advisory personnel. The same factors as outlined in the paragraph on racial matters above were the reasons given for not having a marijuana or drug usage problem.

Military Justice

(U) An analysis of 158 of the UCMJ Article 15 punishments administered since May 1970 revealed that drunkenness, disorderliness, misconduct, and AWOL's accounted for more than two-thirds of the offenses. Most of the offenses occurred during off-duty time. From that sampling, it was concluded that advisory personnel must be kept busy or provided diversions to occupy their free time. As a result, MACIG inspection teams checked into unit recreational plans and programs for adequacy and efficiency.

Corruption

(U) Inquiry into corrupt practices, both on the US and RVNAF side, was a preventive measure against possible criticism and embarrassment to the command. Despite adverse publicity that had been published concerning corrupt practices in Vietnam, inquiries into the matter since May 1970 revealed no significant incidents or problems as far as the senior advisors and other key personnel were concerned.

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MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS

Local Security

(U) During the first three quarterly inspections of advisory units it was noted that local security measures were generally inadequate. Deficiencies most commonly found were: lack of written defensive plans defining areas of responsibility composition of friendly forces, defensive fire plans, and ROE; and inadequate and insufficient number of bunkers and fighting positions. The recommendations made by inspectors on inspection findings resulted in improved local security measures. Units inspected in the 4th Qtr had approximately the same deficiencies primarily because they had not received an inspection since that area had been emphasized.

Open Messes

(U) The inspection of open messes during the year revealed a lack of proper management which resulted in unsatisfactory internal controls and accounting procedures. Those were prevailing and recurring problems throughout the theater because of the lack of trained personnel and the continued turnover of personnel. To assist in correcting the problems, an inspection/audit team devoted at least 1 day in instructing open mess personnel in proper internal controls and basic accounting procedures. In the 4th Qtr, a marked improvement was evident in all cases since the completion of the first cycle of audits. The messes had received significantly more command attention than previously given, and internal controls had been implemented to conform with applicable regulations.

Attachment Orders

(U) Inspection of advisory teams during the first three quarters revealed that attachment orders had not been provided to teams that had support responsibilities for attached personnel. Because advisory teams were not always equipped or capable of providing required support, proper attachment orders were necessary to spell out the types and extent of support to be furnished to attached personnel. Additionally, without attachment orders, the status of attached personnel and the reason for their being there were obscured. That looseness in providing attachment orders to advisory teams could have been a cause of inefficiency and lack of control. As a result of inspection findings, concerted effort was placed on units to provide attachment orders whenever they attached personnel to advisory teams. Primarily because they had not received an inspection since that area had been emphasized, some units had approximately the same deficiencies in the 4th Qtr.

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Misuse of Aluminum Cargo Pallets

(U) In the 4th Qtr inspectors continued to find many instances of the misuse of aluminum cargo pallets. However, due to emphasis given the subject during past inspections, advisory elements had recognized the need for prompt action in returning the pallets to the proper agency. For example, in one province alone, a total of 101 pallets had been collected. The item of equipment was a critical resupply item and was valued at an excess of \$250.00 each. Recovery of those pallets in that one province represented a saving of over \$25,000. (25)

Unauthorized Vehicles

(U) During the 4th Qtr, with the standown and rotation of US units, a situation existed wherein US titled vehicles, without property accountability, had been either disregarded or given to advisory elements. The origin of some of the vehicles was not readily obtainable; however, in one province alone, 10 of the "maverick" vehicles were identified for turn-in. In many cases, the US markings had been obliterated and substitute ARVN markings added. That problem area was emphasized as a special subject in future inspections. (26)

Excess Supplies and Equipment

(U) In the 4th Qtr excess supplies and equipment on hand, generated by standdown of US units, had increased and became a matter of concern on future inspections. For example, an inspection in the Delta Military Assistance Command revealed a \$223,000 inventory adjustment under preparation as a result of a complete physical inventory by the senior advisory. Seventy-five percent of the items were excess to the team's authorization. The recommendations made by inspectors on the finding resulted in improved accountability procedures. (27)

Manpower Utilization

(U) Due to the Vietnamization program, increased emphasis was placed on manpower utilization. As a result of inspection findings during the 4th Qtr, 88 spaces involving three advisory teams were recommended for deletion from the JTD. That area of concern was also made a special subject for future inspections. (28)

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MAJOR CATEGORIES OF COMPLAINT

Personnel Administration

(U) Most requests concerned second-tour enlisted personnel who enlisted or volunteered for a specific job assignment within RVN. Upon arrival in-country the job no longer existed because of reorganization and/or extension of the incumbent's foreign service tour. It resulted in the complainant not getting the specific job or location that he desired. These cases were resolved by coordination with assignment activities. The DA had modified policies regarding the reenlistment or the second-tour RVN volunteer for specific units or geographical locations, and the particular type of request was not expected to reoccur in significant numbers.

Racial Incidents

(U) There had been a low trend of racial complaints. It was significant when compared to the publicity given such matters by the news media. Only five requests in the 3d Qtr and 10 during the calendar year were received involving allegations of racial discrimination. None of the allegations were substantiated. Only one of the 10 requests was from an individual assigned to MACV. That was attributed to the selection of personnel who were assigned to MACV and advisory duty. They were assigned to smaller units located throughout the country. Their duty required close daily contact among themselves and with their Vietnamese counterparts. Their environment and mission was different from the larger US troop units of USARV, and that lent itself to the development of unity within the organization.

Drug Abuse

(U) Drug abuse was another area which gained publicity, particularly in RVN, within the Armed Forces. It was significant that only one action involving drug abuse was received by MACIG Complaints Division during the year. That action involved an individual assigned to a USARV unit stationed in the Tan Son Nhat area. The individual was eliminated from the service.

Unit Administration

(U) In the unit administration category, punishment and R&R were the significant problems. The increase in actions concerning individual punishment was not localized within specific units nor limited to any particular type of offense. In most instances the complaint could have been resolved at unit level. The increase in R&R complaints was due to unsatisfactory conditions and the improper management of R&R centers. Corrective action was initiated by USARV, and MACJ1 monitored the problem more closely.

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Support Activities

(U) Complaints regarding port calls, quarters, and messing headed the support activities category. The port call problem was caused by the variance in date of DEROS, as indicated in the MACV booking roster, and the dates shown in special orders issued by MACAG. The problem was corrected by MACAG. Actions concerning living conditions in BOQ's and BEQ's in the Saigon area were resolved by contacting the USAHAC Inspector General who coordinated corrective action through the USAHAC Housing Management Directorate. Mess complaints were resolved through coordination with the USAHAC Inspector General by a reorganization within the USAHAC food service system.

Pay Complaints

(U) The pay complaints were registered primarily by Air Force personnel. The USAF centralized pay system, located in Denver, was apparently not responsive to the individual airman's requests for pay action. Non-payment of family separation allowance, hostile fire pay, and incorrect deduction of income tax were the major problem areas.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES - Chapter XIII*

1. Ltr (U), COMUSMACV to Chief, JGS, 29 Dec 66, Subj: Not stated.
2. Ltr (U), MACIG to MACJ1, 16 Jan 67, Subj: IG Advisory Assistance to RVNAF.
3. Plan (C), MACIG, 1968, Subj: Annex S, Combined Campaign Plan, AB143 (U), Gp-4.
4. Decree (U), #109/SL/QP-CCB, Prime Minister, RVN, 10 Aug 68, Subj: Not stated.
5. Rpt (U), MACJ3, 28 Jan 70, Subj: Proposed Revision to Headquarters MACV Joint Table of Distribution.
6. Memo 14-70 (U), MACIG, 21 Mar 70, Subj: Organization of MACIG.
7. Memo (U), MACJ02, 27 Oct 70, Subj: JGS Realignment Study Group.
8. Rpt (U), MACIG, CSAS 499070, 30 Jan 70, Subj: JGS-IG Reorganization.
9. DF (U), MACIG, 3 Nov 70, Subj: JGS Realignment Study Group.
10. Rpt (FOUO), MACIG, December 1970, Subj: Inspector General Conference (U).
11. Rpt (U), MACIG, 17 Jan 70, Subj: MIV 2-70.
12. Rpt (C), MACIG, 4 Apr 70, Subj: MIV 40-69 (U), Gp-Not stated.
13. Rpt (S), MACIG, 22 Aug 70, Subj: MIV 51-70 (U), Gp-Not stated.
14. DF (FOUO), MACIG, CSA 4235-70, MIV 62-70, 10 Oct 70, Subj: Alleged Rape of Women by American Forces in Ham Tan District, Binh Tuy Province (FOUO).
15. Rpt (FOUO), MACIG, CSA 3943-70, MIV-63-70, Subj: Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Procurement Irregularities and Money Manipulations in Vietnam (U).
16. Rpt (S), MACIG, CSA 4408-70, MIV-77-70, Subj: Report of Investigation Concerning the Unauthorized Use of Agent Orange by Elements of the Americal Division (U), Gp-Not stated.
17. Rpt (C), MACIG, 16 Sep 70, Subj: MIV 66-70 (U), Gp-Not stated.
18. Rpt (C), MACIG, 25 May 70, Subj: MIV 17-70 (U), Gp-Not stated.
19. Rpt (C), MACIG, 30 May 70, Subj: MIV 17-70 (U), Gp-Not stated.
20. Rpt (C), MACIG, 6 Sep 70, Subj: MIV 3-69-41 (U), Gp-Not stated.
21. Rpt (C), MACIG, 4 Dec 70, Subj: MIV 16-70 (U), Gp-Not stated.

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- 22. DF (FOUO), MACIG, 30 Oct 70, Subj: Completion of GPW Checklist (U).
- 23. Oral Instructions (C), MACIG, 13 Oct 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-Not stated.
- 24. Rpt (C), MACIG, Not dated, Subj: My Lai Summary and Chronology (U), Gp-Not stated.
- 25. Rpt (C) MACIG, 9 Nov 70, Subj: Special Inspection of Binh Tuy Province Advisory Team, Advisory Team 48 (U), Gp-Not stated.
- 26. Rpt (C), MACIG, 1 Dec 70, Subj: Special Inspection of Bien Hoa Province Advisory Team Advisory Team 98 (U), Gp-Not stated.
- 27. Rpt (C), MACIG, 28 Dec 70, Subj: Special Inspection of Dinh Tuong Province Advisory Team 66 (U), Gp-Not stated.
- 28. Rpt (C) MACIG, 5 Dec 70, Subj: Special Inspection of Saigon Civil Assistance Group (U), Gp-Not stated. Rpt (C), MACIG, 6 Dec 70, Subj: Special Inspection of Capital Military Advisory Team (U), Gp-Not stated. Rpt (C), MACIG, 23 Dec 70, Subj: Special Inspection of III Corps and MR 3 Advisory Group, Advisory Team 95 (U), Gp-Not stated.

*All references are located in the office of MACIG.

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CHAPTER XIV

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP

(S) The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), a paramilitary organization composed of civilian mercenaries, was stationed in camps along the border or near VC infiltration routes. (See Figure XIV-1.) The VN Special Forces, advised by the US Special Forces Group Airborne, were responsible for organizing, training, and employing the CIDG. The mission of the CIDG was to conduct border surveillance operations, collect intelligence, interdict enemy infiltration routes and lines of communication, and expand GVN control in remote areas. (1)

(S) The CIDG units were most effectively employed in reconnaissance-in-force operations. Weaknesses in the CIDG were those common to any paramilitary organization: training and discipline below normal standards; defective leadership; and limitations of heavy firepower and organic mobility. A specific problem for the CIDG in RVN was friction with the regular forces resulting from inequities in pay and benefits. Another area of difficulty was the CIDG looked upon themselves as American forces and the ARVN did not mix with CIDG. The latter problem led to a decision by COMUSMACV late in 1969 to accommodate ARVN thinking as he directed US disengagement from the CIDG effort. (2)


(S) Late in 1969 COMUSMACV asked his field commanders to comment on the impact of closing certain camps during FY71. The commanders were unanimous in their desires to keep the camps open. Typical of the rationale for keeping the CIDG camps open was the following message from CG, II FFORCEV:

The border surveillance and interdiction mission in III CTZ is essential and must be continued as long as Communist forces threaten RVN border areas. It is recognized that the CIDG operational efficiency is low; however, their presence exerts some stabilizing influence in the most remote border areas of III CTZ and denies the enemy unrestricted use of some border areas. Significant is the fact that the enemy has invariably suffered heavy losses when he has chosen to attack these CIDG camps for psychological or tactical reasons.... (3)

(S) CG, I FFORCEV, felt the closure of the camps in his area would ... "jeopardize the defense of II CTZ." It was felt defense of the region required defense of the border by interdiction. He noted that by withdrawing the border camps the operational and de facto boundary would move eastward. (4)

(S) While deep concern was being expressed by the northern CTZ commanders regarding the CIDG conversion plan, the IV CTZ commander stated experience indicated the 120-day conversion cycle could be shortened significantly and requested accelerated conversion of two camps. He added the accelerated conversion would result in nine RF companies becoming combat ready sooner than planned and also decrease the stand-down time for the companies. MACV coordi-

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Source: MACJ3

FIGURE XIV-1

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nation with the RVNAF JGS resulted in their nonconcurrence stated as, "...the time afforded by the present schedule (closure on 30 Apr 70) is necessary to permit completion of personnel administrative processing attendant to conversion to RF...." However, JGS reconsidered their position and ordered HQ IV CTZ and HQ VNSF to convert CIDG camps My Dien II and My Phouc Tay to RF status on 31 Mar 70 vice 30 Apr 70. (5)

(S) The impending resolution of the CIDG problem became the concern of SECDEF on 8 Jan 70 when a memorandum was directed to the CJCS reflecting possible political and military advantages to moving CIDG bases further back from the Cambodian border. Possible military advantages cited were: reduction in base vulnerability; increased population security; and better interdiction of enemy infiltrated personnel and supplies. The political aspects were stated as possible adverse impact on Vietnamization in the event one of the camps, manned by RVNAF, was completely overrun, and concern that renewed diplomatic relations with Cambodia might be jeopardized as a result of allied reactions to enemy pressures on the camps. The memorandum further requested the allied forward base structure be re-examined to consider what steps could be taken to reduce military and political vulnerability caused by the existing system of fixed border bases. (6)

(S) Following exchange of correspondence between interested parties, and interim response to CINCPAC, MACV dispatched a three-part message on 26 May outlining the command's coordinated position. Part I outlined the JGS/MACV concept for border base operation; Part II provided additional views concerning relocation of border bases; and Part III provided significant features of the JGS/MACV plan for conversion to ARVN of the 38 CIDG border camps remaining on 1 Jul 70. The combined JGS/MACV border plan was developed by a combined committee and published as JGS Directive No. 10019/TTM/P312/K, 22 May 70.

(S) The basic design of the plan was to add to population security by providing reconnaissance and surveillance along the border. The concept was developed in consonance with the principles of area security set forth in the Combined Campaign Plan (AB-145), which focused friendly operations against enemy main force units in the clearing zones as opposed to the consolidation zones. (See Chapter II for discussion of Combined Campaign Plan (AB-145).) (7)

(S) The plan also directed the remaining 38 CIDG camps converted to ARVN on a phased schedule with a 3-month conversion period for each camp. (8)

June-August:

- I CTZ - Mai Loc, Tra Bong
- II CTZ - Potei Kleng, Plei Mrong
- III CTZ - Tra Cu, Trang Sup
- IV CTZ - To Chau, Thanh Tri

July-September:

- I CTZ - Minh Long, Ba To, Gia Vuc
- II CTZ - Tieu Atar, Trang Phuc
- III CTZ - Thien Ngon, Loc Ninh
- IV CTZ - Tuyen Nhon, Cai Cai

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Montagnard troops watch a C-7 Caribou land at Dak Pek CIDG Camp in Kontum Province.



Two CIDG dependents at Duc Lap CIDG Camp mix concrete to cap the bunker in the background. Cement, like all other items, was supplied to many CIDG camps by airlift, the sole source of outside supplies.

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August-October:

- I CTZ - Tien Phuoc, Thuong Duc, An Hoa/Nong Son
- II CTZ - Plei Djereng, Duc Co, Plei Me
- III CTZ - Duc Hue, Katum
- IV CTZ - Thuong Thoi, Binh Thanh Thon

September-November:

- I CTZ - Ha Thanh
- II CTZ - Duc Lap, Bu Prang, Dak Seang
- III CTZ - Ben Soi, Tong Le Chon
- IV CTZ - Vinh Gia, Ba Xoai

October-December:

- II CTZ - Ben Het, Dak Pek
- III CTZ - Bu Dop

(C) Mai Long was closed in Aug 70, but the other 37 CIDG camps were converted to ARVN Ranger camps as scheduled. (9) After 31 Dec all were known as border defense ranger battalion camps.

HERBICIDE OPERATIONS

General

(C) Herbicide operations, tested in RVN in 1961 and used since 1962, peaked in 1967, tapered in 1968 and 1969, and dropped sharply in 1970. (See Figure XIV-2.) The drastic reduction was due primarily to budgetary restrictions although the ecology issue was involved.

(C) Primarily a GVN program supported by the US Government, herbicide operations were conducted under an elaborate system of policy and operational controls. Projects were developed at a province level and approved by the JGS. US support of defoliation by fixed-wing aircraft and all crop destruction projects were approved by COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador. (10)

(C) Some of the more significant restrictions were:

1. President Thieu limited herbicide operations to areas of low population and enemy infiltration routes.
2. Crop destruction was limited to low population areas under VC control where food was scarce and food denial created an operational burden on the enemy.


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HERBICIDE COVERAGE (km²)



Source: MACJ3

FIGURE XIV-2

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XIV-6

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3. GVN securing and recovering crops was preferred to destruction.
4. Special care was taken to avoid damage to rubber tree plantations. Operations were limited by a no-spray zone of 2 km for helicopters and 5 km for fixed-wing operations.
5. Operations within 5 km of international borders were governed by the rules of engagement.
6. No crops were destroyed in MR 4 (see Table XIV-1). The rationale was summed up by a US advisor who compared rice denial in that abundant growing area to an attempt "...to deny them air to breathe." (11)

(C) Operations in RVN consisted of two major programs: defoliation to deny the enemy cover; and crop destruction to deny the enemy food and tax his manpower.

(C) Three major herbicides were used. Called BLUE, ORANGE, and WHITE, the identification had no relationship to actual color. All constituents of the herbicides used were sold commercially and were considered non-toxic when used in the manner prescribed by Army instructions. They were:

1. BLUE Water based and the fastest acting, it was used against narrow leaf vegetation such as rice and buffalo grass. It killed by drying the plant. Results were seen in 24 hours and leaves were dead in 2 to 4 days.
2. ORANGE An oily liquid, it was used on broad leaf vegetations which included most trees. It acted by inducing rapid uncontrolled growth and showed results in 7 to 10 days. It achieved maximum effect in 4 to 6 weeks. Duration was approximately 12 months.
3. WHITE Water based, it was also used on broad-leaf-vegetation. It destroyed by inducing rapid growth, but results did not appear for 10 to 14 days. It achieved maximum effect in 6 to 8 weeks. Duration was approximately 12 months. (12)

(U) Herbicides were dispensed by UC-123s, helicopters, truck-mounted Buffalo turbines, and hand operated sprayers.

Suspension of ORANGE

(U) Information reported to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on 13 Apr 70 indicated ingredients of 2, 4, 5-T "... might produce abnormal development in unborn animals" The report noted nearly pure 2, 4, 5-T caused birth defects when high doses were injected into experimental pregnant mice, but it did not affect rats. (13) No information on effects

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to humans was available, but DOD suspended use of ORANGE in all military operations pending a more thorough evaluation. (14)

(C) CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV suspend use of ORANGE, provide evaluation of impact of ORANGE suspension, and submit requirements for additional WHITE. COMUSMACV requested 128,000 gallons of WHITE per month pending final resolution of potential health problems of ORANGE. (15)

(S) On 9 May agent WHITE stocks were depleted. WHITE was procured and limited quantities were available in October. The total amount was allocated to support helicopter and ground spray missions. As a result, all fixed-wing aircraft defoliation missions were discontinued on 10 Jul. Fixed-wing and helicopter crop-destruction missions continued with priority assigned to MRs 1 and 2. Herbicide BLUE was procured to support those missions. (16)

(S) The MACV Summer Campaign 1970 defined as a major threat those forces operating in the tri-border areas in MRs 1 and 2. Crop destruction was considered highly successful in frustrating enemy offensive action. All UC-123 sorties, a maximum of 50 per month, were committed to MRs 1 and 2 with priority going to MR 1. It was felt those efforts exploited the success of Cambodian operations by further disrupting enemy logistics and limiting his capability to launch major offensive actions. (17)

(S) Disposition of over 1.4 million gallons of ORANGE posed a major problem. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV comment on feasibility of assisting GVN attain aerial delivery capability to use excess ORANGE stock. On 29 Aug COMUSMACV replied that a proposal for GVN use of ORANGE at that time was not feasible. In September CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV explore the possibility of civilian usage.

(U) COMUSMACV considered the Vietnamese governmental apparatus at that time incapable of embarking on a massive program for civilian usage of herbicide ORANGE. The reply advised against prematurely introducing herbicides for improvement of range and pasture lands and other such civilian uses.


(S) COMUSMACV recommended GVN not be encouraged to acquire military or civilian capability for use of agent ORANGE. The reply further recommended any future effort to induce RVN civilian use of herbicides be made through State/USAID as part of agricultural practices. (18)

Unauthorized Use of ORANGE

(S) A freelance correspondent, in an article written for Time, alleged that ORANGE had been used by elements of the 23d Infantry (Americal) Division.

(S) An investigation, in response to a Chief of Staff directive dated 17 Oct 70, substantiated the allegation and found that ORANGE had been used on at least eight separate occasions during the period May through August 1970. For a further discussion of this subject see Chapter XIII.

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A UC-123 on a defoliation mission. Most herbicides were dispensed by this type aircraft.

Deactivation of 12th Special Operations Squadron (SOS)

(S) On 2 Feb CSAF advised CINCPACAF of a huge reduction in herbicide procurement for FY71. The MACV requirement was \$27 million; OSD approved \$3 million.

(S) USAF used programmed consumption rates and concluded all herbicide stocks would be depleted by 30 Nov. The message proposed three alternatives:

1. Continue present rate of operation until herbicide supply was exhausted and then withdraw 12th SOS from RVN.

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2. Continue present rate through 30 Jun and then reduce 12th SOS to a minimum level for emergency needs.
 3. Immediately reduce 12th SOS to eight aircraft and control herbicides to deplete stock by 30 Jun 71. (19)

(S) CINCPAC noted the high priority tactical commanders placed on the operations and requested COMUSMACV comments and alternatives. (20)

(S) COMUSMACV explained redeployment of US forces focused greater attention on adequate territorial surveillance and security. Since the use of herbicides was considered the most economical method of maintaining surveillance and security, MACV requested reevaluation of the program prepared in November 1969.

(S) None of the alternatives were satisfactory. MACV proposed reserving existing assets and funds for high priority operations and use UC-123 aircraft in airlift roles when not involved in herbicide operations. (21)

(S) On 1 Apr UC-123 sorties were reduced to 120 per month. Seventh Air Force (7AF) reduced the 12th SOS to eight UE aircraft and directed the withdrawal of surplus assets from SEA. (22)

(S) Commander, 7AF recommended the immediate inactivation of the 12th SOS. On 4 Jun COMUSMACV concurred and tasked 7AF with maintaining the capability to conduct herbicide operations. (23) The decision to deactivate was a result of the DOD decision to continue restriction on herbicide ORANGE; the procurement of WHITE as a substitute for minimum usage; and the critical space requirements for expansion of the VNAF. (24)

(S) On 10 Jul 70 the 12th SOS was inactivated and herbicide missions became the responsibility of 315th Tactical Airlift Wing. The aircraft, equipment, and personnel moved to Phan Rang Air Base. (25)

Uses and Effectiveness of Herbicides

(U) In March, DA anticipated a need for information to support the President's policy of retaining first-use option for herbicides. Data were prepared for the US Senate hearings on ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. DA requested specific examples of how defoliation and crop destruction aided allied efforts in RVN.

(C) Examples from COMUSMACV's reply follow:

1. Defoliation greatly improved aerial observation, thus making it more difficult for the enemy to move men, supplies, and equipment from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into RVN without being detected. Increased visibility also enhanced security, target acquisition, and firepower employment:

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a. Defoliation was used in RVN for the following purposes:

(1) Reduce jungle concealment and expose enemy base camp areas, storage sites, and LOCs. That caused the enemy to close or relocate base camps and abandon active storage depots. The increased aerial observation made it more difficult for the enemy to mass forces for large attacks, restricted daylight movement of combat forces, and required circuitous, less desirable routes for infiltration of men and supplies.

(2) Reduce the number of concealed potential ambush and indirect fire sites. That resulted in decreased enemy interdiction of friendly LOCs and indirect fire attacks on population centers and friendly base camps.

(3) Clear areas surrounding US and RVNAF base camps, fire support bases and airfields, including mine fields and wire entanglements. That discouraged sapper attacks and strengthened perimeter defenses through increased ground visibility and fields of fire.

b. Examples of effective use of defoliation were:

(1) Foliage was removed within 30 meters of both sides of a road between two major FSBs of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl). The road was bounded by vegetation consisting of small trees and thick undergrowth approximately 6 feet tall. Prior to defoliation, troops were frequently subjected to enemy ambush. After defoliation, despite indications of enemy activity in the area, no major difficulty was encountered in keeping the road open to traffic.

(2) The removal of double and triple jungle canopy in the A Shau Valley significantly contributed to gathering of intelligence. The removal of foliage exposed and permitted the destruction of BAs and storage sites, and impeded enemy infiltration into areas adjacent to friendly population.

(3) Defoliation strengthened the defensive posture of most FSBs in RVN by removing available concealment for sappers.

(4) Between November 1969 and March 1970 large area defoliation operations along major infiltration routes in western Kontum Province significantly improved visual reconnaissance and target acquisition, aerial photography, and artillery fire adjustment effectiveness. That considerably enhanced the security posture within the 24th Special Tactical Zone.

(5) Defoliation along Highway No. 1, north of Vung Ro Bay, resulted in improved highway security. Prior to defoliation, numerous sniping and ambush incidents were reported by the 9th ROK Div.

(6) Helicopter defoliation around the 45th General Support Group's logistical area in Pleiku improved the observation and facilitated removal of an unmarked minefield.

(7) Defoliation of War Zone C was a large factor in increasing the security of 11th ACR Sqdn operating in a previously secure enemy sanctuary. The increased effectiveness of reconnaissance certainly decreased US casualties and decreased the enemy effectiveness in War Zone C.

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(8) Enemy activity in Nam Can Forest in southern An Xuyen Province decreased after defoliation. Enemy activity along LOCs in Phong Dinh, Dinh Tuong, and Vinh Long Provinces decreased after defoliation.

2. Crop destruction by herbicides was used to reduce enemy local food supply in areas not under GVN control and where friendly harvesting of the crops was not feasible. Crop destruction was considered an integral part of the total food denial program in I, II and III CTZs. Crop destruction diverted enemy manpower to cultivation and portering while it also destroyed enemy morale.

a. Examples of effective use of crop destruction were;

(1) The 120th Farm Production Co, 20th Montagnard Communist Bn, was deployed to central Quang Ngai Province in December 1969 to set up operations in a 36,000 square meter rice field. The farm was heavily damaged by herbicides; they produced only enough food for their own use. The unit relocated.

(2) In October 1969 a rice crop was destroyed in Quang Tri Province near Ca Lu after the friendly population was quickly evacuated.

(3) In four of the five provinces in I CTZ, helicopter crop destruction was effectively employed to destroy small garden plots and rice plots in areas solidly controlled by VC/NVA. During a 3-month period in one province, 237 garden plots were located. After they were destroyed Hoi Chanhs rallied and reported low morale in their units because of food shortages.

b. Effects were revealed in material gathered from captured enemy documents and interrogations. Selected items follow:

(1) A Binh Dinh Province Unit Order, pertaining to a program of self sufficient farm production for 1970, described extensive food shortage and states that solution must include measures to protect crops from enemy (FWMAF and RVNAF) air attacks.

(2) In February 1970, a Hoi Chanh revealed crop destruction operations in western Lam Dong Province took a considerable amount of food. He also told of VC being forced to barter with the villagers for food to prevent starvation.

(3) A Binh Dinh Province unit report stated friendly (VC/NVA) farm production in Binh Dinh had decreased considerably due to enemy (FWMAF/RVNAF) defoliation. (26)

(4) Reports indicated many enemy units suffered critical food shortages which sapped their energy and destroyed their morale.

(5) NVA combat forces were diverted to full time production of food.

(6) Food shortages caused the enemy to seek new sources of food and expose himself to engagement by friendly forces.

(7) Extortion of food by the VC/NVA alienated them from the local populace. (27)

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3. The report concluded MACV was convinced the allied efforts in RVN were aided significantly because of the inherent tactical responsiveness provided by the first-use option policy for herbicides. (28)

Herbicides, A Propaganda Target

(C) The VC exploited the herbicide issue, successfully in many places. They ". . . attributed all manner of disease of man, plant, or beast to the US employment of chemicals"

(C) Rumors and allegations of birth defects and "monsters" resulting from herbicides were frequent. The anti-war faction picked up the theme and exploited it extensively.

(C) Ignorance and superstitions of peasants were used to spread rumors of peasant women "laying eggs" and "giving birth to monsters." VC propaganda was directed to ". . . arousing hatred in the hearts of the people" An example was the statement of the NFLSV Central Committee, ". . . US poison substances have killed fetuses and seriously affected milk secretion of mothers, rendering them unable to feed their babies" (29)

Herbicide Policy Review

(S) In October 1970, the US Ambassador to RVN and COMUSMACV directed the Interagency 203 Committee to conduct a comprehensive review of the herbicide program with particular emphasis on crop destruction operations. The committee, established by the US Embassy to coordinate GVN requests for US assistance in herbicide operations, was composed of representatives of the US Embassy, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Rural Development (MACCORDS), MACJ2, and MACJ3.

(S) The review, initiated on 23 Oct 70, was conducted by the Interagency 203 Committee and a representative of the MACV Science Adviser. The purpose of the study was to determine requirements for changes of policy and procedures. It was limited to consideration of the following:

1. Psychological effects.
2. Political aspects and policy guidelines.
3. Impact on pacification and rural development.
4. Indemnification practices.
5. Economic and agricultural impact.
6. Military effectiveness.

[REDACTED]

(S) Due to the limited time allocated for the review, consideration was not given to medical aspects, ecological effects, defoliation operations, or the technical aspects of the herbicides themselves.

(S) Findings and recommendations were based upon information and data collected by committee members during field trips, interviews with military and civilian officials at military region and province level, and a review of previously published reports.

(S) The committee reached the following conclusions:

1. The psychological effects of crop destruction among the friendly populace in MR 1 and MR 2 were not of major significance.
2. Crop destruction operations had little impact on the political loyalties of the friendly civilian population and no more than any other weapon system.
3. The major psychological and political effects of crop destruction occur outside Vietnam and center on the Paris Peace Talks, other international forums including the UN, the US Senate, and in American domestic news media.
4. There was some possible adverse impact of crop destruction on some potentially friendly villagers, primarily Montagnards living in enemy controlled or occupied territory.
5. Crop destruction had little adverse effect on pacification or rural redevelopment because such operations were conducted outside of pacified areas.
6. The existing system for indemnification payments for claims was slow and unwieldy and was not categorized to show herbicide damage to friendly crops separately from other sources of crop damage.
7. The crop destruction program made an effective contribution to the overall resource-denial program. The enemy's combat effectiveness was reduced as a result of the missions.
8. Existing procedures for project approval and conduct of crop destruction were deemed adequate. However, greater participation by province advisors in the planning was highly desirable. Post-strike analysis of missions should be routine.

(S) The committee recommended that:

1. Crop destruction operations be continued for the remainder of FY71. Prior to 30 Jun 71, the program should be reviewed for possible phaseout.
2. Guidance be provided to province advisors to require greater participation by appropriate members of their staffs in preparation of herbicide projects.
3. Post-strike analysis of each crop destruction mission be made to include photographs whenever possible.

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4. Claims paid for herbicide damage should be separately accounted from those claims paid for other combat damages and each supported by individual funding.

(S) The Ambassador and COMUSMACV considered the report of the Herbicide Policy Review in December. It was decided to phaseout the crop destruction program by May 1971. Following phaseout of crop destruction operations, herbicides would be used primarily to enhance security of friendly installations and facilities by clearing fields of fire and perimeters by helicopter and groundbased spray. (30)

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Source: MACJ3

TABLE XIV-1

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HERBICIDES COVERAGE (km ²) (31)										
DEFOLIATION					CROP DESTRUCTION					
	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	Subtotal	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	Total
1962	0	0	0	20	20	0	0	3	0	23
1963	0	17	69	14	100	1	0	0	0	101
1964	29	113	129	57	338	6	17	19	0	380
1965	18	58	371	185	632	27	63	182	0	904
1966	363	305	1,356	273	2,297	152	104	50	0	2,603
1967	286	613	2,354	752	5,087	213	379	64	0	5,743
1968	1,043	863	2,792	305	5,003	79	193	4	0	5,279
1969	1,002	929	2,762	359	4,852	107	154	2	0	5,115
1970	55	373	376	88	892	24	104	4	0	1,024
Total	2,808	3,351	11,009	2,053	19,221	609	1,014	328	0	21,172
Amount Resprayed	449	771	3,029	0	4,249	268	325	0	0	4,842
Net Area Sprayed	2,359	2,580	7,980	2,053	14,972	341	689	328	0	16,330
Total Area	26,331	79,151	29,709	36,549	171,940	26,331	79,151	29,909	36,549	171,940
Percent- age of Area Sprayed 8.9%	3.26	26.68	5.62	8.71	1.29	0.87	1.09	0	.79	9.49

Source: MACJ3

Table XIV - 1

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES - CHAPTER XIV

1. Rpt (S), MACJ3-032, 9 Jul 69, Subj: PSYOPS and Unconventional Warfare Forces and Resources (U), Gp-4.
2. Rpt (TS), MACJ031, 30 Apr 70, Subj: MACV Command History 1969 (U), Gp-1.
3. Msg (S), CG, IIFORCEV, to COMUSMACV, 061435Z Dec 69, Subj: Reduction of CIDG (U), Gp-4.
4. Msg (S), CG IFFORCEV, to COMUSMACV, 040216Z Dec 69, Subj: Reduction of CIDG (U), Gp-4.
5. Ltr (S), DMAC, 14 Dec 69, Subj: Accelerated CIDG Conversion (U) with 1st Ind, MACJ3-032, 11 Jan 70, same subject, and Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CG, DMAC, 291716Z Jan 70, Subj: Conversion of CIDG Camps My Dien and My Phouc Tay (U), Gp-4.
6. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 130105Z Jan 70, Subj: Border Bases (U), Gp-3.
7. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 25743/261250Z May 70, Subj: Border Bases (U), Gp-4; and JGS Directive No. 10019/TTM/P312/K (C), 22 May 70, Subj: Conversion of CIDG's to the Regular Forces and Reorganization of Ranger Units (U), Gp-Not stated.
8. Ibid.
9. Rpt (S), DA, 13 Jan 71, Subj: Army Activities Report: SE Asia (U), Gp-4.
10. HQ MACV Directive 525-1 (C), 12 Aug 69, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
11. Rpt (C), American Embassy, Saigon, 28 Aug 68, Subj: Report on the Herbicide Policy Review (U), Gp-4; and Rpt (C), MACJ233, 15 Apr 69, Subj: Rice in Vietnam: Provinces of IV CTZ (U), Gp-4.
12. Op. cit. #10.
13. Embtel (U), Washington, 1455, 15 Apr 70, Subj: Suspension of Use of 2, 4, 5-T Weed Killer and Herbicide.
14. Msg (C), JCS to CINCPAC, 152135Z Apr 70, Subj: Restriction on Use of Herbicide ORANGE (C), Gp-4.
15. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 18796/210242Z Apr 70, Subj: Restriction of Use of Herbicide ORANGE (U), Gp-4.
16. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG, XXIV Corps, et al, 35557/170709Z Jul 70, Subj: Herbicides Operations (U), Gp-4.
17. Ltr (S), MG W. G. Dolvin to MG Nguyen Van Manh, 22 Jul 70, Subj: Not stated, Gp-4.

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18. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 46760/090807Z Sep 70, Subj: Herbicide Stockpile (U), Gp-4.
19. Msg (S), CSAF to CINCPACAF, 022006Z Feb 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
20. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 032307Z Feb 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
21. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 9230/240827Z Feb 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U) Gp-4.
22. Msg (S), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 041147Z Apr 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
23. Ltr (S), MACJ3-09, 4 Jun 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
24. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG, DMAC, 35471/170157Z Jul 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
25. Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 241025Z Jul 70, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
26. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to DA, 14961/291500Z Mar 70, Subj: Use of Riot Control Agents and Herbicides (U), Gp-4.
27. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 34174/101305Z Jul 70, Subj: US Anti-Crop Warfare in Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
28. Op cit. #26.
29. Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 240309Z Jan 70, Subj: Proposed Study of Alleged Genetic Effects (U), Gp-4.
30. Rpt (TS), MACJ3, 14 Jan 71, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for Dec 70 (U), Gp-Not stated.
31. Data Sheets (C), MACJ3-06, 29 Jan 71, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.

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