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Chapter I - Introduction (Page 1-12),
Chapter II - The Enemy (Pages 13-120),
Chapter III - Friendly Forces (Pages 121-306),
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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM



COMMAND HISTORY
VOLUME I
1967

Prepared by the Military History Branch
Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff
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1968

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PREFACE

The MACV Command History for 1967 was prepared pursuant to CINCPAC Instruction 5000.5A. It is the fourth in a series of annual official MACV Command Histories begun in 1964. The objective of the history is to provide a comprehensive official record of the activities, operations, and status of the command as viewed at the level of the commander together with an account of the problems that have faced the commander and his decisions. While it is not intended to duplicate unnecessarily the official histories of the component commanders, those operational matters as well as administrative and logistic problems which required the attention of COMUSMACV in his capacity as the US operational commander and senior US military commander in the Republic of Vietnam have been included.

The purpose of this history is to serve as an authoritative source for future research and reference purposes.

The scope of the history is basically restricted to calendar year 1967; however, such summary accounts of earlier events as have been deemed appropriate to provide continuity and understanding have been included. Certain accounts of events of earlier years, which for various reasons were not incorporated in prior histories, have also been included.

Users of this history who encounter gaps in the coverage or insufficient coverage to meet their requirements are invited to forward recommendations to this headquarters (Attention: Military History Branch).

R. W. ARGO, Jr.
Colonel, GS, USA
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

(TS) Just as 1966 was marked as a year of developing strength, 1967 was characterized by accelerating efforts and growing success in all phases of MACV endeavors. Our purpose in Vietnam had not changed. We were there to assist the people, their government, and their armed forces to defeat Communist subversion and aggression and to attain an independent non-Communist society functioning in a secure environment. The accomplishment of this purpose involved three interdependent undertakings which together constituted an integrated concept for the conduct of military operations. They were:

1) To destroy the war-making and war-supporting capability of North Vietnam (NVN).

2) To seek out and destroy Communist forces and infrastructure.

3) To assist the Vietnamese in building a strong central government.

(TS) Our air and naval forces continued to strike selected military targets in NVN during the year. While this major effort was committed to carrying the war to the north, increased air and naval forces were employed to interdict ground and water infiltration routes into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Our success in this area combined with greatly accelerated ground operations prevented the enemy, for the first time, from infiltrating sufficient numbers to replace his battle losses.

(TS) Our strategy in-country was one of a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of Revolutionary Development (RD). Just as our purpose in Vietnam had not changed neither had our strategy. However, the achievement of a sound logistics base combined with an increased force structure had permitted our assumption of a fully offensive posture. Our strategy, within the framework of

of numerous politically based restrictions, had proven sound and would be continued.

(S) The enemy's goal was the people. To this end he attempted to retain and extend his control over the fertile, heavily populated coastal regions. Militarily he had hoped and had desperately tried to achieve a victory in the field. His plans encompassed the destruction of RD programs through selective terror and propaganda, the use of attacks by fire and limited ground attacks, the isolation of cities by interdicting our lines of communication (LOC), and inflicting casualties at times and places of his choosing in battles which would be of psychological importance.

(S) During the year total enemy strength decreased from 278,000 to 220,000. However, the North Vietnam Army (NVA) strength of 52,000 at the end of the year represented a significant increase. Although not sufficient to replace his losses, the NVA managed to infiltrate an average of about 6,000 troops a month into South Vietnam (SVN). Increasingly, voids in the ranks of the Viet Cong (VC) were being filled by regular NVA personnel.

(S) The VC/NVA lost 106,158 men during 1967. 17,998 surrendered as military Hoi Chanhs and 88,160 were killed in battle. The figure for those killed was based on body count and considered to be conservative.

(S) US forces had increased from 385,000 to 486,000 during the year. Third Nation forces had increased from 52,600 to 59,400. GVN armed forces including the National Police had increased from 735,000 to 754,800. With a combined friendly strength of 1,300,800 we achieved a favorable strength ratio of 5.9:1 as compared to the 1966 strength ratio of 4.2:1.

(C) As enemy pressure continued to increase in the northern provinces a division size Task Force (TF) was organized from in-country assets and sent to reinforce southern I CTZ in April. On 22 September the TF was redesignated the Americal Division. Also, the 101st Abn Div with its remaining two bdes arrived in-country in December. The arrival of this Div raised the number of US maneuver battalions in-country to 98 as opposed to the 75 available at the beginning of the year.

(S) A much maligned Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) continued to improve and to assume greater responsibility. As evidence of this improved posture the 199th Lt Inf Bde was relieved of their area of operation (AO) in Gia Dinh Province in December by a three battalion Vietnamese Army unit. Also other ARVN units relieved USMC units in defensive positions along the DMZ.

(S) The dramatic and successful ground operations of 1966 were continued at an accelerated rate throughout 1967. In I CTZ enemy pressure, in terms of numbers and the use of artillery continued to increase throughout the zone but particularly in the area adjacent to the DMZ. The commitment of the US Army TF permitted the concentration of US Marine forces in the three northernmost provinces of I CTZ.

(S) During September the heaviest shellings of the war combined with ground attacks were directed by the enemy in the Con Thien area. However, the enemy's hope of a military victory was defeated by a combination of ground action and the greatest concentration of firepower in support of a single division position in the history of warfare.

(S) Our forces within II CTZ were assigned an economy of force role which permitted increased offensive operations in other areas. The enemy's major effort in II CTZ was made in November at Dak To in the central highlands. A combination of US Army and ARVN units decisively defeated four NVA Regts during this action. The remaining enemy withdrew to the safety of their Cambodian and Laotian bases. Following Dak To enemy activity remained at a low level for the remainder of the year.

(S) In III CTZ the major enemy bases in War Zone (WZ) C and the Iron Triangle were entered in force early in the year. Subsequent operations combined with Rome Plow clearing operations in these major supply and command bases effectively denied their use to the enemy. The enemy's major efforts to achieve a military victory in this Corps occurred in late October at Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province. Again a combined US Army and ARVN force administered a decisive defeat forcing the withdrawal of the enemy.

(S) IV CTZ activity was highlighted by the introduction of US ground and naval forces in the form of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). This mobile force extended the battlefield into previously inaccessible areas of the Delta.

(S) During 1967 we drove the enemy from many of the population centers. His old established base areas, with sparse exception, were no longer safe havens. Increasingly he was forced to rely on his border sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. The year ended with the enemy increasingly resorting to desperation tactics in a vain attempt to achieve a military victory.

(S) The US air effort in 1967 continued to be carried by 7AF, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 3rd Air Division and the air arm of the US Army. The air assets of Attack Carrier Striking Force (TF77) were oriented to out-of-country operations and contributed to a lesser degree in RVN, usually as the results of diverts from their primary targets. The goal of air operations for 1967 was the support of expanded Free World (FW) offensive military operations. While infiltration could not be entirely halted, it was made less effective and more costly by the application of air power. Counterinfiltration programs were aimed at destroying the enemy's military and logistic bases and inhibiting his effective use of Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries. Also constant harassment actions prevented him from massing his forces for a sustained attack. In-country, close air support and interdiction sorties by strike pilots, reconnaissance sorties, FAC sorties, and other fixed-wing and helicopter strikes played their part in support of intensified ground operations.

(S) The USAF Advisory Group continued its role of assisting, training and advising the VNAF in attaining its 1967 stabilization, modernization and professionalization goals. In the implementary program, the VNAF received a squadron of F-5 aircraft in April, for which 7AF provided USAF maintenance support airmen on a temporary duty basis. As VNAF capabilities increased, this support diminished proportionately. During the year the VNAF flew in excess of 35,000 strike sorties, 15,000 visual reconnaissance (VR) missions and airlifted 145,000 passengers and more than 2,000 tons of cargo.

(S) The First MAW, Aviation Component of III MAF, made major contributions in support of ground operations. One heavy and seven medium transportation helicopter squadrons, and three observation

squadrons support both Marine Divisions. Two additional squadrons provide helicopter support to two Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) operating with SEVENTHFLT amphibious forces in support of operations in RVN. Deployment of observation squadrons, transition of newer helicopters and introduction of the CH-53 increased helicopter support capability and improved mobility of combat battalions.

(S) Toward the end of April it became apparent that the buildup of tactical air resources had definite limitations, due to available basing. Yet the increased requirements for air, generated by increased numbers of ground operations and the ever-increasing necessity to supplement the interdiction of infiltration into RVN, demanded an increase in available sorties from some source. Augmented by COMUSMACV's report to JCS, on ARC LIGHT strike results, a 7AF analysis of B-52 employment led to a recommendation of a 20 percent increase in the use of these aircraft. The versatility of the B-52, which was used in close air support, interdiction missions and saturation bombing of base areas made increased utilization highly desirable.

(U) The Navy's essential contribution to our effort in Vietnam continued to grow in 1967 as it had in 1966. Operations MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN continued to deny the enemy infiltration routes he had long employed with impunity. Naval gunfire support ships proved a critical element in the many battles that were waged just south of the DMZ in northern I CTZ.

(U) A major change in our offensive effort was the introduction of US combat troops into the IV CTZ in the early part of the year. The creation of the MRF in June consisting of the US Navy's CTF 117 and the 2d Brigade of the 9th US Infantry Division greatly increased their mobility. Planned since 1965, elements of the MRF arrived in January 1967. The Navy "hardware" consisted of barracks ships for the Army troops, support LSTs and dozens of specially configured landing craft such as armored troop carriers (ATC) and command boats (CCB). The Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB), a mine sweeping gunboat was built from the keel up based on the MRF's requirement. The MRF often teamed up with GAME WARDEN forces to form a combined team for reconnaissance, blocking and pursuit in AO's.

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(U) In the support area Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang's vital intra-coastal trans-shipment route from the deep water port at Da Nang northward to several shallow draft off-load points in the northern I CTZ continued. With the great increase of our forces in that area this hazardous route became our jugular vein. With no respite, despite heartless monsoon storms and heightened enemy attempts to stop our LSTs and small craft, POL, ammo, rations, etc. were ferried up the coast without fail.

(U) In April 1967 the Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF) was doubled in size by the addition of a second group and force. For the remainder of the year two USMC Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) were employed in continuous strikes from the sea into enemy areas in the I CTZ conducting some 16 landings in support of offensive operations ashore, primarily in the coastal area from Hue to the DMZ.

(C) 1967 was a year of change and progress for the "other war." Both the Republic of Vietnam and US looked back upon previous programs to "win the hearts and minds of the people" and examined the successes and failures. The lessons learned were applied to the efforts of 1967 in an effort to develop meaningful, realistic goals and programs. Aggressive military operations expanded relative security into the countryside and permitted Revolutionary Development (RD) to progress with renewed hope of success. Concepts, roles, and missions of the myriad of resources, both civilian and military, were clarified and defined. With the advice and assistance of the entire US community, the GVN, unprecedentedly stable at this juncture, pushed its influence toward the rural dweller and demonstrated heartening signs that it had a grasp of its responsibilities.

(C) GVN stability attained its pinnacle as a result of the nationwide elections held in September and October of the year. After a hiatus of nearly four years, a popularly elected government had installed and directed itself toward the all-important task of leading its war-torn nation. Appointed ministers began to show an awareness that for RD to be successful, close, continuous inter-ministerial coordination had to be established. The newly formed Ministry of RD, under the energetic guidance of MG Nguyen Duc Thang, reviewed

the entire process of RD and set to the task of revitalizing the program. ARVN commanders at all echelons became increasingly aware of their responsibilities toward the peasantry, and, as a result, there were encouraging signs of mutual respect between the two. All the problems inherent in the traditionally patriarchal attitude of the Vietnamese government were by no means completely solved, but progress was real and gave encouragement for the future.

(U) During 1967 the USG made significant changes in its advisory structure. The Office of Civil Operations, formed during the closing months of 1966, brought the purely civilian advisory and assistance facets of the USG under a single manager. This was a step in the right direction and manifestly improved coordination and cooperation between the civilian and military efforts. However, there remained one further step to be taken--put the entire effort, both civilian and military, under a single manager below ambassadorial level. In May 1967 this was done, and COMUSMACV was designated the overall manager. Programs from the several US agencies, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Office of the Special Assistant (OSA), and Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) were examined and reconciled. Under the aegis of the newly appointed DEPCOMUS-MACV for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), Ambassador Robert W. Komer, a unified program, Project TAKEOFF, was developed. Within its parameters, pacification resources were targeted into priority objectives.

(S) During 1967, MACV psychological operations (PSYOP) were marked by changes in organization and intensification of effort. In addition, plans were made for changing the major emphasis of the PSYOP effort from one of support of US-sponsored programs to support of the RVNAF effort, to increase and retain the support of the people for the GVN, and support for the Revolutionary Development program.

(S) Until late May the Psychological Operations Division of the Office of Civil Operations carried out the US Mission's responsibility for PSYOP. Representatives were assigned to regions and provinces for the purpose of coordinating PSYOP, and served principally as advisors to corps commanders and province chiefs. At this level they advised on US policy, and also provided direction, technical


guidance, and support to all US PSYOP efforts to insure that these operations were in harmony and mutually supporting. The Psychological Operations Division of MACV supported military operations only. On 28 May the Office of Civil Operations was combined with the MACV Directorate of Revolutionary Development Support and was redesignated the MACV Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS). Although this did not immediately produce a change in the PSYOP effort, it did result in two offices within MACV dealing with PSYOP problems. This inconsistency was a matter of study throughout most of the remainder of the year, and was finally resolved on 23 October when Ambassador Bunker approved a plan that provided for the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) to furnish policy guidance and coordination, and MACV, through the Psychological Operations Directorate, concentrated on tactical psychological warfare.

(S) Leaflet campaigns in 1967 were conducted over North and South Vietnam and along all infiltration routes into South Vietnam. Although the effectiveness of such programs were difficult to measure, prisoner of war interrogation, and particularly enemy reaction to the campaigns indicated a high degree of success. PSYOP programs were not, however, leveled just at the enemy. It was just as important, perhaps more so, that every effort be made to elicit the support of the people in South Vietnam for the actions of the GVN and the FWMAF. To this end military-sponsored civic action programs were undertaken. The Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP) involved the participation of US/FW/RVN forces in useful programs for economic and sociological development for local populations at all levels. The program included short-term but high impact projects in the field of education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, etc. In short, where the local populace needed help, and it was feasible for the military to provide such help, it was the policy of MACV to encourage it. A companion program to MILCAP was the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). The objective of this program was to improve the health environment of RVN civilians through the commitment of military medical resources to the extent permitted by operational requirements. MEDCAP was divided into two categories. MEDCAP I was care and treatment

of RVN civilians by RVNAF medical personnel, while MEDCAP II was care and treatment of RVN civilians by US and FW medical personnel. Perhaps, of all the programs initiated to win the hearts and minds of the people, none had a greater impact than those which directly assisted the sick and the poor.

(S) During 1967 we achieved a firm logistical base. As the supply system became fully responsive to all consumer demands we turned our attention to refining the system. The logistical support of US forces was organized essentially on an area basis: the Navy as supplier of common item supplies for units located in I CTZ; the Army to provide common item support for US forces located in II, III, and IV CTZs. The 1st Log Cmd, with headquarters in Saigon, was charged with the army's logistical responsibility, and exercised command over three major support commands in Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. The support commands and the Navy Support Activity (NSA) at Da Nang operated major depot complexes to provide wholesale organizational support level supplies, maintenance, and service in their assigned area. In addition, group level support had been established at key locations to provide retail or direct support level supplies, maintenance, and services in areas of major troop population. Support for items limited to units of a particular service was provided by the service involved.

(C) The ratio of combat support troops to combat troops was studied during the year. As a result, in October a schedule for the integration of civilians into the logistics structure was accomplished.



(C) Due largely to unneeded equipment and supplies brought into country by new units and the automatic resupply of items based on what had become obsolete criteria, we had accumulated large

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excess stocks in certain areas. COMUSMACV in November requested that a high level team of supply management experts be sent to Vietnam to make an on-the-spot appraisal of the problem. The applied results of this study would add greatly to the overall effectiveness of our logistical effort.

(U) By early 1967 a pattern had emerged in the extremely fluid military situation existing in South Vietnam. It was one of reacting to enemy attacks. Since it was axiomatic for the VC/NVA to attack only when they possessed clear cut advantages which, in their minds, assured victory, such engagements were tantamount to meeting and fixing the enemy and were insufficient and costly in terms of the personnel and material resources available to COMUSMACV. While the FWMAF and RVNAF possessed sufficient firepower to overcome the VC/NVA, acceptable progress could not be made in establishing security in South Vietnam as long as the enemy retained the initiative. Thus a considerable portion of the Research and Development (R&D) community's efforts were devoted to developing new approaches to locating the enemy, and denying him his inherent advantages, such as superior knowledge of terrain, cover of night and the element of surprise. Other programs dealt with refinements of weapons and equipment, or the development of new devices designed to cope with new problems or to handle old problems better. The entire effort was dedicated to the substitution of science and technology for manpower, permitting economy in the application of forces and wresting the initiative from the enemy.

(S) COMUSMACV thought the urgency of the sensor problem to be such the DDR&E efforts in Washington needed also to be enlisted. He stated the situation as:

> The effectiveness of our military forces in finding the enemy, bringing him to combat and delivering our ordnance could be greatly enhanced by a family of suitable sensors. The urgency of this need and the slowness with which sensors are being introduced in theater calls for strong measures for expediting their development and procurement.

(U) By the end of the year detection devices (sensors) had been integrated into FWMAF inventories. The devices made use of many techniques -- seismic, acoustic, magnetic, optic, etc., and the devices were configured for emplacement by air or by hand. Initially seismic disturbance detectors were found to be successful. Later, a mix of different type detectors was found to improve the validity of target detections and reduce false alarms. Development continued throughout the year addressed to detectors employing the principles of sound, temperature variations, and chemical analysis of air samples. The last technique provided for detection of human presence by virtue of sensing the effluents from human bodies.

(S) These detection devices when incorporated with weapons systems improved combat responsiveness. One such incorporation, Gun Ship II, involved a close coupling of detection devices with Mini Guns and Vulcan cannon in a more rugged airframe than the already proven AC-47. By the end of 1967, in-country evaluation of Gun Ship II indicated that it represented a threefold improvement over its predecessor - the AC-47.

(U) The Research and Development effort was not restricted to infiltration detection devices alone. Development projects ranged from improvement of ponchos to the generation of a 360 degree counter mortar/rocket radar. Success was achieved in many of the areas. There is a continuing effort to insure that the US fighting man is equipped with the best tools for him to do his job. At year end a close coupling between the US Research and Development community and the combat soldier had been achieved.

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CHAPTER II

THE ENEMY

THE ROLE OF NORTH VIETNAM

The Leadership of North Vietnam

(S) The key determinant of North Vietnamese policy continued to be Premier Ho Chi Minh. As both Communist and patriot, Ho Chi Minh's intense desire and lengthy drive to unify all of Vietnam under his leadership remained the driving force behind the North Vietnamese war in the south. Since his victory over the French in 1954, Premier Ho had been accepted by the major Communist countries as the one destined to complete the extension of Communism into South Vietnam and to achieve the goal of a "completely independent Vietnam." During the year Premier Ho continued to show his age. In September a US reporter visiting Hanoi observed that Ho remained out of Hanoi for long periods of time and that public events such as the 2 September NVN anniversary celebration were dominated by the energetic Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The US reporter had a lengthy interview with Prime Minister Dong, leaving Hanoi with the conviction that Dong may now be "running the show in NVN" despite the evidence that Pham Van Dong had less authority than Ho with the North Vietnamese people. Tougher and more rigid than Ho, Dong was described as a hard-liner who was pessimistic over an early end of the war and distrustful of secret negotiations with the US. [1]

(C) The instrument for the implementation of Ho Chi Minh's and Pham Van Dong's po continued to be the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party. This top political control center included Le Duan, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, and until his death in July, the VC Commander, Nguyen Chi Thanh. The membership of the Lao Dong Politburo had been stable since 1956. The death of Thanh and the continuing evidence that Ho Chi Minh was not in good health raised questions about possible changes in the composition of the Politburo as well as the supervision of the

war effort in RVN. General Thanh had been an ideological hard-liner, and those pro-Peking individuals who shared these inclinations presumably wanted to have another of Thanh's type accede to his position in the Politburo. It was possible, however, that a more neutral successor such as General Van Tien Dung might be named to the position. Increased factionalism and infighting might have resulted from this change, but there was very little evidence of internal difference within the close-knit Politburo and very little likelihood that Thanh's death would bring about any change in North Vietnamese policy.[2]

(S) As if to dispel rumors of Ho's failing health, Hanoi news media emphasized his robust appearance, and Ho boasted that he felt 20 years younger. His address to the Lao Dong Party Central Committee contained nothing new, but he alluded to the stalemate theme evident in many recent North Vietnamese military writings, by claiming that the army was keeping over one million enemy troops at bay in the south. A retinue of politburo members was with Ho on the speaker's platform, but Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap failed to appear. In his place was the only other military member of the Lao Dong Politburo--alternate member and Army Chief of Staff General Van Tien Dung. Giap's absence was unusual and at the time caused much conjecture.[3]

(S) There were continuing confirmations of the clear-cut authority and control that Hanoi and the Lao Dong Party exercised through the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and military channels to direct the war in the south. (See Figures II-1, II-2, and II-3.) Though originally created in December 1960, in cooperation with both Moscow and Peking, the control apparatus became questionable in South Vietnam in March 1962 but continued to fall more directly under the sole authority of Hanoi. In May a captured VC cadre member, who was also a party member, gave a comprehensive description of the command relationship between the Lao Dong Party and Communist political and military organizations in South Vietnam. This information confirmed other indications that Lao Dong Party control in the south was increasingly direct and strong. The cadreman confirmed that the Lao Dong Party was the only Communist party in Vietnam and that the PRP was formed as a tactic to advance the deception that there was an independent Communist party in the south. (The governing regulations of the

MILITARY PARTY SYSTEM




Figure II-1




ORGANIZATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
LAO DONG
REUNIFICATION DEPARTMENT
COSVN
MILITARY REGIONS
PROVINCES
DISTRICTS
VILLAGES
HAMLETS
PRESIDIUM
REGIONAL ZONES
PROVINCES
DISTRICTS
VILLAGES
HAMLETS
DIRECT RELATIONSHIP

Figure II-2



MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE

Figure II-3

PRP were drawn up by the Lao Dong Politburo and ratified by the National Party Congress in 1960). The annual end-of-the-year policy meeting of the North Vietnamese Central Committee was attended by representatives from COSVN, and resolutions affecting the south were reviewed by a PRP plenum before implementation. The Lao Dong Party retained primary control of all major fields of VC activity including military policy in the south, political aspects of the war, settlement of the war, and "diplomatic" relationships and appointments. The Lao Dong Party controlled COSVN by directives and on numerous occasions directly controlled Communist military operations in MR 5. Members of the Lao Dong Central Committee were in direct command of VC military forces, and in any dispute between northern and southern military leaders, COSVN could only defer to the Lao Dong Politburo. In describing the role of the PRP and COSVN, the captured VC cadreman stated the PRP had wide discretion in running the day-to-day operations. This was permitted because during recent years COSVN had been strengthened by an influx of executive and middle-ranking cadre and Lao Dong Central Committee members. COSVN reported daily to the Lao Dong Politburo on the situation and was allowed to make policy suggestions.[4]

(U) Captured documents also substantiated Hanoi's tight control of the war in South Vietnam. An important enemy document seized near Nha Trang in April contained a resolution of the 4th COSVN Congress which was held in South Vietnam in March 1966. The resolution openly admitted that its Central Committee was headed by Chairman Ho Chi Minh. The document spoke of the NLF as the southern branch of the party which was closely led by (Hanoi's) Central Party Committee.[5]

(C) Intelligence continued to reveal the strong political and military control exerted directly by Hanoi in the enemy's MR 5 which corresponds generally with the I and II CTZs. This control continued to be exercised through three ill-defined military headquarters. In addition to the Northern Front, which was identified as having control over operations in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and possibly adjacent areas in Laos, there was a DMZ Front headquarters composed of the NVA 324B, 341st, and 304th Divisions and the 360th NVA Div HQ. To the south, the B3 Front, also referred to as the Western Highlands Front, continued to function. The

existence of these three military headquarters pointed up the specific and definite interest that the NVA High Command placed in central Vietnam's "three main zones of operation."[6]

Relations with Moscow and Soviet Aid

(S) Despite the increasing depth and vehemence of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Hanoi regime continued to achieve the significant political victory of eliciting political, military, and economic support from both Moscow and Peking. Weapons, combat equipment, ammunition, and economic assistance continued to flow into NVN to back the war in RVN. Intelligence information on military and economic support of the NVN remained fragmentary, and quantitative estimates were difficult. Even the relative amount of support from the two prime suppliers, Moscow and Peking, was difficult to evaluate; however, it appeared that by early 1967 the military assistance in dollar value provided by the Soviets was about four times larger than that provided by Communist China. In the overall context of communist assistance to NVN, the Soviet Union was believed to be carrying about half the burden, with the remainder provided by Communist China and the East European countries. Assistance provided to the NVN by the countries of Eastern Europe tended to be more of an economic nature. A large volume of Soviet assistance, comprised mostly of economic goods, continued to be sent to NVN by sea while an enormous amount of Soviet combat material was sent to the NVN by rail through Communist China. The amount of Soviet military and economic assistance continued to rise. In estimated dollar value, Soviet military assistance rose from approximately $240 million in 1965 to approximately $670 million in 1966. Estimates of the value of general Soviet assistance to NVN in 1967 ran from $800 million to one billion dollars.[7]

(C) The Soviet-NVN military and economic agreement was signed by NVN's Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi and Soviet Vice Premier Novikov after a month of complex bargaining. With more than the usual propaganda fanfare, the signing of the new annual Soviet-NVN military and economic aid agreement was announced in a communique on 23 September. This agreement covered trade,

aid, and credit arrangements for assistance to be provided in 1968. Although figures for the total amount of aid to be provided were not announced, Hanoi's laudatory commentary reinforced speculation that the new agreement would provide for a considerable increase over the estimated one billion dollar level of 1967. The tone and content of the joint communique were consistent with Soviet pronouncements in 1967 which emphasized Moscow's determination to continue comprehensive support of NVN in the face of increased US activity in the Vietnam war. An even stronger psychological effort evidently was sought by Moscow's communique in that, for the first time listings were made of the general categories of military and economic aid to be rendered by both grants and credits. The communique stated that in 1968 the Soviets would provide aircraft, antiaircraft and rocket equipment, artillery, small arms, ammunition, and other military equipment as well as complete installations, vehicles, oil products, ferrous and nonferrous metals, foodstuffs, chemical fertilizers, medicines, and materials necessary to increase further the defensive capability and economic development of NVN. Hanoi's press subsequently hailed the agreement effusively as "valuable, great, sincere, and efficacious" support to Hanoi and the VC by the USSR. A speech made by Soviet Premier Kosygin included some hard statements aimed at the US; however, these remarks were considerably less militant than those which emanated from Hanoi. Two divergent aspects emerged: Hanoi's truculent opposition to peaceful negotiations; and a telegrammed statement of top NVN leaders that the struggle against the US was aimed at defense of the north, liberation of the south, and peaceful unification. None of these themes were stressed by the Soviets.[8]

(S) The results of the new Soviet support agreement with NVN were reflected in Soviet arms shipments which began in the latter part of the year. It was anticipated that these shipments would include increased quantities of weapons already in use by VC/NVA forces in RVN plus new weapons. It was probable that the new arrangements provided for upgrading the effectiveness of the NVN air defense capability. Additional SAM-2 missiles would probably be introduced, but there was no confirmation that the SAM-3 missile would be introduced into NVN. The improved SAM would provide the low-altitude capability which the SAM-2 system lacked. Intelligence considered it probable that additional ZFU series AA machine guns and S-60 57mm AA guns would be provided. It was possible that the Soviets might introduce the ZU-23 twin automatic

and the ZSU-24 self-propelled quad-AA guns. These weapons were standard with the Soviet Field Forces and had a high rate of fire which would bridge the gap between the 14.5mm and the 37/57mm weapons employed by the NVA. The new agreement might provide some additional MIG-19 and MIG-21 aircraft, but probably not in large quantities due to the vulnerability of NVN bases and Soviet reluctance to stage large numbers of additional aircraft at Communist Chinese bases. Soviet intentions in the important matter of upgrading the VC/NVA small arms inventory were difficult to estimate. Some Soviet assistance in small arms was expected, particularly in those items where the Communist Chinese production capacity was inadequate. During the year the Soviets provided only about 15 percent of small arms and crew-served weapons to the VC/NVA forces in RVN while the bulk of these weapons continued to come from Communist China. It was considered that additional quantities of the new family of small arms would be provided in order to upgrade VC Main Force and Local Force units which were still using a significant number of bolt action rifles and older machine guns. In 1967, the Soviet RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher was introduced. It was probable that the new aid agreement would provide the VC/NVA with substantial quantities of this weapon to replace the older RPG-2 antitank grenade launcher. It was estimated that the Soviets in 1968 would provide increased quantities of 122mm and 140mm rockets for wider deployment throughout RVN. Additional input would permit the employment of these type rockets by VC Main Force units and NVA regiments in RVN.[9]

Relations with Peking and CHICOM Aid

(U) The Chinese Communists continued to view the war in RVN as a model for "wars of liberation." However, subtle changes in Chinese influence in Hanoi, internal political dissension in China, and the sharpened Chinese dispute with the Soviet Union increasingly clouded the simplistic concept of Peking's control over Hanoi and the war. Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists continued with their basic strategy of encouraging the GNVN and providing material support as well as some troop units. Although the possibility of larger CHICOM troop involvement continued, the fundamental North Vietnamese fear of CHICOM domination continued to militate against large deployments into North Vietnam. This GNVN concern about Chinese over-involvement was evident in unconfirmed reports from Hanoi that the GNVN had moved additional troops into defensive positions along the Chinese border to guard against any influx of Chinese refugees generated by political upheavals in China.

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(U) Political propaganda emanating from Hanoi during the year reflected new restraints and coolness toward Peking as compared to previous years. The 1 July anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party elicited a marked reduction in celebratory comments from Hanoi. This cooler attitude toward Peking was also evident during the 31 July celebration of the anniversary of the CHICOM People's Liberation Army. Hanoi made the usual propaganda gestures in keeping with the traditional North Vietnam's balancing technique, but there was noticeably less warmth and enthusiasm this year. In the matter of badly needed assistance in the training of students and technicians, there were also indications of weaker ties between Hanoi and Peking. When the Chinese Communists had withdrawn students from Eastern European countries in 1965, the North Vietnamese Government had done the same. In 1967, however, Hanoi reversed this tendency by sending several thousand students to Communist countries in Eastern Europe in July. The number of North Vietnamese students returning to East Europe reportedly surpassed the previous training program, with Czechoslovakia alone undertaking to train 2,000 students during the next two years.[10]

(S) Despite these changes, which were indicative of relatively minor frictions and differences between Hanoi and Peking, the basic policy and substance of Chinese Communist support of North Vietnam continued. The annual North Vietnamese economic aid delegation proceeded to Peking in April. The delegation, headed by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, negotiated the signing on 5 August of an "Agreement on China's Economic and Technical Assistance to Vietnam" for 1968. Details of the agreement were kept secret; however, there were indications that provisions for substantial military assistance to North Vietnam were included. Hanoi's announcement of this agreement stated that the North Vietnamese had succeeded in shifting the nature of this aid from repayable aid to grant aid. [redacted] Chinese concessions were aimed at strengthening their position in Hanoi and possibly pressuring other Communist countries into also providing grant aid to North Vietnam instead of aid that was repayable on the basis of long-term loans.[11]

(C) In addition to the continuing CHICOM military assistance and the service in North Vietnam of some special support troops there were some indications that Chinese Communist advisors were

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present in South Vietnam with VC/NVA military units. In August a NVA cadreman of ethnic Chinese origin was captured. Other reports during the year alluded to the presence of Chinese Communist advisors in Binh Thuan, Quang Nam, Long Khanh, and Kontum Provinces. COMUSMACV and the US Embassy in evaluating such reports pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing between Chinese residents of Vietnam and CHICOM personnel and concluded that, as in the RVNAF, there was probably a small percentage of ethnic Chinese serving in VC/NVA units. There was also some evidence that the NVA was using Nung tribesmen in special border operations. Although reports of direct participation in the war by Chinese units continued to be received, COMUSMACV concluded that CHICOM personnel operating in South Vietnam were probably limited to individuals or small groups which occasionally visit VC/NVA controlled areas in South Vietnam for short periods.[12]

(S) North Korea also provided North Vietnam a limited amount of assistance. Since 1965 North Korean Premier Kim Il-Song had stated several times that North Korea was willing to provide the GNVN all forms of material and morale assistance, including weapons and troops. Initial North Korean assistance had been confined to such items as rifles and propaganda leaflets. However, in September the South Korean Prime Minister Chung Il-Kwon stated that North Korean pilots disguised as North Vietnamese were helping in the air war against the US raids. The US State Department confirmed that North Korean pilots had been flying from bases in North Vietnam for some time and that some had possibly been involved in combat actions.[13]

Conditions in North Vietnam

(C) In a series of newspaper articles published early in the year NVN Vice Premier Pham Hung outlined the economic plan of the Hanoi regime for 1967. In this sober estimate of the NVN economy the Vice Premier admitted that many problems had been caused by the disruption of transportation, communications, and agriculture, and that these problems could not be solved solely by the government in Hanoi. Country-wide local self-sufficiency was stressed in order to free the central government to concentrate on the more urgent war requirements. The Vice Premier called on local governments for a

much greater effort to overcome such problems as resettlement, evacuation, limitations of manpower in agriculture, and food distribution. In March the NVN Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh gave a similar pessimistic view of the economic situation. Intelligence reports early in the year confirmed that Allied air action had had a marked effect in disrupting economic activities in NVN. Although the situation was not considered critical, the GNVN clearly was forced to cope with a number of increasingly serious problems. Under the growing pressure the government continued to disperse industry, reallocate manpower, and maintain the transportation system.[14]

Transportation

(TS) The effectiveness of the increasingly aggressive Allied air operations over NVN during the year was reflected in an expanded effort to overcome the resulting transportation problems. Following the mid-May northward shift of ROLLING THUNDER operations, a number of indications reflected the effectiveness of the interdiction of rail operations between Yunnan and Hanoi. It was reported in June that directives had been issued by Peking ordering a resumption of coastal shipment of arms, ammunition, and other equipment from Communist China. Allied attacks against transport trains, railroad bridges, and rail lines reportedly had severely reduced the NVN capability to transport war supplies from Communist China. COMUSMACV reported that in excess of 30 percent of the NVN railroad system had been destroyed; in addition, one-half of the NVN railroad repair capability had been destroyed along with storage facilities and over 3,500 trucks and 4,000 watercraft. It was estimated that the comprehensive strike damage to the NVN transport system had forced the diversion of an estimated 500,000 people from other activities to such work as maintaining and repairing roads, railroads, and vital facilities. Other intelligence indicated that by August land transportation in NVN had become very restricted, and that the rail system had all but ceased to function as a consistent means of transportation. The attempt to shift to maritime transportation reportedly was pressed vigorously, and Haiphong continued to be active with regularly scheduled ships using the port for shipments to and from Singapore and Communist China. This coastal maritime traffic reportedly was active mostly at night. Interdicted

LOCs leading from the port area continued to impede the flow of material from the port, and, according to one report, permitted the departure of only one or two trains per day. Besides a shortage of trucks, other transportation equipment, and downed bridges, the interruptions caused by frequent air raid alerts seriously delayed movement of cargoes. 15

Manpower

(S) The growing manpower problem in NVN was openly admitted by the Hanoi regime in the July issue of the authoritative journal Hoc Tap. In what amounted to a major analysis of the NVN manpower problem, Hoc Tap assigned top priority to satisfying labor requirements for both production and troop "replenishment." The regime bluntly conceded that the heaviest burden was a shortage of skilled labor to operate tools and machines. The need for urgently increasing the productivity of manpower was cited as the only way to satisfy large manpower requirements for both the economic and military sector. As Hanoi grappled with manpower problems, Allied operations in the RVN were inflicting higher casualties, and in-country VC recruitment was becoming more difficult. Thus, by July demands on NVN for replacements to continue the war in RVN was estimated to have increased to the level of approximately 15,000 per month. Intelligence estimated that NVA had the capability of training between 80,000 and 100,000 recruits each year for infiltration to the south. Of 120,000 youth who reached 18 years of age each year, 40,000 were believed to be required to maintain the strength of the NVA forces in the north. The remainder of approximately 80,000 potential recruits were available for infiltration to support the war in the south. Since the midyear infiltration replacements ran an average of 3,100 per month, it appeared that the Hanoi regime was able to fill this requirement only by taking such measures as lowering draft standards, reducing in-country forces, or severely restricting manpower allocations to non-military activities of the economy. Numerous intelligence reports indicated that the Hanoi regime was coping with the increasing manpower shortage by lowering age and physical standards for males and relying increasingly on women for military service.

Intelligence estimated that there was a manpower pool of physically fit males between the ages of 18 and 35 which totaled approximately 1.5 million men. The number of men reaching the age of 18 annually was estimated to be about 190,000 of whom approximately 120,000 were physically fit for service. Non-military requirements, such as construction, communications, and transportation appeared to be running as high as 600,000, which left approximately 900,000 men from the total manpower pool of 1.5 million. From these approximations it was estimated that the NVA could increase the in-country male strength from 400,000 to approximately 650,000.[16]

(S) According to a Spanish repatriate from North Vietnam, men between the ages of 18 and 45 were drafted for a tour of three years; many young men in NVN feared being drafted and sent south. Reportedly some men were retained in the army involuntarily after their three years' service. Soldiers preparing to depart for SVN or Laos were given a 12-day leave beforehand and were told not to divulge their destination to their families. Everybody, however, knew the meaning of the 12-day leave. The source continued that many young men faked illness when called up for their draft physical. Desertions were a growing problem, although deserters were unable to travel far because they lacked proper identification cards.[17]

Economic

(S) Air operations against the electric power system of NVN during the year significantly reduced the amount of electric energy available to the small but important industrial base. More than 80 percent of the NVN electric power production was inoperable. This power reduction constituted a considerable economic loss. In addition, industrial production was estimated to have been reduced by as much as 50 percent. Although the reduced industrial production caused some immediate adverse effects on the NVN economy, the longer term cumulative effects were considered to be of greater significance. The prolonged denial of electric power would increase product import requirements, create additional managerial and administrative problems, and complicate further the supply and distribution system.

(S) Shortages of consumer goods gradually became more prevalent and placed greater stresses on the economy. However, the power losses and reduction of industrial production had but little immediate effect on NVN military operations. The military impact, particularly on radar, SAM sites, and communications, was minimized by using substitute sources of power such as portable diesel generators. In spite of the overall power shortage NVN light industry continued to be self-sufficient in the production of light arms, infantry weapons, and ammunition, and was also apparently able to continue export of coal and pig iron.

Food Shortages

(C) Food shortages had developed in NVN by June--flour was being used instead of rice in some areas, and little meat was available in the cities. Russia was reported to have begun to ship food in quantity to NVN from Vladivostock. In July the Lao Dong Party press admitted that farm output in several major regions and other areas had declined during the first half of the year. The Communist press blamed local party leaders for clumsiness which resulted in lower than normal planting and reduced yield. The shortage of food evidently continued through the summer. In August substitution of flour for rice reportedly increased in Hanoi, and food imports rose to record levels. The decline in crop production was attributed partially to a diversion of farm labor to defense work. By late August it appeared that the importation of food had alleviated the problem and that the overall food supply of NVN was adequate to feed the populace. The importation of an estimated 200,000 tons of food during the first half of the year kept the food shortage from becoming critical; however, rationing continued throughout the country. [18]

(S) North Vietnam apparently tried to speed up the fall rice harvest and preparation of fields for the spring crop, but the manpower shortage limited both operations. Radio Hanoi admitted on 1 November that the harvest was not "fully under way" and chided the peasants for "letting the rice overripen in the fields." Both statements suggest that labor shortages were taking their toll in the agricultural sector of the economy. The announcer stated that 20 percent of the crop would be harvested late and expressed concern lest this leave too little time to prepare the fields for the next crop

and the seedlings now under cultivation mature before they could be planted--as had happened the previous year. All necessary jobs were to be postponed, and "all organizations" were told to help the "cooperatives," suggesting that manpower would be diverted from other groups--perhaps local militia and transportation organizations.[19]

Air Strikes

(S) Despite the wartime disruptions of life in NVN the regime continued to retain popular support for the war effort. Although reports concerning the general morale in NVN were not consistent, there were indications that the people were grumbling about the bombing and complaining of economic hardships. Aware that civilian morale had deteriorated, Hanoi attributed the causes to faulty leadership by the party cadres, errors in managing the distribution system, and lack of consideration for the peasant. It was clear that the air strikes and naval bombardments made life difficult for the North Vietnamese citizens; however, most of the populace continued to adjust to the wartime hardships and seemed to turn their resentment against the US rather than the Hanoi regime. Morale problems were more prevalent in the countryside where the war had been felt for the longest period than in the cities where bombing had been selective. Reports confirmed that the morale of the people, particularly in the cities, was not affected greatly by the war. The people in the urban centers reportedly had become accustomed to the raids and to using the individual shelter system while continuing their daily activities. There was reportedly no visible expression of fear or confusion, and shelters were widespread and easily accessible during raids. Housing, food problems, and forced evacuation of homes were the most serious threats to civilian morale. The GNVN increased pressure on the populace to evacuate the large cities, with workshops, offices, and institutions being evacuated from Hanoi in their entirety. Although many left the city, urban residents continued to resist the government order to evacuate and move to the countryside. It appeared that living conditions in the countryside were considered to be worse than those in the city.

(TS) Bombing of key facilities such as electrical power plants and disruption of important administrative functions has forced some of the most essential elements to be moved underground or to remote areas. For example, an electric power plant in the Lao Cai area has

reportedly been moved to the mountains where detection and attack would be more difficult. In addition, the Lao Dong Party leadership in Thai Nguyen area is reportedly living and working in a vast underground complex north of the city. The area is heavily camouflaged and guarded.20

North Vietnam's Armed Forces

(S) Of continuing concern to COMUSMACV were the Armed Forces of NVN with which Hanoi backed the uncomprising political stance. The NVA included ten infantry divisions, one artillery division, and one air defense division. The latter was part of the Air Defense Command, which controlled air defense regiments and 36 SAM battalions. In addition, there were three infantry brigades and five independent infantry regiments. There were also five engineer regiments and two armored regiments in North Vietnam. The total strength of the NVA, including forces in RVN and Laos was approximately 446,000. In addition, there was a 16,500 man Armed Public Security Force and an estimated potential reserve of three million men. Forces were deployed in military regions throughout the country. (See Figure II-4, North Vietnam Forces).

(S) In the southern area of NVN (MR 4) a number of significant changes occurred during 1967. The 325th Inf Div was moved to the DMZ area where it joined the 324B Inf Div and elements of the 341st Inf Div to form the main combat force in that area. HQ 341st Inf Div was relocated northward to central NVN (northern area of MR 4) and probably acted in a training capacity. In conjunction with the relocation of the HQ 341st Inf Div, the 270th Independent Regt reappeared, probably assuming the border defense mission previously carried out by the 341st Div.

(S) The major combat elements in central NVN (MR 3) were the 305th Abn Bde; the 338th Inf Bde; and the 304th, 320th, 330th, and 350th Inf Divs; the latter being upgraded from brigade to division status. The 202d and 203d Armored Regts, 246th Independent Inf Regt, and 308th and 312th Inf Divs remained located in the northern



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MR VIET BAC
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LAI CHAU
LANG SON
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MR NORTH WEST
DIEN BIEN PHU
MR NORTH EAST
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HAIPHONG MUNICIPALITY
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LAOS
MR 3
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THANH HOA
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MR 4
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VINH LINH SPECIAL ZONE
DMZ
LAOS
SOUTH
MEKONG
VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM FORCES
1967
0 25 50 75 MILES
0 25 50 75 KILOMETERS

Figure II-4

area of NVN (MR Viet Bac). In the NW Military Region, the 148th Independent Inf Regt, 335th Inf Bde, and 316th Inf Div remained as the major combat units. The 244th and 248th Independent Inf Regts continued to be located in the NE Military Region.

(S) The North Vietnam Air Force (NVNAF), which was under the control of the Air Defense Command had some 11 MIG-21s, 78 MIG-15/17s, 8 IL-28 jet light bombers, and 38 IL-2/14 light bombers. The NVNAF maintained its inventory even though their airfields were subject to repeated aerial interdiction. After mid-1967 the NVNAF based the majority of their aircraft in Communist China. COMUS-MACV estimated the total NVNAF personnel strength at 3,700. The Air Force was modern and capable of functioning in limited air defense sorties; however, the major air defense role continued to be provided by AA air defense and SAM units. The AA capability continued to expand in 1967.

(S) The operational threat posed by the North Vietnam Navy (NVNN) was limited primarily to small coastal type craft. The inventory included 3 subchasers, 4 minesweepers, 12 motor torpedo boats, 12 motor gunboats and approximately 40 other surface craft. The strength of the NVNN was estimated at approximately 2,500 personnel.[21]

Air Defense

(C) The NVN air defense system developed into a formidable threat to US air operations in NVN. The Air Defense Command in NVN relied on conventional AA weapons, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and MIG aircraft. The NVN succeeded in achieving a definite buildup in the number of AA weapons and, by June, US aircraft on bombing runs over NVN were encountering extremely heavy flak barrages. An authoritative article written by the NVA Chief of Staff, General Van Tien Dung, provided an insight into the increased use of the conventional 37, 57 and 85mm weapons. General Dung stated that the NVA intended to rely primarily on conventional AA weapons rather than a SAM or MIG aircraft increase. The effectiveness of the SAMs and MIGs were disparaged by General Dung who did not mention the USSR, but did stress the theme of self-reliance and dissociation of the NVA from dependence on CHICOM forces. The evident NVA decision to rely

most heavily on conventional AA defense weapons appeared to have been a sound measure in view of the fact that prepared positions rose in excess of 40,000 of which approximately 9,000 were occupied. During 1967 a greater number of US aircraft were downed by conventional AA fire than by either SAMs or MIG aircraft. An unconfirmed report indicated that the Soviets may have introduced a new compact and highly mobile Russian AA gun with self-contained radar tracking equipment into NVN. Such a weapon would permit the NVA to shift their air defenses rapidly to defend convoys and set up unsuspected ambushes of US aircraft.[22]

(TS) Despite the continuing relative ineffectiveness of SAMs, an increased number of SAM sites and a much larger volume of SAM firing were employed in mid-1967. The Commander 7AF stated in June that during the preceding two-year period the enemy had fired a total of approximately 2,400 SAMs and that 799 of these had been fired during April and May of 1967. Commander 7AF further noted that they had been relatively ineffective (kill ratio 1:55); however, the maneuvers of friendly aircraft to avoid the SAMs made them more vulnerable to conventional enemy AA fire at altitudes of 10,000-13,000 feet. Some of the factors which had a bearing on the ineffectiveness of the SAMs in the NVN air war were the effects of weather on the delicate SAM systems, the movement from one site to another caused by US air operations against missile sites (IRON HAND), the lack of NVN crew proficiency in the manning of the SAM system, and the general effectiveness of overall US anti-SAM measures. Unconfirmed reports during the year indicated that the NVA may have begun to receive the advanced Soviet SAM-3. In September intelligence indicated that the NVN had been able to double the number of SAM sites over the preceding one-year period. The number of SAM sites in NVN in mid-1966 was in excess of 100. The total for 1967 was about 195. Intelligence estimated that the maximum number of missiles that the enemy was capable of firing at any given time was 500 to 600 grouped from 150 sites. It was further explained that some of the sites were standby emplacements available for the use of mobile SAM battalions. These mobile battalions were reportedly capable of moving into the emplacement, firing their missiles, and evacuating within 24 hours. Movements of the mobile battalions were made in accordance with US flight patterns.[23]

(S) The NVA stepped up efforts to locate SAM sites closer to the DMZ early in the year. Only low level missile activity was indicated in the area within 40 miles of the DMZ until February 1967 when six missile transporters and other missile associated equipment were detected. Sporadic electronic emission activity continued through March and April while US aircraft continued to destroy active sites. In early May the first US aircraft was shot down in the DMZ area by a SAM. Active IRON HAND and associated US anti-missile operations continued; however, in late May another US aircraft was downed by a missile in the DMZ area. During most of June only sporadic indicators of missile activity were noted until late in the month when activity increased. Eleven missiles were fired from an unknown location on 6 July and one US aircraft was downed. By mid-July nine sites in the DMZ area had been confirmed. Four sites were subsequently destroyed and the remaining sites evacuated. After July SAM associated activity in the DMZ area contined to be sporadic. US air strikes and artillery continued to force the enemy into furtive hit-and-run tactics in order to minimize equipment losses and continue to maintain a threat to US air operations in the DMZ area. These efforts by the NVA were not very effective; nevertheless, the enemy persisted in the attempt to maintain a SAM threat in the area. 24

(TS) The role of MIG aircraft in the air defense of NVN continued to be tertiary when compared with the effectiveness of conventional AA and SAMs. The NVN had initiated an aggressive cycle of MIG activity late in 1966. As the MIGs increasingly took to the air, their losses rose. Between 1 April and 11 June of this year 24 MIG-17s and seven MIG-21s were shot down in operations over NVN. This high number of kills brought the total MIG losses to 75, and resulted in a reduction in MIG activity. NVN aircraft continued avoiding air combat with Allied aircraft. The Commander 7AF stated the following three possible reasons for this change: (1) there were many new enemy combat pilots introduced; (2) restrictions on targets that the US could attack tended to make it less critical that the enemy oppose US air operations; and (3) there was a general worsening of the enemy's capability to sustain MIG activity. 25

INFILTRATION INTO RVN


General

(S) The traditional infiltration corridors into South Vietnam during the latter part of 1966 were through the central and eastern portions of the DMZ, and its northwestern corner. Those infiltrators that crossed the northwestern corner of the DMZ proceeded southwest for a short distance then turned south in proximity to the South Vietnam border. The infiltration corridor consisted of a network of trails generally paralleling Route 92 into Laos (see Figure II-5, Infiltration Corridors 1967; Figure II-5A, NVA Infiltration into RVN).

Infiltration Through DMZ


(C) Marine positions were established early in the year astride both the central and eastern infiltration routes across the DMZ. Since the Marines had interrupted infiltration across the central and eastern DMZ routes, particularly in units of battalion size or larger, the NVA turned to the western end of the DMZ and improved the routes that lead into Laos. The entire portion of the route within NVN was made motorable. Foot movement continued into Laos and around the end of the DMZ. These foot trails turn abruptly to the east below the DMZ and into three spurs of the Cam Lo Valley which trends SE. Small groups appeared to be entering I CTZ by this method of going around the west end of the DMZ. Troops destined for other southern provinces continued to use the Laotian corridor just west of I Corps.

(C) The establishment of Marine forces at Khe Sanh and the arrival of the monsoon in late 1966 increased the difficulties of infiltration west of the DMZ into the Cam Lo Valley. In April Marine forces took over the ARVN camps at Ca Lu and Ba Long, which are astride these new routes around the west end of the DMZ. The objective of the Marines was to interdict post-monsoon infiltration activity. 26



INFILTRATION CORRIDORS
1967

Figure II-5



(A) CONFIRMED — CONFIRMED UNIT/GROUP DETERMINED BY MINIMUM OF TWO CAPTIVES, RETURNEES OR CAPTURED DOCUMENT. (ANY COMBINATION)

(B) PROBABLE — PROBABLE INFILTRATION UNIT/GROUP BELIEVED TO EXIST BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE EVALUATED AS PROBABLY TRUE PROVIDED BY ONE CAPTIVE, RETURNEE OR CAPTURED DOCUMENT.

NVA INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

CONFIRMED (A)
PROBABLE (B)
TOTAL ACCEPTED

Figure II-5a

Infiltration Through Laos

(C) The infiltration routes used by NVA units and personnel continued to follow the same pattern of movement from North Vietnam through Laos and directly into the RVN or through Cambodia into RVN. The main traffic routes of NVN were used to move south to Dong Hoi City. From Dong Hoi units moved south on Highways 101 and 103 to the vicinity of the village of Ho just north of the DMZ. Near the Ho Village was a marshalling area through which nearly all infiltrators passed enroute to Laos. Infiltration groups normally remained in the Ho Village marshalling area for two days and nights making preparations for the journey south. The infiltrators normally discarded their regular NVA uniforms and were issued infiltration passes bearing their name, infiltration group, and general destination in the RVN. From the Ho Village the infiltrators moved SW through the DMZ and into Laos passing Hill 1001 and crossing the Bang Hieng River. After crossing the river the groups proceeded south along the infiltration corridor. This 200-mile corridor referred to as the Ho Chi Minh Trail consisted of a complex network of trails paralleling SVN's border with Laos. By mid-1967 the trail was developed into a massive logistic system with a maze of trails, bridges, waterways, and paths complete with primitive overnight shelters. In the early months of 1967 the enemy had improved many of the roads with crushed stone surface and camouflage where the jungle canopy was thin. To keep the Laos corridor open, the NVA maintained a large assortment of heavy earth moving equipment which was used mostly at night. In addition, some 40,000 laborers and an estimated 25,000 troops were used to maintain and guard the Laos trail system. At various points where the traffic was heaviest, the NVA maintained AA batteries. 27

(C) Infiltration groups entering Quang Tri Province used trails parallel to Route 9 in the Khe Sanh area. Those groups enroute to Thua Thien Province crossed into RVN in the vicinity of the A Shau Valley. Other groups proceeded further south and entered the Quang Nam or Kontum areas or crossed into Cambodia. Infiltration groups travelling to Kontum Province or Cambodia usually spent an average of 45 days marching through Laos. The route was travelled day and night depending upon the overhead concealment afforded by the jungle canopy. The infiltrators travelled approximately 14 hours a day and attempted to cover 20 or 30 km during that time. Bivouac areas were usually separated from the communication-liaison stations around which

personnel were forbidden to cook, smoke, or make loud noises to prevent detection of these stations by Allied aircraft. Many infiltrators stated that they were pushed hard on the journey through Laos, particularly in the southern panhandle. The travel through Laos was described as the worst part of the journey south. Malaria, dysentary, beriberi, and typhoid incidents increased as the infiltrators made their way through the rain and mosquito-laden forests. Reports indicated that some groups lost as many as 40 percent of their strength because of disease, defection, and air strikes. By the end of the year a shift in the traditional personnel infiltration routes to the Route 911/912 complex south from the Ma Gia and Ban Karai passes was noted. With the advents of the dry weather and the increasing personnel requirement in SVN, the enemy utilized an increasing number of vehicles to transport both men and supplies through Laos.[28]

(S) Reports concerning enemy personnel losses during infiltration varied considerably, and, in August, DIA requested a reassessment of [redacted] reports which suggested that personnel losses may have climbed sharply in 1966 and reached a level of 20 percent in 1967. [redacted]

(S) CINCPAC responded to the DIA request by forwarding the conclusions reached at a PACOM Infiltration/Interdiction Intelligence Conference which had been held in July and attended by representatives of the Services and COMUSMACV. At this conference it was concluded that it was not possible to accurately determine the percentages of NVA losses during infiltration; however, estimates of losses were made from approximately 150 interrogation reports. It was estimated that losses from malaria were running about 30 percent or higher, but that most troops affected by malaria rejoined their units leaving an overall loss of not more than ten percent. The rate of desertion appeared to be about two to three percent and usually occurred while the unit was still in NVN. The conference concluded that the threat of air strikes had forced the infiltrating units to travel in more difficult terrain and to

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take a longer time thus making them much more susceptible to disease and lowering of morale. The estimated attrition rate of a unit infiltrating through Laos ranged from at least 10 to more than 15 percent. 30

Infiltration Through Cambodia

(S) Increased reports of the existance of way stations, bivouac areas, and assembly areas in Cambodia indicated that the VC/NVA persisted in maintaining and expanding the extensive personnel and material infiltration network within Cambodia. In addition to the undeniable increase in the tactical use by the VC/NVA of areas in Cambodia adjacent to the RVN border, a number of other developments took place this year concerning the increased use of Cambodia by the VC/NVA. Logistic activity on the "Sihanouk Trail," a southern extension of the Laos infiltration route, continued at an expanded pace. Logistic activities on the Se Kong and Tonle San waterways increased along with related venicular activity along land routes such as the road from Lomphat east to the RVN border. Interest focused on a probable increase in the acquisition in Cambodia of supplies, particularly rice, by the VC/NVA. There were continuing indications that supplies and material destined for the VC/NVA were being shipped through Cambodian ports, including Sihanoukville. There was growing evidence that the Cambodian Army and lesser Cambodian officials had become more directly involved along with local Chinese businessmen in assisting the VC/NVA. [redacted]

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1.3(a)(5)

(S) A significant aspect of the VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory and facilities was the undetermined magnitude of war material which was being routed through Cambodian ports. In August COMUSMACV was informed of the possibility that shipments destined for the VC were entering Cambodia through the Port of Ream, which the Cambodian Government frequently placed off limits to foreign diplomats in a manner that aroused suspicion. The Communists were reported to have established a significant logistic system throughout Cambodia to support VC/NVA troops. The system was reportedly dominated by Chinese and Vietnamese who were aided by corrupt Cambodian officials

[redacted]

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E 1.3(a)(3)(5) [redacted] The Port of Sihanoukville itself was reportedly being used for movement of VC supplies, in addition to use of lighters to move supplies from large vessels lying offshore. Reports indicated that supplies, including food, medicine, weapons and ammunition, were shipped through Sihanoukville. This material was reportedly camouflaged as ordinary merchandise and arrived every month at irregular times, with security provided during off-loading and movement of supplies to unspecified VC base areas. During August three Chinese Communists ships were reported to have unloaded more than 17 tons of arms and ammunition at Sihanoukville for trans-shipment to enemy forces in the RVN. 32

E 1.3 (a)(3) (5) (S) Certain ambiguities developed in the official position of the Cambodian Government concerning VC/NVA activities in Cambodia--a problem of vital concern to COMUSMACV and the US Mission. [redacted] Relations continued to be tense between Cambodia and the RVN, and border incidents continued, particularly in areas where the Cambodian Government maintained little control.

(S) Phnom Penh remained silent on the irritating Mekong convoy system which the RVN had imposed on river traffic in November 1966 to curb possible movement of supplies although the system had caused some inflation and POL shortages in Cambodia. By mid-year, however, the Cambodian Government had initiated some attempts to control the flow of goods to the VC/NVA in the RVN. These efforts appeared to have been motivated more by economic than political reasons. The illegal traffic to the VC resulted in the removal from Cambodia of a wide range of goods without the benefit of foreign exchange earnings. There was evidence that the flow of contraband rice from Cambodia to the VC at a time when world rice prices were high was depriving the government of appreciable exchange earnings. Provincial officials were ordered to make inventories of surplus and exportable rice. Efforts were made to tighten border surveillance and customs procedures; some Chinese businessmen who were known to have dealings with the VC/NVA were expelled from Cambodia; and Prince Sihanouk himself made a personal public appeal to reduce smuggling losses. These control measures were more apparent than real, and the government appeared to be unable adequately to police the long border occupied by

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an apathetic populace. More particularly, the government efforts to control smuggling were frustrated by the connivance of profiteering officials in commercial circles. The Cambodian Army also continued to have a hand in the illegal traffic. The army contracted with boat owners and trucking firms to move supplies and rice to the VC after purchasing the goods from Chinese merchants.[33]

(S) Beginning in April earth excavations were detected in Cambodia approximately ten km west of the Pleiku Province border, and by June at least 32 excavations were being prepared along the Toule River. The excavations were similar in configuration but of two different sizes. Although they did not appear to be rocket installations, their purpose was not clear. In July the US press carried a story which reported the existance of a least 20 fortified base areas located in Cambodia opposite Pleiku Province. Shortly thereafter a Cambodian broadcast carried a denial stating that there were no foreign troops or foreign installations in Cambodia, and charging that the US press item was part of a systematic campaign aimed at finding a pretext to justify an invasion of Cambodian territory by foreign troops under US command. Subsequently the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited the ICC to make an investigation of the alleged fortified areas and to look into the alleged presence of an NVA division in Cambodia. While the ICC investigation was carried out in August, intelligence reports indicated that the Cambodians involved in supply activities made a considerable effort to conceal their activities during the ICC visit. In early August large boats, on the Tonle Kong River, were reportedly sent to the Mekong River, and smaller craft were hidden in the area of Stung Treng. The ICC representatives reportedly were in Stung Treng from 20 to 24 August. In order to avoid detection in the future, shipments were to be trucked from Kratie to a newly constructed warehouse at Ban Kang Memeay and from there sent by boat to the border area of Don Phay.[34]

Maritime Infiltration

(C) Until 1963 maritime infiltration of weapons and supplies from North Vietnam in RVN was sporadic and constituted a relatively minor source of supplies for the VC/NVA operations. During 1965 steel-hulled vessels of approximately 100 tons infiltrated southward at the rate of approximately two per month. In February 1965 MARKET TIME

patrol activity interrupted the shipments by the large, steel-hulled trawlers, but some dispersed sampan infiltration continued. During 1965 the NVA continued occasional attempts to use the large trawlers to resupply the delta areas. [35]

(C) On 1 January 1967 a steel-hulled trawler was discovered off-loading material into sampans off the coast of the Delta Province of An Xuyen. This attempt was apparently scheduled to coincide with the holiday stand-down but was successfully intercepted. [36]

(C) Again in March an attempt was made by a steel-hulled trawler to infiltrate supplies on the coast of Quang Ngai Province. As the trawler proceeded toward the beach, a large explosion errupted aboard. Since MARKET TIME units were not firing at the time, it appeared that the infiltrators had become aware that they had failed to elude the MARKET TIME patrols and destroyed the trawler themselves. Later reports indicated that only the crew of the trawler was landed. [37]

(C) In April information from two returnees indicated that from mid-1966 to April 1967 most of the supplies brought into South Vietnam came in through the overland infiltration system. According to one source sea infiltration dropped to between 0 and 10 percent during this period. Another returnee concurred in this estimate, stating that the VC no longer used sea infiltration to any large extent because of the effectiveness of US and RVN naval control of the sea. This source stated that most supplies were brought in by human pack or by truck through Laos, and the residual sea infiltration was done by small motor boats constructed of wood or metal. [38]

(C) On 15 July the VC/NVA made another abortive attempt of bringing arms and supplies into South Vietnam by the use of a large trawler, this time in Quang Ngai Province. The trawler was intercepted, taken under fire by MARKET TIME units, and run aground near the Batangan Peninsula. A large amount of ammunition and supplies was captured by the Allied forces. The ship reportedly came from Hainan Island.

(TS) In June COMNAVFORV, in addressing the difficulties of stopping the NVA sea infiltration completely, pointed out that the large ships could usually be detected and searched but many of smaller coastwise traffic was not being picked up. One of the problems noted was the reluctance on the part of fishermen to provide information and was in part attributed to the harassment of search operations and area restrictions imposed on the fishermen. COMNAVFORV stated that efforts to overcome this problem were being initiated.[39] (Maritime infiltration and MARKET TIME operations with statistics, charts and base data are discussed in detail in Chapter V)

THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Leadership

(S) Beginning in mid-1966 and increasingly evident during 1967 were changes in the role and objectives of the three top communist control organizations in RVN. These interrelated changes were apparently ordered by Hanoi in mid-1966 and affected the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), and the National Liberation Front (NLF). In order to explicate these shifts, some of which were subtle and reflected both unanimity and traces of tension between the north and south, the basic structure and power links between the north and south should first be briefly noted. The PRP remained the covert extension of the North Vietnam Lao Dong Party into RVN. In political matters the PRP was under the control of Lao Dong First Party Secretary Le Duan. Le Duan's control of the PRP was exercised through the Reunification Department of the Lao Dong. The Reunification Department retained such important missions as directing the infiltration of men and supplies into RVN, and training and dispatching the flow of party-cadre to the south for duty with the PRP. Organizationally, and in accord with communist doctrine, COSVN was considered to be subordinate to the PRP. However, the top leaders of COSVN were also members of the Central Committee of the PRP. In addition to this correlative staffing, COSVN retained direct control of VC military operations in RVN, except in MR 5 which had a direct command link with the NVA. COSVN retained a direct command channel with the NVA and was subordinate to the North Vietnam Minister of Defense, General Vo Nguyen Giap. Thus, insofar as COSVN and the PRP could be viewed as separate agencies, COSVN was the highest echelon of the PRP. The real focus of communist power in RVN was the chief of COSVN and his staff, all of whom were members of the Central Committee of the PRP.[40]

Central Office of South Vietnam

(C) The chief of COSVN, until his death in early July, was General Nguyen Chi Thanh. General Thanh was junior only to General Giap in the NVA and was the eighth ranking member of the Lao Dong Party

Politburo. The circumstances of General Thanh's death were not clear. On 8 July Hanoi broadcast an announcement that Thanh had died of a heart attack in a Hanoi hospital on 6 July. An NVA soldier's notebook, which was acquired in August, carried the notation that the General was killed in action on 6 July. Another intelligence report indicated the VC General was wounded during a July air strike of the Iron Triangle area, evacuated by road to the Cambodian border, and taken by air to North Vietnam where he subsequently died. The air strike reportedly killed or wounded many high ranking VC cadre. [41]

(S) General Thanh had served in RVN since 1964 and was one of the best known and dedicated leaders in the Hanoi/VC hierarchy. Thanh had a dual military and political stature and was allied with hard-line pro-Peking faction. According to the report of a defector, General Thanh was involved last year in a dispute with Hanoi over how to fight the war in RVN. General Thanh reportedly pressed for continuing and even expanding the "mobile" warfare of the VC/NVA forces in RVN, while other factions in Hanoi favored more flexible tactics. The loss of General Thanh as COSVN chief deprived the VC of the talents and tactics of an outstanding northern General. The loss also probably raised the problem in Hanoi of how to retain or gain greater control over COSVN, the true power center of the VC infrastructure. It was considered possible that Hanoi may adopt a collective power sharing arrangement in order to gain closer control over COSVN than might have been possible with one General as powerful as Thanh. [42]

(S) In August intelligence reports indicated that NVN General Bay Hung was sent to RVN to replace General Thanh. However, the US Mission reported in September that RVN press and radio were stating that Thanh had been replaced by NVA Major General Hoang Van Thai. This information was reportedly derived from ARVN intelligence gained from PWs but, as of August, it had not been confirmed by US agencies. The US mission noted that the choice of General Thai appeared to be a logical move on the part of Hanoi. General Thai previously commanded the VC MR 5, was a member of the Lao Dong Central Committee and a NVN Deputy Minister of Defense. During WW II Thai had helped build the Vietminh forces and later joined with General Giap and Ho Chi Minh to establish the NVA. General Thai was Chief of Staff of the NVA under General Giap during the Dien Bien Phu period. Thai was considered well versed in guerrilla warfare and political insurgency operations. He was rated as a brillant strategist, popular with his men, and a man not content merely to issue commands from his desk. General Thai was reported to have been in RVN prior to his assignment. [43]

The People's Revolutionary Party

(C) In 1966 it became apparent to communist leaders in both RVN and Hanoi that the war in the south was in need of a tighter and more centralized political organization, more effective leadership and discipline, and a larger number of trained, experienced and ideologically dedicated cadre. Despite its origin and organic tie with the Lao Dong Party, the PRP had hitherto tended to fit in with the different conditions in the south and soft-pedaled its communist nature and aims. Less emphasis was placed on class consciousness, discipline was less firm, goals less dogmatic, and ideology less heavily stressed. However, beginning in mid-1966 the PRP began more openly to assert its communist objectives and to claim a more direct role in the leadership of the war effort in the RVN. In late 1966 the PRP Central Committee issued a basic directive. As events in 1967 developed, this directive appeared to have been an important one. The directive was important not only because of the changes which were attempted, but also because it was probably the forerunner of a number of other changes in the PRP during 1967 that were not covered in the directive. The directive ordered the reorganization of the PRP, particularly at its broadcast base--the village level. The directive called for the expansion of the PRP by vigorous recruitment of new party members. This recruitment was to be passed among all the various classes and working groups in the RVN, including workers, farmers, ethnic minorities, and religious groups. The objective was to achieve a large numerical increase in the party and to expand the administrative organization of the party downward in order to place party-staffed organs in direct control of the insurgency effort at village level. This expansion of the PRP by recruitment in the RVN appears to have failed. In any case, during the first months of 1967 the communist instituted a number of other changes in the PRP which suggested that more drastic efforts were required. 44

(C) A series of personnel, administrative and political boundary changes of the PRP were begun in late 1966. By March 1967 reorganization had reportedly been made in five of the northern provinces of the RVN and 13 of the southern provinces. The first changes in the VC provincial structure in late 1966 consolidated two provinces in the area of War Zone D into one. According to captured documents, the official reasons given for this merger were to concentrate attack capabilities, to increase combat forces and reduce staff elements, and to comply with COSVN directives. Other captured documents described the consolidation of PRP organizations at the village and district levels, and stated

that these changes were taken to overcome failures within the PRP, to weed out unreliable elements and to streamline the party. Two significant aspects of these changes were evident by midyear. COSVN was increasingly concerned about the reliability of local VC military leaders and local PRP cadres. The COSVN and PRP leaders were particularly concerned about party members who maintained contact with relatives in GVN controlled areas. In some areas it appeared that commanders of local VC units were being transferred from area to area in order to prevent them from rallying to the GVN. The other significant development was the introduction of North Vietnamese party cadre on a sufficiently large scale to utilize them to supervise local administrative party units. Numerous southern PRP cadre were reportedly replaced by cadre from NVN who were ordered to address themselves particularly to improving the ideology and activities of lower-echelon cadre. The cadre from NVN reportedly had been given special training to combat the GVN pacification program.[45]

(S) A credible agent report in August gave additional information on the increased number of NVN political cadre sent to the RVN. The agent reported that Hanoi had become increasingly wary of party leadership in RVN and had responded by sending more NVN party "advisors." The southern leaders were reportedly "retained" in district and provincial positions but were carrying out actions prescribed by the NVN advisors. The agent further reported that all command positions at the higher levels of region and areas were manned by NVN officials and that southern VC officers were assigned as assistant commanders or given minor commands such as those in agriculture or finance. One result of this influx of northern party members was an increase in friction between the northerners and the southerners. This phenomenon was not new, but reports indicated that friction had reached a level that inspired a high-level party directive calling for solidarity and elimination of this personal antipathy. Some of the points of irritation expressed by a southern party leader was that the northerners tended to be proud and domineering and to be too theoretical and lacking in practical experience. The VC leader noted also that the northern cadre isolated themselves from the southerners and from the populace.[46]

(C) The picture of the PRP that emerged from the various reports showed that the PRP was attempting to retrench, to tighten up and consolidate the party organizations on all levels, and to upgrade the quality of party personnel. The increased reliance on NVN party members and

the shifting and demotion of southern party leaders appears to have sparked resentment and strains within the PRP.[47]

National Liberation Front

(S) The NLF served increasingly this year to carry out both internal and international political objectives and to further the illusion that the southern communist movement was independent of Hanoi. The NLF continued to be headed up by the French-educated lawyer, Nguyen Huu Tho, a nominal communist figurehead. There were some indications early in the year that Nguyen Huu Tho had been eased out of control of the NLF. It appeared that Tho's deputy did most of the diplomatic talking for the VC during the first months of 1967, and it was reported that Hanoi had twice vetoed proposals by Tho that he carry out personal diplomatic visits to Cambodia. Tho apparently retained his Chairmanship of the NLF Presidium, for a captured communique dated 30 May indicated that Tho presided over a mid-May plenary session of the Presidium which reviewed VC achievements during the 1966-67 Winter-Spring Campaign. The NLF Presidium again met in April in RVN to review the 1967 situation. Under the Chairmanship of Tho, six communiques were issued which reiterated optimistic forecasts of victory and determination to fight on. The tenor of these NLF pronouncements in 1967 was less confident than in the previous year.[48]

(C) In December 1966 a permanent office of the NLF was established in Hanoi. Subsequently, NLF officials both in Hanoi and in the RVN made explicit and concerted efforts to stress the autonomy of the NLF and to further the image of the NLF as a moderate and flexible representation of the communists of South Vietnam. During 1967 the NLF spokesmen openly and privately took positions that emphasized gradualism as to the timing and flexibility as to the form of reunification. The NLF indicated that some political figures of the GVN would be acceptable in a broad coalition union of the north and south with tolerance for political, social, and economic patterns of the south that differed from the GNVN. The NLF also evidenced not only a willingness to hold talks with the US but continued to advance the idea that the NLF was the only point of contact for any discussions.[49]

(C) Two days prior to the RVN Presidential elections the NLF issued a broad new political program. This program constituted a major appeal to all national, religious, and ethnic groups in the RVN and was the first comprehensive updating of the sketchy and outdated program

issued in 1960. The announcement of the sophiscated new NLF program appeared to be an attempt to refurbish the tarnished image of the NLF in the eyes of the people of RVN and the world. Timed to compete with the GVN elections and containing a specific pledge to eliminate the accomplishment of the GVN, the NLF appeal appeared to be an attempt to recapture political initiative in the RVN and to discredit the constitutionality of the new Saigon government. The heavy stress on the need for broadening the NLF may have reflected the party's concern that it was losing momentum and failing to unite either the GVN opposition groups or the passive political elements in the RVN. In foreign affairs the 1960 policy remained largely intact; however, the new program more explicitly incorporated Hanoi's four points of 1965 concerning the settlement of the war, and emphasized the status of the NLF as the sole representative of the people of South Vietnam. There were hints of divergence between Hanoi and the NLF in the updated program and in subsequent statements made by NLF leaders. For example, later in September the top NLF representative in Hanoi told a foreign correspondent that the government envisioned by the NLF would be neutralist in foreign policy and broad-based, and not communist in the same pattern as the GNVN. These apparent differences between Hanoi and the NLF were more likely part of continuing carefully nurtured effort by Hanoi to foster the concept of NLF autonomy, a concept that was in no way consistent with Hanoi's actual control of COSVN and the PRP in the RVN. 50

(S) In addition to the new wave of internal propaganda activities the NLF launched a widespread effort to expand and upgrade diplomatic relations with communits and non-aligned countries. The NLF maintained permanent offices in a number of countries including Cuba, Algeria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, North Korea, Poland, the UAR, and the USSR. In September the NLF gained permission from the French government to open a "news" office in Paris. This was evidently the first NLF agency to be established in a western noncommunist capital. The establishment in Stockholm of a similar agency was reportedly being considered by the NLF. The NLF announced in June that the permanent office in Cuba would be upgraded to full diplomatic status. The NLF press linked the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba with an announcement of an agreement with Cambodia to establish a permanent office in Phnom Penh. Previously Prince Sihanouk had reiterated Cambodian recognition of the NLF as the "sole representation of South Vietnam as long as reunification is not achieved." Sihanouk subsequently proclaimed recognition of the Hanoi regime and proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the GNVN on the ambassadorial level. 51

(U) Additional NLF diplomatic activity took place in September when the new NLF program for South Vietnam was presented to Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. This appeared to have been the first encounter between the top Soviet leader and an NLF representative. Subsequently Breshnev, Kosygin, and other Russian officials indorsed the NLF program, taking the occasion to specifically hail the aim of a neutral and independent South Vietnam, a point that was quite at variance with the desires and intentions of the Hanoi regime.

(S) Communist China officially recognized the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam, according to the latter's liberation press agency. In addition, there had been indications that the status of the NLF mission in Peiping was being upgraded.

[redacted]

Morale and Recruitment

(S) The morale of the VC/NA fighting troops in the RVN declined during the year, and it appeared that this decline would continue. There were many factors which contributed to this deterioration of enemy morale. The primary causes were the pressure of friendly sweep operations, air, and artillery raids, increasingly severe hardships which the enemy was forced to undergo, and a deterioration of the effectiveness, availability, and motivation of the enemy military and political cadre. Morale problems were beginning to affect the enemy's combat capability. Captured documents revealed that forces were withdrawn from combat without orders, and in some instances enemy units were simply unable to conduct operations that had been ordered because of low morale. Morale had not yet reached the critical stage where there were mass defections or dissolution of units, however, as Allied operational pressure continued it appeared that unless the enemy were able to take corrective measures, it was possible that enemy units would be disrupted by larger scale defections. Enemy units which appeared most susceptible to disruption because of morale were elements of the 5th NVA Div, the 3d NVA Div, and possibly the 2d NVA Div.

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DEGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER
SEC ARMY BY TAG FER
83 06 24

(S) Enemy morale appeared to be most adversely affected by Allied sweep operations. These operations disrupted the VC in areas which he usually considered to be under his control. Sweep operations disrupted the regular supply of food and ammunition and often depleted reserve supplies. The enemy was confronted with superior firepower and forced to fight at a time and place which was frequently not of his own choosing. The enemy was forced into frequent and hurried movements. During sweep operations enemy LOCs were disrupted and supply caches were located and destroyed. If contact with the enemy was maintained for a period of three or more days, often his supply of ammunition gave out. When the enemy was fighting in an area that was no longer well controlled or organized, his supply system of caches was disrupted, and his food and ammunition situation became acute. There were numerous interrogation reports that indicated that this situation had occurred, and it was expected to happen with increasing frequency. During periods that sweep operations were not being conducted, the VC/NVA still had to contend continually with harassment by air and artillery strikes. These strikes were highly demoralizing to the enemy, as it became increasingly apparent to him that there were fewer safe areas. The enemy was increasingly forced to seek refuge by attempting to associate more closely with the local populace. This tactic, however, was not always successful, because increasingly the enemy found himself ostracized by the local villagers who were attempting to protect themselves from the same air and artillery raids.

(S) Another factor which tended to further lower morale and adversely affect the physical condition of enemy troops was the lack of medical supplies. A shortage of medicine to counteract malaria was particularly evident, and malaria rates were reportedly very high in some units. During infiltration to the south malaria rates as high as 80 percent were reported. Other diseases, such as cholera and beri-beri also took their toll. The crude methods of evacuating the wounded from the battlefield and the generally primitive medical treatment available gave the VC/NVA soldier little consolation in the event he was wounded.

(S) A factor which caused considerable disillusionment among enemy troops was that he was misled prior to leaving NVN about conditions in the RVN. Upon arrival in the RVN, after the hardships of infiltration, the enemy soldier found the situation far less favorable than what he had been told in the north. He had generally been told that the Allied forces were poor fighting units which did not have the support of the people of the United States. He had usually been informed that the people of the RVN

would welcome him with open arms and that the Allied forces would soon be defeated, permitting him to return home. It did not take the enemy soldier long to realize that he had been deceived and that he faced a rigorous life with a nebulous hope of return to NVN.

(S) Morale problems and disillusionment among the VC/NVA were not confined to the common soldier. Increasingly in 1967 there was evidence that morale was a problem among military leaders and political cadre at all levels, but particularly in the lower echelons. The actual state of morale of party cadre was difficult to assess; however, by early in the year numerous captured documents indicated that cadre morale had declined to the extent that the highest party leaders were concerned. The problem of morale became the subject of numerous party reports and directives at all levels throughout the RVN. These indicators were confirmed by the increase in defections, desertions, reduced effectiveness of local party leadership, and occasional evidence of increased slienation of the populace from the VC. To combat the declining effectiveness and motivation of lower level cadre, the enemy made extensive shifts in personnel and attempted to improve the situation be sending more cadre from the north. These personnel shifts, and the introduction of regroupees from NVN appeared often to be counter-productive. Distrust and antipathy among the cadre resulted when individuals who had worked hard for the cause for many years were shifted or replaced by northerners. An important factor in the general instability and lower cadre morale, which developed in 1967, was the miscalculation which the enemy made in 1965 when the Allied position, both militarily and politically was at its lowest. At that time the communists considered that the war would soon be won, and, therefore, began to transfer the best political cadre from lower positions to district and provincial posts. The result was to weaken drastically the large basic village hamlet level organization and leadership. Following the US buildup in 1965, the communists were forces to reverse the process of centralization, and in 1966 almost overnight decentralization was ordered. The result was to bring about considerable confusion, and captured documents this year showed that serious morale problems developed among elite cadre who had been sent back to hamlet and village work.

(S) Despite these serious morale problems the VC infrastructure supported militarily and politically by the GVN continued to show a great amount of resiliency. The enemy forces in the RVN managed to keep fighting, and at year's end no mass desertion of either VC or NVA troops had occurred despite the pressure of an active, continuous Allied PSYWAR program and aggressive combat operations. VC/NVA soldiers

were motivated by a continuing series of indoctrination sessions.

(S) Increased Allied military pressure and the achievements gained by the RD program caused serious recruiting difficulties for the VC. Difficulties in fulfilling in-country recruitment quotas caused serious concern at all VC military and political levels. Many of these difficulties were a result of the loss of control over significant portions of the populace and increasing civilian apathy to the VC cause. The VC/NVA were forced to maintain constant pressure on the local populace for allegiance in strategic areas, even to the extent of forcing allegiance on an unwilling populace. The enemy increasingly resorted to forced conscription and intensified the recruitment of both women and youths. One report even encouraged the drafting of 14-year old boys. The VC increasingly turned to the recruitment of women to fill the ranks. Normally the women recruits were employed in support operations. These tasks included making uniforms, assembling grenades, mines and booby traps, carrying supplies to the front and helping to dig fortifications. The VC women also operated radios, handled rear-area staff work and carried out espionage tasks. An estimated ten percent of the VC forces were women. The CG III MAF stated in June that in some areas of the RVN the number of women in the VC guerrilla force was as high as 29 percent. As VC recruitment became more difficult the enemy was forced to deplete his guerrila forces to provide replacements for Main Force units. In turn the enemy had to rely on less physically fit males, youths, and women to replace the local guerrillas. Recruitment was more frequently done by coercion. The NVN manpower pool appeared to have become depleted due to large manning requirements in air defense, coastal defense and construction efforts. The infiltrees and the recruits no longer appeared as well trained and qualified. They were younger and not so fully prepared or indoctrinated for the rigors of survival required in RVN.[53]

Viet Cong and NVA Forces in South Vietnam

(C) The VC and NVA military forces fell into four broad categories: VC Main Force (MF), VC Local (LF), North Vietnam Army (NVA), and VC Irregulars:


1) VC Main Force units can best be described as those which were directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a VC or NVA Front, a VC Military Region or a Sub-Region. (See figure II-6, VC Provinces and Military Regions.) These MF units normally confined their activities within their subordinated Front or MR, and when they moved to another Front/MR, combat control of the unit was also transferred.

2) VC Local Force units were directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operated only within a specified VC province or district. Viet Cong LF units often reinforced MF units that were in the area for an operation. LF units operated in battalion, independent company, and independent platoon strength.

3) NVA units were MF units. They were formed, trained, and designated as NVA units and were composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese.

4) Irregulars were organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense and secret self-defense elements subordinate to the communist organization at the village and hamlet level.

These forces performed a wide variety of missions in the support of VC activities, and, in fact, provided a training and mobilization base for the VC reinforced or supported VC/NVA Main Force and Local Force units that were in the area for a specific mission or operation. Guerrillas were full-time forces which were organized into squads and platoons which did not always stay in their home village or hamlet but were operationally limited to their home province. Typical missions for guerrillas were collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities. The self-defense element of the Irregulars was a VC paramilitary structure which was responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces did not leave their home area and performed their duties on apart-time basis. These duties consisted of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications, and defending home areas. Secret self-defense forces were a clandestine VC organization which performed the same general functions in GVN controlled villages and hamlets as did the self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations involved intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda activities.



1. Possibly with area responsibility for Kontum, Gia Lai and Daklak.
2. Possibly merged with Bà Biển, and designated Long Bà Biển.
3. NVA units operating in tri-border area of DMZ possibly under control of NVA front command.

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Figure II-6

(C) Information from captured documents and statements from VC/NVA returnees (Hoi Chanhs) and prisoners provided the basis for acceptance by MACJ2 and JCS of the enemy Order of Battle. (See attached charts: Figure II-7, VC/NVA Military Operational Structure; Figure II-8, VC/NVA Military Order of Battle Holding Ending 31 December; Figure II-9, VC/NVA Disposition; and Figure II-10, VC/NVA Base Areas.) The total strength available to the VC/NVA in RVN at the beginning of 1967 was 280,000; this included a combat strength of 128,600; a guerrilla-militia strength of 112,700; and a political cadre strength of 87,500. By the end of the year the enemy strength picture had changed somewhat. Total enemy strength available was 228,000; this included a combat strength of 115,150.

(C) The following is a brief description of several of the more typical VC/NVA military units now operating in RVN:

I CTZ--The 324B NVA Div was formed in mid-1965 and was operating in Quang Tri Province. The division, or elements of the division, has operated back and forth across the DMZ since 1966. The 324B was composed of three infantry regiments and six support battalions, which included two heavy weapons, an air defense, engineer, signal, transportation, and medical battalions. Another unit in I CTZ was the 409th VC Sapper Bn and had an operational strength of approximately 400 men. It was formed in May 1964 and was subordinate to MR 5 while conducting operations in company and battalion size. The main mission of the 409th Bn was to conduct sabotage operations and harass Allied LOCs. The 409th was operating in southern Quang Tri Province and, although it was very active in 1965-66 in battalion size operations, it avoided contact whenever possible in 1967.

II CTZ--The Nong Truong 1 NVA Division was subordinate to the B-3 Front and was known as a border unit. It operated in Darlac, Kontum and Pleiku Provinces and, when engaged in an unfavorable contact, it retreated into Cambodia. Elements of this division infiltrated south through Laos and Cambodia in mid to late 1966. The 1st NVA Div was engaged in heavy combat during 1967; however, the morale was considered to be rather high primarily because of its access to the Cambodian safe haven. A small but very active unit in II CTZ was the K-90th VC Sapper Co. The strength of the company was approximately 50 and its base of operation was in Khann Hoa Province around Nha Trang City. Specific targets in Nha Trang this year were the NCO Club, the train depot, and freight yard.

MILITARY OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE
POLITBURO
C O S V R
CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
POLITICAL OFFICE
REAR SERVICES OFFICE
STAFF OFFICES
MAIN FORCES UNITS

Figure II-7

RECAPITULATION OF ACCEPTED ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN RVN-ENDING CY67

TOTAL ACCEPTED PERSONNEL STRENTH*

AREA	COMBAT			ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE	GUERRILLA	PERSONNEL GRAND TOTAL
	MANEUVER	COMBAT SUPPORT	TOTAL			
RVN	100,651 (45,539)	14,505 (10,010)	115,156 (55,549)	37,725 (125)	71,700	224,581 **(55,674)
I CTZ	32,495 (21,935)	5,700 (4,980)	38,195 (26,915)	7,650	17,400	63,245 (26,915)
II CTZ	24,204 (14,084)	4,280 (3,530)	28,484 (17,614)	5,575 (125)	23,400	57,459 (17,739)
III CTZ	26,602 (9,520)	3,680 (1,500)	30,282 (11,020)	16,200	7,650	54,132 (11,020)
IV CTZ	17,350	845	18,195	8,300	23,250	49,745

* NVA PERSONNEL STRENTH SHOWN PARENTHESES

** IN ADDITION TO THOSE NVA IN NVA UNITS THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 10-12,000 NVA IN VC UNITS IN SVN

Figure II-8

CONFIDENTIAL

RECAPITULATION OF ACCEPTED ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN RVN—ENDING CY 67 TOTAL ACCEPTED UNIT STRENGTH

AREA	FRONT			DIVISION			REGIMENT			BATTALION			COMPANY			PLATOON		
	M	CS	TOT	M	CS	TOT	M	CS	TOT	M	CS	TOT	M	CS	TOT	M	CS	TOT
RVN	1 (1)	—	1 (1)	9 (7)	—	9 (7)	36 (27)	3 (2)	39 (29)	169 (80)	41 (33)	210 (113)	209	12	221	50	—	50
I CTZ	—	—	—	3 (3)	—	3 (3)	13 (12)	1 (1)	14 (13)	55 (36)	17 (17)	72 (53)	45	7	52	—	—	—
II CTZ	1 (1)	—	1 (1)	3 (3)	—	3 (3)	11 (10)	—	11 (10)	45 (30)	14 (12)	59 (42)	45	—	45	27	—	27
III CTZ	—	—	—	3 (1)	—	3 (1)	10 (5)	2 (1)	12 (6)	47 (14)	9 (11)	56 (18)	45	—	45	12	—	12
IV CTZ	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	22	1	23	74	5	79	11	—	11

NVA UNITS SHOWN IN PARENTHESES

M—MANEUVER
CS—COMBAT SUPPORT

Figure II-8a

AREA	NVA MAIN FORCE INF	SAPPER	SNIPER	ARTY*	ENGR	SIG	TRANS	MED	VC MAIN FORCE INF	SAPPER	RECON	ARTY*	SIG	VC LOCAL FORCE INF	TOTAL
RVN	78	2	–	19	4	4	3	3	44	6	1	7	1	38	210
I CTZ	35	1	–	11	2	2	1	1	9	2	–	–	–	8	72
II CTZ	29	1	–	4	2	2	2	2	6	2	–	2	–	7	59
III CTZ	14	–	–	4	–	–	–	–	19	2	1	4	1	11	56
IV CTZ	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10	–	–	1	–	12	23

*INCLUDES: AIR DEFENSE, MORTAR, RECOILLESS RIFLE, ROCKET, AND RECOILLESS GUN

Figure II-8b

RECAPITULATION OF ACCEPTED ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE IN RVN

ACCEPTED NVA/VC COMBAT BATTALIONS

(AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967)

I CTZ ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
31 DEC 67





Figure II-9

II CTZ ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE-NORTHERN HALF

31 DECEMBER 1967



TOTAL COMBAT STRENGTH
II CTZ: 28,484

Figure II-9A

II CTZ ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE - SOUTHERN HALF - 31 DECEMBER 1967




Figure II-9A1

III CTZ ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
31 DECEMBER 1967
BINH TUY
PHUOC LONG
LONG KHANH
PHUOC TUY
BEN HOA
BINH LONG
BINH DUONG
GIA DINH
LONG AN
TAY NINH
HAU NGHIA
UNLOC
TOTAL COMBAT
STRENGTH 30,442

Figure II-9B



IV CTZ ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
31 DEC 1967
504
0295
KIEN TUONG
KIEN PHONG
312
CHAU DOC
502
263
261
DINH TUONG
267
614
GO CONG
AN GIANG
0857
SA DEC
VINH LONG
516
KIEN
GIANG
PHONG
DINH
306
509
KIEN
HOA
UMINH
10
TAY
DO
VINH BINH
303
501
207
309
CHUONG
THIEN
BA XUYEN
UMINH
2
0 7164
BAC LIEU
AN XUYEN
TN 3173
TOTAL COMBAT STRENGTH 18,195
TN 3175

Figure II-9C



NVA/VC BASE AREAS
DMZ
LAOS
CAMBODIA
I
II
III
IV
LEGEND
VC/NVA BASE AREA
DROPPED VC/NVA BASE AREA

Figure II-10




Figure II-10A

III CTZ--The 274th VC Regt was one of two regiments which made up the 5th VC Div. The 274th VC Regt was activated in early 1965 in VC Phuoc Thanh Province. The 274th operated in 1967 in Phuoc Tuy Province against the Australian, US, and GVN forces in the area. The morale of this unit was reported to be very low due to heavy contact with Allied ground forces, air strikes, and sweeping operations. The 274th Regt was short of food and equipment, and there was evidence that the regiment was experiencing extreme difficulty in replacing losses with local in-country recruitment. Recent replacements from NVN were reportedly sent south to form another 5th Div regiment, however, they were used as replacements for the two established regiments.

IV CTZ--A typical IV CTZ battalion was the Tay Do VC Local Force Battalion. It was subordinate to the VC Can Tho Province (which encompasses all or part of GVN Phong Dinh, Chuong Thien, Bac Lien, and An Giang Provinces). In 1967 this battalion operated, as did all the battalions in IV CTZ, in company strength. Operations were against Allied Military installations, GVN outposts,, LOCs and district towns. In February 1967 it was responsible for the shelling of the air base at Binh Tuy. It was in heavy contact with Allied forces in April and June of this year. The morale of this unit was low, especially among the new recruits. 54

VC/NVA Base Areas

(C) At the beginning of 1967 there were 85 accepted VC/NVA base areas. During the year 19 were added, 32 deleted and 16 reconfigured. Of the 32 deleted, six were consolidated into other base areas all in IV CTZ. At the year's end accepted base areas totaled 72--53 in-country and 19 out-of-country. As a result of recommendations of the MACJ2 base area review board, it was anticipated that 20 presently held base areas would be dropped and eight would be added. This, plus certain planned reconfigurations, would result in a total of 57 base areas.

(C) Of the 41 base areas in the ten priority areas specified as the neutralization goal in the CY67 Combined Campaign Plan (AB 142), 16 were considered neutralized as of 31 December 1967. Thirteen of those remaining were partially neutralized. This represented 52

percent accomplishment of the 1967 goal. However, the percentage figure does not reveal the true accomplishment for the year. In many instances, although the specific area was not actually neutralized, continued pressure by Allied forces in and around the enemy base areas denied the enemy their use. In many cases it was militarily infeasible to hold penetrated areas because of higher priority requirements elsewhere for forces.. In such cases the enemy could reenter his areas and rebuild them for his continued use. Thus, the problem of base area neutralization will continue to require concerted effort by FWMAF in 1968.[55]

ENEMY OPERATIONS IN RVN

VC/NVA Strategy and Tactics

(C) To realistically assess the applicability of Mao's highly touted "three-phase doctrine" as it applied in 1967 it should be noted that the doctrine had been oversimplified to the extent that it had come to mean merely a transition from guerrilla tactics to battalion and larger scale engagements which it was assumed, would successfully annihilate Allied forces. This was not necessarily the only alternative in the original doctrine. The keynote was flexibility and the continued use of guerrilla forces throughout the three phases. In short, the goal was annihilation of as many of the enemy as possible in all three phases and the development of regular forces as early as possible, even during the first phase if feasible. Guerrilla and conventional operations were to be employed simultaneously to complement and support each other. Just as Vo Nguyen Giap had employed all of the classical "three phases" concurrently against the French in the early 1950s so Hanoi in 1967 revised a flexible doctrine. The most significant departure from guerrilla doctrine was perhaps the establishment of recognizable fronts in South Vietnam.

(C) The first and most important front to be established was at the DMZ. The creation by the VC/NVA of a semi-stable front at the DMZ was a significant strategic move by the enemy. By the deployment of NVA forces in North Vietnam or in the DMZ where they could attack and threaten a general invasion of the northern provinces, the VC/NVA succeeded in tying down a large US force that was otherwise engaged in offensive operations against VC guerrillas in South Vietnam. The creation of the DMZ front coincided with an increase in harassment actions against US and Free World installations and increased VC pressure against GVN controlled hamlets and villages. A second and less distinct "front" was established by mid-1967 by the assemblage of three or four NVA divisions along the Cambodian border on the Kontum/Pleiku axis.

(C) During 1967 there appeared to be no shift to the subordination of military goals for political goals. Hanoi continued to favor and to press for broad confrontations. The key aim was that spelled out in 1966 and earlier--the use of main force units in "mobile warfare" aimed at annihilating as many of the US and FWMA forces as possible. This strategy by no means meant the degeneration of the guerrilla effort. On the contrary, guerrilla actions and small unit harassments including high trajectory bombardment of Allied installations continued to play a crucial role along with intensified political warfare, both on the local level and internationally.

(C) Thus, in the face of the Allied [illegible] the VC/NVA had by early 1967 increased their support [illegible] reliance on guerrilla forces, as a direct and immediate answer to the Allied buildup. New notes of flexibility were injected. The VC/NVA were capable and ready to operate in both small units and in conc[illegible] larger scale attacks designed to keep the Allied forces dis[illegible] in the field, prevent any decisive Allied defeat of VC/NV[illegible]ces, and inhibit Allied pacification efforts.[56]

(S) With the increased activity in the northern CTZ, the IV CTZ took a lower priority in VC operations. During the first half of the year the VC forces in the Delta were defeated in several large-scale operations. These defeats may have resulted in a change in VC tactics in the Delta areas. The shift was from large-scale actions to quick, high-powered guerrilla raids. The emphasis was placed on brevity and dispersal before reaction forces could take action. Often the raids were coordinated with several units striking different outposts in the same area at one time. The small Viet Cong units were well-trained and employed heavy weapons such as recoilless rifles and mortars. It may have been the VC intention to keep the war in the Delta going on a low key while shifting manpower and resources to counter the heavier fighting elsewhere.

(C) During the Operation JUNCTION CITY operation in War Zone C, only a few of the expected large numbers of enemy troops were captured in the enemy headquarters area. US troops did, however, discover documentation and photography of significance. One film showed North Vietnam's second ranking General Nguyen Chi Thanh visiting VC troops in South Vietnam. General Thanh appeared in the role of a touring commander-in-chief. Another item captured in March during JUNCTION CITY outlined the tactical

plans of the Military Staff of the "SVN Liberation Army." The plan called for the conduct of division sized operations during 1967 and the massing and maneuvering of a greater number of troops. It was envisioned that smaller size units would continue to conduct raids of short duration. The document states that enemy division signal units must be trained to insure communications support for operations involving two and three regiments. MACJ2 considered that this document indicated that the enemy would continue their concept of mobile warfare rather than revert to small scale guerrilla tactics.

(S) A major consideration in this Communist plan was the attainment of "strategic mobility." This was to be the answer to the tactical mobility of the Allied forces. The objective was to mass a sufficient number of maneuver battalions to pose a threat in widely separated areas which would not only tie down large numbers of Allied forces in static defensive roles but would also allow the enemy to destroy selected targets at a time of their choosing. This concept was clearly delineated in a document published by the NVA Sao Vang Division in March 1966, entitled, "The Requirements of the Situation in Order to Push Forward Mobile Warfare." According to this document:

> In response to the requirements of the situation and mission, our main force troops must quickly push forward mobile warfare. This means to improve the capability in large coordinated attacks and to carry out annihilation attacks.
>
> Attack by maneuvering troops is the best tactic for our troops, in case we encounter a crack enemy mobile unit. When the enemy is still far from us, we should dispose our units in advance to easily encircle and annihilate them.
>
> . . . after a certain time of applying guerrilla tactics, soldiers will reach concentrated and large coordinated tactics to exterminate the enemy force and protect or liberate the land in order to finally win the war.
>
> Guerrilla war is unable to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, it... is unable to incessantly launch large coordinated attacks.

> In short, it may be said that like a man who has left childhood for manhood, his spiritual and material life must be changed, our troops from guerrilla tactics, have reached mobile warfare, so there must be a very great and basic change for us.

In order to provide for the increased troop strength necessary for such a strategy, the enemy took a bold stroke in the latter part of June 1966: a full division, the 324B, was moved across the DMZ. Intelligence indicated that during the political trouble in Da Nang and Hue the enemy decided the time was right to move across the DMZ, hoping to achieve surprise.[57]

(C) By March 1967, MACJ2 was convinced that the VC/NVA had abandoned all hope of being capable of launching a classic "Phase III" drive to defeat US and FWMA forces in a full scale military action. J2 considered that the enemy had already fallen back to "Phase II"-- the protracted guerrilla war--and that a new strategic plan by the enemy was being implemented. The plan was to sap the strength of the FWMAF, to wreck the pacification program, and to exploit to the fullest advantages the worldwide peace movements. Meanwhile, the enemy would attempt to maintain an offensive capability which could be brought to bear when the time was propitious. In Hanoi's point of view it was a cheap war that the US could not win. The estimated annual cost of the war to Hanoi was only $47 million compared with the $20 billion-plus that the war cost the US annually.

(S) From February to May of 1967, the war in South Vietnam passed through a definite phase. US operations, particularly in III CTZ hit the VC/NVA harder and on a larger scale than they had been hit before. If the US and FWMA forces had been able to maintain this multi-division momentum and been able to destroy main force enemy units in the south, in the words of General Thanh, the former VC/NVA commander, "the US, strategically speaking, would have won victory."

(TS) Instead of either melting away into sanctuaries or risking set-piece action with US forces, Giap struck across the DMZ in March and April with elements of the two divisions located in southern NVN. COMUSMACV responded by deploying US/RVN units northward (including TF OREGON) to counter this major threat to the two northern provinces. The enemy counteroffensive forced the Allies to terminate multi-divisional offensive operations in the south. The VC/NVA stragety also

put an end to speculation that the enemy would abandon mobile warfare and revert to small-scale guerrilla actions.

(TS) Giap's stragety in one respect had not changed. As in the Indochina war Giap continued to regard the war as a struggle to be won by the destruction of enemy manpower. Giap considered it necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories and to turn then into success by altering the balance of forces and transforming his own weaknesses into power. To do all this Giap considered it necessary to move gradually into mobile warfare. Without the transition to mobile warfare the strategic task of annihilating enemy manpower could not be carried out and guerrilla activities could not be maintained and continued. In a series of statements in late 1966 and in early 1967, Giap made it clear that his stragetic convictions were unaltered by the overwhelming US superiority in airpower and artillery.

(TS) The stragety of General Giap was spedded out by General Thanh in the May issue of the NVA People's Army Review. Thanh stated that the US forces had been forced to spread their forces and to fight in areas where there were no clear-cut lines and targets, and were thus unable to organize battles that would permit the use of their full combat efficiency and achieve stragetic results. The US was thus unable to gain control of the battlefield or to shield the activities of the South Vietnamese in defense of the pacification program. The US, in Thanh's view had been unable to prevent the North Vietnamese from helping the VC. On the other hand, according to Thanh, his own regular forces remained capable of fighting all tactical forms, with all tactical methods, in any terrain and on any scale of action. Thanh's review of the basic Giap stragety did not call for exclusive reliance on conventional or mobile warfare but on the maintenance of an offensive position by simultaneous attacks on many battlefields, using not only main forces, regional units, and guerrillas, but also political forces. By this tactic of hitting the US/FWMA forces in many places while maintaining sufficient reserves to mass heavy fighting power in key areas, by being capable of concentrating and dispersing quickly, by fighting small battles and large battles, and combining the two and avoiding the normal set-piece action, Thanh believed that victory could be denied the US no matter how large their force commitment.

(TS) During the FRANCIS MARION operation (4th US Inf Div) the enemy adopted the tactic of slipping a battalion or larger until over the

border to Cambodia to locate and attack small isolated units. After establishing the initial contact the enemy encircled the small unit and sent personnel up into the trees to fire down into the friendly positions. The enemy then attacked from all sides and from the trees.[58]

(S) By September the VC/NVA situation had degenerated appreciably, throughout the RNV. The enemy was facing increasing loss of control of the people particularly in the coastal areas of I and II CTZs and around Saigon. The 2d, 3d, and 5th NVA Divs had attempted to move into the populated plains of lower I and II CTZs in order to reassert control over the populace and to gain food. This effort failed and these enemy units were driven back into the hills and their combat effectiveness further diminished. Despite efforts to reinforce key units the enemy's combat strength was down. Operations through the fall and summer were uniformly unsuccessful, particularly in the northern provinces. A planned attack on Quang Tri had been preempted by Operation MEDINA; sustained enemy attacks in the areas of the DMZ had failed and had cost thousands of casualties. In III CTZ the enemy had been forced to move key units such as the 5th and 9th VC Divs to the north because of pressure of friendly operations and food shortages. In IV CTZ the enemy was forced to rely increasingly on small unit attacks with only limited objectives. Even these tactics brought about steady losses to the enemy. In addition to these military failures, the enemy had failed in the very important effort to counter the September election and frustrate the inauguration of the new government of RVN.

(S) The enemy apparently decided to change his stragety and to launch coordinated, forceful attacks in strength to reverse the steady trend toward defeat. The enemy evidently hoped to convince the people that the Communits cause was not in danger, and that the war would continue at an accelerated pace. Major attacks were planned to be launched in separate areas. On 27 October Song Be was attacked and on 28 October two regiments attempted to overrun Dak To. On 29 October, just prior to the inauguration of the new GVN, the enemy planned to take and hold the District Capital of Loc Ninh. These attacks were supplemented by intensified action throughout the country, particularly in the Delta where coordinated attacks were made against district towns such as those in Kien Hoa Provience.[59]

activities. These specialized forces posed a serious threat against which a successful defense was extremely difficult. When operating in support of infantry in the attack, they performed missions similiar to those of our combat engineers; often acting as "shock troops" to breach friendly defenses. Both sappers and engineers specialized in demolitions in support of combat operations. Both were made up of hand-picked personnel, usually volunteers, who had demonstrated a high degree of will to accept high risks.[60]

(C) A new tactic that was employed at the close of the year by the enemy was to move quietly into a populated area at night, build fortified positions, and attempt to hold the local populace in their hamlets. Friendly forces were thus placed in a dilemma; if fire support was used, civilians would be killed and their homes destroyed; if fire support was not used, the alternative was to dig out the enemy in house-to-house fighting with the attendant higher casualties. The enemy prepared his escape routes carefully. Typically, the enemy exfiltrated if the fires on him became too heavy, or withdrew slowly under pressure attempting to inflict maximum casualties on friendly forces of they did not use massive supporting fires. This tactic was used by the 5th NVA Div during late August and early September in the Tuy Hoa area and during late September and early October in the Ninh Hoa and Nha Trang area. Moderate successes were achieved in countering this enemy initiative. The typical tactic used by FWF was to cordon the enemy occupied area and make maximum use of PSYOP and any appropriate means available to clear all civilians from the enemy held area. When it appeared that as many as possible of the innocent civilians had been evacuated, a process which in some cases had taken several days, the enemy force was dug out and destroyed. The type and level of supporting fires used was dependent on the success achieved in evacuating the civilians.[61]

Use of Tunnels

(C) Intelligence indicated there were three types of tunnels being used by the VC during operations in RVN. The most common type of tunnel was the hiding tunnel which was used to evade Allied sweeping operations. These tunnels were usually expertly camouflaged and secretly located and were used to hide troops and material when the tactical situation precluded the use of withdrawl routes. The VC also constructed elaborate and lengthly escape tunnels. These escape tunnels were constructed with several branches which gave the enemy escape

access to villages or neighboring jungle areas. Ambush tunnels were prepared to counter VC vulnerability to Allied firepower during an ambush of friendly forces. The ambush site was connected to safe areas some distance removed from the action and often provided several alternative branches leading either to secondary ambush positions or routes of withdrawl. [62]

Attacks on Airfields

(C) During the year the number and effectiveness of enemy attacks on friendly airfields by rockets, mortars, and RRs increased considerably. The VC/NVA were able to inflict damage on US and FW airfields in all of the CTZs. The enemy capability for this type of attack was greatly enhanced by their cross-country maneuverability and by the introduction of the more sophisticated 122mm and 140mm rocket launchers. The VC showed a preference for attacking at night and on Sunday. The enemy made extensive reconnaissance and preparations of positions prior to the attacks which were usually carried out in such a manner as to deliver a large amount of fire in a short time. In launching major attacks the enemy selected positions which had a river which served as a barrier between his firing positions and the target. This waterway could serve the dual purpose of providing a means of transporting the heavy rockets to the firing site and delaying the Allied reaction force. Attacks using the 122mm rocket with its more sophisticated launcher which was capable of multiple firing from one site required more protection and security than the attacks using the 140mm rocket. Antipersonnel mines were used to protect the 122mm launch sites. [63]

Command and Control Techniques

(C) Decisions for the tactical employment of the VC/NVA company were made by the battalion. However, orders for the initiation of a specific attack usually originated two echelons above the attacking force. Tactical planning for the employment of the company was made in conference with the battalion commander, with the company commander, platoon leaders, and leaders of supporting units attending. Artillery was employed when possible immediately prior to the ground attack. Long-range artillery usually did not have direct communication between the forward attacking elements and the emplacements to the rear. Thus, missions of this nature were fired by predetermined timing and locations. [64]

VC Terrorism

(C) The purpose of the VC terrirostic activities was to frighten the ordinary people of the south into complete submission and to disrupt the normal process of government. In early 1967 the VC Broadened their range of targets of terror. To achieve their purposes, the VC concentrated on harrassing and terrorizing village chiefs, elders, and RD workers. So intent were the VC against those who might generate goodwill for the GVN, that on 29 May 1967, the VC attacked and burned a dispensary at a Catholic refugee camp in San Tinh District, Quang Ngai Province, fired on the priests house, and kidnapped five boys apparently mistaking them for RD workers; the boys were subsequently released unharmed. Social workers, school teachers, and medical personnel were also added to the target list of terror. In some areas, the VC achieved a measure of success in this broader terrorist campaign and thousands of schools, hospitals, and playgrounds were closed for fear of the VC.

(C) As recruitting and tax collecting became more difficult for the VC infrastructure, the enemy took a harder line with those people that they suspected of shielding potential recruits or of withholding food and money. The VC continued to chop off fingers and hands as warnings and to issue the black "death sentence" form to intended victims of impending terror.[65]

(C) The VC terror campaign designed to disrupt the elections got underway in early August, and sharply increased in the two weeks immediately preceeding the elections. They conducted an intense program of bombings and grenadings directed especially at polling places on the eve of the election day. The terror effort began to drop off sharply by mid-morning of election day, which was the peak of the voting hour. Anti-election messages were reported to have been distributed by word-of-mouth and printed matter, by the VC terrorist. Main targets continued to be village and hamlets officials, police, and RD workers. In general, terriorist incidents of all types, especially against American civilian and military personnel in Saigon, increased considerably during that period of time prior to the elections. The National Police operations prior to and during the elections were directed almost entirely toward providing security. Police were able to thwart many VC terrorist plans, but many did occur, nonetheless.[66]

I Corps Tactical Zone

(S) The enemy attempted to gain greater control over the civil populace and to enlarge the area over which he claimed control. Enemy initiated activity increased in number and intensity to more than twice the preceding year. Numerous heavy attacks by fire were initiated against friendly installations along the DMZ and throughout Quang Tri Province. VC/NVA units conducted ground attacks up to regimental size against fixed positions throughout I CTZ. Primary areas of enemy interest were locations astride supply, communications and infiltration routes, centers of high population and food production, and areas in which GVN succeeded in establishing RD programs.

(S) The enemy hoped his 1967 campaigns would gain significant tactical victories with minimum losses, while imposing heavy losses on ARVN and Allied forces. His intention was to utilize victories as a psychological tool in undermining the morale and prestige of friendly forces. His attendant long-range political aim was to create a political situation in the United States parallel to France in 1953, thus influencing world public opinion and confronting the public with an endless war of attrition.

(S) As a means of achieving his objectives, the enemy evolved a plan which encompassed the destruction of RD programs through selective terror and propaganda, the use of heavy weapons attacks and limited ground attacks, isolation of cities by interdicting highways, and inflicting casualties at times and places of his choosing in battles which would be of psychological importance. He was unable to achieve his ambitious program in 1967, and suffered severe setbacks in both political and military areas. He was most effective in instances when he utilized rockets and/or sappers. His most exploitable successes where his rocket attacks on Da Nang Air Base of 27 February and 15 July, the overrunning of three provincial jails, four district headquarters, and the successful penetration of all provinvial captials.

II Corps Tactical Zone

(C) As 1967 began, II CTZ faced an enemy estimated at 26, 200 NVA main force, 10,300 VC main force and local force, 3,400

administrative troops and 16,900 guerrillas supported by an infrastructure, then believed to number 11,900, but now known to have been considerably larger. This force had a spearhead of 53 maneuver battalions, most of which were organic to four NVA divisions, the 1st, 3d, 5th, and 10th. These divisions, in turn, were controlled by three major headquarters: the B3 Front stationed across the Laotian-Cambodian border; Headquarters, Military Region 5, controlled the in-country forces in the northern portion of the CTZ: and headquarters, Military Region 6, which controlled operations in the southern provinces. In addition to the divisional units under the B3 Front, MR-5, and MR-6, each of these three headquarters had several separate battalions under its control.

(C) Militarily, his primary objective was to retain and extend his control over the rich population and agricultural areas on the coastal plain, with primary emphasis on Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa Provinces, and secondary emphasis on the agricultural areas around Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province. Only by so doing could he accomplish his long term strategic goal of reducing GVN control of urban enclaves, thereby paving the way for ultimate victory. To accomplish his primary objective, he attempted to disperse and tie down the maximum number of US forces, particularly in the Western Highlands where terrain and short lines of communications favor his operations. He hoped thereby to reduce the pressure on his coastal formations and to inflict such heavy casualties on friendly forces as to discourage continued US participation in the war.

(C) The enemy retained a sizeable in-country base, since 20 per cent of the population was under his effective control and an additional 20 percent lived in contested terriority. His infrastructure throughout the zone basically was intact and he was operating an effective system of tax collection points along key roads, thus enabling him to obtain the money he needed to buy on the open market those commodities necessary for his operations, but not obtainable through his own supply system. He was infiltrating replacements from North Vietnam into the zone at a rate of approximately 1,250 per month and was recruiting at the rate of 500 per month within the country. Although he had sustained losses in 1966 of 25,869 known KIA and 8,511 captured, plus losses through the Chieu Hoi Program of 9,068, he apparently was finding replacements in sufficient quantity, though perhaps not in quality, to maintain his overall strength.

(C) Available figures cannot be expected to reflect the substantial military reverses the enemy sustained at Dak To in November, and in

the Tam Quam-Phu Cat actions in December. With notable exceptions in Kontum during June and November and in Binh Dinh in December, the enemy generally tended to avoid battle during the year. Overall, he sustained fewer casualties than in 1966: 22,666 KIA versus 25,869; 6,474 captured versus 8,511; 7,324 Hoi Chanh versus 9,068. Moreover, because RVNAF now was concentrating on security missions and RD support, US and ROK forces had inflicted a greater percentage of the total casualties; 73.2 percent of KIA in 1967 versus 59.8 percent in 1966.

III Corps Tactical Zone

(S) In January 1967 the enemy enjoyed relative security in vast sanctuaries in III CTZ. The use of LOCs by friendly forces was generally restricted to Saigon and its immediate area.

(S) The 1966-67 dry-season campaign began with Allied forces assuming the offensive, while simultaneously supporting pacification operations in the provinces surrounding Saigon. Priority of effort was directed against enemy main force units to the northwest of Saigon and in War Zone C. The enemy was defeated in every major battle of the campaign and his three main force divisions were forced to relocate far to the north and away from the National Priority Area. He was unable to reestablish his position in his former sanctuaries, and it became more difficult to establish contact. He conducted numerous mortar and rocket attacks on base camps and installations, but generally failed to follow up with ground attacks. A notable exception was the attack on Tong Le Chon on 7 August by the 165th NVA Regt, which resulted in heavy VC losses. Beginning in October and continuing sporadically through the end of 1967, the enemy again demonstrated a willingness to engage in sustained combat. His attempts to gain a significant victory at Loc Ninh, Song Be, and Bu Dop/Bo Duc were decisively defeated. November marked the beginning of the 1967-68 dry-season campaign. 1967 may be regarded as the year when the tide of the military aspect of the war decisively shifted in III CTZ. Enemy main force units were now in a defensive posture, and had suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses. Two documents captured in March and November 1967 provided information on the infiltration of VC cadre in Saigon. VC agents were being placed in Saigon to make preparations to topple the Government. Also, due to the weakness in quantity and quality of a revolutionary force in Saigon, COSVN had adopted the policy of using

rural forces to strengthen the city forces. The District Coordination and Operation Committee was to begin operations by 13 November 1967, and every effort was to be made to complete placing agents in Saigon by late January 1968. Previously captured documents and statements from ralliers from Long An Province indicated the enemy in that province considered the Winter-Spring Campaign to be the critical point of the war and that it would end in victory.

IV Corps Tactical Zone

(C) The posture of the VC in IV CTZ deteriorated throughout 1967 despite efforts during November and December to reverse this trend. The enemy continued to lose control of the population as ARVN operations and an expanding pacification program denied increasing areas to VC. Consequently, the enemy suffered a loss of tax bases, sources of recruits, food supplies, intelligence sources, and safe havens to which he could withdraw. Although the total number of VC only decreased by approximately two thousand during this year, the combat efficiency of enemy units decreased gradually due to recruiting difficulties, the impressment of youths into combat units, adequate training, and heavy losses inflicted by US and ARVN forces. Losses sustained by the Viet Cong during the year totaled 13,986 KIA, 4,763 captured, and 9,750 Hoi Chanhs. These figures compared favorably to 1966 totals of 12,074 KIA, 2,495 captured and 5,383 Hoi Chanhs.

(C) In an effort to regain control of the population, the VC moved their most trusted and capable cadre from region and province levels to district and hamlet levels. Many of the younger VC cadre were criticized for a lack of zeal, for not being close to the people and for not effectively implementing NLF programs, reflecting declining cadre effectiveness. The pacification programs remained the primary target of VC activities throughout the year. In addition to overt attempts to disrupt these programs through attacks, shellings, harassments and terrorism, reports were received of VC intentions to infiltrate various aspects of these programs.

(C) The general area of VC unit deployment in the IV CTZ remained essentially unchanged. This area consisted of a belt through the central portion of the Delta, extending from Dinh Tuong and northwestern Kien Hoa Province to the SW through Chuong Thien Province.

(C) During the first eight months of the year, VC initiated incidents generally followed a pattern similar to the preceding year, but at a reduced rate. The only exception to this pattern noted, was the failure on the part of the VC to achieve their normally high incident rate during May. Increased ARVN offensive effort, utilizing timely and effective intelligence, precluded VC accomplishment of announced plans for increased activity during that month. VC-initiated incidents showed a marked increase in Spetember, attributable to VC efforts to disrupt the GVN Presidential Elections. VC activities returned to normal during October, and little effort was expended in attempting to disrupt the elections for the House of Representatives. Commencing in late October, however, VC-initiated incidents took a sharp upswing in both numbers and intensity. This signalled the initiation to the annual VC Winter-Spring Campaign, and the pattern of activity reflected a degree of coordination and concentration not previously evidenced in the Delta. This higher level of intensity and activity continued throughout the final two months of the year, indicating that the enemy retained the capability to conduct such activities, though the effort placed an increasing strain on his military machine. The majority of Viet Cong incidents were not characteristically military nature as in previous years, but harrassments and terrorist tatics (see Figure II-11 Enemy Incidents.) 67

ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS




Figure II-11

ENEMY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

VC/NVA Logistics

(C) In early 1967 intelligence reported that the VC/NVA in RVN had initiated an ambitious program to produce food, munitions, clothing and other items in order to achieve their self-sufficiency.

(C) VC combat units were expected to provide at least part of their food requirements by self-production. It was recognized that the degree of self-sufficiency of the combat unit depended on operational requirements. However, support units and political agencies were expected to produce the majority of their own food requirements plus a surplus for combat units. For every 100 VC combat soldiers, 6 to 12 personnel were engaged permanently in agricultural production. In addition, each soldier and cadre member was usually expected to perform some agricultural labor.

(C) Although the VC/NVA in South Vietnam were achieving self-sufficiency, when all the food sources were considered, it appeared that the enemy had access to enough food to sustain their troops. There were instances of food shortages, particularly in the Central Highlands and Lowlands. These shortages appeared to be a result of transportation problems rather than availability.

(C) The logistic system continued to operate effectively with reliance on three agencies. The Finance and Economic Section, a political agency, continued to have the overall political and civilian sector of the system responsible for raising funds and supply procurement. The Rear Service organizations performed these same functions directly for military units. The Forward Supply Council continued to function as an inter-agency staff which coordinated the logistic efforts of the Economic and Finance Section and the Rear Services. There were indications early in the year that COSVN planned to augment the Forward Supply Councils by establishing Food Provisions Subsections at all levels of the logistic system from province to village levels.

(C) MACJ2 reported in April that there was evidence that the VC were manufacturing a substantial portion of the clothing required by their forces. The VC also produced natural medicines, agricultural tools, and constructed junks and sampans.[68]

Logistic Problems

(S) The decrease in popular support plus friendly action against enemy logistic efforts seriously affected the enemy supply of food, labor, weapons, and ammunition. He was denied access to many rice-rich areas; our defoliation program reduced his own rice production, and vast stores of his supplies were destroyed. Most important, however, was his loss of relatively easy access to the rice quotas formerly provided by the controlled population, which also was less able and less willing to provide labor. There was abundant evidence of a shortage of other supplies, especially ammunition, the distribution of which was also adversely affected by a shortage of porter labor. In-country interdiction of LOCs between the Lowlands and Highlands also increasingly caused the enemy to suffer. Out-of-country interdiction destroyed large quantities of supplies in-transit as well as vast amounts of transport equipment. There were indications that Cambodia, already an important food source to II and III CTZs, played an increasing role as a broker or original supplier for the enemy in South Vietnam. . . On the whole, the enemy had to try new lines of action to alleviate the generally dismal logistical situation.[69]

Rice Requirements

(S) In early 1967 MACJ2 estimated that VC/NVA required between 55,000 and 80,000 tons of rice annually. In I CTZ, rice for enemy troops was supplied from North Vietnam, by self production, through taxation and local collection. An agent report indicated that in early 1967 the Allied chemical crop destruction operations had reduced the amount of food available to VC troops in I CTZ, but that the VC were able to procure food elsewhere. In II CTZ, enemy units were probably relying on self production, taxation, confiscation, and purchases mostly from VC controlled areas. In areas near the Cambodian border, the VC continued to be adequately supplied rice originating in Cambodia. In the III CTZ, the VC continued to rely on rice procured by taxation, confiscation, purchases, and shipments from the IV CTZ and Cambodia. In the IV

CTZ, the abundance of rice and the large areas remaining under VC control made it relatively easy to supply the needs of troops in the area and to export rice to the northern operational areas.[70]

Transportation

(C) The VC/NVA in South Vietnam continued to use a variety of means of transportation to meet the supply requirements of combat units and to replenish storage areas. This VC versatility was illustrated in a document captured early in the year which stated: "In forested areas, use bicycles, three-wheeled carts, and oxcarts. In the lowland dig new canals or dredge old canals to transport the goods by boat. On corridors where the enemy activities are strong, and the people's facilities cannot be used, purchase transportation facilities."

(C) In March MACJ2 directed particular attention to a study of VC dependence on various means of transportation, particularly of rice. The study revealed that in the I CTZ, the VC depended primarily on civilian porters and, secondarily, on sampans and elephants. In the II CTZ civilian porters were used in most instances; however, oxcarts and sampans were also used. In the III CTZ more than half on the rice was carried by sampan and oxcart, and civilian porters were an important additional means. In the IV CTZ most rice was transported by watercraft while porters and oxcarts were secondary means of rice transportation.[71]

Assault Youth

(C) Despite the continued heavy Allied military pressure, the VC have been able to establish and maintain a complete logistic system. The reliance on civilian labor has been discussed above. Early in 1967 intelligence indicated that the VC were emphasizing the formation of Assault Youth units to supplement the civilian labor force. A captured document indicated that NLF policy promulgated in late 1965, called for the establishment of Assault Youth units throughout South Vietnam. It was planned to activate 22 companies of Assault Youth groups to work with COSVN regiments and Rear Service units. Membership was to be voluntary, however, in all likelihood a wide variety of pressures were available for recruitment of young men and women between the ages of 16 and 35. Information on the strength and capabilities of the Assault Youth units remained fragmentary in 1967.[72]

VC/NVA Weapons

(C) Quietly but unmistakably, the quality, quantity and firpower of VC/NVA weapons continued to increase during the first months of 1967. This improvement in VC weaponry began to be accelerated early in 1966, and by mid-1966 the VC/NVA were receiving in quantity the new family of Chinese-manufactured 7.62mm Soviet small arms. By mid-1966 these excellent weapons were being distributed widely in all four CTZs, and the VC forces were using fewer and fewer of the older French, British, German, and captured US weapons. In March of 1967 MACJ2 stated that the weapons employed by the VC/NVA Main Force units were first rate, and there was no longer anything ragtag or wornout about the enemy's weapons. MACJ2 further stated that reports of VC shortages in ammunition of any type were rare. By mid-1967 Soviet weapons and CHICOM copies constituted 70 percent of the weapons providing the VC/NVA with significant new capabilities, including increased firepower, more reliability, and the numerous advantages of standardization of equipment and ammunition. (See Figure II-12, "New Family" of 7.62 Weapons.)[73]

(C) The CHICOMs provided about 80 percent of the weapons used by the VC/NVA. In addition to the 7.62mm family of small arms, the CHICOMs provided flamethrowers, rifle grenades, hand grenades, 12.7mm AA machine guns, and 120mm mortars. The Soviets provided an improved antitank grenade, recoilless rifles, rocket artillery, and heavy long-range artillery.

(C) An improved version of the RPG-2 or B-40 Chinese manufactured antitank grenade was employed during 1966; however, in its antitank role it was not very effective. According to captured enemy documents the RPG-2 antitank grenade was intended to be employed primarily against shipping along the waterways of the RSSZ. The ineffectiveness of the RPG-2 against armor was evident in a survey which showed that out of 194 disabled tracked vehicles, only 16 were damaged by the enemy's use of this weapon. (See Figure II-13, Soviet RPG-2.)[74]

(C) In an effort to remedy this deficiency the Soviets began in 1967 to provide the VC/NVA with the RPG-7, a 1965 model antitank weapon which fires an 80mm HEAT round. This antitank grenade is tube launched, fin and spin stabilized and rocket assisted. The RPG-7 grenade


SOVIET ASSAULT RIFLE AK 47 (CHICOM TYPE 56)
EFF RANGE - 300 METERS
RATE OF FIRE - 90-100 RPM

SOVIET CARBINE SKS (CHICOM TYPE 56)
EFF RANGE - 400 METERS
RATE OF FIRE - 30-35 RPM

SOVIET RPD (CHICOM TYPE 56)
EFF RANGE - 800 METERS
RATE OF FIRE - 150 RPM

Figure II-12

SOVIET RPG 2
(VC/NVA B-40)



EFF RANGE 150 METERS
CALIBER 50 MM
WARHEAD 100 MM

Figure II-13

had about three times the range of the RPG-2 and was more accurate. Analysis of the Soviet RPG-7 rocket round showed that it was fitted with an improved piezoelectric fuse which provided for instantaneous initiation of the shape charge and, therefore, optimum penetration of armor. The first evidence of the existence of the RPG-7 in RVN occurred in April when five of the new type rounds were captured. In May an RPG-7 launcher was captured in the I CTZ. However, until mid-year there were no reports of the new RPG-7 grenade being used against armor in RVN. The RPG-2 continued to be employed against Allied armored vehicles, but without great effect. In February seven armored vehicles were hit with the RPG-2 and sustained only minor damage. In March ten armored vehicles were hit, one was heavily damaged, and two were destroyed. In September the fin assembly of an RPG-7 was recovered from a Mobile Riverine Assault craft that was hit during Operation CORONADO V. This was the first known employment of the RPG-7 in IV CTZ. (See Figure II-14, Soviet RPC-7.)[75]

(C) The most significant new weapon introduced by the VC/NVA was the Soviet 140mm and 122mm rocket artillery. On 27 February a VC/NVA artillery battalion launched the first attack with Soviet 140mm rockets against Da Nang Air Base. The 90-lb 140mm rocket was spin stabilized and had a range of 10,000 meters. The 122mm rocket was an even newer item in the Soviet arsenal, which is fin and spin stabilized. The 122mm round was longer than the 140mm round, weighed 101 lbs, which was heavier, and had a greater range of 11,000 meters. (See Figure II-15, Major VC/NVA Rockets.)

(C) Soviet technique in the employment of rocket artillery called for massed fire with a saturation effect rather than accurate fire against point targets. The VC/NVA improvised in their employment of the Soviet rockets in an attempt to gain maximum accuracy and the volume of fire against FW installations. In employing the 140mm rocket, combinations of 8 or 16 launcher tubes were dismantled, and the tubes were mounted on separate planks (see Figure II-16, Launcher Used for 140mm Rocket). Each tube could be easily transported and hastily emplaced in trenches. The rockets were electrically fired in banks of 10 and 12 from a single fire control pit. The launcher for the 122mm rocket was more sophisticated. Due to the higher torque action of the 122mm a very substantial support for the launch tube was required. Evidence at the firing site near Bien Hoa Air Base indicated that a tripod was used to elevate and traverse the tube. This tripod-supported launching system provided for multiple firing from the same position.




Figure II-14

SOVIET RPG 7
(VC/NVA B-41)
ROCKET

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



Figure II-14A

EFF RANGE 500 METERS
CALIBER 40 MM
WARHEAD 80 MM

FINS RETRACTED

SOVIET RPG 7
(VC/NVA B-41)
ROCKET



FINS EXTENDED


EFF RANGE 500 METERS
CALIBER 40 MM
WARHEAD 80 MM

UNCLASSIFIED

Figure II-14B


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MAJOR VC/NVA ROCKETS



WEIGHT: 90 POUNDS
RANGE: 10,000 METERS

140 MM SOVIET SPIN STABILIZED



WEIGHT: 101 POUNDS
RANGE: 11,000 METERS

122 MM SOVIET FIN STABILIZED


Figure II-15

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

122 MM SOVIET FIN STABILIZED

ROCKET W/FUSE



WEIGHT 101 POUNDS

RANGE 11,000 METERS

LENGTH 1.93 M

Figure II-15A



LAUNCHER USED FOR 140MM ROCKET

Figure II-16

(C) During the latter part of October 1967, a Soviet made and modified 122mm rocket launcher tube was captured in Phuoc Long Province. Examination of the captured weapon disclosed that the tube generally fit the description previously obtained through interrogation, and that the tube was designed for application to Soviet multi-round launchers. The modification to the tube, to facilitate mounting singly on a ground mount, was accomplished in the Soviet Union and was certified by cyrillic markings on the modifications.[76]

(U) The details of the ground-mounted 122mm rocket launcher were completed in December with the capture of two 122mm rocket launcher tubes with sight and tripod. (See Figure II-17, Soviet 122mm Rocket Launcher Tube and Tripod.)[77]

(C) In mid-July the NVA zeroed in on US Marine units in the DMZ area with some of the new Soviet family of larger 152mm howitzers and long-range guns. Midyear shelling of outposts such as Con Thien and the forward base of Dong Ha was extremely heavy and accurate.

(C) While the VC/NVA Main Force units have received no weapons and equipment that have been specifically designed for their fight in RVN, it was considered likely that the newer ordnance being employed would continue to be made available by the Soviets and the CHICOMs. Additional improved weaponry considered releasable by the Soviets may also be introduced, particularly items that have been in the Soviet inventory but have not yet been tested under actual combat conditions..[78]

(C) While most weapons and ammunition continued to be obtained from sources outside of RVN, the VC/NVA retained a capability to produce limited amounts of weapons and ammunition to supplement foreign assistance. Accurate estimates of VC production of munitions were difficult to make. MACJ2 reported that there was a large number of ordnance workshops operating throughout the country. In some areas the VC were apparently able to depend on in-country production for a significant portion of their munitions requirements, particularly less sophisticated items such as mines, grenades, and other explosive devices. The only notable instance of the use by the VC/NVA of chemical agents (CS) took place in November 1966 against a patrol of the US 1st Inf Div. Since that time, reported use of CS has been only sporadic and in small scale actions. The availability of CS remained limited, and that which the VC used was probably captured US stores.[79]




Figure II-17

(C) Aerial photography in May disclosed the presence of six 130mm field guns located about 24 km N of the northern boundary of the DMZ. This was the initial identification of this caliber gun in the NVA inventory. Other photography disclosed four camouflaged 130mm field guns in positions one km N of the northern boundary of the DMZ. The enemy was capable of road movement of this type of field gun into firing positions north of the Ben Hai River to provide a field of fire 1,500 meters short of Quang Tri City and 600 meters short of Khe Sanh. [80]

(C) Elements of III MAF captured 80 Soviet 140mm rockets during the latter part of November 1967. Of the rockets and components captured, it was noted that three of the rocket fuses appeared to be different from the rest. They were turned over to the Marine EOD at Dong Ha. Examination by Marine EOD and CMEC personnel revealed that the fuses were CHICOM Type I manufactured in 1965. The fuses were based on the Soviet V-25 PO Fuse, previously recovered in 140mm rockets. However, the fuse had been modified by the provision of a different type centrifugal safety element and the elimination of the long delay components. The CHICOM Type I Fuse had instantaneous and short delay settings only. The fuse body was slightly longer than the Soviet V-25 and the screw-on nose cap had a bright finish rather than the dull black of the V-25 fuse.

(S) During the closing weeks of December 1967, a number of late model weapons of Chinese manufacture was captured from the Viet Cong forces in the Mekong Delta south of Saigon. Among the weapons captured were AK-47 assault rifles manufactured during the last quarter of 1967 bearing CHICOM markings, and rounds for the 120mm mortar which had not been employed in the Delta prior. The appearance of these weapons indicated a program was underway to reequip the VC Main Force units with standard communist weapons, was being extended farther south, and that the VC intended to maintain the stepped-up pace of the war effort in the south. [81]

(C) The end of the year tally of enemy weapons by type captured during 1967 are as indicated:

French Bolt Action Rifles and Submachine Guns	485
German Mausers	592
US Rifles and Carbines (less M16)	3,714
US Rifles (M16)	817
Soviet and CHICOM Bolt Action Carbines (M1944)	3,438

Soviet and CHICOM Semi-Auto Carbines (SKS)	1,002
Soviet and CHICOM Assault Rifles (AK-47)	2,176
Misc and NFI (not further identified) Individual Weapons	16,649
TOTAL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS:	28,873

Soviet and CHICOM Light Machine Guns (NFI)	64
US Machine Guns (M60)	270
Machine Guns (NFI)	901
Soviet and CHICOM Antitank Launchers (RPG-2)	538
Soviet and Rumanian Antitank Launchers (RPG-7)	38
Misc Launchers (M79, Grenade Launcher, etc.)	494
CHICOM Recoilless Rifles (57 and 75mm)	60
CHICOM Mortars (60 and 82mm)	182
US Mortars (60 and 81mm)	20
Misc and NFI Crew-Served Weapons	289
TOTAL CREW-SERVED WEAPONS:	2,856

(S) The total number of captured items of enemy equipment was greater in 1967, than in 1966, as indicated by the following comparison:82

	CY66	CY67
Small Arms Ammo	875,601 rds	3,632,000 rds
Mortar Ammo	3,667 rds	26,981 rds
Recoilless Rifle Ammo	1,076 rds	5,506 rds
Rocket Artillery	0	604 rds
Grenades	30,034	51,884
AT Grenades	353	7,974
Individual Weapons	17,312	28,873
Crew-Served Weapons	1,511	2,856
Radios	63	247
Telephones	97	180
Switchboards	13	20
Rice	10,431 tons	12,386 tons
Salt	379.5 tons	259.6 tons

VC Intelligence Operations

(C) During the latter part of the year information was received concerning a "double agent" VC training school in Cambodia. The report received was that on or about 13 September 1967 COSVN reportedly directed each VC district in Tay Ninh Province to select one man to attend a three-month double agent training course. The course would include Morse code instruction. Upon completion of training, graduates would become Hoi Chanhs and would attempt to gain the trust of the GVN by assisting in the capture of VC cadre who were no longer considered useful to the VC. Later, the graduates would attempt to obtain employment with RVN agencies, especially intelligence organizations. 83

(C) An enemy document was captured on 9 November 1967 which provided an excellent example of the thoroughness of VC reconnaissance and revealed the special interest that the VC have in American advisors with ARVN units. The document also revealed the extent to which the VC base their operations on intelligence and the manner in which it is integrated in operations orders. As a result of reconnaissance and applied intelligence the VC knew the strength of the CP they were to attack, the number of advisors by grade, and the number and type of crew-served weapons. In addition, the VC knew the terrain features of the CP complex to include the number of fences and entanglements; obstacles and their composition; emplaced mines, locations, types and number; and location of advisors' quarters and protection employed. The VC also knew the number and location of security and sentinel posts of the compound. As a result of the intelligence applied to the operations plan the CP was attacked and overrun. The after action report revealed that in the attack the VC employed small arms, automatic weapons, grenades and 60mm mortar fire. Friendly losses: 16 KIA (2 US, 14 ARVN), 23 WIA (1US, 22 ARVN), and numerous weapons lost.

(C) The VC captured US radios and on occasion succeeded in finding out the operating procedures and schedules used by US troops. The VC monitored US transmissions, and entered friendly nets. A VC prisoner stated that during combat operations, US troops transmitted everything in the clear. The VC easily understood the messages and attempted to counter US operations. Another VC prisoner revealed that by listening to US communication, his unit was able to determine

the meaning of key codewords used by one of the US units. During the battle of Ap Bac Hamlet, Kien Tuong Province, in January 1966, the prisoner's unit, through knowledge of these codewords, was able to learn in advance of planned artillery concentrations and take evasive action. Other VC prisoners indicated that US units were often identified through voice recognition because US operators usually chatted for awhile after passing traffic, permitting the VC to become familiar with the operator's voices and to identify stations. US operators sometimes queried each other in the clear about parts of preceding messages that they were having trouble decrypting.

(C) Another means of securing intelligence informa on was provided by a former member of VC MR 2. He stated that MR 2 normally received warning of impending US or ARVN operations 4 to 5 days in advance. Upon receiving a warning from an unknown source, MR 2 intelligence cadre would begin monitoring US and ARVN communications. The monitoring of US communications was done by English linguists who were part of a radio intelligence unit; other personnel who were not otherwise engaged in operations would monitor ARVN communications. At the same time, intelligence personnel were sent to the base areas of the US or ARVN units reportedly planning the attack to gather information from sources on the installations or from VC personnel or sympathizers detailed to watch US or ARVN bases. As the date for an operation approached, the VC noticed an increase in the number of in-the-clear transmissions which often included the use of unit designators alternately with call signs, which were rarely changed. Intercepts provided the MR 2 planning staff with knowledge and disposition of opposing forces for consideration in reaching a decision on whether to engage them or order a retreat. 84

(C) Analysis of captured documents, interrogation reports and an increasing number of Imitative Communications Deception (ICD) attempts indicated that VC/NVA forces were becoming more adept at exploiting friendly communications. Evidence of the enemy's increased proficiency in Signal Intelligence was noted by his deliberate intrusion into friendly forces' communications and the introduction (by imitation) of information intended to produce situations of tactical advantage to him. ICD attempts were frequently directed at US/ARVN communications. The exact number of successful attempts is unknown but there is documented evidence of ICD attempts against US communications going back to 1964. Some attempts were quite crude while others displayed a high degree of intelligence sophistication. All of

the attempts could have been negated by adherence to sound communications security practices.85

VC Tax Collection

(C) The VC continued to rely heavily on procurement of rice and money in RVN. Intelligence indicated that the agricultural tax was the main source of revenue for the VC infrastructure budget and constituted 80 percent of the total VC income. Although this tax was usually collected in rice during the harvest period, the VC also continued to make monetary assessments. Often the cash collected by the VC was used to purchase rice.

(C) There has been a marked upward trend in the rates that the VC were levying on rice production. For example, in areas of Quang Ngai Province, under VC control in 1966, the rate was raised from 10 to 25 or 30 percent of a family's total production. In VC controlled areas in Long An Province the VC reportedly raised the rate of taxation 50 percent over the previous rates. In areas of Can Tho Province the VC tax rate was reported to have been raised from 25 or 30 percent to 50 percent. In parts of Rach Gia and An Giang Provinces the VC were reportedly studying a collection program that would take up all of the 1967 rice harvest except that amount required by each family for subsistence. In January farmers in VC controlled areas of Kien Phong were reportedly paying 35 percent of their production to the VC. The VC also continued to increase revenue by introducing new types of taxes and contribution schemes, including a property tax on the value of the land, outright confiscation, forced sale of rice, and extractions made at collection stations on roads and waterways. As the VC tax collection problem increased with the loss of people going to the GVN, NLFSVN announced a new tax policy regarding agricultural produce. Taxes were reduced on such products as rice, animals, and vegetables, and the people were authorized to sell their produce in GVN controlled areas. However, that which was sold in GVN areas incurred a higher tax. Landlords and landowners were encouraged to come back to lands under VC control without fear of assessment of back taxes. The object in point was a VC effort to have more people to produce more and at the same time make it advantageous for the farmer to keep his produce in VC controlled areas. In addition, efforts were made by the VC to

continue to expand the areas of control where they could collect taxes. A scheme enforced in Tay Ninh and western Long An in January required the payment of rice tax and the setting aside of a prescribed amount for sustenance of the family for the year. The remainder was purchased at rates considerably below the price in GVN controlled areas.

(C) Early in the year a number of intelligence reports indicated a VC drive to collect a larger portion of all of the taxes on the 1967 harvest in cash. In some cases taxes were to be collected in rice in VC controlled areas and in cash in GVN controlled areas. This emphasis on tax collection in cash may have been a result of increasing difficulties in concealing and transporting of rice.

(C) Intelligence indicated early in the year that there was a number of difficulties in the VC rice collection effort. Some of these problems were: (1) shortage of trained and competent collection personnel; (2) poor performance by cadres; (3) animosity between the local cadres and the people; (4) popular discontent at the high rates; (5) exodus of people from VC controlled areas; and (6) Allied operations during the collection period.

(C) Although the enemy obtained rice from both their internal tax collection and from outside of RVN the VC also attempted to further their self-sufficiency by growing rice and producing other types of food supplies. In late 1966 MACJ2 studied the degree of self-sufficiency in rice production of VC/NVA Main and Local Force units. It was concluded that the enemy units throughout South Vietnam could maintain themselves for a period of approximately three months. In the Delta it appeared possible that units could maintain themselves in rice supplies for up to six months.

(C) There was considerable evidence that the VC/NVA continued to acquire large quantities of rice from Cambodia. Some of this rice was sold to the VC by the Cambodian government; however, the majority of Cambodian rice came into RVN through the smuggling operations of Chinese rice merchants. Accountability reports continued to indicate that most of the rice imported from Cambodia was shipped to areas along the border of II and III CTZs. 86

VC Communications and Electronics

VC Electronic Warfare

(C) Following successes in 1964, the VC greatly expanded their electronic warfare effort to exploit breaches in Allied communications security. This expanded VC effort during the past two years led to a large numerical increase in electronic intelligence units. The resultant decline in quality of operations was probably related to reported organizational changes and to attempts on several levels of the VC command to upgrade the training of technical intelligence personnel. By March 1967 intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had established technical intelligence detachments for the VC MRs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and the 5th VC Div. In 1967 there were numerous indications the VC continued to intensify such measures as interception, jamming, and imitative deception. Interception of Allied communications received the greatest emphasis. Documents captured in February during Operation JUNCTION CITY corroborated previous indications of the primary interest that the VC had in intercepting Allied communications for intelligence purposes. The enemy intercept operations were supervised and provided linguists by COSVN, and all exploitable information was sent directly to COSVN through command channels. The number and size of the enemy intercept units are not known, however, there was evidence that attempts were being made to establish intercept activities at the provincial and district levels. [87]

VC Communications

(C) A VC document captured early in the year during Operation JUNCTION CITY indicated that VC radio intercept and analysis operations were not satisfactory due to inadequate personnel and deficiencies in skill and education of communications personnel. The information derived from the captured document pertained to mid-1966. In the interim, the VC have demonstrated a high degree of interest in improving radio intercept activities and it is possible that during 1967 additional experience, improved equipment, and additional trained personnel had improved their capability to obtain intelligence from US communications.

(C) Intelligence reported that each NVA company in RVN had two radios and that additional radios up to five per company were obtainable from battalion. The NVA company usually maintained radio contact with the battalions. In the event radios were not available to the companies two liaison runners per company were used.[88]

THE ENEMY SITUATION AT THE YEAR'S END

(S) The increase in forces facilitated expansion of combat operations to an extent which denied the enemy the capability to conduct significant operations in the populated areas. Our operations, supported by close air and ARC LIGHT strikes, increasingly neutralized enemy base areas, located and destroyed the supplies on which the enemy depends, and drove him into sparsely populated regions where food is scarce. Steady progress was made in seeking out and destroying communist forces and infrastructure. The overall trend in the enemy's losses from killed, wounded, disease, and capture was favorable to us, as was the overall trend in his defections. The proportion of population and area which he controlled slowly but steadily declined. His in-country recruitment also declined significantly. Consequently, the replacement burden has fallen increasingly on the North Vietnamese. There is increasing evidence that North Vietnam is resorting to wider use of women in the labor force and use of 16-year old boys and men over 38 years of age to provide some of the badly needed military replacements. Shortages of food and medical supplies are taking their toll with deterioration of the morale and quality of the communist forces noted in some units--especially those in isolated areas.

(U) The enemy did not win a major battle in Vietnam in 1967. Most of his main forces have been driven to positions near the borders of RVN where they take advantage of sanctuaries for protection and resupply. When our troops begin to punish them severely, they retreat across the borders, and avoid contact until they have refitted and prepared for another operation. Even than we have been able to detect impending major offensives and to mount spoiling attacks to knock them off balance and force them to fight defensively.

(S) The enemy's strategy continues to reflect an effort to draw Allied forces into remote areas of his choosing, especially those areas adjacent to border sanctuaries, thereby, enabling his local and guerrilla forces to harass, attack, and generally impede the GVN nation building effort. He has shown a recent willingness to engage our forces in sustained combat. Recent large unit deployments from North Vietnam indicate that the enemy may be seeking a spectacular win in RVN in the near future. The enemy has demonstrated a willingness to accept the situation as it exists, and continues to attack, harass, and terrorize

in many areas of the countryside. The VC infrastructure persists as a significant influence over portions of the population. Infilitration from the north still continues at a high rate (estimated to be over 6,000 personnel per month). Enemy employment of artillery, rockets, and mortars has shown a marked increase in both quantity and caliber (120mm mortars, 122/140mm rockets, and 130mm field guns). Although these enemy capabilities are at times formidable in a local sense, they are not overpowering.

(S) The amount of external assistance to North Vietnam has continued to increase each year since the war began and with it the tonnage of goods imported into the country. In 1967, for example, SEASIA import tonnages were also 40 percent greater than the 930,000 metric tons delivered in 1966. Mining and air systematic strikes on LOCs have greatly impeded the flow of imported goods once within the country.

(S) The advent of good weather in late May permitted a concentrated strike effort against all of the northern rail lines and within the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes directed toward reducing the flow of material. Strikes during the three months from June - August accounted for over 56 percent of the total trucks and rail rolling stock reported as damaged and destroyed for the entire year. A midyear estimate indicated that approximately 30 percent of imported material was being destroyed by air strikes while in-transit. Strikes against large military storage depots in the Hanoi and the Thai Nguyen area destroyed additional supplies which had arrived in NVN by rail and sea.

(S) The overall effect of our effort to reduce external assistance has resulted not only in destruction and damage to the transportation systems _ . goods being transported thereon, but has created additional management, distribution, and manpower problems. In addition, the attacks have been creating a bottleneck at Haiphong where an inability to effectively move goods inland from the ports had resulted in congestion on the docks and a slowdown in off-loading ships as they arrive. By October, road and rail interd'-tions had reduced the transportation clearance capacity at Haipl .g to about 2,700 STON per day. An average of 4,400 STON per .ay of imports had arrived in Haiphong during the year.

(S) Although men and material needed for the level of combat now prevailing in RVN continue to flow despite our attacks on LOCs, we have made it very costly to the enemy in terms of material, manpower,

management,, and distribution. Attacks against the NVN transport system during the past 12 months resulted in destruction of carriers, cargo carried, and personnel casualties. Air attacks throughout North Vietnam and Laos destroyed or damaged 5,261 motor vehicles, 2,475 railroad rolling stock, and 11,425 watercraft from 1 January through 20 December 1967.

(S) Through external assistance, the enemy has been able to replace or rehabilitate many of the items damaged or destroyed, and transport inventories are roughly at the same level they were at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, construction problems and delays have caused interruptions in the flow of men and supplies, caused a great loss of work hours, and restricted movement particularly during daylight hours.

(U) Seaborne infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies is considered now to be a relative contribution toward meeting out-of-country requirements. MARKET TIME and SEA DRAGON operations have reduced this enemy capability. Still, as in the ground war, the enemy appears willing to accept losses and continues attempts to resupply in certain hard-pressed coastal areas.

(S) A primary effect of our efforts to impede movement of the enemy has been to force Hanoi to engage from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians in full-time and part-time war-related activities, in particular, for air defense and repair of the LOCs. This diversion of manpower from other pursuits, particularly from the agricultural sector, has caused a drawdown on manpower. The estimated lower food production yields, coupled with an increase in food imports in 1967 (some six times that of 1966), indicate that agriculture is having great difficulty in adjusting to this changed composition of the work force. The cost and difficulties of the war to Hanoi have sharply increased, and only through the willingness of other Communist countries to provide maximum replacement of goods and material has NVN managed to sustain its war effort.

(S) The campaign against the power system resulted in reduction of power generating capability to approximately 15 percent of original capacity. Successful strikes against the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant and the Haiphong cement plant resulted in practically total destruction of these two installations. NVN adjustments to these losses have had to be made by relying on additional imports from China, the USSR, or the eastern European countries.

(S) Strikes over NVN, particularly in the vital NE sector, have encountered increased opposition from NVN. The net result for the year, however, has been a reduction in NVN's fighter aircraft capability and frequent disruption of operational airfields. At the beginning of the year, some 72 MIG fighters were in-country. They used the following airfields: Phuc Yen, Kep, Gia Lam, Cat By, and Kien An, and later Hoa Lac. By late October, strikes had been authorized and conducted against all of these airfields except Gia Lam. By the end of October and through December, only some 20 fighters were operating from airfields within NVN, with the balance operating from Chinese bases. From 1 January - 18 December 1967, the ratio of US aircraft to MIG aircraft downed in air encounters was about 1:3 (25:78) compared to the 1966 ratio of 1:2.5 (9:22).

(S) Probably the most positive reaction to US bombing strikes has been the enemy buildup of the ground components of the air defense system: SAM, AAA, and the aircraft control and warning facilities. Although the estimated number of SAM battalions remained at about 25, the number of SAM sites discovered by the beginning of the year was 151. By mid-December, the total SAM sites discovered had risen to 270, a net gain of 119 sites; however, 41 of these are not currently in use. Although some 3,400 SAM visual firings were noted from 1 January through mid-December (compared to only 990 firings from 1966), SAM results actually declined as evidenced by the average number of SAMs expended to down one US aircraft (56:1) in 1967 compared to the ratio for 1966 (33:1). The total number of AAA weapons increased from 7,126 to 7,959 for 1967, an addition of some 830 guns, mostly in the light caliber range (37mm and 57mm). In the vicinity of the DMZ, 85mm AAA guns were used for the first time as a threat to higher altitude operations. NVN electronic Order of Battle declined from some 400 to 300 radars during 1967, however, the effectiveness of the radar system continued to improve. 89

1) In CY67, known enemy losses were 145,200 and there were in addition at least 24,000 non-battle casualties for a minimum total of 169,200. Although CY67 infiltration figures are not yet firm, utilizing our best estimate for the last half of CY67 we calculate a total enemy input of 113,700 for the year. This results in a known net loss of 55,500. Although the differences varied a good deal, in every month of CY67 the enemy forces in SVN sustained losses greater than input.

2) The enemy has been forced into areas along the borders where supply lines are shorter and he finds sanctuary from Allied

forces. This is shown by his current dispositions in the DMZ, the B-3 Front, and War Zone C.

3) Enemy plans were preempted in many instances such as his planned attack against Quang Tri City. His major operations during the period have consistently failed as evidenced by defeats in the DMZ, at Loc Ninh and Dak To. His attempts to disrupt the GVN elections in September were equally unsuccessful.

4) The war is increasingly an NVA war. As his recruitment in the south dries up he is forced to replace losses in VC units with NVA troops. As the NVA takes over the war, Laos and Cambodia become increasingly important to him for sanctuary, supply bases and routes of infiltration. 90

CHAPTER II

Footnotes

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CHAPTER III

FRIENDLY FORCES

COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE


Pacific Command

(S) The Pacific Command (PACOM) was a unified command under The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and had its headquarters in Hawaii. Its area of responsibility comprised the Pacific Ocean and its islands (with the exception of the Aleutians), the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia (SEASIA). Within his area of responsibility, CINCPAC exercised operational control through the Service component commanders and the commanders of subordinate unified commands. The three Service component commanders assigned were the Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC), Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), and the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Air Force (CINCPACAF). The five subordinate unified commands were the US Military Asstance Command, Vietnam (USMACV), the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), the US Forces, Korea (USFK), the US Forces, Japan (USFJ), and the US Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC).

(S) In areas having a significant force of two or more services, but where no subordinate unified commands had been established, CINCPAC designated CINCPAC Representatives (CINCPACREP). During 1967 there were four CINCPACREPs: these were the CG US Army, Ryukyus Islands who was CINCPACREP, Ryukyus; the Commander Naval Forces, Marianas was CINCPACREP, Marianas-Bonin Islands (MARBO); the Commander, Naval Force Philippines was CINCPACREP, Philippines; and the USAF Liaison Officer to Australia was the CINCPACREP there. In addition, CINCPAC maintained a single senior military representative in each country or area within PACOM where US military personnel were on duty. CINCPAC was also the accredited

CINCPAC
CINCPACAF
CINCPACFLT
CINCUSARPAC
COMUS KOREA
CG 8th ARMY
COM NAVFOR KOREA
COM 314th AIR DIV
CHPROV-MAAGK
COMUS MACV
CG USARV
CG III MAF
COM 7th AIR FORCE
COM NAVFORV
COMUS MACTHAI
CHUSMAG THAI
COMUS TDC
CG USAR TAIWAN
COM TAIWAN PAT FOR
COMDR AIR TF13
DEPUTY CHUSMAG THAI
CHMAAG CHINA
COMUS JAPAN
COMUSAR JAPAN
COM NAVFOR JAPAN
CG 5th AIR FORCE
CHMAAG JAPAN
CINCPAC REP PHIL
CHUSMAG PHIL
CINCPAC REP RYUKYUS
CHMEDT BURMA
CINCPAC REP MARBO
CHDLG INDONESIA
CINCPAC REP AUSTRALIA
OPCOMMAND
PLANNING & COORDINATION
OPCONTROL

Figure III-1



1. ARMY COMPONENT COMMANDER
2. NAVY COMPONENT COMMANDER
3. AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER
4. ALSO DEPCOMUSMACV FOR AIR
5. ASGD PRIM RESP COORD AND COOP WITH ROK CAPITAL DIV AND 9TH ROK INF DIV
6. ASGD PRIM RESP FOR COORD AND COOP WITH ROK MAR BDE
7. UNDER COMMAND, LESS OPCON, OF USASAPAC
8. UNDER COMMAND, LESS OPCON, COMAFV
9. DIR MACT EXERCISES CMD AND OPCON
10. ELEMENTS UNDER CMD, LESS OPCON, OF APPROPRIATE TYPE CMDRS

LEGEND
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL
- COMMAND, LESS OPCON
- COORDINATION & COOPERATION

Figure III-2

US Military Representative or Advisor to the SEATO and ANZUS Councils, the Philippine-US Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Japanese-American Security Consultive committee. [1]

United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

(USMACV)

(U) The mission of USMACV was to assist the Government of Vietnam (GVN) in defeating the insurgent Viet Cong and the North Vietnam Army (VC/NVA) forces in extending governmental control throughout the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(S) COMUSMACV was designated by CINCPAC as the subordinate unified commander to exercise operational control of all assigned and attached forces in carrying out his responsibility for the conduct of US military activities and operations in RVN and in such other areas as CINCPAC directed. He exercised control through his component commanders and commanders of subordinate commands. COMUSMACV was also the representative of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and CINCPAC to the GVN with respect to the Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). The Chief of the US Mission supervised military assistance matters to the extent provided by law and in accordance with executive orders and instructions of the President. COMUSMACV, as the military member of the US mission, coordinated military assistance activities with other US governmental agencies represented in the US Mission and which were concerned with the execution of Foreign Assistance to RVN.

(S) USMACV had three assigned component commanders: CG US Army Vietnam (USARV), the Army component commander; Cmdr, US Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), the Navy component commander; and Cmdr, 7th US Air Force (7AF), the Air Force component commander. COMUSMACV exercised operational control of the US Marine Corps (USMC) elements in-country which were under the command of CG III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). With respect to logistic, administrative, and technical matters of uni-Service interest, the component commanders and CG III MAF reported directly to and received instructions from their respective military service commander at PACOM.

(S) The remaining subordinate commands were: I Field Force, Vietnam (I FFORCEV); II Field Force, Vietnam (II FFORCEV); US Army 5th Special Force Group (Airborne) (5th SFG); and the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). In addition there were various advisory groups and detachments assigned to MACV.

(S) USARV, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to and under the Command of USARPAC. Its headquarters was located at Long Binh. USARV was under the operational control of COMUSMACV. The main function of USARV was to provide COMUSMACV with US Army forces for the conduct of combat and combat support operations within his area of responsibility. In carrying out his responsibility, CG USARV commanded all US Army units assigned or attached by CINCUSARPAC. In addition, USARV discharged Army component command functions for uni-Service Army matters in RVN except for the administration of the Foreign Claims Act.

(S) USARV provided common supply and common service support to all US forces in RVN except to those forces located in the I CTZ and provided Army peculiar support throug.out the theater of operations. It also conducted US military support operations at ports and beaches in II, III, and IV CTZs. Logistically it supported FWMAF in accordance with established agreements and advised and assisted ARVN in the logistic support of force development and operations. Additionally, it assisted ARVN with the development of materiel and logistic organizational requirements and submitted them to approving agencies. In coordination with MACV elements, USARV exercised operational control of logistic programs for military assistance to the RVN and MAP-p·culiar items of the FWMAF.

(S) USARV performed US Army and FWMA Base Development functions and real estate functions in the II, III, and IV CTZs. Also, in those same corps areas, it constructed and maintained roads and bridges and commanded US Army developed bases in RVN as directed by COMUSMACV.

(S) In support of the RD program, USARV assisted the GVN, OCO, and other US and FWMA agencies in the coordination of the logistic aspects of RD Programs and supported RD through military civic action where practical and appropriate.

(S) USARV performed the functions of US area coordinator in II, III, and IV CTZs, coordinating specific administrative actions involving

two or more sevices or two or more elements of the same service. It also exercised operational control of that part of the US Military Assistance advisory effort which provided advice and assistance to the RVNAF Technical Services and the Area Logistic Commands (ALC).

(S) NAVFORV, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to and under the command of CINCPACFLT. Its headquarters was located in Saigon. NAVFORV was under the operational control of COMUSMACV and discharged naval component functions for appropriate naval matters in the theater of operations, less planning/coordination concerning SEVENTHFLT air, naval gunfire and amphibious operations. NAVFORV exercised operational control of the units assigned by CINCPACFLT and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV. With these forces, NAVFORV conducted air and surface surveillance, including visit and search; provided harbor defense; advised on port security and explosive loading; conducted harbor clearance and salvage operations; provided naval gunfire support (with MARKET TIME assets); conducted psychological operations; conducted river patrol operations; coordinated and conducted operations with US Navy Riverine Forces; conducted mine countermeasure operations; and provided combat support of US, RVN, and FWMA forces along the coast of Vietnam, in the RSSZ, and in the Mekong Delta.

(S) Logistic support in II, III, and IV CTZs was provided by USARV except for Service-peculiar items which were provided from NAVFORV's own Service resources as was the entire logistic support in I CTZ. NAVFORV conducted US military logistic support operations at ports and beaches and provided common item support for all US and FWMA forces in the I CTZ. It provided Service-peculiar support for US Navy and assigned US Coast Guard units throughout the theater of operations. In coordination with MACV elements, NAVFORV exercised control of logistic programs for military assistance to the RVN and MAP-peculiar items of the FWMAF.

(S) NAVFORV perfomed base development functions and real estate functions of all US and FWMA forces in the I CTZ. Also, in the same corps area, it constructed and maintained roads and bridges and performed airfield maintenance for air bases less those assigned to the Cmdr, 7AF. Naval Mobile Construction Support (NMCB) was supplied to III MAF and other US and FWMAF as directed by COMUSMACV.

(S) NAVFORV, through acceptance by mutual agreement with CG III MAF, performed some of the functions of the US area coordinator in

I CTZ that would have normally been the responsibility of CG III MAF. COMNAVFORV also served as Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV and supported RD through military civic action were practical and appropriate.

(S) 7AF, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to and under the command of CINCPACAF. Its headquarters was at Tan Son Nhut AB. 7AF was under the operational control of COMUSMACV. Cmdr, 7AF exercised command and direction of all tactical, tactical support, base support, and training units assigned or attached and served as DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations. He also conducted and coordinated offensive and defensive air operations, tactical airlift, air traffic control, search and rescue operations, close air support, and reconnaissance operations for US, FWMAF, and VNAF units which were not assigned or attached to 7AF. The authority that he exercised over III MAF air defense resources was agreed to between the Cmdr 7AF and the CG First Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW).

(S) Cmdr 7AF performed real estate functions of all US and FWMA forces at air bases where the 7AF had primary mission requirements, e.g., Da Nang, Chu Hanh, Cam Ranh, Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Binh Thuy. It also performed base development functions in accordance with MACV directives.

(S) Cmdr 7AF, in coordination with MACV elements, exercised operational control of logistical programs for military assistance to the RVN and MAP-peculiar items of the FWMAF. He provided weather and aerial port service services for COMUSMACV and supported RD through military civic action where practical and appropriate.

(S) III MAF, with units assigned, was a separate uni-Service command directly subordinate to and under the operational control of COMUSMACV. It was assigned to and under the command of CG FMFPAC. Its headquarters was at Da Nang. The CG III MAF conducted, in coordination with the CG I CTZ, unilateral US, combined US and FWMAF and/or combined US/FWMAF/RVNAF combat operations. He exercised operational control through the senior USASF command in the zone, of US Special Forces elements operating in I CTZ. He perfomed designated functions as the US area coordinaor in the I CTZ which were not otherwise assigned to the Naval Component Commander.

(S) Logistically, III MAF was supported by COMNAVFORV except for those Service-peculiar items which were provided from its own Service resources.

(S) CG III MAF exercised operational control of the USAAG, I CTZ and served as the Senior Advisor to the CG I CTZ and conducted operations within I CTZ to support RD activities in established Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) and in other areas as directed.

(S) III MAF provided close air support for ground operations, and designated to Cmdr 7AF those forces assigned to participate in and conduct air defense tasks.

(S) I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV, with their respective assigned and attached units, were assigned to and under the command of USARV from which they also received logistical support. Operational control was exercised by COMUSMACV. In their areas of responsibility (II and III CTZs, respectively), the Field Force Commanders exercised operational control of US and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV. With these forces, and in coordination with the CGs of their CTZs, they conducted US unilateral, combined US and FWMAF, and/or combined US/FWMAF/RVNAF combat operations. They exercised operational control of the USAAGs in their respective areas and served as the Senior US Advisor to the CGs of II and III CTZs respectively. They exercised operational control, through the senior USASF detachment in the zone, of US Special Force elements operating within their areas of responsibility. In addition, they conducted operations within their respective CTZs to support RD activities in established TAORs and in other areas as directed. In addition to the foregoing, CG II FFORCEV coordinated and conducted operations with US Army riverine forces in III and IV CTZs as directed.

(S) The 5th SFG was assigned to and under the administrative control of USARV with COMUSMACV exercising operational control. The CO, 5th SFG exercised command of subordinate detachments except for those elements conducting operations in a CTZ. In those cases he exercised command less operational control. He provided selected SF personnel to other in-country agencies as directed by COMUSMACV as well as providing advisory teams for Sectors and Subsectors.

(S) The 5th SFG provided RD support and psychological operations advice and assistance. Their mission also included training selected personnel from US/FWMAF units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to qualify them for successful long-range reconnaissance patrol operations.

(S) CO, 5th SFG provided advisory assistance to the Vietnamese Special Forces (VNSF) by training and assisting indegenous forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. He further assisted the VNSF by assisting it in the establishment of bases for the conduct of border surveillance operations, operations against VC base areas, and operations to interdict VC internal movement corridors. He developed, in coordination with the VNSF, material, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitted them to COMUSMACV.

(S) Logistically, the 5th SFG were provided common item support by USARV. SF peculiar support was furnished through PARASOL procedures.

(S) SOG was assigned to and under the operational control of COMUSMACV. However, USARV provided logistical support except for mission peculiar items which were provided through its own resources. SOG exercised operational control over US forces and personnel assigned or attached in order to execute missions as were directed by COMUSMACV or competent higher authority. It also advised, assisted, and supported the GVN and RVNAF in planning, coordinating, and implementing such missions as were mutually agreed upon between the US and GVN. It coordinated its activities with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern and in consonance with prescribed policies. In the area of contingency or emergency operations, SOG prepared unilateral US and coordinated US/GVN plans and developed GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as might be required under existing assumptions or agreements. CO, SOG acted as Commander (Designate), Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) for SEASIA and developed plans which were to be implemented on order, for unconventional warfare in that area. SOG also coordinated POST-SAR personnel recovery matters in SEASIA.

(S) There was one USAAG assigned to each CTZ. All were assigned to MACV and COMUSMACV exercised command less operational control. In the I CTZ, CG III MAF exercised operational control of the USAAG in that area and acted as the Senior Advisor to CG I CTZ. In the II and III

CTZs the CGs of the respective FFORCEVs exercised operational control of the USAAGs in their areas of responsibility and acted as Senior Advisors to their CTZ CGs. COMUSMACV exercised command of the USAAG in the IV CTZ. USARV provided all logistical support to the USAAGs except in the I CTZ where the Naval Component Commander provided logistic support less Service-peculiar items which were provided by USARV.

(S) The SAs exercised command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control over designated units through the Deputy Senior US Advisor except in the IV CTZ where the SA exercised command of subordinate advisory teams and operational control of designated units directly. In their areas of responsibility each USAAG provided assistance to the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting RVNAF military and paramilitary commanders and staffs at all levels in operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, and combat support and combat service support activities. They developed, in coordination with the CGs of their respective CTZs, materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitted them to COMUSMACV.

(S) In support of the RD effort each USAAG provided advice, assistance, and support to the RVNAF at all levels in planning and executing coordinated RD projects. In addition they assisted in the coordination of the military and civilian efforts in support of RD.

(S) Additionally, the SA in IV CTZ provided intelligence as directed by COMUSMACV and exercised operational control, through the senior USASF detachment in the zone, of US Special Forces elements operating in his CTZ.

(S) United States Naval Advisory Group (NAVADVGRP) was assigned to USMACV where COMUSMACV exercised command less operational control. COMNAVFORV exercised operational control of NAVADVGRP. Logistic support was provided by the Naval Component Commander in the I CTZ and by USARV in the other CTZs. Service-peculiar items were provided by the Naval Component Commander.

(S) The Chief, NAVADVGRP served as the Senior US Advisor to the Commander of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and to the Commander of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC). While exercising command and direction of subordinate advisory teams, he advised and assisted

the VNN and VNMC commanders and staffs at all echelons in achieving and maintaining a high state of combat readiness so as to fulfill their responsibilities for internal security, to defeat communist insurgency, and to resist aggression. In so doing he developed, in coordination with the VNN and VNMC, materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitted them to COMUSMACV. He advised the VNN in the operation of coastal surveillance centers in coordination with the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) to provide an interchange of information and coordination of effort between the VNN and US coastal surveillance forces.

(S) In the area of RD, he assisted the GVN, OCO, and other US and FWMA agencies in the coordination of RD programs and advised and assisted the VNN and VNMC in psychological operations and military support of RD.

(S) The United States Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) was assigned to MACV where COMUSMACV exercised command less operational control. The Cmdr 7AF exercised operational control of the AFGP. Logistic support was provided by USARV except for Service-peculiar items which were provided by the Air Force Component Commander.

(S) The Chief, AFGP, while exercising command and direction of subordinate advisory teams and operational control of designated units/detachments, advised and assisted the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in achieving a state of combat readiness through application of proper techniques, procedures, and training. He advised and assisted the VNAF in the conduct of combat operations and while so doing developed, in coordination with the VNAF, materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitted them to COMUSMACV. He also advised and assisted the VNAF in psychological operations and military support of RD.

(S) The United States Army Advisory Detachment, Regional Force/Popular Force (USAAD, RF/PF) was assigned to MACV where command was exercised by COMUSMACV. USARV provided logistic support. The Senior Advisor, USAAD, RF/PF provided assistance to the RVNAF in studying policy and concepts, and evolving an organization to develop and maintain an effective RD capability in the RF/PF by advising the Director General/Deputy Chief of Staff RF/PF and staff in all matters pertaining to mission accomplishment in functional areas of administration, operations, organization, training, and logistics. He also assisted

in developing, in coordination with the RF/PF Directorate, materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitting them to COMUSMACV. As a measure of progress, the SA evaluated the effectiveness of the RF/PF through inspections and reports, and coordinated corrective actions as recommendations through MACV or JCS staff agencies. In order to improve morale he insured that the RF/PF units and individuals received authorized welfare benefits and necessary administrative, operational, training, logistical, and combat support by monitoring related activities and reporting infractions to advisory agencies for action.

(S) The United States Army Advisory Detachment, Airborne Division (USAAD, AD) was assigned to MACV where it was under the command of COMUSMACV. USARV provided logistic support. The SA, USAAD, AD, while exercising command and direction of subordinate advisory teams, assisted the GVN in developing and maintaining an effective military capability by advising and supporting the Airborne Division commander and the commanders and staffs at all echelons in operations, training, personnel management, intelligence, and combat support and combat service support activities. He assisted in the coordination of the military and civilian efforts in support of RD. Also, he developed, in coordination with the Airborne Division, materiel, personnel, and organizational requirements and submitted them to COMUSMACV.

(S) The United States Army Advisory Detachment, Railway Securtiy (USAAD, RS) was assigned to MACV where it was under the command of COMUSMACV. USARV provided logistic support. The Senior Advisor, USAAD, RS advised the Commander, Military Railway Service on all matters pertaining to operations, training, intelligence, personnel management, logistics, and rail security while maintaining liaison with the SAs in each CTZ to insure coordination of effort in support of rail security.

(S) Sub-Unit one, First Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (1st ANGLICO) FMFPAC was under the command of FMFPAC and the operational control of MACV. Logistic support was provided by USARV except for Service-peculiar items, which were provided by NAVFORV. The Officer-in-Charge (OIC), 1st ANGLICO provided advice and assistance in planning, coordinating, and utilizing NGF units assigned for in-country support of all forces exclusive of USMC elements.

(S) On the national level the relationship between COMUSMACV and Chief JGS, RVNAF was one of coordination and cooperation. Each commander retained operational control of his respective national forces. Under this arrangement, RVNAF retained all territorial responsibilities.

(S) On the subordinate level the basic concept underlying command relationships between US/FWMAF and RVNAF was one of mutual support through coordination and cooperation in the mutual self-interest of each command. When the circumstances of the tactical situation required an integrated operation involving the forces of two nations, the commanders of the forces involved agreed to a direct support relationship. As a matter of US policy, US forces were not placed under the command or operational control of allied commanders, however, this restriction did not preclude temporary tactical direction of US forces by RVNAF or FWMAF commanders or the temporary tactical direction of ARVN or FWMAF forces by US commanders under certain circumstances.[2]



US AND FWMAF GROUND
DEPLOYMENTS TO RVN, 1 JAN 67
QUANG TRI
HUE
DA NANG
CHU LAI
QUANG NGAI
KONTUM
PLEIKU
AN KHE
BINH KHE
QUI NHON
CHEO REO
TUY HOA
BAN ME THOUT
NINH HOA
NHA TRANG
DONGBA THIN
CAM RANH
DALAT
PHUOC BINH
AN LOC
BOA LOC
PHAN RANG
TAY NINH
PHUOC VINH
DAU TIENG
BEN CAT
CU CHI
BIEN HOA
XUAN LOC
PHAN THIET
LONG BINH
SAIGON
BEAR CAT
PHUOC LE
MY THO
VUNG TAU
CAN THO
SOC TRANG
MAF
FLC
MAW (+)
2 (ROK)
2 CRID
CRID(-)
26 CRID
9ROK
9ROK(-)
25
196
PHIL CAG
25(-)
1(-)
199
9(-)
1ATF
116RNZA
173
ENG
MP
SIG
N
LOG

Figure III-3

UNITED STATES FORCES

US Army

(S) The US Army had deployed 244,712 personnel in RVN as 1967 began. Principal combat forces were the 1st Inf Div, 1st Cav Div (AM), 4th Inf Div, and 25th Inf Div, each with nine infantry battalions (the 4th Inf Div and 25th Inf Div each contained a tank battalion, the 9th Inf Div was partially deployed with six battalions in-country). There were two separate airborne brigades--the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, and the 173d Abn Bde--deployed in-country, as well as two separate light infantry brigades--the 196th and 199th--each of which was composed of three battalions. Additionally, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) was deployed with three cavalry squadrons. Supporting these units were 38 field artillery battalions, including 25-105mm howitzer battalions and three battalions each of 155mm howitzers, 155-eight-inch howitzers, and 175mm guns, plus the aerial rocket battalion, unique to the 1st Cav Div (AM). There were four air defense artillery battalions, 16 combat engineer battalions, seven engineer construction battalions, and 83 other type battalions in-country. Besides these, 56 aviation companies were deployed.[3]

(S) By the end of January, the 9th Inf Div had closed in RVN, increasing the number of brigades in-country to 20 and the number of infantry battalions to 57. One more cavalry squadron was deployed, as were a 105mm howitzer battalion, a 155-eight-inch howitzer battalion, and three more aviation companies. There were still two separate airborne infantry battalions, two separate cavalry squadrons, and one separate tank battalion which had been approved by SECDEF for deployment, but which had not yet closed in-country.[4]

(S) The units in-country and those scheduled for deployment through 30 June 1968 had been approved for deployment by SECDEF as a part of his so-called Program 4. This deployment schedule imposed a ceiling on the number of troops that could be deployed to RVN, and did not approve all the forces for deployment which originally had been requested. The troop ceiling, along with a piaster expenditure limitation, was designed to minimize the inflationary impact of the US buildup on the Vietnamese economy. Successful implementation of Program 4

depended to a considerable degree on the trade-off concept, which assumed that, prior to the program's completion date, units of higher operational priority could be substituted for those already deployed, or remaining in the balance of the program. By early March 1967 the program was 38,241 spaces short of full implementation. Included in this figure were spaces for five battalions or equivalents which could not be considered for trade-off purposes, further reducing the number of spaces remaining in the program, when considered in the light of possible trade-off action. In the light of Program 4, within the perspective of its operational requirements, COMUSMACV conducted continuing surveys to insure that each unit or detachment was productive and needed, and that each contributed effectively to the overall command mission, and to determine whether any could be reduced in strength, absorbed within other units, or deleted entirely. The surveys helped achieve maximum utilization of deployed forces, but failed to uncover areas where major space savings were possible. [5]

(S) By late March, it was apparent to COMUSMACV that the ceiling on US Army forces was inadequate to permit the timely accomplishment of the assigned missions. Therefore, he recommended that the ceiling be increased from 314,076 to 322,668. There were two principal reasons for increasing the Army force structure: it would standardize the organization of infantry battalions by adding a fourth rifle company to each infantry battalion in-country, and initial strength reporting errors and varying unit deployment strengths could be rectified. Without this increase, USARV would be forced to reduce its unit structured spaces by 5,487, which could be done only by reducing combat support units as well as combat service support units in order to maintain a balanced force structure. Some trade-offs were expected even within the spaces requested, in order to meet current requirements of a priority higher than some already programmed, but such trade-offs would be kept to the minimum. While SECDEF on 31 March approved a JCS recommendation that the MACV-reported Army base figure be adjusted upward by 4,944 spaces to correct earlier strength-accounting figures, he was deferring final implementation of an order to decrease the base figure by 2,803 spaces; consequently, the net increase amounted to 2,141 spaces in the Program 4 planned strengths for Army forces through 30 June 1968 establishing a new ceiling of 316,217 spaces. [6]

(S) COMUSMACV's concern with the absence of a countermortar (CM) capability in northern I CTZ caused him to deploy two radar detachments there. As he was interested in using CM radar with 175mm guns

for counterbattery fire and artillery adjustment, COMUSMACV directed USARV to review possible trade-offs to obtain at least ten of the 90 radar detachments deferred by Program 4. USARV fully recognized III MAF's need for ten detachments, but to meet it would leave field forces and air base requirements outstanding. Several trade-offs still remained to be accomplished, and three requirements were pending at JCS and DOD for which no trade-offs had been offered. If these, along with a concurrent rise in the Army ceiling, were not approved, then still more trade-offs would be needed, and identifying CM radar spaces would further complicate the problem. USARV recommended that the USA and USMC ceilings for RVN be adjusted so that the ten CM radar detachments could be included in Program 4 with no impact on the Army force structure. MACV had originally requested 111 detachments; Program 4 had deferred 102, but subsequent trade-offs reinstated two detachments for TSN Air Base and 12 for the field forces. Twenty-four AN/MPQ-4A radar sets were available in CONUS, of which 12 could be used with the personnel obtained by trade-offs. The other 12, to be operated by personnel trained in-country, were requested for immediate air shipment to RVN. DA advised that, contingent upon SECDEF approval, the 12 CM radars would be shipped to RVN prior to the activation and training of the detachments in CONUS. Three options were then available: (1) activate 12 detachments with in-country personnel and equipment assets (other than AN/MPQ-1A sets); (2) form provisional elements, using in-country personnel resources, to operate the 12 CM radar sets until DA activated and deployed detachments from CONUS; or (3) use some combination of trained detachments and in-country activations totalling no more than 12 CM radars. By 30 September 1967, nine of the 12 requested sets (AN/MPQ-4A) had arrived in-country and crew training started on 1 October 1967 using in-country personnel.[7]

(TS) Consideration was given early in 1967 to forming a SECDEF-favored second airmobile division, by converting either the 101st Abn Div (-) in CONUS or an infantry division in RVN, or by bringing together three separate brigades in RVN. A DA study on a second airmobile division envisioned the provision of some resources in addition to Program 4, but CSA thought it wise to assume that the division would have to be formed within the revised Program 4 ceiling. On 18 April COMUSMACV was briefed on the feasibility of forming a second airmobile division, using the 9th Inf Div as a base. COMUSMACV thought it might be better to reorganize the 9th Inf Div as a triphibian division, emphasizing its ability to move by helicopter and watercraft while retaining the minimum number of land vehicles. The division could be formed with three

amphibious battalions, two mechanized battalions, and four airmobile battalions. On 6 July COMUSMACV deferred converting the 9th Inf Div, but he still desired a second airmobile division in RVN to serve as an exploitation force in any CTZ and as a wide-ranging reaction force to enemy initiatives. The 101st Abn Div could be converted in RVN if additional resources, primarily aviation, were provided. COMUSMACV proposed to form the division by converting elements of the division (-) as it deployed, and as resources became available. The actual conversion date would be influenced by several factors but probably would be in the summer of 1968.[8]

(S) On 22 September 1967, SECDEF sent a memorandum to SECARMY approving the plan to deploy by air a Bde TF and the headquarters and control element of the 101st Abn Div (-) (approximately 4,500 personnel) in December 1967. Actual deployment would be authorized by normal deployment procedures through the JCS. Program 5 was to be adjusted accordingly. A decision on the accelerated deployment of the remainder of the 101st Abn Div (-) was to be made at a later date. On 21 October 1967 SECDEF approved the accelerated deployment of the remainder of the 101st Abn Div (-) as an air movement of personnel and equipment during December 1967. On this final decision, DA authorized the movement of the entire division (-), less 1 Trp--2/17 Cav--to deploy by air with ERD/PRD of 1 December 1967. A total of 10,403 persons were to be deployed with 101st Abn Div (-). The 1st Inf Div was designated sponsor for the 101st Abn Div (-) on 23 October 1967. The 101st Abn Div HQ and Spt Cmd was to be located at Locuhs Loa Air Base. The first Bde TF to arrive in RVN, regardless of which unit it might be, was scheduled to be located at Phuoc Vinh. In order to accomplish this the 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div was ordered to deploy to Quan Loi sufficiently in advance to permit occupancy by the first 101st Bde TF to arrive. The second Bde TF of the 101st Inf Div to arrive was to be located at Dong Xoai. By 12 November 1967, combat commitments and changes in the current tactical plans and operations had necessitated revision of the planned deployment arrangements for the 101st Abn Bde (-) in RVN. It was found that the 1st Inf Div would not have forces available to open the road between Phuoc Vinh and Dong Xoai and develop the Dong Xoai base prior to the arrival of the 2d Bde TF, 101st Abn Div. Therefore, it was decided that the 2d Bde TF would stage at Bien Hoa Air Base and move by road to Cu Chi to conduct 30 days of in-country training from that location. On 14 November 1967 the CG 101st Abn Div was informed that the effect of recent COMUSMACV directives on the final stationing plan for the 101st Abn Div made

Phuoc Vinh an undesirable location for the division forward CP and was informed to maintain the division CP at Bien Hoa. YELLOWSTONE commenced on 8 December 1967 with emphasis on opening and using roads to the maximum. Since this operation coincided with the arrival of 3d Bde TF, 101st Abn Div, it was decided to move the 3d Bde TF, 101st Abn Div from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Vinh via land LOC. The 3d Bde TF closed 8 December and commenced its move by land LOC to Phuoc Vinh. The last units of the 101st Abn Div closed 19 December 1967.[9]

(S) Air transportability was considered a prime requirement for artillery, especially in II Corps because of the inadequacy of the road net and the state of road security. The value of the 175mm self-propelled gun had been proved during 1966 despite shortcomings such as excessive tube wear. Also, neither of the larger types of self-propelled artillery--the 175s and the 155s--was air transportable. These weapons were either too heavy or their components too bulky to fit into available cargo aircraft. There was, therefore, still a strong requirement for towed pieces which were air transportable. Further, instances of simultaneous tactical operations in which major forces were transported entirely by air gave the towed weapon an important advantage over the self-propelled weapon. In April it was requested that two 175mm gun battalions, scheduled for deployment to RVN, be deleted from Program 4 and that two towed field artillery battalions (one 105mm and one 155mm) be substituted for them. Acquisition of the two towed battalions would provide a more flexible and effective mix of non-divisional artillery within limits established by Program 4. Additional medium artillery was required for II CTZ, which was programmed to receive seven and one-third heavy artillery battalions, but only five and one-third medium artillery battalions, including other FWF. The 155mm battalion, which was requested for deployment to Tuy Hoa in December, was desirable for deployment to II CTZ because it would increase the ratio of medium artillery and because it was air transportable. The 105mm battalion, which was requested for deployment to Bear Cat in October, would be used to provide light artillery support for base camp defense, to support ARVN operations, and for employment in heliborne operations in defense of Special Forces camps.[10]

(S) As increased enemy activity in I and II CTZ emphasized the need for more long-range artillery fires, CG USARV, on 27 June, requested permission to exceed the maximum 175mm tube density by two until August, when the 8th Bn, 4th Arty, 175mm gun (SP) was scheduled

to arrive. DA had already approved an increase of six tubes, by conversion of the 7th Bn, 8th Arty eight-inch (SP) to composite. DA approval was forthcoming, and 20 tubes were allocated to I CTZ, 12 to II CTZ, 18 to III CTZ, and two to IV CTZ. Upon arrival of the 8/4 Arty in August, tube density again increased by 12. [11]

(S) Eleven self-propelled 40mm air defense artillery automatic weapons (ADA AW) (SP) battalions and 15 quad-.50 machine gun batteries were required for operations in RVN. Since three of each had been scheduled for deployment through February 1967, the additional eight ADA AW (SP) battalions and 12 caliber .50 machine gun batteries were needed primarily to support US divisions and separate brigades fighting in RVN. COMUSMACV considered that the highly mobile, versatile weapons were an ideal addition which could provide a great increase in ground firepower for a relatively small increase in manpower, in keeping with the effort to substitute firepower and machines for men whenever possible. The weapons were needed to support the concept of operations in Campaign Plan for 1967. These weapons were planned for use in LOC opening/protection and convoying, in support of RD, in base and local defense, and to provide close support of maneuver battalions. Forces engaged in opening and securing LOCs required mobile weapons with great firepower, to conduct reconnaissance by fire of suspected ambush sites, and to provide an instant high volume of fire in the event of an ambush. The weapons would be positioned to defend critical points, bridges, defiles, and passes along the route. In convoying, weapons would be interspersed throughout the march column, but with emphasis on the lead and rear. They would support RD by securing rice harvests, disrupting VC tax collection, and rapidly reinforcing threatened hamlets. The weapons could be employed in quick-reaction force roles using their great mobility and firepower to counterattack enemy forces; they were capable of indirect fire covering a considerable area, and might in some cases be able to suppress mortar fire. The extremely rapid response would overcome problems of pursuit experienced by slower moving infantry units. Furthermore, use of these weapons would permit regular altering of base defense positions to counter normal VC detailed reconnaissance of installations prior to attack. Use of weapons in local defense would permit reduction of security forces tied down during operations protecting artillery positions, supply dumps, and remote areas for the local defense role. Such a weapons system was needed especially and was ideally suited to permit quick reinforcement of isolated special forces camps. In areas of infiltration the weapons would be assigned harrassing and interdiction missions. The explosive characteristics

of its rounds and the accuracy of the 40mm cannon of the ADA AW (SP) battalions were suitable for direct neutralization fire against the apertures of elaborate field fortifications normally constructed by the VC. On 17 July CG III MAF requested that an ADA AW Battery (SP), augmented with two ADA machine gun sections, be deployed to I CTZ to support TF OREGON. The weapons were needed to provide convoy escort along Route 1 from Chu Lai to Duc Pho, to provide security for road-clearing and engineer parties, and for economy of force measures, as well as to provide a mobile reserive reaction force. COMUSMACV could not approve the request, because ADA allocations were based on tactical priorities and requirements, size of CTZs, and division equivalents to be supported: the ADA battalion already in I CTZ was supporting three FWMAF division equivalents while those in the other CTZs each were supporting four. The missions CG III MAF outlined were common to the battalions in all CTZs.[12]

(S) In late March, the problem of slippages in deploying Army engineer units caused by engineer equipment problems was addressed. Slippages in Program 4 deployment dates were caused by the inability to supply from CONUS certain mission-essential items of equipment, notably asphalt mixing and paving sets, cranes, and crushing and screening plants. SECDEF proposed that the units in question deploy as soon as practicable, with equipment needs made up from assets then held by the RMK-BRJ construction concern. This proposal would take advantage of plants and equipment excess to RMK-BRJ needs and could assist in demobilizing the civilian firm by providing engineer units to operate and maintain equipment and plants operated by the contractor and for which COMUSMACV had a continuing requirement. At the same time, COMUSMACV was informed of SECDEF approval of the recommendation to deploy the last four engineer construction battalions included in Program 4 to RVN at 80 percent capacity. COMUSMACV was pleased with both of these developments, but emphasized the need for organic equipment to follow as soon as possible.[13]

(TS) Speaking at the MACV Commander's Conference in Nha Trang on 3 April, the outgoing CG of the 1st Cav Div (AM) commented on some of his impressions of operations in RVN. Among other things, he said:

> We haven't been doing well in keeping our strength in platoon leaders, key noncommissioned officers,

and riflemen. Companies of 130 men and battalions of 550 men are common, and this strength is too low.

(S) A study to analyze the strength situation in the divisions and separate brigades of USARV and III MAF was conducted 5-14 April. The study found that division and brigade assigned strengths were substantially above authorized strengths, but that rifle company foxhole strength varied from 20 to 45 men below the assigned level. There were two main causes for this condition: (1) the requirement for base camp and training support, and (2) deletions due to R&R, administrative absences, and battalion support requirements other than base camp. Program 4 ceiling negated the over-strength posture of the command by the effect of draw downs caused by the continued necessity to maintain base camps under current tactical doctrine. Two actions, considered necessary to relieve units deploying with a strength below minimum force effectiveness, were recommended. USARV and III MAF commanders were instructed to take all practical measures to improve the combat force strengths of rifle companies by monitoring the assignment and utilization of combat forces personnel, and COMUSMACV proposed to SECDEF an increase of 8,200 USA and 4,500 USMC in the strength ceiling of Program 4 to offset the draw down of personnel diverted from combat duty. 14

(S) A major in-country troop deployment was the formation of TF OREGON, which began early in April (see Chapter V). In response to the enemy situation in I CTZ, COMUSMACV deployed the 196th Lt Inf Bde (Sep) from the JUNCTION CITY area in III CTZ to Chu Lai, and directed one battalion of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div to deploy to Chu Lai on 15 April and the remainder of the brigade to close within a week. As the 196th Lt Inf Bde (Sep) closed on Chu Lai, COMUSMACV alerted CG I FFORCEV to deploy the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div to the OREGON AO on 1 May. On 20 April, CG III MAF assumed operational control of TF OREGON. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div exchanged designations and colors with the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div on 11 Agust, and on 22 September TF OREGON was designated the Americal Division. 15

(S) After having alerted CG II FFORCEV to be prepared to deploy a three-battalion brigade to II CTZ, COMUSMACV decided to deploy the 173d Abn Bde to II CTZ. The brigade was to become the I FFORCEV reserve, although COMUSMACV's approval was necessary before it could be committed to action. The initial elements of the brigade commenced landing in the early afternoon of 24 May, and landings continued every 15 minutes around-the-clock until shortly after dawn on 27 May,

when the last elements of the brigade closed New Pleiku, and I FFORCEV assumed operational control of the brigade. [16]

(TS) When the 1967 force requirements were developed, 124 maneuver battalions and their associated combat and combat service support were needed. Program 4, accepted because of piaster implications and the realities of Service capabilities, enabled US forces to gain the initiative, but did not permit decisive operations. By early 1967, the enemy had strengthened his structure, and was maintaining large forces along the DMZ, in Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries, and within RVN. Additional US forces were needed urgently and could be provided by reconstituting the original 1967 force package of 555,741. Reconstitution of the package would, in effect, constitute a six-month extension of the 1967 program, and would permit the shifting of force programming from a CY to a FY basis, long needed to make force programming compatible with other programs. COMUSMACV desired an optimum force structure of four and two-thirds additional divisions, totalling 199,017, with a total optimum force end-strength--when added to Program 4's 479,231--of 678,948. Two and one-third divisions were needed in I CTZ, where existing and potential force ratios were critical. A division and a regiment were needed in Quang Tri as a containing force and to release USMC units to expand the Da Nang, Hue-Phu Bai, and Chu Lai TAORs, and to increase security along the coast. A ten-battalion division in Quang Ngai would provide security in the coastal area, facilitate opening and securing Route 1 and the railroad, and relieve pressure on northern Binh Dinh Province. Four separate brigades were required in II CTZ. Two infantry brigades were needed, one in northern Binh Dinh Province to expand security along the coast and to support operations in Quang Ngai Province, and the other around Ban Me Thuot to operate against enemy forces and base areas and to add security to a thinly-manned region. Two mechanized brigades also were needed--one in the western highlands for offensive and containment operations in the Pleiku-Kontum area, and the other in Binh Thuan Province to neutralize enemy forces and bases along the coast and to open and secure Highway 1 and the national railroad to the III CTZ boundary. A division, preferably airmobile, based in Bien Hoa Province, north of the RSSZ, would augment the forces in III CTZ available to exploit success and to operate against the still-formidable VC 5th Div, and would be positioned favorably for operations against War Zone D, or for reinforcing Delta operations. In IV CTZ, primarily naval forces were required. Combat support and combat service support requirements for the optimum force structure were three air cavalry squadrons, four light aviation companies, three armed

helicopter companies, two medium aviation companies, one towed 105mm howitzer battalion, four 155mm howitzer battalions (two towed and two SP), and one 175mm gun battalion, as well as two combat engineer and two construction engineer battalions. [17]

(TS) As originally conceived, the minimum essential force was 80,576, organized into two nine-battalion divisions and a three-squadron ACR for deployment to I CTZ, one division and the ACR for Quang Tri Province and the other division for Quang Ngai Province. Deployment of TF OREGON to Quang Ngai Province filled the need for a division there and caused a reappraisal of the two and one-third division minimum essential force. TF OREGON deployment's most severe impact had been the loss to I FFORCEV of its reserve, the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. In order to return the 1/101st to I FFORCEV, COMUSMACV proposed to replace it with the first available additive infantry brigade. If an infantry brigade was not available until after September, a brigade of two infantry and one mechanized battalions might be acceptable. Accelerated progress in the Delta meant moving the 9th Inf Div to IV CTZ, but it would have to be replaced to maintain the required combat power in III CTZ. In order to do this, COMUSMACV proposed to deploy the southern division of the minimum essential force to Bear Cat. In view of these proposals, the revised minimum essential force placed one infantry division in Quang Tri Province, one infantry brigade in Quang Ngai Province, and one infantry division at Bear Cat. [18]

(TS) By May the rationale for the optimum force was still valid, but in-country deployments had dictated changes in both initial deployment areas and the composition of the forces. Previous MACV force requirements had been linked to geographic areas and two and two-thirds divisions of the optimum force remained so, but two divisions were desired as exploiting forces. Major operations, such as CEDAR FALLS and JUNCTION CITY, required that several units be massed to obtain the requisite 25 to 30 battalions, but competing requirements for the available forces did not permit sustained operations of such magnitude. As War Zone D had not been penetrated and neutralized, neither had War Zone C been neutralized effectively. A two-division exploiting force would provide sufficient forces to penetrate and neutralize major base areas until ARVN would begin pacification, and sustained operations could be initiated without reducing ongoing operations. The composition and location of the revised MACV optimum force structure was: [19]

1 Inf Div	Quang Tri Province
1 Inf Bde	Quang Ngai Province
1 Inf Bde	Binh Dinh Province
1 Mech Bde	Pleiku Province
1 Inf Bde	Darlac Province
1 Mech Bde	Binh Thuan Province
1 Inf Div	Exploiting Force
1 Airmobile Div	Exploiting Force

(S) On 19 May COMUSMACV was briefed on arrival schedules and stationing plans for a one and one-third division force as well as 33 infantry battalion packets to complete the fourth rifle company (ARCOV) conversion. The one and one-third divisions would consist of the 198th Inf Bde, 11th Inf Bde, and 101st Abn Div (-). COMUSMACV approved assigning the 198th Inf Bde to TF OREGON, or to Binh Dinh Province; the 11th Inf Bde was programmed for Duc Pho to relieve a 9th Inf Div brigade; and the 101st Abn Div was programmed for deployment to Bear Cat. COMUSMACV agreed that the priority for arrival of the 198th Inf Bde, 11th Inf Bde, and 101st Abn Div (-) in November 1967, April 1968, and May or June 1968 outweighed any accelerated deployment of infantry battalion packets which would result in deferring the arrival of the major units.[20]

(TS) On 22 March CJCS directed the Joint Staff to analyze COMUSMACV's proposed force requirements, addressing the validity of the forces requested, and ways of meeting validated requests on a time-phased basis. Two cases were to be considered, the first assuming a reserve call-up, and the second no reserve call-up. Specific solutions for each case were desired; a statement "that the required forces cannot be provided without a reserve call-up" was not a satisfactory answer. The study's 14 April completion date, although tight, apparently had overriding implications at the highest level and was not negotiable. The study concentrated on the minimum essential force, although the optimum force was addressed in general terms. The first of the two alternative force postures for RVN, Course A, envisioned an increase of at least 200,000 men against a backdrop of greatly intensified pressure outside RVN. The first 100,000 men, organized into two and one-third divisions and four tactical fighter squadrons (TFS), would be deployed in FY68, and the second 100,000, or another two and one-third divisions and six TFSs, in FY69, with possible later additions. Factors considered were: costs; actions to meet the schedule, consisting of reserve mobilization, extension of tours of duty, and

enlargement of uniform strength; use of the troops in RVN; US ability to switch from one course to another; domestic, Communist and international reaction; effect on Vietnamese attitudes; effect on the possibilities for settlement, and on the situation after a settlement; and possible actions by RVN and third-country forces. The second alternative posture, Course B, limited itself to such increases as could be generated without a reserve mobilization, probably nine battalions or 10,000 men. Factors considered were the impact on US military strategy; the effect on US flexibility of action; Communist, international and domestic reactions; the likely effect on the enemy; and the effect on possibilities for a settlement and on the situation after a settlement. Under the conditions assumed by Course B only one three-battalion USA brigade and one infantry division of nine battalions would be available for deployment to RVN by June 1968. No USA maneuver battalions could be provided in FY69, nor any USMC BLTs in FY68 or FY69. Fundamentally, Course B was a reduction of the minimum essential force by one division, and its adoption would require continued in-country redistribution to meet the formidable enemy threat in I CTZ. It would not be possible to continue large-scale offensive operations and still expand the areas under GVN control, but there would be no major change in basic strategy because of Course B. COMUSMACV believed that Course B would impact seriously on the RD program. In-country deployments of US forces had lessened the indirect military support of RD and Course B's additional forces were not likely to change the situation materially. The 50,000 increase in RF/PF would provide some increase in security, but RD teams were multiplying so rapidly that the density of RF/PF direct military support for RD would actually decrease in FY68. COMUSMACV believed that Course B would definitely slow RD progress, and intensified enemy pressure against the RD program would even result in its regression and weakening of GVN control over already secured areas.[21]

(TS) The National Military Command Center (NMCC) informed COMUSMACV that it planned to push Course A along with certain collateral actions in Vietnam, closing of NVN deep water ports by mining, destruction of a substantial number of the remaining high-value targets, mining of NVN inland waterways, and increased naval surface actions. NMCC felt Course B could lead to a regression of the war, except to the uncertain extent that it could offset by other categories of actions even more intense than with Course A, and was "completely unsatisfactory." NMCC also announced its intention to secure an in-country corps reserve of two divisions not specifically linked to a geographic area. CINCPAC pointed out that one of the key considerations as to which

course of action should be adopted was its influence on the length of the war. The length of the war could not, naturally, be predicted, but it could be assumed that the forces of Course A would substantially advance the day of victory. Not only was this important in terms of lives and resources, but also in terms of national stature and prestige and in minimizing criticism and opposition to the war effort. Hard decisions were required, but CINCPAC felt that long-term rather than short-term requirements should influence the decisions. Course A offered sufficient forces to meet an enemy escalation without an urgent need for more US strength; if the enemy continued at the same level, the PACOM strategy could be fully implemented; and if the enemy reverted to pure guerilla warfare, the PACOM strategy and RD effort could be executed with greater facility. Course B replaced the forces diverted to TF OREGON with a small margin for deployment to northern Quang Tri Province, but gave no buffer in the event of enemy escalation. If the enemy reverted to guerrilla warfare, Course B was adequate to implement COMUSMACV's campaign plan. Course B would meet many of the most urgent short-term needs, but quite likely, more forces would be required later. CINCPAC recommended that the minimum essential force be deployed by 30 June 1968, that steps be taken to insure the availability in the US of sufficient forces to deploy COMUSMACV's optimum force, that the air campaign be expanded and naval surface forces strengthened, and that authority be obtained to implement fully the PACOM strategy. Although elements of the MACV staff initially viewed the alternatives of Course A/Course B as indices of future policy, as the year wore on they appeared to be, instead, merely examples of the continual investigation of all contingencies by the Pentagon.[22]

(S) On 11 July DEPCOMUSMACV (in the absence of COMUSMACV) gave SECDEF, who was making his ninth visit to RVN, and CJCS five force packages which reflected to the greatest degree possible the concept of supplying COMUSMACV's FY68 force requirements, without mobilizing the reserves or extending terms of service, while minimizing US troop strength in RVN. The ground component of package five, consisting of the 11th Inf Bde, 101st Abn Div (-), 198th Inf Bde (which was approved already as part of Program 4), 9th MAB, and four separate battalions, to be formed from 24 of the 33 ARCOV fourth rifle company packets, was approved from FY68, and supplied 19 of the 21 maneuver battalions requested by COMUSMACV as part of the minimum essential force. Also established was a force ceiling of 525,000 for end FY68. SECDEF requested a detailed troop listing of major units

with their deployment capability, and the total unit/numbers constituting the 525,000-man ceiling. It was anticipated that civilian hire/contractor construction substitution on the order of 12,000-14,000 would be used to help meet the requirement while remaining within the ceiling. On 10 August the SECDEF tentativley approved the force levels for FY68. They were:

	USA	USN	USAF	USMC	TOTAL
Program 4	323,735	30,039	56,148	74,550	484,472
FY68 Added Forces	33,297	4,234	2,242	7,523	47,296
Civilianization	-5,414	-812	-542	-----	-6,768
Program 5	351,618	33,461	57,848	82,073	525,000

Realizing that troop listings had not been refined, SECDEF requested that such a listing be submitted for his review. To insure that US forces in RVN did not exceed 525,000, SECDEF wanted a monthly schedule of a civilianization/trade-offs, identified by unit and service, included in the submission. Any additional requirements in the refined troop list, including deferred units,. were to be accompanied by justification and corresponding civilianization or trade-off spaces.[23]

(S) Program 5 was approved by SECDEF on 5 October 1967 and included the substitution of 12,545 military spaces by retention of civilian construction contracts at a higher level than was currently programmed and the direct hire of civilians by military units. On 20 September 1967, COMUSMACV furnished the preliminary guidance on the civilianization program and directed the component commanders to initiate planning. In order to monitor the progress of the program, it was decided to have a monthly conference which would include the Civilianization Schedule as a discussion item. The schedule was discussed at the 18 October MACV Force Development Conference. The MACV component representatives indicated that the necessary planning was under way to implement the program. The major concern voiced by the representatives was the requirement for the necessary funding support in the areas of MILCON and O&M.

(S) Previously on 29 September 1967, COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that MACV intended to follow the initial portion of the contractor substitution portion of the program by deleting a NMCB (762

Navy spaces) and an AF Civil Engineer Squadron (600 AF spaces). He indicated that additional MILCON funds would be necessary for the successful implementation of the program. This was revised later on 12 October by recommending the temporary deployment of construction units scheduled for civilianization due to the shortage of MILCON funds. On 8 November 1967 CINCPAC was requested to appraise JCS/OSD of the requirement to provide the necessary MILCON and O&M support. As an accompanying action, a message to the components directed that they take necessary action through Service channels to obtain funding support.

(S) The basic guidance in preparing MACV Adjusted Force Requirements FY68 was contained in JCSM 416-67, dated 20 July. The component allocations in the message were revised by civilianization. The breakout by component is indicated below:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	USMC	Total
	358,133	37,811	59,528	82,073	537,545
Civilianization	- 9,595	- 2,050	- 600	- 300	-12,545
	348,538	35,761	58,928	81,773	525,000

The MACV Component Command submissions into the force structure were included in MACV Adjusted Force Requirements, and were briefed to DEPCOMUSMACV. A summary of this force structure is indicated below:

Program 4	323,735	30,039	56,148	74,550	484,472
MACV FY68	36,784	7,900	2,821	6,994	54,499
Totals	360,784	37,939	58,969	81,544	536,971
Trade-Offs	1,860				
Adjusted Totals	358,659	37,939	58,696	81,544	537,111

Civilianization	-9,595	-2,050	- 600	-300	-12,545
	349,064	35,889	58,369	81,224	524,566

(S) The initial USARPAC submission exceeded the MACV allocation to USARV. The reasons for this were USARPAC's use of a different ceiling and method of accounting. The different ceiling was based on JCSM, Cite 3632. Guidance from CINCPAC to MACV and further information gained indicated that JCSM 416-67 rather than the previously quoted message was the proper point of departure. The difference between the two USARV ceilings was:

JCS Message Cite 3632	351,618
JCSM 416-67	348,538
Difference	3,080

The USARPAC method of accounting was based on total force projected for Program 5 (i.e., total spaces authorized in-country as of 31 July 1967, total spaces authorized to deploy subsequent to 31 July 1967 under Program 4, and total additional spaces to bring the Army force structure up to the projected Program 5 ceiling). Under this method the Program 4 ceiling lost its identity. JCS, CINCPAC, MACV, USPACFLT, and PACAF based their accounting on Program 4 approved ceilings plus additional force requirements as projected by JCSM 416-67.

(S) The use of the higher ceiling permitted the insertion of the major items below into the initial USARPAC submission:

Six Btry (105T) (Not a stated MACV requirement)		632
Requirements generated by USARPAC/USARV combat support study		1,193
Deferred USARV List		
10 Dog Tracker Teams	220	
Dog Training School	33	

2 Sig Cbt Area Cos	344
Sig Spt Co	350
SEA Sig Sch	40
Conversion of 101st Abn to Airmobile	816
	3,628

An additional reason for the USARPAC overage was that they were carrying 1,164 spaces for treatment of civilian casualties above the USA-RV ceiling. This was in support of the MACV position that these spaces should not be charged against the 525,000 space ceiling. CINCPAC conference had insisted that these spaces must be within the 525,000 ceiling. The current MACV cor.. ..ent space allocations are indicated below:[24]

	Civilianization	Military
Army	9,595	348,880
Navy	2,050	35,472
Marine	300	81,939
Air Force	600	58,709
TOTAL	12,545	525,000

(S) On 3 August JCS recommended that CINCPAC convene a deployment capabilities conference in Hawaii on the latest feasible date permitting compliance with the schedule. The guidelines provided for the conference, which Joint Staff, Service, and OSD representatives were ready to attend, were to provide a detailed troop list, to purge low-priority units to make available assets for higher-priority units, to review recent recommendations in studies developing troop lists and schedules of civilianization/trade-offs, and to review and incorporate Program 4 approved forces which had not been ordered deployed. Spaces in credit account as of 15 August could be used as trade-offs, but JCS recommended leaving a cushion of credit to accommodate unforeseen adjustments. Among other agencies, COMUSMACV was requested to send representatives to the CINCPAC force requirements working group convened at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii during late August. The

working group prepared a refined troop list and deployment dates for forces in RVN, developed a monthly schedule for substituting civilian contractor and direct hire personnel for selected military support units, updated the forces required/deployment monthly data base to reflect the new requirements contained in the refined troop list, reconciled Program 4 strength figures, and established Logistic requirements related to the proposed deployment. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to accomplish the maximum possible refinement of the troop lists.[25]

(TS) In view of increased pressures exerted by NVN regular forces along the DMZ and throughout the entire I CTZ, and the limitation imposed by the onset of the NE monsoon season, COMUSMACV, in September, reassessed his plans to accomplish his fall-winter objectives which were to: (1) establish the 1st Cav Div (AM) as a countrywide offensive force; (2) reinforce I CTZ to the maximum extent practicable without unduly retarding progress elsewhere; (3) move additional elements of the division located in the Long Binh TAOR to the Delta area; and (4) reinforce III CTZ which would enable exploitation of offensive actions to open Highway I, neutralize War Zone C, disrupt War Zone D, and force the enemy into a vulnerable posture away from populated areas. Accelerated deployment of the 101st Div (-) and the 11th Lt Inf Bde permitted COMUSMACV greater flexibility in his planning. While his stated objectives remained valid, the additional resources enabled him to realign his planned force deployments; consequently, he ordered one brigade of the 1st Cav Div (AM) to I CTZ to free a Marine regiment for deployment further north. Concurrently, a regiment of armored cavalry would displace south to III CTZ where maximum advantage of its capabilities could be realized. Action was immediately initiated to move the 173d Bde base camp from Bien Hoa to An Khe; this would provide facilities at Bien Hoa for the early arrival of the 101st Div. It was envisioned that in mid-October the maneuver battalions of the 173d Bde would deploy from Phu Yen and Kontum to the PERSHING AO, and its fourth battalion packet would go to An Khe upon arrival on or about 23 October. Planned also for late October was the deployment of a second brigade of the 1st Cav Div along with the Div HQ to I CTZ to relieve additional Marine forces for employment in the northern areas. Upon arrival of the 1st Cav Div in I CTZ, the 1st Bde, 101st Div would deploy to Binh Thuan to initiate operations against MR 6 (PHOENIX). Upon completion of PHOENIX in late November, this brigade would pass to OPCON II FFORCEV for operations against the 5th VC Div (Operation SANTA FE) in December. Assuming the early

arrival of the 101st Div (-), it would be employed in late January or early February 1968 in Operation SAN ANGELO against MR 10 while simultaneously a multi-divisionoperation, DODGE CITY, would be launched against War Zone D. The success of these revised plans, however, was contingent upon SECDEF's approval of accelerated deployment to RVN of the 101st Div (-) and the 11th Inf Bde, and the continued retention of elements of the 9th MAB already in-country. One of COMUSMACV's primary considerations for accelerated deployment of the above units from CONUS was the possibility of an extended holiday moratorium resulting in an agreement of status quo on force deployments.[26]

(S) On 6 November 1967 SECDEF approved the request of SECARMY to deploy the 11th Inf Bde by surface transportation to RVN in December 1967. He directed that necessary in-country training should be conducted in a low-risk area. The 11th Inf Bde was requested to close in RVN not later than 24 December 1967. Strength on closing was to be 4,659. On 27 November 1967 the general plan for the deployment of the 11th Inf Bde and associated units in Vietnam was published giving the operation the short title of FROST BITE. Upon its arrival in RVN, command less operational control of the 11th Inf Bde to include advance parties and other organic/attached units arriving prior to the 11th Inf Bde command group was exercised by CG USARV through CG Americal Div. Upon arrival, the operational control of the unit and attachments was exercised by CG I FFORCEV. On crossing to I CTZ, operational control passed to CG III MAF through CG Americal Division. The unit arrived at Da Nang in late December and moved immediately to Duc Pho.[27]

(S) The USARV and MACV general plans for deployment of the 11th Inf Bde and associated units to RVN, were based upon utilization of Da Nang as Port of Debarkation (POD). On 9 December 1967 the POD was changed to Qui Nhon and movement by land LOC was directed to Pho De. The Americal Division was designated as the sponsor unit.[28]

(S) In September 1967 a requirement was noted for smoke generator support for DYE MARKER. The original request was for a Smoke Generator Platoon with the remainder of a Smoke Generator Company to follow when needed. A platoon from the 25th Chemical Company was made available from assets in Korea. The platoon was to be augmented by one fuel supply and one maintenance section. The unit was to depart Kimpo not later than 1 October 1967. On 14 October 1967 COMUSMACV was notified that the 62d Chemical Company (-) had been alerted for deployment on or about 20 October 1967.[29]

(S) In August 1967 it was decided to position the 7/1 Air Cav Sq, which was due to arrive in-country during February 1968, at Dong Tam. However, construction at Dong Tam had been halted at the end of Phase I of the program and the 9th Inf Div in its entirety was now to move to Dong Tam. When this was accomplished there would be insufficient space to accommodate a unit of the size of the 7/1 Air Cav Sq in that location. Also, in consonance with the guidance received from COMUSMACV, the immediate future operational planning was to be entered on War Zone C and that portion of MR 10 that was within III CTZ. The requirement also existed to establish a border seal between Bu Prang and Logo which would necessitate extensive use of long-range patrols and continuous surveillance along the Cambodian border. An alternate location was selected near Tay Ninh. This location was oriented graphically to best provide for the support contemplated in War Zone C and MR 10. When considered in conjunction with the employment of the 3/17 Air Cav Sq located at Di An, it facilitated accomplishment of the desired border seal. Also, Tay Ninh was so situated that a minimum of flying time was required in proceeding to and from the primary area of operations. [30]

(S) On 31 October 1967 COMUSMACV expressed concern to CINCPAC in that while the stepped up deployment of the 101st Abn Div and the 11th Inf Bde would greatly increase the combat power need to accomplish MACV FY68 objectives, the intensification of the combat activity would be considerably hampered until the mobility of those units was improved by the arrival of the Program 5 helicopter support. The first of the six assault helicopter companies programmed was not scheduled to arrive until December 1968, two more in January 1969 and the date of the arrival of the last three was not then known. The medium assault helicopter company in the program was not scheduled until August 1968. In addition, the decreased effectiveness of the referenced maneuver units, the pacification program, and SOG requirements were also affected by lack of adequate in-country helicopter mobility. COMUSMACV requested a stepped up program to have the units arrive in the 4th Qtr FY68 and 1st Qtr FY69. DA advised that projected aircraft production and pilot training schedules precluded accelerated deployment of the units requested. DA further advised that the dates listed below for activation and closure of these units were the earliest that could be projected at that time based on availability of essential resources: [31]

Unit	Strength	Activation Date	Close Date
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219	Jul 68	Jan 69
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219	Aug 68	Feb 69
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219AU	Jul 68	Jan 69
Avn Co Med Helo	255S	May 68	Nov 68
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219	Jun 68	Dec 68
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219	Jul 68	Jan 69
Avn Co Airmobile Lt	219	Sep 68	Mar 69

(C) In October, complete decentralization of OV-1 assets was accomplished. Disposition of OV-1 assets and OPCON was:

73rd SAC	OPCON CG, II FFV
131st SAC	OPCON MACV J2
225th SAC	OPCON CG, I FFV
244th SAC	OPCON SA, IV CTZ
245th SAC	OPCON III MAF

(C) DA initiated in August 1967 a phased program to standardize the organization of like units in RVN. On 16 November 1967 the following organizational structures developed during the initial phase were approved:

1) Infantry battalions would include a HQ and HQ company, combat support company, and four rifle companies at a strength of 920. Infantry battalions of the 9th Inf Div were exempt from this reorganization and would be addressed in succeeding phases of the program.

2) Mechanized tank battalions would include a HC and HQ company, service company, and three tank companies at strengths of 907 and 592, respectively.

3) Artillery units were augmented with additional FDC and FO personnel. DA was considering the addition of a fourth firing battery

to the separate brigades to support the fourth battalions concurrently programmed for those units.

Phase II of the program would address combat service units less those in the 1st Log Cmd and STRATCOM. Standard MTOEs were received from CG USARV for HQ DA review and analysis. A second DA team visit to RVN during the period 9-20 December 1967 sought to resolve issues isolated as a result of this review.[32]

(U) The proper utilization of manpower was a matter of constant concern to COMUSMACV and his staff. On the initial rapid move into RVN in 1965-1966, a logistical base was created in an underdeveloped country. The base was complete and efforts were turned to reducing support elements to the minimum essential. Approximately 1.2 million persons received some degree of service support from US military forces. Only 500,000 of this number were US military; the rest were RVNAF, FWMAF, and US civilians. The type and amount of support provided varied with the nature and location of the supported personnel and in many cases was not easily identifiable in terms of US manpower. Approximately 16,800 military personnel spaces were devoted to support for other than US military. Emphasis on combat power in the development of the Program 5 additive forces resulted in 81 percent being combat and combat support. As a consequence, the current percentage of US forces in combat service support was 40.3 percent, 4.7 percent less than in 1966. When considering the overall US military, FWF and RVNAF only 30.5 percent were engaged in combat service roles. This compared favorably with 43 percent in WWII and Korea.[33]

(S) As of year-end the in-country strengths by service was as follows:

Army	314,470[1]
Navy	31,669[2]
Marine	78,013[2]
Air Force	55,908[2]

Coast Guard	476
TOTAL	480,536

NOTE: [1]Does not include 16,619 transients and patients.

[2]Includes patient personnel as follows: (1) USN: 77; (2) USMC 858; and (3) USAF: 285.

US maneuver battalions in RVN were as follows:[1]

Army Divisions		Bdes/Regts/Others	
1st Cav Div	9	11th Armd Cav Regt	3
1st Inf Div	9	173d Abn Bde	4
4th Inf Div	10	199th Lt Inf Bde	3
9th Inf Div	9	1/50th Inf Bn (Mech)	1
23rd Inf Div (Americal	9[2]	1/1 Cav Sqdn 2/1 Cav Sqdn	1 1
25th Inf Div	10	Army Subtotal	13
101st Abn Div	10	III MAF	21[3]
		USMC Subtotal	21
TOTAL	66	GRAND TOTAL	34

[1]The term "Maneuver Battalion" does not include the divisional organic cavalry squadron.

[2]11th, 169th, and 198th Inf Bdes were attached to the Division with three maneuver battalions each.

[3]Includes two tank battalions and excludes two SLFs (one afloat and one ashore).

Planned deployments approved by SECDEF to round out the major portion of Program 5 were as follows:

*4/21 Inf Bn (11th Bde)

*5/12 Inf Bn (199th Bde)

*6/31 Inf Bn (196th Bde)

*5/46 Inf Bn (198th Bde)

*Denotes one maneuver battalion each for a total of four.

(S) Early in 1966 COMUSMACV, in order to provide field commanders with a responsive reconnaissance capability, directed them to form long-range patrol detachments at division and separate brigade level. His goal was to have sixteen trained long-range patrol teams in each division and eight in each separate brigade. Pending approval of these spaces, the six divisions and three separate brigades formed these teams on a priority basis.

(S) JCS document 2472/99, dated 22 June 1967, had authorized two infantry long-range patrol companies for deployment to SVN. Combat operations conducted in RVN established a need for these companies to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition for the Field Forces. These operations had been conducted by various long-range patrol units organized from division and brigade resources and by certain indigenous formations who were inadequate both in numbers and capability for the task. In July 1967 COMUSMACV requested the status of the two infantry long-range patrol companies. DA indicated that the companies would be activated in November 1967 and programmed to arrive in RVN in September 1968. This programmed arrival date was unacceptable to COMUSMACV and he requested that authority be obtained and action taken to activate these two companies in-country using existing resources to the maximum. He further requested that DA provide trained individual replacements. On 12 September 1967, DA granted authority to activate the companies in-country and stated that it would have the capacity to fill with Infantry AIT graduates starting in January 1968. The two units activated in-country were the E/20 and F/54 Inf long-range patrol Co's, each with a strength of 230 men.

(U) The following division and separate brigade Long-Range Patrol (LRP) units were assigned effective 20 December 1967:

Company	Parent Unit	Strength
Co E, 52d Inf LRP	1st Cav Div	118
Co F, 52d Inf LRP	1st Inf Div	118
Co E, 58th Inf LRP	4th Inf Div	118
Co E, 50th Inf LRP	9th Inf Div	118
Co F, 50th Inf LRP	25th Inf Div	118
Co E, 51st Inf LRP	Americal Div	118
74th Inf LRP	173 Abn Bde (Sep)	61
71st Inf LRP	199th Lt Inf Bde	61
Co F, 58th Inf LRP	101st Abn Div*	118

*To be activated on or about 1 January 1968. A LRP company had been requested for the 101st Abn Div prior to their departure from CONUS. However, DA did not have the assets to form the company in CONUS and authorized activation of the company after the division's arrival in RVN. [34]

US Marine Corps

(S) The III MAF with 68,767 Marines and consisting of the 1st and 3rd Mar Div, 1st MAW and a Logistical Support Command were deployed throughout I CTZ as 1967 began. The 3d Mar Div (-) was deployed within the Phu Bai TAOR, the 1st Mar Div (-) within the Da Nang TAOR, and Task Force X-Ray (1st Mar Div) and the 2d ROK Mar Bde within the Chu Lai TAOR. In northern Quang Tri Province, there were three infantry battalions deployed as operating and as RD-supporting forces. Additionally, a reinforced battalion was deployed to the Duc Pho area of Quang Ngai Province. CG III MAF did not believe that, within the force limitations imposed by Program 4, the TAORs could be expanded without long-term reinforcements. On a short-term basis, the TAORs might be increased or new ones established, although ARVN successes in RD would be the determining factor. [35]

(S) Very early in the year the precise command relationship existing between US Marines and their Vietnamese ally was clearly defined. Use of the term "OPCON" was displeasing to senior Vietnamese officers. An arrangement worked out between COMUSMACV and Chief JGS provided that VNMC task forces would remain under Vietnamese command and that the relationship between US and Vietnamese elements would be one of "coordination and control." The issue involved was political, and the approved solution simply circumvented a sensitive area. In practice, at the operating level, RVNAF commanders remained responsive to US tactical direction without regard to the technical distinctions between "operational control" and "coordination and cooperation."[36]

(S) As the enemy threat in the DMZ grew, the deployment of US Army troops to southern I CTZ permitted the concentration of Marine forces in the three northern provinces. As these deployments were proceeding, JCS authorized CINCPAC to employ additional elements of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) to reinforce COMUSMACV in I CTZ. A second Special Landing Force (SLF) was alerted for commitment to I CTZ on CINCPAC's order. The remainder of the 9th MAB continued rehabilitation, but was placed on a 15-day alert for embarkation to I CTZ. COMUSMACV thought that the situation in I CTZ warranted committing two SLFs as soon as possible, and the remainder of the regimental landing team (RLT) upon completion of the rehabilitation. The 9th MAB was organized into an ALFA group, having a 24-hour reaction time, and a BRAVO group, having a 96-hour reaction time; each consisted of one SLF. The remainder of the ground combat components were organized into a CHARLIE group and had a 15-day reaction time. To facilitate deployment, direct liaison among component commanders was authorized. On 19 April CG III MAF requested that the first available SLF be deployed by the ARG to Thua Thien Province on 22 April. Two days later CG III MAF requested that the second ARG/SLF be committed in I CTZ. The nature of the enemy contact, in I CTZ indicated a need for an additional regimental headquarters for control purposes, so CG III MAF requested that HQ 26th Mar Regt be deployed to Da Nang by air (see Chapter V for a discussion of ARG/SLF).[37]

(TS) On 21 March COMUSMACV directed CG III MAF to determine the feasibility of constructing a road into the A Shau Valley from eastern Thua Thien Province to support a forward firing base. CG III MAF reported on 15 April that it was possible to establish a forward firing base west of Hue along Route 547 from which heavy artillery fire could be

delivered against the A Shau Valley, and requested that the 6th Bn, 27th Arty be deployed to I CTZ for use in the forward firing base. The fire support base was completed on 31 July and, in the absence of other guns, 3d Mar Div and TF OREGON furnished two batteries, which reduced TF OREGON's assets to one four-gun heavy battery. Seven batteries were needed throughout I CTZ but only five were on hand, so CG III MAF requested that, since the 6/27 Bn had not been deployed, the 8th Bn, 4th Arty, scheduled to arrive in mid-August, be diverted to Da Nang and assigned to III MAF. On 2 August COMUSMACV approved the diversion of the 8/4 Arty from II CTZ to I CTZ. Other artillery deployments to I CTZ were in response to a 27 June CG III MAF request for additional USMC artillery to support the 26th RLT during the summer campaign season. The 5th Btry (155mm gun); 1st Platoon, 5th How Btry (8") K Btry, 12th Mar (155mm howitzer); and a headquarters battery were approved for deployment from Okinawa to I CTZ on a temporary basis until 1 September. All units had deployed by 15 August except K Btry, 12th Mar whose deployment date was estimated to be 26 August. In view of the late readiness date, it was decided not to deploy the battery before 1 September, but later as part of a normal intratheater rotation with a like unit in RVN.

By the end of 1967 US Marine Corps strength in RVN had risen to 77,636.[38]

US Navy

(S) There were 23,260 US Navy and 448 US Coast Guard personnel in RVN as 1967 began. Although stationed throughout the country, naval personnel were concentrated in I CTZ in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas; both Da Nang and Chu Lai were ports operated by naval support personnel. As with other US components in RVN, the Navy adjusted its personnel strengths within Program 4 to meet changing requirements. Some of the earliest adjustments in the year involved trade-offs to provide six advisors for VNN ships and ten advisors for newly formed RAGs. Another trade-offs was for one space to obtain a boat operations/training advisor for the RF/PF advisory group. Transfer of tactical employment of RF/PF boat companies to the VNN generated the requirement, and failure to provide the advisor could have resulted in decreased effectiveness not only within the RF/PF boat companies but also within VNN. One of

the larger trade-offs during early 1967 was for 254 spaces for liaison personnel between USN and VNN headquarters, and for personnel to man the OPCON center at COMNAVFORV headquarters. In early April, a self-propelled gasoline barge (YOG) was requested for assignment to NAVSUPPACT Saigon. The craft was needed to insure responsive POL support to the mobile riverine base (MRB), and the need for NAVSUPPACT Saigon to have an organic bulk POL resupply to Delta GAME WARDEN bases and MDMAF operations. Five GAME WARDEN bases were operational in the Delta, with two additional bases planned for July 1967. Introduction of the mobile assault force in the Delta would tax USA and contractor assets even more heavely. The YOG for NAVSUPPACT Saigon could fulfill a major portion of POL resupply requirements for the MRB as well as provide emergency POL backup for GAME WARDEN bases. Another 84 personnel, previously deferred in the Program 4, were requested to man the telephone exchanges at Da Nang and Chu Lai. In the absence of programmed personnel, the exchanges were being manned by personnel from other support units and even from USMC combat units. Failure to provide the personnel requested would have resulted in a continued draw down on other units in the proximity including USMC combat units. A helicopter squadron for GAME WARDEN was activated in April. The maintenance concept for the squadron for GAME WARDEN envisioned Navy performance of organizational repair and hangar maintenance at a single centralized site and line maintenance at satellites, while the Army provided total intermediate/depot maintenance and material support.[39]

(TS) Part of the mission of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment (NCR), located at Da Nang, was to provide engineering services for subordinate units. Additionally, the regiment requisitioned the end-use construction material for its subordinate units and operated a material yard to receive, store, inspect, issue, and ship the materials required in construction operations by all naval mobile construction battalions (NMCB) in I CTZ. The 30th NCR had relied on additional-duty personnel from subordinate NMCBs and contract third-country-national employees to provide these engineering services and material depot functions. Experience proved that reliance on such personnel was not a satisfactory solution to the staffing problem. To perform staffing functions on a continuous and effective basis, the regiment needed a minimum of 162 additional military personnel, which were requisitioned. Phase-down of contractor operations in RVN during 1967 envisioned projects being reassigned from the contractor to troop construction units, and it was estimated that at least one NMCB would be

required in III and IV CTZs for MDMAF, MARKET TIME, and GAME WARDEN operations, and one additional NMCB in I CTZ.[40]

(S) On 29 August COMNAVFORV replied to COMUSMACV's request for comments on the feasibility of providing a second PBR division with supporting bases and helicopters in I CTZ, in addition to 20 PBRs and two mobile bases programmed for deployment to I CTZ between November 1967 and February 1968. COMNAVFORV recommended that no GAME WARDEN assets programmed for the Delta be diverted to I CTZ and that requests for additional PBR units for I CTZ be deferred until their suitability in that area had been evaluated. There were 120 PBRs and 22 helicopters in-country, with 80 more scheduled for deployment, and SECDEF had tentatively approved 50 additional boats and nine helicopters as part of the FY68 Force Requirements. Except for the craft programmed for I CTZ, all GAME WARDEN assets had been justified on the urgent need to expand operations in the Delta and RSSZ. There were 450 miles of major rivers in the Delta and the 12 assigned sections could cover only about 25 miles of river each, for a total of about 300 miles. Ideally, there should have been one section per 15 miles of river, so that even with all assets, the force was less than adequate to patrol the Delta. A special problem existed in regard to helicopters. A shortage of pilots precluded manning more than 20 of the USA-loaned helicopters, although 44 had been authorized and nine more requested. The operational environment of the Delta also differed from I CTZ. The PBRs were lightly armed and armored, and depended on speed and maneuverability to move out of the range of shore-based weapons. The wide, relatively deep, long and interconnected Delta rivers were especially suitable for PBRs, while the confined channels of the shallow, short, and isolated rivers of I CTZ negated the craft's characteristics.[41]

US Air Force

(S) Although 1966 had been a period of rapid buildup of air assets in SEASIA, this acceleration was not expected to continue in 1967. It was, however, expected to be a year of modest gains stressing a realignment of forces. The realignments would be based largely on increased and continuing facilities construction and further refinement of tactical doctrine and definition of areas for concentration of operational effort. A modest program of increasing both personnel and

material assets in the air effort existed in all FWMAF as 1966 ended. Amall though it was, in contrast to past experience, the USAF buildup was still the largest of the contributors to the air effort. The year-end 1966 inventory for 7AF showed 1,234 aircraft (834 in RVN; 400 in Thailand) on hand of the 1,511 authorized, and constituted the largest fleet total to that date. Operating out of ten RVN and eight Thai bases, 7AF possessed 1,354 aircraft (948 in RVN; 406 in Thailand) in January, followed by a slight decrease in the inventory in February to 1,342 (954 in RVN; 388 in Thailand). Illustrative of the last six months' 1966 buildup was an increase of 49 percent in assigned strength, and only 33.7 percent in authorized strength. Numerically, 7AF asigned strength in January 1967 was 47,624, in February 45,731, and in March 52,131. Commensurate gains were registered in overall SEASIA Air Force commitments.[42]

(TS) In support of the Combined Campaign Plan 1967, COMUSMACV detailed the impact on USAF buildup for 1967 in a message to JCS on 20 March. In terms of personnel increases based on a minimum essential force of two and one-third divisions, the AF contingent would increase by 5,368--and by another 9,891 if the optimum force package were deployed. In the latter case, the total AF increase would be 15,259. Under the minimum essential force requirements aircraft assets would increase by five F-4 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) and one Troop Carrier Squadron (C-130), and would include an augmentation of 21 O-2A aircraft to various locations in-country. The TFS augmentation was based on a 5.0 sorties/day/manuever battalion planning factor. The total additional units made the construction of another jet capable airfield desirable but not essential; it did mean, however, that additional ramp space and handling facilities were required. The increase would be capable of supporting the planned 21 USA maneuver battalions increase in RVN, and the deployment of the USAF increase should coincide with the movements of the battalions. This, in turn, meant that three TFSs would be in-country in the northern area by November 1967 and two in the southern area by February 1968. The C-130 squadron would deploy in FY68 as the logistics situation dictated. The O-2 aircraft were planned on the basis of nine for each US division. These increases, in turn, required flight crews and maintenance and support personnel. Some service units requiring personnel augmentations were munitions, dispensaries, air police, base communications, emergency airlift, weather, postal, aerial port, construction, and tactical air control.[43]

(TS) JCS considered COMUSMACV's USAF requirements, addressing a minimum essential force of five TFSs in as much detail as possible, while considering the optimum force of five additional TFSs in general terms. Three of the F-4 squadrons would deploy in November 1967 and two in February 1968, corresponding to the supported USA units deployment dates. When the JCS alternative courses study was made, COMUSMACV assumed that Course B forces would include four TFSs with their required support. Course A, on the other hand, envisioned deploying four TFSs in FY68 and six in FY69. As with USA forces, in-country deployments by May had changed the locations where some of the forces were needed but had not negated the basic requirements. After SECDEF's July visit to RVN, two TFSs (A-1), were approved for deployment to RVN, and one TFS (F-4) was to be held in a ready status in CONUS for future deployment, as directed. Another TFS (A-1), previously considered by SECDEF for a CONUS-ready status, was deferred pending adequate justification. In addition to the USAF squadron, two USMC VMA squadrons were approved.[44]

(TS) Type aircraft introduced in the air buildup in SEASIA were O-2A, RB-58, Navy VP (L), C-130 (Commando Lance), and RAAF B-57. Other equipment introduced was Mobile TACAN, MSQ-77 radar and AN/MLQ-29 radar. Unit realignments commensurate with the 1967 air buildup included the 602d ACS, 20th Hel Sq, 606th ACS (Laos). C-130 airlift, ARDF aircraft, AC-47s, A6A aircraft, and HAWK missiles. The increased intensity of PSYWAR operations was reflected in the projected increase of 16 O-2A aircraft. Used primarily in support of forward area combat operations, the O-2A were to be used in each of the four CTZs in support of ARVN and FWMAF. The RB-58s were to be employed as Pathfinders. CINCPAC supported the CSAF proposal as "an excellent method to improve the all-weather bombing capability. . . ." Stationing of C-130 aircraft at Da Nang was delayed during the early part of the year because of operational and security problems. The Da Nang base was already overburdened with 1st MAW, USAF, and VNAF planes. To accommodate additional high-value aircraft would be to subject them to the risk of mortar attacks such as had occurred in the recent past. On 22 March CINCPAC decided that the augmentation would be "contingent upon relocation of aircraft now at Da Nang."[45]

(S) The in-country reconnaissance aircraft inventory, including aircraft from all Services, was 471 early in 1967, and was composed of

11 different types of aircraft. Additionally, SACs TROJAN HORSE (U-2) high-altitude reconnaissance program was available to MACV. This was in marked contrast to the modest B-26, T-28, and RC-47 inventory that USMACV possessed at its inception. Other augmentations to air assets during the first part of 1967 were four additional A-26 aircraft to the 606th ACS in Laos; an extension of time beyond 15 February by the RTG for the VP (L) detachment at U Tapao until a naval facility had been approved for that base; the relocation, on 21 February, and augmentation of the BIG EYE force after its move from TSN to Ubon; the retention of four HAWK battalions for RVN air defense in conjunction with two F-102 detachments and Marine F-4Bs; a contingent of MUDDY HILL aircraft and personnel into Thailand, scheduled for deployment in May 1967; and six ARDF-1 (RC-47) COMPASS DART, formerly called PHYLLIS ANN, to Udorn, contingent upon MACV's gaining its full complement of 47 such aircraft. [46]

(S) As part of a SEASIA TFS modernization programs, it was proposed to convert F-4C aircraft to F-4D, and O-1E to O-2A aircraft. COMUSMACV concurred with the manpower ceiling adjustment made necessary by converting F-4C aircraft to F-4D. The more sophisticated electronic equipment of the F-4D gave it an increased mission capability, but exacted a penalty in the form of increased maintenance. COMUSMACV also agreed that the manpower increase associated with the O-2A conversion was valid. The five F-4D squadrons concerned were to be located in Thailand. [47]

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF)

General

(U) In April 1967 COMUSMACV briefly summarized the progress of the Vietnamese Armed Forces as follows:

> I have worked with the Vietnamese military for more than three years, and I have learned to understand and admire them. A look at their record in combat, as well as in political administration, reveals an exceptional performance when all is considered.
>
> During the last three years I have seen them literally hold their country together. Despite their military background they have taken long strides toward developing democratic processes and institutions. They fought the enemy guerrilla and main forces alone, until we arrived, and, during that time, they were expanding their forces to the limit that their manpower and economy could support. Except for the Continental Army of our earliest years, never before in history has a young military force been subjected to such a challenge.
>
> In my book, the Republic of Vietman Armed Forces have conducted themselves with credit. As I tour the country several times each week, I am encouraged by the obvious improvement in the morale, proficiency and quality of their fighting forces.[48]

(S) Considerable progress had been made during 1966 in molding the RVNAF into a proficient military instrument. Kill ratios declined slightly in some units, but missing in action losses were much lower than in 1965, and weapons lost by the ground forces were reduced significantly. Increased present for duty strengths and decreased desertions were other indications of the substantial progress made by



ARVN DIVISIONAL AND
SEPARATE REGIMENT DEPLOYMENTS
QUANG TRI
HUE
DANANG
AN HOA
CHU LAI
QUANG NGAI
DAKTO
KONTUM
PLEIKU
AN KHE
QUI NHON
CHEO REO
TUY HOA
SAN HE THUOT
NINH HOA
NHA TRANG
DALAT
CAM RANH
PHUOC BINH
AN LOC
BOA LOC
PHAN RANG
PHU CUONG
CU CHI
BIEN HOA
XUAN LOC
PHAN THIET
DUC HOA
LONG BINH
SAIGON
MY THO
VUNG TAU
SADEC
CAN THO
SOC TRANG
BAC LIEU
1
51
2
42
22
23
18
7
25
9
5
21

Figure III-4

ARVN divisions. Problems remained, however. Desertion still demanded constant attention, particularly in some organizations. The Ranger Command had a desertion rate of 25.5/1,000, the Marine Brigade a rate of 27.4/1,000, and the Airborne Division the highest rate of all, 37.3/1,000 men. Analysis of the less-productive ARVN units revealed that the preponderance of them--two divisions, a regiment of a third division, and three ranger battalions--were in III CTZ. Three other ranger battalions and two ACRs in III CTZ were underemployed. COMUSMACV believed that these situations demanded constant command attention. Only marginal improvements had been attained in ARVN unit training. Command emphasis at all echelons was necessary to implement programs of in-place and refresher training. In early 1967 in-place and refresher training was virtually nonexistent, and the full potential of battalion refresher training of ten was not realized because of low personnel input and failure to meet programmed dates. Leadership training required a continuing program. Schools and training centers taught fundamentals, but there was a pressing need to extend the training to battalion and company levels.

(S) Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) had made some progress but much still remained to be done. Utilization of RF as individual companies had created problems in command and control. Deputy chiefs of staff for RF and PF had been created at corps and division levels, but were not adequately supervising the forces. Early in the year COMUSMACV recommended that a comprehensive study be made to determine a way of reducing the span of control of RF/PF to improve their effectiveness. Continued command emphasis was required to provide adequate logistical support, particularly of barrier materials and of weapons for combat outpost defense. More training of PF units was called for to increase their effectiveness. The vital role of PF in the development of RD made their strengthening a matter of priority.

(S) Logistic support had several areas which needed improvement. A centralized movement control agency was needed, as was an improved method of distributing supplies, particularly in the case of PF, which was short BARs, and M2 carbines, even though the items were available in depots. Maintenance was not adequate to support RVNAF. Field maintenance was generally satisfactory, but organizational maintenance had not improved. Depot maintenance was

deficient: although ordnance rebuild requirements increased, production did not rise significantly, so the backlog also increased.

(S) COMUSMACV directed his staff to establish a programming system to assist in quality improvement of RVNAF. The system would consist of the overall program with sub-programs within the purview of each staff agency, would extend to the advisory effort, and would incorporate periodic review and analysis. If Chief JGS agreed, the periodic review could be a joint JGS/MACV high-level effort on a quarterly or semiannual basis. COMUSMACV also recommended that JGS institute a similar system, because a business-like approach would help achieve quality improvement in RVNAF. 49

(U) On 11 January 1967 COMUSMACV met with his principal staff officers and component commanders to discuss means of improving RVNAF's effectiveness. The new role of the ARVN soldier in the RD program emphasized the need to improve his lot in life. Obviously a program designed to improve the well-being of the people would not succeed if one of the main participants was worse off than those he was trying to help. At the time of the meeting, the four most important areas for consideration were field and garrison rations, food for ARVN dependents, cantonments, and dependent housing. The RVNAF pay system made no provision for a ration allowance; subsistence in kind or increased pay would have improved the system, but whatever system was adopted needed to be flexible enough to meet local conditions. US help might be provided in several ways; perhaps the most practical was assistance in kind by providing staples. RVN would pay for the items, and the US would use the money to defer such in-country expenses as troop money exchange and contract payments. Captured rice was another source of rations. COMUSMACV directed CG USARV to assume responsibility for improving field ration utilization, for garrison ration commodities, and for the distribution system. When the field ration was issued, 26.5/33$VN was deducted from the soldier's pay; as this reduced the food-buying power of the family man, he preferred not to receive the ration and sold it when it was issued. It was recommended to RVNAF that the ration be issued free of charge. The garrison ration consisted of administrative foods distributed through RVNAF quartermaster depots and locally-procured perishables, and was supported through payroll deductions. Only rice was occasionally short, and USARV requested GVN to insure sufficient allocations of rice to RVNAF. Also supported, in principle, was a plan of the RVNAF quartermaster for an RVNAF farming project to provide part of the RVNAF requirements for perishables. Also note-

worthy was the establishment for the first time, on 21 February, of unit messes in regular RVNAF and RF company-size units.[50]

(U) USARV was also tasked to improve the RVNAF commissary system for the use of dependent food purchases, and to consolidate the PX and commissary into one system. By early May negotiations for US support of the RVNAF commissary system had been concluded. The agreement stipulated that the US would provide rice, sugar, canned condensed sweetened milk, canned meat or fish, cooking oil, and salt (or acceptable subsititute) for one year, at a maximum cost to the US of $42 million. The food items were to be imported into RVN tax-free, for the exclusive distribution through the RVNAF commissary system, which would not be taxed by the RNV. No food items were authorized for transfer to other RVN agencies, but would be sold only to RVNAF personnel and their dependents at a cost which would be significantly less than on the open market, but still high enough to produce sufficient revenue to fund improvements to the system, and to allow eventual US withdrawal. Piaster receipts from sales would remain the property of the commissary system and were not authorized for any other RVN agency; the RVN also agreed to provide the US a monthly financial statement. The agreement contained provisions for continuation of the system after US withdrawl, and for its extension, if mutually agreeable. The formal accord was signed on 26 May between COMUSMACV and Chief JGS in Da Nang.[51]

(C) The Cantonment Program consisted of two parts: (1) cantonments programmed and funded in the GVN Defense Budget (50 percent GVN and 50 percent US Joint Support Funds), and (2) the US-sponsored cantonment construction plan (MAP/MILCON Program) which provided cantonments for the force structure increase units of FYs 65, 66, and 67. The RVNAF cantonment program was hampered somewhat by competition for limited materials, labor, and transportation. The major deficiency was the lack of a master plan, compounded by possible changes in the location of RVNAF units participating in RD. MAP/MILCON was the responsibility of the Navy Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC).[52]

(C) The RVNAF Department of Housing Program had been initiated in April 1961, for personnel below the grade of sergeant. In 1964 the program was expanded to include all ranks and a separate RF program was begun. No PF housing existed, as personnel normally resided in their own houses. The CY67 GVN Defense Budget contained

300 million piasters to complete previous building programs and to build both officer and enlisted quarters; the houses to be erected with the CY67 funds were ten-family units, providing each family with a living area 3.5 meters by 10.5 meters. Spiraling costs were expected to limit new construction to no more than 3,000 units. On 11 January 1967 COMUSMACV assigned the principal US responsibility for the program to USARV, while MACV Directorate of Construction was responsible for coordinating policy and programs and for funding, relieving the PSYOP Directorate of further responsibility in the program. [53]

(C) III CTZ especially seemed to need assistance in this area, and in the closing months of 1966 COMUSMACV suggested that US materials purchased by MAP funds be used in the construction program. CINCPAC concurred and on 19 December SECDEF approved the proposal. A month later, II FFORCEV was directed to prepare a plan to implement the program and to present it to COMUSMACV. USARV was assigned responsibility for evaluating the program, providing funds, and controlling storage, issue, and use of materials. On 21 January, an initial planning conference met to assign responsibilities for the program. II FFORCEV was to prepare the detailed plan; ARVN III Corps assisted by the III Corps Advisory Team, would acquire real estate and select sites; and USARV was to provide funds, materials, and possibly transportation. On 24 February II FFORCEV submitted its plan for implementing the approved US-funded housing projects in III CTZ. [54]

(C) In January COMUSMACV approved a step which he had vetoed only months before--withdrawal of MAP support from unproductive or ineffective RVNAF units. The MAP Directorate initiated a program to identify unproductive units, and in April a letter was sent to Chief JGS. informing him of the program and potential candidates for withdrawal of support. The US Navy planned to reduce its support to VNN by $7,800 during FY68 by discontinuing support for two ex-fishing boats because they were not configured to perform any mission assigned to the VNN. Other likely candidates from the VNN were underwater demolition teams not properly employed, and a light cargo ship (AKL) which was used in a training role rather than in logistic support. ARVN also had units nominated for withdrawl of MAP support. In III CTZ the 22d and 23d Rgr Bns, and in III CTZ the 5th ACR, had ineffective leadership and were assigned inappropriate missions. Restoration of support would

be contigent upon corrective action being instituted. COMUSMACV wanted the program continued with final evaluation of unproductive units every June and December, which would give RVNAF time to take remedial actions. Curtailing support to regimental headquarters companies could present serious problems, but a possible solution would be to deactivate the regiment and use its productive battalions elsewhere. Loss of a battalion was not desirable but, if necessary, a regiment could learn to operate with three battalions instead of the four that most had. COMUSMACV stated that MACV was the administrator of US funds and equipment, and had the responsibility of insuring productive utilization of US resources. [55]

(C) Chief JGS wrote to COMUSMACV on 3 May, requesting that JGS and the MACV staff work together to improve substandard units. COMUSMACV concurred and directed the MACV staff to coordinate directly with JGS in improving substandard RVNAF units as they were identified. Since corrective measures had been initiated in the 22d and 23d Rgr Bns and in the 5th ACR, COMUSMACV decided to continue military assistance to them, but he proposed that the units be placed on probation until their effectiveness was established conclusively. [56]

(C) In early August the MAP Directorate identified additional RVNAF units for possible withdrawal of MAP support. Eighteen RF companies, 16 PF platoons, and 14 PF squads constituted the majority of the unsatisfactory or marginal units. Besides these, two ARVN infantry battalions, an ACR, an engineer battalion, a reconnaissance troop and an armored car platoon were identified as unsatisfactory. Deficient leadership, defective training, obsolete equipment, and low personnel strengths caused the low ratings. Deficient leadership was present in all but seven instances. One company commander was described as "seldom present," and "preoccupied with his own safety and comfort," while another was "absent for a two-month period due to self-inflicted leg-wound." Obsolete equipment caused two low ratings, and low personnel strengths appeared in 26 low ratings. Defective training programs accompanied deficient leadership in almost every instance. [57]

RVNAF

(C) Desertions continue to constitute one of the most critical problems facing RVNAF. Despite concerted MACV/GVN efforts to

decrease desertions in CY65, no decline was effected until the GVN issued Decreee Law 15 on 21 April 1966. Decree Law 15 and its corollary laws and memorandum provided harsh punishments for deserters, their accomplices, and harborers. A single definition for a deserter (AWOL more than 15 days), and the establishment of military field courts and front line battlefield labor units accompanied the new law. Decree Law 15 was issued only after persistent MACV pressure. A comparison of the first nine months of CY66 and CY67 desertion experience revealed a 37 percent decrease in the desertion rate. Fear of punishment played a major role in the decrease; however, the gradual improvement in RVNAF leadership, personnel management procedures and personnel services exerted a greater influence each day. The main causative factors of desertion that could be influenced by RVNAF, and the status of efforts to overcome them were:

1) Pay and Allowances. In RVNAF, as in the US Army, the morale of the individual soldier was dependent largely upon an effective and equitable pay system. RVNAF pay received continual attention. Since 1964, RVNAF pay was increased through 46 different pay actions in the form of adjustments, refinements, and general pay raises. During CY67 the following pay activities occurred:

a) Improved pay procedures to speed up the issue of pay checks.

b) Increased use of payroll audits.

c) Popular and Regional Forces payroll procedures were standardized.

d) Authorization of "rice allowances" amounting to 200$VN per month for each Regular and Regional Force serviceman and his dependents; and a flat rate of 200$VN per month for each PF serviceman.

e) Popular Force base pay was increased by 380 or 580$VN per month, depending upon the cost of living zone.

f) Effective 1 January 1968, all Regular and Regional Force servicemen received a base pay increase of from 450-500$VN per month. A pay increase was expected on 1 January 1968, for the Popular Forces also. The amount was not announced.

2) Messes:

a) Messes were an important morale factor which could provide another plus or minus to a potential deserter's decision. Full-time US food service advisory effort was employed in assisting the RVNAF to establish unit messes. At the end of September 1967, 1,029 unit messes were reported as being in operation. This constituted 41 percent of the number planned for ultimate establishment. Efforts to establish unit mess halls were hampered by equipment shortages. However, sufficient standard and nonstandard equipment was available by the end of CY67 in depots to outfit planned messes. Efforts were made to have RVNAF Area Logistical Commands (ALC) issue this equipment, and to induce commanders to submit necessary requisitions. The most difficult problem in establishing unit messes was the lack of command interest. ARVN unit commanders failed to grasp the influential role that a unit mess played in establishing and maintaining esprit de corps. This lack of command interest was also noticeable in the staffing for food service functions. There were no food service staff positions authorized in ARVN combat units. A Food Service Officer was authorized at each ALC, however that officer was responsible for ALC units only. RVNAF combat units received advice and assistance from the US Food Service Warrant Officers located at Corps G4 offices.

b) Effective 1 July 1967, MAP supported rations became available for free issue during combat operations. A one-day ration costed approximately 200$VN. It consisted of an A-Pack of 800 grams dehydrated rice, and a B-Pack consisting of canned beef, pork, or fish, plus an accessory package of salt, pepper, and candy. Indications were that rations were not reaching the troops. Most were being "held" at corps level where administrative red tape made it improbable that the units in combat operations were able to obtain them when required. III Corps was the exception. There they were released, under strict accountability, to regimental control.

c) Perhaps the most serious problem existed in regard to the cost of the daily ration provided servicemen who ate in unit messes. The daily ration rates, deducted from each participating man's pay at the end of the month, were computed at the rate of 33$VN or 36.50$VN per day depending on location. A determination of the countrywide average cost to provide a sufficient diet arrived at 60$VN per day. It was apparent that considerable adjustment was needed in the food allowances if that serious problem was to be improved.

3) Postal:

a) One of the factors influencing RVNAF desertions was the inability of the individual soldier to send money home to his family. The RVNAF postal system was doing a good job and its services were being expanded gradually. A comparison of mail movements CYs 66 and 67 by weight in kilograms for all APOs was as follows:

1966	1967	Increase
1,586,760	2,901,030	1,314,270

29 APOs were located throughout RVN at the end of CY67. Five new APOs were programmed for activation in CY68. In addition, there were 27 two-man postal delegations which provided postal services to remote areas on a "route" basis.

b) A comparison of postal money order transactions (cashed and sold) in millions of piasters for all APOs CYs 66 and 67 was as follows:

1966	1967	Increase
190.5	270.6	80.1

The above volume of business figures indicated a healthy development in the capability of the RVNAF serviceman to use the mails and in his acceptance of that system to send money home.

4) Awards. Recognition of a job well done was a positive moral factor. During CY66, 52,000 awards and decorations were presented to RVNAF servicemen, 13,000 more than were awarded in CY65. Significantly, those for Regional and Popular Forces increased 100 percent over CY65. For the first eight months of CY67, there was a 30 percent increase in awards over the same period in CY66. RF and PF still received too small a share of the awards; however, the importance of awards for the morale of the individual serviceman had received recognition and progress in this area was evident.

5) Commissary:

a) The RVNAF commissary system underwent a substantial expansion which assisted directly RVNAF members and their

dependents. Prior to CY67, the RVNAF commissary system could supply only 25 percent of the basic food and sundry items required in the four CTZs.

b) Under a 26 May 1967 agreement between COMUSMACV and Chief JGS, the US agreed to provide up to $42 million in foodstuffs for use in supplementing commissary stocks. Plans provided for a flow of 12,200 tons of subsistence commodities per month beginning 1 September 1967, into the RVNAF commissary system for purchase by the military at a cost below local market prices. Profits from that support were used to expand and improve commissary support to RVNAF. Units with 1,000 or more members could apply for a commissary account. As of the end of November 1967 there were a total of 93 retail RVNAF commissary outlets in RVN. By the end of CY67, ARVN planned to have 173 retail outlets in operation. The greatly improved commissary support for RVNAF was expected to exert a significant, positive influence on the desertion problem.

6) Dependent Housing:

a) Insufficient dependent housing had long been recognized as a factor which contributed to the high RVNAF desertion rate. On 2 August 1967, the Base Development Division, Central Logistics Agency, JGS, updated dependent housing imformation based upon information considered reliable as of February 1967. This update revealed that there was a shortage of 190,000 Regular Force family housing units and 70,000 Regional Force units. There remained 3,052 units from the CY66 program to be erected and 1,200 units to be erected in the CY67 program.

b) At the current rate of construction, dependent housing would not exert a positive influence upon the desertion problem for years to come.

7) Leaves:

a) Long delays in receiving authorized leaves are frequently cited as a contributory cause of desertion. The focal point in this problem concerned the granting of leaves to recruits after basic training, and to some degree, to Regular, Regional, and Popular Force servicemen serving under indifferent leadership.

b) On 2 August 1967 JGS published a new directive pertaining to leave for recruits. Although by year's end it was too early to assess the impact of the new directive, a major change was noted which should be watched closely. This change pertained to leave for recruits after basic training. Formerly, recruits were authorized a six-day leave plus a maximum of five days travel immediately after basic training. At the discretion of the receiving division commander, this leave could be deferred until after the recruit had served with his new unit for 90 days. Division commanders preferred this measure and reported that this procedure enabled the division to develop sufficient esprit de corps in the recruits to insure a better chance of having them return to their units at the end of their leaves. Problems developed, however, with recruits who felt that they deserved leave immediately after training and frequently deserted when leaves were not granted. There had been instances reported also of commanders further delaying leaves after the 90-day period of service with units. Under the new leave policy, recruits had to serve at least 90 days with units before becoming eligible for graduation leave. This new firm policy would eliminate any doubt in recruits' minds as to their privileges in regard to leave. Leave and pass practices in RVNAF required a continuing formal check to insure that a fair and equitable system was being followed. [58]

(U) COMUSMACV was concerned by the lack of an adequate GVN veterans' program. A MACV study revealed that the Ministry for War Veterans, established in March 1966, had instituted no new veterans' benefit programs. The Ministry operated a school for War of the Nation, and attempted to give job placements to veterans and veterans' widows and orphans. There were two homes for invalid servicemen of all components, but they had a combined capacity of only 188 and were in poor repair and inadequately staffed. The National Rehabilitation Institute, a prosthetics center in Saigon, was open to anyone, military or civilian, who had lost a limb because of the war, but was grossly inadequate to handle the demands placed on it. Besides these, there were two offices to help veterans and their dependents in collecting entitlements, and planning was underway to construct a vocational training center for veterans. [59]

(S) The use of military training programs to prepare RVNAF personnel to take their places as contributing members of the economy, following their release from active duty, was studied by MACV and by the US Mission. Extensive RD and other training presented in RVNAF

service schools, training centers, and tactical units produced a variety of managerial and artisan skills. Managerial skills were cultivated in the VNMA, the C&GSC--particularly since its recent reorganization--the National NCO Academy, and the OCS. Many RVNAF personnel had enlarged their professional skills through attendance at US service schools or higher educational institutions. Little retraining, particularly among the latter group, was required for these individuals to assume a productive position in the civilian community. Quite often the artisan skills taught in RVNAF technical service schools had direct civilian application, and frequently personnel trained in administrative functions needed only minor retraining to qualify them for civilian employment. Personnel trained primarily in military subjects had acquired some degree of mechanical aptitudes, some of which were readily adaptable to civilian pursuits. Others required varying degrees of supplementary training.[60]

(C) The GVN, in early January 1967, had no specially-designed program to prepare veterans for civilian occupations. There was a definite need to determine both the short- and long-range requirements for civilian occupational skills, to develop technical training programs to prepare RVNAF personnel in civilian skills, and for the establishment of a government placement agency for occupational training and placement of veterans. A MACV study was initiated to determine how better to prepare RVNAF dischargees to contribute to society. The study recognized that many RVNAF members entered active military service without any skills, and unless trained while on active duty, were discharged in the same status. The study also recognized that military service could be the vehicle to train personnel in a useful skill. In furtherance of the study, a MACV team of three officers visited Korea 4-17 March for background information on ROK military service programs for training military personnel in civilian-oriented occupations skills. The MACV team found that many of the training techniques used in Korea were applicable to RVN, although national differences precluded the use of large segments of the Korean program. Dischargee agricultural training, modified to fit RVN needs, technical training applicable to civilian skills, apprenticeship training of military personnel in technical skills, and centralized discharge processing points, with accompanying systematic statistical record-keeping of the veterans' pool, were all adaptable to the Republic of Vietnam. The MACV study was closely allied with a concurrent interagency committee chaired by USAID. After being briefed on the

study on 7 June, COMUSMACV directed that the study be filed for future use at the appropriate time along with other programs for the post-hostilities period.[61]

(U) Long standing RVNAF policy had been to retain its physically damaged personnel on active duty rolls because there were no facilities to rehabilitate them. As many as 10,000 were in this category. While the practice was understandable, COMUSMACV actively supported a program to give injured servicemen vocational training prior to their separation from the Service. The program, known as the Cat Lai Project, officially began on 22 July at the Cat Lai munitions plant, and was considered to be a real breakthrough in veterans' affairs.[62]

(U) Recognizing the magnitude of a complete veterans' program, COMUSMACV, on 26 August, recommended that priorities be established. The welfare of the physically disabled should have the first priority, closely followed by an extended retraining program, such as the Cat Lai Project. Advisors from the US Veterans Administration could be used advantageously in the program. The size of program dictated that realistic economic parameters be established to insure that the programs objectives could be realized. To expedite development of a viable veterans program, COMUSMACV recommended that the Mission Council support an expanded veterans program for RVN. In view of RVNAF's ability to accomplish a task faster and better than the civilian side, COMUSMACV also recommended that responsibility for veterans' affairs be given to the Ministry of Defense.[63].

(C) During the months of June through September 1967, responsible agencies within JGS prepared the CY68 GVN Defense Budget. Establishment of the National Defense College (NDC), expansion of the Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA), and improvement of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) all required substantial increases in the CY68 Defense Budget. Extensive coordination and justification was accomplished to assure adequate funding was programmed. All funding objectives were included in the CY68 budget except for 800,000,000$VN for new construction at VNMA. The MACV GVN Defense Budget Review Board had been instructed by COMUSMACV to fund the required new construction at VNMA using US joint funds.[64]

(U) NDC and VNMA employed detailed budget procedures in CY68. Action was initiated to obtain more detailed budget submissions from other schools for CY69. Towards this end, each school Senior Advisor

was requested to consult with his counterpart and prepare a detailed budget. This requirement went out in October and the response was excellent. The Vietnamese saw an opportunity to benefit their schools and cooperated fully. The last input was received 15 December 1967. Several of the best justified budgets were presented to CTC in an effort to persuade them to use this detailed budgeting procedure in other schools in CY69.[65]

(U) On 13 December 1966 Premier Ky had signed a decree converting the VNMA from a two-year to a four-year institution. Classroom instruction and curricula were to be patterned after the US Military Academy. Chief JGS initially opposed the curriculum, which featured electrical and mechanical engineering and the social sciences, preferring instead one which emphasized electrical engineering with lower priority on mechanical and civil engineering. The Superintendent, the Academic Dean, and the US Advisors at VNMA opposed this plan and a compromise curriculum eventually was adopted on 21 February. On 13 February, at the start of the academic year, the VNMA senior class voluntarily split into two classes, one moving into the four-year curriculum and the other remaining with the two-year program. Prior to 1967 cadets had been graded only semiannually in academics, and classes were based largely on lectures, with a minimum of outside study required. Beginning in February, cadets were graded daily in mathematics and physical sciences, and weekly in social sciences. Grades were posted weekly and the first resectioning, based on academic standing, occurred on 1 April and was continued every six weeks thereafter. Written partial reviews were given biweekly or monthly, and written general reviews were given in June and November. Lectures, the former mainstay, were frowned upon, and cadets were required to study three hours a night after an average of five hours' instruction daily. The Academic Dean, who held a Master's degree from the US Naval Postgraduate school, believed strongly in the study and teaching methods used at West Point. US officer advisor strength was increased from 6 to 13 to provide a well-qualified advisor to each of the eight academic departments. COMUSMACV strongly supported the VNMA, noting in a letter to Chief JGS that "continued development of the VNMA is one of the most important programs currently in progress to provide for the future of the Republic of Vietnam. I feel that it should be given high priority and continued command interest and emphasis." The program of expanding VNMA into a four-year degree granting institution continued throughout the remainder of CY67. Funds were made available for the modification of the Academic Building and

the purchase of furniture. More than 570 slide rules were provided from US sources. MASF in the amount of $52,000 was approved to assist in funding the translation and printing of textbooks. Two 30-position English Language Laboratories were provided through the MAP. The plans to be used in constructing faculty quarters were approved. COMUSMACV visited VNMA on 23 August 1967, was briefed by the Superintendent, toured the facilities, ate lunch, and spoke to the students. He was very pleased with the progress made at the academy. The CY68 expansion program was funded at 883,955,000$VN. The Corps of Cadet's internal operation improved in the five key areas of self-command system, leadership, counseling, honor system, extra-curricular clubs, and information programs. The athletic program was revitalized to enhance the cadets' athletic ability, confidence, teamwork, and leadership. The academic college made progress in the areas of cadet extra instruction, valid semester examinations, department POLs and SOPs and textbook selections. The new construction program continued to receive emphasis and work progressed on the difficult task of defining the design criteria for the heavy laboratory building. The CY67 recruiting program for prospective cadets received special emphasis, including radio and TV. This program resulted in a 49 percent increase in applicants over 1966 (416 for 280 spaces). A joint VN-US Expansion Committee meeting was held in November 1967. Problem areas were identified, discussed and assigned for action to appropriate agencies.[66]

(C) In January COMUSMACV approved a study of the CGSC, which found, among other problem areas, a poor reputation, low quality students, a faculty with marginal qualifications, and a need for more training funds. Chief JGS did not accept completely the recommendations of the study when it was presented to him, and directed the Central Training Agency (CTA) to make a separate study. The CTA study was completed in February and, although it differed from the MACV study on several major points, COMUSMACV agreed to its findings. Its recommendations were put into effect in March. Selection of students was centralized at CTA rather than delegated to Corps, and only qualified officers with career potential were selected. Further, CTA began assigning recent graduates of the US Army CGSC as instructors and increasing the length of the courses taught. The college continued to improve its program and to produce top quality RVNAF graduates throughout 1967. Academic improvements consisted of POI revisions, guest lecture program, student lecture and research requirements, MOI course for instructors, and a modern library index system.

Some of the college support improvements consisted of a college 5-year plan, a college SOP, detailed budget studies for CY68 and CY69, and renovation of storage and supply facilities. Those hours of instruction that were not pertinent to the situation in RVN were reduced and the courses streamlined.[67]

(U) Considerable progress had been made in implementing COMUSMACV's approval of planning for a NDC. A qualified SA and two assistants were assigned to work with JGS CTA as well as with a USAID-provided civilian educator in developing plans for the school. A committee of US officers was appointed to work with JGS to expedite the establishment of the school, and COMUSMACV was optimistic about meeting a February 1968 opening date. There were problems, however. Selection of an adequate site was critical, and after surveying several possibilities, the Vietnamese Press Directorate Building was found to be the most desirable and suitable. JGS experienced difficulty in obtaining the building and on 23 July COMUSMACV reminded the Vietnamese of the need to get the building or an acceptable substitute in order to meet the opening date. COMUSMACV suggested that JGS publish a decree establishing the NDC as an indication of high-level RVNAF support. Finding qualified personnel was a problem, but COMUSMACV thought 50 personnel could accomplish the mission as well as the 173 envisioned by the JGS. Although funding details were contingent upon site selection, COMUSMACV thought that the facilities, equipment, furnishings, and materials should be of a quality worthy of the senior RVNAF service college. Premier Ky signed the decree establishing the NDC on 23 August 1967 and phased occupation of the building at 2 Thong Nhut began the same day. On 28 August, 11,000,000$VN were made available for rehabilitation of the building. The faculty then consisted of two RVNAF officers, and additional members were selected during October 1967. The curriculum outline was finalized. Two courses were planned: a National Defense Course and a Senior Officer's Seminar. The former lasted ten months with the student body consisting of 20 senior military officers (LTC, COL, and BG) and key government civilians. The Senior Officer's Seminar met each Saturday and was attended by general officers and very senior civilians. The Advisory Detachment consisted of four officers, one NCO, two enlisted men, and two local nationals. MAP support funds were approved by CINCPAC for procurement of TOE equipment.[68]

(U) JGS announced a program to train enlisted men at the National NCO Academy, and subsequently to use them as infantry squad leaders.

Personnel selected would attend Phase II of the 21-week Reserve NCO course conducted at the National NCO Academy. Graduates would be promoted to reserve or regular sergeant, depending on their component before entering the course, and would serve as infantry squad leaders, either in the Regular or Regional Forces. Experie ce and aptitude were emphasized, the educational requirement being basic literacy rather than the nine years' formal schooling previously required. Airmobile training was incorporated into the training program. New leadership policies for students were instituted to include the rotation of command positions and the wearing of class leader insignia. The relationship between the US advisors and the academy staff improved markedly during the 3d Qtr CY67. The Leaders Reaction Course was revised and improved. Portions of the local security responsibility were turned over to military units.[69]

(S) In June 1966 DOD had agreed to a temporary freeze on the RVNAF force levels at the end FY66 strength of 633,645, but granted authority to COMUSMACV, with Mission Council review and approval, to adjust the RVNAF components' strengths within that figure. In early February COMUSMACV, with Mission Council approval, authorized the activation of one base ammunition depot battalion, two ordnance battalions, one composite demonstration artillery battalion, and nine RF rifle companies, as well as several other companies and detachments. In April COMUSMACV, wanting an RVNAF balanced force which was reasonably attainable within the manpower resources of RVN, and which would not generate inflationary pressure on the economy, revised the RVNAF force levels, still keeping them within the end FY66 force level. On 26 April COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC approval of the FY68 force levels necessary to support RD adequately, to continue converting CIDG to RF, to provide railway reconstruction security, and to continue the phased development of a balanced force. Significantly, the force structure proposed was substantially above the end FY66 force level.[70]

ARVN	288,908
VNN	15,964
VNMC	7,452
VNAF	16,448
RF	186,868

PF	163,088
RVNAF TOTAL:	678,728

(S) CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's request on 3 June and requested JCS approval. The Joint Chiefs, however, had a few questions, particularly in regard to the inflationary impact on RVN and US dollar costs, and likely increases in US advisory spaces, and asked COMUSMACV to investigate integrating Ranger units into ARVN divisions to save the administrative spaces allocated to the Ranger organization, as well as to review existing RVNAF overhead units to salvage scarce officer and enlisted leadership talent. There was an apparent contradiction as to the desirability of an RF/PF pipeline, and JCS requested that COMUSMACV clarify the matter.[71]

(S) The estimated piaster costs of the proposed force increase during FY68 were, in millions of piasters: Regular Forces--439.6; RF--1,283.9; PF--561.9. The estimated cost during the first half of the year was 929.4 million piasters, and during the second half, 1,410 million piasters. The estimated dollar costs, both one-time and recurring, were estimated to be:

	One Time	Recurring
US Army	$8,921,789	$15,013,158
US Navy	0	0
US Air Force	0	0

The possibility of assigning Ranger battalions to infantry divisions had been studied, but presented several disadvantages. Corps commanders would lose their reserve forces and become dependent on the divisions for reserve, Ranger esprit and aggressiveness was likely to suffer, and past experience suggested that Ranger units were likely to be malemployed. On 1 January a COMUSMACV--and Chief JGS--approved reorganization of a Ranger command and control system had been implemented, which assigned Ranger battalions to Ranger groups under operational control of the Corps and CMD commanders while the Ranger Command retained command, less operational control. COMUSMACV had approved a follow-on study which would have saved 2,500 spaces, but Chief JGS was reluctant to implement it. RVNAF overhead units were reviewed periodically as a matter of routine. An RF/PF pipeline, not desired in 1966, now was seen as a useful device to remove ineffectiveness from RF rifle and A&DSL companies.[72]

(S) In structuring the RVNAF force level inflationary trends, GVN mobilization policies, the balance of forces within RVNAF, and especially the manpower assets of RVN were considered. The proposed FY68 RVNAF force level was based on a RVN population estimated by the US Mission to be 16,500,000 which was considered sufficient to maintain the force through December 1968. Projections beyond that date were tenuous because experience factors and changes in population control would make it necessary to revise the force structure. A review, commencing in late May, tentatively identified an additional 13,000 spaces needed in the regular force. Designed to determine whether the forces were attainable within the time frame, the review considered leadership potential, recruiting capability, equipment availability as well as available manpower, and budgetary limitations. A prime requirement was for additional RF/PF as the areas under friendly control expanded. Generally, the training base and logistical support structure were adequate, with certain augmentations, to support an increase in the force structure, but the available leadership resources were likely to be strained severely if stretched to cover the proposed increases. Equipment and personnel assets presented a problem, particularly in I CTZ.[73]

(S) On 11 July COMUSMACV told Chief JGS of the increases proposed by the review. Another regiment for the 23d ARVN Div was especially needed as its 42d Regt had been deployed to the 24th Special Zone and the 42d Regt needed a fourth battalion to counter the enemy threat posed by the convergence of major infiltration routes on its zone. Additional ARVN artillery was needed throughout the republic, as were regimental reconnaissance companies and a Ranger regiment for the CMD. Logistical, training, and manpower considerations would delay some of the requirements to FY69. Manpower mobilization would be necessary to attain and maintain the increased force levels during FY68-69, but a loosely-controlled, rapid expansion could lead to low present-for-operation strengths, high desertion rates, and further dilution of the leadership potential. COMUSMACV suggested that MACV and JGS cooperate in developing an activation schedule of FY68.[74]

(S) When SECDEF visited RVN in early July he was briefed on an RVNAF force structure of 685,739. Later that month JCS asked that this figure be resolved with the earlier estimate. COMUSMACV replied that the RVNAF force structure restudy had considered alternative force structures and various mixes of RF/PF and regular forces. When examined within the context of projected US/FWMA forces troop

deployments, anticipated enemy activities, and projected operational plans, the April estimate had proved too low. The proposed modified FY68-69 force levels were:

	FY68	FY69
ARVN	296,050	305,820
VNN	15,964	15,408
VNMC	7,321	7,321
VNAF	16,448	16,448
RF	186,868	234,340
PF	163,088	184,616
TOTAL	685,739	763,953

The FY68 figure included a three-battalion Ranger regiment for the CMD, the extra battalion for the 42d Regt, the extra two-battalion regiment for the 23d ARVN Div, two artillery battalions, and a 3,000-man increase in the ARVN pipeline. To give regiments an organic reconnaissance element, 12 regimental reconnaissance companies also were included in the structure, which was expected to help resolve the problem of unauthorized units which had been inherited from 1966. The FY69 figure included a battalion to round out the 23d Div's two-battalion regiment as well as another battalion for the 9th ARVN Div's 15th Inf Regt. Four 105mm and four 155mm howitzer battalions would intensify ARVN's fire support capability. Although a figure of 100,000 RF/PF could have been justified, training-base capacity and manpower assets combined to limit the figure to 69,000. RF companies were allocated 34,500 spaces; PF platoons, 17,500; A&DSL companies, 6,000; sector/subsector headquarters, 5,000; command and control headquarters, 2,000; and the pipeline, 4,000. The force levels were based on the assumption that GVN would mobilize its manpower in January 1968 by lowering the draft age to 19, extending tours by one year, and recalling selected reservists. During FY69 the draft age would be lowered to 18, and terms of service extended to the duration plus six months. The US Mission long had urged such measures and now the Chief JGS seemed

to view the prospect favorably. While ARVN's manpower resources would support these levels, they were the maximum that could be sustained. ARVN's perennial leadership problem could be offset partially by retaining and calling up qualified and experienced combat leaders, phasing unit activations over the two-year period, implementing the program of US training teams with new RF companies, and decreasing the demand for junior leaders by reducing the scope of the constabulary concept. The increased FY68 force levels were estimated to cost an additional 0.6 million piasters in 1969 over the 1967 budget. Contingent upon GVN implementation of mobilization measures, CINCPAC recommended that JCS approve the revised FY68 force level and the FY69 force level for programming purposes.[75]

(S) On 10 October 1967, JCS informed CINCPAC that the FY68 Force Structure of 685,739 had been approved contingent upon the implementation of the necessary manpower mobilization measures by the GVN. JCS cautioned that some equipment limitations would be forthcoming. On 21 October 1967, COMUSMACV advised the Chief of the JGS of the newly approved force ceiling and authorized the immediate release of spaces to form one infantry regiment, two MP PW camp companies, and two regimental reconnaissance companies. The Chief of JGS was also informed that activation of additional units must be based upon a MACV/JGS jointly developed schedule and until that schedule was approved, all activations from the FY68 force increase would be handled on a case-by-case basis. The activation schedule would be developed after due consideration of manpower availability, recruiting experience, the continued development of leadership potential, the maintenance of adequate present-for-operations strength, the availability of equipment, and the capability of the support base.

(S) A combined Study Group had been appointed to work on the proposed reorganization. Field comments from both RVNAF and MACV agencies were considered in order to develop recommendations. At a briefing on 27 October 1967, COMUSMACV approved the following reorganization measures recommended as a MACV position:

1) At JGS level--the establishment of the position of Vice Chief of the JGS/RF/PF Commander.

2) At CTZ level--the establishment of the position of Deputy Commander for Territory/RF/PF Commander.

3) At DTA level--retention of the DTA with a clarification of pacification responsibilities at DTA and province level. Specifically, the DTA Commander would no longer be responsible for RF/PF and would no longer have approval authority for province RD campaign plans.

4) At Province level--the establishment of a combined position of province chief/sector commander with a military deputy to command the RF/PF.

Additionally, COMUSMACV approved the recommendation to place emphasis on improving the capabilities for command, control and support at sector and subsector levels, and directed a further review of the RVNAF reorganization in June 1968.

(S) On 11 November 1967, COMUSMACV approved several changes in the FY68 RVNAF force structure plan. Changes to the plan included:

1) 53d Regt (-): One battalion to be planned for activation and assignment to the 23d Div in the 3d Qtr FY68. The regimental headquarters and the planned second battalion to be slipped to FY69.

2) Spaces recouped from slippage of the 53d Regt (-) to be used to activate ten additional regimental reconnaissance companies in FY68.

3) Spaces for six of the 13 RF companies planned for railroad security to be reprogrammed to ARVN.

4) Six ARVN rifle companies to be authorized for activation on 1 January 1968 for assignment to the 18th Div.

The changes in the FY68 force structure required the reprogramming of 287 additional spaces from the ARVN pipeline. On 13 November 1967 the Chief of the RVNAF JGS approved the reorganization measures recommended by the combined study committee. The impact of the JGS approval, in terms of objectives sought and objectives achieved, was the same as approved by COMUSMACV on 27 October 1967. The implementation objective date for the measures approved was 1 January 1968. On 18 November 1967 the Chief of the JGS was again advised of COMUSMACV's concern over the low present for operations strengths in many of the ARVN maneuver battalions. On 26 November 1967 the Chief of the JGS was informed of the release of all the spaces (and adjustments)

in the VNN, VNMC, and VNAF as shown in the UAL for FY68. Certain units and spaces in the ARVN were also released at that time. A list of the ARVN and RF/PF units/spaces remaining in the FY68 plans which were not released was also provided.[76]

(U) On 9 December 1967, as a result of the force structure review, COMUSMACV approved a unit activation schedule for the remainder of the ARVN units in the FY68 RVNAF force structure plan. These units were to be activated between 1 January and 1 April 1968. Also provided were several recommended reprogramming actions to legalize existing activities and to provide spaces to activate or augment small service support units for which a need has been recognized. A total of 5,008 spaces were involved. As of the end of CY67 all of the additional RF/PF units in the revised FY68 force increase had been released to JGS except 60 RF companies and 135 PF platoons. Mission Council approval of the reprogramming actions in the CY68 force structure was obtained and CINCPAC/JCS were advised of the adjusted force levels. These new levels were:[77]

ARVN	301,468
VNN	16,003
VNMC	7,321
VNAF	16,448
RF	183,546
PF	160,953
TOTAL	685,739

(S) RVNAF leadership was a continuing source of concern to COMUSMACV. Repeatedly, field advisors' reports rated the leadership of numerous units as marginal or unsatisfactory. Generally, rapid expansion of the force structure, an inadequate base of experienced leaders, and the requirement for RVNAF personnel to occupy governmental positions, in the face of concurrent, pervasive insurgency and aggression, caused the poor leadership ratings. JGS and MACV exchanged thoughts and ideas on the problem, but isolated measures proved ineffective. On 21 July 1966 a Command Leadership Committe of five general officers, chaired by Chief JGS, was formed. The committee

was chartered to formulate comprehensive programs to improve leadership quality and personnel effectiveness throughout RVNAF. Several noteworthy actions resulted from the Command Leadership Program. A career management program for infantry officers, patterned after the US program, provided for rotation between remote and more desirable duty stations, alternation among command, staff, and service school assignments, and initial assignment of newly commissioned officers to combat units. The 1967 Officer Annual Promotion Procedures incorporated efficiency reports into the selection process for the first time, and made full disclosure to the field of the board's findings. The number of officers considered, the number selected, and the point average of selectees' records were published. The 1967 NCO Annual Promotion Procedures likewise made full disclosure to the field of the board's proceedings, and considered NCOs strictly on their merits with no thought given, as formerly, to unit NCO strength; imbalances were corrected after the promotion announcements through inter-unit transfers. The 1967 Enlisted Men Annual Promotion Procedures were concerned mainly with lowering the time in grade criterion for recommended promotion to Private First Class from two years to one year. The Small Unit Leader's Guide; a Vietnamese authored booklet, was distributed to company commanders and to platoon and squad leaders. A handbook on the responsibilities of platoon and company commanders was printed during March; a supplement to the Small Unit Leader's Guide, it contained sections on leadership, discipline, troop leading procedures, and company administration. An RVNAF Inspectorate General, with distinctive branch insignia, was established to conduct both individual complaint and redress procedures and periodic unit inspections. COMUSMACV offered to assign IG advisors and JGS responded quickly, requesting 16. Authority for battlefield promotion of enlisted men was delegated to division for sergeants and sergeants first class and to regiments for other ranks. A comprehensive Personnel Records Management Program was implemented and aimed at an accurate, responsive system for qualitative and quantitative identification of all personnel. The command leadership program was characterized by JGS enthusiasm, significant outputs, and comprehensive identification and evaluation of remaining problems.[78]

(U) MACV has had a system for evaluating RVNAF in effect since 1964. This system, since then, has passed through a number of evolutions, from essentially a narrative report in the beginning to a stylized, format type report. Each change in the Senior Advisors' Monthly Evaluation (SAME) report sought to gain more explicit data

permitting more detailed comparative analysis. Since 1966, SAME reports included both evaluation categories and statistical data. In general the evaluation categories were mission performance, morale, leadership, commander/advisor relations, troop and populace relations, personnel strength, resupply, intelligence collection and use, security, fire and maneuver, fire support, training, equipment, and casualty evacuation. The SA weighted all these factors and assigned an overall rating in combat effectiveness. In addition to the evaluation categories, advisors also submitted statistical data. In general, statistical data covered enemy and friendly casualties, enemy and friendly weapons captured or lost, large unit operations (day/night and contacts), small unit operations (day/night and contacts), and battalion days by type of operation (S&D, Security, and Reserve). The advisors provided "hard number" data in each of the categories mentioned. Since their inception, SAME reports have provided a wealth of information about RVNAF performance, particularly weaknesses. These reports contained very candid comments, which if revealed, could have seriously jeopardized the whole advisory effort. Consequently, careful security measures were imposed and the data were generally limited to in-house MACV use. Through the judicious use of SAME information, many improvements were effected in RVNAF. As is true of most systems, SAME had its shortcomings as well as its strong points. About six months previously, studies were commenced to evaluate the SAME system and recommend improvements. They took into consideration the expected installation of the IBM 360-50 computer at MACV and the consequent increase in analytical capabilities. The current systems for evaluating the VNN and VNAF were examined and it was decided that they were adequate to meet the MACV needs, therefore, the emphasis was placed on improving the capability to evaluate RF. The process of assessing combat effectiveness of ground forces was very complex. The number of variables involved was almost unlimited. As a consequence, there was no simple method of rating combat performance. Although all variables could not be addressed and the limitations of human judgement could not be completely eliminated, it was determined that RVNAF effectiveness evaluations could be improved. The outgrowth of this improvement effort was a System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER).[79]

(U) This resulting system (SEER) was a conclusive effort of two separate studies. It combined the best features of both studies into a single system. The J3 developed portion of SEER evaluated ARVN, VNMC, and VNN while a CORDS developed system was incorporated

to evaluate RF/PF. On 9 December 1967 COMUSMACV approved, for implementation, the concept of SEER. It consisted of four subsystems, Army and Marine Forces Evaluation System (AMFES), Air Force Evaluation System (AFES), Navy Force Evaluation System (NFES), and Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES). AMFES and TFES were to be automated for electronic data processing as soon as possible. TFES was under the cognizance of CORDS; all others were under J3. A revised MACV Directive No. 335-13, the implementing directive was to become effective on 1 January 1968. From the SEER came a quarterly briefing to COMUSMACV, a periodic report of problem areas to staff agencies, feedback reports to advisors, and special analysis as required.[80]

(U) MACV studies of the RVNAF administrative systems designed to identify and promote personnel with leadership ability consistently identified the lack of an effective mechanism to punish or at least stigmatize, negligent and lethargic personnel who occupied leadership positions. RVN had been reluctant to consider the negative aspect of the leadership picture, but as a result of continued urging the National Leadership Committee on 9 June decreed that "Officers who commit a serious offense pertaining to military discipline, mission or obligation may be reduced in grade." This authority assisted commanders in dealing with lax, negligent or poor performance of duties by their officers. Recommendations for demotion were to be considered by disciplinary board convened by the same authority who could promote to the offender's grade. The RVNAF Command Leadership Program addressed primarily the positive means of bringing leadership ability to the fore. The essentially negative processes of demoting those officers who clearly demonstrated a lack of leadership ability helped to round out the array of tools which could be used in developing leadership. Advisors at all levels were urged to press their counterparts to use this new tool against personnel identified as ineffective leaders and commanders.[81]

(S) On 3 March COMUSMACV replied to a JCS Memorandum which outlined a new concept of employment for RVNAF general reserve battalions. Prior to that time, general reserve battalions had been rotated between their Saigon base camps and combat areas on an almost routine basis. A one-for-one rotation policy did simplify operational planning, but it militated against employment of the general reserve as a true national reserve force and did not permit full flexibility of employment to meet the ever-changing national priorities. The new JCS concept

envisioned employing battalions based on the need to accomplish certain tasks, for gaining the initiative in certain areas, and for reinforcing others in the face of major enemy concentrations. Greater utilization was also expected by requiring corps commanders to outline the proposed employment of battalions and to justify the additional forces requested. COMUSMACV thought that general reserve battalions should be used more extensively in IV CTZ to gain the initiative, especially since the effort there was primarily Vietnamese. COMUSMACV noted that the VNMC Brigade usually had been employed in I CTZ; while this permitted the VNMC to train and operate with USMC units, it did not capitalize fully on their amphibious capability. There were several areas in III and IV CTZ where the VNMC could be employed profitably in amphibious operations which would lead to closer relationships between VNN and VNMC and, in the long run, would be beneficial to the RVNAF.[82]

(U) At COMUSMACV's suggestion, Chief JGS agreed to initiate a program review and analysis system similar to the MACV system to aid JGS/RVNAF in evaluating their progress. By MACV request, the Army Concepts Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), assisted by Booze-Allen Applied Research Inc. (BAARINC), developed a managing technique by which JGS could develop an appropriate program review and analysis system. Four Vietnamese officers were assigned to the project. The Program Review and Analysis Improvement System (PRAISE) contract was initiated on 24 June 1967 with work to be completed by 31 December 1967. Interviews of principal staff agencies of JGS/RVNAF were conducted to identify specific problem areas to be used as the intial programs in PRAISE. Five programs were selected for detailed study, Revolutionary Development Refresher Training, AG Program for Computerizing Strength Accounting, PX/Commissary Program, Military Telecommunications Net, Vietnam, and QM Farm Program. The end products were to be a PRAISE manual describing the RVNAF Program Review and Analysis System including the five programs mentioned above in full detail, and a catalogue of sub-programs which would serve as a reference document for the sub-programs that ultimately would be prepared in detail. The BAARINC contract was extended until 30 June 1968 to provide instruction for key staff officers, as requested by JGS. This extension would require BAARINC to train key personnel of JGS/RVNAF in the managing techniques essential to review and analysis activities. Four classes were to be conducted, each 4-5 weeks long, yielding a total student output of about 64. Students would be carefully selected and during the course would, as a

part of their practical work, develop actual programs for subsequent use by their respective staff sections. BAARINC would also conduct a 3-4 hour orientation course for JGS/RVNAF senior officers, and would prepare a complete Program Review and Analysis document. The cost of the contract extension was $67,000-$70,000.[83]

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

(S) The Army of the Republic of Vietnam had an assigned strength of 283,898 on 1 January 1967. It consisted of ten infantry divisions, an airborne division, two separate regiments, an armor command, a Ranger command, and supporting units. On 7 November 1966, a proposal to provide a separate regiment to the Capital Military District (CMD) had been found feasible; it would reduce the number of general reserve battalions needed around Saigon on a continuing basis, and, as a stable combat unit in highly-populated district, the regiment would contribute to RD efforts. Spaces for the regiment could be provided by inactivating four Ranger battalions, as well as a battalion from both the 5th and 25th ARVN Divs. These spaces, plus the Quang Trung Training Center Security Battalion, would be enough to form a four-battalion regiment. A letter recommending establishment of a regiment for CMD was sent to Chief JGS on 2 March 1967. The CMD was to be a paramilitary force built around three ranger battalions, a ranger group headquarters and a ranger headquarters and service company. COMUSMACV directed that this force be identified as a regiment, be given the necessary support and Service elements to make it self-sustaining. Further, that the combat capability of the regiment's battalions be increased. A plan was developed based on this guidance and included the additional personnel required in the FY68 Force Structure Plan. On 20 June, COMUSMACV approved 771 spaces to accomplish this requirement. On 26 June, the J3 directed that JGS be informed of this plan and that plans for organizing this regiment to include the necessary TOEs be developed. A letter was sent to J3/JGS on 30 June informing them of this plan and a DF was sent to the Training Directorate requesting assistance to counterparts in developing the necessary TOEs and MTOEs required for forming the unit. A conference was held on 3 October 1967 with representatives of USARV, JGS, CMD, and MACV staff agencies to determine the status of the organization and to resolve problem areas. At this conference it was decided to accept the JGS

continuation of the designation of the 5th Rgr Gp. Problem areas discussed included transportation requirements, howitzers for the artillery and related equipment, advisor support and the necessity of having the 5th Rgr Gp ready to assume the mission as the 199th (US) Inf Bde was phased out of the area of operations. Most serious problem concerned vehicles and howitzers. The phaseout of the 199th (US) Inf Bde started on 15 November 1967 with that portion of the mission being assumed by elements of the 5th Rgr Gp.[84]

(S) ARVN armor performed well when it contacted the enemy, but a MACV analysis showed that its full potential was not being exploited. Senior ARVN commanders did not understand armor's offensive capabilities; they piecemealed units and did not use squadron headquarters to command and control task forces on combined operations. ARVN corps and division commanders tended to retain armor units near their headquarters, almost as a "palace guard." Several measures would increase the effectiveness of ARVN armor: relocation of some units, using squadron headquarters to command task forces on combined operations, and returning operational control of maneuver units to squadron headquarters. On 7 January COMUSMACV approved for planning purposes a MACV study recommending realignment and relocation of ARVN and US armor and mechanized infantry units. It recommended relocating and consolidating the 3d ARVN ACR around Phan Thiet, and the 8th ARVN ACR at Ban Me Thuot. Balancing these II CTZ realignments, a battalion of the US 4th Inf Div would be mechanized and possibly the US 2d Bn, 47th Inf (Mech) would be diverted to II CTZ. Also recommended was redeployment of the 5th and 10th ARVN ACRs from III CTZ to IV CTZ, attachment of the 1/5 Tank Troop to 1st ARVN ACR, and extension of the 1st ARVN ACR into the 31st DTA. There was c[illegible]iderable US armor located in III CTZ, and the two ARVN ACRs could be employed more effectively in the Delta.[85]

(S) On 20 April Chief JGS requested that COMUSMACV lend ARVN 50 armored personnel carriers (APC). US forces, however, were experiencing a shortage of APCs and COMUSMACV refused the request, although he noted that USARV had requested that delivery of APCs in FY67 be expedited in view of the higher-than-expected combat losses. US advisors believed that ARVN APC assets exceeded slightly their authorized allowances; the discrepancy was caused by ARVN's considering 33 APCs attrition stock and failing to report some battle losses to the advisors. COMUSMACV urged that every possible action

be taken to use fully the facilities of the 80th Ordnance Base Rebuild Depot, which could handle 25 vehicles per month, rather than the five usually found there. COMUSMACV also noted that USARV had developed a program to rebuild some RVNAF APCs at the US Army Depot at Sagami, Japan, and urged Chief JGS to support the program.[86]

(U) Perhaps one of ARVN's greatest challenges in 1967 was to belie its image, in the eyes of many, as a defeated, demoralized army. As a correspondent for the Washington Star wrote in April:

> The South Vietnamese army was created as an anti-Communist force 12 years ago amidst the wreckage of the French Indochina empire. It never managed to mature, and now it lacks the strength, the unity and the morale to meet the challenge. The huge US military commitment to Vietnam has not had the effect of revitalizing the troopers who once fought alongside the French Union forces on the same battlefields that Americans stalk now. In much of the country, US troops have replaced rather than reinforced Vietnamese. Statistically the Vietnamese army is fighting much less than it did two years ago when, in the months of crisis, American ground troops were rushed in to prop up Vietnam against a Communist military victory. All the present Vietnamese generals fought on the French side in the Indochina war, and the shadow of those days in defeat by the Communist peasant army still falls heavily in Saigon. The stigma of having once belonged to a defeated army has never really been erased from the Vietnamese officer mentality.[87]

(S) As these words were being written, US advisors were rating 148 out of 153 ARVN battalions as combat effective, and ARVN combat activity, in terms of battalion-days spent on search-and-destroy operations, was increasing by 20 percent over the average of the first three months of 1967. For the entire first half of 1967, COMUSMACV was "gratified" by the progress shown in the overall effectiveness of ARVN. The number of ARVN battalions rated unsatisfactory in combat effectiveness declined from a 1966 monthly average of 6.7 to 1.5 for the first six months of 1967, and marginally effective battalions dropped

from 17.6 to 5.8. Infantry battalions had averaged 55 percent of authorized strength during 1966, and 77.8 percent for the first six months of 1967. There had been several instances of both improvement and increased aggressiveness during early 1967. During May, the 2d Rgr Gp conducted a two-battalion airmobile operation deep in the jungles of II CTZ, which prompted the US advisor to say, "an operation such as this could not have been successfully executed six months ago." The 18th Div, historically one of ARVN's poorest performers reacted well when informed of a NVA battalion's location; a two-battalion task force was formed which, in cooperation with US units, killed 123 enemy while losing 51. Two groups of the Airborne Division, long recognized as an elite unit, far surpassed previous accomplishments during May and June in I CTZ, killing 833 enemy while losing 63. After describing a successful defense by two companies of the 2d Bn, 9th Regt, 5th ARVN Div, 10 km east of An Loc early on 11 July, COMUSMACV said:

> The morale and esprit of the ARVN units were outstanding throughout the attack. The unit had received 75 new replacements ten days prior to the attack and there was not one case of any cowardice or unwillingness to fight on the part of any ARVN soldier. The leadership exhibited during the conduct of the defense was extremely professional. It is very encouraging and . . . extremely heartening, and perhaps serves as an indicator of increased ARVN efficiency.[88]

(C) Not only in defense was ARVN experiencing success. Increasingly, ARVN displayed its willingness to close with and destroy the enemy. During the second week in July, in Quang Tri Province, the 2/1 Inf Bn attacked an estimated enemy battalion, killing 146, while losing 10 killed and 80 wounded. In IV CTZ, from 26 July - 4 August, a 7th Div search-and-destroy operation killed 234 enemy, captured 217, 30 weapons and 35,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, while losing 16 killed and 93 wounded. COMUSMACV noted:

> In my view the recent improvement of RVNAF combat effectiveness can be measured in terms of their willingness to carry the fight

> to the enemy, and to close with and destroy him in sharp, violent contact. They have demonstrated the well disciplined attributes of professional soldiers, and a vastly improved ability to use their supporting arms and combat support. They have maneuvered with notable success and closed with the enemy. They have participated successfully with US forces in multi-battalion operations. The results of many battles in recent months demonstrate a marked and unmistakeable improvement in combat effectiveness.

As of 9 November 1967 additional impetus was given to the program to improve the image of the RVNAF. COMUSMACV forwarded a letter to General Vien emphasizing the need for awareness within RVNAF of the necessity of gaining a favorable press and expeditiously presenting the result of their operations to foreign newsmen. The possibility of conducting joint US/VN daily press briefings for correspondents was being explored. More balanced coverage on AFRTV and the Stars and Stripes was sought. The information advisory effort was actively to assist RVNAF Information efforts. Senior MACV officers emphasized RVNAF achievements with newsmen and influential visitors. This was a subject that demanded continuous attention. The plan was not intended to show a sudden, obvious concentration of attention on RVNAF activities. It was designed to help the RVNAF, in all ways possible, to gain due recognition for its loyalty, courage, continuing improvement, and its long fight against insurgency which was overshadowed by the major US units conducting large operations against major enemy formations.[89]

(S) To recognize the substantial improvements in ARVN was not to be blind to its very real deficiencies. Leadership still needed improvement. The long years of war had taken their staggering toll, and as ARVN's aggressiveness grew and enemy contacts mounted, so did casualties. Simply because of their greater exposure, the losses impacted most heavily on combat unit enlisted men and their immediate leaders, already an area of critical concern. In April, of the five ARVN units rated combat ineffective or marginally effective, all were deficient in leadership, especially among noncommissioned officers and company grade officers. Also, activation of the remaining RF companies for 1967 would aggravate the deficiency of junior officers and NCOs. To improve the production of leaders, especially infantry

platoon leaders, COMUSMACV on 12 July recommended that Chief JGS expand Phase II of Reserve Officer Candidate Classes 25 and 26 to allow the attendance of as many as 200 NCOs and enlisted men in each class. The recently approved program of selecting qualified enlisted men of the Regular and Regional Forces promised to be a fruitful source of infantry squad leaders. Low operational unit strengths was another problem which promised to become even more significant. COMUSMACV endorsed expansion of the volunteer and conscript quotas to increase accessions of combat unit replacements. An accession increase of 10 percent was necessary to absorb probable increase casualties and to meet the possibility of having to fill RF companies with conscripts. While increased accessions could cause a temporary overstrength in the Regular Forces, understrength in RF/PF would be a balancing agent. COMUSMACV promised Chief JGS his full support if an overstrength resulted.[90]

(S) Concurrently with his efforts to improve the effectiveness of ARVN, COMUSMACV also wanted to increase the tempo of ARVN combat operations. While there had been a general increase in the tempo of the war, there were still measures which could be taken to accelerate operations. The number of night contacts had not risen in the same proportion as other indices, and surprise enemy night attacks suggested inadequate night patrolling. Close security ambushes, offensive night patrols, and night ambushes were measures that COMUSMACV suggested to take the night away from the enemy. Increased reliance on long-range patrols, followed by commitment of larger forces to exploit their finds, was a way to reduce fruitless multi-company sweeps of limited areas. Aggressive pursuit was needed to counter the tendency in some units to pull back too far too long when placing supporting fire on the enemy. An aggressive attitude toward pursuit at all echelons, and quick, aggressive actions responsive to the enemy's movements, would keep him off-balance and permit his destruction in detail. Increased use of US-ARVN "buddy" operations at battalion and company levels would contribute to mutual training and understanding. The "Achilles' heel of the enemy forces" was their logistical system, and methodical, diligent search and forays into suspected base areas was required to destroy the system.[91]

(S) In early June the 9th ARVN Div reported the impending loss of the majority of its captains. COMUSMACV directed that a short study be developed, showing captains authorized and assigned and projected 1967 losses. The study reinforced an earlier study which

concluded that general mobilization was necessary to meet effectively the mounting heavy demands on RVN manpower. Erosion of officer strength was immediate, however, and prompt action was needed to sustain ARVN's fighting effectiveness. The time was not considered propitious to recommend general mobilization, or the expedient of extending captains while continuing to separate other grades. COMUSMACV, instead, recommended that Ambassador Bunker initiate action through GVN channels to suspend ARVN personnel separations for one year. Extension of the terms of service of all ARVN members for one year not only would halt the loss of captains and other experienced officers and NCOs, but also would improve the ARVN leadership situation until general mobilization could be implemented. [92]

(S) On 16 June, COMUSMACV replied to a memorandum of the Special Assistant (CAS) to the Ambassador, who suggested that a separate battalion, regiment, or brigade of Vietnamese of Chinese extraction be recruited. While he would welcome any additional effective troop units, regardless of their ethnic origin, COMUSMACV did not believe the idea of a separate Chinese unit would be palatable to the Vietnamese. With their historic fear and dislike of the Chinese, the Vietnamese would probably resist the formation of ethnic Chinese units. COMUSMACV reiterated his view that general mobilization, which would include Vietnamese of Chinese extraction, was desirable when conditions were appropriate. [93]

(C) ARVN's tasks in 1967 included support of RD. In a letter to Chief JGS on 17 July, COMUSMACV noted that ARVN's RD battalion training program had contributed significantly to the military support of RD. Continuation of RD training for ARVN was suggested as a way of reinforcing successes in the program. COMUSMACV suggested that RD mobile training teams (MTT) be formed when all ARVN maneuver battalions had been trained, to continue RD training of combat support and combat service support battalions. The RD MTTs could begin refresher training of ARVN battalions in January 1968. See Chapter VI for a fuller discussion of ARVN RD training. [94]

(TS) COMUSMACV directed the MACV staff to develop Plan RAINBOW. This was the creation of an elite RVNAF division for in and out-of-country operations. When political considerations permitted it was envisioned this division would be employed in Laos against enemy base area 609 in execution of Operations SOUTH PAW and HIGH PORT. COMUSMACV approved on 27 October 1967 the RVNAF Abn Div

as the basic vehicle to form the Rainbow Division. On 2 November 1967, 1,207 spaces for the expansion were released to Chief of JGS. On 12 November 270 additional spaces were released bringing the total authorized to 1,477 spaces. Personnel and equipment procurement began on 1 December with the last class for expansion purposes to graduate as parachutists on 23 January 1968. The nucleus for the 11th Abn Bn was formed by levying each of the existing battalions for one TOE platoon. Key officers and technical personnel also came from airborne resources. Fillers for the battalion and other elements of the division scheduled for expansion were recruited from ARVN units and training centers. The 11th Abn Bn was to move to the Van Kiep National Training Center on or about 14 January 1968 for a five-week training program. Other personnel that were a part of the expansion would receive OJT. Expansion of the division base was to be completed and have the capability to support the nine-battalion division by 15 February 1968. The 11th Abn Bn was scheduled to be combat ready by 1 March 1968.[95]

(S) In early September 1967, as part of the ongoing effort to get more direct participation by RVNAF into units in DMZ operations, agreement was reached between MACV and JGS to assign responsibility for a portion of the DMZ strong point/obstacle system to an ARVN regiment from the 1st Div. An additional benefit from this action was the release of the US Marines from this static duty. From September through early November, the 1st Div's 2d Regt was retrained and equipped with the M16 rifle to give it the added firepower necessary to face the NVA operating along the DMZ. The AN/PPS 5 and 6 radar sets were requested to provide an improved detection capability. The 2d Regt was the first ARVN unit to receive modern detection radar sets. To fill the void in the DTA left by withdrawal of the 2d Regt, an additional regiment was formed. Four rifle companies were in training at the Dong Da National Training Center, with four other companies scheduled to be activated for training on 1 January 1968, and with four more on 1 February 1968. The 12 new companies were to be operational by mid-March 1968. The four battalion headquarters were to be activated 1 April 1968 and the regiment was to be operational as a unit by 31 August 1968.[96]

(C) COMUSMACV directed a study be made to determine the advisability of equipping RVNAF units with the M16A1 rifles. As a result of the study, an integrated priority of issue list for both US and RVNAF units was recommended to CINCPAC, and SECDEF. A SECDEF

decision on 24 October 1967 approved the priority list and MACV received a distribution program including RVNAF units for the remainder of FY68. On 11 December 1967, COMUSMACV approved a M16 rifle priority of issue plan for ARVN. That plan was developed based on the projected receipt of 85,371 rifles prior to 30 June 1968 and an additional 23,339 rifles during 1st Qtr FY69. Priorities established provided for early issue to the 1st Div, the 5th Rgr Gp and the 11th Abn Bn. Priority of issue to the remaining combat maneuver elements of ARVN was approved by CTZ in this order: I, IV, II, and III. Priorities were designed to be flexible in order to be responsive to changes in NVA deployments and tactics and to allow the priority issue of M16 rifles to valorous units. On 17 December 1967 DEPCOMUSMACV approved a revised priority which rewarded the 21st Div and the 42d, 43d, and 44th Rgr Bns for their success in Operation DAN CHI 315C. On 29 December 1967 the priorities were further revised at the request of the JGS to provide equal priority to II and III CTZ units. Priorities within II and III CTZs were developed by the ARVN corps commanders with the advice and assistance of the senior corps advisor. Those recommendations were forwarded to the Chief of the JGS for final determination.[97]

(C) ARVN effectiveness was measured in two categories, readiness status and effectiveness. There were a total of 117 battalions rated as of the end of 1966 and 120 battalions rated as of the end of 1967. Ratings of satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory were assigned by advisors. In 1967 the basis for rating personnel strength was changed, precluding assignment of a marginal rating. The principle circumstance for marking a unit other than satisfactory in this category was that the number of troops usually present for operations fell below 70 percent of authorized strength. However, this rule was not rigidly applied and other factors, such as sufficiency of officers and noncommissioned officers, were taken into consideration. There was a decline in the number rated less than satisfactory. The principle factors affecting morale were inadequate dependent housing, protracted operations, and weak leadership. Overall, the leadership showed improvement, and the number of battalions satisfactory in training increased. Some units were rated less than satisfactory in vehicles, principally, from a shortage of 2 1/2-ton trucks in RVN. Some problems were experienced regarding radios and other equipment but this was mainly related to maintenance.

(C) There was an increase in the number of battalions considered less than satisfactory in combat effectiveness and in security. It should be pointed out that these evaluations by advisors were basically subjective. As advisors were rotated or as command attention was placed on a certain area, the ratings had a tendency to reflect changes in emphasis. There was also reason to believe that as units improved, advisors were raising the standards by which they rated the units. The ratings did reflect the areas which were the weakest. The 18th and 25th Divs were still the weakest performers. The advisors with the 18th indicated an overall improvement in the division. In general, the 25th Div did not show improvement.

(C) The readiness ratings of the Airborne Battalion reflected a problem in maintaining strengths in the division. This resulted from several factors:

1) The Rainbow Division expansion absorbed considerable personnel from the Airborne assets.

2) The new Airborne infantry battalion was brought up to TOE strength almost entirely out of Airborne Division operational assets.

3) In an effort to stem AWOL rates, each battalion was authorized to keep 30 men on leave at all times.

4) During the same period that the Rainbow Division was taking place, the division suffered 456 casualties.

Although the current operational strengths were down, the on-hand projected increase of 1,653 personnel through March 1968 was expected to increase operational strengths in all divisional areas to the acceptable point. Additionally, the division planned to continue its recruiting efforts at the accelerated rate for Rainbow. In all other readiness categories and in the effectiveness categories, the Airborne advisors rated their battalions satisfactory at the close of 1966 and 1967.

(C) The big factor degrading Ranger effectiveness was personnel strength. Increased casualties coupled with recruiting problems caused extensive reductions in the present for operations strength. To alleviate this problem JGS assigned some draftees to the Rangers, and the Ranger Command intensified its recruiting efforts. However, the problem did not appear to be susceptible to a short-range solution.

Effectiveness was further degraded by the loss of experienced officers and NCOs as casualties. In the readiness categories the number of satisfactory ratings increased over 1966 or remained relatively stable.

(C) The significant factor relating to the ARVN Armored Cavalry readiness was personnel strength. Three of the ten squadrons were reported as having below 70 percent present for operations strength. In all readiness categories, the number of units rated satisfactory either increased or remained relatively stable. All ten squadrons were rated combat effective.[98]

Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC)

(C) The VNMC had an authorized strength of 7,189 and an assigned strength of 7,049 as 1967 began. The VNMC's mission was to conduct amphibious operations and other ground combat operations as might be directed to assist in the counterinsurgency effort. Explicit in this mission were amphibious operations throughout RVN's coastal region as well as independent and combined ground operations; implicit were riverborne operations in the coastal lowlands and in the Delta. The VNMC Brigade consisted of six infantry battalions, one artillery battalion of two 105mm howitzer batteries and one 75mm pack howitzer battery, and an amphibious support battalion providing landing, communications, transportation, medical, reconnaissance, and combat engineer support. Each brigade's infantry battalions had an authorized strength of 876 officers and men, which provided a well-balanced force capable of fielding 650-700 men after subtracting the various noneffectives. The brigade, as part of the General Reserve, received M16s to replace its earlier-issued M1s, carbines, BARs, and submachine guns. US advisors had recommended that the 75mm pack howitzers be replaced with 105mm howitzers, although they wanted the 75s retained for use in difficult terrain and for [redacted] as helicopter-mobile artillery.

(C) Like other elements of RVNAF, the VNMC had some problem areas. Despite its all-volunteer background, desertions also plagued the Marine Brigade, although perhaps not so badly as some of the other RVNAF components. The long deployments of the brigade, particularly of the infantry battalions, left little time for passes and leaves; another factor had been the ineffective apprehension procedures for deserters.

Even so, early in the year there were indications of a declining desertion rate. That other bane of RVNAF, poor leadership, also affected the VNMC to some degree. In the words of the brigade's Senior Advisor: "As a general rule, good, responsible, effective, and highly motivated leaders exist at all levels of the Marine Brigade; however, there are exceptions and there are weaknesses in leadership of certain units." Many of the brigade's officers and NCOs had attended US schools, which had increased their technical skills and had helped to mature their professional experiences. Officer promotions in the VNMC were on a fully-qualified basis after review by the commandant and chief of staff of the VNMC. No quotas were considered in enlisted promotions and were based on the individual's entire record. Fifteen two-to-four man recruiting teams were located throughout RVN to enlist volunteers.[99]

(S) In February COMUSMACV had recommended that Chief JGS employ VNMC forces in the RSSZ on a rotational basis. Later study indicated that certain organizational changes were needed to improve security and operations in that area. Although the major threat in the RSSZ required extensive ground operations, it was a naval command. COMUSMACV on 3 May recommended to Chief JGS that a VNMC officer be appointed to command the RSSZ and that it be incorporated into the III CTZ. The VNN would, of course, continue in a support role. Another recommendation was that the RSSZ be annexed as a prefecture or canton to an existing province, preferably Long An.[100]

(C) On 24 October 1967 authority was granted to the Chief, Naval Advisory Group to convert the VNMC 75mm pack howitzer battery to a six-gun 105mm howitzer battery. Programming action was taken expeditiously to ensure that the 105mm weapons would be delivered by about mid-FY69. Basis for the action included the fact that ammunition for the 75mm pack howitzer was no longer manufactured and available stocks would be expended by approximately January 1969.[101]

(S) COMUSMACV directed a study into the basing ashore of a Vietnamese Marine Battalion in IV CTZ as the third battalion of the US MRF. The battalion was envisioned to participate with the MRF and return to their land base between operations. After receiving COMUSMACV's recommendations on 15 October 1967, MACV staff (COC) and JGS staff conference was held. It was decided to locate the battalion at Binh Duc (halfway between My Tho and Dong Tam). The battalion was scheduled to deploy on 5 November 1967.[102]

(C) The VNMC, like the Airborne, constituted a part of the general reserve. All six Marine battalions were consistently rated satisfactory in all readiness and effectiveness categories. A reduction in combat results was noted during 1967. Advisors attributed this to the fact that two battalions had been committed through much of the year in the II and III CTZ on road clearing missions where there was little opportunity for decisive engagement, and the circumstances of Marine engagements in IV CTZ which resulted in heavy fighting at very close quarters. [103]

Vietnamese Navy (VNN)

(S) At the beginning of 1967 the VNN consisted of 17,349 officers and men. The VNN was considered a combat effective force and had reached a stage of development from which continued improvement was expected. The VNN was initially based, controlled, and supported almost entirely from Saigon, but by April had progressed far in extending operational and administrative control and logistical support to the coastal zones and riverine areas. Rapid wartime expansion severely taxed the base of experienced personnel but, in spite of political manipulation, the command structure seemed to be stabilizing by early 1967.

(S) Operationally, the VNN was organized into the Fleet Command, River Assault Groups (RAG), Coastal (Junk) Groups, an underwater demolition team (LDNN), and motor launch minesweepers (MLMS). The Fleet Command contained one patrol ship (PC), six escorts (PCE), three coastal minesweepers (MSC), 16 motor gunboats (PGM), six large support landing ships (LSSL), five large infantry landing ships (LSIL), three tank landing ships (LST), seven medium landing ships (LSM), six utility landing craft (LCU), and two self-propelled gasoline barges (YOG). Increased command interest beginning at VNN headquarters, through the operational commanders, and down to the individual ship level, seemed to be improving the effectiveness of patrol ships assigned to the coastal and riverine areas. In April COMNAVFORV noted that "there is an increasing number of excellent commanding officers and the quality of patrols and gunfire support missions is improving. Reliability is improving thru better shipboard maintenance and repair procedures." The RAGs were divided into three groups with 227 craft; they were considered to be in excellent spirits and highly effective. The

primary mission of the RAGs was combat troop lift in support of ARVN, VNMC, and USA units. Each was designed to lift one battalion. There were 27 coastal groups with 357 motor junks with the primary mission of counter sea/coastal infiltration. In addition to their primary mission, the coastal groups also "showed the flag" as government outposts in hostile areas, developed intelligence nets, and provided communications and liaison between coastal patrol units and RVNAF and US units ashore; they participated in joint/combined operations by conducting amphibious raids and providing blocking forces; and they also provided liaison personnel to MARKET TIME units. Weather strongly influenced junk operations, which were severely curtailed during inclement monsoon conditions. The LDNN was capable of conducting hydrographic beach surveys and shallow-water salvage operations with open circuit scuba gear. Six of the ten MLMS were employed daily in sweeps of the Saigon, Nha Be, and Long Tau river complex.

(S) Two main problems, shipyard production and LST effectiveness, faced the VNN. Production at the Saigon naval shipyard was inadequate to support the VNN, and occasionally it had been necessary to send some ships to Guam for overhaul. The problem was attributed to two main factors: improper management and a shortage of skilled civilian personnel. Of the two, the shortage of skilled personnel was the more acute, because improved managerial techniques had been introduced which were expected to increase production, even with available personnel resources. Civilian skill shortages were anticipated as long as civilian construction companies exerted inflationary pressure on wage scales. The three VNN LSTs were used primarily as cargo ships rather than for amphibious operations. Even so, they carried only a nominal amount of cargo because of delays in loading and unloading, which reflected inadequate coordination between the agencies that scheduled and loaded the ships. It also demonstrated a paucity of port facilities available for handling LSTs. COMNAVFORV believed that the easing of requirements for port facilities in the Newport-Saigon complex would allow the VNN to be assigned adequate port-handling facilities, and would increase the effectiveness of the ships.[104]

(C) A significant milestone for VNN Sea Force operational readiness was reached in May when two VNN PCEs relieved two SEVENTHFLT minesweepers on MARKET TIME offshore patrol. VNN ships had been conducting offshore patrols in coordination with TF-115 for some time, but this was the first time VNN ships had been formally assigned as an

integral part of MARKET TIME force requirements. VNN operating forces were increased by the assignment of two new PGM to the Fleet Command, the first of four to complete the training cycle. Formal transfer of all four ships from USN to VNN control was accomplished on 20 June, the other two having completed training early in the month. A third YOG arrived in RVN on 11 June and was scheduled to be operational in August.[105]

(C) As of December 1967, the VNN was rated marginal in civilian personnel and fleet command maintenance. Improvement in both of these areas was anticipated. A substantial base pay raise for shipyard workers was expected. Mobile repair teams had been successful in raising the level of competence of Navy Technical ratings to effect ship repairs and commanding officers were increasing emphasis on accomplishment of work by ship's force. During 1966 the VNN lost 14 ships and captured or destroyed 27. In 1967 the friendly loss was six ships whereas the enemy lost 31 captured or destroyed. Though the enemy losses were somewhat less in 1967, the resulting increased ratio was impressive. During December 1967 the VNN searched 34,150 junks and 113,465 persons. The magnitude of this effort was impressive. The results could not be measured by numbers detained alone, but must take into consideration the deterrent effect these operations had on attempts to move contraband by water.[106]

Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF)

(S) VNAF began 1967 with 14,647 officers and men. It consisted of the 23d Tactical Wing (TW) with three fighter squadrons and a liaison squadron at Bien Hoa; the 33d TW with one helicopter squadron, three transport squadrons, and two reconnaissance squadrons at Tan Son Nhut (TSN); the 74th TW with one squadron each of fighters, helicopters, and liaison aircraft at Binh Thuy; the 41st TW with one fighter, two helicopters, and one liaison squadrons at Da Nang; and the 62d TW at Nha Trang with one fighter, one helicopter, and one liaison squadrons. The air training center was also located at Nha Trang. One other wing, the 92d Support Wing, was located at Pleiku; it had A-1 type aircraft, but one squadron was scheduled for conversion to F-5 aircraft in April 1967, and three others to A-37 type aircraft in FY69. Of the helicopter

squadrons, all equipped with H-34 aircraft, one was scheduled for conversion to UH-1D by FY69. Eventually, VNAF hoped to reequip all its helicopter squadrons with UH-1D aircraft, and planned to convert one of its C-47 transport squadrons to C-119 aircraft by FY68. Assisting VNAF in achieving a state of combat readiness through application of logistics, engineering, maintenance, communications, planning, air operations, aerospace medicine, and personnel operating procedures was the mission of the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP), MACV. A significant portion of the group's advisory responsibilities was to keep COMUSMACV and Cmdr 7AF abreast of matters pertaining to the effective utilization of air power, to include tactical, cargo, and liaison aircraft employed by the VNAF.[107]

(S) During the preceding year, VNAF had experienced gradual but consistent improvement in its combat capability. The number of hours flown had increased 23 percent and the sorties 34 percent, even though one of the six squadrons was scheduled for conversion and was in a standdown status. VNAF flew 24 percent of the total sorties flown by USAF and VNAF in RVN during the preceding year. These improvements were attributed to general improvement in aircraft utilization, the Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) rate declining below the five percent standard (except for helicopters), and the Not Operationally Ready Maintenance (NORM) rate declining below the 24 percent standard. Sustained and effective support of ARVN in all CTZs, but especially in IV CTZ, was one of the most recognizable achievements of the VNAF. This was thought to result, in large measure, from improved command, control, and managerial procedures and from improved individual and unit morale; from advances in night support for both attack and helicopter aircraft; and from a general maturing of VNAF. Desertion rates in VNAF seemed to be declining in early 1967, and great strides had been made in formal and on-the-job training. There were, of course, areas in which improvements were necessary, particularly in officer procurement and in prevention of aircraft accidents. Officer procurement, especially of pilots, lagged because of the failure of applicants to meet the physical standards, notably the height and weight requirements. Waivers had been requested for these areas and, if VNAF exercised the waiver, some relief was expected. While in comparison to VNAF standards, VNAF accident rates were high, they also had showed decline.[108]

(S) The problem of greatest magnitude, VNAF helicopter forces alignment, was a topic of much discussion during early 1967. Referring

to UH-23Ds, CSAF stated that no new aircraft procurement of this type was planned for VNAF and the requirement for reconditioned aircraft might be cancelled. CSAF's 25 February program outline was also "to provide 39 UH-34G aircraft from D/Navy in FY67 program based upon estimate of helicopter attrition requirements through FY69 considering phase-in of UH-1Ds." Budgeted for FY69 were two squadrons of UH-1Ds, plus attrition, with a 20 UE for each, but the first four UH-1Ds of the second squadron were already incorporated in the FY68 budget. A fourth and final squadron conversion would be a budgeted item in FY70. In order to support the unconventional warfare mission, a fifth squadron was needed and the particular UE for this squadron's mission would be 25. If the proposed VNAF reorganization plan were accepted and the 83d Operational Group were deactivated, then eight H-34s would be available for the proposed fifth squadron, which would require only seven more aircraft. The mid-March concern over overcrowding and security problems at Da Nang AB brought to light additional VNAF aircraft augmentations. On 15 March 7AF reported that the 41st TW was receiving six additional A-1 H/G, 18 H-34, and six 0-1/U17 aircraft; four A-1s and eight H-34s were on hand, with the remainder due momentarily. At the end of March VNAF assets were 358 assigned aircraft, or 12 short of the authorized strength.[109]

(C) On 1 June the US Ambassador officially presented 20 F-5 jet aircraft to VNAF for use in the 522d Ftr Sq at Bien Hoa AB. The F-5 was the first jet fighter in the VNAF inventory. It was a 1,000 mile-per-hour aircraft designed for close ground support, interception, and armed reconnaissance; it carried 6,200 pounds of ordnance, had two 20mm nose cannons, and operated from short, semi-prepared fields in forward areas. To prepare VNAF for the new aircraft, 33 VNAF pilots had been sent to the US for training in October 1966, returning in April 1967 to activate the squadron. In addition, USAF Training Command furnished a MTT to VNAF's 23d TW to instruct 160 VNAF officers and airmen in maintenance of the airplane. VNAF F-5 operations proceeded smoothly after the acceptance ceremony at Bien Hoa. During their first full month of operationally ready status, the squadron flew 388 sorties, followed by 436 in July and 478 in August. With VNAF's arrival as a jet-capable air force, particular stress was placed upon a comprehensive instrument training program which in turn directly contributed to the emphasis placed on flying safety programs.[110]

(S) The overall programming of helicopters for VNAF ran into considerable difficulty. There were no additional H-34s scheduled for delivery, except those programmed to offset attrition, before VNAF converted to UH-1D models. The UH-1D program also suffered limitations; since UH-1D deliveries could not be effected until 18 or 21 months after funding, the only deliveries that could be expected prior to 3d Qtr FY69 were nine aircraft. Though VNAF helicopter authorization was 105, the number of assigned aircraft could not be expected to exceed 77 until January 1969. COMUSMACV suggested two possibilities in light of this situation: an additional source of UH-34s be located to offset attrition losses, or a DOD level priority be established to allow an input of UH-1Ds to VNAF at a faster rate than that being realized. COMUSMACV took the problem of unconventional warfare helicopter shortages to Chief JGS. The VNAF 219th Helo Sq had an approved authorization for 25 CH-34 helicopters, but because of combat losses it possessed only 13 at the end of July. COMUSMACV was concerned that this limited number of helicopters seriously degraded the troop lift capability required for effective support of important unconventional warfare activities. Immediate action to increase the 219th to its full complement, with necessary associated crews, pilots, and maintenance personnel, meant a realignment of VNAF's manpower and material resources. COMUSMACV stressed to Chief JGS that the gain to be effected would repay the necessary effort and the AFGP was tasked to provide all possible assistance during the realignment. Shortfalls in VNAF's helicopter assets buildup continued to plague the program, but aircraft continued to arrive in-country. During May eight UH-34Gs arrived, but two losses were sustained in the same month in the mortar attack on Binh Thuy. Through June inputs to date totaled 28 with the remaining 11 scheduled to be delivered in the month of July. This completed transfer of 39 from USN resources approved by SECDEF earlier in the year. At midyear it was still hoped that the UE authorized strength of 98 could be achieved by September. The overall total of all types of helicopters in August was still short of the 105 authorized. [111]

(C) A COMUSMACV news conference at the end of the first week in August highlighted the increasing importance of VNAF's operational contribution during the year by pointing out that the sortie rate had increased 34 percent to 17,435/month and hours flown had increased 23 percent to 21,524/month. This had been accomplished while still short of authorized strength. The August inventory consisted of 100 fighter aircraft (21 being F-5s), 57 C-47s, 88 liaison aircraft, and 72 helicopters. Another contribution to this substantial performance was

the VNAF's pilot status. There was a total of 559 in August (fighter, 165; transport, 77; helicopter, 185; liaison, 137), and of these 44 percent had less than two years of flying experience. Nevertheless, VNAF flew 21.5 percent of the in-country air sorties.[112]

(C) Flying safety continued to be a vexing problem for VNAF and AFGP through August because aircraft losses to pilot error exceeded combat losses. Attention had been directed toward the problem since the first of the year and the level had been reduced to a stable though still too-high rate of 23/100,000 flying hours. During the month of August a sudden upward spurt focused the attention of COMUSMACV, AFGP, and all levels of VNAF upon the problem. In that month there were ten major flight and one major ground accident, one minor flight accident, six flight incidents--and only one reported combat loss. Five A-1Hs, one C-47, and one H-34 helicopter were destroyed; three C-47, two U-17A, and one O-1A aircraft received major damage. The VNAF F-5 squadron's performance, 478 sorties and 520 accident-free hours, attested to the fact that Vietnamese could sustain operations without accidents. With concentrated emphasis upon flying safety, VNAF suffered the loss of only one aircraft in the first three weeks of September and, hopefully, continued emphasis would maintain the same commendable results.[113]

Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF)

(S) At the beginning of 1967, the authorized strength of the Regional Forces (RF) was 152,516 and the assigned strength was 149,844, while the strengths of the Popular Forces (PF) were 147,440 and 150,096 respectively. RF/PF expansion capability had been severely curtailed by an October 1966 limitation on RF/PF strength of 300,000. A month later, COMUSMACV proposed to Chief JGS that the TOE of the RF rifle company be reduced by ten spaces and that of the PF platoon by three spaces to obtain some growth capacity. In February JGS approved the recommendation and promulgated a TOE reduction of nine spaces in the RF rifle company and three spaces in the PF platoon, freeing 19,251 force structure spaces for forming new units. The requirements from Corps Commanders and Senior Advisors (SA) were analyzed and on 16 March COMUSMACV was briefed on the findings. COMUSMACV approved the recommended authorization and allocation of 88 new RF

rifle companies and 333 new platoons, and a letter was sent on 18 March to Chief JGS, recommending that the additonal units be formed at an early date. On 1 April JGS published a memorandum allocating the additional RF/PF units. Fifteen RF rifle companies were allocated to I CTZ, 31 to II CTZ, 12 to III CTZ, and 30 to IV CTZ. I CTZ was allocated 41 PF platoons, II CTZ none, III CTZ 42, and IV CTZ 226; this was 24 less than COMUSMACV had recommended--the 24 were held in a central reserve to be distributed as needed. Of the RF companies, 58 were allocated to RD support, eight for railroad security, and 22 for CIDG conversion; all 333 PF platoons were allocated for RD support. [114]

(C) On 29 July 1967 an additional 50 RF companies and 100 PF platoons were allocated to the JGS by MACV. The JGS plan for the distribution of the units to the CTZs was concurred in by MACV on 3 August 1967. The 50 RF companies and 100 PF platoons were distributed ten companies and ten platoons to I CTZ, 17 companies and 30 platoons to the II CTZ, five companies and ten platoons to III CTZ and 18 companies and 50 platoons to the IV CTZ. [115]

(C) On 16 October 1967 MACV concurred for planning purposes in the allocation of 49 RF companies and 346 PF platoons from FY68 assets. This concurrence was predicated on a request by MACV for a review of these allocations during January prior to activation authority being granted. The tentative allocations were five companies and 60 platoons to the I CTZ, ten companies and 60 platoons to the II CTZ, 16 companies and 110 platoons to the III CTZ, and 18 companies and 116 platoons to the IV CTZ. [116]

(C) On 11 March the SA, RF/PF, wrote to COMUSMACV requesting that RF officer acquisition be emphasized. Noting that the 31 January 1967 RF officer strength was over 600 below the 31 December authorized strength, the SA felt that the situation should not be allowed to continue, as it degraded RF's capacity to perform its mission and was likely to deteriorate into even greater shortages as additional companies were activated. COMUSMACV, while sharing the concern of the SA, RF/PF, observed that sufficient RF officer accessions had been programmed to attain the authorized strength by the end of the year. The programmed RF officer strength for 31 December 1967 was 10,781, against an authorized strength of 10,274. Even should an existing shortfall of 557 not be made up, in the absence of unforeseen developments, the year-end strength would be 10,225, or only 49 less than authorized. [117]

(U) On 6 January GVN ordered a PF pay increase, to be effective as of 1 January. Prior to that time, PF basic pay had been 1,820 $VN throughout the country; the new basic pay was established as 2,200 $VN in the lowlands, and 2,400 $VN in the highlands--the higher cost of living accounted for the higher basic pay in the highlands. PF personnel also were authorized 100 $VN longevity pay per echelon per month. Command allowances remained 500 $VN and 300 $VN per month for platoon and squad leaders respectively. This pay increase was originally proposed in June 1966, to compensate for the small increase given to PF in relation to that given to the other components of RVNAF. Another pay action affecting PF was a disability pension for PF members, authorized on 6 February; formerly many disabled PF members unfit for combat service had been retained on service rolls because of the lack of a disability pension system. [118]

(C) In order to develop RF companies into combat effective units, COMUSMACV directed the test of the Regional Force Company Training Team (REFCOTT) concept. The concept provided that a REFCOTT of a US captain, a lieutenant, and three NCOs, would join a newly-formed RF company at an ARVN training center and stay with it into the actual operational phase until the CTZ SA felt it was capable of operating alone, probably six to nine months later. The company would have its own officers, and the company commander would command the company; however, he would follow the directions of the REFCOTT commander. The objective of the concept, which was fully supported by Chief JGS, was to produce superior, combat-effective RF companies with self-sufficient, battle-tested leaders. The REFCOTT was to work closely with the RF company officers and, while developing the leadership capabilities of all leaders, to select the natural leaders in the company to be NCOs. REFCOTT would train and supervise the unit in its initial training and continue to train it during employment and between operations until the company was fully combat effective. "In short, the REFCOTT was in the business of training and supervision rather than simply advising." On 28 June COMUSMACV directed each CTZ SA to provide a REFCOTT to a newly-formed RF company in his CTZ, except in III CTZ, where such a test was already underway. US personnel selected for REFCOTT were to be combat veterans of Vietnam, have nine months left in-country, know some Vietnamese, and be superior leaders. Initial training of the company was to be at an ARVN training center, where training center trainers would train the company. After the company's departure from the training center REFCOTT would begin a continuous in place training program. When the tested RF company

was sufficiently well trained, the REFCOTT commander could assist the training and operations of one or more PF platoons in his area.[119]

(C) The readiness status of Regional Forces, as reflected in advisor evaluations, did not indicate improvement during 1967. There was an increase in less than satisfactory ratings in personnel strength, leadership, and training. There were also fewer provinces rated satisfactory in vehicles and other equipment. In the effectiveness categories, advisors indicated significant shortcomings in mission performance, tactical employment, and security.

(C) The significant changes in the readiness categories of the Popular Forces was the increased number of provinces considered by advisors to have less than satisfactory leadership and training during 1967. The deficiencies in other readiness categories were, in general, related to inadequate maintenance, poor storage practices, and some localized shortages. There was also an increase in the number of provinces considered less than satisfactory in the effectiveness categories.[120]

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)

(S) The fivefold mission of the CIDG was to harass and interdict enemy infiltrators from Laos, Cambodia, and north of the 17th parallel into NVN; to harass and raid VC secret zones and bases, and to harass and intercept inland communication-liaison routes connecting one zone with another; to collect information on areas of operation; and to participate in special operations prescribed by JGS. To accomplish these missions, CIDG, in early 1967, had a strength of 31,477, and a programmed strength of 41,028. The lightly-armed, paramilitary CIDG, which in 1966 achieved a favorable kill ratio of 3.8:1, was most effective when employed in reconnaissance in force and least effective in static security; it also had been employed effectively to block enemy withdrawal, to screen and to conduct search-and-destroy operations against enemy company and smaller-size units. The limitations of CIDG were those of any paramilitary force: training and discipline were below the standard of conventional units, leadership was defective, and it was strapped by limited heavy firepower, and no organic transportation.[121]

National Police Field Forces (NPFF)

(S) The attachment of the 816th NPFF Bn to the 1st Cav Div (AM) for operations against the VC infrastructure in mid-1967 proved extremely effective, and as the period of attachment neared its close, the CG 1st Cav Div (AM) requested that the attachment be extended, in order to maintain the momentum gained toward eliminating the infrastructure. NPFF units would support the 1st Cav Div (AM) for as long as needed, but the Commander NPFF wanted other units to share the benefit of working with US units. On 9 August CG I FFORCEV seconded the request to extend the attachment until Operation PHOENIX began. The working relationship between the two units had made, for the first time, "a real dent in the infrastructure" in II CTZ. Though the Commander NPFF decided not to replace the 816th, there was a possibility of a morale problem arising, as prior policy had been to rotate personnel away from their families every three months. While it was attached to the 1st Cav Div (AM), the 816th NPFF Bn had been issued the big yellow and black horse's head shoulder patch of the division. While the patch did much to account for the close relationship between the division and battalion, some elements of MACV felt that it might cause the 816th NPFF Bn to be identified as a US rather than a GVN agent. Accordingly, the 816th was allowed to keep the patch, but none would be issued to its replacement. [122]

USMACV ADVISORY EFFORT

Introduction

(C) The beginning of 1967 found an extremely unusual and complex US Advisory structure in existence. On the one hand, there was the purely military advisory effort, and on the other hand the purely civilian effort. Between the two, there were lines of coordination and cooperation at all levels, but only at the level of the US Mission was there any unified direction. Until late 1965, an even more fragmented situation existed within the civilian effort. The regular civilian agencies in-country, USAID, OSA, and JUSPAO, operated independently one from the other, but they, too, maintained lines of communication and cooperation with one another and with the military advisory effort at all levels. However, in December 1966, the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) was established to bring under single management the direction of all US civil efforts in support of Revolutionary Development and pacification. This brought the entire civilian advisor effort under unified direction. [123]

(S) The consolidation of the civilian effort was a step in the right direction, but the weakness of total separation of the military and civilian efforts remained. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army, recognized this problem when, in 1966, it undertook a study entitled, "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam." (S) (Short Title: PROVN). The concepts and problems addressed in this study were seminal, and many of them were considered later when the decision was made to organize a MACV functional staff section called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) under COMUSMACV. CORDS is discussed in detail in Chapter VI. [124]

The Military Advisor Effort (U)

The unprecedented buildup of US-Free World forces in South Vietnam beginning in August 1965, and the widely dispersed, large-scale commitment

of these forces in their integrity against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, have had the effect of taking the spotlight off our advisory efforts. It is absolutely essential that this development not be construed as a constriction of your mission or as a lessening of the relative importance of your effort.

You are still the 'heart and soul' of our total commitment in South Vietnam. The ultimate success of that commitment demands an effectual Vietnamese military establishment, not only for victory but also and more important, for the assurance of a permanent peace. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam must be prepared to assume the responsibility for the post-war security of the Vietnamese people with a minimum of external assistance.

Your job is a most difficult and sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, that relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life or death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins.

The training of the US military officer is characterized by conditioned traits of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence of your relationship with your counterpart is constituted by patience and restraint. As a threshold to development of a meaningful affiliation with your counterpart you must succeed in the reconciliation of these contesting qualities.[125]

Such was the guidance COMUSMACV gave to all commissioned advisors at the beginning of 1967. To reinforce guidance from 1966, and to further spell out those areas on which the advisors were enjoined to concentrate so that RVNAF effectiveness could be improved, COMUSMACV expanded his guidance two weeks later when, on 16 January 1967, he wrote:

The war in Vietnam now has reached a point at which its projected future course demands an immediate and substantial qualitative improvement in all aspects of RVNAF capabilities and

operations. Accordingly, the purpose of this letter is to stress to advisory personnel, and to all others concerned, the importance of their individual and collective responsibilities in assisting RVNAF leaders to bring about this general improvement.

. . . many ARVN combat battalions already have shown improvement in present for operations strength. Nevertheless, a large number of the remaining battalions must be considered ineffective or marginally effective when committed to an operation because of the inadequate number of personnel present for duty. This situation evolves primarily from malassignment. . . . Advisory effort to assist in the attainment of the following objectives will do much to alleviate this situation:

Elimination of unauthorized units.

Elimination of overstrength in headquarters units and rear area detachments.

Elimination of unauthorized absences and the large number of personnel on special duty to higher headquarters.

Improved administrative procedures to remove ineffectives from the unit rolls.

. . . Exercising . . . leadership and . . . setting personal examples. . . .

. . . seize all opportunities to arouse ARVN commanders' interest and concern and to instill in them the requisite sense of responsibility for training their units.

Advisory emphasis must be placed on improvement in logistics operations at all echelons.

The foregoing . . . suggested means for improvement do not purport to represent a total listing; rather they should serve as the focus or framework for advisory efforts toward general improvement in quality of all aspects of RVNAF capabilities and operations. . . . [these] call for extraordinary efforts on the part of all US advisors. . . . I shall expect everyone to meet this challenge by applying to his work the highest order of leadership, tact, understanding and professionalism of which he is capable. [126]

(C) To accomplish these tasks and to advise Vietnamese counterparts in combat operations, the advisory structure was organized as shown in tables 1-4 below.[127]

JGS Structural Element

Activity	Authorized Spaces
J1	41
J2	6
J4	11
J6	20
SJA	8
Surgeon	13
Comptroller	7
RF/PF Dir	35
RD Spt	36
PSYOP	56
Log Assistance	364
Railway Sec Det	12
Tng Dir	67
Arty Cmd	8
Armd Cmd	8
Schools/Colleges/Tng Ctrs	265

Rgr Cmd (HQ)		8
	Total	965

Table 1

Tactical Chain of Command

Elements/Units	Authorized Spaces
Corps HQ & Spt	1,147
Cmd	59
Div Spt & 24th TZ	766
Regts	98
Inf Bn.	613
Rgr Cmd (5 Gps/20 Bns)	130
Abn TF & Div	40
Armd Cav Sq (10)	107
Total	2,960

Table 2

Sector, Subsector, RF/PF

Section Chain	Authorized Spaces
RF Bns	31
PF TCs	144

Sectors		853
Subsectors		969
	Total	1,975

Table 3

Other Than Army

Component	Authorized Spaces
Naval Adv Gp	517
AF Adv Gp	493
Total	1,010

Table 4

(C) Thus, the aggregate total for all military advisory spaces amounted to 6,910 at the beginning of 1967. Continuous assessment and reevaluation resulted, in February 1967, in identifying a further need of 415 spaces; however, it was recognized that 164 of these could be traded off from in-being spaces which were credit-balanced; thus, a request for 251 spaces was forwarded to higher headquarters. This request established, most notably, a significant increase within the sector chain by adding 221 spaces of which 137 were designated for subsector, 56 for sector, 21 for RF battalion, and a wholly new requirement which added 20 spaces to RF camps. Trade off spaces were most notable in the tactical chain where 143 spaces were taken from infantry battalions and 12 from the ranger command. Other gains and losses were spread throughout the entire advisory structure with the exception of both Navy and Air Force which remained undisturbed.

(C) On 26 April, further increases were requested with no trade offs acceptable. The additions required 699 new spaces: 341 for sector level, 294 for subsector level, 12 for RF camps. Within the JGS structure, one new requirement area was identified, advisors for PW camps

amounting to 45 spaces. Further, it was determined that the logistical assistance area warranted seven more spaces.

(C) Increasing emphasis addressed the requirements to support pacification, and establishing a secure atmosphere in which pacification could progress focused attention on the overall capabilities of RF whose primary mission was to provide security at sector level. Ongoing studies revealed an even greater advisory effort for RF. As a result of this, in July 1967, it was determined that an additional 2,562 advisor spaces were required. Of these 2,431 were earmarked for the sector chain. Here, a wholly new area was addressed--advisors for RF companies totaling 2,243 of the 2,562 space total. Other areas within the sector chain to be increased were RF camps--90 spaces, sectors--92 spaces, and subsector--six spaces. Notable within the tactical chain, 120 spaces were re-added at infantry battalion level to provide spaces for ARVN units designated for activation.

(C) By 1 August 1967, advisors spaces were allocated as shown in Table 5, below:

Summary of MACV Advisory JTD
JGS Structural Element

Activity	Spaces Authorized
J1	40 (-1)*
J2	6
J4	19 (-1)
SJA	8
IG	3 (+3)
Surgeon	12 (-1)
IO	1 (+1)
Comptroller	7

*Parenthesis indicate aggregate increases or decreases.

RF/PF Dir	38 (+3)*
RD Spt	48 (+12)
PSYOP	59 (+3)
Admin/Fin Svc Ctr	6 (+6)
Log Assistance	371 (+7)
Railway Sec Det	12
PW Camps	38 (+38)
Tng Dir	60 (-1)
Arty Cmd	8
Armd Cmd	8
Schools/Colleges/Tng Ctrs	269 (+4)
Rgr Cmd (HQs)	8
Subtotal	1,046 (+73)

Tactical Chain of Command

Elements/Units	Spaces Authorized
Corps HQ & Spt	1,176 (+29)
Cmd	67 (+8)
Div, Spt & 24th TZ	861 (+95)
Regts	110 (+12)
Inf Bn	590 (-23)
Rgr Cmd	118 (-12)

*Parenthesis indicate aggregate increases or decreases.

Abn TF & Div		63 (+23)*
Armd Cav Sqs		107
	Subtotal	3,092 (+132)

Sector, Subsector, RF/PF

Sector Chain	Space Allocation
Rf Bns	52 (+21)
PF TCs	109 (-13)
Sectors	1,342 (+489)
Subsectors	1,406 (+437)
RF Cos	2,243 (+2,243)
RF Camps	122 (+122)
Subtotal	5,274 (+3,299)

Other Than Army

Naval Adv Gp		517
AF Adv Gp		493
	Subtotal	1,010
	Grand Total	10,422 (+3,504)

*Parenthesis indicate aggregate increases or decreases.

Table 5

(C) The diffusion of responsibility for the advisory effort among the MACV staff required that a single, integrated, overall review of the advisory authorization was necessary to provide a sound foundation for the many ongoing studies which were addressing new requirements,

COMUSMACV felt that the strength of the effort, the necessary basis for future sound advisory growth, was of doubtful validity. He felt that such a review would undoubtedly lead to the recovery of spaces to fill existing requirements and that imbalances existed.

(C) An ad hoc committee, chaired by the Director, Training Directorate, was appointed which included representatives from each of the "J" staffs, CORDS, Comptroller, and RF/PF advisory group. This committee was given the mission of examining the current MACV advisory effort to validate existing strength authorizations and requirements identified in the FY68 force structure and make appropriate recommendations. The scope of the study was to provide the framework on which a sound advisory program could be constructed using the existing advisory effort as a point of departure. Further, it was to determine if the existing efforts were applied properly and to recommend any reorientation deemed appropriate.

(C) Concurrent with the above study, another was born. It was believed that the MACV staff was not the optimum organization to properly discharge the responsibilities relating to the US advisory effort. Historically, no single MACV staff agency had generated advisor requirements or supervised the advisory effort. Advisory requirements had been generated among the MACV staff agencies and processed through the CofS to the DEPCOMUSMACV for approval. Thus, no staff agency short of the command groups had monitorship of the advisory effort. Consequently, the CofS directed MACJ5 to conduct a study to determine the optimum organization.

(S) The above studies, conducted concurrently were titled the Study of MACV Advisory Effort (Flanagan Studies) and the Advisory Organization Study (Project 640).[128]

The Flanagan Study (U)

(C) The parameters of the Flanagan Study encompassed the 10,422 spaces shown in Table 5, above, of which 7,860 were approved and the remaining 2,562 had been requested but not yet approved as of 1 July 1967. The guidelines developed by the ad hoc committee included the following:

1) The basic role of the advisor will not change. He will not change. He will continue to be an advisor, a support coordinator, and a liaison officer in the US chain.

2) Some ARVN units, installations, and agencies are improving to the point where advisory effort may be reduced.

3) Advisory efforts may be reduced by some or all of the following means:

a) Eliminating, consolidating, or reducing frequency of reports.

b) Doubling jobs or functions performed by one man.

c) Eliminating 'nice-to-have' positions.

d) Reducing security detachments when possible.

e) Consolidating facilities and administration to reduce overhead.

f) Substituting ARVN soldiers or Vietnamese civilians in such jobs as drivers, translators, radio operators, guards, clerks.

g) Eliminating duplication of effort at various levels.

h) Eliminating unnecessary operations - as opposed to advising them.

4) Since 1 January 1967, RF recruit training has been improved by training new RF companies at NTCs using same POI as for ARVN recruits and by assigning the same type officers to RF as are assigned to ARVN units.

5) American advisory effort should be reduced in some areas to encourage ARVN initiative and independence.

6) The mechanics of the advisory system should permit flexibility; i.e., if regimental senior advisor so desires, he should be able to send six of his advisors with one battalion and two or none with another.

7) The changing role of the sector/subsector teams in revolutionary development changes the functions of the sector and tactical chain.

(C) The committee recommended the following adjustments in the JTDs of the MACV advisory teams:

1) The deletion of 105 spaces from the MACV staff. These spaces are primarily in the PSYOP Directorate (20 spaces); Logistics assistance (USARV TD) 42 spaces; and Training Directorate (96 spaces).

2) The deletion of 949 spaces from the sector chain. These include the addition of three spaces to each of two RF battalions which currently have none; the deletion of 12 spaces at six PF Training Centers which have not been and will not be activated; the reduction by one half (824 spaces--412 officers and 412 EM) of the 1,648 spaces recently requested for old RF companies based upon one officer and one EM for each of 824 old RF companies; and the elimination of one officer (assistant team leader) from the five-man REFCOTTS recently requested for each of 119 new RF companies. Even with this 949 space reduction in the sector chain, the sector advisory effort would be increased by 1,476 spaces over what it was authorized provided FY 68 requests were approved.

3) The deletion of 562 spaces in the tactical chain. These include 92 from Corps Headquarters (14, I Corps; 35, II Corps, 20 of which are security guards; 20, III Corps; and 23, IV Corps); eight from Capital Military District; 118 from Division staffs and 24th TZ (1st Div, 10; 2d Div, 6; 22d Div, 9; 23d Div, 11; 5th Div, 16; 18th Div, 14; 25th Div, 13; 7th Div, 10; 9th Div, 13; 21st Div, 10; 24th TZ, 6); these reductions roughly standardize Div staff advisory teams; 180 by authorizing a standard three-man advisor team for regiments, ranger groups, maneuver battalions, and ranger battalions; 120 by eliminating the recently requested addition of two advisors for each of 60 ARVN battalions on an RD mission; five from Airborne Division Headquarters; and 39 by standardizing Armor Squadron Advisory teams at one per squadron and two per troop.

4) The committee also recommended that COMUSMACV authorize senior advisors at various levels to shift their subordinate advisors to meet the needs of the situation.

(C) A recapitulation of the total spaces recommended for withdrawal by the Flanagan Study are shown at Table 6 below:[129]

Flanagan Study Recommended Advisor Space Adjustments
JGS Structural Element

Activity	Space Adjustments
J1	-2
Surgeon	-1
RF/PF Dir	-3
PSYOP	-20
Log Assistance	-42
Railway Sec Det	-1
Tng Dir (HQs)	-3
Arty Cmd	-1
Armd Cmd	-1
Schools/Colleges/Tng Ctrs	-28
Rgr Cmd	-3
Subtotal	-105

Sectors, Subsectors, RF/PF

Sector Chain	
RF Bns	+0
PF TCs	-12

RF Cos		-943
	Subtotal	-949
Tactical Chain of Command		
Corps HQ & Spt		-92
Cmd		-8
Div, Spt, & 24th TZ		-118
Regts		-17
Inf Bn		-240
Rgr Cmd (5 Gps/20 Bns)		-43
Abn TF & Div		-5
Armd Cav Sq (10)		-39
	Subtotal	-562
	Total Aggregate Adjustment	-1,676

Table 6

(C) COMUSMACV approved withdrawal of 165 spaces from the JGS structure and 296 spaces from the tactical chain of command--a total of 461 spaces then became available to use as trade off spaces, and the J3 was directed to retain and redistribute these spaces within MACV. [130]

Project 640

(U) As early as 14 June 1967, attention was directed toward the problems created by not having any single staff focal point to coordinate and monitor multi-faceted advisory effort. Experience showed that many activities related to advisory and military assistance to the RVNAF

often encompassed many staff areas of interest and that the staff was not appropriately organized to efficiently carry out its responsibilities in these matters. In view of these weaknesses the CofS directed MACJ5 to study the existing mission and organization of MACV to determine the requirement, feasibility, and desirability of:

1) Reestablishing a MAAG and/or

2) Identifying changes in existing organization and responsibilities of elements of the command to improve the provision, management, control, supervision, and use of critical US advisory and military assistance resources.[131]

(S) A review of possible courses of action identified five feasible alternatives; these were:

1) Establish a focal point for advisory matters at HQ MACV (i.e., "J" staff, DEPCofS, of DEPCOMUSMACV).

2) Assign to HQ JSARV all of the uni-Service advisory effort.

3) Withdraw from USARV all of the uni-Service advisory functions applicable to ARVN performed by JSARV.

4) Establish a conventional type MAAG.

5) Maintain the status quo.

(S) In considering the alternatives, the study was broad in scope and detailed in its analysis. Alternative 4) was discarded because such a course would require creating yet another headquarters and staff which, due to Program 5 force ceilings, was an uneconomical use of manpower resources. Alternative 5) was eliminated since it had already been recognized that the status quo wasn't getting the job done.

(S) The study further indicated that regardless of what the outcome might be, some variation of the first alternative would have to take place; consequently, alternative 2) and 3) were compared in depth. An influence bearing on the resolution between the two alternatives, which represented opposing options, was the desire to adopt the least disruptive course of action. Additionally, the organization of JGS had to be considered. Thus, it appeared that a combination of alternatives 1) and 3) was the most desirable solution of the problem.[132]

(S) On 9 September 1967 DEPCOMUSMACV was briefed by J5 on Project 640. At the conclusion of the briefing, DEPCOMUSMACV approved the following actions:

1) Establishment of a ACofS of MA, at HQ MACV, subject to the development and approval of detailed data on functions, organization, and mission.

2) Establishment of a joint USARV/MACV ad hoc committee by J5 to study and identify functions and responsibility which could be transferred from HQ MACV to USARV.

3) Assigned to the ACofS, CORDS, responsibility for staff monitorship of actions concerning the RF/PF Advisory Group.[133]

(C) The name of the senior position of the newly created military assistance staff was designated Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, the spaces to fill personnel requirements were obtained from those approved for withdrawal as a result of the Flanagan Study. A detailed discussion of the mission, organization and functions of the nascent staff is found below.[134]

(S) In compliance with DEPCOMUSMACV's decision to study further the functions and responsibilities which might be transferred from HQ MACV to USARV, J5 chaired an ad hoc committee which studied the problem in depth. The committee identified purely uni-Service advisory functions and recommended that they be transferred to USARV. At the close of 1967, no action had been taken on this recommendation.[135]

(U) Continuing action, however, realigning the advisory effort did take place. Project 640 identified problems within the field of logistics which still existed. These problems focused on the fragmentation of the logistics advisory effort between HQ MACV and HQ USARV. Consequently, on 23 December 1967, COMUSMACV determined that the operational control of the logistics advisory effort be transferred to HQ MACV effective 15 February 1968. MACJ46 was designated as the agency to coordinate this transfer.[136]

(U) A major recommendation resulting from Project 640 was the establishment of the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance (ACofS, MA) as a focal point at MACV for the advisory effort. To activate and staff the nascent office

expeditiously, it was imperative that spaces be identified and action be taken to establish the office on a permanent basis.


(C) The DCofS stipulated key spaces that had to be identified on a priority basis to allow assignment of personnel prior to 1 November 1967. These spaces were:

06 Army	ACofS, MA
05 Army	Coordination and Policy Branch
05 Navy	Navy Program Manager
05 Air Force	Advisory Support Branch

Subsequent planning conferences addressed the total personnel authorization, the optimum rank of the senior billet, and a proposed organization for the staff activity. Office of CofS, MA (MACMA) was built around the assets of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) Directorate. That office furnished its already authorized ten spaces; there, and six more--a total of 16, initially were considered minimum essential. Subsequent detailed evaluation of the tasks envisioned to be performed by MACMA resulted in increasing the manning level to 19 officers and seven enlisted men, or a total of 26 spaces.[137]

(U) Initial considerations regarding the rank to be authorized for the senior billet showed that the optimum might be at 08 level. However, subsequent guidance from the DCofS was that it should be an 06. Final determination set the billet at the level of 07, and the space was filled by BG Donnelly P. Bolton, USA.[138]

(U) Because MACMA was to provide a focal point at MACV for the advisory effort, and because it was to take in the functions of MAP as well, two subdivisions of the total activity were immediately apparent--that of Military Assistance, per se, and that of Advisory Support. Further study and refinement evolved the organization which was in being at the end of 1967 and is shown in Figure III-5 below.



MISSION: The mission of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance is to supervise, coordinate, monitor, and evaluate, in conjunction with appropriate agencies, the joint advisory effort and the military assistance program in the Republic of Vietnam.

Figure III-5

Advisory Effort to ARVN

(S) On 1 January 1967, there was a total of 5,869 field advisory spaces authorized to the four ARVN corps tactical zones (CTZ) as follows:

I CTZ	838
II CTZ	1,357
III CTZ	1,962
IV CTZ	1,712
TOTAL:	5,869

Of those in I CTZ, 45 were designated to be filled by USMC personnel, the majority of whom filled advisor billets to ARVN artillery and infantry battalions.[139]

(S) By the end of 1967, there were 5,894 Army Advisor billets of which 44 were USMC fill, ten were Air Force fill, and three were Navy fill. While it appears that there was an insignificant fluctuation from the beginning to the end of 1967, there were vast fluctuations in the interim. Frequently, MACV had to withdraw spaces for trade-off purposes. Usually such spaces were obtained by withdrawing, on a temporary basis, spaces from ARVN units not yet activated. Further, a vast number of assets were reprogrammed from other than advisory sources to fill recognized advisor needs.[140]

(C) Early in 1967 the need for a security umbrella under which the pacification effort could function was recognized. During the CJC's visit to Vietnam in January, he presented a number of questions concerning the provision of physical security to the rural areas. One of his questions was, "To insure effective transition of this substantial portion of ARVN from search-and-destroy or clear-and-hold operations to local security activities, is it not essential that these ARVN forces be imbued with the vital importance of their task and be rapidly trained for it, and would it not be wise to assign American officers--our very best men--as advisors to all ARVN local security detachments of company size and larger?" MACV conducted a study addressing this and arrived at an affirmative reply.

(C) The results of the study indicated several advantages which would accrue through assignment of advisors to company size units; these were:

1) improved combat effectiveness,

2) enhanced unit effectiveness in winning the willing support of the people to the GVN,

3) improved unit civic action and PSYWAR operations, and

4) expedited completion of the RD process.

(C) As a result, COMUSMACV requested from CINCPAC approval for an additional 120 spaces which would provide one additional officer (O-3) and EM (E-7) for each battalion conducting independent operations in support of RD.[141]

(C) It soon became evident that all ARVN maneuver battalions should be trained to support RD. As a result, mobile training teams (MTT) were organized with the mission of advising ARVN battalion commanders whose units were designated for such training. This program proved successful, and by 30 September 1967, the MTTs had trained 132 of 144 battalions. The program produced major worthwhile results in ARVN attitudes toward RD.[142]

(U) During the final quarter of 1967, the MTT program made significant progress. As of 31 December, 143 maneuver battalions and 99 others had completed RD support training. To capitalize on the success of this program, a followon RD refresher training program began on 6 November 967. By the end of December 1967, 28 maneuver battalions had completed this training.[143]

Advisory Efforts to VNAF

(S) During 1967, the JTD of the USAF Advisory Group (AFGP) remained fairly constant. On 1 January 1967, the AFGP was authorized 226 officers and 267 airmen. This total of 493 spaces at the beginning of 1967 fell to 464, 193 officer billets and 271 enlisted, as of 31 December


1967. Organizationally, the AFGP had a headquarters element and ten Air Force advisory teams. A detailed organizational chart and mission statement is shown in Figure III-6.[144]

(U) Perhaps the biggest problem facing the AFGP operations personnel was the continuing aircraft accident rate experienced by VNAF. During the month of August 1967 alone, there were ten major flight accidents and one major ground accident, one minor flight accident, and six flight incidents. During the same period, there was only one reported combat loss. Because of the accidents, five A-1H aircraft, one C-47 aircraft, and one H-34 helicopter were destroyed. Three C-47s, two U-17As, and one 0-1A received major damage. There were four fatalities which included one VNAF pilot lost as a result of combat. The Deputy Chief, AFGP, pressured AF advisors to [redacted] ways to motivate VN personnel in order to solve the flying safety problem. That the VNAF pilots could sustain operations without accidents was confirmed by the performance of the VNAF F-5 Squadron which flew 478 sorties and 520 hours in August with no accidents or combat losses. As a direct result of advisor activity, the very poor VNAF safety record of August was reversed in September when only one major flight accident, three flight incidents, and one non-flight incident were recorded.

(U) As was the case in all RVNAF components, VNAF, prior to August, had no strength accounting system in effect. The Directorate of Personnel, AFGP, on 17 August 1967 submitted a program to rectify this problem. This proposal was similar to the old USAF morning report data record system. The program was successful and solved the problem.

(U) For some time, VNAF had expressed an interest in developing a WAF element. In response to this, AFGP, in August 1967 established liaison with 7AF to provide a US WAF to assist the VNAF in this matter. In September 1967, Chief AFGP, approved a request for a WAF officer to replace the departing personnel advisor. The WAF officer, when assigned, performed the dual functions of VNAF personnel advisor and assisting VNAF in establishing a WAF program.[145]


ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP



MISSION: (1) To advise and assist the VNAF to achieve a state of combat readiness through application of logistics, engineering, maintenance, communications, planning, air operations, aerospace medicine, and personnel operating procedures; (2) Act in an advisory capacity to COMUSMACV and CG, 7AF on all matters pertaining to effective use of air power including that of VNAF; (3) To provide for all USAF personnel assigned or attached; (4) Support operations of other agencies as directed or required.

Figure III-6

ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP



MISSION: (1) Serve as the Senior US Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations, Vietnamese Navy (VNN) and the Commandant, Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC); (2) Exercise command of subordinate advisory teams; (3) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC commanders and staffs at all echelons in achieving and maintaining a high state of combat readiness so as to fulfill their responsibilities for internal security, defeat of communist insurgency, and resistance to aggression; (4) Develop, in coordination with the VNN and VNMC, MASF material personnel, and organizational requirements and submit to COMUSMACV; (5) Observe and report on the utilization of material furnished and personnel trained by the United States through MASF; (6) Assist GVN, USAID, JUSPAO, and other US and FWMA agencies in the coordination of Revolutionary Development Support Programs; (7) Advise and assist the VNN and VNMC in psychological warfare and civic action programs; (8) Advise the VNN in the operation of coastal surveillance centers in coordination with the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115) to provide an interchange of information and coordination of effort between VNN and US Coastal Surveillance Forces; (9) Provide intelligence and counterintelligence as directed by COMUSMACV.

Figure III-7

Advisory Effort to VNN

(S) The Naval Advisory Group, less the Marine effort which is discussed separately, below, had a total of 465 spaces, of which 217 were officer and 248 were enlisted. At the beginning of 1967. Minor adjustments were made throughout the year which resulted in an end-of-year space authorization of 224 officers and 251 enlisted, or a total of 475 spaces. These spaces were broken down into two separate activities, the shore elements and the operational elements, to correspond to the VNN organization. Under the category of shore activities fell the Component Command at JGS, the shipyard, the logistical Command, and training centers. The operational elements consisted of the Fleet Command, the Coastal Force, and the Riverine Forces. The detailed organization and mission is shown in Figure III-7.[146]

(C) The major problem confronting advisory personnel to the VNN was in the field of maintenance and supply. The lack of skilled repair facility personnel delayed repairs and overhauls. Flexibility to shift personnel from one facility to another to meet peak loads was a successful technique used to minimize this problem. This, and careful screening of work requests to determine those which were within the capability of the ship's complement enabled the Naval Advisory Group to insure the maximum resources afloat.[147]

Advisory Effort to VNMC

(S) From 38 spaces authorized at the beginning of 1967, the Marine advisory unit increased a total of one space during the year. There was no particular need for large numbers of Marine advisors since the VNMC, with headquarters in Saigon, had only seven battalions, six infantry and one artillery. The authorization for the VNMC reflected no change from 1966, and for the foreseeable future, none was required. All VNMC activities have been consistently rated as SATISFACTORY by the Senior Marine Advisor (SMA) throughout 1967 attesting that these programs developed in 1966 had borne fruit. That the VNMC experienced an effective employment rate of in excess of 80 percent throughout the year attested to their aggressiveness.[148]

Upgrading the Effort

(U) In mid-January 1967 COMUSMACV observed that, in accomplishing the massive buildup of RVNAF over the past years, it had tended to negate concurrent efforts to achieve qualitative improvements in leadership, organization, and operations. Activation of new units required new cadres which had to be drawn from an already marginally effective officer and noncommissioned officer corps. This further reduced the quality of leadership available to already operational units. Thus, it was necessary to create an environment in which qualitative improvement could be made.

(C) The first measure taken was to stabilize the force levels of RVNAF. New force structure plans for FYs 67, 68, and 69 were developed by the MACV staff and were approved by COMUSMACV. In developing these plans, the following criteria were used:

1) Development of a balanced force to enhance operational effectiveness.

2) Development of a force structure attainable and maintainable within the manpower resources of RVN.

3) Reduction of the inflationary effect that a significantly expanded force structure would have upon the economy of RVN.

Having provided this stabilizing environment, the task of improving RVNAF units already in existence became a priority objective of the advisory effort.

(C) Many ARVN battalions had already begun to show marked improvement, but a large number of the remaining were considered marginally or totally ineffective when committed because of inadequate numbers of personnel present for duty. Normally, this stemmed from malassignment rather than from an actual shortage of personnel. To alleviate this condition, COMUSMACV enjoined his advisors to assist in the attainment of the following objectives:

1) Eliminate unauthorized units.

2) Eliminate overstrength in headquarters units and rear area detachments.

3) Eliminate unauthorized absences and the large number of personnel on special duty to higher headquarters.

4) Improve administrative procedures to remove ineffectives from unit rolls.

(U) With regard to the above discussion of significant leadership problems within RVNAF, JGS, as a result of strong encouragement from COMUSMACV, inaugurated a comprehensive Command Leadership Program designed to improve leadership at all levels of command. In a letter to the field, COMUSMACV pointed out to all US advisors that, by exercising their own leadership and by setting personal examples, they could make unique contributions to the success of this vital program.

(C) Further ARVN effectiveness was gained by retraining combat battalions at national training centers approximately every 31 months. Since the personnel turnover between these training sessions was nearly 83 percent, the recycle training was of significant benefit. Further, it was determined that combat effectiveness could be maintained only if unit training was conducted at home stations between combat operations to correct operational deficiencies. COMUSMACV pointed out that command emphasis and supervision of training had been inadequate and that greater personal interest of commanders and staffs and an effective training inspection system were needed. Further, he said, that ARVN commanders must recognize that they are responsible for the conduct of training and that they should actively participate in it. He admonished his advisors to seize all opportunities to arouse ARVN commanders' interest and concern and to instill in them the requisite sense of responsibility for training their units.

(U) Additionally, COMUSMACV noted that advisory emphasis had to be placed on improvement in logistics operations at all levels. He felt that additional spaces could be provided to combat units from those saved by improved efficiency, elimination of unnecessary or unauthorized personnel, and by removal of ineffectives. Advisors were to emphasize improvement of maintenance at all levels, as well, to insure operational readiness of equipment for combat.

(U) These problem areas and suggested means for improvement did not purport to represent a total listing; rather, they were to serve as the focus, or framework, for advisory efforts toward general improvement in quality of all aspects of RVNAF capabilities and operations. [146]

(C) A need to develop a comprehensive assessment of RVNAF leadership problems led, on 3 January 1967, to an agreement between COMUSMACV and Chief JGS which called for the provision of US advisors to the ARVN IG and subordinate commands and agencies. COMUSMACV designated the MACV IG as the SA at JGS level and the Chief, Investigations Division as DSA. The latter served in a full-time advisory capacity with his office at ARVN IG. The DSA's duties were to:

1) assist ARVN IG to establish a RVNAF IG system patterned after OTIG, DA,

2) accompany ARVN IG on inspections, if requested,

3) assist ARVN IG to conduct inspections, if requested,

4) conduct staff visits to MACV advisors at ARVN Corps and Division levels,

5) orient newly assigned MACV IG officers, and

6) prepare progress reports for MACV IG as required.

It was determined that the need for US Army officers to be detailed as IG would total 16.

(C) By 3 June 1967, only three of the 16 spaces had been filled, and COMUSMACV sent a PRIORITY message to DA which requested that the remaining vacant spaces be filled expeditiously. By the end of 1967, all 16 spaces had been filled; however, because the advisory effort to JGS had manifestly increased over and above what was initially anticipated, several of the personnel were diverted at the expense of Division IG advisors.

(C) One of the most significant and noteworthy of the accomplishments wrought by the MACV IG advisory team was the establishment of the JGS Inspector General School. In addition to training inspectors general, this school also trained logistics inspectors and RF/PF inspectors. As of 31 December 1967, 80 percent of the authorized Vietnamese inspectors at division level had been trained, 50 percent at corps level had been trained, and all at JGS had been trained.[150]

(C) Raising RVNAF morale and confidence was identified as another key to increasing their effectiveness. US advisors were encouraged to use all available progress indicators at their disposal toward this end. In a message to the field, the Deputy to COMUSMACV for CORDS said:

> I see many signs that RVNAF confidence along these lines [of success] is growing. However, I believe that it would be further reinforced by greater understanding on the part of RVNAF combat commanders of the extent of our joint achievements since the dark days of 1964-65. Its full extent is often not easily apparent to those at the cutting edge.
>
> Therefore, I desire that all . . . advisors find discreet ways of acquainting their RVNAF counterparts with . . . estimates of progress achieved.

Presented were estimates of enemy losses, evidence of sinking morale, increased Chieu Hoi ralliers, difficulties of VC administrators to maintain their cadre, troubles in the VC camp with recruiting and taxation, VC loss of population control, and VC failures in many other areas. "The above indicators," said the CORDS Deputy, "amply document our increasing progress and should be a shot in the arm to RVNAF commanders. You [the advisor] should employ them fully to reinforce their confidence and morale. Remember that success begets success."[151]

(C) As a result of the continuing program to enhance the advisory effort in every possible way, on 12 December 1967 COMUSMACV solicited the opinion of all CTZ SAs, SA to the Airborne Division, and CG USARV as to the advisability of upgrading the rank of regimental and battalion advisors comparable to that of the advisee. It was considered that the receptivity of advice would be improved. Comments and recommendations from the field were studied, and as of the end of 1967, the thinking was that upgrading would be appropriate in the following instances:

1) Advisors to Infantry Regiments, Airborne Task Forces, and Ranger Groups: from MAJ to LTC.

2) Advisors to Infantry, RF, Artillery, and Ranger Battalions, including Airborne: from CPT to MAJ.

Temporarily deferred from consideration was the upgrading of advisors to Division Artillery, Division G3, Regimental staff, Division Assistant G3, and Battalion Assistants, as well as those of Engineer Groups, Armored Cavalry Squadron and Signal Battalions.[152]

(FOUO) The US advisor/VN counterpart relationship was an area which required continuous emphasis. In a letter to all officer advisors, COMUSMACV said:

> Your job is a most difficult and sometimes frustrating task. Under any circumstances, the relationship of advisor-to-advised is a testy and tenuous one. Here, the relationship is compounded by daily decisions with life and death consequences, and by communications problems complicated by language difficulties and different national origins.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> A natural tendency to be assertive in the rendering of advice and guidance must be tempered with a degree of diffidence. You should provide the ingredients necessary for your counterpart to make valid judgements, and then encourage his decision-making as well as his leadership image, and must not be compromised. Experience has proven that imparting the knowledge required for the decision is eminently more successful than attempting to provide the decision. The net result is a more qualified and confident counterpart and the establishment of a stronger basis of mutual trust and respect. . . .

(FOUO) As a followon in developing good advisor/advisee relationships, JUSPAO Guidance No. 26 was sent to the field by MACV. This guidance provided a discussion of the psychological aspects of counterpart relationships.[153]

(U) A detailed examination of the advisory effort to provinces, districts, and RF/PF is undertaken in Chapter VI.

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES

General

(TS) Although the often-discussed idea of a multi-national force along the DMZ appeared to have been overwhelmed by the magnitude of the threat in I CTZ, nevertheless it died hard. In late April Premier Ky drafted a letter to the heads of the troop-contributing countries, requesting more troops to help man a strong-point obstacle system in Quang Tri Province. Although the US SECSTATE placed a hold on the letter, CINCPAC believed it wise to see COMUSMACV's views on the desirability of an international force along the DMZ, the composition of such a force, and his assessment of the allied countries' ability to contribute to such a force.[154]

(TS) COMUSMACV observed that the employment of an international force offered several advantages, chiefly political and psychological. Use of such a force south of the DMZ would dramatize the defensive nature of the war and would emphasize All. Solidarity. It could also contribute to the ground forces required for a proposed barrier plan (see Annex A), and might form the basis for an international force of different composition under UN or Asian sponsorship which could inherit the anti-infiltration role. On the other hand, there were serious disadvantages to an international force operating near the DMZ. Loss of flexibility of the units assigned to the force was likely, and if its units had to be provided from in-country assets, then on-going projects were likely to suffer. Only if additional forces were provided was the concept considered feasible. The force should be composed of a US three-battalion brigade and similar ROK and ARVN forces, supported by the normal ratio of combat support and combat service support. Australia or New Zealand might provide a Special Air Service (SAS) squadron, or New Zealand could furnish a battery and Thailand up to a battalion, while the Philippines might give a security company. Also needed were two US Army airmobile companies and general support artillery. MACV had no sure knowledge of the capability of the various FW countries to provide additional forces.

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Australia

(S) Following the strong endorsement of Australia's policy in RVN in the federal elections in the fall of 1966, the Prime Minister acted to augment Australia's commitment to RVN. In view of [redacted] the strong support given to a tri-service contingent by the Minister of Defense, the proposed augmentation consisted of elements from all three services. Australia offered for service in RVN HMAS Hobart, a guided missile destroyer, and a RAN diving team; a squadron of eight B-57 Canberra bombers; and a 900-man increase to the existing Army units in RVN. The Australian Government (GOA) wanted general confirmation that HMAS Hobart would be deployed in conjunction with US forces. It was expected that Hobart would remain under national command, but under operational control of the US Navy, and would be on station for at least six months, when she would be relieved by HMAS Perth or a British-type escort. The ship was made available in all respects as an additional ship of the USN force, without operational restrictions, for use in shore bombardment of RVN and of NVN, interdiction of coastal traffic, picket duties for carrier operations, and general operations in support of naval forces at sea. Similarly, GOA wanted the Canberra squadron deployed in conjunction with US forces. It was expected that the squadron also would remain under national control, but would be under operational control of the USAF, and would be located where it could support Australian forces as part of its tasks. The squadron would provide its own maintenance in RVN and would rely on major maintenance from Australia, although logistic support in the form of POL, rations, accommodations, engineer stores, and other common usage items would be expected. US authorities concurred in and welcomed the idea of increasing the Australian contingent, and foresaw no difficulties in integrating the forces into operations in RVN. 156

(S) The initial conference between MACV and Australian representatives met in Saigon on 3 January 1967. The Australians were told of the proposed building construction which could be provided at Phan Rang

airfield, general base organization and operation, and available support, including maintenance, POL, munitions, rations, and billeting for transients. Plumbing and electrical supplies were critically short, so the Australians were asked to supply them. The Canberras would be employed like "all other strike aircraft under the operational control of Commander, 7th AF."

[redacted] The Chief of the Australian team reiterated the wish for the B-57s to be under Australian authority for "command and administration," but for "full operational control by the Air Force under which they work." Deployment of the Canberra squadron was thought ideal for the RAAF because the aircraft were obsolete and had been scheduled for replacement by F-111 aircraft. Besides agreeing that No. 2 Squadron should deploy to Phan Rang from Butterworth, Malaysia, where two spare Canberras would be maintained, the conference also addressed munitions shortage. Should the munitions for the squadron arrive before the squadron, and before the facilities at Phan Rang were available, then 7th AF agreed to store them at Cam Ranh Bay.

(S) When the conference turned to naval matters, US representatives asked for more details on the capabilities of the diving team which was to be integrated into its USN counterpart. The general concept of employment of the team envisaged integral operations of the team with NAVFORV. As RAN and USN representatives were meeting in Subic Bay to develop an arrangement for the logistic and administrative support of HMAS Hobart while operating with the 7th Fleet, the Saigon conference agreed that MACV need not be involved in any agreement pertaining to Hobart. CINCPACFLT would draft the working arrangements between the two navies governing the ship and her support.

(S) Only one additional Australian Army unit, an 80-man civil affairs unit, was planned for RVN. In all, 900 Australian Army reinforcements were provided for integration into units already in RVN. Of that number, 466 were requested additions to the TOEs of already-established units, and the remaining 450 constituted combat reinforcements to 1st Australian Task Force. Appropriate changes and supplements to the military working arrangements (MWA) were prepared by MACV.[157]

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[redacted] Contrary to their expectations, because of the relatively small size of the Canberra squadron and because of the crowded airfield conditions, the Australians were assured that their squadron was both wanted and needed. An Australian construction battalion left for RVN in late January and early February to construct the maintenance hangar and other facilities for the squadron, as provided by the memorandum of understanding signed on 5 January. On 19 April the eight Canberra bombers landed in RVN to comprise the first such Australian aircraft to enter the war. 158

(S) Integration of HMAS Hobart continued. Operational employment, logistic support, command relations, and use of clubs, messes, and exchanges were arranged on a navy-to-navy basis. Pertinent publications and communications items were provided the ship to permit her to function with USN commands and units in the area. On 31 March Hobart relieved a USN destroyer off Chu Lai to begin operations in Vietnamese waters. 159

(S) On 19 January, the Australian CofSA had indicated that ten RAN anti-submarine warfare pilots qualified in H-34 helicopters might be deployed to RVN. After ten hours of transitional training in UH-1 aircraft, these pilots could be integrated directly into USA aviation units. It was not until April, however, that the Australian offer was formalized: early in the month, GOA offered eight fully-trained RAN pilots and approximately 50 maintenance and support personnel to relieve US personnel operating in support of the ATF. The offer envisaged that pay and allowances would be paid by GOA, while the US provided aircraft, spare parts, POL, and ammunition. The personnel, who would rotate annually, would be integrated into US units, and would relieve US personnel on an individual basis. COMUSMACV felt that the proffered helicopter personnel could be used advantageously in RVN. The required ten hours of transition training in UH-1 aircraft for pilot personnel could be conducted in-country, and proficiency requirements for the maintenance and support personnel met by on-the-job training. COMUSMACV pointed out that USA helicopter units were not assigned to support specific organization or task forces, and the units to which the Australians would be assigned would support various forces as dictated by the tactical situation. 160

(S) JCS had requested that the Australian UH-1 pilots be based near an RAAF squadron, to facilitate the administrative matters expected to be made the responsibility of that squadron. JCS also requested that, if

practicable, the personnel be assigned to the US units which normally supported the ATF. In soliciting COMUSMACV's views on the matter, CINCPAC pointed out that later discussions with the Australians indicated that they desired to attach their personnel to the Australian unit at Vung Tau for national administrative support; otherwise, assignment of the pilots to any US unit was fully acceptable. While noting that two US helicopter units were stationed at Vung Tau, CINCPAC said that there was no stated requirement that the US unit to which the Australians would be assigned normally be employed in support of the ATF. COMUSMACV replied that if the proposed Australian increase materialized, the personnel would be assigned to a unit of the 12th Combat Avn Gp, which provided Army aviation support to units in III CTZ, where the ATF was deployed. Should the Australians deploy prior to the arrival of the 135th Avn Co (Air Mobile Light) in October 1967, then they would be assigned to a USA helicopter company in the Bien Hoa/Bear Cat area. Upon arrival of the 135th Avn Co, they would be reassigned to that unit, which would normally support the ATF, although it would also support other units and operations, as dictated by the situation. The planned deployment location for the 135th Avn Co was Nui Dat, about 35 km NE of Vung Tau, where a RAAF helicopter squadron was located. The Australian personnel would be attached to the RAAF contingent at Vung Tau for national administrative support. 161



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(C) The Australian PM announced to Parliament 17 Oct 67 plans to increase Australian forces in VN by 1,700 troops. Australian Army increases will be one Inf Bn (3 RAR), one Tank Sq (Centurion tanks), an Engr Const Trp (45 men), and an additional 125-man group to augment HQ staffs. The 3 RAR will be deployed Nov/Dec to VN and other units as transportation becomes available. An additional RAAF force commitment to VN will be eight Iroquois helicopters, ten helicopter pilots, 20 EM aircrew members, and 100 maintenance personnel. The helicopters and personnel are to be assigned to the RAAF No. 9 (Utility) Heli Sq which was deployed to VN in Jun 66. Acquisition of helicopters and personnel were a limiting factor on deployment of that portion of the commitment. [163]

(S) This force evolved into an increase of a total of 1,978 men which were scheduled to arrive in-country during the period from late Nov 67 to May 68. Upon arrival, this total, subject to minor variations, will increase AFV (including HMAS Perth) from 6,300 to over 8,000 men. The composition of the increase was:

1) Army.

a) Inf Bn Gp (1,784) of 3 RAR with combat support and logistic elements.

b) Tank Sq Gp (250) including logistic support elements.

c) Construction Unit (81).

2) Navy. Ten Skyhawk pilots and 64 ground crew for operational service with US Marines, probably based at Chu Lai.

3) Air Force. An increase of approximately 120 men to No. 9 Sq, RAAF, to give that unit the capacity to operate 16 helicopters.

The Army units were to close in-country during the period 12-28 December. The Tank Sq is due to close 3 Jan 68 - 23 Mar 68. The Construction Unit is to close in Feb 68. The Skyhawk Flight is

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scheduled for mid-1968. No arrival date was scheduled for the Air Force unit since it was predicated on the availability of helicopters.[164]

(C) When queried as to the availability of helicopters in RVN for use by the RAN augmentation, COMUSMACV stated that a review of the in-country assets and those projected for receipt in the near future revealed that the USA was more than two hundred UH-1 helicopters short of the authorized allowances and none were in reserve stockage. With this in mind, he stated that the command was unable to provide the requested helicopters: however, the addition of Australian helicopter pilots and crews would be most welcome. He suggested that they could be integrated into a USA Assault Heli Co in a manner similar to the arrangement which had been made for integration of RAN pilots and mechanics into the 135th Assault Heli Co.[165]

New Zealand

(S) [redacted] Military justification for additional New Zealand forces to RVN was ample. An infantry battalion, deployed to III CTZ as a part of the 1/ATF, would double the ATFs operational capacity, as one of its two assigned battalions was always required for base camp security. Further, 1/ATF had the capability to control multi-battalion operations. A Special Air Squadron (SAS), to help fill the need for long-range patrols and reconnaissance, was another desirable New Zealand contribution to RVN. Other than these units, an APC Platoon would be useful in securing LOCs and a truck company would be helpful in meeting additional transport requirements of the ATF, as well as of US units.[166]

(S) In late 1966 the most likely increases in New Zealand Army (NZA) deployments were a 40-man SAS on a full-time basis, or five 20-man troops alternating six-month tours of duty with their Australian counterparts. The APC troop of 30-men and 12 carriers was another

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possible increase, but was not likely to be available immediately. A final possibility was an infantry rifle company from Malaysia; its deployment to RVN would require its parent battalion to continue its mission with three rifle companies and a headquarters. Possible AF increases were four to six Canberra crews, supported by 40-50 ground personnel, which could be integrated into either USAF or RAAF Canberra squadrons. The B-57s of the RNZAF lacked commonality with US bombers, and it was thought best to leave them in New Zealand for training purposes. Other AF possibilities were: a few fully-qualified Vampire pilots for US-sponsored training and subsequent combat operations, preferably in F-4 aircraft; a few operations, intelligence, and forward air controller personnel; two to four Bristol Freighter transports with flight crews and ground-support personnel necessary to sustain operations; and finally, at some future date, air crews and ground-support personnel for Iroquois helicopters. The most favored naval contribution was diversion of the frigate Blackpool from Singapore to the 7th Fleet off RVN. Perhaps 20-40 officers and men to man and service infiltration patrol craft also might be furnished. Besides these, GNZ had been exploring the possibility of substituting a medical team drawn from the Armed Services for three previously planned mobile civilian medical teams for Binh Dinh Province. 167

(S) COMUSMACV's preference for a NZA contribution was, first, a full infantry battalion, next an infantry rifle company, then an SAS, and finally an APC troop. The infantry battalion, if attached to 1st ATF, would double its capability by allowing two battalions to operate concurrently on search-and-destroy operations. Additionally, security in the Vung Tau area would be increased, which would assist the RD program there. If only an infantry company was made available, it would be deployed as a part of the ATF. An SAS would be employed alone in a specified remote area, to observe and report on enemy dispositions, installations, and activities. The APC troop also would be employed with the ATF. A Canberra squadron would be the most desirable RNZAF contribution, followed by Bristol Freighter transports, support for Iroquois helicopters, F-4 pilots, intelligence specialists, and forward air controllers. The Canberra bombers would operate with the Australian squadron then deploying to RVN, and the Bristol Freighters would provide in-country logistic support as well as a unit movement capability for the ATF. Up to 25 officers and 25 EM, available for at least six-month tours, could be used in conjunction with the Iroquois assault helicopters which normally supported the ATF. Intelligence specialists and forward air controllers would be used within their trained capabilities.

The deployment of a Blackpool-type destroyer to augment 7th Fleet destroyer resources would be especially desirable, and a NZN contingent to supplement manning of either MARKET TIME or GAME WARDEN patrol craft would be welcome. They would be integrated into US Navy crews for indoctrination before ultimately forming their own crews. [redacted]

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(S) On 8 March GNZ announced its intention to send a 16-man joint-Services medical team to Binh Dinh Province in late May or early June to replace the US MILPHAP team at Bong Son. At the same time, the decision to double New Zealand's military forces in RVN was announced. The increase in the military force consisted of an infantry rifle company, with supporting elements, rotated from the NZ battalion in Malaysia for six-month tours of duty. The New Zealand company was planned for deployment with the ATF and was organized identically to an Australian company. An additional 24-man replacement pool was planned also. In discussing deployment plans with the Australians, the New Zealanders were told that the most suitable months for deployment were May or July, as April and June were the rotation months for the 5th and 6th Bns, RAR. Although for a while July was thought the most likely deployment month, the first elements of the company actually arrived in-country on 11 May. USDAO WELLINGTON informed COMUSMACV on 16 Oct 67 that New Zealand would augment their VN force by one rifle company before Christmas. One infantry company of about 150-170 men arrived in-country 16-17 Dec 67. 169

Republic of Korea

(S) In December 1966 the ROK Minister of Defense had visited ROK troops in RVN. Highly impressed with what he saw, upon his return to Korea he urged the ROKG to deploy another Marine battalion to RVN as soon as possible. [redacted] the MOD orally broached the subject to COMUSKOREA, asking for US support in rapidly augmenting the 2d ROK Mar Bde in RVN. [redacted]

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President Park had approved the dispatch of three ROKMC rifle companies for attachment to the ROKMC battalions already in RVN as replacement/reserve companies, and COMUSKOREA expected an official approach by the ROKG to the US for equipment and other support. If the additional battalion was approved, it was thought that three serials each consisting of a ROKMC rifle company (7 Off, 213 EM), reinforced by weapons and medical detachments, would be formed from the existing ROKMC structure in Korea. A fourth increment, consisting of a headquarters and service company (17 Off, 205 EM), would be formed later. COMUSKOREA felt that COMUSMACV should assume responsibility for equipping the companies upon their arrival in RVN. The companies would deploy to RVN in echelon by scheduling their movements with those of regularly rotating personnel. [redacted] 170


(S) Since the battalion would probably operate in I CTZ, COMUSMACV requested CG III MAF's views on the proposal. CG III MAF favored augmenting the 2d ROK Mar Bde, and although he had no overriding objection to organizing a fourth battalion, if CG 2d ROK Mar Bde was so inclined, he thought it would be more advantageous to leave the augmenting companies in the existing battalions. Besides the obvious tactical advantage of a four-company battalion, demands on communications assets, supply, and combat support and combat service support would be lessened. No major difficulties were anticipated in replenishing the units with USMC equipment, assuming that the units arrived with a substantial portion of their initial issue. However, CG III MAF pointed out that no M16E1 rifles had been programmed for the additional force, and that sufficient quantities might not be available initially. No increased demands on combat support assets were expected from the augmentation. 171

[redacted]

(C) In late January the commander of the ROK forces in RVN (COMROKFV) had asked COMUSMACV to support an increase of 202 in the ROKFV strength ceiling of 44,897. Since the deployment of the 9th ROK Inf Div in October 1966, the average monthly casualty rate

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had increased, and this, in conjunction with personnel attending Vietnamese language instruction, accounted for 889 personnel spaces, or 202 more than the 687 authorized as replacements. After staffing the request, MACV sent a letter to COMUSKOREA on 10 February requesting the augmentation. 173




(S) In mid-April ROKG proposed the authorization of 2,963 additional manpower spaces for ROKFV augmentation. This augmentation provided for 1,460 manpower spaces for the 2d ROK Mar Bde, including the earlier proposed augmentation of the brigade by an additional battalion as well as artillery, mortar, and communications units; it covered the number of patients in RVN to (1,112) and it allowed for 391 miscellaneous increases, including the 20 ROKAF personnel for C-46 operations. In order to meet the increased requirements for rotation, replacement, and training in support of this augmentation, a 537-man support element, whose size was determined using the formulae used in computing that of the 1966 depoyments, was also required in Korea. The US Embassy in Seoul thought that the individuals concerned would deploy with their individual weapons and equipment, and that ROKG would provide certain items of organizational equipment. As seen by the Seoul Embassy, and concurred in by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, the US had four responsibilities in implementing these augmentations: Reconstitution of comparable strength in Korea, early replacement in kind of any equipment that Korea provided, provision of the support element in Korea to compensate for increased activities incident to the augmentation, and financing of all costs associated with the augmentation. 175

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(S) The proposed augmentation was based on the assumption that a general US objective, in recognition of a valid requirement, was to expand FW military participation in RVN, and that the dispatch of these augmentations would not adversely affect Korea's security; neither would they impose an economic burden nor detract from the political stability in Korea. The ROK armed forces informally advanced the proposed augmentations after analyzing ROKFV, in the light of experience gained since the first troops dispatched in 1965, to give it a reasonalby balanced force. The augmentations were the subject of staff discussion between COMUSKOREA, in consultation with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, and the ROK armed forces. The ROKG was aware of the talks and approved of the augmentations in principle. The augmentations were considered to be a normal fleshing-out of the force structure agreed to under the second dispatch and, since legislative authorization had been obtained for that deployment, no further authorization was deemed necessary. During the staff discussions the ROK armed forces representatives solicited US support for the augmentations on the same basis as applied to the 1966 dispatch, including "man-for-man" replacement of all personnel sent to RVN.



(S) The 1966 ROK deployment negotiations had established a patient ceiling for the support element in Korea of 1.7% of the forces depolyed to RVN, but made no allowance for patients hospitalized in RVN.

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E perience proved that the authorization for Korea was adequate, but that an extra authorization of 2.4% of depoyed personnel was needed for RVN. Patients in RVN hospitals also reduced ROKFV's effective strength, so COMUSMACV supported ROKG's request for a patient authorization for ROKFV, which would constitute additional filler personnel for RVN. Since the fillers would come from esisting units in Korea, it was assumed that they would be replaced on a man-for-man basis to preclude degrading ROK's defensive posture.[177]

(S) On 8 May DEPSECDEF approved Service funding of the FY67 and FY68 costs, provided that ROKG was told that any additional funding would require congressional approval. To establish US Military Service Funding responsibility for additional costs and to obtain congressional approval, the DEPSECDEF requested that the net additional cost be identified. Ambassador Brown, in Korea, did not believe that the Koreans should be approached until the appropriations committees had been consulted, as discussions with the ROKG with but a partial answer would only complicate matters and it was best to treat the subject as an entity. While ROKG had not been consulted, the Seoul Embassy furnished reasonably sound indications of the financing problem, although after negotiations they might be changed. The grand total of $928,400 included the 1967 dispatch of 2,963 personnel to RVN, as well as reconstitution of strength and support in Korea. While awaiting congressional approval, Ambassador Brown recommended that Service funding authorization be granted to the appropriate military departments. In early June, congressional approval for DOD funding of the FY68 net additional costs, as estimated by the AMEMB Seoul, was forthcoming, and the military Services were advised to finance the costs incident to the deployment.[178]

(S) On 17 June the ROK MOD formally proposed an augmentation to ROKFV along the lines of the 1966 deployment and in accord with the informal proposal, except that 100% equipment reconstitution within three months was requested. Lead-time problems with many items prevented meeting the time request, but the ROKG was told that the equipment would be deployed as soon as possible. The USG completely funded the augmentation, as it had the 1966 deployment. Later in the month, CINCPAC gave COMUSKOREA and COMUSMACV programming instructions for the material/services net additional costs to support the ROKFV augmentation. MAP elements would be used for the approved costs of augmenting the ROKFV within the ROK Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF) program. One time, nonrecurring costs for individual

clothing and equipment, as replacements in kind for that being deployed; increased training costs; and replacement of Marine supplies and equipment would be programmed in the FY67 ROK MASF program. Likewise, the net additional costs (by Service), the increased training requirement, and individual clothing and equipment for support within Korea would be programmed by the FY68 MASF program. Death and disability costs and overseas allowances were not included in the ROK MASF program pending clarification. Follow-on support, other than already identified, would be programmed by adjustments to existing programs within the respective Service programs for supporting FWMAF in RVN. Each Service would program the requirements necessary to complete the authorized equipage of augmentation forces. The 40 ROKMC officers and 938 enlisted men of the first increment of the augmentation left Pusan on 8 July aboard USNS Gordon, debarking at Da Nang on 13 July, and was closely followed by the second increment. [179]

(C) In June ROKG announced its desire to train ROKFV replacements on the new equipment used in RVN but not in the ROK inventroy. ROKG proposed to conduct the training in Korea with US-provided equipment. The Korean desire to provide only qualified replacements, as well as ROKG's wish to modernize its army, were well known to COMUSMACV, who thought that any new equipment provided in the future might also have to be furnished in Korea for training purposes. Additional spaces for the training base might also be required. MACV in-country resources originally were programmed for replacing losses and building a maintenance float for US forces; when issues were made against an unprogrammed requirement, US forces' capability was reduced until the items could be replaced. Providing the equipment might also imply a modernization program for the forces of any donor country and, of course, ROKFV space augmentation required high-level USG approval. As these matters were beyond the range of MACV, but were conditions which would be influenced by any precedent set by final action on the ROKG proposal, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC comment and guidance. [180]

(C) To COMUSKOREA, COMUSMACV said that replacements fully trained in Korea on the new equipment were desirable, but that if the training depended on MACV supplying the equipment to Korea, then it had best be deferred and conducted on-the-job in RVN. Subject to CINCPAC approval, COMUSKOREA should try to obtain equipment for training in Korea from some other source. Only ammunition for the M-16 and M-1 rifles and field ranges with immersion heaters were

available for issue from in-country stocks; all other items were in critically short supply, not in stock, or needed to fill USARV requirements. USMC supplies on hand or in the pipeline, likewise, were sufficient to support only the forces in RVN. UH-1D transition training in-country could not be provided on a continuing basis without adversely affecting performance of the tactical mission. MACV might be able to provide a limited number of UH-1 helicopters by July 1969 to support a transition training program in Korea, if approved. In the meantime, ROKA aviators who had received on-the-job copilot training with USA units in RVN could provide an interim source of replacements for the ROKFV aviation company. CINCPAC felt that several factors had to be considered before agreeing to ROKFV replacement training in Korea on new equipment. Provision of new equipment was the major problem, as some items were in short supply, costly, and required long lead times. The number and qualification of the personnel to be trained also had to be considered; small numbers of students could be trained in the US, in US units in Korea, or in RVN. Training on each new item of equipment had to be studied on a case-by-case basis, and ROKA and ROKMC elements, when feasible, could be trained together. CINCPAC requested COMUSKOREA to determine the number of personnel to be trained annually, new items of equipment needed, US equipment in Korea which could be made available, and the most economical means of conducting the training.[181]

(S) In February, COMUSKOREA asked COMUSMACV to comment on a ROK MOD request that two C-47s be assigned to ROKFV or, alternatively, that two ROKAF C-46s be deployed to RVN. COMUSMACV believed that ROKFV had valid airlift requirements, but noted that in-country airlift aircraft were used for logistical support of US/FW/RVN forces on a mission priority basis. The special air warfare configuration of many USAF C-47s also made them inappropriate and uneconomical to support the ROKAF requirements. Deployment of two ROKAF C-46s to RVN was favored, even though no airplanes of that type were in either the US or VNAF inventory. [redacted] CINCPAC approval of the deployment was necessary, as the aircraft were MAP supported, and COMUSMACV assumed that GVN approval would be obtained through Embassy channels after deployment arrangements were finalized.[182]

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(S) Following receipt of planning data from COMUSKOREA, 7AF began preliminary work on a location and support plan for the ROKAF aircraft. Until the support planning was completed, a deployment date could not be determined. In the meantime, COMUSKOREA initiated action to obtain CINCPAC approval for the deployment and recommended to the ROK JCS that the ROKG seek GVN approval for the deployment. When COMUSKOREA requested CINCPAC approval for deployment of the aircraft, he also asked for a 15 May deployment date. COMUSMACV considered 15 May to be feasible and, pending CINCPAC and GVN approval, was continuing preliminary planning. In approving the request, CINCPAC included it as part of a total ROK augmentation of 2,963 personnel, which he forwarded to Washington. Upon receipt of SECDEF approval of the augmentation, COMUSMACV was authorized to execute a maintenance contract for the two ROKAF C-46 aircraft. [183]

(S) Four commercial aircraft services were approached about their ability and interest in supplying contractual services. All declined, because the estimated costs were prohibitively high and the difficulty in estimating the total costs. A viable and economical plan for deploying was evolved by representatives of 7AF, MACV, ROKAF, and Continental Air Services (CAS). The plan provided that ROKAF aircraft would be bedded down on the CAS ramp area at TSN and that CAS would rent office, maintenance, and supply storage space to ROKAF. CAS maintenance personnel would supervise all maintenance which ROKAF could not perform unassisted. ROKAF would deploy with the necessary spare parts for lay-in stock, and ROKAF and CAS would prepare jointly a comprehensive list of spares, support equipment, and instrumentation; after the initial lay-in, normal supply procedures would be used, with already existing ROKAF C-54 flights providing resupply. COMUSMACV agreed that the prohibitive cost precluded consideration of complete contractual support for the ROKAF administrative aircraft. COMUSKOREA also concurred, with certain reservations: ROKAF would furnish the initial fly-away kit, but as MAP spares were consumed, they had to be replaced by Free World force funds. As ROKAF did not possess sufficient support equipment and special tools for deployment to RVN as part of the fly-away kit, provisions for contract support had to be included in the agreement. COMUSKOREA proposed that ROKAF deploy 23 personnel to support the program: ROKAF maintenance personnel could perform maintenance within their capability, while maintenance beyond it could be contracted. The deployment and total operation, including contract support, had to be accomplished at no cost to the MAP. COMUSKOREA recommended that CINCPAC approve the amended concept, with the

provision that Free World monies fund it. CINCPAC approved the amended concept, subject to mutual agreement of the amendment. 184

(S) Following SECDEF's approval of the proposal to deploy two ROKAF aircraft to RVN, and upon receipt of authority to negotiate a contract, COMUSMACV authorized Cmdr 7AF to negotiate letters of agreement and contractual arrangements incident to the deployment. Costs contingent upon the deployment were to be financed by the military services with program changes forwarded through service channels. COMUSMACV stated that the amendments proposed by COMUSKOREA would be resolved during contract negotiations. The two C-46 ROKAF aircraft arrived at Tan Son Nhut on 29 Jul 67. 185

(S) Discussions with ROK concerning additional forces for RVN had been under discussion for some time at State Department. On 23 Dec 67 CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV of the status of the discussions. The ROKG had indicated a willingness to provide a "light division" of two brigades, with a total strength of 11,000 trained troops, from Korea to RVN. Part of the spaces involved were to be obtained by replacing 5,000 ROK logistic and support personnel in RVN with a like number of civilians who would be either discharged from military duty in-place or would be veterans then in Korea. Thus, only 6,000 new active duty spaces would be required. The civilian salaries would be averaged on the basis of pay scales being paid by US and ROK contractors in RVN. ROK would also send to RVN one F-5 Sq of ROKAF, less aircraft.

(S) Providing the additional force was contingent upon US comitment to provide:

1) The requirements included in the counter-infiltration-counter-guerrilla concept and requirements plan of 3 Oct 67 which was being staffed by JCS.

2) A special strike force of eight battalions in the rear area (one for each rear area security division in the ROK 2nd Army Area) as a temporary measure to support police while infiltration threat continued. These 4,500 spaces would be additive to the 585,000-man ROK budget manning level. Most of the equipment required would come from the reserve divisions but the USG would assume the annual operating costs.

3) Three helicopter companies for ROKA during 1968-69 period for modernization and counterinsurgency purposes.

4) Four additional eight-inch howitzer (SP) Bns and two 175mm gun (SP) Bns.

5) Heavy equipment such as dump trucks, rock crushers, heavy scrapers, bulldozers, etc., for five existing engineer battalions which would help in the construction of the Seoul-Pusan highway.

6) Two destroyers (on loan) to be delivered in 1968.

7) A squadron of F-4Cs. The ROK commented that the price of the F-5A approximated that of a rebuilt F-4C.

8) A squadron of F-5 aircraft to be operated by the 350 ROKAF personnel who would be deployed to RVN.

9) Support for the new division along the lines negotiated for the troops already in RVN.

(S) The highest authority had personnaly discussed the requirements with President Park and had promised USG response by 1 Jan 68 and the fastest possible delivery date for the equipment agreed upon. Discussions had touched upon the possibility of switching a destroyer from US to the Korean Command. President Park had promised to do his utmost to get the troops to RVN by 1 Mar 68.

(S) COMUSMACV felt that the offer to provide the light division was acceptable. But the price tag appeared excessive, not only from a monetary viewpoint but also from the severe drawdown on available equipment, especially helicopters, that would be required to meet the ROK demands. While the ROK proposal might appear, at first glance, to be an operational asset, if the equipment which was to be sent to Korea as part of the bargain was to come from equipment intended for US/FW/RVN forces, then the proposal could well be a distinct liability.

(S) Material such as artillery, communications, aircraft, weapons, construction equipment, and vehicles were not available with in RVN. Further, those items were needed to fill shortages in already existing units and to meet requirements of units being deployed and activated. There were additional quantities needed for RVNAF modernization. As

an example, the unavailability of helicopters had resulted in a shortfall in the number assigned to fill the requirements for RVNAF, ROKFV, 1st ATF, and CORDS. [redacted] Although the world-wide asset position on the items was not known at MACV, COMUSMACV gave the following as the only feasible alternatives:

1) Defer deployment until assets are available from increased production without impact on other MACV (including RVNAF) requirements.

2) Degrade STRAF units in CONUS.

3) Use prepositioned material stockpiled in Europe.

4) Defer fully equipping existing RVNAF units and defer activities and modernization.

5) Defer US units to be deployed or degrade those in-country.

(S) Alternative 5 was not acceptable to MACV but it probably would not make the quantity of equipment needed available anyway. If MACV were to attain a position wherein it could begin to phase down US forces, the primary objective of increasing the effectiveness of RVNAF must be given priority. This would take Alternative 4 unacceptable. Failure to fully equip existing RVN units, meet requirements for programmed activations, or modernize those forces would be a breach of faith and, therefore, detrimental to US national interest. Similarly, the deferral of US units or degradation of those in-country was unacceptable. MACV was not in a position to comment on the feasibility of Alternatives 1, 2, and 3. However, it was noted that the ROK proposal would require significantly more than twice the amount of material needed to field an RVN unit of similar size due to the ROK demands for substantial quantities of equipment for use in Korea in addition to equipment for the unit fielded in RVN.

(S) Should the ROK light division deploy to RVN, COMUSMACV contemplated its use in II CTZ preferably by extending the present ROK TAOR northward into Binn Dinh Province. Advantages of this northward extension of the ROK TAOR were:

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1) Permit employment elsewhere in-country of the relieved US forces as an exploitation force.

2) Take maximum advantage of ROK force success in its TAOR pacification role in a heavily populated area.

3) Would not necessitate excessive augmentation of the command and control or logistical support units for the ROK forces in RVN.

(S) In regards to the F-5 Sq for RVN, deployment of a fighter squadron in conjunction with the ROK division was desirable. Deployment of ROK squadron would permit diversion of US air assets provided for ROK support to US and other FWMA forces. It would increase the contribution of allied representatives in RVN. While the deployment of a combat ready squadron with equipment was recommended, personnel of the F-5 Sq could be married up with the equipment in RVN that was proposed by ROKG. The need for the squadron was not sufficient basis to warrant buying the additional squadron aircraft for ROKAF. If a ROK F-5 Sq were to deploy to RVN, the bed-down site would be Tuy Hoa AB from which the squadron could best support the ROK elements. Ramp space and housing could be made available at a cost of $1.952 million MILCON. 186


Thailand

> Thailand is situated near Vietnam and it will be the next target of the communists, as they have already proclaimed. This is why Thailand realized the necessity to send military units to help oppose communist aggression when it is still at a distance from our country. The government has therefore decided to send a combat unit, one battalion strong, to take an active part in the fighting in South Vietnam in the near future. 187

(S) Thus the Royal Thai Government announced on 30 December 1966 its decision to participate in the ground war in RVN. Enthusiastic support from the Thai people greeted these announcements of their government; over 5,000 men in Bangkok alone volunteered for service in the unit, and a least on Buddhist monk forsook his yellow robes to

volunteer. There were problems to be resolved, however. The USG assumed that the Thai unit would resemble the one originally proposed, or about 1,000 men organized into infantry, artillery, armored car, and quartermaster elements, and able to fight independently of other supporting elements. DOD authorized Service funding support for equipment and facilities used by units in RVN, and for overseas allowances, within the guidelines established for support of the first Koreans dispatched to RVN. Death gratuities were payable by the US, and no undue economic burden was to be imposed on the contributing nation. The assurance given to the Thai Prime Minister, that support for the force would be in addition to that for the Thai forces in Thailand, and would be similar to that given the Thai forces already in RVN, were essential in the Thai decision to deploy the forces.[188]

(S) CINCPAC commended the highly successful political arrangements between the US and Thailand for the employment of Thai ground forces in RVN, and was of the opinion that COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI should discuss organizational, training, equipage, and support matters bearing significantly on the employment of the units.



(S) In the meantime, COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV conferred on the deployment of the Thai ground contingent. From 27-30 January representatives of MACV and MACTHAI met in Saigon and discussed various aspects of the pending deployment; in February the commitment of Thai troops was affirmed. The Thai contingent, which eventually would be located with and under the operational control of the US 9th Inf Div, began training on 13 March. It was not until two days later, however, that representatives of MACTHAI and the Royal Thai Army (RTA) met with the MACV staff to finalize the unit's TOE and TA, and

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to coordinate training, equipage, and deployment matters. The final TOE provided for a regimental combat team (RCT) minus certain elements, with a strength of 2,207, including five percent overstrength. The augmented staff of the RCT was capable of conducting field operations and of securing a base camp; its headquarters company consisted of a communications platoon, a PSYOP platoon, a heavy weapons platoon with a machinegun section, and a four-tube 81mm mortar section. The company also contained an aviation platoon, and an M-113 platoon. The four platoons in the service company were personnel and special services, supply and transport, maintenance, and MP. Four rifle companies constituted the maneuver elements of the RCT. The command and staff element for these companies, as well as for the combat support elements, was included in the regimental headquarters. A reinforced engineer combat company was also included in the RCT; it was agreed that the engineer company should deploy prior to the main body to help build the base camp. A medical company, a cavalry reconnaissance troop of two reconnaissance platoons and a M-113 platoon, and a six-tube 105mm howitzer battery completed the unit's TOE. While the discussion were proceeding, COMUSMACTHAI and the Director of Training, RTA, paid a courtesy call on COMUSMACV on 16 March, and two days later the approved TOE was signed by representatives of MACV and the RTA.[190]

(S) Equipping the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (RTAVR) with M-113 personnel carriers encountered a snag--they were not available. All assets scheduled through the 4th quarter FY67 were to replace battle losses and provide the cyclic rebuild program for US forces. During the discussions in Saigon the RTA agreed to equip only one platoon with APCs furnished by the US; believing that both platoons should be deployed concurrently, it was proposed that the second platoon deploy with 16 MAP-furnished APCs presently owned by the RTA. Both MACV and MACTHAI concurred in this proposal. Subsequently, the RTA reevaluated the proposal and decided to deploy only the platoon from headquarters company, which would be equipped with APCs furnished by the US from project stocks; the platoon of APCs in the reconnaissance troop would not be deployed with RTA MAP-supplied APCs. The RTA was amenable to activating the platoon and using 16-supplied APCs for training in Thailand, but wanted to pick up 16 US-supplied APCs upon arrival in RVN. If this were not possible, RTA did not plan to activate the reconnaissance platoon until a firm equipment availability commitment was given to them. COMUSMACTHAI felt

that the reconnaissance troops' combat effectiveness would be seriously impaired if it deployed without the APCs, but the RTA remained adamant in its view that the US had made at least a tacit commitment to provide the RTAVR 16 APCs from project stocks. RTA confirmed its decision to deploy only the platoon of APCs, the transportation platoon, cross-trained with the reconnaissance troop; activation of the platoon for the reconnaissance troop was indefinitely postponed. In view of this stance, MACV recommended that the 16 M113s in project stocks be released to the regiment for training and that subsequently they be deployed with the regiment.[191]

(S) In late May, CHNAVADGRU MACV advised that VNN would be unable to utilize effectively, the MASF motor gunboat (PGM) 107 scheduled for completion in July and recommended it be diverted to the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) for FWMAF contribution. COMUSMACTHAI preferred the boat be transferred to RTN under MAP as a later year requirement. RTN was already manning two FWMAF ships in RVN and might consider a US request to man another inappropriate, in view of its personnel/ship problems and a potential sea borne insurgency threat to Thailand. [redacted] A more acceptable approach would be to offer PGM 107 as grant aid of a future year and to request Thai assistance in the MARKET TIME effort by relieving the FWMAF PGM when it was due for maintenance and crew rotation in Thailand. This proposal would give RTN personnel considerable training in the patrol aspects of coastal warfare, increase the RTN's prestige, and still satisfy COMUSMACV's need for continued RTN presence in MARKET TIME. If RTN agreed to rotate PGMs in MARKET TIME, support arrangements for the crafts and crews would have to be negotiated.


(S) CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to coordinate with the Bangkok Embassy to determine the military requirements, and the receptiveness of RTG to accepting and manning PGM 107 as an additional Thai contribution to FWMAF. Proceeding along the guidelines specified in the CINCPAC Policies and Procedures Manual for

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FWMAF to RVN, the discussions were to be preliminary only, with the details and decision to be developed later.

(S) Approaches to RTG showed that the Thais did not desire to man PGM 107 as an additional contribution to FWMAF. Unless COMUSMACV had alternate plans for PGM 107, CINCPAC intended to submit a reprogramming recommendation.[192]



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(S) COMUSMACTHAI reported monthly to CINCPAC the progress of the RTAVR in its training. The report rendered on 11 May indicated that RTAVR was at 66 percent strength, and that the RTA had issued a call for previously registered volunteers to report to the RTAVR NLT 10 May. The number of personnel called, if they reported, would bring the RTAVR to 100 percent strength. By late May, the RTAVR was at 96% of its authorized strength, and within two weeks, it had increased to 104%. Its planned 105% strength, including 5% overstrength, was reached by 21 June.[194]

(S) Following a liaison visit by members of the US 9th Inf Div to Thailand, the RTAVR was invited to send liaison personnel and observers to the 9th Inf Div. Later this concept was expanded and the CG 9th Inf Div recommended that a US Army advisory team be organized and deployed to Thailand. COMUSMACV concurred in the recommendation that the team remain with the RTAVR until the regiment's combat capability and its familiarity with local operating conditions warranted. No additional space authorizations were needed, as the team was formed on a temporary basis from in-country resources. The team, consisting of a lieutenant colonel, a major, two captains, three lieutenants, and eight enlisted men, left Saigon by C-130 on 2 July.[195]

(S) On 5 July the RTG proposed to deploy the RTAVR to northeast Thailand against the Communist insurgents prior to sending it to RVN, ostensibly to enhance the RTAVR's morale and to give it a modicum of combat experience; its deployment to RVN would be delayed from one week to two months. [redacted] The bulk of the RTAVR's equipment had been taken from contingency stocks, and the RTAVR often had been given priorities above those enjoyed by other FW and even US forces just to insure its early deployment to RVN. As the RTAVR was dependent on a major US force for logistic support, it was to be associated closely with the US 9th Inf Div, which had provided a highly qualified advisory team to train and deploy with the RTAVR. Supplies and equipment scheduled to arrive after 15 August had been ordered to Bear Cat, where the 9th Inf Div was providing storage and security, and delaying the arrival of the RTAVR would only complicate problems attendant in the existing arrangements. Additional use of the equipment would increase the

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probability that replacement or extensive maintenance would be necessary before the RTAVR could deploy to RVN. Several operations had been planned around the RTAVR, and a delay in its deployment would cause rescheduling, cancellation, and extensive replanning. Training, logistical, and operational requirements in RVN had been developed in great detail to accommodate the Thai force on the agreed deployment dates, and a delay in deploying the RTAVR would waste the efforts and resources already devoted to supporting the Thai forces. COMUSMACV felt "it would be awkward and regrettable to this command to have to adjust these dates." On 27 July, COMUSMACTHAI reported that RTG had cancelled its plans to deploy the RTAVR to NE Thailand. [196]

(S) The deployment of the "Queen's Cobras was divided into four phases. The engineer company, acting as the regiment's quartering party, left Bangkok harbor by RTN LST on 11 July, and arrived at Newport Army Terminal on 15 July. Later that afternoon, after unloading its equipment, the company convoyed to Bear Cat, where it commenced work on the RTAVR's base camp. The advance party deployed by air and closed Bear Cat on 20 August. The main body of the RTAVR closed into RVN during the period 19-23 Sep 67. The last unit of the regiment to close was the APC Platoon which had completed its training by 25 Sep 67 and was deployed to RVN by air on 28 Nov 67. [197]

(S) Anticipating negotiations with RTG for death/disability gratuities for Thai FWMAF to RVN, COMUSMACTHAI, in mid-January, asked the Advisory Group in Korea what dollar amounts and methods of payment had been agreed to between ROKG and USG. To assist him in estimating replacement requirements for the RTAVR, COMUSMACTHAI asked COMUSMACV, for the preceding 12 months, weekly or monthly battle and non-battle loss rates for US/FW/RVN forces infantry battalions. On 19 April COMUSMACTHAI forwarded the estimate FY68 death gratuity costs for the RTAVR. SECDEF did not believe the estimates were compatible with ROKFV experience factors as he felt the 2.3 percent factor used by COMUSMACTHAI should have been one percent or less monthly. In order to validate the death gratuity estimates, CINCPAC requested ROKFV death gratuity experience factors, percentage of combat and noncombat deaths to the total force per month, ROKFV death gratuity scales, average gratuity payments per casualty, and the average total gratuity payments per month. On 22 April COMUSMACTHAI requested that his earlier estimated death gratuities be

disregarded. Noting that the casualty rates were incorrect, COMUSMACTHAI observed that "while [the] rates were furnished by MACV, thi. headquarters [was] equally at fault for using them." New factors provided by MACV were an RTAVR effective strength of 2,207, a monthly hostile and non-hostile aggregate death rate of .15 percent, and an aggregate annual death rate of 1.8 percent. The embassy provided the death gratuity scale, which was for each officer death, $5,347 (48 Months pay and allowances of a captain), for each NCO death, $3,403 (48 months pay and allowances of an E-9), and for each EM death, $2,430 (48 months pay and allowances of an E-6). Therefore, the revised estimate of death gratuities for RTAVR for FY68 was $100,000. COMUSMACTHAI requested that special open allotment fund citations be provided for payment of overseas allowance and death/disability gratuities to personnel of the RTAVR. COMUSMACTHAI estimated the cost of overseas allowances to be: June, $300; July, $12,000; August, $17,000; September, $84,000; October and monthly thereafter, $115,000. The monthly death/disability gratuities were estimated at $10,000 effective with October, 1967.[198]

(S) CJCS requested the Joint Staff to assess the Thai military situation, to include a review of the security situation in Thailand, the organization and capability of the Thais to deal with internal security problems, and their capability to provide additional troops in RVN. COMUSMACTHAI's views were requested, not later than 20 Sep 67, with regard to:

1) Thai capability, including time required to provide the following troop levels, to include necessary supporting troops, to RVN:

a) 5,000 troops (approx 2 Inf Bns, reinforced).

b) 15,000 troops (approx 4 Inf Bns, reinforced).

c) 20,000 or greater (approx 8 Inf Bns, reinforced, or more).

2) Effect each level will have on Thai internal security.

COMUSMACTHAI submitted his report on 16 Sep 67 and concluded that the RTA could provide a 5,000-man force without incurring an unacceptable risk to Thailand's internal security. In addition, he concluded that RTA could deploy a 10,000-man (2 brigade) force. He did not recommend a force of 15,000 or larger because the probable attrition of the

RTA trained base would cause such a loss in combat readiness as to make this contribution unacceptable.

(S) Negotiations with the Thais had centered around a deployment of a total 10,000-man force. CINCPAC concurred that this was probably the largest force the RTG could provide without incurring an unacceptable sacrifice in the trained base of the RTA and accepting more than undue risk insofar as the RTG's ability to effectively counter the present insurgency. The RTG proposed a one Bde Gp at a strength of approximately 10,800 men. This proposed group was to be composed of three Inf Bns, one Arty Bn, one Engr Bn, and other supporting units as required.

(S) When queried on US capability to support the various troop levels considered above, COMUSMACV assumed that MACV must provide maintenance support for all new equipment and all backup beyond division/brigade level including DS units. Other maintenance requirements such as organic support including supply distribution, transportation, and service functions would be done by the Thais. In considering the force levels it was envisioned that the brigade-size force (5,000 troops) would be attached to a US Div for support. As such, the support command of the parent US Div would require a minimum augmentation of 50 men to provide for the additional maintenance requirements. Satelliting a force of 10,000 or greater on a US Div would be impractical. A US Spt Bn of approximately 600 personnel, including HQ, Maint, and Spt Co (+), Med Co, and a Trans Tr Co would be required for direct support of a 10,000-troop Thai unit. For a Thai force of 15,000 to 20,000 a special supp command, including Hq Co, Med Co, S&T Co, and a Div Main Bn (two or three cos): would be required. Estimated strength of this command would be 1,000 to 1,200 personnel. In addition, an increase in general support personnel would be required.

(S) There were no US combat service support units available from in-country assets or in Program 5 to fill the requirements. Alternate methods proposed were:

1) Readjust forces within approved force ceilings.

2) Increase civilian substitution of military spaces.

3) Increase US force ceiling.

He further commented that any adjustment within the current ceiling to provide logistical support for the Thai forces would have to be at the expense of US combat troops. An increase in the US force ceiling was considered the only practical course of action.

(S) Further bilateral discussion set a force size between 10,598 and 12,000 for consideration. Due to suggestions from COMUSMACTHAI and COMUSMACV, the RTFG began to refer to the add-on force as a division. The RTA asked for the following revisions to the US concept for the organization of the division:

1) Add a Div Arty HQ.

2) Revise Recon Sq to consist of three mechanized troops and one LRRP in the Recon Sq. (US concept was one Mechanized Troop and two LRRPs)

3) Add one AA Bn with 18 M-42s, organized for ground security role.

4) A separate replacement company. (This unit would carry the five percent overstrength of the division.)

5) Upgrade the medical unit from Co to Bn.

6) Upgrade the support unit from Bn to Gp.

MACV comment was requested and received. The revisions were considered acceptable with the following exceptions:

1) Three mechanized troops were acceptable but the total APCs should not exceed 48.

2) MACV would provide the division with AAA ground security support through each Field Force. The Thai division would also receive its support in the same manner. M-42s should not be authorized.

(S) The USG and RTG were both anxious to deploy additional Thai forces to RVN at the earliest possible time. By 29 Nov 67, TO&E and construction needs were sufficiently refined that action on funding was required in order to meet the RTAVR Div "begin-training" target of 22 Jan 68 and "begin-deployment" target of 15 Jul 68 for the first

increment of RTA Div force. Commenting on the possibility of expediting the augmentation of the RTFV and the implication that consideration be given to the introduction of the Thai forces into RVN prior to the completion of their training, COMUSMACV did not concur. It was his position that forces deployed for service in RVN should be equipped and ready to accomplish unit missions upon arrival in their AO, with little additional orientation in RVN. As regards FWMAF, this position was in keeping with paragraph 404, CINCPAC Policies and Procedures Manual for Free World Military Assistance to RVN.

(S) Although an exception had been made in the case of certain US units to obtain the forces prior to any possible holiday season stand-down action, COMUSMACV did not concur in the case of FWMAF units. He felt that it was essential that, with the exception of limited in-country orientation, they be fully trained prior to deployment. Lacking such training, it would be necessary to divert troops needed elsewhere to protect them. It would be necessary to obtain and secure training areas; and there would be grave danger of a successful attack with its resultant calamitous consequences in the donor country and for the entire FW effort in VN.


(S) In light of the high-level interest in accelerating the deployment of Thai forces to RVN, COMUSMACV recommended that an initial infantry battalion increment be deployed six weeks early in accordance with the following concept:

1) Select the "best" of the three battalions being trained in the first increment of the RTA Div.


2) Deploy it to Bear Cat upon completion of its company training.

3) Upon arrival at Bear Cat attach it to the RTAVR, which will partially stand down from active combat. The RTAVR will be given the mission of completing the battalion phase of the unit's training. Other portions of the training will be completed after the arrival of the complete increment. This concept assumed that the battalion would be equipped and trained in accordance with the proposed MACTHAI schedule and the proposal would be acceptable to the RTG. If this concept were approved, the battalion could be deployed after its preparation for overseas movement (POM), about 3 Jun 67, an acceleration of about six weeks. 199

Republic of the Philippines



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(S) COMUSMACV was informed in Aug 67 that the Government of the Philippines was assembling volunteers for PHILCAG II at Fort Magsaysay. The tentative planning dates indicated the advance party would depart for RVN about 31 Sep 67; the main force of approximately 600 would arrive about 20 Oct 67 with the remainder closing in-country prior to 16 Dec 67. JUSMAGPHIL took the position with GOP that as much training as possible should be accomplished in RVN utilizing PHILCAG I personnel and equipment and that PHILCAG I should

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provide MTTs early for training in Philippines. COMUSMACV concurred in the position taken by JUSMAGPHIL. This would permit training to be conducted by personnel familiar with the equipment, procedures, and area of PHILCAG operations in RVN. The plans for deployment utilizing overlap of personnel would enhance the feasibility of PHILCAG I utilization and PHILCAG II OJT without undue degradation of operating efficiency. However, in spite of the advantages of small unit rotation, the GOP, due to budgetary limitations, could not financially support any extended overlap. A two-day period was envisioned. COMUSMACV restated his position concerning small unit rotation and gave the following reasons: (1) such a plan maintains continuity of relationships with Vietnamese and US; (2) permits in-country orientation of replacement forces by OJT; (3) minimizes surges in airlift requirements and facilitates redeployment on outbound aircraft; (4) reduces security considerations associated in assembly and movement of large groups. 203


(S) In Nov 67 AMEMB Manila established parameters for Philippine armed forces alternatives which the GOP might be willing to provide for support of additional Army Engr Bns or Bds and any additional PHIL contribution to that which was already committed. [redacted] Units that would be useful to substitute for US personnel spaces in RVN would be organized under a PHIL Log Spt Gp, which would need a small headquarters for command and control purposes. The Log Spt Gp could contain one to three Engr Const Bns (this might include the Engr Bn now contained in PHILCAG).

(S) From Philippine Navy (PN) the proposals were as follows, in descending order of priority crews for five LSTs (400 personnel), or 224 officers and men to operate a 16 LCM Boat Group, or 100 officers and men to operate a division of 12 PFC (Swift craft) in MARKET TIME, or 100 officers and men to operate a division of four PGM in MARKET TIME.

(S) With the US providing modern aircraft and equipment, the PHIL Air Force (Provider) could effectively operate with US forces in a support role in RVN with a 12-aircraft squadron, preferably C-7As (Caribous) or C-123s (Provider). Assuming 60 flying hours per month for aircraft

and no base support requirements, PAF manning would be a total of 50 officers and 203 EM. This would include 47 officers and 45 men for operations and overhead, three officers and 158 EM for maintenance. However, the possibility existed that Philippine requirements could reduce this capability by 50 percent.


(S) In view of the foregoing, ECSTATE considered that the best force for both VN and PHIL needs would be three PHIL Army Engr Bns, a total of about 2,100 men. If GOP preferred to have its own security support force, the US felt this would be acceptable but hoped the security force would be in addition to the Engr Bns. 204



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CHAPTER III

Footnotes

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3. Rpt (S), CA CSOCS-74, 4 Jan 67, Subj: Army Buildup Progress Report (U).

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CHAPTER IV

THE GOALS AND THE STRATEGY

US POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

The View from Washington

(TS) Overall US goals and strategy for the massive effort in Vietnam remained essentially unchanged from those of 1966, but there were subtle shifts in emphasis. 1966 had been a year of tremendous US and Free World military buildup, a year of striking military successes in the field. In 1967, it was clear, the military buildup would taper off; there would be continued and increasing actions against the enemy, on land, sea, and in the air, but quietly yet steadily the emphasis would shift to support of revolutionary development by the Vietnamese themselves. President Johnson summed up past progress and future strategy in his address to the Asian Conference in Manila near the end of 1966:

> The very nature of the warfare confronting us in SVN militates against a single, spectacular success which, in itself, will end the war. Rather, such warfare is better characterized by the relatively slow, grinding, and methodical actions so necessary to ultimate success. Clearly, we recognize that success cannot be equated entirely on military victories, important as they are, but must also be brought about through the effective application of broad and comprehensive politico-economic-sociological-psychological programs designed both to improve the well-being of and to orient the population toward the central government. Our progress to date has been slow but inexorable. With our continued military buildup and the coming into fruition of a multitude of revolutionary development programs now underway in SVN, we would

> expect that at some point in the future the rate of progress in frustrating the communists will be sharply increased. In any case, we are not establishing any time schedules for terminating the war but are prepared to do whatever is necessary to assist the South Vietnamese to defend their country against the communist for as long as they need and request our assistance. [1]

(U) To the American people, the President outlined the road ahead in Vietnam in his State of the Union message on 10 January 1967. Nearly a quarter of his message concerned the problem in Vietnam, and excerpts indicate clearly the task as the President saw it:

> We are in Vietnam because the United States and our allies are committed by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common danger" of aggression in Southeast Asia.
>
> We are in Vietnam because an international agreement signed by the United States, North Vietnam and others in 1962 is being systematically violated by the communists. That violation threatens the independence of all the small nations in Southeast Asia and the peace of the region.
>
> We are there because the people of South Vietnam have as much right to remain non-communist--if that is what they choose--as North Vietnam has to remain communist.
>
> We have chosen to fight a limited war in Vietnam in order to prevent a larger war--a war almost certain to follow if the communists succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force. If they are not checked now, the world can expect to pay a far greater price to check them later. . . .
>
> We are dealing with a stubborn adversary committed to the use of force and terror to settle political questions.
>
> I wish I could report to you that the conflict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face more cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet. I cannot promise you that it will come this year--or the next. Our adversary still

believes he can go on fighting longer than we and our allies are prepared to resist him.

Our men--there are nearly 500,000 in that area now--have borne well "the burden and the heat of the day." Their efforts deprived the enemy of the victory he sought and expected a year ago. We have steadily frustrated his main forces. General Westmoreland reports that the enemy no longer can succeed on the battlefield.

Our pressure now must be--and will be--sustained until he realizes that the war he started is costing him more than he can hope to gain.

I know of no strategy more likely to attain that end than the strategy of "accumulating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of material resource"--of "laboriously teaching troops the very elements of their trade." That and patience--a great deal of patience.

Our South Vietnamese allies are also being tested. They must provide real security to the people living in the countryside. This means reducing the terrorism and armed attacks to levels where they can be successfully controlled by the regular South Vietnamese security forces. It means bringing to the villagers an effective civilian government they can respect and rely upon--and giving them a personal stake in that government. That government is beginning to emerge.

The performance of our men in Vietnam--backed by the American people--has created a feeling of confidence and unity among the independent nations of Asia and the Pacific. Fear of external communist conquest in many Asian nations is subsiding--and with this, the spirit of hope is rising. For the first time in history, a common outlook and common institutions are emerging.

We are eager to turn our resources to peace. Our efforts in behalf of humanity need not be restricted by any parallel or any boundary. The moment peace comes, I will ask the Congress

for funds to join in an international program of reconstruction and development for all the people of Vietnam--and their deserving neighbors who wish our help.

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of Mainland China and the world community--including cooperation in all the tasks of arms control, security, and the progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like the rest of us depends.

We would be the first to welcome a China which had decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would be the first to applaud were she to concentrate her great energies and intelligence on improving the welfare of her own people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate need for security and friendly relations with neighboring countries.

Our hope that all of this will someday happen rests on the conviction that we, the American people and our allies, will see Vietnam through to an honorable peace.

We will support all appropriate initiatives by the United Nations, and others, which can bring the several parties together for unconditional discussions of peace--anywhere, any time. And we will continue to take every possible initiative ourselves to probe for peace.

Until such efforts succeed, or until the infiltration ceases and the conflict subsides, we must firmly pursue our present course. We will stand firm in Vietnam.[2]

Strategic Guidance from JCS and CINCPAC

(TS) During September 1966, CINCPAC reiterated the General Policy Guidance provided by JCS, by promulgating the unilateral US concept for Vietnam which envisaged the employment of military forces of the US, RVN, and Free World nations in the war for South Vietnam.

The purpose of the concept was to provide strategic guidance and direction to subordinate commanders of the Pacific Command for planning and conducting of operations. Included was the mission to be accomplished, military strategy to be followed, and military tasks to be executed with respect to RVN, NVN, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. This concept superseded the concept promulgated in June 1966. The Pacific Command mission, simply stated, was to assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain an independent non-Communist government in South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment.

(TS) The United States military strategy for Vietnam, as enunciated by CINCPAC, involved three interdependent undertakings which together constituted an integrated concept for the conduct of military operations against NVN, and in Laos and RVN. In the north, the strategy would be:

> . . . to take the war to the enemy by unremittent but selective application of United States air and naval power. Military installations and those industrial facilities that generate support for the aggression will be attacked. Movement within, into and out of North Vietnam will be impeded. The enemy will be denied the great psychological and national advantage of conducting an aggression from a sanctuary. This relentless application of force is designed progressively to curtail North Vietnam's war-making capacity. It seeks to force upon him major replenishment, repair, and construction efforts. North Vietnamese support and direction of the Pathet Lao and the insurgency in Thailand will be impaired. The movement of men and material through Laos and over all land and water lines of communication into South Vietnam will be disrupted. Hanoi's capability to support military operations in South Vietnam and to direct those operations will be progressively reduced.

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
(TS) In the south the strategy would be:

> . . . to seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations. United States and Free World Military Forces in coordination with the RVNAF, will take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main force and interdicting his lines of communication on land, along the coast, and on inland waterways. In accomplishing this objective, the existing system of military bases will be extended as necessary. Secure areas will be enlarged with emphasis on the National Priority Areas. Reconnaissance operations into enemy areas will be increased. Intelligence collection will be improved. Bombardment of enemy base areas will be intensified with increased ground follow-up. These operations will result in progressive destruction of enemy forces and infrastructure. Area control will be wrested from the communists. Enemy forces will be broken up into small bands whose chief concern will be their own existence.[3]



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(TS) The success of the US military strategy in RVN would be dependent upon coordinated and persistent effort embracing the three military undertakings:

1) To destroy the war-supporting capability of NVN.

2) To seek out and destroy Communist forces and infrastructure.

3) To get ahead with building the South Vietnamese nation.

These military undertakings formed part of an integrated military, political, economic, sociological, and psychological effort. The US purpose was to assist the GVN and its armed forces to defeat Communist subversion and aggression, to win the loyalty and allegiance of the people, and to attain an independent, non-Communist society functioning in a secure environment.

(TS) CINCPAC established the three main objectives to be accomplished in achieving the desired goal and listed the tasks to support each objective. The first objective was to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and

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to cause NVN to cease its direction and support of the VC insurgency. The tasks to be accomplished in reaching this objective were:

1) Destroy the war-supporting and war-making capability of NVN. Conduct air strikes against enemy ports, power plants, communications facilities, POL and military headquarters and installations, including the air-strike and air-defense capability.

2) Conduct special operations against enemy headquarters, communications, supply lines, and bases in NVN.



4) Be prepared to conduct shore bombardment of enemy lines of communication, port facilities, and other coastal military facilities of NVN.




6) Conduct mine countermeasure operations, and be prepared to conduct a mining campaign of ports, inland waterways, and coastal waterways of NVN.

7) Conduct anti-sea infiltration operations in close coordination with the VNN in coastal waters from the 17th parallel to the Cambodian border and beyond as necessary.

8) Be prepared to institute a maritime quarantine and other shipping interdiction measures.

9) Conduct special operations to restrict NVN coastal movement of military supplies north of the 17th parallel.



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12) Conduct air, ground, maritime, and psychological special operations against NVN.

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(TS) The second objective--to defeat decisively the VC and NVN armed forces in RVN and force their withdrawal--would require the following actions:

1) Conduct sustained unilateral and coordinated offensive operations against VC/NVA forces, war zones, and base areas.

2) Conduct continuous harassing and destructive air offensive against the enemy forces and base areas.

3) Provide combat support, including engineer, artillery, naval gunfire, airlift, and close air support to RVNAF and FWMAF.

4) Provide advisory support to the RVNAF.

5) Interdict VC/NVA land and water LOCs through ground, sea, and air operations.

6) Conduct riverine operations against enemy forces, bases, and supply distribution points in the Mekong Delta.

7) Conduct amphibious operations against enemy forces, bases, and supply distribution points along the coast of the RVN.

8) Conduct psychological operations against VC/NVA personnel and civilians under the influence of the VC.

9) Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence, border surveillance, cross-border, and counterinfiltration operations.

10) Defend military bases.

(TS) The third objective was to extend the Government of Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over South Vietnam. The tasks to be accomplished in reaching this objective were:

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1) Secure and defend major political, economic, food-producing, and population centers.

2) Establish, maintain, and secure military installations and supporting LOCs as necessary in RVN.

3) Conduct clearing, securing, and civic action operations and maintain security once established.

4) Identify and eliminate VC guerrilla forces and the clandestine Communist politico-military apparatus.

5) Assist and support other US Mission agencies, FWMAF, and the GVN in providing relief, reorientation, rehabilitation, and resettlement of refugees.

6) Support and participate in RD.[4]

COMBINED US/RVN STRATEGY

Combined Campaign Plan 1967

(S) The Combined Campaign Plan for 1967, promulgated in November 1966, provided initial guidance for ground operations to be conducted by US/FWMA forces and RVNAF in RVN during 1967. The concept for operations was that the initiative achieved in the 1966 campaign would be retained through a strategic and tactical offense conducted in consonance with political, economic, and sociological programs of GVN and US/FW agencies. RVNAF was assigned the primary mission of supporting RD activities, with priority in and around the National Priority Areas (see Figure IV-1) and other areas of critical significance, defending governmental centers, and protecting and controlling national resources, particularly rice and salt. The US forces would reinforce RVNAF; operate with other FWMAF; and as necessary conduct unilateral operations.[5]

(TS) The ultimate responsibility for population security in the RD plan rested with the RVN, but US/FWMA forces would provide a shield to permit RVNAF, National Police, and RD cadres to increase their direct support to RD. To coordinate planning of local US agencies with the Ministry of RD, the Deputy Ambassador had established in June 1966 a joint US agency planning group (JPG) chaired by MACV. The JPG, in coordination with the Ministry of RD, designated National Priority Areas and developed general guidelines for the 1967 RD program. After approval of these areas, MACV and JGS military planners began development of the 1967 Combined Campaign Plan. Concurrently, the Ministry of RD, with JPG assistance, began drafting detailed guidelines for provincial RD plans to be prepared and executed at the provincial level. There was no single, overall GVN plan. Instead, the aggregate of the 43 provincial plans would constitute the GVN 1967 RD program.

(TS) In concert with the RD program COMUSMACV felt that a determined and coordinated attack on the VC infrastructure was essential to incapacitate the enemy and destroy his ability to control the populace through intimidation and terrorist campaigns. Based on VC capability to unleash further activities of a clandestine, terroristic

1967 NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS




Figure IV-1

nature against Saigon and the surrounding area in VC Military Region IV, it was evident to COMUSMACV that elimination of the infrastructure was an objective requiring maximum attention. Accordingly, MACV recommended to the Ambassador in the latter part of 1966 that a task group composed of representatives of the US Embassy, MACV, and GVN be established to marshal US and GVN resources as required to eliminate the infrastructure in VC Military Region IV. Steps were initiated to achieve US/GVN agreement in the activation of a combined agency to develop plans, policies, and procedures to effect identification, apprehension, and exploitation of key members of the VC Military Region IV.

(TS) COMUSMACV had expressed the belief in October that constant attention to combined planning and to GVN participation in both military operations and RD would result in increased GVN effectiveness not only in defeating the enemy, but more importantly, in continuing to gain support from the Vietnamese people. [6]

(S) The primary mission of the US and FWMA forces was to destroy the VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drive the enemy into the sparsely populated and food-scarce areas; secure base areas and clear in the vicinity of these bases; and, as directed, assist in the protection and control of RVN national resources. Throughout the campaign increased emphasis was to be given to identifying and eliminating the VC infrastructure and to small unit operations designed specifically to destroy the enemy guerrilla force. These operations were to be characterized by saturation patrolling, ambushes, and increased night operations by both RVNAF and US/FWMA forces.

(S) Tactical air forces would support ground operations with close air support provided to RVNAF and US/FW forces. The sustained, large-scale, coordinated operations would be heavily reinforced by strike forces with increased dependence on "on call" capabilities. Aerial reconnaissance efforts would be intensified to provide complete and detailed coverage of operational areas, along the principal routes of infiltration, and to provide early identification of enemy concentrations. Naval operations would be increased in all areas. MARKET TIME activities would be stepped-up to meet the enemy's anticipated increase in sea infiltration efforts forced on him by denial of other infiltration routes. GAME WARDEN forces would continue river operations in the Delta and river approaches to Saigon. Naval gunfire support throughout the coastal areas would be employed routinely for harassing, interdiction and support of coastal operations.

(S) While RVNAF was assigned primary responsibility for supporting the RD program, and US/FWMA forces were assigned the primary mission of destroying the main VC/NVA forces and bases, there would be no clear-cut division of responsibility. RVNAF General Reserve and ARVN Corps Reserve units would conduct unilateral and participate in coordinated and combined search-and-destroy operations. US/FWMA forces would continue to provide direct support and implicit aid to RD activities. The people of RVN continued to be the greatest asset to the enemy, and control of the people was the enemy's goal. With them, the enemy would have most of the ingredients needed for success: food, supplies, money, manpower, concealment and intelligence. During 1967 every effort was to be made to deny these assets to the enemy.

(S) The National Priority Areas for each CTZ, and the areas for priority of military offensive operations at the beginning of the year were delineated. These priority areas cover a large majority of the population, food-producing lands, and critical LOCs within RVN. The National Priority Areas were areas of major significance at the national level where critical civil and military resources were focused on a priority basis for RD. The purpose of designating the areas for priority of military offensive operations, in conjunction with the national priority areas, was to focus the attention and effort of RVNAF and US/FWMA forces to those areas where operations would destroy or drive the enemy into sparsely populated and food-scarce areas; insure the protection of the population and control of resources, and provide unrestricted use of major LOCs, all of which would facilitate follow-on RD. Spoiling attacks to frustrate the VC strategy would continue to be conducted in other areas as directed.

(S) The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) forces under control of 5 USSFG would continue to conduct border surveillance and the interdiction of routes. Emphasis would be placed on developing targets for air strikes to reduce the enemy's use of infiltration routes.

(S) In execution of the Combined Campaign Plan the ARVN corps commanders, in coordination with US and other FWMAF, would:

1) On a priority basis, dispose forces and conduct operations to provide security for populated areas with priority to the National Priority Area within the respective CTZ and protect civil elements engaged in RD activities.

2) Conduct an active defense of all provincial capitals, district towns, logistic and operational bases, and other significant political and economic centers with particular emphasis on those locations identified as areas requiring special defense. This defense would be characterized by saturation day and night patrolling, ambushes, and other anti-guerrilla tactics to supplement the static defense of the areas.

3) Open and secure lines of communication in accordance with the plan for restoration and protection of road, rail, and water LOCs.

4) Conduct operations to protect and control national resources in accordance with the National Resource Control Plan for 1967.

5) Utilize forces not required to accomplish the above missions to conduct operations to destroy the VC/NVA main and guerrilla forces within the areas designated for priority of military offensive operations.

6) Assist and/or reinforce the National Police, as required, to identify and eliminate the VC infrastructure.

7) Maintain active surveillance of the Laos and Cambodian borders and the southern boundary of the DMZ, as well as known land and sea infiltration routes into CTZs as applicable.

8) Establish and maintain an active reconnaissance program, particularly long-range patrols, to locate VC/NVA main forces and their base areas.

9) Conduct sustained, coordinated, unilateral, or combined offensive ground operations against VC/NVA forces, bases, and supply distribution points outside the area for priority of military offensive operations utilizing reserve forces available. These operations would be conducted primarily against those forces and bases positively located by the reconnaissance directed above.

(S) CG III MAF in I CTZ, CG I FFORCEV in II CTZ, CG II FFORCEV in III CTZ, and SA IV CTZ, in coordination with ARVN corps commanders and other FWMAF commanders, would:

1) On a priority basis, conduct sustained, coordinated unilateral or combined ground and air operations to destroy the VC/NVA and guerrilla forces, and neutralize bases and supply distribution points within the area designated for priority of military offensive operations. Enemy base area neutralization would be in accordance with the plan for neutralization of VC/NVA base areas.

2) Conduct operations to support RD activities in established TAORs and in other areas in accordance with the RD Plan for 1967.

3) Conduct sustained offensive operations, based on hard intelligence, against enemy forces located outside the area for priority of military offensive operations.

4) Assist ARVN in the conduct of operations to protect and control national resources in accordance with the plan for National Resource Control.

5) Maintain an active air and ground surveillance of the Laos and Cambodian border and southern boundary of the DMZ and known land and sea infiltration routes into CTZs as applicable.

6) Open and secure lines of communication in accordance with the plan for restoration and protection of road, rail, and water LOCs.

7) Maintain an active reconnaissance program particularly long-range patrols, to locate VC/NVA main forces and their base areas, and conduct operations to destroy forces and bases positively located.

8) Coordinate with and provide support as required to CIDG camps within the CTZ in accordance with the plan for use of CIDG/US Special Forces.

9) Continue advisory effort to the CG of the ARVN corps and subordinate elements in respective CTZs to assist in the accomplishment of tasks assigned in keeping with the concept for the conduct of the campaign.

COMUSMACV STRATEGY

Early 1967

(TS) COMUSMACV's basic strategic concept for military operations in the RVN during the latter part of 1966 and the first part of 1967 was spelled out in late August:

> During the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967--the Northeast Monsoon season--we will maintain and increase the momentum of our operations. Our strategy will be one for a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of Revolutionary Development.
>
> The essential tasks of Revolutionary Development and nation building cannot be accomplished if enemy main forces can gain access to the population centers and destroy our efforts. US/Free World Forces, with their mobility and in coordination with RVNAF, must take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas. Our ability to do this is improving steadily. Maximum emphasis will be given to the use of long range patrols and other means to find the enemy and locate his bases. Forces and bases thus discovered will be subjected to either ground attack or quick reaction B-52 and tactical air strikes. When feasible B-52 strikes will be followed by ground forces to search the area. Sustained ground combat operations will maintain pressure on the enemy.
>
> The growing strength of US/Free World Forces will provide the shield that will permit ARVN to shift its weight of effort to an extent not heretofore feasible to direct support of Revolutionary Development. Also, I visualize that a significant number of the US/Free World maneuver battalions will be committed to Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) missions. These missions encompass base security and at the same time support Revolutionary Development by

spreading security radially from the bases to protect more of the population. Saturation patrolling, civic action, and close association with ARVN, Regional and Popular Forces to bolster their combat effectiveness are among the tasks of the ground force elements. At the same time ARVN troops will be available if required to reinforce offensive operations and to serve as reaction forces for outlying security posts and government centers under attack. Our strategy will include opening, constructing and using roads, as well as a start toward opening and reconstructing the national railroad. The priority effort of ARVN forces will be in direct support of the Revolutionary Development program. In many instances, the Province Chief will exercise operational control over these units. This fact notwithstanding, the ARVN division structure must be maintained and it is essential that the division commander enthusiastically support Revolutionary Development. Our highly capable US division commanders, who are closely associated with corresponding ARVN commanders, are in a position to influence them to do what is required.

We intend to employ all forces to get the best results measured, among other things, in terms of population secured; territory cleared of enemy influence; VC/NVA bases eliminated; and enemy guerrillas, local forces, and main forces destroyed.

Barring unforeseen change in enemy strategy, I visualize that our strategy for South Vietnam will remain essentially the same throughout 1967.[8]

(TS) In mid-October 1966 COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC and JCS of current and projected activities extended into 1967, stating that recent battlefield successes and the continuing buildup of US/FWMA forces permitted the introduction of a new phase of operations. As the monsoon weather conditions shifted to favor exploitation of superior mobility and combat power south of the I CTZ, the strategy would be directed toward a general offensive with maximum practicable support to area and population security in furtherance of RD. Friendly forces would take the fight to the enemy by attacking his main forces and invading his base areas, while simultaneously preventing enemy

guerrillas and main force units from gaining access to population centers. COMUSMACV felt that the dual nature of the military effort would impose greater challenges as offensive operations progressed. He realized that one vital undertaking would be to retain the initiative against the Communist main forces; a second would be to secure the population in controlled areas from harassment and terrorism by guerrillas. Units whose priority mission was security and RD also would be employed against enemy main forces when the opportunity for decisive action appeared. On the other hand, these forces would not be committed away from their Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) for so long a time as to permit security of the population, for which they were responsible, to be downgraded significantly. Units whose priority mission was to conduct offensive operations against enemy main forces also would contribute to area and population security when they were withdrawn to base camps, but they would remain prepared for strong offensive strikes to prevent the enemy from regaining the initiative.

(TS) To restrain further the enemy's efforts to regain the initiative, the SLAM concept had been developed to maximize the use of assets against enemy infiltration through Laos. Success hinged on concentration of available sources on successive target areas. B-52 (ARC LIGHT) strikes would be exploited by sustained follow-up by tactical air strikes. Ground exploitation forces would be utilized when feasible. Defoliation, crop destruction, and psychological operations would be conducted. After exploitation by ground forces, the target areas would be mined and booby-trapped, and surveillance would be maintained to prevent reuse.

(TS) The NE monsoon season would coincide with a sharp decline in the ratio of airmobile companies to brigade-size units. The shortage would reach its peak in January 1967, and balance would not be restored fully until November 1967. The availability of helicopters would be a governing factor in allocation of forces and missions. Offensive action against main forces would be the priority mission of units with built-in airmobile, airborne, or mechanized capability, while units with less mobility would assume priority missions of conducting saturation patrols, intensive ambushes, and civic action essential to RD. Intensification of the offensive effort would require concurrent expansion of combat service support. This factor, together with the shortage of helicopters and the anticipated improvement of surface trafficability, would dictate increased use of surface LOCs for

tactical movement as well as logistical support. The increased use of these LOCs would contribute also to expansion of the areas undergoing RD. Therefore, the strategy for the period November 1966 to May 1967 would include opening, securing, constructing, and using roads; controlling the inland waterways; and achieving a substantial start toward reestablishment of the national railway system.[9]

Guidance to Subordinate Commands

(S) In January, COMUSMACV provided command guidance for 1967 to his field commanders:

> During the past year, the buildup and successes of US/FWMA forces have created a new climate in South Vietnam. . . . We have entered a new phase of the conflict and must reexamine our strategy to insure that it takes advantage of existing strategic opportunities. The VC/NVA forces no longer have the capability of achieving a military victory. We must make 1967 the year during which it will become evident to the enemy and the world that we can and will achieve our military objectives. Concurrently, we must recognize that military success alone will not achieve the Free World objectives in Vietnam. A political, economic and psychological victory is equally important.
>
> During the coming year we will mount a general offensive designed to:
>
> Maintain the momentum of the offensive on a seven-day-a-week, around-the-clock basis.
>
> Decimate enemy forces, destroy his base areas and disrupt the VC infrastructure.
>
> Interdict enemy land and water lines of communication, denying him the opportunity to resupply and reinforce his units and bases in South Vietnam
>
> Open, secure, and use land and water lines of communication.

Convince the enemy, through the vigor of our offensives and accompanying psychological operations, that he faces defeat.

Support political and economic progress in SVN.

. . . . . .

The principles of mass, surprise and economy of force are guide posts in apportioning resources against the full spectrum of enemy elements--main forces, local forces, supply system, guerrillas, and the VC infrastructure. Sustained operations will be planned in support of RVNAF forces to destroy local guerrillas and VC infrastructure. A major part of our strategy will be to complete the tasks undertaken and not to allow the enemy to deceive us into piecemeal or sporadic utilization of our growing resources.

Of particular importance in our strategy is the focusing of our effort on the enemy base areas and supply systems, the Achilles heel of the VC/NVA. Because of his tenuous supply lines leading into and through SVN, the enemy is dependent on the buildup of weapons, equipment, food and medical supplies which are located in his base areas. Destruction of established enemy base areas denies him the opportunity to rest, retrain, recuperate, and resupply easily. Thorough, meticulous search in areas in which our forces are operating is a key to the successful accomplishment of this important task. If we can neutralize the enemy base areas and prevent replenishment of the material captured or destroyed, we will have taken a long stride toward ultimate victory.

The overall strategy will include aggressive action to open, secure, and use land and water lines of communication. We must recognize the necessity of a military contribution to the development and strengthening of the economic posture of SVN. Economic viability is dependent upon getting goods to the market place. Increased use of land and water lines of communication for military activities is essential in view of our limited tactical airlift capability. Continued use of these LOCs also will provide an increase in friendly presence throughout SVN.

Increased emphasis must be placed on the use of long range combat patrols. They play a vital role in the conduct of economy-of-force operations. Extensive use of these assets will provide much greater knowledge of where the enemy is, and equally important, where he is not. This will permit us to apply our combat power where lucrative results can be obtained.

We possess vastly superior combat power and should take advantage of every opportunity to exploit it. The B-52 strikes are examples of the application of combat power against enemy bases and troop concentrations. The B-52 strike provides us with an economy-of-force weapon to maintain pressure on the enemy when troop formations are engaged otherwise. Preplanned integration of the B-52 strike into schemes of maneuver also will be emphasized. Immediate and aggressive followup will be conducted, whenever practicable, to exploit the psychological effect of air bombardment and to assess strike damage to the target.

It is essential that the effectiveness of RVNAF be improved. Concurrently, the image of the military forces of South Vietnam in the eyes of the world and especially in the United States must reflect the contribution which has been and is being made to the overall effort in SVN. Much of the press reporting on this subject is unfair and indicates a lack of understanding of the RVNAF contribution. This, in turn, has a deleterious effect on RVNAF morale and effectiveness. RVNAF must be made to realize that there are military tasks as well as non-military tasks associated with RD. Every influence must be used to get RVNAF to cease conducting an intermittent war and instead to maintain continuous pressure on enemy forces. We must insure that maximum use is made of RVN forces in all our planned major offensives and that they are given tasks which are important and which will contribute to their continued growth potential. We then must insure that full credit is given to their accomplishments in each of these operations.

A basic precept for the success of revolutionary development is that security should spread radially from secure bases to provide protection to more of the population. In order to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy, US/FW forces must be prepared to move to positions peripheral to area of primary RVNAF operations. The protective shield thus established and persistently pushed outward creates the secure environment within which GVN agencies can conduct RD programs. During the coming year, the GVN hopes to surge ahead in the revolutionary development program, and they deserve our support.

Psychological operations will be flexible and timely--quickly responding to the tactical situation and immediately exploiting any psychological opportunity which is created by our expanding offensive. Continuous attention will be given to development of psywar themes pointed toward inducing defections from the ranks of the VC and the NVA, and toward convincing the enemy and the people that the only hope for peace over the long term is allegiance to and support of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. We can and must undermine the enemy's will and capability to conduct protracted war.

In summary, we have two equally important tasks to accomplish simultaneously--maintain relentless pressure on enemy combat forces and support systems and provide expanding security to the population. Our progress will be measured in terms of VC bases eliminated, of territory cleared of enemy influence, of population secured, of land and water LOCs which provide uninterrupted flow of goods to market, and of enemy forces destroyed. The number and nature of our tasks require a combination of deliberate planning and flexible execution. Imagination in the use of our assets, understanding of the political and economic effect of our actions, appreciation of our role in support of the people of SVN, and anticipation of the future leadership needs of SVN will contribute to our success and to attainment of US objectives. The majority of the people

will gravitate toward the side which manifests greater strength. We must demonstrate throughout the country that the GVN is the stronger.[10]

New Threats Bring New Strategies

(S) During 1966 the enemy's main forces, including those of the NVA, had sustained a series of defeats in RVN. In early 1967 the enemy appeared to be trying to avoid large-scale confrontations, with resulting heavy losses, until he became strong enough and sufficiently well trained and equipped to launch a counteroffensive. Intelligence reports did not indicate that the enemy had broken up his main forces, or local forces, in order to pursue the war exclusively at the guerrilla level. However, there were cases in which guerrilla ranks had been thinned by RVNAF and Allied actions to the point that guerrilla forces had to be reinforced by local and main force units. An enemy document, written in March 1966 and captured in January 1967 during Operation CEDAR FALLS, reviews his earlier strategy and sets forth new strategy developed after the entry of substantial US/FWMA forces into RVN. The main emphasis of this new strategy was on continued reinforcement from NVN, across the DMZ but mainly through Laos. The enemy had established a covert but well organized LOC along the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" (or as referred to by COMUSMACV, the "Sullivan Freeway"). The principal objective area appeared to be the Highlands, with the secondary objective areas being Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, and the coastal provinces of II Corps; the Saigon area, of course, was the ultimate objective. Analysis of intelligence information collected, including the recently captured document, along with later prisoner interrogations, indicated an overall continued offensive attitude on the part of the enemy and suggested a conceptual framework on enemy planning. This planning included attacks in the I and II CTZs to cause friendly troops to disperse and weaken the FW position in the Highlands, thus making possible a spectacular victory. The proximity of the Highlands to sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia made such a strategy attractive to the enemy. Such an attempt probably would not be with the intent to hold the ground permanently, but would be to create a psychological impact designed to affect US public opinion against continuation of the war, to bolster his own morale, and to improve his position for negotiation or further combat.

(S) In March, despite several defeats and heavy casualties, the enemy still maintained three divisions in or near the DMZ, where they continued to pose a constant threat to friendly installations, troops, and population in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Elements of the enemy forces had infiltrated into these provinces where their initiative had increased in the previous several months and was expected to continue. The enemy had the capability of launching large-scale attacks across the DMZ at any time. However, it was considered most probable that the enemy would increase the buildup and tempo of coordinated main force guerrilla operations in an attempt to extend himself southward and gradually overwhelm the area below the DMZ. While he had the capability, it was not believed that the enemy would launch a massive multi-division attack. Whether by attack or encroachment, such efforts would serve to force the deployment of additional US and Vietnamese troops to the area and thereby thin out the forces operating in support of RD.

(S) The deployment of an enemy division to Quang Ngai Province by March 1967 served to increase his pressure in the coastal area, but the strategy of attempting to pin down friendly forces in the area in order to divert attention from the Highlands was unsuccessful. However, the concentration of two enemy divisions in Cambodia, west of Pleiku and Kontum Provinces, forced the deployment of a minimum of four US battalions to the Highlands to provide surveillance of the border areas. Soon the minimum forces had to be reinforced as the two NVA divisions appeared to be readying themselves for offensive operations. In III Corps area the enemy had adopted a similar strategy--he had established two divisions in the Tay Ninh-Phuoc Long area of the CTZ and was developing a base and building a division in the mountains and jungle-covered areas east of Saigon.[11]

(S) By March, then, it was evident that the enemy had not given up, but was preparing himself for further action. It was COMUSMACV's feeling that the enemy strategy would be characterized by actions aimed at:

1) Regaining the initiative throughout RVN and maintaining an overall offensive posture.

2) Exacting maximum attrition against the US and Allied forces.

3) Seizing and creating opportunities for entrapment and annihilation of units and attempting to win victories of high psychological impact.

4) Coordinating main forces and irregulars in harassing government and Allied installations and forces.

5) Disrupting RD, and increasing the intensity of guerrilla operations with emphasis on acts of terror.

6) Utilizing bases in sanctuaries and remote areas to refit and conserve the strength of some of his main forces and evade combat when necessary. These sanctuaries included the DMZ; that part of Laos opposite Thua Thien Province; that part of eastern Cambodia adjacent to the Central Highlands; northern III CTZ and the adjacent Cambodian areas; and the mountainous areas adjacent to the Coastal Plains of central Vietnam in the provinces of Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa. [12]

(TS) In early 1967 the magnitude of continuing enemy activity in the Laotian Panhandle was evidence that he was making his main effort through that area. The heavy investment of NVN troops and equipment within Laos, to safeguard the infiltration routes, was indicative of the value the enemy placed on the Panhandle as his all-important lifeline to sustain the battle in RVN. COMUSMACV's planning guidance for US commanders covering operations in the Laotian Panhandle for the remainder of 1967 was directed toward insuring that MACV operations in the STEEL TIGER (see Chapter V) area were planned and executed to obtain maximum achievement of US objectives; [redacted] and that the weight of effort was shifted between STEEL TIGER and Route Package 1 to take advantage of optimum weather conditions (see Chapter V). [redacted] The MACV objectives in Laos were, generally, to:

1) Disrupt and arrest the flow of men and supplies along the infiltration routes from NVN through Laos into RVN.

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2) Attack and destroy enemy base camps and supply storage areas in the Laotian Panhandle.

3) Deny to NVN the assistance provided by the indigenous Laotian population.

4) Destroy the natural concealment of infiltration areas, roads, trails, truck parks, and food crops for porters and infiltration units.

(TS) COMUSMACV's concept of operations in the Laotian Panhandle during the period 1 April - 31 December 1967 was to maximize pressure on the LOCs throughout the STEEL TIGER Program by round-the-clock tactical air reconnaissance and strike operations. MACV would direct ARC LIGHT strikes against fixed targets, Special Interdiction Points (SIP) in support of 7AF LOC interdiction program, and exploitation targets in support of special operations. Concurrently, ground reconnaissance would be increased to locate and define major enemy base and supply storage areas in the Laos-RVN border area. Once located, enemy base areas would be attacked by ARC LIGHT, tactical air, and covert forces. Psychological warfare and herbicide operations would continue throughout the period. COMUSMACV would retain authority for coordination of MACV and 7AF activities, while MACJ2 would act as the focal point for collation and analysis of intelligence data produced by 7AF and ground collection efforts in STEEL TIGER. MACCOC, after coordination with MACJ2, would recommend that COMUSMACV designate specified areas as SLAM targets. The operation conducted against the areas so designated would be in accordance with the MACV SLAM Operations Order.[13]

(TS) In April COMUSMACV, in a message to CINCPAC, JCS, [redacted] proposed and requested approval of a MACV concept to be initiated as soon as possible to curb enemy infiltration through the TIGER HOUND area into RVN. COMUSMACV had reached the conclusion that the enemy infiltrators, well trained, highly disciplined, and armed with modern weapons, were tenaciously defending the SLAM III area (see Chapter V) and vicinity. During the period 23 March through 4 April, 110 tactical air sorties had been committed in the area, resulting in 188 estimated enemy killed. COMUSMACV planned to intensify interdiction of NVN infiltration into RVN by an extension of the SLAM concept to include RVNAF resources. The intensification (nicknamed SOUTHPAW) was to be accomplished by

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employment of a Task Force comprised of covert forces, a reinforced ARVN Airborne or Ranger battalion, helicopter lift assets, helicopter gunships, and TIGER HOUND/TALLY HO forces. Target selection would be based on current intelligence verified through reconnaissance by covert forces. These forces would precede commitment of the Task Force to validate targets and LZs or DZs; and upon commitment of the Task Force operations, the covert forces would operate in conjunction with the ARVN battalion as reconnaissance or maneuver elements. When required, preparatory air strikes by tactical aircraft and/or B-52s would be directed against selected LZs or DZs. The Task Force would conduct blocking, search-and-destroy, or raid operations against selected targets in the operational area. Blocking actions would entail occupation of defensible terrain astride known major infiltration routes and trails in order to disrupt infiltration and force reaction by NVN forces. Search-and-destroy and raid operations would follow the established procedures.[14]

(TS) In the same message, COMUSMACV stated that he was considering, as a follow-on operation, a Phase II Plan (nicknamed HIGH PORT), employing larger RVN forces in sustained operations against enemy forces and bases in Laos. This would be accomplished by employment of an elite RVNAF division-size force in the initial operation. The task force commander, his staff, and troops would be selected specially and would be of the highest caliber obtainable from present RVNAF resources. Enemy Base Area 609, in the tri-border area opposite Dak To, was considered for Phase II. HIGH PORT would not, however, take place prior to 1 January 1968.[15]

Revised Strategy for I CTZ

(S) In mid-February 1967 COMUSMACV directed preparation of a contingency plan to provide a divisional-size force to reinforce III MAF in event of a major threat to northern I CTZ. Enemy offensive action in I CTZ might require deployment of the bulk of III MAF forces north of the Hai Van Pass, thus exposing the southern half of I CTZ to enemy initiative. The contingency plan was to provide for the formation of a provisional division which would be prepared to deploy to the Chu Lai/Da Nang or Chu Lai/Quang Ngai area and conduct offensive and defensive operations in the southern three provinces of I CTZ.

The division would be built around two infantry brigades from I FFORCEV and two infantry brigades from II FFORCEV, each comprised of three maneuver battalions. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div would be one of the brigades designated by I FFORCEV and would support the headquarters of the provisional division. The commanding general of the provisional division (Task Force OREGON) would be the MACV CofS, MG W. B. Rosson. Assisted by USARV, the CG of the provisional division would form his staff and begin operational and logistical planning with III MAF and USARV immediately. The division would operate under the operational control of CG III MAF if and when deployed to I CTZ.

(S) In addition to planning for the formation of the division, plans were prepared for its deployment to I CTZ. The status of the ROK Mar Bde in the vicinity of Chu Lai was to remain unchanged. The plans were to be fully coordinated with I CTZ Marines. The maximum period of time that USMC-occupied areas and positions would be left uncovered after departure of USMC units for deployment to northern I CTZ was 48 hours.[16]

(S) In February CG III MAF requested that COMUSMACV make available to III MAF an Army brigade consisting of at least three battalions during the period 22 February to 15 May. The force was needed to support immediate operations to clear the Sa Huynh area in order to permit surveys of the beach and airfield sites and to provide security for the development of a boat facility, a C-130 capable strip, and later a CIDG camp. Forces were not available within III MAF resources to insure interim security for the Sa Huynh area pending establishment of the CIDG camp in May and at the same time to react to the requirements generated by other operations.[17]

(S) During late March and early April the enemy increased harassment of friendly forces near the DMZ and initiated a series of attacks in the Quang Tri-La Vang-Phong Diem area. It was evident that enemy units in central I CTZ had begun deploying in preparation for the summer campaign while continuing attacks on targets of opportunity. In early April, artillery positions at Gio Linh received 285 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in six attacks. On 6 April an undetermined number of enemy battalions attacked ARVN units in the Quang Tri-La Vang area. The MACV compound at Quang Tri, Trieu Phang District headquarters, and Hai Long District headquarters were attacked by mortar fire, and 220 detainees were released from Quang Tri jail. Cumulative friendly casualties were 149 killed, 242 wounded,

and six missing, against 99 enemy killed and six detained. The magnitude of the attacks indicated that additional forces might have infiltrated into the Quang Tri area. Three estimated battalion-size attacks on La Vang during the same time frame indicated a possible new unit of regimental size in the area.

(S) Increased infiltration in the Tri-Thien subregion was indicated by 25 March photographs showing five new bivouac areas and two possible way stations on infiltration routes running from western Quang Tri toward base area 606 in central Laos. New bivouac areas along known infiltration routes, and previously reported construction in the northern A Shau Valley, indicated enemy reinforcement of the Tri-Thien subregion was taking place.

(S) In central and southern I CTZ, enemy activity was centered in southern Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces as attacks of one and two company size occurred in the Tam Ky area. A Hoi Chanh from MR 5 indicated that Thien Phuoc would be a major objective for the forthcoming summer campaign which was scheduled to commence during April. He added that the Operation DESOTO area which includes Duc Pho covered a primary supply route which the enemy believed required his control for effective operations in that area. This was strong evidence which indicated that Duc Pho also remained a primary enemy objective.[18]

(S) By early April COMUSMACV was concerned about the situation in northern I CTZ. The increasing enemy buildup north of the DMZ and increasing infiltration both across the DMZ and from Laos required urgent reinforcement of III MAF forces in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. In order to free USMC units to move northward to the threatened area, COMUSMACV on 12 April directed activation of Task Force OREGON and its movement into southern I CTZ. Movement of the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div from Binh Dinh Province (II CTZ) and the 196th Inf Bde from Tay Ninh Province (III CTZ) to Chu Lai was completed by 20 April.[19]

(TS) In mid-April COMUSMACV appraised the situation in I Corps in a message to CINCPAC and JCS:

> . . . I have been concerned for some time about the deteriorating situation in I CTZ. Some months ago I made the decision that during the Northeast

Monsoon, when the weather is bad in I Corps, I would adopt a strategy of attempting to hold our own in that area and concentrate forces in other areas to take advantage of good weather. On the other hand, I have reinforced the area with a 175 battalion plus a battery, a 105 self-propelled battalion, an automatic weapons battalion with a quad-50 battery attached and a searchlight battery. These deployments have helped but have not made up for a shortage of infantry.

Several developments have contributed to the situation in I Corps: (1) extension of the TAOR's in I Corps have tied down troops by committing them to an area and the people living thereon; (2) aggressive actions and constant infiltration by the North Vietnamese Army across the Demilitarized Zone; (3) the buildup of troops in Quang Ngai Province supported by infiltration from Laos and the influx of troops and supplies into the A Shau Valley and thence to the mountainous area west of Hue. As you know, Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces are under the command and control of Military Region 4 of the North Vietnamese Army in Vinh and the DMZ is obliterated in a practical sense.

The Southwest Monsoon season which is near at hand will slow operations in the III Corps area but bring excellent weather along the coastal area of I Corps and II Corps. Therefore because of weather and the enemy situation, as you know I have ordered into effect contingency plan OREGON which involves the deployment of a provisional division-size force to Chu Lai for operations in Quang Ngai and Quang Tri Provinces. This move is designed to free Marines to move north for offensive operations which I have directed.

Task Force OREGON will initially have two brigades. A third will be added in the near future. I am studying the feasibility of reinforcing with a fourth brigade on or about 1 June. Needless to say, these deployments will slow down operations and programs in II, III, and IV Corps but I consider the risks acceptable under the circumstances and the

emergency situation leaves me no other choice. Having made these deployments I feel that I have gone as far as I can go in reinforcing I Corps, but I am not sure that this will be enough to decisively reverse the present trend. I therefore recommend that the Marine brigade based on Okinawa reinforce III MAF as soon as possible to include the SLF helicopters and that plans be made to keep the force in Vietnam at least until September. This will permit the regiment to participate with III MAF in their offensive campaign during the period of good weather in the area.

In my opinion, the forthcoming summer campaign in I Corps could be a decisive period of the war. It is essential that we provide every reinforcement available to insure that the campaign is a success and the enemy suffers a decisive defeat. This would not only improve the general security of the area, but could have a profound effect on the strategic thinking of the leadership of Hanoi.[20]

Northeast Monsoon Season Plan

(TS) In mid-August COMUSMACV updated his guidance to field force commanders, with emphasis on employment of the 1st Cav Div (-) during the NE monsoon season. The updated guidance was prompted by the planned arrival of additional maneuver battalions during the latter part of 1967. COMUSMACV stated that when these battalions arrived the 1st Cav Div (-) would be relieved of its mission in the PERSHING and BYRD AOs. The logic of this action was that it would coincide with the beginning of the NE monsoon and would permit deployment of the 1st Cav Div (-) as a theater exploitation force into selected areas where good weather prevailed. During the period October 1967 - January 1968, key targets would be MR 6, the May Tao base area, War Zone D, and MR 10, while during the transition months of February - March 1968, the Do Za area would be the principal target. When the SW monsoon season began in April, it was planned to return the 1st Cav Div (-) to the east coast, probably to Quang Ngai Province.[21]

(TS) Concurrently with operations being conducted in southeastern II CTZ and III CTZ, COMUSMACV planned that Highway 1 would be opened the length of the two CTZs by 1 January 1968, and not later than the beginning of Tet. The operation against MR 10 in III CTZ was envisioned as a part of the overall strategy to neutralize War Zone D. The operations were to be executed based on the latest hard intelligence of the target areas but would be subject to change as the situation dictated. The campaign would last approximately 25 weeks (October 1967 - March 1968) and was planned to be conducted in four phases. Phase I (PHOENIX) would be aimed at locating and destroying MR 6 HQ and enemy elements in the Tuyen Duc/Ninh Thuan/Binh Thuan/Lam Dong Provinces of southern II CTZ and opening Highway 1. Phase II (SANTA FE) would locate and destroy the 5th VC Div elements in the NW section of III CTZ and support operations to open Highway 1 in that area. Phase III (SAN ANGELO) would block the Cambodian border and seal withdrawal routes from War Zone D, in support of Operation DODGE CITY (against War Zone D). Phase IV (YORK) would be conducted against the enemy in the Do Xa area as a part of a large force.[22]

(TS) While the basic concept of COMUSMACV's NE Monsoon Plan was to remain unchanged, the time frame and units involved changed considerably. On 28 September COMUSMACV cabled CINCPAC:

> In view of the accelerated deployment of the 101st Abn Div and the heavy enemy pressure in I CTZ, I have made a reassessment of planned operations and force deployment projected for the Northeast Monsoon Season. As you know, my overall fall-winter objectives have been to:
>
> Relieve the 1st Cav Div in Binh Dinh and commit it to successive country-wide offensive operations: PHOENIX to eliminate MR 6; SANTA FE to destroy the 5th VC Div; SAN ANGELO to disrupt MR 10 and YORK to clean out the Do Xa.
>
> Reinforce I CTZ to the extent practicable without unduly retarding other progress.
>
> Move additional elements of the 9th Inf Div to the Delta.
>
> Reinforce III CTZ so that we can attack during favorable weather in a series of peripheral operations which should open Highway 1, neutralize War Zone C, disrupt War Zone D and force the enemy into a vulnerable posture away from populated areas.

My overall projections have heretofore been based on freeing the 1st Cav to reinforce II FFORCEV in early December. The prospective early arrival of the 101st Div will not allow for initiation of planned operations in III CTZ while diverting the 1st Cav to I CTZ as required by the intensified enemy situation there. To insure adequate combat ready forces for III CTZ operations, I now plan to delay the movement of additional 9th Div elements to the Delta; however, a Vietnamese marine battalion will deploy to IV CTZ to reinforce our mobile riverine operations planned for that area.

These moves are carefully planned to preclude any regression in the vital coastal areas of II CTZ; to insure that the ultimate posture of forces required to meet objectives for next year is not changed significantly; to do what is necessary to relieve and reverse the situation near the DMZ; and to conduct large scale operations in selected areas when weather is favorable. By this reoriented effort, I desire to preempt the enemy strategy of attempting to tie down forces and denude the pacification shield.

The deployments which I plan to make are as follows:

Immediately deploy one bde of the 1st Cav Div to I CTZ thus freeing a Marine regt for further employment north of Ai Van Pass. In conjunction with the reduction of forces in Binh Dinh, I propose to obtain accelerated ROK action throughout their TAOR with emphasis on the Phu Cat Mountain Area of Southern Binh Dinh. Concurrent with the deployment of the 1st Cav elements north will be the return of the 2/11th ACR to III CTZ where favorable weather will exist for armored operations.

The 173d Bde will become an organic part of I FFORCEV with its base camp located, as soon as possible, at An Khe. This will make facilities available at Binh Hoa for the early arrival of the 101st Div.

The 198th Bde will be employed as part of the Americal Division upon its arrival.

O/A 15 October the 173d Bde will deploy from Phu Yen and Kontum to the PERSHING AO. Its fourth battalion will go to An Khe upon arrival O/A 23 October. The bn of the 1st Cav now in Phu Yen will remain there after Operation BOLLING terminates. One bn of the 4th Div will move to Kontum upon departure of the 173d Bde. In Binh Dinh, the 173d Bde will relieve the 1st Cav Div. In addition to its organic battalions, the 173d will retain the 1/50 (MECH) and one bn of the 1st Cav.

In late October a second bde of the 1st Cav and the Div Hq will deploy to I CTZ to relieve additional marine forces as required for employment in the northern areas.

Upon arrival of the 1st Cav in I CTZ (about 25 Oct) the 1st Bde of the 101st Div will deploy to Binh Thuan to initiate Operation PHOENIX against MR 6.

Operation PHOENIX will terminate in late November and the 1st Bde, 101st Div will pass to OPCON II FFORCEV to participate in Operation SANTA FE against the 5th VC Div during December.

During December II FFORCEV will conduct operations in War Zone C utilizing elements of the 1st Div, and 25th Div.

Assuming the early arrival of the 101st Div, it will be employed in late January or early February in SAN ANGELO against MR 10 while simultaneously a multi-div operation, DODGE CITY, will be launched against War Zone D.

Upon the arrival of the 11th Bde in the Americal Div, the 3d Bde, 4th Div will slip south to Binh Dinh to relieve the 173d Bde and the remaining elements of the 1st Cav Div. Subsequent to this, Operation YORK against Do Xa will be initiated utilizing two bdes of the 1st Cav Div. After the termination of this operation, the 1st Cav Div will be in a posture to facilitate future offensive operations in I CTZ. [3]

(TS) On 8 October COMUSMACV reported that, as all indications since 1 October pointed to an enemy withdrawal from the Con Thien

area, he had decided to hold in abeyance any further reinforcement of I CTZ in the immediate future. His plans were to commence offensive operations in III CTZ in December continuing into January 1968 against War Zone C and the 5th VC Div. He also indicated that offensive operations were planned against War Zone D and MR 10 sometime after the arrival of the 101st Div (-) expected during the period of December/January. On 1 November the initial phase was further adjusted. Operation PHOE HIX would now be conducted for a one-week period commencing on about 1 December employing only the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div with the objective of destroying the MR 6 HQ. The opening of Highway 1 in Binh Thuan Province would be accomplished through the use of I FFORCEV assets not later than 25 December. Operation SANTA FE was still to be accomplished in December.[24]

Late 1967/Early 1968

(S) On 29 October COMUSMACV issued Planning Directive No. 9-67 containing planning guidance for senior commanders for the period 1 November 1967 to 30 April 1968. The directive reviewed recent developments, stated operational objectives, discussed the concept of operations, and assigned specific tasks. Recent developments were reviewed as follows:

> Previous offensives have created a situation which is conducive to initiating an all-out offensive on all fronts--political, military, economic, and psychological. RVN/US/FW forces have retained the initiative, spoiled enemy attempts to launch major offensives through the DMZ and in the western highlands, frustrated enemy efforts to disrupt pacification and election activities, expanded the areas of secure population, and made inroads against enemy infrastructure in several key areas. The establishment of a strong point obstacle system south of the DMZ was initiated and is progressing.
>
> Pacification throughout RVN is expanding. Revolutionary Development Cadre groups and military and paramilitary forces in direct support

are gradually, but persistently, becoming more effective.

The war has passed the point at which losses inflicted on the enemy exceed his current replacement input. Air interdiction of the enemy LOCs in RVN and in the extended battlefield of North Vietnam and Laos are hampering enemy resupply efforts. Successive offensives into enemy base areas are reducing his unit effectiveness and morale. The Viet Cong capability to forage, to obtain recruits and support in-country is decreasing. Except along the DMZ where the war has developed a conventional character, the enemy is resorting increasingly to terrorist activity, and hit-and-run attacks.[25]

(S) The following operational objectives were stated:

Increase political, military, economic, and psychological pressures on the enemy in RVN and, to the extent authorized, in contiguous countries and waters.

Expand and accelerate the pacification program with emphasis on improved territorial security, increased military operation against enemy units or bases threatening pacification priority areas, intensified action against enemy infrastructure, and more selective and effective population and resources control.

Increase employment and improve effectiveness of RVN forces with emphasis on RF and PF elements.

Invade enemy base areas, destroy or capture enemy materials and facilities, and defeat enemy organized units.

Interdict enemy lines of communication both in and leading into RVN.

Open, secure, and use additional land and water lines of communication in RVN.[26]

(S) The concept of operations was stated in the following terms:

As the containment forces prevent major incursions of the enemy from out-of-country sanctuaries

the priority for offensive operations will shift, with the weather pattern changes, to the southern portions of II CTZ, all of III CTZ, and IV CTZ. A series of offensives will be conducted in selected areas. The priority for the GVN pacification program behind the protective shield of the US/FW/ARVN forces will be III CTZ/IV CTZ, II CTZ and I CTZ in that order. Economy of forces and maximum flexibility in force allocation between and within corps tactical zones, coupled with maintenance of a balanced logistics support system, is required.

The overall strategy will contain three basic facets: (1) offensives to keep the enemy off-balance; (2) persistent neutralization of enemy base areas with methodical capture/destruction of his supplies and facilities; and (3) improved and expanded territorial security and other pacification programs. Application of all three aspects throughout RVN will be concurrent, although apportioning the weight of effort among them will vary from area to area. A common requirement is finding and fixing the enemy. Hence, tactics will stress long-range patrolling in and around TAORs and integrated operations by military, paramilitary, and National Police Forces in populated areas.

The key to the overall concept is sustained territorial security for the pacification program. The concerted efforts of the entire military-civil team are required to accelerate improved security conditions. A major effort will be made to implement measures to integrate all aspects of the anti-infrastructure campaign. Similarly, better, more specifically targeted population and resources control must be developed and enforced. Planning, as a matter of priority, will provide for the opening and securing of land and water LOCs to enhance inter-community contacts, increase friendly presence in the countryside, and permit uninterrupted flow of civil/commercial traffic.

Pressure will be applied on all segments of the enemy's external and internal support system to reduce the combat effectiveness of his organized forces and to keep him on the move and away from

populated areas. Multi-brigade offensives will be launched against major base areas not previously invaded. Close-in enemy base areas will be neutralized between major offensives with priority against those base areas most seriously affecting pacification priority areas. Previously attacked base areas will be reentered to insure continued neutralization. However, US/FW/RVN units must be prepared for the enemy to react with increased use of guerrilla and terrorist activities.

Improvement in the overall effectiveness of Vietnamese military, paramilitary, and National Police Force (NPF) will be stressed. The planned RVNAF reorganization program is designed to provide the framework for enhanced effectiveness. Under this program ARVN and RF/PF units will continue to exert primary effort on territorial security aspects of pacification development. Concurrently, the tempo of offensive operations by ARVN, combined US/RVN and FW/RVN forces will increase. Our objective, by the end of the period, is to turn over the internal security of selected areas to PF, NPF, and to some extent hamlet self-defense forces. US, FW, and RVN units will provide outer security by offensive against enemy main force units and into enemy base areas. It is vital that during RVNAF reorganization the tempo of ARVN operations not be allowed to decelerate and that improved integration be achieved rather than increased compartmentalization.[27]

(S) Specific tasks were assigned all major subordinate commanders in support of the above concept and objectives.[28]

CHAPTER IV

Footnotes

1. Fact Sheet (TS), DOD/ISA, 11 Oct 66, Subj: President's Asian Trip Oct - Nov 66.

2. United States Policy Statement Series - 1967: The State of the Union (U).

3. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 280050Z Sep 66, Subj: Concept for Vietnam (U).

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5. Combined Campaign Plan, 1967 (AB 142) (S), 7 Nov 66.

6. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 130317Z Oct 66, Subj: Military Planning and Operations in SVN (U).

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8. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 260242Z Aug 66, Subj: Concept of Military Operations in SVN (U).

9. Ibid.

10. Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 241227Z Jan 67, Subj: Command Guidance (U).

11. Briefing (S), COMUSMACV to US PACOM-Area Diplomats in Philippines, Mar 67.

12. Ibid.

13. MACV Planning Dir No. 3-67 (TS), 10 Apr 67, Subj: Planning Guidance for Commanders for Period 1 Apr 67 - 31 Dec 67 (U).

14. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, AMEMB Vientiane and JCS, 180059Z Apr 67.

15. Ibid.

16. Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 191230Z Feb 67, Subj: Operation OREGON (U); Press Conference, LTG Rosson, CG I FFORCEV, of 24 Aug 67.

17. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 110308Z Feb 67, Subj: Forces for Sa Huynh and Operation LEWIS (U).

18. Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 090850Z Apr 67, Subj: SPHINX Report (U).

19. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 090912Z Apr 67, Subj: Visit of GEN Westmoreland to III MAF; Memo (S), Mission Council No. 183, 14 Apr 67, Subj: Minutes of Mission Council Meeting, 10 Apr 67.

20. Msg (TS), GEN Westmoreland (MAC347) to ADM Sharp and GEN Wheeler, 121248Z Apr 67, Subj: Situation I Corps.

21. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV, 150855Z Aug 67, Subj: Concept for Employment of 1st Cav (-) During NE Monsoon.

22. Ibid.

23. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 281500Z Sep 67, Subj: Reorientation of In-Country Forces (U).

24. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 080307Z Oct 67, Subj: Force Deployment; Msg (S), COMUSMACV, 011127Z Nov 67, Subj: Operation PHOENIX (U).

25. COMUSMACV Planning Dir No. 9-67 (U), 29 Oct 67.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

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CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

GROUND OPERATIONS

Background

(U) Before discussing the ground operations in RVN during 1967, it is well to consider the various environments in which these operations took place. The Republic of Vietnam is almost 500 nautical miles in length and its width varies from 185 nautical miles in the south to 35 nautical miles near the 17th Parallel; its area is about 66,000 square miles. Starting at the south, the Mekong Delta is low, flat, and poorly drained. A few miles north of Saigon begins a forest-covered mountain range, with peaks up to 8,000 feet, which extends north beyond the 17th Parallel. Between these extremes of Delta and mountains are coastal plains and jungle-covered plateaus. The climate of RVN is generally typical of that of all SEASIA characterized by alternate dry and rainy seasons. In the south the summer monsoons prevail from June through September, while during the winter months it is very dry. In the north the seasons are reversed. From north to south RVN is divided into four CTZs for tactical operations--I CTZ the most northern zone and IV CTZ the most southern zone. See Chapter 3 for the locations and the command assignments of friendly forces.[1]

(U) The large number of both major and minor operations conducted during 1967 preclude detailed coverage in this history. Annex I (Tabular Listing of Operations) contains a listing of operations resulting in greater than 49 enemy KIA. The operations which follow were selected for inclusion here as representative of ground action and/or were of special significance within the several CTZs.

(U) The great majority of the ground operations in GVN are referred to as either search-and-destroy or cordon-and-search operations. A better understanding of ground operations can be gained by classifying operations into four general categories: (1) the routine cleanup

actions that are carried out within a division's area of responsibility and represent a major share of our effort; (2) the operations resulting from intelligence information. The exit routes from a selected area are sealed off to prevent the enemy's escape and then a systematic search of the area is conducted; (3) the spoiling operations which are hit-and-run strikes designed to break up enemy operations; (4) operations in support of the RD program or other economic development such as the opening of a highway or canal. All operations referred to above are assigned unclassified code names (nicknames) for administrative convenience or for morale or public information purposes. The assignment of a nickname does not indicate the size, duration, nor relative importance of an operation.[2]

(S) The dramatic and successful ground operations of 1966 were continued throughout 1967. During 1966, approximately 57,510 enemy were killed while approximately 90,021 were killed during 1967. More meaningful as an index of success is the ratio of enemy to friendly KIA:[3]

1965	1966	1967
Enemy/Friendly	Enemy/Friendly	Enemy/Friendly
2.9:1	3.5:1	3.8:1

Rules of Engagement

(TS) During 1967, as in 1966, US/FWMA forces, when operating near a border of RVN, were subjected to ground rules that were primarily politically-based. These ground rules, called Rules of Engagement, were established by JCS for the border areas of Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ, and were modified and updated as necessary and republished quarterly. Instructions pertaining to the Rules of Engagement for Cambodia, Laos, and the DMZ were considered sensitive and as such were to be safeguarded by appropriate security means. The instructions, and even the knowledge of their existence, would be held closely, with access limited to persons specifically authorized on a need-to-know basis. No public disclosure of any of the substances contained in

the messages pertaining to the Rules of Engagement or action taken under any authority contained in the messages would be made, except as authorized by MACV. The Rules of Engagement for the three border areas apply to US/FWMA forces only. However, JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV constantly stressed the fact that the personnel in positions to influence RVNAF operations conducted near the borders would make every reasonable effort to insure that such operations were conducted under the Rules of Engagement applicable to US/FWMA forces.[4]

Cambodia

(TS) The Rules of Engagement for Cambodia, at the beginning of 1967, required that major subordinate commanders would, when planning operations near the RVN/Cambodian border, request approval in advance for necessary actions or counteractions against VC/NVA forces which might involve returning for or maneuvering into Cambodia, either in attaining objectives in RVN or in the exercise of the right of self-defense. In emergency situations, the US/FW commanders were authorized to take counteractions in exercise of the right of self-defense against VC/NVA attacks directed at US/RVN/FWMA forces from locations inside Cambodia. Such countermeasures might include artillery and air strikes against attacking forces and maneuver of ground forces into Cambodia as necessary for preservation of the force, but no Cambodian village or populated area would be attacked.



Laos

(TS) The 1967 Rules of Engagement for Laos, while essentially the same as those for Cambodia, were slightly less restrictive.

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Advance approval for planning operations near the Laos/RVN border, where involvement with forces in Laos was probable, was not required; however, commanders were required to keep MACV headquarters informed during such planning. In addition, Laotian villages and populated areas could be attacked when fire was received therefrom, or when in the judgment of the US/FW commander involved, such attack was essential for preservation of his force.[6]

(TS) On 23 February JCS authorized COMUSMACV to conduct artillery fire from positions in RVN against valid military targets in Laos. In early June MACV updated and republished the Rules of Engagement applicable to the Laotian/RVN border. The new publication reflected the authorization granted in February, with no other changes from the rules applicable at the end of 1966. These rules continued in effect for the remainder of 1967.[7]

The Demilitarized Zone

(TS) The Rules of Engagement for the DMZ, as 1967 opened, authorized US/FWMA force commanders to:

1) Conduct air strikes into and north of the DMZ.

2) Employ artillery fire (land and naval) against weapons firing on friendly forces from positions north of the line of demarcation, in order to insure preservation of lives and equipment.

3) Employ naval gunfire into the southern portion of the DMZ against clearly-defined military activities.

4) Maneuver into the DMZ south of the demarcation line when in contact with the VC/NVA forces, or when such engagement was imminent, as necessary for the preservation of US/FWMA forces. These forces would not advance north of the demarcation line and would withdraw south of the DMZ when contact with the enemy was broken. In addition, COMUSMACV would be informed immediately of actions taken under this authority.[8]

(TS) In late February JCS authorized the employment of artillery fire from positions within RVN against valid military targets in the DMZ north and south of the demarcation line and in NVN north of the DMZ. This authorization was included in the COMUSMACV's third quarterly update and republication of the Rules of Engagement applicable to the DMZ, promulgated in March. The updated rules continued to apply only to US/FWMA forces, but COMUSMACV again directed that personnel in positions to influence RVNAF operations, conducted in or near the DMZ, should make every reasonable effort to insure that such operations were conducted under the Rules of Engagement established for US/FWMA forces. In addition to the authorization for increased use of artillery, COMSEVENTHFLT was authorized to employ naval gunfire against suitable targets in NVN between latitudes 17 and 20 degrees north. The authority to maneuver US/FWMA ground forces into the DMZ could not be delegated below the level of the senior US tactical commander in I CTZ (CG III MAF), and when time permitted approval was to be requested from MACV headquarters.[9]

(TS) On 5 May JCS granted increased latitude in the engagement rules for the DMZ. On 8 May COMUSMACV issued new instruction and guidance to field force commanders, granting authority to conduct military operations in the DMZ as follows:

1) Operations by US/FWMA ground forces may be conducted in the DMZ south of the PMDL. US/FWMA forces may return fire across the PMDL but will not advance north of the PMDL.

2) Tactical air strikes may be conducted in the DMZ both north and south of the PMDL.

3) Artillery fire (land and naval) may be directed against valid military targets in the DMZ, both north and south of the PMDL.

4) Artillery fire (land only) may be directed against valid targets in NVN north of the DMZ.

(TS) The September updating of the DMZ rules contained additional latitude for the ground commander. Authority was granted to conduct defoliation operations along identified infiltration routes in the northern portion of the DMZ. These rules continued in effect for the remainder of 1967.[10]

Holiday Stand-down

(TS) Again this year the JCS announced a curtailment of military operations in SEA during Christmas 1967 and New Years, and TET 1968. The Christmas stand-down was observed for 24 hours, from 1800H 24 December until 1800H 25 December. The New Year's stand-down was observed for 36 hours, from 1800H 31 December until 0600H 2 January 1968.[11]

(TS) The instructions governing military operations during the stand-downs were as follows:

1) In RVN.

a) Initiate no military offensive operations except in response to:

1) Enemy initiative endangering the safety of US/RVN/FWMA forces.

2) Abnormally great enemy resupply or infiltration into the southern part of the DMZ and the area immediately south thereof.

3) Abnormally great enemy resupply activites other than that referred to in subparagraph (2) above, which fulfill any of the following criteria: (a) are in such proximity to friendly units and/or installations as to constitute a direct threat to friendly forces; or (b) In other locations involving supplies in such quantities as to indicate abnormally great resupply operations.

b) COMUSMACV was authorized to react to the above listed enemy actions in accordance with existing authorities. Any action taken was to be immediately reported to CINCPAC.

c) COMUSMACV was to assume a full alert posture and to continue all security precautions to include patrol activity and in addition, to be prepared with ready reaction forces to respond to any VC/NVA initiative.

d) Forces in contact with the enemy would not break contact unless the enemy effort to withdraw was clearly evident or until the operation was otherwise concluded.

e) MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN operations would be continued.

f) Intensified aerial reconnaissance would be conducted and search-and-rescue operations would be continued as required.

g) If deemed necessary, for reasons of security, appropriate air and/or naval operations were authorized in support of the above operations.

h) Any operations conducted pursuant to the above instructions would, whenever possible, avoid hamlets and villages in order to minimize their effect on the civilian population.

2) In NVN:

a) Normal armed reconnaissance, air strikes, and SEA DRAGON operations would be suspended during these periods.

b) South of 20°N latitude, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF as applicable may authorize SEA DRAGON operations, air strikes, and artillery fire against observed abnormally great military resupply and against any activities that pose a direct and immediate threat to friendly forces. SEA DRAGON ships will not deliver fire against fixed shore targets except in self-defense.

c) North of 20°N latitude, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT may authorize air strikes against any targets that pose an immediate and direct threat to our forces, such as movement of SAMs to extend additional SAM defenses S of 20°N latitude. (Note: Just prior to the New Year's stand-down the authority to authorize actions as contained in subparagraph b) and c) above was superseded with instructions to recommend to CINCPAC that such strikes, fires or operations be authorized).

d) Conduct intensified aerial reconnaissance and continue search-and-rescue operations as required.

e) Report immediately to CINCPAC the results of any reconnaissance which disclose abnormally great military resupply activity in NVN and any actions taken under the authorities of subparagraphs b and c above. (Note: This paragraph was also modified just prior to the New Year to the extent that the report would be via OPREP-3 Pinnacle and would be sent with a flash precedence).

I CTZ

(U) Smallest of the CTZs, both in area and population, I CTZ encompasses five provinces and two broad geographical areas, the Highlands (inland) and theCentral Lowlands (coastal area). The Highlands is that portion of the Chaine Annamitique paralleling the Laotian border. Elevations vary from 400 to 1,300 feet with some peaks exceeding 2,000 feet. The area is narrow and very rugged. The southern half of the Central Lowlands contains extensive and fertile plains where two rice crops are grown yearly. The northern half of the coastal area is marked by several mountain spurs jutting into the sea and narrow lines of sand dunes backed by intensively cultivated flat fertile areas.[13]

(S) Operations in I CTZ were highlighted during the year by increased enemy activity throughout the zone. Enemy pressure, in terms of numbers and increased use of artillery in the DMZ, dictated reinforcement of the 3d Mar Div. This situation led to insertion of the Americal Division (initially TF OREGON) into the southern two provinces allowing a concentration of Marine forces in the three northern provinces. ARVN forces, primarily concerned with the RD effort along the coastal plains, launched numerous successful search-and-destroy operations. The ROKMC Bde maintained control within its TAOR venturing out frequently to conduct both joint and unilateral operations in the southern sector.[14]

(S) During January, immediately south of and bordering on the DMZ in Quang Tri Province, US Marines involved in Operation PRAIRIE remained in contact with elements of the NVA 324B Div. This five-month operation began as a one-infantry battalion search-and-destroy mission on 3 August 1966, and grew to a nine-battalion operation by October before successfully disrupting and repelling

the efforts of the NVA division to breech the DMZ with a sizable force, then settled down to a brigade-size operation with the mission of preventing infiltration from the north. The operation, which included the flying of 14,228 helicopter and 5,190 tactical sorties, terminated on 31 January after accounting for 1,397 enemy killed.[15]

(S) PRAIRIE II commenced on 1 February with no change in task organization or disposition of troops. While enemy contact was light initially, it increased sharply in late February and early March. On 23 February COMUSMACV authorized artillery fire missions into and north of the DMZ, against purely military targets. This authorization was granted in order to augment air strikes during periods of reduced visibility, to provide protection for long-range aerial reconnaissance by attacking suspected AA positions, and to disrupt lines of communication over which the NVN were resupplying their units in the DMZ. Within five days some 74 105mm howitzer missions had been fired into and north of the DMZ: in the same area, some 116 175mm gun missions were fired. Extreme care had been taken not to fire at non-military targets or at military targets in or near built-up areas. The enemy's reaction to this increased pressure was immediate and intense: on 26 February Marine artillery positions near the DMZ began to receive heavy mortar and rocket fire and, by the end of the month, the enemy had fired almost 1,000 rounds at the positions near Gia Linh and Con Thien. In early March CG III MAF, in a personal message to COMUSMACV, reported on developments in northern Quang Tri Province:

> . . . Recent enemy activity in northeastern Quang Tri Province has been dominated by unusual heavy mortaring of Gio Linh and Con Thien and the rocket/mortar attack on Camp Carroll, as well as the southward movement of the 812 NVA Regt.
>
> The intensity of the mortar/rocket attacks reflects the enemy's obvious extensive resupply activities during TET. The fact that rockets were used for the first time in the northern area shows the importance the enemy places on his activities there. The use of rockets may also reflect the enemy's desire to strike our vital installations from positions as far removed as possible.

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By 1 March enemy activity had led to the commitment of five Marine battalions to Operation PRAIRIE II. The enemy, in an apparent effort to silence the constantly harassing friendly artillery, advanced two battalions of the 812th Regt, 324B NVA Div to positions near Cam Lo. They were detected by a reconnaissance patrol and, after a three-day battle with two Marine battalions, were driven from the area. The enemy was finding that penetration of the DMZ was not an easy task as Operation PRAIRIE II terminated on 18 March.[16]

(S) Operation PRAIRIE III commenced the following day. The fighting during March was characterized mostly by small-unit contact as the enemy refused to become engaged in any large-force battles.[17]

(S) PRAIRIE IV was [illegible]ted immediately upon termination of PRAIRIE III on 19 April, as the Marine force continued to retain control of the key terrain features [illegible]ting routes of infiltration from the north. A significant conta[illegible] the NVA force occurred on 24 April, about five miles NW of [illegible]anh, when an 81mm mortar forward observer team on [illegible]61 was attacked by an unknown number of enemy. Initially the enemy appeared to be another reconnaissance unit, but this idea was soon dispelled as the FO Team was forced to withdraw from the hill under heavy small-arms and automatic-weapons fire. A Marine battalion from Dong Ha was moved to Khe Sanh to exploit the contact and, by late evening of 25 April, one of its companies was heavily engaged with what was estimated at the time to be a reinforced NVA company. However, by the morning of the 26th it was apparent that the enemy force was of battalion size or larger and that it occupied well-prepared positions. One of the Marine Special Landing Forces (SLF) of SEVENTHFLT, then engaged in Operation BEACON STAR 15 miles E of Quang Tri City, was airlifted into the area on the 26th, as were elements of the 3d Mar Regt from Dong Ha. The 2d and 3d Bns, 3d Mars, joined forces and, supported by extensive artillery and air strikes, assaulted and seized the hill. Consolidation of the position and mopping-up was completed by the 29th, and the battalions prepared to assault two other hills in the immediate area held by the enemy: 881 North, two miles to the NW, and 881 South, three miles to the W. On the 30th coordinated attacks were launched against well dug-in enemy forces on the two hills, by evening, after intense fighting, elements of the 3d Bn had seized Hill 881 South, while elements of the 2d Bn were

heavily engaged on the slopes of Hill 881 North. During the night radar-controlled air strikes continued to pound the enemy. On 1 May the heavy fighting continued against an enemy now estimated to be a regiment, as the 1st Mar Air Wg flew the highest number of sorties flown in support of one battalion in a single day since Operation STARLITE in August 1965. By 3 May all that was left of the enemy were a few scattered snipers; substantial control of the hill had been attained, but mopping-up continued until 6 May. The enemy's threat to Khe Sanh had been broken, at least for the time being. Much of the credit for overwhelming the enemy force must go to Marine air strikes that continuously pounded the enemy with pinpoint accuracy and proved to be particularly effective in uncovering bunkers and other fortifications.[18]

(C) During the period 17-28 May friendly forces, for the first time, were permitted to conduct search-and-destroy operations within the southern half of the DMZ. Marine Operation HICKORY was conducted in the DMZ just north of Con Thien and Gio Linh in coordination with SLF Operations BEAU CHARGER and BELT TIGHT and ARVN Operation LAM SON 54. The operation was designed to sweep and clear the area of enemy forces and installations and to assist the GVN in the evacuation of civilians from the area to a resettlement area further south. Under heavy air cover, NGF and USA and USMC artillery support, a multi-battalion force of ARVN infantry and airborne troops, crossed into the DMZ along Highway 1 and linked up with the Marine SLF from the US SEVENTHFLT, which came ashore by amphibious and heliborne assault in BEAU CHARGER just south of the Demarcation Line. To the west, elements of the 3d Mar Div in HICKORY swung into the DMZ just north of Con Thien and linked up with the BELT TIGHT SLF unit landed by helicopter in the DMZ. ARVN units made significant contact with elements of the 31st, 32d, and 812th NVA Regts on 19 and 20 May about 8 km NE of Con Thien, inside the DMZ, accounting for 342 enemy killed. USMC units encountered moderate enemy resistance of company-size and were subjected to numerous rounds of artillery fire. The Marine operation, which terminated on 28 May, was supported by 987 FW aircraft sorties and accounted for 359 confirmed enemy killed. BEAU CHARGER had terminated on 26 May and was credited with 83 enemy killed.[19]

(C) Operation CIMARRON started on 1 June as a continuation of the 3d Mar Div operations in northern Quang Tri Province. Heavy enemy contact commenced the evening of 1 June as elements of the 9th Mar encountered the enemy in a 600-meter egg-shaped bunker complex near the DMZ. The Vietnam-war-developed technique of making solid contact and then pulling back to permit use of artillery support was successfully employed; contact became light by 6 June and most of the enemy fled the area. Throughout the month the operation continued to be a battle of small units, company-size and smaller, as each side engaged in ambush tactics. The friendly forces, supported by air and artillery, were forced to search and seek out the enemy as he refused again to become involved in a large-unit fire fight. The NVA troops encountered by elements of the 9th Mar, in the vicinity of Con Thien, were wearing steel helmets and flak jackets, and employed flame throwers. On 1 July an air observer spotted a large enemy force four km N of Con Thien and called in 105mm artillery fire on the force, killing 50 of the enemy. Later in the day the same procedure yielded 25 enemy dead. The operation, supported by 1,046 tactical air sorties and 245 NGF missions, accounted for 245 enemy killed.[20]

(C) Operation BUFFALO immediately followed Operation CIMARRON of 2 July. On 5 July an air observer spotted a large concentration of enemy troops in an area three km NNE of Con Thien; he called in artillery fire and tactical air strikes, resulting in 200 enemy killed. The enemy also employed artillery in an effort to overcome friendly forces and, between 0745 and 1345 on 5 July, units in the Con Thien area were hit with artillery fire which killed 14 and wounded 25, most of them the result of a single 152mm shell impacting directly on a 9th Mar Bn CP. This was the first time since the war began that the enemy has used artillery as large as 152mm. On 8 July elements of the 3d Mar engaged an unknown size force in a bunker complex about four km SSE of Con Thien. The Marines made solid contact, pulled back, employed artillery fire and air strikes to pound the enemy-fortified positions, and then moved in again and engaged the enemy. The battle had lasted less than three hours when the enemy broke contact, leaving 35 dead; six Marines were killed. During the period 9-10 July the enemy employed artillery and/or rocket fire on the Dong Ha airfield and friendly positions at Con Thien. In each case counter fires were employed; and later sweeps of the area revealed that at least 118 enemy had been killed. The operation terminated on 14 July, having been

supported by 943 tactical air sorties and 389 NGF missions and accounting for 1,280 enemy killed.[21]

(C) Operation HICKORY II (14-16 July), with the same units and in the same area as Operation BUFFALO, was followed on 16 July by Operation KINGFISHER. Large segments of the Barrier Plan (See Annex A, Barrier Plan) had been completed by this time, but work on this massive undertaking continued throughout the year. Although defeated in every military encounter, the enemy continued to tie down major US forces in sparsely populated areas. Light, sporadic contacts were the rule during this period coupled with a significant increase in the enemy's use of artillery and rockets. By the end of August Operation KINGFISHER had accounted for 572 enemy killed.[22]

(S) During September the focal point of enemy concentration in the DMZ area continued to be Con Thien. Con Thien, 14 miles inland and two miles S of the DMZ, lies across a main infiltration route into the south. The loss of Con Thien could open the way for a major invasion from the north as an estimated 35,000 NVN troops were massed in the area. At the very least, its loss would block the construction of the barrier system but, more important, would be the propaganda value of a military victory. During the month of September Con Thien was subjected to the heaviest shelling of the war. The peak period was the week of 19-27 September when 3,077 mortar, artillery, and rocket rounds were received. By the end of September the quantity of incoming rounds had substantially decreased. On 4 October COMUSMACV commented on recent developments in the DMZ as follows:

> It is immediately apparent that the enemy strategy of the past several weeks concentrated on achieving a major victory in the Demilitarized Zone. Con Thien became the focal point of his highest priority. Despite his shelling of our positions along the DMZ, the enemy was not successful in this venture and while no accurate assessment of his casualties can be made, it becomes fairly obvious that he suffered greatly in the exchange of fires. As the reports indicate, our situation has improved measurably. The enemy fires have been forced to subside; there is indication that he is withdrawing at

least a portion of his forces from the DMZ Area and, generally, the victory has been denied. The margin of success on our part is attributable to the massive effort launched against the hostile concentrations in and around Con Thien and into the DMZ and its adjacent areas. In short, one of the greatest massings of fire-power in support of a single division position in the history of warfare was launched against the enemy in a period of about two weeks. This included B-52 strikes, artillery fires, tactical air bombing, and naval gunfire support. Our casualties in Northern Quang Tri Province over the heaviest period of the attack were not exorbitant when placed in proper perspective. For instance, during the period of bitter fighting in the DMZ Area (1-24 September), there were 196 killed and 1,917 wounded (834 evacuated). However, by comparison, in 1966 during the two months when it was necessary to drive the enemy out of positions in Quang Tri Province, we incurred 126 killed and 488 wounded in July and 115 killed and 448 wounded in September. It is also interesting to note that from 1 June through 23 September, the 3d Marine Division fighting in the DMZ Area suffered 564 killed and 5,183 wounded, while the 1st Marine Division (not in the DMZ Area) suffered a comparable 484 killed and 3,788 wounded for the same period.[23]

(U) The Saigon Daily News announced the arrival of the NE monsoons on the front page of its 10 October issue. In part the article stated:

> Two days of heavy rains flooded broad areas of South Vietnam's northern provinces Monday and made life miserable for thousands of American Marines guarding the northern frontiers.
>
> The rains were the first of the monsoons which will drench the northern quarter of South Vietnam for the next five or six months.
>
> The seasonal rains annually turn roads into muck and swell rivers to two or three times their normal size.

The vast low-lying area along the coast becomes inundated with the heavy rains.

Military officials expect the monsoons will bring slow-down in the pace of the war. Although the Communists like to mount attacks when low-hanging clouds mask their actions and neutralize American Air Power, their movements also are hampered by the thick, red ooze.

For the American in the foxhole it means nothing but misery. Helicopters have trouble getting in to bring supplies and carry out the wounded after actions.

Mud cakes equipment and weapons and soldiers sometimes go for days without dry feet. 24

(S) In spite of heavy flood damage to roads and bridges throughout I CTZ, the enemy was unable to exploit the situation due to a sustained high tempo of friendly operations. While the artillery/rocket/mortar fire received in October was on a reduced scale from September, nevertheless, over 50 percent of the casualties suffered in KINGFISHER were from that cause. On 31 October three operations were terminated in name only as the same forces previously involved continued operations under new code names. Operations KENTUCKY (9th Mars) and LANCASTER (3d Mars) replaced KINGFISHER; SCOTLAND (26th Mars) replaced ARDMORE; and NEOSHO (4th Mars) replaced FREMONT. Cumulative results of enemy killed in the terminated operations were: ARDMORE 113; FREMONT 123; and KINGFISHER 1,117. 25

(S) Operations in the 3d Mar Div AO of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces were characterized by numerous small unit sightings and contacts during November. Operations along the DMZ were oriented to provide maximum support to DYE MARKER as enemy activity appeared to be directed toward a relocation of assets and repositioning of forces. On 19 November, Operation HEAD SHED, a combined air, artillery and NGF SLAM, was conducted against enemy artillery positions in the DMZ. The SLAM was scheduled for 24 hours in order to overcome the enemy tactic of rapidly moving artillery from one position to another. Although the bad weather prevented a complete damage assessment, known damage included nine artillery positions destroyed, 21 positions damaged, and eight secondary fires started. 26

(S) Enemy contacts in the 3d Mar Div AO continued light to moderate during December. The end of the year saw a continuation of the shift of US forces to the northern two provinces. By 31 December 373 enemy KIA had been counted in the KENTUCKY AO.[27]

(C) While the 3d Mar Div was hard at work in the northern portion of the zone, the 1st Mar Div was equally heavily committed in the central and southern portions. Representative of operations in Quong Tin Province was Operation UNION which started on 21 April as a reaction to a major enemy contact 15 km WNW of Tan Ky in the Hiep Duc/Tien Phuoc Valley. Units involved were three battalions of the 1st Mar Div from the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs. The initial contact on 21 April was significant in terms of casualties to both friendly and enemy forces, as Marine losses were 41 killed and 97 wounded, while incomplete enemy casualties stood at 89 killed. By the end of April the operation, under control of the 5th Mars, was characterized by many small-unit contacts and had taken a heavy toll of enemy casualties--278 were left dead on the field of battle. During the period 1-17 May the 5th Mars continued the search-and-destroy operation with the majority of contacts being light and resulting in enemy kills of from one to 15, with one exception: on 13 May substantial enemy forces were encountered and the fire fight, with friendly forces being supported by artillery and air strikes, accounted for 150 enemy killed. Operation UNION was supported by 37 NGF and 1,966 artillery missions, and resulted in 865 enemy killed.[28]

(C) During the period 25-31 May the 5th Mars commenced UNION II, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Nam/Quang Tin Provinces. Heavy contact with an estimated enemy battalion occurred on 26 May, resulting in a two-hour battle; friendly forces, supported by artillery and air strikes, killed 161 NVA troops. On 30 May the command group of the 1st Bn, 5th Mar detected irritant gas in the vicinity of BT105214 which caused watering of the eyes. On 2 June heavy SA fire was encountered by two battalions of the 5th Mars from what was estimated to be an enemy regiment (-). Three hours of fighting accounted for 56 NVA killed. During the night, elements of the 2d Bn, 5th Mars, committed from reserve, came under heavy mortar and AW fire from an estimated enemy force of 500 to 600 troops. The operation, supported by 304 tactical air sorties, terminated on 5 June, accounting for 701 enemy killed.[29]

(U) As enemy activity continued to increase in and immediately south of the DMZ, COMUSMACV, in February, directed his Chief of Staff to develop a contingency plan for the organizing and deployment of a division size Task Force to I CTZ. While the primary purpose of the deployment was the release of Marine units to support offensive action in the DMZ area, the intent was also to employ this major force to increase the scope and tempo of offensive operations in the south. In April, TF OREGON was deployed to the heavily VC influenced province of Quang Ngai.[30]

(C) On 11 May TF OREGON launched search-and-destroy Operation MALHEUR in the vicinity of Duc Pho in SE Quang Ngai Province. Forces involved were the 1st and 2d Bns, 327 Inf, and 2d Bn, 502d Inf, of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. During the month, friendly forces engaged the enemy on 18 separate occasions, each time inflicting heavy personnel losses as well as uncovering large food caches and capturing numerous weapons and vast quantities of ammunition. The operation, supported by 311 tactical air sorties, accounted for 392 enemy killed before terminating on 7 June. MALHEUR II immediately followed MALHEUR, in the same area with the same troops involved. Enemy contact was sporadic, but was almost an every-day affair; by 15 June 14 enemy had been killed by small-unit ambushes and patrols. On 16 June a rifle company made brief contact with an estimated enemy battalion, but no significant results were achieved. Light contact continued with friendly units conducting vigorous ambushes and patrols in an unsuccessful effort to draw the enemy into a large-unit fire fight. Numerous small unit engagements were the order-of-the-day during July with an impressive kill ratio of 27:1. Operation MALHEUR terminated on 2 August with a final result of 488 enemy killed. Operation HOOD RIVER, in the same area, accounted for an additional 78 enemy killed.[31]

(C) During the period 13 August - 1 September, TF OREGON units conducted Operation BENTON, a search-and-destroy operation in Quang Tin Province. Daily contacts with small groups of enemy forces resulted in 397 enemy killed. Operation COOK (2-10 September) accounted for an additional 54 enemy KIA in Quang Ngai Province. On 11 September the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div launched Operation WHEELER in the same general area where BENTON had been conducted. Again, frequent engagements with small enemy forces accounted for the majority of the 428 enemy killed by the end of the month.[32]

(C) The 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div, transferred to III MAF and in turn to the Americal Div from the PERSHING AO commenced Operation WALLOWA on 4 October. Conducted in NE Quang Tin/SE Quang Nam, WALLOWA like WHEELER was against elements of the 2d NVA Div apparently attempting to procure rice. By the end of October, WALLOWA had accounted for 675 enemy KIA against a loss of 48 KIA.[33]

(S) On 11 November, Operation WHEELER and WALLOWA were consolidated into Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA in Quang Tin and Quang Nam Provinces. The soldiers of the Americal Div continued to inflict heavy casualties on the 2d NVA Div during the month. Contacts varied from light to moderate with enemy units of up to company size. Contact with the enemy continued at the same level through December. On 9 December, Americal Div troops had killed 103 enemy during nine hours of fighting while suffering two US soldiers killed. By the end of the year, the Div had accounted for 3, 162 enemy KIA.[34]

(C) During February an operation worthy of historical note occurred when search-and-destroy Operation LIEN KET 81/RIO GRANDE/GIANT DRAGON was launched against the NVA 40th Bn and 21st Regt in Quang Ngai Province. The US, FW, and ARVN forces involved were the 4th Bn, 4th ARVN Regt; 1st and 3d Troops, 4th ARVN Armored Cav Sq; 21st and 37th Rgr Bns; 1st, 7th and 8th Abn Bns; 5th US Mar Regt; and the 1st and 2d Bns, 2d ROKMC Bde. Noteworthy was the fact that this was the first tri-nation operation in I CTZ to use a combined command post, and equally as noteworthy was the fact that the ARVN forces recorded their highest one-day kill during the operation, when on 19 February the Airborne TF accounted for 750 enemy dead. The operation terminated on 22 February, resulting in 836 enemy killed; ARVN units were credited with 813 as they severely mauled the enemy units withdrawing from contact with the ROKMC.[35]

(C) On 15 February, the biggest clash of the Vietnam war for the ROKMC Bde occurred when an estimated two battalions of the 21st NVA Regt came out of the foothills and attacked a ROKMC rifle company as it moved into position about eight miles NW of Quang Ngai City. The enemy attackers, using SA, AW, recoilless rifles, and mortars, commenced the attack at dawn and the battle continued until about 0800, when the enemy attempted to break contact. However, a ROKMC blocking force was lifted by helicopters into the foothills behind the

battle area and sealed off the enemy's escape route. The trapped forces were then hammered by artillery and air strikes. Scattered action continued throughout the day as the enemy, believed to be from a base camp within the area, tried desperately to escape; by dusk the enemy had lost at least 246 killed during the day's battle. This action marked the first time in months that an enemy force had attacked a ROK unit of any size.[36]

(C) During the period 11-26 August the 2d ARVN Div conducted Operation LIEN KET 112 in conjunction with Operations COCHISE and BENTON. The heliborne search-and-destroy operation involving 16 battalions was conducted in Quang Ngai Province to the west of Tam Ky. On 12 August heavy contact was made with elements of the 21st NVA Regt. Ground elements were supported by gunships and tactical air and close combat continued for approximately 15 hours before the enemy units finally broke contact. The remainder of the operation was characterized by light and sporadic contact and ended with 202 enemy killed.[37]

(C) During the last week of the year ARVN 1st Regt, 1st Div troops caught an enemy battalion against the sea in Quang Tri Province while conducting LAM SON 166. In heavy fighting, the ARVN force accounted for 217 enemy KIA while losing 15 friendly KIA. This operation was a fitting climax to the many successful 1st ARVN Div actions fought during the year.[38]

Special Landing Force Operations

(S) The Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF) was created by CINCPAC in 1959 as a balanced, versatile contingency force to meet requirements throughout the CINCPAC area of responsibility. The force consists of a battalion of Marines embarked aboard three ships. The battalion is reinforced with tanks, artillery, trucks, engineers, etc. Also, the attachment of a helicopter squadron and an amphibious tractor unit give the Marines the capability of landing by helicopter or Amtrack as well as by boat.[39]

(S) The initial concept for employment of the SLF in RVN was that it would be used in the role of an Amphibious Raiding Force. This role permitted utilization of the force ashore for short periods (48 hours) and, at the same time, insured an early reaction tir e if called upon as CINCPAC's sole mobile ready reserve for contingency operations. In August 1966, with the concurrence of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and COMUSMACV, the role of the SLF was expanded to include mo:e extensive operations ashore. This more active role was continued during 1967.[40]

(S) Intelligence sources had indicated, in December 1966, that the enemy knew of the SLF operation planned for Kien Hoa Province (DECKHOUSE V) in January. This information proved to be correct as the landing was unopposed and the enemy hard to find. The primary cause of the compromise was held to be the lapse of time between the decision to conduct the operation and the actual assault. The final decision to conduct future ARG/SLF operations would, as a result, be held to 36 hours and, if only one Amphibious Operating Area (AOA) was to be used, as little as 12 to 24 hours prior to an assault.[41]

(S) DECKHOUSE VI conducted in Quang Ngai Province during the period 16 February - 3 March was more successful as 280 of the enemy were KIA. Heavy mortar attacks against III MAF units in Quang Tri Province had indicated a requirement to increase the tempo of ground operations in that area. Again COMUSMACV's request for the ARG/SLF was approved and, on 20 March, BEACON HILL was executed ten miles to the W of Operation PRAIRIE II. The effectiveness of the amphibious assault on the enemy flank was apparent in damage to the enemy with 334 NVA confirmed killed.[42]

(S) On 15 April JCS authorized CINCPAC to employ elements of the 9th MAB to support COMUSMACV in I CTZ. This action had the primary effect of making available a second SLF. CINCPACFLT would position one ARG/SLF on a 24-hour reaction time and one ARG/SLF on a 26-hour reaction time, prepared for immediate commitment in I CTZ in response to requests by COMUSMACV. The remainder of the ground combat component of the MAB on Okinawa would continue rehabilitation but would be available on a readiness status of 15 days for embarkation to I CTZ. On 16 April COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that he considered the situation in I CTZ to warrant the commitment of the two SLFs in I CTZ as soon as practicable,

with commitment of the remainder of the RLT to I CTZ within 15 days upon call of HQ MACV. On 11 May, after the two SLFs and the regimental headquarters had been deployed to RVN, COMUSMACV considered that the situation in I CTZ still warranted the deployment of the remaining battalion of RLT 26 to RVN as soon as practicable and requested that the battalion rotation program be suspended for the period June through August. On 13 May CINCPAC, after pointing out the serious disadvantages of deploying this battalion to I CTZ and concurrent suspension of the battalion rotation program, approved the request and directed CINCPACFLT to take the necessary action to deploy the remaining battalion to I CTZ.[43]

(S) Originally planning to withdraw the additional SLF by 1 September, CINCPAC, on 20 August, approved COMUSMACV's request to retain the 9th MAB elements in RVN until 1 November at which time a reevaluation would be made. In support of the request COMUSMACV reviewed the then current situation as follows:

> In spite of recent heavy losses there are indications that the enemy is preparing for resumption of offensive action in the DMZ area. The build-up currently underway there demonstrates that the enemy has not changed his overall strategy of gaining control of the northern two provincies, tying down US forces in the non-populated areas, and causing maximum attrition on friendly forces. Disruption of the national elections during the September/October period is also a known enemy objective. Reduction of friendly forces during this critical period will increase significantly the enemy opportunities to achieve this objective.[44]

(S) Three ARG/SLF operations had been conducted during the first three months of the year. With the arrival of the second SLF the tempo of operations increased considerably. III MAF planning concepts visualized employing the two SLFs in a series of sequential operations with specific target areas to be determined as the situation developed within I CTZ. During late April and May Operations BEACON STAR (Quang Tri) and BEAVER CAGE (Quang Tin) were followed at a one week interval, by BEAU CHARGER and BELT TIGHT. Operations BEAU CHARGER

and BELT TIGHT were executed in support of III MAF's first venture into the southern half of the DMZ (see Operation HICKORY). During June, July, and August ARG/SLF operations were conducted in the four most northern provinces in search-and-destroy roles in support of other operations and on independent missions.[45]

(S) BELT DRIVE and BEACON POINT (Thua Thien) were search-and-destroy operations conducted in late August and early September, and launched specifically to prevent enemy disruption of the RVN national elections of 3-5 September. BELT DRIVE, the first to land, was the 38th assault launching executed by Pacific Fleet units in RVN since March 1965. SLF-A next executed BALLISTIC CHARGE (Quang Nam/Tin) during the period of 16-22 September. SLF-B executed FORTRESS SENTRY (Quang Tri) on 17-25 September and upon conclusion of that operation deployed to the 9th Mar AO.[46]

(S) By 9 October the withdrawal of enemy forces from the DMZ area had reduced the threat to Con Thien and the intensity of attacks by fire had sharply decreased. There were continued indications of enemy buildup in BA-101 with Quang Tri City as the most likely objective for the enemy attack. To counter this threat, Operation MEDINA under the control of the 1st M[illegible] and in conjunction with ARVN forces was conducted in the [illegible]ang Nation Forest (BA-101) during the period 11-23 October. BASTION HILL was the name given to the administrative landing of SLF-A prior to their participation in MEDINA. While casualties inflicted on the enemy were light (58 KIA), base areas containing rice, weapons, and equipment were destroyed and the threat to Quang Tri City during the elections was removed.[47]

(S) On 13 November SLF-B, on Operation BADGER HUNT in Quang Nam Province, phased into Operation FOSTER under the direction of the 7th Mar. The two battalion force, supported by 258 tactical air sorties, accounted for 125 enemy KIA. Of special note, was the evacuation of 11,668 refugees prior to the termination of the operation on 30 November.[48]

(C) The final SLF operations of the year were FORTRESS RIDGE (21-24 December) seven miles NE of Dong Ha and BADGER TOOTH (26 December - 2 January) along the Quang Tri/Thua Thien border. On 27 December the Marines on Operation BADGER TOOTH encountered two companies of the 716th NVA Regt in a

heavily fortified village. The Marines overran the village after bitter night long fighting. The cost was 48 Marines KIA and 81 Marines WIA.[49]

(S) A total of 22 SLF operations were conducted during the year, accounting for 3,287 enemy KIA.[50]

II CTZ

(U) Largest of the Corps Zones, II CTZ encompasses 12 provinces and two broad geographical areas, the Central Highlands and the Central Lowlands. The Central Highlands, actually the southern plateau area of the Chaine Annamitique, can also be divided into two distinct parts. The northern part extends from the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot northward for about 175 miles, and varies in elevation from 600 feet to 1,600 feet, although individual peaks are much higher. Irregular in shape, with an area of about 5,400 square miles, this region is covered mainly with bamboo and tropical broad-leaf forests, interspersed with farms and rubber plantations. The southern portion, much of it lying above 3,000 feet elevation, and centered around Dalat, has about 4,000 square miles of usable land. Evergreens predominate at the higher reaches and bamboo at the lower elevations. Sloping gradually in the west to the Mekong Valley in Laos, the Highlands fall steeply in the east to the Central Lowlands. The fertile, extensively cultivated Lowlands extend as far inland as 40 miles in some areas, while in others they have been crowded into the sea by the encroaching Highlands. Rice is the principal crop, although considerable sugar cane is also grown. In Cam Ranh Bay, II CTZ had one of the finest natural deep-draft harbors in SEA.[51]

(U) Operations were highlighted in II CTZ by the continued progress of the 4th Inf Div in the Central Plateau, the highly successful operations by the 1st Cav Div (AM) in the northern Coastal Plains along the I/II CTZ boundary and the link up of the two ROK Divs TAORs along the coast. ARVN forces, mainly concerned with the RD effort, were active throughout the zone.[52]

(S) Operation THAYER II, which had commenced on 25 October 1966 in Binh Dinh Province, continued into 1967. The operation began as a two-brigade effort to exploit the success of the previous five weeks of almost continuous contact with the enemy in the rich Coastal Plain and the Kim Son and Soui Ca Valleys to the west. On 3 January the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div was placed under operational control of the 1st Cav Div (AM), which with six battalions was still oriented on the 610th NVA Div and other VC elements in the National Priority Area. Significant engagements were nil until late January as the elements of the 610th NVA Div avoided large unit encounters, but enemy personnel losses continued at a high rate. By 10 January the condition of the 18th NVA Regt had deteriorated to such an extent that the 610th NVA Div commander reported:

> After suffering repeated failures, soldiers and cadre of the 18th Regiment are demoralized and possess the intention of rallying to the enemy side. Order the various security sections to survey all cadre, especially the cadre from squad level to battalion commander level, to calm and improve the morale of the aforementioned disaffected men.

On 27 January heavy enemy contact occurred when elements of 2d Bn, 12th Cav executed an air assault into an area four miles NW of Bong Son, while conducting a reconnaissance in force, and encountered elements of the 7th and 8th Bns of the 22d NVA Regt. Elements of the 40th ARVN Regt were committed to blocking positions north and south of the operating area, and the combined force successfully trapped the enemy force which suffered 71 killed, while the friendly force lost four dead. During early February, the main areas of interest were the Kim Son and Soui Ca Valleys and the Oregon Trail SW of Bong Son. A major enemy attack may have been prevented when, on 6 Feb the 3d Bn, 40th ARVN Regt, encountered an estimated NVA battalion immediately east of Bong Son and engaged the enemy in a short but heavy fire fight that resulted in 81 enemy killed before he broke contact. Operation THAYER II terminated following the TET Truce (8-12 February). A total of 2,248 air sorties, 196 NGF missions, and 170 ARC LIGHT missions had been conducted in support of the operation, accounting for 1,757 enemy killed.[53]

(S) Operation PERSHING was initiated on 13 February in the same area immediately upon termination of Operation THAYER II. This operation was designed to locate and destroy VC/NVA forces in northern Binh Dinh Province. The 1st Cav Div (AM) initially employed one brigade of two battalions along the high ground west of the Bong Son Plains, and one brigade of two battalions in the vicinity of the Tam Quang by one battalion of the 3d Bde, and along the northern bank of the Lai Giang River by two battalions of the 40th ARVN Regt. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div screened along the southern portion of the AO, including Soui-Ca Valley--Cresent/Nui Mieu Mountain area, to protect the 41st ARVN Regt, supporting RD in the Phy My Valley. On 13 February the 1st and 3d Bns, 5th Cav engaged a battalion of the 22d NVA Regt in the coastal plains northeast of Bong Son, while on 18 February the two battalions engaged another battalion of the same NVA regiment on the high ground west of the Bong Son Plains. The increased pressure caused the enemy to fragment his forces, and subsequently action was taken to extricate him from the tunnel and bunker complexes around Bong Son. In the An Lao Valley the 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div encountered light and sporadic enemy contact during February. RVNAF had two operations in progress in the PERSHING AO: HOA XUAN 503, by the ARVN 40th Regt in the vicinity of Tam Quang and the Lai Giang River, and AVENGER, by a VNMC task force of three battalions.

(S) The 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) encountered light enemy contact on the Bong Son Plains during early March. On 19 March elements of the 1st Bn, 8th Cav encountered an estimated enemy battalion while searching the area; the battle opened with the enemy enjoying benefit of mass, and on 20-21 March elements of the 1st and 2d Bns, 5th Cav air-assaulted to reinforce the friendly forces. Heavy fighting continued until 212200H March when the enemy broke contact, leaving 159 dead on the battlefield. Meanwhile, in the Crescent area, the 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) fought two sharp engagements on 6-7 March against several reinforced companies from the 8th NVA Regt. The 2d Bde continued search-and-destroy operations on the Bong Son Plains for the remainder of March. The 3d Bde continued screening operations to the west of Bong Son, while 1st Bn, 7th Cav screened the flank of a VNMC task force operating in the An Lao Valley. The enemy continued to refuse to engage in decisive combat as units searched the area. Since the operation commenced, the enemy had suffered 969 killed.

(S) During April the major efforts were directed in the Bong Son Plains and the An Lao Valley areas, with additional emphasis on the Kim Son, Van Hoi, and Soui Ca Valleys and along Highway 506. Combined operations with the 22d ARVN Div in the Phy My Valley, Crescent area, and Cay Giep and Nuy Mu Mountains improved relationships between the forces and resulted in an increase in ARVN combat effectiveness. Enemy contact during the month was light and sporadic throughout the entire area of operations. Heavy fighting of short duration did occur in the An Lao Valley on 8 April, when elements of the 3d Bde engaged an entrenched enemy company. Fighting continued throughout the afternoon and early evening until the enemy broke contact and withdrew, leaving some 63 dead on the battlefield. While the friendly force continued to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy, friendly casualties were being caused by numerous mines, booby traps, and snipers on the Dong Son Plains.[54]

(C) In May the 1st Cav Div (AM) extended the PERSHING AO into southern Quang Ngai Province. The 1st Bde continued operations on the Bong Son Plains, while the 2d Bde was committed to the Kim Son, Soui Ca, and Phu My Valleys and the Crescent area, as the enemy still refused to commit his forces to a decisive engagement. The 3d Bde continued to clear the An Lao Valley and the Fish Hook area, without major contact. On 9 May the 1st Bn, 7th Cav was airlifted to Quang Ngai and began operations in the Nuoc Dinh-Cat Mit Valleys, where suspected bases and supporting elements of the 22d NVA Regt were located. Two sharp but brief enemy contacts were made, and on both occasions the enemy broke contact rather than risk defeat.

(C) The 1st Cav Div (AM) continued operations employing the three organic brigades until 24 June, when the 3d Bde was deployed to the Operation GREELY AO. Upon the withdrawal of the 3d Bde, the 1st Bde assumed responsibility for the An Lao Valley and the Nuoc Dinh-Cat Mit areas in southern Quang Ngai. The 2d Bde continued operations in the southern portion of the AO. By the end of June Operation PERSHING had accounted for 2,345 enemy killed.[55]

(C) During July and August, the 1st Brigade continued search-and-destroy operations to the north and west of Bong Son, while the 2d Bde conducted operations in the Nui Mien and Cay Giek Mountains and also in the Soui Ca, Van Hoi, and Highway 506 Valleys. After

completing operations to the west, the 3d Bde rejoined the division on 27 July. Numerous battalion-size clashes with enemy units had accounted for 3,090 enemy killed by the end of August.[56]

(S) Several significant contacts occurred between the men of the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the enemy in both the Bong Son and An Lao Valley areas during September. The cavalrymen added 413 enemy KIA to their mounting total. Again, in early October, the 3d Bde was moved to another zone. This deployment, to southern I CTZ, permitted the redeployment of additional Marine maneuver forces to northern I CTZ. By November the PERSHING operation had become essentially a holding action as two additional bns were deployed to the west in reaction to the enemy build-up around Dak To. However, significant successes continued to be achieved by 1st Cav Div (AM) units with a kill ratio of 19.7:1 during the month.[57]

(S) On 16 December, the CG I FFORCEV evidenced concern over the situation in the PERSHING AO. While recognizing the fact that II CTZ had, for the time being, been assigned an economy of force role he indicated that any further draw-down of his forces could have an adverse effect on the pacification program in Binh Dinh Province. In support of this opinion he stated that the increase of enemy activity in Binh Dinh Province during the past three weeks appears to have been a reaction to the draw-down of units in that area to reinforce Kontum Province during the Dak To battle.[58]

(S) Operation SAM HOUSTON, a continuation of border surveillance and search-and-destroy operations in the western Highlands of Pleiku Province, began 1 January. The 4th Inf Div (-), reinforced with one tank battalion, encountered no major enemy forces during January, but in early February enemy activity in the area took a sharp increase. This had been expected, as January intelligence reports had indicated that the 1st and 10th NVA Divs, with a combined strength estimated at 9,300 were in Cambodia near the Pleiku/Kontum border; comprised of six understrength regiments with a combat power equivalent to approximately ten full-strength combat effective battalions. Two battalion-size operations were conducted in the area during February, partially accounting for 314 enemy killed in the operation by the end of the month. The most productive contact during March occurred on 22 March, when the 1st Bn, 8th Inf engaged an estimated enemy battalion near the Cambodian border, resulting in 136 NVA killed. The 4th Inf Div terminated Operation SAM HOUSTON in the western highlands on 5 April with 733 enemy killed.

(TS) During the MACV Commanders' Conference on 2 April, CG 4th Inf Div discussed the objectives of Operation SAM HOUSTON and the enemy tactics and techniques during the operation:

> Due to the heavy jungle in the area, a road had to be constructed westward to establish a series of fire bases from which operations near the Cambodian border could be supported. As maneuver companies were airlifted into LZs those that hit strong enemy resistance would pull back while the area was subjected to massive air and artillery fire and then the maneuver units would go back again. Most contacts were of about battalion-minus size and enemy units were reported from the 32d, 8th, and 66th NVA Regts. Two brigades of the 4th US Inf Div were committed into southwest Kontum and swept to the east, establishing fire bases as they moved. An LRRP reported movement across the border and a battalion was inserted and made contact with the 95B and 101C Regts, resulting in 163 killed
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> There are so few suitable areas for LZ's that the enemy can pick them out and prepare them. One innovation was to tie several grenades to a board about ten feet long and place a charge under the center of the board. When the helicopters came in for a landing, the charge would be command detonated, throwing the grenades up into the midst of the helicopters where they would explode. In addition, command detonated mines were found in various patterns around LZ's with enemy soldiers in strong bunkers around the periphery. To overcome some of these techniques, the division first sends in a company on foot to clear the LZ or uses a LRRP to determine what may be in a planned LZ. Along the Cambodian border, the enemy has adopted certain tactics that are unique. Knowing the troop safety distance required for the ARC LIGHT strikes, the enemy moves quickly across the border to get within 3,000 meters of the border. During

> Operation PAUL REVERE, the enemy would follow-up his mortar barrages with a ground assault. In Operation SAM HOUSTON he rushed a couple of companies across the border, set up and fired his mortars rapidly, and then got back across the border. No major ground assaults have occurred for some time. Sometimes the enemy waits to try to ambush us when we go after the mortars. He uses trail watching teams to keep track of friendly forces and we've learned to move very cautiously after contacting a couple of small groups. Also, the enemy deploys his forces in defensive positions in such a way that almost any maneuver by friendly forces subjects troops to flanking fire from positions established in depth to the right and to the left. The best way we have found to counter these tactics is to pull back quickly after making solid contact, call in much air and artillery, and then go back in. 59

(C) On 6 April the 4th Inf Div began Operation FRANCIS MARION in the same area and the day following the termination of Operation SAM HOUSTON. During April the efforts to lure the enemy to a decisive engagement were to no avail, as he continued to refuse major encounters; however, small-unit battles in the northeastern Darlac and southern Phu Bon areas did account for 64 enemy killed and 38 individual and two crew-served weapons captured. During May the friendly forces continued vigilant surveillance of the plateau region and the Cambodian border to locate and destroy the enemy, and to hit food and ammunition caches, rest areas, and infiltration routes. Heavy losses were sustained by the enemy during the month, as his movements to evade contact and his concentration near the Cambodian border further decreased his combat effectiveness. Enemy contact was light and sporadic until 9 June, when the enemy initiated a series of mortar and rocket attacks on US and ARVN positions in the Pleiku area. The enemy continued to pursue his objective to disperse, tie down and destroy friendly forces in the western Highlands, and to disrupt the RD program. Intelligence reports indicated that enemy harassment forces were elements of the 407th Sapper Bn, the H-15 Local Forces Bn in Central Pleiku Province near Pleiku City, and elements of the B-3 Front in western Pleiku Province. The enemy forces' offensive action in western Kontum Province was believed by the intelligence media to be an attempt to divert friendly forces from western Pleiku.

Collation of detainees' statements and analysis of captured documents indicated that the B-3 Front was controlling the 24th NVA Regt making the main effort in western Kontum Province. The "cat and mouse" game continued through June as the enemy refused to commit his forces to any engagement that would produce decisive results. By the end of June the operation had accounted for 709 enemy killed.[60]

(S) Operation GREELY in the western Highlands of Kontum Province (immediately north of Operation FRANCIS MARION) had commenced on 17 June. Units primarily involved were the 173d Abn Bde, 1st Bn, 42d ARVN Regt, and the 5th and 8th ARVN Abn Bns. Operations GREELY and FRANCIS MARION continued to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy during the summer months. On 12 October the two operations were consolidated and renamed Operation MAC ARTHUR under the control of the 4th Inf Div. The AO would include the major portions of Kontum, Pleiku, and Phu Ban Provinces.[61]

(U) The initial three weeks of Operation MAC ARTHUR were relatively quiet ones. However, on 3 November, enemy units were encountered in NW Kontum Province in the vicinity of the town of Dak To. Dak To lies on a valley floor adjacent to a river and is surrounded on all sides by mountains. The peaks and ridges vary between 800-1,300 meters in height. The slopes are steep and are covered by tall, thick trees topped with double and triple canopies. During the period 4-13 November the battle centered around an area 10-15 miles W and SW of Dak To where US forces launched a series of attacks against enemy positions along the ridge lines. The first significant contact NE of Dak To occurred on 14 November where the 3d Bn, 42d ARVN Regt encountered an enemy force. The battle NE of Dak To continued throughout the 14th and 15th with two additional ARVN battalions committed to the action. On the 15th an enemy mortar attack on the Dak To airfield destroyed two C-130 aircraft and the major portion of an ammunition dump. On the 17th heavy fighting both SSW and NNE of Dak To began again. To the SSW and involving two battalions of the 173d Abn Bde, the fight centered around Hill 875. After five days of vicious fighting and several attempts to seize the crest, Hill 875 was secured at noon on the 23d. ARVN forces remained heavily engaged to the NNE during the same period and by the 20th had accounted for 247 eremy KIA.[62]

(U) A significant aspect of the operation was the tremendous logistic effort successfully carried out to reinforce the area with both troops and supplies. At the beginning of the action there were three US and two ARVN battalions in the area. During the next 15 days, reinforcements were lifted in by air and overland, bringing the force strength to nine US and six ARVN battalions. In addition to the normal equipment and supplies required, the destruction of the ammunition dump established the requirement for a sizeable emergency resupply of ammunition in order to insure success of the battle.[63]

(S) By 28 November, the CG 4th Inf Div had announced that only occasional sniper and mortar attacks had occurred during the past three days and that evidence indicated the enemy was leaving the area. Cumulative casualties for the Dak To area on 30 November were: US forces: 289 KIA against enemy losses of 1,222 KIA: RVNAF: 73 KIA against enemy losses of 417 KIA. Enemy activity remained at a low level during the final month of the year.[64]

(C) On 3 January the ROK Capital Div commenced Operation MA ENG HO 8, a regimental-size operation designed to extend the division TAOR southward along Highways 1 and 6B between Qui Nhon in Binh Dinh Province and Song Cau in Phu Yen Province. Initially enemy contact was light, even though prisoners captured identified all three battalions and the headquarters of the 95th NVA Regt and some elements of the 5th NVA Div as being in the area. Intelligence sources indicated that it was possible that the 95th NVA Regt had moved into the area; if so, they continued to avoid contact and showed no intentions of conducting large-scale offensive combat. Small-unit actions resulted in 158 enemy killed by the end of January. During the period 8-12 February the 26th Regt of the Capital Div searched the Canh Giao Valley seeking the enemy with little success. In addition to the valley search, two battalion-size operations were conducted during the month, killing 44 enemy. By the end of February the enemy had suffered 202 killed, while only two ROK troops had been killed. The operation terminated on 4 March, having accounted for 211 enemy killed.[65]

(S) One of the most profitable operations during the month of February was conducted by the 9th (White Horse) ROK Inf Div. Operation PENG MA I, launched on 29 January, was designed to eliminate elements of the 18B NVA Regt and local VC units in Khanh Hoa Province. The most significant characteristics

of the operation were the successful achievement of surprise and complete vertical encirclement of the objective area; the use of night cross-country movement of company-size forces to block the enemy withdrawal; rappelling of demolition teams from helicopters to the tops of hills to clear LZs from which the enemy could be attacked from better geographical and psychological positions; and concentration and massing of firepower on successive objectives. The ROK White Horse Div was supported during the operation by the 7AF, flying 89 tactical air sorties, and by the 17th Cmbt Avn Gp and the 5th Bn, 27th Arty. The operation terminated on 5 March, resulting in a total loss to the enemy of 433 personnel at the cost of 19 friendly killed. COMUSMACV congratulated the White Horse Division on a fine operation.[66]

(C) Since their arrival in-country ROK forces had enjoyed noteworthy success in battle. In order to identify the tactics and techniques employed to achieve these results arrangements were made for 32 US Army observers to accompany ROK forces during Operation OH JAC KYO. In their final report, the observers did not attribute ROK success to new ideas or methods, but rather to their application of well established principles. Tactics, they found, were in line with established US Army doctrine. Outstanding leadership, discipline, aggressiveness, training, patience, and the physical fitness of the ROK soldier were held to be factors contributing to their success.[67]

(S) Operation OH JAC KYO, the largest operation conducted by the ROKFV to date, was initiated on 8 March along the coast of central Vietnam. The operation, under the operational control of the CG ROKFV, involving seven maneuver battalions, was designed primarily to link up the ROK Capital and White Horse Division TAORs, whereby the ROKFV would become responsible for the coastal area from Phan Rang to a point north of Qui Nhon, releasing US forces in the AO for other missions. The area of operations encompassed four districts of Phu Yen Province, measuring about 60 km north to south and 25 km east to west. The area was populated by some 126,000 people, mostly villagers along Route #1 and the coast. The enemy forces in the area consisted of the 85th VC Bn, main force units of Phu Yen Province, four guerrilla companies, 16 local guerrilla platoons, and many hamlet guerrillas. The total enemy strength in the area was estimated to be 2,800, but a reinforcing capability from the 95th NVA Regt, located in the Kylo Valley, also existed.

(S) The ROK forces' objectives, in addition to the link up of the TAORs, was to destroy the enemy within the AO, to contribute to the complete opening of Highway 1, and to deny the enemy the area as a source of manpower and supplies. The concept of operations was to encircle and destroy the enemy by repeated and thorough searching of the battle area, to position friendly troops in such a manner as to protect the local population in support of the RD program, and to conduct intensive civic action and psychological operations in an effort to persuade the villagers in the area to support the GVN.

(S) In view of the vastness of the AO, Operation OH JAC KYO was conducted in three geographical phases to permit mass employment of friendly forces. The entire area was encircled gradually as the two divisions maneuvered units within their assigned areas of responsibilities. The operation successfully linked up the two ROK TAORs, and the ROK forces assumed responsibility for the coastal area from Phan Rang to a point 40 km N of Qui Nhon. The link-up was actually accomplished during the first phase of OH JAC KYO which terminated on 18 April, but Phase II commenced immediately, clearing the enemy from the AO, establishing strong operational bases, and turning over pacified areas to the GVN. The final results of the operation were: friendly: 44 KIA, 165 WIA; enemy: 940 KIA, 432 detained, 288 Hallers, 681 individual and 90 crew-served weapons captured. The kill-ratio was 21:1 in favor of the friendly forces. OH JAC KYO was the name, in an old Korean tale, of a bridge on which two lovers used to meet, and symbolized the meeting of the two ROK divisions.

(S) On 9 July, the ROK Army forces in Vietnam launched HONG KIL DONG, a search-and-destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. The code name of the operation was derived from a fictional Korean hero similar to Robin Hood--famous for his sense of justice. The operation involved elements from the 28th, 29th, and 30th Regts of the 9th ROK Div; also elements from the 26th Regt and the Cav Regt of the Cap ROK Inf Div. The opposing enemy forces in the objective area were the 95th and 183d NVA Regts, comprised of five battalions and the 85th VC Bn. Initial contact with the enemy was established on 9 July, as four battalions were air-assaulted into the objective area to establish support bases and commence search-and-destroy operations. The following day, the 28th Regt, supported by air and artillery, conducted airmobile assaults to continue exploitation of the initial contact. Significant contact with the enemy was maintained

by the ROK Army forces through vigorous and aggressive small-unit search-and-destroy operations. By 28 July 127 tactical air sorties and 18 ARC LIGHT missions had been employed in support of Operation HONG KIL DONG and 373 enemy had been killed by 28 July. COMUSMACV described the ROK Army actions in Operation HONG KIL DONG in the following manner:

> . . . Matching their tactical skill, the ROK Forces have continued to apply their unique Asian approach to the methodical pacification of their areas of responsibility.
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> The successes indicated above, particularly the favorable kill ratio and the amounts of captured material, are indicative of the high morale, professional competence, and aggressiveness of the ROK soldier and emulate the reports continually received on the courage and effectiveness of all ROK Forces in South Vietnam.

Numerous small unit actions highlighted the final month bringing the total enemy killed to 638, as the operation terminated on 28 August.[69]

III CTZ

(U) Though not popularly thought to be a part of the Mekong Delta, III CTZ nevertheless includes the northern part of the Delta. It is a low-lying area, most of it being under 625 feet elevation, and large portions lying as low as ten feet above sea level. The area is drained by three rivers--the Vam Co, the Saigon, and the Dong Nai--all of which are affected by tidal action. Differences of six feet between high and low tide on the northern reaches of the Saigon River have been recorded. While much of the land has been cleared for rice production, there are still large tracts of rain forest, especially in the east and north along the Cambodian border, and in the coastal provinces. Mangrove swamps are found in Gia Dinh Province, where the Saigon River meets the Nha Be River that leads into the sea. Operations in III CTZ continued to be mainly a matter of conducting cordon-and-search missions in response to available intelligence. Several highly successful operations were conducted during the year.[70]

(S) Operation FAIRFAX, initiated on 1 December 1966 by II FFORCEV in Gia Dinh Province, continued into the new year. During January the 199th Lt Inf Bde replaced the 4th Div Bn originally assigned and the operation continued with its original purpose of countering an increasing VC effort to reestablish their influence over the villages and hamlets surrounding Saigon. Emphasis continued to be placed on joint-US/ARVN operations characterized by the conduct of extensive night ambush patrols, river ambushes, and the seal-and-search of hamlets and villages.[71]

(S) During March a particular effort was placed on night ambush patrols and riverine operations. By the end of March 529 enemy had been killed. During April, 199th Lt Inf Bde units conducted ten air-mobile and 11 riverine operations and 1,523 ambush patrols. Thirteen villages/hamlets were the subject of cordon-and-search operations with a total of 11,079 persons screened. In addition, more than 250 search-and-destroy operations utilizing platoon to multi-company-size forces, were conducted throughout the FAIRFAX AO. The 4th Bn, 12th Inf continued to conduct combined operations with the 30th ARVN Rgr Bn in the Thu Duc AO, and the 3d Bn, 7th Inf initiated combined operations with the 3d ARVN Rgr Bn in the Binh Chanh AO, while the 2d Bn, 3d Inf conducted combined operations with the 2d and 6th VNMC Bns and the 3d ARVN Abn Bn in the Nha Be AO. Enemy losses for the month were 142 enemy killed.[72]

(C) The highlight of the May activities was a joint airmobile assault on 15 May in pursuit of enemy elements that had overrun an ARVN outpost; the battle lasted two days, resulting in 12 known enemy killed. On the night of 20 May, combined forces conducted a successful night airmobile insertion into the Tan Binh AO to conduct operations designed to protect the western approach to Tan Son Nhut Air Base. On 24 May a combined force also conducted airmobile assaults into the pineapple area located in western Binh Chanh. The units operated in the area until 28 May, and accounted for ten enemy killed and the capture or destruction of 530 bunkers. During May the brigade units established 1,898 small-unit-size ambushes, an average of 61.2 ambushes per night.[73]

(C) Commencing 1 June, "Restricted Movement Zones" were designated in the Thu Duc and Binh Chanh Districts to assist US/ARVN forces in improving the security of Gia Dinh Province and

the Capital Military District by impeding VC sampans infiltrating into the area. Restrictions were placed on the use of motorized sampans in certain specified zones, and in other zones sampans were prohibited entirely. Extensive daily coverage by FACs, artillery observers, and light fire teams enforced these restrictions and th program served to complement the night ambush operations in interdicting enemy LOCs in the FAIRFAX AO. Cumulative enemy losses at the end of June including 787 enemy killed and 230 individual weapons and 180 tons of rice captured. US losses to the same date included 84 killed and 496 wounded.[74]

(C) A joint operation was conducted on 27-29 July by the 4th Bn, 12th Inf and the 30th ARVN Rgr Bn which consisted of airmobile and river assaults in the Long Thanh District, supported by US and VNAF air strikes and two Navy SEAL teams employed on clandestine missions. Significant results included ten VC killed and 100 bunkers and structures destroyed. On 7 August elements of the 4th Bn and the 30th ARVN Rgr Bn conducted an airmobile assault into the Hoc Mon District. Upon landing, the friendly units received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated VC company concealed in the area east and west of the landing zone. The enemy concentrated his fire on the hovering helicopters, damaging 17 and destroying two. The 199th Inf Bde Ready Reaction Force moved to the contact area and linked up with the units in contact early in the evening. On 17 August Operation SHELBY was initiated as an offshoot of FAIRFAX to establish a forward patrol base from which future operations could be conducted. Air assaults were mounted into the Ly Van Manh area and search-and-destroy operations were conducted until construction on the company-size patrol base was completed. On 24 August the last units were extracted and the operation terminated. Cumulative enemy losses for FAIRFAX by the end of August included 957 VC killed and 247 weapons captured or destroyed.[75]

(C) During September operations were conducted in Gia Dinh, Long An, Bien Hoa and Hau Nghia Provinces. These operations restricted Viet Cong movement and interdicted supply routes. It had become progressively more difficult to make contact with the enemy in the FAIRFAX areas. On 24 September, combined operations with the 5th Rgr Gp were terminated, and each force conducted unilateral operations within the FAIRFAX area in preparation for the eventual withdrawal of the US forces from FAIRFAX.[76]

(C) Continuous patrolling kept enemy activity at a low level during October. In Mid-November the phase-out of US forces and the takeover of responsibility for the AO by ARVN forces began. The 199th Lt Inf Bde terminated Operation FAIRFAX on 14 December. The cumulative results of the operation were 1,043 enemy KIA at a cost of 118 friendly KIA. The following day Operation RANG DONG/PII began with three ARVN Rgr Bns, which had been operating in the area, assumung full responsibility for the FAIRFAX AO. An increase in terrorism and small unit contacts was noted during the December period.[77]

(S) Operation ALA MOANA, initiated on 1 December 1966 by the 2d Bde, 25th Inf Div, was designed as a search-and-destroy operation in Hau Nghia, Tay Ninh, and Binh Duong Provinces. Initially forces were deployed to deny the enemy access to the rice-producing areas adjacent to the Hobo Woods and the Boi Loi Woods complex, but in mid-December operations shifted in the Duc Hue and Duc Hoa Districts of Hau Nghia Province. The 2d Bde operated in these areas during January and February, adding the Filhol Plantation in Binh Duong Province. The primary purpose continued to be to locate and destroy the VC forces and interdict their lines of communication. On 22 February the 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div assumed the ALA MOANA mission and on 26 February a major contact occurred when elements of the 4th Bn, 9th Inf and the 3d Sq, 4th Cav engaged a strong enemy force in the Filhol rubber plantation, resulting in 114 enemy killed. During the period 1 December to the end of February the operation accounted for 325 enemy killed. The tempo of the operation slowed considerably during March and April as the operation continued to be centered in an area 40 km NW of Saigon. The operation's termination coincided with that of Operation JUNCTION CITY, 2400 hours on 14 May. The operation, supported by 1,229 tactical air sorties, accounted for 382 enemy killed, 666 suspects detained, and 93 individual and five crew-served weapons captured, while 47 US troops had been killed and 158 wounded.[78]

(S) During January 1967 one of the more significant battles of the year, Operation CEDAR FALLS was conducted in III CTZ in an area that for years had been dominated by the VC. Intelligence information indicated that the VC Military Region 4 HQ, controlling political, labor and propaganda operations as well as guerrilla activity in the Saigon/Cholon area, was located in the area. The

TAOR, codenamed "Iron Triangle," because of its geographical shape and known enemy fortifications, was located not far from Saigon. Bounded by the Saigon River which winds through War Zone "C," by Route 13 which runs north from Saigon to the Cambodian border, and the Than Dien Forest in Binh Duong Province, it covered some 60 square miles. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 165th VC Regt, the 9th VC Div and 1st NVA Div were in the area. Since previous operations in the area had failed to uproot this enemy stronghold, COMUSMACV decided to invade the enemy sanctuary in sufficient strength to insure destruction of enemy forces and installations, the primary objective being destruction of the VC Military Region 4 HQ. As the entire civilian population was to be evacuated, thus establishing the area as a specified strike zone and denying its future use as a VC support base, some 20,000 leaflets were air-dropped prior to the operation, advising the civilians that they would be assisted in leaving the area.

(S) On 8 January, following four days of concentrated bombing by B-52s, a multi-division force consisting of 20 infantry and armored units, under operational control of CG II FFORCEV moved into the area. The 1st Inf Div conducted a reinforced battalion air-mobile assault to seal and secure the populated village of Ben Suc, long a VC stronghold. Simultaneously, the 25th Inf Div moved two brigades into blocking positions south and west along the Saigon River to prevent exfiltration from the AO. The 1st Div did likewise on the eastern and southern flanks and, to complete the seal, followed with a six-battalion airmobile assault in the north. With the seal complete, two squadrons of the 11th Armd Cav Regt spear-headed an assault that split the "Iron Triangle" from the Thanh Dien Forestry Reserve. The II FFORCEV units, with a higher troop density than had been possible before, proceeded methodically to search the AO for 17 days. On 19 January US troops discovered a vast "underground city," believed to be a part of the VC headquarters complex from which terrorist operations in the Saigon/Cholon area were directed. The troops pushed through the labyrinth of underground passages and chambers carved beneath the jungle floor, some extending for four levels. Behind narrow well-camouflaged entrances, tunnels extending from 200 to 400 yards; deep inside were rooms that had been used for hospitals, mess halls, munitions factories, and living quarters. Cleverly-laid booby traps forced the troops to move slowly, seeking out the VC as they went.

(S) The operation, supported by 1,113 tactical air strikes and 96 ARC LIGHT missions, terminated on 26 January with 720 enemy killed. Also a new record total of 3,702 tons of rice was either captured or destroyed--the enemy lost enough rice to feed 13,000 troops for a full year--and almost 6,000 refugees had been relocated. The destruction of the enemy's 20-year investment in the development of a major command and control center, operating base, and logistic complex, would have far-reaching effects on the units of Military Region 4, and the removal of the inhabitants from the area would deny the VC labor, agricultural, and military manpower resources. It appeared from the almost total absence of enemy acts of terrorism, sabotage, or attacks of friendly posts in or around the city of Saigon during the operation, that the grasp of the infrastructure upon the former population of the "Iron Triangle" area had been severely impaired. COMUSMACV, in commenting on CEDAR FALLS during a Mission Council Meeting, felt that the operation had been very impressive in its results, being the first operation in which the number of enemy captured or detained equalled the number of enemy killed. He added that it had been a very disruptive operation for the enemy in the "Iron Triangle" area.79

(C) The largest battle of the war in RVN, to date, commenced shortly after dawn on 22 February, when a US/ARVN multi-division force, commanded by CG II FFORCEV, launched Operation JUNCTION CITY, a search-and-destroy operation designed, in three phases, to destroy COSVN and VC/NVA forces and installations in War Zone C, located in northern Tay Ninh Province. Intelligence reports had indicated that this 150-square-mile jungle plateau, 70 miles NW of Saigon, sheltered COSVN--the Viet Cong's Control Office for RVN. The first phase of the operation began with a coordinated airborne, airmobile, and ground assault in western War Zone C to seal off enemy escape routes into Cambodia and eastern War Zone C. The US 25th Inf Div was on the west employing three brigades, made up of nine US battalions and two VNMC battalions, to seal the area of operation from the west and south. The US 1st Inf Div was employed to seal the northern and eastern portion of the area, utilizing three brigades (eight battalions). One of these brigades, the 173d Abn, conducted one airborne and two airmobile battalion-size assaults in the northern portion of the 1st Inf Div zone. The airborne assault was the first US major combat parachute jump of the Vietnamese War and the first major one since the Korean War. The assault was conducted at the beginning of

the operation by the 2d Bn, 503d Abn Inf, which jumped at Katum, less than 7 kms from the Cambodian border, in order to seal the escape routes to the North. Following the airborne assault, the two remaining battalions of the brigade conducted airmobile assaults into four landing zones, completing the cordon of the escape routes. After the area was sealed, three battalions (two Armd Cav and one Mech Inf) attacked NW through the center of the operational area. The attacking forces commenced detailed searching of the entire AO and began providing protection for the construction of a CIDG camp, a C-130 airfield 27 km N of Tay Ninh City, and another C-130 airfield at Kantu, 40 km N of Tay Ninh City. There were two major actions during Phase I. The first occurred on 28 February, when the 1st Bn, 16th Inf, supported by air and artillery, engaged an estimated enemy battalion in a heavy fire fight that lasted from noon until near midnight, when the enemy broke contact leaving 167 killed on the battlefield; friendly losses were 21 killed and 29 wounded. The second major action occurred on the night of 10 March when an unknown number of enemy launched a coordinated mortar and ground attack on the 2d Bn, 2d Inf. The battle resulted in three friendly troops killed and 38 wounded, but a search of the area the next morning revealed that 197 of the enemy had been killed. Phase I of the operation was concluded at midnight on 17 March, with 20 US infantry battalions, 14 artillery battalions, and two VNMC battalions involved.

(C) Phase II was initiated at 180001H March, with a repositioning of forces to secure LOCs and cover the construction of another C-130 airfield and CIDG camp, 18 km NE of Tay Ninh City. Thus the area of the operation shifted to the eastern portion of War Zone C. The 1st Inf Div then attacked on two axis: one axis originated in the NE corner of the AO and moved west paralleling the Cambodian border, while the second axis originated in the AO and spearheaded the drive. Meanwhile the 25th Inf Div attached to the south to block the enemy movement to the west. All units involved, which now included 22 US infantry battalions, 13 artillery battalions, and one ARVN Rgr Bn, commenced search-and-destroy operations in assigned sectors. During the first hour of 20 March, one troop of the 3d Sq, 5th Cav, while securing Highway 13 in the vicinity of grid site XT 7846, was attacked by an estimated enemy regiment. Twenty air strikes and artillery supported the troop, and the remainder of the squadron entered into the battle; the enemy suffered 227 killed, while friendly losses were three killed and 63 wounded. On 21 March, an enemy force estimated to be a reinforced regiment,

employing heavy concentrations of mortar, RR, and SA fire, launched a human-wave ground attack on the 3d Bn, 22d Inf and the 2d Bn, 77th Arty. The attacking enemy forces had succeeded in reaching a prepared bunker line when the artillery fired Beehive rounds at point-blank range, shattering the attack. Three additional battalions joined the 3d Bn, 22d Inf in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy, and sporadic contact continued during the day. The enemy suffered 603 killed as a result of his tactical blunder in committing a human-wave assault against US artillery.

(C) The enemy launched an estimated battalion-size attack on the 1st Bn, 26 Inf about noon on 31 March. The 1st Bn, 16th Inf reinforced the attacked battalion and, supported by artillery, light fire teams, and tactical air, forced the enemy to break contact after a six-hour battle that left 28 dead. The next day at dawn the enemy resumed the attack, this time supported by mortar and 75mm artillery and in estimated regimental strength. Heavy artillery and air strikes were placed on the attacking enemy forces and by 0900 the attack had been beaten off and the enemy commenced to withdraw. The 1st Bn, 2d Inf launched an attack through the 1st Bn, 26th Inf that was supported by artillery and air, and which caused the enemy withdrawal to be made in complete disorder. The two-day cumulative results were 581 enemy killed, while friendly casualties were 11 killed and 77 wounded. On 1 April 21 US infantry battalions and 12 artillery battalions were committed to search-and-destroy operations in JUNCTION CITY. Thus far a total of 164 enemy base camps of various sizes, up to one capable of supporting an enemy division, had been found and destroyed in War Zone C.

(C) Phase III of the operation commenced in mid-April; this phase logically could have been considered a new operation, but for security reasons it continued as JUNCTION CITY. During this phase a "floating brigade" composed of an infantry battalion and, alternately, a mechanized or an armored battalion of the 25th Inf Div, plus an ARVN infantry battalion, operated throughout War Zone C. Resupply was accomplished almost entirely by air, utilizing both parachute and helicopters as the brigade roved the area. The object of Phase III was to prevent the enemy forces from re-establishing in War Zone C. Operation JUNCTION CITY, which had begun as a multi-division search-and-destroy operation on 22 February in War Zone C, terminated at 2400 hours on 14 May. The operation, which had tapered off as the enemy contact decreased,

was concluded as a multi-battalion-size battle, under operational control of the 25th Inf Div. During the combined ground-air operation, 2,728 enemy were kiled, 97 suspects were detained, and 491 individual and 100 crew-served weapons captured. The Air Force supported the operation with 4,161 tactical air sorties. Shortly after the operation an enemy overlay was captured with the imposing title of "Counteroffensive Against Operation Junction City, 21 February to 15 April." Most interesting of all the exaggerated claims listed on the overlay was the claim of 13,500 enemy killed, while in fact 282 friendly troops had been killed during the period 22 February to 14 May. Of major significance, Operation JUNCTION CITY was the largest airmobile operation of the war to-date. D-Day was the largest single-day helicopter operation in the history of US Army aviation. A total of 2[illegible] helicopters was used in helicopter assaults and resupply of eight infantry battalions. During the entire operation 92 aircraft were hit by ground fire and six of which were lost to hostile fire. Flying over 80,000 sorties and logging 38,400 flying hours Army aviators airlifted over 19,000 tons of resupply. In the first six days of the operation, the 12th Combat Aviation Group alone transported more than 23,000 troops and delivered more than 3,900 tons of supplies. In Operation JUNCTION CITY the concept of air mobility firmly established itself as one of the decisive factors in our ability to meet and defeat the enemy.[80]

(C) In Long An Province, Operation ENTERPRISE, a long-term operation, was initiated on 13 February. The units involved were from the 9th Inf Div: the 3d Bde and the 3d Bn, 39th Inf operating from Rach Kien, and the 2d Bn (Mech), 60th Inf operating from Binh Phuoc. The division elements were well received by the local nationals, and the Hoi Chanh increase appeared proportional to the influence of the US troop strength. The combined US/ARVN and RF/PF operations, conducted on an almost daily basis, were highly successful. The resulting trend indicated that the VC was finding it increasingly difficult to elude contact with friendly forces. By the end of March, operations in support of ENTERPRISE had accounted for 369 enemy killed.

(C) During the period 9-11 April the friendly forces encountered elements of the 506th VC Bn in the vicinity of Rach Kien when two companies of the 3d Bn, 39th Inf were airlifted into LZs in the area; both companies were subjected to heavy SA

and AW fire upon landing. Concurrently, the 2d Sq, 10th ARVN Div had also encountered the enemy while attacking an objective approximately two km NE of the US units. Utilizing air mobility to maneuver company-size units into position the aforementioned units, together with elements of the 2d and 3d Bns of the 60th Inf, were able to encircle the enemy forces in the area near Rach Kien along the Rach Dia River. The 5th Bn (Mech), 60th Inf HQ and one company was moved from Binh Phuoc to Rach Kien to assist in and control the battle. As the enemy attempted to escape to the west, the brigade commander shifted the battle to the west by rapidly redeploying his forces. The entire operation during this period was characterized by company-size operations, relentlessly searching for and finding enemy troops. The rapid maneuvering of small units into blocking positions and positions from which search-and-destroy sweeps could be executed kept the enemy confused, and the results of the three-day encounter revealed that 247 VC had been killed before contact was broken on 11 April. The enemy forces in the area avoided major engagement with friendly forces during May, but a number of small contacts resulted in 123 VC killed. In June the 3d Bde elements operated in conjunction with the 2d Bde (Mobile Riverine Force) on a protracted search-and-destroy operation in eastern Long An Province. Constant pressure was maintained on the VC forces as friendly night activity was increased and numerous "buddy" operations with ARVN and PF/RF elements were conducted. Contact with large VC forces became less frequent, indicating an apparent enemy desire to avoid friendly forces.[81]

(C) Contact with the enemy was to remain at a low level for the remainder of the year. ENTERPRISE produced excellent results in support of pacification. Where abandoned villages once decayed and empty school rooms deteriorated, there was now a resurgence of normal life. By year's end, the operation had accounted for 1,497 enemy KIA.[82]

(C) In May the 25th Inf Div had launched three search-and-destroy operations in the Tay Ninh/Hau Nghia/Binh Duong Provinces which were to continue for the next seven months. KOLE KOLE by the 2d Bde on 13 May; BARKING SANDS by the 1st Bde on 17 May; and DIAMOND HEAD by the 3d Bde on 17 May, while not particularly impressive in numbers of enemy killed, were representative of the major share of our effort in Vietnam.

Numerous small unit actions led to increased friendly influence over the country-side. The three operations were terminated on 7 December.[83]

(C) The following day, SARATOGA, a search-and-destroy operation in the southern half of the division zone, was initiated. On the same date, the major strength of the 25th Inf Div was committed to Operation YELLOWSTONE, in War Zone C. Through the end of the year, YELLOWSTONE was highlighted by frequent enemy mortar attacks, but light ground action. Recent discoveries indicated that War Zone C was still being used by the enemy as a major logistical area.[84]

(C) During the year, extensive jungle clearing operations, using Rome Plows, were conducted in conjunction with operations such as LAM SON 67, SANTA FE I, BARKING SANDS, and ATLANTA. These operations have been most successful in restricting enemy movement and thereby in reestablishing civilian commercial activities.[85]

(C) West of Saigon, primarily in Phuoc Tuy Province, the Australian and New Zealand forces continued to extend their influence over the surrounding countryside. Continual search-and destroy operations were conducted within their AO as well as frequent joint operations with ARVN and US forces. After participation in the initial phase of Operation SANTA FE I, the Australian Task Force commenced Operation FORREST, on 23 November. This operation, aimed at protecting the rich rice harvest, continued into the new year. The 2,300 man Thai Regt (Queens Cobra) arrived in their assigned AO in southern Bien Hoa Province on 21 September. Operational training had commenced immediately. Operation NARASUAN was initiated in the same area on 20 October and continued through the end of the year.[86]

(U) Two enemy initiated actions occurred in northern III CTZ near the villages of Song Be and Loc Ninh during October and early November which clearly demonstrated the fighting spirit of the ARVN troops and the local paramilitary forces.

(U) Shortly after midnight on the morning of Friday, 27 October, four km S of Song Be, Phuoc Long Province, the 88th NVA Regt attacked the command post of the 3d Bn, 9th ARVN Inf Regt.

The attack began when more than 200 rounds of mortar and RR fire began raining on the tiny Vietnamese Army installation. About one-half hour after this barrage, three waves of attacking soldiers from the 88th Regt left the cover of surrounding jungle and swamp to rush the outpost. Three times before they finally gave up, just before dawn, the NVA attackers made it to the perimeter of the outpost. Each time they were driven back by the stout defense of the ARVN troops together with their supporting fires. Although the exact strength of the attacking force could not be determined, it is estimated that the ARVN defenders were outnumbered at least 4:1. When the enemy attack was finally broken at 0400H and the enemy began to fall back, a 50-man group of the Vietnamese charged out of their outpost and pursued the enemy until they disappeared into the jungle. The enemy had suffered 134 KIA and the loss of 37 individual and 20 crew-served weapons as opposed to friendly losses of 13 killed.[87]

(U) At 0115H on the morning of 29 October, elements of the 273d VC Regt initiated a mortar attack on Loc Ninh District town in northern Binh Long Province. Loc Ninh is situated 13 km S of the northern border between II CTZ and the border of Cambodia, and was defended by three CIDG companies, a regional force company and a popular force platoon. The enemy fired a barrage of 97 rounds of mixed caliber, 120mm and 82mm mortar on the subsector and CIDG compounds. The mortar barrage was followed by a heavy ground attack with the enemy troops firing small arms and B-40 rockets. The ground attack force succeeded in penetrating the outer defenses of the subsector headquarters, and at 0220H occupied the outer perimeter of the compound. At 0645H, the rapid reaction force comprised of two of the local CIDG companies was committed to repel the enemy. At 0900H, two companies of the 5th ARVN Div reinforced the CIDG companies and expelled the enemy from the subsector compound. Sporadic enemy contact continued in the vicinity of the airfield all morning. At 1515H the enemy broke contact, leaving behind 148 dead. Most of the dead were killed by ground fire from the defenders and the ARVN reaction force. During the same period of time, the CIDG camp about two km SW of Loc Ninh was attacked by a heavy concentration of mortar fire. This attack ceased at about 0250H. During this attack, the CIDG casualties were light. The CIDG companies discussed previously, with their advisors, then initiated the counterattack to relieve the elements that were under

attack in the subsector compound. Other scattered contacts on 29 October left an additional 12 enemy KIA. Throughout 30 October, sporadic and harassing attacks were made by the enemy. The next serious attempt to capture Loc Ninh District town began with a mortar attack shortly after midnight on 31 October. The nearby CIDG camp was attacked at the same time with SA and mortar fire. The main ground attack by about 1,500 enemy was launched at 0407H against the subsector compound and the CIDG camp. The enemy was successful in penetrating the subsector perimeter at about 0500H in the morning. Once again the ARVN defenders expelled the enemy from their positions. The die-hard efforts of the enemy in his three-day initial effort to capture the Loc Ninh District cost him 371 men killed and a large amount of weapons and materiel lost. The enemy 371 killed are in addition to the 369 enemy killed in this action to 4 November by US forces. The US forces committed early to the action continued search-and-destroy operations throughout the area as ARVN forces maintained local security. 452 CAS sorties and eight B-52 strikes had been flown in support of operations. By 8 November the major fighting was over with a total of 852 enemy killed at a cost of 50 friendly killed.[88]

IV CTZ

(U) Known simply as "The Delta," IV CTZ embraces the low-lying alluvial plain formed by the Mekong River system in RVN. Except for isolated peaks, nowhere does the land rise over ten feet above sea level. The region's fertile soil is intensively cultivated, with rice being the chief crop. Canals criss-cross the area, and dense rain forests cover its western portion, while mangrove swamps abound along the coast. The zone is divided into three generally equal areas of operations with responsibility assigned for each to the 7th, 9th and 21st ARVN Divs. Major unit operations within the zone were oriented to the destruction of VC main and provincial units and principal bases. Unlike the other CTZs the primary responsibility for ground operations rests with the several ARVN commanders. However, during the year the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), with elements of the 9th US Inf Div and USN TF 117, began to play an important role in this zone.[89]

(S) A representative ARVN operation occurred when the 21st ARVN Div launched Operation DAN CHI 285B, in Phong Dinh Province, on 12 April. During the first day of the operation enemy contact was light, as ARVN units searching the area encountered only scattered resistance; however, action increased the second day after intelligence information revealed that the enemy forces were located in a hamlet along the Saintenoy Canal, about ten km away. The 44th ARVN Rgr Bn was helilifted into the suspected enemy strong-hold and immediately was subjected to intense enemy fire from inside the hamlet and was unable to advance. Air support, including armed helicopters and fighter bombers, was called in to suppress the enemy fire, which came from well-established positions consisting of trenches and bunkers. Before the enemy position was seized by the attacking force, four more ARVN battalions were airlifted into the area and joined the battle against the well-protected enemy force that was employing 81mm mortars and AW (K-50 machine guns). The hamlet (Hung Thanh) was captured early in the morning of 14 April, as the enemy withdrew, leaving 243 dead. The ARVN forces made an effort to airlift elements into blocking positions to prevent the enemy escape, but no further contact with the fleeing VC was established. The advisors with the 31st and 33d ARVN Regts praised the units for their courage and initiative in carrying the fight to the enemy. Final results of the operation were: friendly: 57 KIA, 230 WIA (6 US); enemy: 243 KIA, 50 det, 19 individual and two crew-served weapons captured.[90]

(C) CORONADO, a search-and-destroy operation in Dinh Tuong Province, was initiated on 4 June by the 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div as a part of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF). Initial efforts produced only minor contacts, but techniques and operational procedures of the 2d Bde and the USN TF 117 were further developed toward a highly-maneuverable and potent fighting force. A phase of riverine operations beginning on 19 June marked the first major action involving the entire assets of the MRF, when, in response to intelligence of continuous enemy presence in Long An Province, the MRF, in conjunction with the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div, conducted a riverine assault into that province. The MRF landed two infantry battalions, while the 3d Bde provided blocking forces. The first day, a significant encounter took place, resulting in 256 enemy killed. Intelligence from the battle area indicated that the 5th VC Bn, Nha Be District, the enemy unit

involved, was in the process of undergoing training exercises at the time of the engagement. During July eight major MRF actions were conducted in coordination with two battalions of the 46th ARVN Inf, the 3d VNMC Bn and US Navy Combined TF 117. Although frequent throughout the month, contacts usually involved only small groups of enemy. Upon termination of the operation on 25 July a total of 478 enemy had been killed. 91

(C) CORONADO II was initiated on 27 July as a result of hard intelligence indicating an enemy buildup west of My Tho in the same (Dinh Tuong) province. Initial contact was made with a battalion-size enemy force in the Cam Son Secret Zone approximately 29 km W of My Tho late on 29 July. Early on 30 July a VNMC Task Force was committed to this same general area and remained heavily engaged for the next 48 hours. The 1st Bde (-) of the 25th Inf Div was committed to blocking positions to the east of the VNMC Task Force. This was the heaviest contact of the operation and accounted for the majority of the 441 enemy killed. Later intelligence reports indicated that, had the operation lasted a few days longer, large numbers of the enemy would have surrendered. The operation terminated on 3 August. 92

(C) CORONADO III (5-17 August) was conducted in the Rung Sat Special Zone of III CTZ. Contact was sporadic and one VC was killed. CORONADO IV (19 August - 9 September) followed in Long An, Go Cong, and Kien Hoa Provinces in coordination with the An Dan Brigade (ARVN). At one point helicopters from the 334th Avn Co engaged an enemy unit killing 45 of the 81 killed during the entire operation. 93

(S) CORONADO V was conducted in the swampy Delta area both north and south of the My Tho River in Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces about 50 miles SW of Saigon. The operation (11 September - 8 October) was characterized by light scattered actions with the three major contacts in which the combined force killed 134, 69, and 94 enemy respectively. Upon termination of the Operation the force was immediately deployed to the Rung Sat Special Zone (III CTZ) for Operation CORONADO VI. This operation consisted of waterway patrols with forays ashore to sweep suspected enemy positions. Terminated on 21 October, the operation had accounted for three enemy killed. 94

(S) On 22 October, during a conference with the CG II FFORCEV, COMUSMACV stated that he had tasked COMNAVFORV to provide security for the Rung Sat Special Zone and that II FFORCEV would not conduct additional operations there unless personally approved by him.[95]

(C) CORONADO VII commenced on 21 October in Long An Province. Enemy contact was very limited with one killed and the operation terminated on 23 October. CORONADO VIII was launched in conjunction with the Royal Thai Regiment and the elements of 3-5 Cavalry on 27 October against T-10 base headquarters, and the operation ended two days later with a total of three Viet Cong killed. CORONADO IX commenced on 2 November in Dinh Tuong Province. The most significant action of the operation occurred on 4 December. A TF, composed of the 3d Bn, 47th Inf and the 5th VNMC Bn, was proceeding north on the Rach Ruong. The troops were aboard armored troop carriers (ATC) of the Navy's River Assault Flotilla. At 0735H, approximately eight miles NE of Sa Dec, the VNMC Bn, in the lead, was hit by SA fire from the west bank. The fire was returned and the force continued up river. About ten minutes later the unit came under heavy small arms, RR and B-40 rocket fire. The VNMC Bn Cmdr, boated with the advance elements, immediately ordered his units to attack the enemy positions. The battalion beached under fire and at once became engaged with the dug-in, well fortified enemy force. The close proximity of the enemy prevented the use of air support. A quickly coordinated four-company assault was launched over-running the enemy position. Throughout the rest of the day VNMC units continued to sweep the area of contact. The enemy, who by now were being pressed from the north, south, and east by US units as well as the VN Marines, began withdrawing to the west in an attempt to escape. Contact ranged from heavy to light until all contact was lost at approximately 1800H. The VN Marines had lost 40 KIA while inflicting 154 KIA on the enemy.[96]

(C) The remainder of the year was relatively quiet for the MRF. On 27 December the 5th VNMC Bn was relieved from participation with the MRF by the JGS and returned to their base camp in the Thu Duc area. By 31 December, 346 enemy KIA had been accounted for, one half of the total by the VNMC Bn.

(C) On 8 December the 21st ARVN Inf Div launched Operation DAN CHI 315C in Chuong Thien Province. The original AO had been changed as a result of intelligence confirming the location of the 303 MF Bn and the V-Minh 10 LF Bn along the Kinh O Mon Canal six miles NNW of Vi Thanh. The first day of the operation resulted in a smashing victory and the biggest single day in the Delta history. Selected units were helilifted into blocking positions N, S and NE of the canal. 2/9 ARVN Div maneuvered up the canal from the SW. The attack was supported by artillery, tactical air, and two AC-47 aircraft. The first days action ended with 365 enemy KIA. The operation was terminated on 10 December with a total of 456 enemy KIA at a cost of 73 ARVN KIA.[98]

AIR OPERATIONS

Introduction

General

(S) The utilization of air assets in 1966 had emphasized their value in all areas of the air war--NVN, Laos, and RVN. The areas were not distinct from one another, but rather were inseparably joined. The air effort against NVN and in Laos more closely approximated the conventional utilization of air assets, whereas the continual adaptation and evolution of air tactics to the counterinsurgency type of warfare continued throughout the year in RVN. The in-country air effort made its vital contribution toward achieving an objective whereby "military operations against the aggressors in Vietnam should be pursued to the point where they will be prepared to make major concessions in exchange for relief from the pressures being applied against them." This well postulated objective was projected to continue through 1967 and was felt to be as appropriate as it had been in 1966.[98]

(S) In January COMUSMACV indicated the character of the war to be pursued in 1967. "While 1966 was a year basically characterized by holding actions and spoiling attacks, 1967 must be a year of general offensives by which we increase the momentum of our success." Two factors dictated the employment of air assets--sortie rates and aircraft inventory. The sortie rate for the year fluctuated as the weather and operational demands dictated, but the trend was, nevertheless, upward. Aircraft assets reflected the increased tempo both by increased numerical strength and by the fact that introduction of newer aircraft, plus modification of older aircraft for increased combat effectiveness, added to the aggregate total.[99]

(S) By the end of 1967 the US/FWMAF had 6,069 aircraft stationed in RVN, Thailand, or on US Navy aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. This did not include the SAC B-52s stationed elsewhere, but whose firepower could be added to that immediately available for use against the VC/NVA forces. The number of aircraft by service was:

USAF	-	1,702
USMC	-	585
USN	-	399
USA	-	3,004
VNAF	-	371
RAAF	-	8
		6,069

The figures listed above included both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. All of the US Army inventory aircraft, except for approximately 300 light observation and utility cargo aircraft, were helicopters.[100]

In-Country

Tactical Air

(S) The air effort in RVN during 1967 was in direct support of ground operations. The magnitude of tactical air support is indicated in the following table. Figures do not include B-52 sorties. Strikes by the RAAF are included in the USAF figures.[101]

1967	USAF	USN	USMC	VNAF
Jan	8,436	33	3,524	2,679
Feb	7,682	57	3,940	2,143
Mar	9,786	206	4,374	2,788
Apr	9,284	49	4,240	2,787
May	9,937	103	6,160	2,644

1967	USAF	USN	USMC	VNAF
Jun	9,267	12	5,142	2,738
Jul	10,245	0	5,711	2,709
Aug	9,896	2	4,820	2,579
Sep	10,427	16	4,605	2,516
Oct	11,073	4	3,473	2,214
Nov	10,354	12	3,419	1,792
Dec	10,236	31	3,364	2,059
TOTAL	116,623	525	52,772	29,648

(TS) JCS requested on 12 April suggestions for a possible increase in B-52 and tactical air sortie rates to support MACV's summer campaign. I CTZ, being the area of heaviest activity, required the greater augmentation. The overload on USMC air assets underscored the necessity for additional units.[102]

(TS) COMUSMACV added his support to the argument for increased air assets in I CTZ. The standard planning factor for tactical air support, based upon required sorties/battalion/day, was five. Over the period 1 January - 30 April USMC aircraft had achieved a factor of 8.5, and from 1-27 May it had risen to 11.5. This, however, still fell behind the sortie request rate. This trend was expected to continue until September if augmentation was not forthcoming. In addition to using the two Japanese-based USMC squadrons, COMUSMACV requested a USAF F-105 squadron from Okinawa and an F-100 squadron from CONUS on a temporary basis. Special operations such as HICKORY could well employ additional sorties from USN assets.[103]


(TS) Operation HICKORY, initiated on 18 May in I CTZ, emphasized the concentrated use of air assets. USN, USMC, and USAF joined to deliver 1,082 sorties in the three-day period 18-20 May. In early 1967 ARC LIGHT support was requested for

Operation CEDAR FALLS in western Binh Duong Province, where major units of II FFORCEV conducted a multi-division-size operation against the VC MR 4 fortifications, base camps, and logistic operations. ARC LIGHT employment began D-2 and extended to termination of the operation to counter any threat that might develop in the III CTZ.[104]

(S) In response to CINCPAC's request that the FY68 Force Requirements be reviewed with the possibility of revising current Combat Planning Factors, COMUSMACV advanced some cogent arguments counter to the apparent trend toward applying finite planning and programming factors:

> Political constraints have prevented carrying the war on the ground to the enemy outside of RVN. Fortunately, these constraints have not prevented in-country air power from operating outside RVN; thus, the military essential requirement to interdict the enemy as far as possible from the ground battle area is fulfilled.... Limiting the sortie generated capability of in-country tactical air to that required to support in-country operations would equate to military validation of political constraint by confining air power within a narrow political boundary rather than allowing it to strike the enemy wherever he can be found. The resulting increase in enemy support, and infiltration levels would be reflected in mounting friendly casualties and could prolong the war indefinitely.[105]

(S) In April FWMAF were augmented by addition of eight RAAF Canberra B-57s. It was planned initially to employ the RAAF squadron under COMBAT PROOF (subsequently COMBAT SKYSPOT) procedures against base camps, storage areas, LOCs, enemy communications, and related targets.[106]



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Increased B-52 Employment

(S) The consideration for forward basing of the B-52s at other than Anderson AFB, Guam was well underway in the 3d Qtr of 1966. At that time the JCS, in coordination with CINCPAC and USAF, was planning for deployment of 15 B-52s into RVN. COMUSMACV's remarks concerning the plan pointed out that discernible security problems could be foreseen with RVN basing; mutual interference problems from B-52 launch, climb, and recovery were predictable; the piaster impact was estimated to be in the vicinity of 50 million; beneficial occupancy date (BOD) was estimated as June 1967 rather than the preferred February date; and therefore U Tapao, Thailand, was the recommended base for the deployment. CINCPAC also concurred in the fact that B-52s would be an especially attractive target, and Communist propaganda which would result from acts of sabotage would make RVN-based ARC LIGHT forces a particularly desirable target.[108]

(S) B-52 strikes consisting of three to 12 aircraft were called upon increasingly to generate additional numbers of sorties to meet requests from field commanders. The key to meeting such demands was the ability to bed down additional aircraft at U Tapao, where the response time to requests would be much shorter than from Guam. [redacted]

(S) On 4 March JCS notified CINCPAC of the RTG acceptance of U Tapao as a B-52 base, and that the implementation of the initial increment of B-52s would bear the nickname POKER DICE. COMUSMACV was notified that SAC desired to implement operations at the earliest date to effect a substantial reduction in manpower and airframes. SAC felt that regardless of a 60-day late start, the same savings could be realized if the previously estimated growth rate of operational level was achieved. It was intended that the initial operation consist of three aircraft launched from Anderson AFB, bombing enroute over RVN and recovered at the U Tapao base.

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SAC noted that the necessary B-52 equipment on the CONUS west coast would be in place by 1 April. On 11 March CINCPAC announced that construction had begun on facilities for initial deployment of three aircraft in approximately 30 days, and that units associated with support of this deployment should prepare for movement. 110

(S) The 1967 ARC LIGHT 800/month sortie rate was established as early as 16 June 1966. At that time it was noted that "the increased explosive power available from maximum loaded B-52 aircraft was recognized and considered by MACV in establishing the CY67 sortie requirements." There were many and diverse factors behind the rationale for requesting the 800/month sortie level. COMUSMACV felt that the increased confidence of ground commanders in using the ARC LIGHT force either for direct support or preparation of a target area in conjunction with ground operations would in turn increase the number of valid target requests. He noted that the ARC LIGHT program had been dynamic in nature since the first strike in June 1965. It was noted that the rule of thumb of striking base area targets with three aircraft per square km was an absolute minimum, while six aircraft per square km would obtain a proper saturation. Furthermore, a controlled sortie level should remain flexible in response to surges in offensive and defensive military operations by the enemy as well as ourselves. Therefore, the establishment of a sortie level at 450, 600, or 800 each month predicated on a maximum aircraft load factor was not necessarily applicable in a counterinsurgency situation. The size, composition, and topography of each individual target had to be considered in conjunction with the expected damage level and purpose of the strike, when applying a force level. COMUSMACV insisted that the QUICK RUN force would be increasingly in demand and that this force should be in addition to the current program and not at its expense. 111

(S) At the beginning of 1967 JCS notified CINCPAC that sufficient BLU-3B munitions assets were on hand at Guam to support the calendar year ARC LIGHT requirements. In fact, assets on hand or enroute to Guam provided for an added 250 sorties requirement in excess of the scheduled rate. Referring to the increasing number of available B-52 aircraft, CINCPAC informed COMUSMACV on 6 January that additional forces would deploy to Guam between 10-20 January and from the 725 sorties authorized for January the sortie rate would increase to 800 in February and remain at that level thereafter. 112

(TS) Toward the end of April it became apparent that the buildup of tactical air resources had definite limitations, due to available basing (both in-country and out) and the limited availability of drawdown assets from the USG worldwide commitments. Yet the increased requirements for air, generated by increased numbers of ground operations and by the ever-increasing necessity to supplement the interdiction of infiltration into RVN, demanded an increase in available sorties from some source. Augmented by COMUSMACV's report to JCS, 21 April, on ARC LIGHT strike results, a 7AF analysis of B-52 employment in an interdiction role suggested a possible solution. 7AF felt that an increase to 1,000 sorties/month by 30 June 1967 was reasonable and could be employed effectively using forces currently on hand. Under the 800 sorties/month program since the first of the year, ARC LIGHT forces had launched sorties against out-country targets under the following percentage distribution: January - 15 percent, February - 12 percent, and March - 28 percent. Any augmentation of tactical air assets was confronted with a direct relationship to the ability of bases in RVN and Thailand to bed down additional forces.[113]

(TS) After no more time had passed than necessary for B-52 operations to get into full swing at U Tapao, the request went out to consider raising the ARC LIGHT sortie rate from the 800 to 1,200 a month. As subsequently revealed, U Tapao immediately jumped into the lead as the most favorably considered contender for handling an increase in the number of B-52s. Three options involving B-52 and KC-135 basing at such points as Anderson, U Tapao, Kadena (Okinawa), and CCK (Taipei) were considered. The 800 sortie/month level was achieved with 26 B-52s at Anderson (350 sorties), 15 B-52s at U Tapao (450 sorties), and 29 KC-135s at Kadena. To adjust the force levels at these three sites--Anderson 23 B-52s (300 sorties), U Tapao 30 B-52s (900 sorties), and Kadena 26 KC-135s--impressed CINCPACAF as offering the optimum capability. This also offered the ability to amortize readily any necessary construction costs in light of the increased operating costs and runway construction that might be required at Kadena to accept continuous B-52 operation. The questions concerning responsiveness, feasibility, and flexibility were deferred to MACV and SAC for opinions.[114]

(S) In the early fall of 1967 COMUSMACV requested an evaluation of the effectiveness of ARC LIGHT missions, specifying the following

conditions: (1) strikes in direct support of ground operations; (2) strikes used as spoiling attacks against enemy concentrations; (3) strikes against known base areas; and (4) strikes used primarily against interdiction points and areas to curtail enemy resupply and troop movements. In November the CG III MAF responded. He pointed out that his Command had made limited use of ARC LIGHTs as preparatory strikes in support of ground operations, however, extensive use was obtained as the situation warranted during operations. "ARC LIGHT strikes have proven particularly effective in the attack on known troop concentrations and hard targets, such as fortifications, supply/storage areas, artillery/mortar/rocket positions and communication/supply routes." With respect to spoiling attacks, which connotes the ability to respond rapidly against enemy discovered in an attack position in proximity to friendly forces, the time involved between request and execution, and the safety zone restrictions, derogates flexiblity of employment. However, a long duration buildup in a relatively large area can be effectively countered by ARC LIGHT. ARC LIGHT strikes were considered effective against known base areas, although lack of BDA precluded full evaluation. These strikes provided the blast and penetration effects over a large area required to destroy the hard targets usually located under multiple canopies and which can seldom be identified with the degree of accuracy necessary for other fixed wing strikes. As for interdiction strikes, here too, lack of BDA forestalls complete evaluation but aerial photography has revealed roadcuts and slides which have interdicted the roads and trails and have halted vehicle movement.

(S) As an additional consideration the CG III MAF cited interrogation reports of PWs and ralliers and agent reports attesting to the psychological effects of ARC LIGHT strikes. They are reportedly feared more than any other weapon and it is with reluctance that the enemy enters areas where ARC LIGHT strikes may be used against them.115


(TS) In September 1967 COMUSMACV forwarded a request to CINCPAC to increase the B-52 sortie rate to the level of 1,200 a month. In October JCS offered a number of suggestions to improve the current 800 sorties/month capability, and requested a review and additional justification to CINCPAC. On 1 November COMUSMACV reiterated his request and provided a detailed account of the effects of B-52 utilization, in terms of damage and casualties inflicted on the enemy, modification imposed on enemy tactics and deployment of troops, disruption of enemy plans and the tremendous psychological effect on those who survive a B-52 strike. On 13 November CINCPAC advised JCS that explicit data and projection with expected results of the increase, other than by extrapolation, was not subject to precise definition. It was further suggested that the JCS recommendations to the SECDEF of 17 October 1967 which would provide for 60 days of operation at the 1,200 per month sortie level would assure substantial capability surge to meet intensified enemy operations.[116]

(TS) On 13 November 1967 the SECSTATE, in a joint State/Defense message, advised the Ambassador, Bangkok of the desire to increase the number of B-52s permanently based at U Tapao from 15 to 25 so as to provide the capability to mount 800 ARC LIGHT sorties per month from Thailand. The Ambassador was asked to approach the RTG to obtain approval for the augmentation. It was pointed out that while timing of permanent basing of the additional aircraft would be dependent on completion of the necessary construction, that the request should include interim permission to deploy the ten additional aircraft on a temporary basis, as the capability to service them developed.

(TS) Such permission would provide the US with the capability to surge to 1,200 sorties/month. The decision to surge would be predicated on the situation in Vietnam, i.e., when an enemy buildup presented a significant threat to our forces similar to the situation in I CTZ earlier in the fall. It was noted that COMUSMACV believed the massive concentration of B-52 firepower was a major factor in NVA decision to cease its pressure on our bases near the DMZ.

(TS) On 29 November 1967 the AMEMB Bangkok advised the SECSTATE that the RTG had approved the augmentation of the B-52

force at U Tapao by ten aircraft, to a total of 25, and 1,000 additional personnel.[117]



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(TS) At year's end the Cmdr 3AD (SAC), during a visit to HQ MACV, advanced a proposal for a four-hour cyclic time on target (TOT) which, after study appeared feasible upon implementation of the 1,200 sortie rate. The recommendation to maintain an average of six ARC LIGHT missions daily, scheduled around the clock and to implement a five-hour U Tapao ground divert force (GDF) and thereby cancel the requirement for the nine-hour quick run (QR) force was concurred in by COMUSMACV on 23 December. Elimination of the QR force was suggested to coincide with the start of the 1,200 sortie rate and the five-hour U Tapao GDF. The additional possibility of reducing preplanned strike scheduling from 36 hours to perhaps as little as 18 hours would be an exceptional improvement. HQ MACV indicated its willingness to adjust target selection times in order to assist in arriving at a workable timetable. COMUSMACV indicated that he was prepared to initiate both the cyclic TOT and preplanned strike compression at the request of the Cmdr 3AD (SAC).[119]

(S) In the last half of 1966 concern developed relative to ARC LIGHT ground follow-up operations. COMUSMACV was able to report to DIA that during the two-month period 17 June through 18 August 1966, 31 operations had been reported and seven were still pending for the 45 target strikes during the period. After a specific summarization for individual strikes, he noted:

> The psychological effects of the strikes on the enemy cannot be equated to hard facts and figures. The reports from the field stating that probing actions prior to the strike met very stiff and determined resistance with only weak and ineffectual resistance after the strike are an indication of strike effectiveness. This indicated a high degree of success in spoiling the enemy battle plans. [Numerous] reports...indicated that the enemy

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is evacuating from the area with his dead and wounded immediately after the strike.[120]

Radar

(S) By midyear the use of ground-based radar-controlled bombing had added to the all-weather capability for air strikes in RVN, as well as NVN and Laos. Two radar systems, the USMC TPQ-10 and the USAF MSQ-77 (COMBAT SKYSPOT), controlled 29 percent of the USAF, USN, and USMC attack sorties in RVN during the first six months of 1967. The systems handled 38 percent of the attack sorties in RPs 1-3, while SKYSPOT alone controlled 44 percent of the ARC LIGHT strikes and nine percent of all US attack sorties in Laos. The USAF system alone, five sites in RVN and one in Thailand, gave coverage of all RVN, Laotian Panhandle, and NVN RPs 1, 2, and most of 3. A further advantage was the ability to shift sorties immediately to an alternate target without lengthy pre-strike crew planning. Additional possibilities offered by the radar system were navigation assistance to aircraft, all-weather control of leaflet and flare drops, potential all-weather paradrop capability, and the updating and correction of exact coordinates of key interdiction points.[121]


Defoliation

(S) Defoliation began in RVN in 1961 on a limited basis. The trend toward increased employment was reflected by the gradually increasing areas (in hectares) defoliated: 1962 - 2,000; 1963 - 8,700; 1964 - 25,700; 1965 - 65,000; 1966 - 365,800. Defoliation of LOCs and truck parks in Laos began in 1965; figures for that year and 1966 included the Laotian effort. Comparing the first three months of 1967 to the same three months in 1966, the number of defoliation sorties approximated a 600 percent increase in activity. Crop destruction in selected VC areas was tested in 1962 in RVN and on a trial basis in Laos in September - October 1966. Crop destruction activity was: 1962 - 750 (acres); 1963 - 197; 1964 - 15,215; 1965 - 68,250; 1966 - 117,700. Crop destruction continued as an effective means in denying food resources to the VC. Defoliation was, in addition to its original employment, being used around airfields, bivouac areas, and supply dumps to increase security.[122]

(S) 1966 ended with an astronomical shortfall existing for predicted herbicide requirements in FY68. In an attempt to resolve the shortage problem or to propose acceptable alternatives, JCS queried CINCPAC during the first week of the new year to revalidate COMUSMACV's herbicide requirements in light of the fact that "this requirement is far in excess of current production capability of the US and will require a major production plant expansion program." Further communication revealed that the projected requirements for FY68 would fall 5.5 million gallons short, based upon industrial production capability.

(S) JCS, on 13 February, found COMUSMACV's projected future requirements supportable, but noted that by 1 July the combined total of both orange and white herbicides would not exceed 5.3 million gallons from current production capacity unless cabinet level action was taken. It was predicted, on this basis, that the FY68 nine million plus gallon requirement would not be met, and that by the end of 1967 only 3.65 million gallons could be made available.[123]

(S) Herbicide shortages remained a continuing problem although not an impossible one, considering acceptable compromises. JCS estimated that the delivery of all types of herbicides (orange, white, and blue) would show an increasing total each of the last six months in 1967. The average monthly delivery over that period would be 629.6 thousand gallons and the year-end total would be 3,778.0 thousand gallons. For the last half of FY68 JCS indicated that a steady 823.0 thousand gallon amount could be maintained. COMUSMACV was reassured when informed that the FY69 desired total would fall only four thousand gallons short of MACV's required 11.9 million gallons. Notwithstanding, COMUSMACV found it necessary to point out that white herbicides had been approved as substitutes for orange in FY68 because it was the only choice in sustaining the herbicide program. In addition, the limited availability of defoliant agents had not allowed any buildup whatsoever to the 60-day stockage level desired. On 5 May JCS was able, based on actual contracts, to report that the previous 1st Qtr FY68 prediction of deliveries would be exceeded by 247 thousand gallons.



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(S) The question of authorization for defoliation operations in the northern portion of the DMZ secured SECSTATE's approval on 12 June. CINCPAC reiterated the following guidance for COMUSMACV: defoliation would be limited to narrow strips along identified routes; populated areas must be avoided; upsetting the ecological balance or fouling of watersheds, creating the impression of laying waste to the land, would be avoided; damage to crops, food trees, or trees of economic value was to be avoided; and large-scale destruction of forest trees would be avoided.[125]

(S) Commensurate with the criticality of the military situation in I CTZ just after midyear, the necessity for effective defoliation operations north of the PMDL became more significant. COMUSMACV pointed out that there were approximately 35 km of unimproved roads and foot trails which provided concealed routes for movement of men and material, and that restraints denied the use of orange or white herbicides which were the only possibility of securing acceptable results. On 23 August MACV was informed of the rescission of the restriction, permitting effective defoliation of the identified routes.[126]

(S) Recommendations for guidance on a policy for narrowing the Cambodian border buffer zone from 5 km down to 1.5 km for defoliation operations were forwarded to SECSTATE by AMEMB Saigon. Two inhibiting factors bore heavily upon the decision for narrowing the buffer zone: (1) in many areas the border was not easily identifiable or not clearly established, and (2) an possibility of unintentional spraying of Cambodian territory had to be weighed against any possible political repercussions that might occur. Therefore, the five km buffer remained, though special projects might be considered on an individual basis. Special missions would have to insure that only low volatility defoliants were used, mission altitude had to be as low as possible, wind direction at the time of defoliant applications had to be away from the border, and the border in the spray area had to be known and clearly identifiable from the air. SECSTATE found it necessary to preclude even special missions in those geographic areas where the border was still debatable and special caution was to be exercised in mission approval if Cambodian crops were planted contiguous to the border.[127]

(S) Defoliation and crop destruction operations were not inhibited solely by herbicide shortages and inadequate

numbers of C-123 aircraft. Scheduled sorties lost due to adverse weather, battle damage, and unforeseen maintenance forced the program to fall short of its planned objectives. For instance, approved projects in January 1967 required 10,025 sorties, but the restraint of having to operate with only 14 available C-123 aircraft produced a shortfall of 2,300 sorties which were delayed until FY68. In August 1967 maintenance, weather, and battle damage eliminated 252 planned sorties. The 1.33 sorties planned programming factor for aircraft requirements was proven erroneous under these circumstances. Despite the mid-year increase of the RANCH HAND aircraft inventory to 17, sortie requirements still exceeded capability and new requirements enlarged the program by the addition of new projects and the need to reinforce previously treated areas. COMUSMACV requested an additional seven aircraft and 187 manpower spaces to meet the program's minimum requirements and to support a FY69 program.[128]

(S) Both praise and criticism of defoliation operations were advanced, but the praise outweighed the critical comments which were directed primarily toward improvements obtainable in future projects. Operation JUNCTION CITY convinced the 25th Inf Div that defoliation was very effective in denuding areas and the 1st Inf Div attested to the fact that, "the effects . . . on single canopy jungles have been strikingly successful, leaving no doubt as to the validity of the system." It was found that there was far less likelihood of enemy contact in defoliated areas than in areas that had not been defoliated. Criticism centered upon two aspects: (1) only partial defoliation in some project areas, and (2) no follow-up spray missions in areas of second and third canopy jungle. The shortfall in herbicide missions, attributable to all the foregoing problem areas, contributed the most heavily to the criticisms advanced.[129]

(S) On 12 December 1967 the AMEMB Saigon established an expanded buffer zone around rubber plantations as follows:

1) Except in cases of urgent military necessity, no aerial herbicide missions would be flown over an inner, five km wide zone around any active rubber plantation.

2) Only herbicide WHITE would be used in an outer five to ten km wide zone.

COMUSMACV indicated that as a matter of routine, future projects would not be approved which would require aerial spray operations with the expanded buffer zones. The Cmdr 7AF was advised that proper precautions should be taken to assure adherence to the new restrictions during currently approved operations and that the new restrictions were in addition to those in effect restricting aerial spray when the temperature was above 85 degrees and the wind velocity greater than ten mph. 130

Airlift

(S) In April Operation OREGON severely taxed the C-130 airlift capability and prompted a request to COMUSMACV from the 834AD for additional aircraft. Additional aircraft deemed necessary through 21 April included five C-130A to Cam Ranh Bay, three C-130B to Tan Son Nhut, and two additional aircrews at Bien Hoa. Those requirements, plus support personnel, would augment the already present resources at a level acceptable in-country airlift requirements. 131

(S) At midyear Operations GREELY and BILLINGS well exemplified the problems in providing airlift support in SEASIA. In addition to the continuing heavy demands on airlift capabilities, 7AF established the requirement for an additional 12 C-130 aircraft during the period 24-30 June. The most important reason for this was that "during the past eight hours the tactical forces involved in Operation GREELEY have become actively engaged with a major enemy force." Tactical emergency airlift requirements for the AO consisted of one brigade (three infantry battalions, a brigade headquarters, and various support units), three separate infantry battalions (one battalion to be moved each day commencing on 24 June), and one signal battalion to be in the AO prior to 2400H on 24 June. In addition to the above, a tactical emergency resupply of 60,000 lbs by airdrop was necessary during 24-26 June, and resupply requirements to support the additional GREELEY units were computed. It was already known that the daily resupply for GREELEY and BILLINGS had increased to approximately 450 STON per day while at the same time the support requirements for BILLINGS continued to increase. The 25

June requirement was in excess of 400 STON for unit moves, not including the daily resupply requirements.[132]

(S) In June of 1966 COMUSMACV expressed a requirement for an improved version of the C-130 as well as a follow on tactical assault airlift system. This requirement was endorsed by CINCPAC in August 1966 and the matter transferred by JCS to CSAF the following September. In November 1967 CINCPAC once again expressed his concern to JCS. He pointed out that the tactical airlift aircraft fleet was being operated in a demanding combat environment with resultant increased wear on the aircraft concerned. At this point follow on aircraft for replacement of the C-130, the C-123, and the C-7A were needed and could not be expected to be available prior to the mid-1970s. Additionally, C-130As were scheduled to be transferred to Air Force Reserve units in FY70 without replacement. The near-term future through 1972 gave cause for concern, primarily on the continued availability and effectiveness of the C-130 Fleet. The C-141/C-5A aircraft combination would not be able to replace the C-130 in providing continuous or repetitive tactical support to forward areas where they may be exposed to enemy fire. CINCPAC then recommended that the projected availabity of the C-130 aircraft be reviewed to assure that sufficient assets would remain in the active inventory until suitable replacement aircraft were provided.[133]

(S) On 13 December 1967 COMUSMACV advised the Cmdr 7AF that the requirement to increase the authorized C-130 base line to 60 aircraft in-country had been established as a MACV priority. MACV proposed to endorse the action to CINCPAC in terms of change to the force structure.[134]

Airfield Security

(S) Before the end of the year 1966, the repeated attacks upon Tan Son Nhut AB focused attention upon the problem of providing security for such installations. In late November 7AF was tasked to prepare plans for the possible conversion of TSN from civil to VNAF control plus an interim plan to improve the safety, aircraft control, and conservation of resources at that important base. By late December MACV took further steps for providing defense and security for TSN. Recognizing that the ultimate responsibility for

such defense rested with RVNAF, it was decided that a US-manned command post and quick reaction force would be established. Cmdr 7AF would, in cooperation and coordination with VNAF, organize and coordinate the US effort, be responsible for development and implementation of base defense plans, be responsible for control of vegetation, develop an integrated US communications net, and oversee construction of a joint command post and sufficient guard towers to provide observation of the base perimeter.[135]

(S) Early in 1967, in response to a MACV directive, emphasis was placed on improved air base defense. Expedited action was called for due to increased enemy activity toward such targets, and because a CG USARV survey revealed glaring shortages of defense searchlights and night observation devices. Throughout the four CTZs a shortage of 102 searchlights and 174 observation devices at selected airfields was ascertained. By mid-April completion of the perimeter lighting plan and a hardened command post were significant steps contributing to the security of TSN AB. By mid-year an intelligence analysis of attacks on RVN airfields from 5 April 1966 to 12 May 1967 in the four CTZs (I - 13, II - 13, III - 10, IV - 19), drew the following conclusions: future attacks probably will be conducted between 2300H and 0300H; any airfield of relatively high value is a potential target; a VC/NVA attacking force will use previously prepared positions to minimize time spent in position during attacks; and the introduction of the 122mm and 140mm rockets will greatly increase the firepower and range of the VC/NVA family of weapons, thereby also increasing the VC/NVA capability of mounting an attack on any target of their choosing. These conclusions shifted attention from static defense devices to available supplementation through airborne defenses.[136]

(S) In mid-May both COMUSMACV and 7AF took action to preclude additional attacks on RVN airfields. From the same line of reasoning, both emphasized the urgency for conversion of C-47 aircraft to AC-47 configuration. COMUSMACV's program involving the 417th VNAF Sq proposed the "conversion goal for the first ten aircraft is 1 September 1967 with conversion of the remaining six expected to be complete by 1 January 1968." Pointing out that present resources were inadequate, 7AF called attention to the fact that the AC-47 was the most effective counter

weapon in deterring mortar/rocket/recoilless rifle attacks. COMUSMACV added increased emphasis to the request:

> The recent attack on Da Nang with 140mm rockets exemplified the enemy's capability to mount an attack from beyond what was previously considered an effective range. To adequately deter, detect and destroy these night attacks requires additional night airborne illumination and fire support aircraft.

Beyond an interim measure of diverting four PSYWAR C-47s to nightly flare missions, COMUSMACV urged the increase of AC-47 assets from 22 to 32 aircraft. 7AF informed COMUSMACV that it was installing armament on UH-1Fs in order to employ them for defense of jet air bases due to the increased threat to their security. This was in addition to the CH-3C aircraft being utilized for air base defense, yet at the same time, 7AF clearly recognized COMUSMACV's role in determination of the ultimate mission employment of the UH-1Fs.[137]

(S) The 7 May attack on Binh Thuy Air Base was of immediate concern to COMUSMACV. Losses in the attack included "four A-1s, two H-34s, and one USAF hangar; and damaged one VNAF AC-47, one hangar and several airfield lights." Further emphasis was placed on the AC-47 conversion program in mid-May. 7AF stated, "VC/NVA attack on Bien Hoa AB 13 May. . . highlights concern regarding base defense flare/gunship support requirements in SVN." The existing inadequate number of AC-47 aircraft merely served to dilute their coverage ability at major air bases to an unacceptable degree. COMUSMACV put his weight behind a program to partially alleviate the problem. The original conversion of the aircraft of the VNAF 417th Trans Sq to AC-47 aircraft had been terminated because of supply shortages. Pointing out that USAF was replacing their AC-47 armaments with new MXU-470 guns, COMUSMACV suggested that these older SUU-11 guns be used to modify sixteen aircraft for VNAF because, "in view of the two recent incidents involving attack on VNAF air bases and resulting considerable damage to both real estate and aircraft, the requirement for the tactical firepower capability of the AC-47 aircraft is immediate." Before May was over 20 mortar rounds on Vinh Long airstrip destroyed one UH-1D,

heavily damaged UH-1Bs and caused moderate to light damage on 12 UH-1Ds. Although there were no casualties and the field remained operational this attack once again accentuated the problem area.138

(S) The most effective forward steps to increase air base defense and security was taken in early August. The guidelines for future improvements were issued to all four CTZs by CG USARV, and included renovations of both passive and active defense measures. Passive defense measures focused emphasis on revetments, aircraft dispersal, and perimeter defense installations. Recognizing that the wide variations existing among airfields throughout RVN made a finite revetment/dispersal system impracticable, the guidance still stressed that "it is possible and highly desirable to optimize aircraft passive defense measures for individual airfields." The revetment buildup program was to have highest priority and be completed for all in-country aircraft (plus those programmed through 1st Qtr FY68 by 1 October. For those aircraft functioning as a quick reaction force only minimal reveting was required. In addition, until all passive defense measures had been completed, aircraft would be dispersed to the maximum extent during the hours of darkness. This was to be accomplished by utilizing the entire base camp area. A program of maximum use of guard towers was to be accomplished immediately, whereas xenon searchlights and starlight scopes would be installed as soon as they were available through submitted requests.

(S) Active defense measures focused upon countermortar radar and airborne defenses. Inspections had revealed that "countermortar radars are scattered to such an extent that they are ineffective for airfield defense." These were to be concentrated so as to maximize the radar detection capability at the most critical airfields and an intensive training program be initiated for the countermortar radar sections. In addition to this, patrol operations, searches, and ambushes would be extended out to the limit of effective enemy weapons range. The airborne forces were considered to have a key role to play since they had proven to be the most effective means for locating enemy firing positions. At those installations considered to be critical airfields, designated aircraft would be on three-minute ground alert during the hours of darkness. Their mission was to detect enemy firing positions

and deliver immediate counterfire. A quick reaction helicopter force was assigned the mission of blocking the likely withdrawal routes from the enemy's firing positions. Based on the conviction that defense effectiveness is hampered by the complacency generated by infrequent attacks, a realistic practice alert inspection system was instituted at each individual base.[139]

(C) The USAF presentation at the 7 September MACV Research and Development for Base Defense Conference revealed significant futuristic plans to be employed in achieving airfield security. One aspect of the planning centered around what was termed Tactical Security Support Equipment. The basic principle of the concept was the extension of the sensory capability of the sentry. However, this did not mean replacing him, but it did envision equipment development directed towards increasing the capabilities and performance of the forces in place. It was also patently evident that supplemental to this was the need to deny the attacker the advantages of darkness in the counterinsurgency environment. Planned AF employment beyond the present flares and lighting devices included covert "illumination" through use of infrared equipment, light intensification devices, and other imagery techniques.

(C) Airfield security requirements were identified in the following sequential order: detect, alarm, discriminate, respond, and deter. Detection techniques involved sensor equipment around a fixed perimeter, but also expandable into high threat areas such as rocket belts. Alarm techniques required foolproof lines of communication for passing timely information in an efficient manner to reaction forces. Discrimination involved the differentation between false alarms, nuisance alarms, actual penetrations, and incidental penetrations. A proper mix of diverse types of sensors (i.e., seismic, infrared, and ferrous metal detection) emplaced in concentric circles at varying distances would afford this capability. An alarm transmitted by one device would not be picked up by another device when subjected to the same external force due to the difference in activation principles. This same characteristic would serve, additionally, to provide information on speed, direction of travel, and number of personnel/vehicles involved if a charted plan of implantation by segments was employed. The defense force which was afforded detection, alarm, and discrimination could respond/deter with weapons compatible to the threat. Future programs called for the multiple employment

of concealed intrusion detection devices. Development of futuristic devices (i.e., Geomagnetic, radar, improved seismic, and ultrasonic) would materially increase capabilities.

(C) Beginning 1 September and continuing over a one-year span, 7AF proposed to perfect and integrate all of the most desirable devices and employment techniques into one overall base defense system. The testing of all available equipment was already at Binh Thuy and those selected as demonstrating the most promise would be integrated into a tailored base defense system at Phu Cat as the culmination of a programmed Air Base Defense Test Plan.[140]

Use of Helicopters

(S) The premium placed on air mobility in the war in Vietnam during 1967 was reflected in the number of tasks performed by the US Army and USMC indicate the extent to which ground operations were supported by rotary-winged aircraft:[141]

1967	USA	USMC
Jan	18,936	1,531
Feb	15,279	2,198
Mar	18,804	2,323
Apr	19,743	2,074
May	20,365	2,941
Jun	16,527	2,890
Jul	18,571	2,567
Aug	20,478	2,634
Sep	21,536	2,810

1967	USA	USMC
Oct	18,061	1,860
Nov	17,885	1,720
Dec	23,947	1,797
TOTAL	230,132	27,345

Helicopter Shortages

(S) On 7 November 1967 JCS forwarded SECDEF approved a plan to CINCPAC to divert a ten UH-1D helicopter slice from one of the three aviation companies programmed to RVN in November 1967 to satisfy immediate COMUSKOREA requirement to provide Eighth Army with the capability for increased surveillance and quick reaction troop lift. 142

(S) On 8 November 1967 CINCPAC forwarded a message to JCS, the purpose of which was to identify helicopter deficiencies in CINCPAC's capability to support ongoing and planned operations requiring helicopter lift and to recommend actions designated to resolve problems. It was pointed out that MUSCLE SHOALS-DYE MARKER planning was predicated upon the understanding that the forces, assets, and the hardware associated with this project would be additive, except under those circumstances where the resultant impact of in-country diversions could be assumed without serious disruption or cancellation of essential ongoing operations. Thus far it had been necessary permanently to divert four CH-3s, and temporarily to divert a UH-1 Escort Gunship Company of 16 aircraft. The latter unit would be relieved upon arrival in-theater in March 1968 of the CONUS prepared MUSCLE SHOALS dedicated unit. Provisions for the replacement of the four CH-3s from CY68 production was unknown.


(S) On 17 November 1967 COMUSMACV advised CG USARV that the loss of ten UH-1Ds and supporting personnel from the 134th AHC (deployed to Korea vic RVN) would reduce lift helicopters from 23 to 13 and adversely affect helicopter support of II CTZ. It was

suggested that it may be possible to increase the assets of the 134th by a small drawdown on the other AHCs and thereby improve support for I FFORCEV to a considerable degree without greatly degrading the capabilities of other AHCs.[147]

Out-of-Country

(S) Experience garnered throughout the 1966 out-of-country air campaigns provided a better definition of programs for 1967. The main geographic areas focused upon in 1966 were NVN, NVN coastal waters, and Laos. In an effort to increase the concentration of applied effort, various operational areas were designated within these geographic areas. Laotian operational areas were designated BARREL ROLL (BR), STEEL TIGER (ST), and TIGER HOUND (TH). The coastal waters operational area was designated TALLY HO. The remaining portion of NVN was incorporated into one operational program, ROLLING THUNDER (RT), but this was further subdivided by starting at the TALLY HO boundary and assigning numerical designators northward in a clockwise direction to the northeast quadrant of NVN. These subdivisions were designated as Route Packages and bore the identifiers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6B and 6A. Such a breakout of operational areas by designator and geographical definition provided the capability for designating responsibility to different elements of the FWMAF air effort, the ability to shift the concentration of air effort from one to the other as the weather or enemy activity dictated, and contributed to an economy of forces through the ability to program varying levels of strikes/sorties against fixed targets as well as retaining the ability to strike fleeting or lucrative targets. The success achieved by this operational approach in meeting the desired objectives brought about additional categorizations plus refinements in 1967. The TALLY HO area was extended northward to a latitude just north of Dong Hoi at the expense of narrowing Route Package (RP) 1. The designators RP-6A and RP-6B were interchanged. (See Figures V-1 & V-2). The SEA DRAGON operational area was identified as the NVN coastal waters lying about 20°N. The SL and TH areas in the Laotian Panhandle were expanded to include all of the Laotian territory, while the old SL area of operations was divided into D and E designators. TH was divided in similar

SEASIA OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AREAS 1966



ROLLING THUNDER:	STRIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM	IRON HAND:	STRIKES AGAINST SAM SITES IN NVN.
BARREL ROLL:	STRIKES IN LAOS AGAINST PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH VIETNAM IN SUPPORT OF PATHET-LAO/VIETMINH	TIGER HOUND:	STRIKES IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF STEEL TIGER AREA.
STEEL TIGER:	STRIKES IN LAOS AGAINST PERSONNEL & EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH VIETNAM IN SUPPORT OF VIET CONG.	TALLY HO:	STRIKES IN SOUTHERN NVN (SOUTH OF 17 30) & NORTHERN HALF OF DMZ
		YANKEE TEAM:	RECONNAISSANCE IN LAOS.


Figure V-1

USAF STRIKE AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

NORTH VIETNAM ROUTE PACKAGE AREAS

LAOS SECTOR AREAS

1967



ARC LIGHT
Strikes by B-52 aircraft against personnel and equipment from North Vietnam and Viet Cong.

BARREL ROLL
Strikes in Laos against personnel and equipment from North Vietnam in support of Pathet - Lao/ Viet Minh.

BLUE TREE
Reconnaissance North of 20th parallel in North Vietnam.

IRON HAND
Strikes against SAM Sites in North Vietnam.

ROLLING THUNDER
Strikes in North Vietnam.

STEEL TIGER
Strikes in southern Laos against personnel and equipment from North Vietnam in support of Viet Cong.

TALLY HO
Strikes in Southern North Vietnam (South of 17 30)) and Northern half of DMZ.

TIGER HOUND
Strikes in Steel Tiger Area south of a line from DMZ to Savannakhet.

YANKEE TEAM
Reconnaissance in Laos.

Figure V-2

fashion by designators F and G. By mid-March these vertical divisions were replaced by numerical designators I thru IV as SL longitudinal operating areas (see Figure V-3). Special areas in the old BR area were labeled A, B, and C. Special programs (YANKEE TEAM (YT) reconnaissance in Laos, BLUE TREE (BT) reconnaissance north of 20° in NVN, and IRON HAND (strikes against NVN SAM sites)) continued virtually unchanged.[144]

(S) The sought-after results in the 1966 out-of-country air effort were destruction of material destined for the RVN battlefield, interruption of the productive capacity of NVN, interdiction of the LOCs into RVN, degradation of the air defenses of NVN, and the generation of reconnaissance intelligence of a timely and profitable nature, including enemy activity in Cambodia. Here again, the successes achieved in 1966 were indications of a sound approach, and the same general objectives were pursued in 1967. Nevertheless, there were three identifiable modifications that set 1967 apart from preceding years. The constraints imposed because political factors had dominated the politico-military strategy of out-of-country employment of air, were reduced measurably below those existing in 1965-1966. The intensity of effort was increased several fold beyond previous years, not only because of lessened political constraints, but also by increased numbers of air assets, modernization of older aircraft, introduction of new weapons and aircraft, and lessons learned from the experience of previous years. The third identifiable characteristic of out-of-country air campaigns in 1967 was the shifting of concentrated efforts northward in NVN into the RP-6 areas, while at the same time maintaining high levels of effort in the remaining areas as circumstances dictated.[145]

(TS) The rationale and concepts for employment of out-of-country air assets were expressed and formulated at the very onset of 1967. A CINCPAC working conference during the week of 2 January accomplished the bulk of this task. Two main resolves emerged: the NVN Government must be convinced that a long war is unacceptable and intolerable proposition, and war goods needed by the enemy in RVN must be destroyed whenever possible at storage and distribution points in the northern part of



AIR OPERATIONS ZONES
IN LAOS
4 MAR 1967
A
BARREL ROLL
LAOS
B
LUANG PRABANG
C
NVN
VIENTIANE
STEEL
TIGER
D
E
THAKHEK
SAVANNAKHET
ZONE
THAILAND
RVN
F
III
II
I
IV
SARAVANE
G
ATTOPEU
CAMBODIA

Figure V-3

the country, with concurrent attrition along the LOC leading to the south. An evaluation of the RT operation in 1966 formed the basis for projected planning. The consensus was that "without disruption achieved by air power, Communist forces might long have been able to marshal major forces for an all-out war in RVN." The experience of 1966 had demonstrated that the enemy was resourceful and took immediate counter-action, such as resorting to alternate means of transporting war materials (pack animals, human portage, watercraft) and possessed a recuperative capability in bypassing or rebuilding interdicted LOCs. POL facilities lost had been offset by increased imports or rapid dispersal of remaining stores. In addition NVN had accomplished a major buildup of its air defense system.[146]

(TS) ROLLING THUNDER (RT) and SEA DRAGON constituted the bulk of the operations designed to apply ever-increasing pressure against NVN. Following in the footsteps of the successively more productive RT programs, those listed as RT 53 and RT 54 delineated the tasks, objectives, and employments of air assets in that geographic area for the first third of 1967. The two programs had the following in common: authorization for US armed reconnaissance throughout NVN with exclusions (i.e., CHICOM buffer zone area, 30 nm from the Chinese border, Hanoi prohibited airspace, 10 nm from the center of Hanoi; Hanoi/Haiphong restricted airspace area, 30 nm from the center of Hanoi and 10 nm from the center of Haiphong); authorization to strike sections of LOCs within the Hanoi restricted area; authorized strikes against POL and SAM support areas only after positive identification and notification to Washington of strike plans; authorized strikes against POL facilities collocated with JCS numbered targets that had not been authorized, provided they were outside the prohibited and restricted areas; authorized special coastal armed reconnaissance from 20°42'N to CHICOM buffer zone; plus the authorization for VNAF armed reconnaissance totaling 14,500 attack sorties a month against NVN/Laos, depending upon weather and operational factors. The minor differences existing between the 1966 and 1967 plans were the deletion of the prior restriction on VNAF armed reconnaissance (previously limited to an area between the DMZ and 19° 00'N); the deletion of special naval operations in the coastal waters from 17° to 19°N, and the shifting of RT suffix-Alpha US strikes from

barracks, ammo depots, and storages to steel plants and essential transportation points. A continued program of random surveillance was to be carried out to determine when restrike might be necessary to harass or disrupt renewal of activity within any specified target area. 147

(S) In support of the ROLLING THUNDER program for conducting air strikes against NVN, aircraft of the FWMAF flew combat sorties. The mission of the combat sortie was strike, flak suppression, armed reconnaissance, combat air patrol or rescue combat air patrol. The mission of the combat support sortie was reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures, refueling, airborne early warning, leaflet drops, loudspeaker missions, etc. In 1967 the numbers of combat sorties flown over North Vietnam were:

USAF	-	59,896
USN	-	59,336
USMC	-	9,012
VNAF	-	127
TOTAL		128,371

The numbers of combat support sorties flown over North Vietnam in 1967 were:148

USAF	-	38,973
USN	-	18,585
USMC	-	3,807
TOTAL		61,365

(S) As 1966 ended CINCPAC, from accumulated experience derived from previous truce periods, requested that, "extraordinary reconnaissance efforts against logistic activity and associated facilities along navigable water segments," be a continuing special effort. During the New Year stand-down, the

Song-Giang and Kien Luang Rivers were areas of special interest. Also of special interest were off-load points, supply caches, transshipment points, and especially "points of departure and destinations of water-borne traffic on coastal waterways and tributaries, particularly those in and adjacent to RP-1." Much in the same vein, COMUSMACV requested an intensified reconnaissance effort during the Tet period. The Tet truce did not differ substantially from the instructions and qualifications applicable to the New Year's period. The two major differences concerning Tet were that further refinements of instructions were issued and the length of the period of truce extended beyond that which was first stipulated.[149]

(S) At the same time Tet truce instructions were being promulgated, post-Tet plans were being formulated. The impetus behind this planning was "the feverish activity on RP-1 and TALLY HO roads and waterways during the truce period which dictates the need for heavy weights of effort in these areas as soon as the truce ends." Included in the objectives were the destruction of vehicles and watercraft still transiting LOCs, rolling stock in truck concentration points, and strikes against selected concentration points (e.g., storage areas, off-load points and transshipment areas).[150]

(TS) With the extension of the truce period in NVN, protests began to filter into higher headquarters. CINCPACAF submitted two recommendations: first, if RT operations were still prohibited past the late evening hour of 13 February, then RP-1 should be opened to strikes on the premise that it was an extension of the RVN battlefield; secondly, RP-1 LOCs should be excluded when arranging any future truce periods. The original specified stand-down was 080700H thru 120700H February 1967, but the international political situation extended this until late in the afternoon of the 13th. At this time CJCS indicated that the resumption of RT would begin at 131600H. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC acknowledged this resumption time, but all was not as yet settled--the extension crept forward from 131600H to 131700H, to 131900H, to 140800H. The final exchange of messages indicated that 140100H was the preferred resumption time with the first imperative TOT being 140400H. CINCPAC informed JCS that the TOT would be 140100H.[151]

(S) As 1967 began, plans were underway to provide support for the ARC LIGHT forces that would enable them to operate within areas of suspected SAM threats. DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations was tasked to develop the TINY TIM support plan. This would incorporate a combined ELINT search in conjunction with fighter support aircraft for uncovering definite SAM threat signals or the observation of a SAM launch, a combination intended for defense of B-52 strike aircraft. Although the TINY TIM capability was developed, it was still advisable to use extreme caution in scheduling B-52s into a threat area because of the high risk involved.[152]

(TS) Midyear evaluations of the cumulative results of RT operations were rendered by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV. CINCPAC pointed out that RT Program 54, authorized on 24 February, had been severely inhibited by adverse flying weather. Beginning with Program 55, authorized on 22 April, and continuing through 56, authorized on 2 May, a consistent level of effort in RP-6 had produced significant disruption and destruction in a relatively short period of time. In the space of five weeks the air campaign in the NE quadrant of NVN had produced a higher damage level and, consequently, more stress on the Hanoi government, than the combined previous RT operations.[153]

(TS) In an overall assessment for AMB Bunker, COMUSMACV took an optimistic position in contrasting the situation in the two Vietnams:

> In appraising the current situation it is helpful to consider developments from the viewpoint of the North Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi.
>
> The war has forced North Vietnam towards national mobilization, perhaps total mobilization. As a consequence, little, if anything, is being accomplished except support of the war. On the other hand, the economy, industrial base, and infrastructure of North Vietnam, is progressively deteriorating or being destroyed by our air and naval campaigns. At the same time the cream of their youth and the best of their military leadership are being sent to the south, many of them never to return. Specifically:

85 percent of their power generating resources have been destroyed.

30 percent of their railraod system had been destroyed.

50 percent of their railroad repair capabilities have been destroyed.

Their steel and cement plants have been rendered incapable of production.

3,500 trucks and 4,000 watercraft have been destroyed in the last ten months.

Their MIG aircraft have been reduced by 50 percent.

They have been forced to divert an estimated 500,000 people to maintain and repair roads, railroads, and vital facilities.

Food shortages have developed requiring that flour be used to replace rice in some areas. There is little or no fresh meat available in the cities.

In summary, the country is undergoing severe deterioration.

What have the North Vietnamese authorities got to show for this expenditure of effort and cost? Little, if anything. The North Vietnamese Army has not won a single major victory in the south, despite the fact that they have suffered tremendous losses on the battlefield. Their plans have failed to achieve objectives.[154]

(C) While US military leaders assessed the situation, news filtering out of NVN revealed the enemy summation of circumstances across the DMZ. The writing of the NVN CofS, General Van Tien Dung, is noteworthy not only because of its positions vis-a-vis US evaluations, but also for the fact that beneath the heavy interlarding of propaganda a considerable degree of sagacity is clearly evident. The NVA leader stressed six points having great bearing on the air war in NVN.

Construction of socialist system in North kept pace despite bombing. Full mobilization of all resources proved successful.

US Air Forces cannot fully use their superior strength to attack North massively

on strategic scale. US effort is 'not yet' all out and therefore it can be coped with.

US Air Force suffered grave damage materially and in prestige.

US Air Force tactics do not match conditions and are awkward. Targets are too small, often moving, and too dispersed for sophisticated US weaponry.

US aircraft losses now surpass replacement capacity and pilot shortage is serious.

Chief military problem facing NVN is how to apply concepts and experiences of People's War to the air war the US is waging. Jets and missiles have weak points in defense. Solution is 'effective multi-strata net of fire everywhere...' and close coordination of converging defense arms at all altitudes, and distances with anti-aircraft units as the core.[155]

(S) Evidently NVN correctly evaluated the most effective air defense weapon, because in late June heavier-than-ever concentrations of 37/57/85mm weapons were encountered in RP-6. "Within six nautical miles either side of the northeast rail line (Hanoi to Lang Son) there were in excess of 1,400 guns as of the first part of June," while from "the area of Bac Giang to about 35 km northeast of Kep approximately 900 guns have been identified." In addition, aerial photography established the presence of a CHICOM AAA unit near Thai Nguyen, while the use of unguided rockets around Bac Le railroad yards suggested an effort to force US aircraft into breakaway tactics that would carry them down into the effective range of AAA weapons.[156]

(TS) Briefings presented to SECDEF the first week of July revealed further rationale and statistics relative to interdiction, anti-infiltration, and the NVN bombing campaign. The total target spectrum in NVN was refined into six basic systems: power, war-supporting industry, transportation, military complexes, POL, and air defense. To insure that all six were rendered ineffective, a progressive disruption of the system was initiated. To accomplish this task, target lists were developed for the RP areas, but the focal point of the RT program was RP-6. Targets in an area were categorized under four headings and given sequential priority listing.

The target lists were monitored and constantly changing based on latest intelligence inputs. A description of the overall program noted that "over a five week period starting late in April, the level of stress against the Hanoi government was greater than during the entire previous RT program. . . air resources were being applied in a systematic, cohesive program." Evidence of success was indicated by the changes observed: the way the MIGs were employed, the use and effectiveness of SAMs, and the effectiveness and pattern of AAA fire. The concentration of effort against the northern geographic areas was a well-considered attempt to affect not only the ability of NVN to support aggression, but also its ability to support itself.[157]

(S) CG III MAF added his voice to the mounting concern over enemy buildup in the DMZ before 10 August. The focus of the threat was fixed in and directly north of the DMZ, as evidenced by the buildup in enemy troop strength, strong patrol action, and increased artillery weapons. Based on the results achieved in July on five targets in the same approximate area, one effective means of countering this was the suggested use of increased numbers of ARC LIGHT sorties. Those strikes had produced 24 secondary explosions, destruction of eight artillery positions and 24 AA/AW positions, and damage to trenches and fortifications throughout the area.

(S) Recognizing the still possible existence of a SAM threat, CG III MAF proposed "strikes on a selective basis which will minimize the chance of losses and, at the same time, deal a severe blow to NVN assault potential. The objective included elimination of the probability of any significant invasion and the reduction of enemy mortar and artillery now threatening completion of the DYE MARKER installation." On 11 August SAC informed its CONUS units that a capability must be maintained to deploy aircraft (a total of nine B-52s) to Guam on short notice to support a 900-sortie rate. Personnel might be required to deploy and be in place overseas within seven days.[158]

(TS) In the first two weeks of August further concern was expressed over the possibility of losing a B-52 aircraft to SAM missiles. Notwithstanding the degradation of the SA-2 threat in and around the DMZ by IRON HAND strikes, the possibility still existed of a clandestine enemy capability. Regardless, the enemy buildup in that locale required additional air support to

counteract the threat. Running a calculated risk by employing ARC LIGHT forces was a logical solution, as experience indicated that their most profitable utilization was against troops massing in a relatively confined area. The still small but persistent danger of exposure to the missile threat dictated that every possible precaution be taken.

(TS) The TINY TIM support plan was still in effect, but a change in the ARC LIGHT basic operations order provided an additional degree of security. A single code word would be assigned for use on IDM missions and the airborne strike force commander could, upon receiving the signal, divert or recall his force. Transmittal of the code word would be precipitated by the reception of SA-2 FAN SONG radar signals by either passive ECM sites or TINY TIM support forces. Similarly, any observation of a SAM missile firing in the target area would be the basis for recall or diversion. After several late August sortie losses due to recalls, SAC assured all concerned that it fully appreciated the urgency and priority in and near the DMZ and would accord continued ARC LIGHT support. Henceforth, automatic diverts of airborne forces would occur under only three conditions: (1) receipt of the divert word from property authority; (2) B-52 in-flight detection of both FAN SONG and BG-06 guidance link signals; and (3) or visual sighting of a SAM in flight.[159]

(TS) Use of the change to the ARC LIGHT basic operations order brought about the diversion of 12 sorties on 24 August. Due to lack of any evidence that the suspected SAM site had been destroyed, 36 more sorties were diverted over the following two days. This appeared to be an overly cautious interpretation of the rule, for the lost sorties in a critical target area were based upon the reception of a single FAN SONG signal when it was stipulated that two separate, distinct, and coincidental radar emissions need be identified. Furthermore, the lost sorties occurred at the most inopportune time, when "extensive enemy activity in the DMZ area requires continuing use of ARC LIGHT capability in support of friendly forces in what appears to be worsening local ground tactical situation."

[redacted]

(TS) In view of this pressing situation, COMUSMACV sought means to increase the flexibility in the employment of B-52s to meet the threat. The requirement that targets must first be declared urgent and critical obstructed MACV advanced planning and CINCPAC/JCS advanced approval on target areas under development. In addition, quick run and in-flight divert capabilities were not available in this critical area where enemy deployments were fluid and difficult to predict on a preplanned basis. COMUSMACV, therefore, requested authority to divert preplanned missions into areas north of the PMDL and in NVN south of 17°10'N latitude in which critical situations were emerging.[160]

(TS) Events in the months of July and August reflected considerable change in the RT campaign. On 1 July CINCPAC established an immediately effective prohibited area within a four nm radius of Haiphong. All targets within that area were deleted from the target lists; all targets lying between the four/ten nm of Haiphong required specific authority from CINCPAC for strike. Nevertheless, by mid-July CINCPAC could attest:

> Air operations conducted over the past weeks against the critical Northwest quadrant have demonstrated, within established constraints, a professional application of airpower. The destruction and disruption of key LOC POL and transportation targets in RP-6 have far exceeded any previous period since the beginning of the air campaign against NVN.

(TS) On 14 July CINCPAC authorized the transit of the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted and prohibited areas as necessary in conducting air operations, but still retained the following: CHICOM buffer zone; Hanoi restricted and prohibited areas (30/10 nm); and Haiphong restricted and prohibited areas (ten/four nm). By 21 July armed reconnaissance aircraft were allowed to strike targets on a measured basis (no more than three on any one day) lying within the 30/10 nm radii of Hanoi. While still allowed to transit the Hanoi/Haiphong areas, " [US] aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit are not authorized to attack NVN air bases from which attacking aircraft may be operating except Hao Lac, Kep, Kien An and Kep Ha airfields."

[redacted]

(TS) On 5 August another change authorized strikes against targets within the Haiphong restricted area, defined as that area between the four/ten nm circles around Haiphong. [redacted] The objective of the strikes within the zone was to achieve maximum destruction of locomotives, rolling stock, and supplies of the NE rail line. To avoid as much as possible the foreign or domestic charges of escalation, the strikes would employ the absolute minimum strike force consistent with safety and damage objectives, utilize WALLEYE weapons on bridge targets, and conduct the campaign in a measured manner. [redacted] Additional precautions were to utilize the most experienced pilots, attack only in weather conditions enabling positive identification of targets, and provide adequate electronic capability to insure positive navigational control, including positive strike control if feasible.[161]

(TS) Utilization of new weapons and the impact of the increased RT program in NVN were both reflected during August. Concentrating on the NE sector and RP-1, 700 MK-36 weapons were seeded on NVN targets. Outstanding results were achieved with the 16 WALLEYE weapons released against a wide variety of targets. By the end of August, 59 of these weapons had produced 54 hits. The destruction of the Doumer Bridge on 11 August was of military significance, but beyond this was the immeasurable psychological impact upon the morale of the NVN people. The constantly increasing pressure, inside increasingly diminishing areas, applied through accurate and effective bombing of key targets, was reducing NVN's confidence in their ability to defend vital facilities and in turn adversely affecting morale. The NVNG reaction took various forms: a propaganda campaign against escalation, exaggerated reports of US aircraft losses and results of air strikes, exhortation of their people toward greater efforts, and turning to alternate means for maintaining an acceptable capability (e.g., resorting to fragmented power sources when damage disrupted production from their primary thermal power plants).[162]

(TS) By the end of October Hanoi's International Airport at Gia Lam and the air defense associated equipment at Bac Mai were the remaining NVN key air defense capabilities not yet

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struck by PACAF forces. Strikes against key NVN airfields (including Phuc Yen and Haiphong/Cat Bi for the first time) resulted in a degradation of aircraft installation facilities as well as a rapid decline in the number of enemy fighter aircraft in-country. Although crater repair activities returned the runways of the main jet airfields to serviceability, a large part of NVN's aircraft facilities remained destroyed. Vital ground support equipment, including refueling vehicles, starter units, and oxygen and weapons system handling equipment, was believed to have been severely damaged or destroyed.[163]

(TS) In November 1967 CINCPAC modified the basic operations order: ROLLING THUNDER/BLUE TREE. This was Change 3. The change was as follows:

1) Tactics for conducting strikes will be planned so that flight paths to and from target areas, other than those to specifically authorized targets within the CHICOM buffer zone, will not approach closer than 20 nm to the Communist China border.

2) Aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit are authorized to pursue enemy into restricted and/or prohibited areas, however, pursuit is not authorized into the territorial airspace of Communist China. Every precaution will be taken to prevent violations of the CHICOM border. When engaged in immediate pursuit in connection with affording protection to strike forces, US forces are not authorized to strike NVN air bases from which aircraft may be operating if air base had not been previously struck, however, this does not prohibit attacking the pursued airborne aircraft.[164]

(TS) SAM effectiveness during December dropped considerably from the average SAM to aircraft loss ratio of 55:1 for the entire year. On 20 December all nine B-52 aircraft of an ARC LIGHT mission reported seeing at least two probable SAMs and their detonations at 32,000-36,000 feet in the vicinity of the DMZ. Closest detonation reported at 1,000 feet distance. This marked the second occasion during the year involving SAM firings at B-52s in the area of the DMZ, the first being on 29 October. No B-52s were lost to SAMs, however, it was evident that the NVN intended to maintain a SAM threat to ARC LIGHT missions in the DMZ area and were possibly attempting to establish a similar capability in or near the Mu Gia Pass.

(TS) MIG engagements during the month indicated an increasing and well-coordinated GCI effort to intercept US strike forces. Even though air strikes were conducted during December on the Kian An, Yen Bai, Hoa Lac, Kep and Phuc Yen Airfields rendering them at various times temporarily unserviceable, all major airfields, except Haiphong/Cat Bi, where no reconstruction had been observed, were considered operational by month's end. On 11 December the NVNAF began to combine reactions by both MIG-17s and MIG-21s in nine engagements. Two days later attacks by these types totaled 15 engagements. Tactics were characterized by moving the MIG-17s further from their bases instead of holding them in local orbit, by launching more than a pair of MIG-21s in the initial reaction and by using both MIG-21s and MIG-17s on coordinated high and low passes from more than one quadrant. Multi-directional and successive passes kept US MIG CAP flights in constant reaction to warning broadcasts as enemy fighters moved into the engagement area. In addition, as CAP flights were drawn off in pursuit, other MIGs attacked from another quadrant. MIG prepositioning varied with the approach pattern of strike forces but usually occurred soon after strike ingress from the western border or when the strike forces reached about 30 miles off-shore. When strike ingress did not follow the predicted pattern or when strikes approached from both directions simultaneously, the MIG reaction appeared to be less intense. Four confirmed and one probable enemy fighters, (MIG-17s) and three US fighters were downed in these air encounters. Two, possibly three, MIGs were destroyed on the ground. The year-end enemy fighter OB was estimated to be 20-25 aircraft in-country.[165]

Laos

(S) The mission of air operations over Laos was, for the most part, interdiction of the supply routes running through that country from NVN into South Vietnam. The northern part of the country was designated the BARREL ROLL area. From the standpoint of air operations, it was virtually the exclusive responsibility of the USAF, who flew an average of 483 attack sorties per month in that area during 1967. This effort was augmented by air strikes conducted by the armed T-28s of the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF). The southern, or Panhandle, portion of Laos was for the purposes of air warfare divided into the STEEL TIGER and

the TIGER HOUND areas. These areas, through which most of the supply routes ran, received the preponderance of the air effort in Laos. In 1967 the average numbers of attack sorties per month, by service were:

USAF	-	2,456
USN	-	545
USMC	-	218

T-28s of the RLAF also conducted strikes in these areas.[166]


(TS) Laotian air operations--BR, SL, TH, and YT--were well established programs by the end of 1966, the basic operations order having been promulgated on 11 November. In the first part of 1967 refinements were introduced in an effort to increase the effectiveness of these operations. The basic operations order stated that "NVN continues to contribute substantial support to the insurgencies in Laos and in SVN by providing men and material to assist the Pathet Lao/Viet Minh in Laos and the Viet Cong in SVN." From the estimate of situation, the following mission was derived:

> Conduct armed reconnaissance, interdiction operations and air reconnaissance against selected targets and LOCs in the BR/SL/YT operating areas. The objective is to apply military pressure to achieve maximum effectiveness in disrupting the Pathet Lao, Viet Minh and NVN logistic support, to disrupt enemy logistics flow into SVN, and to cause the NVN to cease supporting the insurgencies in SEASIA.

Military operations in Laos would, therefore, destroy those resources already in Laos, destroy or deny use of enemy facilities and LOCs in Laos, harass and disrupt dispersed military operations, and harass and impede movement of men and materials through Laos into RVN.[167]

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(TS) Under the above concept COMUSMACV assumed considerable responsibility for the execution phase. He would conduct air strikes, armed reconnaissance, and air reconnaissance in accordance with authorized guidance and periodic directives; prescribe priority, frequency, and sequence of missions.



In order to maintain an all-weather and 24-hour capability, employment of the MSQ-77 (COMBAT SKYSPOT) bombing system was authorized. The most specific and limiting restrictions were that aircraft were to avoid populated areas in Laos to the maximum extent possible;

[redacted]

(TS) The air effort in the Laotian Panhandle was further delineated through refinements included in 7AF's Operations Order 433-67 just after the new year began. Specific operational procedures and employment of assets were specified for the TH/SL areas. Special zones were designated in the Panhandle operational areas: Zone I was a stipulated special area in TH; Zones II, III, and IV were special areas lying within the SL area. The new feature introduced was essentially that Zone III became a special category area--the initial promulgation of the order appeared to indicate that Zone III strikes could be executed only under FAC control, and that COMBAT SKYSPOT bombing was prohibited. With statistical proof of the reliability of CEPs achieved under this system of bombing 7AF appealed the apparent restriction against the use of the MSQ-77 system. [redacted]


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[redacted] COMUSMACV informed CINCPAC that COMBAT SKYSPOT strikes were permissible in Zone III, [redacted]

(S) Target strike authorization was clearly defined on 2 March. JCS was authorized to approve RVN and Laotian strikes subject to the following conditions: strikes against targets wholly or partly in RVN (including that portion of the DMZ south of the demarcation line) would require prior concurrence of GVN and AMEMB Saigon; strikes wholly or partly in Laos would require [redacted] targets would be a minimum distance of one km from the nearest noncombatants and would not contain monuments, temples, and other landmarks the destruction of which might cause serious political problems. [redacted] COMUSMACV could secure strikes against targets of a fleeting nature, or those that posed an immediate direct threat to US or friendly forces, if clearly and specifically identified.170




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
(S) Of significance in the ARC LIGHT program for March was the initiation of the interdiction program, which involved repeated bombing of enemy LOCs at random times. After launching 151 total sorties in this program, it was felt that B-52 strikes against key choke points [redacted] appeared to offer significant potential as an integral part of the overall efforts to counter enemy infiltration through RP-1[redacted] Measurements of effectiveness were the enemy's intensive efforts to improve his LOC defenses (i.e., recent deployment of searchlights near B-52 targets, increase in enemy AA fire), and the fact that weekly truck sighting in the TH area dropped during the month of March to one-third of what they had been the previous month. COMUSMACV's report suggested that the B-52s in conjunction with tactical air strikes might be even more effective than analysis had indicated.172



(TS) Laotian air operations were addressed in a MACV planning directive which stated that "the heavy investment of NVN troops and equipment within Laos to safeguard the infiltration routes is indicative of the value the enemy places on the Panhandle as his all-important lifeline to sustain the battle in South Vietnam." The directive was created to insure that MACV operations in SL were planned and executed to obtain maximum achievement of US objectives, that MACV operations were coordinated and integrated with other US operations in Laos,

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and that the weight of effort was shifted between SL and RP-1 to take advantage of optimum weather conditions. During the period April through December 1967, the Laotian air campaign would seek to maximize pressure on the LOCs throughout SL by round-the-clock tactical air reconnaissance and strike operations,



(TS) Further argument in support of flight routes over Laos were pointed out by SAC in terms of flight time, aircraft hours, fuel savings, and reduced support effort that could be achieved. The saving in flight time compared to a B-52 launched from Guam was six hours (seven hours vs. one hour). Based on 333 B-52 sorties from Guam in the period 1 June - 22 July, a savings of $3,965,863 would have been realized using a cost factor of $1,018/hour for B-52s and $496/hour for the required KC-135s.

(TS) COMUSMACV presented the most compelling arguments of all. These included the fact that SAC's reduction to 12 sorties/day from Guam restricted targeting in Laos to a maximum of two six-aircraft boxes which were inadequate for optimum target

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
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coverage; the historical statistics did not reflect the number of valid targets against which large strikes could have been used (e.g., first six months of 1967, strikes on 16 different days employed more than 12 aircraft); the two main reasons for U Tapao basing--economy and timeliness--were negated by Laotian overflight restrictions; U Tapao-based aircraft could complete their missions without refueling; DMZ strikes could be improved by dropping the restrictions. The latter would make possible reorientation of target boxes in the DMZ for more effective coverage; allow SAM evasive maneuvers, preplanned diversion, routing and altitude/time separation for increased security in a high threat area; and daylight TOTs with commensurate increased effectiveness of TINY TIM support.[175]

Cambodia

(TS) Toward the end of July enemy activity in Cambodia advanced to the point that a top priority aerial reconnaissance effort (code name DORSAL FIN) was implemented. This was an "all sensor coverage of the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border area, from 11-18N, 105-54E to the Laotian border and to a depth of 20 kilometers over Cambodia . . . on a continuing basis." The objective was to fill an intelligence gap in a politically sensitive area as it affected the counterinsurgency effort. The reconnaissance was intended to reveal supply areas, training areas, weapons and rocket positions, rest and recuperation areas, staging areas, bivouac areas, infiltration routes and their indicated use, military positions, and any other indications of VC/NVA use of areas for military operations and associated activities. By early August, CG II FFORCEV requested that the program be utilized to verify current intelligence indicating that the enemy in the Parrot's Beak area (WT 6010) was positioning rockets for attacks on Tay Ninh, Cu Chi, Duc Hao, and Tan Son Nhut. The sensitivity of DORSAL FIN called for the most mature and experienced crews for the 20 missions per month authorized. Mission altitudes below 10,000 ft were allowed at the discretion of COMUSMACV north of 12°N latitude if indications signified an immediate threat, but for the same authorization south of that line, Washington level approval had to be secured. To maintain the security of the program, flight crews were to abort their missions in event of imminent danger of

of hostile fire.




Rules of Engagement


(TS) In the last quarter of 1966 a policy had been adopted whereby the rules of engagement would be republished and/or modified and updated quarterly. The third quarterly republication was issued on 3 March 1967, by which time small but significant changes had been added. These were essentially one further requirement for planning Cambodian/RVN border operations, and requiring the defoliation and crop destruction be prohibited within five km of the RVN/Cambodian border. The overall body of rules established was applicable to US/FWMA forces only, but every senior officer was directed to impose the same rules of engagement, where possible, on RVNAF operations. Some of the more significant rules required requesting approval in advance for counteractions against VC/NVA attacks upon US/RVN/FWMA forces emanating from Cambodia, although self-defense of an emergency nature was authorized; others prohibited attacks upon Cambodian villages or populated areas, with a view of keeping civilian casualties to a minimum. Operating under these rules, the largest contribution envisioned from the air effort was strikes against enemy fire from Cambodia upon friendly forces.[178]

(TS) The rules of engagement applicable to Laotian/RVN border operations were similar to those pertaining to the Cambodian/RVN border. COMUSMACV was to be kept informed of all operational planning in the area, necessary self-defense counteractions in emergency situations required only advisories to COMUSMACV, and no instructions regarding operations, emergencies, and planning in the area would be "applied toward widening the conflict in SEASIA."

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Cmdr 7AF was obligated to report all air strikes in the Laotian/RVN border operations area. Furthermore, 13AF was submitting weekly joint recommendations for air operations in the BR/SL areas, which in effect served to channel the utilization of forces into the most lucrative or sensitive areas.179





To apply this last restriction, since the political sensitivity of border incidents could not be overemphasized would require careful navigation to avoid inadvertent violations, maximum feasible radar tracking of operations adjacent to the zone, and border warnings issued to operational aircraft under these conditions.

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On 5 May III MAF A-6A aircraft came within the scope of these restrictions when COMUSMACV, drawing upon previous exchanges of ideas, authorized the use of A-6As in the RPs of the RT program, the objective being to maximize their use in the northern RPs against lucrative targets. A second change to RT, generated by the public knowledge that a British ship of foreign registry and crew had been in the line of fire during attacks on Haiphong, was the admonishment to use extreme caution to avoid endangering foreign shipping.[181]

(TS) In order for the MUSCLE SHOALS plan to attain goals set by SECDEF it was deemed necessary to effect a general relaxation of some of the rules of engagement applicable to the utilization of air power in Laos. To this end COMUSMACV initiated a request [redacted] for:

1) Extending the 200 yard strike zone restriction along Routes 912, 911 and 91 to 2 km.

2) Amending the requirement for FAC control in Zone III so that fleeting targets identified by the MUSCLE SHOALS System could be struck without a FAC.

3) Clarification of informal guidance [redacted] that the sighting of a truck constituted a valid target, as a truck must be associated with a motorable road.

4) A request to exempt MUSCLE SHOALS sensors and munitions from the strike zone restriction. This was considered necessary because of the tremendous volume which would be employed and the requirement to coordinate each sortie would seriously inhibit effective operations.

[redacted] would permit dedicated

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MUSCLE SHOALS aircraft [redacted] to drop sensors and munitions in RVN. CINCPAC, accordingly, ordered that the basic BR/SL/YANKEE OPORD be changed. [redacted]

MUSCLE SHOALS Support

(S) In early November 1967, COMUSMACV requested 7AF to investigate possible main support bases (MSB) in RVN for use during the SW monsoon season by helicopters assigned to MUSCLE SHOALS. On 20 November the Cmdr 7AF replied that no MSB in RVN was planned for MUSCLE SHOALS helicopters. [redacted] would function throughout the year as MSB. It was planned that Khe Sanh, RVN, would be used whenever the weather allowed as a forward operating location (FOL), due to its proximity to DUMP TRUCK. However, during the NE monsoon season, mountainous terrain coupled with the monsoon produce turbulence as well as other adverse weather conditions/phenomena which preclude continuous helicopter operations. When such conditions existed, operations would be conducted from the MSB. Under other circumstances it would be preferable that teams of helicopters operate from the FOL. Up to eight escort and eight CH-3s, with crews would be on station at the FOL, rotating with the remaining aircraft and crews of their parent unit. Although weather [redacted] is poorest during the SW monsoon, continuous helicopter operations are not precluded as at Khe Sanh during the NE monsoon. This arrangement would permit scheduled and heavy maintenance to be accomplished by crews and/or maintenance teams from the parent units and POL and ammunition replenishment at the FOL. Helicopters and crews would remain overnight at the FOL. Sixteen revetted helicopter pads were included in the construction at Khe Sanh which would be suitable. Alternative arrangements could be made at an appropriate nearby installation such as Quang Tri, Dong Ha, Phu Bai or Da Nang should security considerations at the time of transfer of predominant operations require such action. For planning purposes, 15 April 1968 was considered as beginning date for predominant MUSCLE SHOALS helicopter operations from Khe Sanh. 184

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(S) On 6 December 1967 CSAF advised CINCPACAF of the advantages of the AH-1G (Cobra) as an armed escort for the CH-3 MUSCLE SHOALS operation. This message was subsequently passed to the Cmdr 7AF for comment. On 21 December Cmdr 7AF indicated his concurrence with Air Staff views, pointing out that the UH-1G would provide an escort compatibility with the CH-3 which the planned UH-1G was incapable because of its superior maneuverability, firepower and reduced logistics requirements at the forward refueling sites. Recognizing that the Cobra was a new weapons delivery system, its employment was requested despite the possible criticality of logistic support. It was felt that special efforts insuring success of the MUSCLE SHOALS mission was warranted.[185]

USS Forrestal Fire

(TS) The fire aboard USS Forrestal on 29 July had far ranging impacts upon the air effort both in-country and over NVN, but it was the curtailment of the bombing program in the latter case that was the most significant. The aircraft of the CVA, especially the A-6s and those capable of delivering the WALLEYE ASM, were to be sorely missed. The greatest concern, however, centered upon the replacement of the total air effort that the CVA could bring to bear.

(TS) Several alternatives were considered: PACFLT CVA resources augmentation in order to reinstate SEVENTHFLT five CVA capability; temporary deployment of two Japan-based USMC air squadrons to Chu Lai; deployment of a composite squadron (six F-100s and ten B-57s) from Clark AFB to RVN; deployment not later than October but on an expedited basis of the F-4 squadron being maintained in a ready status for deployment to RVN. The immediate actions appearing most feasible were modification of the CVA schedules, whereby three CVAs would be on the line approximately 50 percent of the time during August and September, with the October - December CVA schedule adjusted to retain three CVAs 40 percent of the time. During those times when only two CVAs were on the line, it would be feasible to increase the utilization of USAF and USMC in-country assets for support of SL and RP-1 operations while shifting strikes of Thai-based assets to augment further the effort in NVN.

[redacted]

The goal was to maintain the tempo of operations in the critical southern RPs during periods of good weather.[186]

New Techniques

(TS) The SLAM concept of employment of air assets originated in August 1966 with a suggestion by DEPCOMSUMACV for Air. The original concept was designated GRAND SLAM and called for use of air assets from USAF, USN, and USMC, plus artillery and NGF, in the area of northern Quang Tri Province and the SW corner of the DMZ against the 324th NVA Div. When changing circumstances obviated the necessity for the inception of GRAND SLAM, a series of SLAM operations was initiated in Laos, generally oriented toward interdiction of activity on Route 110 in the southern Panhandle. SLAM operations were generated by MACV, based upon all possible sources of information indicating that a geographic concentration of air effort in a designated time frame would have beneficial results. The normal course of events in a SLAM operation was as follows, in sequential order: ARC LIGHT strikes, tactical air for three to five days, PRAIRIE FIRE teams and PSYWAR leaflets. SLAM operations drew their name from their concept:

> Seeking throughout the Panhandle for enemy concentration...
> Locating specific enemy targets and focusing reconnaissance agencies on the specific area...
> Annihilating the enemy forces, equipment and installations in the target area...
> Monitoring afterwards to insure complete annihilation and deny to the enemy any further use...

ARC LIGHT forces might or might not be employed, but usually were considered for the role of triggering the operation, while PRAIRIE FIRE forces were to assume the role of ground bomb damage assessment (BDA) and further selection of lucrative targets for tactical air. SLAM I was initiated on 7 October 1966; SLAM II was initiated on 12 October 1966.[187]

(TS) COMUSMACV nominated SLAM III on 27 January 1967. His recommendation to CINCPAC stated that the area surrounding

the ARC LIGHT target Kontum 502 contained "all the ingredients to validate an area as a SLAM." This judgment was based on the fact that the area was a terminus of the major infiltration route through Laos into RVN, contained numerous enemy troops, and was a major storage area. Further, ARC LIGHT and tactical air strikes had produced 10 or 12 secondary explosions in a 48-hour period, the terrain favored attack because of the difficulty of moving troops and supplies, and the weather was favorable for continued attack. CINCPAC forwarded his approval to JCS with the added comment that the target was "most extraordinary and a golden opportunity rarely presented to inflict severe damage to the enemy."[188]

(TS) 7AF employed the TH operational plan, programming all-night strike aircraft coverage on 30 January, and on 31 January projected 110 daylight sorties plus 22 night sorties between the hours of 1900H and 0645H. Reconnaissance aircraft were scheduled for both pre-strike and post-strike coverage, as well as continuous ABCCC operation. PRAIRIE FIRE teams were to enter the target area to locate and pinpoint targets for follow-on tactical air strikes after two additional 15-plane ARC LIGHT strikes were executed 30-31 January. SLAM III revealed that, in COMUSMACV's estimation, "the single most important lesson is that delayed reaction times stemming from the complex request and approval procedures detracted from attainment of optimum results." On the other hand he was encouraged that SLAM III "validated this technique for disrupting the flow of men and materiel on the infiltration trails of Southern Laos."[189]

(TS) SLAM IV was initiated on 9 April, employing PRAIRIE FIRE forces, B-52s and tactical air. It was again successful, which led COMUSMACV to conclude that an extension of the SLAM concept was required against the enemy.[190]

(TS) The month of August continued the usage of the SLAM concept to a high degree. On 25 August SLAM V had utilized 60 tactical air sorties and 300 ARC LIGHT sorties; SLAM VI utilized eight ARC LIGHT sorties. A COMUSMACV Command/Staff Conference initiated planning for an August SLAM operation in the TALLY HO area. Through coordinated III MAF and 7AF planning, 96 USAF, 30 B-52, 48 CTF 77, and 41 III MAF sorties would be concentrated on the target area beginning 18 August. When it developed that CTF 77 could not provide the sorties requested, the decision was made to continue the concentration of effort into areas

and request a new SLAM effort later in August into that area necessarily left uncovered.[191]

Operation NEUTRALIZE

(TS) In response to NVN pressure on the DMZ and heavy concentrations of enemy artillery against Dong Ha, Con Thien, and Gio Linh, Operation NEUTRALIZE within the SLAM concept was commenced on 12 September 1967 and was terminated as a special project on 1 November. The purpose of the operation was to find the enemy artillery and adjacent storage areas in and near the DMZ and attack with tactical air/B-52 strikes under the control of the ABCCC (Hillsboro). Adverse weather plagued the operation from the start. During the 49-day period from 12 September to 1 November, there were 21 bad weather days with ceilings below 5,000 feet and rain exceeding one inch/day; 11 marginal days with variable broken cloud conditions with rains under one inch/day; and just 17 days which were considered good flying weather with clear to scattered sky conditions, no rainfall or in amounts less than a half inch/day.

(TS) Initially 7AF was prepared to commit 65 tactical air sorties/day to the effort and requested the III MAF to provide an additional 36. The impact of the weather was such that during the operation 7AF was able to achieve only 49 percent of its goal, resulting in 1,436 sorties flown. The III MAF, however, managed to accomplish about 90 percent of their objective and provided 1,584 sorties. Aircraft from TF 77 added an additional 65 sorties through diverts from their primary targets. The employment of B-52s added still more weight to Operation NEUTRALIZE. A total of 43 strikes, involving 393 sorties, the majority of which were "skyspot" controlled, were conducted. Air Force and Marine pilots flew a total of 105 recon sorties in support of the operation.

(S) Although the goals established for Operation NEUTRALIZE were not achieved, it was considered an effective project. The massive application of airpower significantly reduced the enemy's ability to support his effort by inflicting heavy casualties on reinforcements and by destroying supplies and equipment in his forward logistic support areas. This resulted in marked changes in

the enemy's tactics. He was forced to disperse his artillery to prevent extensive damage from single strikes; he was unable to concentrate his forces without risking heavy losses from B-52 strikes; he was unable to maintain forward supply and storage areas; and many of his defensive positions, which had been constructed and reinforced, were destroyed and no longer served as a haven. In summary, CG III MAF, in reporting to COMUSMACV on 9 November 1967, wrote, in part: ". . . in the DMZ area, indications are that the ARC LIGHT strikes were a major factor in, at least temporarily, dislodging the enemy from assembly areas just south of the DMZ and in the vicinity of Con Thien, and in the destruction of his prepositioned supplies."[192]

(TS) SHOCK operations, [redacted] are more closely tied to the employment of tactical air assets. ARC LIGHT strikes are not precluded from SHOCK operations, but in general the time frame of these operations is of shorter duration, making them more dependent upon tactical air employment. RLAF [redacted] forces play a considerable role in SHOCK operations. Coordination for these operations lies chiefly between 7AF and AMEMB Vientiane, [redacted] Similar to SLAM, a SHOCK operation was to be a continuous effort throughout each hour of a stipulated time period, and COMBAT SKYSPOT plus FAC facilities were utilized--the former for night-time and all-weather capability, and the latter in an attempt to utilize VR direction of tactical air to the greatest possible extent. An example of the flexibility and capability of the air effort to respond readily to the requests for air strikes was exemplified in the latter part of April. AMEMB Vientiane requested an additional 30 sorties/day for four days, to be employed against confirmed targets along Route 110 in Laos. Seventeen hours later 7AF responded, "prepared to allocate the required sorties. We will back up the strike effort with intensified photo reconnaissance to uncover additional target areas. . . look forward to some good hunting." AMEMB Vientiane, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and 7AF had all participated in the confirmation of this required expenditure of air effort.[193]

(S) Operation SHOCK I received a "successful operation" designated by USAIRA Vientiane on 7 May. The operation along Route 110 in southern Laos was directed toward the reduction of the numerous facilities of the enemy's logistical network along

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this route. A total of 119/35 (day/night) missions were executed. The success of SHOCK I was predicted upon eleven indices, but overall it was felt that "secondary explosions alone clearly support the conclusion that operation s primary objective (i.e., destruction of accumulated stocks of military supplies and disruption of enemy lines of communication) was effectively accomplished." Nevertheless, the feeling was that more lucrative results would have been achieved if the operation had been extended to an eight or ten-day period. Furthermore, experience gained indicated that defoliation was of utmost importance for visual reconnaissance in establishing target identification and signif[illegible]. The result was that a SHOCK II operation, encompas[illegible] portion of Route 110 was considered appropriat[illegible] conjunction with the possibility of a SHOCK II operation, COMUSMACV requested a change in the bombing rules applicable to [illegible]mbodian border. He felt that past policy precluding air strikes [illegible] than five km was too restrictive since the inception of incr[illegible] activity along Route 110 from Cambodia through southern Laos [illegible]o RVN. Employing FAC controlled strikes, COMUSMACV proposed the delivery of ordnance right up to the Cambodian border.[194]

(S) SHOCK II, a Laotian operation to neutralize enemy storage and transshipment facilities and to harass enemy infiltration along the Sihanouk Trail (Route 110), extended over the period 20-27 May. The plan was indorsed by 7/13AF, AMEMB Vientiane, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV and carried out by 7/13AF and RLAF aircraft. Several factors, beyond achieving the original objectives, revealed lessons learned and rated the SHOCK II operation as a success: the importance of FACs to such a concentrated air interdiction program could not be overemphasized, RLAF and FAR staffs participating in planning and execution gained valuable experience, and targets were detected and destroyed by an effective and economical use of air power.[195]

(TS) SHOCK III originated from Dep Cmdrs 7/13AF with the support and approval of AMEMB Vientiane, [redacted] and DAIRA Savannahket and was aimed against enemy infiltration of men and supplies from the Ban Bac area south along the Se Kong. SHOCK III was intended to search-and-destroy river traffic, storage areas, supplies, and troop concentrations by using 30 sorties a day from 30 June - 4 July or until a total of 150 missions had been expended. Such an effort hopefully would disrupt the infiltration of men and supplies on the Se Kong into RVN and contribute to the countering of

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a serious threat posed to friendly forces holding the Boloven Plateau. The special effort was ended on the evening of 4 July, but had been hampered by bad weather.[196]

(TS) SHOCK IV was conducted 26-30 December. It was a joint USAF/RLAF effort conducted in the southern TH area of Laos to counteract increasing enemy supply activity from Cambodia along Routes 110, 96, and 165, E of Chavane, into the Attopeu/Bolovens area of Laos and RVN. It was requested by the AMEMB Vientiane, and supported with 160 sorties/day by 7AF and 28 sorties/day by the RLAF on previously validated targets consisting of truck parks, storage areas and troop concentrations. RLAF aircraft attacked supply boats on the Se Kong and those portions of the routes within five km of the Cambodian border. This operation culminated a month long interdiction effort during which time a record number of truck kills were made (902), which was more than five times greater than the record for December 1966 (170), according to records maintained by the AMEMB Vientiane.[197]

NVN Air Defenses

(TS) During the summer months of 1967 MIG activity and SA-2 firings continued at a reduced rate. The marked improvement of NVN air defenses, however, beginning in October and increasing through November and December, was a matter of concern. On the 26th of December a joint plan for strikes against selected elements of the NVN air defense system was promulgated. The objective of the plan was to provide both 7AF and TF 77 strike forces with a degraded air defense environment, thus permitting attacks against priority targets with increased effectiveness. In order to achieve the objective, it was necessary to accomplish the following tasks:

1) Reduce or destroy the SA-2 order of battle to a significant extent.

2) Degrade or destroy selected EW sites that have an associated GCI capability.

3) Further degrade SAM/MIG effectiveness by destroying command and control facilities when discovered.

(TS) The essential element of the plan was the destruction of the ability of the enemy to coordinate EW/GCI aircraft and SA-2 firings.

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Because of its dispersion in depth and large numbers, the AAA system was considered a separate problem and outside the purview of the plan. The first phase of the planned operation was expected to be directed against the S-2 system, with aircraft working from the periphery inward, as far as possible. Every effort would be made to destroy each active site. The control van was to be the primary objective at each site in order to achieve more lasting results by the maximum attribution of specialized personnel and equipment. This was to be followed as soon as possible, or even concurrently with, the second phase, coordinated USAF/TF attacks directed at nullification of the EW/GCI system. The third phase of the operation would be to maintain the NVN SA-2 and EW/GCI systems in a reduced effective condition.[198]

Accidental Delivery of Ordnance

(S) The single most destructive accidental delivery of ordnance by air in RVN occurred at 1910H on 2 March 1967. A Special Forces camp and the adjoining village of Lang Vei were struck by two F-4C aircraft. While making two passes in the area the aircraft expended CBUs, MK-82 bombs, and rockets, accounting for 83 KIA and 175 WIA. Civilian casualties amounted to 78 killed and 165 wounded, with the remainder being various Service personnel. Although the Special Forces camp sustained only light damage, the village was estimated to be 60 to 70 percent destroyed. Forty-five minutes after the attack, MEDEVAC of wounded was in progress. Some 140 civilian wounded were evacuated, while 24 minor injuries were treated at the scene. MACV assistance included medical supplies, blankets, and clothing. The attack resulted from an error in navigation by a USAF flight on an authorized armed reconnaissance mission over Laos. The pilots, depending upon visual identification, were misled by the similarity of topographical features to those of their target area. To preclude a recurrence, absolute compliance with Laotian ROEs was recommended.[199]

(S) ARC LIGHT forces became involved in the civilain casualties debacle in late August. The incident occurred when the B-52 forces were targeted into the DMZ to assist in relieving the pressure applied by the enemy in I CTZ from the sanctuary of the DMZ. The particular nine-plane mission was designed to strike at a major enemy buildup posing an immediate threat to Con Thien/Gio Linh.

Previous Operations HICKORY, LAM SON 54, and BEAU CHARGER had reportedly cleared the DMZ area around Trung Luong of all civilians and friendly RVN forces. The target was developed by III MAF from intelligence that indicated NVN fortifications, AAA/AW positions, suspected bivouac areas, defensive works, and supply caches around Trung Luong. Knowledge that the impending target was to be struck was shared by the 3d Mar Div, MACV, I Corps Advisory Group, and the 1st ARVN Div. At 21052H August 1967 the ARC LIGHT mission, with all bombs on target, struck a compound housing an RVN Police Field Force unit, causing an estimated 11 police killed and 23 wounded. In an effort to prevent a recurrence of civilian casualties in the DMZ, COMUSMACV proposed to Chief JGS that all police be withdrawn, and that the only necessary substitute required be a military observation post overlooking the Ben Hai River bridge. Following the establishment of this recommended course of action, the remainder of the DMZ would be declared a "free strike" zone.[200]

(S) In the attempt to keep noncombatant casualties to an absolute minimum, RVNAF and FWMAF complied with various restrictive procedures. Those relating to the employment of air were also applicable to artillery fire and NGF. In hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants:

> All attacks will be controlled by an airborne or ground forward air controller, tactical air controller (Airborne), ground observer or RVNAF observer and will be executed only after US/GVN/RVNAF approval, as appropriate.
>
> Hamlets and villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (by leaflet and/or speaker or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.
>
> Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgment of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.


In the face of the increased number of civilian casualty incidents accompanying the increased tempo of the war, captured VC documents

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revealed that villagers denied access to guerrillas, fearing government forces attacks with guns and planes. 201

New Weapons

(S) By the last week in January 1967 COMUSMACV was vitally interested in means to reduce the infiltration of NVA forces into RVN through Laos during the dry season. He noted that the riot control agent CS had been approved and that tests conducted at Eglin AFB had demonstrated that bulk CS delivered in napalm tanks could contaminate an area for a period up to 72 hours. [redacted] COMUSMACV requested the approval for use of CS agents in conjunction with interdiction of choke points, so as to extend the required time for repairs and thus contribute toward the development of profitable targets. [redacted]



(S) Added to the arsenal of interdiction weapons was the planned employment of the MK-36 Destructor weapon. CINCPAC had conveyed the approval for use of the weapon on 4 February, and supplemented this by indicating "planned employment of subject weapons

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in NVN is the interdiction of logistical movement of military personnel and material on inland waterways, estuaries, and key land LOCs in RPs 1 - 6B." Tactical aircraft would be employed as the primary delivery of a token number of general purpose bombs to conceal initially the nature of operations. Targets included principal river estuaries, waterways, crossing points (fixed bridges, pontoon bridges, fords and ferry/waterborne logistic craft crossings), passes, critical road intersections, railroads, construction sites, and transshipment points along key land LOCs. Reconnaissance would determine interdiction effectivess and locate new targets in event the enemy created bypasses of the seeded areas.[203]

(TS) By October the MK-36 Destructor was considered to be a significant weapon in the campaign to disrupt the use of LOCs in NVN. Primary emphasis was placed on the use of the weapons against the water LOCs surrounding Hanoi and Haiphong. In spite of an indication of predetonation at an unacceptably high rate from previous seedings, a preliminary analysis of a segment of Route 1A in RP-2 revealed a definite impact from the use of MK-36s in water at river crossings, ferry slips and fords. From 24 July - 10 September 1967, an average of 50 trucks/week were sighted transiting this area. On 10 September 248 MK-36s were seeded. During the following week no trucks were sighted; from 18-30 September ten vehicles were sighted and during the next two weeks only two vehicles were sighted. Between 16-18 October, 31 trucks were seen S of the seeded areas, indicating the fields were no longer active. On 21 October the area was reseeded and photography taken two days later revealed a road barrier, indicating traffic was being rerouted.[204]

(S) On 4 December 1967 Cmdr 7AF forwarded a plan to CINCPACAF for seeding MK-36s in RP-1 prior to 24 December as a means of deterring the movement of supplies from NVN during the anticipated Christmas stand-down. It was intended to seed a portion of the Song Troc River, a portion of the Kien/Dai Giang River, parts of the Song Giang and other targets. The areas were selected for seeding to deter any attempt by the enemy to bypass a seeded ferry by establishing a new river crossing point. In addition, it was intended to reseed as authorized after the Christmas truce.[205]

(TS) Another weapon employed for the first time in 1967 against targets in NVN was the WALLEYE ASM. By strict definition the

WALLEYE was not a missile, but rather a guided glide bomb using a television guidance system. Employment of the system requires visual identification of the target, at which time it is tracked through the TV guidance system of the missile which is connected to the pilot's picture tube in the cockpit. The aircraft is then maneuvered to put the target image within tracking gates that show up on the cockpit display indicator as double lined cross hairs. When the target is gated, the WALLEYE TV guidance system locks on the target and the automatic weapon release sequence starts. After WALLEYE is released from the aircraft, it is automatically guided to the target during its free fall. After release, the pilot is free to break off the attack.

(TS) The WALLEYE was first employed in NVN on 20 May 1967. It was used sparingly throughout the year against hard targets such as the Hanoi TPP, bridges in the Hanoi/Haiphong area and airfields, where utmost accuracy was important. During the month of October WALLEYE attacks used in conjunction with the RT program were extremely productive. Twenty-six weapons were delivered with excellent results on high value targets. Of significance were the strikes on the Hanoi TPP and Phuc Yen Airfield. On the strike against the Hanoi TPP, a new deception was noted. In an apparent effort to defeat the WALLEYE guidance system, white smoke generators were operating on all sides of the power plant, nearly obscuring the target. Pilots were able to obtain lock on by increasing their dive angle to approximately 30° and delivered three WALLEYEs. In support of the strike on the Phuc Yen Airfield on 25 October, WALLEYEs were launched against the control tower and the main hangar with both targets receiving extensive damage.[206]

NAVAL OPERATIONS

In-Country

(C) As delineated by CINCPAC and refined by COMUSMACV, the strategy in RVN for 1967 included plans to seek out and destroy the enemy by offensive military operations. Major efforts in achieving this goal were the anti-infiltration programs in RVN. Operation GAME WARDEN had begun to interdict enemy movement in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) and the major rivers of the Delta, and was expanded to the I CTZ in September 1967 by the addition of the USS Hunterdon County (LST 838), with 10 PBRs embarked to begin Operation GREEN WAVE. This marked the first time GAME WARDEN units had operated outside of the Delta and the surrounding regions. The principal mission of this operation was to determine the feasibility of PBR operations in the I CTZ. As additional hydrographic data became available, GAME WARDEN would be further expanded into western RVN as feasible. Operation MARKET TIME had been successful in reducing VC infiltration by sea, and in 1967 the completion of shore radar sites and the addition of Patrol Gunboats (PG) to the ships available to MARKET TIME would result in increased flexibility and responsiveness.

(C) During 1966, at US urging, the GVN had instituted a system of convoys for all merchant shipping transiting from the South China Sea to Cambodia and return. The purpose was to make shippers reluctant to use the Mekong and Bassac Rivers and the Mekong Port of Phonom Penh for cargoes that often fell into enemy hands, forcing them to divert Cambodian cargoes to already overcrowded Sihanoukville. Additionally, convoys prevented material being unloaded to the VC during transit of the RVN portion of the rivers. During 1967 full support to this convoy program would be given, since as pressures were brought to bear on the other LOCs in NVN and Laos, the enemy could be expected to increase his use of Cambodian LOCs.

(U) To expand US/GVN control of the rice-rich and populous Delta region, the first elements of the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF), the 9th Inf Div, had partially deployed to their base at Dong Tam in December 1966. The Dong Tam base was to

be expanded during 1967, and the arrival of the USN ships and craft programmed for MDMAF would establish the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF).

(C) COMSEVENTHFLT would continue to provide Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) ships for operations in RVN in support of COMUSMACV. The Amphibious Ready Group/Special Landing Force (ARG/SLF) of SEVENTHFLT (TG 76.5) would continue to conduct amphibious landings in support of MACV ground operations, principally in I CTZ. A second ARG/SLF was being formed to be ready for operations in May, which moved CINCPAC to direct a reevaluation of the role of the ARG/SLF to determine the feasibility of employing the ARG/SLF in "dagger thrust" raids responsive to intelligence on VC/NVN concentrations or infiltration routes.

(U) Units of TF 76, the Amphibious Force, US SEVENTHFLT (primarily LSTs) provided continuing intracoastal logistic support in all four CTZs. Additionally, in response to a TMA-USMACV/MSTS-VN requirement a Separate Operations Group, TG 76.9, was activated on 11 April to support the movement of TF OREGON from the Saigon area to the southern I CTZ.

(U) A naval hospital ship (USS Repose (AH-16) would continue to provide valuable offshore assistance to forces in the I CTZ throughout the year. The recommissioning of USS Sanctuary (AH-17) and its arrival in Da Nang on 10 April 1967 meant that COMSEVENTHFLT could then provide continual hospital ship support to COMUSMACV.

(U) Concurrently, the 3d Naval Construction Brigade (NCB) provided support to US forces, ROKF, and USAID programs throughout RVN in port and base development, fortifications construction, civil affairs projects, and a myriad of construction tasks (airfields, bridges, roads, culverts, barracks, POL lines, etc.).

(C) At year's end total Navy and USCG personnel in RVN stood at 32,109 as compared to 24,007 twelve months previous. In addition, some 35,000 naval personnel were serving offshore in units of the SEVENTHFLT.[206]

Operation MARKET TIME

(C) Under the operational control of Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV), COMUSMACV's naval component commander, the Coastal/Surveillance Force (TF 115), known as Operation MARKET TIME, was charged with the detection and prevention of waterborne logistics craft attempting to infiltrate into RVN. MARKET TIME force consisted of Radar Picket Escort Destroyers (DER), Ocean Minesweepers (MSO), Coastal Minesweepers (MSC), and SP-2H, P5M and P-3A patrol aircraft of the SEVENTHFLT; Fast Patrol Craft (PCF) known as Swift boats, 82-foot Coast Guard Cutters (WPB) with supporting auxiliaries, Tank Landing Ships (LST), and Repair Barges (YR); patrol craft of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) Sea Force and Coastal Force (the junk force), which patrolled the shallow inshore and offshore waters to detect small sampans conducting point-to-point redistribution of war materiel and personnel. To complete MARKET TIME as a thoroughly international force, Thailand provided one Medium Patrol Gunboat (PGM) for patrol duties.

(C) Rules of engagement permitted MARKET TIME units to stop, visit, and search any vessel (less warships) within three miles of the RVN coast. Within the 12-mile contiguous zone units could visit and search any vessel (less warships) which gave a false response when asked for identification and declaration of intent, or was considered suspicious. Foreign-flag vessels could not be searched unless specific authorization from CTF 115 was obtained. Outside the contiguous zone, SVN vessels, or those reasonably suspected to be SVN, would be stopped to determine if they were violating the laws of RVN. Surveillance was coordinated and controlled from USN/VNN-manned Coastal Surveillance Centers (CS) at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi.[207]

(S) In late December 1966 and early January 1967 the composition of the SEVENTHFLT force in MARKET TIME came under discussion in relation to an overall Western Pacific (WESTPAC) shortage of combatant ships to meet the increased requirements of expanded SEA DRAGON operations and NGFS in RVN. CINCPACFLT desired to redeploy the MARKET TIME DER/MSO/MSC to other SEVENTHFLT duties, such as the Taiwan Straits patrol, in order to free

destroyers (DD) for SEA DRAGON and NGFS assignments, when the MARKET TIME ships could be spared by COMUSMACV. CINCPAC approved the realignment of forces after COMUSMACV concurred in the proposal. Direct liaison between COMUSMACV and COMSEVENTHFLT to work out details and scheduling was directed, and COMUSMACV proposed the withdrawal of two MSO/MSC as LSTs arrived to set up mobile MARKET TIME bases, and later reduction when shore-based surveillance radars became operational.[208]

(U) MARKET TIME forces made their first significant enemy contact on 1 January when PCFs operating off the Cau Mau Peninsula detected a steel-hulled trawler. As the Swifts closed to investigate, their challenges were ignored and the trawler opened fire. Machine gun and mortar fire from the PCFs set the trawler afire and five secondary explosions were observed. The next morning the trawler had disappeared. Six MARKET TIME personnel were wounded in the engagement; enemy casualties were unknown. MARKET TIME boarding and search operations continued during the February Lunar New Year (Tet) stand-down.

(C) Additional service was done by MARKET TIME forces in providing infiltration/exfiltration patrols for both Amphibious Ready Groups during the latter's conduct of amphibious assaults in the I and IV CTZs. NGFS by MARKET TIME units as well as SAR were provided on an as requested basis.[209]

(S) In early March, CINCPACFLT again requested release of two DERs from MARKET TIME. COMUSMACV did not concur until suitable replacements arrived, pointing out:

> There is no indication that NVN has or will stop attempting to infiltrate badly needed arms and ammunition into RVN in large lots by sea. Rather, it is considered likely that it will continue its efforts to provide needed supplies to the NVN units located in the Coastal areas of I, II, and III Corps and to the VC in the Delta utilizing ships of different types capable of carrying 50 to 120 tons a trip. While it is considered that the probability of coastal infiltration into northern I Corps has been reduced greatly by Operation SEA DRAGON, it is considered also that there has been no diminution of the threat in other VC occupied areas of RVN.

However, the probability of infiltration attempts being successful has been reduced to a certain extent by increased concentration of the off-shore and inshore barriers in areas where infiltration is considered most likely to accure.

CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV, directing that DERs not be re-assigned until they were relieved on station by USCG cutters, which were scheduled to arrive in May. COMUSMACV approved and forwarded COMNAVFORV's request for nine heavy-weather patrol boats to augment the PCFs assigned to MARKET TIME. The request was included in the CINCPAC Program 5 submission to JCS.[210]

(C) No further major infiltration attempts were detected until 14 March, when a steel-hulled trawler was intercepted near Chu Lai by the USS Brister (DER-327), USCGC Point Ellis, and PCF-78. The 100-ton trawler opened fire on the USN/USCG ships, which returned the fire. The trawler beached at Phuc Thien, 60 miles SE of Da Nang, and exploded. Subsequent salvage operations revealed that the trawler had been carrying guns, ammunition, food, and medicine. By 31 March, GAME WARDEN support LSTs were providing radar surveillance of the seaward approaches to their river mouth stations, and one MSO/MSC was released to COMSEVENTHFLT.[211]

(U) No major sea infiltration attempts were detected during April, but 18 sampans which attempted to evade MARKET TIME units when challenged were sunk, and six ground operations were supported by NGFS and blocking actions. On 30 April the first of seven Patrol Gunboats (PG), USS Gallup (PG-85), arrived at Cam Ranh Bay to augment MARKET TIME forces and free SEVENTH-FLT forces for other duties. On 11 April the last P5M (Martin Marlin) MARKET TIME surveillance flight took off from the seadrome at Cam Ranh Bay ending a chapter in the history of this operation and naval aviation.[212]

(S) In late April a special study group with members from CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, and COMNAVFORV met in Saigon to determine the effectiveness of MARKET TIME, how to maximize this effectiveness, and what were optimum future force

requirements. The study concluded that MARKET TIME was an effective counterinfiltration effort providing a 94 percent detection probability for steel-hulled shipping, a 70 percent detection probability for large wooden-hulled ships, and a 25 percent detection capability for small intracoastal sampan shipping. The study recommended that the current force level (projected through 1 May) be maintained at two patrol aircraft (VP) on continuous patrol, five USCG WHECs or USN DERs on offshore station, six USN minesweepers (MSOs or MSCs) on offshore station, two USN PGs in-country, 26 USCG WPBs in-country, and 84 USN PCFs in-country. Further, the study recommended that five additional PGs (then under construction in CONUS) be competed and deployed expeditiously and that the nine heavy weather patrol boats requested in the FY68 force requirements be approved. 213

(C) During May MARKET TIME forces were further augmented by the arrival of the second PG, USS Asheville (PG-84) and the first three 311' class high endurance cutters (WHECs)--USCGC Barataria (WHEC-381), Bering Strait (WHEC-382), and Gresham (WHEC-387). A significant "first," not only for MARKET TIME but for the naval advisory effort, occurrred on 8 May when VNN PCE-08 relieved [illegible] Lucid (MSO-458) on patrol. Later, VNN PCE-12 relieved USS [illegible]inet (MSC-290). Although the VNN Fleet Command had been conducting offshore patrol operations and the VNN coastal patrol force had been conducting inshore patrols, the VNN had not put ships direct into the TF 115 organization as an integral part of the MARKET TIME force structure. In these two cases the USN ships were released for special operations which otherwise would have required employment of additional scarce SEVENTHFLT resources.

(C) MARKET TIME activity for May showed a sharp increase in sightings and boardings, mainly because of improved weather conditions. No large-scale infiltration attempts were detected but one incident illustrated the type of mutual support practiced in GVN waters. During Operation BEAU CHARGER, a USN/USMC amphibious assault and sweep near the DMZ, MARKET TIME forces were employed as blocking and coastal patrol support forces to the SEVENTHFLT ARG/SLF. The USCGC Point Dume was operating near the Hon Gio Island (NVN), just north of the DMZ. At 0315H on 23 May, while enroute to join Point Dume, PCF-13 detected several junks and approached to investigate.

The Swift boat fired warning shots and called one of the junks alongside. The junk's crew took to the water and the other junk evaded to the north. PCF-13 stopped to inspect the abandoned junk and found approximately ten 100-lb bags of rice with CHICOM markings, ten crates of 81mm mortar ammunition, a number of rifles, and a .45 caliber pistol. The Swift boat then fired on the junk's waterborne crew with concussion grenades, and turned toward six nearby junks making for Hon Gio. As the PCF approached another craft and fired warning shots, the crew of the junk jumped into the water and dispersed. A check of the junk disclosed a quantity of rice and arms. The Swift boat and Point Dume then converged on the remaining junks and came under small arms and grenade fire during the pursuit. The MARKET TIME units returned the fire, destroying three of the junks and damaging two others. The US craft then began receiving artillery fire from enemy positions on Hon Gio, and withdrew as the SEVENTHFLT's USS Ozbourn (DD-846) moved in and silenced the artillery emplacements.[214]

(TS) A June MACJ2 evaluation of MARKET TIME effectiveness stated:

> From all indication, Navy interdiction efforts and the deployment of FWMAF along the coastal areas of SVN have made enemy resupply efforts too costly. As an alternative, the enemy has been forced to rely on routes through Laos, which have been developed into Classic LOCs.[215]

(U) July brought another major infiltration attempt by steel-hulled trawlers which was successfully thwarted by MARKET TIME forces. At 111125Z a patrol aircraft in the vicinity of Tan Am detected a suspicious trawler heading SW into RVN waters. It was taken under close surveillance. Then after it turned to the east it was led to believe that surveillance had been discontinued. Covert surveillance showed that it later resumed its course toward Cape Batangan. As it closed the coast and entered RVN territorial waters MARKET TIME units closed and challenged. When the challenge was ignored, the trawler was taken under fire, driven aground, and captured 15 miles NE of Quang Ngai City. Navy and ROK units boarded the trawler and removed 1,168 weapons, 706,000 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, 1,960 antipersonnel mines, 1,730 hand grenades, 5,750 rounds of 12.7 ammunition, 10,000 lbs

of explosives and other assorted ordnance and equipment. One body was found on board.. The trawler was rigged for complete self-destruction with 2,046 lbs of TNT, but the charge was not activated.[216]

(C) MARKET TIME detection capability in the southern portions of III and IV Coastal Zones was enhanced on 23 August when the radar station on Poulo Obi Island (12 miles S of Ca Mau Point) became operational. Not only did the probability of detection during darkness and foul weather increase, but the station could vector patrol craft to intercept contacts. On 18 August Coastal Squadron THREE (PGs) was commissioned at Cam Ranh Bay marking continued increase and refinement of US forces in the MARKET TIME effort.

(C) MARKET TIME force versatility was thoroughly proven in September as I CTZ PCFs and WPBs supported the SEVENTHFLT Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG) with exfiltration-infiltration patrols during Operations BEACON POINT (1-2 September), BALLISTIC CHARGE (15-21 September), and FORTRESS SENTRY (16-18 September) plus NGFS spotting for USS Boston (CAG-1) and USS Dupont (DD-941) on 1-2 September.

(C) Resulting from the discovery that after over two years of operations as much as one-half of the original PCF hull thickness on some craft had corroded, a conference was held at Cam Ranh Bay on 8-9 September to set up an out-of-country overhaul cycle for these craft. Four craft each would go to Subic Bay and Sasebo every two months, starting in December, for a total of 24 over a six-month period. Another review of operating procedures resulted in the shifting of MARKET TIME patrol boundaries an average of five miles inland at the major river mouths. This was designed primarily to improve delineation and in recognition of the greater seaworthiness of MARKET TIME craft over those of GAME WARDEN.[217]

(C) The monsoonal shift in October occasioned the semiannual movement of nine USCG cutters to the I and II Coastal Zones and the sending of a comparable number of PCFs southward. Airborne patrol tracks in the Gulf of Thailand were extended westward to include surveillance of sea traffic bound for Cambodia.[218]

(C) The deleterious weather of the NE monsoon, causing extreme entrance swells, resulted in the capsizing and sinking of two Swift boats (Nos. 14 and 74) at the entrance to the Cua Viet

channel in November. In the light of this loss Cau Viet operations were suspended on 30 November, pending an improvement in the weather. Elsewhere MARKET TIME operations continued at their normal pace. However, the continual effect of the NE monsoon caused a continuing decline in both MARKET TIME patrol activity and coastal junk and sampan traffic. The lowest number of junks and sampans detected in 13 months time was recorded in December (34,591). 114 NGFS missions and 14 hostile fire incidents were reported, primarily in IV CTZ where fair weather prevailed.[219]

(U) Also a part of harbor defense was the STABLE DOOR force charged with harbor surveillance in the ports of Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Saigon, and Vung Tau. Made up of USN Mobile Inshore Underseas Warfare (MIUW) teams, they provided continuous surveillance of waterborne craft transiting anchorage areas by use of high resolution radars and by small craft patrols. These teams boarded and searched craft much in the manner as MARKET TIME forces did at sea. Divers and UDT personnel checked ship bottoms and chains on a frequent basis too. Coordination of effort was achieved through the local Coastal Surveillance Center. STABLE DOOR forces suffered their first major setback with the successful mining of the British tanker SS Amastra, shortly after midnight on 12 April, in Nha Trang harbor. This ship settled by the stern but was soon refloated and repaired.

Operation GAME WARDEN

(U) The River Patrol Force (TF 116), Operation GAME WARDEN, had been implemented during 1966 to interdict VC waterborne traffic on the inland waterways of RVN, particularly the Mekong Delta region, and to open those waterways to legitimate traffic. USN crews manned 120 River Patrol Boats (PBR) operating from five fixed bases, three LSTs, and one mobile base in the IV CTZ and RSSZ. Under the operational control of COMNAVFORV, GAME WARDEN forces patrolled the inland waterways; provided gunfire support for US/RVN/FWMA forces; transported troops; and evacuated civilian and military casualties and refugees. Of special concern to GAME WARDEN was the RSSZ, through which all shipping into Saigon had to pass. During 1966, 11 separate mining attempts against merchant shipping or mine countermeasures (MCM) units were attempted, the most significant being the planting

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length of the waterways under firm control of friendly forces was minimal and confined to waterfronts of the major ports and river cities; complete denial of the waterways to the enemy would require an increase in patrol density to blockade portions and the control of adjacent river branches; and that the enemy had the capability to exercise local control at the time of his choosing. The additional 80 PBRs (50 for IV CTZ, 10 for Saigon/RSSZ, and the later cancelled 20 with two YFNB for I CTZ) authorized under Program 4, along with additional helicopters, were considered to be sufficient forces to accomplish the mission. The arrival of the Mobile Riverine Force in the Delta would complement GAME WARDEN and enhance the overall posture of US forces in the area.222

(U) GAME WARDEN activity intensified in January with numerous fire fights between PBRs and VC forces in the Delta and 12 incidents in the main river channels of Saigon. Three significant incidents occurred in January that pointed up the nature of GAME WARDEN activities. On 1 January at 0050 hours, a Soirap River patrol detected a loaded junk and closed to investigate. At a range of about 75 yards, the junk opened fire on the lead PBR, which returned the fire causing three VC KIA, one missing, and one detained. The junk proved to be on an ammunition supply mission; inspection uncovered one CHICOM machine gun, nine drums of 7.62mm ammunition, 15 B-40 antitank rockets, 45 rounds of 75mm RR ammunition, 500 grenades, 10,000 rounds of 7.62, 30,000 rounds of 9mm ball ammunition, and several hundred feet of safety fuse. Responding to an interrogation report of a VC captured earlier, GAME WARDEN joined forces with USA, RF, and VNN River Assault Groups (RAG) on 20 January to stage a raid on a VC quartermaster depot in the RSSZ. Naval units acted as a blocking and transport force. The day-long operation netted four KIA, 40 possible KIA, 10 cases of TNT destroyed, 45 tons of rice, 40 lbs of documents, 12 bars of silver, and cloth and uniforms captured, plus 30 detainees and 320 refugees removed when the friendly forces withdrew.

(U) In the RSSZ there were three mining attempts and nine other hostile fire incidents directed against USN and VNN MCM units and merchant shipping. The British tanker Haustrom was hit by SA and 75mm RR fire on 9 January, killing one man and wounding the ship's master. The flexibility of GAME WARDEN

was increased with the arrival of the second specially reconfigured support ship, USS Harnett County (LST-821), on 17 January.223

(C) February saw an increase in enemy attention to the RSSZ. One MSB was sunk and two damaged with two USN KIA and 16 wounded by mining and ambushes along the Long Tau Channel. On 15 February COMUSMACV increased ground support for GAME WARDEN units in the RSSZ by directing CG II FFORCEV to deploy two infantry companies on a concurrent basis for a period of 30 days. In response to COMNAVFORV's request, on 25 February COMUSMACV augmented RSSZ forces by directing CG II FFORCEV to provide nightly FIREFLY missions and three light helicopter fire teams. In early March COMNAVFORV summarized the measures being taken to protect MCM units in the RSSZ. In addition to the above mentioned force, ARC LIGHT strikes against the suspected VC headquarters area had been conducted. The MSBs and PBRs had been recently outfitted with the MK-18 grenade launcher, a new hand-cranked weapon that delivered 250 40mm grenades per minute. COMNAVFORV advanced for consideration by CINCPACFLT the employment of the new Armored Support Patrol Boat (ASPB), fitted with sweep gear, which could better absorb ambush fires and provide more return firepower. Development of a drone MCM craft was also being undertaken. In summary, COMNAVFORV noted:

> Regardless of any mix of forces brought to bear in RSSZ, until the banks of Long Tau are secured by troops our river forces will always take the initial blow. . .
>
> Until such time when we acquire the capability to prevent a wily enemy from reaching ambush sites of his choice we will continue unfortunately to receive casualties. We are doing our best and welcome assistance.
>
> The close coordination, mutual support and cooperation demonstrated by COMUSMACV in solving the unique problems in this initial area have been and continue to be most gratifying.

(U) In the Bassac River area in March, SEAL teams conducted ambush and reconnaissance missions. On 17 March PBRs came to

the relief of an outpost on May Island under attack by an estimated 200 enemy. The PBRs called in artillery fire and made firing runs, initiating two large secondary explosions and disrupting the enemy attack. A sweep by PF counted 16 VC KIA. A new VC tactic against the increasingly effective GAME WARDEN patrols was demonstrated when one USN officer and one enlisted man were killed and three enlisted men were wounded by accurate VC sniper fire delivered from ranges up to 500 yards. An enemy document captured in the RSSZ on 21 February had indicated that the VC RSSZ Command (T-10) had received five sniper rifles and in late March RVN Marines captured three M1891/30 (Russian) sniper rifles, one with a 3.5-power telescopic sight. [224]

(U) The final two of four GAME WARDEN LSTs arrived during March, providing additional mobility and flexibility. In the main channel to Saigon the VC continued their attempts to harass and interdict patrols and merchant shipping. On 9 March a claymore mine was detonated against a US minesweeper seven miles SE of Nha Be, showering the boat with pellets but causing no casualties. A large underwater explosion between two patrol boats on 15 March in the lower Long Tau River spewed water, mud, and dead fish 150 feet in the air, but only jarred the PBRs. On the afternoon of 16 March the US merchant ship SS Conqueror was hit by RR fire from VC positions on the east bank of the Long Tau three miles downstream from Nha Be. A PBR patrol came to Conqueror's assistance, drawing fire which was returned. One merchant seaman and two USA MPs of the ship's security guard were wounded. Another claymore mine was detonated against MSB 31 in the Long Tau Channel on 24 March. PBRs and a helicopter fire team suppressed the accompanying enemy small arms fire. [225]

(TS) In his request for additional PBRs and armed helicopters as a part of Program 5 (FY69), COMUSMACV stated the requirement:

> The Game Warden operation was developed to interdict enemy LOCs, enforce the curfew on river traffic, and permit legitimate use of major waterways without the threat of VC taxation. Approximately 400 miles of major waterways in the Mekong Delta have been identified for continuous surveillance. The additional waterways of the RSSZ further

have been included within the scope of this operation. Of the forces approved to accomplish the required surveillance, 150 PBRs will be deployed in the Delta and 30 in the RSSZ. Experience developed during Game Warden operations has shown that the PBR unsupported by air interdiction cannot accomplish fully the required interdiction of enemy LOCs. Therefore, armed helos were added to the forces, at a ratio of [redacted] The resulting helo/PBR tactics, as developed, have attained a high degree of success, and have demonstrated that the helo is essential to the success of the operation. Without the helo fire teams, the inherent capabilities of the PBR cannot be used effectively in interdiction missions.

[redacted]

This detection capability is insufficient in view of the enemy's necessity to make increased use of the waterways, as his control over the area's people and resources decreases. The minimum recommended increase in Game Warden forces is 50 PBR and 9 helos. In view of the increased offensive operations of MDMAF, the additional PBR patrols will result in denying to the enemy much of the support he has depended upon historically. This increase will provide sufficient PBR assets for continuous patrol of the 400 miles of major waterways.

CINCPAC favorably indorsed this request to the JCS. This request programmed 20 PBRs, with attendant USN helicopter gunships (dubbed "Sea Wolves"), for employment in the backshore waters and rivers of the I CTZ two YFNB, to serve as mobile support bases, were requested.226

(C) Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron THREE (HA(L)-3) was commissioned 1 April and assigned to CTF 116, giving GAME WARDEN an integral armed helicopter capability. Patrol activity

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in the RSSZ and Mekong Delta rivers remained at the same high level, but activity on the Co Chien, Ham Loung, and Mekong dropped during April. No specific reasons for the reduced incidents was known, but COMNAVFORV believed that the PBR patrols had forced the enemy traffic from its normal cross-river pattern into the numerous rivers and canals paralleling the main rivers. On 23 April a Sa Dec-based PBR conducting a close surveillance sweep of the Cambodian ship Angor Wat observed two black containers being thrown overboard. One was recovered; it had been recently opened and was marked "VT fuse." COMNAVFORV observed that the incident tended to confirm the suspicion that merchant ships transiting the Mekong under its quasi-international status were supplying the VC.[227]

(C) In late April COMNAVFORV proposed the deployment of one river patrol section (10-12 PBRs, one LST) to I CTZ. CG III MAF and COMUSMACV concurred in this proposal for implementation in mid-May. However, by 9 May the situation had changed in IV CTZ, and the RSSZ. COMNAVFORV, citing recent intelligence reports of the VC strengthening previously understrength units, introductions of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) capability in sapper units, increased mine-production capability, and evidence of improved readiness to use 75mm RR, considered it prudent to postpone the move to I CTZ until additional PBRs and supporting units were delivered from previously approved programs. COMUSMACV concurred in this revision.[228]

(U) During May TF 116 inflicted and suffered its highest fatalities since GAME WARDEN began with 116 VC KIA and five USN KIA. Four of the USN casualties occurred on 24 May when a two-boat PBR patrol was attacked by AW fire in the Ham Luong River six miles S of Ben Tre.

(C) USN SEAL teams operating in the Delta ambushed a VC sapper team and seized documents containing valuable data about VC sabotage methods--a subject of growing concern in a month marked by a considerable increase in enemy swimmer activity. During May swimmers were encountered in several areas of the Delta amid intelligence reports that the Thanh Phu Secret Zone was being used as a sapper training area. On 15 May a PBR patrol killed two VC swimmers near Dung Island; on 19 May a GAME

[redacted]

WARDEN helicopter spotted six VC in black rubber suits and swim fins off the Phanh Phu Secret Zone, killing two before being driven off by ground fire; on 28 May a sentry on the USS Harnett County (LST-821), anchored in the mouth of the Ham Luong River, shot a man astride a log near the ship, producing a small secondary explosion; again on 29 May a Harnett County sentry threw a grenade at a swimmer near the forward boat boom, subsequent investigation revealing that one boat had been tampered with; and on 30 May a PBR patrol engaged two swimmers near the mouth of the Ham Luong--four rounds of M-79 grenades were fired and the swimmers disappeared.

(U) Activity in the RSSZ in May was limited to minor incidents but in the My Tho River activity increased, but no major engagements were recorded. Co Chien River activity centered on PBR support for VN outposts under fire and returning enemy fire from the river banks and evading sampans. In the Bassac River the ability of PBRs (and their crews) to survive was demonstrated when an enemy mine exploded lifting a PBR five feet into the air without casualties or material damage to the PBR.[229]

(U) The growing influence of GAME WARDEN's presence in the Delta was demonstrated by two incidents in June along the Mekong when inhabitants of the region hailed passing PBR patrols to point out VC tax collectors. On 13 June an informant accompanied a patrol to an area near the mouth of the My Tho River and pointed out two men who proved to be VC. Two days later, 12 miles E of My Tho, a sampan owner complained to a passing patrol that two VC tax collectors had confiscated his cargo of rice. When the patrol apprehended the two persons pointed out by the boatman, one of them attempted to bribe the USN patrol officer. Both were apprehended.[230]

(C) July and August activity remained at about the same level, with the VC using more claymore mines in ambushes and the increased use of rockets. On 5 July COMRIVPATFOR (CTF 116) moved his headquarters from the temporary base at Tra Noc to permanent facilities at Binh Tuy. On 11 July COMNAVFORV recommended that the shift of the first river patrol section to I CTZ be scheduled for 1 November and that it be to Hue, to be followed by another section in January 1968, location to be determined. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC concurred. CG III MAF requested that

the deployment be expedited, as with the onset of the NE monsoon and the DMZ interdiction systems under construction would impede the enemy's overland movement he was expected to resort to waterborne infiltration routes which had been used successfully in the past.[231]

(U) The three days prior to the GVN elections of 3 September saw the VC in the Delta intensify their efforts to disrupt the elections. Enemy attacks on GVN outposts were particularly severe. Activity fell off markedly after the elections, which were conducted without serious interruption. The lull in activity continued until the last of the month when PBR patrols came under heavy mortar, RR, and B-40 rocket fire. It became apparent in early October that the enemy had made destruction of PBRs a major objective. On the Bassac, Ham Luong, and Mekong Rivers heavy RR and mortar fire was encountered and the RSSZ was the scene of several abortive mining attempts against PBR patrols. During October GAME WARDEN helicopters flew over 1,000 missions in the Delta, proving themselves to be a major factor in the continued pressure put on the VC. One measure of this pressure was the defection of the commander of the 505th VC Co near Cai Tho.[232]

(S) Responding to CG III MAF's request for accelerated deployment of GAME WARDEN forces to I CTZ, COMNAVFORV initiated Operation GREEN WAVE, with the mission of determining the feasibility of PBR operations in the RVN northern waterways. On 18 September USS Hunterdon County (LST-838) arrived off the mouth of Cau Hai Bay, SE of Hue, with ten PBRs embarked for operations. The operational environment encountered was much different than in the Delta. I CTZ waterways are narrow and shallow, restricting navigation and the PBR's greatest asset--maneuverability. Rather than fighting from swampy, shallow positions, the enemy was well dug in in fortified bunkers. During the operation, which terminated on 7 October, as many as five PBRs were out of commission at one time because of battle damage or groundings. Although this initial venture into I CTZ was not a great success, COMNAVFORV did not feel that sufficient experience had been gained to determine the feasibility of PBR operations in the northern provinces. Operations in the Cua Dai and Truong Giang Rivers had not been successful, but COMNAVFORV felt that the Cau Hai Bay,

Dan Thuy Tu area offered more promising results with additional operating experience. Further, intelligence indicated these areas would be lucrative for interdiction of VC water LOCs. Accordingly, it was planned to locate a mobile base with ten PBRs in the vicinity of Tan My in early December for further evaluation. This plan was subsequently postponed to 1968.[233]

(U) November saw two VC attempts to disrupt ship traffic enroute to Saigon. On 15 November, ten miles SE of Nha Be, a Nationalist Chinese merchantman was hit and on the 18th the SS President Buchanan was the victim of RR fire at a point 12 miles NW of Vung Tau. In both instances PBRs, Navy helicopters, and VN RF responded and killed several enemy; five in the first case and 23 in the second. VC mining attempts proved successful on 23 November when PBR mobile support YRBM-16, anchored at the confluence of the Ham Luong and Ben Tre Rivers, was racked by an underwater explosion from a Viet Cong planted watermine. A raging fire, fed by a ruptured fuel tank, ensued. PBRs being tended by YRBM-16 were then shifted to nearby bases for support.[234]

(U) VC mining attempts continued apace in December too. At about 0200 hours on 22 December, while at anchor in the Nha Be River, the US merchant ship SS Seatrain was holed at the waterline by a floating explosive charge. The ship's pumps successfully countered the flooding and the master did not have to beach as he had intended, to prevent sinking and thus blocking the channel. On the 29th, about midnight, USS Harnett County (LST-821) while anchored in the central Ham Luong River, discovered two devices on the hull which had failed to achieve a high order detonation. Meanwhile YRBM-16 had effected temporary repairs and was prepared for towing to the Ship's Repair Facility, Subic Bay, R.P.[235]

The Mobile Riverine Force

(U) The Mekong Delta is the population center and rice-bowl of RVN. This vast flatland of rice paddies, dense mangrove swamps, and thousands of miles of rivers, streams, and canals had long been a VC-dominated area from which the enemy drew recruits, rice, and resupplied his base camps, staging areas, and caches. The waterways provided him infiltration routes for distribution of

supplies directly to VC units in RVN or via Cambodia into the Central Highlands. During 1966 the USN Operation GAME WARDEN (discussed previously) began interdicting VC waterborne traffic. However, to bring the population and resources of the Delta, with their political and economic wealth, more effectively under GVN control the decision was made to introduce a permanent US military presence into the Delta.

(C) The seemingly hostile environment of the Delta--heat, swamps, and myriad waterways--required new concepts. These were developed in 1966 and resulted in what was called initially the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) and later the Mekong Delta Mobile Riverine Force (MDMRF). This was a joint USA/USN force designed to operate from one fixed base and one Mobile Riverine Base (MRB) consisting of barrack and support ships, housing a USA infantry brigade, which would move from place to place in the Delta. Supporting mobility and firepower would be provided by two River Assault Squadrons (RAS) of 50 boats each, made up of two command boats (CCB), five monitors, 26 armored troop carriers (ATC), one refueler, and 16 Assault Support Patrol Boats (ASPB). During late 1966 the first USA elements of the MDMRF, th 9th Inf Div, arrived in RVN and began training, while the advanced staff elements of the USN component, River Flotilla One (RIVFLOT ONE) established an office at COMNAVFORV HQ in Saigon for planning and coordination. RIVFLOT ONE was made up of the flotilla staff, River Support Squadron SEVEN (RIVSUPRON 7) (two APBs, two supply/resupply LSTs, two YTBs, one ARL, one APL, and a YFNB) and River Assault Squadrons NINE and ELEVEN (RIVASRON 9 and 11) with two divisions of 25 boats each (RIVDIV 91, 92, 111, and 112).236

(C) In early January 1967 COMUSMACV directed the d[illegible]y-ment of advance elements of one brigade of the 9th Inf Div to the Delta base at Dong Tam (5 km W of My Tho), to be followed by an infantry battalion TF closing about 25 January. The Dong Tam base and LST turning basin was created by dredging up silt and mud from the Mekong River to form a dry base area and concurrently create a basin for ships and craft. COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon began concurrent movement of Naval Construction Battalion (NCB) personnel to Dong Tam to construct the naval waterfront facilities, which would be required by 1 March when naval

units were scheduled to arrive. The first USN units of the MDMRF arrived at the training site at Vung Tau in USS Whitfield County (LST-1169) on 9 January. Whitfield County was under the temporary operational control of COMNAVFORV being on "loan" from COMSEVENTHFLT. This command arrangement would be the same for the use of both LSTs of the MDMRF. Training commenced on 10 January, utilizing boats on loan from the VNN River Assault Groups (RAG). On 15 January elements of the 9th Inf Div joined for training and orientation. In an unusual "180 degree turn" in the advisory effort, USN personnel of RAS NINE were assigned to VNN RAGs in the RSSZ and Mekong Delta for orientation and "on-the-job training" by the VNN crews, who had been conducting riverine warfare for years and were the acknowledged and obvious local experts. By the end of January, COMNAVFORV reported to CINCPACFLT: "Concept of embarking Army troops afloat for training periods has proved highly successful to date. Many problems which might have arisen when the Mobile Riverine Forces were constituted have been solved during current training exercises, and new techniques are being developed daily."

(U) COMNAVFORV requested COMSEVENTHFLT to provide an attack transport (APA) to relieve Whitfield County in February, to provide increased berthing space so that the 9th Inf Div troops in training could be increased to 1,195 by A[illegible] and to provide the necessary command and control spaces [illegible] acilities for battalion-size training operations. Further, APA assignment would allow the newly-arrived barrack ships [illegible]'L) and the converted large covered lighter (YFNB) to be assigned to Dong Tam to support the accelerated deployment of naval personnel to that base. During January the 9th Inf Div completed deployment to RVN, and a one battalion TF was established at Dong Tam on 22 January.237

(C) In mid-February CG 9th Inf Div advised CG II FFORCEV that the concurrently programmed afloat assets of two self-propelled barrack ships (APB), which would be available in early 1967, would provide only 1,600 berthing spaces for Army personnel, which, when personnel for support security forces and a brigade staff were subtracted, left an employable combat force approximating a reinforced battalion. From an operational viewpoint it was considered desirable to increase the available combat strength to as near brigade size as possible. Since additional APBs were not available, it was recommended that a non-self-propelled

barrack ship (APL), with a berthing capacity for 660 troops, be made available. COMNAVFORV proposed that if APLs were diverted, Navy personnel be provided to operate and maintain only the USN-peculiar equipment on board. Army personnel would be required to perform all other support functions such as cleaning, preventive maintenance, messing, laundry service, and security. This was found to be satisfactory and the diversion was made.[238]

(U) As training progressed throughout February, utilizing the APA provided by COMSEVENTHFLT, small-unit actions in the RSSZ were undertaken. On 16 February River Assault Division (RAD) 91 and the 3/47 Inf, 2d Bde, 9th Inf Div, conducted a series of sweeps and ambushes in the RSSZ. Enemy contact was light, but several VC base camps were destroyed. On 21 February A/3/47 Inf was landed by RAD 91 in the Rach Don Creek area, uncovering a VC base camp including two work shops, a galley, and 17 berthing huts, all of which were destroyed.[239]

(S) In mid-March COMUSMACV addressed CINCPAC requesting additional forces for FY68. Two cases, a minimum essential force and an optimum force, were detailed. In the case of the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), the two force requirements were the same, owing to the vital nature of the Delta to the overall concept of operations. As stated by COMUSMACV:

> The Mekong Delta contains 36% of the population of South Vietnam and produces 68% of the country's rice. The agricultural importance of the area long has been a primary factor upon which the enemy has based his need for supplies; the people long have provided the basis for organizing political activities and for establishing military infrastructure. The success of the enemy's use of these resources is indicated by the relative ease with which offensive operations and terrorist activities are conducted in the Delta. These resources must be denied to the enemy if the war in the Delta is to be won, and to accomplish this, sizeable offensive operations must be conducted utilizing the 3,000 km of waterways in the Delta to gain tactical mobility.
>
> For this purpose, a concept of operations utilizing combined waterborne/infantry forces

has been submitted and approved. However, only a fraction of the forces necessary to implement this concept were approved. The forces requested in this proposal are necessary to fully implement the approved concept of operations. The present approved RAS forces are capable of lifting less than 20% of the approved infantry division for combat operations. This capability must be increased, if the success desired in the Delta is to be achieved.

(S) Planning for FY69 future force requirements continued through September and was based on recommendations and rationales provided by COMUSMACV and his component commanders to CINCPAC, who concurred and recommended to JCS a virtual doubling of the naval component of the MDMRF during the middle of 1968. The aim was to be able to keep two brigades afloat and one ashore (at Dong Tam) all the time.

(S) Requested were two additional RASs, two Light Lift Craft (LLC), two APBs (USS Mercer (APB-39) and USS Nueces (APB-40) were chosen by CNO), one ARL, one LST, and two APLs. Closure time in-country was programmed for the period July - August 1968 for the first additional RAS and September - October for the second additional RAS. ASPBS for these RASs would follow in November 1968 and January 1969, respectively. The support ships to be added to RIVSUPPRON 7 (APB, APL, ARL, LST, LLC) would close through December 1969 consistent with force needs and boat arrivals. This request completed the MRF as envisioned in the original MDMAF study of early 1966. SECDEF approval of this package, as part of Program 5, came in early October.[240]

(U) As more USN craft arrived and initial training was completed, TF 117 (RIVFLOT 1) operations were extended from the Vung Tau training area. On 10 April the first increment of RAS 11 moved to Dong Tam with 18 ATCs, one CCB, and two monitors, and immediately began battalion sized waterborne operations with the 9th Inf Div, supported by GAME WARDEN and VNN RAG units from nearby My Tho. Early lessons learned included the fact that unlike the rivers of the RSSZ, where the only obstacles were concealed mud banks, the Delta waterways had man-made obstructions such as bridges, fish traps, and VC river blocks to contend with.

(U) Also in April the MRF brigade-configured flagship USS Benewah (APB-35) arrived with USS Kemper County (LST-854), the MRF Support Ship. The arrival of USS Colleton (APB-36) on 2 May completed the Mobile Riverine Base (MRB).[241]

(U) The last of the LCM-6 conversions, two monitors, arrived in country in June as did two large harbor tugs (YTB). All VNN craft which had been on loan to the MRF were returned to their regular units.[242]

(U) Responding to lessons learned, an in-country modification was made to three ATCs by building a small helicopter platform in the form of a super-deck over the forward troop compartment. These converted craft were designated ATC(H) and were used as mobile aid stations. "Dustoff" MEDEVAC helicopters landed on the ATC(H) and speedily evacuated casualties to the support ships of the MRF or to nearby hospital facilities.[243]

(C) After four months of training, the MRF was committed to a major operation on 1 June with the commencement of Operation CORONADO. The MRF conducted the CORONADO series of operations ranging from southern III CTZ, the RSSZ, and northeastern IV CTZ for the remainder of the year. COMNAVFORV provided the following evaluation of the MRF in mid-August:

> Perhaps the best evaluation of MRF achievements can be attained by examining the results of frequent riverine operations in Can Giouc District of eastern Long An Province. In its first operation in this area on 19 and 20 June, the MRF became engaged in the toughest fight it has experienced to date. Over 250 of the enemy were killed at a cost of 46 US KIA and 140 wounded. As the MRF returned to Can Giouc for further operations in late June, during July and again in late August, it never failed to make contact with the enemy. The size of the enemy units encountered has grown smaller and the percentage of prisoners taken versus enemy killed has risen steadily. Increasingly large caches of weapons have been uncovered. River Assault craft now move freely through areas where two months ago ambush with RPG-2s or recoilless rifles could be anticipated at any moment. In summary, it appears that a VC haven and stronghold, rarely

ventured into by ARVN or FWMAF in the past, has been reduced to an area containing only scattered and poorly organized VC guerrillas.[244]

Naval Gunfire Support.

(S) Heavy cruisers (CA), destroyers (DD), one inshore fire support ship (IFS), and three medium landing ships/rocket (LSMR) of SEVENFLT provided support to MACV, firing NGFS missions into all four CTZs during 1967. Over the past years, smooth coordination in mission assignment and spotting procedures had developed until NGFS was a proven all-weather, accurate support requirement for operations of land forces ashore in RVN that fell within range of NGFS ships. As the tempo of ground operations increased during 1966, NGFS ships were much in demand and COMSEVENTHFLT found that because of the lack of assets he could not provide the optimum numbers or types of ships requested by COMUSMACV. The enemy had reacted to the effectiveness of NGFS by moving his caches and assembly areas inland just beyond the range of the 5"/38 guns mounted on the WWII-vintage DDs which made up the bulk of NGFS forces.

(S) COMUSMACV therefore, requested that additional cruisers mounting 8"/55 guns and post-WWII DDs, with their longer range 5"/54 guns, be assigned for NGFS. In late December 1966, COMUSMACV forwarded his NGFS requirements to CINCPACFLT, commenting that "all of the naval ships assigned in the past have rendered excellent support; however, experience has shown a mix of the various types available is desirable." The optimum ship mix envisioned by COMUSMACV was: (1) I CTZ--four ships, to support adequately III MAF, the 1st ARVN Div at Hue, and the 2d ARVN Div at Quang Ngai; (2) II CTZ--two ships, one to support the ARVN and ROK forces in the Qui Nhon area, and one for the Tuy Hoa and Phan Thiet areas; (3) III CTZ--two ships, one for the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ), and one for the area from Baria to Ham Tam; and (4) IV CTZ--one ship for support of ARVN units. To provide increased range capability of the 5"/54 and 8"/55 guns, COMUSMACV recommended that the NGFS force have a ship-mix of one 8" CA, two 5"/54 DDs, four 5"/38 DDs, and two ISF/LSMR. CINCPACFLT was requested to expend every effort

to provide a minimum of five and an optimum of nine NGFS ships on a continuous basis.

(S) CINCPACFLT replied that the recent requirement for two DDs on continuous SEA DRAGON operations had, at times, resulted in less than four DDs on NGFS station. The importance of NGFS in RVN was recognized, and CINCPACFLT would continue to meet the needs consistent with the available resources and other commitments. "The crux of the matter is that we need in WESTPAC at least another destroyer squadron (eight ships) plus an additional 8" cruiser. This assumes added importance in the face of our probably being committed in the near future to an extension of naval gunfire ops in RVN." Although he had requested additional forces, CINCPACFLT was not optimistic about receiving them in the near future. In the meantime he anticipated that, under present circumstances, SEVENTHFLT would be able to provide three or four DDs, one CA, and two IFS/LSMR "a good part of the time. This is the most we can do with assets available without reaching breaking point in tempo-of-ops at sea (now around 70 percent) in terms of personnel proficiency and maintenance time in port."[245]

(S) CINCPAC, in early January, expressed his concern for the lack of NGFS assets when he directed CINCPACFLT to prepare a plan for allocation of the necessary ships to meet the requirements proposed by COMUSMACV, "to include alternatives and full justification for augmentation of DDs from either LANTFLT [US Atlantic Fleet] or ready reserve if necesary." In his guidance he said:

> Performance of destroyers in SEA DRAGON and Naval Gunfire Support had been noteworthy. Both programs have assisted significantly in prosecution of the overall war effort and both merit special consideration in assignment of PACFLT assets. Possible extension of SEA DRAGON operating area could increase requirements for NGFS units. It is essential that adequate resources be made available for continuation of these effective operations.[246]

(S) MACV field commanders persisted in their requests for NGFS in support of ground operations, especially in I and II CTZs. In early January, CG III MAF decried the assignment of only one ship to I CTZ

from 11-15 January:

> CG III MAF is concerned about the increasing frequency that marginal or unacceptable NGFS resources are available to I CTZ troop commanders, and will continue to invite official attention to, and urge continuing action to improve, the availability of this valuable source of fire support in the I Corps coastal regions.

CG I FFORCEV initially requested two DDs and one LSMR for the entire month of February, and one CA for the 5-15 February period to support Operations PERSHING, FARRAGUT, and BYRD. When advised that these forces were not available, CG I FFORCEV responded that:

> Operations to be initiated following the TET truce will cause the commitment initially of a three brigade force: two brigades on the coastal plain northeast of Bong Son, and the brigade in a blocking position at the southern end of the An Lao Valley.
>
> The type of terrain in this AO precludes the timely displacement of heavy field artillery necessary for adequate support. Past experience in this area has demonstrated the requirement for the heavy fire support that is provided by long-range naval gunfire. A cruiser will provide adequate coverage of this critical area.

No cruiser was available and COMUSMACV advised CG I FFORCEV that two DDs/LSMRs would be available, citing the expanded area and mission of SEA DRAGON as one cause of the shortage of NGFS ships.[247]

(S) CINCPAC addressed the JCS on 25 February requesting additional NGFS assets, citing COMUSMACV's stated requirements, CINCPACFLT's statement of non-availability of forces to meet those requirements, and the recently authorized expansion of SEA DRAGON, stating frankly that "present and continuing requirements for additional NGFS ships to conduct operations in SVN and the

expanded SEA DRAGON operation must be met with an augmentation of forces." He submitted two proposals to alleviate the present shortages: (1) obtain ships or craft for the relief of five MARKET TIME DERs, which could then relieve DDs in less demanding roles, the source of these reliefs to be expedited delivery of Patrol Gunboats (PG), USCG high endurance cutters (WHEC), or additional FWMAF ships--Australia and New Zealand having suitable ships and some Latin American countries possibly being willing to send forces for MARKET TIME patrol; (2) alleviate the 8" cruiser shortage by the activation of two CAs then in mothballs, which would permit two in SEVENTH-FLT continuously, thus insuring that at least one was available for NGFS at all times. These measures, however, would meet only partly the DD shortage, and two additional LANTFLT DDs would be required to meet the total required augmentation of seven DDs and two CAs. COMUSMACV concurred in a message to CINCPAC and JCS and gave additional justification for the augmentation of PACFLT sources, explaining that the MACV NGFS requirements given in December were based on full time-on-station availability, and did not take into consideration the absence of ships from the gun line for replenishing, rearming, and, in the case of the one CA, upkeep. COMUSMACV revised his previous requirements, pointing out that ten operations were in progress for which NGFS had been requested by troop commanders, of which only five were being supported because of the paucity of ships. The revised requirements were:

1) I CTZ--one 8" CA, one 5"/54 DD, and two 5"/38 DD/IFS/LSMR.

2) II CTZ--one CA, or one 5"/54 DD and two 5"/38 DD/IFS/LSMR.

3) III CTZ--two 5"/38 DD/IFS/LSMR.

4) IV CTZ--one 5"/54 DD.

On 20 March the JCS advised that five USCG high endurance cutters would arrive in SEASIA 10 May, two PGs would be available to MARKET TIME prior to 30 April, and that alternatives for providing additional heavy gunfire support were under study at joint and service levels. On 31 March the Australian guided missile destroyer HMAS Hobart commenced operations with the SEVENTH-FLT.[248]

(S) CINCPAC reviewed his NGF assets on 11 April, in a message to the JCS, which cited the increased SEA DRAGON and NGFS requirements, and revised his earlier request for additional assets. He pointed out that the SEA DRAGON expansion alone required an additional five DDs in SEVENTHFLT. He requested a total of 15 DDs, to come from the Reserve Fleet, and two 8" gun CAs, similarly from the Reserve Fleet (previously requested); all were in addition to the already approved PG and USCG units. [249]

(S) CINCPAC again addressed the JCS on 16 April concerning the activation of two Iowa class battleships (BB) to augment NGFS assets in PACFLT. He reviewed the confirmed results of NGFS actions from 1 March 1966 - 28 February 1967, which were 16,666 structures destroyed, 22,803 damaged, and 2,008 VC killed (observed), and pointed out that actual damage and KIA were probably much higher since jungle canopy and low visibility frequently made observation of fire impossible. In the SEA DRAGON area the enemy had been forced to move vital installations inshore beyond the range of the 5" and 8" guns of the DDs and CAs. Enemy coastal battery fire against US ships was becoming more intense and highly accurate, and eventually they might face Soviet made surface-to-surface missiles (STYX). As the enemy introduced larger caliber weapons into his coastal defense, CAs would have to replace the more vulnerable DDs, but the BB was the ultimate in invulnerability, and because of its heavy armor and general construction could face any conventional threat. Further, the 16" guns firing 1,900-lb projectiles with 154 lbs of explosives were considered markedly superior to lighter projectiles in both effectiveness and psychological impact. In RVN the greater range of the 16" guns would open a band of valid targets from the DMZ to the Delta. In summary he said:

> Two 8" cruisers now in the Pacific Fleet are committed to SEA DRAGON operations. Destroyers are extended to their limits. In order to maintain existing pressure against NVN coastal targets while providing support to troops ashore, recommend action be taken to activate two 8" cruisers and two IOWA-class battleships. Such a posture will not permit the optimum positioning of three cruisers and a battleship on continuous gunfire

[redacted]

station as desired, but will represent a marked improvement in our present meager assets.[250]

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT again felt the impact of increased requirements on static assets in May when heightened enemy activity in I CTZ and the DMZ prompted CG III MAF to request additional long-range NGFS. Stiffening NVN coastal defenses in the SEA DRAGON area also called for the long-range guns and heavy armor of cruisers. To partly meet both requirements the cruisers were directed to operate in the SEA DRAGON area, but to be within ten hours steaming distance of I CTZ in ready response to COMUSMACV's emergency requirements. Procedures for requesting emergency NGFS augmentation were refined by COMSEVENTHFLT, with the NGFS coordinator (CTG 77.1.0) being given direct liaison with COMUSMACV or his designated representative, implementing COMSEVENTHFLT's policy in response to COMUSMACV's request:

> Fully concur with the need for minimum reaction time in the case of emergencies. Under those circumstances SEVENTHFLT will make every effort to respond regardless of the means by which the request is received.
>
> Under most circumstances consider reaction time will be 6 hours or less. Ten hours was indicated to cover communications delays and possible location of CA/CAG close to 20°N at time of notification.[251]

(S) In early June the JCS gave the status of CINCPAC's April request for additional NGFS assets, advising that on 21 April SECNAV had recommended to SECDEF that one battleship be recommissioned beginning immediately, with the decision on a second one to be deferred for six months. On 12 May SECNAV submitted a program change request proposing activation of USS New Jersey (BB-62). In addition, on 20 May, the JCS had recommended that the worldwide military posture include add-ons of two battleships and two heavy cruisers. (No SECDEF decisions had been made at year's end). This planning could provide help in the future, but the needs were immediate, as indicated by CG III MAF:

> During period 12-16 June only NGF ship assets available in entire I CTZ will drop to two ships, one

[redacted]

5-inch 54 destroyer type and one LSMR. NGF requirements for this area have been repeatedly stated as four ships, and these were derived and validated by you in traffic to higher authority even before the addition of the forces of Task Force OREGON to I CTZ. Additional forces create needs for additional gunfire support.

Recent action placing an 8-inch cruiser on 6 hour reaction time in event of emergency in the northern portion of I CTZ serves somewhat to ameliorate the situation; but fact remains that day-to-day assets have dropped to half the stated requirements.

We are aware of and most appreciative of the fleet's efforts and the support provided during the past three months. Fact that current period is the first time we have dropped this low reflects clearly that the Navy understands our needs and has been attempting to meet them.

(C) The greatest concentration of NGFS firepower was brought to bear against targets in the DMZ on 9 July when the cruisers USS Boston (CAG-1), USS Providence (CLG-6), and USS St. Paul (CA-73) bombarded artillery positions and suspected missile sites. In an effort to relieve the NGFS situation, COMNAVFORV suggested the use of MARKET TIME assets in I CTZ, and COMUSMACV asked COMSEVENTHFLT to comment. COMSEVENTHFLT replied that the SEVENTHFLT ships assigned to MARKET TIME did not have the fire control equipment or the required training. Further, in view of the "opposition" which had recently been experienced in the vicinity of the DMZ, the enemy had no compulsion against firing at cruisers, and the lack of armament and engineering redundancy precluded their assignment except in the most unusual circumstances or emergencies in such a hostile environment.[252]

(U) On 1 August DOD announced that USS New Jersey would be brought out of mothballs and recommissioned for duty in SEASIA, although the ship would not be "on the line" until about April 1968.[253]

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT continued his policy of ten-hour cruisers alert of SEA DRAGON forces, except for periods of short duration when

[redacted]

quicker response to specific operational assignments dictated such reduction, even though COMUSMACV had requested a six-hour alert status for the period 13 August - 4 September due to an indicated enemy buildup in I CTZ. The ten-hour alert allowed COMSEVENTHFLT flexibility in assignment of the 8" NGF ships to northern SEA DRAGON area. This policy was carried out with no adverse effect on I CTZ actions.[254]

(C) Towards year's end COMUSMACV directed his staff to study past NGFS usage:

> In connection with tactical operations... [In that] there are studies which indicate we are getting maximum benefit out of our NGF. There is an inordinate amount fired at night suggesting excessive employment of unobserved H & I fire.... Commanders [are] to look into NGF employment and take steps to capitalize on this important resource.

The results of this review were still pending at year's end.[255]

(U) Without doubt, NGFS had proven itself and become an integral and indispensable part of all near shore operations in RVN and vital to the interdiction of NVN LOCs.

Out-of-Country

(S) The strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam for 1967, as stated by CINCPAC, involved three interdependent undertakings: (1) to take the war to the enemy in NVN by unremitting but selective application of air and naval power; (2) to seek out and destroy Communist forces, and (3) infrastructure in RVN by offensive military operations, assisting the GVN in building an independent, viable, democratic society. Operations against NVN itself had three basic objectives: (1) to disrupt the flow of external assistance in NVN; (2) to curtail the flow of men and supplies from NVN into Laos and RVN; and (3) to destroy in depth those resources in NVN that contributed to support of the aggression.[256]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) As 1967 began US Navy out-of-country operations were to concentrate on the first point--carry the war to the enemy in NVN. Naval aircraft operating from the Attack Carrier Strike Force (TF 77) of the US SEVENTHFLT were tasked for ROLLING THUNDER missions (see above) and SEA DRAGON operations (described below). The Surface Action Group (TG 77.1), consisting of cruisers (CA/CL-CLG) and destroyers (DD/DDG), joined with USN and USAF tactical air forces in Operation SEA DRAGON, the interdiction of coastal waterborne logistics craft in the NVN littoral.

Operation SEA DRAGON

(S) After repeated requests by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC during 1966 to be allowed to interdict the waterborne logistics craft in the coastal waters of NVN by naval gunfire (NGF) and tactical air operations, SEA DRAGON was approved and initiated in October 1966. At the beginning of 1966 SEVENTHFLT surface units and USN/USAF tactical aircraft had been authorized to attack any waterborne logistics craft in the coastal waters of NVN between the DMZ and 18°N. The ships could continue firing if a craft beached or entered inland waters to evade, and could return fire if fired upon by shore batteries. If the US ship were being tracked by enemy fire control radars, the ship could open fire on the radar sight, but fire against any other targets ashore in NVN was prohibited. OV-1B aircraft of the 131st Surveillance Airplane Company were also being employed in Operation SEA DRAGON. The OV-1B with its Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) would detect movement and relay these moving returns to Seventh Fleet Surface Units and USN/USAF tactical fighters.

(TS) In mid-January CINCPAC proposed to JCS that SEA DRAGON operations be authorized in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and be extended northward to compound the enemy logistic problems by forcing him to transport additional materials over his already overtaxed LOCs. Later in January CINCPAC addressed the JCS with proposals for increased anti infiltration measures, observing that undue reliance on any one measure to stop infiltration would not be effective, since alternate LOCs are available to the enemy, and that the problem was to sel-

[redacted]

the best combination of anti-infiltration measures in consonance with the overall US offensive strategy. Although the enemy capability to supply his forces in RVN had been degraded by the previous efforts, CINCPAC recommended that, since the enemy was dependent on external sources for most of his weapons, the port of Haiphong and other minor ports in NVN be closed in accordance with a plan to be formulated later. Further, CINCPAC recommended extension of SEA DRAGON operations to 20° 30'N and restated the case for use of naval shore bombardment against military targets ashore in NVN; to maintain the pressure on enemy LOCs during inclement weather and darkness when air operations were limited. On 15 January 1967 the SEA DRAGON area of operations was extended to 19°N Latitude.[257]

(TS) COMUSMACV and CINCPAC anticipated that NVN would utilize the Lunar New Year (Tet) truce period for a significant logistic effort to resupply its forces in RVN, and requested authority to continue SEA DRAGON operations during Tet. JCS concurred, but higher authority directed SEA DRAGON be restricted to surveillance operations during the truce period. Elaborate machinery was set up in Saigon, Hawaii, and Washington to process reports of waterborne logistics activity so that if the NVN effort were significant, a decision whether or not to renew the interdiction could be reached and implemented quickly.

(S) In late January CINCPAC, noting that SEA DRAGON forces had been highly effective in interdicting NVN waterborne logistic craft (WBLC), proposed the selective mining of NVN inland and territorial waters as "an attractive and economical method of further interdiction of NVN maritime logistics traffic." He outlined plans for covert planting of bottom-laid influence of the magnetic/acoustic type, which were judged to be an effective threat against various craft in use by NVN ranging from sampans to 120-foot armed logistic craft. Three minefields were planned initially: a random field in the mouth of the Song Chang River east of the ferry line; a barrier field four miles N of Kien Giang extending from the three fathom to the six fathom curve; and a barrier field at the entrance to the Kien Giang River. CINCPAC recommended immediate authorization to implement the plans, pointing out the extra dividend in the interference the minefields would cause the NVN high-density traffic predicted for the Tet period.[258]

(U) The Tet ceasefire began at 0800 on 8 February and immediately the NVN logistic effort accelerated. The USS Stoddard, on surveillance patrol off Hon Mat Island, was fired upon by NVN shore batteries the same day. By noon on 9 February, 40 junks, 35 large and nine steel-hulled 120-foot (five armed) WBLC, and one barge had been confirmed as underway, heading south in the vicinity of the Song Giang River.

(S) Citing the increased enemy logistic effort, and the violation of the stand-down by deliberately firing at Stoddard and the shooting down of F-100 reconnaissance aircraft, CINCPAC requested JCS authority to resume SEA DRAGON interdiction with NGF and air strikes. Later, on 9 February, CINCPAC summarized the spot reports being filed by SEA DRAGON forces in a message to the JCS which reported again that many waterborne craft, including armed steel-hulled trawlers, were engaged in shipment of supplies to the south. It was estimated that approximately 30,000 tons of supplies would be moved during the truce period, which translated into an enemy combat-support capability of 300 division days. CINCPAC observed:

> We are now watching the results of our interdiction efforts being overcome and pressure being taken off Hanoi as a result of a stand-down in which NVN is the only one to gain any advantage. Once these large quantities of material are in the hands of our enemy, who obviously is in dire need of them, they cannot but contribute substantially to the loss of more American lives. . .
>
> These actions are not those one would expect from an enemy on the verge of suing for peace. . I urgently request authority to attack this traffic with air and naval forces which are now in position to stop [it] immediately.

(C) COMUSMACV summarized the intelligence gathered on 9 February as follows:

> During daylight hours on 9 February, at least 300 waterborne logistics craft were sighted, many over 100 feet in length. The vessels included steel and wooden hulled motorized and sail, junks, sampans,

and barges. The mouths of the Song Giang and Kien Giang Rivers were saturated with traffic throughout the day with the overflow being off-loaded at nearby inlets and streams. An estimated 300 craft entered the Kien Giang between sunrise and sunset. During daylight hours, the density of waterborne logistics craft was from eight to ten per hour per mile between the Song Giang and Kien Giang Rivers. Some of the ships have 50 caliber machine guns on the bow. Some tankers with pipelines fore and aft also have been observed. During the first 24 hours of the TET stand-down, more than 500 trucks were reported in the Mu Gia Pass area. During this period, 115 trucks moved south through the Mu Gia Pass and 108 moved north. On 9 February between 1240 and 1500, 15 trucks were reported waiting to cross on a ferry at XE 750 245. Also reported were two tugs pulling nine barges loaded with a total of 25 to 30 trucks across the river. In addition, there was at least one truck per mile along Routes 1A and 100 south from the ferry. This would total 45 to 50 trucks moving towards the DMZ area.259

(TS) No favorable response authorizing resumption of SEA DRAGON was received, and on 10 February CINCPAC added intelligence that trucks were moving (one pilot reported that "Route 1 looked like the New Jersey Turnpike"), as were increased numbers of WBLC, and pointed out that if the tempo of enemy resupply operations were allowed to continue, a substantial logistics effort would have been carried out successfully. Concurrently, CINCPAC directed that immediately after the Tet truce a maximum air effort be directed against likely off-loading and transshipment/storage areas identified by SEA DRAGON observations. Air and naval surface commanders developed plans to strike these targets at first light on 12 February. Naval forces would consist of three carrier air wings from the Yankee Station carriers and the seven destroyers in the SEA DRAGON area. However, on 11 February the CJCS advised CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that the decision had been made not to resume operations against NVN at the end of

Tet, a decision initially ascribed to the presence of Soviet Premier Kosygin in London until late on the 12th of February.

(C) In summarizing the analysis of enemy logistic actions during Tet, COMUSMACV reported that over 2,200 trucks and 702 waterborne logistic craft were observed. Within 60 hours the enemy had moved 36,000 tons of supplies into positions north of the DMZ, poised for infiltration into RVN. Authority was granted by CJCS and CINCPAC on 13 February to resume military operations against NVN commencing at 0100 local time 14 February.[260]

(S) On 23 February the JCS authorized increased interdiction measures against the NVN logistics and infiltration network. The SEA DRAGON AO was extended northward to 20°N. US naval surface operations were authorized against suitable targets ashore and in the coastal waters of NVN, including ground-controlled intercept (GCI) radars, early warning (EW) radars, antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sites and other military targets, elements of LOCs, and NVN military craft or other NVN craft engaged in logistics activity; civilian casualties were to be kept to a minimum consistent with target damage objectives. Concurrently, CINCPAC was authorized to conduct selective mining of NVN inland waters and estuaries south of 20°N to interdict NVN military and logistic waterborne craft. CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to implement these measures.[261]

(S) The expansion of the SEA DRAGON area to 20°N put naval surface forces in the Route Package I area, requiring coordination with 7AF to preclude mutual interference. The procedure arrived at required the SEA DRAGON Commander (CTG 77.1) to provide 7AF with a list of preplanned NGF targets daily. USAF aircraft were warned clear of NGF areas and ship-shore trajectory areas during NGF action. USAF pilots who developed suitable targets that they could not strike due to weather or other reasons informed an Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC), which in turn passed the target to CTG 77.1 and kept USAF aircraft clear of the area during the resulting naval bombbardment. Again, as throughout the joint effort in Vietnam, cooperation and coordination were the order of the day.[262]

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(C) On 26 February TF 77 aircraft laid the first minefield in NVN. Subsequently, in March, fields were laid in the Song Ga, Song Giang, Song Ma, and Cua Sat River. In accordance with SECDEF public affairs guidance, the mining was announced to newsmen 27 February, stating that a limited number of air-delivered non-floating mines were planted in selected river areas of NVN to counter the increased use of waterborne craft to infiltrate men and supplies into RVN, and that no threat to deep-water maritime traffic was posted. In response to queries, it was to be pointed out that Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha were deep-water ports, and that, therefore, they had not been mined.[263]

(S) Responding to the broadened SEA DRAGON concept, CINCPACFLT increased the USN surface forces by reassignment of his only deployed eight-inch gun cruiser from NGFS duties to SEA DRAGON. The lifting of restrictions against NGF ashore in NVN presented lucrative targets for the bigger naval guns. NVN response was predictably quick, as more SEA DRAGON ships began to come under fire from NVN shore batteries. On 1 March the cruiser USS Canberra was hit by shore fire which inflicted light damage to the superstructure. USS Stoddard, while conducting a search-and-rescue mission, was hit by shore fire on 17 March. Damage included a six-inch hole in the port side at the waterline and numerous small fragment hits; there were no personnel casualties. Other than USN forces participated in SEA DRAGON operations for the first time when HMAS Hobart joined US ships in April.[264]

(S) Forces available for SEA DRAGON operations were augmented in late April by the arrival of the heavy cruiser USS Boston (CAG-1) from the Atlantic Fleet, providing three cruisers in SEVENTHFLT for SEA DRAGON and NGFS employment. In early May information from covert sources revealed that no supply traffic had been sighted on the Song Ga since two supply barges had been sunk on 1 March, and that there was a resultant shortage of supplies in the area causing a lowering of morale. CINCPACFLT, responding to CINCPAC guidance, instituted a program for reseeding all minefields in NVN, with special emphasis on the Song Ga and Song Giang Rivers (these two had been reseeded previously on 17 April), prior to the 24-hour Buddha's birthday stand-down on 23 May.[265]

(TS) Cruisers and destroyers continued to roam the coastline of NVN shelling logistics craft and inland LOCs. Fire was exchanged frequently with NVN shore batteries, whose number and accuracy increased. Minor damage was inflicted on several SEA DRAGON ships, but no personnel casualties were sustained. Typical of the results was this evaluation by CINCPAC for August:

> SEA DRAGON forces continued to apply pressure against the enemy coastal installations and LOCs throughout the assigned area of operations as over 1,000 fixed and moving targets were taken under fire. Destruction and damage to waterborne logistics craft increased as detections rose significantly over July. Over 90 percent of the WBLC detected were either beached or on inland waterways.[266]

(U) Royal Australian Navy participation in SEA DRAGON continued with the relief of HMAS Hobart by HMAS Perth on 26 September.[267]

(TS) On 5 December aircraft from USS Oriskany reseeded five NVN water inlets to augment existing denial areas prior to the probable holiday stand-down periods. In addition though SEA DRAGON operations during December ". . . were limited due to weather . . . the number of WBLC sightings and attacks increased slightly during the month" but were "considered very light when compared to last year's Christmas stand-down period. This. . . . [could] be partially attributed to the MK-36 destructor seedings of river mouths and the presence of SEA DRAGON forces." WBLC sightings during the Christmas period were:

Date	22	23	24	25	26	27
WBLC	2	0	27	325	43	11

The sharp rise on the 25th, the stand-down day, gives evidence of the efficiency of SEA DRAGON as an operation that severely restricted and prevented NVN waterborne logistic movement southwards. Overall the number of WBLC moving during the stand-down period was far less than in 1966, a result of both the mining

campaign and SEA DRAGON force presence.[268]

(TS) In his year-end wrap-up report CINCPAC credited SEA DRAGON forces with destruction of 1,473 WBLC in the first eleven months of CY67; 3,685 land targets struck, including destruction or damage of 303 coastal defense and radar sites. Through mid-December USN units logged 1,384 ship days on station in Operation SEA DRAGON.[269]

Naval Air Forces

(S) COMSEVENTHFLT maintained the Carrier Strike Force (TF 77) of three attack carriers (CVA) at Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. TF 77 aircraft struck targets in the ROLLING THUNDER and SEA DRAGON areas (north of the TALLY HO area), with occasional mission diversions to targets in RVN and the STEEL TIGER areas. Aerial mining was accomplished by elements of the Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) task groups (TG 77.5) as discussed above. Sorties were allocated by CINCPAC and targeting was accomplished by coordination between 7AF and CTF 77 at targeting conferences and through the SEVENTH-FLT liaison group at 7AF headquarters.[270]

(TS) CINCPACFLT maintained five CVAs in the SEVENTH-FLT to provide rotation for R&R and maintenance. These CVAs came from the ten CVAs in PACFLT, augmented by the deployment of one CVA, plus periodic deployment of the USS Intrepid (CVS-11), an ASW carrier converted to handle light attack jets and propellor-driven A-1 attack aircraft, from the Atlantic Fleet. Through 24 May four carriers were on station off NVN all the time but this was reduced to three on that date.[271]

(C) Until May naval air activity was concentrated in out-of-country strikes, but for Operation HICKORY (a USMC search-and-destroy operation into the DMZ) 125 sorties per day were flown by CTF 77 aircraft in direct support of ground operations during the period 18-20 May. On 29 July tragedy struck USS Forrestal (CVA-59). Just prior to the first launch of the day a missile accidentally released from the wing of one aircraft parked among many on the after end of the flight deck, all fully armed and fueled, ready for launch. The missile hit a wing tank on another aircraft, rupturing it and igniting its fuel. Flames

quickly spread to adjacent bomb-laden aircraft causing extensive fires and explosions on and below decks. 131 were killed, 62 injured, and three missing, plus there was extensive flight deck and structural damage by the time the fires were put out. Forrestal had to be taken off the line to return to her home port, Norfolk, Virginia for repairs. CINCPAC authorized a periodic reduction to two CVAs on station until normal ship rotation would bring Forrestal's relief to the SEVENTHFLT. Thus there was a gap of one CVA until early December when USS Ranger (CVA 61) joined the Yankee Station team.[272]

(C) In addition to continued sorties north in July TF 77, acting in response to a 7AF request, provided 32 sorties per day to the northern I CTZ to counter a NVN threat in the DMZ area. This pattern of response continued through the year on a case-by-case basis by request from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC who, as overall commander, coordinated with CINCPACFLT the employment of SEVENTHFLT resources.[273]

Vietnamese Navy (VNN)

Organization, Strength, and Mission

(U) While 1966 saw a continued buildup in the force structure, reliability and training of the entire VNN, 1967, could be said to be a year in which the programs of 1966 were continued and refined. Overall strength stayed fairly constant at about 16,000 throughout 1967.[274]

(U) The VNN, based on a 1966 reorganization, is made up of three principal elements: the Fleet Command, the Coastal Force, and the Riverine Forces.

(C) The Fleet Command is divided into three types of ships, those assigned coastal patrol duties, those assigned logistic support missions and those assigned minesweeping missions. At the end of 1967, VNN Fleet Command elements were:

Patrol Force:	PC (Patrol Craft	1
	PCE (Patrol Craft, Escort)	6
	PGM (Patrol Gunboat, Motor)	20
	MSC (Minesweeper, Coastal)	3
	LSIL (Landing Ship, Infantry, Large)	5
	LSSL (Landing Ship, Support, Large)	6
	TOTAL	41

The logistic support elements of the Fleet Command included:

LST (Landing Ship, Tank)	3
YOG (Gasoline Barge, Self-Propelled)	3
AKL (Light, Cargo Ship)	1
LSM (Landing Ship, Medium)	5
LCU (Landing Craft, Utility)	6
TOTAL	18

The minesweeping craft included:

MLMS (Motor Launch Minesweeper)	10

(U) The primary mission of the fleet patrol ships is to conduct sea and inshore patrols, counterinfiltration attempts from the sea, defeat attacks from seaward, maintain security of offshore islands, and provide NGFS to units ashore as required. All ships are based in Saigon but operate from Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi (Phu Quoc Island). Located at these sites are the five MARKET TIME (anti-infiltration force) Coastal Surveillance Centers (CSC). These operational centers are jointly manned by US and Vietnamese personnel who coordinate USN/VNN MARKET TIME surveillance of the RVN coast, and all requests for assistance (i.e., NGFS, MEDCAP) received.

(C) An average of 13 patrol ships are deployed on the offshore MARKET TIME barrier at any one time. Three LSIL/LSSLs are assigned for support operations in the Delta Region (IV CTZ), and

one LSIL/LSSL and one PGM for support operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). One LSSL/LSIL is made available for merchant escort duty on the Long Tau or Mekong River on an as required basis.

(C) Twenty-seven Coastal Groups (formerly called Junk Divisions and commonly known as the "Junkies" or junk force) make up the Coastal Force which is located the length of the RVN coast. These groups are under both the operational and administrative control of the four Coastal Zone Commanders, whose area of responsibility coincides with that of the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). The force consists of over 300 motorized junks, all sail-only junks having been surveyed by the end of 1966. The latest model junk is the YABUTA, a Japanese designed boat representing a composite of all the best features of the types of junks in use in SEASIA. One-hundred-twenty YABUTAs were built under MAP funds prior to July 1966, before production was drastically slowed at the Saigon Naval Shipyard due to loss of skilled workers to higher paying civilian contractors. Fifty-one of the 60 remaining FY66 MAP YABUTAs were still unconstructed at the year's beginning. Programmed work flow scheduled the completion of one junk every three weeks by the Saigon Naval Shipyard during 1967.

(U) The primary mission of the Coastal Divisions is the prevention and interception of infiltration from the sea and the movement of contraband cargo in intracoastal shipping, as part of the total MARKET TIME effort.

(C) TO&E shortage in men and equipment, lack of fully trained personnel, supply shortages, poor location, and inadequate repair facilities plague the Coastal Groups' efficiency as a fighting force. The Coastal Force has not been able to keep 50 percent of its junks on patrol and 75 percent operational as was hoped for under the overall MARKET TIME concept. Force plans call for a decrease to 268 junks in the period FY67-69 as Coastal Groups are consolidated and the introduction of 40 River Patrol Boats (PBR) (starting in the 3rd Qtr of FY68), 20 Fast Patrol Craft (PCF) (four in 3rd Qtr FY68, four, six months later and the last 12 in FY70) and 20 Armored Support Patrol Boats (ASPB) (four deliveries each Qtr commencing the 1st Qtr of FY69).

275

(C) The Riverine Force is comprised of 13 River Assault Groups (RAGs) and one River Transport Escort Group (RTEG) and is subordinate to the two Riverine Area Commanders in the III and IV CTZs. These groups provide naval support to the III and IV Corps Commanders for operations in the inland waterways, including combat and logistic lift, patrol, escort and minesweeping. The RTEG is a specially trained unit under the operational control of the Waterway Transport Office of the GVN Public Works Department. Its principal mission is to escort commercial traffic along the waterways of the Mekong Delta. From its 28 assault craft the RTEG assigns five to seven craft to accompany each river convoy from the staging area at Bung Tau to the Cambodian border. A convoy leaves approximately every ten days, returning about 22 days later.

(U) The 13 RAGS are located as follows: Three at My Tho; two each at Vinh Long, Can Tho, and Long Xuyen; and one each at Nha Be, Long An, Bien Hoa, and Phu Cuong. The RTEG is located at Saigon.

(C) The average RAG can lift 500 fully equipped ARVN troops. Typical RAG craft are:

NAME	HULL	USE
Commandement	Modified LCM-3	Command/Communications
Monitor	Modified LCM-6	Fire Support/Patrol
Landing Craft	LCM-6(A), 8(A), LCVP (A)	Troop Lift/Escort/Patrol
STCAN	French designed rivercraft	Escort/Patrol
RPC (River Patrol Craft)	US designed	Escort/Patrol
Vedettes	French designed craft	Escort/Patrol

(C) The VNN UDT (LDNN-Lien Doc Nguoi - literally "soldiers who fight under the sea", operated in the RSSZ and the Delta, conducted beach surveys and did hull surveys in defense of merchant shipping in the Saigon Harbor from floating or hull attached mines.[276]

Significant Operations and Operational Trends

(U) In January 1967 a representative number of RAG craft were loaned to advance units of the MDMRF to aid this newly formed USA/USN force in its early training phase at Vung Tau and in the RSSZ. This was necessitated by the closure in-country of the USN and USA staffs and troops prior to the arrival of the force's own craft. The RAG assets were returned in June after sufficient MDMRF craft (ATC, CCB, Monitor) had arrived in-country.

(C) To combat the poor maintenance and supply standards and performance of VNN coastal units (particularly in electronics) CHNAVADGRU ordered six USN advisors to four patrol ships in early January to correct this situation. The influence of their leadership, initiative and professional knowledge was felt quickly, resulting in a noticeably higher operational readiness status of the units to which assigned. Similarly, to improve the efficiency of the six VNN supply depots (established in 1966) a committee of three USN field supply advisors and three VNN officers was formed to conduct frequent field trips in hopes of providing assistance in the form of a mobile training team.[277]

(C) To provide pre-commissioning training for the VNN crews who were to take over the four MAP PGMs scheduled for the VNN, the Naval Advanced Training Center, Saigon commenced instruction in gunnery, seamanship and navigation during February. In March a six-man LDNN team trained with USN SEAL Team Detachment "G" at Nha Be, and similarly the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Saigon conducted courses for VNN storekeepers in stock management to prepare them for the Naval Zone command supply depots being established.[278]

(C) During the period 11-16 April a USCG cutter using its radar capability vectored Coastal Group 16 junks towards suspected enemy craft, introducing a new MARKET TIME patrol technique and

thus further integrating VNN units into the MARKET TIME effort. On 11 May PGMs 616 and 618 completed underway training and joined the Fleet Command. The 14-day relief of USS Lucid (MSO 458) by PCE-08 on 15 May in the First Naval Zone and USS Gannet (MSC-230) by PCE-12 on 17 May in the Second Naval Zone marked the most significant integration of the VNN Fleet Command into the Coastal Surveillance Force to that date.[279]

(C) June saw evidence of the continued modernizing and expansion of the VNN when the third USN YOG under the MAP was transferred to the VNN on 11 June and four PGMs were formally transferred on 20 June.[280]

(U) On 24 July Boatswainsmate (BM) and Gunners Mate (GM) class "A" (basic knowledge) schools were opened at the Recruit Training Center at CRB, giving further evidence of the continued advisory effort achievement in enhancing the competence of the VNN. Such programs and efforts contributed towards the continually increasing reliability and operational performance of the VNN during 1967, paving the way towards the VNN's assumption of greater responsibilities in both the MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN efforts.[281]

(C) On 25 September VNN PCE-09 assumed patrol responsibility for a MARKET TIME area off the west coast of Phuc Quoc Island. VNN UDTs (LDNN) continued to conduct nightly hull inspection of ships' bottoms in the port of Saigon while two other detachments operated with US Navy SEAL units based at Binh Thuy in the IV CTZ and at Nha Be for operations in the RSSZ.[282]


(C) The VNN Fleet Command assumed permanent responsibility for one MARKET TIME station in each Coastal Zone on 1 November. USN Mobile Repair Teams in each Coastal Zone continued to raise the Fleet Command's ability to effect repairs but, nevertheless, at year's end VNN competence in this respect was still considered marginal. Similarly petty officer (NCO) leadership was rated as marginal due to lack of numbers and junior officer leadership of POs. The VNN's combat effectiveness, personnel strength and employment of forces were all considered satisfactory at year's end by the Senior Advisors.[283]

The command structure chart of the VNN is shown at Figure V-23.

[redacted]


ATTACK SORTIES IN NORTH VIETNAM & LAOS**

(ATTACK + STRIKE + FLAK SUPPRESSION + ARMED RECONNAISSANCE)



COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT SORTIES IN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS


(COMBAT = ATTACK + CAP)
(COMBAT SUPPORT = PHOTO RECCE + AIR REFUEL + RECON + AEW + ELINT + ECM, ETC)



**Source of this chart and all subsequent concerning Navy effort in Vietnam is CINCPACFLT ltr (S) ser 1/00143 of 7 Feb 1968, Subj: PACIFIC AREA NAVAL OPERATIONS REVIEW (DEC 67)(U).

Figure V-4

[redacted]


NVN LOGISTIC CRAFT AND SHORE TARGETS ATTACKED
NVN LOGISTIC CRAFT
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
TOTAL 2.250
JAN *F M A ▲M J J A S O N DEC
LOGISTIC CRAFT
SHORE TARGETS
DETECTED
DAMAGED/DISTROYED
NO. OF TIMES BOMBARDED
* TET STAND-DOWN
▲ BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY STAND-DOWN




SEA DRAGON WEIGHT OF EFFORT
ROUNDS FIRED IN THOUSANDS
SHIP-DAYS
20
16
12
8
4
0
200
160
120
80
40
0
JAN *F M A ▲M J J A S O N DEC
ROUNDS FIRED
SHIP-DAYS
* TET STAND-DOWN
▲ BUDDA'S BIRTHDAY STAND-DOWN

Figure V-5


NAVAL GUNFIRE WEIGHT OF EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM
ROUNDS FIRED IN THOUSANDS
SHIP-DAYS
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
JAN F M A M J J A S O N DEC
ROUNDS FIRED (LESS 40MM)
SHIP - DAYS (COMPUTED FROM SHIPS ASSIGNED TO TU 70.8.9)



MARKET TIME ACTIVITY
WATERCRAFT IN THOUSANDS
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
JAN F M A M J J A S O N DEC
BOARDED
INSPECTED
DETECTED

Figure V-6



OPERATION GAME WARDEN
GAME WARDEN ACTIVITY
WATERCRAFT IN THOUSANDS
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
NOV
DEC
BOARDED
INSPECTED
DETECTED

Figure V-7




"SEABEE" DISPOSITION FOR DECEMBER 1967
(typical)
BURMA
Haiphong
Chiang Kham
LAOS
NVN
GULF
OF
TONKIN
HAINAN
Vinh
VIENTIANE
Ban Peang Chang
THAILAND
Dong Ha
Quang Tri
Gia Le
Hue
Danang
Danang East
Chu Lai
Ban Khai
Mamuang
SOUTH
BANGKOK
Qui Nhon
CAMBODIA
U-Tapao
Dien Khanh
Nha Trang
Cam Ranh Bay
VIETNAM
PHNOM PENH
Loi Thieu
Bu Duc
Phan Thiet
GULF
OF
THAILAND
Bao Trai
SAIGON
Long Xuyen
Tan An
Vung Tau
Vinh Long
Can Tho
SOUTH CHINA SEA
NMCB'S (11)
SEABEE TEAMS (11)

Figure V-8

Figure V-9



Length: 165 Ft. Speed: 37 Kts (Gas Turbine), 16 Kts (Diesel), (Acceleration: 0-37 Kts, 60 sec)
Radar: Yes. Armament: 1-3" 50 Cal Gun; 1-81mm Mortar; 2-50 Cal MG.
Crew: 3 Officers, 21 Enlisted. Employment: MARKET TIME Offshore Patrol.



W 381
WHEC - US Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter
Length: 311 Ft.
Speed: 19 kts.(Diesel)
Radar: Air and Surface
Armament: 1-5"/38,2-Twin 40MM,Hedgehog,MG's
Crew: 13 Officers,137 Enlisted
Employment:HARKET TIME

Figure V-10




Figure V-11

PCF - Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift)

Length:	50 Ft.	Armament:	1-81mm Mortar; 3-50 Cal MG.
Speed:	23 Kts.	Crew:	1 Officer, 5 Enlisted.
Radar:	Yes.	Employment:	MARKET TIME Patrol.




Figure V-12

WBP - US Coast Guard Cutter

Length:	82 Ft.	Armament:	1-81mm Mortar; 5-50 Cal MG.
Speed:	18 Kts (Diesel)	Crew:	2 Officers, 9 Enlisted.
Radar:	Yes.	Employment:	MARKET TIME Patrol.




Figure V-13




PHOTO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure V-14

PBR - Patrol Boat, River

Length:	31 Ft. (Fiberglass)	Armament:	3-50 Cal MG; 1-MK18 Grenade Launcher.
Speed:	25 Kts. (Water Jet-Diesel)	Crew:	5 Enlisted.
Radar:	Yes.	Employment:	GAME WARDEN Patrol.




Figure V-15




Figure V-16




Figure V-17

APB - Personnel Barracks Ship (LST Conversion)

Length:	328 Ft.	Armament:	4-4.2in. Mortars, 2-40mm Quad Mounts; 2-20mm Twin Mounts; 10-M60 MG.
Speed:	12 Kts (Diesel)	Crew:	11 Officers, 161 Enlisted.
Radar:	No.	Employment:	MRF. Barracks Ship. Capacity: 122 Officers, 1180 Enlisted.





PHOTO UNCLASSIFIED

Figure V-18

ASPB - Assault Support Patrol Boat

Length:	50 Ft.	Armament:	1-20mm Cannon; 1-81mm Mortar; 2-50 Cal MG, 2-M60 MG, 1-MK18 Grenade Launcher.
Speed:	15 Kts. (Diesel)	Crew:	5 Enlisted.
Radar:	Yes.	Employment:	MRF. Escort, Fire Support, Mine Countermeasures.




Monitor (LCM6 Conversion)

PHOTO UNCLASSIFIED

Length: 60.5 Ft.
Speed: 8.25 Kts.
Radar: Yes.

Armament: 1-40mm Gun; 1-20mm Gun; 1-81mm Mortar; 3-50 Cal MG; 6-M60 MG.
Crew: 11 Enlisted.
Employment: MRF. Fire Support.

Figure V-19



ATC - Armored Troop Carrier (LCM6 Conversion)

Length:	56 Ft.	Armament:	2-20mm Guns; 2-50 Cal MG; 4-M60 MG.
Speed:	8.5 Kts.	Crew:	7 Enlisted.
Radar:	No.	Employment:	MRF. Troop Carrier. Capacity: 40 Combat Troops or 2.5/3 Tons Cargo.

Figure V-20





Figure V-21

CCB - Commandant (ICM6 Conversion) PHOTO UNCLASSIFIED

Length:	60.5 Ft.	Armament:	1-40mm Gun; 3-50 Cal MG; 1-20mm Gun; 2-M60 MG.
Speed:	8.25 Kts (Diesel)	Crew:	11 Enlisted.
Radar:	Yes.	Employment:	MRF. Command Post Afloat.



Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle (PACV)

Length: 39 Ft.
Speed: Up to 60 mph
Employment: Mobile Riverine Force
Armament: Twin .50 Cal MG, .30 Cal MG, Grenade Launcher
Crew: 2 Officers, 4 Enlisted
Features: Capable of traveling over water, swamp and relatively flat land. Transport troops, on side decks, for rapid insertion.

Figure V-22

VIETNAMESE NAVY COMMAND STRUCTURE





Figure V-23



VNM YABUTA JUNK

Figure V-24




Figure V-25

CHAPTER V

Footnotes

1. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.

2. MFR (U), 3 Oct 67, Subj: Interview--Operation CEDAR FALLS, Judy Osgood, CBS: Col A. P. Wade, MACV History Branch, 2 Oct 67.

3. Rpt (S), MACJ341, 3 Feb 68, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY67.

4. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.

5. MACV Position Paper (TS), MACJ52, 7 Apr 67, Subj: MACV Position Relative to Revised Rules of Engagement for Cambodia (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV, 280401Z Sep 67, Subj: Rules of Engagement--Cambodia (U).

6. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.

7. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to FFORCEV Cmdrs, 101811Z Jun 67, Subj: Rules of Engagement--Laos (U).

8. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966.

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149. Msg (TS), 7AF, 290936Z Dec 66, Subj: 7AF Ops New Year's Truce (U); Msg, CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 042355Z Jan 67, Subj: Logistic Target Development and Destruction; Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 112330Z Feb 67, Subj: Intensified Reconnaissance During Tet Period (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to 7AF 121151Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 282153Z Dec 66, Subj: Reconnaissance Operations During Cease Fire (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT et al, 071835Z Feb 67, Subj: Reconnaissance Operations During Tet 1967 (U); Msg (TS), 7AF, 111135Z Feb 67, Subj: Tet - Special Operating Rules (U).

150. Msg (TS), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 110625Z Feb 67, Subj: Post-Tet Plan, RP-1 and TALLY HO, 12 Feb 67 (U).

151. Msg (TS), PACAF to CINCPAC, 122355Z Feb 67; Msg (TS), CJCS to CINCPAC, 130054Z Feb 67; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to Cmdr 7AF, 130731Z Feb 67, Subj: Offensive Operations Against NVN (U); Msg (TS), CJCS to CINCPAC, 131318Z Feb 67; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 131630Z Feb 67, Subj: Offensive

Operations Against NVN (U), Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 131714Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.

152. Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCSAC, 110015Z Feb 67, Subj: SA-2 Threat in DMZ (U); Ltr (S), MACJ02 to DEPCOMUSMACV, 12 Jan 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Short Notice TINY TIM Support Plan (U); Msg (S), SAC to CINCPAC, 111905Z Feb 67, Subj: TINY TIM (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 112230Z Feb 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT (U).

153. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 210430Z Jun 67, Subj: Air Operations NVN (C).

154. Memo (TS), COMUSMACV to AMB Bunker, 21 Jun 67.

155. Embtel (C), Saigon to SECSTATE, 30 Jun 67, Subj: Van Tien Dung Analyses NVN Dry Season Successes.

156. Msg (S), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 230411Z Jun 67, Subj: AAAOB NVN (U).

157. Rpt (TS), Briefings for SECDEF, 7-8 Jul 67.

158. Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 090714Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Program; Msg (S), SAC to JCS, 112205Z Aug 67, Subj: Interim Amend. No. 1 to SAC OPLAN 52-68, Vol II (U).

159. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCSAC,020504Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Basic OPORD, Ch 1 (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPAC-FLT, 120208Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), SAC to CINCPAC 291530Z Aug 67, Subj: Diversion (U).

160. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCSAC, 270001Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 280440Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Target Approval Restrictions (U).

161. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 010430Z Jul 67, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 140220Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), CJCS to CINCPAC, 202044Z Jul 67, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER 57 (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC TO CINCPACFLT, 210407Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 052243Z Aug 67, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER (U);

Msg (TS), CJCS to CINCPAC, 090005Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.

162. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 030001Z Sep 67, Subj: CINCPAC Monthly ROLLING THUNDER (RT) Summary, Aug 67 (U).

163. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 080330Z Nov 67, Subj: CINCPAC Monthly ROLLING THUNDER Summary, Oct 67 (U).

164. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV et al., 201925Z Nov 67, Subj: Basic OPORD: ROLLING THUNDER/BLUE TREE, Ch 3 (U); Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 082315Z Nov 67, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER 57 (U).

165. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 090055Z Jan 68, Subj: CINCPAC Monthly ROLLING THUNDER Summary, Dec 67. (U).

166. Op. cit. 100.

167. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 142100Z Nov 67, Subj: BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER/YANKEE TEAM Basic OPORD (U).

168. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 111005Z Jun 67, Subj: Ibid.

169. Msg (TS), AIRA Vientaine to 7AF, 021040Z Mar 67, Subj: 7AF OPORD 433-67 (U); Msg (TS), 7AF, 040832Z Mar 67, Subj: STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND Operations Restrictions (U); Msg (TS), AIRA Vientiane to 7AF, 060315Z Mar 67, Subj: 7AF OPORD 433-67 (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 071201Z Mar 67, Subj: Air Operations in STEEL TIGER (U).

170. Msg (S), SECDEF to JCS, 022032Z Mar 67, Subj: B-52 Operations in Southeast Asia (U).

171. Msg (S), SAC to CINCPAC, 281625Z Jan 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 112200Z Feb 67, Subj: Ibid.; Embtel (S), Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 120430Z Mar 67, Subj: STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND Interdiction Plan (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 121310Z Mar 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Interdiction Test Program in Laos (U); Embtel (S), Vientiane to CINCPAC, 130558Z Mar 67.

172. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS 210155Z Apr 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Strike Results (U).

173. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to AMEMB Vientiane, 221655Z Apr 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT (U).

174. Memo (TS), MACCOC2, 10 Apr 67, Subj: Planning Directive 3-67.

175. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 060728Z Jul 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Restrictions (U); Embtel (TS), Bangkok 1369 to SECSTATE 150618Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT; Embtel (TS), Vientiane 805, 140406Z Aug 67, Msg (TS), CINCPAC to AMEMB Vientiane, 122201Z Aug 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT (U); Msg (TS), SAC to JCS, 251335Z Jul 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Restrictions (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 130040Z Jul 67, Subj: Ibid.; Memo (TS), MACJ02, 11 Jul 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Restrictions and Thai-Based Fighter Aircraft.

176. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 262325Z Jul 67, Subj: Cambodian Operations (C); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 020248Z Aug 67, Subj: DORSAL FIN (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 020247Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), CG II FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 041055Z Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.

177. Msg (TS), SECDEF to JCS, 271903Z Oct 67, Subj: US/Cambodian Relations (U).

178. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV, 231148Z Dec 66, Subj: Rules of Engagement--Cambodia (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV, 061315Z Mar 67, Subj: Ibid.

179. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to DCG USARV, 231149Z Dec 66, Subj: Rules of Engagement--Laos (U); Msg (TS), Dep Cmdr 7/13AF, 080840Z Mar 67.

180. Msg (S), 7AF, 140751Z Dec 66, Subj: Use of Strike Aircraft (U); Msg (S), 7AF to COMUSMACV, 031111Z Jan 67, Subj: Infiltration Activity (U); Msg (S), 7AF, 191059Z Jan 67; Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 042246Z Feb 67, Subj: Air Operations in Laos (U).

181. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 050257Z May 67, Subj: CHICOM Buffer Zone (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 051210Z May 67, Subj: ROLLING THUNDER (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACAF, 050442Z May 67, Subj: Basic OPORD, ROLLING THUNDER/BLUE TREE (U).

182. DF (TS), MACJ341 to SJS, 13358-67, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Sep 67 (U).

183. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 021200Z Nov 67, Subj: Summary of Selected Monthly Activities (U).

184. Msg (S), 7AF to USARV, 200945Z Nov 67, Subj: CH-3/US-1 Main Support Base (U).

185. Msg (S), 7AF to CINCPACAF, 210515Z Dec 67.

186. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 060020Z Aug 67, Subj: Forrestal Replacement (U).

187. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 060801Z Oct 66, Subj: Operation SLAM (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to AMEMB Vientiane, 110010Z Oct 66, Subj: Ibid.; COMUSMACV's Historical Briefings (TS), 17 Sep 66 and 17 Oct 66; Rpt (TS), MACJ34, 20 Nov 66, Subj: J3 Historical Summary, Oct 66; Embtel (TS), Vientiane to COMUSMACV, 111000Z Dec 66, Subj: Draft Plan--Operation SLAM, 27 Oct 66 (U).

188. Msg (TS) COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 270855Z Jan 67, Subj: Operation SLAM (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 271755Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 290827Z Jan 67, Subj: Ibid., Msg (TS), 7AF to COMUSMACV 300920Z Jan 67, Subj: SLAM III (U).

189. Ibid.

190. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 190059Z Apr 67.

191. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 251145Z Aug 67, Subj: Operation SLAM (U); Msg (TS), 7AF to CTF 77, 131110Z Aug 67, Subj: August SLAM (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF, 170930Z

Aug 67, Subj: Ibid.; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to 7AF 260045Z Aug 67, Subj: SLAM Operation (U).

192. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 021200Z Nov 67, Subj: Summary of Selected Monthly Activities (U); MACCOC2 Historical Input (TS), Oct 67; Msg (S), CG III MAF to COMUSMACV, 091434Z Nov 67, Subj: ARC LIGHT Effectiveness.

193. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 250500Z Apr 67, Subj: Additional Air Strikes Support in Laos (S); Msg (TS), 7AF to AMEMB Vientiane, 220210Z Apr 67, Msg (TS), Dep Cmdr 7/13 AF to 7AF, 220925Z Apr 67, Subj: Request for Special Air Strikes.

194. Msg (S), OUSAIRA Vientiane to 7/13AF, 070705Z May 67; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to OUSAIRA Vientiane, 060537Z May 67, Subj: Air Strikes in Southern Laos.

195. Msg (S), OUSAIRA Vientiane to CINCPAC, 050845Z Jun 67, Subj: Wrap-Up of SHOCK II.

196. Msg (TS), Dep Cmdr 7/13AF, 201105Z Jun 67, Subj: Request for Special Air Strikes (U); Embtel (TS), Vientiane to SECSTATE, 061103Z Jul 67, Subj: Special Air Operations on Se Kong-SHOCK III.

197. Msg (TS), OUSAIRA Vientiane to 7AF and COMUSMACV, 190715Z Dec 67, Subj: Request for Special Strike Package (U); Embtel (TS), Vientiane 3436 to SECSTATE, 221013Z Dec 67, Subj: Special Air Operations in South Laos--SHOCK IV; Embtel (S), Vientiane 3618 to 7AF, 031013Z Jan 68, Subj: December Truck Kills in Panhandle (U)

198. Msg (TS), CINCPACAF to CINCPAC, 262032Z Dec 67, Subj: NVN Air Defenses.

199. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 040030Z Mar 67, Subj: Pinnacle (U); Msg (C), 7AF to CINCPAC, 041235Z Mar 67, Subj: 7AF Pinnacle 099 (U); Rpt (S), 7AF, 4 Apr 67, Subj: Formal Report to Investigation: "The Lang Vei Incident" (U).

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201. Rpt (S), OASD, 18 Aug 67, Subj: Southeast Asia Analysis Report.

202. Msg (S), APGC Elgin AFB to 7AF, 202252Z Jan 67, Subj: Bulk CS-1.

203. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 220215Z Mar 67, Subj: Destructor MK-36 (U).

204. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 021200Z Nov 67, Subj: Summary of Selected Monthly Activities (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 080330Z Nov 67, Subj: CINCPAC Monthly ROLLING THUNDER Summary, Oct 67 (U).

205. Msg (S), Cmdr 7AF to CINCPAC, 040803Z Dec 67, Subj: MK-36 Employment.

206. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 080330Z Nov 67, Subj: CINCPAC Monthly ROLLING THUNDER Summary, Oct 67 (U).

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211. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 150744Z Mar 67, Subj: Number and Types of Ships for Operation MARKET TIME (U); Msg (S), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 182130Z Mar 67, Subj: NGF Assets (U); Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS, 280940Z Mar 67, Subj: MACV FY68 Force Requirements (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 310825Z Mar 67; Subj: Force Requirements (U).

212. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0341, 29 Apr 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Mar 67 (U).

213. COMNAVFORV Monthly Evaluation Report, Apr 67; Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0341, 29 Apr 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Mar 67 (U).

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215. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0603, 9 Aug 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Supplement, May 67 (U).

216. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0605, 10 Aug 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Jun 67; MFR (TS), MACJ02, 3 Jun 67, Subj: CIIC Meeting, 3 Jun 67 (U).

217. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, FF5-16, 5213, n.d., Subj: Monthly Evaluation, Jul 67 (U).

218. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, FF5-16, 5213, n.d., Subj: Monthly Evaluation, Aug 67 (U); Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0889, 25 Nov 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Supplement, Aug 67; Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 05, 2 Jan 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Supplement, Dec 66; Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT Ser 0771, 7 Oct 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Sep 67 (U).

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227. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS, 280940Z Mar 67, Subj: MACV FY68 Force Requirements (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 310825Z Mar 67, Subj: Force Requirements (U); Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, Ser 000450, 1 Sep 67, Subj: SEASIA Deployment Projected Program 5 (U).

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236. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 014, 4 Jan 68, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Dec 67 (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV to NMCC, 230948Z Dec 67, Subj: Daily SITREP 356 (U).

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238. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG II FFORCEV, 091130Z Jan 67, Subj: Deployment of Forces to IV CTZ (U); Msg (S), NAVSUPPACT Saigon to COMNAVFORV, 160130Z Jan 67, Subj: Dong Tam Support Base (S); Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0233, 30 Mar 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Supplement, Jan 67 (U); Msg (S), COMNAVFORV to CINCPAC-FLT, 290426Z Jan 67, Subj: Deployment of COMRIVFLOT ONE, Staff, and Elements (U); Report (C), DA, 1 Feb 67, Subj: Army Buildup Progress Report (U); Ltr (C), SA IV CTZ to COMUSMACV, 9 Feb 67, Subj: Monthly Evaluation Report, Jan 67 (U).

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240. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0258, 22 Mar 67, Subj: COMNAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Feb 67 (U); Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0341, 29 Apr 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Mar 67 (U),

241. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS, 280940Z Mar 67, Subj: MACV FY68 Force Requirements (U); Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 310825Z Mar 67, Subj: Force Requirements (U); Ltr (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Ser 0003464, 13 Mar 66, Subj: Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) Concept (TS) now (U); Ltr (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, Ser 000450, 1 Sep 67, Subj: SEASIA Deployment Projected Program 5 (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 062105Z Oct 67, Subj: FY68 US Force Deployments, Vietnam (U).

242. COMNAVFORV Monthly Evaluation Report (C), Apr 67.

243. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to CINCPACFLT, Ser 0605, 10 Aug 67, Subj: NAVFORV Monthly Historical Summary, Jun 67 (U).

244. MONEVAL (S), MACJ341, 25 Aug 67, Subj: MONEVAL, Jul 67 (U).

245. Ltr (C), COMNAVFORV to COMUSMACV, FF5-16, 5213, n.d., Subj: Monthly Evaluation, Aug 67 (U).

246. USMACV Command History (TS), 1966; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPACFLT, 290945Z Dec 66, Subj: NGFS Availability (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 190130Z Mar 67, Subj: In-country NGFS Requirements (U); Msg (S), CINCPACFLT to COMUSMACV, 310322 Z Dec 66, Subj: NGFS in SVN.

247. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to CINCPACFLT, 102337Z Jan 67, Subj: Allocation of Naval Gunfire Assets (U).

248. Msg (S), CG III MAF/SA I Corps to COMUSMACV, 081542Z Jan 67, Subj: Inadequate NGFS Ship Availability in I CTZ; Msg (S), CG I FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 310223Z Jan 67, Subj: Naval Gunfire Support Request (U); Msg (S), CG I FFORCEV to COMUSMACV, 102345Z Feb 67, Subj: Additional Naval Gunfire Support (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CG I FFORCEV, 271208Z Feb 67, Subj: NGFS Ships Availability (U).

249. Msg (TS) CINCPAC to JCS, 250354Z Feb 67, Subj: PACFLT NGFS Capability (U); Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 190130Z Mar 67, Subj: In-country NGFS Requirements (U); Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC, 201811Z Mar 67, Subj: PACFLT NGFS Capability (U); Article (U), Stars and Stripes, Pacific Edition, 2 Apr 67.

250. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 110317Z Apr 67, Subj: PACFLT NGF Capability (U).

251. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 191432Z Apr 67, Subj: Naval Gunfire Ships (U).

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