

A PATH LESS CHOSEN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

A Monograph

by

MAJ Melvin S. Jackson
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Melvin S. Jackson

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Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Peter J. Schifferle, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Michael J. Swanson, COL, AV

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2014 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

A PATH LESS CHOSEN: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES, by MAJ Melvin S. Jackson, 57 pages.

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is one of four schools at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and has three programs: The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP), and the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3). SAMS is the planning school, and SAMS graduates are planners. It is this commonly held belief that typifies the field Army's expectations of the school, expectations that should guide the school in its mission and curriculum. However, is there a difference between what the Army in the field expects a SAMS/Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) graduate to be capable of when they complete the program and what SAMS/AMSP actually educates that officer to do? This is the primary question answered in this monograph.

The expectations of the Army come in the form of results of a survey, conducted by the school in 2007, of Army general officers in Divisions and Corps. The data indicates the leaders of the Army in the field expect what the school has traditionally produced and has gained a renowned reputation for: critical and creative thinking, problem solving planners and staff officers. These expectations have been shaped primarily by the performance of graduates of the Advanced Military Studies Program, (AMSP), and also by its 30 year history. These performances include the operations in Panama, Kuwait, and Iraq. The combat operations in Panama, Kuwait, and Iraq suggest that SAMS and AMSP are incrementally evolving in an attempt to stay relevant to the US Army and the changing geopolitical context since the end of the Cold War. Of course the school and its graduates know they are much more than planners for the Army. Many graduates go on to successfully command at many echelons and the school has several current general officers as graduates of one of its three programs, with many more in the retired ranks.

This study concludes that the current initiatives at AMSP are an evolutionary step in the right direction. SAMS continues to fill a critical niche in the Army. However, as the Army concludes its operations in Afghanistan and downsizes to a smaller force, it is important that SAMS and AMSP also transform and continue to educate officers in a peacetime Army. The original vision of SAMS must be melded with the new geopolitical environment and with advances in educational theory and techniques. In this way, SAMS will successfully achieve its goal of teaching and instructing the operational art of war.

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ACRONYMS

ALC 2015	Army Learning Concept 2015
ALDS	Army Leader Development Strategy
AMSP	Advanced Military Studies Program
ASLP	Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program
ASP3	Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program
BG	Brigadier General
CGSS	U.S. Army Command and General Staff School
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
COL	Colonel
CSA	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
GEN	General
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ	Major
OES	Officer Education System
OJC	Operation Just Cause
PDF	Panamanian Defense Force
PME	Professional Military Education
POI	Program of Instruction
RETO	Review of Education and Training of Officers(1978)
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
VCSA	Vice-Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
WDC	Wass de Czege study (Army Staff College Training Study)

INTRODUCTION

Between wars the military business slumps. Our people lose interest. Congress concerns itself more with cutting down the Army than with building it up. And the troops...find a large part of their time and energy taken up with caring for buildings, grounds, and other impediments. In view of all the inertias to be overcome, and in view of the fact that our lives and honor are not in peril from outside aggression, it is not likely that our Army is going to be kept in an up to the minute state of preparedness.¹

—1929 General William Lassiter

While the quote is over eighty years old, the issues presented are alive and well today, and quite possibly, more relevant to the current time than 1929. To combat these and many other issues, General Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding General of United States (U.S.) Army Training and Doctrine Command (2008–2011, TRADOC), developed the Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015). In General Dempsey's words, "ALC 2015 is an important component of our effort to drive change through a campaign of learning." General Dempsey argued the need to "learn faster and better than our future adversaries" in order for the U.S Army to "prevail in the competitive learning environment."² Moreover, he explained the importance of changing the current system through a "campaign of learning" to both stay ahead of adversaries and remain relevant to the learners of today.

The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) is time well noted for and bound by its reputation. Enter most Army division or above headquarters and ask where the "SAMS" officers are and the answer one will get is "in the plans shop." This is because asking most Army officers, not associated with the school in any way, they will say that SAMS is the planning school, and SAMS graduates are planners. It is this commonly held belief that typifies the field

¹Brian McAllister Linn, *The Echo of Battle: the Army's Way of War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 117. The quote is dated 20 October 1929, from William E. Lassiter Papers, USMA.

²U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), I.

Army's expectations of the school, expectations that should guide the school in its mission and curriculum. However, is there a difference between what the Army in the field expects a SAMS Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) graduate to be capable of when they complete the program and what SAMS actually educates that officer to do? This is the primary question answered in this monograph.

SAMS is one of four schools at the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and has three programs: The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP), the Advanced Strategic Leadership Studies Program (ASLSP), and the Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3).³ The mission of SAMS is to educate members of our Armed Forces, our Allies, and the Interagency at the graduate level to become agile and adaptive leaders who are critical and creative thinkers who produce viable options to solve operational and strategic problems. AMSP is the traditional "SAMS" program with which people are most familiar. In fact, many people around the military refer to the AMSP as SAMS without a distinction between the school and its programs. AMSP is open to majors or junior lieutenant colonels of all the services and active Army Reserve or National Guard who are Intermediate Level Education (ILE) graduates.⁴ Officers normally attend AMSP the year immediately following ILE at the Command

³US Army Command and General Staff College, "School of Advanced Military Studies: US Army Combined Arms Center, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/sams/SAMSFULLPROGRAMDIRECTORY_AY2013-14_JULY2013.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014). The ASLP is designed to develop theater level senior leaders and general staff officers and prepare AMSP (Advanced Military Studies Program—the major's course) faculty. Prior to 2014, ASLSP was named Advanced Operation Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). Each year, the ASLSP educates 16 student officers and interagency fellows at the graduate level through a comprehensive, multifaceted curriculum focused at the theater-strategic level across the full spectrum of Joint and land force operations. The ASP3 is a multi-year program that prepares field-grade officers for service as strategic planners through a combination of practical experience, professional military education, and a doctorate from a civilian university.

⁴US Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy(OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01C, 22 December 2005 defines Intermediate Level Education, ILE, as the level of professional military education in the US military provided to military officers that are about mid-way through their careers. These officers are generally

and General Staff School (CGSS). The curriculum is currently directed at the strategic to operational levels of war and includes studies in history, theory, doctrine, and practice.⁵ On average, students are required to read at least 100 pages per night. There is a writing program culminating with a research monograph, which is required to graduate. Graduates receive a Masters in Military Art and Science from CGSC.

This study draws upon a combination of primary and secondary research, interviews with past and current faculty, and past and current the SAMS planners to include their supervisors. It consists of four parts: origins and purpose, graduates' application through case studies, analysis and relevance of SAMS, and recommendations. The study analyzes the origins of SAMS from its inception in 1984 through the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The twenty-first century presents changes and challenges AMSP graduates must understand in order to provide their commanders with options. The changes and challenges are indicators of the type of conflicts that may appear in the future and dictate areas that should be covered by the curriculum. Huba Wass Czege report recommended changes in the curriculum in order to accommodate the changes that have taken place.⁶ This research determines whether or not the curriculum is effective. Effective is defined as asking past AMSP graduates if they felt prepared to plan and provide options to their respective commanders during real-world conflicts, such as Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The AMSP graduates are measured against the current stated expectations and AMSP curriculum.

junior field grade officers in the grade of O-4. Each of the services has their own ILE program and exchange officers between their schools. The primary US Army ILE program is conducted by the Command and General Staff School of CGSC at Ft Leavenworth and several satellite campuses across the Army.

⁵The curriculum will be discussed in detail on pages 3-4.

⁶Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, "Army Staff College Level Training Study" (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1983), 12.

AMSP graduates are expected to: lead teams in support of military operations and be good teammates; be effective planners who apply operational art and science; demonstrate critical and creative thinking in developing solutions to contemporary operational problems using Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) approaches; understand the complexities of past and future operational environments; and communicate effectively verbally, graphically, and in writing. The AMSP curriculum consists of seven courses. Theory of Operational Art (TOA) encourages students to explore the relevance of military theory for planning and conducting operations in a complex contingency. The Evolution of Operational Art (EOA) focuses both on operational art and operational science, helping students develop a clear understanding of the elements of this aspect of conflict, and how it has developed over time, and how that influences the status of both operational art and the operational level of war at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The Strategic Context of Operational Art (SCOA) provides students with a deeper understanding of the ways in which the United States exists in the international arena. Design and Operational Art (DOA) teaches the application of conceptual planning in environments that pose complex military and socio-political problems. Future Operational Art (FOA) exposes students to a wide range of thought on future warfare, thus teaching the student how to think about the future instead of what the future holds, instead of attempting to prepare students for a specific future. Applied Integrated Planning (Exercises) is where students achieve program outcomes through practical application of joint and Army decision-making processes. Research Colloquium (Monograph) is where students conceptualize and develop an idea, conduct individual research to refine and explain the idea through the interpretation and evaluation of evidence, and ultimately, publish their results.⁷

⁷US Army Command and General Staff College, “SAMS Full Program Director AY 2013-2014” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center),

The study reviews how AMSP graduates performed in three conflicts, Operation Just Cause in Panama, Operations Desert Shield /Desert Storm in Iraq, and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq. Each conflict involved AMSP graduates as planners. These conflicts highlight the successes and failures of AMSP graduates in a real-world situation.⁸

ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ORIGINS

The difference between a civilian graduate school and a professional one is that in the civilian model, the customer is the student, and in the professional model, the customer is the profession.⁹

—Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege

On 28 December 1982 General Glen Otis, Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), made the decision to approve a 1-year extension of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) course for specially selected officers. The first course, a pilot program, began in June 1983.¹⁰ The efforts leading to the founding of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) were based on the visions of many men, but principally came about due to the persistent energy of one particular officer, COL Huba Wass de Czege.

Instead of attending the Army War College, Wass de Czege was assigned to the Army War College as a War College Research Fellow and detailed to Fort Leavenworth. Wass de Czege wrote a study of the Army Staff College, and his findings were published in the US Army War College colloquium on war and, at least unofficially, distributed to selected senior officers. Wass de Czege's report—Army Staff College Level Training Study, released in final form in

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/sams/_SAMSFULLPROGRAMDIRECTORY_AY2013-14_JULY2013.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014).

⁸Kevin Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi" (Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2010), 124.

⁹Huba Wass de Czege, "An Accident of History," *Military Review* (July/August 2009): 102-107.

¹⁰Dr. John W. Partin, *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827–1983* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983).

1983, was influential in establishing what eventually would be named the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies.

The report focused on the changing complexity of warfare and the need to understand the theory of warfare. In the study, Wass de Czege outlined the changes in warfare from World War II to the present time and noted that the pace of change was growing rapidly. He juxtaposed this increasing complexity with the amount of time other first rate armies took to educate their general staff officers. At the time of the report, the US Army suffered in comparison. Wass de Czege reported that the Israelis sent officers selected for staff college education to school for 46 weeks. The Canadians sent all officers to school for 20 weeks, and then specially selected a smaller number for an additional 45 weeks. The British and Germans sent their officers to school for about 100 weeks and the Russians put their potential general staff officers through an astonishing 150 weeks of intensive education. The US Army sent officers to staff college level schooling for 42 weeks. Wass de Czege wrote, “The Army” with the toughest missions in the world possesses the most austere school system of all first-rate armies.¹¹ This had not always been the case.

Wass de Czege reminded the senior leaders of the Army that three times in the history of general staff schooling the course had been two years in length. The course of instruction at Fort Leavenworth was two years long from 1904 to the United States entry in World War I; from 1919 to 1922; and from 1928 to 1936, just prior to the expansion of the US Army for World War II. Wass de Czege highlighted the graduates of the two-year Leavenworth course that made a difference in staff and command positions in the US Army, ranging from J. Lawton Collins and Ernest Harmon (Class of 1933) to Matthew Ridgway and Maxwell Taylor (Class of 1936). Wass de Czege concluded this short section of his report by noting that at some point in World War II

¹¹Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Staff College Level Training Study,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 13 June 1983), Appendix F-1 thru F-2. Hereafter cited to as Wass De Czege Staff report 1983.

nearly every division (90) and corps (24) were commanded by two-year Leavenworth men.¹² He proposed that a second year of study for selected officers provide a—broad, deep military education in the science and art of war that went beyond that provided by the existing CGSC course. This new course would serve the Army by developing a group of officers better prepared for the demands of general staff work at division, corps, and higher levels of command and seed the Army with a number of officers annually who will provide a positive influence on the Army by their competence.¹³ Wass de Czege's report went directly to key senior leaders in the Army.

Wass de Czege, and other senior leaders, concluded that the pace of change in the conduct of warfare was so rapid that the Army needed to invest more time in educating its officers to deal with the complexity of modern warfare. This was at odds with a study done in 1978 titled the Review of Education and Training of Officers (RETO).¹⁴ The study, while establishing a short staff officer course for captains had also taken a survey of officers in the Army ranging from lieutenants to colonels. The survey showed that most colonels and lieutenant colonels did not believe more time in school was necessary, that the Army needed more doers not thinkers.

There were many officers in the Army thinking though about the growing complexity of war. Wass de Czege said his idea began even before he was named a research fellow, the first glimmer began back on a hill in Vietnam wondering why all the field grade officers above him hadn't a clue about what they were sending him out to do. He was appointed to a study group established by then Lieutenant General William R. Richardson on combat decision-making and judgment. Wass de Czege described this next point toward the idea of SAMS as the "how to teach

¹²Ibid., F-3.

¹³Ibid., F-4.

¹⁴US Department of the Army, General Staff, Officer Training and Education Review Group, *Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO)*, vol. 1-6 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 30 June 1978).

judgment” working group Lieutenant General Richardson established at CGSC, of whom Wass de Czege was the most junior member, and none of the “old” colonels thought there was a problem.¹⁵ Finally, in June 1981 Wass de Czege accompanied Richardson on a trip to the People’s Republic of China. Wass de Czege described a conversation he had with Richardson on the fantail of a river boat, then the moment in China on the Yangtze River with LTG Richardson when SAMS first started to become a future reality. “There may be other theories of how SAMS got started, but before that moment in China, SAMS was in no one else’s mind that I know of, at least no one I knew would even support my idea before I took it to LTG Richardson that day.”¹⁶ Wass de Czege’s vision for this school was not to create a privileged elite or educate officers to do select key jobs better, but rather to create a multiplier effect in all areas of Army competence as these officers would teach others.¹⁷ Articulating the notion that a strategy to manage uncertainty in future wars must be developed, Wass de Czege urged the Army to develop officers able to apply sound military judgment across the entire spectrum of *present* and *future* US Army missions during the preparation for and conduct of war.¹⁸ Wass de Czege believed the Army required officers educated in the practice of the operational art, the level of war at which tactical successes were connected to strategy in the attainment of strategic objectives.

¹⁵Kevin Benson, Oral digital archives from COL (Retired) Benson, Recorded 18 October 2006. Retrieved by author on 17 February 2014.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Wass De Czege Staff Report 1983, F-4.

¹⁸Ibid., F-5.

AMSP Curriculum 1984-1989

The curriculum of AMSP from 1984 through 1989 almost exclusively focused on the Army doctrine FM 100-5, 1982 and 1986.¹⁹ However LTC Don Holder, SAMS third director, intended that SAMS graduates would return to the operational Army as advocates for and experts in Air-Land Battle, especially in the school's first years, which coincided with the release of this new doctrine. Both programs of SAMS, AMSP and AOASF, educated the student officers beyond the basics of the doctrine so that they could explain and properly implement the doctrine in Army divisions and corps as well as higher echelon headquarters.

Under the first three directors, SAMS started a process of immediate student surveys as a class neared graduation. The SAMS administration also set up arrangements for continuing contact effort between graduates and the school to ensure SAMS retained awareness of how graduates performed their duties and for feedback on what was helpful to graduates. A review of the comment sheets from graduating officers from the AMSP class of 1984/85 revealed telling comments on the effectiveness of the curriculum and its focus on division and corps level tactics as well as the operational level. One officer wrote that based on his education in AMSP he finally learned that "war is much more than a tactical battle of attrition." Other comments on the effectiveness of the curriculum were straightforward from, "You have a good thing going—don't screw with it!!!" to "SAMS needs to find viable alternatives to the 'fire hydrant' approach to education." There was also a comment calling for limiting student and especially faculty war

¹⁹The 1982 and 1986 versions of FM 100-5 introduced and refined the tenets of AirLand Battle; Agility, Initiative, Depth and Synchronization. These manuals were written by the first three directors of SAMS (BG (R) Huba Wass De Czege-1983, COL (R) Richard Sinnreich-1986, and LTG (R) Leonard D. Holder-1987) and were also influenced by discussions held with students in SAMS, especially the 1986 version. The focus of instruction was not on the doctrine rather the theory and history.

stories, “Four hours in class is bad enough, if seminar leader allows it [telling war stories] to ramble he is wasting taxpayers’ money.”²⁰

This period was marked with a focus on winning the first battle of the next war to thinking about theater level warfare, from the tactical movement of battalions to the point of penetration to how to disrupt the follow-on echelons of an attacking force. COL Richard Sinnreich, SAMS’ second director, said that FM 100-5, 1982 allowed the Army to “think about victory and winning the war again.”²¹ The combination of new doctrine entering the Army school system and component units in the field as well as new weapons systems led many officers, especially those in Europe, to no longer view their General Defensive Plan positions as Kagan highlighted, as the place where “I was going to die,” but where the Army was going to defeat the Russians.²² The doctrine of the mid 1980s required a link between the tactics of corps and divisions and the strategic objectives of the theater commander.

Expectations/Perceptions

The first years of SAMS existence was marked by a tension of expectations. Internally, there was the tension of establishing the independence of the School and the retention of the reformer spirit that led the first classes to believe they were a part of a group plotting major changes in the way the Army operated.²³ The period was marked by establishing the method of student selection for the AMSP, the refinement of the Fellows’ curriculum and how the Fellows

²⁰End of Course Survey Student Narrative Comments, AY 1984/85, undated, pages 1 and 11.

²¹Kevin Benson notes from oral interview with COL Richard Sinnreich, 18 February 2014. Interview took place on 06 January 2009.

²²Frederick W. Kagan, *Finding The Target The Transformation of American Military Policy*, New York: Encounter Books, 2006, pp. 7.

²³COL (Retired) Greg Fontenot, member of the second class in the AMSP and the sixth director of SAMS, interviewed by author, 14 January 2014.

would be received by the Army, and when and how to integrate officers from other Services into the AMSP. The Advance Operational Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF) is the senior program at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Focused at the operational and strategic levels of war, AOASF is a two year Senior Service College Fellowship that prepares future Colonel-level commanders and operational planners for assignments to critical staff positions within combatant and service component commands. During the first year, the Fellows' curriculum includes graduate-level study of military art and science, visits to combatant and service component commands, a robust guest speaker program, and practical exercises in campaign design. During the second year, Fellows serve as AMSP graduate-level seminar leaders or other faculty positions as assigned by the SAMS Director.²⁴

The highlight, though not viewed so at the time, was the change in the name of the program from department to School. Sinnreich, the second director, wrote in his end of tour report that the cost of SAMS was less than the cost of one M1 tank, but the return on the investment was great and the Army benefited from the education and ability the graduates brought with them to the field Army.²⁵ The first test of the graduates and the source of the external tension was the expectation of greatly improved performance of divisions and corps when SAMS' graduates arrived on those staffs.

External tensions came in the form of where to place the graduates of the School on division and corps staffs, how to overcome the Army's disposition against perceived and real "elites" and, most importantly, how retaining officers for a second year of schooling when the Army felt it needed more doers than thinkers would fare as these officers joined the staffs of

²⁴US Army Command and General Staff College, "SAMS Full Program Director AY 2013-2014" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/sams/SAMSFULLPROGRAMDIRECTORY_AY2013-14_JULY2013.pdf (accessed 22 March 2014).

²⁵COL Richard H. Sinnreich, "End of Tour Report," 1.

divisions and corps. The senior leader advocates of the concept of SAMS had very high expectations of the graduates. The dictum of Moltke the Elder to be more than you appear to be was a guiding principle for the first graduates of SAMS, as well as Wass de Czege's more practically focused advice to "max the PT test and get your hands dirty in the motor pool. You will succeed if you do those things *and* heed the motto of the German general staff to be more than you appear to be." The good news for the Army was, in Wass de Czege's words, "The new manual was followed almost immediately by the disciples and translators of the manual."²⁶

Wass de Czege, Sinnreich and Holder all expected that the graduates of the AMSP would return to the Army and raise the level of understanding of Army doctrine to new levels through more competent execution of operations. The new doctrine clearly pointed out that the political purpose of the war be established before strategic and tactical objectives could be developed. According to Wass de Czege, the AMSP within SAMS would "enhance the ability of selected officers to think clearly, logically, and rapidly, to conceptualize and innovate, to teach and develop subordinates, to integrate the work of specialists and to create high performing staffs that would anticipate and adapt to change."²⁷ These skills would soon be tested in the U.S. Army deployment to Panama during Operation Just Cause.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In June 1987, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the head of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) and de facto ruler of Panama, had a problem. A military rival, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera, accused Noriega of murdering a rival political contender, using Panama as a base

²⁶Huba Wass de Czege, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 January 2014.

²⁷Wass de Czege Staff Report, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1983), 21-22.

of operations for drug smuggling, and election fraud. The U.S. government took action against Noriega. The U.S. discontinued military assistance to the Panamanian Defense Force, called for the establishment of democracy in Panama, and began to pursue a policy of unreserved opposition to Noriega.”²⁸

The planning process for the commitment of U.S. forces in Panama began with the JCS Planning Order of 28 February 1988.²⁹ That this planning began some 22 months before the actual commitment of troops indicates that the planning was done in some detail. The planning for the operation was both extensive and well refined. Several experts agree that JUST CAUSE proved to be one of the most complex and precise operations ever conducted by the U.S. military.³⁰ Even several press reports agreed, “the speed, coordination and concentration of the air-land assault made JUST CAUSE one of the most complicated U.S. combat operations in decades.”³¹

Pre-invasion planning fit into the category of contingency planning. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary, 2010 of Military and Associated Terms* as “a plan for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of a command define a contingency plan.”³² Throughout the months planners worked on a set of objectives based on the evolving situation in Panama and anticipated political goals. In

²⁸Lorenzo Crowell, “The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, the Adequacy of Intelligence, and Its Success as a Joint Operation,” as found in Bruce W. Watson, and Peter G. Touras, eds. *Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), 50.

²⁹John Fishel, “The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama,” Draft paper 10 September 91, 15.

³⁰“Pentagon took note in Grenada to avoid error in Panama Operation,” *Washington Times*, 22 December 1989.

³¹*Washington Times*, 22 December 1989.

³²Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).

accordance with accepted doctrine “policy decisions in large measure, are transmitted to CINCs by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, which assigns missions and tasks.”³³ Although the situation in Panama was unique (U.S. plans would be required to confront an allied force in a country where a Status of Forces Agreement was in effect) the initial guidance that was provided proved to be adequate as a starting point. Throughout the planning process additional guidance was received and brief backs conducted. The military plan, which was finally used, had been developed over 18 months with constant revisions being made before the end product was approved. This lengthy process allowed key leaders to adjust the plans as they saw fit.

The outcome from this planning produced several strategic objectives but the overriding purpose was to remove Noriega from power. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering summed up the situation in Panama by saying “the root cause of the crisis in Panama has been the struggle between Noriega and his thugs and the people of Panama.”³⁴

The principal US Army units involved with the development of the plans and execution of Operation JUST CAUSE were the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light). The corps headquarters formed the nucleus of the Joint Task Force (JTF) *South* headquarters working for General Maxwell Thurman, the commander of US Southern Command. The planners for the Corps/JTF were LTC Tim McMahon (Director), LTC Charles Bergdorf, MAJ James Delony, MAJ David Huntoon, MAJ David M. Rodriguez, MAJ Lloyd Sherfey, and CPT (P) Edward J. Dillenschneider. The lead planner for the 82d Airborne Division was Major William Caldwell.³⁵ These AMSP graduates crafted a well rehearsed and well executed plan that simultaneously struck some roughly 50

³³JCS Publication 3-11, 1-2.

³⁴Thomas R. Pickering, “Panama: A Just Cause,” statement to United Nations Security Council, 20 December 1989.

³⁵COL (R) Richard Sinnreich interview, 10 February 2014.

objectives in a single coordinated blow. The plan was flexible enough to accommodate the fog of battle in Panama City. The XVIII Airborne Corps/JTF *South* conducted a synchronized assault at night, over multiple objectives, and overwhelmed the enemy forces in the theater of operations.³⁶

AMSP Curriculum 1989-1991

The AMSP curriculum prior to the start of planning for Operation JUST CAUSE remained essentially the same as outlined from the beginning of the School. The doctrinal center piece was FM 100-5, 1986. The development of this field manual was very much a result of the discourse within SAMS during the tenure of COL Sinnreich, the second director. As previously discussed, Sinnreich recalled that he and then LTC Holder were not so much influencing SAMS with the doctrine, but taking advantage of the discussions about the theory and history of war that took place during the conduct of the AMSP seminar to refine concepts that then went into the field manual. The scope of the discourse within the seminars reflected the focus of the program.³⁷ Thus AMSP taught doctrine and more. As Lieutenant General Holder recalled, “In fact, the school had the charter, which we the early Directors all agreed upon, of teaching the theory, history, and the thinking behind doctrine.”³⁸ The students in the School discussed the tenets of Air-Land Battle doctrine and how these tenets were developed. Each course in AMSP concluded with an exercise that would reinforce the doctrinal tenets as the student officers developed plans and orders for the exercise and then actually played out the war game, either on a terrain board with micro armor or in computer-assisted simulations. The curriculum consisted of six courses designed as vertically integrated blocks of instruction, sequenced to build on each other from the start of the academic year to the end.

³⁶LTG (R) William Caldwell email, 11 February 2014.

³⁷COL (R) Richard Sinnreich interview, 10 February 2014.

³⁸Notes from Kevin Benson interview with LTG Holder, 18 February 2014. Benson interview with LTG Holder occurred on 5 December 2008.

Course One, Foundations of Military Theory, had a stated purpose of teaching students how to think about war rather than what to think, and laid a theoretical and doctrinal foundation for students to build on through the rest of the year.³⁹ It consisted primarily of material from Clausewitz's *On War* as well as primary US and Soviet army doctrine. Of the thirty-four periods of instruction scheduled for this course, four were history lessons; nine were lessons on doctrine, and the rest on theory.

Course two, Dynamics of Engagements, was designed to reinforce the fundamental knowledge students gained of tactics from company through brigade levels in the CGSO course and provide a laboratory to examine those tactics through the lens of the theory learned in course one.⁴⁰ This course used theory, history, doctrine (both US and Soviet), and practical exercises to study the basic building block of battles—the engagement. Of the sixteen lessons in this course, four were history lessons, two covered US and Soviet doctrine, and ten were practical application exercises of some form including a terrain walk.

Course 3, “Dynamics of Battles,” followed the same rationale focused on the basic building block of campaigns. This course had thirty scheduled lessons, four of which were history lessons, five were doctrinal both US and Soviet, two were theory lessons, and the rest comprised two practical exercises on division and corps operations.

Courses 4 and 5 hence focused on operational art and campaigns. The former was titled “The Evolution and Practice of Operational Art” and was entirely a history survey course focused on its title, the latter “Planning and Conduct of Major Operations and Campaigns” consisting of

³⁹School of Advanced Military Studies, “AMSP Course 1 Syllabus - Foundations of Military Theory,” (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, Academic Year 1987/88), 1.

⁴⁰School of Advanced Military Studies, “AMSP Course 2 Syllabus—Dynamics of engagements,” (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, Academic Year 1987/88), 2-i.

an equal mix of history, theory, doctrine and practical exercises centered on joint and combined operations and capabilities. These two courses again, combined theory, history, doctrine, and practical exercise to develop the body of knowledge at the operational level of war that Wass de Czege and Richardson knew was necessary to successfully implement Air-Land Battle doctrine throughout the Army.

The final course offered to the students in academic year 1987/88 was titled Preparing for War, and included lessons designed to stimulate student thinking of how to effectively use peacetime, to prepare for war in the future. This included organizing, training, and equipping army forces for the unknown, ten to twenty years in the future. Again, the course mixed two history lessons, two theory lessons, four doctrine lessons, and practical exercises with guest instructors to meet its objectives.

Application and Relevance of Experience from SAMS/AMSP in OJC

To appreciate the relevance of the experience that the planners of OJC got from SAMS/AMSP and how it was used in the operation, it is important to analyze the objectives of OJC and the complexity it involved. The key objectives of OJC were to: protect the lives of U.S. citizens, key sites and facilities; neutralize PDF forces, PDF command and control; capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority; support establishment of a U.S.-recognized government in Panama; and restructure the PDF.⁴¹ However, this could not be an easy task following the complexity that were involved in terms of population composition and spread, positioning of the PDF command and control center, and role of Panama City. According to editor of *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations*, Lawrence Yates “In the one hand, Panama City was the seat of government and home to several PDF facilities. On the other hand, most of the

⁴¹Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other Than War* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).

thousands of American civilians and half a million Panamanians lived in the country. In addition, it was a center of economic activity that emphasized banking, manufacturing, service industries, tourism, and retail market".⁴² Therefore, given the objectives (which considered humanitarian principles) and the complexity of the environment, U.S. Army designed a plan that emphasized on seizing control of the capital from the PDF and maintaining order until a new Panamanian government could begin functioning effectively.⁴³ The planners used the knowledge acquired by the AMSP curriculum during the planning and execution of OJC. To begin with, the planners took cognizance of the complexity of the environment of operation. Designing and execution of the "Blue Spoon" code ensured that the lives of U.S. citizens living in Panama and property were protected. This borrowed from the lessons learned in *The Evolution and Practice of Operational Art* which emphasized the dealing with problems in complex environments. In addition, planners used the concept of design. Although design as we know it present day 2014 was not in existence in the 1980s and 1990s, planners still used aspects of design such as conceptual planning, as noted above while planning for the Operation Blue Spoon.

Another key aspect of the plan was coordinated mode of communication, where top-down method was used. Designing a plan that exercised unity in command and the rules of engagement helped in avoiding the repeat of the past mistakes, such as the miscommunication that occurred during operations in Grenada. AMSP had prepared the planners in terms of understanding the evolution of war and the factors that had led to past failures and preventing conflicts. Therefore, they were able to design a comprehensive communication plan depicted by unity in command and clear rules of engagement.

⁴²William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates, *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 49.

⁴³Taw, 67.

Expectations/Perceptions

While the lessons learned effort was going on in the United States, the Army in Europe was planning on a reduction in force as Congress and the American people expected a Peace Dividend from the end of the Cold War.⁴⁴ The great Soviet armies were withdrawing to Russian soil. The Germans were asking why so many Americans were needed in their country now that the Berlin Wall was down and the entire German nation was reestablished.

The last of the storied Return of Forces to Germany Exercises (REFORGER) was conducted in Germany in January 1990.⁴⁵ These maneuvers were a thing of the past as the thrust of planning was how to return forces to the United States. A great number of American Army units in Europe were preparing to fold their units' colors and return their tanks, armored vehicles, and trucks to the United States.

SAMS was not static at this time. It did not indulge in self-congratulation. The faculty and students began to read the after action reports and think through the Implications of these reports to the curriculums of SAMS. In an end of course survey done by the AMSP class of 1988–89, consisting of some of the officers who planned Operation JUST CAUSE, and including faculty thoughts on the results in light of the operation in Panama, student officers and faculty felt that low intensity conflict needed more emphasis, and that the course needed more joint participation. The survey, published in July 1990, reflected similar concerns of previous classes over the perception of elitism and intellectual superiority others would harbor toward SAMS'

⁴⁴Peace Dividend is a political slogan popularized by US President George H.W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the early 1990s, purporting to describe the economic benefit of a decrease in defense spending. It is used primarily in discussions relating to the “guns versus butter theory” in macroeconomics. The term was frequently used at the end of the Cold War, when many Western nations significantly cut military spending.

⁴⁵Exercise Reforger (from return of forces to Germany) was an annual exercise conducted, during the Cold War, by NATO. The exercise was intended to ensure that NATO had the ability to quickly deploy forces to West Germany in the event of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact.

graduates, but tellingly considered about the meaning of the full spectrum of warfare. The faculty noted that while the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division departed Panama rather quickly after the end of hostilities, the 7th Infantry Division and US Army South were left to execute plans for the recovery, to a limited extent, of Panama.⁴⁶

Summary

The short campaign in Panama came to a successful conclusion. The lessons learned teams descended on Fort Bragg and Fort Ord to try to codify what went well and where the Army needed to improve. The new doctrine and the planners from the new school in the Army had done well, as far as accomplishing the mission. The extra year of schooling had paid off in the form of plans that embodied the tenets of Air/Land/Battle. Rehearsals and war-gaming played a significant role in establishing conditions for the exercise of initiative and agility. The depth provided by the use of bases within the continental United States, as well as bases within Panama extended the operation in distance, time and resources. The depth also allowed for the adaptation of the plan when friction and chance entered the execution phase of the plan in the form of icing on the planes at Pope Air Force Base. The XVIII ABN Corps/JTF South conducted a synchronized assault at night, over multiple objectives, and overwhelmed the enemy forces in the theater of operations. While the “lesson learned” effort was going on in the United States, the Army in Europe was planning on a reduction in force. Everything pointed to the fact that United States Congress and the American people expected a “Peace Dividend” from the end of the Cold War.

⁴⁶LTC Harold R. Winton, PhD, Deputy Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, End of Course Survey AY 88–89, 27 July 1990. This survey, with five enclosures, contained an executive summary of findings, statistical analysis, and officer student handwritten comments. Margin notes, author(s) unknown, indicated faculty consideration of lessons learned from Panama and informal reports from recent graduates who participated in the operation. It is held in the SAMS files.

The Army and SAMS faced a test of battle and the new group of highly-educated planners appeared to have passed the test with flying colors. The Army turned back to preparing for war and the routine of the peacetime Army. Training schedules were revised and field exercises and tank gunnery exercises were scheduled. On the other side of the world, an American officer went to sleep in the Sheraton Hotel in Kuwait City. While he slept his world and the focus of the Army changed. He wrote, "I awoke to gunfire at about 4:15 on the morning of 2 August 1990. . . . That sounds like shooting. . . . I wonder who could be shooting at this time of the morning!"⁴⁷ The next test of SAMS and the Army would take place in the deserts of the Persian Gulf.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/STORM

While small in number the graduates of SAMS did play an effective role in the planning for the invasion of Panama. They incorporated the latest Army doctrine into the planning and execution of Operation Just Cause. The SAMS graduates who participated in the Panama operation set a very high standard of performance for the other graduates around the Army. In the summer of 1990 there were some 150 plus graduates of the program. The graduates' ability to apply and adapt doctrine and turn doctrine into action would be tested in the coming months of 1990 and 1991.

Any hope for a return to what passed for "normality" at the end of the Cold War and the conclusion of "Operation Just Cause" was shattered in late July, 1990. The Iraqi regular Army and Republican Guard invaded the Emirate of Kuwait. The president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, declared that Kuwait was now an eternal part of Iraq, its nineteenth province. There was little time to consider the lessons learned from Operation JUST CAUSE as the immediacy of the invasion captured the focus of the Department of Defense and the Army. During this war SAMS

⁴⁷Martin Stanton, *Road to Baghdad Behind Enemy Lines: The Adventures of an American Soldier in the Gulf War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003), 47.

graduates would serve at all levels of war and echelons of command from the strategic, U.S. Central Command, operational, Third U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Command, through the tactical, both Army corps (XVIII ABN and VII) and all Army divisions.⁴⁸ This would serve as the second test for graduates of the advanced military studies program. The test began on 2 August 1990.

General Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf's, Commander-in-Chief, United States Central Command, headquarters received a small team of SAMS educated officers in mid-August 1990. Schwarzkopf was not satisfied with the planning effort in his headquarters. Schwarzkopf felt that he and his staff were "stumped" and could see no imaginative way to stretch the forces at hand into a winning offensive. Consequently he asked the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Dennis Reimer for augmentation of his planning staff. Reimer directed that a team of officers, educated at SAMS, be sent to Riyadh to assist Schwarzkopf. The task they received from Schwarzkopf was highly classified and access to these men was tightly controlled, as well as the access these planners had to other sources of information. This team developed the basis for the final plans to eject the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.⁴⁹

The team consisted of COL Joe Purvis (SAMS fellow), MAJ Greg Eckert, Bill Pennypacker, and Dan Roh (AMSP graduates). Purvis and Eckert were Armor officers, Pennypacker an infantryman, and Roh was a logistician. The team also included a British officer, Brigadier Tim Sullivan.⁵⁰ The British recognized that the SAMS cell was going to plan the

⁴⁸The U.S. Army divisions involved in Operation Desert Storm were: 1st Infantry, 24th Infantry, 82nd ABN, 101st ABN (Air Assault), 1st Armored, 1st Cavalry, and 3rd Armored. The 1st and 24th Infantry Divisions were mechanized formations. The 1st Cavalry Division was an Armored division.

⁴⁹Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, *It Doesn't Take A Hero* (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 354.

⁵⁰Sullivan wore U.S. desert camouflage uniforms in an attempt to avoid coalition concerns about favored treatment of the British.

counter-offensive and wanted to be a part of the effort. GEN Schwarzkopf accepted this help to his plans team because Sullivan, attuned to coalition sensitivities on equal treatment, wore a U.S. uniform to blend in to Schwarzkopf's headquarters.⁵¹

Due to the shared experience at SAMS these officers either knew each other or heard about each other. They were willing to study questions and respond to their caller from CENTCOM without spending a great deal of time asking why he needed to know.⁵² The common view of plans at the time, generally assumed based on a common CGSC experience, was there were two different types of plans; those that worked and those that did not. SAMS graduates, as demonstrated in Panama, were in the business of crafting plans that linked tactical plans to strategic aims and goals. The whole Army knew about the SAMS planners and Operation Just Cause. A standard was established in translating doctrine into plans that were successful, but success produced mixed perceptions.⁵³

Officers on the staff at Central Command and Third U.S. Army had mixed feelings about the arrival of SAMS graduates to reinforce planning efforts already underway, and the mixed feelings soured as SAMS graduates took on the key advisor roles and enjoyed close access, called "face time" with general officers. This caused some jealousy and gave rise to the use of the term "Jedi Knight" as a sarcastic moniker for the arrival of "special" officers educated at SAMS.⁵⁴

⁵¹Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *The Generals' War* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 166. The British knew of SAMS through reports from UK COL Gage Williams who was sent to SAMS as an observer and ended up being named a seminar leader by COL Don Holder.

⁵²Richard M. Swain, *Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1996), 77.

⁵³Kevin Benson, "Educating the Army's Jedi" (Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2010), 168.

⁵⁴This assessment is based on conclusions drawn from interviews and email correspondences with SAMS graduates assigned to divisions and corps in the late 1980s and 1990s. These officers are LTC(R) Mike Burke, LTC (R) Pat Becker, COL (R) Greg Eckert, MG

Headquarters above the level of division and corps did not have SAMS graduates routinely assigned to the staff so it appeared that they just arrived on the scene to save the day. This perception was reinforced by the Army staff in Washington, DC which directed the assignment of SAMS graduates to units deploying to Saudi Arabia.⁵⁵

The Third US Army and Army Forces Central Command headquarters also had a cell of SAMS educated plans officers. Third US Army did not act as the field Army for Central Command since Schwarzkopf retained the position of Commander, Land Forces as well as the Joint Force Commander. Nonetheless, Third Army coordinated the development of plans for Army forces and crafted the two corps attack that Schwarzkopf called the left hook or “Hail Mary.” These officers, whom Arnold called the “long ball hitters,” were: LTC Dave Mock, and MAJs Paul Hughes, Dan Gilbert, and Rick Halblieb. These officers all came from Army divisions that were not deploying to the desert. Mock was a cavalry officer, Hughes a signal officer, Gilbert an infantryman and Halblieb an intelligence officer; these men formed the hub of the planning effort at Third Army/ARCENT.⁵⁶

The addition of SAMS educated planners improved the quality of the planning effort. They were sent to Third Army because of their SAMS education and their demonstrated competence. LTG John J. Yeosock, Third Army Commander and LTG Steven L. Arnold, Third Army G3, and the Third Army planners (including SAMS graduates) crafted a truly operational level plan that included operational movement, maneuvers, fires and sustainment, the art of

(R) James Marks, LTGs Mark Hertling, Dave Huntoon, Bill Caldwell, COL Lance Betros, and COL (Ret) Gordon Wells.

⁵⁵The author did not discover the origin of the moniker, “Jedi Knight.” Some maintain the title was generated from within SAMS before the Gulf War. Others maintain the term was used derisively to describe SAMS graduates during the Gulf War. The first “official” use of the term took place after the Gulf War in the statement of Rep. Ike Skelton.

⁵⁶Swain, *Lucky War*, 143-145.

operational level warfare.⁵⁷ The corps of the Third Army both moved hundreds of kilometers to get into position for the attack. The corps then attacked into the depth of the Iraqi defense, again a maneuver of hundreds of miles. The SAMS planners understood the art and science of warfare that made this movement and maneuver possible. The SAMS planners translated their education into action. By taking on this task they allowed LTG Yeosock to exercise command of Third Army.⁵⁸

The planning for and conduct of Operation Desert Storm established SAMS in the minds of the leadership of the Army as a place to turn to for superb planners. The level of planning at all echelons of command was thorough and incorporated the tenets of Air-Land Battle. The doctrinal underpinning of the planning and execution was sound as the US Army defeated the fourth largest army in the world in 100 hours of ground combat.⁵⁹ The Army spent the years between Vietnam and August 1990 preparing for a war in the central region of Europe against a similarly equipped Warsaw Pact army and found itself fighting the last great armored war of the 20th century in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. The world watched and studied the outcome. The SAMS also watched and studied.

AMSP Curriculum 1991-1996

The fifth director of the school, COL James McDonough (1990), came from a European assignment where he served as the military assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander, General

⁵⁷Notes from Kevin Benson interview with MAJ Eckert, 18 February 2014. Benson interview with Eckert occurred on 20 March 2009.

⁵⁸Swain, *Lucky War*, 143-145.

⁵⁹The United States Army was greatly aided by the United States Air Force. The Gulf War began with an extensive aerial bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. The Coalition, mainly US Air Force, flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs, and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.

John Galvin.⁶⁰ McDonough missed the Gulf War, but was influenced by his assignment in Europe as he saw the beginning of the fragmentation of the continent with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. McDonough wanted to look beyond the war just fought in Kuwait and Iraq. The successful conclusion of the fighting to eject Iraq from Kuwait demonstrated the dominance of the US military on conventional battlefields. The question that followed this demonstrated dominance was what would be the form of war in the future. McDonough intended to take both programs into possible scenarios for future wars.⁶¹

The School remained at four seminars for the AMSP officers. The exercises changed in an attempt to take advantage of the emerging technology available to Army units, such as unmanned aerial vehicles and a growing network of information sharing communications equipment. This equipment increased the students' ability to share a broad understanding of the situation tactically and operationally. The increased complexity of warfare brought an attempt to increase the depth of the education offered to the Fellows as SAMS began the process to develop a Doctor of Military Art and Sciences, a military PhD.⁶²

COL McDonough pressed this development and explored an affiliation with the University of Kansas for academic accreditation as well as gaining approval from the senior leadership of the Army. The movement toward severing the relationship with AMSP due to needing two full years of study to fulfill the requirements of a PhD necessitated working with the Personnel Center for permanent seminar leaders. SAMS hired new faculty to meet the

⁶⁰Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy (West Point, NY: Association of Graduates, 2002), 4–514.

⁶¹COL James McDonough, e-mail to author, 8 January 2014.

⁶²Ibid.

requirements of educating potential PhD candidates. These new faculty members were Dr. William Gregor and Dr. Ernest Evans.⁶³

This combination of a change in the Fellows program, new faculty, and permanent seminar leaders would materially change the nature of SAMS, but when Colonel McDonough left for brigade command this experiment ended. It fell under the pressure of the Personnel Center's inability to sustain the level of quality in seminar leaders and reluctance on the part of the Army to accept a need for military PhD's. Complexity would be handled by the graduates of the School taught by Fellows and faculty and then sent out to the field Army that was grappling with a range of new problems: military operations other than war, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations.

JTF-Los Angeles conducted the first of these new forms of operations. This JTF was formed in response to the riots that followed the outcome of the trial of police officers who beat Rodney King. The 7th Infantry Division headquarters whose planners had to deal with how to support local authorities, posse comitatus, and communicating with civil authorities formed the core of this JTF. The operations other than war challenges continued in this period as the SAMS and SAMS' graduates studied the clans of Somalia, ethnic tensions in Bosnia, and the restoration of order in Haiti.⁶⁴

SAMS' graduates planned and executed operations across the globe and in the United States (in Los Angeles and in Miami in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew), all of which were seen as Carl Von Clausewitz stated in his treatise, *On war*, war as an extension of policy.⁶⁵ Additionally, as SAMS graduates were applying the familiar, tenets of Air-Land Battle and the

⁶³Dr. William Gregor, interviewed by author, 5 February 2014.

⁶⁴COL (R) Kevin Benson, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2014.

⁶⁵Clausewitz, Carl Von, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

military decision making process (MDMP), to the unfamiliar, peace-operations and stability and support operations, SAMS' graduates in Europe and Northeast Asia were still applying the familiar doctrine to situations where they were facing the armies of North Korea and Iraq. This was a challenging time. It was also challenging in recruiting as majors were confronting an Army going from 18 divisions to 10.⁶⁶ The tyranny of the timeline was affecting the decision process of majors looking to attend AMSP, but remain in competition for battalion command.

Expectations/Perceptions

LTG (R) Mark Hertling, an AMSP graduate in 1988 and at the time of Operation Desert Storm the operations officer of the 1st Armored Division's cavalry squadron, summed up the influence of his SAMS education and how it influenced him during the planning and execution of his tactical operations. His main point was how he focused on an end state for the operations and how his squadron would fit into the overall division plan. He said that, "At the end of the day, what should our stance be, how should we be positioned, and what did we want to accomplish." The military history portions of the AMSP curriculum, from the wars of Napoleon to Vietnam, demonstrated to Hertling that "nothing is a first on any battlefield...you can always find examples of what you're doing—or trying to do—in the history, and you ought to look there first."⁶⁷

The planning for and conduct of Operation Desert Storm established SAMS in the minds of the leadership of the Army as the place to turn to for superb planners. The level of planning at all echelons of command was thorough and incorporated the tenets of Air-Land Battle. The doctrinal underpinning of the planning and execution was sound as the U.S. military defeated the

⁶⁶COL (R) Kevin Benson, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2014. As described by Benson, Majors were concerned that an additional year in school would negatively impact their chances for promotion and battalion command.

⁶⁷Personal electronic mail note from LTG (R) Mark Hertling, former commanding general, 1st Armored Division to the author, 15 January 2014.

fourth largest army in the world in 100 hours of combat.⁶⁸ The Army spent the years between Vietnam and August 1990 preparing for a war in the central region of Europe against a similarly equipped Warsaw Pact army and found itself fighting the last great armored war of the 20th century in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. The world and SAMS continued to watch this war.

LTG Fred Franks was promoted to General when he left command of VII Corps and then commanded the Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC. One of GEN Franks' first tasks was to design the effort to update FM 100-5, based on both his command experience in Desert Storm and his appreciation of the changing world. He asked the Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Gordon Sullivan, for the SAMS graduates to be assigned to his headquarters. GEN Sullivan supported the request.⁶⁹

The SAMS directors during this time, COLs Danny Davis, Robin Swan, and James Greer all wrote guidance to the faculty that sought to reinforce the central portions of the SAMS' curriculums while challenging the officer students to broaden their thinking to include the versatility of Army and joint forces conducting operations in support of policy objectives.⁷⁰ The Army was deeply engaged in the Balkans, trying to establish some order in the aftermath of years of bloodshed and in accord with the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord. If there was a Peace Dividend, this fact was lost on the Army and SAMS as operations remained at a high tempo.

⁶⁸U.S. News & World Report, ed., *Triumph Without Victory: the History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993), 89.

⁶⁹Notes from COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS Director who had phone conversation with COL (R) Greg Fontenot, on 14 October 2009. Fontenot recalled that along with his own assignment to GEN Franks' initiatives group, LTCs Dave Mock and Mark Hertling was also assigned to TRADOC headquarters. Although Fontenot stated that LTC Dave Mock and Mark Hertling were the only SAMS graduates assigned to TRADOC, he estimates that at least three were requested.

⁷⁰SAMS Curriculum guidance from COL Davis in 1996, COL Swan in 1998, and COL Greer in 2000. Retrieved from Dr. William Gregor on 7 February 2014.

SAMS' graduates were expected to be agents of change in the Army as they were the ones who studied the changing doctrine, which would embrace the joint construct and be renumbered so that FM 100-5 would become FM 3-0.⁷¹ SAMS' educated officers were expected to go beyond the symbolic and to understand the application of this doctrine in the full range of operations facing the Army.⁷²

COL Davis expanded the AMSP travel during his tenure as AMSP students participated in a series of exercises under the auspices of US Southern Command. Officer students and selected faculty participated in war games at the Chilean Staff College. This exchange reinforced the learning of both Army doctrine and history, but also an appreciation of the high-level professionalism in the officer corps of non-NATO armies unfamiliar to most US officers.⁷³

COL Swan implemented two important changes during his tenure as director, ones that would change how SAMS operated into the future. Swan decided to reduce the monograph requirement from two to one. This was in recognition that the second semester of SAMS was remarkably busy and the level of effort put into two monographs suffered in the face of multiple and competing requirements. Additionally, the civilian faculty had to deal with two additional seminars without any increase in civilian faculty.⁷⁴ Thus, AMSP students would write one monograph.

The second major change Swan made was to expand SAMS from four seminars to six. SAMS had moved from the comfortable if quaint confines of Flint Hall into the new Eisenhower

⁷¹Dr. William Gregor, interviewed by author, 21 March 2014. This was significant because AMSP graduates were to “postulate and be disciples of the new doctrine.” At least this was the expectation of the TRADOC commander, GEN Fred Franks.

⁷²Notes from COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS Director.

⁷³Personal electronic mail note from COL (R) Danny Davis to the author, 15 January 2014.

⁷⁴Dr. Peter Schifferle, interviewed by author, 25 March 2014.

Hall in October of 1994. There was room for six seminars and Swan was under some pressure to include more Reserve Component officers in the AMSP mix. He decided to expand to six seminars, bringing SAMS back in line with Wass de Czege's initial vision of ultimately 96 AMSP graduates going out into the Army per year, although now they would be entering the Total Army, USAF, USMC, occasional US Navy, and international communities.⁷⁵

Additional changes during this period was International officers wishing to attend the AMSP would go through the same selection process as US officers and those ending up above the cut line on the order of merit list would be able to attend. The selection process for AMSP remained firmly in place at Fort Leavenworth. There were international officers attending the first year of the Fellowship with no change to the arrangement that every other year a Marine officer would attend the Fellowship and remain for two years, in the second year this officer would be a seminar leader in AMSP. In 1997 SAMS also added Dr. Peter Schifferle and Dr. Bill Reeder to the faculty. Schifferle succeeded Dr. Rick Swain as the director of the Fellowship and Reeder joined the faculty at large.⁷⁶

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

The Iraq campaign, called Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), was the second major US-led combat operation directed toward Iraq. The strategic aim was to remove Saddam Hussein and the Baathist party from power in order to eliminate Iraq's ability to threaten the US and its allies. The claim was that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which he intended to use against the US and its allies either directly himself or indirectly through terror organizations such

⁷⁵Notes from COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS Director.

⁷⁶Notes from Dr. William Gregor, SAMS faculty member since 1994. Dr. Schifferle is an AMSP graduate, class of 1994. William Reeder is a thirty year Army veteran with two tours of duty in Vietnam. During his second combat tour, he was shot down and captured by the communist North Vietnamese, spending nearly a year as a Prisoner of War.

as al-Qaeda. By removing the repressive Baath party, the Coalition forces could build a stable country with a representative government that would be able to prevent its territory from being used as a base for terrorism and regional aggression, as well as provide another ally in the Middle East.⁷⁷

In March 2003, the US-led Coalition quickly overwhelmed and defeated Iraq's military, seized Baghdad, toppled the Baathist regime, and occupied Iraq. The invasion force, conducting a swift and stunning conventional warfare operation, ended Saddam's 30-year reign over Iraq by early April 2003. Yet, as the invasion force pushed toward Baghdad, Saddam's loyal paramilitary organizations, including Fedayeen Saddam, directed attacks against the Coalition's lines of communications (LOCs). These paramilitary units responded in the manner they were created for-to suppress internal insurrection or other opposition that threatened regime power. This resistance was the first sign that not all Iraqis would warmly welcome the Coalition. It also led Lieutenant General Wallace, the V Corps Commander, to comment to *The New York Times*, "The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces."⁷⁸ This was the initial stages of an insurgency in Iraq that would commit the US military in combat for another eight years.

Graduates prior to the AMSP class of 2001 could say that war was a theoretical possibility in their careers. After the events of 11 September 2001, graduates of SAMS were

⁷⁷Donald P. Wright, and Timothy R. Reese, *On Point II* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 9-12, 14-15, 46. The US-led conflict with Iraq has been ongoing and intensifying since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. In January 1991, the US and a large coalition took direct military action against Iraq after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Upon the conclusion of the campaign, Saddam's military was gravely weakened. However, they still posed a threat internally as Saddam used his military to brutally suppress internal uprisings that threatened his regime. To prevent further repression by the Iraqi Army, the US created and patrolled the northern and southern no-fly zones.

⁷⁸Jim Dwyer, "A Nation at War: In the Field-V Corps Commander; A Gulf Commander Sees a Longer Road," *New York Times*, 28 March 2003.

certain they would be going to war. The urgency of this change for SAMS was significant as the Army and SAMS were preparing for war.⁷⁹

A review of the director's guidance for course development during this time reflected this reality. SAMS retained an elective period following the New Year. This elective period allowed AMSP students to pursue individual areas of study and allowed the faculty to pursue areas of interest and research. The Leavenworth Leadership Chair, made up of newly retired GEN Pete Schoomaker, late of US Special Operations Command, BG Pat O'Neal, and COL Mike Shaler joined SAMS as adjunct faculty and assisted in the instruction of the Fellows on operational art and strategy as well as conducting an elective for AMSP. All in all though, SAMS continued to prepare for war.⁸⁰

The class that entered SAMS in June 2002, both AMSP and AOASF (now called ASLSP), watched the growing tensions with Iraq while war was conducted in Afghanistan.⁸¹ These two classes would participate as a reach planning asset as the director, COL Jim Greer, engaged with deployed headquarters which asked for planning support expertise. COL Kevin Benson, then the C/J-5 of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), specifically asked COL Greer to form planning teams to tackle the challenge of how to get to Baghdad in the event of what the combatant commander, GEN Tommy Franks, called catastrophic success.⁸² The SAMS contributed vital details to the planning of a branch plan that

⁷⁹Personal electronic mail note from COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS director to the author, 15 January 2014.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Prior to 2014, ASLSP was named Advanced Operation Art Studies Fellowship (AOASF). Each year, the ASLSP educates 16 student officers and interagency fellows at the graduate level through a comprehensive, multifaceted curriculum focused at the theater-strategic level across the full spectrum of Joint and land force operations.

⁸²GEN Franks, "The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War," *New York Times*, 16 October 2004. Gen Franks discusses being prepared for the coalition obtaining victory much easier than anticipated.

called for an airborne assault on the Saddam International Airport on the outskirts of Baghdad. Greer's willingness to take on this war planning effort with AMSP and AOASF students put SAMS on the path to continue acting as an important planning asset to the Army at war.

The role of SAMS graduates during the Global War on Terror was similar to the role played by its graduates in the First Gulf War, this time SAMS graduates served at all levels of command, from battalion to division as well as principal staff officers.⁸³ CENTCOM requested support of SAMS graduates and its sister schools, the USAF School of Advanced Air and Aerospace Studies and the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting. These officers rotated in and out of the CENTCOM J5 as CENTCOM struggled to conduct one war while preparing for another—the invasion of Iraq. CFLCC SAMS' graduates included MG William Webster, MG James Marks, COL Kevin Benson, COL Steve Rotkoff, LTC (P) Steve Petersen, LTC Tom Reilly, LTC Mike Hendricks, and MAJ Joe Whitlock.⁸⁴ CFLCC requested a reinforcement of SAMS' graduates in January 2003 and the Army responded with MAJ Brian Sparling, MAJ Bill Innocenti, and MAJ Wayne Grieme. These three along with selected others in the CFLCC C5 developed a post-hostility plan for the occupation of Iraq, ECLIPSE II.

SAMS/AMSP Curriculum

COL Greer left SAMS to command a brigade in the summer of 2003, and COL Kevin Benson became director of SAMS. Benson continued the practice started by Greer and committed the students of the School to a number of reach planning efforts in support of CJTF-7, Multi-National Force–Iraq, Multi-National Corps–Iraq, and the range of headquarters in Afghanistan as well as special and classified projects for Special Operations Command. The projects exposed the

⁸³Although there were no AMSP/SAMS planner positions at the battalion and brigade level, there were former AMSP/SAMS planners that were battalion/brigade commanders.

⁸⁴Names and information given to author during interview with COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS director on 6 February 2014.

officers in AMSP and AOASF to the type of efforts that would be required of them when they joined their commands. As one officer put it, “they had a vested interest in doing their best work for the higher tactical and operational headquarters as they would have no one to blame but themselves if, when they arrived at their divisions, they discovered that higher was all SNAFU”. They would have been a part of higher headquarters.⁸⁵

This period was also marked by a successful request to expand the faculty. Dr. Peter Schifferle refined the curriculum of the Fellowship to align the Fellows with the positions they would hold after graduation, mainly at the strategic level of war. This decision had the effect of further separating the curriculums, and the Fellows found themselves less familiar with the AMSP curriculum that they were expected to teach. Dr. Jim Schneider made the decision to pair Fellows with PhD’s dedicated to each seminar. All of this work supported a successful visit by TRADOC manpower analysts who wholeheartedly supported the expansion of the SAMS faculty. As a result of these decisions, in academic year 2005–06, Dr. Alice Butler-Smith, Dr. Michael Mosser, Dr. Dave Burbach, and Dr. Tim Challans joined the faculty. Also due to budget pressures, AMSP conducted the final staff ride to Vicksburg in 2004; the staff ride began again in 2009. The expansion of the AMSP to six seminars made this trip cost prohibitive.⁸⁶

Expectations/Perceptions

In 2007, Colonel Steve Banach became the 11th SAMS director. COL Banach, an AOASF graduate but not AMSP graduate, came from a brigade command and brought a fresh perspective on the needs of the field Army to SAMS. He continued the work of every

⁸⁵Interview with COL (R) Kevin Benson, Benson did not recall the officer that made the statement, “They had a vested interest in doing their best work for the higher tactical and operational headquarters as they would have no one to blame but themselves if, when they arrived at their divisions, they discovered that higher was all SNAFU.”

⁸⁶COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS Director interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 February 2014.

director, to raise the bar on the understanding of the complexity of warfare, especially critical in the 21st century as the dangers of state warfare appeared to recede and be replaced by wars with non-state actors using unconventional tactics. Banach moved swiftly to begin the AMSP winter start and provided the Army with twelve educated AMSP graduates in December 2008. The graduates allowed the Army to reinforce the planning teams in Afghanistan in anticipation of a shift in emphasis as policy decisions were made to reduce force levels in Iraq and increase force levels in Afghanistan.⁸⁷

COL Banach continued the expansion of AMSP in response to the needs of the Army. Under his leadership, AMSP grew to seven seminars in the July to May cycle and two seminars in the January to December cycle. Banach also succeeded in the expansion of the faculty to support the increase in the student body.⁸⁸

SAMS graduates have a shared experience of theory, history, doctrine, political science, and practical experience as reach planning assets to the Army at war and to the Nation in time of need, such as Hurricane Katrina. The experiments in refining the concept of Design as a vital preliminary to the decision making process is being promulgated at SAMS. This contribution assists in the development of situational understanding and dealing with the daunting challenges of the 21st century and the wars and exercises of power that the Nation will call on the Army to conduct and conclude on terms favorable to the Nation and its vital interests.

⁸⁷Personal electronic mail note from COL (R) Steve Banach, former SAMS director to the author, 10 February 2014

⁸⁸COL (R) Kevin Benson, former SAMS Director interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 February 2014.

The breadth of the vision of the founders of SAMS; Wass de Czege, Winton, Johnson, Sinnreich, and Holder remains as the School refined and grew. The purpose of SAMS though has for the most part, remained the same—to raise the bar of the general understanding of warfare in the officer corps of the US Army. There can be no doubt that the people who made up the School, from permanent civilian faculty and staff to the transitory Fellows and directors, lived the vision and continued to accomplish the mission of SAMS. The corporate body of SAMS graduates in uniform and now retired also continues to contribute to the defense of the Republic.⁸⁹

FIELD EXPECTATIONS OF AMSP GRADUATES⁹⁰

The quality assurance office of CGSC conducted a survey of division and corps commanders in the fall of 2007. The purpose of the survey was to acquire senior leader input as to the quality of recent AMSP graduates. While the survey was conducted simultaneously with the review and update of the AMSP curriculum, and thus had little impact on the 2008 curriculum design, it contains necessary and useful data that will continue to be useful today and into the future. It is not possible to determine with accuracy whether the respondents were rendering opinions of their current AMSP graduates, graduates they have served with over a number of years, or even themselves if they were graduates. Another interesting aspect of the survey is the use of the term SAMS as opposed to AMSP in the questions. Understanding that the intent of the survey was to ascertain opinions on AMSP graduates, AMSP is inserted next to the term SAMS used in the survey questions, for clarity in this monograph. Despite these caveats, the data serves

⁸⁹COL (R) Steve Banach, former SAMS Director, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 February 2014

⁹⁰This section is exclusively derived from the SAMS division and corps commander survey conducted by the quality assurance office of CGSC. The report was prepared by Maria Clark, an analyst from the CGSC quality assurance office and obtained electronically from her on 26 March 2014. This is the most recent survey conducted by CGSC on topic.

to inform on the opinions of the field Army as to the quality of the AMSP program and its graduates, its intended purpose.

Forty-six sitting general officers in Army divisions and corps were sent surveys. Twenty of forty-six responded by the time a report was required, although individual responses continue to come in and are added to the database. “The survey consisted of eight Likert scale questions, four open ended questions, and an opportunity for respondents to provide comments and/or recommendations.”⁹¹ The survey designer chose six primary question areas to fulfill the purpose of the survey.

How prepared are AMSP Graduates?

All commanders agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared upon graduation to address ambiguous problems and all but one agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared for joint or combined staff assignments. This indicates that commanders believe AMSP graduates are capable of serving as general staff officers dealing with complex adaptive military problems. Fourteen of the commanders surveyed either strongly agreed or agreed that AMSP graduates are prepared for senior officer responsibilities. This indicates commander support for one of the original intents of the AMSP; to educate officers that can think like their commanding general officers.

⁹¹Maria Clark, “Division and Corps Commanders Survey Executive Summary” (US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 7, 2008), 1. According to William M. K. Trochim on the Research Methods Knowledge Base website, <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/scallik.php> (accessed 27 March 2014). Likert scale questions are questions that can be rated on a 1-to-5 or 1-to-7 Disagree-Agree response scale. The respondents are not telling you what they believe; they are judging how favorable each item is with respect to the construct of interest, in this case SAMS AMSP graduates.

How are SAMS/AMSP Graduates Different than other Members of your Command Performing
Similar Responsibilities?

A clear majority of respondents (12 of 14; 86 percent) to these questions indicated that they thought AMSP graduates were better thinkers and problem solvers than other officers on their staffs. This could be for several reasons. For instance, the response could be because of poor quality or inexperience of the non-AMSP graduates on the staffs as opposed to an indication of a high quality of graduates, and by inference the program. The opposite could also be a reason for the answer. Regardless of the cause of the opinion, the respondents indicate a high opinion of the thinking and problem solving skills of AMSP graduates. This is a clear indicator that AMSP is fulfilling its stated mission of educating officers to solve complex adaptive problems.

What should be the primary focus of SAMS/AMSP?

Several of the nineteen respondents to this question (9 of 19; 47 percent) indicated that planning should be the primary focus of AMSP. Four of the remaining ten indicated joint and inter-agency operations as the focus. The remainder of responses was diverse and varied. This is another indicator that leaders in the field want AMSP to be a school focused on planning, and thus by inference a school for planners. With the doctrinal relationship of joint operations to the operational level of war, it follows that there is a desire in the field for proficiency at the level. Again, it is hard to attribute a way to these answers, such as whether they are formed because of conventional wisdom about the program or a clear desire for expert planners in the field. Nevertheless, the data indicates planning, at the tactical to operational level, as a primary focus of the program, which was deliberately removed from the 2007 SAMS mission statement. In addition to planning as a subject of many responses, creative thinking and problem solving was closely linked to the answers as well.

Given the Opportunity, Would you Select a SAMS/AMSP Graduate as a Member of your Team?

All respondents to this question answered yes. This response indicates that there is no lack in confidence in the program or its graduates. Commanders in the field do not foresee a drop in quality of officers coming from the program by indicating they would continue to select graduates for assignments to their commands.

The overall survey data indicates that leaders of the Army in the field expect what the school has traditionally produced and has gained a renowned reputation for; critical and creative thinking, problem solving planners and staff officers. These expectations have been shaped primarily by the performance of graduates of the AMSP, but also by its 30-year history. Of course, the school and its graduates know they are much more than planners for the Army. Many graduates go on to successfully command at many echelons and the school has several current general officers as graduates of one of its three programs, with many more in the retired ranks.

ANALYSIS

AMSP Curriculum and CGSC Accountable Instruction System

As a military education institution, the US Army Command and General Staff College is accountable to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for adhering to professional military education standards set forth in CJCSI 1800.01. This instruction requires that service schools undergo accreditation of their Programs for Joint Education (PJE). The process is called the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). There is a deputy director position on the joint staff for military education, which oversees the accreditation process, and CGSC follows the process set forth in appendix F to CJCSI 1800.01.⁹²

⁹²US Department of Defense, "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01C" (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 2005), D-5.

As a graduate education and degree granting institution, CGSC is accountable to the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCA). The Higher Learning Commission of the NCA, which was founded in 1895 as one of six regional institutional accreditors in the US, accredits, and thereby grants membership in the commission and in the North Central Association, to degree-granting educational institutions in the north central region of the US, including Kansas.⁹³ Accreditation from this institution gives the degrees granted by CGSC their academic credibility.

To assist in fulfilling the detailed standards for each of these two accrediting bodies, CGSC has adopted the Accountable Instruction System (AIS).⁹⁴ The stated goal of AIS is to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the educational process by developing instruction based on the CGSC mission and educational goals, eliminating irrelevant instruction and/or coursework from the curriculum, and ensuring graduates gain the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the CGSC programs they attend. It also assists CGSC and its schools in meeting accreditation requirements of PAJE and NCA. The AIS is applicable all the schools in CGSC, including SAMS and its three programs.

The AIS is, in practical terms, a curriculum development process for the schools of CGSC and provides a standard process by which school and department directors, course authors, and faculty should develop and document courseware for their respective curricula. These standards also assist in adherence to accreditation standards. Even further, according to Dr. Claude Bowman of the CGSC Faculty Development Division, “particularly in military education,

⁹³North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, “The Higher Learning Commission,” North Central Association of Colleges and Schools, <http://www.ncahigherlearningcommission.org/> (accessed 24 March 2014).

⁹⁴US Army Command and General Staff College, CGSC Bulletin 30, *Curriculum Development: The Accountable Instruction System* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1 February 2006), 1. This section on the AIS is derived primarily from the information contained in CGSC Bulletin 30.

a more stringent standard is necessary because of the importance of the end result.”⁹⁵ Because of the importance of the education offered by CGSC and other like military schools, and the role these institutions play in forming and embodying the body of knowledge of the military profession, adherence to high standards in curriculum and faculty development seems imperative.

As set forth in CGSC Bulletin 30, the AIS is a four-phase process for developing and assessing CGSC curricula. The four phases are first, analyze and determine instructional and educational needs; second, design effective curriculum to meet the identified needs; third, develop instructional materials and courseware to support goals and objectives; and fourth, implement the developed courseware.

The AIS program of CGSC is much more than a mechanism to implement standard administrative procedures for curriculum and courseware documentation. It is used to develop faculty and courses that are graduate level quality for adult learners. The *CGSC Course Author’s Handbook* contains in-depth material and instruction on topics such as instructional methodologies, relationships between learning domains, levels of learning and learning objectives, and the experiential learning model.⁹⁶ In short, there is a major emphasis in CGSC on achieving and maintaining high standards in every aspect of adult learning, and graduate and professional military education from curriculum and faculty development to NCA and PAJE accreditation. The standards exist for multiple reasons and all the schools in CGSC are required to follow them, including SAMS.

⁹⁵Dr. Claude Bowman, interviewed by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 February 2014.

⁹⁶US Army Command and General Staff College, *CGSC Author’s Handbook*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2010).

Theories of Adult and Professional Military Education

There is a theory of adult education in operation partially in the AMSP. It is a structure to develop what Donald Schoen calls “the Reflective Practitioner” in his book *Educating the Reflective Practitioner*.⁹⁷ Dr. Peter Schifferle cites this theory in his dissertation “Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and US Army Military Effectiveness, 1919 to 1945,” and uses it to illustrate how the Leavenworth programs of this period were responsible for educating the practitioners of the military profession, which differ from education programs designed to educate academics or scientists.⁹⁸ This responsibility is the same one that exists at SAMS today and a version of Schoen's model can be seen in the structure of its curricula both past and present. In Schoen’s model, the curriculum first “presents the relevant basic science, then the relevant applied science, and finally a practicum in which students are presumed to learn to apply research-based knowledge to the problems of everyday practice.”⁹⁹ Looking back at the 1987 curriculum developed from the proposal of Wass de Czege for the school one can see Schoen's model at work. The reliance on first studying theory and history—the basic military art and science; then studying doctrine—the applied military art and science; then finally an exercise or practicum where AMSP students apply what they have learned in a controlled environment. While not followed explicitly, the logic of Schoen’s model is present in the AMSP curriculum.

The prevailing method of instruction in AMSP is seminar discussion. There are multiple theories of education related to the use of discussion in learning. The most frequently cited or referred to amongst faculty is the Socratic Method, named for the Greek philosopher Socrates,

⁹⁷Donald A. Schon, *Educating the Reflective Practitioner* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987).

⁹⁸Peter J. Schifferle, “Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and US Army Military Effectiveness, 1919 to 1945” (Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2002), 170.

⁹⁹Donald A. Schon, *Educating the Reflective Practitioner* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987), 8.

and his conversational style, which is described as inquiring and questioning.¹⁰⁰ Simply put, the Socratic Method involves questioning learners through the subject matter using probing and leading questions in discussions. Many seminar leaders in SAMS, as well as other schools in CGSC use this method in some form in leading seminar discussions.

One theme of Dr. Schifferle's dissertation on the role of Leavenworth service schools on the military profession in the inter-war years is the larger issue of the role of education in the military profession. While there are no specific and distinguishing theories of purely military education in the same vane as those of adult education, there have been several scholars who have studied and written about the relationships between education and the profession of arms. To many members of the profession, the necessity for an education to practice in and progress through the profession may be obvious. Nevertheless, questions such as the particular role of education, who to educate and when, what subjects should they study, whether there should be more science or more art in military education, or how to strike a balance between the two have typified the scholarly work on the topic and will most likely continue to do so well into the future.

In Morris Janowitz's book, *The Professional Soldier: a Social and Political Portrait* he uses the medical and law school analogy in contrasting military education experiences with those of lawyers or doctors. "The military career could better be described as a progression of educational experiences interspersed with operational assignments, in contrast to the concentrated, single dosage of professional education in medical or law school."¹⁰¹ What Janowitz refers to here is the structured progression of professional military schools that officers are required to attend periodically throughout their careers. He describes the progression simply

¹⁰⁰Max Maxwell, "The Socratic Method and its Effect on Critical Thinking," Socratic method research portal, <http://www.socraticmethod.net/> (accessed 26 March 2014).

¹⁰¹Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (USA: The Free Press, 1960), 126.

as officers attending schools commensurate with their rank and the units they will likely serve in; junior officers attending schools focused on tactical level subjects, mid career officers focus on larger unit operations, and senior officer focus on strategic and national level subjects in their schools. Janowitz includes assignments as instructors as educational experiences as well, thus his conclusion that school assignments seem more prevalent than operational ones.¹⁰²

While SAMS does incorporate practical exercises in the AMSP curriculum, they are not used in a manner reflected in the Experiential Learning Model. Finally, as Janowitz's work points out, the level at which instruction is delivered to military professionals is important for them to build the body of knowledge for them and the profession as a whole.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SAMS and AMSP remain highly relevant, and will continue to be so especially as it becomes necessary to respond to unique and unexpected scenarios in an era of non-state terrorism. Planning and strategy has become ever more essential and crucial at all levels of the military. Officers need SAMS graduates to provide strategic vision, the means by which to rethink specific scenarios, and the tools with which to grasp the bigger picture.

As discussed through the history in AMSP Origins, the Army's intended purpose for SAMS and the AMSP was to develop and inculcate in the leadership of the Army, an understanding of Operational Art. This was done primarily because of the introduction of Air-land battle doctrine, campaigning, and the operational level of war to the Army in the mid 1980s. As a doctrinal construct, operational art and campaigning is still very much the prevailing thought of how the Army in the field must operate, certainly at the division and corps level. Even more so, with the imperative of joint operations, an understanding of the Army at the operational level is necessary for mid level and senior Army leaders. Given this, the original curriculum design of

¹⁰²Ibid., 139.

AMSP is still very much valid. While it most assuredly needed to be updated to fit the current environment and operational requirements of the Army over the 30-year history of SAMS, the fundamental subject matter of operational art and campaigning has and will endure.

It is rather surprising that the Army, as an institution, has no mechanism or organization to think through and develop a deliberate role, mission and function for such an institution other than verbal guidance to have the school do so itself. The absence of a more deliberate and inclusive method of charting the course for SAMS as an academic institution, has resulted in a incongruity between what the school is providing in AMSP and what the Army in the field expects. As discussed in each combat operation-Panama, Kuwait, and Iraq and the Field Expectations section, the expectations of the Army have been shaped by the reputation built by the school over the past 30 years. That expectation is for creative thinking, problem solving staff officers and leaders proficient at operational art.

Understanding the roles of education articulated by Wass de Czege and Janowitz, we find that it does not make a difference whether the school is thought of as a school for planners and staff officers or future leaders and commanders because the skills and attributes of each are similar if not the same. What is more important is a broad education in the art and science of war, focused at the appropriate rank level, to develop these attributes. The curriculum is broad, covering the traditional pillars of history, theory, practice, and doctrine; it has also expanded to include regional studies, political science, and international relations. This strategic level is arguably not appropriate for majors at the intermediate level of their careers, nor does it prepare them to meet the expectations of the organizations where they will be assigned.

As shown in the AMSP curriculum section, most of the syllabi and lesson advanced sheets conform to step three of the AIS process. The AIS program, if followed properly, is designed to be a routine, cyclic process resulting in increased effectiveness and efficiency of the educational process by developing instruction based on the CGSC mission and educational goals,

eliminating irrelevant instruction and/or coursework from the curriculum, and ensuring graduates gain the knowledge, skills, and attributes of the programs they attend. In short, there is a significant emphasis in CGSC on achieving and maintaining high standards in every aspect of adult learning, and graduate and professional military education from curriculum and faculty development to NCA and PAJE accreditation. The standards exist for multiple reasons and are required by all the schools in CGSC, including SAMS and its three programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As such, SAMS should continue with the curriculum review of the AMSP curriculum fully utilizing the AIS system. As part of step one of that process, analysis, SAMS should request written, documented guidance from CGSC, CAC, and TRADOC in the form of a charter for the school. Along with the charter, SAMS should use survey from a modern day survey of Army leaders on AMSP as the expectation of the program. In addition, SAMS should request this survey be conducted on an annual basis to incorporate into the cyclic curriculum review prescribed by the AIS system. Once the review and findings are complete, the findings should be presented to those headquarters that issued the school charter for approval and to receive further guidance. This is done in the form of a post instructional conference in keeping with the AIS. The rest of the process should be followed to develop and document curriculum products.

Additionally, AMSP should design a combined curriculum as opposed to separate courses. Theory, evolution, design, strategic context, and doctrine should be taught focuses on one campaign chronologically from the American Revolutionary War to present day and Operation Iraqi Freedom/Enduring Freedom. The curriculum would serve as better transition to application in practical exercise and more closely mirror what is expected of AMSP graduates in the field. A second benefit to this model is that the distribution of theory, history, doctrine, and practice could be more easily adjusted than current day curriculum.

SAMS fills a critical niche in the Army, and when implementing change, the rule must be “first” do no harm.” However, as the Army executes its final missions in Afghanistan, it is important that SAMS and AMSP transform to meet the changing conditions. The stability of the international environment will continue to be uncertain as long as the US is the sole superpower. Ill-defined threats that elude the state-centric paradigm will be the norm. It is highly probable that the US military will continue to be called upon regularly to conduct short duration operations that entail high risk. During the first decade of the 21st century, as the US Army transforms, the force structure may not fit the contingency, and forces will need to be tailored, formed, and trained to execute specific missions. This will require an officer corps, and especially planners, that are mentally flexible, comfortable with developing technology, and educated across the breadth and depth of military art and science.

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