



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**THE CONSEQUENCES TO NATIONAL SECURITY OF
JURISDICTIONAL GRAY AREAS BETWEEN
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY**

by

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September 2014

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GRAY AREAS BETWEEN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY**

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ABSTRACT

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on United States (U.S.) soil memorialized as 9/11 served as the catalyst for major reforms in the federal government. Twenty-two agencies combined to form the Department of Homeland Security with a mission of preventing homeland attacks and reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism. Accomplishing this amalgamation has led Federal Emergency Management Agency supported emergency management discipline principles and homeland security supported discipline principles to create jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs) with stakeholders on a path of division in preparedness, training, and command. Defining “all-hazards” placed them at opposite ends of the spectrum. The purpose of this research is to determine the presence of JGAs, and define “all-hazards.” Case study and qualitative methodologies are utilized to examine three cases for JGAs, a disaster, act of terrorism, and an act of workplace violence. The results revealed utilizing an incident command system on any of these incidents reduces JGAs, Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) provides a holistic approach to disaster and terrorism, and an “all-hazards” incident also requires a management component. The recommendations are: 1) further research in reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, 2) support to sustain HS as a recognized discipline, and 3) research that identifies mentally unstable employees prior to acts of workplace violence.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION	2
B.	STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	2
	1. Community Emergency Planning and Preparedness.....	3
	2. National Preparedness and Response	6
	3. All-hazards Response.....	9
C.	BACKGROUND AND NEED	10
	1. Challenges in Emergency Planning and Preparedness	10
	2. Challenges in National Preparedness.....	11
	3. Challenges in All-hazards.....	12
D.	PURPOSE OF THE STUDY	13
E.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	15
F.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	15
G.	LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY	15
II.	LITERATURE REVIEW	17
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	17
	1. National Preparedness Goal.....	17
	2. Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness.....	19
	3. Robert T. Stafford Act—Title VI—Emergency Preparedness.....	20
	4. Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002	21
	5. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review	22
	6. All-hazards.....	23
B.	SUMMARY	24
III.	CASE STUDY 1—HURRICANE KATRINA.....	25
IV.	CASE STUDY 2—BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING.....	33
V.	CASE STUDY 3—WASHINGTON NAVY YARD SHOOTING	39
VI.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	43
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	43
B.	SETTING.....	43
C.	SAMPLE.....	43
D.	MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS	44
E.	DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES.....	44
VII.	RESULTS	45
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	45
B.	EMERGING THEMES.....	45
VIII.	DISCUSSION	49
A.	CHALLENGES.....	49
B.	LIMITATIONS	52
IX.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	55

X. CONCLUSIONS	57
APPENDIX. CASE STUDIES QUALITATIVE MATRIX	59
LIST OF REFERENCES	61
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	65

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CERT	Community Emergency Response Team
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
ELF	extremely low frequency
EM	emergency management
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EMT	Emergency Medical Technician
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP	Federal Response Plan
HS	homeland security
HSA	Homeland Security Act
IAP	Incident Action Plan
IC	Incident Commander
ICS	Incident Command System
JGA	jurisdictional gray areas
NIMS	National Incident Command System
NBC	Nuclear, biological, chemical
NPG	National Preparedness Goal
NRF	National Response Framework
NRP	National Response Plan
PDA	preliminary damage assessment
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PPD	Presidential Policy Directive
PPD-8	Presidential Policy Directive-8
PDD-39	Presidential Decision Directive-39
PTSD	post-traumatic stress disorder
QHSR	Quadrennial Homeland Security Report

U.S. United States
UC Unified Command

WMD Weapons of mass destruction

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The September 11, 2001 attack on United States (U.S.) home soil memorialized today as 9/11 stands as the deadliest act of terrorism in this nation's history. The attack changed American lives forever, and 13 years post 9/11, it is recognized as the catalyst and wakeup call for securing the homeland from future threats and acts of terrorism by reducing the nation's vulnerability. The unprovoked and random nature of an act of terrorism psychologically impacts a nation with implicit feelings of uneasiness for many of its citizens. The threat of terrorism is seen as equally psychologically impacting as it also promotes a nation's citizens with implicit feelings and uneasiness along with the added fear of when the next act, whether successful or not, will occur. A thwarted act of terrorism serves notice that counterterrorism measures are either needed or must be continued. The global challenge of national security and counterterrorism is primarily the responsibility of a nation's government. Heading up the challenge of national security in the United States is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This research explores how the determination, and more importantly, the urgency of the nation's leaders to show resiliency, has created jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs) between emergency management (EM) and homeland security (HS) disciplines that have consequences to national security.

HISTORY

In the wake 9/11, which exposed U.S. vulnerability to terrorist attacks on its homeland, the signing of the Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 represented the blueprint for a nation of resiliency that unified the government and its community citizenry while deploying measures of counterterrorism as never seen before. The HSA established the DHS by combining 22 agencies with a primary mission of securing the United States against attacks on its homeland and reducing its vulnerability. Along with supporting organizations and community citizenry, the DHS formed what is referred to today as the *homeland security enterprise*. The enterprise composes strategies of implementation for securing the nation against acts of terrorism through intelligence and information collection and analysis, counterterrorism strategies and tactics, law

enforcement policing, investigating and surveillance, fire service suppression and rescue, and emergency medical triage, treatment, and transport. Public safety entities, primarily law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services, represent the majority of first responders to both a disaster, either natural or human-made, and an act of terrorism.

The management component for a response to a disaster or act of terrorism is the responsibility of the emergency management agency within the city, municipality, tribe, or state.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) traditionally provided the management component for any disaster, natural or human-made that occurred in the United States in which all local and state resources had been expended without mitigation, or a major recovery effort was expected from a large loss of life, destruction to vital infrastructure components, or any other “all-hazards” emergency that left the devastated areas in need of federal assistance. Incidents of national consequence that expended all local and state resources to include an act of terrorism were also the responsibility of FEMA. The request for federal assistance was made by the affected state’s governor, and executed by a presidential declaration in which the provisions of the Stafford Act designated FEMA to manage and coordinate all federal resources deployed to the city, municipality, tribe, or state granted under this act. The 9/11 attack, which led to establishing the DHS, placed management responsibility with this federal agency. Title V, of the HSA—Emergency Preparedness and Response, provided the framework for emergency responders to respond, mitigate, and recover effectively from not only terrorist attacks, but disasters, both natural and human-made, and any incident of national consequence. Initial JGA can be found as the HSA of 2002, Title V section 503 (1)—Functions Transferred, designates management responsibilities to the DHS, while section 507(1)—Role of Federal Emergency Management Agency, of this same act designates FEMA as the lead federal agency for the execution of all functions and authorities of the Stafford Act.

The traditional EM and the emerging HS disciplines have created JGAs in preparedness, training, and on-scene command as the stakeholders of both disciplines are one in the same. Discipline principles of both EM and HS not only represent the same

stakeholders, but the operations often require the same first responders. Adding to this complexity is the definition of “all-hazards” by both disciplines. EM defines “all-hazards” as any incident that is not a disaster, neither natural nor human-made, such as a hurricane, earthquake, while HS defines “all-hazards” as an act of terrorism. These definitions prompt competing roles for on-scene command and resource allocation. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8 represents the operational framework of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) along with a broad approach to national and community preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to explore how JGAs between EM and HS disciplines have consequences to national security. A snapshot 13 years post 9/11 reveals a nation of pride and resiliency but also the owner of a complex inwardly focused, national security organization. To examine the JGAs between EM and HS disciplines, the researcher conducted a case study analysis of Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting. These case studies were selected for the following reasons: a) a comparison and contrast between a natural disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and an act of terrorism (Boston Marathon bombing and Navy Yard shooting) in preparedness of the PPD-8 mission areas, b) first responder actions and responsibilities for an act of terrorism to include a bombing and an active shooter, and c) the psychological effects of terrorism on the public and its political ramifications. The three cases are qualitatively analyzed with the following questions.

- How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?
- How is an “all-hazards” response defined?—Is it different from a terrorism response?
- How is planning and preparedness performed?
- Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?

The goal of the research is two-fold, 1) to determine if JGAs occur between the EM and HS disciplines that have consequences to national security, and if found, 2) to

present an action-orientated paradigm to address them. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to protect the first responders from acts of terrorism, reduce vulnerability to future acts of terrorism, and make citizens feel safe at home in knowing consequences to national security from JGAs between EM and HS disciplines are being continually analyzed, and when discovered, they are collectively addressed.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The researcher composed an observation checklist matrix to collect data that analyzed JGAs between EM and HS disciplines utilizing PPD-8, which represented the framework for U.S. preparedness in the five mission areas. The analytical themes produced from the matrix represented the qualitative data to support or refute consequences to national security that resulted from the JGAs created between the EM and HS discipline principles. The researcher's decision to expand the study from qualitative analysis methodology to include case study methodology proved to be a limitation on the time to collect, analyze, and report the findings. Other limitations were related to the sharing of information and theoretical sensitivity as the researcher served in a decision-making capacity during the Washington Navy Yard shooting and with respect to victims, their love ones, and the on-going investigation, data collection for this section of the research concluded in June 2014.

EMERGING THEMES

When analyzing how and why is the determination of who is in charge and when, the principles of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), specifically Incident Command System (ICS), emerged in the natural disaster, the act of domestic terrorism, and the act of workplace violence. NIMS ICS requires that an identified single incident commander (IC) or a unified command (UC) structure be established on all incidents. This structure inherently promotes and prompts accountability measures as each responder on the scene has a person to whom they report. In analyzing "all-hazards," the principles of the EM discipline indicate that planning and preparedness, and response efforts for this type of emergency that is not a disaster, also requires a management component due to the amount of resources expected for mitigation. Emerging from the

analysis of planning and preparedness utilizing the mission areas of PPD-8 was the revelation that first responders and some key stakeholders were the same for EM and HS disciplines when it came to training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and results, the following recommendations are presented. Both EM and HS discipline stakeholders must undertake measures in the area of reducing the vulnerability of the United States to threats and acts of terrorism collectively, which can be accomplished in numerous ways, such as consensus-reaching stakeholder forums and joint training in PPD-8 mission areas that include first responders and community citizenry. Measures that support HS as a recognized discipline must be undertaken. Sustainability of HS is critical because EM discipline stakeholders view this emerging discipline as a competitor as opposed to an ally, as potential terrorists seek the path of least resistance, led by the JGAs between them. The probability and vulnerability of an act of domestic terrorism is increased in the case of the homegrown terrorists who reside daily in this nation's communities. Research in the area of addressing the mental status of U.S. citizens who purchase firearms legally warrants further studying for measures that will lead to denial before they commit an act of terrorism on innocent victims who viewed them as friendly fellow co-workers.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001, attack on United States (U.S.) home soil memorialized today as 9/11 stands as the deadliest act of terrorism in this nation's history. The attack changed American lives forever, and 13 years later, it is recognized as the catalyst for the paramount challenge of securing the homeland from acts of terrorism. The war on terrorism presents a challenge to this nation as leaders worldwide are faced with decisions today that will affect future generations. The apparent randomness of terrorism psychologically impacts a nation with the potential to produce future terrorists and fosters implicit feelings of uneasiness for many of its citizens. This global challenge is primarily the responsibility of a nation's government. Heading up the challenge of national security within the boundaries of the United States is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The DHS, which is composed of 22 agencies, is tasked with the primary mission of securing the nation against terrorism. Along with supporting organizations, and community citizenry, the DHS has formed what is referred today as the *homeland security enterprise*. The 9/11 attack also presented America with a challenge of resiliency. The realization that terrorists, both foreign and homegrown, were willing to give their own lives to take the lives of innocent Americans for their *cause* had a profound impact on America. National security leaders and stakeholders tasked with framing and maintaining a secure and safe nation rose to the challenge. Documents significant in providing the framework for national security are the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), Stafford Act—Title VI, Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Report (QHSR).

In the aftermath of 9/11, the established emergency management (EM) discipline and later the emerging homeland security (HS) discipline became recognized as the leaders in the primary mission of securing the nation from terrorism. The responders and stakeholders of both disciplines were often one in the same whether the incident was a disaster or an emergency of national consequence. Operating within the principles of their respective disciplines, the common goal was to reduce vulnerability to acts of

terrorism on the homeland. Also included in the goal was to increase the response, mitigation, and recovery capabilities of the United States in the event of a terrorist attack or a disaster, either natural or human-made. The discipline principles of both EM and HS disciplines initiate national security measures in the communities across the nation. The approach to preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery required a hazard assessment of the type of incidents most likely to occur in the community. A hazard assessment was developed from these types of incidents with a primary goal of making its citizens self-sustainable until state and federal resources arrived. Within the community preparedness approach and framework, terrorism would be categorized as an “all-hazard” emergency that required a management component.

A. DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION

Discipline for this research is defined as *a recognized domain in academia and industry*; jurisdictional for this research is defined as *the range of authority*; and gray area for this research is defined as *ambiguity supporting theoretic and applied differences in policy and procedure*.

B. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on this nation, responding, mitigating, and managing disasters—both natural and human-made or any emergency of national consequence—was the primary mission of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This previous delegation is significant because disasters, both natural and human-made or an “all-hazard” emergency, such as an act of terrorism, entitled the affected communities and areas to receive federal assistance as outlined in the Robert T. Stafford Act–Title VI–Emergency Preparedness. EM discipline principles provided the framework for disaster response, mitigation, recovery, and emergency planning and preparedness while FEMA served as the lead agency for managing those efforts. The 9/11 terrorists attack prompted the signing of the HSA of 2002, which created the DHS. The HSA provided the framework for the DHS to execute the mission of preventing and recovering from terrorist attacks while reducing vulnerability to future threats and acts.

Title V of the HSA-Emergency Preparedness and Response provided the framework for emergency responders to respond effectively to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies of national consequence with the DHS serving as the lead agency. The emerging HS discipline and its principles are supported by the DHS in the same manner as the traditional EM discipline and its principles are supported by FEMA, which has created jurisdictional gray areas (JGAs). Community emergency planning and preparedness, national preparedness and response, and all-hazards response are three areas that present a challenge for the stakeholders of both disciplines that is explored by the researcher for JGAs.

The U.S. concern of vulnerability to a terrorist attack will continue while EM and HS discipline stakeholders of both disciplines travel down a path of division on funding, resource allocation, and on-scene command. “That is the core of asymmetric attack: avoid areas of redundant strengths, identify areas of weakness, and then exploit them.”¹ The 9/11 terrorist attack will forever be recognized as the U.S. wake up call to the challenge of national security and resiliency, but it will also be forever recognized as the wake up call for realizing that terrorists were willing to undergo extreme measures to execute an act of terrorism. Hurricane Katrina will forever be recognized as the U.S. wake up call to the consequences of natural disaster devastation when planning and preparedness efforts are not properly addressed by the various levels of government with a responsibility to act. With both, the disaster and the emergency, a community approach to planning and preparedness is warranted.

1. Community Emergency Planning and Preparedness

Emergency planning and preparedness starts in the community. This approach encourages input from the community’s residents who will be called on to address collectively the planning and preparedness, and response in the wake of a disaster or “all-hazards” emergency. Title VI of the Stafford Act, Emergency Preparedness, outlines an organized approach utilizing local, state, and federal resources. The governor’s activation of the affected area’s state emergency operations plan along with a declaration served as

¹ Donald Kettl, *System under Stress* 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 85.

the catalyst for federal officials to conduct a preliminary damage assessment (PDA) jointly to assess the impact of the disaster or emergency.² An assessment confirming significant impact to life, the infrastructure, or other debilitating emergency determined by the team would qualify for a Presidential declaration request. It also served notice that all local, state, and mutual aid resources had been expended and a federal response was required. Once signed by the President of the United States, this declaration entitled the affected area to federal assistance that augmented local, state, and mutual aid efforts.

Planning and preparedness efforts are consensus-reached based on the type of disaster or emergency likely to occur, from which the community's priority list is established. Problematic to this approach is an act of terrorism will not make the top of the priority list in most communities; therefore, planning and preparedness efforts will not be undertaken even though an act of terrorism with the potential for national consequences can occur in almost any community. Washington, DC, and New York City represent a contrast to this paradigm, as they both are considered prime targets for a terrorist attack as opposed to many other cities. Hurricane Katrina, a natural disaster, provided an example of this problem when it proved to be a planning and preparedness failure at the community/local level that resulted in national consequences, as was evident to the millions who viewed the lives of New Orleans residents literally being swept away when the levees failed. This natural disaster began in communities in which the likelihood of an occurrence surely placed it above an act of terrorism on the priority list for planning and preparedness.

Opposing the opinion that Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster are those who believe the failed levees made it a human-made disaster. The human-made disaster opinion can be further supported if the flooding that resulted from the failed levees was not considered while composing the community's priority list. Regardless of whether Hurricane Katrina was considered a natural disaster or a human-made disaster, a community assessment should have justifiably placed both types of disasters at the top of the list. The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, which among the major

² *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*, Pub. L. No. 93-288, as amended and Related Authorities, FA 592 (2007).

changes it represented, also points to the lessons learned in the lack of community planning and preparedness.³

PPD-8 represents the operational framework of the NPG and provides a broad approach in planning and preparing to secure the nation that encompasses the community. In accomplishing this task of national preparedness, PPD-8 mandates that the core capabilities of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery be addressed through a top-down mode of delivery with the Secretary of Homeland Security responsible for coordinating the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts of all executive departments and agencies. In consultation with state, local, and territorial government, nongovernmental organizations, private sector partners, and the general public, the task of developing the national preparedness goal is addressed.⁴ Stakeholders that represent federal, state, and local government, private, and nongovernmental organizations are tasked with delivering the collaborative efforts of planning and preparedness to the communities. Citizens have an important role in this process by forming community emergency response teams (CERTS) composed of the same stakeholders who are its residents. The model is built on securing the nation one community at a time.⁵ PPD-8 is similar to Title VI of the Stafford Act in that it involves the community coming together for a consensus built preparedness plan that addresses the disasters and emergencies likely to encounter, which, in turn, represents the conceptual framework for the community's emergency plan. Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are the same whether the disaster is natural, human-made, or an act of terrorism. PPD-8 is distinguished from the Stafford Act-Title VI in that it is not triggered by a declaration, but it is still FEMA's management responsibility in the event of a catastrophic disaster or act of domestic terrorism.

³ Keith Bea et al., *Post-Katrina Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions* (CRS Report No. RL33729) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006).

⁴ The White House, *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2011).

⁵ Homeland Security Act of 2002—Title I. 2002, 107th Cong. (2002).

2. National Preparedness and Response

The 9/11 attacks led to 22 agencies forming the DHS with a primary mission of preventing, preparing, and responding to terrorism attacks within the United States.⁶ U.S. prevention and preparedness efforts to terrorism had become a concern among national security leaders and stakeholders before the 9/11 attacks. “Some policymakers and emergency management professionals worried that the devastation from man-made disasters, particularly terrorist-caused disasters, would match or exceed the scale of damage caused by natural disasters.”⁷ With the Cold War era behind the United States, the thought of an act of terrorism on the homeland was unwelcomed and relevant mainly to those in positions with national security responsibility. “Support for traditional civil defense declined, but in the 1990s terrorism was increasing. FEMA had just undergone a complete reorganization early in the Clinton administration and FEMA’s leadership had no appetite for additional responsibilities and obligations in matters of terrorism.”⁸ The World Trade Center bombing in New York on February 26, 1993, and the Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, brought attention to domestic terrorism by foreign and homegrown terrorists but not enough to effect the changes, such as reorganizing the government in the aftermath of 9/11.

Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39), the U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, which pre-dated 9/11, provided the nation with a mission-specific framework for designated federal agencies in the war against nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.⁹ An inherent problem with this directive was the ambiguity it created in the implementation and reimbursement for local and state governments, and provisions for law enforcement intervention. The signing of PDD-39 on June 21, 1995 by President Clinton came two months and two days after the Murrah Building bombing.¹⁰ The April 19, 1995, date of

⁶ The White House, *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness*, 2011.

⁷ Richard Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics-Emergency Management and Homeland Security* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008), 67.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 56.

⁹ The White House, *Presidential Decision Policy 39* (Washington, DC: The White House, 1995).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

the bombing was considered significant in that it marked the two-year anniversary of the Waco, Texas, stand-off in which 75 members of the Branch Davidian religious sect died in an encounter with law enforcement agencies. The Department of Justice (DOJ) served as the lead agency for federal agencies under PDD-39 and delegated responsibility for threats and acts of terrorism to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). The provisions of PDD-39 also assigned FEMA as the lead for all federal agencies of the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and allowed the American Red Cross to function as a federal agency to coordinate mass care in the event of a disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act. Emergency management principles and policy along with local, state, and federal resources constituted the framework for this broad and fragmented national disaster emergency response plan, which was officially adopted as the FRP in 1992.

The FRP could also be implemented for a response to the consequences of or an act of terrorism involving a NBC or other WMD as set forth in the provisions of PDD-39. The unified federal response prompted the activation of the law enforcement-led WMD Contingency Plan, which added the Terrorism Incident Annex to the FRP in 1997.¹¹ The conceptualized PDD-39 featured crisis management principles captured from the federal plans developed as emergency operation plans at the local and state level. PDD-39 also incorporated consequence management principles captured from the FRP framework that supplemented those same federal plans. The WMD Annex applied to all federal agencies that would be expected to respond to a threat or act of terrorism on the homeland. The major concept of PDD-39 was crisis management versus consequence management.

Crisis management started narrow with law enforcement discipline principles, which were headed up by the FBI and expanded to include support for NBC or WMD terrorism threats and acts; however, it excluded local and state support for the consequences to life and property in the event of a threat or attack. Consequence management started broad with support to local and state government for the consequences to life and property resulting from the threat or an act of terrorism involving a NBC or other WMD and narrowed its scope but included a threat assessment;

¹¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Federal Response Plan, Notice of Change* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1997).

however, it excluded law enforcement. PDD-39 represented crisis versus consequence management principles and division in the same manner that EM and HS disciplines have created JGAs. A return to PDD-39 and its practical application would represent a regression in the war against terrorism in the United States. Furthermore, the need to address the JGAs between EM and HS disciplines is proving to present a challenge that will require national focus, as a failure to do so can have consequences to national security, which could ironically be an act of terrorism in which a NBC or other WMD is used in the attack.

Public safety organizations whose firefighters, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), and police officers were the first to respond to both the World Trade Center and Murrah Building bombings, were also among the first to realize planning and preparedness efforts that addressed terrorism required just as much if not more national attention as disasters. The government reorganization after 9/11 placed FEMA *under* the direction of the DHS. The responsibility of planning and preparedness training of the nation's first responders was already a task being conducted by FEMA under the provisions of the Stafford Act Title VI—Emergency Preparedness. After 9/11, training for public safety-first responders incorporated scenarios in which an unplanned event, such as a terrorist attack, was added to encourage the firefighters, EMTs, and law enforcement officers to think outside the box of the traditional natural or human-made disaster planning and preparedness training. The emergence of the HS discipline in response to 9/11 has seen planning and preparedness efforts focus primarily on terrorism. This paradigm shift creates a JGA in national planning and preparedness training as public safety-first responder efforts have incorporated terrorism while community-training efforts address disasters and emergencies likely to occur in that community based on its assessment. Communities in cities, such as this nation's capital of Washington, DC, and New York City, which are home to iconic landmarks, such as the Capitol and the World Trade Center complex, represent prime targets for terrorists to launch an attack. An assessment that does not take into consideration the vulnerability of the surrounding communities of these landmarks is problematic as a terrorist attack in these cities can

have national consequences. Having this knowledge could be advantageous to terrorists in considering a high-impact target for an act of terrorism.

3. All-hazards Response

Responding to a disaster, natural or human-made, is an essential component of the first responder mission. They arrived in the affected communities and areas to perform the objectives of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. These objectives are not specific to any one public safety discipline as first responders from law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and EM work together during a disaster. The expertise of the EM discipline serves as the disaster management component. “In some localities disaster management was a political football fought over by police and firefighters, both of whom wanted primary jurisdictional authority in emergency and disaster circumstances.”¹² Responding to an emergency, such as a bombing, is also an essential component of the first responder mission. In likeness to a disaster, this emergency also requires addressing the same objectives of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation for mitigation. Again, the expertise of managers of the EM discipline serves as the coordination component by virtue of managing experience with both disasters and emergencies. This practical application is also the standard when the public safety-first responder disciplines train together on the mission objectives. The focus of training is preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.

The events of 9/11 changed the way the United States would respond to and prepare for a catastrophic emergency of national consequence, such as a terrorist bombing. The 9/11 attacks prompted the defining of terrorism as an “all-hazards” emergency by HS stakeholders.

This change occurred while disasters, both natural and human-made, remained true to defining a hurricane, earthquake, and tornado, or a human error event. Problematic is the definition of “all-hazards” as the disciplines of EM and HS have created JGAs. EM discipline principles define “all-hazards” as an event not considered a disaster, such as a

¹² Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics*, 12.

hurricane, earthquake, or human-made error, while HS discipline principles define “all-hazards” as an act of terrorism. This change prompts competing roles for on-scene command, and resources allocation between the stakeholders of both disciplines.

C. BACKGROUND AND NEED

National preparedness attention was re-focused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. With the end of the Cold War era, which had prompted the rise of civil defense 51 years earlier, the U.S. focus on national security became more of the mission of armed military forces under the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD).¹³ 9/11 placed the focus back on national security, but with a new dilemma, the categorization of emergencies that were determined to be acts of terrorism. The traditional EM discipline would now compete with the emerging HS discipline, which by virtue of a government shake-up and demonstration of resiliency, saw agencies come together and form the DHS with a top priority of securing the nation against terrorism. The new dilemma also gave rise to “all-hazards,” which seemed to define any catastrophic emergency not a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, flood, earthquake, or human-made, such as the Three Mile Island accident.

1. Challenges in Emergency Planning and Preparedness

Planning and preparedness for the temporary loss of critical infrastructures, such as electricity and communications, requires a management component to ensure that a systematic approach is taken that addresses the logistics for restoring these essential services. The safety and accountability of those responsible for performing these tasks in the wake of a disaster or emergency of catastrophic consequence also requires a management component. The Reorganization Plan transmitted to Congress on June 19, 1978 by President Carter that established FEMA, gave the agency responsibility for the consolidation of all emergency preparedness, mitigation, and response activities to disasters and emergencies in the United States.¹⁴ A JGA has developed in emergency planning and preparedness as stakeholders who would be expected to execute the

¹³ Michael K. Lindell, Ronald W. Perry, and Carla Prater, *Introduction to Emergency Management* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 27.

¹⁴ Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics*, 56.

emergency preparedness objectives of mitigation, and response under EM discipline principles implemented by FEMA, are now expected to implement those same objectives utilizing HS discipline principles under the direction the DHS, which are similar in management and implementation. This duplication of efforts by the disciplines can result in a missed area of responsibility in national security that allows well-trained opportunist terrorists, such as the U.S. trained pilots of the 9/11 attacks, to cause harm in communities while the stakeholders of both disciplines remain at odds over preparedness planning. “Moreover, the redundancies could actually open the door to well-planned attacks: terrorists could avoid the areas where the government has created defense in depth and seek the areas where defense is much thinner.”¹⁵

2. Challenges in National Preparedness

Preparing the nation for disasters and emergencies ideally starts at the local level in communities that comprise the municipalities, cities, towns, counties, and tribes. The state resources augment the efforts of those levels of government for preparedness planning. “Plans represent the operational core of preparedness and provide mechanisms for setting priorities, integrating multiple entities and functions.”¹⁶ National preparedness efforts were enhanced through Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 as this doctrine set the parameters for achievement with “a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity.”¹⁷ The systematic approach to national preparedness for public safety-first responders training incorporates the National Incident Management System (NIMS). “The NIMS represents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident

¹⁵ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 85.

¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System* (FEMA 501) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, ix.

management at all levels of government.”¹⁸ The NIMS is applicable to a wide range of users who primarily represent public safety organizations.

Challenges are seen when applying NIMS components of preparedness, specifically, Incident Command System (ICS), in community preparedness training exercises. Citizens for the most part are not familiar with the modular organization of ICS, which requires a top-down approach to managing the incident. Challenges are also occasionally found in preparedness training exercises between the first responders of public safety organizations. These challenges range from who is in charge of the scene to disturbing the crime scene while performing life-saving extrication and medical intervention. The differences in EM discipline principles favored by fire and emergency medical service organizations and the HS discipline principles favored by law enforcement sometimes emerge during public safety-first responder organizations joint-training exercises.

Productive training sessions by fire departments from different jurisdictions have resulted in positive outcomes during multi-jurisdiction responses and incident scenes. A consensus agreed commitment between the disciplines to prepare and respond utilizing the principles of ICS, which defines who is in charge, fosters a working relationship that can reduce this JGA.

3. Challenges in All-hazards

Responding to disasters both natural and human-made throughout the nation is a task executed by first responders. Firefighters, EMTs, and law enforcement officers perform in hazardous conditions resulting from hurricanes, flooding, tornados, and earthquakes. “All-hazards” emergencies traditionally represented any response not labeled as a disaster but required a component to manage the resources. “Even before 9/11, under all-hazards emergency management, all levels of government had been in the business of preparing for and responding to acts of terrorism inside the United States.”¹⁹

¹⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System*, ix.

¹⁹ Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics*, 4.

The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act mandated the federal government prepare and provide response capabilities to major metro jurisdictions.

Along with the other measures taken to secure the nation against another act of terrorism like 9/11, such as enhanced first responder training and preparedness, the United States began to deploy an aggressive counterterrorism campaign. This paradigm shift saw disasters become secondary to terrorism. Challenges developed because stakeholders of the EM discipline prepared and responded to disasters, such as hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes, while HS discipline stakeholders prepared and responded to the same disasters, which were labeled “all-hazards” emergencies. A consensus agreed upon definition of all-hazards would reduce JGAs as the principles of both disciplines; specifically on-scene command, resource allocation, and mitigation strategies, would be coordinated between EM and HS with the implementation of NIMS ICS.

D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this research is to explore how JGAs between the EM and the HS disciplines have consequences on national security. A snapshot 13 years post 9/11 reveals a nation of pride and resiliency but also the owner of a complex inwardly focused, national security organization. The disciplines have created JGAs that have consequences on national security as the stakeholders of both who are one in the same often have competing roles and responsibilities that can create opportunities for terrorists, such as the lax pilot training oversight that allowed the 9/11 terrorists to learn how to fly planes in the United States only to use them as a weapon against innocent people. The public safety organizations that represent the first responders will continue to see its workers exposed to unknown dangers from acts of terrorism while they perform their primary mission of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. Complicating national security efforts is defining “all-hazards” by the stakeholders of both disciplines. A collectively arrived consensus on the definition of “all-hazards” and a clear understanding of its implications for both intervention and non-intervention must be adopted for effective and efficient implementation of preparedness in the mission areas of

prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, whether due to an act of terrorism or a disaster, natural or human-made. Moreover, awareness of U.S. vulnerability resulting from JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines must take on a national spotlight of priority.

To examine JGAs between EM and HS disciplines, the researcher conducted a case study analysis of Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting. These case studies were selected for the following reasons: a) a comparison and contrast between natural disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and an act of terrorism (Boston Marathon bombing and Navy Yard shooting) preparedness in the mission area of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, b) first responder actions and responsibilities for a bombing and an active shooter, and c) the psychological effects of terrorism on the public. The three case studies are qualitatively analyzed with the following questions.

- How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?
- How is an “all-hazards” response defined?—Is it different from a terrorism response?
- How is planning and preparedness performed?
- Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?

The researcher examines the case studies for comparison and contrast in preparedness and responding to a disaster (Hurricane Katrina) and an act of terrorism (Boston Marathon bombing and Washington Navy Yard shooting).

The goal of the research is two-fold, 1) to determine if JGAs occur between the EM and HS disciplines that have consequences on nation security, and if found, 2) to present an action-oriented paradigm to address the nation’s vulnerability to acts of terrorism. Ultimately, the goal of this research is to protect the first responders to disasters and other emergencies of significance by requiring on-scene managing and make Americans safe at home.

E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What are the consequences to national security of JGAs between EM and HS, and how can they be resolved?
- Do the JGAs between EM and HS present a challenge for both disciplines in the preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery?
- Do the JGAs between EM and HS present a challenge for both disciplines for an “all-hazards” response?

F. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study will provide educators, stakeholders both internal and external, and EM and HS practitioners, with the framework to examine JGAs that exist between the two disciplines. Promoting and advancing both disciplines in academia and industry while they attain recognition and sustainability globally accomplishes this goal. The ultimate goal of this study is to provide the pathway for unity between the disciplines that will produce safer incident scenes for first responders to disasters, both natural and human-made, and all-hazards emergencies of national consequences, and thus, reduces the vulnerability of U.S. national security.

G. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The limitations of the study are sensitivity to data collection and shared as open-source, time constrains for analyzing the collected data, and the limited number of case studies in this area of research. The Washington Navy Yard shooting case study contained theoretical sensitivity as the researcher served in a decision-making capacity during the incident. The Washington Navy Yard shooting also continued to reveal information about the shooter during the production of this research. Readers of the study can interpret this information as biases although the researcher offered this case study for the lessons learned regarding first responder actions to incidents involving an active shooter.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The literature review for this research set out to examine studies on JGA between EM and HS disciplines. No such studies exist, which makes this research important as it is filling a gap in the literature. Literature was reviewed from the following national recognized documents for comparison and contrast: NPG, PPD-8 preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery, the Stafford Act, Title VI–Emergency Preparedness, the HSA of 2002, Title V–Emergency Preparedness and Response, and the QHSR. Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies provided the analytical tool to examine both disciplines with the questions, a) how and why is the determination made of who is charge and when? b) how is an all-hazards response defined? Is it different from a terrorism response? c) how is preparedness and planning performed? and d) why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern? This research is important as JGA between EM and HS disciplines have consequences on national security.

1. National Preparedness Goal

A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recovers from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.²⁰

...National Preparedness Goal, September 2011...

The NPG provides a comprehensive strategy for preparedness to address threats and vulnerabilities to this nation. The NPG brings the collaborative efforts of local, state, tribal, federal governments and non-government organization stakeholders together to address the goal of preparing this nation through the achievement of core capabilities. The core capabilities represent the mission areas of preparedness that both the EM and

²⁰ Department of Homeland Security, *National Preparedness Goal* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2011).

HS disciplines are expected to achieve. With emphasis placed on preparing for hazards that are *expected* to occur, terrorism preparedness does not figure dominantly in the equation of communities across the nation. According to Vaughn, “Terrorism is a hazard of uncertain probability for most communities and organizations.”²¹

The EM discipline principles support the preparedness mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Prior to 9/11, FEMA led all national preparedness efforts in these mission areas. The birth of the DHS in response to the 9/11 attacks shifts the primary focus of preparedness in the mission areas to terrorism. Some EM experts see terrorism as not only requiring a community preparedness approach similar to disasters, but also returning to the civil defense model.

David Wagman sees the civil defense days of preparedness efforts returning. According to Wagman (2003),

The heightened emphasis on preparing to deal with terrorist threats since Sept. 11 is returning emergency management to its roots in the Civil Defense days of the '40s, '50s and '60s. During those years, Civil Defense efforts involved community vigilance and local preparation to guard against the perceived threat of foreign invasion. As worry over that threat waned, emergency management focused more on natural disaster planning and recovery. That focus was codified with creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 1979.²²

In examining incidents that predate the 9/11 terrorist attacks and shift the EM focus from community preparedness for natural disaster planning and recovery to “all-hazards” community preparedness, the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, were both seen as a wake up call. In the case of Oklahoma City’s Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing, the perpetrators were American-born citizens.

²¹ William L. Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management,” Online Conference held June 28–July 16, 2004, accessed May 17, 2014, www.training.fema.gov.emiweb/downloads/waugh%20.

²² David Wagman, “Emergency Management and Civil Defense,” in *Homeland Security: Best Practices for Local Government*, ed. Roger L. Kemp (Washington, DC: ICCA, 2003), 7.

PPD-8 encompasses many of the NPG preparedness objectives with tasks that must be performed in the event of an act of terrorism or a disaster.

2. Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-8: National Preparedness

This directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.²³

...Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness...

PPD-8 outlines a holistic community preparedness approach to securing the nation. “The national preparedness system shall be designed to help guide the domestic efforts of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public to build and sustain the capabilities outlined in the national preparedness goal.”²⁴ This holistic approach to national preparedness allows all stakeholders to assist in securing the nation one community at a time. Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery is initiated at the local level as the *greatest risk* assessment starts at home. Stakeholders in communities across the nation share the responsibility by planning for the kind of disasters likely to occur.²⁵ This approach requires the stakeholders of the community to come together and analyze the disasters likely to occur. Based on the results, an emergency plan is then developed. The emergency plan addresses terrorism, as an “all-hazards” disaster with a framework indicative of the EM discipline. “Emergency plans never, or virtually never, cover everything that might be required in a disaster.”²⁶ JGA between the two disciplines can result based on the objectives that will need to be addressed. In the area of preparedness, the objectives of mitigation and response must be addressed regardless of whether it is performed utilizing EM or HS discipline principles. As Glen Woodbury stated,

²³ The White House, *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2003).

²⁴ The White House, *Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness*, 2011.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management.”

“Therefore, unless those duties and tasks are clearly separate and distinct, conflict between the emergency management and homeland security principles will occur.”²⁷ Principles of both disciplines are applicable to emergency preparedness.

3. Robert T. Stafford Act—Title VI—Emergency Preparedness

The Federal Government shall provide necessary direction, coordination, and guidance, and shall provide necessary assistance, as authorized in this title so that a comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all hazards.²⁸

....Robert T. Stafford Act—Title VI—Emergency Preparedness....

The Stafford Act defines an emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lesson or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.”²⁹ This broad definition provides an umbrella for both disciplines to operate independently with their own principles of emergency preparedness and ambiguity.

Title VI of the Stafford Act sets out to “provide a system of emergency preparedness”³⁰ that encompasses local, state, and federal resources. Prior to the 9/11 attacks the provisions of all components of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery were core responsibilities of FEMA. The Stafford Act served as the declaration policy for affected areas to receive federal assistance with FEMA providing the coordinating oversight. This arrangement is seen as problematic today for EM practitioners of the discipline, as post 9/11 and the emergence of HS as a discipline have created JGA. At the national level of government in which the stakeholders are one in the same, the EM discipline, which traditionally received support and guidance from FEMA

²⁷ Glen Woodbury, *Emergency Management in Higher Education—Current Practices and Conversations “Emergency Management and Homeland Security: Exploring the Gray Area”* (Fairfax, VA: Emergency Management Agency, 2010).

²⁸ *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*, Title VI.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

under the provisions of Title VI of the Stafford Act, now finds itself in a complex and challenging identity crisis mode of operation. “The HSA caused a restructuring of emergency management to begin. FEMA’s role remains to be determined.”³¹

4. Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002

The primary mission of the Department is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, minimize damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.³²

....*Homeland Security Act of 2002*....

The HSA of 2002 created the DHS, and on January 24, 2003, operations of this agency began. The HSA provided the framework for the United State to execute the mission of preventing and recovering from terrorist attacks while reducing vulnerability to future threats and attacks. Title V–Emergency Preparedness and Response, provided the framework for emergency responders to respond effectively to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Principles of the HS discipline are supported by the HSA in the same manner as EM discipline principles are supported by FEMA. In displaying resiliency to the attacks of 9/11, a shift from all-hazard disaster management to a primary mission of combating terrorism occurred that has impacted both disciplines as Richard Sylves has observed. According to Sylves (2008),

The reorganization merged together agencies (or parts of agencies) with very diverse organizational structures, missions, and cultures, and importantly, diverse ideas about the management of domestic threats and emergencies. In the emergency management arena, the overall effect of the reorganization has been to expand the role of defense and law enforcement-oriented agencies concerned exclusively with terrorism while diminishing the role and decreasing the prestige of organizations conducting all-hazards emergency management.³³

³¹ Lindell, Perry, and Prater, *Introduction to Emergency Management*, 27.

³² Department of Homeland Security, *Homeland Security Act of 2002* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2002).

³³ Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics*, 70.

This shift is also represented by the QHSR, which provides the framework for the U.S. strategic response to terrorism.

5. Quadrennial Homeland Security Review

By describing a forward-looking homeland security vision for the Nation and the requisite set of key mission areas, goals, objectives, and outcomes, integrated across the breadth of the homeland security landscape, it will also serve as a roadmap to keep America safe, secure, and resilient in the years ahead.³⁴

....*Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report*....

The QHSR outlines the strategic framework for all practitioners and stakeholders of the HS enterprise to achieve a secure and resilient nation. This framework is not dictated by the EM or HS discipline, but instead encompasses the principles of both. As much as the QHSR provides the framework for a nation of resilience, it adamantly expresses that it is not a resource prioritization document nor does it detail the agency's roles and responsibilities.³⁵ The QHSR provides recommendations for the HS enterprise to strengthen the nation through five mission areas. Mission #1–Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security primarily favors principles of the HS discipline while Mission #5–Ensuring Resilience to Disasters primarily favors principles of the EM discipline. This favoritism is problematic as the stakeholders of both disciplines who are one in the same support the QHSR mission areas of the HS enterprise even though the list of priorities indicate HS discipline principles rate higher than EM discipline principles. “Hurricane Katrina powerfully illustrated the overall impact of weak preparedness and response in the face of extreme natural disasters.”³⁶ An “all-hazards” *emergency* or “all-hazards” *disaster* presents a challenge for both disciplines, as a JGA is formed based on this definition.

³⁴ Department of Homeland Security, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report-A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2010), vi.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

6. All-hazards

Responding to disasters, both natural and human-made, is part of the mission of first responders throughout the nation. They arrived in the affected communities and areas to perform the objectives of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. These objectives are not specific to any discipline as first responders from law enforcement, fire, EMS, and EM work together during an “all-hazards” response. The expertise of managers of the EM discipline serves as the coordination component. This practical application is also the standard when the disciplines train together on the mission objectives. Preparedness for an “all-hazards” *disaster* is the primary focus of training. The *emergency* is usually an unexpected sudden resource challenging “turn of events” placed in the training scenario to encourage the participants to “think outside the box” in that something unexpected, sudden, and resource challenging, such as a terrorist attack, must always be considered. The 9/11 attacks impelled the focus from disaster to terrorism, while “all-hazards” continued to constitute any *emergency*, which is problematic as defining “all-hazards” by the disciplines creates JGAs.

Terrorism provides a challenge for both EM and HS disciplines as an “all-hazards” *disaster* or *emergency*. A traditional response by the EM discipline focused on the mission areas of response and recovery to a disaster while the HS discipline focused on these same areas to a terrorist attack. The “all-hazards” response to a terrorist attack requires addressing the same core capabilities in the same mission areas as a disaster. The basic framework required to manage a disaster can be applied to the terrorist attack as the objectives that must be achieved: life safety, stabilization, and property conservation do not change. “What the “all-hazards” approach can contribute to the effort to deal with terrorism in its many forms is a basic framework for structuring the emergency response, preparing for the response, and recovering from attacks.”³⁷ In the aftermath of the Boston Marathon shooting, which was an act of terrorism, the city of Boston received federal aid courtesy of a disaster declaration.

³⁷ Waugh, “Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management,” 2.

B. SUMMARY

The literature review for this research examined national recognized documents: NPG, PPD-8, Stafford Act–Title VI, HSA of 2002–Title V, and the QHSR to analyze JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines. Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies provided the analytical tool for examination with a series of questions to determine whether JGAs have consequences for U.S. national security. The definition of “all-hazards,” whether used in conjunction with an emergency or a disaster, is problematic, as it triggers preparedness planning and a response in the mission areas that have stakeholders of both disciplines competing and promoting redundancy. Hurricane Katrina, a disaster, lacked planning, preparedness, and response capability to execute the first responder mission of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation effectively, while the Boston Marathon bombing, an act of terrorism, was a Presidential declared disaster that made it eligible for federal relief. The Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013, also unprecedentedly marked the DHS and FEMA jointly announcing and coordinating relief efforts. These case studies were also chosen because they present a contrast and comparison analysis for the stakeholders of EM and HS disciplines to examine incidents to which both should be expected to plan, prepare, respond, mitigate, and recover that require clear guidelines for on-scene command—who is in charge, resource allocation, and most importantly, management.

III. CASE STUDY 1—HURRICANE KATRINA

Hurricane Katrina is seen as a horrendous natural disaster in which all levels of government—local, state, and federal—performed inadequately in their individual and collaborative roles of responsibility. The failure resulted in lives lost and the question of whether the United States could prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover from a disaster, natural or man-made, or any catastrophic incident of national significance. Having been tested in preparedness and response capabilities four years earlier with the terrorist attacks memorialized as 9/11, the question of lessons learned from it echoed publicly in outcries throughout the nation. Given the fact that Hurricane Katrina was a predicted natural disaster as opposed to an unexpected act of terrorism, such as 9/11, and the challenges presented were fundamentally the same, a nation lacking planning, preparedness, response, and command showed up at the worst natural disaster in U.S. history.

The likelihood of a Hurricane Katrina-type natural disaster had been forecasted and feared by FEMA emergency managers. “It was the worst-case fear of emergency planners—precisely the storm about which FEMA planners had worried in 2001 and for which they had conducted major exercises just the year before.”³⁸ The chaotic domain this nation was forced into on 9/11 served as a warning notice that its nation’s preparedness and response efforts to a disaster or an act of terrorism were extremely inadequate. “But despite the clear warnings and the recurring drills to prepare the nation, both events caught the system flatfooted.”³⁹

³⁸ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 10.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

This case study examines the following questions the researcher considers paramount to determining if gray areas exist between the EM and HS disciplines.

- How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?
- How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism response?
- How is planning and preparedness performed?
- Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?

The DHS’s 2005 National Response Plan (NRP), replaced in 2008 by the National Response Framework (NRF), and the FEMA regulated Stafford Act, which had been adopted in the late 1970s, were both documents that presented the framework to address disasters and terrorism by bring the local, state, tribal resources under one unified command (UC). “The new Department of Homeland Security, with FEMA tucked inside, was designed to help the nation respond better to major disasters. The inescapable conclusion was that it failed its first test.”⁴⁰ As the horror of Hurricane Katrina was being witnessed globally, so too was the issue of leadership, specifically, who was in charge? “Citizens want strong leaders who can help them understand the threats they face and what they can do about them.”⁴¹ The differences between local, state, and federal leaders during Hurricane Katrina were televised around the world. The slow federal response was attributed to who is in charge and when, along with the question of leadership. The requests for federal help by those thought to be in key leadership positions to make them during the hurricane and subsequent flooding went unanswered for far too long. Donald Kettl noted this situation in his analysis of the inadequate federal response to Hurricane Katrina. According to Kettl (2007),

Compounding the rising criticism was FEMA’s sluggish response. Gov. Kathleen Blanco said later, “I asked for help, whatever help you can give me.” Mayor Nagin was more salty. On his Internet telephone line, he told President Bush that “we had an incredible crisis here” and that his flying

⁴⁰ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 12.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

over in Air Force One did not do justice. The next day, he went on a local radio station to complain about the tepid federal response.⁴²

The primary concern of who is in charge of an incident of national consequences or a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, is command of the incident and management of on-scene resources. The NRP, which had replaced the FRP, served as the operational document during Hurricane Katrina. Critical to note is the NRP shifted leadership from FEMA to the DHS. Blame for the failed federal response centered on the lack of leadership from both the DHS and FEMA. “In the critical days before landfall, DHS leadership mostly watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead, and missed critical opportunities to help prepare the entire federal government for the response.”⁴³ The counter argument to this assertion was the new emerging HS discipline favored by the DHS, which by virtue of the NRP was responsible for providing leadership, lacked the expertise to command a disaster of the magnitude presented by Hurricane Katrina. “Without a systematic training and implementation effort, the NRP was unlikely to be widely or readily understood, and unlikely to offer effective guidance, just four months after its implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local response necessary for Katrina.”⁴⁴

Hurricane Katrina proved to be one of the worst natural disasters in U.S. history. The devastation caused by this natural disaster left no one in New Orleans untouched either personally, financially, and equally important, emotionally. “Hurricane Katrina has shown the world how vulnerable the United States is to natural disasters.”⁴⁵ The devastation caused by this natural disaster underscored Mother Nature’s ability to render destruction without being provoked. Planning and preparedness efforts for Hurricane Katrina were well documented to be inadequate despite the numerous predictions of a natural disaster in the form of a hurricane that would devastate the Gulf Coast. “Long-

⁴² Ibid., 67.

⁴³ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina-A Nation Still Unprepared* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2006), 163.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 551.

⁴⁵ Ronald Daniels, Donald Kettl, and Howard Kunreuther, *On Risks and Disasters-Lessons from Hurricane Katrina* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1.

term warning went unheeded and government officials neglected their duties to prepare for the forewarned catastrophe.”⁴⁶ The lack of planning and preparedness touched every level of local and state government in Louisiana. Katrina seemed to be underestimated in the amount of devastation it could cause the Gulf Coast. “Despite the understanding of the Gulf Coast’s particular vulnerability to hurricane devastation, officials braced for Katrina with full awareness of critical deficiencies in their plans and gaping holes in their resources.”⁴⁷ Vulnerability should be addressed because the potential risk and consequences have been identified. Although natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, cannot be measured in totality of destruction, planning and preparedness is still warranted. “In order to achieve adequate preparedness for disasters, multiple levels of planning are needed.”⁴⁸ In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the risk of inadequate planning and preparedness proved costly for those with decision-making responsibilities and deadly for over 1,000 of New Orleans’ most vulnerable. “Without cars or money and no buses to rescue them, they were left to fend for themselves or die.”⁴⁹

The political fallout from the ineffectiveness at the local, state, and federal levels to prepare and respond to Hurricane Katrina proved costly with blame directed at everyone who had a role or responsibility in leadership, decision making, and operations. The Committee on Government Affairs chaired by Maine Senator Susan Collins produced a bipartisan report in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that was critical of the government.⁵⁰ FEMA’s director during Hurricane Katrina, Michael Brown, came under scrutiny for his lack of leadership. “Moreover, FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, lacked the leadership skills that were needed.”⁵¹ The criticism of DHS leadership was also publicly scrutinized for its lack of urgency regarding preparedness in the days before the catastrophic destruction, which resulted from Katrina’s landfall and subsequent

⁴⁶ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina-A Nation Still Unprepared*, 2.

⁴⁷ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina-A Nation Still Unprepared*, 5.

⁴⁸ Daniels, Kettl, and Kunreuther, *On Risks and Disasters-Lessons from Hurricane Katrina*.

⁴⁹ John B. Childs, *Hurricane Katrina-Response and Responsibilities* (Santa Cruz, CA: New Pacific Press, 2005), 83.

⁵⁰ United States Senate, *Hurricane Katrina-A Nation Still Unprepared*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

flooding when the levees failed. “DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary Cheroff himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend before landfall.”⁵²

Hurricane Katrina brought to light social inequality that was echoed by those impacted directly and indirectly. Viewers of media coverage in the United States had a choice of deploying either tacit acknowledge, lying eyes, or acceptance with or without guilt for the social disparity picture captured in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. “Perhaps the most disturbing fact that Hurricane Katrina Survival has placed before our eyes is our society’s loss of faith in its ability to truly help the people whose faces we glimpsed in September.”⁵³ Survival seemed to be based on race, and social economic status. “In the flood waters of Hurricane Katrina everything about the social, economic, and racial injustice of American society floated to the surface.”⁵⁴ Neighborhoods of the affluent were less devastated by flooding, as they were located at a higher altitude. David Wellman noted that Hurricane Katrina painted a vivid portrait of the social economic state of New Orleans during and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina’s devastation. According to Wellman (2005),

Hurricane Katrina did much more than crumble levees, put houses where highways used to be and turned streets into canals. She also rearranged the sociological landscape along the Gulf Coast. Katrina made the normal problematic, the inconspicuous conspicuous, and the invisible visible.⁵⁵

The psychological consequences of a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, can be long term for survivors with cases of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and survivor syndrome.⁵⁶ Family displacements and love ones lost in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina left some survivors depressed as the reconstruction of their lives presented a monumental task compounded by a feeling of distrust for a nation that left its

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Alexander Keyssar, “Reminders of Poverty, Soon Forgotten,” *The Chronicle Review*, November 4, 2005.

⁵⁴ Childs, *Hurricane Katrina-Response and Responsibilities*, 51.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 82.

⁵⁶ Lindell, Perry, and Prater, *Introduction to Emergency Management*, 252.

most vulnerable to fend for themselves in their attempt to survive. The Uniformed Services University located in Bethesda, Maryland analyzed the need and requirements to address the mental health and care of Hurricane Katrina survivors.⁵⁷ According to the Uniformed Services University (2005),

Mental health planning and care delivery to evacuees from Hurricane Katrina and other disasters requires a 1) public health approach for populations, 2) treatment delivery for expected normal rates of all psychiatric illness in the population, 3) care for trauma related disorders, 4) care for emerging disorders such as substance withdrawal and associated medical conditions with psychological consequences and perhaps most importantly, 5) community building.⁵⁸

The questions of how and why a determination is made of who is in charge of a natural disaster equaling the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina was answered by reviewing the operational guidelines of NIMS ICS. “The NIMS provides a set of standardized organizational structures-such as the Incident Command System (ICS), multiagency coordination systems, and public information systems.”⁵⁹ The ICS requires the first arriving unit to establish command. In establishing command, the question of who is in charge is addressed for the initial responders to a disaster. In addressing the concern of who is in charge by implementing the ICS, the question of why a determination is made also answered the question of not doing so, which can create an incident scene in which tactical decisions are made by multiple initial responders that promotes a duplication of efforts, and more importantly, an unsafe incident scene. This scenario would be problematic for first responders to both, a disaster either natural or human-made or an “all-hazards” emergency requiring a management component.

The question of how an “all-hazards” response is defined and whether it is different from a terrorism response was answered in that Hurricane Katrina met the criteria for a natural disaster as an unprovoked act of nature. FEMA headed up the federal

⁵⁷ Uniformed Services University, *Hurricane Katrina—Evacuee Mental Health and Care* (Bethesda, MD: Uniformed Services University, 2005), 1.

⁵⁸ Uniformed Services University, *Hurricane Katrina—Evacuee Mental Health and Care*, 1.

⁵⁹ Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Management System* (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 2.

response with EM principles of response, mitigation, and recovery while defining the disaster as an “all-hazards” emergency requiring a component of coordination and management.

The numerous documented accounts of inadequacy in this area at the local, state, and federal levels of government answered the question of how planning and preparedness to Hurricane Katrina was performed. Inadequate planning and preparedness measures led to the lack of resources required for the size, scope, and complexity of Hurricane Katrina despite the warnings of Hurricane Katrina’s anticipated devastation.

The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern was answered by the negative press and public outcry received in each of these areas, which served notice of a nation dissatisfied with the response and leadership. Hurricane Katrina led to key decision makers and those with authority and responsibility during the hurricane and subsequent flooding to face national scrutiny. Numerous cases of PTSD have been documented among survivors of Hurricane Katrina. Political consequences that resulted from the inadequate response to Hurricane Katrina have led to changes and reforms, such as the provisions of the Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina.

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IV. CASE STUDY 2—BOSTON MARATHON BOMBING

On April 15, 2013, attendees and spectators of the annual Boston Marathon were the targets of two homemade pressure cooker bombs that detonated 12 seconds apart.⁶⁰ The bombings killed three and injured over 250 innocent victims. In the days that followed, two brothers, Tamerlin and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, would be identified as the terrorists who concealed and planted the bombs near the finish line. In the days following the bombing an intensive manhunt was undertaken to capture the brothers.

According to reporters of the Boston Globe (2013),

In more than 100 interviews with police, government officials, residents, and tourists who witnessed the week's events, Globe reporters sought to reconstruct the actions of law enforcement agents between the April 15 bombing that killed three people on Boylston Street and the capture Dzhokhar Tsarnaev seven miles away in Watertown on April 19 after his brother Tamerlin was killed, the conclusion of an epic 102-hour manhunt that left one police officer dead and another badly injured.⁶¹

The two Chechen-ethnic brothers who resided legally in the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, executed the bombings categorized as an act of domestic terrorism because they occurred on U.S. soil, with precision. In the days following, Russia denounced the bombings and pointed out that although the brothers were of Chechen ethnicity, they were radicalized in the United States. The undetected ease with which the brothers were able to plant the bombs that killed and injured innocent victims in the United States is relevant to this research if a JGA between the EM and HS disciplines creates an opportunity for this type of terrorism. It warrants a probe for a possible existence, and more importantly, if found, of a determination of whether it presents a consequence to national security. This case study examines the following questions the

⁶⁰ Barry C. Dorn and Marcus L. Goralnick, *White Paper Preliminary Findings, Crisis Meta-Leadership Lessons from the Boston Marathon Bombing Response: The Ingenuity of Swarm Intelligence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard School of Public Health and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Center for Public Leadership, 2014).

⁶¹ Boston Globe Staff, "102 hours in pursuit of Marathon suspects," *Boston Globe*, April 28, 2013.

researcher considers paramount to determining if gray areas exist between the EM and HS disciplines.

- How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?
- How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism response?
- How is planning and preparedness performed?
- Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?

The annual race attracts runners and spectators who represent nations from around the world. Started in 1987, it is always held on Patriot’s Day, the third Monday in April and attracts up to 500,000 attendees and spectators. Law enforcement serves as the lead in terms of who is in charge in a UC structure that also includes fire and EMS disciplines. HS security discipline principles favored by law enforcement are paramount in the event of a bombing. The need for securing the crime scene and apprehending the terrorists simultaneously requires coordinated planning and preparedness among the law enforcement organizations along with the other first responder disciplines. The fostered inherent working relationship with first responders of the fire service and emergency medical services disciplines allow life safety concerns to be addressed, which includes treating and transporting the injured while carefully preserving the active crime scene for law enforcement. Also paramount to performing these tasks is not assisting any on-scene terrorists trying to escape during the chaos.

Stakeholders from both the EM and HS disciplines plan and prepare for “all-hazards” emergencies that would include an act of terrorism, such as the Boston Marathon bombing. Preparedness training for both disciplines requires addressing the first responder mission of life safety, stabilization, and property conservation. Disaster planning and preparedness for first responder disciplines would encompass terrorism, as the same challenges would have to be addressed. Both EM and HS discipline principles would define this “all-hazards” incident as an act of terrorism requiring a management component. While HS discipline principles would dominate in the response arena, EM

discipline principles would mirror these efforts with an “all-hazards” response. “Emergency management appears to be the “applications” side of disaster policy.”⁶²

Political concerns in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing were magnified by reports that intelligence officials in Russia had informed the United States in 2011 that Tamerlin had become a radical follower of Islam.⁶³ After the bombing suspects had eluded apprehension, a revisit of the crime scene via close circuit television camera revealed troubling images. It showed the brothers calmly walking into the crowds of chaos to an unchallenged escape from the scene. The search for the brothers led to a daylong lockdown, which was highly criticized. The lockdown also led to public comments about civil liberties violations. The psychological effect of this act of terrorism and the lockdown had ramifications that reached beyond the city of Boston and took center stage as an incident of nation significance.

The psychological effects of the Boston Marathon included feelings of fear by those in attendance and outrage and anger by those who watched the bombings from remote locations aired by media coverage and social network outlets. Fueling the anger was the revelation of the two brother’s affiliation with Islam. For many in the United States, the memory of the 9/11 attack was rekindled as the bombing was executed by terrorists who claimed to be inspired by Al Qaeda. Adding to the anger and outrage of America was the August 2013 cover page of Rolling Stones magazine that featured Dzhakhar. Some felt the magazine glorified the alleged terrorist and delivered another hurting blow to the recovering citizens of Boston while some in the Muslim-American community felt it further strained their contentious relationship with U.S. citizens that resulted post 9/11. According to Baig (2014),

Boston will heal, but an ugly scar will remain and the people of Boston will bear the brunt, especially young Muslims who have no malintent

⁶² Sylves, *Disaster Policy & Politics*, xvii.

⁶³ Peter Finn, Carol F. Leonning, and Will Englund, “The Suspects—Chen Refugees Build Lives in U.S.,” *Washington Post*, April 20, 2013, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-34547642.html>.

against America and are here only to make a better life for themselves and families back in their home countries.⁶⁴

The psychological effects of the bombing also seemed to have impacted multiple in-groups to include patriotic Bostonians, concerned Muslim-Americans, and those who felt the need to revisit the horror of 9/11, form their individual opinion, and express it explicitly. “This cover may have gotten people talking about Rolling Stones but it has hurt, again, the people of Boston and America’s law-abiding Muslim-American community.”⁶⁵ Dzhakhar Tsarnaev, scheduled to go on trial on November 3, 2014, faces 30 charges stemming from the Boston Marathon bombing. He faces the death penalty if convicted of committing a crime in which a WMD was used.

The questions of why and how is the determination made of who is in charge were answered in that the Massachusetts State Police served as the lead local law enforcement and public safety organization agency for the UC structure developed as a requirement of the NIMS ICS.⁶⁶ The question of how is an “all-hazards” response defined and whether it is different from a terrorism response was answered in that the bombing was initially recognized as an act of terrorism and the response and mitigation actions reflected the same. “It took 22 minutes from the time of the blast until the last victim was moved off the street into some kind of medical treatment.”⁶⁷ Along with the measures taken to provide life-saving first aid to the injured runners and spectators in attendance, concurrently actions were taken that led to the timely identification of the suspected bombers. “While there was no direct intelligence, the threat of a terrorist attack always exists.”⁶⁸

The question of how planning and preparedness was performed for the Boston Marathon was answered in that logistics for the Boston Marathon began three months

⁶⁴ Matt Seaton and Babail Baig, “Is Rolling Stone’s Dzhakhar Tsarnaev Rock Star Cover An Outrage?” July 17, 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/rolling-stone-boston-bomber-cover-debate>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *The Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack* (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013).

⁶⁷ Mary Rose Roberts, “Marathon Madness,” *Fire Chief*, June 2013, 42.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 44.

before the event. “This year, marathon planning began in January.”⁶⁹ Utilizing EM principles along with the NPG framework, which deploys resources, provided by the community, FEMA integrated the local efforts with the needed management component. “This incident also demonstrated how FEMA’s approach to National Preparedness helped to empower and strengthen the whole community, by giving its members the right tools and information they needed to be prepared.”⁷⁰ In the aftermath of the bombing, a congressional committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs convened and produced the publication, “Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack.” The report noted the importance of involving the community as a resource in the event of an act of terrorism.

The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequence concerns be addressed was answered by the national and international attention the United States was subjected to in the aftermath of the bombing; notable was the decision to place Watertown on lockdown while the Tsarnaev brothers were being sought. Fueling political consequences were inquires of civil liberty violations from the decision of the lockdown.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *The Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack*, 3.

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V. CASE STUDY 3—WASHINGTON NAVY YARD SHOOTING

On September 16, 2013, civilian contract employee Aaron Alexis reported for work by gaining entry onto the Washington Navy Yard utilizing his legally issued identification credentials. Over the next several hours, he would kill 12 co-workers in the second deadliest multiple mass shooting on a military facility. The killing spree ended when Alexis was shot and killed by law enforcement officers who had responded and some who were already at the Navy Yard assisting the armed security guards engaged in a gunfight with Alexis. This active shooter incident also involved fire service and emergency medical service first responder support resources to this law enforcement led incident. Law enforcement agencies in Washington, DC, are routinely in charge of active shooter incidents as they have the expertise, training, and more importantly, the firearms to counter an active shooter incident. This case study examines the following questions the researcher considers paramount in determining if gray areas exist between the EM and HS disciplines.

- How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?
- How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism response?
- How is planning and preparedness performed?
- Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?

It is also noted the researcher served as a first responder, initially in command of DC Fire and EMS resources, and later, as a representative in the established UC post after being relieved by DC Fire and EMS Chief Kenneth B. Ellerbe. The question of who is in charge was answered early, as contract security guards, along with the Naval District Washington Fire and Emergency Services Department stationed at the facility, were the first to be alerted, recognize the incident involved an active shooter, and establish a UC structure with law enforcement serving as the lead.

Analyzing whether the active shooter incident at the Washington Navy Yard on September 16, 2013, should have been categorized as an act of terrorism because it involved the murder of 12 innocent Americans on U.S. soil or categorized as an act of

workplace violence committed by a disgruntled employee with a documented history of mental problems presents a challenge to both EM and HS disciplines. An independent panel commissioned by the responsible Pentagon included in its findings, “the department’s procedures to protect sensitive information and installations are outdated and must better take into accounts security threats posed by insiders.”⁷¹ HS discipline principles dictate that an incident of this nature is law enforcement led with support from other public safety-first responders, such as fire and rescue, to remove the victims from the secured warm zone to the waiting EMTs for triage, treatment, and transport. EM discipline principles dictate that this “all-hazards” emergency required a response from the same public safety-first responders but their actions may or may not be coordinated by law enforcement. What seemed to be agreed upon by the first responders to the shooting was addressing the immediate concern of establishing and developing a UC structure with clearly understood guidelines of authority and who was in charge. Categorizing the shooting as an “all-hazards” response is problematic based on the definition of both disciplines, and categorizing it as an act of terrorism is problematic because the shooting was not a perceived threat or an act committed that was provoked by a political agenda. While answers to what provoked Alexis to go on a killing rampage are still being sought, no indications have been put forth of a terrorist attack with a religious or political agenda targeting innocent Americans. Documented are accounts of an employee who had stated that he felt controlled by extremely low frequency (ELF) electromagnetic waves.

Planning and preparedness by HS discipline principles favored law enforcement organizations occur throughout the nation with active shooter scenarios included in the training. These training sessions often include first responders from the fire service, emergency medical services, and EM disciplines, as each would be expected to serve in a support capacity to this law enforcement-led incident. The researcher noted the timely established UC structure at the Navy Yard shooting aided with the inherent

⁷¹ Ernesto Londoño and Christian Davenport, “Navy Yard Shooting Might Have Been Prevented, Pentagon Review Shows,” *Washington Post*, March 19, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/navy-yard-shooting-might-have-been-prevented-pentagon-review-shows/2014/03/18/5d48cc70-aeac-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html.

characteristics accountability, flexibility, and command and control as roles and responsibilities were recognized at the onset of this tragedy. No support agency first responders were injured during the random shooting rampage by Alexis or the return gunfire by law enforcement. Joint-training sessions attended by Naval District Washington Fire & Emergency Services Department hosted by DC Fire & EMS at its training academy provided for a well-executed operational incident action plan (IAP). The locations of the victims being held in Building 197, the site of the shootings, were known throughout the ordeal and allowed the quick removal of the injured once it was determined and confirmed that Alexis had been taken down by law enforcement. The hot-zone initially established encompassed areas outside the Navy Yard, but it was reduced to the facility after it was determined that a wounded civilian had been assisted outside by a law enforcement officer who then returned inside. Receiving this information at the UC post aided in the determination that Alexis was the lone active shooter.

Political fallout in the aftermath of the shooting ranged from military facility security to the biggest inquiry, which is still being raised—How was Alexis able to obtain credentials that allowed him access to the Washington Navy Yard? Investigations and inquires of Alexis’ military service, which ended in 2011, revealed that he was able to keep his secret clearance as a honorable discharged service member after his supervisor had recommended a general discharge, which thus prevented him from obtaining the job with the contractor, Experts, Inc. Politically, internal inquires came from the DOD that were shared publically regarding the number of secret clearances the department should be looking to decrease. Political-sensitive inquires of the fact that secret clearances are revisited at five-year intervals, or in some cases, are good for 10 years, were met with not so sensitive responses. Stan Soloway, president and chief executive of the Professional Services Council stated, “Security clearance reform has been needed for years and that continuous monitoring of cleared workers is absolutely critical.”⁷² He continued to say,

⁷² Londoño and Davenport, “Navy Yard Shooting Might Have Been Prevented, Pentagon Review Shows.”

“We have a process that is so heavily dependent and focused on interviews and shoe leather.”⁷³

The questions of how and why the determination is made of who is in charge were answered in that the initial first responders to the Navy Yard established a UC structure consisting of the DC Fire & EMS Department, Washington Navy Yard Fire Department and the law enforcement agencies already on the scene or that arrived within minutes of the shooting. The question of how is an “all-hazards” response defined and is it different from a terrorism response was answered in that the initial responders to the Navy Yard deployed strategies and tactics that dictated an active shooter incident. This strategy promoted establishing command, setting up an incident command post, and a UC post for the incoming liaisons from the various agencies. This strategy was indicative of a terrorist attack response but it also allowed the shooting to be handled as an “all-hazards” incident, which by HS discipline principles, is an emergency that is not a natural or human-made disaster but required a management component. The question of planning and preparedness was addressed by the IAP developed by the UC during the incident, which contained the locations of the injured victims, logistics for first-responder’s safety while removing the injured victims, and tactics for confining the shooter to an area for capture. The question of why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern was answered by the numerous inquiries that were political in nature to include the process utilized by Alexis that allowed him to retain his clearance. “Alexis was given a ‘general discharge,’ a classification often used to designate a blemished performance record. In some cases, a general discharge can make it difficult to land a civilian job.”⁷⁴

⁷³ Londoño and Davenport, “Navy Yard Shooting Might Have Been Prevented, Pentagon Review Shows.”

⁷⁴ Theresa Vargas, Steve Hendrix, and Marc Fisher, “The Suspect: A Man of Share Contrasts,” *Washington Post*, September 17, 2013.

VI. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTION

The research was conducted utilizing Case Study and Qualitative Analysis methodologies. The following cases were presented: Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting. The case studies represented a contrast and comparison of a disaster as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, a natural disaster, and an act of terrorism, Boston Marathon bombing. The Washington Navy Yard shooting and Boston Marathon bombing were analyzed for contrast and comparison with a reference to domestic terrorism as they both occurred on U.S. soil. The case study responses were then analyzed using the following documents that compose the framework for this nation's preparedness to a disaster, either natural or man-made or an act of terrorism, in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—NPG, PPD-8, Stafford Act–Title VI, HSA of 2002–Title V, and the QHSR. The EM and HS disciplines were then analyzed for JGAs between them that present consequences to national security.

B. SETTING

The setting for the study occurred in three locations. The setting for the Hurricane Katrina case study was New Orleans, Louisiana, during the landfall of Hurricane Katrina and the days after in which the levees failed, which left everything in their path vulnerable to flooding. The setting for the second case study was Boston, Massachusetts, in the aftermath of the bombs detonating near the finish line and the surrounding area in a neighborhood of Watertown. The third setting was the site of the Washington Navy Yard shooting in southeast Washington, DC.

C. SAMPLE

The sampling procedure utilized by the researcher was a purposive sample. Stakeholders from the EM and HS disciplines who had a role or responsibility in Katrina hurricane, the Boston Marathon bombing, or the Navy Yard shooting as a first responder,

decision maker, or policy maker represented the sample and participants. The document analyzed by the researcher was PPD-8. The gender, age, ethnicity, and social-economic status of the stakeholders from the disciplines were not variables for the study.

D. MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENTS

The researcher utilized an observation checklist matrix format to collect data. The purpose of the matrix was to analyze PPD-8, which represented the framework for U.S. preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery for JGAs between EM and HS disciplines. The analytical themes produced from the matrix represented the qualitative data to support or refute consequences to national security resulting from JGAs. The validity of the matrix was measured by the themes that emerged in analyzing the document and the reliability was measured by the consistency in which the themes emerged.

E. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS PROCEDURES

The procedure utilized by the researcher to collect data for the study consisted of an analysis of the following questions from Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies: a) how and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when? b) how is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a terrorism response? c) how is planning and preparedness performed? and d) why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern? The results of the analysis were placed in the observation checklist matrix (Appendix). The purpose of the matrix was to examine the EM and HS disciplines for preparedness in the mission areas of PPD-8: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery for JGAs in the event of a natural or human-made disaster or an act of terrorism. The common themes and differences that emerged represented the data collection to support or refute a claim of consequences to national security that resulted from JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines.

VII. RESULTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Themes emerging from Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies represent the results. The qualitative findings from these questions are discussed in Chapter VIII. Preparedness in the PPD-8 mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery represented the analysis tool utilized for the case study questions. Hurricane Katrina represented a natural disaster, whereas the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Navy Yard shooting, occurring on U.S. soil, by definition represented acts of domestic terrorism. The researcher considers the Washington Navy Yard shooting an act of workplace violence, however, as opposed to an act of domestic terrorism due to the absence of a political or religious motive for the shootings. Additionally, the researcher notes the well-documented fact that Navy Yard shooter Aaron Alexis gained entry into the facility to commit his mass killing spree with his employee identification work credentials.

B. EMERGING THEMES

When analyzing how and why in the determination of who is in charge and when, the principles of NIMS, specifically ICS, emerged in the natural disaster, the act of domestic terrorism, and the act of workplace violence. ICS requires that an identified single incident commander (IC) or UC structure be established on all incidents. “The incident command organizational structure develops in a top-down, modular fashion that is based on the size and complexity of the incident, as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident.”⁷⁵ While a natural disaster, such as Hurricane Katrina, creates a complex disaster due to the large geographical area impacted, an act of terrorism, such as the Boston Marathon bombing, and a workplace violence incident, such as the Washington Navy Yard shooting, seem to create more of a challenge in complexity due to the initial unknown number of victims, and initial unknown number of perpetrators. Hurricane Katrina responders and stakeholders were subjected to criticism

⁷⁵ Department of Homeland Security, *National Incident Command System*, 10.

for the lack of addressing who was initially in charge and responsible for managing the disaster, which was in total contrast to the Boston Marathon bombing. This concern was addressed by a prepared IAP, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting, in which the UC's IAP developed on the scene determined who was in charge.

In analyzing "all-hazards," the principles of the EM discipline indicate that planning and preparedness and response efforts for this type of emergency that is not a disaster, also requires a management component due to the amount of resources expected for mitigation. FEMA supported EM discipline principles traditionally prepared for and responded to disasters both natural and human-made utilizing the framework of the Stafford Act. Post 9/11 brought DHS supported HS discipline principles with a priority towards preparedness and response to terrorism. Also emerging was the application of preparedness efforts to an "all-hazards" emergency that commenced at the local level and was driven by the hazard assessment that indicated the type of incidents likely to occur in that community. Terrorism preparedness and response capabilities were not previously addressed because they failed to reach the top of the hazard assessment list in communities across the nation. Terrorism preparedness and response capabilities are now being addressed as an "all-hazards" emergency of national consequence requiring a management component.

PPD-8 presented a paradigm of national preparedness with a holistic approach that commenced at the local level, which has been adopted by both disciplines. The HSA of 2002, from which PPD-8 evolved as the nation's framework for preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, takes into account that addressing the greatest threats to the United States should include both terrorism and disasters, both natural and human-made. Measures to have communities become self-sufficient until federal resources arrive to augment the local and state resources are now being addressed. "Emergency planning normally begins with the identification of the disasters that have occurred in a community in the past."⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Waugh, "Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model. IDS Emergency Management," 2.

Emerging from the analysis of planning and preparedness utilizing the framework of PPD-8 was the revelation that first responders and some key stakeholders were the same for EM and HS disciplines when it came to training.

Joint training sessions in planning and preparedness included firefighters, law enforcement officers, and EMTs. Also to emerge was the realization that HS discipline principles placed a greater emphasis on law enforcement functions much like EM discipline principles place a greater emphasis on disasters, both natural and human-made. The categorization of terrorism as an “all-hazards” in terms of planning, preparedness, and response is supported more by HS discipline principles, which can be attributed to the greater need for law enforcement functions in the wake of an act of terrorism and ensuing investigation of this crime.

Hurricane Katrina still today presents a national platform for a discussion on social injustice for the survivors and the millions who watched its devastation that floated bodies to the surface, which represented demographics of social-economic divide. “As conditions deteriorated in New Orleans, Americans were horrified at the scenes they were watching on television.”⁷⁷ With 9/11 viewed as a nation caught off-guard by an unanticipated but predictable terrorist attack, Hurricane Katrina was seen as a nation caught off-guard again, this time by a predicted natural disaster. Hurricane Katrina had outcries of social-economic injustice in New Orleans, as many of its victims were unable to escape because it was the end of the month and they did not have money to pay for transportation out of the path of the on-coming disaster during the early stages. “Many of the residents on public assistance had run out of money.”⁷⁸

Political consequences from Hurricane Katrina included probing the lack of coordination by local, state and federal officials. “Despite knowledge that Katrina was a looming ‘nightmare scenario,’ DHS and Secretary Cheroff failed to adequately prepare the federal government for what became one of the most destructive natural disasters in

⁷⁷ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 66.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

the nation's history.”⁷⁹ Efforts at the state and local levels of government were equally inadequate. Politics surrounding Hurricane Katrina resulted in careers ending for some federal key decision makers involved in the failed planning, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts to this natural disaster, most notably FEMA director Michael Brown. Psychological consequences of Hurricane Katrina's survivors can be measured by tracking cases of individuals treated for psychological disorders resulting from the disaster, which was not a subject of the researcher's study.

In analyzing the Boston Marathon bombing utilizing the framework of PPD-8, this act of domestic terrorism seems to have presented political consequences also. Politics centered on assertions of the United States' knowledge of bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev's ties with Islamic radicals and failure to check further into the allegations by the U.S. intelligence community. Politically, this point of contention raised questions of irresponsibility by top FBI officials, which was downplayed by the bureau's leader. “Three months after the bombing, then FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III said the bureau's failure to share information about the elder Tsarnaev wasn't important.”⁸⁰ The daylong lockdown of the city added to the political fallout as critics including presidential hopeful (Ron Paul) spoke on the ineffectiveness of this tactic. It was noted that the brothers were located after the lockdown ended.

⁷⁹ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 70.

⁸⁰ Susan Zalkind, “5 Myths about the Boston Marathon Bombing,” *Washington Post*, April 6, 2014, B2.

VIII. DISCUSSION

EM and HS disciplines include many of the same key stakeholders. The internal stakeholders include fire service, law enforcement, and EMTs who represent the first responders to the scene of a disaster, both human-made or any “all-hazards” emergency along with government agencies that provide the policies that compose the planning, preparedness, response, and recovery framework. External stakeholders include non-governmental organizations that provide support to the HS enterprise.

A. CHALLENGES

Some of the challenges presented for the stakeholders who are one in the same include an incident scene at which the question of identifying who is in charge becomes a dilemma, redundancy and duplication of on-scene efforts, a lack of clear guidelines for planning and preparedness, and the question of why should the social, political, and psychological consequences of a disaster or “all-hazards” be a concern. The Cold War era gave rise to the civil defense-led mission of community vigilance in the '40s, '50s, and '60s, to guard against foreign invasion, which gave way to the FEMA-led '70s, '80s, and '90s mission of preparedness and response to disasters, both natural and human-made, which gave way to the current HS discipline-led 21st century mission of protecting the homeland against the threat and acts of terrorism. A common theme of the primary mission of each era that continues today is community preparedness and response capability. The efforts of securing the homeland against disasters and emergencies starts in the community and each era realized whether it was a disaster or emergency it required management of the resources. It began as a local incident and based on the impacted community's preparedness and capability to respond, it often represented the success or failure of mitigation. This theme was and is expected to be prevalent in the future regardless of whether the stakeholders of the EM or HS discipline lead the challenge of national security and resiliency for the United States.

The purpose of this case study and qualitative analysis research was to explore how JGAs between the disciplines have consequences on national security. The questions that represented the research are: a) what are the consequences to nation and how can they be resolved, b) does the JGA between EM and HS present a challenge for both disciplines in the preparedness areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, and c) does the JGA between Emergency Management and Homeland Security present a challenge for both disciplines for an “all-hazards” response. These questions were analyzed using Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting case studies with a set of questions that took into account three types of incidents: a disaster, an act of terrorism, and an act of workplace violence. PPD-8 served as the qualitative analysis instrument. The results represented the discussion for each of the three research questions analyzed as the study identified an important gap that could have consequences to national security.

In taking a snapshot post 13 years 9/11, the pride and resiliency of the United States is on display with a complex framework for securing this nation. Adding to the complexity is how EM and HS discipline stakeholders define “all-hazards.” Stakeholders of both disciplines who respond to an “all-hazards” emergency have shared but sometimes redundant or competitive roles and responsibilities. The same can be found in preparedness efforts for an “all-hazards” emergency in which EM discipline principles primarily center on disasters, both natural and human-made, and HS discipline principles primarily center on terrorism. Having both disciplines collaborate and subscribe to a common definition of “all-hazards” emergency can reduce redundant competitive roles of responsibility in preparedness and response.

Preparedness in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery revealed JGAs, as the EM and HS discipline principles seem to mirror each other while being implemented by two different agencies, which causes competing roles and responsibilities. The Stafford Act–Title VI–Emergency Preparedness and PPD-8–

National Preparedness contain identical conceptual and practical components that are primary missions for both EM and HS disciplines. The FEMA-regulated Stafford Act provides a systematic approach to emergency preparedness in the same manner as the HSA of 2002-regulated PPD-8 addresses national preparedness. Having both disciplines working from opposite ends of the spectrum creates problems with coordination. “Homeland security involves so many different agencies performing so many different functions, that drawing clear lines is difficult.”⁸¹ Coordination issues that promote competing roles and responsibility, which thus creates redundancy, are far more prevalent than issues of performing different functions when examining the EM and HS discipline principles. When examining HS, its primary mission is to protect the nation against the threat and acts of terrorism, which is now challenged by expanding its scope in “an attempt to combine and collect the entire array of safety, security, and emergency readiness under collective effort. And as such, it has also become a term of discord.”⁸²

The HSA of 2002, which realigned the federal government and placed FEMA under the DHS, can be seen as a contributor of this JGA that can have consequences to national security. “In the act creating the department, Congress resolved the question of which agencies ought to be included with relative speed.”⁸³ Coordination between the DHS agencies, which also includes FEMA, is seen as a challenge that until resolved will allow JGAs to exist. Removing FEMA from the DHS would be counter-productive, as the EM and HS discipline principles will inherently bring collaboration between them. “The new, spun-off FEMA would still have to work closely with the homeland security elements that remained inside DHS, or it would separate DHS emergency planning from the major agency responsible for carrying out the response.”⁸⁴

Another potential consequence to national security can result from JGAs between EM and HS disciplines because the stakeholders are one in the same, which presents a

⁸¹ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 40.

⁸² Woodbury, *Emergency Management in Higher Education—Current Practices and Conversations* “*Emergency Management and Homeland Security: Exploring the Gray Area*, 1.

⁸³ Kettl, *System under Stress*, 53.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 79.

challenge in determining who is in charge. In determining who is in charge of a disaster or emergency of national consequence, NIMS, specifically ICS, presents a modular top-down management tool that identifies a single incident commander or a UC for the incident. The first responders of fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical service also use this incident management tool for training to plan and prepare in the mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina highlighted the importance of identifying who is in charge early into the incident, as without this imperative component of NIMS being addressed by implementing ICS at either the local, state, or federal level, it can result in key decision-making processes going unaddressed. The Boston Marathon bombing and Washington Navy Yard shooting implemented the ICS component of NIMS, which enhanced accountability and safety for the first responders to both incidents. Stakeholders who represent both disciplines should be on one accord in addressing who is in charge.

B. LIMITATIONS

The researcher's decision to expand the study from qualitative analysis methodology to include case study methodology proved to be a limitation on the time to collect, analyze, and report the findings and results. The decision to present each of the three case studies; Hurricane Katrina, the Boston Marathon bombing, and the Washington Navy Yard shooting, as an independent chapter to the study was also a limitation due to time constraints. The contrast and comparison analysis between disasters, both natural and human-made and terrorism utilizing the questions from the three case studies, which were then analyzed by the PPD-8 matrix, added to the time constraints for collecting, analyzing, and reporting these results and findings utilizing the questions from the study.

Other limitations were related to the sensitivity of the data collected and theoretical sensitivity. The researcher served in a decision-making capacity during the Washington Navy Yard shooting and sharing the data collected for this study during an on-going investigation presented a challenge to limitation. The data collected and shared for the study concerning the Washington Navy Yard shooting case study was limited with respect to the victims and their love ones, as well as the on-going investigation. The researcher's experience as a chief officer in the fire service can be viewed as bias for the Washington Navy Yard case study in the same fashion as ethnographic research conducted by one serving in the same profession. Also, having the researcher serving in a decision-making capacity for the Washington Navy Yard shooting can be viewed as bias with respect to collecting, reporting, and more importantly, sharing of the data.

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IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the results, the following recommendations are presented. Both EM and HS discipline stakeholders must undertake measures in the area of reducing the vulnerability of the United States to threats and acts of terrorism collectively, which can be accomplished in many ways, such as consensus-reaching stakeholder forums and joint training in PPD-8 that includes first responders of the public safety organizations and community citizenry. Research in the area of identifying the differentness between domestic terrorist and foreign terrorist presents intriguing research for the stakeholders of both disciplines. While the focus has been on stopping potential terrorists from coming into the United States to commit acts of terrorism, domestic homegrown terrorists will continue to commit acts of terrorism on the homeland. American-born radicalized citizens, such as the Boston Marathon bombers, lived in this nation's backyard undetected until they took the lives and injured innocent participants and spectators of a race. Domestic terrorist must be identified and stopped before the act of terrorism is committed.

Measures that support HS as a recognized discipline must be undertaken. The acceptance of EM as a discipline recognized by academic and industry came years after its stakeholders had performed the management tasks of mitigation in numerous natural disasters. Sustainability of HS is critical because EM discipline stakeholders view this evolving discipline as a competitor as opposed to an ally. Research that addresses the gaps in national security created by the JGAs between EM and HS is warranted, as potential terrorists will continue to seek the path of least resistance in committing acts of terrorism to kill and injure innocent victims on U.S. soil.

Another area for future research is addressing the mental status of a person who erupts in an unprovoked killing spree of innocent victims on U.S. soil. Prior to the Washington Navy Yard shooting spree by Aaron Alexis, mass killing incidents occurred in the United States, such as the mass killings on the Fort Hood military base in 2009 by Major Nidal Hassan, and the Aurora, Colorado movie shooting by James Holmes on July 20, 2012. In both incidents, the shooter used a legally registered firearm. Research in the

area of identifying these potential “terrorists” whether they are employees, students, or everyday citizens, is recommended and should include more stringent measures to keep firearms out of their possession.

X. CONCLUSIONS

Three conclusions were drawn from this research that can have implications to national security as a result of JGAs between the EM and HS disciplines. The first is in not making a decision of who is in charge in the event of a disaster, either natural or human-made or an incident of national consequence; it can negatively impact first responders and other key stakeholders. Major incidents in which multiple local, state, and federal resources will be deployed for mitigation require clear lines of authority that start with identifying who is in charge. The implication for not having this concern addressed can be devastating, such as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. First responders and other key stakeholders to an incident where the question of who is in charge has not been addressed can find themselves operating on a scene at which a duplication of efforts may occur with a higher probability that some critical tasks will not be identified or addressed in a timely fashion, which may prolong mitigation all together.

The ICS component of NIMS provides a top-down model to manage an incident that would require a multidiscipline, multiagency, and multijurisdictional response, thus addressing this problem. The UC structure would allow the different agencies from different disciplines, and jurisdictions to operate together with equal authority given to each agency or jurisdiction represented. This command structure would also inherently provide accountability for all first responders to the incident with unity of command, which identifies a supervisor for all on-scene personnel, and more importantly, the single IC or unified structure of command would identify who is in charge of the incident.

The second conclusion drawn from this research that can have implications to national security is the absence of a consensus agreed upon definition of “all-hazards” by the EM and HS disciplines. Both internal and external stakeholders must agree on the definition, which will in turn, promote better on-scene management. The traditional response of the EM discipline addressed a disaster, either natural or human-made, and any other incident was considered an “all-hazards” emergency, including an act of terrorism. 9/11 gave the United States a wake-up call, which produced the HSA of 2002 with a top priority of reducing the vulnerability to the threat of terrorism and the

framework for a national response to terrorism on the homeland. Having a consensus on the definition of “all-hazards” will allow the disciplines to operate in unison, as the expectations of both will be agreed upon. This consensus-built collaboration model can also be used in planning and preparing for an “all-hazards” incident and should include joint training by all disciplines expected to respond to an “all-hazards” emergency or incident.

The third conclusion drawn from this research that can have implications to national security is the failure to acknowledge and address political, social, and psychological consequences of a major disaster, either natural, such as Hurricane Katrina, or human-made, or a major incident of national consequence, such as the Boston Marathon bombing. In the case of psychological effects of an act of terrorism, other types of traumatic events in which the lost of life and devastation was great must also be reviewed to provide parameters to address this concern. With evolving technology in communications, such as video equipped cell phones, social implications will be more media driven. By bringing the impact of the incident to those not directly affected, the media can present the “worst of the worst” in suffering to the non-affected population, and thus, shape the perception of the government and its role of responsibility. This approach can potentially lead to political issues that can reach far from the local community where the response initially occurred to the national arena with consequences for those with a role in policy adoption and a responsibility as a government accountable official or employee.

APPENDIX. CASE STUDIES QUALITATIVE MATRIX

Qualitative Matrix

Case Studies:

- Hurricane Katrina (August 29, 2005)
- Boston Marathon bombing (April 15, 2013)
- Washington Navy Yard shooting (September 16, 2013)

Area of Analysis—PPD-8 for Emergency Management (EM) and Homeland Security (HS)

Area of Analysis—Natural Disaster/Domestic Terrorism/Workplace Violence

Discipline—recognized domain in academia and industry

Jurisdictional—range of authority

Gray area—ambiguity supporting theoretic and applied differences in policy and procedure

JGA—jurisdictional gray area

PPD-8

JGAs between EM & HS	Hurricane Katrina (Natural Disaster)	Boston Marathon Bombing (Domestic Terrorism)	Navy Yard Shooting (Workplace violence)
How and why is the determination made of who is in charge and when?			
How is an “all-hazards” response defined—is it different from a Terrorism response?			
How is planning and preparedness performed?			
Why should social, political, and psychological consequences be a concern?			

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