

RAF and Sustainment Warfighting Function

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The United States is in the midst of implementing a responsible transition after ending the war in Iraq, drawing down in Afghanistan, and defeating Al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates, while moving the economy from catastrophic recession to lasting recovery.¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has developed an updated concept for providing trained and ready Army forces to the geographic combatant commanders (GCC) in support of their theatre campaign plans (TCP). This concept, advanced by HQDA, called Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), is intended to support the GCCs to shape the environment, mitigate tensions, and deter armed conflict in their area of responsibility (AOR).²

RAF provides the combatant commander (CCDR) with up to joint task force (JTF) capable headquarters with scalable, tailorable capabilities to support shaping the environment. JTF capability includes Army units assigned to combatant commands; allocated to a combatant command; and those capabilities service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) and prepared by the Army for combatant command (CCMD) regional missions. These forces include Army organizations and capabilities from the corps down to the brigade echelon which are: forward stationed; operating in a CCMD AOR; supporting from outside the AOR, including reach-back capability; and prepared to support from outside the AOR. CCMD requirements are driving and implementing these regional missions. RAF requires an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries for the countries where they are deploying, as well as expertise how to impart military knowledge and skills to others.³

The Army intends that the RAF concept will “support CCMD and U.S. Government requirements to Prevent, Shape, and Win, while remaining operationally adaptable to respond to global contingencies, if required.”⁴ For purposes of the RAF concept, the U.S. Army must have trained and ready forces who will cultivate relationships with allied and partner forces during steady-state activities. Through these relationships, the U.S. Army, as part of a joint, and likely combined force, will be capable of compelling an adversary not to fight, and if necessary, be decisive victors in military actions in the land domain.⁵

Due to current and future budget considerations, doing more with less is the “new normal” for the armed forces. Therefore, the Army must find more efficient ways to be effective as it competes for these finite resources with the other services. RAF provides CCDRs with a Landpower capability to meet emerging or existing regional demands that are responsive and consistently available. In accordance with the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), CCDRs develop and execute TCPs aimed at desired, steady-state strategic conditions. Simultaneously, they develop steady-state daily operations that shape and set the theater through security cooperation activities across their AORs.⁶

To meet these upcoming challenges, the capabilities organically assigned in a brigade combat team (BCT) make it the RAF sourcing unit of choice for CCDRs. A BCT is the Army’s primary land domain maneuver force and is organized as a combined-arms team. BCTs are nearly self-sustaining for up to seventy-two hours and doctrinally require only limited external augmentation to conduct the full range of military operations (ROMO).⁷

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Sustainment Warfighting Function (WfF) Support in a GCC

Prior to examining the Army Sustainment Warfighting Function (WfF) for RAF, the definitions, terms, and practices used to create a common picture and understanding are reviewed. The essence of the Army Sustainment WfF is to provide logistics support and services to Army forces in order to ensure commanders' freedom of action, allowing them to extend operational reach and prolong endurance. Successful sustainment thus increases a commander's number and quality of options.⁸ The three key elements of sustainment are logistics, personnel services, and health service support.⁹

Detailed logistics planning for the movement and support of Army forces is critical. The three elements cited above also include the overarching distribution tasks of supply and transportation, field services, maintenance, and operational contract support.¹⁰ The Army Ordnance Corps is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) doctrine, part of the Protection WfF.

Personnel services must man and fund the force, including Soldier and family readiness and enablers to promote morale. Thus, personnel services encompass a wide range of human resource management, financial, legal, religious, and military band support.¹¹

Health service support (HSS), physical and mental, has its own structure of providers, within the Army Medical Department (AMEDD). Missions include casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics.¹²

The Army Service Component Command (ASCC) is the senior Army command headquarters in theater for the CCMD. As such, it assumes administrative control (ADCON) over Army forces in the GCC's AOR, unless specific exceptions apply. The ASCC fulfills major planning and advisory functions for the CCDR. The ASCC, as directed, also provides Army support to other services (ASOS), including special operations forces (SOF); coalition forces, other governmental agencies (OGA), as well as non-governmental organizations (NGO).¹³

Few appreciate the broad and complex responsibilities of the ASCC. First, it supports the GCC's requirements on a daily basis. Second, it must set the theater and/or joint operations area (JOA). Third, it can serve as the operational HQ, i.e., provide mission command, for immediate crisis response and limited small-scale contingency operations. ASCCs typically have limited forces assigned, and can request augmentation. These units consist of enablers in five areas: sustainment, signal, medical, military intelligence, and civil affairs (CA).¹⁴ This report discusses the sustainment units in detail.

Theater Sustainment Command Operations

The Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) is the ASCC's senior logistics headquarters for the AOR. The TSC is also the executor of the range of Army sustainment missions described above.¹⁵ Hence, the breadth and depth of roles and missions are daunting. The TSC is the centralized logistics command and control (C2) structure to conduct operational-level logistics for the ASCC and the GCC.

The TSC is only a headquarters (HQ) element, however. The overall structure reflects the flattening of organizations. Planners must tailor subordinate units, combining modular force HQs such as expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC), sustainment brigades (SB), combat sustainment support battalions (CSSB), and largely functional companies or smaller elements.¹⁶

The ESC has a unique role for theater sustainment. It can extend the TSC's operational reach and span of control by exercising mission command over multiple SBs. The ESC can focus support on a specific JOA within the AOR. Likewise, it could fall under the mission command of a corps HQ, another Army forces (ARFOR) HQ, or a JTF. Such a close relationship would ensure highly-responsive logistics focused on distribution and readiness in a rapidly-evolving operational situation.¹⁷

SBs consolidate missions previously performed by division support commands (DISCOM), corps support groups (CSG), and area support groups (ASG) into a single operational echelon. Capable of theater opening, theater distribution, and sustainment operations, the SBs have an even narrower area focus than the ESCs. The SBs must also have tailored organizations, built around CSSB HQs and functional subordinate companies and detachments. Specific missions may require specialty units such as movement control battalions, motor transportation battalions, quartermaster petroleum battalions, transportation terminal battalions, and ordnance battalions for ammunition and maintenance.¹⁸

U.S. Army Materiel Command Operations

U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) has the formal mission to develop and deliver “global readiness solutions to sustain Unified Land Operations (ULO).”¹⁹ Moreover, its involvement in a GCC’s AOR has evolved considerably in the last decade. Its focus is national-level sustainment, acquisition integration support, contracting services, and selected logistics support to Army forces.²⁰ Moreover, subordinate elements in theater may also support joint and coalition forces and interagency elements in acquisition, life cycle logistics, and technology (AL&T).²¹ USAMC accomplishes these numerous and diverse capabilities through various major subordinate commands (MSC). These are the U.S. Army Sustainment Command (ASC), Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), and the U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC).

Established in October 2006, the ASC provides logistics from the strategic through tactical levels by synchronizing AL&T. Such a wide purview necessitates support of the operational Army at home-station and while deployed, while simultaneously integrating logistics support with strategic partners, as well as linking the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. Major responsibilities include contracting services for equipment support, logistics synchronization for Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS), and the Logistic Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The ASC deploys several subordinate elements to an AOR: Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB), Army Field Support Battalions (AFSBn), and Brigade Logistics Support Teams (BLST).²²

AFSBs, also established in October 2006, are assigned to the ASC and, when deployed, are under the operational control (OPCON) of the supported ASCC, usually delegated to the TSC or ESC.²³ The AFSB is the major link between the generating force and the deploying operational force, greatly facilitated by their regional alignment in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas.²⁴ The AFSB also performs USAMC national-level provider support and is a key coordinator of related AL&T actions while deployed.²⁵

The AFSBn is subordinate to the AFSB and is a deployable table of distribution and allowances (TDA) unit in direct support (DS) of the ten active-duty division HQs, consisting of Soldiers, DA civilians, and contractors. The AFSBn commands assigned and attached BLSTs. Its primary mission focus is support of deployed Army equipment systems, in particular proper coordination of national-level and AL&T efforts, to include specific logistics assistance. Other AFSBn missions with augmentation are sustainment maintenance; back-up support of field maintenance support to deployed units to perform modification work orders (MWO); and assistance in reset, maintenance, and disposition of theater-provided equipment (TPE).²⁶

The BLST is another USAMC deployable element assigned to the AFSB with a DS role, often for a designated BCT or other brigade-level units. The primary functions of the BLST are to provide subject matter experts (SME) for brigade technical systems, AL&T assistance, and technical support reach-back capability from the brigade to the applicable USAMC agency. The BLST team chief, a major, serves as USAMC’s advisor to the brigade commander and must ensure coordination of all USAMC and related AL&T support for that brigade.²⁷

U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC) is the most recent addition to USAMC, established in October 2008. Uniquely, it provides mission command and procurement authority over all Army contracting organizations with the exception of some specialty units. USACC has two major responsibilities. First, it provides theater-support contracting through the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC). Second, its Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) provides installation contract support to garrison operations in CONUS. The ECC's focus is contracting support in support of Army and joint operations overseas, to include garrisons outside the Continental United States (OCONUS).²⁸ The ECC does so through nine contracting support brigades (CSB), 17 contingency contracting battalions, 16 senior contingency contracting teams, and 92 contingency contracting teams.²⁹

These contracting organizations are radically different from the structures in place during approximately the first half decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, the ASCC's principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC), a staff element, controlled the contracting support mission. Now, the Army senior procurement executive has appointed the ECC commander as the head of contracting activity (HCA), who in turn designates each CSB commander as a PARC. When deployed, the CSB is in DS to the ASCC and executes its contracting mission under the direction and contracting authority of the ECC with both command and contracting authority.³⁰

Thus, Army sustainment has evolved to respond to the drastically-different strategic environment today of non-linear battlefields and emerging threats. However, there is a lack of a single logistics commander in theater, resulting in three distinct sustainment "stovepipe" organizations with the same goal: to support deployed forces in a CCMD AOR. One is the TSC with assigned or attached Army force sustainment (FS) forces. Transition to the modular force has evolved all echelons above brigade (EAB) logistical units to function as "plug-and-play" organizations, necessitating planners to task organize capabilities, i.e., command-and-control HQ units with tailored, functional, companies and detachments. The second is HQAMC with assigned specialty support units. AMEDD health services support constitutes a third stovepipe.

A major element of Army sustainment evolution, renovation, reset, and innovation is APS. The ASC is responsible for all aspects of APS accountability, including storage, maintenance, issues, and receipts.³¹ APS is the third leg of the strategic mobility triad with airlift and sealift and improves force closure times.³² While historically 90 percent of deployed equipment and materiel moves by sealift and only 10 percent via airlift, demands beyond capability and/or capacity may compromise timely responses to short-notice crises. APS stored around the world thus reduces demand upon the other two legs of the Strategic Mobility Triad, whether for exercises, contingency plans, or crisis response.³³

The APS program is an Army strategic program and is a critical capability in support of Army forces. The program consists of unit sets of combat and support equipment, operational projects (unit equipment and supplies above authorization), sustainment stocks, war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA), and most recently, unit activity sets. HQDA G-3/5 (DAMO-SSW) is the approval authority for the release of APS/war reserve. APS is stored in five regional areas and configured to meet stated requirements by the CCDRs and ASCCs.³⁴

Activity sets are a recent addition to APS, consisting of unit equipment prepositioned specifically to equip Army forces conducting training exercises outside CONUS. The equipment is prepositioned at or near the intended training locations and maintained in APS when not issued to training units. U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) established the European activity set (EAS) in early 2014 for rotating units with "a brigade combat team headquarters and battalion-sized armor task force with enablers."³⁵

Joint Sustainment Responsibilities

Executive Agent (EA) responsibility is the delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to a subordinate to act as the sole agency to perform a service or function to others.³⁶ Such responsibilities vary. They may cover only a certain geographical area, a specific operation, or a long-term mission for DoD. Some of the Army's substantial sustainment responsibilities include mortuary affairs; the detainee program; potable water support for contingency operations; military postal operations; veterinary services, which conducts food inspection; and the armed forces blood program.³⁷ The DoD has assigned no less than 47 of 90 component EA responsibilities to the Army.³⁸ The ASCC must integrate and synchronize all this support throughout the AOR.

When operating with allies or coalition partners, the SECDEF can approve an Acquisition Cross-servicing agreement (ACSA). An ACSA provides logistics support, but does not have to be strictly a cash arrangement. Replacement-in-kind or exchange-for-equal value basis is acceptable. Common services under ACSA are ammunition; billeting; food; maintenance; medical services; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); port services; repair parts; and transportation. Prohibited items under ACSA include weapon systems; guided missiles; nuclear ammunition; and chemical ammunition, excluding riot control agents.³⁹

Per Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 164, CCDRs exercise authority, direction, and control over all forces assigned or allocated per direction of the SECDEF. The directive authority for logistics (DAFL) authorizes a CCDR to direct specific logistics actions to promote more effective and efficient execution of approved plans.⁴⁰ The CCDR cannot delegate or transfer DAFL; however, he may delegate responsibility for the implementation and management of common support requirements.⁴¹

Sustainment WfF Function and DOTMLPF

DOTMLPF is a DoD acronym for a methodology to analyze capability gaps and seek mitigations through the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. The acronym stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. A capability gap is essentially a threat or warfighting challenge not encountered before and needing a solution.

Doctrine

ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, published in July 2012, supports ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, published in May 2012. This foundational doctrine articulates how all the elements of sustainment facilitate and support operational success. Sustainment as a WfF is critical to actively promote operational reach and freedom of action.⁴² The future strategic environment and the implementation of RAF across multiple CCMDs require Army sustainment forces to be capable of executing a range of mission types simultaneously. The updated sustainment WfF tasks in doctrine adequately address RAF requirements and do not need additional refinement.

Organization

Organization examines unit structures' ability to plan and conduct operations. Determination of any capability gaps also seeks possible courses of action (COA) for improvement. This section outlines current RAF organizational deficiencies and offers recommended solutions.

In setting a theater, the ASCC structure represents capabilities that are highly task-organized into a selected force based on METT-TC. Although each CCMD is unique, most share similar generic sustainment requirements. The ASCC tailors sustainment units as needed for required capability and capacity levels, then

echelons those capabilities as needed into theater. Again, sustainment units such as a TSC, ESC, SB, and CSSB are only headquarters units, smaller-sized elements are required to conduct logistics and sustainment operations.

Regarding sustainment headquarters structure, there are only three active component (AC) TSCs in the Army, assigned respectively to Pacific Command (PACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), and European Command (EUCOM). One U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) TSC is aligned to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and one Army National Guard (ARNG) is aligned to Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Africa Command (AFRICOM) has no assigned TSC and coordinates through the global force management (GFM) process for support from EUCOM. There are four AC ESCs, two assigned to PACOM and the two others are with the evolving pool of service retained, combatant command aligned (SRCA) units. There are nine ESCs in the USAR and two in the ARNG.

There are 11 AC SBs, of which ten are aligned with a division headquarters; nine in the USAR; and ten in the ARNG. These headquarters units have a variable number of CSSBs assigned at home-station, but are designed to deploy independently with the ability to integrate capabilities in theater as required.

The first recommendation, for more dedicated sustainment unit support for RAF is to SRCA the ten corresponding active-duty SBs and division HQs to the same regionally-aligned GCC. Doing so would have sustainment and division HQs working together as they conduct steady-state operations. Not only would this combination be expeditionary, but it would also provide a synergistic focus for planning, training, and employment. The SB would make recommendations as to the types of logistics units required for RAF mission support to the TSC, most likely through the GEM process.

The second recommendation is to SRCA the USAR and ARNG ESCs to the GCCs in the evolving SRCA “patch chart,” and then plan, train, and support with corresponding active duty forces. A long-term alignment schedule for RAF develops relationships early, along with a mindset of coordination and teambuilding for steady-state operations. Likewise, executing SRCA of the corresponding CSSBs of those units links peacetime training and overseas engagement.

The third recommendation is to SRCA an active-duty ESC to AFRICOM. USARAF currently has no assigned TSC, as well as no other logistics enablers such as an ESC, SB, or CSSB. These units are necessary to plan, coordinate, and execute steady-state requirements, support the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and GEF missions, and potentially respond to crises in the AFRICOM AOR.

Without assigned, key sustainment enablers or capabilities, U.S. Army Africa (USARAF), as the ASCC for AFRICOM, performs support functions outside its scope and charter. The GFM process and other sourcing solutions, such as coordinating with USAR and ARNG units, provide sourcing solutions that are inconsistent and untimely. The results are a lack of continuity for planning and execution, exacerbating the preparation and mission analysis for all events, and degrading shape and prevent activities.

Since October 1, 2010, there has been a standing memorandum of agreement (MOA) between U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and USARAF regarding title 10 § USC 3013 component support. The purpose is threefold: a) establish a common understanding of Title 10 U.S.C. § 162 Combatant Command operational component support requests for forces (RFF), using established global force management implementation guidance (GFMIG), b) establish a common understanding of Title 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (administrative and logistics) non-operational support provided by USAREUR where USARAF lacks the capability to execute, and c) establish processes to support Title 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (administrative and logistics) non-operational support requests for assistance (RFAs).⁴³

The USARAF/USAREUR MOA does not affect the assignment of forces per the GFMIG; rather, the MOA establishes the processes and procedures by which USARAF requests support from USAREUR and establishes processes and procedures by which USAREUR provides support to USARAF. The MOA, however,

does not replace and/or modify the GFM business rules nor does it grant AFRICOM the command authority to deploy USAREUR assigned forces without submitting an RFF. Furthermore, the MOA precludes direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) with USAREUR assigned forces, such as the 21st TSC, and USAREUR forces cannot deploy to the AFRICOM AOR without EUCOM approval and a signed SECDEF order, as per established GFM processes and procedures.⁴⁴

Consequently, support provided to Army units, crisis-response planning and execution, and theater logistics planning in the AFRICOM AOR has been excessively ad hoc. In FY13 USARAF executed a 74-percent increase in events over FY12. In FY14 this trend is projected to continue or increase slightly including theater security cooperation and support to named operations, in addition to emergent operational requirements, such as peace keeping operations (PKO) training missions; and contingency response forces.⁴⁵ Consequently, USARAF has had to conduct increased sustainment planning and execution to support the CCCR's strategic and operational objectives without the expert knowledge that these additional planning staffs bring.

If DoD were to combine EUCOM and AFRICOM into one CCMD again or merge one as a sub-unified command under the other, the current ad-hoc arrangements would end. The current arrangement has been problematic at best, and likely to get worse.

Training

Training sustainment units and leaders must be realistic, rigorous, and relevant to the future environment. The RAF concept supports all of three requirements. As deployments decrease, Soldiers will see fewer opportunities to support real-world missions; therefore, individual and unit training must be challenging and realistic to sustain knowledge and competency expertise. From the perspective of a RAF sustainment, ambiguity, change, and complexity are the norm. Training must emphasize and reflect the necessary adaptability and versatility.

A critical component across the breadth of training venues will be scenarios that force sustainment leaders to adapt quickly to wide-ranging and rapidly-evolving situations. All Soldiers must prepare for unknown events, as they train and maintain expanded, critical pre-deployment skills. The sustainment community must focus on supporting decisive action with offensive, defensive, and stability operations, while ensuring that sustainment personnel are adaptable and flexible.⁴⁶

Sustainment units must be prepared to support the full range of military operations (ROMO), from steady state to Phase V, and now both as RAF supporter and potentially RAF participant. Due to the diversity and different scales of RAF missions, many deploying formations will be small teams. Soldier training must get "back to the basics" for skills that have atrophied after 12-plus years of war. Pre-deployment training is essential in the areas of unit movement operations, asset visibility, contracting officer representative (COR), field ordering officer (FOO), environmental considerations, and field sanitation. Units from the home-station must address these areas with the supported ASCC and on pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS). Importantly, cultural and regional training needs to be added to existing training plans appropriate to the AOR for each unit.

Materiel

In studying the RAF concept for materiel requirements from a sustainment perspective, Soldiers still train at home-station on unit-owned equipment and either deploy with or fall on equipment in theater. Due to fiscal restraints, however, and possible time constraints within an expeditionary capability, HQAMC has added equipment activity sets to APS to provide additional support to RAF units. The concept entails rotating units

to coordinate and draw all or a portion of an activity set for a specific timeframe, then return it to AMC for service and preparation for the next unit.

The first equipment set, the EAS, is intended to equip Army units rotating for European Response Force/NATO Response Force (ERF/NRF) training activities to improve the readiness posture in the EUCOM AOR. The EAS is comprised of equipment from around the world, sent to Germany's Grafenwoehr training area to enable U.S. regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train and operate in the AOR.

The first RAF units aligned with USAREUR are projected to sign for and use this equipment in the spring of 2014 for approximately two months. The EAS consists of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT), a combined arms battalion, a brigade C2 element plus enablers located in Grafenwoehr and Pirmasens for Class VII, major equipment items. The 405th AFSB and the AFSBn-Germany will serve as the lead HQAMC elements assigned to establish the equipment set, provide storage, build a sustainment workforce, and manage future support requirements of over 3,000 major equipment and secondary items.⁴⁷

Also, the CSA approved the concept in fiscal year 2013 (FY13) of prepositioned Army equipment for an Australia activity set (AAS) to equip Army units during future multinational, bilateral, joint training activities. It is currently awaiting diplomatic negotiations for final approval. The projected density list will include a light infantry company and a forward support company (FSC). Planned composition is 114 items. A major advantage to this location is its proximity to the strategically important Pacific region.

Furthermore, HQDA, USARAF, and HQAMC should build an activity set dedicated to USARAF, consisting of an infantry BN, plus a BDE C2 element, plus enablers with support assets staged in Djibouti or Livorno, Italy, to respond to AOR missions. AFRICOM continues to be particularly challenging, due to the great continental diversity, undeveloped infrastructure, the magnitude of its land domain, and the necessity of an equipment set.

Leadership and Education

Future leaders will have to integrate and synchronize all sustainment functions throughout ULO to be effective in the 21st-century operational environment. "They must be adaptive professionals who can think critically to solve problems as they support multiple mission types concurrently and adjust to evolving circumstances."⁴⁸ They must also fully comprehend the spirit of mission command, planning and executing sustainment from tactical through strategic levels, from steady-state RAF activities to decisive action operations.⁴⁹

This mindset must include an understanding and ability to integrate and synchronize sustainment in an AOR for RAF as elements of overall theater security cooperation activities along with conventional forces and SOF while simultaneously coordinating with organizations ranging from ASCC HQ to embassy country teams. Hence the future requires greater cooperation with unified action partners to leverage capabilities of agencies and organizations with diverse perspectives and interests. Sustainment leaders must also be proficient and skilled in working with sustainment enterprises, including the defense industrial base, supply-chain management, life-cycle systems and sustainment, and theater distribution -- planning and executing across all levels. In short, leaders need the skills to achieve desired outcomes through cooperative arrangements with multiple agencies or organizations.

Professional military education (PME) must provide a baseline understanding in the sustainment enterprise that leaders can leverage in tactical, operational and strategic assignments and other broadening experiences. Continued education must build on the foundation to challenge leaders to refine the ability to apply their knowledge to think critically, solve complex sustainment problems creatively, and adapt quickly to

unforeseen circumstances as the operational environment evolves. There will be no shortages of scenarios or situations within RAF mission sets for sustainment leaders to demonstrate adaptability, forward thinking, initiative, and responsiveness to rapid and unpredictable changes and operations.

Personnel

Current sustainment unit modified tables of organization & equipment (MTOEs) for personnel may be sufficient to support RAF units -- if filled to authorized levels. The EAB task-organized companies and detachments are accustomed to tailored structuring. There are caveats, however. The DOTMLPF analysis detailed above highlights the requirement to be prepared to support ULO throughout the ROMO from steady state through Phase V. Thus, the first caveat concerns recent grade-plate reductions, which downgrade skill levels in many critical positions. Skill downgrades will have as-yet unforeseen second- and third-order effects. Second, the Army's mandated 25-percent staff reduction directly impacts those HQ whose missions are projected to expand considerably, if not exponentially, as the RAF concept proliferates across AORs. Third, the restructuring of the BCT adds a third maneuver battalion to the brigade support battalion (BSB) for additional support requirements. The potential impact remains unclear. This enhanced battalion will have its own FSC that will plug into the BSB, but the proposed reductions in BSB's functional companies will likely degrade some capabilities.⁵⁰

Facilities

The RAF concept creates implications for numerous sustainment aspects of a largely CONUS-based Army, specifically an installation's power-projection capability. One of the expectations of RAF units is to be expeditionary and capable of global employment in order to achieve positional advantage over a potential adversary by strategic movement. Unfortunately, the garrisons under the Installation Management Command (IMCOM) had already endured numerous personnel cuts since the end of the Cold War. FORSCOM's Mission Support Elements (MSE) had mitigated some of these losses, as they also assumed numerous rear-detachment functions, but no longer.

Army garrison staffs with their functional directorates are the critical enablers of force projection. The inauguration of comprehensive RAF operations during peacetime may yet highlight shortfalls that will have to be addressed if we are to ensure genuine, agile, rapid, and responsive deployment platforms.

Conclusion

The Army's Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept is a viable approach to provide trained and ready forces to CCDRs to source the prevent, shape and win strategy early, especially during steady state to prioritize shape and preclude having conflict. Sustainment provides a critical role in the successful execution of RAF and development of innovative solutions for its support.

The concept creates a number of challenges for the sustainment WfF function in terms of organization, training, and materiel for RAF units, with as-yet unforeseen consequences in personnel. This report highlights existing capability gaps created by a shortage of sustainment unit HQs and execution unit formations within the ASCCs to support their GCCs, and offers recommendations to address these shortfalls. The RAF concept, in particular SRCA, has the potential to provide the ASCCs with the capability and capacity to meet CCDRs' requirements across the ROMO.

In the absence of outright assignment to those GCCs, RAF activities in steady state warrant large-scale SRCA of sustainment units with DIRLAUTH for long-term planning across GCCs. This comprehensive SRCA

should include AC and Reserve Component force sustainment units that can integrate and synchronize home-station training, through the corresponding SB with their respective aligned division headquarters, to the appropriate ASCC.

The ASCCs must have confidence that the Army's commitment to RAF is long term, with a reasonable level of planned and forecasted predictability, both at home station and in the AOR, barring the outbreak of a major war or massive crisis. Increased risk remains with regard to two aspects of sustainment unit restructuring: a) from AC to USAR or ARNG which requires more lead time for coordination with associated mobilization issues, and b) the concentration of a larger percentage of AC FS capability in the BCTs and the reduced capability and/or capacity at EAB.

Notes

¹ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 7.

² Raymond Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, "Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Regional Alignment of Forces (RAF), Execute Order (EXORD)," Arlington, VA: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 20, 2012, p. 5.

³ *Idem*, "Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), FRAGO 1 to the HQDA Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF), Execute Order (EXORD)," Arlington, VA, Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 17, 2013, p. 3.

⁴ Odierno, "RAF EXORD," p. 7.

⁵ John M. McHugh and Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, "2012 Army Posture: The Nation's Force of Decisive Action," Posture statement presented to the 112th Congress, 2nd sess., p. 6.

⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-22, *Theater Security Cooperation*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2013, p. 1-4.

⁷ *Idem*, Field Manual 3-90.6, *Brigade Combat Team*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2010, p. 1-1.

⁸ *Idem*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012, pp. 3-4.

⁹ *Idem*, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2012, p. 1-1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-8 and 2-9.

¹⁴ *Idem*, Field Manual 3-93, *Theater Army Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2011, p. 1-8. Since the time of writing FM 3-93 has been superseded. See *Idem*, Field Manual 3-94, *Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2014.

¹⁵ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-9 has a full description. Later discussion examines the lack of a dedicated TSC for U.S. Army Africa and Africa Command (USARAF and AFRICOM).

¹⁶ *Idem*, Field Manual 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 2-1. FM 4-94 has been re-categorized/superseded. See *Idem*, ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2013, p. 2-1.

¹⁷ ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 2-20.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-24 to 2-26.

¹⁹ "United States Army Materiel Command Home Page," available from www.army.mil/amc/, accessed on March 14, 2014.

²⁰ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-5.

²¹ FM 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-8, now in ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-6.

²² ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-6.

²³ *Idem*, Army Techniques Publication 4-91, *Army Field Support Brigade*, with Change 1, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 2013, p. 1-3.

²⁴ FM 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-8, now in ATP 4-94, *Theater Sustainment Command*, p. 1-6.

²⁵ ATP 4-91, *Army Field Support Brigade*, p. 1-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3 to 2-4. Admittedly, the statement "deployable TDA" is an anomaly.

²⁷ Ibid., 2-5, 2-6.

²⁸ *Idem*, Field Manual 4-92, *Contracting Support Brigade*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2010, p. 1-1.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 1-1 through 1-2; "U.S. Army Expeditionary Contracting Command Home Page," available from www.army.mil/ecc/, accessed on March 5, 2014.

³⁰ FM 4-92, *Contracting Support Brigade*, pp. 1-1 to 1-2.

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³³ Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-35.1, *Army Prepositioned Operations*, Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2008, p. 1-2.

³⁴ Mona R. Henry Bennett, "Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Overview," Slide #31, Briefing at Redstone Arsenal, AL, October 17, 2013.

³⁵ "The United States Army Stand-To Page," available from www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-01-27/, accessed on March 14, 2014.

³⁶ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Memorandum 10-1*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1997, p. 2.

³⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 2013), p. D-1.

³⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, "DoD Executive Agent," available from www.dod-executiveagent.osd.mil/, accessed on March 29, 2014.

³⁹ ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment*, p. 2-15.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 2-2.

⁴¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2011, p. III-2.

⁴² Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 4-0, *Sustainment*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2012, p. iii.

⁴³ Robert B. Brown and William B. Garrett, "Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Southern European Task Force/U.S. Army Africa Regarding Title 10 § USC 3013 Component Support," October 1, 2010.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Christopher Huggins, AFRICOM G-4, e-mail message to the office of the DA G-4, October 29, 2013.

⁴⁶ Larry D. Wyche, "Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper," Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, VA, August 30, 2013, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁷ Henry Bennett, "Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) Overview," Slide # 21.

⁴⁸ Wyche, "Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper," p. 15.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ See Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-96, *Brigade Combat Team*, when published, for specific details.