

UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES AND BUILDING ENDURING PARTNER
ENABLER CAPACITY IN OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES

A Monograph

by

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ABSTRACT

US ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND BUILDING ENDURING PARTNER ENABLER CAPACITY, by MAJ LaVern T. Burkes, 47 pages.

Since 2001, US Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) have conducted continuous counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against al Qaeda and associated Islamist violent extremist networks (VENs), often partnering with host nation SOF. As the US strives to build partner capacity around the world, building partner nation logistics is a vital consideration. Logistics capacity is a strategic imperative for any nation attempting to strengthen its national defense because logistics is the key enabler of what a nation can do militarily. This monograph addresses the topic of building Indigenous Forces' partner enabler capacity to determine the effectiveness of US Army special forces with building partner enabler capacity pertaining to maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and sustainment to help others understand the importance of building a self-sustaining partner force to produce enduring security effects. This monograph centers on a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces. It illuminates the on-going actions of a small Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF-P), with a particular focus on US Army Special Forces and building enduring partner enabler capacity. In addition to drawing upon the extant secondary literature on the subject, this study includes interviews with former JSOTF-P Commanders, a 1st Special Forces Group Support Battalion Commander, a JSOTF-P Logistics Staff Officer, a JSOTF-P Medical Officer, and a JSOTF-P Special Forces Operations Officer. In the end of the study, three conclusions are offered. First, despite its vast logistics capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, USASOC has under-emphasized building partner enabler capacity. Second, logistics capacity building is critical to help partners and allies strengthen their security, overcome their military readiness challenges, and enable action to thwart security challenges. Third, US Special Forces are effective at building partner enabler capacity at the strategic and operational levels. However, minor adjustments at the tactical level will vastly improve their efforts at that level.

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ACRONYMS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BPC	Build Partner Capacity
CTFP	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
DND	Philippine Department of National Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FMF	Foreign Military Finance
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
IMET	International Military Education and Training
JDA	Joint Defense Assessment
JSOTF-P	Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
JUSMAG-P	Joint US Military Assistance Group-Philippines
MTT	Military Training Team
USASOC	US Army Special Operations Command
USSFC	US Army Special Forces Command
USSF	US Special Forces
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
VEN	Violent Extremist Network

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INTRODUCTION

Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.¹

— President Barack Obama

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggests that threats to US security in the decades to come are likely to emanate from state weakness rather than from state strength.²

However, the US cannot respond directly to every global crisis and should not meet global security challenges unilaterally given the nation's resource-constrained environment. In the May-June 2010 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, the former secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, wrote an article entitled "Helping Others Defend Themselves," wherein he emphasized that "the effectiveness and credibility of the US will only be as good as the effectiveness, credibility, and the sustainability of its local partners."³ He also wrote that, "[w]ell integrated training and assistance efforts can achieve real results."⁴

Since 2001, US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)⁵ have conducted continuous counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against al Qaeda and associated

¹The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), 11, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 5, 2014).

²Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 73.

³Robert M. Gates, "Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S Security Assistance," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2010), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66224/robert-m-gates/helping-others-defend-themselves> (accessed 12 December 2013).

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

Islamist violent extremist networks (VENs). After the 11 September attacks, a small footprint of ARSOF units partnered with irregular Afghan Northern Alliance forces to conduct a rapid UW campaign that ousted the Taliban regime. Since then, ARSOF counterterrorism operations have become more proactive, widespread, and persistent in response to the global threat posed by VENs and insurgencies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, ARSOF employed an effective network for capturing or killing terrorists through surgical strike operations. This capability, however, represents only one facet of ARSOF's approach to reducing the threats posed by VENs. Direct action counterterrorism strikes and raids tend to overshadow indirect operations that enable foreign security forces to win the support of local populations. The indirect approach fosters working "by, with, and through" partners over the long term to advance US national interests and establish enduring security conditions. Essentially, ARSOF leverage their core competency of foreign internal defense to employ indirect approach operations.

As the United States strives to build partner capacity around the world, building partner nation logistics is a vital consideration. Logistics capacity is a strategic imperative for any nation attempting to strengthen its national defense because logistics is the key enabler of what a nation can do militarily. In 2007, the Congressionally-appointed Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq made an explicit connection between logistics capacity and military capability in its report to Congress:

The lack of logistics experience and expertise within the Iraqi armed forces is substantial and degrades their readiness and capability. A renewed emphasis on Coalition mentoring and technical support is required to remedy this situation.⁶

⁶General James L. Jones, Chairman, *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq* (Washington, DC: CSIS, 6 September 2007), 13.

Logistics encompasses planning, executing movements, and support of military forces.⁷ Military theorist Antoine Jomini described logistics as the practical art of moving armies and keeping them supplied.⁸ Its core capabilities are supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health services support, engineering, logistics services, and operational contract support.⁹ For this research, enabler capacity entails the development of maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and sustainment support. Building partner capacity involves more than growing and training indigenous operators to provide national security through killing or capturing leaders of violent extremist networks. The author is not diminishing the importance of developing operators; however, a completely integrated effort also requires building partner capacity in maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and organizational sustainment processes to provide enduring effects.

This study addresses the topic of building Indigenous Forces' partner enabler capacity to determine the effectiveness of US Army Special Operations Command with building partner capacity¹⁰ and to help others understand the importance of building a self-sustaining partner force to produce enduring security effects. This monograph centers on a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) forces. It illuminates the on-going actions of a small Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF-P) working with units from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to demonstrate beneficial results

⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 July 2008), GL-8.

⁸Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

⁹*Ibid.*, x.

¹⁰Other US SOF have been and continue to be involved JSOTF-P, including Naval Special Warfare forces; however, this monograph focuses solely on US Army special forces' contribution to building partner capacity.

achieved through building partner capacity. Within JSOTF-P, the focus for this monograph is on US Army Special Forces and building enduring partner enabler capacity. Along with Plan Colombia, operations in the Horn of Africa and the Trans Sahara Sahel, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines is regarded as an example to be followed in conducting future partner capacity building missions.

In addition to drawing upon the extant secondary literature on the subject, this study includes interviews with former JSOTF-P Commanders, a 1st Special Forces Group Support Battalion Commander, a JSOTF-P Logistics Staff Officer, a JSOTF-P Medical Officer, and a JSOTF-P Special Forces Operations Officer. Three conclusions are drawn from examining the effectiveness of Army Special Operations Forces with building partner enabler capacity. First, logistics capacity is equally important for both developed and developing nations, yet with its vast logistics capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the United States has under-emphasized building enabler capacity of its partners. Second, logistics capacity building is critical to help partners and allies strengthen their security, overcome their military readiness challenges, and enable action to thwart security challenges. Third, US special forces are effective at building partner enabler capacity at the strategic and operational levels. However, minor adjustments at the tactical level will vastly improve building partner enabler capacity.

The USASOC Approach to Building Partner Capacity

USASOC's primary responsibility in building partner capacity (BPC) is leading US Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) operations to co-develop allied partners' security capacity. Specifically, USASOC is USSOCOM's force provider for executing BPC activities. USASOC through its subordinate command, US Army Special Forces Command (USASFC), applies sustained engagement with allied partners to collaboratively develop host nation security interests. The term co-develop illuminates a shared responsibility of security development between the US and partner nations. The US collaborates by, with, and through the partner nation

to enhance their security, governance, and economic development. Thus, USASOC maximizes the expertise of its Army special forces to partner with various nations to execute building partner capacity activities.

USASOC's construct for building partner capacity is identified through its supported role, supporting role, and tenets. First, USASOC's supported role in BPC suggests USASFC must enhance our partner's individual and unit proficiency in security operations. This is accomplished by building the allied partnered nation's capacity at the tactical, institutional, and ministerial levels. Next, USASOC's supporting role in BPC is the integration of Army special forces capabilities to support efforts led by other US government agencies. For example, the integration of special forces capabilities in response to natural disasters. Third, there are three building partner capacity tenets in which USASOC adheres (1) develop a comprehensive approach to partner capacity, (2) must exhibit sustained engagement, (3) and build partner interoperability with US special forces.

USASOC's supported role integrates the capabilities of special operations forces to support capacity building efforts on three levels: tactical, institutional, and ministerial.¹¹ At the tactical level, US special forces assist partners in developing their individual and unit proficiency in security operations. At the institutional level, US special forces assist partners in developing their capacity for training, professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. At the ministerial level, US special forces assist partners in developing security sector operations. This is accomplished through institutional training, professional education, force generation, sustainment, and security sector programs that professionalize the partner force to effectively strengthen its security operations.

¹¹Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), ix.

USASOC's supporting role in BPC is to integrate the capabilities of its special operations forces to support efforts led by other US government agencies. Specifically, Army special forces conduct specialized training to enhance the partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, humanitarian relief, and disaster response.¹² The supporting role includes assisting other US government agencies in developing partners' capacity to counter terrorism, drug and transnational crime, protect critical infrastructure, and respond to natural disasters.¹³ An example of this effort is US military support to the office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance when Typhoon Haiyan swept through the Philippines on November 8-9, 2013.¹⁴

There are three building partner capacity tenets. The first tenet is a comprehensive approach to partner capacity, which integrates the cooperative efforts of US government departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort.¹⁵ The second tenet is sustained engagement, which means that activities are conducted to increase partner capacity, provide visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to the combatant commander's security cooperation plans. Synchronized with US policy goals, USASOC's sustained engagement activities are conducted consistently over time.¹⁶ This tenet suggests US special forces must, over time, sustain

¹²Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, *US Army Functional Concept for Engagement* (Fort Eustis, VA: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2014), 13.

¹³Ibid., 14.

¹⁴"JSOTF-P Commander's Post-Mission Report of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response Support for Operation Damayan 10-22 November 2013," *Special Warfare 2*, no. 1 (January-March 2014): 53.

¹⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1-02.

¹⁶Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The United States Army Operating Concept* (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2010), 29.

engagements with partners beyond the near-term sourcing and budgeting processes. The end result fosters a co-development of security capacity, improvement in identifying current and emerging threats, and contributes to combatant command efforts in security cooperation. The third tenet, partner capacity, comprises activities that focus on attaining partner interoperability with US special forces to attain shared security objectives.¹⁷ This tenet suggests USASOC will leverage and integrate the capabilities of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and non-governmental partners in support of the joint force commander to achieve unity of effort and shared security objectives.¹⁸

USASOC's Building Partner Capacity Lines of Effort

Lines of effort (LOEs) link multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose, cause, and effect to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.¹⁹ As USSOCOM's lead component for FID, five LOEs apply to USASOC's role in building partner capacity.²⁰ The first line of effort involves the enhancement of allied partner's capacity to conduct security operations as demonstrated by subject matter expert exchanges, mobile training teams, and the integration of joint combined exercise training (JCETS). The second line of effort is the development of a partner nations' leaders through US Army education and training programs. The third line of effort illuminates the development of partners' sustaining institutions to create enduring security reform through USASOC's collective resources. The fourth line of effort

¹⁷Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, 13.

¹⁸Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, 13.

¹⁹Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

²⁰The five LOEs were derived from, and are consistent with, the *Army Security Cooperation Strategy*.

addresses cultivating long-term relationships with partner nations to assure country access in the event of an emergency. Finally, USASOC's fifth line of effort identifies supporting BPC efforts led by other US Government agencies as evidenced by partner nations' economic development, essential services, and rule of law.

USASOC's first BPC line of effort is to improve partners' capacity to conduct security operations. Proficiently trained partner units are better able to provide internal security of their nation and participate in coalition operations, if necessary.²¹ US special forces improve partners' individual and unit capabilities and capacities by efforts such as unit exercises, individual and unit exchanges, mobile training teams, and joining partner units in the field. Additionally, US special forces incorporate their personnel in training programs and host partner units to build security capacity. Within USASFC, the incorporation of partners during training is illustrated when conducting joint combined exercise training, known as JCETS.

Due to their regional expertise, Army special operations forces are assigned building partnership capacity through foreign internal defense (FID), counter-narcotics, and SFA training activities. Foreign internal defense is a comprehensive approach, involving the interaction of multinational, joint, Army and interagency efforts. FID is participation by government civilian and military agencies to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and terrorism.²² The US Special Operations Command is responsible for and has the authority to conduct FID. Therefore, US Army special operations forces maintain continuous regional

²¹Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, 13.

²²Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

engagement in each geographic combatant command conducting FID, counter-narcotics, and SFA training activities.²³

According to COL (Ret) David S. Maxwell, the definition of FID above describes the overall framework for OEF-P, the operations conducted by JSOTF-P in support of the Philippines and the collaboration with the US country team. It should also be noted that OEF-P and JSOTF-P did not use the Army/Marine manual on counterinsurgency (FM 3-24), because it was not published until 2006. Rather, they relied upon traditional US Army Special Forces and SOF doctrine that has been practiced for decades. This doctrinal foundation, combined with experience in the Philippines, including many pre-existing personal relationships, and the understanding of unconventional warfare, made SOF the appropriate force to plan and conduct OEF-P.²⁴




Figure 1. JSOTF-P Lines of Effort

²³Department of the Army, ADP 3-05.

²⁴David S. Maxwell, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 February 2014. David S. Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces Colonel, he served two tours in the Philippines commanding the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group on Basilan Island and later commanding the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.

Source: Provided to the author by COL (Ret) David S. Maxwell. Maxwell developed this when Commander of JSOTF-P.

Of equal importance, logistics is a critical component of FID and requires a comprehensive nesting of events from the initial stages of planning. Logistics operations during FID supports US and partner forces with medical, construction, maintenance, supply or transportation capabilities. US special forces typically operate in small force packages in austere environments. Therefore, logistical tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) provide an enduring method of overcoming sustainment challenges within austere environments.

USASOC's second BPC line of effort is the development of partner nation's leaders. Developing partners' leaders through training, leader interactions, and combined planning to support regional or global coalition operations is a critical component BPC. Army education and training programs are the primary instrument in this LOE. Military training teams, staff assistance visits, tabletop exercises, simulations, and other leader engagements and exchanges from US special forces are vital to developing our partner's leaders. A critical objective of this LOE is the development of a partner nation's commissioned and noncommissioned officers to manage complex missions that their operational environment may demand. To enable partners' leader development, US special forces foster an understanding of socio-cultural factors that help us identify potential partners, competitors, and adversaries.²⁵ This understanding includes expertise in foreign languages, regional knowledge, and cultural skills.²⁶ Similarly, Army educational institutions must have adequate resources and faculty to assist the next generation of military leaders. Army educational institutions have the capability to manage, preserve, and share socio-cultural information in support of activities that build partner capacity. This LOE suggests US

²⁵Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, 13

²⁶Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, xiv.

special forces identify and attain the professional military training requirements necessary to develop the ability of partners' leaders to conduct security operations.

USASOC's third BPC line of effort addresses the development of partners' sustaining institutions as vital to its enduring security reform. Institutions with the ability to train, educate, generate, sustain, and synchronize their professional security forces bolster its national defense. Therefore, US special forces strive to maintain its partners' efficiencies through the conduct of staff assistance visits and subject matter expert exchanges. The exchanges enable cooperative relationships among armies and assist partners in developing their institutional capacity to develop, maintain, sustain, and grow leaders within their security forces. This LOE suggests US special forces must be able to identify partners' specific requirements and possess the collective resources necessary to help build our partners' institutional capability and capacity.²⁷

USASOC's fourth BPC line of effort addresses cultivating long-term relationships to assure access to partner nations when required. The 2011 National Military Strategy declares that "we will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security."²⁸ Forming trusting relationships is vital to the long-term co-development of capacity that enhances security. Such efforts include ensuring coalition access to potential trouble spots. Enemies and adversaries will continue to develop technologies to impede access and deny critical areas to the US and coalitions. Assuring partners of continued US commitment to regional security is paramount to nurturing trust and confidence, strengthening partnerships, and promoting future cooperation. Consistent with strategic guidance and theater campaign plans, Army special operations forces demonstrate America's resolve to support regional security by

²⁷Department of the Army, TRADOC Pam 525-8-5, 13.

²⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

conducting or participating in bilateral, regional, and allied agreements, exercises, and military-to-military interactions. Furthermore, Army special operations forces must capitalize on opportunities such as staff talks, subject matter expert exchanges, and training exercises, and they must establish commitments to improve bilateral or regional security. In sum, this LOE suggests US special forces must establish formal and informal relationships with partners to gain access, enhance cooperation, and advance shared global security interests.

USASOC's fifth BPC line of effort identifies supporting activities led by other US Government agencies. The 2010 NSS calls for aggressive development to strengthen regional partners needed to help stop conflicts, counter global criminal networks, build a stable and inclusive global economy, advance democracy and human rights, and grow the ranks of prosperous, capable, and democratic states to address key global challenges.²⁹ The NSS also emphasizes efforts to address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and undermine the ability of governments to manage threats.³⁰ This LOE suggests US special forces must support efforts led by other US Government agencies to enhance partners' ability for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. In sum, the accomplishment of executing USASOC's LOEs are not feasible unless adequate resources are allocated to effectively build partner enabler capacity.

²⁹Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011).

³⁰Ibid.

THE ENABLERS OF BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

Logistics

General George Patton had an appreciation for the importance of logistics. In August 1944, after the Normandy landing while the allied offensive pushed through France toward Germany, General Patton's 3rd Army ran out of fuel and had to halt their advance.³¹ According to historian and author, Martin Van Creveld, numerous allied operations in the European Theater during World War II were initiated and subsequently canceled solely for logistical reasons.³² The example illuminates how logistics will constrain military operations if they are not properly developed and managed. Military operations depend on logistics across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Strategic logistics provides a nation with the ability to build, project, and sustain military power over time through its industrial base. Operational logistics is the sum of those activities and resources required to sustain campaigns and major operations. Tactical logistics is the provision of resources at a point of need to enable execution of military tasks. Each level of logistics is important and interdependent on the other to provide the right resources at the right time and place to move and sustain the force. According to former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen:

Historically, the United States has derived its military superiority from a remarkable ability to translate technological innovation, industrial capacity and a robust logistical architecture into effective battlefield advantages. This exceptional logistical capability represents a potent force multiplier for our Nation.³³

Numerous US partners around the world, beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, require assistance building their logistics capacity, however the United States does not focus on this aspect of

³¹Creveld, *Supplying War Logistics From Wallestein to Patton*, 211.

³²Ibid., 220-222.

³³Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 4-0, i.

building partner capacity.³⁴ In 2002, shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom began, Colonel Patrick Dulin, operations officer of I Marine Expeditionary Force, wrote that “the United States increasingly relies on coalitions in military operations. But not all coalition partners have the technology, funds, or logistics capabilities to work well with US forces.”³⁵ In 2006, US Marine Corps Regiment Combat Team 2 (RCT-2) identified logistics as the greatest challenge for Iraqi Security Forces.³⁶ In 2009, a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report stated that “Coalition forces in Iraq provide advisory support to help the Ministry of Defense bolster acquisition, storage, maintenance, and distribution systems; however, progress in developing self-sustaining logistics and maintenance systems is slower than anticipated and remains problematic.”³⁷

Furthermore, in December 2011, the DOD Deputy Inspector General reported that “it will take an intensive effort by the Coalition and the Afghan Ministry of Defense/General Staff (MoD/GS) to build an independent and sustainable Afghan National Army (ANA) logistics capability, a complex challenge made even more difficult given that the country’s security forces are at war. To succeed in this endeavor will take time, sufficient resources and strategic

³⁴Lieutenant Colonel Boyd A. Miller, USMC, “Building Partner Logistics Capacity” (Strategic Research Project, U.S Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2012), 4.

³⁵Colonel Patrick J. Dulin, USMC, “Finding the Friction Point in Coalition Logistics,” *Army Logistician* (March/April 2002): 9.

³⁶Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, Regimental Combat Team Headquarters: RCT-2 and RCT-6 in OIF 06-08, *A Summary of Lessons and Observations from Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2007-January 2008* (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 12 September 2008), 20.

³⁷Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam Mausner, *Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 31 October 2009), 119.

patience.”³⁸ In 2010, the Joint Staff J-4 published the *Joint Logistics Strategic Plan 2010-2014*, which provides direction to shape multinational logistics and “increase interaction with Multinational partners to build more defense and civilian capacity and capability.”³⁹ The construct is a viable attempt to address the issue of partner enabler capacity, however, the *Joint Logistics Strategic Plan* does not have vast visibility nor authority to shape theater strategic planning or security cooperation programs. By design, theater strategies and security cooperation plans are nested inside the concepts, guidance, and direction given from the strategic national level.⁴⁰

As USSOCOM strives to build partner capacity around the world, building partner nation logistics is essential. Logistics capacity is a strategic imperative for any nation attempting to strengthen its national defense because logistics is the key enabler determining what a nation can do militarily. USASFC is USASOC’s lead component for developing partner nations’ maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and sustainment capabilities. Without effective enabler capacity, partner nations are unable to conduct security operations over a 48 hour period without degradation to the force. Specifically, US special forces’ ability to build effective enabler capacity assists partner nations’ with mitigating an operational pause as a result of host nation security force culmination. Additionally, US special forces must ensure partner forces are logistically astute in planning maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and sustainment operations. Effective building partner enabler capacity allows allied forces to anticipate enabler

³⁸Kenneth P. Morefield, Report No. DODIG-2012-028, *Assessment of US Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army* (Alexandria, VA: US Department of Defense Inspector General, 9 December 2011), i.

³⁹Lieutenant General Kathleen M. Gainey, *J4 Joint Logistics Strategic Plan 2010-2014* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 9.

⁴⁰Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2001), III-7 and IV-5.

short-falls, thus mitigating risk by extending the operational reach⁴¹, tempo, and basing of partner nation security forces. The following case study will illuminate JSOTF-P's effectiveness with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) enabler capacity to thwart terrorist organizational threats. The case study will illustrate the vital aspect of building partner enabler capacity through maintenance, medical, engineering, and sustainment functions.

CASE STUDY OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES

Training and equipment activities are conducted with the Philippines to address terrorist and insurgent threats. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) began in May 2003 and is currently ongoing. The program's mission is to train and equip Philippine forces in conducting counter-terrorism operations. More specifically, the program is designed to counter the operations of the Islamist separatist group Abu Sayyaf and so doing deny a safe haven to al Qaida operatives in the region. The objectives link to (1) internal security, (2) border security, (3) and relationship building.⁴² According to former JSOTF-P Commander, Colonel (Ret) David Maxwell, OEF-P is a prototypical special warfare campaign in which Army SOF operated by, with, and through the Philippine security forces (military, intelligence, and police).⁴³

The US-led OEF-P is executed by Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC). At the height of OEF-P, FYs 2001-2004, building partner capacity resources totaled \$180 million from foreign military financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training

⁴¹Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP3-0). Operational reach is a tether; it is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power. The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point.

⁴²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 11 August 2001), III-7 and IV-5.

⁴³Maxwell, interview.

(IMET).⁴⁴ In FY 2005, the FMF share was just under \$30 million, and IMET funds totaled \$3 million.⁴⁵ Through OEF-P, Philippine units were trained in light infantry, night flying operations, combat and humanitarian engineering, and intelligence capabilities, with the United States providing equipment to support those training initiatives. Maritime equipment for interdiction purposes, radars for adjacent border surveillance, UH-1 Huey helicopters, and precision guided missiles are a few examples of the equipment provided to the Philippines using 1206 funds.⁴⁶ Overall, these efforts assist the Philippines government with addressing terrorist and insurgent threats. Conversely, building partner enabler capacity building efforts are less than desirable. The result is attributed to the Philippine government's resistance to allowing access and engaging in relationship building activities with the US

In sum, OEF-P was created at the end of 2001 to expand the capability of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to capture high value targets from key terrorist organizations. Security ties between the United States and the Philippines grew substantially, making it possible for the US military to increase its interaction with Philippine security forces in relationship building events. In addition to training and equipping the AFP for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, the US military also provided direct military assistance, as part of annual bilateral exercises with the AFP, to communities by engaging in engineering, medical, and

⁴⁴Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Nancy E. Blacker, Renee Buhr, James McFadden, and Cathryn Quantic Thurston, *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 73.

⁴⁵The level of IMET funds allocated to the Philippines is the largest in Asia and second largest in the world.

⁴⁶Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206"* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2012), 24.

dental activities.⁴⁷ The presumption was that the communities that received such assistance would be less likely to provide sanctuary to terrorists. This model is replicated elsewhere in the Philippines by US forces jointly with AFP.

As the regional enforcer of US defense strategy, USPACOM provides unity of effort and military resources to achieve US interests in the Asia Pacific. The USPACOM commander, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, translates strategic guidance from the President, secretary of defense, and chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) into his own vision and strategy. Subsequently, the chairman's vision is disseminated by theater strategy documents: the Pacific Theater Strategy, the theater campaign plan, and the theater security cooperation plan. Detailed analysis of these theater strategy documents reveals that logistics capacity building is not a specific task or line of effort.⁴⁸ The theater strategy documents thoroughly cover security cooperation, building partner capacity, and logistics support. However, the concept of building partner logistics is not a specified task. One could submit that building logistics capacity of partners and allies is implied and does not require identification as specified. Unfortunately, evidence suggests that partner logistics capacity in the Philippines is not adequate and US theater efforts are not focused on addressing the problem. In January 2012, the US Deputy of Defense Attaché in the Philippines stated:

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is hampered with an antiquated logistics management system that is not automated, and limited funds prevent them from budgeting and keeping required replacement parts on hand. Therefore, they often forego scheduled maintenance due to lack of, or misappropriation of, sustainment funds.⁴⁹

⁴⁷US Department of Defense, *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012), 2.

⁴⁸Miller, "Building Partner Logistics Capacity," 11.

⁴⁹Ibid.

Over the last three years, the Philippine Air Force's aircraft fleet has experienced a series of crashes, and some airframes were retired due to a lack of spare parts.⁵⁰

Other US military planners and program managers in the USPACOM AOR, from a 2012 survey, reinforce the statement above. According to Lieutenant Colonel Boyd Miller's survey, key stakeholders unanimously identified a requirement to build partner nation logistics capacity, and that logistics limitations are negatively affecting partner nation military readiness.⁵¹

The United States has conducted large joint training exercises with the Philippines since 1981 called the Balikatan exercises.⁵² In 2002, two Balikatan exercises were conducted, one from January through July and one from April through May.⁵³ The first exercise, Balikatan 2002-1, reportedly involved 1,650 US troops, including 150 US Army and Navy special operators.⁵⁴ This exercise was conducted on Basilan and Zamboagna islands in the southern Philippines areas where Abu Sayyaf frequently operates. The operation was intended to destroy the Abu Sayyaf Group and free an American missionary couple taken hostage in May 2001.⁵⁵ These operations were conducted by the Filipino military with the US serving in a training and advisory role. Various sources suggest operations by the Philippine armed forces "severely disrupted" and

⁵⁰Claire Taylor and Tom Rutherford, "Military Balance in South East Asia" (Research Paper 11/79, House of Commons Library, 14 December 2011), 42-45.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Charles H. Briscoe, "Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded US Special Forces Operations in the Philippines," *Special Warfare* (September 2004): 16-25.

⁵³Global Security, "Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines Balikatan 2002-1," GlobalSecurity.org, 16 March 2004, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan_02-1.htm (accessed 13 January 2014).

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵On June 6, 2002 the Philippine's military attempted to rescue the US hostages and US missionary Martin Burnham was killed in the attempt but his wife Gracia was wounded and later recovered.

“significantly reduced” the Abu Sayyaf Group.⁵⁶ The second exercise, Balikatan 2002-2, involving 2,665 US troops, was held on the island of Luzon and focused on civil military operations and a humanitarian assistance exercise.⁵⁷ The 2003 Balikatan exercise generated controversy in the United States and the Philippines when it was reported that US soldiers, US Marines, and US Special Forces with their Filipino counterparts would conduct or support combat patrols against Abu Sayyaf.⁵⁸ This proposed US participation in combat, allegedly sanctioned by both Philippine President Arroyo and the Bush administration, resulted in significant political opposition in the Philippines.⁵⁹ Balikatan 2003 was eventually modified to ensure that US forces would not participate in combat operations.

The United States has frequently conducted low-level training exercises with specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces.⁶⁰ The exercises, typically involving no more than 100 US Special Forces personnel at one time, focuses on the training of individuals and small units on the employment of specialized counterterrorism equipment provided to the Philippine Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Philippines is considered a major drug trans-shipment

⁵⁶Robert Nolan, “Terror in the Philippines,” *Foreign Policy Association Newsletter*, 6 March 2003; Charles H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on US Special Forces Operations During Balikatan 0201,” *Special Warfare* (September 2004): 55-57.

⁵⁷Global Security, “Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines Balikatan 2002-1,”

⁵⁸CBS News, “US Troops Aid Riles Philippines,” CBSNEWS.com, 21 February 2003; Eric Schmitt, “US Combat Force of 1,700 are headed to the Philippines,” *New York Times*, 22 February 2003.

⁵⁹CBS News, “US Troops Aid Riles Philippines,” CBSNEWS.com, 21 February 2003; Eric Schmitt, “US Combat Force of 1,700 are headed to the Philippines,” *New York Times*, 22 February 2003.

⁶⁰Information in paragraph from Charles H. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded US Special Forces Operations in the Philippines,” *Special Warfare* (September 2004): 16-25.

center and a major regional producer of marijuana.⁶¹ Thus, the United States began counter-drug training with the Philippines.

JSOTF-P and Building Partner Enabler Capacity

Former secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates emphasized, as mentioned in the introduction, the importance of building partner capacity in developing the effectiveness, credibility, and sustainability of its local partners in order to achieve real results.⁶² The on-going actions of JSOTF-P, working with AFP on various remote islands in the Sulu Archipelago illustrates what Gates meant by results. All US forces supporting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines operate under the Kapit Bisig Framework, a mutually agreed US and Government of the Republic of the Philippines accord by which JSOTF-P accomplishes its mission by, with, and through its partner forces. The task force does not engage in combat operations and does not operate from independent locations. Rather, they advise and assist Philippine security forces where they are, on Philippine government bases, compounds and outposts in jungles, villages and urban areas. As a result of JSOTF-P personnel not being decisively engaged in combat operations, US special forces should effectively train AFP in maintenance, medical, facility engineering, and sustainment operations. Thus extending the operational reach, tempo, and basing of AFP personnel actively engaged with al Qaida and various extremist networks.

Maintenance

On a day-to-day basis, the JSOTF-P focuses on supporting the AFP/PNP in deterring remaining terrorist groups and maintaining security gains earned over the previous ten years.

⁶¹“RP-US Troops Start Anti-Narcoterrorism Exercise,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, 31 August 2004.

⁶²Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” 22.

However, the AFP cannot maintain operational tempo without effective maintenance operations of its wheeled fleet. Moreover, AFP maintenance⁶³ operations are conducted by an organic Forward Service Support Unit (FSSU) within either the Western or Eastern Mindanao Command structures and areas of responsibility. AFP maintenance operations rely heavily upon BDAR⁶⁴ and the ability of mechanics to cannibalize parts from other sources. The M35 5-ton vehicle, US made, is the primary troop transport platform with the M1097 HMMWV as the primary combat operations platform. There are four Philippine depots for M-35 parts at the national level. However, the depots do not have adequate bench stock storage levels of the common use M-35 and M1097 items thus hindering its maintenance program. The US government provides assistance with procurement of these vehicles through FME, however, it is the AFP's discretion to fund repair parts and spares to maintain their fleet. Bench and shop stocks are primarily non-existent as AFP mechanics often buy parts locally which provides a limited stock for vehicles but none for weapons systems or NVDs. Repair parts are a mix of commercially procured items modified for use on military vehicles and parts cannibalized from older fleet stock as modern equipment is introduced through FMS cases or AFP procurement. Furthermore, parts requisitioning and reporting are not formalized throughout the AFP. Clearly, there is a requirement for US special forces to build the AFP's field maintenance capacity to enhance their repair parts program.

⁶³Maintenance is all actions taken to retain materiel in serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspection, testing, servicing, and classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding, recapitalization, reset, and reclamation

⁶⁴Battle Damage Assessment & Repair (BDAR) is a procedure used to rapidly return disabled equipment to the operational commander by expediently fixing, by-passing, or juryrigging components.

Medical

An advanced trauma life support capability does not reside within the AFP. Specifically, the AFP experiences challenges regarding the conduct of casualty treatment and evacuation operations. Therefore, US special forces with the assistance of the JUSMAG-P are building the capability and capacity to sustain forces in combat with Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) or Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) terrorist organizations. In an effort to mitigate the medical deficiency, US special forces within JSOTF-P established a partnership between Filipino and US medical personnel (SF medics and doctors) to organize, train, and equip a first responder capability. The following vignette offered by COL (Ret) Maxwell illustrates the impact of US special forces building partner medical capacity:

The US special forces element provided emergency medical technician (EMT) training and an NGO donated refurbished ambulances from the US. One week after the first responder training was complete an AFP Captain and Corporal were ambushed by the ASG and the first responders arrived in time to save both their lives.⁶⁵

Furthermore, the impact of US special forces with building partner enabler capacity of medical treatment was vital during AFP operations against ASG forces. The following vignette provided by COL Fran Beaudette, former commander of JSOTF-P, illuminates the importance of building partner medical capacity.⁶⁶ On 28 July 2011, two platoons of AFP marines infiltrated into an historical Abu Sayyaf Group encampment located on Jolo Island that held an estimated 100 ASG and Jemaah Islamiyah members and affiliates. In the darkness of the early morning, the marines observed several men walking with flashlights. Both the darkness and terrain hid a series of traps and prepared defensive positions along the high ground to the left and right flanks of the

⁶⁵Maxwell, interview.

⁶⁶COL Fran Beaudette, former JSOTF Commander, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 February 2014.

AFP marines. At approximately 0400 the AFP initiated contact, focusing their fire on the activity to the front. The marines immediately took heavy automatic rifle fire and 40mm grenades from both flanks. The initial exchange killed two marines and wounded several others; both AFP corpsmen, the only medics in the formation, were among the fallen. One heroic platoon commander directed both platoons into a dry creek bed and the maintained a forward perimeter with four others to cover their withdrawal. After the firefight these five men were found dead and decapitated. The remaining elements of the two platoons suffered two killed in action and 21 wounded in action – most of them with gunshot wounds. By 0830, the AFP Sulu Island Command and American advisors from JSOTF-P began responding to a mass casualty situation.

Thirteen kilometers separated the wounded in action soldiers from the nearest AFP trauma center on Camp Bautista, the main Filipino military base on Jolo Island. Units from the Philippine Air Force evacuated all 21 patients from the encounter site to the Helicopter Landing Zone on Camp Bautista in a period of four hours. Once the patients reached the HLZ, AFP and U.S advisors facilitated transportation to the local treatment center, where Filipino doctors and five members of a US Air Force Surgical Team conducted triage, treatment and minor surgery. From the trauma center, both PAF and US aviation assets moved the critically injured patients to two different medical centers in Zamboanga City, 155 kilometers north of Camp Bautista. JSOTF-P's efforts on July 28 provide a snapshot of what Gates meant by "real results" from integrated training and assistance efforts to partner nation forces. Medical training between US and AFP personnel provided requisite individual and collective skills for casualty treatment and evacuation. Moreover, Special Forces detachments have lived and worked with the Filipino forces on Jolo Island since 2003. Part of this relationship provided consistent training on first aid, self-care, buddy aid, and patient triage. The results of this exchange were evident on July 28 when all 21 wounded marines arrived at the Camp Bautista landing zone. All AFP wounded arrived with the majority of their wounds dressed. Several had pressure dressings and those with

severe extremity wounds had a tourniquet applied. Many of the dressings and tourniquets were makeshift out of ripped cloth and sticks, and the soldiers with severe wounds had Quickclot on the wound. Despite the loss of their organic corpsmen in the initial engagement, AFP marines demonstrated proficiency in first aid and their unilateral efforts saved lives. Dr. Stephen Fenton, US Air Force Major, stated “the MASCAL was conducted as well as those in which I have participated at Combat Surgical Hospitals in Afghanistan and stateside Level I trauma centers.”⁶⁷ This was a joint, combined, special operations effort with both US and Filipino medical and non-medical personnel. Due to the interoperability of US and AFP forces and the constant communication and coordination by JSOTF-P, all AFP casualties who arrived at the trauma center survived. On Jolo Island, the effects of “well integrated training and assistance efforts” at the tactical level achieved “real results” by saving Philippine marine lives.⁶⁸ AFP actions at the point of injury and during casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) to Camp Bautista illustrate the long-term effects of consistent medical training by US SOF. The collaboration that took place at the HLZ and at the trauma center shows the synergistic results of combined efforts by US and partner nation military forces. Finally, the precise application of professional US military capability in the operational region and during medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) for the critically wounded, illustrates how US efforts can make our partners stronger.

Engineering

In the Philippines, a facilities engineer typically has hands-on responsibility for the electrical engineering, maintenance, environmental, health, safety, energy, controls and

⁶⁷Major Stephen Fenton, a former JSOTF-P Surgeon, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 February 2014.

⁶⁸Ibid.

instrumentation, civil engineering, and HVAC needs.⁶⁹ The need for expertise in these categories varies widely depending on whether the facility is, for example, a single-use site or a multi-use campus; whether it is an office, school, hospital, processing or production plant. To date, the AFP does not have enough trained facility engineers to provide services at assigned compounds. Thus, the capability is outsourced to host nation facility engineers, which is costly. Conversely, AFP often requests personnel assistance from JSOTF-P's Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees) to provide technical support. Due to a high volume of requests from the AFP, JSOTF-P through US special forces and Seabees are building partner facility engineering capacity.

The following vignette offered by COL (Ret) Maxwell illustrates the impact of US special forces building partner engineering capacity.

One of the camps did not have a good water system; therefore, AFP soldiers would manually haul water up to the camp. Our US Special Forces team assessed the situation and found a good water source two kilometers away on the other side of the village. The US SF team convinced their AFP counterparts that they should build a water system from the source to the camp. In the nearby village, there was a huge cistern that had been constructed by an NGO but no one ever followed through and built a running water system. So the US SF team bought a small pump, several kilometers of PVC pipe, and valves to construct a water system. The US SF team hired local labor from the village and convinced the Baranguay Captain (village mayor) that he should invest in a water system for the village. The water system their AFP and US SF team constructed was by a cistern and they put a valve in it to divert water and keep the cistern filled. When the Baranguay Captain purchased their own PVC pipe, the Filipino and US SF engineers helped the village design a gravity-fed running water system. Needless to say, the village people were endeared to the AFP and US forces who provided tremendous support to them.⁷⁰

Essentially, the engineering capability and capacity of the AFP demonstrated legitimacy and allowed them to build relationships with the local village. Subsequently, the engineering effort built AFP trust with the village people and thus assisting with human intelligence gathering against the ASG and MILF.

⁶⁹Bernard T. Lewis and James P. Marron, *Facilities and Plant Engineering Handbook* (McGraw-Hill, 1973).

⁷⁰Maxwell, interview.

Sustainment

In support of US strategic objectives in the Philippines, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is a vital US government agency in direct support of building AFP enabler capacity through foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), and international military education and training (IMET) initiatives. The foreign assistance program through DSCA is a strategic level enabler to support the AFP tactical operator. The Building Partner Capacity Division of DSCA executes many of the DOD Title 10 security cooperation programs at the strategic level. The program includes 1206 Global Train and Equip, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF). BPC Division also administers the State Department's International Military Education & Training (IMET) program, and the sale or grant of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

In the years prior to the base closures of Clark and Subic Airfields, the United States had little interest in what the AFP did with its grant money.⁷¹ The US policy makers and military advisors were mostly concerned with the complicated business of coordinating and ensuring the efficient flow of US grant aid to the AFP. Unlike today, where Foreign Military Financing is prescriptive, grants to the Philippines prior to 1991 were largely focused on combat systems without much thought to spare parts, technical training, life cycle management, and general logistics sustainment of those systems.⁷² In addition to FMF and technical support, the AFP had become dependent upon US Excess Defense Articles (EDA). In the US system, excess equipment

⁷¹US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is not a check written to a foreign government, and is almost impossible to use for anything other than its intended purpose. Many Americans, and many senior US and foreign defense officials do not realize that FMF grants are managed in the US, and these funds never leave the country, and cannot be 'misappropriated' by the foreign beneficiary.

⁷²Charles Ken Comer, "Philippine Defense Reform: Are we there yet?" 18 October 2003, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Philippine_Defense_Reform.pdf (accessed 10 October 2013).

is turned in or stored by the services. Under this system, the US Congress may grant a request by a foreign power for EDA. US origin equipment, such as small arms, M113 armored personnel carriers, M35 2.5 ton trucks, UH-1 helicopters and all types of ammunition, spare parts, matched with US technical expertise already present in the Philippines, kept the AFP able to keep the insurgencies in Mindanao and their ongoing struggle with Communist revolutionary forces contained.⁷³

From 1999 to 2003, Philippine and US defense planners conducted a series of assessments with respect to AFP's capability to perform its essential missions, including internal security operations, territorial defense, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, search and rescue, maritime security, support to national development, and support to regional and global initiatives. In October 1999, the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) began as a policy level discussion between the Philippine Secretary of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense. In the same year, an assessment process formally commenced under the Philippine-US Defense Experts Exchange, where a delegation from the Philippine Department of National Defense (DND) went to the US Department of Defense to explore ways to undertake a joint AFP capability assessment. In 2000, the AFP along with Subject Matter Experts from PACOM, conducted a qualitative capability assessment, which produced an initial JDA. The 2001 Joint Defense Assessment provided an objective evaluation of Philippine defense capability and allowed an external observer to aptly and accurately recognize deficiencies and to independently evaluate them. The JDA was jointly undertaken for the shared interest of enhancing defense and security relations between treaty allies. As such, the JDA was a Philippine-led and US-assisted endeavor. Through this assessment, both nations worked closely to understand and align their

⁷³The New People's Army (NPA) is the longest running communist insurgency worldwide, at 38 years and ongoing.

mutual interests to better address current and emerging threats. However, the AFP and DND were not content with the process.

The dialogue on Philippine defense capabilities was elevated to the strategic level during President Arroyo's May 2003 visit to Washington, D.C.⁷⁴ During the visit, President Arroyo requested US assistance in conducting a strategic assessment of the Philippine defense system as part of a larger defense reform agenda. This led to a follow-up Joint Defense Assessment and formulation of recommendations addressing deficiencies found in the Philippine defense structure. The results of the 2003 JDA were devastating. The JDA findings revealed that the AFP was only partially capable of performing its most critical missions. Moreover, the results pointed overwhelmingly toward institutional and strategic deficiencies as being the root cause of most of the shortcomings. A common thread in all was the lack of strategy-based planning that would focus DND/AFP on addressing priority threats and link capability requirements with the acquisition process. Specifically, the JDA revealed critical deficiencies in the specific sustainment areas of supply and maintenance; acquisition; defense expenditures and budgeting; personnel management; quality assurance for existing industrial base; and infrastructure support.⁷⁵ Also included in the JDA findings were critical operational/near-term deficiencies in the following capabilities: operations and training; intelligence; logistics; communications; civil-military operations; and information operations.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Philippine Defense Reform Handbook, 2008.

⁷⁵BGEN Aurelio B. Baladad, *Philippine Defense Reform Monthly Update* (Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, Philippines: JUSMAG-P, January 2008).

⁷⁶Philippine Defense Reform Handbook, 2008.

Finally, the JDA results indicated deficiencies in critical supporting functional areas such as medical support, engineering, finance, acquisition, manpower, and infrastructure.⁷⁷ As mentioned earlier, in October 1999, the US DOD and Philippine DND initiated policy level discussions aimed at finding the best way to assist the Philippines in the development of a credible defense capability. In 2003, the JDA initiated action for Department of State military grant aid programs to improve the AFP's critical vulnerability, its lack of mobility platforms to conduct operations around the archipelago. Thus, two major Security Assistance Programs, the Mobility Maintenance Program (MMP) and Counter-Terrorism (CT) Programs were established. First, the Mobility Maintenance Program, a plan developed by US PACOM and the US Embassy's Joint US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG-Philippines) developed a five year plan to improve the AFP key mobility systems and presented it to US Department of State's FY02 Foreign Military Finance (FMF) grant consideration. The Mobility Maintenance Program (MMP) originally funded logistics and maintenance support for AFP's four major mobility systems; M35 2.5 ton trucks, 78' Fast Patrol Craft, C-130 aircraft and UH-1H helicopters and included: spare parts for all four systems; programmed depot maintenance for C-130 aircraft; planned restrictive availabilities (depot level) and emergent restrictive availabilities for 78' Fast Patrol Crafts; and an eight-man technical assistance field team.

The Mobility Maintenance Program (MMP), focused on AFP maintenance and logistics, was to improve mobility in support of the War on Terror; the intent was to assist AFP over a short term with these systems. Additionally, the MMP assisted the AFP with oversight of cannibalization of these systems with adequate time to efficiently budget for equipment life cycles, operational costs, and appropriate maintenance program improvements. The original FMF funding allocation was \$19 million in 2002, \$20 million in 2003, and then reduced to only \$5

⁷⁷Comer.

million in 2006 while the AFP gradually took over funding responsibilities for their system's operational readiness. However, by 2005 the United States sustained MMP funding levels without any corresponding contributions.⁷⁸ In order to prepare for eventual Philippine funding, the JUSMAG and AFP J4 (Logistics Officer) immediately established the appropriate FMS cases to support elements of the Mobility Maintenance Program. The MMP commenced with adequate FMS cases and a Technical Assistance Field Team deployed to the Philippines in early 2003.

By 2005, concurrent with the overall PDR effort, the Technical Assistance Field Team was included in the PDR and renamed the PDR Logistics Team (PDR-LT), which included an expansion of their original focus and provided additional technical support in equipment areas of M101/102 Howitzers, MG-520 helicopters, OV-10 aircraft, logistics automation, supply warehousing, and general aircraft technical support. Funding the PDR-LT was included in the United States FMF contribution to the PDR of \$4.2 million for 2007 and later included in PDR Program 6 (Logistics). The selected AFP systems experienced all time high operational readiness rates largely because the Mobility Maintenance Program made it necessary to maintain readiness if the AFP was to continue combat engagement with enemy forces. However, while respected for their technical expertise and assistance to the AFP, the PDR-LT was a source of irritation to the AFP. Mainly, the AFP did not appreciate PDR-LT's unbiased reporting on their actual materiel readiness as a necessary means to fully develop a logistical architecture to sustain the AFP. However, once the US funding ceased, the Department of National Defense (DND) and AFP made the decision not to fund the PDR-LT, but rather constitute their own support to the Maintenance Mobility Plan by funding Foreign Military Sales cases that provided spare parts and

⁷⁸This was a deliberate decision by the US Embassy and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Technical Assistance Field Team began to report the AFP readiness reports to the AFP's Chief of Staff (Cos), which caused a great deal of discomfort amongst senior AFP officials as unflattering readiness results, frequently contrary to their own more inflated assessments, were reported to their bosses.

services for the program.⁷⁹ The PDR-LT completed its mission and departed the Philippines in early 2009.

Second, the Counter-Terrorism (CT) Programs are vital elements of the overall BPC construct. The initial US response to the September 2001 attacks was to grant a massive influx of FMF grants and funds to front-line terrorist states.⁸⁰ With its ongoing struggle with the Abu Sayyaf, who were still engaging in kidnapping, the Philippines greatly benefited from unexpected US contributions. In FY 02, the Philippines was the recipient of \$25 million in Counter-Terrorism (CT) related FMF funds, followed by a \$30 million infusion in the FY03 budget. The special CT Foreign Military Financing was intended to create direct action counter-terrorist capabilities and support for the AFP, who did not have that capability. This financing, under US oversight, was utilized to fund the creation, training, and equipping of three Light Reaction Companies, six Light Infantry Battalions, Philippine Naval Special Operations teams, Philippine Intelligence Modernization, and Night Vision Capable UH-1H helicopters.⁸¹

The FY 2014 request includes \$9.5 million to support the Philippines Office for the Pacific. Specifically, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs support the Administration's and the Armed Forces of the Philippines' (AFP) increasing emphasis on regional maritime security. FMF will expand the AFP's capability to effectively patrol and govern its extensive maritime domain. Through FMF and related military engagement, the United States will continue to develop effective monitoring, detection, and interdiction capabilities. These capabilities also increase the AFP's capacity to respond to natural disasters and provide humanitarian assistance.

⁷⁹Comer.

⁸⁰Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, (Arlington, VA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, April 2013), 52.

⁸¹Ibid.

Key Interventions

FMF programs will build the skills needed to operate and maintain larger and more complex ships and systems now entering the Philippine military, as well as sustain current inventory levels.⁸² Furthermore, US assistance will improve the Philippine military's C4 (command, control, communications, computers) and ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) capabilities. These skills are essential for cohesive operations among the AFP's geographically dispersed units.⁸³ In addition to Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a critical element to building partner enabler capacity. International Military Education and Training (IMET) exposes defense establishment partners to US military training and doctrine to promote democratic values, build capacity, increase the professionalization of the forces, and build lasting military-to-military relationships.⁸⁴ The IMET program is an essential tool for the successful achievement of key US policy objectives in the Philippines. FY 2014 IMET remains aligned with both US and Philippine priorities on territorial defense and maritime security. It will balance critically short term maritime technical training with long term professional military education. According to COL Maxwell, a significant number of Philippine Officers attend IMET in the US; however, we should not mirror image their Professional Military Education (PME) with our PME framework.⁸⁵

⁸²Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, (Arlington, VA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, April 2013), 52.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., 42.

⁸⁵Maxwell, interview.

Enduring Effects

On any given day the JSOTF-P supports the government of the Philippines operations in more than a dozen locations throughout the country, working closely with counterparts in the military, police, political, religious, and civilian realms. This support is synchronized with the overarching US government objective in country. Fundamentally, this holistic integration between the US Government and respective Filipino partners, from the strategic to tactical level, has been the key to success. While the Philippines may present a unique operational environment challenge, this model of full integration and strategic focus on the outcome by both the U.S and our partner nation government is paramount. As previously noted, transnational terrorist organizations have historically been able to thrive in the southern Philippines due to historic issues of separatist fighting, a frail economy, land disputes, and imbalanced government influences. A long-term solution requires resolving these issues. A solution also requires continued pressure by our partner nation security forces on terrorist groups despite their constrained resource environment and competing requirements. The GRP, with JSOTF-P assistance as required, will attain internal peace and security in the southern Philippines and continue to deny sanctuary to al Qaeda affiliated transnational terrorists who had been operating freely in and around its borders.

CONCLUSION

Three conclusions are drawn from examining the effectiveness of Army Special Operations Forces with building partner enabler capacity in the case of OEF-P. First, logistics capacity is equally important for both developed and developing nations, yet with its vast logistics capability at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the USASOC has under-emphasized building this capacity of its partners. Second, logistics capacity building is critical to help partners and allies strengthen their security, overcome their military readiness challenges, and enable action to address security challenges. Many US partners around the world, beyond

Iraq and Afghanistan, require assistance with building their logistics capacity. However, the United States does not focus on this aspect of security cooperation.⁸⁶ By design, theater strategies and security cooperation plans are nested inside the concepts, guidance, and direction given from the strategic level.⁸⁷

Third, Army special operations forces are effective at building partner enabler capacity at the strategic and operational levels. Primarily, US special forces by, with, and through a whole of government approach are able to maximize foreign military financing and foreign military sales to provide AFP the equipment and life-cycle replacement sustainment packages for partnered forces. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) through the Department of State is a vital asset to successful partner enabler development at the strategic and operational environment. Specifically, in OEF-P, JSOTF-P leverages an indirect approach through the Department of State's chief of mission, the Joint US Military Assistance Group—Philippines (JUSMAG) and the Philippine National level leadership to acquire equipment and enablers to sustain enduring AFP security of the nation. However, evidence from this study supports the conclusion that US special forces are less effective at building partner enabler capacity at the tactical level. Based on the OEF-P case study, there is a direct correlation between resources and logistics capability. The AFP have the capability to execute short duration operations within the Joint Operating Area, however, they lack the capability to sustain operations over 48 hours to provide an adequate land defense capability which provides a secure environment uninviting to transnational terrorism.

Along with Plan Colombia, operations in the Horn of Africa and the Trans Sahara Sahel, Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines is regarded as an example of a successful anti-terror operation. The underlying focal point for the comparisons are continuous successful operations

⁸⁶Miller, "Building Partner Logistics Capacity," 4.

⁸⁷Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 5-0, III-7 and IV-5.

conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines with or without US support. There are no unilateral US operations in the Philippines; thus US forces actually conduct operations in a supporting role vice being in the lead. One of the key principles that guides the operations of the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines is an understanding of and a respect for sovereignty. The most important aspect of this mission is US forces are not doing the fighting. Primarily, US special forces are providing assistance to the Philippine security forces to allow them to successfully fight terrorist organizations. Thus, US special forces “by, with, and through” Philippine forces contribute to mutually beneficial US and Philippine strategic objectives. Unfortunately, the same enthusiasm is not replicated in terms of building enduring partner enabler capacity in regards to logistics.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Contrary to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US special forces in OEF-P have the ability to effectively build partner enabler capacity because they are not in the lead when conducting combat operations. Because US special forces are not in the lead, it allows freedom of maneuver to effectively build enduring logistics capacity from the user to direct support levels. US special forces can develop an effective logistical framework from the user to direct support levels through their organic Special Forces Group Support Battalion’s personnel and assets. During the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, Group Support Battalion personnel were focused on supporting their own special operations forces and did not invest adequate time or resources with training partnered forces in logistics. Often, the Group Support Battalion does not have the military occupational specialty (MOS) capacity to provide subject matter expertise in all areas of logistics because of other world-wide security requirements. Therefore, the author recommends leveraging logistics subject matter experts from the corresponding regionally aligned brigade structures. The employment of regionally aligned Brigade Support Battalion personnel provides value-added subject matter experts to augment Group Support Battalion personnel shortages. Bear in mind, the

intent is to maintain a small footprint of logisticians to provide the non-doctrinal term of Logistical Foreign Internal Defense (LOGFID). Repeatedly, our partners' logistical process of manning and MOS proficiency, at all levels, hinders progress in logistics operations.

This research primarily focused on building partner enabler capacity at the strategic and operational levels. Specifically, it addressed how the Department of State and Department of Defense leverage primarily foreign military financing and foreign military sales to build the logistics capacity of US partner nations. However, additional research is required to effectively build a partner forces' logistical system to extend its operational reach during combat operations. More importantly, the AFP must develop cost effective maintenance and supply systems to repair and replace equipment over its pre-determined life-cycle. Our partner forces are heavily relying on US logisticians to execute planning and operations for them. Additional research reference the capacity to build logistics planning processes is vital for our partner forces to truly provide enduring security effects for their respective nations.

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