

PETITE GUERRE: BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE
COOK, COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ARIZONA, APPLICATION OF SMALL WAR
DOCTRINE AGAINST THE APACHE 1870-1873

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

PETITE GUERRE: BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE COOK, COMMANDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ARIZONA, APPLICATION OF SMALL WAR DOCTRINE AGAINST THE APACHE 1870-1873, by MAJ Stephen P. Snyder, 52 pages.

In 1871, Brigadier General George Crook, commander of the Department of Arizona, executed a campaign against the Apache Indian that adapted U.S. Army small war doctrine to defeat the ardent Apache. Crook understood the political, societal, and military factors that contributed to the regional instability in Arizona. Crook's campaign combined the efforts of the Department of the Interiors Bureau of Indian Commissioners with the War Departments military forces to achieve pacification of the Apache. Militarily, he determined that the Apaches' strength was their mobility. Their operations depended on access to mountainous safe havens to sustain offensive operations. Crook reformed his cavalry to operate as small mobile strike forces capable of independent action. He enhanced his intelligence capability by incorporating the use of Apache scouts. He adopted all weather campaigning to exploit the Apaches' winter encampments and destroy their logistic base. Simultaneously, Crook embraced collaboration with the Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Commissioners to the assist in achieving the political aims of assimilation. In 1873, the Apache realized resistance was untenable and capitulated to the U.S. government's desires. From 1871-1873, Crook applied the tenets of contemporary counter insurgency tactics to achieve operational success. His military campaign in Arizona demonstrates the necessity for a combined civilian military approach to achieve success in low intensity conflicts. The experiences from the Army's campaigns in Arizona demonstrate the enduring requirements needed for military forces to be successful against an irregular adversary. Further, recent lessons in contemporary counter insurgency conflicts against non-state actors continue to demonstrate the need to maintain an adaptive and agile military force capable of defeating an enemy in a complex environment. Over 143 years ago, Brig. Gen. George Crook demonstrated an innovative campaign strategy that combined defeat mechanisms to dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate hostiles with the stability mechanisms to compel and influence the Apache to accept U.S. assimilation efforts. This monograph argues that Brig. Gen. Crook's campaign strategy and expert execution of military tactics led to strategic success against an irregular adversary in the Apache Wars from 1870-1873 in Arizona.

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INTRODUCTION

No one starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without being clear in his mind, what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is a political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort of which is required, and makes its influence felt down to the smallest detail.¹

- Clausewitz, *On War*

In October 1871, Captain Gerald Russell of the Third U.S. Cavalry, Department of Arizona, followed the trail of fifteen Apache raiders into the Horseshoe Canyon, Chiricahua Mountains, in the Arizona Territory. He was in command of twenty-five cavalymen and Apache Indian scouts. His mission was to pursue, find, and destroy the raiders. As the hours passed, Russell and his Indian scouts followed numerous false trails devised by their adversaries. Frustrated and determining that his men and horses needed water to continue the pursuit, he ordered a reconnaissance in force to find a waterhole to replenish his stores and reform his columns. Unbeknownst to Russell, for the past six hours, the Apache was baiting him into an ambush. The Apaches had reversed their direction of march, moved into the mountains overlooking the waterhole and set a circular ambush around the waterhole. When the cavalymen arrived at the waterhole, the Apache launched an ambush. The fighting continued into the night and ended when Russell led his forces escape under cover of darkness. Russell sustained two soldiers killed in action and several wounded. The Apache raiders achieved their operational objective using the ambush to stop the cavalry pursuit.²

¹Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. by Peter Paret, and Michael Howard 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 128.

²Peter Cozzens, *The Struggle for Apacheria, Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865-1870* (Mechanicsburg: Stockpole Books, 2001), xviii. The Apache would attack and seek to withdrawal rapidly in order to maintain the ability to continue to destroy pursuing forces. The Gadsden Treaty of 1854 established that the US was responsible for protecting Mexico's border from Apache incursion. The War Department became the responsible agency for this task.

The military campaigns in the Arizona from 1870 thru 1873 were a series of small war operations conducted by the U.S. Army against an irregular combatant. The military's primary objective was to assist the government with the assimilation of indigenous tribes by defeating hostiles that were impeding the Department of the Interiors efforts. The Army's offensive operations were necessary to set the conditions to enable the U.S. government's national aims of western civilian emigration. The Apaches' armed resistance against the government created numerous pressures on the executive branch. Regionally, Mexico deplored the repeated Apache infringement into northern Mexico.³ Ineffectual civilian and military execution of national policy led to a degraded security situation that compelled the federal government to increase military efforts to create stability within the region. The situation in Arizona created a perpetual cycle of violence composed of raids, murder, and reprisals conducted by both civilian settlers and the Apache.⁴ The sensitive nature of the conflict caused the executive branch to place the military in a supporting role to the Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Commissioners. The Army focused its efforts on a series of small war campaigns against hostiles with the goal to; suppress insurrection activities, establish order through civilian and military means, and ultimately force the adversary to embrace a western culture.⁵ The small war campaigns in Arizona that followed the Civil War created an ambiguous operating environment for the government and required the military to increase stability to assist the implementation of an effective reservation system. The

³Robert Watt, *Apache Tactics 1830-1886* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2012), 35.

⁴US Board of Indian Commissioners. *Peace with the Apaches of New Mexico and Arizona. Report from Vincent Colyer, member of the Board of Indian Commissioners 1871*, (Tucson: Territorial Press, 1964).

⁵Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*, 2nd ed. (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1998), 5. Birtle describes the actions of western Army forces as constabulary service composed of a conventional US Army force conducting pacification, security, and governance tasks with civilian agencies. The Army termed the type of operations Small Wars. Small Wars were interchangeable with counter-guerrilla or unconventional warfare against the Indian.

complexity of the situation placed Army commanders in a position that mandated; balancing socio-political external influences requiring limited use of force, develop a means of fighting that defeated the adversary, ensure security efforts to enhanced industrial aims, while concurrently relocating the Apache to a reservation system.⁶

The War Department's subordinate combat elements within Arizona were constrained by external and internal factors that limited the conduct of military operations. The government and the military faced divergent socio-political pressures from eastern humanitarians that sought a civilian answer to hostilities. Conversely, southwestern territory politicians desired a purely military lethal approach of extermination to mitigate threats to the civilian populace and increase economic development. The American public, war weary in the aftermath of the Civil War, did not support full-scale war against the Indian and developed a perception that the problems in Arizona were a humanitarian issue rather than a military one. The post-Civil War drawdown affected the military's ability to project enough force to achieve the prescribed military goals. The Army's training and doctrine prepared forces to operate against a uniformed adversary using combined arms warfare and lacked a codified doctrine that was needed to fight an irregular adversary. The focus of Army doctrine in the late 1870's was to conduct conventional operations against a uniformed adversary through the combination of cavalry, infantry, and artillery to defeat an enemy at a defined decisive point on a contiguous battlefield. However, the requirements for Indian pacification did not include a fixed decisive point and the area of operations prevented the use of combined arms maneuver to achieve tactical success. Formal education and training for

⁶Robert Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and Indian 1866-1891*, 2nd ed. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 6. Utley describes the strained relationship between the Department of the Interior Indian agents and the military. Routinely, the Indian agents made treaties with the Apache that did not take into account military security concerns. The bureaucratic strife further exacerbated pacification implementation within Arizona.

conducting small war operations was limited to rudimentary ethics classes at the United States Military Academy and ill-prepared graduates to fight in the western frontier.⁷ Frontier Army forces used the experience of veterans to establish tactics and standard operating procedures to fight the Indian. In 1868, Congress mandated the establishment of the Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Commissioners to be the primary federal agency responsible for all Indian policies.⁸ For southwest pacification efforts, the War Department took a supporting role in execution of the policy. Political influences and the public's desire for limited military operations forced the military to operate within a perplexing framework defined by divergent political agendas from the War Department and the Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Commissioners. The deteriorating security situation forced President Ulysses Grant to refocus efforts to increase security in the southwest through military intervention. Grant sought to improve the failing Indian assimilation policies by empowering the Bureau of Indian Commissioners to implement the reservation system while the Army provided the military means to influence the Indian to accept assimilation.⁹

American pacification of the western tribes in the late 1800s by the United States demonstrates the need to understand to the complexities involved in conducting limited military actions to mitigate hostilities and create stability in areas of national interest. To achieve the

⁷Birtle, 13. Officers at West Point learned small war doctrine in ethics classes. In 1835, Superintendent Mahan introduced the small war curriculum to officers. However, the focus of officer education was on fighting conventional wars against a uniformed enemy.

⁸Bill Yenne, *Indian Wars the Campaign for the American West* (Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2006), 310. In 1835, the War Department controlled all Indian affairs based on their military operations and interaction with the Native American while conducting constabulary duties. After the Civil War in 1868, Congress transferred responsibility to the Department of Interior Bureau of Indian Commissioners. The transfer occurred due to differing political views on how to implement a reservation system and develop a peaceful way to assist in government pacification goals. Throughout the late 1860's, the War Department repeatedly requested that Indian affairs be placed under their control.

⁹Birtle, 82.

political directives for pacification, the Department of the Interior and the War Department were required to; understand the issues preventing assimilation, explore ways to establish rule of law and governance during conflict, while simultaneously ensuring the application of measured force with diplomatic efforts achieved political directives. Prior research by military historians, suggests that the government's success in subjugating the American Indian was the result of years of successful military actions that rendered the American Indian's resistance untenable. However, leading historians on the subject of western frontier warfare, Charles Robinson, Robert Utley, Andrew Birtle, and others assert; that the campaigns against the Apache provide the scholar with an increased understanding of the military, political, and diplomatic complexities involved in small war operations.¹⁰ The study of the western campaigns in the Arizona provides significant lessons in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Specifically, governments intending to conduct small wars for the attainment of national security aims must ensure that civil-military coordination occurs during all phases of a campaign. Moreover, the government must understand the impacts of military intervention on the attainment of specified aims. The planning and execution of small war operations must account for the military tasks that assist in the development of a fair government for the subjugated, that provides essential cultural considerations with economic and educational reforms to uplift less developed people.¹¹ Institutionally, the government and military must maintain the ability to have a military establishment capable of adapting to different types of warfare and military governance during post conflict.

¹⁰Charles Robinson, *General Crook and the Western Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001). Robinson, Birtle, and Utley significantly contributed to the study of the Indian, western military operations, and social context that surrounded the United States western expansion.

¹¹Dan Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 6.

From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the Apache had resisted multiple attempts of assimilation, extermination, and subjugation from the Spanish, Mexicans, Catholic missionaries, and civilian settlers.¹² The failed subjugation attempts assisted the Apache to develop a warrior culture based on resistance and survival through tactical action. The Apache's goal was to maintain tribal ideologies and unrestricted freedom of maneuver on tribal lands free from governmental pressure. The Apache warrior culture created a warrior that was an expert at fighting in austere environments, understood the use of irregular tactics to render a numerically superior force vulnerable, and possessed an intrinsic warrior ideology that defeated all previous foreign invaders.¹³ Simply, the Apache was a lethal adversary that combined a cultural warrior methodology of fighting, with expert tactical application, to ensure that no entity, state or civilian, would ever be successful at pacification.¹⁴ In 1869, instability in Arizona forced the U.S. government to address the Apache Indians hostile actions through U.S. military intervention.

By the 1860's , the United States had conducted wars against various Indian tribes that spanned two centuries of intermittent conflict comprised of both success and failure. In the west, the Army protected settlers, non-hostile Indians, travel routes, and provided rudimentary governance to undeveloped areas.¹⁵ The increase in western emigration in the southwest resulted in a burgeoning population growth and an increased the requirement for the Army to provide

¹²Watt, 4. Apacheria was the name used to describe modern day New Mexico and Arizona. In 1870, the US government referred to Apacheria as the Arizona Territory or Arizona. The local government had an elected governor for the territory. For the remainder of this paper Apacheria will be replaced by Arizona.

¹³Thrapp, 1.

¹⁴Ibid., 2.

¹⁵Robert Utley, *Frontiersman in Blue the United States Army and the Indian 1848-1865*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 5.

security against Apache raids.¹⁶ The post American-Mexican War annexation of Arizona under the Gadsden Treaty in 1854 increased the need to prevent the Apache from conducting cross border raids into Mexico.¹⁷ The treaty, combined with military enforcement of the borders reprisals reinforced the Apache's perception that his cultural survival was in question. The Apache found themselves geographically confined by Mexico and the United States.

By 1870, the Department of the Interior established numerous treaties with the Apache in an attempt peacefully move all Indians to reservations where they were to be educated, civilized, and converted to Christianity.¹⁸ The discovery of natural resources in Apache tribal lands resulted in an influx of miners that disrupted the Indians nomadic lifestyle. The government attempted to appease the Apache by making treaties that were ultimately broken due to new mineral discovery. The failed treaties and constant forced movement eroded the Apaches' trust in the government and increased their hostile actions. The desire for mineral extraction placed docile Apaches at the whim of the government and resulted in no effective Indian reservations in Arizona. The

¹⁶House Committee on Department of War, *Record of Engagements with Hostile Indians within the Military Division of Missouri from 1868 thru 1882*, 47th Cong., 2d sess., 1882, H. Rep. 37, 1. The annual reports from the War Department from 1868 thru the 1880s show an increasing level of violence conducted by the Apache against military and civilians that caused the executive branch to increase military forces within the Department of Missouri's Arizona area of operations. This area in Arizona was later designated a separate department and commanded by George Crook.

¹⁷Thrapp, 7.

¹⁸David Roberts, *Once They Moved Like the Wind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 84. The titles of; Peace commissioners, Indian agents, Department of the Interior Indian commissioners, are interchangeable throughout official documents and secondary sources. All are used to describe the civilian agents of the government that were dispatched under direction of President Grant to go to Arizona to make treaties with the hostile Apache through non-lethal means in an effort to mitigate hostilities and enable pacification. For this monograph, the two primary commissioners assigned to Arizona to make treaties with the Apache were Vincent Colyer and O.O.Howard. Both men interacted with Brig. Gen. Crook and both men, from 1870-1873 on several occasions suspended Crook's plans for offensive operations under the orders of the executive branch in an attempt to resolve the Apache hostilities. The suspension of Crooks offensive operations led to the continuation of Apache attacks.

Department of the Interiors Bureau of Indian Commissioners failed to develop an effective reservation system as an alternative for the Apache Indian nomadic lifestyle. To appease political desires the Indian Commissioners hastily implemented reservations in areas where cultural assimilation was untenable based on lack of agrarian essentials.¹⁹ Their failed understanding and haste created an inverse effect on the situation that further perpetrated instability. Antagonism between Apaches and citizens increased and manifested itself into a series of reoccurring massacres. Deteriorating conditions created fissures between cultures, ideologies, and the civilian and military organizations charged with pacification. In April 1870, hostile Indians killed seven civilians and vigilante Arizonians conducted a mass murder reprisal killing 117 innocent Indians.²⁰ The massacre at Camp Grant resulted in public outcry for military intervention to achieve security. Following the Massacre, acting Arizona territory Governor Anson Stafford, demanded that President Grant remove the current military commander and give command of the Arizona Territory to a known “Indian Fighter,” Lieutenant Colonel George Crook.²¹

By 1870, Lt. Col. Crook had accumulated an impressive thirteen-year combat record against uniformed adversaries and Indians. His initial assignment after graduating from the United States Military Academy in 1852 took him to the northwest. In the northwest, Crook experienced the complexities of constabulary service in both Oregon and Idaho. His command provided security for governmental exploratory expeditions from the current day Midwest to the

¹⁹Yenne, 114.

²⁰Roberts, 74.

²¹House Committee on Department of War, *Army Adjutant General's Office, Adjutant General to the Secretary of War, promotion of Lieutenant Colonel George Crook to Brevet Rank of Brigadier General, May 1871*, 42d Cong., 1st sess., 1871, H. Rep. 54, 1. Crook's promotion orders are in the National Archives, Adjutant General's Office, Letterbook, 54. The president promoted Crook ahead of his peers and replaced the acting commander Brig. Gen. Stoneman. He assumed the duties as Department of Arizona Commander.

Pacific.²² His pre-Civil War service created a foundation in understanding all aspects of the Indian. He learned the uniqueness of differing tribal distinctions, and developed an understanding of the reasons why the Indians resisted government incursion.²³ His military tasks allowed him to see the tactical employment of Indian style tactics to defeat Army forces. The experience in the northwest provided him with an understanding that humanity was essential in pacification in order to prevent the government and civilian from adopting an extermination approach. While in the northwest, he observed numerous atrocities and inhumane treatment of the Indian. He surmised that assimilation of the Indian would require hard military campaigning to break their resistance and government over watch to allow a primitive people to co-exist in American society.²⁴ Crook prepared his forces for small war combat. He became a student of the Indian's tactics and culture. During the Civil War, he commanded a Union infantry brigade and fought from Appomattox to Shiloh.²⁵ In both Indian campaigns and the Civil War, he understood the need to study the enemy, understand the method by which he employed his forces, and how a commander must balance the myriad of external influences that affect military operations. In April 1870, Crook received a promotion to brevet Brigadier General based on his combat experience, merit, and his successful combat record. He took command of the newly formed military district Department of Arizona. How did Brig. Gen. George Crook, commander of the Department of Arizona, develop and incorporate a campaign strategy that combined the efforts of

²²Charles Robinson, *General Crook and the Western Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 17.

²³Martin F. Schmitt, *General George Crook His Autobiography*, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), xii.

²⁴Robinson, 17.

²⁵Birtle, 83.

the Departments of Interior and War Department to achieve the national aims of assimilating the Apache through the application of military force?

Brig. Gen. George Crook developed an understanding of the factors contributing to the Arizona military operating environment. He visualized a campaign that incorporated civilian efforts to compel the Apache to subjugate, with military operations to isolate and disintegrate hostile forces through military action. He increased his forces operational reach to strike the Apache's base of operations. During post-conflict operations, Crook used his forces to assist the Department of the Interior by developing education and agriculture programs for the Apache.²⁶ His efforts protected the Apache against civilian reprisals while simultaneously empowering the Indian to develop skills necessary for survival. His strategy, execution, and application of small war doctrine directly attributed to successful Apache pacification.²⁷

Crook's campaign framework focused on the use of Indian scouts to enhance his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to "find, follow, and defeat" the enemy in their safe havens.²⁸ He reformed his cavalry to be self-sustaining which increased his ability to conduct continuous operations. His command vision and tactical execution mitigated the enemy's mobility and gave his subordinate elements an increased tactical advantage.²⁹ Crook's forces conducted all-weather operations to penetrate Indian safe havens and support zones, which degraded their logistical support. Crook summarized his campaign strategy in his 1870 guidance to his forces,

Indians should be induced to surrender in all cases where possible; where they prefer to fight. They will get all the fighting they want, and in one good dose instead of a number of petty

²⁶Schmitt, 173.

²⁷Cozzens, xxiii.

²⁸Birtle, 85.

²⁹Roberts, 123.

engagements, but in either case they will be hunted down until the last one in hostility has been killed or captured. Every effort should be made to avoid the killing of women and children. Prisoners of either sex should be guarded from ill treatment of any kind. When prisoners can be induced to enlist as scouts, they should be so enlisted, because the wilder the Apache is, the more likely he is to know the wiles and stratagems of those still in the mountains, their hiding places and intentions. No excuse is to be accepted for leaving the trail; if horses play out, the enemy must be followed on foot, and no sacrifice should be left untried to make the campaign, short, sharp, and decisive.³⁰

Crook received orders from the War Department to apply measured force to defeat hostiles that were preventing the Department of the Interior's efforts.³¹ His mission had multiple sub objectives consisting of; supporting the Bureau of Indian Commissioners treaty enforcement, providing security for civilians and Apaches, and assisting the Department of the Interior with the implementation a reservation system, and military governance.³² Crook's campaign design reflects the effective combination of civil-military integration, a unique understanding of the enemy's desires and needs, and an innovative approach to defeat an adversary through the combination of military force and governance to achieve national security goals.

³⁰Robinson, 127. In November 1871, Crook had transitioned his command to enhance the capability to conduct extended operations into the Apaches mountainous zone of operations. He expressed to his soldiers that when intelligence led them to a trail of Apache hostiles they would follow it until they had destroyed the enemy or the Apache surrendered.

³¹John Bourke, *The Diaries of John Gregory Bourque November 20, 1872 thru July 28, 1876*, 2nd ed. (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2003), 19. In his diaries, Bourke captures official correspondence between Crook and his higher headquarters specifically cited is his correspondence with AAG, MilDivPac. *Crook Report to the Army Adjutant General, Military Division of the Pacific, November 1872* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1876). Bourke captures Crook's response to higher headquarters about going on the offensive against hostiles to create stability in the area of operations. John Bourke served as Crook's aide to camp and adjutant during 1869 -1888. His diaries are a first person account of Crook's operations consisting of orders, official letters from the War Department, Department of Indian Affairs, President Grant's correspondence, and numerous other entities. He wrote two volumes containing his experiences as a member of Crook's Staff and his original diaries are currently located in the United States Military Academy's historical archives.

³²Birtle, 85.

THE ARIZONA OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The Apache's resistance against pacification forced the United States to devote economic, military, and political resources to achieve political assimilation aims. The cost of the Apache pacification efforts was 5000 American lives, thousands of dollars in property, and an estimated thirty eight million dollars between 1862 and 1871.³³ The mission in Arizona required the use of military force to subjugate hostiles while working within the resource constrained War Department. In 1870, Arizona encompassed an area spanning from current day Arizona to the northern tip of Mexico's Sonora and Chihuahua regions.³⁴ The terrain consisted of arid deserts, mineral rich mountainous terrain, and high rocky plains.³⁵ The inhabitants of the area were a nomadic tribe who referred to themselves as *Dine*, or "the people".³⁶ Mexican soldiers coined the name Apache to describe the hostile bands of fighters ranging from Arizona to Mexico.³⁷ The Apache had formed a culture defined by near constant war founded on survival through fighting. They had a history of successfully defeating all attempts of removal and extermination by the Spanish colonists, the Mexican Army, other tribes, and civilian settlers from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. They successfully fought a protracted fifty-year war that disintegrated the Spanish Presidio system in 1831 and effectively defeated a colonial power's intentions of conquering the Native Americans.³⁸ The subjugation attempts further reinforced a

³³Cozzens, xviii. The report from Indian agent John P. Clum to the Department of Interior outlines the complexity of reservation implementation in an unstable security environment.

³⁴Thrapp, 6.

³⁵Thomas Farish, *History of Arizona* (San Francisco: The Filmer Brothers Electrotpe, 1915), 7.

³⁶Thrapp, 8.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., 9.

warrior culture that emphasized the generational development of warriors to preserve their existence.³⁹ The Apache excelled at controlling the tempo of the battle through tactical expertise, deception, command of the terrain, and superior execution of the ambush. He used the ambush as a means to cripple a superior forces momentum by targeting horses, officers, and lead scout elements. The ambush allowed the Apache to gain the tactical advantage in any situation. His tactics increased his operational options to avoid decisive engagement with superior forces.⁴⁰

The Apache trained its forces to attack a superior force by using safe havens and dismounted operations to retain the tactical advantage. Additionally, he exploited the Bureau of Indian Commissioners Indian agents and the War Departments military commanders by feinting appeasement to subjugation to by time and space for offensive operations.⁴¹ By 1870, the Apache had been fighting years of intermittent engagements against the government's efforts to occupy their territory. The Apache goals were to dissuade American efforts through a protracted campaign through a war of attrition that would exhaust Americans will to continue pacification efforts.⁴²

By 1868, the government under the direction of the Grant administration continued to be plagued with the need to develop a policy to address the movement of indigenous tribes living in the southwest.⁴³ From the late 1820s, the American public and elected officials were unable to

³⁹Bourke, 19.

⁴⁰Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 19.

⁴¹House Committee on US Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Difficulty with the Indian Tribes*, 41st Cong., 2d sess., 1870, H. Rep. 1, serial 1014, 1. The 1870 annual report describes an increase in hostile Indian attacks within the Department of Arizona.

⁴²Birtle, 84.

⁴³Robert Wooster, *The American Military Frontiers* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 201.

ascertain the most effective way to humanely civilize the indigenous people of the country to allow emigration to the west. In 1848, at the repeated requests of the Treasury Secretary Robert Walker, the Indian Bureau was detached from the War Department, transformed to the Department of the Interior, and charged as the lead to develop a process to assimilate the native population.⁴⁴ However, the creation of the new department added bureaucracy to the pacification strategy and slowed implementation. Military leaders continued to stress the need for resources and an increased force structure to support security missions on the frontier. In 1853, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis stressed, “in less than half a century the national domain and Indian population had doubled, the white population had increased to eighteen million, while the peacetime strength of the Army remained under ten thousand.”⁴⁵ Advocates of troop increases like Senator George Badger argued, “if we have a nation embracing half a continent, internal and external frontiers to defend; a nation stretching from ocean to ocean, we must necessarily multiply our military means to meet the emergency we have assumed.”⁴⁶ Conversely, the Department of the Interior argued that the United States was not a war with the Indian and the official policy determined a peaceful solution therefore, increases in troop strength were not required.⁴⁷ General Sherman summarized the lack of military resources and its potential impact on pacification attempts in his appeal to Congress, “to not diminish the military establishment any further. If enough troops are not available, I believe the condition of things could result in

⁴⁴Ibid., 202.

⁴⁵Utley, *Frontiersman In Blue*, 247.

⁴⁶House Committee on Department of War, *Annual Report of the Secretary of War to Congress*, 33d Cong., 2d sess., 1855, H. Rep. 32, pt. 11.

⁴⁷Wooster, 206.

amounting anarchy.”⁴⁸ While the government continued to struggle with an approach, hostilities continued. Throughout the late 1860’s, politics drove decisions, atrocities among Indian and whites increased; military reductions decreased the forces available in the west to twenty five thousand troops, and Apache continued armed resistance efforts against civilian encroachment.⁴⁹

In 1869, the instability within the region made the executive, legislative, and public agree that the military must intervene to stabilize the situation. However, the military lacked a singular codified doctrine to conduct small war operations. Their previous constabulary duty experience dictated that pacification required military elements capable of governance, security, and when required peacekeeping type duties. The military goal was to conduct concurrent operations to capitalize on gains of security operations to mitigate the organizational weaknesses of both the War Department and Department of the Interior to enhance to achieve a common end state.”⁵⁰

The Apache’s hostilities in Arizona created an international dilemma with Mexico. President Grant received increased regional pressures by the Mexican Government to stop cross border Apache atrocities and adhere to the United States responsibilities outlined in the post-Mexican American War Gadsden Treaty of 1854. The treaty stated that, “the Apache savage tribes will be under the control of the U.S. government and whose incursions into Mexico shall be

⁴⁸John Marszalek, *Sherman A Soldiers Passion for Order*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), 13. William T. Sherman, *Report of the General of the Army to the Secretary of War*, November 20, 1869, US serial set, no. 1412.

⁴⁹Marszalek, 378. As early as 1886, General Sherman expressed his dislike of having a separate federal department responsible for Indian Affairs. Sherman routinely remarked to his civilian leadership that to develop stability within the southwest military forces needed to be increased and allowed to conduct offensive operations to systematically break the will of all hostile tribes.

⁵⁰Ibid.,391. Though Sherman opposed the War Departments’ supporting role to the Department of Interior’s Indian Commissioners, he continued to seek all avenues available to improve the relationship between the departments in an effort to assist his subordinate commanders’ mission of supporting assimilation. On numerous occasions, Sherman asked Congress and the executive branch for an increase in troops in the western area of operations.

forcibly restrained, in order to preserve the Mexican sovereignty”⁵¹ The Mexican government’s demands required the Army to increase border security to protect Mexican sovereignty from Apache cross border raids. Additionally, the President faced a need to increase security west of the Mississippi to entice western emigration. Western expansion was encouraged through the passing of Homestead Act of 1862. The act enticed emigration by stating that a family would receive 160 acres of land after cultivating it for five years.⁵² Unfortunately, for Grant and the War Department the act came into direct confrontation with the Apache Indians desire to stay autonomous in the southwest.

The Apache reacted to civilian encroachment by increasing civilian attacks and raiding settlements. Public outrage caused the Arizona territorial government to demand that the executive branch increase military operations to destroy rogue Indian bands. Securing white populations against Indian attack became problematic for the Grant Administration. President Grant refused to capitulate to calls for full-scale war, and needed a means to implement a peaceful solution to the situation.⁵³ Hostilities economically affected U.S. mineral extraction and railroad expansion to the pacific coast.⁵⁴ In the East, pressures from influential public appointees called for primarily a non-lethal approach through the Department of Interiors Bureau of Indian Commissioners. Eastern peace philanthropists’ had strong influence in creating policy for the reservation plans in Arizona.⁵⁵ They ignored the hard lined territorial government’s demands of using force to destroy the Indian, and they dismissed assertions that southwest security situation

⁵¹Thrapp, 17.

⁵²Cozzens, 12.

⁵³Birtle, 58.

⁵⁴Marszalek, 379.

⁵⁵Ibid., 381.

was degrading. Together, these differing influences and issues collided in 1870 and placed the administration, Congress, and the Army in a quandary on how to proceed in the Arizona.

The government attempted to appease concerns and Indian pacification requirements through a limited war strategy on the indigenous hostiles.⁵⁶ In 1868, newly appointed President Ulysses Grant, aware of the growing problem in the Arizona territory, implemented a Peace Policy for the Indian referred to as “conquest by kindness”, that called for the Bureau of Indian Commissioners, created by Congress in 1869, and governed by civilian religious philanthropists, to administer a reservation policy moving Indians onto government administered lands.⁵⁷ The “reservation” or prescribed blocks of lands were those locations that a tribe reserved for itself in trade through treaties with the government for their former tribal habitat.⁵⁸ The Board of Indian Commissioners gained increase power and received near cabinet level status from the President. The Indian Commissioners, were appointed and not elected, reported to the President directly, and received an annual discretionary congressional fund of \$70,000 dollars for distribution of Indian appropriations.⁵⁹ The Board of Indian Commissioners had more power, influence, and economic resources than the War Department. The goals of the Grant administration’s policy according to the Secretary of the Interior:

⁵⁶Birtle, 78.

⁵⁷Bourke, *Diary*, 87.

⁵⁸Yenne, 108. US Secretary of the Interior. *Department of the Interior Annual Reports, 1869-1873* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1873). The administration provided federally protected lands for the Apache in an effort to peacefully move them from historic tribal lands. The establishment of reservations continued to drive fissures between the military and civilian Indian agents.

⁵⁹Schmitt, 167. The board of Peace Commissioners under the Department of the Interior Indian Bureau sent Vincent Colyer with \$ 70,000 dollars to Arizona and New Mexico to furnish the Apache with shelter and sustenance to promote the Grant administrations goals of peaceful pacification.

“sought first, to place the Indians upon reservations as rapidly as possible, where they could be provided for in such a manner as dictates of humanity and Christian civilization requires. Being thus placed upon reservations, they will be removed from such contiguity to our frontier settlements as otherwise will lead necessarily, to frequent outrages, wrongs, and disturbances of the public peace. On these reservations, they can be taught the arts of agriculture, such pursuits are incident to their civilization, intellectual, moral, and religious pursuits cannot be prosecuted, and thus it is hoped that humanity and kindness, may take the place of barbarity and cruelty.”⁶⁰

President Grant empowered the Bureau of Indian Commissioners to influence Apaches to move on the reservation. The Army continued to assist the Indian commissioners to secure civilians while remaining responsible for offensive operations against hostiles outside the reservation.

The War Department struggled to understand its role in assisting the assimilation process. They attempted to understand the most effective way to accomplish the mission by questioning, “How did the policy apply to Indians such as the Apache in Arizona that had no reservation system established? How much force is sufficient to secure a reservation? When the civilian hierarchy asked for military intervention on the reservation who would be in command?”⁶¹ The War Department struggled to combine unity of military command with the Indian agents to develop unity of effort to achieve the overall political objective. In Arizona, ambiguity in implementation of the policy plagued the Interior and War Departments. The Grant peace policy individually executed by the Department of Indian Commissioner agents, exacerbated hostilities and strained civilian and military relationships.⁶² The policy clouded the lines between civilian and military authorities, stymied effectiveness of military operations, hampered interagency coordination, emboldened hostile Apache forces, and placed the Army in a tenuous position to accomplish the strategic end state.

⁶⁰Yenne, 104. US Secretary of the Interior. *Department of the Interior Annual Reports, 1869-1873* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1873).

⁶¹Utley, 7.

⁶²Yenne, 107.

The Bureau of the Interior's Indian agents confused the rapidity of establishing reservations with success of policy implementation.⁶³ Ineffectual reservation implementation caused increased tensions between agents and military commanders. Congressional appropriations directly to the Indian agents enabled corruption and inefficiency. In the southwest, congressional resource misappropriation and hastily executed coercion of Apaches to occupy temporary reservations increased Indian frustrations. Indian Commissioner Vincent Colyer's report to the President highlights reservation development ineffectiveness,

“having personally inspected the country and condition of the Apache Indians on the Verde River, I find the Indians to be in considerable numbers, destitute and starving, having no boundaries defining their homes, their country is overrun with hunters who kill their game, frequently kill the Indians, gold prospectors that forcibly take their land, and none of whom locate in this section of the country, agreeably by the powers conferred upon me by the President and communicated to me by the Secretary of the Interior, dated July 21, 1871, and in harmony with the humane action of Congress in providing funds for this purpose, I have concluded to declare all that portion of this country adjoining the northwest side of the Verde River to the point where the river crosses the New Mexico Road be an Indian Reservation, within the limit of which all peaceably disposed Apache are to be protected, fed, and otherwise cared for by the laws of Congress and Executive order”.⁶⁴

Military commanders serving in Arizona “deplored the way the government broke its promises to the Indian and chafed at the shortsightedness that characterized the administration of selecting reservations for Indian Affairs.”⁶⁵ The Indian agents failed to understand the requirements for reservation selection and routinely displayed a lack of understanding of the Indian culture. The Department of the Interior Indian agents developed reservations based on geography that suited the government but did not provide essential elements required for the Apache to develop new

⁶³Wooster, 208.

⁶⁴House Committee on Department of the Interior, *Annual report of the Interior, Indian Affairs 1871*, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1871, H. Rep. 2. Colyer's annual report shows the authority that the Indian Commissioners had in determining the location of reservations.

⁶⁵Yenne, 111.

life skills for upward mobility within the American culture. The failure of effective reservation selection further ignited the warrior spirit of the Apache.⁶⁶

The process of reservation selection routinely ignored military concerns. The selection of reservations bypassed the War Department and went from territorial Indian agents to the Department of the Interior for concurrence. The Department of the Interior sent recommendations directly to the executive branch for approval. The regional military commanders were continually in a reactive posture and could not fully enforce all requirements to establish an effective reservation system. The hasty practice of coercion and broken agreements by the government representatives represented the apathy and greed that the Indian was fighting against.⁶⁷

Political and social Influences caused the military forces operating in Arizona to have perpetually changing military campaign guidance. The Army complained that the Indian agents, under jurisdiction of the federal government, failed to appreciate the complexity involved with the selection of reservations and exacerbated the cycle of violence. Restricted directives resulted in an inability for the Army to gain the initiative and forced an armed force to be entirely reactive in combat.⁶⁸ The ill-suited locations of the reservations created a federally protected zone that allowed for Apache exploitation. Routinely, hostile tribes made treaties with the Indian Bureau, went to reservations, and then used the reservation system as a base of operations to conduct attacks on civilians and the Army. The bureaucracy of the Department of the Interior prevented the Army from conducting effective intelligence gathering on the reservation.⁶⁹ The War Department continued to request to be the lead for Indian Affairs. Conversely, the Department of

⁶⁶John Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 220.

⁶⁷Birtle, 77.

⁶⁸Ibid., 78.

⁶⁹Robinson, 79.

the Interior took advantage of the post-Civil War anti militaristic views and gained public support to keep all Indian affairs under the Department of the Interior. Ultimately, the Department of the Interior won the argument through an enhanced narrative stating, “Will you send professional soldiers, sword in one hand, musket in the other, to teach the wards of the Nation, agriculture, the mechanical arts, theology, and peace?”⁷⁰ The Army adopted a two-phased military approach to achieve the War Department’s mission. First, the hostiles had to be broken in will and spirit, through relentless military campaigning while supporting the Bureau of Indian Commissioners. Second, the Army had to protect the Apache from extermination and teach life skills to assist in their adaption to the western culture.⁷¹ The deteriorating state of affairs Indian and civilian problems led to perpetual blame of the Army for not providing appropriate levels of security for civilians, not peaceably enforcing the policy, and not being aggressive enough in the pursuit of rogue hostiles.

After the Civil War concluded in 1865, Congress immediately took action to decrease the number of standing Army troops in an effort to reduce the War Department’s funding expenditures in an era of perceived peace. The American public was supportive of the military reductions and focused on the need to reduce spending after a costly four-year civil war. To assist in the force reduction efforts, many of the volunteers from the Union Army returned to their home to pursue civilian occupations in the wake of reunification. In 1866, Congress implemented a series of mandated cuts. They reduced the Army by twenty infantry regiments, increased the cavalry regiments to ten for western frontier operations, and placed a force ceiling on the Army of 54,000 uniformed personnel.⁷² The 54,000-member standing Army had three separate and distinct

⁷⁰Birtle, 63.

⁷¹Robert Utley, *Frontiersman in Blue, the United States Army and the Indian 1848-1865*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska press, 1973), 255.

⁷²Birtle, 59.

missions.⁷³ First, over a third of the Army was committed to Southern stability and security operations. More than 20,000 uniformed personnel were responsible for rebuilding efforts, policing the South, and ensuring Southern aggression did not turn hostile to the freed southern African Americans. Second, the Army provided security from hostilities for the expanding western railroad and supporting infrastructure required for expansion. Rail construction to connect the United States coast became a national conquest and the military maintained security of civilians and workers to ensure successful completion.⁷⁴ Lastly, the remaining Army was distributed throughout the Western Frontier to austere outposts tasked with the execution of American Indian pacification policy and security of vital outposts to combat hostile tribes.⁷⁵

After the Civil War, the Army forces assigned to the western frontier consisted of the Division of the Missouri and the Division of the Pacific with numerous sub departments. The two-department system of organization stymied effective command and control due to the tyranny of distance between higher headquarters and operational maneuver units. Communication in the west relied on couriers, which increased time for issuing and receiving orders. Command and control efforts constrained battlefield synchronization of actions over time and space to achieve objectives. Geographically, the two department system, created territorial seams that the enemy exploited, increased security vulnerabilities resulting in military and civilian casualties, and decreased the ability of the government to employ all sources of power bring stability to the western territories.⁷⁶ In total, the military departments were responsible for a native population of over 270,000 people, ever increasing western settlers, and 116 out posts from Missouri to present

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Marszalek, 260.

⁷⁵Cozzens, 16.

⁷⁶Wooster, 202.

day California.⁷⁷ The soldier to terrain ratio estimated that one Soldier in the late 1860's was responsible for over 100 square miles, composing 125 sub-tribes and fifty separate dialects.⁷⁸ The Army's lack of effective command and control degraded a unified direction for a comprehensive campaign approach against hostile Indians.

The post-Civil War years left the Army with reduced personnel, expanding mission requirements, limited political and societal support, and decreasing budgets. Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman, commanding the Division of the Missouri, defined the framework of the problem remarking, "Were I or the department commanders to send guards to every point where they are clamored for, we would need alone on the plains a hundred thousand men, mostly of cavalry. Each spot of every road, and each little settlement along five thousand miles of frontier, wants its regiment of cavalry or infantry to protect it against the combined power of all the Indians, because of the bare possibility of their being attacked by the combined force of all the Indians."⁷⁹ Later, as commander of the Army, Sherman's goals and approaches differed from the Indian Commissioners. He determined that mission success relied on better civilian and military cooperation in stating, "All I aim to accomplish is to so clearly define the duties for the Civil and Military of the government so that we won't be quarreling all the time as to whose business it is to look after them."⁸⁰ Sherman's recognition of the imperative requirement for cooperation between the Interior and War Departments continued to plague all governmental efforts in the west for decades.

⁷⁷Birtle, 58.

⁷⁸Utley, 58.

⁷⁹Marszalek, 394.

⁸⁰Ibid., 390.

The Army had no formal doctrine for conducting small war operations. The Army doctrine for operations in the west was composed of a combination of formal and informal practices and principles consisting of experiences from frontiersman and soldiers spanning from colonial times. The United States Military Academy gave minimal instruction to officers on how to combat Indian style warfare. The Army adopted the definition of the type of warfare experienced in the western frontier from French military theorists of the day. They described frontier operations as *Petite Guerre* or small wars consisting of actions combining small outposts, patrols, raids, and reconnaissance to gain information on the enemy.⁸¹ Military actions in small wars sought to enable pacification of an insurrection.⁸² In 1835, Superintendent of the Academy, Dennis Hart Mahan instituted Indian warfare classes into the institutions curriculum.⁸³ The focus of the curriculum was to educate students on adapting to the enemy, use of indigenous scouts to conduct operations deep into the enemy's area of operations, and to destroy his logistic base.⁸⁴ Mahan's curriculum of small war doctrine at the Academy continued until the start of the Civil War in 1861. The War Department, struggling to balance instruction of conventional warfare with the requirements of western operations, sanctioned Captain Randolph Marcy's 1859 *Prairie Traveler* as a guide for the Army in operating in the western theater.⁸⁵ Marcy combined his western frontier experiences with those experiences of the French and Turkish pacification operations in North Africa against nomadic tribesman.⁸⁶ He saw similarities in the tactics,

⁸¹Birtle, 15.

⁸²Ibid., 55.

⁸³Utley, 13.

⁸⁴Birtle, 65.

⁸⁵Randolph B. Marcy, *The Prairie Traveler: The 1859 Handbook for Westbound Pioneers* 2nd ed. (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2006), 2.

⁸⁶Birtle, 56.

political aims, and complexities of the North African campaigns and the operations in the west. From his experience and the study of irregular adversaries he concluded three principles for conducting small war operations; dispersion of the adversary's forces impeded tactical initiative of the conventional force, mobility was essential in combating the adversary's speed of attack, and forces must conduct all weather operations and at night when the enemy is most vulnerable.⁸⁷ Marcy's work remained as the only official War Department approved doctrine for small wars until the late 1880s.⁸⁸ The Army's doctrine for small wars was a combination of West Point's Indian warfare curriculum, Marcy's *Prairie Traveler*, and the experiences of frontier soldiers. The Army employed both formal and informal doctrine to form a small war doctrine that guided the Army's operations in the west until the twentieth century.⁸⁹

By 1870, despite interagency internal conflict, pressure from Mexico, divisions in unity of effort between the military and civilian organizations, and an increasing hostile Indian population, the Army had achieved marginal success in pacification in the Northwest Territories, California, and the upper mid-west regions. The series of campaigns in the northwest assisted in the capitulation of the enemy and provided adequate security for western expansion. In these areas, the military and Indian agents maintained a strained relationship but, together, their efforts enabled the reduction of hostile actions, the establishment of reservations, and the preservation of western expansion. However, in the southwest territory of Arizona, the Apache continued to gain success in resisting western incursion and provided the government and military commanders with increased concern.

⁸⁷Birtle, 58.

⁸⁸Ibid., 17.

⁸⁹Marcy, *Prairie Traveler*, 46.

From 1867 thru 1870, the Apache conducted fifty-four successful raids on civilian settlements, multiple cross border engagements in Mexico, and killed forty-four citizens.⁹⁰ In April 1870, Brig. Gen. George Crook and his forces within the Department of Arizona adapted a mobile all weather campaign strategy to defeat the enemy. He incorporated civilian assimilation efforts to civilize the Apache, and balanced a myriad of external influences to achieve President Grant's objectives in Arizona. His campaign required an increase in operational tempo to mitigate the enemy's mobility to allow decisive destruction and capitulation.

GENERAL CROOK'S EVOLUTION AS A COMMANDER-SOLDIER-INDIAN FIGHTER

You ask me to tell you about the Indian? Go to the Nathan (Crook's name given by the Apache meaning Chief) he'll tell you. He's more of an Indian than I am.
—An Apache chief remarks to LT John G. Bourke 1880 aide to General Crook.⁹¹

Brig. Gen. George Crook took command of the Department of Arizona in the spring of 1870. Crook's operational success in subduing the hostiles and enhancing the civilian peace emissaries efforts would enable the attainment of Indian pacification, create the conditions for western expansion in the Southwest, and alleviate a strained political relationship with the Mexican government due to cross border Apache incursions.⁹² In order for Crook to achieve success in Arizona, he had to combine his military resources with his understanding of the civilian political aims to effectively bring stability and security to the troubled region.

By 1870, Crook had thirteen years of fighting various Indian tribes ranging from the Pacific Northwest to the territories bordering Mexico. His combined experiences in the northwest, Civil War, and constabulary duty after the war, assisted in the formulation of a unique

⁹⁰Cozzens, 12.

⁹¹Robinson, 92. Apache Indian elder describing the humane treatment that Crook and his forces displayed to subjugated Apaches.

⁹²Thrapp, 7.

understanding of the Indian and a campaign framework to apply military force to defeat them. During the Civil War, Crook fought as a Union brigade commander, taking part in numerous campaigns from Appomattox to the Shenandoah Valley under the command of General Phil Sheridan.⁹³ Crook's success in the western frontier fighting the Indian, lead Sheridan to task him with the mission of dislocating and defeating irregular partisan confederate forces operating within the West Virginia area of operations.⁹⁴ His experience in West Virginia against confederate partisans reinforced his desire to learn to adapt to the enemy's type of warfare. He applied small war doctrine to the situation by; increasing mobility, developing an efficient intelligence network, and incorporating decentralized operations to enhance conventional forces to defeat an elusive enemy. Crook's combat experience in the western territories against the Indian far exceeded the experience of his peers and superiors. Throughout the Civil War, he set himself apart from many other officers within the Army by applying operational analysis to defeat conventional confederate formations and partisan irregulars. Specifically, Crook demonstrated that; he was a commander who was competent in campaign strategy for conventional and unconventional operations, he was capable of adapting to the enemy, and he organized his forces to increase the tempo of operations to gain a tactical advantage, and applied a strategy that disrupted the enemy's source of strength.⁹⁵ His maturation as a combat practitioner enabled his understanding of the complexities of irregular warfare by combining his formal education in Indian warfare from West Point, with his previous antebellum constabulary service in California and Oregon to formulate operational plans to achieve national aims.

⁹³Robinson, 73.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Utley, 163.

Crook tested his Indian fighting approach in post-civil war duty in Nevada by successfully combating the Piate Indians into submission. He focused his efforts to achieve success by determining that conventional Army forces must adapt logistics, mobility, and collaborate with the Indian agents. Essential to his strategy, was the use of scouts to locate the enemy, defeat hostiles, and ultimately compel the Indian to cease resistance and adopt western ways through the Bureau of Indian Commissioners reservation system. Crook continually studied the Indian, tactically, culturally, and politically, to become a military commander that eventually “understood the Indian better than the Indian did.”⁹⁶ His leadership and operational strategy to combat the Apache was a mixture of ruthlessness in combat, with a humanitarian insistence that the Indian must be humanely cared for and educated to survive in western culture against white civilian biases.⁹⁷

In 1861, the country separated along Union and Confederate lines in preparation of approaching the Civil War. Due to the rising hostilities between the north and south, the Army focused efforts away from Indian pacification to conventional war preparation. Crook, a devoted soldier of the United States became determined to fight for the livelihood of the Union. He received a release from federal service and assumed duties as a volunteer regimental commander in the Thirty-Six Ohio Volunteer Infantry.⁹⁸ His appointment as a regimental commander of an all-volunteer force, continued to develop his leadership qualities. Commanding citizen soldiers required Crook to train his volunteers for the demands of combat. He imposed a taxing regime of training, drill, and cavalry operations that enhanced reconnaissance and enabled combined arms

⁹⁶Robinson, 81.

⁹⁷Utley, *Frontier Regulars*, 179.

⁹⁸Robinson, 72.

maneuver. As the war continued, Crook would serve in three separate departments, under numerous Army commanders and eventually attain the position of Division Commander.⁹⁹

Near the end of the Shenandoah campaign, he led his command in a campaign against confederate partisans. The partisans were conducting small raids against Union logistics and preventing Union forces from isolating confederate safe havens in West Virginia. Again, Crook displayed operational prowess in determining the operational requirements of the counter guerilla force, he implemented intelligence-gathering mechanisms to understand the motives, tactics, and requirements of the confederate partisans, and applied innovation through decentralized mobile operations to sever the partisans' ability to maintain safe havens within the West Virginia area of operations. The enemy in Western Virginia was composed of elements from Col. John S. Mosby's infamous ranger force of the Forty-Third Battalion of Virginia Cavalry.¹⁰⁰ To combat this he determined that confederate guerillas relied on intelligence from local citizens and needed mobility to achieve insurrection objectives.¹⁰¹ Subsequently, Crook formed a counter partisan company focused on decentralized operations and raids on support bases, which hampered the enemy's ability to gain the initiative, and effectually placed them in a reactionary posture to Union movements. In West Virginia, Crook developed innovative solutions to adapt his forces to operate in complex battlefield conditions. He adapted small war doctrine to achieve results in a conventional war that mitigated a partisan confederate enemy.¹⁰² After the Civil War congress immediately began a post conflict reduction in force initiative, Crook returned to federal service

⁹⁹Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography*, 110.

¹⁰⁰Robinson, 87.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Robinson, 81. Crook demonstrated his combat prowess in the Civil War against uniformed and partisan adversaries. Following the Civil War, congressional mandates required a reduction in force. Crook assumed his previous rank of Lt. Col. And went back to the frontier to combat hostile Piate Indians.

at his previous rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He assumed command of the Twenty Third Infantry operating in the Military District of Idaho.¹⁰³ The Twenty Third Infantry under Crooks command faced a formidable enemy in the Piate Indians and tested Crooks leadership, application small war doctrine application, and innovation of campaign design within the constraints of the Army.

In 1866, Crook commanded an area of operations that spanned portions of Idaho, Oregon, and Nevada under the division command of the Department of the Pacific.¹⁰⁴ His maneuver area was so vast and had so few troops that local citizens maintained near criminal volunteer militias that destabilized the area and prevented governmental pacification efforts to take root. The size of the area of operations, lawlessness, and Indian reprisals resulted in destabilization.¹⁰⁵ In his new position, Crook observed the lack of coordination between the War Department and the Department of the Interior. In 1865, Crook observed that the Board of Indian Commissioners failed to understand the cultural differences between tribes. He observed that Indian commissioners hastily established a reservation in Boise that placed two antagonistic tribes on the same reservation. Additionally, inclement weather prevented federal stores of food and supplies to arrive to at reservation, which created starvation situation for the “pacified Indians”.¹⁰⁶ The result was intra Indian warfare between tribes, Indian reprisal attacks against the government and settlers, and increased raiding of while settlements.

Operations in 1866 against the Piate Indians provided the opportunity for Crook to test and improve his theorems on Indian warfare. His combined experience of Indian fighting and Civil War counter partisan operations would be the foundation of his Arizona campaign strategy.

¹⁰³Robinson, 81.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 93.

¹⁰⁵Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography*, 184.

¹⁰⁶Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography*, 151.

Crook ordered that his units would; conduct winter campaigns when the adversary was less mobile and their logistic bases were vulnerable, conduct night operations, use Indian scouts to develop intelligence and guide the Army to enemy safe havens, move cavalry on converging columns to the center of operations enabling the Army to continuously pursue the enemy, and increase his formations mobility by shortening logistics utilizing mules instead of wagon trains.¹⁰⁷ Crook's effectiveness in the use of Indian scouts enabled legislation in 1866 and funding of one thousand indigenous Indians scouts to be included in the Army manpower authorizations.¹⁰⁸ From 1866 -1868, Crook executed his Indian fighting strategy and continually worked with civilian Indian agents to implement the reservation system after establishing security. After two years of continuous campaigning Crook received word from the Piate tribal leadership that they were ready for peace stating, "We kill your white Soldiers and ten more come for every one that is killed; but when you kill one of our warriors, no more come to replace him. We are very weak and cannot recuperate."¹⁰⁹ The surrender of the Piate and Crooks humane response to their surrender reverberated throughout the region and resulted in numerous hostile tribes giving up arms for pacification efforts. Crook's fierceness in combat and empathy for the Indian gained favor with Indian tribes and established trust in the federal government. Crook exemplified benevolence during post conflict activities and gained a reputation as a ruthless pursuer of hostiles but more importantly, a protector of Indian rights during all phases of the pacification process.¹¹⁰ Crook's success in Idaho resulted in the surrender of over eight hundred hostile

¹⁰⁷John Bourke, "General Crook in the Indian Country, The Century Magazine 1891," *Discoverseaz* (October 2013), <http://discoverseaz.com> (accessed October 2013).

¹⁰⁸Birtle, 69.

¹⁰⁹Robinson, 101.

¹¹⁰Bourke, *On the Border*, 137.

Indians surrendered. General Halleck, Department of the Pacific explained, “Too much praise cannot be given to General Crook for the energy and skill with which he conducted this war.”¹¹¹

Crook's success in Idaho, validated his approach to combat the irregular tactics of the Indian. It formulated his understanding on how to apply military force to increase security while providing space and time for the Department of the Interior's pacification efforts to take hold within the territory. He changed the culture of his military formation from being reactionary to proactive by adapting to battlefield conditions. He defeated the enemy through enhancing his intelligence capability, mobile converging columns, and all winter campaigning that resulted in enemy capitulation. Most importantly, Crook developed a post conflict understanding that the enemy must be cared for while assimilating to western culture. The government and both the military and the civilians must have a plan to support the Indian. Crook's success in Idaho led his superiors and the President of the United States to move him to Arizona and begin campaigning against the most hostile of tribes, the Apache.¹¹²

Crook arrived in the Arizona Territory in June 1871, and immediately issued orders to his subordinates to provide him firsthand accounts of; the current security situation by region, assessment of the terrain and impacts to cavalry operations, the status of military logistics, recent enemy actions and how they applied their tactics against Army formations, subordinates military views on the effectiveness of civilian led reservation system efforts, and the populace's perceptions of the Apache problem by sub region.¹¹³ Crook combined the field reports from subordinates with his Indian fighting knowledge to develop a vision for the conduct of his

¹¹¹Robinson, 101. Report from General Halleck, *Military Division of the Pacific*, 22 September 1868, in *The Annual Report of the Secretary of War—1869* in the National archives highlights the Army's actions against the Piate Indians. Crook implemented and tested his vision of Indian warfare after the Civil War.

¹¹²Bourke, *On the Border*, 138.

¹¹³Thrapp, 96.

military operations in Arizona. Crook's experience dictated that the pacification process was two-phase operation encompassing military efforts to defeat, secure, and influence the Apache to pacify, with civilian efforts to implement the reservation system.¹¹⁴ First, he realized that he must apply sufficient force to break the Apache's will to fight. To break their will, Crook determined his operations would isolate hostile bands through attacking logistic hubs, safe havens, and ultimately mitigate their offensive combat capabilities. Second, while simultaneously combating hostiles, he had to ensure his military efforts aided Indian agents to compel tribal leaders to accept pacification. His non-lethal approach relied on mutual trust that he developed over time. Crook focused on creating an understanding with the Apache, that as a representative of the government, he would reward good behavior of the Apache during assimilation, increasing the potential for the Apaches' future survival by learning trades and life skills in an era of increasing western expansionism.¹¹⁵ Throughout all phases of his Arizona campaign Crook effectively worked to gain the trust of the Apache tribal leaders.¹¹⁶ Crook helped the Apache understand that he would be fair to the Indian throughout the pacification process but ruthless when the Indian refused subjugation efforts. He explained to the Indian the goal of the government's assimilation policy. He extended his influence as an agent of the government throughout the region by empowering leaders to maintain order of their tribes, convincing them to assist Army efforts by providing scout auxiliaries to assist with targeting and intelligence.¹¹⁷ Through his actions, the

¹¹⁴Birtle, 83.

¹¹⁵Cozzens, 403. On July 9, 1883, Crook gave an interview to the New York *Herald* outlining his combat experiences fighting the Apache and his intense desire to ensure that the government maintains an effort to continue to assimilate the Native American tribes into the western culture through education, trade skills, and farming. During the interview, Crook expressed frustration because in his view, the government was not adhering to their previously stated responsibilities of the peace policy.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Birtle, 69.

Apache began to feel a sense of trust toward the government. Crook theorized that the use of scouts against their own tribe would break the will of rogue Apaches quicker than any purely military application of force.¹¹⁸ Politically, Crook endeavored to use his military influence with the Department of the Interior to “raise and elevate the condition of the Indian himself through fair compensation, education, and training in agriculture.”¹¹⁹ Crook used his increasing mutual trust with the Apache to fight for their rights. During post-conflict administration duties, Crook routinely fought ineffectual Indian Commissioner Treaties and white civilian depredations.

Crook knew that a key to success was developing unity of effort with civilian Indian agents. To this end, Crook subjugated his personal military desires for the greater good of the pacification process. He openly accepted his supporting role to the Department of the Interiors efforts that mitigated bureaucratic strife, by ensuring open communication and executing military operations that enhanced the pacification process. His efforts achieved unity of effort, though strained, between the Interior and War Departments. To ensure military operations mutually supported civilian reservation efforts, Crook postponed and cancelled planned campaigns that he deemed might affect the Department of the Interiors success in various regions.¹²⁰ To mitigate existing organizational tensions between the Interior and War Departments, Crook took advantage of the national focus on Arizona’s unstable security environment, and persuaded the government to give him extended operational control of more reservations in an effort to unify civilian and military efforts and dissuade interagency infighting.¹²¹ Crooks pacification strategy

¹¹⁸Birtle, 69.

¹¹⁹Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography.*, 184.

¹²⁰Robinson, 113.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, 114.

was a two-pronged approach but his success hinged on his tactical success on destroying the hostile Apaches in the region.

Crook received first hand assessments from his subordinates, and conducted a reconnaissance of his assigned sector by embedding his small staff with operational patrols near Bowie, Arizona.¹²² While on his leader's reconnaissance, his element pursued a band of rogue hostiles within the Chiricachua Mountains.¹²³ Crook confirmed his assumptions that Army forces in Arizona would rapidly have to adapt.¹²⁴ His observations allowed him to understand how the enemy employed his tactics to prevent Army forces from gaining success. He assessed that the Apache excelled at controlling the terrain, employing deception, and expertly using ambushes to destroy superior forces. The Apache used terrain to his advantage and maintained a complex system of high mountain safe havens to conduct operations. Their tactics protected their logistical base and enabled mobility to strike at the time and place of their choosing. His analysis of the Apache culture and training of warriors gave the Apache an advantage intangible, commenting that the Apache warrior acted as "his own general" when in contact but, could effortlessly combine action with adjacent elements to decisively halt Army forces in pursuit.¹²⁵

Crook applied his Civil War experiences fighting the confederate partisans to determine that, paramount to the Apaches' tactical success, was their ability to conduct a protracted running rear guard action. Their expert employment of the rear guard divided Army forces over time and terrain and allowed them to continually regroup while exploiting the Army's limited maneuver

¹²²Thrapp, 98.

¹²³Ibid., 114.

¹²⁴Birtle, 70.

¹²⁵Watt, 21.

ability.¹²⁶ As General Sheridan later assessed the tactical problem, “they attack and plunder, then scatter like quails over distance, then regroup at a previously planned point, making it exceedingly difficult for our troops to overtake and punish them.”¹²⁷ Based on analysis of terrain and mobility constraints, Crook assessed his forces lacked sufficient intelligence and reconnaissance resources to locate the enemy. Crook determined that Indian scouts were essential to his targeting effort to find and fix his adversary to gain the tactical advantage.

Crook thoroughly understood the operating environment, the enemy’s strengths, the current conventional operations, and the civilian reservation efforts. Conditions dictated that he change his organization to reform it from a reactionary force to a proactive fighting unit. Ultimately, his goal was to turn a conventional Army force from Indian fighters to Indian thinkers.¹²⁸ Crook’s adaptation of logistics and force structure enhanced his maneuver ability that was still inferior to his adversary but provided the Army a degree of mobility in Arizona to effectively break their will through continual tempo and pressure.¹²⁹ He determined that his command would focus on all weather operations, to include winter expeditions, to maintain continuous pressure on the tribe and to gain the operational initiative. Crook’s Apache scouts increased his intelligence and enabled his ability to maneuver. He determined that his large logistical trains and formations hindered operations and made him vulnerable to Apache tactics. He mitigated this vulnerability by focusing on the use of pack mules, local horses, and increasing

¹²⁶Watt, 20.

¹²⁷Marszalek, 389. Sheridan’s written remarks to War Department Oct 22, 1874 highlight the requirement for more forces in the western theater to mitigate hostile attacks and enhance security. Sherman believed that force, not negotiations was the solution.

¹²⁸Birtle, 69.

¹²⁹Watt, 20.

light mobile forces that could operate individually or in combined mobile converging columns.¹³⁰ Crook understood that the Apache fought like his own general in battle, and his innovation in mobility and formations assisted his cavalry forces to fight as their own element, with each cavalryman acting as his own commander.¹³¹ Effectively, Crook adapted his organization to mirror his adversary.¹³² Crook's converging columns enabled flexibility, which increased his operational options while in contact with the enemy. His innovations provided him with the advantage to exploit success, and allowed him to retain reserve forces from his larger supply convoys with mounted infantrymen, operating within the area to reinforce success.¹³³ Crook issued orders highlighting his command philosophy to his subordinate commands that stated once his reconnaissance elements found a trail of hostiles they would pursue until the Apache was defeated or surrendered.¹³⁴ To enable pacification Crook opened communication with non-hostile tribal leaders and civilian agents of the Department of the Interior. Crook reformed the Department of the Arizona forces tactics, logistics, intelligence, and use of indigenous scouts, that tactically enabled his force to be ready to conduct operations when ordered by the War Department.

CROOK GOES ON THE OFFENSIVE

In August 1871, Crook had transformed his forces within the Department of Arizona to adapt to an irregular enemy by creating a mobile, agile force consisting of two troops of cavalry,

¹³⁰Cozzens, 111.

¹³¹Ibid. Cozzens book provides numerous articles about frontier combat. This selection was published in *Harper's Weekly*, 14 January 1899, and described the various Indian campaigns in the southwest territory against the Apache.

¹³²Watt, 20.

¹³³Birtle, 69.

¹³⁴Robinson, 101.

Indian scouts, and supporting mounted infantry capable of operating within the arduous terrain that the Apache had previously used to defeat adversaries.¹³⁵ From Camp Apache, Crook observed the success of his strategy when three companies of the Third Cavalry with Apache Indian scouts successfully killed seven rogue hostiles and compelled numerous women and children to move to the nearby reservation.¹³⁶ Crook endeavored to take advantage of his recent success and sent orders to his subordinates to prepare for five simultaneous expeditions to concentrate military force on previously inaccessible Apache strongholds.¹³⁷ His intent was clear to his forces; they were to operate without cessation until the hostiles within Arizona, which he estimated as 700 warriors, were either driven into reservations or destroyed.¹³⁸ The Department of the Interior, though, halted Crook's plans for exploiting his initial success. The Department of War suspended all operations until further notice to allow presidential appointee and member of the Indian Board, Vincent Colyer, to attempt to make treaties with tribal elders to entice the hostile Apaches to move onto the reservations. The suspension of tactical operations due to increased socio-political pressures for a peaceful solution to the hostilities continued to impede Crook's ability to effectively use military force to increase stability. Crook continued to ready his command and fully supported the civilian efforts to make peace with the hostiles.

From August through November, Indian agents made treaties with numerous tribes spanning from New Mexico to Arizona. Under the direction of Vincent Colyer and approved by the President, "Crook and his forces will provide temporary asylums to the Tontos, Hualapais,

¹³⁵Cozzens, 144. *Winners of the West 1*, no.11, (November 1924). 3. The article discusses Crook's operations against from 1870 -1873.

¹³⁶George Crook, *Annual Report to the War Department*, 1871, Letterbook 1. No.3, 6-9. The Rutherford B. Hayes Presidential Collection.

¹³⁷Thrapp, 102.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*

and the western band of Apaches on Camp McDowell, and Date Creek until such times as the Indians collected there could be removed to new reservations.”¹³⁹ During the suspension of offensive operations, Crook supported the Department of the Interior by providing active duty officers to act as interim Indian agents to assist with humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁰ Crooks’ actions throughout the fall of 1871 continued to highlight his ability to apply military force when directed but when required to act in full compliance with political directives and focus to governance operations. Crooks forces demonstrated that they were capable of all tasks associated with the complexity of pacification operations in Arizona.

On 5 November 1871, two weeks after Secretary Colyer returned to Washington to give a positive situation report to the executive branch, the conditions in Arizona changed and forced the Department of Interior to allow Crook and his forces to military intervene.¹⁴¹ Hostile Apache Indians, who had received Department of the Interior appropriations from a recently established reservation, attacked and killed six people. The Wickenburg Massacre caused the War Department to allow Crook to execute offensive operations. On 9 November 1871, General Sherman ordered, “the Indian must remain on reservations and General Crook may feel assured that whatever measures of severity he may adopt to reduce these Apaches to a peaceful and subordinate condition will be approved by the War Department.”¹⁴² Crook readied his command for winter expedition using a mobile strike force concept. He issued directives throughout his area

¹³⁹House Committee on Department of War, Headquarter of the United States Army, *General William T. Sherman, Commander of the Army, Response to the Wickenburg Massacre*, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1871, H. Rep. 3.

¹⁴⁰Bourke, *On the Border*, 137.

¹⁴¹Thrapp, 111.

¹⁴²House Committee on Department of War, Headquarter of the United States Army, *General William T. Sherman, Commander of the Army, Response to the Wickenburg Massacre*, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1871, H. Rep. 3, 1.

of operations that hostile Apaches had until mid-February 1872 to move to reservations.¹⁴³ After February 15, Army forces would engage any Indians found outside the reservation.¹⁴⁴ On 7 February, as Crook's units were preparing to depart, Major General Schofield, commander of the Department of the Pacific, again suspended Crook's offensive after the President ordered Brigadier General O. O. Howard to the territory to present one last peaceable alternative to the Apache.¹⁴⁵ Throughout the spring and summer of 1872, Howard expanded the reservation system in the southwest while Crook assumed all security operations. However, during his tenure in Arizona, the Apache conducted over fifty raids and killed over forty people, Howard began to agree with Crook that the hostile Apaches had to be militarily defeated. Crook while supporting civilian governance efforts continually ensured that his forces remained ready when the eventual order came for military action. Militarily, non-action created a problem that emboldened the Apache, and with no military counter action, the Apache increased operations, further plunging the territory into instability. On 15 November 1872, Crook received permission to execute offensive operations. The unstable conditions within the region solidified the political, civilian, and Department of the Interior's understanding that only military force could create the conditions for successful pacification. Crook highlighted his patience and restraint over the past 18 months stating "I think I am justified in saying that I have fully carried out that portion of my instructions which required me to co-operate with the agents referred to, and believe that humanity demands that I should now proceed to carry out the remainder of my instructions, which require me to punish the incorrigibly hostile."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³Thrapp, 113.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., 106.

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Thrapp, 118. George Crook, *Report to Army Adjutant General, Division of the Pacific*, September 21, 1872 highlights Crook's insistence that the military fully supported all civilian

Immediately, Crook re-issued General Order number 10, originally issued 21 November 1871, which required all Apaches to immediately report to the nearest Indian reservation or be regarded as hostile.¹⁴⁷ He sent his Inspector General, Captain W. Brown to Camp Apache and the surrounding reservations to implement the order and ensure that the Department of the Interior Indian agents within the region understood that their efforts were now in support of military operations.¹⁴⁸ Crook planned to use his mobile columns, to isolate hostile bands, penetrate mountainous sanctuaries, and force the Apache to seek relief into the Tonto Basin where he would land a final destructive blow. To increase his effectiveness in pursuing hostiles he would employ his Apache scouts to “find, and fix the enemy”.¹⁴⁹ His operational objectives were to destroy their logistics, force engagements, and strike sanctuaries. He employed nine separate columns consisting of the Fifth and Twenty-Third cavalry, mounted infantry, and Indian scouts to encircle known hostiles, and force the bands through concentric mobile columns into the Tonto Mountain Basin where a decisive action could destroy their military ability to resist.¹⁵⁰ He supported his forces with small mobile pack trains that were capable of continuous supply and reinforcements. All his tactical elements were large enough to sustain operations but small enough to move at high rates of speed and expand operational depth into arduous terrain.¹⁵¹ During the campaign, Crook left the tactical employment of forces up to his operational commanders, and he planned to coordinate their movements to negate the Apache’s ability to

lead efforts but, the situation degraded to the point where security could only be achieved through military offensive operations.

¹⁴⁷Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography*, 192.

¹⁴⁸Robinson, 127.

¹⁴⁹Thrapp, 120.

¹⁵⁰Robinson, 128.

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, 133.

consolidate. By early December 1872, he had his nine columns continuously on the move. His elements were simultaneously destroying hostiles, forcing surrender, destroying winter stores, and controlling safe havens, which prevented the Apaches from collecting supplies for winter sustainment. His scouts provided valuable intelligence reports that confirmed Crook's mobile forces were gaining and exploiting the tactical advantage by limiting the enemy's options to offensively counterattack. By mid December 1872, Crook's forces had killed, compelled, or pressured the remaining Apaches to move from the eastern part of the territory to the southwest into the targeted Tonto Basin.¹⁵² His forces, when not successful at destroying the Apache, kept them continually on the move, which limited their mobility, and began to strain their will to resist assimilation.¹⁵³

After five weeks of winter campaigning Crook had increased his depth into the Apache's heart of operations, his forces destroyed countless bands of hostiles, defeated the enemy's ability to sustain and conduct offensive operations, and re-enforced the fact that resistance was untenable for the Apache. Internally, his command saw the effects of Apache scout lead operations and his reformation of his elements proved that the cavalry could penetrate anywhere required within Arizona.¹⁵⁴

Crook's offensive was showing significant results throughout December 1872. His forces were operationally successful in defeating the enemy and the results of increased Apache capitulation enabled the Department of the Interior's pacification efforts. Moreover, due to Crook's effective military intervention using tactical action as the means to attain political aims, he was reinforcing the administration strategy of pacification. Tactically his actions rendered the

¹⁵²Thrapp, 123.

¹⁵³Ibid., 127.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 130.

Apache reactionary to Crooks constant offensive pursuit. Strategically, the Apache was beginning to understand that further resistance was untenable against the United States, and for self-preservation, began to accept alternative methods provided by the civilian Indian agents. Crooks campaign strategy encompassed a two-phase plan for pacification, allowed the military and Indian agents to simultaneously exploit tactical success. However, due to the fragmented nature of the Apache society, factions of hostile Apaches continued to resist military efforts.¹⁵⁵ In March 1873, Apaches captured, tortured, and killed three civilians in a horrific ambush. Regional and national astonishment and repulsion stemming from the incident further increased the political and societal support required for Crook to sustain operations and punish the Apache.¹⁵⁶ The unwarranted killings solidified the societal, political, and military desires to end the Apaches' resistance. Crook, with increased support regionally and nationally, became more determined to break the Apache's will to resist by conducting continuous punitive expeditions to increase the pressure on hostiles.¹⁵⁷

In the spring of 1873, Crook assessed the effectiveness of his operations. He believed that the increase in voluntary acceptance of the reservation system demonstrated that his strategy was working. He refocused his efforts on destroying the remaining Apaches' centers of operations. Crook assigned Captain George Randall to move to the Verde Mountains and attack a well-defended Apache stronghold thought to be the base of operations of the Apaches that attacked the civilians. Randall, a seasoned veteran of the Indian Wars and Civil War, incorporated innovation to attack the mountain stronghold undetected to achieve surprise. His troopers lead by Apache scouts, moved only at night, dismounted, and seized the high ground of the Turret Mountain

¹⁵⁵Thrapp, 131.

¹⁵⁶Schmitt, *Crook Autobiography*, 177.

¹⁵⁷Robinson, 135.

summit located in the Verde that overlooked the encampment.¹⁵⁸ At dawn, Randall with his troopers from the Twenty Third Cavalry, attacked the encampment killing all the hostiles and forcing the remaining women and children into the reservation. Simultaneously, to Randall's operation, Crook had eight columns consisting of over 1000 cavalymen and hundreds of Apache scouts conducting similar converging attacks that swarmed former safe havens, isolated the enemy into the Tonto Basin, and caused utter destruction of resistance throughout the zone of operations.¹⁵⁹ After the Turret Mountain and Tonto Basin engagements, bands of numerous Indian tribes of Arizona began surrendering to nearly every Army encampment in the region.¹⁶⁰ Crooks forces understood the tasks required for stability and through their actions made the Apache tribal elders feel comfortable with safety on the reservation resulting in an increased surrender of hostile bands. Effectively, by early April 1873, Crook wrote to division headquarters informing them that through continual pursuit, and unrelenting highly mobile offensive operations, the Apache's resistance has been defeated and they sued for peace.¹⁶¹ During a treaty signing at the Camp Verde reservation, an Indian tribal leader stated, "we are nearly dead for want of food, and from exposure. My people could not sleep at night for fear of a dawn attack. Every rock was viewed as a soldier. Though we feared the soldier, we realized we could not be safe because our own tribesman would assist the Army in finding us."¹⁶² A testament to Crooks campaign design and adaptation of conventional forces to defeat the Indian came from a Twenty Third Cavalry officer that asserted, "the Apaches found for the first time that they were

¹⁵⁸Robinson, 136.

¹⁵⁹Utley, 194.

¹⁶⁰Thrapp, 128.

¹⁶¹Robinson, 136.

¹⁶²Thrapp, 130.

overmatched by skillful, daring American Soldiers, who sweep them from the Salt River Canon to the summit of the Turret Mountains.”¹⁶³

Tactically Crook and his forces succeeded in breaking the resistance of the enemy by reducing their ability to project combat power. He mitigated the enemy’s ability to use mobility as an advantage while simultaneously enhancing his forces capabilities to rapidly move, sustain, and destroy by attacking their sustainment and base of operations. Crook understood that operational success was only one facet of the pacification plan. In order to achieve the lasting national strategy of stability in the region through Apache assimilation, Crook had to balance his military success with enabling Department of Interior operations. He focused his efforts and influence on setting the conditions for lasting peace and safety of the subjugated Apache. He issued General Orders number thirteen to his troopers outlining that surrendered Apaches were not harshly treated. General Order number thirteen tasked the Army forces to be humane in peace and to treat the Apache as children of ignorance not innocence.¹⁶⁴ Crook assisted in developing a shared understanding with all involved in the assimilation process. His orders to the Apache demanded that the Indian would surrender to all rules and laws, stay on reservations, and comply with the entities of the government. In return, the Indians would reap the benefits of all the rights under federal law. Consequently, Crook used his influence within the Department of War and relationships with the Department of Interior to campaign for the federal government to develop laws that recognized the Indian as a citizen to ensure that in the future the Indian would be cared for under United States law.¹⁶⁵ Crook continued to support collaboration with the Department of Interior Indian Commissioners by ordering his troops to establish procedures and civil

¹⁶³Thrapp, 130.

¹⁶⁴Bourke, *On the Border*, 165.

¹⁶⁵Robinson, 128.

governance within the reservations where the Apache would lead all efforts to police, maintain, and establish civility through rule of law based on their cultural norms.¹⁶⁶ To ensure the Apache remained off the warpath and successful at adapting to the new western culture, Crook assigned his officers to assist in agriculture development, water irrigation, and farming. His efforts set the foundation for economic prosperity and developing an understanding within the former warriors that their culture can remain intact through other means than war. Crook's post conflict actions enabled pacification, protected the Apache from further depredations, and increased their ability to adjust to civilized culture. Overall, Crook understood that the purpose of his strategy was to link his military operations to the overall attainment of political aims.¹⁶⁷ He expertly nested political, military, and government civilian efforts with the innovative application of small war doctrine to achieve stability that resulted in lasting peace and attainment of political aims. Brig. Gen. Crook's operational application of small war doctrine seized the initiative from the enemy facilitating continuous pressure on all aspects of the Apache's strength. He enabled the simultaneous combination of offensive and stability tasks to create the conditions for conflict resolution.¹⁶⁸ Crook and his forces conquered the Apache and achieved termination of an effort that lasted from the days of Cortes and enabled stability and security in the southwest.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶Robinson, 137.

¹⁶⁷Everett Dolman, *Pure Strategy, Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Routhledge, Taylor, and Francis Group, 2005), 16.

¹⁶⁸Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-1.

¹⁶⁹John Bourke, *On the Border with Crook*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 220.

CONCLUSION

It is certainly easier to launch an insurgency than it is to suppress it.
-David Gaula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* ¹⁷⁰

In 1871, Brigadier General George Crook, Department of Arizona commander, executed a campaign that adapted small war doctrine, experience, and innovation to defeat the Apache and enabled the Grant Administration's national aims of Indian pacification. His campaign one hundred and forty three years ago demonstrates an example of combining operational art with the science of warfare by sequencing tactical operations to achieve strategic political end states. The U.S. Army's operations in Arizona against the Apache reinforces the effectiveness of combining aspects of current military doctrine consisting of; JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, and FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, by Army commanders to apply military force to operate in ambiguous environments. Crook's analysis of the operational environment reinforces the importance of merging conceptual planning benefits with detailed military planning to create advantageous battlefield conditions. Crook developed what nineteenth century military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz described as *Nachrichten* which is "the collective knowledge of the enemy and his country, thus the foundation of one's notions and actions." ¹⁷¹ Crook incorporated a plan to rapidly analyze the complexities within Arizona, took advantage of potential situations for operational advantage, which increased the exploitable adversarial confusion of the Apache. Moreover, Crook implemented systematic organizational changes that enhanced the strategic offense through decisive application of combined arms maneuver to

¹⁷⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3.24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 2-1.

¹⁷¹Antulio Eschevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, 2nd ed. (Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2009), 104.

destroy the enemy and his base of support.¹⁷² He framed the environment to develop a shared understanding of the mission for both the military and governmental entities that mitigated the divergent socio-political variables influencing the degradation of stability within the Arizona.¹⁷³ Crooks actions in Arizona from 1871-1873, reinforced theorist John Boyd's assertions that, "correct application of all available resources enable simultaneity of unified multi-pronged action, which creates decisive advantages in tempo, endurance, speed of execution."¹⁷⁴

Crooks operational framework, clearly defined his vision that the pacification process would require increased cooperation between civilian and military organizations as outlined in ADRP 3-0 *Unified Land Operations*. Crook sought to nest the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Commissioners efforts to synchronize, coordinate and integrate activities of government with military operations to achieve unified action in the defeat of the Apache.¹⁷⁵ Crooks design for the campaign visualized an operational approach to achieve the desired end state consisting of two lines of operation; security and governance. His approach demonstrated the hallmark of current Army doctrine in *Unified Land Operations* where he exercised; initiative, decisive action, and mission command to achieve full success through interagency collaboration. He executed a counterinsurgency strategy that focused his military force to; deliver a succession of blows through continuous military operations by mobile strike forces capable of independent action or convergence at decisive points, and gained the initiative through simultaneity of action that paralyzed the Apache. He matched the enemy's mobility by incorporating of decentralized

¹⁷²Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 1-1.

¹⁷³Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-4.

¹⁷⁴Frans Osigna, *John Boyd and Strategic Theory in the Post Modern Era* (Dissertation, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2003).

¹⁷⁵Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0, 1-4.

operations and reducing logistical requirements that increased his operational reach and tempo. He used Apache scouts to find and fix the enemy, which enabled targeting of their critical capability's and vulnerabilities. His combined lines of operation prevented the Apache from reconsolidating and created the condition that made the Apache wholly reactive to Crooks operations.¹⁷⁶ Simultaneously, Crook embraced interagency collaboration. His forces provided reservation security, implemented strategic communication efforts to influence non-hostile tribal leaders to have their people move to reservations, and assisted with development of education and agriculture programs. The successful Arizona campaign orchestrated by an innovative military apparatus with civilian interagency collaboration demonstrates the requirements needed for the United States to attain its current and future national interests. Brig. Gen. George Crook exemplified what the current Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff GEN Martin Dempsey describes as a necessity for security and stability efforts which is, "The global application of integrated, discriminate military power in all domains that calls for us to organize and conduct networked operations, where any force element can support or be supported by another, with the tactical successes measured with strategic and operational implications."¹⁷⁷ From 1871-1873, Crook applied the facets of contemporary counter insurgency tactics to achieve the strategic end state of pacification.

¹⁷⁶Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1995), 1.

¹⁷⁷GEN Martin Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper" (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff emphasis on the future requirements of the military and interagency to operate in a globalized noncontiguous environment, Washington, DC, April 2012), us.army.mil. (accessed November, 10, 2013)

Analysis/Recommendations for Military Intervention Against Irregular Adversaries in the Future

Operation Environment

The future operating environments that the United States will employ all forms of power to maintain or attain its National Security interests will compose of a diverse system of interrelated variables between state, non-state, and malign actors that will combine illicit motives to create a uncertain complex arena composed of irregular tactics by adversaries. In order to effectively remain a hegemonic power and remain strategically superior to unconventional adversaries who seek to use hybrid warfare to mitigate American superiority, the United States recognizes it cannot afford to, “allow our doctrine or counterinsurgency skills to atrophy like they have historically done after the conclusion of small wars like; the Indian wars, The Mexican American War, Philippines Insurrection, Vietnam, and others.”¹⁷⁸ Further, irregular wars composed of counterinsurgency operations, will continue to be the predominate form of conflict and requires the United States, specifically the Department of Defense, to maintain the capability and capacity to provide the Commander in Chief with a full range of military options that encompasses integrated combined military interagency efforts, to gain the tactical advantage to attain strategic aims. Conflict scholars highlight that “Since 1815, of the last 464 conflicts recorded in the *Correlates of War*, 385 can be identified as a state fighting a non-state actor.”¹⁷⁹ After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the United States government realized that threats to national security can be traced to failing or vulnerable states incapable of adequate security prevention measures to prevent sovereign governments’ internal areas to be used as insurgent safe havens. Therefore, since 2001, the United States has employed all sources of hard

¹⁷⁸Department of the Army, *FM 3.24.2*, 2-1.

¹⁷⁹Sebastian Gorka, and David Kilcullen, “The Actor Centric Theory of War,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* 60 (2011): 17.

and soft power to mitigate the risk of terrorist safe havens and global insurrection activities. The 2010 National Security Strategy highlights the United States policy to stabilize failing or near failing states that have succumbed to irregular malign actor exploitation, stating that the United States, “must address the underlying political and economic deficits, that foster instability and enable radicalization and extremism, that ultimately undermine the ability of governments’ to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.”¹⁸⁰ Militarily, adversaries in the future state of conflict, will to exhibit the propensity to use hybrid irregular warfare, which requires an adaptive learned military organization. Brig. Gen. Crook understood in 1871 that militaries must be able to; anticipate the complex conditions of the environment, understand consequences of action or inaction, appreciate interdependent variables contributing to the conflict, prepare and develop plans for emergence of complicated realities, and interpret and exploit relevant opportunities to exploit advantages while mitigating irregular opponents strategic aims.¹⁸¹ Future conflict requires that the Department of the Army maintain a balanced force capable of conducting high intensity conventional operations while maintaining an enduring capacity to achieve strategic results in low intensity conflict in the midst of military drawdown, a war weary public, and reduced fiscal funding. The military internally faces the challenge of maintaining an adaptive force the Army that can operate with its joint partners. Further, based on threats and an ever increasing series of unstable global conditions the country must continue to prepare for conventional high intensity conflict while emphasizing the inherent quality of adaptation within its subordinate force structures to enable the defeat of asymmetric

¹⁸⁰The White House, National Security Strategy, [www.whitehouse.gov, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed 2 March 2014).

¹⁸¹GEN Martin Dempsey, “*Mission Command White Paper*” (Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff emphasis on the future requirements of the military and interagency to operate in a globalized noncontiguous environment, Washington, DC, April 2012). www.us.army.mil. (assessed November 10, 1873)

threats. Moreover, the military and interagency partners must maintain the capability to exploit the tactical and technical advantages of the force in all forms of combat through adaptation and innovation in pursuit national security aims.

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