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
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1946

REPORT
of the
COMMANDING GENERAL
EIGHTH ARMY

on the
PANAY-NEGROS
and **CEBU**
OPERATIONS

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VICTOR I and II

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REPORT
OF THE
COMMANDING GENERAL
EIGHTH ARMY
ON THE
PANAY-NEGROS
AND **CEBU**
OPERATIONS
VICTOR I AND II

"My heartiest commendation for the brilliant execution of the Visayan Campaign. This is a model of what a light but aggressive command can accomplish in rapid exploitation."

-- Douglas Mac Arthur



Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger
Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION


By the middle of March 1945, the campaign for the liberation of the PHILIPPINES had successfully passed the climactic stage. The original American footholds on the periphery of the archipelago had, by a combination of multiple amphibious assaults on the beaches and protracted engagements in the mountains, been expanded until they formed an almost continuous ring around the islands.

On LEYTE and SAMAR to the east, the last of the Japanese remnants were being destroyed. On LUZON to the north, enemy defenses were disintegrating as MANILA fell to the forces of liberation. MINDORO, MARINDUQUE, and the miscellaneous island groups astride the overwater routes through the VISAYAS were in the final mop-up stage. The enemy's grip on PALAWAN on the western edge of the archipelago had been broken and our operations in ZAMBOANGA (western MINDANAO) and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO had disrupted his communication and evacuation routes to the south. With the only remaining escape route to eastern MINDANAO dominated by our motor torpedo boats and our air superiority established everywhere, the central PHILIPPINES had been turned into a vast trap. Embattled conquerors but a few months before, the Japanese garrisons in these islands were now condemned prisoners facing ultimate capture or annihilation.



Although the four islands comprising the southern VISAYAS (PANAY, NEGROS, CEBU, and BOHOL) are a strategic and economic entity, their liberation required two distinct operations employing two separate task forces.


The mission of seizing and securing PANAY and NEGROS OCCIDENTAL was designated the Victor-I Operation and assigned to the 40th Infantry Division with the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team attached. The operation to liberate CEBU, BOHOL, and NEGROS ORIENTAL was called Victor-II with the Americal Infantry Division designated as the attack force.

ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE CHART
 FOR
 VICTOR-I AND VICTOR-II OPERATION



ORIENTATION MAP LEGEND

Shaded areas under American control
 Sixth Army Operation
 Eighth Army Operation



I. BACKGROUND

General: Situated in the very heart of the PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO and separated from MINDANAO on the southeast by the MINDANAO SEA and from MINDORO on the northwest by the SULU SEA, lies a group of islands known as the southern VISAYAS. This group includes the four major islands of PANAY, NEGROS, CEBU, and BOHOL and several lesser ones, the most important of the latter being MACTAN and GUIMARAS.


Geographically, the characteristics common to the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS as a whole apply to the southern VISAYAS. Their terrain features follow generally the typical pattern of a central mountain mass surrounded by low-lying coastal plains and scored by numerous short, turbulent, and seldom-navigable streams. Like the other islands of the PHILIPPINES, the VISAYAS are heavily wooded, and native methods of land cultivation tend to permit the development of vast areas of high growing grass or "cogonales," which seriously hamper movement and limit observation.

A brief account of the geographical features of the four islands is given in the ensuing paragraphs. Terrain, vegetation, transportation facilities, and roads are also discussed in this geographical study.

PANAY.

Geography: The island of PANAY, which is roughly triangular in shape, is situated between southwest LUZON and MINDANAO, and extends 105 miles in length and 90 miles at its widest point. (See Relief Map, page 5.) It forms the central part of the western "stepping stones" between the islands of MINDORO and MINDANAO. The approaches to PANAY from the west lie in the SULU SEA; those from the south in PANAY GULF. ILOILO, the principal seaport on the south coast, touches on ILOILO STRAIT and extends up the river of the same name.

Vegetation: The main types of vegetation found on PANAY are rain forests, cultivated areas, and grasslands, the latter being of the "cogon" variety.



Roadnet: PANAY, which is well provided with roads, boasts two important, all-weather, gravel-surfaced highways. One closely follows the coast around the island, while the other passes through the central lowlands connecting the north and south coasts. The road system generally insures good vehicular movement and rapid communication between important centers.

Railroads: Prior to World War II, the Philippine Railway Company operated a line 74 miles long between ILOILO and CAPIZ. During the Japanese occupation, this railroad was used principally for the movement of enemy personnel, but constant guerrilla raids had restricted its use to the section between ILOILO and SANTA BARBARA (12 miles) and CAPIZ and DAO (17 miles). Although all railway bridges were reported intact, rails and equipment required much re-conditioning and replacement when the island was retaken.

Airfields: Many pre-war airfields and emergency landing strips were reported on PANAY, but only three of these - MANDURRIBAO (in the ILOILO area) SANTA BARBARA, and SAN JOSE were operational at the time of our landings. During the dry season many others can be made operational within a short period, and the possibility for further airfield development is good. For this purpose the flat areas along the north coast might be utilized as well as other sites in the ILOILO and SAN JOSE areas.

NEGROS.

Geography: The island of NEGROS, the fourth largest in the PHILIPPINES, is shaped like a boot with the toe at the southern end of the island pointing eastward. Like PANAY, it is situated in the waters between LUZON and MINDANAO. It is approximately 105 miles long and 50 miles wide. Like the other VISAYAN ISLANDS it has a heavily forested and mountainous interior with broad flat plains extending inland from the coast. The unbroken coastline contains few bays or inlets; no harbors suitable for large vessels exist. Coastal areas are drained by many small streams and their branches,

as the plain rises gradually in moderate slopes to the hills farther inland. Extending throughout the center of the island on a north and south axis are many high mountains, some of them rising to 5,000 and 8,000 feet. (See Relief Map, page 8.)


Vegetation: Most of the mountainous area on NEGROS are covered with rain forest. The coastal plains are heavily cultivated, the principal products being sugar cane, rice, and corn.

Roadnet: The best roads are on the western coastal plain, while a two-lane, all-weather, coastal highway almost completely encircles the island, and is the primary east-west link of communication. Prior to Japanese occupation, NEGROS had a well-developed transportation system consisting of bus and truck lines which linked the sugar plantations, sugar mills, and local barrios.

Railroads: In 1941 the narrow-gauge railway system consisted of 1,079 miles of track, but variations in gauge and lack of connections between lines reduced its military value. The Japanese, during their occupation, used these railways chiefly to carry surfacing materials to airfields.

Airfields: Because of its airfields and the existence of sites potentially suited for development into airstrips, the island of NEGROS is especially valuable. Before our landing, serviceable airfields were located at BACOLOD; at TALISAY, CAROLINA, and ALICANTE (all north of BACOLOD); at BINALBAGA, to the south; at DUMAGUETE, one mile north of the town of that name in NEGROS ORIENTAL, and at FABRICA on the north end of the island, east of the HIMUGAAN RIVER. Several additional sites are available, but are either under construction or no longer serviceable.

Because of its proximity to MINDANAO, DUMAGUETE AIRFIELD is strategically the most important, and is one of the few airfields on the island that lends itself rapidly to expansion. FABRICA, though considered a secondary operational field, owes its importance to the nearby sawmill of the Insular Lumber Company, the largest of its kind in the PHILIPPINES and a prime objective of our forces.



Pagbulungan Point
Asid Gulf
M A S S A T E

Pulanduta Point
JINTOTOLO ISLAND
JINTOTOLO CHANNEL
V I S A Y A N

Capiz
Pilar Bay
Bulacaue Point
GIGANTE ISLANDS
CALAGNAAN ISLAND
S E A

3449
4390
Mt. Navigud
A 6726
Mt. Baloy
A 5074
Mt. Iloilo
A 4513
P A N A Y
ALABO RIVER
ILOILO


PAN DE AZUCAR ISLAND
BANTAYAN ISLAND
TAGUBANHAN ISLAND

ILOILO STRAIT
GUIMARAS ISLAND
South Point
P A N A Y G U L F

Guimaras Strait
Sagay Point
Bacolod
Mt. Mandalagan
Cantaon Volcano
A 2550
C E B U

Sajoton Point
Mt. Malaspanao
A 2050
TABLAS PLATEAU
Lake Balinsasayao
Cuernos de Negros
A 3202
A 3282
A 2364
N E G R O S

Tanon Strait
Argao
A 2900
A 2999
Sandugan Point
A 1530
A 2000
SIQUIJOR ISLAND



Bonbonon Point

CEBU-BOHOL

Geography: The two remaining islands of the southern VISAYAN group, long, narrow CEBU and oval-shaped BOHOL, are similar to NEGROS and PANAY in topographical aspects. Mountain chains with elevations up to 3,000 feet form the backbone of both islands. (See Relief Map, page 10.) They are heavily populated and as a result have been practically cleared of trees in order to grow corn, the staple crop. On CEBU, minor forested areas remain in the central mountains, while on BOHOL, a few "cogon" grass areas and forests exist in the central part.

Transportation Facilities: On CEBU, transportation facilities include a paved highway around the island and three cross-island roads. A narrow-gauge railway, inoperative when we landed, parallels the coastal highway. Similarly, a hard-surfaced road encircles BOHOL, which has, in addition, a well-developed radial system of highways running from the coast to the center of the island.

Airfields: The two most important operational airfields in CEBU are LAHUG airstrip at CEBU CITY and OPON FIELD on nearby MACTAN ISLAND. Other airfields on CEBU appear to have been little used by the Japanese. However, it is believed that they could easily be made serviceable. BOHOL's four airfields, though not used to any great extent by the Japanese, could be extended and rendered operational within a short time.

Industry: CEBU CITY, which was a thriving industrial center of almost 150,000 population before the war, is second only to MANILA among the cities and seaports of the PHILIPPINES. It has an excellent harbor and is the commercial and political heart of the VISAYAS. Prior to the Japanese invasion, three major oil companies had extensive stocks on hand in CEBU CITY, and an oil well produced 400 barrels a day. A large cement plant (later captured intact in the Victor-II Operation) and coal mines with a daily output of 100 tons were also in operation. But the CEBU CITY that fell to the American troops on 27 March 1945 was largely a mass of rubble. What our bombers had missed was almost completely destroyed by the Japanese when they withdrew.



In contrast, the island of BOHOL has no industrial development or harbors of any consequence and is altogether the most backward of the VISAYAS.

Health and Sanitation.

Throughout the islands in the southern VISAYAS, problems of health and sanitation are those indigenous to the PHILIPPINES as a whole. Outbreaks of all types of intestinal diseases, ranging from diarrhea and dysentery to the dread cholera, occur. Insect-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue fever are also widespread although it is reported that cases of the former occurring in CEBU were not contracted there.

There is a high incidence of respiratory diseases such as bronchitis, pneumonia, and tuberculosis. Infection is rife, and minor cuts and abrasions must be treated immediately to prevent the development of tropical ulcers. The enteric fevers, typhoid and paratyphoid, are also common, while fungus infections of the skin typical of the tropics are widespread.

Cases of leprosy, too, are not uncommon and CEBU heads the list as the province most heavily infected with this disease in the entire archipelago. CEBU CITY and the surrounding communities are the focal points. Before the war it was hoped that local treatment centers would gradually replace the large CULION leper colony in the PALAWAN group, but during the Japanese occupation segregation was not strictly enforced.

II. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Strategically, the campaign for the liberation of the PHILIPPINES reached its climax in the deceptive operations on MINDORO and MARINDUQUE during January 1945. These minor feints in the islands south of LUZON threw the enemy off balance by creating the impression that the major American thrust would come from that quarter. Shortly thereafter, LUZON was invaded from the northwest, and, with its liberation well advanced and LEYTE-SAMAR already secured, the key to the PHILIPPINES was ours.

Subsequently, the clearance of the VISAYAN PASSAGES and the smashing of the enemy grip on the PALAWAN GROUP completed the encirclement of the Japanese garrisons in the central PHILIPPINES. It was now only a question of time before the isolated and entrapped enemy would finally be exterminated.

From a purely strategic viewpoint, the southern VISAYAS are less significant than their northern neighbors; but they could not be dismissed lightly from the overall plan of the war in the PACIFIC. Their occupation was important to the Allied strategy for the following reasons:

- (1) They control the vital inland water passages connecting the VISAYAN, MINDANAO, and SULU SEAS.
- (2) They provide more than a score of well-situated airfields.
- (3) They are the principal food-producing area of the PHILIPPINES.
- (4) CEBU CITY is the second most important harbor and industrial center in the PHILIPPINES.

The Eighth Army's amphibious strikes in the southern VISAYAS, therefore, were designed to consolidate our hold on the entire archipelago by giving us access to the vital waterways, strategic airfields, and natural resources of this rich heartland of the PHILIPPINES.

III. PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

Operations Instructions No. 93 and No. 94, received from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, on 26 February and 3 March, respectively, launched the Eighth Army in its plans and preparations for the seizure of the islands in the southern VISAYAN group. Two distinct overwater operations known as Victor-I and Victor-II were planned. (See Map No. 5, page 14.)

Operations Instructions No. 93 directed the Eighth Army, with the support of Allied Naval and Air Forces, to:

- (1) Seize by overwater operations ILOILO CITY on PANAY and nearby GUIMARAS ISLAND and establish naval and logistic facilities for the support of future operations.
- (2) Continue the offensive to destroy hostile forces on and establish control over PANAY.
- (3) Destroy hostile forces and establish control over the NEGROS OCCIDENTAL area by employing elements of available forces in shore-to-shore operations.
- (4) Make special provision for the capture intact of the large sawmill at FABRICA in northern NEGROS, property of the Insular Lumber Company.

The Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, was directed to prepare, stage, and mount the 40th Infantry Division for the operation from LUZON, but control was to pass to the Commanding General, Eighth Army, upon embarkation. The latter was further charged with the establishment of logistic facilities required to support subsequent shore-to-shore operations and minor naval facilities as arranged with the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.

The Commander, Allied Naval Forces was directed to:

- (1) Transport and establish landing forces ashore in PANAY and provide naval protection for them.
- (2) Conduct subsequent overwater operations to transport and establish landing forces on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.
- (3) Establish naval facilities and initiate motor torpedo boat operations in the ILOILO area at the earliest practicable date.
- (4) Escort and protect shipping on the lines of communication to the PANAY and NEGROS areas.

- (5) Deny the movement of hostile reinforcements and supplies to these areas.

The mission of the Allied Air Forces was to:

- (1) Provide aerial reconnaissance and photography of the PANAY and NEGROS area.
- (2) Provide air cover for the naval task forces and convoys and direct support for the landing and subsequent operations.
- (3) Assist Allied Naval Forces in denying the movement of hostile elements and supplies to PANAY and NEGROS.

Operations Instructions No. 94 directed the Eighth Army, in coordination with the Allied Naval and Air Forces, to accomplish virtually the same missions in the CEBU, BOHOL, and NEGROS ORIENTAL areas (Victor-II Operation). Logistical facilities and minor naval installations were to be established at CEBU CITY and ILOILO, from which points subsequent shore-to-shore operations would be supported.

PART TWO

VICTOR-I OPERATION

I. TACTICAL PLANS

Eighth Army Field Order No. 21, published on 1 March 1945, designated the 40th Division, reinforced, (less the 108th Regimental Combat Team as the task force to carry out the Victor-I Operation. The 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team was placed in Army reserve.

The first phase of the operation, the seizure of PANAY, was scheduled to begin on 18 March (G-Day) with an assault landing in the OTOM-TIGBAUAN area of southern PANAY. This accomplished, our forces were to speed to the east, seize and secure ILOILO CITY and the neighboring airfields and harbor installations. As soon as practicable after G-Day, the division was to land a reinforced battalion on nearby GUIMARAS ISLAND, south of ILOILO, in order to destroy any hostile forces found there.

As specified in this field order, the liberation of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, the second phase of the operation, was to be launched when directed by the Commanding General, Eighth Army. On 24 March, when it became apparent that Japanese resistance on PANAY had collapsed, Eighth Army Field Order No. 27 was published, fixing 29 March (Y-Day) as the landing date for the NEGROS campaign. The 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team was added to the task force and the 164th Regimental Combat Team (Americal Division) was placed in Army reserve.

The 40th Division was directed to seize a beachhead on the PANDAN POINT-HINIGARAN area of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL and to advance rapidly northward to BACOLOD and SILAY, securing those towns and the adjacent airfields. After reaching these initial objectives, the force was to conduct operations to the north and east to destroy the enemy.

The 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team at MINDORO was alerted to drop on 24 hours' notice in an area to be designated by Headquarters, Eighth Army. The 164th Regimental Combat Team on LEYTE was ordered to be prepared to land in the vicinity of SAN CARLOS on the east coast of NEGROS.

Field Order No. 21 assigned the following combat units, totaling 11,809 men, to the operation:

40th Division (-108th RCT)	9,732
470th AAA AW Bn (-Btries C and D)	408
716th Tank Bn (-Companies A and B)	486
Company A (-1st Plat) 650th Amp Trac Bn	160
Det, Hq and Hq Co, 542d Engr B and S Regt	25
Companies C and D, 542d Engr B and S Regt	566
Det, 592d JASCO	250
15th Support Aircraft Party	15
Company B, 80th Cml Mortar Bn	167

In addition, 2,395 service troops were allocated to support the operation.

The Commander, Naval Attack Force, was charged with the control of all amphibious operations. Control of forces ashore was to pass to the Commanding General, 40th Division, upon his arrival ashore.

II. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

As of 22 February 1945, the Japanese strength on PANAY was estimated to be 2,775. Two thousand of the enemy were in and near ILOILO, and the remainder were dispersed in small garrisons at other points on the island. There were 225 in the vicinity of TIRING AIRFIELD, just north of ILOILO; 200 at SAN JOSE DE BUENA-VISTA on the west coast; 250 on GUIMARAS ISLAND just east of ILOILO, and smaller garrisons at some other points.

Twelve hundred of the PANAY garrison were believed to be combat troops. These included the 170th Independent Infantry Battalion, which was the major combat unit on the island; the 2d Company of the 354th Independent Infantry Battalion, and other elements of the 102d Division.

The guerrilla forces on PANAY were well above average in leadership, organization, and combat effectiveness. Their troop strength totalled 22,500 officers and men, under the command of Colonel Macario Peralta, commanding the 6th Military District.

Guerrillas had gained control of much of the island and our troops were assured an unopposed landing anywhere outside the limited areas occupied by the Japanese. They likewise maintained nine airstrips in the northern and central sections of PANAY, and serviced the roads in the southern part of the island.

Of the 14,400 enemy estimated to be on NEGROS, 13,500 were in the province of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. The force in NEGROS ORIENTAL consisted of garrisons of 200 men at SAN CARLOS and 700 at DUMAGUETE.


Combat troops on NEGROS included among others the 77th Brigade Headquarters, the 122d Independent Infantry Battalion, and the 102d Division Engineer Regiment. Troops in non-combat categories included numerous air force ground units under the command of the 6th Air Sector Headquarters. These were assigned to various NEGROS airfields.

The guerrilla organization on NEGROS numbered approximately 13,000 troops under Lieutenant Colonel Salvador Abcede, commander of the 7th Military District. Its operations were restricted by strong Japanese forces on the island. Notwithstanding this opposition, a widespread guerrilla intelligence network had been developed, which proved of considerable aid to our forces.

Guerrilla information was not specific as to the location of Japanese troops on NEGROS, but it was known that they were dispersed in garrisons of varying strength along the northwest and north coastal sections.

Prior to the landing, the estimate for PANAY was reduced from 2,775 to 2,500, due to the reported evacuation of some troops. At the close of the PANAY operation, it was determined that the enemy strength had been 2,141 military personnel and 401 civilians, which corresponded closely with the pre-landing estimate of 2,500. Operations on NEGROS indicated enemy strength had originally been 10,604 military personnel and 1,453 civilians.

In NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, there was a marked discrepancy between enemy captured and counted dead and the data on identified strength. As of 1 July, enemy captured and counted dead slightly exceeded 7,000. Interrogations of prisoners and captured documents show that a considerable number of enemy still remained on the island. During the latter phase of the operation, many Japanese troops withdrew into extremely difficult terrain in the north central sector of NEGROS.



Infantry troops of the 40th Division land on PANAY.



Under cover of tanks, men of the 1st Bn, 185th Infantry, move in against Japanese. (This is one of four photos taken by T/5 Howard Klawitter before he was wounded.)

III. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

The Landing of the 40th Division at TIGBAUAN, PANAY.

As in previous operations, the Allied attack plan called for a softening-up of the objective area from the air prior to the invasion by ground forces. Accordingly, the aerial pounding began on 1 March 1945, nearly three weeks before the target date, when seven United States Marine Corps fighter planes cratered the runways at FABRICA on NEGROS. Thereafter, in an almost daily succession of aerial assaults, Marine and Thirteenth Air Force fighters rained destruction on PANAY and NEGROS. Buildings were destroyed or damaged and fires started at MOLO just west of ILOILO, and at LA PAZ and MABINI, also situated on PANAY. Runways were severely cratered at FABRICA and BACOLOD on NEGROS.

In the strafing and bombing of the BACOLOD airstrip, one of our Marine fighters was shot down by light antiaircraft fire. Many of the bombing missions were aimed at enemy concentrations as a direct means of supporting guerrilla forces, who controlled much of the island's area and prevented destruction of roads and bridges prior to our landing.

Meanwhile, Allied naval activity added to the Japanese logistical difficulties as motor torpedo boats and minesweepers in the GUIMARAS and ILOILO STRAITS harassed enemy freighters and luggers.

On 3-4 March, the staging and mounting of the ground forces began on LUZON when the 40th Division was withdrawn from the front lines in the vicinity of FORT STOTSENBERG. The division loaded and departed LUZON on 15 March.

The task force arrived in the PANAY objective area at 0730 on G-Day, 18 March, without having encountered any enemy air or naval opposition. It was discovered upon arrival there that the area shelled by our naval guns was approximately 7,000 yards west of the assigned landing beach. No harm resulted from this error, however, and the convoy proceeded to the proper beach in the TIGBAUAN area.

H-Hour was set at 0900, and, by 0905, following a second naval bombardment, the first wave hit the beach near TIGBAUAN without opposition. The landing was made in column of battalions with the 1st Battalion, 185th Infantry, leading. Beachhead areas were promptly secured and by 1400, four battalions were ashore. The unloading of vehicles and supplies was seriously impeded by a ten-yard strip of soft sand through which all vehicles had to be towed before reaching hard ground.

The 185th Infantry rapidly advanced along Highway No. 1, an excellent coastal road, and reached OTON by 1700. One battalion of the 160th Infantry remained behind to protect the northern and western flanks of the beachhead area and contacted a small enemy force north of TIGBAUAN. At 1900, Major General Rapp Brush, division commander, assumed control ashore. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion, 185th Infantry, travelling eastward along Highway No. 1, had driven approximately ten miles to AREVALO where it stopped until morning. Meanwhile, the 40th Reconnaissance Troop searched the area to the northeast as far as ALIMODIAN, SAN MIGUEL, and SANTA BARBARA without enemy interference.

The Advance on ILOILO CITY.

On G plus one (19 March), the division resumed its advance on ILOILO from AREVALO as the command post opened at OTON.

At the juncture of Highways No. 1 and No. 3, the 3d Battalion, 185th Infantry, swung to the north and, following light contacts with a small group of Japanese south of MANDURRIAO AIRFIELD, secured the field by 1400.

The eastward drive of the other two battalions of the regiment was halted when the 1st Battalion engaged approximately two enemy platoons barricaded in the MOLO cathedral, receiving intense machine-gun and rifle fire from this force. The Japanese position, which commanded all approaches, afforded excellent observation of our movements. Their guns were fired through slits in the cement walls surrounding the church and in the towers of the building. Our tanks were



A veteran of the 185th Infantry fires at Japanese behind on artillery-battered stone wall. (This photo was salvaged from the camera of Lt. Robert Fields who was killed in action shortly after it was taken.)



A gallery of Filipinos watches intently as members of Battery B, 22d Field Artillery, emplace a 155mm howitzer near OTON on PANAY.

summoned to the aid of the pinned-down foot troops and, using direct fire, destroyed many of the hostile positions. The Japanese retreated to the rear of the cathedral and then dispersed into adjacent buildings.

In the meantime, north and northwest of ILOILO, motorized patrols reached CABATUAN, PIVIA, POTOTAN, JANIUAY, MAASIN, and BAROTAC NUEVO without interference, and the 3d Battalion, 185th Infantry, advanced toward JARO from MANDURRIAO.

At dawn on G plus two (20 March), our artillery laid down a barrage on the MOLO cathedral and adjacent buildings. Following the reduction of these strong points, the first two battalions of the 185th Infantry closed on ILOILO, securing it without opposition. (See Map No. 7, Page 26)

Early on the afternoon of 20 March, Lieutenant General R. L. Eichelberger entered the city of ILOILO with the Commanding General of the 40th Division. That evening, the Eighth Army Commander sent the following message to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur:

. . . The city (ILOILO) was entirely secured about 1300. Remnants of the Japanese garrison fled to the northwest and are now under attack. I would estimate that from 20 to 30 per cent of the city has not been destroyed. Thousands of residents of the city expressed great enthusiasm at their deliverance. Docks are in fine shape and harbor areas appear clear.

As elements of the 3d Battalion, 185th Infantry, continued their drive to the north in pursuit of the retreating Japanese, they reached the AGANAN RIVER on Highway No. 3 without incident but discovered that the bridge had been destroyed. After a minor engagement, PAVIA, on the far bank, was captured as other 3d Battalion troops overran UNGCA to the southeast. On the 21st, patrols of the Reconnaissance Troop reached FRANCISCO GASA (30 miles north of ILOILO) and SAN JOSE (on the west coast) without making contact. The following day, amphibious patrols returning from GUIMARAS ISLAND reported no hostile forces in that area as the division command post opened at ILOILO. The SANTA BARBARA airdrome was secured on 20 March.

At this point, the PANAY phase of the Victor-I Operation entered

the mop-up stage. Enemy casualty lists, however, continued to mount daily as isolated and scattered groups were exterminated. Ninety Japanese were killed on 23 March, and minor contacts continued to the end of the month, mainly in the SANTA BARBARA-PAVIA-SAN MIGUEL sector. As of 26 March, 659 Japanese had been killed or found dead, while the 40th Division had suffered 47 casualties--nine killed and 38 wounded.

The division continued patrol action on the island until 29 March, when the attack on NEGROS began. The 2d Battalion, 160th Infantry, remained on PANAY to complete mopping up.

The Liberation of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.


The landing on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL was made at PULUPANDAN at 0930 on 29 March and was unopposed. The 185th Regimental Combat Team led the division ashore and started the advance toward BACOLOD. Small groups of enemy were encountered along the road, and 16 Japanese were killed.

The daily operations report for 29 March merely stated that a detachment which had landed prior to the main body had secured the BAGO RIVER bridge. The seizure of this 650 foot bridge intact was actually of great tactical importance in the forward drive of the 40th Division. It is a story of courage and daring, of lightning-quick thinking and equally fast action. It is the story of a second lieutenant and his determined platoon who accomplished their mission in the face of heavy odds.

The following paragraphs which recount the action covering the seizure of the BAGO RIVER bridge are based on an official report by an Eighth Army observer.

At 0505 in the pre-dawn darkness of 29 March, four and one-half hours before the division landing was made at PULUPANDAN, Second Lieutenant Aaron A. Hanson and a reinforced platoon from Company F, 185th Infantry, left their ship in two landing craft (mechanized), one of them a rocket type, and one small landing craft (support). As they approached PULUPANDAN, they turned south and sailed 100 yards offshore for a mile and a half before landing at PATIK town.

During this overwater movement, they feared that the rumble of their boats' engines would be heard by enemy forces in the town, thereby betraying their arrival. The noise did arouse PATIK, but only friendly townsfolk met the party when it landed 100 yards south of the town.



The BAGO RIVER bridge in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.



Infantrymen of the 40th Division and Filipinos view the memorial in BACOLOD to Private First Class Theodore Vinthers, who was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his bravery in the seizure of the BAGO RIVER bridge.

They moved inland rapidly along the south side of the road leading due east to Highway No. 1. Before crossing the highway they were met by a sergeant of the guerrilla intelligence who told them that a party of nine Japanese with three ox carts was moving along the PATIK road toward the vital BAGO RIVER bridge. (See Map No. 9, page 31.)

As they crossed Highway No. 1, they sighted the enemy group and, simultaneously, the Japanese saw Lieutenant Hanson's platoon. Dropping off a small force with a radio, the Lieutenant began a race with the enemy to the bridge. His party drove forward on the soft ground to the right of the road while the Japanese advanced on the hard-surfaced road itself. A quick estimate of the situation indicated to Lieutenant Hanson that the enemy's objective was to reach the bridge before his platoon but that gunfire at this point would warn the bridge guards.

At 0730 Lieutenant Hanson's platoon intercepted the enemy near the approach to the bridge and opened fire. The initial volley killed the oxen and four Japanese, the remainder taking cover. The bridge guards now entered the action, and the platoon was subjected to converging small arms and machine-gun fire from both the bridge and the Japanese detachment from PULUPANDAN. After establishing a base of fire with two light machine guns and a 60mm mortar to keep the enemy on the north bank pinned down, Lieutenant Hanson deployed his men for an enveloping attack to seize the bridge.

The platoon charged the bridge. Private First Class Vinthers, an assistant automatic rifleman, took the lead, killing the guard at the bridge entrance. About a quarter of the way across, the platoon was pinned down by intense fire from the far side. Private First Class Vinthers again took the lead, killing one Japanese at a mine control point in the center of the bridge before he could push the plunger of the electrical detonator. Vinthers, who was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously for his bravery, was killed 20 yards beyond this point. One more Japanese was killed on the far side while the remainder dispersed.

At 0745, the bridge was overrun and reported secure at 0800. At this time, however, the platoon was again subjected to enemy fire from Japanese machine guns and mortars emplaced about 500 yards northeast of the bridge.

At 0830, the rear element with the radio reported that natives had warned them of the approach of 60 Japanese and nine ox carts moving up from VALLADOLID. Hanson immediately prepared to meet this new threat. He placed one squad with one machine gun, one Browning automatic rifle, and one sub-machine gun at the northeast end of the bridge. The balance of the platoon with the mortar, bazooka, machine gun, three automatic rifles, and three Thompson sub-machine guns, were deployed on the southwest side of the bridge thereby covering the highway leading to the bridge. The Japanese appeared at 0850 and Hanson's group opened fire, taking them completely by surprise. They killed two and wounded an unknown number. (See Map 10, page 32.) The survivors escaped, taking their wounded and their weapons with them but leaving all the carts, two of which contained high explosives and wooden land mines. The other carts were filled with ammunition, clothing, rations and cooking equipment.

The platoon held the bridge until the main force, which landed at 0930, crossed enroute to BACOLOD.

It is believed that, if the Japanese had succeeded in destroying the BAGO RIVER bridge, the advance of the 40th division would have been retarded considerably. Engineers estimated that it would have taken four weeks to replace it. The nearest available bridge was eight miles to the east and would not support tanks. In addition, the enemy would have been allowed sufficient time to demolish the three major spans and five minor bridges between PULUPANDAN and BACOLOD and to prepare the latter city for a stronger defense.

The following is a breakdown of the bombs (all prepared for electrical discharge) with which the bridge was mined:

- 2 - 1,000 pound U.S. aerial bombs (buried in deck, south end)
- 4 - 250 pound Japanese bombs (buried in deck at middle).
- 3 - 500 pound Japanese bombs (shore side of abutment).
- 10 - 110 pound Japanese bombs (around girders and braces).

The Seizure of BACOLOD and Nearby Airfields.

The following day, the 1st Battalion, 185th Infantry, supported by tanks, outflanked and eliminated an enemy strong point that opposed their crossing of the MAGSUNGAY RIVER. The battalion reached the LUPIT RIVER bridge, and that night Japanese attacks in that vicinity, as well as at the BAGO RIVER bridge, were repulsed.

On 30 March, the 1st Battalion captured the LUPIT RIVER bridge and, with the 2d Battalion on the left, continued the advance along the road toward BACOLOD, capturing three undamaged enemy fighter planes at BACOLOD airdrome. All large bridges along the route had been mined and prepared for electrical detonation, but the speed of our advance permitted their seizure intact.

The Japanese garrison in BACOLOD withdrew to the north and east, leaving a delaying force estimated at 60 men, who burned approximately 25 per cent of the city. As the enemy did not utilize the concrete and sandbag positions which had been prepared in defense of the city, and his resistance was limited to sporadic small arms and mortar fire, our advance was not retarded. (See Map No. 11, page 36.)

LIBRARY
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE



Excellent hard surfaced roads speeded the advance of armored elements of the 40th Division on BACOLOD and its adjoining airfields.



Taking advantage of the concealment offered by the heavy jungle growth, riflemen of the 185th Infantry search for Japanese snipers.


The leading elements of the 185th Infantry dispersed the defenders and moved quickly through BACOLOD, establishing themselves 500 yards north of the city that night. Patrols were sent to the north and east, and returned with information that the MATABANG RIVER bridge was heavily mined.

Our forces patrolling south from the original beachhead searched PONTEVEDRA on 30 March without contact. To the north, reconnaissance elements reached TALISAY at approximately 1000 the next day, receiving some rifle fire from the town. Two hours later the main body engaged a force of Japanese at a river crossing on the south edge of TALISAY where the bridge had been blown out. At the same time the 40th Reconnaissance Troop encountered a large force on the road 600 yards east of BACOLOD. Continuing their northward drive against minor enemy resistance, elements of the 185th Infantry seized SILAY on 3 April.

From this point the attack swung inland over the gently rising cultivated plain between the coast and the mountain ranges of north-central NEGROS. Our eastward advance through this zone was rapid, as the Japanese interposed only small delaying elements in an attempt to gain time for the organization of their defenses in the interior.

Intelligence reports of enemy activity indicated that the Japanese were hurriedly gathering troops in the CONCEPCION and GUIMBALON areas. This suggested that their outpost line of resistance was being established along the CONCEPCION-GUIMBALON-MALAGAO RIVER line, while the principal defenses would be encountered in the mountains to the east. Southern NEGROS, except for the DUMAGUETE region, was under guerrilla control.

On 4 and 5 April, our forces seized GUIMBALON and CONCEPCION and then overran the outpost line against light resistance. The defenses in this area were mainly spider-hole entrenchments. During this action the 160th Infantry sent a battalion east of SAN





General activity along a front line road in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.



A 75mm howitzer (503d Parachute RCT Artillery) fires on enemy positions.

FERNANDO to envelop enemy positions at ESMERALDA HACIENDA and a company north of that point to block a Japanese withdrawal to the northwest. On the left flank, contact was made with an enemy concentration at HINACAYEN HACIENDA.

Patrols to the north reached MALAGO and ALICANTE airfields without contact, and the Reconnaissance Troop moved east along the north coast through VICTORIAS, MANANPIA, and CAROLINA airstrip to the HIMUGAAN RIVER at FABRICA without opposition. At FABRICA they found the Japanese had destroyed 80 per cent of the sawmill. The absence of hostile forces on the north coast confirmed the earlier indications that the Japanese were concentrating their troops in the hills of the interior.

As the two regimental combat teams of the 40th Division neared the Japanese main line, where last-ditch resistance was expected, the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team, which had traveled by air to PANAY and then to NEGROS by water in order to join the 40th Division, was committed. (The paratroopers had been alerted previously for a drop on the ALICANTE AIRFIELD in northern NEGROS, but the withdrawal of the Japanese from that area obviated the plan.)

By 9 April our forces were situated--three regimental combat teams abreast--on a line running generally from a point 3,000 yards east of PILAR to a point 1,000 yards north of CALAPTAN with the 503d covering the north flank, the 160th on the south flank, and the 185th in the center. All elements were subjected to occasional machine gun and mortar fire from the enemy located to the east.

The Attack on the Main Japanese Defensive Line.

From this formation, the coordinated attack to crack the Japanese main line (see Map No. 12, page 40) was launched on the morning of 9 April. Preceded by air strikes and intensive artillery preparations, the division pushed forward over cultivated foothills that were under observation from the enemy-held ranges to the east.

Resistance increased with every yard of advance, confirming the intelligence estimate that we were now battling against the Japanese main defenses. The enemy supplemented his arsenal of

automatic weapons in this area with machine guns salvaged from wrecked aircraft and fired from improvised ground mounts. Anti-aircraft guns were commonly used against our personnel.

By 15 April the division held a five-mile front one mile west of NEGritos. The enemy positions on the range ahead were subjected to heavy air strikes, and on 17-18 April the division began an advance against strong opposition all along the front.

Repeated air strikes were made as our troops climbed ahead. As each enemy strong point was located by our riflemen, it was subjected to a heavy shelling by mortars, tanks, and artillery; then the infantry would close in for the kill. At night our artillery's interdicting and harassing fires prevented the Japanese from reorganizing as they were driven back.

The defenders fought vigorously and with determination, exploiting advantageous positions to the fullest. Because the Japanese postponed their withdrawal from each successive strong point to the last moment, they were forced to pull back hurriedly and were consequently compelled to abandon much heavy equipment.

As the Japanese were driven back from their well-prepared strong points, their defense deteriorated rapidly. Resistance decreased as the enemy sought to reach a rendezvous area to the southeast in which to regroup his remaining forces.

Results of Operations in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL to 9 May.

In his letter to Lieutenant General Eichelberger dated 9 May 1945, the Commanding General of the 40th Division described the progress of operations on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL as follows:


The mission of the 40th Division in the NEGROS Operation as prescribed in Field Order No. 27, Headquarters Eighth Army, 24 March 1945, has been accomplished to the following extent: The BACOLOD-SILAY towns and airfields have been secured and the entire coastal plain on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL freed of the enemy; civil government has been restored to the limit practicable....

He further reported that the enemy losses to 9 May were 2,558 counted dead, and 5,100 (estimated) sick and wounded.



**ADVANCE OF 40th DIV.
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL**
(10 MAY '45)

-  MAIN DRIVES
-  PATROL ACTIONS
-  EXTENT OF ENEMY HELD SECTOR
-  MAIN JAPANESE DEFENSES



20TH ENGR. BATT. TORO. BN. ASPAC. 1045

The Japanese defensive positions extending in depth from BACOLOD-TALISAY-SILAY to the LANTAWAN and PATIG area had been captured and the occupants routed. Hundreds of tons of rations, ammunition, and fuel had been captured, destroyed, or found destroyed. Material captured included more than 200 vehicles, largely destroyed, considerable medical supplies and radio equipment, and the following weapons:

- 252 light, heavy, and aircraft type machine guns.
- 89 mortars, mostly knee mortars.
- 44 20mm and 25mm guns.
- 23 artillery pieces, ranging from 27mm to 3-inch naval guns.

As the division reached its objective at the end of April, it became evident that the Japanese were withdrawing to the southeast to reorganize in the Hill 3355 sector. To meet this maneuver, the 503d Regimental Combat Team (leaving one battalion to protect the northern flank) was shifted southward to the division's right flank. Here it was given the mission of driving northeast to cut the Japanese supply and evacuation route, while the 185th and 160th Regimental Teams attacked from the north and west respectively. (See Map No. 13, page 42.)


This phase of the operation, which began 15 May, required our troops to fight uphill through heavy rain forest and steep mountains. Temperatures dropped as the Americans penetrated higher and higher into the ranges, and it was necessary to issue field jackets to the troops because of the cold.


Enemy organization appeared to be disintegrating, and resistance was less determined. But this breakdown in organization was offset to some extent by the better defensive terrain in which the Japanese were now operating. Hiding in the hills, they were able to set up well-camouflaged ambushes at the top of steep ridges, or around sharp turns on the trail. To dig the enemy out, our troops were

COMBAT
PATROLLING

 185
ATTACKED 15 MAY 45
TO SEIZE HILL 4055


 160
ATTACKED 15 MAY '45
TO SEIZE HILL 3155

76  (PA)
ATTACKED 15 MAY '45
TO SEIZE SW SLOPE
HILL 3155


 903
ADVANCED 14 MAY 45 TO
BLOCK ENEMY WITHDRAWAL
TO SOUTHEAST



**40th DIV. CLOSES TRAP
NORTH CENTRAL NEGROS
14-26 MAY 1945**



20TH ENGR BATT TOPO BN APPAC 1944



A 155mm howitzer firing point blank is used to reduce an enemy pillbox on a hill 1200 yards distant.



Dive-bombing by the 22d Marine Air Group for one hour softened up this heavily defended hill and enabled our infantry to secure it at low cost.

compelled to assault over difficult terrain, often involving steep climbs.

The enemy evacuation route was cut on 26 May by the juncture of the 503d and 185th Regimental Combat Teams in the area southeast of Hill 4055, while elements of the 503d cleared Hill 3355. The 160th Infantry overran Hill 3155, and from these positions extensive combat patrolling by the division broke up remaining enemy groups. With approximately 7,500 enemy dead or accounted for during the operation, considerable numbers of Japanese remained scattered in the hills. But their disorganization, combined with shortages of food, munitions and other supplies, made them incapable of any sustained offensive operations. On 4 June, the Philippine Army Forces of the 7th Military District, under the control of American Forces, took over the pursuit of the remaining Japanese.

Casualties.

When the Victor-I Operation was officially closed on 20 June, 7,525 Japanese had been killed and 263 had been captured. American casualties were 381 dead, 1,061 wounded.

IV - LESSONS LEARNED

Seizure of Key Objectives.

The importance of seizing strategic military objectives in order to insure the successful advance of a task force was once more demonstrated in this operation. The daring and heroic seizure of the BAGO RIVER bridge intact by the 3d Platoon, Company F, 185th Infantry, accelerated the progress of the campaign immeasurably by assuring the uninterrupted advance of the 40th Infantry Division to its final objective.

Effective Use of Guerrillas.

The effective use of guerrilla forces in the liberation of PANAY was well demonstrated. Prior to our landing, guerrillas had kept roads and bridges in good condition and had been instrumental in keeping the island's natural resources out of enemy hands. After the landing, they were used effectively as guides and on reconnaissance missions to determine the strength and dispositions of the enemy.

Speedup in Unloading Vehicles.

As reported by an Eighth Army Headquarters observer, the unloading of landing craft at the time of the initial landing on PANAY was retarded considerably due to the fact that every vehicle had to be towed through ten yards of soft sand to hard ground. It is estimated that the use of landing mats or an improvised log or sandbag ramp would have cut the unloading time in half. (An expedient which overcame similar difficulties in other operations was the carrying of 500 filled sandbags in the bow of a landing ship (tank). These were immediately available for the construction of a ramp.)

Countermeasures Against Enemy Mines.

Although mines and prepared demolition charges were used extensively on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL in an effort to impede our advance, they failed to delay our forces materially, due to the vigorous forward reconnaissance by the engineers and the prompt action taken by them in removing these obstacles. Most mines were easily detected, but some were skillfully concealed. Mines were located by the use of electrical detectors, as well as by visual inspection.

ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS




Signal Corps linemen unroll communication wire at the front near TIGBAUAN.




One of our self propelled 105mm howitzer (M-7) rumbles across a narrow wooden bridge on PANAY.



While some Yank artillerymen set up their 155mm Howitzers
in a churchyard . . .



. . . infantrymen dig in machine guns for the night on the TIGBAUAN
beach where the 40th Division landed 18 March.



Troops of the 40th Division receive an enthusiastic welcome from liberated Filipinos in ILOILO.



Skeletons of burned-out homes and buildings are all that remain of the once attractive town of MOLO, PANAY.




Shortly after landing on NEGROS (29 March) 40th Division troops swing off the highway to flank BACOLOD Airfield.



BACOLOD Airfield was quickly cleared of Japanese snipers, land mines and wrecked enemy planes.



Carrying wounded to an aid station in the vicinity of BACOLOD Airstrip,
NEGROS.



A Japanese mine removed from the base of this bridge is hauled into
BACOLOD. Enemy snipers guarding the overpass were wiped out.



Observers of the 160th Cannon Company (40th Division) direct artillery fire.




Enemy positions are reduced by point blank artillery fire as our paratroop infantry (503d) advance through rugged terrain.




Tanks weaving between coconut trees close in on Japanese-held positions.



A Japanese tank trap is filled by a bulldozer as paratroopers of the 503d Parachute RCT wait to move up.




A captured Japanese machine gun (.25 caliber), originally mounted on a bombing plane and converted for ground use.



Japanese 20mm dual-purpose gun with improvised base and airplane wheels rigged for pulling by carabao.



A dual-purpose Japanese anti-tank gun with base improvised from a truck axle and airplane wheels.



Side view of captured Japanese anti-tank gun. These guns were rigged for pulling by carabao.

PART THREE

VICTOR-II OPERATION

I. TACTICAL PLAN

The Americal Division, reinforced, (less the 164th Regimental Combat Team in Army reserve), was named as the task force for the Victor-II Operation. The division's primary mission was to liberate CEBU, but the operation also included the seizure and occupation of NEGROS ORIENTAL and BOHOL.

The Americal had been engaged in operations on LEYTE since January, and on 3 March the Commanding General, Eighth Army, directed that those elements of the division that were to be employed in the Victor-II Operation be relieved from missions on LEYTE by 10 March in order to stage and mount. Replacements were taken from the 164th Infantry to bring the other two regiments up to strength for the operation.

Eighth Army Field Order No. 23 published 7 March, designated 25 March as the target date (E-Day) for the operation. By an amphibious assault our troops were to seize a beachhead in the TALISAY area on the eastern coast of CEBU. The field order directed the division to advance rapidly along the coast to the northeast and capture CEBU CITY, its airfields, and harbor installations. As soon as possible after E-Day, forces were to land on the nearby islands of MACTAN and OLANGO and to seize the airfield of the former.

The tactical plan further called for a minimum force from the Americal Division to land near SAN VICENTE on BOHOL when directed by the Eighth Army Commander, in order to destroy hostile units on that island.

Additional shore-to-shore operations were to be conducted later by the division to liberate NEGROS ORIENTAL. Following the establishment of a beachhead in the OCOY RIVER-SIBULAN area, our forces were to sweep southward toward the town and airfield of DUMAGUETE, the chief objectives.

The reserve units, the 503d Parachute and 164th Regimental Combat Teams, were ordered to be prepared to reinforce the Americal Division on short notice from Eighth Army Headquarters.

Our combat forces for the operation totalled 13,191 and consisted of the following units:

Americal Division (-164th RCT)	9,732
478th AAA AW Bn (-Btries C and D)	408
746th AAA Gun Bn	601
Company B, 716th Tank Bn	160
52d Engr C. Bn	605
542d Engr B & S Regt (-Det Hq & Hq Co, Cos A,C, & D)	1,109
Company B (-1 Plat) 658th Amph Trac Bn	144
Company A, 80th Cml Mortar Bn	167
592d JASCO (-Det)	250
14th Support Aircraft Party	15

In addition, 2,577 service troops were allocated to support the operation.

The naval force assigned to transport, land, and protect the landing force included the following:

- 5 Destroyers
- 4 Assault Personnel Destroyers
- 8 Minesweepers
- 17 Landing Ships (Tank)
- 11 Landing Ships (Medium)
- 14 Landing Craft (Infantry)

By 21 March all elements of the force were loaded and the convoy moved to the southeast coast of LEYTE to conduct landing rehearsals.

II. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

The G-2 estimate prepared on 1 March 1945 indicated that there was a total of 11,500 Japanese in the areas involved in the Victor-II Operation. These included CEBU, BOHOL, and NEGROS ORIENTAL (DUMAGUETTE area). The distribution of enemy forces was believed to be 10,500 on CEBU, 700 in the DUMAGUETTE region on NEGROS, and 300 on BOHOL. Of the garrison on CEBU, an estimated 8,750 were in the vicinity of CEBU CITY, extending along the coast between TINA-AN on the south and LILOAN to the north of the city. The remainder of the troops in CEBU were distributed in small garrisons along the northeast coast.

Of the total enemy strength involved in the Victor-II Operation, only 3,000 were believed to be combat troops. Seven hundred of these were in DUMAGUETTE, with most of the remainder in and around CEBU CITY. The principal combat units were the 173d Independent Infantry Battalion, which was located in CEBU and estimated to be at full strength of 1,000, and portions of the 174th Independent Infantry Battalion at DUMAGUETTE and SAN CARLOS in NEGROS ORIENTAL. Other identified units included about 800 troops of the 1st Division who were evacuated from LEYTE in January and reached the vicinity of TABOGON on CEBU. Base defense and service units included such elements as the 36th Naval Guard Force, with an estimated strength of 300; the Hattori Ship Repair Unit, which was believed to have been organized for ground defense duties and assigned a coast defense sector; the Mizoguchi Unit; the 18th Shipping Engineer Regiment, and elements of the 106th Sea Duty Company.

Direct command of troops in this area was exercised by the 78th Brigade of the 102d Japanese Division. Headquarters, XXXV Army (Corps), was also in CEBU and exercised overall command of the VISAYAS and MINDANAO. This headquarters was believed to have lost many of its qualified personnel through the establishment of an

echelon in LEYTE. It was also reported to be preparing plans for movement to MINDANAO should the situation require.

Between the time of publication of this estimate and the date of our landing, no information was received to cause any change in the original calculations. Since the end of hostilities, information shows that the enemy's original strength in the areas involved in the Victor-II Operation had totaled about 22,000. The difference between this figure and the estimated 11,500 is accounted for chiefly by the presence of many elements evacuated from LEYTE and service elements which were not detected prior to contact.

Frequent punitive expeditions by the Japanese garrison had repeatedly disorganized and scattered the guerrilla units on CEBU, but they were regrouped early in 1944 under Lieutenant Colonel James Cushing. An intelligence net was developed, and an airstrip was established. Most of the island of BOHOL was controlled by approximately 5,000 guerrillas, and the interior of NEGROS ORIENTAL was held by a force of 2,000.

III. NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

The Landing of the Americal Division on CEBU.

The target date (E-Day) for the Victor-II Operation had originally been set for 25 March. However, the landing vehicles (tracked) in which the assault was to be made arrived at the staging area 48 hours late. As the assault troops had had no previous experience in the use of these craft, a rehearsal was essential. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary that the landing be postponed 24 hours. General Eichelberger so informed General MacArthur by radio on 22 March and the request for a delay was granted.

At 0830 on 26 March the invasion of CEBU was launched with an amphibious assault near TALISAY, five miles southwest of CEBU CITY. The assault was preceded by an Allied naval bombardment, and the landing was made with clock-like precision by three battalions abreast.

The original plan called for the first and second waves to continue inland in their landing vehicles (tracked) until resistance was encountered, and then to dismount and fight on foot. But the beach defenses were the most elaborate and effective yet encountered in the PHILIPPINES. Although enemy resistance was limited to sporadic small arms and mortar fire, our assault wave was abruptly halted when eight of the landing vehicles (tracked) were knocked out by land mines.

The entire length of the landing beach was mined with shells and bombs varying in size from 60mm mortar shells to 250-pound aerial bombs. These armed shells, spaced ten to 15 feet apart, were buried upright with the fuzes protruding through the loamy, vine-covered surface. The minefield was well camouflaged by a line of green vegetation which paralleled the beach about 30 yards from the water's edge. (See Map No. 15, page 62.)


Also extending the length of the beach was a personnel barrier consisting of sharply-pointed bamboo barbs 12 to 18 inches long, partially covered with vines and jutting up from the sand at a 45-

JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS TALISAY-TANKE LANDING BEACH AREA, GEBU ISLAND

TRENCH	RAIL FENCE	BARBED WIRE
CONCRETE PILL BOX	ASPARGUS BED	SPLINTER PROOF SHELTER
CONCRETE SHELTER	BOOBY TRAP	OPEN FIRING POSITION
LOG PILL BOX	SINGLE MINE	A T DITCH
LOG SHELTER	FELLED LOGS	MISSIVE BARRIER
SPLINTER PROOF MINE POS.	CRATER	LOG FENCE



 Scale Approx.



degree angle toward the sea. In the palm groves behind the minefield were continuous barriers which included anti-tank ditches, log fences and walls, timber sawhorses, and steel rail obstacles.

When the landing vehicles were knocked out, other amphibious craft in the assault waves were halted outside the mined area. As they dropped their ramps and unloaded personnel, several men stepped into the minefield and were killed or severely injured by the exploding mines.

The subsequent waves unloaded on the beach but made no attempt to move forward. An observer from the G-3 Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army, reported that along the entire strip of beach soldiers were crowded shoulder-to-shoulder, two and three deep, between the minefield and the water's edge. There was no evidence of any attempt to breach the minefield except by the 542 Hydrographic Survey Unit of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment who began clearing a passage for vehicles and tanks.

The threat of bombardment of the beach area by our naval guns and from the air had caused the Japanese to abandon their well-prepared defenses behind the beach barriers. These defenses included concrete pillboxes with walls from seven inches to three feet thick; emplacements walled with one to four coconut logs; barbed wire, and a network of trenches. Effective concealment was obtained by utilizing dummy nipa huts and foliage. Had the installations been manned with even a small but determined force, our massed troops would have been subjected to withering fire, and the eventual victory would have been a far more costly one.

The Drive to CEBU CITY.

At 1130 on E-Day (26 March) the 1st Battalion, 182d Infantry, which landed on the left flank, nearest TALISAY, pushed rapidly inland despite the mine and barrier system. It was only after considerable delay, however, that the 132d Infantry finally cleared paths

through the minefield and began its advance toward CEBU CITY.

The Japanese did not limit their defensive installations solely to the beach front. The town of TALISAY was bristling with pillboxes and barricades. All roads leading inland and into CEBU CITY were heavily mined and mines were found scattered throughout the hills. Strategically-located pillboxes and roadblocks commanded all road junctions as well as the main highway into CEBU CITY. However, the Japanese did not man the defenses and failed to cover the obstacles by fire. A sizeable enemy delaying force was encountered near PARDO on Highway No. 1, but otherwise our advance was unopposed except for intermittent sniper fire.

At 1615 the division commander assumed control ashore and, prior to dark, all units had secured their E-Day objectives. Enemy losses the first day were 88 killed, and ten Japanese captured; our casualties were eight killed and 39 wounded.

On the evening of E-Day reports were received that guerrillas had secured the reservoir and distribution areas supplying CEBU CITY. Reconnaissance later that night, however, disclosed that the guerrillas had merely occupied the high ground overlooking the reservoir. As a result, two companies of the 132d Infantry were dispatched to seize and secure the reservoir the following morning. Following its seizure by our troops, the area was turned over to the guerrillas.

On 27 March the 132d and 182d Infantry Regiments (each less one battalion) continued to advance eastward, and by 1000 they had reached the outskirts of CEBU CITY. The 3d Battalion, 182d Infantry, consolidated its positions in the reservoir area while the 132d Infantry moved through the wrecked city and secured CEBU's docks. The city's streets had been effectively prepared for defense; road blocks and concrete pillboxes were encountered throughout, but the Japanese had withdrawn to the hills after almost completely destroying the city.

After the capitol building in CEBU CITY was occupied on E plus one (27 March), our forces began to encounter stiff resistance from pillboxes located in the foothills of BABAG RIDGE, west and north-west of the city, where the enemy had concentrated his forces.

On E plus one, guerrillas had been reported in control of the hills north of BASAK, but two days later when a company was sent to comb the area it ran into determined opposition from Japanese in well-camouflaged pillboxes. On this occasion it was necessary to commit the entire 2d Battalion, 132d Infantry, which had been held in division reserve. In this assault two M-7 self-propelled howitzers supported the battalion by employing direct fire against the Japanese positions. A number of enemy ammunition dumps were also hit during this attack. Meanwhile, the 21st Reconnaissance Troop moved rapidly to the southwest and secured the cement plant at NAGA.

On 28 March the 182d Infantry attacked north on a 2500-yard front to seize LAHUG AIRFIELD and destroy the enemy in the hills north of the city. Although the field itself was soon overrun, fanatical resistance was encountered in the adjacent hills which commanded the airstrip. Frontal and flanking assaults were hurled at the enemy's defenses, which were especially formidable in the GO GHAN HILL sector. Tanks were brought up to support the infantrymen, who were often pinned down by streams of automatic fire from mutually-supporting caves and pillboxes. Casualties mounted, and one company of the 182d Infantry suffered heavily when the Japanese blew up a hill shortly after our forces had occupied it.

A coordinated assault, supported by artillery, tanks, and 4.2 inch mortars, was launched on 30 March, and the first line of enemy fortifications were overrun. However, the Japanese positions were

organized in such depth that a breakthrough was not achieved.

Although the enemy gave no evidence of his ability to execute a full-scale, organized offensive, he took full advantage of harrassing tactics by supplementing fanatical defensive fighting with frequent, localized counterattacks.

Infiltration by the enemy during this period was the rule rather than the exception. In one instance, an infiltration party succeeded in penetrating to an ammunition dump which was under guerrilla guard, destroying several thousand rounds of American 75mm shells. Several attempts were also made by small enemy demolition parties to blast our tanks and self-propelled artillery after they had been parked for the night.

In one of their typical localized counterattacks, launched on 4 April, the Japanese drove the guerrillas from the high ground which they had occupied between BUHISAN RESERVOIR and the Race Course. On still another occasion, a battalion of the 132d Infantry was forced to yield ground in the face of a fanatical Japanese charge.

The difficulties facing our troops were summed up by the Americal Division commander, who reported to General Eichelberger as follows:

Situation has developed to the point that approximately two-thirds of the Japanese positions in the vicinity of CEBU CITY have been contacted. The Japanese left flank has not been determined. Positions now facing us are elaborately prepared for defense and include numerous tunnels, with interconnecting tunnels leading into heavily-constructed pillboxes. These positions are in every case on hills and are in depth. All avenues of approach are mined and barbed wire has been encountered. Many pillboxes are so strongly constructed that they withstand direct hits from 105's. The whole Japanese position is estimated to cover a distance of 20,000 yards around CEBU CITY area and is manned by approximately 7,500 troops. There is no indication that the enemy is short of ammunition, and he is well-equipped with light and heavy machine guns. Reconnaissance in force up Highway 1 northeast of CEBU CITY develops numerous Japanese in position armed with small arms, machine guns, heavy mortars, 75mm artillery, and possibly a heavier gun. The whole area is extensively mined. Enemy estimated in this area 1,000 to 1,500. Information believed to be reliable. Now have four battalions seriously engaged, and additional one is covering right flank.

The remaining battalion will be required to determine and attack the left of the Japanese position. It is my considered opinion that operations will be slow and tedious and that expenditure of artillery ammunition will be high. Casualties are increasing and will continue to do so. LAHUG FIELD is intermittently harrassed by 90mm and 20mm fire. This harassment will probably continue until we can drive well back into the mountains.

On MACTAN ISLAND, which had been secured on 28 March without opposition by Company E, 132d Infantry, OPON AIRFIELD was operated until LAHUG could be used. OLANGO and CAUIT ISLANDS also were found to be clear of enemy.

The 182d Infantry continued to press forward, and reached BOLO RIDGE, where it was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 132d Infantry, which secured the ridge and gained ground in the GUADALUPE area. The 3d Battalion, 132d Infantry, probed for the enemy's left flank in the TALAMBAN region, and encountered well-prepared defenses.

On 4 April, following an artillery and naval gunfire barrage, another attempt was made by the 182d Infantry to crack the main Japanese defenses on BABAG RIDGE. The 1st and 2d Battalions gained several hundred yards, but were unable to dislodge the enemy from their principal positions.

The Americal commander requested additional forces, and General Eichelberger responded by sending the division's 164th Regimental Combat Team, which had been held in Army reserve. Upon arrival on 9 April, the 3d Battalion was sent to BOHOL, and the remainder of the force moved 25 miles by a concealed route to the rear of the enemy's right flank. Beginning on 12 April the three combat teams accelerated their attacks against BABAG RIDGE, and on 18 April patrols of the 164th and 132d Infantry met on the ridge. Interrogation of prisoners revealed that the Japanese commander, finding his position untenable as a result of the increasing pressure, had ordered his forces to withdraw to the north and continue resistance until evacuation to NEGROS could be arranged.

The few remaining enemy pockets were destroyed, and our troops captured large quantities of abandoned weapons, ammunition, demolitions, vehicles, food, and clothing.

Throughout the attacks on the Japanese fortifications, the Thirteenth Air Force, the Fifth Air Force, and Marine Air Group 14 conducted daily sorties, and bombing and strafing attacks destroyed many Japanese gun positions, vehicles, ammunition dumps, warehouses, and concrete pillboxes. Airborne coordinators reported that our bombing missions were about 80 per cent effective; these strikes rendered invaluable assistance to our ground troops. The enemy's water supply system was destroyed and landslides were started which sealed many Japanese in caves.

As of 20 April, organized Japanese resistance was officially declared broken in the CEBU CITY area. In an official communique released on 21 April, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur stated:

On CEBU our troops, in a wide enveloping movement which caught the enemy unawares, attacked his positions from the west flank and rear and completely defeated him. His losses were very heavy, 5,000 dead being left in the field with remnants scattered into the hills to be hunted down by our guerrilla forces ... This virtually concludes the VISAYAN Campaign ... it sweeps clear the center of the PHILIPPINES and leaves the only remaining enemy organized resistance in upper LUZON on the north and MINDANAO on the south.

On 22 April, as guerrilla forces attacked an enemy concentration south of the BUHISAN reservoir, the remaining elements of the 132d Infantry began withdrawing toward CEBU CITY to embark for DANA O. They closed in that area the following day and all elements of the regiment pushed north against scattered resistance. During the night of 24 April, the 2d Battalion ambushed and killed two large groups of Japanese north of GUINSAY.

By rapid marches and shore-to-shore movement up the coast, the Americal Division systematically blocked the attempts of the

Japanese to reorganize another defensive line and evacuate from the island. In one instance a prisoner of war stated that enemy remnants had been ordered to rendezvous at SACSAC, in northeastern CEBU. At the time the prisoner was captured, the 1st Battalion, 132d Infantry, had been holding SACSAC for several days, and the cross-island highway in that sector was occupied by elements of the 132d, and the 182d Infantry, which had landed on the northwest coast.

Our control of the coastal areas compelled the enemy to retreat through the hilly interior, where American combat patrols continued to hunt down the scattered enemy remnants until early in June. The Japanese took advantage of the difficult terrain and ambushed several patrols, but the pockets of resistance were steadily eliminated.

As they fled from our pursuing forces, the Japanese frequently slashed and bayoneted Filipino civilians in outlying villages. In committing these wanton atrocities, the enemy did not seek to kill their victims, but only to mutilate them and thus burden the American medical facilities.

Destroying the Enemy on BOHOL.

In accordance with the overall plan for the Victor-II Operation, preparations were begun early in April for the landing on BOHOL, where guerrilla reports indicated the enemy garrison had withdrawn from the coastal areas into the hills. The 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, was designated as the force to invade the island. An advance party arrived at TAGBILARAN on 10 April to confer with guerrilla leaders, and the battalion landed there the following morning.

Motor and foot patrols discovered no enemy until 15 April, when resistance was encountered on high ground north of GINOPOLAN. The following day, Companies K and L attacked the entrenched Japanese

and, despite intense rifle, machine gun, and mortar fire, drove the enemy from the ridge. That night three Japanese counterattacks were repulsed. Company I destroyed another enemy pocket on 20 April, and fleeing groups were pursued until 25 April, when it became apparent that the bulk of the Japanese garrison had been destroyed. Two companies were withdrawn to CEBU on 29 April, and the remainder of the battalion followed on 7 May.

American casualties on BOHOL were seven dead and 14 wounded; 104 Japanese dead were counted, and 16 were taken prisoner.

The Liberation of NEGROS ORIENTAL.

The final phase of the Victor-II Operation was launched at 0820 on 26 April when the Americal Division's 164th Regimental Combat Team (less the 3d Battalion) landed unopposed on NEGROS ORIENTAL between the OCOY RIVER and LOOC. Ashore, contact was made with elements of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop. Their long-range mechanized patrolling had carried them from NEGROS OCCIDENTAL to the DUMAGUETE area.

The 164th Infantry pushed rapidly south, impeded only by scattered mines, and secured the airfield and town at DUMAGUETE. The Japanese garrison there had withdrawn to the interior after burning part of the town.

On 27 April our troops swept westward in pursuit of the enemy. Only a few stragglers were encountered as the 1st Battalion searched the area south of the DUMAGUETE RIVER while the 2d Battalion paralleled their advance north of that stream. By 28 April the two forces had reached a north-south line running through BONGBONG without meeting any appreciable opposition. (See Map No. 17, page 73.)

Following this advance, however, enemy strong points were encountered as the infantrymen of the 164th penetrated to the inland

hills. The 1st Battalion moved back to DUMAGUETE and then forward to SAN ANTONIO, north of the 2d Battalion, in order to engage hostile groups in the MALABO area.

During the first week of May, the 1st Battalion encountered a stubborn Japanese force entrenched on the high ground east of TICALA CREEK. Elements of the 2d Battalion reinforced the 1st, and the enemy was driven from his positions. A pocket of resistance 1,800 yards northwest of CAMPISA was also destroyed by 2d Battalion troops.

Japanese units south and west of BADIANG offered strong opposition to our advance. Our forces repulsed six counterattacks during the night of 8 May and four banzais the following night. In spite of this opposition the enemy positions were reduced by 11 May. South of TICALA and east of CAMPISA additional Japanese strong points were encountered and eliminated with the support of accurate air strikes and artillery barrages.

The continuous pressure maintained by our troops drove the Japanese deeper and deeper into the mountains to the southwest, where they organized a final defensive position in the CUERNOS DE NEGROS region. Patrolling riflemen of the 1st Battalion made the initial contact with this force on 2 June. The difficult terrain and the enemy's well-prepared positions enabled the Japanese to hold their ground against our repeated attacks until 16 June, when the resistance was broken and the remaining enemy were scattered.

Casualties.

In the Victor-II Operation the Americal Division achieved the destruction of the largest enemy force in the southern VISAYAS. By the close of the campaign on 20 June, 10,221 Japanese had been killed, the vast majority of them on CEBU. In addition, 232 prisoners had been captured.

Our casualties during the operation reflect the stubborn resistance offered by the enemy and his exploitation of the advantages of excellent defensive terrain. A total of 449 were killed in action, 1,969 wounded, and nine were reported missing.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED

Pre-Assault Reconnaissance.

Prior to a landing every effort should be made to determine the nature and the extent of enemy beach defenses by ground reconnaissance and interpretation of aerial photographs taken of the objective area. In the landing on CEBU, the advance of our assault echelons was completely paralyzed when the first wave ran into extensive Japanese beach defenses. Eight landing vehicles (tracked) were destroyed when they attempted to drive through this heavily-mined area. It was apparent that plans had not anticipated the possibility of encountering an elaborate mine and barrier system on the beach. Had the enemy chosen to man these defenses instead of withdrawing to inland hill positions, the results would have been disastrous.

Training of Infantry in the Passage of Mine Fields.

The inadequacy of the training of infantry in the passage of minefields was clearly demonstrated in the CEBU landing. Following the destruction by land mines of eight landing vehicles (tracked), no apparent effort was made by infantry elements to gap the mine field as wave after wave of foot troops piled up on the beach. Units of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment finally cleared a passage for vehicles and tanks, thereby allowing our combat echelons to advance.

Many more casualties would have been suffered if enemy fire had been encountered. Had the infantry been fully trained in the breaching of minefields, the leading waves would have promptly cleared and marked a path through the barrier. Such action would have expedited the advance inland, and would have prevented the dangerous massing of troops along the water's edge.

Envelopment of Strong Points.

In the Victor-II Operation each enemy position reduced by our forces was found to be dominated by another on a succeeding ridge.

Since there was little natural cover, our men suffered heavy casualties in direct frontal attacks up slopes covered by overlapping bands of enemy fire. Wherever possible, envelopment from the rear or the flanks is preferable to frontal assault tactics. On the other hand, where a frontal attack is necessary, maximum use should be made of close-in air support using heavy bombs and napalm in addition to artillery.

Close Support by 90mm Antiaircraft Guns.

This weapon, employing direct fire, proved to be singularly effective against the hillside caves and tunnels that were the backbone of the Japanese defenses on CEBU. Emplaced on high ground, the 90mm antiaircraft gun knocked out positions that had survived shelling by artillery, tanks, and mortars. Where the enemy must be routed from well-prepared positions on succeeding ridges, the 90mm antiaircraft gun should be used extensively in close support of the infantry advance.


Reliability of Guerrilla Reports.

Guerrilla reports should never be accepted at their face value until they have been carefully weighed and checked by ground reconnaissance or close interrogation as to the dispositions reported. During the early phase of the operation, both the CEBU CITY reservoir and strategic hill positions north of BASAK were reported under guerrilla control. In both instances the reports proved to be inaccurate, and substantial American forces were required to oust the enemy from these areas.


ADDITIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS




A "dragon's teeth" tank block constructed by the Japanese on CEBU.
The concrete blocks are three feet high.




One of the several houses which the Japanese converted into pillboxes in
LILOAN on CEBU.



Infantrymen of the Americal Division advance through wreckage on the docks of CEBU CITY, the result of our pre-invasion naval and aerial bombardment.



Residents of CEBU CITY greet our troops on E-Day plus one after the advance from the beachhead over heavily-mined roads.



The Japanese destroyed this 200-foot suspension bridge over the MANANGA RIVER, CEBU.




The destruction wrought throughout CEBU CITY by American bombings and Japanese demolitions is shown graphically in this view of the downtown section.



A bulldozer removes a Japanese land mine on the outskirts of CEBU CITY as infantrymen of the Americal Division supervise the operation.




Tanks of 716th Tank Battalion and riflemen of the 182d Infantry drive toward Japanese positions on the high ground beyond LAHUG airstrip near CEBU CITY.



Japanese supplies stored in a cave north of CEBU CITY are removed by guerrillas.



Fragments of our 90mm shells were found around these Japanese caves in the hills above CEBU CITY.




One of our C-47's takes off from reconstructed LAHUG AIRFIELD north of CEBU CITY (9 May). Wrecked Japanese plane still lies along the edge of runway.



A knocked-out Japanese armored boat in the marginal swamp of SILUT LAGOON near LILOAN, CEBU. Craft was of metal construction with a wooden deck.



The 3d Battalion, 132d Infantry, moves north of SOGOD, CEBU, to clear out Japanese remaining on the island.




Tanks of the 716th Tank Battalion transport troops forward for the final mop-up of Japanese forces on CEBU.




They ford the muddy TIMUQUIT RIVER north of SOGOD.



Infantrymen ford the stream on foot when one of our tanks bogs down in the river mud.



The tank casualty is dragged to dry ground. (Note artillery position to the left of leading tank and open type rolling terrain.)



Our 90mm AA guns were highly effective in direct fire missions against enemy pillboxes and defensive installations.




A Japanese cement pillbox 300 yards from the beach (one mile from LILQAN, CEBU).



A Japanese prisoner captured by members of an ammunition and pioneer platoon near TABOGON.




Company I, 132d Infantry, forms a perimeter covering the entry of our troops into TABOGON, northern CEBU.



A heavy machine gun commands the approaches to TABOGON, CEBU. Nipa huts are scattered throughout the heavily cultivated flat coastal plain below.




Landing craft vehicles, personnel (LCVPs) bearing personnel and equipment of the 164th Infantry approach the landing beach north of DUMAGUETE, NEGROS ORIENTAL.



Riflemen of the 164th Infantry, Americal Division, make a wet landing from landing craft (infantry) near DUMAGUETE.



Landing beach north of DUMAGUETE where the 1st and 2d Battalions, 164th Infantry, landed.



Guide ropes are used to assist troops in reaching shore.



Troops of the 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry, pass through a Japanese barbed wire barricade on their way to DUMAGUETE.



One soldier stands guard while others fill their canteens at a crossing of the DUMAGUETE RIVER. (Halazone tablets are used to purify this water for drinking.)



The assault troops move unopposed onto DUMAGUETE AIRFIELD close behind the retreating Japanese.




The 1st Battalion enters the town of DUMAGUETE, capital of NEGROS ORIENTAL.




Aerial view of the BAIS Sugar Central, showing mills, refinery, and employees quarters surrounded by well-cultivated fields.




A typical sugar central on NEGROS ISLAND as seen from a nearby hill.




Aerial view of a road constructed by the combat engineers (164th RCT) through the rugged and mountainous terrain of NEGROS ISLAND.



A devastated area along the route of advance of the Americal Division on NEGROS showing effect of terrific artillery and aerial bombardment.



A tank moving into position slides off a soft shoulder weakened by heavy rains.



Infantrymen of the 164th Regiment dig in on a NEGROS hilltop.

PART FOUR

STAFF SECTION REPORTS

I. G-1 REPORT

Organization and Planning: For the Victor-I and II operations the G-1 Section was organized into the following four subsections: Operations, Personnel, Awards and Decorations, and Civil Affairs.

Before the operations began, frequent conferences were held with personnel representatives of the 40th Division, the 503d Regimental Combat Team, and the Americal Division. During these conferences particular stress was placed on bringing the units to full combat strength with the result that they went into Victor-I and II operations at their approximate authorized strengths. This section prepared the appropriate paragraphs for the administrative orders to accompany Eighth Army Field Orders 21 and 23, and discussed them in detail with the personnel representatives of the units.

Replacements: Following the policy previously established, where the number of replacements being shipped totalled 200 or more, service records were flown from the Replacement Depot to receiving units, which consequently arrived 24 to 48 hours ahead of the troops. This enabled division classification officers to make assignment breakdowns, publish orders, and arrange for transportation to units prior to arrival of the replacements.

In addition, this headquarters maintained liaison with the Navy and the Replacement Command to facilitate the movement of replacements to the fighting units.

The following replacements were shipped to the units during the operations:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
40th Division (Victor-I)	22	1418
503d Regimental Combat Team (Victor-I)	16	682
Americal Division (Victor-II)	293	7050

The shipment of the large number of replacements to the Americal Division was occasioned by the unusually high number of battle and non-battle casualties (detailed in the following paragraph) and to losses resulting from the readjustment and rotation program.

Casualties: A radio report was submitted daily by the divisions and the Regimental combat team to this headquarters listing battle casualties throughout the operations. Following are battle casualty totals:

40th Division (Victor-I)	868
Attached troops, including 503d Regimental Combat Team (Victor-I)	574
Americal Division (Victor-II)	2,427

(In addition, the Americal Division's non-battle losses reached 6,072, due in large part to outbreaks of dysentery and hepatitis epidemics during some of the bitterest fighting of the campaign.)

Civil Affairs: The Civil Affairs subsection attached four Philippine Civil Affairs Units to the combat forces for the administration of civil affairs on PANAY, BOHOL, CEBU, and NEGROS. During the combat phase, these units materially aided our forces by preventing the civilian population from interfering with the progress of the operations. They directed Filipinos to points of safety, provided them with such emergency relief and medical care as the situation would permit, and recruited civilian laborers to assist in behind-the-lines activity.

As the military operations progressed, Philippine Civil Affairs Units reestablished civil government, reopened schools, and established hospitals with a view to relinquishing control of civil responsibility at an early date to the Filipino Commonwealth Government.

Up to 20 June, approximately 3,000 tons of foodstuffs, clothing, and general supplies had been distributed to needy civilians living on PANAY, BOHOL, CEBU, and NEGROS. Eighty-six per cent of these supplies were sold through normal trade channels. Approximately 35 tons of medical supplies were distributed to civilians without charge, although records were kept for later reimbursement by the Commonwealth Government.

Throughout the operations the section also acted upon the normal flow of personnel matters in connection with promotions, reassignments, transfers, readjustment, and awards and decorations.

II. G-2 REPORT

Planning Phase.

Preparation of Estimates: Before the directive was issued for carrying out the Victor series of operation, information on the enemy situation in the objective areas had been collated as a matter of routine, and a good deal of reference material on terrain and weather was on hand. From this information, and such additional information as could be obtained quickly, G-2 estimates for the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were prepared. Material was submitted by the Topographic and Order of Battle subsections of G-2, and by the weather officer. It was integrated by the planning subsection, which also made the analysis of enemy capabilities. The estimate for the Victor-I Operation was published on 22 February and the estimate for Victor-II on 1 March.

It was believed that there were initially 2,775 enemy troops on PANAY and 9,300 in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. Before the landing date the estimate for PANAY was reduced to 2,500. The original calculation for the Victor-II Operation was 10,500 on CEBU, 700 in NEGROS ORIENTAL, and 300 on BOHOL. No evidence was received prior to the landing to cause revisions of these estimates.

The conclusions reached for PANAY-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL were that the enemy would offer a stubborn defense at a number of points, particularly at ILOILO on PANAY and BACOLOD on NEGROS; that strong, well-coordinated attacks were improbable; that no substantial reinforcement of the target area could be made, and that attempts to withdraw troops to other points in the VISAYAS or to MINDANAO would be negligible. Regarding enemy naval and air activity it was concluded that no significant effort, other than the use of submarines and small suicide craft, would be made. As the operation developed, these conclusions were generally proved to be correct although the expected stubborn defense of ILOILO and of BACOLOD failed to develop.

The anticipated reaction to the Victor-II Operation was that the enemy would make a sustained and stubborn defense in and around CEBU CITY; that when this defense was broken he would withdraw into the inaccessible and easily defended inland terrain; that some of his forces might be withdrawn from the target area to MINDANAO, and that no consequential air or naval action would develop. These conclusions proved fairly accurate, although the expected stubborn resistance occurred in the high ground northwest of CEBU CITY rather than in the city itself.

Supply of Maps, Photographs, Terrain Studies and Handbooks.

Maps: Complete small and intermediate scale map coverage of PANAY, NEGROS, CEBU, and BOHOL was available prior to the operation. Large-scale (1:50,000 and 1:25,000) coverage was available for the landing area and the coastal plain in the most densely populated parts of the island. The General Headquarters mapping program did not include plans for additional large-scale mapping of any of these islands.

Photographs: At the time of receipt of the General Headquarters Staff Study at this headquarters, fairly good photographic coverage existed of the landing beaches and early objective areas. Reprints of these photographs were obtained for basic cover and ten copies of each were distributed to the task force commanders. This photography, however, did not cover the complete area for which basic cover was desired and had limited intelligence value because of subsequent changes in the enemy situation.

Requests were immediately made to the Thirteenth Air Force for missions to complete the basic coverage and to obtain up-to-date intelligence. Distribution of these photographs to the task force

varied from five to 16 sets. The largest distribution was made of the sets covering landing beaches and early objectives. Smaller distribution was made of the sets on missions obtained primarily for late comparative intelligence study, particularly where these missions covered areas included in the basic cover. (See sketches, pages 100 and 101.)

Up to the time of the landing on PANAY, 46 sorties had been flown on PANAY and 18 sorties on NEGROS, and a total of 11,000 prints had been distributed to the task force.

Prior to the landing on CEBU, 49 missions had been flown in the Victor-II objective areas and a total of 6,000 prints distributed to the task force.

Allied Geographical Service Terrain Studies and Handbooks.

The following terrain studies and handbooks were available for these operations:

Terrain Study No. 99 - NEGROS
Terrain Study No. 101 - PANAY
Terrain Handbook 51 - PANAY
Terrain Handbook 52 - NEGROS
Terrain Study No. 100 - CEBU-BOHOL
Terrain Handbook 53 - BOHOL-CEBU

As soon as these documents were received in quantity, they were distributed to staff sections of this headquarters and to the task forces concerned. Sufficient copies were provided so that terrain studies could be distributed to battalions, and terrain handbooks could be distributed to platoons.

With the exception of Terrain Handbook 53, CEBU-BOHOL, all terrain studies were received at this headquarters in time to allow complete distribution before the loading dates. Only a part of the shipment of Handbook 53 was received prior to departure of the troops. The remainder was shipped to the task force by courier a few days after the landing.

Use of Photo Interpreter Teams: Upon receipt of information of the pending operations, the photo interpreter teams of this headquarters began studies of existing photographic coverage and all subsequent missions as the photographs were delivered. Reports on these studies were distributed within this headquarters and to the task force. They were intended primarily for use in planning, and included studies of landing beaches, communications, and other military aspects of the terrain as well as a complete report of all observed enemy military installations and activity. No formal reports were prepared after loading began, because satisfactory distribution could not be effected.

Personnel of the photo interpreter teams were available at all times for discussion of specific problems with other sections of this headquarters, particularly G-3, Engineer, and Artillery.

In the planning stage of the Victor-II Operation, close cooperation with photo interpreters of the division and of the Navy Amphibious Group was possible since the Eighth Army Headquarters was located on LEYTE from which the troops were staged.

Counterintelligence: Eighth Army Counter Intelligence Corps detachments made a survey of the areas in which the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were scheduled to take place. An orientation program was initiated, based on available guerrilla intelligence reports, area studies, personality lists, and collateral information received from other Counter Intelligence Corps detachments. Counterintelligence plans were prepared in accordance with standard operating procedures.

Operational Phase.

Activities of the Operations Subsection: Two liaison officers were furnished to the 40th Division for the landing on PANAY. They joined the division on 10 March and remained with it throughout

the staging period, the landing, and the initial phases of the operation. They served as working members of the division G-2 Section, acquired an intimate knowledge of the enemy situation, which was passed to Eighth Army Headquarters, and provided close liaison between Army and division intelligence staffs.

For the Victor-II Operation, one officer was made available during the initial stages. His observations supplied the Army G-2 with considerable first hand information on organized enemy defenses which later helped in analyzing enemy trends.

During both operations, this subsection worked in close coordination with guerrillas and the air and naval forces, furnishing tactical information to the troops up to the last moment prior to the landing. During the course of the operations, this subsection received all reports from subordinate units and disseminated intelligence to appropriate higher, supporting, and subordinate headquarters.

Supply of Maps and Photographs.

Maps: Except for PANAY ISLAND, additional large-scale maps were needed. Large-scale maps available to this headquarters at the beginning of the operations covered only a small part of the islands. These maps were sufficient for landings and for early objectives, but on NEGROS, CEBU, and BOHOL the enemy abandoned his defense of coastal areas and moved into the hills in areas not covered by large-scale maps. Because the operations were conducted simultaneously, it was impossible for this headquarters to prepare maps to satisfy the needs of all troops. Priorities were established to make effective use of the facilities of the one engineer topographic company assigned to the headquarters.

In the case of NEGROS ISLAND, six photomaps of the northern part of the island and two photomaps of a possible landing area

on the west coast were prepared. Later, when enemy defensive positions were established in the NEGRITOS area, additional photomaps were required. A hasty mosaic prepared by the division was lithographed and distributed. As soon as satisfactory photographs were available, three photomaps were prepared by this headquarters.

For CEBU, two 1:50,000 planimetric maps were prepared to fill a gap on the northern part of the east coast. When the elaborate defense system was encountered northwest of CEBU CITY, three photomaps of that region were prepared. Then, as the enemy withdrew to the north, a mosaic of the area where the next defensive system was expected was prepared by the division photo interpreter team. From this mosaic, the topographic company prepared a total of nine additional photomaps.

On BOHOL, enemy action quickly extended into localities not covered by our large-scale maps, but because of higher priorities in mapping other areas, this headquarters was unable to prepare additional maps of that island.

Aerial Photographs: During the planning stages constant personal contact between this headquarters and the Thirteenth Air Force produced a high degree of coordination, and available air facilities were used to the fullest extent to supply the required photographic coverage.

After the operation had begun the air forces were placed in direct support of the divisions in combat, and requests for photographic missions went directly from the ground troops to the Thirteenth Air Force through air support channels. During this stage it was found desirable nevertheless, for officers of this section to keep in constant touch with the air forces, in order to clarify requests and expedite flying missions, as well as to coordinate constantly changing priorities necessitated by tactical developments.

Air force personnel were extremely cooperative, but factors existed which made it difficult to obtain full aerial photographic support in the Victor operations. The basic difficulty was the inadequacy of the resources of the Thirteenth Air Force, both in number of planes and in laboratory facilities. This deficiency caused many delays in filling photographic requests and resulted in a shortage of prints.

Another handicap was the great distance separating ground troops from the Thirteenth Air Force Headquarters on LEYTE; this made personal contact between the ground and air units impossible. Because of the distance involved, misunderstanding of some requests occurred, and the air force was hampered in keeping the task forces informed of its progress.

In the transmission of finished prints, numerous delays occurred due to the great distances involved. The most expeditious method of forwarding prints to ground troops was found to be delivery of the photographs to this office and transshipment through Eighth Army courier channels. With the termination of regular Eighth Army courier service to forward units, arrangements were made for the shipment through the transportation officer by standard army courier service or air freight.

Order of Battle.

This subsection collated and interpreted all information received insofar as it applied to enemy strength and dispositions. While some additional service elements were identified as the operations progressed, no major discrepancies developed between the enemy troops actually found in these areas and those indicated in the initial estimates.

Counterintelligence, Victor-I.

PANAY: The agents of the 40th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment performed their normal functions and secured a number of valuable documents. However, despite precautions taken, many documents were scattered and destroyed by souvenir looting.

Guerrilla elements of the 6th Military District had previously imprisoned alleged spies and enemy collaborators, and screening and investigation of them was begun by the counter intelligence unit. Officials of the Japanese puppet government were either interned or placed in technical custody under definite restrictions. The detachment investigated and cleared Filipinos who were prospective officials.

Difficulties were encountered in determining the status of some civilians because the guerrillas issued clearance certificates which were not officially valid, but were very similar to those issued by the Counter Intelligence Corps. This problem was solved when the issue of clearance certificates by guerrilla forces was discontinued.

The 308th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of this headquarters participated in the PANAY phase of the Victor-I Operation. They assisted in preliminary planning and maintained contacts with guerrilla leaders prior to the operations. Guerrilla files and lists were obtained and furnished to the participating units. One officer of the 308th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was sent to ILOILO 29 March to direct counterintelligence operations pending the arrival of a relieving detachment, which had been held up by shipping difficulties at HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA.

NEGROS: The 40th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment landed at PULUPANDAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, with elements of the 40th

Division on 29 March. The following day, the detachment proceeded to BACOLOD, the provincial capital of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, and as soon as the city was cleared of the enemy, government buildings and installations were searched. The detachment utilized civilians as guards over vital installations. All members of the Japanese puppet Bureau of Constabulary were ordered to BACOLOD where they were processed and restricted to the confines of the city; guerrillas were excluded from the town except when travelling on official military missions. The flood of counterintelligence work encountered in BACOLOD forced the detachment to remain there pending relief, although agents were dispatched with division elements for temporary surveys of the towns of SILAY and FABRICA.

The 40th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was relieved at BACOLOD by the 487th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment on 22 May. The former then moved with the advance elements of the 40th Division into other populated areas of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.

Counterintelligence, Victor-II.

Two Counter Intelligence Corps teams participated in all phases of the Victor-II Operation. The 182d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment from the Americal Division was supplemented by the 488th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment. The latter had been attached to the Eighth Army and was later reattached to the Americal Division. The units landed on E-Day and E plus one and moved to the division command post at BASAK, CEBU, where evacuees were screened for tactical and counterintelligence information.

The 308th Counter Intelligence Corps, Headquarters, Eighth Army, participated in this operation to the extent of planning and gathering information. Many reports were received from civilians who had moved from CEBU to the west coast of LEYTE. Prior to the operation one officer was sent to guerrilla headquarters on CEBU to establish liaison, and several guerrilla officers were brought to Headquarters, Eighth Army.

On 28 March personnel of the 182d and 488th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments entered CEBU CITY, established a headquarters and proceeded to search installations. All civilians sent back by agents working with advance elements of the division were interrogated at a civilian compound. Most high officials of the Japanese puppet government had evacuated CEBU CITY with the enemy. A dock security patrol was set up, an enemy mine field was located and sketched, and investigations were begun of all persons suspected of collaboration. Investigations were hampered because the majority of reliable persons in CEBU CITY had been evacuated and were slow in returning.

The 182d Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was deployed chiefly with tactical elements of the Americal Division. The 488th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment went into the various sectors after the combat phase. Agents were sent to the island of BOHOL and to DUMAGUETE, NEGROS ORIENTAL, when division elements landed there. On SEQUIJOR ISLAND, it was found that the 7th Military District was dealing summarily with alleged collaborators. This situation was changed promptly, and the investigations were taken over by Counter Intelligence Corps personnel.

The 488th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment cleared about 2,000 civilians for civil and military employment, recorded charges against 1,500 Filipinos, and established a card index on 6,000 individuals.

Technical Intelligence.

The teams participating in the Victor-I Operation consisted of two officers and four enlisted men, representing the Ordnance Department, Chemical Warfare Service, Quartermaster Corps, Corps of Engineers, and Signal Corps.

Among the areas investigated were ILOILO, GUIMABOAN, BACOLOD, and TIGBAUAN. No new items of technical interest were discovered

although standard types of enemy equipment were found in small quantities. The enemy apparently made a determined attempt to destroy all supply dumps before retreating.

Many improvised items such as hand grenades and mortar tubes were found. An improvised armored car was examined by ordnance personnel and found to be of inferior design and ineffective for combat.

Considerable United States equipment was used by the Japanese, particularly at BACOLOD, where a naval storeroom was found completely stocked with American-made equipment, such as taps, dies, and dynamos.

In the Victor-II Operation, Technical Intelligence was represented by Field Unit No. 1, composed of one officer or enlisted man from each of the following services: Ordnance, Engineer, Chemical Warfare, Quartermaster, and Signal. This unit landed with the Americal Division at TALISAY, CEBU, on E-Day, 26 March.

In addition to performing their primary mission of recovering, evaluating, and preparing captured enemy equipment for shipment, Technical Intelligence personnel disseminated the following technical information to troops in the field:

- (1) In several instances it had been observed that certain Japanese shells gave off a green, nauseating smoke upon exploding. Investigation by the chemical intelligence officer that this was the effect of detonation and not, as first thought, a toxic gas.
- (2) A new method of using 50-kilogram aerial bombs as land mines was investigated by the engineer technical intelligence officer and a report on recognition and deactivation was turned in to G-2, Americal Division.
- (3) Information on Japanese improvised bombs and booby traps was given by the ordnance technical intelligence officer to acquaint our troops with the various types they would encounter.

Psychological Warfare.

The Psychological Warfare Branch was represented by one warrant officer and one enlisted man who accompanied the 40th Division in the landings on PANAY and NEGROS.

During the preliminary softening-up period, 411,700 leaflets were dropped on PANAY and 491,000 on NEGROS. The grand total of "on the spot" leaflets dropped on PANAY was 491,000. These were prepared by Psychological Warfare Branch representatives with the assistance of language personnel.

Ten front line broadcasts were made on NEGROS in the MOUNT MANDALAGAN area. Following the broadcasts, five prisoners of war surrendered, and other captured Japanese reported that they had been influenced by the leaflets, but that their officers had prohibited them from surrendering at the time.

With the assistance of the Psychological Warfare Branch, the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit in BACOLOD began publication of the newspaper, "Free Philippines," for Filipino consumption.

Results of Psychological Warfare Branch operations on NEGROS were good. Most of the prisoners taken surrendered voluntarily, and their statements show that they were considerably influenced by our leaflets. The effect on the morale of the Japanese forces cannot be measured accurately, but the number of surrenders clearly indicates that the psychological warfare effort weakened the enemy's will to resist, especially in the later stages of the operation.

One officer and one enlisted man of the Psychological Warfare Branch landed with the Americal Division on CEBU. Before the landing 1,303,000 leaflets had been dropped and an additional 494,000 leaflets were dropped on E-Day. Artillery planes and artillery shells were used to distribute leaflets especially prepared for a particular tactical situation. A public address set was used for front line broadcasts, but the results were poor. The same method was used to approach enemy groups on some of the small

offlying islands. The only result, according to Filipino sources, was to cause the enemy troops to flee toward the interior.

The Psychological Warfare Branch published the first edition of the CEBU CITY "Free Philippines" 11 days after the landing, and seven subsequent editions before publication was turned over to Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 15. Later, an edition of the "Free Philippines" was also published in DUMAGUETE.

For the most part the results of the Psychological Warfare Branch activities against the Japanese in the Victor-II Operation were below average. Prisoners of war had generally seen and read the leaflets, and believed what they read, but it was reported that the majority of Japanese troops preferred death to surrender. The Filipino population, however, received and obeyed instructions dropped to them before and during the landing, and were enthusiastic about the newspapers which were published.

Public Relations.

The Victor-I Operation was covered by accredited war correspondents from General Headquarters, with unit public relations officers confining themselves to the production of home town news and pictures. All material was cleared directly through General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area.

The Victor-II Operation was covered by an Associated Press Correspondent from this headquarters, who remained at CEBU until E plus four. He worked out of this headquarters, but his copy was cleared through General Headquarters. In the absence of the Americal Division Public Relations Officer, division public relations activities during the first five days of the operation were handled by the Public Relations Officer of the Eighth Army. Nine Eighth Army stories were filed during this period.

Allied Translator and Interpreter Service.

On the Victor-I Operation one officer and one enlisted man were sent from this headquarters to supplement the 49th Division Language Team.

Of the documents captured on PANAY and NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, 2,030 were found to contain worthwhile information, and 584 of these were of immediate value. On CEBU, BOHOL, and in the DUMAGUTTE area of NEGROS, 5,629 documents were found which contained some information of value. Nineteen hundred of these were of immediate tactical significance.

The Eighth Army Allied Translator and Interpreter Section Advanced Echelon (redesignated the 166th Language Detachment after 10 May) translated and published 142 documents captured during these operations. A number of other documents, of which no translations were published, were referred to interested sections of Eighth Army Headquarters and to a number of other commands and organizations, including Seventh Fleet, Far Eastern Air Forces, and Section 22, General Headquarters.

Lessons Learned.

Maps: Considerable difficulty was encountered because of the lack of adequate large-scale map coverage. The existing topographic facilities did not permit more adequate initial coverage or prompt action on requests for map production after the operation began. It is obvious that an engineer topographic company cannot provide adequate mapping support for an army. For this purpose a topographic battalion is required and smaller task forces should each be assigned a topographic company or at least a reproduction detachment.

Aerial Photographs: It is felt that the aerial photography for these operations was inadequate in the following respects:

- (1) Only a limited number of sorties could be flown.
- (2) There was a lack of sufficient prints for distribution to troops.
- (3) The elapsed time between submission of the mission request and the receipt of the photographs was too great.

- (4) The maintenance of satisfactory communication between the task force and the air force was difficult.

The Thirteenth Air Force, with one photographic reconnaissance squadron, was charged with the aerial photographic support of all Victor and BORNEO operations. A high degree of cooperation was maintained and maximum use was made of existing facilities. But these, both in number of planes and in laboratory capacity, were insufficient to supply the needed amount of photographic support.

It is also felt that each task force should have sufficient planes and laboratory facilities based as close as possible to task force headquarters during the operation. Lack of close liaison and personal contact between ground troops and supporting air forces decreases the value of tactical air support. Under such conditions, missions cannot be explained completely, the ground troops do not have knowledge of the progress of specific missions, and the delivery of prints is delayed.

Terrain Studies and Handbooks: These documents provide excellent orientation material for staff planning and for familiarizing troops with the area in which they are to operate. They should be distributed as early as possible during the planning stage.

Use of Reconnaissance Units: The value of motorized units as a medium for collecting information where extensive road nets exist was well demonstrated on PANAY and NEGROS. The rapid and aggressive use of the 40th Reconnaissance Troop on PANAY corroborated previous information of enemy dispositions, and the same aggressive reconnaissance of this troop on NEGROS quickly confirmed the withdrawal of Japanese garrisons from the coastal areas to their inland defensive positions.

Reports: In order to keep currently informed of the enemy situation during operations, higher echelons must rely on radio reports from the separate task forces as the primary sources of information. The written report, owing to delays in transit, does not serve this

purpose adequately. Consequently all important enemy information developed during the period covered must be included in the radio report.

Interrogation of Prisoners: On CEBU, arrangements for the early interrogation of prisoners were lacking. During the first few hours on the beach several prisoners were turned in, but no interrogators were on hand and no plans had been made to evacuate prisoners to the command post. Language personnel should be available when the first prisoner is brought in.

Since many service units cannot be identified prior to contact, discrepancies between pre-landing estimates and actual enemy strength are inevitable when large forces are involved in operations of this type. Likewise, since guerrilla strength estimates vary greatly and are extremely difficult to evaluate, greater reliance must be placed on the study of available information on unit identifications. The use of the latter method gives the most reliable results and keeps the margin of error to a minimum so that troops allotted for an operation are never faced with an enemy force capable of preventing the accomplishment of their mission.

III. G-3 REPORT

The report of G-3 activities and lessons learned is included in the narrative proper.

FIELD ARTILLERY REPORT

For the Victor-II Operation the field artillery support was furnished by the organic units of the participating division, and the 462d Parachute Field Artillery Battalion (75mm howitzer) of the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team. Reinforcing fires were provided by the 746th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and Companies A and B of the 80th Chemical Battalion. Some 4.2 inch mortars were placed under division artillery control, while others were attached to infantry units.

The caves and heavy fortifications which characterized the Japanese defenses necessitated a high percentage of precision fires. The best results were obtained by using the concrete piercing (CP) fuze which is particularly effective when used with the 155mm howitzer projectile. Several caves were sealed with the expenditure of only a few rounds. Massed fires, using time-on-target technique whenever surprise was possible, were successfully employed when worthwhile targets were found.

Terrestrial observation was much better than in jungle areas, but it was still limited and favored the defender. This placed a severe handicap on reconnaissance officers. In the Victor-II Operation, Americal Division forward observer parties lost nine officers and 30 enlisted men during the critical phase of the campaign.

To reinforce and augment field artillery fires, 90mm antiaircraft guns were used extensively in their secondary role. Due to the lack of experience of gun crews in employing this type of direct fire, initial performances were characterized by unnecessary exposure and the use of improvised fire control methods. After a few days, however, they delivered rapid and telling fire on point targets, and are credited with closing or nullifying many cave

positions. Even though the initial round was frequently lost, usually only two or three rounds were needed to range in on the target. When antiaircraft units were employed with organic field artillery for control, their indirect reinforcing fires were accurate and effective.

Night fires accelerated the successful completion of our operations, particularly on CEBU. Prisoner of war reports and dawn and dusk aerial surveillance consistently indicated that the Japanese left their caves after dark for nearby waterpoints. The artillery took advantage of this practice and laid heavy night fires on the exposed enemy. Major resistance broke unexpectedly on CEBU on 19 April, though on the previous day it had been estimated that two more weeks of hard fighting would be required to dislodge the enemy. Infantry commanders were unanimous in acknowledging the value of night fires in assisting the infantry to maintain pressure on the Japanese and in undermining their will to fight.

The artillery used 155mm white phosphorous shells to mark targets for close support air strikes.

Enemy Employment of Artillery: Although reports from OKINAWA indicated that the enemy had revised his firing methods, Japanese artillery fires were never massed during the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations, and single pieces were generally used to engage targets.

All enemy artillery pieces were placed well inland on commanding ground. Guns were camouflaged and located usually in caves or tunnel entrances, which greatly restricted their traverse. In some cases the enemy was able to evade our direct fire by pulling the gun well to the rear of the cave or tunnel after firing several rounds.

Japanese 20mm dual-purpose guns also were emplaced on high ground and were used principally against ground targets.

Lessons Learned.

For antiaircraft units lacking in combat experience, a brief refresher course in ground fire methods prior to an operation will

improve their efficiency. Such training should be held under joint antiaircraft and field artillery supervision.

If antiaircraft units are to be increasingly employed in their secondary role, the ratio between the types of ammunition and fuzes in the antiaircraft unit of fire should be revised. Some white phosphorous ammunition is necessary as the impact burst of the high velocity projectile is difficult to observe, and the proportion of initial rounds lost is high. The allowance of M43 (air burst) fuze is excessive for ground needs and a higher proportion of M48 (impact) and concrete piercing (CP) fuzes is required if the full capabilities of the weapon are to be realized.

Many advantages accrue from the operation of chemical mortars under artillery control; duplication of missions is avoided, fires from both type weapons (artillery and chemical) throughout the different zones can be coordinated, and the danger of obscuring important targets by mortar smoke is reduced to a minimum.



A Japanese 75mm gun (type 38 improved) emplaced in the mouth of a cave on BAGBAG RIDGE, CEBU, to fire on targets to the north and northwest of CEBU CITY.



The same position from the rear indicates the Japanese method of withdrawing the gun into the tunnel after firing to protect it from counterbattery fire.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY REPORT

General.

Enemy air activity during the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations was limited to one sneak raid on the CEBU CITY area by a lone fighter which dropped a single bomb, causing no damage. Our antiaircraft artillery did not open fire.

Antiaircraft Artillery in Ground Support.

In both operations, antiaircraft artillery was extensively employed in its secondary role, supporting infantry by direct and indirect fire. For this purpose one 90mm antiaircraft gun battalion was assigned to each task force to provide fire support of heavier caliber against installations beyond the range of the 40mm guns and .50 caliber machine guns already attached. The 739th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and the 470th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (less Batteries C and D) were assigned to the Victor-I Operation. The 746th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and the 478th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (less Batteries C and D) were assigned to the Victor-II Operation.

Throughout the operations, infantry action was characterized by company attacks on narrow fronts against enemy strong points consisting of pillboxes and caves connected by trenches and tunnels. The advance of our troops against these fortifications was difficult and costly.

As the possibility of enemy air action became more remote each day, the task force commanders decided to employ antiaircraft artillery in a ground support role, and the gun units were immediately attached to the infantry and the field artillery for this purpose.

Use of 90mm Guns: Two methods were used to employ 90mm guns for ground support. The first method placed the antiaircraft weapons under the control of the field artillery commander for use in battalion mass fires in which direct fire was employed. In this type of antiaircraft assignment, the antiaircraft units conducted

their own fire direction center, but the field artillery assigned targets, conducted surveys, and furnished forward observers.

In the second method, individual 90mm guns were attached to infantry battalions and were employed in direct fire against pillboxes, caves, troop concentrations, and strong points. (Guns used in this manner were commonly called "90mm sniper guns.") They were emplaced close to the front lines and were fired at ranges of 500 to 5,000 yards. The elbow sights of the gun were used for aiming, and in no case was it necessary to use more than three rounds to hit any target. Since their dispersion is small, 90mm guns are well suited for this type of fire. Spotters used the gun sight, field glasses, battery commander's telescope, or the height finder for spotting. One unit destroyed 44 pillboxes with an average ammunition expenditure of 15 rounds on each emplacement. The same unit fired at 55 caves and demolished 49 of them, with an average ammunition expenditure of 24 rounds for each cave.

It was found necessary to dig in gun positions for 90mm guns. Bulldozers, when available, were brought up to do this work; at night the guns were towed inside the local perimeter.

Automatic Weapons: The automatic weapons unit (consisting of the 40mm Bofors and .50 caliber quadruple machine guns) were assigned the mission of giving direct support to the advancing infantry, destroying enemy emplacements, harassing troop concentrations, and engaging targets of opportunity. Ranges were from 400 to 2,000 yards. Targets were assigned by a liaison officer present at the anti-aircraft artillery position. Communications were maintained with the infantry forward command post and the field artillery forward observer. The normal types of fire control for automatic weapons were used.

Due to the frequent moves and difficult terrain on CEBU, only the forward area sights and computing Weiss sights were used. On NEGROS, director control was used entirely. Results of fire were excellent with all types of fire control equipment. Most units

preferred to leave the directors behind in order to reduce the amount of equipment at the front lines.

Radar: The gun laying Radar SCR-584 was employed to good advantage. One was used on CEEU for air warning with the automatic weapons battalion. Another was used in forward areas to detect enemy positions, but this met with only limited success because numerous signals were picked up which could not be distinguished. One set used for surveys proved accurate to within 30 yards.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned.

Operation as Field Artillery: The 90mm gun battalions should be prepared to carry out the complete field artillery role including operation of the fire direction center, surveying, maintaining liaison with the infantry, and providing forward observers. Since the normal radio set issued to antiaircraft artillery units does not operate on the frequencies used by the field artillery and infantry, a radio set that will permit communication between these arms should be issued to antiaircraft units which are assigned ground support missions.

Emplacement of 90mm Gun: A D-7 bulldozer is desirable as a prime mover when this weapon is used as a "sniper gun." In addition to being capable of hauling the gun over rough terrain, the bulldozer is useful in preparing gun positions quickly. For protection against enemy infiltration, all sections should carry an ample supply of barbed wire, sand bags, and hand grenades.

Fire Control: Because dispersion is negligible when the 90mm gun is used for direct fire, absolute precision of adjustment is necessary for effective results. The M48, M71, and M78 fuzes were used with the 90mm ammunition. The M48 point detonating fuze set at delay (.05 seconds) and the M71 fuze were effective against fortifications built of logs, coral, or crushed rock, while the M78 concrete-piercing fuze, because of its .15 seconds delay, was best against caves cut into rock.

Firing Against Concealed Enemy: In the destruction of enemy forces in the dense rain forests of NEGROS, 90mm air bursts were highly effective, and the use of smoke or white phosphorous shells facilitated the registration of fire in heavy vegetation or rice paddies.

Employment of Automatic Weapons: The rapid fire of the 40mm gun was found to be impracticable against ground targets because of the excessive smoke produced. Twenty rounds per minute, single shot, proved to be a satisfactory rate of fire.

Because it is more durable, the forward area sight is better suited than the Weiss sight when automatic weapons are used in direct support of infantry troops.

A gun shield should be adopted as standard equipment for the 40mm gun to provide greater protection for personnel.

AIR-GROUND INFORMATION CENTER REPORT

Victor-I Operation.

For the Victor series of operations, the Air-Ground Information Center, under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, was composed of 12 officers and headed by an Air Corps officer.

Its functions were to aid in planning air support, to collect and disseminate information of the air situation to ground units, to keep the supporting air units informed of the ground situation, and to coordinate the air effort in support of army operations. In the Victor-I Operation, liaison with the air forces was maintained by attaching a ground liaison officer to each of the following headquarters: Thirteenth Air Force, 13th Fighter Command, Marine Air Group 14, and Marine Air Group 12. These officers aided in planning air support, briefing and interrogating pilots, and furnished air information to the Air-Ground Information Center, which acted as a clearing house during the operations.

The Thirteenth Air Force, reinforced by units of the Fifth Air Force, supported the Eighth Army in the seizure of the PANAY and NEGROS OCCIDENTAL areas. The Fifth Air Force continued the air offensive over the southern and central PHILIPPINES, maintained air control over the SULU SEA, and denied movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies to the PANAY-NEGROS area. They also provided tactical aerial reconnaissance and photography, supplied fighter protection for convoys and naval task forces, supplied support aircraft parties, and provided close air support during landings and subsequent ground operations.

Initial plans provided for indirect air support by the neutralization of all enemy airfields in the VISAYAN GROUP and for day and night fighter cover in addition to direct support from attack bombers on air alert during the early part of the operation. The plans also provided for a support air observer to be



Marine fliers drop napalm bombs on Japanese positions concealed in dense vegetation on NEGROS.



Liaison team of the 22d Marine Air Group directs a strike against enemy strong points in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL.

airborne during daylight hours. Additional support aircraft could be requested of the Thirteenth Air Force through this observer. All combat air patrol planes were directed to report to the support aircraft controller upon the termination of scheduled patrols for possible support missions.

PANAY: Operations on PANAY presented no unusual air activities except the dispatch of two L-4 planes to guerrilla held fields for reconnaissance missions in the objective area.

NEGROS OCCIDENTAL: Preparatory air strikes were delivered by planes of the 307th Bombardment Group (Heavy) prior to 29 March, when the 40th Division landed on NEGROS. Fighter cover and attack bombers were on air alert for immediate close support, and an airborne observer was provided for these missions. Heavy bombers for the operation were furnished to the air assault force by the 309th Bombardment Wing of the Fifth Air Force. Control ashore was assumed by the 15th Support Aircraft Party at 1410 on 30 March.

In contrast to the PANAY phase of the Victor-I Operation, activities on NEGROS called for an extensive use of support aircraft. Ground action was supported not only during the initial assault, but throughout the operation. Close air support of the ground units was reinforced by the maximum use of patrol and other aircraft whose ammunition, bomb loads, and fuel had not been expended on their primary missions. More aircraft than could otherwise have been furnished were consequently available, particularly on days when higher priority had been given to other southern PHILIPPINE operations.

The following types of aircraft were engaged in this phase: A-20's, P-47's, P-38's, P-40's, P-61's, F4U's, B-25's, B-24's, and one PBV. On 15 April, 108 aircraft, including 36 B-24's, prepared the way for a general advance. This was the largest number used on any one day. During the operation, from 40 to 90 sorties were flown daily.

Aircraft lost to enemy antiaircraft fire over the target area included four A-20's. One B-24 (with support air observer) was also lost for reasons that could not be determined.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned.

This operation clearly showed the need for maintaining a backlog of targets suited for assignment to pilots reporting in from other missions. Air sections serving with ground units should make a special effort to compile this backlog. Ground liaison officers serving with air units should be particularly alert to request close support missions by combat air patrols. Mission briefings giving the general locations, frequencies, and call signs should be available in advance for all flights able to provide such additional support.

Victor-II Operation.

The Thirteenth Air Force, with attachments, was designated to support the Victor-II Operation. (The Fifth Air Force was also available for additional air support, if requested.) The Thirteenth Air Force supported the operation by:

- (1) Providing aerial reconnaissance and photography of the CEBU-BOHOL-NEGROS ORIENTAL areas as required by the Commanding General, Eighth Army, and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.
- (2) Providing air cover for naval task forces and convoys.
- (3) Providing support for the landing and subsequent operations as arranged with the Commanding General, Eighth Army, and the Commander, Allied Naval Forces.

The mission of the Thirteenth Air Force, in conjunction with the Allied Naval Forces, was to deny the movement of hostile reinforcements and supplies to the CEBU-BOHOL-NEGROS ORIENTAL areas. For air support following the landing, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, authorized direct communication between the Commanding General, Americal Division, and the Thirteenth Air Force. Communication was provided by the 114th Support Aircraft Party (later redesignated the 28th Support Aircraft Party) which was attached to the Americal Division by the 7th Tactical Air Communications Squadron, Thirteenth Air Force. In addition to forwarding air support requests to the Thirteenth Air Force, the

support aircraft party provided voice communication with supporting aircraft, furnished them target data, and directed them on the target.

Forward aircraft control teams from the 592d Joint Assault Signal Company were made available to the Americal Division but were not used initially due to the misconception that they were to work only with naval aircraft.

CEBU: At the start of the operation, an artillery officer of the Americal Division flew over the area in a B-24 as a support air observer in order to furnish ground information (friendly and enemy) to the division.

As the operation progressed, deficiencies in air support became apparent. The first corrective step taken was the replacement of the artillery officer by an experienced forward aircraft control officer of the 592d Joint Assault Signal Company. Being a rated Air Corps observer, he was authorized to direct aircraft on the target. When supporting aircraft reported in to the support aircraft party, they were turned over to this control officer who directed them to targets which could not be designated by observers on the ground. Whenever possible, artillery smoke was used to mark targets. Targets for air strikes were designated by the division through the support aircraft observer, or were selected by the airborne forward aircraft control officer by visual observation. As the support aircraft observer was based (with the B-24) on SIMAR, his knowledge of the ground situation in the operational area was limited.

On E plus 11, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, received a message from the Commanding General, Americal Division, stating that he was not getting sufficient air support and that air support facilities were inadequate due to lack of forward aircraft control teams. The Air-Ground Information Center assigned a higher air support priority to the Americal Division and detailed an officer

from the Eighth Army air section to CEBU to observe and report on air support. Five additional forward aircraft control teams from the 592d Joint Assault Signal Company were sent to the Americal Division. However, as the radio equipment of three of the teams was damaged by salt water, only two teams were able to operate.

During this phase, the effectiveness of air support was limited both by the rugged terrain, which reduced ground observation and made targets difficult to hit, and by the fact that enemy positions were largely underground. However, the bombing did start several landslides which buried many Japanese.

Prior to the landing, and during our operations, a support aircraft party was furnished to the guerrilla forces operating on CEBU. This party directed strikes on the northern part of the island and was of much assistance to the guerrillas. At one time the army operators were withdrawn and the equipment was operated by guerrillas. As the pilots were unable to understand the guerrillas clearly, the army operators were reassigned to these duties.

BOHOL: The Japanese force on BOHOL, estimated at 300 was confined to the TAGBILARAN area by guerrilla forces. Air strikes prior to our landing had destroyed much enemy material. After the landing of the 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on 11 April, the Japanese scattered to the interior hills and presented no targets for air attacks.

NEGROS ORIENTAL: The 164th Regimental Combat Team, less the 3d Battalion, landed on NEGROS ORIENTAL in the vicinity of LOOC, north of DUMAGUETE, on 26 April. By this time, air support was operating smoothly. Air preparation and support of the operation were effective and nothing unusual was encountered by the Air-Ground Information Center.

Lessons Learned.

The difficulties encountered during this operation indicated the need for extensive training in the technique of air support on the part of all concerned, the participation of the Air-Ground Information Center in planning, and the need for Army supervision during the operation to insure proper coordination of air support.

These deficiencies should be remedied by:

- (1) Providing adequate training in air support.
- (2) Insuring that all available means for obtaining and transmitting target data are used.
- (3) Selecting proper targets and their adequate designation and marking.
- (4) Employing sufficient aircraft consistent with the number of available remunerative targets.
- (5) Requiring prompt assessment of air strike results and rapid transmission of this information to supporting air units.
- (6) Insuring that ground information is obtained by interrogation of pilots and transmitted to the ground unit concerned.

The functions of the Air-Ground Information Center cannot be performed properly unless adequate radio communication is provided. Organization of the air support system under the provisions of War Department Training Circular No. 30, dated 19 June 1945, will result in great improvement in the air support of future operations.

SIGNAL REPORT

The missions of the Army Signal Officer for the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were assigned in General Headquarters Operations Instructions No. 93, dated 22 February 1945, and No. 94, dated 2 March 1945. Details for the accomplishment of the missions were contained in Annex 5 to Field Order No. 21, Headquarters, Eighth Army, dated 1 March, and Field Order No. 23, Headquarters, Eighth Army, dated 7 March.

On 2 March, a meeting on the Victor-I Operation was held at the office of the Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, to discuss communication plans. Representatives from the following headquarters were present:

General Headquarters	Seventh Fleet
40th Division	Task Force 78.3
Thirteenth Air Force	Eighth Army
Far Eastern Air Force	

On 9 March, two representatives of this section attended a conference at the office of the Chief Signal Officer, General Headquarters, to discuss signal communications for the Victor-II Operation. The conference was attended by representatives from the following headquarters:

General Headquarters	Far Eastern Air Force
Americal Division	Seventh Fleet
2d Engineer Special Brigade	Amphibious Group No. 8
542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment	Combat Aircraft Service Unit Amphibious Group No. 8
Thirteenth Air Force	

At this conference decisions were reached in regard to the call signs and radio frequencies to be used in the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations. These conferences were followed by the publication, on 10 March, of Signal Operations Instructions 31-7, allocating radio frequencies, and Signal Operations Instructions 33-7, establishing fixed call signs for all units concerned.

The division signal officers were briefed on the signal communication requirements and close liaison was established and maintained between this section and the division signal officers through-

out the planning stages of the operations. Considerable effort was necessary to divide responsibilities between the engineer special brigade and joint assault signal company in order to avoid duplication of effort and to achieve maximum use of both type units.

No problems of training, transportation, staging, or mounting of troops for the Victor-I Operation were encountered by this section since the XI Corps and the Sixth Army were responsible for staging and mounting. In the Victor-II Operation, follow-up calls to the transportation office were necessary to move certain signal troops to LEYTE from various locations.

Schedules for safehand airplane courier service for the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were drafted at a conference held at Headquarters, Far Eastern Air Force. Eighth Army letter, subject: "Temporary Safehand Airplane Courier Service to the Victor-I Area," dated 9 March 1945, and letter, Headquarters, Eighth Army, subject: "Temporary Safehand Courier Service to the Victor-II Area," dated 14 March 1945, set up temporary safehand airplane courier service to the respective objective areas.

Codes were distributed in the usual manner to units engaged in the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations. The distribution of Filipino guerrilla codes involved a considerable amount of work by the personnel of the signal intelligence section as minute photographic copies of these guerrilla codes were received from General Headquarters with an insufficient number of copies for complete distribution. Arrangements were made to have microfilmed codes enlarged by the 832d Signal Service Battalion Photo Section. This permitted easy reading under adverse conditions in the field and consequently eliminated extra work and serious delays in the delivery of these codes. Geographical locations pertaining to the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were requested from units concerned for inclusion in the Geographical Supplement to Combined Assault Code CCBP-0130-D14.

Operational and resupply requisitions for the operations were prepared and placed on New Guinea Base Section. Necessary steps

were taken to determine on what vessels equipment would be loaded and various signal section representatives made checks to assure that operational signal supplies arrived in ample time to permit units to perform their missions.

Conclusions.

As in the past, these operations again demonstrated the necessity for the early selection and assignment of signal units to army or task force headquarters in order to establish liaison missions for the completion of planning, training, staging, and mounting.

Routine supply procedures were found inadequate, necessitating constant checks by the signal supply officer. Because no army signal depot company was provided this headquarters, it became necessary to use personnel of the signal section for that purpose.

In operations in which elements of both joint assault signal companies and engineer special brigades are involved, the coordination of task force planning between these units with regard to the establishment of beach communications is essential.

IV. G-4 REPORT

All units in the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations were equipped with full allowances of individual and organizational equipment except that vehicles were limited to 75 per cent of the number prescribed by tables of equipment. Protective covers and organizational clothing, excluding individual protective clothing, were taken.

Fifteen day's supply of Classes I, II, and IV (except engineer), three units of fire for combat units, and one unit of fire for service units were carried with the initial lifts. Engineer Class IV supplies were furnished as required but, as no new airfield construction was contemplated, it was not necessary to take large quantities. Preparations were made for the repair and extension of existing airstrips on PANAY, NEGROS, and CEBU.

Resupply for a period of 30 days was automatically furnished each operational force by using San Francisco Port of Embarkation ships, supplemented by smaller craft from Base K, LEYTE. At the expiration of this period, resupply was maintained by requisitions on Base K.

Each force was to operate an Eighth Army supply point in its area and maintain a 30-day level of supply of all classes except Class V and engineer Class IV. Engineer Class IV supply was limited to actual requirements; ammunition to three units of fire for combat units, and one unit of fire for service units.

For the purpose of discussion of the execution of the plans, the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations will be handled separately.

Victor-I.

The 40th Infantry Division, at the time of its selection for the Victor-I Operation, was engaged in action against the enemy on LUZON under the control of the Sixth Army. It was withdrawn from combat, equipped, staged, and mounted from the LINGAYEN area of LUZON. Other units comprising the force were staged by the Eighth Army on the islands of MINDORO and LEYTE.

The mounting of all units was accomplished efficiently. The landing near TICBAUAN, 12 miles west of ILOILO, was effected at 0900, 18 March, without enemy opposition. The beachhead was extended the first day and the unloading of supplies and equipment progressed without delay. Landing ships (tank) started beaching at 1500 and unloading began a short time thereafter. By 0800, on 19 March, unloading was completed and all supplies had been moved to the dump areas, approximately one-half mile inland. The dumps were well dispersed and supplies efficiently stored.

The area selected for the storage of maintenance supplies was a rice paddy. No natural cover or concealment was available in the dump area. However, no supplies were lost through enemy action. The supply dumps were moved forward to the city of ILOILO and concentrated in that area as soon as the tactical situation permitted. A paved highway paralleled the southern shore of PANAY and was used as the main supply route to support the movement of troops in the advance on ILOILO.

The docks and piers at ILOILO were not materially damaged either by bombings or enemy demolitions. The warehouses along the water front, however, had been burned, but sufficient storage space remained to permit the warehousing of the maintenance supplies for the task force. The dock area was cleared sufficiently to allow the unloading of the resupply ships upon their arrival on 25 March.

The second phase of the Victor-I Operation involved the destruction of the enemy forces on NEGROS. Troops for this operation were staged from ILOILO and landed on NEGROS on 28 March. The supply of this force was effected from the Eighth Army supply point at ILOILO through the use of fast supply boats and smaller craft.

No difficulties were encountered in supplying either phase of the operation until a shortage of balanced rations arose when a resupply ship arrived with only a ten-day supply of fruits, vegetables, and juices. Before this shortage was discovered, it was too late to

furnish these items by water shipment. Supplies were flown from Base K to NEGROS for a period of ten days to meet the emergency.

Small quantities of rice were found in ILOILO and distributed to guerrillas and civilians. Engineer equipment which had been abandoned by the enemy in the dock area was used to repair local utilities.

Victor-II.

The Americal Division was withdrawn from mop-up operations on the islands of LEYTE and SAMAR late in March. It was equipped, staged, and mounted under the direction of the Eighth Army. Loading began on 16 March from the CARIGARA-PINAMAPOAN area on LEYTE. The landing on the east coast of CEBU ISLAND south of CEBU CITY was effected on 26 March. The beach was heavily mined, and this condition delayed the unloading of supplies until the area could be cleared. By 28 March, CEBU CITY had been captured and the dock facilities were available for the handling of five Liberty ships at one time. Two Liberty ships were berthed and unloading started on 29 March. Supply installations at that time were moved from the landing beach to CEBU CITY. Resupply was effected according to schedule.

A good roadnet radiating from CEBU CITY facilitated the supply of the operation. No supply difficulties were encountered except that a general shortage of artillery ammunition in the theater limited expenditures throughout the operation.

Operations were conducted by the Americal Division on the islands of BOHOL, MACTAN, and in NEGROS ORIENTAL. CEBU CITY served as a base for the staging and supplying of troops involved in these operations.

Supply point facilities at CEBU CITY were taken over by Base S, United States Army Services of Supply, on 15 June.

ENGINEER REPORT

General.

The following major engineer units were committed in the Victor-I and Victor-II operations:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Area of Operations</u>
115th Engr C Bn	PANAY-NEGROS
52d Engr C Bn	CEBU
57th Engr C Bn	CEBU
865th Engr Avn Bn	CEBU
239th Engr Cons Bn (less Co A)	PANAY-NEGROS
161st Pcht Engr Co	NEGROS
542d Engr B & S Regt (less Cos B & C)	PANAY-CEBU-NEGROS
1459th Engr Maint Co	PANAY-CEBU-NEGROS

Intelligence.

Prior to the operation, relief models of the ILOILO area on PANAY and the CEBU CITY area on CEBU ISLAND (scale 1:1,700) were constructed and delivered to the respective task force commanders.

An initial intelligence summary and several supplements were issued for each operational area. Pre-invasion intelligence was sufficient and accurate with the exception that photographic interpretation did not reveal the full strength of the beach defenses at TALISAY on CEBU ISLAND. The collection and dissemination of engineer intelligence during the course of the operations was excellent.

Planning.

Prior to the VISAYAN campaign, a pamphlet entitled "Notes for Eighth Army Force Engineers" was prepared in order to assist the force engineers in planning for their operations and in accomplishing their assigned missions.

Advance information on the operations was obtained by informal liaison with the engineer planning section, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, on 11 February 1945. This information permitted the preparation of detailed plans before the receipt of the Operations Instructions, on 26 February. Engineer construction studies for each operational area were prepared immediately to provide a basis for detailed planning by the force engineers. Special lists of engineer equipment and construction materials were pre-

pared and requisitions submitted. After all available data had been collected, the engineer unit commanders scheduled to participate in the campaign were assembled for orientation conferences. At these conferences, the commanders were provided with all available intelligence information on the objective areas, the engineer construction requirements, and a suggested plan for accomplishing the engineer missions.

Engineer annexes to the Eighth Army field orders and administrative orders were prepared one day after the receipt of the operations Instructions from General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific area.

Obstacles.

The beach and the roads in the CEBU beachhead area were heavily mined with aerial bombs and artillery shells, fuzed with standard contact detonators. Concrete pillboxes, antitank ditches, dragons' teeth, and coconut post obstacles ("asparagus beds") were utilized by the enemy in an elaborate defense system. The failure of the enemy to defend these obstacles by fire nullified their tactical value. However, there was some delay in passing these obstacles because our forces had failed to provide sufficient engineer troops and equipment in the assault waves.

In the other operational areas little difficulty was encountered in passing scattered and poorly camouflaged obstacles.

Combat Engineering.

The combat engineers succeeded in providing and keeping open the main supply roads required in all of the operations, although the problems seemed insurmountable at times. On NEGROS, where at least one non-divisional battalion should have been provided to support the operations, only one construction company was available.

The combat engineers constructed 20 miles of combat roads on CEBU, five miles on PANAY, and 30 miles on NEGROS. These roads, often constructed under fire, traversed difficult terrain where the road gradients were commonly 30 to 40 per cent. Bridge construction

included: 15 major bridges on CEBU with a total length of 585 feet; four major bridges on PANAY with a total length of 125 feet; and three major bridges on NEGROS with a total length of 225 feet. In addition to these major bridges, each operation required the construction or strengthening of numerous bridges of less than 30-foot span.

In the CEBU operation, combat engineers removed over 2,000 mines of all types. In each of these operations, numerous caves, pillboxes, and road blocks were destroyed by demolition.

Construction.

The following major construction projects were directed by Administrative Orders accompanying Field Orders Nos. 21, 23, and by paragraph 4 of Field Order No. 27, Eighth Army Headquarters, dated 1, 7, and 24 March 1945, respectively:

- (1) Rehabilitation of one existing airfield for transport planes in each of the following locations: PANAY, CEBU, and NEGROS ISLANDS.
- (2) Provision for 10,000 barrels of petroleum storage and construction of a tanker jetty at ILOILO, PANAY.
- (3) Provision for 48,500 barrels of petroleum storage and construction of a tanker jetty at CEBU CITY, CEBU.
- (4) Rehabilitation of existing wharves and docks at PULUPANDAN on NEGROS, ILOILO, and CEBU CITY.

The rehabilitation of the MANDURRIA strip at PANAY was completed by G plus three (21 March). At CEBU the original plan was to rehabilitate LAHUG strip in the early phases of the operation, but, because of enemy action, this could not be undertaken. OPON strip on MACTAN ISLAND was therefore selected for early rehabilitation. This strip was placed in operation on E plus seven (2 April). The rehabilitation of LAHUG airdrome was completed on E plus 36 (1 May). All of the existing airfields on NEGROS were so badly bombed that it was decided to construct an entirely new one near BACOLOD. Because of unsatisfactory soil conditions, considerable engineer effort was required in hauling gravel to form a suitable base. The BACOLOD strip was finally placed in operation on Y plus 30 (29 April).

All existing petroleum storage installations at PANAY and CEBU were damaged so severely by bombing that none of them could be repaired during the tactical phase. Plans were revised to provide for the erection of new tanks.

On PANAY, the ILOILO Mission Hospital was adequate to fulfill most of the hospital requirements. Mess halls and officers' quarters were the only buildings constructed. An entire new hospital installation was constructed at CEBU CITY.

Rehabilitation of existing docks and wharves was accomplished with minimum effort and consisted primarily of clearing rubble and underwater obstructions.

In addition to the construction projects directed, the following facilities were provided:

- (1) On CEBU, three ice plants, with a total production of eight tons, were reconditioned; the CEBU Portland Cement Plant was rehabilitated; a 3,172-kilowatt electric power plant was reconditioned; and 1,000,000 square feet of covered storage was provided.
- (2) On PANAY, 74 miles of narrow-gauge railroad were reconstructed; two ice plants, with a total production of six tons, were reconditioned; a 3,000,000-gallon per day water system was rehabilitated; and 500,000 square feet of covered storage was provided.
- (3) On NEGROS, a 125-kilowatt electric power plant and an ice plant of three tons capacity were rehabilitated.

Supply.

The overall estimate of types and quantities of engineer supplies for these operations proved to be unusually accurate.

Engineer supplies were transported to the objective area on fast supply boats and Liberty ships loaded at bases in the theater. Sufficient quantities of engineer supplies, including materials and equipment for rehabilitation of dry weather airfields and for construction of ports and storage facilities, arrived on schedule. Most engineer materials were provided from NEW GUINEA stock; however, timber, lumber, and dock hardware were supplied from LEYTE. The initial shortages were negligible and were covered by the block-loaded resupply ships which had been assigned to support this

campaign.

The only engineer supply difficulties encountered were the transloading and issuing of supplies and equipment in preparation for the operation. The vessel, "Keith Vawter," which was scheduled to arrive at LEYTE long before the assault troops loaded out for the operations, had been delayed at ENIWETOK. This vessel carried assault and pioneer supplies, and Bailey bridges which were to be transloaded on assault shipping. It required determined and persistent effort to insure the arrival of the vessel in time to discharge the needed cargo. The vessel, "Golden Gate," which carried most of the engineer equipment needed by the engineer units loading out of LEYTE, had not been discharged rapidly enough to allow the units sufficient time to fill their equipment shortages. By procuring a high priority on the discharge of the vessel and exercising constant supervision, the unloading was accelerated sufficiently to enable the troops to receive the equipment prior to their departure.

Maps.

Prior to the operation, initial map coverage was completed for all anticipated objective areas and distribution was made to units involved. As the campaign on NEGROS ISLAND progressed, the enemy withdrew into the north central mountains, well outside the area for which large-scale map coverage was available. Numerous uncontrolled mosaics were obtained to provide the necessary map coverage of that area.

Lessons Learned.

Personnel specially trained to clear beach obstacles should be landed in the early waves of an amphibious operation.


All arms participating in an operation should be instructed to avoid unnecessary destruction of public utilities and communications facilities which might be used later by our units.



In some places on NEGROS partially demolished bridges could be repaired...




... in others, new bridges had to be constructed.




In CEBU CITY a crane of the 542d Engineers demolishes the walls of an unsafe building.



Landing Ships, (Tank) nose up to ramps built with concrete rubble which was available in great quantity in demolished CEBU CITY.



The 865th Aviation Engineer Battalion resurfaces LAHUG AIRSTRIP on CEBU.



A dozer of the 57th Engineer Combat Battalion clears a demolished Japanese truck from the right of way.



The network of combat roads on CEBU is pushed across the mountains . . .



. . . and through the valley of the island's interior.

QUARTERMASTER REPORT

General.

Victor-I Operation.

Quartermaster plans for the Victor-I Operation were initiated on 15 February 1945, and after the customary staff discussions and recommendations, the quartermaster plan was published on 1 March as Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 7.

The 40th Division Quartermaster was made responsible for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of all quartermaster activities in the objective area.

The following quartermaster units were provided to support the overall troop strength of 14,194:

- 40th QM Co
- 3315th QM Trk Co (with atchd 3336th QM Serv Det)
- 1st Platoon, 569th QM Rhd Co
- 396th QM Refrigeration Detachment (mobile)
- 1st Platoon, 316th QM Bakery Co
- 234th QM Laundry Platoon (type B)
- 101st QM Graves Registration Platoon (less one section)

Victor-II Operation.

Quartermaster plans for the Victor-II Operation were initiated on 19 February, and were published on 2 March as Annex No. 2 to Administrative Order No. 8.

The Americal Division Quartermaster was made responsible for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of all quartermaster activities in the objective area.

An officer of the Quartermaster Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army, was made available as assistant division G-4 and departed for duty with the Americal Division on 18 March, returning on 22 April.

The following quartermaster units were provided to support the overall troop strength of 19,584:

- 3521st QM Trk Co (with atchd 3368th QM Serv Det)
- 1st Platoon, 248th QM Depot Supply Co
- 410th QM Refrigeration Detachment (mobile)
- 4th Platoon, 123d QM Bakery Co

354th QM Laundry Platoon (hospital)
1st Section, 1st Platoon, 3875th QM Gas Supply Co.
110th QM Graves Registration Platoon (less one section)

At CEBU, the 125th Quartermaster Company, 110th Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon (less one section) and 20 men of the 354th Quartermaster Laundry Company began debarking on E-Day, three and one-half hours after H-Hour, and all units were ashore by H-plus eight hours.

Operations conducted to seize BOHOL, NEGROS ORIENTAL, and adjacent small islands were carried out by the Americal Division, and this section took no separate action in regard to them.

Supply.

Victor-I Operation.

The quartermaster plan prescribed that troops would take with them a 15-day supply of Class I, II, III, and IV. Class I supplies were to include seven days' "10-in-I," two days' "K," and one day's "D" ration. In addition, a 15-day supply of special hospital ration packs was prescribed on the basis of one unit of 200 rations per day for each clearing company, one unit for each section of a field hospital or the equivalent for an evacuation hospital when acting in lieu of a field hospital. The plan also required that a 30-day level of all classes of quartermaster supplies be maintained. Resupply plans provided that one standard block-loaded resupply ship stocked with Classes I, II, III (except for V-80 gasoline and diesel fuel), IV, and PX supplies for 30,000 men for 20 days would be called forward to arrive by G plus four. Each ship was to be loaded with 102,500 gallons of V-80 gasoline and a like amount of diesel fuel. Further resupply for Class III was to be effected by the arrival of 4,500 drums of V-80 gasoline and 200 drums of diesel

fuel on G plus four. In addition, a floating reserve of 44,000 gallons of V-80 gasoline and 22,000 gallons of diesel fuel in drums was maintained by United States Army Services of Supply to be moved forward on call. Issue of V-80 gasoline and diesel fuel was made by drums.

A ten-day supply of Class I for 50,000 men was held available for emergency aerial supply on call. An emergency supply of aviation gasoline was also maintained at the airstrip in the objective areas.

Timely requisitions for all quartermaster items required beyond the amount projected were to be submitted to Base K, United States Army Services of Supply (LEYTE).

Quartermaster supply dumps were established at ILOILO on PANAY, and BACOLOD on NEGROS.

On 23 May, a 7,500 cubic feet refrigeration barge arrived for use in storing perishables.

On 17 May, authorized levels of supply were increased to permit a 60-day level of Class I on hand and enroute, in order to maintain a 30-day level at all times. A 45-day supply of Class II was authorized so as to maintain a minimum of 15 days' supply on hand.

Victor-II.

The quartermaster plan prescribed that troops take with them a 15-day supply of Class I, II, III, and IV. Class I supplies were to include seven days' "10-in-1," two days' "K," and one day's "D" ration. In addition, a 15-day supply of special hospital ration packs was prescribed on the basis of one unit of 200 rations a day for each clearing company, one unit for each section of a field hospital, or the equivalent for an evacuation hospital when acting in lieu of a field hospital. The plan also required that a 30-day level of all

classes of quartermaster supplies be maintained. Resupply plans provided that one standard block-loaded resupply ship, stocked with Classes I, II, III (except for V-80 gasoline and diesel fuel), IV, and Post Exchange supplies for 30,000 men for 20 days, would be called forward so as to arrive by E plus four.

Further resupply of Class III was to be effected by the arrival of 6,000 drums of V-80 gasoline and 700 drums of diesel fuel on E plus four. In addition, a floating reserve of 42,000 gallons of V-80 gasoline and 21,200 gallons of diesel fuel in drums was maintained by United States Service of Supply for movement forward on call. Issues of V-80 gasoline and diesel fuel were made by drums.

Timely requisitions for all quartermaster items required beyond the projected amount were to be submitted to Base K. Emergency requisitions during the period of E-Day to E plus 15 were submitted to Eighth Army Headquarters and, after E plus 15, to Base K.

Seven amphibian trucks (DUKW's) mobile loaded with Class I supplies were called for by the beachmaster on E-Day at H plus three and one-half hours. Rations were unloaded and the Class I dump was established on GREEN BEACH. Class III supplies were likewise called forward and a dump was established.

On E plus two, as resupply ships arrived and were unloaded, supplies were taken directly to the permanent warehouses and dumps which were assigned in CEBU CITY. Issuance of supplies continued from GREEN BEACH dumps until E plus ten, at which time transportation was available to move all supplies to warehouses in CEBU CITY.

The city offered excellent possibilities for a base and a recommendation was made to the chief quartermaster that one be established there at the earliest practicable date. Many skilled civilians

including clerks, stenographers, warehousemen, and even typewriter repairmen, were found.

On 17 May, authorized levels of supply were increased to allow 60 days of Class I on hand and enroute so that the quantity actually on hand would not fall below a 30-day supply. A 45-day supply of Class II was authorized, with the quantity on hand not to fall below a 15-day supply.

On 28 May, a 7,500 cubic feet refrigeration barge arrived for use in storing perishables.

The situation with reference to the receipt, storage, and issuance of civilian supplies was confused initially because responsibility was divided among the division G-4, the division quartermaster, and the Civil Affairs Unit. This was remedied by a conference of the officers concerned, and measures of cooperation were agreed upon.

Victor I.

United States Armed Forces ILOILO Cemetery No. 1 and United States Armed Forces BACOLOD Cemetery No. 1 were established. At the close of the operation, these cemeteries contained 43 and 370 graves, respectively.

Victor II.

Although the Americal Division was provided with a combat-experienced graves registration unit, considerable difficulty was encountered in obtaining properly prepared records from them. This was the first operation in this theater for the graves registration unit and they apparently felt that procedures used by them in the Pacific Ocean Area would meet requirements for the Eighth Army. As a result, many minor details of graves registration records were not prepared according to the Eighth Army Standing Operation Procedure provided for the unit. Approximately 40 per cent of all records received by this headquarters had to be returned for one or more

corrections.

On 15 June, custody of United States Armed Forces CEBU Cemetery No. 2 was transferred to Base S, Armed Forces Western Pacific, with 447 graves.

Lessons Learned.

In this operation, as in others, the combat units carried only a small amount of supplies with them. This made it necessary for quartermaster service units to debark promptly in order to establish dumps and begin the issue of supplies in the midst of the unavoidable confusion incident to a beachhead operation. To correct this deficiency it is recommended that:

- (1) All units take with them a five-day supply of rations (one "D" and one "K" ration with the individual and three emergency "C," "K," or "10-in-1" rations in unit supply) in order to be self-sustaining until bulk supplies can be unloaded, segregated, and issued.
- (2) Gasoline tanks of all vehicles should be completely filled and a reserve carried to avoid the necessity of drawing from bulk supply soon after landing.
- (3) Responsibility for the receipt, storage, and issuance of civilian supplies should be invested in the representatives of civil affairs units involved. All supplies shipped to civil affairs units should be clearly marked to distinguish them from army supplies.
- (4) Prior to and during an operation, graves registration units as well as combat units must be instructed in prescribed War Department procedures and the standing operating procedure of the command under which they operate.

ORDNANCE REPORT

Troops.

The ordnance support for the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations was furnished by the following units:

Victor-I

740th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company (40th Division)
259th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
184th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Detachment, 558th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (tank)
Detachment, 611th Ordnance Ammunition Company
Detachment, Team 5, 3073d Ordnance Composite Company

Victor-II

721st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company (Americal Division)
106th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company
183d Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad
Detachment, 558th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company (tank)
Detachment, 578th Ordnance Ammunition Company
Team 5 (less one detachment) 3073d Ordnance Composite Company

Ammunition.

The ammunition plan for both operations was essentially the same. Initial supply was set at three units of fire for combat troops and one unit of fire for service elements. An automatic re-supply of two units of fire was loaded on a Baltic coaster for each operation and arrived, in both cases, eight days after the initial landings. If additional supplies became necessary, they were to be obtained by requisition.

Because of ammunition shortages and the necessity for conserving available stocks for the Victor-V Operation, it was necessary to impose restrictions on the use of critical items during these operations. For a short period, daily expenditures of ammunition were limited to 18 rounds per weapon for 105mm howitzers, seven rounds for 155mm howitzers and 12 rounds for 81mm mortars. On 16 April for Victor-I and on 7 May for Victor-II, these restrictions were changed to a daily allowance of one-tenth unit of fire for each weapon. On 27 April, when all restrictions on Victor-I were lifted with the changing situation, it was found that they had not seriously affected the operation. In the Victor-II Operation, however, it is believed that while the restrictions did not affect the operation,

the total amount of ammunition expenditures was reduced.

Class II and IV.

The plan for Class II and IV supply for both operations was the same. A 15-day supply was specified as the initial level and a 30-day supply was to be attained and maintained by automatic resupply and requisition. This headquarters provided a 30-day automatic resupply.

Comments.

No unusual ammunition problems were encountered in the Victor-I Operation, and supply was efficiently handled by the 611th Ordnance Ammunition Company.

The 259th Ordnance Medium Maintenance Company employed several capable civilian mechanics to work in their own shops. In addition, the ordnance company operated a civilian garage, using Filipino mechanics who worked under the general supervision of ordnance personnel. This garage repaired a number of civilian vehicles which were on the island. As gasoline was not available for civilian use, these vehicles were leased by the army and helped to alleviate a critical transportation shortage.

In the Victor-II Operation, the 578th Ordnance Ammunition Company did superior work. After CEBU CITY had been secured, ammunition could be discharged directly from the ships to the dock, greatly reducing the time and labor involved. An unusual ammunition dump was set up at CEBU CITY utilizing box cars on the inoperative railroad to store ammunition. The cars provided protection from the elements. Safety precautions were taken by dispersing the cars throughout the railroad yards.

Lessons Learned.

Active follow-up on requisitions is necessary to insure that required quantities of ammunition are properly loaded on resupply ships. In future operations, where resupply ships are to be loaded

within the theater, a qualified ammunition officer should be designated to check and supervise this loading.

In order to utilize all local facilities, plans should be made for the salvage and repair of civilian vehicles which can be adapted to military use.

All dunnage brought ashore should be collected at some point for use in ammunition dumps. In the early stages of an operation, it is frequently necessary to place ammunition dumps in extremely muddy locations. As time seldom permits the search for dunnage locally, all available lumber used as dunnage on assault shipping should be brought ashore promptly for ammunition storage purposes.

CHEMICAL WARFARE REPORT

Victor-I Operation.

Chemical units involved in the Victor-I Operation consisted of Company B, 80th Chemical Battalion, a ten-man detachment from the 272d Chemical Service Platoon, and two men from the Chemical Warfare Technical Intelligence Team No. 1. Except for the technical intelligence personnel, who operated under the supervision of the division chemical officer, no augmentation of the division chemical section was necessary. Prior to the operation, this section requested that an entire chemical service platoon be attached to the division, but because of the shortage of such platoons only a ten-man detachment was allotted by General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area.

Offensive chemical warfare weapons used by ground forces consisted of 4.2 inch mortars, M1A1 flamethrowers, and chemical smoke grenades. During the operation 66 per cent of the colored grenades that were used were red, as it was found that the red smoke was more visible from the air.

Thirty-one per cent of the ammunition expended by the 4.2 inch mortars was white phosphorous. The unit-of-fire table authorized only 20 per cent white phosphorous, but the amount expended did not greatly exceed the 27 per cent figure recommended by this headquarters for a new unit-of-fire table. The mortar company preferred the heavy M4 high explosive shell (now substitute standard) because of its additional destructive effect on foliage.

As previous operations in the Philippines indicated that no toxic agents would be used by the enemy, defensive chemical warfare equipment and expendable supplies taken on this mission were held to a minimum.

Reports prior to the operation indicated that large amounts of toxic gas were stored in NEGROS OCCIDENTAL. The findings of the chemical technical intelligence personnel completely disproved this report. No substantial quantities of enemy chemical warfare

material were discovered, and there were no indications of Japanese intent to wage offensive gas warfare.

Victor-II Operation.

Chemical troops involved in the Victor-II Operation were Company A, 80th Chemical Mortar Battalion, a detachment of ten men from the 184th Chemical Service Platoon, and the Commanding Officer of Chemical Warfare Technical Intelligence Team No. 1.

Offensive chemical weapons used in this operation were M2-2 flamethrowers, 4.2 inch chemical mortars, and incendiary and smoke grenades. A request was made by the division chemical officer for a white smoke grenade which would function on impact, to be used by L-4 planes for marking targets for air strikes. Australian grenades (M77) would have been satisfactory, but they were unobtainable, so bottles of "FS" smoke were furnished instead. Red smoke, because of its greater visibility from the air, was used far more extensively than any other color. Approximately 77 per cent of the colored smoke grenades used were red.

Before this operation the mortar company was short of vehicles, but no attempt was made to correct this condition by requisition while on CEBU. As a result, necessary transportation was still lacking when the company departed for the Victor-V Operation.

There was no indication of Japanese preparations for offensive gas warfare, and no appreciable quantities of enemy chemical supplies were found.

Recommendations.

Because red smoke was more visible, red smoke grenades were in greater demand than other colors. It is therefore recommended that the allowance of red grenades be doubled and the allowance of other colors be reduced by 25 percent.

Company officers in mortar battalions should be thoroughly trained in supply matters to insure proper maintenance of prescribed levels of supply during the long periods of separation from battalion headquarters.

MEDICAL REPORT

General.

Since the Victor-I and the Victor-II Operations were separate actions, no joint medical support was provided for hospitalization and evacuation. Medical activities for each action, therefore, will be considered separately.

Victor-I Operation.

The non-divisional medical units employed in direct medical support of the 40th Division (less one regimental combat team) and the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment were:

- 37th Field Hospital
- 20th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 21st Portable Surgical Hospital
- 34th Malaria Control Detachment
- 65th Malaria Control Detachment
- 33d Malaria Survey Detachment
- 403d Malaria Survey Detachment
- 637th Medical Clearing Company (Separate) (less one platoon)
- Detachment, 506th Medical Collecting Company (Separate)
- Detachment, Company B, 262d Medical Battalion (2d Engineers Special Brigade)
- Surgical Team, 51st General Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 54th General Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 334th Station Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Detachment L-5 litter type aircraft, Fifth Air Force (eight planes)

In support of assault troops making the initial landing on PANAY, 19 March 1945, were the 20th Portable Surgical Hospital (attached to the 185th Infantry Regiment), the 637th Medical Clearing Company (less one platoon), Company B, 262d Medical Battalion, and the 33d Malaria Survey and 65th Malaria Control Detachments.

Medical units in support of assault forces in the initial landing on NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, 29 March, included the 21st Portable Surgical Hospital (attached to the 160th Infantry Regiment), the 37th Field Hospital, the 34th Malaria Control Detachment, the 403d

Malaria Survey Detachment, and a detachment of the 506th Collecting Company. One battalion of the 160th Infantry and a platoon of the divisional clearing company remained on PANAY. Also making the same landing, but mounted from PANAY, were the 20th Portable Surgical Hospital, 33d Malaria Survey Detachment, 65th Malaria Control Detachment, and a detachment of Company B, 262d Medical Battalion. The portable surgical hospitals were established first on the landing beaches to provide surgical care for the initial casualties. Later, as the beachhead was extended, these hospitals supported the divisional and separate clearing companies. The detachment of the 506th Collecting Company was established initially in the vicinity of the landing beach and provided temporary hospitalization and ambulance service. Later, the collecting detachment was moved forward and established in close support of the combat elements.

The malaria control and survey detachments carried out the usual function of insect control. Company B, 262d Medical Battalion, was established on the beach and served as an evacuation hospital for casualties en route to LEYTE. The 37th Field Hospital came ashore several days after the initial landing and was established in the NEGROS OCCIDENTAL Provincial Hospital, BACOLOD.

On 4 April, when the 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team was committed, the 20th Portable Surgical Hospital, reinforced by a surgical team, was attached to the regiment. Since the campaign on NEGROS was virtually completed by 9 June, the 33d Malaria Survey and 65th Malaria Control Detachments moved on that date to ILOILO, PANAY. They were followed on 16 June by the 37th Field Hospital which was established in a reconditioned civilian hospital. The 637th Clearing Company (separate) replaced the 37th Field Hospital at BACOLOD.

The three surgical teams previously mentioned were used to reinforce the surgical service during the campaign. Those of the 51st General Hospital and the 334th Station Hospital were employed with the 37th Field Hospital, while the team from the 54th General Hospital served with the 637th Clearing Company. All three surgical teams had been returned to their parent organizations by the end of the operation.

Hospitalization and Evacuation.

There were no problems in the hospitalization and evacuation of patients in the Victor-I Operation. Initial casualties were light and facilities for hospitalization were ample at all times.

Evacuation: The Commanding General, Eighth Army, was responsible for effecting coordination with the commanders, Allied Naval Forces and Allied Air Forces, for the evacuation of casualties by naval assault craft and air transport to MINDORO or LEYTE. A 30-day evacuation policy to LEYTE was established early in the operation.

The initial casualties during the landings were evacuated to LEYTE on landing ships (tank) specially equipped for this purpose. Evacuation from PANAY to LEYTE was accomplished by air while evacuation from NEGROS was accomplished first by L-5B aircraft to PANAY and by C-47's from PANAY to LEYTE. Daily requests for evacuation to LEYTE were coordinated with the Thirteenth Air Force.

Hospitalization: In this operation no evacuation hospital was available and a field hospital was therefore substituted. All minor casualties were treated in clearing stations while the more serious cases were hospitalized and treated in the field hospital. The surgical teams were invaluable in providing skilled surgical treatment for the wounded. Provisions were made for the construction of a 100-bed fixed hospital, tented, (with huts) on PANAY, but after landing it was found that an existing civilian hospital could be reconditioned for this purpose.

Health Problems.

An epidemic of infectious hepatitis occurred among 40th Division

troops on NEGROS and PANAY, reaching its peak in the month of April. Despite increased efforts in insect control and improved sanitation, the epidemic remained relatively uncontrolled. It is believed that these cases may have originated in the CLARK FIELD, BAM-BAM, FORT STOTSENBERG area on LUZON, where the division had been engaged during the month of February. Flies and filth beyond description were encountered there, as the Japanese had made no effort to construct latrines and garbage pits or to bury their dead. This initial lack of sanitary control was probably a contributory factor in bringing on the epidemic. Venereal disease among 40th Division troops also rose sharply. Wherever possible, cases were treated with penicillin on a duty status. Contact records were made on all cases and infected contacts were apprehended and given treatment until all traces of infection had disappeared.

Supply.

The division established a medical supply point in an existing building in ILOILO. No significant supply problems were encountered. The division had a 15-day supply when it arrived in the operational area. Requisitions for a 30-day resupply were prepared by this section and forwarded to Base K, LEYTE. Further resupply was provided by block-loaded ships, one of which arrived in the operational area on 25 March (G plus seven). Emergency radio requisitions for items such as whole blood, penicillin, biologicals, and other critical items were forwarded by the division to Base K with information copies to this headquarters. In the majority of cases, delivery was accomplished within a matter of hours by the use of evacuation planes bound for the operational area, or by the use of Eighth Army courier planes.

One hundred and sixty pints of whole blood were carried into the operation by assault troops of the division. Since the Sixth Army had mounted these troops it had furnished the original supply of blood. In addition, 1,424 pints of whole blood were flown to the division during the operation, making a grand total of 1,584 pints.

During the latter phase of the operation, the 52d and 53d

Infantry Regiments (Philippine Army) were activated on PANAY and NEGROS, respectively. Requisitions covering medical supplies and equipment for these organizations and attached service units were prepared by the 40th Division, edited by this headquarters, and filled by Base K. Shipments were made to supply officers of the regiments concerned.

Victor-II Operation.

The non-divisional medical units used in direct support of the Americal Division (less one regimental combat team) were:

- 58th Evacuation Hospital
- 59th Station Hospital
- 10th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 17th Portable Surgical Hospital
- 52d Malaria Control Detachment
- 40th Malaria Survey Detachment
- 670th Medical Clearing Company (separate)
- 399th Medical Collecting Company (separate)
- Detachment Company B, 262d Medical Battalion, 2d Engineer Special Brigade
- Nurses, 172 Station Hosp
- Detachment 75th Medical Depot Section
- Two surgical teams, 174th Station Hospital (four officers and twelve surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 155th Station Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical Team, 172d Station Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 334th Station Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 361st Station Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 118th General Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 126th General Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 133d General Hospital (two officers and six surgical technicians)
- Surgical team, 168th Evacuation Hospital (one officer and six surgical technicians)

The medical units accompanying the assault troops during the initial landing on CEBU, 26 March, were the 10th and 17th Portable Surgical Hospitals and a detachment from Company B, 262d Medical Battalion. The 10th Portable Surgical Hospital was attached to the 182d Infantry Regiment, while the 17th was attached to the 132d Infantry Regiment. The 58th Evacuation Hospital did not land on E-Day because its landing ship (tank) was unable to beach due to sand bars. The following day the vessel attempted to beach and grounded on a sand bar, necessitating the unloading of personnel and equipment by land-

ing craft (mechanized). The unit was assigned a bivouac area northwest of PARDO. The following day the hospital set up a surgery ward with three operating tables in the PARDO church. A complete X-ray unit and nine completely equipped wards were set up under tents on the church grounds. On 30 March the number of wards was increased to 15, utilizing all available areas in the vicinity of the church. Three surgical teams were assigned and assisted in the care of the patients. Due to the limited space, a reconnaissance was made to locate a more suitable site. Three days later the hospital was moved to CEBU CITY and established in the Anti-Tuberculosis Society Hospital.

The portable surgical hospitals continued to operate in close support of their respective regiments. The detachment of Company B, 262d Medical Battalion, was established near TALISAY beach and acted as a holding hospital for casualties evacuated on the hospital landing ship (tank). Later it moved to a building in CEBU CITY.

The divisional clearing company, which landed shortly after the assault, functioned as an evacuation hospital on the beach, and on 29 March three surgical teams from the 58th Evacuation Hospital were assigned to provide surgical treatment. As soon as the 58th Evacuation Hospital became established in CEBU CITY, serious casualties were evacuated there for treatment. The surgical teams from the 58th Evacuation Hospital were returned and replaced by three of the separate teams which were attached to the 58th Evacuation Hospital. The skill and judgement of these surgical teams saved many lives and prevented numerous casualties from becoming permanently disabled.

The 670th Clearing Company, on arrival in the operational area, set up near the landing beach and later moved to a school building in CEBU CITY. Its principal function was the hospitalization of minor casualties and convalescents.

The 399th Collecting Company landed on 2 April. It established a collecting station in support of the combat elements and furnished ambulance service wherever required.

The 40th Malaria Survey and 52d Malaria Control Detachments

which also landed on 2 April assisted in the general insect control program.

On 7 April a new landing was made by the 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry, on BOHOL. It was supported by the 670th Clearing Company (less one platoon) which joined the parent unit on 20 April. On 26 April, the 164th Infantry (less one battalion) supported by the 670th Clearing Company (less one platoon), landed near DUMAGUETE, NEGROS ORIENTAL. This medical unit was reinforced by two surgical teams.

The first fixed hospital to operate in this campaign was the 59th Station Hospital which arrived in CEBU CITY on 11 June. It was located in newly constructed, prefabricated buildings in CEBU CITY. On 15 June, the 59th Station Hospital and the 75th Medical Depot Section, which had arrived in the area 20 April, were placed under control of Base S.

Hospitalization and Evacuation.

Evacuation: The Commanding General, Eighth Army, was charged with the responsibility for effecting the coordination of the evacuation plan with the commanders, Allied Naval Forces and Allied Air Forces, and for the evacuation of casualties by naval assault craft and air transport to MINDORO or LEYTE. A 30-day evacuation policy to LEYTE was established at an early date.

The Commanding General, United States Army Services of Supply, provided 500 bed credits on LEYTE as of E-Day and additional bed credits as required. The initial casualties were evacuated to LEYTE on a Navy hospital landing ship (tank). No further evacuation was made by water. A critical shortage of hospital beds made it necessary on several occasions to reduce the 30-day evacuation policy to as low as ten days. In the early phases of the operation, seriously wounded patients were evacuated from CEBU by air in PEY's. After MACTAN ISLAND was secured, the OPON airstrips was utilized for evacuation by C-47 planes. Patients were transferred from CEBU to MACTAN by landing ship (medium) and held overnight in a holding station

established by Company B, 262d Medical Battalion, 2d Engineer Special Brigade, for evacuation the following day. Later in the campaign, when the LAHUG airstrip on CEBU became operational, patients were transported directly to LEYTE by C-47's. Effective 10 May, a daily schedule of evacuation was established. Three L-5B aircraft were detached from the PANAY-NEGROS operation for island evacuation and proved invaluable in evacuating casualties from the BOHOL and DUMAGUETE areas.

Hospitalization: During the first three days of the operation, clearing stations, which provided the only hospitalization in the area, were taxed to capacity. Although hospitalization, messing facilities, and personnel for patient care were insufficient, the presence of competent surgical teams insured the best possible professional care under the circumstances. An ample number of hospitals was provided for the operation but they did not arrive early enough to meet the initial emergency. The 58th Evacuation Hospital in particular should have been established at an earlier date. Nevertheless, when it was set up, its normal capacity was increased more than 100 per cent.

Health Problems: Many men of the Americal Division were hospitalized with infectious hepatitis during April and May 1945. As in the case of the 40th Division, the onset of this disease was without doubt caused by the great amount of filth and contamination from flies to which Americal troops were unavoidably exposed during previous operations.

Malaria was moderately prevalent during the campaign. This disease had been practically non-existent in pre-war CEBU. Occupation of the island by the Japanese, the influx of malarious civilians from other islands, and the presence of American troops who came from highly malarial areas probably resulted in the greater seeding of malaria parasites in the anopheles mosquitoes. Relaxed atabrine discipline accounted for much of the increased malaria rate among the troops.

In the latter part of the campaign, venereal disease also became a problem, and control measures similar to those in PANAY and NEGROS were instituted.

Supply.

Directives for initial supply and resupply were the same as those used in the Victor-I Operation. In the initial landing, Americal Division troops carried in 192 pints of whole blood. Additional amounts required were subsequently requested by radio from Base K. Information copies of these requests were submitted to this headquarters. A total of 2,648 pints was received by the Americal Division during this operation.

On 15 June all supply responsibility for CEBU was assumed by Base S, Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) established on that island.

Conclusions.

Medical service was adequate in both the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations. In the Victor-II Operation, however, the medical units were not employed to their greatest advantage. Certain units were not in operation for several days, resulting in the evacuation of a large number of the patients during the early phases. Shortages of personnel, both in officers and enlisted men, was a constant problem. For example, the 40th Division arrived in the Victor-I target area lacking ten medical officers. This and other similar situations were met and partially alleviated by placing surgical teams, made up of medical officers and enlisted technicians, on temporary duty where they were most urgently needed. These teams were drawn from units which were either not operating at full capacity or which were inactive.

Immediate repair of captured airfields to make them operational at the earliest practicable date is desirable, not only for tactical reasons but also for purpose of evacuation and supply.

Because troops engaged in combat are almost constantly exposed to all kinds of filth, disease-carrying flies, and malarial vectors,

it is imperative that atabrine discipline and sanitation measures be rigidly enforced.

It was found that direct requests to the issuing base expedited deliveries of supplies to the units placing requisitions. In each instance information copies of requisitions were forwarded to this headquarters.

Lessons Learned.

In order to provide definitive treatment to casualties in the early phases of combat and reduce the evacuation from the area to a minimum, medical service must be carefully planned so that medical units will be placed in operation at the earliest practicable date.


The practice of utilizing surgical teams in areas where the greatest number of casualties have been incurred facilitates expert surgical attention in the shortest time for those seriously wounded. Such a procedure allows task force surgeons greater flexibility in the rendition of their services.

The L-5B litter type plane, because of its ability to land on and take off from restricted areas, has proved itself admirably suited for the rapid evacuation of seriously wounded casualties from forward areas, especially where such areas are not readily accessible by road. The use of these planes for the evacuation of casualties was undoubtedly responsible for saving many lives and alleviating the suffering of the wounded.

Air evacuation from operational areas to rear bases is preferable to other methods because the travel time is cut to the minimum, and maximum comfort is afforded the patient. It is therefore recommended that L-5B litter type planes be provided in sufficient numbers to meet the demand for evacuating the wounded.



A wounded paratrooper on NEGROS is helped toward the battalion aid station.



Filipino litter bearers evacuate American casualties down a precipitous slope on CEBU.

V. TRANSPORTATION REPORT

The Eighth Army Transportation Section functioned during the Victor-I and Victor-II Operations principally in coordinating amphibious loading and air and water resupply operations. This was accomplished through the use of Navy amphibious shipping, Army Air Force planes, United States Army Services of Supply fast supply vessels, and heavy cargo ships. An experienced officer of this section was attached to each task force for liaison purposes.

Victor-I.

Initial Phase: To lift the 40th Division, reinforced, (less one regimental combat team), from LINGAYEN GULF, LUZON, to the objective area, 15 landing ships (tank), ten landing ships (medium), and 12 landing craft (infantry) were allocated. The selective loading of the assault shipping on the near shore was completed on schedule due to excellent advance planning. This enabled the landing craft to be expeditiously discharged on the far shore, thereby aiding the tactical plan. A satisfactory beach area, an excellent road net, and a well coordinated beach control system facilitated the discharge of personnel and cargo.

Because of the excellent port facilities at ILOILO the supply point for the operation was located there. A sheltered anchorage was available for five large cargo ships and the reinforced concrete dock was ready for immediate discharge of one Liberty type ship. Berths along the concrete wharves located on the banks of the ILOILO RIVER were also available for numerous small ships, landing craft, and barges.

A track was laid by the Philippine Railroad, PANAY Division, along the wharves and from ILOILO north to CAPIZ. By 6 May 1945, the railroad was placed in operation as a civilian enterprise. Rehabilitation was accomplished by former employees and a company of guerrilla engineers, with technical advice and assistance rendered by the 239th Engineer Construction Battalion.

The railroad was of military value only insofar as it transported food products to the cities, thereby reducing greatly the shipping that would otherwise have been required for civilian relief by the Philippine Civil Affairs Units.

Operations on NEGROS.

The amphibious movement from PANAY to PULUPANDAN, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, on 29 March, was successful due to efficient coordination between the 185th Regimental Combat Team and the naval units involved. A sandbar offshore prevented the beaching of landing ships (tank); consequently they were discharged in midstream by lighterage.

One platoon of the 803th Amphibious Truck Company was mobile loaded with the howitzers of a field artillery battalion and debarked from landing ships (tank) in the stream. When the pieces were emplaced, the trucks reverted to the control of the beachmaster for lighterage. The offshore approach was sufficiently steep for all other landing vessels to beach and no difficulties were encountered by the amphibious craft in retracting. Bulldozers were necessary to haul vehicles through a 50-yard strip of loosely packed sand on the beach. An excellent road net was available and division supply dumps were established in coconut groves 200 to 400 yards inland.

A reinforced concrete pier 400 yards north of the beach was repaired within 48 hours after the landing and was available for unloading supply vessels and barges. It was connected with the two-lane, concrete road paralleling the west coast of NEGROS. The bridge over the BAGO RIVER was two-lane, but all others were single lane. The rated capacity of all bridges on the road leading north to BACOLOD was 35 tons.

The road net and storage facilities in BACOLOD were excellent. A reconnaissance of the city waterfront revealed that facilities for landing craft (medium) were available and that other port facilities including landing beaches and several small jetties for barge discharge were adequate to supply the operation.

Resupply by Water Transportation.

A schedule of heavy shipping was prepared by the Transportation Section. This schedule included all the resupply requisitions of the various supply services. The requisitions were listed according to the loading port with deadweight tons and ship tonnage. The tonnage of the resupply shipping was only 11,840 deadweight tons and was lifted by four fast supply vessels, two Liberty type ships, and one Baltic coaster. One of the Liberty ships was a standard block-loaded resupply vessel. The Baltic coaster lifted two units of fire loaded for selective discharge. Extra shipping space that was available on the second Liberty type vessel was also used to good advantage by loading for selective discharge.

The resupply vessels rendezvoused at LEYTE. Naval escorts were not available to escort individual ships, consequently all resupply vessels were put into one convoy which arrived at ILOILO on G plus four. Stevedore gear was deck-loaded to insure facilities for discharge.

Two fast supply vessels, loaded with aviation gas, motor fuel, and oil were available as floating reserves in addition to the shipping shown above on schedule of heavy shipping. Class III resupply was available to the division commander on call, but as the need did not arise, the vessels were assigned to another operation.

One J-barge, deck-loaded with bridge timber, arrived at ILOILO on 22 March and a refrigeration barge arrived on 26 April.

The combined tonnages of the heavy shipping schedule and the date requirement for cargo discharge indicated that a daily discharge rate of 800 deadweight tons would be necessary. Forty landing craft (mechanized) and 25 amphibious trucks (DUKW's) were made available to insure the accomplishment of this discharge rate. For the period 1-10 April the average daily discharge weight was 766 deadweight tons, which reflected the accuracy of the calculations made. The excellent

port facilities plus the employment of adequate and well-organized civilian labor, enabled the waterfront to be operated throughout the campaign without a serious backlog at any time.

Thirteen 400-ton barges were captured and used in discharge operations and later in the resupply of NEGROS. The barges were towed by landing craft (infantry) as tugs were not available.

A fast supply vessel was secured and assigned to the division for supply of outlying points and the movement of cargo from ILOILO to NEGROS.

The Eighth Army Transportation Officer and a naval officer who was a former official of the Luzon Stevedoring Company, arrived in ILOILO on G plus eight to organize civilian labor to operate the waterfront. The naval officer had been familiar with the port facilities prior to the war and was acquainted with a number of the former dock foreman and stevedore bosses. The former civilian waterfront supervisors were easily located and were eager to resume port operations. Suitable numbers of civilian stevedores and dockhands were hired through the Philippine Civil Affairs Unit. Three civilian supervisors, former employees of the local stevedoring company, were released from a Japanese internment camp on LUZON just prior to this operation and were flown to ILOILO. Through the efforts of these and other civilians the entire waterfront was under complete civilian operation by G plus 15. The employment of civilians relieved all troops of port operations.

The following statistics substantiate the successful execution of the transportation plan:

- (1) In the initial phase of the operation 14,194 troops, 2,052 vehicles, and 17,553 deadweight tons were lifted on amphibious shipping.
- (2) The tonnage of resupply cargo for the operation totalled 57,516 deadweight tons.
- (3) After the amphibious lift, troop movements to the division totalled 906 casualties and 2,052 replacements.

Air Transportation.

Small shipments of critical supplies were transported by the Eighth Army safehand courier plane from LEYTE to the 40th Division on LUZON prior to the departure for the Victor-I Operation. Beginning on G-Day, 18 March, the air division of the Transportation Section coordinated aerial resupply with the air forces to lift personnel, equipment, supplies, and mail from LEYTE to PANAY. A PBV plane was initially used for the operation from G-Day to G plus 20, operating from the bay in the vicinity of ILOILO. After the assault landing on NEGROS ISLAND on 29 March, the plane also made landings on the water in the vicinity of PULUPANDAN POINT, NEGROS.

On G plus 20, ILOILO AIRFIELD was placed in operation and the PBV plane was replaced with a C-47.

On 5 May, United States Army Services of Supply assumed control of the safehand courier plane service. Cargo was loaded by the 13th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron on planes of the 322d and 54th Troop Carrier Wings and on unscheduled planes operating from LEYTE airstrips. This system was generally satisfactory. In addition, when staff officers requested air transportation on extremely short notice, they were transported in some instances in L-5 planes, made available by the Civil Affairs Section or the Field Artillery Section of Eighth Army Headquarters.

The total weight shipped by air transportation in the Victor-I Operation was 83,679 pounds, divided as follows:

- 175 persons with baggage (40,000 pounds)
- 3,055 pounds Whole Blood
- 20,000 pounds Mail
- 120 pounds Radar Equipment
- 260 pounds Chemical Warfare supplies
- 1,021 pounds Engineer supplies
- 5,000 pounds Guerrilla supplies
- 2,972 pounds Medical supplies
- 5,588 pounds Ordnance supplies
- 998 pounds Quartermaster supplies
- 800 pounds Psychological Warfare pamphlets
- 2,400 pounds Currency
- 380 pounds Signal equipment
- 985 pounds Personal baggage

Victor-II Operation.

Initial Phase: The following amphibious shipping was allocated to lift the Americal Division, reinforced, (less one regimental combat team) from LEYTE to CEBU:

4 High speed transports (APD's)
17 Landing ships (tank)
11 Landing ships (medium)
10 Landing craft (infantry)

Loading began on 16 March, and the target date (E-Day) was set for 25 March. Ideal weather conditions and a satisfactory loading beach on the near shore assisted operations. The division had been relieved from combat duty only three days prior to the assault loading, and because of the limited time available, the beachmaster experienced difficulties in coordinating the efficient use of labor and equipment and the loading of units which were being regrouped and re-equipped. No time was available to slot supplies in the vicinity of the beach. A one-day delay in the completion of loading was caused by the late arrival from ZAMBOANGA of Company B (less one platoon) of the 658th Amphibious Tractor Battalion. The convoy departed at 0700 on 24 March and the target date was changed to 26 March.

Intelligence reports indicated very shallow water at the unloading beach in the objective area. This headquarters secured three Navy pontoon causeways (three cubes wide and 19 cubes in length) which were lifted to the objective area on the sides of landing ships (tank). When the landing craft ran aground about 150 feet offshore the three landing ships (tank) discharged over the pontoon causeways. Landing vehicles (tracked), landing craft (mechanized), and amphibian trucks (DUKW's) were utilized to lighter personnel and cargo ashore from the remaining vessels which were discharged in the stream. The beach was heavily mined, but after it was cleared its condition permitted the expeditious movement of cargo from small landing craft to segregated supply dumps. The roads were in excellent condition and created no motor transportation problem after mines

had been removed.

A survey of the port facilities in CEBU CITY revealed that a large sheltered anchorage was available in the harbor, and the piers, wharves, and quays were in excellent condition with one exception; Pier No. 3 was not usable due to bomb damage and nearby sunken wrecks. It was determined that five Liberty ships and numerous small vessels could be docked for immediate discharge. Submerged wrecks were marked with buoys and those hazardous to navigation were removed within two weeks. A stone jetty was converted for use in discharging landing ships (tank) and smaller craft. On MACTAN ISLAND, across the strait from CEBU CITY, piers capable of handling small ships were used to load personnel and cargo which had been air-lifted from LEYTE to MACTAN for subsequent movement by water to CEBU. A marginal railroad, inoperative because of bomb damage, was located near the dock area in CEBU CITY. Within a short time it was repaired and placed in operation providing transportation facilities from CEBU CITY to DANA0.

Mr. C. John Martin, an American civilian who had resided in CEBU CITY for a number of years prior to the war, was located and assigned to this headquarters prior to the operation. He was the president of the CEBU CITY branch of the Philippine Stevedoring Company. Mr. Martin conferred with the division staff prior to the loading and gave them invaluable information concerning beaches, roads, terrain, waterfront facilities, and many other details not available from intelligence studies.

Mr. Martin landed with the assault echelon, and was hailed as a hero and leader by the civilians of Cebu. Within ten days he organized former waterfront personnel and took over the complete operation of the waterfront, thus relieving all troops for other duties.

Arrangements were made for the payment of the civilians through a Philippine Civil Affairs Unit.

Resupply by Water Transportation.

A schedule of heavy shipping was prepared which included all resupply requisitions together with complete logistics for the operation. The requisitions, totalling 13,341 deadweight tons, were segregated at the loading port. Vessels of appropriate capacities were not available; therefore some shipping space was sacrificed. Most of the extra space was utilized by loading for selective discharge. The above cargo was lifted by two liberty type vessels, one "Y" or "Dutchman" type, and one Baltic Coaster. One of the Liberty vessels was a standard block-loaded resupply ship. The other Liberty ship carried general cargo from Base K. The "Dutchman" lifted general cargo, mostly engineer supplies, from New Guinea bases. The Baltic coaster carried two units of fire loaded for selective discharge. Cargo lifting gear was deck-loaded on resupply vessels scheduled to arrive early in the operation.

A potential discharge rate of 1,500 deadweight tons per day was established for CEBU CITY. Since the state of repair of waterfront facilities could not be definitely determined prior to landing, 40 landing craft (mechanized) and 25 amphibious trucks (DUKW's) were made available to insure adequate lighterage. The need for a 1,500 deadweight ton discharge rate did not develop but berth space, cargo handling equipment, egress roads, storage space, and civilian labor would have been adequate to handle cargo at this rate.

A slow tow of one J-barge, deck loaded with 60 tons of lumber, and an 80-foot fuel barge made up at LEYTE, arrived at CEBU CITY on E plus four (30 May). That same day a refrigeration barge arrived as cargo vessels began discharging at the docks. During this period the Japanese continued their harassing artillery fires from positions on the high ground northwest of CEBU CITY, shelling our ships and the dock area. Our vessels returned this fire from their docked positions.

The following statistics indicate the successful execution of the transportation plan:

- (1) In the initial phase of the operation 19,418 persons, 1,878 vehicles, and 16,419 deadweight tons were lifted on amphibious shipping.
- (2) The tonnage of resupply cargo for the operation totalled 60,708 deadweight tons.
- (3) After the amphibious lift, troop movements to the division totalled 1,357 casualties and 3,680 replacements.

Air Transportation.

The Transportation Section began coordinating aerial resupply with the air forces on E-Day. The Eighth Army safehand courier plane, a PBX, made water landings in the vicinity of CEBU CITY from E-Day to E plus 14. All space not occupied by courier and safehand mail was utilized for high priority personnel and cargo. On E plus 14, OPON FIELD on MACTAN ISLAND was placed in operation and used until LAHUG AIRFIELD at CEBU CITY was ready for operation. On E plus 14 the PBX was replaced by a C-47 and air shipments of perishables from LEYTE began. Cargo shipments were loaded by the 13th Air Cargo Resupply Squadron utilizing the planes of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing, Thirteenth Air Force. Emergency evacuation of patients from the operational area was made by air on returning supply planes.

United States Army Services of Supply assumed control of the safehand courier plane on E plus 42 (6 April.)

The total weight of air shipments for the Victor-II Operation was 336,659 pounds. Of this amount, 54,791 pounds of supplies were shipped from LEYTE to MINDORO for the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, which was later committed in the Victor-I campaign. The balance of 281,868 pounds was lifted from LEYTE to CEBU and consisted of the following:

- 241 Persons (42,240 pounds)
- 1,042 pounds Whole Blood
- 12,190 pounds Mail
- 58,409 pounds Chemical Warfare supplies
- 24,000 pounds Guerrilla supplies
- 4,335 pounds Medical supplies

91,270 pounds Ordnance supplies
30,000 pounds Perishable rations (shipped until E plus
42 when Base K assumed responsibility for shipments).
4,707 pounds Signal equipment
643 pounds Special Service supplies
620 pounds Airplane parts
600 pounds Personnel records
4,575 pounds Baggage
1,230 pounds Psychological Warfare leaflets

Lessons Learned.

The assignment of an experienced liaison officer from the Transportation Section to each task force in advance of an operation proved very advantageous. He offered assistance on technical matters to the division staffs and kept this headquarters informed of the status of loading, discharging, and port operations.

To avoid confusion and delay in slotting supplies and equipment and controlling beach operations on the near shore, task force units scheduled to load for an assault landing should be relieved from combat duties as early as practicable.

Whenever uncertainty exists as to the possibility of beaching landing craft on the far shore, pontoon causeways should be carried by the assault craft.

In order to overcome the difficulties inherent in beach operations, close coordination is necessary between the naval beachmaster and the army shore party. The use of civilian stevedore labor proved very effective and relieved service troops of many waterfront duties.

Recommendations.


To insure the availability of adequate gear for immediate discharge, it is recommended that sufficient stevedore equipment be deck-loaded on all supply vessels scheduled to arrive early in an operation.



Aerial view of CEBU CITY, showing the harbor.



Men of the 132d Infantry make a wet landing in the TALISAY-TANKE area on CEBU.



Cargo ships docked at the CEBU CITY wharf to resupply troops. Gun crews aboard the resupply ships exchanged shots with the enemy artillery in the hills in the background where the Japanese stubbornly held their main line of resistance for three weeks.



Service troops disembark from the army transport "Cape Cleave" in CEBU harbor. This ship is berthed at one of the wharves found usable when the city was captured.



North side of damaged Pier No. 2 at CEBU CITY, showing sunken Japanese vessel.



The "Michael J. Owens," first cargo ship to dock at CEBU CITY, enters its berth.

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