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Staff Memorandum

ATTITUDES OF FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TOWARD THE COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF INFANTRY SQUAD LEADERS

by

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This report describes research to determine (1) characteristic behaviors of rifle squad leaders when setting up a defensive position and when in a fire fight, and (2) the evaluations of these behaviors by other squad leaders and by superiors and subordinates. Results of questionnaire surveys of Korean War veterans are analyzed.

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BRIEF

The objectives of this study were (1) to identify what behaviors are performed by rifle squad leaders when setting up a defensive position and when in a fire fight, and (2) to determine the extent to which these behaviors are viewed as desirable by men who have performed very well and men who have performed very poorly in combat.

The research was carried out in 1953 by means of questionnaires administered to a sample of combat infantrymen participating in the Korean conflict. These soldiers had been identified in an earlier research (Task FIGHTER) as being fighters or non-fighters. Each soldier rated the over-all effectiveness of a squad leader with whom he had served in combat and then indicated how frequently the rated squad leader performed certain behaviors appropriate to a setting-up or fire-fight situation. The data were analyzed on the basis of the caliber of combat performance of the soldiers completing the questionnaires.

The results of this research substantiate, and to some extent add to, other findings dealing with the personality characteristics of soldiers who have done well and those who have done poorly in combat, that is, fighters and non-fighters. Specifically, the data reveal that, in contrast to non-fighters, fighters are:

1. more discerning and more aware of the behavior of their squad leader.
2. more definite in their opinions as to the caliber of performance of their squad leader.

In addition to substantiating other research, the findings presented here throw light on the leadership expectations of outstanding combat infantrymen. In many cases the leadership expectations of fighters closely parallel popular conceptions of the military leader as well as leadership principles found in Army field manuals. For example, fighters expect their squad leader to:

1. give orders in firm confident manner, direct them to specific people, and make sure that orders are understood.
2. make sure that orders are promptly and properly carried out and accpet no back talk from his men.
3. employ men, weapons, and equipment effectively.
4. display courage, initiative, and concern for his men's welfare.

In some instances, however, the leadership expectations of fighters while similar to leadership principles found in Army field manuals, tend to diverge from popular conceptions of what a leader is like. For example, fighters expect their squad leader to:

1. keep his men informed as to the calibre of their preformance, both when they do <u>well</u> and when they do <u>poorly</u>.
2. ask his men for suggestions and follow such suggestions when they are good.
3. explain the "why" of an order and admit when he is wrong.
4. Questions orders which appear unclear or unreasonable.
5. be warm and friendly with his men.

The above points are discussed in detail in the body of this report and the possible implications of these findings to the Army are indicated on Pages 44 through 50.

PREFACE

One of the prime objectives of Human Research Unit No. 2, OCAFF, has been to concern itself with the Army's NCO training program. Officers and noncommissioned officers alike have indicated that this training should incorporate experience gained in the Korean conflict. In the fall of 1952 a research project was initiated to tap these valuable combat experiences. The research reported here was conducted in Korea in conjunction with Task FIGHTER. The research project was approved by Department of the Army, G-1, 26 November 1952.

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ATTITUDES OF FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TOWARD THE COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF INFANTRY SQUAD LEADERS

This paper presents an analysis of the leadership techniques utilized by good and poor infantry squad leaders in a stress and non-stress situation. Specifically, this paper reports (1) the frequency with which various leadership techniques are employed by squad leaders when setting up a defensive position and when in a fire fight, and (2) the extent to which these behaviors are identified as indicative of good or poor squad leaders by men who have performed very well and men who have performed very poorly in combat.

PROCEDURE

In the fall of 1952 intensive exploratory interviews were conducted with combat infantry veterans of the Korean conflict. These interviews confirmed previously held hunches that the general combat situation could be divided into a number of specific situations differing in the amount and kinds of physical and psychological stress present. It was hypothesized that the leadership techniques employed by squad leaders would differ with the combat situation and that a soldier's acceptance of these leadership techniques would depend upon the specific combat situation in which that technique is employed. These exploratory interviews revealed that men differ in how well they perform under the stress of combat, and that personality differences might well account for these performance differences. It seemed likely that these men would also differ in the type of leadership they expected, needed, and under which they could function most effectively.

For the most part, Army field manuals dealing with leadership, e.g., FM22-10 and FM22-100, have not given adequate consideration to these hypothesized situational and personality differences in their exposition of leadership principles.

Questionnaires dealing with two combat situations were prepared—one dealing with squad leadership techniques when setting up a defensive position, and the second dealing with squad leadership techniques when in a fire fight. These two situations were selected because (1) they characterized the combat situation prevailing in the final days of the Korean war and, consequently, were situations with which combat infantrymen would be familiar; and (2) they differed in the amount of physical and psychological stress present.

In the winter of 1953 questionnaires dealing with the setting up of a defensive position and fire fight situations were administered to a sample of 274 experienced combat infantrymen—members of front line infantry units stationed in Korea. Slightly over half of these men had been previously identified as "fighters," that is, they had performed outstandingly well in combat. The remaining men had been previously identified as "non-fighters," that is, they had performed very poorly in combat.[1] Both "fighters" and "non-fighters" were contacted in Korea, and the questionnaires were administered to them

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[1]Egbert, Robert L., Cline, Victor B., Meeland, Tor, Brown, Charles W., Forgy, Edward W., and Spickler, Martin W. "The Characteristics of Fighters and Non-Fighters: I. An Analysis of Intelligence and Personality Scales; II. An Analysis of Interest Patterns; III. An Analysis of Clinical Interview and Life History Data." Human Research Unit No. 2, OCAFF, Fort Ord, California, March 1954, June 1954, and August 1954.

in an area a few miles behind the main line of resistance.

Each infantryman was first asked to rate the over-all effectiveness of a squad leader with whom he served for at least one month in Korea. This rating was made on the following five point scale: "way above average," "a little above average," "about average," "a little below average," and "way below average." For purposes of analysis the rated squad leaders were divided into two groups. Approximately half of the rated squad leaders had been rated "way above average," or "a little above average." These leaders have been designated good leaders. Leaders rated as being "about average," or below, have been designated poor leaders. (Sixty-five per cent of these poor leaders had actually been rated as being "about average." Thus, this study is more correctly a comparison of the combat performance of above average and average infantry squad leaders. For ease of presentation, however, the leaders are referred to as good and poor, respectively.)

After rating the squad leader, each infantryman was asked to indicate how often this same squad leader performed each of a number of behaviors while setting up a defensive position and/or in a fire fight.[2] Frequency of performance was indicated on the following five point scale: "always," "usually," "about half the time," "seldom," and "never." For purposes of analysis, frequency of performance of the various behaviors was also divided into two groups. The cutting point again was the point which divided the rated squad leaders into two

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[2]These behaviors were identified earlier as a result of interviews held with other combat veterans of the Korean war. An example of a behavior is "gave his orders in a firm confident manner."

groups of approximately equal size, i.e., the median.

The findings presented in this report are based on the relation between a squad leader's rating (good and poor) and the frequency with which this same squad leader was reported to have performed the various leadership behaviors (above or below the median). When the relation is such that it is unlikely to have occurred by chance, the particular behavior is described as being characteristic or typical of one kind of squad leader and not the other, e.g., typical of the good but not the poor squad leader. Following this, desirable behaviors are those which were typical or characteristic of good leaders. Similarly, undesirable behaviors are those which were typical or characteristic of poor leaders.

It should be noted that while the infantrymen were asked to indicate what behaviors the rated squad leader actually performed, some infantrymen probably indicated what behaviors the rated squad leader should have performed. It is likely that these "ideal expectations" reflect the soldier's social and psychological needs as well as whatever leadership training he had received in the Army via NCO school or OCS.

It is not known to what extent a squad leader was rated and described by more than one infantryman, because the soldiers were not requested to indicate the name or organization of the squad leader they chose to describe. Such a procedure was followed in order to obtain an unbiased evaluation of a squad leader's effectiveness and an accurate report of his actual behavior.

The data was analyzed on the basis of the caliber of combat

performance of the infantrymen contacted. Two categories were formed and the men used in the study were assigned to one of two groups: fighters—consisting of approximately 152 soldiers who had performed outstandingly well in combat; and non-fighters—consisting of approximately 123 soldiers who had performed very poorly in combat. This breakdown permitted a study of the relationship between a soldier's combat performance and his evaluation of squad leader behavior.

On the basis of content, each of the behaviors were assigned to one of four activity areas: control activities—concerned with ways a squad leader exercises control over his men; intermediary activities—concerned with how a squad leader acts as an intermediary between his subordinates and his superiors; interpersonal activities—concerned with informal relationships existing between a squad leader and his men; and tactical activities—directly concerned with carrying out the squad's mission against the enemy or maintaining security.

The particular behaviors in each activity area which were employed by the squad leaders, and the extent to which these behaviors were viewed as desirable by the two groups of soldiers—fighters and non-fighters—will be discussed in the following section entitled RESULTS.

DEFINITION OF TERMS USED IN TEXT

The material presented in this report is based on an analysis of statistical data. For ease of presentation and in order to increase the readability of this report the findings have been presented in lay terms. Since these lay terms are based upon precise statistical relationships, the exact meaning given these terms in this report are outlined below.

FIGHTERS and NON-FIGHTERS:

We have called soldiers FIGHTERS when they were reported to have performed very well in combat. We have called soldiers NON-FIGHTERS when they were reported to have performed very poorly in combat.

GOOD and POOR SQUAD LEADERS:

We have called a squad leader GOOD if the soldier rated him as being "a little above average," or "way above average." We have called a squad leader POOR if the soldier rated him as being "about average," "a little below average," or "way below average."

FREQUENTLY performed a behavior:

We have used the term FREQUENTLY when the soldiers reported that the squad leader they rated "usually" or "always" performed a behavior.

TYPICAL, CHARACTERISTIC, OR THE MARK of a good (or poor) squad leader:

We have considered a behavior as TYPICAL, CHARACTERISTIC, or THE MARK of one kind of squad leader (good or poor) when the soldiers indicated that it was more frequently performed by one kind of leader than another, for example, more frequently performed by good squad leaders than by poor squad leaders. In these cases the difference in frequency of performance between good and poor squad leaders is of a

magnitude that it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence or better.)

DESIRABLE, APPROVED, UNDESIRABLE, DISAPPROVED, CRITICAL:

We have referred to a behavior as DESIRABLE (or UNDESIRABLE) when—

We have said that soldiers APPROVE (or DISAPPROVE or are CRITICAL) of a behavior when—

the soldiers indicated that the behavior was more frequently performed by good (or poor) squad leaders than by poor (or good) squad leaders. In these cases the differences in frequency of performance between good and poor squad leaders is of a magnitude that it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence or better.)

GREAT INTEREST, GREAT CONCERN, SENSITIVE:

We have said that soldiers show GREAT INTEREST, GREAT CONCERN, or are SENSITIVE towards a behavior when they have indicated that the behavior was more frequently performed by one kind of (good or poor) leader than another. In these cases the differences in frequency of p formance between good and poor squad leaders is of a magnitude that it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. (Significant at the .05 level of confidence or better.)

LITTLE INTEREST, LITTLE CONCERN, UNCONCERN, INDIFFERENCE, UNCERTAINTY, UNCRITICAL, AS TRUE, EQUALLY TRUE:

We have said that soldiers show LITTLE INTEREST, LITTLE CONCERN, UNCONCERN, INDIFFERENCE or UNCERTAINTY towards the performance of a behavior when—

We have said that soldiers are UNCRITICAL of the performance of

a behavior when—

We have said that soldiers consider the behavior AS TRUE of good as it was of poor leaders, or EQUALLY TRUE of good and poor leaders when—

the soldiers report that there was little difference in the frequency with which good and poor squad leaders performed a behavior. In these cases the differences in frequency of performance between good and poor squad leaders might well have occurred by chance.

RESULTS

The results are presented in turn for each of the four activity areas. The behaviors within each of these four areas have been arranged into a number of logical sub-areas. Tables summarizing the findings in each activity area are included at the end of the textual discussion of that area.

Evaluation of Squad Leader

As has been mentioned before, soldiers were asked to rate the over-all effectiveness of their squad leader. Interestingly, while half of the fighters rated their squad leaders as being above average, but one-third of the non-fighters rated their leader above average. It thus appears that non-fighters, that is, men who had done poorly in combat, feel their leadership was at best average and more likely below average. Two explanations suggest themselves at this point. It is possible that non-fighters did, in fact, have ineffective leadership. If this is true, this may help explain the poor combat performance of these non-fighters. It would similarly help explain the good performance of fighters who may have been led by highly effective squad leaders. On the other hand, it is possible that fighters and non-fighters had leaders of equal caliber. Non-fighters may be rationalising their own poor performance in combat by placing the blame for that performance on their squad leader. No evidence is available at this time to suggest which explanation is the correct one.

Control Activities Area

Probably the most important function of the squad leader in any

situation is exercising control over his subordinates. The behaviors making up the control activities area have been divided into three sub-areas for purposes of analysis: manner of giving and implementing orders, delegation of responsibility, and maintenance of prestige. These will be discussed in turn.

Manner of Giving and Implementing Orders:—The precise way a squad leader gives orders to his subordinates was found to be related to how highly he was evaluated. In both the setting-up and fire-fight situations, approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently giving their orders in a clear confident manner, making sure that their orders were clearly understood and as checking to see that their orders were promptly and properly carried out. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently directing their orders to specific people when setting up. This behavior was not included in the fire-fight situation. In both the setting-up and fire-fight situations, fighters and non-fighters agreed that a squad leader should make sure that his orders are clearly understood and should make sure that his orders are promptly and properly carried out. Fighters in the setting-up situation, and both fighters and non-fighters in the fire-fight situation also agreed that a squad leader should give his orders in a firm confident manner. Non-fighters indicated indifference towards this behavior in the setting-up situation. Both fighters and non-fighters agreed that a squad leader should direct his orders to specific people in a setting-up situation.

Approximately one-third of the soldiers reported that their squad leader frequently threatened or swore at their men when setting up

and when in a fire fight. Non-fighters were critical of swearing in both situations, but critical of threats only when setting up. Fighters were unconcerned about these behaviors in both situations. This constitutes one of the very few instances in this study where non-fighters were more certain of what they expected (or did not expect) of a leader than were fighters.

Approximately two-thirds of the squad leaders were reported as frequently complimenting their men when they did a good job, and as chewing-them-out when they did poorly. This was true in both the setting-up and fire-fight situations and in both situations only fighters attributed the practice to good rather than to poor squad leaders.

Delegation of Responsibility:—Squad leaders, to varying degrees, consult with their men before issuing orders to them. It may be assumed that the acceptance of an order will be more likely to the extent that men are consulted before the order is issued. Approximately half of the squad leaders were reported as frequently asking their men for advice and approximately two-thirds of the squad leaders were reported as frequently following their subordinate's advice when it was good. This was true in both the setting-up and fire-fight situations. Fighters and non-fighters agreed that in both situations, these two practices were the identifying marks of a good rather than a poor squad leader.

Squad leaders can give their men wide discretion in the implementation of orders, that is, they can specify what is to be done but not how it is to be done. Approximately two-thirds of the squad

leaders were reported as frequently giving their men wide discretion in their implementation of orders when setting up and when in a fire fight. There was little reported difference however, in the frequency with which good and poor squad leaders gave their men such wide discretion.

Maintenance of Prestige:—In addition to the delegation of responsibility (discussed in the previous section), three other items can be viewed as dealing with the maintenance of prestige. These were: admission of error, acceptance of back-talk from subordinates, and the explaining of the "why" of an order. This latter behavior was included only in the setting-up situation however.

Approximately two-thirds of the squad leaders were reported as frequently explaining the "why" of an order (when setting up) and as admitting when they were wrong. Both fighters and non-fighters agreed that a squad leader should admit when he was wrong, but only fighters approved the explaining of the "why" of an order.

Approximately twenty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently accepting back-talk from their men, and this was true both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Only fighters were critical of such behavior, non-fighters attributing it as often to good as to poor squad leaders.

TABLE I—CONTROL BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER WHEN SETTING UP AND WHEN IN A FIRE FIGHT

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
1	30	Gives orders in a firm confident manner*	X**		X	Y
56	12	Makes sure that his orders are clearly understood	X	Y	X	Y
50		Directs his orders to specific people	Y	Y	--------***	
15	46	Does not threaten his men				Y
53	17	Does not swear at his men		Y		X
14	35	Checks to see that his orders are promptly and properly carried out	Y	Y	X	Y
44	53	Compliments his men when they do well and chews them out when they do poorly	X		Y	
26	60	Asks subordinates for suggestions	X	Y	Y	Y
57	40	Acts upon good suggestions offered by subordinates	X	Y	X	Y
46	6	Gives his men leeway in carrying out orders				
8		Explains, whenever possible, the "why" of an order	X		--------	
3	56	Admits when he is wrong	X	X	Y	X
27	32	Does not let his men talk back to him	X		Y	

*Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Interim Report for original wording.

**The symbols X and Y indicate the attitudes of the two soldier groups towards the listed behaviors:

X indicates that the behavior is very clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .01 to .001 level of confidence.

Y indicates that the behavior is clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .05 level of confidence.

***Behavior not included in this situation.

Intermediary Activities Area

When acting as an intermediary between the men in his squad and platoon headquarters, the squad leader performs one of his most important functions. It is also a trying duty since the demands of his superiors and subordinates are not always identical. The behaviors making up the intermediary activities area have been divided into three sub-areas: questioning superiors' orders, respect for superiors, and securing non-tactical information from superiors.

Questioning Superiors' Orders:—In passing along orders from superiors to subordinates, difficulties can arise on one of two scores: the squad leader can view the orders as unclear, or he can consider the orders unreasonable or impossible to implement.

Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently questioned orders which they felt were unclear, and a smaller number of squad leaders (approximately two-thirds) were reported as frequently questioning orders which they felt were unreasonable. These patterns were evident both in the setting-up and fire-fight situations. Fighters approved both practices in both situations. Non-fighters indicated approval only of the questioning of unreasonable orders, and of that only in the fire-fight situation.

Respect for Superiors:—While acting as a link in the chain of command, the squad leader may or may not respect his superiors. By respecting their position, the squad leader tends to fulfill his role in the military structure, though in some instances this may be at the expense of losing the loyalty of his men. His disrespect for superiors can be demonstrated by publicly criticizing superiors or

griping about orders.

Approximately one-fourth of the squad leaders, both when setting up and when in a fire fight, were reported as frequently criticizing their superiors in public and as whining and griping when they received orders from superiors. Public criticism of superiors was considered an undesirable practice only by fighters, and by them only in the setting-up situation. Fighters were uncritical of this behavior in a fire-fight, and non-fighters were uncritical of such behavior in both situations. Whining and griping, however, were of more concern to non-fighters than to fighters. While fighters indicated that good and poor squad leaders were equally likely to whine or gripe when receiving orders both when setting up and when in a fire fight, non-fighters considered this same behavior an undesirable practice in both situations.

Respect for superiors is also indicated by the extent to which squad leaders identify with orders of superiors, that is, passes superiors' orders along as if they were their own orders. Approximately half of the squad leaders were reported to frequently identify with their superiors' orders both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Fighters tended to identify this as a desirable practice when in a fire fight, but as true of poor as well as of good leaders when setting up.

Securing Non-Tactical Information:—The squad leader can also act as a channel of communication between superiors and subordinates. To a considerable extent, information influencing the future of the men in the squad is in the hands of persons in the platoon headquarters.

It is reasonable to expect that the rank and file would be vitally interested in such information, and the effective squad leader would thus be one who makes serious efforts to secure such information and pass it along to subordinates. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently inquiring as to their unit's future plans when setting up. Both fighters and non-fighters approved this practice inasmuch as they identified it with good rather than with poor squad leaders.

TABLE II—INTERMEDIARY BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER WHEN SETTING UP AND WHEN IN A FIRE FIGHT

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
32	24	Questions unclear orders*	X**		Y	
39	18	Questions unreasonable orders	X		Y	X
36	51	Does not publicly criticize his superiors	X			
23	23	Does not whine or gripe when receiving orders		Y		X
20	47	Identifies with his superiors orders			Y	
25		Inquires about the unit's future plans	X	Y	--------***	

*Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Interim Report for original wording.

**The symbols X and Y indicate the attitudes of the two soldier groups towards the listed behaviors:

X indicates that the behavior is very clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .01 to .001 level of confidence.

Y indicates that the behavior is clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant of the .05 level of confidence.

***Behavior not included in this situation.

Interpersonal Relations Activity Area

A considerable portion of a leader's relations with his men are relaxed and informal and reflect the fact that they both are fellow human beings rather than soldiers differing in their position in the military structure. The nature of a squad leader's behavior towards his men in these informal situations may well influence how he is evaluated by his men and, consequently, how well the squad performs. Obviously opportunities for informal social relations are practically nonexistent when in a fire fight. Consequently, the behaviors in the interpersonal area apply only to the setting-up situation.

The squad leader can do many things which affect the morale of his men. His behavior can serve to make his squad a more effective and spirited team, or it can do the reverse. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently having a friendly word and smile for their men, and over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently sharing their cigarettes with their men. Both fighters and non-fighters attributed these practices to good rather than to poor squad leaders. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently trying to keep their men cheerful. Only fighters attributed this behavior to good squad leaders. Non-fighters attributed this behavior as often to poor as to good squad leaders.

An earlier section of this report indicated that both fighters and non-fighters approved a squad leader's efforts to secure information regarding the future of their unit. Nearly one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported as frequently failing to transmit such

information along to their subordinates. Only fighters, however, were critical of this failure. Non-fighters attributed this neglect about as often to good as they did to poor squad leaders.

information along to their subordinates. Only fighters, however, were critical of this failure. Non-fighters attributed this neglect about as often to good as they did to poor squad leaders.

TABLE III—INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER WHEN SETTING UP AND WHEN IN A FIRE FIGHT

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire-Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
40		Has a friendly word and smile for his men*	X**	Y	--------***	
51		Tries to keep his men cheerful	X		--------	
47		Shares his cigarettes with his men	X	X	--------	
19		Tells his men what he knows about the unit's future	X		--------	

*Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Interim Report for original wording.

**The symbols X and Y indicate the attitudes of the two soldier groups towards the listed behaviors:
X indicates that the behavior is very clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .01 to .001 level of confidence.
Y indicates that the behavior is clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .05 level of confidence.

***Behavior not included in this situation.

Tactical Activities Area

Most of the squad leader's behaviors in combat are necessarily concerned with the successful accomplishment of the squad's tactical mission. For ease of presentation the behaviors making up the tactical activities area have been divided into eight sub-areas: communication, use of weapons and equipment, deployment of men in a fire fight, fire control in a fire fight, setting up a defensive position, concern for men, initiative, and courage. These will be discussed in turn.

Communication:—One of the most important functions of the squad leader when setting up involves securing tactical information from his superiors and transmitting this information to his subordinates. Over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently inquiring from superiors about the location, strength, and activities of nearby friendly and enemy units and as passing such information along to their subordinates. Fighters and non-fighters showed little interest in the securing of such information, but both indicated approval with the transmitting of such information to the rank and file.

It might be assumed that soldiers would be more concerned with their own unit's tactical and logistical situation. Approximately one-third of the squad leaders were reported as frequently being lax in the ascertaining of such information. On the other hand, approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently transmitting such information as they did have along to their subordinates. Fighters showed little interest in the ascertaining of such information, but identified as good, those squad leaders who

transmitted such information along to their subordinates. Non-fighters, on the other hand, indicated approval of the securing of such information, but were relatively indifferent to its transmission to subordinates.

Soldiers' attitudes towards the securing and transmitting of challenges and passwords evinced a similar pattern. Over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently inquiring as to the current password and as transmitting this information to their subordinates. Fighters identified both practices as the mark of a good squad leader. Non-fighters showed considerably less interest in both activities, though they too indicated that it was the good rather than the poor squad leader who inquired as to the current challenge and password.

The securing of tactical information from subordinates and, in turn, transmitting this information to superiors can occur both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently urged their men to pass information to themselves when setting up. A similar number of squad leaders were reported to have frequently transmitted such information along to their superiors. Both fighters and non-fighters approved the securing of information from subordinates. Fighters also approved the transmission of such information to superiors both when setting up and when in a fire fight, but non-fighters evinced such approval only when in a fire fight.

Use of Weapons and Equipment:—The weapons authorized the rifle squad are the rifle and the automatic rifle. To some extent, during

the Korean war, machine guns and, to a lesser extent, recoilless rifles have also been attached to rifle squads. The manner in which the squad leader employs these weapons is a measure of his combat effectiveness. Over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported as frequently using these four weapons effectively, and this was true when setting up and when in a fire fight. In all instances fighters identified effective utilization of these weapons as the mark of a good squad leader. Non-fighters indicated relative indifference towards the manner in which the rifle and BAR were employed in a fire fight, but approved the effective employment of the relatively immobile machine gun and recoilless rifle in that situation. In a setting-up situation, non-fighters showed particular concern with the effective utilization of the rifle, but not with the effective utilization of the BAR.

Barbed wire, booby traps, trip flares, and trip grenades are strictly defensive devices. It is difficult to employ them in an offensive. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported as frequently using these devices effectively when setting up. Both fighters and non-fighters identified the effective use of these devices as the mark of a good squad leader.

While the mortar is not usually associated with the rifle squad, the squad leader may be required to act as an observer for a mortar unit, directing its fire upon the enemy. Little over half of the leaders were reported to have frequently directed such fire properly when on a fire fight. Only fighters identified this practice as the mark of a good squad leader.

Map and compass are vital to the effective setting up of a defensive position, and approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently used these two tools effectively. Again, only fighters considered this behavior the mark of a good squad leader.

The radio and field telephone are used both when setting up and when in a fire fight and over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently used these communication devices effectively. Fighters considered their effective use as desirable in both situations while non-fighters made such an evaluation only when setting up. Non-fighters attributed their effective use about equally to good and poor squad leaders when in a fire fight.

Deployment of Men in a Fire Fight:—Success in combat requires that a squad leader deploy his men, as well as his weapons and equipment, effectively. While the deployment of men can not strictly be differentiated from the deployment of equipment and weapons (for these tools are used by men) for purposes of this research, separate items were included for men and for equipment and weapons. Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently deployed their men properly for an assault on enemy positions, and also, more specifically, when assaulting enemy automatic weapons, bunkers, and enemy snipers. Roughly the same number of squad leaders were reported to have rapidly and properly deployed their men for a defensive action, as when repelling an enemy assault. Over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently told their men how, when and where to move, and to have kept their men

moving, particularly when exposed to enemy mortar or artillery fire. All of these behaviors were considered the mark of a good squad leader by fighters. With the exception of approval given to keeping men moving when exposed to enemy mortar and artillery fire, non-fighters considered all of these behaviors to be about as true of good as they were of poor squad leaders.

Four other behaviors related to the effective deployment of men in a fire fight were also reported to have been frequently performed by over three-fourths of the squad leaders: assigning of security; insuring that key positions are kept covered; redistribution of the weapons, equipment, and ammunition of the wounded and dead; and the maintaining of contact with friendly units on the squad's flanks. All of these behaviors were approved by fighters. Again, non-fighters attributed them as often to good as to poor squad leaders.

Fire Control in a Fire Fight:—One of the most important functions of the squad leader in a fire fight is exercising fire control over his men. Over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently pointed out specific and area targets to their men, controlled the use of tracer ammunition, particularly by automatic weapons, made sure that automatic weapons were moved when necessary, and requested aid from supporting weapons when they felt it was necessary. These behaviors were all considered desirable by fighters. Non-fighters were relatively indifferent towards their performance. Approximately sixty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently made sure that their men fired their weapon and to have told their men when and how often to fire their weapon. Only non-fighters indicated

that insuring that men fired their weapons was the mark of a good squad leader. Both fighters and non-fighters indicated that good and poor squad leaders were about equally likely to tell their men when and how often to fire their weapons.

Setting Up a Defensive Position:—The sequence of operations ordinarily performed by squad leaders when setting up their squad in a defensive position were outlined by a number of behaviors. The specific behaviors as well as the number of squad leaders reported to have frequently performed them were: ascertains from superiors where the squad should set up (88%); carefully examines the terrain and available maps (67%); selects positions so that fields of fire overlap with those of adjoining units (81%); selects positions so that fields of fire within the squad overlap (84%); assigns each man a definite position in which to set up (83%); assigns alternate and supplementary positions to his men (65%); selects observation and listening posts and assigns men to them (77%); makes sure that weapons are the first thing set up (86%); makes sure that his men dig in (85%); tries to have obstacles placed on enemy approaches (78%); tries to establish contact with units on his squad's flanks (73%); and prepares for his superiors a sketch of the squad's position (61%). All of these behaviors were identified as the mark of a good squad leader by fighters. Non-fighters approved only five of these behaviors, attributing the remainder about as often to good as to poor squad leaders. The approved behaviors were: selecting positions that overlap inter and intra squad; making sure that weapons are set up first; making sure that men dig in, and preparing a sketch of the squad's position.

Concern for Men:—The squad leader, even in combat, can show considerable concern for the welfare of his men, and the extent of this concern may well influence how he is evaluated. Over eighty per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently known the exact location of each of their men both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Fighters considered such knowledge the mark of a good squad leader in both situations, while non-fighters considered it such only when setting up.

Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently moved from position to position, both when in a fire fight and when setting up, checking on and reassuring their men. Only fighters identified these practices as the mark of a good squad leader.

Approximately eighty per cent of the squad leaders, both when setting up and when in a fire fight, frequently cautioned their men to do nothing that would unnecessarily expose themselves to enemy observation or fire. Only fighters considered this practice desirable.

Over eighty-five per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently made sure that aid was given to those men who were sick or injured, and this was true both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Fighters considered such concern to be the mark of a good squad leader in both situations, while non-fighters made such an evaluation only when in a fire fight.

Three behaviors indicative of concern for men in a fire fight, as well as the proportion of squad leaders reported to have performed these behaviors frequently, were: encouraged his men to talk it up (64%); exposed himself, when necessary to rescue wounded men (82%);

and remained in a forward position, when necessary, covering his men (71%). Fighters approved all three of these behaviors. Non-fighters indicated approval only of encouraging men to talk-it-up.

Certain men in a squad may require the squad leader's particular attention—the new man, primarily in order to insure his own survival, and the likely "bug-out" primarily in order to insure the survival of the unit. Over three-fourths of the squad leaders were reported to have frequently payed particular attention to new men, both when setting up and when in a fire fight. Fighters and non-fighters, alike, approved of such concern.

Squad leaders were reported to have frequently shown greater concern with likely "bug-outs" when in a fire fight (83%) than when setting up (60%). Only fighters approved extra attention being paid to likely "bug-outs."

Initiative:—While the squad leader is expected to follow the direction of his superiors, he is also expected to use his own initiative. This is particularly true when in a fire fight inasmuch as contact with superiors is frequently uncertain. Three items dealt with the display of initiative when in a fire fight. Less than one-fourth of the squad leaders were reported as being frequently dependent upon their superiors in decision making and only fighters were critical of this absence of initiative. Approximately two-thirds of the squad leaders were reported as taking charge of the platoon when necessary and only fighters identified this as the mark of a good squad leader. Approximately fifteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have ordered their squad to pull back before they

had orders to do so from superiors. Depending upon the circumstances, this can be viewed as a desirable or undesirable use of initiative. Both fighters and non-fighters indicated that this behavior was as true of good as it was of poor squad leaders.

Courage:—One of the most important factors influencing a soldier's attitudes towards his leader is the amount of courage displayed by that leader in a stress situation. Approximately three-fourths of the squad leaders, both when setting up and when in a fire fight, frequently took up a position where they could control their men. Fighters approved such behavior in both situations; non-fighters primarily when setting up.

In a fire fight, the squad leader can exhibit courage by firing at the enemy when not actually directing his men, by leading his men in spite of heavy enemy fire, by leading his men even in spite of his own wounds and even, if necessary, attacking the enemy single handed. Approximately seventy per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have performed the first three activities frequently, and about half of the leaders were reported to have customarily attacked enemy personnel single handed. Fighters approved these behaviors while non-fighters attributed them about as often to good as to poor squad leaders.

The stress of a fire fight can cause even the most stable individual to lose his head, to become excited. About one-fifth of the leaders were reported as frequently becoming excited in such a situation, and both fighters and non-fighters were critical of such a reaction.

The excited squad leader may try to or actually leave his men and go back to the rear. Less than fifteen per cent of the squad leaders were reported to have tried to go back to the rear when their squad was setting up, and a similar number were reported to have bugged-out on their men when in a fire fight. While these behaviors were viewed as undesirable by both fighters and non-fighters, they were identified as the mark of a poor leader only by fighters in the setting up situation. This probably reflects the fact that very few squad leaders customarily tried to "bug-out" or actually did "bug-out" on their men.

TABLE IV—TACTICAL BEHAVIORS REPORTED BY FIGHTERS AND NON-FIGHTERS TO BE THE MARK OF A GOOD SQUAD LEADER WHEN SETTING UP AND WHEN IN A FIRE FIGHT

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
38		Finds out all he can about friendly and enemy units*			--------***	
7		Tells his men all he knows about friendly and enemy units	Y**	Y	--------	
2		Finds out all he can about the squad's tactical and logistical situation		Y	--------	
13		Tells his men all he knows about the squad's tactical and logistical situation	X		--------	
55		Finds out the current challenge and password	X	Y	--------	
31		Tells his men the current challenge and password	X		--------	
49		Urges his men to pass information to him	X	Y	--------	
43	55	Passes information along to his superiors	X		X	Y
6	4	Uses his riflemen effectively	X	X	X	

*Behavior wordings have been paraphrased for ease of presentation with behaviors worded negatively in the original questionnaire reworded positively here. See Supplement to this Interim Report for original wording.

**The symbols X and Y indicate the attitudes of the two soldier groups towards the listed behaviors:
X indicates that the behavior is very clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant at the .01 to .001 level of confidence.
Y indicates that the behavior is clearly the mark of a GOOD squad leader. Significant of the .05 level of confidence.

***Behavior not included in this situation.

TABLE IV continued

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
18	57	Uses his BAR men effectively	X		X	
35	15	Uses his machine guns effectively	X		X	X
54	21	Uses his recoilless rifles effectively	Y		X	X
12		Uses barbed wire effectively	X	X	--------	
30		Uses booby traps and trip flares effectively	X	Y	--------	
	44	Directs mortar and artillery fire effectively	--------		X	
60		Uses a map and compass properly	X		--------	
48	2	Uses a radio and telephone properly	X	Y	X	
	27	Deploys his men for an assault properly	--------		X	
	38	Deploys his men against enemy automatic weapons properly	--------		X	
	49	Deploys his men against enemy snipers properly	--------		Y	
	9	Deploys his men for defense properly	--------		X	
	13	Deploys his men for defense rapidly	--------		X	
	7	Tells his men how, when and where to move	--------		X	
	36	Keeps his men moving, especially when under mortar or artillery fire	--------		X	X
	16	Assigns specific men to act as security	--------		X	

TABLE IV continued

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
	22	Makes sure that all key positions are kept covered	--------		Y	
	43	Redistributes surplus weapons and ammunition	--------		Y	
58	48	Tries to establish contact with units on his flanks	Y		X	
	33	Points out targets to his men	--------		X	
	19	Makes sure that his men are firing their weapons	--------			Y
	45	Exercises fire control over his men	--------			
	1	Supervises the use of tracer ammunition	--------		X	
	41	Makes sure that crew served weapons are moved frequently	--------		X	
	59	Requests aid from supporting weapons and neighboring units when necessary	--------		X	
42		Finds out from superiors where the squad should set up	X		--------	
11		Examines maps and terrain before assigning positions	X		--------	
59		Selects positions so that fields of fire overlap with those of neighboring units	X	Y	--------	
5		Selects positions so that fields of fire within the squad overlap	X	X	--------	
29		Assigns each man a definite spot on which to set up	X		--------	

TABLE IV continued

ITEM NO.			SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire-Fight	A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
17		Assigns alternate and supplementary positions to his men	X		--------	
10		Selects and assigns men to observation and listening posts	X		--------	
22		Makes sure that weapons are set up first	X	Y	--------	
52		Makes sure that his men dig in	X	X	--------	
33		Tries to have obstacles placed on all enemy approaches	X		--------	
4		Prepares a sketch of his squad's positions for his superiors	Y	Y	--------	
9	29	Knows the exact location of each man in his command	X	X	X	
16	34	Moves from position to position and man to man checking on them	X		X	
45	50	Cautions his men to do nothing that will unnecessarily expose themselves to the enemy	Y		X	
	25	Encourages his men to talk it up	--------		X	Y
37	58	Makes sure that aid is given to the sick or injured	X		X	Y
	3	Exposes himself, when necessary, to rescue wounded men	--------		X	
	14	Remains in a forward position, when necessary, covering his men	--------		X	
28	11	Pays particularly close attention to new men	X	Y	X	Y

TABLE IV continued

ITEM NO.		A GOOD SQUAD LEADER IS ONE WHO	SETTING UP		FIRE FIGHT	
Setting Up	Fire-Fight		Fighters	Non-Fighters	Fighters	Non-Fighters
21	5	Pays particularly close attention to likely "bug-outs"	X		X	
	42	Doesn't always have to be told what to do by his superiors	--------		X	
	10	Takes charge of the platoon when necessary	--------		Y	
	28	Orders his squad to pull back only when told to do so	--------			
34	39	Takes up a position where he can control his men	X	X	X	
	31	Fires at the enemy when necessary	--------		X	
	37	Leads his men in spite of enemy fire	--------		Y	
	8	Leads his men in spite of his wounds	--------		X	
	26	Attacks the enemy single handed when necessary	--------		X	
	20	Does not become excited	--------		X	Y
41		Stays up with his men—does not try to go to the rear	X		--------	
	52	Doesn't "bug-out" on his men	--------			

SITUATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN EVALUATIONS OF BEHAVIORS

This study has confined itself to squad leader performance in two combat situations, when setting up a defensive position and when engaged in a fire fight. These two situations can be viewed as differing in the amount of psychological stress present. The fire fight is clearly a stressful situation. The squad is engaged with the enemy. Life and limb are clearly in jeopardy. Setting up, on the other hand, is less likely to be stressful. While at times it is necessary to establish defensive positions under enemy fire, this is not always the case.

In view of the differences between these two combat situations, one might expect that soldiers' attitudes towards their leader's behavior in the two situations would also differ. Twenty-eight behaviors appeared both in the setting-up and fire-fight questionnaires. Eleven of these behaviors were not evaluated in the same way in the two situations. On seven of these eleven behaviors, differentiations were made between good and poor squad leaders in the fire-fight situation but not in the setting-up situation. Apparently, all of the soldiers were more differentiating in their evaluations when in a fire fight than when setting up. The striking character of the fire-fight situation may account for this difference. Moreover, the soldiers included in the study were selected because they had all been intimately involved in a fire fight. The extent of their participation in setting-up situations is not known, though all who completed the questionnaire participated in at least one such operation.

Of the eleven shifts in evaluations, nine were made by non-fighters, and in six of these nine instances the shift involved differentiation in the fire-fight situation and nondifferentiation in the setting-up situation. Apparently non-fighters were somewhat more sensitive to their squad leader's performance when in a fire fight than when setting up a defensive position.

The behaviors exhibiting the attitude shifts did not fall into any clear pattern.

Control Activities: Non-fighters identified the giving of orders in a firm, confident manner and the absence of threats accompanying these orders as the mark of a good squad leader when in a fire fight. They did not so identify these behaviors when setting up. Thus, non-fighters were more sensitive towards their leader's behavior in the stress than in the non-stress situation.

Intermediary Activities: This more critical attitude of non-fighters in the stress situation was also apparent in their identification of the questioning of unreasonable orders to be the mark of a good squad leader when in a fire fight, and in their failure to so identify the behavior when setting up. Certainly the requirement that orders be in line with command capabilities is more crucial in a fire fight than when setting up. Non-fighters may well be justifying their poor combat performance on the fact that their unit was asked to perform tasks beyond its capabilities.

Fighters were critical of squad leaders who publicly criticized their superiors when setting up, but felt that good leaders were as likely as poor leaders to publicly criticize their superiors when in

a fire fight. This suggests a more tolerant attitude towards squad leaders when under stress, and a more critical attitude towards these same leaders when the stress is reduced.

The need for firm direction from leaders was appreciated by fighters who considered identification with superiors' orders the mark of a good squad leader when in a fire fight, but as true of poor as it was of good leaders when setting up.

Tactical Activities: The transmission of information to superiors and the effective utilization of machine guns and recoilless rifles were considered by non-fighters to be the distinguishing marks of good squad leaders when in a fire fight but not so identified when setting up. Here again it appears that non-fighters are exhibiting a more discerning and critical attitude in the stress than in the non-stress situation. On the other hand, non-fighters were more discerning when setting up than when in a fire fight with reference to the effective utilization of riflemen, radio-telephone, and with reference to knowledge as to the whereabouts of the various men in the squad. The reason for this shift is not clear.

FIGHTER AND NON-FIGHTER DIFFERENCES IN THE EVALUATIONS OF BEHAVIORS

The soldiers included in this study were selected because they had performed especially well or especially poorly under the stress of combat. It seems likely that differences in their respective combat performance are related to differences in their personalities. These personality differences should be reflected in differences in what fighters and non-fighters expect of squad leaders when setting up and when in a fire fight.

Over-all Comparisons: The most striking difference between the responses of fighters and non-fighters is the frequency with which the two groups differentiated between good and poor squad leaders in terms of how often these leaders performed the various behaviors—fighters differentiating far more often than non-fighters. Fighters made eighty-eight per cent of all the possible differentiations, and made ninety-two per cent of the differentiations that were possible in the tactical activities area. Non-fighters, on the other hand, made only forty-one per cent of all possible differentiations and but thirty-two per cent of the differentiations that were possible in the tactical activities area. It thus appears that fighters, as compared to non-fighters, are highly sensitive to the performance of their squad leader. Moreover, this sensitivity is more evident in tactical activities than in nontactical activities.

This sensitivity of fighters and insensitivity of non-fighters may have a number of bases. First, fighters may be more intelligent,

more discerning than non-fighters. Second, fighters may have had more front line combat experience than non-fighters and consequently have a better basis upon which to evaluate squad leader performance. (Task FIGHTER found that, in fact, fighters were more intelligent and had somewhat more combat experience than non-fighters.)[3] Third, fighters, in contrast to non-fighters, may be more willing to make discriminating judgments in view of their outstanding combat performance. They have performed well in combat and they probably know they have done well. Consequently, fighters may feel themselves well qualified to judge the combat performance of their squad leader. Non-fighters, on the other hand, have done poorly in combat and they probably realize that they have done poorly. Consequently they may feel themselves unqualified, if not unworthy, to evaluate the behavior of their squad leader.

Fighters: An examination of how fighters evaluated some of the behaviors provides clues as to their personality. Fighters expect their leader to act the leader, that is, to give orders in a firm confident manner, make sure that orders are clear, insure that orders are promptly and properly carried out, and to permit no back-talk from their men. They are uncritical of squad leaders who may accompany orders with swearing or threats, and this too can be viewed as fitting in with the traditionally accepted picture of the noncommissioned officer.

Concessions to more "democratic" leadership are indicated in

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[3]Egbert, et al., op.cit.

their approval of the explaining of the "why" of an order, admission of error, and the seeking and following of advice from subordinates. Fighters also wish to know the caliber of their performance, this perhaps reflecting the fact that their performance, at least in the fire fight, was highly effective.

Fighters also show an appreciation of the need for stricter discipline in the stress than in the non-stress situation. While they approve the questioning of orders both when setting up and when in a fire fight, they are somewhat more certain of this evaluation when setting up. Similarly, they place high value upon a leader's passing along orders as if they were his own when in a fire fight but not when setting up. This emphasis upon discipline apparently does not include particular disapproval of a squad leader's tendency to criticize his superiors or to whine or gripe when receiving orders. This pattern is similar to their uncritical attitude towards swearing and threats directed to subordinates—that is, an approval of the traditional picture of the noncommissioned officer, strong, firm, coarse, and frequently griping.

Fighters approve a squad leader's being friendly with his men, and of his efforts to keep his men cheerful. Again these may be concessions to a more democratic type of leadership.

In the tactical activities area fighters clearly judged squad leaders by how frequently these squad leaders effectively secure and transmit tactical information to their men and their superiors, employ weapons and equipment, deploy men, set up a defensive position, show concern for their men's welfare, and display courage and

initiative. Fighters hesitated to differentiate between leaders in two areas: securing of information from superiors, and exercising strict fire control over their men. These failures may reflect a somewhat independent frame of mind on the part of fighters.

Non- Fighters: An examination of how non-fighters evaluated some of the behaviors provides clues to their personality. Non-fighters are somewhat more concerned that the squad leader be considerate of and tolerant with his men than they are with accomplishing the tactical mission or maintaining the traditional picture of the noncommissioned officer. Non-fighters are unconcerned that squad leaders give orders in a firm confident manner, but they do expect him to direct his orders to specific people and to make sure that his orders are clearly understood. In contrast to fighters, non-fighters indicate little interest in the "why" of an order. They, again in contrast to fighters, are critical of leaders who threaten and swear at their men, particularly during a fire fight. Similarly, non-fighters do not place high value upon a squad leader's refusal to accept back-talk from his men. The sensitivity of non-fighters is also apparent in the high value they place upon being consulted, having their suggestions respected, and in having the squad leader admit when he is wrong. Particularly in a fire fight, non-fighters are less concerned with knowing the caliber of their performance (possibly because it was poor) or with having the squad leader supervise that performance.

Non-fighters' relative unconcern with the feasibility of orders was apparent in their failure to identify the questioning of orders

when setting up as a desirable practice. Their concern with performance in the fire fight, however, was apparent in the high value they placed upon the questioning of unreasonable orders in that situation. While non-fighters would tolerate back-talk on the part of subordinates, they disapproved such behavior on the part of squad leaders.

Non-fighters agreed with fighters in viewing with favor a squad leader's efforts to be friendly with his men.

Non-fighters differentiated between good and poor squad leaders on but one-third of the behaviors included in the tactical activities area. A concern with defense is evident among the behaviors non-fighters used as a basis for differentiation. When in a fire fight, non-fighters indicated more concern with the effective utilization of the relatively defensive machine gun and recoilless rifle than with the more offensive rifle and BAR. And of the three "weapons" non-fighters used as a basis for differentiation when setting up, two were clearly defensive, barbed wire and booby traps/trip flares. And again, non-fighters more frequently differentiated between good and poor leaders in the sub-area of setting up a defensive position than in the sub-areas of employment of weapons and equipment, deployment of men in a fire fight, fire control, initiative and courage. The concern of non-fighters for the welfare of the men is evident in the fact that they valued a leader who paid special attention to new men, but interestingly, did not value a leader who paid special attention to likely "bug-outs."

POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF RESULTS

The value of the research reported here lies in at least two areas. First, the findings support other research data dealing with the personality characteristics of men who have done well and men who have done poorly in combat. Second, the results presented provide information as to what kinds of leadership behavior are viewed as indicative of good combat leadership by men who have performed successfully in combat.

Personality Characteristics of Fighters and Non-Fighters: One of the most important problems faced by the Army is the identification of men with high fighting ability prior to their actual exposure to combat. Such identification would enable the Army to place these men in front line combat units with a consequent increase in unit effectiveness and a decrease in loss of life. The staff of Task FIGHTER, of Human Research Unit No. 2, has conducted extensive research into this problem of the identification of combat ability.[4] Recent results indicate that it is possible to identify a number of characteristics which differentiate the good from the poor combat man, that is, the fighter from the non-fighter. The research reported here supplements and confirms this existing knowledge as to the characteristics of fighters and non-fighters.

The most striking difference between fighters and non-fighters identified in this report is the frequency with which they utilized behaviors as a bases for differentiation between good and poor squad

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[4] Egbert, et al., op.cit.

leaders, fighters so differentiating much more often than non-fighters. This ability to discern and differentiate is very likely related to intelligence. The results of Task FIGHTER revealed that fighters were more intelligent than non-fighters. They found that fighters, as compared to non-fighters, had more formal education, and had scores indicating greater intelligence on Aptitude Area I, a Military Information Test, and on various other tests designed to measure intelligence. Moreover, as a result of interviews with fighters and non-fighters, FIGHTER staff members concluded that fighters possessed a higher degree of "cognitive organization" than non-fighters. "This was not mere intelligence, but the possession of a general awareness of what was going on around the individual and also the degree to which the person was in contact with reality."

The similarity between these findings and those presented by Task FIGHTER is also evident in the attitudes of fighters and non-fighters towards specific leadership behaviors. Task FIGHTER has identified many of the personality characteristics which differentiate the fighter from the non-fighter. We might then expect a relationship to exist between these personality differences and differences in what fighters and non-fighters expect of their squad leaders. Such relationships can be discerned.

Task FIGHTER found, that compared to non-fighters, fighters tended to have a greater sense of social responsibility. In the combat sense, social responsibility could take the form of accepting and approving those leadership techniques which materially contribute to the group's (squad's) carrying out its tactical mission. Fighters clearly approved

such techniques much more often than non-fighters. In addition to the leadership techniques approved by both fighters and non-fighters, fighters also approved explaining the "why" of an order, informing subordinates about the squad's tactical and logistical situation, passing information to superiors, effective utilization of weapons and equipment, effective deployment of men, fire control, and the proper setting up of a defensive position.

Task FIGHTER found that fighters tended to be more masculine, tougher than non-fighters. One might expect then that fighters would more likely approve masculine and tough behavior on the part of their squad leader than would non-fighters. The evidence available here also supports this finding. Fighters, more clearly than non-fighters, expect their squad leader to give orders in a firm confident manner, compliment his men when they do well and chew them out when they do poorly, not accept back-talk from subordinates, and question superiors' orders. Unlike non-fighters, fighters were also relatively uncritical of squad leaders who swear at or threaten their men when giving orders.

Task FIGHTER found that fighters, in contract to non-fighters, were active rather than passive. They engaged in sports (particularly those involving body contact) more frequently, went to work earlier, earned more money, held more responsible positions, and held a higher level of aspiration. This cluster suggests that compared to non-fighters, fighters are venturesome, aggressive, courageous, and display a greater amount of initiative. We might expect that fighters (again in contrast to non-fighters) would approve behaviors indicating these same personality traits in their squad leaders. This also appears to

be true from the evidence available here. Compared to non-fighters, fighters show greater approval of a leader's display of courage and initiative when in a fire fight and when setting up.

The relatively passive outlook of non-fighters was also evident here in the relative frequency with which they differentiated between good and poor leaders in the clearly defensive action of setting up rather than in the more active operations included in the questionnaire, and in their differentiation between leaders on the relatively defensive weapons of machine gun and recoilless rifle when in a fire fight (in contrast to the more offensive rifle and BAR) and on the clearly defensive barbed wire and booby traps/trip flares when setting up.

These confirmations of earlier findings dealing with the personality characteristics of fighters and non-fighters have important implications for the selection and training of men to serve in front line combat units. A detailed discussion of such implications can be found in the reports issued by Task FIGHTER.

Behaviors Indicative of Good Combat Leadership: The Army is continually faced with the problem of selecting and training men for leadership positions. A recent study conducted by Human Research Unit No. 2 provided information as to the leadership expectations of three groups of combat veterans—squad leaders, men subordinate to squad leaders, and men superior to squad leaders.[5] The research reported here provides information as to the leadership expectations of two

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[5]Showel, Morris. "A Comparison of the Combat Performance of Good and Poor Infantry Squad Leaders," Human Research Unit No. 2, OCAFF, Fort Ord, California. September 1954.

additional groups of combat veterans—fighters and non-fighters. The opinions of fighters are particularly important, not only because they are experienced combat men (which was true of the soldiers used in the earlier study) but also because they performed outstandingly well in combat and evaluated behaviors consistently in two combat situations.

Attitudes towards leadership can have at least two basis—popularly held conceptions about what a leader does and official Army doctrine as to what a leader is expected to do. Frequently, popularly held conceptions about leadership and official Army doctrine dealing with leadership coincide. When such agreement occurs, the soldier is presented with a consistent influence to behave in an effective manner. Leadership techniques falling into this category, this is, recognized by both the public and the Army, need relatively less emphasis in Army leader training programs.

Fighters indicated approval of many leadership techniques which can be identified in Army doctrine (FM-22-10 and FM-22-100) as well as in popular conceptions about leadership. Their attitudes can be viewed as further substantiating Army leadership doctrine. For example, fighters expect their leader to direct his orders to specific people, give them in a firm confident manner, and make sure that his orders are clearly understood. Fighters also expect the squad leader to make sure that his orders are promptly and properly carried out and to accept no back-talk from his men when giving them an order. In the tactical activities area, fighters' leadership expectations clearly are identical with popular conceptions and official leadership doctrine. The leader is expected to keep his men informed as to the tactical situation,

challenges and passwords. The leader is expected to show concern with the securing and transmitting of tactical information. The leader is expected to utilize weapons and equipment properly, deploy men effectively, exercise fire control, show concern for men's welfare when under fire, and display courage and initiative.

In some instances it appears that popular conceptions of what a leader should do do not coincide with official Army doctrine. When such disagreement occurs, the soldier is not presented with a consistent influence to behave in the manner approved by the Army. A soldier's civilian experiences may lead him to model the popular conception of the leader rather than the leader as exemplified in Army doctrine. Moreover, lower echelons in the Army itself, being unacquainted with or unconvinced of the desirability of recognized leadership principles frequently hold popular but erroneous conceptions of what is effective leadership. Leadership principles falling into this category, that is, recognized in Army doctrine, but ignored or deemphasized in popular conceptions, probably both in civilian life as well as in certain levels in the Army, need relatively great emphasis in Army leader training programs. Fighters' attitudes towards leadership seems to be consistent with official Army leadership doctrine rather than with popular conceptions, and this provides influential support for this doctrine. For example, fighters expect their squad leader to keep his men informed as to the caliber of their performance, both when they do well and when they do poorly. Fighters wish their squad leader to seek advice from his men and to follow that advice when it is good. They expect their leader to explain the "why" of an order and to admit when he is wrong.

Fighters' attitudes towards a squad leaders' behavior with reference to his superiors at times seem to conflict with popular conceptions.

Fighters expect their squad leader to question orders which appear to him to be unclear or unreasonable.

In the area of interpersonal relations, fighters expect their squad leader to exhibit somewhat greater warmth and concern than is popularly attributed to the non-commissioned officer. Fighters expect their squad leader to be friendly, to try to keep his men cheerful and to share cigarettes with his men. They expect him to inquire as to the unit's future plans and to transmit such information along to his men.

In two instances, attitudes of fighters tend to coincide with popular conceptions of leadership rather than with official leadership doctrine as found in FM-22-10 and FM-22-100. Fighters are relatively uncritical of squad leaders who swear at or threaten their men or squad leaders who whine or gripe when receiving orders from superiors. To some extent, the Army's attitude towards these behaviors can be viewed as the striving for an ideal state, one which is difficult of attainment in any organization manned, recruited, and organized as is the Army.

In conclusion, the reader should bear in mind that the data gathered from outstanding combat infantrymen amplifies existing knowledge about leadership. The material presented here can be utilized in the basic training program as well as in the various leadership training programs now conducted by the Army—for example, the NCO schools and OCSs. These findings can be incorporated into current training programs via lectures, field manuals, field problems and other training aids. It would also seem desirable to bring these findings to the attention of soldiers in TOE units in order that they may take them into account when performing their duties in these units.