TRAINING
IN THE
GROUND ARMY
1942—1945

Study No. 11

Historical Section . Army Ground Forces
1948

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The Army Ground Forces

TRAINING IN THE GROUND ARMY 1942-1945
Study No. XI

By
Lt. Col. Bell I. Wiley

Historical Section - Army Ground Forces

1948
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office, Chief, Army Field Forces
Fort Monroe, Virginia

GWHIS 314.7(1 May 48)  1 May 1948

SUBJECT: Studies in the History of Army Ground Forces

TO: All Interested Agencies

1. The history of the Army Ground Forces as a command was prepared during the course of the war and completed immediately thereafter. The studies prepared in Headquarters Army Ground Forces, were written by professional historians, three of whom served as commissioned officers, and one as a civilian. The histories of the subordinate commands were prepared by historical officers, who except in Second Army, acted as such in addition to other duties.

2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

4. In order that the studies may be made available to interested agencies at the earliest possible date, they are being reproduced and distributed in manuscript form. As such they must be regarded as drafts subject to final editing and revision. Persons finding errors of fact or important omissions are encouraged to communicate with the Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, Attention: Historical Section, in order that corrections may be made prior to publication in printed form by the Department of the Army.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY FIELD FORCES:

[Signature]

L. V. WARNER
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General
This study was prepared in the Historical Section, Headquarters, AGF, by Lt. Col. Bell I. Wiley, who in civilian life is head of the History Department of Louisiana State University.

The purpose of the study is to give an over-all view of the training of the Ground army from the inception of Army Ground Forces, 9 March 1942, until the spring of 1945, when Army Ground Forces completed its original mission of training units for combat and began to concentrate on redeployment. The role of Army Ground Forces in redeployment is presented in Studies Nos. 37 and 38 of this series.

In accordance with plans formulated in 1943, the material comprising this study eventually is to be incorporated with other material treating of organization, doctrine, personnel, and equipment to form a summary history of Army Ground Forces which is scheduled for publication as Study No. 2 of the AGF wartime historical series. But since it now seems likely that circumstances beyond the control of this headquarters will postpone indefinitely the writing of the other portions of Study No. 2, and because a general survey of training is needed now for planning and other purposes, it was deemed desirable to make the following record of AGF wartime training experience available immediately as a separate study. Further, it is thought that after Study No. 2 is published the present monograph will continue to prove useful in that it segregates in a single small volume essential material covering the training of Ground troops.

Joseph Rockis
Lt. Col., Inf.
Chief, Historical Section
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Chapter I

TRAINING: MARCH TO DECEMBER 1942

Objective and Emphasis

The major objective of training in 1942 was to bring Regular Army and National Guard units activated in peacetime to a state of combat readiness and to initiate systematic preparation of the new selective-service units required by wartime mobilization plans. In all training activities the expansion necessitated by war was a paramount consideration. Regular Army units were robbed repeatedly for cadres and replenished by untrained inductees or partially trained men from replacement training centers; National Guard units contributed whole battalions, regiments, and even combat teams to satisfy urgent requirements for task forces and defense missions; all types of old organizations were subjected to repeated stripings of personnel and equipment to meet the more urgent needs of alerted units.1

During 1942, and to a considerable extent thereafter, General McNair gave priority to the training of divisions. This was attributable in part to his conviction that small units could be trained in less time than divisions, and in part to a prevalent tendency in Headquarters, AGF, to look on the division as the ideal team. At any rate the initial emphasis in Army Ground Forces was on the preparation of large units. It seems probable also that Headquarters, AGF, placed greater emphasis always, and especially in 1942, on units of the combat arms than on service organizations.2

The development of leadership was also a major goal in 1942. The 1941 maneuvers had revealed woeful deficiencies among officers high and low, as evidenced by low morale, slack discipline, and poor performance in tactical operations. At a special critique for general officers in Louisiana in September General McNair, after chiding senior commanders for their delinquencies, particularly their reluctance to clear organizations of incompetent subordinates, stated:3

I tell you once more -- unequivocally and emphatically -- I propose to have discipline and efficiency in this Army! Only leadership will produce these essentials. We must have men who are professionally able, who are keen and enthusiastic, who have character and physical energy,

1. (1) Memo of Col Lloyd D. Brown, G-5 Sec GHQ, for Brig Gen Mark W. Clark, 26 Dec 41, sub: NG DIs that are Short Inf Units. Mis file (S) CofS (S) 112. (2) MS on file, "The Army Ground Forces in 1943," prepared by Gen McNair for Army and Navy Journal attached to ltr of LeRoy Whitman to Gen McNair, 10 Sep 43. McNair personal corres. (3) Hist of AGF, Study No 1, Origins Of AGF: General Headquarters, US Army, 1940-42. (4) History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp 13-14. All references to studies in the history of AGF in this and the following notes are to the lithoprinted texts issued by the AGF Historical Section in 1946.

2. (1) Memo (S) of Brig Gen W. S. Paul to CofS AGF (undated but early Jul 42), sub: Condition of Nondiv Serv Units, 320.2/283 (S). (2) AGF memo (S) to CofS USA, 3 Aug 42, sub: Pers & Tng Status of Units of AGF, and accompanying papers. Ibid. (3) WD memo (S) G-3 to CofS USA, 30 Dec 42, sub: Tng Serv Units. 353/163 (S). (4) History of AGF, Studies No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training, pp 2, 12, and No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, p 45.

and who will act! We must be done with shilly-shallying and indecision; each of you must realize your inescapable responsibilities in this matter and must meet them fearlessly and effectively.

To the attainment of the standards laid down in this statement, both on high levels and among junior leaders, General McNair throughout 1942 devoted himself assiduously.4

Another high-priority objective in 1942 was the perfection of air-ground cooperation.5 But in this, more than in any other major aim, General McNair, for reasons set forth below, was doomed to disappointment.6

The Initial Training Program

After inception of Army Ground Forces older units continued until June 1942 to follow a (General Headquarters (GHQ)) directive of 30 October 1941 entitled Post-Maneuver Training. In general this provided an intensive review of basic and small-unit training, up to and including the regimental combat team, as prescribed in War Department Mobilization Training Program (MTP) and applicable portions of an earlier GHQ directive on combined training.7

Adoption of this plan had marked a departure from General McNair's original intention of immediately following up the 1941 maneuvers with an extensive program of training in air-ground cooperation. Basic reason for the change was that the units in maneuvers showed how lamentably deficient they were in the rudiments of their own branches, and hence how far from ready they were to initiate "graduate" training with the Air Forces. General McNair decided, therefore, to devote the early months of 1942 to correction of defects revealed by maneuvers and to make air-ground cooperation the central theme of a new cycle scheduled for summer and fall.8

Principal emphasis in the post-maneuver program was on "discipline, smartness, marching, use and care of weapons, use of cover, transportation, technique of collective fire, patrolling, tactics, teamwork in the combined arms," and development of leadership among noncommissioned and commissioned officers. Training was to be varied and progressive. To heighten realism as well as to provide a definite check on one phase of training before proceeding to the next, three tests were prescribed. These tests, which were the first of a comprehensive series prepared by GHQ and its successor AGF, were (1) Platoon Combat Firing Proficiency Tests, based on an attack problem involving fire and movement; (2) Field Artillery Battery Test, which required the unit to occupy and organize a position in a rapidly moving situation and prepare to execute observed fires; (3) Infantry Battalion Field Exercise Test, requiring the battalion as part of a regiment and supported by artillery to assemble and launch an attack on a

4. See file of speeches made by Gen McNair, 1942. AG Records.
7. GHQ ltr to Army Comdrs & CofArmd F, 30 Oct 41, sub: Post-maneuver Tng. 353/652 "Training as issued by GHQ - Christiansen file."
hostile position. These tests, which remained in effect throughout the war with only minor modification, were among the most valuable inheritances of Army Ground Forces from General Headquarters.9

Mobilization plans adopted in January 1942 called for activation before the year's end at the rate of three or four four a month of 35 new divisions (subsequently extended to 38).10 In the final weeks of the GHQ period a system was developed which outlined each major step in the building of new infantry divisions (subsequently adapted to all other types) from selection and training of staff and cadre before activation day to the completion of maneuvers. Adoption of this plan made it possible for the training of new divisions in various stages of development to proceed concurrently with the review and advanced training of pre-Pearl Harbor divisions.11

The training program for new divisions contemplated achievement of combat readiness one year after activation. The year was broken up to provide seventeen weeks for individual training, thirteen weeks for unit training, fourteen weeks for combined arms training, and eight weeks for maneuvers.12

But activities prescribed for the period before activation day, as eventually modified, added another three months to the training year.13 The division commander and his three principal assistants were called to Washington for three days of orientation on D-92 ("D" being activation day), whence they went to Holabird, Md., for four days of instruction in automotive vehicles. From D-70 to D-45, key members of the officer cadre went to appropriate branch schools for special instruction in their duties, while enlisted cadresmen received preparatory training, either in special schools or within the parent unit. Arrival of staff and cadre at camp (with housekeeping personnel coming before other enlisted men) was staggered over the period D-44 to D-3. Officer fillers, mainly recent graduates of officer candidate schools, more than 450 strong, arrived D-25 to D-20. Enlisted fillers from reception centers were scheduled for arrival during the two weeks following activation day.

The division commander, assistant division commander, and division artillery commanders were designated by the War Department not later than seventy-eight days prior to activation and brought to General Headquarters for a week of orientation. The division commander then went to Fort Leavenworth for a month of special instruction at the Command and General Staff School, while the assistant division commander took a special course at the Infantry School and the artillery commander at the Field Artillery School. The General Staff officers and Special Staff heads, designated also by the War Department, joined the division commander at Leavenworth for the special Command and General Staff School course. Forty-four key officers of the infantry, artillery, engineer, quartermaster, medical, signal, and cavalry components were designated by the War


11. (1) See Chart No 1, "Building an Infantry Triangular Division", 17 Jan 1942. (2) GHQ ltr 353/21 (Inf)-II to Army Comdrs. 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs. (GHQ Tng Christiansen).

12. Ibid.

13. See Chart No 2, "Activation of 65th Infantry Division"
Department, on the recommendation of the chiefs of their respective branches and services, and sent to appropriate branch or service schools for special courses running concurrently with that of the commander and his staff at Leavenworth. The remainder of the officer cadre, designated by an army commander, followed the same procedure.¹⁴

These various activities, providing for the building of a division around a nucleus approximately one-tenth its strength drawn from a parent organization, were outlined in a chart which was revised for each monthly increment of new divisions. When the initial plan was first circulated it elicited widespread commendation, Gen. John M. Palmer calling it "the finest piece of large scale planning" he had seen "in fifty years of army service."¹⁵

The February directive specified that new divisions during the individual training period were to follow MEF's prepared by the chiefs of appropriate branches supplemented by a chart prepared in GHQ which accompanied the directive as Chart 1. In unit training specific guides were available only for infantry (in the form of subject schedules and a training bulletin prepared by the Infantry School), field artillery, engineer, and quartermaster organizations (Chart 2) which supplemented the various branch guides, provided for progressive training of units through the battalion. For the combined period, Chart 3 of the directive was virtually the only guide, as branch programs for advanced periods did not exist. This chart called for a series of regimental combat team exercises culminating in the maneuver of one combat team against another.¹⁶

Tests specified in the program were the same as those prescribed in the October 1941 directive for post-maneuver training.¹⁷

The February directive specifically required higher commanders to provide troop schools for training of officers and noncommissioned officers in their current duties. In keeping with a principle regarded as fundamental by General McNair, commanders were enjoined from making these schools so extensive as to "deprive units unduly of officers and noncommissioned officers needed for troop training." In practice troop schools were usually held at night.¹⁸

The program for new divisions outlined by General Headquarters in February was distinguished for completeness and thoroughness. It proved so satisfactory indeed that it became the backbone of the training directive issued in October 1942 for general guidance of all AGF training.¹⁹

¹⁴. Ibid.
¹⁵. Personal ltr of Gen John M. Palmer to Gen McNair, 24 Mar 42. McNair Corres.
¹⁶. GHQ ltr 353/21 (Inf)-H to Army Comdrs, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs.
¹⁷. Ibid.
¹⁸. Ibid.
¹⁹. AGF ltr to CG's, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 1942. 353/52 (Tng Dir ).
No plan comparable to the well-conceived program for divisions was developed in 1942 for small units, though an engineer program, and one for field artillery organizations so detailed and thorough as to become a model for other branches, were issued by GHQ in February. As a general rule in 1942 nondivisional units during the individual training period followed programs inherited from branch chiefs and subsequent periods were guided by directives of a very sketchy nature issued by army commanders. The failure to provide detailed guidance for small separate units was unfortunate, as separate units generally and service units in particular usually had less experienced officers than did divisions. In short, guidance was least complete in organizations where it was needed most.

Training in schools, replacement training centers, and special commands inherited by AGF in general followed NTP's previously prepared in the offices of appropriate branch chiefs. In establishments created on or after 9 March 1942, such as the Amphibious Training Center, guides prepared by staffs of the new organization under the general direction of Army Ground Forces were followed. Because mainly of absorption in the training of large units and leanness of its headquarters staff, Army Ground Forces was disposed in its early days to let subordinate installations to the utmost extent practically develop their own programs.

Extension of Field Organization for Training in 1942

The period immediately following inception of Army Ground Forces witnessed a considerable extension and revision of its field organization. Outstanding among these activities was the setting up of additional installations for the supervision of specialized training. On 21 March 1942 an Airborne Command, shortly to be transferred to Ft. Bragg, N. C., was activated at Ft. Benning and placed under command of Col. W. C. Lee. This organization, operating directly under General McNair, was given the mission of organizing and training all parachute and air-landing elements controlled by Army Ground Forces and coordinating training as required with units made available by the Army Air Forces. Initially the Airborne Command consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, three Parachute Infantry Regiments and an Infantry Airborne Battalion. On 15 May 1942 the Parachute School was activated and placed under the Airborne Command. When the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were activated on 15 August 1942, they were assigned to Second Army for administration and to the Airborne Command for training. By the end of 1942 the activated units of the Airborne Command and its subordinate elements had increased to include one Glider Infantry Regiment, one Parachute FA Battalion, two Parachute Infantry Regiments, and Battery D, 151st Airborne AA Battalion.


21. (1) For Engineer Program, see GHQ Unit Tng Prog, 7 Mar 42. Christiansen file. (2) For FA Program, see incl 4 to GHQ ltr to CG's Armies, 16 Feb 1942, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs. 353/21 (Inf)-H. (Christiansen), copy of FA Program in Hist files.


23. Interviews by AGF Hist Off with heads of AGF Spec Staff Secs, Jan 44. For complete list, see note 35, Study 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training.

In April, 1942 the Desert Training Center (after 20 October 1943, The California-Arizona Maneuver Area) began functioning under the command of Gen. George S. Patton with headquarters at Indio, Calif. The initial AGF directive, having in view participation of U.S. forces in North African campaigns, gave the new establishment the general mission of preparing units for operation under desert conditions. General Patton was also instructed to develop appropriate tactical doctrine, technique, and training methods; to develop and test equipment; and to recommend changes in tables of organization and basic allowances. He was specifically charged in training to emphasize operations of dispersed combat groups remote from railhead with restricted water supply and to give special attention to combined training with the Army Air Forces.

Developmental and testing activities of the Desert Training Center were delegated by General Patton to a Desert Warfare Board created in April 1942. During the course of its existence the Board tested an impressive list of articles ranging from air filters to desert rations, and initiated studies in a wide variety of fields including health, sanitation, clothing, lubricants, navigational aids, and maintenance.

The Desert Training Center grew from a strength of some 10,000 officers and men in June 1942 under General Patton and the I Armored Corps to 27,198 under General A. C. Gillem and the II Corps in August, and 76,764 men at the end of the year under Gen. Walton H. Walker and the IV Armored Corps. During General Walker's regime (8 November 1942-29 March 1943) the War Department, on recommendation of General McNair, transformed the Center into a model theater of operations, divided into a combat area under the immediate command of General Walker and a communications zone, administered through a subordinate commander. Air Force units operating in the Desert area until 1 December 1943 were under the control of the Center Commander.

With its conversion into a theater of operations, the mission of the center was extended from preparing men and units to function under desert conditions to providing advanced training in combined arms, under conditions of maximum toughness and realism for personnel and units destined for all parts of the globe. The Center proved to be one of the most effective of all subordinate agencies in furthering the AGF mission of preparing units for combat. In September, 1942, even before its transformation to a model theater, General McNair characterized the Center as "probably the most valuable single training area for large units and for conditioning troops."

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27. Ibid, p 15 and App I, "Assigned Strength of DTC-C-AMA."
A third special training installation established in the early period of Army Ground Forces was the Amphibious Training Command (re-designated Center 24 October 1942) which was activated on 27 May 1942, and which began to function as a training agency with removal to Camp Edwards on 15 June.32 The task originally laid out for this organization, which was commanded throughout by Gen. Frank A. Keating, was to train before 1 February 1943 in shore-to-shore amphibious operations twelve divisions earmarked for ROUNDUP.33 On 1 July 1942 the goal was reduced to five divisions, and on 25 September, following indefinite postponement of ROUNDUP the 1 February deadline was removed and the indefinite objective substituted of training five divisions in shore-to-shore movement "as soon as practicable" and thereafter maintaining a pool of trained amphibious units comprising five divisions plus required extras and fillers. In October 1942, the Amphibious Command's mission was broadened to include final training and battle conditioning of all units assigned to it for instruction in shore-to-shore operations. The dual objective was to be accomplished for each division within a period of thirty days.34

After completing training of the 45th Division in August and the 36th Division in October General Keating's command was transferred to Carrabelle, Fla., where at Camp Gordon Johnston it trained the 38th Division in November-December 1942, and the 28th Division (last of the Divisions trained amphibiously under Army Ground Forces) in February-March 1943. The Amphibious Training Center was officially disbanded on 10 June 1943.35

On 3 September 1942, Army Ground Forces, after a period of experimentation in winter and mountain operations extending back to the early days of GHQ, activated the Mountain Training Center at Camp Carson, Colo.36 Commander of the Mountain Training Center was Col. Onslow S. Rolfe of the 87th Mountain Infantry, which organization along with the 86th Mountain Infantry activated in November 1942, and smaller units of other branches, including four battalions of Pack Artillery, constituted the backbone of the new establishment.37 In October 1942, the Mountain and Winter Warfare Board, which had been activated on 15 November 1941 "to test and develop mountain and winter equipment and formulate, develop and recommend changes in mountain and winter warfare doctrine," joined other elements of the Center at Camp Carson.38

In accordance with previous plans, Colonel Rolfe and his mountain troops—many of whom were experienced ski-men recruited from the National Ski Association of America and its subsidiary, the National Ski Patrol System—in November 1942 moved from Camp Carson (elevation about 6,000 feet) to Camp Hale 158 miles distant (elevation 9,500 feet), for special winter training in high altitude.39 At Camp Hale all the regiments,

33. Ibid.
34. Ibid, pp 8-9.
35. Ibid, pp 12-17.
37. Ibid.
38. WD ltr AG 320.2 (11-10-41) MR-M-C, 15 Nov 41, sub: Constitution of 87th Mt En and Activation of lst Bn (Reinf). AGF 320.2/33 Inf.
39. MTC Special Orders (SO) 56, C/ Carson, Colo, 10 Nov 42.
the signal company and about 10 percent of the supporting units making up the "test force," as Colonel Rolfe's command was sometimes called, were taught skiing. All the rest of the troops received snowshoe instruction (weapons Platoons of infantry regiments were given both ski and snowshoe training). Training was complicated by the fact that some of the recruits sent to Colonel Rolfe were from reception centers and hence unready for special training in any form. Partly because of this fact and in part because of deficiencies of some of the officers holding key staff positions, winter maneuvers undertaken in February 1943 left much to be desired. In June 1943 Colonel Rolfe was transferred to the 71st Division and his "test force," minus the 87th Mountain Infantry and the 601st Field Artillery Battalion sent to the Aleutians, became the nucleus of the 10th Mountain Division. This division, activated 15 July 1943 under Gen. Lloyd E. Jones, assumed control of mountain training activities.

Creation of new training establishments was paralleled by expansion and readjustment of the old. The Armored Force, which at inception of Army Ground Forces controlled two corps and four divisions, on 23 December 1942 had one corps and eight divisions under its command. The Tank Destroyer Command which in March 1942 consisted only of headquarters organizations (Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Unit Training Center, School and Board) on 16 July 1942 instituted an officer candidate school and in October established a Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center. In August, the Command was redesignated the Tank Destroyer Center and moved from its temporary location in Temple, Tex., to a permanent home at Camp Hood. Before the end of the year the Unit Training Center was designated the Advanced Training Center, and a new organization, the Basic Training Center, was created to activate and give elementary training to Tank Destroyer organizations. In June 1942 the Tank Destroyer Center received its first batch of tank destroyer battalions for training. As the number of battalions increased group and brigade headquarters were activated to supervise their training. At the end of

41. Memo of Col O.S. Rolfe for ONHIS, 12 Dec 47, sub: Rpt on Activities of MTC, 314.7 Hist file. See also revised edition of History of AGF, Study No 24, The Mountain Training Center, Chap IV.
42. See reports of observers as follows: (1) Memo (C) of Maj John L. Tappin for SOFS AGF, 17 Feb 43, sub: Obs during Visit to MTC, Cp Hale, Colo, Feb 4-12, 1943. (2) Memo (C) of Maj Walter A. Wood to ACofS G-4, 20 Feb 43, sub: Rpt on Exercises Conducted at MTC, Cp Hale, Feb 1-12, 1943. (3) Memo (C) of Minot Dole, Cm Chm NSPS, for Col Ridgeley Caither, no date, sub: Obs made at Cp Hale, Colo, Feb 4-13, 1943. Copies filed in 314.7 AGF Hist file.
44. See Chart No 3, Ground Forces in the War Army.
46. Ibid, p 23.
47. Ibid, p 82.
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the year the Center had under its supervision two brigades, seven groups, and about forty battalions. 50

During the period 9 March-31 December, two new replacement training centers were added to the Replacement and School Command, and the strength of its replacement training centers increased from about 115,000 to about 150,000. 51 An even greater expansion was experienced by the Antiaircraft Command, the enlisted strength of which increased during this period from about 75,000 to more than 120,000. 52

The armies, which were the main dependence of AGF in the training of units, also experienced considerable adjustment and expansion in 1942. In the spring both the Second and Third Armies recovered many of the troops that had been transferred during the hectic weeks following Pearl Harbor to key points along the country's borders. Second Army, for example, in the early spring received some 60,000 nondivisional troops from the First Army and Eastern Defense Command, and General Lear, who for several months after Pearl Harbor had been left without a single corps, in April obtained the III Corps, and in June and August respectively the newly activated XI and XII Corps were assigned to his command; the VII Corps, which had been rushed to the Pacific Coast in December 1941, belatedly came home to Second Army in November 1942. 53 The number of divisions under Second Army increased from four on 9 March 1942 to twenty on 23 December; on the latter date four divisions were assigned to each of the subordinate corps headquarters and four (including three airborne divisions) were assigned directly to Second Army. 54 Third Army, having lost the V Corps to First Army in January 1942, had only the IV and VIII Corps under its control at inception of Army Ground Forces. During the course of the year it gained the VI, IX, X, XIII, and II Armored Corps. 55 Divisions under its control increased during the period 9 March-23 December 1942 from seven to twenty-six; of the twenty-six, three were assigned directly to Army and twenty-three to subordinate corps. 56

Both the Armies experienced a tremendous growth in nondivisional strength. By the end of 1942 Second Army had attained an over-all strength of 401,239, and Third Army 330,785. 57 Details of assignment to armies, corps, and special commands as of 23 December 1942 are set forth in the accompanying chart. 58

50. See Chart No. 3, Ground Forces in the War Army.
51. (1) Ibid. (2) Chart No 4, Combined Capacity of RTC's.
52. History of AGF, Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center, pp 34-36.
53. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, pp 74-75.
54. (1) Chart No 4, AGF Combat Units, GNSTA, 23 Dec 42. (2) AGF Chart, 9 Mar 43, in A Short History of the Army Ground Forces (mimeographed). Copy in 314.7 Hist file.
55. (1) History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, pp 24-25. (2) Chart No 4, AGF Combat Units.
56. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF Chart, 9 Mar 42, in A Short History of AGF. 314.7 Hist file.
57. Ibid.
58. See Chart No 3, Ground Forces in The War Army.
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<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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| **1943 CAVALRY** | 5,450 | 5,450 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 | 9,726 |
|        | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| **TOTAL** | 147,182 | 147,482 | 176,482 | 176,688 | 176,688 | 179,744 | 181,504 | 187,312 | 186,128 | 162,794 | 179,278 | 174,878 | 174,638 |

| **1944 ARMORED** | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 | 12,300 |
| **CAVALRY** | 4,750 | 4,750 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 | 6,720 |
| **FIELD ARTILLERY** | 24,048 | 24,048 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 | 24,900 |
| **INFANTRY** | 137,820 | 137,820 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 | 193,940 |
| **TANK DESTROYER** | 7,540 | 7,540 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 | 6,608 |
| **TOTAL** | 174,158 | 174,158 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 | 244,408 |

| **1945 ARMORED** | 17,500 | 17,500 | 18,500 | 18,500 | 18,500 | 18,500 | 22,340 | 10,480 | 10,480 |
| **CAVALRY** | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 | 8,400 |
| **FIELD ARTILLERY** | 17,200 | 17,200 | 15,600 | 15,600 | 15,600 | 15,600 | 18,950 | 13,440 | 13,440 |
| **INFANTRY** | 281,300 | 281,300 | 330,660 | 330,660 | 330,660 | 330,660 | 347,980 | 297,220 | 260,000 |
| **TANK DESTROYER** | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 | 2,900 |
| **TOTAL** | 327,320 | 327,320 | 376,060 | 376,060 | 376,060 | 376,060 | 401,180 | 321,136 | 290,716 |

**COMBINED CAPACITY OF RTC's**
One change in field organization made in the early Army Ground Force period deserves special mention. This was the setting up of small headquarters to supervise the training of small units. Transfers from the defense commands together with numerous activations in the early months of 1942, fairly swamped the armies with nondivisional units. Army commanders, following a practice started in France in World War I, commonly attached these units to subordinate corps. In some cases corps in turn "passed the buck" by attaching these units to divisions and occasionally even to regiments. The result in any event was to reduce small separate units to the status of stepchildren or orphans. Commanded by low ranking officers some of whom were lacking in military "know-how," these units were at a great disadvantage when forced, as they frequently were, to compete for scarce equipment with large units who had colonels and generals to speak for them. To make matters worse, commanders of such units had very little literature to guide them in the training of their units.

When this unfortunate situation was brought to General Marshall's attention in April by a report of Inspector General Virgil L. Peterson, he suggested to General McNair that armies be given small training headquarters, commanded by brigadier generals to supervise small units. In accordance with this recommendation General McNair in May sent out letters to armies and separate corps directing each of them to set up an experimental headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, and to report the results to him as soon as practicable. He received a reply immediately from General Lear stating that Second Army had already set up such headquarters at Ft. Knox (December 1941) and Ft. Custer (April 1942) and that on the basis of experience thus acquired he could testify to the practicability of the plan now proposed by General McNair.

In June and July ten small supervisory headquarters, commanded by colonels, were activated by Second Army and one each by Third Army, II Corps, and VII Corps. In accordance with AGF instructions, "Type A" headquarters, consisting of five officers and sixteen men were provided for stations having 2,000-5,000 nondivisional troops, and "Type B," consisting of eight officers and thirty-one men, where such personnel exceeded 5,000. By 31 December 1942 headquarters and headquarters detachments special troops of both types in Army Ground Forces had increased to twenty-nine. Despite certain defects in the initial organization and a tendency of some commanders to slight training for administration, these supervisory headquarters, in that they afforded a home and an articulate parent for hundreds of small units, filled a vital need in the training of ground units.

Combined Training--June to November 1942

On 23 April 1942, Army Ground Forces issued its first major training directive, outlining the program of training for the period 1 June to 31 October 1942. The directive, as a general rule, applied only to older units that had completed the schedule of post-maneuver training prescribed by GHQ on 30 October 1941. Recently activated units were to continue training under programs previously issued, but new infantry divisions following the directive dated 16 February 1942, were instructed to work the
preliminary air-ground phases of the April directive into the unit and combined training periods so as to be ready to go directly into maneuvers on completion of regimental combat team exercises.

The April directive provided for six weeks of preliminary air-ground training followed by eight weeks of maneuvers and culminating in seven weeks of advanced small unit training. The preliminary period consisted largely of preparatory schools in air-ground cooperation for officers of corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions. But during the last two weeks of this phase, all personnel were to receive instruction in identification of aircraft, air-ground communication, designation of safety limits, antiaircraft security measures, and other fundamentals of air-ground operations; the culminating activity was a field exercise in which school instruction was put to a practical test.

Maneuvers, outlined for the second period, largely because of restrictions imposed by gasoline and rubber shortages, were to be on a much smaller scale than in 1941 with opposing ground elements being limited to the troops of a single corps. But maneuvers of 1942 were considered more advanced than those of 1941 in two respects: (1) they featured for the first time river crossings: including the attack and defense of a river line--operations characterized by General McNair as particularly difficult; (2) they called for an unprecedented amount of air-ground and infantry-armor coordination.62

The allotment of seven weeks following the large-scale exercises to "miscellaneous and advanced small unit training" came in part from the experience of 1941, when a period of several months had to be added to the training cycle for correction of deficiencies brought to light by maneuvers.63 But the additional objective of giving units a final pre-combat polishing was evident in the requirement that "small task forces composed of riflemen, grenadiers, machine guns, mortars, antitank guns, engineers and communications personnel will be organized. Each exercise will be in-the nature of a rehearsal for a particular phase of combat..."64

Preliminary air-ground training which, like other phases of the exercises, was staggered among the corps so as to economize in air support, was initiated in the VI Corps in the latter part of May.65 On 11 June a three-day air-ground exercise featuring elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 2d Armored Division, and an air-support command, was held at Ft. Benning, Ga., to demonstrate methods of joint training for the benefit of ground commanders and their staff. Some 1,800 of whom were summoned to be present. The demonstration, while quite impressive in many respects, was disappointing to Army Ground Forces in the number and quality of participating air units. Frequent changes in these units interfered greatly with rehearsals. Pilots and planes were assembled from far and wide so hastily as to permit little advance preparation for their part in the program. The Provisional Task Force furnished by the Army Air Forces had only 30 percent of the normal strength of an air support command, and one element, a dive bomber squadron not being available, was borrowed from the Navy. Only four high-ranking air officers were present (though seventy-five generals were then assigned to the Air Forces) and two of these attended as representatives of the War Department.


63. Ibid. pp 3-4.

64. AGF ltr to CG's, 23 Apr 42, sub: Tng Dir for Period Jun 1-Oct 31, 1942. 353/1043 (Tng Gen).

65. See chart attached, Ibid.

12
Generzal' -Staff rather than of the Air Forces. The dearth of planes and personnel, the
heaty improvisation, and the lack of preparatory training which marked air participa-
tion in the Benning demonstration was only a foretaste of a condition which was to
plague combined training throughout 1942, and in large measure to defeat the objective
laid down in the April directive.

After several changes in major ground units scheduled for participation, maneuvers
got under way in North Carolina on 13 July with Maj. Gen. Z. J. Devley of the VI Corps
in command. Gen. Walter Krueger of the Third Army directed two series of maneuvers
in Louisiana, beginning with the VIII Corps exercise, 3 August-20 September and fol-
lowed by IV Corps maneuvers, 21 September-8 November. In December General Krueger
directed a two-week air-ground command post exercise in Louisiana in which the prin-
cipal-command participants were Gen. Courtney Hodges' X Corps and the 2d Air Support
Command. General A. C. Gillem directed VII Corps (Maj. Gen. Robert C. Richardson,
Commander) maneuvers in the Desert Training Center from 31 August to 16 October.
In Tennessee, where General Lear delegated the preliminary planning of exercises to Gen.
Lloyd R. Fredendall of II Corps (who also acted as chief umpire and Deputy Director),
maneuvers did not begin until 20 September. When General Fredendall and II Corps
were withdrawn early in October to take part in the invasion of North Africa, they were
replaced by Gen. C. P. Hall and XI Corps.

An armored division participated in each of the maneuvers. The full roster of
participating divisions of all types is shown in the accompanying chart.

Critiques which followed the 1942 exercises detailed the shortcomings common to
maneuvers: Offensive and defensive lines were unduly extended; orders were verbose;
time and space factors were not sufficiently considered; coordination of infantry with
armor was deficient; reconnaissance lacked aggressiveness; troops and vehicles were
road bound and insufficiently dispersed; camouflage, cover, and concealment left much
to be desired. General McNair attributed deficiencies in part to the enormous turnover
of personnel experienced by units participating in maneuvers.

68. Statement of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair on Maneuvers of AGF, 12 Oct 42, 314.7
   (McNair).
70. (1) Statement of Gen McNair on Maneuvers of AGF, 12 Oct 42, 314.7 (McNair).
   (2) History of AGF, Study No 15, The Desert Training Center and C-AMA, p 33. (3) Chart
   No 5, AGF Maneuvers.
71. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 110
72. Ibid.
73. Chart No 5, AGF Maneuvers.
74. (1) History of AGF Studies No 16, The Second Army, pp 111-113, and No 17, The
   Third Army, pp 35-36. (2) AGF 1tr to CG's, 7 Jan 43, sub: Post-Maneuver Comments,
   1942. 354.2/840 (1942). (3) Statement of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair on Maneuvers of
   AGF, 12 Oct 42, 314.7 (McNair).
The primary objective of the 1942 maneuvers was to develop air-ground cooperation, and it was in this fundamental aspect that results were most disappointing. In their final reports commanders of both armies commented on the adverse effects on joint training of the exceedingly limited air participation, and General McNair stated to General Marshall on 30 December 1942: "We have made little progress in air-ground cooperation in spite of our efforts if we view frankly the conditions that must obtain in order to secure effective results in combat." He added: "The trouble is that the air side of the set-up has been too sketchy to permit effective training. I say this without criticism of the Air Forces." Ground commanders were partly to blame for the failure, a fact which General McNair did not fail to specify, in that they did not always make full or proper use of aviation that was available to them. But the conclusion seems inescapable that the main reason for the unsatisfactory results was the failure of the air forces to come through with the required aviation. Reports pouring into Headquarters, AGF, from the field throughout the maneuver period told of last minute cancellations of promised air support, of four or five planes being sent when forty or fifty were expected, of obsolete planes, of substitute equipment, and of poorly trained pilots.

The main reason for air's defection in the combined program was the fact that demands of aviation training during this period of terrific expansion and of high level strategic commitments far exceeded available resources of planes and pilots, a fact which General McNair appreciated and often used as a basis for counselling patience in communications with subordinate ground commanders. But the sentiment was strong in AGF circles that more air could have been provided for joint training if the Army Air Forces in its thinking and planning had attached more importance to the technique and training necessary for close support of ground operations.

But despite shortcomings large and small, responsible commanders found much that was gratifying in the 1942 maneuvers. The spirit of the soldiers was noticeably higher than in the exercises of 1941. Leadership also was vastly improved, particularly among junior officers, a fact which helped place the stamp of approval on the work of the officer candidate schools. Discipline, maintenance, supply, intelligence, traffic control, and physical fitness all showed a marked improvement over previous maneuvers. General Lear characterized the maneuvers in Tennessee as "one of the bright spots in my army career.... The finest ... I have ever witnessed," and General McNair in summarizing results in Army Ground Forces as a whole states:


76. Ibid.

77. Ibid. pp 26 - 30.

78. Ibid. pp 35 - 45.

79. (1) Statement of Gen McNair on AGF Maneuvers, 12 Oct 42. 314.7 (McNair).

80. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 111.

81. Statement of Gen McNair on AGF Maneuvers, 12 Oct 42. 314.7 (McNair).
The maneuvers have indicated a markedly improved state of discipline and much higher standards of small unit training. The quality of leadership displayed has been most encouraging, although there is still room for improvement. High Commanders and staffs... have undergone many changes since 1941, but their performances have been surprisingly effective considering the attendant conditions.

Administration of the Training Program in the early AGF Period

Army Ground Forces took various steps to implement the training prescribed in general directives such as those of February and April. Important among these was the issuance of supplementary directives outlining training for special commands of which those given to the Amphibious Training Center on 12 June and 24 October 1942 are convenient examples. The directive of 12 June was of a very general nature, as the Army Ground Forces staff, at that time having little in the way of information or experience on which to rely, had to feel its way and lean heavily on the commander charged with execution of the program.82 The directive of 24 October, utilizing the experience of the first units to pass through the Amphibious Training Center, as reported by the Center commander and AGF inspectors, was more detailed and specific.83

Army Ground Forces also undertook to see that subordinate agencies were provided with MTP's, manuals, and other guides required for the effective training of troops. As a general rule Army Ground Forces delegated the actual preparation of such literature to appropriate schools, but drafts were sent to Headquarters, AGF, for editing and approval and, where appropriate, for transmission to the War Department for publication. The Training Literature and Visual Aids Division of the Requirements Section was the agency in Headquarters, AGF, which coordinated and supervised preparation of training literature; this agency worked in close coordination with appropriate divisions of the Ground G-3 Section.

Limitations of space preclude detailed treatment of the work of Army Ground Forces in connection with training literature. But the first year of the AGF period was an exceedingly busy and productive one in the preparation of all types of manuals, circulars, and other training guides.84

Visits of inspection were another means of implementing the training program, and throughout the AGF period the Commanding General, accompanied by key members of his staff, spent a considerable portion of his time in the field. General McNair during his first year as Commander of Army Ground Forces accumulated about 55,000 miles of official air travel, most of which was devoted to trips of inspection to subordinate installations.85

Neither General McNair nor his successors spent much time on these visits at the headquarters proper, but hurried to the field to observe the troops in training. They gave particular attention to maneuvers and to other combined training exercises. General

82. AGF ltr (S) to CO Amph Tng Cen. 12 Jun 42, sub: Gen Dir - Shore-to-Shore Tng. 353/12 (Amph) (S).
83. Ibid.
84. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of heads of Spec Staff Secs and Offs of G-3 Sec, Hq AGF, Jan 44.
85. Travel Log of CG AGF, 314.7 (McNair).
McNair, while advocating on the spot correction of specific errors and deficiencies, instructed his officers as a general policy not to indulge in lengthy oral comment on what they observed, but rather to submit their remarks to the senior officer in charge of the inspection for inclusion in an official letter sent to the appropriate commander soon after the visiting party returned to Washington.86

Because of leaness of headquarters staff and absorption in such headquarters activities as breaking in new personnel, revising tactical organization, doctrine, and training guides, officers below the level of general staff heads did not make frequent visits to the field in the early months of the AF period.87 When General Lear in May 1942 commented on the fact that he had not received any reports for some time of AF visits to Second Army units, the Chief of the AF Training Division remarked to General McNair:88

General Lear has heard little from this headquarters of late ... for the reason that few visits of inspection have been made ... the press of business here in this office has been such that I have been loath to recommend any extensive activity along that line. However, just as for any other commander, I believe our job is only half done with the issuance of orders. We must get out and see that they are faithfully executed.

In the months following, visits to the field did increase, but before 1943 frequency of the trips left much to be desired. This was particularly true of special staff sections, where personnel was so sparse as to make it extremely difficult for officers to leave their desks, a situation that was especially unfortunate in view of the fact that units which looked to special staff members for supervision were the ones most in need of guidance.89

Testing, which was still another means utilized by General McNair in implementing his training mission, was not extended during the early months of the AF period. This was attributable apparently to the absorption of staff officers at this time in other duties. While General McNair believed that the administration of tests was a function of subordinate commanders--his general rule being that a unit should be checked by the commander of the next higher organization--he considered it the responsibility of his headquarters to make available for use of these commanders comprehensive tests for the checking of units large and small. He did not approve his headquarters' issuing

86. (1) Information compiled from AF, G-3 files 333.1 (Inspeos. by AF Staff Offs). (2) Statement of Brig Gen Leo Donovan, G-3 to AF Hist. Off. 19 Feb 45. (3) Personal observation of AF Hist Off.

87. Interview by AF Hist Off of heads of Spec Staff Secs and Offs of G-3 Sec., Hq, AF, Jan 44.

88. Memo of Col Lowell W. Roock, Chief of Tng Div, AF to Gen McNair, 21 May 1942, sub: Comment on Ltr of Gen Lear, 18 May 42. G-3 file, McNair 201 Bndr.

89. History of AF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in the AF, pp 1-2, 41-42.
mandatory tests for individuals, such as MOS tests, on the ground that the preparation of individual tests was the responsibility of subordinate commands. 90

Headquarters, AGF, deemed it necessary in the interest of effective training to control the number of tests to which troops were subjected. When Second Army in the fall of 1942 prescribed a testing program which General McNair regarded as excessive, Army Ground Forces required its curtailment. The Ground Chief of Staff in issuing the restraining order stated the AGF position as follows: 91

Our theory is to prescribe a sound course of training, select capable commanders, and let them alone. At certain prescribed intervals subject the unit to tests conducted by our most capable personnel. These tests must show whether the commander has accomplished his mission. If tests are continuous the commander doesn't have a chance to show what he can do.

Not all division commanders believed that Army Ground Forces in practice lived up to its declared intention to "select capable commanders and let them alone," Gen. Harry J. Maloney, for example, in a final summary of his experience in training the 94th Infantry Division, reported that tests and inspections of higher headquarters were so burdensome as to hinder greatly his efforts to give his command the training which from his intimate contact with it he knew to be the most urgently needed. 92 General Devers apparently held a similar view, and General Marshall in June 1943 told the Ground Chief of Staff that he thought AGF "prescribed training too minutely and as a result ... killed initiative and reduced the opportunity of officers to exercise leadership." 93

Vital to Headquarters, AGF, in its preparation and administration of the training program was the experience accumulated by ground units as they participated in combat. From the beginning General McNair kept in touch with important combat operations through personal correspondence with key ground commanders. In the spring of 1942 the practice was initiated of sending a few selected officers and enlisted men from each division earmarked for early shipment overseas to theaters of operations. 94 The primary object in sending out these teams was to give the divisions, through their representatives, a foretaste of combat conditions, but the informal reports which they brought back were sometimes made available to other organizations. From time to time in the months following Pearl Harbor individual observers were sent out by the War Department and Army Ground Forces to collect information on specific subjects. In August 1942, Army Ground Forces, apparently at General Marshall's suggestion, took steps to send about twenty observers designated by armies, schools, and other major subordinate commands to

90. (1) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of heads of Spec Staff Secs, Hq, AGF, Apr-May 45. (2) GHQ ltr to CG's, 16 Feb 42, sub: Tng of Newly Activated Inf Divs. 353/21 (Inf)-N. (3) AGF ltr to CG's, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

91. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 115.

92. (1) Personal ltr of Gen Maloney to Maj Gen John P. Lucas, CG, Fourth Army, 22 Jul 44. 322/39 (94th Div). (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Gen H. J. Maloney, 18 Jul 44.


94. WD ltr to Selected Offs of Designated Divs, 12 May 42, sub: Orders. 210.68/7 (Foreign Obsrs)(S).
overseas theaters to collect information that might be useful in the conduct of training.95 Observers dispatched under this plan were brought to Headquarters, AGF, for orientation and given a questionnaire covering points of information desired by the various staff sections. On their return from the theaters they reported to Headquarters, AGF, before proceeding to their units, turned in written reports based on the questionnaire, conferred with interested sections, and when requested gave talks to assembled officers of the Headquarters.96

Early in 1943 General Marshall suggested the desirability of sending commanders of divisions overseas at about the midpoint of the training period, so that they might have the advantage of first-hand knowledge of combat in completing the training of their units. But General McNair, being strongly of the opinion that division commanders could not be spared from their training duties, advocated the sending of corps commanders; his recommendation was adopted.97

In the latter part of 1942 G-2, AGF, suggested that General McNair send observer teams, representing the arms and boards, to overseas theaters.98 But not until after General Eisenhower, moved apparently by a desire to reduce the number of observers and to systematize their activities, suggested such a plan was it adopted.99 Under this scheme permanent boards made up of officers representing the combat arms (not until December 1943 was provision made for including representatives of the technical services on the AGF boards) were set up in each of the theaters; the tour of duty on a board normally was about six months.100

In the latter part of 1943 a Dissemination Branch was established in the Ground G-2 Section to supervise observer activities, to reproduce board reports, and to disseminate them to the field. Creation of this central coordinating agency filled a vital and longstanding need in collecting combat lessons and making them readily available to units in training.101

The major subordinate commands rendered valuable assistance to Headquarters, AGF, in implementing its training program. The role of the two armies was of special importance, particularly in the formative period of Army Ground Forces, for these were

95. (1) AGF ltr to CG's A/B Comd, AA, RASC, Armc F, Amph Tng Ctr, 21 Aug 42, 210.68 (S). (2) Gen Council Min (S), 21 Sep 42.


97. (1) Memo (S) of Gen McNair to Gen Marshall, 27 Feb 43, sub: Oben Tours O'ceas for High Comdrs. 322.96/77 (Comdrs) (S). (2) History of AGF, Study No 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers, p 7.

98. Undated (but about Nov 42) draft summary by Col Carpenter, G-2, AGF, of observer activities. G-2 Observer file /7.

99. Gen Council Min, (S) 14 Jun 43.

100. (1) AGF Memo (C) for C/S USA (Attn: Eur Sec OPD) 14 Dec 43, sub: Estab of AGF Obser Bd in ETUSA. 334/2 (Obser Bd) (C). (2) Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Col. R.R. Robins, 24 Dec 43. 334/106(AGF Bd) (S).

going concerns when it was established, with strong commanders and well-organized staffs thoroughly familiar with training problems and well experienced in the administration of large training establishments. The initiative displayed by General Lear in meeting the problem of nondivisional units has already been noted. General Krueger showed similar alertness and ingenuity in setting up "Krueger Tech," a special school for junior officers to correct deficiencies in leadership revealed by the 1941 maneuvers.102 General McNair, in April 1942, disapproved making the school a permanent establishment on the ground that the officer candidate schools were then able to accomplish the required training, but he recognized the value of work already done by "Krueger Tech" during a period before the OCS system had become firmly established.103

The armies and other major commands, to a greater extent in 1942 than later, supplemented AGF training directives with instructions of their own—usually in the form of training memoranda. The sub-commands, like Army Ground Forces, implemented their training programs by inspections; as a general rule inspections were extended in 1942 and early 1943 to meet the ever-increasing expansion. The Antiaircraft Command, for example, in June 1942, established a team under the direct control of its Inspector of Training which visited each subordinate installation at intervals of two or three months to check on the state of training and equipment, the adequacy of training methods, and the efficiency of organization and personnel.104 The Second Army in April 1942 initiated monthly inspections of the training and administration of each unit under its command, but later the rapid growth of the command necessitated reducing the frequency of inspections to once every six weeks or two months. The system developed by General Lear in 1942 provided for three types of inspection: (1) team inspections, coordinated by G-3 and G-4 under the Chief of Staff for checking of housekeeping, administration, motors, and training; (2) technical inspections, initiated by section chiefs to examine the state of technical training; and (3) special inspections of particular units as directed by the army commander. Second Army inspectors were guided by elaborate check lists, and beginning June 1942, information obtained by inspectors supplemented by periodic reports of major units was recorded in a special file which made it possible at all times promptly to furnish higher headquarters up-to-date information on a unit's status of training.105

While General McNair eventually found it necessary to restrain certain of his subordinates whom he thought overzealous in tests and reports,106 there can be no doubt that the initiative and aggressiveness of army and other commanders in discharging their missions was of tremendous benefit to him, particularly during the period when Army Ground Forces was cutting its teeth.

Steps toward Realism in 1942

Both Headquarters, AGF, and subordinate commands attempted in 1942 to make training more rugged and to give it more of a battle-field flavor. The inspiration for these and similar efforts in 1943 seems to have come in large measure from British commands.

106. (1) Ibid. pp 155, 116, 119. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. 319.22/22.
training, particularly from the GHQ Battle School at Barnard Castle, Durham County, England. General Marshall was greatly impressed by what he saw of British training on a visit to Europe in April 1942, and in May, at the request of Gen. Mark W. Clark, a full report on the British Battle School at Barnard Castle was forwarded to Headquarters, AGF. Activities scheduled at this school included battle drills with live ammunition, attack on a pill box, "under intensive covering fire from all weapons," house-clearing and village fighting, snap-shooting at pulley controlled targets, bayonet assault and obstacle courses, defense of a river line, and lectures aimed at preparing soldiers mentally for battle. Study of the materials collected by General Clark in May, 1942, from the Battle School suggests that AGF borrowed heavily from the British, not only in initial efforts to make training more realistic, but also in framing the major training directives of October 1942 and the first six months of 1943.

In May 1942, the Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Command, initiated a battle conditioning course at Camp Hood, Tex. Capt. Gordon T. Kimbrell, graduate of the British courses in commando tactics, was in charge. Captain Kimbrell's layout consisted of an obstacle course, crawling across an open field, hip-shooting, street-fighting, and "tank-hunting." In June 1942, Headquarters, AGF, apparently drawing on both British practice and the Tank Destroyer model, issued a directive outlining a battle practice course for suggested use in all subordinate commands. The course consisted of thirteen stations, interspersed with obstacles such as walls, hedges, ditches, streams, and craters. To the accompaniment of appropriate sound effects, individuals and small units equipped with blank cartridges and practice grenades were required to proceed from station to station, solving minor tactical problems as they were encountered along the way. A critique was held at the completion of the course.

In July 1942, the Tank Destroyer Command initiated an infiltration course where "live ammunition was fired over advancing troops for the first time in United States Army Training." About this time, also, a village fighting course based on British models was established at Camp Hood. This course, after being modified by the Replacement and School Command to relax controls and to make it tactically realistic, became a prototype for the combat-in-cities exercise prescribed by Army Ground Forces in February 1943.

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107. See folder on British GHQ Battle School in CofS files. (AGF Hist.)
108. Second Army memo AG 314.8-8 to Gen Offs of Second Army, 5 May 42, sub not given, summarizing remarks made by Gen Marshall to staffs of new divs, 24 Apr 42.
109. See folder on British GHQ Battle School in CofS files. (AGF Hist.)
110. See folder on British GHQ Battle School in CofS files. (AGF Hist.)
111. History of AGF, Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, pp 83-84.
112. AGF ltr to CG's, 17 Jun 42, sub: Battle Practice Course. 353/1380.
113. Ibid.
115. Memo on Battle Courses prepared by Hist Off, R&SC for AGF, Hist Off, May 46. (AGF Hist.)
In October 1942 the Amphibious Training Center introduced at Carrabelle, Fla., special exercises for physical and mental toughening of trainees, including Bayonet and Knife Course, Log Exercise Course, and a "Judo" Course. In late 1942 Gen. Ben Lear, drawing on his observations of marine training at Camp Pendleton, Calif., and the Tank Destroyer Center at Camp Hood, completed plans for a course of Ranger training in Second Army units. A Ranger School was initiated in January 1943 at Camp Forrest, Tenn., where 600 selected men who later were to become instructors in their own units were given an intensive two-week course in "dirty fighting" techniques, physical hardening, and mental conditioning; and subjected to realistic infiltration, close-combat, and village-fighting exercises. General Lear wanted to make the Ranger School a permanent establishment for training instructional personnel, and wished to institute a plan for certifying as "Rangers" all soldiers who could meet the required standards. But General McNair--because he thought that troops should be trained in units by their own commanders and not in schools, and because he was opposed to some of the more spectacular features of Ranger training--did not approve, and the school was discontinued after two sessions. The essentials of the Ranger exercises early in 1943 were incorporated in the regular AGF training program, and in 1944, the idea of a special Ranger corps was approached in the Expert Infantrymen scheme.

Obstacles to Training, 1942

Training in 1942 was beset with tremendous obstacles. Most difficulties sprang from two fundamental sources: (1) the enormous and unexpected demands created by a decision in April 1942, to invade France either in the fall of 1942 (SLEDGERHAMMER Plan) or the spring of 1943 (ROUNDUP Plan); (2) expansion of the armed forces at a pace that out-ran the capacities of selective service and industry in men and material.

On 27 July 1942, cross-channel invasion of Europe was postponed indefinitely. About the same time, plans for a landing in North Africa in the fall of 1942 (GYMNAST later called TORCH) were revived. Later the combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to the invasion of Sicily (HUSKY) following victory in Africa. All of these plans called for large-scale participation of American forces.

The decision in April 1942 to attempt a cross-channel invasion of Europe in the fall or following spring was exceedingly disruptive to training. Initial plans called for participation of some 1,000,000 American troops, of which Army Ground Forces was to provide 595,000, including seventeen divisions, of which twelve were to be amphibiously trained. Damaging of these divisions for the anticipated operations required

117. (1) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Col John B. Sherman, HQ AGF, formerly in G-3 Sec, Second Army, 18 Oct 43. (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Gen Ben Lear, 5 Mar 46. (3) History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, pp 140-44.
118. (1) Pers ltr of Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 25 Jan 43. McNair Corres. Pers ltrs of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Jan, 2 & 9 Feb 43. Ibid.
119. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 2 Feb 43. Ibid.
120. History of AGF, Study No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army, p 6.
121. See Biennial Report of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
122. Information obtained from BOLERO Plan materials in AGF Plans file (S).
that they be filled immediately with trained personnel and given a complete outfitting of battleworthy equipment. With resources already taxed to the limit by an expanding army, this meant that the required personnel and equipment had to be taken from units of lower priority, most of which were already hard put for equipment (initial allowances for divisions were 50 percent of that listed in the T/O&E and for extras and fillers 20 percent, and in 1942, few were the units that had this much) and their ranks had already been depleted by drafts for cadre, officer candidate school, and Air Force volunteers.123

Adoption of ROUNDUP also meant that service troops had to be provided immediately and in numbers far in excess of those contemplated in the 1942 Troop Basis in order to prepare the way in England for the coming of combat troops and to implement supply phases of the proposed operation. Army Ground Forces in the late spring and summer was not only called on to activate large numbers of AGF type units, but heavy drafts were made on ground organizations to provide the service personnel required for ROUNDUP.124

The various changes in strategic plans were disruptive also in that they caused confusion in the preparation of units for overseas movements. Units were alerted, removed from alerted status, and realerted, with accompanying fluctuations of morale. Some were moved to ports of embarkation where long periods of inactivity and vain waiting dulled the edge of combat readiness that had been developed by months of careful preparation, and were then moved back to camp to unpack equipment and resume the routine of training, now anti-climactically dull.125

The straitened condition to which Ground units were reduced by personnel shortages in 1942 may best be depicted by a few specific examples. In July 1942 the 3-1 Infantry Division was short 195 officers and 1,425 enlisted men and the 40th Division 170 officers and 2,000 enlisted men.126 Far worse off were the 30th, 31st, and 33rd Divisions, which according to General Lear virtually became replacement pools for AGF units. The 30th Division declined from a strength of 12,400 in June 1942 to 3,000 in August; the 31st from 15,000 to 7,200, and the 33rd from 13,200 to 8,400.127

Throughout the summer of 1942, nondivisional units on the average had only about two-thirds of their authorized strength.128 Enlisted shortages in AGF units of all


124. (1) History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in the AGF, pp 3-8. (2) Draft memo 340.2/219 (C) of AGF Plans Section for Col Eliot D. Cooke, IGD, 21 Oct 42, sub: Processing of Task Forces. 314.7 (AGF Hist, Gen Tng). (3) Interview by AGF Hist Off of heads of Special Staff Secs, Jan 44.


128. (1) "Comparative Strength of AGF." 320.2 (Comp Str)(S). (2) Information compiled from occasional comparative strength reports filed in Ground Statistics Section.
types on 30 June 1942 exceeded 162,000 and in September were about 330,000.129

It was common practice in 1942 for new units to hobble along at cadre strength for several months waiting for arrival of fillers from reception centers. A factor contributing to this situation was that in July 1942, because of changes in rules affecting dependents and the institution of a policy of granting two-week furloughs to inductees, selective service shortchanged the Army some 90,000 men.130 When units finally began to receive their fillers they frequently came in widely spaced dribbles.131

But old organizations suffered more than new ones. In August 1942, General Lear remarked that National Guard units were "low in their mind."132 This was not surprising, as recurring depletions to fill other units meant continuing postponement of the opportunity for combat. Even when replacements were furnished promptly, which usually was not the case, the effect on training was disruptive. Some units had to keep several programs running concurrently to accommodate replacements received at various stages of training. This practice strained instructional personnel--already sparse from repeated turnover--almost to the breaking point. Most of the older divisions adopted the scheme of segregating replacements in special training groups until they reached a level that made mixture with other troops practicable. But some units were so reduced as to necessitate beginning the training cycle all over again. It was not unusual in 1942 for an organization, as a result of repeated losses for cadre, officer candidate school, and transfers, to have to go through basic training several times. Then when finally alerted, it was often so far below authorized strength as to require it in turn to rob some unit of lower priority before leaving port. This circle was a vicious one inimical alike to orderly training and morale.133

A considerable amount of the turnover in personnel experienced by AGF units was produced by transfers to the Air Forces and inroads of OCS quotas. These losses caused a deterioration of the general quality of Ground personnel, which already was relatively low on account of WD assignment policies which favored the Air Forces and the technical services.134 General McNair reported to General Marshall in February, 1943, that the character of manpower in units under his jurisdiction "declined visibly toward the end of 1942."135 A specific illustration was afforded by seven Tank Destroyer battalions, which after heavy losses to Army Air Forces and Officer Candidate Schools found themselves with over 50 percent of their personnel in Classes IV and V of the AGOT, whereas

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129. (1) Ibid. (2) Graduation Address of Gen McNair at C&GS School, 12 Sep 42. McNair Speech File.

130. Gen Council Min (5), 4 Aug 42.


132. Record of Telephone conversation between Gen McNair and Gen Lear, 11 Aug 1942. Lear Personal Files.

133. History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in AGF, p 41.

134. Ibid.

135. Memo (C) of Gen McNair to Gen Marshall, 2 Feb 43, sub: Discipline of Trs in North Africa. 353/1 (M20)(C).
normal distribution of all men inducted by selective service at this time was 33.2 percent in these classes. In 1943 before the War Department made the pre-training of illiterates an AGF responsibility, divisions had to maintain special training units to bring substandard soldiers up to a level that would enable them to grasp the fundamentals of training.

Inadequacy of equipment was almost as great a deterrent to training in 1942 as was that of personnel. In February 1942 it was found necessary to curtail sharply allotments of ammunition for training purposes, and in months following mushrooming of the armed forces accompanied by requirements for arming the allies, necessitated restrictions in most other types of equipment. Provision of full allotments to units alerted for special operations like ROUNDUP and TORCH required the taking of equipment from units in less advanced stages of training. In August 1942 and AGF staff officer, after visiting seven divisions in training, reported that "the shortage of equipment in new units is becoming more critical with each months' new activations," and following a similar trip in September he found "a continuance of the tightening up of equipment."

Nondivisional units, because of their relatively lower priority, were worse off than divisions. At Camp Hood in the spring and summer of 1942, "simulated tank destroyers maneuvered against simulated tanks over terrain almost devoid of roads, firing was conducted on improvised ranges... and so few radios were available that practically no communications training could be given."

Artillery officers throughout Army Ground Forces were directed in April "to fire a simulated problem each day... using a matchbox, sandtable, some sort of terrain board, or any other expedient," and to put their batteries through simulated service practices.

Commanders of nondivisional units used blocks of wood for mines, sandbags for ammunition boxes, galvanized iron pipes mounted on ration carts for artillery, sticks for guns, and "jeeps" for tanks, not to mention a long list of mock structures ranging from landing craft to "Nazi villages." To a large extent nondivisional training in 1942 represented a sequence of assumptions, simulations, and expedients.

Another major obstacle to training in 1942 was the incompetence and inexperience of officers. The problem of high command was not as great as it was during the GHQ period, but even so, responsible authorities found it necessary to remove a number of officers...


137. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 96.

138. GHQ ltr 353.15/12-H (2-16-12), 16 Feb, sub: Marksmanship Courses.


141. AGF ltr to CG's, 14 Apr 42, sub: FA Firing. 353.1/92 (FA).

142. History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in AGF, p 50.
generals whose divisions persistently sagged below the standards required by General McNair and to place in their stead leaders of proved ability in the handling of large units. During the first year of the AGF period, Generals Bradley, Simpson, and Milliken were called from going organizations to take over lagging divisions, with results that were highly gratifying to General McNair.

The rapid expansion of the Army created a demand for trained staff officers that was considerably greater than the supply, with the result that in 1942 some high staff positions had to be filled with persons who were not graduates of the Command and General Staff School. The number of incompetent regimental and battalion commanders was also distressingly large, an instance of which, when personally observed by General Marshall on his trip to North Africa in January 1943, elicited from him a blast that produced terror throughout Army Ground Forces. But the junior and noncommissioned officer situation was even more disturbing. Reports of AGF inspectors were replete with such statements as "hesitant uncertain leadership by platoon and squad leaders"; "poor troop leadership by junior commanders"; and "squad and platoon leaders ... lax in correcting errors." Divisional units, particularly those of service categories, on the average had less competent leadership than divisional organizations. In some cases units were commanded by officers commissioned directly from civilian life because of their technical proficiency who were woefully lacking in the essentials of leadership.

In order to make most economical use of the limited equipment and experienced supervisory personnel that was available, Third Army in September 1942 requested authority to concentrate considerable numbers of units of the same branch at a single

144. Pers ltrs of Gen McNair to Gen Bradley, 16 Jun 42, and to Gen Milliken, 7 Aug 42. McNair Corres.
146. Ibid. p 15.
147. (1) Ltrs of Gen McNair to Gen Lear and other major comdrs, 2 Feb 43, inclosing memo of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, dated 1 Feb 43. McNair Corres. (2) Pers ltr of Gen Robt. C. Richardson to Gen McNair, 13 Feb 43. Ibid.
149. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 83.
150. History of AGF Study No 12, Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, p 15.
151. History of AGF Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training in AGF, pp 42-43. Many of the directly commissioned officers were in "affiliated" units. During the period of the national emergency AGF had under its command an aggregate of 135 affiliated units. See AGF memo for CofS USA, 26 May 45, sub: WD Policy on Demob of "Affiliated" Units. 370.01/42 (c).
station, rather than having them scattered about at camps throughout its entire area of jurisdiction. In December Second Army made a similar proposal. G-1, the Engineer, and the Signal Officer of AGF, supported the idea of grouping organizations during initial periods of training. But General McNair, while admitting the necessity of applying the unit-training center idea where training was so highly specialized that technical considerations were paramount (which he thought to be the case with antiaircraft, armored, tank destroyer, and certain chemical units), disapproved large-scale grouping of units by branch as a general practice. He opposed branch grouping because it violated two principles which he regarded as fundamental; namely, (1) that a unit should have the same associations in training that it was to have in combat, and (2) that the commander of a unit should have complete responsibility for training it.152

Establishment of the Long Range Training Program

Dark as was the situation prevailing Army Ground Forces during the greater part of 1942, the outlook began to assume a brighter hue with the approach of fall. Indefinite postponement of NDUP in late July permitted a slowing down of activations and lessened somewhat the strain on manpower and equipment. On 12 September the War Department took a propitious step in authorizing most units—including all divisions—at activation a 15 percent overstrength to offset cadre and other losses.153

Partly because of the hopeful outlook with respect to personnel and equipment and partly because it seemed the time ripe for projecting training on a permanent basis rather than issuing a new directive every few months as had been the case since inception of NDUP, Army Ground Forces on 19 October 1942 published a general training directive effective 1 November which had no terminal limits.154 In the words of one staff officer it was "a directive to end all directives."155

The new directive reduced the training period of divisions from 52 to 45 weeks, the individual training period being cut from 17 to 13 weeks (mainly on the ground that henceforth prompt arrival of fillers would make possible initiation of training soon after activation day), the unit period from 13 to 11 weeks, and the combined period from 14 to 11 weeks.156 No change was contemplated in maneuvers (8 weeks), which were outlined in a separate directive issued on 7 December 1942.157

In a statement to the press of 7 November General McNair attributed the stepping up of the training program to the greatly increased flow of equipment, more and better officers, increased cadre personnel, and greater experience in training. "The rapid progress displayed by the troops in this year's maneuvers convinces me of the

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153. AGF ltr (R) to CG's, 25 Sep 42, sub: Policies Concerning Mob. 320.2/80 (R).
154. Ibid.
155. Interview by AGF Hist Off of Col John B Sherman, Eq AGF, 12 Oct 43.
156. AGF ltr (R) to CG's, 25 Sep 42, sub: Policies Concerning Mob. 320.2/80 (R).
157. AGF ltr to CG's Second and Third Army, 7 Dec 1942, sub: Maneuvers-Feb to Aug 43. 354.2/1 (Maneuvers-1943).
practicability of shortening the training period," he said. "We have found that a 35-week minimum training period now is equivalent to a longer period a year ago." 158 In a letter to General Lear of 19 September 1942 General McNair stated that the likelihood of divisions being called overseas before completing a year's training was a principal reason for the curtailment. The AEF commander deemed it better to rush the divisions through an abbreviated program and to use any time that might remain for review than to take the chance of having to ship them to theaters before finishing a full cycle. 159 Subsequent experience was to prove that General McNair's cuts were too drastic and that the 52 weeks of training originally prescribed was closer to the normal requirement than the 43 weeks specified in the new schedule. Early in 1943 one week was added to each of the first three periods to accommodate transition firing (individual period), battle courses (unit period), and attack on a fortified position (combined period); in June 1943, a period of indefinite length was added for post-maneuver training. 160

The directive of 19 October 1942 modified only slightly the content of the ground training program. It was based primarily on experience acquired in training, especially in maneuvers. The invasion of North Africa did not come until after the directive was issued, and before that operation, American participation in combat was too limited to afford a dependable basis for any major modification of the training program. The influence of British training is evident in the provision that "unit and combined training will include ... attack of fortified areas, combat-in-cities and infiltration," but detailed guides for these exercises were not issued until the early weeks of 1943. 161 The principal significance of the October directive lies in the fact that it provided an over-all frame for the various programs applicable to Ground units and placed training on a permanent and systematic basis.

The October directive specified that units and installations guided by previously issued programs were to continue following these programs to completion, at which time they were to initiate training under applicable portions of the new directive. But the new directive prescribed certain modifications of current programs. New divisions, for example, were to adjust their schedules to the curtailed training periods and all infantry divisions were to add to the unit and combined programs air-ground training (detailed in a separate enclosure), attack of fortified areas, combat in cities, and infiltration exercises by individuals and small units. Infantry divisions that had completed combined training were directed to give priority to known distance and combat firing and to review previous training with emphasis on developing the proficiency of the battalion and the regimental combat team. 162


159. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Sep 42. McNair Corres.

160. (1) History of AGF, Study No 12, Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, p 25. (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Jun 43, sub: Supplement to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir).

161. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 19 Oct 1942, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov, 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir). (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 4 Feb 1943, sub: Special Battle Courses, 353.01/61.

162. AGF ltr to CG's, 19 Oct 1942, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).
The October directive covered nondivisional training only in very broad terms. In general, instructions indicated the MTP's and other guides applicable to each category of nondivisional units, and specified points for special emphasis. Nondivisional artillery units, for example, were to concentrate on tests and combat firing; medical units were to stress construction and removal of obstacles, including mines and booby traps, use of explosives and demolitions including torpedoes, stream crossing, and field fortifications; and signal units were to emphasize training of wire and radio teams, command post exercises employing communications personnel at reduced and normal distances, air-ground communication, and maintenance of communication equipment. All types of service units were directed where practicable to participate in field exercises with combat units, so as to develop teamwork, and "during field training [to set up] in the field—not in buildings."163

In provisions treating of training in general, special attention was invited to realistic supply training, military intelligence, security, physical and mental conditioning, night operations, air-ground cooperation, and chemical warfare training. A special inclosure prescribed the standard training for divisions and lower units the pre-manuever instruction in air-ground cooperation outlined in the general directive of 23 April 1942. A subject schedule for chemical warfare training was given in another inclosure.

The most important innovations introduced in the October directive were three tests prepared in Headquarters, AGF. The first, a physical fitness test, provided for putting at least 75 percent of the personnel of each Ground unit through a series of exercises consisting of push-ups, 300-yard run, "burpee," 75-yard pig-a-back run, 70-yard zig-zag run, and short fast march. The second, an infantry battalion (and horse cavalry squadron) combat firing test provided for the execution of both a defensive and offensive mission by an infantry battalion (cavalry squadron) supported by a battalion of light artillery. The attack phase featured the use of all weapons with live ammunition on silhouette targets. The percentage of hits was to be checked at the conclusion of the problem. Supporting artillery was directed to deliver fire over the heads of attacking troops. The third new test was for the checking of tank destroyer battalions in tactical proficiency and combat firing.164

The following complete schedule of tests, old and new, was prescribed by the October directive:165

1. Individual Training Period
   a. MTP Test (prepared by corps or army) at end of period by Corps or Army commander.

2. Unit Training Period
   a. Physical Training test by corps or army commander.
   b. Infantry and cavalry platoon combat firing proficiency test by division or similar commander.
   c. Field artillery battery tests by division artillery or similar commander.
   d. Field artillery battalion tests by corps or army commander.
   e. Tank destroyer battalion tests by corps, army or TD Center commander.

163. Ibid.
164. Ibid.
165. Ibid.
3. Combined training Period
   a. Infantry battalion and horse cavalry squadron field exercise test by corps or army commander.
   b. Infantry battalion and horse cavalry squadron combat firing test by corps or army commander.

The directive stated that army and separate corps commanders might give such additional tests as were deemed necessary to units that had completed combined training, but it advised that those units should be tested at least once a year and not oftener than once every six months.166

G-3 of Army Ground Forces in commenting on the extension of testing provided by the new directive, remarked that while he realized "all our time cannot be devoted to tests, ... the necessity for eliminating waste in our training is so urgent that progress must be based on careful and accurate tests."167 There can be no doubt that Army Ground Forces placed great store by its program of testing which, as will be shown below, was extended further in 1943-44. Reports of tests were read with a sharp eye in the G-3 Section of General McNair's Headquarters, and poor performance on tests, particularly those on the battalion level, sometimes was a major contributing factor in the removal of a general officer.168

While some unit commanders viewed the testing program as unduly onerous and restrictive,169 in general it was regarded at home and abroad as a valuable feature of training. Of the artillery tests, which General McNair described as the "personal creation" of his G-3 Gen. John W. Lentz,170 Brig. Gen. Carl A. Baehr, an artillery officer with combat experience in NATO said in late 1943:171

The Field Artillery has done nothing more valuable for training than the AGF Tests. They had a specific objective, and everybody knew what it was, which is what an objective should be. I used them, and modifications of them over and over again. I am willing to accept sight unseen, any battalion that has made an honest 90 or higher in the tests.

The training directive issued on 19 October 1942 was amended considerably in 1943 and 1944 in the light of lessons learned from increasing participation of Ground troops in combat. But the most impressive thing about these modifications is their fewness.

166. Ibid.

167. Pers ltr of Gen John M. Lentz to Col John B. Sherman, 15 Sep 42. Lentz 201 file (Personal).

168. (1) This statement is based on a study of unit test reports in the files of the AGF, G-3 Sec, of the file 322.98 (Comdrs.) (S). (2) For an instance of Gen McNair's close scrutiny of an MFP Test with a view to checking on a division comdr's fitness for his position, see personal ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Fredendall, 13 Jul 43. McNair corres.

169. (1) Pers ltr of Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, CG 94th Div to Maj Gen John P. Lucas, CG 4th Army, 22 Jul 44. 322/30 (94th Div). (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Gen Malony, 18 Jul 44. (3) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Maj Gen S.E. Reinhart, CG 65th Div 3 Nov 44.

170. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Maj Gen G. R. Cook, 3 Feb 44.

The program built by General McNair and his associates before the end of 1942, based largely on experience acquired in training, was to stand remarkably well the test of combat and thus to prove that the objective stated in the directive of 19 October 1942 -- "to produce well-trained, hard-hitting fighting teams" -- was more than a hollow hope.

Summary of Training Situation at the End of 1942

As the year 1942 came to a close, training in Army Ground Forces remained noticeably deficient in a number of respects. First, the status of service units left much to be desired. No systematic plan had been developed for the selection and schooling of key personnel well in advance of nondivisional activations. Establishment of headquarters and headquarters detachments special troops had resulted in improved supervision on lower levels, but guidance from higher headquarters was inadequate. A special survey of AGF service units conducted by The Inspector General in December 1942 indicated that separate units were considerably worse off than divisions with respect to equipment, personnel, and training guides. An AGF staff officer remarked in December that "small, separate units have been a weak spot of training in 1942."

Combat intelligence training also was below par, as was maintenance and maintenance training. With reference to the former, Headquarters, AGF, noted a tendency in lower commands to neglect basic combat intelligence for study of the habits of foreign people. Perhaps the most serious deficiency of all was in air-ground training. On 8 January 1943 General McNair remarked in an address to the graduating class at West Point: "To date our training efforts in air-ground cooperation have been futile, if we are frank with ourselves."

172. (1) Memo of Brig Gen Floyd Parks, CofS AGF for CG, AGF, 16 Aug 42, sub: Pers for Hq AGF. CofS files, bdvr marked "Memos from CofS to CG" (S). (2) Memo of Brig Gen Phillip E. Brown to CG, AGF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Spec Survey of AGF Spec Serv Units other than Divisional. 33.1/1425 (Inspec, Fld Fs). (3) Memo of WD G-3 for CofS USA, 30 Dec 42, sub: Tng of Serv. Units 353/163 (S). (4) Memo of TIG for DCofS, USA, 5 Dec 42, sub: Spec Survey to Determine the Effectiveness of Present Policies for Tng of Service Units of the AGF (Except of Element of Div) & SOS 320.2/283 (S).

173. (1) Memo of Brig Gen Floyd Parks, CofS, AGF for CG, AGF, 16 Aug 1942, sub: Pers for Hq AGF. CofS files, binder marked "Memos from CofS to CG" (S). (2) Memo of TIG for DCofS USA, 5 Dec 42, sub: Special Survey to Determine the Effectiveness of Present Policies for Training of Service Units of the AGF (except of elements of divs) and SOS. 320.2/283 (S).

174. AGF ltr to CG Third Army, 31 Dec 42, sub: Visit to Cp Gruber and Cp Barkley. 353.02/33 (AGF).

175. (1) Interview by AGF Hist Off of staff offs. Jan 44. (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Col K. M. Matthews and other offs of G-4 Sec, 10 Oct 45. (3) Memo of TIG (S) for DCofS, USA, 10 Oct 1942 sub not given, and accompanying papers. 333.1/29 (S)

176. Pers ltr of Gen J. L. Devers to CG's all Armies, 6 Dec 45. 350.09/158.

177. Graduation Address of Gen McNair at U. S. Military Academy, 8 Jan 43. McNair Speech file.
But notwithstanding these and other shortcomings, 1942 was a year of tremendous progress. Between 9 March and 31 December 1942—a period in which Army Ground Forces experienced an augmentation of over a million men—37 divisions and 1,437 nondivisional units were activated. During this period, also, fifty new courses were instituted in AGF schools, and 55,440 new officers graduated from officer candidate schools, which was nearly forty times the number graduated in 1941. Thanks largely to the work of the officer candidate schools, leadership, which General McNair had declared on 30 November 1941 to be the training bottleneck, improved tremendously. Repeatedly in public statements during the closing months of 1942, General McNair referred proudly to the quality and performance of the lieutenants pouring from these schools. On 24 September 1942, for example, he remarked:

OCS have been an inspiring feature for two reasons—first because they are selective, and competition is always keen, and second because they know how to be a soldier before becoming an officer.... I think that the OCS are the finest thing that have happened in our training.

The training program was considerably better in December than in March 1942. Headquarters, AGF, had recently placed the over-all program on a permanent and systematic basis. Lower commands had also improved the programs for which they were immediately responsible. The results throughout were gratifying to General McNair. On 10 November he said in a radio address directed to the first selective service divisions activated by AGF:

The President, Secretary of War and Chief of Staff of the Army ... all have pronounced you good.... After over seven months of training, you are well on your way toward fitness for battle.

On the next day, 11 November, he stated: "Progress has been praiseworthy. The army of 1942 is greatly improved as compared with the 1941 model." On yet another occasion, he remarked:

178. AGF Biennial Report, 1941-1943 (draft), pp 8-9, 17 May 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist). This report is in error on the number of divisions activated as it was 37 rather than 36 as given in the report. See Table II (pp 5-6) in Study No 12, Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.


180. Script used by Gen McNair in a broadcast over NBC (Red Network) from Monroe, N.C., 30 Nov 41. McNair Speech File.

181. See McNair Speech File.

182. Record of Interview with Gen McNair at Desert Training Center, Indio, Calif, 24 Sep 42. Mimsographed copy in 314.7.


184. Armistice Day address of Gen McNair, 11 Nov 42, Blue Network. Ibid.
... in spite of the heavy turnover of personnel, and even though the older units have had many sacrifices due to expansion, the troops this year are better than ever, paradoxical as that may seem. A fine lot of young officers—graduates of the OCS—have taken over the small units. The resulting improvement in the small units has had a fine aggregate effect on the larger units.

Evil days were to plague Army Ground Forces again; but as 1942 came to a close these could not be foreseen. The outlook at that time was full of promise.
Chapter II

TRAINING: JANUARY TO JULY 1943

The keynotes of training during the first half of 1943 were (1) a continuing emphasis on large units, paralleled by an increasing attention to nondivisional and replacement training; (2) strengthening of AGF control over training with a corresponding lessening of the influence of armies and other major subordinate commands; (3) further enhancement of realism in response to the initial combat experience of American troops. Basic factors in the administration of the training program were an increase in the supply of equipment and a temporary amplitude of manpower.

Increasing Emphasis on Nondivisional Training

A combination of circumstances tended to focus attention on small unit training in the latter part of 1942 and the early months of 1943. One factor was an unfavorable report made by The Inspector General following an extensive survey of service units under Ground control in December 1942.1 The War Department, while for a time considering turning all service units over to Army Service Forces for initial training, eventually decided against making any change in the existing arrangement other than to define more clearly the units for which Army Ground Forces was responsible and those which were the charge of Army Service Forces.2 But the fact that the War Department even considered removing service units from his jurisdiction undoubtedly caused General McNair to think more seriously of their training. Another influence contributing to the same end was a memorandum of General Marshall to General McNair, 1 February 1943, reporting serious shortcomings in appearance and discipline observed by him on a recent trip to North Africa. "The impression I got was that the divisional organizations were held up to a much more satisfactory standard than the separate units," he said. "Something has to be done to remedy the present defects," he concluded.3

General McNair in his reply to General Marshall attributed the low standards mainly to the fact that experienced officers in tactical units were spread too thin because "headquarters all over the world...were grossly overstaffed," and leadership potential of Ground organizations were being depleted by assignment policies which favored the Air Forces. He expressed hope that the recently provided group headquarters and headquarters detachments special troops might improve the situation with respect to separate units.4 He immediately sent copies of General Marshall's memorandum to his principal subordinates in the field with the request that they take vigorous steps to improve the situation.

1. (1) Memo of TIG for DCofS, USA, 5 Dec 1942, sub: Spec Survey to Determine the Effectiveness of Present Policies for Tng of Serv Units of the AAF, AGF (except of Elements of Divs) & SOS. 320.2/283 (S). (2) Memo of Brig Gen Phillip E. Brown to CG, AGF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Spec Survey of AGF Spec Serv Units other than Divisional. 333.1/1415 (Inspect Fld Fs).

2. (1) WD Memo, G-3 for CofS, USA, 30 Dec 1942, sub: Tng of Serv Units. 353/163 (S). (2) WD Memo WDGCT 320.2 Gen (12-5-42) for CGs, AGF, SOS, 5 Jan 43, sub: Resp to Tng of Serv Units & accompanying papers. 353/105 (C).

3. Memo of Gen Marshall to Gen McNair (C), 1 Feb 43, sub not given. 353/1 (NA) (Tng)(C).

measures to raise standards. "There is no point to issuing any more directives in the matter," wrote General McNair. "The situation can be met only by vigorous personal leadership of all commanders from the highest to the lowest unit."  

Headquarters, AGF in the early months of 1943 took two major steps for the improvement of nondivisional training. First was the issuance on 18 March of a plan for the building of nondivisional units similar to that adopted more than a year before for divisions.  

Instead of assembling personnel at the last minute on a catch-as-catch-can basis without previous instruction in their duties as had normally been the case before, the new plan provided that preliminary steps should be initiated ninety days prior to the activation of a unit. Officers and cadre were to be designated two months before "D" (activation) day and given special instruction for their forthcoming assignments. Key officers were to attend a thirty-day course at the school of the appropriate arm or service. Commissioned personnel and enlisted cadre were to reach camp before activation day on a staggered schedule. Fillers and allotted overstrength were to arrive on "D" day.  

While recurrence in the latter part of 1943 of serious personnel shortages in Army Ground Forces nullified to a considerable extent the provisions of the plan of 18 March, the immediate effects were salutary, and even during the lean days that were to come the mere existence of such a scheme was not without benefit.  

A second measure for the improvement of separate units was a revamping of fundamental guides for nondivisional training. In January 1943, a revised MET for basic infantry training prepared by the infantry school in consultation with Headquarters, AGF was issued, along with a revised guide for the unit training of the infantry regiment. In January, also, a revised Field Artillery program, prepared by the Field Artillery School, covering both individual and unit training periods, was issued by Army Ground Forces. The new artillery program won high praise in Headquarters, AGF for its thoroughness and completeness. Headquarters, AGF, sent the Field Artillery program to the Antiaircraft Command with instructions that it be followed in revising the training guide for Antiaircraft units, and in July 1943, the Antiaircraft Command published a

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5. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Major Subordinate Comdrs., 2 Feb 43. McNair personal correspondence. Orig of ltr to Lear, see Lear Pers Corres. Quoted matter is from ltr to Lear.

6. AGF ltr to CG's, 18 Mar 43, sub: Plan for Activation of Nondivisional Units. 320.2/192 (R).


8. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of heads of Spec Staff Secs, Hq AGF, Jan 44 and Apr-May 45.


10. Ltr of Gen McNair to CG R&SC, 16 Jan 43, sub: FA Unit Tng Prv. am, and accompanying papers. 353/252 (FA).

11. Ibid.

34
new program based on that of the Field Artillery.\textsuperscript{12} The TD Center also used the FA program as a guide for revision of MTP for TD units.\textsuperscript{13} Both the infantry and artillery programs included lessons learned in combat. The new guides were of great practical assistance to unit commanders in that they broke the training program down into subject schedules.\textsuperscript{14}

On 23 January 1943, G-3 of Army Ground Forces recommended that MTP’s for service units be revised and that comprehensive guides be prepared for the unit training period.\textsuperscript{15} MTP’s, most of which had been prepared during the GER period by the chiefs of the technical services, were with few exceptions obsolete, lacking in detail, and insufficiently adapted to the needs of units required to function in close association with combat organizations. Deficiencies observed in combined training and in the theaters in 1942 and early 1943 focused attention sharply on the fact that no UTP’s had been prepared for guidance of service units.\textsuperscript{16}

In the early months of 1943 Chiefs of the Technical Services, working in close collaboration with appropriate special staff heads in Headquarters, AGF, revised MTP’s applicable to ground service units. Preparation of UTP’s, done in some instances by the Chiefs of Technical Services in collaboration with their oppositees in Army Ground Forces, and in others as an AGF project, proceeded more slowly than the overhauling of MTP’s, but by September 1943, they were available for signal, engineer, quartermaster, and ordnance units. Their usefulness to inexperienced small unit commanders was impaired somewhat by the fact that as a general rule they did not include subject schedules. But even so, the UTP’s filled a vital need in nondivisional training.\textsuperscript{17}

**Strengthening of AGF Control over Training**

It has been previously noted that Army Ground Forces during the first few months of its existence, largely because of the smallness and inexperience of its staff, exercised only a limited supervision over armies and other large and well-established commands. But as its headquarters acquired strength and experience General McNair began to shape and direct training with a firmer and farther-reaching hand.\textsuperscript{18}

Following issuance of the detailed directive of 19 October 1942, for example, Second Army, which on its own had issued a similar directive at about the same time, was advised to modify its training program in some particulars and in effect to re-issue as

\begin{itemize}
  \item 12. History of AGF, Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center, p 25.
  \item 13. History of AGF, Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, p 80.
  \item 14. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Staff Offs, Jan 44.
  \item 15. AGF M/S, G-3 to Cofs, 23 Jan 43, sub: Tng Program for Serv Units. 461/43 (MTP).
  \item 16. (1) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of heads of Spec Staff Secs, Jan 44. (2) Notes taken on speech of Gen Lentz to staffs of 63d and 70th Divs, by Lt Col K. R. Greenfield, 16 Mar 43. See AGF Chronology, Hist file.
  \item 17. (1) Ibid. (2) M/S, G-4 to Cofs, 5 Feb 43, and accompanying papers. 461/3 (MTP).
  \item 18. (1) Interview by AGF, Hist Off of Staff Offs, Jan 1944. (2) Interview by AGF, Eq of Col John B. Sherman, 12 Oct 1943. (3) History of AGF, Study No. 16, The Second Army, pp 115 ff.
\end{itemize}
In commenting on the Second Army program the Chief of Staff of Army Ground Forces had questioned the necessity or wisdom of lower headquarters prescribing tests in addition to those required in the new directive issued by General McNair. He made specific reference to the progressive field training tests which Second Army required of subordinate units. But Second Army, not deeming the Ground Chief of Staff's comments an order, failed to modify its test requirements. On New Year's Day 1943, Army Ground Forces issued a letter entitled "Conduct of Training" which left no doubt that tests such as the field training tests of Second Army were considered superfluous and objectionable; and General Lear immediately ordered their rescission. But this letter comprehended subjects other than tests and, according to General McNair, was directed more to other commands than to Second Army.

The "Conduct of Training" letter, written by General McNair himself, was perhaps the most sharply worded official communication ever to go out from Headquarters, AGF. Projection of its vigorous phrases against the background of prevailing circumstances points strongly to the conclusion that General McNair wanted forcibly to impress on subordinate commanders the fact that henceforth his headquarters was to maintain a vigorous control over AGF training. Subordinate commands were enjoined from substituting their own for War Department and AGF literature and thereby swamping commanders of small units with a flood of paper. Commanders below the level of divisions were not to be required to prepare and conduct tests, nor were they to be compelled to submit "periodic, written training-progress reports." The letter even set a maximum length--"four hours ... for a company ... eight hours for a battalion; and twenty-four hours for a regiment"--for tests given by corps, army, and other higher commanders. But the tone of the letter seems more significant than the extent of its detail. "Vehicles are maintained properly by tools, elbow grease, and dirty hands, not by pencils and forms," wrote General McNair. "Too many cases of motor stables," he added, "consist principally of ceremonial flourishing of dust rags."

An AGF letter on interferences with training, dated 31 January 1943, while considerably less sharp in tone than that on conduct of training, exemplifies the same tendency toward a strong and detailed control over training. Commanders were required, for instance, to secure specific authority from Headquarters, AGF for all full-time schools which exceeded four days in duration; and concerning another source of interference they were advised in the following terms: "There are still instances of..."

21. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 1 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of Tng. 319.22/22. (2) History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 120.
22. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Jan 43. McNair Corres.
23. For evidence of Gen McNair's personal authorship, see M/S, Lentz to CofS, AGF, 18 Jan 43, attached to pers ltr of Col Tom Hickey, Hq XI Corps to Lentz, 11 Jan 43. G-3 file 353/8 (Tng Gen 1943.)
24. Ibid.
25. AGF ltr to CG's, 31 Jan 1943, sub: Interferences with Tng. 353.02/78 (AGF).
excessive special duty and fatigue details. Administration and reports are often ex-

cessive. First sergeants frequently are found in the orderly room during morning

training hours.26

The Ranger School episode affords one of the best examples of the increasing con-

trol of Army Ground Forces over training. General Lear, deeming Ranger type training

necessary for increasing the combat fitness of units under his command, and thinking

that the calling of one officer and one enlisted man from each battalion for a two-week

period of training as instructors would not work an undue hardship on units concerned,

instituted the school in January 1943 on his own initiative.27 The training directive

of 19 October 1942 had specified that subordinate commands should obtain permission of

Headquarters, AGF, for troop schools requiring absence of officers and men from their

units during scheduled training,28 but General Lear when called to task by General

McNair replied: "It entirely escaped my thought that we should get authority from your

headquarters for the starting of this school."29

As soon as plans for the school became known at Headquarters, AGF, General Lear

was called on to explain violation of the 19-October restriction on such activities.30

After he indicated that arrangements had proceeded to a point that would make cancella-

tion very difficult, he was permitted to start the school.31 But despite General

Lear's subsequent efforts to "sell" the program to General McNair by having him attend

the first graduation exercises and by writing him personal letters, Army Ground Forces

ordered closing of the Ranger School after two sessions.32

Another illustration of intensification of AGF control over training was a letter

written to Second Army, 1 April 1943, following an unfavorable report of an AGF in-

specting party on an Infantry Battalion firing test given by the III Corps, a Second

Army unit. After strongly condemning the unrealistic manner in which the test had been

conducted, the AGF letter stated:33

It is directed that tests for the remaining battalions of the 80th Divi-

sion be cancelled and that III Corps be directed to draft a new test

26. Ibid.

27. (1) Interview by AGF Hist Off of General Lear, 14 Oct 43. (2) Personal ltr of

Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 27 Dec 42, with incl. "Copy of Official Ind sent by 2nd Army in

Response to AGF Order for Explanation of its Action in Instituting Ranger School with-

out AGF Authority."

28. Par 6, AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52

(Tng Dir).

29. Pers ltr of Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 27 Dec 42.

30. Ibid, incl: "Copy of official Ind sent by 2nd Army in Response to AGF Order for Explanation of its Action in Instituting Ranger School without AGF Authority."

31. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Lear 4 Jan 43. McNair Corres.

32. (1) Personal ltr of Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 6 Feb 43. Ibid. (2) History of

AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 142.

33. AGF ltr to Second Army, 1 April43, sub: Inf Bn Firing Tests. 353.02/121

(AGF).
problem in conformity with provisions of Inclosure 10, Training Directive effective November 1, 1942. All Infantry battalions of the 80th Division will be given the new test.

Indicative also of the extension of AGF authority to lower levels was the fact that Army Ground Forces in commenting on maneuvers in Louisiana in June 1943 departed from its customary procedure and inserted a few paragraphs on tactical plans. The "Red" command was criticized for committing two-thirds of its forces in a static deployment instead of holding the maximum portion in reserve to await the actions of the enemy, and the defense was called to task for being too passive.

Visits to the field by AGF inspecting parties became more frequent in the latter part of 1942 and the early months of 1943, and this was undoubtedly an important factor in extending the influence of General McNaIr's headquarters. Expansion of the AGF testing program had a similar result in that it afforded a closer check on the quality of training. Another influence, purely coincidental, which tended to increase the relative influence of Headquarters, AGF, in field training was a series of changes in the command of major subordinate agencies that came early in 1943. In February, Gen. Walter Krueger left Third Army to take command of the Sixth Army in Australia,36 in April Gen. Ben Lear was called to Washington to command Arm yGround Forces while General McNair visited the African front, after which the veteran Second Army commander was retired for age.37 In May Gen. Jacob L. Devers departed the Armored Force to assume command of ETOUSA.38 All three of these men were exceptionally aggressive leaders whose incumbency in their respective positions extended considerably farther back than the inception of Army Ground Forces. It is not to their discredit that the influence of AGF was felt in their commands to a greater extent after their departure than before. Their going simply marked a transition from a period when the direction of General McNair was somewhat remote and general to one in which it was, relatively speaking, intimate and detailed.

It is possible, though by no means certain, that the extension of AGF control of field training in 1943-1944 was carried to a point which tended to stifle the initia tive of armies and other major commands.39 Support for this view may be found in the fact that Second Army, which from its inception in 1940 had been responsible for many important innovations, including MTF Tests, an orientation program, and supervisory headquarters for separate units, initiated no major training project after General McNair in January 1943 disapproved the Ranger School.40 But it is quite possible that

34. History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, p 86.
35. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Staff Offs, Jan 44.
37. History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, p 121. General Lear was subsequently called back to active duty. He commanded AGF from July 1944 to Jan 1945 and then was sent to an assignment overseas.
39. See Memo (S) of Gen Christiansen for Gen McNair, 16 Jun 43, sub: Conference with Marshall. 343,7 (Christiansen file, binder marked "Memos of CofS to CG.")
the relative quiescence of the major field headquarters after 1942 was due primarily to the fact that by that time the training program had grown up or crystallized to a point which greatly lessened opportunity for initiative.

Further Heightening of Realism

Early in 1943 Headquarters, AGF, took important steps toward infusing a greater degree of realism into the training program. The directive of 19 October 1942 had laid the basis for increased realism by suggesting that obstacle courses be made “to resemble the battlefield rather than the gymnasium,” and specifying attack on fortified areas, combat in cities, and infiltration exercises for inclusion in the training program.41 Sentiment for lessening the gap between training and combat received a tremendous boost from American experience in battle, particularly in the TORCH operation. Reports of this operation told of soldiers so terrified when first they encountered the tumult and confusion of battle that they refused to leave transports or took refuge in holes on the beachhead and resisted entreaties of their officers to move forward.42 General McNair was greatly distressed by these unhappy reflections on troops trained under his command. In a speech to the graduating class at the U. S. Military Academy on 8 January 1943 he stated:43

"Battle results to date serve to emphasize the well-known fact that our troops, when they arrive overseas, are not hard enough and are far from adequately trained. Pearl Harbor stimulated training, but insufficiently... Experience overseas has shown the great importance of... physical condition... ability to shoot and use weapons... and... familiarity with the sounds, sights, and sensations of battle. Systematic effort is being made to afford the soldier in training an opportunity to encounter every element of battle so far as it is possible to create them artificially."

The first of the series of AGF directives promulgated in 1943 to heighten realism in training was issued on 5 January under the subject "Training in Operations against Permanent Land Fortifications."44 This directive provided for coordinated attack on a fortified area--consisting of replicas of pill boxes and other types of defensive installations--by small assault parties and by combat teams ranging in size from battalion to regiment with supporting chemical, engineer, tank, and tank destroyer elements. Funds were made available for constructing the necessary mock-ups and other training aids, and units were directed to send officer representatives to the Engineer School at Ft. Belvoir for a special course in assault operations, so that they might qualify as instructors of their men. A typical layout of a fortified area, "based on a section of the German 'West Wall" was attached to the directive for guidance of unit commanders in preparing fortified areas. The directive specified that "at least one

41. AGF ltr to CG's, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).
42. Notes by AGF Hist Off on speech of Gen McNair to Staff of Aug 1943 Div, 17 May 1943. Notes filed with Div Notes "Difficulties Officers."
43. Graduation address of Gen McNair at US Military Academy, 8 Jan 43. McNair Speech File.
44. AGF ltr to CG's, 5 Jan 1943, sub: Tng in Ops Against Permanent Land Fortifications. 353/2 (Assault)(R).
battalion per infantry regiment will use live ammunition so far as practicable with a view to creating battlefield realism."45 In actual practice some division commanders, by wording extra allowances from higher headquarters, had all participating units use live ammunition.46

The combined training period was extended from eleven to twelve weeks to assure adequate time for the new exercise.47

As applied by the more aggressive unit commanders, the attack on a fortified area became an exceedingly realistic and valuable training activity. Gen. Harry J. Malony rated it as one of the best of the exercises prescribed by Headquarters, AGF. In his words, "it separated the men from the boys."48

On 4 February 1943 Army Ground Forces issued a directive outlining for use of all combat troops special battle courses similar to those featured in General Lear's Ranger School and some of which had already been instituted in subordinate commands. The Army Ground Force letter of 4 February contained detailed instructions for exercises in infiltration, close combat firing and village fighting ("combat in cities"). The objective of these exercises was to subject the trainee "to every sight, sound, and sensation of battle," and to train him "to act calmly with sound judgment regardless of noise, confusion and surprise."49

The infiltration exercise required that troops crawl about 100 yards over ground traversed by wire entanglements, with machine gun bullets whistling closely overhead and explosive charges throwing up dirt and slush about them. The close combat firing course, designed "to teach men to fire small arms with speed and accuracy at surprise targets and while negotiating broken terrain" provided for the advance of troops over a considerable expanse of rough, wire-traversed terrain, with explosives going off about them, and with targets controlled by pulleys bobbing up unexpectedly at ranges varying from five to fifty yards. General McNair's aversion to "trick stuff"50 was apparent in the statement: "Reports on jungle fighting indicate the importance of the single aimed shot.... Hip or snap shooting should be resorted to only as an emergency measure of self defense when surprised, and then only when there is a reasonable target." The combat in cities exercise consisted of small units moving through mock villages and clearing streets and houses of hostile forces simulated by pulley controlled dummies, some of which were made to appear suddenly on stairways or to jump

45. Ibid.

46. (1) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Gen Harry J. Malony, OG, 94th Div, 18 Jul 44. (2) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Gen Louis E. Hibbs, OG 63d Div, 8 Jul 44 and of Col E. G. Wheeler, OG 63d Div, 6 Jul 44.

47. AGF ltr to OG's, 5 Jan 43, sub: Tng in Ops Against Permanent Land Fortifications. 353/2 (Assault) (R).

48. Interview of AGF Hist Off with Gen Malony, 18 Jul 44.

49. AGF ltr to OG's, 4 Feb 43, sub: Special Battle Courses. 353.01/61.

50. On 2 Jul 43 Gen McNair wrote to Gen Fredendall: "I am not surprised about the 101st Airborne Division. These trick outfits, practically without exception, emphasize their tricks to the exclusion of sound basic and other training for everyday fighting." McNair Corres.
from closets. Sketches of the various type courses based mainly on installations already in use in some of the subordinate commands were attached to the directive. The unit training period was extended from eleven to twelve weeks to accommodate the scheduled activities.51

The directive outlining the special battle courses required that they be coordinated with other phases of training so that artillery practice might be utilized for accustoming infantrymen to overhead shell fire. It also prescribed the over-running of infantrymen in slit trenches by tanks.52 In April 1943, four light tanks were issued to each division to facilitate this activity.53

The Staff of Headquarters, AGF, kept close tab on the special battle courses, especially in the early months of 1943, to assure their being properly launched in field units. An officer of the G-3 Section reflected the pervasive interest in the new exercises in an informal note of 28 February to an acquaintance in Headquarters, Second Army. "Mental conditioning," he said, "getting them used to battle noises, overhead firing, and all that stuff ... is the big thing ... right now."54

Realism was also heightened by the institution in April 1943 of a course in transition firing. Experience in training had revealed that the gap between firing under ordinary conditions and shooting amidst the hurly-burly of simulated combat was too formidable for soldiers to take in one leap. Men who performed creditably in qualification and familiarization firing tended, when they came to combat courses, to make flagrant mistakes in assuming position, adjusting sights and taking aim. The result was a low percentage of hits and a waste of ammunition. The transition firing course, prescribed in April 1943 as a preliminary to combat exercises, involved adjusting sights and firing at silhouettes that were made to appear in quick succession at varying distances. A fourteenth week was added to the individual training period of units to afford ample time for the transition program.55

Realism received still further accentuation from conversion early in 1943 of the California Arizona Maneuver Area to a model theater of operations. For this arrangement permitted divisions and other units after they completed regularly scheduled maneuvers to devote thirteen weeks to "post-graduate" training under a play of influences bearing the closest possible resemblance to combat conditions.56

The trend toward realism was boosted greatly by War Department action in April to make available more generous allotments of ammunition for combat firing.57

51. AGF ltr to CG's, 4 Feb 43, sub: Special Battle Courses. 353.01/61.
52. Ibid.
53. Par 14, AGF Wkly Dir #15, 13 Apr 43.
54. Abstract of telephone conversation between Col Phillips, Asst G-3 AGF and Maj Seigert, Asst G-3, 2d Army Hq, 28 Feb 43.
55. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 26 Apr 43, sub: Tng Ammunition, Marksmanship Courses, Familiarization & Combat Firing. 471/1719. (2) Tng Cir (TC) 30, WD, 10 Mar 43.
57. (1) WD Memo W775-2-43, 26 Apr 43, sub: Ammunition for Tng Individuals and Units of the AUS. AG 471-1. (2) History of AGF, Study No 16, The Second Army, pp 144-45.
Continuing Efforts to Improve Leadership

Despite the gratifying performance of OCS graduates in maneuvers and other training in 1942, leadership continued to be a major source of concern. General Marshall’s adverse reports on the situation in North Africa has already been noted. From New Guinea in December 1942, Gen. R. L. Eichelberger wrote to General McNair: 58

The sins of our military system rise up to haunt us. Where are trained corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants who can lead men?

General McNair devoted a considerable portion of his West Point address of 8 January 1943 to the subject of leadership, citing specific examples from theaters of officers failing to measure up in combat. 59

On 16 March 1943 G-3 of Army Ground Forces said in an address to staff officers of two new divisions: "... developing good NCO's and junior officers ... is at present one of our major problems"; and on 17 May he remarked: "The No. 1 problem is leadership." 60

The War Department Inspector General after checking nine officer candidate schools reported in January 1943 that "during recent months there has been a definite decline in the quality of candidates." He suggested a number of remedial steps, including raising the ACF score for admission to candidacy from 110 to 115. General McNair agreed that the leadership potential of ACF units had reached a very low ebb, but this he attributed to the diversion of high intelligence inductees to the Air Forces and the siphoning of Class I and II men out of the Ground Forces into the Army Specialized Training Program. He thought that the basic remedy for deterioration of officer candidates was the revision of assignment policies so as to give Army Ground Forces a more equitable share of high-grade personnel and the stopping of drafts on Army Ground Forces’ potential leaders for special programs. 61

Army Service Forces and War Department G-1 proposed lengthening the OCS training period from 13 weeks to six months as a means of improving leadership. This General McNair opposed repeatedly and strongly, on the ground that the best way to make a leader was to keep the candidate in school for the shortest practicable period and then to throw him on his own resources in a unit where the habits of leadership and command could be developed in actual practice. Extensive technical knowledge in the view of Army Ground Forces could be more appropriately developed later in advanced courses. 62

Despite the opposition of General McNair, the War Department in May directed lengthening of all OCS courses to four months. Army Ground Forces sought to obtain as

58. Pers ltr of Gen R. L. Eichelberger to Gen McNair, 18 Dec 42. McNair Corres (Classified).

59. Graduation Address of Gen McNair at US Military Academy, 8 Jan 43.

60. Notes by AGF Hist Off on speech of Gen Lentz to staff of 63d & 70th Divs, 16 Mar 43, 314.7 (AGF Hist).

61. History of AGF, Study No. 31, Training of Officer Candidates in AGF Special Service Schools, p 22.

much benefit from the extension as possible by directing its school commands to draw up courses that would emphasize practical work and reduce theory to a minimum.63

In March 1943, the Replacement and School Command proposed as a means of improving NCO leadership that rejected officer candidates be trained in special courses as platoon sergeants. Army Ground Forces disapproved the suggestion on the general principle that the best place to develop noncommissioned leadership was in the unit, and that the responsibility for developing it reposed in the 'unit commander.' This principle was regarded as fundamental by General McNair, and when over a year later (May 1944) the War Department expressed interest in a school for NCO's, modelled on that for officer candidates, Army Ground Forces reaffirmed its belief in the principle's soundness.64

Army Ground Forces took vigorous steps for developing leadership within units. General McNair and his staff emphasized the matter in their contacts with the field, and their efforts were forcefully seconded by armies and other major subordinate commands, which increasingly in 1943 fell to the direction of men who had observed at first hand the performance of leaders in combat.

One measure invoked by Army Ground Forces for improvement of junior leadership deserves special mention. This was an exercise for platoon leaders prescribed in the June 1943 supplement to the general training directive of 19 October 1942. Lieutenants were required by this exercise to take their platoons on a six-day cross country operation over a course about fifty miles long, traversed at intervals by mine fields and other obstacles. The lieutenants were on their own day and night. No transportation was available to them except organic tactical vehicles. Rations and water could be drawn only at specified points along the course. Cooking had to be done by small groups.65

The platoon leader was given a variety of missions including reconnaissance of a hostile bivouac, night attack on an enemy position, withdrawal, reorganization, and concealment in bivouac when confronted by superior enemy force; preparation of a defensive position, subjection to a night attack, followed by continual harassment of the succeeding day; night reconnaissance followed by attack and destruction on an enemy dump.66

Reports of field commanders indicated that the platoon leadership exercise was of great value in testing the ability of lieutenants to meet varying situations without benefit of immediate supervision, and developing their resourcefulness and self-confidence.67

63. Ibid, p 23.
64. History of AGF, Study No 30, Wartime Training in the Schools of AGF, p 3.
65. AGF ltr to CO's, 7 Jun 43, sub: Sup to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir). See particularly incl 1.
66. Ibid.
67. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of various staff offs & unit comrs of 63d, 69th, 84th & 94th Divs, on Field Trip, Jun-Jul 44. Records of these interviews are filed in 314.7 file.
Refinement of Procedure in Subordinate Commands.

The early months of 1943 witnessed a continuing effort in subcommands to improve training procedures. Limitations of space preclude an extensive treatment of this topic, but a few measures will be cited as examples.

Gen. Courtney H. Hodges, who succeeded General Krueger as commander of the Third Army in February 1943, established a Test and Inspection Subsection under his G-3. The new arrangement systematized and placed on a hard and fast schedule inspections which before, though frequent, "had fallen haphazardly to officers not busy at the time."68

Another contribution of General Hodges early in 1943 came as the result of a request from General McNair for recommendations to improve combined training following a disappointing performance of the 77th and 90th Divisions in the first exercises of the 1943 maneuvers. After an extensive survey of the situation, General Hodges decided that one of the principal reasons for the poor showing of units on maneuvers was the great difference in the nature of the "D" Series—last of the combined exercises within the division and the "big" maneuvers. In the "D" exercises the division was split, with the result that the commander never had the opportunity of maneuvering his unit as a whole. Moreover, the terrain over which the "D" series was played was usually much less difficult than that encountered in maneuvers, and the problems of logistics less formidable. The net result, in General Hodges' view, was the inability of many commanders satisfactorily to bridge the gap between the two phases of combined training.69

With General McNair's approval General Hodges in April 1943 introduced four pre-maneuver problems, called "flag exercises" the purpose of which was to help commanders make the transition from the "D" Series to the "big" maneuvers, and to rid them of the "Louisiana Maneuver complex," as their inclination to forget in maneuvers the lessons learned in previous training was sometimes called.70

Each of the flag exercises lasted two days. The first involved a tactical march followed by reconnaissance, approach march, and development of enemy positions; the second featured attack on an organized position; the third was the organization of a defensive position followed by daylight withdrawal; and the fourth consisted of the occupation of a position followed by a night withdrawal.71 A fundamental desire of General Hodges in scheduling these exercises was to make training rather than winning the prime objective. Before the second round of exercises was launched in April, the maneuver director told division and unit commanders:72

All problems will be solved slowly, properly and correctly. The idea of winning and losing must be forgotten.... First one side will attack and win, and then the other....

68. History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, p 117.
70. Ibid, pp 64-65.
72. Ibid, pp 64-65.

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The flag exercises unquestionably served a useful function in combined training. General McNair who in February had found the first Louisiana exercises "disappointing," reported on 13 April that "the final results were gratifying and reassuring." That he credited the flag exercises with much of the improvement is evidenced by his transmitting to all major Army Ground Force commands the basic points of General Hodges' report proposing these exercises with the statement: "The comments of the Commanding General Third Army are believed thoroughly sound and of interest in connection with the pre-maneuver of new divisions under your command." The flag exercises remained a standard feature of combined training during General Hodges' regime in Third Army, but Headquarters, AGF, did not require their adoption by other commands.

In Second Army, where General Fredendall assumed command in April 1943, the inspection system was revised with a view to placing more emphasis on activities which pointed directly to combat and lessening relatively the stress on such functions as housekeeping. The Antiaircraft Command in the spring and summer of 1943, partly on its own initiative and partly by direction of Army Ground Forces, extended the training period of antiaircraft units to 26 weeks (including four weeks for organizational activities), added a realistic five-day tactical field exercise to the unit training program, and prepared master MTP's and UTP's for Antiaircraft units modeled on those previously drawn up by the Field Artillery School for artillery organizations.

In the Tank Destroyer Center, where in May Gen. Orlando Ward, leader of the 1st Armored Division in the Tunisian campaign, assumed command, the spring and summer months saw an increasing emphasis on gunnery. In March the Center introduced sub-caliber firing at buttoned-up tanks to give gunners realistic training in firing at rapidly moving targets. General Ward devoted special attention to the correlation of practice firing with combat firing, the perfection of gun teams, and the development of proficiency in indirect fire missions. He experimented with battle plays, with a view to establishing set formations for particular situations in much the same fashion as they were used by athletic teams, but failing of formal approval in Headquarters, AGF (which, while repeatedly expressing interest in battle plays, could never quite bring itself to the point of actually prescribing them), these exercises were not taught as a part of official tank-destroyer doctrine. After General Ward's departure from the Tank Destroyer Center in the fall of 1943, General McNair in a personal letter to a friend paid him this tribute:

Orlando Ward had the Tank Destroyer Center for a period of months and transformed its firing. We now have batteries making as many as twenty successive hits against a realistic target.

73. (1) Ibid, p 63. (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 13 Apr 43, sub: Initial Performance of New Divs at Maneuvers. 354.2/56 (Maneuvers 1943).
74. Ibid.
75. History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, pp 63-65.
78. Pers ltr of McNair to Gen Orlando Ward, CG 2 DC, 14 Feb 44. McNair Corres.
80. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen F. E. Louis, 18 Nov 43. McNair Corres.
Gen. A. C. Gillem, who succeeded General Devers as Commanding General of the Armored Force in May 1943, was, like General Ward, keenly interested in perfecting gunnery. He was also a strong advocate of infantry-tank cooperation, and during his regime at Ft. Knox he did much to promote combined training of armored and infantry units.

**Maneuvers, February 1943**

On 7 December 1942 Headquarters, AGF, issued a new maneuver directive. The general training directive of 19 October 1942 had prescribed maneuvers as a standard part of divisional training. The directive of 7 December 1942 implemented this requirement by placing maneuvers on a permanent basis; instead of subordinate commands closing maneuver areas and sending director headquarters home after a limited period of exercises as had been the case in 1941 and 1942, they were now to run maneuvers continuously until all divisions had been "put through" them. The directive issued in December 1942, with only slight modifications, remained the basic guide for maneuvers until the stepping up of overseas movements forced a discontinuance of "big" maneuvers in the spring of 1944.

Exercises outlined by Army Ground Forces for the permanent maneuvers did not differ markedly from those of 1942. But in order that commanders might have considerable leeway in adapting exercises to varying local situations, they were not prescribed in as great detail as formerly. For the same reason, and for the sake of making problems more realistic, the previous practice of setting a time limit for each problem was not followed in the new directive; but the over-all period allotted to each division for maneuvers was eight weeks. The number of problems was not definitely fixed, but it was anticipated that about eight or ten would be completed in the eight-week period. The AGF directive specified the following general types of maneuvers:

1. Movement to contact, meeting engagement, and aggressive action by both sides.
2. Meeting engagement, aggressive action by a large force, and the withdrawal of a small force.
3. Aggressive action against a covering force, with a view to forcing it to withdraw across or through an obstacle.
4. Attack and defense of a river line, the objective of the attacker to require the crossing of his major elements.
5. Coordinated attack of a prepared position. Situation to be so drawn as to permit at least 24 hours of uninterrupted and unobserved work on the defensive position.
6. Delaying action on successive positions over a considerable distance.
7. Breakthrough of an over-extended position and the withdrawal of the defender over a considerable distance.

Army Ground Forces suggested the desirability of repeating the problems involving attack and defense of a river line and attack of a prepared position. Commanders were authorized to run the problems in any sequence they desired. They were likewise

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82. AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Dec 42, sub: Maneuvers February to August 1943. 354.2/1 (Maneuvers 1943)(R).
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
permitted to group and regroup participating units at their discretion, keeping in mind always the general objective of realistic training. One important restriction was imposed by Army Ground Forces in the interest of assuring a resemblance to combat conditions: the army or other command directing the maneuvers was not to delegate the preparation of problems to organizations participating in the exercises nor to give them advance information "as to the type or duration of the proposed action." 85

The desire for realism was also apparent in the provision that "ammonition ... will be played in bulk and weight insofar as practicable. Organic ammunition-carrying vehicles will carry proper loads." At a supply conference held in Washington early in 1943 Army staff members were directed to operate depots in a manner comparable to that followed in overseas theaters. 86

The general directive of 19 October 1942 prescribed preliminary training in air-ground cooperation for divisions approaching maneuvers, but the framers of the maneuver directive of 7 December, influenced no doubt by unhappy experience in recent exercises, were noticeably pessimistic as to the part that air would play in the maneuvers of 1943. The subject of air-ground cooperation was dismissed with a reference to the general directive of 19 October 1942, attachment of a brief enclosure on identification panels, mention of the possibility of the participation of airborne units, and the statement, "It is hoped that air support will be available for all maneuvers. Details cannot be foreseen at this time." 87

Maneuvers under the new directive got under way in Louisiana on 1 February 1943; in C-AMA (where training was governed partly by a special directive and in part by general maneuver instructions of 7 December 1942) on 19 April; in Tennessee on 26 April; in West Virginia (where divisions divided their time between amphibious training under Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, and maneuvers under XIII Corps) on 2 August; and in Oregon on 5 September. The year 1943 proved to be the big year in maneuvers, from the standpoint of the number of units participating. All in all, 17 corps headquarters and 47 divisions took part in maneuvers in 1943, as compared to only 7 corps and 19 divisions in 1942. 88 About a half million men participated in the Second Army maneuvers alone. The complete schedule of participating units is set forth in Chart No. 89

Maneuvers as previously noted had an inauspicious beginning in 1943. 90 But they improved with the passing of time. 91 There seems little doubt that on the whole they were the best of all the maneuvers held under Army Ground Forces or its predecessor

85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. See Chart No 5, AGF Maneuvers.
89. Ibid.
90. See above, p 45.
Several factors contributed to their excellence. First, the establishment in each army of permanent director headquarters made possible the building up of experience and the improvement of supervisory procedures. Third Army, for example, in April 1943, after the first round of exercises, revised its director setup so as to make its control of maneuver activities more effective. A salient feature of the change was the establishment of a provisional headquarters under the director to handle details of administration, especially of small units attached to army, thus making it possible for the director to devote himself more completely to larger problems of supervision. The salutary effect of the flag exercises instituted by General Hodges in April 1943 has already been noted. In May a special center was set up to look after casualties. In August 1943 the director instituted a plan of having divisions hold their own critiques, where problems were covered in considerable detail for the benefit of junior officers, while higher commanders met separately for less formal sessions covering points of special concern to them. Under the arrangement previous to this, critiques were held in a theater that would accommodate no more than one-third of the officers of participating units. In August also the Third Army initiated special critiques for service units.

A second factor contributing to the outstanding quality of maneuvers in 1943 was the increasing leaven of combat-experienced officers in director headquarters and in participating units. In Tennessee, for example, General Fredendall, the Director, and Colonel Denney, the Deputy Director, had been commander and G-3 respectively, of the II Corps during the initial phases of the North African campaign.

A third influence contributing to improvement of maneuvers in 1943 was the brightening of the equipment situation. More guns, ammunition, trucks, and other items essential to realistic operations were available than in 1942, and the restrictions on gas and rubber were lifted to an extent that permitted a closer approach to theater supply practices. It would be grossly misleading to leave the impression that improvement proceeded to a point of near-perfection, for such was not the case. Critiques throughout indicated a stubborn persistence of such deficiencies as overextension of lines, failure of communication between units, inadequate reconnaissance, bunching of troops in attack, failure to appreciate the effects of artillery fire, congestion of vehicles on highways and in exposed parking areas, and violation of security.

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92. This statement is based on the treatment of maneuvers in the histories of Second and Third Armies, just cited, and of GHQ (Study No 1), pp 23-25, and on a study of maneuver critiques published at various times by Headquarters, AGF. The AGF comments are filed in 354.2.

93. History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, p 64.

94. See above, p 45.

95. History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, p 64.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid, p 43.

The most disappointing aspect of the maneuvers in 1943, as in 1942, was air-ground cooperation, and again the principal reason was the meagerness of planes and trained pilots made available for preliminary training and the maneuvers proper. 99 But even so, improvement was noted in air-ground cooperation. 100 The spirit of mutual helpfulness, developed on the level of army director-air support command, paid dividends in training comparable to that achieved on similar levels in combat areas. 101

One feature of the 1943 maneuvers which deserves special mention was the participation in Louisiana in the spring of the 93d Division, first of the three Negro divisions activated in World War II, and the 100th Infantry Battalion, a Japanese-American unit the maneuver performance of which was an advance indication of the outstanding distinction that it was to win on the battlefields of Europe. Despite serious misgivings as to the results of pitting a colored against a white division in the depths of the South, no untoward incidents worthy of note materialized. The 93d Division was markedly deficient in the care of weapons, vehicles, and other equipment, and its general performance was so low as to impel the director to give it an unsatisfactory rating at the close of maneuvers. But close observers of the Negroes found ground for encouragement in the fact that units commanded throughout by exceptionally strong officers and NCO's were capable of giving a good account of themselves, and that the division as a whole, while obviously retarded by the relatively poor economic, educational, and technical background of the overwhelming majority of its personnel, showed steady improvement from beginning to end of the maneuver exercises. 102

Final Major Revision of the AGF Training Program, 7 June 1943

Before 1943, as previously noted, Army Ground Forces had been compelled by the limited use of American troops in combat to depend largely on experience in maneuvers for information on which to base the training program. 103 But the North African campaign initiated in November 1942 and extending into the summer of 1943, made available an abundance of American combat experience for the guidance of General McNair and his staff. On 7 June 1943 Army Ground Forces issued in the form of a supplement to the directive of 19 October 1942, the first general training directive which had as its primary basis lessons learned by United States soldiers on the field of battle. This also proved to be the last major revision of the AGF training program. 104

The directive of 7 June 1943 applied specifically to divisions that had completed maneuvers and to nondivisional organizations that had finished unit training. In other words it provided a review program for organizations that had completed the normal cycle of training. Such an arrangement was in furtherance of General McNair's previously indicated design of rushing units through a relatively brief cycle and devoting any time that might remain to correction of deficiencies and review.


100. (1) Ibid. (2) History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, pp 34, 62.

101. Personal observations of AGF Hist Off in Tennessee Maneuvers, Aug 43.

102. (1) History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, pp 65, 73. (2) For a comprehensive treatment of AGF experience in training Negro troops, see Study No 36, The Training of Negro Troops (S).

103. See above p 27.

104. AGF ltr to CO's, 7 Jun 43, sub: Sup to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 1942.

353.01/52 (Tng Dir).
In reducing the training time of divisions in 1942, General McNair had been influenced by the belief that overseas demands would be so urgent as to make a short cycle imperative. But by the late spring of 1943 the strategic outlook had changed. At that time the end of the North African campaign was in sight, and the cross-channel invasion of the continent was being projected for the spring of 1944, with Operation Overlord (invasion of Italy through Sicily) planned a limited interim operation. In the meantime highest priority was to be given to strategic air attacks on Fortress Europe.106

These and other high-level decisions made in the spring of 1943 indicated that divisions and other units, instead of being called to theaters shortly after completing abbreviated training programs, would probably pile up in the United States for a considerable period of time. It was partly to meet this situation that Army Ground Forces on 7 June 1943 issued a directive which provided for extending training for an indefinite period beyond completion of the normal cycle.107

The directive of 7 June 1943 placed greatest emphasis on all-around proficiency of the individual soldier and perfecting the ability of small units to act on their own. It also stressed leadership, discipline, "ruggedness and toughness of the individual," scouting and patrolling, sanitation and personal hygiene, security, dispersion and camouflage, mines and demolition, and night fighting.108 Repeated references to these subjects in combat reports bring into bold relief the intimate bearing of battlefield experience on the new directive.109 On 8 January 1943, for example, General McNair in his speech at the United States Military Academy, read extracts from a report "Fighting on Guadalcanal," citing the necessity of troops being "rugged and tough," expert in the use of their weapons, scrupulously observant of rules of sanitation, and of junior officers being versatile and self-reliant. General McNair in this speech also referred to lessons taught by the landings in North Africa.110 The comments of General Marshall on discipline, based on personal observations in Africa have already been noted.111

General Eisenhower, after the setback at Kasserine Pass in February 1943, was reported to have expressed a determination "to profit by our mistakes and to make definite suggestions to the War Department to improve and intensify training."112 In late February he cabled General Marshall urging the necessity of overcoming training deficiencies manifested by troops in action, particularly when they first went into combat.113 In March, April, and May high ranking observers, including General McNair

105. Pers ltr (C) of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 19 Sep 42. McNair Corres (C).
106. These were decisions at Casablanca Conf. 14-26 Jan 43. See AGF Chronology under date 26 Jan 43.
107. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of bd staff offs, Jan 44.
108. AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Jan 43, sub: Sup to Tag Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 353.01/52 (Tag Dir).
109. These reports are filed in 319.1 (Foreign Observ).
110. Graduation Address of Gen McNair at U.S. Military Academy, 8 Jan 43.
112. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, p 268.
113. Excerpts from this cable were sent to Gen Lear by Col R. N. Young, Office of CofS, USA, at Gen Marshall's direction on 3 Mar 43. Lear Pers Corres.
himself, brought back detailed reports of these deficiencies—and the shortcomings mentioned with greatest frequency and emphasis are the ones to which specific attention was called in the directive of 7 June.\footnote{114}

When in March General Fredendall stopped at Headquarters, AGF, en route to his new assignment as commander of Second Army, he stated that his experience in Africa indicated need for greater stress on training troops in use and removal of mines, night fighting, and reconnaissance.\footnote{115} In April the Chief of Staff, AGF summarized reports made by Generals Lucas and Hall after their return from North Africa as follows:\footnote{116}

Training: They said there was nothing wrong with the training in our country at the present time, but it was a fact that the divisions that were over there were not properly trained; that we need much small unit training, considerably more than we are getting; that one-third of the training should be at night; that training should be conducted in all kinds of weather and under all kinds of strenuous conditions; that we need much more close order drill for disciplinary training (this, I think, they got from Patton); that much time should be spent on mines, both placing and removal; that basic training of service units was universally poor; that service units needed better marksmanship instruction; that all men should know how to fire the .50 calibre machine gun; that soldiers should be trained not to get lost -- they should know how to use the compass, maps, and other things to enable them to go where they want to go; that they saw no close air support; that the proportionate casualties in field officers was too high -- they thought this was because junior officers lack basic training and the senior officers had to provide the close leadership that junior officers should provide.

Other observers made similar comments.\footnote{117}

To correct deficiencies reported by theaters and to adapt training more closely to combat needs, the directive of 7 June 1943 prescribed three stages of progressive training beginning on the individual level and culminating in divisional exercises in which elements of the division were supported by attached spare parts. No definite time limits were set, but it was suggested that the training prescribed for each phase normally should be completed in about two months. Subjects outlined for the first phase included qualification and familiarization firing, laying, detection and removal of mines, individual and group cooking, field sanitation, and scouting and patrolling. Special emphasis was to be devoted to perfecting the proficiency of the squad, and for the first time in its history, Army Ground Forces prescribed a test for this the smallest tactical unit in the army.\footnote{118}

\footnote{114. Summaries by AGF Cofs of these reports may be found in 314.7 (AGF Hist) bound "Memos of Cofs to CO." See also 319.1 (Foreign Obs).}

\footnote{115. Rpt of Gen. Fredendall (S) on Tunisian Front, 10 Mar 43. 314.7 (AGF Hist - Gen Tng notes).}

\footnote{116. Memo of Cofs for CO, AGF, 19 Apr 43, sub: Rpts of Obsn by Gens Lucas & Hall. 314.7 (AGF Hist) "Memos of Cofs for CO."}

\footnote{117. (1) Memo of Cofs for CO, AGF, 19 Apr 43, sub: Rpts of Obsn by Gens Lucas & Hall. 314.7 (AGF Hist) "Memos of Cofs for CO." (2) See 319.1 (Form Obs).}

\footnote{118. AGF ltr to CO's, 7 Jun 1943, sub: Sup to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 1942. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir).}
The second phase was aimed primarily at bringing the platoon to a high level of performance, but special attention was to be devoted during this period to night operations, including patrolling, gapping of mine fields and raids to secure important information and destroy hostile positions. Reference has already been made to the special test for platoon leaders included in this phase. In the second phase also platoons were required to retake the platoon combat firing test.

The third phase was devoted to developing the technique of night attack and perfecting combined-arms training. In furtherance of the first of these objectives, commanders were required to conduct progressive exercises beginning with the battalion and extending through the regiment. Problems were to be conducted first by daylight, then at night, over varying types of terrain, and were to include attack and defense missions over areas traversed by mine fields. Combined arms training was in the form of a division test, divided into five phases as follows:

1. A defensive phase in which one regiment, reinforced by an infantry battalion and supported by two battalions of light artillery, organizes and occupies an interior sector of a battle position.

2. A development phase in which the division, less units on the defense, drives in the defensive outpost and makes contact with the defensive position.

3. A reconnaissance phase in which the division plans its attack through information gained by thorough and deliberate ground and air reconnaissance.

4. A night attack by one battalion to gain a foothold within the defensive position from which an attack can be launched at daylight.

5. The continuation of the attack at dawn.

Live ammunition was to be used in the fourth and fifth phases. All exercises were to be free.

At some time during the training period covered by the directive, units were to run the special battle courses prescribed in February 1943. All troops were to undergo the infiltration course at night as well as in daylight.

By way of summary it may be said that while the supplement of 7 June 1943 modified the training program in some important particulars, especially in providing for increased emphasis on night fighting, small unit operations, leadership, discipline, and combat firing, these were points long recognized as fundamental. The principal change

119. See p 43 above.

120. AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Jun 43, sub: Sup to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 1942. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir).

121. AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Jun 1943, sub: Sup to Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 1942. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir).

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.
made by this directive was one of stress; and the same is generally true of subsequent directives, which as previously intimated, had to do largely with particular aspects of training. To use a figure, the AGF training structure by the summer of 1943 had taken final form and reached its full dimensions. The changes that came after June 1943 were mainly in the nature of repainting, repair, and interior rearrangements; no adding of rooms or other extensive remodeling was found necessary. In fact, one of the most impressive things about the work of General McNair and his associates in Army Ground Forces was the small degree of change that had to be made during war in the program that they had built in peace.
Chapter III

TRAINING -- JULY 1943 TO D-DAY

High points in training during the period July 1943 to D-Day were these: (1) tremendous increase in overseas movements in anticipation of OVERLORD; (2) an increasing emphasis on replacement training; (3) greater stress of maintenance and maintenance training; (4) contraction of field installation; (5) recurrence of serious personnel problems as a result of an unexpected demand for overseas replacements; (6) adjustment to meet problems created by personnel losses and acceleration of overseas movements; and (7) continuing refinement of the training program. Each of these points will be treated below.

Increase in Overseas Movements

In June 1943 the strength of Army Ground Forces, after climbing very rapidly during the preceding nine months, reached a peak of almost 2,100,000. Thereafter troops under command of Army Ground Forces continually declined. By D-Day, AGF strength had fallen to approximately 1,500,000.1

A principal factor in this decline was the stepping up of troop shipments to England in preparation for the cross channel invasion of Europe. In August 1943, only one American division was in the United Kingdom; by 6 June 1944 the American force in Britain exceeded a million and a half.2 The enlisted strength of Ground units shipped to ports of embarkation serving all theaters during the period July 1943 -- June 1944 was approximately 800,000, and most of these men went to Great Britain. The peak months of shipment for the period were January and March 1944 during each of which AGF units with enlisted strength aggregating nearly 120,000 arrived in ports of embarkation.3

The increasing requirements of theaters made it necessary for Army Ground Forces to redouble its efforts to assure units arriving at port thoroughly prepared to perform their missions. The process of preparing units for overseas movement, commonly referred to as "POM," had been thoroughly overhauled early in 1943, so as to provide ample notice of anticipated movement overseas and to place preparation for shipment on a continuing, long-range basis. During the months that followed, POM procedures were repeatedly refined. In the summer and fall of 1943, Army Ground Forces held conferences with representatives of its principal components for the purpose of articulating and explaining POM functions. In November General McNair recommended in the interests of saving time and effort that units on the "Blue List" (Units destined for Great Britain that preshipped most of their equipment) be relieved of inspection and shortage reports except for such articles of equipment as they were supposed to take with them, which suggestion the War Department adopted in December. Army Ground Forces in April 1944 instituted the practice of giving armies and other principal agencies six months' notice, instead of three as formerly, of prospective shipment of units under their command; and announcement of earmarkings sent out each month were accompanied by appropriate instructions for initiation of POM procedures. Thus for the first time in AGF

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1. See AGF Str Chart, prepared by GNSTAT in AGF Sta Data (S), 25 Jul 45.


history it became standard procedure for responsible agencies to begin a planned pro-
gram of shaping their units for overseas movement six months before the expected date
of shipment.4

But unfortunately the well-conceived system could be only partially applied because
of recurrence late in 1943 of the necessity of stripping low-priority units and sending
many organizations to port on short notice to meet unexpected calls from theaters.
When units received a heavy increment of partially trained, incompletely processed
fillers only a few weeks before shipment as was frequently the case in 1944, prepara-
tion for overseas movement, far from being the orderly process prescribed in War
Department and Army Ground Force directives, became a frenzied effort to qualify per-
sonnel and "to get them by" the POM inspectors. And units alerted on short notice fre-
quently had to be shipped "in current status of training," which meant specific direc-
tion by the Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, to waive the usual POM require-
ments.5

Increasing Emphasis on Replacement Training

Activation of the last divisions in August 1943 in a sense may be said to mark a
transition in Army Ground Forces, from a period when the mobilization and training of
units was the dominant interest to a period when the provision of replacements became a
major concern. This is not to say that after August 1943 completion of the training of
divisions and the activation and preparation of additional units did not continue to
figure prominently in the scheme of things; but beginning with the autumn of 1943, re-
placement training, which in the early period of Army Ground Forces had held a rela-
tively insignificant position, came increasingly into the spotlight. By D-Day the Re-
placement and School Command was pushing Second Army for the distinction of being the
largest training establishment in Army Ground Forces.6

The changing emphasis is well indicated by the fact that in the fall of 1943
General McNair made his first comprehensive inspection of replacement training centers.
On 4 October 1943 he wrote to General Hazlett, Commanding General of the Replace-
ment and School Command:

I hope to make another trip next week; including Blanding, Wheeler,
Croft and McClellan in my effort to familiarize myself, even though be-
latedly, with the increasingly important matter of replacements.

The trend toward greater emphasis on replacements received a boost from General
Marshall who on 13 October 1943 wrote General McNair:8

4. History of AGF, Study No 21, Preparation of Units for Overseas Movement, pp 14-
15, 28-29.
5. Ibid. pp 30ff.
6. (1) Second Army Strength Chart, in App III to Study No 16, The Second Army,
filed with Additional Material for Second Army History. 514.7 Hist file. (2) AGF
History, Study No 33, The Replacement and School Command, pp 186-87. (3) Figures
furnished AGF Hist Off by Hist Off, R&SC, 2 Aug 46. For strength figures on subord
comdrs, see MRU rpts, bulky file, AGF (C).
7. Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Hazlett, CG, R&SC, 4 Oct 1943. (McNair
Personal Corres.)
8. Personal ltr of Gen Marshall to Gen McNair, 13 Oct 1943. (McNair Corres (S),
CofS binder).
Regarding the training of replacements and antiaircraft units, I wish you would concentrate your efforts for the next two months on these phases of AGF.

Influence of General Marshall's comment is suggested by the remark of General McNair to General Patton ten days later: "We are making a special effort to furnish better replacements."[9]

As a part of the general effort to improve the quality of replacements in the summer of 1943, Army Ground Forces took two important steps. First was extension, on recommendation of the Replacement and School Command, of the training period from 13 to 17 weeks, with provision in the fifteenth and sixteenth weeks for two weeks of field training; the field program consisted of a series of tactical problems during which trainees were called on to apply, under conditions simulating combat, the skills which they had acquired in earlier training. The second step was the setting up under AGF control of depots at Ft. Meade, Md., and Ft. Ord, Calif., to process replacements for overseas movement. Before the establishment of these depots, final processing had been a weak link in the replacement system. Under the new setup conditions were greatly improved.[11]

As an additional move for raising the quality of replacement, General Lentz, G-3, AGF, proposed in November 1943 that replacement training centers be reorganized to train men in standard tactical units rather than in artificial functional organizations as was then the practice. The position of General Lentz was succinctly expressed by one of his assistants who stated: "A heavy weapons battalion cannot conduct logical field exercises by itself."[12] But the proposal was laid aside after the Replacement and School Command pointed out the difficulties that would ensue from its adoption. These included an increase of overhead, as tactical units would be smaller than existing organizations, expensive and troublesome adaptation of housing, complication of specialist training, and lessening of flexibility in controlling output.[13]

Greater Stress of Maintenance and Maintenance Training

During the first part of the AGF period when the Army was expanding at breathtaking pace, maintenance and maintenance training received only minor emphasis. This circumstance was attributable apparently not so much to failure of Headquarters, AGF, to appreciate the importance of maintenance—though some of the staff whose activities had to do largely with care of equipment thought General McNair deficient in maintenance consciousness—as to the fact that the terrific pressure to provide in a hurry millions of men who could fight forced maintenance into a secondary position.[14]


13. Ibid., pp 15-16.

14. (1) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Col K. M. Matthews & other G-4 Off, 10 Oct 45. (2) History of AGF, Study No 15, The Desert Training Center and C-AMA, pp 80-84.
This neglect of maintenance while concentrating on teaching men to march and shoot, unavoidable though it may have been, by the autumn of 1943 had produced a situation that was embarrassing to General McNair. Reports from subordinate commands showed large numbers of "deadlined" vehicles, and AGF staff officers visiting the field noted an alarming tendency of troops to neglect their clothing, weapons, and other equipment. Members of the Inspector General's staff making the rounds of AGF installations also found maintenance to be considerably below the desired standards. The situation seems to have been brought to a head by a chance meeting of G-4, AGF, and the Inspector General in the Louisiana Maneuver Area in the fall of 1943. On this occasion the Inspector General was said to have spoken so emphatically about deplorable maintenance conditions among AGF units participating in maneuvers that the Ground G-4 initiated a corrective program immediately after returning to Washington.

One of the first of the ameliorative measures was the issuance on 13 November 1943 of an Army Ground Force directive, "Preventive Maintenance of Equipment." This directive stressed the importance of such matters as "thorough and constant first and second echelon maintenance in order to save third and fourth echelon maintenance"; called attention to the importance of training operators in first echelon maintenance as well as in driving; urged the keeping of accurate and complete records allotting of adequate time for preventative maintenance, and the establishing of a thorough system of maintenance inspection. A brief of a maintenance plan that had proved outstandingly effective in an infantry division was attached to the directive for guidance of other Ground units.

A second and more important step for the improvement of maintenance was the initiation of a program of field inspections under the supervision of the Ground G-4. Under this program a team of AGF inspectors repeatedly visited training establishments and with the assistance of expert personnel borrowed from subordinate commands made thorough checks of the equipment of divisions and other organizations. The AGF officers during their inspections made on-the-spot suggestions for correction of deficiencies and held comprehensive critiques at the end of their visits. On returning to Washington after each trip the team leader prepared official letters for dispatch by the Adjutant General to appropriate major commands indicating to them the main findings of the inspections and ordering correction of deficiencies. General McNair followed the reports rather closely and encouraged the teams to "bear down" in their criticisms. On one occasion when a letter reflecting unfavorably on maintenance conditions in the 77th Infantry Division, of which his son Douglas was Chief of Staff, was presented to him for approval prior to dispatch, he scribbled on an attached memo slip:

"This is good stuff. Keep this sort of thing up. It will get results."

As the AGF inspectors became seasoned in their duties, procedures were refined,

15. Ibid.
17. AGF ltr to CG's, 13 Nov 43, sub: Preventative Maint of Equip. 400.402/1737.
18. (1) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Col K. M. Matthews and other G-4 Offs, 10 Oct 45. (2) Study of Maintenance Inspection Reports for 1943-44 filed in 333.1 (AGF Inspect.)
19. See Note 18 (1) above.
critiques were broadened, coordination was established with Army Service Forces and The Inspector General, and a high degree of uniformity in standards was established. Maintenance continued to be the source of considerable complaint, as witness The Inspector General's report on conditions in C-AMA early in 1944, but on the whole maintenance was better on D-Day than it was a year earlier.

**Contraction of Army Ground Force Training Facilities**

The slowing down of mobilization and the increase of overseas movements during the year preceding D-Day was accompanied by a reduction and readjustment of the training establishment. The first agencies to be closed were those devoted to specialized training. On 10 June 1943 the Amphibious Training Center was officially disbanded after transfer of the primary responsibility for amphibious training to the Navy. The Mountain Training Center passed out of existence on 23 October 1943, following transfer of most of its personnel to the 10th Light Division (Alpine) activated on 10 July 1943. Mainly because of depletion of service units by overseas calls, C-AMA was terminated as an AGF facility on 30 April 1944.

Other agencies were reduced and reorganized to take up the slack resulting from deployment and shrinking requirements. In the Antiaircraft Command, for instance, which experienced a decline in over-all enlisted strength from about 225,000 in July 1943 to about 90,000 in July 1944, the Training Center at Ft. Sheridan was discontinued in November 1943 and the Replacement Training Centers at Ft. Eustis and Camp Callan in February 1944. On 15 October 1943 the Tank Destroyer Center's Individual Training Center was inactivated and in February 1944 a reorganization was effected which eliminated the Unit Training Center, placed the Tank Destroyer Center, School, and Replacement Training Center under the Replacement and School Command, and reduced Tank Destroyer Center personnel to 21 officers and 47 enlisted men. The Armored Force, re-designated Armored Command on 2 July 1943, experienced similar adjustments. On 20 February 1944, the Ft. Knox establishment was renamed the Armored Center and placed under the Replacement and School Command. No significant changes were made in the

20. (1) History of AGF, Study No 15, The Desert Training Center and C-AMA, pp 80-84. (2) Memo (C) of TIG for DcofS, USA, 12 Jan 44, sub: Spec Maint Inspeo of C-AMA, and accompanying papers. 333.1/101 (C-AMA)/(C).

21. (1) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Col K. M. Matthews & other G-4 Offs 10 Oct 45. (2) Gen Council Min, (S), 2 April 45. Rpt of TIG.


organization of the armies during this period, but the strength of assigned units de-
clined considerably.28

Recurrence of Serious Personnel Problems

On 6 June 1943 Gen. John M. Lentz, G-3 of Army Ground Forces, wrote to Gen. Floyd
Parks, Assistant Commander of the recently activated 69th Infantry Division: "No mat-
ter what strength you attain you will be drilling recruits again before too long."29
This sombre prophecy was to prove all too true.

Because of failure of the War Department in apportioning replacement output among
the branches to make adequate allowance for the relatively heavier attrition suffered
by the infantry, and further because the expanding commitment of Ground elements follow-
ing the invasion of Sicily produced increasingly heavy Ground losses, tactical units in
training had to be stripped to supplement the output of replacement training facilities.
While artillery, engineer, and other combat branches felt the strain to some extent, the
replacement crisis of 1943-44 was essentially an infantry crisis.30

Another factor contributing to the recurrence of personnel difficulties in 1943-44
was the failure of selective service to provide men in sufficient quantities to meet
activation schedules as set up in accordance with the Troop Basis. AGF requisitions on
reception centers lacked 20,000 men of being filled in May 1943, 57,000 in June, and
26,710 in August.31 The 63rd Division activated in June 1943 had only about half its
T/O strength in mid-September and the 65th Division activated in August did not reach
full strength until about the end of the year.32 On 21 September 1943, Army Ground
Forces reported that shortages in newly activated units aggregated 75,000 men.33

Still another factor in the personnel crisis was the loss of men to the Army Spe-
cialized Training Program (ASTP) and the Air Forces. In September 1943 General McNair
announced that about 55,000 men had been recently transferred to the ASTP, and that
within the past three months some 15,000 Ground troops had gone to the Army Air Forces
for cadet training.34

Hist file.

29. Personal ltr of Gen Lentz to Gen Parks, 6 Jun 43. Lentz 201 (Personal).

30. (1) Pers Ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Truscott, 10 Jan 44. McNair Corres.
(2) Memo (S) of Gen Marshall for SW, 10 Feb 44, sub: Serious Pers Shortages. 355/100
(ASTP) (S). (3) History of AGF, Studies No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army, pp 26-
27, No. 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp 37-42, and No 21, Prep-
aration of Units for Overseas Movement, p 31.

31. History of AGF, Study No. 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army, p 17.

32. History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions,
pp 25, 43.

33. History of AGF, Study No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army, p 17.

34. Ibid, p 21.
Early in January 1944 shortages in AGF units aggregated 56,000 men, and a month later the figure had climbed to 87,000. On 20 January 1944 the War Department, influenced in part at least by the tightening manpower situation, discontinued the policy of granting units 15 percent overstrength at activation, thus removing a vitally needed cushion against attrition.

Delay in the receipt of fillers was a great inconvenience, and losses of high-intelligence personnel to ASTP and the Air Forces seriously impaired the quality of manpower in AGF units. But the repeated stripping of units to provide men for overseas replacements and alerted organizations was most disruptive of all, for the effect of this practice was to convert tactical units into replacement training centers.

In the latter part of 1943 fourteen infantry divisions lost an aggregate of 24,541 men to overseas replacement depots or to alerted units. For replacement of overseas losses only, two divisions in February 1944 yielded up 6,200 men; in the late spring and early summer, seventeen divisions lost 64,411 men; and a final draft in July and August 1944 took away 12,057 more. Additional men were withdrawn to fill high-priority units, to meet parachute and OSS requirements, and for sundry other purposes.

Non-divisional units, being largely of branches other than infantry, were not robbed for replacements to anything like the same extent as divisions, but it was not unusual for non-divisional units in early stages of training to be called on for men to fill alerted organizations. And non-divisional units seem to have suffered as much as divisions from delay in receipt of fillers. The 286th Engineer Combat Battalion, for example, which was activated on 17 December 1943, had on 10 March 1944 received only 50 percent of its fillers; and the 12724 Engineer Combat Battalion activated on 20 April 1944, by mid-July was still short 65 percent of its fillers.

Both divisions and non-divisional units experienced heavy losses in officers, with infantry units bearing the brunt of stripping. Withdrawal of commissioned personnel from tactical units did not begin as early as enlisted stripplings, nor were they as a general rule proportionately as large, but the loss of leaders was considerably more disruptive than that caused by inroads on the rank and file. In June 1944 Gen. Harry J. Malony, Commanding General of the 94th Division, reported that there was not a second lieutenant in his command who had been on duty with the division in maneuvers seven


36. AGF Memo (C) for CofS, USA 16 May 44, sub: Overstrength of Units to Equalize Losses Through Attrition. 320.2/428 (R).


38. History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training, p 44.

months before. In divisions officer losses were heaviest in infantry regiments, and in platoon and company grades, but turnover in engineer and medical components was considerable. An experience typical of a number of regiments was that of the 260th (65th Division -- activated 16 August 1943) whose commanding officer stated on 1 November 1944, a few weeks before the unit went to port.

The turnover of commissioned personnel in this regiment since activation has been about 150 percent. The turnover has been heaviest among junior officers, principally among the lieutenants. Some companies have had as many as seven commanders and some platoons have had sixteen leaders. Battalions have had as high as five commanders. The regiment has had two commanding officers.

The infantry officer of a low-priority division who stayed with his unit longer than three months during the period April-September 1944, apparently was an exception.  

Enlisted and officer losses for all purposes reached tremendous proportions in some divisions. The 94th Division, from activation (August 1942) to departure for port (July 1944) lost 873 officers and 8,890 men; the 65th Division (activated August 1943, went to port December 1944) 1,088 officers and 11,782 men; and the 106th Division (activated March 1943, went to port October 1944) 1,215 officers and 12,442 men. The 69th Division (activated December 1942, went to port November 1944) which apparently had the greatest turnover of any of the divisions activated in the AGF period--except possibly those specifically designated as replacement divisions, lost 1,336 officers and 22,235 enlisted men; to put it another way, the staff of the 69th Division trained approximately three divisions--the one that went to port in late 1944 and the two that had previously gone as replacements and transfers.

Officers and men taken from divisions were replaced by personnel from various sources and of diverse background. In general, with the exception of the ASTP men and Air Force cadets who were returned to the Ground Forces in large numbers in the summer and fall of 1944, enlisted personnel received by units that had been stripped was inferior in quality to that which they had lost. Officer replacements sent to infantry units frequently were "retreads" from antiaircraft and tank destroyer organizations or instructors from replacement training centers who had grown rusty in broad infantry knowledge as a result of specialization for long periods of time in a few subjects under the committee system. Occasionally divisions received as replacements for company commanders or battalion executives officers who had risen to the grade of captain or major as mess supervisors or in other administrative capacities and who had little or no experience in unit command. Sometimes the newcomers were able after a few weeks to overcome the handicap of inexperience by observing subordinates and taking refresher courses under the supervision of regimental or battalion commanders, but in many instances they had to be reassigned or reclassified. In either case there was a considerable period.

40. Personal ltr of Gen Maloney, CG 94th Div to Gen Lucas, CG 4th Army, 22 Jul 44, 322/30 (94th Div).
41. Statement of Col Dunkley to AGF, Hist Off 1 Nov 44.
42. History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp 38-42.
43. Ibid, pp 37-42.
44. Ibid, pp 42-45
when the unit concerned suffered from ineffective leadership.\textsuperscript{45}

A substantial number of enlisted men sent to units in compensation for those lost to overseas depots and alerted organizations were from replacement training centers with basic training completed in their arm. Other came from service installations, antiaircraft battalions, and tank-destroyer organizations with basic training completed, but not in the arm of the unit to which they were being assigned. Further diversity was offered by men from the ASTP, some of whom had little military training, and men sent back from overseas garrisons whose training had become somewhat obsolete.\textsuperscript{46}

Sometimes personnel received in units as replacements came in large hunks, but more frequently they came in dribs and drabs, thus increasing the disruption. It was not uncommon for commanders during periods of personnel replenishment to conduct training on several different levels so as to accommodate newcomers of varying backgrounds and bring the miscellany of personnel to something approaching a common denominator of training.\textsuperscript{47} The situation in many units was aptly summarized by Maj. Gen. Charles G. Bolte who said of his own (69th) Division in April 1944: "A man now is like an individual going to a University instead of a man who is taking his classes as part of a class in college."\textsuperscript{48}

It would be misleading to leave the impression that tactical units were the only organizations that suffered from personnel exigencies of 1944, for no AGF establishment escaped the unhappy consequences of the nation's dwindling manpower. Replacement training centers, for example, were called on repeatedly to give up experienced officers and cadetsmen to tactical units and overseas replacement depots and to take in their stead personnel not well qualified as trainers, and who sometimes were broken down specimens kicked about from pillar to post until they were utterly beyond hope of salvage; yet replacement center commanders were required to try them out as instructors of recruits.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Adjustment to Meet Personnel Losses and Acceleration of Overseas Movement}

One of the first steps taken by Army Ground Forces to meet the personnel crisis of 1943-44 was to establish a Special Basic Course early in 1944 at the Infantry, Field Artillery, and Armored Schools. The purpose of the new course was to facilitate conversion of surplus officers from Antiaircraft, Tank Destroyer, and other branches to Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery. By the end of 1944, 9,270 officers had been retrained under the conversion program--8,590 at the Infantry School, 642 at the Field Artillery School, and 38 at the Armored School.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, p 43.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p 42.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, p 34.

\textsuperscript{48} 69th Div Comdr's Record of Conf with Unit Comdr, 8 Apr 44. In possession of Maj Gen C. L. Bolte.

\textsuperscript{49} This statement is based largely on interviews and personal observations of AGF Hist Off with off's of IRTO, Cp Fannin, Tex, Jun 44, and Ft McClellan, Ala, Dec 44.

\textsuperscript{50} History of AGF, Study No 30, Wartime Training in the Schools of AGF, pp 22-23.
A second step was taken on 27 April 1944 when Army Ground Forces issued a special directive for the guidance of 22 divisions (17 of which were infantry) designated to bear the brunt of stripping and replenishment. This directive, based on a careful computation by General McNair of the maximum stripping which divisions could stand, provided for the adjustment of training on the basis of the division's readiness date and the sources of its filler replacements. The following typical distribution of training time was suggested:

1. Six weeks of individual training time and tests for replacements received from other units or replacement training centers of an arm or service other than that to which assigned.

2. Thirteen weeks of individual training and tests for replacements received from reception centers.

3. Five weeks of unit training.

4. Four weeks of combined training.

5. Seven weeks of maneuvers.

6. Six weeks of post-maneuver training.

The directive also stated: "The periods indicated will be adapted to the time available so as best to meet training needs. Where total time available is insufficient, maneuvers will be either curtailed or omitted; individual and small-unit training must not be slighted." Supplementary instructions provided that divisions were to initiate this "modified" or "retraining" program as soon as they had obtained 80 percent of their authorized enlisted strength. Subsequent events prevented the attainment of the full course of training outlined in this directive by any of the 22 divisions. Each of the 17 infantry divisions, with one exception, received increments of fillers after being alerted, varying in round numbers from 1,000 to 4,000. Requirements of POM (Preparation for Overseas Movement) and limitations of time made it impossible for division commanders to give the eleventh-hour replacements very much in the way of unit training, much less combined training.

On the eve of their departure from the Army Ground Forces, these 17 divisions, which included all but one of the infantry divisions activated after November 1942 and which roughly were the last divisions to go overseas, contained a considerable portion of personnel that had not progressed far beyond the level of basic training.

51. AGF M/S (S), CG to CoFs, 7 Mar 44. 355/206 (S).
52. AGF ltr to CG's, 27 Apr 44, sub: Supplemental Tng Dir for Specially Designated Divs. 353.01/114.
53. AGF ltr to CG's, 27 Apr 44, sub: Supplemental Tng Dir for Specially Designated Divs. 353.01/114.
54. Statement of Gen Leo Donovan, G-3 AGF to AGF Hist Off 19 Feb 45.
55. History of AGF Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, p 36, and p 39, Chart III.
56. Ibid, Chart No 1, p 39.
On 14 July 1944 Army Ground Forces was compelled because of urgent overseas demands to curtail the training cycle of nonground units. Details of the accelerated schedule, published on 14 July 1944, are set forth in the accompanying table. The new arrangement grouped units in three categories according to the source of their fillers. Organizations receiving the bulk of fillers from reception centers were allowed longer training periods than those which drew their personnel from replacement training centers or units of other branches; units made up of personnel from replacement training centers or organizations of the same branch as their own were allowed the shortest training period of all. The principal cut was in unit and combined training. Ordnance units, for example, under the old schedule were authorized 14 weeks for individual training, 16 for unit training, and 8 for combined training; under the accelerated program the allotments for the three periods were respectively 14, 7, and 3 weeks for all except maintenance companies which were permitted 6 additional weeks for unit training. Newly activated units and units that had been stripped were to initiate individual training as soon as they had attained 80 percent of authorized strength and received 50 percent of their equipment. Units that were following old schedules were to adjust the remainder of their training time to the accelerated program.

The accelerated program did not prescribe combined training for antiaircraft and several types of service units, but directed them instead to devote three weeks of the unit period to training in the field. Units for which combined training was prescribed, but which for lack of opportunity had to forgo this training, were directed to substitute therefor an equivalent period of intensive unit training in the field. Provision was made for subordinate commanders in exceptional cases to request extension of time allotted under the accelerated program.

The accelerated training program created an outstanding difficulty with reference to the schooling of specialists. Some type of signal engineer, and other units were composed largely of personnel whose duties were so technical as to require them to attend service schools of several weeks duration. Getting this personnel to school and back without disrupting the training program and impairing the integrity of the unit had been a considerable problem under the old schedule. Curtailment of the training period made this problem more acute. Schooling was accomplished in many instances only at the cost of having a majority of the personnel absent from the unit after completion of basic training.

As previously noted the California-Arizona Maneuver Area was closed in April 1944, mainly because heavy drafts for overseas operations left an insufficiency of service units for support of divisions in the field. Discontinuance of this graduate school of combined training was a serious blow to the training program. Of the 64 infantry divisions trained in the United States, only 13 had training in C-AMA, and of the 26 activated after July 1942, only one. Of the 87 divisions of all types trained in the United

57. AGF ltr to CG's, 14 Jul 44, sub: Accelerated Tng of Non div Units, w/insclosd charts. 353.01/124.
58. History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Nondivisional Training, p 34.
59. AGF ltr to CGs, 14 Jul 44, sub: Accelerated Tng of Nondiv Units. With insclosd chart. 353.01/124.
60. Ibid.
61. Interviews by Hist Off of AGF Staff Offs, Apr-May 45.
States, only 20 had tours in C-AMA. 62

Urgent calls for units overseas necessitated discontinuance of maneuvers in Tennessee in March and Louisiana in April. Plans were made for resumption of Louisiana maneuvers in the summer, but advance of the readiness dates of the divisions scheduled for participation necessitated their abandonment. A few divisions received, in lieu of the cancelled maneuvers, a month of exercises at or near their home stations, with each division less a combat team maneuvering against the detached team, but these exercises were a poor substitute for "big maneuvers." 63

Of the 11 infantry divisions activated in 1943, only 4 participated in maneuvers against other divisions. Four noninfantry divisions activated in 1943 and 2 divisions activated previous to that time also were denied participation in division versus division exercises. This meant that commanders of 13 of the 87 divisions of all types trained in the United States took their commands overseas without ever having had the opportunity of maneuvering them as a unit in the field. The loss of training in staff functioning, logistics, maintenance, supply, teamwork with supporting units, and large-scale tactical operations under higher command was incalculable. 64

Continuing Refinement of the Training Program.

Despite the enormous disruption caused by the personnel crisis and the acceleration of overseas movements, Army Ground Forces continued its efforts to improve the quality of training. Among several factors facilitating this effort were an increasing-leaven of combat-experienced personnel in AGF units and other training establishments as a result of rotation practices instituted by the War Department, improvement in the quality and quantity of combat information made available to training agencies, and increase of ammunition allotments for firing practice. 65

Of specific measures to improve training, revamping of antiaircraft and replacement training center programs were outstanding. In the summer of 1943 new unit training programs prepared by the Antiaircraft Command at the direction of Headquarters, AGF, and based on the excellent programs of the Field Artillery, were issued for antiaircraft organizations. The new programs consisted of master training programs for Antiaircraft gun, automatic weapons, searchlight and balloon units covering a twenty-two week period (8 weeks basic, 14 weeks advanced), supplemented by detailed unit training programs for all except gun battalions. Of these programs General McNair stated: "Unquestionably their proper use will improve the quality and guarantee the uniformity of the training of antiaircraft artillery units." 66 Early in 1944, largely because of doubts expressed by General Marshall concerning the effectiveness of antiaircraft training, provision was made to give antiaircraft units on completion of the regular cycle several weeks of combined training with air or appropriate ground organizations.

63. Ibid.
64. (1) Ibid. (2) Statement of Gen Leo Donovan, G-3, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 19 Feb 45.
65. (1) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of Staff Offs, Apr-May 45. (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 11 Feb 44, sub: Combat-Firing. 471/1907.
At the conclusion of combined training, units were to be given a special course of refresher training prepared by the Antiaircraft Command.67

In the summer of 1944, new MTP's were instituted in the Replacement and School Command. The new programs de-emphasized such projects as Articles of War, aircraft recognition, and tactics of the company and placed increased stress on mines, booby traps, weapons and tactical training of the squad and platoon. The over-all effect of the changes was to eliminate "frills," increase realism, and bring replacement training more closely in line with combat experience. Background information for the revision came in large part from a tour of the battlefields made by General Hazlett, of the Replacement and School Command, in the spring of 1944.68

Other measures for improving training included readjustment of OCS courses to simplify the officer training program and to provide greater stress on technique, extending requirements for combined training of infantry with artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, and other combat support elements, and increase of combat firing exercises, including the employment of Antiaircraft and tank destroyer units in secondary roles of supporting artillery.69

Still another aspect of the movement to improve training was the revision of tests. In December 1943 Army Ground Forces directed the Antiaircraft Command to prepare tests for antiaircraft battalions similar to those currently in use by Field Artillery units.70 In January and March 1944 tests prepared in accordance with this directive were published for gun, automatic weapons, and searchlight battalions. New Tank Destroyer Tests were issued in April 1944 which raised standards of marksmanship and stressed ability to hit moving targets.72 In April also G-3, AGF, motivated largely by adverse comments in POM inspection reports on proficiency of soldiers in their individual specialties, directed special staff sections to prepare MOS Tests for each type of Ground Service unit.73 In the months following, these tests were completed and disseminated, but because of the long-standing opposition of the Commanding General, Army.

67. (1) Ibid, p 27. (2) AGF ltr to AA Comd, 20 Jan 44, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 355.01/107 (Tng Dir).


69. (1) History of AGF, Study No 30, Wartime Training in the Schools of AGF, pp 14-15. (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 16 Oct 43, sub: Inf-Tank Tng. 355/9 (Inf) (R). (3) AGF ltr to CG's, 7 Dec 43, sub: Inf FA Coordination. 355/2237. (4) AGF ltr to CG's, 6 Nov 43, sub: Employment of Tanks and TD's as Arty. 355/2233. (5) AGF ltr to CG's, 28 Feb 44, sub as in (4) above. Ibid.

70. AGF ltr to CG, AA Com., 3 Dec 43, sub: Tests for AAA, and accompanying papers. 353/52.

71. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 30 Jan 44, sub: Tng Dir effective 1 Nov 42, and accompanying papers. 355.01/107 (Tng Dir). (2) Inc 19, 20, 21 to AGF ltr to CG's, 5 Mar 44, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 355/52 (Tng Dir).

72. M/S, G-3 to CofS, 18 Apr 44, sub: Revision of TD Firing and Tactical Firing Test. 355.01/52.

73. Memo of G-3 to Spec Staff heads, 5 Apr 44, sub: Tng Tests, and accompanying papers. 353/2321.

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Ground Forces, to the policy of prescribing tests on the individual level, they were not made mandatory. In June 1944 a new air-ground test was prepared by Army Ground Forces but was not approved by the War Department.

Progress of Training to D-Day

Reports from theaters gave abundant evidence of continuing improvement in AGF training. Following the invasion of Sicily General Patton wrote to General McNair: "The troops have improved tremendously since Tunisia.... The 45th Division which was not battle tried has done a splendid job and has no excuses to make either to the 1st or the 3d Divisions." Units arriving in the United Kingdom from America in the summer and autumn of 1943 were reported to be "well-trained especially in fast-moving corps and army operations over large areas."

These and other favorable reports alleviated somewhat the disappointment manifested by General McNair in the infantry because of its failure to show the desired aggressiveness in the early stages of the Tunisian and Attu campaigns. While on 4 August 1943 the Ground Commander had expressed regret to General Balmer at his inability to give the infantry a pat on the back like the one recently bestowed on the artillery, in November he was sounding a note of faith in the doughboy's dependability. "There is nothing in front of him but the enemy," he said. "The only force that can break the hostile infantry is our own infantry.... Victories are won in the forward areas -- by men with brains and fighting hearts, not by machines." Some allowance should be made for the fact that Army Ground Forces at this time was launching a program to build up the doughboy's prestige, but even so there is little doubt of a genuine change in General McNair's attitude toward infantry performance.

In the spring of 1944 came even more convincing evidence of the progress and battleworthiness of AGF training. At that time the 85th and 88th Infantry Divisions, first to be committed of divisions built "from scratch" by Army Ground Forces from selective service personnel, entered the line in Italy. From the beginning they "fought as veteran units," and thus according to General Marshall gave "the first confirmation from the battlefield of the soundness of our division activation and training program." General Eisenhower after visiting AGF-trained units in England shortly before D-Day remarked: "American training at home has improved miraculously because of lessons learned in North Africa and the Pacific" -- quite a different note from that sounded by him after the Kasserine Pass affair.

74. (1) Ibid. (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off. of Special Staff Heads, Apr-May 45.
75. History of AGF, Study No 35, The Air-Ground Battle Team.
76. Pers ltr of Gen Patton to Gen McNair, 2 Aug 43. McNair Corres.
78. Pers ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Balmer, 4 Aug 43. McNair Corres.
81. Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, p 548.
But there was still much room for improvement in AGF training. At D-Day as at all previous times, one of the greatest deficiencies was in air-ground training. Small unit leadership and nondivisional training while showing considerable improvement also left much to be desired. Coordination of infantry with armor, tank destroyers, and antiaircraft units was yet another point of weakness. To the removal of these deficiencies much effort was to be devoted in days ahead.


83. (1) OPD Info Bull, Vol 5, 16 Mar 1945. (2) Interview by AGF Hist Off of Staff and unit comdrs in 63d, 65th, 69th, 84th, 86th and 94th Divs, Jun-Jul 1944. (3) Memo (C) of Gen Marshall to Gen McNair, 22 Feb 44, sub not given. McNair Corres.

84. Ibid.
High points of this period were (1) further acceleration of overseas movements accompanied by intensification of AGF efforts to get units ready for shipment; (2) persistence of personnel difficulties; (3) continuing effort to improve training; (4) further concentration on replacement training; (5) continuing emphasis on maintenance; (6) stress of the orientation program; (7) preparation for redeployment.

Further Acceleration of Overseas Movements and Intensification of AGF Efforts to Get Units Ready for Shipment

The summer and fall of 1944 brought a mounting tide of overseas movements. In September, 385 AGF units (including 9 divisions) with an enlisted strength of 139,839 arrived at ports of embarkation, a figure which broke all previous records, but in October the all-time high was attained when 393 units having a strength of 149,313 men were sent to port. Shipments fell off sharply in November and continued to decline moderately during December, January, and February. In March they dropped to the relatively low figure of 89 units and 13,747 men. But the volume of shipments during the nine months following D-Day was far greater than that of any equivalent period in the history of Army Ground Forces.1

General Eisenhower's needs became so urgent in the later summer and fall of 1944 that infantry and certain other types of units had to be shipped considerably in advance of previously estimated dates of departure, and hence before they had time to complete the program of training. At one time in October 1944, Army Ground Forces was called on to ship 66 engineer combat battalions in current status of training. As not enough time was allowed to permit some 1,800 specialists attending schools to rejoin these units, unalerted engineer organizations were combed for substitutes; but since these sources were too limited to meet the requisition the prematurely alerted battalions had to fill many of the specialist positions with ordinary fillers lacking the required technical training.2

In August 1944 several divisions in the strategic reserve whose shipment had not been anticipated before July 1945, were earmarked for the European Theatre and given tentative readiness dates ranging from 9 November 1944 to 27 January 1945. In October, following an emergency call from General Eisenhower's headquarters, the dates for infantry regiments of these divisions were moved up to October and November. Subsequently, some of the dates were changed again, but the regiments and other parts of the divisions as well, moved to port by 31 December or shortly thereafter. By the end of January 1945, only two divisions remained under AGF control, and these departed in February.3

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Premature shipment and continual changing of readiness dates was most disruptive to training. Some units that were subjected to the off again, on again, treatment were compelled after carefully crating their equipment to unpack a part of it and resume training while awaiting a new call to port.4

Difficulties were enhanced by the fact that most of the units prematurely alerted had been subjected to repeated stripings in the months preceding to provide overseas replacements or to fill units of higher priority. When new they themselves were faced with the prospect of shipment there was no alternative to their robbing unalerted units that remained in the country or drawing men from replacement training centers and such other sources as were available, rushing through what seemed to be the most essential training and moving to port in as good condition as possible.5 The result of this unfortunate situation was to make mockery of the teamwork which Army Ground Forces had from the beginning viewed as the main objective of its effort, and to lessen greatly returns from a training program carefully shaped over a long period of time. It is a sad bit of irony that the last divisions shipped overseas, the ones built after the training program had been brought to its highest degree of refinement, and at a time when equipment was most ample, were, because of personnel turnover and premature shipment, the most poorly trained of all.6 The 42d and 65th Divisions, for example, two of the last divisions activated by Army Ground Forces, had no combined training of infantry regiments and artillery battalions. Never in training were they assembled as divisions by their commanders except for reviews; not more than one man in four had been in his regiment for the full period of training; and one man out of every three had joined the division within the past five months. Men did not know their officers, and officers were unacquainted with their men. These divisions, and others of similar experience, were teams only in name.7

Adjustment of the training program to accommodate accelerated shipments has already been noted.8 Other steps taken by General Lear, who succeeded General McNair as Ground Commander in July 1944, to deliver the required units to port in the best possible conditions were institution of AGF inspections of alerted units; sending an AGF representative to POP inspections of The Inspector General to maintain liaison and expedite corrective of deficiencies found on this final War Department check; establishment of liaison with ASP agencies whose primary concern was the final equipping and shipping of units; and bringing pressure on armies and other subordinate commands to offer every possible assistance to units trying to meet imminent readiness dates. In the fall of 1944, the armies kept liaison representatives at the headquarters of each alerted division to help the commander prepare his unit for movement to port.9


5. Ibid. pp 28 ft.


8. See above, pp

9. (1) History of AGF, Study No 21, Preparation of Units for Overseas Movement, p 40 ft. (2) Personal observations of AGF Hist Off on visit to 65th Div, Oct-Nov 44. (3) Interviews by AGF Hist Off of AGF Staff Offs, 1945.
Continuing Efforts to Improve Training

The trend toward closer supervision of field activities by Headquarters, AGF, which characterized earlier periods, was carried forward during the regimes of General McNair's successors particularly during the period when General Lear was in command (July 1944-January 1945). Intensification of AGF control was facilitated by the shrinking size of the training establishment which resulted from acceleration of overseas movement. The aggressiveness of General Lear and his particularly keen interest in field matters were other contributing factors. While commander of Second Army, General Lear had been notable for the sharp eye with which he followed training, and he brought this quality with him when he came to the command of Army Ground Forces. One of his first acts was to revise inspection procedure with a view to strengthening the influence of Headquarters, AGF, on field training. Previous to the summer of 1944, AGF inspectors followed the practice of withholding their findings—other than minor deficiencies corrected on the spot—until their return to Washington, where comments were consolidated, edited, and transmitted through channels in an official letter. In August 1944, General Lear instituted the practice of assembling key officers of inspected organizations after completion of the inspection and giving them a full oral report of observations both favorable and unfavorable. After a very brief statement of the purpose of the meeting, General Lear introduced in succession members of the AGF party, which he had increased to about twice the former size—each of whom gave a succinct summary of his findings and made suggestions for the correction of deficiencies. General Lear concluded the session with a statement of his own impressions. Stenographers made shorthand records of the conferences, copies of which usually were mailed by the Army Ground Forces to army, corps, division, and special troops headquarters. The tenor of these oral comments differed little if any from that of the written communications which they superseded. But it seems likely that a prompt face-to-face presentation of the inspection report in a meeting presided over by the Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces made a greater impression on subordinate commanders than the delivery of a written report through channels after a lapse of several days.

General Lear’s enlargement of the inspection party made it possible for him to intensify examination of installations that he visited. Ordinarily the Commanding General and his highest ranking associates concentrated on inquiry into discipline and housekeeping while other members of the party made a detailed inspection of personnel, equipment, and training.

At some time during the inspection visit, General Lear assembled the junior officers and noncommissioned officers of the division and talked to them about their responsibilities as leaders. The purpose of the talks was to impress on small-unit leaders the importance of their work and to stimulate determination and aggressiveness. These sessions also helped get the influence of AGF Headquarters down to the lowest levels of command.

10. Pers observations of AGF Hist Off in Second Army, Apr 43, and Hq AGF, July-Dec 44.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

73
General Lear's bent for getting about was also a factor in intensifying AGF control. During the six months of his command he and his inspecting team visited every major installation of Army Ground Forces, including 25 divisions, and piled up about 50,000 miles of official travel.14

Another step of Army Ground Forces during this period for improvement of training was the reorganization of headquarters and headquarters detachments special troops. The acceleration of overseas movements and the growing complexity and volume of personnel adjustments in 1944 placed an increasing load of work on these supervisory organizations. To meet the enlarged responsibilities and to correct deficiencies revealed by experience, Army Ground Forces in July 1944 authorized two new types of special troops headquarters. Formerly there had been a Type A Headquarters of 7 officers and 20 enlisted men for stations having a nondivisional strength of 2,000 - 5,000 men and a Type B Headquarters of 9 officers and 32 enlisted men for those housing over 5,000 men. The setup instituted in July 1944 authorized a Type C Headquarters of 11 officers and 35 enlisted men at posts where nondivisional strength was 2,500-3,000 and Type D Headquarters of 16 officers, one warrant officer, and 49 enlisted men where it exceeded 7,500. All A and B Headquarters not scheduled for inactivation in the near future were to be converted to C and D Types. The most striking difference between the composition of Type D Headquarters and the B Type that it superseded was the relatively greater strength in the former of administration and supply personnel.15

In the fall of 1944 the size and the functions of the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, were again increased. This change derived mainly from the prospective movement overseas of all the corps headquarters. When the III Corps departed in August 1944, a miscellany of nondivisional units was left on the West Coast without benefit of near supervision. To fill in the gap the Army Ground Forces set up at Ft. Ord a "super" headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, called it 1st Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Special Troops, AGF, gave it general courts-martial jurisdiction, and placed some 42 units having a strength of over 10,000 men under its supervision for administration, supply, and training. The new headquarters, consisting of 28 officers (commanded by a brigadier general), 4 warrant officers, and 90 enlisted men, was charged with "all the functions and duties normally discharges by an army or separate corps commander." Members of the AGF staff sometimes referred to this organization jokingly as the "bob-tailed" corps.16

The success of the experimental headquarters at Ft. Ord naturally suggested filling in the gap left by removal of other corps with a similar organization. In October 1944, the seven principal headquarters and headquarters detachments remaining in the Army Ground Forces were designated as "S" (for special) type, and authorized a strength of 30 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 88 enlisted men. To permit adaptation of the headquarters and headquarters detachments to variations in local needs, army commanders at their discretion were authorized to depart from the branch allocation of officers set forth in the published table of distribution. For example, the published table of distribution provided for two ordnance officers and one signal officer, but if a given headquarters had no ordnance units attached and had many signal units, the army commander could delete the ordnance officers and add two signal officers. All of the "S" type headquarters were assigned to army, but their functions were comparable to those


16. Ibid.
prescribed in August for the headquarters at Ft. Ord. One AGF staff officer said of the
new organizations: "Special troops headquarters act as a branch army headquarters in
dealing with all army units," and another said that these headquarters were recognized
"as administrative as well as training agencies of the armies."17

In the "S" type for the first time specific provision was made for inclusion in
headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, of officers of the various
services. This provision removed a principal source of criticism leveled at these
organizations from the time of their inception; namely, their inability to furnish ex-
pert supervision for technical training.18

As the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, declined in num-
ber and were reorganized into new types, they were able to shed their less capable of-
ficers. At the same time they received a larger admixture of combat experienced person-
nel from the ever-increasing flow of returnees pouring into the United States. At V-E
Day the headquarters and headquarters detachments, while far from perfect, were con-
siderably better adapted to their supervisory functions, from the standpoint both of
organization and leadership, than they were during their pioneer days of 1942. On the
whole their contribution to the training of the ground army was a valuable one.19

During the six months following D-Day, Army Ground Forces devoted considerabe
attention to the improvement of cooperation between infantry and its supporting arms. On
14 June 1944 provision was made for attachment of tank destroyer and separate tank
battalions that had completed the unit period to infantry divisions for two months
combined training. Subsequent stepping up of shipment dates interfered to some ex-
tent with this training, but it was given high priority, and good results were obtained.
In August 1944, Army Ground Forces directed that tank battalions of armored divisions
be given combined training with infantry divisions.20 In August also, subordinate com-
mands were instructed to use tanks in the village fighting course.21 Headquarters,
Army Ground Forces insisted that the combined training exercises be realistic, specifying
in particular that tanks fire live ammunition.22

Army Ground Forces during this period sought also to increase the realism of the
close-combat exercise. A new version of this exercise, known as "buddy system,"
adopted in October, provided for running of the course by teams of three or four men,
each of whom filled alternately the roles of the soldier moving forward and the soldier
providing cover.23

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 16 Aug 44, sub: Combined Tng for Tnk & TD Units with Inf
Divs. 353/23/11. (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 17 Aug 44, sub: Combined Tng of Tk Bns with Inf
Divs. Ibid.
21. AGF ltr to CG's, 23 Aug 44, sub: "Use of Tks in Village Fighting." 353.01/128.
22. Record of Tel Conv of Col Faine, AGF with Col Donegan, G-3, 4th Army, 21 Aug 44.
G-3 Files 333.1 (Insp by AGF Stf Offs) Bndr 5/338.
23. AGF ltr to CG's, 6 Oct 44, sub: Spec Battle Courses. 353.01/61.
Headquarters, AGF, with General Lear personally taking the lead repeatedly urged division, replacement training center, and other subordinate commanders to relax controls in close-combat exercises, employ more weapons, and to make more abundant use of live ammunition.24

Tests were subjected to further revision in the months following D-Day. On 15 June 1944 Army Ground Forces issued a new set of combat intelligence tests which were simpler of administration than previous versions and which included some of the more pertinent lessons from the fighting fronts.25 In September firing tests for chemical mortar battalions were published, and in November indirect fire test for tanks and tank destroyer units.26 Minor revisions were made in platoon combat firing tests in August, and in September improved versions of antiaircraft tests were disseminated.27

Further Concentration on Replacement Training

The continuing decline in the number of tactical units remaining in the Zone of Interior as the ground Army was deployed was accompanied by a further shifting of emphasis to replacement training. In August 1944 the RTC program was readjusted to provide a common course of instruction for all branches during the first six weeks of the training cycle, with emphasis on basic military subjects, and with branch specialization postponed to the last eleven weeks. The two principal reasons for the change were (1) to meet requirements under the Physical Profile Plan adopted early in 1944 which directed that all RTC trainees be reprofiled at the end of six weeks to permit a redistribution of personnel in the interest of the infantry; and (2) to prepare the replacement system for the possibility, in the event of an overseas emergency, of having suddenly to convert to infantry or to ship men before their training was completed.28 The new arrangement did not work out satisfactorily, and in February the Replacement and School Command recommended its discontinuance. The War Department on 17 March 1945 authorized a modification of the plan.29

Both General Lear and General Stilwell (who succeeded to the Command of Army Ground Forces on 20 January 1945) made frequent visits to Replacement Training Centers

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24. This statement is based on personal observations of the Historical Officer made on trips with General Lear during the period, July to December 1944, and on study of transcripts of Lear's inspection conferences in AGF. G-3 files, 333.1 (Inspection by AGF Staff Offs).


26. (1) AGF ltr to CG's, 25 Sep 44, sub: AGF Chem Mortar Co Tactical Firing Test. 353/108 (CWS). (2) AGF ltr to CG's, 10 Nov 44, sub: Indirect Fire Test for Tanks and TD's. 353.4/230.

27. (1) M/S, G-3 to DCoS, 17 Aug 44, sub: Revision of Inf and Cav Plat Combat Firing Tests. 353.01/52 (Tng Dir). (2) History of AGF, Study No 14, Problems of Non-divisional Training in AGF, p 32, (3) AGF ltr to CG's, 27 Sep 44, sub: Tng Dir effecrve 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).


and followed replacement activities with considerable interest. In December 1944 a conference of replacement training center commanders and AGF representatives was held at Ft. McClellan, Ala., to consider important matters affecting personnel and training. 30

At the end of May 1945, the Replacement and School Command had reached a peak strength of 481,000, and by that time also an aggregate of 2,309,000 men had entered Army Ground Force replacement training centers. 31

Continuing Emphasis on Maintenance

The increasing emphasis on maintenance which had been noticeable since the fall of 1943 extended into the period following the invasion of Europe. This trend received a considerable impetus from reports of the theaters that troops had not attained desired standards in the care of clothing and equipment. In November 1944 General Eisenhower sent a radiogram to the War Department urging adoption of stringent measures for correction of maintenance deficiencies. 32 An investigation early in 1945 by The Inspector General of maintenance in the three major commands showed conditions in Army Ground Forces to be better than those in Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces, but, even so, considerable room for improvement in Ground standards was indicated. 33 More time was set aside for maintenance and maintenance training in redeployment than in former programs, but not nearly as much as G-4 and special staff heads of Army Ground Forces desired. 34 Maintenance continued to be a source of disagreement within Army Ground Forces as well as a cause of criticism by outside agencies until the end of the war. 35

Increasing Stress on Orientation

The year preceding V-J Day witnessed a marked increase of attention to orienting the Ground soldier in such matters as the background, nature, and progress of the war, the character and habits of the enemies, and the reason why it was necessary for him to risk his life in battle. This growing emphasis on orientation was due in part to War Department pressure, 36 but the unusual vigor with which the program was shaped and applied in Army Ground Forces is to be credited largely to General Lear, who, since the summer of 1941, had been keenly concerned with the soldier's apparent failure to understand either the causes of the War or of his being in it. As early as 1942 General Lear had instituted an orientation program in the Second Army.

Soon after General Lear came to Headquarters, AGF, he began work on a plan for effectively orienting the personnel of his new command. On 11 September 1944, a directive was issued which stated:

30. Personal observations of AGF Hist Off who attended the conference at Ft McClellan.


32. See Tab A to M/S, G-4 to CofS, AGF, 1 Apr 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. AGF, G-3 file 300.6 (AGF Tng Memo No 1).

33. Gen Council Min (TIG Report), (S), 2 Apr 45. History of AGF.

34. Study No 38, Redeployment Training, pp 6-7.

35. Ibid.

36. See WD Cir 360, 5 Sep 44.
The Army Ground Forces orientation must be considered an integral part of training. Its application is a command responsibility. Knowledge of world events and their military significance is of extreme importance to soldiers.

The directive contained detailed suggestions for operation of the orientation program, among which were the following:

1. Orientation officers of regiments and higher headquarters should be graduates of the School for Special and Morale Services at Lexington, Va., and should devote most of their time to orientation activities.

2. Commanders of companies and similar units should designate an officer to handle orientation in addition to his other duties.

3. Unit commanders should personally take charge of weekly orientation exercises directed by the War Department. Activities considered appropriate for this hour included War Department orientation films, forums based on "Army Talks" and discussions of current events. Replacement Training Center commanders were directed to set aside an additional half-hour for orientation during weeks when War Department films were shown.

4. Units should keep up-to-date situation maps and use them as a basis for orientation discussions.

5. A daily news bulletin should be prepared, distributed to platoons and larger units, posted in conspicuous places, and "read and explained to all men at some designated time each day."

A suggested guide for inspection of orientation activities, prepared by the AGF Information and Education officer, was attached to the directive.37

On 6 January 1945 Army Ground Forces issued a stronger and more detailed directive aimed at further increasing the effectiveness of the orientation program. This directive reemphasized the point that orientation was a command responsibility and a part of regular training, down to and including the platoon. It stated further: "All commanders and men must be prepared mentally for what is happening in the world today and understand its significance and possible effect upon them."38

The January directive required that in companies and higher units "not less than one undivided hour per week will be devoted to ... (orientation) training during normal duty hours and such training will be conducted or directly supervised by regularly assigned officers of the lowest echelon (platoon) of command." Tactical units as well as replacement training centers were to devote an additional half-hour to orientation during weeks when War Department films were shown during the hour normally devoted to orientation discussions.39


38. AGF ltr to CG's, 6 Jan 45, sub: AGF Orien Prog. 350/118.

39. Ibid.
The directive issued in January was directed primarily at Replacement Training Centers, since by that time provision of replacements had become the principal activity of Army Ground Forces, and since General Lear deemed it particularly important, in view of the shortness of their training period and their being sent overseas as individuals without benefit of that inspiring sense of belonging and group support derived from training in tactical units, that indoctrination of replacement trainees be given special attention. To assist replacement training center commanders in building up the morale, Headquarters, AGF, provided them with a series of weekly orientation talks which, in connection with War Department films, were to comprise a complete 17-week program. In addition, a series of three talks treating of the organization of the Army, the background of the War, and the reasons for the soldier's being called to service, prepared by an AGF officer selected for his special knowledge of the subject, and followed by an appropriate film, were distributed with specific instructions that (1) they were to be given to trainees during their first week of service; (2) the first was to be delivered personally by the Center Commander -- a requirement which subsequently had to be modified because of the many demands on the Commander's time; and (3) the remaining two were to be given by general officers. A similar series of talks was required at the two AGF replacement depots, with subjects adapted to the theaters served by each particular depot.

The orientation directives were backed up by intensive inspections, with General Lear making administration of the program a point of his own personal examination. A poorly kept situation map, a dayroom display that was not up to standard, or a bumbling discourse by an orientation officer, invariably elicited from the Ground Commander words of reproof not soon forgotten. Some subordinate commanders, and even some of the high-ranking members of General Lear's own staff, thought that the orientation program was stressed to a point that caused interference with other training, and that in many instances the results were more in the nature of eyewash than of the real thing. However valid these objections may have been, there seems no doubt that an indoctrination program along the lines of that developed by General Lear was seriously needed, that he responded to the need with characteristic vigor, and that much good came of his efforts.

40. Conversation of AGF Hist Off with Gen Lear, 20 Dec 44.
41. AGF ltr to CG’s, 6 Jan 45, sub: AGF Orien Prog. 350/1182 (AGF Hist 350 Ed).
42. Personal observations of AGF Hist Off on inspection trips with Gen Lear.
43. This statement is based on conversation of AGF Hist Off with RTC comdrs & AGF Staff Offs, 1944-45.
Chapter V

REDEPLOYMENT TRAINING: V-E DAY TO V-J DAY

Planning for Redeployment: Training Memorandum No. 1

The training program for the redeployment period was prescribed in AGF Training Memorandum No. 1, issued tentatively in April 1945 and published in permanent form on 1 June. This memorandum had its inception in the early fall of 1944, when G-3 of Army Ground Forces proposed that the multitude of tests and directives then in effect, some of which went back to the G-3 period, be brought up to date and compressed into a single document. On 5 October 1944, shortly after the G-3 proposal had been initiated, instructions were received from the War Department requiring the preparation of a program of training for use during the period that would follow the defeat of Germany. It was decided to combine the proposed streamlining of literature on training with the charting of a redeployment training program.

The War Department directive required that the following subjects be stressed: maintenance of health; load-bearing training; chemical warfare; swimming, lifesaving, and resuscitation; knowledge of Japanese tactics, techniques, and weapons; identification of Japanese planes and equipment; care and maintenance of arms, vehicles, equipment, and clothing under climatic conditions prevailing in the Pacific; map and aerial photograph reading; and natural and artificial camouflage. The War Department directed further that special attention be devoted to physical ruggedness, small-unit training, scouting and patrolling, and security against surprise ground attacks. A minimum of two hours weekly was required for "orientation," but in no other case did the directive specify the amount of time to be devoted to a subject.

In general, the principles stated by the War Department were in harmony with AGF concepts of redeployment training, and they were embodied in Training Memorandum No. 1, the new comprehensive AGF directive. The chief source on which the Army Ground Forces drew in preparing the new program was its own experience during the years of mobilization and war and the experience of overseas commands as reported by AGF and War Department observers. In short, the redeployment training program was for the most part a simplification and rearrangement of existing training literature adapted to meet the needs of an all-out effort against Japan. No significant change was made in procedure or doctrine. Indeed, except for increased stress on subjects peculiarly

1. This chapter is a condensation of a full-length discussion of the topic. See Studies in the History of AGF, No. 38, Redeployment Training, to which the reader is referred for more detailed treatment.

2. The tentative edition (mimeographed) is filed in 355.01/1 (Tng Memos); the final edition (lithographed), ibid, sep bndr.

3. (1) Statement of Lt Col M. F. Brennan, AGF G-3 Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 10 Oct 45. (2) AGF M (G-3) to CG, 30 Mar 45, sub: Tng Memo No 1. G-3 Records, 500.6 (AGF Tng Memo No 1). (3) WD memo (R) 355 (5 Oct 44) for CGs AGF, ASF, AAF, 5 Oct 44, sub: Tng after the Defeat of Germany. 555/5 (Redpl) (R).

4. WD memo (R) 355 (5 Oct 44) for CGs AGF, ASF, AAF, 5 Oct 44, sub: Tng after the Defeat of Germany. 555/5 (Redpl) (R).

5. Statements made in this paragraph are based mainly on comparison of Training Memorandum No 1 with earlier AGF training literature and on conversations of the AGF Historical Officer with various members of the AGF G-3 Section in October 1945.
applicable to Pacific warfare, the redeployment training program contained nothing that was new.6

The G-3's of subordinate commands, called to a redeployment conference in Washington, 27-28 March 1945, viewed the new program favorably. But when Training Memorandum No. 1 was circulated in draft form among the staff sections of Headquarters, AGF, for comment and concurrence, G-4 and some of the special staff heads registered objection to certain of the provisions. The main points of issue were the allotment of time for maintenance of clothing and equipment, provision for training in maintenance and supply discipline, relative stress on training units of the arms as against those of the service units of tactical as distinguished from technical training.7

The Chief of Staff, AGF, sustained G-3's position on the relative importance of tactical and technical training in service units.8 The subject was threshed out between G-3 and the various special staff sections in the course of preparing redeployment training programs (RTP's). Adjustments were made in the Ground services, but the RTP's, as published in final form on 1 June 1945 fell considerably short of what was regarded by special staff heads as a desirable balance between tactical and technical subjects. On a concession that was obtained applied to all the services. In the RTP of each service was included this provision:

Unless specifically modified by the Commanding General, AGF, the specifications set forth in TM 12-427, "Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel," are adopted as the standard of individual training. In order to insure appropriate assignment of personnel, unit commanders will carefully analyze current T/O&E applicable to their units and conduct training to qualify fully each specialist in his MOS.

Generally speaking, the RTP's for service units differed in three important respects from previous programs: they gave subordinate commanders considerable latitude in arranging the details of training; the RTP's, to a larger extent than earlier programs, were based on lessons learned in combat; and whereas former programs had to be general enough to prepare units and individuals for operations against many enemies in widely scattered portions of the world, now it was possible to point all training activities directly toward Japan.9

Little change was contemplated in technique for redeployment training. One innovation, however, should be mentioned—the use of demonstration teams organized and trained on War Department level to facilitate instruction in complicated equipment and procedures. Mobile intelligence training teams trained at Camp Ritchie were used in acquainting AGF units and replacement centers with Japanese organization, weapons, equipment, and uniforms, and for instructing ground intelligence personnel in foreign


7. (1) AGF M/S, G-6 to CofS, 1 Apr 45, sub: Tag Memo No 1, G-3 Records, 300.6 (Tag Memo No 1) (2) AGF M/S, G-3 to staff sections, with replies thereto (various dates), 3 Mar 45, sub: AGF Tag Memo No 1. Ibid.


9. RTP's for each of the services in AGF, 1 Jun 45, par 5. Copies in files of AGF Hist Sec.

Training by extraneous and migratory groups was not a radical departure from the training policies developed by Army Ground Forces under General McNair, who had himself sanctioned modification of the unit training principle in instances where instruction was highly specialized. In the case of redeployment training in intelligence, clothing, and chemical subjects, limitation of time was an additional factor in calling for the application of mass-production techniques.

**Difficulties, 8 May-14 August 1945**

The surrender of Japan brought the war to an end before redeployment training as prescribed in Training Memorandum No. 1 got under way. The course of events during the preceding summer months, however, had been such as to make the outlook for effective training unfavorable in the extreme.

Among the difficulties which threatened the training program—and the greatest problem—was the disruptive effect on units of personnel readjustment policies after V-E Day. Status reports prepared in the ETO reveal the effect of these policies on typical units selected for redeployment. The 28th Division in one week experienced a turnover of 20 percent of its enlisted strength and in 40 days a turnover of 46 percent of its officers. Between V-E Day and V-J Day, the 35th Division lost 285 officers and 3,800 men. The 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion during the three months following V-E Day lost 50 percent of its personnel; the 530th Ordnance Depot Company reported in August 1945 that 73 percent of its personnel had been in the unit less than one month; and the 122d Signal Radio Intelligence Company reported that 95 percent of its strength was above the critical score of credits for early discharge. A large proportion of the men lost under readjustment policies were key specialists and noncommissioned officers.12

Personnel problems were increased by unforeseen, last-minute extensions of campaign credits. The 2d Division, for example, after having replaced all men with scores of 85 or above, received credit shortly before sailing from Europe for two additional campaigns. This made some 2,700 more men eligible for discharge.13 Because of lack of time, the prescribed policy of completing personnel adjustments in Europe, where replacements were available, had to be abandoned and adjustments postponed until return of the organization to the United States. But since the output of replacement training centers was being sent to the Pacific, there was no adequate source of replacements in the Zone of Interior, and hence provision had to be made for the return from the ETO not only for the 2d Division but for others as well of a "packet" of about 2,000 low-score replacements to fill the gap left by removal of personnel made eligible for discharge.

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11. Ibid., pp 9-10.

12. (1) AGF H/8 (S), G-3 to CofS, 30 Aug 45, sub: Returning Units Reported Not Fully Qualified, 355/1564 (Readiness)(S). (2) Status Rpt (R) on 5th Inf Div, 12 Jun 45, 319.1/51 (Redep) (R).

13. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 2 Jul 45, sub: Pers for Redepl Units, 200.3/4 (Redep) (S).
discharge by the addition of battle credits. This arrangement would have been fairly satisfactory if the packets could have been shipped promptly, but lack of shipping space--partly as a result of concessions to public pressure for the early return of high-point men--caused a delay in the forwarding of these replacements. None had arrived by V-J Day. In fact, it was not until October that these packets began to reach American ports.

The basis for selecting divisions to be redeployed and for determining the order of their return was not known in Headquarters, AGF. But designating for redeployment units which had a preponderance of high-score personnel while choosing for inactivation many with comparatively few men eligible for discharge, created formidable difficulties.

Another problem faced by those responsible for redeployment training in the United States was the lack of coordination with European theaters. In the early stages of redeployment planning it appeared that coordination would leave little to be desired. It was planned that one of the Army groups, probably the Sixth; would be responsible for supervising redeployment training in the ETO and that a master training program then in process of preparation should be very closely integrated with programs drawn up by the Army Ground Forces. Draft copies of AGF Training Memorandum No. 1 were sent to the ETO in April 1945 and to the MTO a few weeks later. Representatives from the Training Division, G-3 Section, AGF, visited the ETO early in May to further the coordination of the Army Ground Forces and the ETO on matters of redeployment training. Training memoranda were modified to fit the facilities available in the ETO. It was agreed that a training status report would be sent to Army Ground Forces by the Sixth Army Group, and that Headquarters, AGF, would recommend to Operations Division that training officers be exchanged between the special staff sections of AGF Headquarters and the staff of Sixth Army Group. It was recommended that arrangements be made for establishing liaison between Headquarters, AGF, and various headquarters in the ETO in order to provide the latest information on AGF units returning to the United States.

These training plans, however, did not work out. Because of the absorption of units and higher headquarters with occupation duties, the inadequacy of training facilities, the acceleration of the shipment schedule, and other obstacles, the scheme of training units at home stations in the ETO under armies and corps proved impracticable, and responsibility for training passed to the Assembly Area commands. Restrictions of space and equipment, however, precluded any but the most limited training by units after they left their home stations in Europe. An AGF officer who visited Europe in July

15. Ibid.
17. AGF M/S (S), 19 Mar 45, sub: Conf with Brig Gen Eyster, G-3 Hq ETO, on Matters Pertaining to Redepl. AGF G-1 Control Div, bdnr marked "Special Planning--Interim Redeployment."
18. (1) AGF M/S (S), G-3 to CofS, 3 May 45, sub: Extract from Final Rpt of Col Hans W. Holmer, Engr member, AGF Bd, MTO. 353/6 (redepl) (S). (2) AGF ltr (S) for MTO, 9 May 45, sub: AGF Tng Memo No 1, dated 28 Apr 45. Ibid. (3) Memo (S) of Col S. E. Paine and A.M. Parsons, AGF G-3 Sec, for CofS AGF, 14 May 45, sub: Rpt of Visit to ETO concerning Redepl Tng of Units in that Theater. 353/7 (Redepl)(S).
1945 reported that "very little, if any, training will be accomplished in ETO by indirectly redeployed units." \(^{19}\)

In view of the tardiness and inadequacy of status reports, liaison was imperative, but plans to maintain liaison between AGF and the ETO on redeployment matters also went by the board. An AGF request in May for permission to send a liaison party to Europe elicited a reply from the ETO to the effect that such liaison was neither necessary nor desirable. \(^{20}\) By 11 July, status reports had been received for only four of the 170 units listed in June for return to the United States, and no lists of shortages of units by grade, SSN, and arm or service. The reports that were received did not give a true picture of either training or personnel. \(^{21}\)

But the fact most distressing to those charged with reception and training of redeployed units was that the Army Ground Forces did not until the latter part of July receive up-to-date information concerning the shipment of returning ground units. Schedules laid down before V-E Day in redeployment forecasts were stepped up considerably in the ETO as more shipping became available than had been anticipated, with the result that units expected in August came pouring into the United States in July. AGF officers asked Operations Division for revised schedules only to find that they were not available in the War Department. \(^{22}\) An AGF liaison party visiting the European Theatre of Operations in July 1945 obtained up-to-date redeployment schedules and cleared up other major points of misunderstanding, but this action came too late to be of great benefit.

AGF officers who held key positions with respect to training of redeployed units were of the opinion that many of the difficulties growing out of the return of units from Europe might have been avoided if strong control of redeployment activities had been exercised on the War Department level. Lack of coordination seemed due in large measure to the persistence after V-E Day of the previous practice of permitting theater commanders a free hand in overseas activities. This principle, when applied to matters as closely related to responsibilities of interior agencies as redeployment, greatly aggravated the problems of those agencies. \(^{23}\)

The problem of equipment, while apparently not as formidable as in most of the previous period, was nevertheless a source of considerable concern at AGF Headquarters. According to War Department regulations, units were to turn in to supply agencies before their departure from Europe all except minimum essential equipment for shipment direct to the Pacific. This meant that equipment required for training in the United States would have to be furnished from AGF stock in the Zone of Interior. The War Department,

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21. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF Memo for CofS, 11 Jul 45, sub: Status Rpts on Units Scheduled for Redepl. 319.1/6 (Redepl).


23. Statements made in this paragraph are based primarily on conversations of the AGF Historical Officer with key members of G-1, G-3, and G-4 Sections in October 1945.
in response to AGF insistence, directed that 100 percent T/O&E equipment be laid down at the training station of the unit's return, and that it be in condition serviceable for combat.24 In one instance, the Army Service Forces sought by direct negotiations with the Army Ground Forces to be relieved of the 100 percent combat serviceable requirement. But the Army Ground Forces, apprehensive lest this be the first of a series of such requests, gave a firm negative reply.25

Two factors beyond the control of both commands complicated the equipment problem. One was the acceleration of the rate of return of divisions and other units from the ETO. The other was the shifting of division stations to meet unforeseen changes in strategic plans. This shifting is exemplified in the case of the first two armored divisions (the 13th and the 20th) scheduled for return to the United States. The Army Ground Forces in mid-April 1945, in reply to an inquiry from the ASF Distribution Division, designated Camp Polk and Ft. Benning as stations to receive the first armored divisions selected for redeployment. The Army Service Forces initiated measures necessary to lay down a complete set of equipment for an armored division at each of these stations. Subsequently, strategic plans were modified to provide for inclusion of the first two redeployed armored divisions in an armored task force attack on the Japanese homeland. Because of this change, it was necessary to give the divisions amphibious training; hence Camp Cooke, Calif., was designated as their station instead of the two camps previously selected. The Army Service Forces, notwithstanding the fact that some armored equipment had already been shipped to Ft. Benning, was now called on to lay down two complete sets of armored equipment at Camp Cooke.26

Redeployment training, beset as it was with difficulties in personnel, liaison, and equipment, was complicated and made more difficult by the acceleration of the operations timetable in the Pacific which took place after the original plans for redeployment had been put into effect. This acceleration threatened to reduce the training period which had been planned and which were regarded as minimum for effective training. If one plan under consideration on V-J Day had been carried out, the 20th Armored Division would have had only 20 days for training in the United States, and the 13th Armored Division only 9 days, a situation particularly disturbing in view of the fact that the scheduled operation was amphibious and neither division had had amphibious training.27

24. (1) AGF M/S, G-4 for CofS, 30 Apr 45, sub: Equip for Redepl Tng. G-4 TF Div files. (2) AGF M/S (S), G-4 to CofS, 30 May 45, sub: Conf on Equip Priorities. Ibid. (3) Statement of Lt Col John A. Hanson, TF Div G-4, to AGF Hist Off, 9 Oct 45.

25. ASF memo (C) SPRL 370.01 for CG AGF, 14 Jun 45, sub: Redepl Tng Demands for Trailer 1-Ton 2-Wheel Cargo, and attchd papers. 475/11 (Redepl)(C).

26. (1) Statement of Col A.L. Harding, AGF G-3 Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 7 Nov 45. (2) AGF 2d ind (draft) 355.1 (R) (11 Apr 45), 21 Apr 45, on WD memo (S) WDGS 11721, for CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 12 Apr 45, sub: WD Installations. Files of Col. A.L. Harding, AGF G-3 Sec. (3) AGF M/S, G-3 to CofS, 29 May 45, sub: Stations for Divs. Ibid.

27. (1) AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 9 Aug 45, sub: Conditions of O'sea Movement of 86th and 97th Inf Div and Allied Redepl Shipment. 355/1559 (Readiness) (S). (2) Statement of Col S.L. Weld, AGF G-3 Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 16 Oct 45.

"The capitulation of Hirohito on 14 August saved our necks," said one member of the G-3 staff. "With things being as they were it would have been absolutely impossible for us to have sent well-trained teams to the Pacific for participation in the scheduled invasion of Japan." This officer had in mind primarily the disruptive effect on units of personnel readjustment policies after V-E Day. But while personnel difficulties constituted the greatest problem, changes in policy and misunderstandings with respect to equipment and liaison were sufficiently disruptive to justify the application of his statement to the redeployment effort as a whole.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY

Perhaps the most consistent aspect of training during the period under discussion was that it had to keep pace with fast-moving events. This meant rapid expansion which taxed the capacities of the army in personnel and facilities and required constant readjustment to meet new and frequently changing demands. Battle teams had to be formed and trained in spite of the continuous disruption of units to meet requirements for officer candidates, for cadres of newly activated units, for the ASTP and other projects, and to supply deficiencies resulting from losses due to various causes.

In the early months, training of divisions and of large units generally took priority, with leadership training as the paramount concern and with emphasis on training combat rather than service units. This period saw the issuance on 19 October 1942 of a general training directive which established and stabilized a long-range program and which strengthened AGF control over training throughout the Zone of Interior. This directive lacked the advantage of combat experience, but it was sufficiently elastic to admit of modifications in response to new requirements.

The progress of the war saw an increased emphasis on nondivisional training, particularly that of service units. There was greater concentration of effort on training of replacements. Battle experience made it possible to lessen the gap between training and actual combat. The revision of the general training directive in June 1943 placed greater stress on the proficiency of the individual soldier and on the ability of small units to act independently. Subsequent modifications in the training program provided for increased emphasis on night fighting, small-unit operations, leadership, discipline, and combat firing--points long recognized as fundamental. The changes made were in emphasis rather than content. As has been pointed out, one of the most impressive features of General McNair's contribution to the Army Ground Forces was the essential stability of the training program.