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

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Chapter VI - Communications (Pages 173 - 181).

Immediately following each Chapter are Footnotes which are numbered which indicate the sources for the information.

Maps are contained on Pages 182-184. MAAG Organizational Structure is contained on Page 185, Appendix I.

USMACV Organizational Structure is contained on Pages 186-187 (Appendix II & III).

Pages 188, (Appendix IV) contains Key Personnel Listing - 1964,

Pages 189-193 contain Chronology 1964, (Appendix V).

Pages 194-199 contain Glossary of Terms (Appendix VI).

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
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

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Foreword

This is the first annual history of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (USMACV). Preparation began in late 1964, when organization of the Military History Branch was authorized by COMUSMACV.

It will be recognized that development of an extensive base of historical data is dependent upon comprehensive research conducted over a considerable period of time. While much of the current calendar year has been devoted to this effort, results for the most part will not be manifest until publication of the 1965 edition. Lacking the advantage of a prior research effort, the 1964 history necessarily relies, therefore, on routine staff records and reports.

For the US commitment in Vietnam, 1964 represents the year of transition; a year when events reversed the planned phase-down of US Forces and forced recognition of the magnitude and severity of the threat. This history, then, portrays the manifold tasks confronting COMUSMACV during a critical period, and documents his response to the challenge presented by them.




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


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
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
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
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(C) COMMAND SUMMARY

(U) The mission of the Commander of the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (COMUSMACV) consists of 16 specific functions, but these instructions serve only to sketch an outline of his task. The basic problem to which the United States government has addressed itself in Vietnam is nation-building. Within that broad goal the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV), attempts to provide the security environment to sustain a viable nation.

(U) A legacy of long years of bitter struggle between the Vietnamese people and the French left a land split by ethnic, religious, political, and economic differences. In spite of the defeat of the Japanese forces by the Allies in 1945, a return to the old colonialism was precluded; the earlier defeat of the Allies had demonstrated that indeed the oriental was equal to the occidental in military prowess. Thus, any Western attempt to renew its influence was suspect to some degree as being a re-assertion of imperialism--and elements of distrust from this fear have inevitably affected relationships between the Vietnamese and all occidentals.

(C) The US support of the French in their years of fighting against the Viet Minh could hardly be interpreted by many Vietnamese except as supporting French aims to reestablish her colonial empire. The American involvement was small but opportunely cited by propagandists and advertised by AID (Agency for International Development) handclasp labels made in America. Thus, after Dien Bien Phu, an important task was to dissociate US assistance to the fledgling Republic of Vietnam from the strain of the past. This psychological coloring was not easily removed. A ready-made propaganda theme was available for Viet Cong exploitation.

(C) The nature of the specific task of building a nation in Southeast Asia was further complicated by Vietnam's long history of divisiveness among ethnic and religious groups. Vietnamese contempt for the Montagnard; Buddhism versus Catholicism; these factors have long impeded total unification in South Vietnam. This complex background has restricted US assistance and created unexpected problems at critical junctures.

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(B) As a consequence, the US military forces have encountered new challenges. The complexity and diversity of the requirements placed upon individuals, units, and the command as a whole have extended far beyond the scope of their military training and experience. COMUSMACV has had to master a capability among his staff and field elements to contribute positively to the growth and maturity of a newly-born nation. This contribution is complicated by the fervent and avowed enemy that not only thwarts constructive action but constantly charts the attractions of the communist model. If these arts are insufficient to lure the Vietnamese youth, terror and force are applied without hesitation in whatever form and intensity required to delay progress, force inaction, and discourage commitment.

(C) To build, yet stay the disruptive influence of the Viet Cong, the United States has, throughout the tenure of several political administrations under both national parties, undertaken to supply both moral and physical assistance through men, money, and equipment. The military portion of this support attempts to provide a security environment conducive to the daily functioning of government. But this military force is only one ingredient in creating a secure atmosphere: it interacts with economic, political, psychological, and social programs fostered by other US support to the Vietnamese. In the application of this assistance, differences between US and Vietnamese customs, morals, and values often pose profound cultural obstacles to both US and common US-Vietnamese goals.

(D) The governmental structure of the Republic of Vietnam, while undergoing several upheavals in 1964, was basically organized as follows: The Minister of Interior in Saigon exercised direct authority, in matters pertaining to local government, over some 25 province chiefs plus the mayors of several autonomous cities and the Prefect of Saigon. Provinces were further subdivided into districts which in turn comprised several villages. Hamlets were administrative subdivisions of villages. The Minister of Defense exercised parallel authority. Subordinate to him were the commanders of the four major tactical zones (Central and the Capital Military Zones). Each zone commander was assisted by a liaison officer for military affairs whose principal function was to monitor and advise on military operations. The zone was divided into division tactical groups, the commanders of which exerted a certain degree of military authority over the province chiefs. These civil and military relationships and exertion of authority were not stereotyped throughout the country but seemed to be dependent upon the individuals occupying the various positions.

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(U) The organization of the Vietnamese military force differs from the structure of the US defense establishment. Not only is the Vietnamese military organization comprised of Regular and Regional Forces, roughly analogous to the US regular and reserve elements, but a local paramilitary force of great significance is present in almost every Vietnamese hamlet and village. This is the Popular Force, which most closely resembles the militia or American frontier posse, armed citizens often united only by a vigorous, righteous anger against their predators. In 1964 the Vietnamese military organization was also impressed into a civil role since within the military ranks were often found the best educated, most competent administrators and the military threat of the Viet Cong made security the priority problem for the civil government.

(C) Vietnamese military officers functioned as province and district chiefs responsible for civil administration as well as military commanders for the conduct of operations against the Viet Cong. Thus, this dual military-civil responsibility was inextricably interwoven in the pacification program with its triple aim of establishing law and order, providing the benefits of government, and developing responsible citizenry. The US military advisory program extended throughout this Vietnamese military-civilian structure.

(U) COMUSMACV, as the senior US military officer in Vietnam, fulfills the central responsibility of chief advisor and consultant to the Ambassador and the other governmental agencies represented in the US Mission. In Saigon, this responsibility requires regular contacts with the directors and chiefs of these agencies. The complete integration of US programs depends as well upon the easy and regular communication between subordinate officers who conceive, develop, and formulate in detail the interrelated plans and programs of the several US agencies for presentation to the Mission Council.


(U) COMUSMACV supervises the execution of US military programs and activities. In the field, this often overlaps with the activities of other US Mission agencies. Since the US military advisory structure provides the broadest spectrum of US contacts throughout all levels of the Vietnamese government, efficient integration of the programs and objectives of all US agencies is mandatory. At the subsector level the military advisory team is the summation of all elements of US support.

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(C) In the discharge of these advisory, consultative, and support functions, the field advisors require detailed information pertaining to the concepts and aims of US military and other programs. Many have undergone extensive general and specialized training for their military duties prior to arrival in Vietnam. However, additionally, they require regular information concerning the status of US aid plans and programs at the national, regional, and local levels to provide the perspective for implementing their own programs. The evolution of US programs and the ever-changing context of the politico-military situation in Vietnam demands constant assessment by the Commander to insure that all subordinates share his understanding and concern. The Commander must evaluate the experiences of the field advisors and determine what lessons can benefit all advisors. Thus, the Commander must provide a means of analysis and communication to modify current concepts regarding the advisory role in the light of the most recently available experience. In an even larger sense, the Commander is responsible for communicating to all other members of the US military profession so that their understanding of counterinsurgency and the attendant military responsibilities will improve and, hence, enhance the total US capability to respond to insurgencies that may arise elsewhere.

(C) The military conflict itself involves a complete gamut of force in varying intensity. Insurgent forces, reinforced by Northern Vietnamese cadre and regular units, design their strategy and tactics to exploit every advantage inherent in the offensive role they enjoy, and expertly magnify every disadvantage that befalls any central government. There are, and have been, of course, many weaknesses in the governments of Vietnam which present ready targets for both military and political action by the Viet Cong. The central government has not appeared to be actively seeking to promote the welfare of the individual peasant. Corruption, nepotism, and other evils of a super-stratified society have focussed enmity of the people against any intruder from outside the village boundaries. In this context, the loyalties of individuals cannot often be told with certainty, not even through their actions. The oft-stated goal of counterinsurgency has been "winning the hearts and minds of the people." This platitude is not easily translated into specific action.

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
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(C) Although integrated programs of military, political economic, social, and psychological action have been developed in almost infinite detail by the several governments which have held power, these programs have too often deviated from their original concept and have seldom been completed. The power of the central government

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has been nominal at most; in fact the daily life of the vast majority of the population is unaffected by the machinations of religious, ethnic, and political groups which have created disquiet in Saigon and some of the larger cities. The province chief and the district chief have the most direct contact with the people. The daily life of government is in the hands of these individuals and it varies province by province, and within each province, district by district. However, this is as it should be for the strategy and tactics of the government's pacification program must be individually tailored to the land, the people, and the enemy. The needs of the province are not determined by multiplying the needs of any individual by the provincial population. The problem is, therefore, that, although the conduct of government is decentralized to the province level, the resources are controlled and provided through the Saigon central ministries.

(C) Since military commanders at corps and division most regularly assume a civic role in addition to conducting military operations, the coordination between these officials and the provincial authorities is critical. The province chief and the district chief are the best authorities on whether an area is primarily Viet Cong in sympathy and can judge the wisdom of free-bombing or using artillery fires in support of an attack or a beleaguered outpost. These practical constraints on military action are easily ignored especially during the urgency of battle. But, it is the province and district chiefs who must reenter the area, pick up the bodies of civilians, indemnify the victims who have lost family or home, and explain why the death and destruction were necessary.

(C) To oversee the diverse US military assistance being provided, COMUSMACV required communication systems which provided accurate and timely information of field activities. The environment of Vietnam, however, subjected military communications to new stresses. The channels for communication are more intricate than elsewhere. The existence of multiple channels between the field and Saigon through the many US agencies acts as both an abrasive and lubricant for the military channels. Some information bogged down in one system flowed more easily through another. Frustrations were encountered, leading to personal contact as a substitute for the use of established or prescribed means of communication.


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(C) The particular nature of the advisory role admits that dual channels of communication exist--US and Vietnamese. This may give rise to confusion. For example, a subordinate advisor may receive instructions to press for a particular act by his counterpart and be informed that the counterpart's superior is making an

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identical requirement. But the congruence of the requirement as stated in the two individual messages may not be perfect. If the communication is in writing, at least the translation may be compared with the American understanding of the intent. But often communication is oral or, even if in writing, copies are not automatically distributed to the interested US advisor.

(C) COMUSMACV requires direct reports from the field on the counterinsurgency program to be forwarded with comment, if desired, but without change or consolidation at intervening headquarters. A similar requirement applies to MACV reports submitted to Washington through Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). In addition, special teams are frequently dispatched to the field to obtain first-hand information of combat actions for immediate return and report to COMUSMACV and subsequent forwarding to Washington. These unusual procedures reflect the unusual nature of the war in which every incident and operation, no matter how minor, is of interest to the American public and their government. This places a strain on the time-honored system of command channels and is another example of the flexibility of "modus operandi" which members of the US military forces must develop while in Vietnam.

(U) Although rapid communication from the field to headquarters is mandatory, an equally important requirement exists to keep the soldier in the field informed of events happening elsewhere. In addition, the American military community cannot fully appreciate the concern of US domestic interest in the fighting without access to regular news sources. This information task is no small requirement.

(C) Just as the command has a need to inform its members, each member shares with the Commander the obligation to inform the American people of US activities in Vietnam. Desirably, understanding can also thus be gained in other foreign countries. In a large part, the concentrated press attention on the struggle in Vietnam has made the land the daily source of headline banners. The natural tendency to emphasize the unusual has created some difficulties in maintaining harmonious relations between the press and military spokesmen. But beyond this, the nature of the conflict itself, the secretiveness of unstable regimes, the undramatic daily record of small but significant change, makes reporting on Vietnam as special as the conflict itself.

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(U) As other nations of the free world have appreciated their stake in the continuing freedom of Vietnam in Southeast Asia, more military and other assistance has been provided to Vietnam. Some forces of several nations--Australia, New Zealand, Korea, the

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Philippines—are serving at the side of the Vietnamese. The logistical support for many of these forces comes from US sources administered by the Command. As these international forces increase, inevitably, greater world interest will follow. Hopefully, the sacrifice for freedom these foreigners share with the Vietnamese citizen will continue to inspire him in what has proven to be a life-long struggle.


(U) Given the problem of communication, the continually divergent impressions of progress reported by the press and official observers, and the complexity of the US counterinsurgency program, US officials in Washington and elsewhere have felt the need periodically to visit Vietnam for personal assessments of the situation. These visits have frequently resulted in changing, in broad concept or detail, the nature of the US support. The appointment of a senior US Army officer as the Commander when the Command was established did not displace nor substitute for the authority which the CINCPAC headquarters had maintained over its former direct subordinate, the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam. Such procedures as a basically Navy-oriented command being responsible for the support of a primarily Army force have further challenged the serviceman's versatility. These, and many other related factors, have all served as a demanding test of the ability of US forces in Vietnam to adapt themselves to unique command relationships.

(C) Without question, in the minds of some observers, there seemed some evidence to uphold the charge that the United States has found Vietnam a convenient testing ground for new weapons and a training site for its officers and men. The adherence to peacetime administrative procedures coupled with siestas, dependent families in Saigon, and sudden bombings have illustrated the unreality of the war. The US Forces' role has not always been well defined and has created frustration with the political restrictions imposed on direct action. The organizational structure is intricate and improvement frequently difficult. A major change in forces might be hastily accomplished but then, in contrast, an important but modest requirement for three men could consume 14 months awaiting approval; patently the rapidly changing needs of the Command frequently made it difficult for superior headquarters to respond.

(C) The cost of the US program in Vietnam has been high in men and money. There has been evident an unwillingness to commit fully US Forces to assist, support, or engage in combat, all for good and sufficient reasons. But the absence of this commitment in 1964 opened to question the resoluteness of the US Forces.

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and the willingness for sacrifice to achieve eventual victory. The US aim was sometimes indistinct--to itself, to its men in Vietnam, to the Vietnamese, and to our allies and enemies. The price rose as the Viet Cong (VC) strength continued to be superior to the ability of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to resist and defeat. The US Forces continued to become more involved.

(C) Even the replacement of an unpopular authoritarian regime by a military leadership could not obtain greater popular active support for the war. The failure to mobilize all national resources to defeat the Viet Cong was perhaps to be expected when any regime had so patched a mandate of power. Coups, abortive coups, demi-coups, and internal purges revealed as falsity all attempts to claim popular support for the government. Each change of government following the replacement of the Diem rule was interpreted as an improvement over the past. But, in fact, the changes were so frequent that, to some degree, the US advisors became the only unifying force within the country.

(C) On the part of the US military this degree of concern with politics was foreign to their experience and taste. Reluctantly, though, the recognition grew that the Vietnamese military represented the only real basis for power within the country. The US military professional was, therefore, required to acquire and exercise judgment and advise on political matters that were foreign to his traditional military role and which his professional education had purposely ignored. In this situation, the American military officer had to learn to rely upon his knowledge as a citizen, his education in government and civics. That the US officers provided some stability of government and increasingly have entered into new roles such as sector and subsector advisor with confidence attests to their ability to adapt to whatever requirement is posed.

(C) This very adaptability and willingness to assume new roles has not been without hazard. For, in the absence of US activity in support of Vietnamese need, the military officer has not been hesitant to undertake new responsibilities. This had led to conflicts with other US agencies formally charged with responsibility for support of programs but without means to exercise that responsibility. Some active US military personnel have been loaned to other US agencies; retired service personnel have also demonstrated competence for these new tasks. Thus, a new generation of military professionals has been born in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam.

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(C) General Paul D. Harkins, who had assumed command of the COMUSMACV on 8 February 1962, continued in this capacity during the first half of 1964. The position of COMUSMACV during 1964 required unusual leadership in order to maintain the integrity of the Command and clear control during a year of extreme stress as the Government of Vietnam demonstrated little stability and was hard-pressed to direct its military forces in effective operations against the Viet Cong. The intimate knowledge of faces, places, and situations--American and Vietnamese--had been the forte of General Harkins but the increasing size and dispersion of the Command plus the increasingly demanding responsibilities for military planning throughout Southeast Asia stretched the already crowded schedule of the Commander. Therefore, in January the position of Deputy COMUSMACV was established and assigned to Lt General William C. Westmoreland.

(C) General Westmoreland became the roving eyes and ears for COMUSMACV and gained a profound understanding of the counterinsurgency program. His analysis of the command and staff functioning led to a recommendation for reorganization and consolidation of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, within the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

(U) Upon his promotion to COMUSMACV in June 1964, General Westmoreland developed new procedures for managing the diverse programs and activities within Vietnam. The establishment of the Executive Council in July, the new emphasis on the Command Information Program, the personal orientation of incoming personnel, the personal background discussions with members of the press, the close coordination of military programs under the new Ambassador, and the frequent meetings with his staff all marked the personality of the new Commander.

(U) The year 1964 was one of transition: Change in enemy capability, change in Vietnamese governments, change in the US commitment, change of Ambassadors, change of commanders, and change in organization. This history of the Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, portrays one facet of the changing face of the war--missing are the views of the field advisor, the subordinate elements, the superior command, the supported forces, and the adversary.


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(S) CHAPTER I

PERSONNEL

(C) The Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, MACV J1, witnessed an eventful year in administering the US personnel program and simultaneously expanding the advisory effort. Change of one program inevitably led to changes in other programs. Crash actions became routine and too little time was available for complete and thoughtful consideration of the impact on personnel of the many programs developed, enlarged, reduced, or modified in infinite variety during the year. Reorganization followed reorganization once for the entire command and several times for elements within it. New Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) requests were initiated before previous requests were honored. Personnel programs became too often ideals with little resemblance to reality.

CONSOLIDATION OF MAAG AND MACV

(S) In this aura of change, the greatest began in February and entailed J1's attention for many months. With the establishment of the Khanh government a reassessment of US support was in order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were considering various measures to be taken in connection with the command direction of the US effort in Vietnam. On 15 February the JCS requested the comments of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV on the disestablishment of MAAG, Vietnam, and the merger of its functions with those of MACV.¹

(S) In response to the JCS query, COMUSMACV indicated to CINCPAC that he did not recommend a change in the organizations or the command relationships at that time.² COMUSMACV considered that positive direction over MAAG was exercised and that the command structure was responsive for all functions and responsibilities. Additionally, COMUSMACV stated that any reorganization with all its attendant problems would be counter-productive to the US effort. Further, the proposed reorganization would be incongruous with the planned phase-down of MACV after the insurgency and the gradual buildup of MAAG. Alterations on the US side would only compound the confusion on the Vietnamese side, which had recently undergone two coups, with attendant governmental changes.

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(S) CINCPAC concurred with COMUSMACV and advised the JCS "we will be unduly rocking the boat to no practical purpose since COMUSMACV already clearly exercises operational command over MAAG and advisors." COMUSMACV considered that the existing organization freed COMUSMACV to concentrate on the counterinsurgency effort without laboring on Military Assistance Program (MAP) administration and logistic details.

(S) However, advanced information concerning the Secretary of Defense's visit on 8-12 March, indicated that he was interested in the feasibility of merging MACV and MAAG and desired to discuss possible organizational changes. An ad hoc group under the supervision of the J1, Joint Gen Staff

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was formed in late February to explore the possible reorganization of the US command elements to improve efficiency, avoid duplication, and reduce personnel.

(3) On 3 March J1 queried the staff on the possible effects of a reorganization and established certain organizational and functional guidelines for its study.⁴ DEPCOMUSMACV discussed the results with COMUSMACV and a briefing was prepared. While many details of the possible reorganization remained incomplete as of the arrival of the Secretary of Defense, the initial study had indicated a reorganization might be feasible. The Secretary directed that a plan for the reorganization be submitted to CINCPAC and JCS concurrently.⁵

(c) The feasibility study was expedited and forwarded to CINCPAC on 12 March, and recommended approval of a concept for the reorganization. Detailed manning documents were to be developed and the reorganization could become effective in three months.⁶ This initial study concluded that the reorganization would: improve responsiveness to command, remove duplication, save about 85 spaces, require three months to a year to be fully effective; create funding problems until FY 66 or later, require revision of Army and Air Force personnel procedures for flexible, efficient in-country personnel assignments, require some further detailed study, require some office relocations; and, although feasible, would temporarily reduce the Command's operational capability.

(S) CINCPAC endorsed the recommendation with the following statements:⁷ that no major reorganization of MACV and MAAG be undertaken at this time and that COMUSMACV eliminate duplication of functions and unnecessary staff elements of both headquarters; that field advisors be transferred from MAAG to MACV; and that MAAG be reduced but retained for detailed MAF functions and advising RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) on non-operational matters.

(c) While the reorganization was under consideration by JCS, the MACV and MAAG staff agencies continued to refine details. The preparation of a new MACV JED disclosed that no major funding and personnel problems would result.

(c) On 31 March COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that authority be granted to reorganize.⁸ COMUSMACV urged early and final decision to relieve the air of uncertainty throughout the command and to enable processing current JED's or developing new ones based upon whatever organization might be approved. CINCPAC reaffirmed his previous opposition and stated his belief that such a massive reorganization

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could not be effected without disruption of the US efforts in Vietnam. He suggested that COMUSMACV investigate ways of eliminating duplication and combine like functions without reorganizing.⁹

(C) Despite CINCPAC's views, the JCS on 10 April announced the approval of the MACV/MAG reorganization for immediate implementation. The following JCS provisions were stated:¹⁰

"The present organization of MACV as a Subordinate Unified Command in RVN should be retained. However, in the Service manning of his headquarters, COMUSMACV may adjust the manning proportion so as to reflect the particular interests and degree of involvement of the services. The JCS note the view of COMUSMACV that the proposed reorganization can be accomplished with a savings of personnel and with minimum disruption of about one month. It will be important to explain in detail the modus operandi of the new organization to Ambassador Lodge and General Khanh prior to its announcement."

(S) COMUSMACV directed that organization, manpower requirements, and function statements be finalized with the least practicable delay. He established 15 May as the target date for the disestablishment of MAG and recommended that concurrently his Terms of Reference as COMUSMACV be changed to read:¹¹

"COMUS Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, will:


- a. Exercise operational command of all US Forces and military agencies assigned.
- b. Consult with the Ambassador on US political and basic policy matters. In case of differences of view, both representatives should report such differences to CINCPAC and to Department of State, respectively, for decision in accordance with existing procedures.
- c. Keep the Ambassador fully informed, especially on all high level contacts with the officials of the Republic of Vietnam, and including major military plans and pending operations.
- d. Plan for and be prepared to conduct military operations as directed by CINCPAC.
- e. Discharge US military responsibility to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) in accordance with CINCPAC policies and directives.
- f. Assist the GVN and RVNAF in planning for military operations.
- g. Develop coordinated US-GVN plans as directed by CINCPAC.
- h. Plan, program and administer the military assistance program in Vietnam.

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
- i. Under the operational command of CINCPAC, COMUSMACV will:
- (1) Make recommendations to CINCPAC concerning military assistance in the host country.
 - (2) Develop military assistance plans and programs in cooperation with the Chief of the US Diplomatic Mission and other US Governmental agencies in the mission and submit them to CINCPAC.
 - (3) Make recommendations to CINCPAC concerning off-shore procurement of military assistance material or services.
 - (4) Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished by and personnel trained at the expense of the United States.
 - (5) Administer military sales transactions in accordance with current instructions.
 - (6) Provide appropriate advisory services and technical assistance to the host country on military assistance.
 - (7) Work directly with the military departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military assistance material, disposal of MAP excess property, training and services in the host country.
 - (8) Provide liaison with the host country with respect to weapons production and off-shore procurement matters.
 - (9) With respect to the mutual weapons development program provide such services as may be required.
- j. In addition, and to the extent not previously specified in sub-para (i) preceding, COMUSMACV is responsible to CINCPAC for administering in the host country those responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense enumerated in section 623 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
- k. In discharging these responsibilities, COMUSMACV will be guided by the policies and procedures set forth in the Military Assistance Manual, the Military Assistance Basic Planning Document, Department of Defense directives and instructions as applicable, and such other directives as may be issued by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and CINCPAC.
1. With respect to administrative, technical, and other non-policy matters primarily of interest to his service, COMUSMACV as the Army Component Commander; the Chief of the Navy Advisory Group, and the Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group may receive instructions from and are authorized to communicate with, their military departments and the agencies thereof. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC will be kept informed as appropriate.
 - m. Administer and supervise joint frequency coordination in SVN in accordance with PACOM CEE.
 - n. Continue development of GVN capabilities to provide such support for US Forces as may be required under existing agreements.

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o. Coordinate US military intelligence activities in the Republic of Vietnam.

p. Exercise operational control of all RDC&E activity in RVN."

(C) The planned reorganization was finalized, approved by COMUSMACV and forwarded to CINCPAC on 23 April.¹² Organization, statement of functions, and manpower requirements were reflected in a proposed MACV JTD, 15 May 64.

(C) On 15 May 1964, with the consolidation of MAAG, Vietnam, and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the Command assumed the full scope and depth of functions previously performed by both organizations.^{13,14} From 15 May until the close of the period, MACV was in a transitional organization and expansion phase, during which major effort was devoted to amalgamation and providing the framework for stable future operations. The balance of the year minor changes in the headquarters staffing were implemented but the direction and nature of the organization was not materially altered, only expanded and refined. The reorganization was dwarfed by subsequent changes in MACV staff and field advisory teams.

(C) In year-end assessments of the effect of the reorganization of the Command on efficiency, no staff sections commented that any major deficiencies had developed. In truth, it was difficult to assess whether the consolidation's effect was not inextricably submerged with the diverse effects of expanded and changing programs which characterized the last half of the year. However, it was apparent that the ability of the Command to sustain the many complex and diverse changes in the US effort within the balance of 1964 attested to its increased flexibility and responsiveness to command. As the following year developed and the US program further evolved, the new organizational structure would prove its effectiveness or unsuitability for future requirements.

BULLET

(S) Although a decrease in the US military assistance to Vietnam was anticipated at the beginning of 1964 with a withdrawal by 1965, events during the year proved that this was an unrealistic expectation. In fact, rather than reducing the American involvement the last half of the year saw a considerable increase in the strength of US forces.

(C) While the consolidation of MAAG and MACV had indicated that a small saving in personnel would result, this saving quickly was outweighed by the expansions which followed. On the same date as the consolidation of the two commands a new JTD was approved with a net increase of 308 spaces. JTD changes provided 249 additional


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field advisors, 226 allotted for subsectors (the military equivalent of districts, the political subdivision of provinces), and 140 new spaces for staff functions¹⁵ which had not been previously performed, or were performed ineffectively.

(S) At the special meeting on SE Asia in Honolulu on 1-2 June further increases in the US effort were considered as a means to influence the planning and execution of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program.¹⁶ Increased advisory strength for existing teams with tactical units and extension of US advice to lower echelons of the GVN were approved. The rationale for the increase was that some success was being obtained with the present teams which might be even greater with more advisors. In the case of subsectors, teams had been placed in the field in March at 13 districts considered most critical, primarily to render assistance to Regional and Popular Forces. But the experiences of these test teams indicated a wider range of duties could be performed, and the one officer and one NCO authorized were inadequate for the full range of responsibilities; accordingly, two officers and three EM were authorized--to be senior and assistant senior advisors, operations-intelligence advisor, medical advisor, and radio operator. The number of teams was increased to include 113 of the total 237 districts in Vietnam. Army tactical unit advisors were increased for infantry, armor, and artillery from two officers and one EM to two and three, from one and one to two and three respectively, and for armored cavalry squadrons, from two officers per squadron headquarters and one officer per M13 troop to two per headquarters and one officer plus two EM per troop. The Naval Advisory Group also increased from 154 to 235 spaces, replacing many spaces eliminated earlier under the 1000-man reduction in late 1963, furnishing advisors to newly activated Navy units and commands, and providing advisors for some functions not previously covered.


(S) The program for US Army Special Forces (USASF) in RVN was also reviewed and several changes were made.¹⁷ In the past USASF had maintained a small permanent staff in-country as a control headquarters for the rotating field detachments which spent six months on operations and border surveillance missions. It was decided that USASF effectiveness would be improved if personnel served on a PCS basis, and strength increased from 523 to 1299. Also, it was necessary to augment the existing administrative and logistic base for USASF support. Initial estimates of the buildup indicated an increase of about 4200, later refined to 4800.¹⁸

(S) A plan for the phased buildup was submitted to JCS on 28 July which called for individuals and units to arrive during the period 1 August - 1 December, with the USASF buildup from 15 September - 1 February 1965.¹⁹

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(C) The buildup presented heavy requirements for all services but each filled them on a priority basis. Generally, units deployed on schedule and individuals early. But the buildup did cause personnel turbulence, and assignment policies were violated. The Department of the Army could not satisfy the requirements within the same frame and in several instances artillery and armor officers were assigned as advisors to infantry units. Subsector advisors, initially to be captains with lieutenant assistants, were often upgraded and majors were assigned as senior advisors. In view of the very short lead-time and the quality requirements in effect (described in "Personnel Management section"), the requirements were remarkably well satisfied by all the services. At the beginning of 1964, strength was 15,989; on 31 May, 16,454; and on 31 December, 23,301--and increase of nearly 50 percent over January.²⁰

PERSOINEL MANAGEMENT

(C) The buildup complicated the J1 personnel management activities. The consolidation, the expansion, the redistribution of people by priority, the twice-changed JTD, the regular monitoring of strengths, changes in assignment, and constant efforts to improve the personnel management activities constituted major tasks for J1 and required detailed coordination with all elements of the MACV headquarters and field advisory teams. Following the buildup, and within a reasonable time to allow the reorganization to become effective, J1 considered an evaluation of minimum staffing requirements by all elements of the Command was urgently needed. On 30 November COMUSMACV directed a review of manpower requirements and personnel utilization.²¹ The raw data was collected by the end of the year but analysis was incomplete.

(C) Table I shows the level of manning maintained during the year, by staff section and field advisory team. Percentages of authorized strength assigned and actual numbers of the principal staff sections and advisory teams are also indicated.

(C) There has been no attempt to maintain fixed percentages for representation from each of the services. Guidance for COMUSMACV specified that staffing by each service should be proportionate to the nature of the effort. Personnel within the Headquarters were assigned without regard to service and it was not uncommon for a naval or air force officer to occupy a space in which he was required to act on matters primarily ground-oriented. In this situation, learning periods of up to three months were required in some jobs--but the performance of personnel was creditable. For joint staff duty, officers should have had prior staff experience or be graduates of their service command and staff college. All officers did not

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have those qualifications, but there were few instances of reassignment because of inability. Some officers more suited for field assignment were transferred from the Headquarters. In the field officers were assigned to service-oriented jobs. Only Marines occupied positions as advisors to other than units of their own service, primarily within the I Corps area. Marines were assigned to infantry or artillery units, and a few to subsectors and training centers. J1 assigned no Marines to administrative jobs but recognized that some flexibility was necessary for senior advisors since rotation and attrition might require exception to general policies.²²

(C) Throughout the year an austere manning level had been maintained both in the Headquarters and in the field. The work week had been prescribed as 60 hours in May and a schedule for a 70 hour week was to become effective in January. These long hours doubtlessly reduced the manpower requirement, although whether directly proportional is questionable. Field advisory teams were initially authorized many administrative support positions but the increase in their numbers clearly created an administrative burden and, until JTD revisions could be made, required diversion of advisors from primary duties to administrative support. Illustrative of the problem is the case of sector advisory teams. When subsector teams were added, administrative and logistical support by sector teams necessarily doubled and tripled. Someone had to furnish ration breakdown, prepare supply requisitions, and prepare reports. This problem was further accentuated by an unstated but observed policy that field advisors would enjoy living standards and recreational, religious, postal, and other services as nearly equivalent to that available in Saigon and CONUS as possible. With this situation, officers and enlisted men often found additional duties as demanding as their primary responsibility, and in some cases the additional duties overshadowed primary duties. Administrative austerity became increasingly less feasible.

(C) Future planning for changes in the JTD had to accommodate this reality. The May JTD reflected new requirements for advisory support of the Vietnamese, but the September JTD included mostly US requirements. An example of the sacrifice in advisory capability to satisfy US requirements existed in the Directorate of Army MAP Logistics (DAML). When MAAG and MACV were consolidated the technical service sections of MAAG were eliminated and the only technical service expertise available to MACV was concentrated in DAML. Consequently DAML was increasingly required to furnish advice to COMUSMACV--to the detriment of regular duties.²³

(C) The quality of US personnel has been unusually high. This resulted from the criteria for assignment which had been established

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in late 1963 by the Secretary of Defense. All colonels were to be graduates of the senior service schools, all lieutenant colonels in key positions were to be graduates of their service command and staff college and not have failed selection for promotion to colonel, and all majors in key positions were required to be graduates or candidates for their service command and staff college and not have failed selection for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Such criteria imposed tight restrictions on assignment by the services. DA disagreed with the number of positions designated as key; MACV wanted all field grade officers to meet the criteria. All enlisted men were to be grade E4 and above to assure a higher level of professionalism within the command.²⁴ As the number of personnel increases and as more personnel have completed service in Vietnam, these criteria will be increasingly more difficult to meet.

(C) Assignments in the Headquarters often required special qualifications which necessitated diversion of an officer or enlisted man from his programmed assignment. As the buildup progressed during the year a higher level of priority was given to Headquarters requirements since staff planning had to precede the buildup. Nonetheless, the J1 resisted pressure from staff elements for complete freedom of personnel selection. Later in the year, policy for assignment generally gave priority to field advisory positions.²⁵

(C) Assignment of grade O6 officers was carefully controlled. In December special procedures were established to coordinate all actions and information pertaining to their assignment and provided instant response to the Command Group regarding these individuals. The qualifications of prospective division and corps senior advisors were personally reviewed by COMUSMACV. Candidates for positions as corps staff officers and senior sector advisors were carefully screened.

US PERSONNEL SERVICES

(U) The full scope of personnel services provided in other commands was also available within MACV. The September JTD included five Special Services officers, one per corps and the Headquarters. Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS) expanded the Exchange facilities within Saigon and opened new field exchanges during 1964. Exchanges were crowded and pilferage in shipments to the field branches were problems. An enlarged PX was planned for operation in Saigon in early 1965 and the forecast buildup in both US and international forces promised a high level of customer demand in the future.

(C) To the newcomer, one of the more surprising characteristics of MACV was the absence of military barracks and tents traditionally associated with garrison and field duty. Throughout the country US

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personnel resided in a variety of quarters, including villas and hotels. Within the Saigon area HSAS provided 18 BOQ's and nine BEQ's for permanent party and six additional hotels for transient spaces. As the buildup proceeded, at peak periods some personnel were required to occupy commercial facilities. Dependent housing was furnished by HSAS in three cities, Saigon, Nha Trang, and Dalat. In February, after several terrorist acts in Saigon, 40 individuals elected to return their dependents to CONUS. In September a policy change prevented dependents being brought to Vietnam at government expense unless the sponsor was authorized an accompanied tour; only 120 positions were so authorized at the end of the year. The total military dependents known to be in-country at the end of the year was 547. The contrast of dependent family life was a source of comment by field advisors visiting Saigon and, though the presence of dependents contributed significantly to the morale of those living with their families, an equally significant adverse effect may have resulted amongst others not so privileged. The contrast contributed to the psychological gap between the Headquarters and the field, and added to the remoteness and unreality of the war for Saigon staff officers.

(U) One morale builder effectively used was the awards and decorations system which recognized valor and meritorious service. COMUSMACV found that disparities existed between the policies applicable within each of the services and continually attempted to bring award authority under his direct control.²⁶ In February COMUSMACV requested authority from CINCPAC to award the Joint Service Commendation Medal,²⁷ but this was denied on the basis that DOD directive prohibited delegation below CINCPAC. The Department of the Army did approve COMUSMACV as authority for award of the Army Commendation Medal and the Air Medal with "V" device. The 2d Air Division (2AD) was delegated authority by Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to award the Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal, and Purple Heart to USAF personnel in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).²⁸ In July CINCPAC supported a MACV request for securing Congressional approval for US personnel to accept and retain decorations presented by GVN in recognition of combat services, but by the end of the year Congress had not acted. A continuing effort had been and would be made to concentrate approval authority for the most often given awards to the appropriate command. At year's end award authority in MACV was as stated in Table II.

(C) A constant problem during the year was maintaining accurate and timely release of casualty information. A new directive was being prepared to improve these procedures by the end of the year. The difficulty is not unique to Vietnam since the principal consideration has been to insure that next-of-kin are informed first, by the

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government, before press reports are released. The difficulty of obtaining accurate information on casualties is somewhat more complicated in counterinsurgency since missing-in-action is not readily verifiable through contacts with the Viet Cong. The officially approved casualty figures were reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in Washington by the MACV Office of Information and reflected known casualties; they vary in small detail from the classified figures since the whereabouts of missing personnel is in question. In 1964 total US casualties were 140 killed, 1034 wounded, and 22 missing, which represented over 50 percent of the cumulative total suffered by US forces in RVN.

(C) The high quality of personnel within the Command created fewer disciplinary problems than normal. The principal function of military police was physical security, and increasing VC terroristic activity necessitated more MP units. The 175th MP Detachment was activated in March and augmented in May by the assignment of the 66th MP Company. These units provide military police in the Saigon/Cholon area. Four criminal investigators were also assigned to the Provost Marshal's office for out-of-country investigations. The Provost Marshal recommended physical security plans for all MACV activities and installations throughout RVN. A master plan for security of all BOQ's and BEQ's in the Saigon/Cholon area was approved by COMUSMACV in November, then implemented. One major requirement of unusual note developed during the year--safeguarding Bob Hope and his troupe during the 1964 Christmas holidays. This was completed without incident. The visit did coincide with the bombing of the Brink-BOQ on Christmas eve, which spurred Hope to quip--"while I was going to my hotel in Saigon, I met another hotel going the other way." The incident served to emphasize that physical security was imperfect and that the Viet Cong were no respecters of a holiday spirit.


(U) The USAF provided the important-to-morale postal service within the Command. It grew apace with the buildup of MACV strength. Additional spaces were added to the JED for this service, but assignment considerably lagged the strength increases. New APO's were established at Hue, Quang Ngai, Kontum, Bac Lieu, and Vinh Long, and full service was established at Tan Son Nhut. Facilities at Tan Son Nhut, Saigon, and Da Nang were expanded or in process of expansion by the end of the year. The mobility of personnel within the Command and the absence of a complete and accurate postal locator file delayed delivery of mail to some individuals and units. Mail was, however, handled on a priority basis and was included as air cargo on all scheduled flights. Staff visitors to the most remote field advisory detachments were often pressed into service as mailmen. A significant improvement in delivery of mail to Vietnam was accomplished in

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November when daily service was inaugurated from San Francisco. Prior to that time incoming mail was flown to Vietnam only three times weekly, although CONUS-bound mail had departed daily. COMUSMACV had personally intervened to obtain this improved service following a complaint brought to his attention. A significant improvement of morale resulted.

(U) Religious activities also increased during the year and 26 chaplains were serving the Command in December, nine more than in 1963. This number provided total area coverage without regard to service affiliation. Both a Roman Catholic and a Protestant laymen's retreat were scheduled for November at Dalat, but the Protestant retreat was cancelled because of floods. Construction of chapels was requested at Da Nang, Hue, and Saigon but had not been approved at the end of the year.

(U) The American Red Cross maintained offices in Saigon, and two sub-offices were opened in 1964 at Nha Trang and Can Tho. In addition to its usual welfare activities, the American Red Cross acted as liaison between the League of International Red Cross Societies and the RVN Red Cross during the floods. A special problem was faced in extending a large number of loans to MACV personnel to offset the lagging pay of USAF personnel on TDY in the Command.

(U) The five Special Services officers added to the JTD permitted an expanded program of recreational activities within MACV. In September the MACV Comptroller determined that Aid-in-Kind funds could be used to support Special Services and several items were budgeted following this action. The Capitol Kinh Do theater in Saigon was bombed in February and was then closed permanently. Negotiations were begun for a 35mm theater at Tan Son Nhut and it opened in September. In October a second set of five 16mm film prints started circulation, assuring better movies for the field. The R&R program in the beginning of the year included out-of-country flights to Japan, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Bangkok, and in-country trips to Nha Trang. In April the Japan and Philippine flights were discontinued since they were little used. In 1964 almost 4000 passengers went to Hong Kong and almost 1000 to Bangkok. About 75 percent of the field advisors reported they were able to have at least one R&R trip during their tour. In November, one trip in a TDY-without-per diem status was authorized for all personnel, subject to normal approval.²⁹ The in-country R&R facility at Nha Trang was used by 325 persons since its opening in September. The Special Services library was relocated and expanded from 2000 to 12,000 volumes, and branches were established at Da Nang, Soc Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho. The Saigon USO Club was used by about 400,000 persons in 1964 and a branch club in Da Nang was scheduled for opening


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in January 1965. The MACV sports program was discouraged following the bombing of the Pershing Athletic Field in February. In December action to reopen the field in 1965 was started by HSAS, with plans to restrict its use to participants only. A survey of COMUSMACV recreational needs in July indicated that 13 locations desired swimming pools and action was initiated to procure them in 1965. A swimming pool near Tan Son Nhut was opened in August and pool construction was completed at Bien Hoa in August but was still underway at Soc Trang. However, for the majority of the personnel in MACV recreational facilities were restricted to tennis, volleyball, basketball, and other informally organized sports requiring limited resources.

(U) Supplementing the R&R program, a normal leave and pass policy³⁰ permitted all personnel to take a maximum of 15 consecutive days ordinary leave as operational requirements would allow. Ordinary leave to CONUS was discouraged but emergency and compassionate leaves of 30 days maximum were granted.

ADVISORY EFFORT

(C) As the provider and manager of manpower for US forces the J1 was more deeply involved in US unilateral problems than other staff sections. Increasingly during the year, and prior to the incumbency of Brig Gen Sternberg, it was evident that the influence of personnel policies on RVNAF effectiveness had not been fully appreciated by RVNAF or MACV.

(C) The root of many defeats had been ascribed by advisors and the American press, to poor soldiers, poor leadership, and lack of motivation. These concerns fell within the area of J1's responsibilities. A comprehensive review of RVNAF personnel policies and administration completed by the Adjutant General at the direction of the J1 in March became the basis for many actions during the year. COMUSMACV forwarded the rationale of 28 specific actions to the Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council emphasizing that "if the war is to be won it will be the soldiers who win it, and their morale and welfare must be uppermost in our thoughts." The Murday Report, as the study was known, involved recommendations in the several areas in which J1 advised RVNAF--manpower, personal management, personnel services, and administration.

RVNAF MANPOWER

(C) "Rice-paddy" strengths of military and paramilitary forces in RVN were, in most cases, less than authorized and assigned. A priority requirement in 1964 was to bring these figures into closer coincidence. Table III indicates a shortage of 5.3 percent of authorized strength


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existed in ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) forces as of 31 December 1963. At the same time some shortages were such larger--nine percent for Popular Forces and 17 percent for National Police. Although this does not appear to be beyond tolerable limits, "rice-paddy" strength was well below assigned strength, due to desertions, AWOL's, and inaccurate strength accounting procedures which are described in some detail in Table IV.

(C) The March conference with the Secretary of Defense increased force level goals by 50,000 in regular and paramilitary strengths to support an announced national mobilization. During the year assigned strength did not increase substantially as shown in Table III.³² The 90,336 increase represented a 19 percent increase over the first of the year. The overall assigned shortage was decreased to 2.5 percent of the total authorized. The sharpest rises occurred from July to December and resulted from active US-GVN cooperation in formulating and implementing plans and programs for manpower procurement and utilization. The actual year-end strengths for RF and PF were increased in December by 10,368 and 64,177 respectively so those shortfalls represent higher goals and are less significant than they appear.


(C) A significant manpower question affecting the force goals remained unanswered during much of the year. Considering the increasing degree of Viet Cong control in much of the country and the long years of fighting already past, was sufficient manpower available in areas of GVN control to field the required military forces to defeat the insurgency? To answer this question, MACV conducted a manpower resources survey in each province. The study found that about 365,000 men were available and qualified for the regular forces and an additional 800,000 men could meet the other force requirements. This study confirmed that the force goals were not impossible and were subsequently used as the basis for manpower planning and procurement.

(S) The procurement of manpower was assisted greatly by the promulgation of draft laws during the year. The National Public Service Decree of 6 April resulted directly from discussions between Premier Khanh and Secretary of Defense McNamara in March. This decree provided that all male Vietnamese citizens from 20 - 45 were subject to service in the military and civil defense establishments. Subsequent decrees prescribed draft criteria, lengths of service, redesignated the Civil Guard as the Regional Force and the Self-Defense Corps as the Popular Force, incorporated both into the RVNAP, and set regulations and pay for these elements. A review of the GVN laws by a representative of the US National Selective Service at the request of the Ambassador concluded that draft laws were adequate but improved enforcement was needed.³³

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(S) Ambassador Taylor's concern with manpower problems was evident in the establishment of the US Mission Personnel and Manpower Committee in August. The committee was chaired by [redacted] with representation from other US agencies, and it worked closely with a counterpart GVN committee, frequently meeting in combined session.³⁴ One of the major actions of the committee was the recommendation for a collective call-up of youths aged 20 - 25 with an enforcement period following. Plans for this were developed and approved by the Prime Minister in October. A preliminary call-up in IV Corps in August provided lessons which were incorporated in the national plan. The need for extensive prior planning to include transportation, food, and orientation for the draftees was the major conclusion. A Mobilization Directorate was established in August within the Ministry of Defense to direct the call-up; a US advisor was furnished full time to this office.³⁵

(C) The call-up was conducted during the period 20 October - 2 November with a month enforcement phase following to apprehend and induct draft-dodgers. Pre-call-up publicity emphasized that this was the last time youths 20 - 25 could voluntarily report and that "tough" measures to apprehend and punish evaders would follow.³⁶ Results were initially gratifying. Over 10,000 conscripts were sent to induction stations and in November alone over 11,600 men (including volunteers) were actually inducted into the regular forces. Careful planning, effective publicity, and credibility of the enforcement procedures accounted for this success.³⁷ The enforcement phase was less laudable. Although detailed procedures³⁸ were established for the enforcement, the measures required detailed execution by province chiefs and local officials and were not uniformly effective. The failure to enforce the call-up resulted in new accessions in late November and early December being much less than anticipated and required to meet force level goals.

(C) Meeting 1965 goals seemed particularly remote since 7,000 conscripts were due to be discharged after having been involuntarily extended before Christmas. After MACV urging, a token discharge program was begun in December with completion scheduled for 1965. Keeping faith with the soldier was essential to RVNAF morale and credibility with the public in GVN demanded that the discharge program proceed. COMUSMACV summarized the US view on the importance of more effective execution of the manpower programs:

"...it is imperative for the GVN to act now to vigorously enforce the call up; widely publicize the program to discharge personnel who have been involuntarily extended, pointing out the obligation of other citizens to bear arms to make discharges possible; acquire sufficient personnel

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to offset losses through discharge action and attain authorized force levels; take positive action to prepare for further call-up of personnel by year groups to increase the force levels according to current plans."³⁹

(c) Although this plea was followed by announcement that the Ministry of the Interior would round up draft-dodgers, particularly in the Capital Military District, the whole-hearted GVN action had not begun by the end of the year. The average monthly gains in conscripts achieved during 1964 was 2817 with a high of 5852 in November as a result of the call-up, and a low in February of 797. A total of 33,809 conscripts were added to the regular forces.⁴⁰


(c) In addition to the call-up several other actions were completed in 1964 with the goal of increasing the RVNAF manpower. The MACV J1 and his counterpart and other staff officers visited field recruiting officers.⁴¹ Several extraordinary actions were taken by MACV in an attempt to attain the force levels. In a letter in May and again in June,⁴² COMUSMACV urged the Minister of Defense to establish "material and career benefits...not available to the conscriptee." A comprehensive recruiting campaign was undertaken which included extensive publicity, enlistment bonuses, special training for recruiters, and accelerated quotas for unit recruiting. These actions coupled with the call-up, enabled the regular forces to exceed their authorized strength levels by the end of the year.

(c) Recruiting and the call-up had added 33,180 men to the regular forces during the year, with the bulk from recruiting, joining in the last half of the year. Monthly gains varied from an average of 2765 to a high of 6518.⁴³ Regional Forces gained an average of 2057⁴⁴ monthly and Popular Forces 6903⁴⁵. The greatest gain for the Popular Forces came with the integration of Armed Combat Youth. It must be noted that the greater willingness to serve in the Popular Forces was due to the fact that their normal employment was in their immediate home areas; similarly, the Regional Forces enjoyed greater popularity than the regular forces since they were normally employed in their home provinces. These preferences tended to create a reliance on conscripts for the regular forces.

(c) A special problem considered by both the High Command and MACV was the use of ethnic and religious minorities within the RVNAF.⁴⁶ The increased force levels established for some areas, particularly in the Mekong Delta, relied heavily upon anticipated support of such groups. The Chinese and Montagnards were similarly critical to

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attainment of force goals in other areas. A study of this problem was underway at the close of the year.

(C) As part of the continuing US effort to maintain assigned strengths of combat units at authorized levels, an expanded RVNAF Women's Army Corps was recommended in June.⁴⁷ Although initially rejected by the High Command it was subsequently approved in December⁴⁸ and a plan was developed to increase the WAC from 700 to 2,000;⁴⁹ approval of the plan was anticipated in January 1965. In November WAC recruiting was begun and a training center near Tan Son Nhut was scheduled to open in late January 1965. The plan contemplated a WAC detachment in each of the four corps and replacement of EN by WAC's in clerical and administrative positions. The concept closely paralleled US Army WAC programs.

(C) By December the several actions outlined above had resulted in major programs underway which promised to improve the manpower situation of RVNAF. A series of joint visits by Brig Gen Sternberg and his counterpart throughout the country evaluated these programs. A series of actions for all combat unit commanders was directed which would increase the operational strength of all combat units. They included transferring personnel on detached service to the units with which they were serving, eliminating non-TOE job assignments, limiting rear base personnel to a maximum of 120 per regiment, and recruiting personnel to offset losses.

RVNAF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

(C) The RVNAF promotion system was one of the several personnel management areas which had been scrutinized in the Murday Report. In October an important outgrowth of that attention was realized. A combined US-GVN group began a study of the officer and enlisted promotion systems to increase overall effectiveness. The proposal of the group was essentially to adopt a system similar in concept to that of the US Army.⁵⁰ The principal features were: establishing criteria and procedures for promotion including a merit promotion for outstanding personnel, emphasis on combat service, annual central selection boards, phased promotion throughout the year, and rigid adherence to criteria to insure fairness and wide advertisement of this policy.⁵¹ A regulation implementing this concept had not yet been published at the end of the year.

(S) The continuing US interest in the whole area of promotion obtained important results in the year. Over 4726 officers and 60,749 enlisted men were promoted during the year. A long-standing inequity was erased when a command promotion authorization was made in December.⁵² This policy permitted commanders of units in the

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Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Regional Forces commanders of combat support units of the Regular Force, and district chiefs to be promoted without regard to their regular rank.⁵³ This promotion policy recognized many individuals of long tenure in command positions who served in grades lower than their positions authorized.

(C) A problem throughout the year, and one for which only limited improvement could be expected, was the provision of interpreters to advisory teams. In April the Chief, US Army Section, MAAG, suggested that the interpreter program be managed by ARVN rather than MAAG. The proposal was approved and the Organization and Training (O&T) Directorate managed the program with J1 guidance and assistance until ARVN was ready to assume the responsibility on 1 October.⁵⁴ The interpreter program has improved considerably under the new arrangement. A civilian interpreter program was started to assist the subsector teams.⁵⁵ Requirements for interpreters have been listed in priority. Hop Tac requirements have been satisfied and procedures have been developed to assign language-qualified US advisors to positions without interpreters.⁵⁶ ("Hop Tac" means "many working together" in Vietnamese)

(C) As mentioned earlier, RVNAF strengths were considerably dissipated by desertions (Table IV). Desertion rates in 1964 nearly doubled those for the Regular and Regional Forces over those of 1963 and showed a 50 percent rise for Popular Forces.

(C) Primary causes of the high 1964 desertion rates were: increased numbers of conscripts, relocation of units from previous stations, assignment of personnel in areas away from home provinces, family separations, and lack of an effective leave program.⁵⁷ Desertion was one of the problems addressed in the Marday Report and though a number of recommendations had been made to General Khanh by COMUSMACV in March,⁵⁸ the problem remained acute throughout 1964. RVNAF had urged major unit commanders to adopt special orientation programs for new draftees, but little effect was noticeable.

(C) One handicap in apprehending deserters was overcome during the year by organizing the 3d MP Battalion, the first unit of this size. The unit operated in the III Corps area in support of Hop Tac. Its success led to a study to form ten battalions to be activated during 1965-68. The 3d MP Battalion operations resulted in the seizure of large quantities of contraband items intended for Viet Cong use.⁵⁹ A related study by the Staff Judge Advocate in coordination with the J1 corrected a common misunderstanding regarding the authority of police forces. Many US advisors had complained that RVN laws were inadequate to deal with the insurgent

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activities. The review found that laws were adequate but that ignorance or misinterpretation sometimes resulted in their faulty application and enforcement.

HVNAF PERSONNEL SERVICES

(C) Since improved morale and welfare policies had been highlighted by COMUSMACV in March, a review of morale was prompted in September. Dependant housing and recreational facilities had been improved and continuing emphasis on commanders' concern with troop welfare was needed. Summarizing the results of actions since January 1964, COMUSMACV stated:

"...actions taken by General Khanh are commendatory and although there is much room for continued improvement, I do not consider that shortcomings in welfare and promotion actions in the Regular Force can be seriously considered as a contributing factor in the organization of the coup. ⁶⁰

(S) The continuing occurrence of coups and general political instability in August and September did create grave concern for its potential effect on troop morale. A survey⁶¹ completed by J1 following the September coup was forwarded by COMUSMACV to the Ambassador. The analysis revealed that "while the coup did have an adverse effect on the morale and combat effectiveness of the various elements, the overall effect was less severe than might have been predicted."

(U) A positive accomplishment of the advisory effort was the liberalization of the HVNAF awards policy and establishment of 24 new awards. As a result 19,388 awards were presented in contrast to 13,585 in 1963.


(C) As a result of direct MACV interest and the assignment of an advisor to the Social Services Directorate (SSD) considerable improvement in SSD activities occurred. Among these was the expansion of warehouse and sales facilities for the PX-commissary operations; 14 new outlets were opened including some serving four divisions and five national training centers. ⁶²

(S) The improvement of dependant housing required more prods than courtesy might have urged. The importance of improved housing for dependants had been stressed by COMUSMACV in his letter⁶³ to General Khanh on 16 March. During Secretary McNamara's visit the matter had also been discussed and he had asked COMUSMACV to assist the GVN "in providing the required housing on an expedited basis." COMUSMACV had outlined a course of action to this end on 19 May but General Khanh did not reply. The J1 was designated the US

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representative to expedite the program. A stronger letter on the subject was sent in mid-June and General Khanh's immediate attention was requested.⁶⁴ Subsequent to this the CY 64 housing budget was increased from 50 to 350 million \$VN⁶⁵ and by the end of the year this entire amount had been obligated in contracts. By December all of CY 63 housing units had been completed and CY 64 construction totaled 12,341 units, exceeding the number constructed from CY 61 through 63.⁶⁶ This experience demonstrated that significant results could be obtained when high priority was assigned even though considerable resistance and lack of interest characterized the GVN attitude.

(C) A series of pay raises for the various elements of RVNAP were instituted during 1964. In the several recommendations made on this subject by COMUSMACV two considerations prevailed--the missions of the fighting forces and the role of the family as the dominant concern of the individual soldier. The first pay raise applied to the Regular lower three grades of enlisted men and gave them an additional 200 \$VN effective 15 February. The Civil Guard (later Regional Force) lower three grades received a raise of 100 \$VN effective 1 March and a similar raise was given the Self-Defense Corps (later Popular Force) and trainees in the Junk Force.⁶⁷ Conscript pay was equalized to that of volunteers effective 1 May.⁶⁸ An adjustment in base pay to offset the increased cost of living was made for all officers, noncommissioned officers, and corporals first class effective 1 July.⁶⁹ Another raise improving base pay and allowances for Regular and Regional Forces became effective 1 November.⁷⁰ It included a ten percent increase in base pay for Regular officers, NCO's, and corporals first class, and 300 \$VN monthly increase for the lower three grades and all personnel of the Popular Force and the Coastal Force. Additionally, NCO's and corporals were given the same allowance as officers for high cost of living. These actions greatly improved morale and assured higher standards of living, although insufficient time had elapsed by the end of the year to note their effect on enlistments, desertions, and other indicators.

RVNAP ADMINISTRATION


(U) The revision and updating of qualification records of officers and EN and improvement of the strength reporting systems were the two principal efforts in the administrative field. Both had been included in the Marday Report. The qualification records had often been incomplete and inaccurate. Inadequacies in these basic records prevented other urgently required improvements in the personnel management field. Records were adapted in 1964 for use of machine records which would greatly assist in personnel

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management and strength accounting.⁷¹ Following the search letter to General Khanh and a study of the strength accounting system, classes for personnel officers were conducted in the field and liaison teams were assigned to corps to supervise the implementation of the new reporting system. Frequent field visits by US advisors were required and further improvement in the strength accounting system was expected in 1965. As part of the new system, new report forms were adopted and were in use in all corps by 15 November. The changes in the system were also designed for machine tabulation.

(U) The establishment of an adequate printing facility and standardization of publications had also been a priority action identified in the Murday Report. A modern printing plant and publications center had begun at Camp Tran Hung Dao as a result of planning begun in late 1962. The center opened on 15 December 1964. A comprehensive program⁷³ had been developed and presented to the High Command printing control committee which promised that economies of operation and standardization of forms, distribution, storage and issue procedures, and numbering systems would be effected.

SUMMARY

(C) In October a study of the MACV personnel advisory effort indicated a number of significant problem areas. Many of these stemmed from the fact that personnel advisors had been eliminated from divisions in the 1000-man cut in 1963 and corps efforts were thereby considerably weakened. In September 1964 these positions were again authorized at division and a buildup in advisory capacity slowly developed again throughout the field. It was found that both corps and division G1 advisors were inadequately informed of RVNAF personnel programs and that their counterparts were not better informed. US advisors were too heavily engaged in US personnel activities and most were devoting less than half their time, and some none of their time, to RVNAF personnel matters. Commanders generally were unconcerned with personnel programs and personally took little interest in morale and welfare programs. Inadequate communication existed between G3/J1 and corps and division G1's and much information never trickled down to the persons needing it, advisors or counterparts. G1 advisors were seldom brought into planning problems by other corps and division advisors.⁷⁴ For each of these deficiencies in the field advisory effort some reflections were also mirrored by conditions in MACV and the High Command.

(C) Action to correct these deficiencies were several. A bi-monthly conference of G1 advisors and their counterparts was instituted;⁷⁵ the first conference in December dispelled such

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
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erroneous information. An orientation program for incoming personnel advisors was begun. New systems of communication from Saigon to the field were developed and staff visits were increased.⁷⁶ Senior advisors were urged to use GI advisors solely in advisory matters rather than administrative duties.⁷⁷ At MACV Headquarters the J1 advisory branch was strengthened and new programs were developed.

(C) A tally at the end of 1964 revealed that substantial progress had been made on 16 of the 28 specific actions recommended by the Murday Report and for only two had efforts gained no results. Effective programs had been instituted in line with the recommendations in: enacting a national military service law, decreasing conscription shortfalls, achieving strength goals, improving desertion control, instituting personnel management teams, improving officer and enlisted promotions and obtaining battlefield promotions, establishing standard pay and allowances, improving dependent housing, obtaining increased command attention to troop welfare, establishing leave programs, obtaining more effective release programs, establishing a printing and publications system, and increasing the use of automatic data processing. Some progress had been obtained in other areas though continued MACV encouragement in 1965 would be required for: obtaining higher strengths in combat units, improving qualification records, instituting an officer rotation system, increasing decentralization of authority, expanding the MOS system, improving aptitude testing, obtaining an effective efficiency report system, improving recreational facilities, developing TOE's, improving strength accounting and statistical procedures, and obtaining increased compliance with orders. An inadequate response was obtained to two recommendations and little progress was anticipated in expanding the officer appointment base and equalizing retirement benefits for all forces.⁷⁸

(C) Even though many faults in the RVNAF personnel system remained having the disapproval of US advisors, 1964 marked a series of significant improvements. The year had witnessed considerable fluctuation in US forces and their organization but it was apparent that an important gap in the US program was closing by the extension of the advisor effort in the important personnel area.

(C) As these advisory programs developed, closer coordination between the MACV J1 and the rest of the MACV staff also seemed likely to follow. Although programs were changing constantly, significant improvement in the staff relationships were noted by officers within the J1 section. The forecast expansion of all US programs might temporarily divert J1 concentration to US unilateral programs but the value of the RVNAF advisory effort was indelibly marked.

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TABLE I:

MACV PERSONNEL STRENGTHS

<u>SECTION</u>	<u>ASG</u>	<u>21 May 64</u>		<u>ASG</u>	<u>1 Jan 65</u>	
		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% FILL</u>		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% FILL</u>
J1	26	22	118	46	35	
J2	81	135	60	133	135	
J3	85	105	81	153	130	110
J4	40	40	100	47	43	109
J5	20	20	100	35	30	117
J6	106	130	82	147	132	111
AG	118	104	114	147	136	108
HQ COMDT	94	73	129	48	49	98
COMPT	14	18	78	21	18	117
SURG	22	20	110	23	21	110
SJA	6	7	86	9	7	114
JRATA	12	12	100	13	12	109
G&T	139	191	99	226	194	116
MAP	16	15	107	14	15	93
DAML	174	133	131	175	148	118
OI	19	19	100	57	59	97
NAV GP	143	154	93	245	235	104
AF GP	210	229	92	309	305	101
RF/FF	26	23	113	26	23	113
I CORPS	122	113	108	153	117	131
II CORPS	134	131	103	187	143	131
III CORPS	194	190	102	201	156	129
IV CORPS	113	104	109	151	123	123

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


TABLE II:

MACV AWARD AUTHORITY

US ARMY

AWARDED:

DFC, SM, BSM, AM, ACM, PH

AM, ACM, PH

LEGION OF MERIT

SILVER STAR OR HIGHER

AUTHORITY:

COMUSMACV

CG, USASCV

CINCUSARPAC

HQ DA

US NAVY

PH

AM (Sustained operations only)

ALL OTHERS

CNO, CMC

CGFMFPAC
(Members only
of CTU 79.3.5)

SECNAV

US AIR FORCE

BSM; AM, AFCM, PH

ALL OTHERS

COMDR, 2AD

HQ USAF

JOINT SERVICE AWARDS

JSCM

CINCPAC


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RVNAF TROOP STRENGTH

250 Number of Troops in Thousands




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TABLE III

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TABLE IV:

DESERTION RATES 1962-1964

	1962	1963	1964
Regular Force	4.65	3.78	8.32
Regional Force	7.39	7.72	13.18
Popular Force	12.22	16.11	24.45

x 100 per thousand

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
FOOTNOTES

1. Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV, Cite 4897, DTG 151953Z Feb 64. File MACJ1 (S).
2. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ01 1227, DTG 171055Z Feb 64. File MACJ1 (S).
3. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 180150Z Feb 64. File MACJ1 (S).
4. Memo, MACV(J1) to VMAC, 3 Mar 64, Subj: Reorganization of the Command Element, Vietnam. File MACJ1.
5. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ01 1867, DTG 111034Z Mar 64. File MACJ1 (S).
6. Ltr, MACJ1, Ser 5300/0219, 12 Mar 64, Subj: Study on Reorganization of Hq MACV and MAAG (U). File MACJ1 (C).
7. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 220912Z Mar 64. File MACJ1 (S).
8. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DTG 310935Z Mar 64. File MACJ1 (S).
9. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 012308Z Apr 64. File MACJ1 (C).
10. Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV, Cite 5802, DTG 101545Z Apr 64. File MACJ12 (C).
11. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ1 3067, DTG 200309Z Apr 64. File MACJ1 (S).
12. Ltr, Hq MACV, Ser 0415, 23 Apr 64, Subj: MACV, 15 May 64 JTD (U). File MACJ12 (C).
13. MAAG GO 165, 14 May 64.
14. MACV GO 49, 15 May 64.
15. Ltr, Hq MACV, Ser 0415, 23 Apr 64, Subj: MACV, 15 May 64 JTD (U). File MACJ12 (C).
16. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ32 5380, DTG 240005Z Jun 64. File MACJ12.
17. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ32 4661, DTG 060839Z Jun 64. File MACJ12.
18. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ32 6180, DTG 161045Z Jul 64. File MACJ12.
19. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ1 7044, DTG 281229Z Jul 64. File MACJ12 (S).
20. Ltr, Hq MACV to CINCPAC, Subj: Strength Report Vietnam (CINCPAC BOS 5314-1) (U). File MACJ12 (S).
21. Ltr, Hq MACV, 30 Nov 64, Subj: Personnel Utilization. File MACJ12.
22. Interview, Lt Col William R. Hesser, J1, 19 Apr 65. File Hist Br (S).
23. Interview, Lt Col John L. Davis, III, J1, 19 Apr 65. File Hist Br (S).
24. Interview, Brig Gen Ben Sternberg, ACofS, J1, May 65. File Hist Br (S).
25. Interview, Lt Col William R. Hesser, J1, 19 Apr 65. File
26. MACV Directive 672-1, 1 Sep 64.
27. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Cite MACJ1 1263, Feb 64. File MACJ13.
28. Msg, PACAF to 2d AD, Cite P 714, Jun 64. File MACJ1.
29. Msg, JCS to COMUSMACV, Cite OCL716, DTG 101447Z Nov 64. File MACJ1.



30. MACV Directive 630-3, 1964
31. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MAC 2806 Intel, DTG 042139Z Jun 64. File MACJ1.
32. DF, MACJ1 to Cofs, 16 Jan 65, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U). File MACJ14 (C).
33. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Nov 64, Subj: Measures of National Mobilization to Put SVN On A War Footing (U), TAB B, para 3. File MACJ14 (S).
34. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Dec 64, Subj: Effective Enforcement of the GVN Conscription Program (U), para 1. File MACJ14 (C).
35. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Nov 64, Subj: Measures of National Mobilization to Put SVN On A War Footing (U), TAB B, para 3. File MACJ14 (S).
36. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Dec 64, Subj: Effective Enforcement of the GVN Conscriptioa Program (U), para 2. File MACJ14 (C).
37. Ibid.
38. DF, MACJ1 to Cofs, 31 Oct 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U), para 2b. File MACJ14 (C).
39. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Dec 64, Subj: Effective Enforcement of the GVN Conscription Program (U), para 4.6. File MACJ14 (C).
40. Fact Sheet, MACJ1 to Cofs, 15 Jan 65, Subj: Regular Force Gains and Losses (U). File MACJ14 (C).
41. DF, MACJ1 to Cofs, Aug 64, Subj: Input for US Mission Meeting (U), para d. File MACJ14 (C).
42. Ltr, COMUSMACV to MGen Kriem, 24 Jun 64. File MACJ14.
43. Fact Sheet, MACJ1 to Cofs, 15 Jan 64, Subj: Regular Force Gains and Losses (U). File MACJ14 (C).
44. Fact Sheet, MACJ1 to Cofs, 15 Jan 65, Subj: Regional and Popular Force Gains and Losses (U). File MACJ14 (C).
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47. Fact Sheet, MACJ1 to Cofs, 17 Jun 64, Subj: GVN Forces Building (U). File MACJ14.
48. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Minister of Defense, No 016,66, Subj: Recruiting of Female Personnel. File MACJ14.
49. DF, MACJ1 to Cofs, 24 Oct 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U). File MACJ14 (C).
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52. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Nov 64, Subj: Measures of National Mobilization to Put SVN On A War Footing (U), para 3. File MACJ14 (S).
53. DF, MACJ1 to Cofs, 12 Dec 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U), para 2. File MACJ14 (C).

54. DF, MACJ1 to Director, O&T Div, 5 May 64, Subj: ARVN Interpreter Program. File MACJ14.
55. DF, MACJ1 to CofS, 17 Oct 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting. File MACJ14.
56. MFR, Major J. T. Hayes, J1, 17 Jan 65, Subj: Interpreter Program. File MACJ14.
57. Fact Sheet, MACJ14 to CofS, 19 Jan 65, Subj: RVNAP Desertion Rates (U). File MACJ1 (C).
58. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Gen Khanh, Ser 753, 31 Mar 64, Annex 13 to Incl. File MACJ14.
59. Interview, Major N. R. Pugliese, Provost Marshal Office, 20 Apr 65. File Hist Br (S).
60. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 19 Sep 64, Subj: Morale and Welfare of Officers and Noncommissioned Officer of the Regular Force. File MACJ14.
61. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 2 Oct 64, Subj: Evaluation of Morale and Combat Effectiveness of RVN Units in Post-Coup Attempt Period (U). File MACJ14 (S).
62. DF, MACJ1 to CofS, 17 Oct 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U), para 2. File MACJ14 (C).
63. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Gen Khanh, Ser 753, 31 Mar 64. File MACJ14.
64. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Gen Khanh, Ser 1391, 16 Jun 64. File MACJ14.
65. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 16 Nov 64, Subj: Measures of National Mobilization to Put SVN On A War Footing (U). File MACJ14 (S).
66. Chart, MACJ1, Title: Distribution of RVNAP Family Housing Unit, CY61-CY64. File MACJ14.
67. Fact Sheet, MACJ1 to CofS, 10 May 64, Subj: Increased Compensation for GVN Military and Para Military Forces. File MACJ14.
68. Ibid.
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70. DF, MACJ1 to CofS, 31 Oct 64, Subj: Input for Weekly Mission Meeting (U), para 2. File MACJ14 (C).
71. Ltr, Hq MACV, Ser 3242, 28 Mar 64, Subj: Personnel Accounting System for the Regular Force, para 1 and 2 of Incl. File MACJ14.
72. Ltr, COMUSMACV to Gen Khanh, Ser 753, 31 Mar 64, Annexes 3 and 4 to Incl. File MACJ14.
73. Ibid, Annex 25 to Incl.
74. DF, MACJ1 to CofS, 15 Jan 65, Subj: Personnel Advisory Effort (U). File MACJ14 (C).
75. Memo, MACJ1 thru COMUSMACV to Executive Secretary, US Mission Council 8 Jan 65, Subj: Progress Report, US Mission Personnel and Manpower Commission (8 Jan 65) (U). File MACJ14 (C).
76. DF, MACJ1 to CofS, 15 Jan 65, Subj: Personnel Advisory Effort (U). File MACJ14 (C).
77. Msg, DEFCOMUSMACV to SA (Corps and Div), Dec 64, Subj: Utilization of Corps and Div G1 Advisors (U). File MACJ14 (C).
78. Interview, Major Jared B. Schopper, J1, 20 Apr 65. File Hist Br (S).



(TS) CHAPTER II

INTELLIGENCE


(U) In Phuoc Tuy Sector in December 1964 the Sector Operations and Intelligence Center (SOIC) reported the movement of large Viet Cong concentrations into a previously calm area, thus predicting the battle of Binh Gia. Also in December, the SOIC at Ba Auyen Sector launched an operation of Regional Force units to check a reported Viet Cong force. This became the Battle of Dai Ngai where the Viet Cong lost numerous personnel and weapons but with minor ARVN losses. In Binh Dinh Sector in early '65 the SOIC noted a Viet Cong buildup; this intelligence resulted in 200 Viet Cong deaths. In April 1965, Kien Hoa Sector sent four intelligence agents to locate Viet Cong units. They returned with definite information; as a result Operation Tien Giang 19/65 was launched. This operation resulted in 86 Viet Cong killed with negligible RVNAF casualties.¹

(C) These and other examples indicated that efforts to organize and establish an effective intelligence organization within RVNAF in 1964 were at last starting to reap dividends. 1964, a year of reorganization, buildup, and laying groundwork for RVNAF intelligence, paid off. Intelligence was beginning to obtain results not only in the tactical realm, but also strategically. Increased aerial reconnaissance capability built up in 1964 was providing sound targets for VNAF and US airstrikes not only in South Vietnam, but also in North Vietnam and Laos. The year of reorganization and buildup augured well.


REORGANIZATION AND BUILDUP

(S) At the end of 1963 previous US consideration of the progress of the war changed as the new military government became established. But some actions proceeded based upon earlier plans; for example, overall advisory strength was reduced by 1000 as of December 1963. During this same period, however, Washington officials were taking a closer look at the situation. The new government disagreed considerably with optimistic estimates which the Diem government had proclaimed. On paper the war had seemed to be progressing well but in actuality was being lost. As a result the entire reporting system was reevaluated and coordinated. All terms and reports were defined and studied with renewed interest. RVNAF was reporting the presence of significantly more Viet Cong than the US evaluation indicated. Resolution of this difference resulted in a great increase in US-reported Viet Cong order of battle (a net increase of approximately 44 percent for the year).² This reevaluation culminated in the visit of Secretary of Defense McNamara in March of 1964.

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(C) The lines of communication between Saigon and Washington proved to be not only long but intricate. The picture put forth at one end and interpreted by the many staffs and agencies along the way looked somewhat different at the other end.

(C) Obviously US support had to be reconsidered. Instead of reducing support to RVN the US would have to initiate a buildup, and plan to stay in Vietnam indefinitely. Immediate steps were taken to stop and reverse the speeding train of US effort which had planned withdrawal of forces by 1965.

(S) During 1964, to keep pace with intelligence requirements and possible extensive US involvement in Southeast Asia, the US intelligence effort in Vietnam was reorganized and expanded. When the decision was made in March to extend the US effort in Vietnam, plans were developed for degrees of expansion and possible eventualities. One eventuality that came about was the combination of MACV and MAAG in May. That resulted in the J2 section increasing from five to six branches as follows: Collection Branch (formerly Plans and Operations); Counterintelligence and Security Branch; Production Branch; Reconnaissance and Photo Intelligence Branch; J2, High Command, Advisory Branch; and Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC). The CIIC was the new branch.³ Concurrently, the J2 strength increased from 76 to 135.⁴ Prior Planning contributed to smooth transition and uninterrupted J2 operations.

(S) One of the most important additions to J2 in 1964 was the CIIC. The need for this branch was realized in early 1964. The COMUSMACV's concept for the establishment of an Indications Center outlined the mission of providing continuous evaluation of political and military events in Southeast Asia for indicators of the threat to US interests. This branch was fully operational by August, and was organized in two sections: Warning, which provided 24 hour reception, collation, analysis, and reporting of intelligence received from all sources; and Analysis (formerly Current Intelligence), which provided a strategic viewpoint of all information collected in Southeast Asia. The Analysis Section provides a daily intelligence summary, a weekly presentation, and other special briefings to COMUSMACV and distinguished visitors.⁵

Current Intelligence and Indications Center

(TS) In September a realignment of functions within J2 placed the Analysis Section under Production Branch and added a Plans and Targets Section to the CIIC. The latter section prepared and updated intelligence estimates and target lists for Southeast Asia contingency plans, and also undertook special studies. A major project was the preparation of proposed target lists for the Laos Panhandle. These lists were approved and a combined Embassy Vientiane - MACV list compiled. In October these lists were used to initiate interdiction of communist infiltration.⁶

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(S) Another significant element of the reorganization was the assumption of attache functions by the J2, Collection Branch, and the elimination of the US Attache post in Vietnam. Also, the Collection Branch expanded liaison with the United States Overseas Mission (USOM) and the United States Information Service (USIS). This liaison gave J2 the added capability to tap and collate the valuable information sources of the two US agencies. In the case of USIS, the liaison officer dealt mostly with newspaper reporters, interviewing them after field trips to gain any information they might have gathered and also to give the reporters access to background information from intelligence files when appropriate. In this manner rapport with the press was established and much valuable information was added to the vast intelligence input.

(C) In the case of USOM, liaison was important because of the National Police and the Chieu Hoi programs. The value of National Police information requires no explanation but the contribution of the Chieu Hoi program is less apparent.

(C) The Chieu Hoi Program (essentially meaning "open arms") is the GVN surrender plan for the Viet Cong and has keen interest for J2 because of information gathered from Chieu Hoi ralliers. The original program was announced by President Diem on 17 April 1963. It was placed under the Minister for National Defense on 28 December 1963 and achieved psychological prominence at national and province level during 1964. In May 1964 Premier Khanh placed the program under a special commissioner.⁸ This action centralized the program responsibility in one individual, simplifying the coordination problems of USOM as the US agency responsible for Chieu Hoi. The program provided safe conduct, reorientation, vocational training, and resettlement assistance for Viet Cong, Viet Cong supporters, and sympathizers who defect, as well as RVNAP deserters and petty criminals. In the past the program had been badly administered by the Vietnamese. Its psychological content was weak and appeals untimely. The resettlement program had never been implemented and problems such as security, land titles, and political status existed. Despite all these shortcomings the program enjoyed some success. From April 1963 to 1 January 1965 a total of 16,859 ralliers (Chieu Hoi returnees) have been processed.⁹ J2 has gained valuable information from ralliers, such as unit designations, locations of arms caches, and indications of Viet Cong intentions.

(S) Another significant element of reorganization was the formation (by the Counterintelligence and Security Branch) of a Counterintelligence Advisory Committee (CAC). This committee consisted of representatives from all counterintelligence sources in-country and was set up in the fall of 1964, and was fully operational by December.

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The committee met monthly to discuss current counterintelligence events and to present a unified counterintelligence picture to the command. During its short existence it has drafted the first all Counterintelligence Coverage Plan and set up an integrated radio net between all the counterintelligence agencies located in Saigon. This committee also kept COMUSMACV informed of counterintelligence estimates, measures, functions, procedures and plans essential to the security of the Command.¹⁰ All these functions had previously been informal, uncoordinated, and unsatisfactory. CAC has performed a valuable and much needed service during its short existence, and should prove even more valuable in the future.

(S) A unique aspect of the US intelligence effort in Vietnam is that it must study not only the Viet Cong, but also the Vietnamese. The likelihood and actuality of coups in 1964 caused US intelligence agencies to remain current on the status of Vietnamese leaders and military units. Senior advisors reported any unique movements or attitudes directly to COMUSMACV in an effort to keep ahead of any possible government change.

(C) In 1964, a MACV Intelligence Collection Plan was published for the first time.¹¹ This plan promoted the efficient collection of intelligence by determining EEI, designating collectors, and establishing priorities. The absence of a unified collection plan had been a serious deficiency of MACV intelligence. A new "Intelligence Guide and Operating Procedures" was also published.¹²

ADVISORY EFFORT - LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

(C) In January 1964, the RVNAF Directorate of Intelligence underwent a complete reorganization. This was the initial step in laying the groundwork for more effective use of our advisory effort. This reorganization closely paralleled the US system and made it easier to render understandable advice. The old organization reflected French influence and was not compatible with demands of modern intelligence operations. The benefits of the reorganization continued to accrue throughout the year and, although neither fully nor happily accepted by the Vietnamese at first, by year's end its values were apparent to them.¹³


(C) The overthrow of President Diem in November 1963 had rendered an adverse blow to the GVN intelligence network because police structure disintegrated, Diem's personal agents were removed, and many government officials were changed country-wide,¹⁴ and the Vietnamese J2 High Command Advisory Branch had to reestablish an effective, competent, intelligence organization with direction. This included establishing an acceptable collection system, publishing directives, determining standards, and training personnel.

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(C) Among the accomplishments by the High Command Advisory Branch was the reorganization of the J2/High Command Documents Library. The Library had no filing system and had relied on individuals' memory of document locations. Through the training of US advisors and through education of the Vietnamese, the Documents Library was reorganized in May. The new system incorporated an indexing and cross-indexing method of cataloging and filing all record material. This project resulted in a greatly facilitated system for handling materials invaluable to the intelligence process.¹⁵

(U) Another very important contribution was the publication of numerous guidance documents by the Vietnamese with dissemination down the Vietnamese intelligence chain. These documents were valuable for providing common goals.

(S) One document published in March was "Training of NCO Interrogators for Small Units." This guidance resulted in approximately 1000 non-commissioned officers receiving training on the conduct of immediate tactical interrogations.¹⁶ Another document published in March was entitled, "Prisoners of War, Documents and Material Captured on the Battlefield." This document, for the first time, gave specific guidance for disposition of these intelligence sources.¹⁷ An August publication was "PW Evacuation and Transfer by RVNAF." It established definite procedures for prisoner handling and processing throughout RVNAF.¹⁸

(C) These guidances, basic field manuals within the US Army, had not been previously published and distributed by the Vietnamese. In most cases, original drafts were prepared by US advisors and then "sold" to the Vietnamese J2, High Command. As a result, J2 MACV realized a greater use of intelligence sources and a greater intelligence output of higher quality.

(S) It is interesting to note that although US agencies do not refer to captured Viet Cong as prisoners of war, RVNAF does not pay heed to this. US agencies refer to them as Viet Cong captives. The reasoning behind this is legal; advantages accrued to the Viet Cong if they were accorded official status as POW's.¹⁹

(U) One further bit of groundwork was the expansion of a Vietnamese intelligence school system. Many quotas for Vietnamese to attend US intelligence schools were procured and the Vietnamese intelligence school system was upgraded.

(S) One expansion in January occurred when US advisors proposed an interrogator training program be set up at the Military Intelligence Center (MIC) of the J2/High Command. Approximately 40 students were

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
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trained in 1964.²⁰ Success of this program was shown by the MIC processing 193 detainees of all types and issuing 297 source exploitation intelligence reports in 1964.²¹ These reports exhibited a substantial increase over 1963 in both volume and quality. In February, US advisors recommended an increase in the RVNAF Intelligence School physical plant facilities to meet the growing demand for trained intelligence personnel. Construction started in July on the Cay Mai Intelligence School, to expand its capacity from 1388 to 2000 students.²²

(S) One glaring problem in intelligence was within the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). Prior to January 1964, the VNN intelligence capability was virtually non-existent. Only two VNN officers had any formal intelligence schooling. The J2/High Command Advisory Branch continually stressed the importance of developing the VNN intelligence capabilities and its possible role in the intelligence community. Since January approximately 25 officers and 12 enlisted men had attended intelligence schools and a significant improvement in naval intelligence followed.²³ Naval intelligence at year's end was accepted by J2/High Command as greatly improved. Accurate reporting supplemented by an active collection effort resulted in the capture of many documents and weapons. Navy Intelligence Summaries are now disseminated country-wide and are considered quite valuable.

(S) In addition to establishing basic courses of intelligence instruction and implementing a military interrogator program, US advisors recognized that it was necessary to develop expertise in the Vietnamese intelligence interrogators. It was therefore recommended that an advanced interrogation training course be established. This proposal was accepted and the first class of 15 officers attended in July.²⁴


(S) Although great strides were made in establishing a professional intelligence system for the Vietnamese-US effort in 1964, there were problems remaining unsolved or partially solved. The J2/High Command was supposedly a joint staff, but in reality it was almost completely army at the outset of 1964. Consequently, coordination with air force and navy intelligence agencies had been very difficult and, in many cases, incomplete or absent. Much coordination was accomplished by US advisors. US advice consistently recommended the addition of air force and navy personnel to the J2/High Command staff to facilitate coordination. A breakthrough was made in September when a VNAF air intelligence officer was assigned. This officer was the Air Staff Intelligence Representative in all areas of air interest. At year's end there was still no navy representation on the staff, supposedly due to critical personnel shortages in the VNN.²⁵

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(C) Another problem was proper personnel utilization. It had been found in far too many cases that after initial training, Vietnamese intelligence personnel returned to their posts, and were used in different jobs, or had so many additional duties that they couldn't perform their primary intelligence duties. US advisors constantly urged their counterparts to check on school-trained personnel to see that they were properly assigned. Although somewhat improved at the end of 1964, the problem still existed.²⁶

(S) It was difficult to lay extensive groundwork while fighting a war. Basic intelligence documents were published by the Vietnamese and provided tools of the trade. The entire J2/High Command was reorganized to parallel more closely the US organization. Files were more orderly organized. Intelligence schools of several types were established as well as continued schooling of many Vietnamese in the US. Many strides were taken; many remain for the future. The J2/High Command must become truly joint and intelligence-trained personnel must be properly used.

TACTICAL EFFORTS

(C) In the realm of tactical intelligence in 1964 the main accomplishments were training agents and interrogators, improving reporting techniques, allocating money for intelligence use by sectors, and forming military intelligence detachments.

(C) Agents and interrogators were trained in Saigon for use at company, battalion, and sector level. The ultimate goal was to have two trained interrogators at company and battalion level for immediate battlefield information. It had been found that at sector the untrained interrogator was easily fooled by hard-core Viet Cong captives. A course was designed and presented in an effort to prevent this from happening. During 1964 great benefits were realized by having a trained interrogator at these levels. The suspect could be interrogated for tactical intelligence and then be shipped immediately though the chain of interrogation with each level benefitting.

(S) Another tactical-level action was increased coordination to facilitate reporting. The principal change was the formation of the Sector Operations Intelligence Center.²⁷ The SOIC was to be a focal point for all intelligence operations with all intelligence agencies in a sector. This would permit a free exchange of information and present a clearer picture of the sector situation. This concept worked extremely well, but was dependent mostly on the caliber of the Vietnamese sector commander, his S2, and the US advisor. In many cases the SOIC also included the sector operations center. This


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collocation facilitated planning operations and placed the sector S2 and S3 in the same room, thus improving coordination. The success of some SOIC's was demonstrated in Kien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy, Binh Thanh and Ba Xuyen sectors. They initiated Regional and Popular Force operations and also determined patrol and ambush sites. Although the SOIC's were not completely adequate in 1964, at least they were organized and operational.

(S) Another significant item of tactical intelligence effort was the establishment of a sector intelligence fund.²⁸ These funds were administered by the Collection Branch, J2, MACV. This is not to say that the US advisor paid agents directly. He did not, but gave the money to his counterpart to pay agents. The RVNAF intelligence officer has a small fund of his own, but it is too small to be of real value. The US advisor could supplement this RVNAF fund as he saw fit.

(S) In October a need was seen for RVNAF military intelligence detachments in the Phuoc-Binh-Thanh, Binh-Lam, Phuoc-Bien Special Zones and Capital Military District. All division areas had organic military intelligence units, but insufficient intelligence capability in these special zones reduced the efficiency of the national intelligence effort. The J2, High Command Advisory Branch broached the subject with the Vietnamese, who agreed. In the same month, a proposal was submitted to J3 to increase RVNAF intelligence strength ceiling. This was approved by RVNAF J3 on 1 December 1964, and military intelligence detachments should join these special zones in early 1965.²⁹

(S) On the tactical level in 1964, intelligence definitely improved. The training of interrogators for company, battalion, and sector greatly facilitated collection of immediate battlefield intelligence. The establishment of the SOIC for the first time brought all sector intelligence agencies together where they could exchange information and formulate plans; the establishment of an intelligence fund for the sector intelligence advisor provided new channels of intelligence and gave the advisor some leverage over his counterpart.

AIR EFFORT

(C) A large increment of the increased intelligence input in 1964 came as a result of the air reconnaissance buildup, both qualitative and quantitative. The combination of more aircraft, faster flying aircraft (jets), better photo processing methods, and a 24 hour-a-day capability added together to greatly increase the amount of intelligence gathered by aerial means.

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(c) (S) The need for air reconnaissance and photo intelligence increased due to three factors: (1) national interest in determining military buildups in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; (2) increased JCS interest in the Laotian situation beginning in 1964 which prompted medium and low level reconnaissance of Laos; and (3) application of extensive infrared reconnaissance to seek out the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

(c) (S) During 1964, infiltration routes were partially identified by aerial photography. J2 MACV had estimated the numbers and types of infiltrators and materiel solely based on interrogation of Viet Cong captives and captured Viet Cong documents.³⁰ Other sources had proved unreliable. However, in 1964 aerial photography uncovered and defined many routes of infiltration. The covert movement of men and materiel from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam along the extensive system of jungle trails increased Viet Cong strength by about 7000 men in 1964 with approximately 90 percent of the reported infiltrators being young draftees of native North Vietnamese origin.³¹ As in previous years the bulk was destined for Viet Cong Military Region 5 to form new main force battalions, to replace experienced battalions transferred to provincial control.³² The aerial photography of infiltration routes in 1964 provided an abundance of targets, but bombing was not started until 1965.

(c) (S) In April the 716th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (VNAF) was phased out by converting the resources to tactical bombing units, necessitating all aerial photo support for RVNAF to be performed by the US.³³ At first glance this would appear to be against the US policy of "working ourselves out of a job," but this action was essential due to a scarcity of VNAF pilots. Pilots were needed in combat squadrons and the US was better equipped and had more pilots to perform the reconnaissance. Eventually this capability will have to be re-developed in the RVNAF, but in 1964 the critical need required diversion of combat pilots from reconnaissance.

(TS) The buildup and expansion of aerial reconnaissance started in February when high altitude flights with U2 aircraft began over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.³⁴ As more emphasis was placed on aerial reconnaissance the role of the Reconnaissance Photo Intelligence Branch of J2, MACV, expanded, eventually to monitor and process requirements for US Special Forces and Vietnamese in addition to the MACV staff. In May, low level reconnaissance began in Laos, using the combined resources of the United States Air Force and Navy, under the code name YANKEE TEAM.³⁵ In August steps were taken to evaluate the reconnaissance resources within RVN. This led to the assignment of infrared/radar equipped Army aircraft to complement the expanded Air Force infrared program.³⁶


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(S) The arrival of a Navy carrier with aircraft equipped with night flash/strobe equipment provided new capabilities for TEAM and other RVN requirements. The Reconnaissance and Interpretation (RPI) Branch proposed expanding the existing night reconnaissance capability by using Navy aircraft. This action was approved by CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, and was scheduled to begin in early 1965.³⁷ The use of more and faster jet reconnaissance aircraft on a 24 hour-a-day basis insured that reconnaissance and photo intelligence efforts will provide a major source of intelligence in the future.

(S) In 1964 there was a pressing need to shorten the time for developing a strike target and reporting the target to a tactical unit before the target moved away. In an attempt to solve this problem a target research and analysis group was formed within the RPI Branch on a trial basis, using new techniques. The results led to the formation of a Target Research and Analysis Center (TRAC). The concept included initial assignment of US and RVN personnel with a gradual takeover by RVN personnel. The change was approved by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC in December 1964.³⁸ This agency will greatly increase the air capability for timely strikes on Viet Cong targets.

SUMMARY

(U) In late 1964 the efforts to build up and refine all intelligence agencies and sources in South Vietnam started to reap dividends. Operations based on accurate intelligence began to engage Viet Cong forces where they had been reported. The Viet Cong found it increasingly difficult to move large troop concentrations without being preyed upon by US and VNAF air strikes and ARVN ground units, and he was being struck in his base areas.

(C) These recent successes were the result of the reorganization, buildup, and refinement of the RVNAF and US intelligence efforts during 1964. At the same time J2 doubled its strength and continued to perform its mission. The J2/High Command was reorganized to more closely parallel US organizations, and greatly eased the rendering of advice by US advisors.

(S) On the tactical level the SOIC was an effort to centralize and coordinate intelligence agencies within the sector. Although success of the SOIC varied in all 45 sectors, the general consensus was favorable and was confirmed by tactical successes. The allocation of funds to the sector intelligence advisor enlarged the provincial intelligence machinery and gave the advisor more influence with his counterpart.

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
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(U) The buildup in J2 added to the US effort and efficiency not only in South Vietnam but in all of Southeast Asia. J2 responsibilities influenced the daily hamlet life and the council of government. 1965 will test the efficiency of the intelligence system developed, nurtured, and refined in 1964.

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3. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 152257Z Feb 64. File MACJ2 (C); JTD, Hq MACV, 15 May 64. File MACJ2 (C).
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13. Interview, Lt Col Livaditis, 6 May 65. MACV Hist Br File (S).
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(TS) CHAPTER III

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OPERATIONS

(S) Nineteen-sixty-four was a year of expansion, change in evaluation of the enemy threat, and shift in emphasis from advisory combat support and greater US unilateral involvement. J3 was in turn compelled to undergo continual internal reorganization to meet these expanding responsibilities. Improved communications links with CINCPAC and OSD generated a demand for centralized, detailed information, and in turn necessitated a continuing search for meaningful criteria and indices for pacification progress. RVNAF force increases appeared to be a tacit admission that pacification was not progressing as planned. The force increase was designed to permit pacification progress concurrent with formal unit retraining and leadership training. As was true in 1963, training appeared to be the key to correct deficiencies in combat effectiveness and small unit leadership. Other major problems in 1964 were the implementation of an effective, timely VNAF close air support system; revitalization of GVN psychological warfare operations and civic action; improvement of security measures for critical US installations; and development of support, security, and control for increased US unilateral activities.

ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION

(U) The end of 1963 saw the Operations Division of J3 divided into two branches, Operations and Special Warfare. Generally speaking, such functions as preparing MACV's operational plans for RVNAF; collective, maintaining and disseminating information on RVNAF operations; and monitoring US unilateral activities were the responsibility of Operations Branch. The Special Warfare Branch had staff responsibility for psychological warfare and Special Forces programs and operations. J3 also exercised operational control of the US staff element which provided advisory support to RVNAF J3 and jointly managed the Joint Operations Center.

(U) Numerous reorganizations preceded the 15 May integration of J3 into the MACV structure. On 1 January the Civil Affairs Office, MACV, and the Psychological Warfare Section of the Special Warfare Branch of J3 were consolidated as the Psywar/CA Branch under J3. This consolidation reflected a recognition of the inter-relationship of these functions and, in fact, mirrored an existing consolidation in all staff levels of the Vietnamese Army and in advisory channels subordinate to MACV.

(U) The major reorganization in the 15 May JTD established five branches in J3: Operations, Operational Plans and Analysis (OP&A), Psywar/CA, Operations Information and Joint Operations Center. The transfer of psychological responsibility to the Psywar/CA Branch on 1 January and the contemplated PCS deployment of the 5th Special Forces Group to RVN eliminated the need for a Special Warfare Branch. J3 did, however, retain the responsibility of monitoring the advisory effort in conjunction with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), the Vietnamese Special

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Forces Groups. The implementing agency for this assistance became, in time, the 5th Special Forces Group. Within the Plans and Analysis Branch an Operations Analysis Section was when augmented with the Statistical Data Processing Unit, improved analytical capability.

(U) August saw another reorganization within J3 which affected the Operations and the OP&A branches. In order to clearly separate the planning and operation functions of J3, the operational planning responsibility was transferred from the Operations to the CPW Branch. At the same time, two major sections, the War Room Section and the Operations Briefing Section (COC) were established within the Operations Branch. The War Room Section was organized primarily to assist in the coordination of operational responsibilities throughout Southeast Asia, in particular, certain US unilateral actions within Vietnam. The COC performs its primary function of collecting, distilling, and disseminating information on all operational aspects of the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. In addition to the COC and War Room Section, an Emergency Action Center was established within Operations Branch to process incoming messages and to collect, distill, and disseminate all emergency information.

(U) The final reorganization action of 1964 saw the Office of Sector Affairs renamed the Pacification Planning and Operations Branch. On 1 December it was incorporated into J3³ to integrate pacification more closely with operations.

(U) J3 underwent extensive reorganization and expansion as the pressure of both VC activity and US participation increased. The consolidation of MAAG into MACV simplified channels for the senior advisors and gave J3 more direct influence on operations. As the MACV scope and span of control increased, J3 was likewise forced to expand and reorganize to meet the ever increasing requirements posed by not only the advisory effort, but greater US unilateral involvement, the changing needs of the Ambassador, and theater contingency plans.


OPERATIONAL AND PACIFICATION REPORTING

(C) A common experience in the collection of information is that, as the demand for centralized detailed information increases, the military reporting system in turn becomes subject to critical examination and subsequent revision. In this regard, MACV's reporting system in 1964 was no exception. In October 1963 the Information and Reports Working Group (IRWG) was formed under the sponsorship of J3 to review the entire information gathering, reporting procedures, and retrieval systems then used by MACV.⁴ This working group addressed itself to three broad areas of

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interest: intelligence collection and reporting; combat operations including ground, sea, and air activities; and province operations. The objective of this review was (1) to eliminate the collection of irrelevant and unnecessary information (2) to establish a meaningful and responsive reporting system directed specifically to the collection and consolidation of only that information considered essential to counterinsurgency operations in RVN.

(C) The project was completed and the working group officially disbanded on 15 October 1964. Although at the year's end the reporting system was again under examination, the activities of this group did result in the consolidation or discontinuance of many routine reports, a more responsive reporting system, and a substantial increase in the use of automatic data processing facilities in Hawaii.⁵

Operational Reports

(C) For operational reporting the principal result of the IRWG was the establishment of an integrated system of periodic reports to include: the MACV daily Situation Report (SITREP),⁶ the weekly Military Report (MILREP),⁷ the Monthly Evaluation (MONEVAL),⁸ and the Quarterly Review and Evaluation.⁹ The information contained in the above four reports was designed to be complementary with minimum duplication.

(C) Commencing in June, however, at the direction of the Chairman of the JCS (Secretary of Defense), COMUSMACV was required to submit to CINCPAC and JCS the Senior Advisor's Monthly Evaluation Report (SAME).¹⁰ The purpose of the SAME was to forward to JCS, through CINCPAC, personnel and equipment data and advisory evaluation of the combat/combat support effectiveness of battalion sized units, provided directly by US advisors "on the ground." This information was to be provided directly to CINCPAC and JCS from the lowest level without further summarization or analysis by COMUSMACV, although intervening levels were permitted to add comments where appropriate. The SAME, in particular, reflected this increased demand for centralized detailed information and the desire of data analysts in OSD for raw data, unanalysed in the field.

(C) An additional reporting requirement occurred in September when COMUSMACV was directed to supply the Ambassador a weekly and monthly Military Assessment to enable the Ambassador to meet reporting requirements levied on him by the Secretary of State.¹¹ This requirement stemmed from recognition that the close relationship between political and military problems in Vietnam served to emphasize the necessity of cooperation for their solution by State and MACV.


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(C) Other reports included the Semi-Annual Report of Forces and the Semi-Annual Report of Unconventional Warfare and Psychological Operations Forces' Resources submitted to CINCPAC. Operations After Action Reports were required from US advisors throughout 1964 on all significant RVNAF operations.¹³ As a result of a J3 study on VC ambushes, COMUSMACV directed that advisors submit after reports on all ambushes, in order to build up a data base for developing better counter-ambush tactics for RVNAF.¹⁴

Pacification Reports

(C) In March 1964 COMUSMACV directed the establishment of a central facility for the collection, evaluation, and display of data relative to current conditions in each of the forty-five provinces. On 15 May 1964 the Province Reports Center was established in the High Command Compound.¹⁵ The mission of the Center was to provide a facility for the receipt, display, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of all pertinent data relative to the provinces and to advise US agencies on pertinent pacification matters by conducting briefings and providing documented data.

(C) Pacification reports from the beginning were in a constant state of flux because of a continuing search for a meaningful basis of comparison between past and present. Uncertainty as to what data were significant created a demand for more and more information, with the resultant introduction of statistical methods into pacification reporting. As the search for significant indicators for pacification progress continued throughout 1964, reports became more numerous and unwieldy.


(C) Subsequent to May 1964, numerous MACV and Joint USOM/MACV Directives were published which established the reporting base and procedures for the preparation and submission of pacification reports.¹⁶ The most important directives published were MACV Directive 335-10, entitled "Monthly Report of Pacification Progress and Population and Area Control," and Joint USOM/MACV Directive Nr 2-64, entitled "Criteria to Evaluate New Life Hamlets."

(C) MACV Directive Number 335-10, dated 15 July 1964, promulgated on the basis of an agreement between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and J3 outlined the format and assigned responsibilities for the preparation of a monthly report to DIA pertaining to progress of the pacification effort and control of land areas and population. The significance of this report is its use by DIA in periodic briefings of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other high government agencies on the overall pacification status.

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(C) Joint USOM/MACV Directive Number 2-64, dated 8 October 1964, represented a milestone in the promulgation of an agreed Government of Vietnam policy on pacification. This directive accomplished two other important purposes: it established six-point criteria to be used in determining when a New Life Hamlet is considered "pacified" and it established an important measurable indicator of pacification progress.

(C) By the close of 1964 pacification reporting procedures gradually taken form to the point where GVN and US reports were either combined or closely paralleled each other. They furnished the minimum information required by MACV and higher headquarters to measure a difficult and complex program.

FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

(S) The year saw a considerable buildup in US advisory personnel, both in the US Army Special Forces and the newly instituted sub-sector advisory program. In the combat support field, US participation increased markedly with a sizeable buildup of US Army aviation units and with the retention of the USMC helicopter squadron beyond its projected turn-over date. Plans for a programmed buildup of RVNAF were also instituted in the latter part of the year.

US Army Special Forces Buildup

(S) At the beginning of 1964, the US Army Special Forces, Vietnam, (Provisional) (USASFV(P)) had a large Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) "Strike Force" program already underway. Regarding the CIDG "Strike Forces", the advisory teams faced a particularly difficult and challenging task. Not only were the Vietnamese Special Forces an intermediate advisory level between the USASF advisors and the CIDG, but the advisory climate was further complicated by different ethnic and religious groups and the natural animosity which existed between Vietnamese, Montagnards, Cao Dai, and Chinese Nungs. Although the CIDG program did not reflect the primary mission of the Special Forces, due in part to a realization that the environment in Vietnam was not conducive to "friendly" guerrilla type activity, the advisory effort readily adapted to a counter-insurgency role. The USASFV detachments were engaged in many varied activities: area development programs, border surveillance and control, operations against the VC base areas and war zones, blocking VC infiltration routes and corridors, civic action projects to include medical aid, overt and covert intelligence collection, GVN pacification operations, training of the CIDG "Strike forces", and advising and assisting the Vietnamese Special Forces High Command and Vietnamese Special Forces.

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(S) In February 1964 USASFV in-country strength consisted of a Headquarters Detachment, Provisional, located at Nha Trang, and four "B" Detachments and 37 "A" Detachments deployed in 44 different locations. Total strength averaged 94 officers and 429 FM. During this period all detachments were on a TDY status from either the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa, or the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.

(S) With this handful of officers and enlisted men the USASFV was able to achieve some impressive results. As of 20 March 1964, they had trained 19,937 "Strike Forces", 44,258 village defenders (hamlet militia), and 584 village health workers since the inception of their program in November 1961.¹⁷

(S) In the spring of 1964, with this record of achievement as background, expletory discussions and studies were conducted by DA, CINCPAC, MACV, and USASFV on the feasibility of introducing a full TOE Special Forces Group into the RVN on a PCS basis to replace deployed TDY detachments. The first formal request for a Special Forces buildup was initiated by the CO of the USASFV on 1 March 1964. In this request it was pointed out that considerable advantages would accrue from the organizational capabilities of a Special Forces Group and from the greater continuity and efficiency gained from a PCS deployment of detachments. Further, the introduction of a Group Headquarters and Headquarters Company would enhance the planning and coordination required in the expanding Special Forces role.¹⁸

(S) From this beginning, many levels of the US Government became concerned with the proposal. During his visit to Vietnam in April 1964, the Chairman of the JCS was apprised of the matter by COMUSMACV. The Chairman indicated that he was favorably disposed toward assigning all Special Forces personnel on a PCS basis and that procedures would be worked out by the DA Staff. This contemplated action was reinforced on 13 May 1964 by a statement from the Secretary of Defense to the effect that USASF personnel in the RVN should be replaced by PCS detachments upon completion of their current TDY tour.¹⁹ This high level informal concurrence was followed by an exchange of messages between COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and DA DCSOPS directing that COMUSMACV request the assignment of a Special Forces Group to the RVN on a PCS basis.²⁰ On 22 July a message was dispatched to CINCPAC making a formal request to increase the in-country USASF TDY strength of 707 personnel to 1299 PCS personnel.²¹


(S) These force-increase preliminaries terminated on 6 August 1964 when DA designated the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for assignment to USARPAC for duty in the RVN effective 1 October 1964.²² This Group was to be composed of 1299 officers and men with a phase-in to begin as soon as


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possible after designation and to be completed by 1 April 1964. The JCS increment of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), composed of four "A" detachments, arrived in-country 1 October 1964, and by 31 December 1964 there were 1264 of the scheduled 1299 Special Forces personnel in the RVN.

Retention of the USMC Helicopter Squadron in the RVN

(S) The USMC helicopter squadron stationed at Da Nang had been originally scheduled to turn over its equipment to VNAF on or about 31 March 1964. I Corps operational flying hour requirements and implementation of the National Campaign Plan, however, indicated that VNAF would not be able to meet this schedule. Consequently, after MACV discussions with CINCPAC, JCS requested that CINCPAC extend the USMC helicopter squadron in the RVN beyond its contemplated withdrawal date.²³ MACV undertook a study and determined that a minimum of 1200 flying hours were required each month to meet the operational demands of I Corps. It was also estimated that the USMC helicopter squadron was supplying roughly 4/5 of the total troop lift missions. VNAF transition training in the UH19 helicopter and upgrade training for CONUS trained VNAF helicopter pilots further reinforced the conclusion that it would be necessary to extend the USMC helicopter squadron in the RVN until 30 June 1964. On the basis of this study MACV submitted to CINCPAC a proposed plan to accomplish the necessary personnel training and turn-over of helicopters to VNAF by the extended date of 30 June 1964.²⁴ CINCPAC suggested several modifications to the MACV plan, such as providing on the job training for small increments of VNAF personnel placed on TDY status with the USMC helicopter squadron²⁵ and requested that MACV resubmit a detailed plan for VNAF personnel training and turn-over of helicopters to include the proposed modifications.²⁶ CINCPAC in turn requested JCS to extend the USMC helicopter squadron in the RVN until 30 June 1964. JCS approval was granted on 22 January 1964.²⁷

(S) In May 1964 MACV informed CINCPAC that the present level of US armed transport helicopters in the RVN should be maintained for the foreseeable future in order to meet the demands of increased tactical operations and the new Chien Thang Pacification Plan. Although plans were still progressing toward release of the USMC helicopter squadron on 30 June, MACV proposed that the unit should be retained in the RVN indefinitely.²⁸

(S) JCS was informed of this proposal and deferred decision pending further evaluation.²⁹ On 28 May MACV again recommended to CINCPAC that the USMC helicopter squadron be retained indefinitely and based in Da Nang to support operations in I Corps.³⁰ JCS approval was granted on 10 June 1964.³¹

Buildup of US Army Aviation Units in the RVN

(C) At the end of 1963 the USA inventory in RVN included 230 rotary and 140 fixed wing aircraft (see Table V). Because of the expanding advisory effort in 1964 as well as increased operational requirements, it became clear

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that additional USA aircraft and air craft support would be necessary. The programmed augmentation, requested in July 1964, was aimed at providing tail-gate delivery of supplies to US advisors in remote locations and one USMC/USA airmobile (helicopter) company in support of each ARVN division. 32 Corps aviation assets were therefore to depend on the number of assigned divisions, which in turn would be dictated by VC strength and capability in each corps area. A separate airlift platoon (10 UH1B helicopters) was to be provided each ARVN corps headquarters for additional support. From 1 October to 24 December 1964, 20 separate Army aviation organizations ranging from signal detachments to TC battalions arrived in Vietnam. At the end of 1964 the USA inventory included 327 rotary and 182 fixed wing aircraft (see Table VI).

(C) In addition to their own operational needs, each corps had the responsibility of supporting USOM and USAF activities within their respective zones. Since certain logistical requirements were beyond corps' capabilities, two additional Caribou (CV2B) aircraft were allocated for USOM use and three Caribous, two U1A's, and one UH1B aircraft were allocated for Special Forces. MACV continued to support JUSMAAG, Thailand, with one Caribou and one U1A aircraft.

Subsector Advisory Program

(U) In late 1963 and early 1964 the possibility of extending the US advisory program to the district level was under US and Vietnamese study. It was planned to deploy a few experimental teams in the spring of 1964 and if these were successful, the program would be expanded later in the year. Just which of the 240 odd RVN districts would eventually have teams was to be determined primarily by advisors at province level. A number of objections to the program were voiced. The limited GVN staff at district would be overwhelmed with advice and advisors. Communist propaganda of US takeover would grow new teeth. The provincial MACV-USOM-USIS balance of pacification-wide advice would be disrupted by the introduction of a purely military team at the next subordinate level. Increased numbers of US personnel meant increased casualties.

(U) In April and May the pilot teams were deployed. One officer and an NCO went to each of thirteen districts in provinces neighboring Saigon. The first casualty was reported within six hours of the arrival of the first team on station. However, the slightly wounded non-com returned quickly to duty and there were no more casualties the rest of the summer.

(U) The experimental teams, just as those that were to follow, found the going slow at first. There appeared to be no standard Vietnamese district staff and little similarity between districts. Slowly each advisor pieced together a picture of the organization in his district, the staff with which he would work. The GVN was in the process of building district

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
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staffs and experiencing its own growing pains. For a young nation in its tenth year of war, trained talent for such an expansion was scarce. District chiefs were left to make their own arrangements for using this limited manpower. Some very odd TD's resulted.

(U) By the end of May, encouraging signs were detectable. Isolated and remote districts became closer members of the provincial family. Communications improved. People, rather than messages, moved back and forth. The districts were no longer overlooked in provincial affairs and plans. Military ties were quickly improved. Strengthening of economic and social bonds followed. Later, as the teams became firmly established, other advantages accrued. Support of all types became more responsive to actual district requirements. The district chief gained new prestige and the US obtained fresh insight into local conditions, activities, requirements and attitudes and aspirations of the people. The pilot teams did become involved in USOM and USIS areas of interest but without the disruption feared by some. Advice and assistance was furnished in planning and executing educational, economic, agricultural, youth, and information programs. In other words the MACV teams at district became the US Mission organ. Some teams devoted up to 80 percent of their energies to non-military matters. A 50-50 split between military and civil activities was common.

(U) Not all of this was apparent when Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland met Secretaries Rusk and McNamara in Honolulu in June. However, early indications were clear enough for the decision to expand the program by 100 additional teams.


(U) Plans and preparations began for a September through December buildup. A type five member team of two officers and three EM was selected. The title of subsector advisory team derived from the district's military alias, subsector. Prospective team locations were determined from recommendations submitted by advisors in the field. Neither size nor location were rigidly set forth, however, as MACV delegated authority to corps to make adjustments to meet local situations. Terms of reference were developed drawing from the lessons learned by the pilot teams; in particular providing that the subsector (district) teams would extend the capabilities of USOM and USIS, as concurred in by their local representatives. A two-week in-country Military Assistance Training Advisor (MATA) course was established in Saigon to accommodate the rapid influx.

(U) The buildup began on schedule and by year's end was practically complete. Most of the advantages demonstrated by the experimental teams were verified, winning over many skeptics. These new advisors met and overcame the same problems the thirteen original teams surmounted. They enthusiastically assumed broad and unfamiliar responsibilities with very

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little guidance. Guidance for advisors was purposely non-specific and, as was made abundantly clear, variety was the only consistent quality of Vietnamese subsectors. As the sole US representation below provincial level, the subsector team was the executor of the US effort at its most productive end.

(U) By the end of 1964 many new districts were under consideration for assignment of advisory teams, including USASF "A" Detachments at some locations. A number of personnel changes were under study to determine the best means of augmenting subsector team capabilities (operations, training, security, etc.) and support of subsector teams with certain hard skills (intelligence, engineer, additional medical, police). Missions and duties were also under revision to better suit the changing situation. The subsector advisory team had proven an important member of the US program.

RVNAF Buildup

(S) A comparison of statistics for the end of 1963 and 1964 reflected a considerable RVNAF force expansion. Regular Forces increased by 33,976 to a total of 246,284 and total RVNAF strength increased by 120,475 to a total of 535,851. It was apparent, however, in mid-1964 that force levels at that point in time were not adequate to achieve any real pacification progress, while at the same time allowing for adequate reorganization and retraining. Consequently, on 10 October 1964, COMUSMACV directed that a joint US-GVN team be constituted to survey RVNAF Force Structure requirements to determine whether the current structure adequately supported the GVN National Pacification Plan and its projection at province level.

(C) The Force Structure Survey Team visited each corps headquarters to study and discuss regular and paramilitary forces available, and those additional forces required in each province. The field trip was conducted between 26 October and 5 November with further discussions conducted with the corps senior advisors on 6 and 7 November.


(S) Two alternative force increases were developed; the first was designed to achieve progress in priority one Hop Tac areas to arrest VC forward movement in certain other critical areas; and the second alternative was designed to produce more overall progress in pacification. The proposed GVN Force increases were as follows:

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	<u>Alt 1 (total)</u>	<u>Alt 2 (total)</u>
Regular Force	31,459 (275,058)	48,269 (291,868)
Paramilitary Forces		
Regional Force	35,387 (133,002)	Same as Alt 1
Popular Force	79,194 (189,185)	Same as Alt 1

(S) Estimated first year costs were 125.8 million dollars for Alternative 1 and 154.3 million dollars for Alternative 2, with subsequent yearly costs of 119.6 and 144.7 million dollars, respectively.

(S) On 24 November 1964 MACV formally requested approval of Alternative 1 from CINCPAC, coincident with US Embassy message recommending similar approval to State Department, Washington.³³ On 25 November, the J3 personally delivered the force structure increase study to CINCPAC and briefed interested CINCPAC staff members. CINCPAC accordingly dispatched its concurrence with MACV recommendations to JCS on 29 November (approval was received from JCS on 23 January 1965).³⁴

(U) Coincident with the force increase discussions, studies were also conducted on an apparent shortage of weapons in the Popular Forces. These studies had resulted from a verbal request from the J3 in January 1964 to the RF/PF (Regional Force/Popular Force) Advisory Detachment for the exact weapon shortages of Popular Force units, disregarding MAP authorization. The resultant survey indicated a shortage of 25,773 weapons. These figures were forwarded to the J4 requesting necessary corrective action. A J4 survey of total weapons in the RVN indicated that there were over 792,000 weapons in the hands of troops and in storage depots. The J4 then requested that the J3 initiate action to urge High Command to release the necessary weapons for the Popular Forces.³⁵ Further discussions throughout 1964 were eventually overtaken by Alternative 1 and 2 Force Increase Studies and all action was discontinued pending a joint VN-US survey to determine the exact requirements for the new force structure.³⁶

Summary

(S) Force structure changes were either a direct response to increased VC activity or a reflection of a desire to capitalize on successful results obtained by existing forces. The programmed buildup of RVNAF reflected mainly an inability to cope with VC inroads and successes, and a


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tacit admission that pacification was not progressing as planned. The retention of the USMC helicopter squadron beyond its planned turn-over resulted from VNAF's inability to field sufficient trained personnel to assume the many operational requirements within I Corps. The sizeable increase in Special Forces, however, resulted from a desire to capitalize and exploit initial successes achieved in the border control and surveillance program, as well as to attain greater continuity and effectiveness through a PCS rather than a TDY status. Initial success with the subsector program also spurred a substantial increase in that area. This increase, in particular, seemed to reflect the questionable axiom that if certain results are attained with X advisors, then by increasing the number of teams, the results attained will likewise increase. Whether this increase might have been more selective and "individually tailored", rather than a standard "TO&E" issue, remained to be evaluated at the end of 1964. Substantial success with heliborne operations also led to a greater commitment of US Army aviation units in the RVN. Few indeed would deny that the mobility advantage accrued from the helicopter had greatly improved the GVN/VC force ratio and that the helicopter, in fact, was a major contributing factor to GVN operational effectiveness.

ADVISORY AND COMBAT SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Advisory Activities

(U) At the J3 level, actions taken to advise and influence RVNAF were separated into two areas: (1) J3 actions taken solely within the advisory system to maintain and improve the ability of COMUSMACV, corps, division and other senior advisors to give good and timely advice; and (2) actions taken by MACJ3 to advise RVNAF directly. Contacts with RVNAF J3 were normally conducted on a daily basis; however, during and after the J2/J3 High Command reorganization in August 1964, all contacts with J3 counterparts had to be coordinated through the Joint Operations Center (JOC) to preclude any inadvertent US involvement in RVNAF internal shuffling. This requirement was directed by the J3 and had the unfortunate although anticipated effect of severely limiting MACV/counterpart contacts. In the last quarter of the year, however, new guidance permitted J3 staff officers to coordinate directly with their counterparts. From October on, in fact, there was considerable encouragement and even pressure to increase counterpart contacts.

(U) An example of J3 staff actions taken solely within the advisory system was the "Lessons Learned" project. MAAG had already published 64 "Lessons Learned" prior to 1964 based upon advisory experiences and after action reports. This project was continued throughout 1964 and by year's end a total of 43 had been published.


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"Lessons Learned" had wide distribution to US advisors within Vietnam and assisted immeasurably in disseminating experiences and successful techniques to the field. The project also had a world-wide distribution to US military headquarters, military schools, and selected allies for use in the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and training.

(C) After receipt of the first Senior Advisors Monthly Evaluation Report (SAME) in July 1964, COMUSMACV was in a far better position to give specific and detailed advice to CINCPAC on the combat/combat support effectiveness of RVNAF units down to battalion. In an October letter to CofS, RVNAF, COMUSMACV gave a detailed listing of the deficiencies contained in the September SAME.³⁷ The action had not been coordinated with the Naval Advisory Group unfortunately. The frankness of this letter, (part of which stated that leadership at all levels in the Sea Force was ineffective), led to a partial rupture in relations between the VNN Sea Force Commanders and their advisors. Nevertheless, COMUSMACV continued to inform CINCPAC of combat ineffective units and the reasons therefor. As a result of this direct action between MACV and RVNAF, CINCPAC in December 1964 directed that all Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) commanders take corrective action on all listed deficiencies.³⁸ A Combat Effectiveness Inspection Team Program was also instituted and by the year's end the RVNAF Inspector General had inspected two battalions that had been designated combat ineffective by COMUSMACV. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the units should be sent to National Training Centers for refresher training, as had been proposed in COMUSMACV's original letter.³⁹

(S) In addition to the above mentioned activities, J3 throughout 1964 conducted normal inspections, investigations, and staff visits to both advisory detachments and RVNAF units and headquarters. In addition to these visits, the J3 also accompanied the US Ambassador, as COMUSMACV's representative, to Washington for several meetings. On 5-18 September the agenda included discussion of support for the Khanh government and on 25 November - 6 December the Alternative 1 Force Increase was discussed.

Pacification

(U) At the beginning of 1964 pacification was essentially at a standstill following the November 1963 coup which had as yet produced no replacement for the Dien-Nhu Strategic Hamlet Program. The initial action by the Minh government was the promulgation early in the year of the "Dien Hong" plan, a revision of earlier pacification plans; however, implementation of this plan was prevented by the 30 January coup.

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
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(U) On 22 February the Khanh government issued a replacement plan for the Strategic Hamlet Program, the "Chien Thang" or "Victory" plan which stressed an integrated civil-military approach. A realistic reevaluation of the situation in early 1964 revealed that only a small fraction of the former strategic hamlets were still under GVN control. Consequently, this plan commenced from a greatly reduced RVN base. Following a province-division-corps-national planning cycle and a similar budgeting cycle, implementation of the plan got slowly under way in the spring.⁴⁰

(U) Some factors which tended to retard the implementation of the national pacification plan were: A lack of guidance on the organization and roles of pacification forces, a lack of clarity in pacification definitions, and problems related to efficient programming.

(U) The original GVN "Chien Thang" plan published in February did not adequately delineate the roles of the various elements of RVNAF in the conduct of the war. Each separate force had written its own mission into the "Chien Thang" plan and no overall attempt had been made to integrate or relate the separate missions to pacification concepts. Consequently, there occurred throughout the year considerable misuse of resources, such as assignment of regular forces to static security missions and movement of paramilitary units out of their native districts and provinces.

(S) In November 1964, to correct these deficiencies, High Command drew up implementing instructions to all military agencies for the continuation of the pacification effort. The RVNAF Directive (AB 139) set forth principal and minimum missions to be accomplished in 1965 and contained missions for the Corps Tactical Zones, other tactical areas, and the Air Force and Navy, and six annexes, describing various concepts and techniques for achieving the established goals.⁴¹

(S) A thorough study of the Directive conducted by J3 revealed certain basic weaknesses and omissions. These were:


- (1) roles, missions, and inter-relationships of Regular, Regional and Popular Forces were not clearly established;
- (2) failure to define and limit the roles of corps and divisions in the pacification program;
- (3) failure to base the plan on the existing pacification status through lack of an adequate planning and programming cycle;
- (4) unilateral approach which did not consider or provide for coordination of the resources and efforts of other government agencies;

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(5) assigned goals failed to consider local conditions and resources;

(6) failure to provide sufficient integration of civil action and psychological warfare programs; and

(7) failure to provide adequate reaction time for subordinate planning.

(S) The MACV reply to this directive was contained in a personal letter from J3 to the J3 RVNAF, High Command. This letter pointed out the major deficiencies noted above and recommended corrective actions. In addition to the J3 letter, a 19 December US Mission statement on the subject was accepted in large measure by the RVNAF High Command. In fact, with minor changes only, all US proposals were incorporated into the RVNAF Directive AB 139. At the year's end GVN views on this subject were fully compatible with the US.

(U) As with roles and responsibilities, the "Chien Thang" plan also lacked clarity and detail in the new definitions and terminology. This lack of clarity and confusion of terms, coupled with a lack of direction from the US Mission, made a consensus on the pacification terms extremely difficult. Consequently, in May, MACV proposed a designation of three major pacification phases: clearing, securing, and developing. Later in the year a US group worked out details within each major phase, and formulated concept and definitions for the Mission Council's approval in December. Concurrent staff discussions with GVN on the subject were begun with favorable initial response.⁴²

(S) In May 1964, upon the recommendation of Secretary McNamara, COMUSMACV directed J3 to develop, jointly with GVN, procedures for programing pacification operations. The purpose of pacification programing was to establish time phased requirements of manpower, money, and materiel which would be needed to support counterinsurgency operations throughout Vietnam. In compliance with this directive, a joint, combined committee (MACV-USOM-GVN) was established for the project.

(S) After reviewing the existing province pacification plans, it was determined they did not include appropriate programing data; however, rather than rewriting the 1964 plans (which would have undoubtedly retarded the pacification effort), a programing system was developed around existing plans. The key features of the pacification program included estimates of hamlets to be pacified within a given calendar quarter (rate of progress), and estimates of GVN forces and materiel which would be required to support and secure the hamlets and areas pacified.

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
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(S) The programing document, complete with instructions and forms to be used, was completed in June 1964, approved by MACV and RVNAF, and disseminated to subordinate US and GVN agencies. Joint US-GVN teams then visited each corps to acquaint selected personnel with programing documents.⁴³ Instructions specified that the completed forms would be submitted through GVN channels to the Central Pacification Committee by 1 August 1964 reflecting the pacification status of each province as of 1 July 1964, and projecting the program ahead for six calendar quarters.

(S) As of 31 August, less than half of the provinces had submitted pacification programs, and of these many were incomplete or incorrectly prepared. To correct these deficiencies, joint MACV-GVN teams visited each province to re-instruct the province chiefs and sector advisors on the preparation and submission of the programing reports. All province reports were finally received by October 1964. Subsequently, on 21 October, new guidelines for the preparation of pacification and development plans during 1965 were published and disseminated. The CY '65 instructions were basically a revision of the 1964 instructions.

(C) By late 1964 it became apparent the pacification programing plans for all provinces had been grossly optimistic. Consequently, on 11 November 1964, COMUSMACV requested corps, division, and sector advisors to submit a list of realistic short term pacification goals for the period 1 January - 31 March 1965.⁴⁴ The Central Pacification Committee simultaneously requested the same information through GVN channels. In general, the pacification programing effort was unsuccessful. This attempted system was a case of adding another program to the already overburdened Vietnamese officialdom which was neither responsive nor sophisticated enough to absorb it.

(U) To prepare sector advisors for their role in the pacification program, O&T Directorate, MACV, had conducted the MACV Advisor's Training Course. An evaluation of the course in May 1964 disclosed a need for a greater emphasis on provincial activities and on the roles and missions of USOM and USIS at that level. The Office of Sector Affairs was assigned the responsibility of developing and conducting a course to meet this need,⁴⁵ and in coordination with USOM and USIS, a five-day course to be presented by MACV, USOM and USIS officials was conceived. While designated primarily for sector and subsector advisors, attendance by USOM personnel and corps, division and sector paywar/civic action advisors was authorized and all attendees were encouraged to have served at least 8 weeks in their duty position prior to attending, in order to provide a better frame of reference for the instruction. The revised course was presented in August, and again in November and December to accommodate increased numbers of subsector advisory personnel and was programmed for monthly presentation in CY 1965.⁴⁶


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(C) In mid-1964, the Viet Cong, challenged by some GVN pacification success, concentrated their activities on fragmenting and disrupting GVN control in Saigon and the surrounding provinces. As a result of this concentration, COMUSMACV directed Senior Advisor, III Corps, to organize a full-time US task force to accomplish initial planning for "Pacification Intensification in Critical Areas (PICA)."47 The goal of the PICA plan was to integrate pacification efforts across military boundaries and to obtain increased cooperating between RVNAF and civilian ministries. The work of the planning staff culminated in Operations Order Hop Tac 1 on 12 August 1964.48

(C) The Hop Tac coordinating staff was initially placed under control of the CG, III Corps. However, because of inherent requirements to coordinate and deal directly with GVN ministerial agencies, it soon became clear that a control group was needed at national level to expedite problems and coordinate the activities of the Rung Sat Special Zone (under VNN operational control), and the Capital Military District (CMD). Based upon recommendations of the US Ambassador, GVN established the Hop Tac Council, a combined coordinating and supervisory group working at national level. Membership of the council included: A chairman, the CG of III Corps, the CG of CMD, the CO of the Rung Sat Special Zone, representatives of the Ministry of Interior, the National Police, Vietnamese Central Intelligence Organization, and the US counterparts of these personnel.

(C) Hop Tac got under way in September, and in October numerous visits were made to the Hop Tac provinces by deputies of USOM, USIS, and MACV. The conclusions of their report revealed the difficulty in energizing a program with the scope of Hop Tac: "Generally speaking, Hop Tac, as a program, does not appear to exist as a unified and meaningful operation... a long, tough, slow process of mobilization and organization lies ahead."49

(C) During November and December, however, the learning process began to pay dividends: Cadres became more effective, ralliers to the Chieu Hoi appeared increased, police capabilities more than doubled, and confiscation of supplies reached an all time high. At the end of 1964 Hop Tac was one of the few pacification areas that showed some success and greater promise.


(C) In conclusion, the last half of the year, increased GVN pacification activities were, in the main, matched by increased VC pressure against attempted GVN expansion. The result was an overall balance with GVN progress in some areas, notably the Hop Tac

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the Mekong Delta area north of the Bassac River, and GVN regression in other areas, principally the coastal lowlands of I and II Corps, previously considered a strong GVN base. Another contributing factor making extended success difficult was the frequent rotation of personnel and irregular allocation of funds because of the continuing political crisis.

PSYWAR AND MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

(C) Considerable delay in getting an effective, integrated psywar/civic action program delineated and into effect was experienced in 1964. Delays in allocating funds compounded a situation already difficult by vagueness of responsibilities and a lack of school trained US advisors.

Programs

(U) Since the governmental turmoil following the November 1963 coup, little emphasis was placed on civic action at the beginning of the year. The US Mission had already approved a 62,025,000 SVN CY 1964 Psywar/civic action budget and the MACV comptroller had begun to release funds on 24 December 1963. A second change of government in January 1964, however, with subsequent personnel reorganization within GVN and RVNAP, delayed the execution of the budget.

(U) The CY 1964 Psywar/CA budget had a late start since the Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP) funds to the corps and sectors were not provided until May 1964. At about that time two inadequacies in the budget became obvious. First, there was inadequate support provided tactical psyops; and second, the 25 million piastres allocated to MILCAP were insufficient. These deficiencies were corrected somewhat by a 92,960,000 SVN budget revision approved by the US Mission on 20 July. This revision included 4.5 million piastres for tactical psyops (leaflets, posters, etc) and an additional 75 million piastres for MILCAP.

(U) The additional MILCAP funds were not fully used, however, due to two factors: (1) the indemnification program was over-funded and (2) administrative difficulties delayed the release of the funds to the sectors until October. On 17 November, the RVN Psywar Directorate, recognizing that a large portion of the MILCAP funds would not be expended by the end of the year, proposed that approximately 32 million piastres be approved for military dependent housing. At the end of this program was still being staffed within the Ministry of Defense. Of the additional 75 million piastres approved for MILCAP, only 10 million were spent.


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(U) During this period US advisors to the RVN Psywar Directorate assisted in the preparation of the CY 1965 Psywar/CA Budget. In an attempt to correct the deficiencies of the CY 1964 Budget, two major changes were effected: (1) 6.8 million piastres were specifically provided for tactical psywar support at corps level and below, and (2) the indemnification program was reduced from 64 percent of the 1964 budget to 43 percent of the 1965 budget. Thus, a far greater proportion of the MILCAP funds were allocated for construction, gifts, psywar entertainment, and information and education programs.

(U) Funds specifically earmarked for US sector advisors for quick response projects, purchase of give-away items, rewards and local welfare participation had virtually not existed prior to 1964. Since a definite requirement existed for timely psywar response to VC instigated incidents, new attention was directed toward the availability of funds at sector level.

(U) A MACV Fact Sheet, recommending a cash fund controlled by the US sector advisor, was prepared for COMUSMACV's presentation to the Secretary of Defense. In response to this MACV recommendation, a cash fund was established. \$200,000 were made available from appropriated AID contingency funds to provide monies for the USIS Petty Cash Fund for a period of one year beginning 29 June 1964. These monies were to be released quarterly in increments of \$50,000 by USOM to the American Embassy. USIS was to then draw the money from the Embassy and distribute the funds to US sector advisors. The purpose of the fund, basically, was to provide monies for minor expenditures (normally \$25 or less) for which other funds were not available. The program met with enthusiastic response and at the end of 1964 it was clear that additional funds could readily be used at the sector level.⁵⁰

(C) By mid-1964, it had become clear to both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV that the entire civic action program needed revitalization. Ambassador Taylor requested a thorough study of the subject; he was informed by COMUSMACV on 21 August that the MACV staff had been charged with making this study.⁵¹ On 5 October COMUSMACV forwarded a memorandum to the Ambassador furnishing the conclusions of this staff study and recommended that the Ambassador direct a USOM-USIS-MACV study to develop a proposed organization and charter for a joint, integrated mechanism to guide and coordinate civic action.⁵² Upon completion, this study would provide a basis for discussions with the Vietnamese on how best to channel and revitalize the combined civic action effort.


(C) Based upon COMUSMACV's recommendation, the Ambassador directed COMUSMACV, Director, USIS, and Director, USOM, to establish a joint study group chaired by COMUSMACV to prepare recommendations for the approval of the Ambassador. These recommendations, as a minimum, were to include:

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the organization, charter, responsibilities, and guidelines for an integrated civic action program in Vietnam.⁵³ During the course of this study, however, no agreement could be achieved. The USOM position on the scope of study confined the program to military civic action only, e.g., the use of GVN military forces to carry out projects designed to improve the image of the GVN. As a consequence, no integrated plan, no special purpose organization, and no basis for working out a province-by-province integrated program were developed.

(C) One result of these studies, however, was that COMUSMACV and CINCPAC did agree to present to the US-GVN joint meeting in mid-January 1965 a revitalized Military Civic Action Program. By letter, 22 December 1964, the Chief of Staff, MACV, forwarded a staff paper to the Chief of Staff, RVNAF, which broadly outlined such a program and recommended early discussions between MACV and RVNAF staffs.⁵⁴

(C) Another factor which retarded the implementation of an effective Psywar/CA Program was the difficulty in obtaining fully qualified officers to fill the sector S3 advisor positions. MACV had originally recommended in December 1963 that the MAAG Vietnam JTD be augmented to provide an S3 advisor at provincial level. In the same message MACV noted that assigned personnel were generally not school trained. COMUSMACV stressed that if the availability of trained officers for the S3 advisor's position were expedited, psyops would be materially improved.⁵⁵ This topic was again brought up during the March 1964 visit of the Secretary of Defense.

(C) DA set plans in motion for a tailored course at the US Army Special Warfare School (USASWS) and the US Army Civil Affairs School (USACAS) to train sector S3 advisors in psyops and civic action. CG, USCOMARAC, was charged with the responsibility for the course of insuring that the officers trained would make a port call on or about 11 October 1964.⁵⁶ At the request of USASWS, J3 assisted in preparation of the program of instruction (POI) for the special psyops course. By November some 50 school trained officers were in-country, and, although by the end of the year it was still too early to assess the impact of this program, it was generally agreed that school trained officers had provided much needed improvement.

Psywar

(U) Following the 1 November 1963 coup d'etat, there was a complete change of attitude in the RVNAF regarding the importance of psychological operations. During the Diem regime the iron clad control exercised by Diem's governmental apparatus precluded the feasibility of psychological operations. With Diem's downfall, however, a complete change occurred and all psyops schools and training centers began to pass their programs and POI's after US schools.

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(U) To capitalize on this attitude change, J3 developed plans for the use of five US Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to train, advise and assist the Vietnamese in certain technical areas. Throughout 1964, these MTT's assisted the Vietnamese in the following fields: radio management, Viet Cong propaganda research, printing management and production, psyops instruction, and motion picture production management. During the tenure of these teams, distinct progress was discernible in all technical fields in which advisory assistance was given, and the consensus at the end of 1964 was that the MTT's had made a significant contribution to the long term improvement of RVNAF psychological warfare operations.

(C) To augment the capabilities of the MTT's and achieve greater continuity of effort, CINCPAC suggested that consideration be given to the permanent assignment of technical personnel in the RVN. These personnel would assume an assistance, supervisory, and training role, and, thus, eliminate to a large extent the requirement for MTT's and additional TDY personnel. Through an exchange of messages between COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, approval was received for the establishment of a permanent US Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity Pacific (USABVAPAC) Detachment in Vietnam similar to those detachments already operating in Japan and Korea.⁵⁷


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(C) The USABVAPAC Detachment, Vietnam, contributed immeasurably to the psyops effort in the RVN by filling in the technical advisory void that had existed in the areas of printing, radio, mopix, and, to a certain extent, research. In addition, the approval for augmenting the Detachment with MTT's of up to five personnel for periods of 90 days permitted the use of those specialized skills required for limited periods. To expedite these augmentations, CINCPAC permitted direct coordination between COMUSMACV and CO, USABVAPAC.

(C) The Chieu Hoi Program, originally established by decree of President Diem on 17 April 1963, was thought to be potentially the most productive of the psywar efforts. The program floundered, however, throughout succeeding governmental crises because of a lack of demonstrated interest on the part of GVN officials.

(C) On 9 September, COMUSMACV suggested that an inter-agency committee be established chaired by USIS to study the Chieu Hoi program. This committee would determine the applicability of the Chieu Hoi program to Hop Tac, and what steps should be taken to revitalize the program. COMUSMACV appointed the Chief, Psywar/CA Branch as MACV representative.

(C) The committee found that the program was funded with enough resources for the remainder of CY 1964; however, the organization of the Chieu Hoi program did not allow or provide for responsibilities for American advisors at each level. The committee concluded that:



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Chieu Hoi program suffered because of a lack of initiative and coordination at national level; (2) more productive results might be achieved by greater emphasis through the GVN if all levels of government were given specific missions; and (3) the lack of a national land resettlement policy for ralliers and vague responsibility for retraining hampered the objective of the entire effort.

(C) The committee recommended that: (1) the Mission Council endorse the importance of the Chieu Hoi program and support an effort to revitalize it as an effective, integral part of the overall pacification effort; (2) the importance of the Chieu Hoi program and its potential in the pacification effort be emphasized to the Vietnamese Internal Security Council with a request that a working level joint committee develop a detailed national program; (3) primary responsibility within the US Mission for support and supervision of this program remain with USOM with necessary support and assistance rendered in appropriate areas by MACV and USIS; (4) and USOM undertake responsibility for chairing the joint US/GVN committee, with membership to include representatives of MACV, USOM, and the Embassy.

(C) The Mission Council ad hoc committee defined a complete framework of actions and procedures necessary to revitalize the Chieu Hoi program.⁵⁸ No provisions were made, however, for specific directives to US advisors; later COMUSMACV issued a letter to the field providing guidance.⁵⁹ At the conclusion of 1964, the program had still not received vigorous implementation, mainly because of conflict between a Ministry of Interior Directive and a Special Commissariat for Chieu Hoi Decree relative to reward rates.⁶⁰ 27 M 19 M


(S) The antithesis of the Chieu Hoi program was the bounty program which likewise offered considerable potential yet suffered from a similar lack of action. Realizing that there had never been an RVN national program of rewards for killing or capturing VC personnel, the Chairman, US Mission Psychological Operations Committee, submitted a proposal to the Mission Council outlining details for MACV-recommended bounty program.⁶¹ This initial program was disapproved by the Mission Council; however, Washington became interested and suggested reconsideration of the proposal. A revised proposal was submitted on 28 September 1964 and approved for purposes of low-level discussions with the GVN.⁶² (12 Aug 18 Sep 21 Jul

(S) On 22 December 1964, the Director, USIS, submitted a status report to the Ambassador which in effect stated that the proposed program, involving large scale rewards for VC leaders charged with specific criminal acts, had not as yet been tested. The Director, USIS, suggested that the Ambassador might want to consider establishing an ad hoc committee to study and recommend action to implement a pilot model bounty program in two or more provinces. On 29 December 1964, COMUSMACV and other Mission Council members were informed that the Ambassador desired such an inter-agency ad hoc committee, and at the time discussions on the bounty program were still under way.

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(C) Early in 1964 the Vietnamese displayed an interest in the possible employment of political warfare in the RVN. As a result of this interest, several visits by high level GVN officials were made to the Republic of China, and based on their observations and reports, recommendations were made to establish a general political warfare directorate at the High Command.

(C) On 26 June, Prime Minister Khanh indicated to the US Ambassador and COMUSMACV his intent to form a political warfare organization in RVNAF. The basic plan was developed and approved by the Prime Minister in July, and, on 29 July, the Minister of Defense, RVN, formally requested the Nationalist Chinese Minister of Defense to send a delegation of specialists to Vietnam early in August to discuss political warfare activities in Vietnam.

(C) The General Political Warfare Department, RVNAF, was established by Prime Ministerial Decree on 24 October, and a 19 November High Command, RVNAF, Memorandum placed the following diverse agencies under the Department: Military Security Service, Social Directorate, Psychological Warfare Directorate, Catholic Chaplain Directorate, Protestant Chaplain Directorate, Buddhist Chaplain Directorate, Paywar Office/High Command, Psywar Training Center, and Press Officer (later added by High Command Memorandum, 16 December).⁶³

(C) A study and draft organization of political warfare jointly prepared by the Chinese Advisory Group and the Vietnamese was forwarded to MACV on 3 December. An analysis of the study revealed that the Political Warfare Department objectives were: (1) prevention of VC penetration in RVNAF and the protection of military secrets; (2) improvement of troop welfare and morale; (3) conduct of psychological operations toward RVNAF, toward civilians both loyal to RVN and uncommitted; and toward the VC; (4) fostering of military civic action and soldier-civilian relationships; and (5) public information.

(C) Subsequent to the joint study, the Vietnamese apparently realized certain shortcomings of the proposed organization and once again took it under study. In brief, they recognized that the CHINAT plan was more geared toward China than the VC or the DRV; it was more geared toward land mass warfare and military government than working with the existing governmental agencies in Vietnam.

(C) At the year's end, the Psywar/CA Branch of J3 was developing a concept for a political warfare organization to present to the Vietnamese. This organization, with the same objectives as the Chinese-Vietnamese proposal, would require minimal reorganization and movement of subordinate agencies and, at the same time, complement the concept of pacification.


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(U) As psychological warfare operations expanded in Vietnam, the demand for psywar printed material steadily increased until the capabilities of the RVNAF Psywar Directorate presses became completely overwhelmed. The overflow in turn began to tax the facilities of the GVN Ministry of Information, USIS, and the USABVAPAC, in Okinawa.

(U) In February 1964, a closer look was taken at the TOE of the four ARVN Psywar battalions. These TOE's authorized each battalion a "Printing Set, Light Mobile", yet it was determined that this item had never been programmed through MAP logistics, apparently through an erroneous assumption made by US personnel in Vietnam. The Department of the Army accordingly informed field agencies of a new limited-standard printing set specifically tested and designed for field use, recommending that four of these sets be requisitioned on a priority emergency urgent basis. MACV accordingly prepared a request to divert FY 1963 MAP funds against the printing requirements to expedite supply action. This request was approved and given an issue priority of A05 in FY 1964 program.⁶⁴ The printing plants had not arrived by the end of 1964.

(U) To ensure immediate mobile printing capability in the event of implementation of Southeast Asia Contingency Plans, CINCPAC approved a MACV request for transfer of a heavy mobile printing set (authorized USABVAPAC in Okinawa) to the RVN.⁶⁵ When the three-van mobile printing complex arrived in the RVN, it was placed under the control of the USABVAPAC Vietnam Detachment in Saigon. It was made available, however, to the RVN Psywar Directorate for 40 operating hours per week with the condition that consumed expendable materials be replaced in kind.⁶⁶ The introduction of this item of equipment greatly augmented the GVN printing capability in the psyops effort.

(U) Two psyops items of equipment underwent field testing under the supervision of the US Army Concept Team, Vietnam (USACTIV)—the audio-visual Tri-Lambrettas and the airborne loudspeakers. After the initial testing period both items were incorporated into the MAP Logistics Program.

(U) Eight audio-visual Tri-Lambrettas were originally tested by ARVN infantry divisions. After successful testing, the time was considered important enough to request an additional 90 units through the MAP program, designed for the RF Composite Psywar/CA Teams at sector level. They arrived in-country in December; the basic vehicles, audio-visual components, and body units were to be assembled and issued to units in early 1965.


(U) During 1964 thirteen 250-watt airborne loudspeaker sets were placed in use to support RVN psyops. Five were mounted in VNAF U6 aircraft, four in VNAF U17 aircraft, and four in USAF U10 aircraft. These sets proved to be very effective at altitudes of less than 10,000 feet. By 1 January 1964, however, an ACTIV test of 1000-watt sets was starting

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completion. These more powerful sets were found to be effective up to 3000 feet, thus permitting greater coverage while providing increased safety to crew and aircraft.

(U) After completion of the ACTIV test, these 1000-watt sets were transferred from ACTIV to USAFSCV for use by aviation units in a direct support role under the operational control of the corps senior advisors. The 250-watt sets were retained in a general support role; however, they were frequently loaned to the corps. All sets were distributed throughout the country on an equitable basis and located to ensure quick response. A requirement for seventeen additional 1000-watt sets was placed in the MAP Logistics Program on 25 March 1964; however, they had not arrived by the end of 1964.⁶⁷

(U) Another project which fell under the aegis of the USABVAPAC was the preparation of the annual psyops calendar. USABVAPAC was given the project in 1963 when USIS, Saigon, stopped making the calendars because of a change in USIA's worldwide policy. COMUSMACV at that time still felt that a calendar was a worthwhile psyops project, and on his request, CINCUSARPAC approved the USABVAPACV project and allocated \$18,000 for printing and distributing the CY 1964 calendars.

(U) USIS prepared the final artwork for the 1964 calendars and shipped it to USABVAPAC, Okinawa, which in turn contracted the printing in Japan. A total of 200,000 copies were printed and distributed in Vietnam in 1964.

(U) The Psywar/Ci Branch, MACVJ3, was put in charge of the 1965 project with USABVAPACV in coordination with USIS, actually preparing the calendars. A total of 150,000 copies were requested and, although a time delay precluded the publication of a complete calendar, the period March through December was covered. These calendars emphasized the theme "Your Government and You"; they were designed primarily for the rural population of the pacified areas under corps control.⁶⁸

(S) Another psychological weapon which came under discussion in 1964 was the possible use of television in the Republic of Vietnam. As early as 1960 several commercial companies had attempted to introduce TV to Vietnam. Officials of the RVN government, as well as COMUSMACV (who initially proposed a closed circuit military TV system), were favorably disposed toward acquisition of a TV capability. The US Mission, however, was disinclined to undertake a study of the project until October 1964.

(S) As early as April 1964, MACVJ3 provided a study recommending favorable COMUSMACV comment on the establishment of a TV system as a psychological weapon.⁶⁹ The US Mission Psychological Operations Committee in turn recommended to the Ambassador on 30 April that the Mission endorse an International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) TV proposal, deferring final judgment on the investment guarantee until a decision is made by TAG per

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evaluation of the proposal could be made. The Country Team, however, did not endorse the ITT proposal primarily because of cost and security problems and a general feeling that it would be inappropriate to introduce such sophisticated equipment into a country struggling with insurgency.

(S) The subject of TV in Vietnam continued to receive "lip service" during the remainder of the year and on 12 October, a briefing on several proposals to bring TV to Vietnam was presented to the Mission Council. In the ensuing discussion, the Council agreed that more facts were needed before a considered judgment could be rendered. The Ambassador asked that a subcommittee be formed under the Psyops Committee to work full time on financial, technical and programing aspects for a final decision by the Council. Representatives of USOM, USIS and MACV were designated to serve on this subcommittee. The TV report was developed in substantial detail by the subcommittee and subsequently accepted by the Mission Psyops Committee and forwarded to the Mission Council for approval.⁷⁰ The subject was placed on the Mission Council Agenda for 14 December 1964 and was still under study at the year's end.

(U) As part of the "Free World Assistance Program", 16 Philippine Army officers arrived in Vietnam on 16 August 1964. These officers, in coordination and cooperation with MACV, assisted in the advisory effort directed toward psychological warfare and civil affairs in III Corps. They were initially assigned in pairs to the three psywar companies and the three civil affairs platoons in the provinces of Binh Duong, Gia Dinh, and Long An. Of the four remaining officers, one acted as OIC, while one each worked with the Psywar Directorate, the III Corps Psyops Center and the 1st Psywar Battalion. At the end of 1964 two of the officers originally assigned at CA platoon level were reassigned to the 2d CA Company.

(U) The Filipinos concentrated their efforts at a lower level than the US. Being assigned to the ARVN psywar companies and CA platoons and actually traveling and working with teams of these units, they ensured that the Psywar/CA portion of the pacification plan was being carried out. In the short time the Filipinos operated in the field in 1964, they were able to make an important contribution to the psywar effort in Vietnam. This prompted the Vietnamese to request another contingent of 16 officers who were scheduled to arrive in the RVN during mid-January 1965.

(S) It appeared at the end of 1964 that psyops was only beginning to approach its potential. A slow start after Diem's overthrow was compounded by delay in allocating sufficient funds to get programs initiated. The Vietnamese were concentrating on development of gadgetry and psychological advantages of the potentially more productive efforts such as

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and the bounty program. This appeared to reflect a preference for the cheap, material gadget over the more difficult and demanding face-to-face approach with the people themselves.

Civic Action

(C) Under the aegis of the Military Civic Action Program, 1964 saw the introduction of Seabee Technical Assistance Teams (STATS), Seabee deep well drillers, and US Army Engineer Control and Advisory Detachments (ECADS), all instrumental to pacification.

(C) The STATS were composed of one engineer officer and twelve enlisted construction specialists with a wide variety of construction skills. These US Navy teams were especially equipped, trained, and manned to perform civic action and military engineering assignments in a counter-insurgency environment. Throughout 1964, two STATS were sponsored by the USASPV and two by USOM; the teams were rotated and replaced roughly every eight months. At the end of 1964, the four in-country STATS had been employed at 52 different locations in the Republic of Vietnam and had accomplished the following construction: 11 air strips (min length 1800 feet); 298 miles of road; 87 bridges constructed or rebuilt; 18 bridges repaired; 35 wells drilled; 36 new life hamlets designed and constructed; 1800 (approx.) Vietnamese personnel trained; miscellaneous military engineer tasks (e.g., fields of fire, ammo bunkers, gun emplacements, fortifications, etc.); and miscellaneous civic action tasks (e.g., schools, dispensaries, province facilities, latrines, etc.).

(C) By the end of 1964, MACV had approved the continued deployment of two STATS each in support of USOM and the Special Forces for 1965.⁷¹

(C) During the month of January 1964 it was decided at State Department/OSD level to enter into a high priority effort to supply potable water to the rural areas of Vietnam, particularly in the critical Hop Tac provinces and the Delta. The US responsibility for this program was assigned to the Public Works Section of USOM. USOM requested that MACV assist the program by providing military engineers to operate deep well and hydro-jet drilling equipment and to design and construct surface water systems. These military personnel would also concurrently train the Vietnamese for these tasks. USOM would provide all well drilling rigs with necessary auxiliary equipment and construction materials.

(S) MACV requested 50 Navy Seabees for deep well drilling, 16 Army Engineers for hydro-jet drilling, and 22 Army Engineers to design and construct water supply systems.⁷² The request was approved by the RVN and the first contingent of 16 Seabee well-drillers arrived in the RVN 18 March 1964. They were initially assigned to drill deep wells at Tan Hiep in Dinh Tuong Province and at Ben Luc in Long An Province.

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
(C) On 10 April 1964 a Rural Water Supply Task Force (RUWSTAF) was established by USOM. This was a joint US/GVN organization to provide a focal point for all management, logistical and operational capabilities of the joint US/GVN effort. All personnel received special training in the water supply functions they were to perform in the RVN. Military command and operational control of these personnel was exercised by COMUSMACV via appropriate Army or Navy subordinate commands.

(C) To facilitate control and planning for rural water development, the RVN was broken into five regions. Although a country-wide effort was to be made to find water, the major emphasis at first was placed on the following 15 provinces selected as critical and requiring priority effort: Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, An Xuyen, Ba Xuyen, Chuong Thien, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Phuoc Thanh. The majority of these provinces were in the Delta where water needs were greatest and geological information the most meager. RUWSTAF was concerned with other than conventional drilling as a means of providing potable water and all known means, including experimental US desalting equipment, were evaluated as a part of the basic program.

(C) Since RUWSTAF was a joint US/GVN effort with one main goal being an independent GVN continuing program, the Task Force was set up with GVN/US counterparts. The Chief, RUWSTAF was Vietnamese, appointed by the GVN Director of National Water Supply Agency (NWSA). Basically, the combined GVN/US effort with a proposed manpower of approximately 850 acted as a clearing house for rural water supply requests and provided coordination and direction to the effort in order to provide potable water to rural areas by the fastest and most economical means possible.

(C) USOM announced on 13 October that, as soon as practicable, the Rural Water Supply Program would be carried out primarily through GVN efforts with essential US support being provided by USOM civilian advisors. As a result of this decision the Seabee well-drillers commenced phasing out, and on 31 December 1964 they terminated operations in support of RUWSTAF. MACV and USOM, however, continued to provide equipment and logistic support for the program. Military participation in the RUWSTAF was scheduled to end in June 1965; however, at the end of 1964 plans were underway to have selected Seabee well-drillers remain in Vietnam and provide on-the-job training to ARVN Engineer personnel in support of the military well-drilling program.

(U) In June 1964 eight ECAD teams (one control and seven training teams) from the 539th Engineer Detachment, Okinawa, arrived to assist in the Rural Water Supply Program; in particular, hydrogeological drilling and surface water development. The Vietnamese were extremely pleased with the accomplishments of these teams and were most anxious that the program be completed. Because USOM was concerned that the



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Vietnamese would rely too heavily upon the teams the second increment was phased-down to one control and four training teams. Plans at the end of 1964 were to phase-out the second increment as they completed their training missions. At the request of the Vietnamese and the Director, USOM, COMUSMACV extended the OIC of the first increment in the interest of providing continuity to the program and to use his services as Operations Officer of the Rural Water Supply Office.⁷³

(U) At the end of the year it was generally agreed that both the Seabees and the Army Engineers had provided immeasurable support to USOM civic action projects, and had done much to project GVN pacification into rural areas.

AIR SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Rules of Engagement

(S) Air support activities in the RVN came under close scrutiny throughout 1964 as the need for effective, timely close air support increased to meet VC pressure. This scrutiny involved not only VNAF, but Air Commando Squadrons, and both USMC and USA helicopter support. The whole problem of rapid response was complicated not only by the inflexibility of the VNAF air support system but also by the limitations imposed on US air support by the rules of engagement.

(TS) The rules of engagement as applied to air activity in Vietnam had a long and complicated history. For political reasons, and recognizing the restricted US mission of advising and training RVNAF, it was necessary to place certain operational restrictions upon US marked and manned aircraft in the RVN.


(TS) In 1962, basic guidance on the use of armed helicopters authorized engagement with clearly identified Viet Cong elements which were considered to be a threat to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers.⁷⁴ In addition, armed helicopters, being evaluated under the direction of ACTIV, were required to have a GVN observer aboard, and all flights and suppressive fires delivered were considered to be defensive in nature.

(TS) A clarification and slight relaxation of this guidance occurred in February 1963 when a JCS message indicated that armed helicopters were permitted to initiate fire, providing the target could be identified as a substantial threat. If the threat was negligible, the helicopters were required to leave the area.⁷⁵

(TS) A MACV directive published on 19 June 1964 provided general guidance in this area and identified all restrictions imposed by earlier messages received from higher headquarters. This particular directive provided guidance to both USA and USMC helicopter crews for

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
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to the limited number of Vietnamese observers and their general lack of urgency, they were not always available when needed and scrambles were consequently delayed or even aborted. Like all rules of engagement, however, they were frequently violated, particularly when US armed helicopters were called upon to fulfill an emergency close air support role. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in August was the event that ushered in a substantial expansion and relaxation of these restrictions.

VNAF Air Support

(U) (C) As mentioned above, the VNAF air support system came under close scrutiny in 1964 as the need for timely close air support increased. Increased Viet Cong attacks on hamlets and troop ambushes focused attention on the lack of responsiveness of air support to the immediate needs of the ground commander. It was generally true that unless a preplanned air patrol was used or strike aircraft were in the air and could be diverted in an emergency, assistance for the hamlet, village or troop convoy commander under attack was delayed as much as several hours. Since the most critical need for air support occurred during the first 30 minutes of a clash several studies on this problem were initiated during the year to resolve the problem.

(U) (C) The first study was initiated in February by a US Army-USAF team of two officers.⁸³ This study of the ARVN Air-Ground Operations system disclosed a distinct weakness in the capability to handle emergency or immediate air requests. These requests often become bogged down in the chain of command and, if and when finally approved, usually resulted in the aircraft arriving too late to be effective. Lack of reliable communications was found to be another factor having an adverse effect on the processing of air requests. Although adequate numbers of radios were available at the necessary levels to form the designated ARVN Air Request Net, in many cases the radios were being used for other purposes or not at all. Air request channels varied in accordance with the desires of each local or corps tactical zone commander. The paramilitary air request system extended up from the village or hamlet, through district or sector, and usually on through each successive military chain of command. Here again, delays in approval of an air strike occurred all along the chain, and quite often requests were allowed to die for some obscure reason. Many of the tactical operations centers were not staffed on a 24-hour basis with people capable and authorized to make decisions on requests. There were no VNAF air liaison officers (ALO) or VNAF forward air controllers with ARVN tactical units, making it difficult to educate the ARVN commanders on the capabilities and use of tactical air support through contact and mutual control of requests and strikes. Air to air communication of communications was a problem and proper control of air strikes was often impossible. Installation of AN/ARC-44 radios



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correct this problem area. High Command directives covering the air-ground operations system were not available at all levels of command and were generally disregarded in favor of operating level directives.

(C) Because of these difficulties the study recommended that: (1) operations centers should be manned 24 hours a day with people empowered to make decisions; (2) immediate air requests should be processed in-the-clear; (3) ARVN should set up and man air request radios 24 hours a day; (4) ARVN/VNAF should establish and operate an air-ground operations schools; (5) MACVJ6 should expedite procurement and installation of AN/ARC-44's in tactical aircraft; (6) VNAF should provide ground commanders with FAC's; (7) High Command close air support directives should be updated and those of subordinate commands which were in conflict should be rescinded; (8) immediate air requests should be passed directly from battalion to corps TOC/ASOC (tactical operations center/air support operations center) with simultaneous information to division or special zone; (9) required ARVN radio sets should be redistributed for best air/ground use; and (10) a simple air request message numbering system should be initiated. COMUSMACV provided High Command with suggested appropriate corrective actions based on the findings of this study team.⁸⁴

(C) In April, with a continuing lack of air support responsiveness still evident in daily clashes, ambushes, and hamlet attacks, the US Strike Command Air Request System was introduced into RVN, initially as a test case in III Corps and 7th Division areas, but later expanded into other CTZ's.⁸⁵ This system initially employed USAF ALO's, FAC's, radio operators, and HF single sideband voice communications equipment. It was established at corps, division, regiment, airborne brigade, and special zone levels, and was intended to provide a rapid means of passing emergency air support requests to corps. VNAF ALO's and FAC's were to be collocated with USAF ALO's and FAC's as soon as they could be made available by VNAF, so that they could eventually assume complete responsibility for the function.

(C) By October 1964, although the VNAF Air Request Net had been positioned in III and IV Corps, manned by USAF personnel and equipment, it was not being used by ARVN to transmit immediate air support requests, nor was it being used by VNAF for necessary training of ALO/FAC's. VNAF was still unable to man the system because of insufficient personnel,⁸⁶ a situation complicated by the equipping of the fourth A-1H squadron. ARVN in turn refused to use the new air request net apparently because of: Lack of implementing instructions from High Command; distrust between ARVN and VNAF; the fact that the net was manned by USAF personnel; a reluctance of Vietnamese Commanders to permit their units to communicate directly with senior units; and the fact that battalions were often too distant from regimental headquarters to allow the use of

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FM radio. They preferred to continue using their own communications equipment and personnel which involved the use of cumbersome CW transmissions and encoding procedures.

(C) As air responsiveness continued to be less than desirable, a second MACV survey team was commissioned to investigate the problem. A team of five officers representing the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps visited all four CTZ's, studied operational logs, queried ARVN, VNAF and advisory staffs, and witnessed typical operations in order to evaluate functioning of the system in use. This second survey identified the same problem areas as the first, plus a few additional ones.⁸⁷ This second study recommended that: (1) the availability of a light portable radio compatible with the VNAF net, for use between battalion and regiment, should be investigated; (2) the delivery of the authorized increase of 48 OI/U17 aircraft should be expedited; (3) the VNAF Air Request Net should be adopted as the primary immediate air request system; (4) the VNAF Air Request Net should be manned with VNAF ALO's, FAC's and radio operators as rapidly as possible; (5) VNAF observation aircraft should be further dispersed in all CTZ's; (6) the movement of strike aircraft to IV Corps should be expedited to reduce reaction time of fighters; (7) VNAF ground alert posture should be reduced from 30 minutes to 15 minutes; (8) VNAF FAC's should be authorized to coordinate air strikes from both the ground and the air, and from any type of aircraft; (9) the rules of engagement should be expanded to allow the ground commander to coordinate close air support strikes through a F/C, a US advisor, or a forward observer (artillery); (10) emphasis on training of personnel for the air request system should be renewed; and (11) High Command issue a directive requiring mandatory use of this system.

(C) At year's end MACV had formally presented recommended corrective actions to High Command through briefings, personal interviews and official correspondence.⁸⁸ Verbal assurance of early positive action was received from High Command. By December, air support responsiveness was beginning to show improvement through the following actions: (1) staging flights of Al's at Tra Noc (New Can Tho Airfield) for support of IV Corps; (2) increasing air patrol missions to provide an "airborne alert" capability during critical time periods in critical areas; (3) dispersing OI type aircraft and FAC's to obtain better reaction capability for controllers; and (4) utilizing the VNAF air request net (single sideband) in some areas to expedite passage of emergency requests for air support.


(C) Although many problem areas remained at the intentions and plans appeared genuine.

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Control of US Air Resources

(C) As the USA and USMC Helicopter aviation assets expanded in the latter part of 1964, certain procedures were evolved to more efficiently use the resources available. Generally speaking, the USMC/USA aviation assets in the RVN were allocated to the corps senior advisors for operational control in support of normal tactical operations. The UTT Helicopter Company (redesignated the 68th Aviation Company, in August 1964), the 57th Medical Ambulance Helicopter Detachment, and the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment were all retained in general support of the corps areas.

(C) Requests from corps for use of general support aviation resources were submitted from the corps TOC to the Army Aviation Element (AAE) located at the Joint Operations Center Branch, MACVJ3. The AAE (later redesignated the Army Aviation Operations Section (AAOS)) fulfilled the corps requirement if possible, and when a conflict of interest arose between corps areas, the AAOS, through the JOC, determined a priority of support based upon MACV policy and the importance of the operations as determined by the J3, RVNAP. In September a revised MACV directive established procedures for the temporary reallocation of aviation assets between corps areas to meet immediate operational needs. This reallocation could be readily effected by direct contact with the AAOS, JOC Branch, by the quickest available means of communication.⁸⁹

(C) To further expedite the allocation of air support resources, the AAE's of USA aviation battalions were collocated with the USAF ASOC at each ARVN corps headquarters. This collocation at corps was mirrored at High Command level by placing the AAOS of the JOC Branch, MACVJ3 with the AOC at Tan Son Nhut. Thus, air requests for all types of aviation support were first funneled into the corps TOC where, with both USA/USAF representation, the mission could be quickly relayed to the appropriate action agency at the corps ASOC. If the mission could not be supported with corps resources it would then be forwarded for final decision and action to the AOC.


(C) It became evident in the latter part of 1964 that a clearer delineation of responsibilities was needed in the area of joint and combined airmobile operations. This was occasioned by the advent of increased VNAF helicopter troop lift and close air support capability, in conjunction with increased US Army, US Air Force, and US Marine Corps aviation assets.

(C) A MACV directive published in October filled this requirement.⁹⁰ This directive set forth procedures to be followed in the planning and execution of airmobile troop lifts to include:

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of responsibilities of specific units, guidance on mission planning, coordination and control, request procedures, tactics, and target marking.

(C) This directive specifically required commanders of US aviation elements and their representatives to actively participate with ARVN and VNAF in the development of operation plans, and prescribed that pre-planned operations would normally be coordinated at the TOC/ASOC level. In addition, it enjoined the use of pre-strikes for appropriate operations, described escort tactics, called for the employment of VNAF FAC's in conjunction with airmobile operations, and outlined means of target marking.

(U) Throughout 1964 there was a continuing effort to refine existing airmobile techniques and experiment with possible innovations and improvements. As an example, on 2 December 1964, the US senior advisor to the ARVN Airborne Brigade proposed to COMUSMACV employment of units of the brigade as a heliborne reaction force. This concept, nicknamed "Falcon Flight," would exploit the capability of the airborne units as a highly-mobile, rapid-reaction, intervention or strike force. According to the argument for the proposal, exploitation of this capability (largely neglected in previous operations) could influence significantly the conduct of the war, particularly in the critical III Corps, without degrading the general reserve posture of the Airborne Brigade. An operations plan was worked out by the senior advisor to the Airborne Brigade in coordination with CO, 145th Avn Bn, CG, USASCV, and III Corps Senior Advisor. A copy of this plan was offered in support of the proposal. 91

(U) The "Falcon Flight" concept envisioned ad hoc combinations of an airborne battalion and an army aviation battalion to execute the following types of missions: search and destroy, reaction, reserve for ground operations, and exploitations. The "Falcon Flight" concept, except for its size, was similar to the "Eagle Flight" concept successfully employed in the Delta. At year's end the "Falcon Flight" concept was being reviewed by MACVJ3 to determine the availability of required helicopter lift and to resolve certain obscurities of command arrangement and procedures of implementation.

(C) During the latter part of 1964 discussions were under way on the need for liaison aircraft at province/sector level. In early December briefings were presented to Maj Gen Moore, 2d Air Division, and Air Vice Marshal Ky, Commander, VNAF, on the projected plan for OIA aircraft deployment.

(C) In essence the plan envisioned the deployment of 56 US, 20 USAF and 126 VNAF liaison aircraft in a manner designed to achieve equal distribution of capabilities with greatest coverage and least duplication. This plan requires the following:

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USA aircraft assignment structure was to be taken as a beginning point, augmented with USAF and VNAF liaison aircraft to provide the most equitable distribution. At the year's end the subject was still under study and a MACV directive was being prepared to clarify the tactical air control system as applied to organization and equipment of liaison aircraft. This directive was to also describe the means for rapidly shifting the air liaison effort as emergencies might demand.

(S) As the number of USAF aircraft in the RVN increased and the possibility of DRV/CHICOM air activity became more likely after the Tonkin Gulf incident, the 2AD recognized a need for a permanent Local Base Rescue (LBR) Detachment in the RVN. In August 1964 the 2AD requested MACV support for such a detachment.

(S) The increased flight training, combat support, and combat operations created the need for fully manned and equipped LBR Detachments at busy airfields such as Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Da Nang. These detachments supplemented existing ground crash rescue and firefighting equipment. The 2AD, in turn, was prepared to provide facilities at each base to include helicopter alert pads, alert rooms, communications, and logistical support.

(S) The justification for LBR's was practically identical for each of the airfields. In short, presently assigned base crash rescue and firefighting equipment were inadequate for off-base use. The terrain surrounding the bases was flat marsh land and hostile forces were present within the traffic pattern areas, presenting a threat to surface crash rescue operations.

(S) The 2AD considered that the principle advantage of the LBR's was the aircraft itself, which was a Kaman, turbine-powered, H43B helicopter. This machine could scramble immediately without warmup and carried fire suppression equipment and specially trained fire-fighters. This fire-fighter unit also gave aircrews a psychological boost since its rapid maneuverability enabled it more easily to keep fires away from the cockpit.

(S) A MACJ3 letter describing the above requirement was forwarded to MACV Chief of Staff on 19 December 1964 for approval and dispatch to CINCPAC.⁹² The entire LBR project, however, was overcome by events in early 1965 when this specific requirement was incorporated into MACV's priority request.


(S) As part of a continuing testing and evaluation program, as pure combat support, MACV in August 1964 requested approval from CINCPAC to employ LAZY DOG weapons in the RVN.⁹³ CINCPAC on 26 September approved the use of LAZY DOG on suitable targets within the RVN and authorized

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the use of CBU-2/A munitions on YANKEE TEAM escort and SARCAP in Laos. The message further stated that there was no restriction against the use of AGM-12B. 94

(S) Beginning in late October 1964 the Air Force Test Unit (AFTU) of MACV conducted an evaluation of the LAZY DOG bomb against selected targets in the RVN. The rules of employment were established as follows: (1) authority for use was vested in the 2AD Commander; (2) only US aircraft with US crews operating under MACV rules of engagement were authorized to expend; (3) only selected targets were considered, and all targets were required to be clearly delineated and free of friendly forces; (4) separate LAZY DOG briefings were required to be conducted before each use of the weapon; and (5) the squadron commander, operations officer, and pilot were required to check the aircraft prior to use.

(S) The AFTU continued the evaluation into 1965 but by the close of 1964 a complete evaluation could not be made. One of the basic problems in the evaluation was the collection of data. The difficulty in determining precise results in a combat environment, such as the radius of lethal effects, made a worthwhile analysis well nigh impossible.

(S) In summary, 1964 saw a slow improvement in the timeliness and effectiveness of close air support. In the early part of 1964 armed helicopters were called upon time and time again to perform a close air support role; VNAF fighter-bombers were unresponsive; and missions were frequently aborted as a result of communications difficulties. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, improvement accelerated somewhat as a result of the relaxation of the rules of engagement and the implementation of the VNAF ALO/FAC system and VNAF Air Request Net. Although the system was far from perfect and far from fully implemented, the structure had been established and considerable progress made in 1964.

BORDER CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE

(S) In the early part of 1964 it was still evident that pacification progress was being greatly hindered by the steady infiltration of personnel and materiel into RVN from Laos and Cambodia. As part of the increased attention to VC infiltration, a US Navy staff group was established in January 1964 to study all aspects of VC infiltration into South Vietnam. The general conclusions of this study were: (1) VC infiltration of personnel and equipment was taking place in undetermined but sufficient quantities to successfully support and sustain primary operations; and (2) the primary source of supply continued to be from DRV

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via Laos and Cambodia with delivery by porters via foot trails, by boat and sampan on the rivers and canals, and along the coast by larger seagoing craft.⁹⁵

(S) The whole problem of border control came under intensive study and analysis in the early part of 1964 by the J3 staff,⁹⁶ and after analyzing several border control plans, MACVJ3 concluded that border control, per se, was feasible.

(S) The type plan determined by MACVJ3 to be most effective in impeding infiltration incorporated the following general characteristics: (1) a "border control area" adjacent to the border cleared of all population and obstacles to observation; (2) a physical barrier unit within the "border control area"; (3) a second area or zone adjacent to the "border control area" where extremely strict population and resources control would be practiced; and (4) sufficient forces available to patrol the border and destroy small infiltration groups.


(S) Cost figures for such a program were difficult to determine; however, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) study, one of the several MACV conducted, used an average cost per mile figure based on the II Corps heavily forested border. This figure, which was in fact the highest cost estimate of all the studies, indicated a total cost of \$70.4 million for a physical barrier.


(S) By mid-summer two projects were under way. On COMUSMACV's urging, ARVN moved Special Forces units (CIDG) up to the Cambodian border in IV CTZ. Concurrent with this movement of forces, IV Corps began to study a proposed pilot border control plan incorporating a physical barrier. Later, the use of USASF "A" detachments was considered as possible subsector advisors for districts contiguous to the Cambodian border in IV Corps.

(S) In August IV Corps completed its plan and presented it to COMUSMACV.⁹⁷ In general, the IV Corps plan entailed considerable manpower and resources; however, the estimated total cost was considerably less than the ARPA study. Both the Ambassador and COMUSMACV felt that implementation of the IV Corps plan would greatly impede cross border infiltration into the vital Mekong Delta. COMUSMACV, in fact, directed that a further study be made on a control plan from the delta to the 17th Parallel.

(S) The IV Corps Border Control Plan was forwarded to CINCPAC on 12 October 1964⁹⁸ and concurrently presented to RVNAF for their consideration and possible implementation. As of 31 December 1964, CINCPAC still had the plan under consideration and COMUSMACV had received no report.

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action taken by RVNAF. RVNAF did, however, conduct a study of the plan during December and presented a briefing on the plan to CINCPAC. The High Command generally felt that the plan would impede infiltration into the delta; however, they were reluctant to begin implementation until the extent of US participation and resources was determined.

(S) The CIDG mission of border surveillance and control assumed increasing importance throughout 1964. In fact on 1 January 1964 18 CIDG camps were already located in areas suitable for this mission. To interdict known VC infiltration routes, USASF "A" detachments and their VN counterparts were directed to move an additional eight CIDG camps to locations suitable for border surveillance and control. This action was taken in late spring of 1964 and by June it was determined that control was reasonably effective where camps were located within patrolling distance of the border or on interior infiltration routes. In spite of this relocation, however, VC infiltration of personnel and materiel continued in enough volume to permit a sizeable step-up in VC attacks and harassment throughout the summer.

(S) By late summer a study by the MACV staff in coordination with the CO, 5th USASFG, analyzed means of reducing VC infiltration. This study, completed in December, recommended a shift in emphasis from the interior area development concept to that of border surveillance and control and interdiction of interior lines of VC communications. A plan, recommending the establishment of five new CIDG camps and the relocation of certain other camps close to the border, was submitted to COMUSMACV for approval in September.⁹⁹

(S) In October COMUSMACV gave tacit approval for the relocation of certain other camps closer to the border; however, this approval was contingent upon the organization and subsequent employment of a Nung Chinese battalion in a continuous patrol role to the west of Da Nang. In fact, by December 1964 little progress had been made in the relocation program for two reasons: First, the corps commanders and the corps senior advisors had never considered the Special Forces/CIDG location study to be a firm directive, although detailed instructions for the opening of new CIDG camps along the border had been provided in RVNAF Directive AB 139; second, and, perhaps more significant, the relocation effort never did receive support in an approved budget.¹⁰⁰ At the year's end, 29 of the 44 CIDG camps located in the RVN were assigned a border control and surveillance mission, six on the Laotian Border and 23 on the Cambodian Border.


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(TS) Another subject closely tied in with VC infiltration from Cambodia and the IV Corps Barrier Plan was the control of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers. The amount of VC ammunition and weapons in IV Corps led to the conclusion that significant amounts of war materials were being shipped up the Mekong and Bassac Rivers into Cambodia, then infiltrated by small boats and sampans to VC supply points within the RVN. cursory review of manifests of Mekong upbound ships revealed that in the period July 17 to August 10, five ships (UK, Japanese, Dutch, Norwegian and Panamanian flags) carried full loads of cement (total 9200 tons) from Haiphong to Phnom Penh. In the same period numerous shipments of suspect chemicals, including a large quantity of potassium chlorate, loaded in Hong Kong, passed upriver. Most chemicals were shipped on British, Panamanian, Japanese, and Norwegian flag vessels.


(TS) In order to prevent material for the VC being delivered in Cambodia for subsequent transshipment into the delta by small boats, JCS recommended in July 1964 that RVN be encouraged to render a strict interpretation of Article II of the Protocol annexed to the "Convention requesting maritime inland navigation on the approach to the port of Saigon."¹⁰¹ US State Department in turn suggested that the US Embassy, Saigon, take up this matter with RVN; later it judged that neither the convention nor general principles of international law would prohibit restrictions on Mekong River traffic so long as they were consistent with certain principles.¹⁰² The State Department was informed in September that US Embassy, Saigon, would meet with the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry on 13 September 1964 to review proposals on Mekong River controls which were developed at a Cabinet meeting on 11 September 1964. In this effort to control the flow of arms, munitions, and explosive materials upriver to Phnom Penh, emphasis would be on GVN measures to protect its internal security rather than reprisals against Cambodia.

(TS) The RVN formulated controls designed to permit closer surveillance over arms and chemical cargos included: (1) a requirement for GVN authorization for all vessels using the Mekong River; (2) a possible escort of vessels at GVN discretion; (3) a requirement for customs inspection; (4) a cessation of Vietnamese pilotage as far as Phnom Penh; (5) a suspension of navigation between sunset and sunrise; and (6) a designation of only four authorized halting sites along the river. Although a Japanese ship bearing four cases of carbine magazines consigned to Cambodia was held up at the mouth of the Mekong in October, exact procedures and the timing for the introduction and announcement of controls were still unclear.

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(TS) The US Embassy, Saigon, recommended the following actions: (1) the RVN government should forbid transit of all arms, munitions and a designated list of chemicals which could be used in manufacture of explosives unless properly invoiced to RKG or covered by a transit license issued by the GVN; and (2) all ships should be subject to search for compliance with regulations. (In practice, search would normally be only of ships coming from Chinese mainland, North Korean, or DRV ports)

(TS) In September, JCS expressed concern over materiel support for the VC which was first shipped to Sihanoukville, thence by land to Phnom Penh, and then down the Mekong and Bassac Rivers and associated canals and tributaries into the RVN. 103 JCS requested an assessment of what was required in terms of actions, equipment, and personnel to stop or appreciably reduce the flow of support to the VC via these water routes.

(TS) As mentioned earlier, MACV had already conducted extensive studies on several border control plans, among which the IV Corps Barrier Plan had already been completed in August and approved both by the Ambassador and COMUSMACV. In answer to a JCS query, this Barrier Plan was modified slightly to include the addition of searchlights and heavy machine guns at border checkpoints on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers, as well as the use of barriers on the river itself to funnel traffic through the checkpoints. In the exchange of messages with CINCPAC which followed, CINCPAC was informed that no additional personnel could be effectively used at that particular time; however, as control measures developed, Vietnamese customs officials would require additional craft and searchlights.

(TS) Although the IV Corps Barrier Plan was still under discussion by CINCPAC at the close of 1964, it was clear by that time that MACV supported the IV Corps Barrier Plan and the relocation of CIDG units to the border as the best solutions available. Both projects had been under way too short a time at the close of the year to evaluate their effectiveness.

USE OF CHEMICALS: HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL MUNITIONS

(S) Since the beginning of US support to the RVN, new and more effective weapons systems to meet the counterinsurgency challenge have been sought and tested. One such system was first broached in 1961 when CHMAAG suggested herbicides as a possible tactical weapon for reducing VC concealment along key communications axes and destroying VC resources.

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(S) It was clearly understood at the outset, however, that a long and laborious task lay ahead in developing a system that was responsive and effective yet still remained acceptable to the 1954 Geneva agreement. Herbicides, often referred to as "chemicals", immediately conjured up new charges of germ warfare susceptible to the communist propaganda machine, akin to US experience in the Korean War.

(S) Defoliation was definitely considered the less sensitive of the two herbicide operations (defoliation and crop destruction). The first defoliation was conducted in August 1961 and continued until May 1962. After that time the Ambassador and COMUSMACV were delegated joint authority to conduct defoliation operations, following these general guidelines: Such operations would not include crop destruction and would be limited to clearing roadsides, powerlines, railroads and other lines of communications, and the areas adjacent to depots, airfields and other field installations.¹⁰⁴ Further guidance was given to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV in August 1963 which permitted the execution of a few high priority projects in populated areas "where the military advantages were very clear and hand cutting and burning not feasible."¹⁰⁵

(S) A MACV evaluation of all defoliation operations conducted between September 1962 and September 1963, requested initially by Department of Defense, concluded that defoliation operations had definite military worth in counterinsurgency and recommended continuation of the program.¹⁰⁶ The program was continued with State/Defense approval and considerably increased in frequency and magnitude throughout 1964. In fact, in late January 1964, authority was delegated to division senior advisors for hand-spray defoliation operations. This procedure greatly reduced the time lag involved in small defoliation projects such as the control of vegetation for security around outposts, airfields, and depots. At the year's end, 882 km of lines of communications had been defoliated to an average width of 400 meters, more than double the 349 km for 1963.

(S) The true military worth of defoliating along communications axes remained a serious question. An accurate military assessment was not possible due primarily to the fact that the decrease of incidents in a defoliated area to a possible corresponding increase in adjacent non-defoliated areas was not analyzed. Defoliation was often intermittent along roads, railroads, and canals as a corrective rather than a preventative measure; this completely neglected heavily vegetated adjacent areas.

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(S) A more promising approach to defoliation was undertaken in the latter part of 1964--defoliating VC safe haven areas. One such operation in a mangrove area of Co Cong Province was a total success. The VC completely evacuated the area; the defoliation permitted RVNAF to maintain close surveillance over the entire area. At the close of 1964, another such operation was under way in the Boi Loi Woods of Binh Duong and Tay Ninh provinces. Although evaluation in 1964 would have been premature, the sizeable number of defectors and civilians seeking relocation indicated some success.

(S) As mentioned earlier, "crop destruction" was the far more sensitive program; unless handled extremely carefully, the program could easily generate the psychological onus of "gas warfare". Although initial crop destruction operations were conducted in July 1961 concurrently with defoliation, the program started to lag for fear of potential repercussions.

(S) On 4 October 1962, however, State/Defense authorized crop destruction in principle and advised the Country Team to implement the proposed program keeping in mind the following: "(1) the program should only be implemented where stage of crop growth gives reasonable prospects of success; (2) targets should be selected in areas where maximum damage is done to Viet Cong and minimum to non-communist peasants; and (3) the Country Team should consider psywar aspects carefully with a view to minimizing anticipated adverse political repercussions both inside and outside RVN."107

(S) Crop destruction missions were subsequently initiated in the latter part of 1962 and continued into 1963 against a background of increasing adverse propaganda from the DRV. This was climaxed on 8 April 1963, when the Secretary General of the International Control Commission presented the RVN with a letter from General Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), charging that noxious chemicals had been used to carry out "collective reprisals" against the people of South Vietnam in violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.108


(S) As a result of this unfavorable propaganda, the State Department requested in early May 1963 a full report and evaluation of all herbicide operations in 1963, and, as an interim measure, required that all future crop destruction missions be approved in advance by the Assistant Secretary of State, Far Eastern Affairs, and DOD. Task Force Saigon, after a thorough evaluation, recommended that

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destruction be continued as an effective weapon against the Viet Cong and that authority to approve crop destruction missions be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV.¹⁰⁹

(S) Such authority was not forthcoming, however, and in February 1964, it was again requested that approval authority be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV for 12 VC areas in addition to War Zone "D", in order to avoid time-consuming procedures for crop destruction approval. This authority was granted on 3 March 1964. The continued expansion of VC controlled areas, however, soon resulted in numerous VC food production farms being discovered outside of the originally approved areas. At MACV's request, State Department on 29 July 1964 delegated the authority for approval of all crop destruction operations to the Ambassador-COMUSMACV level.¹¹⁰

(S) Crop destruction, although conducted on a somewhat limited scale, was by far the most effective herbicide operation employed in RVN. It is interesting to note that of the 5690 hectares of VC food crop destroyed in 1964, 4865 were after the delegation of approval authority to the Ambassador. These figures, when compared to the 1963 total of 79 hectares, reflect the enormous strides herbicide operations have made. Even so, the food denial program did not achieve its full potential in 1964. Success was limited by several factors; perhaps the foremost was the failure to pursue and gain early approval for crop destruction when the control of people and terrain by the Viet Cong was limited. Secondly, JGS, High Command, was not organized to conduct these type operations on a country-wide basis, nor did RVNAF possess the procedure or experience to submit timely crop destruction requests. Last of all, poorly engineered spray equipment and a lack of motivation on the part of VNAF pilots quite often resulted in inefficient delivery of the herbicide on target. This necessitated in October, November, and December 1964 the use of USAF C123 aircraft under the FARMGATE concept (mixed US/VN crews). In spite of these difficulties, the crop destruction program has been effective against the VC and their supporters, often causing them to relocate their production farms and safe-haven areas. In addition several hundred people have returned to RVN control as a direct result of the crop destruction program.

(S) In addition to the use of herbicides, 1964 saw the introduction of riot control munitions; an equally sensitive subject with potential connotations of "gas warfare". As early as March 1964, MACV conducted a study on the potential use of riot control munitions in RVN counterinsurgency operations.¹¹¹ The study was forwarded by MACV through channels to DOD requesting authority for the tactical employment of these munitions. CINCPAC then requested in June that a plan be submitted for the use of CS gas on both wide-spread and limited scales.¹¹² On 28 September the plans

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were dispatched by COMUSMACV with recommendations that the initial use of CS gas be conducted by the Vietnamese, for RVNAF already possessed the capability to initiate such use and therefore heavy US involvement would not be necessary.

(S) In mid-September, the possibility of using riot control munitions was discussed by MACV and High Command representatives at action officer level. As a result of MACV suggestions the High Command in late October began to express an interest in using these munitions in the control of civil disturbances. Since US policy precluded US use of riot control munitions except in defense of American lives, all efforts were directed towards assisting RVNAF in developing employment techniques.

(S) In late November 1964, riot control munitions were used successfully in Saigon to disperse rioting students. This initial success led to the requisitioning of additional munitions and dispersal equipment for RVNAF in preparation for further use of riot control munitions in both a civil disturbance and also in a possible tactical role.

(S) In late December 1964, RVNAF requested US support in planning and executing a tactical operation in Tay Ninh Province employing riot control munitions. This combined operation was conducted on 25 December 1964 with the hope of freeing US personnel in a suspected VC detainment camp. A total of 870 CN, CN/DH, and CS gas grenades and 300 pounds of bulk CS were delivered. Although results could not be evaluated because the VC vacated the area prior to the employment of the agent, the actual mechanics involved in timing and delivery were successfully executed. 113 At the year's end, US advisors were assisting the RVNAF in planning and training for the future use of riot control agents in a limited tactical role.

MISCELLANEOUS PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS

(U) Throughout the year J3 became involved in diverse projects and programs which were related in a basic sense. All were designed to improve the combat effectiveness and capabilities of the RVNAF.

(C) After a midsummer rash of VC ambushes of RVNAF units, COMUSMACV directed that a study be conducted on this subject. As a result of the study, field advisors were subsequently required to submit an after action report on all ambushes. It was hoped that these reports would provide the basis for improved counter-ambush techniques which would then be disseminated both through advisory channels and through the RVNAF training center system. A similar study was also conducted on the VC employment of land mines. J3 published a letter on this subject urging emphasis on intelligence.


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increased defoliation along principal roads, revision of POI's for RVNAF training centers and unit training programs, and expansion of the psyops campaign on VC mines. 114 Results of both studies were difficult to assess. For example, insofar as the ambush study was concerned, although the number of ambushes decreased, the size of ambushed units increased with a resultant net increase in RVNAF casualties.

(S) During the year TOE's and improved weapons systems also were studied. ACTIV completed a study in October 1964 which examined possible changes in individual and crew served weapons and munitions for RVNAF. 115 The study was forwarded to J3 for comments and after review the following recommendations were made: (1) M16 rifles should be substituted for M1 rifles, carbines, and submachine guns in the following priority: I - Ranger battalions, II - Marine battalions, III - Airborne battalions, (no US units should be deprived of M16 rifles to accomplish this conversion); (2) all M1 carbines organic to ARVN combat units should be converted to M2 carbines; (3) the authorization of M79 grenade launchers should be increased to one per Ranger, Marine, airborne and ARVN infantry type squad; (4) all model 1919 A4 caliber .30 machine guns in all Ranger, Marine, Airborne, and ARVN infantry type units should be exchanged for model 1919 A6 caliber .30 machine guns; and (5) all M2 60mm mortars should be exchanged for M19 60mm mortars in Ranger, Marine, Airborne and ARVN infantry type units.

(S) The Chief of Staff on 31 December 1964 forwarded these recommendations to DANL and requested that the proposals be reviewed, a cost estimate computed, and a time frame for implementation established. 116

(C) Concurrent with the ACTIV study, the MACV Directorate for Organization and Training (MACOT) commenced a study of the Ranger battalion TOE. 117 The subject was initially broached in September by the Ranger Command which had recognized by that time that Ranger units were being consistently employed in infantry type missions and not on tasks for which originally trained and equipped. Consequently, their organic weapons lacked the firepower infantry missions require and it was felt that TOE shortcomings were causing excessive Ranger casualties.

(C) MACOT, along with Ranger officers and their advisors, studied the problem for a weapons mix to provide greater firepower yet at the same time allow for Ranger mobility and flexibility. The recommendations, correlated closely with the ACTIV study, were: (1) put a grenade launcher M79 with each Ranger squad; (2) add a M1919A6 machine

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each Ranger company; (3) convert the 60mm mortar from the M2 to the M19; and (4) substitute in each Ranger squad three M2 carbines for four caliber .45 submachine guns. At the end of the year MACOT's recommendations were being reviewed by interested sections of MACV Headquarters.

(C) There were basically two material changes initiated during 1964; the conversion of the ARVN 4.2 in. mortar battalions into 105mm howitzer battalions, and the programmed replacement of the M24 tank with the M41A3 tank.

(C) DA approved MAP support of additional artillery in April 1964, and in August the decision was made by COMUSMACV to bring in 102 additional howitzers for the completion of the artillery organization. In essence, the artillery reorganization provided two 105mm howitzer battalions (18 tubes each) for each of the nine infantry divisions and five 155mm howitzer battalions (18 tubes each) under corps control.¹¹⁸ The last of the artillery weapons was scheduled to arrive in-country on 5 January 1965 with reorganization to be completed by 31 January 1965. The artillery project officer monitored the reorganization program and made appropriate recommendations to ARVN regarding the employment of additional weapons.

(C) As a corollary to the artillery reorganization, 271 4.2 mortars were replaced by the additional howitzers and consequently became excess to the TOE requirements of ARVN. A detailed study was initiated to determine whether these weapons might be gainfully employed by paramilitary forces. Although completion date of the study was 10 January 1965, the portion pertaining to III and IV Corps was forwarded to MACVJ3 on 15 December 1964, with a recommendation that 4.2 in. mortars be provided to paramilitary forces.¹¹⁹ It was anticipated that a similar recommendation would be made for I and II Corps.


(C) The recommendation to replace the M24 tanks in ARVN units with the M41A3 tank was approved by MACV in July 1964.¹²⁰ The basis of the decision was the increasing difficulty in maintaining a suitable level of spare parts. One hundred M41A3 tanks were programmed for arrival in Vietnam.¹²¹ A transition training program to qualify Vietnamese tank crews was developed by the Doctrine and Literature (D&L) Branch in October 1964 and joint ARVN-US planning to complete this program continued throughout the remainder of 1964.¹²² At the year's end, plans called for the commencement of training in March 1965 and completion by 14 October 1965.

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(U) Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA), in early November 1964, requested command approval for the establishment of a MACV requirement to develop and introduce a family of booby-trapped munitions for use in the RVN.¹²³ The Chief of Staff approved and forwarded to JRATA on 30 November 1964 the proposal for the employment of a limited quantity of booby-trapped munitions for evaluation purposes.¹²⁴

(C) Another JRATA project in 1964 was the ARVN searchlight platoon study. In a MACV daily briefing on 30 July 1964, J3 proposed that a searchlight platoon be obtained for evaluation in the counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam. The purpose of the searchlight platoon would be illumination support of hamlets during counterinsurgency operations. COMUSMACV concurred in the proposal and directed JRATA to draw up and submit the evaluation. JRATA in turn assigned the task to ACTIV.

(C) On 12 August 1964, ACTIV was notified by the ACSFOR ACTIV liaison officer that, "There are no searchlight platoons in an operational status in CONUS at the present time. The last two platoons were deactivated at Fort Benning, Ga., during February 1964." Several alternatives were considered and it was finally decided to request sufficient equipment and personnel on a TDY basis to train a Vietnamese searchlight platoon.

(C) Accordingly, MACV requested that the equipment for one artillery searchlight platoon be sent to Vietnam for the purpose of forming an ARVN platoon.¹²⁵ MACV also requested a US Army instruction team of one officer and six NCO's experienced in operations and maintenance of searchlight platoons for 120 days TDY to train ARVN in the operational employment of searchlights. The JGS approved the project; it was planned that, if the concept proved feasible and the equipment was satisfactory, a request would be made to transfer the equipment to the MAP Program.

(C) DA agreed to provide the requested resources and directed US Army Materiel Command to insure delivery of required equipment by 16 October 1964.¹²⁶ DA earmarked six new Standard A, 30-inch searchlights in lieu of the Standard B lights, and requested CG USCONARC to provide the instruction team.

(C) On 22 October the High Command, RVNAF, approved the activation of the searchlight battery in Vietnam and directed the Artillery Command, RVNAF, be responsible agent for the activation, organization, and training of the searchlight platoon. It further directed the Chief of Engi-

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near, RVNAF, to receive the required equipment upon its arrival in Vietnam, issue it to the Artillery Command for evaluation, and return it to the US issuing agency upon completion of the study.

(C) By 9 November six 30-inch searchlights, six generators, and the US Army Instructor Team consisting of one officer and six NCO's had arrived in Vietnam. The drawing and processing of equipment started on 12 November, and on 23 November a three week training program commenced at the 30th FA Bn Headquarters. The TOE of the ARVN Searchlight Platoon included: Platoon headquarters; platoon detail and maintenance section; six searchlight sections; six 30-inch searchlights, trailer mounted; six generators, trailer mounted; and totaling eight officers, nine NCO's and 45 EM.

(C) After the training program was completed, a day and night demonstration were presented on 23 December 1964; on 26 December the field evaluation phase commenced under the control of III Corps. Corps deployed the unit with two sections at Bien Hoa, two at Thu Dau Mot, and two at Duc Hoa. At the close of 1964 the test was continuing.

(U) In September the US 25th Infantry Division proposed sending Vietnamese language students from the division to the RVN as part of the division's language training program. CINCPAC recommended MACV approval of the proposal and MACV concurred. 127 On 14 November, 15 EM and four officers arrived in Saigon. After attending the in-country Military Assistance Training Advisors Course the personnel were organized into three After Action Interview Teams and one two man team which attended the basic RVNAF Psychological warfare Course. The teams were initially deployed to ARVN battalions to conduct interviews of personnel who had participated in successful ARVN actions. By the end of the year the teams had investigated four actions, and their reports were being prepared and studied by J3. These reports represented a long-term US investment since lessons learned could filtrate into RVNAF training and operations through US advisors.

SECURITY OF CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS

(S) The security of US personnel and critical installations in RVN was an object of constant attention by MACV throughout 1964. This was evidenced early in 1964 by a letter from COMUSMACV to Commander, 13th Air Force, in February, and by a letter from CHMAAG to Senior Advisor, III Corps, in April, on the subject of airbase security. Then on 5 August COMUSMACV met with General Khanh and key RVNAF commanders and staff officers

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to discuss the Tonkin Gulf incident and the necessity for upgrading the security of vital installations such as ports, airfields, communications and POL facilities, and vital lines of communication.

(S) On 10 August, 2AD published an operations analysis entitled "Passive Defense Measures at Bien Hoa Airbase Against Mortar Shelling." This document reviewed the possible effects of a mortar attack and outlined the dispersion required to minimize damage to personnel and equipment. On 15 August letters were sent to Commander, 2AD and CINCPAC, informing them of COMUSMACV's decision to assign US Army officers to major airbases as ground defense advisors and suggesting establishment of joint ground defense operations centers. On this same date COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC of passive defense measures already taken and requested the alerting of certain US units for contingent deployment to RVN. 128

(S) Shortly thereafter, DEPCOMUSMACV visited the three major airfields of Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang; as a direct result of his observations, a joint High Command/MACV Survey Team was formed which visited the same three airfields the first week of September. Throughout September and October efforts to improve airbase security continued; plans were reviewed, updated, and coordination between ARVN and VNAF continued, although the 13 September coup had strained relations between the two services considerably. 129

(S) By 1 November two US advisors had been assigned to the 34th Tactical Air Command Group staff for security evaluation and a Joint Ground Defense Operations Center (JGDOC) had been established. The communications capability of the JGDOC had been augmented and established to most units at the airbase, although admittedly the communication link to the outer perimeter was weak. An effort had been made to improve the training of the 57th RF Battalion manning the perimeter. A system of ambushes had been established; clearing of foliage had started; an artillery fire plan had been coordinated; and reinforcements were planned from the 5th and 7th Airborne Battalions. The guard was more alert; a standby flare ship was on call and armed helicopters were on five minute alert.

(S) In spite of this progress the VC inflicted major damage by a surprise mortar attack during the night of 1 November. This attack clearly indicated, as a subsequent investigation confirmed, that an efficient, integrated defensive effort was sadly lacking. Although efforts had been made to improve the training status of the 57th RF Battalion, it was discovered that the US advisor to this unit had some

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25 companies to advise. Consequently, patrolling was neither adequate nor effective, and reaction was incredibly slow on the perimeter. On the night of the attack, the province chief had fragmented and reduced the RF strength by pulling troops away for convoy security. Reinforcements were not effectively employed due to the indiscriminate use of artillery and air strikes in close proximity to the airbase. Perhaps most significant, the 13th of September coup had injected a political overtone to all dealings between the ARVN and the VNAF, in effect isolating the two services from one another, and resulting in a lack of coordination between interior and exterior security forces.

(S) Immediately following the Bien Hoa mortar attack, COMUSMACV, both by orders to US commanders and senior advisors, and by visits and correspondence with GVN and RVNAF High Command, renewed his efforts to upgrade the security of all vital installations.¹³⁰ RVNAF High Command was already responding to COMUSMACV's counsel; a series of directives established zones of intensified patrolling around airfields and, more important, clarified command responsibilities involved.¹³¹

(S) For the remainder of the year, the deployment of US combat troops to Vietnam as a course of action to improve security of US personnel and critical installations was repeatedly reviewed; however, with the exception of Marine security forces for the Hawk sites at Da Nang and US Military Police in Saigon, this suggested policy was rejected in preference to clear GVN responsibility in this area.¹³² The US Ambassador, in fact, warned against an over-stress on static security and stated that aggressive field operations by RVNAF forces were the best means available for establishing law, order, and public safety in the RVN.¹³³

(S) The terrorist bombing of the Brink BOQ in downtown Saigon on 24 December renewed reviews of security problems and by the year's end there was continuing US unilateral command, staff, and advisory effort to upgrade security of airbases and other critical installations.

(S) Airfields, of course, were not the only critical installations that received careful scrutiny after the Gulf of Tonkin incident and later after the Bien Hoa mortar attack. Communication facilities such as "Big Squirt" and US Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM), the ports of Da Nang and Saigon, and the Saigon-Cholon-Gia Dinh complex all received increasing attention later in 1964.

(S) "Big Squirt" was a project code name for a 50 KW medium wave transmitting facility built in the vicinity of Hue. This project was

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initiated by direction of DA in April 1964 to provide a facility for relaying Voice of America, USIS and RVN programs to a target audience in North Vietnam.¹³⁴ The receiver and transmitter sites were constructed some five miles apart near the city of Hue in Thua Thien Province, with the receiver north of the Hue landing strip, and the transmitter southeast of the Hue Citadel. The facility became operational for non-directional transmissions on 18 July 1964 and for directional transmissions on 1 August 1964.

(S) The US-GVN agreement, finalized on 28 June 1964, included the provision that "the Government of Vietnam shall provide the necessary assistance in maintaining adequate physical security of the installations. COMUSMACV, in turn, designated the Senior Advisor of I Corps as the MACV representative to coordinate security requirements with ARVN.¹³⁵ On 5 October 1964, the Senior Advisor, I Corps, reported in a letter to the Chief of Staff, MACV, that, as a result of a personal inspection, he was not satisfied that the sites were being secured to "the degree appropriate to their financial cost and the propaganda value attached to their destruction." He recommended additional physical security measures such as double fencing, more lighting, erection of guard towers with searchlights, and construction of a guard booth with an under-vehicle inspection pit. These recommendations resulted in a change order to the contract between the Department of the Army and Page Electronics, with on-site installation of the additional items to begin in early February 1965 and to be completed by mid-April 1965.¹³⁶

(S) The Tonkin Gulf incident spurred an examination of the STRATCOM facilities. On 8 September 1964, the Senior Advisor of the Capital Military District (CMD) described the protective obstacles, fortifications, defense systems and units available for the security of the STRATCOM site at Phu Lam. Close-in and internal security were described as adequate but the external security was considered inadequate. It was recommended that: (1) the JGS be requested to provide one airborne or Ranger company to the CMD each night for employment in securing the STRATCOM site; (2) the JGS be requested to provide one tank company for employment as part of the reserve force planned for use in the Phu Lam area; and (3) direct coordination between the CMD and the unit commanders concerned be authorized.¹³⁷ COMUSMACV recognized the exposed position of the STRATCOM site but stated that there was insufficient threat of concentrated enemy attack to justify requesting further assistance from the High Command. Regional and Popular Forces deployed around the Phu Lam site were incorporated into the defensive and reinforcing plans for the site.¹³⁸


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(S) Closer attention, however, began on 3 October 1964 when the CG USASCV reported that the physical security measures at the STRATCOM site located at Phu Lam were inadequate. The major deficiencies were identified to be a lack of adequate defense barriers, and a shortage of personnel to provide adequate close-in security and active patrolling out to the effective range of VC mortars. The CG, USASCV, recommended that planned engineer construction of security defenses be completed without delay, using US Army Engineer Special Action Teams to assist civilian contractors in the construction of the defense barrier. He also recommended an augmentation of the existing security forces by hiring a 64 man civilian security force from the Nung ethnic group.139

(S) The plans and schedule for the construction of security facilities were reviewed with the Deputy Officer in Charge of Construction (DOICC) SEASIA and were found adequate. COMUSMACV, in turn, informed CG USASCV that the inclusion of an Engineer Special Action Team to augment the civilian contractor would not be necessary, nor did he approve of direct hiring of armed civilian guards at a US installation without authority from the Ministry of the Interior. The 64 man security requirement was accordingly added to the USOM plan to create a Reserve National Police Force to provide static security for US installations.140

(S) Subsequent to the surprise mortar attack on Bien Hoa airfield, a re-examination was made of the security of the STRATCOM site. Six infra-red devices to be used in the watch towers were requisitioned by Consolidated Support Activity and arrived on 18 December. However, as of year's end 1964, the infrared devices had not been put into operation due to some initial trouble with the batteries and lack of a charging rack.

(C) During 1964 only intermittent attention was given to the security of the Port of Saigon and the Saigon Naval Base and Shipyard. This stemmed from a lack of interest and coordination between the different agencies responsible for particular sections of the Port of Saigon complex.

(C) On 20 March, the commander, CMD, militarized a portion of the commercial port of Khanh Hoi Island to improve the security of the piers and warehouses receiving and storing MAP equipment and USOM supplies. Then on 27 May 64, the Director, General Directorate of National Police, conducted a meeting on security of the commercial port with representatives of the Mayor's office, Gia Dinh Sector Hq, CMD, JGS, VNN, USOM, and MACV.

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The results of this meeting were the establishment of a border line between commercial and military sectors of the port and the definition of responsibilities for the various security agencies involved.141

(C) An incident occurred in November, however, which once again highlighted the problem of security. At about 0100 hours, 5 November, a VC squad burned the An Khanh Village Office, distributed propaganda, and fired small arms for five to ten minutes harrasing the villagers. The fact that this incident took place less than 1000 meters from the port was extremely significant, for it served to focus attention on the ease with which the An Khanh vital point could be infiltrated. It also underlined the threat posed to shipping and port facilities from possible mortar, recoilless rifle and small arms fire from the An Khanh vital point. More than anything else, the incident clearly pointed out the need for coordination between the civilian, military, and naval agencies involved in the security of the river, the port facilities, and the adjacent land area.

(C) As a result of the An Khanh incident, a VNN defense plan for the Saigon Naval Base and Shipyard was drawn up and the sea commander published interim security instructions for his ships in port. In addition the US Naval Advisory Group (NAVGP) developed a staff study on the adequacy of defense measures for the Naval Base and Shipyard, followed shortly by a J4 study of the commercial port and related off-loading terminals in the vicinity of Saigon.142 Joint interest was evidenced during the later part of November by the US-GVN construction Committee which considered the security of the commercial port on Khanh Hoi Island.

(C) Both the J4 and the NAVGP studies were sent to J3 for appropriate action. Both studies, in fact, emphasized the lack of coordination between the numerous agencies involved and both recommended the designation of Commander, CMD, as the single overall coordinator. At the year's end, recommendations based on these two studies were being developed by MACVJ3 to forward to High Command.

(S) In contrast to the Port of Saigon, Da Nang port security was a far easier problem to solve with far fewer agencies requiring coordinated action. However, on 2 November 1964 COMUSMACV requested a CINCPACFLT Naval Base and Harbor Defense Security Team to assess and recommend improvements for the security of the Maritime Operations Base at Da Nang.143

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(S) The CINCPACFLT team arrived 19 November and divided its study into two parts: One, a survey of the Da Nang Naval Base to determine the base defense requirements, and second, a survey to the Da Nang Harbor to determine requirements, for defense plans and facilities. The combined report was forwarded to the Chief, Maritime Operations, SOG, MACV, on 11 December 1964.

(S) Many deficiencies were noted by the survey: To correct them, COMUSMACV directed J3 to prepare an outline defense plan for the Da Nang harbor. A MACV Da Nang Port Security Survey Team was formed 29 December 1964. COMUSMACV directed that the team examine the existing harbor and naval defense plans as well as the organization of units assigned to implement them.¹⁴⁴ These tasks were to be accomplished during a field trip 1 - 2 January 1965.

(S) By this time a separate, but related requirement had been generated by a December message from CINCPACFLT.¹⁴⁵ CINCPACFLT had requested information on the supposed attempt to sabotage the USNS Muskingum at Da Nang on 30 October. In addition, CINCPACFLT requested information on the adequacy of protection for US shipping in Da Nang Harbor to include: what hazards were to be expected by US shipping in Da Nang, what steps were being taken to improve security; and who was responsible for the overall security measures. The COMUSMACV report was not complete at the end of the year.

(U) The Brink BOQ bombing on 24 December 1964 focused attention once again on security of installations in general, but more particularly on the Saigon area. On 26 December the Chief of Staff, MACV, directed that an ad hoc committee under the chairmanship of J3 examine: (1) the present threat to the security of US personnel and facilities in the Saigon, Gia Dinh, Cholon complex; (2) the requirements to protect these personnel and facilities; and (3) the selection of appropriate agencies to provide adequate security.¹⁴⁶

(U) The committee developed a list of US personnel and some 60 installations by priority that required security. It was found that the number of personnel required to provide security was a simple problem for the professional civil and military policemen on the committee; however, controversy arose as to which agency would provide the security. Two views were propounded: A MACV Provost Marshal view that a tailored US MP battalion should augment the existing GVN security forces; and a

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USOM view that the GVN unequivocally maintain the responsibility for providing security for US personnel and installations. USOM, accordingly, proposed that the National Police be augmented by a GVN sponsored Reserve Police Force.

(U) After the first meeting the chairman requested that the committee members complete their requirements for the physical security of the greater Saigon area, selecting either one or a combination of both proposals. These completed requirements were then to be examined in detail on 4 January to determine a MACV position for the US Ambassador.¹⁴⁷ At the year's end, in spite of MACVPM's proposal, it appeared that there would be no change in the basic concept that the security of US property, personnel, and installations would remain with the GVN.

(U) For the security of critical installations, MACV reacted intermittently in direct response to overt VC incidents. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the possibility of DRV/CHICOM air activity in conjunction with VC retaliatory action directed attention to the whole area of security, yet it took the Bien Hoa airbase attack and the Brink BOQ bombing to jar complacency and force realistic analysis of the problem. In all fairness, however, it must be emphasized that the basic concept of GVN responsibility for security remained in effect throughout 1964, a situation which narrowly delineated MACV's scope of action.

US UNILATERAL ACTIVITIES

(U) US unilateral activities have seen an impressive buildup in the second half of 1964. Beginning in May the authority was received from CINCPAC to establish a continuing program of air reconnaissance over Laos.¹⁴⁸ Thereupon the US commitment increased rapidly in answer to the Tonkin Gulf action and the mortar attack on the Bien Hoa Airbase. US retaliatory air strikes against the DRV in August accelerated in turn the introduction of US air defenses and crews to guard against possible DRV/CHICOM counter-strikes

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Gulf of Tonkin

(S) The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, more than any other single event, accelerated the buildup of US forces in Vietnam and increased the readiness posture of other US units in the Pacific. At 020808Z August 1964, while conducting a routine patrol (Desoto Patrol) in the Gulf of Tonkin, the USS Maddox was pursued and attacked by three DRV PT-craft in international waters (about 40 miles off shore). Retiring away from shore at 25 knots, the Maddox received torpedo attacks and 37mm machine gun fire. It retaliated with 5-inch guns, damaging one PT boat. The Maddox sustained no personnel casualties or material damage. Air support was requested from the USS Ticonderoga and two F8E aircraft responded with attacks against the three PT-boats, inflicting 20mm cannon hits on all three. One PT-boat was observed to be dead on the water and one F8E aircraft was damaged slightly by debris from its own rocket.

(S) Asserting the US right of freedom on the seas, the Gulf of Tonkin Desoto Patrol was resumed on 3 August with the USS Turner Joy accompanying the USS Maddox. On the night of 4 August, both ships were attacked by multiple PT-boats, once again in international waters (about 60 miles off shore). The US ships fired on 13 contacts, claiming three positive hits with one or two PT-boats sunk. Air cover from the USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation was provided continuously from 041410Z until 041750Z August, although visual contact with the attacking PT-boats could not be established. The USS Turner Joy claimed sinking one craft and damaging another with gunfire. The damaged torpedo boat, which had illuminated the Turner Joy with a searchlight during the gun battle, returned fire but inflicted no hits on the Turner Joy. The number of torpedos fired at US ships was not firmly established beyond an initial sounding of one at the outset of action. It was firmly established however, in retracing the action, that at least five PT-boats had engaged the two patrol destroyers as they retired seaward at night.


(S) In retaliation for this unprovoked attack against US ships on the high seas, US Naval forces were directed by JCS to conduct air strikes on pre-briefed targets in the DRV. 150 The following targets were hit on 5 August with 64 strike sorties launched from the attack aircraft carriers USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation: Swatow/PT-boats located at Port Wallut, Hon Gay, Phuoc Loi, Quang Khe, and Luc Chao estuary; and POL storage at Vinh. In addition, armed recce flights were conducted

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over Swatow/PT-boats located beyond the three mile limit. Damage inflicted during the strikes consisted of 11 Swatow/PT-boats destroyed, 22 Swatow/PT-boats damaged, and the POL storage depot at Vinh 90 percent destroyed. US losses consisted of one A1H shot down at Loc Chao estuary and one A4C lost at Hon Gay. It was later reported that the pilot of the A4C, LT(JG) Alvarez, was held prisoner in the DRV.

(S) Another Gulf of Tonkin Desoto Patrol began on 17 September by USS Morton and USS Edwards. At about 181200Z, both ships were approached by high speed, unlighted surface craft about 45 miles off shore. Although threatening maneuvers were made by the high speed craft, there was apparently insufficient evidence of actual attack to justify further retaliation against the DRV. This particular patrol was completed on 19 September without further incident. Although CINCPAC recommended normal continuation of the Desoto Patrols, the recommendation was disapproved by higher authority. Consequently, the September patrols were the last patrols conducted during 1964.

Air Defense

(S) Shortly after the Tonkin Gulf incident it was recognized that a need existed to bolster the air defense of critical US installations in the RVN. It was decided that the most appropriate air defense system would be the HAWK surface to air missile, because of its low altitude capability. The existing F102 type aircraft, already committed to RVN for air defense, could adequately meet the medium and high altitude threat posed by CHICOM and DRV aircraft. On 31 August, COMUSMACV proposed to CINCPAC that HAWK units be deployed to the RVN for the defense of critical installations at Saigon, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Da Nang and Phu Bai.¹⁵¹ CINCPAC in turn recommended to JCS that two US Army HAWK battalions and one USMC HAWK battalion be deployed to the RVN from CONUS.¹⁵²


(S) During the period 21-27 September a US Army Team from USARYIS and a USMC team from WESTPAC conducted a ground survey and prepared plans for the employment of HAWK in the RVN. The US Army team concerned itself with the Tan Son Nhut-Bien Hoa and Nha Trang areas, and the USMC team with the Da Nang area. CINCPAC informed JCS of the survey results and, recognizing the Da Nang area as the most vulnerable, recommended the immediate deployment of one USMC HAWK battalion to WESTPAC.¹⁵³ COMUSMACV submitted to CINCPAC¹⁵⁴ his concept on the deployment of HAWK to Da Nang, with a phased deployment as follows: Phase A - immediate deployment of two HAWK

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batteries to Da Nang air base; Phase B - as soon as possible prepare one battery site on Monkey Mountain; Phase C - move the second battery from Da Nang Air Base to Hill 327 as soon as security and necessary engineer work has been completed; and Phase D - as soon as pacification progress permitted, an estimated six months after initial deployment, deploy a third battery to Marble Mountain. A security force of one reinforced rifle company was recommended for the air base with an additional 50 security personnel to be added to each unit as it moved from the air base to its new defense site.

(S) JCS directed that a HAWK battalion be deployed from Twenty-Nine Palms, California, to WESTPAC on or about 16 November, with further instructions to be provided by CINCPAC pending resolution of siting and security arrangements.¹⁵⁵ CINCPAC in turn informed COMUSMACV that he was sending the two initial batteries, consisting of 420 HAWK personnel augmented with a 153 man security force, due in the RVN on 5 December.¹⁵⁶

(S) The actual arrival of the HAWK unit in the RVN was delayed due to prolonged siting arrangements. MACV had initiated a request to obtain the necessary real estate for site locations on Monkey Mountain and Hill 327; however, it was not until 11 December that final clearance was obtained from the RVN for the use of this land by US units. On 3 December, due to this delay, JCS directed that the HAWK battalion be diverted to Okinawa, although the 153 man security force was ordered to continue on to the RVN.¹⁵⁷


(S) Once clearance for the land was obtained, representatives from DOICU-Saigon and MCB-5 (Seabees) conducted a survey and prepared a cost estimate for the proposed sites, later consolidated and forwarded to CINCPAC.¹⁵⁸ CINCPAC advised JCS that the permanent site construction cost, if accomplished by civilian contractor, would be \$3,260,000 and, if accomplished by MCB-5 personnel, would be \$1,723,000 with an identical completion time of eight months. The cost for temporary site construction on Da Nang airfield would be \$30,000 if done by civilian contractor and \$23,000 if done by MCB-5 personnel, with an identical completion time of one month. CINCPAC recommended to JCS that the work be done by civilian contractors due to the critical role of MCB-5 in key contingency plans.¹⁵⁹ At the end of 1964 arrangements for site construction were still under discussion and study.

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Countermortar

(S) In the middle of discussions over the HAWK missile system, the VC conducted a surprise mortar attack on Bien Hoa airfield on 1 November, not only underlining the urgency for adequate air defense, but also identifying a need for countermortar and ground surveillance radar. As a result of this attack, COMUSMACV assigned JRATA the task of determining the feasibility and advisability of providing additional radar devices at all major airfields in the RVN where US commitments in manpower and equipment were high. On 14 November JRATA recommended that eight countermortar radars (AN/MPQ-4A) and three ground surveillance radars (AN/TPS-33) with US crews be requested from operational units for immediate shipment to the RVN, 160 and deployment as follows: 161

<u>AIRFIELD</u>	<u>RADAR MAINTENANCE TEAM</u>	<u>COUNTER MORTAR RADAR</u>	<u>GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR</u>
Bien Hoa		1	1
Da Nang		1	
Phi Hai		1	1
Phu Bai		2	1
Tan Son Nhut		2	
Vung Tau		1	

This program was forwarded to CINCUSARPAC, who endorsed it to DA stating that he readily understood COMUSMACV's desire for trained crews and equipment but maintained that, if his headquarters were directed to provide some or all of the requirement, immediate replacement would be necessary to maintain their combat readiness posture in support of contingency plans. 162


(S) DA proposed to CINCUSARPAC that one each radar section, AN/MPQ-4A and AN/TPS-33, and maintenance teams be provided from USARPAC resources to test their effectiveness in the RVN prior to fulfillment of MACV's full requirement. DA also advised CINCUSARPAC that his unit combat readiness posture would be only slightly effected, since the most likely deployment in any event would be Southeast Asia. CINCUSARPAC, in turn, requested that CINCPAC obtain COMUSMACV's comments on the DA proposal since it was realized that it did not meet COMUSMACV's stated requirement. 163

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(S) COMUSMACV replied to CINCPAC on 23 December that the DA proposal had already been considered by his headquarters prior to submitting his request and had been rejected for the following reasons: (1) five major airbases would be left without equipment for countermortar fire and two major airbases would be left without equipment for the detection of surprise attacks during periods of reduced visibility; (2) one section would not provide an adequate basis for evaluation, for it could conceivably stay in Vietnam for 12 months and the air base never be attacked; and (3) radars were a stated MACV operational requirement and further evaluation, on top of the JRATA study, was not considered necessary.¹⁶⁴

(S) CINCPAC concurred, however, with the DA proposal and suggested Bien Hoa as the initial evaluation site.¹⁶⁵ COMUSMACV accepted the CINCPAC offer. Technical testing was not considered necessary because of technical experience already available and the fact that one USMC countermortar radar had been in operation in Da Nang since 4 December 1964.¹⁶⁶ At the close of 1964 the equipment had not yet arrived in-country from USARPAC.

Laotian Armed Recce/Strike Operations

(TS) BARREL ROLL was the code name assigned to JCS approved armed route reconnaissance/strike operations in Laos.¹⁶⁷ BARREL ROLL operations were conducted under YANKEE TEAM procedures and included the use of USAF and USN aircraft on armed recce of roads, and strikes against pre-briefed fixed Pathol Lao/Viet Minh (PL/VM) or possible Viet Cong military installations and areas in the Laotian Panhandle and Plaine des Jarres.

(TS) BARREL ROLL operations began on 12 December by elements of the 2AD on Route 8 in the Laotian Panhandle and against a military strong point on Route 12 as a secondary target. By year's end five BARREL ROLL missions had been flown, three missions by the USAF and two by the US Navy.

(TS) The results of the missions conducted were not as fruitful as had been hoped. No activity, vehicles, personnel, or other sightings were made on the routes except for a small vehicle on the Nape Bridge bypass on Route 8. Attacks were made, however, against air defense positions in response to fire received. Attacks against secondary targets destroyed or damaged several buildings, many of which appeared to be abandoned or in the process of being dismantled.

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(TS) Although large returns were not gained from armed recce strikes in 1964, the combination of YANKEE TEAM and BARREL ROLL operations did hamper PL/VM travel during daylight hours, inhibited the creation of large military areas and installations, and forced the PL/VM to disperse military and supply installations. While BARREL ROLL operations were believed to have great potential for inhibiting infiltration into Laos and the RVN, this potential had not yet been realized at the close of 1964.

AIR FACILITIES

(U) Because of the aviation buildup in 1964, it became necessary to establish certain minimum criteria at selected airfields to relieve the over-burdened civil facilities, meet immediate operational requirements, and insure adequate flight safety procedures. A MACV directive had been originally published on 24 May 1963 to establish policies and procedures for the utilization of flight facilities and airspace in the RVN and for the publication and dissemination of Notices to Airmen. This original directive, however, was literally overcome by the aviation buildup and further guidance in this area became mandatory.

(U) The predominant US military users of airspace in the RVN were the 2AD and USASCV. Since the majority of traffic was US military, ten airfields were designated to be administered by one or the other of these two organizations. 2AD was given the responsibility for Ban Me Thuot, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Tan Son Nhut; USASCV assumed responsibility for Qui Nhon, Soc Trang, Vung Tau, and Quang Ngai. When the 25th Division moved into the III Corps Zone in October 1964, these assigned responsibilities were modified slightly by dropping Quang Ngai.

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(U) A new MACV directive published on 5 December 1964 required 2AD and USASCV to provide as a minimum the following facilities on their respective airfields: Control tower with UHF/VHF/FM radios; approach control facility; IFR clearance capability; terminal navigational facility; approved instrument facility; approved instrument departure; runway lights; crash rescue unit; and access to a weather facility.

(C) With the projected increase in 1965 of additional aircraft assigned to Vietnam, it was clear at the end of 1964 that the efficient control of airspace required attention, refinement, and improvement.

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OTHER J3 ACTIONS

Code of Conduct

(U) In October 1964, 2AD requested that MACV develop a directive relating to escape and evasion in counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam. PACAF had a regulation establishing policy for USAF air crews who fell into communist hands; however, this regulation did not adequately cover current operations of the counterinsurgency in the RVN. A MACV directive was prepared which provided policy guidance and, in general, directed that personnel evade capture by all possible means, and abide by the Code of Conduct if captured. The draft MACV directive recognized that misinterpretation and confusion had resulted from the fact that the specific standards of the Code of Conduct were written for guidance in "wartime" and counterinsurgency as yet had not been identified as "war". The proposed directive specified that the Code of Conduct would apply to the counterinsurgency situation. In spite of this non-concurrence, the directive was to be submitted to CINCPAC in January 1965 with an explanation of the disagreement.

Helicopter Armament

(U) On 10 November 1964 ACTIV completed a study of seven air-mobile companies in Vietnam to determine the adquacy of weapons and weapon mounts being used by the door gunners on the UH1B helicopters. The study was forwarded to J3 for comments and included the following recommendations: (1) continue arming the crew chiefs and door gunners with the M60 machine gun as a primary weapon; (2) authorize the USASCV M16 rifles for use as secondary weapons on UH1B helicopters in a quantity to be determined by each airmobile company; and (3) conduct controlled tests in CONUS to determine the most effective combination of weapon and weapon mount for door gunners. 168 J3 concurred in these recommendations and prepared a letter to the Department of the Army requesting action on items (2) and (3) above. At the end of 1964, however, the J3 had reconsidered his recommendation on the M16 rifles and delayed the letter pending resolution of this point.

Buildup


(S) The increased US unilateral activities in the RVN during 1964 created in themselves a mushrooming and self-generating effect. The YANKEE TEAM and BARREL ROLL programs were designed to support friendly

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operations in Laos, give a "shot in the arm" to friendly governments in Southeast Asia, and hopefully interdict personnel and supplies coming into the RVN via Laos. Yet, as the threat of DRV/CHICOM retaliation arose after the Gulf of Tonkin incident and VC capabilities increased within the RVN, the already increased US facilities and equipment in the RVN further generated an expansion of support, security, and control functions. At the end of 1964 this appeared to be a continuing trend.

TRAINING

(U) Although advisory responsibilities for training were the domain of the Director, Organization and Training Division, the J3 was directly interested in training results. Recruit, unit, combat readiness, Regional and Popular Force training, all set limits on RVNAF capabilities.

(C) Recruit training was extensively changed in 1964. At the beginning of the year, plans called for the training of 30,000 recruits, all at the Quang Trung Training Center. In January MAAG recommended that basic combat training (BCT) and advanced individual training (AIT) POI's be revised to eliminate duplication and correspond more closely to purely counterinsurgency requirements. This revision was accomplished in March, not only for the BCT and infantry AIT, but also for the AIT of all arms and services.

(C) In May a GVN decision to bring ARVN up to force levels resulted in a requirement to train upwards of 40,000 recruits during the remaining seven months of 1964. In the light of this substantial training increase, MACV recommended that recruit training be expanded from Quang Trung to the four national training centers, and the Airborne Brigade and Ranger Training Center at Duc My. To provide increased capacity at the four national training centers, an emergency construction program was immediately initiated for housing, ranges, and other facilities. This construction, and an augmentation to the training centers' TOE's, was completed in the fall. In addition, MACV reluctantly approved a reduction of the recruit program from 12 to nine weeks when it became apparent that without such reduction it would be impossible to accommodate the large input unless divisions were required to conduct part of the training. The reduced 9 week program was placed in effect on 1 June and continued for the remainder of 1964. By the year's end, over 45,000 recruits had been trained or

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were in training at the national training centers. Experience during the latter part of 1964 showed that initial misgivings over the inadequacy of the nine week program were, in fact, well founded, and on MACV's recommendation the 12 week program was readopted on 1 January 1965.

(C) Although the goal set for formal unit training in 1964 was completion for all infantry and Ranger battalions not already trained, it became apparent as 1964 wore on that the general paucity of regular troops available to meet increased VC activities rendered this goal infeasible. The Ranger battalions, however, were able to complete their initial training in October and continued with a program of retraining using a six week training program. For the infantry, the year started with eight battalions in training under a four week unit program, subsequently extended in April to five weeks. Initial plans called for two battalions from each corps to be in training at all times; however, by May the number of battalions in training had dropped from eight to four due to operational requirements. COMUSMACV encouraged General Khanh to resume the original schedule. Although there was some temporary improvement, by September it became apparent that the corps found it difficult to release even one battalion at a time for formal training.

(C) Because field advisors were still reporting that a low state of training was one of the major factors contributing to the low level of combat effectiveness in ARVN units, MACV again urged ARVN to resume the original training schedule. Nonetheless, formal infantry battalion training continued to slide during the remainder of the year until at the year's end, there was only one battalion in training at a national training center. Although 25 infantry battalions had been trained and eight battalions retrained during 1964, there still remained 15 that had not received formal unit training. At year's end, ARVN had under study a MACV proposal that top priority for 1965 should be retraining combat ineffective units.

(C) Refresher training of artillery units continued throughout 1964. In July an intensive retraining program of divisional 4.2-inch mortar battalions to be converted to 105mm howitzer battalions commenced and was to be completed in January 1965. Armor units likewise conducted refresher training throughout the year. In April, transition training of armored reconnaissance troops being converted from M114's to M113's commenced and was completed in November.


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(C) As far as combat readiness training was concerned, the program met with little success. Continued recommendations to ARVN, once in February, and twice in July, to promulgate an effective system of combat readiness training finally resulted in the publication of a directive in September. The directive had little impact, however, and at the year's end it appeared that little effective training was being accomplished outside of schools and training centers. One notable exception was the Air Ground Operations MTT, a joint US-VNAF-ARVN team, which toured schools, training centers, and units during the spring and summer and achieved considerable success.


(C) Regional Force training during 1964 saw the initiation of Regional Force recruit training, and also a considerable increase in training due to the force structure increase. The Regional Force structure was increased from 90,000 to 97,615 personnel in May 1964 (473 to 523 rifle companies), with the majority of these companies allocated to IV Corps for the organization of religious sect companies. In November plans were made to further increase the force structure in two phases: To 111,841 (640 companies) immediately, and to 133,002 (759 companies) by the end of CY 1965.

(C) The 1964 objectives were to train all remaining new units in the basic unit POI, and to provide refresher training for approximately 60 percent of the rifle companies. As of 31 December 1964, 533 Regional Force companies were organized, of which 494 (94 percent) were trained, 20 were in training, and 19 remained to be trained. Of these figures, 196 companies (37 percent) had completed the four week refresher POI and seven were in training.

(C) Training plans for Regional Force religious sect rifle companies were begun in January 1964 following negotiations between the Hoa Hao Sect and the GVN. Initially only eight companies were authorized, but this number was eventually increased to support the force structure increase authorized in May and to allow for the recruiting of Cao Dai and ethnic Cambodian personnel. By the year's end there were a total of 74 religious sect companies in the Regional Force: 49 Hoa Hao, 13 Cao Dai, and 12 Cambodian companies, all from IV Corps except for four Cao Dai companies from Tay Ninh Province in III Corps.

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(C) Prior to 1964 there had been no established recruit training program for the Regional Force. Organization and Training Directorate (O&T) recommended a plan to train 4000 recruits in 1964, and although the plan was approved to begin in April, training fell short due to recruiting difficulties. The Regional Force was authorized in June to conscript personnel so as to increase the input to 14,000 recruits; however, due to ARVN's priority, few recruits were obtained. At the year's end 2064 recruits had been trained for assignment as fillers to existing units and 704 recruits were undergoing training. The recruit training POI (nine weeks) was the same used in ARVN training centers, thus providing considerable flexibility in training and allowing better use of Regional Force training centers when their input fell short. To illustrate, 1450 ARVN recruits were undergoing training in Regional Force training centers during the months of November and December 1964.

(C) Popular Force training during 1964 suffered from two weaknesses: Being of lowest priority, actual strength initially fell far behind programmed force levels until July, and leadership training quotas were never filled during the entire year. PF training was programmed by the Bureau of Instruction (BOI) High Command, for 1964 based upon an authorized force structure of 110,000. The program was published in January 1964 but was not followed. A serious training lag developed immediately due to the late publication of the CY '64 program, difficulties in recruiting, and the reluctance of province chiefs because of security conditions to send their units away from the province to be trained. Despite advice to High Command in the form of letters and conferences to place emphasis on filling the prescribed quotas, both unit and leader training continued to lag as much as 60 percent below that programmed.

(C) In July the integration of the Armed Combat Youth into the Popular Force began. This action accelerated unit training and at the end of the year the authorized force structure of 2804 platoons equivalents (PE's) had been exceeded by 287. The serious lag in leadership training continued throughout the year primarily because province chiefs would not plan ahead and select prospective leaders for training before the formation of a new unit. Also, after a new unit had received basic unit training and returned home, the province chief was reluctant to release squad or platoon leaders for leadership training. Although the problem had been brought to the attention of both RF/PF headquarters and High Command on several occasions, no positive action was taken to fill leader training quotas.


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(C) During the year, new programs of instruction were proposed to BCI, High Command, for replacement training (April), operational readiness (in-place) training (May), leadership training (September), and basic unit training (October). As of 31 December 1964 the revised basic unit POI (seven week) had been adopted and was being published for implementation in February 1965; the revised leaders' POI (seven weeks for squad leaders and ten weeks for platoon leaders) was under consideration; but no action had been taken on the proposals for replacement or operational readiness POI's.

(C) In October 1964, a proposal for the consolidation of Popular Force training centers to improve facilities and conduct of training, and reduce the cost of manpower (cadre and advisors) and material without reducing the overall training base capacity was forwarded to High Command. In December, the Senior Advisor, RF/PF, forwarded a recommendation to COMUSMACV that the responsibility for all RF/PF training be given to RF/PF Headquarters in order to insure unity of effort. At the year's end the Vietnamese were conducting a survey of Popular Force training centers to determine repairs needed; however, there was still a disagreement between RF/PF Headquarters and Training Command as to which agency was responsible for the centers.

(C) During 1964 some 352 ARVN officers and enlisted men attended off-shore training under MAP sponsorship. This training included: Formal schooling at CONUS service schools and certain overseas schools; professional civilian schooling at colleges and universities in CONUS; observer and on-the-job training in CONUS and overseas; and orientation tours for senior officers at various CONUS and overseas activities and installations. To attest to the recognition that leadership training was a critical need in the RVNAF, 910 spaces were requested for off-shore training in FY 1966, an increase of 560 over FY 1965. The FY 1966 program was approved by the Chief of Staff, MACV, in December 1964 and was submitted to CINCPAC in January 1965 for final refinement.


(C) At the end of 1964 it appeared that perhaps MACV had been too optimistic about implementation of the various programs. Recognizing from field reports that the general low state of training and the dearth of good junior leaders were the main causative factors of poor combat effectiveness, MACV became impatient when training programs were not immediately implemented or quotas were not met. What MACV failed to recognize was that the buildup of VC strength and activity had put far too great a strain on the limited RVNAF resources to permit unit rotation through the training centers. Pacification progress and troop retraining were simply incompatible at existing force levels.

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OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

(S) During 1964 RVNAF strength, material, and capability considerably increased. Overall strength increased by 120,475 to a total of 535,851. This was a substantial increase in both regular and paramilitary forces as compared to 1963 figures. A sizeable increase in firepower and mobility was added with the receipt of 122 more 105mm and 30 more 155mm howitzers. Additional airmobile support was provided by 78 more helicopters. Increased availability of helicopters resulted in a marked increase in airmobile operations, 98 in 1963 and 498 in 1964. Regarding VNAF, efforts to meet programmed flying hours were successful in 1964 for the first time; the changeover from T28 to A1H aircraft with an increase of total VNAF aircraft from 228 to 282 resulted in a substantial increase in combat capability. The requests for VNAF air strikes increased substantially in 1964 over 1963 with 89,790 sorties and 120,412 hours flown in 1964 as compared to 66,593 sorties and 94,576 hours in 1963.


(S) Two major trends, however, were discernible in 1964 which tended to negate or suppress any improvement in RVNAF combat capability. Perhaps the most important, and often the most understated, was the increased strength and improved combat capability of the VC. Estimated strength of confirmed main and local forces increased by approximately 44 percent during 1964 (22,900 to 33,000) as opposed to an approximate 20 percent increase for RVNAF. This strength buildup was accompanied by a noticeable increase in VC ability to ambush or attack ARVN units of battalion strength and larger. The VC also demonstrated a willingness to stay in a contested area before yielding to superior strength and combat power. Infiltration of more modern weapons, ammunition, and some critical medical and signal supplies apparently continued at an increased rate during 1964, thereby giving the VC a corresponding increase in fire power and logistic support. 127
Hand

(S) This particular trend had a very direct effect on RVNAF attempts to correct identified weaknesses. In 1964 major problem areas were largely repetitive of those in 1963: High desertion and casualty rates, poor junior leadership, and a generally unsatisfactory state of training. Although MACV urged an ambitious increase in formal unit, combat readiness, and leadership training to correct these deficiencies, operational requirements necessitated by increased VC activity simply would not permit attainment of the programmed quotas.

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(S) This situation was reinforced by a second adverse trend in 1964. As more and more fire support became available, ground unit commanders and hamlet defenders began to depend more heavily on artillery and air at the expense of ground fire and maneuver using organic weapons. Consequently, when RVNAF troops observed more dependence being placed on supporting fires, their aggressiveness and motivation to close with the VC diminished appreciably. Delays caused by calling for air or artillery frequently permitted the VC to break contact, or in contrast, the VC often found that the best way to escape supporting fires was to maintain close contact, the closer the better. Success in this tactic encouraged the VC to engage in close combat and made it more difficult for the ARVN to employ air and artillery effectively.

(S) At the end of 1964, it appeared that the two trends mentioned above would continue well into 1965. A resultant steady decline in RVNAF operational effectiveness was likely unless a sizeable increase in the force structure occurred to permit pacification progress, concurrent with a major effort in leadership and formal unit training to correct past and present deficiencies. Whether the GVN had the capability of mobilizing the population sufficiently to produce an adequate number of personnel out of a constantly shrinking manpower pool to meet this requirement was another serious consideration as 1964 closed.

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THE MONTAGNARD UPRISING 169


(C) In September, the problem of ethnic differences within SVN was dramatically highlighted by the Montagnard revolt in Darlac and Quang Duc provinces.

(C) Expressing their deep and long-held resentment against Vietnamese treatment, the Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), comprised of Montagnard personnel under Vietnamese leadership with US Special Forces advisors, rebelled on the night of 19-20 September at four camps. The plan was to kill or imprison the Vietnamese leaders and their associates, then attack the two province capitals, Ban Me Thuot and Gia Nghia. A fifth camp was to have joined the revolt but was prevented from doing so only by the timely intercession of US Special Forces personnel.

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(C) The initial phase of the rebellion was successfully executed. However, the attack on Gia Nghia aborted. Ban Me Thuot was saved because US advisors alerted ARVN forces in the area. ARVN responded by establishing road-blocks, thereby preventing the entry of rebel forces into the capital.

(C) The next few hours were critical. The rebel forces were blocked for the moment. They attempted to broadcast their demands, but the only available radio was disabled. Their leader, Y-Bham, was trapped in Ban Me Thuot. However, he was saved by an audacious rescue group and apparently gained sanctuary in Cambodia.

(C) US advisors, for their part, worked feverishly to persuade the CIDG to return to their camps. Efforts were made to arrange a meeting between the leaders of the two forces. Unfortunately, the rebel leaders misunderstood the arrangements for the meeting and, while proceeding towards Ban Me Thuot, were fired upon by ARVN troops. This episode apparently convinced the Montagnards that they could not trust the Vietnamese at the negotiation table.


(C) But, at least the momentum of the rebellion was halted. ARVN rapidly strengthened its position. The rebels, for the most part, withdrew to their camps. Working under the most hazardous conditions, US advisory personnel attempted to convince both sides of the importance of negotiations rather than further bloodshed. The position of these advisors was extremely delicate. On the one hand it was vital to overcome the Vietnamese suspicion that the US sided with the Montagnards. Additionally, it was imperative that ARVN be persuaded not to attack with their superior forces. In dealing with the rebels, it was essential to persuade the CIDG of US sincerity and to overcome the utter distrust of the GVN by the Montagnards. The latter were convinced that ARVN would inevitably attack. Negotiations would only result in severe punitive measures against their people.

(C) To prove their sincerity the Americans who had been held as hostages by the Montagnards made no attempt to free themselves. US personnel volunteered to act as "messengers" in attempting to arrange a peaceful settlement. Only as a consequence of continued inducements on the part of several of these Americans, particularly Colonel Freund, the deputy senior advisor of II Corps, was the status quo maintained. The GVN was agreeable to negotiations but all efforts to contact Y-Bham were unsuccessful, and other rebel leaders were unwilling to take his place. After a week of waiting the Vietnamese inevitably began to grow impatient and formulated plans to seize the rebel camps.

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(C) US resolve to prevent a confrontation intensified. Urgent conferences with VN officials led to a postponement of the planned attack but only long enough for the US to make one final effort to secure the freedom of the Vietnamese prisoners and to persuade the rebels to return to the fold. Colonel Freund's entreatments were timed with a display of US airmobile power designed to provide a psychological push to his efforts. Shortly thereafter an ARVN negotiator arrived at the main camp. ARVN forces then moved in on the camp. After a few very tense moments the rebels capitulated and agreed to lay down their weapons. General Khanh, the GVN Prime Minister, then arrived at the camp and, in an impressive ceremony, accepted the surrender, granted full amnesty to the CIDG and distributed funds for the aid of their families. With this, the rebellion ceased at all Montagnard camps.

(C) Not all observers, however, were convinced that the rift would remain healed. It has been too deeply rooted. In the words of Colonel Freund, "At the heart of our problem is the almost unreasoning fear on the part of the local Montagnard leaders of betrayal...it is almost beyond the capabilities of their imagination to believe that the safety of any of their people...can be guaranteed in...negotiations with the Vietnamese authorities. They are...captive of their own past experience..." After many years of ill-will toward the Montagnais, it would remain for the Vietnamese government to prove its good faith by deeds, not just words.

SUMMARY


(U) The year 1964 saw expansion, change, re-evaluation of the enemy threat, and shift in emphasis from advice to combat support and greater US unilateral involvement. As the tempo of VC attacks and harassment increased, and the nature of the US effort changed, J3 was forced to undergo almost continual reorganization to meet the requirements of the advisory effort, greater US unilateral activities, the needs of the Ambassador, and theater contingency plans. At the end of 1964 this trend appeared to be continuing and a further augmentation of J3 to cope with the increased span of control seemed probable.

(C) The demand for centralized, detailed information grew throughout 1964, and reporting systems accordingly came under close scrutiny. Pacification reporting, in particular, underwent continuous change as the search for meaningful criteria and accurate indices of progress expanded more and more reporting requirements. This requirement for an ever-widening range of information resulted in an almost overwhelming burden for the field advisor.

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
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(C) The US advisory effort for training was generally marked by an impatience to get programs implemented and training quotas filled. This impatience on the American side was opposed on the Vietnamese side by a reluctance and often a complete inability to meet programmed goals. As mentioned earlier, the existing force level would not support both operational requirements and training quotas. It also appeared that a tendency existed to impose US techniques and POI's on the Vietnamese system with little regard for specific counterinsurgency requirements or the sophistication of the Vietnamese training input.

(C) Although the combat capability of VNAF substantially increased effective and timely close air support was a problem that existed throughout 1964. Continued attempts were made to get the VNAF Air Request Net and the VNAF ALO/FAC system operational throughout the country. In the early part of 1964 US armed helicopters were repeatedly called upon to fulfill a close air support role, largely because of inadequate response time and frequent aborting of missions on the part of VNAF. It was only at the end of 1964 that VNAF began to furnish sufficient personnel to man the VNAF Air Request System, and although some progress had been made in III and IV Corps, the system was far from country-wide.

(C) On looking at the many programs and plans generated by MACV, it might be concluded that many did not adequately assess the GVN's capacity to implement them. Pacification programs, for example, such as Hop Tac, and the "Momentum Program" were either continually revised or dropped entirely when it became clear that the already overloaded Vietnamese system was not responsive nor competent enough to execute them. The more sophisticated methodology of programming the entire pacification country-wide never achieved full understanding by the Vietnamese province officials.

(C) Psychological warfare operations and military civic action were programs of tremendous potential, yet achieved only a fraction of their worth in 1964. It was a case basically of too little emphasis and that emphasis being placed in the wrong area. ARVN, largely through US urging, became more interested in gadgetry and methodology at the expense of the more difficult, yet more productive, face-to-face approach with the people. Thus, the emphasis was placed on loudspeakers, leaflets, and Lambrettas rather than the potentially more productive Chieu Hoi and bounty programs.

(S) The security of critical US installations received sporadic attention throughout 1964 in direct response to overt VC incidents. It must be emphasized, however, that the capability and responsibility is

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
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this regard remained unequivocally with the GVN, thus restricting considerably MACV's scope of action. The mortar attack on Bien Hoa and the Brink bombing clearly identified basic weaknesses in technique and command relationship. At the end of the year it began to appear that a greater US unilateral effort in the field of security might be the only way to solve the problem.

(S) As far as other US unilateral activities were concerned, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was the event that triggered planning for escalated US involvement. Although operations had already commenced by May 1964, the threat of DRV/CHICOM retaliation and increased VC activity after the Gulf of Tonkin incident brought in air defense missiles, ground surveillance and countermortar radars, and other related security measures. These measures and the substantial buildup in USAF and USA aviation assets produced a mushrooming effect whereby additional requirements were generated for support, security, and control functions. At the end of 1964 the stage was definitely set for greater US involvement in both men and material.

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TABLE V

US ARMY AIRCRAFT INVENTORY, END OF 1963

<u>Rotary Wing</u>		<u>Fixed Wing</u>	
UH-1B	162	O-1	57
CH-37	3	U-1A	27
<u>CH-21</u>	<u>65</u>	U-6	16
TOTAL	230	U-8	8
		CV-28	26
		<u>OV-1</u>	<u>6</u>
		TOTAL	140

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TABLE VI

US ARMY AIRCRAFT INVENTORY, END OF 1964

<u>Rotary Wing</u>		<u>Fixed Wing</u>	
UH-1B	317	O-1	57
<u>CH-37</u>	<u>10</u>	U-1A	29
TOTAL	327	U-6	30
		U-8	12
		CV-2B	40
		<u>OV-1</u>	<u>14</u>
		TOTAL	182

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117. Study, D&L Br, O&T Div, 9 Oct 64, Subj: Ranger Bn TOE. File MACJ3 (C).
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126. Msg, DA to COMUSMACV, DTG 282318Z Aug 64. File MACJ3.
127. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 102355Z Oct 64. File MACJ3.
128. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite 8149, DTG 150123Z Aug 64. File MACJ3 (TS).
129. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite 12890, DTG 080633Z Nov 64. File MACJ3 (S).
130. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite 13523, DTG 080633Z Nov 64. File MACJ3 (S).
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132. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite 13443, DTG 070313Z Nov 64. File MACJ3 (S); Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite 18, DTG 021220Z Dec 64. File MACJ3 (S).
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
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144. Msg, COMUSMACV to SA, I Corps, Cite 18688, DTG 291130Z Dec 64. File MACJ3 (S).
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146. DF, MACJ324, 26 Dec 64, Subj: Physical Security of Greater Saigon. File MACJ3.
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148. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 260836Z May 64. File MACJ3.
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152. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 120320Z Sep 64. File MACJ3 (TS).
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162. Msg, CINCUSARPAC to DA, DTG 050352Z Dec 64. File MACJ3 (S).
163. Msg, CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC, DTG 092205Z Dec 64. File MACJ3 (S).
164. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Cite 18240, DTG 231125Z Dec 64. File MACJ3 (S).
165. Msg, CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 082338Z Jan 65. File MACJ3 (S).
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(S) CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS

(U) During 1964 Brig Gen Frank A. Osanski continued as MACV J4. When the MAAG and MACV were consolidated, J4 offices were re-located to MACV-2 Compound. This physical separation did not enhance coordination with the other staff sections remaining in MACV-1 Compound. The staff and functions of the J4 remained essentially unchanged during 1964 although some functions were absorbed from MAAG when the commands were consolidated. The J4 staff was organized in six branches—Plans and Policy, Requirements and Capabilities, Movements, Logistic Operations, Base Development, and POL. Additionally, liaison officers were maintained with the J4 High Command and the Control Office of Procurement, RVNAF.

(U) Logistic support was provided under the principle of over-all national responsibility; material provided to RVNAF is MAP-funded, and individual US military services were responsible for supply of service-peculiar items. Initially all plans were predicated on a withdrawal of military forces in 1965. Supporting these operations were 16 separate logistic systems within Vietnam—CAS, USOM, CARE, DOICC, POL, ARVN, VNN, VNAF, USA, USAP, USASF, HSAS, USMC, MACV field advisors, SOG (Studies and Observation Group) and the US Embassy.

DEVELOPING LOGISTIC SYSTEMS

(U) Major logistic problems stemmed from the lack of coordination among the many systems, the lack of suitable real estate for housing, offices, and advisory detachments, and special logistic problems. The complexities of the US and Vietnamese logistic systems were further compounded by the unpredictability of Viet Cong activities and the evolving nature of the American reaction to them. The only assurance during the year was that the logistic situation was dynamic and would challenge US ingenuity.

(U) The logistic organization for support of US forces in Vietnam consisted of multiple systems, allowing duplication, overlapping, and gaps in functions.¹ US Army Special Forces (USASF), a subordinate part of the US Army Support Command (USASCV), operated a logistic system which paralleled in many respects that of USASCV. The Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS), and the Headquarters Commandant (Hq Comdt), were operating parallel supply lines in support of US advisors. Four systems furnished utility repairs.² Each of the services had its own medical supply system with separate lines to the US. Some logistic functions were not being performed—shipper services at ports, depot level maintenance, and aerial port functions. Other logistic functions such as billeting, generator repair, operation of messes, and repair and utility type activities were completed at various levels of efficiency according to the initiative and skills of each advisory unit.

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(U) These conditions necessitated a general overhaul of logistic support, especially in the common user area. Specific improvements were made in the several systems. Personnel were assigned at un-country ports to provide shipper services. Each corps area was provided a logistic coordinator for billeting, messes, generator repair, etc. More air bases were provided or were programmed to be provided with aerial port detachments to handle cargo and passengers. Operation of administrative vehicles was centralized in HSAS for Saigon.

(C) As the US and other Free World contingents in Vietnam grew, it became evident that such minor actions were only nibbles at the problem. What was required was a means to provide support to US Army units and Free World contingents, and to provide common user support to other US forces. J4 MACV, recognizing this problem, developed a proposal for introducing a US Army Logistic Command into Vietnam. At the end of the year the concept had been agreed to by all echelons except the JCS and Secretary of Defense but approval appeared likely.³ While the introduction of a standard logistic command would improve the situation it certainly would not resolve all US logistic problems. HSAS, for example, would remain in Saigon and would continue to perform some functions that a logistic command would normally perform. USAF units had no base assets in Vietnam and would continue to obtain USAF-peculiar support primarily by air from offshore bases. Specific tailoring of the system could not remove some obstacles to a single system because of unique service regulations and requirements—but introduction of the Logistic Command should reduce much duplication and provide better support for many requirements.

(U) Extremely long supply lines is an obvious problem, Vietnam being half-way around the world from CONUS. The military requisitioning system in CONUS was too slow. The Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedure (MILSTRIP) system includes a series of maximum order and shipping plans for various coded priorities of requisition. A code specifying five-day delivery might take up to 45 days. Other codes calling for delivery within 45 and 75 days ran as high as 90 and 270 days respectively. Recognizing that use of false MILSTRIP priorities would only cause confusion, J4 MACV adhered to the specified coding system, hoping the system would improve with time.⁴

(FOUO) The MAP supply system for RVNAF was improved in 1964. The year saw numerous changes in MAP values, programs, and funding procedures. Shopping lists and augmentation packages were developed which resulted in nearly doubling the approved FY 65 ceiling in effect at the beginning of the year. The normal planning phase for six fiscal years for Vietnam was packed into FY 65 and 66. Additional advisors, increased RVNAF force strength, contingency construction equipment modernization, and the stepped up combat tempo necessitated revised monetary program levels.⁵ Conferences during the Secretary of

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
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Defense visits in December 1963 and March and May 1964 resulted in shopping lists of \$29.8 million; packing, crating, handling and transportation costs for these items totaled \$11 million. This raised the FY 64 program level from \$189.7 million to \$230.5 million. Review of FY 65 and FY 66 programs resulted in boosted estimates. In FY 65 the program nearly doubled from \$160.6 to \$292.3 million, and FY 66 showed an increase of approximately 120 percent. These revisions further stretched the entire logistic program.

(FOUO) The rapid expansion of numbers and size of advisory teams often caused requirements which could not be accommodated by the regular supply system. In many cases purchase of non-standard items was authorized through Embassy agents in Hong Kong and from local purchases with piastre funds. Transportation from CONUS has been partially responsible for delays and a shipment backlog of 60 days has sometimes existed at Travis AFB.⁶

(U) The entire logistic system in Vietnam was conducted on an austere basis. The system of the Hq Comdt supplying up-country field advisors was not expanded during a two year period and included one officer and 20 men, although the numbers of people and installations supported had more than doubled in that period.

(U) The fact that CINCPAC was charged with supply responsibility also led to some unique problems. Although within PACOM an adequate supply base for the fleet exists, large depots with Army-type items are not located within the Command. One item requisitioned was 500 compasses, which resulted in a special procurement order by the US Navy which would have caused a three month delay. A request through USARYIS to Army supply channels resulted in the compasses being flown directly. The definition of common user items applicable within the Navy referred to any item being used by several elements within the Navy and excluded those items common between the military services or between government departments. This acted to eliminate many items from easy access. These problems were attendant to the nature of the Command and its continual change and posed significant problems throughout the year.

(U) Within Vietnam local purchasing also posed problems. A coordinated purchasing agency for the three MACV subordinate commands, USASCV, 2d Air Division (2AD), and HSAS, which had earlier established separate purchasing offices in Saigon, was organized in August. The services were unable to agree to a single unified purchasing arrangement; collocation was next best.⁷ The coordinated purchasing agency was relocated in a single office. The consolidation resulted in common use of bidder lists, pricing guides, etc; reduced competition for products on the local market; simplified purchasing on a mutually acceptable basis; and meant that services did not inflate prices by bidding for identical items from a few contractors.

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
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(U) Dispersion of advisors stretched the ability of the organization and required its modification during the year. Also, the larger number of advisors in each corps area resulted in a logistic support requirement beyond the capability of existing means. To remedy this situation, a logistics coordination branch was established on each corps advisory team which expedited field supply.⁸

LOGISTICS PLANNING

(C) Planning the logistics requirements for counterinsurgency was a new experience for the military services. That experience was constantly tapped for future use. In response to a request by the Department of the Army,⁹ J4 collected detailed information on RVN logistics operations and prepared counterinsurgency staff planning factors.¹⁰ This information supplemented the Staff Officers Field Manual, DA FM 101-10, which previously applied to conventional warfare. An example of the data obtained is daily consumption of supplies. The consumption figures for US and Vietnamese personnel contrast sharply; RVNAF required 12.3 pounds of all classes of supply per man per day and the US 39.2 pounds.¹¹ The prepared planning factors have borne the test of time and have become the basis for much in-country logistic planning.

(FOUO) J4 considered that counterinsurgency planning should be accomplished at MACV Headquarters, based upon studies and factors such as described in the previous paragraph. This philosophy of planning was not fully in accord with MACV practice in the judgment of Brig Gen Osowski.¹² He described the actual procedure used as follows: "I think the tendency now is to ask the lower commanders to develop a plan on the basis of certain broad guidance given them and then correct their plans...I think it ends up finally, anyway, in the plans being imposed from the top." In his final report,¹³ Gen Osowski outlined three methods of planning: planning for all possible requirements for any mission; integrated planning with all staff sections based upon a single strategic concept; unilateral planning based upon a J4 concept unrelated to other staff concepts. He concluded that J4 planning had of necessity employed the first method, the "shotgun". J4 initiated a project to develop plans based upon the third method. This divergent philosophy of staff planning procedures doubtlessly affected the logistic support within the Command adversely. The systems were subjected to only one severe test, which occurred during the November floods.

(U) Reference information was expanded using on-site observations of airbase loading and facilities.¹⁴ Flood damage information from the November-December floods was compiled for USON and served as a basis for estimating engineer effort required for repair. These facts permitted the planning for the temporary diversion of ARVN engineer resources from military projects, to substitute for the Ministry of Public Works, and proved adequate to immediate needs.¹⁵

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(U) Another planning guide developed was a line of communications handbook for railroads, highways, rivers and seaports, and coasts and beaches. It was compiled from existing material updated by on-site surveys and staff reviews.¹⁶ In 1964 the handbook was approved for staff planning only within RVN; however, copies were submitted to CINCPAC for review and approval for wider use.

(C) During the year several conferences were conducted to consider logistic problems. In October a JCS/CINCPAC working level logistic team visited MACV. J4 MACV briefed the team on: the requirement for a US Army Logistic Command; difficulties resulting from excessive delays in receipt of construction money; the slow delivery of MAP supplies; the delay incident to development of inter-service support agreements; the move of the HSAS exchange and commissary from their present location to the HSAS compound; and the adequacy of the US hospital in Saigon. Subsequently the team made a field trip to major logistic installations. The entire trip by the JCS team was considered very worthwhile and the results promised to be helpful to participating commands. Full consideration of the logistic command requirement was assured.

(C) These major problems were considered in the constant effort to improve the logistic support within the Command. The 1964 version of the Country Logistics Improvement Plan, although designed to improve RVNAF logistics, was developed unilaterally by MACV since contingency plans were involved and CINCPAC instructions and classification prevented disclosure to RVNAF.¹⁷ MACV instructions for preparation of the 1965 version, however, directed that the plan be developed jointly with RVNAF in an effort to obtain Vietnamese cooperation and that its classification be Confidential to permit wider distribution.¹⁸


(U) Another planning problem considered by J4 was the variation in operation of messes within the country. Cooperative messes prepared their own menus and purchased food from the commissary. Other units operated field ration messes with meals prepared on an Army or Air Force master menu, drawing subsistence from the HSAS. Personnel eating in the cooperative messes received a cost of living allowance which was not paid to those eating in the field ration messes. The two systems had both advantages and disadvantages. The J4 had long urged that field ration messes become the rule and a study was completed which recommended this action.¹⁹ At the end of 1964 the study had been staffed and was awaiting presentation to the Chief of Staff for decision. Consolidation and conversion of cooperative into field ration messes with extension of the non-subsistence cost of living allowance to all US personnel was recommended. Final action was not anticipated in the near future and the J4 expected disapproval since J1 and others had opposed the action on the basis of an adverse effect on morale.²⁰

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(S) Four planning conferences during the year considered responsibility in SEATO. In March 1964 the Central Region Field Force (Designate) (CCRSFF (D)) coordination conference was held in Bangkok. The purpose was to review the CCRSFF OPLAN 4/64 and to highlight problems anticipated in its execution.²¹ These included optimum loading and joint use of air bases, lines of communication for Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom forces, port facilities for SEATO forces in Thailand, prepositioning actions to facilitate introduction of SEATO forces, deployment plans, and movements. In September the Commander SEATO Force Plan 4 coordination conference met in Bangkok.²² Major subjects were the establishment of SEATO force headquarters in the theater, reporting on status of logistic planning for the CCRSFF OPLAN 4/64, and method of establishing control of movement into and within the theater. In December the CCRSFF SEATO real estate conference was held in Bangkok.²³ Its purpose was to complete coordination of real estate requirements of all SEATO forces scheduled for deployment in Thailand under CCRSFF OPLAN 4/64. Although not finally approved by all SEATO nations at year's end, tentative agreement on all requirements was obtained.²⁴ These conferences provided a means for expeditious resolution of problems more time-consuming through regular procedures.

(C) A test of the logistic feasibility of CCRSFF OPLAN 4/64 was planned for March 1965 in Exercise LOG TRAIN in Thailand,²⁵ the annual SEATO military test exercise. MACV participation is a J4 responsibility for development and planning since the plan was MACV-originated, and contemplated furnishing the largest force levels for SEATO. Combined C-staff coordination was a major task.²⁶ Preparatory meetings in September and December were attended by J4 representatives.

BASE DEVELOPMENT

(C) The expected withdrawal of US forces from RVN in 1965 reduced the real estate and construction program to a minimum in early 1964. However, in August 1964, the Tonkin Gulf incidents and recognition that the end of the war in 1965 was unlikely, reversed this downward trend. Rather than reductions, a series of crash programs to support incoming US personnel and aircraft followed. To minimize the problems arising from these programs, master planning boards were established at major air bases and a facilities review board was organized to coordinate construction requirements for all service components.²⁷ Programs were directed to be developed with a five year projection, and construction standards for a maximum ten year life expectancy.²⁸


(U) A US construction staff committee had become active in March functioning under the US Mission Council, to decide policy matters and work with a Vietnamese counterpart committee to coordinate construction programs in-country.²⁹ One of the important real estate actions during the year was the relocation of the MACV staff

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between compounds 1 and 2, which was planned and executed under J4. Illustrative of the country-wide expansion, over 150 real estate requests were processed for release of GVN land for use by US forces.

(U) Several locations were considered during the year for a US hospital. A triangular plot of land was obtained at Tan Son Nhut and architectural and engineering (A&E) funds were received for design of a new 100 bed hospital on a 200 bed chassis. Temporary relief of crowded conditions was anticipated by improving the US Navy Hospital. Extensive study and discussion preceded the agreement by CINCUSARPAC that additional military hospital facilities were required in Saigon; the contention was that the US Navy should support Saigon requirements.

(U) The major construction effort was expediting new facilities to support additional US forces during the last four months of the year. Concurrently, directives, procedures, coordination, and liaison were revised to provide more responsive supervision of the real estate and construction programs.³⁰

(U) As part of the buildup, a special study, "Air Base Support Problems in SEASIA," began on 1 November as a comprehensive and coordinated review of all aspects of air base loading and use for both current and contingency operations.³¹ This was the first comprehensive attempt by MACV to obtain detailed, definite, and valid recommendations for supporting air forces operating under contingency plans; its completion was expected in January 1965. One major finding anticipated is a determination of requirements for airfields, runways, taxiways, and parking ramps.


(S) A related problem developed in November when J4 briefed the Ambassador on the requirement for a parallel jet runway at Da Nang and a new jet field at Chu Lai.³² The briefing was to prepare the Ambassador for discussion of construction projects with top governmental officials in Washington. Although the J4 presented the project as being supported by MACV, the data available as justification did not satisfy the Ambassador. Later, it was found the requirement for a parallel runway at Da Nang had been identified by CINCPAC in a study based on a forecast arrival of new aircraft in Vietnam and that the details for the project were in that headquarters.³³ It appeared that COMUSMACV supported a CINCPAC project without complete understanding of the requirement. Apparently, adequate inter-command coordination was the fault. A separate MACV study later did not agree with the CINCPAC conclusion.³⁴ At the end of the year, MACV had been advised that MAP funds would be used to finance A&E studies for both fields,³⁵ and J4 and J5 would review the requirements.

(S) Perhaps the most difficult logistic planning requirement was determination of the availability and capacity of lines of communication. The insurgency environment constantly upset calculations. Historically, the pacification program in Vietnam had been directed

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primarily toward the people and had not been aimed specifically at territorial security of the logistic base. J4 considered this a deficiency and in July 1964 forwarded to J3 a list of critical facilities and lines of communication requesting that pacification plans consider the necessity of their protection.³⁶ The J3 replied that airfields, depots, railroads, ports, and POL facilities were critical and an attempt would be made to improve security.³⁷ J4 identified 50 critical logistic installations and monitored on a situation map the pacification status of the contiguous areas. Ideally, J4 considered that a special program similar to that of Hop Tac around Saigon should have been initiated. J4 considered an installation adequately secure if an area within the radius of VC mortar range was pacified, or, for linear routes, was sandwiched by pacified areas one kilometer wide on both sides.³⁸ The end of 1964 revealed a deterioration of security on the situation map. For example, around the commercial POL farm at Nha Be, although all security forces necessary were in place or programmed for deployment, the pacified area had shrunk considerably. Security of the logistic base remained a major problem and no real improvement was in sight. Outside of Saigon/Cholon only Nha Be and the major airfields were considered reasonably secure.³⁹

(C) The increased threat of hostile action against commercial POL facilities coupled with increased consumption of POL for military operations emphasized the need for more security of POL terminals. The Sub-Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam (SAPOV), improved security by changes in static defense measures such as terminal lighting, perimeter fencing, roads, communications, and water patrols. In addition, installation defenses were more closely integrated with military plans of districts and provinces. Nha Be, the largest POL complex in the country, was assigned a subsector advisory team in the district, and more ARVN troops significantly increased the security of that vital installation.

(C) With the exception of Da Nang, all POL deliveries originated at the Nha Be terminal seven miles south of Saigon. The lines of communication are extremely long, over poor roads, and vulnerable to hostile action. The completion of commercial coastal terminals at Nha Trang and Qui Nhon in 1965 will enable contractors to deliver on an east-west axis, considerably reducing supply line length, thereby decreasing vulnerability to hostile action. The SAPOV took several steps to counteract increased Viet Cong action. All commercial barge transport of petroleum along inland waterways is escorted by RVN naval ships and rules for this escort have been recommended as an RVNAF directive.⁴⁰ Military escort for commercial POL vehicles was also formalized by a MACJ4 memorandum.⁴¹ A MACV emergency POL supply plan

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
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was published for implementation in event of loss of POL storage facilities or interdiction of land routes.⁴² This plan provides resupply by military tankers, over-the-beach POL discharge, resupply, military convoys, and complete military POL distribution.

(U) Symptomatic of the difficulty of providing logistic support to MACV and the difficulty of obtaining understanding of field requirements was a problem solved during 1964. In June, after 14 months of sustained effort, an inter-service support agreement was developed among the Army, Navy, and Air Force for port advisory personnel to perform shipper services at the ports of Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang.⁴³ This service is critical in many cases because shipments to the ports are often consigned to addressees which require transshipment from LST's to aircraft. With no up-country logistic support these cargoes could easily become lost or misrouted. The protracted deal involved consideration by JCS and the determination of what service would furnish personnel and who would be their supervisor, since HSAS had no up-country supervisory capability.⁴⁴ The agreement called for two Army soldiers and one Marine attached to HSAS to be stationed, one at each port, to receive and forward US supplies and equipment arriving for US forces. The agreement satisfied a long-recognized need.

LOGISTICS MOVEMENTS

(C) Transportation requirements during 1964 increased as a result of several factors. First, US participation reversed from phasedown to buildup—typified by the US strength rise from 15,989 to 23,301 at year's end. There were increased tonnages, doubling and tripling for some modes, shipped to more locations—220 instead of 141. Secondly, Free World contingents arrived. Thirdly, VC activity reduced the dependability of land transport. And last, the November-December floods upset normal loads and resulted in emergency transportation requirements.

(C) It was necessary to augment and improve airlift and sea-lift capability and performance to keep pace with the buildup. During the year US LST's operated by Military Sea Transportation Service increased from two to seven. These LST's were under MACV operational control. An additional three LST's were under 13th Air Force operational control to move USAF ammunition and supplies from the Philippines to RVN primary ports and to inter-coastal ports. Also, an average of three LST's operated from Japan-Okinawa to RVN. In all, LST shipping more than doubled in 1964, from an average of 2600 tons monthly in the first quarter to an average of 5500 tons in the last.⁴⁵ This added capability absorbed the non-priority and normal logistic items for US forces and for the RVNAF National Pacification Plan.

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
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(C) Airlift capability was augmented by one US Army CV2B company, two USAF C123 squadrons, and six RAAF CV2B aircraft giving total air transportation resources of two US Army CV2B companies, two USAF C123 squadrons, and six RAAF CV2B's. The C123 squadrons and RAAF CV2B's are centrally controlled for common user airlift support. Aircraft shortages were not a problem since aircraft had been readily available from CINCPAC.⁴⁶ The availability of increasing numbers of helicopters during the year greatly assisted the transportation of supplies. Helicopter availability increased from 45 percent to 75-80 percent and monthly flight time from 25 hours per plane to 50 or 60 hours and higher, as UH1B's replaced older models. C123's are programmed for 60 flying hours per plane per month, and as this time increased to 75-80 hours, the additional squadron arrived and flight time returned to the programmed level.

(FOUO) Tonnage moved by the US/VNAF combined air movements system increased from 8279 tons in January to a high of 16,727 tons in December.⁴⁷ RAAF lifted about 700 tons monthly compared to 200 tons by VNAF. US forces were dependent upon airlift for about 40 percent of their requirements during 1964. This contrasted with only about 6.5 percent of all tonnages for US and RVNAF being airlifted in 1963. Even this percentage was about double the experience factor from the Korean War. This reliance on airlift resulted in part from the practice which many field advisors followed of "shopping in Saigon" for supplies rather than depending upon regular supply channels.⁴⁸ This practice violated schedules and upset programs by an undetermined amount. The large passenger traffic, an estimated 20,000 per month, also decreased available airlift for supply movements.⁴⁹


(C) In spite of severe stress the transportation system was able to accommodate great fluctuations and did not prove inadequate for any operational need. The increase in battalion and subsector advisory teams added substantial loads to the transportation requirement. Ammunition expenditures increased greatly as VC activity grew. The whole transportation system was upset by the floods in November and December. Prior to the floods about 70 percent of all US and RVNAF movement was by road and almost 90 percent of Vietnamese requirements were satisfied by this means--about 700 tons monthly. The balance was shipped by air (five percent), by rail (five percent), and by sea (20 percent). During and immediately after the floods, only about 20 percent was moved by road and the rest by air and sea; these means were inadequate. During this period some US advisory detachments ran out of food for lack of air delivery. A large part of all airlift and much sealift was diverted to flood relief.⁵⁰ Consequently, a backlog remained at the end of the year.

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(C) Although increased airlift and sealift capabilities were planned by RVNAF for 1965, a tonnage increase of only 20 percent was contemplated; US planners considered a 30 percent figure would be more realistic.⁵¹ Estimates proved extremely unreliable for requirements. J4 considered that "the operator is the man who least knows what he needs." Experience demonstrated that "they invariably either underestimate or overestimate, sometimes as much as 500 percent; but on the average customers underestimate their requirements."⁵² Faced with field requirements not programmed, unknown changes in VC activity, and changing transportation capabilities, reliable estimates seemed highly unlikely.

(U) As the tempo and scope of the war increased, a system was developed for controlling priority of movements. The Combined Movements Allocations Board (CMAB), although formed, was never required to function in 1964 since forecast requirements consistently fell below forecast capabilities for the transportation systems.⁵³ Therefore, approximately half of the movement capabilities were allocated or programmed by the CMAB. The system desirably will operate to move cargo to a destination by the time the addressee wants it--by whatever means is most efficient. J4 monitored the completion of the programmed capabilities and controlled the remaining capabilities to satisfy unscheduled and special movements.

FUEL REQUIREMENTS

(C) As mentioned above, POL requirements created a major problem. The quantity of POL consumed by US and RVNAF increased from 6,048,000 US gallons in January to 10,744,000 US gallons in December.⁵⁴ Consumers increased in numbers and locations. Expanded commercial POL transportation and storage facilities were needed by oil companies as POL consumption taxed available storage facilities and distribution systems. During 1964 it became difficult to maintain a 15-day operational reserve and on a few occasions the reserve was as low as six or seven days. This fluctuation was caused by peak consumptions and delivery delays (construction of additional tankage and changing the axis of delivery from north-south to east-west will overcome some difficulties). POL resupply was further complicated by increasing VC action against commercial POL storage, vehicles, and barges. Three barges were sunk in October, others set afire, and crews kidnapped. A captured VC document revealed a plan to execute a series of actions against road POL traffic--first stopping the vehicles and collecting a fine, then turning the truck back if it doesn't pay, and the next time burning the truck.⁵⁵ Countermeasures included improved defenses for POL facilities, use of military escort for barges and trucks, and development of emergency military resupply procedures.



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(C) The total military and commercial bulk POL storage available in RVN as of 1 January was 67,956,000 US gallons increasing to 100,626,000 by the end of the year, with 100,626,000 programmed for 1965. Additional storage is being constructed at the largest consuming fields, with largest capacities at Bien Hoa and Da Nang. At Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Nha Be storage will be expanded and, except for Nha Be, will have tanker receiving facilities. The commercial companies have been reluctant to build additional storage until they are certain of its profit. For example, at Nha Trang, Esso has used an anchored barge instead of building adequate on-shore storage. Additional military bulk storage has been requested to satisfy forecast POL consumption.⁵⁶

(U) Commercial oil companies operated the only POL testing laboratories in RVN at the beginning of 1964. These companies tested their own products to insure their military suitability but were not staffing and equipping their laboratories to be responsive to military needs. At the request of SAPOV, a mobile Army petroleum products laboratory was assigned to USASCV for fuel testing.⁵⁷ The laboratory became operational on 1 September and a MACV quality surveillance directive was prepared.⁵⁸

LOGISTICS PROBLEMS

(C) Ammunition transportation and storage was also a problem. The general buildup resulted in transportation bottlenecks and created overcrowding in ammunition storage areas at a recognized and accepted risk to safety.^{59,60} The ammunition transportation problem was critical while off-loading ships in the Saigon port and for later shipment from Saigon to other points in Vietnam (barges off-load ships at Saigon, then trucks transport the ammunition to the storage areas). Storage was inadequate at Bien Hoa, Da Nang, and Nha Trang, and of these, only Bien Hoa was building additional storage. Requirements for Da Nang and Nha Trang were under study by J4 and 2AD.⁶¹

(U) Logistic problems were not confined to major systems. Several supply and maintenance problems required special attention. During the spring, tires, tubes, and batteries were scarce. Two actions were taken. Local recapping capability was expedited and by June began to produce about 4000 tires monthly.⁶² Also, CONUS sources speeded supply and some 18,000 tires were received in June. These actions eased the tire situation by August and September. Lack of both electrolyte and local overhaul capability caused a battery shortage, but quick shipment from CONUS solved this.⁶³


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(U) During the year another small but important supply problem was faced. In December 1963 the Secretary of Defense had suggested that uniforms might improve the morale of the Popular Forces (then Self Defense Corps) and COMUSMACV concurred.⁶⁴ After considerable study and discussion, MAP funds were obtained and contracts let. By June, 198,824 uniforms (two per individual) were made available for Popular Forces.

(U) The in-country supply of barbed wire was generous during 1963 and much had been distributed to provinces for hamlet defenses. Hamlet construction was often behind schedule; some deterioration in storage resulted; records were incomplete and barbed wire was used for a variety of purposes.⁶⁵ By June 1964 it was evident that control of these resources required an inventory.⁶⁶ In the interim, a reevaluation reduced MAP requirements by three million dollars worth of barbed wire and construction materials.

(U) Sandbags were a major problem. During the rainy season exceptionally heavy downfall required many small dams and bunkers to be reinforced or replaced. Some 200,000 sandbags were used for this purpose. In December, after a review of physical security following the 1 November mortar attack on Bien Hoa, it was decided that all aircraft and major installations should be revetted. Some 200,000 sandbags were imported from Thailand and the Philippines for revetting 2AD aircraft, and 1,400,000 sandbags were obtained from Okinawa for revetting USASCV aircraft and facilities. During this period the RVNAF High Command was very cooperative and loaned their resources even at the cost of some shortages within their own supply system. As security of fixed installations continued to be critical, sandbags remained in short supply at the end of the year but the supply rate exceeded the labor capacity to fill and place them in defensive positions.⁶⁷

(U) Other items of supply also caused some difficulty. Popular Forces advisors complained that units were not receiving their full TOE vehicle authorization. Vehicles, however, are allocated to units by an Equipment Modification List considering the mission and priority of each organization and sometimes vary widely from TOE. Replacement of old commercial vehicles with militarily serviceable ones, and review of missions to assure a basic number was on hand, improved vehicle status to an acceptable level.⁶⁸


(U) On 29 October the Chief of Staff approved the recommendations of an ad hoc committee which had recommended a basis of issue for MAP-supported mission-type equipment (general purpose vehicles, signal equipment, and compound defense weapons) furnished to US advisors by RVNAF.⁶⁹ A major issue of this equipment was scheduled for 15 January 1965 when 524 one-quarter ton vehicles were to complete this allocation.⁷⁰

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RVNAF LOGISTICS

(U) Although the bulk of J4's effort was devoted to logistic problems, there were some significant advisory programs with RVNAF. Considerable advice and assistance was provided on procurement. Actions resulting from this advice were in three phases. From January through June preparations for activation of the RVNAF Central Purchasing Office, to include development of a TOE, initial SOP's and acquisition of personnel, office space, and equipment, were completed. In the next two months personnel were received and assigned, SOP's finalized, functions broken down and assigned, and some actual purchasing begun--negotiations started for approximately a million piastres' worth of uniform cloth and similar value of lumber and accessory items for the construction of RVNAF dependent housing. The last phase began in December with full purchasing operations underway.

(U) RVNAF requirements for logistics planning were obtained through the Directorate of Army MAP Logistics (DAML) for ARVN and through the Air Force and Naval Advisory Groups for VNAF and VNN/VNMC. This data was used as a basis for estimating capabilities and requirements to support CINCPAC OPLAN 32-64 which was prepared and forwarded in December.⁷¹ This was the first revision of the country logistic estimate since 1961. In the interim the RVNAF strength has been fairly stable and the estimate had not required revision.

6 Dec 64

(U) The administration of the MAP property during the year became a J4 function on the dissolution of MAAG. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provided that chiefs of MAAG's will "observe and report on the utilization of material furnished by the US." A MAAG directive had required annual reports on use, maintenance, and security of MAP property from all advisors to MAP-supported RVNAF units.⁷² A MACV reports study group recommended that regular reporting be discontinued.⁷³ MAAG concurred and had revised its directive to call for reports only when discrepancies required corrective action beyond the advisory capability. A reexamination of the procedure by direction of COMUSMACV determined that a regular reporting procedure should be reinstated.⁷⁴ The new directive required that US advisors to MAP-supported RVNAF units report semiannually in April and October their personal observations of the treatment and use of MAP equipment.⁷⁵ The first reports received in October showed some improper practice still existed. These deficiencies were noted in a letter to J4, High Command, by Brig Gen Osanski requesting corrective action.⁷⁶ MAP property is one of several levers that J4 can and has used on occasion to obtain compliance with US desires. Ammunition, engineer construction and maintenance funds, POL, and MAP items can provide critical controls. In one instance it was found that some ordnance vans were

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
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being converted into rolling quarters for generals. After a withdrawal of the vans, the fault was corrected and the vans were returned to their authorized use.⁷⁷

(U) Redistribution of MAP property was another function from MAAG. The applicable MACV directive published in September stressed that RVNAF services should retain reported property until shipping instructions are provided by the US authority.⁷⁸ The semiannual reports of the redistribution of MAP property required by OSD and CINCPAC were forwarded to CINCPAC in June and December. Salvageable MAP property with a value of \$27,708,000 was declared for redistribution in 1964 and an actual amount worth an original acquisition cost of \$6,721,000 was redistributed to other MAAG's or to US units.⁷⁹

(C) In addition to supporting RVNAF, the US logistic system supported military contingents from five nations during 1964—New Zealand, Australia, Korea, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. Although some support was Vietnamese, US agencies provided food, officer mess and billet furnishings, individual equipment, administrative transportation, hospitalization, maintenance and repair parts support for RAAF aircraft, etc. With no US logistic base in RVN, this support was provided by designated US supply agencies on a "case by case" basis. To improve support and regularize procedures, a MACV directive was published in December. This directive designates single US logistic contact points for each international contingent and a specific US agency for each type support. Problems stemmed primarily from hasty deployment of these contingents prior to proper logistic planning and preparation. In November MACV recommended to CINCPAC a number of actions for future deployments, to minimize logistic problems. At year's end it was likely support might have to be provided in 1965 for an additional 6-10,000 man international force, a significant increase from the approximate 500 supported in 1964.^{80,81}

(C) The most complex logistic support was required for the National Campaign plan for pacification. The J4 considered the plan was misnamed, but was an expression of doctrine or philosophy of counterinsurgency. J4 considered that a plan required two basic things, both absent in the pacification plan; "straight lines drawn by J3, and a lot of arithmetic worked out by J4." The absence of phase lines and clearly defined objectives prevented logistic planning of a definitive nature.⁸²

(C) During the year several experiences confirmed the difficulty of planning the logistic support for the pacification program. The total engineer requirements were summarized in a study made in conjunction with USOM.⁸³ The study became the planning base for the combined engineer effort of USOM and MACV to allocate units and materiel. An 18 month study of the use of various modes of transportation for passengers and cargo was compiled, averaged, and established as an experience base for estimating

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material requirements to support the counterinsurgency effort. Besides providing planning material to the MACV staff, the J4 and trained the RVNAF J4 personnel in the preparation of a plan to support the RVNAF National Campaign Plan. A medical estimate was also prepared by the J4 with the MACV Surgeon's help.⁸⁵ It contained experience data as well as estimates of future requirements to support the plan. A requirement for additional hospital beds was identified in the estimate.

(U) Individual province pacification plans were reviewed by J4 and J3, and an extract of planned material requirements was made. Initial plans did not present an adequate estimate. A standard basis and format was developed for the submission of province plans.⁸⁶ The response to the standard format permitted a summary of detailed material requirements for supply action. The procedure became routine and with more realistic requirements estimated, more adequate stocks were maintained.

(U) The J4 expressed admiration for the RVNAF logistic system, considering it more efficient than the US system, since "it is so streamlined they use the Army system to support all the forces."⁸⁷ Even so, during the year suggestions for further improvement were made. Three reviews of the RVNAF logistic systems were completed. Jointly with DANL, J4 assessed the organization and logistic capability of RVNAF and para-military forces. Specific actions were begun to improve the logistic capability of support elements of ARVN, RF and PF. An organizational change in the administrative support and logistic company (ADS&L) was recommended to the High Command. Ranger battalions expressed a need for self-administered supply systems, able to operate strategically without reliance on a distant logistic system. For this purpose a review of the ADS&L company supporting Ranger units was begun.

SUMMARY

(S) In a tour completion report,⁸⁸ the departing J4, Brig Gen Osmanaki, summarized the logistic effort within MACV during the period of his three year tenure. He pointed out that the J4 staff organization and manning had varied little during his tenure. Actions had been principally in three categories--developing US logistic systems, assisting and advising RVNAF, and preparing for logistic support of US and SEATO plans. Projects had included both current and long-term actions and, in addition to normal projects of these types, included support and planning for annual pacification plans. Key problem areas were identified over the years and several, such as minor ports, base loading, messing, and POL, have been perennial. Gen Osmanaki identified ten unresolved problems and forecast solutions for his successor. They were: centralized airlift, field ration or cooperative messes, PX and commissary location, construction standards, hospitals, headquarters location, engineer support, engineer construction, logistic command, and ammunition supply. He further pinpointed four potential problem areas as: POL distribution, HSAS-Logistic Command relationships, base development, and strategic planning of logistics.

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(S) Although Gen Ozanski considered that counterinsurgency in Vietnam had only validated logistic doctrine and posed no unique problems, he did consider that some logistic problems were aggravated within Vietnam. He stated:⁸⁹

"In a normal theater of operations such as Europe, one relies on the five means of transportation in priority--rail, road, pipeline, inland waterways, and finally air. But here, because of VC interdiction of the surface means of transportation we rely on them in the reverse order--air first, then on water, there is no pipeline, then on road and least on rail...Secondly, real estate is so much at a premium because the VC control so much real estate, and for other reasons, real estate is perhaps the greatest bottleneck which we have in logistics. One of the other peculiarities of counterinsurgency is, the expenditure of ammunition is so small. For a while the ARVN forces actually used more ammo in training than they did once they were trained and joined their units, because they saw silhouette targets much more than they did the VC. The other great difference is the interdiction of road movement, which means that you have to be careful what you send over the roads for fear of ambush."

(S) As mentioned before, Gen Ozanski disagreed with planning procedures used within MACV and also expressed a belief that counterinsurgency posed no really new challenge to US military competence. He summarized this conviction as follows: "I will trade all this misguided philosophy that counterinsurgencies are different, that they have to be fought differently, conceived of and executed differently. I don't believe that now. I believe the first principle of counterinsurgency strategy, like that of any other strategy, is to secure the base; and I think we neglected this until recently." The wisdom of his remarks will be increasingly put to the test as the end of 1964 promised heightened levels of VC activity.

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
FOOTNOTES

1. Interview, BGen Frank A. Osmanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S).
2. Ibid.
3. MACV Plan for Introduction of Log Cmd, 19 Dec 64 - Revised by CINCPAC, 21 Dec 64 - Briefed to JCS, 29 Dec 64. File MACJ4 (S).
4. Interview, BGen Frank A. Osmanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S)
5. Historical Monograph MAP Directorate to Hist Br, Period ending 31 Dec 64. File 440/64 (S). Hist Br.
6. Interview, Lt Col Keith S. Lain (Hq Comdt, MACV), Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
7. Interview, Col M. E. Riley, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S); Ltr, MACJ46, Subj: Organization of the Coord Purch Agency, 22 Apr 64. File MACJ4.
8. JTD, Hq MACV, 1 Sep 64. File MACJ4 (C).
9. Ltr, DA, Subj: Request for Logistics Data, 10 Mar 64. File MACJ4.
10. Ltr, COMUSMACV, Ser 0332, Subj: Request for Logistics Data, 3 Apr 64. File MACJ4.
11. Interview, Maj Raymond H. Griswold, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
12. Interview, BGen Frank A. Osmanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S).
13. Final Report, BGen Frank A. Osmanski (MACJ4) 30 Mar 62 - 28 Feb 65. File MACJ4 (S).
14. Informal documents and sketches - Base Development Br, J4. File MACJ4.
15. Interview, Maj Francis Wolak, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
16. Line of Communications Handbook, Vietnam. Dec 64. File MACJ4 (C).
17. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
18. Ltr, MACJ4, Subj: 1965 Country Improvement Plan, 21 Oct 64. File MACJ4.
19. Interview, BGen Frank A. Osmanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S); 3d Draft, MACJ4 to CofS (not dispatched per Gen Crowley), 28 Feb 65. File MACJ4 (S).
20. Ibid.
21. Report of SEATO Coordination Conference, Mar 64. File MACJ4 (TS).
22. Report of SEATO Coordination Conference, Sep 64. File MACJ4 (TS).
23. Report of SEATO Real Estate Conference, Dec 64. File MACJ4 (TS).
24. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
25. Msg, DEFCOMUSMACVTRAI, DTG 300330 Oct 64. File MACJ4.
26. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
27. MACV Directive 405-2, Real Estate, Master Planning, 4 Dec 65. File MACJ4; MACV Directive 15-2, Facilities Review Board, 26 Oct 64. File MACJ4.
28. Interview, Maj Frank Wolak, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).

29. US Mission Council Meeting, 4 Mar 64. File MACJ4 (S).
30. MACV Directive 415-1, Construction, 17 Nov 64. File MACJ4 (U);
MACV Directive 415-2, Construction, 17 Nov 64. File MACJ4; MACV
Directive 405-1, Real Estate, 3 Dec 64. File MACJ4; MACV Directive
701-2, Airfield Maintenance, 3 Dec 64. File MACJ4.
31. Ltr, COMUSMACV, Ser 01596, 7 Nov 64. File MACJ4.
32. Briefing, Cdr Russel F. Wilson, J4 for the Amb and Deputy Amb,
24 Nov 64. File MACJ4 (S).
33. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65. Hist Br
File (S).
34. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br
File (S).
35. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 301820Z Dec 64. File MACJ4.
36. DF, MACJ41 to MACJ3, Subj: Security of Logistic Facilities. 8 Jul
64. File MACJ4.
37. DF, MACJ324 to MACJ4, Subj: Security of Logistic Installations, 1
Sep 64. File MACJ4.
38. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br
File (S).
39. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
40. Ltr, MACJ44, Ser 74, 7 Jan 65. File MACJ4.
41. Office Memo 8-64, MACJ4, 1 Dec 64. File MACJ4.
42. MACV Directive 500-2 27 Mar 64, with change. File MACJ4 (S).
43. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
44. Interview, Lt Col James B. Carroway, J4, 13 Apr 65, Hist Br File (S).
45. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
46. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File
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47. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
48. Interview, Lt Col Keith S. Lain (HQ Comdt, MACV), 21 Apr 65. Hist
Br File (S).
49. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
50. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S).
51. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
52. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S).
53. Interview, Lt Col Thomas E. Benson, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
54. Interview, Maj Marion D. Bagmann, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
55. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S).
56. Ltr, MACJ4, Ser 005, 6 Jan 65. File MACJ4.
57. Msg, CINCPAC, 300035Z Sep 64. File MACJ4.
58. Ibid.
59. Interview, Col N. E. Riley, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
60. Interview, BGen Frank A. Ozanski (MACJ4), 4 Feb 65. Hist Br File (S);
Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, DTG 200519Z Jan 65. File MACJ4 (S).
61. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Cite MACJ46 1817 DTG 200610Z Jan 65. File
MACJ4 (S).
62. Fact Sheet, MACLOG-OR, Subj: Supply Shortages V. 1 Jul 64. File
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63. Fact Sheet, MACLOG-OR, Subj: Electrolyte, 31 Jul 64. File MACJ4.
64. DF, MAC-RF-PF, Subj: PF Uniforms, 7 Jan 65. File MACJ4.
65. Interview, Col M. E. Riley, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S).
66. DF, MACLOG-EN, Subj: Barbed Wire and Steel Fence Post, NRLH (U), 28 Jan 65. File MACJ4 (C).
67. Interview, Col M. E. Riley, J4, 14 Apr 65. Hist Br File (S)
DF, MACJ46 to DEPCOMUSMACV, Subj: Sandbag Requirement, 14 Nov 64.
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68. DF, MACLOG MSB, Subj: EML (U), Dec 64. File MACJ4 (C). MACJ4.
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(TS) CHAPTER V

PLANNING

(S) J5 as the joint staff planning element of MACV headquarters bore the heavy burden of maintaining US contingency plans, developing SEASIA plans, and advising the RVNAF on planning matters. 1964 was a year of major turmoil in planning as the extent of the US involvement was drastically altered, Viet Cong activity increased measurably, and direct encounters between US and DRV elements occurred against a backdrop of GVN instability and inaction.

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(S) The basic guidance for the Vietnam Country Military Plan had been directed in September 1963 by the Secretary of Defense. From this guidance the Accelerated Model Plan had been prepared and forwarded to CINCPAC in November 1963. But JCS approval was overtaken by events and no major action was taken on the plan. The guidance had assumed that insurgency within Vietnam would be controlled in the north and central portions of the country by the end of 1964 and throughout the RVN by the end of 1965. Some actions had preceded based upon this plan; most notably a suspense on further base development and the return of 1000 men to COMUS in December 1963. This widely heralded return evolved from the assumptions governing the plan but was undertaken for other than valid military reasons.

(S) New JCS and CINCPAC guidance in March 1964 led to the new country plan, "The Short Range Plan for Vietnam (SRVN)," and required fundamental changes in many plans. The concept of operations conformed to the GVN National Pacification Plan and admitted the limited delay capability of the RVNAF against overt aggression. In general, the SRVN was a resume of 64-66. Although completed in early July, this plan too was immediately outdated before implementation and revisions were begun. The country plans were replaced by the Military Assistance Planning Reference Book, RVN, published 21 August by CINCPAC.

(S) Current intelligence had given no indication of the end of the insurgency, although as mentioned above several plans had been predicted upon a specific date. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) assumed the insurgency in Vietnam would end prior to FY 68 and provided a substantially smaller force structure than that needed. On 1 October COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that the current approved RVNAF force structure through FY 67 be extended through FY 74. Thus, within a year's time, the planning changed from contemplating reduction of US support in 1963 with withdrawal by 1965 to a forecast that RVNAF forces would continue to be required at current levels ten years in the future. This drastic revision reflected more...

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
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realistic intelligence estimates of VC capabilities versus a deteriorating GVN, a fuller appreciation of the complexity of the problem of building a nation while simultaneously combatting insurgency, and the catastrophic effect on GVN effectiveness and public morale of repeated coups and acute government instability.

(C) (S) A host of changes followed the fundamental alteration of the JSOP long term outlook for Vietnam. The extent of the US involvement was detailed in many operations plans. One of the problems stemming from these plans was the provision of suitable facilities and determination of sources of personnel for the functioning of the headquarters. The planned location and staffing of command posts for COMUSMACV were reviewed based upon MACV reorganization, situation changes in SEASIA, and plans updated and completed during the year. Determination of single location and uniform staffing for the several plans involved was set as a goal to be achieved if practicable.



(C) Each current organizational and force change in MACV required updating of contingency plans. The consolidation of MAAG and MACV in May also required a review of the emergency plan for evacuation of US noncombatants.² Three changes to the original plan, published in March 1964 prior to the May reorganization, were issued. The plan required support of CTG 76.5 in extreme emergency conditions. Supporting plans of CTG 76.5 and 2AD were revised and other supporting plans published. In all some 5444 potential noncombatants were identified, an increase from 4683 during the year. Consequently, MACV had current plans complete and the Command was ready to conduct an Embassy or military controlled evacuation.

(C) In event the VC threat did not evoke this severe measure lesser security plans were devised. Throughout the political turbulence of 1964, the protection of MACV personnel, dependents, installations, and property against isolated or general attacks was a con-

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stant concern. All subordinate organizations were required to have defense plans for their installations completed by November 1964 consistent with the basic MACV security plan which was updated and published on 15 September.³ Defense plans were also prepared for all BOQ's in the Saigon area. In addition, emphasis was placed on the defense of critical installations including major headquarters, airfields, supply depots, and communication centers. MACV continued to rely upon GVN for security of US personnel, property, and installations against any hostile action—but US plans were developed as it became apparent that isolated or general deteriorations of GVN control in areas where US forces were located might well obviate GVN capability to discharge its security responsibilities. The 1 November mortaring of Bien Hoa was a dramatic case in point.


(U) One peacetime practice of US military forces was transferred by MACV to the counterinsurgency effort; a suggestion program, which was instituted in the early part of the year. In January a letter to all commands and agencies in Vietnam solicited all personnel to submit ideas for achieving victory over the Viet Cong.⁴ A MACV staff committee analyzed the submissions to evaluate their feasibility or forward them to appropriate experts. By the end of the year 817 suggestions had been received and many had been adopted for implementation. Many suggestions were related or similar to many changes already under study. In October and November, wide publicity of the program resulted in suggestions being received from CONUS, Europe, Canada, Thailand, and New Zealand.

EXPANDING THE EFFORT

(U) A major change in the US/GVN counterinsurgency program was its reinforcement by much wider support from other free nations to the GVN. This was stimulated in May 1964 when the Secretary of State urged other nations of the Free World to contribute contingents to support Vietnam.⁵ Since mid-1962 the Australians had furnished a group of 30 advisors to the RVNAF. To plan and supervise US involvement in the arrival of additional military personnel, equipment, or units, the J5 was designated to maintain staff cognizance over arrangements prior to formal government-to-government agreements. The first agreement⁶ completed subsequent to the request was for support of a 25-man Army Engineer Detachment from New Zealand on 11 June; the detachment arrived in July. In August a detachment of six Caribou aircraft with crews and maintenance personnel from the Royal Australian Air Force arrived in Vietnam, as part of the new agreement.⁷ A military contingent of 16 doctors, nurses, technicians, and civic action officers from the Philippine Army Forces arrived in Vietnam on 17 August. The Republic of Korea⁸ sent 135 men, including 19 professional personnel to staff a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital which was located in Vung Tau.

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The ROK also sent 10 Karate instructors. The Republic of Korea furnished an advisory group of 14 officers in October to advise RVNAF on political warfare and to assist in setting up systematic political warfare training. Responsibility for US support for these contingents was transferred to the International Military Assistance Office (IMAO)⁹ from J5 when the former office was organized on 19 December around a nucleus of former J5 members. The IMAO functions under the joint staff supervision of J5 and provides office and administrative space for liaison personnel of all IMA contingents.

(A) In June COMUSMACV advised CINCPAC that the upgrading of the US military posture contemplated by the longer term US commitment required several logistic actions. Contingency plans for SEASIA envisaged jet aircraft developments would congest existing facilities. It was thought the three jet capable-airfields at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang could be supplemented by lengthening the runway at Quang Ngai to accomodste jets;¹⁰ however, for technical reasons it could not be lengthened¹¹ and an engineering survey for alternate sites¹² led to a recommendation by COMUSMACV that a jet airfield be constructed at Chu Lai¹³ on the coast at the Quang Tin and Quang Ngai border. CINCPAC advised JCS of the Chu Lai requirement but also recommended a second runway for Da Nang¹⁴ to increase total capacity and operational flexibility. Subsequently the Secretary of Defense authorized MAP funds for architectural-engineer services for both projects.¹⁵ Chu Lai was also the site under consideration for installation of the USMC Short Airfield Tactical System (SATS) as a backup for Da Nang. Pending funding and completion of the permanent construction at Chu Lai, SATS would give a much earlier capability. At the year's end CINCPAC had asked MACV for an estimate of time required to procure the essential real estate.¹⁶

REFINING THE PLANNING ORGANIZATION

(U) Besides expansion and buildup, refinements in planning organization characterized the J5 year. Throughout the year J5 exercised joint staff supervision over the Military Assistance Program (MAP) Directorate [redacted]. In December 1964 a third staff agency was assigned to J5 for staff supervision when the newly activated IMAO became operational. As mentioned above, it was anticipated that the IMAO importance would grow with anticipated expansion of Free World assistance to Vietnam.

(S) (U) SOG had been formed in January 1964 to implement a [redacted]

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
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



(C) The RVNAF organization underwent more extensive changes. MACV J5 acted as the focal point of US advice and comment. Beginning in May, with the military running the GVN, the military sought at the same time to realign many functions of the Ministry of Defense and High Command. All proposals seemed constructive with one exception--the cumulation of total financial authority in one military office. The J5, RVNAF High Command (then Plans and Studies Division) solicited MACV comments on their reorganization plan¹⁹ and incorporated the MACV counterproposal to the Minister of Defense on 18 July.²⁰ A revised proposal was developed by the High Command on 4 August²¹ and was again referred to MACV for comment. The process was repeated²² and on 18 October, at a joint meeting of the Chief, Vietnam Branch, MACVJ5, with the High Command J5, early reorganization of the High Command and the RVNAF was recommended.

(C) The next note on the status of the reorganization was a phone call from the CINCPAC (General Khanh) to COMUSMACV on 7 November requesting comment on draft decrees to implement the reorganization. The decrees were not available until 0030 hours 8 November and were translated by 0715 and presented to COMUSMACV. The decrees²³ were cumbersome, ambiguous, and required revision in several respects--but before changes could be recommended it was learned the decrees had already been signed. The careful development of the structure of the RVNAF and the organization of the High Command over several months was thus potentially lost by inadequate implementation through hasty action. COMUSMACV and the Ambassador objected and subsequently the decrees were withdrawn, revised, and reissued on 11 November,²⁴

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


reflecting US recommendations--and the value of careful consultation over long months was retained--but with some loss in close relations on the US side if not on both. The point at issue was the Vietnamese proposal to eliminate vital checks and balances at highest levels of promotions, appointments, and budget and finance.

COUNTERING THE DRV

(S) The conduct of other RVNAF planning was difficult. Planning factors were constantly changed by instability stemming from political turmoil. The National War Plan of 1961 to protect RVN against external threats required many revisions to reflect forces currently available and revised enemy capabilities. There was a need to make this plan consistent with other US and SEATO plans. MACVJ5 helped to develop a new plan consistent with others. It was presented in outline form to the High Command (then Joint General Staff) in January 1964. However, the 30 January coup intervened before it was adopted. The new High Command did not accept the MACV plan but, using it as a guide, developed and published a draft contingency defense plan. After incorporation of some MACV refinements, this plan was finally published on 10 August as the Emergency Defense Plan.²⁵ It was later translated and disseminated to US Senior Advisors.²⁶


(TS) MACVJ5 continued to address the potential problem of a major escalation of conflict in SEASIA. The possibility of CHICOM/DRV overt aggression was recognized by CINCPAC OPLAN 38-64 (Military Operations to Terminate Aggression in Southeast Asia (U)), published in June. This US unilateral plan placed primary reliance on air and naval forces under direction of PACOM component commanders. COMUSMACV as COMUSSEASIA (Designate) was tasked with the conduct of the land battle. His supporting plan was issued in November.



...for US forces to be allocated to COMUSSEASIA were: two corps headquarters, one Marine expeditionary force, three infantry divisions, one airborne brigade, and nine Marine fighter/attack squadrons. The plan assumed participation of the following friendly allied forces: two ARVN corps headquarters, four or five ARVN divisions, one RVN Marine brigade, [redacted], one Commonwealth brigade, and one Philippine battalion combat team. OPLAN 38 was rapidly overtaken by the invalidation of many of the assumptions on which it depended.

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(S) A haunting concern of some members of the US Mission (then referred to as Country Team) was expressed at a Country Team meeting in April 1964.²⁷ The fear was that a defeat like Dien Bien Phu might cause a discouragement and panic throughout the RVN. It was postulated that a formidable force secretly assembled just north of the DMZ in Laos astride Route 9 or in the mountains west and south-west of Hue could launch a surprise attack and seize the historic capital city. Such a Viet Cong victory might cause RVNAF to lose its will to fight as well as excite American domestic furor. Against this contingency J5 completed an outline defense plan on 5 August.²⁸ The intent was to commend this plan to RVNAF. However, that thought was overshadowed by the DRV PT-boat attack on USS Navy ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Best intelligence at that time indicated the most serious threat was not an overt attack but rather a covert buildup of PAVN light infantry type units within the RVN. During the rush of subsequent events, the growth of VC strength, and the deterioration of the government political apparatus, the plan was shelved and never forwarded to the High Command.

(S) The US Mission was not the only originator of plans which were unrelated to the threat or failed to be adopted in original concept. In May the RVNAF J5 forwarded a study to MACVJ5 based on [redacted] air defense system requirements in the RVN. After staffing within MACV, it was concluded that no RVNAF air defense system should be developed. Later MACVJ5 undertook on its own a project for a longer range, phased Air Defense Requirements Plan since sometime in the future it was envisioned that RVNAF would assume full responsibility for all aspects of RVN defense, including air. J3 objected to the diversion of personnel from pacification to specialized defense units and a second version was rejected in November by J3 and the 2AD for the same reason and the implied promise of jet squadrons to VNAF in 1969. The third version of the plan²⁹ was approved on 21 December and was oriented strictly as a requirements plan to be saved as future developments would dictate when the requirements would be transformed to capabilities.


ESCALATION

(S) The attacks on 2 and 4 August by DRV PT-boats on US Navy destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin caused an immediate review of contingency plans and generated action for combined planning not previously completed. Retaliatory air strikes were planned and executed against targets in the DRV. In Saigon, both US and GVN officials were concerned that the events might trigger the deployment of DRV [redacted] ground and air forces into the RVN. On 5 August a MACV planning committee began to develop plans for combined US/RVNAF defense and on 7 August the group met with the RVNAF JGS representatives with the tacit authority of local senior US officials

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to begin combined planning for RVN defense and eventual counterattack of the DRV by US/RVN forces. OPLAN SK-1-64 was completed August and submitted to COMUSMACV and the RVNAF Minister of Defense. By this date tension had lessened and combined planning was tacit authority for it having been withdrawn on both sides.

(TS) Following the attack, US air and naval forces in SEASIA/South China Sea swiftly built up. The aftermath of the DRV attack resulted in an analysis of possible DRV reactions to the US retaliatory air strikes and counter US moves which prompted several actions. Additional US troops were in position at sea ready for landing on short notice. COMUSMACV determined that the most likely DRV reaction, if any, would be a ground attack on Hue or Da Nang by PAVN units infiltrated into the northern provinces of the RVN. COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that USASCV be strengthened with a modified logistic command and one signal area combat battalion, and one USMC and two Army HAWK battalions deployed to the RVN.³⁰ RVNAF was repeatedly asked and cautioned to strengthen airfield security.³¹ The combined planning described above was also discontinued because a real Vietnamese xenophobia was manifested by Vietnamese on the question of command of Vietnamese troops.³² The cry of "Go North" among the GVN was channeled into plans for air strikes in Laos and DRV including one mission for VNAF in Laos.³³ As it became apparent that DRV reaction was not imminent the US military posture in SEASIA gradually relaxed and the urgency of certain deployments dissipated.

(TS) From the Tonkin Gulf incidents until the end of the year, J5 was constantly dealing with the urgent problem of devising feasible politico-military measures and sanctions to buttress and discipline the GVN as it stumbled from one political crisis to the next. Earlier appraisals of the situation were discarded as internal stability deteriorated. While attention was focussed on improving internal stability, increasing attention was directed to devising measures which would reduce infiltration and force the DRV to cease its support and direction of the insurgency in the RVN.³⁴ Courses of action considered ranged from small cross-border forays by the RVNAF with US advisors to escalated series of US air attacks against DRV military and industrial complexes.³⁵ Limited cross-border operations by the RVNAF para-dropped intelligence teams were begun and US armed reconnaissance/photo flights were flown in Laos south of the 19° Parallel. OPLAN 34A operations were intensified. The discussions of Ambassador Taylor in Washington on 1 December reviewed the series of actions previously considered.³⁶ These actions were developed into a phased program designed to convince the DRV of US willingness to broaden the spectrum of conflict in both weapons and operations. At the end of the year COMUSMACV had concluded that the level of operations should not be increased until GVN internal problems were resolved, particularly since the escalated operations required

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combined planning with RVNAF for air and ground operations against the DRV itself.³⁷ Higher authority, however, determined that RVN morale needed a lift which only accelerated action could provide despite the risks that the RVN might turn the fight over to the US.

(TS) Another plan considering an escalated series of actions was OPLAN 37-64. The plan was published on 15 April 1964³⁸ in response to a CINCPAC plan³⁹ and the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to the President⁴⁰ following his March visit to RVN. He had urged appropriate agencies of the US government be instructed to prepare immediately to be ready to initiate a wide range of Laotian and Cambodian border control and retaliatory actions against DRV on 72 hours notice and to be ready to initiate a program of "graduated overt military pressures" against DRV on 30 days notice through air attacks by VNAF, USAF and USN aircraft.

(TS) The resultant MACV plan, although unilaterally developed, was designed primarily for execution by RVNAF with US advisory, planning, operational, and material support. The plan permitted implementing any type action in or out of sequence of escalation. The purpose was similar to that of other plans--forcing the DRV to cease its support of the insurgents. The plan called for active US air support when operations were beyond the capabilities of VNAF such as aerial reconnaissance, air strikes by FARMGATE, and overt air strikes by US B57 aircraft. This plan was also being consolidated with OPLAN 37-65 at year's end.


(TS) Planning to halt DRV support of the insurgents also acknowledged the necessity to do something about the infiltration corridor through Laos. Two similar plans⁴¹ providing for an increasing intensity of cross-border operations into Laos south of the 17° Parallel by RVNAF were published in March. The companion plans called for US advisory, planning, training, and material assistance. They differed in the one (OPLAN 98) was to be executed covertly with participating personnel in mufti or rag-tag and all equipment unmarked; the other (OPLAN 98A) planned uniformed personnel carrying marked equipment. Both plans as a first step proposed to obtain evidence of communist infiltration of military personnel and equipment from DRV into the RVN through Laos, and then to disrupt such infiltration. Ground patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and ground or air attacks on targets of opportunity were contemplated. Air attacks in the covert plan were to be restricted to unmarked VNAF aircraft or RLAF aircraft.

(TS) Following the 8 March 1964 visit to the RVN by Secretary McNamara, CINCPAC approved these plans⁴² and recommended the covert plan suffice to implement the Secretary's recommendation to

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the President that high level overflights of RVN's borders continued and that "hot-pursuit" and RVNAF ground operations in Laos be authorized as a means of controlling the border.⁴³ Although only early and limited phases were implemented, these plans generated a few small cross-border operations into Laos during 1964. At year's end, these plans also were being consolidated into OPLAN 37-65.

(TS) A bold plan to control infiltration through the Laos Panhandle was developed following a series of JCS and CINCPAC queries in June.⁴⁴ J5 studied the combined RVN/FAR capabilities, forces, and deployments required to seize the Laos Panhandle. Detailed studies of the framework for bilateral/multilateral planning, means and methods to use ethnic groups; concept of operations; PL/PAVN strength, location, and probable intentions; friendly force strength and location; and a terrain analysis were completed. An outline plan⁴⁵ envisioned four phases--prepositioning of forces, sealing off the Panhandle by offensive operations, expanding secured areas in Laos to include the Plaine des Jarres, and establishing governmental control over areas released from communist control and subsequent withdrawal of US combat forces. In addition to available FAR/NEUT forces the plan called for eight divisions (five US) and seven brigade/regimental combat teams (two US). Analysis of the concept indicated that tremendous lead times were required to preposition US forces and to develop an adequate logistics base. The imminence of possible execution of this and other plans led later to re-examination of CINCPAC/COMUSSEASIA contingency plans calling for deployment of similar US forces. This re-examination led to many constructive refinements of certain logistic work and unit schedules.

(TS) Throughout the year, extensive studies were conducted of targets and target systems in Laos and the DRV. Plans for the application of demonstrative direct air strikes against the DRV were begun at mid-June on JCS and CINCPAC instructions.⁴⁶ The MACV Air Force Component Commander (Cmdr, 2AD) developed detailed air strike plans for A1 (VNAF or FARMGATE) and US B57 aircraft which were forwarded to CINCPAC for approval.⁴⁷ Concurrently, the JCS directed that airstrike plans also be developed for attacks of higher intensity on 82 targets and 12 armed reconnaissance routes in the DRV.⁴⁸ JCS furnished an outline plan providing selective options for the graduated attack on the targets employing VNAF, FARMGATE, US aircraft, or combinations thereof.⁴⁹ Considerable priority planning at CINCPAC and subordinate levels ensued, resulting in CINCPAC FRAG ORDER Nr 1 of 7 August to implement the plan upon order.⁵⁰ The 2AD developed the MACV supporting air strike plan for the VNAF and FARMGATE A1 aircraft.⁵¹ This plan, too, was consolidated with OPLAN 37-64, as an annex to the CINCPAC plan.

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(TS) In early August J5 selected six specific targets in the DRV for possible attack by VNAF in retaliation for acts of terrorism by the VC in the RVN.⁵² These were expanded in response to a request by Ambassador Taylor later in August after an ambush in Kien Hoa.⁵³ Following the Gulf of Tonkin incidents, targets in the Laotian Panhandle were selected for VNAF strikes as a device, if needed, to divert GVN attention from their proposals to strike the DRV.⁵⁴ This option was never exercised by US authority.

(TS) These and other target studies prompted the submission to CINCPAC of a priority listing of targets in Laos and the DRV of prime interest to MACV to ensure their inclusion in higher level target studies and oplans.⁵⁵ CINCPAC was supplied an additional list of targets in the DRV and Laos for inclusion in the covert annex of OPLAN 37, then under revision.⁵⁶ At year's end, J5 planners with the assistance of the 173d Airborne Brigade, were studying targets in DRV/Laos suitable for US airborne raids for eventual inclusion in the same plan.

SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANNING

(C) In addition to plans for operations directly related to the insurgency within Vietnam, COMUSMACV served concurrently as COMUSMACTHAI which carried substantial SEATO and US Forces Southeast Asia responsibilities for planning. During 1964 the greatest priority for planning was allotted to the major SEATO plan, designed to thwart and defeat [redacted] aggression.

(C) Major action on this plan occurred at coordination conferences in Bangkok in March and December. COMUSMACV as the Commander (Designate) for the Central Region SEATO Field Forces (OPLAN 4-64) sponsored the March conference.⁵⁷ The plan had been prepared and issued in October 1963. Many problems of long standing were resolved; others which evolved on the spot were attacked and others particularly in communications and logistics were identified. Separate conferences were scheduled for these problems. The subsequent real estate conference in December resulted in essential agreement among all member nations but had not been formally approved at year's end by all member nations. After the February conference for movements problems, the plan will be completed and subsequently require only periodic updating and review.

(C) The March coordination conference in Bangkok generally set the stage for a meeting of SEATO Force Commanders in September.⁵⁸ CINCUSARPAC as Commander of SEATO Forces under OPLAN 4 invited the Commander, or his representative, of the Eastern (Pakistan), Central (US), and Western (Philippine) SEATO Field Forces to discuss matters of mutual concern and problems appropriate for their level. In contrast to the March conference when France and Pakistan had sent only

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"observers" at the Force Commanders' Conference, only the French again attended as observers, but all member nations were represented in some capacity. The agenda dealt mainly with the SEATO Force Headquarters organization, functioning, staffing, location and communications support. Thailand agreed to provide an appropriate facility in Bangkok for the SEATO Force Headquarters. Coordination procedures between the various national components and the SEATO field Forces were also clarified. Each Regional force Commander reported on the status of planning for his area of operations. Only the Central Region (US) had completed plans.

(S) As a result of the conference SEATO OPLAN 4 was updated and current at the end of the year, with the February 1965 conference scheduled to resolve the one area requiring attention.⁵⁹ A SEATO plan for operations to counteract insurgency in Laos (OPLAN 5-64) had been published by MACTHAI in 1962. However, CINCPAC, as the US Military Representative to SEATO, directed that, for political purposes, no immediate revision of this plan be undertaken.⁶⁰ The plan to counter aggression by the DRV (OPLAN 6-66) had been published by MACV in 1961 and was awaiting approval of an August revision on force assignments by member country military advisors. The plan to defeat insurgency in the RVN (OPLAN 7-64) was an updating of the plan published by MACV in 1963. The remaining SEATO plan, to counter insurgency in Thailand (OPLAN 8-YR), was sponsored by Thailand. For political reasons there has been no action essential to development of the basic SEATO Force Commander's plan. On the other hand, an effective bilateral US-THAI defense plan was progressing well in its development at year's end.


(TS) The increasing concentration of US and world attention in Southeast Asia and its future led to some new and unique arrangements for coordination of US interests and activities. During the summer of 1964, accordingly, the necessity for extra-SEATO arrangements within SEASIA became apparent, as did requirements for the close coordination of all US missions in the area. Frequent and direct consultations among the US Missions to Laos, Thailand and the RVN was required on the increasing military activities which affected all three countries. In September, an ad hoc committee of US military and diplomatic representatives to Laos, Thailand, and the RVN met in Saigon to consider the current air operations over Laos and possible future air/ground operations in the Lanthan Peninsula by RVNAF or other forces.⁶¹ Ambassador Taylor recommended the formalization of this group as the Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACORD). He recommended that the committee be periodically convened to consider "how to mount quickly effective military operations in Laos and SVN... on satisfactory political terms."⁶² The Secretary of State concurred⁶⁴ and SEACORD terms of reference were approved. There were

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military and state representatives from each mission, by the Chief of Mission. CINCPAC representation was in October a SEACoord meeting reviewed the RLAF strikes against target in the Laotian Panhandle, the desirability of US jet combat patrol cover for these missions, and targeting coordination requirements.⁶⁵ In November, SEACoord participants reviewed military operations in Laos and a proposed project to improve Route 9 from Dong Ha, RVN, to Svannakhet, Laos, as an aid to countering insurgency in SEASIA.⁶⁷ The next meeting was scheduled in January 1965. The sessions already conducted had proved highly useful in achieving a common understanding and attack on the problems stemming from communist activity throughout Southeast Asia.




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SUMMARY

(S) The year 1964 was one of constant reevaluation and revision of plans. Planning factors, which were valid at the outset, disappeared or lost all meaning in 12 months. There was an increasing resort to planning for unilateral actions with an increasing escalation in intensity of violence and degree of direct US action involved. This be-

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came necessary as the Viet Cong gained strength while shaken by instability and consequent ineffectiveness. inability of the RVNAF to obtain significant victories during the year aggravated political instability affecting not only the civilian agencies of the GVN but causing problems within military establishment.

(S) The J5 planning effort was largely unilateral and its plans vis-a-vis the DRV involved greater emphasis on military measures applied beyond the borders of the RVN. In this new shift, greater reliance was placed upon Thailand as the most stalwart member of SEATO and the only strong stable free nation remaining in Southeast Asia. There was some effort through an extension of military assistance from other free nations to Vietnam to reverse the trends. Their help promised to grow larger in 1965. In some respects, this shifting in plans and sources of military strength was a conclusion, perhaps unconsciously, on the part of the US planners that the RVNAF was insufficient to the task and that a solution to the insurgency must include substantial actions beyond the borders of Vietnam. An increasing frustration with the advisory role and the results of the US support of the GVN to date hastened the development of plans to escalate the conflict. The communists obligingly provided a relatively palatable political rationale in the form of serious provocation by wanton acts of terrorism and violence directed against US personnel and installations.

(TS) The multiplicity of plans developed, revised, and maintained in 1964 required considerable dispersion in the J5 planning effort. That some plans were closely related was evident in that seven plans were consolidated into the single OPLAN 37-65 to stabilize the situation in the RVN and/or Laos. It is almost certain that other plans could have been developed into a family of plans or consolidated into fewer plans in number than existed during the year. That such a simplification and consolidation was not accomplished is partially a result of the planning system itself. Although a rather full stable of plans existed, their value was hinged to the validity of a wide range of varying assumptions. Repeatedly new situations would develop, unanticipated by previous planning. Crash efforts would produce a plan through intricate MACV staffing only to find that the immediacy of need and sometimes the need itself had evaporated. The planning process was but a reflection of the mercurial nature of an increasingly ineffective GVN and the search for US actions which might serve to reestablish the VC-GVN power equation in the GVN favor. This situation forced a complete reversal of the US national estimate and policy on the scope and duration of the US commitment to the GVN during the year.

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(TS) Some specific characteristics appear in the planning effort which may constitute serious deficiencies. Although the basic plan for the US support was the country plan and its successor, the several plans prepared during the year did not appear to be implementing plans for the basic plan. Further, no integration of the planning effort between MACV and other US agencies within the country was noted by special comment. J5 efforts were almost totally restricted to strategic military planning. Essentially, strategic plans were not implemented during the year, with few piecemeal exceptions, and therefore no experience was developed concerning the feasibility and adequacy of the plans which might have led to revisions or development of new plans.

(TS) The J5 conclusions for the conduct of the war appeared to be that the insurgency could not be countered with forces available to the RVNAF, that increased use of non-Vietnamese forces applied to areas in the DRV and Laos was essential to obtain a cessation of support for the Viet Cong by the DRV and that the Viet Cong within RVN could not be countered by defense measures to forestall terroristic activity. Active offensive measures were beyond the ability of the RVNAF--however augmented, strengthened, supported, or advised by US or other friendly forces. These conclusions explain in large part the type of plans maintained in the J5 repertoire. But it leaves the performance with no ending.

(TS) There are no plans which consider what actions will follow the cessation of DRV support; since the present National Victory Plan promulgated in May 1964 was not fully implemented there has been no attempt to develop a new master plan for counterinsurgency operations within Vietnam. It may well be that the stage of conflict within Vietnam by the end of 1964 had reached a point where only conventional warfare held any promise of success; at least, there were no new plans contemplating a lesser level of military effort developed or in concept in 1964.

(TS) As the year ended it was unclear whether the series of US plans had as its purpose the gradual withdrawal of the US presence in Vietnam following negotiations or whether the US intended to stay in the race in all of Southeast Asia. An eventual restoration of government authority within Vietnam demanded that the thousands of arms supplied from sundry sources over many years should be brought under control in a systematic way; a demilitarization of the society would be required as responsibility for law and order could be assumed by police authorities. A test for their adequacy would be forthcoming in 1965 if the trend of events continued.


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FOOTNOTES

1. SR. MACJ5 to Cofs. 1 Aug 64. subj: Command Post Locations. File MACJ5 (TS).
2. COMUSMACV OPLAN 60-64, 16 Mar 64. File MACJ53 (S).
3. COMUSMACV OPLAN 61-64, 15 Sep 64. File MACJ54 (S).
4. Ltr. MACJ5, 28 Jan 64, Subj: Brainstorming. File MACJ5.
5. State Dept Circular 2043, 2 May 64. File MACJ5 (C).
6. Summary of Agreements, United States of America and New Zealand, 11 Jun 64. File MACJ5 (C).
7. Summary of Agreements, United States of America and Australia, 22 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (C-NOFORN).
8. Summary of Working Arrangement, United States of America and Republic of Korea, 5 Sep 64. File IMAO.
9. MACV GO 676, 19 Dec 64.
10. Msg. COMUSMACV, DTG 101049Z Jun 64. File MACJ5.
11. Msg. COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ5 6202, DTG 170105Z Jul 64. File MACJ5.
12. Msg. CINCPAC, DTG 210338Z Jul 64. File MACJ5 (S).
13. Msg. COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ4 8077, DTG 104240Z Aug 64. File MACJ5 (S).
14. Msg. CINCPAC, DTG 260127 Sep 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg. CINCPAC, DTG 152338Z Oct 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg. CINCPAC, DTG 260536Z Nov 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
15. Ms. DA, Cite OSD/ISA 003265, DTG 291417Z Dec 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
16. Ms. CINCPAC, DTG 020331Z Nov 64. File MACJ5 (S).
17. Ms. CINCPAC, DTG 270108Z Nov 63. File MACJ5.
18. Ms. CAS Wash, DC, Cite 84972, 26 Nov 63. File MACJ5.
19. Tentative Plan for the Reorganization and Improvement of Defense Ministry and CINCPAC Agencies, JGS to MACJ5, May 64. File MACJ5 (K).
20. Ltr. COMUSMACV to Gen Khiem, Ser 0839, 18 Jul 64. File MACJ5 (K).
21. Revised Plan for Reorganization and Improvement of Defense Ministry and CINCPAC Agencies, JGS to MACJ5, Aug 64. File MACJ5 (K).
22. Ltr. MACJ5 to Lt Col Nghi, 28 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (K); Tentative Plan for the Reorganization of National Defense Installations and CINCPAC, 7 Sep 64. File MACJ5 (K).
23. Decree, 8 Nov 64, subj: The Organization of High Command, RVNAF. File MACJ54 (K); Decree, 8 Nov 64, subj: System of Organization in the RVNAF. File MACJ54 (K).
24. Decree 1752/QL/ND, 11 Nov 64, subj: The Organization of High Command, RVNAF. File MACJ54 (K); Decree 332/QL, 11 Nov 64, subj: Organization of the RVNAF. File MACJ54 (K).
25. JGS Contingency War Plan of 64 (CWP64), Jan 64. File MACJ5 (TM).
26. Ltr. MACJ5, 21 Aug 64, subj: Ltr of Transmittal, RVNAF Contingency Defense Plan PT-1-64, 10 Aug 64 (U). File MACJ54 (TS).
27. Extract, para 7 of EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon to State Dept, Cite 2142. File MACJ5 (S).

28. Contingency Defense Plan PT-2-64, MACJ5, Aug 64. FILE MACJ54.
29. Requirements Plan, Hq MACV, Nov 64, subj: RVN Air Defense. File MACJ5 (S).
30. Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Cite MACJ3 8149, DTG 150123Z Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
31. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ00 8214, DTG 160955Z Aug 64. File MACJ5.
32. Verbal Instructions, Amb Taylor, 13 Aug 64.
33. DF, MACJ5 to CofS, 16 Aug 64. File MACJ5.
34. DEPTTEL, State Dept to AMEMB Saigon, Cite 439, 14 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, JCS, Cite 2343/441-1. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 170530Z Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 290340Z Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, JCS, Cite 9703, DTG 121802Z Oct 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ5 11293, DTG 131731Z Oct 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, JCS, Cite 001931, DTG 170045Z Nov 64. File MACJ5 (TS); Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 240311Z Oct 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
35. COMUSMACV OPLAN 37-64. File MACJ5 (TS).
36. Memo, MACJ5 to CofS, no date, subj: Comments on DOD "Briefs" on Courses of action, GVN. File MACJ5 (TS). DEPTTEL, Amb Taylor to Amb Johnson and Gen Westmoreland, DTG 032145Z Dec 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
37. Memo, COMUSMACV to Amb Taylor, 6 Jan 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
38. MACJ5 ltr of Promulgation to OPLAN 37-64, 15 Apr 64. File MACJ54 (TS).
39. CINCPAC ltr of Promulgation to OPLAN 37-64, Ser 000115, 30 Mar 64. File MACJ54 (TS).
40. Msg, JCS, Cite 5375, DTG 181522Z Mar 64. File MACJ5.
41. MACJ5 ltr of Promulgation to OPLAN 98-64, 10 Mar 64. File MACJ5 (TS); MACJ5 ltr of Promulgation OPLAN 98A, 13 Mar 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
42. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 102305Z Apr 64. File MACJ5.
43. Msg, JCS, Cite 5375, DTG 181522Z Mar 64. File MACJ5.
44. Msg, JCS, Cite 6676, DTG 052237Z Jun 64. File MACJ5; Msg, JCS, Cite 6647, DTG 052217Z Jun 64. File MACJ5; Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 100448Z Jun 64. File MACJ5; Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 132345Z Jun 64. File MACJ5.
45. COMUSSEASIA Outline Contingency Plan for Military Operations to Occupy Laos Panhandle, 3 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (S).
46. Msg, JCS, Cite 6888, DTG 162144Z Jun 64. File MACJ5; Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 180800Z Jun 64. File MACJ5.
47. Msg, 2d AD, DTG 260950Z Jun 64. File MACJ5.
48. Msg, JCS, Cite 7184, DTG 010052Z Jul 64. File MACJ5; Outline Plan, JCS, Ser 2343/383-2, 24 Aug 64. File MACJ5.
49. Outline Plan, JCS, Ser 2343/243, 14 Jul 64. File MACJ5.
50. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 062335Z Aug 64. File MACJ5.
51. Msg, 2d AD, Cite 1854, DTG 241600Z Aug 64. File MACJ5.
52. DF, MACJ5 to MACJ2, MACJ3 and 2d AD, 4 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS); DF, MACJ5 to CofS, 22 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS).

53. MACJ5 Fact Sheet, 25 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
54. DF, MACJ5 to CofS, 16 Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
55. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ2 8430, DTG 201255Z Aug 64. File MACJ5.
56. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ5 10077, DTG 230601Z Sep 64. File MACJ5.
57. Report of the SEATO Coordination Conference, Bangkok, Mar 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
58. Report of the Commander SEATO Force Plan 4 Coordination Conference, Bangkok, Sep 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
59. Ibid; Report of the SEATO Coordination Conference, Bangkok, Sep 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
60. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 060135Z Jun 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
61. EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon to State Dept, Cite 913, 19 Sep 64. File MACJ5.
62. EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon to State Dept, Cite 870, 16 Sep 64. File MACJ5.
63. DEPTTEL, State Dept to AMEMB Saigon, Cite 727, 25 Sep 64. File MACJ5.
64. EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon to State Dept, Cite 1080, 10 Oct 64. File MACJ5.
65. Ibid.
66. Msg, COMUSMACV, Cite MACJ3 11197, DTG 121657Z Oct 64. File MACJ5.
67. EMBTEL, AMEMB Saigon to State Dept, Cite 1415, 6 Nov 64. File MACJ5.
68. DEPTTEL, State Dept To AMEMB Saigon, Cite 2204, Jun 64. File MACJ5 (S).
69. EMBTEL, AMEMB Bangkok, Cite 459, 23 Jun 64. File MACJ5 (S).
70. Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 290536Z Aug 64. File MACJ5 (TS).
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(S) CHAPTER VI

COMMUNICATIONS

(U) The communications system left by the French and Japanese in Vietnam at the time the US began its military assistance to Vietnam was outdated and extremely inadequate. The system consisted mainly of local networks around large cities with virtually no inter-connecting long lines of communications. Thus, the primary US advisory effort was directed at improving the country-wide communications system while at the same time developing Vietnamese military communications within and between units. By the close of 1964 a multi-million dollar country-wide system existed and was still growing in an effort to keep pace with the continually expanding US programs in Vietnam. Also, within Vietnamese military units, many changes and improvements had been made to increase the effectiveness of these units in counterinsurgency operations and to increase their ability to communicate with one another, thereby improving mutual support capabilities. The communications system now in being supports US and RVNAF contingency plans and normal operational requirements, both of which constantly change. Requirements and plans are reevaluated continually and short-term solutions have been devised to meet immediate operational needs.

(U) Throughout 1964 attention was focused on improvement of the communications system nation-wide and within units. At the beginning of 1964 the general feeling was the US would be out of Vietnam by 1965. This dampened the urgency to increase and refine any communications facilities. However, with the visit of Secretary McNamara in March, the whole effort was changed from pullout to buildup. With this it became necessary to expand the entire communications facility. Planning for new systems and coordination for the better use of the old system was immediately stepped up. 1964 recorded many significant communications happenings as a result of the buildup.

COORDINATION


(U) A most critical need in the general effort to improve communications was the establishment of some mechanism for the overall coordination and direction of US and VN communications systems. This need for a mechanism to provide overall direction and coordination was recognized as a basic requirement to the improvement of communications on a continuing basis by COMUSMACV. As a matter of fact, MACV took the lead in urging improved coordination and cooperation between US agencies on the one hand and VN agencies, military and civilian, on the other.

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(U) An outgrowth of MACV urging was the establishment, April 1964, of the Communications Electronics Subcommittee, reporting directly to the Ambassador. This subcommittee was charged with the evaluation of existing systems and submitting recommendations for improved coordination and integration of US communications systems in-country. In July 1964, subsequent to the establishment of the US Mission Council, Ambassador Taylor redesignated the subcommittee as the Communications-Electronics Staff Committee under the Mission Council.¹ The committee consists of the MACV ACoFS J6 as Chairman, a USIS representative, a representative from the Embassy Communications Section, and a USOM representative.² Shortly after its formation, this committee assumed the responsibility for urging the establishment of a counterpart committee in which the RVNAF ACoFS J6 would be Chairman. Such a committee was formed in August with representatives of appropriate VN military and civilian agencies. The two committees, US and VN, developed a close working relationship and had periodic meetings during the year. The two committees reviewed RVN communications systems requirements and future plans. The objectives of both groups were similar, i.e., elimination of duplication, upgrading existing communications, increasing efficiency and insuring adequate capacity for immediate and future needs. Principally, these committees were mechanisms for meeting the immediate requirement to provide overall direction and coordination for communication efforts in Vietnam.

(S) The Tonkin Incident, 5 through 9 August, emphasized the need for intricate and rapid coordination. Ground control facilities for aircraft, previously in planning stages, were immediately deployed.³ Special procedures were established during this crisis to deliver high precedence traffic directly to addressees. This meant placing communications personnel on 12 hour days for seven days a week. The alternate command post at Vung Tau was planned and communications installed on a crash basis, to include multi-channel circuits into the main system, switching facilities, and local wiring. The alternate command post could have supported MACV with communications had they moved; however, the crisis passed and the facilities were subsequently removed. The information gained by the installation of this facility will be of great value in any future crisis. Coordination was made for use of all means of communication throughout Vietnam.


(U) Further instances of coordination revolved around communication centers. As a result of a study conducted by ACoFS, J6, duplication between Army and Air Force communications centers was reduced considerably. Some facilities were discontinued in key areas such as Nha Trang, Da Nang, and Hue, and their responsibilities and functions absorbed completely by the remaining facility, eliminating some Army and some Air Force installations. This greatly improved efficiency while saving defense dollars.

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(C) Another act of coordination which reaped benefits concerned the MACV communications center. Prior to 8 October the MACV communications center was operated from two locations, in MACV-1 compound and another in MACV-2. In October the two facilities were combined at MACV-1. Before the combination, terminal facilities were split. All Top Secret and secure circuits were terminated in MACV-1 and all common user circuits in MACV-2. This caused a great deal of trouble and confusion due to the large volume of traffic between the two facilities as well as the physical operation of duplicate "comcenters". The combination was accomplished efficiently with only minor technical problems. By rewiring the compound and increasing terminal facilities, greater and more efficient service was made possible.⁴

(U) Early in 1964 a difference in interpretation arose between US Army and US Air Force communications agencies on the definition of "local telephone service." The Air Force had previously been assigned responsibility to provide local service at Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, Da Nang, Pleiku, and Bien Hoa. The Air Force interpreted local service to include on-base lines only. The Army interpreted local service to include the area around the terminal facility governed by the capability of the line to carry the signal and included off-base lines. A decision was requested from CINCPAC and on 10 June the Army's definition was upheld.⁵ This has proven to be the most efficient method of service and the Air Force has since concurred.

ADVISORY EFFORT

(U) Due to the complexity and hugeness of the effort it was necessary to augment the J6 advisory staff with a Navy and an Air Force representative in September. This has proven to be worthwhile and has expanded the scope and effectiveness of the advisory effort by making it a truly joint operation.

(U) One of the greatest problems solved by the J6 advisory effort was to convince the Vietnamese to form a control headquarters for "floating" signal units. There were a large number of these units reporting directly to High Command. This proved cumbersome. Subsequently, the 61st Signal Group was formed with all floating units under it and the Group Headquarters reporting directly to High Command. This greatly aided command, control, and coordination.

(U) Another intricate problem encountered was frequency control and assignment. Complex coordination and "personal diplomacy" with RVNAF eventually resulted in relieving the shortage by multiple-user assignment to the same frequency. The lead time for new US units coming into country remained a vexing aspect of the frequency problem.


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REACHING THE PEOPLE

(C) Besides tactical and strategic communications there was the problem of getting the "word" to the people. One way this was done, of course, was by radio, but other means were and are also available. In 1964 an inter-agency subcommittee appointed by the Mission Council was to consider the possibility of introducing television into Vietnam. This medium potentially might provide a great asset for counterinsurgency. The subcommittee concluded that TV could advance US objectives, rural pacification, urban stability, national unity, Free World support, the US presence in Vietnam, and allow the Vietnamese government to better project its image and that of the US to more of the people. The subcommittee recommended that the Mission Council request approval from the Ambassador to negotiate with the Vietnamese government and interested US-commercial corporations to establish a Vietnamese Government Television Broadcasting Corporation, and that a Mission project officer be appointed to coordinate planning for introduction of television as soon as possible. At year's end this was being negotiated with the State Department for approval.

(U) Another facet of reaching the people concerns the necessity to keep US personnel in Vietnam informed. This was done in 1964 mainly by Armed Forces Radio System (AFRS). During the year, AFRS increased the efficiency of its service by replacing old BC-610 transmitters with new Bauer 720 AM transmitters. Service was also expanded in 1964 by using the newly installed microwave system, "Southern Toll", to send AFRS programs to Can Tho where they were rebroadcast to the entire Mekong Delta area, which gave service for the first time to many remote locations. A 90-day survey was ended 15 June and showed that AM and FM service was provided well over 99 percent of the time, and in November a study showed that 94 percent of US personnel in Vietnam receive satisfactory AFRS reception. The effect of this radio station as a psychological tool to present US views and personality to Vietnamese listeners cannot be discounted. It is a well known fact among US advisory personnel that many Vietnamese prefer AFRS to Vietnamese stations.


(U) One significant event for AFRS in 1964 occurred on 24 December when the AFRS studio was damaged by the explosion in the Brink Hotel. Interim facilities were immediately set up at Radio Vietnam studios. Within 24 hours the service was restored at the Brink studios and, on 25 and 26 December, an alternate studio was established in the United States Information Service building in anticipation of possible future bombing incidents.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

(U) Adequacy of US communications systems both in-country and out-of-country required major consideration. With the buildup the existing systems became increasingly inadequate. During 1964 a number of new systems were installed to increase the efficiency and try to keep pace.

(FOUO) One of the most serious deficiencies was the lack of adequate communications to CINCPAC and the US. In order to alleviate this somewhat, on 24 August an experimental Syncom Satellite Mark IV (X) Ground Station arrived in Saigon to supplement strategic communications as a short duration alternate communications system for point-to-point communications from Saigon to Hawaii and CONUS.⁶ This experimental model provided one voice and one teletype circuit. It sufficed as an expedient until 3 October, when a Mark IV (I) terminal arrived in Saigon for use as a primary system.⁷ This change increased reliability and provided additional channel capacity. The Mark IV (X) then reverted to an alternate status and will be relocated in Thailand in early 1965. Since October the Mark IV (I) has handled a remarkable volume of operational traffic. In addition, as a side-light, it was used to receive live broadcasts of the World Series, the National Election returns, and President Johnson's Thanksgiving Day Message. It appears that satellite communications are here to stay and will increase MACV capability in the future.

(U) One of the foremost additions to the Hawaii/US communications channel was "Project Wetwash". The addition of this system, which was completed on 1 January 1965,⁸ is the single most important change in Vietnam communications in 1964. "Project Wetwash" consists of 60 channel submarine cables from the Philippines to Nha Trang with a troposcatter system from Nha Trang to Saigon. This is the first system capable of carrying large traffic volume in and out of country. It provides dependable communications vital to the Vietnam effort and facilitates through traffic to the United States.

(U) An evident indication of communications expansion in 1964 is the STRATCOM facility. This element more than doubled in capacity and volume during the year.⁹

(S) Other aspects of strategic communications became cause for concern and effort in 1964. The existing long lines communications in-country became more inadequate as 1964 progressed. The systems did not provide the requisite capacity, quality, or reliability required. In the event of a crash buildup traffic could not be adequately handled. Rigid priorities would rule with a much lower standard of service

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provided. The tactical systems would have to be replaced with high grade commercial systems in adequate numbers. In order to correct this glaring deficiency a plan for an integrated wideband communication system was established to upgrade the facilities. By the end of 1964 the concept had been approved by JCS and was in the detailed planning stages in the Defense Communications Agency.¹⁰ The concept calls for completion within one year but could be completed on a crash basis in several months. The installation of this system will give Vietnam a high grade, commercial quality communications network.

(C) The extreme need for additional long lines facilities is illustrated by the case of "Crossbow". Early in the year the main link to the north between Saigon and Pleiku, called "Backporch," which is a 72 channel troposcatter system, became so overloaded that the "Crossbow" system, which supplied an additional 24 channels, had to be installed between these terminals. With this addition the severe overloading has been alleviated and it is possible to keep the traffic flowing, but additional systems are already being planned for 1965.

(U) In addition to military systems, commercially contracted systems were being planned and installed. USOM contracted systems such as "Southern" and "Northern Toll" were two of these. On 10 August, circuits of "Southern Toll", a commercial microwave system covering the area south of Saigon, were accepted by USOM from the civilian contractor. Additional circuits will be made available as multiplex equipment is installed. Installation of circuits from the microwave tower to the users proved difficult. Lines were leased or installed as the local situation dictated. "Southern Toll" did provide high quality voice and teletype circuits in 1964 and should improve in 1965. As previously mentioned, AFRS programs were transmitted via "Southern Toll" to Can Tho for rebroadcast throughout the Mekong Delta.

(U) "Northern Toll" is a proposed USOM microwave telecommunications system to provide modern dependable communications north of Saigon. This system, suitable for television as well as dial telephone, is currently being evaluated by AID in Washington. MACV has been in favor of the proposal since 1963 and COMUSMACV has given his support to the system, which will greatly aid MACV communications to the northern provinces by allowing MACV to lease some of its channels.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS


(S) With the extensive buildup of US field advisors, tactical communications in 1964 took on an added importance. Advisors in isolated

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posts or with RVNAF units in remote, Viet Cong-infested areas had to have a communications link of their own. US advisors had been using Vietnamese communication systems which were not always adequate or available. In March 1964 certain communication items were requested on the MACV shopping list, these requirements were presented to the Secretary of Defense on one of his periodic visits. This list included 500 PRC-10 radios which were issued in May to American advisors at corps, division, sector, subsector and battalion advisory teams.¹¹ This gave the American advisor his own communication means for the first time. Final coordination for the issue of this equipment was completed during the visit of Secretary of Defense McNamara in March, and meetings held during this visit brought about the issue of radios for lower levels such as battalion and subsector during the buildup of these teams from October through December.¹²

(C) Another step forward in tactical communications was in the ground-to-air system. Effective ground-to-air communication required compatible radio sets in aircraft and ground units. The installation of AN/ARC-44 radios in aircraft gave them the capability of communicating with the ground family of radios (the installation process commonly known as "retrofit"). The original "retrofit" program was completed in 1964. This gave all tactical aircraft in RVN, except for USAF C123's and VNAF C47's, the capability to communicate with ground units. The C123's and C47's were not originally included in the program because their roles for flare ship and resupply missions had not been fully appreciated. Thus it was necessary for these planes to carry the AN/PRC-10 ground radio on these type missions. This arrangement was not satisfactory due to the short range of the radio and the incapability of connecting it into the aircraft intercom system. To overcome this deficiency and improve operations the ARC-44 was requested for these aircraft, and will be installed.^{13,14} All aircraft presently being deployed to Vietnam are fitted with an air-to-ground radio capability.


(U) Simultaneously it was recognized that a modern air request system was needed in RVNAF. A tactical air communications plan was designed to provide RVNAF with a modern air request system. Joint US-Vietnamese teams traveled about the country in the spring and summer briefing all personnel down to sector level on the system. However, in October and November a MACV survey team discovered that the system had not been generally accepted by RVNAF and was not being fully used. This fact was presented to COMUSMACV in mid-November. Subsequently, briefings for VNAF and the High Command resulted in RVNAF publishing a directive with detailed implementing instructions for full use of the system.

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(S) Another improvement in RVNAP tactical communications was made by issue of the M209 coding device which enhanced communication security down to battalion level. At first they had used insecure French keylists. These were destroyed and American keylists provided. For this same purpose, an operations code was developed in the Vietnamese language replacing another insecure system known as "Slidex."¹⁵

SUMMARY

(C) In essence 1964 was a year of great expansion and reorganization of the communications effort in Vietnam. The months of April and May were the turning points. As a result of complete reevaluation of the situation the national policy shifted from pullout to buildup. This threw a tremendous burden on the existing communication systems and required new systems to be planned. Immediate steps were taken to upgrade and install new system. Doubling and tripling of facilities and traffic were the order of the day. With the advent of a major US expansion great amounts of equipment had to be introduced into the country and use of that already in Vietnam had to become more efficient. Many projects begun in 1964 will be completed in 1965 and later.

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
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FOOTNOTES

1. Memo, CESC to Chairman, Mission Coordinating Committee, 16 Jul 64, File 5050.50 (U). MACJ6.
2. Interview, Lt Col G. D. Dean, 7 Apr 65. MACV Hist Br File (S).
3. Msg, 13th AF to 1st Mobile Comm Group, Clark AFB, Cite 13-A-4 12989, DTG 060056Z Aug 64. File 3721.2 (S). MACJ6.
4. Ltr, Hq DA OTAG to CINCUSARPAC, 7 Apr 64, subj: Project USARPAC-Vietnam-SIG004-64-DEV, House Cable System, Vietnam. File 2300.6. MACJ6.
5. Msg, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, DTG 100035Z Jun 64. File 2300.5 (U). MACJ6.
6. Msg, DA to CINCUSARPAC, DTG 192114Z Jun 64. File 2000.40 (C). MACJ6.
7. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, DTG 032331Z Sep 64. File 2000.40 (C). MACJ6.
8. Msg, PACGEEIARGN to CINCPAC, Cite 2 PMRM 6-0422, DTG 050615Z Jun 62. File 82/62 (S). MACJ6.
9. Msg, Hq USA SCC-PAC to COMUSMACV, DTG 110200Z Nov 64. File 2000.4 (S). MACJ6.
10. Report 2339/160, MACJ6 to JCS, 13 Nov 64, subj: Integrated US Southeast Asia Wideband Communications (U). File 2000.6.0 (S). MACJ6.
11. Telecon, CINCPAC to USMACV, Cite CPTT-7-64, DTG 150100Z May 64. File 2000.42 (S).
12. Msg, MACV to JCS, Cite MACJ32 6338, DTG 191551Z Jul 64. File 7100/64 (S). MACJ6.
13. Msg, CINCPACAF to COMUSMACV, Cite PFOBC 51838, DTG 040413Z Nov 64. File 2060.2 (C). MACJ6.
14. Msg, CINCPACAF to COMUSMACV, Cite DORQ 01417, DTG 020200Z Dec 64. File 2060.2 (C). MACJ6.
15. Memo, CINCVNAF to VNAC, Sr 1106/TTL/6/MH/41/K, 13 Nov 64, subj: Replacement of the Slidex Coding Method (U). File 2220.7 (K). MACJ6.

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COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS - NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN TOLL




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MAP I
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BVN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



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
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WETWASH, BACKPORCH, AND CROSSBOW




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
MAAG ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

(as of 1 January 1964)




US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

(as of 1 Jan 64)



US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 (as of 31 Dec 64)



KEY PERSONNEL LISTING - 1964

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>DATE OF INCUMBENCY</u>
LT GEN W. C. WESTMORELAND	Dep Cmdr, MACV	27 Jan 64
GEN W. C. WESTMORELAND	Cmdr, MACV	20 Jun 64
Vice GEN P. D. HARKINS		
Lt GEN J. L. THROCKMORTON	Dep Cmdr, MACV	2 Aug 64
MAJ GEN R. G. STILWELL	CofS	9 May 64
Vice MAJ GEN R. G. WEEDE, USMC		
BRIG GEN B. STERNBERG	ACofS, J1	20 Jan 64
Vice CAPT J. A. TREDT, USN		
BRIG GEN C. A. YOUNGDALE, USMC	ACofS, J2	25 Jan 64
Vice COL W. O. FARRIOR, USAF		
BRIG GEN W. E. DEPUY	ACofS, J3	9 May 64
Vice BRIG GEN R. G. STILWELL		
BRIG GEN F. A. OSMANSKI	ACofS, J4	30 Mar 62
MAJ GEN M. B. ADAMS	ACofS, J5	7 Dec 62
COL R. E. KIMBALL	ACofS, J6	11 Jun 64
Vice COL P. S. POMEROY		

(U) APPENDIX 4

CHRONOLOGY 1964

JANUARY

- 2 Council of Notables convenes to draft new constitution.
- 3 Buddhist convention promulgates charter of Unified Vietnamese Buddhist Church.
- 4 Cambodian forces attack RVN unit in An Gian Sector.
- 6 Maj Gen Don becomes Commander-in-Chief of RVN Armed Forces.
- 14 General Westmoreland named deputy to General Harkins.
- 17 RVN dissolves the special Saigon command, puts capital under III Corps.
- 18 Largest helilift of war: 115 helicopters carry 1100 troops into Zone D. VC avoid contact.
- 21 US Naval team fights cholera epidemic in Saigon.
- 30 General Khanh replaces General Minh in a bloodless coup.

FEBRUARY

- 3 Kontum city MAAG compound attacked with grenades, 1 US wounded, 1 building burned.
- 7 Playboy bar bombed, five US killed.
- 9 Pershing Field bleachers bombed, two US killed, 25 wounded.
- 10 General Khanh names himself as Premier; General Minh as Chief of State.
- 11 Capitol Kinh Do Theater bombed, 3 US killed, 50 wounded.
- 25 Asst Sec State for Far Eastern Affairs Hilsman resigns under fire.
- 27 Supposedly trapped, VC battalion fights through 2500-man ARVN ring, Dinh Tuong Sector.

MARCH

- 3 RVN airborne troops kill 110 VC out of estimated enemy battalion near Cambodian border, Kien Phong Sector.
- 6 Gen Khanh replaces three of four corps commanders and five of nine division commanders.
- 8 Secy of Def McNamara visits Vietnam.
- 14 300 VC captured in operation in Kien Phong Sector.
- 20 RVN forces mistakenly hit Cambodian town of Chantreau.
- 23 Opn Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Kien Phong Sector, finds VC battalion in fortified village, kills 126.

APRIL

- 7 Gen Khanh makes Saigon a special zone and splits III Corps.
- 13 District Capital Kien Long (near U Minh Fores) overrun: about 300 ARVN KIA, 200 civilian casualties.

APRIL (CONTD)

- 25 President announced Gen Westmoreland to replace Gen Harkins;
ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag kills 84 VC.

MAY

- 2 USNS Card, aircraft ferry, damaged by VC shaped charge in Saigon River.
3 VC bombing at USNS Card dock injures 8 US.
7 Cambodians charge GVN armored troop attacked village of Taey
two miles inside border. RVN claims Cambodians interfere with
hot pursuit of VC.
10 Terrorist plot to explode bridge along Secy Def's route
discovered and foiled.
12 Secy of Def visits Vietnam. Two Cambodian jets strafe RVN units
in Tay Ninh Province.

JUNE

- 5 RVN bombs and burns a 20-mile strip on Vai Co Orient River along
Cambodian border
20 Gen Harkins departs MACV.
21 UN Mission departs from NY to investigate VN-Cambodian border
incidents,
23 Amb Lodge resigns; Gen Taylor named to replace him.
24 Opn Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong-Kien Phong Sector .
border kills 99 VC.
25 Successful attack on VC training camp in Quang Ngai kills 50 VC.
28 Amb Lodge departs Saigon.
29 New Zealand Army Engineers Det arrives.

JULY

- 1 Mr Wm Sullivan named minister-counselor of Embassy. Senate
confirms Taylor-Johnson appointments.
3 Mr Killen appointed to direct USOM.
4 Special Forces camp at Poley Krong overrun, 50 friendly killed.
DRV charges that RVN guerrillas attacked in Laos on 27 June
and the DRV coast on 30 June.
6 Nam Dong SF camp hit, 58 friendly (2 US, 1 Australian) killed.
15 Secy McNamara informs press conference that no PAVN units are _____ 7
operating in RVN.
19 Gen Khanh leads a mass meeting and shouts "Bac Tien!" ("To the
North!")
20 9th Regt, PAVN 304th Div, cut up in battalion encounters with _____ 7
ARVN in Thua Thien, Quang Nam and Quang Tri Sectors.
22 National VN Student Association demands nationalization of French
property, severance of diplomatic ties. Gen Ky confirms
guerilla raids on DRV to press

JULY (CONTD)

- 23 Gen Taylor meets Gen Khanh, disagrees over Khanh's call to go North.
- 27 Pentagon announces several thousand additional advisors will go to VN.

AUGUST

- 2 USS Maddox on patrol in Gulf of Tonkin attacked by 3 DRV PT boats.
- 5 US carrier planes hit PT pens and Vinh oil tanks in DRV.
- 16 Gen Khanh removes the Chief of State, Gen Minh, and assumes the RVN presidency.
- 19 VC inter-province headquarters in Mekong Valley bombed. VC begin effective 20mm AA fire.
- 21 VC ambush in previously cleared area of Mekong Delta disturbs US.
- 25 Gen Khanh resigns presidency.
- 26 Rioters attack US-supported hospital in Da Nang when guard shoots over heads.
- 27 Gens Khanh, Minh, Khiem, agree to lead nation as triumvirate.
- 28 RVN proposed to UN Security Council that UN Commission be established to investigate border incidents.
- 29 Military triumvirate appoints Dr Oanh to head government. Gen Khanh "ill" in Dalat. Buddhist leaders announce they will pressure for all-civilian government.

SEPTEMBER

- 2 Under Buddhist pressure, government releases 509 rioters arrested week before.
- 3 Khanh replaces triumvirate with 15-member committee, to elect a temporary Chief of State and Prime Minister.
- 4 Taylor goes to Washington. Khiem resigns as Def Minister. Khanh announces army people will resign their posts in caretaker government.
- 5 4 Cambodian jets cross border and fire on RVN aircraft and miss.
- 6 1 Cambodian aircraft fires on Chu Muong outpost. 150,000 Buddhists parade in Saigon at funeral for victims of Buddhist-Catholic rioting.
- 8 Government reorganized: Khanh retains Premiership; Minh becomes Chairman.
- 9 Khanh abolishes internal press censorship.
- 12 State Dept announces no plans for international negotiations on VN.
- 13 Abortive coup begins.
- 14 Abortive coup ends.

SEPTEMBER (CONTD)

- 15 Khanh arrests 5 coup leaders. Opn Tu Luong 134 near Quang Ngai City results in 80 VC killed.
- 18 2d Tonkin Gulf incident: DRV PT boats attack destroyers Edwards and Morton.
- 20 Centering in Bon Sai Pa SF Camp, Quang Duc Sector, Montagnard soldiers begin rebellion against RVN authority. Opn Lam Son 129, Quang Tri Sector, results in 77 VC killed.
- 21 Labor strike cripples Saigon public services.
- 22 Korean non-combatant military assistance group arrives.
- 24 Strike ends with compromises between labor leaders and Khanh Government.

OCTOBER

- 1 Bac Lien and Chou Doc sectors reinstated from subsectors of two neighboring sectors.
- 2 Khanh announces he will accept a draft call to head government; threatens force to crush further labor protests.
- 3 An Xuyen Operation Dan Chi 73, 150 VC killed.
- 4 Riot police disperse workers in Saigon. VC kill 1 US, 40 VN 18 miles from Saigon.
- 7 RVN complains to ICC about DRV infiltration.
- 9 Brig Gen Vien becomes III Corps commander.
- 11 3 VC battalions, RVN forces, engaged near Go Dau Ha; heavy losses.
- 14 Gen Khiem named Amb: to US.
- 15 Sep 13 coup leaders go on trial.
- 17 Dan Chi 80: RVN troops kill 123 VC in 2 day operation on Ba Xuyen-Bac Lien border.
- 18 DRV charges US-RVN aircraft bombed DRV village Oct 16 & 17.
- 20 RVN gets new constitution.
- 21 Khanh's government makes way for new civilian government.
- 23 Coup leaders acquitted.
- 24 Coup leaders re-arrested. Suu elected RVN President; Huong Prime Minister.

NOVEMBER

- 1 VC shell Bien Hoa Airbase with 81mm mortars, kill 4 US and 2 VN soldiers.
- 4 Typhoon Iris hits Central Vietnam causing widespread disruption of communications, and destruction of crops.
- 17 USOM allocates flood relief supplies; Marine helicopters begin shuttling supplies from the USS Princeton.
- 21 Opn Thang Long 27, Dinh Tuong Sector, wrests Ba Dua from VC control, kills 136 VC.

NOVEMBER (CONTD)

- 22 Opr Phong Hoai, Tay Ninh Sector, concludes with destruction of a VC base area and arms factory, 157 VC killed.

DECEMBER

- 5 Gen Ky gives ultimatum to Gen Khanh - support Prime Minister Huong or else; VNAF 100% alert.
- 6 Opa Dan Chi 92, IV Corps, 138 VC killed.
- 7 VC overrun bn cmd post on hill 193, threatens An Lao Subsector hqs, stay in area to fight. Two companies of ARVN missing.
- 9 RVN forces retake hill 193, and secure An Lao Subsector hqs.
- 9 VC attack 3d Regt hqs and arty position in Quang Tin Sector: RVN reaction forces kill 162 VC.
- 20 Bloodless coup; High National Council dissolved.
- 25 Brink BOQ bombed; 2 (US) killed, 108 (US and VN) wounded.
- 28 RVN reaction force runs 1-to 2-4 hard core VC bns in Ba Xuyen Sector, kill 87 VC, make largest capture of enemy weapons to date, including two 75mm recoilless rifles and four 50 cal. anti-aircraft machine guns.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Abbreviations

Definition

AAE	Army Aviation Element
AAOS	Army Aviation Operations Section
ACM	Army Commendation Medal
ACSFGR	Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ACTIV	Army Concept Team in Vietnam
AD(2)	2d Air Division
AFCM	Air Force Commendation Medal
AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AID	Agency for International Development
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
AM	Air Medal
AMEMB	American Embassy
AOC	Air Operations Center
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASOC	Air Support Operations Center

B

BSM	Bronze Star Medal
-----	-------------------

C

CAC	Counterintelligence Advisory Committee
CA	Civil Affairs; Civic Action
CAS	Combined Area Studies
CCRSFF	Central Region SEATO Field Force
CGFMFPAC	Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHINAT	Chinese Nationalist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CIIC	Current Intelligence and Indications Center
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCVAF	Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Armed Forces
CINCVNAF	Commander in Chief, Vietnamese Air Force
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific
CMD	Capital Military District
COC	Combined Operations Center
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander US Military Assistance Command, Thailand

(U) APPENDIX 6

COMUSMACV	Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSSEASIA	Commander, US Southeast Asia
CTG	Commander, Task Group
CTU	Commander, Task Unit
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
Chieu Hoi	"Open Arms" Program

D

DAML	Directorate of Army MAP Logistics
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DEPCOMUSMACTHAI	Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Thailand
DEPCOMUSMACV	Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
DEPTEL	Department (State) Telegram
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
D&L (DL)	Doctrine and Literature
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOICOC	Deputy Officer in Charge, Construction
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam

E

ESTEL	Embassy Telegram
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F

FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAR	Royal Australian Forces
FMP	Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

G

GRVN	Government of the Republic of Vietnam
GVN	Government of Vietnam

H

HEDSUPFACT	Headquarters Support Activity
HO COMDT	Headquarters Commandant
HSAS	Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon
Hop Tac	"Many Working Together"

I

IFR Intermediate Frequency Radar
IMAO International Military Assistance Office

J

JGS Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
JOC Joint Operations Center
JRATA Joint Research and Test Activity
JSCM Joint Service Commendation Medal
JTD Joint Table of Distribution
JUSMAG Joint US Military Advisory Group

L

LST Landing Ship, Tank

M

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP Military Assistance Program
MCB Mobile Construction Battalion
MILCAP Military Civic Action Program
MILREP Military Report
MTT Mobile Training Team

N

NAVGP United States Naval Advisory Group
NEUT Neutralist Laotian Forces

O

OP&A Operations Plans and Analysis
O&T(OT) Organization and Training Directorate

P

PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PACOM Pacific Command
PAVN Peoples' Army of Vietnam
PF Popular Force
PH Purple Heart
PL Pathet Lao

POI Program of Instruction
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare

R

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAC Research Analysis Corporation
RAND Research and Development Corporation
RDFU Research and Development Field Unit
RF Regional Force
RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force
RUWSTAF Rural Water Supply Task Force
RVN Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
Rallier Chieu Hoi Returnee

S

SA Senior Advisor
SAME Senior Advisor's Monthly Evaluation
SAPOV Subarea Petroleum Office, Vietnam
SM Service Medal
SOIC Sector Operations & Intelligence Center
SOG Studies and Observation Group
STARCOM Strategic Army Communications System
STRATCOM US Army Strategic Communications Command
SVN South Vietnam

T

TOC Tactical Operations Center

U

USABVAPAC US Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity,
Pacific
USARYIS US Army Ryukyu Islands
USARPAC US Army, Pacific
USASCC US Army Strategic Communications Command
USASCV US Army Support Command, Vietnam
USASFG US Army Special Forces Group
USASFV(P) US Army Special Forces, Vietnam (Provisional)
USASF US Army Special Forces
USIS United States Information Service
USOM United States Overseas Mission
UTT Utility Tactical Transport

UNCLASSIFIED

V

VC	Viet Cong
VM	Viet Minh
VN	Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
(\$)VN	Piastre (Dong)
VNN	Vietnamese Navy


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WESTPAC	Western Pacific Command
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
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

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ANNEX A - SPECIAL OPERATIONS
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