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By authority of: *Deputy Sec. of State, AFSC*

Date: *17 Jan 49*

Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas

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CAMPAIGN PLAN GRANITE II

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial 00071

UNCLASSIFIED

3 June 1944

(to be shown only to those who must see it for further study)

GRANITE II

1. The attached Outline Campaign Plan for operations of the Pacific Ocean Areas during 1944 and early 1945 eventually to establish forces in position to force the surrender of JAPAN has been submitted to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations in compliance with his directive. It is based on the strategic concept approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1943 and the directive contained in Joint Chiefs of Staff 713/4 of 12 March 1944.

2. The Plan is issued for the information of the major commanders concerned. Pending action by higher authority it will be utilized as a guide to long range planning. It will be used as a basis for acquiring and preparing forces; and for providing means for their logistic support.

3. The plan is not in itself a directive. Operations required will be covered by specific directives.

C. H. McMORRIS
Chief of Staff

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O. L. THORNE,
Flag Secretary.

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OUTLINE PLAN FOR OPERATIONS OF
THE PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
TO
ESTABLISH FORCES IN POSITION TO FORCE THE
SURRENDER OF JAPAN

PART I --- CONCEPT

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

To secure control of sea and air communications through the Central Pacific by isolating and neutralizing the CAROLINES and by establishment of sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea and air routes.

To extend the control of the eastern approaches to the PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA, and to establish fleet and air bases and forward staging areas for the support of operations against MINDANAO, FORMOSA, and CHINA.

To obtain positions from which the ultimate surrender of JAPAN can be forced by intensive air bombardment, by sea and air blockade, and by invasion if necessary. The ultimate strategic objective is to establish our sea and air power, and if necessary our amphibious forces, in those positions and force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

B. TASKS

1. General Tasks

To maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN.

To apply the maximum attrition to JAPAN's air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

To establish and protect sea and air communications which support the positions occupied by all our forces in the Pacific Ocean,

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2. Specific Tasks

To neutralize TRUK and other enemy bases in the eastern and central CAROLINES.

To cover and support operations in the Southwest Pacific Area.

To seize the southern MARIANAS.

To initiate bombing of JAPAN from bases in the MARIANAS.

To seize PALAU.

To occupy the MARIANAS-PALAU line.

To support the occupation of MINDANAO, and also the occupation of LUZON if such operations prove necessary.

To occupy southern FORMOSA and to establish a base on the coast of CHINA.

To support strategically the operations of the Southwest Pacific Area by covering, and by destroying or containing enemy fleet forces.

To develop sea and air communications with RUSSIA and make preparations for operations in the North Pacific in the event that RUSSIA enters the war against JAPAN.

3. Eventual Tasks

In cooperation with the Southwest Pacific Area, to establish sea and air forces in the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area.

To destroy Japanese sea communications by air, surface, and sub-surface attack.

To subject JAPAN to intensive air bombardment.

C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The conduct of operations will be designed to:

- a. Destroy the Japanese Fleet at an early date.
- b. Inflict the maximum attrition on enemy air forces.

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c. Intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication.

d. Enable us to launch shore based and carrier based air attack on JAPAN.

e. Keep CHINA in the war.

f. Insure that the sequence of operations remains flexible and that preparations are made to take any short cut made possible by developments in the situation.

g. Take advantage of the earliest practicable reorientation of forces from the European Theater.

The naval strength currently or prospectively available in the Pacific is not sufficient to carry on the operations projected for 1944 and early 1945 without careful timing. Major Southwest Pacific operations will require cover or support from units of the Pacific Fleet. Likewise, if the operations in the Central Pacific are to progress effectively, and with the momentum necessary, there must be a pooling of assault shipping and at times strong shore based air support from NEW GUINEA or the BISMARCKS. During the later phases of the campaign, strong shore based air support from CHINA will also be required.

Accordingly, close coordination must exist between the advance of the Southwest Pacific Area along the NEW GUINEA - N.E.I. - PHILIPPINE axis and of the PACIFIC OCEAN AREA westward through the MARSHALLS and the MARIANAS, and southwestward along the MARIANAS-PALAU line, and thence into the vital LUZON - FORMOSA - CHINA COAST area, not only with respect to mutual support, but also with respect to sequence and timing in order that the Pacific Fleet may always be available to contain or destroy such enemy fleet forces as threaten interference.

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CCS 417/2 of 23 December 1943 is quoted in part as follows:

"CONCEPT WITHIN THE PACIFIC"

The advance along the NEW GUINEA - N. E. I. - PHILIPPINE axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the MANDATED ISLANDS. These two series of operations will be mutually supporting. United Nations naval forces can be deployed to support successive operations along each axis, and to prevent interference by hostile surface units with simultaneous operations in the two areas. Transfer of forces and resources from one area to the other is contemplated. When conflicts in timing and allocations of means exist, due weight should be accorded to the fact that operations in the Central Pacific promise at this time a more rapid advance toward JAPAN and her vital lines of communication; the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese homeland; and, of greatest importance, are more likely to precipitate a decisive engagement with the Japanese Fleet.

The aim should be to advance along the NEW GUINEA - N.E.I. - PHILIPPINE axis and to complete the capture of the MANDATED ISLANDS in time to launch a major assault in the FORMOSA - LUZON - CHINA area in the spring of 1945 (i.e., before the onset of the typhoon season) from a distant base."

The neutralization of TRUK will be continued by aerial bombardment intensified to the greatest practicable degree, from shore bases in the MARSHALLS and the BISMARCKS, by carrier strikes and by submarine and surface attacks on supporting shipping. The neutralization of PONAPE, KUSAIE, and NAURU ISLANDS will continue. The neutralization of TRUK and the lesser positions to the eastward will eventually be completed after they have been isolated by the occupation of the MARIANAS and PALAU.

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The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS will be accomplished by an amphibious operation mounted in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, the MARSHALLS, and the SOLOMONS. The naval covering, striking, and support forces will be based in the MARSHALLS. Long range aircraft to cover the operation will be based in the MARSHALLS and staged through ENIWETOK. Long range aircraft from the BISMARCKS will support the operation by attacks on enemy bases in the CAROLINES and by reconnaissance as required.

SAIPAN and GUAM will be captured initially and their air bases activated immediately. TINIAN will then be captured. After capture, the three islands will be developed as a base for long range aircraft and for light naval forces and submarines. Staging facilities will also be developed for use in further operations.

If the strength of the expeditionary troops and supporting forces available in the forward area after the capture of the MARIANAS permits, and the strategic situation is otherwise favorable, a position in the western CAROLINES will be seized and occupied immediately in order to hasten the complete isolation of TRUK and to establish communications between the MARIANAS and ADMIRALTIES.

The seizure of PALAU will be accomplished by a major amphibious operation mounted in HAWAII and the SOLOMONS. The operation will be preceded by sustained long range air attacks against TRUK, WOLEAI, HALMAHERA, MINDANAO, and PALAU itself. The assistance of the air forces of the Southwest Pacific Area will be a dominant factor in these preliminary air attacks. Naval covering, striking, and supporting forces will be based in the ADMIRALTIES and the MARSHALLS. After capture, PALAU will be developed as a base from which to attack Japanese sea and air communications, and also as a forward staging area to support further advances into the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA, and CHINA.

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Occupation of the MARIANAS-PALAU line will be completed by the occupation or neutralization of YAP and by the occupation of ULITHI.

General strategic support of the operations of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA will be furnished by the projected operations of the Pacific Fleet and other units of the Central Pacific Force in the MANDATES, to the extent that they contain or destroy enemy naval and air forces. In addition, the operations of carrier striking forces and heavy covering forces will be timed so as to prevent enemy fleet forces from interfering with operations in the Southwest Pacific during critical periods.

The occupation of MINDANAO is expected to be initiated by the forces of the Southwest Pacific as soon as practicable after the seizure of PALAU. During the period in which the forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas are occupying the MARIANAS-PALAU line, the forces of the Southwest Pacific will have moved westward along the coast of NEW GUINEA as rapidly as availability of forces permits, assault shipping being a dominant factor in the scope of operations. It is expected that assault shipping from the Pacific Fleet will be reallocated as necessary for the MINDANAO operation, and that the Pacific Fleet units will, from positions to the eastward of SARANGANI ISLANDS cover and support the operation.

After MINDANAO has been occupied, the forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas will be prepared to undertake the seizure of southern FORMOSA and AMOY, or to support the occupation of LUZON by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on FORMOSA and the CHINA COAST.

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The occupation of LUZON, if required, will involve a major amphibious assault on the west coast of LUZON following the seizure of intermediate objectives in the Central PHILIPPINES by minor amphibious and air-borne operations. A subsidiary landing on the east coast of LUZON may also be involved. The support of such operations may involve the projection of PACIFIC FLEET units into the SOUTH CHINA SEA for covering, striking, and direct support. The establishment of sufficient beachheads may require the use of one or more amphibious corps from the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS. 023818

The occupation of Southern FORMOSA, and seizure of a base on the CHINA Coast whether undertaken prior to or following the occupation of LUZON, will involve major amphibious assaults which must be preceded by the destruction of enemy naval and air forces to a degree which permits our seizing and maintaining control of the air and sea in the area. These operations without the prior occupation of LUZON presuppose that air forces operating from the southern PHILIPPINES will neutralize the Japanese air bases in LUZON, and that our air forces operating from bases on the Asiatic mainland will effectively support the attacks.

The magnitude of the forces required for the attack on FORMOSA and AMOY will necessitate the use of widely separated mounting areas including the MARIANAS, PALAU, HAWAII, and the SOUTH PACIFIC.

The ports of FORMOSA are of such limited size that the Port of AMOY must also be seized to obtain an adequate fleet anchorage, and such a seizure becomes an integral feature of the FORMOSA operation.

The establishment of major naval and air forces in FORMOSA and AMOY will effectively sever Japanese sea communication between the EMPIRE and the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA, and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES; will increase the effectiveness of bombing operations against JAPAN; and will place our forces in position to operate along the coast of CHINA with secure sea communications.

The North Pacific Force will carry out naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet. Base facilities and defensive installations in the ALEUTIANS will be augmented in preparation for entry into the KURILES and SOVIET territory in the event of Soviet collaboration. Preparations will be made for executing very long range bombing against the KURILES and northern JAPAN. In the event of the U.S.S.R. entering the war, operations in the NORTH PACIFIC will assume greatly increased importance and may involve a major redeployment of forces.

During periods between amphibious operations, carrier striking forces will be employed to deliver destructive attacks on selected vital targets in a manner calculated to reduce enemy naval and air strength, to prepare for further operations, and to disorganize the enemy defensive preparations.

All operations will be so conducted as to maintain maximum readiness to take advantage of opportunities to bring important enemy naval forces to action.

Throughout the campaign the submarines available will be used primarily to inflict attrition on naval forces and shipping and will be diverted to scouting, observation, and rescue services only in cases of urgent necessity. However, full use of submarines will be made in coordination with other naval forces in attacks on enemy bases and on enemy naval forces.

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D. SEQUENCE AND TIMING.

The sequence and timing of operations projected for the PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, and of SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations requiring the support of major Pacific Fleet units, is tentatively set as follows:

<u>Operation</u>		<u>Tentative Target Date</u>
✓ FORAGER	Capture of SAIPAN, GUAM, and TINIAN.	15 June 1944
STALEMATE	Capture of PALAU	8 September 1944
INSURGENT.	Occupation of MINDANAO	15 November 1944
CAUSEWAY	Capture of Southern FORMOSA and AMOY	15 February 1945
INDUCTION	or Capture of LUZON	15 February 1945

The foregoing sequence and timing may be accelerated if the overall strategic situation develops in a more favorable manner than now seems likely. A major fleet action, although it may delay one operation for a brief period, will greatly accelerate those which follow.

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PART II -- OPERATIONS

A. FORAGER

ASSUMPTIONS.

That HOLLANDIA, WAKDE, the ADMIRALTIES, and EMIRAU are available as bases.

Attacks to neutralize enemy air bases at NAURU, WAKE, PONAPE and in the MARSHALLS are continuing.

That TRUK has been subjected to destructive carrier attacks and sustained bombing from bases in the MARSHALLS and BISMARCKS.

That our sea and air forces have been able to prevent effective use of TRUK by major units of the Japanese Fleet and can maintain air superiority and control of the sea in the area of operations.

PURPOSES.

To establish bases from which to:

- (a) Attack Japanese sea and air communications.
- (b) Support operations for the neutralization of TRUK.
- (c) Initiate bombing of JAPAN.
- (d) Support further advance into the PALAUS, PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA and CHINA.

To maintain unremitting military pressure against JAPAN.

To extend our control over the WESTERN PACIFIC.

TASKS.

a. Capture, occupy, and defend SAIPAN, GUAM and TINIAN and develop bases in these islands.

b. Prepare to capture, occupy, defend and develop an additional secondary base in the Western CAROLINES using forces provided for Task a.

c. Gain control of the remaining JAPANESE MARIANAS.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

The use of TRUK by major units of the Japanese Fleet is being severely limited by shore based bombing and intermittent carrier attacks.

Naval surface forces and submarines will be employed to attack the sea communications of TRUK to prevent its use as a fleet base and to prevent the adequate logistic support of its defense forces. Concurrent with the operations to deny the effective use of TRUK to the enemy fleet there will be conducted from ENIWETOK long range reconnaissance of the MARIANAS and such bombing attacks as may be found practicable. Heavy carrier attacks may be made against either or both objectives at such times as availability of forces permits and profitable targets are presented.

Preliminary operations and dispositions of amphibious forces will be such as to avoid positive indication of the objective for the operation proper.

Intensive attacks by carrier aviation and naval gunfire in direct support of the assault on the MARIANAS will commence about D-3 and will continue throughout the operation.

Assault forces will include the Fifth Amphibious Corps consisting of the 2d and 4th Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division mounted in HAWAII, and the Third Amphibious Corps consisting of the 3d Marine Division and the 4th and 22d Marine regiments (reinforced) mounted in the SOLOMONS Area. Units mounted in the SOLOMONS will effect a rendezvous in the western MARSHALLS with forces from HAWAII.

The Seventy Seventh Infantry Division will be prepared to embark in assault shipping returned to PEARL after the initial assault. The earliest estimated date of readiness for departure is D plus 25.

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The scheme of maneuver in the MARIANAS must provide for the initial capture of one or more airfields and the rapid neutralization of others in order to insure early superiority of shore based air facilities. It must also provide for the early availability of the best harbor in the area. The seizure of SAIPAN will meet the first requirement.. The seizure of the vicinity of APRA harbor will assist in meeting the first requirement and will also meet the second.

The task of seizing a secondary base in the CAROLINES will be accomplished if forces are available after completion of the capture of the MARIANAS. Its accomplishment is therefore included in the scheme of maneuver for the capture, occupation, and defense of the MARIANAS. No assault, garrison or service troops will be provided. The capture and development of an additional base if undertaken will be accomplished with ground forces not committed in the MARIANAS or forces released therefrom.

Although extension of control along the line GUAM - ULITHI - YAP - PALAU should follow the capture of the MARIANAS as expeditiously as possible, it is not included in the scheme of maneuver. It is however indicated as the most desirable employment for reserve forces not otherwise required to be committed.

The scheme of maneuver will consist of four phases as follows:

- 1st Phase - Capture of SAIPAN, activation of airfields and neutralization of TINIAN by air and artillery. Capture PORT APRA, GUAM, and the land areas which dominate it.
- 2nd Phase - Capture of the remainder of GUAM.
- 3rd Phase - Capture of TINIAN supported by shore based air from SAIPAN. This phase may be concurrent with the 2d phase.

4th Phase - (Contingent) Capture WOLEAI.

An essential to the eventual successful development of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS as a base area is the prompt and energetic initiation of special measures to clear and improve the limited anchorage areas and port facilities available in the area, and to provide such anti-submarine protection as is practicable for the anchorages.

FORCES REQUIRED

See Appendices A, B and C.

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B. STALEMATE

ASSUMPTIONS

That GUAM, TINIAN and SAIPAN have been captured and are available as anchorages and air bases.

That WOLEAI has been captured or is being neutralized..

That a fleet anchorage and air base are available at MANUS ISLAND and an air base is available at EMIRAU.

Enemy air bases at NAURU, WAKE, PONAPE, and in the MARSHALLS have been neutralized.

That TRUK has been subjected to destructive carrier attacks and sustained bombing from bases in the MARSHALLS and BISMARCKS.

That the forces of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA have secured control of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the north coast of NEW GUINEA to include GEELVINK BAY and the VOGELKOP.

That airfields are in operation on the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as BIAK.

That our sea and air forces have been able to prevent effective use of TRUK by major units of the Japanese Fleet and can maintain air superiority and control of the sea in the area of operations.

PURPOSES

To establish bases from which to:

- (1) Attack Japanese sea and air communications.
- (2) Support operations for the neutralization of TRUK.
- (3) Support further advances into the PHILIPPINES, FORMOSA and CHINA.

To maintain unremitting military pressure against JAPAN.

To extend our control over the WESTERN PACIFIC.

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TASKS.

a. Destroy or contain Japanese naval and air forces in the MANDATED ISLANDS.

b. Capture, occupy, defend the PALAU ISLANDS and develop bases in these islands.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

The initial carrier attacks on TRUK and the MARIANAS in February, followed by the bombing of TRUK, PONAPE, SATAWAN, and WOLEAI by shore based aircraft from the MARSHALLS, the BISMARCKS and NEW GUINEA, served to weaken the enemy air force in the CAROLINES. They served to destroy installations and to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air bases in the CAROLINES. They also served to prevent further use of TRUK as a base for major units of the Japanese Fleet.

The carrier attack on PALAU, YAP, and WOLEAI in late March, followed by the carrier attack on TRUK, SATAWAN, and PONAPE, together with surface bombardment of the last two objectives in early May, have served to hasten the neutralization of the enemy positions in the Central and Eastern CAROLINES. Their neutralization will be made even more effective by the cumulative effect of the sustained bombing by air forces operating from the MARSHALLS, the BISMARCKS, and eventually from the western NEW GUINEA Area.

After the occupation of the MARIANAS, followed by the occupation of the VOGELKOP, the Central CAROLINES will be cut off from the northwest and from the southwest and the line of communications via PALAU and WOLEAI will be subjected to sustained bombing at effective distances from bases in the MARIANAS and from bases in northern and western NEW GUINEA. These opera-

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tions, together with those of surface ships and submarines will effectively neutralize all enemy positions east of the line YAP-PALAU-HALMAHERA.

The use of PALAU as a fleet base ceased when the enemy forces present were driven out by the carrier attack in late March. The bombing to be initiated by the Southwest Pacific forces when the Western NEW GUINEA airdromes are ready will be intensified when the BIAK airdromes are occupied and activated. Incident to this bombing extensive photographic reconnaissance of PALAU will be accomplished. After the airdromes at GUAM are activated, PALAU will become a primary objective for the heavy bomber groups in the MARIANAS.

The seizure of PALAU will be accomplished in close coordination with the advance of the forces of the Southwest Pacific area along the NEW GUINEA-PHILIPPINES axis. If this advance involves a simultaneous movement into HALMAHERA, operations will be so conducted as to obtain a maximum of mutual support and the operations of the striking and covering forces will, in particular, be so conducted as to support both the HALMAHERA and the PALAU operations.

At the time of the assault our occupation of the MARIANAS and of western NEW GUINEA will have created a situation in which an enemy naval threat must come from the northwest passing east of MINDANAO, from the CELEBES SEA, or from the southwestward through the BANDA SEA. The routes of approach other than from the northwest can be effectively covered by searches from NEW GUINEA and from Northwest AUSTRALIA. Striking forces which attack enemy forces and bases in the DAVAO region are in suitable position to interpose against any enemy forces which

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approach from north and east of MINDANAO.

The assault on PALAU will be made by the Third Amphibious Corps, to which will be attached the headquarters and corps troops, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, the Seventh, Seventy-seventh, and Eighty-first Infantry Divisions, and the First Marine Division, with the Twenty-seventh Infantry Division in reserve. The First Marine Division will be mounted in the South Pacific. The Twenty-fourth Corps Headquarters and the three infantry divisions will be mounted in HAWAII. The Twenty-seventh Infantry Division will be held in reserve in the SOUTH PACIFIC.

The operations for the capture of PALAU will be conducted in two phases, as follows:

(a) Bombardment and Reconnaissance Phase.

(1) Continued neutralization of enemy positions in the Eastern and Central CAROLINES, and in the MARSHALLS, including WAKE.

(2) Sustained bombing of PALAU, HALMAHERA, and DAVAO from bases in Western NEW GUINEA.

(3) Intensified bombing of PALAU and YAP from GUAM as soon as bases in the MARIANAS are activated.

(4) Continued reconnaissance of PALAU incident to bombing operations.

(5) Intensified submarine attack on the sea communications of PALAU.

(6) Air and surface bombardment of PALAU and supporting bases by carrier task forces commencing on D-3 and continuing through D-1.

(7) A strong carrier task force attack on DAVAO on D-1 and D day.

(8) Fleet action against any enemy surface units which

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enter the area.

(b) Landing Phase.

(1) Final bombardment of assault objectives on D day by carrier based aircraft, and by heavy concentrations of surface fire support groups closely synchronized with landing operations to capture PELELIU and NGESEBUS ISLANDS and establish beachheads on northern BABELTHUAP ISLAND.

(2) Occupation and development of KOSSOL ROADS as a fleet anchorage.

(3) Improvement of the beachhead and development of unloading facilities to support the landing operation and the essential base developments in northern BABELTHUAP. Fleet services will be provided afloat in KOSSOL ROADS and NGARDMAU BAY by appropriate units of the Service Force.

(4) Operations ashore to complete the capture of BABELTHUAP ISLAND.

(5) Landing operations to seize islands in MALAKAL HARBOR area, supported by aircraft, surface fire support groups, and field artillery emplaced ashore.

(6) Develop permanent base facilities in MALAKAL HARBOR - KOROR area.

Subsequent to the capture of the PALAUS, naval forces of sufficient strength for protection against hostile naval or air action will remain in the area until airfields are activated and adequate protection by shore based aviation is established.

Two Army Divisions will remain at PALAU temporarily for rehabilitation and as major components of the defensive garrison. The 1st Marine Division, one Army Division, and corps troops in excess of the number that can be rehabilitated at PALAU will be moved to the South Pacific for rehabilitation.

FORCES REQUIRED

See Apendices A, B and C.

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C. CAUSEWAY

ASSUMPTIONS

That the strength of the Japanese naval and air forces has been reduced during 1944 to a degree which permits our seizing and maintaining control of the air and sea in the area.

That we have secured our sea communications by establishing control of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU area.

That PALAU is in our possession and has been developed as an air base, advanced fleet base, and forward staging area for the support of this operation.

That Southwest Pacific air forces operating from the southern PHILIPPINES will support the capture of FORMOSA by neutralizing Japanese forces in the northern PHILIPPINES to an extent which makes the capture of LUZON prior to the move on FORMOSA unnecessary.

That our operations against FORMOSA will be effectively supported by our air forces operating from bases on the Asiatic mainland.

PURPOSES

To establish bases from which to:

- (1) Bomb JAPAN.
- (2) Support further advance into CHINA.
- (3) Sever Japanese sea and air communications between the EMPIRE and the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA, and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

To establish secure sea and air communications to the coast of CHINA.

To deprive the JAPANESE of the resources of FORMOSA and SOUTH CHINA.

To maintain unremitting military pressure against JAPAN.

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TASK

Capture, occupy, defend, and develop southern FORMOSA and the port of AMOY.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The capture and occupation of FORMOSA and AMOY, which together form one strategic entity, requires that our forces establish undisputed control of the sea and air in the area of the operations concerned. Accordingly, the movement into FORMOSA and AMOY will be preceded by shore based air operations as follows:

- (a) Preliminary reconnaissance of the objectives by air forces based on the Asiatic mainland, supplemented as necessary by those based in the southern PHILIPPINES.
- (b) Destructive attacks on the main Japanese islands by very long range bombers operating from CHINA and the MARIANAS.
- (c) Destructive attacks on the Japanese air forces and bases in FORMOSA, AMOY, and the PESCADORES by air forces based in CHINA.
- (d) Neutralization of the enemy air bases in LUZON by air forces based in MINDANAO.

Prior to amphibious operations against FORMOSA strong carrier attacks will be made as necessary against critical objectives in LUZON, in the RYUKYUS, and possibly in the main Japanese islands in order to destroy enemy forces and installations and avoid early disclosure of our intentions to the enemy. Carrier attacks against objectives on FORMOSA, AMOY, and in the PESCADORES will be deferred until shortly before the amphibious assault.

Prior to the operations, the sea communications of FORMOSA and the PESCADORES will be destroyed to the maximum extent practicable by the operations of submarines and by surface and air attacks on shipping.

The passage of the attack force north of LUZON and the approach to FORMOSA will be covered by further intensified attacks on such enemy air bases in LUZON and in FORMOSA as may continue to be effective.

The scheme of maneuver is designed to gain possession as soon as possible of an adequate fleet anchorage at AMOY, and also sufficient airdrome capacity in FORMOSA, together with unloading facilities adequate to support its development, to insure positive control of the air in the area.

PHASE I

Commencing on D-3 day, initiate intensive attacks by carrier aviation and naval gunfire in preparation for the assault.

Commencing on D-day, employing one amphibious corps of two Marine divisions and one infantry division, and one Army corps of three infantry divisions, capture, occupy, defend, and develop the western coastal plain of FORMOSA as far north as the SOBUNKKEI RIVER.

PHASE II

Commencing on approximately D plus 20 and employing an amphibious corps of two Marine divisions, and three Marine regimental combat teams, seize AMOY, QUEMOY, and adjacent islands and establish defenses to ~~secure~~ the harbor against attack from sea or shore.

Air bases will be activated as rapidly as possible in southwestern FORMOSA to support a force of twelve fighter squadrons, four light bomber squadrons, four medium bomber

~~TOP SECRET~~
squadrons, eight heavy bomber squadrons, twenty-four very long range bomber squadrons, four heavy search squadrons, one long range photographic squadron, four troop carrier squadrons, and three squadrons of patrol seaplanes.

Bases will be activated in the vicinity of AMOY for eight fighter squadrons, four light bomber squadrons, one photographic squadron, two squadrons of patrol seaplanes, and eventually for two carrier air groups.

The air force to be based ashore in the two areas will total approximately 1,200 airplanes.

The port of TAKAO will be developed to the extent necessary to accommodate shipping to support assault and garrison forces, planned developments in the area, and also to mount forces for subsequent operations. The port of AMOY will be developed as an advanced fleet base with port facilities to provide logistic support for major fleet units and also occupation forces.

It is estimated that the seizure and occupation of southern FORMOSA will require the employment of expeditionary troops consisting of two corps of three divisions each, with supporting and service troops, and that the seizure of AMOY will require an amphibious corps of the equivalent of three divisions. Tentative composition of major units and mounting areas are as follows:

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<u>CORPS</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL TROOPS</u>	<u>MOUNTING AREAS</u>	<u>TIME OF LANDING</u>
III Amphibious Corps to FORMOSA	1st MarDiv 2nd MarDiv 96th InfDiv	SOPAC MARIANAS HAWAII	))) D day
XXIV Army Corps to FORMOSA	7th InfDiv 27th InfDiv 81st InfDiv	PALAU SOPAC SOPAC	))) D day
V Amphibious Corps to FORMOSA	4th MarDiv 5th MarDiv Three Marine RCTs	HAWAII HAWAII SOPAC	))) D plus 20

FORCES REQUIRED

See Appendices A, B, and C.

APPENDIX A

Summary of Ground Forces

FORAGER

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Mounted</u>
<u>Assault</u>	
V Amphibious Corps	HAWAII
Corps Troops	HAWAII
2nd Marine Division	HAWAII
4th Marine Division	HAWAII
27th Infantry Division	HAWAII
3 JASCOS	
III Amphibious Corps	SOUTH PACIFIC
Corps Troops	SOUTH PACIFIC
3rd Marine Division	SOUTH PACIFIC
1st Marine Provisional Brigade	SOUTH PACIFIC
4th Marines	
22nd Marines	
2 JASCOS	
<u>Garrison</u>	
9th Marine Defense Bn	SOUTH PACIFIC
14th Marine Defense Bn (plus 1 90mm Btry)	SOUTH PACIFIC
17th Marine Defense Bn (less 155mm gun group)	HAWAII
18th Marine Defense Bn	WEST COAST
4 AAA Gun Battalions (less 2 batteries)	HAWAII
3 AAA AWpns battalions	HAWAII
2 SL Batteries	HAWAII
2 C.A. battalions (155mm gun) SM	HAWAII

STALEMATE

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Mounted</u>
<u>Assault</u>	
III Amphibious Corps	SOUTH PACIFIC
Corps Troops	SOUTH PACIFIC
1st Marine Division	SOUTH PACIFIC
81st Infantry Division	HAWAII
2 JASCOS	
XXIV Army Corps	HAWAII
Corps Troops	HAWAII
7th Infantry Division	HAWAII
77th Infantry Division	HAWAII
2 JASCOS	
<u>Garrison</u>	
3rd Marine AA Battalion	SOUTH PACIFIC
5th Marine AA Battalion	HAWAII
2 AAA gun Battalions (reinforced)	HAWAII
4 C.A. battalions (155mm) SM	HAWAII

CAUSEWAY

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Mounted</u>
<u>Assault</u>	
Expeditionary Troop Headquarters	HAWAII and U.S.
III Amphibious Corps	SOUTH PACIFIC
Corps Troops	SOUTH PACIFIC
1st Marine Division	SOUTH PACIFIC
2d Marine Division	MARIANAS
96th Infantry Division	HAWAII
3 JASCOS	

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Mounted</u>
<u>Assault</u>	
V Amphibious Corps	HAWAII ✓
Corps Troops	HAWAII
4th Marine Division	HAWAII
5th Marine Division	HAWAII
Separate Regimental Combat Teams	SOUTH PACIFIC
4th Marines	
22d Marines	
29th Marines	
3 JASCOS	
XXIV Army Corps	PALAU ✓
Corps Troops	PALAU
7th Infantry Division	PALAU
27th Infantry Division	SOUTH PACIFIC
81st Infantry Division	SOUTH PACIFIC
3 JASCOS	
Additional expeditionary force troops (Army)	HAWAII and U.S.
<u>Garrison</u>	
4th Marine AA Battalion	SOUTH PACIFIC
11th Marine AA Battalion	SOUTH PACIFIC
2d Marine AA Battalion	HAWAII
13th Marine AA Battalion	HAWAII
15th Marine AA Battalion	HAWAII

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Mounted</u>
16th Marine AA Battalion	HAWAII
8 AAA Gun battalions (reinforced) Army	HAWAII
4 155mm Gun battalions S.C. Army	HAWAII
3 Marine 155mm Gun battalions S.C.	HAWAII

See Appendix I for detailed list of garrison forces.

Appendix B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SUMMARY OF NAVAL FORCES REQUIRED
(Ship Based Aircraft Included)

TYPE	PHASE V	PHASE VI	PHASE VIII
	June- Aug 1944	Sept-Nov 1944	Feb-May 1945
	FORAGER	STALEMATE	CAUSEWAY
BB	7	8	8
CB			2
CV	7	8	11
CVL	8	8	7
CA	9	9	11
CL	11	12	14
CLAA	4	4	3
CBB	7	8	8
CVE (combat)	11	16	32
(transport for CVE garrison A/C)	3	4	9
DD	136	142	180
DE	28	30	42
AM	10	10	12
DMS	10	10	10
YMS	24	24	24
PC-PCS	26	24	36
SC	10	12	24
AT	6	6	12
AN	4	4	4
ARS	2	2	2
ARL	1	1	2
ARB	1	1	2
AO	21	21	32
AE	5	5	7
SS	12	12	18
AV	2	3	2
AVP	3	4	2
AVD	3	3	3

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TYPE	FORAGER	STALEMATE	CAUSEWAY
AGC	2	3	7
APA	41	42	120
AP(fast)	15	10	0
APD	12	15	18
AKA	13	12	39
AK(fast)	1	1	0
LSD	7	7	8
AP(initial garrison)	15	9	18
AK(initial garrison)	31	11	22
LST	86	100	200
LCI(FS)	36	36	42
LCI	12	18	18
LCT	40	40	50
LSM		18	72
LCC	20	26	42
LVT(cargo)	1454 *	1248 *	1872 *
LVT(tank)	336 *	300 *	450 *
DUKW	450 *	400 *	600 *
VF (CV-CVL)	364	400	494
VSB (CV-CVL)	252	288	396
VTB (CV-CVL)	198	216	261
VF (CVE)	154	224	448
VTB (CVE)	99	144	288

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* Plans contemplate using LVT battalions and DUKW companies on alternate operations insofar as practicable. Anticipated requirements for replenishment of vehicles are as follows:

LVT's - Normal replenishment of 25% per quarter.
 LVT's (cargo) - Operational replenishment of 40%
 for each operation.
 LVT's (tank) - Operational replenishment of 75%
 for each operation.
 DUKW's - Normal replenishment of 7% per month.

Ships and Small Craft in Local Naval Defense Forces

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>FORAGER</u>	<u>STALEMATE</u>	<u>CAUSEWAY</u>
<u>Fleet Supported Units in Forward Area</u>			
AV	2	3	2
AVP	4	4	4
ARD			1
DD	9	9	18
DE	6	6	12
LST		10	20
AM	4	4	8
AR			2
AN	3	4	6
AT	2	6	4
AD			4

	<u>Base Supported Units</u>		
PC	3	6	12
PCS	10	6	12
SC	11	10	12
PT			48
YMS	24	12	24
ARB	1	1	2
ARL	1	1	2
LCI(FS)	6	6	12
LCT *	40	40	100
LCM *	100	80	120
LCVP *	160	120	180
LCP (L) or (R)*	16		

* The Advance Base Plan should provide for housing of personnel of the boat pool. Consideration should also be given to housing LCT crews (1 officer, 15 men each) and Group Commanders.

The logistic support, including potable water and hospital facilities, of the base supported units will be provided for in the fleet logistic plan during the assault phase and in the bases' logistic plans thereafter. It is anticipated that the forces initially assigned will be reduced as the localities concerned become rear areas.

Appendix C

CENTRAL PACIFIC AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS (Squadrons)

		VSB/			PB(HL)	PB(ML)	VBH	VBM	PB			VH
		VF	VF(N)	VTB					VD (MS)	VR	VLR	
HAWAIIAN AREA	15 June	10	1/2	6	2		4		1	1		
	15 Sept	7	1/2	6	2				1	1		
	15 Feb	7	1/2	6	2				1	1		
	15 Mar	7	1/2	6	2				1	1		
	15 Apr	7	1/2	6	2				1	1		
	15 June	7	1/2	6	2				1	1		
GILBERTS MARSHALLS	15 June	7	1	5	2	2		4	2	4	2	
	15 Sept	7	1	4	2	2	2		1	4	2	
	15 Feb	4		2	2	2	2		2	2		
	15 Mar	2		2	1	1			2	2		
	15 Apr	2		2	1	1			1	2		
	15 June	2		2	1	1			1	2		
MARIANAS	15 June	7	1-1/2	2	2	2	8		1	2	2	1
	15 Sept	7	1-1/2	2	2	2	2		1	2	2	1
	15 Feb	4	1/2	2	2	2	2		1	2	2	1
	15 Mar	4	1/2	2	2	2	4		2	2	36	
	15 Apr	4	1/2	2	2	2	4		2	2	36	
	15 June	4	1/2	2	2	2	4		2	2	12	
PALAU	15 Sept	7	1	2	2		8	4	1	2	1	
	15 Feb	4	1	2	2		8		1	2	1	
	15 Mar	2		2	2		4		1	1		
	15 Apr	2		2	1				1	1		
	15 June	2		2	1				1	1		
FORMOSA AND AMOY	15 Feb	15	5	8	2			4	2			
	15 Mar	15	5	8	2		4	8	1	2	1	1
	15 Apr	15	5	8	4		8	8	2	2	4	1
	15 June	15	5	8	4		8	8	2	2	4	1
TOTAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS	15 June	24	3	13	6	4	12	4	3	7	5	1
	15 Sept	28	4	14	8	4	12	4	3	9	6	1
	15 Feb	31	7	20	10	4	12	4	2	9	6	1
	15 Mar	31	6	20	9	3	12	8	1	8	7	1
	15 Apr	31	6	20	10	3	12	8	2	7	10	1
	15 June	31	6	20	10	3	12	8	2	7	10	1
READY RESERVE	15 June	6	1	3	2	1	4	0	1	2		1
	15 Sept	7	2	4	2	1	4	4	1	2	3	1
	15 Feb	12	3	5	3	1	4	4	1	2	6	1
	15 Mar	12	3	5	3	1	4	4	1	2	6	1
	15 Apr	12	3	5	3	1	4	4	1	2	6	1
	15 June	12	3	5	3	1	4	4	1	2	6	1
TOTAL CENTRAL PACIFIC REQUIREMENTS	15 June	30	4	16	8	5	16	4	4	9	5	2
	15 Sept	35	6	18	10	5	16	8	4	11	6	2
	15 Feb	46	10	25	13	5	16	8	3	11	6	2
	15 Mar	42	9	25	12	4	16	12	2	10	7	2
	15 Apr	42	9	25	13	4	16	12	3	9	10	2
	15 June	42	9	25	13	4	16	12	3	9	10	2

* Total requirements VSB/VTB include 6 inshore patrol squadrons.

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SQUADRONS AVAILABLE TO CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

	FORAGER				STALEMATE				CAUSEWAY				CAUSEWAY				CAUSEWAY				CAUSEWAY			
	15 June 44				15 Sept 44				15 Feb 45				15 Mar 45				15 April 45				15 June 45			
VF	A	N	M	Tot	A	N	M	Tot	A	N	M	Tot	A	N	M	Tot	A	N	M	Tot	A	N	M	Tot
Fighters	9	2	29	40	9	2	32	43	9		36	45	9		48	57	9		48	57	9		46	55
VF(N)	1																							
Fighters night	1		4	5	1		5	6	1		7	8	1		7	8	1		7	8	1		7	8
VOS																								
VSB/VTB		17	23	40		13	23	36		12	23	35		12	32	44		12	32	44		12	33	45
PB(HL)																								
Heavy search		6		6		6		6		6		6		7		7		7		7		13		13
PB(ML)																								
Medium search		6		6		11		11		11		11		12		12		12		12		13		13
VBH																								
Heavy bomber	12			12	12			12	12			12	12			12	12			12	12			12
VBH																								
Medium bomber	4		6	10	4		8	12	4		12	16	4		15	19	4		15	19	4		14	18
VD																								
Photo	2	2	1	5	2	1	3	6	2	2	3	7	2	3	3	8	2	3	3	8	2	3	2	7
PB(HS and MS)																								
Patrol seaplane	11			11	12			12		5		5		8		8		8		8		10		10
VR																								
Troop carrier	2		6	8	2		6	8	2		6	8	2		6	8	2		6	8	2		6	8
VLR - Very heavy bomber					12			12	36			36	36			36	36			36	36			36

Basis: Army: W.D. Table of Deployment of Air Force Units as of 30 June 1944.
Letter, War Department, file OPD 370.5 TS (12 April 1944).

Navy: Total allocated to CenPac and SoPac by CominCh serial 001156
13 April 1944, less squadrons estimated to be re-forming and less
3 PB(MS) and 4 VOS allocated to SoPac by JCS 713/5.

REQUIREMENTS (INCLUDING RESERVE) vs. AVAILABILITY

	FORAGER			STALEMATE			CAUSEWAY			CAUSEWAY			CAUSEWAY			CAUSEWAY		
	15 June 1944	Req	Avail	15 Sept 1944	Req	Avail	15 Feb 1945	Req	Avail	15 March 1945	Req	Avail	15 April 1945	Req	Avail	15 June 1945	Req	Avail
VF		Reg	Bal		Reg	Bal		Reg	Bal		Reg	Bal		Reg	Bal		Reg	Bal
Fighters	30		40	40	35	43	46	45	1	42	57	42	57	42	57	42	55	4
VF(N)																		
Ftrs. Night	4		5	4	6	6	10	8	2	9	8	9	8	9	8	9	8	1
VOS																		
VSB/VTPB	16		40	40	18	36	25	35	10	25	44	19	44	19	44	25	45	20
PB(HL)																		
Heavy Search	8		6	6	10	6	13	6	7	12	7	5	13	7	6	13	13	
PB(ML)																		
Medium Search	5		6	4	5	11	5	11	6	4	12	8	4	12	8	4	13	9
VBH																		
Heavy Bomber	16		12	12	16	12	16	12	4	16	12	4	16	12	4	16	12	4
VBM																		
Medium Bomber	4		10	12	8	12	8	10	8	12	19	7	12	19	7	12	18	6
VD																		
Photo.	4		5	4	4	6	3	7	4	2	8	6	3	8	5	3	7	4
PB(HS & MS)																		
Patrol seapl.	9		11	12	11	12	11	5	6	10	8	2	9	8	1	9	10	1
VR																		
Troop carrier	5		8	8	6	8	6	8	2	7	8	1	10	8	2	10	8	2
Very heavy Bomber (VLR)	0		0	15	12	3	42	36	6	42	36	6	42	36	6	42	36	6

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Appendix "I"
GARRISON FORCESPART I - STALEMATE

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER OF UNITS - STRENGTH</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>Area Command and Staff, including Civil Affairs</u>	250	250	
<u>UNITS REHABILITATING</u>			
Inf Divs (reinforced)	2--44,000		
<u>GARRISON AIR UNITS</u>			
See Appendix C	7,509	761	2,618
<u>SIGNAL UNITS</u>			
AWSq or Argus			2--468
AWBn (3 Cos)	1--750		
Comm. Unit (N)		1--300	
Comm. Unit (A-N)	2--851	(2--851)	
Sig Teams	6-- 63		
Sig Constr Co	3--603		
Sub-total	2,267	300	468
<u>ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY UNITS</u>			
Bns AAA	2--2,500		2--2,500
<u>COAST DEFENSE UNITS</u>			
Bns 155 gun (SC) (less heavy equipment)	4--2,720		
<u>ENGINEER UNITS</u>			
Avn Engr Bns	4--3,228		
Constr Bns	1-- 944		
Dump Trk Co	1-- 114		
Grp Hq	1-- 97		
Hv Shop Co	1-- 178		

App. I; Part I - STALE
MATE

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Maint Co	1--200		
Parts Supply Det	1-- 59		
Dep Co	<u>1--218</u>		
Sub-total	5,038		

QUARTERMASTER UNITS

Trk Bns (9 Cos)	2--1,089		
Serv Bn (8 Cos)	2--1,790		
Gr Reg Co	1-- 130		
Port Bn (5 Cos)	1--1,084		
Hq & Hq QM			
Base Depot	1-- 154		
Dep Sup Co	1-- 194		
Salv Repair Co	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -- 301		
Laundry Cos	2-- 547		
Bkry Cos	2-- 336		
Plat Sales Co	1-- 60		
Marine Dep			<u>1--1,600</u>
Sub-total	5,685		1,600

ORDNANCE UNITS

Hq & Hq Det Ord Bn	1-- 25
Bomb Disposal Squads	4-- 28
Hv Maint Co (FA)	2-- 396
Dep Co	1-- 186
Am Cos	2-- 372
Plat Tire Rep Co	<u>1-- 60</u>
Sub-total	1,067

MEDICAL UNITS

Gen Hosp (1,500 bed)	1-- 903
Gen Hosp (1,000 bed)	1-- 662
Med Dep Unit	1-- 10
Dispensary G-4 (200 bed)	<u>1--189</u>
Sub-total	1,575 189

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>AVIATION SERVICE UNITS</u>			
Avn Serv Gp	3--4,461		
Acorn (w/CBs)		2--3,472	
Casu		2--1,216	
NATS Facilities		-----	
Hq Sq & Serv Sq			1--643
Sub-total	4,461	4,788	643

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

Cub (w/CBs & CB Spec)		2--9,369	
Amphibious Boat Pool		3--1,557	
SLCU		1-- 441	
Pancake Engine Overhaul		1-- 30	
E-1 Combined AR-AD		1-- 764	
Gropac		1-- 600	
F-1 Constr Bn (Sp)		1/4-- 254	
DUKW Cos			2--368
Sub-total		13,015	368

SUMMARY - PALAU GARRISON

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Area Commanders and Staffs	250	250	
Units Rehabilitating	44,000		
Garrison Air Forces (See Appendix C)	7,509	761	2,618
Signal	2,267	300	468
AA Artillery	2,500		2,500
Coast Defense	2,720		
Engineer	5,038		
Quartermaster	5,685	1,600	
Ordnance	1,067		
Medical	1,575	189	
Aviation Service	4,461	4,788	643
Miscellaneous		13,015	368
Totals by Services	77,072	20,903	6,597
GRAND TOTAL	----- 104,572		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PART II - CAUSEWAYNUMBER OF UNITS - STRENGTH

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Hq & Hq Co & Sp Trs	2--1212		1--2000			1--2000
Not listed else- where						
Includes person- nel for civil affairs						
<u>AAA UNITS</u>						
Hq & Hq Btry AAA Brig	1-- 74					
Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp	2-- 142					
AAA Gun Bn(SM)	8--5160					
AAA S/L Bn(SM)	2--1706					
AAA Bn AW (SM)	7--5033					
AA Bns, Marine			2--2200			4--4400
Sub Total	12115		2200			4400
<u>ARTILLERY UNITS</u>						
Hq & Hq Btry FA Brig	1-- 103					
Hq & Hq Btry FA Gp	4-- 392		1-- 98			1-- 98
155mm How Bn	4--2124		3--1950			3--1950
4.5" or 155mm Gun Bn	2--1062		3--2211			3--2211
FA Obsn Bn (A)	2--1010					
155mm Gun SP (FA) 155mm	4--2024					
8" or 240 How Bn	4--2324					
155mm (SC) Bn (SM)	4--2152					3--1584
Sub Total	11191		4259			5843

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<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>TANK DESTROYER</u>						
Hq & Hq Co TD Gp	1--	74				
TD Bns	2--	1342		1--	671	
Sub Total		1416			671	
<u>TANKS</u>						
Hq & Hq Det TK Gp	1--	101				
TK Bns	4--	3004	(One Med TK Bn each MarDiv.)	included organically in		
Sub Total		3105				
<u>ORDNANCE UNITS</u>						
Gp Hq & Hq Det	1--	53				
Bn Hq & Hq Det	8--	200				
BombDisposal Sqd	6--	42				
Hv Maint (FA)Co	3--	594				
Hv Maint TK Co	2--	420				
Dep Co	3--	558				
Maint Co AA	2--	326				
M Auto Maint Co*	3--	360				
Hv Auto Maint Co	1--	211				
Tire Rep Plat	1--	39				
Am Co*	6--	1116				
MM Co*	11--	1859				
Sub Total		5778				

Note: * Medium Maintenance for Marine Corps Units performed by Mar. Field Depot, reinf.

FORMOSA

AMOY

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>SIGNAL UNITS</u>						
JASCO's	4--1512		2-- 758			3--1137
Sig Bns	2--1654		1-- 781			1-- 781
Sig Rep Co	1-- 188					
Photo Plat	1-- 50					
Rad Int Co	1-- 259					
Joint Com Cen	1-- 500				1-- 350	
Sig Dep Co	1-- 191					
Sig Cons Bn	2--1190**			1- 595		
Cable Ships***						
Cable Barges Shallow						
Draft***	2--					
Sub Total	5544		1539	595	350	1918

Note: ** One (1) Signal Construction Bn (A) to accompany Cable Ship.
 *** Floating Equipment.

QUARTERMASTER UNITS

Gas Sup Co*	2-- 256					
Serv Bns	5--4705					
Trk Regt	1--1635					
Ster Cos	2-- 318					
Car Co	1-- 135					
Dep Co (Sup)	4-- 776					
Mar. Serv Co			1-- 258			1-- 258
Mar. Ldry Co			1-- 268			1-- 268
Mar. Mtr T Bn			1-- 628			1-- 628
Mar. Salv Co			1-- 118			1-- 118
Gr Reg Co	2-- 260					
Salv Coll Co	2-- 418					
Hq & Hq Co QM Base Dep	1-- 154					
Ldry Cos	3-- 819					

APP I - PART II - CAUSEWAY

FORMOSA

AMOY

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>QM UNITS (Cont'd)</u>						
Salv Rep Co	3--	603				
Bkry Co	6--	1008				
Sales Co	1--	178				
Sub Total	11265		1272			1272
Note: * To be included in Marine Field Depot Reinf.						
<u>MEDICAL UNITS</u>						
Med Bns	2--	930	1-- 461			1-- 461
Amb Co Mtz Sep	4--	372				
Clr Co (Sep)	1--	117				
Portable Surgical Hosp	4--	148				
Evac Hosp(400 Bed)	3--	888				
Field Hosp(380 Bed)	4--	1008				
Med Lab	1--	58				
Sn Co	4--	468				
Med Dep Co	1--	178				
Field Hosp (N) (600 bed)		2-- 700*			1-- 350*	
Mbl Hosp(1500 bed)		2--1294			3--1941	
Gen Hosp(1000 bed)	4--	2568				
Sta Hosp(500 Bed)	2--	702				
Sta Hosp(250 Bed)	2--	384				
Med Storehouse (N)					1-- 55	
Malaria Control Unit	4--	48			1-- 12	
Optical Unit (N)					1-- 3	
Malaria Surv Unit	4--	52				
Hq Med Serv	1--	120				
Sub Total	7041	1994	461		2361	461

Note: * Total of three field hospitals, Navy, for assignment to support two Marine Amphibians as required by situation.

SECRET			FORMOSA			AMOY		
<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>			<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>TRANSPORTATION UNITS</u>								
Ry Opng Bn	1--848							
Port Hq & Hq Co	1--519							
Port Bn (4 Cos each)	4--3600							
CB Special (F-1) (N)		* 1--944					4*--3776	
Sub-total	4967	944					3776	
Note: * One CB Special (N) to operate with each Marine Amph. Corps Field Depot Reinf.								
<u>ENGINEER UNITS</u>								
Engr Hq	2--144							
Hq & Hq Co Engr Gp	7--595		1--84					1--84
Engr C Bn or Equiv	12--7968	4(CB's*) --4456	1--750			3 CB's* --3342		1--750
Topo Co	1--125		1--125					1--125
Topo Bn	1--445							
Water Sup Co	2--282							
Dep Co	2--388							
Dp Trk Co	8--912							
Hv Shop Co	2--356							
Hv Pon Bn	4--1584							
L Pon Co	8--1624							
Treadway Bridge Co	2--288							
Maint Co **	2--362							
Gen Cons:								
Cons Bn	10--9440	4--4456				5--5570		
Gen Serv Regt	1--1321							
AFld Cons:								
C.B.		6--6684				6--6684		

CONFIDENTIAL				FORMOSA			AMOI		
<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>Engr Units Cont'd</u>									
Avn Engr Regt	3--8103								
Avn Engr Bn	2--1614								
Mbl SL Maint Plat	1-- 36								
Light Equipment Co	2-- 246								
Hq & Hq Co Base Dep Gp	1-- 75								
Petroleum Dist Co	1-- 228								
Base Equip Co	1-- 184								
Parts Sup Co	1-- 182								
Firefighting Plat	6-- 174								
Forestry Co	2-- 326								
Sub-total	37002	15596	959				15596	959	

Note: * Navy CB's attached to each Marine Amph Corps as Corps Troops.
 ** Marine Engr Maint Co to be included Mar Field Depots Reinf.,
 in addition to other CB requirements.

AVN SERV UNITS

Serv Gps	3--4680								
Dep Gps (Air)	1--2491								
Serv Gp (Spec) (VLR)	8--5960								
Dep Gp (Spec) (VLR)	2--2298								
Patsu		1--316				1--316			
AW Sqs (M)			3--690					2--460	
Hq & Serv Sq (MAG)			4--2600					4--2600	
Acorn (Less CB*) (Seaplane)		1--497				1--497			
Acorn (Less CB*) (Landplane)		1--503				1--503			
Casu		2--840				1--420			
AACS Det (includes 7 towers)	1-- 87								

CONFIDENTIAL FORMOSA				AMOIY		
TYPE OF UNIT	Army	Navy	Marine	Army	Navy	Marine
<u>Avn Serv Units (Cont'd)</u>						
AACS Det					1--32	
Sig Co Avn	1--181					
Sig Cons Co Avn	1--228					
Sig Co Wg (VLR)	2--356					
Sig Co Serv Gp Spec (VLR)	8-3328					
Sig Co Serv Gp	2--200					
Sig Co Dep Avn (VLR)	2--904					
Sig Co Dep Avn (VBH-VBM)	1--226					
Sub-total	20939	2156	3290		1768	3060

Note: * CB's of Acorns and Cubs included in CB's listed under Engr Units.

SPECIAL UNITS

MP Bn	1--566					
MP Co	1--197		1--101			1--101
LVT(C) Bn *	10--4970					9--4284
LVT(Tk) Bn *	2--1554		1--846			1--846
DUKW Co (Amph Trk Co)**	12--2208			6--1104		
Base Post Office	1-- 98					
Base Censorship Det	1--136					
Field Dep Reinf Mar			1--3000			1--3000
Mar Serv Comd Gp			1-- 98			
Mar Air Delivery Sec			2--172			
Hq & Hq Co Serv Comd	1--335					
Sub-total	10064		4217	1104		8231

Note: * Shown in recapitulation as part of Expeditionary Force and Corps Trs.

** Shown in recapitulation as part of Service and Construction Units.

CONFIDENTIAL			FORMOSA			AMOY		
<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>			<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>CHEMICAL WARFARE UNITS</u> (Included in Special Units in recapitulation)								
Decon Co	1--170							
Lab Co	1-- 59							
Smoke Gener Co	2--270					2--270		
Maint Co	1--123							
Dep Co	1--184							
Cml Processing Co	1--146					1--146		
Sub-total	952					416		
<u>ADDITIONAL NAVAL UNITS</u>								
Gropac	1--1100							
Standard PT Unit	1-- 282					1--282		
Material Recovery Unit	1-- 25					1-- 25		
Standard Landing Craft Unit	3--1320							
Communication Unit Navy	3-- 381					5--1069		
Cub (Less CB's*)	1--1692							
Lion (Less CB's*)						1--3853		
P-8, Port Devel Unit	(1-includ. in Cub)					(1-includ. in Lion)		
Naval Supply Depot						(1-includ. in Lion)		
Sub-total	4800					5229		

Note: * CB's in Cubs and Lions included in CB's listed under Engr Units.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~RECAPITULATION

<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Expeditionary Force and Corps Troops (non-divisional)	41107		10844	1266	350	19291
Divisions	56952		36288			54432
Service and Con- struction	90200	20690	5982	1104	23501	5752
Actical Air Force Units (See Appen- dix C)	26328	810	4909			5429
Special Units	2284		3371	416		3101
Additional Naval Units		4800			5229	
TOTAL	216,871	26,300	61,394	2,786	29,080	88,005

TOTAL AREA: FORMOSA - 304,565AMOY - 119,871GRAND TOTAL: CAUSEWAY - 424,436


CONFIDENTIAL


GRANITE II Appendix D


Phases of Campaign

*Alternate Operations


-  CENTRAL PACIFIC OBJECTIVES
-  SWPAC OBJECTIVES
-  NEUTRALIZED ENEMY BASES








LEGEND





TOP SECRET

CAUSEWAY

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