DECLASSIFIED AD-A954 030 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam FPO San Francisco 96626 FF5-16/023 whd 5750 Ser 0150 17 MAR 1969 CONFIDENTIAL - Unclassified upon removal of enclosures From: Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Commander in Chief U. S. Pacific Fleet (Code 12) To: Subj: U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary; February 1969; submission of Ref: (a) CINCPACFLT 1tr ser 1/6925 of 2 October 1967 and the and the state of the Encl: (1) Post-Tet Enemy Offensive Summary (2) Operation SEA LORDS Summary (3) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary,
(4) River Patrol Force Summary, LECTE River Patrol Force Summary. (5) Riverine Assault Force Summary, JAN 24 1985 (6) USN Statistical Summary. (7) Naval Advisory Group Summary, (8) VNN/VEMC Statistical Summary, A. A. (9) Psychological and Civic Action Operations D 1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (9) are submitted. 2. Due to a change in reporting procedures, the information for the USN Civic Action Statistical Summary is not available for the current month's Historical Summary. Beginning with next month's Summary, the Civic Action Statistical Summary will carry the figures for the previous month's work i.e., March Historical Summary will contain February's Civic Action Statistical Summary. 3. The data contained in enclosures (6) and (8) is based on information available this date. Any adjustments to enclosures (6) and (8) will be FILE COPY reflected in February's Historical Supplement. Copy to: COMUSMACV (Hist. Branch, SJS) DECLASSIFIED CNO (Op-09B91E) Director of Naval History DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT R 85 01

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#### POST-TET ENERY OFFENSIVE SUMMARY February 1969

More than 100 cities, towns, including Saigon, and military installations throughout South Vietnam were targets of Viet Cong rocket and mortar shells on 23 February as an apparent new enemy offensive began. Widespread and coordinated rocket/mortar attacks, in addition to some ground probes, were experienced in all four Corps areas, and provoked retaliatory actions from allied forces.

U. S Navy units and installations in I, III and IV Corps areas reported numerous scattered enemy initiated actions that were associated with the new offensive.

Hardest hit among U. S. Navy activities were I Corps' Danang Naval Support Activity and vicinity. On 23 February, an estimated 20 to 30 enemy 122-mma rockets, fired in three volleys, impacted on the NAVSUPPACT, Danang deepwater piers (BT 025 836). The initial casualty list revealed no U. S. Navy personnel casualties, however, material and property damages were extensive. The adjacent ARVN ammunition dump received several rocket hits which set off secondary explosions which spewed shrapnel fragments over a wide area, causing fires and destroying and damaging U. S. Navy structures and materials.

Elsewhere in I Corps, NAVSUPPACT Detachment Sa Huynh in Quang Ngai Province (BS 928 221) received five enemy mortar rounds on 25 February. Three impacted in the water near POL barges, and two rounds landed on a nearby hillside. The mortar attack was accompanied by small-arms fire

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from directions north and east of the island. NSAD reaction personnel returned the fire with .50 caliber, M-79 and M-60 fire. Gunships were also called to the scene. One pusher boat sustained minor damages and one Navyman was wounded during the attack.

On 27 February, two enemy 122-mm rounds slammed into the NAVSUPPACT, Danang covered storage area (BT 055 795) causing extensive damage, including wounds sustained by 13 Navymen. More rockets were lobbed at the Danang bridge loading ramp (BT 035 762) during a rocket barrage on the 27th, destroying LCU 1500 and YFU 78. LCU 1500 received a direct hit by a rocket of unknown size. Ammunition on the LCU was detonated and an explosion occurred with fire spreading to the nearby IFU. Another craft, LCU 1614, sustained minor damage by shrapnel. Total U. S. Navy personnel casualties were reported at 21 Navymen: killed and 38 wounded.

The enemy initiated attacks in the Giant Slingshot area, III Corps, on 23 February, with a OlOO assault on Tan An, followed by attacks in Ben Luc, Co Dau Hoa, Duc Hoa, and Tra Cu, in rapid succession. The enemy employed rocket and 82-mm mortar fire with coordinated ground movement in their rapid attacks. Navy units in these areas were already poised for such attacks as a result of published intelligence by CTG 194.9. The only USN casualties resulting from these attacks occurred at Go Dau Hoa when one Navyman was killed and five others were wounded. Enemy casualties resulting from return fire were unknown.

In IV Corps, the Dong Tam Support Base received 24 rounds of 82-mm

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Mortar and seven rounds of 75-mm recoilless-rifle fire on 23 February. No hits were received in the Navy area or within the Mobile Riverine Base. There were negative reports on U. S. Navy casualties.

On 26 February, 11 enemy rockets impacted in My Tho City. The My Tho PER base received a direct hit and several near misses. One round hit a bunker in the corner of the base. There were no USN personnel casualties. Material damage was minor shrapnel dispersion into a SEAL quonsist structure; major damage to one electrical connection bax and phong. lines between PER base and Victory Hotel were severed.

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#### OPERATION SEA LCR DS SUMMARY February 1969

Each campaign area in Operation SEA LORDS remained at a high leval of activity during February. Vietnamese Navy (VNN) participation increased with the transfer of TF 117 craft to the VNN to form two Rive. Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID) which began operations in the GIANT SLINUSHOT Campaign and the addition of coastal group units to the Rach Giang Than -Vinh Te Campaign for Operation TRAN HUNG DAO. Results obtained from both interdiction and river incursion operations showed improvement with increased employment of ground forces in combined and joint operations with the naval forces. Enemy opposition to uperation SEA LORDS forces remained heavy, especially in the GIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign.

Along the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong rivers, patrol and river assault craft hampered enemy movement taking evading craft under fire on more than 30 occasions. On several of these occasions arms and ammunition were discovered in the evading craft. On the evening of 27 February an evading sarpan, abandoned by its occupants after being fired on, was searched and found to contain two AK-47 rifles and 72 B-40/41 rockets. Patrol craft participated in nearly 60 ground operations by inserting small reconnaissance patrols, company size landing forces, and by providing blocking patrols. Twice during the month major operations, KKEL HAUL I & II, utilized convoys of patrol craft and heavy assault craft. These convoys were formed to carry out river ambushes and ground

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sweeps on the Van Co Dong between Hiep Hoa and Go Dau Ha. Operation KEEL HAUL I took place 8 - 12 February and KEEL HAUL II occurred 21 - 25 February. Ground and naval forces in Operation GIANTSLINGSHOT accounted for 123 energy killed (81 body count plus 42 estimated), 8 captured, 6 Hoi Chanhs, 9 suspects detained, 10 sampans captured, 48 junks/sampans destroyed. In addition to the evading craft taken under fire there were more than 80 instances when fixed wing or helicopter strikes/artillery fire were called in or the river craft engaged enemy positions. Enemy opposition came in the form of more than 70 hostile fire incidents plus 7 booby trap detonations. In addition, enemy attacks by fire and light ground probes on bases came with the post-Tet offensive beginning on 23 February. These attacks began at Tan An followed shortly by attacks at Ben Luc, Go Dau Ha, Duc Hoa, and Tra Cu. Go Dau Ha and Tra Cu were hit again on the 21th and 25th. The initial attack on Go Daù Ha was the most serious when one navyman was killed and five wounded as 10 rockets and 35 mortar rounds hit the area. Total friendly losses in February GIANT SLINGSHOT operations came to 5 USN and 1 USA killed; 49 USN, 19 USA and 5 VN wounded; 20 USN and 2 VNN craft damaged; and 1 PBR destroyed. January operations appear to have cleared out most of the large energy arms caches near the two rivers as the number discovered fell from more than 40 to only 3 in February. Material captured in arms caches and direct action with the energy included:

> 20,000 rounds small arms ammunition 9 107-mm rockets 76 B-40 rockets 6 B-41 rockets

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- 1 B-40 launcher
- 2 RPG-2 rounds
- 19 RPG-7 rounds
- 16 recoilless rifle rounds (57-mm 5, 75-mm 11)
- 25 mines, bangalore torpedoes, claymores, etc.
- 38 grenades 70 pounds of explosives plus detonators and fuzes
- 32 Individual weapons
- 10 miscellaneous guantities of documents and medical supplies.
- 10 kilograms rice

The energy mine threat that had developed in January on the Kinh Lagrange and Kinh Ong Lon appeared to be neutralized by the chain drag mine sweeping carried out during February in the BARRIER REEF interdiction campaign. Hostile fire incidents numbered eight with only two navymen wounded. Two Vietnamese were killed and one wounded in an attack on an outpost which patrol craft aided in suppressing with their gunfire. While ground forces were not as available as in the QIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign a total of 14 sweeps, reconnaissance probes or ambushes were carried out jointly with RE/PF's or CIDG units. These operations, plus nine occasions when patrol craft guns or Seawolf strikes were brought to bear on enemy positions, resulted in five Viet Cong killed, three wounded, and 46 structures destroyed. In addition, one evading craft was taken under fire destroying the sampan and killing an estimated four Viet Cong. Another aspect of BARRIER EFEF operations was a medcap and extensive psyops carried out in the vicinity of the major enemy north to south crossing point on the Ong Lon.

As in EARRIER REEF mine sweeping during February appeared to neutralize the mine threat on the Vinh Te Canal. Daily patrols by PBR's on the Vinh

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Te and PCP's supported by an ATC on the Rach Giang Thanh continued during the month. Low water in the western portions of the Vinh Te hampered operations somewhat and district and provincial forces remained reluctant to join in operations on this section of the infiltration patrols along the Cambodian border. With the commencement of Operation TRAN HUNG EAO in mid-February and the introduction of SEAL operations along the Rach Giang Than the amployment of ground forces began to show improvement. The VNN forces consisting of units from two coastal groups (8 Command, 2) Kien Giang, and 6 Yabuta Junks), 80 reaction troops, 4 LCVP and 2 FOM began operating initally from Ha Tien. On 20 February additional VNN coastal and river assault units began their operations from Chau Doc on the Vinh Te and north westward along the Chau Doc River (VNN mine eweeping of the Vinh Te by LCVP had started in late January). During the month four hostile fire incidents resulted in one navyman killed and four wounded, one VNN LCVP sunk, and severel VNN wounded.

Operations in the Each Gia Campaign continued with patrols occasionally extending out from the Each Gia-Long Xuyen Canal onto Kinh Ba The, Kinh Tri Ton, Kinh Chung Ban, Kinh Each Soi, and Ha Tien-Each Gia Canal. Patrols were largely unopposed with no USN casualties in only five hostile fire incidents which were directed primarily at ground units being supported. Contact with enemy units was made on several occasions by RF/PF's and ARVM operating with patrol craft and EF boat units. Eacults of these actions included 14 RF/PF or AEVM killed and 57 wounded, 56 Viet Cong killed and

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7 captured, one arms cache discovered, and 133 structures destroyed.

Coastal patrol craft continued their raids into rivers and canals off the Gulf of Thailand; South China Sea; and portions of the Co Chien Ham Luong, Soi Rap, and Rung Sat Special Zone patrolled by "Swift" boats. The most significant trend in these operations was the employment of reaction forces with the "Swift" boats to engage energy units along the waterways. Also noteworthy was the decrease in hostile fire incidents and the conduct of almost routine patrols on rivers which the PCF's had to fight their way onto in prior months. However, the energy did deliver deadly accurate rocket fire from well prepared positions in several engagements with one "Swift" boat sunk and another nearly lost (see Coastal Surveillance Summary for details). Results of the 48 river incursions includeds

Energy casualties:

a.	Killed	28 (20 BC + 8 EST)
Ъ.	Wounded	1 EST
c.	Captured	9

Friendly casualties:

8.	Killed
Ъ.	Wounded

1 (MSF soldier) 18 (16 USN, 1 MSF and 1 newsman)

Enery material losses:

8.	Destroyed (1) Junks or sampans (2) Structures	484 685
Ъ.	(3) Rice Damaged	14 tons
-•	(1) Junks or sampans (2) Structures	129 38 <b>3</b>
c.	Captured (1) Junks or sampans	2

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### Friendly material losses

а.	Craft	damaged	5*
		destroyed	0#

# PCF 71 which sark in 10 feet of water was salvaged.

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#### CCASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY February 1969

Sea and air surveillance patrols along the coast of South Vietnam continued to maintain a highly effective barrier against the infiltration of arms and ammunition by sea. During February nearly 75 percent of the 32,407 junks and sampans detected were checked by 15,361 inspections and 8,894 boardings. Boarding operations resulted in the detention of 696 persons for curfew or restricted area violations, improper papers, and other suspicious activity. In addition craft which attempted to evade when challenged were taken under fire killing or wrunding the occupants on at least 19 occasions. Other coastal surveillance activity consisted of 1,411 detections of steel hulled vessels transiting MARKET TIME areas. No suspicious activity was disclosed by 603 close aboard inspections and 33 boardings.

Since the beginning of Operation SEA LORDS in late October 1968 TF 115 "Swift" boats have steadily increased the extent of normal river patrol operations. The expanded functions are carried out to free TF 116 PBR's for employment elsewhere and to maintain a US/GVN presence on rivers and canals opened by prior "Swift" boat river raids. In the Rung Sat Special Zone two PCF's under CTG 116.9 operational control continued routine patrols on the Soi Rap detecting 2,210 craft and carrying out 703 inspections and 1,053 boardings. In addition the PCF's assigned inshore patrol stations off the lower Soi Rap and Long Tau patrolled on these rivers until 20 February.

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On 18 February one "Swift" boat under the operational control of CTG 194.9 began patrols on the "handle" of GIANT SLINGSHOT, the Van Co River. Here 1,005 craft were detected and 486 inspections and 218 boardings carried out. As in prior months "Swift" boat patrols continued on more than 70 miles of the lower Ham Luong and Co Chien rivers under the operational control of CTG 115.3.

During the entire month 2 to 3 PUF's in company with an ATC maintained routine patrols on the Rach Giang Thanh covering that portion of the Rach Giang Thanh/Vinh Te Canal interdiction barrier along the Cambodian border. In addition, patrols and operations in support of ground forces began to take place on a near daily basis on the Bay Hap and Cva Lon rivers in southerm Ca Mau Peninsula. Near mid-February PCF's in the First Coastal Zone also began conducting patrols on the Cua Dai River, 26 miles southeast of Danang.

Craft patrolling on all rivers carried out numerous gunfire support missions and participated in frequent ground operations by providing blocking patrole and landing or recovering troops. The latter aspect of operating with reconnaisance troops and embarking a reaction force on river incursions and raids marked a significant change in the nature of TF 115 river operations. Enemy forces initiating fire fights with "Swift" boats now often find themselves under attack by troops supported by the concentrated fire power provided by the PCF's.

Naval gunfire by TF 115 units scored heavily against enemy formes and installations again in February. Destruction of enemy junks and sampans

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was especially high and hurt the Viet Cong primary means of mobility in the areas of TF 115 operations. A total of 758 naval gunfire missions including targets engaged on nearly 50 river raids and patrols resulted in the destruction of 1,037 junks and sampans and 1,006 structures and bunkers plus another 877 junks/sampans/structures/tunkers damaged. Enemy personnel losses came to 131 killed (94 by body count plus 37 estimated), 50 wounded, and 9 captured. In 28 hostile fire incidents and two mine detonations TF 115 units sustained one killed (one Mobile Strike Force soldier) and 24 wounded (including one CES newsman and one Mobile Strike Force soldier). Material losses came to 6 "Swift" boats damaged and one sunk which was later salwaged.

On 1 February four PCF's carried out combined operations with EOD personnel and RF/PF iroops from Cai Muoc along the Bay Hap River on the west side of the Ca Mau Peninsula. At a point two miles up river PCF's 21, 50, 72 and 93 came under AK-47 sniper fire which was suppressed with no friendly casualties. After embarking the RF/PF units at Cai Nuoc approximately 8 miles up the river the craft proceeded another three miles to a canal running south toward the Cua Lon River. On the canal several bunkers and two barricades were discovered and destroyed by the EOD team. After sweeping along the canal for approximately four miles the RF/FF's reboarded the "Swift" boats for the return trip to Cai Nuoc. On the way back to the open sea targets of opportunity were fired on. Results of the day's operation totaled 15 bunkers, 3 structures, 5 sampans, 2 barricades, and 400 pounds of rice destroyed; 5 bunkers, 16 structures, and 3 sampans heavily damaged; and one

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Viet Cong suspect detained. On the 3rd a similar operation was conducted by PCF's 5, 13 and 50 for the second of eight incursions on the Bay Hap during the month.

At the month's end preparations were underway for basing a SEAL platoon at Cai Muoc as a particularly significant operation took place on the 28th. A three PCF operation had encountered intense hostile rocket and automatic weapors fire from positions three miles from the river mouth on the evening of the 27th wounding one crewman on PCF 23. On the morning of the 28th PCF's 23, 43 and 94 again entered the river and embarked RF/PF's from Cai Nuce for a probe of the enemy positions. Landing parties from PCF's 23 and 94 discovered fresh spider holes and much empty brass in the area as PCF 43 provided cover from the river. After ECD personnel destroyed two bunkers the landing parties were reembarked for another probe three miles further up river. Heavy small arms fire was net as the planned landing area was neared. With 30 troops on board each craft the three "Swift" boats responded immediately by turning toward and beaching opposite the enony positions. This surprise maneuver caused the Viet Cong to stand and run, followed closely by the RF/PF's. As the action moved up river PCF's 23 and 43 followed and again came under hostile fire. Again the enemy positions were charged with PCF 93 joining in the action. With the RF/PF's already ashore this time FCF creamen went ashore in pursuit of the enemy. During this phase of the action one Viet Cong was killed and his still loaded rocket launcher ceptured. Total results of the day's action included 30 sampans,

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15 structures, 7 bunkers, 12 tons of rice, 1 still, and 50 gallons of liquor destroyed; 2 sewing machines, 6 individual weapons, one rocket launcher, small arms ammunition, enemy psyops material, a man, a woman, and a child captured; and 10 Viet Cong killed (4 by PCF's and 6 by RF/PF's). There were no friendly casualties and the "Swift" boats received only minor damage.

On 11 February, 10 PCF's teamed with an LFR, an LST, an MSO, a WPB, a WHEC, an airborne spotter, Air Force jets, and Mobile Strike Force (MSF) troops to carry out eight hours of operations on the southern portion of the Ca Mau Peningula. After preparatory naval gunfire by USCGC WACETSET (WHEC 44), USCOC POINT CYPRESS and USS WHITE RIVER (LFR 536) the river incursions began at 1223. At the mouth of the Rach Duong Keo PCF's 43, 14 and 71 proceeded approximately 2 ½ miles up river while 20 MSF troops swept up the east river bank. Also starting from the same point PCF's 3, 10, and 31 proceeded about two miles up the Trum Gong River for a psycps broadcast. At the same time 10 miles to the east-northeast POF's 28, 53, 60, and 103 entered the Rach Nang and in just four minutes came under heavy hostile fire from the south bank about one mile up river. With PCF 103 taking two rocket rounds in the port engine and PCF 60 hit in the bow below the waterline all four craft turned back down river and cleared the mouth about 15 minutes later. Two men were slightly wounded in this engagement, one each from PC7's 60 and 53. Then an effort to save FCF 60 which was starting to settle by the bow comtinued for over an hour. Finally when a P-250 was brought from the POINT CT-PRESS BT PCF hill the flooding was brought under control with the bow already

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below the surface. Temporary repairs were then made by WHITE RIVER as the remaining undamaged craft assembled for another venture up the Rach Nang after the enemy positions were hit by air strikes and naval gunfire in the early afternoon. At 1625 PCF's 3, 10, 31, 43, 44, and 71 with the MSF troops embarked headed up river. The troops were landed at the river mouth and contact was soon made as PCF 71 took a rocket hit on the port side. By 1630 the troops had surrounded the energy firing position. In the ensuing fire fight two Viet Cong were killed and another probably killed before the enemy retreated up river with the MSF unit in pursuit until darkness forced breaking contact. In addition 3 crewmen on PCF 10 were wounded by broken glass. Efforts to beach PCF 71 after clearing the river failed and the "Swift" boat sank in ten feet of water a half mile south of the river mouth. Other enemy losses to PCF and MSF forces during the day came to 27 bunkers, 20 claymore mines, 28 grenades, one structure, and one sampan destroyed; 2 K-47 rifles captured; and numerous bunkers damaged. One MSF soldier was woulded.

On 12 February PCF's 18, 39, and 99 entered the Cua Dai and proceeded to Hoi An in company with three Yabuta junks of Coastal Group 14. At Hoi An a pre-Tet concert was performed by the Third Marine Amphibious Force drum and bugle corps in the market place. Other payops activities were carried out as tapes were broadcast and numerous materials were passed out. On the transit back to sea targets of opportunity were taken under fire and light hostile fire encountered causing no damage or casualties.

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On the 24th PCF 67, while on patrol on the Co Chien River, received a request to provide transportation for the Naval Intelligence Liafson Officer, Tra Vinh. After proceeding about 2 miles up the Tra Vinh Canal from the river the "Swift" boat's stern was lifted out of the water and two crewmen thrown overboard by a command detonated mine. After recovering the two men from the canal PCF 67 proceeded back to the Co Chien where PCF 22 arrived to provide assistance. After the flooding could not be controlled PCF 67 was beached at Coastal Group 35. Three of the six men wounded were placed on PCF 22 and the other three went to Coastal Group 35 for medevac. After the flooding was brought under control PCF 71 made temporary repairs and proceeded to Vinh Long escorted by PCF 57.

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#### RIVER PATROL FORCE SUPPLARY February 1969

In February, in addition to resources control and interdiction patrols on the rivers and canals of the Delta and ESS2, GAME WARDEN forces cont med to support Operation SEA LORDS by conducting interdiction operations in the Each Gia, Vinh Te Canal, Earrier Beef and Giant Slingshot campaigns.

Encay initiated incidents were relatively infrequent for most of the month and were lowest during the encay-declared truce period of 15-22 February in honor of the Tet holidays. Intelligence sources continued to look for the start of a new encay offensive during the period around Tet. The attacks launched by the encay throughout the country in the early morning hours of 23 February were evaluated as the beginning of the new offensive. After the initial attacks encay activity against Naval forces remained substantial for about five days. The last day of the month showed a noticeable decline to the level of the pre-offensive period. Some intelligence reports advise that the offensive may be accomplished in several phases. One report states that captured documents indicate there are to be three phases, of 5, 10, and 19 days respectively.

There were seven enemy attacks on conmercial shipping during the month. All of these occurred during the period 23-27 February. The SS OCALA VICTORY on 23 February was attacked twice, once 20 miles southeast of Saigon (YS 100 645) and the second time when ill miles southeast of the capital (XS 995 765). The first attack was believed to be a

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command detonated mine that caused no damage to the ship; the second was an EPG attack that also caused no damage. The same day, the SS ANCEOR came under SPG attack when about 11 miles southeast of Saigon (IS 985 763) with no damage incurred. On 24 February, 17 miles southeast of Saigon (IS 041 681) the SS LAWRENCE VICTORY and the SS ELWELL were passing in midstream on the Long Tau Hiver when they came under hostile RPG attack from the east bank of the river. No hits were taken and there were no casualties. On 27 February in a four hour period three different ships on the Long Tau cans under hostile rocket attack. The SS AMARIA was fired on 102 miles from Saigon (XS 988 775). One rocket hit the ship causing minor damage. The Japanese ship WACO MARU received two rocket rounds 133 miles from Saigon (TS 048 722), taking one direct hit and incurring minor damage. The previously mentioned LAWRENCE VICTORY received 7 rockets from a point 18 miles southeast of Saigon (YS 038 648). taking two hits on the starboard side and suffering minor damage. There were no friemly personnel casualties during any of these attacks. Energy casualties as a result of PER and Seawolf return fire are unknown.

During this reporting period GAME WARDEN units detected 168,448 craft and conducted 36,820 inspections and 53,435 boardings. This is slightly less than a 2 percent decrease over last month's detections. Although there has been a decrease in the number of detections made by GAME WARDEN forces over the past few months, this is explained by the fact that TF 116 units have been called upon to support various SEA LORDS operations. Their former

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station and the responsibility for resources and population control on the lower parts of the rivers of the Delta have been assumed by TF 115 units,

United States Navy fatalities for the month were six, a forty percent decrease from last month's figure. The enemy, in the meantime, suffered an almost 91 percent increase in his fatalities. This month's enemy killed were 189 (body count) and 121 (probable).

About 0100 on 3 February a group of SEALs were inserted by LSSC on an island 11 miles west of My Tho (XS 325 408). The LSSC and the two PER's in company then placed a blockade around the area while the SEALs began a house to house search. One Viet Cong was uncovered in a spiderhole and utilized as a guide for the rest of the search. They followed a foot print trail into heavy brush at the edge of the island, attempted to get the Viet Cong to come out of the brush and failing, opened fire on the area. Four Viet Cong were killed and another was wounded. Thirteen Vietnamese males were detained as a result of the house search. After interrogation of the detainees, nine were released, two were classified Viet Cong on their own admission and two others were listed as draft dodgers. The four prisoners were turned over to the My Tho police for disposition.

As part of Operation KEEL HAUL, on the evening of 11 February, three ambushes were set up along the Van Co Dong River, utilizing two PBR's at each location. A rowing patrol of two PER's was established on the river, remaining in the area of operations. The rowing patrol, PER's

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40 and 123, were proceeding north on the river to rendesvous with tango boats, also part of the operation, when they came under heavy rocket and automatic weapons fire from the west bank of the river about 9 miles northwest of Luc Hoa (IS 468 038). The enemy ambush area was estimated to be 400 meters long and contained four B-40 rocket positions and 10-12 automatic weapons positions. The lead boat, PBH 123, received one B-40 rocket hit on the forecastle centerline cleat. PBR 40, the cover boat, received two B-40 rounds in the stern sheet area. The cover boat ran aground on the east bank of the river at full speed ending up 25-30 meters inland of the beach. Initial U.S. casualties were one wounded on the lead boat; one killed, one missing, and two wounded, one of them critically, on the cover boat. The critically wounded sailor subsequently died of wounds and the sailor listed as missing was later found dead. PER's from one of the ambush sites raced to the scene. With the arrival of the tango boats, 60 troops from C Company, 2/27th Infantry were inserted for perimeter security for salvage operations. Two alfa boats and two tango boats were needed to pull the PER off the beach. After successfuly freeing the boat it was towed to Tra Cu. While searching for the missing in action sailor, a small energy arms cache was discovered. Energy casualties for this encounter are miknown.

During early afternoon of 16 February, 17 miles west of Duc Hoa on the Vam Co Dong River (XS 490 965), PER's 753 and 754 received one

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recoilless-rifle round and three rockets from the east bank of the river. PER 753 sustained hits portside forward of the coxswain's flat, resulting in a holing of the hull and a fire aboard the boat. Both crews fought the fire until it became uncontrollable; the boat was then abandoned and the crew boarded PER 754. The PER was engulfed in flame and remained in mid-stream circling out-of-control finally beaching on the east bank of the river. After the ammunition and fuel tanks blew up the PER sank. Two personnel were wounded slightly in the attack. Enemy casualties are unknown.

The following day, 3 miles southwest of Duc Hoa, (XS 562 934) in the early afternoon, PER's 842 and 754 came under rockot and automatic weapons fire. PER 754 was hit in the coxewains' flat, killing the boat captain and wounding three of the crew. The PER's left the area for medewac and were replaced by another patrol acting as on scene commander for LHFT and artillery fire. Enemy casualties are unknown.

On 19 February, 9 miles east of Tan An (XS 700 668), TU 195.9.5 was in night waterborne ambush position on the west bank of the Van Co Dong River. The boat at the southern end of the ambush sighted three sampans, with four occupants each, enter the river from a small canal on the east bank and proceed north staying near the east bank. The PER's illuminated the sampans and took them under fire. No return fire was received. The sampans were pulled from the bank to the middle of the river for inspect-

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as probable kills. Three AK-47's and a box of assorted medicines and documents were recovered from the sampans. There were no U. S. casualties.

Six PHR's were requested by the senior sector advisor of Tra Cu to block a canal three to five miles west of 7 - 34 (XR 305 702 to XR 335 714) on the early afternoon of 24 February. The request was initiated as a result of the inability of pinned down RF/PF forces to pursue Viet Cong troops escaping from the firefight area. The PBR's had previously been requested to place 60-mm mortar fire into the same area in support of the Vietnamese troops. The PBR's requested Seawolf cover for the incursion. With the arrival of two Seawolves, the PER's entered the canal. Light automatic weapons fire was encountered and the PER's returned and suppressed the fire. The Seawclves placed strikes in the same areas and at targets along the canal designated by a forward air controller (FAC) on the scene. As the PER's advanced up the canal, they took armed evading personnel under fire, killing 11, one of which was a Viet Cong tax extortionist, and wounding another. The Seawolves returned to their LST for replenishment and returned to the area upon its completion. Whey they returned the PER's departed from the canal and the Seawolves placed strikes on targets of opportunity as designated by FAC. Seawolves strikes accounted for an additional 16 of the enemy killed. There were no U. S. casualties.

Beacting to intelligence of a Viet Cong wedding to be held on 25

Enclosure (4)

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February, with 20-30 VCI/guerrillas in attendance, four PER's embarked 30 PF's and 14 National Police from Cai Be and proceeded to the area 7 miles northeast of Vinh Long (XS 157 408). At the same time 30 troops of 2/39th Infantry Battalion, U. S. NINTH Division proceeded to the area by helo. As the boats approached the landing area 25 civilians, apparently part of the wedding ceremony, scattered into the interior of the island. The troops from the boats began immediate pursuit and the PER's spread out to block the area from the river. Army troops inland had scattered contact shortly after landing but the Viet Cong broke off immediately. A sumpar with three males aboard left the landing area and headed south, ignoring the warning shots of the PER's. As the sampan approached the south bank it was taken under direct fire. One male jumped from the sampan and started swimming to the beach. He was taken under fire and killed. The sampan was apprehended and the two occupants were turned over to U. S. Army S-2 Cai Be. The troops continued the cordon and search and several Viet Cong and the bride in the wedding ceremony were captured. One Chieu Hoi to USA troops stated he could lead them to his weapon. The troops returned inland with the Chieu Hoi while the PBR's extracted the PF's and National Police. Returning to shore with the Chieu Hoi and his weapon for pickup by the PBR, the Army troops encountered one Viet Cong squad and killed two of them in the resulting fire fight. A total of five Viet Cong were detained. There were no friendly casualties.

At the request of the Tra On senior sector advisor two Seavolves were

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Enclosure (4) CONTREMENTER

scrambled, in mid-morning 24 February, to support U.S.-advised troops in heavy contact with the enemy within three kilometers of the Tra On (XR 044 046 - XR 047 046). The Vietnamese troops were being pinned down by a crew served automatic weapon. The LHFT placed multiple strikes in the area and received heavy automatic weapons fire on each pass. After rearming and refueling, the Seawelves delivered the HA(L)-3 flight surgeon to treat 14 friendly wounded, then placed additional strikes in support of the troops. The Seawelves were credited with 20 Viet Cong killed. Before returning to Binh Thuy, they embarked four of the Vietnamese wounded for medevac to Can The.

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While patrolling the Vinh Te Canal on the night of 27 February, the lead boat of TU 116.5.2 was struck by an underwater explosion 16 miles southwest of Chau Doc (VS 925 685). The mine exploded under the stern of the boat throwing three of the crewmembers overboard and knocking the boat captain and patrol officer to the deck. The gates were jammed open as a result of the explosion and the boat beached. Seawolves were scrambled and the cover boat picked up the personnel in the water. Two PER patrols, one from Tinh Bien and the other from an ambush position east of Tinh Bien arrived on the scene and secured the area around the PER and landing zone. The Seawolves medevaced three of the crew to Chau Doc. Harasement and interdiction fire from the Ba Yoai Special Forces camp was spotted into the field between the border and the mining site. The mined PER was taken under tow to Tinh Bien. No enemy fire was received during the entire incident.

Enclosure (4)

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#### RIVERINE ASSAULT FORCE SUMMARY February 1969

Twenty-five river assault craft of River Division 91 were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 February, in ceremonies alongside USS ERNEWAH (APB - 35), flagship of CTF 117. Vice Admiral Zumwalt, CCM/AVFORV/CHNAVADGRU and Commodore Chon, Vietnamese Chief of Naval Operations presided. As of 1 February, River Assault Division 91 was dissolved.

MRF activity continued in the same pattern established in recent months with MRG "A" supporting units of the 2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry Division in Kien Hoa Province, and MRG "B" roving the lower Delta in support of Vietnamese Infantry and Marine Corps operations.

After several months hiatus, enemy initiated fire fights (ENIFF's) resumed on 16 February against MRG "A" assault craft in Kien Hoa Province. Naval craft came under attack 14 times during the month. The increased enemy activity in Kien Hoa is reflected in the substantial increase in his losses, an average of 23 KIA per day. Unevaluated for the most part, are the results of MRF return and suppression fire.

Although MRG "B" craft came under attack 13 times during the month, ground contact during operations or after quick reaction insertions was in general, light, as the energy remained elusive.

Twenty-nine river assault craft of RAD 92 continued to work in the GLANT SLINGSHOT Operation area, supporting troop lift of CIDG (Civilian Irregular Defense Group), PRU, RF/PF and U. S. Army units along with escort and patrol duties. MRF forces along the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong

GROUP 4 Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years Enclosure (5)

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#### Rivers incurred energy hostile fire 14 times during the month.

Enemy swimmer activity within each of the mobile riverine bases was observed on six separate occasions by vigilant lookouts. Hull inspec-, tions revealed negative results on all occasions.

The following table indicates the extent and diversity of MRF boat assignment during a typical day in February:

### ACTIVITY/OPERATION

### MRF CRAFT ASSIGNED

	ASPB	ATC	MON	CCB	REPUTLIER
2nd Brigade, U. S. 9th Infantry Division (MRG "A")	15	31	5	1	2
hth Battalion VNHC (NRG "B")	1	6	3	1	
Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT	11	11	3	Ŀ,	
Task Unit 116.5.4	2	2			
Task Group 115.4		1			
MRG "A" Base Defense	1	16	1	1	
MRG "B" Base Defense	5	14	1	2	1
Casualty Reports	1	1	1		
Overhaul/Conversion/Backfit	1	8	3	•	1
Totals:	40	90	17	ঈ	<b>T</b>
Transferred to Vietnamese Navy 1 February:	8	13	3	1	

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#### TASK GROUP 117.1 OPERATIONS

Standard watermobile, airmobile and infantry activity continued this month as MRG "A" operated primarily in several districts of Kien Hoa Province.

Infantry troops experienced occasionally heavy contact and the highest monthly casualty total on record was inflicted on the enemy as he lost 678 killed, 8 wounded and 194 detained. U. S. casualties were 26 killed (1 USX, 25 USA) and 187 wounded (35 USN, 152 USA). Navy casualties mounted as the enemy reinstituted attacks against MRG "A" assault craft on the Een Tre and Ha Lai Rivers. Enemy initiated fire fights (ENIFF's) begin on 16 February and continued throughout the month.

On two occasions, RAC came under particularly heavy and well-aimed fire during ELEF's originating from river banks. At 1230 on 24 February, while enroute to landing sites with Delta Company of the 3/47 Infantry embarked, units of RAD 131 received combined rocket and automatic weapons fire from both banks of the Song Ba Lai, at a position three miles northeast of Ben Tre (XS539 363). Six craft were hit resulting in 11 USN wounded (none serious) and only light damage to the boats. Fire was returned and suppressed with unknown results. On 27 February, RAD 112, enroute to beach sites on the Song Ba Lai with ALFA Company of the 3/60th Infantry aboard, came under heavy rocket, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire from both banks at a position four miles northeast of Ben Tre (IS 575 347). Fire was returned and suppressed. Twolve USN were wounded

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in this encounter (8 minor, 4 serious) and one VC was killed. Five of the assault craft received hits.

Energy swimmers with SCUBA gear were sighted within close proximity of the USS VERNON COUNTY (IST 1161) at MRB AIFA, at Dong Tam, on two successive days - at 1635 on the 25th and at 2120 on the 26th. A swimmer was sighted climbing out of the water on the 25th. He was taken under fire by a 3/60th Infantry sniper on board API-26 and was listed as a probable VC killed. In both cases concussion grenades were dropped into the water. Subsequent hull inspections by EOD personnal had negative results.

A Viet Cong attempt to emulate the MRF occasioned disastrous results. Two platoons of Alfa Company, 3/60th Infantry in night positions along the Each An Einh, three miles southeast of No Cay (IS 501 157), detected three large motorized sampans moving northward along the waterway, reconning the banks by fire. The soldiers quickly set up an ambush and took the sampans under fire. Twenty-one of the energy were killed and three sampans were captured. There were no U.S. casualties:

#### TASK GROUP 117.2 OPERATIONS

Water blockades along the Song Can Tho and Kinh Xa Mo in Phong Dinh Province, begun 30 January, continued this month. The 21st ARVN Infantry Division had been conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations to prevent massing of VC forces in the area. The RAC, working in conjunction with elements of the 21st ARVN Infantry Division, established a water blockade along the Song Can Tho from the Cai Rang Bridge (WS 826 059) in Phong Dinh Province to a point eight miles west of Can Tho (WS 710 400) and along the Kinh Xa Mo from Thuan Mon (WR 643 923) to the junction of the Kinh Xa Mo and Song Can Tho. One company each of the Enclosure (5)

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2nd Battalion Vietnamese Marine Corps and the 295th Phong Dinh Regional Force Company were embarked as ready reaction forces. During the operation, which lasted until the morning of 3 February, a total of 7,659 sampans were processed resulting in 62 detainees, 3 of which were confirmed Viet Cong. Ground forces reported only light and sporadic contact throughout.

On 23 February, RAS 15 commenced operations in Tax Binh District of Vinh Long Province in support of units of the 9th ARVN Infantry Division. Mission objectives were to destroy enemy bunkers and defensive positions in enemy base area 478 and to conduct riverine assault and eagle float operations as part of an extensive 9th ARVN Infantry campaign to drive the VC from the area. Enemy resistance was encountered early, as two B-40 rocket grenedes were fired at the RAC at 1255 on the 23rd, shortly after backloading troops banks of the Ranh Ba Ke, three miles rorth of Tan Binh (XS 082 177). One recist hit the consvain's flat on A-152-1 wounding two sailors. The craft returned and suppressed the fire. One company of troops was landed as a reaction force and established light contact, killing two VC and capturing one B-40 launcher and one AX-47. One ARVN soldier was killed and two wounded. Supporting helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft placed strikes on the energy positions after the RAC departed the area. The aircraft destroyed six bunkers, damaged four and observed three secondary explosions. Frequent troop insections gained light and sporadic contact as the operation continued. Monitor

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105-mm howitzer and LHFT fire into suspected energy troop concentrations produced several large secondary explosions. Thus far in February, RAS 15 units in the Tan Binh area have received hostile fire 10 times, one sailor has been killed and 19 wounded; 10 Viet Cong are known dead. MRG "B" EOD personnel have destroyed 132 bunkers along riverbanks as the operation continues into March.

Enemy swimmer sightings occurred within MRG "B" on 5, 7, and 9 February. In each case, results of swimmer search and hull investigations were negative.

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	USN STATISTI Februar		,
	MARKET TIME	GAME WARDEN	MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE
Detections	37,034	8بلبار168	*
Inspections	17,153	36,820	5,498
Boardings	10,190		#
Craft detained	<b>#</b>	0	<b>#</b>
Persons detained	696	667	276 + 21++
Viet Cong suspects	56	38	
Hostile fire incidents	28	*	27 + 14 <b>**</b>
Enemy cesualties:			as made and a statement between
a. Killed 131 (9)	$\pm BC + 37 EST)$	194 (BC)+131 (PROP	8) 706(PC) + 14(PROB)/5**
b. Wounded		5(BC)+ 12(PRO	
c. Captured	9	13	17
USN casualties:			O NON /OF THE /- T TONING
a. Killed	0* Չև <del>*</del>		2 USN/26 USA/+ 1 USN**
b. Wounded	24 <del>*</del> 0	•	46 USN/156 USA
o. Captured	0	0	0 2 USA
d. Missing Enemy material losses:	v	Ŷ	. 2 004
a. Destroyed:			
(1) Junks or s		132	10/+ 9##
(2) Structures		227	796/+ 23**
b. Capturod:	1,000	22(	150/4 23-4
(1) Junks or s	2 ana	20	1**
			67
(2) Ammunition	(rounds) 0 )1h(destroyed)	See page 2	35,390/+ 68,440**
(b) Rice (tons	)14 (destroyed)	See page 2	J) J
c. Damaged:	)14 (069 01 0 <b>9 64 )</b>	, nee have r	3
(1) Junks or s	ampan <b>s 233</b>	. 51	
(2) Structures		161	
USN material losses:	044		-
a. Destroyed:			
(1) Surface cr	aft #3##	1	0
(2) Helicopter	s 0		- +
b. Damaged:	•	v	
(1) Surface cr	aft 7#	*** 34	27#####/6##
(2) Helicopter		. 3	→ , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
SAR missions	<b>4</b>	Ť.	*
Ark Occ		Slingshot operat:	

WIA on TF 194 (MARKET TIME Raider) operations.
WIA on TF 194 (MARKET TIME Raider) operations.
PCF 71 sank on 1 February and was later salvaged
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GROUP 4 Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years Enclosure (6)

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#### TF 116 Captured Weapons/Ammunition

- Individual weapons ฮ
- 9 Grenades

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- 2
- 4
- 14
- Grenades 107-mm rockets (complete) RFG-7 rockets rounds B-40 rockets B-41 rockets Water mines (100 lbs) Land mines <sup>1</sup>/<sub>3</sub> lb blocks of C-4 Bangalore torpedo Clips/magazines for individual weapons Small arms rounds Chicom machine-cun armo 10
- 637
- 1 Box Chicom machine-gun ammo

#### TF 116 Captured Foodstuffs

600		Rice
1,080	1 <b>bs</b>	Salt

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#### NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP February 1969

#### Vietnamese Navy

The Vietnamese Navy encountered moderate enamy activity throughout most of the month of February with an increase in harrassment, mortar, mining, and sapper attacks commencing 23 February when the announced Viet Cong Tet cease fire was over. These attacks appeared to be intended as a show of force as there was a decrease in enemy initiated incidents after the 25th. The Fleet Command Ships, Coastal Force, and Riverine Units, operating in their respective tactical areas, performed a variety of missions including patrols, escort, naval gunfire support, logistic support, and amphiblous assaults. The increase in the number of coordinated VNN/JSM operations added to an expanding Vietnamese Navy role in the war effort. While providing greater coverage of the waterways, the expansion of the VNM operations on to the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong rivers, and the Rach Giang Thanh and Vinh Te Canal has hampered enemy personnel and material infiltration. Intelligence sources indicate the presence of VNM forces in these areas has brought about improved relations with the local people.

On 1 February aboard the Mobile Riverine Force flagship, USS BENEWAH (APB 35), Vice Admiral E. R. ZUMWALT, Jr., Commander U. S. Kaval Forces, Vietnam/Chief, Naval Advisory Group, turned over 25 U. S. Kavy river craft to the Vietnamese Navy under the accelerated Furnover Program (ACTOV). The 25 vessels; three LCM "Monitors", one Command and Communications Boat (CCB),

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eight Assault Patrol Support Boats (ASPB's), and thirteen Armored Troop Carriers (ATC's), are now divided into two Vietnamese River Assault and Interdiction Divisions (RAID 70 and RAID 71). Their mission, as their name implies, is to conduct river assault and assume an interdiction role similar to efforts now being made by the U. S. Navy units in the Mekong Delta.

The initial utilization of the two RAID's was in GIANT SLINGSHOT Operations. RAID 70 units are stationed on the Vam Co Tay River with one CCB, one monitor, four ATC's, and two ASPB's at Tan An and four ATC's and one monitor at Tuyen Nhon. RAID 71 units are stationed on the Vam Co Dong River with one monitor, three ATC's, and three ASPB's at Ben Iac and'. two ATC's and three ASPB's at Tra Cu.

During the period 20 through 22 February the HAID units commenced the integration into the GIANT SLINGSHOT Operation as they rendezvoused with TF 116 and TF 117 units presently assigned on the Vam Co rivers. After receiving indoctrination in tactics, training, communications, and VMN operations center, capabilities, the RAID's were ready to commence operations,

Operation KEEL HAUL II of the GIANT SLINGSHOT Operation was launched at 211800H. On the third night of the operation, 23 February, and integrated heavy convoy consisting of one VNN ASPB, one U.S. ASPB, and two U.S. ATC's with troops enbarked departed Tra Cu heading south on the Vam Co Dong River. The heavies were preceded by two U.S. PBR's in normal KEEL HAUL fashion as the entire force assumed a convoy posture while patrolling

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the river. During the patrol an ambush unit of one VNN ASPB and one U.S. ASPB received automatic weapons and B-MO rocket fire from both banks of the river. Both boats sustained B-MO rocket hits resulting in two J.S. wounded, including the U.S. advisor on the VNN boat, and two VNN personnel wounded, who were treated at Tra Cua and returned to duty. After the fire fight all units cleared the area and a B-52 strike was placed at the location of the attack. Later that night Tra Cu came under attack receiving seven rounds of  $\delta_{2-mm}$  mortar. The mortar positions were pin-pointed and taken under fire with MO-mm cannon from a Monitor. Three secondary explosions were sighted.

The next day the final phase of Operation KEEL HAUL II took place. At 2145H five Viet Cong were observed moving toward one U.S. ASPB and one VMM ASPB. They were taken under fire by the US/VNN force at point blank range. The two units cleared the area and then returned for two more firing runs. After heavy artillary was placed into the position, the two ASPB's and U.S. PBR's made a search with negative results. KEEL HAUL II was completed at 0030H, 25 February.

Operations to interdict personnel and material infiltrations across the RVN/Cambodian border into RVN were expanded to include VNN units. The Fourth Coastal Zone Commander (VNN) is in command of VNN forces consisting of two Coastal Groups (8 Command, 23 Kien Giang, and 6 Tabuta Junks), 80 Raiders (Reaction Troops), approximately 30 personnel for the operational command, and a repair/support team. The four LCVP's and two FOM's assigned

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to the Vinh Te Operation from RAG 26 which chopped to the VNN junk force on 21 February are included in the operation. Primary support bases are the VNN LCU at Chau Poc and the VNN AKL 451 at Ha Tien. Additional staging sights will be established as the tactical situation dictates.

On 19 February the newly arrived junk advisors were given a tour of the Vinh Te Canal by CTG 116.5 and 116.5.2. Discussions with the advisors included operational areas of each element, recognition signals, and operating techniques. Most of the junk operations will be limited to the Vinh Te Canal from Chau Doc to Tien Birh, due to the present low water level. U.S. Navy forces will cover the remaining tactical area.

Although the first mission of the expanded operation entitled TRAN.<sup>5</sup> HUNG DAO was conducted when two VNN FCF's, two Command junks, four Kien Giang junks, and hO Raiders patrolled up the Rach Giang Thanh from Ha Tien on the 8th of February, the newly arrived junks did not commence patrols until the 23rd of February, when they sailed down the Vinh Te Canal toward Tinh Bien. Approximately three and one half miles from Tinh Bien the junks ran aground. When the water level rose again, the junks patrolled eastward with negative results.

#### Vietnamese Marine Corps

Operating in III and IV CTZ the Vietnamese Marine Corp (VNMC) and their U. S. Advisors experienced light energy contact throughout the month with the exception of the 5th Eattalion which experienced heavy fighting in the last days of February.

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Brigade "A", comprised of Brigade Headquarters, 1st and 6th Infantry Battalions, and Battery "C", VNMC Artillary Battalion, conducted reconnaissance in force operations under the OPCON of the 25th ARVN Division in the vicinity of Tay Ninh, III CTZ. On 6 February the Brigade moved to Binh Duong Province under the operational control of the 5th ARVN Division and conducted reconnaissance missions there for the remainder of the month with light contact. The 6th Battalion returned to Thu Duc OPCON to JCS and remained there until 10 February when they relieved the 2nd Battalion of Brigade "B" in IV CTZ under the control of the 21st ARVN Division. The 6th Battalion conducted joint riverine operations for the rest of the month with the 21st ARVN, experiencing scattered enemy contact.


Brigade "B" including Brigade Headquarters, the 2nd and 1th Infantry Battalions, and Battery "D" of the VNEC Artillery Battalion conducted riverime/ reconnaissance operations in IV CTZ throughout the month under the control of the 21st ARVN Division. Enemy contact was reported as light. The 2nd Battalion, which was relieved by the 6th Battalion on 10 Pebruary, returned to their base camp at Thu Duc and remained in reserve until 26 February when the battalion was summoned to reinforce the Long Bien Special Zone in Bien Hoa Province. Battery "D", which was relieved on the 10th by Battalion "B", returned to Saigon for the rest of the month under the Capital Military District control.

The 3rd Battalion was initially in reserve at its base camp at Thu Duc. On 6 February the marines commenced reconnaissance missions in force in Tay

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Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, III CTZ, OPCON to the 2nd Brigade U. S. Air Calvary Division. From 8 - 11 February the 3rd Battelion uncovered 12 weapons and munitions caches which were reported to be the largest weapons caches ever discovered by South Vietnamese troops. Included in the caches were 240-mm rockets never seen before in Vietnam. The 3rd Battalion, remaining with the U.S. Air Cavalry in the III CTZ throughout the month, participated in reconnaissance missions with very little additional results.

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The 5th Battalion operated under the 18th ARVN Division in III CTZ. Conducting reconnaissance operations, the battalion encountered light contact through 22 February. On 23 February the 3rd Battalion was placed under OPCON of the Long Bien Special Zone by the Commanding General III Corps. While providing security for the Bien Hoa POW Camp and acting as a reserve force for the Long Binh Special Zone, the battalion made contact with NVA regulars on 26 and 27 February. The two day battle was the scene of heavy fighting as 154 of the enemy died and 24 were captured. Friendly casualties included four marines killed and 29 wounded.

Battery "A" of the Artillery Battalion, underwent training at the Duc My Training Center, Duc My, Vietnam, the first part of February and remained at their base camp at Thu Duc under the JGS for the rest of the month.

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# VNN/VNMC STATISTICAL SUMMART February 1969

VIETNAMESE NAVY:	Daily Average Search		thed Deta		ined	
	Oper	Empl.	Junks	People	Junks	People
COASTAL FORCE I II III IV	38.6 48.0 52.3 56.9	38 <b>.0</b> 46 <b>.9</b> 52 <b>.1</b> 56 <b>.2</b>	13,653 24,704 6,874 4,741	55,070 64,506 20,943 15,757	6 24 18 24	90 219 56 166
	Sub	-Totals:	49,972	156,276	72	531
*FIEDT COMAND PATRCL SHIPS	33.1	26,1	1,992	6,865	5	14
RIVERINE AREA CRAFT	118.4	117.0	5,750	18,928	0	. <b>O</b>
#GEN RESERVE FORCE	55 <b>.9</b>	49.6	3,047	9,791		_0
		TOTALS:	60,761	191,801	7 <b>7</b>	535
VIETNAMESE MARINE	CORPS :					
VC/NVA	XIA:	244	Capture	d: <u>3</u> 8	Suspecta	s detained:
VNMC	XIA:	28	WIA:	193	HIAI	0

\* Provided 77 gunfire support missions. # Includes RAG 27, RTEO and RPG 51.

GROUP 1 Downgraded at 3 year intervals Declassified after 12 years

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#### PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CIVIC ACTION OPERATIONS FEBRULRY 1969

During the month another step was taken to theart the persistent energy propaganda which proclaims that American forces are would-be conquerors who seek to replace the French colonialists. Many signs throughout the country announce the presence of various U. S. installations or truck routes. In the past, these signs have been printed almost exclusively in English. In an effort to maintain the proper UVN/US relationship, all signs were made bi-lingual, with English subordinate to the Vietnamese. In itself, this appears a rather insignificant move bit, in reality, any action that denies the energy a source of propaganda and, at the same time, enhances the image of the South Vietnamese government with the populace, is important to the psychological operations effurt.

Loudspeaker broadcasts continued to be highly utilized this month with an estimated 1100 hours of broadcasts reported. For the most part, these broadcasts have been very effective. On 25 February, PER's played three hours of broadcast tapes in the Tra Cu District of Vinh Einh Proince, stressing the heavy VC battle losses that occurred in that area on the 23rd. The following morning, two males and one female rallied to Coastal Croup 36, stating that they rallied as a result of the previous might's broadcasts. Conversely, a Hoi Chan who rallied to the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) on the 18th stated that the PER broadcasts and

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leafist drops were ineffective in his area (the Cu Lao Dung Island/Long Fhu District of Ba Xuyen Province) which is directly across the Bassac River from the first incident mentioned. In part, this apparent contradiction may be explained because the second rallier comes from a VC-Controlled area where people are not permitted to pick up or read the leaflets; also, PER's have recently conducted extensive offensive operations in cooperation with local district forces in that area during the past month.

The period of Tet provided an excellent opportunity for participation in Civic Action. In Danang, the Naval Support Activity provided b,000 family packages to the mayor of Danang for distribution to needy families. These packages contained rice, cloth and fruit and the contents were purchased on the local market at a cost of 1,200,000 VN\$. This act not only helped the poor but also stimulated the local economy. The PCF's of TO 115.h, in a similar act, presented 125 Tet packages to the village chief of Tra Pho Village (VS530 552) for distribution to his people.

The energy attacks on 23 February caused a major setback to the Civic Action program in the Danang area. The Civic Action Lumberyard, its entiro supply of lumber and cement and several vahicles, generators, hand tools and other miscellaneous gear valued at \$110,000 were completely destroyed. Every effort is being made to acquire new supplies and equipment to get the program moving again.

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MEDCAPS during the month were estimated to have treated 23,000 personnel. A total of 30 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the Naval Forces.

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