



Joint Advanced
Warfighting Project

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Al Sahawa—The Awakening
An Education and Training Resource Guide

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Executive Summary

The objective of the Anbar Awakening project is to create an unclassified, accessible resource for trainers and educators. It is presented in multimedia to accommodate different teaching and learning styles.¹ The project presents the Awakening movement's phases from the development of the insurgency in 2003 to the Coalition's transfer of responsibility for Al Anbar to the Iraqis in 2008. In addition, it offers analysis and lessons, many of which are transferrable to current and future conflicts.

Background

In 2003, a US-led Coalition toppled Iraq's military in less than a month of major combat operations. Following the defeat of the Iraqi military, a combination of events resulted in a lethal insurgency. In March 2004, insurgents in Fallujah killed four US contractors. A local mob hung the burned remains of two of the Americans from the old city bridge. The Coalition's abortive attempts designed, in part, "to make the insurgents pay" simply added influence, or *wasta*, to the insurgent's cause. It also signaled the Iraqis and others in the region that the Americans could be "beaten." According to Dr. Mowaffak Rubai'e, the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Fallujah became a symbol of the insurgency.²

The security and political conditions in Iraq worsened throughout 2004. Al Qaeda's bombing of the Madrid commuter train system on 11 March resulted in Spain withdrawing from the Coalition in April. Honduras soon followed. Almost simultaneously was the revelation of criminal abuse of Iraqis by US personnel at Abu Ghraib prison. These and related issues, festering since 2003, gained traction in the spring of 2004 and provided recruitment fodder for a growing insurgency. The young firebrand Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, seized the opportunity and with his militia and other supporters created havoc in the southern cities of Karbala, Najaf, and Al Kut. Additionally, the growing insurgent activity threatened to cut the Coalition lines of communication from Kuwait to Baghdad. Contracted truckers were intimidated; little fuel and supplies were getting through to Baghdad and Al Anbar. In response, the Coalition redeployed units from ports of debarkation and home station to return to Iraq and

¹ Professional Military Education institutes have asked for unclassified, public releasable material to be used in their seminars.

² Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubai'e, Iraqi National Security Advisor, interview with Dr. William Knarr and Major Robert Castro, USMC, at his home in Baghdad, Iraq, 29 Jan 2006.

stabilize the situation. By May 2004, according to former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, “the whole country was boiling.”³

To add to the chaos were several major transitions during June and July. Two new headquarters, the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) and Multi-National Corps–Iraq stood up to replace the smaller combat focused Combined Joint Task Force-7. Then the Coalition Provisional Authority passed sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government and stood down. Recognizing the new status of a sovereign Iraq, the US re-established its embassy with Ambassador John Negroponte at the helm. But with this new team came a new plan: to set the conditions for successful elections in January 2005. Those conditions necessitated eliminating Fallujah as an insurgent sanctuary.

By summer 2004, Fallujah became unbearable for its residents. They had come to understand through experience the horrors of living under Al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) extreme interpretation of *Sharia*. Instead of partnering with the Iraqi people to fight the occupiers, the extremists, led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, demanded to lead the jihad with the intent of first destroying and then transforming the social fabric of the province. Notable Fallujah area residents such as Farhan De Hal Farhan and Sheikh Mishan Abu-Jumayli soon fled but carried the message that these *takfiris*, or extremists, were really the enemy of the Iraqi people. This realization and simple message was the first step toward what would become the Awakening.

During the next two years, communities, towns, and districts along the Euphrates would awaken to the fact that AQI was not their friend. They also soon realized that they could not defeat AQI on their own. The only way AQI could be beaten was for the Anbaris, like it or not, to partner with the Coalition. But there was a reciprocal requirement. The Coalition had to be willing to work with the local people; in most cases that meant working through the tribes. This was the second step in the Awakening.

One of the biggest challenges the Coalition faced was connecting the people to the Government of Iraq (GOI). After all, the Coalition was going to leave and it had to wean the people off Coalition support. Fostering the legitimacy of the GOI and developing that connection was the third and most difficult step. At this writing, it is also the step that, despite the withdrawal of Coalition forces in 2011, remains largely incomplete.

Thesis/Alternative Thesis

Most popular narratives of the Anbar Awakening associate the beginning of the movement with a 14 September 2006 proclamation by Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu-Risha where he coined the term *Al Sahawa*. The simplicity of this version fails to connect events and relation-

³ Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, interview with Dr. William Knarr and Major Robert Castro, USMC, Baghdad, 6 Feb 2006; Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubai’e, interview 29 Jan 2006.

ships that preceded Sattar's declaration. This project contends that there was a robust connection in terms of events and relationships from Fallujah in 2004 to Al Qaim in 2005 to the Hadithah-Hit Corridor in 2006, to Ramadi in 2006/2007 and back to Fallujah in 2007/2008. That connection, however, was not obvious to American eyes. In effect, the awakening, or *sahawa*, became the *Sahawa*, an accumulation of related events and efforts by communities along the Euphrates, setting the conditions for a dramatic turning point in Ramadi as the insurgents ran out of room to hide. The awakening in Ramadi was spectacular, but it did not begin or end there.⁴ This collaboration, grounded in Iraqi culture and societal networks, went generally unrecognized by most outsiders. Understanding this underlying context enables a deeper, more coherent, and more complete narrative of the Awakening movement.

Structure and Purpose

The power of this Training and Education Resource, both Teacher's Guide and DVD is not in its analysis and conclusions, but its collection. The sheer breadth of the material allows students and historians and others to explore different themes, and perhaps develop different or even counter-conclusions to what appears in these volumes.

The Awakening project comprises five volumes of supporting documents and an interactive DVD with a Teacher's Guide. The five volumes that document the project's findings, tell the story of the Anbar Awakening. The DVD provides that information in multimedia and interactively. The purpose of this document, the Teacher's Guide, is to suggest how an instructor might use the DVD and the various volumes to support and inform research, training, and education.⁵ It provides storyline experiences that may be relevant to on-going and future conflicts and examples that enable students to see the strategic implications of tactical actions and visa-versa.

⁴ This paper uses the upper case *A* or *S* to describe the overall Awakening or *Al Sahawa*, and the lower case *a* or *s* to describe those local movements to include the one in Ramadi.

⁵ *Teacher* is used generically—professor, instructor, trainer, small group or seminar facilitator all apply.

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1. The Awakening⁶

At a 14 September 2006, meeting in Ramadi, three days after a classified report was leaked to the *Washington Post* announcing Al Anbar as “militarily unwinnable,” Sheikh Abdul Sattar Albu-Risha announced the Awakening—the *Sahawa*.⁷ At that meeting, Sattar, along with 40 other sheikhs from the Ramadi area, signed an Emergency Council proclamation to work with the Coalition to drive Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) from Al Anbar. By December 2006, 18 of the 21 Ramadi-area tribes had joined this Awakening movement.⁸ By February 2007, the movement began to accelerate throughout Al Anbar as the Coalition reinforced areas seeking help to defeat Al Qaeda. On 3 September 2007, one year after Sattar’s announcement, President George W. Bush met with the tribal leaders of Al Anbar and the leadership of Iraq to congratulate them on their successes.⁹ Sattar was assassinated ten days later, but the Awakening did not stop or stall. On 1 September 2008, conditions were stable enough for the Coalition to hand over control of the province to the Iraqis.

What happened? How could Al Anbar—the birthplace of the Sunni insurgency and AQI—turn around so quickly?

This volume and the others in the study provide trainers and educators a set of multimedia tools for use in the classroom and the field that describe the conditions that existed in the theater, what the actors perceived and how they reacted to change those conditions, and analyses of the decisions and implementation processes that contributed to the Awakening.

A. Objective

The objective of the Anbar Awakening project is to create an unclassified, accessible resource for trainers and educators. It is presented in multimedia to accommodate different teaching and learning styles.¹⁰ The project presents the Awakening movement’s phases from development of the insurgency in 2003 to the Coalition’s transfer of responsibility for Al

⁶ The Awakening movement was the Anbar Awakening until 2007 when two things occurred: Sheikh Sattar changed the name Al Anbar Al Sahawa to the Al Sahawa Al Iraqi, and the movement was implemented in other areas of Iraq outside of Al Anbar.

⁷ Thomas E. Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq,” *Washington Post*, 11 September 2006.

⁸ Ramadi is a city and district—in this case, those sheiks came from both the city and the district. Anthony Deane, Colonel, USA, “Providing Security Force Assistance in an Economy of Force Battle,” *Military Review* (Jan–Feb 2010).

⁹ Alissa J. Rubin, “Sunni Sheikh Who Backed US in Iraq Killed,” *New York Times*, 14 September 2007.

¹⁰ Professional Military Education institutes have asked for unclassified, public releasable material to be used in their seminars.

Anbar to the Iraqis in 2008. In addition, it offers analysis and lessons, many of which are transferrable to current and future conflicts. This final product includes a multimedia instructional package to accommodate different teaching and learning styles.

B. Collection

Interviews were conducted in the United States, Iraq, and Jordan, and were structured around a series of five primary research questions (PRQ). Those questions were supplemented with secondary research questions (SRQ) that provided more granularity to the research. The SRQs, when answered, addressed the breadth and depth of the project and kept it focused on the objective. None of the research questions were necessarily static; in particular the SRQ. They were flexible; some changed as they were answered and new leads developed. Interview plans based on those questions were tailored to each interviewee. Although the final collection plan was more detailed and complex, the initial PRQs and SRQs are in Table 1-1.

Table 1-1. Initial Primary and Secondary Research Questions for the Awakening Project

Primary Research Questions	Secondary Research Questions
1. How, when, and why did the insurgency start?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who participated? • Why did they join?
2. What was the Al Anbar Awakening?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the prevalent definition? • Are there other definitions? If so, what are they? • Do different groups define it differently? If so why? • Was there more than one awakening?
3. What caused the Al Anbar Awakening?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What events set the conditions for the Awakening? • Why did the Anbaris turn against Al Qaeda? • Why, and under what condition, did the Anbaris seek help from the Coalition? From the GOI? • What were the notable events of the Anbaris turning on AQI and joining with the Coalition? Was the GOI a partner in those events? Was there a relationship between those events? • Was there a “tipping point?” If so, when, where, how did it start, how did it evolve?
4. How did the Al Anbar Awakening reconcile the causes identified by PRQ 3? Who and what events contributed to the reconciliation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who and what events contributed to the reconciliation? What processes were used to reconcile the causes? • What were the strategies used by the actors to achieve their goals? • How did those strategies interact? • What resources were necessary/made available to the actors to implement their strategies?
5. What were the major themes of and lessons from the Al Anbar Awakening?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did these themes and lessons contribute to success in the larger context of Iraq? • Are they transferable to other areas such as Afghanistan or Africa? • Should they be incorporated into doctrine? • Should they be taught at the various Professional Military Education institutions? If so, how?

C. Publication Series and Structure

Creating an unclassified, credible, accurate resource for trainers and educators to examine the Awakening using multimedia is more difficult than it may sound. Constructing all of the material gathered during the interviews into a multimedia product begins where most case studies, historical analyses, and comparable projects, end: First, the case study must be completed; next (or simultaneously, if possible), the multimedia materials must be collected; and then those materials must be woven together to bring that case study to life.

That being the case, this volume is part of a multi-volume set comprising interview transcripts, a final study report, this Teacher's Guide and the enclosed DVD.

D. The Volumes

The Al Anbar Awakening product consists of five volumes of reference material, comprising nine publications, plus a Teacher's Guide with an interactive, multimedia DVD. Volume I is the final report containing a storyline that follows the organization of the DVD. Volumes II–V contain the interview transcripts organized according to Coalition areas of operation (AOs). (See Figure 1-1; also, a map of the various AOs is in Appendix B.)

The volumes are organized as follows:

- Volume I. Al Anbar Awakening—Final Report
- Volume II. Al Anbar Awakening: AO Atlanta, An Overview
- Volume III. Al Anbar Awakening: AO Denver, Western Euphrates
- Volume IV. Al Anbar Awakening: AO Topeka, Ramadi Area
- Volume V. Al Anbar Awakening: AO Raleigh, Fallujah Area

Taken together, these volumes tell the in-depth Awakening story and feature all of the interview transcripts from which the storyline was constructed. As an example, Volume II covers AO Atlanta, which is approximately all of Al Anbar province. Volumes III–V cover the AOs subordinate to AO Atlanta and districts subordinate to Al Anbar.

Additionally, Volumes II–V all begin with the same introduction, PRQs, and structure to orient readers within the project and storyline, regardless of which volume they read first.




Figure 1-1. Areas of Operation in Al Anbar provide the structure for the Awakening volumes

E. This Document

This document, with accompanying DVD, provides a teacher with material to discuss various aspects of the Awakening, from its inception in 2004 when the Anbaris realized that AQI was not their friend, until the Coalition transferred responsibility for the security of the province to the government in 2008. It starts with an introduction to the project in this Chapter, followed by the DVD Read-ahead for storyline context in Chapter 2 (this is the narrative from chapter 12 of the Final Report, Volume I). Chapter 3 provides a description of the DVD and Chapter 4 suggests an education and training approach for using the DVD.

Additionally, the following appendices are provided.

- A – Who’s Who. Name spellings and descriptions of Iraqis who appear in the document. The description includes the person’s position, tribal affiliation, and some background information.
- B – Maps. Map showing areas discussed during the interviews.
- C – Guide. Guide and description for all of the discussion point segments
- D – Illustrations
- E – References
- F – Abbreviations

2. *Al Sahawa*: A Continuous, Connected Narrative of the Awakening

This chapter provides the Anbar Awakening narrative as context for the Teacher’s Guide and DVD. This is also provided as the Read Ahead for the DVD. The narrative was developed from the thousands of pages of interview transcripts and documents collected and analyzed during the life of the project (all part of the DVD). In addition, there are a multitude of other studies on the Awakening and a number of competing hypotheses on its beginnings and evolution, some of which disagree with the analysis and conclusions here. In line with goals of this Education and Training Resource for Professional Military Education—that is good! The purpose of the material provided in this DVD is to encourage users to explore other perspectives, expand the research, conduct their own analysis and develop their own conclusions. As such, the following provides one project’s Awakening narrative.

Most accounts of the Awakening movement begin with Sheik Abdul Sattar Albu-Risha’s 14 September 2006 anti-AQI proclamation. On that day he coined the term *Al Sahawa*. During the next year, conditions—security, governance and development—improved dramatically. Although some acknowledge other awakenings before 14 September 2006, those were usually characterized as “localized,” dismissed or the accounts make no mention of their contributions or connections to the overall movement.¹¹ The leaked classified Coalition report of 17 August of 2006, concluding that the Multi-National Forces and ISF were “no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in Al Anbar,” only reinforced the perception that gains, if any, were limited, inconsequential, and offered little hope for success.¹²

This report suggests otherwise. It also offers two things that most other accounts do not. Generally, it reveals a narrative that reflects continuous improvement throughout Al Anbar starting in Fallujah in 2004 and ending in Fallujah in 2008. Specifically, it contends there was a connection—that events before September 2006—such as those in Fallujah, Al Qaim and the Corridor—helped set the conditions for the awakening in Ramadi through tribal connections, in-

¹¹ This includes James Soriano, Department of State, Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader in Iraq, 2006–09; editors CWO-4 Timothy McWilliams and LtCol Kurtis S. Wheeler, in *Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume I*, 274; Col Gary W. Montgomery in *Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume II*.

¹² Ricks, “Situation Called Dire in West Iraq.” Officially, the report is known as the “State of the Emergency in Al Anbar,” I MEF G-2, 17 Aug 2006 (no author named). It was cleared for open publication 16 Dec 2010 by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense, and declassified by US Central Command Memorandum 10-012, at the request of Dr. William Knarr. Although many now disagree with the assessment for Ramadi, and in particular the November update, few, if any, have questioned the assessment as it related to the rest of Al Anbar, such as Fallujah, Al Qaim, and the Corridor.

teractions, and events. The following summarizes the narratives found in Chapters 2–10 and the analysis of Chapter 11 (all of the Final Report) to provide a continuous, coherent narrative; it also discusses contributing factors to the Awakening and offers some concluding thoughts.¹³

A. The Continuous Narrative of the Awakening

Conditions were being set for the awakening in Ramadi the moment the Iraqis recognized that AQI was not their friend in Fallujah in 2004. As insurgents fled to other communities along the Euphrates to escape the onslaught of the Coalition in Fallujah, they were preceded by Fallujan residents escaping to many of those same locations bearing witness to the true nature and agenda of AQI. As bad news travelled from east to west along the Euphrates, Awakening events and movements subsequently developed from west to east. The movement started in Al Qaim in 2005, migrated through the Hadithah-Hit Corridor in early 2006 and set the conditions for the Ramadi awakening in late 2006.¹⁴ The Iraqis in Fallujah’s environs, however, were not impressed or significantly influenced by these events until sufficient forces (GOI and Coalition) became available through the surge in 2007. The following traces the Awakening events from Fallujah in 2004 to Fallujah in 2008 and provides a coherent connected storyline.

1. Fallujah, 2004

The extremists’ occupation of Fallujah from April through November of 2004 was an incredible morale builder for the insurgency.¹⁵ The Coalition’s failure to expel the insurgents gave the impression that the Coalition could be beaten. As such, according to Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubai’e, the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Fallujah had become a powerful symbol for the insurgency.¹⁶ But during that period, the common Iraqi resident got a taste of AQI’s extreme interpretation of *Sharia*.¹⁷ Coupled with the paranoia created by the Coalition’s infor-

¹³ Recall that this section responds to several SRQs: What were the notable events of the Anbaris turning on AQI and joining with the Coalition? Was the GOI a partner in those events? Was there a relationship between those events, in particular, between the one in Al Qaim in 2005 and the premier awakening event in Ramadi in 2006?

¹⁴ The project differentiated between events and movements. The first event or step in the Awakening movement was that the Iraqis recognized AQI was not their friend, i.e., was their enemy. This primarily happened in Fallujah. The Anbaris realization that they could not defeat AQI on their own and needed the Coalition and the Coalition’s recognition that they needed to work with the people, primarily through the tribes, was the second step. The third step was incorporating the GOI into this partnership. The first time all of these steps or conditions were met in any significant manner was in Al Qaim. That’s when it became an awakening movement.

¹⁵ “Many enlisted following a great battle they considered a great victory—the Apr 2004 fight for Fallujah,” Abu Nour, insurgent and kidnapper of Jill Carroll; “The Jill Carroll Story,” *Christian Science Monitor* (18 Aug 2006).

¹⁶ Al-Rubai’e interview, 29 Jan 2006.

¹⁷ In October 2004, Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s *Jama’at Al-Tawhid Wa’al Jihad* became AQI when Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden.

mation operations campaign in preparation for the second battle for Fallujah in which the insurgents suspected everyone of being a spy, retribution for any infraction was severe. Many recall those days under AQI management, one of whom was Farhan De Hal Farhan. Farhan fled Fallujah with his family in September 2004. He was well aware of AQI's methods of operation and, along with many of the other residents, learned quickly that the extremists, rather than supporting a nationalist or anti-occupation effort, were simply the enemy of the Iraqis. He carried that story to Al Qaim where he was elected mayor in December 2005.

In November 2004, AQI lost its sanctuary in Fallujah to the Coalition forces' onslaught in the second battle of Fallujah, (Operation AL FAJR). There were a number of other benefits to the operation. It dispelled the myth that the Coalition was afraid to invade Fallujah and that Fallujah, defended by AQI, was somehow invincible. This operation undercut extremist propaganda in a way that no Coalition message ever could and it prompted other "renegade" cities to reflect on a Fallujah-like fate. It also built Iraqi confidence and opened a critical window of stability for the January 2005 elections.

Unfortunately, many insurgents fled Fallujah to Ramadi, to other communities along the Euphrates such as the Hadithah-Hit Corridor, to the north to Mosul, and to Al Qaim on the Iraqi/Syrian border.

2. AO Denver, 2005: A View from Al Asad

AO Denver was the largest of the Coalition's AOs. Those who deployed there nicknamed it the *Wild West*—a 30,000-square-mile region in Western Iraq containing several major population centers along the Western Euphrates River Valley (WERV)—Hit, Hadithah, and the Al Qaim district—and sharing borders with Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Throughout 2003, AO Denver was occupied by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Army units. The First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) took control of Al Anbar in early 2004, and Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) were assigned to the area.

Regimental Combat Team-2 (RCT-2), commanded by Colonel Stephen Davis, assumed responsibility for AO Denver in February 2005 from RCT-7. RCT-2's command was based out of Al Asad Airbase, which is south of the river between Hadithah and Hit. Col Davis described the environment:

The Euphrates is a highway. It's been a highway for 4,000 years. These are business men out here, and you need to look at this area through a different lens. The solution out here will be found as a business equation. This is not good guys versus bad guys, although there were plenty of bad guys. Everybody's got a business angle up here, because that's what they do. And there are some great survivors up here. They've

survived 35 years of Saddam. He couldn't tame them, and so by understanding this, you start to understand a bit about the environment that we were walking into.¹⁸

Davis's mission was to "Conduct COIN [counterinsurgency] operations in order to disrupt and interdict anti-Iraqi insurgent elements." The goal was to stabilize these areas to a point where the National Referendum on the Constitution in October and National Elections in December could be held.

During August through October 2005, RCT-2's forces grew from 3,200 to around 14,000 as it received additional GOI and Coalition support. That included elements of the newly formed 7th Iraqi Division. This allowed Colonel Davis to implement a strategy of combined, persistent presence within the AO. Additionally, during this time SF detachments were reintroduced to AO Denver; they began engaging the population to determine which tribes might be receptive to working with the Coalition and GOI. This led to forming the first tribal militia in Al Qaim—the Desert Protectors—that was approved by the GOI and US forces. The following provides the story for two of the major communities within the AO: Al Qaim and the Hadithah-Hit Corridor.

a. Al Qaim, 2005–06

Although the district's population of 150,000–200,000 represents only 10% of the Anbar population, the area is strategically important because it is on the Iraqi border with Syria and along the Euphrates River.¹⁹ Al Qaim is a lucrative smuggling route for black market goods, and was AQI's lifeline to Baghdad as foreign fighters, money, and other resources fueling the insurgency infiltrated Iraq. With the loss of Fallujah, Al Qaim also became AQI's newfound sanctuary.

The significance of this terrain was not lost on the Coalition. Blocking the Syrian/Iraqi border along the Euphrates at the Husaybah port of entry and securing Al Qaim was part of the Coalition's larger strategy to restrict the movement of foreign fighters and resources—including suicide bombers and IED materials—from Syria down the Euphrates to Baghdad. This was particularly important as the Coalition and GOI prepared for the constitutional referendum in October 2005 and for the elections two months later.²⁰ CTF 3/6's ability to implement a combined, permanent, persistent presence in the Al Qaim district, starting in September 2005, was critical to the start of the Awakening in all of Al Anbar, and security in the Al Qaim District continued to improve. By March 2006, when 3/6 transferred responsibility of the area to 1/7 Marines, CTF 3/6 had established some 16 Battle Positions from Husaybah to

¹⁸ Colonel Stephen Davis, interview with Dr. William Knarr and Colonel Dale Alford, USMC, Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC), Camp Lejeune, 25 May 2010.

¹⁹ Colonel Dale Alford, briefing on 3/6 Marines in Al Qaim Iraq, Aug 2005 to Mar 2006, Institute for Defense Analyses, 16 Feb 2010.

²⁰ Davis interview, 25 May 2010.

Ubaydi. Each position included Marines and Iraqis with company areas assigned based on tribal distribution to link a company with a tribe.²¹ Additionally, the positions were located in such a way that the Coalition and Iraqi forces lived among the people. They were also transitioning the Desert Protectors, established in September 2005, from a semi-independent tribal force into regular units of the Iraqi Army and local police force.

LtCol Marano, Commander, 1/7 Marines, continued to build on that strategy. Seven months later, in September 2006, as 1/7 Marines prepared for transfer of authority with LtCol Schuster and 3/4 Marines, the Coalition and Iraqis had developed a fairly sophisticated operation to control the physical terrain. They had prepared the border with obstacles and the human terrain with Iraqi Army and police stations strategically placed throughout the AO. Some of those stations had already been turned over to full Iraqi control. COL Ismael, commander, 3rd Iraqi Brigade, indicated that security was so effective in the Al Qaim district that AQI had fled to Rawah, a city along the Euphrates River, 57 miles to the east of Husaybah. This did not mean that there were not pockets of AQI in Al Qaim, but by late 2006, the ISF and Coalition dominated the area. In addition to security, a local government had existed since December 2005 when Farhan De Hal Farhan had been elected as district mayor.²²

Again, as this narrative demonstrates, by the time Sheikh Sattar coined the term *Al Sahawa*, Al Qaim was already secure with a functioning local government, its economic and social systems recovered and developing. Follow-on units built on that success. But the awakening in Al Qaim, while enabled by the Coalition, was built by Iraqis like Sheikh Kurdi, Colonel Ismael, and Mayor Farhan who risked their lives and those of their families to take control of their destinies rather than forfeit their futures to AQI. They weren't there on short tours; they were there for the long haul.

The Bookends: Fallujah and Al Qaim

By spring 2006, developments in Fallujah and Al Qaim had restricted AQI's freedom of movement. Population control measures in Fallujah such as berming, checkpoints, and identification cards, coupled with the development of the ISF, all contributed to disrupting AQI within the city and east into the Baghdad area. Fallujah wasn't necessarily stable, but it was not the insurgent sanctuary it had been in 2004. Additionally, successes in Al Qaim restricted the flow of foreign fighters and their resources from the west across the Iraqi/Syrian border into Al Qaim. This, of course, did not end the insurgency. As an adaptive enemy, elements of AQI (especially their leaders) found ways around and through both Al Qaim and Fallujah, but the loss of major sanctuaries at both ends of the WERV, effectively bookending the insurgency, greatly reduced

²¹ It was not an exact science, but it worked well.

²² Farhan De Hal Farhan, mayor of Al Qaim district, interview with Dr. William Knarr, Col Dale Alford, USMC, and LtCol David Graves, USMC, Ubaydi, Iraq, 17 Apr 2010.

their efficiency and operational effectiveness. As such, the insurgents were forced towards “cool” spots, exploiting Coalition and Iraqi security gaps in the Corridor and Ramadi areas.²³

b. The Corridor, 2006

Early Coalition efforts to build and train Iraqi security forces—particularly in the Hadithah area—generally succeeded. However, during 2004, the Iraqi civilian and Coalition relationship changed in the area due to events in Fallujah. Marine units assigned to the Corridor area deployed to Fallujah to support operations in April–June 2004 and again in November–December 2004. During their absence, insurgents seized control of the newly vacated space, and proceeded to hunt and punish Iraqis they found who had cooperated with the Coalition. The Corridor residents had been left unprotected by the Coalition twice; but they wouldn’t be deceived again by AQI or the Coalition. They had realized early on that AQI was not their friend, and that intermittent Coalition security was worse than no security. They remained non-committal until they saw evidence and assurances of a permanent, persistent presence.

As a military economy of force area for much of 2003–05, the Corridor didn’t have enough troops to execute a COIN strategy of clear, hold, and build. As one Coalition battalion commander described it, they were destined to a cycle of “clear, abandon, clear, abandon...” But, that started to change in October 2005 when RCT-2’s forces more than quadrupled, to include additional Iraqi forces. The SF detachments assigned to Hit and Hadithah discovered that the Albu-Nimr in the town of Hit was receptive to partnering with the Coalition under the Desert Protectors program as had the Albu-Mahal in Al Qaim.

Brigadier General David Reist, former deputy commanding general of the MEF (FWD), coined the term “Commercial Battlespace” and contended that the Awakening moved from west to east, tied to the commercial routes along the WERV. He characterized it as “a wave coming ashore, not a singular event in any way, shape or form.” The wave, in this case, began in Al Qaim during summer and fall 2005. In early 2006, it followed the WERV to the area around Al Asad in the Corridor. Reist also credits the chief of police in Baghdadi—Colonel Shaban Barzan Abdul Himrin al-Ubaydi, also known as the Lion of Baghdadi—with leading the fight against AQI. Other Iraqis like Colonel Farouq and Mayor Hakim provided leadership and continuity for the Hadithah Triad and Baghdadi areas. Hit would suffer from a rapid turnover of forces from September 2005 to February 2006 with five different units assuming responsibility for the area. But in February 2006, it would be finally assigned a US battalion that would stay for an entire year, and then be followed by units also with long term commitments to the area.

²³ *Cool spots* are LtGen Allen’s reference to gaps in Coalition and Iraqi security.

With AQI resistance emerging in Baghdadi and Hadithah in early 2006, AQI was running out of places to operate and hide, and it migrated east to more favorable terrain in the Ramadi area and to the east toward Fallujah. Ramadi then became known as the worst city in Iraq.

3. Ramadi, 2006–07

The insurgency in Anbar suffered serious damage in late 2005 from successive Coalition operations in the western parts of Al Anbar targeting its leadership and network. This opened a window of opportunity for the elements of the Sunni Arab Resistance and other nationalists to politically engage the Coalition and elements of the GOI. Despite this, AQI regrouped in late 2005/early 2006 and targeted those insurgent and tribal leaders who sought political negotiation. AQI was so successful that it recovered from most of its losses in 2005 and became the dominant insurgent group in Al Anbar, and in Ramadi in particular. By March, AQI had eliminated much of the competing insurgent resistance groups in the Ramadi area, either by murder, neutralizing their efforts, or forcing those who resisted into their fold.²⁴

Despite its dominance in Ramadi, there was, not surprisingly, little enthusiasm among Ramadi residents for AQI. The increased criminality that AQI brought, along with its murder and intimidation campaigns, meant that AQI was more feared than loved. The tribes and local leaders that remained anti-AQI, however, maintained a low profile until their window of opportunity would open. It would do so with the deployment of the Ready Force Combat Team (RFCT) to Ramadi in May 2006.²⁵ Then, given the right conditions that included force structure, experiences, strategies, and leadership—Iraqi as well as Coalition—it would accelerate into what would be called the Awakening.

We do not intend to tell the full story of the Ramadi awakening here, but certain considerations paint a much different picture than that of the MEF's intelligence assessment of August 2006.²⁶ Those considerations, in fact, paint a more formidable picture for the RFCT.

The August 2006 leaked intelligence assessment, as reflected in the media and revalidated in November of 2006, lamented the loss of the province and marginalized any COIN successes throughout it. To the contrary, there were marked successes in Fallujah, Al Qaim, and the Corridor. Additionally, expelling the insurgents from Al Qaim and disrupting their opera-

²⁴ Colonel Montgomery and Chief Warrant Officer 4 McWilliams, "Al Anbar Awakening," Volume II, *Iraqi Perspectives* (Marine Corps University Press, 2009), 12.

²⁵ There is a strong Coalition connection in these events. LtCol Bill Jurney, Commander, 1/6 Marines in Ramadi in 2006 built on the experiences and lessons of LtCol Dale Alford, Commander 3/6 Marines in Al Qaim in 2005/2006. Upon arriving in Ramadi, Jurney briefed MacFarland on his plan. MacFarland commented that Jurney "was completely inside my head intent-wise...[and] took it to another level at the battalion." It's interesting that MacFarland had built on the lessons of McMasters in Tal Afar and Jurney built on the lessons of Alford in Al Qaim, but, at the time neither knew much of the other events, i.e., MacFarland had not heard much about Al Qaim and Jurney had not heard much about Tal Afar.

²⁶ Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, "Anbar Picture Grows Clearer and Bleaker," *Washington Post*, 28 Nov 2006.

tions in the Corridor also drove the surviving jihadists east, exacerbating the situation in Ramadi. AQI felt the pressure and Ramadi was its last significant urban staging area and the last, and largest, symbol of its power. Essentially, Ramadi was AQI's Alamo.

The Ramadi awakening, detailed in Chapter 7 of the Final Report, was dramatic and the major turning point in the Anbar fight against AQI. Its success was made more dramatic by comparison to other areas in Al Anbar. Ramadi had now become the sanctuary, the Caliphate. The extremists had to be decisively defeated in Ramadi. The rest of Al Anbar could not improve without Ramadi "catching up." And it did – dramatically. Its eruption, coined *Al Saha-wa* by Sheikh Sattar Abu-Risha and energized by him and his uniting of the Ramadi area tribes against AQI, quickly surpassed and accelerated improvements in neighboring communities such as the Corridor. As an example: In Ramadi, there were fewer than a hundred policemen in September 2006, but increased to 3,500 by July of 2007; correspondingly, incidents fell from 35 a day to less than one a day between February and April 2007. The movement was contagious in other parts of Al Anbar with the number of policemen in Al Anbar increasing from 3,500 in October 2006 to 21,500 by June 2007 and insurgent incidents falling from 1,300 in October 2006 to 225 in June 2007.²⁷

But it wasn't over. Although success in Ramadi positively affected other communities immediately to the northwest, it didn't have as much effect in the east, as the Fallujah sheikhs and tribes were more independent and less influenced by events in Ramadi. Although the Surge in Iraq was inaccurately credited with a number of successes, it did make a difference as the Coalition and Iraqis expanded its successes beyond Ramadi into areas such as the environs of Fallujah.²⁸

4. An Awakening emerges: Fallujah, 2007

At the start of 2007, Fallujah proper was not *out* of control and was nowhere near the ungoverned insurgent sanctuary it had been in 2004, but it was also not *under* control. The solution to the insurgency in the Fallujah area and its significant impact on security in Baghdad was much broader than simply controlling entry into, and movement within the city. It depended on controlling its environs: Saqlawiyah, Al Karmah, and Zaidon.²⁹ These small towns, suburbs, and rural hamlets resourced and fed the insurgency. The urban areas of Fallujah and Baghdad could not be stabilized until these sources were isolated or eliminated.

²⁷ John F. Burns, "Showcase and Chimera in the Desert," *New York Times*, 8 July 2007, www.nytimes.com; Colonel John Charlton, former Commander, 1st BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, interview with Dr. William Knarr, Alexandria, VA, 20 Oct 2010.

²⁸ Most notably Senator John McCain credited Sattar's *Sahawa* proclamation in September of 2006 to the later surge of forces in 2007, that was sequentially impossible. Senator John McCain, interview with Katie Couric, CBS, 22 July 2008.

²⁹ There were other critical areas such as Ameriyah-Ferris to the south of Zaidon, but the Awakening project concentrated on the three listed.

Events in the Fallujah area illustrate that not all of the Anbar awakenings evolved similarly. People typically associate the awakening with the tribes, but in the Fallujah area, local political, security, and economic power manifested itself in many different ways. In Zaidon, for example, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigade (a Nationalist insurgent group) accepted the Coalition's help to defeat AQI and essentially remained in charge of the area after the fight.

Al Karmah's redemption depended on the Coalition establishing a window of security in preparation for a senior tribal leader, Sheikh Mishan, to return from Jordan. This case leveraged the typical tribal affiliations to defeat AQI, even though for many years the Jumayli tribe's loyalties were split between insurgent and anti-insurgent.

In Saqlawiyah, the police force, enabled by the Marines, developed, gained credibility, and established control over the area. However, in all cases, there seemed to be an AQI-perpetrated event, some called it an egregious act, an over-reach, that was the straw that broke the camel's back; an event that catalyzed the population to choose the Coalition instead of AQI.

During this period, the Coalition conducted a Ramadi-like "clear, hold and build" operation within the city of Fallujah. In coordination with operations conducted in the surrounding areas, Fallujah was the last area to be stabilized for turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqis in September 2008.³⁰

Section A outlined the events occurring from Fallujah in 2004 to Fallujah in 2008 that are critical to understanding the Awakening movement. Although it introduced a number of relationships—such as the movement of Iraqis from one area to another and carrying the story of AQI atrocities, as well as Coalition and Iraq successes—there is a much more complex, nuanced story of relationships and networks that provides a deeper, connected, and coherent understanding of the movement.

B. A Narrative Connected by Relationships and Events

We are not your enemy. Al-Qaeda is your enemy. —The Messenger³¹

During the chaotic summer of 2004, when Fallujans were entering the Awakening by realizing that AQI was not their friend, meetings were underway in Amman, Jordan. Those meetings, facilitated by Talal al-Gaoud, a prominent Iraqi businessman that lived in Amman, brought together Americans and Iraqis. The purpose was to find a way out of the anarchy that

³⁰ While there seemed to be very little tribal connection between Fallujah, in particular the city, and other Al Anbar communities, there was a Coalition connection. In 2007, LtCol William F. Mullen, Commander, 2/6 Marines adopted a Ramadi-style "clear, hold, build strategy" from 1/6 Marines in Ramadi. In 2006, LtCol Journey, Commander, 1/6 Marines adopted a "clear, hold, build" strategy from LtCol Dale Alford, 3/6 Marines lessons in Al Qaim in 2005.

³¹ David Rose, "Heads in the Sand," *Vanity Fair* (12 May 2009): 7. This is an incredible story. The project found nothing wrong in the account and was able to verify much of it through discussions with Colonel Walker, Ken Wischkaemper, Jalal al-Gaoud, and Ra'ad al-Hamdani.

gripped Iraq, and in particular Al Anbar. On 18 July 2004, Talal convened a conference at the Sheraton Hotel in Amman. The American invitees included representatives from the Department of Defense, American Embassy in Amman, the Coalition, and businessmen. The Iraqis included prominent businessmen and Iraqi notables from the various tribes and confederations, former Iraqi generals such as Ra'ad al-Hamdani, and former Iraqi government officials from the Saddam Hussein era. Although they spoke of reconciliation and development, there was a much more important objective.

According to David Rose, author of *Vanity Fair* article "Heads in the Sand," Talal arranged a private meeting on 19 July 2004 to introduce the Americans to the face of the insurgency: a Fallujan they called The Messenger. Colonel Walker, USMC, commander, 3rd Civil Affairs Group in Iraq from February to September 2004, was at that meeting; according to him, the message to the Americans was, "We are not your enemy. Al-Qaeda is your enemy," and he urged the Coalition to work with the Sunnis to defeat them. A series of meetings ensued that convinced Walker of the authenticity and credibility of the participants and their strategy. Unfortunately, political infighting and turf sensitivities marginalized future talks. Although described as a major opportunity lost, it reinforced the deep involvement of Iraqis residing outside of Iraq (top down), as well as inside Iraq (bottom up) to find a solution. It also demonstrated the power of the Al Gaoud clan to bring together high level players as well as of their connections in Iraq to the insurgency.³² As Colonel Walker sees it, this dialogue was the start of the Awakening.

The Coalition's November 2004 assault on AQI's Fallujah sanctuary forced insurgents to flee to communities along the WERV. AQI offered to partner with the tribes of Al Qaim to fight the Americans; most accepted. The Albu-Mahal found out later that this was no partnership and AQI was no friend. They initially drove AQI from the area in May of 2005, but AQI returned in July and August with a vengeance.

Calls for help went to MNF-W (via the Al Gaoud clan), MNF-I, and the Iraqi Government. When Sheikh Sabah, the leader of the Albu-Mahal, asked Dr. Sadun Dulaymi, then Iraq's minister of defense, for assistance, Sadun turned to General George Casey, Commander, MNF-I, for help. GEN Casey responded with funding, equipment, and training to develop the Desert Protectors. Additionally, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 582 was assigned advisory responsibility to develop those tribal forces. While most of the Albu-Mahal tribesmen fled to Akashat, some fled to the Ramadi area, and Mahalawis (Albu-Mahal tribesmen), joined with Sheikh Sattar Albu-Risha, and Sheikh Jassim Muhammad Salih al-Suwaydawi in the Ramadi area to support the awakening movement there.

In addition to the refugees, there were other ties between the Albu-Mahal and Albu-Risha tribes. Sadun, the principal GOI coordinator for the Desert Protectors, was Sheikh Sat-

³² Al Gaouds have been categorized as a family, clan and subtribe. Because of their prominence and size (larger than a family) and in line with the ODA that partnered with them, this paper uses refers to them as a clan.

tar's uncle, and had grown up next to Sheikh Sattar's family's compound in Ramadi. When Sheikh Sattar's successor, Sheikh Ahmed Abu-Risha, was asked about the first instance of an Iraqi tribe turning on AQI, he responded matter-of-factly, "Abu-Mahal in Al Qaim."³³ He spoke of contacting Sheikh Sabah of the Abu-Mahal in 2005 and offering to help. Sheikh Sabah asked that they contact Dr. Dulaymi, the minister of defense and a member of the Abu-Risha tribe, to solicit formal GOI recognition of the growing anti-AQI movement. Sheikh Ahmed's brother Khamis travelled to Baghdad and met with Sadun to discuss support for the Abu-Mahal. There was also a direct connection between Sheikh Sabah and Sheikh Sattar. According to Sheikh Sabah, Sheikh Sattar met him in Jordan to discuss the Abu-Mahal's success against AQI. Sheikh Sattar was increasingly concerned about AQI's grip on the Ramadi area and was looking for ways to counter them.³⁴

During his trip to Jordan, Sattar also met with other prominent sheikhs to gain their approval and support for his upcoming fight. Notably, Sheikh Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman, co-regent to the Dulaymi Tribal Confederation,³⁵ supported the Abu-Mahal tribe's revolt against AQI in 2005.³⁶ He, along with other notable sheikhs in Jordan, approved Sheikh Sattar's request. This support convinced Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to back the Awakening. Maliki reportedly said that there would be "no Awakening unless Majed and the sheikhs agree to it."³⁷

The types of people participating in and driving the Awakening went beyond traditional tribal leaders. Among those attending the meeting with Sheikh Sattar and Sheikh Majed was Numan Abdul Mahsen al-Gaoud, a prominent businessman and owner of the Doha Group in Baghdad.³⁸ The Al Gaouds, a prominent clan from the Hit area, belong to the Abu-Nimr tribe. The Abu-Nimr and Abu-Mahal tribes are closely related and share ancestry.³⁹ Additionally, during the early stages of the Abu-Mahal's fight with AQI, it was Fasal al-Gaoud, and former governor of Al Anbar province, who initially contacted the Americans at Camp Fallujah on behalf of the Abu-Mahal. Additionally, Fasal al-Gaoud was present at Sheikh Sattar's Awakening announcement of 14 September 2006, and also served as an original member of the

³³ Sheikh Ahmed Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi, paramount sheikh of the Abu-Risha tribe and president of the Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq (The Iraq Awakening Party, MSI), interview with Dr. William Knarr, Col Dale Alford, USMC, and LtCol David Graves, USMC, at Sheikh Ahmed's guesthouse, Ramadi, Iraq, 22 Apr 2010.

³⁴ Sheikh Sabah interview, 3 Feb 2011

³⁵ The Dulaymi Tribal Confederation is the largest and most influential tribe in Al Anbar. The tribe has a rich history in Iraq, dating back before Islam was born.

³⁶ Sheikh Majed interview, 3 Feb 2011.

³⁷ Sheikh Majed interview, 3 Feb 2011.

³⁸ Numan al-Gaoud interview, 13 Feb 2013

³⁹ Jalal al-Gaoud interview 5 Feb 2013.

Awakening Council. Also in attendance, and one of the signatories of the emergency decree, was an Albu-Mahal representative from Al Qaim.⁴⁰

Those connections and relationships were further strengthened by the return of Special Forces teams to the area in 2005 after a short hiatus. As indicated previously, an Operational Detachment Bravo was deployed to Al Asad with ODAs deployed to Al Qaim, Hadithah, and Hit to work with the tribes and develop those relationships from the bottom up. In fact, Major General James Mattis, 1st Marine Division commander from August 2002 to August 2004, credits Major Adam Such, Special Forces, with making initial contact with the Albu-Nimr tribe as early as mid-2004. According to Mattis' account, Major Such and the efforts of these isolated SF detachments "actually began what eventually morphed into the Anbar Awakening."⁴¹

C. Disconnected Perspectives, Rather than Disconnected Events

As this study has illuminated, the events in Al Qaim and Ramadi are connected. These connections flow through a web of subtle yet effective tribal communication, coordination, and affiliations. This narrative of the Awakening runs counter to the common one (especially among American commentators) that the Ramadi awakening was disconnected and unrelated to previous events. So, why do so many Americans view the Al Qaim awakening and other events in such a limited way?

Colonel Walker offered one explanation. Walker attributed much of the Coalition's inability to recognize the relationships to a "Coalition time versus Arab time" mind-set. On one hand, Coalition members perceived events in Iraq based on their deployments; Marines, for example, saw the sequence of events in seven-month rotational increments. On the other hand, the Iraqis visualized and connected events during the entire time frame, which in turn related to their collective memories of events predating the 2003 invasion. They could bridge these events and see continuity where the Coalition could only perceive incremental and disconnected episodes.⁴²

Another reason why many failed to recognize the connections can be traced to the classified intelligence report leaked to the press in September 2006, two weeks before Sheikh Sattar announced the Awakening in Ramadi.⁴³ It reported that the tribal system "wholly failed in AO Raleigh and Topeka and has only limited efficacy in AO Denver."⁴⁴ The only exception noted

⁴⁰ Relations within the Al Gaoud clan was not necessarily congenial. There were reported conflicts between the former governor Fasal and his cousin, Sheikh Bezi.

⁴¹ McWilliams and Wheeler, *Al-Anbar Awakening, Volume I*, 24–25.

⁴² Walker interview, 6 Jan 2011.

⁴³ Thomas E. Ricks, "Situation Called Dire in West Iraq," *The Washington Post*, 11 Sept 2006. Officially, the report is known as the "State of the Emergency in Al Anbar," I MEF G-2, 17 Aug 2006 (no author named). It was cleared for open publication 16 Dec 2010 by the Office of Security Review, Department of Defense and declassified by US Central Command Memorandum 10-012, at the request of Dr. William Knarr.

⁴⁴ "State of the Emergency in Al Anbar," 1.

in the report was Fallujah, where the tribes still functioned despite “local politics in Al Anbar [being] anemic or dysfunctional due to insurgent intimidation....”⁴⁵ While a number of Coalition senior leaders in Al Anbar characterized the report as basically accurate when read in its entirety, the report unfortunately set a despondent tone when select elements of the report were headlined in the media. The report led many to conclude that there was no success.

However, on 14 July, COL MacFarland announced on a televised Department of Defense news briefing that “I think we have turned a corner here in Ramadi.”⁴⁶ At a news conference on 29 September 2006, MacFarland gave a progress report: “The last time I talked to you [14 July 2006], I told you that we were at a tipping point in the battle for Ramadi. Well, I think we’ve actually tipped.” That comment was based on a reduction of incidents within the district and an increase in the presence of Coalition and ISF.⁴⁷ As incredible as it may seem, a 28 November 2006 *Washington Post* article entitled, “Anbar Picture Grows Clearer and Bleaker” provided an update to the original August intelligence report, and indicated there had been no improvement, and that no improvement was expected in Al Anbar’s security conditions.⁴⁸

Awakening events in 2004, Al Qaim in 2005, and the Corridor in early 2006 might have shone through if the media had not chosen to highlight the elements of the leaked report that so authoritatively and adamantly denied any successes in the Anbar area. Based on this report and subsequent high-level media coverage, much of the US audience was left with the impression that success could not have started in Al Anbar until the Army’s Ready First Combat Team arrived in Ramadi in June 2006. As more detailed research makes clear, however, the Iraqis were well aware of the connections, relationships, and significance of previous events to include Al Qaim, and would count it as the physical starting point of the Awakening movement.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ “State of the Emergency in Al Anbar,” 4.

⁴⁶ COL Sean MacFarland, DoD news briefing/interview, televised 14 July 2006; in a 29 September 2006 DoD news briefing, MacFarland announced, “I think we’ve actually tipped. Attacks are down 25 percent over the past couple of months, and coalition forces, together with the Iraqi security forces, have steadily increased their presence inside of the city.”

⁴⁷ DoD News transcript, 29 Sept 2006, Presenter: Army Colonel Sean MacFarland, Commander, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division.

⁴⁸ Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, “Anbar Picture Grows Clearer and Bleaker,” *Washington Post*, 28 Nov 2006.

⁴⁹ Americans who saw continuity and relationships among those events were Colonel Walker and Brig Gen Reist. Colonel Walker attributed much of that continuity from 2004 to 2006 to the influence and commitment of the Al Gaouds and their involvement in every Awakening event starting in 2004. BrigGen Reist emphasized that money and smuggling were critical to the Anbaris survival. Calling it the Commercial Battlespace he contended that the Awakening flowed along the WERV from west to east, the major smuggling route, starting in Al Qaim, emerging in Baghdadi and culminating in Ramadi.

D. Conclusion

The Awakening was much more than Sheikh Sattar's announcement on 14 September 2006. Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid, Al Anbar Governor during 2005–06 described it best as a sequence of actions and events throughout Al Anbar:

When we started fighting Al Qaeda in Fallujah, the fight started to trickle down to Al Qaim, then Hadithah, then Anah, Rawah, and all these cities. The tribes with the help of the coalition forces, they took the fight to Al Qaeda. The last round of fighting was in Ramadi.⁵⁰

These events were connected through the “Sheikh network,” that unofficial grapevine of social connectivity that Americans were not part of. Rather than the starting point, Sheikh Sattar's *Sahawa* was the product of accumulating events and movements.

Although many Americans perceive events in Ramadi as disconnected from previous events, this study showed that the Iraqis saw and leveraged those connections and relationships, thus creating a continuous narrative that:

- began in 2004 with the battles for Fallujah and the meetings in Amman, Jordan;
- sparked in 2005 in Al Qaim with the first significant revolt of a tribe against AQI;
- saw the emergence of courageous Iraqi leaders such as Colonels Shaban and Farouq in late 2005/2006 to organize and lead local police forces in the Corridor;
- was strengthened by the continued involvement of influential Iraqi tribes and families to connect the various events;
- set the conditions in 2006/2007 for the Ramadi *sahawa*, the turning point, where it accelerated throughout Al Anbar, and
- entered its final stages in Al Anbar in 2007/2008 with its return to the environs of Fallujah.

Subsequently, the awakening, or *sahawa*, became the *Sahawa*, a collective effort by communities along the Euphrates. This collaboration, grounded in Iraqi culture and societal networks, albeit unrecognized by most outsiders, provides a deeper, more coherent and continuous narrative of the Anbar Awakening.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Governor Mamoun Sami Rashid, Al Anbar Governor 2005 to 2006, interview with Dr. William Knarr, Colonel Dale Alford, USMC, and Lieutenant Colonel David Graves, USMC, Ramadi, 7 Apr 2010.

⁵¹ The situation in Iraq was much more complex than anything that's been written. Even this project with more than 3,000 pages in transcripts and a multi-media addendum has numerous gaps. It didn't exploit the other Government Agencies or National SOF, both of which made significant contributions. Additionally, there are other themes and conclusions that can be drawn that are just as important depending on the reader's research questions and interests. As such, the reader is encouraged to delve into the other volumes and transcripts to explore and discover the uniqueness of all the perspectives, both Coalition and Iraqi.

3. DVD Description

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the structure and contents of the DVD. The Homepage top banner (Figure 3-1) provides access to the five major sections of the DVD: Chapters, Select Topics, Supporting Information, Read Ahead Material, and the Site map.⁵²



Figure 3-1. Homepage top banner

The Site Map (Figure 3-2), accessed by clicking [Site Map](#) at the bottom right corner of the banner, provides a more detailed view of the DVD structure and contents. Additionally, each of the boxes in the site map is active so the user can immediately go to that section if desired. Each of the five major sections is discussed below.




Figure 3-2. DVD Site Map

⁵² The material on the DVD runs more efficiently if transferred to a hard drive. Create a folder called *Sahawa*. Open *My Computer*, right click on the DVD drive, left click on *Explore* and copy all of the DVD files to the *Sahawa* folder. Double-click *Start.exe*.

A. Chapters

This section of the DVD addresses the events in Al Anbar from the birth of the insurgency in 2003 to Fallujah in 2007/2008. As indicated, there are seven chapters: Chapters 1, 2, 6 and 7 are narratives in PDF describing events during the periods indicated. Chapters 3–5 are interactive and provide the most significant events related to the Awakening movement.⁵³

The screen in Figure 3-3 is what appears when the user clicks on *Chapters* from the banner. From there, hovering the mouse over each chapter will highlight the corresponding section of the map. As an example, at Figure 3-3, the user moused over Chapter 3, 2005, Al Qaim. When clicked, the viewer will be taken to that chapter.




Figure 3-3. Screen from which Users Navigate between Chapters 1–7

Chapters 1 and 2

When the user clicks on Chapter 1 or Chapter 2, a PDF of the narrative will appear as read-aheads to aid discussing those events and periods of time.

Chapters 3–5

When the user clicks on Chapters 3–5, a short vignette will play. The vignette either summarizes events for the period or tells a story that significantly influenced events in the corresponding area and that was relevant to the Awakening overall. For Chapter 3 of the DVD, AQI's 11 April

⁵³ For a more complete description of events in 2003 and in Fallujah in 2004, see *Seizing the Peninsula, a vignette from the Battle for Fallujah, an Education and Training Resource Guide*, with DVD, IDA Document and DVD D-4286, January 2011.

2005 attack on Camp Gannon is the vignette (see Figure 3-4). As footage of the attack plays, Colonel Stephen Davis, Commander, Regimental Combat Team 2 describes the impact of the attack and the realization that Zarqawi had focused his efforts and resources in the Al Qaim area.



Figure 3-4. Chapter 3 vignette, AQI attack on Camp Gannon

When the vignette finishes, the Al Qaim navigational screen opens (see Figure 3-5). The opening screen includes links to Discussion Frames (videos) material on the left, and on the right to a student read-ahead, an Organizations and People line and block chart, Chronology, and Area Map.




Figure 3-5. Al Qaim Navigational Screen

Discussion Frames. The frames on the left side of each area’s navigation screen link to video and text for discussion. The first frame at the top left of Figure 3-5 shows a picture of Major Frank Diorio, who was in charge of Camp Gannon on the day of the attack. Clicking the photo leads to video of Major Diorio talking about the attack and follow-on events. The events and topics presented on the left of the navigation screen are subjects for discussion in an education or training setting and will be described in greater detail in the next chapter.

In order to back out of the panels, the user needs to click on the “X” that is on that page.

Read Ahead. The read-ahead provides in text format the narrative for that chapter and provides context for the numbered frames on the left side. The read ahead material is taken from the chapters in the Final Report. If the user wishes to explore the details, he can go to the next panel (panel 7, Organization and People) and access the various transcripts as described in the next section.

Organizations & People. The line and block chart shown in Figure 3-6 shows up under Organizations & People for Chapters 3–5 and is tailored for that chapter, in this case Chapter 3. Organizations and people unrelated to the chapter’s AO are grayed out. Users can visualize

the relation of each player to the others and where each fits into the storyline in terms of level of organization and function.




Figure 3-6. Organizations and People Chart, tailored for Chapter 3, Al Qaim

In this example, 3/6 Marines LtCol Alford is clicked, taking the user to a short summary and transition panel (see Figure 3-7). From there, the user can access LtCol Alford’s Interview Transcript.




Figure 3-7. Panel for Colonel Dale Alford, former commander, 3/6 Marines

Clicking on other boxes in the Organizations & People chart can lead to multiple subjects. If a user clicks on the MNF-W & MND block, a panel would come up that enabled access to summary panels and then transcripts for LtGen John Allen, the former Deputy Commander of MNF-W in 2007 and 2008, for MajGen Neller, the former DCG for Operations, MNF-W in 2006 and 2007, for Colonel Rick Welch, Chief, Reconciliation/Engagement Cell from 2004 to 2010, and others.

The same thing applies to the GOI and ISF structure on the Organizations & People chart. The PM box leads to summary panels and interview transcripts for former Prime Ministers Ayad Allawi and Ibrahim Al Jaafari.

The last major block on the right addresses the area, in this case Al Qaim. For Al Qaim, it provides transcripts for the mayor, representatives of the Albu-Mahal tribe and the Desert Protectors.

Chronology. This link on a chapter's navigational screen leads to a PDF of the chronology of events in the chapter's AO. It also includes events outside the area but that had an effect on the area. For the Al Qaim chronology, for example, the insurgents fleeing Fallujah in 2004 found refuge in areas along the Euphrates to include Al Qaim; hence, the battle for Fallujah is included in Chapter 3's chronology.

Area Map. Figure 3-8 is the map for Chapter 3, Al Qaim. It includes an area map, a date bar, unit icons, and a button to overlay tribal areas. The default setting for the date bar is 11 April 2005, the day of AQI's attack on Camp Gannon. Sliding the bar left or right moves time forward or backward, the result of which is shown on the map. In the case of Al Qaim and Figure 3-8, the date is 27 August 2006.⁵⁴ At that time 3rd Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division (3/7 IAD) was stationed in Al Qaim—the icon for the unit appears on the map. Hovering over the 3/7 IAD icon, sBG Ismael's photo appears. In some cases, the unit icon may bring up the text *Click here for details*. In those cases, clicking on the icon brings up a summary for sBG Ismael and access to his interview transcript. The same thing happens when hovering over the Mayor Al Qaim box or the 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (1/7 Marines) icon.

⁵⁴ Actually, sliding the date bar moves through time too quickly to precisely stop on 27 August. Clicking and holding the pointer to the left or right until the desired unit or organization icon appears will be more effective.




Figure 3-8. Area Map for Chapter 3, Al Qaim

At the bottom right corner of the map is a Tribes button that brings up an overlay of tribal areas on the map. Moving the pointer over the map, the tribe's name that is dominant in that area appear, and, in some cases, a photo of the sheikh appears. For some tribes, [Click for Details](#) comes up which leads to the sheikh's bio summary and subsequently the interview transcript.

Chapters 4–7

Chapters 4 and 5 are structured the same as Chapter 3, though the maps may not be as sophisticated as the one in Chapter 3.⁵⁵ Chapter 6 comprises a Read Ahead for discussion, and Chapter 7 introduces the user to the study's collection, analysis, lessons, and themes.

B. Select Topics

A number of topics surfaced during the course of the study and they are highlighted in this section of the DVD (see Figure 3-9). Two of the topics were developed for discussion,

⁵⁵ The area map for Chapter 3 was created to demonstrate what could be done in the future.

one on culture (Solutions) and the other on the value of The Surge. Four topics are presented in various stages as candidates for additional research.




Figure 3-9. Select Topics Navigation Screen

1. Solutions

In video from a presentation, LtCol Dale Alford discusses a dilemma he faced as Commander, 3/6 Marines: How do the Marines maintain the base outhouses when the Marines and the Iraqi soldiers approach hygiene differently? According to him, the solution is to allow the non-commissioned officers to be creative and develop solutions. In a COIN environment, there are many different situations that require trust and creativity.

2. The Surge

In Senator John McCain’s interview with Katie Couric, CBS on 22 July 2008, he stated, “Colonel MacFarland was contacted by one of the major Sunni sheikhs, because of the surge, we were able to go out, and protect that sheikh and others and it began the Anbar Awakening. I mean, that’s just a matter of history.” Not exactly. In fact, it was sequentially impossible because Sattar’s *Sahawa* proclamation in September of 2006 occurred many months before the president’s surge of forces in 2007. Having said that, the Surge was important, but for different reasons. In this Select Topic, LtGen Allen, COL MacFarland, and others discuss the importance of the surge.

After presenting the newscast, students come to the Fact or Fiction feature and get to vote on whether they think a statement appearing on the screen is fact or fiction, rating their confi-

dence from -5 to +5. The Voting Calculator at the top of the screen allows the teacher to compute a seminar average.⁵⁶

3. Force Requirements

This is another Fact or Fiction topic. The video clip here is of General Shinseki's 25 February 2003 testimony to the Senate when, responding to a question from Senator Levine on the number of forces required to occupy Iraq after a successful invasion, he responded that it might take up to several hundred thousand soldiers. He went on to list all the reasons why it might take a significant force. Within days, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz refuted those numbers, indicating that "several hundred thousand troops were way off the mark." Here, students have an opportunity to look at force requirements for this type of war. Volume I discusses this in a little more detail and Colonel Scott Feil, USA, Retired, provides some additional considerations in a paper that is appended to the topic on the DVD to further the discussion.

4. Lioness Teams

Today they are called Female Engagement Teams or Cultural Support Teams, but during the Awakening they were the Lioness Teams. This section takes the student back to the concept's beginning in Ramadi in 2003, the coining of the moniker, and discusses the background of those teams. It then challenges the researcher to predict how that capability might be provided in the future.

5. Motivation

What was the motivation for the insurgents and the insurgency? Nationalism, former regime elements (who had lost jobs and status), religion, money, criminal activities are all addressed. This section encourages students to explore those reasons as a potential center of gravity for the insurgency.

6. *Al Sahawa*

There are myriad descriptions of the Awakening—how, why, and where it started, the various actors, and its evolution. Since Sheikh Sattar Abu-Risha coined the term *Al Sahawa* this paper started with, and built on his initial characterization as conveyed by Colonel Sean MacFarland and others. However, there are other characterizations with historical value that consider the Awakening's evolution beyond Al Anbar province to the rest of Iraq. The chal-

⁵⁶ After playing the introduction video, the instructor would click the drop down for the input calculator and ask for a show of hands for each of the inputs (-5 to +5). The instructor would then enter the values in the calculator by either pressing the Tab key or by clicking the 0 (zero) and typing in the number of votes for that value. When everyone has voted, the instructor clicks Average and the slider icon will move to indicate the class average vote on the topic. Pressing Reset clears the calculator.

lenge for the researcher is to look at one or a combination of perspectives that most accurately describe the movement and to flesh out those descriptions.

C. Supporting Information

This section of the DVD comprises the Reference Library, Glossary, Chronology, and Publication Information. The reference library is the most important to the student. It contains documents that governed or guided operations, including United Nations Security Council Resolutions, Congressional Resolutions, Coalition Provisional Authority orders, and declassified MNF-I documents such as the Campaign Plans and periodic assessments covering 2004–2007.

Two appendices within this guide were added to enhance the teacher’s situational awareness as he tailors the material to support other learning objectives.

- A – Who’s Who. Name spellings and descriptions of Iraqis who appear in the document. The description includes the person’s position, tribal affiliation, and some background information.
- B – Maps. Maps showing military AO’s, major population centers and adjacent communities within Al Anbar.

Chapter 4 suggests how this material might be used.

4. Education and Training Approach

This chapter offers an approach to using the Awakening DVD. It is just one of many approaches that can be developed depending on the teacher's learning objectives.⁵⁷ The chapter will follow the storyline in Chapter 2 of this document and the more detailed storylines in each of the DVD chapters (found in the Read Ahead feature of each chapter's navigation screen). It will identify a specific Discussion Frame and in some cases a subframe, suggest discussion points, and solicit comments from the students. Although some frames may not have corresponding suggested discussion points, they are mentioned for continuity. Teachers are welcome to play all of the clips and pick their own discussion points depending on the learning outcomes of the course, class or seminar. The ones that follow are simply examples from each of the chapters. There is a description for each frame and subframe in Appendix C.

A number of themes surface in each chapter and perspectives on those themes came from both Iraqis and Coalition members. Those themes include:

- Importance of the area to both the Coalition and AQI;
- Turning or tipping point where the tribe or tribes realized that their interests were better served by siding with the Coalition (rather than AQI);
- Connection of the local resistance to the GOI to establish and reinforce legitimacy of both the developing force and the GOI;
- Movement from a threat-based to a population-based strategy; and
- Connection of an event to the larger Awakening movement.

Look for those themes because they will be discussed at the end as they relate to a suggested teaching venue and relevant learning outcomes.

A. DVD Chapter 3. 2005, Roots of the Awakening, Al Qaim

Al Qaim is strategically important due to its location on the border and along the Euphrates River; a lucrative smuggling route for black market goods; and AQI's lifeline to Baghdad as foreign fighters, money, and other resources that fueled the insurgency infiltrated Iraq. Al Qaim's

⁵⁷ The discussion points and potential responses in Sections A–D of this chapter are *a* way to use the material, not *the* way, nor are they exhaustive for the rest of the story. For example, one could frame the use of the material to refer back to the Research Questions and elicit responses about those. There are many fruitful ways to use the material to understand the Awakening either as a series of events and outcomes and for the implications for doctrine, resources, training, and manning.

sahawa provided one of the first examples of a tribe turning against AQI and subsequently joining the Coalition to fight AQI. This chapter describes Al Qaim's evolution from supporting AQI to working with the Coalition and the GOI against AQI.

1. Lead-in: Attack on Camp Gannon

The lead-in for Chapter 3 highlights AQI's 11 April 2005 attack on Camp Gannon. Colonel Stephen Davis, Commander, Regimental Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) in Iraq from January 2005 to February 2006, narrates this section.

Discussion Point. *What is the importance of the attack as described by Colonel Davis?*

Candidate (i.e., a possible) response. The professionalism, synchronization and impact of the attack, to include the resources committed such as three SVBIEDs, pointed to the handiwork of Zarqawi.

2. Frame 1, Major Frank Diorio

Major Frank Diorio, former commander, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (3/2 Marines) gives a first person account of the 11 April 2005, insurgent attack on Camp Gannon and the complex attack that followed.

3. Frame 2: Colonel Davis

Clicking on Frame 2 of Figure 3-5 leads to a breakdown of Davis' account (see Figure 4-1). A short description of the segment will appear in the center larger frame as the pointer hovers over the subframe. A number of topics lend themselves to discussion: Why is the area important? What is the unit's mission? What is unique about this area? What is the Coalition's relationship with the people (government, security, tribes, religious leaders and other)? What happened in the area? For this frame several potential discussion points were selected.



Figure 4-1. Subframes and Segment Transcripts, DVD Chapter 3

Discussion Point. *What was RCT-2’s mission? In general? Specifically?*

Candidate Response: The mission was counterinsurgency, but specifically, RCT-2 was tasked with ensuring a successful constitutional referendum in October 2005 and National elections in December 2005. Also note that this is consistent with the MNF-I Campaign Plan of August 2004 located in the reference library.

Discussion Point. *Who was the enemy?*

Candidate Response: According to Davis the threat included “tribally based criminal enterprises; nationalist insurgent-former regime guys, Ba’athists, the 1920s Revolutionary Group; and foreign fighters.”

Discussion Point. *What did the increase in force structure from 3,200 to 14,000 provide RCT-2? How significant was this to the overall fight in AO Denver?*

Candidate Response: An opportunity to move from a threat-based (characterized as “whack-a-mole,”) to a population-based strategy (combined permanent, persistent presence). The additional forces along with the change in strategy, was the turning point in Al Qaim.

Additionally, on the right-hand-side of Figure 4-1 there is a button labeled Segment Transcripts. This leads to a PDF of the segment transcripts if someone wants to follow along. In some cases, it provides extra material for context. It also provides the length of the video clip to help teachers decide whether to use part, or all of a clip.



Figure 4-2. Frame 3, Subframe 1 with Sheikh Kurdi

4. Frame 3: Sheikh Kurdi

Frame 3 on Figure 3-5 will access subframes beginning with Sheikh Kurdi of the Albu-Mahal tribe. Sheikh Kurdi talks about the resistance, AQI, and the Albu-Mahal turning on AQI. He then talks about the Albu-Mahal tribe turning on AQI why Al Qaim was so important to AQI.

Discussion Point. *Why did the insurgency develop and expand in Al Qaim?*

Candidate Response: Sheikh Kurdi provides several reasons: American insensitivities to Iraqi traditions and culture, the Iraqi’s right to resist an occupying force, and the view, by some that AQI was the “complete jihad.”

Discussion Point. *Why did the Albu-Mahal tribe turn on AQI?*

Candidate Response: AQI’s severe interpretation of Sharia and their insistence on dominating every part of the tribe’s lives to include security and governance. When the Albu-Mahal resisted AQI attacked and it became a point of survival for the tribe.

Discussion Point. *Why was Al Qaim important to the AQI?*

Candidate Response: Al Qaim was a major border crossing area for AQI in terms of foreign fighters, goods, money, and bomb making material. As Kurdi points out, not just for AQI operations in Al Anbar, but throughout Iraq.

5. **Frame 4: Major Diorio**

At Frame 4 and its subframes, Major Diorio discusses the major battle in Al Qaim between AQI and the Albu-Mahal.

Discussion Point. *According to Major Diorio, what was the turning point in this COIN fight that all counterinsurgents look for?*

Candidate Response: The turning of the people against the insurgents and siding with the Coalition forces.

6. **Frame 5: Dr. Sadun Dulaymi, Iraqi Minister of Defense, Major Muhklis, leader of the Desert Protectors and LtCol Dale Alford, Commander, 3/6 Marines**

Discussion Point. *What were the Desert Protectors and why were they important?*

Candidate Response: The Desert Protectors were the first tribal militia to be vetted and recruited into the Iraqi Security Forces to fight alongside the Coalition against AQI. Gaining the support of the people and linking those security forces legitimately to the HN government is one of the tenets of COIN.

Discussion Point. *According to Major Muhklis, what were the Desert Protectors expected to do?*

Candidate Response: During Operation Steel Curtain they were expected to gather intelligence, fight alongside the Marines, and identify detainees that were insurgents.

Discussion Point. *What was LtCol Alford's #1 priority focus of effort?*

Candidate Response: Training and developing Iraqi Security Forces.

B. **DVD Chapter 4: The Corridor**

The Corridor is located along the Euphrates between Al Qaim and Ramadi. A map of the area is located in Appendix B or in the DVD Chapter 3 map located on the bottom right.

1. **Frame 1: Colonel Farouq, Mayor Hakim and LtCol Cooling**

Discussion Point. *Why is the Corridor, and specifically, the Hadithah area so important?*

Candidate Response: Colonel Farouq calls it the knot because, as a terrain feature it links Syria to Ramadi (or Baghdad) and also links those cities to the north. Mayor Hakim discusses the oil pipeline and dam in the area. Although in disrepair, both have tremendous potential. He also mentions that they need cooperation from Turkey to access the water and fill the dam.

Discussion Point. *LtCol Cooling mentions the Azerbaijani company. Why is that important?*

Candidate Response: It's partnership in the Coalition is extremely important, but it is more significant here because it is the only Coalition partner located in AO Atlanta (the MEF's area of operations) and puts the "M" in MNF-W.

2. Frame 2: LtCol Cooling

Discussion Point. *What did LtCol Cooling mean when he said, "We cleared, abandoned, cleared, abandoned, cleared, held, and built"?*

Candidate Response: Hadithah, and in fact the Corridor, as an economy of forces area, had been plagued with a lack of security forces. When forces were present they normally rotated through quickly. The read ahead for the Corridor provides a table of units rotating through the area. The worst area for short rotations and the lack of troop continuous presence was Hit.

Discussion Point. *What were some of the indicators of the importance of Colonel Shabani and Farouq?*

Candidate Response: LtCol Cooling mentions the number of attacks on each and AQI sending in special teams to kill Farouq. These HN heroes need protection because they are the Iraqi leaders that will defeat the insurgency.

3. Frame 3: LtCol Donnellan

Discussion Point. *LtCol Donnellan mentions "The dramatic difference in the two halves of the deployment....the first few months and the last few months; was pretty much night and day." What seemed to make the difference?*

Candidate Response: He named a number of things: The berming, limited vehicular traffic, an identification system for vehicles and people – all classic population control techniques. Additionally, Mayor Hakim brought governance into the area.

C. DVD Chapter 5, Ramadi

Ready First Combat Team deployed to Ramadi in May/June 2006. This chapter describes events in the Ramadi area during 2006-2007. The RFCT link up with the Albu-Risha tribe was a significant event in turning the tribes in the Ramadi area and Al Anbar.

1. Frame 1: Colonel MacFarland

Colonel MacFarland, Commander, 1st BCT, 1st AD (also known as the Ready First Combat Team – RFCT) discusses moving the brigade to Ramadi, the importance of Ramadi, the approach in taking Ramadi back from the insurgents, and the importance of working with the tribes.

Discussion Point. *Why was Ramadi important?*

Candidate Response: Ramadi was important for several reasons: Capital of Al Anbar, population center, major line of communication into and out of Baghdad.

Discussion Point. *Why did MacFarland say he had to work with the tribes?*

Candidate Response: The tribes were the source for the security forces. He had to work with the tribes to get Iraqi Police recruits.

2. Frame 2: LTC Deane

LTC Deane, commander, Task Force 1-35 Armor, also known as “Task Force Conqueror,” discusses movement of the battalion to Ramadi in May 2006, his area of operations, and his engagements with Sheikh Ahmed Abu-Risha and his brother Sheikh Sattar Ablu-Risha.

Discussion Point. *What did the MiTT Commander, LtCol Stillings mean when he said, “If you give me 10 Soldiers, I will give 300 in return”?*

Candidate Response: He meant that if LTC Deane provided him 10 Soldiers, he could train and advise 300 Iraqi soldiers to support LTC Deane’s operations.

Discussion Point. *What did LTC Deane mean by, “It only forces them to be brave once”?*

Candidate Response: He meant that they needed to immediately send the candidates to training, because if they waited or delayed the process, the potential recruits would not come back for fear of AQI retribution on them and their families.

Discussion Point. *Why was 9 and 14 September 2006 so significant?*

Candidate Response: Sheikh Sattar’s meeting with Colonel MacFarland and his discussion of the manifesto took place on 9 September 2006. Sheikh Sattar announced the *Sahawa* on 14 September with 40 other Ramadi area sheikhs. This was a turning point.

3. Frame 3: Sheikh Ahmed Abu-Risha

Sheikh Ahmed was the lead sheikh of the Abu-Risha tribe after his brother Sattar was assassinated.

Discussion Point. *What was significant about Sheikh Ahmed’s contact with Sheikh Sabah of the Abu-Mahal and Iraqi elites in Amman, Jordan.*

Candidate Response: It reflects the importance and linkage between the various tribes that some have called the “Sheikh Net.”

Discussion Point. *What was the significance of Sheikh Ahmed's comment on the importance of the religious leaders (and his invitation for those leaders to talk to the JAWD team)?*

Candidate Response: This was probably best expressed by COL Charlton (Frame 5) who indicated that AQI started by taking over the mosques and delivering their own messages. It was important to return the mosques back to the resident clerics and monitor the messages to assess the climate.

Discussion Point. At Subframe 3, Colonel MacFarland discusses police substations. What was the significance of developing the police substations?

Candidate Response: He couldn't get police stations built outside of the MOI's master plan. Once he called them substations he could get them built where the sheikhs felt they were most needed. This allowed them to defend their own areas first.

4. Frame 4: LtCol Bill Journey

LtCol Bill Journey commanded 1/6 Marines in Ramadi in 2006/2007. The battalion had one of the most difficult areas in Iraq, the epicenter of the Al Qaeda-proclaimed Caliphate – the heart of Ramadi.

Discussion Point. *What was LtCol Journey's 4-block plan?*

Candidate Response: Each block constituted action for 30 days. Journey provided a plan for the next 120 days for which the first 30 was the most important. As such he immediately moved into the heart of the city – insurgent dominated territory.

Discussion Point. *How did LtCol Journey develop the Iraqi Security Forces in his area?*

Candidate Response: He worked with the Iraqi Army battalion to relocate them from Camp Ramadi into the city. He worked with Governor Mamoun to recruit and vet policeman and construct Joint Security Stations throughout the city to dominate the “physical” and “human” terrain.

Discussion Point. *What was the Information Operation campaign?*

Candidate Response: A clean-up of the city so the residents could physically see improvement but also a “communications” plan to tell the people what was happening in their city to include “terrorist” activity.

5. Frame 5: Colonel Charlton

Colonel John Charlton, commanded the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (3ID), also known as the Raiders, in Ramadi from February 2007 until March 2008.

Discussion Point. *COL Charlton discusses the difference between physical and psychological separation. What is the difference?*

Candidate Response: The physical aspect is clearing the area of insurgents. The psychological aspect is the residents seeing Iraqis clearing the area and knowing that the Iraqis will continue to provide security.

Comment: COL Charlton discusses why building relationships with the religious leaders is so important. This is discussed above in Frame 3 with Sheikh Ahmed.

6. Frame 6: Area Orientation, LTC Ferry and Sheikh Jassim—Battle for Sofia

LTC Ferry, commander TF 1-9, provides background on the events in Sofia. AQI is using Sofia to fire mortars into the Coalition area. Sheikh Jassim pledges to keep AQI out of the Sofia area.

Discussion Point. *Why is LTC Ferry so surprised by the opening events of 24 and 25 November?*

Candidate Response: He had just arrived, was about to conduct operations in the Mulaab area of east Ramadi and received a call from Sheikh Jassim who indicated he and his people would be killed if LTC Ferry did not help.

Discussion Point. *What would you have done?*

Candidate Response: Get responses from participants – in general, there are no wrong answers.

Discussion Point. *What was Sheikh Jassim's relationship with Sheikh Sattar? With Captain Travis Patriquin?*

Candidate Response: Jassim attended the 14 September 2006 proclamation of the Awakening and received help from Sattar. Patriquin, in coordination with Sattar and the RFCT, provided ammunition, weapons and satellite phone minutes to Jassim.

Discussion Point. *What was the significance of the Battle for Sofia?*

Candidate Response: It cleared the sanctuary that fed fighters and resources into both Ramadi and Fallujah.

D. Chapter 6: Fallujah

The battle wasn't over yet. At the start of 2007, Fallujah proper was not *out* of control and was nowhere near the ungoverned insurgent sanctuary it had been in 2004, but it was also not *under* control.

Discussion Point. *Why was Fallujah different than the rest of Al Anbar and what did the Coalition need to do to bring it under control?*

Candidate Response: Fallujah was not influenced by the Awakening as was the rest of Al Anbar—essentially, they were not part of the Dulaymi Confederation and were not influenced by those events, activities or leaders. Additionally, the solution to the insurgency in the Fallujah area and its significant impact on security in Baghdad was much broader than simply controlling entry into, and movement within the city. It depended on controlling its environs: Saqlawiyah, Al Karmah, and Zaidon.⁵⁸ These small towns, suburbs, and rural hamlets resourced and fed the insurgency. The urban areas of Fallujah and Baghdad could not be stabilized until these sources were isolated or eliminated. That finally occurred in 2007 and 2008.

During this period, the Coalition conducted a Ramadi-like “clear, hold and build” operation within the city of Fallujah. In coordination with operations conducted in the surrounding areas, Fallujah was the last area to be stabilized for turning over security responsibilities to the Iraqis in September 2008.⁵⁹

E. How else can this material be used?

The following suggests a way to use the Training and Education Resource material in addition to the “discussion point/candidate response” approach suggested above. Although it will focus on the themes and discussion points of the last section, there is a wealth of material in the DVD’s Reference Library. References include documents from the international level to the strategic/operational so that researchers can review and cite original, and in some cases recently declassified, documents. Additionally, Select Topics offer different perspectives on topics that may not be reflected in the discussion topics listed above or learning outcomes below.

Again, *the following is an example* of a subject with a learning objective and learning outcomes developed from the material in this guide and DVD. This is one, of many ways to use the material.

⁵⁸ There were other critical areas such as Ameriyah-Ferris to the south of Zaidon, but the Awakening project concentrated on the three listed.

⁵⁹ While there seemed to be little tribal connection between Fallujah, and in particular the city, and other Al Anbar communities, there was a Coalition connection. In 2007, LtCol William F. Mullen, Commander, 2/6 Marines adopted a Ramadi-style “clear, hold, build strategy” from 1/6 Marines in Ramadi. In 2006, LtCol Jurney, Commander, 1/6 Marines adopted a “clear, hold, build” strategy from LtCol Dale Alford, 3/6 Marines lessons in Al Qaim in 2005.

Course Title: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency: Al Anbar Awakening

Learning Objective: Each seminar member will comprehend US/DOD Counterinsurgency Doctrine and its applications to US strategic objectives (as it related to the Coalition efforts in Al Anbar, Iraq).⁶⁰

Potential Learning Outcomes that reflect learning expectations are listed below.⁶¹

1. Summarize the root causes of the insurgency to include why the tribes were inclined to side with AQI.
2. Discuss the importance of Al Qaim, the Corridor and Ramadi to both insurgents and the Coalition.
3. Explain the difference between “population-centric” and “threat-centric” approaches; cite examples in the Awakening and the conditions that allowed the Coalition to move from one approach to the other.⁶²
4. Identify the turning or tipping points in each of the three areas to include the similarities and differences.⁶³
5. Discuss the importance of legitimacy as it pertains to the host nation government; cite examples of how that linkage between the people and the government was developed, or not.
6. Recognize the relevant actors in COIN, specifically describe those actors as they relate to Al Qaim, the Corridor or Ramadi.
7. Identify the linkages between the various communities and tribes and the GOI, and events in those areas to the larger Awakening movement.⁶⁴

Note that Learning Outcomes 2 through 6 correspond to the themes listed at the beginning of the chapter.

⁶⁰ The learning objective verb, *comprehend*, is associated with Bloom’s taxonomy; the verbs associated with the learning outcomes such as *discuss*, *recognize* and *explain*, are all associated with *comprehend*. The Application and Analysis levels would be more appropriate for PME courses, but again, these are only examples.

⁶¹ There are seven listed here; more than would normally be associated with a course. The purpose was to provide examples. Depending on the course objective, other ones could be developed for use.

⁶² These terms *population-centric* and *enemy-centric* were derived from JP 3-24 (pp. I-2 and IV-6) and correspond to the threat-based and population-based approaches discussed in the themes.

⁶³ Where the tribe or tribes realized their interests were better served by siding with the Coalition.

⁶⁴ Specifically, identify the connections between the various communities (Al Qaim, Corridor, Ramadi and Jordan) and tribes (Albu-Nimr, Albu-Risha, and the Albu-Mahal) and the GOI, and events to the larger Awakening movement.

Using the video segment descriptions at Appendix C, the teacher can identify those segments that best illustrate and contribute to discussing and understanding the learning outcomes. An example is reflected in Table 4-1.

Rather than using the themes developed during the case study, the Teacher could connect the seminar members to the doctrinal tenets of COIN in Joint Publication 3-24. Those tenets could be listed as 1-6, rephrased into learning outcomes and linked to the relevant segments much in the same way that the case study themes were linked. As an example, one of the tenets is “Secure the population.”⁶⁵ That could be rephrased as “Describe the various means of securing the population in Al Qaim, the Corridor and Ramadi.”

Table 4-1. Example: Select video segments for Al Qaim linked to learning outcomes

Frame	Subframe	Description	Learning Outcome
2. Colonel Steve Davis	4. Davis	General Casey plused us up from 3,200 people to over 14,000, they could now execute a population-centric strategy.	3
3. Sheikh Kurdi	1. Kurdi	Sheikh Kurdi was the “on-the-ground” leader of the Albu-Mahal in Al Qaim. According to him, when the Americans came they were not trained in the traditions and cultures of Iraq. There was a tremendous patriotic resistance in the area.	1
	3. Kurdi	Al Qaim was strategically important to AQI because of its connection to logistics, finance and sanctuary in Syria. This was important to their efforts in Al Anbar, and throughout Iraq.	2
	5. Sheikh Sabah	Sheikh Sabah, Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Mahal discusses the Albu-Mahal turning on AQI and the development of the Desert Protectors.	4, 5, 6
	6. Dr. Sadun Dulaymi, MOD	Sheikh Sabah called Dr. Sa’dun Dulaymi, the Minister of Defense from Amman, Jordan and requested support for his tribe.	5, 7

F. Conclusion

The purpose of this Training and Education Resource—User Guide with accompanying DVD—is to give teachers material to discuss various aspects of the Awakening, from its inception in 2004 until the Coalition transferred responsibility for the security of the province to the government in 2008.

There are a multitude of other studies on the Awakening and a number of competing hypotheses on its beginnings and evolution, some of which disagree with the analysis and conclusions in this paper. The material provided in this Training and Education Resource provides users an opportunity to explore other perspectives, expand the research, conduct their own analysis and develop their own conclusions.

⁶⁵ Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 11 November 2013, III-11.

Appendix A. Who's Who

Interviewees

- Abd al-Hakim Muhammad Rashid Muhammad al-Jughayfi**, Mayor of Hadithah
- Abdul Qadir Mohammed Jassim Obeidi al-Mifarji**, General, Minister of Defense from 2006 to present, preceded by Dr. Sadun al-Dulaymi, Sunni Arab, born in Ramadi
- Abdullah Jallal Mukhlif al-Faraji**, Head of Sunni Endowment for Anbar Province, Regent Sheikh of the Albu-Faraj tribe; Ramadi City Council Member
- Adel**, Brigadier General, Commander 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division
- Ahmad Jelayan Khalaf**, former Desert Protector
- Ahmed Bezia Fteikhan al-Rishawi**, Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Risha tribe, President of Mutamar Sahawat al-Iraq (MSI)
- Ahmed Hamid Sharqi**, Colonel, Chief, North Ramadi Police Precinct
- Aum Ahmed**, resident of Al Qaim
- Babakir Badr-khan Shawat al-Zubari**, General, Chief of Staff for the Joint Forces Command, Studied at the Iraqi Military Academy in Baghdad in 1969, served in the Kurdish Peshmerga 1973–91; Escaped to Iran as a political refugee in 1975; Acting Commanding General of Iraqi Joint Headquarters, 2004–05; Chief of Staff, Iraqi Joint Headquarters, 2005 to present
- Bakhit Arak Ali**, Lieutenant Colonel, Commander, Qatana Police Station, Ramadi
- Bezi Mujjil Nijris al-Gaoud al-Nimrawi**, eldest Sheikh of the Albu-Nimr tribe; one of the first tribal leaders to offer to arm tribesmen and support Coalition (Summer 2003); turned down by CPA over concerns of creating tribal militias; lives in Amman, Jordan
- Farouq Tareh Harden al-Jughayfi**, Colonel, Police Chief Hadithah
- Hareth al-Dhari**, (Dr.) Leader of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and Zobai tribe
- Ibrahim al-Jaafari**, former Iraqi Prime Minister, April 2005 to May 2006
- Ismael Sha Hamid Dulaymi**, staff Brigadier General Former Commander 28th Iraqi Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division
- Jalal al-Gaoud**, Iraqi Businessman from Hit, residing in Jordan
- Jassim Muhammad Salih al-Suwaydawi**, sheikh of the Albu-Souda tribe
- Kurdi Rafee Farhan Al-Mahalawi**, lower tier sheikh of Albu-Mahal tribe
- Mahmood al-Janabi**, a leader with the Jaish al-Islami (Islamic Army) insurgent group
- Majed Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman**, Sheikh of the Dulaymi Confederation
- Mamoun Sami Rashid Latif al-Alwani**, former Governor of Anbar; Anbar Provincial Council Member; Chairman of the Provincial Council's Economic Committee
- Mishan Abbas Muhammad al-Jumayli**, Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Jumayli tribe

Mohammed Al-Saady, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister and Chairman of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation. Recently elected to the new Parliament.

Mukhlis Shadhan Ibrahim al-Mahalawi, Desert Protectors commander

Nathem al-Jabouri, former member of AQI

Numan al-Gaoud, businessman and member of the Albu-Nimr tribe in Hit

Raad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani, Lieutenant General, Retired Republican Guard Commander; Leader of the FRE Movement to Reintegrate with GOI

Raja Farhan, mayor of Al Qaim

Sa'fa Al-Sheikh, National Security Advisor

Sa'id al-Jughayfi, Sheikh of the Jughayfi tribe in Hadithah

Sabah al-Sattam Effan Fahrhan al-Shurji al-Aziz, principal Sheik of the Albu-Mahal tribe in Al Qaim

Sadun Juwayr Farhan al-Rishawi al-Dulaymi, Doctor, Former Minister of Defense 2005/ 2006, Doctorate in Social Psychology from United Kingdom's Keele University

Said Flayyah Othman al-Jughayfi, contesting Sheikh, Albu-Jughayfi, one of the top 17 influential tribes in Anbar, Hadithah

Sha'ban Barzan Himrin, Colonel, former Chief of Police in Baghdadi

Sheikh Ali Hatim Abd al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulayman al-Assafi al-Dulaymi, President of the Common Council of Iraqi and Arab Sheikhs, Lineal Sheikh-in-waiting of the Albu-Assaf tribe, Founder of the Iraqi National Front

Tariq al-Abdullah al-Halbusi, Principle Sheik of the Halbusi tribe located in Fallujah

Thamer Kadhem al Tamimi, closely associated with JAI; one of the first and premier Sahawa leaders in Baghdad

Thamir Ibrahim Tahir al-Assafi, Doctor, Head of the Muslim Ulema Council (MUC) for Anbar and Senior Theologian to Sunni Waqf; Ramadi City Council member; Al-Anbar University (AAU) Professor of Religious Studies; Mutammar Sahawat al-Iraq (MSI) office of Religious Affairs

Thary Abed Alhadi al-Yousef al-Zobi, Deputy Governor, on the Awakening

Other Notable People

Abdul Sattar Albu-Risha, Leader of the Awakening movement in the Al Anbar Area, assassinated 13 September 2007

Abdullah al-Janabi, close supporter, organizer, and religious advisor to many of the insurgent groups growing in and around Fallujah during the summer of 2003; became one of the key influential insurgent leaders during both battles of Fallujah (2004)

Abu Ayyub al-Masri, replaced Zarqawi as leader of AQI following the former's death in June 2006; created Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Jordanian-born founder of *Jama'at Al-Tawhid Wa'al Jihad* (JTJ – Group of Monotheism and Holy War) (2003) and later Al-Qaeda in Iraq (October 2004); killed in Coalition airstrike in June 2006

Amer Abd al-Jabbar Ali Sulayman al-Assafi al-Dulaymi, Co-Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Assaf tribe and Co-Sheikh General of the Dulaymi Confederation

Faisal al-Gaoud, former Sheikh of Albu-Nimr; father of Sheikh Fasal

Fasal Rakan Nejris, Sheikh of Albu-Nimr tribe; appointed governor of Anbar by IIG November 2004; replaced as governor by Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi (May 2005); Awakening Council leader; died 25 June 2007 in Mansour Hotel bombing

Hamid Farhan al-Heiss, from the Albu-Thiyab tribe; member of the Anbar Salvation Council; don't confuse him with his brother, Sheikh Muhammad Farhan al-Heiss and contesting lineal sheikh of the Albu-Thiyab tribe

Hatim Razzaq, current Sheikh of Albu-Nimr

Hikmat Jubayir, mayor of Hit; Sheikh of Albu-Nimr tribe

Karim Burjis al-Rawi, former governor of Anbar Province (April 2003–August 2004); forced to resign after his sons were kidnapped; replaced by Mohammad Awad

Khalid al Irak al-Jassim, leader of the Albu-Ali Jassim tribe, killed by AQI

Khalid Araq Ataymi al-Iliyawi, well respected Ali Jassim tribal leader brutally murdered by AQI (August 2006); his body was hidden preventing burial for three days, violating both tribal and Islamic custom; catalyst for tribal resistance to AQI in the Ramadi area

Lawrence Mutib Mahruth al-Hathal al-Aniza, Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Aniza tribe, Mayor of Nukhayb, Anbar, Iraq

Mudhir Abdul Karim Thiab al-Kharbit, son of Sheikh Malik; assumed leadership of clan upon his father's death; Ba'athist supporter and strongly anti-Coalition following his father's death

Muhammad Mahmoud Latif, leader of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and Ramadi Shura council

Muqtada al-Sadr, Shia cleric and leader of the Mahdi Militia

Naim Abd al-Muhsin al-Gaoud, appointed by Coalition forces as first mayor of Hit (April 2004)

Nayil al-Jughayfi, seized control of Hadithah during initial invasion; subsequently recognized by Coalition as first mayor (April 2004)

Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi, appointed governor of Anbar by newly-elected provincial council (May 2005); kidnapped by extremist elements to influence Albu-Mahal to stop fighting AQI; found dead in a home after Coalition-insurgent fighting in the area; replaced by Mamoun Sami Rasheed

Razak Salim Hamza, former commander 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division

Sheikh Malik al-Kharbit, tribal leader of the Khalifawi (Ramadi area); head of one of the most important families in the powerful Dulaymi tribal federation; cooperated with Coalition forces before the invasion; tragically killed along with between 17 and 22 family members, including women and children during mistaken Coalition airstrike on his compound (11 April 2004); cited as motivating factor turning Ramadi-area tribes against Coalition


Talal al-Gaoud, son of Bezi al-Gaoud; worked with Marines engagements in Jordan in 2004; died suddenly in 2006

Tariq Abdul Wahab Jasim, former Commander Iraqi First Division

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
Appendix B. Maps

Note: North is towards the top of all maps as you read them.



Base map courtesy of National Geospatial Agency

Figure B-1. Map of Iraq and its neighbors



Area of Operation boundaries extracted from map courtesy of I-MEF and USMC History Division

Figure B-2. Map of military operational areas in Iraq during 2004




Figure B-3. Phases of the Al Anbar Awakening




Figure B-4. Map of Al Qaim area




Figure B-5. Map of Hadithah area




Figure B-6. Map of Al Asad/Hit area




Figure B-7. Map of Ramadi area




Image courtesy of 1st MARDIV

Figure B-8. Map of Fallujah and surrounding cities

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Appendix C. Segment Guide for Discussion Points

This guide is a reference to all the chapter segments used for discussion points. For example, if the teacher is using the material to support a case study on COIN, then missions, population support, insurgent activity would be important topics. The teacher could find those activities or events in the following tables and mark them. This is discussed more in Chapter 4 of this Guide. The following covers chapters 3 through 5 on the DVD.

Chapter 3. Al Qaim		
Frame	Sub-frame	Description
1. Major Diorio		Major Diorio, former commander, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (3/2 Marines) gives a first person account of the 11 April 2005, insurgent attack on Camp Gannon and the complex attack that followed.
	1. Diorio	Major Diorio, former commander, India Company, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines (3/2 Marines) gives a first person account of the 11 April 2005, insurgent attack on Camp Gannon and the complex attack that followed.
	2. Diorio	Continued
	3. Diorio	Continued
2. Colonel Steve Davis		Colonel Steve Davis, Commander, RCT-2, discusses his area of operations, AO Denver, (30,000 square miles from Hit west to the Jordanian and Syrian Border), and the mission (COIN). Additionally, half-way through the tour, the RCT received additional forces in order to conduct combined, permanent, persistent presence.
	1. Davis	The Euphrates is a Highway; it's been a highway for four thousand years....
	2. Davis	Mission: Conduct COIN operations to disrupt and interdict...
	3. Davis	The little RCT with a division mission and a MEF battle space.
	4. Davis	General Casey plused us up from 3,200 people to over 14,000....
3. Sheikh Kurdi		The Albu-Mahal tribe turned on AQI and forced them from the city-center in Husaybah. Tribal leaders (Sheikh Kurdi, Sheikh Sabah, Major Mukhlis) and Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, Minister of Defense, discuss the development of the Hamza battalion, initially organized to fight the Americans and later to fight AQI. Eventually, in August 2005, AQI turns on the tribe with a vengeance and drives them from Husaybah.

	1. Kurdi	Sheikh Kurdi was the “on-the-ground” leader of the Albu-Mahal in Al Qaim. According to him, when the Americans came they were not trained in the traditions and cultures of Iraq. There was a tremendous patriotic resistance in the area.
	2. Kurdi	When Al Qaeda arrived they were considered to be “the complete Jihad.” However, in 2004 they started to treat the people badly. When the tribes attempted to set up their own security, AQI rejected their efforts and beheaded the police chief. The Albu-Mahal then turned against AQI.
	3. Kurdi	Al Qaim was strategically important to AQI because of its connection to logistics, finance and sanctuary in Syria. This was not only important to their efforts in Al Anbar, but throughout Iraq.
	4. Kurdi	The Hamza battalion was initially formed to fight the Americans but later turned on AQI.
	5. Sheikh Sabah	Sheikh Sabah, Paramount Sheikh of the Albu-Mahal discusses the Albu-Mahal turning on AQI and the development of the Desert Protectors.
	6. Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, MOD	Sheikh Sabah called Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, the Minister of Defense from Amman, Jordan and requested support for his tribe.
4. Major Diorio		Major Diorio, former Commander, India Company, 3 rd Battalion, 2 nd Marines provides his account of AQI’s attack on the Albu-Mahal tribe on or about 26 August 2005, and the Marines support and evacuation of tribal members to Akashat. This was essentially the tipping point of the tribe seeking help from the Coalition and subsequently the development of the Desert Protectors in Al Qaim.
	1. Diorio	AQI turns on the Albu-Mahal tribe with a vengeance. The Coalition has just taken out the palace (AQI’s gathering place) and they were now moving into the yellow hotel in Husaybah. But AQI was persistent in attacking the Albu-Mahal. Tribesmen and their families were fleeing the city. A number of which turned to the Marines for refuge.
	2. Diorio	The Marines defend the Albu-Mahal and evacuate tribesmen and their families to Akashat.
	3. Diorio	There was a realization that this was the tipping point that all counterinsurgency operations need – a Sunni tribe that had sided with the Coalition.
5. Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, MOD		The Albu-Mahal tribe fled to the Akashat area south of Al Qaim. Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, the Minister of Defense in 2005, worked with General Casey, Commander, MNF-I and LTG Petraeus, Commander, MNSTC-I and the Prime Minister, Al Jaafari to establish the Desert protectors. They were first employed in Operation Steel Curtain in November 2005.

	1. Sa'dun	Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, the Minister of Defense in 2005, called the "Father of the Desert Protectors," discusses the beginning of the Desert Protector Program.
	2. LtCol Alford	LtCol Dale Alford, Commander, 3 rd Battalion, 6 th Marines (3/6 Marines) describes the conditions when he arrived in Al Qaim on September 2005.
	3. Alford	LtCol Alford summarizes Operation Iron Fist, 1-7 October 2005 as the battalion attacked from west to east into Karabilah.
	4. Alford	LtCol Alford describes Operation Steel Curtain, a regimental size operation that took back Al Qaim from AQI.
	5. Major Mukhlis	Major Mukhlis led 89 Abu-Mahal Desert Protectors during Operation Steel Curtain. He describes three stages of the operation: intelligence gathering, fighting along side the Marines, identifying detainees.
	6. Alford	LtCol Alford describes 3/6 Focus of Effort.
Chapter 4. The Corridor		
Frame	Sub-frame	Description
1. Colonel Farouq		Hadithah was important because of its location, the dam and oil. Called the "Knot" by Iraqis it was strategically located for access to Syria, Baghdad, Salah ad-Din and Ninawa; the dam, when operational, provided electricity and water to the region; and K3 Pumping Station was integral to moving oil in Iraq and to Syria.
	1. Farouq	The Knot: Hadithah was a very strategic location. It was between Salah ad-Din, Ninawa, and the Syrian borders, so it was what we called a "knot."
	2. Mayor Hakim	The Capital: Hadithah.... it's like the capital of the west side, the western region. It's like the communication point between the east and north.
	3. LtCol Cooling	The Dam in Hadithah was important and the unit from Azerbaijan was assigned the mission of securing the dam.
2. LtCol Cooling, Commander, 3/3 Marines		"Clear, abandon, clear, abandon, clear, hold, and build": The Corridor was an economy of force area; units assigned never seemed to have enough resources to truly conduct counterinsurgency operations. Fortunately a number of Iraqis stepped forward.
	1. Cooling	Conditions in Hadithah when 3 rd Battalion, 3 rd Marines arrived in March 2006.
	2. Cooling	We cleared, abandoned, cleared, abandoned, cleared, held, and built.
	3. Cooling	The reason why Baghdadi became important is because of a guy named Colonel Shaban.
	4. Cooling	Colonel Farouq was so good that Al Qaeda in Iraq sent special teams to kill him and his police force.

3. Colonel Farouq, Police Chief, Hadithah		Colonel Farouq grew up in Haqlaniyah. He escaped in 2004 when targeted by Al Qaeda in Iraq but returned in 2006 as the police chief for Hadithah.
	1. Farouq	I grew up in Haqlaniyah with my family...On 7 November 2004, these terrorists blew up the main city centers and the IP station in Hadithah.
	2. Farouq	I thought there would be a celebration when I returned...
	3. Farouq	The ice-breaker....
	4. Farouq	Joining forces with Colonel Shaban.
4. LtCol Donnellan, Commander, 2/3 Marines		2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines deployed to Hadithah Triad area from September 2006 to April 2007. "The dramatic difference in the two halves of the deployment....the first few months and the last few months; was pretty much night and day."
	1. Donnellan	2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines (2/3) deployed to Hadithah from September 2006 to April 2007.
	2. Donnellan	Rebuilding bridges and berming the city.
	3. Mayor Hakim	A new mayor in town.
	4. Hakim	Local governance and an opportunity to see the turning point.
Chapter 5. Ramadi		
1. Colonel MacFarland, Commander, RFCT		Ready First Combat Team deploys to Ramadi: Colonel MacFarland discusses the 1st BCT, 1st AD (also known as the Ready First Combat Team – RFCT) movement to Ramadi, the importance of Ramadi, and his approach in taking Ramadi back from the insurgents.
	1. MacFarland	Ramadi was important for several reasons: Capital of Al Anbar, population center, major line of communication into Baghdad....
	2. MacFarland	The approach: Isolate the city, take one neighborhood at a time, move essentially from west to east, and develop Iraqi Security Forces.
	3. MacFarland	We knew that we had to work with the tribes to get Iraqi Police recruits, and Tony found a surprisingly willing partner in Sheikh Sattar.
2. LTC Deane		Task Force Conqueror, Building Capacity: LTC Deane discusses the movement of Task Force 1-35 Armor, also known as "Task Force Conqueror," to Ramadi in May 2006, his area of operations, and his engagements with Sheikh Ahmed Albu-Risha and his brother Sheikh Sattar Albu-Risha.
	1. Deane	LTC Deane discusses the movement of Task Force 1-35 Armor, also known as "Task Force Conqueror," to Ramadi in May 2006.
	2. Deane	LtCol Kris Stillings from the Military Transition Team (MiTT) approached LTC Deane with a deal, "Hey, if you give me ten guys, I can give you 300."
	3. Deane	"It only forces them to be brave once." They changed the location of the recruitment drive from the Glass Factory to the Albu-Risha Compound and shipped the recruits out the same day they were recruited.

	4. Deane	The first recruitment drive under this new process was held on the 4 th of July 2006 at the Albu-Risha compound.
	5. Deane	On 5 September 2006 Sheikh Sattar convened a meeting with other Ramadi sheikhs and presented the 11-point plan to LTC Deane.
	6. MacFarland	On 9 September 2006 Sheikh Sattar convened a meeting with other Ramadi sheikhs and presented the 11-point plan to COL MacFarland.
3. Sheikh Ahmed Albu-Risha		Sheikh Ahmed discusses recruitment, going to Amman for approval of the Awakening, enlisting the support of the religious leaders, and supporting the Albu-Mahal tribe in 2005. COL MacFarland discusses Police substations.
	1. Ahmed	Sheikh Ahmed discusses recruitment at the Albu-Risha Compound
	2. Ahmed	Sheikh Ahmed travelled to Amman, Jordan to gain approval from the Iraqi elites.
	3. MacFarland	COL MacFarland discusses the significance of the Police substations.
	4. Ahmed	Sheikh Ahmed discusses the importance of including the religious leaders in the Awakening movement.
	5. Ahmed	Sheikh Ahmed discusses the Albu-Risha support to the Albu-Mahal in Al Qaim in 2005.
4. LtCol Bill Jurney, Commander, 1/6 Marines		The battalion had one of the most difficult areas in Iraq, the epicenter of the Al Qaeda-proclaimed Caliphate – the heart of Ramadi.
	1. Jurney	Colonel Jurney discusses his 4-Block plan; each block designed to cover 30 days of the deployment.
	2. Jurney	The Iraqi Security Forces were a critical partner in this fight and Military Transition enabled that capability.
	3. Jurney	“We needed to move the violence away from the Government Center....” So they seized a building in the heart of the insurgent controlled area for use as a police station.
	4. Jurney	The Governor identified and vetted 120 police candidates from his tribe to include the police chief, LtCol Salam, “an amazing guy...still renowned as a hero.”
	5. Jurney	The Voice of Ramadi
	6. LtCol Ahmed, Police Chief, Ramadi	The opening of the first IP station in Warar and the rumors of the “Axe” or “Hatchet Man.”
5. Colonel Charlton, Commander, Raiders		Colonel John Charlton, commanded the 1 st Brigade Combat Team (1 st BCT), 3 rd Infantry Division (3ID), also known as the Raiders, in Ramadi from February 2007 until March 2008.

	1. Charlton	The 1 st BCT, 3 rd ID, also known as the Raiders immediately conducted clear and hold operations in Ramadi.
	2. Charlton	COL Charlton discusses the difference between physical and psychological separation and Operation Murfreesboro.
	3. Charlton	1 st Battalion, 6 th Marines conducted Operation Okinawa in their sector as part of the brigade operation.
	4. Charlton	Operation Call to Freedom was conducted from 17 to 30 March. This was the third and final operation to clear Ramadi.
	5. Charlton	Sheikh Sattar supported the recruiting drive for the Iraqi Army, and brought in a thousand candidates. the first day – more than could be handled.
	6. Charlton	COL Charlton discusses why building relationships with the religious leaders is so important .
6. Area Orientation: Sofia		The Battle for Sofia was conducted in the Shark Fin area located to the east of Ramadi.
	1. Narrator	As an area orientation, 1-9 Infantry Battalion was located at Camp Corregidor. To the east of Ramadi was Sofia and Julaybah located on the first and second shark fins.
	2. Sheikh Jassim	Sheikh Jassim is a member of the Albu-Souda tribe primarily located in Sofia. He discusses meeting with, and joining Sheik Sattar.
	3. LTC Ferry	LTC Ferry, commander TF 1-9, provides background on the events in Sofia. AQI is using Sofia to fire mortars into the Coalition area. Sheikh Jassim pledges to keep AQI out of the Sofia area.
	4. Jassim	Sheikh Jassim sets up checkpoints starting 28 September. He has a discussion with the Coalition on building a police station in Sofia.
	5. Ferry	TF 1-9 prepares for operations in the Mula'ab area of east Ramadi and starts hearing of this fire fight in the Sofia area to the east of Corregidor.
	6. Jassim	Sheikh Jassim describes the initial events of 25 November when his tribe was attacked by the insurgents.
	7. Ferry	LTC Ferry receives a call for help from Sheikh Jassim.
7. LTC Ferry		TF 1-9 supports Sheikh Jassim and the Albu-Souda tribe.
	1. Ferry	LTC Ferry decides to support Sheikh Jassim.
	2. Ferry	LTC Ferry describes his movement from camp Corregidor into the Sofia area.
	3. Ferry	LTC Ferry finally links up with Sheikh Jassim just about as Jassim is ready to abandon Sofia and cross the Euphrates to the north.
	4. Ferry	LTC Ferry describes meeting Sheikh Jassim and his actions to gain control of the area.
	5. Jassim	Sheikh Jassim describes the insurgent actions: mortar attack and then a ground attack. They have killed members of his family.
	6. Ferry	Coalition and Sheikh Jassim's forces secure the area and make plans to take down insurgent locations in Sofia.
	7. Jassim	Sheikh Jassim describes combined operations with the Coalition after they secure the northern part of the Shark Fin.

Select Topics		
Awakening Perspectives	LtGen Allen	There are three awakenings: one with a capital "A" and two others with lower case "a".
	Prime Minister Jaafari	The Awakening had its benefits and was successful in Al Anbar, but was not helpful in other areas of the country where AQI was not operating. It became a social program.
	Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi, MOD	Dr. Sa'dun Dulaymi was the Minister of Defense under PM Jaafari and is known as the Father of the Desert Protectors because he developed the program in coordination with the Coalition and the Albu-Mahal tribe.
	BrigGen Reist	BrigGen Reist coined the term "Commercial Battlespace" and saw the Awakening as a movement along the Euphrates from west to east. He acknowledges Colonel Shabani as one of the awakening leaders in the Baghdadi area near Al Asad.
	Sheik Kurdi, Albu-Mahal	Sheikh Kurdi was the on-the-ground sheikh for the Albu-Mahal tribe as Sheik Sabah fled to Jordan.
	LTG Ra'ad Hamdani	LTG Hamdani was the 2nd Iraqi Corps Commander during OIF. He finds the term "Awakening" to be an insult to the Iraqi people.
	Mayor Hakim, Hadithah	Mayor Hakim discusses why the Hadithah awakening was different than the Ramadi awakening.
	Sheikh Majed, Dulaymi Confed	Sheikh Majed describes the Awakening as the revolution of tribes.
Lioness	1. COL Brinkley	Colonel Brinkley commanded the 1 st Engineer Battalion (1 EN) in Ramadi from August 2003 to September 2004 under the 1 st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 1 st Infantry Division (1 BCT, 1 IN DIV). In this audio clip, Colonel Brinkley provides the background on the Engineer Battalion and the number of female medics he had available.
	2. Brinkley	Colonel Brinkley discusses a number of potentially tense situations during cordon and searches and at traffic control points and then addresses the benefits of having the Lioness Teams.
	3. COL Cabrey	Colonel Richard Cabrey commanded 1st Battalion, 5 Field Artillery (1-5 FA), as part of the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in Ramadi from September 2003 to September 2004. In this audio clip, Colonel Cabrey discusses the development and use of the Lioness Teams.
	4. Brinkley	In this audio clip, Colonel Brinkley provides the background on the name "Lioness" and the minimum of two female Soldiers per team.
	5. Brinkley	Colonel Brinkley discusses the training of the Lioness teams

	6. CPT Cooper	CPT Cooper was a member of the Legal Section, 1st BCT, 1st AD, in Iraq from January 2006 until February 2007. In June 2006, as a result of a request from one of the battalion commanders for US female Soldiers to support an operation, CPT Cooper developed, organized and trained the Lioness Platoon.
	7. CPT Cooper	During the period CPT Cooper led the teams, the number of requests increased from combat units that started to understand and use the team's capabilities.
	8. CPT Cooper	Captain Cooper discusses integrating with other Iraqi women groups in addition to supporting combat operations.
	9. CPT Cooper	Being an asset is being able to do what their male counterparts are expected to do.

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Appendix F. Abbreviations

AO	Area of Operation
AQI	Al Qaeda in Iraq
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
BrigGen	Brigadier General–US Marine Corps
BG	Brigadier General–US Army
COIN	counterinsurgency
COL	Colonel, US Army
Col	Colonel, US Marine Corps or US Air Force
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
FOB	Forward Operating Base
GEN	General, US Army
Gen	General, US Marine Corps or US Air Force
GOI	Government of Iraq
IAD	Iraqi Army Division
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
LtGen	Lieutenant General, US Marine Corps
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel, US Army
LT Col	Lieutenant Colonel, US Air Force
LtCol	Lieutenant Colonel, US Marine Corps
LTG	Lieutenant General, US Army
MAJ	Major, US Army
Maj	Major, US Marine Corps or US Air Force
MajGen	Major General, US Marine Corps
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps–Iraq
MND	Multi-National Division
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces–Iraq
MNF-W	Multi-National Forces–West
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq
ODA	Operational Detachment Alpha
PME	Professional Military Education
PRQ	Primary Research Questions
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RFCT	Ready First Combat Team
ROE	rules of engagement
SFODA	Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha
SIGACT	Significant Activity Report
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRQ	Secondary Research Questions
WERV	Western Euphrates River Valley

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