



# A Risk Mitigation Model: Lessons Learned From Actual Insider Sabotage



**Software Engineering Institute** 

**Carnegie Mellon** 

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**Attacks and Countermeasures** 

ATC-5&6, November 7, 2006



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1. REPORT DATE <b>07 NOV 2006</b>		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVE 00-00-2006	red 5 <b>to 00-00-2006</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
A Risk Mitigation Model: Lessons Learned From Actual Insider Sabotage				5b. GRANT NUMBER		
Danviage				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
				5e. TASK NUMBER		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Carnegie Mellon University ,Software Engineering Institute (SEI),Pittsburgh,PA,15213				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAIL Approved for publ	LABILITY STATEMENT ic release; distributi	on unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO CSI 33rd Annual S	otes Security Conference	and Exhibition, 6-8	Nov, 2006, Orlan	ndo, FL.		
14. ABSTRACT						
15. SUBJECT TERMS						
16. SECURITY CLASSIFIC	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER	19a. NAME OF			
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**Report Documentation Page** 

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188



## A Risk Mitigation Model: Lessons Learned From Actual Insider Sabotage

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November 7, 2006

# Financial Institution Discovers \$691 Million in Losses...

Covered up for 5 Years by Trusted Employee

Manufacturer Loses \$10 Million-Lays Off 80 Employees...

Sabotage by Employee of Eleven Years Nearly Puts Company Out of Business





# **COULD THIS HAPPEN TO** YOU?

## **Agenda**

#### Introductions

#### Background

- Evolution of CERT's Insider Threat Research
- Simultaneous PERSEREC Insider Threat Research

Interactive Case Example

Key Insider IT Sabotage Observations

- Case Examples
- Statistics
- Observables

**MERIT** Model Overview

**Best Practices** 

**Future Work** 



# Introductions

#### What is CERT?



Center of Internet security expertise

Established by the US Department of Defense in 1988 on the heels of the Morris worm that created havoc on the ARPANET, the precursor to what is the Internet today

Located in the Software Engineering Institute (SEI)

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- Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC)
- Operated by Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

# **Background**

#### **Evolution of CERT Insider Threat Research**

#### Insider threat case studies

- U.S. Department Of Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC)
- CERT/U.S. Secret Service *Insider Threat Study*

#### Best practices

Carnegie Mellon CyLab Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats

#### System dynamics modeling

- Carnegie Mellon CyLab *Management and Education on the Risk* of Insider Threat (MERIT)
- PERSEREC



#### Simultaneous PERSEREC Insider Threat Research

Small number of cases (10)

In-depth Personal, Organizational Psychological Perspective

Emphasis on experience of individual by those in workplace as he moves from disgruntlement to attack

Results Available (Shaw and Fischer, 2005; Shaw, 2006)

Similar Findings to CERT

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# **CERT/USSS** Insider Threat Study

#### Definition of insider:

#### Current or former employees or contractors who

- intentionally exceeded or misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems or data in a manner that
- targeted a specific individual or affected the security of the organization's data, systems and/or daily business operations





# Insider Threat Study

Funded by US Secret Service (partially by Department of Homeland Security)

Big picture approach: examine technical & psychological aspects of the problem

Objective: Analyze actual cases to develop information for prevention & early detection

#### Methodology:

- Collected cases (150)
- Codebooks
- Interviews
- Reports
- **Training**





#### **MERIT**

#### Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat

Funded by CyLab

Develop models of insider IT sabotage

Communicate the multi-disciplinary nature of problem

Problem and mitigation requires analysis of policies, practices, technologies over time

Develop innovative training materials

Help organizations understand how they need to work across departments to mitigate the insider sabotage risk

May require mental model shift, culture change




# 2006 e-Crime Watch Survey

CSO Magazine, USSS & CERT 434 respondents

# Percentage of Incidents With no Source Identified

# 100 80 60 40 2005 2006


# Percentage of insiders versus outsiders







# Percentage of Participants Who Experienced an Insider Incident (2004-2006)





# Overview of Insider Crimes

# **Types of Insider Crimes**


*Fraud:* obtaining property or services from the organization unjustly through deception or trickery.

**Theft of Information**: stealing confidential or proprietary information from the organization.

IT Sabotage: acting with intention to harm a specific individual, the organization, or the organization's data, systems, and/or daily business operations.

# Insider Threat Study Case Breakdown

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# **Typical Fraud Incidents**

#### Who were they?

- Current employees
- Half male; half female
- Non-technical; non-management positions

#### Why did they do it?

Greed

#### How did they attack?

- Many had privileged access
- Only legitimate user commands
- Used their own username & password
- Acted during working hours from within the workplace

# **Typical Fraud Incidents - 2**

#### How was it detected?

- System irregularity
- Non-technical means

How was the insider identified?

System logs

What were the impacts?

- Financial impacts to employer
- Impacts to innocent victims

## Typical Theft of Confidential Information Incidents

#### Who were they?

- Current employees (but almost half of them had already accepted another position)
- Male
- Over half held technical positions

#### Why did they do it?

- **Financial**
- Entitlement (some didn't realize it was wrong)
- Disgruntled

#### How did they attack?

- Used their own username & password, but half also compromised an account
- Acted during working hours from within the workplace



## Typical Theft of Confidential Information Incidents - 2

#### How was it detected?

- Non-technical means
- Half by system irregularity

#### How was the insider identified?

System logs

#### What were the impacts?

- Financial impacts to employer
- Organization & customer confidential information revealed
- Trade secrets stolen
- Innocent victim murdered
- Insider committed suicide



# Typical IT Sabotage Attack

#### Who were they?

- Former employees
- Male
- Highly technical positions

#### Why did they do it?

- Disgruntled
- Revenge for negative work-related event

#### How did they attack?

- No authorized access
- Backdoor accounts, shared accounts, other employees' accounts, insider's own account
- Many technically sophisticated
- Remote access outside normal working hours



# **Typical IT Sabotage Attack - 2**

#### How was it detected?

- Manually by non-security personnel
- System failure or irregularity

#### How was the insider identified?

- System logs
- Most took steps to conceal identity and/or actions

#### What were the impacts?

- Inability to conduct business, loss of customer records, inability to produce products
- Negative media attention
- Private information forwarded to customers, competitors, or employees
- Exposure of personal or confidential information
- Web site defacements
- Many individuals harmed



## Insider Case Exercise

# Ian Archer's Attack of iAssemble, Inc.

We will hand out a description of a fictional but representative case.

Please take a few minutes to review the case description.

We will be leading an interactive discussion of this case.

#### iAssemble Case Timeline

#### 1997

iAssemble established – Eagles and Thompson partners, and Archer employed Archer builds network and computing support for critical iAssemble processes

#### Fall 2000

Archer's father diagnosed with lung cancer Archer looses driver's license for DUI

#### Winter 2000-2001

Adams hired as lead administrator

Archer moves all programs off of local workstations and onto central server

Allen hired as junior administrator to work with Archer

Archer tests malicious program four times at work on test server



# iAssemble Case Timeline (cont.)

## Spring 2001

Allen shares password with Archer Formal complaint filed by coworker against Archer for harassment Archer reprimanded

#### **Summer 2001**

Archer begins interviewing for other jobs

Archer creates backdoor; intimidates coworker out of backup tapes

Archer fired; remote access via Allen's account; logic bomb planted via backdoor

Law enforcement brought in; forensics examination started

#### **Aftermath**

Archer indicted in Fall 2001; convicted Spring 2002. Company never recovered.



# **Questions & Discussion**

### **Questions about Case**

Why did Archer attack iAssemble?

Why was Archer able to harm iAssemble's systems after firing?

What could iAssemble have done to prevent the attack?

What should iAssemble do in the future?

# Why did Archer attack iAssemble?

# **Key Concepts**

#### Unmet expectation as origin of disgruntlement

- What can cause expectation to grow?
- What other types of unmet expectation might lead to disgruntlement?

#### Predisposition to attack


 What personal risk factors might have indicated that Archer was predisposed to attack? Why was Archer able to harm iAssemble after firing?

# **Key Concepts**

#### Access path

A sequence of one or more access points that lead to a critical system

An organization may not know about all of the access paths to its critical systems.



What could iAssemble have done to prevent the attack?

## **Key Concepts**

#### Behavioral precursors

Actions (offline) by the insider that might indicate an increased risk of cyber attack

#### Technical precursors

Online actions by the insider that might involve setting up the attack

What should iAssemble do in the future?

## iAssemble Case Summary

### **Questions about Case**

Why did Archer attack iAssemble?

Why was Archer able to harm iAssemble's systems after firing?

What could iAssemble have done to prevent the attack?

What should iAssemble do in the future?

### iAssemble Case Lessons (Behavioral)

Management should recognize potential impact of negative work-related events, e.g.

- New supervisor
- Layoffs
- Start or end of new project
- Change in salary/bonus structure

Management must be alert for behavioral precursors

Management should increase auditing and monitoring for technical preparatory actions

Bottom line: Management must understand and pay attention to the conditions that increase risk of insider threat.

### iAssemble Case Lessons (Technical)

Management must recognize technical precursors

Ability to disable access must be on-demand and absolute (particularly for system administrators & privileged users)

Negative events like demotion and firing are critical points

But this is often easier said than done

- Disabling access requires management to understand access paths available to insider
  - Management's understanding depends on rigorous access management practices
    - Practices tend to degrade over time without regular reinforcement
      - It takes time to recover from poor access management practices

Bottom line: Proactive, ongoing access management needed

### **MERIT**

#### Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat

Funded by CyLab

Develop models of insider IT sabotage

Communicate the multi-disciplinary nature of problem

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Develop innovative training materials

Help organizations understand how they need to work across departments to mitigate the insider sabotage risk

May require mental model shift, culture change

## **Definition of Insider IT Sabotage**

#### Cases

- across critical infrastructure sectors
- in which the insider's primary goal was to
  - sabotage some aspect of an organization or
  - direct specific harm toward an individual(s).



## **Summary of Sabotage Crimes**

Constructed or downloaded, tested, planted logic bomb

Deleted files, databases, or programs

Destroyed backups

Revealed derogatory, confidential, or pornographic information to customers, employees, or public

Modified system or data to present pornography or embarrassing info

Denial of Service by modifying authentication info, deleting data, or crashing systems

Modified system logs to frame supervisor or innocent person & conceal identity

Downloaded customer credit card data & posted to website

Cut cables

Sabotaged own project

Physically stole computers and/or backups

Planted virus on customers' computers

Extortion for deleted data & backups

Defaced organization's website

Listed person as deceased in federal government database



# Key Insider IT Sabotage Observations

## **Definition of Insider IT Sabotage**

#### Cases

- across critical infrastructure sectors
- in which the insider's primary goal was to
  - sabotage some aspect of an organization or
  - direct specific harm toward an individual(s).



## **Agenda**

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Interactive Case Example



Key Insider IT Sabotage Observations

- Case Examples
- Statistics
- Observables


**MERIT** Model Overview

**Best Practices** 

**Future Work** 



## Insider Threat Study Case Breakdown



### Who Were the Saboteurs?


Age: 17 - 60

Gender: mostly males

Variety of racial & ethnic backgrounds

Marital status: fairly evenly split married versus single

Almost 1/3 had previous arrests



### Observation #1:

Most insiders had personal predispositions that contributed to their risk of committing malicious acts.

## **Personal Predispositions**

Serious mental health disorders

Personality problems

Social skills and decision-making biases

History of rule conflicts

### **Serious Mental Health Disorders**

A diagnosed mental health problem for which treatment was recommended or sought.

### **Examples:**

- Treated with anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications
- Alcohol and drug addiction
- Panic attacks
- Mental health treatment for stress
- Physical spouse abuse
- Seizure disorder
- Examples: "Bill" and "Archer"

### **Personality Problems**

Biased views of self and others that cause maladaptive relations.

#### **Examples:**

- Sensitivity to criticism & needs for attention
- Chronic frustration & feeling unappreciated
- Difficulties controlling anger with bursts of inappropriate temper
- Chronic sense of victimization or mistreatment
- Chronic grudges against others
- Grandiose/above the rules
- Subject is avoided by others or they "walk on eggshells" around him or her
- Bragging, bullying, spending on fantasy-related items
- Compartmentalizes
- Lack of conscience, impulse control, empathy for others, social impact
- Example: CTO



## Social skills and Decision-Making Biases

Chronic withdrawal or conflicts with fellow workers, supervisors and security personnel.

#### **Examples:**

Bullying and intimidation of fellow workers

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- Refusal to confront supervisors with legitimate work-related complaints due to shyness while complaining to competitors
- Serious personality conflicts
- Unprofessional behavior
- Personal hygiene problems
- Inability to conform to rules
- Example: Silent hacker



## **History of Rule Violations**

Past legal, security, or procedural violations.

### Examples:

- Arrests
- Hacking
- Security violations
- Harassment or conflicts resulting in official sanctions or complaints
- Misuse of travel, time, expenses
- Example: Heavy metal


## Case Example – Observation #1

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A database administrator wipes out critical data after her supervisor and coworkers undermine her authority.



## **Personal Predispositions**



### Observation #2:

Most insiders' disgruntlement is due to unmet expectations.


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## **Case Example – Observation #2**

A network engineer retaliates after his hopes of recognition and technical control are dashed.



## **Unmet Expectations**



\*\* Data was only available for 25 cases



## **Unmet Expectations Observed in Cases**

Salary/bonus

**Promotion** 

Freedom of on line actions

Use of company resources

Privacy

Work ethic

Authority/ Responsibilities

Project requirements - deadlines, milestones

Job dissatisfaction

Supervisor demands

Coworker relations

Overestimated abilities

Access to information following termination


Unmet Expectations Generated by Personal Predispositions

### Observation #3:


In most cases, stressors, including sanctions and precipitating events, contributed to the likelihood of insider IT sabotage.

## Case Example – Observation #3

A disgruntled system administrator strikes back after his life begins to fall apart personally and professionally.



## **Stressors /Sanctions/Precipitating Events**





### Stressors/Sanctions/Precipitating Events Observed in Cases

#### **Termination**

gross insubordination

violation of company rules

poor performance

not being a team player

false information on background check

discussion about termination of employment

#### Sanctions

Reprimands

work related issues

aggressive and malicious behavior

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Suspension for excessive absenteeism

Demotion due to poor performance

Responsibilities removed from projects

Suspension of Internet access

Death in family; Divorce

#### **Financial**

Disagreement re: salary/compensation

Bonuses lower than expected or removed

Failure to offer severance package

Passed over for promotion

Disagreements

with supervisor

with colleagues

Transfer between departments

New supervisor hired

Access changed

Termination of subcontractor contract

Termination of partnership

Termination of other employees

Outsourcing of project

Demotion due to project completion



### Observation #4:


Behavioral precursors were often observable in insider IT sabotage cases but ignored by the organization.

## Case Example – Observation #4

A "weird tech guy" is able to attack following termination because no one recognizes the danger signs.



### **Behavioral Precursors**



### **Behavioral Precursors Observed in Cases**

Drug use

Conflicts (coworkers, supervisor)

Aggressive or violent behavior

Web surfing, chat rooms at work

Mood swings

Bizarre behavior

Used organization's computers for personal business

Poor performance

**EEO** complaint

Absence/tardiness

Sexual harassment

Poor hygiene

## **Behavioral Rule Violations Ignored in Cases**

Inappropriate purchases on company accounts

Lack of background / reference / employment references

Lied about professional certifications

Poor work habits

Irregular hours

Drinking / smoking on the job

Sexist comments to co-workers

Excessive unproductive time

Worked from home against company policy

Propositioned co-workers with numerous computer ventures - using organization resources

Violated dress code

#### Observation #5:

Insiders created or used access paths unknown to management to set up their attack and conceal their identity or actions.


The majority attacked after termination.

### **Case Example – Observation #5**

The "weird tech guy" realizes the end is near so he sneakily sets up his attack.



### Created or used unknown access paths



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#### Unknown Access Paths Observed in Cases

Planted logic bomb while still employed

Created backdoors before termination or after being notified of termination

Installed modem for access following termination

Changed all passwords right before resignation

Disabled anti-virus on desktop & tested virus

Network probing

Installed remote network administration tool

Download and installation of malicious code and tools (e.g., password cracker or virus)

Disabling of system logs & removal of history files

#### Observation #6:

In many cases, organizations failed to detect technical precursors.



## **Case Example – Observation #6**


A logic bomb sits undetected for 6 months before finally wreaking havoc on a telecommunications firm.





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## **Technical precursors undetected**



#### **Undetected Technical Precursors Observed in Cases**

Downloading and use of "hacker tools" such as rootkits, password sniffers, or password crackers

Failure to create backups as required

Failure to document systems or software as required

Unauthorized access of customers' systems

Unauthorized use of coworkers machines left logged in

Sharing passwords with others & demanded passwords from subordinates

System access following termination

Refusal to swipe badge to record physical access

Access of web sites prohibited by acceptable use policy

Refusal to return laptop upon termination

Use of backdoor accounts

Use of organization's system for game playing, violating acceptable use policy

Set up every new computer so he could access it remotely



#### Observation #7:

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
Lack of physical and electronic access controls facilitated IT sabotage.

### **Case Example – Observation #7**

Emergency services are forced to rely on manual address lookups for 911 calls when an insider sabotages the system.



#### **Lack of Access Controls**



#### **Access Control Vulnerabilities Observed in Cases**

Access following termination

Did not remove system administrator privileges

Only physical access controls – no electronic

Insider permitted to have sole copy of source code

Physical & electronic access permitted the rest of the day after termination

Ability to release changes to customer systems with no two man rule

Insider permitted to retain computer account following termination (with reduced privileges)

Insider able to release logic bomb to production system – no 2 man rule

Use of coworker's computer left logged in unattended

Insider never swiped badge

Insiders created backdoor accounts that were not detected

## MERIT Model Overview

## **System Dynamics Approach**

#### A method and supporting toolset

- To holistically model, document, and analyze
- Complex problems as they evolve over time
- And develop effective mitigation strategies
- That balance competing concerns

#### System Dynamics supports simulation to

- Validate characterization of problem
- Test out alternate mitigation strategies




## **Model Exposition**


Our system dynamics model is described as a sequence of feedback loops that tells how the problem (i.e., insider sabotage) unfolds

- Each feedback loop describes a single aspect of the problem
- Multiple feedback loops interact to describe the complex nature of the problem

#### **MERIT Model – Extreme Overview**



#### **MERIT** Simulation Model



# **Best Practices**

## CyLab Common Sense Guide - Best Practices

Institute periodic enterprise-wide risk assessments.

Use layered defense against remote attacks.

Actively defend against malicious code.

Institute periodic security awareness training for all employees.

Monitor and respond to suspicious or disruptive behavior.

Enforce separation of duties and least privilege.

Deactivate computer access following termination.

Implement strict password and account management policies and practices.

Collect and save data for use in investigations.

Log, monitor, and audit employee online actions.

Implement secure backup and recovery processes.

Use extra caution with system administrators and privileged users.

Clearly document insider threat controls.

# Future Work

#### **New Starts & Future Work**

#### **New Starts**

- Requirements for insider threat detection tools
- CyLab MERIT-IA (MERIT InterActive)
  - Analysis of current cases

#### **Future Work**

- Self-directed risk assessment
- Best practice collaboration
- Investigative guidelines
- Extension/analysis of MERIT model
- Insider threat workshops

# **Questions / Comments**

## **CERT Insider Threat Reports**

CERT Insider Threat Website: <a href="http://www.cert.org/insider\_threat/">http://www.cert.org/insider\_threat/</a>

Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure Sectors: <a href="http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/insidercross051105.pdf">http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/insidercross051105.pdf</a>

Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector. <a href="http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/bankfin040820.pdf">http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/bankfin040820.pdf</a>

Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat (MERIT):
Mitigating the Risk of Sabotage to Employers' Information, Systems,
or Networks: <a href="http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/merit.pdf">http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/merit.pdf</a>

Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats: <a href="http://www.us-cert.gov/reading\_room/prevent\_detect\_insiderthreat0504.pdf">http://www.us-cert.gov/reading\_room/prevent\_detect\_insiderthreat0504.pdf</a>

2006 eCrime Survey: http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/ecrimesurvey06.pdf

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CSI November 7, 2006

## Other related Insider reports

- Shaw, E.D. (2006) "The Role of Behavioral Research and Profiling in Malicious Cyber Insider Investigations," Digital Investigation, The International Journal of Digital Forensics and Incident Response, Vol. 3, Elsevier Publications, Exeter, UK
- Shaw, E.D. and Fischer, L. (2005) Ten Tales of Betrayal: An Analysis of Attacks on Corporate Infrastructure by Information Technology Insiders, "Monterrey, CA.: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center.
- Shaw, E.D. (2004). "The insider threat: Can it be managed?" In Parker, T. (Ed.), *Cyber Adversary Characterization: Auditing the Hacker Mind,* June. Syngress Publications, Rockland, Mass.
- Shaw, E.D., & Stroz, E. (2004). WarmTouch software: Assessing Friend, Foe and Relationship." In Parker, T. (Ed.), *Cyber Adversary Characterization: Auditing the Hacker Mind.* June. Syngress Publications, Rockland, Mass.

#### **Points of Contact**

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#### **CERT Insider Threat Web Site:**

http://www.cert.org/insider\_threat/