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THESIS

THE CODE OF CONDUCT--ITS RELEVANCY
AND VALIDITY: 1955-1970 (U)

BY

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The Code of Conduct and National Policy pertaining to captured personnel subjected to "cruel" treatment was and is controversial. This study evaluates the relevancy and validity of Article V and applicable implementing instructions from 1955 to 1970. The research shows that irrespective of culture values, background characteristics, or type of character structure, "cruel" treatment and psychological pressure succeeded--in some cases--in forcing collaboration. The study concludes that Article V and applicable implementing instructions were never realistic or valid for cpatives subject to "cruel" treatment; trends in

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THESIS

THE CODE OF CONDUCT--ITS RELEVANCY AND VALIDITY: 1955-1970

by

Thomas E. Wolters
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signed Thomas E Wolters

Date 17 March 1971

14 April 1971

THE CODE OF CONDUCT--ITS RELEVANCY AND VALIDITY: 1955-1970

by

Thomas Edward Wolters

B.A., Park College, 1966

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
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Abstract of

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> There is a natural sympathy of a human being for a human tragedy. He who judges in these cases cannot help but identify himself with the judged. Even the bravest will ask himself: Would I have broken and confessed falsely had I suffered as he did?
>
> Hanson W. Baldwin

On 17 August 1955, President Eisenhower proclaimed a six article Code of Conduct applicable to all members of the Armed Forces of the United States who may be exposed to capture or become prisoners of war.[1] The Code requires those within its purview to mentally, physically, and morally oppose all enemy efforts against them, their fellow servicemen, and their country during peacetime, combat, or captivity.[2]

On 8 July 1964, the Department of Defense published Directive 1300.7* to provide basic guidance for the development and achievement of the aims and objectives of the Code of Conduct. Directive 1300.7 specifies the basic policy of

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*Entire Code of Conduct is reproduced in Chapter II, p. 19.

the Armed Forces in regard to the Code of Conduct and specifically states: ". . . the Code of Conduct is applicable to all members of the Armed Forces at all times."[3]

Objectives of the Code are to protect, beyond any reasonable doubt, the cause for which the United States stands, and to strive for the greatest possibilities of survival for all those who serve that cause.[4] The ultimate objective of the Code was to make it crystal clear, in all cases, precisely when a member was in the line of duty or not in line of duty.

Since the Code was promulgated in 1955, there has been limited cause or opportunity to evaluate its relevancy, validity, or applicability; however, a number of Cold War incidents, United States involvement in Southeast Asia, and the eventual repatriation of our prisoners from North Vietnam have aroused renewed interest in the Code. Release of a few prisoners of the Vietnam conflict and the Pueblo incident of 1968 caused the communication media to focus particular emphasis on Article V of the Code. As was the case when the Code was published in 1955, Article V remains controversial. One side of the argument claims Article V is too spartan; its standards are impractical, if not impossible, and in conflict with "modern-day" realities. The other argument claims that

Article V only reiterates what is normally expected of a serviceman in performance of duty to his country and is "so traditional that every American should automatically be aware of it."[5]

Article V of the Code states:

> When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.[6]

Department of Defense Directive 1300.7 specifies that all military personnel are bound to comply with the provisions of Article V. Once a man is in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist answering further questions, he will still be totally responsible for further responses.[7]

Presidential Executive Order 10361, implementing the Code, directed each prisoner to withstand all enemy efforts against him. The Committee Report offers ultimate mercy for the prisoner on return to his homeland. Conversely, it is made clear that responsibility for misconduct is placed squarely on the individual, and that with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will the prisoner should be able to withstand pressures and abide by the Code.

What was proper patriotism, education, and strength of

will in 1955? Moreover, what is it today--1970? How can a man be held totally responsible for further responses when he is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist making further responses? Is the last sentence of Article V--"I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause" --realistic?

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the relevancy and validity of the Code of Conduct and National Policy pertaining to interned personnel who are subjected to "cruel" treatment by their captors.

The major objective is to determine if it is realistic to expect a captive subjected to "cruel" treatment by his captors to comply with Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report.

Specific objectives are to develop the evolution of the Code of Conduct; to evaluate the relevancy of Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report in view of value orientations that existed in 1955; to determine if applicable value orientations of United States citizens have changed since 1955; to evaluate the relevancy of Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report in view of "changed" value orientations

evident in 1970; and to show the value of prisoners of war as instruments of foreign policy.

Although the Code of Conduct consists of six articles, this study will deal with Article V, and primarily, with the last sentence of Article V. When discussing Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, the concept of--even though a man is placed in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist answering further questions, he will still be totally responsible for further responses--will be of primary interest. Discussion of the Committee Report will be confined to the statement: ". . . with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will the prisoner should be able to withstand the pressures and abide by the Code." In the discussion of changing value orientations, this study will be primarily concerned with high school and college youth--the primary source of military inductees and those most likely to become prisoners of war.

For purposes of clarity, the following concepts will be used throughout this study.

Cruel treatment: disposed to inflict pain and suffering; delighting in another suffering; without mercy or pity; depriving others of their social-psychological needs so as to produce involuntary behavior.[9]

Captor: a person who captures and holds others in confinement.[10]

Captive: a person held in confinement or subjection.[11]

Policy: any governing principle, plan, or course of action.[12]

Relevant: germane; implies such close natural connection as to be highly appropriate or fit.[13]

Before examining the relevancy of Article V and applicable implementing instructions, some understanding of how the Code of Conduct evolved will be necessary. In Chapter II, the writer will trace the value and treatment of prisoners of war from antiquity through the Korean conflict, and the resulting development of the Code of Conduct.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT

Since the beginning of warfare, captors have been confronted with the problem of what disposition to make of their captives. In the most ancient times, captives were held as chattel, the spoils of the victorious armies, with execution or human sacrifices to the gods being the most accepted disposition.[1]

Several examples, from early recorded history, give us some insight into the minimal value attached to an adversary captured in combat. Germanticus commanded his legions to "slay and slay on, do not take prisoners; we shall only have peace by the complete destruction of the nation."[2] Captive extermination became so common that it was unwise to do differently. When Hemocratus, the Syracusan general, ordered his troops to treat captured Athenian prisoners with moderation, he was condemned to exile by his government.[3]

Expansion of ancient civilization brought about the need for mass labor forces to accomplish numerous manual tasks of the premachine age. With this need came the end to torture and extermination of captives. In fact, bartering of captives as slave labor became so profitable that many punitive

military expeditions were altered into slave collecting forays. A good example was Caesar's second campaign into Gaul where he sold 33,000 Belgian captives.[4]

The end of the Roman Empire and beginning of the Dark Ages was, again, characterized by barbaric treatment of captives. Near the end of the Middle Ages, captives regained some reprieve from extermination and torture. The practice of monetary ransoming of captives evolved to the point that definite scales of payment were established.[5] Throughout the remaining Middle Ages, captives were generally considered unfortunate victims of the conflict, with the principle of humane considerations for the vanquished evolving.

The end of the Thirty Years War and Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, brought about several changes in philosophy pertaining to captured personnel: a foundation for the development of basic concepts of captive treatment was developed, agreements were reached which shifted the responsibility for captive care to the belligerent states (instead of the actual combatant elements themselves), and repatriation of prisoners with ransom was prescribed.[6]

Although there was a trend toward more humane concepts in dealing with captives between 1648 and World War I, the record was replete with exceptions to international agreements

and treaties calling for neutralization of captives. In nearly all cases, the thrust of these violations was toward obtaining intelligence information from the captive. A good example is this United States Civil War report from the Union stockade at Point Lookout on the Potomac:

> They were placed in solitary confinement and denied water. These vicious measures were . . . employed to wring information from a captive . . . by military police or secret service agents.[7]

With World War I came a reversal in the overall trend for better circumstances for captives. The horror and brutality of prolonged trench warfare apparently caused Germany and her allies to adopt a harsher attitude toward their captives. A British flyer, Duncan Grinnell-Milne, describes captive conditions in his book, An Escaper's Log: ". . . wounded British prisoners were herded into cattle cars and left for days during the trip to Germany."[8] Although there was an overall regression of captive treatment during World War I, treatment was commensurate with conditions of the war and captives were primarily exploited for intelligence type information. It was not until World War II that captives were subjected to indoctrination programs for political and propaganda purposes.

World War II was marked by extreme divergence in captive

treatment; the exploitation process ranged from barbaric to the most propc:. Numerous allied prisoners of the Germans were subjected to an indoctrination program. The objective of the program was to cause the captive to lose faith in himself, his cause, and the future of his country. Due to an inherent defect in the Nazi propaganda program--the insistence of posing as a superior race to those of the other belligerents[9]--the German efforts were highly unsuccessful. All shortcomings in the German indoctrination program were more than compensated for by their expert handling of interrogations, from which they obtained numerous and significant intelligence data. Some pilots were threatened with military trials for strafing attacks; however, these threats were part of the psychology of the interrogations to obtain intelligence information.[10]

In comparison to the Germans, the Japanese were more cruel and less sophisticated as captors. In the early part of the war, they made some attempts at indoctrination for political and propaganda purposes. Captives were encouraged to learn Japanese and watch propaganda films.[11] Neither of these programs were compulsory; consequently, they were soon discontinued. This minimal effort toward indoctrination, combined with extremely brutal treatment of captives, is

indicative of the minimum value of the prisoners to the Japanese. Excerpts from the 1948 Military Tribunal of the Far East support this fact. Prisoners were ruthlessly killed by shooting, decapitation, drowning, death marches, forced labor in tropical heat without protection from the sun, complete lack of housing and medical attention, and aviators were killed without trial.[12]

The United States and United Kingdom basically conformed to standards set forth in the Geneva Convention of 1929. Captives were interrogated and used for intelligence purposes, with minimum effort toward further exploitation. The United States did initiate an indoctrination program; however, it was limited in scope and aimed at ". . . general education to enlighten prisoners concerning democracy."[13]

Soviet treatment of captives was quite a different matter. In addition to being thoroughly interrogated and exploited for intelligence purposes, captives were subjected to a well organized indoctrination program. The Soviet indoctrination program was successful in that numerous German captives collaborated with their Russian captors. These cooperative German captives were then sent to Soviet indoctrination schools to receive orientations in Communist ideology. The objective of the Russian led "Committee for Free

Germany"[14] was to use the indoctrinated German captives to promote the Communist cause in Germany. Unlike other allied nations, the Soviet failed to repatriate their captives after the termination of hostilities. Most of the 1,270,000 captured Germans[15] were unaccounted for, and it was not until September 1953, that token groups of these World War II captives were freed. Although Soviet motives were not crystal clear, they appeared to be centered on using the captives as tools for political ransom in the furtherance of Communist objectives.

From antiquity until World War II, captives were interrogated and exploited, almost exclusively, for intelligence purposes. Beginning with the Second World War, captives were increasingly exploited for political and propaganda purposes; however, it was not until the Korean conflict that exploitation for the welfare of the captor "state" was the basis for captive treatment and value.

In Korea and the ideological conflicts of more recent times, the Communists have combined the rights and requirements of prisoners into a concept of how such individuals can best be utilized to benefit the collective welfare of the "state," irrespective of any previous concepts of captive treatment.[16] Consequently, personnel captured by the

Communists during the Korean conflict were exploited to the maximum in the promotion of the goals of their captors.

Overall, United States personnel who fell captive in Korea did not fare well. Of 7,190 servicemen captured, 2,730 or 38 percent died in captivity. By comparison, only 11 percent of 129,701 United States prisoners of World War II died in captivity.[17] Additionally, the record indicates that none of our personnel were successful in escaping, and nearly one-third of them collaborated with the Communists as either informers or propagandists.[18] Twenty-one of the collaborators refused repatriation after the armistice, and 192 of those who did return were found chargeable with serious offenses against fellow prisoners or the United States.[19]

In the final analysis, the Communist psychological warfare program in Korea was highly successful; over 70 percent of our captured personnel cooperated, to some degree, with their captors and made some contribution to the Communist psychological campaign.[20] The impact of the Communist psychological warfare/propaganda effort was pointed out by the noted author, Edward Hunter; speaking to the Committee on Un-American Activities in March 1958, he stated: "In Korea we had atomic weapons but lost the war and were unable to

use those weapons because of a political and psychological climate created by the Communists."[21]

Like other wars, the Korean conflict had its disturbing aftermath. Victory was not clearly imprinted, the war ended in what appeared to be a stalemate, and the entire effort became "suspect," resulting in a postwar inventory.[22] Although relatively small in number, the cases of actual prisoner misbehavior in Korea had a great impact on the American public. Press releases in The New York Times revealed that the public was extremely interested in and concerned about fellow Americans who were being held captive.[23] During the early part of the war, over 70 percent of the press releases, pertaining to prisoners of war, were about the atrocities being committed by the North Korean and Chinese captors. As the war drew to an indefinite end, emphasis in the news releases began to change. By 1953, 46 percent of the reports were concerned with misbehavior of our fellow Americans, and by 1954, over 76 percent of the news releases dealt with captive misbehavior. The reasons why the American public was so disturbed are difficult ones. Some of the answers may be found in the way Americans have traditionally perceived war.

Historically, Americans have viewed war as a matter of

moral principle. To them, modern wars have had a right side and a wrong side, and if Americans are involved in the war, they must be on the right side. This traditional American view of war may be inherent in a concept stated by William Makepeace Thackeray, who wrote:

> The world is a looking glass, and gives back to every man the reflection of his own face. Frown at it, and it in turn will look sourly upon you; Laugh at it and with it, and it is a jolly, kind companion.[24]

To be sure, most Americans believed the United States was on the right side during the Korean conflict.

Because of this very fact--the United States being on the right side during the Korean conflict--numerous Americans were extremely disturbed to learn that a considerable number of their fellow citizens, who were prisoners of war, collaborated with their Communist captors during that conflict. Collaboration resulting from torture, exhaustion, or brain damage may have been partially acceptable; however, collaboration as a result of bribery suggested two new dimensions: Americans, who were prisoners of war during the Korean conflict, did not much care whether they were helping the right side or the wrong side, or they had changed their political attitude as to which side was the right side. If either of these dimensions were true, the politically significant

behavior of Americans may be entirely independent of their political value judgments, or these judgments may be completely determined by the current situation in which an individual finds himself--proper childhood training and objective moral standards notwithstanding. In any event, if either of these conditions hold true for a significant percentage of our fellow citizens, the political equilibrium of the United States appears doubtful.[25]

Needless to say, fears of an unstable political equilibrium triggered a wave of discourse that raged from coast to coast. Eugene Kinkead, writing in The New Yorker, argues that our experience in Korea reflected a massive moral dissolution, that the high percentage of collaboration and token resistance of our prisoners of war was primarily due to their own weakness, and that the final responsibility for this wholesale sellout lies with our fundamental institutions.[26] At the other end of the spectrum, Dr. Charles W. Mayo, of the Mayo Foundation, testifying before the Political and Security Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in October 1953, stated:

> If anything was surprising, it was that so many, both of these who had "confessed" and those who had not, had somehow continued throughout to act like men. One man had been sentenced to death twelve times, and had refused to yield. Another

> man had been made to dig his own grave, had been taken before a firing squad, heard the command to fire and the pistols click on empty chambers, but had still refused to yield.[27]

Similar inconsistencies existed among the services themselves. Major General William P. Dean, of the United States Army, admitted that he had contemplated suicide and had written and signed two documents which the Communists could have used for propaganda purposes; he received the Congressional Medal of Honor. On the other hand, Colonel Schwable of the Marines was court-martialed for signing a single confession.[28]

Because of such inconsistencies and the conflicting views of numerous Americans, it was obvious that some sort of articulated and standardized, national policy in regard to prisoner of war conduct was required. To this end, the Secretary of Defense appointed an Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War.[29] After two months of extensive investigation, the committee unanimously agreed that the United States required a unified and purposeful standard of conduct for her prisoners of war.[30]

The Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces of the United States was the most important recommendation made by the committee. It contained six articles designed to guide the actions of any captured American in any type of situation.

The spirit and intent of the Code, as recommended by the committee, was that in any situation, the serviceman must be responsible for all his actions.[31] In the words of the committee was found the basis for the standard of the Code: "We can find no basis for making recommendations other than on the principles and foundations which have made America free and strong and on the qualities which we associate with men of integrity and character."[32]

President Eisenhower promulgated the Code as Executive Order 10631 on 17 August 1955 and directed the Secretary of Defense to insure that all military personnel be trained in its provisions.[33] Current Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, of 8 July 1964, directs that training in the Code of Conduct be initiated without delay upon entry of any individual into the Armed Forces and continue throughout his military career, providing periodic and progressive indoctrination appropriate to his increasing rank and leadership responsibilities.[34]

The Code provides no penalties, is not definitive in the terms of offenses, and leaves to existing laws and judicial processes the determination of personal guilt or innocence in each individual case.[35]

Code of Conduct for the Armed Forces

1. I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

2. I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender my men while they still have the means to resist.

3. If I am captured, I will continue to resist by all means available. I will make every effort to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

4. If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them up in every way.

5. When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability. I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

6. I will never forget that I am an American fighting man, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.[36]

From the times of Germanticus, and the philosophy of "slay and slay on," to the more recent ideological conflicts, and the concept of "exploitation to benefit the collective

welfare of the captor state," the value and treatment of the captive has varied with the whim of his captor. In antiquity, the captive was of little political or propaganda value and readily disposed of by extermination. From the end of antiquity to World War II, the captive was primarily exploited for intelligence type information. In World War II, we saw the first significant efforts at indoctrination for political and propaganda purposes. In Korea, we witnessed a highly successful psychological warfare program, which received substantial support via prisoner of war exploitation. Reaction of the American public was one of dismay, shifting from concern for welfare of the prisoners of war to concern for their questionable behavior while they were interned. The Code of Conduct was promulgated to prevent future occurrences of this type. The Code, and particularly Article V, were controversial.

For Article V and applicable implementing instructions to be valid as antidotes to collaboration, they must be relevant to the reasons why a captive collaborates, resists, or remains neutral. In Chapter III, the writer will develop the specific reasons for collaboration, resistance, or neutrality.

CHAPTER III

COLLABORATION, RESISTANCE, OR NEUTRALITY--?

> If God Himself was sitting in that chair we would make him say what we wanted him to say.
>
> A Communist interrogator's boast

Before examining the relevancy of Article V and applicable implementing instructions, we must have some insights into why a captive resists, collaborates, or remains neutral. To accomplish this, the writer will draw primarily on three studies: Dr. Robert J. Lifton's psychiatric evaluation of Chinese Communist "thought reform" and psychological study of the "closed" versus "open" approaches to human change, Dr. Julius Segal's study of factors related to the collaboration and resistance behavior of U.S. Army prisoners of war in Korea, and Dr. Edgar H. Schein's study of reaction patterns to severe chronic stress in American Army prisoners of war of the Chinese.

Dr. Robert Jay Lifton, Research Associate in Psychiatry and Associate in East Asian Studies at Harvard University, spent approximately two years in Hong Kong conducting a psychiatric investigation of thought reform by means of interviews with people who had been put through the process in

China.[1] Dr. Lifton's principal subjects were Western civilians who were expelled from China after completion of the thought reform program, and Chinese intellectuals who underwent reform in regular universities or special "revolutionary universities."[2]

Before discussing how thought reform affected the Western civilians and Chinese intellectuals, some understanding of the philosophy and rationale of this subject is necessary.

Chinese Communist Philosophy or Rationale for Thought Reform. Whether applied to Western civilians, Chinese intellectuals, or American prisoners of war, the process is the same. Leading Chinese Communist political theorists, including Mao Tse-tung, believe that the "old society" in China and all non-Communist countries is evil and corrupt. The "old society" had been dominated by the "exploiting classes"--the landowners, and the bourgeoisie. Everyone has been exposed to this type of society and retains from it evil remnants and ideological poisons, which thought reform can rid man of and make him into a "new man" in a "new society."[3] While we view the process as a set of coercive maneuvers, the Chinese Communist view it as a morally uplifting, harmonizing, and scientifically therapeutic

experience.[4] In reality, it is a systematic application of psychological techniques to compel a person to change his basic values.[5]

Western Civilians. During the 1951 national campaign for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, most Western Europeans and Americans who had not left China were arrested on flimsy or manufactured evidence of "dangerous espionage activities." They were held in "Detention Houses" for one to five years for the purpose of "solving their cases." Dr. Lifton interviewed 25 of these Western civilians, whose occupations and nationalities were as follows: twelve Catholic priests, one Protestant minister, four businessmen, two journalists, two physicians, one research scholar, one university professor, one sea captain, and one housewife. There were seven Germans, seven Frenchmen, five Americans, one Dutchman, one Belgian, one Canadian, one Italian, one Irishman, and one White Russian.[6]

The consistency with which the Communists were able to obtain a confession, irrespective of the individual's character structure, was bewildering. Some examples are as follows.

Dr. Charles Vincent was in his early fifties and

had practiced medicine in China for 20 years. He was born and raised in a pious middle class family in Southern France and attended strict Catholic boarding schools until he was 17 years old. Two days after being arrested, Dr. Vincent made what he called a "wild confession"--a description of espionage activities which he knew to be nonexistent.[7]

Another subject, Father Francis Luca, managed to hold out for two weeks before making a false confession of three major crimes. Father Luca had anticipated being arrested and had promised himself, if imprisoned, he would defend the Church and say nothing false. His initial response to interrogation was, therefore, one of forthright defiance;[8] however, the inevitable can be seen in Father Luca's own words:

> At the beginning it was only a question of curiosity, but afterwards, when I couldn't endure it and my mind was confused, I thought, "Why don't they say exactly what they want me to say? It is so difficult to get at what they want." After two weeks I would say almost anything they wanted me to say . . . but of course not easily.[9]

Father Luca was the son of a prominent Italian colonial official, and an excellent student who was raised in a classical European family. His resolve to follow a more purposeful existence carried him into the priesthood.

He wanted to help others, to have a lasting aim and a broader point of view that embraced the whole of things which could help people who underwent unpleasantness.[10]

The Communists succeeded in eliciting incriminating personal confessions from all 25 Western civilians. The time required to obtain the confessions ranged from two days to several weeks; however, in the simplest terms, a confession was a requirement for survival.[11] For a prisoner to survive and retain physical and psychic life,[12] he must avoid being totally overwhelmed by environmental influence. To undergo thought reform and not submit to some of its influences is an ideal impossible to achieve--"whether the ideal was held by the prisoner himself, his colleagues, or the shocked onlookers of the outside world."[13]

Chinese Intellectuals. In his interview of 15 Chinese intellectuals, Lifton found that they had experienced a process similar to the one experienced by Western civilians. Great emphasis was placed on confessions, with the final confession being the highlight of the course.[14] It was the content of these confessions--much of it antithetical to the most basic Chinese cultural institutions--and the psychological appeal that assisted the confession process that is of interest.[15]

In the final confession, the subject was requested to denounce his father as a symbol of the exploiting classes and as an individual.[16] This act, in a culture so rooted in filial piety that it was considered disrespectable for a son to write or speak his father's name, is quite appalling.[17] Similarly, in traditional Chinese life one would go to great lengths to avoid humiliation or "loss of face," and, at the same time, attempt to avoid putting someone else in a position where this might happen to him--a code of propriety clearly violated by the abject public confessions.[18] Additionally, the practice of informing on and criticizing family and friends strongly violates the most basic Chinese concepts of loyalty.[19]

All of the Chinese intellectuals interviewed had come from the young rebellious generation. Many of them had become emotionally involved in breaking away from old traditions and could find psychological support for their defiance in thought reform.[20]

Individual Character Structure and Susceptibility to Thought Reform. In response to the critical question of what factors in individual character structure are responsible for the differing susceptibilities to thought reform influence,

Lifton made the following generalizations: the degree of balance and integration, for either Western civilians or Chinese intellectual, is much more important than the specific type of character structure. Each captive tended to be influenced to the degree that his identity, whatever it may have been, could be undermined through the self-deprecating effects of guilt and shame. "This susceptibility in turn depended largely upon his balance between flexibility and totalism, and their special significance for his character structure."[21] As a source of the extremist, emotional, patterns of ideological totalism, the captives personal histories were revealing. Those most influenced by thought reform had experienced an early lack of trust, extreme environmental chaos, total domination by a parent or parent-representative, intolerable burdens of guilt, and severe crises identity.[22] This early sense of confusion, dislocation, and intense family milieu control produced complete intolerance for confusion and dislocation, and a desire for reinstatement of milieu control.

In all cases, those who resisted the most possessed a greater strength of identity; however, it must be remembered --"factors contributing to individual totalism are in some measure part of every childhood experience."[23] The potential

for totalism is a continuum from which no one escapes, and in relationship to which no two people are the same. Because personnel in our armed services come from all parts of the society, some will have been subject to high degrees of totalism. This problem is particularly significant to the Army with their reliance on the draft as the main method of personnel procurement.

United States Army Personnel. Since the probability of capture is highest among Army personnel, an extensive effort was made to develop an Army indoctrination and training program, designed to provide captured soldiers with appropriate defenses against Communist exploitation.

To determine what action should be taken, a research team headed by Dr. Julius Segal studied personal histories and prison camp conduct of all 3,323 returnees. Based on these determinations, each returning prisoner of war was placed in one of three criterion groups: participator, resister, or middle man.[24] Fifteen percent of the men studied fell into the participator category (those who had been recommended for court-martial or dishonorable discharge). Five percent were classified as resisters (men who had been recommended for decoration as a result of meritorious behavior,

or had committed at least two distinct acts of resistance while in captivity). The remaining 80 percent fell into the middle man category (men who had little or no derogatory, or conflicting information about them). For subsequent analysis purposes, 238 participators, 203 middle men and 138 resisters were selected. This selected group of 579 captives were compared with regard to their backgrounds, experiences, attitudes, personalities, and prison camp behavior.[25]

Resisters vs. Participators. In comparing these groups, it was found that background characteristics did not serve as distinct differentiations between the two groups. Differences in age, education level, civilian occupation, marital status, religious preference, geographic origin, rank, Army branch, and length of military experience did not meet the criterion established for a significant statistical difference.[26]

Susceptibility to inducements and pressure (including both threat and physical abuse) were the main factors in differentiating between resisters and participators.[27] Contrary to a widely held belief, the degree of pressure applied by the captor was negatively rather than positively related

to degree of participation. The resisters bore the brunt of the enemy's threats of and physical abuse. Over 75 percent of the participators received little or no threat of or physical abuse, and over 33 percent received none. Only three percent were severely mistreated. In sum, physical abuse and mistreatment were frequently the results of resistance, and seldom the prelude to participation.[28]

It was in the captives' response to materialistic and not ideological considerations that the Communists found the major key to the riddle of captive behavior. We must recognize that our military forces are drawn from a society in which the desire for self-enhancement in a competitive environment is <u>not</u> discouraged.[29] On the contrary, those who get there first with the most are admired. This type of socialization transferred to the prison compounds of Korea, in which survival itself was a challenge, was more powerful than the Judaeo-Christian principles which impose moral and ethical limits on opportunistic behavior.[30]

The contrast between resister and participator was clear; 90 percent of the resisters were not influenced by the enemy's promise of reward; conversely, 92 percent of the participators were influenced.[31] Rewards of the captor were real. Cooperative captives received everything from better

food and clothing to money. Proof of this fact can be found in the physical and psychological conditions in which the captives were returned. Physically, the participators came back healthier than the resisters, even though they went into captivity in no better shape. Psychologically, the resisters came back with fewer neurotic symptoms.[32]

In the final analysis, those captives who accepted rewards or those who took punishment were not products of a particular culture. Self-sacrificing by the resisters and opportunistic behavior by the participators cut across all lines: age, education level, occupation, geographic origin, and religious preference.

Middle Men vs. Resisters and Participators. In comparing the middle men to the resisters and participators, it was found that the middle men were lower in intelligence and education, greener soldiers, more withdrawn and less active. They participated less than the participator group, resisted less than the resister group, received virtually no preferential treatment or punishment, and were more often alone than with others in captivity. From a background viewpoint, they were less active in sports, less possessors of entertainment talent, and less frequently married. All of

these factors could be associated with an introverted personality and unwillingness to interact in close terms as a member of a social unit.[33]

In a behavioral sense, both the participators and resisters acted in a way which brought them into open conflict with the laws. The participators were in conflict with laws which govern our national security and the resisters were in conflict with laws which governed the captor's program of exploitation. Neither group was successful in combating the opposing forces through withdrawal and inactivation. The middle group's response was more "normal" in that it was similar to the way most individuals respond to threats created by interaction with conflicting social forces.[34]

Thought Reform and Social Forces. Dr. Edgar H. Schein's social psychological investigation found the program of subversion and indoctrination to be thoroughly integrated into the entire camp routine; manipulation of the entire social milieu was involved.[35] By the systematic destruction of the captives' formal and informal group structure, the captors were able to undermine captive loyalties and induce feelings of social isolation. The only social relationship open to

the captives was in the form of political activities, such as the "peace" committees which served as propaganda organs.[36]

In regard to the difficult question of what factors made a man collaborate, resist, or remain neutral, Schein found the following: (1) some, who lacked any kind of stable group identification, collaborated for outright opportunistic reasons; (2) some, whose egos were too weak to withstand physical and psychological rigors, collaborated out of fear; (3) some had firm convictions that they were infiltrating the Chinese ranks and obtaining intelligence information, and collaborated out of convenient rationalization--none of these men were ideologically confused upon repatriation; and (4) those who were vulnerable to ideological appeal because of low status in their own society, collaborated with the sincere conviction that they were doing the right thing; this group was younger, less intelligent, from backward areas, members of various minority groups, and malcontents; they viewed themselves as failures in their own society and were positively attracted by the immediate status and privileges which went with being a "progressive."[37]

The resisters fell into one of the following groups: (1) those who were well integrated with secure, stable group identifications and could withstand social isolation and

still exercise good judgment; (2) those who were chronic obstructionists with histories showing recurring resistance to any form of authority; (3) those who were idealists or martyrs to religious and ethical principles; and (4) those who were anxious, guilt-ridden individuals who could only cope with their own strong impulses to collaborate by denying them and over-reacting in the other direction.[38]

The largest group of captives remained relatively neutral by establishing a complex compromise between captive demands and their own value system. They physically and emotionally withdrew from the whole environment, suspended their feelings, and adopted an attitude of watching and waiting in lieu of hoping and planning.

The dilemma of this difficult problem is revealed in the following statements:

> Whatever behavior the Chinese attempted to elicit, they always placed their demands very carefully, they always required some level of participation from the prisoner, no matter how trivial, and they repeated endlessly.[39]

To defend against this subtle process, Schein argues:

> Ultimately that which sustains humans is their personality integration born out of secure and stable group identifications. One may be able to produce temporary submission by direct intervention in cortical processes, but only by

> destroying a man's self image and his group supports can one produce any lasting changes in his beliefs and attitudes.[40]

Summary. In the final analysis, the intensity and duration of the external reform pressures were the most significant factors in the success or failure of thought reform. Findings of each approach to the problem support this conclusion.

Psychiatric Evaluation of Chinese Communist Thought Reform and Psychological Study of Closed vs. Open Approaches to Human Change. External reform pressures were such that a confession was inevitable and essential for survival for both the Western civilians and Chinese intellectuals. The fact that most of the Western civilians were steeped in traditional European cultural values was not particularly significant. The degree of character balance and personality integration were more important than the specific type of character structure, and those who resisted the most possessed a greater strength of identify.

Confessions, from the Chinese intellectuals, contained concepts which were diametrically opposed to the most basic Chinese cultural institutions. Because the Chinese intellectuals were from an emotionally involved, rebelling

generation, thought reform offered psychological support for their defiance.

Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behavior of U.S. Army POW's in Korea. Background characteristics did not serve to differentiate between resisters and participators; however, background characteristics of the middle men were significantly different. Their ability to remain uninvolved was supported by a background of nonparticipation in sports, entertainment, and social groups.

Susceptibility to inducements and pressure did serve to differentiate between resisters and participators, and contrary to popular belief, the degree of pressure applied was negatively rather than positively related to degree of participation. In the captives' response to materialistic, and not ideological consideration, the Communists found the key to control captive behavior. Resisters and participators could not be distinguished by culture background; self-sacrificing by resisters and opportunistic behavior by participators cut across all lines.

Reaction Patterns to Severe Chronic Stress in American Army POW's of the Chinese. By eliminating all social relationships, other than those for political activities,

the captors were able to undermine all captive loyalties and induce feelings of social isolation. Those most susceptible to collaboration lacked stable group identification, were opportunistic, had weak egos, tended to rationalize, or were vulnerable to ideological appeal.

The resisters were well integrated, had secure group identifications, were idealists or martyrs to religious or ethical principles, were historically chronic obstructionists, or guilt-ridden individuals.

The large middle group physically and emotionally withdrew, suspended their feelings, and watched and waited in lieu of hoping and planning.

If Article V and applicable implementing instructions are valid, they must be relevant to these findings.

In Chapter IV, the writer will analyze these findings vis-a-vis Article V and applicable implementing instructions. Additionally, selected case histories of nine captives, who have been interned and repatriated since the Code was promulgated, will be presented.

CHAPTER IV

ARTICLE V, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1300.7, AND THE COMMITTEE REPORT AS ANTIDOTES TO COLLABORATION

> All higher motives, ideals, conceptions, and sentiments in a man are of no account if they do not come forward to strengthen him for the better discharge of the duties which devolve upon him in the ordinary affairs of life.
>
> Henry Ward Beecher

In view of Lifton's, Segal's, and Schein's findings, is it realistic to expect a captive to abide by those provisions of Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report, which prescribe: "I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause;"[1] "even though a captive is in a position where it is beyond his ability to resist answering questions, he will still be totally responsible for further responses;"[2] and, "with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will the prisoner should be able to withstand the pressures and abide by the Code"?[3] Furthermore, how have those interned and repatriated since the Code was promulgated fared?

In this chapter the writer will analyze the findings

from Chapter III vis-a-vis these questions and present selected case histories of nine post-Code returnees.

Lifton found that all 40 of his subjects had confessed.[4] The external reform pressures, applied by the captors, were such that to survive, the captives had to confess. The substance of nearly all confessions was such that Article V would have been violated.[5] We must now ask the question: if these subjects would have had the Code of Conduct or something similar, would it have helped?

The answer to this question can be found by examining the validity of the Committee Report statement: "with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will, the prisoner should be able to withstand the pressures and abide by the Code."[6] It would be hard to argue that 15 Chinese intellectuals,[7] socialized and inculcated in a traditional Chinese society, lacked education, patriotism, and strength of will. Moreover, their confessions contained denunciations of the father.[8] In a culture so rooted in filial piety that it was considered disrespectable for a son to write or speak his father's name, and where tremendous efforts were made to avoid humiliation or "loss of face,"[9] we could generalize that a more spartan Code was already in being. Additionally, Dr. Vincent, Father Luca, and most of the other Western

civilians were educated, socialized, and inculcated in classical European families. Father Luca had even anticipated the problem, and promised himself that he would not confess. After two weeks of forthright defiance, he confessed.[10]

In the final analysis, the only variables in the Chinese Communist equation were duration and intensity of external reform pressures versus time until captive confession. This equation applied against Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report rationale, left the captive two choices--violation of the directives or loss of physical and psychic life.

The group classified as "resisters" by Segal, conducted themselves in a manner which would have been in compliance with the Code and applicable directives.[11] Thus, we could generalize that Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report would have been after the fact for this group. On the other hand, the "participators" were very similar to the "resisters" in background characteristics: age, education level, civilian occupation, marital status, religious preference, geographic origin, rank, Army Branch, and length of military experience.[12] Therefore, it should follow: if background characteristics do not serve to differentiate between "resisters" and "participators,"

the statement--"with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will the prisoner should be able to withstand the pressures and abide by the Code"--is not relevant.

If, in fact, physical abuse and mistreatment were the results of resistance and not preludes to participation, then Article V is irrelevant as an antidote to collaboration and, conversely, an incentive to captive abuse and mistreatment.[13] Because the "participators" were responsive to materialistic, and not ideological considerations,[14] a morally and idealistic oriented Code is of questionable validity.

The "middle men," who satisfied the requirements of Article V and applicable implementing instructions, had significantly different background characteristics than those of the "resisters" and "participators:" lower intelligence and education, greener soldiers, more withdrawn, less active, less frequently married, less active in sports, less possessors of entertainment talent, and less willing to interact in close terms as members of social units.[15] It could be argued that these background characteristics are incompatible with the statement: "with proper patriotism, education, and strength of will the prisoner should be able to withstand the pressures and abide by the Code." The duration and intensity of the external reform pressures were such that the

"middle men" were able to remain reasonably withdrawn. Their introverted personality traits contributed to that success. Binding them to a specific, prescribed standard of performance may be in conflict with the essence of their success: avoidance, withdrawal, suspended feelings, and an attitude of watching and waiting in lieu of hoping and planning.

From the social psychological viewpoint, Schein found the "collaborators" to fall into one of the following groups: opportunistic, lacking of stable group identification, possessors of weak egos, rationalizers, or vulnerable to ideological appeal.[16]

Those vulnerable to ideological appeal viewed themselves as failures in their own society and were positively attracted by the immediate status and privilege which went with being a "progressive."[17] One could not argue that some "proper patriotism, education and strength of will" was not needed in this group; however, it is quite unrealistic to think that years of socialization and inculcation[18] into such value orientations can be changed by binding an individual to a highly idealistic Code.

The facts show the "participators" to be a product of their society;[19] and, although they are not an ideal product,

it is simplistic to believe that 18 years of socialization and inculcation can be reversed by a brief indoctrination into an idealistic Code.[20] In the simplest terms, "proper patriotism, education and strength of will" must be inculcated into the individual by our fundamental institutions before they can be reinforced by the Code.[21]

All of the "participators" would have violated Article V. While this is undesirable, it is not surprising in view of their value orientations: opportunistic, individualistic, weak egos, rationalizers, and ideological dissatisfied. All of these groups, except those disenchanted with their ideology, were extremely susceptible to materialistic considerations.[22] Again, the question must be asked: how realistic is a moral and idealistic principle against materialistically socialized captives and materialistic inducements?

Schein identifies the "middle men" key to success as a complex compromise between captive demands and their own value system. By compromising, they were able to withdraw, suspend their feelings, and remain relatively uninvolved.[23] Schein concludes that personality integration born out of secure and stable group identifications will prevent any lasting change in a captive's beliefs and attitudes; however,

it will not prevent temporary submission by direct intervention in cortical processes.[24]

Since the Code was promulgated in 1955, a limited number of individuals have been interned by the Communists and repatriated. The selected case histories of nine repatriated captives (four from Vietnam, and five from North Korea) will be presented. The captive's reaction to captor techniques and his evaluation of Article V and applicable imple- instructions will be discussed.

Lieutenant Robert F. Frishman[25*] was forced to eject from his disabled aircraft over North Vietnam on 24 October 1967. He was captured by Vietnamese peasants, turned over to Vietnamese troops, and transported to Hanoi. Upon arrival in Hanoi, he was taken to an interrogation room, questioned extensively, and threatened with death, within four hours, if he did not answer. He resisted until passing out. The next day he was taken to a hospital, and an elbow (injured when his aircraft was shot down) was removed. The injury gave him a great deal of difficulty and did not heal for six months.

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*Only one reference will be made for each case since all information for each case was extracted from a single source.

Prison conditions were primitive and each cell had the camp rules spelled out. Each prisoner rose at the sound of the gong, bowed to all guards, informed on his countrymen, and answered all questions asked by the interrogators. Talking to or looking at other prisoners was prohibited. Frishman was held in solitary confinement until just prior to his release. Interrogations were carried out in the cells and interrogation rooms. The interrogators, using various methods, would rage that Frishman was being uncooperative, strike him, place a gun against his head, threaten to kill him, or be overly friendly and solicitous--keeping him off balance. One particular interrogator was most efficient and had an uncanny instinct for finding the right torture to suit the prisoner. Prisoners who suffered from claustrophobia were rolled up in bamboo mats and left to scream in spastic fear. Others were hung by ropes from the ceiling, burned with cigarette butts, and deprived of sleep or food for agonizing days. Throughout his entire internment, Frishman was commanded to write statements about his "criminal acts," about the "humane treatment" the North Vietnamese provided, and "the excellent medical treatment." When he refused, he was confined in a room bare of everything except a low stool and swarms of hungry mosquitoes. He was forced to crouch on

the stool, unmoving, for as long as three days. Frishman stated that whenever his limits of endurance approached, he knew he would have to give in. When he could not stand it any longer, he wrote their statements. He was forced to rewrite many statements but never wrote precisely what they wanted. In addition to the stool treatment, Lt. Frishman considered isolation and inactivity the worst tortures.

On 4 July 1969, Frishman and two other prisoners were told that they were going to be released. Prior to release, the prisoners were forced to write farewell statements saying they were criminals, were sorry for their crimes, were opposed to United States policy, and thanked the North Vietnamese for the excellent treatment. Frishman stated that writing the amnesty request was revolting.

Lt. Frishman was subjected to both physical and mental torture. The North Vietnamese used the following techniques: isolation, monopolization of attention, dependency on captor, induced fatigue, alternating rewards and punishment, creation of anxiety, and physical torture. Frishman stated that he tried to follow Article V, but in order to survive, he had to talk to his captors and sign certain statements. He believes Article V was too restrictive and led to personal guilt feelings.

On 29 October 1963, Major James Rowe[26] was captured, blindfolded, transported by sampan to a hidden camp, and confined. This was the beginning of over five years of internment for Major Rowe.

With no medical treatment and primitive conditions, Rowe's main aim was to survive. Aside from interrogation and indoctrination, it was a constant struggle to try and stay alive. Although Rowe was interned in several camps, the mode of operation was the same. Part of his captivity was spent with two fellow prisoners and part in isolation.

Major Rowe stated that the Communists had two ultimate goals for their captives: to gain as much propaganda value as they could, and to try to force them to violate the Code of Conduct. The Viet Cong feel that once the captive returns, if he has violated the Code, he will be punished by the United States government. He said the Communists either have to "convert" the prisoner and release him or "eliminate" him. He further stated that he thought they had about given up hope for him, and that he was condemned to be eliminated soon.

Major Rowe said he followed Article V to the best of his ability. He gave more than name, rank, serial number, and date of birth, but did not sign any confessions. He believes

that Article V is too restrictive and does not give the prisoner enough room to maneuver within the situation. He evaded answering harmful questions by lying, and kept saying the same lies over and over until the interrogators were unsure of what he was saying. Major Rowe told of a fellow captive, an American Army Officer, who followed Article V to the letter. The Communists never got anything from him; he was very "bullheaded," and, as a result, he was executed.

Major Rowe chose not to give his captors anything but, at the same time, did not stand up and "bash" heads with them. He concentrated on escape the entire time he was a prisoner, attempted escape three times, and was successful on 31 December 1968.

Major Fred Thompson[27] ejected over North Vietnam on 20 March 1968, was captured by Vietnamese militia, and marched north towards Hanoi. During the trip, his treatment was decent, and he suffered only mild harassment. Major Thompson was not interrogated until three days after capture, and then he was interrogated three times by different interrogators but asked the same questions. He answered the questions that he figured the enemy already knew the answers to. For the next five days, the captors tried to get him to

write the questions and answers down on paper. He successfully resisted for five days but then was forced to write the material.

Upon arrival in Hanoi, he was placed in solitary confinement and interrogated two or three times a day for the first five days, each session lasting about 30 to 40 minutes. He was not interrogated after the first five days in Hanoi but was forced to attend indoctrination lectures.

Major Thompson was not subjected to any brutal treatment or overt physical pressure during his captivity. The soft sell technique was used almost exclusively. In his opinion, he was not asked to divulge any sensitive military information and credits his treatment to the fact he tried to be congenial to his captors, and they reciprocated in return. The interrogators talked to him about the Code of Conduct and seemed to be familiar with it. He believes that Article V is a tool in the hands of the captors and that sticking to name, rank, service number, and date of birth would probably have resulted in his death.

Lieutenant (junior grade) Dieter Dengler[28] was captured by the Pathet Lao forces on 2 February 1966. During the first night of capture, Dengler was forced to lie on his back in spread-eagle fashion with his hands and legs tied

to a tree and used for target practice. He was patiently and persistently asked a number of questions by interrogators, but refused to answer. Later he was offered the opportunity to write letters to his family, which he did. The next day Dengler was given a one-page Communist propaganda statement condemning the United States, and told to sign it. He refused and was beaten severely. The following day there were additional interrogations and beatings, until Dengler became unconscious. When he refused to answer questions again the next day, Dengler was tied behind a water buffalo which dragged him through the brush. The interrogations and beatings lasted for three days.

Dengler was not exposed to thought reform, primarily because of the low intelligence of his captors, the Pathet Lao. They tried continually to get him to sign statements condemning the United States. He never signed any documents and suffered continual beatings. In July, Dengler and his cellmate escaped, and evaded for 17 days. His cellmate was killed, but Dengler managed to escape the assassin and was rescued four days later.

Lt. Dengler did not succumb to his captors, even in the face of most brutal and inhumane treatment. He was confined in semi-isolation, seldom saw his guards, was treated like

an animal, and had no rights whatsoever. Dengler credited his ability to resist and escape to three things: his "previous background" (Dengler was born and raised in Germany during World War II), his Naval Survival School training, and an intense desire for freedom.

Lt. Dengler was not subjected to any sophisticated techniques of interrogation and thought reform. He described his captors as ignorant. They did not know the United States and Europe existed until United States aircraft flew over and the North Vietnamese propaganda began.

The first night after capture, Commander Lloyd Bucher, captain of USS Pueblo, was brought to the interrogation room and told to kneel on the floor. His captors placed a pistol behind his head and said they would fire in two minutes unless he confessed that the Pueblo had intruded into their waters. At the end of two minutes the gun clicked but did not fire. The interrogator claimed it was a misfire; however, when the slide on the pistol was drawn back, Bucher did not hear a bullet hit the floor. He realized then his captors were only trying to scare him and not kill him. When this ruse failed, the North Koreans beat him until he lost consciousness.[29] Later they took him to another prison and forced him to observe while they tortured a South Korean

whom the captors claimed was a spy. The South Korean was subjected to a horrible beating, had a compound fracture of his right arm, had bitten through his lip, and had his right eye hanging out. The North Korean chief informed Bucher that this was the type of torture reserved for spies, and that he and his crew would receive the same. The captors knocked Bucher around and told him to sign the confession, or his crew would be shot one by one starting with the youngest. Bucher stated he was convinced they would do it, and that he was not prepared to see his crew shot. He signed the confession. That night, Bucher tried to commit suicide by drawning himself in a bucket of water in his room but was unsuccessful.[30]

Quartermaster First Class Charles Law, who suffered the most prolonged and vicious beatings of all the Pueblo crew members, finally signed a confession. Law was ringleader of the group that made obscene, mocking gestures while being photographed for propaganda purposes. When his captors discovered the trick, Law was kicked, slugged, and clubbed intermittently for nine hours. Law explained why he signed a confession. "If they were fanatical enough to take us off the high seas, there wasn't any doubt in my mind they would kill us. We waited for the United States to come in and

annihilate this bunch of barbarians." When the crew realized that was not going to happen, they signed as a matter of survival.[31]

Lieutenant (junior grade) Fred Schumacher, Operations Officer, signed a confession admitting that the Pueblo was a spy ship when a North Korean general confronted him with a captured copy of the Pueblo's control report. This report described the ship's mission in detail. Schumacher stated that he was only acknowledging what the North Koreans already knew, was not sure whether he still believed in the Code of Conduct, and that he knowingly deviated from it.[32]

Lieutenant (junior grade) Tim Harris, the youngest officer aboard the Pueblo, signed a confession after being dealt a particularly savage beating in which he was almost killed. He wanted to take his own life but could not.[33]

Lieutenant Edward Murphy, the ship's Executive Officer, was forced to sign a false confession stating that he was spying in North Korea's territorial waters. His captors placed a stick behind his knees, made him squat so his legs were clamped on the stick, beat him senseless, then revived him. The entire process was repeated with the second beating lasting over an hour; Murphy still refused to sign. That night he was stripped to his undershorts and put into a room

with the windows open. His hands were tied behind his back, and the stick was placed behind his legs. He lost all feeling, and his legs began to quiver. The guards kicked him backward and forward until he fell on the floor, then continued the kicking until he got up. On six occasions he passed out completely. Between the fifth and sixth time, he signed the confession.[34]

Exactly how Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report, would have influenced the behavior of Chinese intellectuals, Western civilians, and United States prisoners of war in Korea, and has influenced post-Code returnees will never be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; however, some generalizations can be made.

The captors, through use of external reform pressures, control captive behavior. Background characteristics--including "proper patriotism, education, and strength of will" --are not the key factors. If the captors so desire and apply pressure accordingly, nearly all captives--whether they be Chinese intellectuals, Western civilians, or U.S. Army prisoners of war--have two choices: collaborate or stick to the prescribed behavior and face eventual loss of physical and psychic life.

External reform pressures applied to the 15 Chinese

intellectuals and 25 Western civilians pushed them to one of these two choices. All of them chose collaboration--education and inculcation in traditional European values, dedication to moral and ethical principles, and adherence to the most traditional Chinese cultural values notwithstanding. Since all 40 of these subjects were already dedicated to a "higher principle," it is extremely doubtful that Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, and the Committee Report (or something similar) would have aided them in resisting. Furthermore, specific, prescribed behavior--once violated--contributes to the self-deprecating effects of guilt and shame, and helps to undermine captive identity.

External reform pressures applied to U.S. Army prisoners in Korea was not as sophisticated; therefore, they had more alternatives: 5 percent resisted, 15 percent collaborated, and 80 percent remained neutral. Background characteristics, other than disenchantment with ideology, did not serve to differentiate between resisters and collaborators; however, the middle men had unique background characteristics.

Since the resisters performed as they did, without any prescribed principles of behavior, it is reasonable to assume a similar performance in the future.

The middle men performed successfully by remaining

withdrawn, uninvolved, and compromising their values with those of the captors. Binding them to a specific standard of behavior may, in fact, subvert the secret to their success.

The collaborators were vulnerable to ideological and materialistic appeals. After 18 years of socialization and inculcation, ending in disenchantment with one's ideology, it is unrealistic to think that a short indoctrination in a set of highly idealistic and moral principles will be successful. Moreover, most of those--socialized in a society in which the desire for self-enhancement in a competitive environment is highly encouraged--are highly susceptible to materialistic intimidation. The Judaeo-Christian principles which normally impose moral and ethical limits on opportunistic behavior were not strong enough among the collaborators. Since extreme mental and physical abuse was a result of resistance and not a prelude to collaboration, it was not a factor.

Of the nine post-Code returnees, seven signed confessions violating Article V, Department of Defense Directive 1300.7. To survive, all nine had to go further than the "ideal" of Article V. In general, they believe Article V to be too restrictive and a tool in the hands of the captor.

The captor knows it exists; therefore, if he can force the captive to violate it, he induces the self-deprecating effects of guilt and shame, undermines captive identity, and produces further collaboration.

Even if one prescribes to the theory that the committed man has no breaking point and can abide by the Code, he must ask the following question: are the people being produced by our society more or less "committed"?

In Chapter V, the writer will examine some trends in the American character (particularly youth) and their relationship to commitment and the Code.

CHAPTER V

ARTICLE V, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 1300.7, AND THE COMMITTEE REPORT: 1970 VIS-A-VIS 1955

> If the American character has been deteriorating--and I must regretfully admit that I this it has--the very first thing to arrest the drift is to check the compass, refer to the chart, and set the course.
>
> Orrin E. Klapp

In arguing that the "committed man" has no breaking point and can abide by the Code, Dr. Harold G. Wolff points out the fact that our fundamental institutions must play the major role in developing committed men.[1] The armed services alone cannot prepare the individual for all the crises of war. Long before our youth come into the military service, they must have learned the need for commitment, convictions, loyalties, and direction. They must realize, that although enjoyable, the comforts, luxuries, elaborations, and elegances of an opulent society are not essential to life. They must know that during periods of crisis they can survive, if they are committed.[2]

There is no questioning the fact that the Code requires commitment and that our fundamental institutions must play

the major role in producing committed people; however, there is a question that must be asked: is the American character such that people are more or less committed in 1970 than they were in 1955?

In this Chapter, the writer will analyze some aspects of the American character and their relationship to commitment and the Code. Specific areas of interest will be the typical American urban middle-class family socialization process, college student values, the status of the American hero, and public reaction to the Pueblo incident and related United States confession.

It is argued by many that the most dominant value in American culture is success.[3] Unlike many other Western nations, the American is taught from infancy onward that not only can he be a success, but he must be a success. At the same time he is being successful, the American--because he derives his moral standards from Christianity--must be good. He must love his neighbor as himself and, at the same time, compete with him for the symbols and rewards of success.[4] In discussing the intra-personal inconsistencies produced by this sort of a socialization process, Dr. Ashley Montagu proposes that it is one of the principal causes of functionally induced mental illness and sums it up as follows:

> Our socialization process teaches co-operation and competition at one and the same time. Co-operation means striving <u>with</u> others to achieve the same or similar goals. Competition means striving <u>against</u> others to achieve the same or similar goals. These two principles are irreconcilable with each other, for they represent contradictions.[5]

This type of fierce competition, concentrating on success, can lead to anomie, deviant behavior, and the eventual breakdown of the regulatory structure of society. The conflicts generated within the individual from the socialization process and the sin of failure (lack of success) produce normlessness, personal disorganization, and demoralization.[6] When this type of psychic rootlessness is passed from parents to children, it is more damaging, and the results make the question of commitment an extremely valid one.

For numerous years now, the United States has had the highest juvenile delinquency rate of the entire English-speaking world; in 1960 alone, over 700,000 children were referred to the courts for delinquent acts. Our homicide rate is the highest in the world, our violent crime rate is second to none, no one can approach our alcoholic rate, and our divorce courts are the busiest in the world. In Dr. Montagu's words, the trend in the American character in 1962 was as follows:

> I mean, in the plainest language I can muster to my purpose, that unless we take a good look at the value determinants which produce the kind of disorganization which is so evident in so many families in our society today, and having taken a good look, do what is necessary, there is a real danger that this society may go the way of the Roman Empire.[7]

Values, completely different from those that prevail in the society as a whole, can be inculcated into individuals within the family. On the other hand, society--the working system of social values--largely determines the values of the family.[8] The Hazen Foundation Study is illuminating in regard to what effect the educational institution has had on the family inculcated value of "success." Overall the study shows that instruction in the social sciences has had very little influence on student attitudes. Most students highly value a college education; however, intellectual contribution and character or personality nurturing are secondary. Vocational preparation, and adjustment to the status quo are the primary objectives of most students.[9]

The study also reveals that 85 percent of the students believe that they must determine their own destiny, that anyone can succeed by his own hard work, and that, in general, the aspiration for power or practical material satisfactions predominate over social or religious values.[10]

In a comparative study on "the outlook of youth on the future," Gillespie and Allport found United States students to be pretty much separated from the political and social aspects of their existence. One of the students stated it this way: "We are so busy fulfilling this expectation of success that we have neither time nor energy left for good citizenship."[11]

Possibly more revealing than either of the studies of college youth, was the Remmers and Radler study of American adolescents. With respect to all education, more than 72 percent of all high school students felt that the most important thing they could get out of high school was knowing how to get along with people. If you know how to get along with people, you can conform to the expectations of others, and conformity results in success.[12]

This tremendous concern with "private" values as distinguished from social, group, political, religious, or moral values is the state of mind that is frequently referred to as "privatism."[13] In the final analysis, the pressures toward success, securing a degree, obtaining a meal ticket to suburbia, and moving on to a rich and personal life appear to be the dominant values in the life of the American student.[14]

Another indicator of the trends in American character and commitment can be found in the public view of social types which serve as hero models. These models, or images, can either guide people positively by imitation, or negatively by avoidance.

America has more hero type models and role varieties than any other nation in the world. This important dimension of the American role structure indicates a wide choice of heroes and is almost synonymous with freedom.[15] Additionally, a wide variety of hero models, and a confused order or hierarchy in the values expressed by those models gives us two insights: first, the wide variety of models implies that there is little consensus about "highest" or absolute ethical standards (a saint is no better than a pin-up girl), and second, in the values expressed by all the models--a strip-teaser may outshine a scientist, or a glamour girl may be more "successful" than the founder of a hospital.[16] This sort of fuzzy thinking makes the American value system look a little uncertain: there is no definite point of judgment, and inconsistent models create conflict within individuals. It is highly probable that people are confused and demoralized by too many role choices. Conversely, a few hero models such as defenders, martyrs, and

group servants would promote a uniform, stable character type throughout the society.[17]

In sum, a society that has a wide diversity of hero types will suffer loss of identity unless, along with the free choice of types, the society provides effective agencies of guidance, well institutionalized avenues of proving oneself in whatever type is chosen, controls to limit the undesirable types from being presented to the public in quantities, and effective agencies for personality repair and readjustment. If the diversity of hero types continues without these provisions, people will end up with roles unsuited to them, thoroughly confused as to who they are and whether they should be what they have chosen.[18]

Alienation from heroism can be seen on many levels in America.[19] There is a common tendency to make fun of anyone who is out in front. Heckling the President and Supreme Court Judges is routine and the most sacrosanct figures are not immune to mockery.[20] Professor Orrin Klapp of San Diego State asked 50 college students to list American heroes of history, tradition, and today. He then gave them 250 derisive titles and asked them whether any of the titles were appropriate to the heroes they had selected. The derisive titles applied to Einstein, Lincoln, Eisenhower, Washington,

and Franklin D. Roosevelt were 70, 75, 140, 187 and 205 respectively. While we should expect some heroes to draw more mockery than others, it is significant to note that no one was immune.[21]

In addition to traditional and historical heroism taking its licks, many of America's esteemed statuses have come under fire. Politicians, lawyers, doctors, dentists, clergymen, businessmen, and, more recently, military men have been highlighted in cartooning and innumerable jokes.[22] This type of mockery indicates that Americans are inclined to downgrade their own higher roles and statuses that are the focal point of striving.

Overall, the evidence indicates that mockery of heroes and esteemed statuses is more than a literary mode or amusement for satirists and tired intellectuals. It has entered popular thought and is a significant feature in American society. The prevailing mood seems to be disengagement from commitment and adaptation to conditions in which the individual dares not give whole-hearted support to institutions and ideals because, if he does, he may be sold out.[23] How far this type of thought has penetrated American society is open to investigation; however, it is clear that the image

of the hero and esteemed statuses is often used to discount the "ideal" they stand for.[24]

Events of more recent times--the Pueblo incident, the American helicopter shot down over North Korea on 17 August 1969, and public reaction to crew behavior and U.S. government confessions--are enlightening in regard to American character, commitment and the Code.

To free the Pueblo crew, the United States negotiator, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, USA, signed a document prepared by the North Koreans.[25] The document read as follows:

> To the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
>
> The Government of the United States of America, Acknowledging the validity of the confessions of the crew of the USS Pueblo and of the documents of evidence produced by the Representative of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the effect that the ship, which was seized by the self-defense measures of the naval vessels of the Korean People's Army in the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Shoulders full responsibility and solemnly apologizes for the grave acts of espionage committed by the U.S. ship against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea after having intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. And gives firm assurance that no U.S. ships will intrude again in the future into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Meanwhile, the Government of the United States

> of America earnestly requests the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to deal leniently with the former crew members of the USS Pueblo confiscated by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side, taking into consideration the fact that these crew members have confessed honestly to their crimes and petitioned the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for leniency. Simultaneously with the signing of this document, the undersigned acknowledges receipt of 82 former crew members of the Pueblo and one corpse. On behalf of the Government of the United States of America. Gilbert H. Woodward, Major General, USA[26]

Before signing the document, General Woodward made it clear that he was signing the document for one reason only: to obtain the freedom of those who had been illegally seized and held as hostages by the North Koreans. He further stated that his signature did not imply United States acceptance of the numerous false statements in that document.[27]

Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, complimented General Woodward as follows: "I also want to thank our negotiator at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward. He carried out his difficult and successful assignment with distinction and has preserved the integrity of the United States while obtaining the release of the men of the Pueblo."[28]

Secretary of State Dean Rusk added his comments: "Apparently the North Koreans believe there is propaganda value

even in a worthless document which General Woodward publicly labeled false before he signed it."[29]

Nearly a year later, a similar procedure was performed when the United States signed a Communist prepared confession in order to obtain the return of three American helicopter crewmen who had been shot down over North Korea. General Arthur H. Adams, Senior Armistice Delegate of Command, signed the following prepared statement:

> The United Nations command assumes full responsibility, solemnly apologizes for having violated the armistice agreement and seriously infringed upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, infiltrating on August 17, 1969, a military aircraft deep into the territorial air of the Northern half of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and firmly guarantees that it will not commit such a criminal act again in the future and that it will strictly abide by the armistice agreement, requesting the Korean's People's Army side to send back the pilots of the O-23G helicopter which was shot down by the self-defense measures of the Korean's People's Army.[30]

After signing the document, General Adams refuted as follows: "It is obvious that a small unarmed helicopter of this size will not be deliberately sent to hostile territory and it is equally obvious that there was no hostile act or international infiltration."[31]

Public reactions to the conduct of the Pueblo and helicopter crewmen, and signing of confessions by the United

States government are illuminating. A Harris survey, conducted in January 1969,[32] reveals the following: The American people held a consistent view that the most important consideration was to save the lives of the Pueblo crew members vis-a-vis the ship, secret equipment, documents, or even the "honor and integrity" of the United States. The public responded to values which were at variance with prevailing military codes. They rejected the charge that "the Captain of the Pueblo did disservice to his country in trying to save his own life," by 68 percent to 9 percent. They believed the "Pueblo crew showed real courage in the face of physical and mental torture," by 83 percent to 2 percent. The public concurred with Bucher's claim that, "the reason he confessed to spying in North Korean waters was that the crew was threatened with death," by 68 percent to 5 percent. The American public agreed that, "it was right for the United States to sign a false statement that the Pueblo violated North Korean waters, in order to get the crew back," by 58 percent to 22 percent. The public rejected the proposition that "honor and integrity of the United States were more important than the lives of any servicemen," by 65 percent to 13 percent.

Four significant reasons for backing the actions taken

by the United States government were as follows: "It was important to do anything to get the men back, it was the only practical way to get them back, we have to stand behind our men in uniform, and it was better late than never." Those in opposition to the action had three main reasons for disapproval: "Some kind of steps should have been taken earlier, we should have been more forceful in our initial responses, and we should have immediately taken back the ship and men in the first place when it was captured."

Public reaction to the helicopter incident and its related confession was minimal: The New York Times coverage consisted of two days, was allocated to page five, and two half-page columns.[33]

In the final analysis, the evidence indicates a move away from commitment. Anomie, deviant behavior, and disruptions of the regulatory structure of society have increased. A high percentage of our high school and college youth are deeply concerned with private values--success via conformity--in lieu of social, group, political, religious, or moral values. A wide variety of hero models and role choices indicate lack of consensus in regard to ethical standards. The most sacrosanct heroes and esteemed statuses are subjected to frequent mockery and criticism, and the United

States government, supported by the American public, has on two occasions, considered the saving of lives more important than commitment to an idealistic and moral principle.

If, in fact, America as a nation and Americans as individuals are moving away from "commitment," we must ask the following question: What effect does prisoner of war conduct have on United States foreign policy? In Chapter VI, the writer will examine the use of prisoners of war as instruments of foreign policy.

CHAPTER VI

EXPLOITATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR FOR PROPAGANDA AND FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES

> In Korea we had atomic weapons but lost the war and were unable to use those weapons because of a political and psychological climate created by the Communists.
>
> Edward Hunter

Recent conflicts, between divergent doctrines of national states--particularly between democratic and Communist ideologies, involve minds as well as might. Propaganda, as an instrument of policy, is used frequently and substantially. A major source of this propaganda is the prisoner of war. In this Chapter, the writer will briefly examine Communist coercion of prisoners of war to induce them to perform acts or give information which is of subtle but effective aid to the enemy as a propaganda weapon.

In Chapter II, the writer traced the value and treatment of prisoners of war from antiquity through the Korean War. It was found, beginning with World War II, that captives were increasingly exploited for political and propaganda purposes; however, it was not until the Korean conflict that exploitation for the political and propaganda welfare

of the captor state was the basis for captive treatment.[1] A more detailed look at the Korean conflict will reveal several examples.

Korea. In August 1950, prior to direct Chinese entry into the Korean conflict, the Communists made their first attempt to use prisoners of war for political purposes. The USSR delegate to the United Nations Security Council, Jacob A. Malik, claimed to have received a cable of protest signed by 39 captured United States officers. The protest was against further senseless bloodshed in Korea, and the names of those who allegedly signed it were published.[2] After repatriation, nearly all of the officers charged with signing the protest denied--under oath--having signed it.[3]

By January 1951, the Chinese had taken over control of the prisoners of war, and more sophisticated propaganda efforts were introduced. The so-called "Stockholm Peace Appeal" was circulated through several prisoner of war camp indoctrination centers. Peace committees were formed, and a petition--appealing to the United Nations for peace and signed by several American prisoners of war--was forwarded to the United Nations in February 1951.[4]

In the spring of 1951, the Communists began their germ

warfare propaganda campaign. In early May, North Korea filed a protest, charging the United States with germ warfare. From May 1951 until May 1952, the Communists exerted extensive efforts against United States Air Force flying personnel in order to substantiate the North Korean germ warfare charges.[5] On 16 May 1952, the signed confessions of two captured pilots were announced to the world and published in the People's China--a Peking newspaper.[6] Although these confessions did not substantiate the Communist charges of germ warfare, they did serve to create doubt and confusion in the arena of world public opinion.

In June 1956, the extent of Communist efforts in the world public opinion arena were further revealed. Former prisoners of war, testifying before the House of Representatives Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities, exposed the "Save Our Sons Committee." The Committee consisted of two American-born women who were members of the Communist Party. Between June 1952 and October 1953, the Committee obtained, from Communist sources, names, camp locations, and other pertinent information about United States prisoners of war. They wrote letters to relatives and friends of the prisoners, encouraging them to express their views of "disenchantment with the war" to the news media and Congress.[7]

Both of these women refused to testify; however, their efforts to arouse public opinion on behalf of the Communist cause was clearly established.[8]

Vietnam. The Vietnam story is not complete; however, it appears to be somewhat similar to the Korean one. Captured American prisoners are exploited through externally oriented propaganda operations.[9] They are encouraged to write letters, make tapes, draft leaflets, submit to press interviews, and pose for propaganda photography. This documentary material, purportedly originated by captured American prisoners, consists of: confessions of atrocities; support for antidraft demonstrations and peace groups; criticism of minority and racial group practices in the United States; praise of North Vietnam and her people; descriptions of the good treatment they are receiving, and appeals to the United States government to reassess the situation and end the war. The emergence of strong antiwar groups in the United States, who have ties with Hanoi, allow this propaganda to be channeled directly to these groups.[10] It is then presented to United States audiences in the most effective manner.

In at least two cases, Communist attempts to exploit

prisoners of war for political and propaganda purposes have backfired. In September of 1965, following the execution of Viet Cong terrorists by the South Vietnam government, the National Liberation Front announced the execution of American prisoners of war in retaliation. The Internation Committee of the Red Cross filed formal complaints against these acts of reprisal, and requested permission to investigate.[11]

In July 1966, Hanoi announced that captured American flyers were to be tried as war criminals. Several American prisoners were paraded and displayed in Hanoi and other cities in an effort to obtain local support. The prisoners were photographed and the pictures disseminated worldwide.[12] Instead of obtaining world sympathy, and forcing a halt to the bombing in North Vietnam, world opinion went against the Communists. Pope Paul VI, United Nations Secretary General U Thant, American antiwar groups, and U.S. Senate "Doves"[13] appealed to Ho Chi Minh to stop the scheduled trials. Ho Chi Minh conceded and announced that no trials were anticipated. Ho apparently interpreted these reactions to be in opposition to his political objectives and relented. Lack of success notwithstanding, this brazen effort at political blackmail is an outstanding example of attempted use of prisoners of war in influencing foreign policy. The foregoing

paragraphs attest to the fact that American prisoners of war in Korea and Vietnam have been exploited for propaganda and political purposes. Because of this, we must ask the following question: has the United States done everything possible to counteract these Communist efforts?

World Opinion. During World War II, Nazi concentration camps administered extremely cruel treatment to millions of captives. The treatment was such that it aroused the indignation of the civilized world. More than 25 years later, placard-carrying pickets attested to the intensity of this indignation by demanding justice and condemning the acts outside the Munich Palace of Justice during the trial of former Nazis.[14]

Contrary to the widespread and lasting indignation toward the Nazis after World War II, indignation toward the Communists after Korea was localized and short lived. One argument contributes this disparity of concern for those who had endured extensive and intensive abuse to the following: in Korea, vis-a-vis the Nazi concentration camps, atrocities were not widely committed, and most of the American prisoners capitulated without enduring severe pressures or torture.[15] As documented in Chapter II, some captives

collaborated with little or no applied pressure; however, others were deceived and coerced. Furthermore, others withstood persecution beyond the recognized limits of human endurance.[16] In the final analysis, it cannot be argued that the treatment and methods employed were in consonance with the provisions of humane conduct.

Used properly, propaganda can be an effective weapon in influencing world opinion. It naturally follows that counterpropaganda can be just as effective. It is entirely feasible that nations who use coercive methods in dealing with prisoners of war can be exposed for what they are--uncivilized. In the long term, the will and morale of the captive may be strengthened and the captor may be deterred from "cruel" treatment.

Good examples of United States failure to properly counter Communist propaganda efforts are numerous. In Korea, the Communists distributed films showing American officers reading and signing alleged germ warfare confessions. As a counter, the United States showed films explaining the use of mental and physical torture to extract such confessions.[17] In the writer's opinion, this was an outstanding example of United States counterpropaganda that was not used as successfully as it might have been. Maximum use of the United

Nations as a forum for distribution of the truth could have been more effective. It was and still is highly probable that many Asians believe the bacteriological warfare charges brought against the United States are true.[18] In many areas of the "third world," Communist vis-a-vis "free world" propaganda is equated and credence extended to the side which gives the most effective presentation.[19] Moreover, if the United States intends to compete in the psychological warfare arena, she must develop the expertise to penetrate the Asian-Communist countries and apprise those people of the truth.

Summary. It would be difficult to support Edward Hunter's position that the United States lost the Korean War because of the political and psychological climate created by the Communists, or that prisoners of war were the single source of propaganda for this political and psychological climate. Conversely, it is unquestionably clear that Communist exploitation of prisoners of war for propaganda purposes is a formidable weapon, and must be countered. In the past, United States counterpropaganda has not been as successful as it should have been. During Korea, United States efforts to counter the completely false charges of

bacteriological warfare were only partially successful. More recent events--the Pueblo incident and the Vietnam conflict--have offered similar challenges and made truthful penetration into the Asian-Communist countries more important.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary. The Code of Conduct was created to fulfill three objectives: to protect the cause for which the United States stands, to attain the greatest possibilities of survival for all who serve that cause, and to clarify the line of duty issue. Parts of the Code, and its applicable implementing instructions--specifically, Article V, one statement in Department of Defense Directive 1300.7 and one statement in the Committee Report--were controversial in 1955 and are more controversial today. The problem of prescribing specific behavior under all conditions (multitude of situations in which captives find themselves, their degree of commitment, and variations in captive intelligence and personality) is extremely difficult. In brief, the guidance offered by Article V and its applicable implementing instructions is quite simple, whereas, the challenges of captivity are not.

This study has gone back to ancient warfare in order to show the evolution of the Code of Conduct. The political value, propaganda value, and treatment of prisoners of war, from antiquity to the Korean War, were discussed. The

increasing importance of the captive as a source of propaganda for psychological and political purposes was developed. In Korea, Communist exploitation of American captives for psychological and political purposes was highly successful. Reaction of the American public was one of dismay, and provided the impetus for promulgation of the controversial Code of Conduct.

Once the Code and applicable implementing instructions were promulgated and established, this study turned to their relevancy and validity. If they were to be valid as antidotes to collaboration, they must be relevant to the reasons why a captive collaborates, resists, or remains neutral. The reasons for collaboration, resistance, or neutrality were discussed from three different viewpoints: psychiatric and psychological evaluations, factors related to collaboration and resistance, and reaction patterns to severe chronic stress. Captive groups studied were Western civilians, Chinese intellectuals, and American Army prisoners of war; all groups were prisoners of the Chinese or Koreans.

After determining the reasons for collaboration, resistance, or neutrality, this study discussed the relevancy of Article V and applicable implementing instructions as antidotes to collaboration. Case histories of nine post-Code

returnees were presented to show captive reaction to captor techniques, and captive evaluation of Article V and applicable implementing instructions as antidotes to collaboration.

Knowing that the Code and applicable implementing instructions were controversial, and that a high degree of commitment was required in order to abide by them, trends in the American character were examined. The typical American urban middle-class family socialization process, youth values, status of American heroes, public reaction, and official United States policy regarding the Pueblo incident were discussed.

Finally, exploitation of prisoners of war as a propaganda source for political and foreign policy purposes was examined. Specific examples from Korea and Vietnam, as well as the use of world opinion to counter these efforts were discussed.

As a result of the research undertaken in preparing this study, the writer has arrived at the following generalizations:

Irrespective of culture values, background characteristics, or type of character structure, "cruel" treatment and the application of psychological pressures succeeded--

in individual cases--in forcing collaboration. The degree of character balance, character integration, and strength of identity was pronounced in the resisters. Susceptibility to materialistic inducement among American Army prisoners of war was a major weakness.

Article V and applicable implementing instructions would have been ineffective as antidotes to collaboration. A man derives basic human and moral values from his own background. His personality and being are the sum and substance of what he has been exposed to during his lifelong development. This process of socialization and development is, in the main, completed by age 18. By that age, an individual's personality has been formed, his moral values established, and a personal code of ethics somewhat solidified. The ideals of his religion, country, and home are well inculcated, whether having been done in the right or wrong manner. The most authoritative and substantial codes (filial piety in China and the Ten Commandments in the Western world) have already had their effect.

Post-Code returnees found it virtually impossible to give only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth when conversing with their captors. Nearly all captives were placed in a position where it was beyond their ability to

resist, and yet, there was no alternative--except death. Several captives, who didn't accept death and had no other guidelines to follow, developed serious guilt feelings. This made them more vulnerable to the captor's coercive techniques. The captors used Article V and applicable implementing instructions to their advantage. They tried to create guilt feelings, thereby forcing the captive to live with the gnawing fear that no matter what he said, it could be held against him when and if he was ever repatriated.

The argument that the "committed man" has no breaking point and can abide by the Code is extremely valid. To argue that our fundamental institutions, and not the armed services, are primarily responsible for developing committed men is equally valid. Irrespective of these arguments, trends in the American socialization process, student values, status of American heroes, and public reaction to the Pueblo incident indicate a movement away from commitment. Moreover, the signing of two Communist-prepared confessions by high ranking United States government officials indicates that the national leadership is less interested in commitment than humanitarianism. If high ranking government officials can sign Communist-prepared confessions, then why can't American prisoners of war perform similar acts to preclude

death or exploitation for propaganda purposes. In view of these well known precedents, it is unreasonable to expect the individual prisoner of war to abide by the provisions of Article V and applicable implementing instructions.

The conclusion of this study is that Article V and applicable implementing instructions were never realistic or valid for prisoners of war subject to "cruel" treatment. Moreover, because of trends in the American character--away from commitment--they have become less valid and realistic with time. Therefore, members of the United States Armed Forces cannot be expected to strictly adhere to their provisions.

Because prisoners of war are a propaganda source for political and psychological warfare, their actions will have an impact on United States foreign policy. Therefore, it is imperative that those subject to captivity be as politically astute as possible; they must know whether a propaganda film will be disregarded or treated as a serious mistake. For this reason, revisions to Article V and applicable implementing instructions must be accomplished by combined efforts of military and civilian policy makers.

Recommendations. Article V should be rewritten as follows:

> When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am required to give my name, rank, service number, and date of birth. To the utmost of my ability, I will evade answering further questions or making oral or written statements disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to their cause.

The key changes are "bound to give only" to "required," and "I will make no" to "I will evade." "Bound to give only" is ambiguous and has been frequently misinterpreted. The United States abides by the Geneva Convention which requires the prisoner of war to give his name, rank, service number, and date of birth, so why not write it that way. Changing "I will make no" to "I will evade" allows the captive to maneuver. He can elude, avoid, or get around answering directly without the fear of "failure" and "guilt" which go with going beyond a specific point. These changes are not in conflict with the moral principles on which the Code is based.

Department of Defense Directive 1300.7 should be revised so as to reflect the following concepts:

--A captive cannot be held responsible for his actions once he is forced to a point where it is beyond his ability to resist.

--The United States accepts joint responsibility for

captive action beyond that point where the captive is no longer able to resist.

--Recognition of the national responsibility for the moral fiber inculcated into United States servicemen.

--Recognition of the possibility that some information may be divulged by the captive without harm to this country or allies.

--Recognition of the probability that some captives will be forced beyond their ability to resist, and if they are--all is not lost.

Those parts of the Committee Report which infer that "proper patriotism, education and strength of will" are the essence to resistance should be deleted. Simple answers to complex problems are out of order in a complex world.

In presenting these recommendations, the writer realizes that they can scarcely be termed a final solution to the problem. They are, however, a beginning upon which to give the United States military man a firm base from which to challenge the many threats which may confront him as a prisoner. For the long term, an Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War should restudy the entire prisoner of war/Code of Conduct issue. It is incredible to think that highly controversial guidance on such a complex issue can remain

valid for 15 years in a rapidly changing world; particularly when that guidance was formulated in a short period of time by a few people.

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