

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Autumn 2007

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Cover

The Kongo-class guided-missile destroyer JDS Chokai (DDF 176) of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force alongside USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) on 10 December 2002. The scene is evocative of one of the many levels at which the “thousand-ship navy,” examined in detail in this issue by Ronald E. Ratcliff and Derek S. Reveron, would operate—and in a real sense already does. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Bo Flannigan.

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FROM THE EDITORS

We open this issue with a timely meditation by the distinguished political scientist George Quester on the past history of preemptive or preventive military action by the great powers, beginning with the little-remembered British naval assault on the city of Copenhagen in 1807, spurred by a fear that Great Britain might shortly face a combined Franco-Danish fleet that would pose an intolerable threat to its control of the seas in the ongoing global struggle with Napoleon. As the United States continues to assess its past and future strategies in the greater Middle East, it is well to ponder carefully the lessons of this history.

This issue also features another round of contributions to the current debate over the new maritime strategy under development within the U.S. Navy. The distinguished British naval analyst and historian Geoffrey Till provides a thoughtful perspective from the other side of the Atlantic (a version of this paper was delivered at the Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum in June 2007). The Navy, it may be added, has actively solicited the views of naval strategists and thinkers from around the world on the future direction of American naval policy, making clear in the process that maritime security cooperation will play a considerably more central role for the Navy and the nation in that policy than has been the case in the past. (A volume including papers from naval officers throughout the Americas will be published by the Naval War College Press in early 2008.) The third article, by Professor Ronald E. Ratcliffe of the Naval War College faculty, expounds further on this theme, providing a critical analysis of the concept of the "thousand-ship navy" as originally formulated by outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Mullen. Ratcliffe makes some useful recommendations as to how this concept can be operationalized and incorporated in the emerging maritime strategy. Professor Ratcliffe's article will be appearing shortly as well in Newport Paper 29, *Shaping the Security Environment*, edited by Derek S. Reveron.

The U.S. Navy is facing a budgetary situation that can only be described as dire and growing more so in view of the enormous financial burdens levied on the American military by the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This raises a series of questions concerning the future size and structure of U.S. naval forces, questions that bear directly on the maritime strategy options the Navy will have

available to it in the coming decades. Robert J. White, in his article “Globalization of Navy Shipbuilding: A Key to Affordability for a New Maritime Strategy,” makes a powerful case that it is time for the Navy to give serious consideration to developing partnering arrangements with offshore shipbuilding nations and firms as the only way to reduce significantly the costs of new ship construction. Finally, we also include under our maritime strategy rubric a document that, though something of a departure from our normal article format, should be of considerable interest in this regard. This is a report, prepared by Craig H. Allen, outgoing Stockton Professor at the Naval War College, on the results of a workshop of legal experts from around the world, held in Newport 31 October–1 November 2006, on the future global legal order. The tenor of this report may surprise some who are inclined to take for granted the stability of that order.

ASIA EYES AMERICA

Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-first Century, edited by Jonathan D. Pollack, is now available for sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office, through its online bookstore at bookstore.gpo.gov/. This third book in our Policy Studies Series extends the East Asia focus of the first two volumes, *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century* and *Korea: The East Asian Pivot*, also edited by Dr. Pollack. A highly distinguished assemblage of international scholars and analysts presented these papers at the Naval War College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of 4–5 May 2006. They examine a contemporary Asia marked by increased competence, confidence, and resilience, and in which the U.S. role is a major variable. This book is a groundbreaking contribution to the study of the contemporary Asia-Pacific and to the wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy and policy.

WINNERS OF OUR ANNUAL ARTICLE PRIZES

The President of the Naval War College has awarded prizes to the winners of the annual Hugh G. Nott and Edward S. Miller competitions for articles appearing in the *Naval War College Review*.

The Nott Prize, established in the early 1980s, is given to the authors of the best articles (less those considered for the Miller Prize) in the *Review* in the previous publishing year. Cash awards are funded through the generosity of the Naval War College Foundation.

- First place: Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Dilemma,” Autumn 2006 (\$1,000)
- Second place: Jane G. Dalton, “Future Navies—Present Issues,” Winter 2006 (\$650)

- Third place: Commander Joel A. Doolin, JAGC, USN, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” Spring 2006 (\$350)
- Honorable Mention: Robert C. Rubel, “The Epistemology of War Gaming,” Spring 2006.

The Miller Prize was founded in 1992 by the historian Edward S. Miller for the author of the best historical article appearing in the *Review* in the same period. This year’s winner is Lieutenant Colonel Angelo N. Caravaggio, Canadian Forces, for “The Attack at Taranto: Tactical Success, Operational Failure,” Summer 2006 (\$500).

TWO NEWPORT PAPERS: COMING THIS FALL

Two major Newport Paper monographs now in preparation appear this fall, by mail to subscribers (contact the editorial office if you’d like to become one) and online. In *Shaping the Security Environment*, Newport Paper 29, editor and contributor Derek S. Reveron of the Naval War College faculty declares, “The question . . . is not whether the military should be engaged in . . . shaping”—diplomacy, security cooperation, and strategic communications in furtherance of regional stability—but “how these operations should be structured to ensure unified action and what new capabilities are necessary to perform these missions efficiently.” Papers by six scholars and practitioners examine this vital concept from a variety of perspectives.

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30, will be the third of a series in which Dr. John B. Hattendorf, the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, is documenting the history of U.S. naval strategic thinking in recent decades. It will provide the key capstone documents for U.S. naval strategy in that decade. These documents are described in Professor Hattendorf’s Newport Paper 19, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986*, and were the predecessors of the documents that he published in Newport Paper 27, *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents*. A collection of selected documents of the 1980s is in preparation.

TO OUR INTERNATIONAL READERS

Sharp increases in the cost of international mailing oblige us to consider less expensive ways of serving our international readers. Our present plan is, beginning with the Winter 2008 issue, to mail the *Review* outside the United States in print form only to institutional subscribers (libraries, etc.), supplying it to individual readers, whether subscribers or requesters, on CD-ROM. Exceptions will be considered:

individual subscribers who cannot, for whatever reason, read the journal in CD format are invited to contact the Press editorial office. The same policy will apply to our Newport Paper monographs. Readers within the United States are not affected in either case.

ERRATUM

Due to an editorial error, the biographical note (page 16) of Professor George Baer's article in our Spring 2007 issue misstated the title of his 1994 book, which should be *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy 1890–1990*.





Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master's degrees in public administration (finance) from Harvard and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency "E" for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of staff of the Navy's Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission area. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.

PRESIDENT'S FORUM



Our Citizen-Sailors and Professional Military Education

OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq moved downrange, it became increasingly clear that the level of effort, personnel requirements, and operational tempo demanded of the nation's reserve forces exceeded their capacity and flexibility under the old paradigm of reinforcing, sustaining, or augmenting active-component commands through units drilling at traditional reserve centers. With these war efforts, as well as in support of the Defense Department's homeland defense and homeland security missions, reserve employment moved from simple reinforcement and augmentation to (in some cases) the primary role. For example, senior reserve officers serving as Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers across the country have the lead in planning and executing the Navy's role in the vital homeland security mission of supporting civil authorities in disaster response. In several operating areas around the world, reserve units and individual augmentees provide vital mission support in such areas as cargo handling, construction, medical services, physical security and force protection, intelligence, and supply.

Our reserves also play a lynchpin role in providing expertise to major command staffs. Reserve personnel are fully integrated into the command and control structure of our regional combatant commanders throughout the world. For homeland defense and security, reserves are integrated into the U.S. Northern Command staff structure and at all levels of the Navy hierarchy from the squadron level up. For example, the U.S. Fleet Forces Command is supported by four reserve joint task force units that provide watch standing and surge augmentation. Additionally, in direct support of operational requirements, reserve personnel serve on battle watch staffs and in key command and control roles for joint commanders of air, land, and maritime staffs. Without the expertise that

resides in our reserve forces, much of which is achieved on long-term mobilizations and deployment, the Navy would find it difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish all its operational missions.

Our nation has long relied on its citizen-soldiers and -sailors—whether called militia, volunteers, or reservists—in times of crisis. Today’s demands for capacity and expertise have increased this reliance and forced the retirement of the stereotypical reserve model, now viewed as a Cold War relic. Reservists are deployed around the world, working and fighting side by side with, and virtually indistinguishable from, active-component members. Since 11 September 2001 over six hundred thousand Guardsmen and reservists have been mobilized in support of operations around the globe, and over ninety-five thousand are currently on active duty. The Navy Reserve has mobilized over forty-four thousand personnel since 9/11 in direct support of global war on terror missions; over twenty thousand are on active duty today.

The result of this steadily increasing reliance on our reservists is that today men and women serve with the expectation of being recalled to active duty for up to twelve months during any five-year period. Moreover, these sailors are expected to “hit the deck running” and integrate themselves seamlessly into functioning organizations as they fill what were formerly active-component billets. One of the great challenges facing the Navy is training and educating these reservists so that they can meet that expectation when recalled to active duty. Operational- and strategic-level leaders need to be educated not only in the particulars of specific designators or rates but also in the broader aspects of national security, national defense, Navy, joint, and coalition operations—and they must be strategically minded and capable of critical thinking. As for their active-component counterparts, broadly based education is vital for reserve personnel if they are to function effectively in the challenging and constantly changing arenas of joint and coalition operations.

Accordingly, during the summer of 2003 the College began comprehensive planning and coordination with the Chief of the Navy Reserve (CNR) to identify ways in which existing College programs could be bolstered to meet increased student demand and shaped to fit the unique requirements of our citizen-sailors. The result of this collaboration was the implementation of a range of initiatives over the past three years.

- CNR has established regularly scheduled selection boards for all Naval War College programs to ensure that reserve officers who are best positioned to leverage additional professional military education are afforded those opportunities through the College.

- The CD-ROM Program, designed for students who do not have easy access to online systems or to seminars, is particularly supportive of reserve participation. The College has expanded eligibility to the program for reserve officers.
- The College's existing two-week Reserve Officer Courses have been completely restructured, abandoning the stand-alone, two-week national security overview model in favor of courses that are fully integrated with accredited programs. This provides our reserve leaders with an intense in-residence opportunity, which serves as a foundation for the College's comprehensive distance-education programs.
- In 2005, the Naval War College tripled the quotas for reserve officers in the Web-enabled, CD-ROM, and Fleet Seminar programs, and in 2006 it added two hundred seats for reservists in the Web-enabled and CD-ROM programs.
- Reserve officers have been given the same priority as active-duty officers for selection for and placement into the Fleet Seminar Program. In 2005, a new Fleet Seminar Program was added at Joint Air Reserve Base, Fort Worth, Texas, specifically to target the large Navy Reserve population in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. Based on the results of this initiative, the College is exploring other reserve force concentration areas, such as Atlanta, Miami, and Denver, to expand further the Fleet Seminar Program.

At the same time that the College was looking for ways to educate our reservists more effectively and comprehensively, our reserves were developing innovative ways to support the College's rapidly expanding mission set. The Naval War College has three fully integrated reserve units that support the College missions: the Public Affairs Unit, the Navy Reserve Law Unit, and the Support Unit.

The Public Affairs Unit directly supports both the intermediate- and the senior-level resident curricula through realistic media training during Capstone War Games. Reservists bring their considerable civilian career expertise as professional media, public relations professionals, government officials, business leaders, and teachers to bear as they play the role of stereotypical “relentless, inquisitive, and sometimes hostile” media.

The College's Navy Reserve Law Unit supports two vital areas of the College: the International Law Department and the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. This unit participates in all operational law (OPLAW) activities, including teaching, research, international engagement, publication, and conference support. Some of the current high-priority OPLAW research projects are developing rules of engagement (ROE) and maritime operational zones databases and a

new multinational ROE manual. Several unit members have been actively engaged with the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy. In 2006, in recognition of the Law Unit's superlative performance, the College received the Rear Admiral Hugh H. Howell, Jr., Award of Excellence. This is the highest Reserve Law Program award; only four active duty-supported commands nationwide received it during 2006.

The Naval War College's Support Unit, comprising roughly thirty reserve personnel, works across the full range of the College's activities, including war gaming, education, and direct support to operational commanders. The support unit is fully integrated with the War Gaming Department for such major academic events as flag-level courses for senior joint commanders (see my "President's Forum" in the Winter 2006 *Review*), the Secretary of the Navy's Current Strategy Forum, and the Chief of Naval Operations' International Seapower Symposium.

Reserve members of the Newport Office of Naval Intelligence Detachment, while not organizationally assigned to the College, are colocated with it to provide critical intelligence support to war gaming, analysis, and research. The depth of expertise that this unit offers increases the level of realism in virtually every analysis, conference, and workshop.

The recent requirement levied upon the Naval War College to manage the content for both the officer and enlisted Professional Military Education (PME) Continuums represented a huge task that the College was not initially resourced to accomplish within the mandated timeline. (On this project see the Spring 2006 "President's Forum." The Navy's PME Continuum provides a succession of educational opportunities designed to prepare each individual for challenges at the tactical, operational, and then strategic levels of war. It is designed primarily to develop logic, reasoning, and analysis and to broaden each sailor's perspective to prepare him or her for increasingly complex duties. The key elements are leadership, professionalism, military studies, including naval and joint warfare, and national, maritime, and global security.) Thankfully, the reservists were there to meet the call. Reserves represent the core effort behind initial course planning, management, curriculum development, and fielding of the online Primary Level course. Also, over 75 percent of the manpower currently assigned to development and deployment of a new Enlisted PME course is being provided by Navy Reserve personnel.

Reservists have provided a critical adjunct to the Naval War College's manpower needs, assisted with continuity, and provided much of the expertise needed to establish these new initiatives. I know of no other organization in the U.S. Navy that relies more upon the integrated support provided by its reserve units than the College.

Reservists allow the Naval War College to “answer all bells.” The College, in turn, continues to provide its reservists professional education programs and opportunities they need for the challenges that fall increasingly on their shoulders.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jake Shuford". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "J".

J. L. SHUFORD

*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College*

Dr. Quester is a professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. He has also taught at Cornell and Harvard universities, the University of California at Los Angeles, the National War College, and the U.S. Naval Academy. He earned his doctorate in political science at Harvard University. His many books include *Offense and Defense in the International System (reissued 2003)*, *Before and After the Cold War: Using Past Forecasts to Predict the Future (2002)*, *Nuclear Monopoly (2000)*, *The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (1995)*, *Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India: Stable Deterrent or Proliferation Challenge? (1992)*, *Deterrence before Hiroshima (1986)*, *and Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-five Years (1970)*.

TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF PREEMPTION

George H. Quester

The world could this year be celebrating the two-hundredth anniversary of what came to be known as “Copenhagening.” In August 1807, a British fleet for the *second* time confronted the Danish government at Copenhagen with an ultimatum that the possibility of the Danish fleet falling under the control of Napoleon could not be tolerated. Just as before the 1801 attack under the command of Admiral Horatio Nelson, the Danes were given the choice of surrendering their fleet to British control or of doing battle. The Danes resisted in 1807 as in 1801, with the result that the bulk of their fleet was destroyed (along with perhaps 30 percent of the city of Copenhagen itself), but the important result for Britain was that Napoleon was once more precluded from mustering a naval threat.¹

The British rocket-firing and mortar ships that were used in the attack on Copenhagen were to see action again in the 1814 British attack on Baltimore during the War of 1812, in “the rocket’s red glare, the bombs bursting in air.” (One wonders whether anyone between 2007 and 2014 will now be exploring a special “sister city” celebration between Copenhagen and Baltimore.)

The threat headed off by British preemption is all too analogous, of course, to the threat posed since September 2001 by the possibility of mass-destruction terrorism against the U.S. homeland. Since such terrorists cannot be deterred by the prospect of retaliation, and since defenses against such attacks will always be imperfect, the lives of millions of Americans will be at stake. Whatever the wisdom or folly of the particular American “preemptive” attack on Iraq, future American presidents will have to be willing to consider striking first to preempt an attack on American cities.

The Bush administration has been criticized for blurring the distinction between “preemption” and preventive war. There are many ways to draw this distinction, but our intuition may often fall back upon the question of whether war is imminent and inevitable (whereupon we might be less morally critical of the initiative taken and label it “preemption”) or whether peace might instead have been an option for longer (with a morally condemnable “preventive war” initiated simply because the power relationships were being changed). In defense of any leader making such choices, however, it must be noted that “worst-case analysis” may often make an adversary’s attack seem inevitable, once the conditions for such an attack are right, so that actions to head off the attack will always seem like “preemption.”

As our model from the past, the threat the Royal Navy preempted at Copenhagen was existential, a threat to the very safety of Britain itself. If Napoleon or anyone else had ever been able to assemble naval superiority in the English Channel, the independence and liberties of Englishmen would have been at an end. The memories of the two preemptive attacks on Denmark were to be en-

“Preemption” and “anticipatory self-defense” came to draw moral disapproval as a result of World War I.

shrined for a century thereafter in periodic references, in Britain and among Britain’s prospective adversaries, to the option of another “Copenhagening” attack, striking first against any challenger to

British naval supremacy. Such threats were fairly openly voiced in Britain in the first decade of the twentieth century, by First Sea Lord Sir John (“Jackie”) Fisher and many others, against imperial Germany, after the kaiser elected to build a fleet rivaling Britain’s.²

Before London’s attention shifted to Germany, the same prospects and threats were discussed almost as openly against France, always a threat and rival in British eyes.³ Around the time of disputes with Washington about the British Guiana–Venezuela border and about Central America, such threats were also voiced vis-à-vis the United States (at a time when Britain had some forty battleships and the United States had three but was planning to build more).⁴ One can indeed find earlier references in congressional debates on naval expansion, where opponents of such expansion voiced fear that it would merely lead to a British “Copenhagening” attack on the United States.⁵

If the British threat was intended to keep imperial Germany or later the United States from expanding their fleets, it did not succeed in the end. Yet the threat of such preemption or preventive war was never seen as an entirely idle threat by prospective adversary states. Nelson and his successors had, after all,

proved that Britain was willing to act first militarily where its very existence was threatened.

As a real illustration of the same kind of reasoning in one British confrontation with the United States we must note the British attack on the Niagara River in 1837 against the *Caroline*.⁶ The attacked vessel was quite rightly suspected of being utilized to help the Canadian rebels against British authority in southern Ontario. Rather than waiting for another shipload of weapons to come across the river to aid the rebels, a British naval raiding party preemptively sailed over to the American side, seized the ship, in the process killing a number of people, and then sent the burning vessel crashing over Niagara Falls.

The American protests over this mini-repetition of the Copenhagen experience included an 1841 note from Secretary of State Daniel Webster that has become remembered as the “*Caroline* doctrine.” Perhaps the most significant U.S. citation in today’s international law, the doctrine seeks to place stringent limits on what any power can inflict as a preemptive act, stressing that the attack being preempted must be *very* imminent and that the preemptive action has to be proportional to the attack being headed off.⁷ It is more than a little ironic that this doctrine, the major American contribution to international law, is now regularly being challenged and minimized by American legal scholars associated with the Bush administration.⁸

If one wants another illustration of the logic of “Copenhagening,” one can move forward to the decisions made by Winston Churchill in 1940 immediately after the Germans had reached Paris and won a French surrender. Churchill, of course, knew what “Copenhagening” meant, having been a close associate of Jackie Fisher in the years of the German-British naval race before World War I. Rather than live with the risk that the French fleet might fall under Hitler’s control, Churchill dispatched British ships to several French ports in North Africa with an ultimatum very similar to what had been given to the Danes, except that the French were given *three* choices, rather than merely two. They could put their naval vessels under British control; or they could sail their ships across the Atlantic and station them in Martinique and Guadeloupe, in effect under American surveillance; or they could do battle with the British. The French chose to do battle, with the result that several French warships were sunk and some 1,300 French naval personnel lost their lives.⁹

Churchill chose not to label this engagement with the French with the phrase “Copenhagening,” for this might hardly have endeared him to the Danes, who had just been subjected to the Nazi occupation, or to the Americans, or to the few other neutrals left in the world. Most Americans were indeed relieved by the British attack, as a sign that Britain under Churchill was not prepared to come to terms with Hitler’s Nazi Germany but would fight on.

But the imminence of preemptive motives as World War II evolved is hardly limited to the British naval tradition. One important theme of this article will be that preemption may indeed have been somewhat legitimized by all the experiences of 1939 to 1941 in other places, as the unfolding of the new war substantially eroded the worldview that liberals around the world had endorsed in 1918.

The dominant theme of world opinion in 1918, as embodied in Woodrow Wilson's designs for the League of Nations, was that "anticipatory self-defense" was a major part of the problem for international relations, causing wars to occur that perhaps neither side had wanted. The rule for the new League of Nations was to be that of "collective security," by which whoever was the *first* to take military action would ipso facto be at fault thereby, with all the world coming in to punish the launcher of violence.¹⁰

But an important theme of the later United Nations, as envisaged by the more "realist" Franklin Roosevelt in 1945, was that some kinds of advance threats are so ominous that one cannot wait for an actual military attack, that one may instead have to anticipate and preempt such a threat.¹¹ The chain of relevant examples here is interestingly interlocked. Facing the threat that Adolf Hitler might

Whatever the wisdom or folly of the particular American "preemptive" attack on Iraq, future American presidents will have to be willing to consider striking first.

have meant to invade the Soviet Union, as he had outlined in *Mein Kampf*, Joseph Stalin confronted his weaker neighbors in the Baltic region and demanded that they submit to a sort of Soviet military

occupation. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia submitted reluctantly, but the Finns did not. In his dialogues with the Finns before launching an invasion against them in the winter of 1939, Stalin's message was a very straightforward exercise in what we today would call "realism." He simply accused Finland of being too small and too weak, so small and weak that it amounted ipso facto to a threat to Soviet security, if only because it was a power vacuum through which bigger and more hostile powers could strike at Leningrad and the rest of the USSR.¹²

Because Finland had been a democratically governed and civilized society between the wars, Americans and many other people saw this attack as nothing more than another barbaric and aggressive dictator having his way with a democratic neighbor, exactly as Hitler had treated Czechoslovakia. At the behest of many of the Latin American members of the League of Nations, after the military invasion of Finland was launched the League actually expelled the USSR from membership.¹³ Many ordinary people in France and Britain had the same moral view of the Russo-Finnish conflict, but Winston Churchill and a number of the French leaders saw additional strategic advantages to offering some "assistance" to the Finns. Because the logical line of communication for any British

and French forces coming to help the Finns would run across northern Norway and Sweden, Churchill saw an opportunity to use the plight of the Finns as an excuse to cut off Nazi Germany from Swedish iron ore. Further, because Finland was the victim of what Stalin was styling a preemptive attack, the Allies might have a way to weaken Nazi Germany economically.¹⁴

When asked to give the Allies permission to cross their territory, however, Sweden and Norway, however sympathetic they themselves were to Finland, refused, knowing that Germany would almost surely invade southern Scandinavia if such permission were given. Nonetheless, the Allied proposal to “help” the Finns, much as it was really directed against Nazi Germany’s iron ore sources, may indeed have helped bring an end to the Winter War between Finland and the USSR: Stalin, fearing the consequences of being drawn into actual military combat with even token British and French contingents, somewhat reduced the demands he was making of the Finns. The Finnish government, seeing what the Allies were up to and not wanting its Scandinavian friends drawn needlessly into World War II, softened its attitude on a truce with the Soviets.

But the suspension of warfare between Finland and the USSR in March 1940 did not end the plans of Churchill and his French partners to strike a strategic blow against Hitler. The troops that had been assembled to land at Narvik and then to move across northern Norway and Sweden were kept ready for action, as Churchill also contemplated mining the Norwegian coastal waters through which Swedish iron ore was shipped from Narvik to Germany. The Nazi German leadership was hardly unaware of the Allied intention, and Hitler gave orders for the planning of a preemptive counteroperation. The British mined Norwegian waters on 8 April 1940, and German armed forces moved into Norway and Denmark on the 9th.

To summarize the chain of preemptive logic here, the British and French were thus *not* preempting Nazi aggression in Scandinavia in 1940. But they were using the Soviet self-described preemptive attack on Finland to plan an invasion of Norway and Sweden. The German attack on Denmark and Norway preempted this Allied military violation of Norway and Sweden. In the interactions of preemptive motives here, Sweden came out ahead, being allowed to remain neutral, while Denmark was a loser.

Following the German occupation of Denmark, the British government elected to act preemptively against the possibility of a similar German move into Iceland, which had been very loosely affiliated with Denmark under the personal rule of the Danish monarch. Just as Sweden and Norway had objected to British military occupation, and as Norway and Denmark had objected to the German military moves, Iceland protested the British action. When the British government explained that it had been taken only to head off a German attack,

the Icelandic government rejected this argument, accepting the occupation only under protest and with the British promise that the occupation would be terminated as soon as the war with Germany was over.¹⁵ When President Roosevelt elected to join the British occupation of Iceland in 1941, the American government asked for an Icelandic invitation, or at least an Icelandic statement that there was no objection to the American presence. The government in Reykjavík offered neither, and the United States settled in the end for a statement that the Icelanders would not violently object, again with a promise that the American forces would leave when the war with Germany was over.

The end of this trail comes with the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, but the shadow of preemptive logic does not stop there, for it continued for Finland to the end of the Cold War. Finland was spared an imposition of communism and an influx of Slavic immigrants, but was forced to sign a Friendship Treaty providing that the Soviet Union could demand “urgent consultations” with the Finnish government whenever Moscow sensed a risk of a new German invasion coming through Finnish soil.¹⁶ It can, indeed, be argued that the United States and Britain by 1945 sensed a certain legitimacy in Soviet concern for warding off future invasions through the smaller states to the west. The understanding and hope of Roosevelt and his advisers, before the Yalta Conference of February 1945 and after, was that the Soviets would be given a preemptive guarantee against new invasions through Finland and Poland, while these countries would otherwise be allowed to manage their own affairs. This was indeed what was more or less achieved for Finland, but it was violated for all the other states that were forced to live under communist rule.

As the symmetrical opposite of Finland, Iceland in the summer of 1945 naturally enough inquired whether American troops would be leaving, now that the war in Europe was over.¹⁷ The American response was that the war was not “over” until there was a German peace treaty. The logic of 1939 to 1945 was now that serious military threats had to be headed off in advance, a very different logic from the inherent sanctity of small countries proposed by the League of Nations, and this logic burdened Iceland just as it had burdened Finland. The subsequent history of Icelandic-U.S. relations all through the Cold War shows repeated demands for the termination of the American bases in Iceland, amid calls for Icelandic withdrawal from NATO, fortuitously headed off again and again by the timing of Soviet military actions in Korea, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, etc.¹⁸

To repeat, the League of Nations had regarded preemptive thinking as a major part of the problem of preserving the peace. The United Nations was to be based somewhat more on a premise that systems like fascism were inherent threats to peace, threats that had to be anticipated and preempted. One could see this view as simply an acceptance of hard-headed “realist” thinking by Roosevelt and

everyone else, having seen how rapidly the Nazis had moved from seeming disarmament to control of all Western and Central Europe. Much of the diminished support for collective security and of the renewed legitimacy for anticipatory self-defense must thus be directed to the experience with Hitler and his allies. The difference in basic reasoning between the two international organizations is illustrated by some of the subtle differences between the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter. In articles 53 and 107, the Charter specifically allows any of the World War II Allies to resume warfare, without Security Council permission, against any of the enemy states of that war. Also, the Security Council is charged with dealing with “threats to peace,” where the League of Nations requirement was simply that an attack on one was an attack on all.

We now often remember condemnations of preventive war and preemption as grounded in the United Nations Charter, that is, as a post-1945 phenomenon. The 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq was thus condemned by a United Nations vote, with even the United States joining in the criticism. If preventive wars were contemplated to head off the Soviet or Chinese nuclear programs, such wars apparently never got very serious consideration.¹⁹ One thrust of this article is that memory may distort the historical record here, as the United Nations at its founding was less resolutely opposed to preemptive reasoning than had been the League of Nations.

Because mass-destruction attacks on the American homeland may now become all too possible, attacks that cannot easily be stopped with defenses, attacks that cannot be so readily deterred as in the confrontations of the Cold War, it may remain necessary for American presidents to claim the prerogative of preemption (even if the wisdom of the particular preemptive attack against Iraq is in doubt). Just as the world could not tolerate a reappearance of fascism and the British could not tolerate the threat of a naval invasion, so the world today may not be able to tolerate the threat of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The basic argument of this article is that there has indeed been an extensive history of preemptive and anticipatory military action, a history from which lessons can be drawn, if the United States will now inevitably have to claim this prerogative. Preemption is often described as condemned by international law, but this condemnation was not so clear or strong until World War I showed the world how horrible war could be. Later, if such a condemnation was clear in the aftermath of World War I, the memories of World War II served somewhat to reduce it.

What, then, are some of the lessons of the historical experience? One kind of lesson is to be extracted from the way the world saw Stalin’s actions after World War II. Rather than merely ensuring the USSR against aggression, as Yalta

conferees were ready to do, Stalin chose, for reasons of ideology or of more severe preemptive concerns, to deny Poland and Romania, etc., what he tolerated in Finland. Had he allowed Estonia to be independent, albeit hosting Soviet military bases, and had he allowed Poland a democratic government, albeit with Soviet military bases and transit rights to East Germany, much of the Cold War would have been different, and much of Western hostility to the Soviet system could have been avoided.

What Finland achieved in maintaining its own political and cultural character, even while being “Finlandized,” is what Iceland also achieved in the West—to escape being culturally swamped. The American threat here was more a matter of demographics than of ideological zeal; one constantly had to compare the size of British or American forces that might be needed to prevent a German or Soviet invasion with the military-age male cohort of the Icelandic population. At times during World War II the total of British and American servicemen in Iceland vastly exceeded the total Icelanders of similar age, implying a risk that a great many young Icelandic women would pair off with foreigners rather than

The threat the Royal Navy preempted at Copenhagen was existential, a threat to the very safety of Britain itself.

with Icelanders. One of the demands most repeated by opponents of the American presence after 1945 was that the garrison at Keflavík be restricted to the base or given only a limited number of

passes per month into Reykjavík or any other Icelandic town. A parallel demand was that American military personnel deployed to Iceland all be of European origin. (This demand was indeed accepted well into the 1950s, it being analogous to the Saudi Arabian demand that no Jewish personnel be deployed at the American air base in Dhahran.)

On a broader cultural front, the Icelandic demand was that American television signals not be transmitted at Keflavík in a manner that would seduce Icelanders into watching American programming—this at a time when Iceland was considering having no television at all, or at most a very limited state-run offering devoted mostly to culture.²⁰ The end solution for this problem saw American armed forces television shifted to an on-base cable system, with programs no longer transmitted over the air, where Icelanders would have been able to tune them in. A solution for the demographic problem came when the U.S. Air Force deployed more American *female* personnel to Keflavík, making the percentage of females assigned to that base the highest in the world. After a great deal of arguing back and forth, in the end the American presence was contained, so that Icelandic cultural autonomy could survive, but a crucial military base remained

under American control (so that, most importantly, it could not quickly fall under Soviet control).

Some would see the difference between Eastern Europe's fate and the fate of Iceland as illustrating the difference between democracies and totalitarian dictatorships in their foreign policies. Lest one conclude that democracies will always be restrained in how much they change a territory after feeling driven to take preemptive military possession of it, one must note two earlier preemptive moves by the United States: the occupation of the Philippines and the incorporation of Hawaii, both in 1898.²¹ In both cases, an important incentive for the U.S. government was the fear that some other power would seize these positions in the Pacific if the United States did not. In the case of the Philippines, such fears pertained in particular to Japan and to imperial Germany. (Germany, in the wake of the Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War, had in fact purchased the Mariana and Caroline islands from Spain, as well as showing an interest in the Philippines.) In the case of Hawaii, the powers being preempted were Britain, Japan, and imperial Russia, all of which had dispatched naval vessels to Hawaiian waters at one point or another.

Filipino resistance to the American occupation of the islands produced a very savage guerrilla war, one that some have compared to the war in Iraq. It had, however, the happy outcome that the guerrilla resistance was in the end suppressed, and Filipinos over the ensuing four decades came to feel generally positive about Americans.²² An early American commitment to Filipino independence was helpful here, as was quite enlightened management of the territory once peace was established. In 1898 and afterward, very few Americans saw the Philippines as slated for statehood and full incorporation into the United States. The island population was simply too large, and seemingly too alien in culture and traditions, to be assimilated, and the islands were too far away geographically.

In contrast, one saw no violent resistance to the American incorporation of Hawaii, and today Hawaii is seen by one and all as just one more state of the United States, not only a key naval base that had to be kept out of hostile hands. But it is important to note that in the first territorial legislature elected after 1898 a majority of the seats went to a party that was opposed to American sovereignty. If no such sentiment could ever capture a majority in Hawaii today, an important reason is that the ethnic nature of Hawaii was changed forever by massive inflows of Caucasian, Japanese, and other immigrants, to the point where the native Hawaiian population today represents only some 20 percent of the total.²³

To summarize the comparisons rather bluntly, Hawaii thus suffered the fate that Stalin tried to impose on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Because the ethnic

and social change in Hawaii was relatively complete and successful, only a few people would today voice any objection. Because the Slavic migration into the Baltic republics was not completed before the USSR collapsed, the resistance to such a process became a cause célèbre for the Baltic peoples and one more grievance to be noted around the world against Stalin and the Soviet system. Finland escaped what Estonia experienced. Finland's fate was more comparable to that of Iceland, which in turn escaped what had happened to Hawaii. One general lesson for practitioners of preemption (for these are *all* examples of such preemption) would be that one must thus either succeed totally at the assimilation of the territory involved or else be quite scrupulous about respecting the local political and social status quo.

A second lesson stems more broadly from the *uses* to which one's hegemonic power and exercises in preemption are put. The example of Britain in the century before 1914 is quite suggestive. The British were often imperious, arrogant, and high-handed, and Americans of all stripes retained resentments on this score into the twentieth century. One can find such resentment, and fear of the possibility of a British preemptive naval attack, expressed by people as prominent as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge.²⁴

Yet each of these three prominent thinkers on American naval strategy and foreign policy was to revert to a view by which Britain was seen not as a rival or enemy but as a role model and partner. An important explanation for this shift stems from the relatively benign purposes for which Britain had used its naval power. The British dominance of the seas (for the preservation of which the British were so ready to strike the first blow) was used to stamp out piracy and the slave trade and generally to make the seas safe for the free trade of all—purposes, indeed, altogether parallel to those for which the U.S. Navy is deployed today. If power is compounded and retained but used for the political and economic benefit of all, the counterinstincts of balance-of-power thinking are not likely to be so persuasive, and the logic of “bandwagoning” will play a larger role.

Not every American naval planner came around to the same benign interpretation of British naval strength that Mahan and Roosevelt endorsed at the end. One sees a curious debate during and after World War I between Admiral William S. Sims, who had served as head of liaison with the British during the war and now pooh-poohed any possibility of future Anglo-American conflict, and Admiral William S. Benson, the first officer to hold the title of Chief of Naval Operations. Benson wrote repeated memoranda to President Woodrow Wilson arguing that every state that had ever begun matching Britain on the seas—the Netherlands, Spain, France, and Germany—had wound up fighting a war with the British and that the United States was next on the list.²⁵

The combined lesson of Pax Britannica and the tradition of “Copenhagening” is thus that some Americans, such as Admiral Benson, deeply resented Britain, while others felt gratitude for and acceptance of how British power had been used. The same may be inevitable for any parallel American policy of preemption in the future. The instincts of balance-of-power thinking are simply too strong to be swept away entirely by gratitude and bandwagoning, but if the power exercising a hegemony can show that it is solicitous toward the rest of the system, some of such instincts can be overcome.

A third set of lessons obviously pertains to the possible setting of precedents for other powers, who might imitate one’s initiations of armed conflict. In the aftermath of the American incursions into Afghanistan and Iraq, one now often sees concern as to whether they would embolden Israel or India for preemptive strikes against Iran or Pakistan, or Japan against North Korea, etc.²⁶

One can find an interesting analogy here in the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, when the Japanese attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur without giving the warning of a prior declaration of war (a pattern that was to be repeated, of course, in 1941 at Pearl Harbor). Americans and most of the European powers were relatively sympathetic to the Japanese, regarding Japan as the model of how an Asian state could quickly become modernized and westernized and seeing Russia as the most backward of the European states. If Japan was being welcomed into “the club” of Western and modern states, however, most Europeans nonetheless regarded the manner of the sneak attack on Port Arthur as a bit improper and unseemly. The new member of the club obviously needed to read and study the rules a bit more.

This reaction may thus have been common around the European continent and in the United States, but it hardly was the response of Sir John Fisher. Rather than apologizing for or lamenting the style of the Japanese attack, Fisher told his officers that this was exactly the way preemption should be done, striking early and first, striking without warning.²⁷ (There had, after all, been no prior declarations of war when the Danish fleets were “Copenhagened.”) These were the years of the beginning of a British-Japanese formal alliance. Since Japanese naval officers very much admired and wanted to emulate the British navy in these years, many of them studying the naval craft in Britain or on British ships, it is indeed inevitable that the Japanese had heard the British public statements about “Copenhagening” and fully knew to what the phrase referred. In the same way that Japan learned from the British and sensed that striking first is morally legitimate when one’s existence is threatened, might Japan or another friend of the United States now learn a parallel lesson from more recent ventures into “preemption”?

One argument advanced here is that “preemption” and “anticipatory self-defense” came to draw moral disapproval as a result of World War I. That war shocked one and all as an exemplar of how horrible war could now be. That war was very plausibly the result of interlocking anticipations, when adversaries saw urgent necessity to strike first. The impact of World War I is interestingly illustrated by the changes in Theodore Roosevelt’s attitudes as the war broke out. Roosevelt’s first reaction, in letters and some public comments, was to sympathize with the German need to strike through Belgium, since the French might have done the same thing in reverse.²⁸ Belgium (perhaps like Finland one world war later) was just too small and weak to defend itself—that is, was too weak to avoid becoming a power vacuum and a sort of international nuisance. Great powers like Germany and France would simply have to do what they needed to do, and small powers would suffer because of all the inevitabilities.

After weeks of reports, however, about how ordinary Belgians were suffering in the war they had not started, Theodore Roosevelt shifted dramatically away from such tough-minded realism to condemning the Germans for having imposed war on an innocent neutral. Roosevelt was not to be noted for his logical consistency, and he never came to any total endorsement of collective security or of Woodrow Wilson’s vision by which *all* initiation of war was to be condemned, but neither could he, in face of the horror of a prolonged World War I, stick to a much more tolerant view of power politics above all.

Roosevelt in his private letters had earlier even suggested that he would have sympathized with the British had they chosen to launch a preventive “Copenhagening” attack on the growing German navy, or with the kaiser had Germany launched a preventive war attack on land against the Russians.²⁹ Very few statesmen would have voiced such sympathies in the immediate aftermath of the carnage of World War I. But the evolution of World War II was to bring back a lot of more “realistic” thinking of such kinds.

Preemption and preventive war thus indeed have a mixed history in terms of moral acceptance. The strongest condemnation of such war initiation dates from 1918 and not from 1945. The world’s experiences before 1914 and after 1938 may yet offer lessons on how we all will have to live with and make the best of such options.

NOTES

This article presents some preliminary conclusions in what will be a book-length study of historical analogies to the contemporary issues of preemption and preventive war, the research for

which is supported by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. The foundation bears no responsibility for the propositions presented here, which are solely those of the author.

1. An account of these attacks on Copenhagen can be found in R. C. Anderson, *Naval War in the Baltic* (London: Francis Edwards, 1969).
2. A good discussion of the interactions here can be found in Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent* (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
3. On Fisher's plans against France, see Ruddock F. Mackay, *Fisher of Kilverstone* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1973), pp. 214, 217.
4. For discussions of the possibility of British preemptive attacks against the U.S. Navy in this period, see Forrest Davis, *The Atlantic System* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941), pp. 3, 44–46.
5. Kenneth J. Hagan, *This People's Navy* (New York: Free Press, 1991), pp. 70–71, 93.
6. For details of the attack on the *Caroline*, see Kenneth P. Stevens, *Border Diplomacy* (Tuscaloosa: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1989), pp. 13–15.
7. On the details of Webster's note, *ibid.*, pp. 165–66.
8. For an example, see Abram D. Sofaer, "On the Necessity of Preemption," *European Journal of International Law* 14, no. 2 (2003), pp. 209–26.
9. Churchill's reasons for the British attack on the French fleet are discussed in Winston S. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), chap. 8.
10. A fuller discussion of collective security can be found in Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1966), esp. chap. 12.
11. FDR's vision of what the United Nations approach to peace would look like is outlined in Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the United Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1997).
12. The dialogue between Stalin and the Finns is recounted in Olli Vehvilainen, *Finland in the Second World War* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), chap. 3.
13. On the Soviet expulsion from the League, see R. H. Haigh et al., eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy: The League of Nations and Europe* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower, 1986).
14. Churchill's intentions here are discussed in Martti Haikio, "The Race for Northern Europe, September, 1939–June, 1940," in *Scandinavia during the Second World War*, ed. Henrik S. Nissen (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 53–98.
15. Iceland's experience with being the object of preemption is outlined in Donald Neuchterlein, *Iceland, Reluctant Ally* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), chaps. 1, 2.
16. On the Finnish experience during and after World War II, see T. Michael Reddy, ed., *Charting an Independent Course* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1998).
17. On Icelandic feelings after 1945, see Neuchterlein, *Iceland, Reluctant Ally*, chaps. 3–10.
18. See Gudni Th. Jóhannesson, "To the Edge of Nowhere? U.S.-Icelandic Defense Relations during and after the Cold War," *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 3/4 (Summer/Autumn 2004), pp. 115–37.
19. This author's more extended views on the American failure to launch a preventive war precluding a Soviet nuclear force can be found in George H. Quester, *Nuclear Monopoly* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 2000).
20. For this author's fuller account of the issues on American television signals in Iceland, see George H. Quester, *The International Politics of Television* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1990), pp. 182–84.
21. The preemptive aspects of American imperialism in 1898 are outlined in Warren Zimmerman, *First Great Triumph* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), pp. 318–19.
22. The American subjugation of the Philippines is chronicled in John Morgan Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973).
23. See Tom Coffman, *The Island Edge of America* (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2003), on the assimilation of Hawaii.
24. The evolution of the thinking about Britain in these major figures is outlined in George T. Davis, *A Navy Second to None* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1940), and Philips Payson O'Brien, *British and American Naval Power* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998).
25. On Admiral Benson, see Mary Klachko with David Trail, *Admiral William Shephard Benson:*

- First Chief of Naval Operations* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987), esp. chap. 12.
26. For such a contemporary statement of concern, see Karl P. Mueller et al., *Striking First* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), pp. 115–19, and Michael O’Hanlon, Susan Rice, and James Steinberg, *The New National Security Strategy and Preemption*, Policy Brief 113 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, December 2002).
27. Fisher’s statements about the Japanese Port Arthur attack are recounted in Mackay, *Fisher of Kilverstone*, pp. 319–20.
28. Theodore Roosevelt’s reactions to the outbreak of World War I are outlined in John Milton Cooper, *The Warrior and the Priest* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 277–78.
29. For these earlier endorsements of preemption or preventive war by Theodore Roosevelt, see Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy* (New York: Kings Crown, 1956), p. 293.



NEW DIRECTIONS IN MARITIME STRATEGY?

Implications for the U.S. Navy

Geoffrey Till

Globalization, with its impact on the strategic environment, is the central fact of the early twenty-first century. Some, in the traditions of the nineteenth-century Manchester School, welcome it as ushering in an era of peace and plenty by replacing competitive, aggressive balance-of-power politics with a much greater sense of international community. Others see globalization as undermining their ways of life, their independence, their beliefs, and their future prospects. Still others dispute assumptions of globalization's assumed longevity and worry, on the contrary, about its prospective, if not imminent, collapse. Either way, the present and future state of globalization will be a major determinant of

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the shape and nature of world politics, and governmental attitudes to it will in turn be major determinants of strategy and of defense and naval policy.

Several more points need to be made about globalization, however. First, it encourages the development of a "borderless world," in which the autarchy of the national units of which it is composed is gradually whittled away by a variety of transnational economic and technological trends. The focus will increasingly be on the system, not the units; plans and strategy will, an argument goes, need to serve that system as a whole. Nations will become relaxed about their borders, because they have to be. But this cuts both ways: they will be relaxed about the borders of other nations too. In a globalizing world, systems thinking pulls

strategists forward geographically. This forward-leaning approach to the making and implementation of strategy has been a marked characteristic of European and American defense thinking for a decade now. Thus Tony Blair in early 2007: “The frontiers of our security no longer stop at the Channel. What happens in the Middle East affects us. . . . The new frontiers for our security are global. Our Armed Forces will be deployed in the lands of other nations far from home, with no immediate threat to our territory, in environments and in ways unfamiliar to them.”¹

Second, globalization is a *dynamic* system, since, among other things, trade and business produce a constantly changing hierarchy of winners and losers, and because, historically, conflict seems to be particularly associated with economic volatility.² New players in the game have to be accommodated, its victims supported, and future directions anticipated. The defense of the system has therefore to be constant and proactive, rather than merely intermittent and reactive. This calls for continuous action along all the diplomatic, economic, social, and military lines of development, with the latter’s requirements based on the need to “shape the international security environment.”

Third, globalization depends absolutely on the free flow of trade—and this goes largely by sea. For this reason alone, seapower is at the heart of the globalization process in a way that land and air power are not. This provides both an opportunity and a challenge, not least because sea-based globalization is potentially vulnerable to disruption. In itself, this is not new, for Mahan warned us of it over a century ago: “This, with the vast increase in rapidity of communication, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds knitting together the interests of nations to one another, till the whole now forms an articulated system not only of prodigious size and activity, but of excessive sensitiveness, unequaled in former ages.”³

The “excessive sensitiveness” that Mahan had in mind derives from the fact that interdependence, and indeed dependency of any sort, inevitably produces targets for the malign to attack. But there is special point in his warnings now, partly because the extraordinary extent and depth of today’s version of globalization depend on a supply-chain philosophy of “just enough, just in time” that increases the system’s vulnerability to disruption. Moreover, there have emerged various groups and situations that could exploit or exacerbate that increased vulnerability. Such threats include, obviously, direct attack by groups or states hostile to the values and outcomes that the system encourages. Less obviously, international maritime crime in its manifold forms (piracy, drugs, and people smuggling) and the unsustainable plundering of marine resources all threaten to undermine the good order on which the safe and timely passage of shipping depends. Conflict and instability ashore, moreover, can have disruptive effects in

neighboring seas, as was demonstrated all too clearly in the Tanker War of the 1980s, for example.

The protective function of naval activity will plainly be a significant part of any defensive response, because so many of these threats to the system can, and do, take a maritime form or have important maritime consequences and require maritime responses. Indeed, the Tanker War just mentioned is a particularly clear example of the many ways in which navies “protect the system,” both directly by what they do at sea and indirectly by what they do *from* it. Identifying, prioritizing, and preparing, from among the range of possible naval responses, the platforms, weapons, and skill sets that will realize those responses are the chief tasks of today’s naval planners. To repeat the point made earlier, many of these requirements are bound to pull sailors forward, geographically. This should not be news to sailors, since a forward-leaning policy was a characteristic of *Pax Britannica*—the last great age of globalization. Thus:

Britannia needs no bulwarks
 No towers along the steep;
 Her march is o’er the mountain waves,
 Her home is on the deep.⁴

The defense of the system requires a range of naval tasks that covers much of the spectrum of conflict, a range that seems to be getting ever wider. The resultant strategies are a blend of cooperative and competitive approaches in policy, since the two are no more mutually exclusive in maritime-strategy making than they are in international political life. Such strategies need to produce a range of outcomes, or “deliverables.”

FOUR NAVAL NECESSITIES FOR A GLOBALIZED WORLD

Perhaps four mutually dependent, key, and closely related deliverables can be identified as being required. The first of these is a somewhat reformulated concept of *sea control*. Several things need to be said about this. First, sea control in broad principle remains what it has always been—the grand enabler that allows the sea to be used for whatever purpose will serve the interests of the power that controls it. It therefore remains at the heart of maritime strategy. But in a globalized world it is less a question of “securing” the sea in the sense of appropriating it for one’s own use, and more of “making it secure” for everyone but the enemies of the system to use. This is clearly aligned with the notion that “freedom of navigation” is a universal requirement, if not a universal right, and ideally should not be restricted to particular flags or cargoes. The language and the rhetoric of maritime strategy need to be taken a step farther away from older, more exclusive concepts of the “command” of the sea.

Such sea control operations are most likely to be taking place in littoral regions (where the threats are rather different from, and at least as challenging as, those encountered on the open ocean). Moreover, the likelihood that such campaigns take place in the course of wars of choice rather than of necessity makes the “force protection” variant of sea control peculiarly apposite. There is ample evidence that contemporary domestic opinion and—perhaps especially—an intrusive and unsympathetic media will not bear the level of attrition common, for example, in Britain’s system-defense wars of the nineteenth century in what was later known as the third world.⁵ Sustainable system defense in the twenty-first century depends on the maintenance of high levels of security for the peacekeepers themselves. This is as true for sailors operating off the coast as it is for soldiers in the streets of Basra or Baghdad.

In the post-Cold War period there has developed a concept of liberal interventionism in defense of the system, a concept based on the notion that if we do not go to the crisis, the crisis will come to us.⁶ Best of all is to be there already, preventing the crisis from arising in the first place. “The emphasis on expeditionary operations,” explains the British Ministry of Defence, “has enabled the UK to have a key role in shaping the international security environment.”⁷ This kind of thinking has resulted in Europe and the United States, and a perhaps surprising number of countries in South America and the Asia-Pacific as well, in a strong focus on *expeditionary operations*, the second of our four naval necessities. Navies have switched their focus away, to some extent, from what they do at sea to what they can do from it. But in the second of these they implicitly acknowledge the fact that disorder at sea is most often the consequence of disorder on land and that, in consequence, naval activity conducted purely at sea usually deals with the symptoms of the problem rather than its causes. It is when they have an impact on events ashore that navies are at their most significant, strategically.

Power projection in an expeditionary mode can therefore be seen as a defense of the trading system against the instabilities and threats ashore that might arise. These potential threats include rogue states, inter- or intrastate conflict, and the malign effects of a host of newly empowered nonstate actors. In certain circumstances these can all threaten the health of the global sea-based system.

In earlier ages, of course, defense of the trading system was based primarily on the direct defense of shipping at sea. Mahan indeed famously observed, “The necessity of a navy springs from the existence of peaceful shipping and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment.”⁸ But nowadays the defense of the immediate political and strategic conditions that make beneficial trading possible has taken its place in naval priorities. There remain sea-based

threats to the trading system, of course, and these will still need to be dealt with, but in the postmodern world they no longer command the attention they did in Mahan's day. Instead the system is largely defended by collective expeditionary action against threats ashore.

The current focus on the apparently unending land phase in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, poses a number of real challenges for the navies of the participants. In the short term these conflicts absorb funds and resources that might otherwise go to navies.⁹ The tyranny of the immediate commitment is certainly a factor in the longer-term budgetary embarrassments of the U.S., British, and several European navies.¹⁰

Politically, the costs and disappointment of both campaigns seem likely to make similar forays elsewhere less likely. On the face of it, this could undermine the case for developing expeditionary capabilities. Since expeditionary assumptions underlie, even justify, many of the major acquisitions of Western navies (in the shape of aircraft carriers, amphibious forces, and so forth), this would seem to be serious news for sailors. On the other hand, the limited liability implied by purely sea-based responses to instabilities ashore may commend more "maritime" conceptions of intervention to politicians, who may be more anxious to avoid casualties and messy long-term commitments ashore.

This vision of a more sea-based conception of expeditionary operations, with much less emphasis given to the commitment of land forces ashore, comes close to the notion of good order from the sea. Either way, the future shape of expeditionary operations and a country's prospective willingness to participate in them will clearly be further major determinants of naval policy in the United States and elsewhere.

The interest that is so evident in the United States, Europe, and parts of the Asia-Pacific in the kind of sea basing that underpins expeditionary operations is an obvious manifestation of this.¹¹ Given the constraints of resources common to navies in what used to be called "the West" and the developing gap between these resources and the range of possible commitments, it seems to make sense for such cooperative navies implicitly to accept a degree of specialization and a "contributory" ethos in the preparation for, and conduct of, expeditionary operations. They do not expect to cover all the colors of the naval rainbow, but, ideally, they remain confident that those they do not, someone else, equally reliable, will. They may not welcome this development or the degree of reliance on allies that it implies, but in the face of budgetary realities they accept its inevitability. Accordingly, less stress is placed on the maintenance of a "balanced fleet" or, indeed, of an indigenous maritime industrial base. This pragmatic approach fits nicely into the conceptions of an interdependent, borderless world and an open economy—conceptions that lie at the very heart of globalization.

Globalization prospers when trade is mutually beneficial and takes place in conditions of order, both on land and at sea. But as the *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* says, a variety of threats to *good order at sea*, our third naval necessity, imperil this:

Weak coastal states often are not able to regulate or provide protection for the legitimate movement and safety of vessels within their waters. They are frequently ill-prepared to safeguard their maritime commerce and energy infrastructure, or protect their marine resources from illegal exploitation and environmental damage. Combined these vulnerabilities not only threaten their population, resources, and economic development, but can threaten the security of the maritime commons and even the continuity of global commerce.¹²

Such threats need to be taken seriously and almost certainly need to be taken separately. It is probably a mistake to conflate maritime terrorism with piracy, for example; the diseases are different, and so are the cures. But one unifying requirement of them all is the need for maritime domain awareness (MDA) systems that provide the necessary information in a timely and useful manner to the people who need it. This in turn demands systems that are continuous in time, substance, and space rather than sporadic, since the essential thing is to pick up what is normal in order to identify the “abnormal.” MDA, in short, is a permanent requirement that, ideally, should monitor all civilian activity on the entire world ocean. An emerging issue is whether it will eventually monitor naval activity too.

Good order at sea will contribute to maritime security and the defense of the homeland, and globalization means that this is bound to have its “home” and “away” dimensions. Forward operations conducted in defense of the global system can be seen as defense in depth of the homeland. In a borderless world, for example, cargo-container security begins, and may be at its most manageable, in foreign ports—another example of the way in which globalization requires maritime strategy to be “forward leaning.” Here is the *U.S. Coast Guard Strategy* again:

The U.S. maritime border, like the land and air borders, is integral to the global system of trade. Securing the maritime border is an *international activity* that requires pushing the nation’s layers of border security far away from its shores—through U.S. waters, onto a well-governed ocean commons, then seamlessly joining the secure maritime domain of foreign partners. It also requires *extensive partnerships* that integrate and build unity of effort among governments, agencies, and private-sector stakeholders around the world.¹³

The maintenance of good order at sea may be down in the “softer,” more constabulary end of the spectrum of required maritime capability in defense of the system. For all that, it is a crucial enabler in global peace and security and therefore something that should command the attention of naval planners

everywhere. Where navies are, in all but name, coast guards, this raises few issues, but it certainly raises them for those planners of larger navies grappling with the allocation of resources between the hard and soft variants of maritime security.

Here the essential question is the balance to be struck between coast guard functions and forces, on one hand, and conventional naval ones, on the other. Should navies absorb these functions or hive them off to specialized forces specifically designed for the purpose? There are arguments either way, but there is little doubt that the function itself is important and becoming increasingly so. This is especially the case when dealing with threats that shade into the strategic area, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental degradation. But since piracy, fishing disputes, and illegal immigration can feed, as well as reflect, disorder ashore, navies too have strong defense interests here.

Much of this requires the close cooperation, if not the integration, of all the respective maritime agencies of as many countries as can be persuaded to cooperate. Knowledge is indeed power. This brings us to the fourth naval necessity in the defense of the system, namely the *maintenance of a maritime consensus*. A great deal has been written about “commanding the global commons,” by which is usually meant the sea and the air and space above it.¹⁴ But people are the biggest “commons” of all, and securing their support is probably the single most crucial requirement for the defense of the system. Commanding the human commons provides such a level of military and political advantage that it must surely be regarded as *the* “key enabler of the U.S. global power position.” Accordingly it is hard to exaggerate the importance of this battle for world opinion, whether it finds expression in the parliaments of allies, the editorials of the *Washington Post*, or the streets of the Middle East.

The perpetrators of 9/11 were not arguing for a bigger slice of the cake—they were trying to blow up the bakery, because they thought globalization inherently inimical to their aspirations. Notwithstanding, they are half-supported by huge numbers of people who do want a bigger slice of the cake and who need to be persuaded away from that support by the assurance of a system that seems fairer to them—hence the importance of the political, social, and economic lines of development, in which naval forces are of particular utility given their flexibility and ubiquity. A forward and sensitive maritime presence can help not only deter malefactors from malign actions or compel them into benign ones but also provide a means of signaling interest in a region’s affairs, monitoring events at sea and ashore, and contributing to the development of a sense of international community through a policy of active coalition building. The guiding principle

throughout is that so long as national objectives are preserved, preventing war is always better than winning it.

This being so, the benign applications of seapower have particular salience in broader operations intended to defend the system through the winning of the hearts and minds of the populations on which it ultimately depends.¹⁵ The notion of the “global fleet station” and the purposeful use of sustained cruises by hospital ships like the USS *Mercy* and *Comfort*, and other such humanitarian relief operations, fit the bill exactly.¹⁶ In other circumstances, of course, coercive deployments of carrier battle groups off potentially hostile coasts may be more appropriate. Either way, naval diplomacy requires the closest coordination between navies and their foreign ministries.

Many of these ideas are subsumed within the concept of the “thousand-ship navy.” This is certainly a snappy and memorable title, but it is unfortunate for its apparent exclusion of the coast-guard forces, which collectively have a huge role to play in this concept. Moreover, folk memories of the “six-hundred-ship navy” aspirations of the Ronald Reagan era make some think of it as simply another U.S. Navy budgetary demarche. Finally, the term “navy” immediately sets up connotations of hierarchy and leads to the question, “Who’s in charge?” Concerns of this sort may make the idea harder to sell to other navies. On the other hand, the notion of an informal maritime coalition acting in concert against a host of common threats to common interests is an attractive and persuasive one that commands wide support.¹⁷ Phrases such as “global maritime partnerships” may not have quite the zing of the “thousand-ship navy,” but in the long run they may sell better, because they make it clearer that what is envisaged is maritime forces effectively “policing” the system, with everyone contributing as they wish, as and when they can. Encouraging the currently doubtful to participate and facilitating this, where necessary with deliberate and sensitive campaigns of capability building, must be a high priority. What is called for, and indeed appears to be happening, is a “conversation” conducted by the U.S. Navy with the rest of the world, a conversation that does not necessarily have to end up with the Navy always acting as the sheriff in a host of maritime posses.

Indeed, the tsunami relief operation of 2004 in many ways shows the thousand-ship navy concept in action, since this very necessary task was successfully performed by a loose coalition of the willing that got together, at very short notice, outside fixed agreements, with no one “in charge.” The international rescue effort from Lebanon last year was much the same. Both were made possible by the participating navies’ habit of working together.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. NAVY?

So, to sum up, what should all of this mean for the service? Plainly, the most obvious thing to be said is that future American foreign policy will provide the framework that determines what the Navy can or cannot do. But assuming that in broad terms the United States continues to focus on a program of liberal interventionism designed to defend the system, there should be a major focus on the higher, more intense end of the spectrum of conflict, simply because no one else can do it as well, or as much, as can the U.S. Navy. Hence the need for a continuing accent on quality in sea control operations and power projection, even if this does result in a drop in quantity, as measured by the number of platforms available. It is important for the Navy to stay ahead of the game in the manifold disciplines it lists under the headings of “Sea Strike” and “Sea Shield.” This should provide increased operational advantage over prospective adversaries, in the shape of greater effectiveness, accuracy, and discrimination in the use of force and of greater levels of force protection for all campaign participants. The result will be increased confidence among political decision makers at times of strain, something that may well be even more important in the wake of the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan.

The snag is that this may well sustain, if not strengthen, a strategic culture of resolute preeminence at all costs that was certainly appropriate in the twentieth century, when peer competition with other major naval powers was the order of the day, but that may be less appropriate in the globalizing world of the twenty-first century. Such aspirations for strategic dominance may unsuit the Navy for significant contributions at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, while feeding the prejudices of those who complain of the malign effects of a U.S.-dominated unipolar world.

Moreover, these aspirations come at a level of economic cost likely to prove increasingly burdensome in the future, perhaps unnecessarily so. Given the emerging littoral environment in which these operations are likely to take place, less powerful allies have much to offer—in, for example, the operation of SSKs (i.e., diesel-powered hunter-killer submarines), mine warfare, the insertion of special forces, and limited power-projection operations. Such operational and budgetary considerations would seem to reinforce the political benefits of a U.S. Navy approach that is as “inclusive” as physically possible to the practice of the most demanding aspects of naval business. For all these reasons, the more “exclusive” American seapower is, the less likely it is to be strategically effective in the long run.

The positive encouragement of allied participation in all manner of maritime operations calls for a focused, deliberate, and intelligent maritime assault on all the things that make this difficult at the moment. Interoperability is key. This is

partly a matter of shared technical proficiency, which is ultimately “fixable,” and also of protocols and standard operating procedures.¹⁸ The American tendency to overclassify everything does not help.¹⁹ Policy divergences with coalition partners may be even less tractable. Overall, such difficulties may be real and based on hard experience or imagined and merely the kind of general wariness toward giants that “little guys” might be expected to display.

The maintenance of a permanent forward presence in critical areas should provide the means to increase interoperability through near-continuous combined action with partners. The most critical area for this at the moment is what has been described as the “supercomplex” that stretches from the Gulf to the Northeast Pacific but “goes light” in the middle around Southeast Asia.²⁰ With its increasing industrial base, merchant shipping traffic, and port facilities, this area is rapidly becoming the center of gravity of the world globalization system. This is not to say that areas such as the Gulf of Guinea, the Mediterranean, or the Caribbean are not important but merely to suggest that at the moment their problems and issues can be handled mostly by regional forces acting in concert, with the U.S. Navy benignly in the background. Africa, indeed, is likely to be of increasing importance, but the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific will nonetheless remain, collectively, the major focus for the time being.²¹

The range of requirements also calls for the strongest possible integration of the naval effort with other forces of maritime order—in the American case, most obviously the Coast Guard. Often, indeed, as both the Japanese and the Americans discovered in the Straits of Malacca, coast-guard forces will provide far more appropriate responses to developing situations, responses that may well be able to head off the need for more forceful interventions later on.

Coast-guard forces have much to offer a unified and integrated maritime strategy, because the increasing value of the resources to be found in the exclusive economic zones provides governments around the world with very real economic incentives to make use of U.S. Coast Guard expertise. The U.S. Coast Guard is a unique organization, unlikely to be replicated anywhere else; nonetheless, it has much to offer in the way of advice on many aspects of maritime security that can be adopted or adapted by anyone else—and it can make that advice available in a manner that represents absolutely no threat to the sovereignty of others.²² By doing so, it indirectly defends the system, while at the same time serving American national interests and contributing to the maritime outreach of the United States. Much of this, of course, depends on its *not* being seen as the U.S. Navy. Nonetheless, the Coast Guard does not have the ships and the personnel to establish a presence all round the world, and its global effectiveness rests in significant degree on its symbiotic relationship with the Navy.

To a lesser extent the same applies when it comes to security nearer home, where strong naval forces clearly provide reserve capacities for the civil power that will normally be exercised by constabulary forces. In many ways, therefore, the closer the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy the better, provided, of course, that the essential differences between the two are preserved as well.

Underpinning much of this in the Navy should perhaps be a sense of humility—for however effective hard naval power may be, it remains but part of the military line of development, and that in turn is only part of the broader range of softer, political, diplomatic, and economic power needed to defend the system. The success of the “smiling diplomacy” of China in reversing stereotypes of its intentions in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is a timely reminder of the fact that hard power is at its most effective when used with restraint—at least in situations short of all-out conflict.

But this sense of humility should not be pushed so far that “the naval case” is not explained sufficiently well and sufficiently fully to publics and decision makers, especially given the tight margins within which the services all operate. One requirement will presumably be to ensure that any “naval” strategy and policy also becomes “national” and so secures the resources necessary for it to achieve its purposes. For this approach to be accepted, naval policy certainly will need meshing-in with foreign policy. In the early twentieth century the U.S. Marines were sometimes considered “State Department troops,” and to the benefit of both. Nowadays, the same might well need to apply to the whole of the maritime team.

BUT WILL GLOBALIZATION SURVIVE?

But this review of what might be called “postmodern” maritime defense presupposes a fundamental change in the nature of international politics. It assumes that we are indeed living “on the cusp of a new era . . . [one] plagued by uncertainty and change and unrestricted warfare, an era of shifting global threats and challenging new opportunities . . . that calls for new skill sets, deeper partnerships, and mutual understanding.”²³ It assumes that sea-based globalization will continue and that its defense remains at the heart of naval policy around the world.

But the threats that globalization faces are serious and may prove fatal. It is worth remembering that in many ways the world of the late nineteenth century was, in its own terms, as globalized as ours is today but that the system collapsed in the face of commercial rivalry, the discontent of the disadvantaged, and growing nationalism.²⁴ In some ways, these problems were in fact a by-product of globalization, especially in regard to the kind of inequality of benefit that bred

nationalism. The result of this was a world war, which, as Niall Ferguson has observed,

sank globalization—literally. Nearly thirteen million tons of shipping went to the bottom of the sea as a result of German naval action, most of it by U-boats. International trade, investment and emigration all collapsed. In the war's aftermath, revolutionary regimes arose that were fundamentally hostile to international economic integration. Plans replaced the market; autarky and protection took the place of free trade. Flows of goods diminished; flows of people and capital all but dried up.²⁵

This is indeed a chilling historical example of the way in which war can, to borrow Thomas Friedman's phrase, "unflatten" the world. If it is indeed true that "war and warfare will always be with us; war is a permanent feature of the human condition," then it is far from inconceivable that the same might happen again.²⁶

Accordingly, the prudent naval planner might well feel the need to bear this lesson of history in mind, especially given the fact that our kind of globalization faces an extra range of threats (most obviously international terrorism, resource depletion, and environmental degradation) that theirs did not. A Marxist might even argue that all of this is a result of the "inherent contradictions" of global capitalism and, accordingly, is historically inevitable.²⁷

Should this Marxist analysis be right and globalization either collapse or enter a period of terminal decline, we would face a bleaker, harder, much less communal world of increased levels of competition in which coercive military force and power politics dominate the strategic horizon. We would have, in short, a warlike future.

Current expectations seem to lie somewhere between these two future extremes, of secure globalization, on the one hand, and blood-chilling system collapse on the other, perhaps especially in the crucial Asia-Pacific "supercomplex" area already alluded to. Although in many ways at the heart of the globalization process, that area has been authoritatively described as "an exemplar of traditional regional security dynamics found largely in the military-political mode. . . . Old fashioned concerns about power still dominate the security agenda of most of the regional powers, and war remains a distinct, if constrained possibility."²⁸ "Realistic" assumptions may also focus on the sheer unpredictability of future events, here as elsewhere. Who can really know what the future may bring? Should we not guard against the consequences of our inability to predict? Naval planning would be much affected by a drift in this direction, and for all these reasons there is a persuasive argument that prudent planners should aim to keep their powder dry in case it does.

This suggests much more of a stress on going forward to the past, on preparing navies for action against other navies rather than largely on the prosecution of collective expeditionary campaigns ashore. These latter may indeed become much less frequent, as we have noted above. They are inspired by a sense of liberal interventionism that is not new but has waxed and waned in the past, according to the vagaries of politics and hard experience. In the last great era of globalization, the British prime minister Lord Palmerston was inclined this way because he thought that “liberalism . . . was far more likely than despotism to produce governments stable, pacific and friendly to England and English trade.” But he was challenged by Lord Melbourne, who argued that on the contrary, such assisted powers “never take our advice . . . treat us with the utmost contempt and take every measure hostile to our interests; they are anxious to prove that we have not the least influence on them.”²⁹ Such interventions, in short, would do no good. Instead the focus should be on the defense of national tranquility and on those who might threaten it directly. These issues come and go—but they do come back again, it would seem.

In a world much less determined by the exigencies of a mutually dependent community of production and consumption, the views of latter-day Melbournes are likely to prevail. Naval preparations would then be framed by analysis of what other possibly competitive navies are doing, and there would be much more emphasis on more “Mahanian” concepts of sea control, along with all the naval disciplines that contribute to the independence of action that this implies. For the United States, China and its navy is the most-discussed prospective peer competitor that might need treating in this way. Other countries in this region may take a similar view or focus on their immediate neighbors instead—or, indeed, as well. All this implies preparation for high-intensity “fleet versus fleet” engagements, as Admiral Sergei Gorshkov used to call them. Relevant capacities are expensive and probably optimized for open-ocean operations rather than land attack. Weaponry and sensor mixes emphasize antisubmarine and antiair warfare, antiship missiles, and so on. For the U.S. Navy this aspiration would seem to suggest a need for strong, fully networked naval forces, centered on carrier battle groups, permanently forward in the major area of concern, and it would also seem to reinforce the inclination toward the high-intensity end of the spectrum, even if this does make cooperative action with allies more difficult. Finally, such an approach also ultimately justifies the maintenance of nuclear deterrent forces at sea and everything that goes with it.

All this suggests a preference for the maintenance of the traditional naval fighting disciplines and a balanced, not a specialized, “contributory” fleet. A resolute defense of a secure indigenous maritime base, if necessary at the price of industrial and commercial cooperation with allies, would also seem to make

sense. The greater the extent to which this is part of a larger national policy to close and defend the economy against external pressure, the more it would be at variance with the free trade conceptions that underpin globalization. Most countries feel such pressures to some extent.³⁰

There is, sadly, no denying that there are tensions between these two approaches in the development of maritime strategy and naval policy. Accordingly, the U.S. Navy, like all the others, needs to make choices as to where the balance is to be struck between them, unless it has the kind of resource base that would allow it to do both as much as it wants to. Given that a resource turnaround of this scale is unlikely, a carefully judged twin-track approach against high-end, state-centric threats, on the one hand, and low-end, people-centered threats, on the other, seems called for. The result could be a novel mix of different types of maritime (naval, marine, and coast guard) forces, in which numbers of platforms are inevitably set against their quality. Although this is currently the subject of a wide-ranging debate about a future maritime strategy for the United States, a debate intended to help produce the answers, this is essentially a political decision that rests on political analysis of the state of the world, its likely future, and the desired future role of the United States.

But here, perhaps, naval planners not only reflect international realities but also mold them. They have an effect—and, indeed, that is surely the point of having navies in the first place. Too much stress on the more competitive variants of naval policy might in some circumstances become something of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as arguably it did in the days before the first and second world wars. Demonizing China and its navy, for instance, is likely to produce just the kind of Chinese navy the United States would not wish to see. That being so, there is much to suggest a policy presumption in favor of the essentially cooperative defense of the sea-based globalized world system, if only from fear of the darker, bleaker world that might succeed it.

NOTES

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1. Tony Blair, *Reflections on 21st Century Security*, speech on HMS *Albion*, Plymouth 12 January 2007.

2. Niall Ferguson, *The War of the World* (London: Allen Lane, 2006), pp. lix–lxii.

3. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Retrospect and Prospect* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1902), p. 144.

4. Thomas Campbell [1777–1844], *Ye Mariners of England*, in Peter Jay, *The Sea! The Sea!* (London: Anvil Press Poetry, 2005), p. 45.

5. The level of this attrition is often forgotten these days. But with the exception of such

- grand disasters as the early days of the Crimean War, the retreat from Kabul, or the battle of Isandlwana, such casualties rarely attracted political controversy, even comment. It was accepted as an inevitable part of the burdens of empire.
6. *Strategic Defence Review* (London: The Stationery Office [hereafter TSO], 1998), introduction, para. 6.
 7. *The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter* (London: TSO, 2002), introduction.
 8. Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1890), p. 23.
 9. "Gates Plans to Use Air Force, Navy Funds to Cover Army Costs in Iraq, Afghanistan," *National Journal CongressDaily AM*, 12 April 2007; George Friedman, "The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power," *Stratfor*, 10 April 2007.
 10. Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of Navies," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 April 2007.
 11. See Geoffrey Till, *Naval Transformation, Ground Forces and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate*, Letort Papers (Carlisle, Pa.: SSI, December 2006).
 12. *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship* (Washington, D.C.: 2007), p. 51.
 13. *Ibid.*, p. 35 [emphasis original].
 14. Barry Posen, "Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony," *International Security* 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5–46, esp. 8–13.
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 16. See Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Newport Paper 28 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007), pp. 101–106, 108–109, et seq., available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/documents/28.pdf.
 17. See "The Commanders Respond," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* (March 2007), pp. 14–31, and "Charting the Course: World Navy Chiefs Look to the Future," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 May 2007, pp. 23–50.
 18. See Paul T. Mitchell, *Network Centric Warfare: Coalition Operations in the Age of US Military Primacy*, Adelphi Paper 385 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006).
 19. This was a problem even in the tsunami relief operation; Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, p. 72.
 20. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have developed the useful notion of the supercomplex in *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003).
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BUILDING PARTNERS' CAPACITY

The Thousand-Ship Navy

Ronald E. Ratcliff

That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill.

Aristotle, *Politics*

In the fall of 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, challenged the world's maritime nations to raise what he called a "thousand-ship navy" to provide for the security of the maritime domain in the twenty-first century. Speaking at the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, Admiral Mullen candidly admitted to the assembled chiefs of navy and their representatives from seventy-five countries that "the United States Navy cannot, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain. It must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use for others that threaten national, regional, or global security."¹ He had voiced the idea a month earlier in an address to students at the College, but he now elaborated the concept:

Because today's challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of this vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity.

As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea . . . advantages such as mobility, access, and sovereignty. . . . We must now leverage these same advantages of our profession to close seams, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure the security of the domain, we collectively, are responsible for. As we combine our advantages, I envision a 1,000-ship Navy—a fleet-in-being, if you will, made up of the best capabilities of all freedom-loving navies of the world.²

Nearly two years after the bold proposal for a multinational maritime force, little progress seems to have been made in constituting this “navy-in-being.” This article argues that the thousand-ship navy, now more generally referred to within the U.S. Navy as the “Global Maritime Network,” or “Partnership,” is an idea well worth pursuing. But the Navy is struggling (perhaps even failing) to build support for it, for three reasons. First, it has not invested sufficient resources—monetary, administrative, or intellectual—to achieve the important goals articulated. Second, the Navy does not appear to appreciate fully the nature of the challenges it faces in overcoming the global maritime manifestation of the classic “tragedy of the commons” (which will be discussed below). Third, despite its rhetoric, the service has not made the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership (TSN/GMP) a part of its current maritime strategy, which raises doubts as to whether such a concept will be incorporated in the new strategy currently being written. The absence of any mention of the thousand-ship navy in Admiral Mullen’s May 2007 testimony before Congress on the status and future of the service seems to belie the importance he has given it in forums involving the international naval community.³ The lack of such official support for the TSN/GMP has likely been interpreted by nations reluctant to participate as a sign of weakness in American commitment to the concept.

This article will present its argument in three parts. The first will address the goals and objectives of the thousand-ship navy/Global Maritime Partnership that have been communicated in such unofficial venues as the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* and *Navy Times*. The second part will examine the challenges the U.S. Navy faces in convincing the rest of the world to expend limited resources on an international navy. The third will identify specific steps and initiatives that need to be given serious consideration if the potential and goals of the concept are to be realized. Unless the U.S. Navy is willing to move beyond the public-relations program that now seems to substitute for serious commitment, this bold concept risks becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations—that is, it will die, and not because it was a bad idea but because the country that proposed it was not committed to it.

A GLOBAL MARITIME SECURITY NETWORK

The rationale for the TSN has largely been seen within the U.S. Navy as emanating from increased international maritime traffic due to globalization. In late 2005, Navy officials asserted, “Promoting and maintaining the security of the global maritime commons is a key element because freedom of the seas is critical to any nation’s long-term economic well-being. . . . Policing and protecting the maritime commons against a wide spectrum of threats is a high priority for all

nations interested in economic prosperity and security that comes from a safe and free maritime domain.”⁴

The service has used a series of magazine articles and speeches by various senior officers, including Admiral Mullen, to explain and build support for the thousand-ship navy. The TSN/GMP is envisioned as an international maritime force, an aggregation of maritime entities, not just of the world’s navies. It would also include the world’s coast guards, seaborne shipping enterprises (shipping lines, port facilities, and other maritime-related entities), and various governmental agencies and nongovernmental bodies. In an effort to head off concerns about sovereignty, the Navy has attempted to make clear that participation would be strictly on a voluntary basis and that the goal is simply to meet the “compelling need” that has emerged “for a global maritime security network, a ‘Navy of Navies,’ to protect the maritime domain and to ensure the lifeblood of globalization—trade—flows freely and unencumbered.”⁵ Ten guiding principles have been established in these public writings and statements for the “Navy of Navies”:⁶

- National *sovereignty* would always be respected.
- Nations, navies, and maritime forces would participate where and when they have *common interests*.
- The focus would be solely on security in the *maritime* domain: ports, harbors, territorial waters, maritime approaches, the high seas, and international straits, as well as the numerous exploitable seams between them.
- While no nation can do everything, *all nations could contribute something of value*.
- The TSN/GMP would be a *network* of international navies, coast guards, maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law enforcement, all working together.
- Nations or navies having the capacity would be expected to *help less capable ones* increase their ability to provide maritime security in their own ports, harbors, territorial waters, and approaches.
- Nations or navies that need assistance *would have to ask for it*.
- Each geographic region would develop *regional maritime networks*.
- To be effective and efficient, the Global Maritime Partnership would have to *share information widely*; classified maritime intelligence would be kept to a minimum.

- This would be a long-term effort, but the security of the maritime domain demands that it *start now*.

To operationalize the concept, the U.S. Navy identified two objectives it considers critical to protecting the world's waterways and facilitating the free flow of trade among nations: increased "maritime domain awareness," through greater collaboration and transfer of information among nations about anything maritime, and positioning of maritime assets so as to be able to respond to crises or emergencies. The Navy views the TSN/GMP as fundamentally a means of sharing responsibility for maritime security—"importing it into regions where it is lacking and exporting it from regions that have the capability and desire to do so."⁷ Proponents argue that the concept is already, to some extent, in being; they regularly point to instances where navies have coordinated operations on an ad hoc basis to achieve necessary and worthwhile goals. Among the most cited are Task Force 150, which operates in and around the Saudi Arabian Peninsula; the Indonesian tsunami-relief effort of late 2004 and 2005; and the Straits of Malacca counterpiracy agreement, known as MALSINDO, between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

Yet despite such efforts to "sell" the idea of a thousand-ship navy, in late 2006 Admiral Mullen felt obliged to seek active support for it at two international maritime conferences. At the Mediterranean Regional Seapower Symposium in Venice and at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Pearl Harbor, he told his contemporaries that it was time to "move beyond dialogue" and to "take tangible steps" that would "put these powerful ideas to work at sea."⁸ He argued three compelling reasons for moving faster to constitute the Global Maritime Partnership. First, the pace of globalization is raising the stakes for security in the maritime domain, where 90 percent of the world's trade passes from production to market; second, globalization has brought, along with its benefits, new vulnerabilities as well, particularly to "ideologues, pirates, proliferators, criminals, and terrorists" who not only are likely to target maritime regions but are "innovative, smart and determined, and [able to] often act—and react—faster than many of our traditional governing bodies."⁹ Third, Admiral Mullen suggested, rapid advances in technology and information technology can significantly facilitate multinational naval operations, but only if nations take advantage of them.

Important as these points are, however, perhaps better explicating the way ahead and accenting the tangible steps the U.S. Navy has already taken to make the concept a reality would make a stronger argument for it. Also, and though the Navy has made clear that it has no desire to dictate the terms of participation, it must provide leadership in the form of action to draw in other navies. Specifically, the Navy would gain greater purchase among the world's maritime

entities by acquiring, employing, and sharing the necessary information and communications technologies than by merely highlighting the possibilities they offer. Operations at sea cannot take place without the means to coordinate the actions of participating units, and they cannot succeed without current and actionable intelligence. Until the Navy can explain or demonstrate how both functions will be accomplished in the TSN/GMP, it should expect only tepid responses from potential participants.

Today, on the eve of the Eighteenth International Seapower Symposium, two years after the thousand-ship navy concept was introduced, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the concept has yet to gain widespread support among the world's maritime enterprises. Despite the success of combined naval operations in highly publicized operations that averted or relieved major human disasters around the world, many countries remain cautious about "joining" or being seen as advocates of the Global Maritime Partnership. However logical and benign the thousand-ship navy seems to the United States, other countries remain openly wary of its intended purposes and possible unintended consequences. They have legitimate concerns, and if the U.S. Navy is to constitute a thousand-ship navy it must address them forthrightly. That challenge is not inconsequential. Hyperbole and rhetorical calls to act for the greater good of a globalizing world will not be sufficient. Indeed, if the logic of the TSN/GMP has clear appeal to many nations, the concept also has weaknesses that if not resolved will likely prove fatal.

"THE TRAGEDY OF THE (MARITIME) COMMONS"

Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.

Garret Hardin

The "maritime commons" comprise seas and waterways either beyond sovereign control of any nation or under the shared sovereignty of two or more. With no single guarantor of their security and well-being, they are attractive for illicit activities. Since September 2001 the U.S. Navy has become particularly concerned about these areas and has called for greater scrutiny over and the "policing and protecting" of those where the collective economic prosperity of the world's trading nations might be threatened.¹⁰

As Admiral Mullen has declared, the expansive maritime commons and the wide range of threats that exist there are beyond the capacity of any navy, including that of the United States, to police or control. The nature of those threats, however, is not self-evident, nor is their urgency commonly acknowledged.

Among the reasons for this, one of the most important is that the benefits that accrue from the maritime commons are not equally shared. Where the United States sees in the maritime common the free flow of commerce, many other states are forced to live with entirely different circumstances. For major trading nations like the United States the concern with respect to the maritime commons is a disruption in shipping, which would cause significant perturbations in the world's economy. Arguably, however, those effects would be brief and quickly overcome. The problems that many other nations face in the maritime commons, however, are not potential but present, not episodic but long term, and they affect "human" security more than national or economic security. These challenges include waterborne pandemics, maritime crime and piracy, the misuse of ocean resources, and the smuggling of contraband goods, people, and drugs. These challenges are largely regional; they do not threaten the global village but constitute a menace to the well-being of local populations.

Thus the "tragedy of the *maritime* commons"—notwithstanding assertions that everyone benefits from the security of the maritime commons, nations benefit so unequally that many see no reason to contribute to it.¹¹ Many nations that lie near or astride important parts of the maritime commons but do not benefit significantly from world trade are hard pressed to justify spending their limited resources to help the world's wealthiest countries get richer. The U.S. Navy's seeming lack of appreciation for these differing equities may account for much of its inability to generate enthusiasm.

This raises an important challenge for the combatant commands—building capacity for partnership through security cooperation. If the Navy is to nurture an international global maritime network of entities that contribute to the maritime domain, it must move past a rhetoric focused on a threat to world trade. It must find ways to make the thousand-ship navy a solution to a wider set of problems.

INTERNATIONAL DOUBT AND RETICENCE

Much of the contemporary naval literature refers to providing for or protecting the "global maritime commons" as if it were a self-evident good. But as we have seen, the reality is that individuals usually only act when it benefits them directly. Aristotle, in the passage quoted above, is likely the first to warn against assuming too much collective good will as being the natural order of things.¹² During the Peloponnesian War, in the fifth century BC, the Athenians made the point harshly to envoys of the Aegean island of Melos (as reported by Thucydides): "You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."¹³

Neither are the navies of the world equals; the U.S. Navy is, and will likely remain for some time to come, completely and absolutely dominant wherever and whenever it chooses to operate. Admiral Mullen's predecessor, Admiral Vern Clark, bluntly stated what most in the service believe, that the U.S. Navy would and should "operate from the maritime domain anywhere, anytime, without a permission slip." While the ramifications of American combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are beyond the scope of this article, it seems apparent that American willingness to "go it alone" gives many nations reasons for reluctance to join a potentially encumbering, if ad hoc and voluntary, arrangement like the Global Maritime Partnership.

ASIAN CONCERNS

India, for example, has been quite candid in its assessment of American interest in the global maritime domain. A recent article in an influential Indian national security publication seems to capture a broadly held sentiment about American intentions.

Among the foremost security concerns of the nation after 9/11 is the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists on its territory and their proliferation through inimical states. The global reach of the predominantly maritime threat and the "overstretch" of the US Navy have led to the initiation of a series of American initiatives like Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), all aimed at mobilizing global support to secure the US "homeland."

A "Thousand-ship Navy" (TSN) is another novel concept; recently defined . . . as "a global maritime partnership that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address mutual concerns." . . . The TSN is thus show cased as a benign initiative, aimed at obtaining the co-operation of "friendly navies."¹⁴

The implication here is that the TSN/GMP is largely an attempt by the United States to secure its homeland while avoiding the controversial aspects of the programs listed above and the legitimate concerns they have generated for national sovereignty. That said, the Indians have also noted, pragmatically, that their nation has much to gain: it would gain access to the U.S. intelligence grid; information sharing would neither impinge on India's sovereignty nor conflict with international law; and participation would provide India politico-diplomatic goodwill, since it is unlikely that it will formally join the Proliferation Security Initiative, at least in the near term.¹⁵

Possibly more surprising has been the assessment by Australian and other Asia-Pacific security analysts that the TSN/GMP is not feasible in Asia because of differing maritime security strategies, divergent perceptions of the maritime

threat, and long-standing and unresolved territorial disputes, particularly in the South China Sea.¹⁶ In this view, China is an impediment to the thousand-ship navy, because of its support of regional maritime projects and agreements that the United States and its principal Asian ally, Japan, have refused to join.¹⁷ Nowhere has this been more evident than in the Straits of Malacca, where the U.S.-sponsored RMSI has drawn heavy criticism from Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Singapore.¹⁸ China, in contrast, has gained extensive diplomatic leverage by calls for nonintervention by other navies in the straits and by financial support of local maritime initiatives. Chinese relations with Taiwan impede some navies from participation in the TSN/GMP. Japan and Korea, however, are strong proponents of the concept, which adds another complication to its implementation because it puts them at odds with China.

China's own strategic calculus and security strategy vis-à-vis the United States are works in progress. Recently, Jerry M. Hultin, former Under Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of U.S. Pacific Command, wrote,

As China's own naval power grows, it will need to fashion a naval policy within a national security policy that supports its own interests. It can cooperate with the United States by coordinating naval strategy and deployments, as do many of America's current allies; it can fashion its own separate strategy, seeking to compete with or displace American strategy, or it can pursue a mixed strategy, combining elements of both approaches.

For its part, the United States will need to make adjustments in its policies and strategies as Chinese military power grows.¹⁹

While the potential exists for the United States to make room for China and other problematic countries, such as Iran and Venezuela, to join the thousand-ship navy, mutual distrust will make it difficult to argue that "everybody is welcome." In point of fact, not everyone is welcome, and the criteria that define "like-minded" interests have yet to be clearly delineated. Yet Russian naval participation in NATO's Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR may provide a model for how countries with competing national interests can participate constructively in the TSN/GMP.

The principles and the goals of the thousand-ship navy are nearly synonymous with those of the *U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security*. The latter is based on three broad tenets: preserving the freedom of the seas, which includes the right of innocent and transit passage and access to the world's ports; facilitating and defending the free flow of maritime commerce; and promoting the movement of desirable goods and people across borders while screening out dangerous people and goods.²⁰ The similarity in terms and concepts is not lost

on those who must decide whether to participate in the Global Maritime Partnership and then justify their choices to domestic authorities who critically examine the cost and kinds of operations their naval forces conduct. Unless compelling reasons can be found that link participation directly to local security, few naval forces will be willing to join, even briefly.

CONTENTIOUS OBJECTIVES AND CHRONIC PROBLEMS

As noted earlier, increased maritime security involves two primary objectives: an effective level of maritime domain awareness must be established, and naval forces must be in the right places at the right times. Both present considerable operational and administrative challenges.

The level of maritime domain awareness necessary to disrupt or eliminate illicit enterprises requires information and intelligence analysis on a massive scale. Information is available in many disparate and potentially valuable forms, such as invoices on maritime cargo, shipping companies, port activity, insurance assessments, fishery area control and management schemes, naval and national intelligence, and countless others. While the TSN/GMP is envisioned as comprising regional maritime networks, the questions of whom these networks would involve, where they would be, and how they would collect, process, and disseminate information are all yet to be resolved. Three exemplars are cited as steps in the right direction: the Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Center in the Mediterranean, the Malacca Strait Patrol Agreement, and Task Force 150, in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz. These efforts have shown the potential of coordinated maritime operations, yet they have also made clear the substantial problems that arise when critical information is classified by a nation. As the U.S.-led counterdrug operations in the Caribbean have shown conclusively, actionable intelligence is the single most important prerequisite for interdicting illicit traffic at sea.²¹

Putting maritime assets in the right location is equally problematic. Most nations do not have the resources to sustain units where they can be most effective. Often, activity of the kind that the Global Maritime Partnership is intended to combat occurs in the waters of the world's poorest nations; their navies find the distances involved too great, but national sensitivity over sovereignty often precludes them from asking for help. In this sense national pride is an impediment to greater cooperation among the world's navies, even in a framework as flexible, informal, and ad hoc as the thousand-ship navy. Additionally, the rules of engagement that govern the actions of each navy begin with national rules and regulations and so may be at odds with the wishes and desires of the United States and its vision for the TSN/GMP. The experience of U.S. intervention efforts in the Western Hemisphere provides numerous examples of conflicting national priorities and perceptions of the issues leading to less than optimal results.²²

Among the critical challenges, then, that confront successful implementation of the Global Maritime Partnership, four stand out. The first is building trust. Long-held animosities, suspicions of other nations' intentions, and the general secrecy that surrounds national security plans affect relations among some of the most important potential contributors to the thousand-ship navy. The list is large—India and Pakistan, China and India, Japan and China, Korea and Japan, Australia and Asia, Southeast Asia and China, Chile and Argentina, and Venezuela and the United States, to name a few—and the issues complicated and often intense. The second challenge concerns capability and capacity. Many navies and coast guards find it difficult to act even when in a position to do so. Most countries' navies are more akin to coast guards. Ships and craft suited for customs and border patrol or for monitoring fisheries and economic exclusion zones are not well suited to dealing with terrorists or proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, the carrier-centric U.S. Navy is ill suited to operations in the littorals.

A third issue involves jurisprudence. Domestic and international law governing conduct on the seas is notoriously vague and complex, which complicates the actions of forces operating within a construct like the Global Maritime Partnership. Individual navies or commanders willing to act consistently with the intent of the TSN/GMP may be overruled by sovereign authorities because of the vagaries of the law. Problems of this sort already impede the kind of cooperation envisioned by the TSN/GMP, and there would be no mechanism within the partnership to resolve them. Finally, there is the issue of communications. While new communications technologies offer many channels, "common operating pictures" and maritime domain awareness require more than Web portals and radio circuits. An operational picture at sea is fluid, and a lapse of information flow for even a few hours can destroy any chance for coordinated or purposeful action.

Nothing in this list is new, but the world's navies have yet to find ways to resolve them. The Global Maritime Partnership is attractive for that very reason to many nations that have been frustrated by other attempts and see in the TSN/GMP at least a promising start. Concrete action and active dialogue, however, must replace rhetoric and pleas for greater commitment on the part of others. If the thousand-ship navy is to survive and grow, the U.S. Navy will need to take a stronger role in constituting a "navy in being," in a way that does not alarm or put off potential participants. It must be more a catalyst than a leader.

TIME FOR COMMITMENT

Long a purpose-built "blue water" fleet, the U.S. Navy continues to struggle mightily to transform itself into a force that can meet the operational challenges

of littoral waters.²³ Moreover, the inability of the Navy, or of its joint and inter-agency partners, to secure the strategic approaches to the United States against drug traffickers despite nearly twenty years of intensive effort speaks starkly to the magnitude of taking on the global maritime commons. Still, the thousand-ship navy makes sense, and for the reasons Admiral Mullen identified in 2005. But unless the U.S. Navy shows commitment to the Global Maritime Partnership by programs and initiatives that directly support it, navies that have not yet signed on are unlikely to do so any time soon.

The U.S. Navy can and should consider seriously a number of steps in order to revive enthusiasm for the thousand-ship navy. The first is to *make it an important element of the forthcoming maritime strategy*. Seapower in the twenty-first century is unique in history. Where once fleet power was determined by the amalgamation of large numbers of capital ships and their escorts, modern weapons make such assemblages dangerous and impracticable. In any case, the world's nations have demonstrated a growing unease about, if not downright unwillingness to follow, American-conceived and -led military operations. A clear and unambiguous statement of commitment to the Global Maritime Partnership in the maritime strategy now being formulated would signal to the world's navies that the U.S. Navy is serious about a global approach to protecting the maritime commons.

Provide clearer guidance about the structure of the TSN/GMP. One of the advantages of the concept is its ad hoc nature, a “come as you are, when you can” approach that frees navies from formal agreements or binding obligations. This is also, unfortunately, one of its greatest weaknesses. Without greater specificity about operating procedures, command relationships, and basic rules of engagement, navies are hard pressed to explain or justify their commitment to their national leaderships. There are several rudimentary steps that the U.S. Navy and committed partners can take to eliminate the less beneficial elements of “ad-hocracy.” One would be establishing a basic command structure dividing the maritime commons into defined operating areas and assigning nominal leadership roles for regional powers. Another would be to delineate a basic set of rules of engagement addressing obvious and necessary restraints and constraints. A third would be linking the TSN/GMP with existing organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and with the antipiracy centers being established in various parts of the world.

Third, *forget GFS and embrace TSN/GMP-FS.* Part of the current Navy strategy is to construct and deploy “Global Fleet Station” (GFS) ships to support the ships of the U.S. Navy and regional partners in a variety of maritime and littoral operations. These ships and the operational ideas behind them show how the Global Maritime Partnership could work and could serve as fleet experiments to

identify operational and administrative problems and facilitate international solutions. A group of dedicated TSN/GMP–Fleet Station ships, under the administrative control of current U.S. maritime component commanders, could be deployed to show Navy commitment to the concept and entice other nations to participate. These platforms could be used as test beds to experiment with command-and-control procedures using common communications equipment and operating concepts.

Make the U.S. Coast Guard a major element of the thousand-ship navy. Few navies have, like the U.S. Navy, the sole purpose of warfighting. Most navies, as we have noted, are more like the Coast Guard, tasked with maritime law enforcement and stewardship of their countries' maritime resources. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that we are really speaking of the "thousand-ship coast guard." Given the kinds of operations that are likely to occupy the Global Maritime Partnership, placing the Coast Guard at or near the vanguard has an indisputable logic. If the TSN/GMP is to be a network of all maritime-related organizations, not just an ad hoc collection of navies, the Coast Guard seems to be the most logical agent to coordinate it. The Navy, then, needs to find the Coast Guard a prominent role in the development and growth of the concept and, relatedly, to consider how the Navy and Coast Guard could operate as a national force in American territorial waters as well as abroad.

Partners must be enabled to see the same operating picture the U.S. Navy does— allies and coalition partners have been telling the Navy that for years, and seemingly endless studies of communication, command, and control only confirm it. Until the U.S. Navy provides a portal through which its partners can tap into its information, it cannot expect them to contribute freely to it. Until the Navy can show that it will give as good as it gets, reluctant partners will continue to have a sound reason to resist meaningful participation.

Finally, if the U.S. Navy is to gain credibility and support for the TSN/GMP, it must *take steps to support and leverage recent efforts by America's political leadership to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)* within the next two years.²⁴ American objections have ranged from concerns about loss of national sovereignty to unease over access to important but often contentious seaways. The unwillingness of the United States to sign an agreement that almost all of the rest of the world has ratified makes advocacy for the TSN/GMP appear hypocritical. UNCLOS is not a perfect document, but such agreements rarely are, and America already purports to abide by its rules; formal ratification should be painless, and it would constitute a major step toward protecting the global maritime commons. The nation must demonstrate that it honors Admiral Mullen's statement that "acting in one's national interest" serves the global interest as well.²⁵

The thousand-ship navy is a concept whose time has come. The U.S. Navy can no longer protect the world's most important waterways alone. Still, the Navy's conception of the maritime commons as being a self-evident good must be modified both in word and in deed. Naval strategies and concepts do not stand in isolation from the particular issues and interests that dictate national security policies. Hence, the U.S. Navy must make clear its firm commitment to, and the benign intent of, the thousand-ship navy through concrete acts. The alternative is to lose the opportunity for an innovative and workable solution to an age-old problem—protecting the freedom of the seas in a time of great uncertainty and peril.

NOTES

- This article appears also as chapter 4 of Derek Reveron, ed., *Shaping the Security Environment*, Newport Paper 29 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2007).
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 8. Adm. Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 31 October 2006.
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. Morgan and Martoglio, "The 1,000-Ship Navy," p. 14.
 11. See Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," *Science* (1968), pp. 1243–48, for a full description of how the "commons" are generally treated and how self-interest overcomes more altruistic notions.
 12. Aristotle's critique of Socrates in *Politics*, Book II, Part III, arises in his comments on Plato's *Republic*, wherein he objects to Socrates' description and advocacy of communal ownership as a "sign of perfect unity in a state," a condition that he calls impracticable.
 13. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: Dutton, 1910; repr. 1914), Book V, chap. 17, "The Melian Conference," p. 394. The translation by Rex Warner in 1954 (New York: Penguin) reads, somewhat more expressively: "The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept" (p. 402).
 14. Gurpreet S. Khurana, "'Thousand-Ship Navy': A Reincarnation of the Controversial P.S.I.?" *ISDA Commentary*, 28 December 2006.
 15. Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India Intrigued by 1,000-Ship Navy Idea," *DefenseNews.com*.
 16. Wendell Minnick, Taipei, "U.S.-Led Proposal Won't Work for Most of Asia," *DefenseNews.com*.
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18. For an overview of the RMSI see Admiral Tom Fargo's address to the Military Operations and Law Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, on 3 May 2004, available at www.pacom.mil/speeches/.
19. Jerry M. Hultin [Hon.] and Dennis Blair [Adm., USN (Ret.)], "Naval Power and Globalization: The Next Twenty Years in the Pacific," *Politique Americaine* (September 2006).
20. *United States National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House), March 2005, available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html.
21. For these issues in one important application, see Craig H. Allen, "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations," *Naval War College Review* 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 35–52.
22. For a detailed discussion of the problems that characterize U.S. government agency efforts to combat the flow of drugs into the United States, see *The Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America*, hearing and briefing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 9 November 2005, no. 109–139.
23. While such initiatives as naval expeditionary warfare forces have been fielded, the Navy's premier program for littoral operations, the Littoral Combat Ship, is in disarray; cost overruns threaten the future of that program. The Navy has yet to build support in Congress for its 313-ship fleet; the LCS episode threatens the Navy's credibility as to whether it can sustain a shipbuilding program to get to that number.
24. On 15 May 2007, President George W. Bush released a formal statement calling on the Senate to ratify UNCLOS.
25. See note 1, above.

GLOBALIZATION OF NAVY SHIPBUILDING

A Key to Affordability for a New Maritime Strategy

Robert J. White

The Navy states that 313 ships are necessary to support U.S. national security requirements. To build this fleet, the service is requesting a significant increase in its shipbuilding budget. Both the Government Accountability Office and the Congressional Budget Office contend that the Navy request underestimates true shipbuilding costs. Worse yet, current budget pressures and historical budget trends leave even the lowest budget figure in jeopardy. How then can the Navy make its plan affordable? To meet shipbuilding requirements it must look beyond domestic industrial sources and fully exploit the comparative advantages of globalization.

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Globalization exploits the advantages of multiple countries through not only labor and technology but also “trade, finance, production, and even the rules of national economies and how they relate to each other.”¹ Its impact on manufactured goods is complex and widespread. Today the meaning of an American or Japanese label on a computer or automobile is problematic, in that over two dozen components come from more than half a dozen countries.² A “made in the United States” security requirement has become an arcane vestige of the industrial age. At best, it is a comfortable fantasy. At worst, it is a waste of national resources. In practice, in fact, it is already a fiction. One needs to look no farther than the HARM, Patriot, and Tomahawk missiles or the “Marine One”

presidential helicopter to realize that foreign sourcing is already well under way in military systems.

Can global production reduce the Navy's shipbuilding cost risk? This article examines such a strategy to rationalize the budgetary means with the shipbuilding goals of the U.S. Navy.³ The service needs to exploit the efficiencies of foreign shipyards to meet its force planning goals. Globalization should be embraced as an affordability measure within the new maritime strategy now being formulated.

THE 313-SHIP NAVY

The United States is a maritime nation. "More than 80 percent of the world's trade travels by water and forges a global maritime link."⁴ As a result, American economic prosperity is contingent upon the freedom of the seas, and U.S. Navy primacy is the only reliable guarantor of that freedom for the United States and the international community. To maintain that primacy, in February 2006 the Navy laid out the details of a new plan for a 313-ship navy.⁵ During congressional testimony the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, stated:

The 2007 Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels is an investment plan that is both executable and affordable based on balancing several factors: naval force operational capability, risk, and the ability of the shipbuilding industrial base to execute the plan. . . . Full funding and support for execution of this plan is crucial to transforming the Navy to a force tuned to the 21st Century and built upon the foundation of Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet. . . . As part of the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] process, the Navy used a capability-based approach to calculate the size and composition of the future force. . . . The analysis concluded that a fleet of *about 313 ships is the force necessary* to meet all of the demands and to pace the most advanced technological challengers well into the future, with an acceptable level of risk.⁶

If we accept at face value the figure of 313 ships as representing the tools required to execute the Navy's portion of grand strategy—that is, to support national goals with acceptable risk in the envisioned security environment—what remains is to rationalize resource constraints. Unfortunately, while the Navy believes the plan is executable and affordable, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sums up the reality of the situation: "The Navy plan requires more funds than may reasonably be expected."⁷

The Cost Risk of the 313-Ship Navy

In press reports even before Admiral Mullen's comments, the Navy announced that it would require an average of \$14.4 billion annually for new ship construction over the next thirty years.⁸ This represented a 37 percent increase over the 2000–2005 average of \$10.5 billion in annual new ship-construction funding.⁹

A 2006 GAO report questioned the accuracy of the Navy estimate. It analyzed the cost growth in the construction of four ships, each the “lead ship” of a new class, over the period from fiscal year (FY) 1996 to 2006. This analysis revealed an average increase of 27 percent over initial budget estimates.¹⁰ According to the report, the Navy plan scheduled nine new lead ships for construction between fiscal years 2006 and 2016.¹¹ The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is even less confident than GAO in the Navy’s numbers. Because of significant cost growth in recent Navy shipbuilding programs, the CBO projects the actual requirement to be \$19.5 billion, a 35 percent increase over the Navy estimate—and a nearly 100 percent increase over recent budgets.¹² Add on a CBO estimate of support ships missing from the Navy plan, and the annual costs reach \$21.7 billion (see figure 1).

FIGURE 1
AVERAGE ANNUAL SHIPBUILDING COSTS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 2007 DOLLARS PER YEAR)

	New Construction Only
Navy shipbuilding budget in recent years	10.5
Navy estimate of cost of 30-year plan	14.4
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan	19.5
CBO estimate of cost of 30-year plan plus additional ships needed to fully support all elements of 313-ship fleet consistently over the long run	21.7

Source: Adapted from O’Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans*, p. 17.


Funding Risk

Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have increased the need to replenish and replace existing weapon systems. For this purpose the Department of Defense doubled its planned investments in ongoing major weapons programs over the Future Years Defense Plan for 2001 to 2006, from \$700 billion to \$1.4 trillion, and increased its annual procurement budget 33 percent, from \$75 billion in 2006 to \$100 billion in 2010.¹³ These increases will cover present weapon system procurement but little more. On top of this, the new Navy shipbuilding plan doubles required funding from \$8.7 billion in 2007 to \$17.2 billion in 2011 and maintains it at that level.¹⁴ Worse yet, the Navy plan, the Army’s Future Combat System, and the Air Force’s F-22A Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter programs will be competing for increased procurement funds simultaneously.¹⁵ In this environment can the Navy truly expect to receive 17 percent of the 2011 Defense procurement budget for new ship construction alone, when it receives around 10 percent today?¹⁶

Further, Navy and Defense Department requirements are not the only pressures on discretionary funding. Rising costs for health care, education, veterans

affairs, transportation, natural resources, and the environment all make rising claims on this same pot of money. The fiscal reality becomes even bleaker when three facts are considered. First, the administration took on the global war on terror and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq while cutting taxes. Second, Defense Department funding is historically cyclical, and a downturn is now likely (see

FIGURE 2
NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY, FY 1946–2011



Source: Steven Kosiak, *Historical and Projected Funding for Defense: Presentation of the FY 2007 Request in Tables and Charts* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 7 April 2006), p. 4.


figure 2). Finally, Defense funding is shrinking as a percentage of gross domestic product (or GDP—see figure 3). In fact, the defense budget is to be cut from 3 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.4 percent in 2024.¹⁷ Realistically, an increase in neither the Navy “top line” (total allocation) nor the Defense Department budget should be expected.

THE NAVY CONTINGENCY PLAN

Admiral Mullen acknowledges that funding for his plan must come out of the existing Navy budget top line.¹⁸ The Navy contingency plan therefore relies, according to the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, on the confluence of five factors: limiting increases in personnel costs, prioritizing shipbuilding budgets and construction rates, limiting increases in operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, reducing research-and-development (R&D) funding, and preventing upward “requirements creep” and cost growth in shipbuilding programs.¹⁹ Unfortunately, these factors are not completely within Navy control.

The first of these factors, personnel costs, currently accounts for 65 percent of the Navy budget. The service is reviewing personnel requirements with a view to reducing this figure. Military personnel needs were studied in FY 2006, while civilian personnel and contractor services personnel will be studied in fiscal 2007 and 2008, respectively. But the effectiveness of reducing personnel costs to hold or reduce the budget line may be limited by congressionally mandated raises in pay (i.e., military/civilian pay-parity actions in every year of the Bush administration except 2007) or end strength, as the Army experienced in 2006. The second factor, prioritizing shipbuilding, means lowering funding in other

FIGURE 3
NATIONAL DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS A SHARE OF GDP, FY 1910–2011



Source: Kosiak, *Historical and Projected Funding for Defense*, p. 12.

procurement accounts (aircraft, weapons, etc.). This is not practical, given the influence of aviation in a carrier-based Navy and the need for smart standoff weapons (cruise missiles, extended-range munitions, etc.) for the high-priority “strike” mission. Of what use is a carrier strike group without aircraft and weapons?

Third, the Navy’s plan to

limit O&M costs is contingent upon keeping surface ships on line for their full thirty-five-year service-life expectancy; in fact, however, ships remain in service for significantly less time.²⁰

Fourth, reducing R&D costs is problematic. Arguably, the U.S. Navy’s fundamental advantage is in technology. It is not possible to build “upon the foundation of Sea Power 21 and FORCEnet” without innovative research and the developmental technologies it generates. Even if the Navy were in the future to use only commercial off the-shelf (COTS) technology, R&D funding would be required to ruggedize equipment for shipboard use and integrate it with existing systems. Further, Defense acquisition training stresses that the cost of fixing problems in a new system escalates by orders of magnitude as it matures from an idea through design to production and deployment. Thoroughness in the research and development phase is the key to avoiding these problems. How then will a reduction in Navy R&D funding limit cost growth in a ship’s construction or its logistical and maintenance support once in service? Experience shows just the opposite. The fifth and final factor, limiting upward pressure on requirements and therefore cost, may be a bridge too far, as evidenced by the GAO and CBO studies. Moreover, aside from mission, it is the rapid pace of technology that drives requirements creep.²¹ So if holding the line on requirements may limit cost growth, it will also diminish the technology advantage that ships take to sea.

Innovative thinking, then, will be required if the Navy is to build the 313-ship fleet. What keeps the Navy from building affordable warships?

DOMESTIC SHIPBUILDING

The commercial American shipbuilding industry is virtually nonexistent. What remains today is wholly dependent on a domestic market guaranteed by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (known as the Jones Act).²² Though once competitive in the world market, U.S. industry no longer exports any vessels.²³ Today, commercial vessels can be built in South Korea for a third of the price of comparable ships built in the United States.²⁴ In fact, a Korean shipyard can deliver a new ship for what an American shipyard pays for steel alone.²⁵

The American military shipbuilding industry is concentrated in six shipyards run by two prime contractors.²⁶ Their sole customer is the U.S. Navy. As the Navy shrank from the eight-hundred-ship fleet of World War II to the roughly 280-ship fleet of today, the shipbuilding industry consolidated. Unfortunately, however, while the Navy modernized, industry fell behind. Facing no competition, U.S. shipyards became inefficient and outdated. Today's U.S. Navy combatants are highly sophisticated and more lethal than ever, yet they are constructed in essentially the same manner as they were sixty years ago. Instead of reinventing processes to remain competitive as foreign shipyards did, U.S. yards relied on "Buy American" legislation. Analysis completed in 2005 showed that Navy and industry initiatives are closing the productivity gap with foreign shipyards;²⁷ nonetheless, American shipyards remain fifteen years behind foreign peers.²⁸

Industry blames low and unstable production rates for high material costs and low productivity. But those factors have existed for sixty years. Moreover, toward the end of the Cold War the Defense Department recognized that military demand would no longer generate the economies of scale required for affordable production. The present emphasis on dual-use technology, relaxation of former requirements to use military-specification components where industry specifications are sufficient, and the preference for COTS items wherever possible have all been outgrowths of that realization. Unfortunately, their effectiveness has been limited by the segregation of U.S. shipbuilding between the commercial and military sectors. Few shipyards work in both.²⁹

Commercial shipbuilding, then, depends solely on protectionist legislation, and military shipbuilding hides conveniently behind national-security claims. The Department of Commerce states this claim succinctly: "It is essential that the capability and infrastructure needed to build these [military] ships is resident in the United States because it provides added assurance that they can be built, repaired, and maintained during times of conflict."³⁰ The problem with maintaining such a "surge" capability is twofold. First, as the Commerce Department freely admits, maintaining excess industrial capacity drives up cost and degrades competitiveness. Between 1997 and 2002 the cost of a surface combatant rose 30 percent above inflation;³¹ in comparison, competition and overcapacity

in shipyards on the world market drove the price of a new commercial vessel down 19 percent.³² Second, the complexity of modern combatants renders a World War II–style mobilization entirely infeasible.³³ In fact, a three-to-five-year construction cycle means that a warship ordered at the beginning of a conflict is not likely to be available before the end.³⁴ Further, it is plainly unrealistic to believe that all foreign shipyards in friendly and allied countries “would simultaneously turn down revenues and deny access.”³⁵ Finally, as early as 1988 the national security strategy recognized that defense industrial mobilization is not a unilateral matter but requires coordination between the United States and its allies. In the words of President Ronald Reagan, “Fortress America is an obsolete concept.”³⁶

GLOBALIZATION OF PRODUCTION

Globalization is not new. Certainly the increasing rate of globalization since World War II is significant, but as Stephen Brooks contends in his book *Producing Security*, the real difference in the latter half of the twentieth century was the introduction of geographically distributed production.³⁷ In this “globalization of production” an item may cross international borders repeatedly in various stages of manufacture. Finished products can represent “work done in ten, twenty, or even thirty countries.”³⁸ Cheap transport and the free flow of capital allow companies to combine the advantages (e.g., in labor costs, technological prowess, heavy industry, banking, government subsidies, etc.) of any number of countries in a single product. Such cost-benefit analysis is continual: when the advantage shifts, so too does capital, always seeking the path of least resistance.

Unlike Sir Norman Angell in his famous book *The Great Illusion* (1912), Brooks does not guarantee peace or forecast the end of war. Instead, he concludes that the globalization of production is a new economic force for increasing international security. He adds it to the list of other great-power stabilizers, such as “democratic peace” (the presumed disinclination of democratic states to go to war), nuclear weapons, and international institutions.³⁹ He draws a second conclusion as well: “No state, including great powers, can now effectively remain on the cutting edge of military technology if it does not pursue significant internationalization in the production of weaponry.”⁴⁰ The opportunity cost of autarky is too high: it wastes resources replicating goods and services available competitively abroad; worse still, it denies these resources to the exploitation of domestic advantages.

Military shipbuilding requires a combination of heavy manufacturing and high-tech systems integration. Foreign shipyards have the heavy manufacturing advantage in building ships of low to medium complexity for the bulk transport and cruise industries. For its part, the United States designs and builds the most advanced warships in the world. The American shipbuilding advantage resides

in the area of complex combat systems that integrate shipboard, and increasingly offboard, weapons fire control, sensor, and navigational systems. Integration is the value added by U.S. industry.

Assume for the moment that U.S. Navy, federal, and state government funds were available to bridge the fifteen-year gap between American and foreign shipyards. There is no doubt the United States could eventually become competitive on the world market. But what is the opportunity cost of spending these resources to develop heavy manufacturing? Is internationally competitive shipbuilding the “value proposition” of the Navy after next? No. The Navy says the future resides in FORCENet systems that integrate today’s platform-centric combat systems with tomorrow’s off-board manned and unmanned sensors and systems. That places the focus on developing and building these network-centric technologies. This is the indigenous technology necessary for national security, not heavy industry. Globalization of warship production would allow the United States to focus on its strengths today and tomorrow.

Globalization in U.S. Military Systems

Global production of military systems, like globalization itself, is nothing new. In fact it is a firmly established trend, even within the U.S. military. The presidential helicopter (actually a squadron of them), known as “Marine One,” is a case in point. Presidents have been flying in Sikorsky helicopters since 1957.⁴¹ Sikorsky is a U.S. company and a subsidiary of United Technologies, another American company. Yet today’s Sikorsky Marine One variant of Sea King aircraft, the VH-3D, contains a cockpit made in Taiwan, a fuel system and landing gear made in Brazil, a tail fin and stabilizer made in the People’s Republic of China, and a main cabin made in Japan.⁴² The VH-71, which will become the Marine One aircraft in 2009, will be a foreign design built by Lockheed Martin fronting for Agusta Westland, a joint British and Italian firm.⁴³ Is the Marine One of today or tomorrow truly “made in the United States”?

In 1992 the Commerce Department studied subcontracting in three Navy weapons systems: the Mark 48 Advanced Capability (ADCAP) Torpedo, the AGM-88 High-Speed Anti-Radiation (HARM) Missile, and the VLF Digital Information Network (VERDIN) communications system. It found that 13 percent of subcontracting went to foreign firms.⁴⁴ A 2006 Defense study found that 2 percent of all weapons system procurement went to foreign prime contractors. In fact, a detailed analysis of twelve weapons systems, including the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC3) Missile, the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, and the Tactical Tomahawk Missile, indicated that 10 percent of subcontracts went to foreign vendors.⁴⁵ In contrast, only 4 percent of the material purchased by military shipbuilders is of foreign origin.⁴⁶

A Quick Calculation: Global Warship Production

Global warship production would allow the Navy to combine the advantages of heavy manufacturing in foreign shipyards and systems integration in the U.S. defense industry.⁴⁷ Assume that the cost of a domestically manufactured warship without its combat system is \$200 million. Since, as evidence suggests, high-tech combat systems account for roughly one-third the total cost of a ship, completing the vessel adds \$100 million, for a total of \$300 million.⁴⁸ But a South Korean yard could build the same ship, less its combat system, for \$67 million. Add back in the U.S.-built combat system, and the total outlay is \$167 million—the globally manufactured warship is just over half as expensive as the domestically produced vessel. Granted, this is an oversimplified comparison; for instance, the additional outfitting costs of integrating the hull with the combat system would be substantial. Yet there is plenty of room to pay for outfitting at a domestic shipyard, as well as for “unknowns” like requirements growth, and still save money.

A THOUSAND-SHIPYARD NAVY

Like all new initiatives, global production of warships is not without risk. First, ownership of resources means that shipyards are available when needed; reliance on foreign yards weakens this guaranteed availability. Whatever the financial incentives of foreign industry to deliver, politics creates a whole different calculus for foreign governments. But this risk can be “bought down,” by spreading it across multiple international partners—a “thousand-*shipyard* Navy.” The vision is illuminating. It connotes a network of international partners, information sharing, and interoperability like that underlying the “thousand-ship Navy.” Friends, allies, and partners find ways of working together. A recent case involving the delivery of a German-built MEKO-type frigate to Australia illustrates this flexibility: the German government refused to send the vessel directly to the Persian Gulf, because of policy disputes over Iraq, but it was more than willing to allow delivery in Australia itself.⁴⁹

Domestic resistance can easily be envisioned as well. Congress, industry, and unions are certainly stakeholders and must be included in the strategy development process. Objections to foreign sourcing are well known. They revolve around loss of jobs, industrial facilities, and, consequently, political clout.

Certainly the risk of losing U.S. jobs is significant. The aircraft and automobile industries are examples by which to gauge the potential impact. Yes, jobs were lost, and industry was threatened as foreign sources were introduced. To mitigate the risk to domestic shipbuilding, then, start small with a single new class. Use Northrop Grumman or General Dynamics, owners of the six major domestic naval shipyards, as the system integrator and final outfitter (or divide

the two functions between them). As success builds, more classes can follow; if the strategy falters, it can be modified or scrapped while domestic capacity remains. In the aircraft and automobile industries, international competition greatly increased the productivity of American workers and increased pay commensurately. Both industries survived and rewarded customers with better products. Similar results are reasonable to expect in the shipbuilding industry.

Political objections need to be addressed with Congress, in advance and then continuously thereafter. “Buy American” restrictions increased sharply in the 1980s, but waivers and exceptions are available to circumvent them.⁵⁰ In addition, recent defeats of new restrictions are evidence that these hurdles can be surmounted when addressed proactively.⁵¹ Finally, as the current wrangling over the VH-71 presidential helicopter proves once again, all agreements are subject to constant maintenance and review.⁵² But in the end, as stated by the Department of Defense in its 1989 report on “Buy American” restrictions, “The United States could not build Fortress America even if this were a desirable object. Nor could the Department of Defense reverse worldwide economic trends, such as the internationalization of manufacturing.”⁵³

The first step to global production warships is to separate high-tech combat and mission systems from the remainder of the vessel. The Navy is already starting down this path with the introduction of “mission modules” for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This allows the Navy to build a multimission hull, specialized for given tasks by swapping modules in and out. This partitioning would have the additional advantage in a foreign-sourcing context of separating export-sensitive technology. The Navy can foreign-source a hull without export-restriction issues. This concept also isolates within the mission modules any requirement changes involving high-tech development. Separating risk in this way would improve the Navy’s ability to manage cost growth associated with requirements-and-mission creep, as identified in Admiral Mullen’s contingency plan. It would also facilitate replacing outdated combat systems during overhaul periods.⁵⁴ This in turn would reduce modernization costs required to keep surface combatants fully mission capable over their entire intended service lives. Achieving full service life reduces O&M costs, at least for new ship classes, again per the Navy’s contingency plan.

The second step is to procure the hull abroad. Our quick calculation showed that the Navy can reduce costs by buying hulls from foreign sources, buying combat systems domestically, and then paying a domestic shipyard to fit out the hulls with its systems and set them to work. Unfortunately in the case of LCS, hulls were bought domestically. Just four months after launching the first ship, the Navy was forced to issue a stop-work order and then subsequently cancel LCS-3 because of significant cost overruns on the construction of LCS-1 and

projections for LCS-3.⁵⁵ Speculation puts “significant” at anywhere from an additional \$100 million to \$200 million.⁵⁶

One of the most important challenges facing the U.S. Navy is recapitalizing the fleet for the future. Whether the service decides to remain based on nuclear aircraft carriers or change its focus to alternative vessels, it will need to build ships—and shipbuilding costs continue to rise. The Navy understands that it is unlikely to receive additional shipbuilding funds. Therefore, its current approach to building the fleet involves “nested” strategies to contain shipbuilding costs, generate business efficiencies, and free up funds from other areas. To do so the Navy must, as we have seen, limit increases in personnel costs, prioritize shipbuilding budgets and stabilize construction rates, limit increases in operations and maintenance costs, reduce research and development funding, and prevent requirements creep and cost growth. This shipbuilding strategy is fraught with risk. It is contingent upon factors the Navy may influence but cannot control. Worse still, it does not exploit U.S. defense industry strengths; it trades away high-tech competitive advantage for what is at best heavy industry parity.

In 1988 President Ronald Reagan stated, “Even if we could afford, economically and militarily, to chart our National Security Strategy without allies—which we cannot—we would not want to do so.”⁵⁷ Twenty years later, the “Thousand-Ship Navy Global Maritime Network” and the global production of new ships both support that implied desire for cooperation in a new maritime strategy.⁵⁸ In the thousand-ship navy, cooperation is achieved as a “fleet” regionally coalesces behind common security goals and objectives. In global production, cooperation is further enhanced by market economics. In the worldviews of the United States and its partners, security and economics are mutually supporting, and both are compelling. They are two sides of the same coin. If a “thousand ships” can work, so can a “thousand shipyards.”

NOTES

1. Jeffrey D. Sachs, “The Geography of Economic Development,” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, 4th ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), p. 266.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
3. For the purposes of this article consideration of foreign shipbuilding will be limited to conventionally powered surface craft and will exclude nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
4. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security* (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2005), p. 1. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html.
5. U.S. Navy Dept., *Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2007* (Washington, D.C.: 6 February 2006).

6. U.S. Navy Dept., *CNO's Posture Hearing FY 2007 Budget*, statement of Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, before the House Armed Services Committee, 1 March 2006, p. 17, available at www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/testimony/ [original emphasis]. FORCEnet: "The operational construct and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the Information Age, to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land." Naval Network Warfare Command, *FORCEnet*, forcenet.navy.mil/fn-definition.htm.
7. U.S. Government Accountability Office [hereafter GAO], *Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy's Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan*, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management, testimony before the Subcommittee on Projection Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-06-587T (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 30 March 2006), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06587t.pdf.
8. New construction excludes conversion programs and nuclear refueling. The number actually reported was \$13.4 billion, which the Congressional Budget Office assumed was in 2005 dollars. For all analyses it uses 2007 dollars, which equates to \$14.4 billion. Eric J. Labs, *Resource Implications of the Navy's 313-Ship Plan* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 16 December 2005), p. 1.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
10. GAO, *Defense Acquisitions*.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Ronald O'Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 16 August 2006), p. 16.
13. GAO, *Defense Acquisitions*, p. 6.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
16. The figures were \$8.9 billion in 2007 and \$85 billion in 2007, compared to \$17.2 billion in 2011 and \$100 billion in 2010. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
17. Adam Talaber, *The Long-Term Implications of Current Defense Plans and Alternatives: Summary Update for Fiscal Year 2007* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, October 2006), p. 3.
18. "Navy Sets Shipbuilding Goals Requiring Big Funding Boost," GovExec.Com, *Daily Briefing*, 8 February 2006, www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0206/020806cdam1.htm.
19. Robert Work, *Know When to Hold 'Em: Modernizing the Navy's Surface Battle Line* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 20 September 2006), p. 3.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
21. Mark V. Arena, *Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen? A Macroscopic Examination of the Trends in U.S. Naval Ship Costs over the Past Several Decades*, RAND Report MG-484 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006), p. xviii.
22. Industrial College of the Armed Forces [hereafter ICAF], *Shipbuilding 2006* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Spring 2006), pp. 2-4.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
25. ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2005* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2005), p. 8.
26. ICAF, *2002 Industry Studies: Shipbuilding* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 6 November 2002), p. 2.
27. U.S. Defense Dept., *Global Shipbuilding Industrial Base Benchmarking Study Part I: Major Shipyards* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Industrial Policy], Spring 2006), p. vii, available at www.acq.osd.mil/ip.
28. ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2006*, p. 3.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
30. U.S. Commerce Dept., *National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry* (Washington, D.C.: May 2001), executive summary, p. 11, available at www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/OSIES/DefMarketResearchRpts/.
31. Based on the average annual increase in "real terms" from FY 1961 to FY 2002. Arena, *Why Has the Cost of Navy Ships Risen?* p. xvi.

32. John Birkler, *Differences between Military and Commercial Shipbuilding: Implications for the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence*, RAND Europe Report MG-236 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005), p. 67.
33. ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2001* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2001), p. 11.
34. ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2006*, p. 10.
35. Ibid.
36. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, 1988), p. 2.
37. The fundamental difference between international trade and the globalization of production is that not only raw materials and finished products cross international borders but also unfinished products in various stages of manufacture. For example, cotton harvested in one country may cross one border to be made into cloth, then another border to be cut into pieces, another to be assembled into a shirt, and another finally to be brought to market.
38. Sachs, "The Geography of Economic Development," p. 264.
39. Robert Jervis defines the "great powers" as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Russia and China are not great powers, because of the unknown stability of their regimes. Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (March 2002), pp. 1–13.
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45. U.S. Defense Dept., *Foreign Sources of Supply: Assessment of the United States Defense Industrial Base* (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Acquisition, Technology & Logistics]. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Industrial Policy], April 2006), available at www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/.
46. U.S. Commerce Dept., *National Security Assessment of the U.S. Shipbuilding and Repair Industry*, executive summary, p. 9.
47. The notion that "purchasing hulls overseas and adding systems in the U.S. could reduce costs" is briefly mentioned in ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2006*, p. 10.
48. Ibid., p. 6.
49. Royal Australian Navy officer attending the Naval War College's Naval Command College, conversation with the author, January 2007.
50. Brooks, *Producing Security*, pp. 100–103.
51. Ann Roosevelt, "Senate Defeats Buy American Amendment," *Defense Daily*, 23 June 2004, p. 1.
52. Christopher J. Castelli, "Winter Rules Out Moving VH-71 Production Overseas," InsideDefense.com, 28 March 2007.
53. U.S. Defense Dept., *The Impact of Buy-American Restrictions Affecting Defense Procurements* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1989), as cited in Brooks, *Producing Security*, p. 91.
54. ICAF, *Shipbuilding 2006*, pp. 13–15.
55. The stop-work order to Lockheed Martin applied only to increases beyond the anticipated \$220 million and \$197 million for LCS-1 and LCS-3, respectively. General Dynamics, as the second contractor, is continuing work. It should be noted the GD version of LCS is of Australian design and is being manufactured in Mobile, Alabama, at Austal Shipyard, a subsidiary of Austal, Australia. U.S. Navy Dept., *Navy Statement on LCS Stop Work Order* (Washington, D.C.: 12 January 2007), available at InsideDefense.com; and U.S. Defense Dept., *Navy Terminates Littoral Combat Ship 3* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 12 April 2007) available at GlobalSecurity.org.
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- cost under \$300 million and its second around \$250 million. Christopher P. Cavas, "LCS Hits 'Considerable Cost Overruns,'" DefenseNews.com, 11 January 2007.
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MODERATOR'S REPORT

Legal Experts' Workshop on the Future Global Legal Order

Craig H. Allen

In late 2006, as part of its multifaceted effort to help the Chief of Naval Operations develop a new, contemporary maritime strategy for the nation, the Naval War College convened a “Delphi group” of experts—in this case, in international law—to provide the maritime strategy development team a candid assessment of the probable state of the global legal order in 2020. The workshop, chaired by Craig H. Allen, the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, was held 31 October–1 November 2006 in the College’s Decision Support Center (equipped with an advanced World Wide Web–based group collaboration and decision-support system), in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

In addition to four faculty members of the College’s International Law Department, thirty-eight outside experts participated, drawn from the United States and ten other nations. (The list of participants is available on the Naval War College Press website.) The group included military and coast guard legal advisers; attorneys from the Defense, State, Justice, and Homeland Security Departments and from the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia; law professors; an attorney specializing in commercial maritime law; and the director of the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.

The experts participated in their personal capacities, on the understanding that no views would be attributed to any nation, agency, or individual. They were provided advance copies of the questions that would be asked and six “strawman” legal futures that would be considered during the workshop. They were also given a list of materials that might provide helpful

Professor Allen, of the University of Washington School of Law (where he is Judson Falknor Professor of Law), was the Charles H. Stockton Chair in International Law at the Naval War College for 2006–2007. He chaired the NWC Legal Experts' Workshop discussed in this article.

background: the Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Naval Operational Concept* (2006); National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future* (2004); Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Seven Revolutions* (2006); Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Project on National Security, *Forging a World of Liberty under Law* (2006); and the UN secretary-general's high-level panel report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility* (2004).

RELEVANT CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER

Most organizations assume that the world in front of us is basically continuous—that tomorrow will be like today. . . . On the contrary, we live in a time of perpetual discontinuity, a time in which bombshells and shockers are part of everyday life.

PETER SCHWARTZ

The legal experts' workshop began with a presentation of the principal law-related findings of the 24–25 August 2006 Geo-Strategic Environment Workshop (GSEW) held at the Naval War College. The GSEW findings were summarized in a “geostrategic grid” comprising six analytic dimensions: economic, energy, environment, governance, technology, security/law, and demographics. The GSEW analysis of the governance and security and law dimensions revealed significant concern about the vitality of international law and institutions. For example, the GSEW concluded that “some international organizations are looking long in the tooth and incapable of coping with emerging challenges.” Another expressed concern over the fact that “bilateral agreements are on the rise as international organizations continue to fall short in their objectives.” Those concerns and others raised a number of questions that warranted closer examination by legal experts.

The experts considered, without formally adopting, several propositions as possible starting points for the workshop. They included the propositions that:

- A robust and respected global legal order, founded on respect for the rule of law, would save lives by providing predictability, preventing conflicts, and providing effective and peaceful means to resolve conflicts that do arise.
- Military operations that conflict with international law are more likely to fail in achieving the desired end state.
- Any maritime strategy must be adapted to the global legal order in which it will function.
- The future global legal order is uncertain but can be estimated.
- The future global legal order can to some degree be shaped.

Following the scenario-based planning approach advocated by, among others, Peter Schwartz (author of *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*) and former National Security Council planner Philip Bobbitt (now law professor at the University of Texas), the experts considered six possible future global legal order scenarios for 2020. The first three focused on the degree and direction of change in the legal order (from significant growth to regression), one posited a shift from globalism to regionalism, and a fifth posed the possibility of a collapse of the global legal order. A sixth scenario posited a dynamic global legal order that defied the foregoing, essentially linear approach. The suggested characteristics of this sixth future scenario included:

- There would be no single future global legal order—the global legal order of 2020 would be multifaceted.
- International relations, international law, and international institutions would be in a constant state of flux, as they would have to be in order to adapt.
- The roles of international law and institutions would wax and wane in response to changes in leadership (international, national, and non-governmental); their effectiveness in responding to crises, chronic problems, human rights abuses, and demands for reform; the state of the economy; and perceptions of key stakeholders.

The Baseline

The experts ultimately chose an approach that looked at the likely changes from the existing “baseline” global legal order. Although they were not asked to define the baseline, they reviewed some broad parameters before turning to the changes. Among the baseline considerations discussed (but not resolved or voted on) was that any discussion of the global legal order must include not only the obvious treaties, customary international law, and Security Council resolutions but also the transnational application of national laws, decisions of international tribunals (courts and arbitral tribunals), and “soft law.” In some Muslim states the Sharia also plays an important, even preeminent, role. Second, these laws may come into conflict with each other or otherwise create uncertainties. One uncertainty singled out for discussion was the relationship of Security Council resolutions to existing international law, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Third, U.S. planners must appreciate the important role of international law and institutions in perceptions regarding the legitimacy of state action. Legitimacy perceptions will be critical in the increasingly difficult task of building coalitions. A fourth baseline consideration was that the United States must understand that not all states implement and enforce laws in

the maritime domain in the same way. Foreign navies and coast guards may play roles quite different from their American counterparts, particularly in the area of law enforcement.

Governance Issues

The legal experts were only slightly more optimistic about international organizations and national institutions than were the GSEW experts. Seventy-eight percent agreed with the latter that some international organizations are “long in the tooth” and incapable of coping with emerging challenges. A majority also agreed that as international organizations and global treaties fall short, more states will rely on bilateral approaches. They almost universally (92 percent) agreed that the effective power of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will grow significantly between now and 2010. When later asked if it is likely that future maritime security operations will require the U.S. Navy to coordinate with NGOs more often, 38 percent believed they would. One expert believed that there would be much more pre-response engagement with NGOs.

The experts overwhelmingly (72 percent) listed the United Nations Security Council as the most influential international organization in global affairs; the European Union (EU) was a distant second at 45 percent, followed by the Group of Eight (G-8)* at 40 percent. There was less agreement on the future course of the Security Council.

A majority of the experts predicted that the UN Charter would be amended to expand the veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council beyond the present five. Those who predicted an increase foresaw up to twenty permanent members, though most put the number at from seven to ten. One expert reminded the group that before it would be legally binding on the United States any amendment would have to receive the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, leading to the possibility that much of the world might ratify a change to the Charter that the United States rejected.

All of the experts believed that it is likely (62 percent) or very likely (38 percent) that the Security Council will pass more “legislative” resolutions in the coming years—as it has done with respect to international terrorism, in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in UNSCR 1540. A slight majority believed that the Security Council would eventually impose upon Iran proliferation-related sanctions that could require maritime enforcement (which it later did, in UNSCR 1747). That might have significant consequences for the U.S. Navy and its partners in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean. More generally, however, 83 percent of the

* The Group of Eight, established in October 1975 to facilitate economic cooperation among the members: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

experts believed that in the foreseeable future the Security Council would—even where it has found, under Article 39 of the Charter, that a given situation threatens international peace and security—authorize enforcement measures in only about half the cases.

There were fifty-one member states when the UN was established in 1945; today there are 192. Most of the experts believed that the number of states will increase by 2020. They differed, however, in how high the number would go; estimates ranged up to 225, the average being approximately 200. In a world that increasingly operates on a one-nation/one-vote rule, U.S. influence would be diminished. The experts discussed the extent to which the international legal order (global or regional) enhances or impedes the ability of the United States to respond unilaterally as a primary actor. They also discussed whether the universality of global “rule sets” and institutions was hindered by their growth on the regional level. Opinions on the latter question were mixed. Some saw the relationship between global and regional approaches as complementary; others believed they can come into conflict and that regional approaches can undermine the unity of effort needed to solve global problems.

The experts widely believed that failing states will be a significant problem in the coming years. One cited a study that provided a disturbing estimate: twenty states that have already failed, twenty that are in danger of failing, and twenty that are borderline. The total accounts for nearly one-third of the states in the world. Failed states present a number of challenges. One challenge the experts briefly considered was massive migrant/refugee flows.

Regional Developments

Opinions on regional issues were mixed. One expert opined that global problems require global solutions but that states often do not have the capacity to implement those measures without regional cooperation. It is also clear that UNCLOS, particularly Part XII on protection of the marine environment, calls for global or regional solutions. One expert pointed out that regional rule sets often fill actual gaps in the global rule set or provide alternatives better adapted to a given regional identity (e.g., the Pacific Islands Forum states).^{*} The group seemed particularly moved by the warning of one expert that “regional” measures pertaining to enclosed and semi-enclosed seas—such as the Straits of Singapore/Malacca, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean, Baltic, and Red Seas—should be monitored closely. Those measures have the potential to impact significantly on navigation rights.

^{*} Formerly the South Pacific Forum, established 5 August 1971 to promote regional cooperation in political matters between the sixteen members: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.

Several experts believed that as the national security stakes go up, if the Security Council fails to take sufficient action on WMD proliferation, regional security organizations or coalitions will feel compelled to act. Some experts discussed the possibility of greater delegation by the Security Council to regional organizations. The fact that at least one such organization, NATO, now responds out of its area is a significant development. One expert suggested that the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)* be closely watched. If ReCAAP succeeds in improving the security conditions in the Malaccan Straits, the idea may catch on. Regional arrangements may also extend their interest or protection to pipelines and submarine communication cables on the seabed, which are vulnerable to accidental or intentional damage or destruction.

Many of the experts expect more regional development in laws governing fishing and environmental protection. One of the experts pointed out that, for his nation, regional solutions are a necessity, not a luxury; regions must marshal resources to meet some of their challenges. One expert thought there was a good possibility that regional port-state control organizations (the United States participates in several) will evolve beyond their present safety and environmental-protection focus to take on maritime security. With their large vessel owner/charterer databases and access to the Automatic Identification Systems, port-state control organizations will be favorably positioned to conduct the analysis necessary to detect anomalies.

Nonproliferation and Disarmament

One-third of the experts expressed a belief that if North Korea and Iran join India, Israel, and Pakistan as nuclear-weapons states, the already fragile Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty will collapse. One suggested that we could soon be facing a world of thirty nuclear-weapons states. The experts' answers to certain related questions are revealing (figure 1).

A majority of experts were skeptical of the efficacy of Security Council-ordered sanctions. Asked "What will be the likely effect of UNSCR 1718 sanctions against North Korea?" they answered as shown in figure 2 (at this writing it is still unclear what course North Korea will take). Interestingly, most experts did not believe the United States should lead any maritime enforcement of sanctions against North Korea. Seventy-five percent thought China should conduct any necessary maritime interdiction operations, with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia, and NATO also getting large support. Most thought that any such operation should be multilateral; one suggested that a UN-based force would

* Entered into force on 4 September 2006, with fourteen states ratifying to date: Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Viet Nam.

FIGURE 1

Do you believe that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will survive if North Korea and Iran join India, Israel, and Pakistan as non-NPT-compliant nuclear-weapons states?	Yes: 68% No: 32%
How likely is it that the Security Council will impose sanctions against Iran for violations of UNSCR 1696?	Likely: 53% Unlikely: 47%
How likely is it that the Security Council will impose sanctions against Iran for NPT violations that will require maritime enforcement?	Likely: 47% Unlikely: 53%

have the greatest legitimacy. Whether future maritime enforcement actions against North Korea would have to be reconciled with the existing UN cease-fire agreement was not posed directly to the experts.

The nuclear nonproliferation challenge will almost certainly grow. A rapidly growing demand for nuclear power applications, in response to oil scarcity and carbon emission concerns, means there will be significantly more fissile material in circulation, which could be diverted to nuclear or radiological devices. The future challenge of preventing proliferation and safeguarding nuclear materials while in storage or transit will be significant. The International Atomic Energy Agency's visibility will also grow.

The regime for missile technology (including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles) is very weak, as the interdiction of the M/V *So San*—which violated no laws transporting Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen—demonstrated.* The fact that Iran provided Hezbollah with both unmanned aerial vehicles and antiship cruise missiles demonstrates the urgency of the mission and of the at-sea enforcement, missile-defense, and force-protection challenges.

Jus ad Bellum: Law Governing Resort to Armed Force

We cannot accurately characterize the security threat environment of 2025; therefore we must organize and arrange our forces to create the agility and flexibility to deal with unknowns and surprises in the coming decades.

GENERAL PETER PACE, USMC, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The law governing a state's resort to armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state is governed by articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. In the coming years, that law might not have the flexibility needed to meet the threat environment described by General Pace in his Chairman's Assessment of the 2006 Quadrennial Review, particularly with regard to threats posed by transnational terrorist networks and WMD proliferators.

* For the *So San* incident, see, in the *Naval War College Review*, Craig H. Allen, "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations," vol. 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 42–43.

FIGURE 2

Sanctions will have no effect on North Korea's nuclear weapons or missile programs but will result in further hardships to the North Korean people.	54%
Sanctions will persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons and missile programs, accept IAEA safeguards, and return to Six-Party Talks.	21%
Sanctions will simply force North Korea to be more covert about its programs.	21%

A significant minority of the experts (43 percent) believed that the majority of states do not accept that “anticipatory self-defense” is lawful under the UN Charter, insisting that a state is justified in using armed force only after it has been the victim of an armed attack. Of the experts holding that a majority of states *do* accept the principle of anticipatory self-defense, 59 percent believed that the principle was limited to situations meeting the test set out in the *Caroline* case—that is, immediacy, proportionality, and necessity.* Some experts believed that growing concerns over WMD proliferation will cause more states to soften their stance against preemptive use of force, particularly as they come to appreciate the consequences of the fact that nation-states have lost their historical monopoly on the large-scale use of force. Absorbing an “armed attack” before responding may be untenable if the attack is by WMD.

One expert cited two areas of concern in the *jus ad bellum*. The first is its treatment of transborder responses by one state against another that is supporting terrorists who attack across the border. The second area concerned responses to states that harbor such terrorists. The expert who made that point warned that decisions by the International Court of Justice on “self-defense” must be carefully monitored.

The experts cited some continuing gray areas in the law. For instance, is an attack on a merchant vessel, submarine cable or pipeline, offshore platform, satellite, unmanned vehicle, or computer network an “armed attack” justifying the attacked state in using force to defend itself? One development to watch for is the forthcoming definition of the crime of “aggression” by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Most of the experts (78 percent) thought it was unlikely that the majority of states will accept the argument that the “duty to protect” justifies humanitarian intervention to halt gross human rights abuses in the absence of an authorizing Security Council resolution. Given the number of potentially failing states, this is sure to be more widely discussed.

Jus in Bello: Law of Armed Conflict

Some experts predicted that states and NGOs will increasingly argue that everything in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions represents customary international law and is therefore binding on all states whether they are party to

* For a discussion of the legal principles established by the 1837 *Caroline* case see Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defense*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 184–85.

the protocol or not (the United States is not). They warn that one of the international tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice or one of the international criminal tribunals, might hold to that effect in the near future. Some also point out that the decision might not come from an international tribunal but instead from U.S. federal legislation or the Supreme Court.

Several experts warned that the law of armed conflict might evolve in a way that steadily narrows the use of force, by taking increasingly strict positions on military necessity and proportionality. One expert opined that the law of armed conflict is already a virtual arms control treaty. When asked if the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah would lead to efforts to further restrict the rules regarding proportionality (e.g., collateral damage or casualties), 40 percent thought it would. There is already considerable debate within the American Society of International Law on this subject—most of it highly critical of Israel.


The experts saw the law of armed conflict as an area in which the U.S. Navy can help shape the law, through participation in international negotiations and conferences with relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations. It is also an area that may present more interoperability issues in the coming years, as allies and coalition partner states come to the game with different law of armed conflict rule sets and different rules of engagement.

Law of the Sea

The experts who spoke out all voiced strong support for U.S. accession to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and frustration over the continued delay in its doing so. (The convention's system of seas, zones, airspace, etc., is summarized in figure 3.) Some described experiences demonstrating that being a nonparty is a source of considerable friction, if not a disability, in dealing with other states on maritime issues. Most believed that the United States would in fact accede to the convention either by 2010 (60 percent) or by 2015 (83 percent). Significantly, President Bush formally announced on 15 May 2007 that he was urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the convention during the current session of Congress.

A significant minority of the experts expressed concern about the stability of navigation rights codified in the UNCLOS (see figure 4). In answer to a related question on what they believed would have the most influence on the construction and application of UNCLOS in the next ten years, they ranked the influences as follows (beginning with the most influential): state practice; processes in intergovernmental organizations other than the UN (e.g., International Maritime Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization); decisions by international tribunals; and the annual UN process (the Informal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, and the General Assembly review).

**FIGURE 3
UNCLOS ZONES AND LIMITS**



On the influence of state practice, several experts were very outspoken on the need to pay particular attention to practice by the United States. The U.S. push to extend its laws into coastal waters in the name of security or environmental protection will, they argued, encourage other states to do the same, leading to an erosion of navigation rights.

FIGURE 4

Will the innocent passage regime remain stable until 2020?	62% yes 38% no
Will the innocent transit regime through international straits remain stable until 2020?	59% yes 41% no
Will the archipelagic sea lanes passage regime remain stable until 2020?	49% yes 51% no

As one expert warned, one cannot focus on the innocent-transit passage regimes through the territorial seas without also carefully watching what coastal states (including the United States) are doing in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). As he put it, “If you can’t get through the EEZ, you will never get to the international strait.” The experts further warned that navigation rights of warships and military aircraft should not be the sole focus but that the navigational and overflight rights of the merchant vessels and commercial aircraft so vital to military logistics and to the vitality of international trade should also be considered.

Maritime zones were briefly discussed (Israel having imposed a “blockade” on Lebanon less than four months before the workshop). One expert warned of the often-overlooked connection between navigation rights and freedoms and *jus ad bellum*: If the doctrine of preemptive self-defense grows, could a state

bordering the Strait of Hormuz attempt to close it to all navigation in the name of coastal-state “self-defense”?

The experts made one prediction that suggests a potential new partner in the quest to protect freedom of navigation: 72 percent of the experts believed that in the coming years China will regularly patrol waters more than a thousand miles from the Chinese coast.

A majority of the experts believed that more marine protected areas will be established between now and 2020. Management plans for these areas may incorporate a variety of navigation restrictions to protect vulnerable ecosystems, perhaps including vessel reporting and movement systems, pilotage requirements, routing measures and areas to be avoided, and discharge restrictions that exceed the standards of the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (or MARPOL, as modified in 1978). Fifty-one percent of the participants believed that more than 10 percent of the oceans will be designated as maritime protected areas by 2020; 24 percent put the number at 34 percent or more. Another source of concern to freedom of navigation will be boundary-delimitation disputes over offshore areas (particularly those with oil and gas) as states attempt to exclude foreign vessels from disputed waters.

One expert with extensive personal knowledge and experience on the subject pointed out that the executive branch of the U.S. government is poorly organized for making balanced ocean-policy decisions. The National Security Council-led Policy Coordinating Committee, Oceans Sub-Policy Coordinating Committee, on which the Navy serves, seldom meets. As a result, the Committee on Ocean Policy (led by the Council on Environmental Quality) dominates the ocean policy agenda, and in a way that favors environmental protection over freedom of navigation.

The experts were cautious regarding the legal status of sea-basing vessels and unmanned vehicles, some expressing the belief that their status has not been authoritatively determined. One urged that the U.S. Navy should not assume that other states will accept its position without question. Another argued that sea basing must be distinguished from “navigation.” Unmanned vehicles will not necessarily be accorded the same navigation and overflight rights as manned craft, particularly as armed unmanned vehicles become more common, and at least one expert considered the case for claiming sovereign immunity for them weak.

Ninety-five percent of the experts predicted that in the coming years more states will claim the legal right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in and over their EEZs. At the same time, 92 percent believed that more Mediterranean states will assert EEZ claims; presently, only Egypt and Cyprus have made full EEZ claims.

The discussion made it clear that the answers of some of the experts regarding coastal-state control over military activities included intelligence and hydrographic collection activities. One expert pointed out that China takes the position that all such collection activities fall within the UNCLOS provisions for marine scientific research and would therefore require coastal-state consent before they could be carried out in the two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ.

Environmental Laws Applicable to Military Operations

The experts predicted that restrictive environmental regulations will increase both in the United States and overseas. Those regulations would extend to vessel and aircraft discharges, including air and sound emissions (i.e., sonar). The regulations would take several forms, including conditions on basing and port and landing restrictions, and some would increasingly extend the coastal zone out to two hundred nautical miles. As mentioned earlier, the experts also foresaw an increase in the portion of the seas that will fall within marine protected areas of various kinds. Canadian claims over Arctic waters will take on added importance if future ice conditions in those seas open a northern interocean route to ordinary surface vessels. One expert warned that the immunity or exemption for warships and other public vessels from applicable coastal-state environmental laws may be eroding. Moreover, an increasing number of laws hold commanders personally liable for violations by their vessels or aircraft.

One expert warned that the G-77* states, a body that operated so effectively during UNCLOS III, is once again driving the Law of the Sea environmental agenda within the annual Informal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea. Navigation rights are not of great concern to G-77 states. The experts urged the U.S. Navy to join the Department of State in fully engaging in the Consultative Process or it might find its interests underrepresented. The same is true at the International Maritime Organization, where the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency might push for a position inimical to Navy and merchant-marine mobility interests. One expert noted that shipping NGOs (e.g., the Baltic and International Maritime Council and the International Chamber of Shipping) are engaged in the same issues.

Some experts were worried that environmental regulations applicable out to two hundred nautical miles—both in the United States and overseas (especially the EU and Australia)—would open the way to what one called the “territorialization” of the exclusive economic zone, by which he meant that the EEZ regime would be as pervasive and restrictive of operations as the territorial

* The Group of Seventy-seven, so called for its original membership, now includes 130 states and the Palestine Liberation Organization. It was established 15 June 1964 to promote economic cooperation among developing countries.

sea regime. The experts cautioned the Navy to pay careful attention to domestic legislation, both federal and state, because such regulations may prove to be the first and worst to encroach upon freedom of navigation. One expert pointed out that UNCLOS, because the United States is not party to it, is not a treaty under Article VI of the Constitution and that therefore some courts will be reluctant to hold that the international law of the sea preempts conflicting state laws.

Four potential consequences of the increasing scope of environmental regulations were identified. First, they will make it harder to conduct combined operations, thereby limiting the U.S. Navy's ability to overcome interoperability problems (the RIMPAC '06 sonar litigation is a case in point). Second, they will make it more difficult to obtain overseas bases or to enter foreign ports or land at foreign airports. Third, they will expose commanders and their subordinates to enforcement actions by foreign governments. Finally, they will make weapons training more difficult. Although the United States can offset some loss of live training with "synthetic" training, that technology is not available to most other nations.

Accountability of Military and Civilian Personnel

The experts most familiar with accountability issues saw little or nothing in that realm favorable for the U.S. military in the future. The expectation is that more conduct will be criminalized and that more states will seek to prosecute American service members and civilians. It is to be expected that some status-of-forces agreements and visiting-forces agreements will have to be renegotiated to give host states more extensive jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Article 98* agreements will be harder to come by. More states may claim universal jurisdiction over certain offenses (particularly those within the jurisdiction of the ICC), and more states may adopt laws equivalent to the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. Some states may be expected in the not-too-distant future to refer a U.S. service member to the ICC. The chilling effect this would have on officials, commanders, and ordinary service members must be considered.

Allies and partner nations may find their freedom of action further limited by regional legislation or judicial decisions (e.g., the European Court of Human Rights), making it harder to attract coalition partners and increasing legal interoperability challenges. In the near future we may well see rulings from international, regional, and national courts that will send a chill through commanders and their subordinates. We should also expect to see more "commander liability" laws imposing personal liability for environmental violations. As a result, commanders might increasingly feel compelled to take out professional liability insurance and to keep criminal defense attorneys on retainer.

* That is, agreements negotiated under Article 98 of the Rome Statute protecting U.S. nationals from surrender for prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Law Enforcement/International Criminal Law

When asked what they thought the greatest threat was to the sea lines of communication (the conversation included international straits), 47 percent answered criminal activities or terrorism. Piracy was listed by only 5 percent of the experts. The majority (69 percent) of the experts did not believe that the international criminal law regime will evolve sufficiently between now and 2020 to effectively address transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation networks, maritime trafficking (in narcotics, weapons, and humans), or piracy, in the absence of significant military assistance. However, some did believe that by 2020 terrorism and trafficking in narcotics or humans could become crimes of universal jurisdiction or grounds for an expanded right of approach under Article 110 of UNCLOS.

One expert pointed out that many of the missions listed under “maritime security operations” in the *Navy Operational Concept* require law enforcement authority and that at present the only authorization the Navy has from Congress is for piracy and counterdrug enforcement. Perhaps (the question is unclear) the Navy should reconsider its stance on the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and the related Department of Defense directives. One expert reported significant and unresolved tensions with the PCA in the U.S. Northern Command area of responsibility.

The experts were also asked to express their opinion on future trends in enforcing laws in the maritime domain. When asked what proportion of flag states would be willing and able to exercise effectively their jurisdiction and control over their ships outside their own waters, none thought that 80 percent would be able to do so; the majority (71 percent of the experts) thought that only 40 percent or less of the flag states would. As to which states would likely see their roles in maritime law enforcement grow the most, 61 percent of the experts believed it would be coastal states, followed by the “willing and able states” (19 percent, some citing NATO and Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] states), port states (16 percent), and flag states (2 percent).

Several experts raised questions regarding the use of force in law enforcement operations. Some wondered whether any use of force, even warning shots or disabling fire, raises issues under the UN Charter. Others believe that force used by a vessel engaged in law enforcement against a nongovernment vessel to compel compliance (to stop or board) raises questions regarding probable cause, reasonableness, and the necessity to compel compliance but not Article 2(4) use-of-force questions. The issue is squarely presented by UNSCR 1718, which authorizes “inspections” but cites Article 41 for its authority, implying that no armed force can be used.*

* Article 41: “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

Intelligence/Information

The experts identified a number of links between intelligence and the law of the sea. There was concern that more states may assert the position that no intelligence collection can take place in or over a state's two-hundred-nautical-mile EEZ unless prior consent is obtained from, and all information obtained is shared with, the coastal state. Disputes over laws governing intelligence and hydrographic collection activities by air (e.g., the April 2001 EP-3 dispute with China) and sea (China's March 2001 protests concerning USNS *Nathaniel Bowditch*) in a coastal state's EEZ are a potential flashpoint, particularly with China and North Korea.

The experts believed that the breadth and depth of persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other collection sources—including many open sources, like Google Earth and Digital Global—together with the growing and increasingly networked databases, will vastly increase our maritime domain awareness, as well as that of adversaries. At the same time, the U.S. Navy will itself grow increasingly transparent, eliminating its potential for achieving surprise and increasing its force-protection challenge. Nevertheless, the difficulty of sifting through a global merchant fleet that now numbers over six hundred thousand vessels (as the UN Conference on Trade and Development reported in 2006), 270,000 of which are registered in “flag of convenience” states, to detect anomalies will be daunting.

Legal issues in intelligence and information sharing will also present a growing challenge in the coming years. More laws in the United States and EU that make it more difficult to share information are to be expected, as well increased hostility in Congress to some collection methods. Moreover, federal courts cannot be expected to continue to shield intelligence broadly from disclosure under the Classified Information Procedures Act.

Migrants/Refugees

The United States is certainly not alone in its struggle to stem the flow of illegal migration. Australia and the Mediterranean states also have serious problems. The experts discussed several scenarios that could trigger massive migrant or refugee flows. As mentioned above, 73 percent of the experts were of the opinion that the present legal regime on refugees is inadequate to handle such large movements.

CONSEQUENCES FOR MARITIME SECURITY MISSIONS

Linear analysis will get you a much-changed caterpillar, but it won't get you a butterfly. For that you need a leap in imagination.

ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

After examining changes in the global legal order, the experts turned to a discussion of the likely effects those changes might have on maritime security missions. They were first given a list of twenty-two missions listed in the current *Navy Operational Concept* and asked which would likely no longer be necessary in 2020. Only two of the twenty-two missions received many votes for elimination: pollution response (52 percent of the experts) and marine resource protection (33 percent). Surprisingly, 11 percent thought deterrence and maritime law enforcement could be eliminated by 2020, and 5 percent said the same about sea control and Security Council sanctions enforcement.

Defense Missions

Few of the experts forecasted significant change to the national defense missions of the Navy, other than the earlier suggestion by 11 percent that deterrence would no longer be necessary (it is unclear whether these answers referred only to strategic deterrence). Some appear to suggest that counterterrorism and counterproliferation will be of such a scale as to present a greater demand for a national defense response. This will almost certainly be the case if (when?) another 9/11-scale attack or a WMD attack occurs. One discussion focused on ballistic missile defense; however, the experts were not polled on the matter. Several experts offered extended comments on potential growth in enforcement measures ordered by the Security Council (a MOOTW mission, about which more is said below). Those views focused on sanctions enforcement against North Korea or Iran and on the likelihood that failed states would create threats to international peace and security requiring intervention. Enforcement actions against North Korea or Iran would carry a significant risk of escalation. It was also noted that North Korea presents two significant threat potentials: escalation during counterproliferation/Security Council enforcement operations and the kind of collapse that could trigger a massive refugee flow.

Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW)

Most of the comments regarding the global legal order changes that are likely to affect naval missions fell within the MOOTW rubric. Some saw an increasing demand for counterproliferation, counterterrorism, maritime intercept operations, maritime law enforcement, humanitarian relief, and freedom of navigation operations. Several predicted that maritime law enforcement will become the dominant naval mission in the future. A majority of the experts expected an upturn, perhaps a sharp upturn, in the demand for maritime interception operations, particularly those conducted under a Security Council resolution, or outside such a resolution, to interdict WMD or delivery systems. They were less sure about the legitimacy and viability of an interception scheme if the underlying legal regime collapses. For example, if the Non-Proliferation Treaty were to collapse after

reaching a tipping point of renunciations, the underlying legal prohibition on the transfer of fissile materials or nuclear technology would disappear.

Some experts expected that concern over proliferation would lead a large number of states to ratify the 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention.* The protocol's amendments to Article 3 will extend the prohibitions on the transfer or transport of WMD, while amendments to Article 8 will provide new authority for boardings by states other than flag states. When the protocol enters into force, demand for interdiction operations may rise appreciably; however, it is doubtful that the U.S. Navy or Marine Corps will have authority under American domestic law to take enforcement action under it. Accordingly, any maritime enforcement by the United States would be carried out by the Coast Guard.

Several events could trigger a need for a rapid surge response, including a pandemic, natural disaster, or a collapsed state that triggers a massive refugee flow. Planners should understand, it was suggested, that the global legal regime for such crises is grossly inadequate. With up to sixty states failed, failing, or on the borderline, there will be a continuing need for naval evacuation operations and for an offshore stabilizing presence.

Means and Methods

The experts predicted that future Navy maritime operations will be more joint (85 percent), more combined (94 percent), and more interagency (88 percent). One warned that the transition to interagency operations under the “lead federal agency,” “supported-supporting agency” approach will present much more of a challenge than will the transition to joint operations. The majority did not believe that future operations will more often be coordinated with or directed by the UN (68 percent) or with NGOs (62 percent). Friction due to legal interoperability issues and pressure on foreign navies to avoid operations with the navies of states that do not subscribe to their full rule set (UNCLOS, Geneva Protocol I, etc.) may make it increasingly difficult to form coalitions. When asked what factors they believed would be most influential in persuading other states to join a global maritime partnership (formerly referred to as the “thousand-ship navy”), they answered: shared interest (79 percent), economic incentives (8 percent), threat concerns, gaining access to information held by partners (2 percent), and a pledge to promote and abide by the rule of law (2 percent).

“THE RULE OF LAW AT SEA IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING”

The legal experts' workshop began the U.S. Navy's “conversation with the country,” indeed, with the world—a conversation that is an integral part of the

* Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992. The 2005 Protocol to this convention has not yet entered into force.

maritime strategy development process. The experts are to be commended for their seriousness of purpose and their willingness to share their views on this vital matter. Plainly, they have demonstrated the wisdom of groups.

The geostrategic environment has been described as one characterized by rapid change. Although that is certainly true in some of the dimensions covered, such as technology, it is less true of the legal regime. Because the law tends to evolve relatively slowly, it can serve as a stabilizing force to promote public order. That said, however, it is clear that the experts believe that the global legal order will in fact evolve between now and 2020 and that those changes will alter the context in which the new maritime strategy operates. A number of experts forcefully stated that it would be a mistake for the U.S. Navy or the maritime strategy to portray international law *only* as a restriction on freedom of action. They clearly saw international law as an “enabler” as well.

There is an appreciable risk of an erosion of navigation and overflight rights in coastal waters and of high-seas freedoms in the coming years. The potential instability of the 1982 UNCLOS regime is exacerbated by the failure of the United States to accede to the convention. “Shaping” activities by the United States and like-minded nations (perhaps including China in the not-too-distant future)—through strategic communications and diligent, consistent diplomacy that focuses on shared interests and continued freedom-of-navigation exercises—will be indispensable to protecting existing freedoms. For the United States, the task begins at home, where overreaching legislation and presidential proclamations to enhance coastal security or environmental protection provide a template for other states.

The military profession will be increasingly challenged by the likely changes in the law of armed conflict and expanding personal-responsibility doctrines. The challenge may include an expansion of criminal prohibitions, assertions of jurisdiction by more states, or refusals to adhere to restrictions in existing status-of-forces/visiting-forces agreements on host-nation jurisdiction. The potential for a chilling effect on the willingness of members of the national security profession to take action or even travel abroad bears careful watching.

The U.S. Navy should expand its participation in global and regional fora with responsibility for the development of domestic and international law relating to the law of the sea (including provisions applicable to merchant vessels and military and commercial aircraft). It should pay, the experts felt, particular attention to the UN annual process on ocean affairs and the law of the sea, the International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization, and, within the United States, the oceans policy working groups.

All of the experts agreed that the new maritime strategy should affirm the place of international law in maritime security. As one expert put it, international law “is the foundation on which we operate; it is why we are there and it defines the

parameters of everything we do.” Respect for international law does not mean abandoning rights protected by UNCLOS or acquiescence in attempts by other states or NGOs to further restrict rules governing the use of armed force. As one expert pointed out, to achieve the objectives established by higher-level strategy documents, this nation must employ diplomatic and information measures to “shape” international law. Accordingly, the new maritime strategy should:

- Acknowledge the central role of international law in protecting *the balance of state interests* in the oceans. Embrace the law of the sea as both a long-standing guarantor of the right to use the seas, as well as a set of carefully calibrated restraints on the exercise of those rights, to guard against abuses.
- Emphasize that freedom of navigation and overflight is not merely a U.S. interest, but a global interest, and that we must act cooperatively to protect those freedoms for merchant vessels and civil aircraft as well as warships and military aircraft.
- Acknowledge that the rule of law at sea is not self-executing. Without effective enforcement measures, compliance levels may not be adequate to meet the need for public order on the seas. Although international law assigns primary enforcement responsibility to the vessels’ flag states, we must recognize that not all flag states are willing or able to fully comply with their international obligations. The same can be said for a number of port states and coastal states. The common interest in maritime domain security urgently requires all states to take joint action to close these gaps.
- Pledge to redouble Navy efforts—in close partnership with the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce and Homeland Security—to encourage the new Senate to provide its advice and consent to U.S. accession to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

MODERATOR’S NOTE

This report is based on the Web-IQ answers and written and oral remarks of the participants. The experts were not asked to approve it, and it does not necessarily represent the individual views of any given expert or of the Naval War College. The workshop “record” consists of: graphics produced on the second day recording the experts’ oral suggestions of the first day; moderator’s notes taken on the second day; forty-seven pages of Web-IQ summarized answers; and the handwritten submissions of twenty-five experts on a

handout prepared and circulated on the second day. The chairman/moderator culled from that record those opinions most relevant to the maritime strategy development project. The moderator prepared a separate summary of suggestions regarding issues the experts felt deserved closer examination in a dedicated legal conference. The Peter Schwartz epigraph is from his *Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in Time of Turbulence* (New York: Free Press, 2004).

Mr. Bollinger is a senior vice president with the international consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, specializing in global aerospace and defense issues. He is also a published author on Soviet maritime history. His Stalin's Slave Ships: Kolyma, the Gulag Fleet, and the Role of the West was published by Praeger in 2003. He is currently completing a seven-year project on the history of the ships of the Soviet merchant fleet from 1917 to 1950, which he expects to publish in 2008. Mr. Bollinger holds a BSFS in international economics from Georgetown University and an MBA from the Wharton School.

DID A SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP ENCOUNTER THE PEARL HARBOR STRIKE FORCE?

Marty Bollinger

Over the past two decades several authors have advanced the proposition that a Soviet freighter, traveling from the west coast of North America to Vladivostok in Russia's Far East, encountered the Japanese carrier attack force bearing down on Hawaii in the days before 7 December 1941. There is further speculation that this merchantman reported its contact to Soviet authorities, or that the circumstances surrounding its voyage indicate that the Soviets knew of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. In any case, such warning was either not passed on to American authorities or was delivered but not acted upon. Therefore, it is argued, this incident is further evidence of duplicity in the events surrounding America's entry into World War II, though views differ as to whether that charge is most appropriately leveled against the U.S. or Soviet government.

This scenario has become fodder for observers ranging from serious academics to conspiracy theorists.¹ But did it happen? A careful review of the data, including detailed shipping records in late 1941 from both Russian and American sources, suggests this encounter was highly improbable and that much of the controversy is based on confusion and misunderstanding about the ships involved and the routes they would have taken.

EVOLUTION OF THE CONTACT SCENARIO

Authors have advanced several variations of a scenario involving the interception of the Japanese carrier force by a Soviet merchant ship, and the story has evolved over time, as have the identities of the Soviet ships in question. One of the earliest accounts, and the only one to describe a specific encounter, was published in 1979 in *The Reluctant Admiral*, a biography of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto by Hiroyuki Agawa.² Though Agawa does not suggest that the encounter is part

of a broader conspiracy and does not even say the ship involved was Soviet, his book is nonetheless the “patient zero” of this controversy. Agawa describes an encounter that took place on 6 December, Tokyo time, which was still 5 December in Hawaii:

In fact, on December 6 the [Admiral Chuichi] Nagumo force did catch sight of one passing vessel of a third nation. Those in command of the task force watched the progress of the ship in question, a merchantman, with an extraordinary degree of tension. Had it shown any signs of radioing a report on the movements of the task force to anyone else, it would probably have found itself at the bottom of the sea within a few minutes. The vessel, however, must have thought that the Nagumo force was a fleet engaged in exercises—or possibly it made a correct guess as to its purpose and was too scared to signal its find—for it soon disappeared from sight without anything happening.³

If true, this scenario puts the intercept at a location about 950 nautical miles north of Hawaii in the vicinity of latitude 37° north, 161° west, just two days before the infamous attack. Unfortunately for those wishing to track down the original sources, Agawa does not provide a reference for this story or even a bibliography, and the ship and its nationality remain unspecified.

In 1985 a retired American rear admiral, Edwin T. Layton, citing Agawa’s version of an encounter, contributed an additional scenario in his *“And I Was There”*: *Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets*.⁴ Layton labors to advance several possible explanations for mysterious radio signals detected by a radio operator aboard *Lurline*, a Matson liner operating in the Pacific in early December 1941. It is often reported that these signals, picked up between 1 and 3 December, and in a form not intelligible to *Lurline*’s radio operator, must have been from the Japanese strike force.⁵ These signals, and the circumstances surrounding the subsequent loss of the *Lurline*’s radio logbook, have long served as substantiation for conspiracy theorists regarding American foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Layton puts forward the hypothesis that the Soviet steamship *Uritskii* could have been the source of these radio transmissions.⁶ He notes that the Japanese admirals at sea had been warned by their counterparts ashore to be on the lookout for two Soviet ships operating in the North Pacific and postulates that one of them had to have been *Uritskii*, since it left San Francisco on its way to Vladivostok about the same time as the Japanese fleet left the Kuril Islands for its attack on Pearl Harbor. Layton also repeats Agawa’s story of an encounter at sea on 5 December (Hawaii time) and concludes that “the timing and location of the contact reveal that the vessel sighted by the *Kido Butai* [special attack force, i.e., the carrier strike force] could have been only *Uritskii*.”⁷

Independently of any encounter at sea, the voyage of *Uritskii* also plays a vital role in Layton's complex theory that the Soviets knew of the Japanese plans in advance.⁸ This theory is based on his observation that the United States never intercepted any warning sent by Japanese spies in San Francisco back to Japan regarding the sailing of *Uritskii* on a possible converging course with the attack fleet. In a bit of tortured and incomplete logic, Layton argues this lack of a warning suggests collusion between the Soviets and Japanese and that therefore the Soviets had to have known of the plans in advance. Layton further suggests that at least some of this information may have made its way to President Franklin D. Roosevelt by 26 November, either intercepted by U.S. intelligence or provided by the Soviet premier, Iosif Stalin, to the United States.

In 1990, Michael Slackman went farther, claiming without reservation that the ship "of a third nation" encountered on 5 December (Hawaii time) was in fact *Uritskii*, citing Agawa and Layton as his sources. Slackman further argues, in the spirit of Sherlock Holmes, that the absence of a radio transmission from *Uritskii* following this encounter raises the possibility of collusion, as put forward by Layton, though it "by no means prove[s] that the Soviets knew of the Japanese plans."⁹

Another author, though he actually refuted the role of *Uritskii* as a candidate for an encounter, is relevant because he introduced a new ship into the scenario, the tanker *Azerbaidzhan*. Robert D. Stinnett, in *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (published in 2000), reports that the Japanese had been warned to be on the lookout for two Soviet ships, Layton's *Uritskii* as well as the tanker *Azerbaidzhan*, but that an actual encounter "didn't happen."¹⁰ Stinnett convincingly dismisses Layton's scenario around *Uritskii*, noting that the Soviet ship, shortly after sailing from San Francisco for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, proceeded instead to Astoria, Oregon, and remained there until 5 December.¹¹ Stinnett also reports that *Azerbaidzhan*, which left the United States around the same time, was "diverted south," though without explaining what that means or presenting compelling evidence that such a diversion ruled out a potential encounter at sea with the Japanese.¹²

This controversy continued in 2001 with the publication of Michael Gannon's *Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack*. Building upon Agawa's original report, published in English in 1979, about an encounter on 5 December (Hawaii time), Gannon contends that the most likely candidates for an interception were the Soviet tanker *Azerbaidzhan*, as suggested by Stinnett, as well as the freighter *Uzbekistan*, a newcomer to the controversy.¹³ He does not mention *Uritskii*, though he cites Layton as a source. Gannon refers his readers to Layton's argument that the failure of the Japanese to sink this Russian ship indicates the possibility of collusion between the Soviet and Japanese

governments, but he is very clear that such collusion is only conjecture and “has never been proved.”

That is where we stand today. Three Soviet ships have been suggested for a potential encounter with the Japanese: *Uritskii*, *Uzbekistan*, and *Azerbaidzhan*. The date of the encounter ranges from 1 December to 5 December. If the former, the encounter would have been about 1,750 nautical miles to the northwest of Pearl Harbor, in the vicinity of 43° north, 178° east. If the latter, the encounter would have taken place about 950 nautical miles to the north of Pearl Harbor, in around 37° north, 161° west.

UNRAVELING THE STORY

Hiroyuki Agawa was the first author who published an account wherein the Japanese fleet actually intercepted a merchant ship, and no such account has surfaced since. Certainly there has been ample opportunity. In 1993, Donald J. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon presented *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans*, a compilation of firsthand material from those involved in the planning and execution of the mission.¹⁴ This includes an affidavit from Commander Minoru Genda, the chief planner of the attack, and the diaries of Captain Shigeshi Uchida and Commander Sadamu Sanagi, both of whom served in the Operations Section of the Naval General Staff in December 1941. The book also presents entries from the war diaries of the Combined Fleet, the destroyer *Akigumo*, the 5th Carrier Division, 1st Destroyer Squadron, and 3rd Battleship Division. None of these accounts mentions anything about an encounter with a merchant ship, though the diaries of those involved indicate that great care was taken to avoid detection and refer to reports from Japanese fleets in other parts of the Pacific about encounters with Allied or other ships.¹⁵


In his *Reluctant Admiral*, Agawa fails, as we have seen, to provide a source for his story of the encounter. In correspondence with the present author, Agawa confirms that he has never come across a written account of this encounter and that none exists in his personal records or in the official records maintained by the Military History Division of the Japanese Defense Agency.¹⁶ By his own account, his depiction is based on a comment made to him decades ago by an individual in the Military History Division. It is conceivable that this comment arose from warnings received by the carrier strike force of a Soviet ship sailing along its route rather than an actual encounter. It could also relate to an encounter between a Soviet merchant ship and a Japanese warship far from the carrier strike force.¹⁷

It is known that the Japanese were on the lookout for Soviet ships, as was documented in 1994 in *Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941*.¹⁸ Prepared by Frederick D. Parker, of the Center for

Cryptological History of the U.S. National Security Agency, this publication presents intercepts of Japanese wartime naval communications, decoded by the United States after the war's end. One transmission, logged as SRN-116667, was sent on 27 November from the imperial headquarters to the striking force: "Although there are indications of several ships operating in the Aleutian area, the ships in the Northern Pacific appear chiefly to be Russian ships. . . . They are *Uzbekistan* (about 3,000 tons . . . 12 knots) and *Azerbaidzhan* (6,114 tons[,] less than 10 knots). Both are westbound from San Francisco."

Other accounts of this warning indicate that it identified the most likely time of an encounter as 27–29 November.¹⁹ It is clear now that Layton and Slackman, in advancing the case for *Uritskii* intercepting the Japanese, and that Stinnett, in refuting that contention, were in fact chasing a red herring—it was not *Uritskii* but *Uzbekistan*, along with *Azerbaidzhan*, that the Japanese were worried about. Layton's original conspiracy argument, which hinges on the absence of intercepted warnings regarding *Uritskii*, now falls apart: we now know, as Layton did not in 1985, that the reason the United States never intercepted such a specific warning is that none was ever sent.

FIGURE 1



Layton, Slackman, and Stinnett mistook *Uritskii* (left) as the subject of a warning sent to the Japanese fleet. In fact, the warning concerned the *Uzbekistan* (right).

Author's personal collection

Certainly the Japanese had reason to be concerned about the possibility of an encounter with a Soviet merchant fleet. In late 1941, ships moving across the North Pacific were given considerable attention by the Japanese, since the Imperial Japanese Navy was at the same time assembling its Hawaiian attack force in Hitokappu Bay on Etorofu (now Iturup) Island in the southern Kuril Islands. The degree of concern is illustrated in the extent to which the attack plan attended to the threat of accidental discovery by merchant shipping. Vice Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, chief of staff of the First Air Fleet in 1941, described the planning methodology: "After making an extensive study of all passages of ships all over the Pacific for the past ten years or more, the course was selected to pass through the line near 40 degrees North Latitude that any ships had never passed

before [*sic*], aiming to reach the point about 800 miles due north of the Hawaiian Islands.²⁰

Alas, the ten years of historical shipping data missed a major change in trading patterns that began after 22 June 1941: an unprecedented flood of aid from the United States to the Soviet Union across the Pacific, part of a greatly expanded volume of merchant shipping between the Soviet Union and its trading partners in the Pacific. After Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Soviets “surged” the ships of their Far East State Sea Shipping Company for the purpose of obtaining vital materials. Some ships were dispatched to the South Pacific and Indian oceans to collect emergency supplies of tin, rubber, and food.²¹ Others were dispatched to the United States to secure emergency aid. Even though Washington did not formally extend the Lend-Lease program to the Soviet Union until 28 October, the Americans agreed on 2 August to provide the Soviets with emergency supplies, especially of aviation gasoline. The United States quickly put together an ad hoc fleet of American tankers to this end.²² Simultaneously, the first wave of four Soviet ships departed the United States for Vladivostok with emergency cargoes of fuel;²³ a second caravan of ships from the Soviet Far East merchant fleet left shortly thereafter.²⁴ At the same time, a third wave of ships headed the opposite way, to the United States.²⁵ It seems the route between San Francisco and Los Angeles and Vladivostok was crisscrossed with wakes, far in excess of historical trading patterns.

Japanese agents, already in place in West Coast ports to monitor commercial as well as naval ship movements, reported the departure of tankers from Los Angeles to the Soviet Union. Rear Admiral Giichi Nakahara, head of the navy’s Personnel Bureau, recorded the following in his diary on 22 August: “The U.S. is carrying on a propaganda actively [*sic*] that she is supporting Russia by supplying the latter with gasoline. Rumors run that oil tankers are headed for Vladivostok. But I wonder if it’s true or not. . . . It would be better for us to warn the U.S. that the American support of Russia is quite troublesome.”²⁶ The rumors were true, which caused concern for Japanese officials. Nakahara further wrote in his diary on 29 August: “Transportation route of the U.S. to supply Russia with materials for aid—it should be contrived that the route will not be made through the Japan Sea.”²⁷

Fortunately for Japan, the frantic burst of activity between the United States and the Soviet Far East began to slow as summer transitioned into autumn, in part due to growing tensions with Japan over the matter. After all, Japan was allied with Germany, with whom the Soviet Union was engaged in mortal combat. Moreover, Japan suffered under an oil embargo by the United States at the very time the Americans were dispatching tankers, bursting with gasoline, to Vladivostok, passing within sight of the Japanese home islands. Japan informed

the Soviet Union in late August that it would object to and potentially prevent shipments of aid to Russia via Vladivostok.²⁸ Less than a week later it was reported that the United States would shift the destination of Soviet aid from Vladivostok to points in the Persian Gulf, which would offer a more direct route to the Soviet war front and had recently opened up as a result of the joint Soviet-British occupation of Iran.²⁹

By mid-October worsening relations between the United States and Japan had led to a warning issued by the Navy Department for all U.S.-flagged ships in Asiatic waters to avoid areas where they might be attacked. These ships were advised to put into friendly ports to await instructions, suggesting to contemporary observers the likely termination of planned voyages to the USSR by fourteen American freighters.³⁰ Within a week the United States announced its plan to terminate *all* shipments of war materiel to Vladivostok, in favor of routes across the Atlantic to Arkhangel'sk.³¹ Contemporary reports refer to rumored threats by the new Hideki Tojo government in Japan, formed on 15 October. But the reason could have been more prosaic: it was being said that the docks at Vladivostok were overwhelmed with aid and that the long thin line of the Trans-Siberian Railway could not accommodate the accumulating stockpile. As was reported at the time: "Vladivostok has been temporarily abandoned as a port of entry for U.S. goods, not only because of the danger of friction with Japan. Vladivostok, though much farther south, has more ice than Archangel. Besides, the long Trans-Siberian Railway is far too busy carrying troops to the front and machinery from it."³²

This planned termination was apparent to Japan in late October. Rear Admiral Nakahara's diary for 24 October noted, "The United States made it clear that to transport materials for aiding the USSR through Vladivostok would be stopped." His diary for 26 October followed up: "The United States Navy Department made a showdown [*sic*] that the transportation route of sending material for the aid of the Soviet was changed to Boston-Archangel course."³³ By late October it was being reported in the American press that all U.S.-flagged ships voyaging to the Soviet Far East had been recalled to friendly ports.³⁴ But what of the few remaining *Soviet* ships already planning a voyage back home? How likely is it that one of these ships might have encountered the Japanese?

SOVIET SHIP MOVEMENTS IN NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 1941

Fifty-five Soviet freighters and tankers operated outside Soviet waters in the Pacific region in 1941.³⁵ One, *Vatslav Vorovskii*, had been written off as a total loss after running aground on the Columbia Bar on 3 April. After the German invasion, eight others were sent to the South Pacific or Indian Ocean, and another fourteen transited from the Pacific to the Atlantic via the Panama Canal.³⁶ None

of these twenty-three ships is a candidate for an encounter with the Japanese carriers. Of the remaining thirty-two ships—that is, those operating in the North Pacific—some were held up in U.S. ports pending emergency repairs after having been declared unseaworthy by the Coast Guard. Others were unloading in Vladivostok in late November and early December 1941, and still others at that time were loading in American ports.

Of the fifty-five ships in total, only four sailed from the United States from West Coast ports to the Soviet Far East between 7 November and 30 November, which is the critical interval for a possible Soviet-Japanese encounter at sea. Any ship departing before 7 November would have in all likelihood been passing westward through the northern Kuril Islands when the Japanese fleet sailed eastward, over five hundred nautical miles to the south. Ships departing after 30 November could not have reached the Japanese fleet even had they sailed at high speed straight for the launch point north of Hawaii.³⁷


The four ships that sailed in this interval were *Uritskii*, *Azerbaidzhan*, *Uzbekistan*—all mentioned previously—and the timber carrier *Clara Zetkin*. *Uritskii* and *Clara Zetkin* can be ruled out quite easily. The former left San Francisco on 28 November heading to Portland, Oregon, on the Columbia River, and thence to Vladivostok. The latter departed the following day, also with Portland as its destination. Neither ship proceeded directly to Portland, both stopping instead on 1 December at Astoria, near the mouth of the Columbia. *Uritskii* remained there until 5 December. *Clara Zetkin* stayed a day longer, departing Astoria on 6 December. Neither could have intercepted the Japanese fleet.³⁸

This leaves *Uzbekistan* and *Azerbaidzhan*, the two ships put forward as candidates for an encounter by Gannon and the subjects of the original fleet warning sent by Tokyo in 1941. The former sailed from San Francisco on 12 November, heading to Vladivostok, and *Azerbaidzhan* followed two days later for the same destination.³⁹ Based only on the timing and intended destination, it is reasonable to suppose they might in fact have approached the Japanese fleet in late November—hence the warning sent to the Japanese task force.

This warning may have been unnecessary. The United States and the USSR had recently opened up a new route for Lend-Lease ships traveling to Vladivostok that greatly reduced the probability of an encounter. Up to the middle of 1941, Soviet ships would have followed a route that took them south of the Aleutians—and into the teeth of the prevailing westerly winds and along a rock-strewn and fog-covered coast. The new track led through Unimak Pass in the Aleutians into the Bering Sea, passing *north* of the Aleutian chain and reaching the Soviet Union near Ust'-Kamchatsk. This new route, about the same distance and somewhat safer, had been developed after a major hydrographic expedition launched in 1939 and continued in 1940;⁴⁰ up until then it had

been considered too dangerous, due to the lack of reliable charts. After August 1941 this northerly route became standard for Soviet ships on Lend-Lease missions and is known to have been in use in November 1941.⁴¹ Ice does not seem to have been an impediment; Russian ships were seen traveling through Unimak Pass as late in that winter as February.⁴²


MAP 1
MAJOR SHIPPING ROUTES TO VLADIVOSTOK FROM U.S. WEST COAST



While the exact position of these ships at any particular time remains unknown, it is possible to develop reasonable estimates given the probable courses steered during the 4,700-nautical-mile trip to Vladivostok, known times of departure, and the ships' known speeds. For example, we know that *Uzbekistan* departed San Francisco on 12 November and that its estimated speed was twelve knots. Map 2 illustrates the probable track and positions of *Uzbekistan* along the route, as well as positions of the Japanese carrier strike force.

Given the assumptions reflected in map 2, *Uzbekistan* would have left San Francisco on a northerly heading, skirting the Gulf of Alaska until reaching Unimak Pass, then heading across the Bering Sea and making a landfall off Ust'-Kamchatsk around 24 November, then proceeding south to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka. If *Uzbekistan* did not stop at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, it would have passed through the Sea of Okhotsk and entered the Sea of Japan via the La Perouse Strait, heading thence to Vladivostok and arriving there around 29 November (Tokyo time). The Japanese fleet's closest point of approach would have been midday on 26 November (Tokyo time), shortly after it sailed from Hitokappu Bay, when *Uzbekistan* was about four hundred nautical miles north in the Sea of Okhotsk, on the other side of the Kuril Islands. As the Japanese fleet encountered periods of driving snow and dense fog during the first few days at


MAP 2
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF *UZBEKISTAN* AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE



sea, visual contact would have been uncertain even had the ships been much closer.⁴³


Azerbaijan was originally scheduled to depart San Francisco on 10 November, but that sailing was canceled, and it did not actually get under way until 14 November.⁴⁴ It would have followed the same route as *Uzbekistan*. Somewhat

MAP 3
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF *AZERBAIDZHAN* AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE



slower than *Uzbekistan*, it would have still been in the Bering Sea north of the Aleutians when the Japanese fleet departed for Hawaii, and the nearest point of approach would have occurred on 28 or 29 November (Tokyo time), on which dates *Azerbaidzhan* was about a thousand miles to the north. There is, however, one element of uncertainty surrounding *Azerbaidzhan*. The San Francisco Maritime Exchange log card for *Azerbaidzhan* recording the ship's departure from San Francisco at 10 AM adds the parenthetical comment "diverted south." It is unclear exactly what this means, and no precise records of this ship's movements in late 1941 have surfaced.⁴⁵ It is possible that the turn to the south was a function of the weather, for two days later, shortly after *Uzbekistan* sailed on 12 November, a major gale hit the Pacific Northwest, wreaking havoc with local shipping.⁴⁶ Perhaps *Azerbaidzhan* was aware of the approach of the storm and deviated slightly to the south to avoid it before heading toward the Alaskan coast, thence resuming the normal route to the Soviet Union.⁴⁷

FIGURE 2




The Japanese strike force was also warned to be on the lookout for the Soviet tanker *Azerbaidzhan*.

Author's personal collection

But what if *Azerbaidzhan* did not follow the new northerly route to Vladivostok at all? What if the reference to "diverted south" indicates that the ship took the more traditional southerly route to Vladivostok? Or, what if its captain decided to take the shortest great-circle route home after maneuvering around the storm, then slashing the Pacific Northwest? In the former case, *Azerbaidzhan* would have reached the Aleutian Islands on 26 November, just about the time the Japanese fleet sailed from Hitokappu Bay. The closest point of

approach would have been around 28 November, when *Azerbaijdan* would have been about five hundred nautical miles north of the Japanese fleet and heading in the opposite direction.


MAP 4
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF AZERBAIDZHAN AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE,
ASSUMING A SOUTHERLY ROUTING



Similarly, if *Uzbekistan* after avoiding the storm took a great-circle route, thereby passing well south of the Aleutian Islands, it still would have passed into the Sea of Okhotsk before the Japanese strike force sailed from the Kuril Islands and thus not have been in a position to encounter it. Moreover, even had such a meeting taken place near the Kuril Islands, it would have occurred within a few hundred miles of Japanese territory, reducing the significance of any sighting of a large Japanese fleet. After all, sighting a large number of Japanese warships exercising near home waters would have been less notable than finding that same fleet thousands of miles from home, near America's largest naval base in the Pacific.

There is, then, no evidence to support the view affirmed by Gannon and Slackman, and suggested by Layton, that the Japanese strike force heading for Hawaii encountered a Soviet merchant ship on 5 December 1941 (Hawaii time). On that day *Uritskii* and *Clara Zetkin* were in Astoria, *Uzbekistan* was most likely in Vladivostok or Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka, and *Azerbaijdan* was entering the Sea of Okhotsk over a thousand miles from the Japanese fleet and moving in the opposite direction. Likewise, no evidence places a Soviet merchant ship in the vicinity of the Japanese fleet in the period 1–3 December, another scenario

MAP 5
PROBABLE POSITIONS OF *UZBEKISTAN* AND JAPANESE STRIKE FORCE,
ASSUMING A SOUTHERLY ROUTING




considered by Layton. The related hypothesis—that the failure to report such an encounter by the Soviets indicates that the Soviets knew of the impending attack in advance—can also be rejected based on the available data, inasmuch as it establishes that there *was* no encounter.

It is harder to refute out of hand the hypothesis that the Japanese force might have stumbled upon a Soviet ship much earlier in its journey, around 27 or 28 November. Surely the Japanese had been warned of this potential, and of *Uzbekistan* and *Azerbaijdzhan* specifically. Interestingly, this is not the scenario advanced by Agawa, Layton, Slackman, or Gannon, all of whom place the encounter between three and eight days later. The evidence, however, suggests that neither ship was a candidate for such an encounter even during this earlier period, as their courses took them far from the Japanese fleet, with the closest point of approach hundreds of miles away, in fog and rain, and within or close to Japanese home waters. Therefore, it seems probable the Japanese did manage to maintain operational security during the tense voyage to Hawaii.

What became of the Soviet ships that played roles in this mystery? *Uritskii* left the Pacific in summer 1942 and became a world traveler, transiting the hazardous Northern Sea Route across the roof of the Soviet Union from Vladivostok to Arkhangel'sk, returning the following year to Vladivostok via the Panama Canal, thereafter continuing in operation in the Far East until removed from service in 1957. *Azerbaijdzhan* eventually made its way to New York, where it joined the

Atlantic convoys on the infamous Kola Run. It was hit by an air-launched torpedo in convoy PQ-17 but managed to carry on, one of the few survivors of that ill-fated convoy. After the war it returned to civilian service in the Far East until it was removed from the shipping roster in 1975. *Clara Zetkin* operated for another three decades in the Pacific, ending its years in the Soviet fishing fleet until it was broken up in 1975.

FIGURE 3



Uzbekistan, the ship most likely to have encountered the Japanese, was lost on 1 April 1943 after running aground in Darling Creek, Vancouver Island.

Library and Archives Canada/Canada. Dept. of National Defence/PA-116031/PA-116032

Uzbekistan's career was not as long. The ship operated between the American West Coast and Russian Far East only until 1 April 1943, when it ran aground off Vancouver Island. Parts of the wreckage are still visible today, a sad and quiet reminder of a global conflict many decades ago—and of the intriguing questions that continue to arise even sixty-six years afterward.

NOTES

- The author would like to thank, for their assistance in the preparation of this article, Naoyuki Agawa, Maura Bollinger, Anne Doremus, Hak Hakanson, Mark Herman, William Kooiman (San Francisco National Maritime Museum Library), Declan Murphy, Joseph Sanchez (U.S. National Archives and Records Administration), and Jeffrey Smith (Columbia River Maritime Museum).
1. The first book to advance this possibility is Edwin T. Layton's *And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985). This book was reprinted in 2006 by Bluejacket Books, without change to the relevant material covered here. Other works advancing this theory include Michael Slackman, *Target: Pearl Harbor* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990); Peter B. Niblo, *Influence: The Soviet "Task" Leading to Pearl Harbor, the Iron Curtain, and the Cold War* (Oakland, Ore.: Elderberry, 2001); and Michael Gannon, *Pearl Harbor Betrayed: The True Story of a Man and a Nation under Attack* (New York: Henry Holt, 2002). (Gannon's book was initially published in 2001.)
 2. Hiroyuki Agawa, *The Reluctant Admiral*, trans. John Bester (New York: Kodansha International, 1979). The Japanese-language original version of this book was published by the same author in 1969 as 山本五十六 [Yamamoto Isoroku] and describes the encounter in the same manner as in the English-language 1979 variant.
 3. Agawa, *Reluctant Admiral*, p. 251.
 4. Layton, *And I Was There*.
 5. The story of *Lurline* and how its radio operator intercepted signals that appeared to indicate the Japanese fleet was advancing on Hawaii was introduced initially in published form by Ladislav Farago in the paperback version of *The Broken Seal* (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), pp. 379–402. This was an updated version of the hardback book published by Random House in 1967. This story was also advanced by John Toland in *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1982). Over time it has become clear that the *Lurline* radio intercepts provided no useful information as far as the movements of the Japanese fleet were concerned. See Philip H. Jacobsen's definitive paper, "Pearl Harbor: Radio Officer Leslie Grogan of the SS *Lurline* and his Misidentified Signals," *Cryptologia* 29, no. 2 (April 2005), pp. 97–120.
 6. Layton, *And I Was There*, pp. 261–62.
 7. *Ibid.*, pp. 260–61. Layton cites two sources: Agawa's *Reluctant Admiral* and an "enlisted man's wartime account" titled *The Southern Cross* but otherwise unspecified. The latter is apparently the wartime account of *Akagi* crewman Iki Kuramoto (or Kuramoto), presented in U.S. Congress, *Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 517. While Kuramoto confirms that warnings were issued about Russian ships, he reports that no such encounter took place.
 8. Layton, *And I Was There*, pp. 220–21.
 9. Slackman, *Target*, p. 71. Slackman cites both Layton and Agawa as sources for his statements. In fact neither Layton nor Agawa actually states that *Uritskii* definitely intercepted the Japanese fleet. Agawa does not name the ship in question, and while Layton strongly suggests that the ship in question was *Uritskii*, he does not state this as a fact.
 10. Robert D. Stinnett, *Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor* (London: Constable, 2000), p. 160. Stinnett writes that both *Uritskii* and *Azerbaijan* were mentioned in a warning sent from Japan to the attack fleet. He is incorrect in this, as the message actually mentions *Uzbekistan* and *Azerbaijan*.
 11. Stinnett is not the only author to have dismissed the potential involvement of *Uritskii*. More than a decade earlier, Russian author Nikolai Nikolaevich Yakovlev also ruled it out as a candidate, arguing in Пёрл-Харбор, 7 Декабря 1941 года: Быль и небыль [Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941: Reality and Fantasy] (Moscow: Politizdat, 1988), that it was preposterous to assume that *Uritskii*, a timber carrier designed for service in the Arctic, would have been involved in transport operations between the United States and the USSR in 1941. Of course, we now know for certain that it was.
 12. Stinnett, *Day of Deceit*, pp. 160–61.
 13. Gannon, *Pearl Harbor Betrayed*, p. 210.

14. Donald J. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, *The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993).
15. While Goldstein and Dillon focus their book on Pearl Harbor, their diaries and notes describe Japanese ship movements in other parts of the Pacific as well, including the Philippines.
16. E-mail correspondence in August 2005 between the author and Hiroyuki Agawa, as graciously relayed and translated by his son, Naoyuki Agawa.
17. This scenario is certainly plausible. A similar encounter occurred between a U.S. merchant ship returning from the Soviet Union and a Japanese warship patrolling the Kuril Islands. Capt. Henry M. Glick, who in late 1941 was a crew member aboard the U.S.-flag tanker *J. C. Fitzsimmons*, reports in a narrative in the author's collection that *Fitzsimmons* encountered a Japanese destroyer near the Kurils just ten hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. As the United States and Japan were then not at war, the tanker was allowed to proceed without incident.
18. Frederick D. Parker, *Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924–1941*, SuDoc D 1.2:P 32/3 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History, 1994).
19. Goldstein and Dillon, *Pearl Harbor Papers*, p.184.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 140–41.
21. These ships included *Igarka*, *Arktikii*, *Mikoyan*, *Maxim Gorkii*, *Uelen*, *Perekop*, *Maikop*, *V. Mayakovskii*, and *Nevastroi*. See Victor Puzyurev, "Торговый Флот во Второй Мировой: Ленд-лиз через Тихий Океан" [Merchant Marine Fleet in World War II: Lend-Lease via the Pacific Ocean], *Морские вести России* [Sea Stories of Russia], no. 9-10 (2004). This article uses the Library of Congress transliteration protocol for Soviet ship names, except for ships named after a famous non-Russian person (e.g., Friedrich Engels, Clara Zetkin). Other transliteration protocols generate slightly different spellings.
22. First to arrive was the new tanker *LP St. Clair*, crossing the Pacific from Los Angeles and arriving in Vladivostok on 2 September. It was followed over the next few days by *Associated*, *J. C. Fitzsimmons*, *Montebello*, *Mojave* (carrying motor gasoline), *Huguenot*, and *Paul M. Gregg*. See: "Shipping News," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 September 1941, p. 22; "Fourth American Tanker Sails for Russian Port," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 September 1941, p. 23; "Hitler Missed the Tanker," *Time*, 15 September 1941; "Oil Shipments to Russia Showing Gain in Volume," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1941, p. A11; and "Shipping News," *Los Angeles Times*, 15 November 1941, p. 13.
23. The first wave included *Batumi*, *Minsk*, *Belomorkanal*, and *Komiles*. See: Puzyurev, "Merchant Marine Fleet in World War II"; "Russian Tanker Sails with Gas," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1941, p. 1; and "Reds Help Solve Tanker Problem," *Washington Post*, 15 September 1941, p. 3.
24. These ships included *Angastroi*, *Menzhinskii*, *Uzbekistan*, *Uralmash*, *Urdarnik*, *Bolshoi Shantar*, *Sakhalin*, *Khabarovsk*, *Sergei Kirov*, *Kuznets Lesov*, and *Dzhurma*. See J. I. Ostrovskii, ed., *Дальневосточное Морское Пароходство: 1880–1980* [The Far East Sea Shipping Company: 1880–1980] (Vladivostok: Far East Book Publishing House, 1980), p. 192. The last ship, *Dzhurma*, was temporarily detached from its infamous duties as a Gulag transport ship for slave laborers. See Martin J. Bollinger, *Stalin's Slave Ships: Kolyma, the Gulag Fleet, and the Role of the West* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003).
25. These ships included *Felix Dzerzhinsky* (flagship of the Gulag fleet), *Komsomolsk*, and *Uritskii*. See Timothy Wilford, "Watching the North Pacific: British and Commonwealth Intelligence before Pearl Harbor," *Intelligence and National Security* 17, no. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 152–53.
26. Goldstein and Dillon, *Pearl Harbor Papers*, p. 49.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
28. Bertram D. Hulens, "Tokyo Threat Reported," *New York Times*, 27 August 1941, p. 1. See also Otto D. Tolischus, "Japan Cautions U.S. on Gas for Reds," *Washington Post*, 28 August 1941, p. 3.
29. "Goods for Soviets to Be Rerouted," *New York Times*, 31 August 1941, p. F1.
30. Bertram D. Hulens, "Our Craft Warned: Navy Says Ships Were Called from Voyages for

- Instructions,” *New York Times*, 18 October 1941, p. 1.
31. See, for example, William V. Nessler, “Archangel Chosen as Best Route: Officials Discount Japanese Threat,” *Washington Post*, 23 October 1941, p. 1; and “Blunder Bares Our Plan for Russian Shipments,” *New York Times*, 26 October 1941, p. E3.
 32. “Aid on the Wharves,” *Time*, 17 November 1941. The Japanese had issued a warning on 27 August.
 33. Goldstein and Dillon, *Pearl Harbor Papers*, p. 63.
 34. “Non-Pacific Pacific,” *Time*, 27 October 1941. *Time* reported that fifty-odd merchantmen had all returned to friendly ports, further speculating that ten or fifteen ships destined for the Soviet Union would do likewise. This was in response to U.S. Navy orders issued in mid-October.
 35. There is no single authoritative source of Soviet ship movements in the Pacific at this time. The author, however, has over the years compiled such a list from dozens of Russian and Western sources. Sources in English include the *New York Maritime Register* in late 1941 (esp. vol. 74, nos. 1–23); *Marine Digest* in late 1941 (esp. vol. 19, no. 47, and vol. 20, nos. 4–11); Coast Guard records; harbor pilot logs; Department of Commerce ship clearance files for West Coast ports; *San Francisco Shipping Guide*; and “Shipping News” in the *Los Angeles Times*. Russian-language sources include Ostrovskii, *Far East Sea Shipping Company*, and Ministry of the Marine Sea Fleet, *Мирный Флот Дальневосточных Морей* [Peace Fleet of the Far East Seas: Far East Sea Shipping Company] (Moscow: 1980). This database reflects an integration of these sources; though reasonably comprehensive, it could be in error in specific cases.
 36. Ships operating in the South Pacific or Indian Ocean appear to have included *Arktika*, *Kovda*, *Maksim Gorkii*, *Mikoyan*, *Perekop*, *Smolnyi*, *Turksib* (probably), and *Uelen*. Ships being redeployed via the Panama Canal to the Atlantic included *Ashkhabad*, *Belomorkanal*, *Dekabrist*, *Dneprostoi*, *Dvinoles*, *Friedrich Engels*, *Kiev*, *Kolkhosnik*, *Komiles*, *Michurin*, *Nevastroi*, *Petrovskii*, *Shchors*, and *Tblisi*.
 37. This interval reflects the expected transit times from American West Coast ports to the point 3,600 nautical miles later at which a ship transits the northern Kuril Islands, about 1,100 miles short of Vladivostok. This trip would take thirteen or fourteen days for a relatively new and fast ship, such as *Uzbekistan*; a slow ship, such as *Uritskii*, powered by a coal-fired, three-cylinder steam engine, required seventeen steaming days at nine knots to cover this distance. Performance data for these ships is from the Soviet official ship register: Регистр морских судов: 1938–39 [Register of Sea Ships: 1938–39] (Leningrad: Vodnii Transport, 1938). The *Uritskii*, probably the slowest ship along this route, was a timber carrier constructed in 1927 in the Soviet Union, one of four in the third series of this class. Its power plant was rated at 950 indicated horsepower, which translates into about 203 net horsepower. For detailed information on *Uritskii* see Igor D. Spasskii, ed., *История отечественного судостроения: В пяти томах* [History of Domestic Shipbuilding: In Five Volumes] (St. Petersburg: Shipbuilding, 1996), vol. 4, pp. 54, 57.
 38. The movements of these two ships are clearly established by Columbia River Bar Pilots logs for the period, as well as by bar pilothouse logbooks for the region. *Uritskii* arrived in Astoria at 10:05 AM on 1 December and departed at 7:05 AM on 5 December. *Clara Zetkin* arrived at 2:20 PM on 1 December and departed at 3:40 PM on 6 December.
 39. See U.S. Customs Service, *Record of Vessels Engaged in Foreign Trade—Cleared or Granted Permit to Proceed, for San Francisco Harbor for November 1941*. Copies are available in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Pacific Region—San Francisco, Records of the U.S. Customs Service (Record Group [RG] 36).
 40. “New Sea Route to Asia Sought,” *Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1939, p. 28.
 41. The route used by Soviet ships on Lend-Lease missions is depicted by Alla Paperno, *Тайны и История: Ленд-лиз Тихий Океан* [Secrets and History: Lend-Lease Pacific Ocean] (Moscow: Terra-Book Club, 1998), p. 18. The route was formally opened in August 1941; see “New Route to Russia Proposed for Ships,” *New York Times*, 20 August 1941, p. 7. The route was in use in November; see

- “Soviet Ice Ship in Seattle,” *San Francisco Call Bulletin*, 17 November 1941, p. 14.
42. *Journal of Light Station USCG Cape Sarichef 1938–1943*, Department of Commerce Lighthouse Service Form 306. The Cape Sarichef lighthouse marks the entrance to Unimak Pass. The logbook of the lighthouse keeper indicates that Russian ships passed through the pass as late as 25 February 1942. Records are available from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the United States Coast Guard (RG 26), Records of the Lighthouse Service, Lighthouse Station Logs for Cape Sarichef, 1934–1943 (box 74).
43. See the diary of Lt. Cdr. Sadao Chigusa of the *Akigumo*, a destroyer escorting the carrier fleet, as presented in Goldstein and Dillon, *Pearl Harbor Papers*, pp. 184–85.
44. U.S. Commerce Dept., *Record of Vessels Engaged in Foreign Trade*, November and December 1941.
45. *Azerbaijanzhan* next surfaces in the records in Los Angeles on 18 February 1942. It subsequently sailed through the Panama Canal to New York, arriving in April 1942. See “Soviet Vessels—Lend Lease Repairs, Etc.,” a table compiled by W. L. Martignoni, director of the Division of Maintenance and Repair, Pacific of the War Shipping Administration. The table, prepared late in the war, details the locations, dates, and costs of repairs to Soviet merchant ships in U.S. ports during World War II. Available in the records of the War Shipping Administration, Office of the Russian Shipping Area, 1942–46, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, RG 248.3.3.
46. “Storm: Three Are Dead, but Gale in the Northwest Is Dying Down,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 15 November 1941, p. 9.
47. This scenario has been advanced by others, including William Kooiman, reference librarian of San Francisco Maritime National Historic Park, in e-mail correspondence with the author, 14 February 2006.

COMMENTARY

STRATEGY AND THE STRATEGIC WAY OF THINKING

Mackubin Thomas Owens

Strategy is often portrayed as the interaction of ends, ways, and means, which is a useful formulation. In essence, strategy describes the *way* in which the available *means* will be employed to achieve the *ends* of policy.

The word “strategy” is used in a variety of contexts. There are business strategies, coaching strategies, financial strategies, and research strategies. Over the past few decades, the concept of strategy increasingly has been applied to organizations. An organization develops a strategy based on its mission or goal, a vision of the future, an understanding of the organization’s place in that future, and an assessment of the alternatives available to it, given scarce resources.¹

Yet the central application of the concept of strategy continues to be defense planning. History makes it clear that the development of a coherent strategy is absolutely essential to national security in times of both war and

peace. In the absence of a coherent strategy, non-strategic factors, such as bureaucratic and organizational imperatives, will fill the void to the detriment of national security.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The term strategy is derived from the classical Greek word *strategia*, the art of the general (*strategos*). Despite the ancient origins of the word’s etymology, modern strategic studies can be said to begin with the division of the art of war into the theory of “the use of engagements for the object of the war” (strategy) and “the use of armed forces in the engagement” (tactics)

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by the great interpreters of Napoleonic warfare, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.² As the latter wrote:

Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war. The strategist must therefore define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose. In other words, he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: in fact, shape the individual campaign and, within these, decide on the individual engagements.³

These nineteenth-century writers originated the modern conception of strategy as the art of assembling and employing military forces in time and space to achieve the goals of a war. Previously, writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli and his successors through the eighteenth century had used a related term, “stratagem,” to mean a ruse or gambit to achieve an advantage through surprise.⁴ While such writers limited their use of “strategy” to mean the application of military forces to fulfill the ends of policy, it is increasingly the practice today to employ the term more broadly, so that one can speak of levels of strategy during peace and war.⁵ Accordingly, more often than not, strategy now refers not only to the direct application of military force in wartime but also to the use of all aspects of national power during peacetime to deter war and win.

POLICY AND STRATEGY

This more expansive usage of strategy inevitably overlaps with the common meaning of “policy,” which is defined as the general overall goals and acceptable procedures that a nation might follow and the course of action selected from among alternatives in light of given conditions. In their military history of the United States, Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski define defense policy as “the sum of the assumptions, plans, programs, and actions taken by the citizens of the United States, principally through governmental action, to ensure the physical security of their lives, property, and way of life from external military attack and domestic insurrection.”⁶ For our purposes, “policy” refers primarily to such broad national goals as interests and objectives, and “strategy” to the alternative courses of actions designed to achieve those goals, within the constraints set by material factors and geography.

In general, strategy provides a conceptual link between national ends and scarce resources, both the transformation of those resources into means during peacetime and the application of those means during war. As such, it serves three purposes.⁷

First, strategy relates ends or the goals of policy (interests and objectives) to the limited means available to achieve them. Both strategy and economics are concerned with the application of scarce means to achieve certain goals. But

strategy implies an adversary who actively opposes the achievement of the ends. Second, strategy contributes to the clarification of the ends of policy by helping to establish priorities in the light of constrained resources. Without establishing priorities among competing ends, all interests and all threats will appear equal. In the absence of strategy, planners will find themselves in the situation described by Frederick the Great: “He who attempts to defend too much defends nothing.” Finally, strategy conceptualizes resources as a means in support of policy. Resources are not means until strategy provides some understanding of how they will be organized and employed. Defense budgets and manpower are resources. Strategy organizes these resources into divisions, wings, and fleets and then employs them to deter war or to prevail should deterrence fail.

Although strategy can be described as the conceptual link between ends and means, it cannot be reduced to a mere mechanical exercise. Instead, it is “a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” It is a mistake to attempt to reduce strategy to a single aspect, although it is not unusual for writers on strategy to try.⁸ Clausewitz dismissed as simplistic the reduction of strategy to “principles, rules, or even systems,” because, on the contrary, strategy “involves human passions, values, and beliefs, few of which are quantifiable.”⁹

Strategy, properly understood, is a complex phenomenon comprising a number of elements. Among the most important of these are geography; history; the nature of the political regime, including such elements as religion, ideology, culture, and political and military institutions; and economic and technological factors.¹⁰ Accordingly, strategy can be said to constitute a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and these other factors on the other.

Different writers stress different aspects of strategy. Clausewitz identified five strategic elements: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical.¹¹ Sir Michael Howard has laid out four “dimensions of strategy”: the operational, logistical, social, and technological.¹² Building on the foundation established by Clausewitz and Sir Michael, Colin Gray has provided a comprehensive list of seventeen factors divided into three broad categories. While some might accuse him of a failure to apply “Occam’s razor” to the problem of strategy, Gray’s exhaustive list demonstrates the complexity of the strategic enterprise.

Gray’s first category is “People and Politics,” in which he treats factors that contribute to strategic culture such as people, society, politics, and ethics. His second category corresponds to Clausewitz’s division of the art of war into “preparation for war”: economics and logistics, organization, military administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology. His third category corresponds to “war proper”: military operations; command; geography; friction, chance, and uncertainty; the adversary; and time.¹³

STRATEGY AS A DIALOGUE BETWEEN POLICY AND NATIONAL POWER

To be successful, strategy making must be an interactive process that takes account of the interplay of all factors. An inflexible strategy may be worse than no strategy at all, as the Germans discovered in 1914 and the French in 1940. To paraphrase Gray, strategy is the product of the dialogue between policy and national power in the context of the overall international security environment.¹⁴

Strategy and Geopolitics

Real strategy must take account of such factors as technology, the availability of resources, and geopolitical realities. This last factor is critical, although in a globalized world we sometime forget that strategy is developed and implemented in real time and space. A state must consciously adapt its strategy to geopolitical realities. The strategy of a state is not self-correcting. If conditions change, policy makers must be able to discern these changes and modify the strategy and strategic goals accordingly.¹⁵

For instance, while the U.S. policy to contain the Soviet Union remained essentially constant during the Cold War, certain factors changed. Accordingly, it is possible to identify three distinct strategic periods during the Cold War, all of which had operational and force-structure implications.¹⁶ Similarly, the post-World War II strategic concept of the United States Navy demonstrates a remarkable continuity from its origins in the late 1940s until 1989, emphasizing forward, offensive action to secure sea control and to project power against the Soviets. The main variables during the Cold War were available resources and technology. Thus “during periods of budgetary constraint or when the international climate was unfavorable to the application of the preferred strategic concept,” the Navy’s leadership was forced to modify the particulars of its strategy by curtailing its offensive orientation.¹⁷

When strategy makers, operators, and force planners do not adapt to changing conditions, serious problems can result. Jakub Grygiel shows how a failure to adapt strategy to geopolitical change led to the decline of Venice (1000–1600), the Ottoman Empire (1300–1699), and Ming China (1364–1644).¹⁸ Each actor faced changing circumstances but made wrong strategic choices. These cases are cautionary for the United States, since it now is facing geopolitical changes of the same magnitude.

While U.S. policy makers have paid lip service to the idea that U.S. strategic focus must change as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire, there is much evidence to indicate that America’s focus has not changed. From World War I up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. strategy has been based on the 1904 Heartland theory of Sir Halford John Mackinder.¹⁹ However, 9/11 and the rise of China have shown the limitations of such a theory.²⁰

Strategic Culture

Another important aspect of strategy making is the “strategic culture” of a state or nation. By applying the notion of strategic culture, analysts attempt to explain continuity and change in national security policies, thereby creating a framework that can explain why certain policy options are pursued by states.²¹ Kerry Longhurst describes strategic culture as:

a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.²²

For Carnes Lord, strategic culture constitutes the traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals.²³

One of the charges often brought against American strategic culture is that it confuses technological superiority with strategy itself. For instance, critics of the current efforts to “transform” the U.S. military claim that America tends to seek technological fixes to strategic problems, in an attempt to remove itself from the sharp end of war.²⁴

Strategy versus Nonstrategic Factors

In any case, strategy is an indispensable element of national security. Without it, something else will fill the void. For example, in wartime service doctrines will dominate the conduct of operations if strategy is absent. This state of affairs is captured by Andrew Krepinevich in his characterization of the Vietnam War as “a strategy of tactics.”²⁵ In peacetime, defense planning is dominated by what Samuel Huntington calls “structural decisions”: organizational imperatives, congressional politics, etc.²⁶

To minimize risk, planners must, to the extent possible, avoid mismatches between strategy and related factors. For instance, strategy must be appropriate to the ends, as established by policy. Strategy also requires the appropriate tactical instrument to implement it. Finally, the forces required to implement a strategy must be funded or the strategy revised. If the risk generated by such policy/strategy, strategy/force, and force/budget mismatches cannot be managed, the variables must be brought into better alignment.

LEVELS OF STRATEGY

War and conflict can be divided into several levels. As noted above, Clausewitz distinguished between tactics, “the use of armed forces in the engagement,” and

strategy, “the use of engagements for the object of war.” It is now common to speak of an intermediate level between strategy and tactics, a realm concerned with the planning and conduct of campaigns to achieve strategic goals within a theater of war—the “operational level of war.”²⁷ The central focus of this essay is the strategic level of war and conflict, which in itself is subject to further subdivision. Writers often refer to grand strategy, military strategy, theater strategy, and service strategy.²⁸

Grand Strategy. In its broadest sense, strategy *is* grand strategy. In the words of Edward Mead Earle:

strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.²⁹

Thus grand strategy is intimately linked to national policy, in that it is designed to bring to bear all the elements of national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—in order to secure the nation’s interests and objectives. Grand strategy can also refer to a nation’s overarching approach to international affairs— isolationism or disengagement, cooperative or collective security, selective engagement, or primacy.³⁰

Finally, grand strategy can allude to a geopolitical orientation—“continental” or “maritime.”³¹ Whichever meaning is emphasized, the choice of a grand strategy has a major impact on the other levels of strategy and force structure.

Military Strategy. Military strategy is concerned with the employment of military power in peace and war. In peacetime, military strategy provides a guide to what Samuel Huntington calls “program decisions” and “posturing.” Program decisions involve the strength of military forces, their composition and readiness, and the number, type, and rate of development of weapons. Posturing is defined by how military forces are deployed during peacetime to deter war (Clausewitz’s “preparation for war”). In wartime, military strategy guides the employment of military force in pursuit of victory (Clausewitz’s “war proper”).³²

A nation’s approach to its security policy and strategy can take the form of either strategic pluralism or strategic monism. The former “calls for a wide variety of military forces and weapons to meet a diversity of potential threats.” In contrast, the latter refers to primary reliance on a single strategic concept, weapon, service, or region. Strategic monism “presupposes an ability to predict and control the actions of possible enemies.”³³

Theater Strategy. Theater strategy is concerned with the operational level of war: the planning and execution of campaigns designed to achieve strategic results in a theater of war. This function, however, involves adapting the requirements laid out by the national and military strategies to the particular circumstances of a geographic theater. Combatant commanders (COCOMs) must take into account the objectives and priorities established by the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report as they develop their own goals and plans for achieving them in times of both war and peace. The process of transforming national-level strategy into theater strategy and security is discussed below.

Service Strategy. Service strategy refers to what is more properly described as “doctrine,” or a “strategic concept.” Huntington defined the latter as “the fundamental element of a military service . . . its role or purpose in implementing national policy.” A service’s strategic concept answers the “ultimate question: What function do you perform which obligates society to assume responsibility for your maintenance?”³⁴ When a single service is permitted to claim an independently decisive role for its own strategic concept, the result is usually some form of strategic monism.

NATIONAL-LEVEL STRATEGY AS A GUIDE FOR THE COCOM

How does the process work in practice? The NSS serves as the grand strategy document for the United States. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires that each administration produce a national security strategy early in its first term (most administrations have not done this) and “regularly” thereafter. The NSS defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as the COCOMs. The NSS is supplemented by three other documents: the NDS, the NMS, and the QDR. These three core documents, as well as others on transformation and the family of joint concepts, provide the strategic guidance for translating national policy into theater strategy and force employment, integrating and synchronizing the planning and activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, the services, and combat support agencies.

The National Security Strategy. The NSS provides a statement of broad goals and the general way that the tools of national power will be employed to advance those goals. For instance, the current NSS flows from “the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”³⁵ According to the current NSS, the United States must be prepared to play the leading role in a global effort to make the world safer and more just.

One of the document's main themes is that the spread of democracy and respect for human dignity are inseparable from the national interests of the United States. The NSS discusses the progress made and challenges still facing the nation's efforts to champion aspirations for human dignity, strengthen alliances, help defuse regional conflicts, protect against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ignite economic growth through free markets and free trade, encourage democracy, develop cooperative agendas with other global powers, transform America's national security institutions for the twenty-first century, and engage opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.³⁶

National Defense Strategy. The NDS focuses on how the military instrument of power contributes to achieving national security objectives, providing a more direct link between the National Security Strategy and the NMS. The NDS lays out the Department of Defense's strategic objectives, articulates the ways the department will achieve those objectives, and discusses implementation of the strategy. The NDS established four categories of challenges that can serve as general planning cases: traditional (state versus state warfare), irregular (unconventional warfare, such as insurgency), catastrophic (an adversary's acquisition of WMD or the like), and disruptive (an adversary that develops a breakthrough technology to negate current U.S. advantages). The NDS also points the way ahead to force planning by describing the desired capabilities and attributes of a future joint force.³⁷

National Military Strategy. The NMS sets the strategic direction for the armed forces to implement the NDS by describing the ways and means to achieve supporting military objectives. Among other things, the NMS places an increased emphasis on homeland defense; mandates a shift from "threat based" to "capabilities based" planning; replaces the requirement to prevail in two "nearly simultaneous" major theater wars with the requirement to "decisively [defeat] an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations"; and enhances the focus on transforming the U.S. military to a twenty-first-century force capable of responding to a variety of threats across the spectrum of conflict.³⁸

The Quadrennial Defense Review. The NDS and NMS provide the strategic foundation for the congressionally mandated 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR provides a "snapshot" in time of the department's strategy, capturing the experiences of the armed forces over the previous four years and the direction to take in the future, emphasizing the needs of the combatant commanders.³⁹

Theater Operational Planning and the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. On the one hand, theater strategy is concerned with operational planning and

operational art, such as the planning and conduct of campaigns. On the other hand, however, it also includes the development and implementation of a Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

In terms of warfighting, the national and military strategies help to establish the desired goals in a theater, linking operational considerations to the requirements established by national authorities. Based on guidance from higher authorities, the theater commander determines the desired outcome within his area of responsibility. The staff then develops war plans based on an array of plausible scenarios. Using various force planning models and war games to determine force size and mix, the COCOM staff then derives the force necessary at the outset of a campaign to achieve the desired outcome.

In addition to determining the required force, staffs at all levels also determine the schedule for deploying forces from out of theater. Part and parcel of this determination is the establishment of the Time-Phased Force Deployment Line, designating in a detailed manner the timeline for forces to be deployed to the theater.

The higher-level strategies also establish priorities among the various theaters, indicating which will be the site of the main effort and which might be designated “economy of force” in the event that crises occur in more than one theater simultaneously.

However, warfighting and war plans are only one part of the COCOM’s job. Also included is the responsibility for shaping the theater in hopes of advancing U.S. interests without recourse to war, engaging the governments within the region, and developing the necessary security infrastructure to maintain a favorable state of affairs. In this regard, the COCOM employs such tools as security assistance, military exercises, and humanitarian support. The COCOM’s actions are not strictly military in nature; diplomacy and interagency operations play a major role in the development and implementation of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan of each geographic command.

Consider as an example just one theater—U.S. Central Command. In the near term, U.S. security concerns remain focused on the war on terrorism, access to oil and gas, furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process, the influence of radical political Islam on states in the region, and the futures of Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Central Asia. The Central Command posture statement lays out the major issues that the command faces in its area of responsibility; they include stabilizing the situation in Iraq, training Iraqi security forces, contending with terrorist attacks, and furthering the Arab-Israeli peace process.⁴⁰


STRATEGY AS A GUIDE TO FORCE PLANNING

Strategy also serves as a guide to planning future military forces. In theory, the strategy–force planning process is logical. The planner first identifies national

interests and the objectives necessary to achieve those interests. The planner then assesses the ability of adversaries to threaten those interests or to interfere with the achievement of national objectives. These represent the “operational challenges” that U.S. forces must surmount in order to implement the strategy. Next, the planner forges a strategy to overcome operational challenges and a budget to fund the capabilities and operational concepts required to implement the strategy.

To execute any chosen strategy, certain strategic requirements must be fulfilled. These requirements determine the necessary military capabilities and operational concepts, which in turn drive the acquisition of forces and equipment. Thus, if there is a strategic requirement for a particular capability, the forces or equipment that provide that capability should presumably be obtained.

As previously noted, throughout the process the planner must constantly evaluate any risk that may be created by a potential ends-means mismatch. The figure graphically portrays in idealized form the essential link between strategy making and force planning.⁴¹



For example, the geographic position of the United States and its status as the dominant world power requires that it be able to overcome the “tyranny of distance” in order to project sufficient troops for necessary influence into a potentially hostile environment. To do so, U.S. forces must surmount such operational challenges as countering an adversary’s asymmetrical antiaccess strategy;

defending its space assets, bases, ships, or even the continental United States from attack; and operating in urban terrain. Part of thinking about operational challenges is making educated guesses about the types of military competition that may take place in the future.

To overcome these operational challenges and confront plausible future areas of military competition, the United States must develop new operational concepts. These might include operations based on stealthy, extended-range, unmanned system–dominated air warfare; distributed, deep-strike, nonlinear ground operations; submersible, distributed, sea-based power projection, both strike and amphibious; space warfare; and independent, integrated information warfare.⁴² Currently, all the services are developing such operational concepts.⁴³

In practice, strategic decisions must always compete with the demands of domestic politics, or what Samuel Huntington has called “structural decisions.” These are choices “made in the currency of domestic politics.” The most important structural decision concerns the “size and distribution of funds made available to the armed forces.”⁴⁴ As the example of the Reagan administration illustrates, the strategy maker or force planner can never ignore fiscal constraints. Indeed, political reality sometimes dictates that budgetary limits will constitute the primary influence on the development of strategy and force structure. Additionally, bureaucratic and organizational imperatives play a major role in force structure choices.⁴⁵

Strategy is designed to secure national interests and to attain the objectives of national policy by the application of force or threat of force. Strategy is dynamic, changing as the factors that influence it change. Strategic requirements have evolved considerably since the end of World War II, and with them the descriptors of military strategy.

The evolution of military strategy over the past fifty years illuminates the interrelationship of ends, means, and the security environment. Potential mismatches between ends and means create risks. If the risks resulting from an ends-means mismatch cannot be managed, ends must be reevaluated and scaled back, means must be increased, or the strategy must be adjusted.

Strategy making is a central component of defense policy. Without a coherent, rational strategy to guide the development and employment of forces, structural factors such as bureaucratic and organizational imperatives dominate the allocation of resources for defense, leading to a suboptimal result.

NOTES

1. For a practical example of strategy as a guide to organizational planning, see Admiral M. G. Mullen, *Navy Performance Guidebook*, Sec. 3, "Develop a Strategic Plan" (undated), <http://nwcintrant/CNOPublications.pdf>.
2. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), p. 128.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
4. For an excellent treatment of the origins of modern strategic thinking, see Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1989); cf. the chapters on Jomini and Clausewitz in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986).
5. Paul Kennedy, ed., *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1991); Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), *passim*.
6. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), p. xiii.
7. I am indebted to Dr. Robert S. Wood, former dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, for this formulation.
8. For instance, Luttwak, in *Strategy*, reduces strategy to a manifestation of "paradoxical logic." In his monumental *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1987), Archer Jones reduces strategy to a choice between "persisting" and "raiding." In *World Politics and the Evolution of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995), John Weltman explicates warfare in terms of a simplistic version of Delbruck's distinction between strategies of annihilation and attrition.
9. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "On Strategy," in *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*, ed. Williamson Murray et al. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), p. 1; Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 134–36.
10. Murray and Grimsley, "On Strategy," pp. 7–20.
11. Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 183.
12. Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979).
13. Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 23–44; Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 131–32.
14. Colin Gray, "Inescapable Geography," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 2/3 (June/September 1999), p. 169.
15. Jakub J. Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2006).
16. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, chapter 28 in *Strategy and Force Planning*, ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, 2nd ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1997), pp. 391–94.
17. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "U.S. Maritime Strategy and the Cold War," in *Mysteries of the Cold War*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (London: Ashgate, 1999), p. 167.
18. Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change*, pp. 51–161.
19. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "In Defense of Classical Geopolitics," *Naval War College Review* 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1999), esp. p. 65f.
20. But see C. Dale Watson, *Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: Multipolarity and the Revolution in Strategic Perspective* (London: Routledge, 2007).
21. On strategic culture, see Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1977); Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Colin S. Gray, "Comparative Strategic Culture," *Parameters* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1984), and *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton, 1986); Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 4, no. 5 (November–December 1985); Alastair Ian Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995); Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998); Lawrence Sondhaus, *Strategic Culture and Ways of War: An Historical Overview* (London: Routledge, 2006).

22. Kerry Longhurst, "The Concept of Strategic Culture," in *Military Sociology*, ed. Gerhard Kummel and Andreas D. Prufert (Baden-Baden, Ger.: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000), p. 200.
23. Lord, "American Strategic Culture," pp. 269–93.
24. See, for example, Colin Gray, *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History* (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
25. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 164–93.
26. Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 3–4.
27. Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp. 91–112. See also Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security* 5, no. 3 (Winter 1980–81); Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," in *Military Effectiveness*, ed. Millett and Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), vol. 1., pp. 3, 12–19.
28. For instance, see Luttwak, *Strategy*, pp. 69–189.
29. Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943), p. viii.
30. Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5–53.
31. Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Super Power* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1988), and *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane Russak, 1977).
32. Huntington, *Common Defense*, pp. 3–4. Huntington's strategic category corresponds to Graham Allison's "rational decision model," in which "governments select the action that will maximize strategic goals and objectives" (Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review* 63, no. 3 [September 1969], p. 694). Huntington's structural category shares many of the attributes of Allison's "organizational" model, which sees the actor in national decisions as "a constellation of loosely allied organizations" (Allison, p. 699). Allison's original paper was later expanded into a book: *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). An updated and expanded version was released as Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999).
33. On strategic pluralism and strategic monism, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 400, 418–27, and *The Common Defense*, p. 264; Gordon W. Keiser, *The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944–47: The Politics of Survival* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 121–22. Cf. Mackubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," *International Security* 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 106–108, and "Goldwater-Nichols: A Ten-Year Retrospective," *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1996), and "The Use and Abuse of Jointness," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 1997).
34. Samuel Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 80, no. 5 (May 1954), p. 483.
35. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006), p. 1.
36. *Ibid.*
37. U.S. Defense Dept., *The National Defense Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: March 2005).
38. U.S. Defense Dept., *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff, 2004).
39. U.S. Defense Dept., *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: 6 February 2006).
40. Admiral William J. Fallon, "Statement of the Commander, U.S. Central Command before the House Armed Services Committee," *CQ Congressional Testimony*, 18 April 2007.
41. Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, Jr., "Strategy as a Guide to Force Planning," *Naval War College Review* 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1988), p. 15.
42. For example, see Michael Vickers, *Warfare in 2020: A Primer* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996), p. 1.

43. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Do We Still Need the Services? The Limits of Jointness," *Armed Forces Journal* (June 2006).
44. See note 29, above.
45. Thomas Ricks and Anne Marie Squeo, "The Price of Power: Why the Pentagon Is Often So Slow to Pursue Promising New Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 October 1999, p. 1.

PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP VISITS VIETNAM SETTING THE STANDARD FOR SEA-BASED HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lucius, U.S. Marine Corps

As the Marine and naval attaché in Hanoi, Vietnam, for the last two years, I have been privileged to serve on the forward edge of U.S. efforts to forge a strengthened bilateral defense relationship with a strategically important partner. These efforts have taken many forms, but none has been as potentially far reaching as the recent visit to Danang City from 15 to 25 July 2007 by PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, a four-month humanitarian-assistance mission conducted in several Southeast Asian ports by the USS *Peleliu* (LHA 5) and embarked teams of medical, dental, and engineering personnel. While not the first humanitarian mission conducted by the U.S. military in Vietnam since the normalization of postwar relations in 1995, this one was sufficiently remarkable to be characterized as a watershed in the development of the bilateral military relationship.

During the ten days that *Peleliu* anchored in Danang Harbor, uniformed service personnel from the United States and seven other Asia-Pacific nations partnered with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and medical professionals of the host nation to care for 3,667 patients, providing medical and dental treatment as well as pharmacy and optometry services. The PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission also included a biomedical repair team, which evaluated nearly a hundred different pieces of equipment needing repair from twelve different clinics and hospitals and restored a third of them to operating condition. Additionally, the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP medical staff hosted “subject-matter-expert exchanges” for hundreds of city health officials, addressing basic life support, first

aid, treatment of burns and fractures, wound care, nursing care, infection control, immunization safety, and disaster response. Forty-two P2 medical and surgical specialists also met with their Vietnamese counterparts to participate in informal discussions and collaborative clinical care at Danang General Hospital, the Danang Ophthalmologic Hospital, and the Center for Preventive Medicine.

In addition to medical and dental outreach activities, a combination of U.S. Navy “Seabee” (construction battalion) and community relations projects led to the renovation and upgrade of six medical clinics,

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an orphanage, a school for disabled children, and a vocational training center for disadvantaged youth. Finally, Project Handclasp donations valued in excess of \$100,000 (U.S.) were handed over to two local NGOs, and tens of thousands of dollars' worth of medicines were donated to local health agencies. The statistics, however, represent only a part of the overall PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP success story of this visit.

Since the reestablishment of diplomatic relations the U.S. Navy has been permitted to call upon Vietnamese ports only four times. However, during a January 2007 visit by Admiral Gary Roughead, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (now of U.S. Fleet Forces Command), Vietnam's Ministry of Defense informally broached the possibility of a visit to Vietnam under the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP rubric, as a special case, a humanitarian-assistance activity to be hosted by the Ministry of Health, rather than a defense-related port call. Admiral Roughead immediately grasped the import of this subtle overture, and the wheels were soon set in motion to turn it into reality.

During subsequent discussions with the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Health, it was stressed that the lessons of the U.S.-led disaster relief operations in the wake of the 2004 tsunami and the 2006 Leyte landslide might have profound relevance for Vietnam, a country that is itself prone to typhoons, floods, and mudslides. A visiting U.S. Navy warship could enable a multinational humanitarian mission that could in turn help Vietnam's national and local authorities work through the planning and coordination that would inevitably be required to facilitate response to an actual crisis. The government apparently concurred with this line of reasoning, and soon after, the Ministry of Health was assigned as the official host of the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP visit.

It then fell to an advance team of PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP planners and U.S. Defense Attaché Office staff in Hanoi to find a suitable location for the visit. A preliminary survey was made of three potential sites in central Vietnam (Danang City, Quy Nhon City, and Nha Trang City), but Danang offered the best chance for success, largely because of the local government's extensive experience in hosting visits by foreign warships, but also because of its long history of welcoming foreign medical missions and NGOs. Moreover, as the former base of numerous U.S. Marine and Navy units from 1962 until 1973, Danang was the sentimental favorite of the planners. It was not lost on us that one of the names originally considered for the USS *Peleliu* had been the USS *Da Nang*.

The USS *Constitution* was the first U.S. Navy ship to visit Danang, in May 1845. Unfortunately, that visit ended in firing upon the harbor and the deaths of dozens of Vietnamese—not an auspicious start to military relations. Nearly 120 years later, on 8 March 1965, Marines of Battalion Landing Team 3/9 came ashore at Red Beach 2, just north of modern Danang City. Eventually, this area

became home to the largest American military presence in the Republic of Vietnam's I Corps zone. U.S. Navy Seabees upgraded Danang's Tien Sa Port in the late 1960s to accommodate oceangoing freighters. Also, Danang City's Ngu Hanh Son District had been the primary beneficiary of III Marine Amphibious Force's civic action program, which included extensive medical and dental outreach. Since the end of the war, a number of nongovernmental organizations founded by former American veterans have remained active in this area, and a handful of the clinics involved in P2 outreach had actually been constructed by these groups. It seemed that a return of active-duty American medical providers to this area in partnership with local Vietnamese doctors might help close a painful chapter of a shared history.

By the time a second advance team had visited Danang City in late May 2007, a fair amount of progress had been made toward defining the scope of the visit. Officials from Danang City's Department of Health had provided a list of desired activities, and those recommendations formed the core of the plan. Additionally, a locally based NGO, the East Meets West Foundation, had done much groundwork on several key projects. This round of meetings, however, ended with the realization that limitations imposed by Vietnam would seriously constrain the extent of PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP activities. Health officials were adamant that P2 personnel not perform surgery, nor would they allow any medical or dental work involving Vietnamese citizens to be done aboard ship. Vietnamese law, they claimed, prohibited foreign doctors from performing surgeries in Vietnam. But NGOs like Operation Smile had been doing just that since at least 1996; clearly, there was something else afoot. These restrictions would limit what the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP could ultimately achieve in Vietnam. Still, there was much that could be accomplished.

It was also determined during this advance-team visit that Danang's Tien Sa Port could not accommodate *Peleliu*. The ship would need to remain at anchor; personnel and equipment would need to be transported between ship and shore every day. Because helicopters had been ruled out by Vietnam early on, and since there were no U.S. Coast Guard-certified water taxis, we would have to request authority to operate the ship's utility landing craft (LCUs). This permission was not a foregone conclusion, as LCUs had significant historical "baggage" for the Vietnamese. Craft like these had last plied the waters of Danang Harbor before 1973, when the situation had been markedly different. During the concluding lunch for the second round of advance-team meetings in Danang, a senior member of the city's Foreign Affairs Department leaned across the table and told me quite bluntly that he had been a member of the Viet Cong for six years and that he had spent much of that time living in tunnels. The remark was not meant as a rebuff or a warning, yet it did serve as a reminder that despite

reassurances that the Vietnamese have put the past behind them, the war's legacy remains deeply engraved in the individual and collective psyches of the nation's leadership. We could take nothing for granted.

Back in Hanoi, the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Health was briefed on a preliminary plan that had been refined over the preceding weeks. Generally speaking, officials appeared supportive of the broad outline, but they also reaffirmed restrictions on medical procedures and insisted that *Peleliu* be referred to as a "hospital ship" in all discussions with the press. They also seemed preoccupied with the question of which uniforms would be worn by American and foreign military personnel working ashore. Finally, Ministry of Health officials declared that they would need the prime minister's approval of the overall plan, and we offered to provide a detailed concept of operations to assist them in developing their briefing to him. In retrospect, it is clear that this PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission had enormous political risk for its advocates within Vietnam's government and that they were attempting to remove any risk that was avoidable so as not to jeopardize the broader benefits of the visit. It became increasingly apparent over the next few months that elements in Vietnam's government were very dubious about this mission, but it also seemed that our adaptability and responsiveness to concerns could inoculate our supporters against any unwarranted criticism.

Developing the promised concept of operations was a serious challenge, for a variety of reasons. Although bilateral military relations between the United States and Vietnam had improved steadily in recent years, progress had been constrained by a number of factors, not least of them the memory of American involvement in Vietnam's long history of conflict. That nation's proximity to the People's Republic of China possibly also played a role in its efforts to downplay the military aspect of the planned visit while stressing the humanitarian. This "spin" not only made the visit more palatable to Vietnamese hard-liners but helped to mitigate the government's concerns about any appearance of prematurely accelerating a naval relationship with the United States.

Drafting a comprehensive plan for the Ministry of Health was also complicated by the nonstandard planning documents used by the P2 staff, a hodgepodge of papers and spreadsheets assembled with great care and much detail but little consistency across functional areas. Each area had a solid plan, but there was no grand structure that drew them all together. Still, by mid-June, sufficient data had been collected to craft a comprehensive concept of operations for submission to the Ministry of Health. This document covered in detail not only all the planned outreach activities but also uniforms, customs, immigration, medical-provider credentialing, liberty (shore leave) for the crew, LCU operations, force protection, and protocol.

By late June, a team of P2 planners “embedded” in U.S. Defense Attaché Office Hanoi had been cleared by the ministry to begin working exclusively with the Danang City Foreign Affairs Department and Department of Health. A third advance visit was conducted to finalize the concept and work out unresolved problems, but because final approval by the prime minister had not yet been received, many key city offices, such as customs, police, and border defense, were unwilling to discuss matters of substance. Vietnam’s often Byzantine bureaucracy prevents subordinates from acting without explicit guidance from higher echelons, and for a visit of this profile local officials were reluctant to make support commitments without “top cover.” The advance team was forced to return to Hanoi with many important issues still pending.

Defense Attaché Office and PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP planners traveled once again from Hanoi to Danang City the week prior to the arrival of *Peleliu*, scheduled for 15 July, to complete preparations. In the following days the team made last-minute site surveys and met with local authorities, NGOs, and other important players. A final countdown meeting with the Danang City authorities was held on the 13th to reach consensus on the few remaining unresolved problems and review the proposed daily schedule. As the meeting began, however, it became clear that a number of important previously agreed-upon items were now stumbling blocks. Specifically, it was made known not only that the Department of Customs had received none of the necessary documents for the importation of P2 equipment and pharmaceuticals but that an entirely new uniform policy would be necessary. The government of Vietnam had recently decided that military uniforms would not be permitted for any P2 activities, with the single exception of liberty. Worse yet, the plan to operate LCUs had not yet been approved.

It fell to the Defense Attaché Office representatives to reiterate forcefully the centrality of the landing-craft arrangement, without which the entire mission would have to be scrubbed. The U.S. naval attaché stepped briefly out of the room for some “damage control” with individuals from the ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs; within ten minutes the matter had been resolved. Even without authorization from the national government, local authorities would permit us to proceed in accordance with the proposed concept of operations—unless we received guidance to the contrary, we would simply proceed as planned. The ship’s gig (a boat for the use of the commanding officer), however, could not be used, and no latitude was given with respect to the new uniform policy. Furthermore, a request to employ the Marine Forces Pacific Band ashore was denied outright. While these seemingly disconnected pronouncements were met with not a little dismay and frustration among the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP embarked staff, they were consistent with Vietnam’s decision-making process and reflective of certain latent sensitivities toward the mission.

Decision making in Vietnam is not only very centralized but can quickly bog down in collaboration and consensus seeking. Decisions, especially sensitive ones, must be discussed and coordinated far in advance, and the interim between request and decision is often lengthy. The diplomatic note requesting authorization for the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP visit had been submitted by the American embassy on 15 May, but a formal response was not received until 10 July, nearly two months later—though there was never any real doubt that the mission would be approved. Delays in critical information from the P2 planners put Vietnam's officials farther behind in their decision-making cycle for several important and contentious issues. For example, it took several weeks to lay out precisely how landing craft would be used between ship and shore. Consequently, a formal employment plan could not be submitted to the government until 3 July; certain vital elements were still pending on the eve of the ship's arrival.

Danang authorities admitted at the 13 July meeting that their own red tape had prevented them from receiving many key planning documents until two days before, though they had been submitted to the Ministry of Health weeks prior. Still, as in the case of the LCUs, local authorities without guidance from above bravely permitted us to move forward in the best interest of success. It is not at all surprising that some requests were denied. It was because the captain's gig was a matter of convenience and not central to the mission, as the LCUs were, that officials drew a line and stood firm. Moreover, bands, especially military bands, are used in Vietnam for powerfully emotive propaganda purposes; granting permission for their use was a more politically sensitive decision than local officials were willing to make. Also, Vietnam made important concessions on pilotage fees and visa requirements. The revelation about nonreceipt of paperwork with less than forty-eight hours to go was less than welcome, but experience of working with government officials gave the Defense Attaché Office a certain, qualified confidence that everything would somehow come together at the very last moment. Sure enough, by late in the afternoon of 14 July assurances had been received that most of the issues of concern were resolved.

Negotiation with Vietnamese officials can be a plodding and frustrating experience and often requires deep reserves of patience, but in no way did discussions—even over uniform policies, LCU employment, or band performances—ever suggest an obstinacy born of antipathy or, worse, a blatant effort to hold the U.S. Navy at arm's length. Yet a tendency to read such attitudes into Vietnamese behavior was often prevalent among Americans, many of whom had no experience of Vietnam beyond history books or films. On the day of *Peleliu's* arrival, for instance, a busload of sailors on liberty stopped in Danang's Hon Market. Reports indicate that the bus was quickly mobbed by locals and that some of the

passengers believed they were being warned not to get off. Fearful for their safety, the sailors quickly moved on. But earlier U.S. port calls to Danang suggest that it is most unlikely that these young sailors were ever threatened. It is far more probable that local vendors were expressing their high hopes for these cash-laden customers a bit too enthusiastically. Expectations can shape perceptions, however, and these sailors likely expected a negative reception from a hostile people still seething with wartime memories. Consequently, that is how they perceived the event. The reality is that most Vietnamese were born after the war and that few still bear malice toward Americans. Fewer still would ever indulge in that sort of public display. Likewise, there was often a knee-jerk tendency on the American side to attribute a bit more connivance to Vietnam's legendary bureaucracy than was warranted by the facts. If there are ghosts in Vietnam's bureaucratic machine, there clearly are in ours as well.

Once PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP activities began in earnest in Danang City on 15 July with the ship's arrival, few substantial problems arose. The P2 "embed team" seemed to develop a real appreciation for the nuances of Vietnamese culture and became quite skilled at working within the host-nation negotiating paradigm. Danang City authorities also shifted into high gear and were able to coordinate support requests rapidly. "Pop-up" requirements were dealt with rapidly and with minimal fuss. By the fourth day, the mission had hit its groove as P2 and host-nation counterparts achieved the level of familiarity and trust that is essential for a productive and sustained work relationship in Vietnam.

Looking back, the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission to Vietnam achieved many notable successes. For the first time, a U.S. Navy ship visited that nation as a partner of a civilian ministry in support of local civilian authorities. This partnership set a precedent for cooperation in meteorological, medical, and search-and-rescue activities, without accelerating the bilateral defense relationship at a pace beyond that which the People's Army was capable of or willing to accept.

The P2 visit was also the first time in forty years that a foreign navy had been permitted to use landing craft in Vietnam's territorial waters. Despite the impact that LCUs had on an already congested harbor and the local pilotage and coast-guard resources required to support their numerous daily trips, local officials proved very cooperative. Nearly a hundred cross-harbor movements and the transportation of city officials and their families to shipboard tours and receptions likely gave local authorities confidence in the U.S. Navy's ability to employ embarked boats in a safe and low-key manner in Vietnam's waters. Future requests may be viewed more favorably and require less discussion. This greater level of trust may eventually extend to the use of embarked helicopters to reach remote and underserved areas.

Finally, this was the first time that the government of Vietnam had accepted an invitation to send observers to join a military-led humanitarian-assistance mission. When *Peleliu* left on 25 July, three physicians from Danang General Hospital were on board to participate in follow-on P2 activities in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. The Ministry of Defense had declined an invitation to send an observer of its own, but participation in an American military mission by any Vietnamese official at all was a positive step toward broader cooperation. The doctors are still aboard *Peleliu* at this writing, but ideally, they will return to Vietnam with positive feelings about and practical, firsthand experience in humanitarian-assistance operations and will urge their government to seize other similar opportunities in the future.

Despite initial concerns that Vietnam's Ministry of Culture and Information would severely restrict domestic reporting about PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP activities, media coverage of the visit and the activities of *Peleliu*'s crew turned out to be remarkably extensive and positive. PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP public affairs personnel, acutely sensitive to Vietnam's concern about perceptions, wisely downplayed the ship's primary warfighting mission, emphasizing instead its role as an enabling platform for humanitarian work and drawing attention to its medical capabilities. Over eighty articles appeared online, and dozens of print articles ran in regional papers as well as the state-controlled dailies. In addition, Vietnam Television and the Voice of Vietnam carried reports about P2 activities in prime time. Given the number of Vietnamese who access the Internet (Vietnam Net, the country's largest online news service, receives fifty million page hits per day), the impact of this coverage must have been significant. Stories about ethnic Vietnamese personnel participating in the P2 mission proved especially popular. That this visit received such coverage in a news market that is entirely state controlled suggests that Vietnam desired to trumpet this visit as an example of its receptiveness to international humanitarian assistance. In fact, the large number of domestic journalists who registered to cover PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP activities signaled early on that Vietnam's government would not let this mission fail.

Beyond the palpable excitement of watching medical professionals from the United States, Vietnam, and seven other countries working alongside NGO partners to provide important humanitarian services to underserved urban and rural communities, the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission proved groundbreaking in many ways. A senior leader of the Danang City People's Committee was so impressed with his ship tour that he later commented that we should make more use of the ship's facilities during subsequent visits. One senior Department of Health official even suggested that this sort of event be conducted annually in

Vietnam. As an initial, trust-building event, the PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP mission to Vietnam appears to have achieved precisely what was intended of it.

Everyone involved can see how far we have come and how much has been accomplished in terms of building trust and developing a relationship that will bear fruit for years to come. A precedent of cooperation now exists that, should a serious natural disaster once again hit Vietnam, will prove of inestimable value in facilitating a rapid international humanitarian response. Vietnam is feeling its way into the arena of peacekeeping and regional disaster response; participation in PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, albeit limited, may ultimately be remembered as a tentative and yet bold first step toward a more assertive role in the future.

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
RESEARCH & DEBATE

HOW MANY COUNTRIES DOES IT TAKE TO MAKE A THOUSAND-SHIP NAVY?

Derek S. Reveron


While senior Navy leaders caution about taking the “thousand-ship navy” literally (it does not have to be one thousand and will include coast guards, maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and local law enforcement), the importance of maritime cooperation necessitates an understanding of likely contributors. With missions of patrolling choke points, maritime interdiction, and maritime domain awareness, it matters what types of ships are available; draft, endurance, and capabilities dictate what missions can be performed. Of the 18,524 ships listed in the 2007 *Jane’s Fighting Ships*, at least 2,108 can be considered potentially available based on size and sustainability (see figure 1).¹

FIGURE 1
NAVY SHIPS BY TYPE



Underlying the thousand-ship-navy concept is recognition that no single country can keep the oceans safe for trade and other legitimate activities. This is logically based on the importance of seaborne trade, the size of the world’s oceans, and globalization. At the same time global trade has increased, and naval fleets have steadily declined since 1989 (see figure 2).² While much has been made of China’s modernization efforts, its overall fleet

**FIGURE 2
RISE OF GLOBAL EXPORTS AND PERCENTAGE DECLINE OF MAJOR NAVIES SINCE 1985**



has declined from 1,160 in 1985 to 376 in 2005. Russia experienced the steepest decline, of almost 70 percent.


Modern ships are much more operationally capable, but numbers do matter when it comes to maintaining presence and responding to crises with sufficient capacity. If the fleets of China, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan were combined, there would be 872 major and minor combatants and submarines. While the United States envisions a thousand-ship navy not controlled or dominated by any one country, under existing mutual defense treaties the United States and its allies could provide 1,114 ships and submarines.

A key question for all maritime planners is where to deploy forces. Not surprisingly, most of the world’s navy ships are based outside of important operating areas in the Northern Hemisphere, but the demand for maritime

security is in the Southern Hemisphere. This necessitates either new concepts like sea basing or new investments in forward bases and underway replenishment.

To interdict illegal trafficking and combat piracy, presence matters. Up until 1994, reports of piracy and armed robbery against ships were relatively equally distributed around the world. As global trade increased throughout the 1990s, reports increased in the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait, and the Indian Ocean. In 2006, there were 240 incidents of piracy, which was a 9 percent decrease from 2005 (see figure 3).³

**FIGURE 3
2006 REPORTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS**



 NOTES

The author wishes to thank Lieutenant Commander Tim Slentz for providing research assistance.

1. Platform inventories are based on *Jane's Fighting Ships Online*, "Analysis/Spreadsheet: World Naval Ship Fleets" available at www.janes.com. Major combatants include aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes. Amphibious warfare includes helicopter carriers, and assault and landing ships. Auxiliaries, landing craft, research ships, and other noncombat ships (icebreakers, buoy tenders, etc.), and those ships with less than one-thousand-ton displacement were excluded. While the case could be made that vessels of less than a thousand dead-weight tons could contribute significantly to the thousand-ship Navy, the larger points to be considered when designing naval coalitions are sustainability and interoperability.
2. Data include only active combat ships and derived from the appropriate years of *Jane's Fighting Ships*. Auxiliaries, landing craft, research ships, and other noncombat ships (icebreakers, buoy tenders, etc.), and those ships with less than one-thousand-ton displacement were excluded. Trade data is in billions of dollars, derived from World Trade Organization, *International Trade Statistics, 2006*, table IV, p. 27, and "Exports of Manufactures of Selected Economies 1990–05," p. 128, available at www.wto.org.
3. International Maritime Organization, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Annual Report, 2006* (London: 13 April 2007).



BOOK REVIEWS

A COMING CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. OVER TAIWAN

Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. *Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 377pp. \$60

This sophisticated Chinese-language research, based on numerous original sources and interviews, completes Lewis and Xue's authoritative series on China's military development. Other books in the series, all published by Stanford University Press, are *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (1994), *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (1993), and *China Builds the Bomb* (1988).

In this fourth and final volume, the authors (both scholars affiliated with Stanford) begin by surveying Chinese military culture and history. Among their findings is that as part of a larger effort to exploit military tension with Moscow to further his personal power, in 1969 Marshal Lin Biao placed China's nuclear forces on "full alert" (an action both unprecedented and, thus far, unrepeated) without Mao Zedong's approval or knowledge. Such assertions should be weighed against other information as it emerges. Lingering uncertainties are hardly the fault of the authors, however, because, as they point out, "no [Chinese] Party, military, or

state contemporary security-related archives have been opened up to the general citizenry, let alone foreign scholars."

Part Two elucidates China's military decision making. A key finding is that China's national command authority resides with the Politburo Standing Committee even during "the most intense crises involving armed threats and military deployments" but that it transfers to the Party's Central Military Commission in war. Untested in battle since 1979 (against Vietnam), the dynamics of these complex bureaucracies remain uncertain even after this penetrating analysis.

The third part examines China's recent efforts to modernize its strategic rocket forces and air force. Efforts to improve strategic missile command, mobility, and survivability appear to have been partially tested in the 1995–1996 cross-strait crisis and in subsequent exercises. The authors' earlier assertion that China's current doctrine of "'active defense' can justify preemption even before the enemy has struck because the enemy *intended* to strike first" raises troubling questions about China's stated policy of

no first use of nuclear weapons (NFU). Indeed, the authors demonstrate that, alarmed at the prospect of a conventional attack on its strategic infrastructure, China's military planners have recently revisited NFU. This, and lingering problems with military aviation (despite the catalyst of the 1991 Gulf War, subsequent Russian imports, and incremental domestic progress), have caused Beijing to seek additional deterrence through a growing arsenal of conventional missiles.

Finally, the authors assess the degree to which China's military has met the strategic imperatives of its ancient strategists and modern leaders. They reach the sobering conclusion that despite China's continuing difficulty in approaching Western technological and even organizational levels, Taiwan's importance to Chinese identity, strategic value, and position as a bellwether of national territorial integrity justify extraordinary expenditure of blood and treasure. Moreover, China's military planners appear to believe that by investing selectively in asymmetric weapons, they can reconcile these conflicting realities without fueling an arms race and hence mutual insecurity. It is to be hoped that a new generation in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, drawing on Lewis's and Xue's research, will find the collective wisdom to avert conflict that would devastate all parties involved.

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Dreyer, Edward L. *Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433*. Old Tappan, N.J.: Pearson Longman, 2006. 238pp. \$20.67

The military history of China has become a common element in the professional reading of many American military officers. Journals like this one have included an important focus on the Chinese past and present, and Edward Dreyer's book contributes important new history and analysis to that understanding. Studying the Chinese foreign expeditionary armada of the early fifteenth century, Dreyer outlines a Chinese strategy and set of naval tactics that are familiar to today's naval officer.

Starting in 1405 the eunuch Admiral Zheng He led a series of seven voyages from the shores of the Ming empire into the South China Sea and Indian Ocean. These voyages were made by fleets larger than any the world had ever seen; armadas of over two hundred vessels, the largest wooden vessels ever constructed, carrying roughly thirty thousand sailors and marine infantry. Scholars and Chinese government historians have characterized these expeditions, which reached as far west as the coast of Africa, as peaceful voyages of discovery. Dreyer, however, disagrees. He writes instead, "After thoroughly reviewing the primary Chinese sources, I concluded that the purpose of the voyages was actually 'power projection' . . . rather than mere exploration. Zheng He's voyages were undertaken to force the states of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean to acknowledge the power and majesty of Ming China and its emperor."

The book is structured in a straightforward manner, chronologically moving from Zheng He's personal biography and the background history of the voyages to the voyages themselves. While not a professional naval architect, Dreyer has obviously done his research.

He provides documentary and archaeological evidence, as well as explanation of basic principles of naval architecture, to support his conclusion that the largest of the ships, the *baochuan*, or “treasure ships,” were at least three times larger than Nelson’s flagship HMS *Victory*.

While the book is not annotated, the level of academic rigor is evidenced by an impressive group of appendixes. The reader should expect nothing less from Dreyer, a leading sinologist who is well versed in not only the history but also the language of the original Chinese source materials. Much of his history comes directly from contemporary primary sources, and the appendixes include translations of the original historical material. This inspired inclusion allows readers to draw their own conclusions. There are also time lines, a valuable index, and a bibliographic essay discussing previous interpretations of Zheng He’s voyages from academic, journalistic, and Chinese government sources.

Conventional wisdom in the military-history community holds that China’s small naval heritage is of little value. Naval battles on the grand lakes and rivers of the Middle Kingdom are not afforded the consideration or importance given to Admiral Matthew C. Perry’s victory on Lake Erie or Rear Admiral David Porter’s gunboat campaigns on the Mississippi. Dreyer’s profile of Zheng He and the history of the voyages of the Foreign Expeditionary Armada provide a new view of Chinese naval heritage, one that includes interesting parallels to American naval strategy important to today’s naval professionals. The Chinese government has held up the voyages of Zheng He as

exemplars of their own future naval strategy. Dreyer’s book offers a compelling revision of past views on the Ming fleets that can help guide future discussion on China’s modern naval ambitions.

BENJAMIN ARMSTRONG
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Bauer, Gretchen, and Scott D. Taylor, eds. *Politics in Southern Africa: State and Society in Transition*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005. 404pp. \$26.50

In the first few pages of this book it becomes clear that Gretchen Bauer and Scott Taylor are not Afri-pessimists. Indeed, one rather suspects that they have little tolerance for observers who look at the African continent and see nothing but misery, defeat, and despair. Such a depiction, according to the editors, relies on far too broad an analytical brush. Bauer and Taylor warn, quite reasonably, against treating Africa as some sort of political and cultural monolith and argue instead for a more regionally focused research approach.

The editors defend with convincing logic their choice to examine the region of southern Africa. Southern Africa contains some of the strongest economies on the continent and is more closely intra-linked than other African regions. If, as Bauer and Taylor contend, regional success stories are being submerged by Africa-wide studies, this work should give those stories the exposure and credit they deserve. *Politics in Southern Africa* is certainly organized to identify regional and local state success. Having made a convincing argument for a regional approach, they

examine the individual regional states: Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Subsequent chapters are devoted to regionwide issues of AIDS, women and politics, and “southern Africa’s international relations.” A final chapter presents research conclusions and predictions for the future.

This approach is sound, and the book’s scholarship is commendable. Each chapter is well written, carefully organized, and packed with pertinent factual data and strong analysis. All this makes the volume a useful addition to the lay reader and scholar alike.

While *Politics in Southern Africa* contributes to a deeper understanding of regional issues and forces, the book is also surprising. For the reader, after finding it easy to agree with the potential benefits of using a regional approach, is ready, even eager, for a parade of success stories and analyses that offer a counterbalance to the somber predictions and gloomy assessments of the Afripessimists. Alas, this is not what follows. Rather than a book of successes, this is a book of “ifs.” For example, it is argued that *if* Botswana can gain control of its AIDS epidemic, and *if* its diamond mines do not run dry before the country can diversify, a stunning success will ensue. In a similar vein, the book maintains that *if* South Africa can control its endemic crime wave and *if* the country can avoid a political system dominated by one party (the ANC), serious progress can be made. Similar conditional stipulations can be found in every chapter.

The editors also point out that the region is at a crossroads. There are potentially positive trends, such as the undeniable, if sometimes glacial, growth of civil

society and of ecological awareness, and these trends potentially bode well. The fact that they are observable, if only faintly, in such dysfunctional states as Zimbabwe should not be dismissed. This brings up the matter of the editors’ conclusions.

In an act of courage, Bauer and Taylor do not shy away from conclusions about the fate of southern Africa, and they deserve credit for that. However, in this process they enter the realm of rose-tinted optimism. They choose to see the southern African glass as half-full, arguing the region will see a vibrant civil society, a culture of constitutionalism, converging economies, and democratic stability. Still, that Bauer and Taylor would edge out on this predictive limb is perhaps one of the book’s strongest selling points, as their conclusions serve as both an invitation to readers for debate and a challenge to learn more about the region.

RICHARD NORTON
Naval War College



Ghazvinian, John. *Untapped: The Scramble for Africa’s Oil*. New York: Harcourt, 2007. 320pp. \$25

John Ghazvinian, who has a doctorate in history from Oxford University and currently is a visiting fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, was born in Iran and raised in Los Angeles and London. He is a skilled journalist who takes the reader on an extensive journey in Africa to better know “more about where our oil will be coming from.” His bottom line is that “oil, far from being a blessing to African countries, is a curse. Without exception, every developing country where oil has been discovered

has seen its standard of living decline and its people suffer.”

Why the scramble for African oil? Because African oil is of high quality and therefore relatively cheap to refine. Africa is surrounded by water, so access to the sea and less expensive maritime transport further reduces costs (in comparison to Central Asia, which must ship by pipeline), and there is increasing global demand, in which Africa represents a larger percentage of new discoveries and production. In addition, newly discovered offshore reserves coupled with new ultra-deepwater drilling technology and transshipment directly from oil platforms avoids the usual onshore problems.

Ghazvinian’s field work is based on wide-ranging interviews with politicians, economists, warlords, diplomats, aid workers, oil-company executives, activists, priests, crude-oil bandits, soldiers, bureaucrats, technocrats, scientists, historians, oil-rig workers, lawyers, bankers, old men, and boys, among others. He provides comprehensive assessments on Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad, and Sudan. Ghazvinian is quick to point out that each country differs in terms of the dynamics of the complex factors at work. A few examples in his words:

“Nigeria, it is simply the doomsday scenario, an amalgamation of all the worst oil has to offer Africa: corruption, ethnic hatred, Dutch disease, and rentierism, organized crime, militant rebellion, hostage taking, and sabotage of industry activity, and a country held together tenuously.”

“Gabon is the golden child ruled by a self-interested French puppet who

forgot to prepare his country for life after oil and has left it with a castrated economy.”

“Cameroon and Congo are much the same story, but in the latter country, oil has fueled a bloody civil war that has left the population traumatized and afraid to speak out against the country’s high-level corruption.”

“Angola is the sleeping giant where billions of dollars have disappeared and where government maintains deep distrust of and distance from the international community.”

Ghazvinian concludes with a discussion of the U.S. military’s increasing interest in Africa, such as in the Gulf of Guinea and the establishment of a new Africa Command. He also details China’s long-term strategy of gaining access to oil by providing patient capital for oil infrastructure in riskier areas coupled with considerable development aid without the typical Western conditionality.

The reader will find this informative, comprehensive, fast-paced journey to Africa invaluable in better understanding the challenges and complexities of the “curse of oil.”

RICHMOND M. LLOYD
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Martel, William C. *Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007. 446pp. \$36.95

William Martel, formerly of the Naval War College and now of the Fletcher School at Tufts University, accomplishes his chief goal of starting a discussion of a worthy, intensely policy-relevant topic. He demonstrates that a consensus

definition of the term “victory” remains out of grasp, despite centuries of learned commentary on military affairs. Martel casts his book as a preliminary investigation of the nature of victory. This “pre-theoretical” inquiry, he declares, is the best that can be achieved, given the nature of war—a violent clash of wills pervaded by uncertainty and strong passions. Given these realities, no social-science theory can tell political and military officials how they can arrange matters to assure victory.

After surveying the works of classical and modern strategic theorists, Martel constructs a framework for analyzing past wars and informing future deliberations on when and how to use force to achieve policy objectives. Victory, says Martel, can be classified by: its level, designated (in descending order) grand strategic, political-military, or tactical; how, and how much, the war alters the prewar status quo; how fully the victorious society mobilizes itself for war; and the manner and scope of postwar obligations incurred by the victor. The author next uses this framework to classify several U.S. military actions, ranging from the 1986 Libya raid to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Evaluating victory is an ambiguous undertaking, even using this analytical approach. The Libya raid yielded only a “quasi-political-military victory,” inducing a change of political behavior on Moammar Gadhafi’s part. The outcome of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, sure to engender the most controversy among Martel’s case studies, remains in doubt. While American policy makers are clearly thinking in terms of a thoroughgoing, grand-strategic victory that reorders Middle Eastern affairs, only a partial victory is yet in hand, and even

that result could slip away amid terrorism and communal bloodletting. *Victory in War* renders a service by improving our ability to learn from past operations and think through future operations before embarking on them.

Given the preliminary nature of Martel’s work, certain issues await elucidation. Most notably, the terms affixed to the levels of victory—grand strategic, political-military, and tactical—imply that the author wants to invert the familiar Clausewitzian relationship between policy and strategy. Placing grand-strategic victory above political-military victory in the hierarchy suggests that strategy—roughly speaking, “grand strategy” means deploying diplomatic, economic, and ideological as well as military power to realize policy aims—ranks above politics in the order of things. A taxonomy clearly affirming the supremacy of policy would enhance Martel’s analytical enterprise and its relevance to practitioners and scholars considerably.

In short, *Victory in War* marks the beginning of what promises to be a fruitful debate on matters of vital interest to political and military leaders—and the nations they serve.

JAMES R. HOLMES
Naval War College



Prados, John. *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006. 696pp. \$35

In an era where overhead imagery is available to anyone with a computer and a credit card, where the twenty-four-hour cable news cycle drives government decisions and the Internet

provides global connectivity, are secret wars still possible? Not according to the author of *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA*.

Veteran intelligence and policy writer John Prados provides a detailed, if somewhat disjointed, chronology of CIA covert actions since the inception of the agency. Prados describes the most recent chapters in the long history of U.S. covert actions, dividing covert actions into two types: political actions (including propaganda and psychological operations) and paramilitary operations. Covert and clandestine intelligence collections are addressed only peripherally, often when covert action and collection must be weighed against one another.

Prados focuses on several common threads. He describes the rivalries within the CIA between the proponents of political and paramilitary operations, and between covert operations and clandestine intelligence collections. He also discusses the competition between the rival “baronies” of the regional divisions within the agency’s Directorate of Operations. The author generally takes a negative view of covert actions, maintaining (for the most part) that they are antithetical to American ideals. With more justification, he points out that covert actions rarely lead to permanent solutions.

However, Prados makes several excellent points that are often overlooked. First, CIA covert actions are carried out on the orders of the president. The varying degrees of control between different administrations, and the relationship between the president and his Director of Central Intelligence, are key factors that determine both the degree of autonomy given to the agency and the amount of operational detail a

president receives. Even when given a high degree of autonomy, the CIA has operated under presidential guidance. Second, Prados points out that from the start it was impossible to keep covert actions totally secret. Many of the operations discussed (such as the Bay of Pigs, Angola, and in Southeast Asia) could not be accomplished on that scale today. Most importantly, Prados argues that covert actions are a poor substitute for policy.

At the end of this long and detailed book, the reader is left feeling that something is missing. The author’s treatment is not balanced, and one wonders if other viewpoints would tell a different story. Still, this is a valuable book for students of intelligence activities.

JOHN R. ARPIN
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Tillman, Barrett. *LeMay*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 205pp. \$21.95

Some great leaders are remembered only as a caricature, and General Curtis E. LeMay may be the epitome of this unfortunate tendency. Mention LeMay, and many see only the movie character General “Buck” Turgidson in the 1964 film *Dr. Strangelove*. Barrett Tillman’s balanced and concise depiction of LeMay puts this limited (and largely inaccurate) view into context. More importantly, he retrieves some of the enduring lessons of leadership that can be learned from one of America’s greatest airmen.

This is precisely the intent of Palgrave Macmillan’s “Great Generals” series. These books—titles on Patton, Grant,

Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Stonewall Jackson have already appeared—are designed to be “quick reads,” of as much interest to the general public as to the military history buff. The work under review treats an important leader who may be in particular need of some rehabilitation, and it is a great advertisement for the entire series. In a single day’s reading one can dispel many of the “Strangelovian” myths and appreciate the man, the leader, and the timeless leadership lessons his example provides. Tillman skillfully blends elements from LeMay’s personal and professional lives with the historical, providing a remarkably nuanced appreciation for this greatest of bomber generals. Any reader can profit from this comprehensive account; for instance, any reader familiar with the classic film *Twelve O’clock High* will recognize that a good bit of LeMay went into Gregory Peck’s character, Brigadier General Frank Savage. But even the most serious student of military history is likely to learn something new about LeMay’s life and times.

Tillman’s portrayal of LeMay, however, is not solely complimentary. While he obviously has great appreciation and admiration for his subject, he is also frank about LeMay’s shortcomings. He admits that LeMay was much more effective as a commander and operator in the field than in Washington, D.C., as vice chief and then chief of staff of the Air Force. Tillman also calls LeMay’s decision to run for vice president in George Wallace’s independent party bid of 1968 “disastrous for his reputation,” although he finds any conclusion that LeMay himself was a racist “demonstrably false.” In sum, *LeMay* offers a balanced description of the general and his leadership.

LeMay’s insights into leadership are still useful today. The “bedrock of his leadership was professional competence.” He was known as the premier pilot, navigator, and bombardier in all his early bomber commands. Throughout the book, LeMay’s emphasis on competence, accountability to high standards, teamwork, developing subordinates, and communication come through loud and clear. Tillman uses LeMay’s own words as his final word on leadership: “No matter how well you apply the art of leadership, no matter how strong your unit, or how high the morale of your men, if your leadership is not directed completely toward the mission, your leadership has failed . . . [in a single word, leadership is] Responsibility.”

It is one thing to describe the principles of leadership. It is quite another to understand how the great leaders in history have lived and applied those principles. Barrett Tillman’s excellent narrative salvages both LeMay and his timeless lessons for today’s leaders.

DAVID BUCKWALTER
Naval War College



Davis, Lance E., and Stanley L. Engerman. *Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Economic History since 1750*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006. 325pp. \$85

As its title states, this book is an economic history examining the impact of naval blockades in general, but it really focuses on four major wars since 1750: the Napoleonic Wars (including the War of 1812), the American Civil War, World War I, and World War II (including the U.S. blockade of Japan).

While providing voluminous data on the economic effectiveness of naval blockades, the authors' conclusions are generally dismissive of their military usefulness, suggesting that an opponent's "military strength" and "productive capacity play a more important role in the outcome of war."

Yet this negative assessment of blockades seems to run counter to many of the book's case studies, such as the War of 1812, which the authors call "a military disaster for the United States." During the American Civil War, the Northern blockade against the South played "a significant role in the Union victory." In World War I, Germany's debilitating "food crisis" was mainly due to "the effectiveness of the Allied blockade." Finally, in World War II the U.S. blockade against Japan was so tight that "it may have been the most effective naval blockade in history."

Given these generally positive views, it comes as a genuine surprise when the authors conclude by suggesting that the success rate of naval blockades "does not seem very high," and that nations will continue "to deploy blockades, but greater success than that which has occurred in the past should not be expected."

One problem might be the tables, some 142 in all, which document in minute detail the impact of naval blockades on wartime economies. Unfortunately, virtually all these tables were adapted from previous works, and some have not been updated. Another possible problem might be the authors' too-narrow focus on economic factors rather than on how economic and military pressure jointly achieved victory. The inability of the Confederacy to obtain iron plates from abroad to construct its own navy,

due mainly to the effectiveness of the Union blockade, is one case in point. The tight U.S. blockade against the Japanese home islands in combination with the use of the atom bomb may have been crucial in forcing Japan to surrender.

Before naval blockades are dismissed as an ineffective strategy, many other successful naval blockades that did not include large economic components would have to be considered. The authors of this book barely mention the U.S. "quarantine" during the Cuban Missile Crisis or Britain's use of maritime exclusion zones while retaking the Falkland Islands, both widely considered to be highly effective examples of naval blockades.

BRUCE ELLEMAN
Naval War College



Ferreiro, Larrie D. *Ships and Science: The Birth of Naval Architecture in the Scientific Revolution, 1600–1800*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007. 432pp. \$45

This is the first in a planned two-volume history of the application of scientific theory to ship design. Larrie Ferreiro is well qualified to take this on, having both trained and worked as a naval architect and having earned a PhD in the history of science and technology.

The sailing ship was arguably the most complex mechanical system in common use prior to the Industrial Revolution. Thus a natural development of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, for emerging "scientists," to try to explain the behavior of the ship at sea. The initial goals were to understand how it was

that ships floated and were propelled through the water, with the ultimate objective of applying scientific principles to optimize the design of ships before they were actually built. Ferreiro traces the pursuit of this emerging ship science through the work of key individuals, most notably Pierre Bouguer, the “father of naval architecture.” The book also takes a topical approach, focusing on efforts to develop the major concepts of ship design, including the proper configuration and placement of masts and sails, hull resistance in water, hull displacement, buoyancy, the center of gravity, and the metacenter. Running through this history is the evolving process of naval architecture through the end of the eighteenth century, including the development and standardization of terminology, ship models and plans, and experimental techniques.

This is ultimately a story of failure, a succession of scientific dead ends on the road to eventual enlightenment. Most of the baseline theoretical work of this period was later determined to be incorrect due to a variety of limitations inherent in early science, including inadequate mathematics, limited experimentation techniques, a lack of reliable means to spread ideas, and not least of all, dogged adherence to Aristotelian physics. It is nevertheless an instructive account of how early theorists came to understand the phenomena they were trying to explain.

Beyond the basic science, this is also an interesting story of the process of innovation within an established bureaucracy. Up until the nineteenth century there was virtually no demand for the application of scientific principles to ship design among those actually building or operating ships. Science was seen both as unnecessary and undesired by ship constructors, whose designs had proven quite adequate and whose livelihoods depended upon safeguarding their specialized and unwritten knowledge. Ferreiro’s thesis is that the primary impetus for developing and applying standardized scientific techniques to ship construction was an effort by administrators outside shipbuilding to impose increasing control over warship design and production. Although little actual change was evident by the end of the eighteenth century, Ferreiro reveals the elements of the eventual shift in bureaucratic control over ship design from individual craftsmen (ship carpenters) to members of an entirely new profession (naval architects).

This book well serves its primary purpose as a general history of the beginnings of naval architecture. It is also valuable as a broader history of technological innovation, offering insight into the relationship between science and technology and the social impact of technological change. I look forward to the second volume (post-1800) of the series.

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