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THE FORGOTTEN SERVICE:
DETERMINING THE US ARMY'S ROLE IN SHAPING AMERICAN
STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

BY
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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



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


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ABSTRACT

The Asia-Pacific region is rapidly emerging as a major focus of American interest. Since America's acknowledgement of Asia's importance in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States has sought means and developed methods with which to enhance engagement in the region. Regional organizations, dialogues, and diplomacy are among the methods the US employs. The role of American armed forces in the region is to support these important activities.

As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, current strategies focus on the contributions of air and sea-based capabilities articulated in the Air-Sea Battle concept. But while America looks toward the Pacific and sees a vast area of ocean and air, Asian nations view themselves regionally and primarily as land-based powers. This is particularly important because over half the world's population lives on the Asian continent. Given the cultures of Asian nations and America's military history in the Asia-Pacific region, we should not neglect the potential contributions of the US Army to Asian-Pacific strategy. It is also important for the Army to think seriously and critically about how it can best contribute to furthering America's strategic interests in the region.

This study comprises an analysis of the US Army's history in Asia and the Pacific along with current American and Asian actors' contemporary security interests in effort to determine what role the US Army should play in shaping American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. Taking into account threats to regional stability in the region, the 21st century requirements for America's army in the region should include four primary and four auxiliary missions. The four primary missions are deterring war and enhancing regional stability, preparing for war, foreign military assistance, and counterterrorism. The four auxiliary missions are helping inculcate American values, responding to humanitarian and natural crises, securing and eliminating WMD, and establishing military governance. The study then concludes by recommending specific steps the Army must take to enhance its capabilities in areas where those capabilities do not fully meet these above requirements.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. The paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. When this is done, and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it.

Julian S. Corbett

It may seem as though the Asia-Pacific region has suddenly grabbed the attention of American policy makers, particularly after a decade-long period of war in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. The truth, however, is that the region has always played a significant part in global affairs. Today the region is both economically and militarily formidable and demands the attention of world powers. According to former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, speaking to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2012, “In this century, the 21st century, the United States recognizes that our prosperity and our security depends even more on the Asia-Pacific region. After all, this region is home to some of the world’s fastest growing economies: China, India, and Indonesia to mention a few. At the same time, Asia-Pacific contains the world’s largest populations, and the world’s largest militaries. Defense spending in Asia is projected by this institute, the

IISS, to surpass that of Europe this year, and there is no doubt that it will continue to increase in the future.”¹

Given these developments, the Asia-Pacific region is rapidly emerging as a major focus of American interest. Since America’s acknowledgement of Asia’s importance in the 2010 National Security Strategy, the United States has sought means and developed methods with which to enhance engagement in the region. Regional organizations, dialogues, and diplomacy are among the methods the US employs. The role of American armed forces in the region is to support these important activities. As Panetta observed, the United States ascribes to a set of rules that include “the principle of open and free commerce, a just international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of all nations and a fidelity to the rule of law; open access by all to their shared domains of sea, air, space, and cyberspace; and resolving disputes without coercion or the use of force...Backing these principles has been the essential mission of the United States military in the Asia-Pacific for more than 60 years and it will be even a more importance mission in the future.”² Thus, American military involvement will be incorporated in the nation’s new strategic vision for the region, and it is imperative that the nation obtains all it can from each of its armed services.

As the United States rebalances to the Asia-Pacific region, current strategies focus on the contributions of air and sea-based capabilities articulated in the Air-Sea Battle concept. But while America looks toward the Pacific and sees a vast area of ocean and air, Asian nations view themselves regionally and primarily as land-based powers. This is particularly important because over half the world’s population lives on the Asian continent. Given the cultures of Asian nations and America’s military history in the Asia-Pacific theater, we should not neglect the

¹ Leon E. Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Sangri-La Dialogue in Singapore,” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5049>.

² Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary Panetta at the Sangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.”

potential contributions of the US Army to Asian-Pacific strategy. It is also important for the Army to think seriously and critically about how it can best contribute to furthering America's strategic interests in the region.

The Insufficiency of the Air-Sea Battle Concept

The emerging Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept centers primarily on the issue of access, specifically addressing how to counter China's growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Cognizant of burgeoning military technologies and the ability for near-peer competitors to exploit them, the United States finds itself in a position in which it must ensure its ability to maintain and strengthen its influence in a region possessing growing global stature and importance. According to a 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) paper, the United States has a clear strategic choice, either "to risk a loss of military access to areas vital to its security – and those of key allies and partners to whom it is committed by treaty or law – or to explore options that can preserve the stable military balance that has seen the region enjoy a period of unparalleled peace and prosperity."³ For the near future, ASB is the US armed services' answer to addressing A2/AD challenges.

The manner in which ASB will tackle the problem of access involves the concerted application of technology and military systems. According to the DOD's Air-Sea Battle Office, "The ASB Concept's solution to the A2/AD challenge in the global commons is to develop networked, integrated forces capable of attack-in-depth to disrupt, destroy and defeat adversary forces (NIA/D3). ASB's vision of networked, integrated, and attack-in-depth (NIA) operations requires the application of cross-domain operations across all the interdependent warfighting domains (air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace, to disrupt, destroy

³ Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), x.

and defeat (D3) A2/AD capabilities and provide maximum operational advantage to friendly joint and coalition forces.”⁴

Although ASB may effectively address A2/AD challenges, political and military leaders must not limit America’s strategic and security interests to the issue of access as it marginalizes the role of land forces. Such a narrow perspective can lead to the neglect of other important security needs of the Asia-Pacific region. In 2009, with the Asia-Pacific in mind, Defense Secretary Robert Gates requested the Navy and Air Force to develop a concept to address the access challenges present in the region.⁵ While the omission of the land domain may not have been intentional at the time and the Army has since been included in ASB planning, the concept’s name is declarative. In short, the Air-Sea Battle concept is furthering America’s strategic interests in the Pacific, but it is not sufficient.

The Fallacies of Single Perspectives and Domain Neglect

Americans tend to look at the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of the country’s west coast. From there, America looks outward and sees a large expanse of ocean and air. Looking at a map bolsters this perspective, as the color blue dominates the area. Adding to this conception, this ocean-air perspective seems to end where land borders appear, thereby failing to acknowledge the existence of the land at the other side. This is unfortunate because people live on land. It is upon the land in which Asian strategies originate. It is in the human domain that human interaction and engagement exist. The sea and the air are important primarily to the extent that they influence life on land. While sea and air forces must have a significant role in America’s new strategic vision, political and military leaders cannot afford to neglect the

⁴ Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013), 4.

⁵ Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges, 1.

role of land forces in a region in which armies possess the greatest military influence over national affairs.⁶ Humans dominate land and require other humans to interact with them effectively.

Asian states have a history of their forces playing an influential role in domestic and international politics, an aspect that continues today. Throughout the region, the armed forces are crucial actors in not only domestic and international affairs, but also in state and nation building, political domination, maintaining order, and ensuring international security.⁷ Acknowledging the importance of landpower in a region with a history of invasions, colonization, and border disputes, these military institutions tend to place great importance on their armies because they are seen as the ultimate form of retaining domestic control and power players in joint operations.⁸

Two perceptive theorists, Sir Julian Corbett and Sir John Slessor, understood this terrestrial reality.

Originally published in 1911, Julian S. Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* still offers valuable insights into the importance of combining services to maximize strategic effect. Corbett argued it was impossible to separate the theory of maritime war from the theory of war in general. After political objectives were established, strategists developed strategic objectives to attain the desired political aims. Though a forthright proponent of maritime power, Corbett clearly appreciated the army's role in achieving strategic objectives. In his words, "Since men live upon land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else

⁶ Muthiah Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 2.

⁷ Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance*, 2.

⁸ Andrew Scobell, *The US Army and the Asia-Pacific* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2001), 32.

by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.”⁹
Given this role, he asserted the “paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war.”¹⁰

Corbett further observed, “naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a part of maritime strategy – the higher learning which teaches us that for a maritime State to make successful war and to realize her special strength, army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately connected than are the three arms ashore.”¹¹ This is a clear statement of the importance of what is today called joint warfare and also of appreciating the importance of all services in warfare.

In *Air Power and Armies*, John Slessor echoed Corbett about the importance of complementary military action. He asserted that ground and air assets should to be nested in a larger strategic context in which “each must be applied in such a way as to make the best use of, and create the best opportunities for the other.”¹² For Slessor, the combined forces primary objective in a continental campaign “will be the defeat of that army—or at least its expulsion” to a distance that gives depth for air defense.¹³ Only then, according to Slessor, “the ultimate reduction of the enemy nation may (and very likely will) be undertaken, not by the traditional methods of land invasion, or by the continued assaults upon their armies in the field, but by air measures.”¹⁴ He further answered that a land campaign “means to *break down the resistance of the enemy*

⁹ Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 16.

¹⁰ Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 16.

¹¹ Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 11.

¹² J.C. Slessor, *Air Power and Armies* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2009), 82.

¹³ Slessor, *Air Power and Armies*, 3.

¹⁴ Slessor, *Air Power and Armies*, 3.

army, which includes reconnaissance and observation for the army and direct attack by the air force—both directed to the same end.”¹⁵

Thus, both Corbett and Slessor recognized the requirement for what would today be called jointness.

To be successful in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States must integrate and synchronize the contributions of all the armed services. Each service possesses its own capabilities with which to address particular aspects of the Asia-Pacific theater. Access and coverage problems are real and require real solutions. The concept of Air-Sea Battle argues that air and maritime assets are best tailored to address these access and coverage concerns. At the same time, a human contact and engagement problem also exists. This is where land component assets may best contribute. The solutions to these challenges lie in shades of purple. Only by marrying the specialties and experiences of all the services in the region can the United States best serve its interests. But in order for this to happen, the US Army needs to determine how it can best meet the America’s Asia-Pacific requirements.

The Research Question and How It Will Be Answered

The research question may here be stated as follows: “What role should the US Army play in shaping American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region?”

This question is particularly important in the case of America’s withdrawal of ground combat forces from Iraq in 2011 and Afghanistan in 2014 and its reluctance to engage in protracted ground wars during a time when the nation shifts its attention to Asia and the Pacific. As the Army looks toward a defining narrative for its contributions to achieving American interests, it is important for the United States and the Army to remember its past and the characteristics that have always existed in the

¹⁵ Slessor, *Air Power and Armies*, 4-5.

region and in American warfare. The Army has always played an important role in US engagement in Asia and the Pacific. There needs to be an understanding why the Army's role has been significant and if there are reasons to assume otherwise during America's rebalance to the Pacific. This is vital if assuming that China will continue its current trajectory of economic, military, and political growth while North Korea remains a volatile, dangerous regime intent on becoming a viable nuclear power.

To find the answer, this thesis first reviews the US Army's historical legacy in the Asia-Pacific, from its occupation of the Philippines in the early 20th century to its contemporary roles a century later. While broad in scope, this historical summary will examine what the Army has done for America in Asia and the Pacific. The review demonstrates the Army has been a major Pacific force and instrument of America's strategic influence. Source material for this chapter includes various historical works, primarily books such as Brian McAllister Linn's *The Philippine War*; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski's *For the Common Defense*; and various collections from the US Army Center of Military History. The thrust of the analysis is to determine the capabilities the Army has given to the accomplishment of American objectives in the Pacific.

Chapter Three assesses the current security environment within the Asia-Pacific theater, first focusing on the interests of China, North Korea, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Australia. It then examines America's security interests in the Asia-Pacific. Finally, it evaluates threats to American interests and opportunities to advance them. Source material for this chapter includes regional actors' national security strategies and defense white papers; relevant books on the subjects; US national strategic documents and speeches from the White House, Department of Defense, and Department of State; and various periodical literature.

Chapter Four provides an analytical evaluation and institutional review. It examines similarities and differences between past and present actions and motivations in the region, as well as the causes of those similarities and differences. It then discusses the implications of these similarities for the United States and its armed services. Information and conclusions from the preceding chapters will provide the source material for this analysis.

Chapter Five assesses America's requirements for its Army in the Pacific and Army capabilities to meet those requirements. The sources for this examination are from preceding chapters and official army publications. In the end, the evidence gathered should enable the study to address two areas: a) what America requires the Army to contribute to its Asia-Pacific strategy and b) what the Army must do to meet those requirements.

The conclusions will highlight the significance of the earlier chapters' findings as they pertain to America's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific while recommending specific steps the Army must take to enhance its capabilities in areas where those capabilities do not now fully meet new requirements.

As the United States rebalances to Asia and the Pacific, it must not marginalize the contributions of the Army. While the US perspective of the region focuses on its vast ocean and expansive airspace, all services play a vital role in achieving US security interests. America must determine what role it wants the Army to play in this new future. The Army, in turn, must determine how it will meet its responsibilities. The Army's enduring history in the region clearly demonstrates the service's role in achieving American strategic objectives for over a hundred years. For the good of both the country, and the Army, that legacy must continue.

Chapter 2

America's Army in the Pacific

In a region as vast and ocean-covered as the Asia-Pacific, naval and air forces are extremely important. Nevertheless, the Army is the ultimate symbol of a rock-solid U.S. commitment to the enduring peace and prosperity of the region. The Army is the core service in the labor-intensive business of peacetime engagement. Moreover, when hostilities break out and the commitment of U.S. forces is required, the Army forms the nucleus of any mission force. Finally, only the Army, the sole service that can occupy land, can guarantee a decisive strategic (i.e. political) outcome and an effective transition to a desired end state.

- Andrew Scobell

The US Army has a long, enduring history in the Asia-Pacific. Of the 187 campaigns the Army has fought, 63 have been in the Asia-Pacific region. This is the greatest number in any region outside of the Americas. Many casual observers might expect the campaigns in Europe, which include two world wars, to be the region with the most campaigns outside of the Americas. This is a significant misconception. The Army has been a major Pacific force, and the United States has used the Army as an instrument of strategic influence. The evidence of the past clearly demonstrates the validity of the propositions. This experience suggests that the nation will not again require the Army to contribute to American interests in the region.

This chapter examines the US Army's role in various Asia-Pacific campaigns to understand landpower's contributions in a region often associated with a vast ocean. These summaries demonstrate that the Army's historical presence in the Asia-Pacific has mattered. With varying missions ranging from counterinsurgency, to amphibious landings, to training and advising, US ground presence has proved indispensable in enabling human interaction and providing a clear picture of overall operations. This is particularly true because almost every campaign has

involved rooting out a well-entrenched, committed adversary. The importance of not only seizing and holding ground, but also engaging with other populations on foreign soil is a theme that runs through the Army's Asia-Pacific campaigns. Most importantly, recurring capabilities emerge that the Army has had to contribute toward achieving national interests.

The Philippine War, 1899-1902

America's military involvement in the Asia-Pacific began in the late nineteenth century on the islands of the Philippines. The archipelago was the US Army's first test of Pacific warfare and a byproduct of American expansion. One can trace the origins of America's involvement in the Philippines to its vision of expansion beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. Individuals such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, best known for his influential views on naval theory, argued for a strong American presence in the Pacific. Given American interests in Asia, particularly limiting European influence over open trade with China, these voices resonated with the William McKinley administration. But both the State and Navy Departments were concerned about the presence of Spanish forces in the Philippines.¹ Based on these concerns, President McKinley agreed to attack the islands if war were to break out between the two nations over the liberation of Cuba. The eventual war led to an American victory.

President McKinley had first looked at the Philippines as a means of increasing his bargaining power for negotiations with the Spanish during the Spanish-American War.² Cuba was his primary concern during the war. However, the acts of Commodore James Dewey altered McKinley's view of the Philippines and opened his mind to the possibility of annexation. On 1 May 1898, Dewey and his six warships won a

¹ Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 382.

² Mark Moyer, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 65.

significant victory over the Spanish fleet off the naval base of Cavite.³ Despite this victory, Dewey realized he was unable to occupy the territory and cabled his superiors that while his warships' guns could secure Manila's surrender at any time, doing so would result in his becoming responsible for its inhabitants.⁴ Unable to provide the personnel necessary to secure the city, Dewey waited in Manila Bay for the Army to arrive.

Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt was the overall commander of the Philippine expedition. Confused as to whether the Americans were to "subdue and hold all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely to seize and hold the capital," Merritt sought direction from McKinley who failed to provide a clear policy objective regarding American presence in the Philippines.⁵ McKinley replied that the Spanish fleet's defeat and the need to secure peace with Spain required the United States to "send an army of occupation to the Philippines for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of Spanish power...and of giving order and security to the islands while in possession of the United States."⁶ The Army contingent began as a force of 5,000 volunteers at the recommendation of Dewey, who incorrectly believed that his control of Manila Bay constituted control of the city and surrounding area.⁷ This number would soon rise dramatically as the situation on the ground proved much different from what McKinley had anticipated.

American forces assaulted Manila on 13 August 1898. The exiled Filipino nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo worked alongside US forces during the assault. Aguinaldo had started a rebellion against Spanish rule in 1896. The Americans returned Aguinaldo to the Philippines via steamer

³ Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 8.

⁴ Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 8.

⁵ Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 5.

⁶ Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 5.

⁷ Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902*, 5-6.

on 19 May 1898 to help undermine Spanish forces until an American ground contingent could arrive.⁸

The Philippines came under American rule with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War. A variety of motivating factors influenced the American action. Among the factors were a desire for commercial opportunities in Asia, concern that the Filipinos were incapable of self-rule, and fear other states, such as Germany or Japan, would seize the islands if America did not act.⁹ Those opposed to annexation believed the US was engaging in morally questionable practices through colonizing the islands, while others feared the possibility of non-white Filipinos having a role in American government.¹⁰ Just two days prior to the treaty's ratification, fighting broke out between Philippine nationalists and American forces. Led by Aguinaldo, the nationalists sought independence from what they perceived as foreign-power colonization.

Thus, the Army's role in the Philippines became one of counterinsurgency and eventually an occupying force responsible for civic action. American commanders in the Philippines used creative methods of counterinsurgency. Recruiting and leading Filipinos required these officers to display charisma, integrity, and social skills, with a significant advantage being many officers' ability to speak Spanish.¹¹ Many US soldiers viewed the Filipinos as inferior, and they exhibited enthusiasm toward their mission.

The importance of human interaction in military operations was clearly evident during the Philippine Insurrection. The expeditionary commander, General Elwell S. Otis, ordered his commanders to

⁸ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 65.

⁹ Office of the Historian, "The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902," US Department of State. <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/war>.

¹⁰ Office of the Historian, "The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902."

¹¹ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 71.

concentrate their efforts on civic action during the first months of 1900.¹² Otis had hoped that upon seeing how American rule could benefit the population, the Filipinos would support the United States.¹³ American soldiers built schools, markets, roads, and bridges, while also setting up pharmacies and health clinics in an attempt to improve medical care and reduce mortality rates.¹⁴ McKinley wanted the Army to prove “to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.”¹⁵

Despite efforts to secure popular support, Otis misjudged the actual situation on the ground. Failing to speak with officers in the field or to seek out knowledgeable sources, Otis was unaware of the environmental realities facing his subordinates and did not understand that civic action was dependent upon security.¹⁶ Colonel Arthur Murray, commander of forces in Leyte, justifying a transition to military operations as the primary component of counterinsurgency, remarked, “Kindness and consideration I regret to say appear to me largely if not wholly unappreciated by these people, who seem to regard our lenient and humane treatment as an evidence of weakness on our part.”¹⁷ The Filipinos were now engaged in guerilla warfare.

The fighting that resulted was both lengthy and costly, lasting over two-and-a-half years. The US sent over 122,000 service members to the Philippines to quell the rebellion; however, the monthly strength during the period of conflict was only 40,000.¹⁸ The Philippine Insurrection ultimately claimed more American lives than the Spanish-American War

¹² Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 72.

¹³ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 72.

¹⁴ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 72.

¹⁵ Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 307.

¹⁶ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 73.

¹⁷ Moyer, *A Question of Command*, 73.

¹⁸ Richard L. Millett, *Searching for Stability: The US Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 7.

that had placed the Americans in the islands in the first place.¹⁹ While President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed an end to the Insurrection on 4 July 1902, fighting continued for several more years, especially against the Muslim insurgents in the southern islands known as the Moros.²⁰

From this experience, America had, or at least should have, learned two fundamental lessons about its role as a Pacific power. First and foremost, that which is acquired must be held. Alternatively, as Clausewitz put it, “every attack has to take into account the defense that is necessarily inherent in it, in order clearly to understand its disadvantages and to anticipate them.”²¹ Second, while naval forces are necessary to project power in the Pacific, they have only limited influence ashore, particularly for protracted operations. For that, one needs an army.

World War II, 1941-1945

Following the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Americans were eager to join a war that had been going on for years. After launching its surprise attack, Japan was certain to be a target of US military might. Because of service rivalry, the Pacific’s immense size, and politics, officials divided the Pacific Theater during WWII into two, independent, coordinate commands. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur oversaw the Southwest Pacific Theater, while Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was responsible for the Central, South, and North Pacific Theaters. With the exception of the South and Southwest Pacific, each command conducted its own operations with its own ground, air, and naval forces.²² Early objectives in the Pacific consisted of small islands, coral atolls, and jungle-bound harbors and airstrips

¹⁹ Millett, *Searching for Stability*, 7.

²⁰ Millett, *Searching for Stability*, 8.

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 525.

²² Center of Military History, *United States Army in World War II Reader’s Guide* (Washington, DC: United States Army, 1992), 41.

that required amphibious operations using a relatively small number of troops as opposed to large ground forces.²³ However, these small forces, together with air and naval operations, produced significant strategic gains during the war. WWII proved the Pacific to be a joint theater. By 1942, the Army and USAAF units had sent approximately 350,000 men to the Pacific.²⁴ Even at the height of the war in Europe, the Army committed up to one-third of its resources to the Pacific war.²⁵

The first offensives in the Pacific, at Guadalcanal and Papua, had US forces focusing on the threat against their line of communications in the south. The campaign consisted of three stages, or tasks. Task One, under the supervision of Admiral Nimitz, had South Pacific Area forces seizing base sites in the Southern Solomons.²⁶ Task Two involved South Pacific forces advancing up the ladder of the Solomons while Southwest Pacific forces moved up the north coast of New Guinea.²⁷ Task Three had the forces of the two theaters converging on Rabaul and clearing the rest of the Bismark Archipelago, outflanking the Japanese naval base at Truk in the Caroline Islands and setting the stage for an assault to retake the Philippines.²⁸ General MacArthur provided the strategic direction for tasks Two and Three.

The campaign began on 7 August 1942, with the 1st Marine Division landing on Guadalcanal and nearby islands in the southern Solomons.²⁹ An epic land, air, and naval struggle ensued; however, the Guadalcanal campaign ultimately halted Japan's expansion and, combined with MacArthur's victory at Buna, allowed the US to gain the

²³ Center of Military History, *United States Army in World War II Reader's Guide*, 41.

²⁴ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 441.

²⁵ Richard W. Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008* (Washington, DC: Center Of Military History, 2005), 165.

²⁶ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 167.

²⁷ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 167.

²⁸ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 167.

²⁹ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 167.

offensive for the first time in the war.³⁰ Guadalcanal also has the distinction of being the only Pacific campaign that American forces came close to losing.³¹ During the six-month struggle for control of the approaches to Guadalcanal and possession of the island itself, air and naval forces fought six full-scale naval battles, along with hundreds of smaller engagements.³² Meanwhile US ground forces fought Japanese military forces in the tropical rain forests, in the mountains, and on the grassy hills of the island.³³ In the end, it took the Americans two Marine divisions, two Army divisions, and an additional Army regiment to subdue Japanese forces.³⁴

MacArthur's New Guinea offensive helped set the strategic pattern for Allied victories in the other portion of the South Pacific campaign.³⁵ Having only four American and Australian divisions to commit, MacArthur relied heavily on USAAF air support to provide air cover to an Allied amphibious force of beaching ships and craft, cruiser and destroyer escorts, and supply vessels.³⁶ Despite harsh physical conditions and a strong opposing, Japanese force, MacArthur's forces gained a solid foothold on New Guinea's northern coast in January 1943. With the aid of the 5th Air Force and 7th Fleet, MacArthur's overland effort during the Buna campaign yielded additional Allied victories. As MacArthur was prepared to isolate Rabaul, US forces in the Solomons completed the encirclement by fighting up the chain at New Georgia and Bougainville.³⁷ Realizing the severity of their losses and the need to reorganize, the Japanese withdrew their fleet and set up a new defensive perimeter that included the Marianas, the Philippines, Formosa, and

³⁰ Donald L. Miller, *D-Days in the Pacific* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005), 48.

³¹ Miller, *D-Days in the Pacific*, 48.

³² Center of Military History, *United States Army in World War II Reader's Guide*, 47.

³³ Center of Military History, *United States Army in World War II Reader's Guide*, 47.

³⁴ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 170.

³⁵ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 443.

³⁶ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 443.

³⁷ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 443.

Southeast Asia, with some residual forces left along the eastern coast of New Guinea.³⁸

In 1944, the Allies gained more victories over the Japanese as Nimitz and MacArthur continued their advances. Nimitz's forces gained success at Tarawa and Makin atolls in the Gilbert Islands and isolated Japanese base complexes in the Marshalls.³⁹ MacArthur, meanwhile, began a drive toward the Philippines. The path to the Philippines involved offensives at Wewak, Hollandia, and Biak along the New Guinea coast as part of a "leapfrogging" movement. This series of offensives did not require a major carrier force, and was possible with a small air arm, and only a minimal number of divisions.⁴⁰

Following victorious, simultaneous operations against the Marianas that enabled the USAAF to establish basing for its B-29s, MacArthur attacked Leyte in October 1944 with six divisions of the 6th Army and the 7th Fleet.⁴¹ Admiral William Halsey's 3d Fleet provided support. The naval battle ended in a devastating defeat for the Japanese, who suffered the loss of four large carriers, three battleships, nine cruisers, eleven destroyers, and more than 500 aircraft.⁴² The Americans, by contrast, lost only two small carriers and three destroyers.⁴³ This followed a long, bitter slog to capture Leyte, which the Japanese strenuously resisted.

In January 1945, MacArthur's 6th Army, 7th Fleet, and 5th Air Force invaded the Philippines' most populous island, Luzon. While the 7th Fleet and supporting 3d Fleet suffered high losses as a result of Japanese kamikazes, the major portion of the land campaign took six months of hard fighting. The capture of Manila was particularly brutal. The 6th

³⁸ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 443.

³⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 463.

⁴⁰ Miller, *D-Days in the Pacific*, 91.

⁴¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 444.

⁴² Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 465.

⁴³ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 465.

Army suffered 10,000 casualties while killing over 100,000 Japanese.⁴⁴ So entrenched were the Japanese in the mountains of Luzon that another 50,000 still remained there following the war's end.⁴⁵

After the Japanese surrender, the Americans turned to the occupation of Japan with MacArthur overseeing the military occupation. The General Headquarters of the Far East Command was responsible for the military forces in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea.⁴⁶ Troops comprised "military government" teams and distributed across Japan's eight regions and 46 prefectures during the initial phase of occupation.⁴⁷ Within the teams, functional sections handled various missions to include government, economics, information and education, and public health.⁴⁸ While decisions originated in Tokyo, implementation took place at the levels of governors and mayors. It was the responsibility of the local military government teams to observe and report to headquarters on the effectiveness of the implantation process. These teams were later renamed Civil Affairs teams and staffed with civilians.⁴⁹

Following the end of the war, US forces also had to help the Philippine government with its counterinsurgency capabilities during the Huk Rebellion. During Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Philippine Communist Party had established a guerrilla organization called Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, abbreviated Hukbalahap or Huk, declaring to be fighting for liberation from the Japanese.⁵⁰ After the war, however, Huk veterans banded together to fight against the newly established, corrupt Philippine government. With the Philippine government faltering, the US helped elevate Ramon Magsaysay to the

⁴⁴ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 481.

⁴⁵ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 481.

⁴⁶ James Dobbins, et al., *America's Role In Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 30.

⁴⁷ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building*, 30.

⁴⁸ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building*, 30.

⁴⁹ Dobbins, *America's Role in Nation Building*, 30.

⁵⁰ Moyer, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, 91.

presidency. Magsaysay, who decided to serve as his own secretary of national defense, turned the government around through a series of organized public work projects, large-scale social welfare programs, reforms, and the replacement of poor field commanders.⁵¹ For its part, the US provided intelligence and aid to Magsaysay's government along with the experience and expertise of military intelligence officer, Edward Lansdale, who became Magsaysay's trusted advisor.⁵² Magsaysay's presidency showed the impact one man at the top could have on a counterinsurgency's success.

American experiences in the Pacific during WWII highlighted two important lessons. The first was that staging areas require the capture and holding of ground, demanding offensive action that can be bloody and hard-fought against a well-entrenched enemy. For this, the combination of various armed service components working toward accomplishing an objective is essential. As Corbett observes, "It may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is free to devote itself wholeheartedly to the destruction of the enemy's fleets."⁵³ The coordination of land, sea, and air assets produced desired effects. Second, the defeat of an enemy and most of its vital infrastructure creates a responsibility to assist in rebuilding efforts and provide security. For this purpose, ground forces are required, and human interaction is paramount.

Korea, 1950-1953

⁵¹ Moyer, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, 106.

⁵² Moyer, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, 99.

⁵³ Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 16.

When North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, the demarcation line between North and South Korea, on 25 June 1950, the US brought a motion for intervention before the United Nations Security Council. The North Korean aggression was seen not only in the context of a budding Cold War, but the Korean peninsula itself was also strategically significant. Chinese, Japanese, and Russian political leaders have long appreciated Korea's location and its proximity to key regional actors.⁵⁴

Following WWII, 50,000 US troops occupied Korea below the 38th Parallel, while the Soviet Union had responsibility for Korea above that line.⁵⁵ The Soviet troops were remnants of the force that had fought the Japanese in Manchuria and into Korea in the weeks prior to war's end. American troops left the peninsula after the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed on 15 August 1948.⁵⁶ Following the departure, North Korea embarked on a campaign of intimidation against the ROK. Repeated propaganda attacks and frequent border raids across the 38th Parallel ensued. The US, seeking to see the newly formed Republic prosper, provided economic aid and technical assistance. Military aid to the ROK was limited to light weapons, which provided for only minimal defense and far short of the combat aircraft, naval attack vessels, and heavy ground weapons required to repel a full-blooded assault.⁵⁷ It was a decision that later came back to haunt American decision makers.

American military presence on the peninsula arrived soon after President Harry Truman authorized General MacArthur, then Commander in Chief of Far East Command, to supply ROK forces with ammunition and equipment, evacuate American dependents in Korea,

⁵⁴ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950* (Washington, DC: United States Army, 1997), 1.

⁵⁵ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950*, 4-6.

⁵⁶ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950*, 6.

⁵⁷ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950*, 7.

and survey the condition on the ground. After seeing the dire situation first hand and the ROK forces' inability to prevent the North's drive south of the Han River, MacArthur recommended to Truman that the US send a US Army regimental combat team (RCT) to the area south of Seoul.⁵⁸ He also recommend that the US build up to a two-division-sized force on the peninsula to mount a counteroffensive. Truman approved MacArthur's recommendations on 30 June and authorized him to use all forces available to him later that day.⁵⁹ Despite presidential approval for an American military response, the US Army encountered several problems when it encountered the North Korean Army.

Popular sentiment against a large standing military establishment in the aftermath of WWII led to unpreparedness to conduct combat operations in the summer of 1950.⁶⁰ The 8th US Army (EUSAK) entered the war with one-fifth of its authorized tanks and critically short of essential weapons and units.⁶¹ As the main field unit on the peninsula, it was unable to engage in offensive operations until it was reinforced with additional American soldiers, artillery, tanks, and anti-tank weapons.⁶² Also, it required additional units from outside the theater to include the 5th US Infantry Regiment, the 2d US Infantry Division, and the 1st Marine Brigade.⁶³

Given the inability to field an American force of adequate combat strength to counter North Korean forces, MacArthur was forced to adopt piecemeal commitment. Task Force Smith, the lead contingent of 8th Army, was approximately half the size of a battalion combat team from the 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division when it arrived near Osan on 5 July.⁶⁴ Meeting heavy resistance from a well-trained and

⁵⁸ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 224.

⁵⁹ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 224.

⁶⁰ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950*, 14.

⁶¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 510.

⁶² Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 510.

⁶³ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 510.

⁶⁴ Center of Military History, *Korea—1950*, 14.

heavily equipped North Korean army, the soldiers of Task Force Smith withdrew to the south to hastily established positions of the 34th Infantry Regiment and additional elements of the 21st Infantry. But the American units were unable to halt the advancing North Koreans. The Americans then fell back to defend the southern port of Pusan.

On 7 July, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a unified command comprised of all the forces of UN member contributing states. The US was the major contributor of forces, and MacArthur became the commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) in the field. Together, 15 member states provided troops.

The situation began to turn in favor of the UN forces when, in September 1950, MacArthur regained lost ground and pushed north. After a daring landing at Inchon, near Seoul, MacArthur's troops quickly maneuvered to cut off the North Korean Army from its supply bases. By the end of the month, UN forces had liberated Seoul and were advancing on the 38th Parallel.⁶⁵ The question then became whether or not to hold at the 38th Parallel and maintain the status quo ante or press north into North Korea. MacArthur and other members of the UN command believed that a northward advance would not meet with resistance from the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. With authorization from Washington and despite warnings from the Chinese, MacArthur pressed into North Korea, and by October 1950 had almost reached the Yalu River separating North Korea and China.⁶⁶

The situation once again changed for UN forces as they neared the Yalu River, this time for the worse. Perceiving the approaching UN forces to be a significant threat, China sent its army into North Korea. US and UN forces were surprised by the size, strength, and determination of the

⁶⁵ Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953" *US Department of State*, <http://history.state.gov>.

⁶⁶ Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953."

Chinese forces and soon pulled back behind the 38th Parallel.⁶⁷ The introduction of Chinese troops began a new phase in the war. Seoul changed hands several times in early 1951 as Chinese and UN forces clashed in a number of attacks and counterattacks in and around the capital. MacArthur wanted to extend the fight into the Chinese border despite rejections from Truman. On 11 April 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur for insubordination and replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway.⁶⁸

In 1951, 8th Army was a force of seven American, one Commonwealth, and ten ROK divisions.⁶⁹ Commanded by General James Van Fleet, 8th Army had fought hard and bloody engagements with the communist forces to drive them back across the 38th Parallel. Despite the aid of massive artillery and close air support, 8th Army had to engage the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) infantry, fighting them in the high ridges and valleys that dominated the terrain just north of the 38th Parallel.⁷⁰ American and UN troops inflicted casualties in a ratio of ten to one, destroying the myth of PLA invincibility.⁷¹ By July 1951, the war was stalemated, with both sides fighting limited engagements, unable to force the other's surrender.⁷² Both sides, however, maintained the demarcation line of the 38th Parallel.

The next two years failed to end the conflict. Small skirmishes broke out between the two sides while peace negotiations sought to find resolution. On 27 July 1953, at Panmunjom, the DPRK, PRC, and UN signed an armistice agreeing to a new border of demarcation between the North and South along the 38th Parallel, but on the Kansas line where the two sides confronted each other.⁷³ Although the armistice brought an

⁶⁷ Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953."

⁶⁸ Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953."

⁶⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 520.

⁷⁰ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 521.

⁷¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 521.

⁷² Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953."

⁷³ Office of the Historian, "The Korean War, 1950-1953."

end to the fighting it failed to end the state of war. President Dwight Eisenhower noted, “We have won an armistice on a single battleground not peace in the world. We may not now relax our guard nor cease our quest.”⁷⁴

Following the armistice, the US and ROK entered into what became an enduring alliance through their signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. 8th Army remained in Korea to help monitor the cease-fire line and align itself with the ROK Army and other Korean national forces.⁷⁵ Other 8th Army duties included acting as the ground force component for the United Nations Command (UNC) and supervising the training of ROK forces.⁷⁶ The 8th Army-ROK relationship was further solidified on 20 November 1954, when 8th Army headquarters was combined with US Army Forces-Far East as the major Army command in the Far East and later moved from Camp Zama, Japan, to Seoul on 26 July 1955.⁷⁷

As a reminder that a state of war still existed, the North Koreans engaged in a number of truce violations during the post-war years that, while infrequent, were sometimes serious. Beginning in 1966, the North embarked on a campaign of violence that continued into 1971 and resulted in the deaths of over 40 Americans and hundreds of North and South Koreans. As South Korea’s prosperity grew, the North attempted to destabilize its economic and political progress through a number of incidents along the DMZ, including terrorist raids and attempted subversion. Other acts during this period were a failed North Korean commando raid on the Presidential quarters, the Blue House; the capture of the USS Pueblo in international waters; large-scale guerilla

⁷⁴ Center of Military History, “Korea, 1951-1953” (Washington, DC: United States Army, 1997), 284.

⁷⁵ “Eighth Army History,” *Eighth Army*, <http://8tharmy.korea.army.mil/history.asp>.

⁷⁶ “Eighth Army History.”

⁷⁷ “Eighth Army History.”

raids on the ROK east coast; and the shooting down of an unarmed US Navy reconnaissance plane.⁷⁸

The constant threat from North Korea accelerated preparations to defend the ROK. Improvements made along the DMZ included US and ROK defensive positions, increased firepower, enhanced night monitoring capabilities, more powerful searchlights, and various other detection devices. Modernization of the ROK Army was also accelerated during this time. In 1970, officials decided to reduce the number of US forces in Korea as ROK military capabilities improved. The belief that the ROK armed forces were capable of taking over the primary burden of ground, homeland defense and implementation of a US-funded, five-year modernization package for the ROK armed forces both influenced this decision.⁷⁹

Several major organizational changes took place in 1971. In March 2nd Infantry Division pulled back from the DMZ and handed over its area of responsibility to a ROK army division. Late that month, the only area of the DMZ the 2nd Infantry Division protected was a 1,000-meter sector in the vicinity of Panmunjom, the site of the armistice commission. Additionally, 7th Infantry Division redeployed to the United States and deactivated on 2 April 1971. By the end of June, 8th Army's numbers were reduced by over 18,000.⁸⁰

The late 1970s brought further changes as roles altered and the future of US forces in South Korea came into question. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter began fulfilling his promise to withdraw US combat ground troops from the ROK by 1980 or 1981.⁸¹ In November 1978, the ROK-US Combined Forces Command was activated to take over UNC's responsibility for planning and executing the defense of the

⁷⁸ "Eighth Army History."

⁷⁹ "Eighth Army History."

⁸⁰ "Eighth Army History."

⁸¹ "Eighth Army History."

ROK.⁸² The redeployment of 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division to the United States followed in December.⁸³

It did not take long for the fate of ground forces in Korea to change again. Acknowledging growing Congressional and outside support for maintaining US ground forces in Korea and after a his own state visit to the ROK in July 1979, Carter announced that the withdrawal plan would be placed on hold pending further review in 1981.⁸⁴ During a February 1981 summit, Presidents Ronald Reagan and Chun Doo-hwan reaffirmed the “security of the Republic of Korea is pivotal to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia and, in turn, vital to the Security of the United States.”⁸⁵ As a result, Reagan cancelled US troop withdraw plans. Subsequent administrations reaffirmed the importance of maintaining US military force levels on the peninsula.

The Korean War provided two lessons to American leaders. First, an army ill prepared and ill equipped for an unexpected and undesired ground war in Asia could lead to serious difficulties when vital interests were threatened. Following WWII, the American armed forces were significantly neutered. The result was armed services in general and an army in particular that were deficient in equipment, training, and troop strength. At the beginning of the war, American forces were not in a position to halt the advance of North Korean forces into South Korea. Second, the threat of third-party intervention is likely if the third party’s security interests are at stake. China committed its armed forces when it perceived a threat from the American advance, quickly changing the dynamic of the war.

The years following the armistice signing provide another important lesson. A ground-force presence is necessary to deter and defend against an aggressive, volatile enemy. While supplemental to ROK

⁸² “Eighth Army History.”

⁸³ “Eighth Army History.”

⁸⁴ “Eighth Army History.”

⁸⁵ “Eighth Army History.”

forces, American force presence in South Korea has deterred a large-scale North Korean offensive. Despite this presence, North Korean acts of aggression have demonstrated the willingness of the DPRK to risk conflagration on the peninsula.

Vietnam, 1965-1973

American involvement in Vietnam began in the years following the end of WWII. At the time, Vietnam was fighting for its independence from France. While the US favored Vietnam's independence, America gave its support to France as the Vietnamese rebels, the Viet Minh, aligned themselves with the Communists.⁸⁶ France's defeat in 1954 drew increased American involvement, as the US assumed the training and advisory role of the non-Communist South Vietnamese armed forces.⁸⁷ Framed in the context of the Cold War and a struggle against the spread of Communism, American commitment grew as Washington sent additional troops and material to aid the South Vietnamese in their fight against Southern guerillas, the Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese regulars.⁸⁸

The situation in Vietnam began to trouble Johnson in 1964. Facing a rough presidential campaign and wanting to focus on domestic programs, Johnson had little interest in Vietnam or the potential for a foreign policy debacle. However, when the North Vietnamese attacked two American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson suddenly found himself with Congressional and popular support. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed on 7 August 1964, provided for limited operations designed to protect Americans; however, it also allowed Johnson "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any

⁸⁶ Stewart, *Deepening Involvement, 1945-1965* (Washington, DC: United States Army, 2012), 5.

⁸⁷ Stewart, *Deepening Involvement*, 5.

⁸⁸ Stewart, *Deepening Involvement*, 5.

member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.”⁸⁹

In February 1965, Johnson approved Operation Rolling Thunder, a series of air operations, against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). What he approved, however, was not what the Department of Defense had proposed. The original design of Rolling Thunder was to use a full-scale air assault on the DRVN’s military bases, transportation system, and industrial infrastructure.⁹⁰ Deeming this concept domestically and internationally risky, Johnson limited the intensity of the strikes and the list of approved targets out of fear the proposed Rolling Thunder scheme would risk Chinese and perhaps even Soviet involvement.⁹¹ Preventing initiation of World War III by Chinese and Soviet involvement became a goal equal to retaining South Vietnamese independence.⁹² Thus, he implemented an air campaign of “graduated escalation,” along with the promise of incentives to entice the DRVN to give up the war. The bombing campaign, however, led to further expansion as the Johnson administration deployed additional ground troops to South Vietnam for the airfields’ defense.⁹³ South Vietnamese communists, known as the Viet Cong (VC), responded with a series of rocket attacks on American bases in South Vietnam and attacks against the airfields from which the air strikes were launched.⁹⁴ At this point, Johnson was forced to decide whether to commit American ground troops or forego a military victory.

From April to July 1965, Johnson approved a series of proposals from General William Westmoreland, Military Assistance Command

⁸⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 576-577.

⁹⁰ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 577.

⁹¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 577.

⁹² Mark Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 43.

⁹³ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 463.

⁹⁴ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 578.

Vietnam (MACV) commander, committing the equivalent of five American divisions into the ground fighting of Vietnam.⁹⁵ Westmoreland requested 200,000 troops to shift to offensive operations in South Vietnam, and Johnson's authorized buildup almost reached this number.⁹⁶ The president, however, declined to declare a state of national emergency and deferred any decision to call up the reserves.⁹⁷ Westmoreland developed an operational concept of exploiting the US Army's helicopter mobility and air and artillery superiority, conducting "search and destroy" operations against the most threatening communist units, while the AVRN concentrated on VC guerillas and terrorists.⁹⁸ One of McNamara's advisors described the concept as "grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass," while another observer noted, "You simply grind out a terribly punishing war, year after year, using that immense American firepower, crushing the enemy and a good deal of the population until finally there has been so much death and destruction that the enemy will stumble out of the forest, as stunned and numb as the rest of the Vietnamese people."⁹⁹ It is clear that the Vietnam War was rapidly becoming one of attrition.

From May to December 1965, US forces assured the immediate survival of South Vietnam. After this period, US forces attempted to go on the offensive and stymie the enemy's regaining of the initiative. From 1965-1966, Johnson allowed Westmoreland to run the war on his own terms. By the end of 1965, attrition emerged as the defining principle for American combat operations.¹⁰⁰ In Westmoreland's words, "the destruction of the main force units" was his "ultimate military objective."¹⁰¹ Subsequently, US troop buildup continued with numbers

⁹⁵ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 580.

⁹⁶ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 580.

⁹⁷ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 48.

⁹⁸ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 580.

⁹⁹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 580.

¹⁰⁰ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 363.

¹⁰¹ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 363.

rising from 184,313 in the beginning of 1966 to 351,572 by the end of October.¹⁰² US Army numbers alone increased from 116,755 to 221,067.¹⁰³ In December 1966, Westmoreland wrote, “We now have three consecutive large scale operations planned starting after the first of the year. This is the first time I have had enough troops to engage in such an ambitious program. Hopefully, they will achieve great success.”¹⁰⁴

According to Westmoreland, 1967 marked a pivotal turn in the war. Taking the offensive, US soldiers pursued the enemy aggressively, focusing on the heartland around Saigon, the coastal plains and western highlands, and the area along the Demilitarized Zone.¹⁰⁵ The Americans “engaged in a constant search for tactical concepts and techniques to maximize their advantages of firepower and mobility and to compensate for the constraints of time, distance, difficult terrain, and an inviolable border.”¹⁰⁶ Enemy body counts for the year were an estimated 81,000, which heightened Westmoreland’s confidence the war would soon be over. The increased confidence was accompanied by increased strength. 459,700 service members were in South Vietnam by October 1967.¹⁰⁷ The number of US Army artillery batteries rose from 25 in October 1966 to 48 a year later.¹⁰⁸ During the same time, the number of infantry battalions rose from 39 to 58.¹⁰⁹ While the number of US Air Force combat planes based in South Vietnam changed little from the 400 at the end of 1966, the number of tactical air strikes rose 40 percent, with B-52 strikes rising over 50 percent.¹¹⁰ Support also came from Pacific allies with two divisions from South Korea, a brigade from Australia, a

¹⁰² Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 355.

¹⁰³ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 355.

¹⁰⁴ Carland, *Stemming the Tide*, 355.

¹⁰⁵ George L. MacGarrigle, *Taking the Offensive: October 1966 to October 1967* (Washington, DC: United States Army, 1998, 432.

¹⁰⁶ Stewart, ed., *American Military History, Volume II*, 325.

¹⁰⁷ MacGarrigle, *Taking the Offensive*, 432.

¹⁰⁸ MacGarrigle, *Taking the Offensive*, 433.

¹⁰⁹ MacGarrigle, *Taking the Offensive*, 433.

¹¹⁰ MacGarrigle, *Taking the Offensive*, 433.

regiment from Thailand, and an armed civic action group from the Philippines.¹¹¹

Any sense of gained US momentum or initiative changed in late January 1968, when the communists launched the Tet offensive. In this “General Offensive-General Uprising,” communist forces attacked 200 cities, towns, and villages.¹¹² Although air strikes and city battles devastated the VC, the American political reaction resulted in Johnson’s announcing on 31 March that he would not seek reelection. Campaigning on the proclamation that he had a secret plan to end the war “with honor,” Richard Nixon became president. His plan to draw down American commitment benefited from several international and domestic developments and several policies the administration initiated. By the time Nixon agreed to the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, 21,000 additional Americans along with an estimated 600,000 Vietnamese had died.¹¹³ Less than two years later, a large-scale, conventional North Vietnamese-VC offensive captured key South Vietnamese provinces along with the capital of Saigon.

The Vietnam War provided American decision makers with three important lessons. First, it showed how quickly the requirement for ground forces in an Asian war could arise. This was primarily because of American decision makers’ fallacy in believing that the United States could conduct the type of war that it desired as opposed to the type of war that the conditions on the ground required, particularly in the absence of clearly defined political objectives. Second, and related to the first lesson, Americans must understand the culture and motivations of its adversaries. Trying to image Western reasoning and motivations upon Eastern cultures, with histories of invasion, war, and occupation spanning hundreds of years, is problematic. The North Vietnamese and

¹¹¹ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 581.

¹¹² Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 588.

¹¹³ Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 588.

VC had time on their side, something the Americans did not. Third, and perhaps most significantly, the Vietnam War serves as a caution against committing large numbers of American forces in places and circumstances in which America's national interests do not justify the potential loss.

Post Vietnam, 1973-1999

Following Vietnam, the US Army continued to maintain a presence within the Asia-Pacific region. Its continued presence required organizational changes, however. After America's commitment in Vietnam ended, the US Army Pacific headquarters controlling Army forces in the region was disestablished and direct reporting commands set up South Korea and Japan. Army units in Hawaii fell under the direct command of Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) in Atlanta, Georgia. To act as a liaison between the Department of the Army and US Pacific Command (USPACOM), the Army created a small US Commander-in-Chief Pacific Support Group in Hawaii. In 1981, at the request of USPACOM, the Army established a major component command, US Army Western Command, in Hawaii to address shortfalls in Army support.¹¹⁴ The 25th Infantry Division and supporting units augmented the new command.

Army Western Command oversaw several missions and exercises in the Asia-Pacific designed to engage regional armies and promote peace and stability. Engagement programs included senior officer visits, bilateral exercises, small-unit activities, individual soldier exchanges and multinational regional security conferences.¹¹⁵ These activities provided, and continue to provide, the centerpiece for USPACOM's Theater Security

¹¹⁴ *Transforming U.S. Army Pacific*, 6.

¹¹⁵ *Transforming U.S. Army Pacific*, 6.

Cooperation Program (TSCP).¹¹⁶ During this time, the Army continued its joint responsibility for the defense of the ROK,

In the early 1990s, Army Western Command acquired Army forces in Japan and Alaska and was redesignated US Army Pacific (USARPAC). This organizational change provided a larger force pool and facilitated enhanced command of Army forces in USPACOM's area of operations. The Army continued its presence in the Pacific throughout the remainder of the 20th century.

21st Century

The 21st century brought new roles and missions to the US Army in the Pacific. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and as combating terrorism became a priority, President George W. Bush's administration stepped up the number of training and counterterrorism operations in the region. Consequently, USARPAC assumed the role as joint command for Homeland Defense/Civil Support/Consequence Management in the area of operations.¹¹⁷

As of 2013, Army forces in the Pacific participated in 134 activities in 34 countries annually, while conducting more than 20 multinational large-scale exercises.¹¹⁸ These exercises have included Balikatan with the Philippines; Cobra Gold with Thailand; Talisman Saber with Australia; Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve with the ROK; Yama Sakura with Japan; and Yudh Abhyas with India.¹¹⁹

The post-Vietnam era and early 21st century in the Asia-Pacific gave American decision makers two valuable lessons. First, while some of the region's security challenges remain the same such as those originating from the Korean peninsula, new challenges have emerged to

¹¹⁶ *Transforming U.S. Army Pacific*, 6.

¹¹⁷ David Garcia, "US Security Policy and Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia," UNISCI Discussion Papers 5 (2004), 6.

¹¹⁸ US Army Pacific, "USARPAC Fact Sheet." *US Army Pacific*, <http://www.usarpac.army.mil>.

¹¹⁹ US Army Pacific, "USARPAC Fact Sheet."

include the threat of terrorism in a region boasting the world's largest Muslim population. Second, both old and new security concerns have provided increased engagement opportunities with Asia-Pacific partners and allies. From humanitarian efforts to military training exercises, army-to-army engagement provides for human interaction, the resolution of misunderstanding, and the ability to further achieving common national interests.

Conclusions

The US Army has a long history of campaigns and engagements in the Asia-Pacific. Sometimes out of necessity, such as during WWII and the Korean War, and others reluctantly such as the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War, American administrations have sent ground forces to war in the Pacific as a statement of American resolve. In each case, the enemy proved to be formidable and unpredictable. In many instances, American technological advantage failed to eliminate the threat; and hard fought, bloody confrontations bordered on primordial levels. Hidden enemies proved frustrating, US forces repeatedly found themselves facing an enemy unwilling to conduct operations on American terms. In each of these conflicts, ground forces were an important factor in determining the final results.

The lessons learned during these campaigns provide insight into how America should approach its posture in the Asia-Pacific region during its rebalance efforts. Recurring themes center on the American proclivity initially to fight the war it wants to fight, rather than the war it has to fight; conflicts have a large human component in which ground forces are required to deter, defend, and engage the local population; and the importance of joint operations and national assets in achieving a desired political objective.

Three important insights emerge from the foregoing historical analysis.

First, America must understand the global, regional, and local contexts of its wars and minimize the use of faulty analogies. This means that the US must not image Western ideas and decision-making concepts on Asian actors. To hedge against this tendency, Mark Clodfelter recommends an assessment of the nature of the enemy, type of war waged by the enemy, the nature of the combat environment, the magnitude of military controls, and the nature of the political objectives.¹²⁰ In almost every instance, American decision makers failed to understand fully the motivations and resolve of the adversary. When faced with the decision to intervene in Korea, President Truman cited histories where he “remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead.”¹²¹ President Johnson relied heavily on American experience in Korea to rationalize his decisions. From justifications for not withdrawing from Vietnam to fear of Chinese and Russian intervention, Korea set a precedent in Johnson’s mind.¹²² These faulty perceptions and decision-making concepts resulted in the US initially engaging conflicts in a manner it was comfortable fighting under established doctrine as opposed to ensuring fighting was commensurate with the regional and local context along with the characteristics, culture, goals, and capabilities of the enemy.

Second, warfare is an inherently human endeavor and requires engagement at the human level. From the destruction of an enemy’s army, to engaging in counterinsurgency operations, to deterring and defending ground, to performing stability and support missions, ground forces are required as an integral part of America’s desire to remain a Pacific power. Initial assessments on the number of ground forces

¹²⁰ Clodfelter, *The Limits of Air Power*, 219-220.

¹²¹ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 218.

¹²² Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), 133-135.

required during America's Pacific campaigns were invariably too low, and additional troops were subsequently required. The enemy, often technologically deficient compared to American capabilities, relied heavily on its ground forces. Despite overwhelming US firepower, air and maritime superiority, and resources, the enemy proved challenging. At the same time, these conflicts showed the importance of gaining intelligence and assessing military effects among the local population, while making necessary adjustments in strategy.

Finally, no one service is capable of achieving American national security objectives in the Asia-Pacific by itself. Operational and strategic success requires all elements of combat power working in sync to achieve clear political goals. From the island-hopping campaigns of WWII to the later years of the Vietnam War, air, land, and sea components in coordination with one another was the ideal combination for mission success. Today, while it is difficult to prescribe a set ratio for the services, the demands of the conflict and nature of the enemy, not some pre-set formula, should dictate service participation in any given joint campaign. All arms of national military power must be coordinated to achieve military objectives in pursuit of national interest.

Focusing on the Army's role in America's actions in the region, one sees certain missions that the Army was overall responsible for conducting. Based on these missions, capabilities the Army has given the nation in the Pacific from 1900 to the present included:

- 1) Counterinsurgency (successful in the Philippines and a failure in Vietnam)
- 2) Civic Action (Philippines, Japan, Korea, Vietnam)
- 3) Inculcation of Democratic Values (Philippines, Japan, Korea)
- 4) Sustained Ground Combat (WWII, Korea, Vietnam)
- 5) Occupation (Philippines, Japan, Korea)
- 6) Foreign Military Assistance (Philippines, Japan, Korea, Vietnam)
- 7) Deterrence (Korea)

8) Assistance to Regional Stability (Korea)

Awareness of these wide-ranging Army capabilities provides an important vantage point from which to assess the contemporary security needs of the Asia-Pacific region.



Table 1: Army Campaigns in the Pacific, 1898-1945

War with Spain

Manila	31 July - 13 August 1898
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China Relief Expedition

Tientsin	13 July 1900
Yang-tsun	6 August 1900
Peking	14-15 August 1900

Philippine Insurrection

Manila	4 February-17 March 1899
Iloilo	8-12 February 1899
Malolos	24 March-16 August 1899
Laguna de Bay	8-17 April 1899
San Isidro	21 April-30 May and 15 October-19 November 1899
Zapote River	13 June 1899
Cavite	7-13 October 1899 and 4 January-9 February 1900
Tarlac	5-20 November 1899
San Fabian	6-19 November 1899
Mindanao	4 July 1902-31 December 1904 and 22 October 1905
Jolo	1-24 May 1905 and 6-8 March 1906 and 11-15 June 1913

WWII- Asiatic-Pacific Theater

Philippine Islands	7 December 1941 - 10 May 1942
Burma, 1942	7 December 1941 - 26 May 1942
Central Pacific	7 December 1941 - 6 December 1943
East Indies	1 January - 22 July 1942
India-Burma	2 April 1942 - 28 January 1945
Air Offensive, Japan	17 April 1942 - 2 September 1945
Aleutian Islands	3 June 1942 - 24 August 1943
China Defensive	4 July 1942 - 4 May 1945
Papua	23 July 1942 - 23 January 1943
Guadalcanal	7 August 1942 - 21 February 1943
New Guinea	24 January 1943 - 31 December 1944
Northern Solomons	22 February 1943 - 21 November 1944
Eastern Mandates	31 January - 14 June 1944
Bismarck Archipelago	15 December 1943 - 27 November 1944
Western Pacific	15 June 1944 - 2 September 1945
Leyte	17 October 1944 - 1 July 1945
Luzon	15 December 1944 - 4 July 1945
Central Burma	29 January - 15 July 1945
Southern Philippines	27 February - 4 July 1945
Ryukyus	26 March - 2 July 1945
China Offensive	5 May - 2 September 1945

Source: Adapted from "The Army Flag and Its Streamers," US Army Center of Military History, <http://history.army.mil>.

Table 2: Army Campaigns in the Pacific, 1945-1975

Korean War

UN Defensive	27 June-15 September 1950
UN Offensive	16 September-2 November 1950
CCF Intervention	3 November 1950-24 January 1951
First UN Counteroffensive	25 January-21 April 1951
CCF Spring Offensive	22 April-8 July 1951
UN Summer-Fall Offensive	9 July-27 November 1951
Second Korean Winter	28 November 1951-30 April 1952
Korea, Summer-Fall 1952	1 May-30 November 1952
Third Korean Winter	1 December 1952-30 April 1953
Korea, Summer 1953	1 May-27 July 1953

Vietnam

Advisory	15 March 1962 - 7 March 1965
Defense	8 March 1965 - 24 December 1965
Counteroffensive	25 December 1965 - 30 June 1966
Counteroffensive, Phase II	1 July 1966 - 31 May 1967
Counteroffensive, Phase III	1 June 1967 - 29 January 1968
Tet Counteroffensive	30 January 1968- 1 April 1968
Counteroffensive, Phase IV	2 April 1968 - 30 June 1968
Counteroffensive, Phase V	1 July 1968- 1 November 1968
Counteroffensive, Phase VI	2 November 1968 - 22 February 1969
Tet 69/Counteroffensive	23 February 1969 - 8 June 1969
Summer-Fall 1969	9 June 1969 - 31 October 1969
Winter-Spring 1970	1 November 1969 - 30 April 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive	1 May 1970 - 30 June 1970
Counteroffensive, Phase VII	1 July 1970 - 30 June 1971
Consolidation I	1 July 1971 - 30 November 1971
Consolidation II	1 December 1971 - 29 March 1972
Cease-Fire	30 March 1972 - 28 January 1973

Source: Adapted from "The Army Flag and Its Streamers," US Army Center of Military History, <http://history.army.mil>.

Table 3: WWII US Overseas Deployments as of December 1943

	AGAINST GERMANY	AGAINST JAPAN
Personnel	1.8 million	1.8 million
Divisions		
US Army	17	13
Marine Corps	0	4
US Army Air Forces		
Strategic bombers	2,263	716
Tactical bombers	1,251	723
Fighters	3,456	1,897
Transporters	849	545
Naval aviation		
Land-based aircraft	204	1,662
Carrier aircraft	366	1,941
US Navy warships		
Battleships	6	13
Large carriers	1	7
Light carriers	0	7
Escort carriers	9	14
Heavy cruisers	2	12
Light cruisers	8	20
Destroyers	120	188
Destroyer escorts	112	57
Submarines	40	123
Amphibious transports	10	34
LSTs	92	125

Source: Millett and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*.

Chapter 3

Contemporary Security Needs of the Asia-Pacific Region

US economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the US military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.

- 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance

The Asia-Pacific region provides security challenges and concerns not only for the United States, but also for regional actors themselves. China, Russia, South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Australia all have geopolitical interests in the region. The security concerns and interests of the regional actors reach into the heart of those states' military and domestic interests. Understanding the security concerns of the regional actors is thus essential for America to develop its policies.

There are several common security concerns of Asia-Pacific states. Terrorism, border and territorial disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the growth of cyber threats all warrant attention. At the same time, transnational threats are attracting as much attention as military threats. Domestic concerns are prevalent with the majority of ASEAN countries, which compels them to look both inward and outward. Similarly, China and Russia are just as concerned with maintaining internal stability as they are with their geopolitical standing.

Looking outwardly causes several regional actors to be concerned with two states in particular, China and North Korea. If any states have the potential to cause conflict by either deliberately provocative action or action that is misinterpreted as being provocative, these are they. Chinese growing, economic, political, and military assertiveness creates

apprehension among other actors about both its demonstrated capabilities and its at times opaque interests. North Korea's nuclear capabilities and its stockpiles of other weapons of mass destruction make it a threat to regional stability. Together, China and North Korea represent the two greatest threats to American interests in the Asia-Pacific. These threats, however, also provide the US opportunities to strengthen alliances and promote stability.

This chapter first examines the security interests of the major Asia-Pacific actors of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The elements focused on include each actor's strategic significance, its internal and external objectives, and its importance in the region. There follows an examination of America's interests in the Asia-Pacific and an analysis of the most significant threats to those interests centered on China and North Korea. Finally, it examines opportunities available to advance American interests.

Interests of the Major Asia-Pacific Actors

China

China's rise in influence in the Asia-Pacific region is palpable. Its growing economic and military capabilities, combined with a new political assertiveness in the policies of President Xi Jinping, generate serious security concerns among its neighbors. Resources matter. China's defense budget is expected to continue rising as its economy continues to develop. The country has been able to increase its military spending by double digits for the past decade because of its economy, the world's second largest.¹

¹ *Asian Defence Yearbook 2012*, Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Osacar Sdn Bhd, 2012), 53.

With an estimated 2.3 million troops, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the both world's largest and among the most highly secretive. In an effort to alleviate concern among other regional actors, China insists that the undergoing modernization program within the PLA is purely defensive. According to the parliament's spokesman, Li Zhaoxing, "China's limited military strength is aimed at safeguarding sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity." Regardless of intent, the modernization continues; and capabilities and missions evolve. Analysts believe that actual defense spending is probably double the published figure. In his "state of the nation" speech, premier Wen Jiabao declared, "We will enhance the armed forces capacity to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local wars under information age conditions." Despite being far behind the US in many areas of technology, China has made advances in satellite technology and cyber warfare, while also investing in advanced weaponry to include its first aircraft carrier.²

The preface of the 16 April 2013 white paper *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* also seeks to alleviate the concerns of its neighbors by proclaiming, "China opposes any form of hegemonism or power politics, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, not will it engage in military expansion."³ Furthering this theme is a veiled reference to the United States, "Some country has strengthened its Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanded its military presence in the region, and frequently makes the situation there tenser."⁴ In other words, China wants others to see it as not seeking hegemonic power, but to view the US as the state that will destabilize the region

² Asian Defence Yearbook 2012, 53.

³ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* (Beijing: Ministry of Defense, April 2013), <http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm>.

⁴ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

through its interest in the Asia-Pacific. Explaining its actions, China states that it needs to “safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity and development interests.”⁵

As for perceived security threats in the region, the white paper cites a variety of international, transnational, and domestic concerns. Among them are China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; Japan’s claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands; Taiwan as “the biggest threat to the peaceful development of cross-Straits relations”; and natural disasters, security accidents and public-health incidents.⁶ There is also a belief that war is moving away from a focus on mechanization to one of information, as other global powers accelerate the development of military technology to gain strategic advantages in the domains of space and cyberspace. Given China’s development in space programs and cyber warfare tactics over the past decade, this is a notable acknowledgement and provides some insight into the state’s strategic direction.

Promoting an idea of diversified armed forces capable of carrying out multiple roles, China has developed policies and principles that guide the employment of its armed forces:

Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, and supporting the country’s peaceful development. This is the goal of China’s efforts in strengthening its national defense and the sacred mission of its armed forces, as stipulated in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and other relevant laws. China’s armed forces unwaveringly implement the military strategy of active defense, guard against and resist aggression, contain separatist forces, safeguard border, coastal and territorial air security, and protect national maritime rights and interests and national security interests in outer space and cyber space. ‘We will not attack unless we are attacked; but we will surely counterattack if attacked.’ Following this principle,

⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*.

⁶ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*.

China will resolutely take all necessary measures to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁷

Many observers have noted China's rise to prominence in the Asia-Pacific. While the country is modernizing its military, it contends that it is not under the guise of hegemony. As the country grows, its leadership is taking a more assertive posture. This new tone has the potential to lead to conflict if China's growing assertiveness goes unchecked or its intentions remain opaque.

Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK)

Given the North Korean regime's lack of engagement with the international community, it remains an enigma to many outsiders. Its lack of transparency has left observers to interpret the DPRK's vitriolic rhetoric and piece together information from its former citizens. One can thus only deduce the true intentions of the state from fragmentary evidence. Experts surmise North Korea's strategic goals as being 1) the survival of the Kim family regime, 2) the elimination of internal threats, 3) unification of the two Koreas in a manner advantageous to the North, 4) the strengthening and maintenance of the state's conventional forces, 5) improving capabilities in the fields of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles, and 6) upgrading deterrence against the United States and South Korea.⁸

The North Korean regime under Kim Jong-un has undergone several leadership changes since Kim's ascension, leaving some observers to conclude that Kim is firmly in charge. Following Kim Jong Il's death in December 2011, seven top officials accompanied the hearse containing his body along with Kim Jong-un. Two years later, only two of the seven remain alive and in leadership positions within the regime,

⁷ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

⁸ East Asian Strategic Review 2012, 60.

with the other five either retired or executed.⁹ Considering that those no longer in power include the former heads of the North Korean military, security police, and the country's ruling political party, a significant, and mostly public, purge is taking place.¹⁰ Some Korean scholars, such as Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University, believe Kim is consolidating his power, while others, such as John Delury of Yonsei University, contend that they are signs of power struggles and a growing rift within the top leadership.¹¹ Whatever the reasons, Kim appears to remain in control or the foreseeable future.

North Korea consistently seeks to legitimize itself as a regional power through showcases of bravado. Shortly after taking power, Kim's regime engaged in a number of provocations against South Korea to include the successful launching of a satellite into space, the country's third nuclear test, cyber attacks against South Korean banks and television stations, and the firing of artillery in South Korean coastal waters.¹² Direct threats to attack Guam, Okinawa, Hawaii, and the American mainland followed.¹³ The regime also continues its quest to be a credible nuclear threat. To obtain this status, North Korea needs to accomplish four tasks: obtain the necessary explosive or fissile material, incorporate the explosives into a warhead small enough to fit on a long-range missile, build a long-range missile, and secure a platform from which to launch it.¹⁴ While North Korea still requires a reentry vehicle for

⁹ Andrei Lankov, "N Korea: All in the Family," *Al Jazeera English*, 13 March 2014, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/n-korea-all-family-201431251015190619.html>.

¹⁰ Lankov, "N Korea: All in the Family."

¹¹ Tania Branigan, "What Does Jang Song-thaek's ousting mean for North Korea? – Q&A," *The Guardian*, 9 December 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/jang-song-thaek-north-korea-q-and-a>.

¹² "Parallel Worlds," *The Economist*, 26 October 2013, 5.

¹³ "Parallel Worlds," 5.

¹⁴ "Parallel Worlds," 5.

a warhead, it is already able to produce enough plutonium for one bomb a year from its Yongbyon reactor.¹⁵

While much is unknown about North Korea, its provocative actions and bellicose declarations indicate a country that is willing to destabilize the region. The regime under Kim Jong-un will seek to ensure its survival and take the steps necessary to become a credible nuclear threat.

Russia

As demonstrated during its hosting of the 2014 Winter Olympic Games, Russia wishes to burnish its international image. Despite apparent desire, Russia has also taken serious steps to cement its power in what it considers its sphere of influence. A few short weeks after the closing of the Olympic Games, Russia invaded the Crimea in what may be a sign of Russia's growing confidence in its place in the world. In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has emerged as a formidable actor, particularly in the area of natural resources. Its economy is growing, and its armed forces are modernizing. While some may consider Russia an Eastern European power, its influence in the Asia-Pacific region cannot be ignored. It is a player there, too.

Russia adopted a new national security strategy in 2009, moving away from a concept of national security as a purely military or geopolitical notion and acknowledging factors such as demographic strength, quality of human resources and quality of life.¹⁶ The document, which projects its strategy out to 2020, demonstrates an understanding that Russia's social, economic, and humanitarian conditions influence the state's security as much as does its military strength. These concerns are reflected in manifestations such as the widening gap between rich and poor, unemployment levels, and health and education. The strategy

¹⁵ "Parallel Worlds," 6.

¹⁶ David Fouse, ed., *Issues of Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges* (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2010), 22.

emphasizes protecting the country and its population against acts of terrorism, ethnic and religious extremism, and international crime to include drug trafficking. Nevertheless, while demographic decline and international migration are concerns, there is reluctance to address the issue with Russia's neighbors such as the former Soviet republics and China.

Despite deemphasizing a military role in national security, Russia's activities in the Crimea demonstrate its willingness to apply its armed forces in furtherance of its interests. Observers highlighted a noted difference in mobility, equipment, and behavior between the Russian armed forces in Crimea and those that entered Georgia in 2008 or the North Caucasus.¹⁷ The modernization of its armed forces is a priority. In a February 2013 meeting with military leaders, President Vladimir Putin declared, "Our goal is to create modern, mobile, and well equipped armed forces that can respond rapidly and adequately to all potential threats, guarantee peace, and protect our country, our people and our allies, and the future of our state and nation."¹⁸

Regarding China, Russia has shown signs of distancing itself from its once-close relationship with its neighbor. Current trends indicate that the country is attempting to shape a new East Asian security concept based on the supposition of a rising China. Some analysts believe that the reference in its revised *Military Doctrine*, released February 2010, of declining probability of major military conflicts yet increased military dangers on a number of fronts constitutes an oblique reference to China.¹⁹ Militarily, Russia has taken steps to bolster its presence on the Russo-Chinese border through the 2010 establishment of the Eastern

¹⁷ CJ Chivers and David M. Herszenhorn, "In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army," *New York Times*, 2 April 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/europe/crimea-offers-showcase-for-russias-rebooted-military.html?_r=0.

¹⁸ Chivers and Herszenhorn, "In Crimea, Russia Showcases a Rebooted Army."

¹⁹ *East Asian Strategic Review 2012*, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 2012), 187.

Military District. Expanding the area of authority of the former Far Eastern Military District, the new district places control over the entire border under a single military command.²⁰ One may also see concern over China in Russia's reluctance to reduce its tactical nuclear warheads while also rebuilding its intermediate-range nuclear forces.²¹

Given its shared border with North Korea, Russia has demonstrated its desire to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula. According to its 2009 National Security Strategy, Russia is concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies, as well as the production of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems or components.²² While its earlier tendency was to defend North Korean positions in parallel with China's stance, Russia is now showing signs it wishes to develop its own approach to North Korea. While China refused to criticize North Korea publicly following both the 2010 sinking of the ROKS *Cheonan* and the later shelling of Yeonpyong Island, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov criticized North Korea's bombardment of Yeonpyong, its construction of new uranium enrichment facilities, and development of nuclear warheads and missiles.²³ The two countries have since sought to develop a cooperative relationship without the influence of China.

Although engaged domestically and seeking to maintain internal stability, Russia is also being externally assertive. Efforts to modernize its armed forces are coupled with Russia's willingness to use them in furtherance of its security interests. Protecting what it views as threats to its national integrity are high priorities. The country is breaking from its traditional relations with China and is forging external alliances on its own terms, based on its own interests and concerns. It is unclear if

²⁰ *East Asian Strategic Review 2012*, 187.

²¹ *East Asian Strategic Review 2012*, 187.

²² *Russia's National Security Strategy to 2020*, trans. Rustrans (Moscow: Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 2009).

²³ *East Asian Strategic Review 2012*, 189.

Russia's annexation of the Crimea and efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine are merely targets of opportunity or part of a broader campaign of increasing Russian influence. A new Russia is emerging, and the direction it takes will certainly have influence in the Asia-Pacific region; the precise manifestations of that direction, however, are yet to be revealed.

Japan

Japan has maintained close relationships with the United States since the end of WWII. During this period, Japan has emerged as a global economic and political actor. At the same time, its imperial past in the region continues to affect relations with other Asian actors, particularly China, North Korea, and South Korea.

In 2013, Japan's Ministry of Defense published *Defense of Japan 2013*, which cited regional threats such as issues arising from territorial rights, as well as, the military modernization of neighboring states. Specific examples included recent North Korean missile launches and nuclear tests, China's expanded and intensified activities in the waters and airspace surrounding Japan, and Russia's increased military activities.²⁴ Acknowledging non-geographically centered concerns such as cyber attacks, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, international terrorism, and the increasing vulnerability of governance systems, this paper recommended countries with shared security interests work together to address common concerns.²⁵ This position seems to reflect Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's desire to strengthen Japan's military cooperation with the United States.

Japan's primary security concerns stem from North Korea and China. As a leader in nonproliferation, Japanese security planners have been acutely aware of North Korea's nuclear-weapons development. In

²⁴ *Defense of Japan 2013* (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 2.

²⁵ *Defense of Japan 2013*, 2.

his May 2009 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue, former Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada identified other global threats such as piracy, natural disasters, infectious diseases and climate change as significant threats to the region. Hamada, however, also emphasized rapid military modernization and North Korea's nuclear and missile tests, citing a need to focus specifically on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. He further stated that Japan was ready to be a significant player in nonproliferation and help promote an increased understanding of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).²⁶

Maritime security is another concern for Japan, particularly its linkages to Chinese naval expansion. There has been, over the past several years, an increase of Chinese survey ships entering Japanese territorial waters. Both China and Japan seek a greater role in sea lines of communication (SLOC) protection, which creates the potential for clashes between the two nations. Territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands further stress cooperation in this area.²⁷

Japan's security interests center on North Korea and China. The country believes that recent North Korean and Chinese actions have the potential to destabilize the region. At the same time, Japan is eager to help in efforts toward nonproliferation.

Republic of Korea (ROK)

The ROK is not only a key US ally in the Asia-Pacific, but it also remains in a state of war with North Korea. Despite its constant threat from the DPRK, South Korea has prospered economically, politically, and militarily. Since the 1953 Armistice, the US has maintained a military presence in South Korea. Today, the US has approximately 28,000 troops in South Korea and maintains wartime operational control of forces in

²⁶ Fouse, *Issues of Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges*, 92-93.

²⁷ Fouse, *Issues of Engagement: Asian Perspectives on Transnational Security Challenges*, 93.

the country. South Korea regained peacetime operational control of its forces in 1994.²⁸ Because of its remaining in a state-of-war, South Korea's security interests are focused primarily on deterring North Korean aggression and defending its homeland.

Tension on the Korean Peninsula has steadily escalated since 2010. North Korea's 2010 sinking of the ROKS *Cheonan* and the subsequent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island months later brought the two Koreas to the brink of war and resulted in the ROK's relieving several top-level defense officials. The death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, followed by his son Kim Jong-un's succession, has also heightened tensions between the two Koreas. As the ROK armed forces prepare for the impending transfer of operational control from the US to the ROK, preparedness for a conflict with North Korea has become increasingly important in the government's eyes.

Originally scheduled for 2015, the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the US to the ROK remains under review. Citing growing threats from North Korea, the Seoul government recently requested to delay the transition.²⁹ During the first round of discussions in December 2013, the two governments agreed to take North Korea's weapons program and the ROK forces' deterrence and command capabilities into consideration when deciding the timeline for OPCON transition.³⁰

Released the same month as the election of President Park Geun-hye in December 2012, the *2012 Defense White Paper* outlines the country's international and regional security concerns. Issues of territorial sovereignty, religion, natural resources, and ethnicity are seen as constant security challenges in the region along with growing non-

²⁸ "S. Korea, U.S. to Hold 2nd Talks for Wartime Control Transfer."

²⁹ "S. Korea, U.S. to Hold 2nd Talks for Wartime Control Transfer," *Yonhap News*, 19 January 2014.

³⁰ "S. Korea, U.S. to Hold 2nd Talks for Wartime Control Transfer."

military and transnational threats such as terrorism and cyber attacks.³¹ Viewing North Korea as its most direct threat, the ROK states its intension to “eliminate the enemy’s will to carry out provocations through a concept of active defense,” while addressing any acts of provocation with a “swift, accurate, and thorough response within our sovereign rights of self-defense.”³² The ROK government ultimately defines its national security objectives as “maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, guaranteeing the people’s safety and establishing a foundation for national prosperity, and increasing the nation’s international influence and advancing its status.”³³

Bolstering the ROK’s self-defense capabilities and upholding the ROK-US Alliance to promote stability and peace on the peninsula are coupled with engagements with neighboring countries to “maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” Acknowledging the ROK’s close proximity to China, Russia, and Japan has resulted in the ROK’s seeking opportunities to conduct mutual exchanges and cooperation to achieve regional peace and stability.

Its shared border with North Korea and history of war with its northern neighbor is an overbearing issue in maintain South Korea’s stability. Despite the constant threat from North Korea, the ROK has prospered over the past 60 years. Its goal is to continue to do so.

ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is comprised of ten member states: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, ASEAN seeks to promote peace and stability among its member states while

³¹ *2012 Defense White Paper* (Seoul: Ministry of Defense, 2012), 2.

³² *2012 Defense White Paper*, 2.

³³ *2012 Defense White Paper*, 40.

working together to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in the region. ASEAN countries are becoming influential economic actors on the world stage. Several of the factors supporting future growth among the region include rapidly growing numbers of middle-income households, strong growth in intra-Asian trade and manufacturing supply chains with Northeast Asia, and expansion in infrastructure spending and urban development across all ASEAN countries over the next two decades.³⁴ While given little priority in past administrations, the Obama administration views ASEAN as one unified actor. Justifying its greater US priority, one Department of State official proclaimed, “We are diversifying our strategic and military approach.”³⁵

In October 2013, ASEAN published the *ASEAN Security Outlook 2013*. The document outlines the security concerns not only of ASEAN as a whole, but also those of the individual member states. For each, there are combinations of traditional and non-traditional threats that the member state feels warrant attention. All member states have a consensus of a number of shared traditional and non-traditional security concerns influencing the Southeast Asia community. These concerns include terrorism, transnational crimes, nuclear and conventional arms proliferation, sea piracy, cybercrimes/attacks, epidemic and infectious diseases, climate change and environment degradation, natural disasters, and unresolved land and sea territorial claims. With regard to territorial claims, several disputes exist between member states and China over the South China Sea.³⁶ In addition, the members are using

³⁴ Rajiv Biswas, “Global Recovery Should Carry ASEAN Through Economic Headwinds,” *Forbes.com*, 19 January 2014, <http://forbes.com>.

³⁵ Tanguy Struye De Swielande, “The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *Parameters* (Spring 2012), 80.

³⁶ *Asian Defence Yearbook 2012*, Asian Defence Journal (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Osacar Sdn Bhd, 2012), 52.

ASEAN's security-related framework to enhance cooperation in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR).³⁷

Looking beyond the *ASEAN Security Outlook 2013*, the post-Cold War era has brought peace to the ASEAN member states. To these countries, traditional security threats in the region come from the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea.³⁸ This perception heavily influences ASEAN's desire for a balance of power in the region.³⁹ It also encourages the need for cooperation. Fostering regional and international cooperation helps smaller states such as those in ASEAN with insufficient national capacity to combat transnational threats.⁴⁰ ASEAN hopes that the example of avoiding conflicts and fostering cooperation will create regional norms that influence international norms.⁴¹

While comprised of ten small countries, ASEAN as a whole affects the region. The bigger powers must collaborate with ASEAN to achieve their regional goals. The Southeast Asian countries wield the power of economics and geography. Thus, any regional policy must consider ASEAN and its interests.

Australia

Australia is a strong US partner in the region and one of the foundations of renewed American interest in the Pacific. It is a partnership forged and solidified during the Pacific campaigns of WWII. Australia's geographic location places it in a position where it is keenly aware of the regional and international relationships it must develop and maintain. Australia's largest trading partner is China, and it is currently

³⁷ *East Asian Strategic Review 2012*, The National Institute for Defense Studies Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 2012), 127.

³⁸ Zhai Kun, "The ASEAN Power," in *The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Ron Huisken (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2009), 22.

³⁹ Kun, "The ASEAN Power," 22.

⁴⁰ Kun, "The ASEAN Power," 23.

⁴¹ Kun, "The ASEAN Power," 23.

beginning a multi-million dollar construction project to accommodate the rotation of US Marines.⁴² How the country perceives its security environment is important in understanding the region.

In 2013, the Australian government released *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security*. This national security document, Australia's first, outlined the Pacific actor's key security interests and provided former Prime Minister Julia Gillard's vision for "A unified national security system that anticipates threats, protects the nation, and shapes the world in Australia's interest."⁴³ For its national security objectives, the government cites protection and strengthening of Australia's sovereignty; ensuring a safe and resilient population; securing Australia's assets, infrastructure, and institutions; and promoting a favorable international environment.⁴⁴ It focuses on areas that Australia envisions threats originating and opportunities originating from. These areas include, but are not limited to, ongoing economic uncertainty and volatility, the persistent threat from terrorism, cyber crimes and attacks, ongoing low-level instability in the region, climate change, and changing demographics.⁴⁵ Australia believes the US-China relationship will be the "single most influential force in shaping the strategic environment."⁴⁶

Key national security risks include espionage and foreign interference, instability in developing and fragile states, malicious cyber activity, proliferation of WMD, serious and organized crime, state-based conflict or coercion significantly affecting Australia's interests, and terrorism and violent extremism.⁴⁷ To counter these threats, the country

⁴² Gina Harkins, "Australians Invest Millions to Upgrade Military Facilities for Marines," *Marine Corps Times*, 14 October 2013. <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20131014/NEWS/310140020/Australians-invest-millions-upgrade-military-facilities-Marines>

⁴³ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security* (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013), ii.

⁴⁴ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, ii.

⁴⁵ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, iii.

⁴⁶ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, iii.

⁴⁷ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, ii.

has developed “pillars” upon which domestic and geopolitical efforts will center. These pillars include countering terrorism, espionage, and foreign interference; preserving Australia’s border integrity; deterring and defeating attacks on Australia and Australia’s interests; preventing, detecting and disrupting serious and organized crime; promoting a secure international environment conducive to advancing the country’s interests; strengthening the resilience of Australia’s people, assets, infrastructure, and institutions; the Australia-US Alliance; and understanding and being influential in the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific.⁴⁸

After evaluating the security environment, the document enumerates three government priorities of efforts through 2017. These efforts are 1) enhanced engagement in support of regional security and prosperity to increase Australia’s influence in the region over the long term; 2) integrated cyber policy and operations to enhance Australia’s digital network defense; and 3) effective partnerships to achieve innovative and efficient national security outcomes, particularly in an environment comprising transnational, multi-actor, and technologically advanced threats.⁴⁹

Complementing Australia’s national security strategy is the *Defence White Paper 2013*, outlining Australia’s defense-related priorities and objectives. While acknowledging the need for the Australian government to dictate the country’s security priorities, the document refers to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as being the core of the country’s national security.⁵⁰ Defence views ASEAN as an influential actor in promoting regional collaboration to handle security concerns. Mirroring the concerns of other regional actors, flashpoints include the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the

⁴⁸ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, ii.

⁴⁹ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, 37.

⁵⁰ Australian Government, *Australian Defence White Paper 2013*, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), 1.

South China Sea.⁵¹ These areas “have the potential to destabilize regional security owing to the risk of miscalculations or small incidents leading to escalation. Establishing effective mechanisms to help manage these pressure points will be increasingly important.”⁵²

Australia’s geographic location makes it ideally suited to pursue the priorities of America’s economic and military shift to the Asia-Pacific. Its geography also dictates the types of relationships it seeks with other Asian-Pacific actors. As one of America’s anchoring allies in the region, Australia should be closely consulted in the working out of American interest in the Pacific.

America’s Interests in the Asia-Pacific

In 2010, the Obama Administration released its *National Security Strategy*, outlining America’s key national interests. The document articulated four enduring national interests: security, prosperity, values, and international order. Within the area of security, the document focuses on strengthening security and resilience at home; disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world; reversing the spread of nuclear and biological weapons and securing nuclear materials; advancing peace, security, and opportunity in the Middle East; investing in capacity of strong and capable partners; and securing cyberspace. This document seeks to promote prosperity by strengthening education and human capital; enhancing science, technology, and innovation; achieving balanced and sustainable growth; accelerating sustainable development; and spending taxpayers’ dollars wisely. In terms of values, the United States seeks to strengthen the power of its example; promote democracy and human rights abroad; and promote dignity by meeting basic needs. Bringing about world order consists of ensuring strong

⁵¹ Australian Government, *Australian Defence White Paper 2013*, 11.

⁵² Australian Government, *Australian Defence White Paper 2013*, 11.

alliances; building cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence; strengthening institutions and mechanisms for cooperation; and sustaining broad cooperation on Key global challenges.

While focused globally, the United States has declared in numerous public venues an effort to rebalance efforts toward the Asia-Pacific. Several American interests lay within the territorial boundaries of the region. According to the *National Security Strategy*, “Russia has reemerged in the international arena as a strong voice. China and India--the world’s two most populous nations—are becoming more engaged globally. From Latin America to Africa to the Pacific, new and emerging powers hold out opportunities for partnership, even as a handful of states endanger regional and global security by flouting international norms.”⁵³

As North Korea continues to flaunt its status as a nuclear power, the US shows concern for keeping the rogue state’s ambitions under control and ensuring it adheres to international obligations.⁵⁴ This includes efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and persuade North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in order to gain integration into the world’s political and economic communities.⁵⁵

To help facilitate access and influence within the region, the US seeks to continue its already-close relations with Asian partners and foster new alliances. Several of its efforts align with the security concerns of multiple Asia-Pacific nations. As stated in the *National Security Strategy*, “Our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation of prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region....We are working together with our allies to develop a positive security agenda for the region, focused on regional security, combating the proliferation of

⁵³ United States, *National Security Strategy* (Washington: White House, 2010), 8.

⁵⁴ United States, *National Security Strategy*, 4.

⁵⁵ United States, *National Security Strategy*, 23-24.

weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, climate change, international piracy, epidemics, and cybersecurity, while achieving balanced growth and human rights.”⁵⁶

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense*, outlines ten missions designed to protect US national interests and achieve the objectives of the 2010 *National Security Strategy*. These missions include countering terrorism and irregular warfare; deterring and defeating aggression; projecting power despite anti-access/area denial challenges; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating effectively in cyberspace and space; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; defending the homeland and providing support to civil authorities; providing a stabilizing presence; conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations; and conducting humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations.

Written in 2012, the Defense Strategic Guidance provides significant insights into America’s interests in the Asia-Pacific. As explained in the guidance, “US economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the US military will continue to contribute to security globally, *we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.*”⁵⁷

Two main states of concern are North Korea and China. Regarding North Korea, the United States intends to work with regional partners to deter and defend against North Korean provocation. This is particularly significant, given North Korea’s attempts to pursue a nuclear weapons program. At the same time, several questions regarding intentions

⁵⁶ United States, *National Security Strategy*, 42.

⁵⁷ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 2.

surround China's emergence as a regional power. The United States acknowledges that China's growth has the potential "to affect the US economy and our security in a variety of ways," and wishes China would provide greater clarity as to its strategic intentions to avoid regional friction.⁵⁸ It is no mistake that China is referred to in the same paragraph as the American need to maintain regional access and using "a balance of military capability and presence" to maintain stability, free flow of commerce, and US influence in the region."⁵⁹

Threats to and Opportunities for US Interests

America's interests in the Asia-Pacific coincide with the emergence of Asia as a major player in international politics and the global economy. However, the region is not without threats to order and stability. Several flashpoints exist accompanied by the potential for conflict. China and North Korea pose the greatest threats to US interests in the region. Despite these threats, opportunities also exist to advance US interests.

Threats

The greatest threats to US interests include those that have the potential to destabilize the Asia-Pacific region. As General Martin E. Dempsey notes, "All of the trends, demographic trends, geopolitical trends and military trends are shifting toward the Pacific. So our strategic challenges in the future will largely emanate out of the Pacific region, but also the littorals of the Indian Ocean."⁶⁰ The two greatest sources of destabilizing threats include China in the long term and North Korea in the short term. These two states provide the greatest security challenges to the region, but for very different reasons. One state, while

⁵⁸ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 2.

⁵⁹ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 2.

⁶⁰ Struye De Swielande, "The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region," 75.

seemingly reluctant to engage in outright conflict, is becoming sufficiently aggressive to raise questions about its regional intent. The other state flagrantly violates international norms and frequently engages in provocation.

China. China matters today and will continue to matter in the future. It is the greatest long-term threat to US interests in the region. Along with China's growth comes apprehension from several state actors, as China's intentions in the region are unknown. At the forefront of the Asian Century, the anticipation of Asian cultural and economic domination in the 21st century, China's actions and relations affect the entire region. Militarily, many view China with caution, while others see little reason for concern. The truth is probably somewhere in between. While posing the biggest long-term threat, any threat to US security interests derives from its rising economic and military power, combined with political assertiveness. This section looks at these three areas.

China's economic rise to become the second-largest global economy has intertwined the country with the economic affairs of several international markets. While already the leading trade partner with several Asian countries, China's economic strength influences both global and regional trade flows, emerging-market currencies, and the overall global financial system.⁶¹ A March 2014 *Wall Street Journal* poll asked 49 economists what overseas force they believed had the greatest potential to slow US growth. Twenty-seven economists cited China's weakening economy.⁶² This was after China reported weaknesses in January-February industrial production and retail sales.⁶³ This is understandable as the Chinese economy is closely tied to America's financial well-being. As of November 2013, China owned \$1.317 trillion

⁶¹ Kathleen Madigan, "Economists See China Slowdown as Biggest Threat to US Recovery," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 March 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304185104579437330513248834>.

⁶² Madigan, "Economists See China Slowdown as Biggest Threat to US Recovery."

⁶³ "Economists See China Slowdown as Biggest Threat to US Recovery."

of US government debt.⁶⁴ Another side of an economic-based threat is as China's economy rises, its need for raw materials and resources increases. This tendency could lead to increased competition for resources within the region, leading to conflict.

Efforts toward modernization constitute a central aspect of China's growing military presence. Addressing this in its Defense White Paper, the Ministry of Defense declares, "Over the years, the PLA has been proactively and steadily pushing forward its reforms in line with the requirements of performing its missions and tasks, and building an informationized military."⁶⁵ According to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), China represents a military threat of the highest order. Its war games foresee a China 20 years from now as hegemonic and aggressive, attacking military targets.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, others such as Jonathan D. Pollack at Brookings counter, "What is the imaginable context or scenario for this attack?"⁶⁷ To Pollack and others, China has too much invested in a stable relationship with the US to risk attacking it. Nevertheless, China's military growth and actions worry several in the region. After China announced a new air-defense zone covering the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Japan, the US, and the ROK dispatched military aircraft into the zone to challenge the Chinese claims.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ Matt Egan, "China Now Owns a Record \$1.317T of US Government Debt," *Fox News Business*, 16 January 2014, <http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy-policy/2014/01/16/china-now-owns-record-1317t-us-government-debt/>.

⁶⁵ Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces*.

⁶⁶ Greg Jaffe, "US Model for a Future War Fans Tensions with China and Inside Pentagon," *Washington Post*, 1 August 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-model-for-a-future-war-fans-tensions-with-china-and-inside-pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX_story.html.

⁶⁷ Jaffe, "US Model for a Future War Fans Tensions with China and Inside Pentagon."

⁶⁸ Simon Tisdall, "China's Military Presence is Growing. Does a Superpower Collision Loom?," *The Guardian*, 1 January 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/01/china-military-presence-superpower-collision-japan>.

A significant aspect of China's military modernization is its development of anti-access (A2) and area-denial (AD) capabilities and cyber capabilities. To ensure that America's security interests in the Asia-Pacific are addressed, there is a need to maintain US power-projection capability, along with enabling unrestricted access to the global commons. The challenge will be from adversaries that use asymmetric means to counter US military and technological advantage. Such measures include electronic and cyber warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, and mining.⁶⁹ As a result, A2/AD capabilities have become a major focus of the US military. According to DOD's Air-Sea Battle Office, "A2/AD capabilities are those which challenge and threaten the ability of US and allied forces to both get to the fight and to fight effectively once there."⁷⁰ These capabilities together with strategies to employ them "combine to make US power projection increasingly risky, and in some cases prohibitive, while enabling near-peer competitors and regional powers to extend their coercive strength well beyond their borders."⁷¹

Ultimately, perspectives on threat vary depending on interests. While its growing military strength and assertiveness is felt throughout the region, China states its armed forces "are undertaking missions which are noble and lofty, and assuming responsibilities which are paramount and honorable. They will constantly place above all else the protection of national sovereignty and security as well as the interests of the Chinese people. They will persistently regard maintaining world peace and promoting common development as their important missions,

⁶⁹ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 4.

⁷⁰ *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013), 2.

⁷¹ *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges*, 2.

and accelerate the modernization of national defense and the armed forces.”⁷²

The appointment of Xi Jinping as president in 2013 has produced a change in China’s rhetorical tone. Whereas former president Hu Jintao spoke of a peacefully rising China, Xi has adopted a more nationalistic message, stressing Chinese pride and asserting China’s rights within the international community.⁷³ In his first address to the nation on 17 March 2013, Xi exclaimed, “We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”⁷⁴ He continued, “To realize the Chinese road, we must spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core.”⁷⁵ While Xi has been unclear as to what the “Chinese Dream” actually is, the language is hard to ignore.

North Korea. North Korea is the greatest short-term threat to US interests in the Asia-Pacific. It is the greatest challenge to stability in the region and the most likely source of armed conflict involving multi-regional actors. Many within the international community consider it a belligerent nation, and North Korea’s actions affect several regional actors directly. Its threat is based on an unpredictable, unstable political regime with a history of human rights abuse, a nuclear capability combined with an active WMD program, and a long tradition of hostility between North and South Korea.

Stability on the Korean Peninsula is not only a ROK and US concern, but also a concern for other regional actors, including Russia,

⁷² Information Office of the State Council, *The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces*

⁷³ Tisdall, “China’s Military Presence is Growing. Does a Superpower Collision Loom?”

⁷⁴ “What Does Xi Jinping’s China Dream Mean?” *BBC News*, 5 June 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22726375>.

⁷⁵ “What Does Xi Jinping’s China Dream Mean?”

China, and Japan. A crisis on the peninsula has the potential to escalate quickly and draw in those directly affected, particularly China and Russia, who both share borders with North Korea. If a crisis erupted, China and Russia would have to deal with an exodus of North Korean refugees. The US, treaty-bound to defend the ROK, would have to engage North Korean forces militarily alongside their ROK allies. Japan, within missile range of a North Korean attack, would find itself enabling US and United Nations (UN) forces. In the end, what happens on the Korean Peninsula affects the most powerful and influential actors in the region and this could have global repercussions.

The North Korean regime is a historical aberration. It is therefore in all probability not a matter of whether or not the regime will collapse, but when. Furthering a military-first policy at the expense of its people, the regime is responsible for manifold human rights violations. Violations which the UN Commission on Human Rights describe as being representative of a state “that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world” and includes such acts as “extermination; murder; enslavement; torture; imprisonment; rape; forced abortions and other sexual violence; persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds; the forcible transfer of populations; the enforced disappearance of persons; and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.”⁷⁶ In addition to the humanitarian crises, allied forces going into North Korea could expect a complex and challenging physical environment with mountainous terrain, hundreds of underground facilities, and an army boasting 1.19 million troops that includes the world’s largest special operations forces.⁷⁷

Another pressing concern is North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability and stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the

⁷⁶ “North Korea: UN Commission Documents Wide-ranging and Ongoing Crimes Against Humanity, Urges Referral to ICC,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 17 February 2014.

⁷⁷ *Asian Defence Yearbook 2012*, 68.

event the regime feels threatened, it is an open question of whether and how North Korea might employ WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. If survival of the regime were at stake, there is little reason to believe that North Korea would not use its WMD. A 2010 RAND study concluded that North Korea has produced sufficient plutonium for six-to-ten nuclear weapons with enough plutonium from external sources for an additional ten nuclear weapons.⁷⁸ In the event a 10 Kt nuclear weapon ground burst in Seoul, it would produce an estimated 200,000 dead and 200,000 more casualties.⁷⁹ The only certainty US intelligence has regarding the number of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in North Korea is that the numbers are most likely higher than can be verified.

Regime collapse could lead to proliferation of these weapons as opportunities to introduce WMDs into the black market increase. Preventing the proliferation of these weapons will be a high priority for the US and its allies. As stated in the Defense Strategic Guidance, “The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology has the potential to magnify the threats posed by regional state actors, giving them more freedom of action to challenge US interests.”⁸⁰ Containing North Korea’s WMD stockpiles and eliminating these weapons will be a time-intensive and methodical endeavor requiring specialized skills sets, equipment, and personnel.

North Korean provocations of South Korea could also lead to military conflict. Given the ROK’s assertion that it will retaliate against future aggression, hostilities on the Korean Peninsula have the potential to draw in global and regional actors quickly. If such an incident occurs, the people of South Korea will be those most affected. The thriving South Korean metropolis of Seoul is in constant threat of North Korean

⁷⁸ Bruce W. Bennett, *Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat*, RAND National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica: the RAND Corporation, 2010), vii.

⁷⁹ Bruce W. Bennett, *Uncertainties in the North Korean Nuclear Threat*, ix.

⁸⁰ *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 3.

hostility. Home to over ten million inhabitants and the ROK government, Seoul is within range of a North-Korean artillery attack. While US and ROK forces would be able to provide a swift counter-strike if North Korea shelled Seoul, the damage could prove devastating and cause widespread panic. The US would be affected directly, as well, because US forces are responsible for the safe evacuation of non-combatant US and international citizens from the areas threatened under North Korean attack.




Figure 1: North Korean Provocations Since 2010

Source: Author's Original Work

Opportunities

While China and North Korea are the greatest threats to American interests in the region, they also provide opportunities. Depending on the path the US desires to take, three opportunities available are 1) to use the fear of a rising China to enhance existing alliances with Japan, South

Korea, ASEAN countries, and Australia; 2) to use China's need for continued economic expansion and maintenance of domestic stability to embark on a long, arduous process of converting it from a competitor to a partner in the region; and 3) to use North Korea's erratic, dangerous behavior to a) solidify the US-ROK-Japan relationship, and b) detach Russia and China from its alliance system. The first opportunity is probably the most tenable. The second and third opportunities will require the greatest effort on the part of the United States and depend largely on the reciprocal actions of the other actors involved.

Enhancing existing alliances. Tensions in the region are high because of China's global emergence. China's actions and interests have crossed paths with the interests and security concerns of several Asian-Pacific neighbors. Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries, and Australia have all acknowledged some degree of trepidation concerning China's growth. The US can work with these nations and develop closer alliances based on this trepidation. This could include trade agreements, military-to-military partnerships, and intelligence sharing. Their proximity to China and close economic and political ties influence the level of criticism some actors are able to express. However, all could agree on the need for China to clarify its interests. As stated in the Australian national security strategy document, Australia would like China "to embrace openness and transparency to help build understanding and trust across the region."⁸¹ The US should proceed with caution here. As China rises, the gravity of its global stature and capabilities may pull its Asian neighbors closer into its sphere of influence. Proximity matters.

China as a partner, not a competitor. Some argue that China desires to become a partner rather than a competitor. If true, then the US should convince China that cooperation between the two countries is in China's best interests. Conversely, however, Chinese distrust of

⁸¹ Australian Government, *Strong and Secure*, 29.

American intentions in the region could work against such US efforts. A growing distrust between China and the United States has the potential to create preventable tensions and hamper bilateral relations. In a published report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace titled *US-China Security Perceptions Survey*, there is a low level of strategic trust between the two countries. Only a small minority of all respondents in both countries viewed the other country as an enemy.⁸² A majority of US and Chinese elites together with the American public and a plurality of the Chinese public viewed the other nation as a competitor.⁸³ Among the survey's recommendations are emphasizing cooperation over competition; not allowing minority extremist views to hijack policy; building mutual trust through official and unofficial exchanges, meaningful dialogue on strategies and interests, and the explanation of intentions; discussing how to coexist and accommodate each other's interests; preventing the Taiwan issue from derailing broader cooperation; and establishing rules on cybersecurity.⁸⁴

Exploit the North Korean threat. The threat from North Korea provides an opportunity to solidify the US-ROK-Japan relationship while possibly decreasing Chinese and Russian support to the belligerent nation. Several regional actors acknowledge the threat posed by North Korea as genuine. The biggest hurdle, however, is the strong historical animosity felt between South Korea, China, and Japan. Japan's imperial history in Korea and China often reverberates politically. In July 2012, the ROK put a historic military-intelligence sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea on hold following uproar from Koreans over the proposed collaboration with the Japanese.⁸⁵ While US relations between

⁸² *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 1.

⁸³ *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications*, 1.

⁸⁴ *U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications*, 2.

⁸⁵ "(2LD) Japan Ready to Ink Military Pact with S. Korea 'At Any Time,'" *Yonhap News Agency*, 17 April 2013,

South Korea and Japan are solid, Japanese-South Korean relations remain strained. An increased threat from North Korea may trump this animosity.

There is potential for the US to influence the level of support China and Russia provide to North Korea. While remote, given China and Russia's interests in maintaining stable conditions on the Peninsula, especially its border areas, there may be cleavages to exploit. This is where emerging relationships may help. For example, John Delury, a historian at Yonsei University in Seoul, observes, "The most overlooked development in northeast Asia is the rapid strengthening of China-South Korea relations."⁸⁶ This is significant, particularly in light of Beijing's complicated relationship with Pyongyang since North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013 and Kim Jong-un's execution of his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who had built a strong relationship with China.⁸⁷

Russia has shown indications that it is becoming wary of North Korean aggression and may be ready to develop closer relations with South Korea. Moscow has become frustrated with Kim Jong-un's indifference to advancing the 2011 Russo-North Korean accords achieved by Kim Jong-il and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.⁸⁸ In November 2013 in Seoul, President Vladimir Putin announced plans to build an underwater gas pipeline from Russia directly to South Korea, bypassing North Korea.⁸⁹ Moscow has also offered Seoul various investment opportunities and joint projects.⁹⁰ With its influence over the

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/04/17/79/030100000AEN20130417008300315F.HTML>.

⁸⁶ "The Politics of Status: China Helps South Korea Honor the Assassin of A Japanese Colonial Official," *The Economist*, 23 November 2013, 48.

⁸⁷ Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, "The China-North Korea Relationship," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 18 February 2014, <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>.

⁸⁸ Stephen Blank, "Frustration with North Korea," *The Diplomat*, 23 December 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/the-significance-of-russias-frustration-with-north-korea/>.

⁸⁹ Blank, "Frustration with North Korea."

⁹⁰ Blank, "Frustration with North Korea."

DPRK in question, Russia may see advantages in increasing its influence with the ROK. There are several complications with exploiting this opportunity. Chinese and Russian distrust of American intentions in the Asia-Pacific are one. Another is the need for South Korea to balance effectively its relations with China, Russia, and the US. Nevertheless, North Korea's increasingly provocative behavior creates the possibility of its being susceptible to isolation, and American statesmen should be alive to this possibility.

Conclusions

The security interests of the Asia-Pacific region transcend borders and continents. WMD proliferation, border disputes, piracy, cyber threats, and terrorism are just a few of the challenges facing states with interests in this dynamic region. The security interests of China, North Korea, Russia, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and Australia all vary depending on national histories, proximity to other key regional actors, and ideas of territory. China seeks to increase its global stature and modernize its armed forces while assuaging fears of Chinese hegemony. North Korea's actions show a regime taking steps to maintain its power, using bellicose acts to garner international attention and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Russia is looking inward at the same time it is demonstrably asserting itself in its perceived sphere of influence. Japan's focus is on threats from North Korea and China as it seeks nonproliferation of WMD and shows concern over territorial disputes. South Korea sees North Korea as the greatest threat to its economic and political rise. The ASEAN member states view cooperation and collaboration as essential in limiting disputes and preventing regional conflicts. Australia seeks to secure its sovereignty, protect its people, and foster an environment of regional stability. Understanding how these key Asian-Pacific actors view the region helps the United States put its own interests into context.

America's overall national interests are security, prosperity, values, and international order. Acknowledging the growing influence of the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the US has stated its intention to rebalance its international stance toward the region. At the same time, several American interests lay within the region's boundaries. To help facilitate access and influence within the Asia-Pacific, the US seeks to continue its already-close relations with regional partners and foster new alliances. Two main states of concern are North Korea and China. North Korea's status as a nuclear power concerns the US as it seeks to keep the rogue state's ambitions under control, while ensuring it adheres to international obligations. At the same time, the US has several questions regarding China's intentions as it emerges as a regional power.

China and North Korea represent the greatest threats to US interests in the region. As China continues to rise, it is America's greatest long-term threat. While reluctant to engage in outright conflict, China is becoming sufficiently aggressive to raise questions regarding its intent in the region. Its rising economic and military power, combined with political assertiveness are sources for increased tensions.

In the short term, North Korea poses the greatest threat to regional stability and US interests. It flagrantly violates international norms and frequently engages in provocation. North Korea's threat derives from an unpredictable, unstable political regime; a nuclear capability combined with an active WMD program; and a long tradition of hostility between itself and South Korea.

The threats to American interests in the Asia-Pacific also offer opportunities to further US regional goals. These opportunities are: 1) using the fear of a rising China to enhance existing alliances with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries, and Australia; 2) using China's need for continued economic expansion and maintenance of domestic stability to embark on a long, arduous process of converting it from a competitor to a partner in the region; and 3) using North Korea's erratic, dangerous

behavior to a) solidify the US-ROK-Japan relationship and b) detach Russia and China from its alliance system.

The contemporary security needs of Asian-Pacific actors display their perceived position in the region and the direction they wish to go. Experience dictates several of these interests. For the US to understand better what steps it should take in the region to further its interests, it should know the similarities and the differences between the past and today.





Figure 2: Political Map of Asia
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency⁹¹

⁹¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Regional and World Maps," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html>.



Figure 3: Political Map of Oceania
 Source: Central Intelligence Agency⁹²

⁹² Central Intelligence Agency, "Regional and World Maps," <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html>.

Chapter 4

Analytical Evaluation and Institutional Review

What can the United States expect in the Asia-Pacific region? Where should it direct its national assets? By examining the history of the United States in the Asia-Pacific and its security interests in the region today, one can begin to develop likely future scenarios along with potential courses of action. Some of the security concerns of the past still resonate today, while others either have been transformed into new challenges or are no longer relevant. US foreign policy and America's approach to global engagement are significant indicators of intentions.

This chapter evaluates similarities and differences between the past and present and then evaluates the implications of both. It examines today's US security interests in the Asia-Pacific through the lens of previous American military campaigns. Similarities exist primarily because the motivations of state actors have changed little over time. Meanwhile, differences between the past and today are mostly environmental and stem from Asia's rapid economic and political growth, affecting the region's influence on global affairs. One can attribute other differences to the changing characteristics of warfare and military influence. The chapter ends by assessing the implications of the similarities and differences.

The Similarities

Echoes from the past reverberate. While Asian prosperity and the characteristics of security concerns may have changed, elements of American ideals and practices hold steady. America remains concerned about Chinese and Russian actions in the region, as well as their perceptions of US regional engagement. At the same time, the region's geography remains unchanged as it did during America's engagement in

the region during the 20th century. Perhaps more importantly, the nature of security remains eternal and is reflected in the beliefs of regional actors. Developments in technology and tactics fail to alter the basic elements of conflict management and state motivation. In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, writing on the importance of the region to US interests, highlighted that the “most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region.”¹ At the same time, Asian actors have similar concepts of investment. State motivations for engagement are the same today as they were in Ancient Greece. State motivations hearken back to Thucydides’ construct of fear, honor, and interest.

Fear

National security concerns and actions to mitigate those concerns often stem from fear. Fear of ceding the Philippines to other European powers drove the US toward annexation of the Philippines. Fear of the Americans entering the war on their own terms factored into Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941. Fear of the spread of communism sparked US intervention in Korea and Vietnam. Fear of American incursion caused China to enter the Korean War. Fear of Chinese and, to an extent, Soviet intervention in Vietnam caused President Johnson to place limitations on American military options. Fear of Chinese intentions and losing regional access to the global commons because of Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities may lead to future conflict involving US armed forces. Mortal fear and suspicion between North and South Korea could lead to a 21st century Korean War.

¹ Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” *Foreign Policy*, 11 October 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century.

Today, the US is taking several steps to alleviate those fears. One is to maintain regional alliances, assuring diplomatic cooperation. The anchors for US engagement in the Asia-Pacific are treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand. With the exception of Thailand, these alliances have been forged through previous US experiences in the Pacific. As Secretary Clinton observed, “They have underwritten regional peace and security for more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region’s remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security challenges.”² Maintaining and strengthening these alliances are crucial to establishing US military presence in the region. At the same time, they commit the United States to the protection of our allies as in the cases of the *US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960* and the *Republic of Korea (ROK)/United States Mutual Security Agreement of 1954*.³ These commitments are particularly important given Japan and South Korea’s shared concerns over North Korea.

Another step the US takes to alleviate fears is by increasing its military presence and fostering partner capacity. Part of fostering alliance, programs such as US Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) Theater Security Cooperation provide outlets for US and Asian partner armed services to train and collaborate together in preparation for regional crises and conflicts. The element of preparedness ensures that the United States and allied forces react to threats in a timely and coordinated manner. Coincidentally, these military partnerships help increase US intelligence within the region. Knowledge of capabilities and plans for contingencies help mitigate fear of the unknown.

² Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.”

³ Tanguy Struye De Swielande, “The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *Parameters* (Spring 2012), 78-79.

Honor

Honor can manifest itself in the perception of one's worth. It is the belief that a group of peoples or national identity is deserving of certain stature or destined for greatness. There are several past examples of honor motivating state behavior and influencing security in Asia and the Pacific. A resurgence of American national greatness materialized during the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, leading to US expansion into the Pacific in an attempt to bring "order out of chaos".⁴ Japanese nationalism leading up to and during WWII led to aggressive militarism and its attacking almost all of its Asian neighbors while subjecting them to occupation. Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, "a date which will live in infamy," stirred America's sense of honor and brought the US into the war.⁵

As in the past, one can observe honor in contemporary Asia. Xi Jinping's "Chinese dream" of spreading the "Chinese spirit" displays an emerging nationalist tone.⁶ For North Koreans, there is the long-held belief that the Koreans are uniquely homogenous, a race of pure-blooded people whose innate goodness has made them perpetual victims of foreign aggression.⁷ Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's December 2013 visit to the controversial Shinto shrine, Yasukuni, which honors Japan's war dead and several WWII war criminals, sparked outrage from Beijing and Seoul.⁸ In visiting the shrine, Abe, who many close observers

⁴ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 128.

⁵ "Teaching with Documents: 'A Date Which Will Live in Infamy,' the First Typed Draft of Franklin D. Roosevelt's War Address," *National Archives*, <http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/day-of-infamy/>.

⁶ "What Does Xi Jinping's China Dream Mean?," *BBC News*, 5 June 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-22726375>.

⁷ BR Myers, *The Cleanest Race* (Brooklyn: Melville House Publishing, 2010), 57.

⁸ Editorial, "Risky Nationalism in Japan," *New York Times*, 26 December 2013.

consider a nationalist and historical revisionist, played to his base, the right wing of the Liberal Democratic.⁹

Interest

Interest encompasses a state's quest for security and prosperity. Between 1945 and 1948, an American concept of national security developed that included a strategic sphere of influence within the western hemisphere, domination of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, an extensive system of outlying bases to expand US force projection, access to resources and markets within Eurasia, denial of those resources to adversaries, and the maintenance of nuclear superiority.¹⁰ One can see similar actions toward interest in the Asia-Pacific today. For China, it is trying to expand its power of influence beyond its geographical barriers: the Strait of Malacca and the ASEAN countries in the South; Japan and South Korea in the North; and Taiwan on the East.¹¹ Russia's 2014 actions in Crimea and its actions in areas it considers within Russia's sphere of influence are others examples. For the US, it is through the execution of six priorities: "strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights."¹²

Like attempts to counter Soviet and communist influence during the Cold War, the US is actively engaging regional actors to increase its security. Recent American policies toward ASEAN countries, for instance,

⁹ Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, "Why Japan's Shinzo Abe went to Yasukuni," *BBC News*, 26 December 2013.

¹⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War," in *American Foreign Policy: The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century*, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), 253.

¹¹ Struye De Swielande, "The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region," 77.

¹² Clinton, *America's Pacific Century*.

are attempts to counter ASEAN countries' traditional ties with China and are designed to gain control of the Asian Rimland, an area some experts believe will be the location of Washington's and Beijing's struggle for Asian dominance.¹³ Also, American efforts to limit the effects of Chinese A2/AD capabilities, the patrolling of Asia's sea lanes, and increased military presence and bilateral military exercises all work to maintain a concept of national security that originated after WWII.

Such interest led America to annex the Philippines as a facilitator for access to the lucrative Chinese market, while protecting growing US trade throughout the Pacific.¹⁴ One of America's most ardent imperialists was Albert Jeremiah Beveridge. Prior to his election to the US Senate, Beveridge gave a speech in 1898, outlining his vision for US economic expansion in the Asia-Pacific. He prophesized, "We will establish trading posts throughout the world as distributing points for American products. Great colonies, governing themselves, flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade."¹⁵ The underlying concepts behind Beveridge's proclamation are still found in the policies of the US and other states.

Today, economic interests in the region continue and are a source of engagement. "Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests," according to Clinton.¹⁶ She adds, "Open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on

¹³ Struye De Swielande, "The Reassertion of the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region," 82.

¹⁴ Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 38.

¹⁵ Gregg Jones, *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, the War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America's Imperial Dream* (New York: New American Library, 2012), 93-94.

¹⁶ Clinton, *America's Pacific Century*.

exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia.”¹⁷

Akin to economic interests is the need for resources. The quest for resources has led to armed conflict and occupation in Asia before. Japan's imperial history of committed atrocities in Korea and China, for instance, are still a source of great Korean and Chinese animosity toward the Japanese. The need to acquire resources is a need that transcends ideology. Regional border disputes and territorial claims are about more than the addition of land. They are about claims to the resources in and around these disputed areas. The ongoing dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is not about claims to a rock in the East China Sea, but rather to the rich natural gas deposits under the sea around it. According to Shelia Smith, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, “Energy is clearly what’s driving a lot of Chinese behavior.”¹⁸ While some territorial claims may be under the guise of cultural significance, resources and access to resources is and always will be a strong motivating factor for armed aggression.

State motivations in the Asia-Pacific remain the same today as those that impelled America’s first intervention into the region. Fear, honor, and interest will certainly carry over into the future, as well.

The Differences

Many of the differences between the past and the present arise from Asia’s emergence as a significant actor in international politics and economics. Many argue that the Asian Century has begun. This emergence has caused American dominance in the region to wane at a time it seeks to maintain its regional influence. The strategic environment has also changed. During past American military

¹⁷ Clinton, *America’s Pacific Century*.

¹⁸ Marianne Lavelle and Jeff Smith, “Why Are China and Japan Sparring Over Eight Tiny, Uninhabited Islands?,” *National Geographic*, 26 October 2012, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com>.

intervention in the Asia-Pacific, third-world status primarily dominated the region. Western-style modernity did not exist, particularly in areas such as infrastructure and technology. There are many past examples of American political leaders and military service members considering Asian peoples inferior, deserving of either scorn or pity.¹⁹ Today Asian states are establishing themselves as key actors on the world stage and as leaders in technology and innovation. Countries such as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, India, China, and Malaysia are models of growth. South Korea and Japan, in particular, have prospered following American post-war rebuilding efforts.

This rise in technology and modernity significantly affects the regional security context. The characteristics of security are evolving, and the security concerns of Asian-Pacific actors reflect this trend. Globalization of trade and information has connected the United States and Asia in ways more closely than previously imagined. Simultaneously, technological innovation and the emergence of global information society have altered the interaction of military means and societies. During WWII, one of strategic bombing's aims was to disrupt the adversaries' economies.²⁰ While some argue the intent was to undermine the social fabric of Germany and Japan, targeting factories and military facilities also had a military strategic purpose. Today, cyber capabilities enable states to disrupt economies and technological progress, accomplishing the intent of strategic bombing without the attendant destruction. This dynamic did not exist during previous American military campaigns in the region. It is, however, a dynamic that could destabilize the region and influence the conduct of future conflict. China, Russia, and North Korea all have histories of conducting cyber operations, and their full capabilities have yet to be revealed.

¹⁹ Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 80.

²⁰ Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 275.

Other differences complicate the strategic environment. Weapons of mass destruction are an emerging threat in the region. While North Korea's conventional capabilities remain a threat as they have since 1950, its WMD program presents new problems for any military force seeking to deter, defend against it, or occupy it after an internal collapse. The US and its Asian allies now must concern themselves with rogue nations possessing nuclear weapons and their development of long-range missile technology. WMD proliferation is now a concern for multiple regional actors, especially with the progression of global terrorism.

Despite these very real and important differences, several similarities exist between the past and the present.

Implications

The differences and similarities between America's past experiences in the Asia-Pacific and those of today offer policymakers several valuable insights. To further America's security interests in the region, it should mitigate the probability of armed conflict. This requires an understanding of how fear, honor, and interest will influence the likelihood of armed conflict in the region. Concurrently, US policymakers must be aware of how North Korea's WMD program and China's global rise as an economic power create challenges to US interests.

There are three implications of the similarities between America's past experiences and today. First, because fear, honor, and interest affect all regional actors, there will continue to be the likelihood of armed conflict in the region. Second, conflicting honor and interest between China and Japan have a high probability of causing armed conflict in the long term, either unintentional or deliberate. China's entangling interest with other regional actors such as South Korea, Australia, and ASEAN would further complicate such a conflict. Finally, because fear, honor, and interest all exist in the DPRK-ROK relationship, a high-intensity conflict is most likely to occur on the Korean Peninsula relative to other

locations on the Asian mainland. Given this likelihood and the potential severity of this conflict, this is the most important conflict to deter.

Two implications result from the differences in past and contemporary American experiences in the region. First, North Korea's possession of WMD and its ambitions to become a nuclear power with delivery capability make the prevention of a high-intensity war vital. Second, China's rise as an economic power coupled with American dependence on Chinese trade, makes a healthy US-China relationship paramount in the region. These implications mean that the US should 1) strengthen allied partnerships in the region, 2) maintain military presence in the region as a deterrent, and 3) engage in diplomatic and collaborative efforts with China to reduce the chances of misunderstanding leading to conflict.

American efforts to maintain and improve diplomatic relations with Asian-Pacific actors must be an imperative to promote regional stability. Such relationships should emphasize shared cooperation and interests in an effort to reduce potential conflict and further American regional interests. Opportunities to do this through military cooperative efforts are available.

There is a need for the US to maintain a military presence in the region to maintain conventional deterrent strength. Robert Kagan suggests that most East Asian countries believe that a "reliable and predominant America has a stabilizing and pacific effect."²¹ Kagan even goes so far as to suggest that China, too, while wishing to overcome the US as the dominating force in the region, views an American withdrawal as enabling an ambitious Japan.²² At the same time, an active US military presence provides credible nuclear deterrence. American military withdrawal from South Korea would likely embolden an already aggressive

²¹ Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 94.

²² Kagan, *The Return of History*, 94.

North Korea as it did in 1950. Some may argue that China or Russia could fill the resulting military vacuum if the US were to decrease its presence, but it would be at the expense of lost American influence in the region, and increased tensions among nations such as China, South Korea, and Japan.

Understanding China and developing a productive US-China relationship must be a US priority to reduce the chances of conflict. The US must ensure it does not conflate Chinese capabilities with intentions. While containment worked regarding the Soviet Union, such a strategy may not be necessary with China, particularly if Chinese intent is unclear. Lu Dehong, a retired People's Liberation Army (PLA) officer views American policy toward China and Asia as dysfunctional. He recommends cooperation between Washington and Beijing through opportunities for strategic engagement. In his opinion, these efforts will help expose shared interests and compatibility. As Lu states, "Mutual strategic confidence will flow from taking every opportunity to maximize the common interest."²³

Examination of the implications from past and present US experience in the Asia-Pacific demonstrates that an active military presence in the region serves several interests. First, it provides a means for regional engagement through partner activities. Second, it allows for the maintenance of conventional deterrent strength. Lastly, it maintains a credible nuclear deterrence.

Conclusions

One can develop likely courses of action and likely scenarios from examining the history of the United States in the Asia-Pacific along with the security interests in the region today. Some of the security concerns

²³ Lu Dehong, "The Role of the United States in the Future Security Architecture for East Asia – from the Perspective of China-US Military-to-Military Interaction," in *The Architecture of Security in the Asia-Pacific*, ed. Ron Huisken (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2009), 96.

of the past still resonate today while others have evolved into new challenges. Many of the differences between the past and today are from Asia's emergence as a significant actor in international politics and economics. This is a significant aspect of the region.

The nature of security and warfare remain eternal and are reflected in the beliefs of regional actors. Technological advances and new tactics fail to alter the basic elements of conflict management and state motivation. Fear, honor, and interest will always drive state behavior just as they did in Ancient Greece. Fear, honor, and interest not only explain the security concerns of regional actors, but potential conflicts involving North and South Korea, China, Russia, and the United States. Despite these similarities, the characteristics of security are evolving and the security concerns of Asian-Pacific actors reflect this growing trend. Not only are cyber capabilities a concern, but also WMD. To further America's security interests in the region, the US should mitigate conflict through maintaining an active military presence in the region, while building regional partnerships and cooperating with the Chinese to the extent cooperation is feasible.

Chapter 5

Meeting Army Capabilities Required in the Asia-Pacific Region

And if for one moment you believe that because Iraq is over and Afghanistan is winding down that the future holds few challenges for you, then you are terribly mistaken. Because as long as there are threats to this great Nation, the Army upon which this Nation was founded, will be the cornerstone of its security, its freedom and its future. And you, as Army Officers, will shape that future, secure our freedoms, and protect us from harm.

Admiral William H. McRaven

As the United States rebalances toward the Asia-Pacific, it must remember its historical presence in the region and evaluate its current security interests. Regional cooperation and collaborative efforts start within the human domain. Looking at China and North Korea as America's long-term and short-term threats, respectively, Americans must determine what they require from the Army. Similarly, the Army must determine what it must do to meet those requirements.

This chapter first examines what the US should require from the Army to advance its interests, mitigate threats, and exploit opportunities. It then examines what steps the Army must take to fulfill these requirements.

America's Requirements for the Army

To ensure it addresses its interests, the US must apply all elements of national power. In terms of military power, the US must take advantage of the Army and its dominance within the human domain. Reexamining the capabilities the Army has given the nation in the Pacific during the 20th century one recalls: 1) counterinsurgency, 2) civic action, 3) inculcation of democratic values, 4) sustained ground combat, 5)

occupation, 6) foreign military assistance, 7) deterrence, and 8) assistance to regional stability. Today's security interests require blending these capabilities with new requirements.

Taking into account threats to regional stability in the Asia-Pacific, the 21st century national requirements for America's army in the region should include four primary and four auxiliary missions:

- 1) Deterring War and Enhancing Regional Stability (Primary)
- 2) Preparing for War (Primary)
- 3) Foreign Military Assistance (Primary)
- 4) Counterterrorism (Primary)
- 5) Helping Inculcate American Values (Auxiliary)
- 6) Responding to Humanitarian and Natural Crises (Auxiliary)
- 7) Securing and Eliminating WMD (Auxiliary)
- 8) Establishing Military Governance (Auxiliary)

Requirements seven and eight are both contingent on a North Korean regime collapse or repulse of a North Korean attack followed by a partial occupation of North Korea. In addition, requirements seven and eight require full cooperation with Beijing and partial cooperation with Moscow. Having the Army take on these responsibilities ensures US interests are addressed while taking advantage of Army capabilities.

Deterring a major war and enhancing regional stability (primary)

North Korea is the greatest short-term threat to regional stability and US interests in the region. Its rhetoric and actions belie those of a state desiring peaceful cohabitation. The Korean Peninsula is the most likely origin of a major war in the region. Deterring North Korean aggression and preventing war between North and South Korea is of paramount importance. The US Army must assist in maintaining deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. There is no greater deterrent and show of US commitment than boots on the ground.

Preparing for war (primary)

The Army must remain ready to fight in the Pacific if deterrence fails. The most likely location for such failure is a war on the Korean Peninsula. In the event of a war, the Army is to “destroy the enemy’s forces as a means to further an end.”¹

To prepare for war the Army must train to fight, conduct joint and combined exercises, engage in war planning, and prepare logistically. This includes cultural training applicable to the region, realistic exercises simulating potential regional contingencies, and plans that account for possible involvement from third country intervention from such actors as China and Russia. Exercises with the ROK like Ulchi Freedom Guardian and Key Resolve should continue and expand. As historian TR Fehrenbach wrote, “You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting young men in the mud.”²

Foreign Military Assistance (primary)

Evaluating the security concerns of Asian actors, cooperation and engagement are desired to reduce the prospect of conflict. As engagement begins at the human level and several Asian nations value their armies’ role in defense, the US should have the Army take the lead in engagement opportunities such as military-to-military activities to prevent misunderstanding and conflict. This includes assistance in counterinsurgency and assistance in conventional warfighting.

Counterterrorism (primary)

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 97.

² TR Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963), 427.

Varieties in government, cultures, and grievances all influence terrorism in Asia. While significant characteristics distinguish terrorist threats faced by each Asian-Pacific country, similarities also exist.³ Countries such as the Philippines and Thailand have histories grappling with local ethno-nationalist Islamic insurgencies rooted in colonial policies and fighting for separation or autonomy.⁴ While Islamic ideology plays a minor role in these conflicts, radical Islamist elements in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia use these insurgencies to rally support for the Islamist agenda and radicalize sympathizers.⁵ As local terrorism has the ability to destabilize governments, the US must leverage its armed services to provide counterterrorism assistance to Asian partners. Counterterrorism “includes actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence global and regional environments and render them inhospitable to terrorist networks.”⁶ The Army, through US Army Special Operations Command, has an ability to influence this area in the human domain by working with governments, armies, and civil authorities to help them limit threats from terrorism.

Inculcating American values (auxiliary)

As a byproduct of Foreign Military Assistance, military-to-military engagements provide opportunities to educate national armies in civil-military relations and assist the US State Department in people-to-people engagement. Given the influential role of armies in the region, the US Army is well-suited for this purpose.

³ Scott Helfstein, “The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia,” in *Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 1 October 2009), 4.

⁴ Helfstein, “The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia,” 4.

⁵ Helfstein, “The Landscape of Jihadism in Southeast Asia,” 4.

⁶ Thomas K. Livingston, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance,” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2011), 29.

Responding to humanitarian and natural crises (auxiliary)

The Asia-Pacific region has experienced numerous natural disasters requiring humanitarian assistance. From tsunamis, to earthquakes, to flooding, the region's nations are aware of the threats natural disasters pose and consider them security priorities. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, nearly half of the world's natural disasters occur in Asia and the Pacific.⁷ In 2008 alone, natural disasters in the region affected more than 55 million people and resulted in 7,000 fatalities and US\$15 billion in damages.⁸ Recent US assistance efforts include Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2008, Padang Earthquake in Indonesia in 2009, Monsoon Floods in Pakistan in 2010, and the Great East Japan Earthquake in Japan in 2011.⁹ As an extension of its regional engagement operations, the Army should be ready to provide rapid, necessary humanitarian assistance and represent the US in the event of a natural crisis or another event requiring humanitarian assistance.

Securing and eliminating WMD (auxiliary)

A need exists for securing and eliminating North Korea's WMD stockpiles should US and ROK forces enter the country during a Korean contingency. Such scenarios include an internal North Korean regime collapse or the event US and ROK forces enter the DPRK following the successful repulse of a North Korean attack. As America's key land component command in the ROK, 8th Army should be prepared to secure and provide assistance for the elimination of North Korea's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to prevent the WMD proliferation.

⁷ UNEP Regional Office for Asia Pacific, "Natural Disasters," *UNEP*, <http://www.unep.org/roap/Activities/DisastersandConflicts/tabid/6056/Default.aspx>.

⁸ UNEP Regional Office for Asia Pacific, "Natural Disasters."

⁹ Jennifer DP Moroney, Stephanie Pezard, et al, *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, RAND National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica: the RAND Corporation, 2013), xv-xvi.

Establishing military governance (auxiliary)

In a scenario where US and ROK forces have to enter North Korea following a regime collapse or a North Korean offensive, there is the possibility that US forces will have to help establish a military government. While the ROK has overall responsibility for setting up a Korean government in the North, US Army experience in post-war governance may prove invaluable in an assistance role.

The Army's Required Capabilities

With knowledge of America's expectations from its army in the region, the US Army must ensure it takes the necessary steps to meet US requirements. Though the Army may already expect such requirements, emphasis is on the best ways the Army should contribute to America's rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. These efforts may entail organizational restructuring and change in priorities of effort. For all requirements, the Army must embrace its applicability to the human domain and learn to dominate this dynamic environment.

Deterring a major war and enhancing regional stability (primary)

To fulfill the requirement of deterring a major war, the Army should maintain Korean military presence and keep operational and manning levels at roughly present levels of combat preparedness. The ability to conduct a decisive land campaign is required to deter effectively North Korean aggressions and defend the ROK in the event of war on the Peninsula. 8th Army and its ROK counterpart have been deterring North Korea since the signing of the Armistice. To bolster combat effectiveness, the US Army announced the rotational deployment of a combined-arms battalion, comprised of approximately 800 soldiers along with wheeled

and tracked vehicles, beginning in February 2014.¹⁰ After the end of its 9-month deployment, the unit will redeploy to the United States and a follow-on rotation will take its place.¹¹ Such unit commitments, in addition to raising the level of prestige and desirability associated with Korean tours within the institution, will not only help meet the requirement of deterring a major war on the Peninsula, but also reassure the ROK and neighboring countries of America's commitment to stability in the region.

The Army should also examine other ways it can contribute to deterring wars and promoting regional security interests. The situational environment is influenced by the emergence of cyber warfare. This is an area where the Army has the opportunity to contribute significantly to national security in an era where senior civilian leadership is reluctant to engage in conventional ground warfare. The Army should bolster the size and capabilities of its cyber forces, both Active and Reserve, in an effort to provide operational forces in cyberspace capability. This not only includes broadening training and education opportunities while shortening acquisition timelines, but also fielding cyber teams to commands within the Asia-Pacific theater and working with regional allies.

Preparing for war (primary)

While fiscal restraints may make this requirement challenging, the Army must ensure that its combat capabilities are commensurate to counter the threats associated with the Asia-Pacific. The Army has already taken steps to prioritize the Asia-Pacific. One such step was the elevation of US Army Pacific from a three-star to four-star command. Organizing regionally aligned forces are another step in this direction and

¹⁰ News Release, NR-009-14, "Cavalry Unit Deploys to Republic of Korea," 7 January 2014.

¹¹ News Release, NR-009-14, "Cavalry Unit Deploys to Republic of Korea."

allow tailored forces with regional expertise to train and develop relationships with Asian-Pacific armies.¹²

The Army should also tailor its forces to complement the Air-Sea Battle Concept and focus on ways to counter A2/AD capabilities.¹³ Any battle against North Korea will be an Air-Sea-Land Battle and the country needs to broaden the Air-Sea Battle Concept to include ground-based capabilities. Capabilities the Army can provide to overcome A2 challenges include suppressing or destroying air defenses that challenge joint operations, as well as protecting regional enclaves for naval operations.¹⁴ The Army can also contribute to the A2/AD mission with its ground-based air defense systems to protect joint assets such as ports and airfields.¹⁵ As a people-oriented service, the Army must remember what sets it apart from the other services as well as contribute to the joint fight.

Foreign Military Assistance (primary)

Foreign Military Assistance demonstrates US commitment through military-to-military engagement with Asian partners. The Army should take the lead in this area and focus on assisting counterinsurgency efforts and conventional warfighting. As highlighted in the *Strategic Landpower White Paper*, a document developed between the US Army, US Marine Corps, and US Special Operations Command, influencing people “be they heads of state, tribal elders, militaries and their leaders or even an entire population – remains essential to securing US

¹² David Vergun, “Regionally aligned forces continue to organize despite budget uncertainties,” *Army News Service*, 23 October 2013.

¹³ John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, *The Army’s Role in Countering Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges*, RAND National Defense Research Institute (Santa Monica, CA: the RAND Corporation, 2013), x.

¹⁴ Gordon IV and Matsumura, *The Army’s Role in Countering Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges*, 34.

¹⁵ Gordon IV and Matsumura, *The Army’s Role in Countering Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges*, 34.

interests.”¹⁶ The Army should dedicate a brigade-sized unit to counterinsurgency efforts, the institution’s practicing experts in counterinsurgency with the ability to field teams of advisors and practitioners to allied nations. As assigned soldiers rotate to other units, they will be able to carry their knowledge and expertise to the rest of the conventional Army. In addition, the Army should expand the Army Irregular Warfare Center into a Center of Excellence responsible for not only doctrine development but also education in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. This Center of Excellence would then work closely with the designated brigade-sized unit and Special Forces teams to provide Army-wide counterinsurgency capability. For conventional warfighting assistance, the Army’s move to Regionally Aligned Forces within the active and reserve components is a way to build regional expertise and develop longstanding relationships with Asian-Pacific allies.

Counterterrorism (primary)

The threat of terrorist activity in Asia-Pacific nations requires the Army to be available to assist partner governments with their counterterrorism efforts. Counterterrorism demands constant and effective coordination among several governmental actors and across several areas to include military, social, political, economic, and psychological.¹⁷ Therefore, all elements of Army Special Operations Forces are required for counterterrorism efforts. While direct action missions against terrorist leaders are the most recognizable counterterrorism efforts, the ability of Army forces to enable and empower Asian partners to defend their governments and countries is

¹⁶ Raymond T. Odierno, James F. Amos, and William H. McRaven, *Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*, May 2013, 4.

¹⁷ Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (New Brunswick: The Interdisciplinary Center for Herzliya Projects, 2005), 287-288.

just as powerful.¹⁸ Generating special operations forces requires an investment in time, talent, and funding. These commitments need consideration if the Army seeks to expand the size of its special operations forces to add counterterrorism as a primary mission. US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) began increasing the total number of Army Special Forces battalions from 15 to 20 in FY2008.¹⁹ The Army should also increase the number of Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Group battalions to commit regionally specialized teams to Asian partners.

Inculcating American values (auxiliary)

As the largest and most respected armed services in the world, the US armed forces are ideally suited to highlight a dynamic, professional defense establishment under civilian control, governed by rule of law, and in the service of a democratic system.²⁰ Out of the US armed services, the Army is best suited to take the lead on military-to-military engagements within the region. One reason for this, as political scientist Andrew Scobell points out, is because in each of the Asian-Pacific countries, the indigenous army is the largest, most dominant, and most influential service.²¹ For its part, the Army must tailor its engagement teams to the culture and political environment of the partner country. This requires extensive knowledge and social awareness of the regional actors and strategic climate.

Responding to humanitarian and natural crises (auxiliary)

¹⁸ Livingston, "Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance," 29.

¹⁹ Andrew Feickert, "US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 September 2013), 4.

²⁰ Andrew Scobell, *The US Army and the Asia-Pacific* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2001), 32.

²¹ Scobell, *The US Army and the Asia-Pacific*, 32.

Responding to humanitarian and natural crises is another means of strengthening alliances and promoting cooperation within the region. This is particularly true since any US involvement in such operations will be part of a combined effort with other regional actors. A 2013 RAND study concluded that in the event of large-scale disaster relief efforts such as Japan in 2011, difficulties arose from the lack of a single military point of contact (POC) with which civilian US agencies and international organizations could coordinate.²² Based on RAND's recommendations, the Army should explore making HA/DR experience an additional skill identifier (ASI) and have Army Human Resources Command track individuals with this special skill set.²³ A cadre of experienced personnel would allow the Army to provide leadership in HA/DR efforts. The Army should also send senior officers to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) Joint Humanitarian Operations Course.²⁴ While relief teams are limited to available units, forces designated as Asia-Pacific RAF should include one to three HA/DR trained and experienced coded positions in planning cells. USARPAC should include regular HA/DR exercises and training scenarios. In addition to coordinating joint efforts with the other US services, the Army should utilize partnerships established through its Asian-Pacific engagement missions, especially with ASEAN countries given their willingness to engage in HA/DR efforts.

Securing and eliminating WMD (auxiliary)

In the event of a Korean contingency, ground forces entering North Korea will have to engage in CWMD elimination and include offensive operations such as characterize, control, detect, destroy, exploit isolate,

²² Moroney, Pezard, et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, xvii.

²³ Moroney, Pezard, et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, xvii.

²⁴ Moroney, Pezard, et al., *Lessons from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region*, xvii.

neutralize, secure, and seize.²⁵ Given the pervasive threat North Korea's weapons pose and the strong potential for WMD proliferation in the event of a regime collapse scenario, the Army should provide all equipment, training, and personnel required to carry out this mission effectively. While conventional forces can carry out parts of these missions, the Army must have dedicated CWMD expertise available. The Army must stand up organizations such as the 20th CBRNE Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives) to facilitate securing and elimination missions on the ground. Capabilities required include ready, expeditionary CBRNE force packages to execute a wide assortment of CWMD missions and reachback communications from the field to CWMD experts at all levels of government, academia, and industry.²⁶ In addition, 8th Army, US Forces Korea (USFK), and US Army Pacific should work with the Department of the Army and other US government agencies to develop a CWMD intelligence sharing network along with developing policy on the conduct of secure and elimination missions. The capability to integrate shared intelligence on WMDs may require the Army to establish a specialized organization for this purpose.

Establishing military governance (auxiliary)

The most likely scenario in which the Army would need to contribute to establishing military governance is in Korea following a North Korean regime collapse or post-conflict. According to Francis Fukuyama, such a scenario would require security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore electricity, water, banking and payment systems, and other areas of governance.²⁷ The Army will need proficiency in these capabilities to either provide services

²⁵ Joint Publication 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 10 June 2009, IV-25.

²⁶ 20th CBRNE Command, "Capabilities," 20th CBRNE Command, <http://www.cbrne.army.mil>.

²⁷ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 100.

or provide assistance to ROK counterparts. There will also be a need for the Army to help prevent the re-emergence of members of the old regime.²⁸ Intelligence gathering and sharing capabilities would need developing on the ground following occupation to carry out this requirement.

Conclusions

American security interests in the Asia-Pacific deserve a response from each US national security asset. From its armed forces, the US should expect specific contributions from each service to address threats to US interests. There must not be a tendency to limit regional challenges to only access. Each service possesses unique capabilities to enhance military operations in the region. For the Army, that contribution is the ability to operate in the human domain. While advances in technology exist, the human aspect of peaceful engagement and conflict has changed little over centuries. As elucidated in the *Strategic Land Power White Paper*, “the American culture’s focus on technology and productivity drives a tendency to view conflict as a technical problem to be resolved primarily by technical means. The US has been more successful when its policies and actions stemmed from a focus on achieving an understanding of the human and societal dynamics of the nations or regions where we have deployed military forces.”²⁹ For operations in the human domain, the Army is best suited.

America should require the Army to be responsible for seven missions that fit well within the human domain of operations. Primary missions should include deterring war and enhancing regional stability, preparing for war, and Foreign Military Assistance. To meet the requirement of deterring war and enhancing regional stability the Army

²⁸ Fukuyama, *State Building*, 101.

²⁹ Odierno, Amos, McRaven, “*Strategic Landpower*”, 5.

should maintain Korean military presence and keep operational and manning levels at roughly present levels of combat preparedness while building cyberspace forces. To prepare for war the Army should continue prioritizing the Asia-Pacific theater, commit units to the region through Regionally Aligned Forces, and demonstrate the need to broaden the Air-Sea Battle Concept to Air-Sea-Land Battle. Foreign Military Assistance requires the Army to dedicate a unit to counterinsurgency expertise and establish a Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence while assisting allies in conventional warfare. To meet the demands for counterterrorism, the Army should commit additional time, talent, and funding to its special operations forces while increasing the number of its battalions.

Auxiliary missions should include helping inculcate American values, responding to humanitarian and natural crises, securing and eliminating WMD, and establishing military governance. Inculcating American values is achieved through military-to-military engagement and the demonstration of a professional army working under civilian control. To respond to humanitarian and natural crises the Army should develop a HA/DR additional skill identifier and track personnel with this special skill set to find disaster relief leadership and aid in HA/DR planning at the operational level. Securing and eliminating WMD requires the Army to stand up rapidly deployable units with CWMD expertise and consider establishing a specialized organization able to integrate WMD intelligence from several national and international assets. To establish military governance, the Army should ensure it is proficient in such capabilities as security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore electricity, water, banking and payment systems, and other areas of governance.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

Speaking before the ASEAN Defense Forum held in Honolulu on 3 April 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel told the attendees, “We are committed to the security and the prosperity of the region because of our interests, and also [because of] our close relationships, alliances, and commitments. America has a long-standing engagement and commitment with the Asia-Pacific region. It’s a commitment that we will continue to meet in the 21st century.”¹ As Asia continues to grow in global stature, American interests in the region will as well. It is up to the United States to determine what role the US Army should play in shaping American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Being successful in Asia and the Pacific requires the United States to maximize the contributions of all the armed services because each service possesses its own capabilities to address particular aspects of the Asia-Pacific region. While the vast size of the region creates access and coverage problems that require a solution, a human contact and engagement problem also exists. Solutions to these challenges lie in the concept of jointness. Combining the capabilities and experiences of all the US services in the region will allow the United States to achieve its strategic objectives. History has shown that over-emphasizing the capabilities of one service over another and over-relying on technology to overcome human challenges produce a faulty strategic premise. Therefore, the US Army must determine how it can best meet the America’s Asia-Pacific requirements.

The US Army has an enduring legacy in the Asia-Pacific. It has contributed to America’s strategic interests in the region through its

¹ Cheryl Pellerin, “US-ASEAN Forum Deepens Partnerships, Increases Opportunities,” *US Department of Defense*, 3 April 2014, <http://defense.gov>.

participation in campaigns including the Philippine Insurrection, World War II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and it continues to contribute today. In many instances, America's technological advantage failed to eliminate the threat as hard fought, bloody confrontations drove on for years. Unseen enemies frustrated US troops and leadership as US forces found themselves facing an enemy unwilling to conduct operations on American terms. However, despite these challenges, ground forces were a deciding factor in eventual military success during every conflict. In the end, the capabilities the Army provided to 20th century American intervention in the Asia-Pacific included: 1) counterinsurgency, 2) civic action, 3) inculcation of democratic values, 4) sustained ground combat, 5) occupation, 6) foreign military assistance, 7) deterrence, and 8) assistance to regional stability.

Understanding the Army's role in the region requires first an understanding of the global, regional, and local contexts of previous US conflicts in the area. In addition, warfare as a human endeavor requires engagement at the human level. The destruction of an enemy's army, engaging in counterinsurgency operations, deterring and defending ground, and performing stability and support missions, all require forces on the ground. Operational and strategic success requires all elements of combat power working in sync to achieve clear political goals.

The security interests of Asia and the Pacific affect states beyond regional borders. Several regional actors are influenced by WMD proliferation, border disputes, cyber threats, and terrorism. The security interests of China, North Korea, Russia, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and Australia all vary depending on their histories, proximity to other key regional actors, and concepts of territory. China's increase in global stature and military modernization have resulted in alarm from several regional and global actors. Speaking on China's growth, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel remarked, "With this power comes new and wider responsibilities as to how you use your power, how you employ that

military power.”² Meanwhile, North Korea endeavors to maintain regime stability, using acts of aggression against its neighbors to achieve international legitimacy and gain recognition as a nuclear power. Russia is looking inward at the same time it is asserting itself in areas such as the Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Japan remains focused on North Korea and China, advocating for nonproliferation while showing concern over territorial disputes. South Korea rightfully views North Korea as the greatest threat to its economic and political rise. The ASEAN member states have embarked on a mission of cooperation and collaboration to limit disputes and prevent regional conflict. Australia, in the meantime, seeks to look after its sovereignty, protect its people, and foster an environment of regional stability. For the United States to put its own security interests into perspective, it must understand the views of these key Asian-Pacific actors.

For America, its overall national interests are security, prosperity, values, and international order. Acknowledging the Asian Century, the US has turned its attention to the region and proclaimed its interests. Continuing its already-close relations with regional partners and fostering new alliances helps the US achieve access and influence within the Asia-Pacific.

China and North Korea represent the greatest threats to US interests in the region. China’s continuing rise in economic, military, and political stature is America’s greatest long-term threat. Of great concern is China’s political assertiveness. Its rising economic and military power, combined with this political assertiveness are sources for increased tensions in the region. In addition, the US seeks greater transparency from China. North Korea, meanwhile, poses the greatest threat to regional stability and US interests in the short term. North Korea’s threat derives from an unpredictable, unstable political regime, a nuclear

² Cheryl Pellerin, “Hagel: US to Send 2 More Aegis Ships to Japan,” *US Department of Defense*, 6 April 2014, <http://defense.gov>.

capability combined with an active WMD program, and a long tradition of hostility between North and South Korea. As North Korea continues to seek status as a nuclear power, the US desires to keep the rogue state's ambitions under control while ensuring it adheres to international obligations.

Threats to American interests in the Asia-Pacific also offer opportunities. Opportunities to further US strategic goals are: 1) use the fear of a rising China to enhance existing alliances with Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries, and Australia; 2) use China's need for continued economic expansion and maintenance of domestic stability to embark on a long, arduous process of converting it from a competitor to a partner in the region; and 3) use North Korea's erratic, dangerous behavior to a) solidify the US-ROK-Japan relationship, and b) detach Russia and China from its alliance system.

Examining the history of the United States along with the security interests in the region suggests feasible courses of action and plausible future scenarios. Several past security concerns reverberate today, while others have become new challenges. The nature of security and warfare remain the same. Fear, honor, and interest continue to drive state behavior. Many of the differences between the past and today are from Asia's emergence as a significant actor in international politics and economics. The characteristics of security are also evolving and the security concerns of Asian-Pacific actors reflect this trend. Cyber capabilities are a concern, as well as WMDs. Furthering America's security interests in the region requires the US to mitigate conflict through understanding the nature of war, cooperating and collaborating with the Chinese, and maintaining US military presence in the region.

America should require the Army to be responsible for eight missions that fit within the human domain as it looks toward the 21st century. These responsibilities should include:

- 1) Deterring War and Enhancing Regional Stability (Primary)

- 2) Preparing for War (Primary)
- 3) Foreign Military Assistance (Primary)
- 4) Counterterrorism (Primary)
- 5) Helping Inculcate American Values (Auxiliary)
- 6) Responding to Humanitarian and Natural Crises (Auxiliary)
- 7) Securing and Eliminating WMD (Auxiliary)
- 8) Establishing Military Governance (Auxiliary)

To meet the requirement of deterring war and enhancing regional stability the Army should maintain military presence on the Korean Peninsula while building cyberspace forces capable of contributing to operational forces. To prepare for war the Army should continue prioritizing the Asia-Pacific theater, commit units to the region through Regionally Aligned Forces, and broaden the Air-Sea Battle Concept to through dedicating its own assets capable of countering A2/AD to the theater. Foreign Military Assistance requires the Army to dedicate a brigade-sized unit to counterinsurgency expertise and establish a Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence while assisting allies in conventional warfare. Counterterrorism demands that the Army commit additional time, talent, and funding to its special operations forces while increasing the number of its battalions.

The Army must ensure it has the capabilities to achieve its auxiliary requirements as well. Inculcating American values is achieved through partner capacity missions as the Army demonstrates the capabilities of a professional army working under democratic, civilian control. To respond to humanitarian and natural crises the Army should develop a HA/DR additional skill identifier and create a pool of skilled personnel from which to find disaster relief leadership and aid in HA/DR planning at the operational level. Securing and eliminating WMD requires the Army to generate rapidly deployable units with CWMD expertise and consider a specialized organization able to integrate WMD intelligence from several sources. To establish military governance in

situations such as North Korean regime collapse of post-Korean conflict, the Army should ensure it is proficient in such capabilities as security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore electricity, water, banking and payment systems, and other areas of governance.

The history of US involvement in the region and the proclivities of the various Asia-Pacific states suggest ground forces will most likely play a significant role in regional affairs. However, new environmental challenges and complexities exist. The Army must correctly appreciate the current regional complexities and ensure it is able to meet the strategic objectives of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. To do so, it will have to bolster its cyberspace forces, dedicate its own counter A2/AD assets to the region, retain an element of its counterinsurgency capabilities and expertise, identify and manage personnel with HA/DR experience, and expand its CWMD capabilities. Harkening to its legacy in the Asia-Pacific and realizing how it can best contribute to America's 21st century interests, the Army will ensure that it does not become the forgotten service as America surveys the vast Pacific.

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