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Following a decade of war, the civil-military divide in the United States continues to occupy deep discussion on military bases, in university classrooms, journalistic conference rooms, the Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill. Much of the study of the divide in the civil-military relationship focuses on civilian control of the military, and attempts to remedy this divide through civilian actions. Expanding on the focus of study heretofore—and using a new paradigm employing a version of the Clausewitzian trinity represented by the military, the people, and the government—the author identifies four areas of civil-military divide: The Culture Divide, the Control Divide, the Connectivity Divide, and the Knowledge Divide. The author recommends methods to improve each divide from a military perspective, with the intent of spurring further study and discussion. The ultimate aim of this essay is to foster understanding and trust to improve United States foreign policy related to security and the military instrument of power.

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

SHRINKING THE CIVIL-MILITARY DIVIDE: A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

by

William J. Bartolomea

Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

Following a decade of war, the civil-military divide in the United States continues to occupy deep discussion on military bases, in university classrooms, journalistic conference rooms, the Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill. Much of the study of the divide in the civil-military relationship focuses on civilian control of the military, and attempts to remedy this divide through civilian actions. Expanding on the focus of study heretofore—and using a new paradigm employing a version of the Clausewitzian trinity represented by the military, the people, and the government—the author identifies four areas of civil-military divide: The Culture Divide, the Control Divide, the Connectivity Divide, and the Knowledge Divide. The author recommends methods to improve each divide from a military perspective, with the intent of spurring further study and discussion. The ultimate aim of this essay is to foster understanding and trust to improve United States foreign policy related to security and the military instrument of power.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction

> From the time of the revolution to the present day, Civil-Military relations in America essentially have constituted a bargain among three parties: the American people, the government, and the military as an institution.[1]

To the serving military officer and student of American civil-military relations, Mackubin Thomas Owens' statement above is noteworthy for two reasons. First, Owens characterizes the relationship as a *bargain*, not unlike the Clausewitzian trinity occurring between the people, the government, and the military.[2] However, given the unique make-up of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF), the relationship is less of a trinity or triangular with the military at one pole and more a four-square configuration with the military at the center, linked internally and externally to the people and the government. (Figure 1)

EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE	EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT
MILITARY	
INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PEOPLE	INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT

Figure 1

Second, describing the relationship as a bargain connotes an equitable exchange of services between the bargaining parties.

Unfortunately, after over a decade of war initiated by poor political and strategic direction, complicated at times by insufficient operational leadership, and essentially ignored by the American public, it is clear that there is a growing fracture in the bargain

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[1] Mackubin Thomas Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain* (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011), 1.
[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 101.

between the military, the government, and the people. This growing rift portends

significant risks to national security if not repaired.

As to whether the civil-military bargain is broken, it may be a matter of degree,

but there can be little doubt about the strained quality of the current relationship between

the military and the other two elements of the body politic. One need only read the

emerging analysis of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the attitudes apparent in the

popular press, and recent war literature to see that virtually no one in the relationship

believes the bargain is on solid footing.[3]

The academic study of civil-military relations began in the late-1950s when

Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz laid its theoretical foundations. In the

decades since, scholars and writers such as Eliot Cohen, Peter Desch, and Peter Feaver

have reevaluated and expanded these ideas. These academics focused primarily on the

important topic of civilian control of the military. This civilian control aspect continues

to occupy deep discussion and study.[4] What is lacking, however, is a similarly deep

study of three other aspects of the civil-military divide brought about by the

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[3] See Ben Fountain, *Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk* (New York: HarperCollins, 2012); Phil Klay, *Redeployment* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014); Andrew Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); James Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic.com*, January/February 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/12/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/. (accessed 5 January, 2015).

[4] For recent arguments on the civil-military divide, see Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003); Michael Charles Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds. *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001) [Based on the digest of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies 1999]. For earlier, seminal works concerning the civil-military divide, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957) and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960).

establishment of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). These divides may have more effect on U.S. national security in the future than the oft-studied civilian control issue.

What follows is an evaluation of the civil-military divide that expands beyond the civilian control perspective. This essay recommends a new paradigm for the civil-military relationship by introducing three new areas that heretofore have received scant attention in the study of the interaction of the military with society and government. These new areas are the Culture Divide, the Connectivity Divide, and the Knowledge Divide.[5] Along with the Control Divide, these areas make up the four methods of interaction between the All-Volunteer Force, American society, and U.S. government officials—the bargain between the military, the people, and the government. By limiting focus on the civil-military divide to just civilian control, scholars have overlooked other critical divisions in the civil-military relationship. Further, this paper recommends how the Armed Forces can help shrink these divides.

Few authors have focused on the divide from the military perspective—or provided insight on the role the military itself plays in this divide. As one author noted, "it remains unclear whether our nation can make sound strategic decisions unless there is a more direct and personal connection between the Army, the people, and the state."[6] Is the divide between the military and their civilian chiefs most critical? What about the divide between the military and society? What is the military's role in shrinking this divide? Before answering these questions, this essay lays the foundation for categorizing the interaction between the military and other areas of society and government.

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[5] Lindsay Cohn, *The Evolution of the Civil-Military "Gap" Debate*. A paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), (Duke University, 1999). The term "Culture Gap" is used by Cohn in much the same manner as in this thesis.

[6] Philip Carter, "Final Draft," *Foreign Policy* (28 January 2013). www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/28/final_draft. (accessed December 29, 2014).

Chapter 2 – Defining the Divides: A New Clausewitzian Paradigm

In his seminal study of warfare, Carl von Clausewitz defined war as a trinity of three interacting forces—passion, reason, and chance.[1] To embody these forces, he assigned them mainly to the people, the government, and the military, respectively. It is through these three elements that this essay examines the methods of civil-military interaction.[2] Although Clausewitz' description of these three forces related specifically to war, his intuition in identifying the trinity as a relationship between the people, the government, and the military speaks to his deep understanding of how these institutions interact within, and influence, the Nation-State. Applied to today's modern, democratic America and in the context of the civil-military bargain, a new relationship arises that focuses on the military and its interaction with both the population and political leadership on the subject of war and service in this new age. To stop at this rudimentary description, however, oversimplifies the relationship and implies an equal connection between the three elements of the trinity. In fact, the three elements are not equal in their interaction—the military is unique.

In a democratic society, the military is different and unique in the trinity because it is at once all three elements. A member of the military is simultaneously a citizen and a member of the government.[3] This is not true for the other two elements of the trinity.

Since the military is its own pole of the trinity, it has a relationship with the other two elements. Thus, a relationship between "the military and the people" and "the military and the government" exists. Assuming also that the military is at times the

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[1] Clausewitz, *On War*, 101.

[2] The people will also be referred to as "society" or "American society." The military includes individual servicemembers.

[3] Military members are subordinate to the President as Commander-in-Chief, and thus are members of the Executive Branch of the government.

people *and* the government, two new relationships form. The result is four methods of interaction for the military: the military *and* the people, the military *and* the government, the military *as* the people, and the military *as* the government.

Having defined the interaction of the military with the other two elements of the trinity, the next step is to evaluate each interaction separately. What relationships do these interactions form, and what—if any—divides exist in these relationships? Taking each of the four interactions in turn, a definition of the relationship formed by each ensues.

The Military *and* the People

The relationship of the military and the people refers to who defends the state. It deals with the idea of service and focuses on values and citizenship. Any divide between the military and the people will be a *Culture Divide*. With an active duty military force of approximately 1.4 million service members, today's military makes up just .4% of the U.S. population.[4] Although the National Guard and Reserves add to this percentage, for most of this essay, the author will focus on the active duty military only.[5] What does the service of such a small percentage of the people mean to those in uniform? Are they isolated from the other 99.6% of the U.S. population? What special responsibilities come with service? How do military members ensure they stay attuned to the culture and values of American society *writ large* while also remaining committed to the military

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[4] Active Duty Armed Forces Strength Figures for September 30, 2014 total 1,378,834. This includes all five U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard). https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. (accessed 16 October, 2014). http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/robert-schlesinger/2013/12/31/us-population-2014-317-million-and-71-billion-in-the-world. (accessed 16 October, 2014).

[5] This essay focuses on those that wear the uniform every day. The National Guard and Reserves most closely approximate the idea of a citizen-soldier as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. The National Guard is authorized 459,600 citizen-soldiers. 2015 National Guard Bureau *Posture Statement*, http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2015%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf. (accessed February 23, 2015).

culture? Where do these cultures diverge? If they have diverged, can military members take steps to shrink this divide? This essay provides answers to these questions and develops recommendations to shrink the Culture Divide.

The Military _and_ the Government

The relationship between the military and the government refers to civilian control of the military. The Founding Fathers' strong desire to ensure civilian control of the military formed the genesis of the U.S. policy establishing a small standing army augmented by the citizen-soldier that dominated the first 140 years of American history. Despite America's military expansion during the Civil War and both World Wars, civilian control of the military rarely caused concern in the halls of the Capitol or the White House. At the beginning of the Cold War, the civil-military paradigm changed, establishing a new normal for civilian control.

In the 1950s, peacetime conscription and a large standing army—raised to counter the spread of communism—reawakened in American society some of the fears of the Founders. Historical studies of the civil-military divide by Huntington and Janowitz related to civilian control—referred to as the *Control Divide* for this essay—focused on the friction between military officers and their civilian leaders. In essence, these scholars hypothesized that "the institution created to apply violence against enemies of the state can threaten the state it was created to protect."[6]

The Vietnam War and its aftershocks further changed the dynamic of the military's relationship to the government. The All-Volunteer Force replaced the draft, which was not in and of itself unusual in American military history. What *was* unusual

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[6] Kimberly C. Field, *The Long War and America's Relationship with its Military* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 2008), 4.

was the *size* of this new AVF. As a comparison, the AVF was 125,900 in 1900 and

255,600 in 1930.[7] By 1975, over 2.1 million personnel made up the active duty AVF.

The size of the current "peacetime" all-volunteer force would shock John Adams and

Thomas Jefferson. Today, the desire to institute a draft is politically and socially

unpalatable. Despite over ten years of continual combat in two theaters, military service

today remains solely a voluntary undertaking. This undercuts the idea of the citizen-

soldier vital to the Founder's vision, and results in a potential expansion of the Control

Divide. What are the issues and concerns that face today's civilian leaders and military

officers related to the Control Divide? Does civilian control of the military still firmly

exist, or are gaps emerging in this relationship? What steps can military members take to

ensure their actions contribute to a strong relationship with their civilian leaders? Is it

incumbent on military members to take steps to shrink the Control Divide?

The Military _as_ the People

How do military members and the civilian population interact with each other?

What knowledge of the military do non-serving citizens possess? Where do the military

world and the civilian world overlap and connect? Knowing that the vast majority of

American citizens do not to serve, how does the Nation educate the citizenry on the

armed forces? Does the citizenry need to be educated? Is it enough to know simply that

a military exists to defend the people, maintain security of the homeland, and protect

American interests? In evaluating the military as the people, the primary concern deals

with contact and understanding. In many cases, this consists of both physical and

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[7] http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec31.pdf. As a percentage of the overall U.S. population, the current active military is four times larger than 1900 and twice as large as 1930. (accessed November 22, 2014). The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) did not exist until 1973. The use of the term AVF in conjunction with the size of the active duty military in 1900 and 1930 is meant to convey that since there was no conscription or draft at this time, these service members were essentially "volunteers."

emotional contact. Because individual service members *are* the people (but for over 99%, not the other way around) how do they bridge the *Connectivity Divide* that exists between the people and the military?[8] Shrinking budgets often mean shrinking military infrastructure. Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiatives continue to dissolve the connective tissue between the civilian populace and the military. As the military establishment shrinks into smaller and smaller areas of the country, will the Connectivity Divide expand? Even in areas where military bases exist, is there still a divide between the military and the surrounding communities? Since the end of the Cold War, opinion polls surveying public attitudes toward national institutions have regularly ranked the armed services first. While confidence in the executive branch, the Congress, the press, and even organized religion diminished from the 1970s to the 2000s, confidence in the military rose.[9] If this is true, is it incumbent on military members to maintain this high repute as a national security imperative? Will a widening divide lower the population's confidence in the military? What actions can military members take to shrink the Connectivity Divide?

The Military _as_ the Government

Subsumed within the behemoth that is the United States Government, the United States Military resides. If the government is a behemoth, it is in no small part due to the size of the military. As one of the four instruments of national power—together with diplomacy, economic action, and information—the military plays a vital role in achieving national objectives, defending national interests, and protecting national security. As

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[8] For fictional accounts of the Culture and Connectivity Divides, see Ben Fountain, *Billy Lynn's Long Halftime Walk* (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2012) and Phil Klay, *Redeployment* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2014).

[9] David C. King and Zachary Karabell, *The Generation of Trust: How the U.S. Military Has Regained the Public's Confidence Since Vietnam* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2003), 4.

policy makers and civilian leaders decide on policies to meet U.S. objectives, how does

their understanding of the military instrument of national power affect their decisions?

Do they understand the military, how best to employ it, and what its limitations are in

helping to achieve national objectives? In evaluating the interaction of the military *as* the

government, concern lies in how civilian understanding of the military affects national

security and foreign policy. Any gap in this understanding represents a *Knowledge*

Divide. What steps can the military take to shrink this divide?

Shrinking the Divides

This essay began with a new paradigm updating Clausewitz's Trinity of the

military, the people, and the government. Further, this introduction defined four

interactions between the military, the people, and the government, and their relationships

and resultant divides. (Figure 2)

And People VALUES *CULTURE DIVIDE*	*And Government* CIVILAIN CONTROL *CONTROL DIVIDE*
As People INTERACTION *CONNECTIVITY DIVIDE*	*As Government* FAMILIARITY *KNOWLEDGE DIVIDE*

MILITARY

Figure 2

So why is this topic important? Besides the basic republican societal relationship

described earlier, examples highlight other areas of importance. In evaluating the

military-people interaction, imagine a scenario in which society and the military drift

further and further apart, where the Culture Divide and the Connectivity Divide continue

to expand. The military drifts further to the periphery of the national conscience, perhaps

reaching a status of isolation that turns the AVF into a "mercenary-like" organization. The military undertakes operations throughout the world, but the general population has no interest in where or why. The people are less inclined to support the military, or more problematically from a national security perspective, are inclined not to want to volunteer for the All-Volunteer Force because they do not understand or value the military. In short, serving (and protecting, fighting, and maybe dying) is someone else's burden.

In evaluating the military-government interaction, imagine if the Control Divide between civilian leaders and military personnel expands to dangerous levels. Service members begin to question civilian policy as the two political parties drift further apart. Officers begin to "take sides" or deliberately subvert civilian leaders and administrations with different political ideations. The apolitical nature of military service erodes to the point that the military becomes a political instrument.

If the Knowledge Divide widens between civilian officials and the military, proper use of the military instrument of national power suffers or whole-of-government capability worsens.[10] Government officials commit military forces to missions beyond their capability or training. Coupled with a smaller-than-needed force—or a force of sufficient size, but insufficient capability—this divide causes the government to commit the military instrument of national power improperly or haphazardly, further exacerbating U.S. national security dilemmas.

Both military and non-military citizens feel the effects of the four divides identified in this essay. Each has a responsibility to help shrink the divides. However, this essay will focus squarely on actions the military can take to shrink the Culture, Control, Connectivity, and Knowledge Divides.

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[10] See Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic.com*, January/February 2015.

Chapter 3 – The Culture Divide: The Military and the People

When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen.
- George Washington[1]

Since the advent of the AVF, the Culture Divide arguably has expanded and continues to widen. As noted author and former Army Colonel Andrew Bacevich points out, "The approach that this nation has taken to waging war since Vietnam (absolving the people from meaningful involvement), along with the way it organizes its army (relying on professionals), has altered the relationship between the military and society in ways too few Americans seem willing to acknowledge."[2] Today, the most important area of study in U.S. civil-military relations is the Culture Divide between the military and the people. Fortunately, from a military perspective, this divide may be the easiest to shrink because it is mostly a military problem.

The Culture Divide between the military and the people has always existed. Until Vietnam, the effects of this divide were minimal because of either the small size of the military, or the use of conscription, or both. The events surrounding Vietnam exposed a growing rift between American society and soldiers that defended it. As the journalist, Ward Just, wrote in 1970, "Society's mistrust of soldiers is equaled only by the distrust of soldiers for society."[3] Although this quote may be an exaggeration of the general mood of the country during Vietnam, the underlying tone is indicative of an idea that sprouted during the 1960s—military service is *not* a requirement of citizenship in a democracy. This sentiment gave rise to the All-Volunteer Force.

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[1] George Washington to the New York Legislature, June 26, 1775. Library of Congress. http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/newyork.html. (accessed February 6, 2015)
[2] Andrew J. Bacevich, *Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013), 14.
[3] Ibid., 52.

The AVF, in turn, caused new concerns regarding who serves, why, and how it would influence the relationship between the people and the military. Morris Janowitz recognized that the AVF would have an impact on civil-military relations and on American domestic social structure. He predicted that the AVF would become less and less socially representative. [4] In the early days of the AVF, this proved to be true, as a disproportionately large number of minorities joined the military.[5] However, today's military aligns closely with the American population *writ large* in terms of socioeconomic and racial representation.[6]

Despite the seeming representative nature of the American military, the fact remains that today, only 0.4% of the U.S. population serves in the active military and a mere 9% of American adults have served in the military during their lifetime.[7] Current and former military members are a minority category in American society. If one believes that former military members still live their lives by the values they learned during their military service, then the potential exists that 9% of the American population has a value code different from a large portion of society. Discounting those no longer in service, there still exists a group of Americans (active duty military personnel) whose

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[4] Morris Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military as a 'Sociopolitical' Problem," *Social Problems* 22, no. 3 (February 1975): 444.

[5] By 1980, approximately 22% of enlisted members of the AVF were African-American. U.S. Congress, *The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, July 2007), 22. However, 12 percent of the overall population was Africa-American. Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung. *Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, regions, Divisions, States* (Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, September 2002), A-1.

[6] Three notable exceptions include the overrepresentation of southerners in the military (see Figure 7), the underrepresentation of the richest and poorest 10% of the population (see Figure 6), and the underrepresentation of the women in the military as a percentage of the population (16% versus 51%). https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. (accessed February 5, 2015)

[7] In 2013, The U.S. was home to 21 million civilian veterans; about nine percent of the population. www.factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_13_5YR_DP02&src=pt. (accessed November 23, 2014).

professional values may differ fundamentally from those of the greater society. How are

these values different?

Each military department has its own espoused *values* that define what is

important to it as an institution.[8] Huntington used the term *professional military ethic* to

describe the "constant standard by which it is possible to judge the professionalism of any

officer corps."[9] Five values from the three departments overlap and are defined in this

chapter as *Military Values*. These include *Honor, Duty, Integrity, Courage,* and

Selflessness. Each of these values connotes either a form of sacrifice or a specific way of

behaving. These values reveal common martial ideas related to morality, ethics, respect,

and spirit. *Honor*, *Integrity*, and *Courage* focus on the betterment of the individual with

the ultimate goal of betterment of the organization, while *Duty* and *Selflessness*

specifically require subordination of the individual to the organization or a code.

A complete discussion of American societal values is beyond the scope of this

essay, but it is important to define a few terms as a form of reference and comparison to

the Military Values described above. The most complete and appropriate representation

of shared American values comes from author and international relations professor L.

Robert Kohls in his monograph "The Values Americans Live By." Of the 13 values Mr.

Kohls describes, *Change, Equality, Individualism, Materialism,* and *Competition* best

represent *Societal Values*.[10] The distinction between these value sets quickly becomes

clear—Military Values focus on the institution, while Societal Values focus on the

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[8] U.S. Navy and Marine Corps core values include Honor, Courage, and Commitment. U.S. Army Core
Values include Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. U.S. Air
Force Core Values include Integrity First, Service before Self, and Excellence in All We Do.
[9] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 62.
[10] The 13 values are Personal Control, Change, Time and its Importance, Equality, Individualism, Self-
Help, Competition, Future Orientation, Action, Informality, Directness, Practicality, and Materialism.
http://www.uri.edu/mind/VALUES2.pdf. (accessed 2 January, 2015)

individual. This disconnect in values defines one aspect of the Culture Divide between the military and the people. In a society that celebrates individuality both in terms of behavior and rights, the values of the military are different and unique.

Senior military officers highlight the importance of understanding the need for differing Societal and Military Values, and the critical aspect of this relationship that starts with Societal Values—values of the people. Admiral Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed this issue during a conference on military professionalism hosted by the National Defense University in January 2011. During the speech, Admiral Mullen cautioned the mostly-military attendees that, "Our audience, our underpinning, our authorities—everything we are, everything we do, comes from the American people. And we cannot afford to be out of touch with them."[11]

So why is this important? Some scholars would have their readers believe that these differing values contradict each other. As a recent *Slate* article exclaimed, "The real 'two Americas' are not rich versus poor or religious versus secular but military versus civilian."[12] Should Military Values and Societal Values be the same? The answer to this is an unequivocal "no." Military Values should imbue service members with the idea that they have volunteered (one could say they have exercised individual freedom of choice) to support a cause larger than themselves. Importantly, this cause is not the military service of which they are a part, or the military itself. This higher cause is defense of The United States of America—codified in writing by the United States

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[11] Ike Skelton, "The Civil-Military Gap Need Not Become a Chasm," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 64 (1ˢᵗ quarter 2012), 61.

[12] Jacob Weisberg, "Rough Draft: The Gross Unfairness of the All-Volunteer Army." *Slate.com* (22 Mar 2006). www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2006/03/rough_draft.html. (accessed December 12, 2014).

Constitution and upheld through the oath of office. From a military perspective, the best way to shrink the Culture Divide is to understand that Societal Values and Military Values do not—and should not—coincide. Mackubin Owens raises the idea that, "Success on the battlefield is the military's *functional imperative*. To carry out its functional imperative, the military cannot govern itself in accordance with the principles of liberal society. The functional gap between society and the military must exist to some degree."[13] Further, one is no better than the other; they are different because they need to be different.

Two recommendations for military personnel in shrinking the Culture Divide spring forth from this discussion on values. First, Military Values are not superior to Societal Values. Officer and non-commissioned officer professional military education curricula should reinforce this perspective. Second, the military services should agree on one set of values as Military Values based on those attributes that define the uniqueness of military service rooted in the oath of office.

A sort of hubris is beginning to infect the United States military. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, noted, "It is off-putting to hear…comments that suggest that the military is to some degree separate and even superior from the society, the country, it is sworn to protect."[14] Civilian leaders are not the only ones who have recognized this disturbing trend. As retired Admiral Stanley Arthur, commander of U.S. Naval Forces during the first Gulf War noted, "More and more, enlisted as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. *This*

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[13] Owens, *U.S. Civil-Military Relations After 9/11*, 139.
[14] Robert M. Gates, "Thayer Awards Remarks" (speech presented to West Point Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., October 6, 2011). www.westpointaog.org/page.aspx?pid=4843. (accessed November 22, 2014).

is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy."[15] Scholars and authors also note

the pomposity of some military members. Author Chuck Colson touches on this notion

of hubris when he writes that "many in the military no longer care to protect our

[American] way of life—because they regard civilian life in America as degenerate and

corrupt."[16] When the military begins to see itself as "better" than the people and

government it has sworn to protect, it requires the attention of military and civilian alike.

Former Missouri Congressman Ike Skelton, a celebrated supporter of the military and

PME, recognized a problem within the military when he noted,

> If leaders speak negatively about civil society, they run the risk of
> reinforcing adverse or apathetic military attitudes toward the public.
> Commissioned and noncommissioned officers should set a tone of mutual
> respect between the military and society.[17]

Inspired by Congressman Skelton, focusing on the "why" of Military versus Societal

Values as a topic of study in the PME continuum would decrease military hubris, an

important step in shrinking the Culture Divide. Another step is to tie Military Values to

our founding documents.

There should be one set of Military Values that applies to the entire Joint Force

rooted in the oaths of office. An important aspect of these core values is that they are

deliberately and intentionally separate and distinct from greater Societal Values, but

rooted in the ideals of the U.S. Constitution. As one military author noted, "A true

military core values program begins with the way personnel take—and understand—their

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[15] Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between Military and Society," *The Atlantic.com* (July 1997). www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1997/07/the-widening-gap-between-military-and-society/306158. (accessed February 24, 2015). Emphasis mine.

[16] Chuck Colson, "Anchors Away? The Military Values Gap," *Breakpoint.org*, (November 11, 1999). www.breakpoint.org/commentaries/4638-anchors-away-. (accessed February 24, 2015).

[17] Skelton, "The Civil-Military Gap," 64.

oath."[18] Tying Military Values to the oath of office is a critical aspect of helping

servicemembers understand why the values they live by are different from that of non-

serving society. The original oath of enlistment included the terms "honestly" and

"faithfully," while the officer oath of that period included the terms "fidelity" and

"honor."[19] Today's oaths include these same ideals. Recommended oath-based Military

Values include *fidelity* (or faithfulness) to the Constitution, *integrity* (or honesty) in the

performance of duties, and *honor* in service.

The effects of the Culture Divide risk creating long-term damage to American

civil-military relations. Unfortunately, the nature of the AVF will do little to shrink the

Culture Divide, and may actually worsen the situation. If left unchecked, the differences

between the military and the people, exacerbated by an "us versus them" mentality, will

spill over and widen the other divides. The good news is that the Culture Divide is a

military problem, and thus shrinking the divide necessitates a military solution through

military actions. These include inculcating military members through PME with why

Military Values and Societal Values differ—and why this is necessary—but also how

both sets of values share the ideas espoused in the Declaration of Independence and

captured in law by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, common joint Military Values

focused on the oath of office—Fidelity, Integrity, and Honor—and rooted in the ideals of

the Declaration of Independence and Constitution will indoctrinate servicemembers to the

importance of their oath and the Military Values they have sworn to uphold.

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[18]Arnold E. Resnicoff, "Military Core Values: They Don't Exist," *Huffington Post* (February and April 2014): http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rabbi-arnold-e-resnicoff/military-core-values_b_4691535.html. (accessed January 4, 2015).
[19] www.history.army.mil/html/faq/oaths.html. (accessed February 4, 2015)

Chapter 4 – The Control Divide: The Military and the Government

Much study of the Control Divide exists as it relates to civilian control of the military. This divide focuses on the uniformed military's relationship with civilian governmental leaders, including both elected and appointed officials. The basis of civil-military discord in the United States is rooted in fears of a military coup. The Founders believed that small standing armies, augmented by citizen-soldier militias, would allow for appropriate defense of the nation while maintaining governmental balance of power and civilian control of the military. As Janowitz noted, "In peacetime, the US military was organized on the basis of a very small professional cadre, augmented in wartime by large numbers of civilians who served as officers and enlisted personnel and whose essentially civilian loyalties would prevent the emergence of a military establishment at odds with civilian political leadership."[1]

The modern day discussion of the Control Divide began with two ideas espoused by Huntington and Janowitz: objective control and civil-military cooperation, respectively.[2] Objective (or autonomous) control depends on the professionalism of military officers to ensure adherence to civilian control, and highlights the separateness of the military and civilian entities—one develops political policy and strategy and one achieves political objectives through military action.[3] Conversely, civil-military cooperation recognizes the expansion of professionalism and influence of the military

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[1] Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military," 434.
[2] Unlike the term "objective control" which is used specifically by Huntington, the term "civil-military cooperation" used above is the author's own attempt to categorize Janowitz' civil-military theory.
[3] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State,* 83-85.

officer, and believes that the political system supports an active role for the military in policymaking.[4]

In simpler terms, Huntington recommended a separation of the military and civilian leaders, proposing the military concern itself with executing violence, and civilians with setting policy and executing strategy. Janowitz believed that the military had a role to play not only in executing violence, but also in national policy and strategy. The last several decades have demonstrated that no single theory of civil-military relations has dominated in practice.

After more than 230 years, the original fears of a *coup d'état* have given way to less overt, but no less worrisome actions on the part of both the military and the civilian leadership that threatens to widen the Control Divide. Noted military historian Russell Weigley concluded, "Faithful military acceptance of civilian control is a major desideratum of the U.S. Constitutional system. Better yet, however, is faithful obedience based on candid civil-military discussions and on mutual understanding and trust."[5] To shrink the Control Divide, the military must focus on building trust.

The vital issue of trust is not a new one between civilian leaders and military personnel. In his book, *Dereliction of Duty*, General H.R. McMaster provides a scathing indictment of the civil-military relationship during the Vietnam Era. He notes, "Against a backdrop of Kennedy's efforts to reform the Defense Department…a relationship of mutual distrust between senior military and civilian

[4] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1971), 343.

[5] Russell F. Weigley, "The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present," *Soldiers and Civilians*, ed. Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), 227.

officials would develop."[6] This chapter examines three areas of concern for military

members related to the Control Divide: political naiveté and partisanship, antipolitical

subversion, and the effect of post-retirement political actions by officers. Each of

these factors erode trust and widen the Control Divide.

Perhaps the most disturbing development in the relationship between the military

and the government, and the area with the greatest potential to widen the Control Divide,

is the perceived overt politicization of the officer corps. Richard Kohn provides a

succinct summary of the dangers of this trend:

> Partisan politicization is a cancer in the military, particularly inside the
> officer corps. It has the potential to divert soldiers from their tasks and to
> affect their morale, and thus their fighting ability.   Surely [sic]
> partisanship undermines public confidence in the objectivity and loyalty of
> the military, and by association, in the policies of their civilian masters. A
> number of senior officers recognize these dangers. On taking office in
> 2008, the new air force chief of staff warned his generals explicitly: "You
> will deal with politics . . . but you must remain apolitical . . . now and in
> retirement."[7]

Today's officer must navigate between the two extremes of apolitical thought and

partisan politics to be effective in carrying out his/her duties. Author and soldier

Jason Dempsey captures several useful sentiments concerning the civil-military

divide as it relates to politics. He declares, "As officers are confronted with a line

between politics and military strategy that is increasingly porous, they must

familiarize themselves with ways to engage the various seats of political power."[8]

Simply being apolitical is not enough, especially when that translates to political

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[6] H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 1997), 5.
[7] Richard H. Kohn, "Tarnished Brass: Is the U.S. Military Profession in Decline?" *World Affairs Journal*
(Spring 2009). http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/tarnished-brass-us-military-profession-decline.
(accessed 4 October, 2014).
[8] Jason K. Dempsey, *Our Army: Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations* (Princeton
University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2010), 195.

naivety. Multiple generations of officers have had the idea of apolitical thought and a

"bastardized version of Huntington's dictum to keep the military and politics

separate…" drummed into their minds, to the point where some are unable to

navigate Washington, D.C.[9] The thought of military officers bumbling through the

political spheres of government is disturbing, but more so is the idea that officers

might be taking deliberate actions to undermine government officials for political or

institutional reasons.

The hubris exhibited by some members of the military discussed in the

previous chapter may be extending from values to politics. Jason Dempsey touches

on this condition as a shift from apolitical to antipolitical. He cites the recent conflict

in Iraq as encouraging "many [in the military] to question the value of democratic

processes and institutions."[10] Add to this recent partisan actions related to the Budget

Control Act, sequestration, or a host of other political battles and the notion of a

growing antipolitical sentiment in the military is quite possible.

Richard Betts, Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia

University, observed that "sub-optimal civil-military relations demonstrated by a

reluctance of the military to provide military options, budget requests that reflect a

preferred capability and a myriad other acts of lesser-than-coup commission and

omission can result in bad policy, and/or ineffective execution."[11] When these

actions carry over to performance of military duties, however, crossing this line

becomes more than a problem of policy or effectiveness, it becomes damaging to both

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., 190.
[11] Richard K. Betts, *Are American Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem*, Saltzman Working Paper No.1., (September 2007), 22.

the reputation of the military and the defense of the nation. "A significant portion of the military's prestige comes from its reputation as one of the most apolitical American institutions."[12] Antipolitical or partisan action erodes this reputation.

Janowitz noted in 1975 that the AVF would lead the officer corps to become more and more conservative.[13] This hypothesis has proven particularly prescient. In 1976, in response to a Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP) poll, a third (33%) of senior military officers (major and above) identified with the Republican Party. By 1996, this percentage had increased to 67%. Although 1996 was the last year the FPLP conducted their poll, a continuation of this trend to 2016 would put the percentage of military officers affiliated with the Republican Party at overwhelming levels.[14] Professor Dale Herspring noted that a continued military affiliation with the Republican Party would have long-lasting and serious repercussions on civil-military relations.[15] Although Herspring did not define what these repercussions might be, partisan political actions and antipolitical thought may both be a consequence. That society (and civilian officials) consider military members largely apolitical in spite of the increasingly conservative nature of the officer corps, in particular, speaks to military professionalism.

Does political affiliation alone lead to subversive actions? Of course, the answer is no, but consideration of how others perceive military political affiliation is something the military officer must take into account. A 2006 poll asked civilian

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[12] Dempsey, *Our Army*, 11.

[13] Janowitz, *The All-Volunteer Military*, 444.

[14] In 1980, the number had risen to 46% (FPLP poll). In 1984, the number had grown to 53% (FPLP poll). In 1988, the number rose again to 59% (FPLP poll). The 1992 FPLP poll showed that 61% of senior military leaders supported the Republican Party. By 1996, only 7% of officers surveyed in the FPLP survey identified as Democrats. From Dempsey, *Our Army*, 30-33.

[15] Dale R. Herspring, *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 425.

respondents which party they felt had the support of most members of the military. A large majority of these civilians, 74%, said they believed most members of the military supported the Republican Party.[16] Thus, not only do the facts show that military officers overwhelmingly affiliate with the Republican Party, but American society overwhelmingly equates military service with Republican affiliation. The hard-earned trust of the military endures despite the undeniably conservative leaning of the officer corps. So how does the military reconcile the self-recruitment nature of the AVF officer corps—that is, the tendency for like-minded conservatives to seek military service—with the knowledge that this trend will likely continue, perhaps expand, and potentially strain civil-military relations? The answer to this lies in the *actions* and *language* of military members—especially those of senior officers. Unfortunately, recent events by retired officers are chipping away at this trust.

In 2006, six retired general officers went public in both print and media attacking then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.[17] This unprecedented display of public disagreement between former military officers and their civilian leader caused a furor in the halls of the Pentagon and in Washington. Author David Margolick surmised, "[I]n a nation founded on civilian control of the military, in which generals fight wars but rarely take on their politically elected bosses, the spectacle of six retired generals…attacking a sitting secretary of defense was extraordinary, and, for some, extraordinarily unsettling."[18]

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[16] From a study by Ansolabehere, Rivers, and Luks titled "Cooperative Congressional Election Study" contained in Dempsey, *Our Army*, 177.

[17] David S. Cloud, Eric Schmitt, and Thomas Shanker, "Rumsfeld Faces Growing Revolt by Retired Generals" *New York Times* (April 13, 2006). http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/washington/13cnd-military.html?_r=0. (accessed February 5, 2015).

[18] David Margolick, "The Night of the Generals," *Vanity Fair* (April 2007). http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/04/iraqgenerals200704#. (accessed February 5, 2015).

Another example of disturbing action occurred in 2012 when "more than 300 retired generals and admirals…endorsed Republican [presidential candidate] Mitt Romney's bid for the presidency."[19] As the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, pointed out, "Former and retired service members, especially generals and admirals, are connected to the military service for life."[20] Even after leaving office, partisan political actions such as the "generals' revolt" can undermine trust in the military. General Dempsey continues, "When the title or uniform is used for partisan purposes, it can erode the trust relationship" between the military and their civilian leaders.[21] There are several ways the military can shrink the Control Divide by reestablishing trust.

It is important to understand that solutions to problems involving power, power sharing, foreign policy, military action, and national strategy related to the Control Divide are so complex, nuanced, and multifaceted that simple solutions are virtually impossible. However, what follows builds on recommendations by scholars and authors cited in this essay and elsewhere. To lessen the impact of partisan politics, the military education system must reevaluate its curriculum regarding ethics, politics, and the civil-military relationship. In an attempt to stem the antipolitical undercurrents within the military, leaders must emphasize the appropriate way to undertake political action, both in and out of uniform.

In 1960, Janowitz wrote, "Because it is constrained in exploring the strength and weakness of the domestic political process, military education does not

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[19] Mark Thompson, "Does the Military Vote Really Lean Republican?" *Time* (November 5, 2012). www.swampland.time.com/2012/11/05/does-the-military-vote-really-lean-republican. (accessed February 9, 2015).
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

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necessarily develop realism and respect for the system. Its content is still dominated by moralistic exhortations regarding ideal goals."[22] The current form of instruction on ethics and civil-military relations at National Defense University exhibits the same deficiencies Janowitz pointed out in 1960; the curriculum is inadequate, haphazard, and preachy. Student officers receive lectures on why General X and Admiral Y were wrong to support presidential candidate A or B. Instructors hammer home the righteousness of being apolitical to the Defense Department's future military leaders. See no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil is the curriculum when it comes to civil-military relations, partisan politics, and the Control Divide. The generic term "best military advice" is the mantra used during discussions of tricky or nuanced situations involving military members and civilian officials, but lecturers and senior leaders give little real *instruction* on how to navigate these potentially dangerous waters. Instead, the curriculum should focus on *how* senior military leaders successfully interact with civilian officials and give concrete examples of when military officers stepped over the line in terms of partisan political actions.

When it comes to antipolitical undercurrents in the military, it is incumbent on leaders to emphasize the oath of office and military core values. These will lead servicemembers to stay above (or below) the fray of everyday party politics. This becomes more difficult when we consider that military members are also American citizens whose families and communities are affected by the actions of our elected leaders, so their concern for the political direction of the country still hits close to home. The important distinction regarding politics is to ensure military members understand that these feelings must not affect their military duties. Just as military

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[22] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, 429.

and societal values are separate and distinct, so too must be professional military duties and personal political actions and ideas. These ideas include not just actions in uniform, but extend to social media outlets. "Social media is giving [military members] more opportunities to express their opinions about politics than ever before."[23] Leaders must emphasize the proper and appropriate use of social media by active military members.

The nuanced nature of civil-military relations related to the Control Divide continue to make this one of the most difficult aspects confronting military members, and a large reason that the Control Divide is the most-oft studied and analyzed. Much work remains on both sides of the civil-military relationship. However, as Eliot Cohen points out, "The overall record of the American military…remains one of complete 'subordination and loyalty' to the Constitution. For the United States…the central problem of civil-military relations has *not* been the most fundamental one— that of preventing a military takeover of the state….but the adjustment of relations…has proven a very different matter."[24] Although there is much to be proud of in U.S. civil-military relations related to the Control Divide, there continues to be much room for improvement.

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[23] Ben Sherman, "You Posted What on Facebook?" *Fort Sill Cannoneer* (August 2012). www.army.mil/article/84850. (accessed January 3, 2015).
[24] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2002), 241-242.

Chapter 5 – The Connectivity Divide: The Military as the People

> I have this deep existential angst about a military organization within a democratic society that's as isolated from the rest of that society as our military is becoming.[1]

It is difficult to recall a time since World War II when the American people viewed the U.S. military in a more positive light. "Recent polls suggest that society trusts [the] All-Volunteer Force three times as much as they trust the president and five times as much as they trust the Congress."[2] Despite this popularity, there is little doubt that scholars, military members, politicians, and ordinary citizens feel "that today's American military is at once increasingly prominent as an instrument of national policy and increasingly detached from and poorly understood by the civilian society in whose name it is asked to fight."[3] The implications for the continued detachment of the military from the people define the Connectivity Divide. The divide comes in two forms that constitute the basis of this chapter—physical and psychological. This divide is gaining recognition both inside and outside the military as a disturbing trend with unknown long-range impacts.

The Connectivity Divide debate began in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the Gates Commission, the body formed by President Nixon to study the effects of ending the draft and moving to an all-volunteer military.[4] The commission highlighted a number of potentially troubling outcomes that could result from implementation of the

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[1] A quote by political scientist Michael Desch. Mark Thompson, "An Army Apart: The Widening Military-Civilian Gap," *Time* (November 10, 2011). http://nation.time.com/2011/11/10/an-army-apart-the-widening-military-civilian-gap/. (accessed September 16, 2014).

[2] Field, *The Long War*, 11-12.

[3] David M. Kennedy, ed., *The Modern American Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.

[4] For a comprehensive accounting of the history, implementation, and evolution of the All-Volunteer Force—including the Gates Commission—from an army officer-turned-bureaucrat-turned-policy-maker insider perspective, I highly recommend Bernard Rostker, *I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006).

AVF, including the potential isolation of the force from society; with isolation, an erosion of civilian respect; and a decline in the population's concern with foreign policy.[5] Although the Gates Commission considered these and other effects of the volunteer military, it failed to interpret sufficiently the significant impact the AVF would have in separating the military from the citizenry. George C. Marshall, arguably one of the greatest soldier-statesman in American history, felt that a connection between the people and their army was even more important than the interaction between senior officers and senior civilian officials.[6] Today, military leaders and public officials are echoing the prophetic sentiment voiced by General Marshall decades before implementation of the AVF. In 2010, Admiral Mullen voiced a similar concern, "We come from fewer and fewer places—we've BRAC'ed our way out of significant portions of the country….Long term, if the military drifts away from its people in this country, that is a catastrophic outcome we as a country can't tolerate."[7]

This physical separation of the military has occurred slowly. Five Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiatives have occurred since 1988 (Figure 3), resulting in a redistribution of military bases across much of the nation, and concentrating them in military-friendly and highly conservative southern states.[8] (Figure 4) Corresponding with this shift to the South and Midwest is, unsurprisingly, an overrepresentation in the proportion of new military members from those same areas. This trend leaves large swaths of the country physically separated from the military.

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[5] Karl W. Eikenberry, "Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force," in *The Modern American Military*, ed. David M. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 215.
[6] Bacevich, *Breach of Trust*, 194.
[7] Thompson, "An Army Apart."
[8] Ibid. For more information on the BRAC process, see www.defense.gov/brac. (accessed 1 January 2015).

Figure 3

Active-Duty Military Population, 2000

With Military Installations

Active-duty military as a percentage of population 18 and older

- 10.0 to 60.3
- 3.0 to 9.9
- 1.0 to 2.9
- 0.5 to 0.9
- 0.2 to 0.4
- 0.0 to 0.1

U.S.
Average
0.6

● Military installation with 10,000 or more active-duty military personnel

Figure 4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau

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Even in areas with a large military presence, unless the surrounding civilian population has a stake in what happens on the base, there is little physical or emotional contact. "Where [troops come from] gets more and more away from the general population," former National Guard chief General Steven Blum alleged. "What they do behind those gates is pretty much, `Who cares?' to the general population, unless they make their living off of what goes on in there."[9] Exacerbating this separation, post-9/11 security measures make access to military bases by ordinary civilians extremely difficult. Moreover, specific service regulations prohibit military members from going out publicly in their primary work uniforms, further exacerbating the Connectivity Divide.[10] Indeed, the term "out of sight, out of mind" may be a fair assessment of the relationship between the military and the people. For those areas without a significant military presence, increasingly the Northeast and upper Midwest and West, the Connectivity Divide has expanded to disturbing proportions.

The psychological separation is the most difficult to quantify, but may be the most damaging from a national security perspective. The lack of popular concern regarding military issues and actions translates into a lack of oversight by the people's elected representatives. In an outstanding article discussing the widening Connectivity Divide, James Fallow notes:

> This has become the way we assume the American military will be discussed by politicians and the press: Overblown, limitless praise, absent the caveats or public skepticism we would apply to other American institutions….This reverent but disengaged attitude toward the

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[9] Thompson, "An Army Apart."

[10] The Marine Corps, for example, forbids its service members from wearing their utility uniform (primary work uniform) outside of military bases for anything but emergencies. Often, military members are discouraged from being alone in uniform off military bases as a force protection measure.

military…has become so familiar that we assume it is the American norm.[11]

Three negative trends persist because of a lack of public interest. First, the use of the military has grown exponentially since the inception of the AVF.[12] Second, to maintain the illusion that the AVF is fully capable of handling the many national security issues confronting the United States, the Department of Defense dramatically expanded the use of contractors at the expense of former military occupational specialties, such as Military Police. Actions such as this mislead an already disinterested public (and undoubtedly many in Congress) into believing that the capability of the AVF is greater than actually exists.[13] Finally, due to a change in tolerance for debt-heavy spending, the government has financed the second costliest war in our nation's history (Iraq and Afghanistan—the War on Terror) while simultaneously cutting taxes.[14] The bargain of shared hardship in times of crisis between the people and the military today has tipped heavily toward the military. Thus, the people are largely immune from any short- or medium-term financial burden associated with military operations. The long-term effects have yet to play out.

This psychological separation between the people and the military, coupled with the physical separation, increases the Connectivity Gap to a point where the military as the people is becoming harder and harder to identify. The military, for its part, may be

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[11] Fallows, "The Tragedy of the American Military," *The Atlantic.com*, January/February 2015.

[12] The AVF-deployments-per-annum ratio is five times higher than that of the draft force since the end of WWII. From 1946-1972, 19 oversees deployments occurred. From 1973-2012, 144 deployments occurred. Eikenberry, "Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force," from *The Modern American Military*, 217.

[13] As of March 2011, DoD had more contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq (155,000) than uniformed personnel (145,000). Moshe Schwartz and Joyprada Swain, *Department of Defense Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background and Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, May 13, 2011).

[14] Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The Price of Civilization* (New York: Random House, 2011), 17. WWII was the costliest.

helping to widen the divide by its increasingly self-induced detachment from the people.

Examples include on-base housing, shopping, schools, children's sports leagues, and

community and social events such as concerts, comedy shows, and movies. Tucked into

their "Mayberrys," on military installations, service members and their families live

somewhat secluded from the "civilians" on the outside.

Once again, the hubris of military members may be playing a part in widening the

gap between the military and the people, this time affecting the Connectivity Divide. As

Bacevich notes:

> Whatever its other merits, the present-day professionalized force is not
> conducive to…civil-military intimacy. Indeed, to the extent that the
> members of the AVF see themselves as professionals—members of a
> warrior caste adhering to their own distinctive code—they have little
> interest in nurturing a close relationship with civilian society.[15]

What is the point of a military in a republic if it is separate from the people? The

symbiotic nature of the trinity—and the associated bargain—mandates a relationship with

the people. The psychological and physical separation is intensifying the problems

identified throughout this essay. The military must take steps to shrink the Connectivity

Divide. It is not only vital for the military, but more importantly, to national security and

the continued success of the republic.

Before his passing in 2013, Congressman Ike Skelton, former Chairman of the

House Armed Services Committee, recognized the growing divide between the military

and the people. Shortly after leaving office in 2011, Congressman Skelton authored an

article that appeared in *Joint Forces Quarterly* discussing the civil-military gap. In the

article, he recommended a number of actions military members could take to shrink the

Connectivity Divide. These included:

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[15] Bacevich, *New American Militarism*, 219.

- Having officers increase their interaction with the surrounding communities through non-political civic involvement, volunteerism, and specific civil-military collaboration, which fosters contact and understanding.
- Increasing the presence of Service members in the community. Specifically, leaders should use their positions of authority to influence and encourage troops to get involved, whether it is joining a civic club, sending their children to an off-base school, or joining or coaching a sports team.
- Ensuring that motivated and charismatic individuals are assigned to community liaison roles at the base. Such individuals could prove extremely effective in building a strong outreach campaign and helping individual Service members get involved.
- Having commanding officers host events on their respective bases that are open to the public. They could be ceremonies honoring achievements of individuals, or a military version of "show and tell."
- Granting troops extra leave, requiring them to return to their hometowns to talk about their experiences. These talks could take place in high schools, town hall meetings, or civic organization luncheons. If Service members return to their hometowns and talk about what they do and their pride in it, their visits could generate understanding and respect and address the general lack of knowledge most civilians have about the military.[16]

Although some of these recommendations seem small and even mundane, any act that connects the military and the people either physically or mentally will shrink the Connectivity Divide by some measure. Taking a page from Congressman Skelton's playbook, General Dempsey began a program that encourages military members to get involved in their communities. Called "Commitment to Service," the program challenges service members and veterans to "work with civilians to address common problems such as hunger [to] better form new bonds of shared experience."[17]

Additionally, the Department of Defense should encourage military members to wear their uniforms off base. Besides airports, where and how often do civilians see military members in uniform, even around military bases? Seeing a military member in uniform at the supermarket, the mall, a sporting event, or the movies provides a simple,

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[16] Skelton, "The Civil-Military Gap," 64.
[17] James Kitfield, "The Great Draft Dodge," *National Journal* (Dec 2014). www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-great-draft-dodge-20141212. (accessed January 5, 2015).

subtle reminder that military members are engaged in the same sort of daily activities—

with the same concerns, problems, and interests—as those of their fellow citizens. The

force protection concerns related to service members wearing uniforms off base would be

offset by making them more conspicuous and numerous, thus providing a form of

protection through their overt presence.

Andrew Bacevich provides the final recommendation concerning interaction with

the surrounding community. He writes:

> True education on matters related to politics, strategy, and related disciplines
> ought to take place in a context that encourages free inquiry, accommodates
> diverse opinions, and promotes interchange across the civil-military divide.
> Only civilian institutions of higher learning can fully meet these prerequisites.
> As an integral part of their professional development, all career military
> officers deserve the opportunity for post-graduate study; all of them—not just
> a few, as is the case today—should acquire that education at government
> expense on the campus of a civilian university.[18]

This recommendation would at once increase military interaction with the community,

shrinking the Connectivity Divide, and simultaneously provide military officers with an

opportunity for higher-level education at civilian universities. This interaction between

military officers and civilians in an academic setting could educate possible future

political and business leaders about their military counterparts in their classrooms and on

their campuses, potentially shrinking the final divide addressed in this essay—the

Knowledge Divide, which exists when the military and its civilian governmental leaders

do not fully understand each other.

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[18] Bacevich, *New American Militarism,* 223.

Chapter 6 – The Knowledge Divide: The Military as the Government

Parvi enim sunt foris arma, nisi est consilium domi.

- Cicero, *De Officiis*[1]

In the late 1980s, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, developed a doctrine for the use of military force based on some prescripts from his former boss, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. Often referred to as the "Powell Doctrine," it stipulated before committing U.S. forces, civilian leaders should ensure the achievement of four benchmarks: weigh costs and benefits; develop clear, realistic, and achievable political objectives; gain the support of the American public; and clearly define an exit strategy. Further, it stipulated that the threat should be of vital national interest and dealt with in overwhelming fashion.[2]

The Powell Doctrine was a result of the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which many military members (and non-military scholars) felt highlighted the limitations of exclusively civilian strategy- and policy-making, especially as it related to the proper use of the military.[3] General Westmoreland, former commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and Army Chief of Staff, summed up this sentiment when he said war is "too complex to be entrusted to appointed officials who lack military experience [and] a knowledge of military history."[4] To be sure, the Powell Doctrine was controversial and disturbed many civilian officials who believed that a military officer

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[1] Translated as "Arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home." Excerpt from *The Modern American Military*, ed. David M. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.
[2] Michael A. Cohen, "The Powell Doctrine's Enduring Relevance," *World Politics Review* (July 2009). www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4100/the-powell-doctrines-enduring-relevance. (accessed January 3, 2015).
[3] See McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*; Glenn Ronald Walker, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Vietnam" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1994); Orrin Schwab, *A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations during the Vietnam War* (Westport, CT.: Praeger Security International, 2006).
[4] Bacevich, *New American Militarism,* 41.

had overstepped his bounds in essentially enacting government policy. However, Powell based his doctrine on the hard lessons of wars like Vietnam, where "a little surgical bombing or a limited attack" failed, leading to "escalation—more bombs, more men…more force."[5] These kinds of war have "been tragic" in many aspects. The Powell Doctrine focused on those going into harm's way. He stated, "we owe it [to military members] to make sure…we have carefully matched the use of military force to our political objectives."[6] Powell never specifically sited civilian incompetence or lack of military knowledge, but the dysfunction of the civil-military relations during Vietnam surely influenced the tenets of his "doctrine."

Today, the debate over the importance of military experience in the halls of Congress and the White House continues. Michael Desch examined the Knowledge Divide from the angle of "threat environments." He postulated that when states face low internal threat and low external threat (as the United States does today, especially when compared with the existential threat of nuclear war with Russia), they tend to exhibit

> civilian leadership without knowledge, experience, or interest in military affairs. Civilian policy-makers may abandon objective control….Factionalism can also emerge within the military institution, and the military's orientation may be uncertain….Civilian and military ideas may not remain in harmony. Hence, we should expect low-level civil-military conflict to emerge.[7]

Peter Feaver looked at the Knowledge Divide from an "agency theory" perspective. He theorized that the civil-military relationship is a combination of the monitoring of military agents by civilians, and military agents deciding to work (follow

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[5] Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1992/93). www.cfr.org/world/us-forces-challenges-ahead/p7508. (accessed February 16, 2015).
[6] Ibid.
[7] Michael P. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 16.

the expressed wishes of the civilian leaders) or shirk their duties (perform at a level that is less than desired by the civilian leaders) based on expectations of the consequences. In this model, four basic outcomes can emerge: military working under civilian nonintrusive monitoring; military working under civilian intrusive monitoring; military shirking under civilian nonintrusive monitoring; and, military shirking under civilian intrusive monitoring.[8] He argues that during the Cold War, the primary pattern was "military working under civilian intrusive monitoring." However, in the post-Cold War era, he sees the civil-military relationship as "military shirking under civilian intrusive monitoring."[9] Feaver wrote this in 2003. Today, over ten years and two presidents later, arguably this relationship has changed to "military shirking under civilian non-intrusive monitoring."

Evidence of shirking by the military exists in the statements by general officers related to weapons programs such as the A-10, the covering up of shortcomings of developmental programs such as the MV-22 Osprey, the perceived obtuseness to the problem of sexual assault, and the leaking of sensitive information to media outlets by military personnel.[10] Military shirking and non-intrusive civilian monitoring are not new

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[8] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 284-285.
[9] Ibid.
[10] See Kristin Davis, "IG Investigating Two-star's 'Treason' Comments," *airforcetimes.com* (January 27, 2015). www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2015/01/26/air-force-inspector-general-james-post-treason-comments/22346947. (accessed February 17, 2015); Mary Pat Flaherty, "General Charged in Osprey Cover-up," *The Washington Post* (August 18, 2001); U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Sexual Assault in the Military* (Washington, D.C.: September 2013); Department of Defense, "Statement from George Little on Defense Initiatives to Limit Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information," *defense.gov* (July 19, 2012). www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15451. (accessed February 17, 2015).

phenomena.[11] Interaction and understanding of the military, however, may be at its lowest point since before WWII.

A lack of exposure to the military by government officials is one area that leads to non-intrusive civilian monitoring. Desch posits, "The United States now has a civilian leadership with much less interest in, or experience with, military affairs."[12] Professor and author Benjamin Fordham argues, "*Decreasing exposure* to the military might make civilians less supportive of military spending, leading to lower military budgets" and reinforces the tendency by the military to "shirk" or act politically on behalf of the institution.[13] This lack of exposure comes in two forms: direct military experience by civilian officials and relationships with military personnel either personally, or through constituency; each of these lead to a propensity for non-intrusive monitoring.

The number of serving members of Congress with military experience has decreased significantly since the end of conscription in 1973. In the 91st Congress (1969-1971), 398 members (73%) had served in the military; in the 112th Congress (2011-2013), only 118 had previous military service (22%).[14] (Figure 5) The current number of serving members of Congress with military experience has decreased further to 101 (18.7%).[15] This decrease may be the result of social underrepresentation from the highest

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[11] General George B. McClellan provides an appropriate historical example of military shirking. The Clinton Administration and their allowance of excessive military "policy-making," (e.g., Don't Ask, Don't Tell) is an example of non-intrusive monitoring.

[12] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 23.

[13] This is based on data from the "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society" sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). Emphasis mine. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Military Interests and Civilian Politics: The Influence of the Civil-Military 'Gap' on Peacetime Military Policy," *Soldiers and Civilians*, eds., Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 334.

[14] Eikenberry, "Reassessing the All-Volunteer Force," 222.

[15] http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage.gispdfhitspanel.pdflink/ http%3A$2f$2fprod.cosmos.dc4.bowker-dmz.com$2fapp-bin$2fgis-congresearch$2f3$2f3$2fd$2fd$2fcrs-2015-ksg-0021_from_1_to_13.pdf/entitlementkeys=1234%7Capp-gis%7Ccongresearch%7Ccrs-2015-ksg-0021. (accessed February 24, 2015).

income bracket in today's AVF. (Figure 6) According to retired General and former

Ambassador, Karl Eikenberry, the change in congressional oversight that seems to have

resulted from the AVF is the most worrisome effect since its inception. While serving as

Ambassador in Afghanistan, Eikenberry concluded, "that because so few lawmakers had

military experience on their resumes, or constituents either fighting on the front lines or

protesting back home, they didn't feel qualified or obligated to press military leaders on

their decisions."[16]

Figure 5

[16] Eikenberry quoted in Kitfield, "The Great Draft Dodge."

Distribution of Active-Duty Enlisted Personnel, by Family Income Prior to Military Service

(Percent)

Families of Enlisted Personnel
Families with Recruit-Age Youths

Income Category (Based on families with recruit-age youths)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data for 2000 from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth conducted by the Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Figure 6

Another factor contributing to the decreasing exposure of government officials to the military is the paucity of direct familial relationships, or in the case of elected officials, the lack of military constituents. Within the military itself, a strong tradition of family service exists. Eleven percent of enlisted Army soldiers and 21% of officers report having a career-military parent. An additional 39% of the Army had a parent who served, but did not make a career in the military.[17] The simple math shows that in 2010, 50% of enlisted and 60% of officers in the Army had a parent who served in the military. Compare this with the 535 members of Congress, about 1% of whom had a child in uniform in 2006.[18] Additionally, the continued realignment of military bases to predominantly the South and Midwest limits the number of active or veteran constituents

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[17] Dempsey, *Our Army*, 46.
[18] Kathy Roth-Doquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from Military Service—And How it Hurts our Country* (New York: HarperCollins Publishing, 2006), 7.

in many congressional districts. (Figure 7) As the lack of exposure to the military by government officials continues to expand, insight into the proper use of the military will decrease correspondingly. What can the military do to help shrink this Knowledge Divide?


Military Enlisted Recruit-to-Population Ratios, by Region in 2007

Ratios less than 1.0 indicate underrepresentation of recruits, and ratios more than 1.0 indicate overrepresentation.

U.S. Census Region/Division	% Total 2007 U.S. Recruits	% Total U.S. 18–24-Year-Old Males in 2006	Recruit/Population Ratio
Northeast	12.81	17.58	0.73
Middle Atlantic	9.51	13.10	0.73
New England	3.30	4.50	0.73
Midwest	21.56	22.02	0.98
East North Central	14.76	15.10	0.98
West North Central	6.80	6.90	0.99
South	42.97	36.23	1.19
East South Central	6.28	5.70	1.10
South Atlantic	21.62	18.50	1.17
West South Central	15.07	12.00	1.26
West	22.66	24.17	0.94
Mountain	7.70	7.20	1.07
Pacific	14.96	17.00	0.88

Source: Heritage Foundation calculations based on data from U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Data Center, Non-Prior Service Accessions, 2007, and Steven Ruggles, Matthew Sobek, Trent Alexander, Catherine A. Fitch, Ronald Goeken, Patricia Kelly Hall, Miriam King, and Chad Ronnander, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0, University of Minnesota, Minnesota Population Center, 2008, at http://usa.ipums.org/usa (July 21, 2008).

Map 1 • CDA 08–05   heritage.org

Figure 7

First, prior veterans and National Guard or Reserve personnel can run for elected office. Utilizing the G.I. Bill to attend Law School is a good starting point to begin the

path to elected office, given that 32% of congressional representatives are lawyers. Jason

Dempsey highlights the fact that Army officers, especially those who joined after 2001,

are more likely than their civilian counterparts to be politically active.[19] A natural

continuation of this political activism, once out of uniform, can help to bring a fresh view

and valuable military experience to Congress, reversing the 30-year trend of declining

veteran representation. (Figure 5) Veterans' organizations can assist in this endeavor by

actively supporting prior service candidates.

Another recommendation is one given by Janowitz in 1975:

> The restructuring of the idea of the military career into a modern citizen-soldier concept would be another approach. Professional military service would include periods of assignment to civilian employment and, after a specified term of military service, officers would be shifted into the civilian civil service. Entrance into the military would, thereby, not be perceived as selecting a highly specialized and differentiated career, but as taking one step in a career in public service. Movement in this direction appears remote because many civilian occupational groups strongly resist incorporating into their ranks men who have served.[20]

The interesting aspect of this recommendation is the last line, which highlights

the distaste for the military when Janowitz wrote this recommendation. The current

view of the military makes this old recommendation perhaps more valid today than it

was in 1975. The downside to this approach is the impact it will have on military

specialization, and the relative re-training that will need to occur. A recommended

modification to account for specialization is to expand short-term (2-3 year) military

"liaison" billets within multiple civilian departments and agencies. Just as "joint"

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[19] Dempsey, *Our Army*, 153.
[20] Janowitz, "The All-Volunteer Military," 448.

assignments are a prerequisite for selection to flag rank, incorporating benefits for "interagency" billets would ensure these jobs become more competitive.[21]

The military currently offers opportunities for military members to serve as congressional staffers. This program should grow so *every* Representative and Senator has a military member on his or her staff. Exposure to differing points-of-view benefits both military and civilian alike, and elected leaders would profit from the assistance of an actual servicemember to provide insight and advice.

Another recommendation to increase military understanding in the civilian halls of government is the prioritization of prior military service for future government employment. Author and soldier Paul Yingling recommends, "While veterans' preferences exist for many [government] positions, they are most often not the deciding factor. For those who are physically qualified, they should be. This would encourage those who wish to serve in government to invest a few years of their lives in the military before continuing in other, equally valuable, ways."[22] This simple idea increases the likelihood that prior military personnel end up in other governmental departments and agencies, paying huge benefits in the whole-of-government approach to tackling myriad issues vital to the United States.

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[21] Effective 1 October 2008, Joint Qualified Officer Level III attainment became a prerequisite for selection to O-7 in the active component. http://prhome.defense.gov/Portals/52/Documents/RFM/MPP/OEPM/Docs/JOM%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%2030%20Mar%202010.pdf. (accessed April 7, 2015).
[22] Paul L. Yingling, "The Founders Wisdom" *Armed Forces Journal* 147 (Feb 2010). http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/the-founders-wisdom/. (accessed October 14, 2014).

Chapter 7 – Summary and Conclusion

The civil-military divide continues to occupy the national consciousness. In a nation defined by the interaction of each citizen with each other and the government—and the inherent responsibility of self-government—divides between the military, the people, and the government affect every American citizen. As arguably the sole great power in the world, maintaining a strong military force is critical to the continuation of a prosperous America. Further, a desire to advance the grand strategic values and ideals espoused in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to the rest of the world depend on the reach and influence of the U.S. government through military, diplomatic, informational, and economic endeavors engendered in part by the strength and scope of the U.S. Military. Because of the uniqueness of civilian control, and the relationship between the AVF and the rest of society, the divides identified in this essay are more critical to a successful military than ever before. Since the military more often than not is the primary tool in our nation's foreign policy toolkit, the ideas to shrink the divides become as important as domestic infrastructure or universal healthcare.

The divides described in this essay should concern every U.S. citizen. However, the focus of recommendations on military actions to shrink the identified divides aim this thesis squarely at uniformed personnel. Before military members point the finger at the government or the people, an honest critique of their own shortcomings will help to start the process of improving civil-military relations. As a result of the study of the Culture Divide, the Control Divide, the Connectivity Divide, and the Knowledge Divide, some recurring themes present themselves.

First, military hubris continues to paint a disturbing narrative regarding the civil-military divide. This hubris manifests itself in three of the four divides (all but the Knowledge Divide) and threatens to further erode civil-military relations. The hubris affecting the Culture Divide lies in the separation of values between the military and society. These often-divergent values—one focused on service to a larger cause and one focused on the individual—are driving a wedge between the people and the military. The bargain of unselfish service by military members as espoused in the oath of office is breaking down due to the notion that military members are "better" than the society they serve. For civilians, although the people admire the sacrifices and service of the AVF (as evidenced by public opinion polls), they often seem reluctant or unwilling to adapt these values to improve the larger civic community.

Military hubris continues to expand the Control Divide through the act of antipolitical feelings. The toxic environment that categorizes today's political arena causes military members to recoil at all things political, often at the expense of best military advice and honest congressional testimony. For their part, politicians sometimes present duplicitous expectations of military members, caught between their civilian chain of command, their responsibilities to the people's elected representatives, and their requirement to present "best military advice." The Connectivity Divide is perhaps the least affected by hubris, but is not immune to the idea that "those civilians" do things differently in other parts of the country. Often, military members fence themselves off from the greater society, content to live, work, shop, relax, play, commune, and socialize on isolated military bases. Civilians seem to be unaware or uninterested in their military and show what many in the military see as token forms of support at sporting events and

other public gatherings. Even personal demonstrations of support and "thanks for your service" comments leave military members guessing at the sincerity of those who choose not to (or cannot) serve. Do people thank military members for their service out of sincere appreciation, or because they seek absolution for their failure to serve?

The potential for further divergence and division in U.S. civil-military relations seems likely, particularly given the attitude and culture prevalent in the All-Volunteer Force. Combine with this an often-dysfunctional political landscape and a society largely preoccupied with their individual issues and the widening of the divides seems more likely. The "do as I say, not as I do" message the military receives from the government and the people makes the continued viability of the AVF tenuous. The United States must implement a method to bridge the gap between those that serve and those that do not. Compulsory national service is one way to do this.

National service would expand the burden of civic sacrifice across the polity, providing a common and shared societal process to bind Americans, regardless of class, race, socio-economic status, or political affiliation. The arguments for ending the draft were politically necessary in the late 1960s, and reinstitution of the draft is severely remote, at best. Today, after the events of 9/11 and the last 13 years of conflict, many young citizens are eager to serve their country in a variety of ways beyond military service. The Franklin Project, a national service initiative launched by the Aspen Institute and first proposed by General Stanley McChrystal, calls for a minimum of one year of paid compulsory service for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 28 in areas such as healthcare, education, anti-poverty initiatives, or conservation.[1]

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[1] www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/franklin-project. (accessed January 28, 2015).

The House of Representatives has introduced four separate "Universal National Service Acts" bills since 2003.[2] The most recent, proposed on February 15, 2013, would require "all persons in the United States between the ages of 18 and 25 to perform national service, either as a member of the uniformed services or as civilian service in a Federal, State, or local government or with a community-based agency or community-based entity."[3] National service would be predicated on the idea that the "sacrifices needed to maintain a vibrant economy should be shared by all."[4] Additionally, national service would provide a binding and shared experience for all Americans, the first step in shrinking the divides that separate one portion of society from another.

The bargain between the military, the people, and the government flourishes when shared responsibility permeates the trinity. When all three elements of the trinity feel that the others are sacrificing appropriately for the betterment of all, an environment of understanding and trust ensues. In the end, it is trust that will advance a healthy civil-military relationship. This trust starts with the words and deeds of the United States Military.

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[2] Charles Rangel, Representative from the 13th Congressional District in New York, "Why We Need Universal Service," *Huff Post: The Blog* (May 25, 2011). www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-charles-rangel/why-we-need-universal-ser_b_837827.html. (accessed January 17, 2015).
[3] https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr748/BILLS-113hr748ih.pdf. (accessed January 17, 2015).
[4] Rangel, "Universal Service."

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<u>Vita</u>

Lieutenant Colonel Bill Bartolomea was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps in 1995 following graduation from Penn State University. He is an AH-1W Cobra Pilot and a Joint Tactical Air Controller who has served in both aviation and infantry units. He has commanded Marines at the Company and Squadron level. He participated in Operation Stabilize (East Timor), Operation Iraqi Freedom I and 06.08, and Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan in 2009 and 2013. He has served as an instructor at The Basic School in Quantico, VA and as the Director, Commandant's Staff Group. His most recent assignment was as Force Preservation Officer, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC. Lieutenant Colonel Bartolomea is a graduate of Marine Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, Amphibious Warfare School, and Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

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