THE AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER

Study No. 22

Historical Section, Army Ground Forces

1946

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The Army Ground Forces

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Study No. 22

By
Capt. Marshall O. Becker

Historical Section, Army Ground Forces
1946
1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the War Department.
PREFATORY NOTE

In compliance with 1st indorsement, Eq AGF, 210.4/2(AGF) GNAGS (15 Jul 42), 2 December 1942 to WD letter AG 210.31 (26 Jun 42) MR-F-PS-M, 15 July 1942, Subject: "Appointment of Historical Officers," and subsequent instructions, Capt. Marshall O. Becker, Publications and Photo Division, Amphibious Training Center, was designated as Historical Officer and the preparation of a history was begun. With the cooperation of Brig. Gen. Frank A. Keating, who, upon the disbandment of the Amphibious Training Center on 10 June 1943 became Commanding Officer of Force Headquarters Section (Army), Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Capt. Becker was detailed for temporary duty at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces from 23 December 1943 to 17 January 1944 and completed the history under the supervision of the Historical Section, Army Ground Forces.

KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD
Lt. Col., Inf.
Chief, Hist. Sect.

9 March 1944
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Amphibious operations prior to the present conflict had been limited in scope and had been confined to river crossings or small raids on enemy-held shores. Amphibious operations on the grand scale of those conducted in Africa, Sicily, and Italy had not been officially anticipated. The situation, both strategically and tactically, shortly after this country's entrance into the second World War soon indicated that landings on a large scale would have to be planned and executed in order to defeat the enemy.

There were two amphibious corps in the United States armed forces at the outbreak of hostilities, one in the Pacific Fleet and one in the Atlantic Fleet. These were combined Army-Marine units controlled by the Navy. The Amphibious Corps of the Pacific Fleet consisted on the 3d Infantry Division and the 2d Marine Division. The Amphibious Corps Atlantic Fleet consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. The 9th Infantry Division had also been trained by the Amphibious Corps Atlantic Fleet. These units represented the sum total of the Amphibious forces of the United States, with the exception of small units of the Fleet Marine Force which had been trained for amphibious raids. It was apparent that the United States did not have sufficient troops trained for the type of operation which was necessary to win the war.

Dissatisfaction with the system of amphibious training which had been followed up to early 1942 was widespread, and numerous suggestions had been made concerning it. A brief study, based mainly on the training of the 3d Infantry Division, was made by Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Floyd L. Parks, Army Ground Forces Deputy Chief of Staff, and submitted to the Chief of Staff in April 1942.1 This report included the remarks of Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas concerning the amphibious training of the 3d Division, which he commanded.2 Colonel Parks' memorandum for the Chief of Staff set forth the following considerations: (1) The structure for amphibious training at the time the 3d Division was being trained was "unwieldy, ineffective, and dangerous." (2) The planning, preparation, and training for amphibious operations up to that time had been so deficient that a real operation against a competent enemy could end only in disaster for American forces. (3) The prevailing Army-Marine amphibious set-up was unsound because only the Army had both the means and the grasp of the problem to plan, prepare, and train the necessary ground and air forces for joint amphibious operations on the scale envisaged. In view of these considerations, Colonel Parks recommended that the Army should have the responsibility for the undertaking. He also advocated that the existing Army-Marine Amphibious Corps set-up be abandoned as soon as possible; that the Army be charged with the planning, preparation and training for large-scale amphibious operations; and that the Navy and the Marine Corps assist the Army only in procurement of the necessary shipping, landing craft, and special equipment, and with technical advice and cooperation.

1. Memo (S) of Lt Col F. L. Parks DCofS AGF for the CofS Amphibious Training Center (ATC), 3 Apr 42, sub: Amphibious Training and Operations. 353/1 (Amph) (S).

A study of amphibious forces was also contained in a paper prepared by the Joint United States Staff Planners in April 1942. Naturally, the exact composition of ground, sea and air forces or of any given amphibious task force could not be definitely determined until a specific operation was indicated. It was pointed out that the number of amphibious troops in the United States was inadequate and that expansion was a matter of immediate and imperative concern. It was recognized that it would be impracticable to have Marine troops undertake all amphibious operations because the expansion problems of the Marine Corps made it improbable that sufficient Marine troops would be available. Again the question of composite Army-Marine Corps arose and the paper pointed out that inherent differences in organization, communication systems, administrative and supply systems, objectives, customs, and procedure produced considerable difficulties of coordination. The Marines were organized for attacks on limited objectives instead of the extensive operations required as the strategic offensive in the Atlantic and the Southwest Pacific commenced, calling for large ground forces capable of sustained action. The Army, on the other hand, was trained and organized for this type of action and had large numbers of troops available for amphibious training.

Because the Army was the organization undertaking the actual operation, the Joint Staff Planners felt that the Army should conduct the necessary training as well. The Army should therefore establish amphibious training centers to train large numbers of ground troops. It was recommended that these training centers be located on seacoasts in a temperate climate near to land and air training centers, where safety from submarines existed and terrain suitable for maneuvers on a division scale was available. The planners recommended that the training program should consist of basic, individual and small-unit training of ground forces in the techniques of embarking and debarking from small landing craft and in the training of small boat crews. A second phase of training was planned to include the use of transports and supporting vessels to require actual loading and embarkation on practice operations. The final phase of training was contemplated as a complete rehearsal, or series of rehearsals of the combat operation planned, including the use of all arms expected to be employed. On the basis of the above considerations, the paper recommended that the amphibious troops in the Atlantic and the Southwest Pacific be composed exclusively of Army personnel and that the Army establish amphibious training centers to train sufficient Army divisions to accomplish the large-scale amphibious operations envisaged.

At the time these studies were being made a tactical plan, the XXX Plan, was under consideration. This plan involved large numbers of troops who were to be employed in an amphibious operation of considerable magnitude. It is mentioned here for its influence on the establishment of the Amphibious Training Center.

Every division earmarked for employment under the XXX Plan was to receive complete shore-to-shore amphibious training. The objective to be achieved was the training of twelve divisions in the United States prior to 1 February 1943. Of these


4. The thoroughly unsatisfactory status of amphibious training up to May 1942, the realization of responsible officers that something had to be done about the situation, the exigencies of the strategical and tactical requirements for the prosecution of the war, the realization that the Army was the logical organization to be responsible for amphibious training, and the urgent demands of the XXX Plan all combined to shift the emphasis of responsibility for amphibious training from the Navy to the Army.
twelve, eleven were to be infantry divisions and one was to be an armored division. In addition to these, three divisions, including one armored, were to receive their training overseas. Sufficient small boat crews were to be trained to enable the simultaneous movement of eight divisions, with fifty per cent replacement of boat crews available - this also to be accomplished by 1 February 1943.5

On 9 May 1942, the War Department tentatively outlined the part Army Ground Forces was to play in this picture. Army Ground Forces was made responsible for the shore-to-shore amphibious training of the twelve divisions trained in the United States. The objective on that date was to train four divisions at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts; six divisions at Carrabelle, Florida; and two at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 1st, 3rd and 9th Divisions were not included in this training program because they had either received such training or were undergoing it at the time. The Camp Edwards training was to be completed between 15 July 1942 and 1 November 1942. The training at Carrabelle was to be initiated at a later date to be set when camp facilities and boats became available. Similarly, the mission prescribed for Fort Lewis was contingent upon the availability of boats.

The final War Department directive issued on 22 May 1942 was based on the 9 May directive. Army Ground Forces was charged with development of doctrine, training of tactical units (to include shore-to-shore and, if facilities permitted, ship-to-shore training), and "all phases of the operations of Army units involved in embarking troops and equipment in small boats from the land, the approach to and loading on a hostile beach, the establishment of a beachhead, and the preparation and initiation of an attack inland."7 Services of Supply was charged with "the organization, training, supply and equipment of boat operating and maintenance units, the operation of transportation facilities for landing operations, and for the equipment and training of shore parties."8

Proceeding concurrently with shore-to-shore amphibious training by the Army was ship-to-shore training under control of the Navy. The 3rd Infantry Division was still being trained on the West coast, and the 1st and 9th were receiving similar training on the East coast. This training was independent of Army Ground Forces except that the participating units were Ground Force troops and some overhead personnel were also provided by the Ground Forces.

The sheer magnitude of the project of training twelve divisions by 1 February 1943 made its fulfillment, to say the least, highly improbable, owing to the non-existence of facilities such as training areas, training aids, landing craft for training boat crews, at the time the plan was conceived. Army Ground Forces advised the War Department early in June that the project was considered impracticable in view of the few landing craft in prospect at that time which included only two hundred small boats and probably no tank lighters. Ground Forces recommended a more practicable basis, i.e., to begin training as soon as possible and to proceed as fast as the situation

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5. Memo (S) of Brig Gen H. R. Bull AGofS G-3 WD for CofS USA, 9 May 42, sub: Orgn and Tng of Amph Forces. WDGO 353 (Amph) (S).
6. Memo (S) of Brig Gen H. R. Bull for CG AGF, 9 May 42, sub: Orgn and Tng of Amph Forces. Ibid.
7. Ltr (S) TAG to CG AGF, 22 May 42, sub: Responsibility for Amph Tng. AG 353 Amph Tng MT-C.
8. Ibid.
would permit. In reporting the above to General McNair, Colonel Lowell W. Rooks, Chief of the Training Division, Army Ground Forces, stated that he understood informally that the War Department held the same view and that a meeting would be called on 9 June to consider a new directive to revise the training objective.

A brief orientation at this time concerning the amphibious training organizations which were operating concurrently but independently during 1942 and 1943 may serve to eliminate some of the confusion which is inevitable in a study of amphibious training. The part played by Army Ground Forces (with which this narrative is exclusively concerned) was carried out by the Amphibious Training Center. This was strictly a Ground Forces installation and had no connection with the Navy except for occasional "academic liaison" and the use of Navy-operated craft in small numbers. Also in 1942 the Amphibious Corps Atlantic Fleet (ACAF) was reconstituted, using Army troops with an Army headquarters at Camp Pickett, Virginia. This Corps comprised the 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 2d Armored Division. Control was exercised by the Navy - there was no connection with the Amphibious Training Center. Shortly before ACAF Headquarters was closed out in October 1942, the Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet was constituted with headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. AFAF was a ship-to-shore training agency under Navy control, with a small number of Army personnel on the staff. This installation, like ACAF, was entirely independent of the Amphibious Training Center. It is enough to know that these other two units existed - our main concern is with what the Army did by itself to accomplish its amphibious training mission.

CHAPTER II
ACTIVATION AND MISSION

To fulfill its assigned mission of training twelve divisions in shore-to-shore amphibious operations by 1 February 1943, Army Ground Forces activated the Amphibious Training Center (known as the Amphibious Training Command on date of activation, but later redesignated "Center.").1 The effective date of activation was 20 May 1942, but work along the lines contemplated had been progressing for over a month before that date.2

On 9 April 1942, Colonel (later Brig. Gen.) Frank A. Keating, Chief of Staff of the 2d Division, was ordered to Army Ground Forces to advise during the early days of the Amphibious Training Center, and particularly to assist the site board which was investigating possible locations for the proposed training centers.

The general plan was to establish three amphibious training centers, located at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts; Carrabelle, Florida; and Fort Lewis, Washington. Divisions were to be rotated through these centers to receive shore-to-shore training. It was contemplated that training would begin at Camp Edwards on 15 July, at Carrabelle when the camp was completed, and at Fort Lewis on a date contingent upon the future situation.3

After one week's duty at Army Ground Forces, General Keating returned to Fort Sam Houston, Texas and was ordered forty-eight hours later to join the site board at Fort Myer, Va., to inspect proposed training locations. The board visited sites in the vicinity of Fort Myer, Va., and Everglades, Venice, and Carrabelle, Florida. Sites in Texas, Miss.-jippi, and Louisiana were not visited because the reports from the Area Engineers in those localities had all been distinctly unfavorable.

The board's instructions provided that the site chosen was to possess, as nearly as possible, four basic features: (1) an island well off shore (preferably about ten miles out from favorable landing beaches; (2) a large sheltered body of water for basic small-boat training convenient to a camp or bivouac area; (3) a coastal strip approximately twenty miles long with a maximum number of good landing beaches (each beach to be about one mile in length); and (4) suitable terrain adjacent to the beaches (hinterland) to a depth of approximately eight to ten miles for training troops in the establishment of a divisional beachhead.

None of the sites visited possessed all of the features desired, but the board felt that Carrabelle approached most nearly the basic requirements. General Keating was not in favor of it because of the undesirable nature of the beaches and maneuver areas, and the Surgeon General considered it unhealthful. The Carrabelle site was nevertheless approved, chiefly because no others appeared to be available and the urgent need for expediting amphibious training to meet the requirements of XXX Plan outweighed sanitary considerations and the lack of certain desired features in the Carrabelle site.4

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1. WD Memo W220-3-h2, 24 Oct 42.
2. AGF ltr (R) to CO ATC, 22 May 42, sub: Amph Tng Comd. AGF 353/1 (Amph)(R).
3. AGF ltr (S) to CO ATC, 12 Jun 42, sub: Gen Dir - Shore-to-Shore Tng. AGF 353/12 (Amph)(S).
Brig. Gen. Frank A. Keating
"He Operated on a Shoestring"

"The Creed of the Amphibious Training Center"
The War Department ordered initiation of construction at Carrabelle at the earliest practicable date, and in the meantime amphibious training began on Cape Cod, Massachusetts, with utilization of Waquoit Bay near Camp Edwards as more or less of a stop-gap until Carrabelle could be completed.4a

On 3 June 1942, General Keating was again placed on temporary duty at Army Ground Forces. His first job was to prepare rough sketches of the desired location of buildings and installations in the Carrabelle area. He also made plans for starting training at Camp Edwards on 15 July. He proposed the organization of the Amphibious Training Center and arranged with Army Ground Forces for procuring the necessary officer and enlisted personnel.

The chronology of the activation procedure of the Amphibious Training Center was somewhat confused. Plans were being formulated and action was being taken on oral orders as early as April 1942, although the organization did not exist as such until 20 May. Even after official activation on the latter date the center remained on the inactive list until 15 June. General Keating had been placed in command of the unit on the date of its official activation, but he had no command and no personnel until his arrival at Camp Edwards on 15 June 1942. Prior to that date everything was in the formative stage and existed mainly on paper. This somewhat anomalous situation was dictated by the exigencies of the situation and the need for expediting the required training in preparation for the XXX Plan.

The Amphibious Training Center began functioning as a going organization at Camp Edwards on 15 June 1942.5

The initial mission and objectives for the Center were as follows: (1) to produce divisions ready for combat in a shore-to-shore operation; (2) to accustom army personnel to landing craft and to teach the technique of embarking and debarking personnel and equipment; (3) to train divisional and lower commanders and staffs in their duties in the entire chronological sequence of a shore-to-shore operation, to include the preparation of plans and orders, the assembly in bivouac, the preparations for embarkation, the crossing, the assault of the beaches and subsequent operations inland; (4) to establish a course of instruction in over-water "Commando" raids; (5) means permitting, to terminate each divisional training period with a full scale division maneuver, supported by aircraft; (6) using as a guide tentative texts prepared by Army Ground Forces, to "proceed with the necessary revision and elaboration based upon the information which will flow to you from Great Britain and which you will gain by practical experience . . . record the tactical doctrine of shore-to-shore operations, as it applies to a division and is a necessary background for training, based upon the data furnished you from abroad and from this Headquarters and submit it through this headquarters for War Department approval"; (7) maintain close liaison with the Engineer Amphibian Command; (8) represent Headquarters Army Ground Forces in perfecting arrangements for the reception and bivouacking of the first division to be trained; (9) make plans to proceed to Carrabelle with a part of the staff and demonstration unit when the situation as to boats and construction dictates; (10) make tentative plans to provide instructional personnel for Fort Lewis. In compliance with the War Department Directive to Army Ground Forces, on 22 May 1942, training in ship-to-shore operations was also included in the initial mission of the Amphibious Training Center.

4a. Brig Gen Frank A. Keating, "Narrative" (Development of Amphibious Training Center; copy of this document is in Appendix 7).

5. AGF ltr (S) 353/12 (Amph) (6-12-42) GNTG to CO ATC, 12 Jun 42, sub: Gen Dir-Shore-to-Shore Tng.
The unsettled status of amphibious training in higher headquarters soon resulted in changes of the mission. These changes continued to occur throughout the life of the Center.

The first occurred on 25 June 1942. On that date the responsibility of the Army Ground Forces was altered by the deletion of the phrase "... and, if facilities permit, ship-to-shore movements." This of course resulted in a revision of the directive of 12 June to the Amphibious Training Center. The War Department desired that training in ship-to-shore movements be disregarded for the time being. It was stated that the scope of training at the Army centers "might be extended at some later time if facilities permitted and the situation indicated that such extension would be desirable. It was not the intent of the War Department to include any ship-to-shore training at this time." The mission of the Amphibious Training Center was on that date defined as including shore-to-shore training only.6

The objective, if not the mission, of the Amphibious Training Center was altered even before the first training period got under way. This change, like the others, came as a result of the unsettled status of amphibious training. The decision was made in higher headquarters. The initial objective was to train twelve divisions by 1 February 1943, but on 1 July 1942, the War Department reduced this to five divisions.7 The directive ordering this reduction revealed the indefinite status of amphibious training in higher headquarters in the statement that as yet there was no agreement with the Navy regarding the operation of landing craft in the X= Plan. This change of objective did not noticeably affect the activities of the Amphibious Training Center.

The War Department modified the objective again on 25 September 1942.8 On that date the previous requirement to train five divisions in shore-to-shore operations by 1 February 1943 was rescinded. This would seem to indicate that there was no further need for the Amphibious Training Center, but an indefinite objective was substituted. The new requirement was that a pool of five divisions trained in shore-to-shore movement be maintained. The pool was to be created "as soon as practicable" and was to be maintained at a level of five divisions plus required non-divisional units. This change, like the previous one, had no noticeable effect on the activities of the Amphibious Training Center.

The mission was altered still further on 24 October 1942 when the instructions contained in the "General Directive - Shore-to-Shore Training" of 12 June were rescinded.9 The new directive revealed that the Center was giving more concrete expression to broader objectives originally stated in the 12 June directive. Whereas the latter had specified a broad series of functions as comprehensive as those of a service school, the 24 October directive, profiting by experience and improved facilities, put these on a practical working basis. The new directive prescribed the following: (1) inauguration of training as soon as practicable at Carrabelle, Florida,

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7. WD memo (S) WDGCT 353 Amph (7-1-42) of G-3 WD for CG AGF, 1 Jul 42, sub: Orgn and Tng of Amph Forces. AGF 353/ (Amph)(S).

8. WD memo (S) WDGCT 353/41 Amph (9-25-42) of G-3 WD for CG AGF, 25 Sep 42, sub: Orgn and Tng of Amph Forces.

9. AGF ltr (S) 353/12 (Amph) (10-24-42) to CG ATC, 24 Oct 42, sub: Gen Dir - Shore-to-Shore Tng.
for such divisions and non-divisional units as might be directed; (2) allotment of a period of one month for the training of each division; (3) instruction partly by Amphibious Training Center staff and troops and partly by exercises prepared by the Center and executed by the troop units training; (4) echeloned training to take advantage of the entire one-month period where facilities would not permit the simultaneous amphibious training of all units; (5) direction of training toward: (a) ultimate proficiency of divisions and non-divisional units in amphibious operations, (b) physical and mental hardening of all individuals, and (c) combat in cities; (6) amphibious training to emphasize: (a) use of landing craft stressing loading, unloading, formations, control, and boat discipline, (b) organization and tactics of combat teams, (c) clearing of beach obstacles; (d) beach organization - the development and advance inland, (e) night operations, (f) use of intelligence agencies and development of an intelligence system under conditions peculiar to amphibious operations, (g) supply, (h) signal communications, (i) chemical warfare, (j) air-ground support, (k) antiaircraft defense; (7) termination of training by a night-landing problem of sufficient duration to require establishment of supply dumps on the beach and forwarding of supplies to units on the beachhead line; (8) inclusion in the training of such elements of ship-to-shore training as facilities at Carrabelle permit, in order to simplify later training under the Navy which it was contemplated units would receive after the shore-to-shore work at Carrabelle.

This change in mission required some readjustments in the Amphibious Training Center, both in organization and curriculum. Battle training for all individuals was substituted for the requirement to train provisional Commando task forces. Greater emphasis was placed on amphibious training in problems peculiar to unit staffs, and the whole field of training was broadened from the original concept of basic training for individuals in amphibious technique to training for all echelons in both technique and tactics.

The Amphibious Training Center was growing up from a small unit and individual training organization to something more nearly comparable to a well-established service school. Its mission after 24 October 1942 was much broader than it had been when it was assigned its first task on 12 June 1942, even though the number of divisions to be trained had been considerably reduced. The effect of these changes in mission on the organization and training policy of the Amphibious Training Center will appear in later chapters.
CHAPTER III
FROM BIRTH TO DEATH

The history of the Amphibious Training Center was divided into two geographically and chronologically separate periods - the first its life at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and the second its life at Carrabelle, Florida. Haste and confusion characterized both periods. The exigencies of the training mission required the initiation of the Center's efforts on 15 June 1942 after less than three months of planning and preparation.

General Keating arrived at Camp Edwards on 12 June accompanied by Colonel T. Wolfe, Executive Officer of the Center. Only sixteen officers had arrived by 15 June; nevertheless, work on accomplishment of the training mission began at once.

The preparatory period from 15 June to 15 July 1942 was devoted to development of doctrine and technique; securing training equipment; preparing lectures, conferences, and map problems; organizing the headquarters; setting up the proposed curriculum of instruction; assignment and reassignment of instructors; building training aids; organizing and teaching tactics and technique to demonstration units; experimenting with new ideas; clearing training areas; preparing and publishing training literature, conducting numerous rehearsals; and viewing with apprehension and alarm the rapid approach of 15 July when the first school was to begin.

Amphibious Training Center headquarters and the school building were established at Camp Edwards proper. The demonstration unit\(^1\) was also housed initially at Camp Edwards, pending the erection of a tent camp at Washburn Island on the shores of Vineyard Sound, approximately five miles south of the main post at Camp Edwards.

The first student unit to undertake amphibious training at that station was the 45th Infantry Division, which was trained by echelons - one regimental combat team at a time. The proposed tent camp at Washburn Island was not yet completed when the first combat team arrived on 12 July, but sufficient tentage was provided (for all elements of it) within a few days after its arrival. In the interim individual shelter tents were used.

Training of the first combat team of the 45th Infantry Division started on schedule at 0800 15 July 1942, and continued for ten days. The second and third combat teams succeeded the first without interruption until conclusion of training on 20 August.

The final phase of the training consisted of amphibious maneuvers by all elements of the Division on 17, 18, and 19 August during which the troops were transported with their supplies and equipment in small landing craft from the shores of Washburn Island across Vineyard Sound to make a landing on Martha's Vineyard, an island about six miles distant. Immediately upon completion of its training, the Division moved out to make way for the next student unit.

The boat-operating unit which was assisting the Amphibious Training Center was already bivouacked in tents on Washburn Island when the 45th Division arrived for training.\(^2\) The Center concentrated all student units and demonstration troops on the

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1. See Chap IV.
2. Ibid.
Col. Peter T. Wolfe, Executive Officer
Island to save training time by eliminating transportation of classes over long distances. Boats and beaches were also available in that area. The Center’s demonstration battalion remained at Camp Edwards during the training of the 45th Division owing to lack of tentage and necessary kitchen and latrine facilities on the Island. The battalion was finally moved to the Island on 15 August after it had completed its demonstrations for the 45th Division and while that unit was preparing for the final maneuver. The move had to be expedited because the battalion was participating in the division maneuver.

The second student unit, the 36th Infantry Division, arrived on 22 August 1942. One regimental combat team was bivouacked in the tent camp at Washburn Island while the remainder of the division occupied quarters on the post at Camp Edwards. Combat teams were then rotated for training between Edwards and Washburn Island.

The training of the 36th Division was conducted in essentially the same manner as that of the 45th Division and covered the period 24 August to 3 October 1942. It was terminated by the customary shore-to-shore landing exercise which was held on 1, 2 and 3 October.

It had been planned to move the Center to Carrabelle, Florida on the completion of construction at that camp. General Keating requested that he be authorized to move south on the completion of the training of the 36th Division, and the move was directed to take place on or about 5 October.\(^3\)

Little could be done to prepare for the move when the directive was received in September because all available personnel of the Center were engaged in instructing and providing demonstrations for the 36th Division, and the Center’s demonstration unit had to act as opposing troops for the final maneuver. Accordingly, most of the work of moving the Center and its demonstration unit - plus all equipment including cargo-net towers - was crammed into the three days following the final division exercise. The move started on 6 October 1942.

All elements of the Amphibious Training Center had arrived at Carrabelle by 15 October, and preparations were immediately made to receive the first student unit to be trained at the new camp. The new location on the swamplands of the Gulf Coast of Florida was certainly not an inspiring sight - construction was not completed and fifty yards from the fringe of the camp the casual wanderer found himself in a swampland, tangled, and snake-infested subtropical jungle.

The period from the arrival of the Center personnel at Carrabelle to the arrival of the first student unit was spent in clearing areas for training, erecting the cargo-net towers and other training aids, preparing and revising training schedules, making the new camp liveable, preparing and conducting rehearsals, perfecting plans for the employment of the boat-operating unit, planning for the bivouacking of the next student unit, and reconnoitering for suitable landing beaches and maneuver areas.

The first unit to be trained at Camp Gordon Johnston (as the location at Carrabelle was designated on 13 January 1943\(^4\)) was the 38th Infantry Division. Training of this unit began on 23 November 1942, and terminated with the usual maneuver held on 17, 18, and 19 December. The maneuver on those three days was not executed to the

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3. AGF ltr (R) 370.5/1 (Amph) CNGCT to CG ATC, 19 Sep 42, sub: Transfer of Amph Tng Comd Units to Carrabelle, Fla.

4. WD Go 2, 13 Jan 42.
"The Maneuver Area Inland Was Swampy"
satisfaction of the Amphibious Training Center, and was accordingly repeated with greater success on 28, 29 and 30 December.\(^5\)

There was a lapse of almost one month between the completion of training of the 38th Division and the arrival of the next unit, owing to indecision of higher headquarters as to where to move the 38th Division. This period was spent in combat training for the troops of the Center's demonstration unit and in further technical and tactical training for the boat-operating unit assigned to the Center.

The 28th Infantry Division was the next unit to arrive. Its training began on 28 January 1943 and was terminated with the final division landing exercise on 7, 8 and 9 March. This unit was the last infantry division to be trained by the Amphibious Training Center.

General Keating had been notified in February that upon completion of training for the 28th Division he was to concentrate on further training for the demonstration unit and the boat-operating unit. This program was followed because at that time no other divisions were available to take shore-to-shore training.\(^6\) The next unit to be trained was expected about 10 April but actually no other divisions were trained by the Center.

On 10 March General Keating told the assembled officers of the Center that the future of the organization was very much in doubt and that it appeared probable that no more training would be conducted at Camp Gordon Johnston. General Keating kept in close touch with Army Ground Forces by telephone regarding the status of the Center, and early in April he was notified verbally that the Center was soon to be disbanded. In compliance with these directives, training aids were torn down and salvaged or shipped to other camps in the country, a large amount of property was either turned in to the post supply agencies or shipped in accordance with Army Ground Forces directive.

Early in May, after all training aids had been removed, key officers transferred, and the Center generally rendered incapable of further operation as such, three separate battalions arrived for basic amphibious training. These were the 81st Chemical Battalion, the 61st Medical Battalion, and the 462d AAA AW Battalion. The school was hastily reorganized by pressing into service officers who had not served before as instructors, and an abbreviated course of basic amphibious training was given to these battalions. Fortunately the cargo-net towers had not been torn down, but the nets had to be re-erected and considerable work in addition was required to restore the obstacle courses, battle courses, etc., to an operating condition. There were no boats available because the boat-operating unit had previously been ordered away.

Upon completion of the training of these three battalions, the remaining personnel of the Amphibious Training Center reverted to their former status of uncertainty and awaited further action on the part of higher headquarters. In the meantime tactical training of the demonstration unit continued. The waiting period was short—the Amphibious Training Center was officially disbanded on 10 June 1943.\(^7\)

\(^{5}\) See Chap VII.

\(^{6}\) AGF ltr (C) 353/32 (Amph) GNGCT to CG ATC, 16 Feb 43, sub: Additional Tng for the 3d Engr Amph Brig and the 75th Composite Inf Tng Bn.

\(^{7}\) WD ltr AG 322 (10 Jun 43)OB-I-GNGCT-M to CG AGF, 12 Jun 43, sub: Disbandment of the Amphibious Training Center.
The disbandment of the Center was not a surprise to the officers connected with it. Rumors from higher headquarters had indicated as early as September 1942 that the Amphibious Training Center existed only by the grace of God and the Navy Department. On 5 September 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a paper in which they stated their belief that amphibious operations were essentially the responsibility of the Navy, but that they also recognized the fact that Army units must be used in this type of warfare until sufficient Marine units could be organized and trained to work with the Navy. They agreed that the Army and Navy should train and hold available some units for amphibious warfare. The tenor of the paper indicated clearly that the Navy still considered amphibious operations and training peculiarly a Navy function.

Shortly after the publication of the above paper a meeting was held in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 of the War Department, who, at that time, was General Edwards. This meeting was attended by General Edwards, WD; General Streett, Colonel Gallant, and Colonel Woodruff, OD; Colonel Phillips and Lt. Colonel Williams, AGF; and Colonel Beall, GCS. The paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was discussed, and General Edwards said that by the terms of that paper it appeared the Navy was going to take over all amphibious training. He also pointed out that strategic plans were not sufficiently definite to abandon shore-to-shore training such as the Amphibious Training Center had been conducting. Both General Streett and General Edwards thought that the Army should continue its training of Army Ground Forces units in conjunction with the boat-operating units of the Service of Supply. The consensus of the assembled officers was that the Army should continue its training at Carrabelle along the lines then being followed, but that the word "amphibious" should be eliminated both from the title of the Center and from the training directive upon which the Center was operating.

On 5 November 1942 Army Ground Forces recommended to the War Department a policy regarding future amphibious training: (1) that the Army retain its installation at Carrabelle and train troops amphibiously without any connection with the Navy (this training to last for one month, after which the troops would be trained by the Navy, in such advance subjects as were peculiar to the Navy, for a period not to exceed one month); (2) that if the Navy desired to take over amphibious training entirely, they could take Carrabelle without any Army Ground Forces personnel and furnish all equipment and personnel necessary to train units - the Army participation to be limited to furnishing the units to be trained.

Again on 9 November 1942, General McNair stated his policy with regard to amphibious training. He said he felt that the Army could provide basic amphibious training very effectively at Carrabelle - in all probability better than the Navy could do it. He reiterated that the Army should retain Carrabelle and carry on as they were then doing, but that if the Navy wanted to take over entirely, then Carrabelle should be turned over to them and the Army set-up should be removed.

While this battle was going on in higher headquarters, the Amphibious Training Center was proceeding with amphibious training under Army Ground Forces at Carrabelle.

8. JCS 61/1, 5 Sep 42, sub: Distribution and Composition of U. S. Amph Forces.
11. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for AGofS G-3 WD, 9 Nov 42, sub: Amph Tng. AGF 355/47 (Amph) (S).
"Offshore Sandbars Interfered with Training"
waiting for its fate to be decided and apprehensive of being taken over by the Navy. Good news was received by General Keating in a letter from General McNair dated 4 January 1943, which reflected the still unsettled status of events in higher echelons.12 General McNair stated:

"We have decided, as you probably know, that your plant will operate independently and irrespective of what the Navy may or may not do. It is wholly impossible to get definite information with reference to the Navy's operations."

This decision was short-lived. The Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, and the Chief of Naval Operations entered into an agreement published 10 March 1943, which provided that the Army was to discontinue all amphibious training except for the 3d and 4th Engineer Amphibian Brigades, which units had been requested by General MacArthur for use in shore-to-shore operations in the Southwest Pacific.13 The agreement further provided that all amphibious training facilities at Camp Edwards and at Carrabelle be made available to the Navy when and if desired.

Thus on 16 March 1943 the Army Ground Forces was relieved of all responsibility insofar as shore-to-shore amphibious training was concerned.14 This was later confirmed in a letter from The Adjutant General which stated:

"All objectives and responsibilities previously assigned to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, pertaining to shore-to-shore amphibious training at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, and Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, are hereby revoked."15

The battle was over. Army Ground Forces had no further responsibility for amphibious training. Accordingly, the Amphibious Training Center was disbanded. The official date was 10 June 1943, although the Center had been considerably dispersed and relatively inactive since early April.

12. Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Keating, 4 Jan 43. AGF AG Records, 355 Amph Tng.

13. Photostat (S) of Memo of Agreement of the Chiefs of Staff, USA, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (incl to WD ltr (S) AG 355 Amph Tng (3-10-43)OB-S-6-M, 17 Mar 43, sub: Army Amphibian Engr Boat Trng).

14. WD memo WDGCT 355 Amph (3-16-43) of Org and Tng Div G-3 WD for the CG AGF, 16 Mar 43, sub: Army Amph Tng (Shore-to-Shore).

15. WD ltr (R) AG 355 (3-20-43)OB-S-GNGCT to CG AGF, 28 Mar 43, sub: Revocation of Certain Tng Responsibilities, AGF.
Inclosure No. 1 to GO No. 1, Hq ATC, 6/12/42.

Schematic diagram of channels of Command and coordination

Legend
--- Command
--- --- Coordination
CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATION

The problem which General Keating faced in June 1942 was to set up an entirely new kind of special training command in the shortest possible time. The XXX Plan demanded that training be started without delay and expedited to the fullest extent. The problem was more serious because there was no precedent to follow in organizing the new command.

The initial organization of the Amphibious Training Center, outlined by General Keating, was published 12 June 1942. General Keating fully realized that the organization he had prescribed was subject to change in accordance with the developing situation.

The original organization of the Amphibious Training Center provided for a Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Provisional Headquarters Detachment, Staff Section, Faculty Section, and the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion which was the demonstration unit for the Center. All the various sections were responsible directly to the Executive Officer, who was, of course, responsible in turn to the Commanding Officer.

The Staff Section was composed of an Administrative Division, Operations and Training Division, and Supply and Logistics Division. Each of these Divisions had a "Chief" who was responsible directly to the executive officer.

The Faculty Section was composed of the Amphibious Division and the Commando Division, each of which consisted of an Administrative Section, a Basic Training Section, and a Tactical Section. The Chiefs of the Amphibious and Commando Divisions were also responsible directly to the executive officer.

There was also a Joint Planning Board in the original plan of organization. The Board was to consist of the Executive Officer, Chief of the Administrative Division, Chief of the Operations and Training Division, and Chief of the Supply and Logistics Division. These officers were to be assisted by the Chiefs of the Amphibious and Commando Divisions. The Board's function was to recommend tactical doctrines and principles and training technique, and examine and pass on all special equipment proposed for training or tactical use. In actual practice, the officers comprising the Board were far too busy with their own Divisions to function as a group. (The Board's work was accomplished by its members functioning as individuals.)

The general nature of the duties envisaged for the Staff and Faculty Sections was "to render professional advice and assistance to the Commanding Officer of the Amphibious Training Center and the troops undergoing training; harmonize all plans; supervise training; conduct amphibious operations; develop training technique; insure close liaison with all agencies participating in joint operations and coordinate their activities; prepare instructional material for publication; issue detailed instructions for the execution of all plans; make continuous research for improvements in tactical methods and equipment; and establish an efficient training unit." In order to carry out these functions, each responsible officer was assigned definite duties for his particular office.

1. ATC GO 1, 12 Jun 42. Hist Off files.
2. Ibid.
The executive officer was the principal adviser and assistant to the commanding officer and was charged with transmitting the directives of the commanding officer to the appropriate staff and faculty members for compliance, and with directing and coordinating the work of the staff and faculty. His duties were more nearly those of a chief of staff than an executive officer.

The duties prescribed for the chief of the Administrative Division of the Staff Section were (1) general supervision of the Provisional Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment; (2) supervision and control of all administrative matters pertaining to the operation of the Amphibious Training Center; (3) formulation of administrative doctrines, principles, and policies pertaining to training (except those matters concerning supply) and supervision of the execution of such training; (4) coordination and publication of all instructional material prepared by the various divisions of the staff and faculty; (5) in the absence of a special staff officer, and when applicable, supervision or assumption of the duties pertinent to the functions of a Headquarters Commandant, Provost Marshal, Judge Advocate, Chaplain, Special Services Officer, Inspector, and Liaison Officer.

The Chief of the Operations and Training Division was charged with (1) preparation and supervision of the execution of all tactical doctrines, principles and policies; (2) development of training methods and technique; (3) formulation and preparation of all training programs and schedules; (4) coordination of all matters pertaining to tactical training and operations; (5) control of activities of boat units attached to the Center, and maintenance of liaison prior to their attachment;
(6) research and development of training aids; (7) preparation of appropriate tables of organization and proposals for special types of equipment for amphibious operations; (8) contact and coordination with U. S. Naval and Air units engaged in amphibious training, and with foreign officers detailed to participate; (9) preparation and coordination of all orders and plans normal to the functions of an Operations and Training Division; (10) in the absence of a special staff officer, assumption or supervision of the duties of an Air Officer, Antiaircraft Officer, Artillery Officer, Chemical Officer, Intelligence Officer, Engineer Officer and Signal Officer.

The Chief of the Supply and Logistics Division was responsible for (1) preparation and supervision of the execution of all doctrines, principles, and policies pertinent to supply and logistics of amphibious warfare (except those peculiar to the Administrative Division); (2) general control of all arrangements for supplies, evacuation, transportation, and other administrative matters related thereto; (3) coordination and supervision of the technique of supply and logistics of the Amphibious and Commando Divisions; (4) planning and supervision of activities normal to the fourth section of the general staff as outlined in FM 101-5; (5) preparation and distribution of maps, aerial photographs, aerial mosaics, and similar type material; (6) expenditure of special training funds; (7) in the absence of a special staff officer, supervision or assumption of the duties of an Ordnance Officer, Surgeon, Finance Officer, and Quartermaster Officer.

The Chiefs of the Amphibious and Commando Divisions were jointly charged with (1) all matters pertaining to the actual training of all units detailed for training at the Center; (2) formulation and preparation of training doctrines and principles; (3) development of training technique within their respective divisions; (4) coordination (each within his respective sphere) of all training in combined operations involving land, sea, and air forces; (5) preparation and execution of plans for special training of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion and for all details connected with demonstrations to be conducted by that unit; (6) coordination between these two divisions and with appropriate divisions of the staff of all matters relating to amphibious and commando training.

The provisional Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment operated under the general supervision of the Chief of the Administrative Division and was responsible for the operation of the Center headquarters and the officers' mess. This unit performed all the clerical and "housekeeping" functions for the Amphibious Training Center. The commanding officer of the detachment was responsible for the performance of all duties incidental to those of a detachment commander, and, in addition, those appropriate to a headquarters commandant as outlined in FM 101-5.

The 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion had been activated on 15 June 1942 by the Commanding General, VI Army Corps upon orders of Army Ground Forces. This unit had been requested by General Keating on 12 May and was to serve as the demonstration unit or "school troops" for the Center.

The Battalion was organized according to the plan proposed by General Keating when he recommended its activation. It consisted of one rifle battalion headquarters and headquarters company, one rifle company, one heavy weapons company, a battalion medical detachment, and a composite field artillery battery which had two 105 mm howitzers and two 155 mm howitzers.

3. AGF 1tr (R) 320.2/3 (Inf) (5-26-42) GNOPH to CGs Second and Third Armies, II and VI Army Corps and CO ATC, 26 May 42, sub: Orgn of 75th Composite Inf Tng Bn.
4. Ibid.
The Battalion operated under the orders and supervision of the Chief of the Operations and Training Division, but administrative and disciplinary control were the responsibility of the Battalion commander. The Battalion's initial mission was (1) to conduct all demonstrations; (2) to maintain close contact with boat units; (3) to accomplish authorized experimentation; and (4) to furnish such commissioned officers and enlisted men as might be directed for duty as assistant instructors or for other training purposes.

In addition to the demonstrations it was required to perform, the Battalion did all the "pick and shovel" work for the Amphibious Training Center. Aside from the small number of men in the Headquarters Detachment, all of whom were constantly busy in their assigned jobs, the personnel of the Battalion were the only men available to the Center to do the variety of job incidental to the training mission. The Battalion also furnished frequently up to three-fourths or more of its officers to act as assistant instructors in the training areas. Another function performed by the Battalion was that of serving as opposing troops for the division landing exercises conducted by the Center.

The strength of the Battalion was augmented in July 1942 by the addition of one platoon. This platoon was ordered intact from Camp Bullis, Texas, where it had been a part of "Krueger's College of Tactical Knowledge - the Third Army Officers' Training School." It consisted of one officer and forty-five enlisted men, and upon arrival at the Amphibious Training Center was designated the Commando Demonstration Platoon and used exclusively for demonstrations and operations connected with commando training.

The 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion remained assigned to the Amphibious Training Center throughout the life of the latter organization, and when the Center was disbanded in June 1943, the Battalion was transferred to Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet for further demonstration work in amphibious training. It was withdrawn from AFAF on 1 December 1943, and on 10 December 1943, was turned over to XII Corps and officially disbanded. All officers and men were absorbed by the 77th Infantry Division at Camp Pickett, Virginia.

To assist in the execution of its mission, the Amphibious Training Center was provided with boat-operating units furnished by the Engineer Amphibian Command with headquarters at Camp Edwards. This Command was not a Ground Forces unit at any time, but under the jurisdiction of the Services of Supply. It was activated at Camp Edwards in May 1942, shortly before the activation of the Amphibious Training Center. The purpose of the organization was to train army personnel to operate landing craft for transporting ground forces in shore-to-shore operations.

Engineer Amphibian Brigades were organized at Camp Edwards and trained by the Engineer Amphibian Command. Hurriedly-trained elements of the brigades were then made available to the Amphibious Training Center for use in training infantry divisions in amphibious operations. The Engineer Brigades provided the boats, operated them, and were responsible for the cross-water supply of the combat troops.

The 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade, which had been formed in late May 1942 was the first one to work in conjunction with the Amphibious Training Center. The Engineers were new at the game and were very poorly trained at the time the Center was using them to train the 45th Division.

5. AGF ltr (R) 320.2/3 (Inf) (5-26-42) GSNPN to CGs Second and Third Armies, II and VI Army Corps, and CO ATC, 4 Jul 42, sub: Orgn of 75th Composite Inf. Tng Bn.

6. Based on Capt Becker's own observations and his informal conversations with General Keating and Colonel George P. Lynch, Operations Officer; see also p. 63.
About halfway through the training of the 45th Division, the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade was alerted for overseas duty and withdrawn from the Amphibious Training Center. The 2d Brigade, which had been activated in June 1942, was substituted.

Shortly after the Amphibious Training Center arrived at Carrabelle, the 2d Brigade was alerted for overseas duty, and another change in boat units was made. The 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade served with the Center throughout the training at Carrabelle.

Such was the organization of the Amphibious Training Center when it went into business in June 1942. The Center itself consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Staff Section, Faculty Section, and the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion. Working with the Center, but not a part of it, the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade was followed in succession by the 2d and 3d.

The process of change which General Keating had anticipated when he prescribed the initial organization of the Center began to assert itself as soon as the unit started to operate. The changes which came about were due in part to an increase in the number of officers, in part to the realization that certain features of the organization were not practicable, and in part to an attempt to simplify procedure and thereby make the greatest possible use of the limited facilities available. Alterations came about so gradually as hardly to be perceptible. The basic plan of organization and chain of command remained about the same, but the functions of various sections were modified considerably.

The first noticeable change occurred in the Amphibious Division of the Faculty Section. This Division was assigned the task of preparing the instruction for the 45th Infantry Division, both the tactical and technical training of the troops and the theoretical training of the division staff. The Basic Training and Tactical Training Sections of the Amphibious Division trained the troops while the Administrative Section of the Division prepared the division staff course.

It soon became apparent that there was little if any difference between "basic" and "tactical" training for the troops in amphibious operations, and accordingly the Basic and Tactical Training Sections of the Amphibious Division were merged.

During the training of the 45th Division the officers of the Administrative Section of the Amphibious Division found that the problems incident to the conduct of a staff school were not at all similar to those of the remainder of the Amphibious Division. As a result of this discovery, the Administrative Section was removed from the Amphibious Division and established as the Academic Section. The new section was made responsible directly to the Operations Officer and was charged solely with conducting the school for regimental and division staffs.

This left only the now-fused Basic and Tactical Training Sections in the Amphibious Division. Since they had become one, the two names were dropped, and the office was designated simply "Amphibious Division." This change was completed by 15 August 1942.

In the original organization of the Center, there was no clearly defined line of demarcation between purely administrative duties and purely training duties. For example, the Chief of the Administrative Division was at the same time charged with the administration of the Center and with the preparation of doctrines, policies, publications, etc., pertaining to training. The same difficulty existed in the Supply and Logistics Division which was charged with administrative supply of the Center and with training responsibilities regarding supply problems in amphibious operations.
By 20 August when the training of the 45th Division was completed, officers of the Center were cognizant of this unsatisfactory situation. Accordingly, changes started to occur. Some were by direction and others "just happened." By the time the training of the 36th Division was completed the situation had been fairly well corrected. Administrative functions and training functions were separated so that neither interfered with the other. As an example, the Supply and Logistics Division concentrated on administrative supply while the tactical doctrines and policies regarding supply were worked out by officers of the Academic Section.

The name of the Administrative Division was changed early in the life of the Center. The first Chief of that Division was Lt. Colonel Donald J. Beeler, Inf., who was relieved shortly after the arrival of Major Stephen F. Tillman, AGD, on 1 July 1942. Major Tillman took over the duties of Chief of the Administrative Division and since he was a member of the Adjutant General's Department in late July he changed the designation of the Administrative Division to "Adjutant General's Section." From that time on the Section was known by the latter title and continued to grow very much along the lines of the Adjutant General's office in an infantry division.

Concurrently with the separation of administrative and training functions, there was a change in the chain of responsibility on the part of the Division chiefs. All administrative departments became directly responsible to the Executive Officer, while all departments concerned with training became directly responsible to the Operations and Training Officer. This arrangement was far more practicable and worked out to better advantage than had the old system when everyone was responsible directly to the Executive Officer. The new system was well established by late August 1942.

The arrival in June, July and August 1942 of officers who were branch specialists led to the formation of a Special Staff. They were what the name implies and were responsible directly to the Executive Officer and indirectly to the Operations Officer. Their function was to assist the Academic Section in the preparation of doctrine, tactics, and technique peculiar to their branch; to assist in preparing and delivering lectures in the staff school; and to assist the student division staffs in the solution of problems concerning their branch in amphibious operations. By October 1942, the Special Staff contained an Air Officer, Signal Officer, Surgeon, Engineer Officer, Tank and Tank Destroyer Officer, and a Chemical Warfare Officer.

When the Center first began operating, a group of British officers were assigned to it to assist in the formulation of doctrine, etc. They were also employed by the Academic Section in the staff school. In order to provide them a niche in the organization, they were designated "Foreign Officers' Section" in July 1942, and were assigned a place on the revised organization chart which was published in November.

A development started in July 1942, which eventually grew into the Publications and Photographic Division of the Operations Office. The responsibility for the publication of all literature, which had initially been assigned to the Chief of the Administrative Division, was early shifted to the Operations Officer. In order to handle the volume of literature necessary to conduct training, the Operations Officer assigned one officer to this task. The initial function of editing and publication of training literature was gradually expanded to include preparation of visual training aids; maintenance of a staff reference library; maintenance of a photographic record of the Center; supply of maps, overlays, aerial photos, etc.; public relations activities; and distribution of school publications to other service schools and army commands. The office functioned until November 1942 as an unknown part of the Operations Office. On 5 November it was recognized and given an entity of its own with the title "Publications and Photographic Division."
The Commando Division had been going along quite serenely, utterly unaffected by the changes that were taking place in the organization of the Amphibious Training Center headquarters, but in November 1942 it suffered its first and last change. The revised training directive of 24 October from Army Ground Forces took the stress off Commando training for selected individuals and put it on battle training for all personnel of the student units. As a direct result, the Commando Division was abolished and the Special Training Division was substituted for it.

This new Division absorbed all the personnel of the old Commando Division plus some additional officers and men who were brought in because of their special qualifications in swimming, judo, knife fighting, etc. The Special Training Division was made directly responsible to the Operations Officer on 5 November 1942.

The Academic Section did not remain stagnant after its initial break from the Amphibious Division. Lt. Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, Director of that Division, had realized early in the training of the 45th Division that instruction in the staff school was not based on the four general staff groups nor on the relation of special staffs thereto, but rather on arm and service. This was unavoidable at the time because sufficient officers were not available to accomplish the desired result.

During the training of the 36th Division additional Special Staff officers arrived for duty and six officers were transferred within the Center headquarters and assigned to the Academic Section. This permitted the reorganization of the Academic Section along general staff lines, with one officer responsible for each echelon - G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4. The change had no effect on the training of the 36th Division, but by the time the Center arrived in Carrabelle, the Academic Section was ready to operate on a more satisfactory basis.

The changes which took place in the organization of the Amphibious Training Center between June and November 1942 had come about through necessity and an earnest desire to improve the quality of instruction. To all appearances, little thought had been given to a deliberate reorganization of the Center; the changes took place when it seemed advisable to make them.

During the breathing spell after arrival at Carrabelle and before the 38th Division arrived for training, the organization of the Center was surveyed for possible improvements and to prepare for the contemplated extension of the training. As a result, a new organization chart was published on 5 November 1942 which ratified the changes already made rather than directed new ones.

The organization outlined on this chart divided the headquarters into an Administrative Staff and an Operations Staff, thus emphasizing the lesson previously learned regarding the necessity of keeping administration and training functions separate. The new set-up provided for a Chief of Staff and an Academic Board; neither of these materialized because approval of the Tables of Distribution upon which the chart was based was not obtained before the training center was disbanded. The Headquarters Company which was to take the place of the Headquarters Detachment was not forthcoming for the same reason.

The Administrative Staff contemplated under the new organization consisted of the Adjutant General, Headquarters Commandant and Provost Marshal, Range Officer, Supply and Procurement Officer, and a Liaison Officer.


8. ATC Staff Memo No. 5, 5 Nov 42. Hist Off files.
Lt. Col. Gerald F. Lillard, Director of Staff Training Division

"British Officers Assisted the Infant"
The Operations Staff was to consist of the Chief of Staff (nonexistent), Executive Officer, Operations Officer, Assistant Operations Officer, and the directors of the various divisions of the Operations Office.

All echelons of the headquarters were to be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, including the Operations Office. Under his jurisdiction the Operations Officer had the Amphibious Training Division, the Special Training Division, the Staff Training Division, and the Publications and Photographic Division.

The reorganization confirmed the changes in duties which had taken place in the various divisions and sections since June 1942. Headquarters Company had the same duties as those previously performed by Headquarters Detachment, and in addition was to provide local security for the headquarters and necessary fatigue for work in administrative and academic buildings. The Academic Board was to have essentially the same duties as the old Joint Planning Board, but this one, like its predecessor, never actually functioned as such. The duties of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion were unchanged. The Operations Officer was charged with all duties incident to planning, preparation, and conduct of training. The Director of the Amphibious Division was charged with direction and control of the field training of all units except those being trained by the Staff Training or Special Training Divisions. The Director of the Special Training Division was responsible for the preparation and execution of all special training activities - hardening courses, street fighting, etc. The Director of the Staff Training Division was to organize and conduct all staff schools. The Special Staff officers were to serve as instructors in addition to their normal administrative duties and to assist the staff officers of student units. The Adjutant General was to perform all administrative duties normal to an adjutant general's office. The Supply and Procurement Officer (note change from "Logistics") was to handle all administrative supply for the Center.

Two new elements appeared on the organization chart of 17 November 1942. One was the Department of Experiment and the other the Publications and Photographic Division. The first was directly responsible to the Executive Officer, and the second to the Operations Officer.

The Department of Experiment was organized as a result of a suggestion made by Major A. C. Miller to Colonel G. P. Lynch, Operations Officer on 19 September 1942. Major Miller believed that some such facility should exist for testing special equipment for amphibious operations; formulating and testing new ideas, methods, and techniques, etc. Accordingly, the Department was organized on 21 October 1942, but never accomplished anything spectacular in testing or experimenting. The main difficulties seemed to be procuring equipment to test, equipment with which to conduct tests, personnel to carry out the tests, and sufficient time to carry on the work. Its assigned mission was (1) to receive, test, and report upon all items submitted for experimentation; (2) recommend test of items of equipment and materiel for amphibious operations; (3) assume full custody of all material submitted for test; (4) maintain a complete file on all experiments. At the height of its career, the Department consisted of two lieutenants and one private.

The Publications and Photographic Division was the outgrowth of the natural demand of a school for visual training aids, training literature, photographs, training films, etc. During its growth it was handed various other incidental duties such as public relations work. The duties assigned the Division on 5 November were (1) to supervise the preparation, coordination, publication, editing, and dissemination of all non-administrative printed matter produced by the Center (including all types of illustrations); (2) to maintain a record of distributions; (3) to operate a drafting, photographic, and art section; (4) to assure that all possible interested agencies
such as field forces and service schools be furnished copies of publications; (5) to maintain the staff reference library; (6) to maintain a file of all foreign publications and a record of their temporary releases to individuals or divisions of the staff; (7) to assume all responsibilities for the preparation of training films and film strips; (8) to regulate and control all still photography and photographic files; (9) to maintain the film and photographic library; (10) to aid and assist publicity officers; (11) to maintain all moving and still picture projection equipment in excellent operating condition; (12) to procure maps and maintain the map file. At the peak of its existence, this Division had two officers and eight enlisted men to perform its functions.

The Amphibious Training Center was in a constant state of flux from the date of activation until its death. The final organization outlined on 5 November 1942 held until the dissolution of the Center in June 1943. The organization chart may seem to indicate that the Amphibious Training Center had an elaborate organization with excessive overhead, but such was not the case. The personnel of the Center never exceeded 68 officers and 71 enlisted men in the headquarters, with approximately 26 officers and 600 enlisted men in the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion.
ORGANIZATION CHART
AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING CENTER
Camp Carrabelle, Florida

Commanding General
  Executive O
  Chief of Staff
  Academic Board

Headquarters Company
Supply and Pro Sec
Dept of Experiment
Spec Staff Section
75th CITBn
Attached Troops

AG Section
  Misc Div
  Postal Division
  Personnel Div

Adm Section
Correspondence Sec
Msg Cen and Motor Div Sec
Records and Mail Sec
Publ and Orders Sec

Adm Sec
Officers Section
Enlisted Section
Reports and Returns Sec
Classification Sec

Operations Office

Annex No 1 to
Staff Memorandum No 5,
Hq. Amphibious Training Center
November 17, 1942
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CHAPTER V

EXECUTION OF TRAINING MISSION

The Amphibious Training Center was beset by numerous difficulties in the execution of its training mission, some of which continued until the Center was disbanded. Those which interfered most with the operation of the Center and with the quality of instruction offered to student units were the initial lack of doctrine concerning shore-to-shore operations, shortage of personnel, shortage of equipment, and the relationship between the Center and the Engineer Amphibian Brigades.

The training mission of the Center was aided considerably by the nature of the officer cadre assigned at activation. All the officers originally ordered to the Center had served with either the 1st, 3d or 9th Infantry Divisions, all of which had had some amphibious training under the jurisdiction of the Amphibious Corps Pacific Fleet or the Amphibious Corps Atlantic Fleet. Although the training given those three divisions was ship-to-shore, the experience gained by the officers during the training and the "pocahheets" they brought with them to the Amphibious Training Center were of great value in formulating the initial doctrine for shore-to-shore operations.

Yet the Amphibious Training Center found itself launched into a program of training with very little concrete doctrine or principles on which to base its activities. Army Ground Forces had been made responsible in March 1942 for the preparation and publication of doctrine on shore-to-shore operations. This responsibility was immediately delegated to the Amphibious Training Center. Tentative literature was prepared in the Training Division of Army Ground Forces to assist the Center in its task. This literature consisted of a paper entitled "Shore-to-Shore Amphibious Operations and Training" written by Colonel Walker of Army Ground Forces, and "Cross-Water Raids" prepared by Major J. Y. Adams and edited and published by the Publications Branch, Requirements Division, Army Ground Forces. The Training Division, AGF, admitted that "both texts were prepared hastily to give the Amphibious Training Center something for immediate practical use."

The status of doctrine for shore-to-shore operations was demonstrated on 3 June 1942, when the Command and General Staff School requested Army Ground Forces to furnish the latest information on that subject for incorporation into the instruction at Leavenworth. The School was informed that "the doctrine of shore-to-shore operations is now being studied and formulated." This was little more than a month before the Amphibious Training Center was scheduled to begin its first course of instruction.

Immediately upon reporting for duty with the Center on 17 June 1942, Colonel G. P. Lynch, the Operations Officer, was charged with the preparation of doctrines and principles for training and operations of the type contemplated. He was assisted by the Chiefs of the Administrative, Amphibious, and Commando Divisions, and by General Keating and the Executive Officer when they could spare the time. The result of their combined efforts was forwarded to Army Ground Forces on 27 June 1942, after the expenditure of

1. AGF Memo Slip (M/S) (S), Tng Div to G-3, 6 Jul 42, sub: Doctrines and Principles of Amph Opns. AGF 353 (Amph) (S).

2. Memo of Col Lowell Rock, Tng Div AGF for CG AGF.

3. C&GS Sch ltr (S) to CG AGF, 3 Jun 42, sub: Responsibility for Amph Tng and Opns. AGF 353/10 (Amph) (S).
a considerable amount of time and energy which was desperately needed in the direction of preparations for the start of the first school on 15 July. Approval was received from Army Ground Forces to use these doctrines and principles temporarily; instructions were issued to plan for revision in the light of experience gained in training.

The source of the personnel for the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion was at the same time fortunate and unfortunate from the standpoint of the training mission. The Battalion was activated on 15 June and was scheduled to start its first demonstrations of amphibious warfare on 15 July. It would have been desirable if all members of that organization had had previous amphibious training, but this was not the case. The officers and the enlisted cadre (key noncommissioned officers only) were drawn from the 1st, 3d and 9th Infantry Divisions, but the filler replacements were fresh from Replacement Training Centers. The officers and key noncommissioned officers had had amphibious training in their former units, but the bulk of the Battalion knew nothing about this type of warfare, and had to be trained from the beginning. This difficulty was resolved by the untiring efforts of officers and noncoms to train the remainder of the Battalion, a feat which they had accomplished satisfactorily by the time the second combat team of the 45th Division was ready for training.

Perhaps the greatest problem experienced by the Amphibious Training Center was the shortage of equipment and the difficulty of securing what was needed to conduct the training. This condition obtained throughout the activities of the Center, and was not satisfactorily settled before the Center was disbanded. All necessary equipment for the Center was supposed to be on hand on the date of its activation, but actually there was little at Camp Edwards with which to work on 15 June 1942.

On 13 June 1942, when the initial group of officers reported for duty at Camp Edwards, the Center headquarters building was entirely bare except for one folding table, one folding chair, and one staff sergeant. It was not until about two weeks later that sufficient furniture was available to furnish the desk space of the headquarters. Even then most of the personnel were working on small folding tables.

The building assigned to the Amphibious Division of the Center had been an officers' recreation building previously used by the 29th Division. When the Center moved into it there was a bar at one end of it and paper decorations from some party long forgotten were still hanging from the walls and ceiling.

Mess halls for the use of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Building were not in operation owing to lack of essential property such as dishes and cooking utensils. Officers and men of the initial cadre for the Battalion had to mess with one regiment of the 29th Division on a "guest" status.

Individual and organic equipment for the Battalion was not on hand when the full complement for the unit arrived, and was not procured until after the training of the 45th Division had started. This fact seriously hampered the training of the Battalion and made it necessary for the Center to borrow a full rifle battalion from the 45th Division to conduct demonstrations for the first student combat team. Procurement of equipment for the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion was delayed because the Supply Officer at Camp Edwards did not have it on hand and had to requisition it through normal supply channels.

4. ATC ltr (C) to CG AEF, 27 Jun 42, sub: Doctrines and Principles of Amph Opns. ATC files. These doctrines were set forth in ATC Tng Memo 2, 2 Jul 42, sub: Doctrines and Principles. See Appendix 10 (G).


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"The Headquarters at Camp Edwards was Small"

"Outdoor Classrooms were Improvised at Edwards"
The procurement of individual and organic equipment for the Battalion was a relatively simple matter compared with the problem of securing necessary items of training equipment for the Center, because the Battalion was able to requisition on the basis of its regular rifle battalion Table of Equipment while the Center had no such basis upon which to operate. Supply agencies consistently refused to issue sorely needed equipment without such a basis even though they had it on hand in warehouses.

On 23 July 1942, Colonel P. T. Wolfe wrote a letter to Lt. Colonel H. R. Johnson, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, requesting information regarding a requisition for training equipment which had been submitted to the post supply agencies at Camp Edwards on 30 June and which had not yet been filled. Colonel Wolfe stated that no action had been taken as yet although the requisition had been turned in about three weeks before. He said further that most of the articles requested were known to be on hand in the warehouses at Camp Edwards but that they could not be issued to the Center because it did not have a regular basis of issue for them. The supplies concerned included such items as rope (for the cargo-net towers), barbed wire and pickets (for training in crossing of beach obstacles), tools and lighting equipment (for the Commando Division tent on Washburn Island), demolition equipment (for Commando training), and drafting and duplicating equipment (for use of the Operations Office in publishing training literature). The situation indicated clearly how completely administrative red tape can "tie up" essential training functions. The equipment was sorely needed on one side of Camp Edwards, but it had to remain unused on the other side because there was no Table of Equipment authorizing its issue.

A requisition which had been submitted on 30 June was traced by Army Ground Forces at the request of Colonel Wolfe, and the Commanding General, Services of Supply, was requested to fill it as soon as possible. Further investigation elicited the information from the office of the Chief of Engineers that there was no record of it on hand but that steps would be taken immediately to supply the items requested. The Amphibious Training Center was informed of this action on 13 August, but some of the items requested were not actually received until after the Center had moved to Carrabelle.

The lack of a regular basis of issue for supplies and equipment forced the Center to put in a "special" requisition for everything it needed. This meant that each requisition had to be forwarded to the chief of the supply agency for approval. That individual, in turn, had to get the approval of the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces. The loss of time while requisitions were being backed around through channels constituted a serious threat to the training mission of the Center.

Colonel Wolfe sized up the problem concretely in a memorandum he prepared for Colonel Keller of Army Ground Forces on 20 August 1942, in which he stated:

The lack of a T/BA for the school causes more difficulty than any single item. Inability to state a definite authority on the face of a requisition means that each one must be "special" and run the consequent chances of being disapproved in some supply channel where personnel are not acquainted with our needs.

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He cited the example of a requisition for fifty antitank mines which had been denied because the Center could not furnish any authority except the fact that the mines were needed for training.

The obvious solution to this difficulty would seem to have been the preparation of a basis of allowances for the school, and in fact such a basis had been requested verbally by officers of the Center in meetings with Army Ground Force representatives. The reason for failure to provide a Table of Basic Allowances was revealed in a telephone conversation between Lt. Colonel Ralph E. Doty of the Amphibious Training Center and Colonel Middleton of Army Ground Forces on 25 August 1942. Colonel Middleton phoned in regard to the memorandum Colonel Wolfe had submitted on 20 August and informed Colonel Doty that G-3 of Army Ground Forces did not want to set up a Table of Basic Allowances for the Center at that time because he felt that the needs of the Center were not yet sufficiently determined to reduce them to a Table of Allowances. G-3 preferred that the Center continue to submit special requisitions for the equipment it needed.

The need for a basis of issue for school equipment became increasingly apparent in the succeeding months of training at the Center. Finally on 18 September 1942, Army Ground Forces sent a letter to the Center in which it was stated that the Center had been in operation for several months and had gained knowledge and experience regarding its equipment needs. The Center was accordingly directed to prepare a list of items needed in order that their procurement might be expedited. The letter stated further that when the belief that equipment requirements had become sufficiently stabilized, a proposed Table of Basic Allowances was to be submitted. Through some unfortunate circumstance, possibly connected with the fact that the Center left Camp Edwards shortly after the date of the letter, the communication was not received.

A tracer letter was sent to the Center on 15 October and reply was made by first indorsement. Owing to incomplete information contained in the tracer letter, the Center "missed the post" in its reply and did not convey the desired information. The correspondence was returned by second indorsement from Army Ground Forces on 12 November 1942, with a slap on the wrist for the personnel of the Center. The second indorsement stated that since writing of the subject letter (the one on 18 September, requesting a list of equipment) the need for a Table of Equipment or a Table of Basic Allowances had become increasingly apparent. The "slap" was contained in this sentence:

To secure delivery of equipment effectively it is necessary to have a standardized equipment list properly approved and distributed to all concerned. This need has been thoroughly explained on several occasions to members of your headquarters.

The letter might well have said "by members of your headquarters." The Center was directed in the same communication to prepare and submit by 15 November 1942 a list of equipment which, if approved by Army Ground Forces, would be distributed as the Table of Allowances for the Amphibious Training Center. The list was accordingly prepared and submitted for approval. On 17 February 1943, it was still being passed around


10. AGF, ltr 400(Amphib) GHQs to CG ATC, 18 Sep 42, sub: Equip for ATC.

11. Ibid.

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through the offices of the chiefs of supply agencies in Headquarters, Services of Supply. An approved Table of Allowances was not received by the Center prior to its dissolution.

The effect of the equipment shortage on the training conducted by the Center was clearly stated in a report made by Major W. B. Kunzig, Chief of the Commando Division, to General Keating on 25 July 1942, a portion of which is quoted here:

The Provisional Commando Task Force of the 45th Division completed a ten-day period of Commando training during the period 15-25 July 1942.

From the viewpoint of the faculty officers of this command the course of instruction as given to the Provisional Task Force was adequate, under the circumstances, and the results achieved were believed to be satisfactory. Numerous obstacles prevented the fullest accomplishment of the desired aims. Among these the lack of necessary equipment was dominant. Consistent reliance on improvisation was necessary. The schedule as originally planned could not be carried out in its entirety. Some deletions were necessary; for example, the course in "Use of the Compass" was omitted because the compasses ordered did not arrive. The course in aerial photos was omitted because it was decided the aerial photos available were not sufficiently clear enough to carry on a satisfactory course. Valuable training films could not be shown because the necessary alternating current could not be generated for the sound films; direct current was all that was available. In the course on demolitions dynamite had to be substituted for TNT which was not available. In some cases the chronological order of the schedule was altered because of the late arrival of equipment.

The shortage of personnel was a problem as serious to the Amphibious Training Center as was the supply problem. By 17 June 1942, only twenty-two officers had reported for duty, and by 15 July when the first school started, only fourteen more had arrived. The tremendous amount of work to be done and the small number of officers to do it seriously handicapped the training efforts of the Center.

On 13 July 1942, General Keating stated that he was very disappointed in the progress which had been made in the past twenty-five days toward preparation for the first school. He said that only fifty percent of the commissioned officers originally requested had actually reported for duty, although all had been ordered to report. His explanation of the discrepancy was that units from which the officers had been ordered had given them leave of absence upon release from their old stations and prior to their arrival at the Amphibious Training Center. This seriously delayed the preparations at the Center, and General Keating said that he felt, in that connection, that units should consult the commanding officer of the unit to which officers were ordered to report prior to giving them leave in order that problems of the type he was facing could be avoided.

At no time during the life of the Amphibious Training Center was the number of personnel allotted to it considered sufficient for the job it was required to do.

12. AEF ltr 475/61 (Amphib) GHERK 3/30669 to CG 803, 17 Feb 43, sub: Special List of Equip for the Ag and HqCo, and Ops and Tng Unit Sec, ATC.


Lt. Colonel Williams of Army Ground Forces visited the Amphibious Training Center at Camp Edwards and made the following observations in a memorandum for General Lentz, Army Ground Forces:

"In view of the fact that the present War Department directive orders us to maintain a pool of five amphibiously trained divisions and that a study is now in progress in the Office of the G-3, WDGS for the purpose of integrating the training at Carrabelle with the training at Norfolk, I am convinced that the Amphibious Training Center should be set up on a working basis. The present staff and faculty of the Amphibious Training Command, as well as the composite demonstration battalion, are not large enough to carry out the work which is required of them. . . . the one medical officer in the Amphibious Training Command has not only been responsible for the health and welfare of the command but also for the establishment of the training policy of the medical battalion of the division taking amphibious training."

Colonel Williams stated further that his two visits to the Center had thoroughly convinced him that General Keating was operating on a shoestring. These observations were reported on 6 October 1942, after two divisions had already been trained by the Center.

Colonel Williams submitted a similar report to the Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces on 3 December 1942, after having visited the Center from 26 November to 30 November at its new home in Carrabelle. He reported that instruction was extemporized in many instances owing to the lack of sufficient officers to conduct the training, and cited the example of privates from the Center training groups to students the size of a rifle company. A shortage of transportation was also reported which resulted in drivers working until 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock every night. Colonel Williams said that the only critical comments he heard concerning the demonstrations conducted by the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion "were based upon the fact that realism was destroyed because so few men were available to demonstrate a battalion landing team that the spectators were required to visualize one man running ashore as a mortar squad or a rifle squad and much good instruction was lost." On the basis of his observations, he recommended that the demonstration battalion be increased in size by the addition of two rifle companies.

The fact that the personnel assigned to the Center were not sufficient for the mission at hand had long been recognized by General Keating, and on several occasions he had requested additional personnel. He was particularly concerned about the contemplated expansion of the Center after its arrival at Carrabelle, and with that in mind he request on 4 September 1942 that twenty-three additional officers be assigned to the Center as instructors and special staff officers. Army Ground Forces informed General Keating that his request for additional personnel was disapproved because no expansion of the Center after its arrival at Carrabelle was contemplated by Ground Forces.

In December 1942, General Keating was directed by Army Ground Forces to prepare a proposed Table of Distribution for the Amphibious Training Center which would include

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15. Memo of Lt Col Williams for Brig Gen John M. Lentz, 6 Oct 42, sub: A Discussion of Future Aspects of the ATC. AGF 353/137\(\frac{1}{2}\) (Amph).

16. Memo of Lt Col Williams for CofS AGF, 3 Dec 42, sub: Rpt on Visit to ATC, 26 - 30 Nov 42. AGF 353/260 (ATC-AF).

17. Ltr (C) of CG ATC to CG AGF, 11 Sep 42, sub: Request for Add Pers. AGF 210.31 (Amph)(C).
his estimate of the personnel needed to conduct the training. The Tables were accordingly prepared and forwarded to Army Ground Forces with a fervent prayer that they would be approved and thus allow the Center to operate in the style to which it had always aspired.\textsuperscript{18} This prayer was never answered. General Keating requested a total of 104 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 335 enlisted men for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company, plus a full rifle battalion for demonstration troops which would have contained about 30 officers and 900 enlisted men. When the Center was disbanded the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment contained 69 officers and 71 enlisted men and the Battalion had 26 officers and only about 600 enlisted men.

On the basis of the Tables prepared by General Keating, the Special Projects and Requirements Divisions of Army Ground Forces prepared a similar table and submitted both to Army Ground Forces for consideration.\textsuperscript{19} The table prepared by Army Ground Forces recommended a reduction of 19 officers and 38 enlisted men from the total submitted by General Keating. After consideration of both proposed tables, General McNair recommended to the War Department, on 20 January 1943, a total of 119 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 855 enlisted men (including the demonstration battalion) as the minimum requirements to train the 23,900 troops then undergoing training at Carrabelle.\textsuperscript{20} He was notified on 25 February 1943 that his request was approved, but that the allotment of officers and warrant officers would be delayed until the allocation as to rank and arm or service could be made.\textsuperscript{21}

In the meantime, the Amphibious Training Center was operating with insufficient personnel and was wondering what had happened to the Tables of Distribution. On 24 February 1943, General Keating requested that delivery of the Tables to the Center be expedited in order that reorganization might be effected. He was informed by Army Ground Forces that reorganization of the Amphibious Training Center would be held up pending further instructions.\textsuperscript{22} This action was taken as a result of informal information from G-3 of the War Department (Colonel Adams) that amphibious training was to be taken over by the Navy.

On 13 March 1943, the distribution of grades and arm or service of officers for the Amphibious Training Center was published; it authorized an allotment of 118 officers and 3 warrant officers.\textsuperscript{23} This information was forwarded to General Keating with the statement that no actual increase in officers or warrant officers allotted to the Center would be made in accordance with the strength authorized by The Adjutant General pending further instructions from Army Ground Forces.

The action taken by higher headquarters in connection with the reorganization of the Amphibious Training Center was a distinct disappointment to General Keating for two

\textsuperscript{18} Ltr of Gen Keating to Gen McNair, 5 Jan 43. AGF 320.2 (Amph)
\textsuperscript{19} AGF M/3, G-3 to CofS, 12 Jan 43, sub: AGF 320.2 (Amph).
\textsuperscript{20} Ltr (R) 320.2/17 (Amph) GNGCT/00699 of CG AGF to CofS USA (Attn-G-3), 20 Jan 43, sub: Allotment of Pers to the ATC.
\textsuperscript{21} WD ltr AG 320.2 (1-20-43) PO-M to CG AGF, 25 Feb 43, sub: Almt of Pers for the ATC.
\textsuperscript{22} AGF M/3, G-3 to AG, 25 Feb 43, sub: Request to rush delivery of Tables of Distribution. AGF 341 (Amph).
\textsuperscript{23} AGF ltr AG 320.2 (1-20-43) PO-M-SHCAE to CG AGF, 13 Mar 43, sub: Almt of Pers to the ATC.
reasons. First, if the Center were to continue in operation, the problem of insufficient personnel would not be solved. Second, he had hoped to promote some of the enlisted men of the Center on the basis of the new allotment. He felt very strongly on this latter point because some of the enlisted men had been doing the work of officers in carrying on the training and he had been unable to promote them to noncommissioned officer grades because no allotment was authorized. When the allotment finally was authorized he was ordered to take no action on it. General Keating accordingly requested Army Ground Forces for permission to promote deserving enlisted men on the basis of the allotment authorized by the Adjutant General on that date. Authorizations to make the promotions was granted on 17 March, with the proviso that no additional personnel would be requisitioned to fill any vacancies created pending further instructions from Army Ground Forces.24

Such was the story of the personnel problem of the Amphibious Training Center. Like the supply problem, no satisfactory solution was reached before the Center was disbanded.

A third serious problem confronting the Amphibious Training Center concerned its relations with the Engineer Amphibian Brigades which provided the boats for use of the Center. The functioning of the Engineer Amphibian Brigades could make or break the Center because without adequate numbers of boats manned by efficient and highly trained crews, only limited training in amphibious operations could be conducted. It was conceded that the number of boats provided for use of the Center by the Engineer Brigade was inadequate to conduct the desired training, and it was also conceded by the War Department and Services of Supply that the crews were insufficiently trained.25

"Available Boats Were Used to Capacity"


25. WD memo WDGT 353 (Amph)98-28-42) for CG AGF, 19 Sep 42, sub: Availability of Engr Trs for the Atc.
The shortage of boats was caused not so much by any failure on the part of the Engineers but rather difficulties of production coupled with commitments of the United States to send boats to England. The lack of training of boat crews was a result of serious problems confronting the Engineer Amphibian Command. The Engineer Brigades were newly activated units - the 1st Brigade having been activated little more than a month before the Amphibious Training Center started to function - and their training, as well as that of the Center, was hampered by the shortage of boats.

The Engineer Amphibian Command and the Brigades activated by it were under the jurisdiction of the Services of Supply, while the Amphibious Training Center was an Army Ground Forces installation. Possible difficulties arising from this anomalous situation were anticipated on 13 June 1942, when Army Ground Forces outlined the situation to the War Department. The Deputy Chief of Staff of Ground Forces said at that time he fully expected commanders of the Engineer Amphibian Command and the Amphibious Training Center to cooperate in the accomplishment of the training mission, but he also suggested that the War Department issue a directive to insure that harmony would prevail. The reply of the War Department was noncommittal - namely, that issuance of such a directive was not favorably considered in the absence of definite proof of its necessity. Naturally no proof of necessity could be furnished since the Brigade and Center had not yet started to work together. The War Department said further that it expected that the commanders concerned would cooperate fully and that the issuance of a directive at that time might create suspicion and be equivalent to "borrowing trouble."

After working for almost one month with the Engineer Amphibian Command in the formulation of doctrines and principles regarding training and operational responsibilities, General Keating was still not satisfied with the cooperation between the two commands. On 13 June 1942, he stated that he was very much concerned about the lack of coordination between the General Staff, Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply. He particularly wanted a directive which would clearly define the functions and responsibilities of both the Amphibious Training Center and the Engineer Amphibian Command. He stated further that there was full cooperation with the Engineers, but that both organizations were not certain as to where the functions of one left off and the other began. He felt that it was a case of the blind leading the blind.

The situation continued in status quo until after the Center arrived at Carrabelle. Following disbandment of the Center General Keating stated that the idea of two separate forces (Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces) working under the rule of mutual cooperation instead of unity of command was wrong.

One of the problems anticipated actually occurred very early during the training of the 45th Division. This was the withdrawal by the Engineers of the Brigade which was working in conjunction with the Center on the training of the 45th Division. Only one combat team of that Division had been trained at the time the incident occurred, and training of the second combat team was just getting under way. General Keating commented:

26. Memo (R) 320.2/2 (Amphib) GMenG of DCoF for CofS USA, 13 Jun 42, sub: Coordination of Amph Comds.

27. WD D/F WDGCT 353 (Amph)(6-13-42) to CG AFG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Coordination of Amph Comds.

28. Ltr of Gen Keating to Col Nelson M. Walkor, 13 Jul 42. AFG AG Records, 353 (Amph)

"Essential Construction Was Delayed"

"Improvised Mock-ups Took the Place of Boats"
The 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade, which is the unit furnishing the boats and trained boat crews for us, was unexpectedly ordered sometime yesterday (24 July) to sail by not later than next Tuesday (28 July). This threw a monkey wrench into our training program and we will not be able to carry on instruction with the second echelon of the 45th Division until other trained personnel can be furnished by the Engineers. It became necessary, owing to the withdrawal of the 1st Brigade, to delay for one day the scheduled training of the second echelon of the 45th Division, and to curtail to some extent the boat training offered. The Division suffered by this removal of the 1st Brigade because the 2d Brigade which was substituted for it was newly activated and inadequately trained. It was a case of the initial difficulty being repeated.

The same thing happened to a lesser extent when elements of the 2d Engineer Amphibian Brigade were alerted for overseas duty during the training of the 36th Division. General Keating reported by telephone to Army Ground Forces, and the old battle over the status of the Engineer Brigades was revived.

Army Ground Forces once again approached the War Department on the problem with his agreement:

Engineer units for this purpose (training infantry divisions) have been rotated in the past. Since those units have been newly activated, the training of the divisions has been seriously handicapped. The engineer boat units utilized by the Amphibious Training Command should be highly trained as training and demonstration troops until completion of the entire shore-to-shore training project. It is urgently recommended that one engineer boat battalion and one engineer shore battalion be assigned to the Amphibious Training Command for the duration of the training program or until units of an equivalent high state of training are available.

The matter was referred to the Chief of Engineers who stated that perfection in the training of Army Ground Force units was of no particular consequence unless the necessary Engineer Amphibian units were trained to support them. The training requirements of the Engineer Amphibian Command were being severely handicapped by the extremely limited number of boats, which, he maintained, was the major reason why the rotation of boat and shore battalions was necessary. He felt that it was important that all Engineer Amphibian units have the benefit of combined training with Ground Force units and recommended that the system then employed be continued - the utilization by the Amphibious Training Center and the student divisions of the Engineer Amphibian units best trained at the time. The Training Division, Headquarters Services of Supply, concurred in the feelings of the Chief of Engineers and recommended that the requested assignment or attachment of Engineer Amphibian units to the Amphibious Training Center should not be made.

30. Ltr of Gen Keating quoted in AGF memo (S) 210.4 (7-24-42) GNGCT, CoFS AGF to Col Nelson, 27 Jul 42, sub: Visit to ATC.
31. AGF memo (C) 320.2/22 (Engr)(8-28-42) for CoFS USA, 28 Aug 42, sub: Availability of Engr Trs for the ATC.
32. Ibid, 2d ind, CoFEngr to CG SOS, 7 Sep 42.
33. Ibid.
"Drivers Were Trained in Outline Boats"

"The Staff Classroom at Edwards was Small"
Owing to the shortage of equipment and inadequacy of training of Engineer Amphibian units, the assignment of such units to the Amphibious Training Center was not favorably considered.\textsuperscript{34} The War Department promised that when sufficient equipment was received and when the units of the Engineer Amphibian Command reached a satisfactory state of training, the requested assignment would be made. In any event, when training started at Carrabelle, one boat and one shore battalion was promised for the duration of the training program.

While the above decision was being reached on the request of 28 August for the attachment of one boat and one shore battalion, Army Ground Forces reviewed the probable requirements for training at Carrabelle and decided that more would be needed at that station. Accordingly, on 20 September 1942, Army Ground Forces submitted another request to the War Department.\textsuperscript{35} The previous arguments were reiterated: (1) the policy of cooperation between the Engineer Amphibian Command and the Amphibious Training Center was unsatisfactory due to task force missions and training requirements of the Engineers; and (2) the mission of the Amphibious Training Center was such that it should have permanently assigned Engineer Amphibian units as school troops. The following recommendations were made: (1) that the 2d Engineer Amphibian Brigade be assigned to Army Ground Forces for reassignment to the Amphibious Training Center; and (2) that no calls be made on the Brigade for task force missions, except in case of emergency, until the Center completed its mission.

The 2d Brigade actually did accompany the Center on its move to Carrabelle, but was not assigned or attached to it. Shortly after arrival at the new station, the Brigade was ordered to overseas duty and the 3d Brigade, another newly activated unit, was substituted for it.

On 29 October 1942, G-3 of the War Department directed that the 3d Brigade be attached to the Amphibious Training Center at Carrabelle.\textsuperscript{36} The Brigade at that time was still at Camp Edwards. The order for the move of the Brigade to Carrabelle was issued by Services of Supply and contained the statement that upon arrival at Carrabelle the unit would be "attached for training" to the Amphibious Training Center. On 4 November, Army Ground Forces referred the matter to G-3 of the War Department, and requested that the order be changed to remove the ambiguity of the phrase "attached for training."\textsuperscript{37} War Department replied on 6 November:

> It is believed that the provision of paragraph 2, directive WDGCT 353 Amph (10-29-42) adequately provides for control over the 3d Amphibian Brigade. In event of any concrete case arising indicating insufficient control over this unit for the purpose intended arising from insertion of the words "for training" in the first paragraph of the movement order, it is requested that this action be re-submitted.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} WD memo (C) WDGCT 353 (Amph)(8-28-42) for CG AGF, 19 Sep 42, sub: Availability of Engr Trs for the ATC.

\textsuperscript{35} AGF memo (S) 353/35 (Amph)(9-20-42) GNGCT for CofS USA, 20 Sep 42, sub: Permanent Engr Amphibian Sch for the ATC.

\textsuperscript{36} AGF memo (S) 320.2 (Amph)(10-20-42) for G-3 WD, 4 Nov 42, sub: Comd Status of the 3d Engr Amphibian Brig.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

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The final round in the battle was fired by Army Ground Forces on 19 January 1943, when that headquarters recommended: (1) that the activation and training of Engineer Amphibian Brigades be made the responsibility of Army Ground Forces; and (2) that the Engineer Amphibian Command and all activities pertaining thereto be assigned to Army Ground Forces. These recommendations were made because Army Ground Forces felt that the Engineer Brigades were essentially combat units; they worked closely with ground forces; and their training and operation depended completely upon close association with combat organizations. Army Ground Forces pointed out further that the training responsibility for combat units or organizations closely associated with combat units had been placed upon Army Ground Forces by War Department Circular No. 59, 1942.

The War Department replied on 17 March 1943 that the problem presented in regard to the status of Engineer Amphibian Units was resolved by recent agreement between the Army and Navy with reference to amphibious training. That particular agreement "resolved" a number of problems for the Amphibious Training Center by the simple expedient of "dissolving" it.

The problems which confronted the Amphibious Training Center were the same throughout its existence - shortage of equipment, shortage of personnel, inadequate control over the boat-operating units, delay in essential construction, etc. The difficulties encountered at Carrabelle were no different from those met at Camp Edwards; they were merely the same ones on a somewhat increased scale. Essential construction had not yet been completed when the Center opened for business at Camp Edwards, and the same situation prevailed at Carrabelle. Supplies were difficult to obtain in both places. Personnel were overworked in both camps.

The difficulties were made more noticeable at Carrabelle, particularly as regards shortage of personnel and equipment, by the fact that the entire student division was trained concurrently at that station, whereas only one regimental combat team at a time was trained at Camp Edwards. This naturally meant that all problems of the Center were increased threefold. But there was little increase in facilities for meeting these enlarged responsibilities. The boat problem was eased somewhat by the provision of an entire Engineer Brigade, but still there were seldom more than enough boats to transport one regimental combat team at a time.

When the Center arrived at Carrabelle the new camp was still not completed and it began to look as though some of the essential construction would not be finished by the time the 38th Division arrived for training. The Post Theatre, which the Center needed to show training films to the student units, did not have the projection equipment installed although all of it was on hand. The Post Commander informed General Keating that the equipment could not be installed until the Army Motion Picture Service sent someone down to do it. Regulations prevented the installation of the projectors by anyone other than a representative of that service. Investigation revealed that the personnel for the job had been selected but they were on a tour of other camps in the south and would arrive at Carrabelle on some indefinite date in their itinerary. The equipment was finally installed in time but General Keating and the Operations Officer has some anxious moments over it.

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The area around the new camp was mostly jungle and there was no place where a unit the size of a regimental combat team could train. This fact necessitated the clearing in each combat team area of an area about 1000 yards square, which was only accomplished shortly before the arrival of the 38th Division after the expenditure of a considerable amount of money, time and effort.

Suitable beaches on which to train the student units in small landing craft were not available in each combat team area. Offshore sandbars and the extremely gentle slope of the sea floor rendered all but one beach practically useless. The District Engineer finally dredged out one suitable beach in each combat team area, at an estimated expense of $500,000.

The Carrabelle site was divided into four separate camps which spread over twenty miles of the Gulf Coast. One regimental combat team occupied each of three areas while Post Headquarters, the Center Headquarters, and the student division rear echelon occupied the fourth. The Engineer Brigade was located in Combat Team Area No. 3. This geographical separation made coordination difficult until sufficient telephone facilities were installed, and required much lateral movement of students along the coastline. There was only one suitable road through the camp which soon became very unsatisfactory as it broke down under the strain of the heavy traffic. Labor details had to be employed constantly to keep the road serviceable.

The Amphibious Training Center’s answer to the problems with which it was confronted during its existence was improvisation and the application of ingenuity and untiring effort. When desired equipment was not available, either something else was substituted or a suitable facsimile was improvised. If sufficient personnel were not available to do a job, those who were available worked harder and longer until the task was completed.

At Camp Edwards and at Carrabelle sufficient boats were never available to allow all personnel of the student units to practice in boats at the same time, so mock-ups were built on dry land and students were trained in them. These improvisations were built the same size as the real boats and served as valuable training aids in teaching methods of loading and debarking. They did not arouse the same interest in the students as did the real boats, but they were an effective field expedient.

The shortage of boats also made it impossible to give vehicle drivers sufficient training in backing their vehicles into landing craft and practicing combinations of loads. The solution to this problem was to outline on the ground with logs, planks, scrap lumber, rope, or whatever was available, the inside dimensions of landing craft of various types. These "outline craft" were then used to train drivers. After drivers had become proficient on these training aids, they were taken down to the beach and given a short period of practice with actual craft so they could "get the hang of it" while the boat was in the water. Valuable training time for other personnel of the student units was saved by this method.

When it became apparent that a suitable school building could not be provided in time at Camp Edwards, a small recreation building was pressed into service as an expedient. Every sort of available material was utilized. Blackboards were installed (homemade with plywood and black paint) and the room was darkened for the showing of training films by covering the windows with cardboard and tar paper. The room was not all that was desired, but two division staffs were trained in it.

The school building provided at Carrabelle was no improvement. Fortunately, General Keating approached the contractors before the floor was laid and persuaded
"The Schoolroom at Carrabelle was no Improvement."

"Debarkation over a Simulated Ramp."
them, after much argument, to slope it from rear to front to increase the visibility of students in the back of the room. This helped considerably, but the room was so long and narrow that it was almost impossible to make training charts large enough to be seen clearly from all points in it.

The Center's Engineer Officer drew up plans for a new school building which were submitted by General Keating with a request that construction be expedited on 9 November 1942. The building was not completed until after the Center was disbanded.

Endless examples of the improvisation of training aids could be cited, including the use of wooden rifles to teach basic positions in battle firing, use of dummy sticks of dynamite and dummy detonators to teach preparation of explosive charges, etc. Even moving boats and the rolling sea were improvised on dry land to teach firing of machine guns mounted in landing craft. The device used was a mock-up boat made of 2 x 4's and burlap and mounted on a jeep. The jeep then traversed a rolling roadway, similar to the roller-coaster idea, which reproduced fairly accurately the motion of a boat in the water and afforded students manning the machine guns an opportunity to try their hand at firing on a simulated beachline from a simulated boat.

Sufficient personnel and equipment were never available to the demonstration battalion to portray accurately the appearance of a full battalion landing team. This problem was solved by the use of vari-colored flags representing different types of equipment and different tactical units. One man with a flag could then represent a mortar squad, a bulldozer, a 2 1/2-ton truck, or whatever was needed.

Demonstrations of a battalion team making a landing were given on dry ground owing to the shortage of boats and to the fact that student units could see more clearly the composition of boat teams. When the boat teams reached the imaginary shoreline after crossing the "water," the ramps on the "boats" were lowered and the men deployed across the simulated beach. The "ramps" were portrayed by two men holding a rifle about two feet off the ground in front of the members of the boat team. Debarkation from the boat was then demonstrated by men jumping over the rifle "ramp" and running across the beach.

When bleachers for seating classes outdoors were not available, personnel of the Center improvised them with logs, planks, and scrap lumber. Outdoor "classrooms" were provided in the same manner.

When office furniture and supplies were not available, the headquarters force of the Center either borrowed or built what was required. The 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion had no office supplies of any kind during the first two weeks of its existence, so pencils and paper were borrowed from the 29th Division and orders were written in longhand on packing-box desks.

The Special Training Division, when organized at Carrabelle, found itself in a similar situation. Major Hoskot, the Director, said that the office started out with nine officers, one field desk, and an old apple crate for a chair. It developed that the apple crate was not needed because everyone was too busy to sit on it.

The story was the same from start to finish of the Amphibious Training Center - bickering and indecision in higher headquarters; expansion of the training mission and objective without corresponding expansion of facilities; and attempts on the part of the Center to accomplish its mission with whatever means could be made available. Improvisation and plan Yankee ingenuity frequently saved the day.
CHAPTER VI
TRAINING AT CAMP EDWARDS

The training program to be followed in the training of the 45th Infantry Division at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, was published on 8 July 1942, and became effective 15 July when the first class started. The mission of the Center was "to train division staff officers, combat team staff officers, and elements of division and attached troops in independent and joint amphibious shore-to-shore and commando operations."1

Each division trained was broken down into groupments and trained by echelons. Groupment "A" was composed of the division general and special staff; "B" was regimental combat team number one; "C" was combat team number two; "D" was combat team number three; "E" was all other division units not assigned to Groupments "B" to "D" inclusive; and "F" was the provisional commando task force to be organized from elements of each division.

Groupment "A" consisted of all officers assigned to G-2, G-3, and G-4, and the Division Automotive Officer, Engineer Officer, Ordnance Officer, Signal Officer, Surgeon, and Quartermaster. In addition to these a representative group of the Division Artillery Commander was attached. This Groupment in the 45th Division was trained under the direct supervision of the Administrative Section of the Amphibious Division of the Center and the objective assigned was the development of a highly efficient general and special staff trained in all matters pertaining to tactical, administrative, and logistical planning of shore-to-shore operations.

Groupments "B", "C", and "D" each were to consist of one infantry regiment, one field artillery battalion (105 mm how), one combat engineer company, one collecting company from the division medical battalion, and such armored, antiaircraft, signal, and tank destroyer units, etc., as might be attached. These groupments were trained under the direct supervision of the Tactical Section of the Amphibious Division, and the objective assigned was to develop in each division regimental combat teams which would be well coordinated, fast moving, and efficient in all phases of shore-to-shore and commando operations.

Groupment "E" consisted of the Headquarters and Military Police Company of the division; Signal Company; Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery; Medium Artillery Battalion; Engineer Battalion, less Companies A, B, and C; Quartermaster Battalion; Medical Battalion, less collecting companies; Reconnaissance Troop; and any attached units. The Basic Training Section of the Amphibious Division was given the responsibility of supervising the training of the groupment, and the objective assigned was the training of the above units to play their respective parts in shore-to-shore operations in a highly coordinated and efficient manner. This Groupment was broken down into three sub-groupments, one each of which went through the training concurrently with Groupments "B", "C", and "D".

Groupment "F", the Provisional Commando Task Force, consisted of a group of selected individuals forming those combat and service elements usually found in a commando organization. Its composition consisted of a Commanding Officer and Staff; one infantry rifle company, a detachment from the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon of Regimental Headquarters Company; one infantry battalion medical section; one infantry antitank platoon; one 81 mm mortar platoon; one engineer platoon; one infantry

1. ATC Tng Memo 3, 8 Jul 42, sub: Tng Program effective 15 Jul 42. Hist Off files.
battalion communication platoon; one infantry antitank mine platoon; and one infantry
battalion ammunition and pioneer platoon. The Chief of the Commando Division was
responsible for the training, and the objective assigned was to develop a highly ef-
ficient commando force in each infantry division, and to teach the division and subor-
dinate unit staffs the principles, doctrine, and tactics applicable to commando
operations.

A ten-day period of training was allotted to each combat team, ten days for the
Provisional Commando Task Force, and ten days for the division general and special staff.
The first three days of the training period for each combat team were devoted to a
school for three selected officers and three noncommissioned officers from each company,
battery, or similar organization; and all available regimental and battalion staff
officers. In this three-day period the selected personnel were given a concentrated
course of amphibious training to prepare them to conduct the training of their units for
the remainder of the period. The last seven days consisted of training conducted by
this group and directed and supervised by officers of the Amphibious Training Center.
The first day of training for the division general and special staff was the same as that
for the selected officers and noncoms, consisting mainly of an introduction to amphibious
warfare, while the remainder of their training period was devoted to staff functions.
The Commando Force trained separately since its subjects were more specialized and
distinct in nature.

The Center began training of the first regimental combat team and the Provisional
Commando Task Force of the 45th Division along the lines outlined above on 15 July 1942.
The first period ran from that date until 25 July; the second from 28 July to 6 August;
and the third from 10 August to 20 August. The staff course was held between 28 July
and 7 August, running concurrently with the training of the second regimental combat
team.

The subjects included in the training of the regimental combat teams were basic
and were designed primarily to enable the students to handle themselves and their equip-
ment in an amphibious operation and to acquaint them with the landing craft they would
use and with the functions and operations of the Engineer Amphibian units which would
transport them. Subjects covered in the first three-day school period for selected
officers and noncommissioned officers were a general orientation; doctrines and prin-
ciples of amphibious operations; compositions of boat teams and boat waves; proper
method of wearing equipment; scaling of cargo nets; lowering of light organic equipment
and weapons from piers into landing craft; methods of embarking into and debarking from
landing craft; loading and unloading of trucks, artillery, and other heavy equipment;
crossing barbed wire and clearing beaches of obstacles and mines; operation of boats; and
practical work in day and night landing exercises. During the three-day period while
the officers and noncoms were receiving their instruction, the remaining personnel of
the combat team were undergoing rigorous physical training consisting primarily of road
marches and swimming.

The officers and noncoms who were trained during those three days then took over
their units and trained them in the subjects which they had learned. This training
consisted almost entirely of practical work supervised by personnel of the Center and
conducted in accordance with schedules published by the Center. Lengthy conferences
were avoided because of the shortage of time for practice.

The training of the Commando Force was not periodized but ran continuously for ten
days, all personnel being trained together. All instruction was given by personnel of
the Commando Division, assisted upon request by the officers and noncoms of the student
units in the conduct of the practical work. The Commando course was designed primarily
to harden the students physically, perfect basic training so vital to the success of
"Instruction in Cargo-Net Scaling"

"The Commandos Were Tough"
raider operations, teach tactics and techniques of hand-to-hand combat and self defense, and teach the tactics of raiding forces. The subjects covered in the first school were conditioning exercises consisting of obstacle courses; bayonet, grenade, and hand-to-hand fighting methods; use of the compass; map reading; military sketching; message writing; aerial photograph reading; mine techniques, demolitions; knots and lashings; crossing barbed wire and beac...
The problem was as realistic as possible within the limitations imposed by safety requirements, availability of troops and equipment, and lack of sufficient boats. The beaches on Martha's Vineyard were extensively wired and covered with beach obstacles. Demolitions were planted on the beaches and inland to be exploded during the landing to simulate naval gunfire support, artillery fire, and land mines. The island was defended by the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion, but the number of troops available in that unit was small, which resulted in the use of flags and umpires to represent the enemy on a part of the island.

One company of parachute infantry from Fort Bragg took part in the exercise in conjunction with the division. Its mission was to jump at H-hour and capture the airfield, which it did in moderately good order.

The Provisional Commando Task Force was employed under direction of the division staff with the mission of landing by boat to assist the parachute infantry in the capture of the airfield. Actually the Commandos arrived first and had the situation fairly well in hand by the time the parachutists landed.

"Every Attempt Was Made Towards Realism"

Considerable realism in the problem was lost owing to scarcity of boats. Those available could carry only one full regimental combat team, the Commando Task Force, and token representations of the remaining two combat teams and the division rear echelon. This necessitated turning the exercise into a combined maneuver and command post exercise. The shortage of boats also seriously curtailed the play of the supply problem, which the personnel of the Center considered to be one of the most important points to be brought out by the maneuver.

Further realism was lost owing to the small maneuver area available on the island. The restrictions of space necessitated the imposition of arbitrary phase lines in order to prevent the troops from progressing too far in too short a time. The resultant arbitrary halting of the advance of the combat elements tended to make them lose interest in the problem.
Despite the numerous handicaps the exercise was carried out successfully on 18, 19 and 20 August, amid loud explosions, smoke screens, dropping parachutists, and the roar of landing craft motors.

The lessons learned from the execution of the maneuver did not reflect unfavorably upon the Amphibious Training Center. Most of the mistakes made in the conduct of it resulted from ignoring the doctrines of the Center or from improper execution of them. The majority of the unfavorable comments of observers were directed toward irregularities caused by violation of basic training principles on the part of individuals of the Division - such things as using lights and smoking in the open at night, bunching of individuals, poor road discipline, improper camouflage, etc., which of course were not the responsibility of the Center.2

The Engineer boat and shore units came in for their share of unfavorable comment as well. Their failure to land units on the designated beaches in the prescribed formation at the proper time indicated a lack of thorough training on their part.3

The exercise was of great value to all participating units and to the Center as well. As a result of it, the Center resolved to place more emphasis on discipline and basic training of individuals; the necessity of thorough, intensive, and exhaustive planning for amphibious operations on the part of unit staffs; and the necessity for complete coordination and accurate timing among all elements of a combined assault force.

The brief period between the completion of training of the 45th Division and the start of the next school for the 36th Division was spent in improving the instruction offered by the Center, particularly in regard to the staff school. The map exercise was revised and additional conferences were scheduled, raising the total from eighteen hours to twenty-two hours, with one additional day provided for solution of the map exercise.

Conferences added to the staff curriculum included types and characteristics of small landing craft; functions and operations of the Engineer boat regiment; organization of boat teams, boat waves, and the battalion landing group; loading and unloading heavy equipment and vehicles; functions and operations of an Engineer shore company; using of equipment, scaling cargo nets, lashing and lowering equipment into boats; embarking and debarking boat teams; signal communication within regiment and battalion in shore-to-shore operations; battalion landing group in an assault on a hostile shore; British infantry battalion in combined operations; British Engineers in combined operations; use of field, antiaircraft, and antitank artillery in combined operations; effect of hydrographic and meteorological conditions on selection of D-day and H-hour; operation of Engineer boat battalion; naval gunfire support in shore-to-shore operations; organization of the air force (with reference to amphibious warfare); air-ground support in shore-to-shore operations; British air-ground support; use of paratroops; artillery and tank destroyer units in shore-to-shore operations; combat engineers in amphibious warfare; signal communications; and administrative planning.4

The field was considerably broadened by the addition of these subjects, and the new schedule included more extended consideration of amphibious warfare in its relation to arms, services, and staff sections. Basic subjects previously taught only to the troops (cargo-net scaling, lowering equipment, etc.) were included to resolve some of the difficulties observed in the 45th Division exercise with regard to the functions of individual soldiers. Additional training was given regimental and battalion staffs in

2. Rpts of Obsrs, 45th Inf Div Maneuver. Cpy on file at Hq, Tng Cen, ATC, U S Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Va.
3. Ibid.
4. ATC Tng Memo 4, 3 Sep 42, sub: Tng Dir. Hist Off files.
night classes in preparation of boat assignment tables and landing schedules for a battalion landing group, and preparation of regimental and battalion field orders for shore-to-shore operations.

In order to give the selected officers and noncommissioned officers a better picture of an amphibious operation and thus increase their interest in the instruction thereby heightening the value of the training they would give their own troops - certain additions were made to the schedule of instruction for the regimental combat teams. The new subjects included: types and characteristics of small landing craft; organization of the Engineer Amphibian Brigade; functions and operations of Engineer boat and shore regiments; British combined operations; theory of shore-to-shore operations; method of handling supplies; operations and functions of an Engineer shore company; system of medical evacuation in amphibious operations; and signal communications within the regiment and battalion. This revision was another indication of the trend toward improvement and extension of the training offered by the Center.

The changes in the curriculum of the Commando Division were more in the direction of extension of training than addition of new subjects. More practical work was undertaken, especially in the conduct of night problems involving use of maps and compasses, use of demolitions, techniques of employing and removing antitank and antipersonnel mines, etc. The conditioning courses were augmented by speed marches and instruction in the use of the toggle rope (a short rope with an eye-splice in one end and a wooden handle on the other, extensively used by the British Commandos for wall scaling, improvising bridges, garroting the enemy). A system of hardening (involving log exercises calisthenics with a log about ten feet long and eight inches in diameter) developed by the British was also added.

The training of the 36th Division was conducted in the same manner as that of the 45th except for the extensions and improvements listed. The period allotted to the first regimental combat team ran from 24 August to 13 September, the second from 5 September to 16 September, and the third from 18 September to 4 October. The Division staff school was in session from 5 September to 21 September, with the period from 23 September to 4 October allotted for the preparation and planning for, and the conduct of, the final division exercise. The Commando course ran from 5 September to 16 September.

The final exercise of the 36th Division was more satisfactory than that of the 45th Division. The problem and plan of execution were basically the same for both exercises, but the extensions in the training schedule were reflected in better performance of the maneuver by the 36th Division. More boats were available than previously, and by careful employment of them and shuttling them between assault and reserve battalions, the whole division was able to participate. The supply problem suffered this time, too, but not quite so badly as before.

The lessons learned from the execution of this second maneuver were the same as those learned from the 45th Division exercise - necessity for more accurate planning, better timing and coordination, more discipline on the part of troops, and the need for further training in navigation and boat operation on the part of the Engineer Amphibian units.

All training at Camp Edwards was conducted at Washburn Island and on the beaches surrounding it, except for the staff school which was held on the post at Edwards and the final exercise which was held on Martha's Vineyard. All training aids were concentrated in that area in order to reduce the necessity of excessive travel by the students.


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Training aids for the basic amphibious subjects consisted of cargo-net towers, mock-up boats, outline boats, barbed wire entanglements, and actual landing craft furnished by the Engineers. The Cargo-net towers were structures forty feet high and twenty feet square which represented piers from which troops might load into landing craft when embarking on a shore-to-shore operation. Rope nets were suspended on two sides of these structures and were used to teach the technique of loading from piers into boats. In some cases a good deal of patient instruction was necessary to overcome acrophobia in some individuals. The mock-up and outline boats were dry-land representations of landing craft used to teach methods of embarking, loading, and debarking. The barbed wire entanglements were erected to teach methods of crossing obstacles of a type likely to be encountered on a hostile shore.

The Commando installations were located in a separate camp about eight hundred yards from the main installations on Washburn Island and were separated therefrom by the waters of Waquoit Bay. The Commando camp contained only the barest essentials for physical comfort, which was intended as a part of the hardening training but was also a matter of necessity owing to lack of time to construct housing facilities. Student units bivouacked in shelter tents, messed in the open, and used open-pit latrines.

Training aids available at the Commando camp included an obstacle course, grenade course, bayonet course, demolitions course, mines, booby-traps, a Commando Efficiency Course, and speed march courses. All the facilities, with the exception of prepared mines, booby-traps, and demolitions, were built by the Commando Division with the aid of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion.

The Commando Efficiency Course, which is probably the only one of the aids listed which needs explanation, was a course designed to test the proficiency of the students in the type of warfare being taught them. Students were put through the test, graded, and rated according to their accomplishments. Briefly, the course was a circuitous route through the woods and underbrush on which the soldier being tested was confronted at unexpected turns in the trail with dummies representing the enemy in various conditions of activity and hostility. The aim was to test the reaction of the soldier, on the basis of the training he had received, to unexpected situations similar to those he might meet in combat. His intestinal fortitude was also tested by one of the situations put before him - at one turn in the trail the soldier met a realistic-looking dummy under circumstances that indicated the best method of disposing of this particular enemy was to bayonet him. If the soldier reacted properly and used his bayonet he got blood sprayed over him from a bladder in the dummy's stomach. The blood was real (pig blood secured from a slaughterhouse) and some soldiers were considerably shaken by the sight of it.

The training conducted at Camp Edwards was as thorough and complete as could be expected under the circumstances outlined in Chapter V, and the student divisions seemed to be fairly well satisfied with it. Everyone connected with the Amphibious Training Center freely admitted that there was room for improvement, and better things were expected when the Center moved to Carrabelle.
CHAPTER VII

TRAINING AT CAMP GORDON JOHNSTON
(Carrabelle, Florida)

The instruction offered by the Amphibious Training Center at Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, although basically developed on the basis of that given at Camp Edwards, Massachusetts, differed in several major respects. Particularly notable was the trend toward more intensified training of student units. All divisions of the Center had been constantly striving to increase the quality and quantity of the training given to student units, and their efforts met with more success at Carrabelle than they had at Edwards. The improvement was due in part to a slight increase in the number of instructors and in part to more adequate equipment which the Center had been slowly and painstakingly acquiring during the five months of its existence.

An Army Ground Forces training directive dated 24 October 1942, altered in some respects the mission and objective of the Amphibious Training Center.¹ This directive was interpreted in a training program effective 15 November 1942, published by General Keating on 10 November.² As outlined in this program, the mission of Center at Carrabelle was to teach, by academic and practical means, all phases of amphibious operations involving a shore-to-shore movement, and to outline the basic principles of ship-to-shore movement by lectures and conferences. The objective to be attained by each student division was the formation of a highly efficient, well-coordinated, hard-hitting, and fast-moving amphibious force, thoroughly qualified to act independently or in conjunction with other army troops and naval forces in a combined operation. The objective also included the mental and physical hardening of all officers and enlisted men for arduous field service and battle.

The instruction prescribed by the new training program was to emphasize loading and unloading landing craft quickly and quietly by day and night; boat discipline; boat formations and control of landing craft; organization and control of troops during loading and unloading operations; organization, tactical operation, and supply of combat teams, including the seizure of the beachhead and the advance inland to the division objective; crossing beach obstacles and defensive works; clearing the beach of obstacles, demolitions, etc., and the subsequent beach organization to support the operation; resupply; night operations; development of an effective intelligence system applicable to amphibious operations, including the employment of intelligence agencies and scouts of all units; development of an effective signal communication system peculiar to amphibious operations; the use of smoke for screening; the use of chemicals for contamination purposes; methods of decontamination; air-ground support; anti-aircraft defense; swimming; camouflage; knife and bayonet fighting; jiu-jitsu; infiltration; battle firing; firing automatic weapons from landing craft; and combat in cities.³

The main emphasis was placed on discipline and control of individuals, boat crews, and boat formations; more thorough organization and planning for shore-to-shore operations; organization of the beach for supply functions; and proper use of signal

¹ AGF ltr (S) 353/12 (Amph)(10-24-42) GMCT, 24 Oct 42, sub: Gen Dir - Shore-to-Shore Tng.
² ATC Tng Memo 7, 10 Nov 42, sub: Tng Program Effective 15 Nov 42. Hist Off files.
³ Ibid.
communication facilities. The two maneuvers at Camp Edwards had shown that proficiency in these matters was essential to successful accomplishment of an amphibious mission.4

The requirement to train a Provisional Commando Task Force in each student division was dropped; substituted for it was battle inoculation and physical and mental hardening for all individuals. The street fighting phase of this hardening process was an innovation in amphibious training. The substitution of these new courses for commando training was in harmony with a general Army Ground Force policy to prefer measures calculated to condition all troops for combat over those aimed primarily at making "super-killers" out of a select few. General McNair was never strong on commando training as such. He favored only such features as could be worked into general training. Battle conditioning was played up throughout Army Ground Forces, beginning early in 1943.

Training of division staffs in ship-to-shore operations, which had been dropped at Camp Edwards by Army Ground Force directive, was included in the new directive for Carrabelle.5 This was probably due to the fact that developments in higher headquarters had indicated that the Navy was likely to take over amphibious training and operations in the near future, and it was therefore desired to prepare student units as much as possible for joint action with the Navy in Navy ships.

The organization of the student divisions at Carrabelle into lettered groupments for training followed the same system as that used at Camp Edwards, except that Groupment "P" was excluded because of discontinuance of commando training. The composition of Groupment "A" to "E" inclusive was the same.6

Camp Gordon Johnston was large enough to house simultaneously the entire student division reinforced, the Engineer Amphibian Brigade, the station complement, and the personnel of the Amphibious Training Center including the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion. There was sufficient ground space available to permit the training of an entire division at one time, and accordingly the previous system of training combat teams in succession was abandoned. Both student divisions at Carrabelle were trained as reinforced division units and not as separate combat teams.

The decision to train a whole reinforced division at one time necessitated considerable additional construction of training aids and caused a serious drain on the personnel and facilities of the Amphibious Training Center. But the new method worked out better from the standpoint of the student division because it gave the division commander and staff an opportunity to observe the training of all elements concurrently and thereby to draw conclusions regarding the relative efficiency of the various combat teams. It also obviated the former undesirable feature of leaving two combat teams relatively idle while the third was being trained.

To achieve the simultaneous training of the whole division, Camp Gordon Johnston was organized into three regimental combat team areas and a base camp area. The three combat teams of the division each had one area, while the division rear echelon, the station complement, and the Amphibious Training Center Headquarters occupied the base camp site. To facilitate basic amphibious instruction each of the three areas was provided with a large clearing containing two cargo net towers, four mock-up boats (at the base of the towers), and eight outline boats. Eight more mock-up boats were

4. Ibid.
5. AGF ltr (S) 355/12 (Amph)(10-24-42) CNGOT to CG ATC, 24 Oct 42, sub: Gen Dir - Shore-to-Shore Tng.
6. ATC Tng Memo 7, 10 Nov 42, sub: Tng Program Effective 15 Nov 42. Hist Off files.
"The Obstacle Courses were Rugged"

The Infiltration Course, "Actual Combat Would Be Easier"
located on the shoreline in each regimental camp. Each site also included a "special training area" containing an obstacle course; grenade and bayonet courses; areas for judo, knife and bayonet, hand-to-hand fighting, and demolitions training sites. A fourth area contained the same basic amphibious and special training aids for the use of the division special units not attached to combat teams. Facilities for swimming instruction were provided in each of the three combat team areas. Two swimming sites were fresh-water lakes and the third was on the shore of the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to the above, a fifth location contained facilities for the conduct of all courses involving the use of live ammunition - street fighting, infiltration course, battle firing, and firing from simulated landing craft.

The innovations in training at Carrabelle, insofar as the troops were concerned, were connected mainly with physical and mental hardening or "special training" as it was called by the Center. The new courses added were vigorous, exciting, and full of "blood and thunder." They so engaged the interest of the troops that they very nearly overshadowed the amphibious features of the training offered.

The Bayonet and Knife course was similar to the one conducted at Camp Edwards for the Commandos, but was on a larger scale. It was designed primarily to condition troops physically and mentally for close combat and to teach new methods of handling knives and bayonets.

The Log Exercise course which the Commandos had used at Edwards was given to all troops as a conditioner and hardener.

Swimming instruction was provided for all troops not only because of the physical benefits to be derived from it but also to impart to men who had never learned to swim enough skill to enable them to save themselves in case a landing craft got shot out from under them during an amphibious operation. Advanced swimmers were given additional instruction in swimming with full combat equipment and in rescue techniques.

Each obstacle course consisted of seventeen obstacles, with an over-all length of 550 yards, and was capable of accommodating 125 men every forty minutes. Student familiar with obstacle courses in other camps frequently remarked that the one at Carrabelle was the toughest they had encountered.

The Grenade Course was not built along the lines of the standard practice course outlined in field manuals, but was designed to simulate battle conditions requiring the use of grenades.

The Judo Course had as its motto: "Kill or Be Killed," and was designed to teach the soldier how to kill with his bare hands and to condition him mentally for that gruesome task. The objective was to train dangerous fighters, confident of their ability to deal effectively with anything the enemy had to offer in unarmed combat, and to inculcate in the soldier an aggressive, offensive approach to battle.

The Infiltration Course, similar to others scattered throughout the country, had the objective of all battle inoculation courses - to simulate as closely as possible the noise, confusion, and danger of battle and to accustom the soldier to the shock and noise of nearby explosions and the whine of bullets over his head. The course at Carrabelle was 150 yards wide and 100 yards long. The troops crossed from one end to the other through a field littered with barbed wire obstacles, logs, stumps, shell
holes, and trenches, and traversed by the interlocking fire of six machine guns the trajectory of which cleared the ground by thirty inches.

The Boat Firing Course was built to simulate firing from small landing craft and consisted of mock-up landing craft mounted on jeeps which traversed a rolling runway 150 yards long. Students manning machine guns mounted in the mock-ups fired at targets from 150 to 300 yards in extension of the runway. All machine gunners of the student divisions took this training.

The Battle Practice Course consisted of a number of targets at varying ranges and of varying degrees of visibility. It was designed to teach snap shooting at close quarters of the pistol, carbine, rifle, Browning automatic rifle, Thompson submachine gun, and light machine gun. All weapons were fired from the hip.

The Street-Fighting Course was the pride and joy of the Training Center and of the students who worked on it. An abandoned logging village called Harbeson City was reconstructed by the Center to simulate a Nazi village. Live ammunition and large amounts of explosives were used in the training. Subjects taught on this site included wall scaling with and without ropes, combat on rooftops, special uses of grenades and small arms, use of booby traps, house searching, house-to-house advance, and combat in streets. Two days of instruction were given each infantry battalion, during which time each platoon solved a tactical problem in the village, using live ammunition.

All training in the special subjects outlined above was the responsibility of the Special Training Division which came into being upon the demise of the Commando Division. The new Division profited greatly from inheriting all the personnel and equipment of the Commandos. It first appeared as a part of the Center in the reorganization of 17 November 1942.7

Changes and innovations also appeared in the training afforded the division and the regimental and battalion staffs. These came about as a result of suggestions made by Lt. Colonel Lillard, Chief of the Academic Section at Camp Edwards. He had long sought to improve the staff training by reorganizing his section along general staff lines in order to permit more specialized instruction in staff problems, but was unable to achieve the desired result in time to affect the training at Camp Edwards. Additional officers were given him at Carrabelle, and he reorganized the Academic Section into G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 sections with a small administrative staff. Ten officers in all comprised the section. The former name was dropped and "Staff Training Division" was substituted for it on 17 November.8

The most noticeable changes appeared in the school for regimental and battalion staffs. One additional day and several new subjects were added to the course. Conferences added included the functions of S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4, in shore-to-shore operations, and more emphasis was placed on the practical work involved in subjects previously taught - preparation of orders, boat assignment tables, landing schedules, etc.9

7. ATC Staff Memo 5, 17 Nov 42, sub: Staff Doctrines and Functions. Hist Off files.
8. Ibid.
9. 38th Inf Div Tng Schedule, 23 Nov to 21 Dec 42; Hq ATC, 16 Nov 42. Hist Off files.
Street Fighting, "Just Like Stalingrad"

Boat Firing Course, "Even Boats on the Rolling Sea were Simulated"
The course of instruction for the division general and special staff of the 38th Division was more specialized and less general than that of the previous divisions, and was arranged more closely around the general staff sections. Conferences were considerably better owing to the presence of more instructors (thus allowing more time for preparation) and revisions and refinements based on past experience. A total of twenty-seven hours of conferences was provided, including these additions: beach organization in Combined Operations (British); intelligence and counter-intelligence functions in shore-to-shore operations; parachute troops in shore-to-shore operations; use of barrage balloons in amphibious warfare; and the functions of G-1. All British subjects previously taught, except beach organization and a general discussion of British Combined Operations, were dropped because only two British officers remained with the Center when it left Camp Edwards.10

The period from 15 October to 23 November was spent by the personnel of the Center in getting ready to train the 38th Infantry Division along the new lines indicated above. By the time the Division arrived, all immediately contemplated changes in the schedule and curriculum had been made and the necessary construction of training aids, with the exception of the Street-fighting Course, had been accomplished. This course was not completed and open for business until 19 December; as a result the 38th Division lost sixteen days of training on it.

Training of the 38th Division started on 23 November and ran through 19 December. The usual final division landing exercise was held on 17, 18, and 19 December. Throughout the training period, battalion landing groups within each combat team were rotated among basic amphibious training areas, exercises on the water using actual landing craft, and special training areas in order to assure maximum use of all training aids and boats.

The school for regimental and battalion staffs was held on the nights of 23, 24, and 25 November. The division general and special staff attended the school for selected officers and noncommissioned officers on those same three days, and then took a course of instruction under the Staff Training Division from 30 November through 10 December.

The division landing exercise which concluded the training of the 38th Division was, to say the least, very unfortunate. The exercise called for the movement of the division by water from a site near the town of Carrabelle to beaches on Peninsula Point and Lighthouse Point at the opposite end of the reservation - a total distance by the water route planned of about thirty-five miles. All preparations were made very much as before. The beaches were mined and wired, demolitions were planted, and the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion plus one rifle battalion from the 38th Division was designated as defending troops. Air support for the operation was furnished by the Third Air Force.

The problem got under way as planned, and the division did a good job of loading and embarking from the friendly shore at Carrabelle. By ten o'clock on the morning of D-day only about one battalion had landed on the hostile shore, and even that one did not land in the prescribed order or formation. One battalion landing group landed at a point approximately twenty miles up the coast from the designated beaches and attacked vigorously inland, unaware of the mistake. This group captured with no resistance the small town of Crawfordville, and only then did they realize their error. They accordingly marched about twenty-five miles overland to get back into the maneuver area. Other elements of the division landed at various times and places throughout the remainder of the day. The tactical problem was suspended for most of the first day in order to straighten out the tangle.11

10. Ibid.
"Bullets Sprayed Like Water from a Hose"
(Hip-firing of light machine gun on Battle Course)

"A Beautiful Target" (The 38th Division Exercise was "unfortunate")
Much valuable training was lost to the division on account of the failure to land them at the proper time on the right beaches. The difficulty was caused by the lack of proper navigation and control of landing craft by the Engineer Amphibian Brigade. General Keating was very much distressed over the incident because he had previously directed the Brigade, which was attached to the Center, to perfect its training along these lines.12

In order to remedy the defects noted and to give the 38th Division a chance to experience a successful landing, the problem was ordered repeated by direction of General Keating on 28, 29 and 30 December.13 The repeat performance went off much better, and the division benefited considerably more than it had from the maneuver the previous week.

Since the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade was attached to the Amphibious Training Center, General Keating was able for the first time to have a word in the training of the unit furnishing boats for use of the Center. This had not been possible at Camp Edwards because the Brigades were trained by the Engineer Amphibian Command. General Keating took full advantage of his opportunity in an attempt to correct errors and eliminate deficiencies which had been noted during the division exercises, particularly the one conducted by the 38th Infantry Division.14

He released the period from 31 December to 16 January 1943, inclusive, to the Commanding General of the 3d Brigade for training and directed that these subjects be stressed:

a. All functions of shore personnel during the embarkation phase - to include establishment of dumps, construction of roads, and the organization and operation of personnel assigned to assist in the loading.

b. All functions of boat personnel during the embarkation phase - to include the organization for and control of boats during the embarkation phase.

c. Navigation - to include the use of all navigation aids.

d. Control of boats, and maintenance of boat formations during the crossing phase.

e. All functions of shore personnel during the landing phase - to include organization for assisting combat troops in landing; establishment of dumps; construction of the road net from beach to dumps; turn-arounds at dump sites; organization for placing supplies in dumps; and the development of a procedure for accounting for supplies delivered.

f. All functions of boat personnel during the landing phase - to include organization for control of incoming boats to insure that boats carrying heavy equipment and supplies land at the proper place on the beach; organization of a system for salvaging and reclaiming damaged boats and equipment; and the organization of a system for marking beaches to show channels, shoals, and obstructions.

g. Boat maintenance.

This all-inclusive directive was given to the 3d Brigade on 1 January 1943 with instructions to submit a detailed training program to the Center not later than

12. ATC Tng Memo 8, 10 Nov 42, sub: Tng Dir for 3d Engr Amph Brig. Hist Off files.

13. ATC Tng Memo 16, 21 Dec 42, sub: Tng Program 22 - 30 Dec 42, 38th Inf Div and 3d Engr Amph Brig. Ibid.

14. ATC Tng Memo 22, 1 Jan 43, sub: Tng Dir for 3d Engr Amph Brig, 31 Dec 42 to 15 Jan 43. Ibid.
January. General Keating further stated that the 3d Brigade had a definite mission to perform and that he expected its successful accomplishment would be "continually kept in mind." He suspended all holidays in the Brigade "until the desired proficiency is attained."15

The 38th Division general and special staff also reserved a little "post-maneuver" training under the Staff Training Division. On 22 December 1942, the staff school was reconvened for three hours spent in conferences designed to orient the staff in the special problems of ship-to-shore operations.

Training given the next student unit, the 28th Infantry Division, was little different from that given the 38th Division, except that by the time the 28th began its training the Center had its feet more firmly planted on the ground with the result that instruction was smoother and more polished. No additional courses were added for the troops of the 28th Division, but the fact that the street-fighting course was in full operation by the time they arrived enabled them to take full advantage of it, whereas the training of the 38th in this respect had been impaired by delay in construction.

One special course was added for selected personnel of the 28th Division and the 3d Engineer Amphibian Brigade. The students consisted of one officer from each of those two units, four enlisted men from each infantry battalion of the 28th Division, two section leaders and all riflemen of one platoon of the division reconnaissance troop, and eleven enlisted men from each regiment of the 3d Brigade. The purpose of the course was: to train these selected personnel as amphibious scouts and to teach them to handle rubber boats and other small landing craft in smooth or rough water; to land silently and secretly on all types of shores during daylight and at night to secure information or to guide friendly landing craft to designated beaches; to secure by stealth or by force necessary information on road nets, terrain and artificial obstacles, enemy dispositions, beach organization, currents, tides, channels of approach, artificial and natural under water obstacles, characteristics of the beach, limitations on landing personnel and heavy equipment, and other information requiring off-shore reconnaissance; and to develop a system of visual signals and signal communications to be used in communication with friendly forces.16

Training for this group ran from 11 February to 24 February 1943, during which time the students received instruction in scouting and pat-rolling, use of the compass, map reading, operation of boats, use of nautical charts, etc., and undertook practical work in physical hardening, swimming, and day and night reconnaissance exercises.17

The training of the 28th Division as a whole started on 26 January 1943, and was terminated by the landing exercise held on 6, 7 and 8 March. This division was trained with the same organization into groupments for training, and the same method of rotating battalions within each combat team area in order to take full advantage of all available training aids and boats as the 38th.18

15. Ibid.
16. ATC Tng Memo 10, 26 Jan 43, sub: Tng Dir for Amph Scout Tng. Hist Off files.
17. ATC Tng Memo 16, 10 Feb 43, sub: Revised Tng Schedule for Amph Scouts. Ibid.
18. ATC Tng Memo 5, 14 Jan 43, sub: Tng Schedule for 28th Inf Div. Ibid.
The school for the Division general and special staff was held from 4 February to 17 February. It included thirty-four hours of instruction in all. Courses added were intelligence agencies in shore-to-shore operations; intelligence and counter-intelligence with the Engineer Amphibian Brigade; signal communications of the Engineer Amphibian Brigade; navigational control of the crossing; ship-to-shore operations, general; ship-to-shore operations, administrative planning; and conferences on recent landing operations (North Africa and Guadalcanal).19

In addition to the staff schools for the 28th Division, the Staff Training Division repeated most of its instruction twice during the periods 7-13 February and 17-23 February for the benefit of two groups of War Department General Staff officers who were sent to the Amphibious Training Center for indoctrination in shore-to-shore operations preparatory to overseas assignment.

The final exercise of the 28th Division was executed in a more satisfactory manner than any of the previous three. The results of additional training of the division staffs and the Engineer Amphibian Brigade in particular were making themselves felt. Embarkation was well carried out, the water crossing of the assault units was good, and the landing was better than it had been previously - at least most of the units hit the right beaches at approximately the right time.20

A severe electrical storm which came out of the Gulf of Mexico on the second night of the maneuver seriously disrupted the latter stages of the exercises. Landing craft were driven ashore, fourteen men were drowned, and the next morning the beaches for twenty miles along the coast were strewn with boats. There were not sufficient craft left afloat to move the reserve regimental combat team on the following day, and consequently that unit lost all benefit it might have derived from participation in the landing.

The resupply problem was played in the 28th Division exercise through the use of dummy stores which had been improvised by personnel of the Center and the Engineer Brigade, consisting mostly of old ammunition cases and fiber containers which had been filled with sand to approximate the weight of live ammunition. These supplies were also used in the problem of the 38th Division.

In addition to its principal task of training the two infantry divisions at Carrabelle, the Amphibious Training Center carried on some incidental training activities. Tests in connection with the use of Chemical Warfare units in shore-to-shore operations which had been started at Camp Edwards were continued on an increased scale at Carrabelle. The 78th Smoke Generator Company, which had started the work at Edwards, was ordered out for overseas assignment before the Center left that station and the 79th Smoke Generator Company was sent to Carrabelle to carry on the tests. This company worked in conjunction with the Amphibious Training Center and the Engineer Amphibian Brigade in determining tactics and technique of smoking hostile beaches to screen the approach of landing craft. Tests were also conducted using the 4.2" chemical mortar mounted in landing craft firing HE and white phosphorous projectiles onto the shore.

The work was done under the direction of the Chemical Warfare Amphibious Project which

19. Ibid.

"Broken Boats Littered the Beach After the Storm"

"Barrage Balloons Were Used in the Exercises"
was organized at Carrabelle on 5 November 1942 by the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service on direction of the War Department. Companies of the 2d and 3d Chemical Battalions were rotated through the Center between 15 November 1942 and 10 March 1943, to participate in this training.

The 302d Coast Artillery Barrage Balloon Special Platoon was attached to the Center on 15 November 1942 from the Barrage Balloon Training Center at Camp Tyson, Tennessee, for the purpose of training and experimentation in amphibious operations. Activities of the platoon were directed by its commanding officer and by the coast artillery officer (Lt. Col. M. H. Thompson) on the special staff of the Center, and were carried out in conjunction with the 3d Brigade and the student divisions. Balloons were transported on landing craft to protect the forces during the water crossing, and after the landing was made they were set up on the beach to protect shore installations and beach supply dumps. But the electrical storm which interrupted the 28th Division maneuver destroyed all of them.

Two communications squadrons of the II Air Support Command were also trained at the Center in their functions with regard to air support of a shore-to-shore operation. The 6th Communication Squadron was trained from 6 December to 19 December 1942; and the 7th Communication Squadron was trained from 24 December 1942 to 21 March 1943. Both squadrons had an opportunity to participate in a division landing exercise and to provide communications for the air support of the landings.

The 377th Coast Artillery Battalion (AA) (AW) was trained from 14 January 1943 to 4 April 1943, in the tactics and technique of antiaircraft automatic weapons units in amphibious warfare. This unit also participated in the division exercises, furnishing protection of beach dumps and installations.

The 28th Infantry Division was the last reinforced division to be trained by the Amphibious Training Center. The uncertainty prevailing at the time when the training of that unit was completed made it appear improbable that any more units would be trained in the near future. In the middle of March the uncertainty was resolved when General Keating was informed by Army Ground Forces that the Center was to be disbanded.

Training was revived on a reduced scale in April, when three separate battalions were sent to the Center for basic amphibious training.

To lay the basis for the execution of its mission, the Amphibious Training Center had, in June 1942, hastily formulated the doctrines and principles of amphibious operations which could be deduced from previous experience. Nine months spent in the planning, thought and activities involved in training four divisions had enriched this experience. The result was reflected in a new formulation of doctrines, published at Camp Gordon Johnston, 17 March 1943. A year later, after his further experience as commanding officer of the Force Headquarters Section (Army), of the Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, General Keating stated that the doctrines set forth in

21. WD Dir. OPD 471.6 (6-3-42) CWS 660.2/131 (S).
22. See Chap. III.
24. ATC Tng Memo 23 (S), Op Gordon Johnston, 17 Mar 43. See Appendix 11.
his Training Memorandum of 17 March 1943 "have governed all actual Amphibious operations to date and are surprisingly sound. If we were to re-write them, we would do so with hardly a change."25 A comparison of this document with the original Training Memorandum of 2 July 1942 provides a measure of what the Amphibious Training Center achieved in advancing the science of amphibious operations.

25. Ltr of Brig Gen Frank A. Keating to Lt Col K. R. Greenfield, Hq AOF Historian, 15 Mar 44.
CHAPTER VIII

EPILOGUE

The personnel of the Amphibious Training Center were scattered to the four winds. Some of them were released for reassignment to combat units and others were retained for the conduct of further amphibious training under the supervision of the Navy.

General Keating left the Center in late March 1943 for duty as Senior Officer in Force Headquarters Section (Army) of the Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, at Norfolk, Virginia. Shortly after assumption of his new duties he began to call for officers who had worked with him at the Center, some of whom were placed on duty at Norfolk and Camp Bradford, Virginia, and some at Fort Pierce, Florida, where the Navy had amphibious training installations in operation.

The personnel of Headquarters Detachment, both officers and enlisted men, who were not needed for further work with the Navy were transferred to the station complement of Camp Gordon Johnston awaiting reassignment by Army Ground Forces. They were subsequently assigned to a number of newly activated divisions, service schools, or replacement pools.

The 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion was transferred intact to Camp Pickett, Virginia, and assigned to Force Headquarters Section (Army), Amphibious Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, for further duty as demonstration troops. The Battalion left Camp Gordon Johnston on 7 June 1943 and arrived at Camp Pickett two days later.

The period from arrival at Camp Pickett until July 22 was spent in getting settled at the new camp and in basic training of the personnel of the Battalion. No plans had as yet been made for the employment of the unit in Navy ship-to-shore training.

On 22 July the Battalion was ordered to Camp Bradford for indoctrination in ship-to-shore amphibious training in order that it might better fulfill its new mission. It stayed at Camp Bradford until 5 August, when it was ordered back to Camp Pickett and directed to open a basic amphibious school for a number of separate battalions and smaller units by 10 August. This school was to consist of a brief indoctrination for selected officers and noncommissioned officers and a course for the unit staffs.

It was the same story all over again - a requirement to start a school in five days when there was very little with which to work. Fortunately, when the Amphibious Corps Atlantic Fleet had been at Camp Pickett from August to October 1942, it had built cargo-net towers and mock-up boats in three separate areas. After considerable repair these training aids were used by the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion in the conduct of its school.

Most of the officers of the Battalion had never previously acted as instructors, since their duties had been only to demonstrate or to supervise training. They nevertheless prepared conferences for the first school, which started on 10 August as directed.

The units trained during the month of August at Camp Pickett included a quartermaster service battalion, a railhead company, an ordnance ammunition service platoon, a military police company (corps) and an antiaircraft battalion. Ten days of training were offered in the school - five days of classroom work and five days of practical work in the training areas.

On 7 September 1943, the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion, less Heavy Weapons Company, was ordered back to Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, to reopen the camp.
for the purpose of training the 4th Infantry Division in ship-to-shore operations under supervision of the Navy. Training started on 1 October 1943, and ran until 30 November, at which time the camp was again closed so far as amphibious training was concerned, and the Battalion was ordered back to Camp Pickett.

In the meantime, the Heavy Weapons Company, which had been left at Camp Pickett, carried on the basic training school at that station. The school was supervised by a detachment of three officers (Lt. Col. McGinn, Maj. Stare, and Capt. Stout) who had been sent over from the Navy Training Center at Camp Bradford for the purpose. Lt. Col. McGinn and Capt. Stout were former members of the Amphibious Training Center at Camp Edwards and at Camp Gordon Johnston.

The first school under the Amphibious Training Detachment at Camp Pickett (as the Heavy Weapons Company plus the detachment of officers from Bradford was designated) opened on 10 September. Training was carried on continually, officers and men working seven days a week, until 16 December 1943. During that time the small detachment of ten officers (seven from Heavy Weapons Company) and 160 enlisted men trained the 31st Infantry Division reinforced, and the 77th Infantry Division, plus twelve separate battalions of antiaircraft, tanks, and tank destroyers. Ten days of training were given each regimental combat team of the divisions and each separate battalion. The large number of units trained in the short period of time necessitated overlapping of the schools so that while one unit was taking its five days of practical work in the field, the next unit was receiving its staff school.

Upon completion of their basic training at Camp Pickett, units moved to Camp Bradford, Virginia, for further training involving the use of actual landing craft, and for operations on transports in the Solomons Island area of Chesapeake Bay.

The training for the last combat team of the 77th Infantry Division was completed on 16 December 1943. By that date all elements of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion were reassembled at Camp Pickett. Army Ground Force orders disbanded the Battalion as of 10 December 1943, and assigned all officers and enlisted men to XIII Corps for realignment to the 77th Infantry Division. The latter unit had completely absorbed the officers and men of the Battalion by the end of December.

The dissolution of the 75th Composite Infantry Training Battalion ended the life of the last remaining element of the Amphibious Training Center.