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**SUCCESSFUL SEPARATIONISTS IN A UNITY FAN
SOCIETY: AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI SOCIAL MOVEMENT
IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

by

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December 2013

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AL-JANUBI SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN**

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ABSTRACT

The Southern separatist movement in Yemen represents a major threat to the Republic of Yemen's stability and, consequently, to regional and international security. It started as a rights-based social movement led by the Southern military officers who were forced to retire after the 1994 civil war. Searching for solutions to the embers of unrest under the ashes of grievances against government ignorance and their marginalization, these separatists established a Southern-based social movement called *Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has had great political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and great narratives to sell. Al-Houthies' Northern problem, the 2006 presidential election, and the Arab Spring opened political opportunities for Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. Al-hirak's charismatic leadership, financial resources, and activists' recruitment bases provided great mobilizing structures, and Yemeni government corruption, wrong policies, and discrimination against Southerners provided the movement with the cause, and supported its narrative. However, Al-Hirak's success will be limited to disrupting Yemen's stability and security. It is not equipped to separate the South from the rest of Yemen but can cause much trouble.

Therefore, the Yemeni government, with regional and international support, should act instantly to make an end to Southern grievances by returning stolen lands, restoring Southern dignity, and supporting moderate factions of the movement to accept dialogue. More importantly, the government should purify itself by fighting corruption, improving its public administration, making an end to discrimination, and providing social services to its entire population regardless of the region, affiliation, gender, or status.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	THE PROBLEM AND CONCERN OF THE THESIS.....	1
B.	LITERATURE REVIEW	2
C.	METHODOLOGY	4
D.	THESIS ORGANIZATION.....	5
II.	ROOTS OF THE MOVEMENT	7
A.	HISTORY OF YEMENI UNITY	7
1.	Yemen's Unity: One Nation in Two States	7
2.	The Reunification of 1990	10
3.	1993 Parliamentary Election.....	12
4.	A Story of Crises	13
B.	SOUTHERNERS' GRIEVANCES AND THE RISE OF THE MOVEMENT	16
1.	Economic Grievances.....	17
2.	Social Dimensions of the Southerners' Grievances.....	19
3.	Cultural Grievances.....	21
III.	POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES	23
A.	AL-HOUTHIES MOVEMENT IN SA'DAH	23
B.	2006 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION	25
C.	THE ARAB SPRING (AR-RABīʿ AL-ʿARABī) POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY	26
D.	REPRESSION OF AL-HIRAK.....	29
1.	Observable Coercive Repression	29
a.	<i>State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites</i>	<i>29</i>
b.	<i>State Agents Loosely Connected with National Political Elites</i>	<i>31</i>
c.	<i>Private Agents</i>	<i>33</i>
2.	Unobserved Coercive Repression	34
a.	<i>State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites</i>	<i>34</i>
b.	<i>Private Agents</i>	<i>35</i>
IV.	MOBILIZING STRUCTURE	37
A.	LEADERSHIP.....	37
B.	RESOURCE MOBILIZATION	40
C.	FACTIONS OF THE MOVEMENT	41
1.	The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South (<i>Al-Majlis Al-A'La Lilhirak Al-Selmi Letahrir Al-Janub</i>).....	42

2.	National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (<i>Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub</i>).....	43
3.	The National Commission for the Southern Movement and the Retired Military Officers Committee (<i>Almajlis Alwatni Lelhirak Al-Janubi and Jamiat al-Mutaga'Idin al-Janubiien</i>)	43
4.	Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Shabab Waltullab Al-Janubiin).....	44
5.	South Youth Federation (<i>Ittihad Shabab Al-Janub</i>)	44
6.	The Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic Congress Taji) (<i>Harakat Taji</i>)	44
7.	Youth February 16 (<i>Shabab 16 Febrair</i>).....	45
8.	The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (<i>Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer</i>).....	45
9.	The Southern Nation National Congress (<i>Almutamar Al-Wattani Lisha 'B Aljanub</i>)	45
D.	ANALYSIS OF AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI NETWORK, FACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND INFLUENTIAL LEADERS	46
1.	Link Analysis.....	47
2.	Social Network Analysis (SNA)	49
3.	Geospatial Analysis.....	53
V.	AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI'S CULTURAL FRAME AND PUBLIC SUPPORT ..	55
A.	IDEOLOGICAL PACKAGE AND FRAMING	55
1.	Ideology.....	55
a.	Religion.....	55
b.	Socialism.....	56
2.	Framing of Religion and Socialism	56
3.	Opportunities in Adaptation.....	57
B.	MOTIVATING AND MANIPULATING SUPPORTERS FOR THE CAUSE	58
1.	Attraction.....	58
a.	Ideological Concept.....	58
b.	Social Services.....	59
c.	Glory and Excitement	59
2.	Duty and Honor.....	59
a.	Fighting Repression.....	60
b.	Defending Homeland or People and Ejecting the Occupier	60
c.	Seeking Revenge	61
3.	Rewards	62
a.	Financial	62
b.	Power	63
c.	Prestige	63
C.	PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE	64

1.	Religious Beliefs and the Ideological, Ethical Tolerance for Violence.....	65
2.	Revenge	66
3.	Cultural Propensity for Acceptance of Violence.....	66
4.	Necessary Desperation.....	67
D.	ACCEPTABILITY OF COSTS AND RISKS	68
1.	Intimidation	68
2.	Assessment of a Likely Victor	69
VI.	AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI'S NARRATIVES	71
A.	DIAGNOSTIC FRAMES	71
1.	Southern Plight.....	71
2.	It is an Occupation, It is Not Unity.....	73
3.	Southern Arabia.....	76
4.	Unjust War (1994 Civil War Calamity).....	76
B.	PROGNOSTIC FRAMES.....	77
1.	The Resources.....	77
2.	Unity of the Southern People (Nation)	78
3.	Separation Is the Solution	78
C.	MOTIVATIONAL.....	79
1.	Bright Future in a New Civil Institutional State.....	79
2.	Responsibility and Duty of Resistance and Traders.....	80
3.	Absence of Hope.....	80
4.	One Nation, Two States	81
VII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	83
A.	CONCLUSIONS	83
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	87
1.	To the Yemeni Government.....	87
a.	<i>Effective Measures To Be Continued.....</i>	87
b.	<i>Practices To Be Avoided</i>	89
c.	<i>Policies That Should Be Implemented</i>	90
2.	To Al-Hirak and Al-Janubi.....	92
3.	To the International Community	94
APPENDIX. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE COMMITTEES ON LAND ISSUES AND FORCED RETIREMENT IN THE SOUTH.....		97
LIST OF REFERENCES.....		103
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		111

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Network.	46
Figure 2.	Influential Actors' Network Relationships.	47
Figure 3.	The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South Links.	48
Figure 4.	Geospatial Analysis of the Al-Hirak Movement.	53

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Summary of SNA on Al-Hirak Al-Janubi Factions – Top 10.	51
Table 2.	Top 6 Al-Hirak Faction Performances in Centrality Measurements.	52

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQAP	Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
GPC	General People's Congress
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
JMP	Joint Meeting Parties
NDC	The Yemeni National Dialogue Conference
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
RoY	Republic of Yemen
SNA	Social Network Analysis
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM AND CONCERN OF THE THESIS

The Republic of Yemen has become one of the weakest countries in the world. The state faces extreme economic, political, and security challenges.¹ Its central control is challenged by Al Houthies in the North, tribal leaders in the East, and AQAP in every meter of the country. Political parties are feeding instability and weakening the central government by undermining its efforts to provide basic services and security for the people by supporting sabotage against government institutions, and fighting over power, while the country is struggling to stand on its feet.

The only threat that can tear Yemen apart and, consequently, produce huge instability to the region² is the Southern separation social movement that is called (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*). While Yemen is facing different economic, social, security, and political challenges, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, as Haidar and Stracke assert “is growing in terms of members, supporters, and sympathizers, and broadening networks and activities in the main cities of the South.”³

The Southern Separation Movement (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*) that was easy to shape when it began poses a very serious threat—not just to Yemen’s security—but to the existence of the country’s unity as a whole. The Southern people know they deserve respect, equal treatment, and equal opportunities with their Northern brothers. To obtain their rights, they know they have to do something. Therefore, Southern people are climbing what Mogaddam called “the staircase”⁴ to search for opportunities and get their rights. If they find only closed doors, like they found before, they will, for sure, join Al-Hirak and use all means to separate the South from the North.

.1 Kamil A. Mahdi, Anna Wurth, and Helen Lahner, eds., *Yemen into the Twenty-first Century: Continuity and Challenges* (UK: Ithaca Press, 2007), 425.

.2 Nicole Stracke and Mohammed Saif Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen,” *Sheba Center for Strategic Studies* (April 2010), <http://www.metransparent.com/spip.php?article9779>.

.3 Ibid.

.4 Fathali Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” *American Psychologist* (March 2005): 161.

The purpose of this thesis is to understand the underlying factors behind the success of a separatist movement in a society that considers unity an ultimate principle. It will answer the question why unity fans are willing to die for separation. It examines the existing threat to the country's unity to anticipate the future of the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's social movement in its competition with the Yemeni government for popular support. The thesis argues that the congestion in the South is a product of the Yemeni Government's ignorance and marginalization of the Southerner's rights and grievances in Yemen. Therefore, it illustrates the need for an immediate engagement with the Southern people by the Yemeni government as well as the need for support by the international organization, along with regional and international powers, to absorb the problem and lower the potential temper, hence securing the country's unity and improving regional and global stability.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

Stephen Day has produced a very valuable book about contemporary Yemen that studies regionalism and rebellion in Yemen. He considers the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi uprising to be the beginning of the Arab Spring, and not the other way around. He claims five precedents behind the rise and the strength of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi: the outcome of 1994 and the government repression and corruption that planted the seeds of the movement; the forced early retirement of civilian and military employees (especially Ali Naser's partisan in 1998); the activities of the public forum for the Sons of Southern and Eastern Provinces during Ramadan 2001–2002 that brought it to the forefront; the surprising public support among citizens across the South for the 2006 presidential campaign of Faysal Bin Shamlan; and the interpretation of the 2005–2006 success of Al Houthies that strengthened it and made it possible.⁵

Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway edited *Yemen on the Brink* on the eve of the Arab Spring that explains the implications of the Houthies rebellion on the stability of the country and the degree of support for the Al-Hirak uprising. It explains mostly all

⁵ Stephen W. Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 228.

contemporary threats, not only to the government, but to the nation, especially when such threats happen in the same time period.⁶

The article, “Breaking Point: Yemen’s Southern Question,” describes, with a relatively detailed report, the history, causes, activities, and future of the Southern separation movement (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*), and the internal and external players who are effectively involved in one way or another in Al-Hirak Al-Janubi movement. The article describes the political opportunity of the Arabic spring that sparked the movement and gives it the weight it has today. The report recommends different approaches to end the movement and weighs these approaches’ strengths and weaknesses, as well as makes recommendations for the different players inside and outside Yemen to take in order to solve the issue for a more secure Yemen.⁷

In “Yemen’s Forever War: Political Instability in the South,” April Alley gives the reader a general insight into the current Southern problem. The article does not give detailed information about the Southern grievances and causes of the recent unrest. However, for those who are unfamiliar with the problem, this article may open the door to the Southern movement, in general, and give a recent picture of the Yemeni security situation.

In “The Southern Movement,” Stracke and Haidar provide detailed information about the relationship, establishment, and leaders of different factions of the Southern separation movement. This article focuses more on the short- and long-term strategies that the Yemeni government should implement to ensure the Southern social movement could not move to the extreme left. For Stracke and Haidar, the Southern movement is still not united in itself and has problems among its different factions. Therefore, the movement may produce a security threat but cannot challenge the legitimacy of the central government.⁸ The article was produced prior to the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring

.6 Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway, eds., *Yemen on the Brink* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

.7 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report N 114, International Crisis Group (October 20, 2011), accessed March 12, 2013, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-North-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/114-breaking-point-yemens-Southern-question.aspx>.

.8 Stracke and Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen.”

produced great changes for the Southern separation movement and new challenges for Yemen.

In “the Southern Movement in Yemen,” Dahlgren provides information on the establishment of the Southern movement and its use of the Internet to send messages inside and outside Yemen. It provides an insight into the reasons behind the social movement and also states how simple problems become great problems if not treated correctly and immediately.⁹

C. METHODOLOGY

Glenn Robinson, following the Social Movement theory that generally focuses on groups as the proper units for analysis when explaining collective actions, asserts that Hamas is a social movement.¹⁰ In his description, a social movement falls between general structural theories that analyze relatively large units, and rational theory that tends to analyze individual rational choices. Social movement theory tends to utilize three fundamentals: it analyzes how political opportunity structures impact the observed group’s existence; it focuses on the structures and institutions of the groups under observation; and it looks at the group under study in a cultural frame. In Social Movement theory, culture cannot be ignored as the group is affected by what is around it.¹¹

Utilizing the Social Movement theory, this thesis will conduct a case study of the Southern separation movement (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*) in Yemen to understand the factors that underlie its success. The study will focus on the political opportunity the Southern separation movement exploited, the institution and structures of the separation movement, how the culture of separation and the general feeling of discrimination in the Southern part of the country supported this movement, and what the Yemeni government

⁹ Susanne Dahlgren, “The Southern Movement in Yemen,” *ISIM Review* 22 (2008), https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17267/ISIM_22_The_Southern_Movement_inYemen.pdf?sequence=1.

¹⁰ Glenn E. Robinson, “Hamas as Social Movement,” in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*, ed. Quintan Wicktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).

¹¹ Ibid.

could have done to absorb and shape the movement to the benefit of the state. In studying this social movement, we will look at the Arab Spring as a beginning for political opportunity, the institutions *Al-Hirak Al-Janubi* already has, the cultural effect on their social movement, the narratives of the movement, and the possible outcomes if the separation social movement is not shaped and absorbed by the Yemeni government in support of the international community.

The RAND study, “Factor Tree for Public Support,” has provided a very useful tool to study the public support of social movements,¹² which we will use to explain the cultural framing and its impact on *Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*’s popularity and motivations. Jennifer Earl uses three key typology dimensions to categorize repression of a given movement. Those dimensions are the identity of the repressive agent, the character of the repressive actions, and whether the repressive actions are observable.¹³ We will use Earl’s typology of repression as an attempt to understand the effects on the relationship between the government and *Al-Hirak Al-Janubi* in Yemen.

D. THESIS ORGANIZATION

Chapter II discusses the roots of the Southern separation movement by providing the history of Yemen before unity. It also focuses on domestic and international factors that lead to unity; the shortfalls of unity procedures and practices that lead to the 1993 crises; the parliamentary election consequences that lead to 1994 civil war and the initiation of *Al-Hirak* in 2007; and how in 2009, *Al-Hirak* became the harvest of the economic, social, and cultural grievances that political, military, and tribal leaders in Yemen planted in the early 1990s and 2000s.

Chapter III contains an analysis of the main political opportunities that lead to the initiation of the movement, the support for its existence, and the participation in its sustainment. The discussion also explains the consequence of the Houthis rebellions on

.12 Paul K. Davis, Eric V. Larson, Zachary Haldeman, Mustafa Oguz, and Yashodhara Rana, *Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism*, National Defense Research Institute (RAND), (2012), <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1122.html>.

.13 Jennifer Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression,” *American Sociological Association* 21, no. 1 (March, 2003), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3108608>.

the reputation of the government, and how the rebellions contributed to the strength of the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. The 2006 presidential election broke the shield of the Sana'a administration and revealed the possibility of a change. During this time, the Arab Spring enabled the Southerners to openly call for separation and arrange a huge demonstration. Finally, government repression added to the previously mentioned opportunities and contributed to the growth of the movement.

Chapter IV focuses on the mobilizing structures that played into the movement's strength and analyzes how the movement's leadership, networks, factions, resources mobilization, and relationships between its factions, play to the strengths and weaknesses of the movement.

Chapter V discusses the cultural framing that Al-Hirak Al-Janubi relies upon to get more supporters and legitimize its actions. This chapter also presents an explanation of how Al-Hirak's ideology plays to its strengths, what motivates people to dedicate themselves to the cause, what the movement is able to provide to its supporters, how it has promoted a legitimacy of violence, and how it convinces its members to accept risks.

Chapter VI focuses on the narratives of the movement and beliefs among Southerners. It analyzes the existence and effectiveness of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational narratives, and its ability to frame these narratives and utilize them to get more popular support.

Chapter VII presents a summary and conclusions of the findings of the thesis and recommendations to the Yemeni government, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, and the international community which favored Yemen as a secure and stable country.

II. ROOTS OF THE MOVEMENT

A. HISTORY OF YEMENI UNITY

The Republic of Yemen (ROY), as it is known today, was not first born in May 22, 1990. It was an offspring of several attempts by both the Northern and Southern parts of the country, either unilaterally or bilaterally. Throughout history, as Hassan Boutaleb asserts, Yemen experienced centralized administration periods more often than times of separation.¹⁴ In modern times, Cairo's agreement (*ittifagiat al-gahirah*) in 1972 and Tripoli's agreement (*Ittifagiat Trabulis*) on November 28, 1972, represent a joint effort by both parts of the country to reunify. Both agreements had set the stage for the 1990's declaration of the united Yemen.¹⁵ However, unilateral attempts by the South were parallel to the joint attempts. For example, the National Movement Front in the early 1980s represented an eagerness of the South to unify Yemen at the time by force. Abdulfattah Ismaeil, the president of the South at the time, called for instant unity in the Kuwait Agreement (*Itifaqiat Al-Kwait 1977*), while the Northern part had some reservations and asked for more time to negotiate and prepare for the unification process.¹⁶

1. Yemen's Unity: One Nation in Two States

Just like Germany, Vietnam, and the Korean peninsula, Yemen's separation and reunification was affected by global conflicts and the Cold War between great global powers. Yemen was only one state under the Ottoman Empire's rule until 1839 when Great Britain occupied the Southern part of the country. The Ottoman Empire and Great Britain finally implemented partitioning of the territory of Yemen into North and South

¹⁴ Hassan Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah: Direasat Fi 'amaliat Al-Tahawel and Min Tashtir Ila Al-Wahdah* (Beirut, Lebanon: Center of Arab Unity Studies, 1994), 43.

¹⁵ Ali Abdullah Saleh, "Al-Thakirah, and Al-Siasiah" (Sana'a: Al Arabia News Channel, June 21, 2013), interviewed by Taher Barakah, Al-Arabia website, <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/programs/politic-memory/2013/06/21/3-الذاكرة-السياسية-علي-عبد-الله-صالح-.html>.

¹⁶ Ibid.

in 1905.¹⁷ They finalized their agreement on borders between the North and the South in 1914.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the Yemeni people had no say in this agreement and did not recognize it as a legitimate action.¹⁹

Directly after WWI, the Ottoman Empire surrendered its power and legitimacy to the Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamied Al-Deian who refused to participate with Sharif Hussein in fighting against the Ottoman Empire and remained partial throughout the war. Soon after he established the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen (*Al-Mamlakah Al-Mutawakkilīyah Al-Yamanīyah*), he announced his willingness to bring back the Southern part of the country, and supported the resistance groups in the South to free the country from British occupation.²⁰ However, due to a huge gap in technology and army professionalism between the Northern part of Yemen and England, the North was defeated and was only able to hold the mountains. Hodeida was occupied, and Great Britain supported Al-Idrissi and the Saudi family after that in their fight against the North. Having no other choice, the imam signed an agreement with England in 1934 in which he agreed to give up the South, at the time, in exchange for peace.²¹

Despite the 1934 and 1950 agreements between them, during the time from 1918 until 1962, both Britain and the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen (*Al-Mamlakah Al-Mutawakkilīyah Al-Yamanīyah*) supported resistance groups of the other side. What is called the Revolution of 1962 in the North was a result of British support for revolutionaries. Aden was their safe haven and base for their propaganda and newspapers.²² However, the outcomes of the revolution in the North were very disappointing for the British side. One of the six goals of the revolution in Sana'a was to free the South and reunite the county. As a result of the October 14, 1963 revolution, the young regime in Sana'a supported the resistance groups with safe havens, weapons,

.17 Sophia Dingli, "The Politics of (re)Unification: Lessons from Yemen for Cyprus," *Academia*, http://www.academia.edu/2626169/The_Politics_of_Re_Unification_Lessons_from_Yemen_for_Cyprus.

.18 Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 29.

.19 Ibid.

.20 Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

.21 Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 31.

.22 Ibid, 41.

money, and media until the occupation was forced to leave Aden. Just like their brothers in the North, the Southern revolutionaries made reunification of the country their main goal. The Southern constitution “declared the South to be a part of a single Yemeni nation.”²³ Although both the North and the South were aiming, planning, and taking serious steps to reunify the county, each side was doing so on their own terms. In addition, the Cold War overcame the situation in Yemen, which became a proxy for the USSR in the South and the U.S. in the North.²⁴

Unity continued to be the dream of the Yemeni people, the Yemeni government, and stakeholders on each side. Both sides would go to war or clash over the borders, but when they met, instead of discussing current problems at the time, unity would consume the entire meeting.²⁵ Between 1970 and 1990, several meetings were conducted, but the primary meetings took place on October 28, 1972, during the Cairo agreement (*itifaq alqahirah 1972*). In this agreement, both countries decided to reunify the county²⁶ but then the North side did not take steps forward as a result of the USSR’s intervention in the South and the fear by the West that Northern Yemen would move toward the communist side. The Tripoli Agreement of November 1972 (*Ittifaq Trabulis 1972*) followed the Cairo agreement. In the Tripoli agreement, the two leaders agreed to take serious steps to unify the country, including the agreement to change the name of the new state to the Republic of Yemen, which then replaced the names of both states.²⁷ On February 28, 1973, the presidents from the North and South met and signed the agreement.

In February 1977, the Qataba Agreement (*itifagiat Ka’taba1977*) called for the establishment of several committees to solve the border issues and study collective benefits between the new single nation’s parts, including a unified foreign policy, and

²³ Robert W. Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982).

²⁴ “Human Rights in Yemen during and after the 1994 War,” *Human Rights Watch/Middle East* 6, no. 1 (October 1994).

²⁵ Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 125.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ali Abdullah Saleh, “Al-Thakirah Al-Siasiah” (Sana’a: Al Arabia News Channel, June 21, 2013).

joint share of the oil revenues in Marib and Shabwa.²⁸ The 1979 Kuwait Agreement between Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abdul Fattah Ismael (*ittifagiat Al- Kwait 1979*) called for instant and simple unity; however, Ali Saleh asked for time to discuss a federal system with the people in the North.²⁹ In 1989, the Sana'a Agreement (*Ittifagiat Sana'a 1988*) defined unarmed borders and uncontrolled movement of the Yemeni people between Sana'a and Aden, and established unified investment and joint-development programs.

In November 1989, during the Aden agreement (*Ittifag Aden 1989*), Ali Abdullah Saleh of the North and Ali Salem al-Beedh of the South agreed to finalize the steps and combine the two parts of Yemen.³⁰ This 1989 Agreement led to the declaration of unity between the two parts of Yemen on May 22, 1990.³¹

2. The Reunification of 1990

On May 22, 1990, Ali Abdullah Saleh raised the unity flag in Aden. Throughout the country, people were celebrating, dancing their traditional dances, and congratulating each other for the upcoming bright future. Finally, the dream became true. Reunification came as a result of the end of the Cold War and change in the international system. The Soviet Union seized its aid to many countries, including the democratic Republic of Yemen.³² As Norman Cigar asserts, "The USSR ha[d] become a dominant factor in the local economy, and its aid had engendered a real dependence on Moscow."³³ Unity then became a necessity, not only for history and long-term benefits to the country, but also for the short-term survival. Additionally, with support from the U.S., reunification moved forward and reduced the fear of communist intervention.

.28 Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 136.

.29 Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia*, 99.

.30 Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 109.

.31 "North and South Yemen: in Search of Unity," Directorate of Intelligence, Scribd, January 19, 1990, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/51196986/CIA-Study-on-Yemeni-Unification>.

.32 Thomas B. Stevenson, and Abdul Karim Alaog, "Football in Newly United Yemen: Rituals of Equity, Identity, and State Formation," *University of New Mexico, Journal of Anthropological Research* 56, no. 4 (2000), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3630927>.

.33 Norman Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR: Prospects for the Relationship," *Middle East Journal* 39, no. 4 (Autumn, 1985): 785, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4327184>.

For the Yemeni people, unity was the norm, and separation was an exception. Ordinary people did not look at all the regional and international changes that allowed reunification to happen. So the people in the North and the South were eager to see their country reunified and their brothers' conflicts ended. However, this was not the case with both administrations in the North and the South. Both administrations signed the agreement in fear that the other had hidden plans. Two extremely different ideologies were uniting in one body, just as the people were being united. The Southern administration believed in a one-party system and was extremely ideological, espousing a Marxist and Lenin-based philosophy. The Northern administration was comprised of a set of tribes and was supporting Islamic groups to contain Socialism. An international group report examining this period indicated, "From the start, this was a troubled unification that resulted in a short, bloody civil war in 1994."³⁴

Fear and lack of trust between the two administrations played to the benefit of the newly established state. It established a new constitution that allowed for a multiple party system, parliamentary elections, separation of the administrative, legislative, and judicial systems, and set the stage for presidential elections. The period from 1990 to 1993 was the best democratic time for Yemen. A new constitution was formed and set for referendum, the people began discussing their constitution and understood what it meant to have a voice in it, and debates about the constitution were held throughout the country. Debates and disputes between major players were mostly political and peaceful disputes; however, fear also played into the crises in the country before and after the 1993 parliamentary election, which led to the civil war in 1994 and consequently led to the grievances of the Southern people, and to the establishment of the separatist movement (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*).

³⁴ "Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question," Middle East Report N 114, International Crisis Group.

3. 1993 Parliamentary Election

Instead of spurring unity, the 1993 Parliament election reinforced the divide between the main parties in the Yemeni government.³⁵ The Southern system was more professional than the Northern tribal system. The South had more educated figures, along with a British-adapted administration and finance system,³⁶ and professional military; however, economically, the South was a failed state. The North contained a poor administration, an Ottoman and Egyptian financial system,³⁷ and was relatively more corrupt. However, it was better off economically. Therefore, as Abdul Karim Alaug asserts, “comparatively stronger Northern governorates were in a position to dominate the South economically.”³⁸ Both Sana’a and Aden planned to govern the entire Republic of Yemen.

The Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) had supporters in the North. With those supporters, it planned to win the election and take the whole country under its rule. In fact, “Article 2 of the Southern Yemeni constitution asserts the claim of the YSP to the leadership of the entire nation.”³⁹ On the Northern side, Ali Abdullah Saleh was eager to unify the country because he knew this would add his name to history. Although Saleh was willing to offer some concessions, his followers were acting the same as the YSP. The YSP attracted Northern military officers and educated figures who had visited or studied in the USSR. They knew they had something in common and were able to gain many supporters who believed in communist ideals and philosophies.

Implementing the end justifies the means philosophy, each side planned and acted to win the election. Two main points contributed to the failure of the YSP to win a majority in the parliamentary election. First, the YSP maintained full control of the Southern part of the country, which contained only 30 percent of the parliamentary seats.

³⁵ Peter Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government's Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests* (USA: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 12.

³⁶ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Stevenson and Alaug, “Football in Newly United Yemen.”

³⁹ Stookey, *South Yemen: A Marxist Republic in Arabia*, 94.

Therefore, the YSP had to compete with the General People's Congress (GPC) and other Islamic parties for governmental control. Next, because the YSP's leaders misunderstood the strong Northern tribal system, the tribal system survived in the North and enjoyed control of the Yemeni society while, in the South, the YSP managed to end that control. The YSP's nominees for the election were mainly educated figures and retired military officers. Nevertheless, the GPC's candidates were shayhks or religious figures. When a Shaykh in Yemen ran for election, he should win or the tribe's pride would be affected. As Stephen Day asserts, "While the South had a long-term view of unity, the Northern regime focused on a short-term agenda to maintain the status quo [that gave the Northern regime a relative superiority in the election]."⁴⁰ Ali Saleh's close figures ensured winning the election by all means. To promote this, military commanders ordered their soldiers who were assigned to guard the ballots to steal them and change the election sites to card counting sites. As a result, the GPC won 121 out of 301 seats in parliament, the Islah won 62 seats, and the YSP won 56 seats.⁴¹ The election results for the YSP were not pleasant, even though it won most of Southern seats and shared some in the North, including 18 seats from independent members that were added to the 56 seats.⁴²

4. A Story of Crises

Immediately after the unification of the country, the Yemeni political crisis began. As Brehony asserts, "The economic situation and the assassinations led to an accelerating deterioration in relations between the YSP and GPC leaders in 1992."⁴³ However, the election results ignited the problems denied in the early 1990s.

While the GPC and Islah parties were very happy about their gain in 1993's parliamentary election, the YSP realized its weight in the Yemeni political system. Although winning an election was one step, the YSP needed to begin to plan for other

⁴⁰ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion In Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

⁴¹ Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, "Stereotypes And Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen," *Int. J. Middle East Studies*, Cambridge University Press 27, no 4 (1995), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/176363>.

⁴² Boutaleb, *Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah*, 297

⁴³ Noel Brehony, *Yemen Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia* (London and New York: I.B. TAURIS, 2011), 189.

means of survival. Hostile acts had begun, and political traps were initiated by all parties. Realizing how important the shayhks were in the North, the YSP began supporting the shayhks of the Northern tribes against the Sana'a, especially the Bakill tribal confederation.⁴⁴ Taking advantage of the new Ministry of Defense, the YSP issued guns⁴⁵ and money to some tribes to gain their support.

The YSP plans succeeded to a certain degree in gaining supporters among Northern tribes; however, as Dresch and Haykel explain, the following degree of support was gained by the YSP in the North before the 1994 civil war.

A number of local shayhks at odds with Abdullah [Al-ahmar] went at some point to the Socialists. More generally, however, there was sympathy for the YSP, expressed or discussed largely in private: most of Dhu Faric seemed to prefer the YSP, perhaps 70 percent of Dhu Khayran did so, perhaps 30-40 percent of Fadl and Jabr, and of this latter fraction about one-half showed sustained interest. All other things being equal, perhaps 60-70 percent of Al-'usaymat might in some degree have favored the Socialists.⁴⁶

GCP and Islah were doing the same,⁴⁷ especially with the Zumra. Besides, the Al-Islah Islamic party was built on hatred of communism. Defeating the YSP meant they would get to win the Southern seats and defeat the GPC as well. Therefore, the Islah party mobilized its people for Jihad to end communism in Yemen.

War mobilization from both the North and the South was continuous, while political agreements and mediation were conducted. During the mediation on Taiz (*Jami aljanad*), the Northern tribal and religious leaders met with Ali Salem al-Beedh. They had thrown their Jah,⁴⁸ or so-called 'mamah,⁴⁹ to get him to come back to Sana'a and

⁴⁴ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

⁴⁵ The general armaments unit military police commander explains the way the orders were issued by the Minister of Defense, Haitham Qasem, a YSP member, to arm sheikhs with an average of 50 AK47s and other sniper guns, but the commander of the unit was refused these orders by direction from Ali Saleh.

⁴⁶ Dresch and Haykel, "Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen," 421.

⁴⁷ Stevenson and Alaug, "Football in Newly United Yemen."

⁴⁸ Jah is a 'mamah of a man or his weapon that he threw to the other man or men's laps or to the ground under them to show them his respect and ensure they accept his demands. It is used mostly by the mediation party that tries to get the disputing parties to agree for peaceful talks.

⁴⁹ 'Mamah is the shawl that tribesmen cover their heads with.

stop mobilization. Ali Salem made another mistake, which reflected his misunderstanding of the tribal system. He left the Jah and responded impolitely to those tribal and religious leaders. When they came back to Sana'a, their hearts were with Ali Abdullah Saleh.

The leadership of the YSP made yet another mistake in Amman Jordan, when the leaders signed what is called "the Document of Pledge and Accord" (*Wathigat Al-Ahd Walittifaq*) on February 20, 1994. After both sides signed the agreement, Ali Saleh and Ali Salem delivered speeches. Ali Saleh called on disputants to forgive and forget. He asked Yemenis to forget the past and start fresh to build a new country. Unlike Ali Saleh, Ali Salem revealed his concerns and mistrust about Ali Saleh's intentions and willingness to implement the agreed upon points.⁵⁰ Although Ali Salem's speech was more realistic and valuable, people in Yemen were happy about Ali Saleh's speech because he gave them what they wanted to hear. After both parties' signatures, Ali Saleh returned to Sana'a but Ali Salem along with Salem Saleh Mohammed moved to Saudi Arabia which had a bad relationship with Sana'a at that time.⁵¹ Ali Saleh exploited Ali Salem's visit to Saudi Arabia to blame him for the failure of the agreement and started planning to move the battle to the South.

Besides, the history of the YSP played to its defeat in both election and civil war. On February 22, 1972, several shayhks from Northern Yemen lead by Naji Ben Ali Al Ghader, mostly from Bakil, Khawlan, were invited for a conference in the PDRY. They were promised support. However, during lunch, they were massacred. Therefore, when tribal Shaykhs had to decide whom to support, Ali Abdullah Saleh or Ali Salem Al-bied, they brought back the memories of their fathers and brothers. The promise of support from Ali Salem was not a trustworthy one. Ali Abdullah Saleh took advantage of the issue and kept reminding supporters of the YSP of what could happen to them. He gave them the opportunity to come back without punishment and keep the money and weapons

⁵⁰ "Ali Salem Al-Beedh speech in Amman," YouTube video, 04:30, posted by "Yezennet," May 9, 2009, accessed August 23, 2013, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNKkWzWyJbk>.

⁵¹ Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, 194.

they got from the YSP. The secret agreements were revealed by the president only when the civil war started.⁵²

The war occurred first at Amran and then in Dhamar, the YSP plan was that Southern brigades would initiate the clashes, and then loyal tribes would mobilize their people and assault important cities. Then the Southern army would move toward Sana'a. The Northern GCP and Islah had a secret agreement with tribal leaders to continue their promises to the YSP of support but not to do so. Therefore, when the problem started in Amran the Southern brigade surrendered and then in Dhamar the other strong brigade surrendered. The Northern tribal leaders then dedicated themselves to support Ali Abdullah Saleh. First because they did not trust YSP if they were to win, and more so they saw Ali Abdullah Saleh winning.

The civil war that started in late April and ended early July 1994 resulted in the defeat of the YSP whose leaders fled to Gulf countries while Ali Saleh's regime claimed to strengthen unity with soldiers' blood. While Ali Saleh was called the unity hero, the Southern people were suffering from his followers' corruption, discrimination, and marginalization. The Yemeni 1994 Civil war, as Hussein asserts, had "widened the gap between the North and the South. Little effort to narrow the rift and bring actual unity between the people of the two parts of Yemen has been made."⁵³

B. SOUTHERNERS' GRIEVANCES AND THE RISE OF THE MOVEMENT

The roots of the Southern separatist movement (*Al-Hirak Al-Janubi*), goes back to 1994. However, "the first significant appearance of the South Yemen Movement on the political scene in Yemen was in 2007 in the form of mass protests and demonstrations organized by human rights associations of retired military and civilian groups."⁵⁴ At the

⁵² Ali Abdullah Saleh, "The Security and Political Situation and Reasons of 1994 Civil War" (The Yemeni Parliament, Sana'a, May, 1994).

⁵³ Douaa Hussein, "Legal Reform as a Way to Women's Rights: The Case of Personal Status Law in Yemen," *Social Science Research Network, Department of Law, The American University in Cairo* (January 15, 2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985565

⁵⁴ Saqqaf Omar al-Saqqaf, "Conflicting Agendas: Approaching Decisive Dialogue in Yemen," *Aljazeera Center for Studies* (November 11, 2012), accessed February 12, 2013 <http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2012/11/2012111115648204431.htm>.

time of its establishment, “Al-Hirak originated as a rights-based movement requesting equality under the law and a change in relations between North and South—all within a united country. The government responded to the demands with repression; it also largely ignored its own promises of reforms.”⁵⁵ However, by 2009, the rights-based movement had changed its path and raised the ceiling on its demands as the movement began to champion Southern independence.⁵⁶

In its report to the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) (*Mutamar alhiwar alwatani alshamil*), the Southern case team laid out the Southern grievances and roots of the problem through political, economic, judicial, and cultural dimensions. The report considers the 1994 civil war and what happened afterward as the roots of the Southern grievances that led to the establishment of *Al-Hirak* social movement. These contributing factors represented the abolition of the Southern political, economic, and cultural partnership.⁵⁷

1. Economic Grievances

War looting and vandalism (*Faid*)⁵⁸ characterized the Yemeni civil war.⁵⁹ It was the fast approach for corrupt military officers, tribal leaders (*shaykhs*) and some religious leaders to get rich. Looting was largely organized. “Looters arrived in trucks and larger vehicles and loaded up equipment and machinery.”⁶⁰ The administration in the North supported and allowed the idea of *faid* among its supporters to encourage more people to join the fight. This culture of *faid* in the war in Yemen was a clever recruitment tactic.⁶¹ Nevertheless, in the long term, it created critical problems and created serious grievances among Southern people who were victims of looting regardless of their side, opinion, or

.55 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question.”

.56 Ibid.

.57 “The Southern Case’s Team Report,” *Yemeni National Dialogue Conference*, Sana’a, accessed July 2, 2013, <http://ndc.ye/arnews.aspx?id=1008>

.58 *Faid* is a Yemeni term that is used to describe looting, during and after wars, that is usually done by the winning side.

.59 “Human Rights in Yemen during and after the 1994 War.”

.60 Ibid.

.61 Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion In Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 147.

actions. Looting was the first impression the Yemeni citizens in the South knew about the Northern people. However, according to the Human Rights Watch, looting was initiated by separatist officials, especially of Aden, in the last days of the war.”⁶²

Looting was not only associated with the 1994 civil war; military leaders and strong officials, mostly from the North, under supervision and support from the administration, looted and occupied most of the government offices, officials’ houses, and unused land.⁶³ In the South, the YSP owned most of the land and businesses. After the civil war, instead of moving the ownership to the central government or implementing legal privatization, corrupted officials from the North and some from the South added these lands to their properties.⁶⁴ Even when the government made some efforts to redistribute lands to landless people from the South, its actions were determined by political affiliations rather than any other criteria.⁶⁵ In addition, oil investment was controlled by Northern corrupt officials who own some of the oil companies.⁶⁶

As each day passed by in Yemen, grievances were raised in the South. After the war, many Southerners, especially women, were sent home⁶⁷ or fled to the Gulf countries. Many military officers came back from Dubai and other gulf countries to Yemen in an effort to address and solve their issues and grievances. However, they were ignored and left to live with a fraction of their former salary since the corrupt leaders and administrators typically shared some of the retirees’ salaries. In Yemen, especially in the military, there are financial officers or clerks (*kateb malis*), who are often the richest individuals in the Yemeni military. They often own million dollar homes, because they get a portion of the salaries of every individual in the military. Additionally, if the

.62 “Human Rights in Yemen during and after the 1994 War.”

.63 “The Southern Case’s Team Report,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, Sana’a.

.64 Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*, 12.

.65 Helen Lakner, “Land Tenure: Social Structure and the State in the Southern Governorates in the Mid-1990s,” in *Yemen into the Twenty-first Century: Continuity and Challenges*, ed. Kamil A. Mahdi, Anna Wurth, Helen Lakner (UK: Ithaca Press, 2007).

.66 “The Southern Case’s Team Report,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, Sana’a.

.67 Susanne Dahlgren, “The Southern Movement in Yemen.”

financial officer is no longer in uniform and remaining at home like the retired Southern military officers, their share is even higher.

Financial resources support both the arguments for reunification and separatism. One of the main reasons behind the government of the South seeking unity in 1989 was economic problems. The South was very dependent upon the Soviet Union's military and economic aid. As soon as the Cold War was over between the Soviet Union and the West, the Soviet Union washed its hands of all allies including the PDRY,⁶⁸ which lowered the "GDP per capita by 20 percent in 1989."⁶⁹ To survive, the Southern government had to return to the Republic of Yemen and link itself to the Northern government.

After reunification, Ali Saleh's regime, using its great relations with the West, was able to attract many international companies to come and search for oil resources in Hadramaut and Shabwah. The Southern government discovered that it also had many oil resources that were not exploited. Because of these discoveries, Ali Salem al-Beedh (Unity State Vice President) began a plan, along with other significant members of the YSP, to re-separate the country. Their desire for separation was even greater after the 1993 parliamentary election in which their party came in third, with only 56 seats out of 301.

The oil in Mareb represented a low percentage of the overall reserve relative to Al-Massila oil and natural gas,⁷⁰ mainly because the corrupt officials from the North were selling oil and gas that was produced from Southern land and using it to purchase Southern land, which was not acceptable.

2. Social Dimensions of the Southerners' Grievances

After the civil war, many officials who supported the YSP fled to neighboring Gulf countries, while many returned to their villages to avoid personal assassination or arrest. Although, the president Ali Saleh announced General Amnesty to all Southern

.68 Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, 169.

.69 Ibid.

.70 Marib is in the North part of Yemen, and Massila is located in wadi Hadramout in the South part of the country.

military officers and political leaders who fought on the side of separatists, excluding only sixteen individuals who planned and announced separation, the government did nothing to rebuild the trust of Southern people. The officers who fled to their villages were not ready to go back to their units and hold positions lower than the ones they had before, so they preferred to stay home. The government marginalized them even more by ignoring their grievances. Even their salaries were cut in half to be shared between them and the corrupt officials. Individuals, who were brought back to work, were brought back only to show balance in the general administration employment. Furthermore, individuals from the South were assigned to take official duties in places that have no real effect in decisions making. In fact, some Southern military or police officials who held important positions in the new administrations were nothing relative to officers who were forced to retire after the war. Therefore, Southern retired officers and officials did not accept the fact that they were getting a fraction of their salaries while others, who were nothing relative to them before the war, were enjoying power and money.

Corrupt officials took the land and offices in Aden and other areas as paybacks, either stealing outright or paying a fraction of the price. Returning YSP officials and military officers did not expect to see their party's and government land, buildings, and properties taken by individuals. They did not expect to see officials from the North control and play with the properties they protected their entire lives. They viewed those officials as occupiers. There was a saying about an official who was in Aden selling the sea, the mountains, the flat land, and the sand to Southern investors.⁷¹ While this was happening to them, Southern military officers did nothing to end their grievances, because they were afraid of the Northern system and the military. In addition, they had had very bad experiences from previous civil wars that resulted in the deaths of many innocent people in the South.

⁷¹ When one of my relatives was studying in Aden, he would argue with retired military officers who were forced to study as well to continue taking their salaries; they used to give this joke about the corrupt Northern official. The official would first take money from the investor to let him invest in Aden; then he would sell him the sea area to dump rocks onto it to make it suitable as a tourist site. Finally, he would sell him the mountains to get the rocks he needs to dump on the sea. After all, when the sea becomes good and flat land, the official would sell the land to the southern investor. This is how corrupt Northern officials are seen in the eyes of Southerners.

3. Cultural Grievances

Sarah Philips asserts that, “to most people, the Yemeni state is an instrument through which a small band of elite exploits and harasses the people. This will not change unless the state delivers benefits and builds trust between itself and grassroots communities.”⁷² The Southern case team mentioned several cultural grievances that led to their movement. Some of those grievances are the exclusion and marginalization of Southerners, as well as treason and blasphemy toward the Southern people based on ideological differences and false intellectual justification that led to a large crack in the Yemeni society, and the inability to accommodate the cultural and social diversity of nation. All of which produced a deep-rooted crisis. The government in Sana’a glorified the culture of war and the role of the military and limited the Southerners’ freedom of expression of their social and cultural values. Douaa Hussein asserts, “The different power structures in the North have dominated the political field and shaped the cultural and legal context of the new Yemen.”⁷³ Furthermore, ignoring the modern and contemporary history of the South and downplaying some of the symbols and leaders of the struggle as well as marginalizing and harassing the Southern media, particularly the Al-Ayyam newspaper reflect the government’s efforts to suppress the South. Many of the names of the Southern streets, schools, residential neighborhoods, public spaces, important campsites, and vital facilities were changed from outside to erase the collective memory of the Southern people in an attempt to erase the culture of the South.⁷⁴

.72 Sarah Phillips, “Yemen: On the Brink: What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building,” *Middle East Program* 107 (March 2010), <http://www.scribd.com/doc/28267109/What-Comes-Next-in-Yemen-Al-Qaeda-the-Tribes-and-State-Building>.

.73 Hussein, “Legal Reform as a Way to Women’s Rights: The Case of Personal Status Law in Yemen.”

.74 “The Southern Case’s Team Report,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, Sana’a.

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III. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

A. AL-HOUTHIES MOVEMENT IN SA'DAH

In 2004, the Houthies movement was raised in North Yemen. The Yemeni government sent a battalion to capture Hussein Badr Addien Al-Houthi, the leader of the Al Houthi movement in the North. The mission failed, and as a result, many soldiers were killed. To restore its reputation, the government sent a brigade, reinforced by another brigade, and then by another brigade, until it eventually realized that nobody really respected the government in those areas. Estimates of the six-round war expenses are around 1 billion dollars in hard currency reserve,⁷⁵ in addition to huge military weaponry losses.

Although the government focused all its military, political, and economic resources on countering Al- Houthies, it failed to deal with the movement and proved to be a failed, corrupt, and unprofessional government. The war emboldened other threatening actors, such as Al-Hirak and Al-Qaeda.⁷⁶ Lucas Winter states that “the conflict [between Al-Houthies and the Yemeni government] has wrought a humanitarian disaster that makes the government look negligent if not criminal.”⁷⁷

Soldiers who participated in the ceremonies were being tested in real missions and were proving to be failures against tribal men who had no formal military training but were fighters. The Houthies movement uncovered the government reality. It showed how weak, corrupt, unstable, and fragile the Sana'a system was. Stephen Day asserts, “After 2005, the Houthi rebellion in the Northwest highland had a broad demonstration effect about the possibility of resisting the regime's armed forces. The next year, groups in the Southwest region around Aden discussed ways . . . to confront Saleh's regime.”⁷⁸ As

⁷⁵ Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,” in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010) 58.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Lucas Winter, “Fragile State: Yemen in Conflict” (December 2012)
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Fragile-State.pdf>.

⁷⁸ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 227.

Christopher Boucek asserts, “The war in Sa‘da takes precedence over concurrent security challenges, such as confronting AQAP and resolving secessionist aspirations in the South.”⁷⁹

The Houthis had no land taken or oil exploited by corrupt leaders in Sana‘a; however, they had heard enough. The Southern military officers started to see themselves as better than the Houthis. They were successful military commanders who knew everything about weapons, tactics, and politics, and had grievances that Al-Houthis did not. They felt that if the Houthis could challenge the government, so could they. The Al-Houthis movement diverted the government attention to fight the wars in the North, giving the Southern retired civilians and military officers’ time and space to organize themselves and build up their movement. They did so untouched and unobserved. The government neither had the time to suppress them, nor to solve their grievances.

As educated figures, Southern retired military officers tested the government’s ability and willingness to respond very slowly. They asked for the rest of their salaries that the corrupt *Kateb Malis* and officials had taken from them, and as April Alley states, “wanted greater access to government services and employment, improved rule of law, better resource management, plus economic and political decentralization.”⁸⁰ They demonstrated in abandoned areas, and sometimes in urban areas, but not very powerfully. These demonstrations would come and go from time to time. During this period, the government was very busy with the problem in Sa‘da. To them, the Southern people were not important. Besides, to demonstrate their control of the South, some Southern officials told the administrators that the Al-Hirak were just a very small number of people that had no effect whatsoever on the ground of the South.

As time passed, the government did nothing to end retired military officers’ grievances. Therefore, retired officers began talking about other grievances beyond their

⁷⁹ Boucek, “War in Saada,” 45.

⁸⁰ April Longley Alley, “Yemen’s Forever War: Political Instability in the South,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (July 19, 2010), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/yemens-forever-war-political-instability-in-the-south>.

own. They had no problem selling their narratives, because the government had many issues that could be addressed.

Searching for a solution to their problem, the retired military officers generated a Southern-based social movement called Al Hirack Al Janobi, which found supporters from outside and within the country. Until now, the Yemeni government has neither the ability to solve the Houthi movement in the North militarily, nor to get the major factions of the Southern separation movement to participate in the NDC.

B. 2006 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

The 2006 presidential election changed the political map of the Republic of Yemen. New alliances called the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) were formed in support of a real opposition presidential candidate from the South against the president Ali Saleh. “Hamid Al-Ahmar, [the son of Hashid confederations’ Shaykh and the known businessman], was the first in the JMP suggest a Southerner as president, in order to actively drawn attention to the Southern problems.”⁸¹ The new opposition alliance was not only able to break the system’s solid picture, but also willing to use all means available to defeat it including support of the Southern military officers, opening Southerners’ eyes to their grievances and implying acknowledgment of them.

In addition to the Houthies’ efforts to open a space for the movement and display how failed, corrupt, and weak the government in Sana’a was, the 2006 presidential election opened another opportunity for the Southern military officers. Phillips asserts that “the Yemeni regime’s capacity to contend with domestic challenges . . . has diminished so much in the past two years.”⁸² Ali Abdullah Saleh was not able to gain the Islah party’s support like he did in the 1999 presidential election. The Al-Ahmar family did not agree with him on how to continue appropriating the rest of the government properties or to his plans to set his son Ahmed for presidency. The Islah party realized it was time to go against the president since they had the tribal side support. Although Ali

.81 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report N 114, International Crisis Group.

.82 Sarah Phillips, “Yemen: On the Brink: What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building.”

Abdullah Saleh had Al-Zendani's (Al-Islah party's religious figure) support along with the Shaykh of hashid Abdullah Al-Ahmar. The sons of Al-Ahmar were against him and did their best to support his opponent.

Al-Ahmar's sons (Jahal Alahmer as they were referred to by their tribe) supported all kinds of resistance against the president. One option was to support the retired military officers and some officials in the South to move forward. Al-Ahmar's sons thought that when the president responded to their demands, they would tell those in the South to stop. Problems in Sana'a initiated and fed the problems in Aden, Dhale, Abien, Shabw, and other areas. However, when the president asked about the problem, officials from the South would tell him that those are separatists; no matter what you do for them, they will not change. The only option was ignorance.

The roots of the Southern problem are in Sana'a. When the government in Sana'a was united, the problems in the South were marginal, and when the stakeholders in Sana'a started fighting each other over power and resources, they created a chance for the movement in the South to rise through direct or indirect support. The Southern movement found people in Sana'a who recognized their problems, supported their efforts, and legitimized their actions. Either side would gain their support in return for using them as a tool to weaken their enemy in Sana'a. Al-Hirak had grown until it reached a state where it felt strong and called for separation. Even after Ali Salem Al-Beeth called for separation, the governing GPC party and its allies and the opposition parties of JMP continued to fight each other over power and support from factions of Al-Hirak, and in an effort to strengthen its base in Sana'a.

C. THE ARAB SPRING (*AR-RABī' AL-ʿARABī*) POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY

Today, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is a blooming rose in the Arab Spring. If the Houthi movement in the North and the 2006 presidential election opened a political opportunity for Al-Hirak to take root, the Arab Spring opened the political opportunity for the movement to flourish. Arab Spring has exposed the fragilities of the autocrats who have

ruled for so long in countries it has affected.⁸³ However, in Yemen, after several movements, the Arab Spring has changed the scale of power to Al-Hirak at the expense of the state. The way the Arab Spring occurred, and the way it was handled, contributed to the favor of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi.

Following an extension of the support of Al-Hirak during and after the 2006 election by different factions in Sana'a, the Arab Spring witnessed protesters in Sana'a, Taiz, and Aden from those who had supposedly supported unity and had acknowledged the Southerners' grievances. Parties in Sana'a fought each other by supporting different factions in the country, and Al-Hirak was one of them. Ali Saleh accused the youth and JMP of supporting the separatists. To prove him wrong, JMP agreed with Al-Hirak to hold their call for separation until the regime collapsed. This gave them credibility by acknowledging to the people that Al-Hirak would discontinue its call for separation if Ali Saleh would step down. That was a dangerous game played by the JMP that made the call of Al-Hirak more legitimate and provided an opportunity to exploit the situation to mobilize more supporters and organize large demonstrations. The JMP thought they could exploit Al-Hirak by destroying Ali Saleh, and thus stopping him. In the meantime, Al-Hirak was also exploiting them, which made the effort stronger than anyone's ability to contain.

Before the Arab Spring, the Yemeni parliament passed a law that regulated protests in the county. According to the law, those who wanted to protest had to get permission from the Ministry of the Interior, and then follow the route that the ministry provided. Although the opposition parties did not respect this law, it gave the government legitimacy to oppress demonstrators and enabled it to control protestors and abduct activists by accusing them of protesting without permission.

The protest law vanished when the Arab Spring sparked. During the Arab Spring, not only did protests begin in the streets without government permission, but they also

⁸³ Zahra Babar, "The Arab Spring 18 Months Later: More Questions than Answers," *Center for International and Regional Studies*, Georgetown University, <http://cirs.georgetown.edu/research/300441.html>

destroyed the legitimacy and challenged the existence of the government itself.⁸⁴ Alexandra Lewis asserts, “The protests, which pitted citizens against law enforcement personnel, have had a negative impact on perceptions of police legitimacy.”⁸⁵ Al-Hirak’s ability to organize huge protests benefited most from the Arab Spring. Although Al-Hirak had crossed what was called “the red line” by calling for separation, the government’s hands were tied and could do little to control Al-Hirak protests.

The Yemeni Arab Spring was settled by the Gulf initiative that reflected the existing powers in the country against the youth’s will. Al-Saqaff asserts,

[The Gulf initiative] led to a political settlement that reflected the existing internal balance of power and the influence of external parties. This has generated resentment among some of the revolutionary youth movements, and among unofficial actors such as the Houthi group in the North and the South Movement. These parties, as a whole, saw the Gulf Initiative as having betrayed the goals of the revolution, and considered it a settlement that does not represent change. The Gulf Initiative, for them, was merely a new mechanism for the re-distribution of power and leverage among the old political, tribal and military power centers in Yemen.⁸⁶

After the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative, the last hope of a civilized state was lost by the South, and Al-Hirak was the only choice for them to go to.

The Arab Spring introduced a new technique Al-Hirak used to legitimize the movement and use religion to gain more supporters—The Friday sermon (Juma’a Khutba). The Juma’a Khutba began demonstrating in the streets and was very famous during the Arab Spring in Yemen and other countries. Therefore, when the Arab Spring’s Khutba declined, Al-Hirak continued using Juma’a Khutbas to support its cause.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s activists may take credit for inspiring the other revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and claim they started their peaceful revolution earlier than any

⁸⁴ Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications,” *Royal Institute of International Affairs* 88, no. 1 (January 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428541>.

⁸⁵ Alexandra Lewis, “Violence in Yemen: Thinking about Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013): Art-13, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/86-299-3-PB.pdf>.

⁸⁶ Saqqaf Omar Al-Saqqaf, “Conflicting Agendas: Approaching Decisive Dialogue in Yemen.”

other uprising in the Arab world. Stephen Day also asserts that, “the popular uprisings that came as a surprise in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, were already well underway in Yemen.”⁸⁷

D. REPRESSION OF AL-HIRAK

Repression is a two edges sword, and a user of repression should be a master in its techniques. A mistake in any action can provide a huge push to the movement, instead of affecting it. Unfortunately, the Yemeni government is implementing unstudied repression plans. Therefore, instead of compromising Al-Hirak, the Yemeni Government repressions provided political opportunities to the movement that made it even stronger. Unscientific repression plans have contributed to the establishment of the movement, justified its goals and actions, and supported its causes and narratives.

Repression, based on Tilly’s definition, is “any action by another group which raises the contender’s cost of collective action.”⁸⁸ For the sake of understanding the effects of repression as a political opportunity, the author will describe the coercion dimension and ignore the channeling dimension because channeling is not easy to observe or measure.

1. Observable Coercive Repression

a. State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites

Both Al-Hirak and the Yemeni government were familiar with the observable coercion that was implemented by the national security agents. In the South after 1986, the socialist party, especially the Tughma, practiced murder and disappearing techniques against the Zumra.⁸⁹ Active political figures disappeared as soon as their activities threatened the other side. Some of those individuals’ fate was unknown until recently. Before 1994, as a result of tension between the GPC and Al-Islah on one side,

⁸⁷ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*.

⁸⁸ Earl, “Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression.”

⁸⁹ For more information about the 1986 crisis, see Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*.

and the YSP on the other, political assassinations, kidnapping, and planned car accidents happened almost every day.⁹⁰ This type of repression did not stop after the civil war.

According to the Southern case team's report, the government in Sana'a continued its prisoning, torturing, and enforced disappearances of South activists throughout the period from 1994 to 2011.⁹¹ Repression was extended to the media side as an attempt to contain the movement. According to the Human Rights Watch report, "On May 4, 2009, the Ministry of Information suspended eight daily and weekly independent newspaper publications over coverage they had given to events in the South."⁹² May 2009 also witnessed the creation of a new court that began trying journalists over the next two months.⁹³

At the time of Al-Hirak's initiation, the Yemeni government conducted several arrests of the movement's field leaders. Arrested individuals were treated as criminals and called "sick" (*"amrath"*).⁹⁴ Hasan Baum, along with twelve leaders of the movement, was arrested in April 2008 for six months.⁹⁵ He was released and arrested again, and released after the Arab Spring. Hasan Benan, Abdurabu Muhriq, and Khaled Mana' are activists in Al-Hirak and are in the government prisons.⁹⁶ The arrests of Naser Alnuba, Muhsen Alyazidi, Hassan Baum, and journalist Ahmed Umar ben Faried sparked a huge demonstration in Al-dhal' in 2007; these arrests were condemned and considered a barbaric action that cannot be done by a government.⁹⁷ "They drew more attention to

.90 Boutaleb, "Al-Wahdah Al-Yamaniyah," 267.

.91 "The Southern Case's Team Report," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, Sana'a.

.92 Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*, 51.

.93 Ibid.

.94 The term "Sick" or "Amrath" is used in Yemen to describe individuals who, regardless of what you do for them, hate you anyway and work against you. This word misleads government officials in Yemen. Therefore, instead of treating people's grievances, the government accuses them of being Amrath.

.95 Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*, 1.

.96 "Yemeni Occupation Authorities' Re-Transfer of Detainees from the Southern Movement of Aden to Sana'a," *Al-Ganub Al-Hur News Network*, April 2, 2013, <http://www.algnoubalhur.com/news.php?action=show&id=4524>.

.97 Ali Naji Sa'ed, "Demonstrations in Dali condemn the operations of oppression suffered by demonstrators in Aden and Hadramawt," *Mareb Press* (September 4, 2007), http://marebpress.net/news_details.php?sid=7478&lng=arabic

the rapidly evolving protest movement, as more citizens began participating in daily sit-ins and rallies.”⁹⁸ Al-Hirak still demands the releases of their leaders and individuals who disappeared since 1994, or were arrested during the rise of the movement for political reasons. Even those with criminal charges were considered political prisoners.

When arrested, Al-Hirak political leaders have received more support and become symbols for the movement to rally around their release. Al-Hirak benefits not only from the arrests, but from the release of their activists. For example, when Al-Hirak activist, Fares Al-dhale‘i, was released, Al-Hirak celebrated the release by conducting demonstrations to show its ability to coerce the government.⁹⁹ However, although observable coercion is a tactic both Al-Hirak and the government have mastered, they do not rely on it much due to huge media intervention, the United Nations Human Rights Organization, and national and international Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs) involvement in internal conflicts.

b. State Agents Loosely Connected with National Political Elites

The Yemeni government and most of Yemeni society used to treat separatists as criminals. The government took extreme measures to suppress the movement such as blocking and disrupting Al-Hirak demonstrations with police and military forces.¹⁰⁰ According to the Human Rights Watch, “The security forces, and central security in particular, have carried out widespread abuses in the South—unlawful killings, arbitrarily detentions, beatings, crackdowns on freedom of assembly and speech, arrests of journalists”¹⁰¹ The Yemen Observatory on Human Rights “(YOHR) report cataloged 623 peaceful protests between January and mid-November 2008 . . . the number of protractors killed (7), injured (75), and arrested (860). These numbers mean

⁹⁸ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 229.

⁹⁹ “Demonstrations in Al-Dali’ Celebrate the Decision of an Amnesty for Political Prisoners.” *Aden Al-ghad News*, http://adenalghad.net/news/55495/#.UdMpbeDn_IU.

¹⁰⁰ “The Southern Case’s Team Report,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

¹⁰¹ Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*, 1.

that each time security forces physically intervened; they arrest more than 10 percent of the protestors.”¹⁰² However, according to Day,

A turning point came on the eve of the country’s October 14 holiday, which commemorates the start of South Yemen’s revolt against British [occupation] in the 1960s. Security forces shot and killed four young men in the same street where British Colonial soldiers had killed seven Yemenis on October 14, 1963. This echo of violence and oppression from more revolutionary times, ignited massive anti-government protests across the South and Saleh was powerless to stop them.¹⁰³

This type of repression has not always been consistent. Sometimes, police forces attempt to control Al-Hirak demonstrations with aggressive measures. At other times, the government has no reaction at all to the same type of demonstrations.

Implementing aggressive measures or having no measures at all are dangerous actions, and represent a government with no strategy. When taking aggressive measures, the government is hurting the protesters and their families, including those who are not core members of Al-Hirak. As a result, Al-Hirak has gained more sympathizers and been able to recruit more supporters. “Very aggressive measures increase bitterness and alienation among Southerners, who say the North economically exploits and politically marginalizes them,” ¹⁰⁴ and gives Al-Hirak’s narratives more credibility. On the other hand, lack of measures against demonstrations support Al-Hirak by showing how strong the movement has become. Then Al-Hirak is strong in the eyes of the Southern people. This also enables Al-Hirak to recruit more supporters.

Even when a professional security force attempts to disperse demonstrations, it creates more tension and new supporters for a movement. This tension has become worse with the Yemeni government and Al-Hirak. The Yemeni security forces are less professional and less disciplined. The Human Rights Watch claims that “in its six protests investigated in depth by Human Rights Watch, Yemeni Security Forces

¹⁰² Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 238.

¹⁰³ Stephen Day, “The Political Challenge of Yemen’s Southern Movement,” in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 69.

¹⁰⁴ Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*.

violated almost every aspect of [international] standards.”¹⁰⁵ Therefore, their acts benefit Al-Hirak for sure. In fact, Al-Hirak benefits more from government coercion than it does from its resources and structure.

c. Private Agents

During 2007 to 2009, “the central government helped establish committees to protect the unity, and groups of pro-unity supporters—some of them armed—who have carried out armed attacks on unsuspecting Southern activists.”¹⁰⁶ Lately, Al-Islah, despite being accused of supporting Al-Hirak before and during the Arab Spring, has established itself as a private agent for the Yemeni government to suppress Al-Hirak social movement. On March 18, the Al-Islah party called its supporters from the Southern part of the country, reinforced by party members from the North, to conduct a demonstration on Aden in favor of unity. Al-Islah wanted to show its ability to control the South and show the world that supporters of unity in the South are as many as Al-Hirak supporters.

Understanding the effect on their cause, Al-Hirak leaders condemned the attempt even before it occurred. Al-Hirak factions announced their willingness to demonstrate on the same day at the same place.¹⁰⁷ The Yemeni government remained normal and did not interfere with the demonstration, but also did not stop it despite the fact that clashes were expected between the two sides. On that day, thousands of people moved to Aden from both Al-Islah (unity supporters) and Al-Hirak (separation supporters). Clashes were observed, and casualties from both sides were recorded. Security forces were accused of supporting the unity demonstrations led by Al-Islah.

The government was complicit with Al-Islah’s attempt to suppress Al-Hirak using the same techniques Al-Hirak used; however, the confrontation had negative consequences for both the government and Al-Islah party. The outcome of demonstration

¹⁰⁵ Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 36.

¹⁰⁷ “Islah Calls up its Old Veterans to Protect the March Intended to be Established in Aden,” *Yafa’ News* (February 7, 2013), <http://yafa-news.net/39058.html>.

and clashes was in favor of Al-Hirak, who reacted aggressively by burning several Islah offices in Aden, Hadramout, and Shabwah.¹⁰⁸ Al-Islah and the GPC condemned each other's actions regardless of whether they were right or wrong, and who supported other movements like Al-Hirak and al-Houthies. The GPC took advantage of the Al-Islah involvement in this demonstration, and criticized it in its media, portraying Al-Hirak supporters as victims. Al-Hirak appeared stronger after this action, and a new window was opened for Al-Hirak to justify the use of violence under a self-defense slogan.

2. Unobserved Coercive Repression

Unobserved coercion is relatively safe compared to observed coercion. The Yemeni government's unobserved actions benefited the unity government to an extent, because it was implementing unobservable actions that benefited the state; however, sometimes these actions benefited Al-Hirak even more due to their unintended effects.

a. State Agents Tightly Connected with National Political Elites

On the bright side, the political security bureau and national security bureau were very active in Yemen. They were aware of the Al-Hirak movement activities and knew its effective leaders. After the leadership change, the national security bureau regained its good reputation of being a tool in the hand of the government, instead of the regime. Among Al-Hirak members, there were accusations of each being proxies for the unity government. The mistrust between Al-Hirak leaders and members was considered a product of the national security involvement. It was next to impossible to measure the outcomes of the national security involvement because of its nature of secrecy.

On the negative side, political and national security bureaus' actions opened opportunities for Al-Hirak to coerce the people of the South. Unity supporters were treated as traders or agents of these bureaus. This hindered the government attempts to gain public support in the South. During the Southern movement, the Southern people could choose to be with Al-Hirak or they could be proxies for the political and national bureaus.

¹⁰⁸ "Southern Movement in Rasd Directorate, Yafe'a Closes the Headquarters of the Islah Party," *Aden Online* (February 18, 2013), <http://aden-online.com/mobnews/1242141>.

b. Private Agents

To Al-Hirak members, people who supported unity or acted in favor of the government—or even worked for the public administration—were considered agents of the government. There were many uneducated individuals who thought they represented the country and felt it was a legitimate duty to speak on its behalf. However, they did not know how to handle a discussion with separation supporters. They attacked the separatists with obscene words and were unable to distinguish the separatists in the South from Al-Hirak activists. Consequently, they attacked all Southern people. Collectively, Southerners felt closer to Al-Hirak than to the unity movement, even though they supported the unification of the country.

Al-Hirak exploited the acts of uneducated individuals, especially when they held positions in the public administration or represented known political parties.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, any harm to a Southern individual inflicted by an individual from the North or an employee of the government was considered an attack by an occupation force against poor Southern people. Al-Hirak was building its separatist narrative on behaviors of individuals who spoke on behalf of the government or unity, when in fact, they only represented themselves.

¹⁰⁹ Aidaruos Nasr Naser, “Defenders of Yemeni Unity,” *Mareb Press* (September 16, 2012), <http://mail.marebpress.com/articles.php?id=17308&lng=arabic>.

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IV. MOBILIZING STRUCTURE

A. LEADERSHIP

Al-Hirak began as an unstructured movement without recognized leadership,¹¹⁰ but had no problem finding charismatic leaders. Leaders who governed the South prior to reunification, and those who declared separation in 1994, are still leading Al-Hirak Al-Janubi today. They provide guidance and leadership, and also legitimize the movement by being the ones who, in the eyes of some Southern citizens, are the legitimate leaders of the South. One of Al-Hirak's narratives is that all other Arab Spring revolutions existed to get rid of their leaders, while the Al-Hirak revolution came to bring back its leadership.¹¹¹

Some of Al-Hirak's leaders were inside the country, and some lead remotely from exile. For example, Ali Salem Al-Beedh was the president of PDRY since 1986, the vice president of RoY from 1990 to 1994, and he declared himself again as the president of the South during the two months of 1994 civil war. Ali Nasser Mohammed was the president of PDRY from 1980 until he fled to Northern Yemen in 1986. In 1990, he was relocated to exile to set the stage for unity as part of political agreement between the North and the South.¹¹² He reestablished his connections in Yemen after 2006, when he realized that Sana'a was becoming weak. Haidar Al-Addas, the federalism admirer, was the prime minister in both the PDRY and RoY until 1994. Abdurrahman Al-Jefry (president of Sons of Yemen League Party) was famous for his strictness against unity and his ability to influence the business people outside Yemen to gain their financial support. All of the leaders mentioned above were symbolic exiled leaders; each one has his own proxies who represent his views, follow his orders, and receive his support.

.110 Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, 210.

.111 This is a widespread narrative used by Southern people, especially those who support Ali Salem Al-Beedh. I hear it whenever we discuss the relationship between Al-Hirak Youth and the old leadership with Southern individuals who support separation.

.112 Ali Abdullah Saleh, "Al-Thakirah Al-Siasiah," Sana'a: *Al Arabia News Channel* (June 21, 2013).

On the ground, Al-Hirak had well-known leadership that represented its different factions. Although Al-Hirak started as a retired military officer's movement with retired military leaders like Nasser Al-Nubah, other leaders jumped into the movement when the movement took the path toward separation. Among those leaders were: Hassan Baoum, who sits against Ali Salem Al-Beedh; Mohammed Ali Ahmad who participated on the NDC; Al-Hasani who was the commander of the navy until 2007 when he was forced to retire; Ali Haitham Algharīb the councilor for political affair of the Supreme Council of the peaceful movement for the liberation of the South; Qasim 'Askar; Abdulhamid Shukri; Sheikh Hasan Benan of Hatm faction; Ali Naser Al-Shaibah from Abyan; Sheikh Saleh Ben Farid Al-'Aulaqi from Sahbwah; Ali Ben Ali Shukri from Aden; Salah Al-Shunfuri from Aldal'a; former Al-Qaeda member Tareq Al-Fadli from Abyan; and others. Ali Salem Albeedh's appearance had marginalized most of the existing domestic leaders. Alasarar asserts that, "The movement's core leadership, which consisted of esteemed figures with fresh portfolios, such as Hassan Ba'aum, and Nasser al-Nouba, was completely overshadowed by the power and influence of the former, older, Southern leadership."¹¹³

Politically and financially, exiled leaders were critical of the movement. However, leaders on the ground participated in Al-Hirak demonstrations, coordinated its movement and programs, and spoke on its behalf to support the exiled leaders or marginalize them. On July 7, 2013, demonstrations were called by Baum to gather in Mukkala, Hadramout. What was new about it was its loyalty to Hassan Baum and not Ali Salem Al-Beedh. It repeated slogans like "No leadership after today, our leader is Hassan Baoum" (*La Qiadah Ba'd alyoum, Gaidna Hassan Baoum*).¹¹⁴ Operationally, the movement would not survive without leaders on the ground who were charismatic, smart, and willing to face the government for their cause. Leaders on the ground had the advantage of credibility in the eyes of their supporters, while leaders who lived outside

¹¹³ Fatima Abo Alasarar, "Saving South Yemen from Itself," *Forging Policy* (May 7, 2013) http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/07/saving_the_South_of_Yemen_from_itself.

¹¹⁴ "For the First Time, a Demonstration of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi without Pictures for Al-Beedh and Revolutionary Slogans Led By Ba'oum and Nubia," *Huna Aden* (July 7, 2013), <http://hunaaden.com/news/1263/#ixzz2YJWgkHxS>.

Yemen had the advantages of history and money, which was very important to sustain the movement. Ali Salem owned the main television channel that called for separation, which he acquired to support those who supported him.

The only weakness within the Southern movement leadership is the disagreement between their different factions, which affects the overall legitimacy of movement's cause. Nicole Stracke and Haidar assert, "Most of the groups involved in separatist activities work independently and often in competition with each other. In fact, the movement is characterized by deep divisions as the leadership of each group tries to impose its own agenda."¹¹⁵ Al-Hirak lacks a unified leadership¹¹⁶ and "it is unlikely that there is a single over-arching leadership body."¹¹⁷ Leaders of Al-Hirak have no problem declaring their hatred and mistrust of each other. They have "failed to overcome their past differences and found it difficult to make their voice heard."¹¹⁸ For example, when Hassan Baum called for demonstrations in Mukalla to celebrate the Southern calamity on July 7, Ali Salem Al-Beeth called for civil disobedience against these demonstrations.¹¹⁹ Andrew Engel, "[Al-Hirak's] leadership is fractured among domestic and exiled figures, with [many] different councils claiming to speak for it."¹²⁰ Susanne Dahlgren also asserts, "The Southern movement has no national leadership or joint organization and locally takes a variety of forms."¹²¹ This describes how the exiled and local leaders were able to agree upon one thing and disagree upon many others. Today, unity still enjoys critical support from strong leaders in the South.

¹¹⁵ Stracke and Haidar, "The Southern Movement in Yemen."

¹¹⁶ "Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question," Middle East Report No. 114, *International Crisis Group*.

¹¹⁷ Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*.

¹¹⁸ Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, 2011–2012.

¹¹⁹ "Civil Disobedience in Mukalla Activation and Angry Youth Ignite the Fire in the Main Roads," *Hadramout Press* (July 6, 2013), <http://www.hadrmoutpress.com/index.php?ac=3&no=5920#sthas> h.J5bThq2P.dpuf.

¹²⁰ Alley, "Yemen's Forever War: Political Instability in the South."

¹²¹ Dahlgren, "The Southern Movement in Yemen."

B. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

Al-Hirak relied heavily upon specific areas and specific ages for human mobilization. As one religious woman asserts, “the main body of Al-Hirak are the youth of unity meaning those who were born after 1990,”¹²² because, unlike old and experienced men and women, youth did not see the problems of separation in both the North and the South, they only saw the problems they had. Youth are convinced that, after separation, they will get to live a decent life. Leaders of Al-Hirak rely for support on youth who do not know the history of those leaders. However, although history is bad for the youth to know, it is good for the old who belong to the Tughma group,¹²³ which helps sustain the flow of the movement, regardless of a president who is from the South but from the Zumra group. Initially, the movement relied on the tribal areas (Al-Dalea, for example) that were from the Tughma, and ruled the country from 1986 to 1994 until the Zumra, supported by the unity army, defeated them and confiscated their homes and lands.¹²⁴

The saying “money talks and everyone has a price,” can tell how important financing is for social movements to survive. From 2007, Al-Hirak used to pay 2000 YR daily for those who participated in demonstrations.¹²⁵ If the regulars who participated in occasional demonstrations got this amount of money daily, middle leaders and activists supposedly got more than that. Therefore, financing was the blood of Al-Hirak, who could live only with enough of it on hand.

In terms of financial resources, Al-Hirak relied mainly on the outside support of Yemeni businessmen in Gulf countries, Europe, and the United States. According to one of the movement’s local leaders, Salah Alshunfrah, the main resources of Al-Hirak was not external support. Al-Hirak depended upon 100 YR (47 cents) that was contributed by

.122 Afaq Al-Hiwar, Yemen channel, <http://www.yemen-tv.net/media/index.php?mod=items&cid=15>.

.123 After the 1986 crises in the Southern part of the country, the two sides of the conflict were called Tughma (those with Al-Beedh,) and the Zumra (those with Ali Naser Muhammed). The current President, Abdurabu Hadi, is from the Zumra.

.124 “Breaking Point? Yemen’s Southern Question,” Middle East Report No. 114, *International Crisis Group*.

.125 An officer in the special forces who is from the South described the way Al-Hirak support the demonstrators and give them money to ensure their continuity of demonstrations (2008).

each member through donations for the injured persons, and businessmen inside and outside Yemen.¹²⁶ However, unconfirmed reports mentioned relationships between Iran and some of the movement's leaders, especially Ali Salem Al-Beedh.

Regional players fought against each other in Yemen. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran supported each other's enemies, regardless of who was right and who was wrong.¹²⁷ In the case of Al-Hirak, it was in Iran's interest to support the weakening of the Yemeni government and open a political space for Al-Houthies in the North. However, there is no evidence about the strength, type, character, or relationship between Al-Hirak, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

C. FACTIONS OF THE MOVEMENT

Al-Hirak is known for having a mixed structure and organization. It has a charismatic centralized leadership and works in factions at the same time. It is called Al-Hirak (the moving), not Harakah (movement), which explains the kind of structure it contains. As mentioned in the crisis group's report, "The Hirak is a loosely organized popular movement, internally diverse and fluid, that houses a number of important historical, regional and ideological trends."¹²⁸ It consists of "various locally and regionally organized groups that loosely coordinate their activities, but often act independently."¹²⁹ Therefore, it has many factions. Some factions agree on the end state and disagree on the means, other factions agree on the means but disagree on the end state, and some disagree on both the means and the end state.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is a set of individuals who lead and represent their tribal clans, previous political affiliation, and military position. It is divided between radicals who want separation and accept dialogue only under international supervision to reach an agreement with the government, and moderates who seek solutions to their people's

.126 "Salah Al-Shunfarah speech in Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's meeting," YouTube video, 6:59, posted by "Shabalgnoob," November 23, 2011, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wj0I6TLn1PA>.

.127 Saqqaf Omar Al-Saqqaf, "Conflicting Agendas: Approaching Decisive Dialogue in Yemen."

.128 "Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question," Middle East Report No. 114, *International Crisis Group*.

.129 Bouckaert, *In the Name of Unity*, 12.

grievances under the unity umbrella. In turn, the radicals are divided between extreme radicals who call for an armed resistance, and others who call for peaceful resistance like demonstrations and civil disobedience. The most extreme and strongest faction is led by retired military officers who know nothing but fighting and are supported by Ali Salem al-Beedh. Other factions that ask for civil disobedience are led by Abu Baker Aladdas, Ali Naser Mohammed, Hassan Baum, and Mohammed Ali Ahmed. The current leadership of the YSP is less extreme and demands solutions to the Southern people's grievances under a united government.

Al-Hirak factions vertically and horizontally intersect with each other on their goals, leaders, and active members. They move like thick water from side-to-side, joining one another at times, and leaving one faction to join another at other times, according to situations, resources, and leadership. The following section explains the main factions of Al-Hirak or, what we may call, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's network structure:

1. The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South (*Al-Majlis Al-A'la Lilhirak Al-Selmi Letahrir Al-Janub*)

The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South (*Al-majlis Al-a'la lilhirak al-selmi letahrir al-janub*) is the largest component of the Al-Hirak and was established in May 2009. It is very popular in all the provinces of the South, and its leaders have political and social weight in the South, as well as at home and abroad. It depends on businessmen from Gulf countries and some expatriates for financial support, as well as from international funding indirectly and non-exposed.¹³⁰ It is predominantly led by Ali Salem Albeedh from exile, and Hassan Baum in Yemen, and relies upon other sub-leaders like Salah Alshunfura, Abdullah Mahdi, Ali al-Saadi, Qasim Aldaara, Saleh Abdel Haq, Ali Al-Bishi, and Nasser Al-Tawil.

This faction is witnessing variations, significantly between those who embrace independence and separation, as well as, disengagement from the North, who consider the South an occupied territory. The most prominent leader of this trend, Hassan Baum, is also the most popular and most influential. The Shallal Ali Shaia' parliament member,

¹³⁰ Saleh Al-Jabwani, "The Iranian Money Consequences on the Southern Revolution," *Muntada Al-Hirak Al-Janubi* (July 7, 2013), <http://aden11.com/vb/showthread.php?t=33816>.

Nasser Al-Khabji, has great supporters as well. Others are calling for the federal system (two regions within the framework of the federal state), to the people of the South with the option of a referendum for free self-determination. Among those who embrace the federal system are the first unity government prime minister Haidar Abu Bakr Al-Attas, and the former President of the South, Ali Nasser Mohammed. However, both seem to be more independent in their actions from this faction, and also have independent supporters.

2. National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (*Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi‘Adat Dawlat Al-Janub*)

The National Council to Return the National Nation, led by Abdul Hamid Shukri and Amin Saleh, was strong at the grassroots level. However, currently, most of its leaders have joined the leader Ali Salem’s faction, which has weakened it significantly.

3. The National Commission for the Southern Movement and the Retired Military Officers Committee (*Almajlis Alwatni Lelhirak Al-Janubi and Jamiat al-Mutaga‘Idin al-Janubiien*)

Although Brigadier Nasser Al-Nuba and Brigadier General (retired) Nasser Al-Tawil have established (within the Retired Military Officers Committee) the root of Al-Hirak, this faction has become one of the weakest components, as it is confined to some events in the province of Shabwa and AdDali’, with some activities in the governorates of Abyan and Hadramaut.¹³¹ However, some of the Southern leaders succeeded in attracting this faction’s activities to Aden. For example, Al-Nuba was supported by Ali Salem’s faction in breaking the civil disobedience in Aden; however, at the same time, was denied access to the stage to speak, which brought tensions between the two factions. Today, while Al-Nuba retains the symbolic leadership of this faction, he works mainly on the side of Hassan Baum with the Supreme Council of the peaceful movement for the liberation of the South.

¹³¹ Stracke and Haidar, “The Southern Movement in Yemen.”

4. Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Shabab Waltullab Al-Janubiin)

The Youth and Student Movement exists heavily in the province of Aden, but is also present in almost all Southern governorates. It is led by Fadi Hassan Baum, Ali Abdulrab, and AbdelFattah al-Rubaie, and is a suite of the wings of the Supreme Council for Peaceful Movement leader Hassan Baoum (Fadi's Father). This movement was intended to contain the youth anger through some activities, media presence, and good communication via social networking sites.

5. South Youth Federation (*Ittihad Shabab Al-Janub*)

The South Youth Federation is one of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's weakest factions. Its leaders, Ali Al-Saia, Wajdi Shu' Aybi, and Anwar Ismail, broke away from the Al-Beedh movement. It is characterized by its adoption of the establishment of the so-called State of South Arabia.

6. The Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic Congress Tajj) (*Harakat Tajj*)

Tajj was established and officially announced in July 2004.¹³² Jalab 'Ubadi was the exiled leader of the Tajj, and Saleh Al-Yafi' was his deputy and local leader. Main members were Al-Khader Al-Hassani, Abdu Al-Nakieb, and sub-leaders Abdullah Abdulsamad and Fadl Alhaj from England, Ahmed Muthanna and Fadl Alisa' from the U.S., Mohammad Almas from Sweden, and Badr Alsalahi from the Arabian Gulf. So far, this faction exists only in the media, and does not have a presence in the field. This movement had strong ties with the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South;¹³³ however, in the first week of May 2013, the Tajj leadership met in Cairo¹³⁴ to discuss changing its way of activities, according to the new leadership's affiliation and situations on the ground.

¹³² Southern Democratic Congress, "Who we are," accessed August 10, 2013, <http://tajaden.org/abouttaj.html>.

¹³³ Stracke and Haidar, "The Southern Movement in Yemen."

¹³⁴ Southern Democratic Congress, <http://tajaden.org/abouttaj.html>.

7. Youth February 16 (*Shabab 16 Febrair*)

The Youth February 16 was one of the Arab Spring creations, and has a known leader, Hasan ben Shu'aib. It started as a movement to change the regime in Sana'a under the same slogan "*Al-sha'ab yurid isqad al-nitham*;" however, it deviated to become one of the separatist factions. What is significant about the group is its use of religious leaders to justify violent actions against what is called the Northern occupation. It participated in blocking streets and damaging some interests of Northern businessmen in Aden. This faction tends to not reveal its leaders and members. It seems to be a shadow for other bigger factions in the movement.

8. The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (*Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer*)

HATAM is the oldest faction of the Southern Movement, beginning in 1994 as a result of the civil war. It targets security check points, some security institutions, and assassinations of military officers.¹³⁵ Ali Salem Al-Beedh adapted the movement recently, along with its leaders Shaikh Hassan Banan, and Abdulfattah Al-Rubai'i, who are affiliated with the Supreme Council and Ali Salem. HATAM is considered to be the symbol of the Southern revolution against what is called the Yemeni occupation.

9. The Southern Nation National Congress (*Almutamar Al-Wattani Lisha 'B Aljanub*)

The Southern Nation National Congress represents the people who accepted and participated in the NDC. Its leaders Ahmed Al-Surimah, Mohammed Ali Ahmed, and Yasin Umar Makkawi, represent Al-Hirak on the NDC in Sana'a. However, Ahmed Al-Suraimah withdrew on from the NDC on May 1, 2013, and accused those who stayed as traders. Mohammed Ali Ahmed is now the leader, along with Yasin Umar Makkawi, who was nominated as the NDC President Deputy by the President of Yemen.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ "Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question," *Middle East Report* No. 114, International Crisis Group.

¹³⁶ "Yassin Omar Ahmed Makkawi as a Vice President of the National Dialogue Conference: The Decision of President of the Republic to Form a National Dialogue Conference," *Saba News* (May 7, 2013), <http://www.sabanews.net/ar/news308981.htm>,

D. ANALYSIS OF AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI NETWORK, FACTIONS, RELATIONSHIPS, AND INFLUENTIAL LEADERS

To provide an analytical description of the movement's mobilization structure, three forms of analysis available in Palantir's visual analytic program were used. These forms are Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis (SNA), and Geospatial Analysis. The focus of the analysis is toward factions of al-Hirak's network as units of analysis in order to understand each faction's strength relative to other factions. It also analyzes individuals that lead those factions to measure their level of influence.

Figure 1 illustrates the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi social movement's anarchic structure. The relationship and links indicate that the movement is horizontal and divided, however, related to each other in some way or another. Figure 2 shows different entities like factions (shown in blue), locations (shown in yellow), that accommodate Al-Hirak, known active members (shown in green), and events (shown in black) based on available open source data.




Figure 1. Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Network.

1. Link Analysis

The link analysis in Figure 2 illustrates the influential agents of each faction and their relationship and relative importance to other factions.




Figure 2. Influential Actors' Network Relationships.

Based on link analysis as shown in Figure 2, Ali Salem Al-Beedh is the most influential individual with 21 links to factions and other activists with a lead type of relationship, followed by Hassan Baum who has 11 links. Hassan Baum is the most influential leader on the ground and is considered a legitimate leader of the local movement among many activists. In addition, Ali Salem Al-Beedh and Hassan Baum are mostly linked by a relationship to the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the

Liberation of the South. Ali Nasser Mohamed and Haider al Addas are ranked third with 10 links. While both are considered active leaders in the movement, Haider al Addas, located in Saudi Arabia, has an advantage of relationship with more business organizations.

Figure 3 shows that The Supreme Council of The Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South has more links than other factions. Links relationships can be seen in membership, components or branches, sub groups, and affiliations with other factions or activists. Interestingly enough, the Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic Congress Tajj) (*Harakat Tajj*) ranks second in affiliation and relationships, which can be explained by its bases outside Yemen and dependency on activities and other factions in Yemen. Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Shabab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) ranks third.




Figure 3. The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South Links.

In terms of appearances, the Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic Congress Tajj) (*Harakat Tajj*) appears in six locations, mostly countries outside Yemen; while inside Yemen, the Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Shabab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) appears in six cities, namely, Sabuah, Lahj, Abian, Ad Dali, Hadramaut and Aden. The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (*Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer*) appears in five governorates: Lahj, Hadramaut, Ad Dali, Abyan, and Aden while the rest of the factions are dispersed in four or fewer governorates.

The only faction that has a relatively hierarchal structure with components or branches in all main six governorates of southern Yemen is The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South. It has branches in Shabuah, Aden, Ad Dali, Hadramaut, Lahj, Abyan and even in Soqatrah island. Besides, the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South has high number of membership relative to other factions. It has 23 active leaders attached to the headquarters of the organization and an average of six active leaders for each branch, while other factions have active members in different locations or governorates without formal components or branches. Therefore, link analysis shows that the general pattern of the Southern separatist movement is centered around The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South and has four influential leaders that have ties with most factions and activists of the movement.

2. Social Network Analysis (SNA)

To take our analysis a step farther than only the number of links a faction or an individual has, we implemented a Social Network Analysis to measure significance of each faction. Four SNA measurements were applied to the movement's factions in one mode analysis. Individuals and entities other than factions were excluded to purify the results and ensure that the relative degrees of all types of centralities are not influenced by irrelative entities. Those four measurements are:

- Betweenness centrality measures the extent to which a faction lies on the shortest paths between all other actors in a network. Thus, it captures the ability of a faction to control the flow of information and other resources through a network.
- Closeness centrality that measures the average distance from the measured faction to all other factions in the network.
- Degree centrality that measures a faction's relative importance in the graph in terms of its number of ties.
- Eigenvector centrality, the more significant form of measurement in SNA, that assumes that ties to highly central actors are more important than ties to peripheral actors. Thus, an actor's eigenvector centrality is its summed connections to others, weighted by their centrality scores.

Table 1 summarizes the rank of factions corresponding to the four measurements of centrality. Note that each color in the table represents a faction, and the numbers shown in parentheses the raw value in centrality measurement.

Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Degree Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality
The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South = (126.5)	The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South = (0.8)	The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South = (23)	The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South = (0.13)
The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) = (43.5)	The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) = (0.7)	المجلس الاعلى للحركة الشبابية Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) = (18)	المجلس الاعلى للحركة الشبابية Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) = (0.10)
المجلس الاعلى للحركة الشبابية Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) = (31.5)	المجلس الاعلى للحركة الشبابية Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) = (0.68)	The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) = (18)	The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) = (0.10)
The Movement of the People of the South (Southern Democratic Congress Tadj) (Harakat Tadj) = (23)	National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub) = (0.63)	The Supreme Council (Al Dali'a Branch) = (11)	The Supreme Council (Al Dali'a Branch) = (0.06)
Yemen Socialist Party = (23)	The Higher National Forum for the Independence of the South (اللائقندسلايلعلا تينطو للاتنيها لا جبوز) = (0.60)	The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer) = (11)	The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer) = (0.06)
National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub) = (13.9)	The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer) = (0.58)	National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub) = (11)	National Council of Al-Hirak: The National Council to Return the National Nation (Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub) = (0.05)

Table 1. Summary of SNA on Al-Hirak Al-Janubi Factions – Top 10.

It can be seen in Table 1 that The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South has the highest centrality on all types of centrality. The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) and Youth and

Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) are alternating between second and third importance in four measurements of centrality. The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) is seen as the previous version of The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South, and the Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) is, in fact, the Youth branch of The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South. However, the Youth movement is more important as it has higher eigenvector centrality, which means it is more closely connected to other important factions of the movement including The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South. These three factions have dominated the potential of brokers and bridges; direct and indirect influence; the dissemination of information and involvement of activities within the network.

Table 2 shows the overall rank of factions in all SNA centrality measures.

	Betweenness Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Degree Centrality	Eigenvector Centrality	Overall rank
The Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South	1	1	1	1	First
Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin)	3	3	2	2	Second
The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success)	2	2	3	3	Third
The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (<i>Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer</i>)	8	-	5	5	Forth
The National Council to Return the National Nation (<i>Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub</i>)	6	4	6	6	Fifth

Table 2. Top 6 Al-Hirak Faction Performances in Centrality Measurements.

The analysis shows that Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South is the most significant faction of the movement. It ranks first in all degrees of centralities. The Youth and Student Movement (Harakat Al-Sahbab Waltullab Al-Janubiin) is second in overall degrees centrality, and The Council of the Peaceful Movement to Liberate the South (Success) is third. The Movement for Self-Determination HATAM (*Haraka Taqreer Al-Maseer*) ranks fourth followed by The National Council to Return the National Nation (*Al-Majlis Al-Watani listi'Adat Dawlat Al-Janub*). Therefore, overall link and SNA centralities analyses conclude that the Supreme Council of the Peaceful Movement for the Liberation of the South is the most central and influential faction in the movement.

3. Geospatial Analysis

In terms of geospatial analysis (see Figure 4), the movement is primarily present in the southwest part of Yemen, especially Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Syabwah, and Ad Dali governorates as compared to Hadramaut and al Mahrah, which are located at the southeast of Yemen.




Figure 4. Geospatial Analysis of the Al-Hirak Movement.

As Figure 4 shows the Aden governorate has the highest density of the movements' presence. Therefore, it is the most important governorate for the movement activities. In the northern part of Yemen the movement seems to have a lesser or insignificant presence. Although Figure 4 shows presence of the movement in governorates' centers and suggests that the movement's presence is concentrated as indicated by hotspots, the movement's presence is dispersed all over particular governorates.

V. AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI'S CULTURAL FRAME AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

A. IDEOLOGICAL PACKAGE AND FRAMING

According to history, Yemen is a single state.¹³⁷ From 1960 until 1990, both administrations of the North and the South struggled to unite the country. In schools, children in Aden and Sana'a learned about Yemen as a united county.¹³⁸ Therefore, although the reunification was—like Germany—a product of Cold War termination, it represented the peoples' will in both the North and the South. Trying to create a separatist ideology is very difficult for Al-Hirak. In fact, when the movement was sparked in 2007, unity was its metaphor.¹³⁹ Therefore, the movement is relying heavily upon the grievances that were produced during and after 1994 civil war.

1. Ideology

a. Religion

In an Islamic society that believes in the Day of Judgment religious ideology should be present to overcome all the ethical dilemmas. The side that wins the religious justification for its actions wins the hearts and minds of the people who are dedicated for the cause. In Yemen, religion is not in favor of separation at all. Therefore, there is not a significant or single ideology uniting the Southern movement and providing it with public support. Religious figures are struggling to find significant religious support for the separationists, because Islam is about unity. Al-Hirak activists realized the importance of religion and ideology at the beginning of their struggle. Al-Nuba asserts,

.137 Under his rule, Abu Karib As'ad was able to unify the whole of Southern Arabia from the coast to highland. He was thought to have reached Yathrib (Al-Madina Al-Munawwara now in Saudi Arabia). For more information, see Alessandro De Maigret, "Arabia Felix: An Exploration of Archaeological History of Yemen," *Stacey International*, translated by Rebecca Thompson, 2002.

.138 Hunud Al Fadhli, "Lady of the Fadhli: Unity Remains Forever One that Will Not Be Able To Dismember the Yemeni Body," June 25, 2013, <http://yemen-press.com/news20257.html>.

.139 Saut Al-Janub Al-Arabi, SBR, <http://www.soutalgnoub.com/vb2/showthread.php?t=7262>.

“We (Al-Hirak) should have an ideology that defines our country, and defeats their (Al-Islah) ideology.”¹⁴⁰

b. Socialism

The idea of socialism is active among Al-Hirak activists and some of the Southern poor, who depend upon the government for support. The South was governed by socialism for more than twenty years, and most of the people were very dependent upon the government for support and services. Changing to a capitalist system, especially a failed system, encourages people to remember their life before reunification. They were very poor people struggling for food and basic services, and differences between social classes were almost absent under Socialist rule. Under capitalism, the Southerners are still poor, but they are able to see that there are also many rich people, especially the Northerners. Poor people are nostalgic for Socialism for economic reasons, while leaders of the retired military organizations, retired military officers who were trained in the USSR, and Al-Hirak activists, especially ex-leaders of the Socialist party, are missing the Socialist system for its philosophy. It had been their religion for many years. Therefore, Al-Hirak is benefiting from the Socialist philosophy of economic and caste systems.

2. Framing of Religion and Socialism

During the 1994 civil war, the ideology of Jihad worked well for the unity government. Being a proxy of the USSR, the Southern separatist government was considered to be dominated by non-believers (*kuffar*) that had to be eliminated. At the time of the war, the Southern military did not recognize how important religion was. However, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi recognized this early on in its movement; therefore, religious figures were utilized to mobilize the people of the South and legitimize the call for separation.¹⁴¹ Attacks on the Al-Islah party (that supported Ali Saleh during the civil war by providing Jihadists and legitimizing its war) were more prominent. The Al-Hirak Al-Janubi movement, by delegitimizing the civil war, was questioning the religious

¹⁴⁰ *Al-Ayam Newspaper*.

¹⁴¹ “New Faction in the South Publicized Soon as the National Islamic Movement of the South,” *Hadramout Press* (August 4, 2013), <http://www.hadramoutpress.com/index.php?ac=3&no=6224#sthash.Vu9DDxFr.dpuf>.

leaders from the North who supported it, to ensure they would not have the same effect if another war or dispute occurred.

To overcome ideology-framing difficulties, Al-Hirak relied upon delegitimizing the unity government causes, by exploiting its mistakes and highlighting corruption. Just like separatism, corruption is condemned by Islam. Al-Hirak, through its religious supporters, attacked the corrupted system in Sana'a and sold separation as the only way to survive. Al-Hirak printed many pre-unification flags to represent the South and changed the name of Southern Yemen to Southern Arabia (*Al-Janub Al-Arabi*) to convince the people that the South was not a part of Yemen at all.

Although religion was not in favor of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi in its call for separation, Al-Hirak had succeeded in using religious ideology to counter the 1994 civil war and promote the Northern ideology and unity factions of the movement under one umbrella. Socialism, like religious ideology, had limited effects due to the change in the international system and the failure of Socialism. Al-Hirak was using Socialism to get more supporters, and at the same time, deny any intentions to return to it.

3. Opportunities in Adaptation

Although the Al-Hirak leadership was calling for separation of the county as a limit to their negotiation with the Yemeni Government, they adapted to the situation. During the Arab Spring, Al-Hirak agreed to freeze their call for separation. They supported the youth against Ali Saleh because of an agreement between the JMP's leaders and Al-Hirak leaders against a common enemy. This benefited the JMPs by unifying all efforts against Saleh, and gave Al-Hirak an opportunity to mobilize its supporters untouched. Within the NDC, there were participants of Al-Hirak, who continued to call for separation and for a federal system, but they participated in the NDC, despite other factions of Al-Hirak's refusal.

The Al-Hirak movement relied heavily upon the grievances, unemployment, and repression they had experienced over 15 years. In response President Hadi formed a committee that looked at the Southern grievances of repression, began receiving their claims of stolen lands, and revived occupations they were forced to retired from. At the

same time, Hadi was withdrawing the carpet from under Al-Hirak leaders' feet if the committee worked as it should. Therefore, from the leaders of the Al-Hirak announcement, there was an adaptation to the situation strategy where they asked for separation at times, a federal system other times, and addressed their grievances on many occasions, according to the situation and opportunity. Al-Hirak exploited every opportunity to sell its narratives and depict the unity government as a Northern occupation of the South. Even separatist incidents were politicized to support Al-Hirak's cause; however, the leaders were forced to comply with their young supporters, who were convinced that separation was the solution to their problems.

B. MOTIVATING AND MANIPULATING SUPPORTERS FOR THE CAUSE

1. Attraction

a. Ideological Concept

Al-Hirak could not rely upon a religious concept to achieve its ultimate goal. Southern religious figures were accustomed to attracting new members and mobilizing the existing supporters for separation. Al-Hirak leaders were using the Friday sermon (*khtba*) to call for supporters, as an attempt to change the Southerners' belief in unity. Some religious figures justified separation as the only means to end grievances and escape from the corruption for which the government in Sana'a was famous. However, although religion was used to legitimize the movement, religion itself needed justification to legitimize its call for separation. In Islam, unity is the norm, and separation is odd; therefore, successful, religious concepts can only delegitimize the other religious ideas of unity.

The ideology of Communism was working for those who lost their luxury after 1994 and for those who suffered from the corrupt figures in the government. However, the main force behind the movement was the resistance against occupation ideology that Al-Hirak had put great effort into emphasizing itself as the only supporter for the people of the South, and the only choice to end their grievances.

b. Social Services

Citizens in the South looked to the government to provide them with social services. The Yemeni government controlled the country and claimed responsibility for providing services, even when it failed to do so. Although providing social services would legitimize Al-Hirak as the best alternative for the government in Sana'a, it did not attempt to do that on a reasonable scale.

Al-Hirak utilized social services to gain the public support; however, it depended upon the government's inability to provide the expected social and basic services like electricity, medication, and decent education. It promised to provide all services to the people when it gained office after the separation. However, this was too risky for Al-Hirak. If the government in Sana'a recognized the issues and provided the basic services, Al-Hirak would be out of business.

c. Glory and Excitement

Al-Hirak leaders were experts in propaganda and the ability to mobilize their citizens. They relied upon the mass gathering of their supporters to gain more supporters and recruit more people. When an individual from the movement or an individual from the South was killed, hit, or injured by security forces, Al-Hirak supporters came with the separation flag and called him a martyr if killed, or a revolutionary if injured. The death would be a demonstration in Aden or Aldalea, which created glory for the movement in the rural areas and among unemployed or oppressed individuals who achieved their goals by joining Al-Hirak. Al-Hirak then gave them respect and a feeling of being important; this provided them with a reason to live, and a reason to die.

2. Duty and Honor

People may think that unity is great and support it strongly. However, they may feel obligated to act against their basic beliefs due to their moral obligation to protect their people against wrong doings by the government or revenge for oppression.

Therefore, the moment those individuals feel bad for their people and believe they need to act is the movement they join Al-Hirak, even if they do not believe in its values.

a. Fighting Repression

Fighting repression is one of the core values Al-Hirak relies on to get public support in the South. After the 1994 civil war, the corrupt leaders from the North and the South exploited their position and took lands that belonged to common people from the South, the retired military officers stayed in their villages isolated as an untouchable people, and any individual who spoke against corrupt leaders was considered a separatist, which was a great crime. Although corrupt leaders in the government were suppressing the whole country North, East, West, and South, it was easy for the separatist movement to sell the narrative of repression only to the South. Al-Hirak blamed the reunification for enabling corrupt figures to destroy the country.

Southern members joined Al-Hirak after individuals were killed or injured, or a leader was imprisoned. It is one of the Yemeni's characteristics to support their family members, friends or neighbors against strangers or the government, even if they do not like what they do. People would join Al-Hirak if the government imprisoned, injured, or killed any member they knew. According to Al-Hirak, corrupt leaders from the South were able to destroy the country under Sana'a's governmental protection. Fighting repression was a metaphor that was easy to sell in Yemen, because Al-Hirak needed little effort to prove Sana'a government corruption and dictatorship.

b. Defending Homeland or People and Ejecting the Occupier

It has not been easy for the Al-Hirak to sell the narrative of occupation since the country was reunited in 1990. However, grievances of the people that were experienced by the people in the South at the hands of the unity army who looted the South during and after the civil war has paved the road for Al-Hirak to sell their narrative. Al-Hirak paints a picture of the North as occupiers who want the South in order to loot it, destroy its goods, and deplete its resources. The Arab Spring gave Al-Hirak, what is called in social movement theory, a political opportunity to strengthen its position but at the same time affected its narrative. However, repression still plays in favor of Al-

Hirak. Although the president and other key leaders in the government are now from the South, the Southern people still suffer from repression. Therefore, Al-Hirak is perceived to support the people of the South.

c. Seeking Revenge

Revenge in Yemen has been very common, because people of Yemen do not easily forget being defeated. They would spend their lives looking for opportunities to take revenge. In Al-Hirak's case, revenge was a main factor of the movement. Retired military officers, who were mainly from the Tughma, sought revenge from the government in Sana'a for defeating them during the civil war, and for marginalizing them afterward. The retired military officers also sought revenge from the Southern Zumra, who fought on the side of the unity army during the civil war, and held positions in the government in the name of the South. This explained the continuity of the movement, regardless of having the president, the prime minister, the minister of defense, head of national security bureau, and other officials who held key positions from the Southern part of the country. Those who were holding positions were considered to be from the Zumra from whom the Tugma are seeking revenge. Currently, President Hadi has reinforced this idea by appointing many officials from Zumra, instead or retuning some of the Tugma to government key positions to reduce the congestion. Alley asserts that, "now, a common complaint is that Yemen has moved from the Sanhanization of the state (Sanhan is Saleh's tribal area) to the Abyanization of the state (Abyan is Hadi's home governorate).¹⁴²

Al-Hirak is the solution to the retired military officers' dilemma, because after the separation, Al-Hirak leaders, who are mainly from the Tughma, would go back to their official positions, which would then enable them to marginalize the Zumra officials, including President Hadi. For the common people, revenge is important because they felt oppressed not only by the government in Sana'a but also by the Northern people,

¹⁴² April Longley Alley, "Triage for a Fracturing Yemen," *The Middle East Channel* (October 31, 2012), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/10/31/triage_for_a_fracturing_yemen?wp_login_redirect=0.

including religious figures who declared the war on the South during 1994. In addition, the Zumra marginalized most of the Tughma people after the 1994 civil war.

Although revenge is a factor that affects many disputes in Yemen, forgiveness is also a powerful factor that works against revenge. Yemeni people forget easily if their honor is not hurt, and the other side admits what they did and asks for forgiveness. If the government in Sana'a worked on forgiveness, Al-Hirak would lose revenge as a motivating factor. Nonetheless, the government should consider solving the problems that exist in the South, return the properties and lands to their rightful owners, return the government employees to their positions and provide them with decent salaries, and then ask for forgiveness.

3. Rewards

Rewards can be viewed as short- and long-term factors. There are instant rewards people may receive like money, power, and prestige, but more importantly, there are long-term rewards that are very critical for Al-Hirak to survive. Both long-term and short-term rewards are essential in terms of public support.

a. Financial

Al-Hirak supporters have been mainly peasants and retired civil and military servants. Most Al-Hirak members were oppressed and marginalized, and most are military and civilians who were forced to retire after the civil war and suffered from shortage of money. They did not even receive their total salaries. Therefore, a promise to provide financial support after separation was an excellent long-term reward for members of Al-Hirak. In addition, instant financial support was critical. Individuals would support the separation if they received more benefits from it, rather than continuing with the reunited system that marginalized them. Al-Hirak gave money to active participants, promising more after separation for every Southerner. Al-Hirak was relying mainly on the exiled leaders and some of the Yemeni labor in Gulf countries and the West, especially those who were exiled after the 1994 civil war and felt obliged to support the movement in the South.

b. Power

Taking revenge, gaining money, fighting corruption, returning the stolen land, and supporting the Southern people are linked by way or another with power. Power can be seen in those who need to be empowered over their villagers or others who need to seize power over the county. Al-Hirak provides a road map for individuals to get power. It promises them positions in the new state. Besides, some of Al-Hirak leaders have felt the power currently by being leaders who give orders and are served by other members. Al-Hirak is giving luxury for people who got nothing from unity but marginalization. Therefore, power is a key factor behind the movement and working to sustain it.

c. Prestige

Prestige here is held for the two main categories representing the Southern movement. The retired military officers and civil servants who lost their power and prestige after 1994 find it in Al-Hirak where people start looking for their advice, obeying their orders, and honoring them. For retired military officers and former Socialist party leaders, Al-Hirak is the lost island they eventually found to get back to their luxurious life even if it was only in terms of respect and feeling important once again.

For the peasants and youth who do not get the respect they deserve, either because they are poor, uneducated, or young, Al-Hirak grants them the prestige they seek. They get to attend the elders' meetings, participate in the demonstrations, and most important get their voice heard by those who would not listen if Al-Hirak did not exist. Nonetheless, Al-Hirak's giving prestige to the peasant is working only in the short-term. If Al-Hirak grows, its leaders will no longer give the peasants the respect they gave them earlier, because the leaders of Al-Hirak, just like the government in Sana'a, are corrupt. They do not really care about the people. Prestige still works in the long-term for leaders of Al-Hirak and tribal leaders who support it. Therefore, the Yemeni government should understand this factor and launch programs that grant equality and empowerment to the people by giving them a voice to decide how they organize themselves in order for the government to defeat Al-Hirak.

C. PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF VIOLENCE

Huge debates exist among the different factions of Al-Hirak about the legitimacy of using violence and the ability of sustaining an insurgency. There have been some occasions when coercion was practiced against Northern individuals who live or work in Southern cities for a limited time. For example, on July 11, a Northern merchant was killed in al-Dali' with his son and brother-in-law; on July 25, a grocer from Taiz was murdered in Zinjibbar, and in early December 2009, Northern residents in the South feared for their lives and returned to their homes in the North.¹⁴³

Violence is a two edges sword. It enables Al-Hirak to draw a line between the Northern and Southern people and to remind the people about the history of separation that was full of hate. It has also forced several families from the North to abandon their houses or work in Southern cities. Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (EQAP) has presented to Al-Hirak its way of struggling against the Yemeni government, which is their common enemy. As Phillips asserts, "Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula had provided its support to what it calls the Southern struggle. It would legitimize their use of violence only when they accept Sharea law as a way of life after separation."¹⁴⁴

The Al-Hirak faction that uses violence hopes to ignite clashes between the people from the North against Southern people. They might attack Southerners in Sana'a, for example, as revenge for what Al-Hirak did to Northern people in Aden, which, if it happens, will grant Al-Hirak great success in achieving its goal. However, this tactic has not worked and apparently will not. People of the North, despite their grievances, fall in love with unity, and deep in their hearts they know that Southerners feel the same way. The general understanding in the North of the movement marginalized those acts and categorized them as criminal rather than political actions.

Al-Hirak understands that using violence will legitimize reactions by the government against Al-Hirak, whose members had bad experiences in 1986 and 1994.

¹⁴³ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 250.

¹⁴⁴ Phillips, "Yemen: On the Brink: What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building."

They have not recovered from violence. Therefore, Al-Hirak is better off without violence. Except for Ali Albeedh, who has called several times for armed resistance, Al-Hirak leaders understand that violence will get them nothing compared to a peaceful means¹⁴⁵ Violence may cost Al-Hirak its cause, lives, resources, and national and international sympathy they gained over time. Therefore, violence is not a choice on the table right now. Violence can be framed in terms of religious beliefs, revenge, cultural prosperity, or necessity in desperation.

1. Religious Beliefs and the Ideological, Ethical Tolerance for Violence

In a country that is more than 99 percent Muslim and where the population has the same bright history, speaks the same language, depends on the same resources, and shares the same values, norms, and morals, it is very difficult for a group of people to utilize religion as a tool to justify violence or manipulate ethics to fit violence into an acceptable category. Until now, neither religious figures in the North nor religious scholars of the South have issued what is called a *fatwa* to legitimize killing the other.

However, Al-Hirak is taking steps to enable itself to resist any possible Fatwas by the Northern scholars who oppose separation. It is attacking scholars (*Ulama*) of the Islamic brotherhood to delegitimize their ideas and Fatwas. The Ulama of Al-Hirak are mobilized to make separation acceptable and important for a good future, as they usually say, for the North and South. To this end, Al-Hirak is using the slogan “one nation, two countries.”

Attempts are being made by Al-Hirak to convince Southern people that Northern people are “the others.” If Al-Hirak succeeds in these attempts, it will legitimize any violence against the people from the North and against the army, which then will be seen as occupation forces despite the fact that the commander-in-chief and most of its commanders are from the South.

¹⁴⁵ “The Minutes of the Meeting between the Southern Leaders and Ben Omar in Dubai,” <http://voice-yemen.com/news/53587.html#ixzz2X6tHb5QM>.

2. Revenge

Personal revenge is very common and accepted in the Yemeni culture. A relative of a murdered person would be ready to use violence against those who he thinks killed his relative, if he has the chance to do so. Therefore, if Al-Hirak leaders planned to use violence, they would find a way to enable individuals to use violence, which will lead to more violence, and eventually lead people to think of using violence only for revenge.

Apart from individual accidents that happen now and then, and that result in people being killed by Al-Hirak, there is nothing occurring on a scale that would initiate or legitimize violence for revenge. As an Islamic society, revenge in Yemen is only legitimized to equal the bad actions and individuals who would seek revenge from a person who committed the sin. Furthermore, using revenge for violence is culturally permitted only in response to violence; it cannot be used to retaliate against marginalization. Because Al-Hirak is motivated by people's rights and grievances that were ignored in the past, violence as a tool for revenge would be very limited unless clashes occur that ignited problems between the army or security forces on one side and Al-Hirak on the other. The Yemeni government seems to understand the case and is wisely being very patient with Al-Hirak members' activities.

3. Cultural Propensity for Acceptance of Violence

Because the Yemeni culture does not believe in violence, the Yemenis are very peaceful people. While Most Yemeni Men carry Ak-47s and wear daggers (*Janbias*) all the time, violence and crime is very low compared with other developed countries like U.S. The Arab Spring proved the peacefulness of the Yemeni people, who seek peaceful means to end their disputes. The current Al-Hirak leadership and its stakeholders have suffered from the 1986 and the 1994 civil wars. They were former leaders of the YSP,¹⁴⁶ and therefore, they know exactly what it means to use violence. That is why violence is

¹⁴⁶ "Breaking Point? Yemen's Southern Question," Middle East Report No. 114, *International Crisis Group*.

not a choice, and will not be in the near future, except for self-defense and as the last resort.¹⁴⁷

Even if the violence were to be in retaliation for violent repression of Al-Hirak by others who committed such acts, it would undoubtedly turn public opinion against them. People in the South are very educated and know what it means to use violence. People have suffered a lot, and they are not ready to tolerate the consequences of more violence. If Al-Hirak used violence, its popular support would decline, and it would lose legitimacy and supporters.

4. Necessary Desperation

There is nothing more dangerous than when a person says, “There is nothing else I can do to take back my rights except to use violence.” To justify their unreasonable violence, insurgencies, governments, and terrorist organizations use the last resort argument. Currently, Al-Hirak cannot rely upon religion to legitimize violence, as it is unacceptable in ethics and in Yemeni culture. However, Al-Hirak can inject religion and ethics by necessity, and as a last resort. Necessary desperation is very dangerous. Feeling there is nothing to do but promote violence to gain your rights is dangerous, and it can happen with Al-Hirak.

Until recently, Al-Hirak was relying upon peace as the main stream of its movement. The government has to control its reactions, use only limited and necessary force to suppress any violence, and avoid using violence against civilians, to avoid justification of violence as a reaction.

¹⁴⁷ A Southern officer explained to me a time when members of Al-Hirak refused to use violence against harassment by military forces in Al-Dhali even though they were able to seize the tanks and control the area. They chose not to react in spite of the fact that they are retired professional military officers who are better trained than the military forces that were wearing slippers,” he said.

D. ACCEPTABILITY OF COSTS AND RISKS

All movements accept risks when they are established. Those who do not accept risks cannot exist in the first place. Therefore, the question should be, to what extent can a movement or an individual accept risk, and what cost is he willing to pay? Acceptance of costs and risks depends upon the goals the individuals and the movement want to achieve, the rewards they will get, and the obligations they believe they have. There are some related factors to be examined, like intimidation, and assessment of the likely victor; however, it is always a matter of risks and benefits. Therefore, a good narrative can make people accept risk, and having no alternative, can also make people accept even more risk.

1. Intimidation

Intimidation is used by both Al-Hirak and the government. When the government puts more pressure on the Southern people and manipulates them, it pushes them to join Al-Hirak. At the same time, Al-Hirak is pressuring people to join the movement or at least appear to be joining the movement. For example, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi uses intimidation to force civil disobedience in Aden and other areas in the South, to send a message to the international community regarding its ability to control the South.

Intimidation is a great technique for Al-Hirak in urban areas, but it will work against Al-Hirak if used in the rural areas where tribal sheikhs are powerful. In a tribal society, intimidation does not really work since it affects the tribal leaders' luxury and sovereignty, which will have bad consequences in the long term. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is a living example of failed intimidation measures against tribes. Al Zarqawi lost when he suppressed tribal leaders and tried to control them.¹⁴⁸ Intimidation is a useful tool for mobilizing support in the short-term, but is likely have unpleasant consequences in the long term.

¹⁴⁸ John Arquilla, "Warfare in the Information Age" (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 2012).

2. Assessment of a Likely Victor

There is an old Yemeni saying that describes what a majority of the people always do. The saying is “I am with the strong with Allah’s help” (*Ma‘a alqawi Ya awon allah*). People will be with the strong most of the time. At the beginning of the Al-Hirak movement, people were very alert. They did not declare their support for separation because they did not see it winning. However, the Arab Spring gave the political opportunity for Al-Hirak Al-Janubi to openly state its goals. It enabled Al-Hirak to show its success. Although the success of Al-Hirak still relies upon what the government does and how it responds to the people’s demands, Al-Hirak has proven its power and ability to control certain areas and mobilize a great number of the people.

The government still appears strong in the eyes of the people, especially after defeating the Al-Qaeda militarily in Abyan and its ability to mobilize tribal support from the South itself. The military reform decisions on April 2013 played in favor of unity in terms of public support. Nonetheless, whoever wins or loses public support in the near future is linked to the decisions made by the grievances committee that are currently receiving claims from the people in the South, and the Southern case committee in the NDC. If these committees solve most of the problems and military reform proves a success, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi would lose much of the public support it currently enjoys.

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VI. AL-HIRAK AL-JANUBI'S NARRATIVES

A. DIAGNOSTIC FRAMES

1. Southern Plight

Reunification is a symbol of systematic discrimination and exploitation of the South. Discrimination and exploitation policies are implemented via “blurring the identity and culture, destruction of the institutional infrastructure and human resources, murder and exclusion of the Southern cadres, plundering the resources and the capabilities of the South, and political containment of the Southern issues.”¹⁴⁹

The Southern people are very poor and barely surviving, while corrupt individuals from the North are exploiting the South's lands and resources.¹⁵⁰ The Government in Sana'a discriminates against the Southern people who are exempt from important positions in the public service. Even those high positions that were given to Southern individuals were largely symbolic.¹⁵¹

The Southern citizens have been discriminated against, not only as second-class Yemeni people, but they have been described as non-indigenous Yemenis. They are said to be new arrivals from Somalia, Ethiopia, India, and Pakistan. For example, Ali Salem al-Beedh, who signed the declaration of unity, was described as being Indian (*Hindi*), an extreme racial discrimination that strips Southerners of their right to land and history.¹⁵²

.149 “Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference, Sana'a, <http://ndc.ye/ar-issue.aspx?show=1>.

.150 Brehony, *Yemeni Divided: The Story of a Failed State in South Arabia*, 211.

.151 Stephen Day, “The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement,” in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 65.

.152 “Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

The Southern youth are deprived of receiving scholarships abroad, along with opportunities to continue their studies and obtain higher degrees.¹⁵³ The government in Sana'a has been depriving the new generation in the South from enrollment to many institutes. For example, they are prevented from joining civilian and military colleges and other military and security institutions. Even worse, they are denied employment in absolute terms in state public services such as the judiciary and public prosecutorial offices, oil and diplomatic fields, and in financial areas such as taxation, finance, and customs offices.¹⁵⁴ As Lewis asserts, "Following the unquestionable victory of the North of Yemen over the South, President Saleh's regime set about a process of purging Southern leaders from key positions in the South and replacing them with Northern officials."¹⁵⁵

The Southern people were not only denied opportunities to work in high-level leadership positions in the state public administration, but also from public office at the middle and low levels in their provinces. The retired Southerners were called the political party of "stay home" (*Hizb khallik belbait*).¹⁵⁶ "There are whole ministries in Sana'a that do not have a single Southerner employee."¹⁵⁷ Besides, as Day asserts, "throughout the last half of the 1990s, top military commanders in the Southwest, mid-Southern, and eastern regions, had family and tribal connections to President Saleh in Sana'a."¹⁵⁸

Repression is not limited to education and employment opportunities. The business field has a great share as well. For example, Sana'a government has denied import and export licenses to Southerners. The South has been under systematic

.153 "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

.154 Ibid.

.155 Lewis, "Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism."

.156 This term is generally used to describe those who were forced to retire without any pensions or future regardless of their willingness to continue in the service and regardless of their young age. The term was used during the National Dialogue Conference on June 24. For more information about the challenge of retired military officers and the term's usage, see Abdul Aziz Thafer, "New Impasse Waiting for President Hadi," *Mareb Press* (December 17, 012) <http://marebpress.net/articles.php?print=18466>.

.157 "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

.158 Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

impoverishment policies from Sana'a, leaving the country in need of charities from the two-occupying parties (GPC and Islah) and other associations with political religious orientations.¹⁵⁹

In the Republic of Yemen, the educational system is very poor, the administrative system is very corrupt, the military is corrupt and controlled by families in the North, electricity is very unreliable or not available, Yemeni sport is shameful, and the police force is very corrupt. Besides, over all, sheikhs from the North control Yemeni government, justice is absent, and people are very poor. Furthermore, experts, educated and faithful individuals, are exempt from good positions if not forced out of jobs. This narrative aims to open the wounds of the Southern people. Despite the fact that the whole country is suffering, the Southerners are suffering more. Al-Hirak is working day and night to convert existing grievances into revolutionary ideas.

2. It is an Occupation, It is Not Unity

The South came to unity with good faith and great intentions. Its intent was to build a state associated with the practice of democracy. However, centers of military, tribal, and religious groups' power in the North were not peaceful. Abdullah Bin Hussaien Al-Ahmar (one of the key tribal leaders and a speaker of the House of Representatives) admitted this in his memoir. He mentioned an agreement between himself and Ali Abdullah Saleh to form an opposition political party, mainly to weaken the YSP. Both Ali Saleh and Al-Ahmar created the Islah party on September 9, 1990.¹⁶⁰

As a political Islamic party, Islah expressed its opposition to unity through its rejection of the constitution's referendum. Although the Islah party mobilized demonstrations to express its rejection of the new so-called a "secular constitution," the same people fought in 1994 to protect the same constitution.¹⁶¹ The system in Sana'a has killed unity by abolishing significant documents under which the unity was established.

¹⁵⁹ "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

For example, most of the unity Constitution's articles have been modified more than once. All modifications were implemented only to enhance the control of the victorious party.¹⁶²

In the name of unity, the South has given major concessions including its capital, its currency, the head of state [position], the land of wide sea beaches, islands and multiple natural resources while the North gave nothing in return.¹⁶³ While the Northern elite held capital in the form of land and business enterprises, Southern citizens' lands were controlled by the YSP. They depend mainly on their salaries from the government.¹⁶⁴ After the civil war, the Sana'a regime has distributed the land of the South as gifts to relatives and loyalists of the Sana'a regime, as a gift from God to the Northern supporters while Southern people could not find land to bury their dead.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, the tribal, military, and religious alliance in Sana'a has committed the most heinous human rights violations in the South during and after the 1994 civil war "in which some are difficult to mention because it is not appropriate to say that Muslims have committed it."¹⁶⁶

In an interview with *Monitor News*, Ali Salem stated that,

They were not willing to form a civil state and did not want to implement the agreement we signed with them. President Saleh formed the Al-Islah (Reform) Party with Sheikh Abdullah Al-ahmar. This is an Islamist party. They considered the people of the South to be communists, and thus, they all formed alliances among themselves to get rid of us. Meanwhile, we entered into the unity agreement and worked with them on the basis that we are a single state and a single people. Yet, they carried out acts that undermined this unity and occupied the South. Since that time (July 7, 1994), we consider the South to be occupied. Today, the people are

.162 Ibid.

.163 Ibid.

.164 Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*, 41.

.165 "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

.166 Ibid.

expressing their views in a civil, peaceful and civilized manner in order to restore their state and their identity.¹⁶⁷

Ali Salem al-Beedh declared separation on May 21, 1994, meaning that the reunification was over. What happened during and after the 1994 civil war was an occupation by the Northern army and traders from the South. Therefore, it is every Southern citizen's responsibility to join the movement to drive the Northern occupation out of the Southern state.

What happened in 1989 and 1990 was an agreement between two individuals (Ali Abdullah Saleh and Ali Salem al-Beedh) only. Neither the Northern nor the Southern people were involved in the decision making process. In fact, the unity agreement between the North and the South consists of only one page while Germany's unity agreement consists of more than a thousand. Therefore, reunification was driven by passion and not by extensive and realistic studies. In addition, what is based on falsehood is false.¹⁶⁸

Occupation is an essay narrative a movement can make to get supporters and mobilize its members. However, in Yemen, the case is a little different. Trying to convince the people that the North is occupying the South when in fact the president, the prime minister, the minister of defense, the head of national security bureau, the head of military intelligence, and the military commanders are from the South is hard to do—especially after the military reform decisions by the president that unified the military and proved the new president had control of the country. However, Al-Hirak leaders still repeat the word “occupation” convincing the people that the president and other figures in the government are not really ruling.

.167 Haytham Mouzahem, “Former South Yemen President to Continue to Call for Secession: Interview with Ali Salem al-Beedh,” *Al-Monitor News*, May 27, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/ali-salim-beidh-president-south-yemen-secession.html>.

.168 “Firas Al-Yafi’I, Ali Naser Mohammed: Unity Agreement is One Page Signed by the Two Sides in a Qat Meeting,” *Aden Online* (May 22, 2013), <http://sahafah.net/show1074867.html>.

3. Southern Arabia

The South was never part of Yemen. It is Southern Arabia, not Southern Yemen. Therefore, reunification was wrong in the first place. The name of Yemen was given to the South by the YSP when in fact the South is historically and culturally different. For example, occupying British forces called the South “Southern Arabia,” which has nothing to do with Yemen. Therefore, what is happening now in the South is a Yemeni occupation of the Southern Arabia.

As stated in the vision for the Southern case, “the facts of history have been ignored. These two entities [the South and North system in Yemen] were not united in any era of history. Unity was based in passion, not in accordance with the logic and reason, and there are differences among the systems economically, culturally, and socially.”¹⁶⁹

This narrative is used to justify separation. By demonstrating that the South has not been part of Yemen at any time, the Al-Hirak movement is justified. With this narrative, the government in Sana‘a will be perceived as occupying a country instead of a corrupt government.

4. Unjust War (1994 Civil War Calamity)

The 1994 Civil War, in addition to the Southern plight, is what broke the back of unity. The unjust civil war was launched by Ali Saleh’s regime against the South using every unjustified and dehumanizing means possible, and the South became the booty for corrupt Northern individuals. Ali Saleh used the religious, tribal, and Al-Qaeda veterans to fight what was called “the infidels.” They supported him only so they could loot from the Southern people. As Ba‘aum noted, “The civil war by the ‘ousted’ President Ali Abdullah Saleh to invade the South, which reneged on all the covenants and agreements signed with its political unity and partnership project, has set all unity foundations for failure.”¹⁷⁰ The Southern people were defeated in 1994. As a result, the Yemeni

¹⁶⁹ “Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case,” Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

¹⁷⁰ “Baoum calls his supporters to move to demonstration square in Khur Maksar,” *Aden Online* (April 25, 2013), <http://sahafah.net/show1049467.html>.

occupation forces were distributed in each governorate to suppress the people of the South, just like any other occupation forces would do.

The international community and the U.N. Security Council were aware of the separation and did not support the South against the occupation. The day Ali Saleh declared war on the South should be commemorated as a calamity. The Southern people condemn what happened during and after the civil war. During that war, the president of the South, Ali Salem, was forced into exile, and he should come back because he is still the president of the South.

After the unjust war, instead of implementing its commitments to the international community made during the civil war, the Sana'a government has implemented a policy of exclusion and deportation of Southerners. Civil and military individuals have shared the property of the people of the South, including lands, real estate, factories, and farms.¹⁷¹ Besides, the Southern citizens were denied opportunities to elect their representatives in the House of Representatives (the parliament) and local councils. All elected individuals represent the two main parties in the North, namely, the GPC and Islah.¹⁷² This narrative is used to justify separatism by proving the civil war against the separatists in 1994 was unjust.

B. PROGNOSTIC FRAMES

1. The Resources

The Southern people may not exceed six million, which represents only 25 percent out of the total 25 million people in Yemen. The unity government is very dependent on its budget, with almost 70 percent of it based on the gas and oil reserves discovered in Hadramawt. Oil and gas fields in the North, especially in Marib, are draining. Therefore, even with an uncorrupt unity government, the South is losing. The resources that are extracted from Hadramawt are used to support 25 million people when they should only support 6 million people (the Southern people). The Southern people are

¹⁷¹ "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

¹⁷² Ibid.

very poor while their oil is sold to cover expenses in Sana'a and other places in the North.¹⁷³

When the South obtains its independence, the oil, regardless of its small amount, will be more than enough for the South. The South will be one of the rich Gulf countries, and the North will be waiting for help from the South. Therefore, instead of begging the government in Sana'a to help the Southern governorates, Sana'a will be begging the South to get financial support.

This narrative aims to draw the feeling of being exploited and convincing the Southern people that before reunification these resources were not available. Now with these resources, compared with the number of the people in the South, the South will be one of the Gulf countries. Besides, one of the big aims of separation is to restore and retain the resources of the South so that these resources will be exploited only by the Southerners.

2. Unity of the Southern People (Nation)

Separation from the North is essential to maintain and keep unity in the South. The government in Sana'a has worked and is working hard to separate the Southern people. The South can only be united after separation from the North. The painful history that they have experienced since 1967 will be gone when the people join al-Hirak. Now the Southern people have a common goal, which is to build a new democratic and developed Southern state. This narrative is used to counter the idea of different Southern factions and disparities within the separatist movement. Al-Hirak is attempting to convince the people that the South will be united under its umbrella.

3. Separation Is the Solution

For the sake of retaining resources, for the sake of a modern and democratic state, for the sake of coming out of slavery and marginalization by the North, and for the sake of a decent life, the South has to separate from Republic of Yemen. People of the South

¹⁷³ Lewis, "Violence in Yemen: Thinking about Violence in Fragile States beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism."

are grieving, exploited, occupied, and oppressed by the corrupt individuals from the Yemeni occupation and their infidels from the South.

The resources of the South are used to feed the whole country of 25 million instead of 6 million. Those resources cannot feed the whole country but can make the Southern people very rich. Despite the Sana'a government's efforts, if any, the problems of the Southern people will not be solved. The only solution for all these problems is separation. By separation, the South will have enough resources to be rich. It can end corruption and build a real democracy. And all the bright future of the South can only be reached by separation. This narrative is mainly used to counter the government's efforts to solve the Southern people's grievances. When separation is the only solution, the Sana'a government's efforts can be only painkillers. They can delay the problem but will never solve it.

C. MOTIVATIONAL

1. Bright Future in a New Civil Institutional State

Regardless of the dark history of the South, after it is granted its independence, the South will be one of the Gulf countries. The South has the resources and expertise. Susanne Dahlgren asserts, "Bad governance and corruption is thought to be characteristic of the Northern culture at large."¹⁷⁴ Therefore, corruption will vanish, and South Yemen will be a great developed country. After separation, every citizen will be respected and treated equally. Development will move faster than its pace currently. Besides, Aden will regain its glory and fame as the new Dubai in the 21st century.

The state in the South will not be as it was during or even before reunification. It will not come back to YSP. Instead, the Southern state will be a modern state with great institutions, free elections, separate authorities, and a free court system. There will be rule of law and great government administrations that support the people instead of robbing them. After separation, there will be national consensus where people will forgive each other and live happily ever after. What is standing between these dreams and the people

.174 Dahlgren, "The Southern Movement in Yemen."

of the South is reunification. This narrative gives the hope and reason behind the separatist concept. It gives the people hope and draws a very bright picture of the South after separation.

2. Responsibility and Duty of Resistance and Traders

It is the responsibility of each individual in the South to join the Al-Hirak. Those who do not join will have no future in the new government. Everybody has to join the movement to get the benefits of the new state after independence. It is a religious duty to support the grieving people and end injustice and corruption. This narrative is used by the movement to justify repression of unity supporters and to get financial support from businesspersons and donations from average depoliticized people.

Since the whole South is for separation, only traitors, who receive money from the Northern government, are supporting unity. Traitors should be treated as occupation agents. This narrative is used to ensure that supporters of unity are coerced to join Al-Hirak. By joining Al-Hirak, unity supporters will change from traitors to heroes. If unity supporters join Al-Hirak, at least they will no longer express their opinion openly against Al-Hirak supporters and risk being treated as occupiers' agents.

3. Absence of Hope

The South has tried unity. It turned out that unity was not the solution for the Southerners' problems. Instead of solving the Southern problems, reunification enabled corrupt leaders from the North and the South to exploit the resources for their own benefit. The government in Sana'a has promised many times that it will solve the Southern problem, but instead it has continued supporting corrupt leaders. Some Southern leaders have tried to make proposals and projects to resolve the political situation of the South after the tragic war in 1994, such as removing the effects of the war by reforming and purifying the path to reunification and initiating a national reconciliation. The first attempt was in December 2001 when a group of Southern dignitaries, including members of the parliament, leaders of political parties, organizations, tribes, and businessmen, met in Sana'a throughout the month of Ramadan to discuss the Southern grievances. The meeting participants drafted a letter of complaint

to Saleh, which was delivered to his office with no result. The complaint was published in a newspaper and had no effect. This convinced the Southerners of the absence of hope and the need to form an organized resistance against the regime in Sana'a.¹⁷⁵ Nonetheless, the regimes and powerful figures in Sana'a continued, unjustifiably, rejecting all valuable and honest proposals.¹⁷⁶

The Arab Spring, instead of taking down the old regime, ending family and tribal control of civil and military institutions, and bringing new fresh and loyal blood to lead the country, brought back the old faces. President Hadi was the Vice President of the old regime, and the current government is giving favor to the GPC and Islah while the Southern people are exempted. There is no hope with unity. Everything will continue to be the same if not worse. This narrative, which kills the hope of any good future linked with unity, is used to counter the Yemeni Arab Spring narratives. The absence of hope narrative is the result of the government's failure to deliver its reform promises to the Southern people.¹⁷⁷

4. One Nation, Two States

If there is no hope for the people under reunification, they should seek another path and try to find decent lives through separation. However, The nation will continue to share its history and relationships but in two-states system.¹⁷⁸ It is yet to be compulsory, but this narrative with time will be used in the near future to support the idea of Jihad if violence is to be used. In Islam, unity is necessary. Anyone who calls for separation is against the general understanding of Muslims. Southern scholars, who issue Fatwas, use this narrative to justify separation saying it is acceptable for Muslims to separate if there

.175 Day, "The Political Challenge of Yemen's Southern Movement," in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 69.

.176 "Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's Vision of the Roots of the Southern Case," Yemeni National Dialogue Conference.

.177 Alley, "Yemen's Forever War: Political Instability in the South."

.178 "Firas Al-Yafi'i, The First Political Project to the National Dialogue Conference to the Establishment of Two States and One Nation," *Aden Online* (May 27, 2013), <http://sahafah.net/show1079425.html>.

is more benefit in separation than in unity, which is the case in Yemen. Its aim is to support violence in the future if needed.

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of the harm Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has done to the stability and security of the united country and the unintentional political opportunity it provided for Al-Qaeda to operate more freely in the South, Al-Hirak is a social movement that aims to support its people in the South and has great intentions and respect toward their brothers in Northern governorates. Al-Hirak was established to fight against corruption, discrimination, and the marginalization of Southern people by corrupt government officials, tribal shiekhs, and political figures. Therefore, separation is not the desired end result for Al-Hirak; it is a means toward an end, which is to restore the Southern people's dignity, grant equality, secure stolen resources, and produce a fair and just life for its people.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi is composed of factions with an anarchic structure. It is a mix of tribal loyalists, former YSP members and leaders, and youths who found their future brighter as they became part of it. Alliances and fractures among factions, leaders, and activists are very common to the point that the observer gets confused as to who supports whom. Al-Hirak's factions are fighting with each other over leadership, resources and the right to represent the South. However, Al-Hirak has ingredients that enabled it to rebel against the government and challenge the country's main principle which is unity. It is taking advantage of the government's mistakes and weaknesses and is creating its own opportunities to grow bigger by attracting more supporters who are willing to give money, time, effort, and even their lives, while the government is losing its authority and the glory of unity is growing dim.

All conditions that are required for a successful social movement are available to Al-Hirak Al-Janubi. First of all, the South has grievances that can legitimize any movement against the Yemeni government. Al-Hirak has no problem selling its narrative to the Southern people. Reunification has given the South nothing other than poorness and marginalization. Their lands are robbed, their jobs are given to others, their culture is

marginalized, and their dignity is affected. Besides, the unity government is very corrupt and offers its people no hope for the future. These strong narratives are working to shore up Al-Hirak Al-Janubi.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has had great political opportunities that have worked in its favor. The Houthis in the North helped by exploiting the weakness of the central government and diverting the government's attention to the North, which helped the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi movement during its early growth phase. The 2006 presidential election opened the door to political and financial support for the movement by political parties in Sana'a in their fighting of each other. Besides, Faisal Ben Shamalan, who runs against Ali Abdullah Saleh repressing the JMPs, was from the South. He was humiliated by the GPC and Ali Saleh and was accused of supporting Al-Qaeda. Although many of the Southern people voted for him, he did not reach 30 percent of the votes. Therefore, the hope to have a president from the South was lost. The 2006 presidential election also produced disputes among tribal and political figures in Sana'a, which provided an exploitive opportunity for Al-Hirak.

In terms of mobilization resources, Al-Hirak has the whole South to recruit from, it has great charismatic and symbolic leadership, and it has financial support within and from outside Yemen. Many Southern migrants in the Gulf countries are willing to provide extensive financial support to the movement because they believe in its cause. Al-Hirak has many factions that are indisposed to their fighting and claim the same goal which is to support and free the Southern people from the Northern occupation.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi's social movement is able to frame its ideological and cultural concepts to support its cause, it has the ability to direct religion to support its cause, or at least to work against the religious beliefs in the North and the South that support the reunification. It has exploited socialist and communist ideologies to support its cause and, at the same time, denied any intention to adopt these ideologies if separation is achieved. Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has many motivational aspects to support the cause of the movement. For example, the movement offers many attractions to new recruits, appeals to the sense of duty and honor that each Southerner should fulfill, and promises rewards to those who join the movement and to the Southern people as well.

The Southern political, cultural, and economic grievances along with the narratives Al-Hirak has developed over the last 15 years; the movement's mobilization structure in terms of leadership, financial resources, and recruitment opportunities; the several political opportunities, and many other factors discussed in this research suggest that Al-Hirak Al-Janubi will be a huge success in the near future unless it is addressed and treated immediately.

However, by success, we do not mean that it will achieve its ultimate goal of separation. The movement's success will be contained by the society who values unity as a worshiped principle. The success we mean is a success to challenge the government and survive against its measures that make Al-Hirak a potential enemy for the country and the government itself. The central government and religious figures in the North and South will not accept separation of the county. The president, the prime minister, the minister of defense, and many military and security commanders are from the South, and they do not accept what so-called separatists demand. Therefore, if both sides continue to avoid listening to one another and negotiating in good faith, they will achieve neither true separation nor unity, and the country will be ruined. The real loser will be the simple and poor citizens in Yemen. Furthermore, the security of the region and consequently the world will undoubtedly be affected. This is especially likely if Yemen is exploited by Al-Qaeda who waits for this political opportunity or other regional players who may use Yemen as a proxy to achieve their agenda. Therefore, since all sides will be affected, each side shares the responsibility to get the country out of this dangerous bottleneck.

Yemen's future will be determined by the way the Yemeni government, Yemeni society, and the international community—that favors a stable Yemen—choose to handle the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi social movement. The NDC is struggling to find a way out of the Southern problem. In fact, even all other issues that are discussed in the NDC are hostages of the Southern case. No agreements can be achieved on the new constitution, the type of the new state, transitional justice, or other matters until an agreement is achieved on the Southern case.

The NDC's struggle to find solutions to the Southern people's grievances does not intercede for it among the main factions of Al-Hirak that refused any kind of participation

or recognition of a dialogue that is not between, what they claim, two states. Even the only faction that participates in the NDC (Almutamar al-wattani lisha‘b Al-janub) doubts any real outcome from it.¹⁷⁹ At a time when Al-Hirak supporters are willing to die for separation, unity supporters are willing to die for unity, which makes Al-Hirak Al-Janubi a movement that is very effective, strong, and destructive to itself, the nation’s stability, and regional and international security.¹⁸⁰

The Yemeni government must act immediately to acquire international and regional support to end the cause of the Southern grievances, end corruption, provide the required services, and give the people hope of a future in a united state. Al-Hirak Al-Janubi leadership should act in a way that supports the people of the South but does not destroy the county. They should continue with demands for a new democratic state that supports its people and ends discrimination against any minority, group, or region. They should demand a decentralized government that gives local institutions more power. But they should do so thoughtfully, honestly, and with care.

For the sake of the regional and international stability, the international community has great responsibilities toward the Southern people, the Al-Hirak Al-Janubi movement, and the RoY as a whole. The Arab Spring has proved how Al-Qaeda can exploit a weak central government to build itself and occupy territories. Therefore, the RoY should be economically, administratively, and politically supported. More fighting in Yemen between the government and the Al-Houthies, Al-Hirak Al-Janubi, or any other movement can lead to a dark future, or could challenge the existence of Yemen as a

.179 Mohammed Ali Ahmed, in a message to President Hadi, stated his real concerns about the mechanism of the NDC and that the dialogue in its current state would not address the Southern case. He suggested substantive changes to make the dialogue genuine. One of his suggestions is to transfer the dialogue to a neighboring country and have it between the South and the North instead and without a limit. For more details, see “Mohammed Ali Ahmed Issues Conditions to Move the Dialogue between the North and the South to a Neutral Country Chosen by the Sponsors of the GCC Initiative,” *Al-khabar News* (August 15, 2013), <http://sahafah.net/show1158161.html>.

.180 Jessica T. Mathews, “Foreword,” in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

state.¹⁸¹ The following section will explain in detail what each player could do in order to reach a safe way out of this huge challenge.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To the Yemeni Government

The Yemeni government is one of the few governments that has had extensive experience with opposition movements. Yemen is made of elites and opposition movements represented by tribes, religious figures, and political parties. Al-Hirak is not the first and only movement the government is facing, and it will not be the last. Although the government is benefiting from continued experience with opposition movements, it lacks an overall strategic approach toward them. Part of that is explained by looking at the government's weak and dysfunctional institutions that are occupied and managed by high, middle, and low-level corrupt officials. This is partially why the Yemeni government's approach has been inconsistent and often supports and justifies Al-Hirak's existence. Therefore, there are positives to be continued, negatives to be avoided, and new policies to be implemented in order for the Yemeni government to fulfill its share of the solution.

a. Effective Measures To Be Continued

A presidential resolution has established a committee to investigate Southern land issues, and the return of the retired military and civilians to their jobs, along with other grievances and complaints. The committees, composed of judges and respected people from the South, have received more than 25,000 claims.¹⁸² Once those problems have been resolved, outstanding individuals and leaders from the Southern movement will join the unity government, and the narrative of the separation will be extremely affected.

¹⁸¹ Boucek, "Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral," in *Yemen on the Brink*, ed. Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

¹⁸² "The Primary Evening News," *Yemen TV*, April 19, 2013.

After taking office in 2012, President Hadi established what are called public committees (*Allijan Alshabia*) from the South. Although the main purpose of these committees is fighting Al-Qaeda in Abyen, they are playing a significant role in supporting the unity government next to the military forces. The public committees legitimize the unity government's presence in the South and publicly support Hadi. The government is benefiting from these committees because they are respected fighters and tribesmen who represent a huge part of the South that cannot be ignored. Understanding their weight, Al-Hirak avoids any clashes with those committees. Although the public committees are not participating against Al-Hirak demonstrations or forming any militias to coerce Al-Hirak militias, they are forces in the hand of the Yemeni government that enable the government to use its iron fist when needed with little collateral damage to the relationship with Southern people.

The government is supporting the lesser of two extreme factions, like Mohammed Ali Ahmed, who is participating in the NDC with several Al-Hirak members. However, the moderates are less popular among the Southern people, because they are perceived as traitors. The government tries to support moderate factions by accepting their demands to give them more legitimacy, hoping such efforts will delegitimize the radical factions. Moderate leaders are asked to denounce any extreme act by the extreme factions.

The Yemeni government seems to understand that the more clashes occur between Southern demonstrations and security forces, the more casualties on both sides, the higher the temper, the more extreme Al-Hirak supporters become and the more supporters Al-Hirak gets. Therefore, the Yemeni government is dealing with caution. Although an inaction strategy may give Al-Hirak political and security space to act freely, recruit supporters, and show its strength, which will make any government suppression in the future very difficult, it opens new windows for dialogue with Al-Hirak and legitimizes moderate factions and supporters of unity among Southern people.

The government has initiated new procedures to accept candidates for the Military and Police Academies that ensure a just way of accepting candidates from each

and every governorate.¹⁸³ This practice will work against the Al-Hirak narrative of unjust and little representation in these academies.

b. Practices To Be Avoided

Lack of government measures is a two-edged sword. On one hand, it gives Al-Hirak members some space to release pressure, while on the other, Al-Hirak is showing its strength, and people in the South perceive it as a movement that can stand against the government that is consequently perceived as weak.

The government is mainly relying upon assigning unity supporters to positions in the new administration to secure their support. This technique can only work against insurgencies that are isolated from the population. Besides, those who hold high level positions are claimed to be from the Zumra or from Abyan governorates, which means the Tughma will be motivated to insist on their demands for separation. If true, this is like putting oil on a fire, and will not help solve the problem. Just as Sanhanian brought Saleh down from the throne, Abyanization will bring unity down, and will make the people from the South and the North a symbol of exploitation, instead of a symbol of pride.

Ignorance of current suffering by the Aden governorate and other Southern governorates' people as a result of the absence of electricity is affecting the new government's credibility, and supporting narratives by the separationists. A government that is not able to provide electricity to its people during summer time cannot not do anything else. The people in Aden are threatening to go to the streets and conduct demonstrations, while the government is continuing to close its ears to these demands.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ "Ministry of Defense sets 10 Centers in the Provinces for the Reception of Applicants for Admission to Military Academies," *Yemenat News*, July 14, 2013, <http://www.yemenat.net/video412.html/news37275.html>.

¹⁸⁴ "Sons of Aden Give the Government 48 Hours to Stabilize the Electricity and Threaten to Ignite Streets Outrages," *Yemen Press*, July 14, 2013, <http://sahafah.net/show1129836.html>.

c. Policies That Should Be Implemented

The Yemeni government should ensure, as Craig Cohen states, that they are “confronting impunity of political and criminal elites, resolving disputes peacefully, providing equality before the law, including justice for past grievances, protecting fundamental human, civil, and political rights, especially for women and minorities, [and] creating effective accountability procedures”¹⁸⁵ by enforcing the law on its citizens and treating them equally. All things being equal, to the degree the unity government succeeds in enforcing law and order, to that degree the Yemeni government gains legitimacy.

Limiting the amount of resources flowing to some extreme factions of Al-Hirak Al-Janubi and policing its financing are essential to weaken its movement. As long as money continues to flow, the movement will continue, regardless of the government efforts to address people’s grievances. Currently, the Yemeni government measures to control financial flows are either very weak or absent. The government is very successful in controlling and observing Al-Qaeda money flowing to the country, but not with Al-Hirak. To a certain degree, it has managed to control weapon flows. For example, the government has seized weapons on Aden and Mukha ports, and seized an Iranian ship full of heavy weapons, like anti-aircraft and anti-tanks rockets, believed to be for Al-Hirak.¹⁸⁶

By providing enough information and intelligence to the businessmen who support the movement covertly, the government can indirectly force the businessmen to make decisions they would not do by delaying their imported items (i.e., harassing them with police forces in their stores). The government can trade their freedom of doing business by seizing their support to Al-Hirak. Besides, the government should protect Southern investors and businesses from Al-Hirak Al-Janubi’s harassment and repression to gain their minds and prevent Al-Hirak from exploiting them. So far, Al-Hirak

¹⁸⁵ Craig Cohen, “Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction,” *U.S. Institute of Peace, Stabilization and Reconstruction Series* No. 1 (March, 2006), 9.

¹⁸⁶ The Primary Evening News,” *Yemen TV*, Sana’a, Republic of Yemen, May 29, 2013, <http://www.yemen-tv.net/>.

supporters still enjoy sovereignty and the ability to do business freely because the government is perceived as weak and unable to harass them when Al-Hirak can.

To find a way out of the snag, the Yemeni government should provide enough support to the moderate factions of the movement to enable them to get more supporters on the ground, which will enable them to initiate pro-unity demonstrations. At the same time, it should grant free demonstration legitimacy for any movement overtly, and exert some efforts to control those demonstrations until it limits them to a small corner. It can do that by issuing justified laws to regulate demonstrations and apply them to other demonstrations before it applies them on the Al-Hirak movement demonstrations. For example, Great Britain is famous for channeling and using indirect suppressions when dealing with insurgencies. It negotiates with leaders in the open and hits them very hard under the belt. Channeling can always produce good results when used wisely with less collateral damage; however, channeling is a long-term approach that can sometimes produce little in the short term. Therefore, it is necessary but not sufficient, to defeat social movements.

The government should highlight great events that may reunite the Yemeni people, and give them hope and a common goal to rally around. For example, the government should spend reasonable efforts and money on sports like football. Having a strong football team will give the people hope and a common symbol. By symbolically identifying the team with the nation, football is a significant force in boosting national harmony.¹⁸⁷

However, these are short-term strategies that are definitely needed, but they only work as a partial repair. Partial repairs are ineffective when dealing with this type of problem, because failure risks the security and existence of the whole country. Long-term and consistent strategies should work side by side with short-term ones to enable unity supporters in the South to speak publicly in favor of a united Yemen. The support should be justified by not only their links to officials and Shaikhs but also by the actions and policies the Yemeni government has implemented.

¹⁸⁷ Stevenson and Alaug, "Football in Newly United Yemen."

Therefore, the government has to ensure its messages have reached the poor, uneducated and tribal people, high, middle and lower classes. Words and speeches are not enough, though; actions should talk in this case. The Yemeni government should provide services in equal scale for all people in all areas with more focus on severely non-serviced areas. People in Yemen, especially in the South, need to see changes in the government tactics and the way it does business in order to change the bad picture they have developed over the last 20 years.

Finally, the solution for Aden's problems is still in Sana'a. Before taking any actions toward or against Al-Hirak or any other rebellion group, the government should treat its long-term disease. The government or, we can say now, leaders, who need to write their names in history, should act immediately to reform the government public administration, reform military services, and limit corruption. As long as the government is infected with corrupting disease, lacks the public administration, and is unable to provide expected services, it will be perceived as illegitimate and will be a potential Faid for Al-Hirak and other existing and potential opposition groups.

2. To Al-Hirak and Al-Janubi

Currently, Al-Hirak is a hostage of its leaders' "flat view" when it seeks solutions to Southern problems. It failed to adjust its policies, activities, and demands with the changing national and international situations. It is led by old figures who have great experience but a history of sacrificing their peoples' welfare for their own pride. Therefore, Al-Hirak leaders, supporters, and sympathizers should understand that unity is not the cause of what Southerners suffer nor is separation the solution to those problems. Therefore, a new course of action should be implemented, and all solutions should be considered. Al-Hirak should aim for the ultimate goal and not divert its efforts toward one of the means.

Al-Hirak al-Janubi's factions have initiated reconciliation and tolerance conferences (*mutamar altusaleh wattusameh*) among all Southern people which, if implemented correctly, will put an end to the Stoke sectarian strife between the people in the South. This initiative should be implemented, not only for the Southern people but for

all Yemenis. Al-Hirak cannot ask Southern people to forget and forgive and, at the same time, call for retaliation against their brothers from the North. The movement will be more legitimate by being consistent in its demands to its supporters.

Al-Hirak Al-Janubi has opened the Yemeni government, the international community, and most importantly, the Yemeni society's eyes to Southern grievances. If not for Al-Hirak, the Southern case would have no ears listening to it, or at least would not have the same amount of attention it has today. However, Al-Hirak has to be realistic about the future of the country if it is divided. Neither the North nor the South will survive if separation happens. Other solutions to the problem should be reasonably looked at to end grievances without destroying the country.

Factions of Al-Hirak know how difficult it is to unify the movement. This indicates the future of the South if separation occurs. The movement cannot ask for separation on the one hand and unity among its people on the other. Having a president and many officials from the South could be exploited by the Al-Hirak movement to obtain its people's rights and be a source for a greater country instead of a tool to destroy it. Al-Hirak Al-Janubi leaders should stop fighting each other and accusing their brothers who disagree with them about the means or the ends by being traitors. Freedom should be ensured for all Southerners and Northerners to speak freely against or for unity.

Violence, although it is minimal, can affect the cause of the movement and make it easy for the internal and external enemies of Yemen to use it against the movement. Repression and violence should be stopped for the sake of the movement to get the benefits of its members' sacrifices.

"History has no mercy," to my knowledge, is a true statement. Individuals who call for separation will be looked at as traitors by future generations, especially when Al-Hirak fails, as is highly likely, to unify the country and fulfill its promises to the Southern people. The Southern people were very active in their call for unity and led to it. They have made many compromises to ensure the reunification of the country. Therefore, they will not forgive those who participated in or supported a harmonious country.

Finally, the NDC is a golden opportunity for all Yemenis to lift the country out of the quagmire and establish a modern democratic state that respects human rights, and is based on a separation of authorities and a decentralized system. The NDC is the way to make the impossible possible. Instead of marginalizing itself, Al-Hirak can benefit from it. The Northern people have understood the Southern problem, have surrendered the presidency, along with high government civilian and military posts, and are willing to do more to save the main principle that is not only theirs, but also belongs to the Southern people as well. Al-Hirak leaders can participate in the new administration and end the grievances from within the system, which will make Al-Hirak a bright spot in the Yemeni history. It will achieve its principles with less cost, and without sacrificing the main principle that their ancestors fought for.

3. To the International Community

The world is one small village. Due to the globalization of modern technology, advanced communications, and international trade, international member states are more dependent and more easily affected by other states' problems. Political leaders, academics, and intellectuals can no longer ignore the disasters or failures of other states because those will affect them as well. In the world that we live in today, anybody's problem is everybody's problem. As Ashraf Ghani has stated, "The rapid pace of globalization and technological change mean that instability, insecurity and terror are now more easily exported than ever before."¹⁸⁸

If left alone, Yemen is a potentially failed state. It has very few resources, a poor education system, and corrupt public administration that are faced with overwhelming, chronic, and complicated political, economic, and social challenges. Therefore, there are benefits and interests, along with moral and ethical responsibilities, behind international support for the RoY. The international community, especially the developed countries and international governmental and non- governmental organizations, are morally responsible for supporting the economic health and, more importantly, security and stability of the RoY.

¹⁸⁸ Ashraf Ghani, "Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State-Building," *Overseas Development Group, Working Paper 253*, September 2005, 1–20.

The regional support represented by the GCC and regional powers is an excellent example of a beneficial and positive intervention by neighboring countries to ensure the security and stability of Yemen. The GCC initiative has saved Yemen from falling into unlimited and unknown problems. The U.S., Europe, Russia, and China have agreed on the importance of the stability of Yemen. Unity was mentioned in almost each resolution issued by regional and global powers, as well as the Security Council. The Security Council has provided extensive support during the transition period and to the interim president Hadi in his decision.

The support of the NDC with finance and expertise is appreciated. It helps lead the country to a future with some light, instead of the darkness it was moving toward. The Security Council and the SG Representative, Mr. Jamal Ben Umar, have visited Yemen more than 22 times during and after the dialogue, and have achieved significant results by convincing many factions and local powers to accept dialogue, including some factions of Al-Hirak.

The international committee has arranged for two conferences to support Yemen financially, which will result in support of development programs with almost 4 billion USD. Represented by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the UN has provided support to the transitional presidential election, and continues to provide the government with experts to help fight corruption and support improving public administration.

The road ahead is still very bumpy. A strong economy is needed for stability success, and is very dependent on the security situation. Natsios states that “development cannot effectively take place without the security that armed forces provide. And security cannot ultimately occur until the local population views the promise of development as an alternative to violence.”¹⁸⁹

The international community, while encouraging the Yemeni government to respect human rights, opens more political space for expression and establishes more

¹⁸⁹ Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” *Parameters* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 6.

reforms, making it clear that separation is not encouraged and is not negotiable. By supporting unity, the international community closes many doors for potential and expected problems. However, this does not mean, in any way, that the international community should support the aggressive or unjust acts by the government against Al-Hirak activists. It means only diverting the direction of Al-Hirak from looking at the means (separation), toward the achievement of the end (an honored and equal life and a modern state).

APPENDIX. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE COMMITTEES ON LAND ISSUES AND FORCED RETIREMENT IN THE SOUTH

President Hadi has issued a decision to establish committees of land issues and forced retirement of military officers and civilian employees. The committee consists of judges who are mainly from the Southern part of the country.

نص قرار الرئيس هادي بإنشاء لجنتي قضايا الأراضي والمبشرين بالجنوب



التفاصيل
تاريخ النشر: 09 كانون 2/يناير 2013



وار برس - متابعات

صدر أمس قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم (2) لسنة 2013م بإنشاء وتشكيل لجنتين لمعالجة قضايا الأراضي والموظفين المبشرين عن وظائفهم في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري بالمحافظات الجنوبية.

فيما يلي نصه:

رئيس الجمهورية:

بعد الاطلاع على دستور الجمهورية اليمنية

وعلى مبادرة مجلس التعاون الخليجي وآلياتها التنفيذية الموقعتين بتاريخ 2011/11/23م.

وحرصاً على معالجة القضايا المتعلقة بالأراضي والموظفين في المحافظات الجنوبية وفي سبيل إنجاز الحوار الوطني والمصالحة الوطنية ونظراً لما تقتضيه المصلحة العامة.

قرر

مادة (1) تنشأ بموجب هذا القرار لجنتان على النحو الآتي:

أ: لجنة نظر ومعالجة قضايا الأراضي، وتشكل من الإخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

1-القاضي/ صالح ناصر طاهر قاسم

2- القاضي/ علي عطبوش عوض محمد

3- القاضي/ داوود عبده أحمد المعشري

4- القاضي/ محمد عمر باشيب

5-القاضي/ يحيى محمد عبدالله الإرياني.

ب: لجنة معالجة قضايا الموظفين المبعدين عن وظائفهم في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري، وتشكل من الإخوة التالية أسماؤهم:

1-العقيد/ حسين عبدربه صالح عبدان 2-الرائد/ خالد محسن العكيمي

3- العميد/ سالم عبدالله العطاس 4- القاضي/ سهل محمد حمزة

5-القاضي/ علوي عبدالله قاسم الأديمي 6- العميد/ علي عبيد صالح

7- القاضي/ علي عوض بن هامل 8- القاضي/ ناصر علي عبده علاو

مادة (2) تعمل اللجنتان في ضوء الأسس الآتية:

أ: الالتزام بالتجرد والاستقلالية والموضوعية وإعلاء المصلحة الوطنية العليا عند ممارستهما لمهامهما.

ب: عدم النظر في القضايا التي تم معالجتها من قبل أو صدرت بشأنها أحكام قضائية باتة.

ج: يكون نطاق عمل اللجنتين الادعاءات بالانتهاكات التي وقعت على العقارات والأراضي العامة والخاصة أو على العاملين في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري للفترة من 1990م حتى صدور هذا القرار.

د: الاستعانة والاستفادة من أعمال اللجان السابقة على صدور هذا القرار ونتائج ما توصلت إليه تلك اللجان لضمان عدم تكرار المعالجات.

هـ: علانية وشفافية إجراءاتهما وقراراتهما وإتاحتها للكافة عبر مختلف الوسائل الإعلامية المتاحة.

مادة (3) تتولى كل لجنة – وفق الاختصاص المحدد لها في تسميتها – ممارسة المهام الآتية:

أ: بحث الادعاءات بالانتهاكات المشمولة في نطاق اختصاصها بناءً على شكاوى وبلاغات من المتضررين وإجراء تحقيقات مستقلة وشفافة بشأنها والتأكد من وثائق جميع الأطراف والاستماع لكافة الأطراف بشكل عادل للوصول إلى الحقيقة التي تمكنها من إصدار قرارها العادل والقانوني المبني على أسس وحيثيات جوهرية وسليمة.

ب: تقديم المقترحات والمعالجات العادلة والقانونية وتقدير التعويضات المناسبة ورفعها إلى رئيس الجمهورية بتقارير ربع سنوية ليتولى إحالتها إلى الحكومة للتنفيذ.

ج: وضع وإعلان آليات عملها بصورة تكفل سهولة التلقي وسرعة التنفيذ.

د: تقديم تقرير تفصيلي إلى رئيس الجمهورية في نهاية عملها يتضمن نتائج أعمالها وتوصياتها ومقترحاتها الكفيلة بعدم تكرار مثل تلك الانتهاكات مستقبلاً.

هـ: اتخاذ الإجراءات القانونية اللازمة لتنفيذ مهامها واختصاصاتها بالتنسيق مع الجهات المختصة.

مادة (4) لأغراض تنفيذ اللجنتين لمهامهما، يكون لهما السلطات الآتية:

أ: استدعاء الشهود وأي طرف يكون حضوره مهماً والاستعانة بالسلطات المختصة عند الحاجة.

ب: النزول إلى كافة الأماكن المدعى بوقوع انتهاكات فيها -وفقاً لما تقررره اللجنة المعنية- وعلى جميع السلطات بما فيها السلطات المحلية تسهيل مهامهما.

ج: الاستعانة بالخبراء المختصين والفنيين للاستفادة منهم في تنفيذ مهامهما.

د: طلب أية وثائق أو مستندات أو تقارير أو بيانات تتطلبها أعمالهما.

هـ: الاستعانة بموظفين حكوميين للعمل تحت إدارتهما على سبيل الالتماس.

مادة (5) تضع كل لجنة لائحة تنظم اجتماعاتها وآلية اتخاذ قراراتها وتعلنها.

مادة (6) على لجنة نظر ومعالجة قضايا الأراضي مراعاة الآتي:

أ: إعطاء الاهتمام والأسبقية في نظر وحل القضايا للحالات التالية:

- الأراضي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد بحجة الاستثمار وثبت استغلالهم لها لغير الوجه الذي صرفت من أجله.

- الأراضي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد بمساحة تتجاوز ما يحتاجه الفرد لبناء مسكن شخصي له.

- الأراضي المصروفة من الدولة للأفراد مدنيين وعسكريين كتعويض ولم يمكنوا منها.

- أراضي الجمعيات السكنية التي تعرضت للانتهاكات.

- الأراضي المشتراه بحسن نية أو عبر الصرف المزدوج من أكثر من جهة أو محافظة.

- السكن غير الشرعي في بعض العقارات.

- الأراضي التي بنظام التأجير في عدن بحيث تؤول ملكيتها إلى ملاك المساكن مع إلغاء نظام التأجير القديم المطبق في عدن منذ عهد الاستعمار.

- استعادة الأراضي الزراعية التي استصلحتها الدولة وتم توزيعها بعد حرب 1994م.

ب: معالجة وإزالة أي بسط على أراضي الدولة من أي شخص طبيعي أو اعتباري خاص أو ادعاء الملكية بوثائق مزورة أو عبر وثائق أخرى معتمدة من جهات رسمية غير مخولة بهذا الحق أو سبق للمحكمة إلغاء تعميدها أو توثيقها لهذه الأراضي مع معالجة أي آثار قانونية ترتبت على ذلك وبطريقة عادلة.

ج: مراجعة ما تم صرفه من الأراضي لأغراض الاستثمار أو الزراعة أو السكن من قبل الجهات الرسمية المقدم بشأنها ادعاءات أو شكاوى وعلى وجه الخصوص هيئة الأراضي أو إدارة المساحة العسكرية أو مكاتب الأوقاف أو مكاتب وزارة الزراعة، وتوثيقه عبر هيئة الأراضي فقط مع مراعاة المراكز القانونية المستقرة للمشاريع الاستثمارية والسكنية والزراعية التي أقيمت على تلك الأراضي.

مادة (7) على لجنة معالجة قضايا الموظفين المبعدين عن وظائفهم في المجال المدني والأمني والعسكري مراعاة الآتي:

أ: من أحيلوا إلى التقاعد قبل نهاية مدتهم القانونية يتم معالجة أوضاعهم على النحو التالي:

1: تطبق عليهم استراتيجية الأجور والمرتبات.

2: يتم إعادتهم إلى جهات أعمالهم إذا لم يكونوا قد بلغوا أحد أجلي التقاعد.

3: يمنحوا كافة الحقوق القانونية من ترفيع أو ترقية.

4: تحتسب لهم فترة التقاعد القسري لأغراض الترقية والترفيع والمرتبات.

ب: من أحيلوا إلى التقاعد بحلول أحد الأجلين يتم معالجة أوضاعهم على النحو التالي:

1: تطبق عليهم استراتيجية الأجور والمرتبات إذا كانت الإحالة قد تمت ما قبل الاستراتيجية وما بعدها ولم تطبق عليهم.

2: يتم تسوية أوضاعهم التقاعدية وفقاً للدرجات والرتب التي كانوا يستحقونها قانوناً عند الإحالة إلى التقاعد.

3: يتم منحهم كافة الترفيعات والترقيات والقانونية والحقوق المكتسبة التي تم إسقاطها عنهم.

ج: معالجة أوضاع الموظفين والعاملين في الوحدات التي تم خصصتها ولم تعالج أوضاعهم حتى الآن، وبما يكفل منحهم كافة الحقوق والتعويضات وفقاً لقرارات مجلس الوزراء الصادرة بشأنهم والعقود الموقعة مع من آلت إليهم تلك الوحدات.

وفي جميع الأحوال، لا تحول هذه المعالجات دون تمتع المشمولين بهذه المادة بأية حقوق أو امتيازات مقررة في التشريعات النافذة.

مادة (8) على الحكومة السعي للحصول على المساعدة والدعم الدوليين لتمويل التسويات والتعويضات المقررة بموجب هذا القرار كما يقع عليها توفير الموازنة التشغيلية للجننتين.

مادة (9) على اللجنتين الانتهاء من أعمالهما خلال فترة لا تتجاوز سنة واحدة من تاريخ نفاذ هذا القرار.

مادة (10) يُعمل بهذا القرار من تاريخ صدوره وينشر في الجريدة الرسمية.

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية بصنعاء

بتاريخ : 26 / صفر / 1434 هـ

الموافق: 8 /يناير/ 2013م

عبدربه منصور هادي

رئيس الجمهورية

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