Applied Concept

The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach

Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

This is the final MNE 5 document on "The Military Info Ops Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach".

Contact peterwestenkirchner@bundeswehr.org for inquiries regarding subsequent updates beyond MNE 5 efforts.

Bonn, 03 April 2009

For Multinational Staffing
(Comments due by 30 April 2009)
Target: Final Draft, 29 May 2009

1. REPORT DATE **03 APR 2009**	2. REPORT TYPE **Summary**	3. DATES COVERED **-**

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE **Applied Concept - The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach**	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **Kommando Strategische Aufklärung (KdoStratAufkl), Gruppe informationsoperationen (Grp InfoOp), Bonn, Germany**	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) **USJFCOM J9 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, Suffolk, VA**	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised for personal and non-commercial use only, provided that all copies retain the author attribution as specified below. The use of this work for commercial purposes is prohibited; its translation into other languages and adaptation/modification requires prior written permission. Kommando Strategische Aufklärung (KdoStratAufkl), Gruppe Informationsoperationen (Grp InfoOp), Attn: LTC Peter E. Westenkirchner, Robert-Schuman-Platz 3, D-53175 Bonn, Germany, The original document contains color images.

14. ABSTRACT
This concept paper is based on the Multinational Information Operations Experiment (MNIOE) White Paper "Information Activities in Future Coalition Operations a Comprehensive Approach (from a Military Perspective)", dated 31 May 2007, which was coordinated and agreed among Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) Partners and MNIOE participating nations and organisations at working level. The White Paper describes a common understanding of the Information Operations (Info Ops) function developed by the MNIOE participants during a lengthy course of discussions (since 2003). Meanwhile, this understanding has affected current national and multinational concept development, e.g., that of the European Union and NATO; many of the MNIOE group of experts were involved in the preparation of NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine for Info Ops. In order to further promote the MNIOE conceptual approach to Info Ops in an applied operational context, this Applied Concept also builds on AJP-3.103 in its current version, amending/adjusting the original as required.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
multinational, experiment, MNE, information operations, comprehensive approach, information environment, public affairs

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT **unclassified**	b. ABSTRACT **unclassified**	c. THIS PAGE **unclassified**	**SAR**	**74**	

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13 Reproduction of this document and unlimited distribution of copies is authorised for
14 personal and non-commercial use only, provided that all copies retain the author
15 attribution as specified below. The use of this work for commercial purposes is
16 prohibited; its translation into other languages and adaptation/modification requires
17 prior written permission.
18
19 Point of Contact:
20 Kommando Strategische Aufklärung (KdoStratAufkl)
21 - Gruppe Informationsoperationen (Grp InfoOp) -
22 Attn: LTC Peter E. Westenkirchner
23 Robert-Schuman-Platz 3
24 D-53175 Bonn, Germany
25 Phone: +49 (0)228 43320-464
26 E-mail: peterwestenkirchner@bundeswehr.org

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

27   **Preface**

28   This concept paper is based on the Multinational Information Operations Experiment
29   (MNIOE)[1] White Paper "Information Activities in Future Coalition Operations – a
30   Comprehensive Approach (from a Military Perspective)", Final Draft, Version 1.8,
31   dated 31 May 2007, which was coordinated and agreed among Multinational
32   Interoperability Council (MIC) Partners[2] and MNIOE participating nations and
33   organisations at working level. The White Paper describes a common understanding
34   of the Information Operations (Info Ops) function developed by the MNIOE
35   participants during a lengthy course of discussions (since 2003). Meanwhile, this
36   understanding has affected current national and multinational concept development,
37   e.g., that of the European Union and NATO; many of the MNIOE group of experts
38   were involved in the preparation of NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine for Info Ops.

39   In order to further promote the MNIOE conceptual approach to Info Ops in an applied
40   operational context, this Applied Concept also builds on AJP-3.10[3] in its current
41   version[4], amending/adjusting the original as required.

42   Major critical issues for change, reflected in this document, are:

43   •   the desired emphasis on effects-based thinking and an effects-based
44   approach to operations, considering all relevant actors in their multiple roles;

45   •   the proposed scope of advice and co-ordination concerning effects in the
46   information environment – not limited to those actions deliberately designed to
47   affect the information environment (information activities), and not focused on
48   adversary[5] decision-makers[6] only;

49   •   the envisioned role of Public Affairs related to Info Ops – fully integrated in the
50   co-ordination process for effects in the information environment and
51   information activities;

52   •   the requirement for mission-specific strategic and political guidance for
53   information activities in the suggested format of a multinational Information
54   Strategy; and

55   •   the aspired applicability of proposed processes and structures regardless of
56   organisational form – national contingents, Coalition or Alliance.

---

1   Germany has established MNIOE in 2003 as a national initiative to further develop the military Information
     Operations (Info Ops) function in the context of enhancing future Coalition interoperability through
     collaboration in multinational Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E). The MNIOE project is
     initially designed to explore, refine, verify and validate recommendations to the Multinational Interoperability
     Council (MIC). This remains the primary role of the MNIOE project. At the same time MNIOE is also
     supporting the development and implementation of Info Ops concepts, policy and doctrine for use in national,
     Coalition and/or Alliance operations/missions.
2   MIC Partners are: AUS, CAN, DEU, FRA, GBR, ITA and USA.
3   Allied Joint Publication 3.10: 'Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations'.
4   AJP-3.10 Ratification Draft (issued 20 October 2008).
5   Throughout this publication, the term **'adversary'** includes potential as well as actual adversaries.
6   The term **'decision-maker'** is used in its broadest sense throughout this document. They include political and
     other leaders and military commanders, influential individuals, military personnel, armed factions and specific
     population groups (e.g. ethnic, cultural, religious and political).

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

77

Table of Contents

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Chapter 1 – Introduction to Information Operations

Section I – Background

101. <u>The Global Security Environment</u>.   The security environment[7] in the 21st Century is characterised by fundamental changes: it is more complex and involves a great deal of uncertainty about potential origins of challenges to stability and peace. Risks and threats are more diverse, motivate asymmetric warfare[8], and tend to exceed our current security-related capabilities. This results in profound changes to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution, including multinational interventions[9]. There is also an expectation in some societies, reinforced by media exposure of global issues, that conflict and confrontation will be constrained by increasingly moral codes and regulated by progressively more extensive legal obligations. Concurrently, there has been an 'information revolution' – mainly driven by the rapid development of Information Technology (IT) – that has ushered in an age of computer-aided decision-making, and which created information societies[10]. Understanding this evolving information environment[11], including underlying causes and dynamics of instability, is the most essential prerequisite for crisis/conflict prevention and resolution. As we live in an information-dominated environment there is an increased reliance on, and desire for, information. In addition, the impact of real-time media coverage of crises, the exploitation and manipulation of the media by some parties and the ever-increasing use of technologies such as the Internet has resulted in a world where information plays an increasingly important or even decisive role. In order to address substantial changes in both the evolving global security situation and the information environment, concepts, processes and doctrine are being developed to deal with these new challenges. Effective and efficient actions require integrated application, and the continuous consideration of the information factor throughout all related processes – analysis, planning, execution and assessment.

102. <u>Strategic Guidance</u>.   Military action alone cannot resolve crises, but it can set the conditions for resolution by other actors, including the use of the full suite of national power provided by partner states. During planning and throughout operations the military identifies how it may best support, and be supported by,

---

[7]   The **'security environment'** is a complex political-military web of regional, cultural, and political competitions and conflicts, involving threats to vital interests posed by a variety of actors.

[8]   **'Asymmetric warfare'** is characterised by engagements between forces of dissimilar capability and doctrine (*modus operandi*).

[9]   The term **'intervention'** is not intended to imply a purely military intervention. It is intended to describe activities by a broad range of civil and military actors in an interagency context.

[10]   An **'information society'** is a society in which the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, and manipulation of information are a significant economic, political, and cultural activity.

[11]   The **'information environment'** is defined as the virtual and physical space in which information is received, processed and conveyed. It consists of the information itself and information systems. (**'Information systems'** are defined as socio-technical systems for the collection, processing and dissemination of information. They comprise personnel, technical components, organisational structures, and processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share, transmit and disseminate information.)

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

162   other areas of activity[12]. Information activities[13] – within the scope of any area
163   of activity – will need to relate back to overall direction and guidance, i.e., to an
164   Information Strategy[14] that sets forth Information Objectives[15]. It must be
165   coordinated between governments and provided through national government
166   authorities. As the political/military situation evolves and matures for a given
167   operation, revised/updated strategic guidance could be provided to adjust the
168   planning and conduct of information activities accordingly.

169   103. <u>Non-Kinetic Activities</u>.   While Information Objectives may be accomplished
170   through kinetic or non-kinetic means, as effects-based thinking is applied, there
171   is likely to be an increased focus on non-kinetic activity. A large element of
172   operations is non-kinetic and recent military missions have shown its
173   significance by increasing the commander's choice of means by which effect
174   can be achieved at all stages of a crisis. However, it is not only the movement
175   towards an effects-based approach to operations[16] that has brought about this
176   new emphasis on non-kinetic activity.

177   104. <u>Information as an Operational Factor</u>.   A modern military campaign is a big and
178   complex enterprise. It is composed of multiple and multi-layered essential
179   factors that make up the operational environment and that, however, can still be
180   related to the three basic operational factors: *force, space and time*,
181   supplemented and interlinked by a fourth operational factor: *information*[17].
182   Control of the operational factors and their interrelationship is the chief
183   prerequisite for success in the planning and execution of any military action;
184   their balancing is the core of operational art.

185   a. There are multiple essential factors constituting campaign **force** strength.
186   Force strength of a modern campaign includes not only various arms and
187   services of the military but also civil security forces (such as police and law
188   enforcement agencies). In addition, modern campaigns take on a variety
189   of forms and employ a variety of methods of operation. Offence and
190   defence blend and interchange quickly with other tasks of Stability
191   Operations. This requires overall consideration in employing various
192   operational forms, methods and means and close co-ordination among

---

[12]   **'Areas of activity'** are the national or organisational means to enforce political will or exert influence on others. Broad categories of actions taken to influence a security environment include politics/diplomacy, economy, information and security services (civil and military), as well as cultural/developmental activities, humanitarian assistance, and civil administration support.

[13]   **'Information activities'** are actions designed to affect information and/or information systems (the information environment), performed by any actor.

[14]   The **'Information Strategy'** states the comprehensive, interagency and multinational approach across all levers of power to crisis/conflict prevention and resolution in the information environment. It provides mission-specific strategic and political guidance for civil and military information activities in support of mission objectives. For details see Analytical Concept: "Development and Implementation of a Multinational Information Strategy".

[15]   **'Information Objectives'** are Decisive Conditions in the information environment. They should be measurable to enable analysis, planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of related actions and/or effects.

[16]   The **'Effects-Based Approach to Operations'** (EBAO) – as described in the emerging NATO 'Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations' (CAFJO) – is an interpretation of the broad approach to security, which recognizes the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. See Chapter 1, Section III: 'Principles of Information Operations', and Chapter 3: 'Info Ops in the Effects-Based Operations Process'.

[17]   See Figure 1.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

193   them, and the integration in an interagency context. There is a high degree
194   of dependency among various essential factors making up campaign force
195   strength. Thus, there is a higher demand for overall co-ordination in order
196   to achieve coherent effects through rationally configuring and organising
197   various capabilities, actors and resources.

198   b. The operational **space** of modern military campaigns is vast, and full
199   depth and multi-dimensionality have become an important characteristic of
200   a modern operational environment. Operations of a modern military
201   campaign are conducted not only on the ground, in the sea and the air, but
202   also in outer space, underground, under water and in the virtual
203   environment (e.g., cyberspace), which is of particular relevance to the
204   information factor. Campaign operations place a high demand on the
205   integration of all dimensions in this respect.

206   c. The factor of **time** indispensably interlinks the factors of force and space.
207   Time determines the employment of force in a given theatre of operations.
208   It is the scarcest resource that cannot be re-supplied or by-passed. The
209   essence of Command & Control (C2), seeking overall effect toward
210   accomplishing campaign objectives, is the employment of the right force to
211   the right place at the right time. The interdependency between time and
212   the other operational factors requires their continuous consideration as
213   dynamic determinants in the decision and execution cycle or the
214   operational planning process, respectively.

215
216   **Figure 1: The Fourth Operational Factor 'Information'**

217   d. **Information** is understood as an assembly of data in any medium or form
218   capable of communication and use by assigned meaning through known
219   conventions used in symbolic representation.[18] There are three basic

---

[18] Based on: USA JP 1-02 – Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

features of information that need to be considered for planning, execution and assessment of operations:

(1) <u>Development of Knowledge</u>. Information is data interpreted in a context, and in turn, enables the linkage of data as a basis for the development of knowledge – this function is a prerequisite for developing situational awareness and understanding;

(2) <u>Communication</u>. Information enables humans to communicate and act in a social environment – this function *inter alia* is a prerequisite for effective C2;

(3) <u>Automation</u>. Information enables automated systems to function without direct involvement of human reasoning – this function constitutes a decisive factor for new technological advances, including the whole range of sensors and effectors.

105. In modern information societies the creation, distribution, diffusion, use, and manipulation of information is a significant economic, political, and cultural activity. Thus, information is a decisive factor *per se* and will increasingly affect the factors force, space and time. Perception and awareness gained from analysis of collected information and personal observations have long been an integral part of human existence; those with a superior ability to gather, understand, control and use information have gained a substantial advantage. The ability to manage and employ information underpins activities in diplomatic, military, economic and other areas of activity, maintaining own/friendly freedom of action. From the strategic to the tactical level and across the range of military operations, information plays a vital role in the manner in which decisions are made. The success of military operations may rest on the perception of all actors involved. There is therefore considerable benefit to be gained by affecting the flow of information through a decision-maker and his understanding of that information.

106. <u>The Impact of the Media</u>. All crises occur under the spotlight of the international media. The maintenance of understanding and support of public opinion is crucial for democratically accountable governments, and this influences[19] the options they can take, including military action, and the presentation of these options to different audiences. In order to gain and maintain public support, national governments and international organisations/agencies need to show a degree of transparency in their actions, and these actions must be in accordance with international law. The influence of the media has increased as access to regional and international media has increased. This has been brought about by technologies such as satellite broadcasting and global connectivity through the Internet. In addition, the availability of relatively cheap printing and copying equipment has brought newspapers and other printed material to a much wider audience. Consequently, there is a need to be proactive in ensuring that the presentation of actions is accurate and reflects approved themes and messages, while at the same time countering other actors' attempts to undermine public support.

---

[19] The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines the term **'influence'** as 'the capacity to have an effect on the character or behaviour of someone or something, or the effect itself'. This benign definition provides the meaning of 'influence' throughout this document.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

264　107. <u>The Impact of Technology and the Internet</u>.　In addition to the role played by
265　technology in increasing access to the media, there is an ever-increasing
266　dependence on IT systems. Computers now pervade society; they also form the
267　core of most military systems, especially communications systems/signals
268　support and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
269　(ISTAR). This increased reliance on computer technology introduces new
270　opportunities that can be exploited, and new vulnerabilities that must be
271　addressed. In addition, technology has provided a new means of direct access
272　to information via the Internet. That information is absorbed without necessarily
273　knowing its validity and source. In some cases, considerable credence is placed
274　on it; this is particularly so in societies without a free press. The Internet is used
275　to spread or circulate information and opinion, including rumour, with a speed
276　inconceivable a few years ago. The Internet is an unrestricted and unregulated
277　medium, available globally, which an adversary can exploit either to spread his
278　message, as a vehicle to attack friendly systems, or as an open source of
279　Intelligence (INTEL).

280　## Section II – Fundamentals of Information Operations

281　108. <u>Definitions</u>.　　The definitions of *Information Operations (Info Ops)* and
282　*information activities* are as follows:

283　　　a. Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and co-ordination
284　　　　regarding activities affecting[20] information and information systems –
285　　　　including system behaviour and capabilities – in order to create desired
286　　　　effects.

287　　　b. Information activities are actions designed to affect information and/or
288　　　　information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include
289　　　　protective measures.[21]

290　109. <u>Approach</u>.　The approach to the Info Ops function outlined in this document is
291　based on the following ideas:

292　　　a. <u>Systemic Understanding</u>.　As the effects-based approach to operations
293　　　　draws from an *understanding of the operational environment as a 'system-
294　　　　of-systems'*, a concept for Info Ops in this context requires the
295　　　　identification and application of relevant systems[22]. The MNIOE approach
296　　　　introduces a distinctive understanding of socio-technical information
297　　　　systems[23], which provide the core functionality of modern societies in the
298　　　　above understanding. Systemic understanding results from Systems
299　　　　Analysis, which is based on a combination of methods from various
300　　　　approaches, such as Systems Theory, Complexity Theory and Network

---

[20]　The term **'to affect'** is used throughout the document in a generic sense meaning: 'to have an effect on',
　　without any pre-defined (positive or negative) connotation.
[21]　This definition is common to both MNIOE and NATO AJP-3.10; it is authoritatively defined in NATO's Military
　　Policy on Public Affairs (MC 457/1).
[22]　The concept of **'systems'** used in this context includes both human as well as technical factors.
[23]　**'Information systems'** are defined as socio-technical systems for the collection, processing and
　　dissemination of information. They comprise personnel, technical components, organisational structures, and
　　processes that create, collect, perceive, analyse, assess, structure, manipulate, store, retrieve, display, share,
　　transmit and disseminate information.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

301 Theory. Systems Analysis of information systems is a prerequisite for
302 gaining a comprehensive and systemic view of the operational
303 environment.

304 b. <u>A New Mind-Set</u>. In the information age the strategic, operational and
305 tactical levels are more interrelated than in the past, which demands a
306 different quality of co-ordination and C2 across the levels of engagement.
307 Today's military operations to counter the complex challenges of the
308 global security environment require consideration and integration of the
309 information factor throughout all processes – analysis, planning, execution
310 and assessment. This integration demands that all decision-makers at all
311 times appropriately understand the (possible) effects of their actions in the
312 information environment: it is not just about deliberate activity using
313 information through means of communication; it is the combination of
314 words and deeds that delivers the ultimate effect. A respective systemic
315 understanding of the information environment should result in a consistent
316 and coherent orchestration of all available means, comparable to the
317 military concept of 'combined arms combat' or the philosophy of 'jointness'
318 in operational art. This is a new mind-set, which requires comprehensive
319 *education and training* rather than restructuring military organisations.
320 Education and training are long-term processes and must be addressed
321 as soon as possible.

322 c. <u>Advice and Co-ordination</u>. The Info Ops function is understood as an
323 integrating process rather than a capability in its own right. It provides
324 advice to the commander and his[24] staff on effects and possible
325 information activities, and proposes solutions from a generalist's
326 perspective, based on a comprehensive and systemic understanding of
327 relevant factors of the operational environment, including cross-cultural
328 communication. This includes the preparation, integration, monitoring and
329 assessment of capability contributions, and the co-ordination of actions to
330 create synchronised effects considering their relationships and
331 interdependencies and associated resources as a function of time and
332 space. Co-ordination[25] is related to the harmonisation of actions and
333 effects to promote desired (and avoid undesired) effects. Synchronisation
334 is related to the timing of actions and considers time dependencies of
335 effects. The MNIOE approach applies a *'process management philosophy'*
336 to Info Ops and stipulates cooperative arrangements – instead of
337 command relationships and a fixed allocation of capabilities to Info Ops –
338 with the aim of full scope co-ordination and integration of options, and
339 better flexibility and adaptability to mission and situation requirements.

---

[24] Throughout the document, pronouns are to be understood gender-neutral; they should neither reveal nor imply
the gender or sex of a person.

[25] **'Co-ordination'** refers to consultation in order to forge common action or harmonisation in a concerted
manner. Co-ordination activities can involve both subordinates as well as those organisations over which the
commander has no authority. Co-ordination results in carefully planned and executed activity in which the
various elements involved in an operation – military and civil – are harmonised in such a manner as to provide
the greatest advantage to the overall mission. Co-ordination does not require command relationships
(subordination) but active participation of all involved. The co-ordination process usually is organised by the
assignment of Coordinating Authority.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

340 110. <u>Focus of Info Ops</u>.   An actor's effectiveness is a function of will,[26]
341 understanding[27] and capability[28]. In other words, actors must have the will to
342 act, an understanding of the situation to act, and possess the capability to act. If
343 any one of these elements is not in place, their ability to act in the way they
344 want to will be affected. Generally conflict focused, military campaigns have, in
345 the past, aimed primarily at affecting an adversary's capability, with the
346 secondary aim of affecting his will. Activities advised by and coordinated
347 through Info Ops address all three dimensions, i.e., influencing will, affecting
348 understanding, and targeting those capabilities that promote understanding or
349 the application of will – ultimately in order to change behaviour.

350 Effects in the information environment can be created by a variety of military
351 activities, the close co-ordination of which will contribute to the achievement of
352 Information Objectives. Info Ops covers three inter-related activity areas:

353 • Activities that focus on changing, influencing, or reinforcing perceptions
354 and attitudes of adversaries and other approved parties.

355 • Activities that focus on preserving and protecting own/friendly freedom of
356 manoeuvre in the information environment by defending the data and
357 information that supports own/friendly decision-makers and decision-
358 making processes.

359 • Activities that focus on countering command functions and capabilities,
360 by affecting the data and information that support adversaries and other
361 approved parties, and are used in C2, ISTAR, and weapon systems.

362 111. The Info Ops function ideally considers the full range of military operations. The
363 following are examples of how to support mission accomplishment in all military
364 operations by creating effects in the information environment:

365 a. <u>Will</u>.   Military activities may be aimed at actors at any level capable of
366 influencing the situation.

367 (1) Military activities can influence other actors' will and undermine
368 cohesion. For example, questioning the legitimacy of leadership and
369 cause may weaken their moral power base, separating leadership
370 from supporters (political, military and public), thus degrading their
371 desire to continue and affecting their actions.

372 (2) Military activities can protect those capabilities – for example friendly
373 command, control and communications infrastructure – that allow us to
374 exercise effective command, and to seize and maintain the initiative.
375 Countering adversary attempts to influence the will of own/friendly
376 actors can isolate the adversary, maintain coalition cohesion and
377 enhance own freedom of action.

378 b. <u>Understanding</u>.   Military activities may seek to affect the information
379 available to other actors in order to influence their understanding of a
380 given situation.

---

[26] **'Will'** includes factors such as motivation, intent, attitude, beliefs and values.
[27] **'Understanding'** includes an actor's perceptions of a given situation and an actor's situational awareness of
that situation.
[28] A **'capability'** is understood as a combination of ways and means to perform tasks or create an effect under
specified conditions.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

(1)   Military activities can deny, degrade, disrupt and manipulate the information available to a decision-maker in order to affect perception and thereby understanding. Manipulation of information in these ways may directly affect the decisions and actions of other actors, enabling own/friendly Information Superiority[29].

(2)   Military activities can also ensure that the information available to friendly decision-makers is safeguarded and assured. In this way, shared understanding between partners will be possible (provided the appropriate mechanisms are in place), thus improving own/friendly decision-making and effectiveness. In addition, providing factual information to other approved parties can gain their support or undermine efforts of an adversary attempting to gain support from them.

c.   Capability.   Military activities may affect those capabilities – such as command, control and communications infrastructure and facilities – that support understanding a situation, decision-making, and the application of will (i.e., focused action):

(1)   Military activities can degrade, disrupt, deceive, destroy or deny those capabilities that allow adversary decision-makers to increase their understanding; bolster, impose, apply and sustain their will; and to exercise effective command. Military activities can also attack the source of the adversary decision-maker's power base, splitting internal and external groupings and alliances. In addition, they can be directed at any information-based processes that enable the employment of weapon systems.

(2)   Military activities can protect those capabilities that allow us to exercise effective command, and seize and maintain the initiative. Capabilities can be protected directly by providing materiel and advice, or indirectly by targeting those adversary capabilities that could be used for an attack.

112.   Summary.   The military Info Ops function will support the integration of the information factor in analysis, planning, execution and assessment of military operations – and complement respective education and training efforts. Info Ops advice and co-ordination will integrate military activities to influence will and understanding; affect capabilities; exploit information and information systems; protect own information and information systems; and counter adverse information activities.

---

[29]   **'Information Superiority'** is the state of a relative superior ability of an actor to collect, process, and disseminate information compared to competitors in the same arena and to draw an operational advantage from it. (Based on: USA JP 1-02 – Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.)

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Section III – Principles of Information Operations

113. <u>Effects-Based Approach to Operations</u>.   Modern military operations are likely to be more efficiently conducted by adopting an effects-based approach. The individual elements that comprise an effects-based approach are not new; it is a philosophical change in the way to plan, conduct and assess operations. It puts a stronger focus on cause and effect *versus* target-centric attrition. Effects-based thinking facilitates the appropriate build-up of forces, effective C2, comprehensive targeting and flexible plan execution; enhances the ability to task-tailor forces according to desired effects; and supports the integration of multinational contributions across the spectrum of levers of power and all stages of conflict – from pre-crisis (peacetime) to post-conflict. It involves the coherent planning, execution and assessment of actions by all involved organisations – together with the use of modern technology and novel approaches to enhance situational understanding – that brings new possibilities to the way future operations will be conducted.

114. Info Ops is an integral part of the military application of the effects-based approach, intended to achieve synergy through the co-ordination and synchronisation of military information activities integrated with other actions. The Info Ops integrating function involves the selective combination of lethal and non-lethal effects, kinetic and non-kinetic means to achieve campaign objectives.

115. <u>Commander's Direction and Personal Involvement</u>.   The commander's personal involvement drives Info Ops, and exercises control over all Info Ops activity within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down the chain of command. Following mission analysis, the commander formulates his initial intent, which reflects higher guidance. Tactical level planning is based on that intent, which must have a clearly defined military end state and identify the effects required to achieve the relevant objectives. Without this guidance, the Info Ops effort will lack focus and will not support the creation of desired effects.

116. <u>Close Co-ordination and Sequencing</u>.   The very nature of Info Ops and the large, diverse target set means that there needs to be very close integration within a command, and consistency with mission-specific strategic and political guidance for information activities. All plans and activities must be coordinated, de-conflicted and synchronised up, down and across the chain of command with other military, political and civil activities in order that one activity does not compromise, negate or diminish the desired effect of another.

117. <u>Centralised Planning and Decentralised Execution</u>.   Due to the requirement for full integration of the Info Ops function, the principles of centralised planning and decentralised execution apply at all command levels. However, centralised execution may be required for certain types of targeted information activities, when all involved force elements are required to adhere rigidly to a plan, or where strategic assets are used.

118. <u>Input to Joint Targeting</u>.   Effective targeting requires a detailed understanding of the operational environment and the commander's objectives. Military

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

463 information activities may include a wide range of actions and will be conducted
464 by kinetic and/or non-kinetic means delivering lethal and/or non-lethal effects.
465 The relevant functional/capability experts and the Info Ops staff identify effects
466 in the information environment required to achieve the commander's objectives
467 and a range of actions that, when integrated into the overall campaign plan, will
468 achieve those objectives. Info Ops will co-ordinate the assessment of the
469 (possible) impact of activity and propose appropriate action.

470 119. <u>Early Involvement and Timely Preparation</u>.   Info Ops involvement in planning
471 must start early, because both planning and execution take time and results can
472 be slow to emerge.   Hence, a commander's intent towards the information
473 environment, and direction as part of the planning process, must be given at the
474 earliest opportunity. Info Ops staffs need to be fully involved in the planning
475 process to integrate the information factor within the overall campaign plan.

476 120. <u>Monitoring and Assessment</u>.   The successful prosecution of Info Ops relies on
477 continuous monitoring and assessment of the short and long-term effects of
478 interrelated activities, directed towards Information Objectives. Particular
479 attention should be paid to changes in the adversary's behaviour and such
480 other items as changes in the attitude of the civilian population, political activity,
481 and expressions of unrest. Also, changes in an adversary's capability may be
482 used as an indicator for measuring success, e.g., reduced efficiency,
483 disorganisation and slower reactions to events and specific actions in response
484 to deception.

Section IV – Capabilities, Tools and Techniques

486 121. <u>Military Capabilities and Functions</u>.   Military capabilities provide the ability to
487 create a desired effect in a specific operational environment. Capabilities can be
488 people, assets, means and methods, as well as structures, systems and
489 specific characteristics of these. Functions are generally performed by staff
490 activities for the purpose of orchestrating available capabilities to achieve
491 mission objectives.

492 122. The Info Ops function is concerned with integrating activities affecting
493 information and/or information systems to create desired effects using military
494 capabilities. Various capabilities and functions may contribute information
495 activities by either applying their full scope of actions or parts of it, on a
496 permanent or temporary basis, as determined by the commander. Info Ops
497 must be applied to the whole spectrum of military operations and meet the
498 requirements for asymmetric warfare and networked operations in the light of
499 rapid technological developments in order to combine the valuable contributions
500 of various (national) military capabilities. Specific military capabilities and
501 functions required for performing information activities can be derived from their
502 defined purpose and their role related to information and information systems.

503 123. The three inter-related activity areas described in Paragraph 110 can make use
504 of all or any capability or activity that can exert influence, affect understanding
505 or have a counter-command effect; the extent is only limited by imagination,
506 availability, policy, doctrine and legal constraints. However, there are several
507 capabilities, tools and techniques that form the basis of most activity affecting

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

508 the information environment. Information Objectives can be achieved by the
509 planned co-ordination and synchronisation of military capabilities, tools and
510 techniques to create effects on information or information systems, such as
511 direct and indirect communication, and by using the electromagnetic spectrum
512 or computer networks. The use of force, such as coercion and destruction, may
513 also combine with those means, e.g., by delivery of specifically targeted fires,
514 which can create considerable effects in the information environment. Clearly,
515 many of these tools and techniques have a much wider application than just in
516 the information environment though the potential unintended effects of such
517 activity must always be considered.

518 124. Identification of force capability shortfalls is an important aim of multinational
519 CD&E efforts in the armed forces' transformation process. This document
520 provides a broad description of the *scope and scale of military activities* suitable
521 to affect information and/or information systems – with a view on current and
522 emerging capabilities – and suggests related capability requirements for future
523 multinational operations. The following paragraphs[30] provide examples of
524 capabilities, tools and techniques that can be used for achieving Information
525 Objectives.

526 125. <u>Key Leaders Engagement</u>.   Key Leaders Engagement (KLE) is the planned
527 and coordinated use of the senior leadership of the friendly force to influence
528 key decision-makers / opinion shapers / influencers / leaders in the assigned
529 area of operations in support of the commander's objectives. Related
530 information activities include:

531 a. bilateral talks (BILATs) of senior leaders with military and civilian
532 counterparts at their level of influence;

533 b. speeches held at various occasions in the presence of the media and/or
534 key decision makers;

535 c. featured interviews to selected media with wide influence;

536 d. conferences arranged to discuss specific items of interest with influential
537 characters.

538 126. The commander may delegate selected members of his command group and
539 special staff to perform respective high-level functions. In particular, the Political
540 Adviser (POLAD) may be able to exert influence on high-ranking civil actors
541 such as local government authorities or representatives of the International
542 Community. The Chief Public Affairs Officer (CPAO) is the primary contact for
543 the media[31]; he is authorised to speak on behalf of the commander, and is
544 responsible for the dissemination of messages to the media throughout the
545 operation, in consultation with the Chief Info Ops.

546 127. As part of the Info Ops contribution to an operation it is vital that all key actors
547 and their inter-relationships are identified. Having detailed knowledge of
548 relevant stakeholders' personalities, leadership styles, ambitions, motivations,
549 objectives (short and long term), current stances, dependencies, psychological
550 profiles and personal histories will be essential to provide the context to plan

---

[30] The sequencing of the paragraphs is not meant to indicate any order of priority, nor does it propose any
standard allocation of capabilities/activities to the Info Ops function.
[31] This function may also be performed by the Spokesperson (if established).

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

appropriate information activities. An important component in all plans will be to recognise the complex, adaptive relationships and dependencies that exist between actors. The Info Ops staff will compile dossiers – based on INTEL products and input provided by other functions/capabilities, such as PSYOPS, CIMIC, etc. – that present relevant background information on key actors to be engaged (e.g., *curricula vitae*) and other information in support of targeted messaging (similar to traditional 'target folders').

128. The Info Ops staff coordinates the Key Leaders Engagement Plan (KLEP), the purpose of which is to de-conflict and streamline command group information activities. It provides an overview of actors, dates and times, locations, contents and objectives, related to specific milestones of an operation. Info Ops responsibilities include the tracking and assessment of the KLEP, in close co-ordination with the CPAO.

129. Psychological Operations.   Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are planned psychological activities using methods of communication – including media products and face-to-face communication – and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. PSYOPS are conducted to convey selected information and indicators to governments, organisations, populations, groups and individuals, with the aim of ultimately changing their behaviour and decisions. Successful PSYOPS weaken the will of an adversary, reinforce the feelings and stimulate the co-operation of the loyal and sympathetic, and gain the support of the uncommitted.

130. PSYOPS contribute to create effects in the information environment by affecting the decision-making of selected actors either directly and/or indirectly through addressing their respective public or military forces.

131. Electronic Warfare.   Electronic Warfare (EW) includes military actions to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum which encompasses the interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions; the employment of electromagnetic energy to reduce or prevent adversary use of the electromagnetic spectrum; and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.

132. EW comprises the disciplines of Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Protective Measures (EPM):

   a. ECM offer an alternative to the use of physical force on information systems. Furthermore, the footprint of PSYOPS broadcasts may be enhanced and deception supported by the coordinated use of ECM.

   b. ESM provide information and INTEL as part of All-Source Intelligence at all levels for Info Ops analysis, planning and assessment.

   c. EPM is critical for all operations and can support Operations Security (OPSEC) and Force Protection objectives of the force commander.

133. Overall, EW can support operations so that critical information on which an adversary will make a decision, or the information systems for carrying such information, can be affected to own advantage.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

594　134. <u>Computer Network Operations</u>[32].　Computer Network Operations (CNO) use
595　　　　technically advanced approaches to enter computer networks and attack or
596　　　　exploit the data, the processes or the hardware; they include activities against
597　　　　the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems as
598　　　　well as protective measures.

599　135. CNO comprises the interrelated activities of Computer Network Exploitation
600　　　　(CNE), Computer Network Attack (CNA), and Computer Network Defence
601　　　　(CND).

602　　　　a. CNE provides the ability to get information about computer systems, to
603　　　　　　gain access to information hosted on computer systems and the ability to
604　　　　　　make use of the information and the system itself.

605　　　　b. CNA are operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
606　　　　　　resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
607　　　　　　networks themselves.

608　　　　c. CND includes the preventive protection of own computer systems and
609　　　　　　measures to block and counter adversary CNA and CNE.

610　136. <u>Operations Security</u>.　OPSEC is an analytical process intended to reduce the
611　　　　risk to a military operation by adversary INTEL exploitation and maintain
612　　　　freedom of action by preventing adversary foreknowledge of friendly
613　　　　dispositions, capabilities and intentions. The OPSEC process:

614　　　　a. identifies critical information and determines what indicators hostile INTEL
615　　　　　　systems may obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive
616　　　　　　critical information in time to be useful to adversaries;

617　　　　b. analyses the susceptibility of information to exploitation by hostile INTEL
618　　　　　　systems (vulnerabilities);

619　　　　c. analyses hostile INTEL systems and operational capabilities, motivation,
620　　　　　　and intentions designed to detect and exploit vulnerabilities (threat
621　　　　　　analysis);

622　　　　d. assesses the potential degree to which critical information is subject to
623　　　　　　loss through hostile exploitation (risk analysis);

624　　　　e. selects and executes counter-measures that eliminate or reduce to an
625　　　　　　acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions that may be exploited
626　　　　　　by adversaries.

627　137. OPSEC is concerned with the achievement of secrecy and surprise in military
628　　　　operations and activities through protection of capabilities and intentions from
629　　　　hostile INTEL exploitation. The ultimate objective is to prevent an adversary
630　　　　from obtaining sufficient information in a timely manner to predict and degrade
631　　　　own operations or capabilities. Effective OPSEC contributes to Information
632　　　　Superiority.

633　138. OPSEC also reduces or negates the signatures of indicators which could be
634　　　　pieced together to reveal critical information already protected by established
635　　　　security procedures such as Information Systems Security (INFOSEC),
636　　　　Communications Security (COMSEC), Computer Security (COMPUSEC),
637　　　　Document Security, Physical Security and Personnel Security. OPSEC

---

[32]　In NATO, CNO is defined as 'Cyberwar' and also includes 'Cyber Defence'.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

638
639
640
641 concentrates on those activities that could indicate the existence of an organisation, impending operation, or its details, reveal intentions, dispositions, capabilities and potential vulnerabilities. These activities are then given additional protection using a range of counter-measures.

642
643
644
645
646 139. Military Public Affairs[33]. Military Public Affairs (PA) is the function responsible for promoting the force's military aims and objectives to the public in order to enhance awareness and understanding of the mission. This includes planning and conducting media relations, internal communication and community relations.

647
648
649
650
651 140. In a democracy, military forces are responsible and accountable to the public for the performance of their mission. PA is the primary means to reach the general public. Therefore, PA is a command responsibility of the highest priority. PA at each level of command directly supports the commander, and may therefore not be further delegated or subordinated to other staff functions.

652
653
654
655
656
657 141. PA activities are information activities. PA is a key contributor of effects in the information environment and has an important role in implementing an Information Strategy. Therefore, other information activities must be closely coordinated with PA in order to ensure consistency in the message released by the military to outside audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the campaign.

658
659
660
661
662
663
664 142. Civil-Military Co-operation. Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the military and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies[34]. CIMIC facilitates co-operation between a military force and all parts of the civilian environment within the assigned area of operations by civil-military liaison, support to the civil environment, and support to the force. This includes:

665
666
667   a. considering social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations;

668
669   b. liaison and co-ordination with International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs);

670
671
672   c. forging an effective relationship between the military and indigenous civilian authorities, organisations, agencies and populations within the area of operations.

673
674
675 143. The CIMIC staff need to establish relations with a variety of civilian authorities and agencies, and will be a valuable source of information to assist planning for information activities. CIMIC also needs to coordinate with other capabilities that

---

[33] Also known as 'Public Information'.
[34] The meanwhile widely accepted NATO term 'CIMIC', which describes a military capability, must not be confused with the **'Civil-Military Co-ordination'** concepts of the European Union (CMCO) or the United Nations (CMCoord): CMCO in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU's response to the crisis; the approach of UN-CMCoord is designed to address the need for co-ordination of the activities of international civilian humanitarian actors, especially the UN humanitarian agencies, and international military forces in an international humanitarian emergency.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

676 address civil audiences and affect civil information systems in order to assist the
677 creation and sustainment of conditions that support the achievement of the
678 commander's objectives. Depending on the situation and mission requirements
679 CIMIC activities (within the scope of CIMIC tasks) may directly contribute to
680 influence key decision makers or become part of a campaign to win the trust
681 and co-operation of the local populace.

682 144. <u>Troop Information</u>[35].   An inherent part of leadership and training for each
683 commanding officer is the responsibility for keeping all personnel under his
684 command informed of the situation, their role in the mission, their personal
685 responsibilities, and the strengths and weaknesses of the unit which they serve.

686 145. Troop Information programs generally are designed to help instil in each
687 individual the qualities and character traits required of a combat effective
688 soldier. This includes theatre specific cultural awareness and the
689 implementation of appropriate 'rules of behaviour'. In addition, Troop
690 Information can support Counter-Intelligence (CI) awareness and prevent
691 hostile propaganda from becoming effective. Commanders establish Troop
692 Information programs to fulfil the particular needs of their commands. To the
693 extent possible, Troop Information should be conducted at the lowest unit level
694 to facilitate communication and exchange of ideas between the unit leader and
695 the individual soldier.

696 146. The central contents of Troop Information programs must be in concert with the
697 Information Strategy, harmonised throughout the national contingent of each
698 multinational partner, and should, wherever possible, be coordinated between
699 the nations. Info Ops staffs should be kept well informed of their commanders'
700 Troop Information programs to be able to consider own vulnerabilities and
701 adjust Info Ops advice appropriately. Products of Troop Information programs
702 must be in line with PA media guidance and internal communication activities.

703 147. <u>Special Forces and Forces for Special Operations</u>.   Special Operations Forces
704 (SOF) are specially designated, organised, trained and equipped forces using
705 operational techniques and modes of employment not standard for conventional
706 forces. SOF activities are conducted across the full range of military operations
707 independently or in co-ordination with operations of conventional forces to
708 achieve political, military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-
709 military considerations may require clandestine, covert or discreet techniques
710 and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with
711 conventional operations.

712 148. SOF can support the assessment of the information environment and provide
713 effective information activities, e.g.:

714 a. Special Reconnaissance (SR) involves a wide range of information
715 gathering activities that focus on strategic or operational objectives
716 designed to give the commander time sensitive information with human
717 insight. SR is the conduct of environmental reconnaissance, target
718 acquisition, area assessment, post-strike assessment, emplacement and
719 recovery of sensors, or support of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and
720 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations.

---

[35]   Also known as 'Command Information'.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

b. Direct Action (DA) includes raid, ambush, direct assault, obstacle clearance, and anti-ship operations in pursuit of important targets located within hostile or denied territory. DA targets may be hostile key personnel as well as important elements of information infrastructure.

c. Military Assistance (MA) to foreign states includes education and training, and other military support. When conducted within multinational operations, MA activities must be consistent and conform to the campaign objectives.

149. SOF need to participate in Info Ops co-ordination efforts in order to promote common awareness of activities relevant to information and information systems, and to ensure consistency of the overall appearance of the force.

150. Presence, Posture and Profile.   The impact that the mere presence of a force may have on perceptions can be significant. Deploying even limited capability to the right place at the right time can add substantial credibility to messages being delivered through other channels and provide a major contribution to deterrence. The posture of troops on the ground can demonstrate both commitment and intent and must be considered and balanced with the requirements of force protection. The public profile of commanders at all levels will impact on perceptions and therefore the public role of the commander must be carefully analysed and opportunities used to transmit key messages.

151. Military activities and characteristics such as troop presence, posture and profile as well as the performance of the individual soldier in the field bear information content and can be intentionally employed to affect information and/or information systems to create desired effects. Info Ops should contribute to the co-ordination and synchronisation of these elements of military operations to assist full integration of the overall campaign.

152. Deception.   Deception is complex and demands considerable effort and a sound understanding of an adversary's way of thinking. Deception operations require an active OPSEC program to deny critical information about both actual and deceptive activities. Knowledge of deception plans must be carefully protected and a 'need-to-know' criterion must be applied to each aspect of the deception operation. Deception during operations can directly contribute to the achievement of surprise and indirectly to security and economy of effort. Ultimately, deception operations must not affect the credibility of the forces and/or political authorities. Info Ops planners must be involved in deception planning in order to ensure that information activities are properly employed in support of deception operations.

153. Physical Destruction.   Physical destruction of adversary capabilities – such as massive strikes on enemy forces – in co-ordination with information activities can have enormous effect in support of own objectives. Physical destruction can also create effects on decisive adversary information infrastructure. However, destruction of (elements of) adversary information systems in many cases may not be desirable/proportional or attainable/supportable, in particular concerning those parts of information systems that are required for further exploitation or that may lead to complete denial of information if destroyed. Related effects may be obtained through the use of air-delivered munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles and SOF. Tactical resources such as naval gunfire,

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

768   artillery and manoeuvre forces may also be used to contribute to create effects
769   on information and information systems. In order to appropriately consider these
770   kinetic options and advise on desired and undesired effects, the Info Ops staff
771   needs to be involved in the targeting process, addressing the whole scope of
772   hard and soft targets.

773   154. <u>Counter-Intelligence</u>.   CI includes those activities which identify, assess and
774   counter potential and/or actual threats to the forces' mission and personnel
775   posed by intelligence collection activities of hostile INTEL services,
776   organisations, or individuals engaged in terrorism, espionage, sabotage,
777   subversion, and/or organised crime. CI needs to participate in Info Ops co-
778   ordination efforts in order to promote common awareness of activities relevant
779   to the information environment.

780   155. Related Enabling Disciplines.

781   a.   <u>Networked Operations</u>[36].   Networked operations consist of C2 and
782   employment of capabilities based on a joint, inter-echelon and
783   interoperable information network – including procedures, organisation
784   and technology – that links all involved personnel, agencies, units and
785   facilities as well as sensors and effectors. They impact all levels of military
786   activity from the tactical to the strategic. At the operational level,
787   networked operations provide commanders with the capability to generate
788   precise effects at an unprecedented operational tempo, creating
789   conditions for the rapid interruption of adversary courses of action. A
790   networked force is linked or networked by an information infrastructure
791   that enables capabilities to share and exchange information among the
792   geographically distributed elements of the force: sensors (regardless of
793   platform); actors and effectors (regardless of service); and decision
794   makers and supporting organisations (regardless of location). In short, a
795   networked force is an interoperable force, a force that has global access to
796   assured information whenever and wherever needed. Across a broad
797   spectrum of mission areas, evidence of the power of networked military
798   operations is emerging from experiments and exercises. Empirical
799   evidence collected to date indicates a strong correlation between
800   information sharing, improved situational awareness and understanding,
801   and significantly increased combat power; this is the actual force multiplier
802   effect. A common theme in this evidence is the critical role of modified (in
803   some cases new) tactics, techniques and procedures, which enable
804   personnel to use an information advantage effectively, enhance C2 and
805   action effectiveness, as well as to provide input into the Common Relevant
806   Operational Picture (CROP)[37]. Info Ops constitutes a basic function in
807   networked operations as the related co-ordination effort contributes to
808   achieving Information Superiority and effective C2.

---

[36]   See Glossary for definition and reference, as well as related other/alternative concepts.
[37]   A **'CROP'** is a rules-based picture of the operating environment that presents data in a way that is relational to
the user or the environment. This promotes interagency and cross-jurisdictional information sharing by giving
each user access to the information that they need based on their security clearances and organisational
needs.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

809	b.	<u>Intelligence</u>. The purpose of INTEL is to support political and military
810		authorities in the planning, execution, and assessment of military
811		operations in peace, crisis and conflict. INTEL generates the basics for
812		military planning, to include assessment and targeting, and provides an
813		indispensable prerequisite for effective C2. INTEL also provides the
814		Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), the resources and
815		instruments that enable military capabilities to operate effectively.
816		Furthermore, it supports effects assessment by observing changes or
817		responses following friendly actions on the (potential) adversary or others.
818		The ultimate aim of the INTEL process is to produce relevant information
819		from all sources in a comprehensive, responsive, and timely manner, so
820		that military decision-makers may gain and maintain an information
821		advantage over an adversary. The Info Ops staff will have to closely
822		cooperate with the INTEL community during preparation, planning,
823		execution and assessment of operations. This is especially crucial in terms
824		of coordinating information activities with INTEL operations to prevent
825		interference by one with the other. Further, accurate and timely advice by
826		INTEL to Info Ops is fundamental to the success of the Info Ops function.
827		Successful military information activities must be founded on effective
828		INTEL support. Attributes of effective INTEL include timely, accurate, and
829		relevant information about adversaries, other approved parties, and the
830		operational environment. The Info Ops staff should work closely with the
831		INTEL staff to define those INTEL requirements necessary to plan,
832		execute and assess the effectiveness of military information activities.
833	c.	<u>Command & Control Support</u>. The C2 Support function includes
834		information management, processing and transfer as well as information
835		security functions. C2 Support contributes to achieving and maintaining
836		Information Superiority and effective C2. This comprises the use of IT to
837		support information transfer, processing, representation, storage,
838		management, as well as locating, directing, identification, navigation and
839		security functions. C2 Support enables a wide range of activities to
840		become effective on own and other's information and/or information
841		systems, and therefore require specific consideration for Info Ops advice
842		and co-ordination.
843	d.	<u>Knowledge Management</u>. Knowledge Management (KM) is the process
844		of purposeful handling, direction, government or control of the acquisition,
845		validation, production, transfer, and integration of information and explicit
846		knowledge to support comprehensive/holistic situational understanding in
847		a multidimensional scenario/environment. KM deals with the fact that
848		contemporary operational commanders are faced with data and
849		information overload from multiple sources beyond traditional military
850		perspectives. Yet they lack sufficient means to synthesise data and
851		information to provide the key actionable knowledge required for timely
852		and effective operational decision-making. KM leverages state-of-the art
853		knowledge processing, abstraction, inference and retrieval tools and
854		methods to contribute to the provision of actionable knowledge. KM
855		specifies business rules and best practices to encourage a Cross-Domain
856		Collaborative Information Environment (CD-CIE) during multinational

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

857 operations. KM can be considered as an enabler of the CD-CIE, but on the
858 other hand will benefit from such a well orchestrated framework –
859 particularly in terms of mutual knowledge exchange and perceptual co-
860 ordination between participating parties. KM enables a wide range of
861 activities – both synchronous and asynchronous – to become effective on
862 information and/or information systems, and therefore require specific
863 consideration for Info Ops co-ordination.

864 e. Multinational Information Sharing. Unity of effort is essential to achieve
865 consistency of word and action in multinational operations. This is
866 achieved as much by co-ordination and consensus-building as it is by
867 unity of command. Unity of effort has broad implications on planning and
868 decision-making processes, and the execution of operations. Information
869 is the source of knowledge; the ability to manipulate information and
870 knowledge confers power. Information sharing or collaboration is the
871 cornerstone in building a relationship of trust and confidence between
872 partner nations and commanders. The sharing of information in a
873 multinational body to create a multinational Knowledge Base is enabled by
874 Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS). This is of particular relevance for
875 INTEL. Effective MNIS is a prerequisite for mission accomplishment and
876 supports all aspects of multinational operations, including Info Ops.
877 Arrangements and techniques for MNIS should be established and
878 practiced in peacetime in order to be effective in crisis, enhance Alliance
879 cohesion, and facilitate a coalition building process.

880 f. Interagency Co-ordination. Interagency co-ordination at all levels is
881 critical for the success of operations since it builds the link between the
882 different instruments and elements of national power. Concepts emerge to
883 outline structures and procedures for interagency co-ordination at the
884 operational level. They inter alia aim at facilitating information sharing
885 throughout the multinational interagency community and bringing cross-
886 government expertise, perspective and understanding to the planning,
887 execution/management and assessment/evaluation processes. Civil
888 experts involved in interagency co-ordination as Subject Matter Experts
889 (SMEs) may belong to governmental organisations and agencies
890 operating worldwide or regionally/locally. They can contribute their
891 knowledge, views and perceptions to Systems Analysis within the
892 Knowledge Development (KD)[38] process and support liaison to civil actors
893 during the conduct of operations. As Info Ops will orchestrate military
894 information activities in conjunction with other activities to form a
895 synergistic entity, Info Ops participation in interagency co-ordination at all
896 levels and throughout planning, execution/management and assessment/
897 evaluation is essential.

---

[38] See Chapter 3, Section II: 'Info Ops in the Effects-Based Operations Process – Knowledge Development'.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

918
919
Chapter 2 – Info Ops Advice and Co-ordination Process and Staff Requirements

920
Section I – Info Ops Generic Process Model

921 201. The purpose of the generic process model for Info Ops is to provide a
922 comprehensive overview of the role of the Info Ops function in general staff
923 activities at the (military) operational level required for analysis, planning,
924 execution and assessment of operations. It describes the Info Ops contributions
925 to military processes at the operational level of command, interfaces to higher
926 and lower levels as well as to civil processes and products, relationships within
927 the decision and execution cycle, and assumptions on the integration of military
928 information activities within a comprehensive approach.

929 202. The generic Info Ops process model is primarily intended to explain the
930 essentials of the Info Ops function to military practitioners – commanders and
931 their staffs – and enable them to better understand the added value of this
932 emerging concept and initial ideas for its implementation. Furthermore, this
933 model should also inform other government departments and civil partners of
934 the military view on information activities in order to facilitate the required
935 military and civil interaction within a comprehensive approach.

936
937 **Figure 2: Generic Military Operational Level Processes**

938 203. A generic Info Ops process model should be applicable to the whole scope of
939 military activities within a comprehensive approach. As the Info Ops function
940 constitutes an integral part of military analysis, planning, execution and

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

941 assessment, a generic process model for Info Ops should also refer to generic
942 military processes and their related civil interfaces without considering extant
943 concepts such as the NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP) or other
944 specific models used in current CD&E.

945 204. The mutually complementing processes of analysis, planning, execution and
946 assessment are interconnected by feedback loops, and proceed iteratively and
947 in parallel. Each process is characterised by input and output relations, specific
948 staff activities, and performing actors in their specific roles. Altogether these
949 features frame a generic model for military operational level processes (see
950 Figure 3).

951 205. The generic Info Ops process model encompasses the contributions of the Info
952 Ops function to the four identified generic processes at the military operational
953 level as well as the interfaces to higher and lower levels, and to related civil
954 processes.

955

956 **Figure 3: Model of the Info Ops Function and Civil-Military Interfaces**

957 206. Info Ops contribution to military <u>analysis</u> should concentrate on the provision of
958 guidance to the analysis and evaluation of the information environment, and the
959 development of an estimate of the state of the information environment,
960 including assumptions on future developments. Info Ops will promote enhanced
961 situational awareness and understanding regarding the information
962 environment.

963 207. Info Ops contribution to military <u>planning</u> should concentrate on a continuous
964 dialogue between the Info Ops staff and joint planners on the analysis and
965 assessment of the information environment. This will facilitate the integration of
966 the information factor (relevant aspects of the information environment and

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

967 possible information activities) into plans and the co-ordination of relevant
968 functional/ capability experts' contributions. Military Info Ops staff will also
969 provide input to the development of mission-specific strategic and political
970 guidance for military and civil information activities.

971 208. Info Ops contribution to military <u>execution</u> of operations should concentrate on
972 the co-ordination of functional/capability experts' contributions to the
973 execution/implementation of plans regarding information activities, and the
974 possible effects of military actions in the information environment. This will be
975 based on superior guidance provided for civil and military information activities.

976 209. Info Ops contribution to military <u>assessment</u> of operations should concentrate
977 on the collaborative evaluation of insights provided by the functional/capability
978 experts and the identification of de-conflication and/or co-operation requirements
979 regarding effects in the information environment. This will also contribute to
980 enhanced situational awareness and understanding – and finally the integration
981 of the information factor in military and civil actions.

982 ## Section II – Info Ops in the Decision and Execution Cycle

983 210. Military C2 is the process of exercising authority and direction by a commander
984 over assigned and attached forces. It is about focusing the efforts of resources
985 toward the accomplishment of a mission. C2 consists of several functions, to
986 include: establish a common understanding of the commander's intent;
987 determine roles, responsibilities, and relationships; establish rules and
988 constraints; monitor and assess the situation and progress.[39]

989 211. The 'OODA Loop' (Observe–Orient–Decide–Act)[40] is a generic and simplified
990 model of the decision and execution cycle continuously applied by commanders
991 and their staff. Each activity is based on input from the previous activity and
992 provides the basis for the next activity. The 'OODA Loop' model basically
993 remains valid throughout the scope of security actions in complex contingencies
994 and emergencies, but its focus changes in the framework of modern information
995 societies. In conventional war speed was crucial to completing the decision-
996 making process – it got you inside your opponent's OODA Loop. We have to
997 use a different approach in today's crisis/conflict prevention and resolution
998 activities: stressing speed above all else does not make sense in interventions
999 that can last a decade or more. Today, we still need to act speedily, but the
1000 focus must be more on accuracy (developed in the 'observe-orient segment' of
1001 the loop).

1002 212. Decision makers must understand what they see before they decide what to do.
1003 To date, network-centric concepts have focused on shortening the 'sensor-to-
1004 shooter' step (or: the 'decide-act segment' of the OODA Loop). Now, we must
1005 focus on improving the quality of the 'observe-orient segment'. Even more
1006 important, the OODA Loop expands to track not just our opponent's reaction,
1007 but how the entire operational environment is reacting – our forces, the host
1008 nation, Coalition partners, civil actors, and even our own population.[41]

---

[39] For further details on C2 functions see: D. Alberts, R. Hayes: Understanding Command and Control (2006).
[40] J. Boyd: An Organic Design for Command and Control – A Discourse on Winning and Losing (1987).
[41] Based on: Thomas X. Hammes: Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks (2006).

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1009
1010 **Figure 4**: **Info Ops in the Decision and Execution Cycle**

1011 213. The OODA Loop can be used to illustrate the importance of the information
1012 factor for effective decision-making and C2. This model can also facilitate the
1013 identification of generic leverage points for information activities (see Figure 4
1014 above).

1015 214. During the 'Observation' activity, Info Ops contribute to the identification of
1016 essential information requirements and advise on the information environment,
1017 in order to improve situational awareness. The impact of own information
1018 activities on other actors' Observation activity is primarily directed at their
1019 information systems to affect their capability to collect, process, and
1020 disseminate information, and the information itself.

1021 215. During the 'Orientation' activity, Info Ops contribute to the development of
1022 shared situational understanding by providing specific expertise and analytical
1023 skills related to the information environment, its system dynamics and inherent
1024 cause-and-effect relationships. This contribution includes advice to staff
1025 activities as well as the co-ordination of respective functional experts' input. The
1026 direct impact of own information activities on other actors' Orientation activity is
1027 relatively limited; it mainly occurs indirectly during the Observation activity by
1028 affecting the ability of an actor to collect, process, and disseminate information
1029 or by manipulating the respective information itself.

1030 216. During the 'Decision' activity, Info Ops contribute to the preparation of plans and
1031 orders by advising the commander and staff on issues related to the information
1032 environment, by coordinating functional experts' input to the design of

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1033 integrated military information activities, and by participating in the interagency
1034 co-ordination process. This results in plans and orders that detail the
1035 commander's will to act, and which appropriately consider aspects of the
1036 information environment relevant for the achievement of mission objectives. As
1037 described above for the Orientation phase, the direct impact of own information
1038 activities on other actors' Decision activity is limited and in most cases occurs
1039 indirectly through affecting others' information collection, processing and
1040 dissemination capability.

1041 217. During the 'Action' activity, Info Ops contribute to the implementation of plans
1042 and orders focused on integrated information activities. This requires the
1043 continuous assessment of the situation regarding the information environment,
1044 and the development of recommendations for the adjustment of plans and
1045 orders, including effects, actions and resources. The impact of own information
1046 activities on the actions of other actors is primarily directed at their capabilities –
1047 ways and means – to implement decisions.

Section III – Roles of Info Ops at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels

1050 218. Operations are directed, planned and conducted at three levels of command:
1051 political direction and guidance are obtained via the strategic commander, while
1052 planning and execution are largely achieved at the operational and tactical
1053 levels. The distinction between activities conducted by forces at the different
1054 levels is clear, but the effects of political, strategic, operational and tactical
1055 levels of joint operations will seldom remain only at one level. This requires
1056 special consideration for Info Ops, where interconnected information systems
1057 and the psychology of decision-making mean that action at the tactical level can
1058 have strategic implication and *vice versa*.

1059 219. Strategic Level. Strategy is the planning, coordination, and general direction of
1060 military operations to meet overall political and military objectives. At this level,
1061 armed forces are used within an overarching political framework and in a
1062 synchronised fashion with other instruments of power/civil areas of activity. Info
1063 Ops staff at this level should:

1064 a. recognise any political or legal limitations on the conduct of military
1065   information activities, with particular regard to international law, custom and
1066   practice, host nation agreements/arrangements, support by other nations
1067   or other sensitivities;

1068 b. contribute to military strategic assessment and advise on the information
1069   factor in all military-strategic planning and conduct of operations;

1070 c. contribute military advice to the development and implementation of an
1071   Information Strategy;

1072 d. consider the impact of approved Rules of Engagement (ROE) on the
1073   application of information activities;

1074 e. contribute to the force generation process by considering available
1075   resources for the planning of information activities;

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1076   f.   regularly update and inform the strategic commander on the focus and
1077   progress of the overall Information Objectives, which will contribute to the
1078   review of the Information Strategy;

1079   g. ensure co-ordination of strategic level targeting to include information
1080   activities. This applies especially to sensitive targeting such as against
1081   computer networks and IT, population groups or individuals.

1082 220. Strategic guidance will usually include available political guidance, strategic
1083   goals, directives and limitations. Overall Info Ops strategic guidance will be
1084   derived from the Information Strategy and outlined in the strategic plan or
1085   directive. It is the responsibility of the strategic level Info Ops staff to ensure that
1086   military co-ordination with the higher-level political and media aspects of the
1087   operation takes place regularly. This feedback loop is crucial in order to ensure
1088   that the targeted information activities at the strategic and operational levels are
1089   synchronised with other activities.

1090 221. After the initial co-ordination process has been established and strategic
1091   planning guidance has been issued, the strategic level Info Ops staff will
1092   contribute to further refinement of plans and directives, taking into account
1093   issues from multinational and joint operational planning. Given the scope of the
1094   tasks described above and the potential sensitivity of information activities,
1095   every consideration should be given to ensure that the strategic level Info Ops
1096   staff is established on a full-time basis. This will require sufficient manpower to
1097   cope with the demands from the operational level as well as the requirements of
1098   the higher political and military bodies.

1099 222. <u>Operational Level</u>.   The level at which campaigns and major operations are
1100   planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within
1101   theatres or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by
1102   establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic
1103   objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating
1104   actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. The
1105   operational-level Info Ops staff should assist in:

1106   a. the analysis of the information environment conducted by the INTEL /
1107   Knowledge Development (KD) and functional/capability staffs by providing
1108   focused guidance;

1109   b. planning and campaign synchronisation by cross-functional co-ordination
1110   of efforts related to effects and activities in the information environment;

1111   c. identifying and prioritising the operational level effects in the information
1112   environment necessary to achieve campaign objectives (campaign
1113   assessment and synchronisation);

1114   d. coordinating effects (and activities) in the information environment
1115   (including contribution to the targeting process);

1116   e. providing guidance for allocating forces and resources as necessary for
1117   subordinate commanders to execute their tasks (the operational
1118   commander will maintain the capability to change the emphasis of
1119   information activities at the operational level for the joint campaign to react
1120   to developments);

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1121   f.   supporting the co-ordination of military information activities with other
1122   agencies in theatre, as appropriate;

1123   g.   providing military advice on effects in the information environment to the
1124   strategic commander and contributing to the assessment of the information
1125   environment;

1126   h.   providing guidance to tactical commanders to enable them to create the
1127   desired effects depicted in the operational plan.

1128   223.   <u>Tactical Level</u>.   The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned
1129   and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task
1130   forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and manoeuvre
1131   of combat elements in relation to each other and to the opponent to achieve
1132   combat objectives. The tactical-level Info Ops staff should:

1133   a.   assist in conducting a mission analysis based on the commander's intent
1134   and relevant plans to integrate information activities in tactical plans;

1135   b.   provide advice on planning and implementing activities to create effects in
1136   the information environment, including the appropriate assignment of
1137   resources;

1138   c.   assist in coordinating the conduct of information activities focused on
1139   creating an effect on key local decision-makers and groups by affecting
1140   their will, decision-making processes and capabilities;

1141   d.   provide advice on (possible) effects of other actions in the information
1142   environment;

1143   e.   provide advice on protecting own information and information systems.

Section IV – Info Ops Staff Activities

1145   224.   The Info Ops staff of a military headquarters is responsible for implementing the
1146   Info Ops function through the following major staff activities:

1147   a.   evaluation and interpretation of results from Systems Analysis concerning
1148   the information environment;

1149   b.   advice to planning and execution of operations regarding effects in the
1150   information environment;

1151   c.   development of Info Ops contributions to planning and assessment from a
1152   generalist's perspective;

1153   d.   co-ordination of contributions by military capabilities to planning, execution
1154   and assessment regarding effects in the information environment.

1155   225.   These staff activities include in particular:

1156   a.   <u>Evaluation and interpretation of results from Systems Analysis</u> concerning
1157   the information environment.

1158   (1)   Establishment, development and utilisation of information relationships
1159   (SME network).

1160   (2)   Assessment of the Situation:

1161   (a)   description of the operational environment related to information
1162   and information systems (considering global/ strategic aspects);

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1163   (b) mission analysis/analysis of (strategic) guidance for creating
1164   effects in the information environment;

1165   (c) analysis of limitations (assumptions, constraints and restraints) for
1166   information activities;

1167   (d) identification of own capabilities for creating effects in the
1168   information environment;

1169   (e) identification of others' capabilities for creating effects in the
1170   information environment, considering allied, friendly, neutral and
1171   (potentially) adversary actors.

1172   (3) Estimate of the situation:

1173   (a) comparison of the actual and aspired situation in the information
1174   environment (variance analysis related to the situation and
1175   mission);

1176   (b) identification and evaluation of possible trends (developments,
1177   evolutions) in the information environment;

1178   (c) Identification and evaluation of possible and desired effects in the
1179   information environment that can be created by military means;

1180   (d) Identification and evaluation of the vulnerability of own information
1181   and information systems and respective protection requirements;

1182   (e) Development of the Info Ops Estimate (see Annex 3A).

1183   (4) Development of contributions to situation update and decision
1184   briefings.

1185   (5) Development of contributions to the enhancement of situational
1186   awareness and understanding, and the development of the CROP.

1187   (6) Formulation of (additional) information needs, KRs, and requirements
1188   for Systems Analysis.

1189   b. <u>Advice to planning and execution</u> of operations regarding effects in the
1190   information environment.

1191   (1) Briefing the commander and staff on the situation, possible effects and
1192   developments in the information environment.

1193   (2) Identification of possible trade-offs regarding effects in the information
1194   environment.

1195   (3) Monitoring of the conduct of information activities and variance
1196   analysis concerning planned/desired and actual effects.

1197   (4) Identification of coordination requirements for military and civil actors
1198   conducting information activities.

1199   (5) Identification of collaborative opportunities for military and civil actors
1200   conducting information activities (description of possible synergetic
1201   effects).

1202   (6) Participation in various staff activities related to:

1203   (a) EBP (including targeting) and exercise planning;

1204   (b) EBE (including targeting) and exercises.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1205		(7) Proposal of training programs to promote integration of the information
1206		factor in planning and execution of operations.
1207	c.	Info Ops <u>contributions to planning and assessment</u> from a generalist's
1208		perspective.
1209		(1) Formulation of effects in the information environment, including MOE.

c. Info Ops <u>contributions to planning and assessment</u> from a generalist's perspective.

    (1) Formulation of effects in the information environment, including MOE.

    (2) Development of Info Ops contributions to general planning products, including contributions to the development and implementation of an Information Strategy at appropriate levels of command.

    (3) Proposal of activities for key leaders engagement (command group and special staff), and designing the KLEP.

    (4) Development and proposal of common assessment criteria for information activities.

    (5) Identification of differences and commonalities in the assessments of military capabilities regarding information activities.

    (6) Analysis of indications and reports, and formulation of Info Ops contributions to EBA.

    (7) Formulation of Info Ops contributions to the reporting system.

d. <u>Coordination of contributions by military capabilities</u> to planning, execution and assessment regarding effects in the information environment.

    (1) Harmonisation and synchronisation of proposed information activities, including proposals for the KLEP.

    (2) Harmonisation and consolidation of individual assessments of military and civil information activities.

    (3) Harmonisation of individual contributions to the development of the CROP concerning the information environment.

    (4) Participation in various staff activities related to:

        (a) EBP (including targeting) and exercise planning;

        (b) EBE (including targeting) and exercises;

        (c) EBA;

        (d) evaluation of exercises and operations (lessons learned).

Section V – HQ Internal Co-ordination and Staff Requirements

226. <u>General</u>. The commander provides direction and guidance to the HQ on Info Ops development and implementation. He also provides advice on Info Ops to the higher levels of command, including assessment of information activities as part of the campaign and for implementation of the Information Strategy. The commander is a key Info Ops contributor in his own right, given his ability to influence local events through presence and dialogue, and he also contributes to the wider mission-specific guidance through his direction of all HQ activity.

227. Meeting the commanders' objectives, requires information activities being fully integrated and coordinated with all other military actions. In order to create the desired effects, a coherent and synchronised approach among HQs, adjacent and subordinate commands, and the strategic-political level must be achieved.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1247   One of the keys to success is thorough co-ordination of information activities
1248   from the strategic to the tactical level. Commanders should ensure that any
1249   information activity likely to affect other areas is implemented with prior co-
1250   ordination and notification.

1251   228. <u>Implementation Criteria</u>.   Implementing the Info Ops advice and co-ordination
1252   function requires efficient and effective processes and organisational structures.
1253   Requirements and constraints are usually given by some general factors such
1254   as the composition of the coalition, the type of mission, operation, and scenario,
1255   political and strategic guidance, and the HQ philosophy (e.g. structure,
1256   organisation, processes, and battle rhythm), and specific factors such as the
1257   availability of resources, expected workload, and timeframes (e.g. for planning).
1258   Therefore, implementation of the Info Ops function in multinational operations
1259   should not be pre-defined, but adaptable, based on generic implementation
1260   options tailored to best address the requirements and constraints given.

1261   229. Organisational design should consider various aspects in order to provide
1262   optimal conditions for the performance of the advice and co-ordination role of
1263   the Info Ops function. Such aspects include, but are not limited to:

1264   a.   the complexity and longevity of the mission;

1265   b.   the understanding of 'information' as an operational factor, and related
1266   opportunities and risks within the staff;

1267   c.   systemic understanding of the information environment and respective
1268   situational awareness and understanding within the HQ;

1269   d.   specified Info Ops function responsibilities and accountability;

1270   e.   integration of the Info Ops function throughout all processes of the
1271   operation;

1272   f.   the recognition of the Chief Info Ops/Info Ops staff as the primary advisor
1273   to the commander/HQ on effects in the information environment;

1274   g.   the application of Coordinating Authority by the Chief Info Ops;

1275   h.   Info Ops awareness of staff activities and related advice and co-ordination
1276   requirements;

1277   i.   the implementation of an Information Strategy;

1278   j.   the interactive relationship of Info Ops with other interagency actors at the
1279   appropriate level of command/involvement;

1280   k.   a suitable balance of Info Ops specific and other duties for staff personnel
1281   in Info Ops functions;

1282   l.   the supporting role of Systems Analysis;

1283   m.   minimisation of 'stovepipe' working and optimisation of information flow
1284   within the HQ (suitability for collocated or distributed work);

1285   n.   efficient use and flexible allocation of available resources;

1286   o.   qualification and training requirements;

1287   p.   administrative support requirements.

1288   230. <u>Info Ops Staff</u>.   The implementation of the Info Ops function should be led by a
1289   dedicated Info Ops staff in order to promote the full integration of the
1290   information factor in all military activities. Its primary role is to assist the

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1291   commander in planning, coordinating and directing the implementation of
1292   information activities to support the achievement of campaign objectives. The
1293   Info Ops staff are generalists, operators and advisors. They are process
1294   managers for internal and external co-ordination and provide advice to the
1295   commander and his staff on actions and effects related to the information
1296   environment. Advice can be formal, such as inputs to plans and orders, or
1297   informal, such as discussions or briefings. The Info Ops staff need to have a
1298   comprehensive and systemic knowledge of the information environment, and
1299   need to basically understand the scope of options available for affecting the
1300   information environment.

1301 231. The focus and responsibilities of the Info Ops staff will be determined by the
1302   command level and assigned mission. At the operational level, there will be a
1303   need for a comprehensive staff to enable planning, operations, INTEL support
1304   and specialists to determine targeting and campaign assessment. At the tactical
1305   level, the need will focus more on specialists to deliver capability against
1306   specified targets.

1307 232. <u>The Chief Info Ops</u>.   The Chief Info Ops at each level is the lead adviser on
1308   effects in the information environment. He is responsible for the overall direction
1309   of Info Ops through the HQ co-ordination and synchronisation process, and
1310   chairs the IOCB. The Chief Info Ops ensures prioritisation, de-confliction and
1311   unity of purpose for all military information activities undertaken within the
1312   command.

1313 233. Linked to the Info Ops function, Coordinating Authority[42] needs to be granted to
1314   the Chief Info Ops by formal regulations. It is recommended that the Chief Info
1315   Ops should be positioned above functional groups (or J-staff divisions) of an
1316   operational level HQ. An appropriate integration of the Chief Info Ops in
1317   Command Group meetings and respective reporting procedures is required to
1318   accomplish his primary advisory role. In order to act as the appropriate military
1319   interface for the harmonisation of military and civil information activities, the
1320   Chief Info Ops is required to establish an interactive relationship with respective
1321   interagency representatives at the respective level of command. The rank of the
1322   Chief Info Ops must facilitate all these responsibilities.

1323 234. Within the HQ, the Chief Info Ops is responsible for:

1324   a.   providing specific Info Ops input to the development of the commander's
1325   direction and guidance;

1326   b.   preparing Info Ops contributions to the commander's plans and orders;

1327   c.   assisting in the determination of the desired effects in support of
1328   Information Objectives;

1329   d.   assisting in the determination of possible military actions to support the
1330   attainment of Information Objectives;

---

[42] **'Coordinating Authority'** is the assigned responsibility for coordinating specific capabilities, functions or activities involving two or more agencies (organisations or commands). The individual with assigned Coordinating Authority has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1331   e.   recommending priorities for military information activities;

1332   f.   contributing to the campaign synchronisation and assessment;

1333   g.   coordinating with all principal functional staff areas, special staff and
1334   higher and subordinate HQs;

1335   h.   coordinating KLE;

1336   i.   chairing the Info Ops Co-ordination Board (IOCB)[43].

1337 235. <u>Info Ops Staff Structures</u>. Given the evolving nature of Info Ops and due to
1338   command and mission specific requirements, an Info Ops staff can be formed at
1339   all levels of command. Comparable command levels should generate similar
1340   Info Ops structures within staffs. The actual size of the Info Ops staff, its
1341   allocation within the headquarters, as well as the function's organisational
1342   design will depend on the specific requirements (mission and situation) of the
1343   multinational force.

1344 236. The generic implementation requirements and the respective roles and
1345   responsibilities of both the Chief Info Ops and the Info Ops staff as outlined in
1346   this chapter could be applied to a variety of HQ structures including traditional J-
1347   structured staffs, functional group centric staffs, or other staffs. The Info Ops
1348   staff should understand information as an operational factor and be aware of
1349   the capabilities available to the commander for creating effects by information
1350   activities. They should be integrated in applicable cross-functional teams and
1351   participate in appropriate working groups of a HQ to enable a continuous, close
1352   dialogue with all relevant staff elements and support the processes throughout.
1353   It must be clearly understood that these Info Ops generalists will not replace
1354   capability experts or special staff. Info Ops will involve functional experts to
1355   collectively identify and exploit the full spectrum of options and appropriately
1356   assess situations and issues related to the information environment.

1357 237. Representation of Info Ops in all relevant HQ functional groups (or J-staff
1358   divisions, respectively) enables the Info Ops staff to monitor and to be aware of
1359   all relevant HQ activities, identify advice and co-ordination requirements, and
1360   provide advice and input. However, detailed procedures to integrate the
1361   members of the Info Ops Staff in cross-functional groups must be in place. In
1362   order to ensure such representation a cross-functional matrix-organised
1363   structure of the Info Ops function may be implemented as a suitable option.
1364   However, such a matrix organisation must be based on formal matrix
1365   agreements approved by the appropriate authorities.

1366 238. In principle, different options for the assignment of Info Ops staff personnel
1367   (besides the Chief Info Ops) are conceivable. The selected option must allow
1368   for the application of Coordinating Authority and priority tasking of the Info Ops
1369   staff by the Chief Info Ops. Examples for the organisation of the Info Ops staff –
1370   based on a traditional J-staff organisation – include (see Figure 5):

1371   a.   Chief Info Ops as member of the HQ's special staff with decentralised Info
1372   Ops personnel in J-divisions, probably J2, J3 and J5. This would ensure
1373   that Info Ops was fully considered at the highest, decision-making level
1374   with close relationships to the command group. Possible disadvantages

---

[43]   See Paragraphs 232-234 and Annex 2A.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1375   could result from a reduced involvement of the Chief Info Ops in day-to-
1376   day J-staff activities, and from administrative problems inherent in the
1377   matrix-type organisation of the Info Ops staff.

1378   b. A centralised Info Ops staff brigaded at Chief of Staff (COS) level under a
1379   Chief Info Ops. This would ensure that Info Ops was fully considered at
1380   the highest, cross-functional level in planning, execution and assessment
1381   of an operation. Possible disadvantages could include a lack of liaison and
1382   understanding of the more detailed aspects of the operation, particularly in
1383   the J3 and J5 areas.

1384   c. Centralised Info Ops staff at Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) level under a
1385   Chief Info Ops would ensure a greater level of liaison with specialist staffs
1386   within the respective J-division whilst retaining a significant level of senior
1387   influence within the HQ, albeit a considerably reduced level compared to
1388   the COS construct.

1389
1390   **Figure 5**: **Info Ops Staff in a Generic HQ Staff Structure (Examples)**

1391 239. <u>The Information Operations Co-ordination Board</u>. The Info Ops process is put
1392   into effect through the existing HQs co-ordination processes and via an IOCB,
1393   which prepares inputs to relevant HQ internal and external processes including
1394   the joint targeting processes, the INTEL process and the joint co-ordination
1395   process. A wide range of staff functions play a role in the Info Ops process, as
1396   outlined in Annex 2A. Functional area participation in the IOCB is essential in
1397   order that their input and subject matter expertise can be applied to the Info Ops
1398   co-ordination process. Of particular importance is the need for all activity to be
1399   consistent with the Information Strategy.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1400 240. The purpose of the IOCB is to develop and maintain a common situational
1401 understanding of the information environment among all actors involved, and to
1402 coordinate the collective approach to achieving Information Objectives. IOCB
1403 meetings complement the bilateral efforts of the Info Ops staff to provide advice
1404 and assist co-ordination.

1405 241. The IOCB is integrated into the HQ's battle rhythm and meets regularly within
1406 the HQ, attended by relevant staff and Liaison Officers (LOs) from subordinate
1407 or superior commands, as required, to plan, coordinate and synchronise military
1408 activities affecting the information environment. In this capacity, the IOCB may
1409 also function as a think-tank for the commander.

1410 Section VI – External Coordination

1411 242. <u>General</u>. To realise desired effects in support of the Information Strategy,
1412 close co-ordination of campaign and supporting plans, among strategic,
1413 operational and tactical HQs is vital. This co-ordination up and down the
1414 command levels takes the form of formal plans, direction, guidance, doctrine,
1415 policy and training. Co-ordination is also required with international and regional
1416 political and civil organisations through agreed procedures and structures.

1417 243. <u>Component Commanders/Tactical Level Commanders</u>. It is important that
1418 activity conducted by component commanders and commanders at lower
1419 tactical levels are synchronised with activity at higher levels. In addition,
1420 commanders at these levels will often be required to conduct activity to support
1421 higher level objectives. To ensure synchronisation, proposed information
1422 activities may need to be forwarded to superior HQ's Info Ops cells for de-
1423 confliction with other ongoing activities. LOs will normally be required during
1424 crisis or deployed operations. All LOs must maintain close contact with their
1425 command Info Ops staff to ensure they are fully aware of changes and/or
1426 requirements to be discussed at the IOCB.

1427 244. <u>Inter-Command Level Co-ordination</u>. Any viable assessment of information
1428 activities requires an inter-command effort as intended and unintended effects
1429 can be felt across informational, physical and psychological boundaries. Given
1430 the potentially wide-ranging effect of military information activities, a coordinated
1431 approach is necessary across all command levels and political institutions. Thus
1432 a system of co-ordination and liaison processes between commands and
1433 supporting agencies (GOs, IOs, NGOs, etc.) that allows staffs to communicate
1434 with, send reports to, and receive guidance from, superior and subordinate
1435 commands is required.

1436

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1437 **Annex 2A – The Information Operations Co-ordination Board**

1438   2A1. <u>General</u>.   The IOCB is the forum for the implementation of Info Ops collective
1439   co-ordination and advice, chaired by the Chief Info Ops. It will convene as
1440   necessary in the HQ decision cycle and as required during non-operational
1441   activities.

1442   2A2. <u>Membership</u>.   The IOCB should involve expertise from all staff elements,
1443   determined by mission and situation requirements. A possible composition of
1444   the IOCB is shown in Figure 6. This composition is not fixed and the Chief Info
1445   Ops will invite other parties, which may include other agencies and
1446   departments, as required, to contribute to the mission and the role of Info Ops in
1447   accomplishing the commander's objectives. IOCB member responsibilities are
1448   outlined at paragraph 2A6.

1449

1450   **Figure 6**: **Possible Composition of the IOCB (Example: Operational Level HQ)**

1451   2A3. <u>Role</u>.   The role of the IOCB is to ensure that military information activities are
1452   coherent and synchronised with other actions (potentially) affecting the
1453   information environment. The IOCB provides the forum for collective co-
1454   ordination of information activities. Within the scope of its assigned functions,
1455   the IOCB will provide initial co-ordination of target nominations related to
1456   information and information systems to facilitate subsequent harmonisation. It
1457   will also provide advice on possible effects in the information environment
1458   created by other military actions. The responsible capability representatives,
1459   functional advisors or Component LOs will present results from IOCB
1460   discussions to the respective targeting boards, where the Info Ops
1461   representative will monitor the selection, harmonisation, nomination and
1462   prioritisation process, and advise on over-arching, cross-functional issues, as

1463
1464

required. The IOCB further provides a forum for co-ordination, de-confliction and monitoring of Info Ops related plans and activities.

1465

2A4. <u>Responsibilities of the IOCB</u>. The responsibilities of the IOCB are:

1466
1467

    a. co-ordination, revision and assessment of the plans and information activities based on approved Information Objectives;

1468
1469

    b. provision of Info Ops guidance based on commander's guidance and direction;

1470

    c. consideration of activities affecting the information environment;

1471

    d. identification of necessary and available resources and requirements;

1472

    e. recommendations for tasking, co-ordination and staff action;

1473

    f. review of Info Ops inputs to the main body and annexes to various plans;

1474

    g. development of target nominations;

1475

    h. recommendation for approval of the Info Ops annex to plans;

1476
1477

    i. co-ordination with outside agencies in consultation with other staff areas, as required.

1478
1479
1480
1481
1482
1483
1484
1485
1486

2A5. <u>General Responsibility of Representatives</u>. Representatives on the IOCB must have the authority to speak for and make decisions on behalf of their command functional area. Representatives provide information on their future intentions and advise on the employment of their assets. Through the IOCB, activities are de-conflicted and intentions amended to ensure coherence before submitting inputs to the planning and targeting processes and, ultimately, the commander for approval. Representatives from the subordinate or component commands, usually Info Ops officers, will provide expertise and act as liaison for Info Ops matters between the higher and subordinate commands.

1487
1488
1489
1490
1491
1492
1493

2A6. <u>Contribution of Specialist Staff to the IOCB</u>. To maximise the effectiveness of Info Ops, an integrated approach to operations that considers desired effects on the will, capability and understanding of adversaries and other approved parties must be considered. This requires a coordinated approach to Info Ops across the staff, led by the command group, to achieve a common understanding of the nature of the Info Ops function. Specific responsibilities for roles, functional areas and other staffs include:

1494
1495
1496
1497

    a. Political Adviser. The POLAD advises on policy implications of proposed information activities and when required, coordinates the political aspects of information activities with higher HQ counterparts. The POLAD guides public diplomacy activities in accordance with the Information Strategy.

1498
1499

    b. Legal Adviser. The Legal Adviser (LEGAD) advises on legal implications, including ROE, of proposed information activities.

1500
1501
1502
1503

    c. Cultural Adviser. The Cultural Adviser (CULAD) advises on cultural implications of proposed information activities, including ethnological, religious and social aspects. He also contributes to the assessment of information activities from the cultural perspective.

1504
1505
1506
1507

    d. Gender Adviser. The Gender Adviser (GENAD) advises on general gender issues that may affect information activities. In particular, the GENAD can provide advice regarding gender equality and women empowerment, based on a high degree of cultural sensitivity. Depending

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1508 on the scenario requirements the CULAD may cover the function of the
1509 GENAD.

1510 e. Systems Analyst.   Using scientific methods, the Systems Analyst[44]
1511 provides significant input to all operational and campaign analyses and
1512 assessments in relation to the information environment. He is closely
1513 associated with Info Ops, advising on and analysing measures of success,
1514 and informing campaign assessments. His advice and output will be
1515 applied throughout the iterative planning, execution and review cycle.

1516 f. Chief Public Affairs Officer.   The CPAO is responsible to the commander
1517 for all media relations, internal communication and community relations
1518 plans and activity. He participates in the Info Ops co-ordination process to
1519 ensure that PA activities and other military information activities are
1520 mutually consistent.

1521 g. Chaplain.   The Chaplain is responsible for the spiritual ministry and
1522 pastoral support to soldiers and their families in a range of challenging
1523 environments. He may contribute religious and cultural assessments to the
1524 Info Ops function.

1525 h. Manpower Management Representative (J1).   J1 participates when
1526 personnel and troop information matters are relevant to the conduct of
1527 information activities. J1 identifies personnel requirements and shortfalls,
1528 and provides advice on troop information programs.

1529 i. Intelligence Representative (J2).   J2 coordinates INTEL collection
1530 requirements and provides analytical support for Info Ops in close co-
1531 ordination with the KD support staff. INTEL will provide the initial Systems
1532 Analysis, to include a description of the political/military decision-making
1533 process and decision-makers, nodal analysis, human/cultural factors and
1534 an analysis of other entities' capabilities to affect the information
1535 environment. J2 assists in the assessment of activities and the resulting
1536 effects and advises on the capability of all-source INTEL support to Info
1537 Ops to include targeting.

1538 j. Operations Management Representative (J3).   J3 advises on the
1539 integration of effects and activities in the information environment into the
1540 HQ's deliberate short and mid-term planning process as well as on the
1541 integration of information activities in the context of current operations.

1542 k. Logistics Representative (J4).   J4 considers the effects of information
1543 activity on logistics and support, including any related capability
1544 requirements.

1545 l. Plans & Policy Representative (J5).   J5 integrates Info Ops planning into
1546 the long-term planning process (advance and crisis response planning).

1547 m. Communications and Information Systems / Command & Control Support
1548 Representative (J6).   J6 identifies Communications and Information
1549 Systems (CIS) vulnerabilities and develops procedures and capabilities to
1550 protect friendly battle management and Consultation, Command, Control,
1551 Communications and Information (C4I) systems. J6 develops INFOSEC

---

[44] From the KD support staff or embedded in the INTEL (J2) staff.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1552		plans and supports the development of OPSEC plans. J6 also assesses
1553		the impact of adversary information activities on own systems.
1554	n.	Training and Exercises Representative (J7). J7 contributes lessons
1555		learned and mission rehearsal aspects to Info Ops.
1556	o.	Financial Management Representative (J8). J8 advises on budgetary
1557		issues of projects having an impact on the information environment.
1558	p.	Civil-Military Co-operation Representative (J9). J9 advises on CIMIC
1559		capabilities and assessments that support Information Objectives.
1560	q.	Psychological Operations Representative. The PSYOPS representative
1561		advises on PSYOPS capabilities and assessments that support
1562		Information Objectives.
1563	r.	Special Operations Forces Representative. The SOF representative
1564		provides advice on SOF capabilities and force utilisation in support of
1565		information activities.
1566	s.	Liaison Officers. LOs provide critical linkages between their parent
1567		organisation and the supported HQ, ensuring the activities of both are
1568		mutually supportive. There needs to be a good understanding by LOs of
1569		plans and capabilities for information activities of their command. At the
1570		operational level, Component Commands should not rely on their
1571		standing, general purpose liaison staff for representation at the IOCB;
1572		rather should they consider involving flexible expertise appropriate to the
1573		subject issues to be discussed.
1574	t.	Electronic Warfare Officer. The EW Officer provides advice on EW
1575		support to Information Objectives and feedback on its effectiveness.
1576	u.	Targeting Officer. The Targeting Officer ensures integration of Info Ops in
1577		the targeting process. He also assists in target de-confliction and
1578		assessment of effects of information activities.
1579	v.	Computer Network Operations Officer. The CNO Officer advises on CNO
1580		capabilities and assessments that support Information Objectives.
1581	w.	Chief Engineer (J-ENG). The role of engineers is particularly significant in
1582		relation to Info Ops because of the particular visibility of engineers'
1583		achievements and their special capacity of contributing to host nation
1584		reconstruction. The Chief Engineer advises on capabilities and
1585		assessments that support Information Objectives.
1586	x.	Chief Medical / Theatre Surgeon (J-MED). Medical support and
1587		assistance may have an enormous psychological impact on local/regional
1588		audiences. The Chief Medical advises on capabilities and assessments
1589		that support Information Objectives.
1590		

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Chapter 3 – Info Ops in the Effects-Based Operations Process

Section I – Effects-Based Operations Introduction

301. Effects-based thinking focuses on influencing or changing system behaviour or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power/areas of activity in order to achieve directed policy aims. Effects-Based Operations (EBO)[45] consist of planned, executed, assessed, and adapted military actions based on a comprehensive and dynamic understanding of the operational environment.

302. Effects-based thinking provides the ability to be more responsive and discriminating by emphasising the desired end state behaviour, i.e., how the situation in the operational environment would appear and evolve, and the specific effects that would lead to this desired end state. The effects-based approach postulates a more comprehensive understanding of a crisis, e.g., its root causes and symptoms, relevant elements and involved parties and actors, and their interrelationships. It will also promote a comprehensive understanding of other parties to the conflict as well. Armed with this knowledge, military commanders are afforded a more flexible and effective means to prosecute activities ranging from co-operation to conflict by focusing on the effects they would need to create in order to achieve a behavioural change in the system of actors.

303. The effects-based approach to operations establishes explicit linkages among system behaviour consistent with own objectives, the necessary effects that would lead to this behaviour, each instrument of power/area of activity required to generate these effects, and the specific tasks (sets of actions) at each level of command. This understanding and these explicit linkages – promulgated to, and understood by leaders at all levels – provide increased flexibility and a greater ability to adapt to rapidly changing situations within the operational environment.

304. Effects-based thinking also provides a powerful backdrop for a greater unity of effort among the various instruments of power/areas of activity. When all instruments understand relevant system behaviour, the various elements that support or enable this behaviour, and the changes which would have to occur within a system to alter this behaviour, they will produce a much broader set of possible effects capable of achieving the desired behavioural change. Interagency co-ordination, participation and liaison must be an organic component in the commander's EBO process.

305. EBO are about ends (effects), ways (actions) and means (resources) – it is the synergy of the three that gets results. An end is a description of what is to be achieved; ways is a description of how an end might be achieved, and means is a description of who might be used. EBO are 'outcome centric'; they focus upon

---

[45] The term **'Effects-Based Operations (EBO)'** is used throughout the document for the military application of effects-based thinking – or: the effects-based approach (to operations) – at the operational level of command.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1632 the results that might be obtained by the application of military actions in
1633 concert with the other areas of activity and the selection of the most expedient
1634 and effective way of obtaining these outcomes. The conduct of EBO, therefore,
1635 demands first to establish the intended outcome prior to
1636 determining/implementing the actions that will likely produce the desired result.

1637 306. Actions undertaken at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels can
1638 cause effects at any other level. Effects can occur simultaneously on the
1639 tactical, operational and strategic levels of military operations, as well as in
1640 domestic and international civil arenas. Effects, at each level and in each arena,
1641 are interrelated and cumulative over time. Also, effects in this context can be
1642 cognitive as well as physical, i.e. changes in attitudes and behaviour of actors,
1643 as well as in the functionality of weapon systems or other capabilities.

1644 307. Within an effects-based approach to operations, military information activities
1645 will notably contribute to achieve effects on adversary, friendly, neutral, and own
1646 system behaviour or capabilities in concert with effects produced by other
1647 military and civil means. Effects on own systems will support the protection and
1648 enhancement of own capabilities.

1649 308. The delineation between what constitutes information activity and what
1650 constitutes mainstream military activity is becoming increasingly blurred as
1651 effects-based thinking is pursued. In the future commanders and their staffs will
1652 have to consider all means for creating effects from the outset, and they will be
1653 as familiar with information as they are with the traditional operational factors
1654 force, space and time. The desired end state is the full integration of the factor
1655 information – a sufficient awareness of the additional options provided by
1656 affecting the information environment.

1657 309. Within EBO, Info Ops will notably contribute to create effects on adversary,
1658 friendly, neutral, and own system behaviour or capabilities in concert with other
1659 military and civil activities. Info Ops must be fully integrated in order to enable
1660 co-ordination and advice on the military contributions to an overarching
1661 Information Strategy.

1662 310. The EBO process can be described in terms of four major functions: Knowledge
1663 Development (KD); Effects-Based Planning (EBP); Effects-Based Execution
1664 (EBE); and Effects-Based Assessment (EBA). The effects-based approach
1665 proposes a few key divergences from traditional approaches in each of these
1666 areas. Once a campaign is under way the EBO functions will occur both in a
1667 sequential and in a parallel manner.

1668 ## Section II – Knowledge Development

1669 311. KD is a function that applies Systems Analysis to generate and enable explicit
1670 knowledge of the operational environment in order to improve situational
1671 awareness and understanding in support of a comprehensive approach in a
1672 multinational and interagency context. Systems Analysis is a method which
1673 defines a network of elements, their relations and interactions, evolving in space
1674 and time and so allows a valid contextual assessment of objectives, sequences
1675 of effects and sequences of actions. The result of Systems Analysis is a
1676 comprehensive modelling of the operational environment with its system

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1677 dynamics and feedback loops. Systems Analysis will provide a description of
1678 intended effects and will expose both intended and unintended consequences.
1679 Systems Analysis will utilise various existing models, methods, techniques to
1680 model and explore the system in its dynamics. Although no single model or
1681 method will sufficiently cover all aspects, the application of specific models will
1682 facilitate a systemic view on the operational environment. Relevant candidate
1683 models may be found in several scientific areas, to include: operations
1684 research, cognitive modelling[46], social, natural and economic sciences, social
1685 and technical network analysis, command and control assessment, human
1686 behaviour representation, risk assessment, information dissemination, and
1687 ethnology[47].

1688 312. Basic staff activities such as personnel, INTEL, operations/command & control,
1689 logistics, plans & policy, communications, training & exercise, budget and
1690 finance, CIMIC, and the Special Staff contribute to and receive value from the
1691 KD process without interfering with original responsibilities. KD also utilizes
1692 linkages between national and multinational partners/agencies, Centres of
1693 Excellence (COEs), SMEs, and the HQ staff. It strives to take advantage of
1694 relevant information and knowledge from all available (open and classified)
1695 sources of expertise.

1696 313. KD contributes to a knowledge base that contains the information necessary for
1697 Systems Analysis and other use. The results of Systems Analysis and other
1698 assessment are continuously fed back into the knowledge base. It is
1699 continuously updated by and accessible for customers (civil and military actors
1700 and supporting staff). KD facilitates a widened, comprehensive view on the
1701 operational environment. Based on a systemic methodology, the clarity of
1702 interrelationships between all relevant actors and issues with regard to power
1703 and influence is significantly enhanced. Improved situational awareness and
1704 understanding provides a common, improved foundation for further analysis,
1705 planning, execution/management and assessment/evaluation of operations/
1706 missions, including their related processes and structures among military and
1707 civil partners.

1708 314. Systems Analysis provides the Info Ops function with valuable knowledge of the
1709 relevant systems in order to make valid assumptions, to take full advantage of
1710 their strengths and weaknesses, and to assess the impact of information
1711 activities.

1712 Section III – Effects-Based Planning

1713 315. <u>Overall Planning Considerations</u>. Info Ops is an integral part of military activity
1714 at every level of command. It is therefore critical that Info Ops aspects are
1715 considered in the planning process from the beginning. Planning of effects and
1716 activities in the information environment must directly support the commander's
1717 intent, guidance and desired end-state. Info Ops staff should be core members
1718 of relevant staff planning sub-groups, and provide inputs to planning for the

---

[46] E.g., mental models for decision-making, individual or shared sense-making.
[47] Systems Analysis may be structured according to the PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) or any other adequate analysis scheme.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1719 targeting process. An Info Ops estimate will usually be conducted (either as a
1720 written product or as a less formal process) to ensure that all potential
1721 information activities and their intended effects are properly considered and
1722 then fed into the commander's estimate process.

1723   a. Inclusion. Planning of activities to achieve desired effects in the
1724   information environment provides significant input to EBP. There are
1725   important links to be established with the planning team looking at the
1726   overall commander's campaign. It is imperative that Info Ops is not added
1727   on afterwards, but integrated into planning from the beginning while
1728   Strategic Objectives and Decisive Conditions are being identified as a
1729   central aspect. It is equally important that planning for Info Ops is
1730   considered during the IPB process.

1731   b. Integration. The Info Ops staff need to understand the other aspects of
1732   the commander's plan and how they may impact on planned activities in
1733   the information environment (and supporting plans) and ensure that Info
1734   Ops are integrated into the overall plan, without conflict with other
1735   elements and functions. This means that the Info Ops planners must
1736   maintain a broad perspective with respect to how other operations can
1737   impact on the information environment, taking a protracted amount of time
1738   to complete or involving several synchronous operations and activities.

1739   c. Planning for Sensitive Issues. Certain information activities may be
1740   considered sensitive due to the nature of these, the audiences or the
1741   targets. This type of planning may have to be conducted within a sub-
1742   group of the planning team. Briefing of sensitive plans or those which are
1743   classified above the level of the overall operation will have to be
1744   conducted separately on the basis of 'need to know' and should be
1745   marked with a Limited Distribution (LIMDIS) caveat. Plans should always
1746   be considered for sensitivity marking if they address deception, the use of
1747   special IT, political sensitivities or if plans involve using SOF.

1748   d. Phasing. Effects in the information environment to support the overall
1749   mission and implementation of the Information Strategy must be
1750   considered at the earliest stage possible, and relevant activities have to be
1751   required even prior to the deployment of the main force. Similar
1752   consideration should be given concerning the support to transition and
1753   redeployment, where effects in the information environment need to be
1754   continued.

1755 316. Effects-Based Planning. The EBP function supports the development of a plan
1756   that matches the end state with the effects needed to achieve the end state,
1757   with the causative actions required to create the effects, and the resources
1758   needed to execute the actions. EBP also supports the development of an
1759   assessment plan which provides the method to assess the progress of the
1760   campaign towards achieving the end state.

1761 317. The end state describes the state of the system that is desired at the end of the
1762   operation. During planning, development and application of effects statements
1763   bridges the gap between end state and actions. Not only is a bridge of reason
1764   provided between the two, but a context for civil-military interaction is built, and
1765   the basis for continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the operation is

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
created. An end state may be decomposed into objectives, which describe the intended end state from the commander's perspective. The wording of objectives and effects is more specific than that of the end state. Effects are then translated into actions that will need to be taken against parts of the system in order to create the desired changes. Many actions may be required to create an effect.

1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
318. EBP emphasizes the consideration of the various effects (physical and/or behavioural states of a system) caused by an action or set of actions that result from application of capabilities associated with specific levers of power. Besides own actions under control of national/Coalition/Alliance power, other actions are undertaken by (potential) adversaries, friends and neutrals, including non-state and non-governmental civil and military actors that affect mission accomplishment. All of these actions cause effects and – more or less – shape the behaviour of those who perceive these actions and/or related effects.

1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
319. The product of EBP is an effects-based plan that provides subordinate commanders with sufficient detail to complete their own planning, as well as with the direction for the conduct of the operation. It is developed throughout the project planning process and *inter alia* contains the plan expressed in a synchronisation matrix that depicts the relationships and dependencies among desired effects, planned actions, and their associated resources as a function of time and space.

1787
1788
1789
1790
1791
1792
320. The Info Ops function facilitates the appropriate consideration of the information factor within the military instrument of power. It coordinates military information activities and integrates those with other military activities throughout the EBP process. Representatives and experts from all relevant capabilities will contribute to the development of effects, actions, and tasks according to their areas of expertise.

1793
1794
1795
1796
1797
321. Based on the Information Strategy Info Ops contribute to EBP by facilitating the exploitation of the full spectrum of available options, and by supporting the co-ordination and de-confliction of information activities in order to form a coherent effort. Info Ops also supports the harmonisation with civil information activities using appropriate procedures and structures for interagency co-ordination.

1798
1799
1800
1801
1802
322. Outputs from Info Ops Contribution to Planning. The functions and processes indicated above will lead to the production of key planning products in support of operational plans and executive papers. The products are applicable for both training and operations. Standard formats should be developed and used as guidance for Info Ops staffs within command standard operating procedures.

1803
1804
1805
    a. Info Ops Estimate. Info Ops contribute to the staff estimate throughout the operational planning process and conduct of operations. Details are provided in Annex 3A.

1806
1807
1808
1809
1810
1811
1812
    b. Info Ops Elements of Plans. The strategic plan/directive is required to provide overall guidance to the operational planner. It should, as a minimum, cover details concerning strategic-political intent and any restraints, constraints or limitations placed on planning for information activities. The desired effects, themes and messages generated from the specific Information Objectives distilled from the Information Strategy will be listed in the Info Ops Matrix. Subordinate commanders will use this

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1813 matrix as a basis for their own plans. Info Ops must be developed to
1814 support both the Information Strategy and the overall campaign plan;
1815 consequently, Info Ops staff must ensure that the two requirements are
1816 melded together and potential conflicts of interest highlighted. The Info
1817 Ops staff will be responsible for providing the following elements as part of
1818 the plan:

(1) the commander's intent concerning desired effects in the information
1819 environment;
1820

(2) Information Objectives provided by the Information Strategy;
1821

(3) HQ internal and external coordinating instructions concerning the
1822 implementation of the Info Ops function within their own and
1823 subordinate commands;
1824

(4) Info Ops considerations concerning INTEL, targeting and assessment
1825 of effects in the information environment.
1826

(5) Co-ordination and support to the primary contributors of information
1827 activities will be included as cross-references to the appropriate
1828 functional annexes. These cross-references are not fixed but will be
1829 situation and mission-dependent.
1830

1831 An outline Info Ops Annex to plans is at Annex 3B.

1832 c. <u>Info Ops Contribution to Tasking</u>.   Within development of orders, Info Ops
1833 contributes aspects concerning the information environment that affect the
1834 conduct of information activities and require additional co-ordination effort.
1835 This contribution focuses on the identification of opportunities for the
1836 achievement of synergetic effects, and on the de-confliction of efforts (e.g.,
1837 concerning the use of resources). The Info Ops staff will not issue any
1838 separate orders.

1839 d. <u>Info Ops Contribution to Targeting</u>.   Info Ops assist in the targeting
1840 process by identifying where (information) activities could be applied to
1841 achieve specific effects in support of the commander's mission objectives.
1842 During planning and continuously as part of implementation, target
1843 nominations are required in order to implement information activities and
1844 other actions affecting the information environment. These targets will be
1845 coordinated through the Info Ops process (e.g., using the IOCB) and can
1846 include a diverse array of subjects, including decision-making systems,
1847 information systems and other linked activities. The cyclic target
1848 development process during planning must include Info Ops input from the
1849 strategic to tactical levels and vice versa.

1850 e. <u>Force and Capability Co-ordination</u>. To ensure that relevant capabilities
1851 and appropriate staff manning are inserted in good time into the force
1852 requirements, a clear analysis must be carried out to determine broadly
1853 what activities are needed to support the campaign. This is a continuous
1854 process and requires regular review.

1855 f. <u>Campaign Plan Review</u>. Throughout the planning process, the Info Ops
1856 staff will continue to conduct assessment of the information environment,
1857 and contribute to the refinement/adjustment of estimates and plans. This

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1858 will require constant synchronisation of the planning of information
1859 activities with feedback to the Information Strategy.

1860 ## Section IV – Effects-Based Execution

1861 323. The EBE function monitors actions taken to create specific effects. Following
1862 the issuance of the orders derived from the EBPLAN, execution of EBO is
1863 dynamic and adaptive, which provides two subtle but vital differences compared
1864 to traditional execution: first, military and civilian actions are conducted
1865 complementary whenever possible; secondly, in combination with continuous
1866 assessment, opportunities are created to make adjustments to the plan in a less
1867 disruptive manner, making even fundamental changes potentially less costly in
1868 terms of momentum, resources, and even political will.

1869 324. EBO focus in terms of systems, not in terms of traditional targeting. Information
1870 activities in EBO aim at specific parts of the system – information systems – and
1871 their relations to other sub-systems in order to contribute to influencing overall
1872 system behaviour and capabilities. The spectrum of information systems covers
1873 those of (potential) adversaries as well as own and those of others (friendly and
1874 neutral). Information activities may be aimed at individuals, groups, populations
1875 (audiences) as well as technical components of information systems (targets):

1876 a. *'audiences'* for non-kinetic information activities could be (potential)
1877 adversary decision-makers, supporting opinion leaders and opinion
1878 formers, and their followers[48];

1879 b. *'targets'*[49] for kinetic information activities could be the information
1880 infrastructure, IT and information-based processes of (potential)
1881 adversaries[50;] ultimately also humans may become targets, if non-kinetic
1882 action is ineffective.

1883 325. Effects created by information activities cannot be limited to specific sub-
1884 systems, e.g., if mass media or electronic emissions are involved. These means
1885 by their nature may cause side effects on unintended audiences that have to be
1886 considered and weighed in the planning and approval process.

1887 326. An essential element of the EBE process is co-ordination with relevant civil
1888 activities, and the synchronisation of respective actions to ensure unity of effort.
1889 The Info Ops function facilitates the co-ordination of military information
1890 activities with civil information activities.

1891 ## Section V – Effects-Based Assessment

1892 327. EBA is the basis for the commander to ascertain campaign success from start
1893 to finish, and provides continuous feedback to the other functions of the EBO

---

[48] However, to be able to support the full spectrum of possible operations/missions, information activities may be
conducted to reinforce behaviour of friendly audiences and/or to consolidate and modify behaviour of neutrals
– to prevent them from becoming adversary or hostile.

[49] In NATO a **'target'** is defined as the object of a particular action, for example a geographic area, a complex,
an installation, a force, equipment, an individual, a group or a system, planned for capture, exploitation,
neutralisation or destruction by military forces. (AAP-6(2007))

[50] In addition, Info Ops will contribute to maintaining the functionality of, and exploiting own and friendly
information systems.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1894
1895
1896
process. The EBA function addresses the accomplishment of actions, the creation of effects, and the attainment of the end state as expressed in the Synchronisation Matrix while the plan is executed.

1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
328. EBA periodically measures the degree to which the elements of the campaign plan have been established as a function of time. These measurements are based to a varying degree on a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses. An assessment plan provides the method to assess the progress of the campaign. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) describe the parts of the system that need to be examined in order to determine whether effects have been (or are being) achieved. Measures of Performance (MOP) describe the parts of the system that need to be examined in order to determine whether the assigned actions have been (or are being) completed. Baseline measures will be developed in the planning phase and collected, where feasible, before operations start.

1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
329. Info Ops contributions to EBA will have to consider short, mid and long-term effects – the latter usually applies to consistent changes in behaviour of human audiences. The Info Ops staff, in co-operation with COEs and SMEs of respective capabilities, will have to apply the respective measures for each effect (MOE) and supporting actions (MOP) which they developed during EBP to cover the whole range from short to long-term. For long-term effects reliable MOE will likely not be available in the early phases of an operation. In these circumstances MOP may provide indicators/trends that permit interim assessment until observable indicators linked to the MOE occur. Assessment in the absence of reliable MOE may ultimately depend on the judgement and experience of the commander and his staff.

1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
330. Assessment of both MOE and MOP can be conducted by using organic means of military capabilities (such as PSYOPS target audience analysis, PA media analysis, manoeuvre and special forces reporting, and INTEL) as well as by outsourcing services (e.g., opinion polls and scientific studies). Assessment is also critically dependent on component reporting of their activities and the effect the component identified they had on the target. Synthesis of all available sources lends legitimacy to the final analysis and ensures follow-on actions are timely and appropriate.

1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
331. Plans can expect to be compromised by developing circumstances, so continuous adjustments are likely to be required during implementation to ensure proper focus on desired outcomes. Based on EBA results, Info Ops have to continue co-ordination throughout the adaptive process to maintain coherence and unity of effort.

1932

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Annex 3A – The Info Ops Element of the Staff Estimate Process

1933

1934 3A1. <u>General</u>.　The following guidance addresses Info Ops considerations at the
1935 various stages of the command estimate process, which can be conducted as
1936 either a written Info Ops estimate, or as a thought process that feeds into the
1937 overall staff estimate, as required. It should be updated through an iterative
1938 process that involves INTEL, Systems Analysis as well as functional/capability
1939 expertise and will contribute to overall situational awareness and understanding.
1940 The Info Ops staff will provide guidance to INTEL analysts, submit specific
1941 Knowledge Requests (KRs)[51], and coordinate analysis contributions and
1942 assessments from capabilities. The Info Ops staff will not perform any INTEL
1943 collection or analysis function itself.

1944 3A2. <u>Analysis of Strategic and Political Guidance</u>.　The Info Ops staff will
1945 continuously review the Information Strategy to reaffirm relevancy of Information
1946 Objectives, planned desired effects in the information environment and related
1947 activities. The Info Ops estimate should contain an updated comparison of
1948 strategic guidance and the operational commander's intent and plans. Related
1949 assessments should be translated as feedback and advice to superior
1950 authorities.

1951 3A3. <u>Assessment of the Information Environment</u> [52].　The Info Ops estimate should
1952 focus on the analysis and assessment of the information environment in a
1953 systemic context including at least relevant actors, specific information systems,
1954 and the media. This description and assessment cannot be done in isolation by
1955 the Info Ops staff, but needs to be coordinated and draw from
1956 functional/capability expertise without duplicating others' analysis efforts. The
1957 resulting product should be considered as a summary of collective situation
1958 analysis.

1959 3A4. <u>Status of Own Information Activities</u>.　The Info Ops estimate should include an
1960 overview of available own capabilities, tools and techniques for conducting
1961 military information activities, including their current state of readiness,
1962 involvement in current operations and principle limitations. This part of the
1963 estimate should be contributed to by the responsible capability representatives,
1964 functional advisors or component LOs. Chapter 1, Section IV and Chapter 2,
1965 Annex 2A provide initial guidance for structuring this part of the estimate.

1966 3A5. <u>Status of Other Actors' Information Activities</u>.　The Info Ops estimate should
1967 also include an overview of other relevant actors' capabilities, tools and
1968 techniques for creating effects in the information environment, including their
1969 (assumed) intent and objectives, current state of readiness, involvement in
1970 current operations, principle limitations and vulnerabilities. This part of the
1971 estimate should be coordinated with INTEL and the responsible capability
1972 representatives, functional advisors or component LOs.

1973 3A6. <u>Possible Effects in the Information Environment</u>.　The Info Ops estimate should
1974 conclude with a list of possible effects, considering all three activity areas

---

[51]　Traditional: 'Requests for Information' (RFIs).
[52]　See Analytical Concept "Development of a Multinational Information Strategy" for a generic taxonomy of the
information environment and a list of guiding questions for its assessment.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

outlined in Chapter 1, Section IV. Effects must be formulated in a way that describes the physical and/or behavioural state of a part of the information environment (see Paragraph 3A3) that results from an action or set of actions. They should be characterised as desired or undesired. In addition, the Info Ops staff should consider possible trends (developments, evolutions) that may occur over time without own interference.

1981

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

1982 **Annex 3B – Info Ops Annex to Plans (Format)**

1983   ANNEX O TO
1984   PLAN xxxx
1985   TITLE xxxx
1986   DATED dd mm yyyy

1987   INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1988

1989 REFERENCES:

1990

1991 **1.** (xx)[53] <u>SITUATION</u>.

1992   **a.** General. See main text.

1993   **b.** Specific.

1994   (1) <u>Information Environment.</u> Summary of mission-relevant aspects of
1995   the information environment, taken from the Info Ops Estimate.

1996   (2) <u>Strategic Guidance</u>. Summary of mission-specific strategic and
1997   political guidance on information activities (Information Objectives, themes
1998   and messages).

1999   (3) <u>Own Information Activities</u>. Summary of the status of own
2000   information activities, taken from the Info Ops Estimate.

2001   (4) <u>Other Actors' Information Activities</u>. Summary of the status of other
2002   actors' information activities, taken from the Info Ops Estimate.

2003 **2.** (xx) <u>MISSION</u>.

2004   **a.** <u>Strategic Command</u>. Statement of the superior commander's intent
2005   towards the information environment, taken from the Strategic Directive
2006   (if available).

2007   **b.** <u>Operational Command</u>. Statement of the commander's intent towards the
2008   information environment, taken from the main plan, Paragraph 3.a.

2009 **3.** (xx) EXECUTION.

2010   **a.** <u>Information Objectives</u>. List of Information Objectives that are to be
2011   achieved or contributed to by military means, derived from the Information
2012   Strategy and the Strategic Directive (if available).

2013   **b.** <u>Themes and Messages</u>. Taken from the Information Strategy and the
2014   Strategic Directive (if available).

---

[53] Abbreviated classification.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2015　**c.** Supporting Effects.　Prioritised list of desired effects in the information
2016　environment.

2017　**d.** Primary Contributors.　Cross-reference to appropriate functional annexes of
2018　capabilities conducting or contributing to information activities.

2019　**e.** Key Leaders Engagement.　Guidance on the development of the KLEP.

2020　**4.** (xx) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

2021　**a.** Information Operations Co-ordination Board.　Guidance on the IOCB
2022　composition and process in support other HQ processes, taken from the
2023　relevant SOPs (if available).

2024　**b.** Analysis Support.　Guidance on INTEL/Systems Analysis support to Info
2025　Ops as well as contributions by capabilities conducting or contributing to
2026　information activities, with cross-reference to appropriate functional annexes.

2027　**c.** Targeting.　Guidance concerning the coordination of target nominations,
2028　taken from the relevant SOP (if available).

2029　**d.** Measurement of Success.　Reference to effects listed in Paragraph 3.c:
2030　guidance on the coordinated/collective assessment of MOE.

2031　**e.** Info Ops Reporting.　Guidance on contributions to reporting concerning
2032　information activities and effects in the information environment, with cross-
2033　reference to appropriate functional annexes.

2034

2035

2036　APPENDIX:　Info Ops Matrix　(Format: see Annex 3C)

2037

2038

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2039 ## Annex 3C – Information Operations Matrix Format (Example)

2040

Serial	Information Objectives	Commander's Military Objectives	Priority	Effects	Themes	Messages	MOE	Co-ordination Requirements	Remarks

2041

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2042
2043
2044
2045
2046
2047
2048
2049
2050
2051
2052
2053
2054　　　　　　　　　　　　　THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
2055
2056

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Chapter 4 – Education and Training

Section I – Introduction of a New Mind-Set

401. A comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment by all decision-makers and their staffs should be the ultimate goal for integrating the information factor throughout analysis, planning, execution and assessment of military operations. The Info Ops function will assist all relevant staff activities by providing advice and co-ordination.

402. It is of utmost importance to understand that Info Ops staffs will never be able to substitute respective leadership qualifications required to cope with all challenges posed to the security environment in modern information societies: the information environment is not a parallel universe that could be looked at independently from 'traditional' or 'conventional' activity; nor can it be dealt with just the employment of a limited number of some 'core capabilities'. Therefore, the Info Ops function requires the application of a generalists' perspective rather than a biased specialist view.

Section II – Info Ops Staff Skills and Competencies

403. Info Ops staffs should be able to contribute to all aspects of the EBO process and provide advice based on a sound knowledge of the information environment. A vital prerequisite for this is an understanding of the functional capabilities contributing to or performing information activities, and experience of general HQ processes. Info Ops staffs require appropriate levels of experience, training and qualifications to discharge the Info Ops staff activities described in Chapters 2 and 3.

404. Specific Info Ops staff skills and competencies – derived from these staff activities include:

a. A comprehensive and systemic understanding of the information environment.

   (1) Basic principles of complex systems (Systems Theory).

   (2) Basic principles of Systems Analysis ('systemic approach').

   (3) Basic principles of Operations Research (OR), and Modelling and Simulation (M&S).

   (4) A conceptual model of relevant aspects of the operational environment for information and information systems:

      (a) recognition of system structures and dynamics;

      (b) balancing complexity reduction vs. complexity management;

      (c) selection and assessment criteria for factors that determine system behaviour.

   (5) Procedures and structures for the collaboration with personnel/agencies with assigned Systems Analysis/INTEL functions:

      (a) roles and responsibilities of advisors and analysts vs. planners and operators;

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2098
2099

          (b) significance of the focusing of planning and conduct of operations on information and information systems.

2100
2101

    (6) Basic principles of intercultural competence and human communication.

2102
2103

  b. Basic knowledge about own and others' capabilities for creating effects in the information environment:

2104
2105

    (1) Options for providing specific direction and guidance (e.g., Information Strategy).

2106
2107
2108

    (2) Available and relevant assets/means/methods (military and civil) for creating effects in the information environment, including their capacity and employment principles:

2109

          (a) assets, means and methods for conducting information activities;

2110
2111

          (b) possible effects of mainstream activity in the information environment;

2112
2113

          (c) interfaces and starting-points for synergetic effects and/or trade-offs.

2114
2115

    (3) Basic methods and techniques for the measurement of success (MOP and MOE).

2116
2117

    (4) Legal aspects involved in the employment of above capabilities, including ROE.

2118
2119

  c. Process management skills, including components of information management and visualisation techniques:

2120

    (1) Deepened knowledge and skills for staff duty:

2121
2122

          (a) possible staff structures (emphasis on particularities of joint and combined headquarters);

2123
2124

          (b) basic staff processes (e.g., planning, targeting), including battle rhythm.

2125

    (2) Methods and tools:

2126

          (a) Info Ops Estimate;

2127

          (b) KLEP;

2128

          (c) Info Ops Matrix.

2129
2130

    (3) Recognition of the importance of the establishment and development of expert networks, and the collaboration with SMEs.

2131

    (4) Preparation, conduct and evaluation of co-ordination processes:

2132

          (a) IOCB (see Annex 2A);

2133
2134

          (b) details of the co-ordination with members of the command group and special staff;

2135

          (c) details of the consultation with civil actors.

2136
2137

405. Furthermore, Info Ops staff should have gained literacy and/or experience in the following areas:

2138

  a. understanding effects-based thinking and the comprehensive approach;

2139

  b. understanding information as an operational factor;

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2140   c. understanding the joint targeting process;

2141   d. creativity skills (for adapting plans for information activities to specific
2142   environments);

2143   e. holistic and analytical thinking skills;

2144   f. leadership and moderation skills;

2145   g. social competence and communication skills.

2146 Section III – Individual and Collective Training for Info Ops Staff

2147 406. Prior to employment in a multinational (Alliance or Coalition) context, nominated
2148   Info Ops personnel should have undertaken a multinational Info Ops course
2149   (e.g., at the NATO School or by attendance of a national course offered by a
2150   partner nation) and/or have undergone a similar level of national training.

2151 407. In addition to formal training courses, individual training can be undertaken with
2152   personnel grouped for training depending on their role and function in a HQ
2153   staff. Those involved daily with Info Ops, either by being an integral part of an
2154   Info Ops staff or indirectly involved through working in another section, will
2155   require a higher level of understanding and training than personnel who will just
2156   gain some limited exposure during exercises. Additionally there is a general
2157   requirement to train all staff to have a basic understanding of the Info Ops
2158   process and to train the command groups to understand how Info Ops can
2159   benefit them and how to best employ the resources/capabilities at their
2160   disposal.

2161 408. Personnel augmenting a staff for exercises or operations need to be properly
2162   qualified and should have some experience prior to filling the posts. Sufficiently
2163   detailed job descriptions for each Info Ops billet should be prepared and posted
2164   or distributed during the planning phase for operations or exercises.

2165 409. Augmentees to HQs must receive the latest policy, doctrine and SOP
2166   information concerning Info Ops prior to filling an Info Ops post. This will enable
2167   them to properly prepare for their functions. Failure to do this may cause
2168   augmentees to spend several days reviewing basic doctrine and policy instead
2169   of fulfilling their post. Attending training courses in Info Ops and related
2170   applications will help provide the augmentees with a basis of knowledge and
2171   understanding.

2172 Section IV – Training Activities for Key Leaders

2173 410. It is crucial that the key leaders gain an understanding of the Info Ops function,
2174   information activities and the effects that can be created. The training of key
2175   leaders in Info Ops will greatly improve their understanding of how Info Ops can
2176   contribute to the mission, and thereby enable the Chief Info Ops to gain
2177   approval for Info Ops contributions to plans and operations within an
2178   environment supportive of Info Ops. Training for key leadership can be provided
2179   through attendance at various multinational courses (e.g., run at the NATO
2180   School) and through national resources.

2181 411. Key leader knowledge of Info Ops will also help to ensure that Info Ops
2182   becomes central to plans and exercises. The Chief Info Ops should take every

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2183   opportunity to brief and update key leaders to ensure they understand the
2184   importance and central role of Info Ops.

Section V – Headquarters Functional Area Internal Training

2185

2186   412. It is important that functional staff divisions and specialist staff also benefit from
2187   Info Ops training to enable them to effectively work and integrate with Info Ops
2188   staff to maximise the Info Ops contribution to the mission. Training could
2189   include lectures, pre-exercise briefings, and mini-exercises to develop aspects
2190   of Info Ops, to ensure that the entire HQ staff is aware of the strengths and
2191   benefits of Info Ops and that they incorporate them into all unit training.

Section VI – Integrating Info Ops within Exercises

2192

2193   413. Outside structural exercise planning, there is a real need for the Info Ops staff
2194   to be fully involved in the preparation of strategic, operational or tactical
2195   exercises. Info Ops has many links across the spectrum of exercise training
2196   objectives and operational planning. Info Ops should therefore be integrated
2197   from the beginning of the exercise planning process through exercise analysis
2198   and the identification of lessons learned. Integration of Info Ops is considered
2199   particularly relevant for command post exercises, study periods, seminars and
2200   map exercises to develop the Info Ops knowledge and understanding of
2201   commanders and their key staff.

2202   414. Equally important are manpower and forces for exercises. Depending on the
2203   type of exercise being conducted, serious consideration should be given to the
2204   manning of Info Ops staff and the expertise required, especially since much of
2205   the staff is often built through augmentation. Other role players and Directing
2206   Staffs, who control, coordinate and synchronise the Info Ops contribution from
2207   the adversary's perspective should be considered early in the planning process.
2208   There will also be the need for interagency co-ordination and co-operation with
2209   civil actors such as IOs, NGOs and other civil representatives involved in
2210   exercising Info Ops.

2211   415. When considering the training objectives of each unit participating in the
2212   exercise, the type of training, forces and units required should be determined.
2213   Certain manoeuvre operation elements and the more technical aspects of
2214   information activities such as EW and CNO are best trained during a live
2215   exercise, which may include everything from providing tactical jamming assets
2216   to playing the role of adversary key decision-makers.

2217   416. Early allocation or request for units is essential together with an understanding
2218   of their intended role in the exercise. The limitations and other restrictions for
2219   operating those forces need to be resolved in the early stages of planning.

2220   417. An exercise analysis plan should be created as part of exercise planning to
2221   ensure that valuable lessons identified before, during or after the exercise can
2222   be addressed. Lessons should be captured during exercise runtime so that they
2223   can be addressed, changed during the exercise (if necessary) and can also be
2224   included in later analysis.

2225

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2226

Chapter 5 – Legal Aspects

2227

Section I – Developments in Modern Warfare and Law

2228 501. The advent of IT has made it possible for adversaries to attack each other in
2229 new ways, inflicting new forms of damage and influence. Attackers may use
2230 international networks to affect adversary systems without ever physically
2231 entering the adversary's country. Additionally, a country's dependence on
2232 information-based systems may make those systems particularly attractive
2233 targets. Furthermore, the dual-use nature of many information systems and
2234 infrastructures may blur the distinction between military and civilian targets.

2235 502. The provisions of International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict
2236 (LOAC), apply to Info Ops. As a result of the rapid technology expansion over
2237 the past decades, the virtual nature of information, and the change of focus
2238 from manoeuvre warfare to asymmetric warfare, some activities involved in Info
2239 Ops may require further consideration under International Law.

2240 503. There is currently no common international understanding as to whether
2241 information activities other than kinetic options are comparable to an "armed
2242 attack" or to "use of force" in the traditional sense. The dilemma in responding
2243 to an opponent's information activities is the difficulty in actually identifying an
2244 attack. This is exacerbated when supposed information activities occur during a
2245 period of relative calm or reduced international tensions. Investigators may have
2246 difficulty differentiating between an accidental catastrophe and a malicious
2247 attack. In any case, the response to adversary information activities shall be
2248 proportional.

2249

Section II – Legal Challenges to Info Ops

2250 504. Info Ops challenge existing international law in three primary ways:

2251 a. First, the intangible damage or cognitive effects that information may
2252 cause is fundamentally different than the physical effects caused by
2253 traditional warfare. The damage and destruction caused by conventional
2254 munitions is easy to comprehend and conforms to accepted views of war.
2255 In contrast, the disruption of information systems or the manipulation or
2256 corruption of stored or transmitted data or the shaping of human
2257 perception may cause intangible damage – such as the disruption of civil
2258 or government services or the unconscious and biased decision-making of
2259 military leaders – without primary or secondary physical effects.

2260 b. Second, the ability of information or an electronic signal to transit
2261 international networks challenges the concept of territorial sovereignty. As
2262 the world becomes increasingly "networked" with signals travelling across
2263 international borders with impunity, allowing individuals or groups to affect
2264 systems around the globe without directly or indirectly causing physical
2265 damage, the precept of territorial sovereignty becomes blurred.
2266 Additionally, such intangible crossing of national borders without causing

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2267   any physical effects may not be the type of violation traditionally
2268   recognized as a military attack.

2269   c.   Third, information activities which do not cause physical damage may
2270   be difficult to define as "attack" or "acts of violence against the adversary"
2271   in the sense of Humanitarian Law. Thus, regulations of the LOAC
2272   protecting non-combatants and civilian objects partly may not be
2273   applicable. Furthermore, in the context of information activities, it is difficult
2274   to distinguish legitimate military targets from forbidden civilian objects.

Section III – Fundamental Questions

2275

2276   505. When examining the relationship between Info Ops and the law – particularly
2277   International Law and the LOAC – it becomes apparent that fundamental
2278   questions need to be explored:

2279   a.   How do the terms 'use of force', 'armed conflict', 'armed attack',
2280   'aggression', 'violence', 'hostile intent', and 'hostile act' equate or relate to
2281   information activities?

2282   b.   Who are considered combatants related to information activities?

2283   c.   How will established legal principles related to national sovereignty be
2284   affected by information activities?

2285   d.   How does international law apply in situations where there is no armed
2286   conflict or UNSC mandate but where Info Ops are applied, ranging from
2287   peacetime to military operations other than war?[54]

2288   e.   When and how is Info Ops targeting restricted by the principles of the
2289   LOAC?

2290   f.   How can proportionality be determined for information activities?

2291   g.   What obligation exists to assess reverberating effects?

Section IV – Rules of Engagement

2292

2293   506. The political/strategic leadership must clearly state not only the objectives for
2294   any mission that they task to the military but also the constraints that are to be
2295   placed upon that mission and its execution. The adherence to a set of ROE
2296   does not, however, guarantee the legality of a particular action; it remains a
2297   command responsibility to use only that force which is necessary, reasonable
2298   and lawful in the circumstances.

2299   507. Ideally, there should be just a single set of ROE; these should be agreed to by
2300   all nations contributing to a Coalition operation. However, national differences
2301   often result in additional national limitations on ROE which may be more
2302   restrictive than the Coalition's ROE. Clearly, this will be a major factor for the
2303   commander to consider when assigning troops to task. The commander will
2304   strive, through the auspices of the Strategic Commander or interagency co-
2305   ordination procedures and structures, to establish uniform ROE throughout his

---

[54]   In NATO, the full scope of activities to affect the information environment requires NAC approval.

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

| 2306 | command. This process can, however, be lengthy and, thus, the issue must be |
| 2307 | an early component of the planning process. |

Section V – Legal Requirements

2309	508. Commanders are required to consider the legality of their actions, including
2310	those in the information environment.
2311	509. Existing military capabilities already create effects on information and
2312	information systems, and therefore a stand-alone study of the law surrounding
2313	their application is not required.
2314	510. Separate consideration of the legality of using emerging capabilities for the
2315	purpose of affecting the information environment may be necessary.
2316	

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2317
2318
2319
2320
2321
2322
2323
2324
2325
2326
2327
2328
2329
2330
2331
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336   THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
2337
2338

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

Lexicon Part 1 – Abbreviations

2339		
2340		
2341	AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
2342	ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
2343	AJP	Allied Joint Publication
2344	BILAT	Bilateral Talk
2345	C2	Command & Control
2346	C4I	Consultation, Command, Control, Communications
2347		and Information
2348	CAFJO	Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations
2349	CD-CIE	Cross-Domain Collaborative Information Environment
2350	CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation
2351	CI	Counter-Intelligence
2352	CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
2353	CIS	Communications and Information Systems
2354	CMCO	Civil-Military Co-ordination (EU)
2355	CMCoord	Civil-Military Co-ordination (UN)
2356	CNA	Computer Network Attack
2357	CND	Computer Network Defence
2358	CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
2359	CNO	Computer Network Operations
2360	COE	Centre of Excellence
2361	COMPUSEC	Computer Security
2362	COMSEC	Communications Security
2363	COS	Chief of Staff
2364	CPAO	Chief Public Affairs Officer
2365	CROP	Common Relevant Operational Picture
2366	CULAD	Cultural Adviser
2367	DA	Direct Action
2368	EBA	Effects-Based Assessment
2369	EBAO	Effects-Based Approach to Operations
2370	EBE	Effects-Based Execution
2371	EBO	Effects-Based Operations
2372	ECM	Electronic Counter Measures
2373	EPM	Electronic Protection Measures
2374	ESM	Electronic Support Measures
2375	EW	Electronic Warfare
2376	GENAD	Gender Adviser
2377	HUMINT	Human Intelligence

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2378	Info Ops	Information Operations
2379	INFOSEC	Information Systems Security
2380	INTEL	Intelligence
2381	IO	International Organisation
2382	IOCB	Information Operations Co-ordination Board
2383	IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
2384	ISTAR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition
2385		and Reconnaissance
2386	IT	Information Technology
2387	J1	Manpower Management (staff division)
2388	J2	Intelligence (staff division)
2389	J3	Operations Management (staff division)
2390	J4	Logistics (staff division)
2391	J5	Plans & Policy (staff division)
2392	J6	Communications and Information Systems /
2393		Command & Control Support (staff division)
2394	J7	Training and Exercises (staff division)
2395	J8	Financial Management (staff division)
2396	J9	Civil-Military Co-operation (staff division)
2397	J-ENG	Engineers (staff division)
2398	J-MED	Medical (staff division)
2399	JP	Joint Publication (USA)
2400	KD	Knowledge Development
2401	KLE	Key Leaders Engagement
2402	KLEP	Key Leaders Engagement Plan
2403	KM	Knowledge Management
2404	KR	Knowledge Request
2405	LEGAD	Legal Adviser
2406	LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
2407	LO	Liaison Officer
2408	LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
2409	MA	Military Assistance
2410	MC	Military Committee (Publication)
2411	MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
2412	MNIOE	Multinational Information Operations Experiment
2413	MNIS	Multinational Information Sharing
2414	MOE	Measure(s) of Effectiveness
2415	MOP	Measure(s) of Performance
2416	M&S	Modelling and Simulation
2417	NAC	North Atlantic Council

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2418	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
2419	OODA	Observe–Orient–Decide–Act
2420	OPP	Operational Planning Process
2421	OPSEC	Operations Security
2422	OR	Operations Research
2423	PA	Public Affairs
2424	PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information
2425		(analysis scheme)
2426	POLAD	Political Adviser
2427	PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
2428	RFI	Request for Information
2429	SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
2430	SME	Subject Matter Expert
2431	SOF	Special Operations Forces
2432	SR	Special Reconnaissance
2433	ROE	Rules of Engagement
2434		

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
2451
2452
2453 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
2454
2455

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2456 # Lexicon Part 2 – Terms and Definitions

2457

2458 <mark>(to be issued)</mark>

2459

2460 Adversary

2461 Affect

2462 Asymmetric Warfare

2463 Capability

2464 Common Relevant Operational Picture

2465 Comprehensive Approach

2466 Co-ordination

2467 Coordinating Authority

2468 Decision-Maker

2469 Effects-Based Approach to Operations

2470 Effects-Based Operations

2471 Function

2472 Influence

2473 Information

2474 Information Activity

2475 Information Environment

2476 Information Objective

2477 Information Operations

2478 Information Society

2479 Information Strategy

2480 Information Superiority

2481 Information System

2482 Instrument of Power

2483 Intervention

2484 Key Leaders Engagement

2485 Knowledge Development

2486 Network Centric Warfare

2487 Networked Operations

2488 Operational Level

2489 Understanding

2490 Will

2491 Security Environment

2492 Strategic Communication

2493 Strategic Level

2494 System

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2495   Systems Analysis

2496   Tactical Level

2497   Targeting

2498

2499

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2505
2506
2507
2508
2509
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516
2517
2518   THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

UNCLASSIFIED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

– The Military Information Operations Function within a Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approach –
MNIOE Applied Concept, Coordinated Draft Version 3.0

2519
2520
2521
2522
2523
2524
2525
2526
2527
2528
2529
2530
2531
2532
2533
2534
2535
2536
2537
2538
2539
2540
2541

2547

2548   Point of Contact:
2549   Kommando Strategische Aufklärung (KdoStratAufkl)
2550   - Gruppe Informationsoperationen (Grp InfoOp) -
2551   Attn: LTC Peter E. Westenkirchner
2552   Robert-Schuman-Platz 3
2553   D-53175 Bonn, Germany
2554   Phone: +49 (0)228 43320-464
2555   E-mail: peterwestenkirchner@bundeswehr.org