

KOSOVO ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT; ACHIEVING NATO NON-ARTICLE 5  
CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
Strategic Studies

by

BERAT SHALA, MAJOR, KOSOVO SECURITY FORCE  
PG Dipl. Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom, 2009  
B.A., The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 2005

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2014-02

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 12-12-2014		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> FEB 2014 – DEC 2014	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Kosovo Armed Forces Development; Achieving NATO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations Interoperability			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> MAJ Berat Shala			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Kosovo Security Force will evolve into Kosovo Armed Forces starting in 2014. This new institution will be developed to take new security responsibilities of Kosovo defense, support to civil authorities, and participation in international operations. One of objective of Kosovo Armed Forces is to be fully interoperable with NATO members, in order to participate effectively in NATO-led operations. A ten year development plan (2014-2024), explains that KAF will be developed in accordance with NATO standards.  NATO requires that participating nations meet specific criteria's doctrine, training, and materiel in order to be interoperable and effective in NATO-led Crisis Response Operations. Therefore, this study focuses in examining current Kosovo Armed Forces development program in order to determine whether it meets the NATO doctrine, training, and material requirements. In addition it examines if the current development program creates an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Kosovo Armed Forces, NATO interoperability, NATO Crisis Response Operations					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	107	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Berat Shala

Thesis Title: Kosovo Armed Forces Development; Achieving NATO Non-Article 5  
Crisis Response Operations Interoperability

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
LTC Karl F. Ledbuhr, M.A.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Matthew W. Broaddus, M.S.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Frank J. James, D.V.M.

Accepted this 12th day of December 2014 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

KOSOVO ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT; ACHIEVING NATO NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS INTEROPERABILITY, by MAJ Berat Shala, 107 pages.

Kosovo Security Force will evolve into Kosovo Armed Forces starting in 2014. This new institution will be developed to take new security responsibilities of Kosovo defense, support to civil authorities, and participation in international operations. One of objective of Kosovo Armed Forces is to be fully interoperable with NATO members, in order to participate effectively in NATO-led operations. A ten year development plan (2014-2024), explains that KAF will be developed in accordance with NATO standards. NATO requires that participating nations meet specific criteria's doctrine, training, and materiel in order to be interoperable and effective in NATO-led Crisis Response Operations. Therefore, this study focuses in examining current Kosovo Armed Forces development program in order to determine whether it meets the NATO doctrine, training, and material requirements. In addition it examines if the current development program creates an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to express my sincere appreciation to all the that contributed to the successful completion of this work.

My utmost and sincere gratitude goes to my committee chair LTC Karl Ledebuhr for his support, motivation, and constructive criticism needed to focus, develop, and complete my thesis. I extend this gratitude to the other members of my committee, Dr. Frank James and Mr, Mathew Broaddus, whose insightful advice and comments helped me to improve the thesis.

Most importantly, I will be forever indebted to my loving wife Alberina for her continuous support, patience, and understanding. In addition, my daughter Diella gave me joy, motivation and strength to continue and finish this work.

Finally, I would like to express my warm thanks to the staff of the Graduate Degree Program; Dr. Robert Baumann, and Mrs. Venita Krueger.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	x
TABLES .....	xi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	1
Overview of Kosovo Armed Forces Development.....	1
Research Questions.....	7
Definitions .....	7
Assumptions.....	9
Limitations .....	9
Scope and Delimitations .....	10
Significance of the study.....	11
Thesis Structure .....	11
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW .....	13
Kosovo Armed Forces Development.....	13
Republic of Kosovo Defense White Book.....	14
Long Term Development Plan.....	17
KAF General Military Doctrine.....	20
Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine .....	23
Master Thesis Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations .....	24
NATO Documents .....	26
NATO RTO Technical Report Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors.....	27
Allied Administrative Publication-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development.....	28
Allied Joint Publication 3(b) Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations .....	29
Allied Joint Publication 3.4(a) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.....	31

Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1 Training and Education for Peace Support Operations .....	34
U.S. Doctrine .....	36
U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational Operations .....	37
U.S. Army FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations .....	38
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	41
CHAPTER 4 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS .....	43
Interoperability.....	43
NATO Standards.....	46
The Political-Military Framework for Partners Involvement in Operations .....	47
Doctrine Requirements .....	49
Materiel Requirements.....	56
Other requirements.....	59
Analysis of Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Armed Forces .....	60
Doctrine.....	61
Future Doctrine .....	63
Training.....	67
Future Training .....	73
Materiel .....	76
Can KAF doctrine, training, and material program standards be achieved by 2024?.....	79
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	84
Summary of the Findings.....	84
Recommendations.....	88
Doctrine.....	88
Training.....	89
Materiel .....	91
Further Research Recommendations .....	91
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	93

## ACRONYMS

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
ATN	Army Training Network
BALBAT	Baltic Battalion
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CPR	Civil Protection Regiment
CREVAL	Combat Readiness Evaluation
DOTMLPF	Doctrine Organization Training Materiel Leadership Personnel Facilities Interoperability
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
JP	Joint Publication
KAF	Kosovo Armed Forces
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
KSF	Kosovo Security Force
LTDP	Long Term Development Plan
METL	Mission Essential Task List
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OCC E&F	Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback
OPCON	Operational Control
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SAR	Search and Rescue
SARTF	Search and Rescue Task Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSSR	Strategic Security Sector Review
TACON	Tactical Control
TACVAL	Tactical Evaluation
TCN	Troop Contributing Nations
TTP	Techniques, Tactics and Procedures
U.S.	United States
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UTL	Universal Task List

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Kosovo Armed Forces Structure.....	16
Figure 2. Kosovo Armed Forces Doctrine Hierarchy .....	22
Figure 3. Concept of Training and Education .....	35
Figure 4. Kosovo Armed Forces Doctrine Hierarchy .....	69
Figure 5. Civil Protection Regiment Organizational Chart.....	70

## TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Principles of Unit Training .....	39
Table 2. NATO Doctrine Standards.....	66
Table 3. NATO Training Standards .....	74
Table 4. NATO Materiel Standards .....	78

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to examine the current Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) development program and determine whether it meets the doctrine, training, and material requirements to create an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.<sup>1</sup> This study analyzes and compares the Kosovo Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR), KAF Long Term Development Plan, KAF Doctrine, and NATO standards and requirements for participating in NATO led operations.

In this first chapter the researcher introduces and describes KAF development plan background information. Once the background information regarding the problem is introduced the researcher then describes the primary and secondary research questions. To facilitate the reader's understanding of these technical documents, concepts key terms are defined, and research limitations and delimitations described.

#### Overview of Kosovo Armed Forces Development

The Kosovo Armed Force development program roots originate from the demilitarization of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) agreement. This agreement was signed between KLA leadership and NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) in June of 1999 regarding the demilitarization and transformation of KLA. This agreement facilitated the

---

<sup>1</sup> NATO Non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations include multifunctional operations, falling outside the scope of Article 5, which contribute to conflict prevention and resolution or serve humanitarian purposes, and crisis management in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives.

resolution of certain political problems and was the catalyst for the formation of the KAF. It is important to note that, the agreement indicated that with the resolution of Kosovo political status, Kosovo will develop their armed forces with the mission similar to that of the United States (U.S.) National Guard.<sup>2</sup> The political status of international state acceptance of Kosovo was a long and deliberate process that involved members of the United Nation (UN). Recognition in order to demilitarize the KLA an interim solution was proposed and implemented. To meet the UN requirements a civilian organization, Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), was created and became known as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). The KPC's mandate was to provide disaster-response services, perform search and rescue, provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist de-mining and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities.<sup>3</sup>

Kosovo's final status resolution went through a number of developmental phases. In 2005, the UN assigned a Norwegian diplomat named Kai Eide to conduct a study if the resolution of final Kosovo status negotiations should begin.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Kai Eide submitted his report in the end of 2005, indicating that conditions for final Kosovo status negotiations have been achieved. The UN Security Council (UNSC) endorsed Mr. Eide's recommendation and authorized the start of the status negotiation process. This report was important for Kosovo, since there was a long debate whether it should be

---

<sup>2</sup> NATO, "Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK," 29 June 1999, accessed 30 March 2014, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm>.

<sup>3</sup> NATO, "NATO's Role in Kosovo," 22 October 2013, accessed 24 March 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_48818.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm).

<sup>4</sup> Fatos Bytyci, "Kosovo Amends Law to Close Western Supervisory Body," *Reuters*, 7 September 2012, accessed 10 May 2014, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/uk-kosovo-supervision-dUKBRE8860LN20120907>.

negotiations in the first place, and give the opportunity for Kosovo to be independent. The UN Special Envoy, former Finland President Mr. Marti Ahtisaari, led the negotiation process between Kosovo and Serbia. Discussions began in early 2006, and continued until end of 2007. Although the negotiating parties did not reach an agreement, Mr Ahtisaari drafted a final status proposal, known as “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (Comprehensive Proposal) where he suggested a “supervised independence” for Kosovo. While this proposal was not approved by the UNSC, Kosovo in coordination and support from the U.S. and European Union (EU), on 17 February 2008 declared its independence and free democratic country called Republic of Kosovo. Since 17 February 2008, until end of 2014 Republic of Kosovo has been recognized by 108 countries.

The Republic of Kosovo (hereafter Kosovo) embraced Mr. Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal in entirety and implemented all the recommendations. One of the recommendations was the establishment of a new multi-ethnic, professional Kosovo Security Force (KSF).<sup>5</sup> However, KSF was to be developed with certain limitations and restrictions. Limitations and restrictions imposed by the Comprehensive Proposal are on KSF’s end strength, mission and equipment. In article 5 of Annex VII of comprehensive proposal states that KSF shall “consist of no more than 2,500 active members and 800 reserve members, shall be lightly armed, initially the KSF shall be primarily responsible for crisis response, explosive ordinance disposal, and civil protection.”<sup>6</sup> In addition,

---

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Security Council, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” 26 March 2007, accessed 10 May 2014, [http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive proposal-english.pdf](http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive%20proposal-english.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 54.

Article 5 of Annex VIII states that “[c]hanges to the limits set forth in Article 5.2 of this Annex are to be determined by the (International Military Presence) IMP, in coordination with the (International Civilian Representative) ICR. A full review of these limits shall be conducted no earlier than 5 years from the date this Settlement enters into force.”<sup>7</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed to assist in the dissolution of the KPC, establishment of the KSF, and a civilian structure responsible to supervise the KSF, the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. The KPC ceased to be operational and stand down on January 20, 2009, and the KSF stand up began on January 21, 2009.

Since January 2009, KSF has been developed, trained and guided by NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). The core mission of the KSF is to conduct crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad; civil protection operations within Kosovo; and to assist the civil authorities in response to natural disasters and other emergencies. Primary tasks of KSF include search and rescue operations; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); inspection, decontamination and destruction of hazardous materials; firefighting; and humanitarian assistance tasks.<sup>8</sup>

Since 2009 and until the end of 2014, Kosovo Security Force has conducted numerous missions in assistance to civil authority within Kosovo. These missions were mainly related to demining, search and rescue, and hazardous materials operations. Although, KSF is third line responder in Kosovo for civil emergency, (police and emergency services being first and second), because of the lack of capabilities and skills

---

<sup>7</sup> United Nation Security Council, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” 54.

<sup>8</sup> Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, LAW No. 03/L-046, *Law on the Kosovo Security Force*, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, 13 March 2008.

in these institution, KSF was often first on the scene. Extensive engagement in demining and other emergency response within Kosovo gave an opportunity for KSF to gain experience and enhance their professionalism in the civil emergency types of missions.

In March of 2012, one year before the five-year limitation imposed by the Comprehensive Proposal for the review of future missions, organization and structure of the KSF, the government of Kosovo initiated a Strategic Security Sector Review (SSSR).

The main SSSR objectives were:

1. To define Strategic Objectives of Kosovo and Security and Defense Policies of the Republic of Kosovo;
2. To define the Strategic Security Environment, and possible security Risks and Threats;
3. To analyze the current capacities of internal security institutions;
4. To define the capacities that internal security institutions need in the future;
5. To make recommendations for developing necessary capacities and the dissolution of those not required (needed), based on SSSR capabilities analysis;
6. To provide guidance for new National Security Strategy of Kosovo;
7. To provide recommendations for necessary legislative changes;
8. To establish security institutions based on SSSR recommendations and based on the National Security Strategy;<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Republic of Kosovo, “Analysis of Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo,” Prishtina, March 2014, 11, accessed 10 May 2014, [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Analysis\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Security\\_Sector\\_Review\\_of\\_RKS\\_060314.pdf](http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Analysis_of_Strategic_Security_Sector_Review_of_RKS_060314.pdf).

Chapter 7 of the SSSR gives recommendation for the transformation KSF into the Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF).

According to the SSSR:

Kosovo Armed Forces will take on, over time, primary responsibility for homeland defense; and gradually transfer capabilities for responding to civil emergencies to the Emergency Management Agency. Additionally, it was determined that the Kosovo Armed Forces will continue to participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations; assist civilian authorities to respond to natural disasters and emergencies, including readiness for a regional or an international response; conduct explosive ordinance disposal; and assist civilian authorities in civil protection operations tasks.<sup>10</sup>

In addition, SSSR recommended that core tasks of the Kosovo Armed Forces should be:

1. Defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Support to civilian authorities
3. Support to communities
4. Participation in international and peace support operations.<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, SSSR recommends that future Kosovo Armed Forces will be comprised of no more than 5,000 active personnel and no less than 3,000 reserve personnel which shall be developed to that NATO standards of interoperability.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, SSSR recommends that Kosovo Armed Forces will have a clear goal of participation in appropriate international operations, as part of a national strategy to build a closer relationship with NATO and ultimately NATO membership.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 30.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 30.

## Research Questions

Recent SSSR in Kosovo recommended that Kosovo Security Forces evolve in to Kosovo Armed Forces. These forces will be developed starting 2014, and the process will continue until 2024 when it is estimated these forces will reach their full operational capabilities. One of the recommendations of the SSSR as core task for the KAF is to participate in appropriate international operations. In addition, Kosovo leaders continuously declared Kosovo's willingness and readiness to participate in the NATO led operations. Therefore, considering that Kosovo's intention is to participate in NATO missions, the researcher examined the current development program of Kosovo Armed Forces in order to evaluate if this program will create an effective and interoperable force that can effectively contribute in these operations.

Primary Question: Does the current KAF long term development program meet the 2024 objective of supporting NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations?

Secondary Questions: (1) Will the KAF 2024 long term development program meet the NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations doctrine, training, and material standards? (2) Will the KAF 2024 doctrine, training, and material program be achieved by 2024?

## Definitions

In order to ensure that the reader better understands the study there are few definitions of key terms used throughout the thesis. The key terms used through the thesis are described below.

Humanitarian Assistance: As part of an operation, the use of available military resources to assist or complement the efforts of responsible civil actors in the operational

area or specialized civil humanitarian organizations in fulfilling their primary responsibility to alleviate human suffering.<sup>14</sup>

Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations: An operation specifically mounted to alleviate human suffering in an area where the civil actors normally responsible for so doing are unable or unwilling adequately to support a population.<sup>15</sup>

NATO Interoperability: The ability for allies to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. Specifically, it enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each other's infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate. Interoperability reduces duplication, enables pooling of resources, and produces synergies among the 28 Allies, and whenever possible with partner countries.<sup>16</sup>

Non-Article 5 Operations: multifunctional operations that encompass those political, military, and civil activities, initiated and executed in accordance with international law, including international humanitarian law, contributing to conflict

---

<sup>14</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 6, *NATO Glossary Terms and Definitions* (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), 2014), 2-H-5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces," 11 May 2012, accessed 24 March 2104, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_84112.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm).

prevention, resolution, and crisis management, or serve humanitarian purposes, in the pursuit of declared Alliance objectives.<sup>17</sup>

Peace Support Operation: An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building, and/or humanitarian operations.<sup>18</sup>

### Assumptions

The following assumptions related to the Kosovo Armed Forces development are considered relevant for the research process.

1. Kosovo Armed Forces will remain committed to participate in NATO led operations and seek NATO membership
2. Kosovo will continue to be committed to participate on regional security initiatives
3. Kosovo will continue to seek to participate on Partnership for Peace activities

### Limitations

This research can only examine open source information. The researcher is limited to resources that can be accessed from Fort Leavenworth, KS. In addition,

---

<sup>17</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4(A), *Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations* (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), 2010), 9.

<sup>18</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP 6, 2-P-3.

because of distance researcher has limited access to resources and information from Kosovo.

Kosovo Armed Forces is in process of development, and many key documents are yet to be developed or in process of development. Therefore, documents of Kosovo Security Force will be analyzed to determine current situation and how these documents can help in KAF development. In addition, these documents will be analyzed if they meet the criteria of NATO.

### Scope and Delimitations

This thesis will examine the current development plans of Kosovo Armed Forces in order to determine whether it creates ready, trained and interoperable forces for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations in NATO-led operations. This thesis will initially examine the status of Kosovo Armed Forces by analyzing doctrine, training and materiel aspect of the force. Then, this thesis will examine if current program is covering all required aspects to create an effective force to participate in NATO Non-Article 5 operations by analyzing the NATO requirements and standards for these operations.

However, this study will only analyze one of the KAF mission task; participation in international and peace support operations. This study not attempt to examine and analyze the NATO requirements for membership. In addition, in-depth analysis of the Kosovo security threats and capabilities needed to face these threats is out of the scope of this study.

### Significance of the study

Kosovo will develop its Armed Forces in accordance with the Security Sector Review results and recommendations. One of the security sector review recommendations was that Kosovo would have a clear goal of participation in appropriate international operations. In addition, Kosovo leadership continuously declared Kosovo's willingness and readiness to participate in NATO-led operations. Therefore, since Armed Forces will be developed almost from scratch, this study will attempt to identify and analyze issues, standards, and requirements needed to be incorporated in the Kosovo Armed Forces development plans, which will help create ready, trained and interoperable units for NATO-led operations.

### Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into five chapters: Introduction, Literature Review, Methodology, Analysis, Conclusions and Recommendations. Chapter 1: "Introduction" gives brief overview of the Kosovo Forces development. In addition, chapter 1 includes the thesis statements, the primary and secondary research questions, scope and importance of the study and the necessary assumptions.

Chapter 2: "Literature Review" focuses on the identification of what information is known about the subject and what are the gaps. The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part analyses official documents of Kosovo Armed Forces development. The second part of this chapter analyzes NATO requirements for conducting military operations. The third part analyzes the U.S. doctrine and training to fill the gap where NATO documents are either restricted or classified.

Chapter 3: “Methodology” describes and explains the steps taken by the researcher to analyze information needed to address the primary and secondary questions. Researcher used the META study method (including descriptive, and comparative methods). Through this methodology, researcher initially analyzed the NATO requirements and standards, current situation of KAF development, and then compared these findings through modified DOTMLPF analysis answered the primary question.

Chapter 4: “Findings and Analysis” describes the findings and their impact on the research questions. The chapter examines and analyzes the NATO requirements for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations by listing the requirements for non-NATO members. Then this chapter analyzes the current situation of KAF through modified DOTMLPF analysis. At the end the author will compare KAF program with the NATO requirements in order to answer the secondary questions and give an answer does the current KAF long term development program meet the 2024 objective of supporting NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

Chapter 5: “Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research” is focused on describing the conclusions that are deduced from the study. Based on the conclusions the chapter emphasizes the recommendations for further research.

In summary chapter one of this study introduced the thesis by giving background information regarding KAF development and defining the problem. This chapter also gives short background and defined key terms of this study. In chapter 2 of this study, key literature is reviewed in order to examine what has been written in this topic and what are possible gaps.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relevant literature associated with Kosovo Armed Forces (KAF) doctrine, training, material program and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. In addition to reviewing current existing literature in this topic, this chapter also aims to identify gaps that exist in the literature. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on publications regarding KAF development in order to identify status of the forces, gaps and future development needs. Second part analyzes NATO doctrine regarding NATO Non-Article 5 operations and training requirements and standards in order to see what are doctrinal and standard requirements for NATO operations. Third part analyzes the U.S. doctrine regarding Multinational Operations, Peace Operations, and training in order to fill the gaps of NATO doctrine

#### Kosovo Armed Forces Development

The SSSR conducted by the government of Kosovo reviewed the entire security architecture of the Kosovo in order to determine what the security requirements of Kosovo are. This review recommended that KSF evolve into KAF with 5000 active and 3000 reserve members. The mission of Kosovo Armed Forces is;

1. Defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity
2. Support to civilian authorities
3. Support to communities

#### 4. Participation in international and peace support operations.<sup>19</sup>

The focus of this study is only to analyze last KAF mission task, the participation in international and peace support operations, and determine the interoperability for participation in international operations under NATO leadership. The SSSR also recommended that KAF should be developed in accordance with NATO standards and requirements in order to be interoperable with NATO members when participating in international operations. In accordance with the SSSR recommendations, Kosovo started to plan for the development of this force. Kosovo Security Force Policy and Plans department as a lead element developed Republic of Kosovo Defense White Book, KAF Long Term Development Plan, and overarching Doctrine of Kosovo Armed Forces.

#### Republic of Kosovo Defense White Book

Republic of Kosovo Defense White Book (White Book) is a document that explains the government policy, principles and concept of armed forces development. This document outlines how Kosovo intends to develop its security sector in general and armed forces specifically. Alternatively, this document sets the security policies of Kosovo upon which the KAF will be built. Kosovo aspires to be a member of international organizations such as the UN, NATO, European Union (EU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as actively participate and contribute to regional and international security. By being a member of the above mentioned organizations and participating in regional and international security, Kosovo is attempting to transform itself from a dependent security consumer to

---

<sup>19</sup> Republic of Kosovo, “Analysis of Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo,” 33.

security provider. Conversely, by participating in these organizations and contributing to regional and international security, Kosovo's intention is to achieve its national interests, which are independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, stable economic development, citizen's safety, welfare and property. Therefore, in order to achieve its national interests, Kosovo intends to develop and prepare capabilities needed to contribute in peace support and humanitarian operations and for other international missions under NATO, OSCE, EU and UN.<sup>20</sup>

Kosovo Armed Forces development is necessary means to achieve Kosovo's national interest. By developing professional, multiethnic, and affordable Armed Forces, Kosovo can contribute to the regional and global stability which is one of the national interests. In Defense White Book is given the structure of the KAF, mission, and tasks. Kosovo Armed Forces will be under a democratic civil control, and main units are Land Force Command, National Guard, Logistics Command, and Training and Doctrine Command. (see figure 1)

---

<sup>20</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Defense White Book of Republic of Kosovo*, Draft (Prishtina, Kosovo, March 2014), 17.




Figure 1. Kosovo Armed Forces Structure

Source: Republic of Kosovo, *Defense White Book of Republic of Kosovo*, Draft (Prishtina, Kosovo, March 2014).

Kosovo Armed Forces mission statement:

To be prepared to defend Kosovo sovereignty and territorial integrity, to defend its citizens, their property and interests of Republic of Kosovo, as well as to be prepared to contribute and participate in peace building and peacekeeping operations and regional and global stability.<sup>21</sup>

Kosovo Armed Forces will be developed in three phases. During the first phase (2014-2016) will take place focus will be on changes in constitutional framework, and development of concepts, doctrine and manuals for the new force. During this phase, KAF will continue to conduct the emergency response mission, since the capabilities that KSF has will be transferred to KAF. This is also because other Kosovo institutions that are responsible for emergency response (Kosovo Police and Emergency Department), did not develop their emergency capabilities to that level to take over the tasks that KSF conducted. Therefore, until these institutions do not develop these capabilities, emergency response will remain under the KAF. During phase two (2017-2019), KAF

<sup>21</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Defense White Book*, 39.

will focus in developing its command, control and communication capabilities, procurement of essential individual and collective equipment, and modernizing its forces in order to be capable to conduct its mission. Third and final phase (2020-2024) the focus will be to complete the force with personnel and equipment and achieve full operational capabilities to be capable to carry its constitutional mission. By the end of this phase, each major command will be filled with personnel and essential equipment, trained and capable to complete its mission.<sup>22</sup> The Defense White Book helps partially answer first secondary question in determining status of KAF and what is the road that KAF will take to develop its capabilities to be ready, credible and interoperable force to effectively participate in NATO led crisis response operations.

#### Long Term Development Plan

The Long Term Development Plan (LTDP) provides the strategy for how the KAF will be developed during 2014-2024. Moreover, this document explains specific fields and timeframe how KAF will be developed, in order to achieve the objectives set in the Defense White Book and SSSR recommendations. This document is essential to this research, since it gives more details on how KAF will be developed and what capabilities will be developed. This facilitates an examination of the KAF status to determine if it meets the NATO standards. In addition, by examining the objectives and goals set in LTDP, author will be able to answer second secondary question to determine whether KAF can reach 2024 objectives set.

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 58.

Long Term Development explains that Kosovo aims to develop a professional force that is under democratic civil control, capable to accomplish its constitutional mission, and is interoperable with other forces. This force will be developed in accordance with NATO standards in order to create interoperable capabilities, to serve the purpose of the force mission in a national and international environment.<sup>23</sup> Intent is to develop forces that are rapidly deployable and interoperable with other forces in the region and broader, and capable to operate with civilian authorities, non-governmental organizations and other national and international agencies. These characteristics are required by NATO to be able to participate in NATO operations. However, Long Term Development Plan does not give more details how they are going to develop these capabilities.

Long Term Development Plan sets KAF mid and long-term objectives. In Defense White Book it was explained that KAF would be developed in three phases; phase I 2014-2016, phase II 2017-2019 and phase III 2019-2024. These phases in LTDP are expressed as mid and long term objectives. As mid-term objectives are included phase one and two (2015-2019), while phase three falls under the long-term objectives (2020-2024).

Mid-Term Objectives (2015-19) emphasis will be in preparing, developing, and implementing military training in order to build and develop a well-trained and interoperable force.<sup>24</sup> Considering that mid-term objectives are focused on developing

---

<sup>23</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Long Term Development Plan of Kosovo Armed Forces*, Draft (Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014), 14.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

doctrine, training the soldiers and units up to company level, priority is given in developing training and doctrine command capacities. This unit will be lead element in developing doctrines, training curriculum and training capabilities to improve current operational capabilities and to train future capabilities. In addition, by the end of 2016 KAF Training and Doctrine Command will have developed capacities to train skills that are required for new KAF mission and tasks. These programs will be developed within the NATO standards and requirements to conduct operations. Within mid-term period, (2015-2019) KAF will complete the procedural requirements (doctrine, manuals, procedures etc.) and conduct training for all individual and collective training up to a company level.<sup>25</sup>

The main issue in NATO operations, for all participants in these operations and especially for smaller countries, is logistical sustainability of forces in these operations. To sustain forces in operations domestically and abroad, KAF will review all logistical strategic and operational documents, doctrines, concepts, regulations, and SOPs. Similarly, to other documents mentioned above, KAF aims to finish this review by end of 2016 in order to ensure good functioning of logistics, and that these documents are compatible with the new KAF mission and NATO standards.<sup>26</sup> In addition to review of documents, KAF will assess individual and collective equipment that are currently in possession of KSF, and which of this equipment can be carried to KAF. Assessment of equipment and standardizing this equipment with NATO requirements is necessary in

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 32.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 27.

order to have a sustainable and deployable force that is capable to carry its mission domestically and abroad.<sup>27</sup>

Long-Term Objectives (2019-2024) are focused toward achieving full operational capability for the KAF mission tasks. Long Term Development Plan explains that the emphasis during this phase will be in conducting combined exercises in order to achieve full operational capabilities. During this phase battalion level, training will be conducted and evaluated at Kosovo's Collective Training Center (CTC). During this phase, advancement in specialized training is aimed, in order to enhance the level of skills acquired during the midterm phase. Conducting these, advanced training will ensure the skill level required to conduct KAF mission and provide trained personnel for all KAF mission tasks, as well as prepare units for possible deployment abroad in peace support and humanitarian operations.<sup>28</sup> In addition, during this phase the KAF intends to build infrastructure for training ranges for up to a battalion level exercise.

#### KAF General Military Doctrine

Final draft of KAF General Military Doctrine DPU-01 (in Albanian Doktrina e Pergjithshme Ushtarake DPU), provided a further detailed information regarding the KAF and how they plan to conduct operations. KAF military doctrine defines how Kosovo Armed Forces are organized, employed and deployed on operations both at home and in international operations. Kosovo military doctrine further explains the fundamentals of the KAF operations in the defense and security of the nation and the

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 27.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., 46.

ways they contribute to the international operations. This document helps to partially answer secondary questions in determining the current KAF situation, but also by comparing with NATO doctrine and requirements help to answer if KAF is interoperable with NATO forces and capable to operate effectively in NATO led Operations.

Kosovo military doctrine explains the hierarchy of the doctrinal and procedural documents. According to military doctrine, this document is the first level of doctrinal documents or the capstone. Second level of doctrine, or keystone, include specific field doctrine numbered from 01-07 and corresponding to specific fields such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, communication and training and leadership. Third level of doctrine is Manuals, and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTP).<sup>29</sup> (See figure 2)

---

<sup>29</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *General Military Doctrine of Kosovo Armed Forces*, Draft (Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014), 17.

Kosovo Armed Forces Doctrine Hierarchy




Figure 2. Kosovo Armed Forces Doctrine Hierarchy

Source: Created by author based on the information on the doctrine from Republic of Kosovo, *General Military Doctrine of Kosovo Armed Forces*, Draft (Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014).

Kosovo Armed Forces will be capable to conduct operations in response to crisis domestically and internationally, conduct peace support operations, assist civil authorities to respond to natural disaster and other emergencies, and be prepared to respond regionally and internationally.<sup>30</sup> However, for operations abroad, KAF will plan and prepare to always operate together with allies and partners. Therefore, harmonizing doctrine in order to have a common procedural understanding with NATO forces is necessary.

KAF Military Doctrine is developed in harmony with NATO standards for developing doctrine and conduct of operations. Similar to NATO Standard AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations, Military Doctrine explains that KAF will

<sup>30</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *General Military Doctrine*, 21.

conduct operations based on NATO principles of conducting operations which are Unified Command, Security, Flexibility, Simplicity, Sustainability, Cooperation and Interoperability.<sup>31</sup> Preparing its units to conduct operations based on these principles, KAF intends to achieve the interoperability with NATO forces.

However, KAF Military Doctrine gives very little explanation how the KAF will train and prepare soldiers and leaders for these operations. In the doctrine hierarchy, training and leadership doctrine is part of the documents, so it is expected when developing these manuals will give more explanation and lay down in more detail how KAF will develop its leaders and train their forces. Nonetheless, this document explains the values and principles of Kosovo Armed Force. Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of status but also understand how KAF will train and develop its soldiers and leaders, training documents of current institution, KSF documents were reviewed.

#### Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine

Kosovo Armed Forces has not developed yet the Training Doctrine; therefore, for the purpose of this study Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine was used. Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine was published in 2010 and is primary training document of Kosovo Security Force. This document explains that the purpose of training in KSF is to prepare units, soldiers and leaders to be competent, reliable, suitable and ready to accomplish the mission.<sup>32</sup> This document further explains duties and responsibilities of unit training, and defines the responsibilities of officers and

---

<sup>31</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *General Military Doctrine*, 40.

<sup>32</sup> Kosovo Security Force, *Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine* (Ferizaj, Kosovo: Training and Doctrine Command, June 2010), 5.

noncommissioned officers for training. Training in KSF is conducted in two domains, individual or institutional training that is conducted within the Training and Doctrine Command and its schools, and collective or unit training that is conducted in the units. Kosovo Security Force training is oriented in standards, competitive, demanding, and effective. All the training within KSF is conducted based on the characteristics mentioned above. These characteristics purpose is to train individuals and units to a high standard and produce ready soldiers and units in order to accomplish their mission.

Training Doctrine of KSF explains the process of Mission Essential Task List (METL), which in essence is identical to the U.S. Army's METL development and training concept. Training Doctrine explains that commander must identify those tasks that are essential for accomplishing the mission during crisis, and portrays these tasks in METL, which in essence also give basis for the training program.<sup>33</sup> Further, this document explains that, the purpose of creating METL is focusing training on the most important tasks that are required to accomplish the mission.

#### Master Thesis Kosovo's Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations

Major Ejup Maqedonci in his master's thesis, "Kosovo's Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations," elaborated capabilities that Kosovo can contribute to NATO-led stability and humanitarian operations. According to Major Maqedonci, Kosovo can start its initial engagement in [stability and humanitarian] operations with the KSF's search and rescue, medical, EOD, demining, and CBRN

---

<sup>33</sup> Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine* (Ferizaj, Kosovo: Training and Doctrine Command, June 2010), 30.

units.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, he elaborates that these units have been trained and developed by NATO from 2009-2013 when the Full Operational Capabilities for Kosovo Security Force have been declared.<sup>35</sup> This signifies official recognition by NATO as units that have reached the required professional level. In addition, he elaborates that KSF Search and Rescue Task Force (SARTF) “has sufficient professional and logistics (equipment) capabilities to become included in EADRCC planning for disaster response in disaster cases.”<sup>36</sup> Major Maqedonci, elaborates that with the skill, knowledge and certification that KSF members of these units have gained during these years can be part of NATO-led stability operations and conduct training for HN forces.<sup>37</sup> However, he recognizes that lack of doctrine, and procedures for deployment in support and humanitarian operations could cause friction in the multinational environment. He further explains that development of the doctrine is a necessary step for development of other manuals, procedures and documents required for preparation of units and soldiers for support and humanitarian operations.<sup>38</sup>

The documents reviewed regarding the development of Kosovo Armed Forces will help to answer the first secondary question in determining if KAF development program achieves doctrine, training, and materiel NATO standards. These documents are

---

<sup>34</sup> Ejup Maqedonci, “Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2013), 69.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 68.

also basis to determine whether the current program is creating a ready, trained and interoperable force that is capable to operate with NATO members when deployed in international operations. In order to determine whether KAF meets the doctrine, training, and material requirements to create an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, it is necessary to review NATO documents and determine what are NATO standards and requirements.

### NATO Documents

In order to determine whether current KAF programs meets the doctrine, training, and material requirements to create an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations, it is necessary to understand NATO requirements for these operations. Key NATO doctrine documents used in this study are NATO RTO Technical Report Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors, NATO Standard Allied Administrative Publication (AAP) 47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, NATO Standard Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3(b) Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations, NATO Standard Allied Joint Publication (AJP) -3.4(a) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. These documents explain what key doctrinal principles of conducting operations are, but also provide a good basis for comparison with KAF documents whether KAF program is compatible with NATO requirements. In addition, NATO Standard Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1

Training and Education for Peace Support Operations, explains what are NATO training and education standards for Peace Support Operations.

NATO RTO Technical Report Multinational Military Operations  
and Intercultural Factors.

NATO Research and Technology Organization Technical Report on “Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors” suggest that the increase of NATO nations responding to international crises and conflicts in the post-Cold War period through support for multinational operation has led to the identification of a number of potential areas of conflict or stress between collaborating countries.<sup>39</sup> Authors argue that changes in the operational environment and new threats to NATO members demand a shift from traditional interoperability understanding, to a more conceptual depth interoperability, which is “cooperability.”<sup>40</sup> This term provides shared understanding of cognitive and doctrinal interoperability, or “interoperability of the mind” and “unit in thought.”<sup>41</sup> They further argue that “it is not only system interoperability but operational and particularly cultural interoperability . . . that contributes to mission success.”<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> Brian McKee, Angela R. Febbraro, and Sharon L. Riedel, RTO-TR-HFM-120, *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors*, NATO Science and Technology Organization, November 2008, 1-2, accessed 24 March 2014, <https://www.cso.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-TR-HFM-120>.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-3.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

These frictions as it is mentioned above can be mitigated through developing common doctrine, training, and command and control structures. These would mitigate friction on preparedness of forces, command and shared understanding.

Allied Administrative Publication-47  
Allied Joint Doctrine Development

Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development provides guidance on how Alliance doctrine is developed and what it tries to achieve. The purpose of AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development (December 2013) is to establish, describe and recognize formal procedures for the development of Allied joint doctrine and the standardization of the Allied Joint Doctrine Development Process.<sup>43</sup> Doctrine in this document is defined as “[f]undamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>44</sup> Further, in this document it is described that;

Allied joint doctrine enhances the operational effectiveness of NATO troops by capturing and promulgating commonly agreed principles that guide the employment of NATO military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is principally concerned with joint matters at the operational level. Joint doctrine should enhance the interoperability of coalition forces, foster initiative, creativity, and conditions that allow commanders the freedom to adapt to varying circumstances. Joint doctrine standardizes terminology, symbology, training, responsibilities, and processes among NATO forces and enables commanders and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving the operational problems confronting them. It also provides fundamental considerations used to

---

<sup>43</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-4.7, *Allied Joint Doctrine Development*, Supplement to AAP-3(J), Edition A Version 2 (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), December 2013), 1-1.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-2.

determine command relationships and the assignment of missions, objectives, and tasks.<sup>45</sup>

In addition, AAP-47 describes the relation of Allied Doctrine and Training. Allied Doctrine intends to achieve a common skill level for allied and partner forces by providing the foundation for joint training and education. Moreover, by describing common procedures and establishing uniform operational methods, joint doctrinal publications create a common baseline, which assists the commanders and their staffs in developing standards for joint training and exercises.<sup>46</sup> This document gives principles that allied and partner forces need to develop their doctrine in order to be able to operate better in multinational environment. Since KAF is at its first steps of development, but also its goal is to participate in international operations, developing its military doctrine based on these guidelines and principles is important.

#### Allied Joint Publication 3(b) Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3(b) Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations, gives a more detailed explanation of how allied forces conduct operations. This document applies to allied members and partner countries. NATO Standard AJP-3(b) describes the fundamental principles of joint operations, but also explains how the force is formed in joint operations, which is responsible for preparation of these forces, execution of operations, and transition and termination of operations.

NATO Force Creation for NATO led operations is a lengthy process, situation based, and can be tailored based on capability requirements of the situation or crisis. It

---

<sup>45</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP 4-7, 1-2.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 1-3.

starts with the activation of the force, which is Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) responsibility. Once the formal force activation is issued, alliance conducts a troops-to-task analysis, which determines the requirements of capabilities for conduct of operation. This allows the alliance to send a formal request to contributing nations. Contributing nations will commit their forces in accordance with the requirement. Their responsibility is to provide a trained and ready force to conduct operations required by alliance. Once the nations commit their forces this will constitute the Multinational force, and allow a further detailed planning to take place.

A slightly different process is for non-NATO countries. For non-NATO countries to participate in the operations, political decision is essential. If North Atlantic Council decides that non-NATO countries participation is necessary, a formal decision is issued which initiates the request for forces to be sent to possible contributing countries. However, since these countries are not in NATO and do not have same standards and requirements, it is necessary to evaluate the suitability of those forces for the mission, unless they have a valid NATO certification.<sup>47</sup>

Every Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) to NATO led operations are responsible for preparing their participating forces and have primary responsibility for training, equipping and sustaining these forces. Troop contributing nations are responsible to provide ready, trained and equipped forces at appropriate readiness to meet the operational requirements for capabilities that these nations have committed their forces. However, Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for the direction and guidance of

---

<sup>47</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations* (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), March 2011), 2-14.

the training program, and these directives should include standardization requirements to ensure equal standards for all forces participating in the operation.<sup>48</sup> Although TCN are responsible to provide trained forces for the operation, mission specific training still need to be conducted for operation specific tasks. This procedure is for all types of NATO operations. However, considering that many non-NATO countries contribute forces for Crisis Response Operations it is necessary to have exercises in order to confirm that all forces are operationally effective.

Allied Joint Publication 3.4(a) Allied Joint Doctrine for  
Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4(a) Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations provides a more specific understanding of Crisis Response Operations. This document explains the principles of operations that NATO takes outside the mandate of Article 5<sup>49</sup> and considerations that are relevant for successful conduct of these type of operations. Allied Joint Publication 3.4 (a) describes non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations as operations that are initiated and executed for conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, or serve humanitarian purposes.<sup>50</sup> These operations are not limited or bound to NATO territory, and may be conducted by NATO in any part

---

<sup>48</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP 3, 3-9.

<sup>49</sup> Article 5 is at the basis of a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It provides that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. This is the principle of collective defense.

<sup>50</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4 (A) *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*, Draft (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), 2010), 1-3.

of the world. However, these operations require extra capabilities because they are expeditionary and out of normal NATO territory. The fundamental difference between the Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations is that there is no formal obligation for NATO nations to take part in non-Article 5 Operations.<sup>51</sup>

Non-Article 5 operations include a range of operations that may include from combat operations to disaster relief. Usually these are taken in support of an international effort and as a support to international organizations such as UN, OSCE, and EU. Operations that can fall under this category, but are not limited to, are extraction operations, support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency.<sup>52</sup>

Considering that participation in these types of operations is not mandatory for the NATO nations and partner countries, the force generation process may be influenced as well. In addition, nations that contribute forces may do so with specific restrictions on how and when their forces can be used. These national caveats have a direct impact on planning for these operations. Nonetheless, considering that each Crisis Response Operation is unique the initial requirement of forces and capabilities may be determined based on reconnaissance and mission analysis conducted. However, specific capabilities, numbers, command structure, support forces are completed during concept development

---

<sup>51</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP 3-4, 1-3.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 1-4

phase, which then becomes JFC statement of requirements.<sup>53</sup> This basic document is then used for force contribution from member and partner nations.

Allied Joint Publication 3-4 in chapter two emphasizes that interoperability plays a key role in planning for Crisis Response Operations. The ability to operate together effectively and efficiently determines the effectiveness of the forces that conduct operations. Therefore, use of common doctrine, standardized equipment and procedures, and validated through participation in joint and multinational training exercises, provides the basis for the multinational force to be able to work together.<sup>54</sup> Despite the friction and problems that may arise due to different nations participating in multinational operations, often NATO invites as many partner nations as possible because of the nature of the Crisis Response Operations. This is because allies want to improve legitimacy of the operation, increase the size or capabilities of a NATO-led force. Consequently, today non-NATO troops are increasingly becoming a part of NATO-led Crisis Response Operations. However, with a larger number of nations participating in these operations, interoperability becomes even more important. These non-NATO countries are expected to use standard NATO doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP's) or adapt their doctrine and TTP to NATO standards. In order to achieve the interoperability, Joint Force Command determines the degree of interoperability of the equipment and procedures of non-NATO contributing countries with those of NATO countries. This is necessary to fully integrate the efforts of all participating units.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 2-9.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 2-16.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

## Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1 Training and Education for Peace Support Operations

NATO Standard ATrainP-1 Training and Education for Peace Support Operations is the document that intends to enhance interoperability in NATO-led operations by providing basis for training of personnel and units by NATO countries and partner nations. When conducting operations in NATO-led missions, TCN are expected to provide ready and trained forces of these operations. Although TCN are responsible for training and education of their troops, NATO is responsible to recommend training and education guidance and objectives in order to achieve interoperability for operational readiness and effectiveness.<sup>56</sup> The purpose of NATO guidance is to ensure coordinated approach to training and education, in order to enhance interoperability between NATO nations and partners. In order to ensure that all the TCN are training and education troops to a standard that is acceptable and required to accomplish the mission in NATO led operations, and achieve operational readiness NATO issues requirements and guidance for individual training, generic training, and mission focused training. (see figure 3)

---

<sup>56</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1, Training and Education for Peace Support Operations*, Edition B, Version 1 (Brussels, Belgium, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), January 2014), 1-3.




Figure 3. Concept of Training and Education

*Source:* North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1, *Training and Education for Peace Support Operations*, Edition B, Version 1 (Brussels, Belgium, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), January 2014).

Ensuring interoperability and readiness within NATO but also with partner nations, NATO created evaluation procedures for the participating nations in the missions. Contributing nations have to go through following evaluation programs in order to ensure readiness of the units. For NATO countries; Combat Readiness Evaluation Program (CREVAL) for land forces, Tactical Evaluation Program (TACEVAL) for Air Force units and Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) units, and Maritime Evaluation Program (MAREVAL) for naval units. Purpose of these evaluations is readiness,

performance and military effectiveness.<sup>57</sup> However, for non-NATO countries initially they must go through Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation & Feedback Program (OCC E&F), and then level 2 depending on what type of forces they provide, will be evaluated by CREVAL, TACEVAL, of MAREVAL.<sup>58</sup>

NATO doctrine literature created a good understanding of the requirements and standards for achieving interoperability but also conduct of operations in multinational environment. These document help to partially answer the secondary question in analyzing and comparing Kosovo plans and programs with NATO requirements.

### U.S. Doctrine

The U.S. doctrine and manuals were used in order to create a better understanding of Multinational and Peace Operations requirements, and training of forces. In addition, U.S. doctrine was used to have a better understanding of interoperability concept. These documents were also used to fill the gap that may exist due to the small number of NATO doctrine documents that can be accessed. Furthermore, since KAF is using U.S. Army doctrine and manuals as basis for developing their doctrine, these documents will provide good basis for comparison as well. Key U.S. doctrine that are used to help create a better understanding are U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational Operations, and U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations. The U.S. Army FM 7-0 although it is outdated, and not used in the U.S. Army, in this research it is used because today most of information regarding training

---

<sup>57</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ATrainP-1, *Training and Education for Peace Support Operations*, 4-1.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

management and Mission Essential Task List (METL) development is web based and author does not have access to this information.

### U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational Operations

The JP 3-16 Multinational Operations provides the U.S. forces guidance on conducting multinational operations, how to operate in multinational environment and what are principles of multinational operations and multinational force. Considering that security environment is constantly changing and almost all the countries are reducing their defense spending, military operations in the future will include more multinational operations. Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance.<sup>59</sup> Reason why today most of the operations are multinational in nature is that they provide different national contributions and supplement the shortages of certain military capabilities, but also increase the legitimacy of the operation. Although, forming a multinational force does not guarantee a success of the operation, ignoring the principles of multinational force and multinational operations may lead to failure. Principles of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, and trust and confidence.<sup>60</sup>

Different nations have different doctrine, training and procedure conducting operations. These differences can increase the friction within the multinational operations. In order to minimize this friction, multinational forces at all levels should

---

<sup>59</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), I-1.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, I-3

seek opportunities to conduct combined training prior to the actual operation. These trainings enhance relationship between units that consist multinational force, and ultimately enable better cooperation in achieving success of the operation.

Participation in multinational operation is a political decision and often is reflection of national interest of the country that participates in these operations. These interests determine the relationship that participating nation have within the multinational force, and relationship of the command structure. Major issues in multinational operations and multinational force are synchronization and interoperability. On the other hand, nations that constitute multinational force have different level of training and readiness that ultimately plays a direct role in operation. In order to minimize these issues and achieve an acceptable level of interoperability and training, before constituting a multinational force, specific standards are set for interoperability and capabilities. If gaps exist, these are then resolved in bilateral level between contributing nations.

#### U.S. Army FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations

The U.S. Army FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations this document was used to gain a better understanding of training units and leader's process. Although this manual is outdated and not in use by the U.S. Army, using a current version was not adequate since parts of it are only available at the Army Training Network (ATN), and access to this network is restricted to U.S. military only. Field Manual FM 7-0 is the key stone of the U.S. Army doctrine for training units and developing leaders for full spectrum operations. This manual addresses fundamentals of training and developing leaders for conduct of full spectrum operations. This manual

provides guidance to facilitate flexibility and innovative approaches to unit training and leader development.<sup>61</sup> FM 7-0 establishes the principles of unit training. (see table 1)

Table 1. Principles of Unit Training

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Commanders and other leaders are responsible for training</li><li>• Noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews and small teams</li><li>• Train to standard</li><li>• Train as you will fight</li><li>• Train while operating</li><li>• Train fundamentals first</li><li>• Train to develop operational adaptability</li><li>• Understand the operational environment</li><li>• Train to sustain</li><li>• Train to maintain</li><li>• Conduct multiechelon and concurrent training</li></ul>
---

*Source:* U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011), 2-1.

In chapter 2 existing literature was reviewed to examine the key documents regarding KAF development and NATO interoperability. This literature provided the context to situate the research and identify key issues regarding KAF development and NATO interoperability. Reviewing the documents allowed the researcher to identify the gaps that the current research will try to explore. Based on the literature, it is evident that interoperability of forces in the domain of procedure, human and material is necessary to be successful in multinational operations. Chapter 3 reviews the methodology used in this

---

<sup>61</sup> Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011).

research study. It discusses the data collection procedures from different resources and materials.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze current development program of the Kosovo Armed Forces to determine whether it achieves the 2024 goals to develop a ready, trained and an interoperable force that can effectively participate in NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. This study employs a META study analysis of KAF, NATO, and U.S. Army literature to answer the research questions. The intent of this research methodology aims to examine the problem question and answer the “how” and “why” of the research problem rather than “how many” or “how much,” which are typically answered through quantitative methods.<sup>62</sup>

Through qualitative research of official documents, the researcher is examining what is the status of the KAF development. The research analyzes the doctrine development process, training and the steps that KAF will take to train, equip and prepare its forces. The researcher used modified Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) analysis. The DOTMLPF analysis is used to find viable solution for current and future capability gaps identified by the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS).<sup>63</sup> For this research, only Doctrine, Training and Material domain of DOTMLPF was used. Additionally, this research

---

<sup>62</sup> Family Health International, “Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Guide,” accessed 24 August 2014, <http://www.ccs.neu.edu/course/is4800sp12/resource/qualmethods.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, *Concept Development, Capabilities, Determination, and Capabilities Integration* (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, 2013).

examined and analyzed interoperability concept, and NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations requirements. The purpose was to gain an understanding of the interoperability concept, and NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. A definition of interoperability is given in Chapter 4 of this study. Furthermore, through this research methodology researcher identified what are the requirements for non-NATO and partner countries to participate in these operations, and what standards must be achieved.

This study then used comparative analysis in order to compare the KAF development program and NATO requirements. Purpose was to identify potential KAF gaps and shortfalls in doctrine, training and material domain in comparison with NATO requirement and standards. Through this methodology researcher was able to answer the primary question in determining whether current KAF development program meets the 2024 objectives of KAF to develop a force that can effectively contribute in NATO led Crisis Response Operations, and give recommendations how to improve this program to achieve KAF objectives.

This chapter reviewed the research methodology and how the data was analyzed. This chapter explained how researcher collected the data to answer primary and secondary question. In addition, in this chapter was discussed two methodologies used to analyze information collected in order to answer the questions. Findings and analysis of this research are discussed in chapter 4 of this study.

## CHAPTER 4

### FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze findings of this research in order to determine if current KAF development program meets the NATO doctrine, training, and material requirements to create an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. This chapter is organized in four parts; first part defines interoperability; second part identifies what are NATO doctrine, training and materiel requirements and standards for non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations. Part three analyzes current KAF development and compares it with NATO requirements in order to determine whether the KAF current developing program meets NATO requirements and standards to support NATO-led non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The final part analyzes KAF LTDP to determine if these requirements can be achieved by 2024.

#### Interoperability

Recent multinational operations have demonstrated that interoperability is key among forces participating in these operations. In order to ensure that participating forces in operation can operate together, NATO has increased their effort to achieve the interoperability between its members, and their partners. We examined definition of interoperability from the NATO and U.S. perspective. In addition to have a better understanding of what interoperability is, we will identify the key factors required to achieve interoperability.

The NATO Standard Allied Administrative Publication AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions defines interoperability as “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives.”<sup>64</sup> According to NATO interoperability includes technical (including hardware, equipment, armaments and systems), procedural (including doctrines and procedures) and human (including terminology and training) dimensions.<sup>65</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization made a more specific definition of the interoperability by focusing only on force interoperability as “the ability of the forces of two or more nations to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks.”<sup>66</sup> Moreover, NATO explains that the importance of interoperability is that enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together and allows them to share common doctrine and procedures, each others’ infrastructure and bases, and to be able to communicate.<sup>67</sup> The mechanisms to achieve interoperability are the employment of standardization, training, exercises, lessons learned, demonstrations, tests and trials.<sup>68</sup>

Similarly, U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines interoperability as “[t]he ability to operate in synergy in the

---

<sup>64</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP-6, 2-I-8.

<sup>65</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Interoperability.”

<sup>66</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP-6, 2-F-5.

<sup>67</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Interoperability.”

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

execution of assigned tasks.”<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, the U.S. doctrine explains that interoperability enhances operations and is often considered to be force multiplier. According to U.S. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* factors that enhance interoperability are understanding of multinational operation, shared understanding, multinational exercises, visits to assess multinational capabilities, and constant effort to eliminate misunderstanding and confusion.<sup>70</sup> In addition, this publication explains that interoperability is more than technology; it includes doctrine, procedures, communications, and training.<sup>71</sup>

A different approach to interoperability is explained in NATO RTO Technical Report *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors*. In this report authors explain that despite the fact that current interoperability definitions moved beyond technology and include dimensions such as doctrine, command and control, rules of engagement, standardized operating procedures, training, it still fails to account for the cultural interoperability such as language, ethics, and social beliefs.<sup>72</sup> In addition, authors argue that “it is not only system interoperability but operational and particularly “cultural interoperability” – the shared way by which multinational military coalitions or alliances “do business” – that contributes to mission success.”<sup>73</sup>

---

<sup>69</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2013), 133.

<sup>70</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-16, I-9.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, I-9.

<sup>72</sup> McKee, Febbraro, and Riedel, 1-3.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

Interoperability in multinational operations is essential to mission success. It is important to understand that interoperability expands beyond technology and includes commonality of doctrine, education, training and procedures that soldiers use.<sup>74</sup> Interoperability in multinational operations is also important because today different countries provide different capabilities to create the multinational force. Without common understanding of doctrine and procedures it would be hard to conduct operations. Interoperability is an important NATO requirement for NATO-led operations. This factor allows the multinational force to work together toward accomplishing the mission.

#### NATO Standards

Participation of NATO alliance in peace support and peace keeping operations outside its territory during the 1990's surfaced many issues and problems for the alliance to conduct these operations. These issues and problems identified especially during the operations in the Balkans, forced NATO to review its operation processes, and to require more strict standards implementation by the members.

The trend of non-NATO countries participating in NATO-led operations has increased through years. In recent NATO-led operations more than one third of the participating nations are from the non-NATO countries. Therefore, increase in number of countries participating in these operations has increased the importance of interoperability not just among NATO countries but with partner and non-NATO countries as well. In order to ensure that every participating nation can contribute

---

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 1-3.

effectively in the operations, NATO has set a number of requirements that non-NATO members are required to meet before they participate in these operations. These requirements were in the procedural, human, and technical domain. In addition, for partner countries NATO published political-military framework based on which the partner nations will contribute their forces for NATO-led operations.

### The Political-Military Framework for Partners Involvement in Operations

In the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO recognized the great value that partner countries are adding to the NATO-led operations. In this summit, the Heads of State and Governments agreed to review the 1999 Political-Military Framework for partner involvement in NATO operations (PMF), and give the partners more authority in the planning and decision making process. This framework gives the modalities of the partner's participation in shaping strategy and decisions in the planning phase and execution phase of current and future NATO-led operations.<sup>75</sup> An operational partner that participates in NATO led operations is considered any of the countries that contribute forces or capabilities, or support in any way in NATO operations that North Atlantic Council (NAC) formally recognizes.<sup>76</sup> Countries that are willing to contribute, and committed their forces or capabilities to participate in NATO operations are not automatically recognized as operational partners. These countries initially are recognized by NAC as potential operational partners. Potential operational partners need to go

---

<sup>75</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Political Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-Led Operations*, April 15, 2011, accessed 12 November 2014, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2011\\_04/20110415\\_110415-PMF.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-PMF.pdf).

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

through a process for acceptance as operational partner. Recognition as operational partners is done by NAC, based on Military Committee advice and successful completion of six required measures:

1. a formal statement of intent by the country that it is prepared to offer a contribution in support of a NATO-led operation;
2. provisional recognition by the NAC of the country as a potential operational partner;
3. completion of proper security arrangements with the potential operational partner to allow the sharing of operational classified information;
4. completion of participation and detailed financial arrangements with the potential operational partner;
5. signature, if required, of a technical memorandum of understanding between the relevant military authorities of NATO and of the potential operational partner; and
6. certification by SHAPE of the potential operational partner's contribution.<sup>77</sup>

Although these measures are mostly political in nature, the certification process of potential operational partners is key to achieving military requirements to becoming an operational partner. The importance of these measures is to ensure the ability of partners to operate together with Allied forces. Potential partner nations declare capabilities and forces that they are committing for current or future NATO operations. It is important that the NATO authorities have access to these capabilities or forces and assess them in order to determine their interoperability and the scope of their potential contribution to NATO operations.<sup>78</sup> Capabilities or forces declared for the NATO operations need to meet doctrine, training, and materiel criteria' as minimum. Then these capabilities and forces are evaluated to ensure that they are interoperable and compatible with NATO forces.

---

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

## Doctrine Requirements

To operate in a multinational force environment it is necessary to understand each of the member nation's operational procedures. Therefore, NATO has published common alliance doctrine in order to standardize the operating procedures and achieve a common goal in the operation. According to NATO publication, doctrine is defined as “[f]undamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.”<sup>79</sup> NATO published its doctrine and expects from its members to harmonize their doctrine with NATO in order to achieve a common principles in conducting operations. Consequently, by setting common principles of conducting operations NATO doctrine enhances the interoperability of coalition forces, foster initiative, creativity, and conditions that allow commanders the freedom to adapt to varying circumstances.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, NATO doctrine aims to achieve common understanding of terminology, and symbols, but also ensures that all members have equivalent level of training and capabilities to accomplish the mission. By having a common doctrine, the intent is to ensure all participating nations are able to conduct operations successfully. NATO doctrine gives the principles of conducting operations in multinational environment. It provides guidance for the commanders to plan operations in accordance with following doctrinal elements; comprehensive approach, joint and multinational approach, and joint action.

Contemporary operating environment is much more complex than earlier and requires a comprehensive approach and coordination with many non-military actors.

---

<sup>79</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP 4-7, 3.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 4.

Therefore, NATO seeks to achieve its objectives through effective coordination with governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations and private sector.<sup>81</sup> Comprehensive approach for conducting of operations will be achieved by adhering to following guiding principles: proactive engagement, shared understanding, outcome based thinking, and collaborative working.<sup>82</sup> In addition to coordination with other actors, NATO doctrine explains that for successful conduct of operations it is necessary to plan for different range of military operations. Contemporary security environment does not include just planning for combat operations, but also for security operations, peace support and peace military engagements. Successful conduct of operations in campaign is understanding that operations are comprised of combination of activities and characteristics may change overtime. Moreover, it is important to understand that operations are not conducted just to defeat the opponent but to set the conditions to transfer the situation to civil authorities.<sup>83</sup>

NATO doctrine explains the fundamental principles of joint operations and provides guidance on the conduct of joint operations at the operational levels. According to AJP-3 principles of joint operations are: Definition of Objectives, Unity of Effort, Sustainment, Concentration of force, Economy of Effort, Flexibility, Initiative, Maintenance of Morale, Surprise, Security, Simplicity, Multinationality.<sup>84</sup> In addition to principles mentioned above, peace support, stabilization or humanitarian assistance

---

<sup>81</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP 3(b), 1-1.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-3.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-4.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-7.

operations require Impartiality, Consent, Restraint in the use of Force, Perseverance/Long-term View, Legitimacy, Credibility, Mutual Respect, Transparency, Freedom of movement, and Environmental Protection.<sup>85</sup>

Second approach to conduct of operations in multinational environment is joint and multinational approach. Joint approach has to do with understanding of capabilities of each component of the force. It is necessary to understand the availability of the forces for conduct of alliance operations and what are their strengths and weaknesses in order to employ them effectively considering environment, time and space these forces will operate to accomplish the mission. In addition, alliance operations are characterized by the multinational environment. Today, multinational force is required to increase the legitimacy of the operation, but also it fills possible gaps that one or few countries may have.<sup>86</sup>

Principles mentioned above are valid for all types of operations, and aim is to standardize the doctrine of all the members of the NATO alliance. In addition, NATO encourages its partner nations to harmonize their doctrine with NATO doctrine. This way NATO intends to achieve procedural interoperability among members, but also with partner nations.

In addition to common principles of conducting operations in multinational environment, NATO standard for operations which fall outside of the mandate of Article 5 gives additional principles and guidance. Operations that are different from Article 5, are called non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. These operations are described as

---

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 1-7.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 1-10.

operations that are initiated and executed for the purpose of conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, or serve humanitarian purposes.<sup>87</sup> Non-Article 5 operations include a range of operations that may include extraction operations, support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, peace enforcement, and counterinsurgency.<sup>88</sup> Besides the principles mentioned above that are common for all types of NATO operations, for successful conduct of non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations are given few more principles. These principles include consent, restraint of use of force, perseverance, legitimacy, credibility, mutual respect, transparency, and freedom of movement.<sup>89</sup>

Doctrine requirements intend to achieve common understanding of procedures among the members of NATO alliance. In addition these publications are available for partner nations in order to harmonize their doctrine with NATO. However the main reason for doctrine is to provide guidance for the members to prepare their forces to participate in these operations. This guidance need to be translated into training programs to meet these requirements to achieve the goals and accomplish the mission.

### Training Requirements

Troop Contributing Nations have the primary responsibility for training of their forces. TCN are responsible to provide ready, trained and equipped forces at appropriate

---

<sup>87</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AJP 3-4, 1-3.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 2-4.

readiness to meet the operational requirements for capabilities that these nations have committed their forces. However, in order to ensure and maximize interoperability and effectiveness of the forces participating in the operation, NATO gives guidance, and recommends training and education objectives for NATO-led operations.<sup>90</sup> Training and education objectives given by NATO include individual training prerequisites, generic training guidance, and mission specific training, which lead to operational readiness.

It is important to have the individual training prerequisites before moving forward with other training. Selection of personnel for the operation is essential, and as minimum should have basic military skills. Basic skills that are considered as minimum requirement for successful training and education for NATO operations are weapons handling, CBRN protection, first aid, navigation and orientation, and voice and communications procedures.<sup>91</sup> In addition, for key personnel additional skills are required and include language, voice procedures according to NATO standards, and communication and information system competency.<sup>92</sup>

Besides individual training prerequisites, generic training guidance is issued to members and partner countries to train their forces in order to achieve operational effectiveness criteria and to improve interoperability among forces. Generic training is divided in nine specific training areas and include; force protection, operating techniques, supplementary tasks, legal implications, tactics, cultural awareness, security sector

---

<sup>90</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ATrainP-1, 1-3.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., 2-2.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

reform, civil-military transition team, and additional educational subjects.<sup>93</sup> These skills are important for almost all crisis response operations. By training their forces in accordance with the guidance issued by NATO, it ensures that all participating nations have equal skills.

After they complete the generic training for the forces based on the mission and forces committed for the operation, NATO issues mission specific guidance. Depending on the mission, it is important that nations train their forces for specific skills that are required to accomplish the mission. For example, every mission requires specific training guidance and ROE. For peace support operations, contributing nations must ensure that their forces besides military skills are trained and qualified in peace support operations techniques.<sup>94</sup> Troop contributing nations are responsible to train, exercise and prepare their forces and provide ready force for the operation. They are responsible to train individual and collective level to reach operational readiness.

In order to ensure the interoperability and the operational effectiveness of the forces or capabilities committed by the contributing nations, NATO has created several mechanisms that evaluate these capabilities. The evaluation of forces and capabilities for the partner and potential partner nations is done in two levels. First level is the NATO Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F). This evaluation process provides a progressive evaluation tool that evaluates the interoperability level of capabilities or forces. After the partner or potential partner nations have successfully

---

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>94</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations* (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), 2011), 70.

completed this level they can continue to level 2 of the evaluation which evaluates readiness, performance and military effectiveness of the units by using Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL), Tactical Evaluation (TACEVAL) or Marine Evaluation (MARVAL) methodologies.<sup>95</sup>

NATO requirements to achieve the interoperability between the NATO members and partner forces are evaluated in the procedural (doctrine, procedures), human (training and terminology), and technical (including equipment, armament and systems). These criteria's are published as guidance for the member and partner nations that need to incorporate in their own forces in order to develop interoperable and effective forces. Contributing nations, NATO members and partner nations are responsible for equipping, training, sustaining, and providing ready forces for the operations. The evaluation process is a critical examination of the results against the defined training and education objectives, in order to examine if the levels of interoperability and capabilities are achieved in order to contribute to operations.<sup>96</sup>

As part of the enhancement of the interoperability with NATO member forces, and to some extent an informal evaluation and certification process is participation in NATO training activities and exercises. These exercises and training activities play a crucial role in preparing the partner and potential partner nations for NATO-led operations. In addition, it is an excellent opportunity for all the parties participating in

---

<sup>95</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ATrainP-1, 4-1.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

these exercises to get familiarized with the procedures and capabilities of each other and achieve interoperability among forces.<sup>97</sup>

### Materiel Requirements

Interoperability among participating nations in multinational force environment is essential to success. Besides procedural and human domain of interoperability, NATO requires technical interoperability, or interoperability of equipment, systems, and infrastructure. In fact technical interoperability is the oldest domains within NATO which has been trying to achieve since its creation in 1949. However, participation of NATO members in recent operations outside their territory has increased the importance of technical interoperability. Technical interoperability does not mean common or same equipment for everyone in the alliance, rather it aims to have equipment that can share common facilities, enable forces to interact together, and exchange data and services with other equipment.<sup>98</sup> Reaching interoperability between participating nations in the operation is done through standardization. By standardizing equipment, systems and infrastructure between the NATO members, and partner nations it enhances the ability to interact together but also provide and receive services from one another. NATO recognizes three levels of standardization: compatibility, interchangeability and

---

<sup>97</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Political-Military Framework*, 2.

<sup>98</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Interoperability."

commonality.<sup>99</sup> These levels of standardization are directly linked to achieving technical interoperability among members.

According to NATO compatibility is “suitability of products, processes or services for use together under specific conditions to fulfill relevant requirements without causing unacceptable interactions.”<sup>100</sup> By achieving compatibility of processes and equipment, NATO is seeking to enhance interoperability. Compatibility extends in all technical aspects, to include personal and collective equipment, C4I systems, and other logistic materiel such as fuel, food, and other materiel. By having standardized and compatible equipment and systems, NATO aims to lower the cost of the operation, but also enhance the support possibility between the participating nations in the operation. Compatibility is the possibility of equipment to use each other’s infrastructure for sustainment, and systems to be able to receive and give service to each other.

In addition to compatibility, to achieve high level of interoperability NATO requires interchangeability. According to NATO definitions interchangeability is “the ability of one product, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfill the same requirement.”<sup>101</sup> Standardizing equipment and being able to share common logistics for maintenance and function gives the commander more flexibility during the operation. Interchangeability includes personal equipment such as armament, or night vision goggles, or other personal equipment, to collective equipment such as using filters for

---

<sup>99</sup> Roman Dufek, “Collective Logistics Support for NATO-led Operations,” *Readperiodicals*, April 2014, accessed 4 December 2014, <http://www.readperiodicals.com/201404/3368328191.html>.

<sup>100</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, AAP-6, 2-C-10.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-I-7.

maintenance of vehicles. Also interchangeability decreases the cost of the operation, and allows for a much easier cooperation in logistics supply between the partners.

Last requirement of NATO standardization is commonality. According to NATO definitions, commonality is defined as “the state achieved when the same doctrine, procedures or equipment are used.”<sup>102</sup> In the time of economic austerity it seems that commonality is very common in NATO. In fact, recently NATO introduced the concept of “Smart Defense.” Smart defense is the cooperative way of generating defense capabilities necessary for the alliance. Through smart defense, NATO intends to enhance the cooperation between alliance members to develop, acquire, operate, and maintain capabilities needed to conduct alliance essential tasks.<sup>103</sup> This cooperation between the alliance members can develop capabilities or equipment that individually would not be possible, thus have a common use of the equipment. Recent examples include joint fighters, guided precision munitions, or other similar platforms which are constructed by one or more of the member nations.

Technical interoperability among NATO members and partner nations is necessary, in order to be able to accomplish the mission. Achieving compatibility, interchangeability, and commonality standards of equipment and systems decreases the friction in operating in the multinational environment. In addition, allows the commander much higher flexibility to achieve the mission accomplishment.

---

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 2-C-10.

<sup>103</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Smart Defense,” 16 July 2014, accessed 5 December 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_84268.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm).

## Other requirements

In addition to requirements and standards mentioned above, participation in NATO operations depends on other factors as well. Creating a force for the NATO led operation is a process that is influenced by the level of contributing force, capability to sustain the forces, and national caveats. These factors play an important role when inviting the partners to participate in NATO-led operations. Although a higher number of participating nations in operations is desired, since it increases the legitimacy of the mission, however military leadership has a different perspective. When force generation is conducted military planners view the contributing nations from the perspective of interoperability, integration and capabilities that they are offering. The process of force generation intends to fill the gaps of the capabilities that are required to accomplish the mission at hand. They require suitable forces that can effectively contribute to mission success, compared to political interest and a symbolic force that does not have a real contribution to the mission success and has many limitations.<sup>104</sup>

Another factor that influences the invitation of partner nations to participate in NATO led operations is their capability to sustain their forces. Contributing nations are responsible to equip, and sustain their forces in the operation. If the contributing nation is not able to sustain their forces continuously and effectively, this represents a major restriction for the NATO to achieve mission success. NATO requires partner nations that

---

<sup>104</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Radu Burduja, “Transforming for Multinational Operation; A Study of National Army of Moldova” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 2014), 63.

can sustain its forces in an extended period, logistically and being able to rotate forces in theater for as long as the operation continues.<sup>105</sup>

A factor that influences the invitation of partner nations is national caveats that the partner nations have for the use of their forces in the operation. Higher the numbers of caveats that partner nations have for the use of their forces by NATO, less the possibility for the partner nation to be invited by NATO to participate in these operations. NATO is looking for the partners that have few and possibly no caveats on use of their forces.<sup>106</sup>

In conclusion, participation of partner nations in NATO led operations is desired because they provide legitimacy to the operation. However, there are few steps and processes that these nations must first address. In order to ensure the interoperability between the participating nations in the operation, NATO has set the standards and evaluation criteria's for the forces and capabilities committed. These standards and criteria's are set as guidance upon which the nations will prepare their forces to participate in NATO led operations.

#### Analysis of Kosovo Security Force and Kosovo Armed Forces

The Kosovo Security Force is planned to evolve into Kosovo Armed Forces in 2014 in accordance with the recommendations of the Kosovo Strategic Security Sector Review. The new institution will be responsible for the defense of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Republic of Kosovo, support civil authorities in dealing with civil emergencies, and to be ready and capable to deploy in international peacekeeping

---

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 64.

operations.<sup>107</sup> This subchapter will examine current KAF development, in order to determine if current development program meets the NATO doctrine, training, and material requirements and standards to participate in NATO-led non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

### Doctrine

Kosovo Security Force was created in 21 of January 2009, in accordance with Mr. Ahtisaari's comprehensive proposal for Kosovo final status. Kosovo Security Force is multiethnic, professional, lightly armed security force that is subject to democratic, civilian control, and is responsible for crisis response operations in Kosovo and abroad; civil protection operations within Kosovo; and to assist the civil authorities in responding to natural disasters and other emergencies.<sup>108</sup> NATO took the responsibility to have lead role in KSF standup, recruitment and training, and the establishment of a civilian-led organization to supervise and control the KSF, until KSF reaches Full Operational Capability for the assigned mission tasks.<sup>109</sup> The priority in developing the KSF initially was to Training and Doctrine Command, which will deal with training of the all KSF personnel, develop procedures and doctrine, and set the common standard for entire KSF.

The development of KSF doctrine and procedures is responsibility of KSF Training and Doctrine Command. Within this unit, department of doctrine is tasked to

---

<sup>107</sup> Republic of Kosovo, "Analysis of Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo," 33.

<sup>108</sup> Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, LAW No. 03/L-046.

<sup>109</sup> NATO, "The Kosovo Security Force now Self-Sustainable," 30 July 2013, accessed 5 December 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_101890.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_101890.htm?selectedLocale=en).

develop, publish and disseminate doctrinal publication for entire KSF. Despite the effort of NATO to standup, train, and develop the KSF, the process of doctrine development within KSF was never formalized. Because of the urgency of standing up the KSF, limitations imposed on mission of the KSF, doctrine development within KSF was mostly done by adopting KPC manuals and publications and just doing cosmetic changes by changing names from KPC to KSF. The KPC doctrine was based on the U.S. doctrine, which was translated and adapted for the KPC needs by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) project that was in charge of assisting KPC Training and Doctrine Command. Doctrine publications of KPC included many publications for core KPC tasks and missions, which in 2009 became KSF missions. These tasks were search and rescue, hazard materials handling, demining, and emergency management. In addition to the publications for the tasks mentioned, KPC publications included leadership, planning process, and decision making. These publications were adapted and with the approval of KSF leadership and KFOR advisory team it became KSF doctrine.

In addition to KPC doctrinal publications, KSF was assisted by KFOR mentors and assistants to develop doctrine for the needs of KSF. The KFOR assisted KSF by providing NATO doctrine and standards, and assisting KSF to adapt these publications for KSF core missions.<sup>110</sup> This process intention was to introduce NATO doctrine in KSF and start creating NATO standards within the KSF. However, despite the KFOR mentorship and assistance, KSF is still in process of developing a formal doctrine development process that can develop their own doctrine for their own needs. Instead,

---

<sup>110</sup> Xavier Meulenbeek, “Towards an Independent Kosovo Security Force !?” (Master Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherland, 2013), accessed 12 November 2014, <http://gpm.ruhosting.nl/mt/2013-MA-SG-18,MeulenbeekXavier.pdf>.

KSF doctrine development was mainly focused on adapting the lower level publications, manuals, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), from the US doctrine and publications for the needs of conducting KSF core missions. So far KSF has published four main doctrinal publications. These publications include Training Doctrine, Logistics Doctrine, Communications Doctrine, and Peace Support Operations Training Manual. These documents were mostly adapted from the U.S. doctrinal publications for the KSF needs. These documents, with some changes and modifications will be transferred to KAF.

The KSF was mostly oriented in the lower level and immediate needs publications in order to provide common guidance for training, and daily functioning of the units. These publications were mostly adapted either from previous organization, or adapting the U.S. Army doctrine for the KSF needs. In addition, KFOR mentors responsible to advise and assist in developing the KSF introduced NATO doctrine and standards within the KSF. These publications will transfer to KAF and will be adapted for the KAF needs.

#### Future Doctrine

Kosovo Defense White Book explains that Kosovo Armed Forces will be developed in three phases; phase one 2014-16, phase two 2017-19, and phase three 2020-24. During the first phase of KAF development, focus will be on development of concepts, doctrine and manuals for the new force. Final draft of the KAF doctrine has already been completed and awaits approval from higher authorities. KAF Military Doctrine explains the principles of military operations, types of operations it will conduct, and how they plan to conduct operations, domestically and abroad.

KAF military doctrine explains the fundamentals of the KAF operations in the defense and security of the nation and the ways they contribute to the international

operations. KAF military doctrine is in harmonization with the NATO Standard AJP-3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations. According to KAF military doctrine, KAF will conduct operations in accordance with following principles; Unified Command, Security, Flexibility, Simplicity, Sustainability, Cooperation and Interoperability.<sup>111</sup> These principles are the same as in the NATO Standard AJP-3. In addition, considering that KAF intent is to participate in international operations and conduct Peace Support Operations, KAF military doctrine adopted additional principles that are also given in the NATO doctrine. These principles are Impartiality, Consent, Restraint in the use of Force, Perseverance/Long-term View, Legitimacy, Credibility, Mutual Respect, Transparency, and Freedom of movement.<sup>112</sup>

Kosovo Armed Forces will be capable to conduct conventional operations in homeland defense, conduct non-conventional operations, and conduct of operations to face natural, man-made and industrial threats. In conducting non-conventional operations, or crisis response operations, KAF will conduct those in coordination with other regional or international security organizations. Therefore, to conduct these type of operations a comprehensive approach is necessary to coordinate with other governmental, international and non-governmental organizations.<sup>113</sup> KAF will conduct stability and peace support operations in support of other security institutions to provide safe and secure environment. As part of peace support operations, KAF can conduct humanitarian

---

<sup>111</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *General Military Doctrine*, 40.

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

operations, peace building operations, and operations in response to natural disaster.<sup>114</sup> Comprehensive approach of conducting operations by KAF satisfies the NATO standard. This is in line with the NATO requirements for planning and conducting operations in multinational environment.

KAF in conducting international operations will plan and prepare to always operate together with allies and partners.<sup>115</sup> This statement shows that KAF will plan and prepare participation in international operations always considering the multinational and joint approach. In conduct of international operations, KAF will plan and participate under command of a partner nation. The relationship of this command will be negotiated and discussed during the planning process of the operation. This principle of multinational and joint approach of conducting operations fulfills the second requirement of NATO doctrine standard.

However, KAF doctrine does not consider the third standard in conducting operations, which is joint action. Partially this is because KAF will only have Land Forces. Nonetheless, for participating in international operations it is necessary to incorporate in their doctrine preparation for joint operation. This is one of the key principles of international operations, considering that today all operations are joint.

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., 35.

Table 2. NATO Doctrine Standards

<b>NATO Doctrine Standards</b>	<b>Kosovo Security Force</b>	<b>Kosovo Armed Forces</b>
<b>NATO Principles of Conducting Operations</b>	KSF does not have overarching doctrine that addresses how it conducts operations	Yes
<b>Comprehensive Approach</b>	No	Yes
<b>Multinational and Joint Approach</b>	No	Yes
<b>Joint Action</b>	No	No

*Source:* Created by the author based on the analysis of NATO, KSF, and KAF doctrine

Table 2 explains that KSF doctrine does not meet the NATO doctrine requirements. Even though, during the process of KSF development by KFOR, this institution was introduced with the NATO doctrine and standards. Therefore, it was only limited on KSF missions of emergency response, search and rescue, EOD, and hazard materials. The doctrine developed for KSF needs included only lower level doctrine (manuals, TTP, and SOP) for the KSF needs. KSF did not develop higher-level doctrine, which would explain how KSF conducts operations, and what type of operations would participate.

Different from KSF, doctrine development for KAF has top-to bottom approach. KAF doctrine started with capstone document, which is comprehensive document that lays the path for other doctrinal documents to be developed for the future missions. This doctrine is in harmonization with NATO doctrine and requirements. As it is shown in table 2, KAF doctrine meets majority of NATO standards. Joint action standard need to be incorporated in the KAF doctrine, by either reviewing current draft, or incorporating

this standard in key stone or lower level doctrine. However, the KAF LTDP identifies in phase one of KAF development, a main focus is to develop doctrinal for entire force. It is important that these publications incorporate all NATO standards and fully harmonize with NATO requirements of conducting operations. This will also provide good basis for training and developing capable forces that are interoperable with NATO members.

### Training

Troop contributing nations have the responsibility to train their forces and provide a ready and trained force for NATO-led operations. Troop contributing nations must develop sufficient capabilities to train their forces, according to standards and guidance issued by NATO authorities. Kosovo Security Force has developed capabilities to train their forces for the core mission tasks. This was confirmed in June of 2013, when North Atlantic Council (NAC) declared that KSF has reached Full Operational Capabilities. North Atlantic Council declared that “KSF has reached the required level of self-sustainability in terms of recruiting, vetting, training of personnel, as well as equipping the Force. NATO considers that KSF is fully capable to perform the tasks assigned to it within its mission and to standards designated by NATO.”<sup>116</sup> This statement declared that KSF is trained, and capable to conduct search and rescue operations, explosive ordnance disposal, control and clearance of hazardous materials, fire-fighting and other humanitarian assistance tasks in accordance with NATO standards. More importantly,

---

<sup>116</sup>North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement of the North Atlantic Council,” NATO official webpage, July 9, 2013, accessed 8 December, 2014, <http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/news-room/press-releases/full-operational-capability-declared-for-kosovo-security-force.aspx>.

this statement confirms that KSF is self-sustainable to conduct training in accordance with NATO standards for the KSF core missions.

During the five year period KSF developed its training capabilities, infrastructure and conducted training for its core missions. Training in KSF is conducted in three domains; institutional, operational, and self-development.<sup>117</sup> The institutional training is conducted in Training and Doctrine Command, operational training is conducted in units, and self-development although exists as domain has not been developed yet in desirable level.

In the first years of its development KSF was developing basic training capabilities, and developing its institutional domain of training. KSF Training and Doctrine Command was one of the first units to stand up in order to be able to train the transferees from KPC, and new recruits that were coming from the civilian life. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is consisted of Doctrine Department, Officer School, Non-commissioned Officer School, Specialty Training Center, Collective Training Center and Basic Training Center. (See figure 5 for more details)

---

<sup>117</sup> Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine*, 18.




Figure 4. Kosovo Armed Forces Doctrine Hierarchy

Source: Created by author based on the information on KSF from personal knowledge.

This unit is capable to conduct basic and advanced individual training for KSF core missions, leadership development (Officer and NCO), and language training. Although, KSF mission is emergency response and does not include military tasks, TRADOC built capabilities for basic skills training, including weapons handling, navigation, communication skills, first aid and basic maneuver skills. Specialty training center is equivalent to Advanced Individual Training in the U.S. Army. This center conducts training for KSF core missions and military police, logistics, transportation, basic engineers training, communication. Collective training center is responsible to organize and facilitate collective unit training. Mostly, conducts exercises without troops, command post exercises, and does evaluations during the field training exercises.

Second training domain of KSF is operational training. This training is conducted in the units and intent is to combine individual skills gained in institutional training, as

well as improve those by training within the unit.<sup>118</sup> All KSF core missions are conducted by Civil Protection Regiment (CPR). Civil Protection Regiment mission is to provide trained and equipped specialized units in the field of search and rescue, hazmat material, explosive ordinance demining(EOD), and fire fighting.<sup>119</sup> The CPR inherited the structure of the KPC Civil Protection Brigade, with few modifications and incorporating NATO requirements. (see figure 6)




Figure 5. Civil Protection Regiment Organizational Chart

Source: Ejup Maqedonci, “Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 2013), 23.

<sup>118</sup> Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Defense, *Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine*, 78.

<sup>119</sup> Maqedonci, “Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations,” 23.

This unit has inherited the capabilities from KPC, but also added new skills and level by training with NATO training teams. In addition, KSF in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy has initiated the training of this unit, especially for the Search and Rescue Company to certify them to international rules of International Search and Rescue Agreement (INSARAG).<sup>120</sup> This unit started training in August of 2013, and a contractor from the U.S., contracted by the U.S. embassy is conducting the training. Purpose is to train this unit in order to achieve the level of training and skills, and to be ready to conduct operations in support of NATO-led operations.<sup>121</sup>

Similarly, the EOD Company is also transferred from the KPC. Most of leaders of this unit have been transferred from the KPC and have extensive knowledge and experience that they brought with them. Kosovo Protection Corps, under the supervision of KFOR was conducting EOD operations since year 2000. This company was trained, and mentored by the KFOR U.S. EOD unit. In October of 2014, fourteen members of this company attended 5-week course held by the KSF instructors and assisted by the KFOR US EOD Team, to acquire “knowledge and skills necessary to perform duties and responsibilities during EOD Operations of a qualified International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Level 3 EOD Operator U.S. contingent on level three EOD.”<sup>122</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>122</sup> Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force, “Additional 13 Members Of EOD Team Are Qualified to Perform duties of an EOD Specialist,” Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force Newsletter, November 2014, accessed 5 December 2014, [www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Newsletter\\_Frame\\_November.pdf](http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Newsletter_Frame_November.pdf),

Kosovo Security Force has participated in three short operations and several exercises in the region. In response to explosion of an ammunition destruction facility in Gerdec Albania, with the request from Albanian government, EOD Company provided assistance to Albanian government assistance to manage the situation created and clear unexploded devices.<sup>123</sup> Similarly, after the floods in Albania in 2010 and 2011, with the request from the Albanian government, KSF responded with SAR, medical, transport and military police units to assist Albanian government in management of emergency created in the northern part of Albania.

Kosovo Security Force also participated in number of training events and exercises in the region. Mostly these exercises were to enhance regional cooperation, but also achieve interoperability in the multinational crisis response operations. In June 2014, KSF participated in European Command (EUCOM) sponsored trilateral command post and tactical field exercise. This exercise included 900 participants from nine different countries, and was designed to deploy multinational force to disaster relief mission, and to enhance joint and combined interoperability with allied and partner nations.<sup>124</sup> The objective of this exercise was to “prepare participating nations for increased contributions to ongoing and future NATO operations.”<sup>125</sup>

North Atlantic Council has declared that KSF has achieved Full Operational Capabilities and is self-sustainable to conduct recruitment, training, vetting, and missions

---

<sup>123</sup> Maqedonci, “Kosovo’s Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations,” 30.

<sup>124</sup> US Army Europe, “Exercise Immediate Response,” accessed 6 December 2014, <http://www.eur.army.mil/immediateresponse/>.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

for its core missions. This declaration of NAC demonstrates that KSF fulfills NATO requirements and standards in its core mission tasks. Kosovo Security Force is self-sufficient to conduct training for KSF core mission tasks. These tasks include EOD, SAR, Hazard Material handling, and Fire Fighting. In addition, KSF basic training includes basic military skills such as weapons handling, CBRN protection, navigation, first aid, and communications. These skills are in accordance with the NATO requirements for basic skills. However, because of restrictions imposed KSF lacks both the capability and capacity to conduct more advanced military training.

#### Future Training

Kosovo Security Force will evolve to KAF starting in 2014, by taking new tasks and missions prescribed above. However, the capability of KSF to train soldiers and officer for future mission is almost nonexistent. Therefore, in KAF LTDP it is mentioned that priority in development will be given to KAF Training and Doctrine Command in order to do changes in doctrines, training curriculum and increase capacities for training in order to improve current operational capabilities and to develop future tasks.<sup>126</sup> Moreover, during 2015 Kosovo MoD will develop policies that define principles, objectives, system, and responsibilities for training, qualification for individual and collective training of KAF personnel at all levels.<sup>127</sup> The aim is by the end of 2016 to develop new training programs related to mission statements of KAF units and these

---

<sup>126</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Long Term Development Plan*, 25.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*

programs should be compatible with national and NATO standards.<sup>128</sup> These programs will include the requirements for training of the capabilities that KAF will declare for NATO-led Crisis Response Operations. Moreover, LTDP states that within mid-term period (2015-19) KAF will complete the procedural requirements (doctrine, manuals, procedures etc.) and conduct training for all individual and collective training activities for operations on squad, platoon and company level, and prepare for training activities up to battalion level.<sup>129</sup>

Table 3. NATO Training Standards

<b>NATO Training Standards</b>	<b>KSF</b>	<b>KAF</b>
<b>Basic Skills</b>	Yes	Yes
<b>Generic Skills</b>	No	Yes
<b>Mission Specific Skills</b>	Yes	Yes

*Source:* Created by the author based on the analysis of NATO training standards and KSF, and KAF training capabilities, and programs.

Table 3 shows that KSF partially meets NATO requirements and standards regarding training. KSF meets the requirements for basic skills and mission specific skills training. Basic training conducted in KSF TRADOC includes the skills such as weapons handling, CBRN protection, navigation, and communication. However, because of the restrictions imposed on KSF does not have the capability to train generic skills

---

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

requirements. Kosovo Security Force is restricted only to emergency response mission, and training is tailored to KSF core mission tasks.

On the other hand, table 3 shows that KAF will meet all the NATO training standards and requirements. According to KAF LTDP, during the second phase of development, KAF will develop training programs that will meet the KAF requirements for all mission tasks, and these training programs will be developed in accordance with NATO standards. In addition, during third phase, KAF will conduct training that is more specialized in order to enhance the level of skills acquired during the first and second phase. This advanced training will ensure the skill level required to conduct KAF mission and provide trained personnel for all KAF mission tasks, as well as prepare units for possible deployment abroad in peace support and humanitarian operations.

Kosovo Security Force is partially meeting NATO requirements for training standards. This is because of the restrictions that were imposed on KSF during the stand up. KSF is certified for its core missions in search and rescue, explosive ordinance disposal, hazard material handling, and fire-fighting. In 2013, NAC declared that KSF has reached Full Operational Capabilities in its core missions and is self-sustainable to conduct these missions. Nonetheless, to participate in Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Assistance, KAF will need to develop training programs that incorporate generic skills and mission specific skills. However, despite the fact that NATO, and NAC trained KSF declared Full Operational Capability for KSF in core missions, in order to participate in NATO-led operations these forces must be certified by standardized NATO certification process. This is done initially by declaring capabilities that Kosovo will contribute to NATO operations, and then go through the OCC E&F evaluation process

before it starts the level two evaluation and certification for participating in NATO operation.

### Materiel

Overall, the current KSF equipment is suitable for the current emergency response mission. However, the equipment that KSF possesses is mostly either carried from KPC, or donations received from different countries. Although the donations were necessary to be able to operate initially, the standardization of equipment is hard to achieve since different countries donate different type of equipment. The KSF faces difficulties with unstandardized equipment, since there are no qualified personnel to perform maintenance in unstandardized equipment, so some maintenance has to be done by private companies.<sup>130</sup> In addition, operation with the equipment is also difficult since it requires specialized and specific training programs. In order to achieve interoperability with NATO most of current equipment must be decommissioned or discarded. This is because most of the equipment is old, and not standardized.

However, KSF has started to standardize its equipment and procure equipment that is in accordance with NATO standards and requirements. Kosovo Security Force has procured few contingents of NATO standard light weapons from Heckler and Koch G36, Colt M4 assault rifles, and Glock 9mm pistols. These are standard weapons for all KSF members, and it will be the same for the future KAF. Similarly, KSF has invested in tactical communication equipment that is compatible with the NATO standards. Harris radios have been procured for the communication purposes for KSF. These radios are

---

<sup>130</sup> Meulenbeek, "Towards an Independent Kosovo Security Force," 56.

new generation radios that are capable to interconnect and with little modifications and security protocol installations can be interoperable with NATO members. However, because of the limited budget KSF can only procure limited quantity of equipment needed and in an extended period. Currently, very little of KSF equipment is in accordance with NATO standards of interchangeability, commonality, and compatibility.

In order to standardize equipment in KAF, LTDP explains that during the first phase of KAF development, individual and collective equipment that KSF units possess will be reassessed according to the current TOE and start with the integration phase of KSF equipment into KAF equipment. Priority will be given to individual equipment, in order to ensure that all members are 100% equipped with individual equipment and weapons according to their new mission.<sup>131</sup>

Most of the current equipment that KSF possesses is not in accordance with NATO standards. Long Term Development Plan recognizes the issue of the equipment, and the need to standardize across the force. In order to achieve the objective of deploying a force in 2024, KAF need to have clear objectives on how it will achieve the standardization of the equipment, especially considering the limited budget that KAF will have in the near future. Most of the equipment for the KAF will be purchased during the 2014-24 period.

---

<sup>131</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Long Term Development Plan*, 29.

Table 4. NATO Materiel Standards

<b>NATO Materiel Standards</b>	<b>KSF</b>	<b>KAF</b>
<b>Interchangeability</b>	Partial	Yes
<b>Commonality</b>	No	No
<b>Compatibility</b>	Partial	Partial

*Source:* Created by the author based on the analysis of NATO materiel standards, and analysis of KSF, and KAF materials and equipment.

Table 4 shows that currently KSF is partially meeting NATO materiel standards. Most of the KSF equipment are either from donations or inherited from KPC. These equipment, although necessary to accomplish its mission, are outdated, not standardizes, and do not meet the interchangeability or compatibility standard. Furthermore, old equipment that KSF has in possession is creating problems for the KSF, since their maintenance is costly and not practical. Maintenance for most of the equipment must be done outside of the KSF, because it is hard to keep spare parts for every type of equipment.

However, KSF is putting a lot of effort to standardize its equipment. Recently KSF is purchasing equipment that is in accordance with NATO standards of interchangeability and compatibility. KSF intent is to implement no more than two types of equipment for a specific capability. This will solve some of the maintenance issues, but also achieve NATO materiel standards of interchangeability and compatibility.

Regarding, the standard of commonality currently for KSF is not possible because Kosovo cannot participate in any of the NATO materiel platform projects. Moreover, purchasing the platform is not cost effective for Kosovo.

On the other hand, Kosovo Armed Forces is committed to be developed in accordance with NATO standards, to include standards for materiel. At the first phase of development, KAF will do the assessment of KSF equipment and see what equipment is suitable for KAF and if they meet the NATO standards. In addition, according to LTDP future purchase of individual and collective equipment will be always having in mind the interoperability and NATO standards. Nonetheless, similar to KSF, achieving the commonality standard for equipment will be hard. However, Defense White Book mentions that KAF will actively seek to be part of NATO Smart Defense initiative. By participating in this initiative, KAF could achieve the commonality standard easier and more cost effective.

Can KAF doctrine, training, and material program standards be achieved by 2024?

Kosovo has developed a ten year development plan of Kosovo Security Force evolving into Armed Forces. New institution will be responsible for homeland defense, support to civil authorities, and international operation participation. Kosovo aims to develop a force that can deploy in support of NATO-led Crisis Response Operation. In order to be able to accomplish this mission task, this institution need to achieve required interoperability standards set by NATO. These standards include doctrine, training and materiel requirements.

As previously mentioned, KAF will be developed in three phases. Phase I 2014-16 focuses on developing concepts, doctrine and manuals for the new force. Additionally, during this phase new training programs to fulfill KAF mission tasks requirements will be developed. These programs will be compatible with national and NATO standards. Phase II (2017-19) will continue with training of new KAF capabilities, but also develop and modernize command, control and communication capabilities, and procurement of essential individual and collective equipment. Phase III (2020-24) is focused in completing the force with personnel and equipment and achieve full operational capabilities to be capable to carry it constitutional mission.

Kosovo Armed Forces objective is to complete all doctrinal requirements and complete training requirements for up to a company level by the end of 2019. Although this objective is achievable by 2019, it cannot be achieved by KAF alone. Experiences of other countries demonstrates that, developing, testing, and implementing new doctrine takes from two to five years. Nevertheless, this is the case when the institutional knowledge, training capabilities, infrastructure, and other facilitating resources already exist within the institution. Kosovo Security Force, was restricted to emergency response and disaster relief mission, and was not allowed to develop or train on military capabilities. Therefore, Kosovo Armed Forces will only have the capability, knowledge, and infrastructure to train and develop current KSF core mission tasks. KAF will not have the experience, institutional knowledge, and infrastructure needed to develop, train and field these capabilities on their own.

Developing concepts, doctrine and procedures for KAF is achievable by 2024, considering that most of the initial doctrine publications, manuals and procedures will be

adopted from NATO and partner nations. However, the difficult part is implementation of the doctrine in the force. Implementation of new doctrine is time consuming and requires a comprehensive top to bottom, and bottom to top approach. Personnel that implement the doctrine need to understand it, and be able to apply the doctrine in planning, preparing, executing and assessing the operations.

KAF long term development plan explains that during the first phase of KAF development, training focus will be on “train the trainer” program, in order to develop instructor and trainer capabilities, and then continue with training for the new KAF mission tasks up to a company level. However, KAF LTDP does not give further details how these capabilities will be developed, considering such capability, knowledge and experience within KSF does not exist. In addition, KAF LTDP explains in third phase KAF will specifically focus in capabilities related to international military operations, such as humanitarian operations and participate in peace support operations.<sup>132</sup> Similarly, within the KAF LTDP researcher could not find how these capabilities will be developed, considering lack of knowledge, experience, and capability. In order to achieve this objective, KAF would have to cooperate closely with its partners, and seek for assistance and mentorship in developing doctrine, training capabilities, and stand up training infrastructure needed to achieve this objective.

Equipping a force today in the time of economic austerity is difficult even for the wealthiest countries. Many NATO members, despite the requirement to maintain defense expenditure at a 2 percent of GDP, very few of them are applying that standard.

Similarly, for Kosovo it will be difficult to achieve all equipment requirements for the

---

<sup>132</sup> Republic of Kosovo, *Long Term Development Plan*, 42.

force by 2024. Limited budget of defense spending is a limitation that can potentially cause KAF not to reach its 2024 objective in declaring Full Operational Capabilities.

Kosovo Armed Forces LTDP explains that during the second phase of development, KAF will procure and acquire essential individual and collective equipment in line with the TOE.<sup>133</sup> In addition, LTDP explains that by the end of phase three KAF will be completed with personnel, equipment and operational capabilities that correspond to national security requirements. However, considering that currently KSF possesses only equipment for its core mission tasks, purchasing equipment for all KAF capabilities with the budget projection for KAF seems not realistic. Defense spending for KAF in 2015 are estimated 51 million euro (\$63 million). From this amount only 43 percent of the defense spending will be located for KAF support purposes, to include equipment purchase. KAF LTDP estimates that this budget will increase every year by 10 percent, to reach 89 million euro (\$110 million) in 2023.<sup>134</sup> Equipping entire force in accordance with NATO standards with this budget is not realistic. Furthermore, KAF will need to develop maintenance capabilities for the new equipment, which adds the cost of the equipment.

Achieving NATO materiel standards for KAF, will be very challenging considering its limited budget. In order to achieve objective of being capable to accomplish constitutional mission task of homeland defense, KAF will need to receive donations from other countries, which potentially will delay achievement of NATO standards of interchangeability and compatibility. However, KAF does not have to

---

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 50.

achieve equipment standards for all of its capabilities. Prioritization of equipment for capabilities that will be declared for international operations could mitigate the risk of not achieving NATO technical interoperability.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Kosovo SSSR recommended that Kosovo Security Force evolve into Kosovo Armed Force with a mission of homeland defense, support to civilian authorities, and participation in international operations. Kosovo developed a ten-year plan that portrays in phases how KAF will be developed. Kosovo's goal is to achieve Full Operational Capability in all mission tasks for KAF by the end of 2024. One of the KAF mission tasks is participation in international operations. In order to participate in international NATO-led operations, countries need to fulfill a set of NATO standards and requirements in the doctrine, training, and materiel domain in order to ensure interoperability between NATO members and partner nations. Purpose of this research was to examine whether current KAF development program meets the NATO doctrine, training, and material requirements to create an interoperable force that can effectively contribute to NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The research examined NATO doctrine, training, and materiel requirements and analyzed the KAF development program in order to determine if it meets the 2024 objective of supporting NATO non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. This chapter summarizes and interprets the findings discussed in previous chapter, and includes recommendations for further research.

#### Summary of the Findings

Participation in NATO-led operations by non-NATO countries during the last two decades has increased manifold. In recent NATO-led operations as much as one third of the participating countries were non-NATO members. In order to participate in NATO-

led operations, these non-NATO countries had to achieve a set of interoperability standards that NATO requires. These standards include doctrine, training, and materiel.

Kosovo will start to develop its Armed Forces in 2014, and one of the mission tasks of Kosovo Armed Forces is participation in international operations. One of the objectives of Kosovo Armed Forces is to be fully interoperable with NATO members, in order to participate effectively in NATO-led operations. A ten year development plan, explains that KAF will be developed in accordance with NATO standards. However, after examining the NATO requirements and standards, and analyzing KAF development program this study concluded that KAF would only partially achieve NATO standards and requirements by 2024.

NATO doctrine requirements are harmonization of national doctrine with NATO in the aspect of conducting operations. Purpose of harmonization is to set common principles of conducting operations, enhance interoperability, achieve common understanding of terminology, and symbols, and ensure that all members have equivalent level of training and capabilities to accomplish the mission. NATO doctrine standards are fundamental principles of conduct of operations, comprehensive approach, multinational and joint approach, and joint action. Kosovo Armed Forces is in process of developing its doctrine. This doctrine is in harmonization with NATO doctrine, and intents to ensure interoperability with NATO. KAF doctrine includes all but one of the standards. Joint action is not mentioned in the KAF general military doctrine.

Second NATO requirement is training. Contributing nations are responsible to provide a ready, trained and equipped force that can effectively participate in NATO-led operations. In order to ensure that participating nations have equivalent level of training

and capabilities, NATO has issued training guidance and standards. In addition, nations that committed forces or capabilities before participation in the operation must complete the evaluation and certification process. This process ensures that participating forces are interoperable in the aspect of doctrine, training and materiel. NATO-led Crisis Response Operations include a wide range of operations to include from combat missions to disaster relief operations. Force generation process for NATO-led operations is a lengthy process, and is voluntary based. Troop contributing nations commit their forces or capabilities for a specific mission. However, these forces initially must be NATO certified that are interoperable and capable of accomplishing the mission.

Kosovo currently has only disaster relief capabilities that are trained by NATO. In 2013, NATO declared that KSF has reached Full Operational Capabilities for its core mission tasks and is self-sustainable to recruit, train and conduct these operations. Despite being trained by NATO, KSF must complete NATO certification process for these capabilities before these forces can participate in NATO led operations. Part of the certification is training level of forces. NATO issues training guidance and requirements for troop contributing nations. Training for Crisis Response Operations includes basic military skills, generic skills, and mission specific skills. However, KSF because of its limitations in mission is capable to do only two from three of the NATO requirements. Generic skills training requirement is not met by KSF.

On the other hand, KAF in development program explains that during the first and second phase of development it will build enough capabilities for training in all mission tasks up to company level. Initially, KAF will focus to develop “train the trainer” program in order to develop its training capabilities, and then continue with training of

the force. Capabilities for Peace Support Operations will be developed during phase three of the KAF development.

Although KAF LTDP addresses all of the future training requirements and how is going to progress in phases, lack of experience, knowledge and capability to execute the training is a risk and limitation for the KAF. Considering that KSF is restricted to disaster relief mission, knowledge, experience, capability and infrastructure for training for new mission tasks does not exist. To build these capabilities will take more time than just developing the program or doctrine.

Third NATO requirement is materiel standardization. NATO requires that its members standardize their equipment to NATO standards of interchangeability, compatibility, and commonality. Standardization of equipment is necessary to achieve full interoperability within multinational force environment. Forces in the contemporary complex environment must be able to provide and receive services from one another. Kosovo Security Force currently is working mostly on non-standardized equipment. This is because most of this equipment are from donations or inherited from KPC. However, KSF is progressing toward standardization of equipment by purchasing equipment that is compatible and interchangeable with NATO members. Recent purchases of armament, communication equipment, and vehicles are from NATO countries. By adopting these standards, KSF is moving toward the standardization of individual and collective equipment.

Similarly, in KAF LTDP it is explained that during first two phases KAF will assess what equipment can be transferred to KAF based on the NATO standardization procedures. In the future, all the individual and collective equipment will be purchased in

accordance with interchangeability and compatibility standards. However, because of budget limitations, there is a potential risk that KAF will not be able to meet all the materiel requirements until 2024 for the entire force. In order to mitigate this risk, KAF has prioritized equipment supply for the units that have defense missions and those that will be declared for international operations.

### Recommendations

Kosovo Armed Forces LTDP does a very thorough explanation of how KAF will be developed. Nevertheless, some gaps that are identified during this study need to be addressed in order to achieve full interoperability with NATO in domain of doctrine, training and materiel. To improve this plan in achieving interoperability with NATO and develop a force that can effectively contribute in NATO-led non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations researcher gives following recommendations.

#### Doctrine

Kosovo Armed Forces doctrine in general is in harmonization with NATO doctrine requirements and standards. However, one of the standards is overlooked, and not included. NATO always prepares, plans, and executes operations in joint action. This element is not captured in KAF doctrine. It is important that KAF doctrine address this element, so KAF forces are trained, and prepared to conduct operation in joint environment. This may be difficult to be implemented in KAF considering KAF will not have air force, or navy. Nonetheless, addressing this issue in doctrine will prepare KAF forces to understand the principles of joint operations planning, and execution. The

importance of this element is specifically for staff officers that will be participating in operations as staff members of a multinational force headquarters.

Second shortfall in doctrine domain is process of doctrine development. Kosovo Armed Forces is adopting NATO doctrine, and doctrine of U.S. Army for its needs. However, a formalized doctrine development process needs to be in place to continuously develop, publish and improve current doctrine. Doctrine is living document, and KAF must be constantly updating and improving its doctrine. Without a formalized doctrine, development process is impossible to keep up with the changes. The details of these practices and procedures should be carefully examined, documented, and preserved so that organizational development lessons may be extracted.

Kosovo could overcome this limitation through the development of a Doctrine and Lessons Learned Center. This center would ensure doctrine is current from the strategic level to tactical , and input the changes from the practical experience obtained through the lessons learned from the force. This combination of doctrine department a top to bottom approach, and lessons learned department bottom to top approach will help ensure a formalized doctrine process.

### Training

Troop contributing nations are responsible to train their own forces based on the standards and requirements issued by NATO in training guidance. In KAF, the general military doctrine is mentioned that KAF will participate in Peace Support and Humanitarian Assistance Operations. NATO requires that all forces participating in Crisis Response Operations to be trained in basic military skills, generic skills and mission specific skills. Kosovo Armed Forces addresses the issue of training for required

skills, especially in phase three. During this phase, specific skills for peace support operations will be developed and sustained. Nonetheless, it is not addressed how KAF will acquire these capabilities, considering that such capabilities, experience and knowledge does not exist in KAF. Practice of other nations is that they sent their forces in different schools and exercises to gain these capabilities and experience with the intent to transfer those skills in to the force. Perfect example is Baltic countries model with Baltic Battalion (BALBAT) training. During their force development phase, Baltic countries would send their forces to participate in BALBAT, and upon their return home participants were tasked to train others on similar tasks and standards.

Prior to participation in NATO-led operations, NATO requires that a standardized certification process must certify forces and capabilities declared. NATO expects from small countries to provide small but specialized capabilities that will enhance the effectiveness of NATO operation. Considering that current KSF capabilities are trained in accordance with NATO standards, it is convenient that KAF declare those capabilities for NATO operations and start certification process. In addition, participation in exercises with these capabilities will enhance the interoperability of KAF with NATO members and other partner nations.

Kosovo Armed Forces overcome this limitation through the development of a Universal Task List (UTL) from a Land Force Command level down to squad. This UTL would standardize training within KAF, for their defense mission and international operations. The UTL would also provide commanders and planners a standardized tool to prepare, plan, execute and assess training for all mission tasks, to include international operations.

## Materiel

To achieve technical interoperability, equipment, systems and hardware need to meet three standardization criteria's; interchangeability, commonality, and compatibility. These are three standards that NATO requires to achieve interoperability between the members and partner nations. Kosovo Armed Forces when conducting the assessment of KSF equipment, hardware, and systems need to analyze them from the interchangeability, commonality, and compatibility perspective. Only the equipment that meets these standards should be accepted into force, if KAF wants to achieve materiel interoperability with NATO.

Similarly, purchase of new equipment, systems, and hardware should be analyzed from the NATO interoperability perspective. New equipment should meet the NATO requirements of interchangeability, commonality, and compatibility. By following these standards, KAF besides the fact that they would be able to provide and receive service from NATO members, will be also able to sustain their forces easier in multinational environment. By having interchangeable, and common equipment with NATO members, sustainment and maintenance of the equipment in the multinational environment is easier and more cost effective.

### Further Research Recommendations

This study examined the KAF interoperability with NATO from a broader perspective. In order to improve interoperability of KAF with NATO, and create a force that can effectively participate in NATO-led operations, following further research is recommended. Further research is required to outline the resources required, operational procedures organizational structure for the Doctrine and Lessons Learned Center. Only

through a complete analysis of such an organization could its potential benefits be clearly illustrated. Research into the doctrine development used by r small countries who have recently adopt the U.S. Army and NATO doctrine for their needs. While this doctrine is written for a much larger army, it would be bebificalk to capture their lessons on how it was implemented. As it would be key to determine how these countries best achieve NATO doctrine standards and requirements. Research is also required to further Universal Task List to standardize training within KAF, for their defense mission and international operations. Specifically the UTL should focus on pre deployment training for KAF participation in NATO-led Peace Support and Humanitarian Assistance Operations. This research could help develop list of skills, capabilities, and training needed to be conducted prior to deployment in these operations. Also, this would help meet the NATO certification of forces criteria.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Kosovo Government Documents

Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. June 15, 2008.

Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force. "Additional 13 Members Of EOD Team Are Qualified to Perform duties of an EOD Specialist." Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force Newsletter. November 2014. Accessed 5 December 2014. [www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Newsletter\\_Frame\\_November.pdf](http://www.mksf-ks.org/repository/docs/Newsletter_Frame_November.pdf).

Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. LAW No. 03/L-045, *Law on the Ministry for the Kosovo Security Force*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, 13 March 2008.

———. LAW No. 03/L-046, *Law on the Kosovo Security Force*. Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo, 13 March 2008.

———. LAW No. 04/L-177, *On Overseas Deployment Of the Kosovo Security Force*. Pristina, Kosovo, 28 May 2013.

Republic of Kosovo. "Analysis of Strategic Security Sector Review of the Republic of Kosovo." Pristina, March 2014. Accessed 10 May 2014. [http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Analysis\\_of\\_Strategic\\_Security\\_Sector\\_Review\\_of\\_RKS\\_060314.pdf](http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/Analysis_of_Strategic_Security_Sector_Review_of_RKS_060314.pdf).

———. *Defense White Book of Republic of Kosovo*. Draft. Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014.

———. *Long Term Development Plan of Kosovo Armed Forces*. Draft. Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014.

———. *General Military Doctrine of Kosovo Armed Forces*. Draft. Pristina, Kosovo, March 2014.

Republic of Kosovo Ministry of Defense. *Kosovo Security Force Training Doctrine*. Ferizaj, Kosovo: Training and Doctrine Command, June 2010.

### NATO Doctrinal Documents, Articles and Publications

McKee, Brian, Angela R. Febraro, and Sharon L. Riedel. RTO-TR-HFM-120, *Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors*. NATO Science and Technology Organization, November 2008. Accessed 24 March 2014. <https://www.cso.nato.int/pubs/rdp.asp?RDP=RTO-TR-HFM-120>.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Allied Administration Publication (AAP)-4.7, *Allied Joint Doctrine Development*. Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), December 2013.

———. Allied Administration Publication (AAP)-6, *NATO Glossary Terms and Definitions*. Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), April 2014.

———. Allied Joint Publication AJP-3(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*. Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), March 2011.

———. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4(A), *Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*. Ratification Draft 1, Brussels, Belgium, 2010.

———. Allied Training Publication (ATrainP)-1, *Training and Education for Peace Support Operations*. Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), January 2014.

———. “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces.” 11 May 2012. Accessed 24 March 2014. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_84112.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm).

———. “NATO’s Role in Kosovo,” 22 October 2013. Accessed 24 March 2014. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_48818.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm).

———. “The Kosovo Security Force now Self-Sustainable.” 30 July 2013. Accessed 5 December 2014. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_101890.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_101890.htm?selectedLocale=en).

———. *Political-Military Framework for Partner Involvement in NATO-led Operations*. Accessed 12 November 2014. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2011\\_04/20110415\\_110415-PMF.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_04/20110415_110415-PMF.pdf).

———. “Smart Defense.” 16 July 2014. Accessed 5 December 2014. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_84268.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm).

———. “Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the UCK.” 29 June 1999. Accessed 30 March 2014. <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990620a.htm>.

### US Doctrinal Documents

Department of the Army. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012.

- . Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011.
- . Field Manual (FM) 7-15, *The Army Universal Task List*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009.
- . TRADOC Regulation 71-20, *Concept Development, Capabilities, Determination, and Capabilities Integration*. Fort Eustis, VA. Department of the Army, 2013.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013.
- . Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2013.
- . “Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).” Joint Electronic Library. Accessed 20 August 2014. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl\\_tasks.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtl_tasks.htm).

#### Other Articles and Publications

- Burduja, Radu LTC. “Transforming for Multinational Operations: A Study of the National Army of Moldova.” Master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2014.
- Dufek, Roman. “Collective Logistics Support for NATO-led Operations.” *Readperiodicals*, April 2014. Accessed 4 December 2014. <http://www.readperiodicals.com/201404/3368328191.html>.
- Family Health International. “Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector’s Guide.” Accessed 24 August 2014. <http://www.ccs.neu.edu/course/is4800sp12/resource/qualmethods.pdf>.
- Fatos Bytyci. “Kosovo Amends Law to Close Western Supervisory Body.” *Reuters*, 7 September 2012. Accessed 10 May 2014. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/07/uk-kosovo-supervision-dUKBRE8860LN20120907>.
- Geci, Sinan. “Kosovo Security Force Post 2012.” Master’s thesis, American University in Kosova, Rochester Institute of Technology, 2011.
- Kastrati, Kadri LTG. “Natural Disasters Management System in Kosovo.” Master’s thesis, Pristina, Kosovo, Universum College, 2012.

- Maqedonci, Ejup, Maj. "Kosovo's Support of NATO Stability and Humanitarian Operations." Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 2013.
- Meulenbeek, Xavier. "Towards an Independent Kosovo Security Force." Master Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherland, 2013. Aaccessed 12 November 2014. <http://gpm.ruhosting.nl/mt/2013-MA-SG-18,MeulenbeekXavier.pdf>.
- Rus, Christian V., Cpt. "Transformation of the Romanian Army." Master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, KS, 2006
- United Nation Security Council. "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement." March 26, 2007. Accessed 10 May 2014. [http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive\\_proposal-english.pdf](http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf).
- US Army Europe. "Exercise Immediate Response." Accessed 6 December 2014. <http://www.eur.army.mil/immediateresponse/>.