

JFQ

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Issue 43, 4th Quarter 2006

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25th Anniversary
*Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff*
Essay Contest

**Reforming Pentagon
Decisionmaking**

Interagency Dialogue
*Fingerprints and the
War on Terror*

VALIDATING THE
**TOTAL
FORCE**



A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AND SECURITY JOURNAL

Report Documentation Page

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4th Quarter, October 2006

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
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
Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare

by David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins

The United States is presently unrivalled in military power and is assured of remaining so for the foreseeable future, thanks to its resources and the transformation of its forces based on networking principles. However, as adversaries of various sorts and sizes also adopt those same principles and exploit increasingly available and easily usable information technology, U.S. operational advantages and strategic equities could be eroded. The unstoppable spread of information networking and know-how gives rise to the need for a new edge—one that utilizes but transcends networks—by developing people, teams, and decisionmaking methods that convert information into better choices and outcomes. We call this new edge battle-wisdom. —from the Preface

The authors pose and explore complex questions and problems, such as:

- How can military decisionmakers make good sense and full use of the flood of information that networks are able to supply?
- How do people think and solve problems in situations of urgency, danger, high stakes, complexity, confusion, and information abundance?
- What are the respective cognitive contributions of reasoning and intuition in such situations, and how are they combined?
- What policies could improve the key cognitive abilities in military decisionmakers, the better to exploit networked information and cope with complexity?



637 pp.
ISBN 1-57906-070-6

Policy Analysis in National Security Affairs: New Methods for a New Era

by Richard L. Kugler

The U.S. Government will continue to face many difficult decisions in the national security arena. Systematic analysis can help improve the quality of these decisions—sometimes only marginally, but sometimes hugely. . . . This book was written in the hope that it will result in better trained people, sounder analyses, and wiser policies. The Cold War generation has, by now, the benefit of years of experience in this field, but a new generation of young Americans is arriving that lacks such experience. The Cold War has passed into history and an entirely new era has arrived that will demand analytical methods of its own. —from the Preface

Richard L. Kugler, one of the foremost practitioners of the critical art of national security policy analysis, encapsulates more than three decades of his experience in this unique book. He virtually defines the discipline, breaking down policy analysis into three major components—strategic evaluation, systems analysis, and operations research—applying the latest methods of each to real world examples and the daunting issues facing the United States in today's global environment.

coming next in... JFQ

Lessons from the War on Terror

U.S. Joint Forces Command

plus

Forging Provincial Reconstruction Teams

and more in issue 44,
1st Quarter 2007 of JFQ



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ABOUT THE COVERS



The front cover depicts Soldier patrolling near Mushahda, Iraq (Fleet Combat Camera, Pacific/Michael Larson); [bottom left to right] Air Force Reserve member participating in mass casualty Exercise *Life Saver* (U.S. Air Force/Matthew Hennen); Army Reserve Soldier talking with residents in Kirkuk, Iraq (Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic/Jeremy L. Wood); Naval Reservist trains aboard USS *Crommelin* (USNR FFG-37 Reserve Detachment); Coastguardsman on maritime interdiction patrol in South Pacific (USC-GC *Galveston Island*/Nathanael T. Miller); and Marine posting as lookout near Abu Ghraib, Iraq (1st Marine Division Combat Camera/James J. Vooris). The back cover shows Soldiers clearing building in Al Iskandariyah (U.S. Air Force/Kurt Gibbons III); joint tactical air controllers relay battle damage to anti-aircraft gun in Iraq (U.S. Air Force (Russell E. Cooley IV)); Marines checking direction of gunfire in clash with Taliban insurgents, Operation *Asbury Park* (22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit/Keith A. Milks); and Navy boarding team conducting maritime interdiction in North Arabian Gulf (Fleet Combat Camera, Atlantic/David C. Lloyd).

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Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JFQ* is the Chairman's flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America's military and security apparatus to meet tomorrow's challenges better while protecting freedom today.



From the Editor

Although *Joint Force Quarterly* attempts to advance the debate on timely and important security issues, we realize that strategic lessons are rarely new. Whether the subject is the war on terror, transformation, or orchestrating multiple instruments of national power in a world rife

with uncertainty and competing interests, themes typically remain the same. They all have deep historic roots, unseen and apparent.

For example, America's militias and Citizen Soldiers stand as icons of American individualism and patriotism. Yet their use and preservation are a conundrum for contemporary decisionmakers.

Voluntary military service has been an unbroken tradition for centuries (though compulsories occasionally assisted the volunteers). The U.S. Reserve Component—the National Guard and Service Reserves—traces its lineage to the Massachusetts Militia of 1636. The New England Militia fought in the early battles of the American Revolution at Lexington and Concord, 2 months before Congress established the Continental Army in June 1775. The Constitution and Bill of Rights subsequently empowered militias with clauses that most Americans are familiar with, such as providing “for the common defense.” In 1792, the Militia Act determined that men aged 18 to 45 years would serve in the compulsory militia, but during the 19th century, volunteer militias composed the bulk of the military.

In the 21st century, the United States again has an all-volunteer force. Individuals make the decision to serve through a personal cost-benefit analysis: some alone, some with spousal input, and some with parental approval. Active duty Servicemembers choose professional military service as a career or sign a contract for a term of service. The military then becomes their primary job for the tour of duty, which may last 3 years or more than 30. Reserve Component members, however, use a different calculus.

Reserve Component volunteers, like their Active duty counterparts, must also consider the effect of extended deployment not only on their families but also on their businesses or civilian careers. Indeed, private sector companies bear war burdens beyond taxes. Some personal businesses cannot survive extended deployments, particularly with late notification.

In a more positive sense, some companies have elected to support their employees in uniform by paying the difference between a lower military stipend and regular civilian pay, and some extend medical and other benefits to the families of those activated to serve full time in a state of emergency.

Government leaders must gauge limited funds to achieve crucial political aims, a difficult problem due to the increasingly sophisticated (and pricey) tools employed by the military instrument. The tradition of grabbing a flintlock from above the fireplace bears no resemblance to modern reality. Today's Minutemen must be proficient with night vision goggles, body armor, advanced personal weapons, conveyances, and communications systems; or they must be proficient at their station in space control, flying fighter aircraft, using precision weaponry, or commanding tanker jets.

Technically advanced aids to warfighting were designed for professional military volunteers, with many recently redesigned to defeat amorphous and multinational post-Cold War threats. These advancements create problems in training, proficiency, and system complexity for the Reservist. How to balance the Reserve Component's role and how to increase predictability in order to retain skilled manpower are perplexing questions for leaders.

Because of *Joint Force Quarterly's* mandate from the Chairman to present relevant and diverse debate on strategic security issues, this issue's Forum deals with America's Total Force, the combination of the Active duty military and its Reserve Component, including the National Guard of each state and Service Reserve elements.

Joint Force Quarterly is also proud to present a Special Feature showcasing the winning research from the 25th Annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest. This is the second year that National Defense University Press, with generous support by the NDU Foundation, has published the winners in the journal. This year, to broaden the field, we expanded the competition to all intermediate, advanced, and senior Service and joint professional military education schools, including international fellows and interagency students. Judges representing all schools met at National Defense University to select the best from an outstanding group of finalists competing in three exciting categories of essays.

This issue of *JFQ* also contains an expanded Interagency Dialogue section with an exceptional article by Supervisory Special Agent Paul J. Shannon, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who is the Director for Law Enforcement Policy on the Homeland Security Council at the White House. This cross-agency program is a useful example of interagency cooperation to share information where no pipeline for such sharing previously existed.

We hope you find the information in *JFQ* useful and timely, interesting and provocative. All articles are peer reviewed, though not refereed, to keep the content on the cutting edge, while presenting a broad range of research and educated opinion pieces; we do not homogenize or censor legitimate analysis and discourse, believing the risk of sharing information openly, in conduct of our mission, is less than the risk of impeding it.

JFQ emphasizes scholarly research, carefully considered commentary, and interagency synergy, international senior leader crosstalk, and interviews. See our Web site for more research and added features. Please drop us an email; we appreciate candid input and requests for specific subject matter and analysis. We would like to receive engaging articles on military and diplomatic history, national security and strategic studies, and innovative joint military operations research.

Although there may be little “new” in conflict and warfare, security dilemmas, or human nature, there are always new ways to examine and consider contemporary issues. **JFQ**

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JFQ Dialogue

Open Letter to JFQ Readers

Joint Force Quarterly receives and greatly benefits from a large volume of unsolicited manuscripts on a broad range of national security topics. Moreover, authors submit relevant articles to the journal well in advance of these topics' debut or recognition by the wider defense community. Even when manuscripts focus on technical or specialized aspects of security research, *JFQ* can usually find a way to incorporate the work and sometimes refers an author's study to outside institutes and centers, such as the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. The editors not only desire that authors and research groups continue submitting the array of articles and thoughtful critiques unfettered but also would like to solicit manuscripts on specific subject areas in concert with future thematic focus.

The following are areas of interest to which *JFQ* expects to return frequently, with no submission deadline:

- orchestrating instruments of national power
- coalition operations
- employing the economic instrument of power
- future of naval power
- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
- industry collaboration for national security
- integrated operations subsets (new partners, interoperability, and transformational approaches)
- joint air and space power
- Just War theory
- defending against surprise attack
- proliferation and weapons of mass destruction
- prosecuting the war on terror within sovereign countries
- military and diplomatic history

The following topics are tied to submission deadlines for specific upcoming issues:

December 1, 2006 (Issue 45, 2^d quarter 2007):
U.S. European Command
(including security issues in Africa)
International Relations and Coalition Operations

March 1, 2007 (Issue 46, 3^d quarter 2007):
Intelligence and Technology
U.S. Strategic Command

June 1, 2007 (Issue 47, 4th quarter 2007):
U.S. Pacific Command
CJCS Essay Contest Winners

September 1, 2007 (Issue 48, 1st quarter 2008):
The Long War
Stability and Security Operations Update

JFQ readers are commonly subject matter experts who can take an issue or debate to the next level of application or utility. Quality manuscripts harbor the potential to save money and lives. When framing your argument, please focus on the *So what?* question. That is, how does your research, experience, or critical analysis improve the understanding or performance of the reader? Speak to implications from the operational to strategic level of influence and tailor the message for an interagency readership without using acronyms or jargon. Also, write prose, not terse bullets. Even the most prosaic doctrinal debate can be interesting if presented with care! Visit ndupress.ndu.edu to view our NDU Press Submission Guidelines. Share your professional insights and improve national security.

Colonel David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.)
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for **JFQ Issue 45**



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(including security issues in Africa)

AND

International Relations and Coalition Operations

Submissions Due by
**December 1
2006**

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Letter to the Editor

To the Editor—Recently, I had the honor of speaking at the closing banquet for the 13th Pacific Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC), where 22 Asian and Pacific nations came together to discuss ways in which they could collaborate to isolate, defeat, and prevent the emergence of terrorism within their region.

U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have always valued relationships with allies, but today, these relationships are imperative. Speaking at the PASOC conference, Maria Ressa, the lead investigative reporter for CNN Asia, stressed that the United States is not a “lone hero” in this fight. Indeed, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) clearly understands the importance of coalition partners in winning this global conflict and is executing it shoulder-to-shoulder with its partners.

USSOCOM is leading the Department of Defense (DOD) planning effort to defeat terrorism and has developed a series of plans that synchronize the efforts of the geographic combatant commanders with a global perspective to ensure that there are no seams where terrorists can find sanctuary. While we are leading the DOD effort, we understand that it takes the skills that all nations can bring to the table.

We often refer to this battle as the war on terror. While not a war in the traditional sense, this designation has merit because it is a global problem. Globalization has changed the world dramatically. The world is interconnected through instant communications. Corporations and financial institutions used to be concrete buildings, but today they are electrons in databases that may be located anywhere yet still function in real-time in any time zone. The most widely used language in the world is not Chinese, Spanish, or English. It is binary: ones and zeros used by computers. Thomas Friedman has estimated that there are 245,000 Indians answering support questions that come from around the globe, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week—a situation possible only through globalization.

There is a dark side to globalization, however. Terrorists can now live on one side of the globe and create catastrophic effects on

the other side with only a few strokes of the keyboard or a few minutes on a cell phone. Terrorists spread their message to millions of people over the Internet in seconds. An al Qaeda propaganda video uploaded on a Web site will be translated into several languages and retransmitted to thousands of additional sites for further distribution in less than 24 hours. Their networks are fast and effective.

In truth, their ability to disseminate information is faster than ours.

Terrorism is a difficult problem because it crosses all borders and boundaries—state, economic, political, and religious. To defeat it, we need to create a global counterterrorism network. Before this network can be implemented, however, we must have a common framework with the relationships and ties that allow us to work together. In *The Counter Terrorism Puzzle for Decision Makers*, author Boaz Ganor states that defining terrorism is one of the most difficult problems we face in defeating it; not until a consensus on the definition is reached will efforts to defeat terrorism become more effective. Ms. Ressa also pointed out that “borders and nations cannot contain conflicts.”

Terrorists use violence against civilians to instill fear to accomplish their political goals, force change, and promote their objectives. It appears that they are trying to “weaponize culture” against us, another idea put forward by Ms. Ressa. Many terrorists have reached this level of action only after decades of societies failing to check their radical ideologies. Mr. Ganor points out that it will take a multigenerational effort to eliminate underlying and eroding conditions that contribute to terrorism, to educate and inoculate our populations against the undermining effects of terrorism on society, and to eliminate the current threat. It will be a long battle, but it is wrong to characterize it as a “clash of civilizations.” This is really a battle for security, stability, and freedom for all nations.

Working together, governments can establish counterterrorist networks covering entire regions that identify, locate, and eliminate transnational terrorist threats while at the same time working to diminish the underlying conditions that lead to terrorism. The United States will do all it can to help while respecting the rules of law and international sovereignty. Special Operations Forces will continue to

participate in bilateral exercises and, as we reduce our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, will become available to help train partner nation forces at their request. Over the next 6 years, USSOCOM will grow by nearly 13,000 people, significantly improving the capacity to work with and support partner nations. Theater special operations commands have grown substantially over the last 8 years, and we will continue to add the resources and positions necessary to help each region defeat terrorism. We will work alongside partner nation forces to win hearts and minds and eliminate threats as we continue to strengthen our relationships. Conferences such as PASOC are so important because they create the foundation upon which we can build our networks to defeat this threat.

Last year we had the inaugural USSOCOM International Special Operations Conference. Building on the success of PASOC, the conference brought together special operations leaders from 59 countries, all with the goal of building a world inhospitable to terrorists. From this initiative, we have started a regular series of meetings in Washington, DC, with the defense attachés from several nations to provide an ongoing discussion on terrorism. Efforts such as these at both the global and regional level will encourage international cooperation and eliminate places where terrorists find sanctuary. These conferences provide the basis for building the counterterrorist networks that will eventually defeat global terrorism.

On the wall of USSOCOM headquarters is a statement President George W. Bush made when he visited. It reads, “SOF is the worst nightmare of America’s worst enemies.” I would add that the worst nightmare of terrorist leaders is nations of like-minded people, building a world inhospitable to terrorists—countries of different sizes, religions, politics, capabilities, and histories banding together and sharing skills, intelligence, resources, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to mutually support friendly, willing governments. The efforts of the countries represented in these international conferences are the keys to defeating terrorism. All of us working together to destroy terrorism and eliminate its underlying causes is really the terrorists’ worst nightmare.

—General Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA
Commander
U.S. Special Operations Command






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JFQ

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
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Joint Force Safety Protection and Provision

Joint force safety is as decisive as firepower, tactics, and leadership in combat performance. When safety is viewed as a resource—both an asset and an essential component of force protection—the outcome has far-reaching benefits for all warfighters. *Joint force safety* is defined as a fully integrated and functioning safety program, and when it is recognized as a vital military capability, commanders can exercise it at decisive times and places. Indeed, the desired outcome of joint safety is to develop a warfighter mindset of *asset preservation* as a means to *mission capability*.

Approximately half of all Department of Defense (DOD) mishaps since fiscal year 2002 have occurred in a joint or multi-Service arena. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been a number of accidents that are common to all the Services. For example, helicopter “brownouts” occur when a pilot loses visibility from sand kicking up in the desert landing area outside the aircraft. Training, tactics/techniques/procedures, and potential materiel solutions, such as dust palliatives or cockpit devices that enhance pilot situational awareness, are solutions to this problem.

Negligent discharge mishaps are another serious problem that joint force safety can help solve. Doctrine change could outline appropriate procedures for clearing and cleaning to prevent an unintended discharge of a weapon. Proper training in weapons handling would be based on the appropriate conditions and trained to stan-

*rarely is information
on internal threats found in
joint publications*

dards, and the standards would be reinforced by leadership. Innovative materiel solutions such as chamber blocks may also prevent the consequences of negligent discharge.

Of course, the Services can pursue efforts to mitigate brownouts and negligent discharge individually; however, it is more effective to leverage this knowledge by way of a joint safety effort. Moreover, while there are many joint doctrinal references on protecting the force from external threats, rarely is information on *internal* threats found in joint publications. Consequently, Services rely on their own safety centers for information, doctrine, and safety program architectures.

To remedy the disconnect among the separate Services, the Joint Force Staff Safety Office, when established, will collect mishap data, share information across the Services, resolve differences in safety policies and doctrine, and assess and disseminate best practices from one Service to the others.

The Armed Forces can prioritize their safety efforts to mitigate the most prevalent risks according to resources. Risk mitigation can be accomplished through the following framework:

- **Doctrine and Policy.** Doctrine and policy gaps should be reviewed to address appropriate safety standards. Handbooks and policies

on joint force safety may soon be developed as joint safety concepts mature.

- **Materiel Solutions.** Often there are materiel solutions that affect risk exposure. New technologies can be introduced to prevent mishaps. Some technologies, such as seatbelt improvements, can reduce injuries to the warfighter.

- **Operational Changes.** The method of operation can be changed or implemented to control, reduce, or eliminate risk to the force.

- **Leadership.** Safety is an inherent leadership responsibility at all levels. Leadership seeks a balance between accomplishing a mission and accepting the lowest possible risk. Whenever protecting the force takes a backseat to the mission, the unit’s safety culture is eroded and mishaps invariably occur.

- **Training.** Safety concepts and principles must be embedded in individual and collective training opportunities. Units with good safety records fight as they have been trained. Training devices such as simulators can often enhance safety awareness and modify high-risk behavior.

Today, joint force safety requires coordination among two or more Services or joint force components, and each offers unique and viable capabilities, perspectives, and data to the risk management and joint force preservation process. Joint safety—as an integral part of joint warfighting—ensures that the Armed Forces are prepared for any challenge. **JFQ**

Chief Warrant Officer Alfred L. Rice, USA (Ret.), is a Safety Analyst with Quadelta, Inc.

Book Reviews

Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, the father of the Total Force concept, recently commented on the role that the Reserve Components play in current operations:

Nearly 80 percent of the airlift capacity for this war and about 48 percent of the troops have come from Reserve and National Guard units. The high percentages are due, in part, to the specialized missions of those troops: transporting cargo, policing, rebuilding infrastructure, translating, conducting government affairs—in short, the stuff of building a new nation.¹

Secretary Laird's observations suggest the evolution of the concept he proposed over 30 years ago: the Reserve Components, conceptualized as a strategic reserve, have truly become an operational force. As of June 14, 2006, over 100,000 National Guard and Reserve personnel had been mobilized to Active duty. With this new reality comes the need to transform the Reserve Components to fit their new roles, and numerous scholars and strategists have met to address the task. The products of two of the most recent of these endeavors are brought to your attention here.

"The Reserve Component at War" was one of five panel discussions that took place during *A Nation at War*, the 17th annual strategy conference held April 11–13, 2006, at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Panelists included:

- BG Dave Burford, USARNG (Assistant to the Director of the Army National Guard), who discussed imperatives for National Guard transformation as it moves from a strategic reserve to a post-9/11 operational force
- MG William T. Nesbitt, USARNG (Assistant Adjutant General—Army and Commander of the Georgia Army National Guard), who pointed to the unpredictability of mobilizations, standard equipment, and uncertain budget as the main stressors on the Reserve Components
- MG Donna L. Dacier, USAR (Commander, 311th Theater Signal Command), who applauded the flexibility and resourcefulness the Reserve Components have shown so they can participate fully in Active duty missions but warned of shortfalls in training for combat support and combat service support troops
- BG Michael Squier, USARNG (Ret.), who questioned whether, in the face of many variables, the Reserve and the National Guard are prepared to fight the Long War
- MG Robert Ostenberg, USAR (Deputy to Commander for Reserve Forces, North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command), who linked the usefulness of lessons learned by the National Guard during Hurricane Katrina recovery to a potential domestic terrorist attack.

No written transcript of the proceedings is available, but videotape of this panel discussion is viewable at <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/conf/panels-media.cfm>>.

The International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has produced a comprehensive study of the National Guard and the Reserve in the 21st century as part of the larger CSIS "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" project. The study analyzes military command structures and the defense acquisition process while primarily focusing on the future of the Guard and Reserve Components of the Total Force. The study is available on the CSIS Web site at <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph3_report.pdf>.

L. Yambrick

NOTE

¹ Melvin R. Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 6 (November/December 2005).

NEW from NDU Press for the Center for Technology and National Security Policy



Defense Horizons 54 Lee's Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett's Charge

At the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee made a mistake that doomed the hopes of the Confederate States of America to compel the United States to sue for peace. Why one of the great generals of his time made such a blunder continues to be a topic of research and intense debate. Authors David Gompert and Richard Kugler explain Lee's fateful decision not with new facts but with new analytical methods to illuminate decisionmaking in combat.

Defense Horizons 53 Countering Terrorism Across the Atlantic?

Kimberly L. Thachuk discusses ways to bolster the U.S.–European Union counterterrorism relationship, such as capacity-building, anticorruption measures, and strengthening multilateral agreements.



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**On Point: The United States Army
in Operation Iraqi Freedom**

by COL Gregory Fontenot, USA (Ret.),
LTC E.J. Degen, USA, and
LTC David Tohn, USA

Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
December 2005
519 pp. \$34.95
ISBN 1-59114-279-2

Reviewed by
JAMES HERSON

This team-written book should rank among the classics when future historians debate the strategy, mistakes, and exercise of operational acumen demonstrated by U.S. Army forces throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has continued the *On Point* project commissioned by his predecessor, General Eric Shinseki, to capture and document the challenges and lessons learned in executing OIF. Schoomaker recognized the project's importance for future Army transformation initiatives and for documenting the role of land forces in campaigns such as OIF and the Army's continuing relevance in achieving joint victory. The Chiefs' support ensured the authors' access to and the cooperation of numerous units, agencies, and dozens of contributors to enable *On Point* to document the Army's story in this campaign. This broad brush gives the work balance and not only tells the story of commanders and their plans, but also showcases the exploits and valor of American Soldiers who continue to serve with distinction in Iraq.

Although Army operations and challenges are the centerpiece of this quickly written work, the larger, broader aspects of OIF and the strategic and diplomatic considerations surrounding it are captured, allowing the reader to understand the land campaign in contextual detail. Recognizing the long-term shaping that U.S. Central Command components underwent to prepare to introduce forces prior to offensive operations in 2003, the authors describe the changes in the theater's design from the end of *Desert Storm* until the eve of the second invasion of Iraq. This stage-setting (overlooked in many military histories) enables the reader to see the value of this in-depth preparation, mostly accomplished by Army Central Command, which provided reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and sustainment to Coalition ground forces. The largest challenge the Army faced in Iraq was not the enemy, but rather its own logistics. The authors properly note that it was only through hard work and improvisation that Army logisticians were able to sustain their combat arms brothers at barely a subsistence rate.

The work then segues to the shaping of the battlespace during the second phase and covers the importance of Coalition contributions in sustaining combat operations, examines how the degradation of Iraqi command and control was achieved, illustrates how the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander helped to maintain Coalition political will and resulting military synergy, and explores other factors that directly or indirectly influenced the fight.


Most of the book details the broad operational fight and the challenges Army forces faced in breaching defenses from Kuwait and the ensuing 360-degree asymmetrical fight, the frustrations of the 4th Infantry Division in trying to join the fight after being denied transit through Turkey, the use of the 173^d Airborne Brigade to provide a reinforcing conventional capability to special operations forces elements in the north, and numerous other complementary actions in this distributed battle that were linked by commander's intent and a rapid operational tempo. The V Corps' fight up the Euphrates River Valley, and in particular the 3^d Infantry Division's "thunder runs" and 1-15th Infantry's running gun battles, chronicle the drama of the combat and the rapidly changing face of battle. The remainder of the book covers consolidation, regime change, the collapse of vestigial Iraqi security forces, and the outbreak of looting and public disorder, and expands on the future implications for the Army in Iraq without pointing fingers.

On Point clearly documents that despite advances in digitalization, increased situational

awareness, and other technological enhancements, fog and friction remain a timeless aspect of war and reward only well-trained and -led combined arms teams with victory. The Army's performance across the spectrum of combat in Iraq demonstrated this historical strength and highlights how joint the ground fight has become. The maturation of the American way of war seen in this campaign will testify to how essential our joint partners are in conducting successful ground operations. The authors' clear prose tells the Army OIF story in a compelling way that articulates theater strategy and then weaves in illustrative tactical vignettes, all spotlighting the Soldier, not technology, as the victor. As the authors note, "Humans, not high-tech sensors, remain indispensable, even in the 21st century."

Although the story is fascinating and infused with rich detail, the book's graphics, photographs, and other inserts are of poor quality and detract from the overall excellence. With luck, this minor flaw will not be repeated in the sequel, *On Point II*, in which the authors intend to focus on the shift from decisive combat operations to encountering and combating the current insurgency. If the sequel is half as good, it too should be added to every Soldier's library. **JFQ**

Colonel James Herson, USA, is a Professor of Strategy and Joint Warfighting at the Air War College and has authored numerous articles on military history.



Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle

by Stephen Biddle

Princeton University Press, 2004

337 pp. \$37.50

ISBN: 0-6911-1645-8

Reviewed by
CRAIG STONE

Stephen Biddle argues that, contrary to the belief of some observers, warfare has not actually changed much since the early 1900s. Using case studies and a quantitative statistical analysis model, he presents a new way of viewing warfare and determining outcomes.

Particularly compelling is the connection among the actual practice of war, international relations theory, and the current defense debate regarding the importance of technology. Within the context of military power, some modern international relations theorists have focused on numerical strength, while others have concentrated on technology changing the advantage from defense to offense. Biddle argues that both views are unsound and that the military underpinnings of international politics require a more detailed explanation of how numerical strength and technology interact and work. He counterbalances the contemporary debate about superior technology dominating future warfare. Revolution in military affairs (RMA) advocates who argue that technology is revolutionizing the battlefield need to read this book if only to better understand the weaknesses in their position.

Biddle argues that the real causes of battlefield success have been remarkably stable since 1917–1918, due largely to what he refers to as the modern system of force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are used in combat. He defines this system as “a tightly interrelated complex of cover, concealment, dispersion, suppression, small-unit independent maneuver, and combined arms at the tactical level” (p. 3). Although military members might find this concept obvious, the value of Biddle’s work is the rigorous and broad use of case studies and multimethod statistical analysis to support his assertion.

The author begins by defining the modern system and explains how it is connected to technology and the use of force by examining how changes in military technology since 1918 have altered the battlefield. Next, he deals with the issue of superior numbers (which, he argues, help but are neither necessary nor sufficient for success) and the consequences within the modern system. He then summarizes the modern system theory that he presents in more detail in subsequent chapters. This section is particularly useful because it

alerts readers to the critical issues to watch for when reading the case studies Biddle uses to demonstrate his theory.

The next three chapters present three case studies to demonstrate the modern system theory and its validity. Operations *Michael* (the second battle of the Somme, March 21–April 9, 1918), *Goodwood* (the penultimate Allied attempt to break out of Normandy, July 18–20, 1944), and *Desert Storm* (January 17–February 28, 1991) are examples of an event’s outcome supporting the modern system rather than the orthodox view despite the attacker/defender force ratios. In each example, Biddle explains why the case was selected and what outcome the orthodox theory and the modern system would imply. The second battle of the Somme provides a most likely case to support the orthodox theories of capabilities and a least likely case for the modern system theory. Operation *Michael* was an example of what should have been a British defensive success based on orthodox theories but was in fact a German offensive success, which is what the modern system predicts. It was a case of what should have been the success of defense-dominant technology and numerical imbalance for the Allies. But the Germans broke through, which supports the modern systems theory’s predictions that shallow forward defenders would not succeed against German modern system use of cover, concealment, and combined arms.

Like Operation *Michael*, Operation *Goodwood* was a case in which orthodox theory implied an outcome other than the actual result. Unlike *Michael*, in that the

Allies should have had a clear offensive victory, the end result was a win for German defense. The Germans had defense in depth, and the Allies attacked on a narrow front that prevented them from using modern system tactics such as cover, concealment, and small unit independent maneuver.

Operation *Desert Storm* was picked as a case study because while the breakthrough was predictable, the low loss rate was not. The modern systems theory attributes this outcome to the interaction between force employment and new technology used against traditional system defensive methods.

The final chapters move from the small-n case method to large-N statistical analysis and computer simulations. Biddle uses the University of Michigan’s Correlates of War dataset, the Army’s CDB90 dataset, and a self-developed dataset to test and prove his modern system theory. Though he admits the results are imperfect, they do display a preponderance of evidence to support the modern systems theory. The same holds true for the computer simulation.

The author summarizes his study with a number of important conclusions ranging from the role of military power in international relations to the lesson for historians in interpreting the outcomes of battles. One of the most important findings is that the U.S. focus on RMA and technology as a revolutionary change on the battlefield is misplaced. According to Biddle, most of the important variances in combat outcomes are not from technology change, but rather from the failure of states to implement modern systems methods such as cover, concealment, and maneuver. **JFQ**

Craig Stone recently retired after 29 years as an Artillery Officer in the Canadian Forces. He is an Assistant Professor and Deputy Director of Academics at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario.



**German Strategy and the Path to Verdun:
Erich von Falkenhayn and the
Development of Attrition, 1870–1916**

by Robert T. Foley

Cambridge, MA:

Cambridge University Press, 2005

301 pp. \$75.00

ISBN: 0-5218-4193-3

Reviewed by

JOHN F. O'KANE

Foley dissects the changes in German military thought that began in 1871 and culminated tragically at Verdun in 1916. During this period, the General Staff debated two opposite schools of thought: annihilation and attrition. Both strategies would be tested early in World War I, but only the latter would lead to what some would call “the most senseless episode in a war not distinguished for sense anywhere” (p. 259).

Most senior German army officers backed the strategies of Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen, who advocated quick, mobile wars aimed at annihilating the enemy in a few decisive battles. However, some officers, Erich von Falkenhayn among them, were convinced of the opposite: that the lessons of the Franco-German victory, the Anglo-Boer War, and the Russo-Japanese War were not of the success of annihilation-based strategies. Falkenhayn and his few supporters believed these wars were the beginnings of modern industrialized warfare that mobilized all of a nation's resources. As such, warfare would now require a strategy based on prolonged campaigns of attrition to bleed the enemy white and force them to negotiate peace.

Foley begins with an examination of alternative perceptions of warfare that arose following the German victories in 1871. These

views focused not on the decisive nature of the initial German victory, but on the second phase of the conflict and the challenges offered by the French *volkskrieg*. Some German military intellectuals saw victory in wars of attrition rather than in short wars with decisive battles. Still, most leaders in a position to make policy clung to the belief that the short war strategy was in the best interest of the German military. Enter Erich von Falkenhayn—a commander who, according to Foley, “appreciated and accepted the changed nature of modern mass warfare” (p. 7).

The book next focuses on Falkenhayn's strategies after his appointment as the chief of the General Staff after the German failure at the Marne in 1914. Plagued by the stalemate on the Western Front, pressure from the East to help the fledgling Austro-Hungarians, and unsupportive general officers, Falkenhayn felt compelled to achieve victory quickly. The attrition-based strategy in which he so strongly believed focused on rapidly defeating the French on the Western Front. It was in Verdun that he hoped the French army would expend the last of its reserves, resources, and will to fight, leading to its quick surrender. In turn, England would be isolated and soon forced into a similar predicament.

Any strategy based on attrition was bound to be at odds with

other commanders' views of warfare, as well as the German government's. Falkenhayn underestimated the will of his enemies and failed to realize that the Entente would not accept a peace on German terms in 1916; too much had been wagered at that point to agree to the status quo. As a result of the failure of Falkenhayn's strategy at Verdun, historians, especially German military historians, have generally ignored the concepts from which the strategy was derived. Adding insult to injury, Entente leaders with far greater resources and manpower at their disposal embraced the strategies of Falkenhayn. And through attrition warfare, the Entente leaders were able to accomplish what the Germans could not: peace issued to an army that had been exhausted.

Using records believed destroyed during World War II (which were returned to Germany after the collapse of the Soviet Union) and extensive archival research, Foley has painted an alternative picture of the development of the Verdun strategy. He rebuts Falkenhayn's critics by shedding new light on the German ideas about attrition warfare developed before and during World War I, citing in particular the writings of German historian and military commentator Hans Delbrück. Contrary to the thinking of many in the German army, Delbrück believed future warfare would not be decided by strategic battles and great victories, but rather would result in a settled peace after tremendous losses on both sides. Falkenhayn believed that to bring one side to the peace table, a unique strategy would be needed to force at least one of Germany's enemies to negotiations.

Foley has breathed new life into an issue that has been forgotten or overlooked in the

last century of warfare. Although some historians refer to the Schlieffen Plan as a good example for mobile warfare strategy in the 20th century, they often preface their discussions about the plan with “If only the German army had. . . .” The strategy was a failure from any perspective. Furthermore, many critics of attrition warfare point to the tactical innovations in mobile warfare that came out of World War I, which arguably were the foundation of the blitzkrieg tactics that were so successful in World War II. However true in principle this may be, mobile warfare as prescribed by Schlieffen and his supporters was not proving any more successful in combat than the attrition-based strategy of Falkenhayn. If the Germans had the resources, manpower, and economy of the Entente, *the Falkenhayn Plan* and *volkskrieg* might carry the same connotations today as *the Schlieffen Plan* and *blitzkrieg*. **JFQ**

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Captain John F. O'Kane, USAF, is an Active duty Air Force officer attending the Naval Postgraduate School.

Validating the Total Force

Executive Summary

The way in which the U.S. Armed Forces are apportioned between Active duty, Reserve, and National Guard owes more to economic and political calculation than it does to military efficiency. The two primary factors behind the remarkable transformation to a bifurcated, all-volunteer force were President Richard Nixon's commitment to end the draft and the staggering expense of a large force structure needed to meet the threats of the Cold War. In the intervening years, the professionalism, esprit de corps, and unprecedented effectiveness exhibited by the Reserve and National Guard have eroded past distinctions between the Active and Reserve Components and confirm the efficacy of what we call the Total Force.

The economic and social pressures on Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (1969–1973) in the face of a global security threat are similar to the restraints and constraints present today. Then, as now, America faced an enemy with global reach intent upon subjugating entire populations to the caprice

of an oligarchy. Then, as now, many countries in the world found their interests best served through less than energetic security contributions and diplomatic support, placing a disproportionate burden on the United States. And then, as now, those Americans who were asked to shoulder the greatest risks in combat and who performed with exceptional distinction and valor were far removed from the elite of society. Indeed, just as in Vietnam, those who lead do not bleed.

Since 1971 and the transition to Secretary Laird's Total Force methodology, which made it impossible for any large or lengthy U.S. military operation to be conducted by the Active Component alone, the individual Service branches have incrementally integrated the Reserve Component. Arguably, the inability to distinguish between the Active and Reserve Component owes much to high operational and personnel tempos that some believe the Total Force concept was crafted to inhibit. In the interview and articles that follow, *Joint Force Quarterly* seeks to underline the skilled adaptation of the Reserve Component to the challenges of the Long War against Islamic radicalism and the manner in which the Reserve Component is transforming to meet other emerging threats, both natural and manmade.

Our first Forum article is an interview with the Honorable Thomas Hall, Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. In addition to asserting that the Department of Defense is "expanding and building" on the Total Force concept, he outlines numerous Guard and Reserve transformation issues, from administration to joint training and force deployment. He speaks about the rebalancing of high and low demand forces to meet tomorrow's needs more efficiently and predicts that the Reserve Component will remain about the same size in the years to come with less legacy equipment. The Assistant Secretary concludes with his assessment of the current crop of Guardsmen and Reservists, as well as the employers who support them.

In the second article, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, outlines his vision for the National Guard as it transforms to "a more

joint and effective organization.” Notable in this transformation is the creation of a Joint Force Headquarters in every state and territory, capable of 24-hour integrated operations with a common operating picture that one day should be linked to a domestic security network. This article tells the compelling story of how the Guard has moved from the moniker of weekend warriors to a true operational force.

The U.S. Air Force Reserve is the focus of our third Forum feature. Here, Chief of the Air Force Reserve, Lieutenant General John Bradley, states that the mission of the Air Force Reserve is identical to that of the Active Component and that the (happy) difficulty in distinguishing between Active and Reserve forces has had the negative effect of making it harder to validate Reserve contributions to the Total Force. He further notes that there is a natural tension between the desire of regional combatant commanders for the continuity of longer tour lengths in theater and the ability of part-time Reservists to remain for 120 days or longer. He concludes with his priorities for the future of our 76,000 “Unrivaled Wingmen.”

The fourth essay in the Forum comes from the Commander of the Marine Corps Reserve, Lieutenant General Jack Bergman. General Bergman is dual-hatted as Commander, Marine Forces North, the Marine component of the U.S. Northern Command

with the mandate to conduct homeland defense and provide support to civilian authorities. In parallel with the Navy, the Marine Corps Reserve has made great strides in rebalancing the Total Force to meet the challenges of the future while winning the war on terror. Perhaps the most interesting of the numerous transformation initiatives that he outlines is the assignment of civil-military missions to artillery regiments and battalions in order to balance mission demand while preserving force capability.

Our final article in the Forum holds an unusual argument: the Total Force concept should be strengthened further by increased Federal support to volunteer military organizations at the state and local levels. Colonel Brent Bankus makes the case that state defense force organizations are important assets in crisis and that small investments in training and education would pay great dividends. He identifies legal impediments to closer cooperation of these state entities with the Department of Defense and makes recommendations to

use this resource better. In the final analysis, Colonel Bankus is convinced that we are squandering a time-tested opportunity to improve national security, especially in the area of homeland defense.

The following articles share themes of transformation success and operational achievement that are just as compelling as any discussion dealing with joint interoperability. The dynamics of technology and transformation are destined to alter the Total Force formula. As revealed in the interview that follows, however, America can count on one constant: we find our greatest generation in the Reserve and National Guard.

D.H. Gurney

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (D. Myles Cullent)



An Interview with

Thomas F. Hall

The Honorable Thomas F. Hall is the fourth Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (class of 1963) and retired from uniformed service as a Rear Admiral, USN.



Secretary Hall being briefed by U.S. trainers of Afghan Army



Secretary Hall speaking at Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve meeting

JFQ: When you first assumed your present duties, were you given a specific mandate, or an open road?

Secretary Hall: I think we need to go back even a little bit before that to see how I got here because I served 34 years as an Active duty officer, and to be associated with the Guard and Reserve as a former Active duty officer is a little bit different. But while I was serving in the Navy, I had the chance to serve as the deputy director of the Naval Reserve before I went to my North Atlantic Treaty Organization command in Iceland. So I spent about a year with the Naval Reserve, and when I finished my tour of duty in Iceland, I came back and was actually the last Active duty commander of the Naval Reserve, and I served in that capacity for 4 years. During those 5 years, I discovered what many Active duty officers sometimes don't admit: that Active duty officers don't always know a lot about the Guard and Reserve, and I didn't. But I learned a lot in those 5 years, and then I went out into the civilian world and served as the executive

director of the Naval Reserve Association. So when I came to look at this job, I had had about 10 years of experience with the Guard and Reserve.

As we went into the 1990s and actually past 9/11, it became my belief that our construct for the Guard and Reserve that we had all developed in the '90s had really changed forever. And the idea of the Guard and Reserve being a strategic force waiting to mobilize perhaps once in their lifetime to fight the "Big War" was probably gone forever, and our Guard and Reserve forces were going to be used more. We had a lot of things about them that we needed to change, and they were going to become what we call the operational Reserve. So when I went to the President and offered my services, it was because I believed that the Guard and Reserve were going to be more important than ever, were going to be used more, and that we fundamentally needed to change the way we recruit, train, equip, and utilize our Guard and Reserve forces. When I came to the job, I came with that orientation. I expressed my desire to serve and to be part

of that transformation of virtually 46 percent of the military. Again, even among our own ranks, we don't always realize that almost half of this corporation called defense is invested in the Guard and Reserve. So how we use that, and what the return on investment is of those almost 1.2 million people, is going to be extremely important for our country. I came with that framework, that background, and also a desire to serve. I offered my services, and the President appointed me, and we're almost 4 years later now.

JFQ: Secretary Rumsfeld once observed to the press that you go to war with the army you have. We also go to war with the strategic Reserve we have. If our Reserve forces have enabled transformation of the Active forces, how has our Reserve transformed to serve as an operational Reserve?

Secretary Hall: Of course, *transformation* is a word that you hear everywhere, and in fact all of our forces are transforming, and it is essential that the Guard and Reserve transform along with the Active duty force if we are going to have one force. We can no longer afford not to use the Guard and Reserve in an operational way. We needed to transform the way we equipped the Guard and Reserve, and we can talk a bit more about the equipping strategy. We needed to transform the way we mobilize our Guard and Reserve. We really had a mobilization process that was rooted in the industrial age rather than the technology age. We knew very well how to flow our time-phased deployment plans, we knew how to get big formations into the various theaters of operation, but we didn't always know how to correctly force-package and how to be agile, so we needed to transform that entire process.

We also needed to look at the jointness, which I hope we'll talk some about, of our Guard and Reserve, because they are going to fall in on joint formations. The question of "Do we provide joint education, joint training, for our Guard and Reserve?" was critical, and the answer was, "Probably not as well as we should have." The regulations and the mobilization

On May 30, 2006, Col David H. Gurney, USMC (Ret.), and Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman of Joint Force Quarterly interviewed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Thomas F. Hall in his office at the Pentagon.

authority of the Guard and Reserve are based largely on a strategic Reserve rather than an operational one. So we looked at the bank of laws, policies, and regulations in this area. And again—not many people know this, and I appreciate your journal helping us put out some of this information—in the past 2 years, because of the partnership of the Department of Defense [DOD] with our elected officials, and really because of Congress, we've changed 120 provisions of the law that affect the Guard and Reserve—probably the largest legislative changes in history over a 2-year period. The laws go all the way from how we compensate, how we provide benefits, and how we mobilize our Guard and Reserve. So we needed to overhaul this entire structure and look at it from top to bottom and see how we would transform that force to meet the realities of the war on terror.

JFQ: *In the face of the Long War and the increasing focus on civil defense, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, special operations, and stability and security operations, do we have the right mix of Active and Reserve forces?*

Secretary Hall: I've often said that before we determine that we're out of people, and that we need more people, we first have to look and see if we're out of balance. And the answer was clearly "yes" because I and my colleagues were constructing the Guard and Reserve to meet the Big War, and we were putting a lot of our force structuring—combat, combat service support, civil affairs, transportation, intelligence—into areas that we thought we would have ample time to mobilize, and plenty of time to train, and get these forces when we needed them. We suddenly discovered after 9/11 that no, we're going to need them right away. They can't operate with obsolete equipment. And we discovered that we were calling on certain very low-density units in a very high usage.

Let me give you some examples: civil affairs, transportation, military intelligence, military police. We have a large amount of those structured in the Guard and Reserve, and we were using them all the time. So we went to the individual Services and asked them to look at the balance they had. This also includes civilians, which we can talk a little bit about. And they came back initially and said, "Well, there are about 100,000 types of people that we need that we don't have. And we think there are about 100,000 types of people that we have that we don't need." Let's take the Army as an

example. We had a lot of artillery, field artillery, and air defense artillery. So all the Services together said that they were going to rebalance about 100,000, creating more Active structure and more Reserve structure in these very high-use areas. Since then, we've accelerated, and we have about 125,000 that we're going to rebalance. We're well along the road: we have 70,000 who we've rebalanced now, and we have 55,000 who we're going to rebalance up through the year 2011. When we do that, we will take those 125,000 people and create more structure in those areas that we're stressing.

JFQ: *Do any Reserve Component forces have formal or informal relationships with state militias? If not, should they? And how do you work with them?*

Secretary Hall: About 25 states have militias. A couple of points to remember are that these militias are formed by the states, controlled by the Governor, funded by the states, and are a state entity. So many of our National Guard and Reserve units have informal-type interactions with the state militias, some training and other things, but there's not a formal DOD connection to those state militias because those are controlled by the Governors. But I know in New York, for instance, that the New York Naval Militia and the Naval Reserve work very well together.

JFQ: *How have the Reserve Components engaged with interagency partners to see after their slice of the DOD mission?*

Secretary Hall: DOD is part of the interagency process in all that we do, and especially in homeland defense and homeland security. These past 2 years have been unbelievable in what we have undergone in the form of transition alone. Think about it: the first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, has stood up; the Department of Homeland Security has stood up; and U.S. Northern Command has stood up. All of these entities are focusing on defense of the homeland and security of the homeland. DOD, by way of U.S. Northern Command, normally supports the lead Federal agency. So the way I would characterize it is that DOD, through the Secretary, as ordered by the Commander in Chief, provides forces to support those interagency partners, and I think we have seen that in hurricane support and in the various interactions between the agencies.

JFQ: *In view of the increased operations tempo and personnel tempo that Reserve forces have been shouldering, are there any recruitment or retention challenges on the horizon? If so, how are these being addressed?*

Secretary Hall: One of the things I do in my job is to visit with the Guard and Reserves, young men and women who are serving, and their families. One of the great untold stories of this entire mobilization is the way the young men and women have answered the call to colors, just as the generations before them did. This is a wonderful story that Americans need to be told over and over. Many of our young men and women are volunteering for second and third tours of duty in the Guard and Reserve in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of the world, and we are experiencing a very high retention rate. In fact, our figures compare well to prior to 9/11. So I have often said that people would not stay in an organization that they don't like and that they don't believe in. People are staying in the Guard and Reserve in ever-increasing numbers. Virtually all of the Guard and Reserve forces, with the exception of probably the Naval Reserve by just a small amount, will meet their retention goals by the end of the year.

On the recruiting side is the challenge. Three of the seven components are experiencing recruiting challenges: the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, and the Air National Guard. They're all improving—and, by the way, the Army Guard, which at the beginning of the year was experiencing some shortfalls, is doing a magnificent job, and it appears that they're growing toward the 350,000 that they have projected. But the combination of good retention and hard work in recruiting means that by the end of the year, we have hopes that all the components, with perhaps the exception of the Naval Reserve, might achieve their end strength rather than continuing to have a challenge.

JFQ: *How is the future Reserve Component going to look vis-à-vis the past?*

Secretary Hall: There will be some small reductions, but it will be about the same size. You will see a force that has more compatible equipment with the Active Component; you'll have less legacy equipment come to the Guard and Reserve, which is important because training needs to occur on the same equipment that is going to be used in combat.

You will see a force that has a tremendous amount more combat veterans. We will have the largest number of combat veterans in the Guard and Reserve than at any time since World War II. You'll see an experienced force where most of the top sergeants, top chiefs, and others will all have combat experience. You will find a force that is meeting more predictable rotational patterns. We have a model that says that you should expect to be called up once every 6 years. It doesn't mean you will be; we hope to be able to predict to those forces, their families, and their employers when we're going to call them up and how long we're going to use them.

Also, these forces should be mobilized for periods of 1 year or less. I don't think we can sustain extended call-ups where we're doing 18 to 21 months of mobilization. That's just too much of a stress on the employers, too much of a stress on the families and individuals. Our hope is to get to a goal of 12 months or less mobilization.



You are going to see a Guard and Reserve force that is more joint because our joint training systems, our joint training sites such as Fort Polk [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana] and schools such as the National Defense University are incorporating Guard and Reserve in the courses. Our mid-level courses for senior enlisted and officers are both incorporating joint training, so you're going to see a much greater jointness. Plus, you're going to see people who have served in a joint way much more than in the past. Let's take an example. You're going to see Air Force truck drivers and Navy truck drivers driving in Army missions, so you're going to see people much more comfortable with joint solutions.

JFQ: *In 1971, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced the Total Force concept. The intent was to hold Reserve and Guard leaders accountable for readiness and preparedness. How has the Reserve Component responded in the last three decades, if you can give us a historical perspective? And what do we need to do differently or better to meet the realities of the post-Cold War environment?*

Secretary Hall: A great misunderstanding lies in talking about the Total Force policy. I've heard, "We're walking away from it," "We

no longer endorse it," and "Is it any longer applicable?" And I say, "Yes, it is, and we're not walking away from it." What we're doing is merely expanding and building on it. It was the right policy at the right time to set the stage to launch us toward where we are now. It's the same way with any other kinds of policies that you modernize, change, and transform.

JFQ: *The Total Force concept also required the Reserve Component to meet a basic standard of training. Now that we're 20 years beyond Goldwater-Nichols and in a period where joint and interagency coordination supersede former Active duty and Reserve Component differences, how do the Armed Forces train and educate senior leaders so officers of different Services or components have similar skill sets to command?*

Secretary Hall: This is why joint training facilities are so important—the National Training Center [Fort Irwin, California] and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, and all of our training institutions, all of our Service schools. We must train Guard, Reserve, and Active duty jointly. We are going to have Guard and Reserve personnel serving on joint staffs when they're mobilized, so they have to have joint training. Also, the training concept for Guard and Reserve has changed dramatically. When I go to the National Training Center and see a battalion going through, I can't tell whether they're Active, Guard, or Reserve. I have to ask the instructors. And I also ask the instructors if they notice any difference in the Guard and Reserve and Active duty units they train, and they say, "When I certify them, they're certified, and I'm not certifying anybody who isn't trained. When they come out the other end, they're going to be just as good or just as qualified, and we don't send anybody to the area of responsibility and go over the berm unless they're trained, and I see them there at the point."

JFQ: *There's been a lot of discussion about the role of the Reserve Component, and the National Guard in particular, for the domestic homeland security mission set, from planning to consequence management. This was even before the President's recent proposal to send 6,000 Guardsmen to monitor our Southern border.*

How should the Total Force, as well as the Guard itself, change to respond to the complex network of domestic security tasks?

Secretary Hall: This would be a good question for Paul McHale and [National Guard Bureau Chief] Steve Blum to address because they work in that area, but from my aspect, the President needs to be able to call on the Guard and Reserve for the defense of the homeland in any manner or at any time he sees fit. It is the duty of the Guard and Reserve, the duty of my office, and all of the leaders to make sure that we have the training and equipment and that we are prepared to respond. Our Guard and Reserve forces have demonstrated their readiness during the last year with Katrina and Rita. As I recall, we had a total mobilization of over 100,000 that were already mobilized and were meeting missions throughout the world. At the same time, we mobilized about 50,000 people to go to Katrina and Rita from the National Guard, and they did that without missing a beat, while meeting overseas commitments, which mirrors the view that the National Guard must be prepared to do all missions, both overseas and at home, and must train dually for both missions, and they are doing that. Of course, our Reserve Components have to be available under Title 10 to go to overseas missions or domestic missions. So I just think that we need to view this as a Total Force of 2.6 million men and women under arms that the President uses as necessary to meet both domestic and overseas missions. It is our job to make sure those forces are trained, equipped, manned, and ready to meet any one of those missions when the President calls.

JFQ: *A National Defense University faculty member wrote, "The Abrams Doctrine is widely interpreted as an expression of General Creighton Abrams' determination to maintain a clear linkage between the employment of the Army and the engagement of public support for military operations." Presently, we also understand that some alterations to that mix are under way. We're interested in understanding if you believe that the so-called Abrams Doctrine is at odds with the assessment that a new mix is needed to make a more agile military with the capability to fight today while retaining enough strategic depth for the higher-spectrum contingencies.*

Secretary Hall: General Abrams was a great Soldier and a great American. If he were

alive today, he would be rejoicing in the fact that his principle—that America should never go to war without its Guard and Reserve—is alive and well. Today, we have over 100,000 Guardsmen and Reservists mobilized to virtually every mission around the world. So America has gone to war with its Guard and Reserve—not as we did in Vietnam. So I would say that one of the things that we had walked away from and we are changing now to rejoin is that his doctrine is being shown today as the exact one we need, and we are at war with the Guard and Reserve—100,000 around the world—so the change and mix that we're doing is supporting the Abrams Doctrine.

JFQ: *If the Reserve Component transitions to a more agile or lighter force, and the Guard moves into more homeland security missions, how will the Total Force maintain preparedness for the upper end of the spectrum of conflict?*

Secretary Hall: I don't think those are exclusive. By the National Guard being prepared to meet homeland defense and any further missions they are called to overseas, to be trained jointly, to be properly equipped, and for the Reserve to be the same way, that does not mean that you aren't going to be prepared for one or the other; it means you're going to be prepared for both. If you execute those basic tenets, which is to get regulations correct, get the benefits and compensation correct, get the training correct, get the equipping correct, get the mobilization process correct, and get the usage correct, then you're going to have a force that is ready to respond at home and overseas in an integrated way.

JFQ: *You are reputed to hold forth on the fact that we've uncovered a new "greatest generation." If in fact that is your view, how is this generation to get the credit it deserves in the face of a press that tends to report things with an angle that may be more sensational or perhaps political—how are we to give them the credit they are due?*

Secretary Hall: I certainly would never criticize the press; they have their job to do, and they do that. I returned from Oklahoma this past week, where I go each year to award some scholarships and visit with young men and women, and I met a number of people who were joining the military, and I asked them why. They said, "Well, we just want to serve." I say this is the next greatest generation



Secretary Hall and Secretary of Transportation display Statement of Support for Guard and Reserve

because I visit men and women at Walter Reed [Army Medical Center] who are wounded, who have lost legs and arms, who have made a considerable sacrifice. I have never found one who didn't say, "What I want to do is get well and return to my unit and go back into the fight and help us win this war because we have to." These are people who serve voluntarily, particularly the Guard and Reserve. These men and woman did not have to go—they are doing it willingly, and they want to protect their country. Tom Brokaw's World War II generation will always be the greatest generation, but history will gradually show that this is the next greatest generation.

JFQ: *We would like to give you an opportunity to speak directly to our readership on this issue's focus: the Total Force.*

Secretary Hall: We need to thank the employers of America. One of the untold stories and unsung heroes of America is our employers, and we know for sure that there are 300, probably 500 to 1,000, companies that are providing extra benefits or just extra help to the Guardsmen and Reservists who work for them. These employers maintain jobs for those serving when they come back, and they support families while these men and women are gone. These employers are patriotic in their own way, just like they were serving, because they say, "It's important to let my employee go and serve the country, and I'm going to support him and his family while he's gone." I get on airplanes where I see flight attendants talk to young men and women in uniform, and the attendants tell them, "You're going to

the wrong seat," and there's a questioning look on the part of the young men and women, and the attendants say, "You go up in first class because you're America's heroes." That is something we all need to think about and to thank those employers for.

Once again, the families of our young men and women around the country are supporting these Servicemembers as they never have before. I was a Vietnam-era veteran, and when we returned from the conflict there, because of the political turmoil in the country, we were not welcomed. There were no parades. We didn't question the political aspects; we just went and did our duty. Now, when I travel around the country, I see parades and homecomings. We see celebrations planned and communities turning out. So the support of America for the troops is overwhelming. There will always be political differences about how war is fought, but there's no difference throughout the country that America supports its young men and women. So I see a different sense in America than I did during the Vietnam war.

And finally, I think that when we talk about our young men and women being better trained and the best military we've ever had, I believe that, because I spent a long time in the military. I see very, very bright, articulate young men and women who are willing to come and say, "The price of freedom is service for our country." And they're meeting that call, and I want to thank them, I want to thank their families, I want to thank the employers of America for supporting them.

JFQ: *Thank you, sir.*

The National Guard Transforming to an Operational Force

By H. STEVEN BLUM



When you call out the Guard, you call out America. Never in the Nation's history has this been more true. From our response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to our reaction in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, one thing stands: America's National Guard has transformed from a strategic Reserve force into a fully operational force multiplier for the Department of Defense. This transformation makes the Guard ideally suited for missions to protect our homeland from any threat.

The foundation to perform and excel at these missions is a set of core principles that continues to focus our vision as we navigate the operating environments of the 21st century:

- securing and defending the homeland in support of the war on terror
- transforming as we fight, enhancing readiness and capabilities for rapid action across the full spectrum of military operations
- remaining the constitutionally based citizen militia that continues to serve our nation so well in peace and war

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, ARNG, is Chief, National Guard Bureau.

U.S. Air Force (Mike Arellano)

Texas Air National Guard forces travel to New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina relief operations



■ insisting on a relevant, reliable, ready, and accessible National Guard.

These principles guide our Citizen-Soldiers and Citizen-Airmen, ensuring that they are ready to face any challenge, anywhere, anytime they are called.

21st-Century Challenges

The National Guard is a critical element of America's warfighting capability. While the Guard has certainly transformed in significant ways, there are challenges ahead that require unwavering focus and attention. It is imperative to achieve the right force mix and types of units. We are developing maximum readiness across the full spectrum of national security requirements—from a full-scale war fought overseas to myriad homeland security missions. To that end, we are aggressively working with the Army and the Air Force

to integrate with their transformation plans. Simultaneously, we are continuing to transform the Guard into a more joint and effective organization from top to bottom to meet the needs of our elected and uniformed state and Federal leaders. We must and will do what is right for America.

The operational environment is vastly different than just 5 years ago. The level of the Guard's involvement inside that environment is equally different. The days of large-scale, single-agency operations are long gone. The war on terror, the responses to September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, and the mission to assist U.S. Customs and Border Control with securing the southern border are windows into the future of U.S. military operations at home and abroad, and are all examples of joint, combined, interagency, intergovernmental, and international operations. The ability to think, plan, and operate in a joint, unified,

and combined construct is essential in such an environment.

The Guard's homeland defense and security roles mandate the ability to operate seamlessly between state and Federal intergovernmental and interagency roles. One need only look back to September 11, 2001, and the response to Hurricane Katrina in September 2005, as illustrations of the new operating environment. On September 11, the Guard was there when it was needed. Some 8,500 Soldiers and Airmen were on the streets of New York in less than 24 hours. Guard members were at the Nation's airports within 72 hours. Moreover, the Guard has flown more than 30,000 incident-free, fully armed combat air patrol missions over the United States since September 11.

Less than 4 hours after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast, National Guard forces were in the water, on the streets, and in

the air throughout the affected region, rescuing people and saving lives. Also, Guard forces responded in record time with unprecedented numbers, putting more than 50,000 Soldiers and Airmen into the region at the peak of the effort. The fact that units were deployed in Iraq at the time of Katrina did not lessen the Guard's ability to respond with trained and ready personnel and equipment. Perhaps more importantly, the summer of 2005 once again demonstrated that the Guard can operate, and must continue to be able to operate, across the full spectrum of national security missions.

The Guard successfully accomplished all of these missions while conducting close quarters combat (including seven infantry brigades and Special Operations Forces) in Iraq and Afghanistan, international peacekeeping in Bosnia and Kosovo, and counterdrug border support in the United States. Simultaneously, the Guard was responding to Governors' calls for homeland security operations and minimization of suffering in the face of natural and manmade disasters.

Joint Force Headquarters

One reason the National Guard has been able to respond so effectively is the development of the Joint Force Headquarters. This has been a critical innovation in every state and territory and is a significant change from the days of separate Army and Air Guard state headquarters geared toward administrative peacetime operations.

the Guard's homeland defense and security roles mandate the ability to operate seamlessly between state and Federal intergovernmental and interagency roles

Every state now has a joint operations center with 24-hour, 7-day-a-week, 365-day-a-year operational coverage. These centers are structured and equipped to provide shared situational awareness with all interagency, intergovernmental, and Federal military partners, particularly U.S. Northern Command. The result is a National Guard with a common operating picture of what is going on across the operating spectrum, as well as a better idea of how to work together as we approach issues.



LTG H. Steven Blum, ARNG

U.S. Air Force (Jim Vahrney)

We have developed the Joint Force Headquarters as a sophisticated communications node capable of assuming command and control from all Services and components when responding to domestic emergencies. These new headquarters were tested and proven effective during multiple national special security events in 2004–2005: the Winter Olympics, the Group of Eight Summit, the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, and the Presidential inauguration. The value of these headquarters was further validated in 2005 by the rapid and successful National Guard response to hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma.

We are moving forward to link these headquarters to provide more robust capabilities for sharing secure and nonsecure information within the states or territories, to deployed incident sites, and to other Department of Defense and intergovernmental partners engaged in homeland defense missions and support to civil authorities. To support these needs, the National Guard Bureau has fielded 13 rapid response communications packages, called the Interim Satellite Incident Site Communications Set. These regionally based packages proved absolutely vital when the entire domestic communications infrastructure in the Gulf Coast region collapsed during Hurricane Katrina.

To satisfy the full range of required command, control, communications, and computers capabilities, the National Guard and U.S. Northern Command have worked

together closely on the Joint Continental U.S. Communications Support Environment (JCCSE). When fully operational, the JCCSE will provide U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, the National Guard Bureau, each state Joint Force Headquarters, and our intergovernmental partners with the vital capabilities and services needed to support continuous and accurate situational awareness of operational capabilities. JCCSE will also enhance information-sharing and collaboration capabilities to facilitate mission planning, resourcing, and execution, and fully integrate trusted information-sharing and the collaboration environment to facilitate coordination and unity of effort.

As the National Guard prepares to respond to a potential influenza pandemic, we know that the state Joint Force Headquarters are the only existing organizations with the intrinsic capabilities, knowledge of local conditions, geographic dispersion, resources, and experience to coordinate the massive state-Federal response that would be required in a pandemic of the predicted magnitude, which experts indicate could challenge domestic tranquility like no other event since the Civil War.

Aided by the JCCSE communication backbone, the state Joint Force Headquarters can assist civil authorities as they share a common operating picture, request and coordinate specialized, regionally based response forces, and receive follow-on forces from other states, Federal Reserve forces, or Active duty forces.

Homeland Security

The Guard must continue to transform to maintain its status as a fully operational force multiplier of the Army and the Air Force, while at the same time increasing its ability to respond to a terrorist attack or disaster at home.

WMD Civil Support Teams. Beginning in 1999, Congress funded the formation of joint weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams within the National Guard. These teams were designed to provide direct assistance to civilian emergency responders in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack on the homeland. Few in number and still in operational infancy in 2001, these teams have proven effective. In fact, the New York National Guard's 2nd Civil Support Team—WMD was the first organized unit of any military Service or component to arrive at Ground Zero on the morning of September 11, sampling the air to ensure that no biological or chemical contaminants were present and providing critical communications capabilities. Overhead, in New York and Washington and across the Nation, Air National Guard fighters conducted armed patrols against further attacks. The homeland defense mission—the original task of our militia forebears when they first settled on this continent—had returned to the forefront at the dawning of a new century, demanding that the National Guard restructure in response.

Of the 55 teams authorized by Congress, 12 were approved in fiscal year 2004 and are nearing completion of the certification process. Eleven teams were authorized in fiscal year 2005, completing the congressional mandate to field at least one team in every state, territory, and the District of Columbia. These final teams will be certified by March 2007.

When requested by civil authorities and with a Governor's approval, the teams rapidly deploy to an actual or suspected domestic incident site, conduct identification of agents/substances, assess the potential effects of the WMD incident, advise the local authorities on managing the results of the attack, and assist with appropriate requests for additional support in order to minimize the impact on the civilian populace. The teams are equipped with a mobile laboratory capable of identifying chemical or biological materials, and with a sophisticated communications suite that can link the incident site with other local, state, and Federal agencies and military headquarters. This combination of skill and equipment

makes these teams decisive contributors to public order, stability of government, and public confidence in our national defense. The timely and effective response of these teams to the needs of the emergency response community has resulted in their acceptance as valuable and integral members of the first military response to terrorism.

beginning in 1999, Congress funded the formation of joint WMD civil support teams within the National Guard

CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages. We have also stood up 12 CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages, and with the assistance and direction of Congress, we will stand up 5 more. They are arrayed all over the United States so no region is left uncovered. These packages are designed to augment civil support team capabilities in the case of a catastrophic event and consist of a medical company with decontamination/treatment capability, an enhanced engineer company with specialized search and rescue equipment, and a task-trained combat unit capable of supporting law enforcement. The package is fully available to the combatant commanders and meets a previously identified U.S. Northern Command request.

Quick and Rapid Reaction Forces. We have created National Guard Quick and Rapid Reaction forces through dual-missioning and training existing units. These units are immediately available to state and Federal governments for homeland security purposes and are already forward deployed throughout the United States. The units will retain warfighting and homeland security capabilities. They also meet a previously identified U.S. Northern Command request for forces requirement. Located in every state and territory, as well as the District of Columbia, they are a ready security force available at the request of the Governor or President. A company-sized unit can respond in 4 hours and the remainder of a battalion in 24 hours. They can protect key sites, such as powerplants and transportation hubs, establish roadblocks, and secure WMD incident sites. They can also respond to an incident as part of a state effort, well before Federal assets are called on.

A Cost-Efficient Force

Today, the Guard delivers national defense capabilities to the Nation and individ-

ually to the states, Guam, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia in a way that makes it the most cost-effective trained and ready force.

Guard forces already provide efficiencies by maintaining capabilities at a fraction of the cost of full-time Active duty units. For example, the annual operating cost of an Army

National Guard brigade combat team is only 28 percent of the cost of its Active duty Army equivalent. Similarly, an Army National Guard (ARNG) Soldier costs 28 percent of what an Active duty Soldier costs. Given the planned usage level for each force—Active duty Army, 1 deployment every 3 years; ARNG, 1 deployment every 6 years—anything less than 50 percent makes the ARNG the most economical choice for providing the required capability.

In addition to furnishing 44 percent of the Army's brigade combat teams with a quarter of the resources, the ARNG aggressively seeks efficiencies throughout its organization. Current analysis is under way regarding many Army Guard contracts, already resulting in reduced costs.

Clearly, the National Guard is the American taxpayers' best defense bargain. The Army National Guard uses only 12 percent of the Army budget, yet it provides 32 percent of the overall capabilities. At its peak in 2004–2005, the Army Guard provided about 40 percent of the Army deployed overseas on the ground, fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Air National Guard's business model has also proven its efficiency and effectiveness repeatedly. Its mixture of full-time (35 percent) and part-time (65 percent) personnel allows it to provide the Air Force with a comparable combat capability at a significant savings. This ability to surge within a mission area allows the Total Force flexibility in managing critical skill sets. For example, when the Air National Guard operated the B–1 bomber, its average cost per flying hour was \$12,322 compared to Air Combat Command's cost of \$14,101 (fiscal years 1997–2001). Current figures for the F–16C/Ds have the Air National Guard averaging \$3,703 per flying hour compared to Air Combat Command's \$4,185. The Air National Guard flying hour cost for the

F-15C/D is \$8,535 compared to Air Combat Command's \$9,601.

In its aircraft inventory, the Air National Guard overall has 1,304 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, which is 29 percent of the total Air Force airframes, to include:

- 764 fighter/attack (A/O-10, F-15, F-16, F-117), or 30 percent of total Air Force fighters
- 229 transports (C-5, C-17, C-130, C-141), or 31 percent of total Air Force airlifters
- 252 tankers (HC-130, KC-10, KC-135), or 40 percent of total Air Force refueling capability.

In fiscal year 2005, of the Air Force budget of \$119 billion, the Air National Guard portion was \$7.3 billion, about 7 percent. The Air National Guard is truly the "big bang" for the Air Force's buck.

Family and Employer Cooperation

A tenet of the National Guard is its sensitivity to the needs of families and employers. Soldiers and Airmen join the National Guard by choice. They want to serve their country, state, and community, yet they also want to remain civilians. They wish to live and work in the community, supporting schools and

culture, rather than serving on Active duty status full time. This is especially appealing to Servicemembers who have separated from the Active duty forces and do not wish to relocate or be away from home frequently or for extended periods.

Guard members want a predictable schedule for traditional weekend training once a month and for annual training, which normally occurs once a year for up to 15 days. They understand their commitment to be available in times of national and state emergency and are willing and able to make the sacrifice as long as it is occasional rather than constant and predictable rather than random.

being deployed for up to 1 year of every 6, as long as the military requires larger numbers of forces for worldwide missions.

For the Air National Guard, the Air Expeditionary Force model forecasts the likelihood that a unit may deploy for up to 120 days in a 20-month cycle. The model provides the Air National Guard maximum flexibility in fulfilling its Air Expeditionary Force requirements. To minimize the impact on the employer and the traditional member, Airmen typically deploy in 15-, 30-, or 40-day periods.

While family matters have always been important for the Guard, they came more to the forefront in the early 1990s

the Army National Guard uses only 12 percent of the Army budget, yet it provides 32 percent of the overall capabilities

Employers and families need the same predictability so that they, too, can support both the Nation and their communities and keep the civilian workplace and home operating as normally as possible. The National Guard leadership understands these needs and works at all levels to ensure that families and employers are considered. To that end, the Guard has developed a model for deployed predictability that enhances recruiting and retention. The model for the Army National Guard provides the likelihood of a Soldier

when Guardsmen were called up en masse for operations in Southwest Asia, the first such call-up of that immensity since the Berlin Crisis of 1961. Guard leaders quickly realized that with declining Active duty installations nearby, the families would need more assistance to attain the benefits that would enable them to carry on in the prolonged absence of the Soldier or Airman. The National Guard Family Program was formally established with a full-time support office in each state, staffed by volunteers and family members. Regardless of whether the Guardsman is deployed or serving at home, families have a place to get help.

Recruiting Challenges and Solutions

Maintaining our authorized end strength in recent years has been more challenging, in part because we have become an operational force. Citizens who joined the Guard before September 11 were reasonably certain they would perform their military training 2 days each month plus an annual training period of 15 days and were likely to be called up only in an extreme national security situation or for a deployment that would require up to a 9-month absence from the workplace and home. Since the attacks of September 11, the world has changed completely with respect to national security threats, which has made the National Guard more necessary than ever and has required thousands of Guardsmen to mobilize and deploy for an average of 18 months.

Nevertheless, by working toward greater predictability in deployments, adding new

Czech soldiers wheel Texas National Guardsman during Exercise *Clean Valley* near Prague as part of state partnership program



Texas Air National Guard 149th Fighter Wing (Gregory N. Rippos)

incentives, and changing the ways we market the National Guard, we are making considerable progress in attaining our authorized end strength of 350,000 for the Army Guard and 106,800 for the Air Guard.

Army National Guard. We are especially encouraged by our first quarter 2006 recruiting efforts. The Army National Guard has exceeded its enlistment goal by signing up 13,466 recruits, achieving 106.8 percent of its goal of 12,605. This marks the first quarter since 1993 that the Guard has exceeded its enlistment objectives for this period of the year and the first time it has met 3 consecutive months of recruiting goals since 2003.

We launched a number of changes in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 that account for recent success, including the new American Soldier advertising campaign and the Guard Recruiting Assistance Program (G-RAP), where individual Guardsmen who help recruit new members can receive financial incentive for each referral of a non-prior Service lead that results in an enlistment. G-RAP has been a strong tool in efforts to meet authorized end strength. Launched in December 2005, this contracted program is currently open to traditional Guardsmen, who may receive up to \$2,000 for each referral they provide to a recruiter, provided the prospect meets the enlistment qualifications, is sworn in, and enters basic military training.

Between August 2004 and December 2005, the Army Guard increased the number of recruiters nationwide from 2,700 to 5,100. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses grew during fiscal year 2005 from \$5,000 to \$10,000 for new recruits and from \$5,000 to \$15,000 for prior service Soldiers who

join the Guard. These benefits were further increased for fiscal year 2006 as new Soldiers will receive up to \$20,000 for joining the ARNG along with tuition assistance from the Montgomery G.I. Bill.

ARNG retention continues to be strong as ARNG Soldiers renew their commitment. Retention bonuses, individual Soldiers' confidence in their leaders, and unit camaraderie are the keys to this success.

Air National Guard. The Air Guard has changed its traditional recruiting operations by adding storefront locations in an effort to match the recruiting force with the population, as post-9/11 security provisions have made it more difficult to gain access to Air Guard installations.

With the cooperation of the Air Force, in-service recruiting liaisons have been positioned at 13 Active duty Air Force bases worldwide to make the Air Guard more available to Airmen who have completed their obligation but want to continue serving.

The Air Guard's G-RAP, implemented in April 2006, is already having a positive impact on recruiting, with nearly 1,800 active recruiting assistants and 800 potential enlistments. Also, prior service, non-prior service, and affiliation bonuses have increased from \$10,000 last year to \$15,000 this year.

In December 2006, the National Guard will be 370 years old. Indeed, we are evergreen—transforming and adjusting to many demands on the new Minutemen. We have transformed the Guard from a

the Air Guard has changed its recruiting operations by adding storefront locations to match the recruiting force with the population

strategic reserve to an operational force. We have changed the way we fight, the way we do business, and the way we work with others—all to provide the relevant National Guard that America needs.

Today, we are a joint force, and the Army and Air National Guard are united like never before. We are some 444,000 volunteers—trained, combat experienced, and doubly qualified as we bring our civilian skills to the fight and to the aid of our local communities when disaster strikes.

America insists on a reliable, ready, relevant, and accessible National Guard. Today's Guard member, the 21st-century Minuteman, must be available to deploy at a moment's notice to defend the Nation, at home or abroad. America expects no less. And we are always ready, always there. **JFQ**

Minnesota National Guardsmen and residents transport sandbags after Red River flooding



Reservists conducting
tactical training in
F-16s

An Unrivaled Wingman *Air Force Reserve Vision*



By JOHN A. BRADLEY

Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, USAFR, is Chief of Air Force Reserve and Commander, Air Force Reserve Command.

Lt Gen John A. Bradley,
Commander, Air Force
Reserve Command

U.S. Air Force (Jim Veinagel)



1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jacob N. Bailey)

Since its establishment in December 1948, the Air Force Reserve (AFR) has steadily grown from a standby force using outdated aircraft to a highly experienced, fully engaged force operating cutting-edge equipment. We frequently provide unique capabilities for significantly less than the cost of a full-time force and have enjoyed tremendous success through modernized equipment and organizational improvements. We will sustain these successes by addressing a growing number of challenges that threaten the ability of our Reservists to contribute efficiently and effectively to national defense.

Mission

The Air Force Reserve mission is the same as that of the U.S. Air Force: to defend the United States and its global interests—to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace. Similarly, the AFR purpose, as derived from Title 10, U.S. Code, is to provide combat-ready units and individuals for Active duty whenever there are not enough trained units and people in the Active Component to perform a national security mission.

The United States no longer faces a single monolithic threat as it did during the Cold War. The threats now are multiple and ambiguous, and they emanate from highly

agile and adaptable foes. The Department of Defense is responding by restructuring its forces to defend the homeland and execute the war on terror. In turn, the Air Force will recapitalize, modernize, and transform its organizational structures to become more lean, lethal, and agile—a rebalanced Total Force that will focus on the warfighter.

The scope and nature of today's challenges are shaping our organizational constructs, defining our roles and missions, altering our participation expectations, and affecting the type of people we recruit and retain.

Because the Air Force Reserve is often tightly integrated with the Active Component, it can be difficult to distinguish between Reservists and their Active duty counterparts. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, USAF, said, "It is almost impossible to tell a Reservist from an Active duty servicemember, so many Active duty personnel don't know how much the force depends on Citizen Soldiers." This was a great compliment, but it highlights the problem Reserve Components have when asked to validate their contribution to the fight.

It is important that senior leaders appreciate just what the 76,000 dedicated AFR members have contributed and the capabilities they possess. Not only is the Air Force Reserve fully engaged in the war on terror, but it has also provided critical responses to natural disasters, such as the tsunamis in East Asia and hurricanes in the Gulf states.

As a percentage of the total Air Force requirement, the AFR in fiscal year 2005 made the contributions shown in the accompanying table.

Percentage of U.S. Air Force Requirements Performed by the Air Force Reserve

Mission Area	Percentage of Requirements
Weather Reconnaissance	100
Aerial Spray	100
Aeromedical Evacuation	60
Strategic Airlift	43
Tanker Support	23
Personnel Recovery	23
Theater Airlift	21
Intelligence	20
Flying Training	14
Special Operations	10
Bomber	8

The Air Force Reserve has fought forest fires with C-130s equipped with the modular airborne firefighting system, flown *Noble Eagle* combat air patrols with its fighters, tankers, and airborne warning and control system crews, and controlled satellites and unmanned aerial systems all around the globe. Moreover, it was the sole provider of weather reconnaissance (hurricane hunters) and aerial spraying capability, which was so vital in preventing the spread of disease after Hurricane Katrina.

Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) Participation. AFR fighter packages continue to flow into the AEF cycle, and expeditionary combat support personnel continue to meet a wide range of requirements, from security forces to truck drivers. A-10s from the 926th Fighter Wing (New Orleans) and 442^d Fighter Wing from Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, deployed to Operation *Enduring*

Freedom, while F-16s from the 482^d Fighter Wing (Homestead AFB, Florida), the 419th Fighter Wing (Hill AFB, Utah), and the 301st Fighter Wing (Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base, Fort Worth, Texas) supported Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Additionally, Reserve Litening Advanced Targeting pods with their precision engagement capability, which enabled the strike on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's hideout, are deployed and flown on both Active duty and Reserve A-10 and F-16 aircraft.

Disaster Relief. Reservists, many of whom lost their own homes during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, provided disaster relief by moving over 2,700 tons of cargo, as well as evacuating 5,800 storm victims and 2,600 patients. Reserve recovery teams were credited with 1,045 rescues. The 920th Rescue Squadron (Patrick AFB, FL), flying HH-60 helicopters, was the first unit in the air and saw 187 people rescued in a single 12-hour mission by 1 crew. That same wing provided flawless search and rescue support for the space shuttle *Discovery* and saved 24 lives, including the high-profile recovery of a Navy SEAL team in Afghanistan.

After Hurricane Katrina, the 910th Airlift Wing (Youngstown Air Reserve Base, Ohio) deployed three specialized spray C-130s, unique to the Air Force Reserve, to provide aerial spraying for mosquito control over the affected areas. They treated over 2.9 million acres—an area almost the size of Connecticut. These were remarkable contributions from the Air Force Reserve, whose \$3.9 billion cost is only 4 percent of the Air Force budget.

The Challenge

It is one thing to employ a force designed as a strategic Reserve in a surge capacity and

another to sustain that level of daily operational support over the long haul. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserve addressed this issue in its 90-day interim report to Congress, finding that “a balance between the use of the Reserve Components as an operational and as a strategic Reserve, as necessary to meet national security objectives, must be achieved, and the Reserve Components must be tasked, organized, trained, equipped, and funded accordingly.”

Add to this concern the program budget decisions directing a 10 percent reduction in personnel, plus base realignment and closure (BRAC) mandates that directly impact over 6,000 Reservists, and the solutions become more complex. Finally, with implementation of 20 Total Force integration initiatives intended to streamline and integrate the force further, the number of challenges grows exponentially.

Setting a clear direction for the Air Force Reserve, and identifying critical Reserve Component attributes to military and civilian leadership, are vital to the future viability and efficiency of the force. To address the avalanche of approaching challenges, we have developed an AFR Vision, a significant undertaking that identifies strengths and issues throughout our Reserve Component and across the Reserve's major commands. The realization of this vision will ensure unity of force as we allocate resources and implement changes.

The vision begins by recognizing that we are all part of a single team, fighting as a unified force. We share the same priorities and goals, and this team spirit goes to the heart of providing the best possible support to the



Medics remove patient transported from Ramstein Air Force Base in Air Force Reserve C-141

U.S. Air Force (Doug Moore)

Air Force and its joint partners—flying and fighting as an unrivaled wingman.

Flying and fighting as one Air Force means that we function as a more unified force. We will:

- integrate at all levels of war, providing flexible, tailored, and adaptive ways to fight alongside other air components
- populate Air Force equipment, cockpits, and ramps to serve the mission best, focusing less on who owns the equipment and more on maximizing warfighter effects
- provide the most motivated, ethical, trained, and experienced Airmen in the world.

Challenges clearly indicate that the future requires lean, flexible organizations, constructed to support and quickly adapt to current and emerging missions. The Air Force Reserve will always train to the same standards as the Active Component. It will always strive to maintain parity in equipment with the other Air Force components. It will always remain accessible, flexible, and combat ready.

Operational Reserve

As we learn to sustain an operational Reserve, we will need to derive ways to provide that support with minimal mobilization. Accordingly, one of the fundamental concerns of some policymakers is achieving

assured access to AFR personnel. Although mobilization has traditionally been the approved mechanism that guarantees the use of Reserve personnel and equipment, recent policies have restricted the use of the mobilization process.

The Services are adjusting to these new policies by looking for ways to further enable and encourage Reserve participation through volunteerism. Several of our vision aimpoints are designed specifically to enhance volunteerism and minimize mobilization, and are premised on the Air Force Reserve remaining as operationally engaged in the foreseeable future as it was during the past 3 years.

Reserve members cannot volunteer, Active Air Force members are left to manage the requirement. If Active duty does not have the personnel to cover the need, they must turn back to the Reserve Component and invoke the mobilization process to meet the shortfall. There are valid reasons for certain extended tours (such as the need for leadership positions), but when possible, it is best to provide Reserve units with basic requirements and allow them to determine the best way to meet the tasks. This flexibility is critical to the Reserve's ability to provide voluntary support. More flexibility almost always equates to more support being provided by the Reserve.

We have settled on six aimpoints, which are subsets of the basic AFR vision and serve to guide our decisionmaking across a broad array of issues:

- *Operational in Peace and War:* enhancing and enabling the key attributes that make the AFR operational in peace and war

- *Clear Participation Expectations:* eliminating disconnects between what is required and what is expected

- *Proactive Force Planning:* optimizing ways to employ our force and advocating processes and improvements that make everyone more combat effective

force integration is perhaps the most significant reason we have today's operational capabilities

A major challenge to the Air Force Reserve functioning as an operational Reserve is effective participation in the Air Expeditionary Force. We always encourage members to participate in the AEF and other contingency deployments and urge combatant commanders to reverse the trend of mandating longer stays in-theater before rotating Reservists. Mandatory tour lengths are increasingly hitting 120 days or longer, making them difficult for Reservists to fill. If



Oregon Army National Guardsmen board KC-135 from Illinois Air National Guard to support hurricane relief in Louisiana

U.S. Air Force (RUBY ZARZYCZNY)



U.S. Air Force (LANCE CHEUNG)

Pennsylvania Air Force Reservists pilot a C-130 over Southwest Asia

■ *Leveraged Community*

Connections: connecting to our communities, not just tying to them, and leveraging these connections to maximize participation over a lifetime of military and civilian service

■ *Flexibility in Participation:* organizing participation options to maximize combat readiness

■ *Combat Ready:* preparing not only to come alongside but also to take the lead as needed.

Operational in Peace and War

We will organize and operate as a variable force. We are committed to being an operational force because the Air Force has more missions than the Active Component has forces to support. While the Air Force Reserve is not a full-time force, Reservists stand shoulder to shoulder with the Active force executing essential missions every day.

In the future, many of us, as individuals and units, will engage in daily operations while others remain in reserve. The mix of Reservists who are engaged and in reserve will change rapidly in response to surges and shortfalls in national defense requirements. Accordingly, we will take organizational, personnel, and other actions needed to ensure that we function smoothly as a variable force.

Volunteerism is the attribute that enables an operational force and is the hallmark of the AFR participation. Our members are already volunteering to support daily operations and national emergencies for long periods and in high numbers. We will do everything to enhance and facilitate their ability to serve on Active duty, while protecting their civilian commitments.

Tomorrow's Reserve will continue to provide significant and sustained voluntary operational support to the Air Force on a daily and ongoing basis. Our brand of volunteerism expects Airmen to serve more than required.

Clear Expectations

Each Airman will understand his or her participation expectations. The sustained missions of the Air Force require significantly more manpower than is available by those simply performing their minimum duty. Service policy already enables, encourages, and supports Reserve volunteerism whenever possible, but we are setting the bar even higher for voluntary participation and expect

our people to meet or exceed those expectations.

To encourage volunteerism, we will work to ensure seamless transfer between Service components, Reserve subcomponents, and participation statuses. As we move forward, we fully expect that minimum annual participation requirements for many members of the Ready Reserve may include more than training.

Because we are looking to the Ready Reserve, we will look to our Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) subcomponent for increased participation. The IRR is an integral Ready Reserve asset consisting of previously trained individuals we can use in either a voluntary or nonvoluntary status whenever there are not enough trained and ready members in the selected Reserve. IRR volunteers can be matched against current requirements and be provided necessary training and equipment.

We recognize retirees as another source to fill the ranks of volunteers in an operational Reserve. While this group has never been involuntarily mobilized and can be called up only under full mobilization authority, it can be used on a voluntary basis to support daily Air Force operations.

To enhance service further, we will need to relieve tension between mandating duty and volunteerism. The future Air Force Reserve will reduce this stress through participation practices that allow members to maximize their effectiveness during the time they are in uniform, thus focusing on what makes Airmen passionate about service. Telecommuting, alternative training assemblies, and aligning annual tours with Active Component mission needs are examples of practices we will expand.

F-22A refuels from KC-135R from 916th Air Refueling Wing, Operation Noble Eagle



Recent legislative changes to encourage Total Force integration and engagement have helped current participation levels to continue. These changes include:

- modifying the stated purpose of the Reserve Components to reflect the operational mission, responsibilities, and contributions of the Guard and Reserve more accurately
- eliminating the restriction on using Federal civil service military leave for military technicians
- lifting the 179-day military personnel appropriation restriction to allow Guard and Reserve members to serve up to 3 years of duty without counting against Active duty end strength.

On the heels of these successes, the Department of Defense is considering new legislative, policy, and procedural changes aimed at further improving volunteerism. These legislative initiatives are building on the Total Force concept that began in the 1970s. Force integration is perhaps the most significant reason we have today's operational capabilities. The Air Force, ahead of the Defense Department, embraced the integration of the Reserve and Air National Guard in all matters of planning, programming, equipping, and training. The contribution of the Reserve Components has gradually increased to where they provide most or all the capability in such mission areas as weather reconnaissance (hurricane hunters), aerial spray, firefighting, and aeromedical evacuation.

The challenge is to move beyond current Total Force thinking to sustain an operational Reserve. This process began in earnest when

General T. Michael Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff, commented on the way ahead and the four points that will drive the Air Force's future:

- the Total Force must be adaptable to today's, as well as tomorrow's, fight—and equally adaptable to unknown applications
- it must be seamless among the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components
- it must operate in a joint environment—not only in what is purchased but also in the way it fights, speaks, and thinks
- it must be affordable.

Given the nature of the challenges General Moseley outlined, it is imperative that we keep the Air Force Reserve both lean and on the leading edge, enabling its strengths to help keep the entire Air Force ready to fly and fight efficiently and effectively.

Proactive Force Planning

The future demands that we support the Active Component in operationally important war-fighting missions. To provide this support, we will apply our resources to produce the combat capabilities the Air Force needs. We will tailor our organizations to be lean, smart, and flexible. We have already engaged the corporate process and programmed over 90 percent of the Phase I and Phase II Total Force initiatives.

We strive to strike a balance between mission and location to address where our members can realistically serve. When considering missions that are best suited to producing combat capability, we assess the availability of personnel within a recruiting area that offers practical support to the mission, evaluate the compatibility of the mission operations tempo with Reserve service, and consider the affordability of the overall manpower requirement.

Undertaking new missions will require bold decisions about how we use existing resources. We will develop a resource allocation strategy that will serve as a prioritized blueprint that enables us to organize, train, and equip.

An immediate force planning challenge

the Air Force Reserve benefits from the continual interplay between Reservists' civilian and military lives

is dealing with the changes under BRAC, which will displace up to 6,000 AFR personnel. Our Active duty counterparts understand that moving every 2 to 3 years is an expected part of their career. Many Reservists, however, left the Active duty lifestyle to provide a more stable family situation, establish community

ties, and continue to serve in a more predictable environment. Permanent change of station policy does not allow Services to cover relocation expenses of part-time personnel, so Reservists are faced with a decision to commute to a new community, cross-train into a new specialty, or, in the worst case, no longer participate. The Reserve Recruiting Service is concerned with recruiting and readiness challenges that will result from the proposed unit moves, realignments, and closures.

The impact on the relationship between Reservists and their communities is doubly important because the Air Force leverages the value of community connections.

Leveraged Community Connections

While the Active Component shares ties to family and community, what will continue to set Reservists apart is their connection to employers outside the Air Force. For most Reservists, civilian employers will remain the primary means of providing for their families. Without employer support, many members may be discouraged from volunteering. In the Reserve force of the future, it will be critical to identify new ways to keep employers informed on service expectations.

To achieve our goals, we will not simply be *tied* to our communities—we will be *connected*. If we are connected to a community,

Air Force Reserve pararescuemen from 304th Rescue Squadron training off Djibouti



1st Combat Camera Squadron (Ricky A. Bloom)

we can draw from it and positively feed into it, while being tied to a community may lead to being restrained by it. We will never take for granted the role families and civilian employers play in enabling our members to serve.

We will improve existing community links to develop good family-employer-Reserve connections. This triad will remain central to our identity. It is an enabler that will allow our people to train, participate, and volunteer, and it fosters support when mobilization is necessary.

We will value how civilian and military experience complement each other. The Air Force Reserve benefits from the continual interplay between Reservists' civilian and military lives. One evolves with the other. This synergy is critical, making members better employees and Airmen as we mature and grow.

The command will seek maximum flexibility in balancing existing versus future manning requirements. It will pursue legislative changes to provide relief to Reservists affected by BRAC in the areas of transition assistance, relocation allowances, veteran's benefits, and health care. Reservists will be offered new opportunities in emerging missions, such as the unmanned aerial systems and air operations centers, as well as Total Force Integration opportunities, such as the Fighter Associate Program and participation in Active/Reserve Associate units.

Flexible Participation

We will deliver the best personnel and equipment to the mission, whatever the fight. Reserve flexibility adds strength to the Air Force and brings trained people to combat. Because the future Reserve depends on flexibility to maximize resources, we will meet Air Force mission requirements with volunteers first. For this to succeed, the future Air Force Reserve must have stability, flexibility, and individualized control of its programmed resources.

Because we share the same Federal mission as the Active Component, our force has the same goals and objectives. Accordingly, we will unify and align our resources with the other Air Force components into the most combat-effective, flexible, adaptive, and tailored unified organizations possible—regardless of who owns the bases or facilities.

We will unify and align because it allows the Air Force to leverage resources better where it makes sense, whether in an equipment-constrained or a people-constrained environment. We will continue a human resource policy that is not based on “up or out,” thus allowing qualified individuals to continue performing where their contributions will be greatest. We will implement a “lifetime of service” human resource strategy that gives us the flexibility to task members, maximize Active duty participation, and allow

*if we cannot access experience
from people with prior service, we must
develop our own experience*

service that is consistent with members' abilities and passions.

Our resource strategies will allow members to stay in place longer and build experiences. This model creates force management challenges for the Air Force Reserve, but it also provides seasoned and experienced assets to the Air Force. Thus, we will optimize the fact that our members are geographic-centric but work to minimize the effect that has on managing the force.

Combat Ready

The Air Force Reserve will train, activate, and fight—in that order. To enable that, the paths to leadership must be open to the best and most capable, regardless of status. We will provide deserving Reservists access to developmental opportunities so they can compete for increased leadership responsibilities, including command.

Our developmental paths will involve cross-flow between staff and field assignments to broaden the development of future leaders. We will foster high degrees of innovation and flexibility in structuring the AFR leadership development programs.

The Air Force Reserve will continue as a primary source for retaining people with Active Component experience. It will persist in offering opportunities that appeal to those leaving full-time service but who want to remain part of the Air Force.

We will leverage and develop the strengths of a diverse force and train leaders to recognize and employ those strengths to maximize combat readiness. We will define

experience as more than time spent in the Active Component; it will encompass all duty performed, regardless of type.

If the pool of people leaving the Active Component shrinks, the Air Force Reserve will stand ready to enlist and train first-term Airmen from the community. If we cannot access experience from people with prior service, we must be prepared to develop our own experience.

In coming years, a number of mission related factors will require the Air Force

Reserve to increase modestly and remix its full-time support manpower. The future requires a greater operations tempo than can realistically be supported strictly on a part-time basis. An influx of first-term Airmen will increase the need for full-time

trainers and management activities.

Our goal is to maximize Air Force combat capability by using the appropriate flexible, tailored, and adaptive organizational constructs. We will never forget that we are a drill-based force.

Maintaining combat readiness for an operationally engaged force is a major concern. Program Budget Decision 720 directs a reduction of over 7,700 manpower positions, 10 percent of the total AFR force. The recent personnel and budget cuts have forced our programmers and strategic planners to scrutinize every mission area and program while ensuring the force is combat-ready and prepared to fill the requirements of the combatant commander.

The contributions of the Air Force Reserve to national defense are monumental. As the Reserve team strives to sustain this level of support for the long haul—becoming more adaptable, better trained, and more fully equipped—we will continue to meet the challenges of the new environment. We will continue to seek new opportunities that are right for our members and recognize the delicate balance between Reservists, their families, and their employers.

We want everyone to recognize the vital role our dedicated Airmen and their families play in the defense of the Nation. By remembering that we are *One Air Force in the Same Fight*, we will draw closer to fulfilling the vision of providing the best possible support to the Air Force and joint partners—flying and fighting as an unrivaled wingman. **JFQ**

Congratulations to Freedom Award Winners

The National Defense University Foundation recognizes the current and past winners of the Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award. This honor is presented by the Department of Defense to employers who support the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) Program.

The United States shares nearly half of its men and women in uniform with over 115,000 other “bosses,” the civilian employers of National Guardsmen and Reservists. While Federal law provides very strict protections for civilian employment, the knowledge that their civilian employer supports and appreciates their military service is a major consideration in a National Guardsman’s or Reservist’s decision to continue to serve.

In 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird established Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve to promote cooperation and understanding between Reserve Component members and their civilian employers and to assist in the resolution of conflicts arising from an employee’s military commitment. To thank employers whose support to employees serving in the Reserve Components went “above and beyond” what was required by Federal law, Secretary of Defense William Cohen created the Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award in 1996. The Freedom Award is the Department of Defense’s most prestigious award for employer support.

ESGR only accepts nominations for the Freedom Award from National Guardsmen, Reservists, and their families. Each year, a



selection committee composed of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the ESGR National Chairman, and representatives of the U.S. Department of Labor, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Business, the Society for Human Resource Management, and the Reserve Components, select as many as 15 employers as recipients from over 1,000 nominations.

Recipients have demonstrated their “above and beyond” support by making up the difference in income for deployed Guardsmen and Reservists, continuing health insurance and other benefits, and providing paid military leave. Not all above and beyond support has an economic pricetag. Recipients have helped their deployed employees by sending care packages and phone cards, offering to babysit so that the deployed employee’s spouse can take care of family business, recognizing employees’ Guard and Reserve service in the workplace, and simply keeping in communication with the employees and their families during the deployment.

Freedom Award nominations can be made online at www.esgr.mil during January and February each year.

FREEDOM AWARD RECIPIENTS

2006

AgCountry Farm Credit Services
Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America
Baptist Health
BNSF Railway Company
Cardi’s Furniture Superstores
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Computer Sciences Corporation
DuPont
Fred Fletemeyer Company
MGM Mirage
Skyline Membership Corporation
South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks
Starbucks Corporation
State of Vermont
Sun Valley General Improvement District

2005

Alticor, Inc.
Citizens Financial Group
Eaton Corporation
Enterprise Rent-A-Car
IDACORP
Los Angeles Police Department
Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections
Pioneer Financial Services, Inc.
Ryland Homes
Sears, Roebuck and Co.
South Dakota State University
State of Delaware
Toyota Motor Sales, USA Inc.
USAA
Wachovia Corporation

2001

BAE SYSTEMS
Electronic Data Systems (EDS)
Southwest Airlines
The Boeing Company
The City of Bedford, Virginia

2000

American Express
Framatome Connectors USA, Inc.
Intel Corporation
Midwest Express Airlines
Technology Concepts & Design, Inc.

1999

British Nuclear Fuels Limited, Inc.
General Fire and Safety Equipment Company, Inc.
Hitchiner Manufacturing Company, Inc.
Kaiser Permanente Northwest
The State of Louisiana

1998

American Airlines
American Family Mutual Insurance Company
CSX Transportation
Portland Police Bureau
Wiremold Company

1997

Charles Machine Works
East Penn Manufacturing Co., Inc.
Entec Services, Inc.
Fred Meyer, Inc.
Home Depot Southeastern Division

1996

McDonnell-Douglas Corporation
National Life of Vermont
Schneider National, Inc.
Tektronix, Inc.
United Parcel Service, Central Florida District

2004

Adolph Coors Co.
American Express Co.
Bank One Corp.
Coit Safety Fire & Rescue
General Electric Co.
Harley-Davidson, Inc.
The Home Depot
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
The State of Minnesota
Northrop Grumman Corp.
Onesource Building Technologies, a subsidiary of Fisk Corp.
Saints Memorial Medical Center
Strategic Solutions, Inc.
Sprint Corp.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

2003

Central Atlantic Toyota Distribution Center
D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., Inc.
Miller Brewing Company
PG&E Corporation
Tyson Foods, Inc.

2002

Autoliv, Inc.
General Dynamics Land Systems
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire
State of Wyoming
United Parcel Service Airlines



Marine Forces Reserve in Transition

By JOHN W. BERGMAN

The last 5 years have demonstrated that the Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the Total Force Marine Corps.

Marine Forces Reserve remains committed to the rapid and efficient activation of combat-ready ground, air, and logistics units, as well as individuals, to augment and reinforce the Active Component in the war on terror. Marine Corps Reserve units, Individual Ready Reserve Marines, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees fill critical requirements in our nation's defense and have deployed to countries such as Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Georgian Republic, Iraq, and Kuwait to support all aspects of the war on terror. At home, our Reserve Marines are prepositioned throughout the country, ready to assist with civil-military missions.

As tactics and equipment evolve, our readiness for future challenges must be maintained. Reserve ground combat units, aviation squadrons, and combat service support elements are able to integrate with their Active Component comrades in any Marine air ground task force environment because they are held to identical training standards. Marine Reserve units train to the same uncompromising warfighting standards as our Active Component forces, complementing, augmenting, and reinforcing them as needed. This training ensures that these combat capable units undergo a seamless transition to the gaining force commander. Moreover, a strong inspector-instructor system and a demanding mobilization and operational readiness deployment test program ensure that Reserve units achieve a high level of pre-mobilization readiness.

We have seen historic and tragic events that have impacted our country and Marine Forces Reserve in ways that will reverberate

for years to come. When Hurricanes Katrina and Rita battered the Gulf Coast, for instance, Marine Forces Reserve found itself in the unusual position of being a part of both the evacuation and the relief efforts. Because of these storms, Marine Forces Reserve Headquarters was forced to evacuate the New Orleans area and set up temporary command cells in Texas and Georgia. From these locations we managed the mobilization and deployment of units to the affected areas to support relief efforts. Some Reservists were serving in their own devastated communities. After what amounted to nearly a 3-month deployment, the headquarters elements returned to New Orleans and resumed normal operations.

As a rule, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, with its force structure complementing the Active operating force in its traditional "augment and reinforce" mission, has served the Nation well. Our Reserve rests on that mission and is keen to do its part in times of peril. However, we are conscious of how changes in key drivers—such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Marine Corps' own Capabilities Assessment Group, recent operational employment patterns, and Service expectations of the Reserve—are bound to demand adjustments in Reserve missions and roles.

Total Force in Action

Reserve Marines understand the price of protecting our constitutional freedoms. Even though some have paid the ultimate price in Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*, others continue to step forward and volunteer to serve. The Marine Reserve remains strong and constant due to the committed Marines in its ranks, high recruiting and retention rates, and the ever-increasing benefits that Reserve Marines and their families enjoy.

The Marine Corps adheres to a Total Force construct, which standardizes and integrates an Active Component of 175,000 and a Reserve Component of 39,600. Today's

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ruben D. Maestre)

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Samantha L. Jones)



Background photo: Marine Reservists assigned to II MEF prepare for convoy operation in Iraq

Inset photos top to bottom: 1st Marine Logistics Group providing support to joint Servicemembers in Iraq; LtGen John Bergman, USMCR, and MajGen Douglas O'Dell, USMC, discuss Gulf Coast relief operations; Navy corpsman for Marine Corps Reserve scout sniper platoon taking marksmanship training



U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Frans E. Labranche)



U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Randy Bernard)

Lieutenant General John W. Bergman, USMCR, is Commander, Marine Forces Reserve.

Reserve is comprised of 32,380 Marines in selected drilling units from across America, over 7,200 augmentees, and nearly 58,000 Ready Reserve Marines, who provide a pool of individual capabilities that can be drawn on to augment the selected or Active Component.

As of May 2006, over 6,700 Reserve Marines have been activated in support of Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom* as well as Horn of Africa operations. Of these Reservists, 5,100 were serving in combat-proven ground, aviation, and service support units led by Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers. The remaining 1,600+ were serving as augmentees in support of combatant commanders, the Joint Staff, and the Marine Corps. Since September 11, 2001, the Corps has activated over 39,000 Reserve Marines and 97 percent of all Reserve units.

Recent examples of the augmenting and reinforcing capability of the Reserve abound:

- Two Reserve infantry battalions (2^d Battalion, 23^d Marines of Encino, California, and 2^d Battalion, 25th Marines from Garden City, New York) were promptly mobilized to support defense of the homeland in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

- In 2003, these same Marines, plus two additional units (3^d Battalion, 23^d Marines of New Orleans, Louisiana, and 1st Battalion, 24th Marines of Detroit, Michigan), shifted to major combat operations and participated in the drive to Baghdad.

- The 25th Marine Regiment further supported Marine Corps global requirements when their First Battalion (out of Worcester, Massachusetts) deployed to Okinawa, Japan.

- Marines of Detachment A of the 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion fought in Iraq in 2003, then used their unique amphibious lift capabilities to rescue fellow citizens in Gulfport, Mississippi, hours after Katrina made landfall in 2005.

- Members of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 773 from Marietta, Georgia, conducted immediate rescue, relief, and reconnaissance in New Orleans after Katrina ravaged that city.

- Civil affairs teams from 3^d (Camp Pendleton, California) and 4th (Washington, DC) Civil Affairs Groups, along with 5th (Baltimore, Maryland) and 6th (drawn from 30 states) provisional Civil Affairs Groups, have deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 and have served with distinction and valor.

The capacity of Reserves to augment and reinforce the Active force in such operations, and to provide unique capabilities such as civil affairs, reinforces the utility, flexibility, and strength of the Total Force Marine Corps.

Sustainment

Given that 97 percent of Reserve units have been activated since 2001, how can Marine Forces Reserve ensure continued sourcing of units in support of the Long War? Even though we have activated most units, we are constantly bringing new Marines into the Reserve at a rate of 20 to 25 percent per year. This, along with dedicated Citizen Marines who continue to volunteer, provides continued capability to augment and reinforce the Active Component.

An important source of Reserve Marines is those who transition from the Active to the Reserve Component. While we currently do not see a downward trend in recruitment of these Marines, it is important that we keep this valuable pipeline open. To that end, a recent innovation is the Mobilization Deferment Program, available to both enlisted Marines and officers. Under this program, Marines transitioning to the Reserve Component are eligible for an involuntary mobilization deferment upon their affiliation with a selected unit. To be eligible, Marines must have completed a deployment in support of *Enduring Freedom* or *Iraqi Freedom* in the 12 months prior to their end of Active service. The deferment is good for 24 months from their service end. This program should alleviate the apprehension those Marines might have about involuntary mobilization, providing a powerful incentive to “stay Marine.”

Transformation

Since the war on terror began, it has become necessary for the Marine Corps Reserve to increase support for operations against the backdrop of a rapidly changing world environment accented by asymmetrical warfare and continuing hostilities.

In 2004, the Corps conducted an extensive Total Force Structure Review (conducted by the Force Structure Review Group) recommending approximately 15,000 structural changes to improve the Marine Corps Total Force ability to meet the long-term needs of the war on terror and the emerging requirements of the 21st century. This effort consisted of end strength and structure-neutral offsets to rebalance the Total Force with increases in capabilities for high-demand needs coming

from military-to-civilian conversions and the disestablishment or reorganization of units with capabilities in low demand.

One recommendation of the review group was to assign a secondary civil-military operations (CMO) mission to the Corps’ artillery regiments and battalions. This should serve to provide a CMO focal point within each division, which was previously a mission of the Civil Affairs Groups. According to General Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “While we recognize that every Marine unit must be able to conduct CMO, the Marine Corps requires a designated unit that is staffed and trained to lead CMO in the division’s battlespace.”

This statement illustrates the Corps’ overall effort to adapt techniques, tactics, and procedures to respond in irregular wars in urban environments against asymmetric enemies. For Marine Forces Reserve, this new CMO mission for artillery units allows even greater interoperability between force- and division-level units. Two standing Civil Affairs Groups will each be responsible for supporting two artillery regiments. When this program reaches operational capability, we will have exponentially increased our ability to conduct CMO across the battlefield and given the ground commander a ready pool of in-house CMO warriors to accomplish his mission.

As new warfighting requirements have emerged, we have adapted our capabilities with an eye toward reinforcing these high-demand, low-density units in the Marine Corps Reserve. Examples include the former 8th Tank Battalion in Rochester, New York, transitioning to become the core of a new Anti-Terrorism Battalion, and an Intelligence Support Battalion in Mobile, Alabama, being transformed to consolidate Reserve intelligence assets.

Most recently, changes under the Marine Aviation Transition Strategy have identified realignments within 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 134 in Miramar, California, will be deactivated, with that unit’s structure going to establish two Tactical Air Command Center detachments (one for each coast). These detachments will enhance the capabilities of the 2^d and 3^d Marine Aircraft Wings.

In a further nod toward transformation and realignment, we recently deactivated both the I and II Marine Augmentation Command Elements. Their structure was realigned to augmentation detachments that better support

both I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). This arrangement better serves the customer (the MEF) by giving him ownership of his individual augmentees. That differs from the previous construct in that the MEF was forced to mobilize an entire unit (the Marine Augmentation Command Element or parts thereof) to obtain staffing for surge operations. The new system gives the MEF commander more flexibility in determining his needs, then mobilizing individuals to meet those needs.

In another example of transformation, the 4th Marine Logistics Group has led the way within the Total Force Marine Corps in developing the Marine Logistics Command concept. The group is a tactical-level logistic capability organized along functional combat service support lines. At times, due to the expeditionary nature and quick deployment of forces into a theater, there may be an absence of operational logistic support at the theater level. When that occurs, the logistics command can provide an initial operational or theater level of logistics. Operational logistics links tactical requirements with strategic capabilities to accomplish operational objectives.

A noteworthy addition to the role of Reserve forces is the designation of the Commander of Marine Forces Reserve as Commander, Marine Forces North, which is the Corps component responsible for supporting U.S. Northern Command. Among the duties of this commander and his staff are antiterrorism programs and force protection responsibilities for Marine Corps installations. Marine Forces North also commands, supports, coordinates, and provides advice on the employment of

our Reservists to their communities provide an invaluable perspective and sensitivity to the concerns of officials at the state and local level and pay great dividends in times of crisis response at home, as we saw during the hurricane response along the Gulf Coast in 2005. By combining the duties of Marine Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North in one commander and staff, we have achieved a reasonable balance in the efficient and effective use of headquarters personnel, while dramatically increasing the Corps' ability to support U.S. Northern Command.

Quality of Life

Marine Forces Reserve recognizes the strategic role families play in mission readiness, particularly in mobilization preparedness. We help families to prepare for day-to-day military life and the deployment cycle by providing educational opportunities at unit family days, predeployment briefs, returns and reunions, postdeployment briefs, and through programs such as the Key Volunteer Network (KVN) and Lifestyle Insights, Networking, Knowledge, and Skills (LINKS).

At each Reserve training center, the KVN program ties together the command and family members, providing the family with official communication, information, and referrals. The Key Volunteers, many the parents of young, unmarried Marines, educate families on the military lifestyle and benefits and enhance the sense of community within the unit. The LINKS program is a spouse-to-spouse orientation service that acquaints family members with the military lifestyle and the Corps, including the challenges resulting from deployments. Online and CD-ROM versions of LINKS make this tool accessible to families of Reservists not located near Marine Corps installations.

Military One Source is another tool that provides Marines and their families with around-the-clock information and referral service for subjects such as parenting, childcare, education, finances, elder care, health, wellness, deployment, crisis support, and relocation via toll-free telephone and Internet access.

The Corps' commitment to take care of its own includes not only families but also a Marine's transition from honorable service back to civilian life. Initiated in 2002, the Marine for Life program supports the 27,000 troops transitioning out of Active service

each year. The program was conceived by former Commandant of the Marine Corps General James L. Jones and is manned by Reserve Marines. For the more than 100 Hometown Link Reserve Marines in 80 cities, "Once a Marine, always a Marine" is more than a slogan—it is a way of life. These hometown links provide sponsorship for transitioning Marines that includes assistance with employment, education, housing, childcare, veteran's benefits, and other support services, all with an eye toward ensuring a smooth adjustment to civilian life. To provide this support, the Marine for Life program taps into a network of former Marines and Marine-friendly businesses, organizations, and individuals willing to lend a hand to a Marine who has served honorably. Career retention specialists and transitional recruiters help Marines by getting the word out about the program. Currently, 8,000 individuals log onto the Web-based electronic network for assistance each month (www.m4l.usmc.mil). The program currently enjoys participation by some 6,100 registered employers and 1,600 registered mentors.

More recently, the program has expanded to provide information, advocacy, and support for injured Marines and their families. Assistance is available to help these individuals navigate the process from time of injury through either return to duty or transition to the Veteran's Administration. Currently, some 330 Marines with disability ratings greater than 10 percent are using the program to research disability benefits, charitable organizations, and adaptive technologies applicable to their injuries.

The Marine Corps Reserve continues to be a vital part of the Marine Corps Total Force concept. Reserve Marines are fully dedicated to serving and protecting the Nation now and in the future. They have been engaged in the Long War far longer than many expected and have performed admirably. Their continuing courage, commitment, and dedication to war-fighting excellence, while maintaining close ties to their communities, truly set them apart as Citizen Soldiers. They recognize a crucial mission and realize that the American people will continue to expect the most from them while continuing to support them. Marine Forces Reserve will remain a viable part of the well-equipped, well-led, and well-trained Total Force of professionals and warriors that the Nation has come to rely on. **JFQ**

the Marine for Life program taps into a network of former Marines and Marine-friendly businesses willing to lend a hand to a Marine who has served honorably

Marine Corps forces when attached to U.S. Northern Command within the latter's area of responsibility in order to conduct homeland defense operations and support civilian authorities. Hurricane Katrina highlighted the efforts of Marine Forces North to integrate both Active and Reserve forces in relief operations.

Dual-hatting the commander and staff also leverages one of the great strengths of the Reserve: its close contact with communities all across the United States. The ties that bind

Volunteer Military Organizations An Overlooked Asset



Photos left to right: Connecticut Militia Governor's Guard; Members of the Virginia Defense Force communications unit complete field training exercise at Fort Pickett, Virginia; Cavalry Troop A of the Maryland Defense Force performs mounted drills at Antietam National Battlefield



Virginia Defense Force

By BRENT C. BANKUS

With the current operations tempo for Federal forces, the availability of manpower for homeland security is a major concern. Today's missions are full spectrum: traditional operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, peace-keeping in the Balkans and the Sinai, and defense support to civil authorities in hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy makes it clear that "defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government."¹ With the gradual reduction in force and increased deployments, however, commanders are asked to do more with less. As troops engage in overseas operations, for example, they are tasked with additional short-notice contingencies that further exacerbate the problem.

Given the needs of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, the increased use of National Guard and Reserve units, and the many and varied asymmetrical threats confronting the Nation since 9/11, it is questionable whether sufficient forces will be available.²

Therefore, a serious study of expanding the use of legitimate volunteer military organizations is long overdue.

These groups are not new in America and are divided into state and Federally sponsored organizations. State-sponsored organizations include State Defense Forces (SDFs) and Naval Militias, while elements such as the U.S. Air Force Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard Auxiliary are sponsored by the Armed Forces.

History

From the colonial period through the early 20th century, militia or volunteer units shouldered much of the responsibility for national defense since the regular, or full-time, U.S. military was comparatively small. Militia units augmenting Active forces sufficed until the Spanish-American War in 1898.³ As the 20th century dawned and the United States became increasingly involved in overseas operations, decisionmakers began to reassess the capabilities of such units.

Several pieces of landmark legislation were passed to enhance the militia (for example, the Dick Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916). Through this legislation, the organized militia was renamed the National Guard, given the official role of America's second line of defense, and provided Federal funds for training and equipment. Consequently, the Federal Government had a better-trained and more capable militia at the beginning of the 20th century than ever before.⁴

Federal service was quickly tested as most National Guard units were mobilized for the Mexican border campaign in 1916,

and then all were activated for World War I. However, the prior legislation was a curse and a blessing. With the entire National Guard deployed, states were ill prepared for either self-defense or response to natural or manmade contingencies.

But the mobilization of the National Guard for World War I was not an insurmountable problem because 34 states organized Home Guard or State Guard units as replacements, allowed under Section 61 of the National Defense Act of 1916. These volunteer units used prior service personnel (Spanish-American War and Civil War veterans) as training cadre, performing duties mostly in a nonpay status. For example, well-trained Home Guard units from Connecticut and Massachusetts provided valuable manpower, transportation, and medical assets during the Spanish influenza outbreak in 1918.⁵ Texas also organized State Guard cavalry and infantry regiments to patrol the Mexican border. In all, State Guard units provided an additional 79,000 troops for state duty; however, they were never called up for combat operations in World War I and were quickly disbanded after the Armistice.⁶

Volunteer military organizations were especially important early in World War II. As with our British colleagues, every available resource was used due to the huge mobilization effort, including Home or State Guard units and the fledgling Coast Guard Auxiliary and Army Air Force Civil Air Patrol. These latter two elements represented a phenomenon not seen before: volunteer military organizations sponsored by Federal branches of the U.S. military. Nonetheless, World War II represented a high-water mark for the use of voluntary military bodies, particularly the Home or State Guard.

By the fall of 1940, all National Guard units were again called to Federal service. Recognizing the impending dilemma,

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Photos left to right: Georgia State Defense Force soldiers participate in WMD training; Members of the Washington State Guard attend civil protection training; Members of the 492^d Coastal Command conduct patrol training.



Georgia State Defense Force



Washington State Guard



Alaska Defense Force

President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the State Guard Act on October 21, 1940.⁷ Consequently, Home Guard units, composed of retired or prior service personnel, were again mobilized in all but four states. They were charged with protecting critical infrastructure sites under the direction of each state adjutant general.

Additionally, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and the Army Air Corps Civil Air Patrol provided value-added assets in the event of either prolonged air or amphibious attacks by submarine. As recently released archives prove, the Axis powers considered both concepts. Regardless, both state and Federal volunteer military organizations were valuable assets. In fact, the Civil Air Patrol was credited with sinking several German U-boats, and the Coast Guard Auxiliary rescued hundreds of stranded sailors.

While there are differences between present operations and those in World War II, there are also similarities. During the 2005 flood season, a substantial portion of the Louisiana Army National Guard was unavailable, so state and Federal assets from neighboring states were used in disaster recovery. In addition, the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Civil Air Patrol, and at least five states contributed their State Defense Forces to the relief effort, and all indications are that the volunteers were effective. Thus, to prepare for future contingencies, regardless of location, the increased use of volunteer military organizations seems a common sense approach to provide additional capable assets.

Civilian Authority Support

Since homeland security is the major focus of volunteer military organizations, missions may include meeting domestic emergencies, assisting civil authorities in pre-

serving order, guarding critical industrial sites, preventing or suppressing subversive activities, and cooperating with Federal authorities.

For example, when National Guard units are mobilized, SDFs often assume control of their armories and assist with their mobilization.⁸ The Alaskan SDF also routinely provides security for the Alaskan pipeline and the harbors of Anchorage and Whittier, using four armed patrol craft. With an instructor cadre of current or former state troopers, graduates of the Alaskan SDF Military Police Academy have the same credentials as Alaskan state troopers. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Albany utilized the New York Guard Army Division's Military Police Brigade as perimeter and infrastructure security at Camp Smith and within New York City. Similarly, Air Force SDFs in Texas and New York routinely augment base security forces along with assisting in administrative duties. In addition to the Coast Guard Auxiliary, Naval Militias add another dimension to state-sponsored volunteer military organizations, providing waterborne patrol assets for security missions.

With many retired or former National Guard personnel in their ranks, SDF assets represent an experienced force knowledgeable in local and state emergency operations policies and procedures. The Louisiana SDF, for instance, provides a team of Soldiers as desk officers for each county emergency operations center, consisting of subject matter experts in operations and logistics. Being an integral part of the Georgia Department of Defense, the Georgia SDF was also active during hurricanes Katrina and Rita and provided desk officers for the National Guard Joint Emergency Operations Center at Dobbins Air Force Base near Atlanta. Local volunteer organizations are indigenous to the area and therefore more effective than contract forces.

Today's volunteer military organizations also provide manpower and specialized expertise as several SDFs have robust search and

rescue, medical, religious, legal, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) naval and air capabilities. SDF search and rescue capabilities vary from state to state but routinely include emergency medical technicians and enhanced search capabilities such as horses and fixed-wing aircraft. The Tennessee SDF, for example, with former Special Forces and Ranger members, has a robust search and rescue organization somewhat modeled after a Special Forces "A" team. Its members include licensed paramedics, civilian structural engineers, and communications specialists, all both airborne and scuba qualified, as well as a canine section.

Several SDFs have privately owned fixed-wing aircraft detachments in their force structure. Virginia uses its aircraft extensively as drones for WMD scenarios and assists the Virginia Fish and Game Commission by flying reconnaissance missions over the Shenandoah Valley. While predominantly a ceremonial organization, the Connecticut SDF has occasionally used its cavalry detachment for cross-country search and rescue missions.

The Georgia SDF shares robust chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and explosives capabilities with the Centers for Disease Control and several hospitals in the Atlanta area. The force has acquired the skills of chemists, medical doctors, and other professionals to fashion an organization to advise, assist, and train with the specialized Georgia National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team.⁹

Alternatives to Service

The expanded use of volunteer military organizations provides an opportunity for increasing numbers of citizens to serve in a less demanding military environment than the Federal Active or Reserve military. Of those who enter the Active military, 14 percent leave during the first 6 months and over 30 percent before their first term is complete. Reasons for this attrition include inadequate medical and preentry drug screening. Moreover, recruits fail to perform adequately because they are in poor physical condition for basic training or lack motivation.¹⁰ Routinely, State Guard units during World War II took advantage of National Guard discharges from Active service due to stringent physical standards associated with overseas deployments. Approximately 3,400 National Guardsmen were discharged

prior to deployment, providing trained resources capable of State Guard service.¹¹

Professionals in the legal and medical fields who desire continued service are finding SDF organizations particularly attractive. As doctors and lawyers often have their own practices or are part of small consortiums, the prospect of an extended deployment as part of a Federal force represents a significant loss of income, if not bankruptcy. Participation in an SDF represents a viable alternative, as units are designed strictly for state service and are not subject to deployments.¹²

Border Security Issues

The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service, is responsible for detecting, interdicting, and apprehending those who attempt to enter the United States illegally or smuggle people or contraband, including weapons of mass destruction, across U.S. borders. These boundaries include official ports of entry in 20 sectors of the United States, both on the northern border with Canada (4,000–5,000 miles long) and the southern border with Mexico (over 2,000 miles long). Illegal immigration has received increased attention. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner stated that some 10,800 agents currently are in the field, and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol is exploring the use of volunteer organizations as augmentation.

In April 2005, a volunteer civic organization, the “Minutemen,” conducted a month-long surveillance along the Arizona-Mexico border. These volunteers from various parts of the United States provided an “extra set of eyes” to the Customs and Border Patrol. Commissioner Bonner reported that the Minutemen facilitated the apprehension of over 300 illegal immigrants with no incidents or threats of vigilantism. The Minutemen were observers only and reported illegal crossings to the Border Patrol for action.

Cost Effectiveness

Since all land SDFs are strictly state organizations, their operating budgets are comparatively minimal. Moreover, today’s volunteers receive no pay or allowances for training and drill attendance, and, unless called to state Active duty, mission support is also conducted in a nonpay status. Even when called to state Active duty, SDF personnel are paid a rate that is often not commensurate with normal pay for a Federal force, depending on rank.

During 2002, for example, the Georgia SDF contributed more than 1,797 days of operational service, saving the state \$1.5 million. In 2001, their service saved over \$754,000.¹³ During the 9/11 crisis, the 244th Medical Detachment of the New York Guard provided medical services not available from other organizations and saved the state \$400,000.¹⁴ These are a few examples that prove that expanding the use of volunteer military organizations is economically attractive. Since SDFs possess little equipment, overhead costs are relatively small. Table 1 provides a comprehensive list of SDFs and their funding levels.

Challenges

While attractive, expanding the use of SDFs requires resolving several issues, such as the lack of Federal recognition of state-sponsored volunteer military organizations. Although SDFs were designed for state service, the lack of Federal recognition has other effects. First, current laws prohibit SDFs from purchasing excess Federal field equipment of all types, such as uniforms, affecting unit morale. Second, SDFs lack an active authoritative command and control headquarters to provide strategic direction on unit types, table of distribution and allowances, readiness reporting, missions, training, and personnel policies. Standardizing policies and procedures is essential to ensure interoperability with other state or Federal agencies. Although the National Guard Bureau is the DOD executive agent for SDFs, and though National Guard Regulation 10–4 provides guidelines, the regulation lacks authoritative language to ensure compliance.¹⁵

Most World War II State Guard units, for instance, were modeled after either a light infantry or military police organization. Today, some SDFs mirror that traditional structure, yet there is substantial derivation of unit types that demonstrates a strategic lack of interest. Conversely, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Air Force Civil Air Patrol are well established and seemingly enjoy a better working relationship with their parent Federal service. They do not appear to suffer from the same fickleness of state politics that affects SDFs and Naval Militias. As state entities, and if allowed to

exist at all, SDFs and Naval Militias function at the behest of each Governor and often are stifled by being at the mercy of the state adjutant general, a political appointee.

As demonstrated by the 2002 anthrax attacks against domestic targets, the ease of WMD acquisition causes constant questioning of whether sufficient manpower exists to defend against attacks. Information technology tampering is also a concern and is increasingly difficult to locate and eradicate. The importance of information technology cannot be overstated, as threats to computer security are a great concern. Again, questions regarding sufficient numbers of trained personnel are voiced at every level.

The lack of codified missions and unit types impacts SDF doctrine and training. It is essential to have a clearly established universal task list, approved mission-essential task list, and associated doctrine. To date, all 23 SDF organizations offer military training courses but are without established standards. For example, the Tennessee SDF’s basic noncommissioned officer and basic officer courses are approved through the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. Courses offered by the New York Guard Army Division are also well organized and designed by former non-resident Army Reserve instructors. However, SDFs are prohibited from participating in some nonresident training (for example, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

Table 1. State Defense Forces—Army

State	Active Strength	Budget in \$	Type Unit	Prior Service	Age Range
Alabama	600	30K	Support HQs	75%	22–69
Alaska	274	26.5K–1 Mil	Military Police	75%	20–72
California	500	225K	Support HQs	80+%	18–62
Connecticut	275	0	Infantry/Cavalry	40%	20–60
Georgia	500	0	Infantry	40%	18–64
Indiana	315	40K	Support HQs	70%	21–75
Louisiana	108	0	Admin HQs	96%	50–65
Maryland	194	0	Support HQs	75%	17–70
Massachusetts	60	0	Admin Det.	60–75%	18–65
Michigan	130	0	Support HQs	80%	20–70+
Mississippi	185	0	Infantry	85%	18–78
New Mexico	200	7K	Military Police	75%	18–65
New York	1,200	75K	Support HQs	75%	18–65
Ohio	650	14K	Military Police	50+%	17–67
Oklahoma	28	0	Support HQs	75%	21–75+
Oregon	184	0	Infantry	50%	18–65
Puerto Rico	1,630	300K	Support Det.	30%	16–65
South Carolina	1,500	100K	Infantry	45–50%	17–75
Tennessee	990	53K	Light Infantry	80%	18–70
Texas	1,518	103K	Infantry	60%	17–79
Vermont	326	0	Infantry	90%	17–70
Virginia	774	0	Light Infantry	70%	18–70
Washington	95	0	Infantry	90%	18–64

College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas).¹⁶ To educate their officers, then, states such as California and Georgia enroll their personnel in the U.S. Marine Corps Command and General Staff College.

Due to the homeland security focus of SDFs, another training venue is the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Web site. In fact, several states require FEMA courses as a prerequisite for promotion. Again, however, no standards exist to ensure a base level of education in military support to civilian authority subjects. Table 2 provides a comprehensive list of military courses that SDFs offer.

Recommendations

Volunteer military organizations are older than the United States itself and have proven themselves time and again. Their infrastructure already exists, and the process works despite political pressures. With the growing concern for securing the homeland, common sense should be applied to use these assets to their fullest extent. To do so, several actions are recommended.

Current laws must be changed to grant Federal recognition to state-sponsored SDFs. Denying volunteer access to basic equipment and necessities makes little sense. Also, the lack of Federal recognition impacts the ability to tap into existing nonresident military courses.

Since SDFs and several Naval Militias are strictly state supported, partial Federal funding should be initiated through the National Guard Bureau and the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Some civilian organizations (for example, the Citizen Corps and the USA Freedom Corps) already have access to Federal funding, and all legitimate volunteer military organizations should enjoy the same privilege. Trained volunteer organizations provide manpower and professional services that permit Federal forces to concentrate on other critical areas.

As the DOD agent for SDFs, the National Guard should be more proactive in providing guidance in conjunction with the Department of the Army and each adjutant general. Standardization would add further legitimacy to these organizations. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau should have an office staff to handle SDF matters that cannot be accomplished as an additional duty.

While volunteer military organizations present challenges, evidence suggests that their expanded use makes sense for several reasons. First, with the current high operations tempo, trained Federal forces are at a premium. By actively supporting volunteer military organizations, especially State Defense Forces, Governors have an alternative to provide a trained force at least in cadre strength.

Currently, SDF units operate in 22 states and Puerto Rico, with another handful maintaining a volunteer Naval Militia in addition to Coast Guard Auxiliary and Air Force Civil Air Patrol units nationwide. A volunteer force costs much less to maintain than a Federal force and provides trained personnel for state contingencies.

In the case of SDFs, their organization and use have too often been an afterthought. From the Mexican border expedition through the Korean War, and from the bombing of Pearl Harbor to the 9/11 attacks, State and Home Guard use has been a last-minute reaction to unexpected circumstances. With today's increase in asymmetric warfare, exploring the use of all existing force structures and expanding volunteer military organizations and SDFs are steps in the right direction. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* September 2002 (Washington, DC: The White House, Executive Summary).

² For more details, see Citizen Corps, available at <citizencorps.gov/about.shtm>.

³ Edmund Zysk, "Stay Behind Forces for the National Guard, Soldiers or Policemen?" unpublished thesis, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, May 1, 1988, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵ "U.S. Home Defense Forces Study," Department of Defense, Historical Research and Evaluation Organization, Washington DC, April 27, 1981, 22.

⁶ Barry M. Stentiford, *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 51.

⁷ Zysk, 7.

⁸ Department of the Army, National Guard Bureau Regulation 10-4, Washington, DC, September 21, 1987, 3.

⁹ Kathi Heaton, National Guard Bureau, "National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams Overview and Update," Information Paper, September 24, 2002.

¹⁰ "Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel," GAO/NSIAD-97-39, January 6, 1997, available at <www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?NSIAD-97-39>, 1.

¹¹ Stentiford, 94.

¹² David W. Fairbanks, Virginia State Defense Force, interview by author, October 20, 2003.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁴ After Action Review, Headquarters, Army Division, 244th Clinic, New York Guard, January 9, 2003.

¹⁵ Department of the Army.

¹⁶ Michael Turner, Chief, Non-Resident Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, interview by author, June 29, 2003.

Table 2. State Defense Forces—Schools

State	Basic Training	PLDC	BNCOC	ANCOG	Sergeant Major	Officer Basic	Officer Advanced	CGSC	OCS	Warrant Officer
Alabama	X									
Alaska	X	X								
California	X	X	X	X		X	X			X
Connecticut			X							
Georgia	X									
Indiana	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Louisiana	X									
Maryland	X									
Massachusetts	X									
Michigan	X									
Mississippi	X									
New Mexico	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	
New York	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X
Ohio	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Oklahoma	X									
Oregon										
Puerto Rico	X	X	X	X		X	X			
South Carolina	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Tennessee	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		
Texas	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Vermont	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		
Virginia	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	
Washington										

Key: PLDC = Primary Leadership Development Course; BNCOC = Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course; ANCOG = Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course; CGSC = Command and General Staff College; OCS = Officer Candidate School

Retooling the Nationbuilding Strategy in Afghanistan

By VINCENT M. DREYER



SPECIAL FEATURE

The United States began the war on terror October 7, 2001, by attacking Taliban and al Qaeda targets throughout Afghanistan. Special Operations Forces embedded with indigenous Northern Alliance fighters and followed by a small conventional force of coalition units defeated the enemy in 2 months and forced its retreat along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Once major combat operations ended, however, we faced a crucial question: What next? While intricate preparation had ensured the destruction of the enemy, the short timeline between 9/11 and 10/7 precluded adequate postconflict planning, often referred to as stability and support operations.¹ It quickly became apparent, however, that a major effort to rebuild Afghanistan was necessary

to ensure that it would never again lapse into a terrorist breeding ground or sanctuary. Even President George

W. Bush, who campaigned against military involvement in “peripheral” operations and reiterated his opposition to nationbuilding² prior to launching Operation *Enduring Freedom*, changed his opinion soon after major fighting ended. Thus, the United States embarked on a concerted nationbuilding effort.

The importance of nationbuilding is codified in various high-level U.S. policy documents. The President’s National Security Strategy specifically mentions Afghanistan: “As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations . . . as well as nongovernmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again . . . provide a haven for terrorists.”³ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s National Defense Strategy calls for the capability to defeat adversaries in two separate theaters and to turn one of these operations into a more

decisive and enduring result. To achieve this more ambitious endstate, “we must plan for . . . extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power.”⁴ Likewise, one National Military Strategy goal directs us to “prevail against adversaries.” Stability operations are specified as one way to accomplish this end:

*Winning decisively will require synchronizing and integrating major combat operations, stability operations, and significant postconflict interagency operations to establish conditions of stability and security. . . . The Joint Force must be able to transition from major combat operations to stability operations and to conduct those operations simultaneously.*⁵

The lack of planning for and erratic execution of postconflict operations in recent American endeavors (particularly in Iraq) likely prompted the publication of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)–44 and Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05 mandating unprecedented government attention to this significant issue. NSPD–44 empowers the Secretary of State to lead and coordinate the Nation’s efforts to plan and execute reconstruction and stabilization assistance. In particular, the State Department will “identify states at risk of instability . . . and develop detailed contingency plans for integrated . . . reconstruction and stabilization efforts . . . which are integrated with military contingency plans, where appropriate.”⁶ The directive also

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mandates all other executive departments and agencies to identify skilled personnel who can be deployed for postconflict missions and establishes a Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations.⁷ DOD Directive 3000.05 places emphasis on stability operations, stating that they are “a core U.S. military mission” and should “be given priority comparable to combat operations.”⁸ These documents either directly or indirectly underscore the importance of Afghanistan’s future to America’s security. The translation of emerging doctrine to actual strategy, however, has been ad hoc and inconsistent.

Current Strategy

The strategic objective for Afghanistan is to rebuild the country in such a way that it will never again become a terrorist sanctuary. Complicating this goal is the latent Taliban/al Qaeda–led insurgency that threatens all participants in the reconstruction effort. Given this circumstance, the U.S. Government is pursuing several ways, in cooperation with the international community, to solidify Afghanistan’s future as a stable, peaceful, and self-sufficient nation. Most of the

Photos Top to Bottom:
20-watt broadcast tower built by Iranian government for Afghan Television; Afghan poppy farmer in Tora Bora region; International Security Assistance Force prepares for mission; Afghans building school with resources provided by Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team and coalition forces; Special Forces Soldier in front of bomb site in Kabul, now used as Afghan training site

55th Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell)

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Jeremy T. Lock)

DOD (Al Lowry)

55th Signal Company (Thomas Bray)

SPECIAL FEATURE



55th Signal Company (Kevin P. Bell)

ways predictably employ the military element of national power; however, American leaders are also utilizing diplomatic tools to build consensus and economic measures to jumpstart a broken economy. Analysis of the three primary ways being used to reconstitute the “failed state” of Afghanistan—security sector reform, extension of government influence via provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), and economic assistance—reveals serious disconnects in the strategy, particularly with regard to the resources (or means) being applied to accomplish the designated ways.

Security sector reform refers to concerted efforts by the international community to share the burden of rebuilding Afghanistan’s basic security institutions. At a Geneva conference in 2002, various nations agreed to assume the role of “lead donor” in the five most critical tasks at hand: the United States is responsible for creating an Afghan National Army; Germany is working to build a national police force; Italy is charged with judicial reform; Great Britain is leading efforts to combat opium cultivation; and Japan is responsible for the disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration of the militias operating throughout the country. Each effort has experienced its share of setbacks. Even the American program, the most successful of the five, suffers from major ends/ways mismatches.

Germany’s efforts at police reform have been plagued by poor planning and lack of commitment. Although officials offered a strategy paper to address the situation, they failed to distribute and coordinate it with other donors, particularly the United States, the largest financial contributor. Germany also was slow in prompting the United States to begin a training program for patrolmen while Berlin concentrated on the officer corps. Until a credible, competent, and honest police force is operational throughout the country, it will be impossible for the central government to extend its influence and enforce its policies.

Italy has fallen short in reforming the Afghan judicial system, currently “characterized by a conflicting mix of civil, religious, and customary laws, with few trained judges, prosecutors, or other justice personnel.”²⁹ This reform program seriously lags behind the other sectors due to Italy’s failure to allocate adequate personnel and financial resources

(it has provided only \$10 million annually). In addition, the international community’s inability to address the problem in a holistic fashion and the Afghan Interior Ministry’s failure to integrate its own internal and police reforms with judicial restructuring impede what is arguably the most important of the five sectors.¹⁰

Although Great Britain is tackling the

current U.S. strategy fails to adequately address many of the obstacles to an enduring peace

opium issue in close coordination with the Afghan Interior Ministry, the United States, and the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime, the drug trade continues to be not only destabilizing but also one of the most profitable income sources for the common farmer, accounting for more than half of the economy. Eradication policies that do not provide options for alternative livelihoods run the risk of alienating a large percentage of the population. This problem is compounded by the active involvement of many senior government officials in the drug trade, including cabinet officials and provincial governors. President Hamid Karzai has denounced Afghanistan’s opium cultivation (he declared a “holy war” against drugs last year), but little progress has been made to reduce it. Until a viable program takes effect, the warlords who process and smuggle drugs will continue to hinder government efforts.

The disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration program led by Japan, in close cooperation with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Development Programme, has enjoyed considerable success, accounting for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of over 60,000 former Afghan military forces and more than 11,000 heavy weapons. Numerous militias (some estimates report as many as 850 groups totaling over 65,000 members), however, are not part of the program. These groups are controlled and supplied by local warlords, drug bosses, and, in some cases, government officials.¹¹ Until the Karzai administration takes a firm stand on eliminating these “undocumented” militias, they will remain a latent source of instability and rebellion. Complicating this

issue is the paradoxical reliance of coalition commanders on warlords and their fighters to prosecute the counterinsurgency.

Another overarching challenge associated with security sector reform is the interdependent nature of the five tasks, which combine to form a complex system of systems where progress is constrained when task execution does not proceed evenly. For example, a credible police force is essential for opium eradication, but it is useless without a functioning judicial system. This reality makes coordinated, concerted effort on behalf of all five lead nations essential.

Furthermore, economic reconstruction is inherently linked with the success of security sector reform. Barnett Rubin, an architect of the Bonn Agreement, notes that if people cannot make an honest living, they will gravitate toward criminal activity (for example, the heroin industry). Lawbreakers will seek protection from the historic power brokers—the warlords—thereby diminishing the rule of law. This environment fosters an economy based on illegal transactions, significantly reducing the tax base essential for the development and maintenance of an army and police force.¹² The bottom line is that insufficient means (planning, people, and money) have been provided for security sector reform. Although the strategy is prudent, inadequate resources, as well as insufficient coordination among the lead donors, jeopardize success.

Extension of authority to the outlying provinces is another linchpin in America’s strategy to rebuild Afghanistan’s central government. Provincial reconstruction teams—“joint civilian-military organizations whose mission is to promote governance, security, and reconstruction throughout the country”¹³—are the coalition’s primary means for addressing this critical goal. Comprised of a robust military contingent and interagency representatives from the sponsoring country, as well as an Afghan government official, these teams are designed to “export” the stable environment currently provided by the United Nations–mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul.

These teams generally have been praised for their ability to extend central governmental influence outside the capital, but numerous problems limit their effectiveness. First, the goals of the PRTs are not clear

and vary depending on their sponsoring countries. For example, Americans focus on quick-impact reconstruction projects and internal force protection; British teams concentrate on security sector reform and are willing to intervene in warlord confrontations; German teams are much larger (up to 300 personnel) with a substantial civilian contingent. A British study notes that the lack of common operating protocols and objectives weakens unity of effort and “leads to confusion among national and international actors who cannot predict from one PRT to the next what to expect in terms of expertise, level or sustainability of engagement, or focus.”¹⁴ For example, the unwillingness of American PRTs to provide security for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has arguably limited the ability of more qualified agencies to provide reconstruction assistance. Maintaining a clear distinction between NGOs and PRTs has been another source of friction. James Bishop, Director of InterAction, notes that soldiers carrying weapons and wearing civilian clothes while engaging in humanitarian missions have “blurred the necessary distinction between members of the military and humanitarian workers, potentially putting the latter at risk.”¹⁵ Although a PRT Steering Committee headed by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior is in place, it has yet to synchronize and standardize PRT operations throughout the country.

Despite problems, the overwhelming consensus is that the PRT program has had a positive impact on stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan, a reality that highlights a final deficiency: there are not enough teams to engage the major population centers, let alone the more rural areas.

Michael McNerney notes that “establishing 22 PRTs in the 3 years after the collapse of the Taliban government is a snail’s pace when dealing with an insurgency.”¹⁶ Future plans

call for the establishment of only four additional PRTs by the end of 2007. This would leave at least 8 of the 34 provinces without a team. Absent significantly more PRTs in the hinterland, local militias will remain unstable, police will be ineffective, and widespread poppy production will continue.

Economic assistance is the third major focus of U.S. strategy. Afghanistan was already one of the world’s poorest nations

before it suffered through 23 years of conflict. The cost of creating government institutions and a functioning infrastructure is staggering, so several donor conferences have been held to solicit funds. The Afghan government projects the reconstruction bill to be as high as \$27.5 billion for 2002–2010.¹⁷ The United States is the largest contributor to this effort, providing over a third of the \$3.6 billion pledged by the international community for 2004.¹⁸ Unfortunately, many countries have failed to deliver their pledges, causing a significant shortage of funds for designated projects. Despite the best of intentions, many designated projects have not met the stated goals. For example, only 85 schools of the 286 planned were built or refurbished in 2004.¹⁹

The United States is seeking other funding sources for reconstruction. The Treasury Department unblocked \$145 million in Afghan assets that were frozen in 1999; likewise, nearly all of the sanctions imposed during Taliban rule have been lifted. The Bush administration is also working on a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement designed to “create a bilateral forum to deepen trade and investment relations” with Afghanistan and is supporting the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization.²⁰ While many of these programs will provide more money for nationbuilding in Afghanistan, the efficiency with which the funds are spent is the ultimate determinant of success. Thus far, the record is disappointing.

Alternate Strategies

Most critics of the current strategy contend that it is woefully under-resourced or that the ways employed do not adequately

a larger military presence might incite the largely Islamic population and feed claims that “imperial” America is occupying Afghanistan

address the fundamental requirements of nationbuilding. A few pundits even argue that the endstate itself is flawed. James Dobbins’ RAND study of past postconflict efforts shows a direct correlation between resources and the capacity to provide security, build democratic institutions, and foster economic development.²¹ Citing Kosovo as a success, he notes that the “United States and its allies have put 25 times more money

and 50 times more troops per capita into postconflict Kosovo than into postconflict Afghanistan.”²² Substantial increases in money and manpower would undoubtedly contribute to the success of security sector reform and facilitate the formation of many more PRTs, but there are risks associated with this approach.

Other critics agree with the endstate of Afghan nationbuilding but advocate changes to the ways this strategy is pursued. Kathy Gannon argues that U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cooperation with the warlords and their militias presents the most ominous obstacle to Afghanistan’s transition.²³ She recommends that we cut all ties to the warlords as quickly as possible. While eliminating their influence would contribute to national unification and perhaps weaken the opium trade, the difficulty of such an undertaking must be acknowledged. These warlords are the same individuals who fought side by side with Operation *Enduring Freedom* forces to defeat the Taliban and who continue to support coalition forces in their counterinsurgency/counterterrorist campaign. Gannon contends, however, that continued reliance on the militias and our ongoing provision of weapons and money to them have increased the warlords’ prestige and influence and eroded Karzai’s authority. Yet her proposal to sever relations involves significant risk as well. If the warlords become disenfranchised, they could easily muster sufficient forces to challenge the government in Kabul and return the country to chaos. ISAF is neither large enough nor equipped to counter such retaliation. The United States could quickly find itself in a

quagmire comparable to the Soviet experience, compounded by a probable resurgence of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Although seeing former Taliban leaders and current warlords (some accused of war crimes) assume seats in the recently elected parliament

is disturbing to many Afghans and outside observers, integration of these individuals into the political process is the only realistic way to bolster their collaboration in building a democratic, institution-based state.

Another group of experts advocates more sweeping modifications to current strategy, claiming that the endstate itself is flawed. Subodh Atal argues that the United States should eschew the goal of

nationbuilding in Afghanistan for four reasons.²⁴ First, external aid has proven to be only marginally effective in reconstituting failed states. Second, entanglement in Afghan internal affairs diverts American attention from the primary mission of defeating the Taliban and their terrorist guests. Third, coalition and Afghan forces have been unable to provide the security necessary for reconstruction. Fourth, the Afghan people may begin to resent the presence of foreign soldiers. Atal recommends that the United States dedicate all efforts toward defeating the insurgency along the Afghan-Pakistan border and then exit immediately to prevent America from becoming entangled in the “great game” that has plagued other world powers (Britain and Russia) for centuries. While this proposal would limit the duration of American involvement in Afghanistan, the short-term savings would pale in comparison to the dangers generated.

Retrofitting Strategy

There is no lack of proposed “fixes” to improve the current policy. Most seem constructive, yet many involve excessive risk. Proceeding on the assumption that a reformed Afghanistan is a vital U.S. interest, the following recommendations would retool the current approach rather than discard it wholesale. In addition to dedicating adequate funding for reconstruction, the Bush administration should immediately implement the following courses of action.

Continue the current security sector reform program, but apply diplomatic pressure (and perhaps economic incentives) to persuade the lead donor countries to redouble their commitment and efforts in terms of personnel assigned and money spent. To align the progress of the five most critical tasks, the United States should volunteer to act as security sector reform coordinator and devise a system of accountability and regular synchronization meetings to provide a forum for cooperation. Rather than lamenting the problems caused by the interdependence of the tasks, we should capitalize on this interdependence and use it as a catalyst to drive collaboration.

To relieve some of the burden on the lead countries, the United Nations should be lobbied aggressively to assume a more prominent role in security sector reform, particu-

larly in training police and providing local security during reform activities. UNAMA has the mandate to promote national reconciliation, fulfill the tasks outlined in the Bonn Agreement, and manage all UN humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts in-country. While it has done an admirable job, particularly with organizing and monitoring the national elections, its expertise has not been fully tapped.

Increase the number of PRTs operating in the country and expand their mandate to include a more active security function. The forces for this expansion should come from ISAF and the new Afghan National Army. NATO has declared that Afghanistan is its highest priority, stressing that the country is the Alliance’s “first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area.”²⁵ Yet NATO members are currently contributing only 25 percent of their available forces to ISAF. Although NATO has conducted initial planning to expand its operations into the more dangerous eastern

the National Security Council is probably the only organization capable of orchestrating development of a comprehensive design of assistance

and southern portions of the country, a significant increase in the number of PRTs is not currently planned.

Including the Afghan army in PRTs will not only alleviate the demand for foreign forces but also add to the legitimacy of the PRT mission and refine the training of Afghan soldiers as they are mentored by their ISAF counterparts. Increased numbers of teams will strengthen the government’s authority beyond Kabul and enable judiciary reform, disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration, as well as opium eradication. While there is risk that a larger foreign footprint will incite nationalistic backlash and provide more targets for insurgents, the RAND study noted earlier suggests that more soldiers will enhance the probability of eventual success. As the PRTs facilitate improvements of basic living conditions, indigenous support will increase, which will generate beneficial second- and third-order effects, such as improved intelligence regarding criminal or insurgent activity.

Develop mechanisms to channel a much greater percentage of foreign aid funds through

the Afghan government. For projects controlled by outsiders, concrete measures must be taken to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and focus on the maximum employment of indigenous workers. This initiative provides an exceptional opportunity to merge security and economic objectives; contracting warlords and their militias to execute construction projects “would give both leaders and their foot soldiers a stake in the rebuilding.”²⁶ James Phillips advocates this approach, arguing that dependence on foreign contractors should be reduced as quickly as possible. The United States should place greater effort on “building the Afghan government’s capacity to help its own people by improving public administration and training government officials and Afghan NGOs to train other Afghans.”²⁷ While U.S. officials will have to encourage the international community to contribute significant amounts to this effort, the more difficult task will be applying those assets effectively. In particular,

projects that provide immediate improvement in the lives of war-weary, impoverished people are most likely to produce long-lasting results.

Develop and execute a public diplomacy

campaign to capitalize on the “information” element of national power. Ray Millen proposes the construction of a network of studios and transmission towers that would target the entire country.²⁸ He recommends implementing a public awareness campaign designed to educate the population regarding government programs and to foster “buy-in” to the reform process. An initiative such as this will be particularly important in the government’s effort to combat narcotics trafficking. Not only will Karzai’s exhortations against opium production reach a wider audience, but also information regarding alternate employment programs will be easier to disseminate. Given the low literacy rate of the country, the information architecture should focus initially on oral and visual media to transmit desired messages.

Develop a comprehensive plan that coordinates the plethora of activities. Currently, no single party is in charge of the overarching reconstruction effort: “ostensibly, the United Nations is, but that is as good as saying that no one is.”²⁹ The U.S. Embassy in Kabul is striving to guide the rebuilding process, but

its limited resources and modest span of control of the contributing countries impede effectiveness. Although there is an Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction Steering Group co-chaired by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, it has thus far been unsuccessful in establishing a comprehensive blueprint to establish goals and track results. The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit recommends mechanisms to align priorities and reduce overlap among the numerous lower-level coordinating bodies. In particular, the plan should address:

- specific roles and responsibilities of the various security organizations
- measures to fill security vacuums created by implementation of the disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration program
- fielding a professional police force
- the need to synchronize information operations.³⁰

Planning per se is not normally considered a component of strategy, but in the case of Afghanistan, events have moved so quickly that the strategy has become disjointed at best and incoherent at worst. Fundamental strategic adaptations are necessary, including new planning. Leaders of this process must dedicate the time to develop a concept that aligns their efforts to realize the vision of a transformed Afghanistan. The National Security Council (NSC) is probably the only organization capable of orchestrating the development of a comprehensive design that addresses all aspects of assistance: military, nongovernmental, and economic. Therefore, President Bush should immediately task the NSC to work with key allies to accomplish this critical task. Once a plan is in place, a fully manned U.S. Embassy should be capable of guiding it to a successful outcome.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan is a monumental endeavor, complicated by the nearly total destruction of the infrastructure and an ongoing insurgency. Helping Afghanistan become a stable, representative democracy that enforces the rule of law and respects human rights will be challenging. While it is difficult to find an all-encompassing document outlining a single integrated approach, the principal elements of the strategy are described in various government agency

publications. Close examination of key aspects reveals a major imbalance in the strategic ends/ways/means construct. In particular, we are not applying sufficient resources to ensure strategy success. Furthermore, we are not employing the complete range of our national elements and instruments of power to effect the outcome. A good portion of the international community is engaged in assisting this war-torn nation; thus, the challenge is not in convincing others that something must be done, but rather in encouraging the willing to share the burden more equitably and to synchronize the efforts of key actors. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Stability and support operations include peace operations, foreign internal defense, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to counterdrug operations, and combating terrorism. See U.S. Department of the Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, 2003), 1-4.

² The term *nationbuilding* has various meanings depending on the context. For the purpose of this paper, it refers to activities aimed at securing long-term stability in a country after war or conflict, including establishment or reestablishment of democratic government and national institutions (police, military, and so forth), revitalization of the economy, and physical reconstruction.

³ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 17, 2002), 7.

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⁵ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2004), 13.

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¹⁴ Dylan Hendrickson et al., *A Review of DFID Involvement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan*, report commissioned by the U.K. Department for International Development (London: King's College, July 8, 2005), 7.

¹⁵ James K. Bishop, "Combat Role Strains Relations between America's Military and its NGOs," *Humanitarian Review* (Summer 2003).

¹⁶ Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 4 (Winter 2005/2006), 44.

¹⁷ Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2005), 43.

¹⁸ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2005), 3.

¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

²⁰ U.S. State Department Fact Sheet, "New Initiatives for a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Democratic Afghanistan," June 15, 2004, available at <state.gov/p/sa/rls/fs/33575.htm>.

²¹ James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 146.

²² Ibid., 161. Larry Goodson of the Army War College has also been critical of the "small footprint" approach, noting that "by 2003, the disorder had gotten so bad that in certain locales people had even begun to miss the Taliban's ability to enforce at least a rough kind of justice and suppress some of the grosser crimes." See Larry Goodson, "Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan," *Journal of Democracy* 16 (January 2005), 25.

²³ Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (May/June 2004), 35.

²⁴ Subodh Atal, *At a Crossroads in Afghanistan: Should the United States Be Engaged in Nation Building?* (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, September 24, 2003), 1.

²⁵ Ron Synovitz, "Afghanistan: NATO Looks to Expand Mission After September Elections," September 5, 2005, available at <eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp090505_pr.shtml>.

²⁶ Goodson, 29.

²⁷ Phillips, 2.

Marine fire team training in Combat Town, Central Training Area, Okinawa



U.S. Marine Corps (C. Warren Peace)

Soldiers searching for improvised explosive devices in Baghdad



Camp Victory Combat Digital (Jorge A. Rodriguez)

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Marine trains for night operation in urban area



30th Space Communications Squadron (Barry A. Loo)

Where the Streets Have No Names Looking Past Operation *Iraqi Freedom* to Future Urban Operations

By STEPHEN R. DALZELL

In the ongoing debate over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, some assume that if it had been done differently (more troops, different plans), then current conditions would be different (no insurgency, better economy). Others defend the invasion as executed but agree things have not gone according to plan. Although seemingly incompatible, both positions assume that the situation we are facing in the fourth year of Operation *Iraqi Freedom* was not inevitable and that

it is an aberration in terms of military operations. In fact, it is much more likely that the opposite is true. If we had avoided prolonged urban stability operations, it would have been because Iraq was exceptional. We need to learn the right lessons from current operations



because such operations will become the rule, not the exception, in the foreseeable future.

For years, U.S. doctrine and training (for example, military operations in urban terrain) have been based on the assumption that the setting for urban operations

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would look like European cities—where some of the biggest obstacles would be to overcome removable rubble and service interruptions. Even after our experience in Somalia, we expected cities to have big buildings, extensive road networks, and existing infrastructure. That is not what we encountered in Iraq, however. How different was Iraq? Ask the Marines sent to rescue captured U.S. Soldiers in “House 13” on a certain street in Samarra: “As they made their way through a dusty warren of two-story mud-colored hutches . . . they found House 11. They found House 12. But no House 13. What they did see were more and more Iraqis swarming around.”¹

Now the United States is building better urban training areas, modeled on realities encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.² Iraq’s oil wealth and stable regime set it apart from the environment that would be found in most of the world’s “at-risk” cities. Unlike Iraq—in which most urban areas were developed before sanctions and war led to decay—almost a quarter of the population in both sub-Saharan Africa and the Latin America/Caribbean region live in slums, which are defined by substandard physical conditions and/or the fact they were illegally built, and are therefore not integrated into conventional political and economic structures. There, U.S. Soldiers will not just be groping for “House 13”; they will be searching for a particular alleyway hidden among acres of plywood shacks.

Shantytowns and slums are the urban battlespaces of the future. The U.S. military must prepare for that environment by developing appropriate doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities and giving the warfighter ways to process information and coordinate actions where all existing ground references are unintelligible to the outsider.

U.S. urban operations doctrine relegates civil-military operations to secondary chapters that could almost be subtitled, “How to keep the rabble out of your way.” Why, then, worry about cities at all? Cities matter because that is where the people are; a state does not win a war, stabilize a country, or secure the future until it succeeds with the urban population. Instead of wishing civilians away, we need to figure out how to win them over and help them.

Within weeks of seizing Baghdad, U.S. Soldiers recognized that their inability to address basic human needs and meet fundamental living requirements was turning

citizens against them. “We are dying for help from the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and we get zero from OCPA [Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority],” said one. “You can feel it out on the streets; people are frustrated, and we’re getting rocks thrown at us in neighborhoods where we never did before,” said another.³ In other cases, the stick was needed. U.S. forces found it necessary to make it clear to civilians that they were the center of gravity and could either prolong the insurgency or help coalition forces defeat it.⁴

The new urban environments reflect global changes, and those changes directly impact how the profession of arms does business. Industrial-age conflict saw cities as centers of industry and commerce—the joints and tendons of society. Cities were important primarily with respect to how they supported the clash between organized armies. But fourth-generation conflict is turning the focus to winning the cities, as that is where the combatants live and operate from. The best national strategies for combating terrorism integrate programs of urban development and political reforms with improved law enforcement.⁵ All focus on “winning hearts and minds” as much as changing the physical shape of the urban landscape.

To prepare strategically for these challenges, the United States needs the resolve to maintain hard-to-manage skills like civil affairs, psychological operations, and linguist/regional expertise in peacetime and rapidly integrate them with other units in time for effective operations. Urban operations doctrine needs to be rewritten to focus planners on cities as the positive objective of warfare. Hostiles need to be located, cities need to be controlled, citizens need to be provided for, and institutions must be created before victory can be declared.

General Charles Krulak, USMC, crystallized the reality of modern combat in his “three-block war”⁶ vision of Marines and Soldiers conducting combat, stability, and security operations simultaneously and in close proximity to each other. His insight, however, has failed to reshape either doctrine or planning. American leaders still discuss operations as comprising distinct phases, even when they know better. General John Sattler, USMC, who commanded the joint force in the battle for Fallujah in late 2004, reflected the standard mindset when he referred to his Phase IV as “the civil affairs phase.” At the same time, however, he recognized that “Phase IV—type

humanitarian and reconstruction activities” actually commenced during Phase III, combat operations.⁷

If Iraq challenged our military thinking, future operations in the least stable parts of the world may break it altogether unless we earnestly embrace the lessons to be learned. The United Nations estimates that the populations of less developed regions will grow at an annual rate of 1.3 percent between 2000 and 2020, with the percentage of residents living in urban areas increasing from 40 to 51 percent.⁸ These areas will continue expanding until they merge into huge bands of urban terrain. It will no longer be possible to think of cities as obstacles to be bypassed or key terrain to be seized in a single move. In the course of a conflict, a series of three-block wars will extend incrementally over the region, with low-level conflict flaring up repeatedly in areas behind the “front line” on our tactical maps.⁹

Current trends also give potential opponents the ability to escalate conflicts rapidly. No longer can U.S. forces deploy to conduct humanitarian missions without being prepared for unexpected escalations entailing security operations or even combat. We need to recognize the strategic importance of civilians and to create a new model for urban operations that fully integrates a wide range of potential activities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in those Iraqi cities where the U.S. military was responsible for both reconstruction and security, with a focus on short-turnaround, high-impact projects, there was a more rapid increase in stability than where more complicated interagency and/or international efforts were attempted. Among other virtues, this multitasking type of military-led effort makes it clear that Soldiers on patrol are also providing the material benefits of peace and, potentially, the seeds of cooperation.¹⁰

U.S. strategists and planners need to develop means for monitoring actions and controlling forces in ways that recognize the independence of small units, thus breaking away from the sequential, progressive model of “phased activity” and our geographic understanding of coherent forward lines of troops and forward edges of the battle area. While many transformational initiatives seek to rethink the nonlinear battlefield, they still see the battlefield as the spatial array of military forces and miss the ways in which large groups of civilians, changing location, direction, behavior, and attitudes, will impact multidimensional military mobility. This confluence

of activity will require us to see the continuity of operations such that security efforts support relief, and both lay the foundation for future development.

Experience is alleged to be the best teacher, but first it gives the test, then the lesson. The U.S. military is going through a challenging learning experience in Iraq. The only thing more painful would be for us to fail to learn or to learn the wrong lessons. In some ways, the struggle to secure Iraq's cities is unique, but in others it provides a honing opportunity for future urban operations. That Americans will be tasked with patrolling streets in other developing countries at some point seems relatively certain, and the time to prepare for that future is at hand. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Peter Baker, "Rescuers Nearly Called Mission Off: Team of Marines Feared Ambush," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 2003, 1. One U.S. captive managed to get the Marines' attention from inside a building and was rescued.

² Michelle Volkman, "Welcome to 'Little Baghdad'," *Yuma Sun*, April 13, 2005, and James Hannah, "Mock Villages Provide Taste of Realism," Associated Press via *Army Times* online, August 1, 2005.

³ David Wood, "Absent Aid, Military Warns, Slums Becoming Tinderboxes," *Newhouse News Service*, June 26, 2003.

⁴ Dan Murphy, "An Iraqi City Becomes Turn-around Story," *Christian Science Monitor*, October 31, 2005; Ann Scott Tyson, "Ten Days in Tall Afar: An Exception, Not a Model That Is Easily Replicated," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 2006, B2.

⁵ For one example, see Stephen R. Dalzell, "Beyond 'Draining the Swamp': Urban Development and Counterterrorism in Morocco," upcoming publication by the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, FL.

⁶ Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine*, January 1999, available at <au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm>.

⁷ John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, "Operation AL FAJR: The Battle of Fallujah—Part II," *Marine Corps Gazette* 89, no. 7 (July 2005), 22–23.

⁸ United Nations Human Settlements Programme, *The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003* (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 246. The figures are even higher for the least developed countries, where a 2.4 overall growth rate will push urbanization levels up nearly 47 percent, from 25.6 percent of population to 37.6 percent. The security implications of this and other global trends are discussed in Richard P. Cincotta,

Robert Engelman, and Danielle Anastasion, *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Population Action International, 2003).

⁹ Richard J. Norton offers an even more dire image of the trajectory of urban development in his "Feral Cities," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003), 97–106.

¹⁰ T. Christian Miller, "Sadr City Success Story," *The Los Angeles Times*, September 7, 2005, 1.



How We Might Build Better Coalitions

It's as Simple as "A,A,A"

By NADJA Y. WEST

When answering the question "How might we better build coalitions?" some observations and recommendations appear so fundamental that, given the intended audience, it seems almost insolent to discuss them. However, when it is apparent that these basic tenets are forgotten or for some reason not exercised, a review is not entirely unreasonable.

A vital but somewhat neglected point is that building a coalition actually starts long before one is needed. Fellow world leaders can detect disingenuous gestures as well as our leaders in the United States can. Colin Gray commented that "strategic behavior that offends the sense of justice of key constituencies will meet with more resistance than will behavior that is not ethically so challenged."¹ Though this insight was offered in the context of strategy, it can apply just as well to coalitions. Last-minute courting of previously neglected nation-states can breed suspicion, resentment, and, ultimately, refusal of support if intended partners perceive that they are being treated disrespectfully. In the same vein, a senior official recently suggested that "if you take the time to be inclusive day to day, then when you act unilaterally, allies understand." Analogously, if you treat other recognized sovereign entities with dignity and respect day to day, they will feel more like bona fide stakeholders in a common cause and thus be more amenable to cooperating when their collaboration is needed. In this setting, the alliance will truly be a coalition of the *willing*, not a coalition of the *compelled*.

A second obvious but important point is to determine whether building a coalition

is truly the desired outcome and not merely a hollow act to provide cover. Acting for the latter reason severely damages our credibility, especially since U.S. security strategy has closely linked our values to our interests, and cooperative action is a prominent pillar. Parity on some level is implicit among the entities that form coalitions to achieve common goals. One premise is

that in the unique role as a hyperpower, we do not really need anyone. If this is what we truly believe, we must indicate that position explicitly and act in a unilateral way. If not, then we must act in a manner that indicates a genuine desire for multilateral participation. The mark of a benevolent hyperpower is to be neither apologetic nor haughty about its ascendancy. Military hierarchy offers an example of this. Commanders do not have the luxury of being "one of the troops." Such a position of authority and responsibility requires that every word and deed be carefully measured to ensure the proper message and example are sent to those entrusted to the commander's care, and to ensure that credibility as a leader is maintained. As a hyperpower, the United States is in a similar position. If we say we want to build coalitions, then we must sincerely want it and do it.

In summary, we might better build coalitions by remembering the three "A's" of *acknowledge*, *appreciate*, and *accept*.

Acknowledge that other prospective members of a coalition may not enjoy hyperpower status, but they still have pride, history, intelligence, and the potential to contribute, and they deserve to be treated

with dignity and respect.

the mark of a benevolent hyperpower is to be neither apologetic nor haughty about its ascendancy

Appreciate that possible participants may have laws, conflicting interests, or differing

opinions that may not allow them to become affiliated with the gathering coalition. They may have other agreements or relationships on which they depend that would be compromised if they committed to the suggested partnership.

Most importantly, graciously *accept* that the offer to align with the forming coalition may be declined—a choice that democracy may require. The "play my way or I will take my marbles and go home" mentality is irritating on the playground; when demonstrated by a great power, it is unbecoming indeed.

Fellow world leaders should not be subject to consequences if they do not appear "willing" to support our interests when they legitimately conflict with their own. An eye injury caused by a well-placed thumb is painful, may cause permanent injury, and is not soon forgotten. A similar effect may be seen between allies. We might better build coalitions by adopting the same principles we apply in being good citizens: treating others with dignity and respect. The Golden Rule remains relevant. **JFQ**

NOTE

¹ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 11.

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The Problem of Common Terminology

By MILAN N. VEGO

The use of precisely defined terms is critical in any profession. It is no less important in the military, and the U.S. Armed Forces are no exception. It is not a question of semantics, as some would say, because the terms should be used and understood properly. This does not mean that terms or their meanings should be defined dogmatically; there is always a need to create new terms or modify existing ones. However, great care should be shown in changing meanings. For example, not everything in military theory and practice is obsolete in the information age. Most terms used over many decades and even centuries are still valid. Some need to

be modified because of changing practices, but that does not mean drastically altering the meanings of existing and well-defined terms. In some cases, the original meaning of the term is retained side by side with the new meaning.

Misunderstanding Meaning

A common mistake in terminology is using the terms *tactical*, *operational*, and *strategic* interchangeably or loosely. Each is related to the corresponding component of military art or level of war or, in some cases, level of command. *Tactical* refers to either the theory or practice of tactics. In general, *operational* has several meanings: it pertains

to an operation or a series of operations; to something that is intended for, or involved in, military operations; or to something that functions properly or is ready for service. This term is also used in combination with a number of other terms (for example, operational readiness, operational control, operational strategy, and operational command). However, in all these and similar cases, *operational* does not mean what is properly understood to lie within the domain of operational art.¹ This term should be used in referring to a certain theoretical or practical aspect of operational warfare.

The term *strategic*, correctly applied, pertains to events or actions that have, or can

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have, a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or an entire war. Hence, this term alone should not be used for situations of tactical importance. For instance, it is an exaggeration to consider a bridge, garrison, or air/naval base *strategic*, as often happens. The phrase *strategic corporal*, used frequently by even high-ranking information warfare advocates, is also inappropriate. While the decisions and actions of tactical commanders or single soldiers can have great effects, it is a stretch to suggest that they can have a major impact on the course and outcome of an overall conflict.

The terms *aims*, *goals*, and *objectives* are often used interchangeably. However, there are significant differences in their proper meanings. *Aim* means to direct or intend something toward a given purpose. It also refers to a statement of intent or direction

Effects-based operations (EBO) advocates compound the problem of using proper terms by mixing goals, aims, and objectives. They claim that objectives and tasks are stated in terms of “friendly goals and actions, while effects are stated in the form of behavior and capabilities of systems within the operational environments—friendly, neutral, or adversary behavior.”² EBO proponents are currently trying to redefine the term *objective* by making it broader and more abstract (in essence, by making it indistinguishable from an aim, goal, or effect) in order to make effects, not objectives, the central part of the military decision-making and planning process. The 2006 Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines a *task* as an action or activity (derived from the mission and concept of operations)

Henri de Jomini (1779–1869) insisted that *line of operations* became outdated because of changes in material conditions. Hence, he also changed the meaning of the term as pertaining to an imaginary line along which a force moves from its base of operation toward an assigned physical objective. He used the term *strategic line* for those “important lines which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the front of operations.”⁴ The Jominian term *line of operations* was widely accepted in all militaries.

JP 3–0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (September 2001), states that a line of operations defines the directional orientation of the force in time and space relative to the enemy. It connects the force with its base of operations and its objective. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3–0, *Operations* (2001), adds that in geographic terms, lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of the objective or defeat of the enemy force. However, the same doctrinal document confuses the issue by introducing a new but synonymous term, *logical line of operation* (thereby also implying that there are *illogical* lines of operations), for use largely in stability and support operations when positional reference to the enemy has little relevance. This is not necessarily true because posthostilities operations might include counterinsurgency, as the post-major combat phase in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrates. The 2001 FM 3–0 explains that the logical line of operation helps the commander visualize the use of both military and nonmilitary sources of power as means of support. Confusingly, *decisive point* is used for a collection of tasks aimed to achieve a “military condition.” In the new construct, the commander “links multiple objectives and actions with logic of purpose.” Multiple and complementary lines of operations work through a series of objectives. The commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operations to achieve the desired endstate (see figure on next page). This definition of what constitutes a logical line of operations is contradictory. Among other things, the well-known and commonly understood term *decisive point* is given entirely new meaning. Series of tasks comprising each logical line of operation are in fact component tasks, and what is defined as a *military condition* is actually the main task. And the so-called endstate actually equals part of the strategic objective in the posthostilities phase.

because of their inherently open-ended nature, aims or goals cannot be used as the basis for military planning

for an action. A *goal* is the result or achievement toward which an effort is directed. It is also a statement of one’s intent, but it is more specific than an aim. Both aims and goals are usually expressed broadly. Both are normally used when referring to national interests. They are, in their essence, the expressions used by strategists and policymakers. Hence, an aim or goal must be converted into something more specific: the *objective*, defined as something that one’s efforts are intended to accomplish or to serve as the basis for military or nonmilitary action. The objective can also be described as the purpose of one’s actions, carried out within a specific space and time. A *military objective* is that which, if controlled, captured, destroyed, neutralized, or annihilated, would result in a drastic change in the military situation. Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives are differentiated by their scale and importance.

The larger the objective, the more difficult it is to accomplish by a single act. In practical terms, then, an objective must be divided into component parts (*tasks*) that, when carried out, would accomplish it. In generic terms, a *task* is defined as a definite piece of work assigned to or expected of a person; a duty; or a matter of considerable labor or difficulty. The task answers the question of *what* needs to be done, while the objective answers the question of *why*.

assigned to an individual or organization to provide a capability. In contrast, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) defines a *task* as a directive statement used to assign a discrete action or set of actions to an organization that enables accomplishment of a mission or function. A single task may incorporate multiple individual actions. Neither of these definitions implies that a task is integral to the specific military objective or is derived from the objective rather than the mission.

New Meanings


Another problem in the joint community is the lack of understanding of the true meanings of key operational and tactical terms. For instance, *line of operation* is increasingly misused in the U.S. military, although it is well defined in current joint doctrinal publications. The term was introduced into military theory in 1781 by the British general and theorist Henry Lloyd, one of the chief proponents of the so-called geometrical school. Originally, a line of operation was understood as a line linking an army in the field with its supply depots.³ The Prussian theorist Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Buelow (1757–1807) used the same term and contended that all modern warfare was based on lines of operations. Both Lloyd and Buelow understood this term to mean what today is commonly called a *line of communications* or *line of supply*. Antoine

The final coordination draft of JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2005), and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2006), added a new meaning to *line of operation*: “a logical line that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s).” As a secondary meaning, the term was also defined as “a physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and decisive points related in time and space

objectives.” This definition represents a radical break with the traditional view of what constitutes a strategy. It is in fact a huge step backward. Among other things, it is too simplistic to call strategy a “prudent idea.” In contrast to JP 3-0 (2001), the new definition does not refer to strategy as being both an art and science of matching ends, means, and ways.

JP 5-0 (2006) does not have an entry for *strategy*. However, it provides a definition of *national security strategy* as “the art and

the term underwent numerous changes in Service and joint doctrinal documents. Joint Publications 3-0 (2001), 1-02 (2006), and 5-0 (2006) define *operational art* as the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and ultimately tactical actions by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. A major problem with this definition is that operational art is not considered as both an art and science. Moreover, it does not emphasize that it is an intermediate field of study and practice between strategy and tactics that deals with synchronizing military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic or operational objectives in a theater.



Existing Terms

Some military terms are misunderstood partly because they are not well defined in the various Service or joint doctrinal publications. One of the most egregious cases is the interchangeable use of *endstate*. Properly understood, this term should be used solely in describing the desired endstate (or perhaps more accurately, *desired strategic endstate*). The desired endstate is part of the strategic guidance. The commander’s intent, however, is often understood as being synonymous with the *endstate*. This is incorrect because the commander’s intent is exclusively focused on the *military* aspects of the situation (or “military landscape”) that the commander wants to see after the mission is accomplished.

The true meaning and purpose of *deployment* and *maneuver* seem not well understood by some leading network-centric warfare advocates, which is puzzling because each term is well defined in Service and joint doctrinal documents. It is well known that force, movement, and mobility are common to both deployment and maneuver. However, they differ in their purpose, timing, location, and need for combat support and combat service support. Deployment is intended to move forces from bases or operating areas to where maneuvers will be conducted. Hence, it normally precedes the maneuver. In contrast to maneuver, which is usually conducted in an area either controlled or disputed by the enemy, deployment is generally carried out in the area of one’s own or friendly control. Forces conducting a maneuver move along

to an objective(s).” Apparently, the authors confuse *nodes* and *decisive points* as two different things. In fact, nodes in a given system are also decisive points that should be attacked or protected. Obviously, these changes were made for no good reason except to make a space for the currently fashionable “system of systems” approach to the analysis of the military situation.

Another major problem in the U.S. military today is the radical attempt to redefine what constitutes *strategy* and *operational art*. Although considerable differences existed in the past, *strategy* was generally properly defined. For example, JP 3-0 (2001) defines *strategy* as “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.” Yet the current JP 1-02 (2006) does not provide any definition of what constitutes a strategy. JP 3-0 (2005) defines the term as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational

science of developing, applying, and coordinating instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, law enforcement, and international) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. The secondary meaning of the same term refers to the document prepared by the President and National Security Council that outlines national security strategy.” Joint Publication 1-02 (2006) provides essentially the same generic definition of national security strategy as JP 5-0 (2006). In contrast, JP 3-0 (2005) refers only to the national security strategy *document* but does not explain its meaning. Only JP 1-02 (2006) defines *national military strategy* as “the art and science of distributing and applying power to attain national objectives in peace and war.”

Perhaps the biggest problem was properly defining *operational art*. In an early definition, the U.S. Army FM 100-5, *Operations* (1986), described it as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.” Afterward,

COMBATANT COMMAND



Iraqi soldiers display flag after transfer of operations base from U.S. to Iraqi control

55th Signal Company (Kevin L. Moses, Sr.)

lines of operations, while those carrying out deployment move along lines of communications. Another significant difference is that forces are supported by fires during maneuver (usually not during deployment). Also, one's forces conducting maneuver must be logistically supported and sustained, while those conducting deployment are usually self-sustainable.

feature of the concept is that what represents a decisive point for operational planners usually becomes a task for subordinate tactical commanders. However, this should not be carried too far into the operational or strategic level. For example, obtaining and maintaining sea control or air superiority cannot be viewed as a decisive point, as is often claimed, but rather as an operational or strategic objective to be

instance, define a *campaign* as "a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space." This definition is imprecise because any definition of a military term pertaining to the method of combat force employment should state in simple terms only the ultimate objective of a given military action. Hence, *operational* not only is redundant in the above definition but also obscures the meaning of *campaign*.

In generic terms, a *campaign* in a war consists of a series of related major operations sequenced and synchronized in time and place to accomplish a military or theater-strategic objective. It is conducted according to a common plan and controlled by a joint or combined forces commander. Land and maritime campaigns are differentiated according to the predominant characteristics of the physical environment. Because of the primarily nonmilitary nature of the strategic objective, a campaign in a low-intensity conflict, such as insurgency or counterinsurgency, consists largely of a series of tactical actions; major operations are rare.

A campaign today is inherently multiser-vice and often multinational. Hence, no single Service, including the Air Force, can plan and conduct a campaign. Yet that does not imply that a single Service cannot contribute far more to the outcome than other Services.

Foreign Terms

Translating a foreign military term is often full of pitfalls. This is a problem not just of linguistics but of different military cultures. The accuracy of the original term is often in question. In other cases, the entire meaning

some military terms are misunderstood partly because they are not well defined in the various Service or joint doctrinal publications

New Meanings for Old Terms

An increasing trend with Service and joint doctrinal documents is adding new meaning to well-defined and established terms. *Decisive point* was introduced by Jomini in *The Art of War* in 1838. Since then, the Jominian concept of what constitutes a decisive point has undergone changes, yet its essence has remained remarkably stable. In generic terms, a *decisive point* can be described as a geographic location or source of physical military power whose destruction or capture, control, defense, or continuous surveillance and monitoring would give an immediate and marked advantage over the opponent in accomplishing one's military objective. Today, geographic-, force-, and cyber-oriented decisive points or their combinations are differentiated; they exist at each level of war. The most important decisive points are those located in physical proximity to, or that allow access to, the enemy or friendly center of gravity or some critical enemy capability. A

accomplished. Also, any decisive point has less military significance than the nearby physical objective or center of gravity. For example, decisive points near the operational objective or operational center of gravity are usually tactical in their importance.

There is a shortage of common terms referring to methods of combat force employment. At the tactical level, the terms *attack*, *strike*, *battle*, *engagement*, and *raid* mean different things for each Service. JP 1-02 (2006) does not have an entry for *attack* and provides highly inadequate definitions for *strike* and *raid*. Another problem is that Service doctrines generally do not precisely define the terms for tactical employment of their respective combat forces.

In the U.S. military, *campaign* is one of the most often used and abused terms. Doctrinal documents either do not explain what constitutes a campaign or they define it improperly. Joint publications 1-02 (2006), 3-0 (2001), 3-0 (2005), and 5-0 (2006), for



Iraqi soldiers receive live fire training from U.S. Soldiers

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Ken Bergmann)

of the original term can be lost or drastically changed. Perhaps the classic case of mistranslation of a critical term is the rendering of Clausewitz's *Schwerpunkt* as "center of gravity." This term is widely used in the German military. Its meaning has changed considerably since Clausewitz's day and is now used for many purposes.⁵ Clausewitz wrote:

*One must keep the dominant characteristics of both states in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain Schwerpunkt develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. It represents concentration of the enemy strength most vital to him in the accomplishment of his aim. If you could knock it out directly, it would be the most valuable target for your blows.*⁶

Properly translated, *Schwerpunkt* refers to the "weight of effort" (or literally the "point of main emphasis"), not "center of gravity."⁷ In German military theory and practice, the *Schwerpunkt* has a much broader meaning than what the U.S. military understands as center of gravity. In the military meaning, *Schwerpunkt* designates a theater, area, or place in which combat forces are massed to seek a decision or in which the commander expects a decision. The main factors in selecting a *Schwerpunkt* include the situation, terrain, and commander's intent. Each commander is responsible for concentrating his forces in the sector of the weight of effort (*Schwerpunktbildung*). When appropriate, a commander designates a weight of effort for his subordinate commanders. A change in the situation would require a shift in the weight of effort (*Schw-*

erpunktverlegung).⁸ To complicate the matter, *Schwerpunkt* is widely used for a variety of military situations, such as in designating the theater of main effort versus the theater of secondary effort and in force planning (for example, focusing on one category of forces or platforms versus another). The same term is also often used in politics, diplomacy, and other nonmilitary areas of activity.

Business Terms

Network-centric warfare enthusiasts are principally responsible for the steady influx of business expressions into the military vocabulary.⁹ This trend is exemplified by, for example, the terms:

- transaction strategy
- competitive edge
- competitive space
- leveraging
- human capital strategy
- Vice Chief of Naval Operations Corporate Board
- empowered self-synchronization.

The word *enemy* is being replaced with *threat*, *adversary*, or *opponent*. The term *lock in our success* was adopted from the business term *product lock-in*. Likewise, *battlespace awareness* was adapted from the business term *competitive space awareness*. In fact, the three pillars of network-centric warfare (information, sensor, and shooter grid) correspond to the business (Wal-Mart) model of information, sensor, and transaction grid.

The use of business terms is inappropriate when referring to any aspect of military theory and practice. Among other things, it creates the impression that the main job of the military is not killing but resolving conflict by using business practices. It also confuses and eliminates distinctions among various levels of war. The Department of Defense Office of Force Transformation (OFT) apparently does not share the widely known and commonly accepted definitions of what constitutes *strategy*, *operational art* (or as OFT calls it, *operations*), and *tactics*. It clearly considers each component of military art to be not much different from a business activity. Specifically, OFT asserted in 2003 that *strategy* selects a competitive space and determines the scope, pace, and intensity of competition; *operations* determines key competitive attributes and applies or masters them; and *tactics* executes in the battlespace.¹⁰ The authors are either oblivious to or completely ignorant of the fact that these terms are the result of both the prac-



U.S. Marine explaining to Moldovan army officer C² computer used in Exercise Combined Endeavor 2006, a communications and information systems exercise involving 41 nations

U.S. Air Force (Chris Willis)

tice and theory of centuries of warfare. They cannot be simply abandoned without throwing out the thinking of masters of war.

Another business term, *exit strategy*, is also extensively used by both the U.S. military and politicians, instead of *desired (strategic) endstate*. Among other things, *exit strategy* is associated with the benchmarks in a good business plan that serve for deciding when to call it quits. It was coined by the chief executive officer of Docutel Corporation (inventor of the automatic teller machine) in a story published in *The New York Times* in 1980. Not until 1993 was the term used in a military context. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher used *exit strategy* in reference to Bosnia in his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on April 27, 1993.¹¹ In fact, the purpose of a posthostilities or stabilization

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phase is not to call it quits, but to consolidate and exploit strategic success. Hence, the term desired (*strategic*) *endstate*, is not only more accurate, but also more positive in its meaning than the much misused *exit strategy*.

Misapplied Tactical Terms

Network-centric warfare proponents have been largely successful in introducing new terms and imposing tactical perspective in discussing actions at all levels of war, including strategy and policy. This is perhaps one of the most corrupt influences these enthusiasts have

narrow tactical perspective among information warfare advocates.

Currently, *situational awareness* is applied to all levels of command and war, so no real distinction is made to indicate that the requirements for successful command at the operational and strategic levels are substantially different from those at the tactical level. Operational commanders must think *operationally*, not tactically, to succeed in operation planning and execution. Likewise, the term *theater* seems to be almost abandoned in the U.S. military; the focus instead is on the bat-

training in the correct use of military terms. The use of proper terms accurately conveys tactical or operational perspective and compels the participants in the discussion to use terms right. The lack of agreement on the meaning of military terms considerably complicates communications within a Service and among Services, as well as with allies and prospective coalition partners. **JFQ**

situational awareness was originally used to describe a pilot's perception of reality



U.S. Navy explosive ordnance personnel removing rocket that landed in Camp Victory, Iraq

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Denise A. Rayder)

on the current debate on various doctrinal issues in U.S. military terms. For instance, *situational awareness* is exclusively used in discussing the need for higher commanders to know and understand all aspects of the situation within their areas of responsibility. U.S. Joint Forces Command defines *situational awareness* as “knowledge and understanding of the operational environment, factors, and conditions, to include the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain, that enable timely, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate assessments, in order to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and/or complete the mission.”¹² This term was originally used to describe a pilot’s perception of reality. Situational awareness is purely a tactical term, not operational or strategic. Its extensive use in doctrinal publications is one of the best proofs of the predominance of a

tle space. This is more proof of how the narrow tactical perspective predominates among information warfare advocates.

In general, precise language is essential for the accurate transmission of ideas. Perhaps this is more critical in the national security field than in any other area of human activity. Clausewitz wrote that until terms and concepts are defined, one cannot hope to make progress in examining a question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share his views.¹³ In particular, the successful application of mission command is predicated on having not only common operational or tactical outlook, sound doctrine, common education and training, and healthy relationships between the commanders and their subordinates, but also a common vocabulary.

Indeed, doctrinal documents are the most important means of educating and

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¹ D. Holger Mueller, *The Character of Manoeuvre at the Operational Level* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 1999), 3.

² Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations* (Norfolk, VA: Standing Joint Force Headquarters, USJFCOM, February 24, 2006), I–4.

³ Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77.

⁴ Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (*Precis de l’Art de Guerre*), with an introduction by Charles Messenger (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 101.

⁵ Timothy J. Keppler, *The Center of Gravity Concept: A Knowledge Engineering Approach to Improved Understanding and Application* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1995), 15.

⁶ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595–596.

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 16th edition, with comments by Werner Hallweg (Bonn: Ferdinand Dummlers Verlag, 1952), 874.

⁸ “Schwerpunkt,” HDv 100/900 VS-NfD, *Fuehrungsbegriffe* (TF/B) (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, February 1990), Sch–SEA; related terms include “area of the point of main decision” (*Schwerpunkttraum*), “point of main decision in an attack” (*Schwerpunkt des Angriffs*), etc. Huerth, US-NfD, *Militarisches Studienglossary Englisch*, vol. 2/3 (Bonn: Bundessprachenamt, January 1993), 1060; “Schwerpunkt,” Hermann Franke, ed., *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, vol. 1: *Wehrpolitik und Kriegfuehrung* (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag von Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1936), 649.

⁹ Ironically, U.S. business is going in the opposite direction, increasingly adopting purely military terms in referring to their competitors.

¹⁰ Office of Force Transformation, *Network-Centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage* (Washington, DC: Office of Force Transformation, Winter 2003), 3.

¹¹ Timothy Kane, “‘Exit Strategy’: A Mere Phrase, Not a Strategy,” *USA Today*, June 20, 2005, 15.

¹² Joint Warfighting Center, 112.

¹³ Clausewitz, *On War*, 132.

Future Approaches to the Economic Instrument of Power

By PHILIP Y. KAO

We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are perpetual and eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow.

—Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, 1848

The U.S. military should capitalize on a greater understanding of economics. Indeed, identifying supporting relationships and how the military and key economic and financial figures interact may prove to be a daunting task, but it will enhance the strength and cohesiveness of national security. Whether it is gathering intelligence, providing security, shoring up market confidence, or supporting the execution of economic policies abroad, the military clearly has an economic function. By reinforcing geographic boundaries, the Armed Forces play an inevitable role in shaping local and regional labor markets. Additionally, the military is an enforcer of contracts, providing traction and realism to burgeoning rule of law and economic reforms, especially in the immediate postconflict environment.

The greater Department of Defense (DOD) community should incorporate economic analysis more prevalently into its planning consciousness and the various phases of operations. Prior to conflict, intelligence

efforts conducted jointly by military and economic subject matter experts should discover local expressions of politics and economic relationships. Delineating these structural relationships will help situate and ground later cultural observations into a meaningful context. Moreover, a robust preconflict economic analysis needs to determine the risk preferences of a given country's government. To carry this out, analysts can scrutinize government investments and purchases and look for patterns of trade and regional economic behaviors. During conflict, economic assessment can not only draw on the prior knowledge base but also expand the horizon toward finding economic and resource leverage points and military financing mechanisms. Lastly, in the postconflict phase, economic reconstruction and development should seek to leverage the ongoing and cumulative dialogue between military and economic planners. Probing for real economic capacity on the ground is vital and can thwart a premature and headlong dive into yet another gargantuan institution-building campaign.



Secretary Rumsfeld waves to tourists while meeting with civilian and defense officials in Beijing

1st Combat Camera Squadron (James Bowman)

Defense academics and thinkers have turned a closer eye to social and cultural knowledge since the threat of terrorism took center stage post-9/11. Research conferences sponsored by think tanks and blossoming journal publications have attempted to extract military and security insight from such fields as cultural anthropology and sociology. Along with this renewed focus on “social factors,” research and development pouring into complex systems modeling has given planners guidance and probability tools for analyzing and conducting counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations.

One discipline, economics, which has been (in)famously called “the dismal science” for its cold-hearted and scientific analysis, has been slowly withdrawing behind the curtain. Once the darling child of the post-Cold War era, economics is now coming close to the limits of market fundamentalism and exhausting its own ideological circumlocution. Contrary to public opinion, there was a postconflict plan in Iraq, and it echoed the millennial slogan, “It’s the economy, stupid!” Naomi Klein offers the poignant observation that injecting greed and free-market economic shock therapy into Iraq was indeed a failure and contributed to the escalation of Iraqi insurgency.¹

Economists often ostracize their readers by presenting a deterministic conception of the world. This article, however, steers economics back into our military knowledge base and suggests that failure to do so could be highly detrimental, given the nature of future threats.

Analyses of a Working Partnership

DOD frequently treats economics as a shorthand for macromovements of cash

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flows. This approach is highly superficial and more in line with accounting than the actual science of economics and its various applications. Additionally, the media tend to focus on economics when hand-wringing over the financial and opportunity costs associated with war. For the future, however, we need to deepen our awareness of economics beyond these wave-top representations. The need to share information across U.S. agencies will be paramount in the years to come. Achieving a harmonized, government-wide effort will become the dominant business practice. Unified action is one such concept gaining a second life in this milieu, which harnesses multiple Federal departments and agencies to carry out national strategy directives more efficiently and effectively.

Under this framework, the growing need for economic experts and planners to weigh in critically on the consequences of military action will only intensify. Economics can inform policy instrument options (for example, incentives and sanctions) to prevent kinetic wars or even to terminate conflict midstream without sacrificing our strategic goals. Flexible deterrent options are not new to the military community, and surely they make up certain courses of action in strategic theater cooperation planning, albeit rather anemically.



U.S. Army engineer reviews plans for clinic with Iraqi contractors

What is new, however, is the need to reach beyond DOD and tap outside subject matter experts in various other departments and agencies as working partners. Military planners need to learn more about how they can tailor their interventions, teeing up for a sustainable phase of economic reconstruction. Battle damage assessments of diplomatic channels of strategic communication, economic drivers of growth, trade, and commodity chain networks are just a few examples of the kinds of analyses a working partnership could conduct.

Ultimately, economic actions may prove more palatable in the international arena than unilateral military interventions. Japan is an example. In light of Article IX of its constitution, Japan engages in political realism through the pursuit of economic power. As Samuel Huntington asserts, “In the realm of military competition, the instruments of power are missiles, planes, [etc.]. In the realm of economic competition, the instruments of power are productivity, market control, trade surplus, strong currency, foreign exchange reserves, ownership of foreign companies, and technology.”² By raising our consciousness and appreciation of economics, we can create better national security options and results.

Policy Schizophrenia

In the past, economics and national security shared traditional and overlapping concerns. Robust growth and economic welfare were keys to securing a Maslowian-inflected hierarchy of needs. According to Aharon Barth, the economy is an integral part of military capabilities, such as maintaining a healthy industrial-military complex.³ Also, Barth maintains that in the interconnected global economy, a nation-state’s position within the interdependent network presents itself as a double-edged sword—that is, as a simultaneous instance of power and vulnerability. These concerns are still extremely valid, but other economic strands of thinking and relating must be showcased as well.

U.S. foreign policy orientation to economics has always been rather schizophrenic. During the Cold War, policymakers wanted failing and weak states to grow economically in the hopes of spreading liberal democracy. Military and “social systems” analysts paid extraordinary attention to the causes of civil wars. Indeed, this fixation on failing states and underperforming economies continued through the fall of the Soviet Union. Under the aegis of the post-Washington Consensus, transparency, accountability, privatization, and liberal democracy were packaged into a sacred bundle and parachuted into “unclean” developing countries. Simultaneously, however, policymakers have remained threatened by competitive economies, despite their market leanings. In other words, we have a publicly contradictory policy that extends the olive branch of trade and liberalism while simultaneously refusing to sell certain assets to foreign countries in the name of national security. This economic dilemma is certainly rhetorical

and attributable to our (sometimes) polarized political theories that hedge outspoken liberalism with Kissinger-style realism.

Policy articulations of economics are bifurcated along two strands of political thought. On the one hand, policies drawing from the doctrine of economic liberalism are called on to quell erupting civil wars and nascent insurgencies abroad, especially in areas that have been referred to as the *nonintegrating gap*.⁴ Liberalism stems from the rationale that economic well-being and exchange promote complacency, mutual understanding, and risk-averse behavior. On the other hand, an honest engagement with economics must face up to the (realist) question: How do we go to war and dominate someone who is becoming more economically intertwined with us?

Paul Collier, the former director of research at the World Bank, started a wave of investigations into the economic relationships arising out of the world’s messy conflicts after World War II.⁵ Working with a large dataset, he ascertained some statistically significant relationships, including the observation that economic greed, corruption, and a disproportionate ratio of natural resource export income to gross domestic product are all correlated with conflict. His thesis jumpstarted an academic reaction within the development community because it suggested that greed, rather than political grievance, motivates and sustains civil wars and conflicts. Collier also concluded that peacetime corruption probably has a strong link to economically motivated conflict and that the longer a war lasts, the more likely violence will become economically motivated.

These claims beg for an understanding of how our actions, either by the military or a civilian-military coalition, reproduce the conditions and terms of violence and cause conflicts to relapse. Development academics argue that the law of diminishing returns applies to foreign direct investment and aid. Perhaps there are military actions with diminishing returns and elasticities that we need to identify and put on the table.

The Liberalism/Realism Debate

Economic reconstruction is too often caught up in postconflict planning and should be embedded more thoroughly in military planning. Keeping a blind eye to corruption and informal markets may be politically expedient, especially during the drafting of a peace agreement. Common sense, however, suggests

otherwise. Informal economies are not only dangerous breeding grounds for illicit trade but, more importantly, are also incapable of mobilizing resources (raising taxes) for investing in the public good. Failure to generate and spread prosperity will lead to future conflicts and instability. This brings us to the point that economics and conflict are not so distinct. David Keen, for example, writes that war should not be perceived as an outgrowth of chaos theory, where violence signals a massive societal meltdown. "Rather," he states, "conflict and war is simply a break of a particular system in the hopes of creating an alternative system of profit, power, and even protection."⁶

Unlike liberalism, realism postulates that nation-states are rational actors looking to maximize security gains. Realists argue that economic growth enables nation-states to develop stronger military capabilities and that actors are more willing to engage in war today to secure a higher position tomorrow. Realism also posits that nation-states will leverage their economic powers to influence and threaten those who are weaker. With the epigraph from Lord Palmerston in mind, determining clear-cut friends and foes will be increasingly difficult, especially in economic interdependence. One has to be clear, nonetheless, that economic growth and market-led reforms do not always coincide with Western democratic reforms; they are not hand-in-glove issues. Growing economies may exhibit increased nationalism and clamor for conspicuous cultural politics that, in the best-case scenario, act as an alternative to "our" models and at worst as an antagonistic competitor.

There is a dire need to find ways of dissuading growing economies from investing in defense. (Over)investment in a military may give regional neighbors the wrong security signals, prompting a regional arms race. More importantly, if these countries experience significant economic downturns, they will be left with stockpiles of weapons as their only international bargaining chips.

Research of economic interdependence can take some cues from models arising out of the Palestinian-Israeli case study. Gil Friedman conducted a brilliant analysis that explored the impact of economic incentives on views of peace and violence.⁷ His study, a regression model of Palestinian views on diplomacy and attacks using 2001 public opinion data, is couched broadly around the liberalism/

realism debate. Friedman suggests that there is a modest role for economics, and he tests three hypotheses that state, in summary, that mutually beneficial transnational exchange (between Israel and Palestine) reduces the utility of warfare, enriches the nations, and thereby engenders a preference for the status quo, promoting a positive effect. He concludes that for those who view economic improvement as the most important factor, there is a strong correlation between economic integration and support for peaceful diplomacy. On the other hand, respondents who did not view economic improvement as the most important issue tended to support attacks against Israel even when they believed it damaged the economy. Perhaps the greatest conclusion, and a rather subtle one, is what Friedman describes as Hypothesis 4:

The salience of economic concerns relative to other concerns modifies the strength of the relationship between economic motives and views on war and peace. One way forward could be to conduct similar research but into different areas and relationships.

A Shift in Thinking

There are some tangible economic policy instruments and overall directions to take in boosting our national security and strategic capabilities. First, policymakers should avoid meddling with monetary policy. Our currency and economic strengths trade off of growth and return-on-investment opportunities. Synchronizing interest rates and money supply

economic role playing should be elevated at military exercises and given life outside of the closeted world of wargaming

with national defense strategy would signal a moral hazard and weaken our position in the global economy. With that said, sanctions provide a feasible solution, albeit imperfect in many situations. Critics of these policies argue that sanctions fail because they create subterranean informal markets. Examples of relatively successful sanctions such as the Kimberley (diamond) Process demand a closer study. Alternatively, creating a two-tier market system that makes the cost of business unsustainable for informal market entrepreneurs is one way to deal with informal markets.

Staying economically competitive allows us to manufacture favorable tradeoffs.

For example, China has recently traded in its political relationship with North Korea for future investment and trade opportunities with the United States. Innovating and creating new market niches should ensure our continued economic dominance, diminishing the impact of outsourcing. Without transgressing international dumping laws, new cost-effective ways of pushing out exports and raising tariffs on select imports will be useful yet limited tools. Furthermore, research should explore the feasibility of creating market panics and financial crises. How could we overinvest deliberately in a region in order to induce capital flight, distort regional markets, and create future levers of power? The economics of the information subdiscipline also offers promising insight. Are we hurting our future prospects by ceding away too much in the way of technological and knowledge capital transfers? In other words, is there an unfair arbitrage that is leaving us short-changed? The devil is in the details, and there needs to be an examination of the timing and sequencing of such economic actions alongside other national government strategies.

Interdependence entails a certain shift in thinking about foreign investments. Going along with the conventional wisdom that it is always better to wage war on someone else's turf, we need to consider the types of investment and capital we risk losing in foreign countries during conflict. One hedging strategy is to tilt foreign investments toward mobile assets such as knowledge and human capital; these would be recoverable sunken costs during times of war. As a corollary, we need to make sure that foreign investments in the United States can be replaced relatively cheaply or substituted away.

Under the liberalist framework, economic policy instruments look rather different. For one thing, information operations (IO) present a commonsensical opportunity for military planners and economists to collaborate. Promoting economic growth and spreading awareness of economic empowerment functions as an effective counterinsurgency tactic. In addition to buying away spoilers, IO campaigns that draw from economics can plant the seeds of self-empowerment, democratic participation, and civil society. The increasing debt of the developing world may be a source of violent tension, but



U.S. civil affairs Soldiers assess Baghdad power transfer station to help restore infrastructure

there are opportunities as well. Tied aid and debt forgiveness are implicated in a system of rewards and political reform.

To facilitate a working dialogue between economics and national security, we must be willing to transform. Military planners and strategists must appreciate the sensitivities surrounding the reluctance on the part of many professional economists to participate in discussions spanning economics and national strategy. For one thing, “applied” policy economics is entrenched in normative struggles to solve the woes of underdeveloped countries. Development economics proceeds from understanding economics as a science of maximization, concerned with crafting efficient solutions to situations where the lack of resources threatens to undermine rational behavior and distribution. In a nutshell, normative economics in practice concerns itself with maximizing the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Additionally, economists fear that treating their discipline as a weapon vitiates the unfettered nature of the market system and generates distorting price and information noise. For these academics, war is an exogenous shock and signifies points along a historical time-series. Keeping aware of these normative and institutional tendencies will help pave the road toward effective communication techniques that will bolster the overall national security dialogue.

Economic Relationships as Enablers

The military planning and research community should wean itself away from conventional diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) analysis. Instead

of being just a convenient mnemonic for getting planners to think holistically, there is a growing danger that DIME is ossifying our thinking with respect to social analysis. Too many people eschew various models because the models force them to identify an action or effect solely in terms of DIME-generated categories. One of the powerful conclusions coming out of Collier’s research is that conflict is triggered by the interaction of economic motives and other factors such as social and cultural politics. Economic relationships, just as any other cultural or political observations, are really enablers among social variables. The way they play out is always contingent on the dynamics of each situation. To treat economics rigidly within the framework of DIME would amount to a certain degree of negative training.

To deepen our understanding and move away from a superficial DIME analysis of economics, military training needs to venture into such topic areas as new institutional economics, different markets’ ontologies, behaviors, and the forces and types of capital that regulate preferences and clear imperfect contracts.⁸ Complementary to all this, economic role playing should be elevated at military exercises and given life outside of the closeted world of wargaming. Having various economists (representing the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, for example) train and adjudicate options under pressurized situations within a command post exercise would be highly valuable.

People often refer to the economic instruments of power as the carrots and sticks. But we need a sophisticated and

coordinated national security strategy that differentiates when and where the Nation is promoting economic cooperation/growth versus protecting itself from the vulnerabilities inherent in interdependence. Allowing slippery language to infect policy will lead to disastrous confusion. Being explicit about our strategy and economic instruments will help us remain flexible and shuffle between liberal and realist positions with lower transition costs. An economist at U.S. Joint Forces Command claims that in times of peace, we need to harness the U.S. Government to persuade, influence, assist, reward, and socialize. In times of conflict and crisis, he suggests looking for “unified economic actions” to dissuade, deter, isolate, defeat, and dominate. These economic carrots and sticks should be indexed more explicitly to strategy and political goals, regardless of whether there is peace or outright war. **JFQ**

NOTES

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³ Aharon Barth, “Econo-Realism: Putting Economics at Center Stage. How Does, and Should, IR Research React to Expanding Economic Interdependence?” paper presented to the International Studies Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, March 14–18, 2000, available at <www.ciaonet.org/isa/baa01/>.

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⁵ Paul Collier, “Development and Conflict,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University, October 1, 2004, available at <www.un.org/esa/documents/Development.and.Conflict2.pdf>. See also Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 2004 56, no. 4, 563–595.

⁶ David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, Adelphi Paper 320 (New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), 11.

⁷ Gil Friedman, “Commercial Pacifism and Protracted Conflict: Models from the Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 3 (June 2005), 360–382.

⁸ See Samuel Bowles, “Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 36 (1998), 11; and Samuel Bowles, *Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and Evolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

The Case for

Alliances

By ELIZABETH SHERWOOD-RANDALL

Does America need allies? The United States is the strongest nation on earth, the only standing superpower, and its natural impulse is to assume that it can act unencumbered. Paradoxically, America needs allies because of its overwhelming strengths and the vulnerabilities that lurk in the shadow of such unprecedented national power.

In this era of American predominance, alliances are more compelling than ever, yet U.S. citizens are largely unaware of or uninformed about who their allies are. For example, in the recent uproar over the potential acquisition by a Dubai company of contracts for management of U.S. ports, many were ignorant of Dubai's status as a long-standing partner providing critical support to American policies in the Persian Gulf. The lack of clarity underscores the fact that policymakers and analysts have failed to think strategically or systematically about the role alliances should play in American national security in the 21st century. As a consequence, they have also failed to build the public support necessary for sustained global engagements.

What does an alliance offer that the United States cannot obtain otherwise? Alliances are binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations. The critical ingredients of a meaningful alliance are the shared recognition of common threats and a pledge to take action to counter them. To forge agreement, an alliance requires ongoing policy consultations that continually set expectations for allied behavior. In light of the amorphous nature of new security challenges, such consultations will be essential instruments of American leadership, especially with regard to building and maintaining consensus on ends and means. To generate the capacity to operate together, an alliance requires

Royal Saudi Land Forces and other coalition members roll through channel cleared of mines, Operation Desert Storm

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DOD (Dean M. Fox)

sustained preparations for combined action. In the past, such action has resided largely in the domain of military cooperation; in the future, it will extend to a broader set of collaborative activities that only recently have come to be understood as vital to national security.

Alliances can range in their obligations from the most expansive—"an attack on one is an attack on all"—to guarantees that are more limited in ambition. Across all alliances, the ideal is the creation of an entity in which the sum of cooperation between or among the participating states will be greater than the sheer arithmetic addition of the constituent parts. At a minimum, allies are expected to take into consideration the perspectives and interests of their partners as they make foreign and defense policy choices. The first impulse of allies should be to turn to one another for support; the last impulse should be to go without or around an ally, or to oppose and seek to thwart an ally's policy goals.

*the first impulse of allies should be to
turn to one another for support; the last impulse should be
to go without or around an ally*

Alliances also create incentives for reaching multinational consensus. In the most effective alliances, participants benefit from a central coordinating mechanism that structures consultations and enables horse trading. Allies do not consider each policy issue narrowly on its own merits but rather within the broader context of prior shared experience, concomitant items on the current agenda, and longer-term goals. Therefore, allies are constantly stimulated to consider how their interests dovetail with the interests of their partners in order to maximize support for their own priority initiatives.

It is instructive to contrast an alliance with the "coalition of the willing." The two are entirely different organisms with respect to the durability of the commitment and the breadth of cooperation, particularly in an era in which cooperation must go far beyond traditional military definitions. Indeed, the argument that alliances can be replaced with such impromptu arrangements derives from a failure to recognize one fundamental fact: the capabilities that have been fielded by these groupings are based almost entirely upon underlying alliance commitments that over decades have coordinated

national policies and prepared participants to operate effectively together on the battlefield. Recent coalitions of the willing have borrowed from investments made in long-standing alliances without acknowledging their debt.

What Does America Get from Alliances?

In the intensely interconnected security environment of the 21st century, the view espoused by some senior Bush administration officials, especially during the first term, that the costs of allies outweigh their benefits, is strategically flawed. Alliances are the antithesis of altruism or passivity: they are a highly self-interested instrument for advancing American national security. While it is self-evident that the United States should retain the right to defend itself, that old institutions must adapt to changing times, and that less formal arrangements can make a meaningful security contribution, America's national interests now require a greater investment than ever in

alliances. Going forward, the purpose of alliances must be fourfold:

- generate capabilities that amplify U.S. power
- create a basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power
- avert the impulse to counterbalance U.S. power
- steer partners away from strategic apathy or excessive self-reliance.

Generate Capabilities That Amplify U.S. Power. The initial phase of the Iraq War, with the rapid and high-intensity maneuver operations that few U.S. allies today are capable of undertaking, is often cited as an example of why traditional alliance relationships are no longer required or useful. This claim is wrong both with respect to Iraq itself and with regard to the underlying assumption that Iraq is the most likely model of future conflict. The involvement of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies on a national basis provided important (though not decisive) military support and was almost entirely dependent on the years of



USS Tarawa (Marvin Harris)

Sailor stands watch aboard
USS Tarawa at Jebel Ali, United
Arab Emirates

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doctrinal development, planning, equipping, and training undertaken by NATO members. Furthermore, the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was split over the decision to go to war and that key NATO allies such as France and Germany were unwilling to join in the military campaign severely reduced the multinational assistance available to the United States during the much longer and more costly postconflict phase of the effort.

The opening phase of the Iraq War is also not likely to be the dominant paradigm for the engagement of U.S. military power in the 21st century. While preparing for large-scale conventional and unconventional warfighting will remain necessary to enhance deterrence as well as to deploy force, America will face many threats that will not lend themselves to such robust military responses, much less unilateral ones. The short list of significant threats that the United States can neither prevent nor respond to alone includes attacks by terrorists armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons; widespread proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range delivery vehicles; stability operations in a growing number of failed states that are perfect petri dishes for extremist groups; and the rise of "new" transnational security challenges, such as pandemic disease. Each of these threats may grow in danger in relation to the growth of another; for example, the proliferation of WMD beyond the current nuclear weapons states makes it much more likely that terrorists will be able to obtain them.

To act preventively rather than react only after catastrophe, America needs an expanded toolkit that fully engages the capabilities of other countries as well as its own. Because the United States cannot hermetically seal its borders and cocoon itself within them, there are few scenarios in which it can respond effectively to these challenges without the sustained support of allies and partners.

An alliance can be distinguished from other kinds of cooperative relationships between or among nations by the existence of interoperable military capabilities that enhance prevention, provide deterrence, and contribute to effective defense. A fully evolved alliance is notable for its capability to undertake combined strategic planning, in which two or more nations' security establishments conduct threat assessments, anticipate future security needs, and commit to the development and implementation of a common program to meet the requirements generated by this process. Rather than scrambling to coordinate their capabilities in a crisis, allies can count on preparing to operate alongside one another.

Preparedness in the face of new security threats will require the expansion of strategic planning and coordination of effort across allied governments, involving agencies that previously did not consider themselves essential to national security. The day-to-day business of a meaningful future alliance will necessitate the collaboration of national security establishments, not just defense and military establishments. This will involve broader and deeper combined planning, training, and equipping of personnel—including those that do not belong to departments or ministries of defense—than has previously been achieved. To be fully effective, the United States will need to lead an effort to link agencies of government that have not engaged in sustained multinational collaborative activities and that have traditionally resisted "foreign" access. This is most notable in the need for sharing intelligence and fusing data in real time.

In the defense and intelligence domains, America's extraordinary technological prowess presents an additional challenge to the full integration of allied capabilities. It is hard for most militaries to fight alongside American forces.¹ Yet it is not in American interest for its allies to lack capabilities, to use such a deficit as an excuse not to join us in military action, or to be such a burden on the U.S. military that it resists taking allies along (as was the case in Afghanistan in 2001). The United States therefore needs to lead a continuing effort to improve interoperability and information connectivity with allies.

Create a Basis of Legitimacy for the Exercise of American Power. For the United States, the issue of legitimacy was largely dormant throughout the Cold War. America held the moral high ground; the enemy was repressive domestically and imperialistic abroad.

Occasionally, the United States chose to use its power in ways that strained relations with allies, such as at Suez in 1956 or during the Vietnam War, but never to the breaking point; what held its alliances together was so much more compelling than whatever centrifugal forces might be at work.

With traditional approaches to prevention, deterrence, and defense under siege, alliances offer the single most effective mechanism

Avert the Impulse to Counterbalance U.S. Power. As America's power has become ever more dominant, there is a growing inclination to seek to constrain U.S. unilateralism—to bind the American Gulliver.² The current effort to generate European Union foreign and defense policy competencies partially reflects the impulse to establish a counterweight to U.S. power. In Asia, U.S. dominance is also questioned by those who resent American



U.S. Navy (Edward N. Vasquez)

Participants boarding Russian KA-27 while U.S. Sailors secure area during joint humanitarian exercise *Passex '06*

for ensuring that American actions are perceived to be legitimate. Planning for and using American power in a multinational context enables the United States to build an updated consensus on when and how to use force. Acting without such international "cover" is increasingly problematic, both because it foments resistance to U.S. policies and because the United States needs the help of others to achieve its goals, especially in the arduous and extended aftermath of most military operations.

There is another way in which the legitimacy conferred by alliance relationships can either strengthen the U.S. hand or reduce its effectiveness. If America uses its power in ways that are perceived to respect international norms, it can bolster the global stature and influence of its allies. This creates a favorable climate for the pursuit of its national security goals. Conversely, if it chooses to act outside of its alliances, it undermines its allies' international standing, making it harder for them to support American policies. This makes it harder to achieve American objectives. Ultimately, the United States also risks diminishing the stature of leaders who are most closely identified with its policies, which can lead to their ouster and the election of governments less committed to cooperation.

influence and yearn to chart their own course, potentially in association with others seeking greater global stature, such as China. Washington's ability to preempt or mitigate such balancing behavior is considerably enhanced by transmitting its power through binational or multinational structures.

Steer Partners Away from Strategic Apathy or Excessive Self-Reliance. Another challenge facing the United States is the real danger that key allies will cease to believe that international security requires their active engagement. The end of the Cold War exacerbated latent tendencies in this direction, and the construction of a unified Europe has provided an internally oriented focal point for many over the past decade. Such a divergence of attention has begun to create a divergence of interests that undermines solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance. Across the globe and under different circumstances, long-standing American ties in the Republic of Korea are facing challenges, especially from a younger generation that feels no debt to the United States, with the potential to alter the security landscape in that region and beyond.

On the other end of the spectrum, countries whose security is not embedded in a network of steady relationships may be inclined

to pursue autarkic paths. For example, leaders feeling threatened and insecure may fan the flames of fanatical nationalism, leading some to revisit and possibly reverse their commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Do America's Alliances Meet Needs?

In 2006, the landscape of American commitments around the world—and the commitments that others have made to the United States—retains many of the features of the Cold War alliance system. These arrangements are neither systematic nor comprehensive. The durability of the old structures can be explained by several factors: the pent-up longing for association with the West that was finally requited after the collapse of the Soviet Union; the U.S.-led effort to redefine the missions of key alliances and partnerships in the 1990s; sheer inertia; and the fact that 15 years is a mere blip in human history, so that change may be under way but is as yet not entirely perceptible, especially because the generation that invested so much in Cold War institutions still retains some influence over the policy process in many allied countries.

as they once were on the American security guarantee. Second, it needs to spearhead a sustained initiative to reconcile the tension between the regional rootedness of its partnerships and the increasingly globalized nature of 21st-century security challenges. Third, America should work to expand its alliance relationships to encompass a wider set of governmental and nongovernmental capabilities that provide tools to respond to the full range of likely threats.

In the 20th century, Europe consumed the lion's share of America's international energies. Although conflicts in other regions of the world preoccupied the United States from time to time, Europe remained dominant in terms of the attention and resources that it absorbed and the partnership that it offered in support of U.S. policies. In the 21st century, other regions of the world command American interest and engagement. With Europe reunified, America is no longer riveted on its fate. So, too, Europeans believe that they no longer need to depend on the United States for their security as they did throughout the Cold War. The same may be said of American alliances in Asia. Overall,

the American Government, between the United States and key allies, and among alliances that span the globe. Alliances provide the political framework, the fundamental underpinning, to broad engagement across agencies that affect national security. It will be necessary to build up over time, both bilaterally and in multinational alliances, a dense network of interactions. This will be crucial in dealing with threats such as WMD proliferation and nonstate terrorism, which are less susceptible to traditional military tools and which require intimate cooperation across previously "domestic" structures such as departments of justice, treasury, health, and law enforcement. Old notions of protection of national intelligence assets are also severely challenged by the imperatives of addressing new threats, where the sharing of information on a timely basis may make the difference between life and death for millions.

How Does America Get There from Here?

An American alliance strategy would take a comprehensive, long-range view of national security requirements and would be multifaceted, multilayered, and multiyear. It would commit the United States to a four-pronged policy:

- build upon existing bilateral and multilateral alliance institutions, relationships, and capabilities
- promote the establishment of stronger ties that might become enduring alliances
- pursue peacetime security cooperation with countries that will not necessarily become formal allies
- utilize the full spectrum of cooperative international arrangements that complement alliances.

Build Upon Existing Bilateral and Multilateral Alliance Institutions, Relationships, and Capabilities. Even though polling data show a huge drop in public support for American policies and doubts about America's role in the world, goodwill—and a preference to work constructively together—remains prevalent among older elites that have invested much in ties with the United States. For younger generations, American behavior in the next few years will profoundly influence whether they see Washington's leadership as benign or malign.

two major sets of alliance relationships are discernable: one cluster in Europe, and one in Asia

Looking at the globe, two major sets of alliance relationships are discernable: one cluster in Europe, and one in Asia. They are vastly different in structure and in content. In addition, the United States maintains close security ties with countries in other regions, including Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. What is most striking is that there is no overarching framework for America's relationships abroad and that unparalleled U.S. power does not necessarily translate into the ability to achieve American security goals. In the Cold War, security analysts used to worry about a "strategy-force mismatch." Now they should be at least equally concerned about the "power-influence mismatch."

While the array of relationships that exists today provides a strong foundation for the exercise of American influence, it needs to evolve in several critical dimensions in order to meet present and future needs. First, the United States must take into account the fact that its allies are no longer as dependent

the tables are slowly turning: In the future, the United States—all powerful in one dimension but often hamstrung by its very might—might depend more rather than less on its allies in Europe and Asia to achieve its global goals.

Further challenging existing maps and mindsets, the United States is now faced with the phenomenon of globalization in all its dimensions. Though the most precise definition is an economic one, globalization has significant implications in the security domain, with consequences for threats as well as responses. With respect to alliances, it compels rethinking of some of the fundamentals. In the face of transnational dangers, alliances will need to be defined in broader terms than the classical geographically based model. Transregional linkages among allies and alliances will need to be forged in response to the fact that many 21st-century threats are global rather than regional in nature.

Effective security cooperation now necessitates a much wider embrace of governmental functions. This is true within

The Bush administration needs to undertake a major effort to renew America's most important bilateral relationships. Spanning the globe, from Turkey to the Republic of Korea, from Brazil to Poland, a systematic and sustained commitment to listening to allies is urgently required. Consultation must be more than just informing counterparts of predetermined American positions; it must take their perspectives into consideration while policies are being formulated. Genuine give and take is crucial to achieving consensus on threats and responses. Furthermore, these bilateral ties are also the essential building blocks of multinational alliances.

Given the pace of globalization, it makes sense to ask whether the existing regionally based alliance structures are outdated. To a certain extent, geography is still destiny, and the neighborhood in which a state exists will play a great part in shaping its security perspective and in determining its participation in alliances. But to be relevant to the full range of real and potential security challenges, alliances must increasingly be functionally oriented. NATO has already taken note of this important trend and has transformed itself, moving from a strict definition of its theater of operations to common acceptance that its only meaningful missions will most likely be "out of area."

Extending this concept further, NATO should pursue a greater degree of interface and potential formal coordination with other countries, groups, and organizations. Already, some of this is taking place, with mechanisms such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Southeast Europe Initiative, in discussions of expanded linkages with Australia, Israel, and Japan, and in structured partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. However, there is no overarching conceptual framework for these arrangements. The evolution of mechanisms for marrying NATO's competencies with the European Union's potential will also be critical.³

In Asia, U.S. interests dictate the maintenance of a robust diplomatic, economic, and military presence. In the cases of Japan and the Republic of Korea, it is preferable to wrestle with disagreements within the context of an alliance relationship than to succumb to pressures that would cast either one of them strategically adrift. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. forces in both countries helps prevent either from feeling isolated in playing its role as an American ally. Should

the U.S. presence be drastically reduced or terminated in one, pressures would likely mount in the other to follow suit. As China plays an increasingly shrewd game in the region, cultivating opportunities to enhance its power in ways that may diminish the U.S. role, America's Asian alliances become all the more significant.⁴ They are also necessary building blocks for collective responses to global security challenges.

Looking to the longer term, the United States should seek to establish a worldwide network of key allies, with the objective of creating an alliance of alliances. This would permit bridge-building between and among existing institutional arrangements and would facilitate linkages with organizations such as the Group of Eight, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the United Nations, marrying competencies in diplomacy, economics, and defense.

Promote the Establishment of Stronger Ties That Might Become Enduring Alliances. A U.S. alliance strategy that maximizes the benefits of enduring relationships would not only seek to strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements but also attempt to advance the development of relationships that currently fall short of alliance status. For a variety of reasons, it will most likely not be realistic to offer or ask for guarantees similar to NATO's Article V, but the United States can and should pursue the institutionalization of security cooperation with a number of countries.

In identifying potential allies, the United States should consider factors including governance, geography, regional stature, and potential for meaningful security cooperation. Based on these standards, America should continue the development of fuller security ties with India. With a capable professional military under firm civilian control—setting it apart from many of its neighbors—and major modernization programs under way, India has the potential to be a highly competent military partner. Much progress has been made in this direction in the past 5 years, but much more is possible. Inevitably, the pursuit of enhanced ties with India will complicate the relationship with Pakistan, and while this dynamic must be well managed, it should not stand in the way of the fruition of an important alliance relationship. Other countries that present opportunities for the advancement of bilateral security cooperation with a view toward

the establishment of more formal alliance ties include Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa.

In the multilateral domain, the absence of a security cooperation mechanism is most striking in Asia. The United States has played a major stabilizing role in the region since the end of World War II and has relied heavily on bilateral relationships to achieve its security goals. Historic and current rivalries among regional powers have been a major obstacle to the establishment of institutionalized multinational cooperation. Yet the need is greater than ever for a mechanism that provides a regular forum for consultation, policy coordination, crisis management, and response.

Pursue Peacetime Security Cooperation with Countries That Will Not Necessarily Become Formal Allies. A much undervalued U.S. policy instrument involves the pursuit of peacetime security cooperation with countries whose orientation and future may be uncertain. Correctly conceived and executed, such efforts can reduce suspicion, build confidence, and encourage reform; they can also lay the foundations for prospective partnership and potential alliance relationships. These kinds of investments require U.S. policymakers to look beyond the immediate requirements of national security. Also, they necessitate sustained engagement and taking a genuine interest in the perspectives and concerns of other countries.

Such initiatives are usually low in cost but offer the possibility of big payoffs if they are conceptually sound and pursued with sensitivity and discretion. A leading example took place a decade ago in Central Asia. Looking at maps of the world, senior Pentagon officials noted that what had been considered the underbelly of the Soviet Union was now accessible and without firm geopolitical orientation. A subsequent, relatively modest program to establish bilateral and multilateral security ties with these countries literally redefined the borders of Europe so that newly independent states adjacent to Afghanistan and Iran became members of NATO's Partnership for Peace and offered basing rights to the United States after 9/11.

Today, there are a variety of countries in the world with whom discreet, substantive security cooperation—such as in preventing proliferation or interdicting terrorist activity—can contribute to shaping positive perceptions. In some cases, these initiatives will establish patterns of behavior that might ultimately take



President George W. Bush commends coalition forces at Saddam's former presidential palace

U.S. Navy (Dorell Crandall)

on the characteristics of an alliance. In others, they may not lead to such close ties but will nevertheless anchor participants in activities that serve their own security interests as well as contribute to American goals, demonstrating the rewards of partnership to both sides. In less felicitous cases, they provide American policymakers with valuable early warning about deteriorating domestic conditions, derailments in bilateral relations, or looming sources of conflict.

Utilize the Full Spectrum of Cooperative International Arrangements That Complement Alliances. An effective American alliance strategy would be complemented and indeed strengthened by the recognition that alliances will not fulfill *all* U.S. national security needs and that other arrangements may be more appropriate in specific circumstances. The informal approach to multilateralism has sound roots: During the Cold War, for example, the United States and its NATO allies found that out-of-area challenges, beyond the formal domain of allied commitment, were often best met through ad hoc arrangements that drew upon the political foundation and military preparedness of the Alliance structure but did not burden the allies with reaching agreement to or participation in action by all members.⁵ A leading contemporary case of such cooperation was the first Gulf War, for which the United States organized a multinational coalition that drew upon NATO assets outside the formal Alliance framework and also involved non-NATO nations. The Combined Joint Task Force model developed in the mid-1990s to create a vehicle for those NATO members with the will and capability to take action beyond the European theater is an example of available synergies between existing alliance structures and less formal arrangements.

In the diplomatic realm, informal coalitions have been devised to address specific policy challenges, and “contact groups” have been created for ongoing conflict resolution efforts such as the Middle East peace process and the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Furthermore, processes such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea have facilitated engagement with interested parties on an issue of vital national security concern to the United States. Finally, the Proliferation Security Initiative has created a new model of cooperation for a specific international security challenge: interdicting the transit of materials and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These examples suggest the range of additional possibilities available to an American administration that seeks to exploit opportunities for international support.

Less formal structures, however, do not supplant more formal arrangements. Indeed, the success of informal undertakings will depend in large part on the vitality and durability of the bilateral and multilateral ties the United States maintains and cultivates. Decisions about participation in such ad hoc groupings will continue to be made on a case-by-case basis in national capitals. Multilateral alliances can generate momentum and incentives for supporting American initiatives that are being pursued through more informal processes.

To achieve an enduring sense of common interest and purpose, it will not be sufficient to flex American power and expect others to fall in line. The United States must find ways to transform its power into a magnetic force that draws peoples and nations to its goals. It will not serve American national security interests to disparage multilateralism or to abandon the pursuit of enduring ties in the illusory hope that less formal arrangements will provide both flexibility and sustained support.

The United States must rebuild its alliances and innovate a new kind of connectivity across countries, institutions, and regions that results in a broad-based alliance system that is far greater than the sum of its disparate parts. The United States must also remain committed to making it possible for foreign forces to operate capably alongside American troops and to establishing mechanisms that permit more effective security cooperation with international institutions and nongovernmental organizations.

Day in and day out, the default mode must be to work with allies to get things done. In the short run it may be easier to go it alone. However, foreign and defense policies are measured not only by how they respond to present requirements but also by whether they create the conditions for a safer future. A strategic approach to American alliances will enable the United States to translate its unique power into effective global influence that genuinely enhances American national security. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999); and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” in *Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future*, ed. Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 235–264.

² For an insightful and enduring treatment of the challenge that America’s unrivaled power poses to its foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver’s Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968).

³ A number of useful ideas for linking the United States, NATO, and the European Union are offered by Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, *What New Transatlantic Institutions?* Centre for European Reform Bulletin 41 (April/May 2005), available at <http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/41_grant_leonard.html>.

⁴ Several new structures have emerged in Asia, some of which involve the United States but some of which pointedly do not. Americans do participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which deals principally with economics, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, a vehicle for Asia-Pacific security dialogue. The newest entrant is the Six Party Talks, established in 2003 to address North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, involving the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and both North and South Korea. In stark contrast, ASEAN Plus Three, a process involving Southeast Asian nations along with China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which involves China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (and which recently extended observer status to India, Iran, and Pakistan), do not accord Americans a place at the table.

⁵ Elizabeth D. Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 184–187.

Theater Civil Affairs Soldiers A Force at Risk

By WILLIAM R. FLORIG

The future of the joint civil affairs (CA) force looks bleak. If drastic measures are not taken, this unique capability will soon be a shadow of its former self. To make it relevant for the nationbuilding operations of the future, the Active force needs to be greatly expanded while the Reserve Component must be right-sized and realigned to reflect recruiting and membership realities that are part of Reserve life. Establishing a habitual relationship with a combatant command is the way ahead for this expanded CA force, without all the bureaucratic layers of headquarters that get in the way.

The best proposal to fix the civil affairs force is an Active Component expansion to five larger battalions assigned to the combatant commands, and the creation of a smaller, more capable Reserve CA force aligned with these battalions. Without steps to alleviate the stress on the Reserve Component civil affairs force, it will cease to be relevant or effective.

The Problem

Since September 11, 2001, Army and Marine Corps civil affairs forces have undergone tremendous stress because of operational deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army Reserve provides a large percentage of CA Soldiers today, with the Marine Corps adding a small force from the Marine Reserve. Because of Presidential call-up to execute the war on terror, mobilizing future civil affairs forces for regional contingencies and supporting combatant commanders' theater strategies are jeopardized. To overcome operating tempo

and mobilization constraints, Active duty CA battalions should be created and allocated to support geographic combatant commanders. These battalions must be larger than current proposals call for and assigned directly to the combatant commanders. The Reserve CA force must also be redesigned and downsized to reflect recruiting and retention realities.

Four years of sustained combat operations have had a telling effect on both the Army Active and Reserve Component civil affairs units. The Army's only Active duty CA unit, the recently expanded 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, has seen a heavy operating tempo. This battalion consists of six companies that are regionally oriented and focused on a combatant commander's theater of operations. The force is adequate for short duration contingency operations and has served its purpose well. But for long conflicts such as the war on terror, these companies are overtaxed and too often must be reallocated to cover shortfalls in other theaters. Stated an executive officer of one of the companies concerning the constant deployment of the 96th, "You're either there, you just got home, or you're getting ready to go."¹

The secondary effect of replacing other regionally focused companies in-theater is that they eventually lose their regional specialization due to focus on one theater only. This robs other combatant commanders of the CA experts required to execute their own operations and to support the Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

A striking example occurred during Operation *Unified Assistance*, the tsunami relief effort led by U.S. Pacific Command

(USPACOM) from December 26, 2004, to February 21, 2005. During this relief effort, the 96th could muster only 18 Soldiers for the operation out of an authorized strength of 48. The shortage was due to recurrent deployments and augmentation of civil affairs companies attached to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for operations in Iraq. This lack of rapid reaction CA capability forced to request Reserve Component forces, which were already stretched to the breaking point. If the entire 96th had been available, a strong capability could have been established in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Requested Reserve forces were not used because the Secretary of Defense decided not to leave any U.S. forces in the affected countries after the initial relief effort was complete.

Furthermore, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion can rarely field more than 2 civil affairs teams per quarter to assist with the entire USPACOM area of responsibility, which consists of 43 countries, 20 territories and possessions, and 10 American territories. When those teams are in-theater, they are focused exclusively on the USPACOM commander's priority in regard to the war on terror, leaving no capability for additional theater engagement. Instead, these teams should have the focus of an entire battalion, with 4 companies and 20 civil affairs teams for regular use and rotation in-theater in support of the commander. Additionally, included in the USPACOM theater are Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that receive scant civil affairs support to shape the environment and build host-nation capacity to combat terrorism.

Civil Affairs Realities

But why build more Active Component capability at greater cost when we have such a large Reserve Component force to draw from? Unfortunately, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have left the Reserve civil affairs force in a broken state that will take years to repair. Writing in *Army*, Mark Kimmey argues for Active Component expansion and analyzes why the Reserve Component is not the solution to continued joint CA support for lengthy conflicts or peacetime theater support.²

Kimmey believes the Army Reserve civil affairs force has done a tremendous job in Afghanistan and Iraq despite personnel and resource constraints, but the current force is past the breaking point. During the last 3 years of mobilizations, for instance, nearly every available CA Soldier was mobilized and spent

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a year or more in Iraq or Afghanistan. These Reservists have civilian jobs and cannot mobilize for successive years. Deployment stresses are just beginning to be seen, and many skilled civil affairs Soldiers will likely leave the force and take their irreplaceable skills with them due to the high operating tempo. A Reservist cannot participate in successive mobilizations without risking both career and family.³

Currently, Reserve CA specialties are too frequently filled with Soldiers who have little if any experience in the necessary skill sets. Education and language abilities, for example, are lacking. For years, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command has claimed that CA skills are so specialized that they can only be found in the Reserve force. This idea has been oversold to the Army and the Department of Defense as a whole. Very rarely are the specialized teams filled with officers or noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who can do the job.

The Reserve force is composed of civil affairs generalists, not specialists. Too often units are happy just to have bodies of the correct rank to fill slots, regardless of the civilian skills brought to the table. According to Kimmey, “CA officers and NCOs are currently pressed into jobs they might know something about, but too often we expect a Reservist who works for a bank to know how to set up a banking system. It should be obvious that this does not work very well.”⁴

With the current focus on USCENTCOM, the language skills of our civil affairs forces, both Active and Reserve, are also eroding. During Operation *Unified Assistance*, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, anticipating operations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, could provide only one linguist in the Bahasa language for Indonesia, and no Sinhalese or Tamil speakers for Sri Lanka. The rest of the teams had no useful language skills except Thai, in which the need was minimal. CA forces are much less useful downrange without language skills.

In Iraq, moreover, the United States often relies on host-nation or contract personnel instead of civil affairs Soldiers to provide language support. These interpreters are often of questionable value, wasting time and losing things in translation. The Reserve forces simply have too few linguists trained and even fewer ready to commit to the year or more away from career and family to learn a language of use to DOD only—a deficiency that must be corrected.

Equipment has been another problem for mobilizing Army Reserve CA battalions for *Iraqi Freedom*. While the only Active Component CA battalion (the 96th) had the latest weapons, communications, and vehicles, the Reserve battalions initially did not have the state-of-the-art communications equipment or command and control systems used by regular units. Personnel did not even see these systems until they drew them in-theater, and few operators were trained before arrival. Also, the battalions did not have the shorter M4 carbine so essential for firing from confined spaces in vehicular and urban operations. The bottom line is that the Reserve battalions could not communicate with their regular Army counterparts and had inadequate weaponry for all but the smallest, short-duration firefights.

More generally, there is a wide gap in military education between Reserve CA leaders and their Active counterparts. This is also the case with training. Reservists receive only 24 training days yearly, much of it administratively oriented and poorly resourced, and 2 weeks of unit annual training. That cannot compare with the time, quality, and resources dedicated to Active Component training. The education and training issues are hardly the fault of the Reserve Component. Reservists do their best, given time and resource constraints, but their effort is still inadequate to provide the quality of support required by modern warfare and nationbuilding.

By spring 2005, after the fourth civil affairs command was mobilized, it was apparent that the CA force was in trouble. For 2 years, units were sent into theater as composite organizations filled ad hoc with Soldiers from up to 10 other CA units. The practice of “in-lieu-of sourcing” became commonplace and called for the creation of civil affairs Soldiers from other Army branches and other Service components, sending them to a 2-week course with limited additional specialized training. Due to a lack of qualified personnel, some Soldiers have already performed multiyear rotations, but this is not an option for most Reservists. To fill a fifth rotation of wartime CA units, the Secretary of Defense’s last option is either to remobilize involuntarily most of the personnel who served during the first year of the war or throw together more marginally competent composite units. This is politically untenable and is not in touch with the reality of the exhaustion of the civil affairs force.

The Marine Corps’ 3^d and 4th Civil Affairs Groups (CAGs), approximately 400

Marines, make up the all-Reserve Marine CA force. They have been deployed continuously since the war on terror began in 2001. The Marines decided to expand the force just for the Iraq conflict by creating the 5th and 6th CAGs of nearly 200 personnel, who arrived in Iraq to support the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Sandra Erwin writes, “The Marine Corps created the 5th CAG for this deployment to ease the deployment cycles of the 3^d and 4th CAGs and to create additional civil affairs assets. The unit was established in late 2004 and shipped down to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, for training from January until February 2005.”⁵ The creation of a composite 5th CAG demonstrates how worn out the Marine civil affairs Reservists are. Of note, these CAGs will be disbanded once their mission in Iraq is complete. In the end, if the Army were serious about supporting all of DOD with CA forces, the Marines would not need CAGs.

The Way Ahead

Current proposals by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command reflect a simple expansion of the Active duty CA force to four battalions with the creation of a brigade headquarters, a mere doubling of the current Active Component force. While a step in the right direction, this proposal contains no innovative attempts to transform civil affairs or its command and control. It is also predicated on budget constraints and personnel caps. To provide a capable, expanded CA force for the future, DOD and the Army need to discover where excess legacy capability is located in the Active and Reserve Components to build this more

U.S. Marine Corps 3^d Civil Affairs Group patrols Harwan, Iraq, during humanitarian mission

FEATURE



Soldiers from 478th Civil Affairs Battalion unload furniture donated to school in Dominican Republic, Exercise *New Horizons 2006*

U.S. Army South (Miguel A. Negron)

capable force. The stressed Reserve force needs to be downsized while this Active Component model is expanded to meet future nationbuilding challenges.

Creation of the civil-military operations center capability at the company level needs to remain in the battalion structure; however, each of the CA teams should be expanded to 8 personnel—an additional 512 Soldiers. This will ensure that the teams can operate in places such as Iraq, where force protection conditions demand eight or more Soldiers to embark on an operation. It will not require conventional commanders or Special Forces teams to commit their valuable assets to protect the team. The current four-man structure is insufficient to operate autonomously.

In addition, a fifth battalion should be created, adding 197 more Soldiers attached to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). This battalion would be the initial surge capability for any of the four geographic combatant commands in a contingency or war. The USSOCOM battalion should have a company servicing each Special Forces team that is regionally aligned with the theater Special Operations Command, and the focus of the company should be specific to Special Operations Forces and complement the regional battalion, allowing it to focus on the war on terror and Theater Security Cooperation Plan events for the geographic combatant commander's theater strategy.

The creation of a brigade headquarters, the 95th CA Brigade, is also a problematic part of the current proposal. In a major regional contingency, it is unlikely that the command and control structure of 96 Soldiers will be deployed or needed by a geographic combatant command, and in the event of multiple

conflicts, its effectiveness is limited. The role of the brigade headquarters is to provide command, control, communications, computers, and information management capability and to plan, coordinate, and enable operational/strategic level stabilization and reconstruction, focused on the national (civil) center of gravity. In addition, it must provide rapidly deployable, plug-and-play, civil affairs planning

teams and have the ability to receive and fuse civil information from units into a tactical/strategic-level common operational picture.⁶ In fact, this Army proposal could be used in-theater for a year at most.


Transforming Civil Affairs

Instead, a simpler design is one that will place the more than 15 civil-military operations planners and staff in a more robust cell. Rather than the brigade headquarters arriving in-theater, unfamiliar with the culture and strategy of a combatant command, the geographic combatant command or the Army Special Operations Command cells would be

there as part of the organic staff and participate in deliberate and crisis action planning habitually in theater (see figure). This design would pay tremendous dividends, as these Soldiers would be familiar with the theater, its major plans, and all the civil-military operations staff.

Interagency players such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should have permanent positions at the regional combatant commands under the auspices of a joint interagency coordination group to magnify the effectiveness of the civil affairs staff and command and control element. Once in-theater for war or a contingency, the regionally aligned CA battalion would be attached to the combatant command and under operational control of the commander of the Army Special Operations Command as directed by the combatant command. For administration and service support, the unit would be garrisoned by the Army theater component. This institutionalized relationship would be priceless.

The role of the Active Component CA brigade should be limited to that of force provider and trainer only. It is difficult to fathom how this brigade, as proposed by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, could seriously stay in meaningful contact with five combatant commands while training and maintaining the



Active Component battalions, which should be their primary focus.

Basing-in-theater is not discussed in current plans for transformation. Habitual, mutually supportive relationships simply cannot be maintained from North Carolina. The idea of stationing all five battalions at Fort Bragg is senseless if their purpose is to support the geographic combatant commands; each battalion should be garrisoned near its respective command. The USPACOM battalion, for instance, should be in Hawaii. Getting the battalions away from Fort Bragg would allow them to maintain an unparalleled relationship with the commands. The first step now should be to move the 96th and 97th Battalions' companies in the next 24 to 36 months to bases close to their geographic combatant command and start building from there.

The stationing and assignment of an Active Component civil affairs battalion with each command would have great benefits for the theater commander. With 20 civil affairs teams and 5 civil-military operations centers per company, the regional combatant command could place 5 or more civil affairs teams downrange quarterly in target countries. These teams could monitor and execute humanitarian assistance projects with the host nation and ensure that host-nation forces are trained and monies are properly spent. This synchronized joint and combined effort maximizes resources and contributes to changing population attitudes in ongoing insurgencies. Over time it should prove to targeted populations that the United States is not only friendly but also genuinely interested in their welfare.

Long-term repetitive involvement of the same companies and Soldiers with the host nation will build lasting relationships and trust that we currently do not have the luxury to cultivate. This is also true of the interagency process. The U.S. Agency for International Development, for instance, is the biggest player the non-DOD U.S. Government has in counterinsurgency. Its spending dwarfs any of the humanitarian assistance programs of the geographic combatant commands. Too often, however, military humanitarian assistance projects are not synchronized or linked with anything that USAID and host-nation agencies are doing. Theater civil affairs Soldiers could and would make this synchronization a reality.

To be effective, the Reserve civil affairs force structure needs reengineering. It is unrealistic to expand this force when the Army



Fleet Combat Camera Group, Pacific (Bart A. Bauer)

Civil affairs Soldier speaks with Iraqi civilians through interpreter

Reserve had problems filling the units it had before the war on terror began. Rarely was a CA battalion filled to more than 70 percent strength, and of that, only 50 to 75 percent was qualified to deploy. The expanded force of 28 battalions should be cut back to 20 or fewer, and the remaining battalions should reflect the units that have had high unit strengths and no problems filling positions.

Civil affairs battalions in remote rural areas should be disbanded and moved to population centers to recruit the diverse peoples who speak the languages that are so needed in the field. Units that have failed should fold their colors to free up slots for other units and the Active Component. To assist in filling out the new Active battalions' quality Reserve Component, NCOs and junior officers should be drawn into Active duty with incentives. The 20 Reserve battalions should be apportioned to provide surge capability and continual reinforcement capability to the combatant commander. In addition, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command should be eliminated and turned into a training center and school for all things related to civil affairs and civil-military operations. This should eliminate another bureaucratic level in the chain of command and facilitate the relationship between civil affairs battalions and their combatant commands.

Reserve civil affairs units should be assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Command, where they could be manned, trained, and equipped like all other Army Reserve units. The assignment of CA Reserve forces under U.S. Special Operations Command never truly

worked and is the direct contributor to the fraying of this fine force. Current U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command expansion plans for the Active Component units take us into the middle of the next decade. That is far too slow to meet current and emerging needs that might arise if the United States continues nationbuilding. An interim solution should call for basing the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade's respective companies with their combatant commands now and assigning the Reserve Component civil affairs command with all subordinate units who, in turn, report directly to the theater army to support the combatant command. If current trends continue, the Reserve civil affairs force will shatter and the Active Component expansion will proceed too slowly to be effective in the midterm. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Donna Miles, "Civil Affairs Mission Continues to Grow in Iraq, Afghanistan," Armed Forces Press Service, April 29, 2004, 1-3.

² Mark Kimmey, "Transforming Civil Affairs," *Army* 55, no. 3 (March 2005).

³ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Sandra I. Erwin, "Civil Affairs: As Demands for Nation-Building Troops Soar, Leaders Ponder Reorganization," *National Defense* 39 (May 2005).

⁶ Ritchie Moore and Mike Warmack, "Civil Affairs (CA) Transformation," presentation to the Joint Special Operations University's Joint Civil-Military Operations Course, March 24, 2005.

NATO Stability Teams

The Next Stage of Capability Development

By ANNE M. MOISAN and JENNIFER D.P. MORONEY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has achieved important strides in capabilities since the Prague and Istanbul Summits: the first functional NATO command, Allied Command Transformation, was stood up; the NATO Response Force is on track for full operational capability in fall 2006; deployable headquarters realignment is complete; new missions out of area have been taken on; completion of Stabilization Force, Bosnia, and turnover of the mission to the European Union (EU) have occurred; and training help has been provided for Iraqis. In addition, current operations in or in support of Afghanistan and Iraq, preparations for United Nations (UN) negotiations on the final status of Kosovo, and the search for a peaceful resolution to the Iran nuclear standoff are forcing the Allies to redefine NATO's core missions and to find ways to reenergize the transatlantic link. Likewise, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Madrid train bombing, and the transit blasts in London have led to new types of missions, brought new meaning to Article V in combating terrorism, and raised questions about the NATO role in Transatlantic Homeland Security. With the dramatic shift in operational requirements to stabilization and reconstruction missions, the need to counter terrorism, and the prospect of expanded missions in homeland defense and support to civil authorities in homeland security, the demand for combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS)-type capabilities has increased exponentially.


Despite all it has accomplished, NATO is now approaching Act II of this 21st-century

drama, where transformation faces critical new challenges. From the strain of supporting out-of-area deployments in the Balkans and Afghanistan, and with the growth of stabilization and reconstruction missions, counterterrorism operations, and prospective support to civil authorities in homeland security, the demand for combat support and combat service support type capabilities highlights a severe capabilities gap. The need for a new and broader approach to addressing expeditionary and homeland defense missions, as well as more inventive ways of dealing with new partners and Allies, is clear as we approach the next stage in this evolution of Alliance transformation. To meet these challenges, this article proposes the development of NATO Stability Teams.

Strategic and Capabilities Gaps

The Atlantic Alliance continues to face a gap between its strategic vision of a full range of missions, promoting stability, and the abilities and willingness of member governments to follow through with shared risks, burdens, and responsibilities. In order to maintain Alliance cohesion and effectiveness, it is generally preferable to have the widest possible participation of Allies and partners in major missions. As a result, it is imperative to address capability requirements broadly enough to be comprehensive, while still allowing the fullest participation by individual Allies and partners. To this end, this article suggests a new approach for the Alliance to maximize constructive participation—focusing on the area where global partnering, expeditionary capabilities, and transatlantic homeland security intersect.

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NATO personnel prepare to unload relief supplies in Pakistan

30th Space Communications Squadron (Barry Loo)



U.S. Marines set to train with NATO allies and Guinean Rangers in West Africa

U.S. Marine Corps (Joseph N. Lomangino)

Over the last 10 years, NATO has devised numerous initiatives and programs to address partnering. In response to the immediate post-Cold War demand for Central and Eastern European membership, it crafted the Partnership for Peace (PFP). The PFP program allowed the Alliance to deal with fear of a resurgent Russia and to promote internal reform and democratization among the states of the former Soviet Union. The establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994¹ provided the Alliance a mechanism for political and security consultations and for limited practical cooperation with northern African and eastern Mediterranean states. NATO efforts mirrored the European Union's Barcelona Process and the new European Neighborhood programs to effectively incorporate allies and friends under a new structural relationship. Unfortunately, these programs have met with mixed reviews. Tellingly, partners have remarked that they see no measurable improvement in participation, prospects for integration, and especially additional capabilities.

Since the 2002 Prague Summit, the failure of European Allies to improve expeditionary capabilities is especially evident in the areas of strategic airlift; air-to-air refueling; precision weapons; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR); and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) defenses. The United States and the few European Allies with significant force modernization programs have focused on capabilities which are "high-end technology," expensive, and have acquisition lead times of 10 to 15 years. Identified but often overlooked are the more basic, less expensive, and even more critical combat support/combat service support-type capabilities such as engineering, medical, transportation/trucking, civil affairs, explosive ordnance, and military police. The ensuing security and capabilities gap and the need for a new and broader approach to addressing expeditionary and homeland defense capabilities are key points for the Allies to consider at the Riga Summit in 2006. This article proposes that Act II, the next stage in capability evolution, should be the development of NATO Stability Teams.

Enlarging the Player Base

NATO Stability Teams (NSTs) would be flexible and mobile teams ranging from 20 to 100 personnel organized to leverage

the comparative advantages of host countries to address humanitarian/civilian/military capabilities requirements. These teams could respond to crisis management scenarios and natural and humanitarian disasters, as well as act as enablers for transatlantic homeland security missions. The development of NSTs would provide a unique venue for NATO to constructively address all three integrating elements of transformation. Simply put, NSTs would allow the Alliance to operationalize partnering, expeditionary efforts, and capabilities, as well as focus on capabilities critical to homeland security operational requirements. The teams would provide a real opportunity for all members, including small Allies, new members, and PFP and Mediterranean Dialogue partners, to make an operational contribution to the Alliance if they choose. NSTs would tailor partnering to emphasize the existing comparative advantages of these members and increase opportunities for their participation in operations, diversifying and enlarging the player base, and eliminating "free riders." In addition, NSTs would utilize light, more easily deployable civilian, humanitarian, and military-type units in the overall mix of capabilities at little to no cost to participating countries, while filling critical security and capability gaps for NATO requirements.

After the less-than-satisfactory result of the Defense Capabilities Initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment encouraged members to pursue niche capabilities and a shorter, more focused list of multinational efforts to fill gaps in strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, precision weapons, C⁴ISR, and WMD defenses. Up to now, the emphasis has been on high technology, long acquisition lead-time capabilities, and, by extension, Allies with a higher level of capability and defense resourcing. However, in addition to the well-known requirements for enhanced capabilities in these high-end areas, many CS/CSS-type capabilities are also critically needed but have received little emphasis. This article considers how less-capable or resource-constrained Allies and partners can contribute to NATO transformation and win public support for their efforts. In short, what factors might motivate these partners to take a lead in developing CS/CSS-type capabilities for specific missions?

Expeditionary operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq have shown the importance of support capabilities to a variety of missions. Combating terrorism,

counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and nation-building are all people- and skill-intensive areas where new members and European partners can continue to make significant contributions and a wider circle of partners could provide selected skills. Counterterrorism and information technology security experts, along with critical infrastructure protection specialists, specialized medical facilities, and emergency responders, are fields where European resources generally match or exceed U.S. capabilities.²

CS/CSS-type capabilities support peacekeeping, humanitarian and assistance (to include search and rescue operations), and stability and reconstruction missions, and are critical to NATO transformation. Overall, new mixes of Active military, paramilitary, and civilian response forces are required to ensure that transformation can address current and future threats. But in addition to high-technology systems, CS/CSS-type capabilities such as military police, combat and civil engineers, service support units, and transportation units are just a few examples of transformational capabilities that are currently gapped. Highly motivated Allies and partners could provide these critical capabilities that directly support growing NATO, EU, and UN mission requirements.

The Alliance should assist its members and friends in the development of CS/CSS-type capabilities that serve a dual use—that are useful domestically for homeland security and that at the same time complement NATO's high-end expeditionary capabilities. Most if not all CS/CSS capabilities can serve a dual purpose and may be attractive for potential partners to nationally develop and showcase. NSTs can be developed among the less-capable Allies and partners in the following transformation priority areas:

- chemical corps
- military police/constabulary corps
- engineering (construction, etc.)
- medical
- transportation corps
- ordnance corps (demining).

The benefit of developing functional NSTs is based on overall assumptions about NATO and what motivates individual partners. First, the target audience we seek to motivate is new members and partners, including the Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, and Adriatic Charter

countries. These countries already have CS/CSS-type capabilities to varying degrees, or have indicated a willingness to develop them in support of NATO operations. As a result, NATO will not have to motivate some partners to develop altogether new capabilities, meaning these countries will require no large-scale investment. Third, new Allies can be motivated to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and search and rescue operations under a NATO, EU, or UN umbrella for a variety of compelling reasons. Motivation can be a promised or enhanced capability or the prospect of international prestige through showcasing a capability. Of course, showcasing an NST capability can have varying motivational effects based on whether having the capability enhances the country's international or Alliance prestige or provides it a more weighted input on coalition operational decisions. Finally, developing and enhancing NST capabilities constructively support NATO transformation goals, which can be a motivator for Allies as well as for candidates for membership or closer association.

These assumptions suggest several benefits a country gains by developing NSTs within the Alliance:

- Having a particular CS/CSS-type capability would allow less-capable or resource-constrained partners with NATO equities to improve their prestige in an area where they have expertise.
- Developing NSTs would enable partners to modernize their force structures a piece at a time, since resource or political constraints preclude substantial modernization in the short term.
- NSTs capabilities have strong domestic utility.

From the Alliance perspective, the benefits of developing NSTs are:

- Teams could reinforce the concept of equal partnership.
- Less-capable or more resource-constrained Allies and partners can make a real contribution and even take a leadership role in a gapped capability for transformation, helping preserve NATO's military relevance.
- NSTs can support all three themes of Alliance transformation, including partnering, expeditionary capabilities development, and transatlantic homeland security enhancement.

The above benefits of developing NSTs lead to a framework for leaders and policymakers to analyze the importance of the specific capabilities to both the Alliance and to individual new Allies and partners. After consulting subject matter experts from RAND, the National Defense University, and the Joint Staff on each CS/CSS capability, we first rated each capability from 1 to 5 (with 5 being the highest) according to its criticality to specific missions, which we considered as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance (to include search and rescue), and enablers for search and rescue operations. Using the same scale, we then considered how the capability supports overall transformation goals. We then averaged the criticality factor with the goals under the heading "Importance to NATO." Second, we rated motivational factors for partners according to the 1 to 5 scheme (with 5 being the highest motivation): dual use, international utility and prestige, and support to military transformation at a national level. We averaged these factors under the heading "Importance to Partner."

Comparing the importance of developing CS/CSS-type capabilities to the Alliance and the individual Allies and partners, the capabilities almost always ranked as vital from both perspectives. Only for transportation corps, which scored slightly lower in importance to the partner, was there some divergence. In this exercise, medical ranked the highest of CS/CSS capabilities analyzed, closely followed by engineers/military police, then ordnance corps and chemical corps.

It is important to NATO to focus on the intersection of interests; that is, the long-term impact of initial successes and perceived mutual benefits on enduring and maturing relations between old and new Allies and partners. For example, among the CS/CSS capabilities identified, Romania is strong in military police and engineers. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have a strong engineering tradition. Likewise, Ukraine as a PFP partner is probably strongest in chemical corps and transportation corps. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia could provide medical, engineering, civil affairs, and ordnance corps units. In addition, even members such as Turkey could benefit from providing engineering and civil affairs teams to the mix. The Alliance should also encourage these partners to combine their CS/CSS capabilities where they want to take the lead in regional NSTs.

The Alliance has expended much political capital either bringing in new countries or developing partner relations and regional capacity. However, NATO needs to consider carefully the kinds of capabilities it intends to ask its newest Allies and partners to provide. The key is to ensure that the partners have an opportunity to positively and actively contribute to ongoing and future missions in a meaningful way, while also filling gapped capabilities and contributing to all three key areas of transformation. This approach has many potential benefits, not least paving the way for contributions at a higher level in the future.

To be fair, there may be drawbacks to the approach advocated here. For example, members and prospective members will more likely be motivated by contributing to transformation goals than will Jordan or Morocco in the Mediterranean or some PFP partners in the Caucasus or Central Asia who are not in the military assistance program. Moreover, there is the question of reliability and commitment of partners to sustain and deploy their contributions to the NSTs, whose capability sustainment and deployment are related to cost and political will, both of which can be inhibitors. However, we believe the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.

As Secretary General George Robertson stated in 2003:

While none of the invitees possesses spectacular military capabilities, each of them has niche capabilities that will be valuable to NATO. Moreover, they bring an enthusiasm, willingness, if necessary, to take on risks and an appreciation of the value of a permanent transatlantic alliance.³

Encouraging less-capable Allies and partners to take the lead in areas where they have the expertise improves their confidence and prestige, making them more committed. In addition, the development of deployable CS/CSS-type capabilities can spur defense and military reform by setting the example for the remainder of the force structure. Small successes and confidence-building can set the stage for more significant changes and deepen countries' relationships with NATO.

The CS/CSS capability shortfalls identified by NATO mirror U.S. shortfalls. For example, the NST concept aligns with the Building Partner Capacity Roadmap that stems from the Quadrennial Defense Review

(QDR) implementation plan and DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*. Improving partner SSTR capabilities is a key component. The QDR has endorsed establishing a NATO headquarters for SSTR operations, developing standards by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), integrating planning into the NATO force planning process, and developing metrics to evaluate progress.⁴ The U.S. Government, particularly DOD, would be well advised to focus bilateral and multilateral security cooperation on developing NSTs, since they fill a security and capabilities gap and can be relatively quick “turn key” operations. Offering partner capabilities gives the United States an opportunity to focus its security cooperation efforts to maximize operational relevance.

NST Implementation

Recognizing that NSTs fill critical core capabilities, it is important to consider what additional transformation requirements should be applied to the teams before they can integrate into NATO operational missions. The list is relatively short and can be enhanced by exercises, military-to-military training, and inclusion of units in ongoing operations. NSTs will need to adopt Alliance doctrine and procedures, work under existing command and control/deployable headquarters, and be equipped with compatible communications/radios and procedures to share information and operational orders. Countries providing teams will need to develop options for their own lift, from commercial support to more sophisticated development of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and/or pooling of requirements and assets. While some partners might initially find these challenges daunting, the costs fade compared to the benefits derived from NST participation.

The development and implementation of the NST concept requires a five-step process:

- NATO approves the concept of NSTs at a signing conference, hosted by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in the 2^d quarter of 2007, and all participants agree to timelines and to clearly establish the way ahead.
- Working groups are established to develop plans for each type of NST. Lead/partner countries are identified at this time.
- A pilot program is created for one functional NST. The team is tested in a well-publicized exercise overseen by ACT.

That would allow the results/lessons learned from the pilot program and way ahead for operationalizing other teams to be reported at the 2008 NATO Summit.

- Other NSTs are tested and readied for deployment in an ongoing NATO operation (possibly in Afghanistan, Africa, or Kosovo) by 2010.
- ACT is tasked to capture lessons learned and make recommendations to the NAC, NATO Allies, and participants on how best to focus appropriate Alliance resources to supplement bilateral contributions.

The timeline to deploy the first NST should coincide with the followup NATO Summit of 2008. Like the development and deployment of the NATO Response Force (NRF), interested Allies and friends should be held to a tight 2-year timeline and encouraged to volunteer forces that could complement NRF, but could also be used independently.

The North Atlantic Alliance faces a historic moment at the Riga Summit in 2006 as it evaluates its progress on transformation. Despite the capabilities initiatives resulting from the 1999 Washington Summit and the 2002 Prague Summit, little capability has actually been delivered.⁵ Most military budgets are still flatlined or decreasing, and hard capabilities have a lead time of at least 10 to 15 years in the most optimistic view. Add to this the unrealized expectations of new Allies and friends, the heightened operational out-of-area requirements, and increased terrorism, and the need is clear for a more broad and innovative approach to the transformation issues challenging NATO—global partnering, developing

expeditionary capabilities, and transatlantic homeland security.

The 2006 summit should focus on a few initiatives that are logical extensions of the Prague-Istanbul efforts and grow out of additional cumulative experience in both operations and capacity-building. The NATO Stability Team concept does this and matches Allies and partners who are willing to commit to operations with the specific operational tasks (to include combat as well as stabilization and reconstruction) that need to be done to meet the Istanbul strategic vision: “a full range of missions, promoting stability where it is needed to defend our security and our values.” **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ The Mediterranean Dialogue countries are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.

² Anthony Cordesman, “Rethinking NATO’s Force Transformation,” *NATO Review* (Spring 2005).

³ Secretary General George Robertson’s forward in *NATO Review* (Spring 2003).

⁴ Excerpt from *Quadrennial Defense Review Execution Roadmaps: Building Partnership Capacity*, February 23, 2006, unclassified draft.

⁵ As the outgoing Secretary General, George Robertson stated in an interview on January 2, 2004, “Improving the military capabilities of the NATO member countries has to remain the key priority of any Secretary General, because the credibility of the Alliance depends on it having the capability to take actions.”



U.S. Air Force maintenance crew member reviews schedule for F-15 with Bulgarian officer as part of Joint Contact Team Program

173rd Fighter Wing (Jemiller Shiraf)



Gen. Peter Pace, USMC,
addresses members of
the Joint Staff

U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen)

Reforming Pentagon Decisionmaking

By CHRISTOPHER J. LAMB and IRVING LACHOW

This article is a synopsis of *INSS Strategic Forum 221*, which can be downloaded at ndupress.ndu.edu

A major surprise in the Department of Defense 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report* to Congress is the prominence it gives to decisionmaking reform. Pentagon leaders thought that improvements to the decisionmaking process prior to the QDR would facilitate hard choices on new military capabilities.¹ Yet by the end of the QDR, they concluded that additional decisionmaking reforms were one of two fundamental strategic imperatives for the Department.² In this article, we recommend a Decision Support Cell to improve Pentagon decisionmaking. Before explaining how the cell would work, we identify prerequisites for good decisionmaking and the problems and conditions that currently diminish the quality of that undertaking at the Pentagon.

Reason and Intuition

It is commonly assumed that people should make decisions as rationally as possible and that deviations from the rational ideal are undesirable. Recently, however, scientists have

concluded that people using mental shortcuts can produce good decisions in difficult circumstances. One of the most popular nonrational theories of decisionmaking, which can be dubbed the *intuitive model*, proposes that people make decisions by recognizing situations, matching them to previous situations they have experienced, simulating various solutions in their heads, and then picking the first solution that is good enough to satisfy the problem at hand.³ In this model, popularized in Malcolm Gladwell's *Blink*, biases are not deviations from an ideal approach but rather helpful mental adaptations that enable quick, accurate decisions.

Blink stimulated a defense of rationality and a resultant "blink vs. think" controversy that captured popular imagination.⁴ However, the clear consensus among experts is that people use *both* intuitive and rational techniques to make good decisions. People generally rely on their intuition when:⁵

- they face time-urgent situations such as wildfires or battlefield triage, where even short

delays to "reason through" a formal decisionmaking process can result in disaster

- conditions are dynamic or goals are ambiguous; it makes sense in such circumstances to focus on a quick "good enough" solution that can be reevaluated later
- they have a great deal of relevant experience; the more relevant experience a person has, the more likely he is to use intuition and use it well
- the problem can be modeled in mental simulations to determine what would happen if a given option were chosen (for example, one study found that Navy commanders serving on Aegis cruisers use intuitive decisionmaking for 95 percent of their decisions).⁶

In contrast, people generally use a rational process when:⁷

- they are not under heavy time pressure that requires mental shortcuts; with more time, people are more likely to follow the rational approach, if only to verify an initial gut feeling
- conditions are relatively stable and goals are clear, permitting a rational approach to find an optimal solution

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■ they do not have the relevant experience to provide a basis for pattern matching; then they should (and usually do) resort to a more rational model to guide them through problem formulation, option identification, analysis, and selection of a solution

■ the problem is so computationally complex that it overwhelms the ability to grasp a given situation, at which point the quality of decisions erodes along with the ability to recognize situations or run mental simulations.

Despite different models, human decisionmaking actually represents a continuum. In most cases, people decide through a combination of reason and nonrational mental shortcuts. For example, people can use intuitive rules of thumb to bound the range of possible solutions for a problem analyzed rationally. Similarly, they can use a rational thought process to augment or verify initial intuitive judgments.⁸

How do these observations about the way people decide relate to decisionmaking in the Pentagon? First, reforming strategic decisionmaking must account for the way senior leaders actually make strategic-level decisions (for example, by acknowledging the power of personal and bureaucratic biases). Second, prescriptions for improving decisionmaking

must accommodate rational, nonrational, and intuitive decisionmaking, depending on which is likely to generate better outcomes.⁹ To determine when these different approaches are appropriate, we must understand the circumstances in the Pentagon that affect senior leader decisionmaking.

tify and weigh all possible risks. Second, the infrequency of war means there is not a large experiential basis for making intuitive decisions about what investments will produce the best mix of capabilities for warfighting; therefore, a rational as opposed to an intuitive system makes sense for investment decisions.

Third, many Pentagon planning problems (for example, logistics or strategic lift) are computationally so complex that they defy intuitive judgment alone. Fourth,

there usually is sufficient time to allow a rational process to unfold.

The resource planning and allocation systems designed to support senior Pentagon leaders, therefore, are ostensibly methodical and engineered to minimize risk: objectives are defined, conditions that inform the objectives are identified, alternative ways and means to achieve the objectives are explored, expected and unintended consequences are considered, and decisions are made, generally to eliminate as much risk in as many categories as possible. The same holds true for contingency planning systems that were designed to rationalize campaign planning and war plans review.

Bureaucratic Contributions and Limitations to Rational Decision Support. To execute its ostensibly rational planning processes,


consensus among experts is that people use both intuitive and rational techniques to make good decisions

Challenges

Pentagon decisionmaking reforms since World War II are largely a history of efforts to curtail the power of the Services to veto *joint* solutions that serve the entire military better. Service cultures are beneficial for warfighting, but they can be counterproductive at higher decisionmaking levels where integrated effort is required.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's planning, programming, and budgeting system was installed in 1961 to rationalize Pentagon decisionmaking with broader, more transparent, and more objective decision criteria. It survives to this day, albeit in modified form, because its rational design is beneficial for several reasons. First, the high stakes involved in deterrence and war argue for adoption of rational processes that iden-

Decision Support Cell Structure



the Pentagon is divided into hierarchical organizational structures that represent relatively narrow bodies of expertise: policy, intelligence, program analysis, acquisition, or budgeting. Recently, Pentagon wits have taken to calling these stovepipe organizations “cylinders of excellence,” which they in fact are. Their purpose is to build and nurture deep expertise in narrow bodies of knowledge. These experts identify issues, devise options and recommendations, and forward them up the chain to senior officials. In this regard, Pentagon decision support is essentially “bottom-up” as well as “stovepiped.”

These bottom-up rational decision processes are limited by multiple bureaucratic and human factors. Senior leaders need integrated problem assessments and solution options, but there are few incentives for their subordinates to collaborate to provide them. Instead, subordinates are rewarded for developing and protecting their own organizational equities. Absent any incentive to sacrifice organizational equities for the common good, the

natural outcome of formal coordination in the Pentagon is consensus products that avoid and obscure the need for tough tradeoffs. As a result, many talented and

motivated officials get their positions directly to senior decisionmakers by circumventing the formal coordination process. Proposals presented this way often are clear and creative but reflect a perspective that does not benefit from access to all relevant information.

What Senior Leaders Need. Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense need integrated decision support from the 30 or more subordinate bureaucracies that report directly to them, but they do not receive this support, and they do not have time to produce it themselves. These leaders are the first real point of integration in the Department of Defense, and they do not like it. Former Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries are virtually unanimous in their belief that the Pentagon bureaucracy could be cut from 25 to 75 percent without any degradation in the quality of decision support.¹⁰ The Office of the Secretary of Defense is often singled out as bloated and ineffective, but the Joint Staff also hoards information and defaults toward least common denominator products. Colin Powell remarked that while he was Chairman, the “sole purpose” of his 1,500-member staff “was to keep as

much information away from me as possible, [thinking] let’s just give him what we want him to have, not what he needs.”¹¹

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made it clear early on that he would challenge these bureaucratic tendencies. In a speech on September 10, 2001, he called the Pentagon bureaucracy the enemy, arguing that it “disrupts the defense of the United States and places the lives of men and women in uniform at risk.”¹² The next day, however, he had to go to war with the bureaucracy he had, not the one he wanted. Therefore, like his predecessors, Secretary Rumsfeld uses workarounds to tame the bureaucracy. For example, he relies heavily on a few trusted aides who are able to offer alternatives to the bland or contradictory decision support provided by the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, that practice helps convince subordinates that having access to senior leaders and controlling information to them is the key to success, which further discourages information-sharing and collaboration. The lack of senior leader feedback to subordinates compounds the

the Decision Support Cell would be a dedicated staff located within the Secretary’s office with a mission to enforce discipline and collaboration

problem. If subordinates do not understand senior leaders’ decisions, they may conclude that the wrong choice was made for the wrong reasons, further deepening cynicism.

Decision Support: Balancing Rationality and Intuition. Even if the rational planning and resource allocation processes of the Pentagon worked better, they would be insufficient for producing good strategic decisions. Senior leaders must account for a broader range of factors than those found in analyses conducted by lower level officials. Sometimes the significance of these factors is so great that they dwarf the marginal utility of rational analyses. Even when the results of the rational analyses offer valuable insights, senior leaders ultimately must contrast choices across diverse value sets (operational, political, economic, and so forth). It is difficult to compare rationally the value of better relations with a key ally, less friction with a powerful Senator, and more economical shipbuilding. Doing so requires reliance on intuition, judgment, and other nonrational factors.

This is not to say that there is no role for rational decision support. Senior leaders must rely in part on their intuitive understanding of

the net effect of their decisions across multiple objectives, but they ought to take advantage of decision support that can better inform their intuition. In practice, this means two elements are required for strategic decisionmaking in the Pentagon: clear, transparent, and well-coordinated rational analyses of alternatives from the decision support system, and well-honed personal intuition and judgment. These elements can best be harmonized through the creation of a Decision Support Cell.

Reform’s Critical Element

The Decision Support Cell would be a dedicated staff located within the Secretary’s office with a mission to enforce a degree of discipline and collaboration in strategic decision support for the Secretary and his closest advisors. It should do three things. First, it should help the Secretary focus the decision support process on his own strategic agenda, making sure that he receives integrated products in support of this agenda and that the process provides necessary feedback and

direction. Second, it should improve the quality of the decision support routinely provided by the contingency planning and resource allocation systems, making sure underlying

assumptions are clear and that all viable alternatives are rigorously examined. Third, it should help senior leaders refine their intuitive decisionmaking with exercises that enlarge their experience base.

Strategic Decisionmaking Focus. The QDR Report underscored the importance of senior leader focus on a set of core functions that only they can perform effectively,¹³ but the lack of integrated, quality decision support for strategic issues makes that difficult. The Decision Support Cell should be charged with ensuring the collaboration among Pentagon bureaucracies necessary to put core senior leader issues in a strategic choice framework. In doing so, the cell would not usurp the functions of other staff elements but rather undertake integrating activities that currently are either left to the Secretary or are not done at all.

With a Decision Support Cell to coordinate decisionmaking in senior leader core functions, the Secretary’s personal staff would be free to support his daily schedule and personal needs. Similarly, subordinates could concentrate on their areas of expertise, knowing that the cell would ensure

collaboration when the Secretary needed it. Since the cell would have a holistic view of the senior leader core functions, it would be in a position to advise the Secretary on the importance of keeping abreast of these areas. It would also be in a position to identify specific problems that require him to set priorities among competing interests.

Improving Rational Decisionmaking Support. Comparing and evaluating alternatives is impossible without a transparent set of baseline assumptions, operating concepts, methods, metrics, and data. Without these common, essential precursors to good analysis, with results that are comparable and replicable, senior leaders cannot usefully evaluate alternatives and their consequences. Currently, no single organization has the interest, authority, and resources to produce such timely, quality products. As a result, the foundational products for good decision support are provided too slowly and with insufficient quality and quantity to support a common analytical framework across the Department.¹⁴

The Secretary would need to empower the Decision Support Cell to set standards and timelines for these analytic precursors and to enforce a degree of transparency, collaboration, and information-sharing among all the Pentagon headquarters elements that conduct analysis in support of senior decisionmakers. Exercising this kind of authority underscores why the cell must be independent of any Pentagon component and report directly to the Secretary. If it reported to someone lower, it might be unable to enforce the necessary collaboration and competition of ideas needed to support senior leader decisionmaking. If the cell belonged to an organization charged with conducting analysis on specific problems or conducted analysis itself, it would be predisposed to defend those analyses, immediately ruining its reputation as an honest broker.

Improving Intuitive Decisionmaking Support. The Decision Support Cell must also be able to support senior intuitive decisionmaking by providing leaders with the breadth and depth of experience needed in their jobs. The list of diverse areas where meaningful experience would be desirable includes military operations, executive management, bureaucratic processes, political savvy, government budgeting, media relations, intelligence products and operations, and emerging technologies. While it would be ideal for all senior leaders to possess a depth of real-life

experience in each these areas before taking office, it is not realistic.

Senior leaders can gain experience on the job, but that is time-consuming and inefficient and sometimes means learning by making mistakes. In fact, mistakes offer one of the best ways to learn, but given the stakes associated with strategic decisionmaking in the Pentagon, it is too costly a method to accept readily. A better approach would be to develop the senior leaders' experience base with a tailored program that helps them to:¹⁵

- identify and understand the decision requirements of their job
- practice difficult decisions in context
- review decisionmaking experiences to learn what works and what does not.

The best way to accomplish this goal is with decisionmaking exercises or thought experiments that are built on well-defined scenarios and capture the essence of specific decisions. These exercises could be conducted as tabletop or virtual games or both. Decisionmaking exercises should not be confused with large-scale games or field simulations; each experiment would be a focused event targeted at the characteristics of a unique decision.¹⁶

The Decision Support Cell should also help record the results of real-world intuitive decisionmaking. Even though intuitive decisionmaking is somewhat idiosyncratic and often politically sensitive, the cell must capture senior leader concerns and desires solidly enough to help middle management understand the factors that informed a particular decision, which will increase trust in the system and improve the quality of decision support.

Creating the Decision Support Cell is consistent with the 2006 QDR recommendations for institutional reform. If that seems like a tall order, we should remember that the tactical military already achieved a comparable transformation in decision support. Following the Vietnam War, the Services introduced objective, empirical feedback into training exercises with the aid of new simulation technologies and after-action reports to improve learning and decisionmaking. The training revolution of the 1970s was not an easy transformation, but it was highly effective because it combined the value of objective analysis of courses of action with the ultimate need for commanders to make intuitive assessments and decisions. The Pentagon could do the same thing at the strategic

level with a Decision Support Cell that balances objective analysis and intuitive wisdom. Those who fight the Nation's battles deserve nothing less. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Ryan Henry, "Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review," *Parameters* (Winter 2005–2006), 5–15.

² Department of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006), 65–66.

³ The term *intuitive model* refers to a class of "naturalistic" models exemplified by Gary Klein's Recognition-Primed Model. See Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

⁴ Malcolm Gladwell, *Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking* (New York: Little, Brown, 2005); and Michel Legault, *Think! Why Crucial Decisions Can't Be Made in the Blink of an Eye* (New York: Threshold Editions, 2006).

⁵ Klein, 95–96.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins, *Battle-Wise: Seeking Time-Information Superiority in Networked Warfare* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2006).

⁹ The Services clearly understand this point. Rational and intuitive decisionmaking processes, and the situations in which each should be used, are discussed explicitly in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine. For example, see Naval Doctrine Publication 6: *Command and Control*.

¹⁰ Exit interviews with departing Secretaries of Defense by the Pentagon Office of the Historian and informal comments from participants in defense reform studies who interviewed former senior leaders.

¹¹ "Follow the Leader," *Context Magazine*, interview with Colin S. Powell, available at <www.contextmag.com/setFrameRedirect.asp?src=/archives/200002/Feature0FollowtheLeader.asp>.

¹² "DOD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff—Bureaucracy to Battlefield," remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, September 10, 2001.

¹³ *2006 QDR Report*, 65–66.

¹⁴ Christopher J. Lamb, *Transforming Defense* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, September 2005), 4–17.

¹⁵ Gary Klein, *The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your Gut Feelings to Make Better Decisions at Work* (New York: Currency Books, 2004), 36–63.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 45.

U.S. Marines and Soldiers demonstrate use of nonlethal weapons and tactics in Boeblingen, Germany

FEATURE

New Thinking at USEUCOM

The Phase Zero Campaign

By CHARLES F. WALD

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, is fighting a new kind of campaign in the global war on terror. With an area of responsibility that includes all of Europe, Russia, Israel, and most of Africa, USEUCOM is home to a growing variety of threats. These dangers require new thinking and a new understanding of the differences between theater security cooperation (TSC) and traditional warfighting.

From Norway to South Africa, from Azerbaijan to Senegal, USEUCOM is engaged in a wide variety of operations and TSC activities. It is through these efforts that the command is fighting the war on terror using

a new approach, focusing on terrorism's long-term, underlying conditions. This deliberate strategy of engagement is called *Phase Zero*, but in truth it is much more than just a new phase of systematic campaign planning; it is a new form of campaign in and of itself.

This article examines a number of issues associated with this evolving concept, including the threats in the command's area of responsibility, origins of Phase Zero strategy, and initiatives that make up the campaign.

New Threats

The security environment is changing rapidly. New threats manifest themselves in high-profile events, such as the bombings in Madrid, Casablanca, Istanbul, and London,

and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. But far more frequently, these threats lurk in the shadows. The al Qaeda network inspires operatives to disguise themselves among thousands of peaceful immigrants in largely unassimilated Muslim enclaves throughout Europe. The complex European legal system provides a safe haven for those who would provide terrorists with logistic and financial support, while the vast undergoverned spaces of North Africa serve as fertile recruiting grounds, training areas, and transit routes for a wide range of loosely associated groups that are trying to replace their nations' govern-

ments with their own peculiar and intolerant version of an Islamic state. Many of them pledge allegiance to, or at least claim common cause with, the al Qaeda network. Some funnel money, arms, and volunteer fighters from Europe into Iraq.

In growing numbers, foreign fighters appear to be finding their way back to share their combat experiences with a new generation of potential recruits in Europe's mosques and madrassas and the tribal regions of Africa. With their strongholds in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East growing smaller every day, these groups are trying to build on safe havens in North Africa while simultaneously bringing the fight to the backyard of our European allies. To confront this growing threat, USEUCOM's Phase Zero campaign places a new emphasis on TSC and capacity-building with our allies throughout the region.

What Is Phase Zero?

The traditional four phases of a military campaign identified in joint publications are *deter/engage*, *seize initiative*, *decisive operations*, and *transition*. Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to the beginning of Phase I—that is, everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first

U.S. Marine Corps (Donald E. Preston)

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place. Executed properly, Phase Zero consists of *shaping* operations that are continuous and adaptive. Its ultimate goal is to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts. For the United States, this approach is typically nonkinetic and places heavy emphasis on interagency support and coordination. In many instances, Phase Zero involves execution of a broad national strategy where the Department of Defense (DOD) is not the lead agency and its programs are only one part of the larger U.S. Government effort.

The exact origin of the Phase Zero reference is unclear, making it difficult to give credit for its coining. While it may not have originated with USEUCOM, the command has long applied the Phase Zero concept as a central element of its theater strategy and continues to follow this approach in dealing with a complex and growing threat environment across its 91-country area of responsibility. In the early stages of the war on terror, senior leaders at the command recognized the importance of thinking long term and of collaborating with interagency partners to develop effective security relationships with key partner nations. Leaders at USEUCOM also realized that the preventive focus of Phase Zero is less costly (in both blood and treasure) than a reactive approach to crisis. At the very least, Phase Zero helps set conditions for an easier transition to a more comprehensive U.S. intervention in a crisis.

The primary goal of Phase Zero, however, is to invest fewer resources in a pre-crisis situation to avoid an exponentially larger expenditure later. The 2003 intervention by the United Nations (UN) and United States in Liberia provides a case study supporting this rationale. According to UN figures, the overall operational costs were over \$680 million, mostly for UN peacekeeping and emergency assistance. Prior to that, the United States had committed a mere \$67 million to programs to promote stability in the troubled nation. Doubling or even tripling spending on our preventive programs would still have been far cheaper than the cost of reacting to the crisis and the violence that eventually unfolded.

By taking a preventive approach to security throughout their area of responsibility, USEUCOM leaders accepted the fact that the payoff would not necessarily be immediate.

They understood that defeating terrorism would be a long-term fight and that, in some cases, success would be measured more by

Phase Zero encompasses everything that can be done to prevent conflicts from developing in the first place

the avoidance of costly kinetic events than by the execution of direct action. The non-kinetic emphasis is the heart of Phase Zero, the driving force behind a major new strategy at the command. To achieve strategic objectives, the command has coordinated a variety of previously disparate TSC activities with information operations (IO) and other more traditional military operations into a seamless, effects-based program of operationalized TSC.

Operationalizing TSC

Theater security cooperation is not a new concept. Although it may have been known by other names, such as peacetime engagement, it has always fallen into the category of other-than-war activity. That view is changing, thanks to the maturation of the Phase Zero concept. USEUCOM currently plans and executes various TSC activities as an active and integral part of the war on terror. The primary objectives are eliminating conditions favorable to terrorists and preventing broader conflict. With operationalized TSC, U.S. European Command has improved on peacetime engagement by bringing together planners and operators from its joint staff, the interagency community, and the component staffs (U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Naval Forces Europe, Marine Forces Europe, and Special Operations Command Europe) to plan engagement activities in a synchronized manner. All Phase Zero efforts are coordinated and executed in accordance with theater strategic plans. The continuous involvement of the component commands is essential to draw on their individual strengths and avoid duplication of effort, particularly important in the prudent use of finite defense resources.

While USEUCOM uses assigned, in-theater forces to conduct Phase Zero TSC activities as much as possible, it also gets significant help from Reserve Component forces. These assets are often National Guard units operating under the auspices of the State Partnership Program. This program pairs U.S. states with target countries in

broad-based contact programs that can range from combined military training and exercises to humanitarian assistance and civilian cultural exchanges. This superb Total Force collaboration allows USEUCOM to execute a robust collection of TSC activities, despite the fact that major portions of its assigned forces have been committed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in support of Operations *Enduring Freedom* and *Iraqi Freedom*.

Execution

U.S. European Command executes Phase Zero by conducting operationalized TSC throughout its area of responsibility. Missions range from train-and-equip programs for building capacity in partner nations to regional security initiatives, humanitarian assistance actions, and similar “hearts and minds” engagements. This active TSC strategy is aimed at protecting U.S. interests, promoting stability, and defeating terrorism and its underlying causes. While it would be impossible to examine every TSC activity in detail, two are worth a closer look: Operation *Enduring Freedom*–Trans Sahara and the Caspian Guard Initiative.

Operation *Enduring Freedom*–Trans Sahara is an example of operationalized TSC. It is the first time a series of TSC events has been grouped under the umbrella of a named operation directed by the Joint Staff. It is the American military component of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, a long-term U.S. Government program designed to help the countries of Trans-Sahara Africa cooperate to control the undergoverned spaces of their interiors.

The Trans-Sahara region stretches from Senegal and Mauritania on Africa’s west coast, across Mali, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad. The area is sparsely populated, largely barren, and difficult for local governments to control. Lately, a variety of transnational terrorist groups such as the Algerian-based “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat” (commonly known by the French acronym GSPC) have sought sanctuary there. The entire region is crisscrossed with ancient smuggling routes for moving people, weapons, and other contraband. Under Operation *Enduring Freedom*–Trans Sahara, USEUCOM is working with the militaries of nine countries to improve intelligence, command and control,

logistics, border control, and execution of combined operations against terrorist groups. The mission is a successor to an earlier U.S. Government program known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative. In 2003–2004, planners and trainers taught a variety of basic infantry skills to soldiers from Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. The initiative also included the provision of basic uniforms and field equipment. During training in Chad and Niger, a “hearts and minds” dimension was added by U.S. Air Force Reserve medical specialists conducting medical civil action programs that involved examinations of thousands of local patients, providing many with the only medical, dental, and optometry care they had received in years.

In the summer of 2005, Exercise Flintlock '05 rolled out as the first major Operation *Enduring Freedom*–Trans Sahara activity. It involved a broad spectrum of forces training with several countries across the region. In addition to providing small unit tactical training in marksmanship, land navigation, and basic infantry skills, the exercise also included airborne operations and Special Operations aviation units. The overarching goal was to ensure that participating nations improved on growing security partnerships to halt the flow of illicit weapons, goods, and human trafficking and to deny terrorists sanctuary in the region. The hope is that engagements such as Flintlock will facilitate cooperation and development of capabilities among bordering countries that will result in the apprehension of terrorists—much like the successes achieved against GSPC targets in the recent past in this same focus area of Africa.

The Caspian Guard Initiative is perhaps the best example of an interagency Phase Zero program. It represents a combined effort of DOD, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy. Caspian Guard is an initiative designed to help Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan develop capabilities to monitor traffic in the Caspian Sea and ensure that terrorists are not able to transport weapons of mass destruction, supplies, funds, or people

through the region. Caspian Guard includes a wide variety of programs, including training for Kazakh and Azeri naval units and maritime border guards, upgrading maritime detection systems, and teaching North Atlantic Treaty Organization standard procedures for maritime surveillance operations.

Success in these and similar endeavors is supported by robust information sharing between USEUCOM and partner nations, particularly on terrorist activity (for example, movement and threat warnings). U.S. European Command also cooperates with partner nations to develop and field information systems capable of protecting classified information while making it available to the personnel who need it for mission effectiveness. Through major programs such as Operation *Enduring Freedom*–Trans Sahara and Caspian

and countering extremist ideology through public diplomacy, DOD plays a significant role. USEUCOM's IO efforts consist of a wide variety of actions across many discrete lines of operation, being executed across the theater under the umbrella of Operation *Assured Voice*, which is designed to harness and orient a range of theater information and influence activities to reinforce regional security and establish an environment unfavorable to extremist ideas, recruiting, and support.

The primary intent of the operation is to establish a long-term capability to shape the information environment and counter the negative underlying conditions that impact vulnerable audiences in volatile regions. The value and overall effectiveness of Operation *Assured Voice* is determined by its relationship with other regional TSC activities,

so USEUCOM places significant emphasis on synchronizing information operations closely with all other TSC activities. Orchestration of what we say with what we do is vital; words fade, but actions endure. The local populations of our new partner nations must see concrete benefits from their cooperation with the United States or they will be vulnerable to extremist influences. The operation consists of a collection of specific programs, including military information support teams, Web-based initiatives, and collaboration with private industry throughout the area of responsibility.

Military information support teams are a great example of interagency cooperation to conduct

information operations. Provided to Embassies to support their public diplomacy efforts, these teams are normally made up of four to six uniformed military psychological operations specialists who deploy and work side by side with the country team. Skilled in mass communications and marketing, they perform assorted information activities, from setting up community outreach programs and youth sports leagues to training host-nation military personnel in the conduct of information operations. All their work is directed at



USS *Mount Whitney* underway in support of Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander Europe

U.S. Navy (Sarah Bly)

while USEUCOM uses assigned, in-theater forces to conduct Phase Zero theater security cooperation activities, it gets significant help from Reserve forces

Guard, with myriad supporting actions, the United States and allied nations are working together to defeat terrorist networks. Supporting all these efforts is a carefully planned and executed IO campaign.

Attacking the Center of Gravity

The *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* identifies extremist ideology as the enemy's strategic center of gravity. While the Department of State is the lead Federal agency for strategic communications

improving the security environment in the host nation and reducing support to extremist elements. Deployments typically last from 90 to 120 days and are valued by the country teams as a tool for supporting ongoing Embassy public diplomacy.

The Web site initiatives consist of *Southeast European Times* (addressing audiences in the former Yugoslavia, as well as Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Turkey) and *Magharebia* (for audiences in the Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia). Run in partnership with the State Department and U.S. Embassies, these two sites allow the USEUCOM commander to communicate to foreign audiences using news and information about their regions and providing accurate, balanced coverage about key players, events, and issues.

In contrast to extremist ideology propagated throughout the Internet and other media, these sites present positive themes. The principal topics include the rule of law, open and unbiased media, civilian control of the military, and creation of strong, accountable

success is supported by robust information sharing between USEUCOM and partner nations, particularly on terrorist activity

institutions in both government and business. Six days a week, the Web sites feature regional news as reported in local and international media. They also include in-depth analysis, interviews, and commentary from local correspondents on key regional issues. *Southeast European Times* is published in nine languages and *Magharebia* in three. According to Internet industry sources, *Southeast European Times* is now a major source of regional information. It averages over 5 million hits a month from within the area, with average visits exceeding 20 minutes. Similar numbers are being realized for *Magharebia*, despite its relatively recent launch in late 2004.

All of these efforts are enhanced through collaboration with private industry. USEUCOM partners with local and regional public relations and marketing firms to research target audiences. These firms provide expertise regarding their own societies, and by conducting market research and focus groups they help the command assess attitudes and behavior of host-nation populations without

the stigma that might come from surveys conducted by uniformed U.S. military personnel.

Assessing Phase Zero

To ensure success in Phase Zero, U.S. European Command has instituted a truly ground-breaking concept for assessing the effectiveness of all TSC activities and their supporting information initiatives. The Strategic Effectiveness and Communications Council (SECC) is the primary forum for USEUCOM senior leaders to orchestrate theater information and influence activities. It also evaluates how the command is doing in achieving strategic objectives.

The SECC is a forum of senior USEUCOM and component staff members that meets bimonthly to provide guidance, set priorities, and orient TSC and communications efforts throughout the theater. Each meeting focuses on a particular region of the command's area of responsibility and includes a review of the strategic assessments produced by the J-8 Effects Assessment Cell (comprised primarily of contracted system-of-systems analysts). These assessments provide a snapshot of the command's success or failure in achieving desired strategic effects and furnish the staff with the data to give the commander a regular update on the command's progress toward its strategic objectives.

The SECC also provides a forum for USEUCOM leaders to synchronize the command's messages with its TSC actions. Any action by U.S. forces in the command's area of responsibility can impact perceptions of local governments and populations about the United States. There is a real possibility of conveying conflicting messages when conducting such a variety of activities in a large and diverse area. One of the goals of the SECC is to reduce or eliminate these conflicts by bringing all the stakeholders together to discuss their respective activities, analyze them in the context of the command's overall theater strategy, and synchronize future actions to desired effects. In addition to the review of strategic assessments and the guidance from

U.S. Air Force pararescue jumper glides in near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti

the senior staff to the components, the key product of the bimonthly SECC is a tasking order that provides the command and components with clear guidance and priorities for all information activities.


Phase Zero (or "the time prior to the beginning of a crisis") relates strongly to the *deter* part of *deter/engage* as described in Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; thus, it could be argued that Phase Zero is simply a subset of Phase I under current joint doctrine. But Phase Zero is much more than deterrence and goes beyond mere engagement. It is an active effort to win the war on terror by destroying terrorism at its roots, while avoiding the high cost of major actions by conventional forces. USEUCOM has launched a nonkinetic offensive that will deny terrorists resources and sanctuary and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while building partner nations' capacity to do the same.

U.S. European Command is striking at the enemy's most significant center of gravity—the ideological base and popular support—by encouraging European and African audiences to abandon radical causes. All of these actions are aimed directly at accomplishing four of the six military objectives listed in the *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*. Most importantly, if executed successfully, Phase Zero eliminates the need for Phases I through IV. The goal is to sustain Phase Zero engagements with no transition to subsequent conflict. This long-term, open-ended endeavor makes it more appropriate to describe Phase Zero as a campaign in and of itself—a new kind of campaign that must be fought continuously by U.S. joint forces in concert with the interagency community and in cooperation with allies and partner nations. **JFQ**

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Fingerprints and the War on Terror

An FBI Perspective



Paul J. Shannon

Fingerprint card of Saddam Hussein

By PAUL J. SHANNON

In late 2001, with the Tora Bora bombing campaign in Afghanistan in full swing, a team from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) entered the combat theater on an unprecedented mission: to fingerprint, photograph, and interview captured terrorists as if they were bank robbers.

The idea of this mission was to freeze the identities of terrorists through a traditional law enforcement booking procedure used for decades by police officers in the United States to track dangerous criminals so the terrorists could always be identified as such.

There was urgency to this FBI mission. Afghanistan in 2001 was clearly the launching pad for the attacks of September 11.

Under the rule of the Taliban, this war-torn country had become a haven for terrorists and enemies of the United States, even harboring Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda training camps. Islamic extremists had flocked to the camps by the thousands, over long-established clandestine routes from Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, there was potential for the terrorists to use these same routes to scatter back to their home countries, where they would become undetectable as potential threats.

There was another factor creating urgency in this mission to freeze terrorists'

identities: at the time of the invasion, the American military was not routinely fingerprinting detainees or sharing detainee information with U.S. law enforcement.

The urgency paid off quickly. A foreign fighter captured during the Tora Bora bombings claimed he was in Afghanistan to learn the ancient art of falconry. A fingerprint identification was made against his immigration record, showing that he was denied entry to the United States in August 2001 at Orlando International Airport by a suspicious immigration official. The individual was Mohamed al Kahtani, who would later be named by the

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Author fingerprinting
Saddam Hussein
after capture

a foreign fighter captured during the Tora Bora bombings claimed he was in Afghanistan to learn the ancient art of falconry

9/11 Commission as the likely 20th hijacker. This person remained in U.S. custody.

Background

The Bureau's equipment on this first mission was primitive. Printer's ink, hand rollers, and paper cards were used to gather fingerprints. Descriptive data such as height, weight, eye color, hair color, date of birth, place of birth, and nationality were handwritten on these fingerprint cards. Detainees held erasable boards with their names and assigned numbers for mug shots, taken with a 35-mm camera. Oral swabs like oversized Q-tips were used to collect DNA samples. The gear fit in a briefcase that could be opened and used as a fingerprint platform.

AS THE ARMED FORCES TRANSFORM TO COUNTER THE THREATS OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, WE WILL SOON BE FOCUSING ON ANOTHER NEW MISSION: THE COLLECTION OF BIOMETRIC INFORMATION FROM THE FOES WE FACE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE BIOMETRIC SCREENING REGIME TO DETECT TERRORISTS BEFORE THEY ATTACK. OUR BORDER SECURITY, VISA SCREENING, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS ARE BASED PRIMARILY ON FINGERPRINTS: PERMANENT AND UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS THAT ARE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO COUNTERFEIT OR ALTER. SO WHEN A TERRORIST IS CAPTURED IN THE FIELD, OR A SAFEHOUSE IS RAIDED, IT IS IMPORTANT TO "FREEZE" THE TERRORIST'S IDENTITY SO THAT HE CAN ALWAYS BE IDENTIFIED AS AN ENEMY AND A POTENTIAL THREAT. FALSE NAMES, PASSPORTS, AND NATIONALITIES CANNOT MASK THE DATA FOUND IN FINGERPRINTS OR DNA.


THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, HAS RECOGNIZED THE COLLECTION OF BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION AS A BASIC WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY, ESPECIALLY WHEN FIGHTING INSURGENT ENEMIES WHO HIDE AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

AS AGENT PAUL SHANNON STATES IN THIS ARTICLE, AMONG THE TERRORISTS AND INSURGENTS THAT WE ARE FIGHTING OVERSEAS, ROUGHLY 1 IN 100 HAS A CRIMINAL RECORD IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH MEANS THAT MANY OF THE PEOPLE WE ARE FIGHTING TODAY NOT ONLY HAVE BEEN IN AMERICA AND IN OUR HOMETOWNS BUT ALSO HAVE COMMITTED A CRIME WHILE THEY WERE HERE.


IT IS IMPORTANT THAT EVERY BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIER—EVERY FINGERPRINT, PHOTOGRAPH, DNA SWAB, OR IRIS SCAN—IS COLLECTED CORRECTLY AND PRECISELY THE FIRST TIME BECAUSE THERE MAY BE ONLY THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS, FAMILIES, AND NATION.

WE KNOW THIS IS A DIFFICULT MISSION, BUT WE ALSO KNOW THERE IS NO ONE MORE CAPABLE THAN THE MEN AND WOMEN OF THE U.S. MILITARY TO CARRY OUT THIS MISSION. AMERICA WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE FIGHT TO THOSE WHO WISH US HARM, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT BOTH OUR CITIZENS AND INTERESTS. IT WILL NOT BE EASY, BUT BY USING EVERY TOOL AT OUR DISPOSAL, WE WILL WIN.

Frances Fragos Townsend is Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.



FBI Ten Most Wanted poster of Osama bin Laden



FBI Ten Most Wanted poster of Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi

them. Authority was sought from the U.S. Attorney General to place the terrorists in these databases, which traditionally were comprised exclusively of domestic criminal information. The conventional databases could tell a user who had been arrested for robbing a bank in Dallas, committing a burglary in Newark, or forging a check in Seattle. They could not tell who learned to make an improvised explosive device in a terrorist training camp. This inability was what the FBI proposal to the Attorney General would change. A strong component of this proposal was the recognition that if a police officer had stopped one of the 19 hijackers from the September 11 attacks on the streets or in the airports, nothing in the databases would have alerted the officer to a threat.

In March 2002, the Attorney General approved the FBI proposal, not only endorsing the idea but also issuing a formal directive compelling the Bureau to gather terrorist fingerprints and descriptive data internationally and place this information in databases. Using this new authority, the FBI began adding fingerprints gathered in Afghanistan to IAFIS and almost immediately was confronted with a wholly unexpected finding. When the first batches of terrorist prints were added to IAFIS, identifications occurred at the rate of about 1 per 100 terrorists. That meant that not only had those terrorists been

The team handed out these portable booking stations in Kandahar and Kabul. The agents fingerprinted detainees in U.S. custody there and in Northern Alliance custody in Mazar-e-Sharif. The FBI team, supported by U.S. troops and by deployed U.S. intelligence officers in theater, also worked for months along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, fingerprinting foreign fighters who were captured trying to flee coalition forces.

The fighters were young, radicalized, and committed to jihad. A full quarter of them freely admitted to interviewers that they had surrendered in order to fight another day—a day of their choosing. They expected to be well treated, as al Qaeda trainers had explained U.S. policies toward prisoners. The message to the fighters was wait, and eventually you will be freed.

These self-declarations were by themselves reason to justify the FBI mission in Afghanistan and were of no surprise to the agents; the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior. A person who steals, lies, and commits acts of violence in his twenties is likely to do the same or worse later in life. Criminals also rarely give up when confronted by law enforcement. Instead, they try to remain anonymous and undetected. They lie about their identities to avoid punishment.

Once the booking packages were collected, terrorists' identities were permanently recorded. The FBI team then hand-carried the packages from Afghanistan to Clarksburg, West Virginia, where the Bureau acts as steward to the national criminal databases used by U.S. law enforcement nationwide. The two databases—the National Criminal Infor-

not only had those terrorists been to our country, but they had also engaged in conduct that led to arrest

mation Center (NCIC), a text-based system that officers can query with information such as name and date of birth, and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), which positively identifies criminals by comparing submitted prints against known prints—can be called the backbone of U.S. law enforcement. On a typical day, NCIC is queried more than 3 million times and IAFIS compares over 70,000 submitted prints.

The team's idea was to post the terrorists' photographs and information in NCIC and place their fingerprints in IAFIS, with the result being ready identification when the terrorists attempt to enter the United States or American law enforcement encounters

to our country, but they had also engaged in conduct that led to arrest. By exposing terrorists and networks that otherwise might not have been revealed, these identifications provided immediate security and intelligence gains for the country.

An example shows the power of fingerprinting. A foreign fighter captured near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border claimed he was an itinerant preacher of Islam and not part of the fighting. He was one of many captured in the area with similar stories. The fingerprint identification was made against a misdemeanor marijuana arrest in an American city. When agents examined the arrest records, they determined that he was a flight student. This person remained in U.S. custody.

Such identifications were not aberrations. The Bureau team started what would become a worldwide effort to gather thousands of prints of known terrorists and search and post them through law

Detainee being released
from Abu Ghraib Prison

U.S. Marine Corps (Ben Flores)



enforcement databases. In known terrorist populations sampled to date, and in Iraq today, the hit rate has remained close to 1 percent.

Hits have been recorded at a similar rate on pockets of detainees captured and then fingerprinted in the combat theater of Iraq, which was unexpected because under Saddam, Iraq was a country with closed borders. An interesting event occurred when an FBI team traveled to a remote desert camp on the Iraq/Iran border, the main base of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a terrorist group dedicated to the overthrow of the Iranian government. The MEK members led a sparse, almost cult-like lifestyle where men could not have contact with women, material goods were renounced, and a group mentality held sway. Yet even in this austere environment, when the team fingerprinted about 3,800 MEK fighters, more than 40 hits were recorded against IAFIS.

To the agents on that original FBI team, and on the teams that deployed in 2003, 2004, and 2005 to detainee camps in Baghdad, Mosel, Erbil, and Basra, the consistent rate of identifications against the domestic criminal fingerprint database provided stark conclusions about the nature of the enemy and the battlefield. As the team leader for forensic collection in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the agent who negotiated the terrorist fingerprint exchanges with certain allied countries, I would phrase the conclusions as follows:

- Terrorists are internationally mobile, criminally sophisticated, adept at crossing borders undetected, and adroit at obtaining multiple forms of false identifications.

- Anonymity is the greatest weapon, and the challenge for a Soldier or police officer is to pick the terrorist out of the crowd.

- Terrorism is closely associated with criminality. In fact, under the U.S. system, terrorists who make it to America must be prosecuted in a court of law. Terrorist databases cannot be maintained separately from criminal databases.

- Fingerprints, correctly collected in law enforcement fashion and placed in databases, are the best way to track and identify terrorists. Name and birthdate databases are of limited value against an enemy who hides his identity.

- The battlefield is global. Terrorists bide their time and wait out the immediate conflict to attack later.

Federal Framework

It is critical to homeland security that the military develop what have traditionally been considered law enforcement equities, identify terrorists and enemies of the United States, and share the gathered fingerprints, photographs, DNA, descriptive data, and trace evidence, such as latent fingerprints (fingerprints not readily visible to the naked eye), with U.S. law enforcement. Five years of work by FBI teams gathering terrorist prints led to this conclusion. At the White House, working through the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council, this conclusion has been the foundation of a policy statement on the role of the American military in the forensic identification of terrorists. According to the statement, comprehensive biometric screening for terrorists, especially using fingerprints, will be basic to homeland security,

protection of U.S. troops in combat zones, and identifying previously unknown terrorists. The Department of Defense (DOD) will help in this effort in two major ways: taking full sets of 10 fingerprints for all detainees from overseas operations, and collecting and keeping latent fingerprints and additional forensic identification from the sites of terrorist activities.

At the Homeland Security Council, policy work is in large part directed by Presidential directives. The underlying directive for this policy statement about the U.S. military is Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 11, signed and issued in August 2004. This directive calls for improving terrorist screenings of people, cargo, and conveyances at opportunities outside, at, and within national borders. The military's role in the effort has been substantial, but the considerable advances in the overall enterprise are due to it being interagency and Government-wide. Screening relies not only on those agencies conducting the screenings but also on those serving as collectors, who add to the database as they encounter terrorists abroad and wherever combat takes place. This procedure dovetails with the screening process for visitors to the United States, where names are compared with the date-of-birth watch lists being compiled for the National Center for Counter Terrorism's Terrorist Screening Database.

Until recently, the Federal Government had three major agencies—the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, and Defense—that were building terrorist screening databases and biometric systems that

the overarching directive is to improve terrorist screening through consolidation of screening activities throughout government

could not efficiently share information. DHS and DOD had 2-print screening systems that could not interface with Justice or with the FBI national criminal database, which was based on the traditional law enforcement standard of 10 fingerprints. Through HSPD 11, these agencies have adopted the 10-print standard and are building systems that will be interoperable, connecting law enforcement, border security, and military detainee systems to detect terrorists better before they attack.



Vehicle destroyed
by car bomb

Paul J. Shannon



Latent fingerprints
discovered on car
bomb vehicle

Paul J. Shannon

Significant force protection gains in Iraq and other theaters have already been realized, and identifications have been made against IAFIS of prints gathered by the military.

The overarching directive from HSPD 11 is to improve terrorist screening through consolidation and coordination of disparate screening activities throughout government, and the Homeland Security Council has sought to assist through the interagency process, promoting information-sharing, and Federal standards. Examples of progress include:

- the adoption of a 10-print standard for the biometric screening of all foreign visitors to the United States, including applicants for visas at U.S. Embassies worldwide
- DOD adoption of the 10-print standard in processing military detainees, in particular for insurgent and foreign fighters encountered in combat theaters, and the immediate sharing of this information with U.S. law enforcement
- the Department of State series of overt diplomatic contacts with allies in the war on terror to negotiate agreements to share terrorist screening information, including forensic identifiers such as fingerprints
- Homeland Security Council meetings with law enforcement and intelligence agencies with the goal of fully involving them in collecting terrorist fingerprints and latent prints internationally.

Through HSPD 11, the Homeland Security Council seeks to begin robust international collection of terrorist screening information such as fingerprints. This process must be systematic, sustained, and worldwide, as our screening systems will be only as good as the database against which suspects are checked. This process must also

be a managed effort by multiple agencies, as collection is most effective at first point of contact with known or unknown terrorists. The Department of Defense (in combat theaters primarily), Central Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency are most often the first responders overseas who will have that initial contact.

Other countries, some allies in the war on terror and some not, have significant existing databases of terrorists that would greatly enhance our own. Some countries are safe havens and could provide access to terrorist populations. Collection of screening information can occur through four channels: *overt*, through diplomatic agreements which would be managed by the State Department and would likely be a long-term process; *informal*, through established law enforcement channels, which would be managed by the Bureau; *covert*, when a host country is uncooperative or hostile, which would be managed by the Intelligence Community; and *direct*, through encounter with terrorists and their implements in combat theaters, which would be managed by the military.

Soldiers Meet Agents

In early 2005, the U.S. military committed to adopting a booking procedure for detainees in Iraq and other theaters that meets law enforcement standards with respect to fingerprints, photographs, and mandatory descriptive data. By memorandum and general order, it was mandated that all DOD detainees

be processed to U.S. law enforcement standards. Detainees are specifically to be fingerprinted with 10 rolled and 10 flat prints, which are then shared with law enforcement because of the transnational nature and mobility of the terrorist fighter. Fingerprint-based background checks, also on the 10-print standard, were similarly ordered for foreign nationals applying to work on U.S. military bases and in some Iraqi agencies, such as military and police forces.

These commitments have led to immediate short-term benefits for the military in the Iraqi theater, such as better control of detainee populations, improved force protection for American bases in theater, and identifications against fingerprint databases, which allow military intelligence officers to focus interrogations on the worst terrorists.

As laudable as the gains have been, the U.S. military's status quo on forensic identification in theater, and specifically on fingerprints, remains half a program.

The terrorist crime scenes in such theaters as Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and the Philippines are not being fully exploited for forensic identification in the way U.S. law enforcement would process a murder, rape, or robbery crime scene for trace evidence that would then be preserved to identify the offender. Thus, there are missed opportunities in the short term to wage battle better by identifying and neutralizing insurgents on the ground in theater, and missed opportunities in the long term to secure the homeland, as

latent prints can be placed permanently in law enforcement and border security fingerprint databases for future identifications.

Forensic identifiers, such as latent fingerprints, have no shelf life limit. They are permanent identifiers made against correctly gathered latent prints 40 and 50 years after a crime. Latent prints can also be placed in automated systems such as IAFIS for identifications of unknown terrorists who might try to enter the country during or after the war in Iraq, be it 5, 10, or 50 years from today. Latent prints gathered in Iraq would thus have lasting value to homeland security and contribute significantly to the war on terror.

Recommendations

To institute a full forensic identification program in theater and within DOD, the military must:

- deploy crime scene teams within the combat theater to use simple, well-established techniques to collect and preserve evidence
- establish procedures based on best practices of U.S. law enforcement to track the collection of evidence for later use in U.S., Iraqi, or international courts
- formalize a manner for transferring evidence collected in theater to the U.S. law enforcement laboratories for full exploitation.

Crime Scene Teams. Events recently unfolding in some locations demonstrate that there is urgency for implementing these proposals. Sites discovered in Fallujah included the apparent scene where hostages held by the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi organization were beheaded, as well as an apparent headquarters of al-Zarqawi, including letters written by him. Neither location appears to have been forensically exploited. Other significant, high-value sites not forensically exploited are the hiding hole where Saddam was captured and the shed from which he directed insurgent activity. Minimal effort, supplies, and training could have yielded significant trace evidence from such sites, such as latent fingerprints, hair, fiber, and DNA that could lead to positive, court-accepted identification of victims, perpetrators, and conspirators.

Latent prints in particular would have immediate value to the U.S. military in Iraq. Searches of these prints against automated

databases can take a relatively short period of time but can identify previously unknown terrorists. Hits made against the in-theater database could lead to operations to neutralize terrorists. Moreover, hits reflecting that the terrorists had been in the United States would lead to investigations in the homeland.

The long-term value of latent prints, if searches do not yield immediate hits, is considerable:

- Unidentified latent prints can be placed in U.S. fingerprint databases for future identifications.
- Latent prints are retained for comparison against detainees or fighters in other theaters, such as Afghanistan and the Philippines.
- Latent prints can be shared with allies the same way as intelligence for search against their automated systems and postings for future identifications.
- Latent prints, once identifications are made, are admissible as evidence in U.S., Iraqi, and international courts.
- As part of the rebuilding effort in Iraq, Iraqi security forces are being taught to fingerprint criminals and insurgents, and a commitment has been made that the United States will build an automated fingerprint system for these forces.

Evidence Collection. The cost of gathering latent prints is minimal. There is no expensive logistic apparatus to establish, but simply a formalization of the existing pathway to transfer evidence collected from the field to the laboratory and the creation of as complete an evidence chain (that is, documentary support of where and by whom evidence was gathered) as the ebb and flow

high-value sites not forensically exploited are the hiding hole where Saddam was captured and the shed from which he directed insurgent activity

of combat allows. The key to success is seizing all opportunities, and then gathering evidence properly. Facilitating the search in the short term would require designating three-man mobile teams that would deploy to high-value sites and operations in theater, much as crime scene teams in major cities respond to crime scenes discovered by patrol officers and then process those scenes. The

FBI's basic instruction for evidence collection can be given in a 40-hour week. A more advanced course requires 2 weeks. While certain lab techniques for developing and comparing latent prints and other trace evidence are complex and require considerable training and expertise, collecting trace evidence is basically simple. One team member photographs and documents evidence while the other two collect and preserve, a process known as "bagging and tagging."

This procedure also lends itself to the need in the combat theater to get off the exploited site quickly. If the team knows what constitutes good evidence, it can collect and preserve a great deal in a short time.

Such a process, including photographing and documenting, could be accomplished in minutes with equipment that could fit in a backpack. The gains include a permanent record of the terrorist act and forensic identifiers to discover the perpetrator and prosecute the act as a terrorist crime.

The law enforcement commitment in the short term, primarily from the FBI, would be to train these teams, provide expert advice on the types and amounts of equipment necessary, and provide samples of standard administrative procedures and the documents used to track evidence for purposes of proving criminal acts in a court of law. Based on basic equipment for FBI Evidence Response Teams, a 3-man team could be outfitted for several weeks for about \$2,500. The Bureau would also have to commit to taking in larger volumes of evidence from Iraq, which at present amounts to only a fraction of work received by the FBI laboratory.

Evidence Transfer. The framework for getting evidence from field to laboratory already exists in a process that balances immediate in-theater requirements with the need to develop trace evidence in a laboratory setting. In September 2003, the military with the FBI set up the Com-

bined Explosive Exploitation Cell to analyze improvised explosive devices that coalition forces collected in Iraq. The mandate for the cell was to conduct a quick forensic triage of devices and report back to the theater regarding design, appearance, triggering mechanism, and anything else that could help a Soldier in the field recognize, avoid, or neutralize an explosive apparatus. In this process,



Taking digital identification photo of detainee

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Suzanne M. Day)



Paul J. Shannon

Comparing latent print to print in database



Fingerprinting detainee in Tikrit

1st Combat Camera Squadron (Suzanne M. Day)

while creating a product that definitely saved lives, it was recognized that the devices should also be exploited in a law enforcement manner for trace evidence—DNA, hair, unique tool marks, explosive analysis, or latent prints.

In October 2003, the cell began forwarding devices to the FBI laboratory through the Bureau's command post in Baghdad. More than 800 devices have since been sent to the laboratory, processed through the new Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center. Technicians process the items for latent prints and other trace evidence. The prints are then

Several devices have been linked through latent comparison showing that the same bomb maker worked on them, while others have been linked through DNA comparison.

Crime scene work and evidence collection must become part of the institutional goals of the military and an integrated part of combat operations. Crime scene teams must be present at high-value sites in the aftermath of suicide car bombings and attacks, and on

and passed back to U.S. law enforcement and border security because of the international mobility of the terrorist fighter.

According to Department of State statistics, 87 percent of terrorist attacks against Americans or their interests worldwide have involved improvised explosive devices. This trend will continue as Iraqi-trained terrorists bleed out of Iraq into surrounding countries and Europe and as al Qaeda's preference for large car bombs that inflict maximum casualties shows no abatement. The terrorist's and the insurgent fighter's greatest weapon is anonymity, and the most difficult task for a Soldier or a law enforcement officer in the war on terror is to pick that individual out of the crowd. Forensic identifiers such as latent prints and DNA give the United States the potential to identify the most dangerous subset of terrorists, unknown bombmakers. **JFQ**

the mandate for the cell was to report anything that could help a soldier in the field recognize, avoid, or neutralize an explosive apparatus

searched and posted permanently in IAFIS for future identifications. Analysts also produce reports on devices that are distributed to U.S. law enforcement bomb squads and explosive technicians nationwide, to disseminate domestically the same intelligence on explosive devices that has been passed back to soldiers in the combat theater.


the battlefield during campaigns such as the taking of Fallujah. Soldiers must behave as first responders—in the same manner as U.S. police officers, firefighters, and paramedics—in recognizing a high-value scene, understanding that evidence there must be preserved, and knowing they must call in crime scene teams. The evidence collected must then be exploited

No Leader Is Ever Off Stage

Behavioral Analysis of Leadership

By BRENDA L. CONNORS

1st Combat Camera Squadron (D. Myles Cullen)



The many faces of Saddam Hussein from his 2004 hearing in Baghdad

With a better understanding of the behavior of foreign leaders, we can strengthen our ability to influence them and their decisions. Assessing these figures accurately—indeed, analyzing human motivation rationally—is a tough business. But predicting the behavior of often reclusive and complex individuals who possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an essential task of modern government.

Reliable assessments of nuclear capabilities and human intention in North Korea and Iran top today's list of priorities. U.S. policy, strategy, and operational planning hinge on understanding remote adversarial regimes and our best guess at what their leaders will do next. Will North Korea's leader use his WMD? When? And how far will he go? Need we wait another year and witness more rounds of

United Nations (UN) Security Council deliberations before we know what *personally* motivates Iran's current leader? Not necessarily.

Until 1986, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a vibrant Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior, led by Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist whose interdisciplinary team included experts in social, clinical, and political psychology, as well as cultural anthropology. The team's studies on Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, for instance, provided critical guidance to President Jimmy Carter during the successful Camp David negotiations with and between those opposing leaders.

Today, several agencies, including the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are building models of individuals relevant to agency mission. To enrich these biographical and political models, they use

a variety of analytical methods, such as social network and semantic content analysis of transcripts. Since 9/11, the imperative to do more and better in understanding leaders of interest has resulted in a self-examination of what and how such assessments are done, how they could be improved, and how best to share these improvements. Filling our knowledge gaps in these ways, analysts today are getting better at understanding and predicting leaders' actions.

Movement Analysis

A promising new approach has evolved that may complement traditional ways of assessing leaders and their intentions. This method, called movement analysis, has implications for policy, strategy, and operations. It involves adding a different perceptual and analytic lens through which to assess leaders not well known to us to provide insights about how they might behave. This new kind of investigation can illuminate many issues, as it

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did in Iraq when it empowered us to distinguish the real Saddam Hussein from a possible double. Moreover, movement analysis can help gauge the general potential of an emerging head of state, such as Iran's president. It can also reveal evidence of psychological disorganization, substance dependency, or medical problems and provide insight into cognitive and decisionmaking styles. Such analysis offers a glimpse into a person's style at both the unconscious and conscious level, helping distinguish between a pro-forma expression and a convicted response indicating feeling or belief from a deeper source.

Extensive movement analysis had been undertaken on Saddam Hussein since the 1990s, which afforded baseline evidence about his decisionmaking style, including explanation for his "less rational" decisions. As far back as 1990, for example, observers questioned why he did not partially withdraw his troops from Kuwait while retaining the northern oil fields, which would have undermined the U.S. and multilateral position. Psycho-diagnostic measures of his movement reveal intermittent disorganization visible in his gestures.¹ These measurements can offer hypotheses about when and why Saddam remained attached to certain positions and missed other strategically wise opportunities.² Movement disorganization emerges as Saddam speaks about relinquishment of his WMD, and this disorganization offers insight into his psychological framework related to the weapons, and thus the poor prognosis of any policy to cut him off from them. Also, the body can offer hints of why exile or suicide was highly unlikely given his personal psychological framework.³

Analysis of Saddam's responses in 2003 to questions regarding whether he possessed WMD or had links to al Qaeda offers evidence on several levels both for policymakers, who must make decisions on war or peace, and for military planners and battlefield commanders, who must devise and enact strategic and operational plans. Today, because of the consistency and recurrence of behavioral patterns in the wake of Saddam's capture, there is an opportunity to validate certain hypotheses posed long before his capture. Such patterns are detectable even before a leader is elected, making analysis and planning even more reliable.

The human body is an almost untapped unorthodox instrument of power; it is the ultimate source and container of much strategic information. While it may appear that policy

alone determines a leader's actions, a leader's overall behavior (and its relation to policy) ultimately arises from a body/mind patterning that recurs and manifests on several levels to influence his decisions.⁴ A national leader considers a wide range of strategic choices, but he filters these choices through a personal information base: his body's temperamental hardwiring.

Decoding an individual's intrinsic patterning can penetrate the body's functional and expressive level. Vladimir Putin's labored walking when he appeared on the world stage New Year's Day 2000, for instance, signaled to a behavioral movement analyst that as he rose ever higher politically, he had to overcome great life-long obstacles within himself. Such hurdles reflected in movement signature influence how he perceives himself and his role as Russia's leader.⁵

The Leader Beneath the Performance

Careful study of a leader's behavior involves observing movement below the level of political performance. We have entered an age in which neuroscience discoveries and computerized event recorders can reliably capture quantitative and qualitative measures of human expression in .03 seconds if necessary.⁶ Observing a leader's demeanor beneath the greasepaint penetrates beyond the coaching that image makers offer politicians performing on the stump or in interviews. Charisma, in the end, cannot be easily taught, and performance cannot so easily be improved or masked. When confronted by probing questions, even the most highly trained performers and politicians reveal in movements large and small their stresses, emotions, and movement contradiction. We can detect these signs if we are attuned to such sensing.

Until recently, the behavior of foreign leaders has been considered marginally relevant in the development of U.S. foreign policy and military planning. Domains such as political science, political psychology, public diplomacy, and psychological operations discuss the behavioral dimension but as yet do not directly observe or analyze people or context. But today's security environ-

ment demands that we consider a new point of view that focuses on people's behaviors and experiences.

Bomb Damage Assessment

In March 2003, at the beginning of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the world hoped for a quick and clean extraction of Saddam Hussein from power. The night the United States precisely bombed his headquarters, there was great anticipation that Saddam would be gone shortly. Only hours later, the network television anchors suddenly announced that the Iraqi leader would make a statement. Then a man much resembling Saddam read a defiant speech to the world. Had the Iraqi leader survived the attack? Or was it one of his doubles?

The fog of war can wreak havoc with perceptions, as well as increase the stress levels of targeted adversaries like the former Iraqi dictator, who that evening appeared swollen in the face and wearing what was for him an unusual pair of spectacles. Background commentary and best guess estimates about whether this was the president of Iraq or one of his doubles kept the world glued to the television but actually distorted the general perception of what was happening. Careful analysis of the man wearing the beret and large eyeglasses on that March 2003 evening offered the expert movement analyst evidence that he was Saddam Hussein.

Proof of Identity

Signature movement style is unique and so detailed that it can offer incontrovertible proof of who someone is in the flesh. Even if an imposter has had surgery to alter his facial appearance, he cannot exactly replicate the orig-

Framegrab from Al Jazeera television of an unconfirmed image of Hussein urging Iraqis to resist the U.S.-led occupation

AP/Wide World Photo—Al Jazeera TV



inal. Contrastive analysis of a subject against the self offers micro-evidence in myriad categories, such as head and gaze behavior, handedness, body posture, rhythm, and archetypes of personality that can be compared against a so-called imposter. In addition to tracking what is moving, we can also assess the quality of how someone moves.⁷

In April 2003, a month into the second Gulf War, the networks announced, “Saddam is walking the streets of Um Quasr, Baghdad,” and CNN commentators again asked, “Is this a double?” Even with the poorest of footage shot from 40 feet away, behavioral movement evidence revealed that the man was Saddam. The fact that he was surrounded by several of his closest aides was one cue, but his signature passive body attitude, style of interaction with those surrounding and touching him, and micro-facial expressions offered other sound evidence. One particular display of stress,⁸ barely visible to even a trained observer, strengthened the evidence: Saddam displayed his stress sign of rubbing his left eyelid with his left hand. He did that at a moment when people milling around him came well inside the space he prefers to maintain between himself and others.

Scratching his left eyelid may seem insignificant in day-to-day behavior, but such a subtle recurrence of signature evidence can help identify the man. First, it is observable evidence of an idiosyncratic expression that is a verifiable element of his repertoire. Second, its emergence in context is an indicator of his patterned interaction style and the extreme discomfort he consistently displays when he is in close contact with people.

The war on terror increasingly demands reliable measures in the area of identity confirmation. Amidst the chaos of insurgency and war, when America’s most wanted remain on the run, the remote capacity to identify elusive and lethal figures can save time and lives.

Patterns of Expression

Saddam granted CNN’s Peter Arnett an interview in January 1991, 2 weeks into the first Iraq war while bombs were dropping around his offices. Maintaining control at all costs and featuring himself as the center of attention are the mainstays of Saddam’s patterned movement style. The same pattern emerged 12 years later when he appeared on television to show that he was still alive and in control. This bold appearance revealed the consistency of his behavior and was predict-

ably what Saddam would do. Even with the fires of war burning around him, the patterns drove his actions, and he could not fail to take advantage of that kind of opportunity to seek attention and assert control. Saddam’s defiance during his ongoing trial is another manifestation of the pattern.

Understanding the body’s patterns helps us appreciate that Saddam actually seems to come alive when he can defy the world and gather global attention. When he is not engaged in defiance, we see his body’s true baseline, that of an uncomfortable, impassive leader. Ironically, challenging the prosecution during his trial in Baghdad is recuperation for Saddam and what floats his boat. Placing him in view of the international media in the courtroom is the kind of sparring he thrives on, because it allows temporary freedom from the straitjacket of his controlled body attitude.

Saddam’s movement went well beyond his baseline evasive mode, and his body organized into active deception

Veracity of Saddam’s Statements

Analysis of the behavioral response of the adversary’s unconscious expression on specific topics, such as Saddam’s statements about WMD or links to al Qaeda, offers additional critical evidence for consideration at the policy, strategy, and operational levels. Saddam’s defiance of the UN Special Commission program to verify the destruction of his WMD and links to al Qaeda were the foundations of our public premise to go to war in Iraq. Since our ability to verify the existence of such weapons had been cut off since 1997—and since U.S. intelligence had scant knowledge about whether Osama bin Laden and Saddam were linked—another means of answering these questions was necessary.

Beneath the well-crafted image, resplendent military uniforms, and displays of himself at rallies and on posters as Iraq’s leader, Saddam was a man whose communicative repertoire is strikingly limited. His speeches were mostly bland and monotonous. Flattering images cannot replace the elements of charisma or energetic intensity so lacking in his presentations. In fact, examples of Saddam displaying personal conviction are rare. His

baseline movement style is one of passive detachment, symptomatic of how psychophysically he became organized to survive early in his difficult childhood.

This disconnection from the present also provides him with a patterned sense of “timelessness,” which offers another explanation for his tendency to ignore ultimatums and deadlines or even to recognize that he is on trial. Even after all that has happened to him, detached in part from the body, he is still comfortable telling himself that he is here to stay and that he remains powerful.

Dissimulation Pattern

In January 1991, CNN’s Peter Arnett asked Saddam what had happened to the Iraqi air force planes that landed in Iran to avoid destruction. Saddam’s movement went well beyond his baseline evasive mode, and his body organized into active deception. Saddam constrained all of his movement, brought his arms tight to his sides, stopped his head movement and gestures, and displayed no grins (though they often accompany his evasive mode) while he constructed an implausible explanation of what happened.

The historical record shows that the planes did land in Iran and that he lied about that. Thus, we have a snapshot of what he looks like when he dissimulates (what he does when he is actively constructing a lie).⁹ Moreover, several of the movement measures he employed in this response were behaviors related to constraint of arms and head and a decrease in gesture, which some deception research has also associated with active dissimulation.¹⁰

Now that we know what Saddam does when he believes himself and what he has been known to do when he lies, we can examine two of his more recent responses for evidence about the veracity of his statements.

On February 5, 2003, Saddam gave an interview in Iraq to former British Parliamentarian Tony Benn for the Canadian Broadcasting Company. As soon as the interview began, Benn asked Saddam, “Do you have weapons of mass destruction?”

At first, Saddam responded with his baseline evasive style but then rolled into his nit-picking mode where his gestures become segmented,¹¹ so tightly controlled that the speech and motion correspondence goes off track, signaling a profound separation of thought, movement, and voice revealing a temporary disconnect from his body’s unity of expression.¹²

Umm al-Maarek (Mother of All Battles) mosque near Baghdad has four inner minarets shaped like Scud missiles and four outer minarets resembling the barrels of Kalashnikov rifles



The New York Times (Tyler Hicks)

Context analysis of the verbal assertions that accompany Saddam's heightened segmentation shows that he reduced complex ideas into simple notions, another manifestation of control. This extreme compartmentalization served to disqualify important elements of reality, creating for him a selective perception. This visible movement disorganization broke any momentary unity of expression and is a measurable reflection of the sort of compartmentalized cognition that comes and goes and that suggests that, while Saddam believes what he was saying, he is not fully in touch with reality. The leader recovered with a low level of conviction and concluded, "Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction." There are no signs of active dissimulation in Saddam's response.

Benn, without missing a beat, followed up with, "Does Iraq have links to al Qaeda?" Saddam first flashed a grin, signaling that he was going into one of his evasive responses. He quickly recovered and became clear. In an unfettered way, revealing again the unusual spark of conviction and dynamism in his posture and gesture, he said, "Iraq has no links to al Qaeda."

In a CBS interview 19 days later, Dan Rather also pointedly asked Saddam, "Do you have, or have you had, any connection to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden?" Again, Saddam grinned and launched into an evasive strategy, throwing back the question, asking Rather whether the root of the anxiety was in the minds of U.S. officials or of the American

people. Saddam then got right on track with low-level conviction as he said, "We have never had any relationship with Mr. Osama bin Laden, and Iraq has never had any relationship with al Qaeda." As he denied the links, there was no contradictory movement. In body, he was telling us again that he was speaking clearly about not having a connection to bin Laden.

To these explicit questions, Saddam begins answering from his baseline evasive style and leaves everyone wondering as to the truth. Evasion is most basically Saddam; it serves him well in many ways. It is a communicative mode that keeps everyone unsure all the time and is one of the mainstays of the former dictator. It

Saddam's psychological grandiosity convinces the former dictator that he and Iraq are indistinguishable

buys him time to defend himself and recover from tough questions. But behavioral movement analysis asks that we stay with the stream of communication a bit longer. If we remain focused through the phases and watch what else occurs in movement during such responses, we can learn more.

Saddam's evasive beginning on the WMD question bought him time, but if we look at the body level, the nit-picking gesture and segmentation emerge. This additional evidence in his hand movements cues us that he is in his hyper-vigilant, highly controlled, cognitively isolated selective reality. During this last international CBS interview in 2003 prior to Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, Saddam's

selective reality emerged when he told an incredulous Dan Rather twice that he won the 1991 Gulf War.

While Saddam's response probably was an attempt to garner Arab support and reflected a calculated defiance against the United States, his statement was accompanied by segmentation, a visible movement disorganization that broke his unity of expression and was measurable evidence of the sort of compartmentalized cognition that suggests that while he believed what he was saying, he was at that moment not fully present in his body or in touch with reality.

No Rational Actor

Many political experts considered Saddam a shrewd strategic planner who misled the international community for over a decade, giving him the false title of "rational actor." The movement patterning Saddam displays in real time is a direct and more reliable indicator and may help us to refine our views of when Saddam was rational. The degree to which this former dictator is fully in reality can be reliably measured through psychodiagnostic indicators of the body's movement according to topic and context, and this measurement becomes a critical aspect of strategic planning for policymakers.

Jerrold Post and Amatzia Baram, in *Saddam Is Iraq, Iraq Is Saddam*, argue that Saddam's psychological grandiosity convinces the former dictator that he and Iraq are indistinguishable. They argue that, in his mind, he and his weapons are one and the same. These authors link Saddam's psychological architecture directly to the Mother of All Battles Mosque, which has four minarets shaped

like Scud missiles and four shaped like assault rifles. Looking directly at his body offers additional concrete evidence strengthening the authors' hypothesis derived both from remote behavioral movement analysis and traditional political history and psychological theory.

Saddam was known for his quintessential displays of the right arm waving to the crowds, emphasizing his status and power. A closer look reveals a profound disconnection between the arm movement and his torso. The arm is so controlled that it is detached energetically from the torso. So, in a sense, as a form of compensation, Saddam's arms (his weapons) are his power—unconsciously an extension of what Post and Baram call the

“wounded self and what the body reveals are missing from the whole.” Saddam and his weapons are one and the same, virtual appendages of the fractured man.

Thus, the emergence of segmentation in his arm movement is not surprising in a 2003 response about WMD. Presumably, even raising the topic made his selective perception go into high gear as the mere mention of separating Saddam from these extensions of self evoked in him a sense of detachment (and unconsciously triggered a deep fear and a sense of further dismemberment) seen in the highly controlled, segmented arm gestures.

In responding to Benn’s question about WMD, Saddam was evasive and segmented, but he did not contradict what he was saying in movement. Though denying verbally that he had WMD is what we expected under any circumstance, he could not, in reality, accept the idea of not having them or, for that matter, of not remaining in power. However, that his movement did not contradict what he was saying is interesting additional information.

What would have been compelling is if, while Saddam denied in words that he had WMD, his body movement had contradicted his claim. There was no such evidence in his display. While underneath he might have been telling himself his own story about the weapons, and hoping to restart his program in the future, his statement that he did not have them was supported by his body movement. And when Benn and Rather asked about links to al Qaeda, Saddam did not display his dissimulation mode. This analysis of his very personal relationship to WMD and what it means to him becomes one more piece of evidence to be used by policymakers and planners.

In a world seeking to understand how to communicate with friend and foe alike to avert conflict, using one more leadership assessment tool can help us predict the behavior of political leaders and remote adversaries to whom we have little access.

Each person has a basic hardwired skill to apprehend movement. Perhaps our greatest interagency challenge will be to attend more consciously to behavior. That involves confronting our resistance to embodying such a perspective. It can be hard to accept that we are so patterned and predictable. Moreover, learning something both new and outside our comfort zone, such as decoding movement patterns, can trigger resistance; thus, we find ways to remain unconscious about them.

Still, failure to embrace this soft dimension of power may lead to serious mistakes.

Some kinds of movement patterns can be read easily with modern teaching tools. Research has demonstrated that the facial expression of human emotion is the same the world over (although what triggers and ultimately shapes the display of those expressions is culturally influenced). Appreciating that critical behavioral knowledge represents just the tip of the iceberg for American officials.

The willful failure to uncover the cognitive decisionmaking style and psychological state of mind of the opponent across the table during negotiating or planning for war denies us a tremendous advantage. If the opponent uses it against us, the advantage will be his. In the end, our opponents are never off stage. Neither are we. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ Brenda L. Connors and Martha Davis, “Non-verbal Communication Demonstration Project, Micro-analytic Profiling of Foreign Leaders,” unpublished U.S. Government report, 1999.

² Other evidence continues to emerge about Saddam’s state of mind. See Kevin Woods, James Lacey, Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006), 2–26.

³ Brenda L. Connors, “See a Reflection of Saddam’s Biography,” *Naval War College Review* 57, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 113–116.

⁴ Brenda L. Connors, “Body Leads: A Non-Traditional Approach to Understanding Leadership and Performance Style,” unpublished U.S. Government primer, 2004.

⁵ See Paul Starobin, “The Accidental Autocrat,” *Atlantic Monthly* (February–March 2005), 82–92.

⁶ We constantly interact with what movement analysis theory calls the *four motion factors*, measures familiar to the political military community: power (weight), time and space (environment), and energy. Analytic appreciation of how a leader interacts with these forces is a primary aspect of understanding a behavioral movement signature.

⁷ Charlie Chaplin and Alec Guinness, actors of Hitler’s day, portrayed the Third Reich’s dictator in motion pictures. While certain parts of their performance captured aspects of Hitler’s oratorical style, such as crossing his arms, the careful pausing to keep the crowd waiting, and his smugness, Hitler’s deepest hardwired movement signature, including the movement disorganization manifest in the uncontrollable twitch in his right hand, which he tried to hide during speeches by tucking it beneath his left upper arm, could not be replicated by even the generation’s best actors.


⁸ A movement repertoire will include a person’s stress signs. Studies of footage for over two decades included analysis of one particular unconscious micro-expression of stress that a master movement expert with over 30 years of experience had actually analyzed for cues to inner motivation and the phrasing of his actions.

⁹ The same posture is seen in images taken with former U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie during her last meeting with Saddam.

¹⁰ B.M. De Paulo et al., “Cues to Deception,” *Psychological Bulletin* 129 (2003), 74–118.

¹¹ See M. Davis and D. Hadiks, “Demeanor and Credibility,” *Semiotica* 106 (1995), 5–54.

¹² Saddam at such moments, when his thinking is in overdrive, often corrects his competent interpreters.



Classic pose of Saddam Hussein during one of his rare public appearances

AP/Wide World Photo



Russian soldier captures enemy



German soldiers dash away after setting fire to barn outside Stalingrad

The Enduring Relevance of the Battle for Stalingrad

By BRIAN HANLEY

More than six decades after the surrender of the Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army, some 50 years after the last German prisoner of war was allowed to return to what had once been his homeland, and a couple of generations after the place was renamed Volgograd, the mention of Stalingrad brings distinct images, even to minds untaught in history and geography.

In the months preceding the 2003 Iraq campaign, we were warned that the battle for Baghdad would become “another Stalingrad.” There was no shortage of editorials that argued that the earlier battle might forecast the nature of the impending struggle for the Iraqi capital. Analogies of this kind express just how catastrophic the battle for Stalingrad was.

In military circles, Stalingrad occupies a suitable place in officer development courses that focus on important battles. A campaign of Stalingrad’s proportions offers a multitude of lessons for the military. But what has yet to

be touched on specifically is an appraisal of the Stalingrad campaign that speaks directly to warfighters who value interservice comity and know-how above all else. To this end, this article argues that the Germans could have succeeded at Stalingrad if they had some of our ideas of joint operations and, of equal importance, our high standards in regard to professional integrity.

A Flawed Strategy

Stalingrad was fought and lost by the finest collection of divisions in an army that had not known strategic defeat for a quarter of a century. Where did this collection go wrong? How could talented leaders blunder on such a massive scale? We study the battle for Stalingrad from the German point of view so that 50 years hence, students of military campaigns will not be asking similar questions about U.S. performance in whatever major clash of arms awaits us.

The battle for Stalingrad really began in the summer of 1940, when Adolf Hitler initiated

a plan to attack the Soviet Union (though he had made up his mind that war with Russia was inevitable nearly a year earlier). In the autumn of 1940, Hitler’s intuition told him that the defeat of Great Britain could be accomplished only by conquering Russia. The German army, and to a lesser extent the Luftwaffe, was as close to what we would understand as combat readiness as it ever would be. Morale was at a peak, and there was a core of combat-tested leaders at all levels, although the German equipment was wanting in major respects. In both numbers and quality of weapons, the Russians had the upper hand. The Wehrmacht possessed no tank that could go head-to-head with the Russian T-34 and KV-1, and more than half of the 3,200 Panzers assembled at the eastern frontier in June 1941 were thinly armored machines. The Mark I had 7.62-mm machineguns, the Mark II had 20-mm guns, and the Czech tanks were armed with 37-mm guns. The infantry was without a suitable assault weapon; the standard-issue K98 rifle, an old design but hardly obsolete, was of limited value given the scale, intensity, and conditions of combat that would prevail on the eastern front.

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Even so, the operational and tactical excellence of the soldiers who would employ that equipment was without equal.

Irrespective of the valor and resourcefulness of the combat troops, the military strategy that governed Germany's war on Russia and culminated in the Stalingrad disaster was

the Germans were unprepared, which reflects not only a failure in planning but also a robust and invincible self-deception. As good as it was, the German army that charged across the River Bug in June 1941 in Operation *Barbarossa* was essentially an expeditionary force working to annihilate an enemy that

be kept running without a proper inventory of spare parts. Too late, German industry created semitracked trucks, but they were never produced in sufficient numbers and, even if they had been, none were without major design shortcomings.

The German planning system failed from the start to coordinate ways, ends, and means—a circumstance that had not been corrected when the summer offensive kicked off in June 1942. The decision to persist in executing a bad strategic plan thrust the Germans toward a defeat at Stalingrad that led to Soviet Russia's triumph 2 years later. From February 1943 onward, after the last German soldier surrendered at Stalingrad, Germany could not expect to regain the strategic initiative. Its only realistic hope was to fight a defensive war that would prove so costly to the Soviet armies as to drive Stalin to the negotiating table.

The great loss of men and materiel at Stalingrad meant that the most important strategic objective, the capture of Moscow, fell forever out of reach. And so crippling was the Stalingrad debacle that it removed the need for a northern front, even though the armies investing Leningrad in the spring of 1943 could have mitigated, if not prevented, the massive defeats in the central and southern sectors in 1944.

Practical Difficulties

Operation *Blue*, Hitler's summer offensive, largely duplicated the strategy of *Barbarossa*. The difference between the operations was one of scale. Directive 41 (April 5, 1942) ordered the Wehrmacht to "destroy the active fighting strength remaining to the Soviets and to take away as far as possible their most important resources of war." Hitler no longer had the forces to do this along the entire line, so Operation *Blue* focused on the southern sector of the eastern front. In four phases, the German army would destroy Soviet forces in the Don River Bend, capture the oil fields in the Caucasus, and shore up the front elsewhere until offensive power could be concentrated for further operations.

These ends were not beyond reason given what Hitler assumed to be the threadbare forces opposing him. But even if the intelligence estimates had been accurate rather than terribly wrong regarding Soviet strength and fighting spirit, Berlin's armies would have struggled to execute even this pared-down strategy. Hitler turned a precarious situation into a hopeless one by expanding the aims

the military strategy that governed Germany's war on Russia and culminated in the Stalingrad disaster was terribly flawed

terribly flawed—a circumstance aggravated by the moral feebleness of the operational commanders on the scene. Military planners today would find the Wehrmacht's original objectives of capturing major centers of gravity unexceptionable: the Ukraine (Soviet Russia's industrial and agricultural heartland); Moscow (the seat of Russia's dictatorship and its industrial and communications nerve center); and Leningrad (a major port on the Baltic Sea and cradle of Bolshevism).

Achieving these objectives would give Germany mastery over Russia from Archangel to the banks of the Volga, isolating Stalin and the communist system that Hitler feared and detested on the Asian steppe. But Hitler also insisted that his armies destroy Russian forces in the field—a goal that could not be squared with the other objectives. The great encirclement battles of 1941 have never been matched: 9 major pockets and more than a dozen smaller ones yielded 3 million Russian prisoners, 14,000 tanks, and 25,000 guns, as well as heaps of other equipment. But these victories, spectacular though they were, enfeebled the Wehrmacht in such a way as to make its massive defeat before the gates of Moscow in December 1941 inevitable. In locking down Russian forces in positions called *kessels* (kettles or cauldrons), rather than bypassing them, the German armored columns racked up miles on their tracks and engines they could ill spare. The infantry divisions tasked to liquidate the pockets suffered enormous losses in men and material. Time was spent inefficiently in these encirclement battles rather than in storming Moscow before the autumn rains would hold up the mechanized spearheads, or at least before the unimaginably brutal winter would paralyze and debilitate them.

But even if the original objectives had been doggedly pursued, in one decisive respect

could be defeated only by a military establishment that was structured, provisioned, trained, and experienced in wars of attrition.




Germans find safety behind a wall

Forever Out of Reach

To begin with, the German economy was not geared to support an effort of this kind. Moreover, the army was deliberately deprived of all supplies that would help the troops fight or withstand the Russian winter on the grounds that such items would demoralize the soldiery who, it was assumed, would fight better if they believed the war would be won in a few weeks.

In fact, the entire logistic system was a mess. Supplies were expected to move across great distances, without a proper road and rail network, to a front line constantly in flux. Also, the Germans had far too few trucks. The Opel Blitzes and Mercedes L3000 vehicles soon broke down under the strain of bad roads, excessive cargo, and questionable maintenance. The miscellany of captured vehicles the Germans had to rely on could not



Clockwise from left:
Germans aim heavy artillery at Stalingrad; Germans view battlefield; Map of German campaign for seizure of Stalingrad; Soldiers run for cover behind damaged Panzer tank.

of his plan. On July 23, about a month after Operation *Blue* got under way, he issued a major revision: his armies were to destroy Soviet forces in the Rostov area immediately to the east of where the German forward line was held, push on to occupy the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, and dispatch mobile forces to seize the main oil-producing areas, all in preparation for an offensive that would terminate at the north shore of the Persian Gulf. Maikop was the nearest objective at 200 miles southeast of the German front line. Astrakhan lay some 350 miles distant, Grozny 500 miles, and Baku a further 300 miles to the southeast of Grozny.

In addition, Hitler expected the Sixth Army—at 17 divisions, the largest and best equipped formation of its kind on the eastern front—to deny Russian forces the great volume of munitions, weapons, food, and oil produced in southern Russia by cutting the supply line at the Volga, immediately north of Stalingrad, which

was more than 200 miles east of the German front line in June 1942. According to Directive 42, the Sixth Army and the Fourth Panzer Army were “to attack Stalingrad, smash the enemy concentration there, take the town, and cut off the isthmus between the Don and the Volga.”

These expanded strategic ends were beyond the means of the German army—and given the indeterminate character of his revised plan, Hitler’s strategy in the south was perhaps not attainable without great risk by any army any time. First, expecting armored spearheads to plunge hundreds of miles further into enemy territory from a start point hundreds of miles from the German homeland to seize towns and encircle and annihilate enemy forces is contrary to sound operational and strategic judgment. Even if the enemy puts up only feeble resistance, flanks are well guarded, and all attacks on the flanks fail immediately, embarking on such a course would provoke one logistic crisis after

another. Armored columns require massive quantities of supplies when the objectives are as expansive as Hitler’s, so it makes good sense for them to advance at the head, or as part, of a broad offensive front. That allows these formations to remain within reach of supply dumps and field repair shops.

Hitler took no account of these practical difficulties, nor did he take notice of the additional psychological and physical strain his revised objectives would place on his troops. The Wehrmacht was already weakened by fighting the previous winter. German factory production could not keep up with demand for critical weapons systems—tanks and armored personnel carriers, for instance—and the Soviets were growing stronger and, as strategists and tacticians, wiser by the day. The Russians had every good reason to trade space for time, the objective being to lure Hitler’s armies—his most capable formations in particular—into a trap from which they could not escape. Unintentionally, Hitler collaborated with the Russian High Command on its plan of strategic retreat, to be followed by a series of massive counterstrokes.

Running Out of Options

The Sixth Army began to engage Russian forces outside Stalingrad in late July 1942. By August 23, advance elements had secured the west bank of the Volga immediately north of Stalingrad. At that moment, it appeared that Hitler’s plan, reckless though it was, just might work. From a strategic standpoint, the mission of the Sixth Army and the Fourth Panzer Army was successful. Soviet river traffic fell under German artillery fire, the rail line running north from Stalingrad was in German hands, and the Luftwaffe had free play of the skies, allowing it to pummel the industrial and transportation systems, as well as the civilian population within the city. As a hub of arms production and the movement of raw materials, Stalingrad was knocked out of the war.

Operationally, however, the situation was much murkier for the Germans by late September. Unlike the preceding weeks when the fighting took place on the steppes and in the suburbs, the Russians began to put up a stiff resistance within Stalingrad proper—though German tactics made it easier for the outnumbered and outgunned Soviets to stall the German advance. Instead of seizing the western bank of the Volga, which would have isolated Russian forces in the city and cut off the ferrying of troops and supplies across

the river each night, the Germans attacked the city on a broad front: from the northwest, the west, and the southwest. Advances, always costly in troops, quickly petered out because of pockets of resistance behind the front line, or because the Germans absorbed a critical mass of casualties in exchange for short and often evanescent gains.

Scarcely less important, the Germans had no choice but to use their primary offensive weapon, the Panzer force, entirely in a support role as assault groups. Within Stalingrad, the Panzers were usually employed



Russians celebrate victory after 200 days of fighting

Hitler turned a precarious situation into a hopeless one by expanding the aims of his plan

in small groups (three and four per engagement) and under conditions that favored the defender. Fighting in the dust, darkness, and clutter of a bombed-out city gives prominence to a tank's weakness—a large, noisy, smoking target that does not offer its crew the agility on which its survival depends—while minimizing its strength.

What made the Panzer arm effective was not its firepower, which was always second-rate compared with Russian machines, but its maneuverability and mutual support in formation. The three Panzer divisions (14th, 16th, 24th) and the three motorized divisions (3^d, 29th, 60th) committed to Stalingrad thus would have been more effectively employed as a mobile reserve, ready to annihilate any kind of flanking offensive or counter a deep puncture in the front line. German intelligence told the High Command that the Russians had no strategic reserves left, but military prudence and a knowledge of military history should have kept the Germans from risking all on mere reports. One knows for certain that the enemy has no reserves only when that enemy has been completely, irrevocably subdued. As John Keegan argues, "Intelligence in war, however good, does not point out unerringly the path to victory. Victory is an elusive prize, bought with blood rather than brains. Intelligence is the handmaiden, not the mistress, of the warrior."¹ Hitler was certain that no intelligence service could be expected to deliver.

Prestige versus Lives

The operational and tactical aspects of the battle are what most readily come to mind when one thinks of Stalingrad. By October 1942, after nearly 2 months of a contest marked by unprecedented brutality, the Germans were in charge of almost the entire city but without the strength to hold out should something go wrong. By early November, after the final attempt to take the city had run its course, the Sixth Army was exhausted. Most formations were reduced to a fraction of their original complement of men and equipment. At both the operational and tactical levels, the battle for Stalingrad was effectively lost. The Germans had taken a mass of casualties and lost hundreds of tanks, vehicles, and weapons with nothing to show for it but gathering catastrophe.

At the strategic level, chaos had begun to assert itself many weeks earlier. In late September, Hitler quarreled with and then dismissed his chief of staff, General Franz Halder, whose well-grounded misgivings about the Stalingrad campaign affronted Hitler's understanding of what was at stake. Halder argued for a strategic withdrawal from the city not only because of the casualties and the attendant weaknesses of the extended flanks, but also because the original strategic objective had since been attained—a fact Hitler would concede in a situation briefing 12 days after firing Halder.

As Hitler looked at the matter, however, seizing the city became above all else a matter of prestige—a word always fraught with meaninglessness when a head of state balances it against the lives of his soldiers. Capturing

Stalingrad would humiliate Stalin. The world would take note of communism being smashed under the boot of national socialism and marvel at Hitler's strategic genius and the invincibility of his armies.

Russian armies, which had been assembling on the periphery of the Stalingrad combat zone since late summer, attacked the thinly held flanks of Friedrich von Paulus' army with overwhelming force on November 19. By November 23, the encirclement of the Sixth Army and parts of the Fourth Panzer Army was complete. The Hungarian, Italian, and Romanian armies guarding the flanks and rear areas had been torn to pieces. Despite what was by any sensible reckoning a serious defeat that could only ripen into a strategic calamity if the trapped forces did not break out immediately, Hitler ordered his generals in the pocket to stand fast; he would send forces under General Erich von Manstein to break in. A supply corridor would be maintained until spring, when the offensive was expected to resume.

By Christmas Eve, however, the quixotic attempt by General von Manstein to relieve the Sixth Army had failed 2 weeks after it began. In the meantime, Russian armies pushed the German line some 200 miles west. The Russians assaulted the *kessel* on January 10, 1943. German troops fought valiantly but in a hopeless cause. On January 31, von Paulus surrendered, though remnants of the 11th Corps, isolated in the northern part of the city, did not capitulate until February 2.

For the Germans, it was a disaster beyond imagination. Two German armies

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were removed from the order of battle. Some 100,000 troops, including 2,000 officers and 22 generals, marched into captivity. Perhaps 1 in 20 survived the ordeal that followed. Antony Beevor estimates that, all told, the Axis armies—including the satellite forces—lost more than half a million troops between August and the final surrender at Stalingrad.² The loss of equipment was on an equally catastrophic scale.

The Moral Factor

Hitler is to blame for the Stalingrad debacle. He did not have the means to achieve his vast and at times incompatible objectives, and when his military chief of staff told him as much he was removed from his position. As J.F.C. Fuller has argued, the German army would have achieved its strategic objective—denying the Russian war machine vital raw materials produced in the south—by taking both banks of the Volga many miles north of Stalingrad.³ Such a plan would have squared ways, ends, and means, though the prestige Hitler attached to taking the city outright might never have been realized. Scarcely less significant was that Hitler's manner of proceeding was wasteful. When Hitler realized that Stalingrad could not be seized without bleeding his armies as they had never been bled before, the Nazi leader rejected advice from his commanders about aligning his strategic objectives with his operational plan and forces available.

While Hitler is due the largest share of the blame, his generals bear responsibility as well. For starters, they did not push for freedom of action until after the Germans had been effectively defeated in early November; what the Russians did after November 19 was basically a harvesting operation. The German generals on the scene only conceded the obvious after the hour for action was long past, when there was nothing to do but strike an indignant pose. It would have been far better for the Sixth Army leadership to resign en masse when General Halder was sacked in September than to continue endorsing a strategy they had to know was destructive. The generals rightly feared Hitler, for he might have imprisoned them for defying him or sent them before a firing squad. But the lives of one's troops always come first—and in any case, why should the generals persist in being careless with their soldiers while being overly scrupulous about their careers? Indeed, there was a possibility that Hitler would back

down, as he later would to Manstein and Heinz Guderian. At the least, the commanders might have surrendered when there was nothing to be gained by continuing the fight. No matter how well a campaign is planned, no matter how finely equipped and trained and battle-hardened an army is for a campaign, the moral qualities of the leadership remain of the highest importance.

The Stalingrad campaign took for granted that German forces would always prevail, no matter what the specific details of a given engagement. The German soldier at all levels was superior to his Russian counterpart—his morale was higher as well—and in any case, the High Command was convinced in the summer of 1942 that the Russians had no strategic reserves left. According to a capabilities-based approach to warfighting, the Germans were right to proceed as they did and would probably have defeated the Russians at Stalingrad—just as the Russians would have crushed the Germans in the opening weeks of Operation *Barbarossa*.

If the German experiences in Russia teach us anything, it is that capabilities wargaming can foster an atmosphere of overconfidence that is rooted in a narrow concern for material circumstances. Wargame directors should always throw in an implausible episode or detail, if only to encourage us to expect surprise and to help us cultivate prudence and resourcefulness.

Military leadership, irrespective of time and place, is at heart a moral activity. It is quality of character, not technical virtuosity or even managerial ability, that ultimately wins or loses the day. Wisdom, humility, compassion, and intelligent perseverance are the wellsprings of outstanding officership in peace but most especially in war. This is every bit as true for von Paulus at Stalingrad as it was for Agamemnon before Troy—and it is true for the joint warfighter today. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ John Keegan, *Intelligence in War* (New York: Knopf, 2003), 6.

² Antony Beevor, *Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942–1943* (New York: Penguin, 1999), 398.

³ J.F.C. Fuller, *A Military History of the Western World* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1956).