

# SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL ART

A Monograph

by

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## ABSTRACT

SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL ART, by MAJ Joseph R. Inge, Jr., U.S. Army, 39 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to determine the effects of social media usage on domestic instability as it pertains to the Arab Spring. The examination of social movement theory defines why revolutions occur. Discussing this theory shows that social media was a tool to enhance the uprisings of the Arab Spring but was not a causal factor for the revolutions. Four countries, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, were used as case studies for this monograph. They were chosen for the varying approaches that the revolution took in their specific circumstances and the path that each country assumed as a result of the uprisings. This monograph also provides recommendations for possible military actions that could be taken in cases where domestic stability is effected. The overall affect of this monograph is to allow people to think about how the future practice of operational art will be effected by increased social media usage.

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## INTRODUCTION

Social media is an ingredient, not an entrée.<sup>1</sup>

--Jay Baer

Mr. Jay Baer's quotation sums up the role that social media played in the Arab Spring. This quote is not taken from the context of the Arab Spring. The context of the quote is related to marketing and business practices to improve an organization by relying on ideas and processes while incorporating social media to support organizational goals. This is what social media was to the Arab Spring. Social media was not the reason for the uprising throughout the Middle East and North Africa but it was an agent that accelerated the process and allowed for universal dissemination of the issues and effects. It was a facilitator, not the catalyst.

Domestic instability is seen in some way, shape, or form throughout all societies. There are a number of factors which lead society to domestic instability. Some of the causal factors of domestic instability include economic disparity, social oppression, infrastructure shortfalls, ethnic and religious divides, poor education system, and governments inability to provide basic needs such as security and rule of law for the population. The effect of the instability on the nation depends on the reaction of the government and if there is a peaceful method within the country for voicing grievances. This monograph will focus on the role of social media as it relates to four countries associated with the Arab Spring: Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco. This monograph shows that an increased use of social media increases instability as governments try to control the internet and social media.

The reaction of the governments oftentimes determines the success of the protests. The government's use of social media aids in their reaction and the suppression of the people's points

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<sup>1</sup>Jay Baer, "Convince&Convert," Marketing and consulting, *18 Social Media Quotes My Wife Is Sick of Hearing Me Say*, <http://www.convinceandconvert.com/social-media-marketing/18-social-media-quotes/> (accessed March 31, 2014)

Jay Baer is a hype-free social media and content strategist and speaker, and author of *Youility: Why Smart Marketing is About Help not Hype*. Jay is the founder of <http://convinceandconvert.com>.

of contention. Depending on how the government reacts to revolutions determines the level of instability within a nation. Third world nations, countries with non-democratic style governments, and other developing nations are the ones most susceptible to social revolutions. The attempt by government to control those assets increases domestic instability as the populations feels more oppressed. The increase in instability provides an opportunity for terrorism to possibly gain a foothold within that country. This possibility is a situation that the United States must monitor for potential intervention. Examining what makes up a social movement can focus intelligence efforts for prioritizing situations for potential intervention.

A social movement is a group of people with a common ideology who try together to achieve certain general goals.<sup>2</sup> Within that definition there are a number of types of social movements as well as a many theories on social movement. The most mainstream theory on social movements is politically based. This means that most social movements occur due to some government action or policy which has enraged the population and they want some sort of political change. That change can range from an entire regime change to just an apology and redacting the change that was made to return to the status quo. This type of movement is what has been occurring in the Middle East and Northern Africa since 2010. This type of movement most recently occurred in both the Middle East and Northern Africa, popularly referred to as the “Arab Spring.”

The Arab Spring refers to the pro-democracy uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010. The "spring" is in contrast to the "winter" of oppression that many of these countries have experienced in the past.<sup>3</sup> The Arab Spring began in Tunisia but the

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<sup>2</sup>“Social Movement,” TheFreeDictionary.com, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/social+movement> (accessed January 30, 2014).

<sup>3</sup>“Arab Spring,” Urban Dictionary, <http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Arab%20Spring> (accessed January 31, 2014).



most popular of uprisings occurred in Egypt. The main purpose for the Egyptian revolution, like most revolutions, was that average, poor, and working people felt suppressed. Their economic welfare and social lives were subjected to relatively unacceptable levels of nihilism and degradation.<sup>4</sup> The Egyptian uprisings posed a threat to the relationship between Egypt and the United States. The threat was more diplomatic and economic with a low potential for military involvement by the United States. The United States' policy toward the Arab Spring, not specifically Egypt, has been to voice support for people seeking representative governments but limit the role the United States will play to shape those efforts.<sup>5</sup>

United States goals during the Arab Spring and throughout the region remained constant throughout. United States goals focus on maintaining regional stability and US influence throughout the region, while respecting the needs and wants of the local population with respect to their specific revolt. The United States realizes that if it chooses to back a party in the revolution that it could potentially be put right in the middle of the situation and ultimately become an additional issue for the protest.<sup>6</sup>

The United States goals for this region stem from the days of the Cold War. The United States wanted to diminish Soviet Union influence within the region, deny the spread of communism, and project United States power while spreading the characteristics of democracy to gain allies within the region. Access to oil resources has also been a reason for United States interest and interaction within the region over the years.

The aim of protests in most developing nations is for political reform. The population

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<sup>4</sup>William Shaub, "The Roots of Revolution in Egypt," *Arbitrage Magazine*, <http://www.arbitragemagazine.com/topics/international-affairs/middle-east/the-roots-of-revolution-in-egypt/> (accessed February 20, 2014).

<sup>5</sup>Julie Pace, "Egypt Challenges Obama's Arab Spring Philosophy," *The Big Story*, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egypt-challenges-obamas-arab-spring-philosophy> (accessed February 20, 2014).

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

believes that the current government is not sufficiently providing for their basic needs. The lack of support from the government for the people and the disproportion of economic allocation amongst the population are traditionally the biggest reasons for the push for political reform. The reform does not have to be drastic as far as a coup d'état or entire regime change.

This monograph aims to show that social media is not a causal factor in the formation of revolutions which lead to domestic instability within a nation. Rather, it will show that social media aids in the organization, participation levels, and information flow of opposition groups that revolt. How much social media is used in support of revolutions contributes to its success as well as the reaction of the government. Attempted control of social media and internet resources in conjunction with a harsh government reaction lowers the chance that the current regime will remain in power. This normally results in success for the revolution. It is possible for a regime to remain in power. The government may remain in power by conceding to opposition demands, not attempting harsh control of the internet and social media, and by not resulting to the use of force against protestors. Regardless of the outcome of revolutions, the United States must monitor the area due to the potential for future actions against the country, United States national interest, or potential threat to its allies. The United States must learn to utilize social media to help predict and anticipate potential locations or actors from where the next threat will emerge.

This monograph will provide the information described above in the following manner. The following pages will consist of a review of literature used in the study, a description of the methodology used, the case studies used, analysis of the case studies, recommendations for military involvement, a conclusion, and potential future research topics.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The sources used for this monograph include media articles, books, blogs, and other research documents on the topic. The sources used focused on three major topics. Those topics included a theoretical discussion of the role of social media in furthering social movements, a general discussion of the instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and a specific discussion of the role of social media in Middle Eastern and North African instability during the Arab Spring. Research was also conducted on social movement theory due to it being the basis for the Arab Spring.

Social media and the internet can help further social movements. The multiple mediums and social networking platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and You Tube can help with organizing and coordinating these movements. Some believe that social media and the internet are the only tools used today for organizing these movements. Movements are still primarily facilitated through verbal communication, signs and posters, and other traditional means such as meetings and face-to-face interaction.

The instability in the Middle East and North Africa known as the Arab Spring did not just begin in 2010. Resistance to the government regimes has been ongoing since the inception of those countries. Multiple periods of dissatisfaction occurred most notably beginning in the 1960s focused primarily against Israel and western states due to their reliance on and desire for access to oil resources.

Social media helped fuel the revolutions of the Arab Spring. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube not only assisted in coordinating the efforts of the protestors but helped to spread their messages, actions, and the results of their protests throughout the world. Social media allowed the world to observe what was occurring in the Middle East and Northern Africa more so than ever before. Because these revolutions could be seen by other countries in the region through social media, resistance groups within other countries were emboldened to start revolutions of their

own. The observations of success helped to allow other revolutions to rise. Revolutions across the region were not linked or coordinated. The ability to be seen gave hope that the population could be successful in their own revolution in their own country for their specific reasons whatever those might be.

The types of revolutions that made up the Arab Spring can be defined as social movements. There are four broad categories of social movements. Those categories according to David F. Aberle are alternative, redemptive, reformatory, and revolutionary social movements.<sup>7</sup> Alternative social movements are at the individual level and advocate for minor change. Redemptive social movements are at the individual level and advocate for radical changes. Reformatory social movements occur at a broader group or societal level and advocate for minor changes. Revolutionary social movements occur at a broader group or societal level and advocate for radical changes.<sup>8</sup> The Arab Spring was a revolutionary social movement because the goal was to produce drastic change to the government and society of each country. Examples of social movements include race equality, feminism, religious, socio-economic, and socio-political. The occurrence of social movements has developed social movement theory. Social movement theory describes why social movements occur.

Through research for this monograph it was determined that there is not a clear definition for social movement theory. It has evolved over time based on the advances in social movements. It is defined more by the different types of movements and other theories that are planted in the social realm. There are three components that all social movements have. Those are political opportunity, resource mobilization, and framing. The following paragraphs will discuss each.

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<sup>7</sup>“Types of Social Movements - Boundless Open Textbook,” Boundless, <https://www.boundless.com/sociology/understanding-social-change/social-movements/types-of-social-movements/> (accessed April 2, 2014).

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

Political opportunity theory or political process theory argues “that the success of social movements depends not only on the movement’s resources but on those of major social systems such as the state and how these are brought to bear in support or opposition.”<sup>9</sup> This means that the success of a revolution is dependent and linked to the current situation. The members of a revolution must decide if there truly is an opportunity for their revolution to effect a change in society or the political process. If it can then the decision to revolt could be beneficial. This is similar to understanding the full context and all factors within where the revolution is going to occur.

Resource mobilization theory states “that the success of social movements depends on resources (time, money, skills, etc.) and the ability to use them.”<sup>10</sup> If the movement group is unable to effectively organize, coordinate, and execute actions with all available resources then a revolution stands a less likely chance to be successful. Most importantly is execution. If the resources brought to bear on the goal cannot be used effectively then success is limited.

Framing is ensuring that all parties involved in the revolution have a shared understanding of the situation. If the frame is not the same of the participants and their narrative is not synched then they will have to relook the situation to make sure they are on the right path. Through collective understanding of the situation, framing determines the ways and means the organization uses to meet the end result of their revolution because those are the tools and methods they understand.

All together social movement theory tries to inform why social movements happen. The advent of social media enhances social movements and forces the redefinition of the theory to

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<sup>9</sup>Ashley Crossman, “Political Process Theory,” About.com Sociology, [http://sociology.about.com/od/P\\_Index/g/Political-Process-Theory.htm](http://sociology.about.com/od/P_Index/g/Political-Process-Theory.htm) (accessed April 3, 2014).

<sup>10</sup>Ashley Crossman, “Resource Mobilization Theory,” About.com Sociology, [http://sociology.about.com/od/R\\_Index/g/Resource-Mobilization-Theory.htm](http://sociology.about.com/od/R_Index/g/Resource-Mobilization-Theory.htm) (accessed April 3, 2014).

determine if it is still valid.

Three major sources used for this monograph include “The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring”,<sup>11</sup> *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*,<sup>12</sup> and *The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to our Brains*.<sup>13</sup> These sources provided good insight to the overall picture and thoughts about how the internet and social media have affected society since being created.

“The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring”<sup>14</sup> was written by six Stanford University graduate students; five in the International Policy Studies Program and one in the Public Policy Program. Their paper was written for the Defense Intelligence Agency and investigates as the title states, the impact that social media had on the Arab Spring. The paper provides great background regarding social theory and the reasons for the revolutions that made up the Arab Spring. This source also discusses the implications that the Arab Spring has on the rest of the world.

*The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*<sup>15</sup> is written by Evgeny Morozov. Mr. Morozov is a Belarusian writer and researcher who studies political and social implications of technology. Mr. Morozov does not focus solely on the Arab Spring. He uses examples to include the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union and the Green Revolution in Iran

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<sup>11</sup> Taylor Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, March 20, 2012), [http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia\\_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf](http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf) (accessed October 1, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).

<sup>13</sup> Nicholas G. Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet Is Doing to Our Brains* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010).

<sup>14</sup> Taylor Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, March 20, 2012), [http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia\\_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf](http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf) (accessed October 1, 2013).

<sup>15</sup> Morozov, *The Net Delusion*.

in 2009. Mr. Morozov states that, and other reiterate, that social media and information technologies do not cause revolutions but they do impact the effects those revolutions have on societies and governments. If social media and information technologies are used properly by governments, the results of revolutions can be minimal to the current regime.<sup>16</sup>

*The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to our Brains*<sup>17</sup> is written by Nicholas Carr. This book discusses the impact of the internet and technology on our lives. Mr. Carr states that the internet and technology strains our cognitive abilities, diminishing our learning and weakening our understanding.<sup>18</sup> People tend to want to be interrupted and overwhelmed by information which is what the internet provides us. This overwhelming of information leads people to want more input. This can lead to uprisings and domestic instability as people learn what has occurred in other countries.

Other sources also contributed to this monograph. The primary focus of these articles discusses how social media influences revolutions, specifically those of the Arab Spring. Most sources reviewed reiterated that social media is not the cause of revolutions but a means for facilitating them. Revolutions begin for a number of reasons. Some of those reasons include government oppression, poor economy, poor living conditions, lack of freedoms, unfair treatment, and overall unhappiness. Social media can help fuel revolts which can lead to change in governments and the treatment of citizens.

The other sources used included “The Arab Spring: Understanding the Success of Protest through Social Movement” by Sean Lynch,<sup>19</sup> “The Emerging Role of Social Media in Political

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Nicholas G. Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to our Brains* (W.W. Norton, 2010).

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Sean Lynch, “The Arab Spring: Understanding The Success of Protest Through Social

and Regime Change” by Rita Safranek,<sup>20</sup> and “Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?” by Philip N. Howard, Aiden Duffy, Deen Freelon, Muzammil Hussain, Will Mari, and Marwa Mazaid.<sup>21</sup>

The Lynch paper specifically discussed social movement theory and how that theory impacted the events of the Arab Spring. He began by informing the reader about the history of social movement theory and how it has developed into the modern social movement of Political Process Theory (PPT).<sup>22</sup> Next his analysis focused on through the factors of PPT and social movement theory the countries he chose were successful or unsuccessful in their revolutions. Lynch confirms that social media only played an assisting role in the revolutions he studied.

Rita Safranek writes about the history of social media and its emerging role in bringing change. She did not look solely at the Arab Spring. Safranek also discusses political revolutions in the Philippines and the former Soviet republic of Moldova. She states that some of the factors that affect the success of social media’s role are the size, ethnic diversity, and education levels of the populace, modern telecommunications infrastructure, and level of censorship used by the current regime.<sup>23</sup> She also says that success of the revolution depends on how willing the current

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Movement” (University Honors, 2013), <http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/15059/Lynch,%20Sean%20-%20Spring%202013.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed January 23, 2014).

<sup>20</sup> Rita Safranek, “The Emerging Role of Social Media in Political and Regime Change” (ProQuest Discovery Guide, March 2012).

<sup>21</sup> P. N. Howard et al., *Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?* (Project on Information Technology & Political Islam, 2011).

<sup>22</sup>Sean Lynch, “The Arab Spring: Understanding The Success of Protest Through Social Movement” (University Honors, 2013), <http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/15059/Lynch,%20Sean%20-%20Spring%202013.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed January 23, 2014).

<sup>23</sup>Safranek, “The Emerging Role of Social Media in Political and Regime Change.”



regime is to use violence to stop protests. Revolutions are more successful if the government uses less violent measures and less successful if violent actions are high.<sup>24</sup>

The Howard paper was written about the countries of Egypt and Tunisia. It was written to show the role that social media played in the revolutions of those countries. There were three main findings as a result of the research. The first finding was that social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring. Secondly, a spike in online revolutionary conversations often preceded major events on the ground. The final finding was that social media helped spread democratic ideas across international borders.<sup>25</sup> These three ideas speak to the same conclusion that social media was not the cause of the Arab Spring but was an enabler for its success.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Howard et al., *Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring?*.

## METHODOLOGY

The methodology for this monograph includes analysis of multiple case studies of Middle East and North African uprisings in recent years, specifically during the Arab Spring, which have produced domestic instability. The Arab Spring was chosen because of the history of United States interest in the region and the potential impacts it could have on United States policy and action toward the region. This monograph examines the relationship between the use of social media and the governmental reaction of the countries involved. The examination of this relationship determines if certain trends can be applied to the level of instability.

The criteria used to analyze the case studies chosen include:

- 1) How did organizers use social media?
- 2) How did governments make use of social media in response to opposition movements?
- 3) What was the role of social media in influencing international opinion and policy?

The case studies describe what happened in each country. The analysis following the studies depicts the outcomes and how they effected change within the environment. Recommendations follow the analysis for the potential way ahead to either quelling the violence and negating the revolutions or enhancing the violence and the success of the revolutions.

## CASE STUDIES<sup>26</sup>

The following case studies represent uprisings that occurred in the Middle East and North Africa since 2010 that were enhanced by the use of social media. The countries within this region where uprisings occurred were Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, the Western Sahara, and the Palestinian territories. The case studies selected for study are Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco.

Tunisia was chosen because it was the country where the first revolution occurred. The images and effects from Tunisia ignited the spark to show other countries that they could possibly be successful in a revolution of their own if they wanted to.

Egypt was chosen because it was a key ally of the United States within the region. Seen as one of the more progressive stable nations in the region before the revolution and arguably after, the future of Egypt is very important for the region as a whole.

Syria was chosen because the situation in Syria has not improved due to the uprising. Arguably the situation in Syria is worse as a result of the revolution and due to the lack of the revolution's positive effects Syria remains a country of interest for the United States and the international community.

Morocco was chosen as a case study due to the relatively successful end to hostilities as a result of the revolution. Changes in Morocco as a result of their revolution shine light on the importance of the people being involved in the political process.

These countries each had their own reasons for occurring, but it is clear that the uprisings in the other nations and their broadcast through social media helped ignite a spark to the

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<sup>26</sup>The majority of the information for the case studies comes from the paper written by the public policy department at Stanford University in October 2013. [http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia\\_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf](http://publicpolicy.stanford.edu/system/files/SocialMedia_FINAL%2020%20Mar.pdf).

underlying factors which allowed for them to occur. The table below shows the overall data regarding the uprisings in the order they occurred.

Country	First Large-scale Organized Protest	Largest Protest	Date of Largest Protest	City	Principal organizers
Tunisia	Monday, Dec 27 2010	1,000s	Tuesday, Jan11 2011	Tunis	Trade union activists
Egypt	Tuesday, Jan 25 2011	100,000s	Tuesday, Feb 8 2011	Cairo	Muslim Brotherhood
Syria	Thursday, Feb 17 2011	10,000s	Friday, April 22 2011	Damascus	Syrian Revolution activists
Morocco	Sunday, Feb 20 2011	10,000	Sunday, March 20 2011	Casablanca	Feb 20 Movement

Table 1.1<sup>27</sup> Arab Spring initial overview

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<sup>27</sup> Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring*.

## Tunisia<sup>28</sup>

Protests in Tunisia began in mid-December 2010, marking the unofficial beginning of the Arab Spring. After the December 17 self-immolation of street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, young protestors flooded the streets of the city in order to protest the country's rapidly rising youth unemployment and corruption among members of the elite. The protests quickly escalated into violence and spread across the country to capital city Tunis by December 27. President Zine al-Abidine bin Ali initially delivered strong messages against the unrest, claiming, "the law will be applied in all firmness."<sup>29</sup> However, by mid-January the protests could no longer be contained and bin Ali ended his two-decade rule by fleeing to Saudi Arabia.<sup>30</sup>

While local protests began in Sidi Bouzid immediately after Bouazizi was taken to a medical facility, YouTube and Facebook played a large role in mobilizing Tunisian educated youth. Videos of Bouazizi's suicide quickly appeared online and sparked the first demonstrations. Later, videos of police clashes with rioters fueled the country's anger. Apart from organizational purposes, social media sites also served the important role of information provider. As one activist stated, "Protestors took to the streets with a rock in one hand, a cell phone in the other."<sup>31</sup> Past protests in Tunisia have rarely been able to grow because the state-owned media tightly

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 16–17.

<sup>29</sup>Julian Borger and Diplomatic Editor, "Tunisian President Vows to Punish Rioters after Worst Unrest in a Decade," *The Guardian*, last modified December 29, 2010, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/29/tunisian-president-vows-punish-rioters> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>30</sup>David D. Kirkpatrick, "President of Tunisia Flees; Premier Takes His Place," *The New York Times*, January 14, 2011, sec. World / Africa, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/world/africa/15tunis.html> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>31</sup>Yasmine Ryan, "How Tunisia's Revolution Began," Aljazeera English, January 26, 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html> (accessed November 26, 2013).

controls the news. However, as more and more videos of protests appeared online, they were eventually picked up by international media such as Al Jazeera and disseminated worldwide.

Tunisian activists focused on “breaking the media blackout” and spreading a constant stream of information. This allowed videos to eventually reach sites like YouTube, which was banned by the government. Twitter hash-tags evolved from #Bouazizi to #sidibouزيد to #tunisia.<sup>32</sup> The majority of Tunisians, fearing repercussions, did not actively participate on Facebook or Twitter—sharing or “liking”—until bin Ali’s departure appeared imminent and definite. However, with one of the highest levels of internet penetration in the region (roughly 30%), citizens were able to follow the news provided by “a solid core of activists.”<sup>33</sup> These included bloggers Messou T7Essou and Ben Mhenni, whose blog is named “A Tunisian Girl.”<sup>34</sup> In March 2011, Reporters Without Borders awarded the 2011 Netizen Prize to the popular Tunisian blog Nawaat.org. In May of the same year, the blog received the 11th annual Index on Censorship Media Award, supported by Google.<sup>35</sup>

The Tunisian government’s attempts to block social media sites were largely unsuccessful. However, authorities did manage to arrest prominent bloggers and online activists. The government also hacked into Facebook and email accounts in order to block their access to sites and prevent their obtaining of usernames and passwords. Phishing attempts backfired when

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Tim Lister, “Tunisian Protests Fueled by Social Media Networks,” CNN, January 13, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/12/tunisia/index.html?hpt=C1> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>35</sup>“Nawaat Declines the Arab eContent Award 2011,” Nawaat, <http://nawaat.org/portail/2011/05/02/nawaat-declines-the-arab-econtent-award-2011/> (accessed November 26, 2013).

protesters learned of government actions and produced slogans such as “Free from 404.” The Tunisian government soon became victim itself to a hacking organization called Anonymous.<sup>36</sup>

While social media was an important tool in mobilizing protesters in Tunisia, a range of civil society groups including trade unions, education unions, human rights groups, and opposition groups were clearly instrumental in organizing their members to demonstrate against the regime.<sup>37</sup> The involvement of these groups resulted in the mobilization of a large swath of Tunisian society including students, teachers, journalists, human rights activists, trade unionists, and opposition politicians.<sup>38</sup> This is a striking example of the power of civil society groups to increase participation in broader social movements.

The Tunisia case study exemplifies social movement theory. Within Tunisia the pent-up frustration of the people against the corrupt elitist government due to high unemployment had been festering for a while. Grievances by the people toward the government form the basis of a lot of modern social movements as seen in Tunisia. The beating of and subsequent self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi was the spark necessary to start a revolution. Little political opportunity and a shared frame of the situation, the educated and frustrated youthful population of Tunisia mobilized the available resource of the internet and social media to successfully revolt against the government.

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Christopher Alexander, “Tunisia’s Protest Wave: Where It Comes from and What It Means,” *Foreign Policy Blogs*, January 3, 2011, [http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/02/tunisia\\_s\\_protest\\_wave\\_where\\_it\\_comes\\_from\\_and\\_what\\_it\\_means\\_for\\_ben\\_ali?hidecomments=yes](http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/02/tunisia_s_protest_wave_where_it_comes_from_and_what_it_means_for_ben_ali?hidecomments=yes) (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

## Egypt<sup>39</sup>

On June 6, 2010, 28 year-old Khaled Saeed was brutally beaten to death by police after circulating a video showing Egyptian police divvying the remains of a drug bust.<sup>40</sup> Police claimed that Saeed had choked to death, but photos of Saeed's beaten body soon surfaced online, sparking public backlash against police corruption and torture. It also led to the creation of Facebook group "We Are All Khaled Saeed," moderated by 30 year-old Google executive and cyber-activist Wael Ghonim.<sup>41</sup>

By 2011, the "We Are All Khaled Saeed" page had attracted more than 400,000 members, who rallied around their common frustration with abuses of power by authorities under Egypt's emergency rule, ongoing since 1967. The group page continued to depict other similar abuses—wrongful arrests, torture and government corruption.<sup>42</sup>

On January 18, 2011, graduate student Asmaa Mahfouz posted a 4 minute- and 36 second-long video to both Facebook and YouTube in which she called for her fellow Egyptians to participate in protests against the government. Specifically, she stated that she would go alone to protest in Tahrir Square; when she and several others made their way to this location, the internal security services immediately surrounded them and quietly evicted them from the area. She then posted a second video, announcing her intention to return to the square on January 25th, an Egyptian national holiday, to protest once again. Around this time, a prominent Egyptian youth group, the April 6 Movement, contacted the then-anonymous administrator of "We Are All

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<sup>39</sup> Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring*, 17–19.

<sup>40</sup> "We Are All Khaled Saeed' Facebook Page", <http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/11/%E2%80%9Cwe-are-all-khaled-saeed%E2%80%9D-facebook-page> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> L. Gordon Crovitz, "Egypt's Revolution by Social Media," <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703786804576137980252177072> (accessed November 26, 2013).



Khaled Saeed” asking for “marketing help” with a campaign—protests on January 25th, which would mark the official beginning of the Egypt uprisings.<sup>43</sup>

The linkage of these two online groups—”We Are All Khaled Saeed” and the 6 April Movement—demonstrates the utility of social media in bridging the two communities. The members of these online communities, which could be considered online organizations, therefore were more easily accessed and mobilized by protest organizers, as stipulated by social movement theory. Given that networks of close friends frequently use Facebook, it is also likely for these friend networks to join Facebook pages, or organizations, in tandem. The strong interpersonal ties among networks of friends on Facebook therefore provide the influence upon recruitment that is critical to social movements.

During protests Ghonim provided detailed accounts of events via his Twitter account which had more than 200,000 followers. Social media became some of the main tools for organizing demonstrations and sharing real-time news. In some occasions, these tools were used to fool the police, from planting false rumors to staging “field tests.” Before each protest (most scheduled for Tuesdays and Fridays in order to conserve energy), groups would provide a false lead online and gather at another location.<sup>44</sup> The government retaliated by shutting down Internet access. Google Inc., Ghonim’s employer, responded by creating Speak2Tweet, an application that allowed voice messages to be posted to Twitter.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>David D. Kirkpatrick, “Wired and Shrewd, Young Egyptians Guide Revolt,” *The New York Times*, February 9, 2011, sec. World / Middle East, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/world/middleeast/10youth.html> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>44</sup>Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (June 2011), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>45</sup>Stuart Levey, “Fighting Corruption After the Arab Spring: Harnessing Countries’ Desire to Improve Their Reputations for Integrity,” *Foreign Affairs* (June 16, 2011), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67895/stuart-levey/fighting-corruption-after-the-arab-spring> (accessed November 26, 2013).

Ghonim was jailed soon after the January 25th protests. During his two-week incarceration he was interrogated to provide information about his Facebook campaign which authorities believed was backed by foreign powers.<sup>46</sup> Following his release, 148,700 people signed a Facebook campaign to appoint Ghonim as the spokesman for Egypt's democracy movement. Ghonim's use of social media not only propelled him to international hero status but also afforded him credibility among the protesters, many of which were his age. His role in mobilizing the Egyptian youth is evident. "This is my first day at the protests," one participant said, "the moment I saw Ghonim on TV last night I knew I had to get down to Tahrir and stand with the Egyptian people."<sup>47</sup>

Egypt incorporated all aspects of social movement theory. It incorporated them so well in fact that they removed two governments during the Arab Spring. Just as in Tunisia, dissatisfaction of the government by the people led to their revolution. Fueled by the beating of a young man trying to expose corruption, the use of the internet and social media expediated the long awaited revolution. The shared frame and actions of the people caused change to occur in Egypt.

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<sup>46</sup>Ian Black and Middle East editor, "Wael Ghonim Anointed Voice of the Revolution by Tahrir Square Faithful," *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/08/wael-ghonim-tahrir-square> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

## Syria<sup>48</sup>

Syria presents a unique case in the analysis of Arab Spring movements in that its opposition has continued for nearly two years, with little progress made against the al-Assad regime, and rising casualty counts in the face of brutal repression by military forces. Social unrest in Syria initially failed to materialize, despite calls for protests on social media. In early February 2011, Syrian opposition groups created a Facebook page that called for protests across the country on February 4-5. More than 16,000 Facebook members expressed support, but the demonstrations – planned entirely on Facebook – did not take place, and on February 9, Al Jazeera dubbed Syria a “kingdom of silence”.<sup>49</sup>

However, the opposition movement picked up momentum in March, during which a Facebook page called “The Syrian Revolution 2011” was created to provide updates on the protests. Although it is unclear exactly how people were mobilized in the series of protests that took place after March, various Facebook pages seem to have played a role in calling for the protest and communicating the timing of these protests.<sup>50</sup> Other social media, including YouTube and Twitter, have played some part in fueling public outrage by disseminating information to those who fell victim to the government’s crackdown.<sup>51</sup> They were also useful in delivering eyewitness accounts of the protests and instilling a sense of national cohesion among the

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<sup>48</sup> Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring*, 22–24.

<sup>49</sup> Cajs Wikstrom, “Syria: ‘A Kingdom of Silence,’” Aljazeera English, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/201129103121562395.html> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>50</sup> Kim Ghattas, “Syria’s Spontaneously Organised Protests,” *BBC*, April 22, 2011, sec. Middle East, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13168276> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>51</sup> Abigail Fielding-Smith in Beirut, “Syria Protests Escalate over Death of Boy,” *Financial Times*, May 29, 2011, [http://www.ft.com/cms/s/730f7f62-8a25-11e0-beff-00144feab49a, Authorised=false.html?\\_i\\_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F730f7f62-8a25-11e0-beff-00144feab49a.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&\\_i\\_referer=#axzz1fMrOkj1B](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/730f7f62-8a25-11e0-beff-00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F730f7f62-8a25-11e0-beff-00144feab49a.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&_i_referer=#axzz1fMrOkj1B) (accessed November 26, 2013).

protestors.<sup>52</sup> In addition to a core group of cyber activists, the Syrian protests are also organized in large part by the Local Coordinating Committees (LCCs) which provide information via their website and social media outlets regarding violence occurring against protesters in the country.<sup>53</sup>

Funerals and prayer gatherings have been key events at which movement organizers in Syria mobilize people to protest, in the absence of widespread Internet access and social media usage.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, Syrian activists have routinely held protests after Friday prayers since the beginning of the opposition movement. Protests are often organized in secret with trusted people letting one another know during face-to-face meetings, or if possible using Facebook, Skype, or other social media sites.<sup>55</sup> Fliers are also sometimes discreetly distributed to trusted individuals to advertise protests given the pervasive security force presence, and organizers also appeal to neighbors to take part in protests and strikes.<sup>56</sup>

One Syrian activist acknowledged that demonstrations are difficult to organize in areas where people do not know each other and, perhaps as a result, do not trust each other.<sup>57</sup> This attitude is common, particularly in Syria, where government repression of protests has proven to be unrelentingly brutal. Protesting is a risky act that can easily result in death. As a result,

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<sup>52</sup>Hugh Macleod and a correspondent in Damascus, "Syria's Young Cyber Activists Keep Protests in View," *The Guardian*, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/15/syria-activists-protests-in-view> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>53</sup>"Local Coordination Committees of Syria", <http://www.lccsyria.org/about> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>54</sup>David Arnold, "SYRIA WITNESS: Stories of Allegiance, Protest and Survival," <http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2012/03/syria-witness-stories-of-allegiance-protest-and-survival-98378/> (accessed November 27, 2013).

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup>*Ibid.*

protesters' social ties are of great importance. Minority groups often have greater levels of interpersonal trust.

A strong predictor of participation in a neighborhood organization is when one resides in the same area as one's close friends or relatives. This relationship provides the strong network ties that encourage and facilitate participation. It makes sense then that areas experiencing fewer protests are unable to unite people because of weaker social ties. In addition to this, context regarding individuals' multiple, simultaneous social ties can also be relevant in their decision to engage in protests. Multiple ties can bring conflict to a person as to whether they should protest or not. The lack of ability to develop true interpersonal relationships through social networking would be so critical for this to work in Syria.

The actions in Syria followed social movement theory but, Syria is still an unresolved situation. Limited political opportunity and the shared frame of the situation amongst the people forced the revolution to occur. Social media and the internet called the people to mobilize their resources for the goal of overthrowing the government and President Assad. The revolution turned violent as rebel groups formed and combated the Syrian military. The people were able to force the government to resign but President Assad remains in power so only half of the people's objective was met.

## Morocco<sup>58</sup>

In the past, protests in Morocco have not been uncommon. However, since inheriting the throne in 1999, King Mohammed VI took a few incremental steps towards political freedom, making him popular among older generations that had experienced Moroccan rule under the previous “tyrant” King Hassan II.<sup>59</sup> Consequently, the majority of protestors were dissatisfied and unemployed youths, demanding a British-style monarchy with only ceremonial powers.<sup>60</sup> Although these changes were not necessarily as radical as the regime overthrows proposed in Tunisia or Egypt, the calls to action nevertheless raised concerns and prompted a quick government response.

The primary organizer of the protests was a youth group called the February 20th Movement. This organization used YouTube and Facebook as its primary means of communication. One of its first posts was a YouTube video that featured several young Moroccans explaining their reasons for joining protests to pursue democratic reform including more opportunities for equality, education and employment.<sup>61</sup> The topic gained some traction on Twitter and Facebook, and the Feb 20 Movement page attracted nearly 1,000 members. Protests began in Casablanca and Rabat on February 20th. Compared to other areas, demonstrations were relatively peaceful. More than 30,000 citizens took to the streets of capital city Rabat to call for

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<sup>58</sup> Dewey et al., *The Impact of Social Media on Social Unrest in the Arab Spring*, 24–25.

<sup>59</sup> Marc Champion, “Morocco Joins In, Defying Predictions,” *The Wall Street Journal*, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703498804576156180408970252> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Morocco Campaign #feb20 #morocco, 2011, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0f6FSB7gxQ&feature=youtube\\_gdata\\_player](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0f6FSB7gxQ&feature=youtube_gdata_player) (accessed November 26, 2013).

political reform, but the crowd quickly dwindled, leaving only a few hundred by evening with little need for police intervention.<sup>62</sup>

The Moroccan government chose to communicate with the Feb 20 Movement via social media, sometimes as a preemptive measure. Three days before the scheduled protests, the Minister of Youth and Sports responded to the campaign with a widely read Facebook post calling for dialogue instead of violence. In his post the Minister also blamed foreign actors for orchestrating the unrests as a way to weaken the country.<sup>63</sup> Pro-government organizations launched social media campaigns urging citizens to stay home. Rumors that the protests were cancelled also began appearing online.<sup>64</sup> Although the movement in Morocco has not reached levels seen in other areas, small-scale demonstrations continued with the help of social media organizers. Despite a relatively widespread use of social media – there are some four million Facebook accounts in a population of 35 million – and Internet penetration amongst roughly half of the population,<sup>65</sup> the future of the movement remains uncertain.

The situation in Morocco appears to be the ideal execution of social movement theory. There was little political opportunity for the young educated population in a country with high unemployment but they had a way to voice their grievances. By viewing the revolutions of other nations the people believed they could effect their own situation in the same manner. Through the use of the internet and social media the people were able to mass their resources under a common

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<sup>62</sup>Lisa Abend, “Protests in Morocco: Just Don’t Call It a Revolution,” *Time*, February 22, 2011, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052901,00.html>. (Accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>63</sup>Laila Lalami, “Arab Uprisings: What the February 20 Protests Tell Us About Morocco,” *The Nation*, February 17, 2011, <http://www.thenation.com/blog/158670/arab-uprisings-what-february-20-protests-tell-us-about-morocco> (accessed November 26, 2013).

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>65</sup>Mohammad Al Abdallah, “In Morocco, Social Media Are the Fifth Estate”, November 11, 2011, <http://ijnet.org/blog/morocco-social-media-are-fifth-estate> (accessed November 26, 2013).

frame. The Moroccan people were able to apply enough pressure on the government to force concessions and remove the king from power.



## ANALYSIS

The revolutions in the above mentioned countries did not occur because of the internet or social media. The internet and social media helped to facilitate these revolutions more quickly. The theory of power law growth explains how these revolutions were able to initiate so quickly through social media. These revolutions were spawned in these countries largely due to the dictatorial governments focused on oppressing the population and maintaining the economic gap between the rich and the poor. Social media and the internet were convenient ways to assist in coordinating and fueling them.

The differences in the outcomes of these revolutions derived particularly from the reactions of the governments in each country. The stricter they attempted to control the internet and social media and impose other rules varied the outcomes. Usually, the leader is removed from power if the government initiates more control and does not make concessions toward the people. Syria does not follow that model and hence are in a civil war.

In Tunisia the government attempted to stifle the organization of the protests and information regarding the severity of the revolution by blocking internet access. It also cracked down on the press by limiting what they could report. These actions attempted to limit the reaction of the population and the rest of the world by not reporting the situation in the country. They were unable to quiet the revolution and reporting because of social media. The citizens used Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to get the word out of their success. The Tunisian government attempted to stop this reporting by trying to hack into personal accounts to obtain passwords so they could report what they wanted to and to find information on those reporting to punish them for doing so. These actions did not deter protestors from rebelling. The passion for their revolt was strong and it did not matter if they had internet access. They were still going to revolt. In the end, the Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was relieved of his position and left the country. Just before his departure Ben Ali declared that "there will be from now on a total

freedom of the press, and a removal of Internet restrictions."<sup>66</sup> There is currently an interim president in Tunisia and instability continues with disputes over the new constitution and ongoing protests calling for better living conditions.<sup>67</sup> The next Tunisian presidential election will occur in 2016.

The revolution in Egypt had the greatest effect on the United States relationship with nations within the region. The challenge for the United States was diplomatic and economic in nature and focused specifically on which faction to support and whether to continue aid to Egypt amidst their crisis. With the ousting of two presidents since the start of the revolution Egypt prove that a democratic process can work within the Middle East.

In contrast to the Egyptian response, the Syrian response continues to greatly affect the region and provide continued interest from the international community. The situation in Syria transformed into a Civil War. The world knew that actions must be taken but disagreed on what actions were most appropriate. Those actions ranged from sanctions to supplying weapons to those in the opposition to preside Assad. There were minor changes that occurred within the government regime. The president, Bashar al-Assad, remained in power defiantly objecting the proposals of his people and the rest of the international community that he should step down. The Syrian cabinet resigned "to help quell a wave of popular fury that erupted"<sup>68</sup> in order to save the country and the embattled leader. The United States and the rest of the international community

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<sup>66</sup>Nancy Scola, "Why Tunisia Is Not a Social-Media Revolution," *The American Prospect*, January 21, 2011, <http://prospect.org/article/why-tunisia-not-social-media-revolution-0> (accessed March 1, 2014).

<sup>67</sup>Primož Manfreda, "Arab Spring Uprisings," About.com Middle East Issues, <http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/tp/Arab-Spring-Uprisings.htm> (accessed March 1, 2014).

<sup>68</sup>"Syrian Cabinet Resigns Amid Political Unrest," Text.Article, *Associated Press*, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/03/29/mass-protests-support-syrias-hard-line-regime-despite-resignation-reports/> (accessed March 9, 2014).

remain adamant that conditions must change within Syria despite the belief of citizens that President Assad should remain in power.<sup>69</sup>

The response in Morocco seems to be a model for how not to needlessly shed blood and inflame unrest as we have seen in many other Arab countries.<sup>70</sup> Morocco initiated constitutional reforms that granted new rights to women and minorities. These reforms were approved by 98 percent of the population that voted on the new constitution.<sup>71</sup> It is yet to be seen how effectively these reforms will be implemented but for now violence and instability in the country has lessened.

The connection between internet use to instability and government reform is an interesting relationship to examine. The usage amount of the internet and social media is a factor in producing instability which forces a government reaction. Social media did not cause the Arab Spring but played a vital role of communication that aids the revolutions in the long run.<sup>72</sup>

The outcomes of these revolutions changed the complex global environment both politically and socially. The relationship between the United States and these countries changed as a result of their revolutions. In some cases the effects are more drastic than others. The United States still stands as a nation that supports democracy and freedom for all people and will continue to maintain a focus on the region due to the opportunity to be a breeding ground for terrorist organizations.

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid.

<sup>70</sup>John Glaser, "Morocco's Peaceful Response to the Arab Spring « Antiwar.com Blog", <http://antiwar.com/blog/2011/07/05/moroccos-peaceful-response-to-the-arab-spring/> (accessed March 1, 2014).

<sup>71</sup>Ibid.

<sup>72</sup>Saleem Kassim, "Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media," *PolicyMic*, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/10642/twitter-revolution-how-the-arab-spring-was-helped-by-social-media> (accessed November 20, 2013).

Table 1.2 below shows the level of social media usage within the countries studied as of January 2012. It also depicts the overall reaction of the government of the studied countries and the overall results of the revolutions in the country. The table suggests that the greater usage of social media in conjunction with a softer response from the government resulted in a more beneficial outcome for the people who revolted. The countries in which governments attempted to implement restrictions and harshly control the use of the internet and social media suffered worse as a result of the revolutions.

Country	Social Media Usage (High or Low)	Government Reaction (Decisive or In-Decisive)	Results (Peaceful or Non-Peaceful)	Regime Change (Yes or No)
Tunisia	High	In-Decisive	Non-Peaceful	Yes
Egypt	High	In-Decisive	Peaceful	Yes
Syria	High	Decisive	Non-Peaceful	No
Morocco	High	In-Decisive	Peaceful	No

Table 1.2 Arab Spring results

The governments of Syria and Morocco each took different approaches to keeping their leaders in power and the current situation in each country is different. In Syria, the president remained while the cabinet resigned. The president then decided to use military action against the groups that opposed him and did not make concessions to the demands against him. This action has led to a civil war within the country. The constant turmoil has drawn the attention of the international community which attempted to intervene diplomatically. Fortunately the violence remained within the borders of Syria but the neighboring countries have to deal with a large number of refugees.

The government of Morocco, on the other hand, made concessions to the demands of the people. By not attempting to control the internet and social media, making a referendum to the constitution, and putting it to a vote, the Moroccan king was able to keep his power. This showed the people that the government's willingness to adapt. The concessions made by the government appeased the people, quelled the violence, and allowed the monarchy to remain in power.

The relationships seen during the Arab Spring can be viewed similarly to the trinity that Carl Von Clausewitz developed through his theory of total war which is discussed in his famous book *On War*.<sup>73</sup> Clausewitz describes the trinity as being a constant pull in an attempt to achieve balance in war between reason, passion, and chance. The reason comes from the government. The passion derives from the people. Chance is from the military. In the Arab Spring the breakdown was the same except the reason and the passion had other tools to use, the internet and social media. In the countries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco the people used social media well to amp up their protests. The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt ended with regime change. The governments did not make any concessions to the people's demands so the leaders were removed from office. The new regimes implemented improvements for the people. In Morocco the government decided to concede and make the changes demanded so a regime change did not occur. Syria is a different case because despite the efforts of the people the dictatorial leader continued to oppress the people and that is why the country is still involved in a civil war.

The above paragraphs show how social media and the internet tie into social movement theory. All of the studied revolutions shared a common frame amongst their people. The people understood the problems they faced and the tools at their disposal to try and change their situation. In all of the countries there was not an opportunity for the common people to effectively participate in government. With no political opportunity and a shared frame, the people in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco mobilized the resources they had with the help of social media and the internet. The theory of why social movements occur is sound. Social media and the internet are just a facilitator to the speed and success of a movement.

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<sup>73</sup>Carl Von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

## RECOMMENDATIONS

There are a myriad of options the United States can use to intervene in countries where revolutions have occurred and domestic instability is on the rise. Those options focus on two very broad actions. They are either to support the current government or to give support to the opposition of the current government. The proposed options are primarily military in nature. The options consist of Special Operations Forces (SOF), their capabilities, and expertise working in unstable environments. Timing is another factor in determining which option to use. Whether to intervene at the beginning of the revolution when the situation is still relatively calm or after the revolution is in full swing and domestic instability is running rampant assists in determining which action to take and which side to support. The actions and tables below will show support to the host nation government and the opposition in both timings listed above and the risks associated with each option.

Intervention will greatly affect an environment. The greatest impact as it pertains to social movement theory is to framing and mobilization of resources. The United States military possesses additional resources. This changes the framing of the situation.

Option one provides support to the host nation government at the beginning of the revolution. Depending on the relationship with and governmental goals toward the nation in question, this option appears to be the most straight forward option for the United States to undertake. The structure, mechanisms, and foundations of a government already exist as does the relationship between the United States and the nation being supported. This action consists of providing network analysis teams, intelligence collection, and counter terrorism training. Network analysis in conjunction with intelligence collection provides the government the information necessary to remain ahead of the opposition. It determines who the opposition leaders and key supporters are, what the goals of the opposition are, and how the opposition is organized, coordinates, and operates. By determining this information the government can counter the

revolution with its own themes and messages and develop plans to counter the opposition. Counter terrorism training improves the capacity of the government to target key opposition supporters and organizers. Targeting these individuals and their means of support diminishes the hope of the opposition for the revolution's success. The risk of intervening is low because the existing relationship with the nation allows for easier access. The risk associated with executing option one is high if the revolution is not diminished. The opposition could potentially get stronger in response to the government. International perception for the host nation government and the United States is at risk if both are seen as the bad guy in the conflict.

Option two provides support to the opposition at the beginning of the revolution. This is similar to conducting unconventional warfare and starting an insurgency within the host nation. By providing the opposition with additional network capabilities to allow them to coordinate and tell their story. Instead of providing weapons and training to form a guerilla type army, technology and the training associated with it will be provided. This action would be conducted if the host nation government is clearly seen as not supporting the population, unable to provide for the basic needs, and is not currently an ally of the United States. This would occur in a nation with a more dictatorial type of government. A risk for this option is that the United States does not know the full intentions of the opposition. By siding with a group that intends to establish an authoritarian regime after gaining power, has ties to terrorist organizations, and plans to establish the country as a safe haven for terrorist do not side well with American intentions.

Providing support to the host nation government during a revolution is option three. The actions taken by the United States are generally the same as in option one. If opposition violence increases then United States intervention appears more justified by coming to the aid of a nation in trouble. The opportunity is that the host nation is able to handle most of the burden of quelling the revolution prior to United States involvement. A risk to this option is that it becomes harder to enter the country because of the violence and that the opposition has gained more control.

The fourth option provides support to the opposition during a revolution. Pursuit of this option hinges on the brutality and violence enforced by the host nation government as a result of the revolution. If the host nation government increases hostilities against the people then international perception of United States action is seen favorable as supporting the people against a dictatorial government. United States actions would be similar to those of option two. A risk for this option is that events have destabilized the country so much that it takes more time and forces to correct the wrongdoings. An opportunity is that the United States is able to determine the true intentions of the opposition force so that there are minimal questions toward their goals following obtaining power.

A risk that is common with all four options is that the wrong side is supported. The potential is for the winning side to not improve conditions for the people and make the situation worse. This could enhance instability within the host nation and the region which effects international security. It also unfavorably depicts the democratic process and shows that revolutions are the way to make changes within other nations. By supporting the side that does not improve the situation the United States could be forced to intervene again to improve the situation. There is also the risk of damaging United States credibility by supporting the wrong side of the revolution.

The tables below depict options one through four and the recommendation of this paper to choose either option three or option four. Table 1.3 shows the United States not providing support to the host nation government or to the opposition at the beginning of the revolution. Table 1.4 shows support provided to either party during the revolution.

	United States Support	Risk
Host Nation Government (Option 1)	No	Low
Opposition (Option 2)	No	High

Table 1.3 United States support at the beginning of the revolution



	United States Support	Risk
Host Nation Government (Option 3)	Yes	Medium
Opposition (Option 4)	Yes	High

Table 1.4 United States support during the revolution

Any United States action will dramatically affect the situation in the region. The results will change the make-up of the global environment and start in motion the causes of the next potential conflict. The recommendation of this paper is option three as long as area of the revolution is vital to the strategic goals of the United States, the relationship with the host nation is strong, and the host nation welcomes United States support. If the revolting area is within a location where the United States wants to see change then the recommendation of this paper is to execute option four. Both options allow for the situation to develop and determine if United States intervention is required. If the area is not vital to United States strategic goals then intervention will not occur.

## CONCLUSION

There are a number of factors that cause revolutions which lead to domestic instability and change the already complex operational environment like the Arab Spring did. The revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco did not start overnight. The causes of these revolutions were born over many years of dictatorial government control oppressing the people, not providing for their basic needs, and the economic disparity gap between the elites and the normal population. A tool that aided the vastness of these revolutions was the use of social media and the internet. Social media tools like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube allowed protestors to discuss what they were going to do, inform the world of their actions, and show the world their successes.<sup>74</sup> These tools helped fuel the revolution but were by no means the cause of the revolution. Social media helped enhance and grow the protests and spread their events across the globe which garnishes international support to the cause. It also strengthens the resolve or encourages other countries that are either in the midst of their own revolution or considering a revolution themselves.

Social media does not start revolutions but plays a large role in coordinating them and fueling domestic instability. Maximum usage of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube assists in more successful revolutions because more people become involved and the revolutionary story is able to be told across the world. Telling the story gains support throughout the international community. Support can come in the form of sanctions against the government, monetary support, humanitarian aid, weapons, other military equipment, or just verbal support for their cause whether it is allowing women to vote, improving economic disparity, or complete overthrow of the government.

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<sup>74</sup>TJ Waters, "Social Media and the Arab Spring," *Small Wars Journal* (November 14, 2012), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/social-media-and-the-arab-spring> (accessed March 15, 2014).

As seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, the use of social media has a greater effect on domestic stability within developing countries and those with governments seen as being oppressive towards the people. When people stand up for their rights it provides a potential opportunity for terrorist organizations to build up within a country. This possibility applies pressure against the rest of the world. The reactions of the governments to the protests coordinated through social media and other means determines the success of these revolutions. If the reactions are proportionate to the demands of the people then it is harder for terrorist organizations to gain a foothold in the country. If the government reaction is too harsh the potential for terrorist organizations to gain a foothold is more likely. The government reaction also effects stability of the country and determines if the regime remains in power. Generally a stricter and more forceful reaction decreases stability and result in loss of power from the regime and eventually a regime change. The United States military, specifically the Army, must continue to look at ways to use social media to defeat potential adversaries due to these uprisings and to defeat the enemy in the current fight. By properly observing social media within countries with increased instability, the United States military will be able to anticipate potential planning efforts. It will also allow the United States to support international partners with intelligence against potential adversaries of global democracy. The Army must also use social media to tell its story and message the global community which positions itself in a greater position of relative advantage.<sup>75</sup>

It is easier today to fuel the causes of domestic instability through the use of social movement theory and social media. Social media provides the ability to coordinate actions and tell a story. How well either the government or the opposition movement does that aids in determining the outcome of the revolution. The future is unknown but social media will play a

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<sup>75</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

significant role in defining the direction that it takes.

### Proposals for Future Study

Domestic instability, the internet, and social media will remain a constant in the global environment and will not disappear in the near future. These items will continue to add to the complexity of the environment. Below are some research recommendations within these topics:

1. What are specific actions can the United States military take to incorporate social media in predicting future potential operations?
2. How does domestic instability within third world nations affect the United States military?
3. In what order should the factors that affect domestic instability be addressed to improve the situation?
4. What is the likelihood of an Arab Spring like revolution to occur within the United States that has a dramatic effect on the entire nation?
5. Is social movement theory still valid due to the rise of social media?

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