

OPERATING IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN  
LESSONS OF A DECADE OF WAR  
FOR THE DUTCH ARMY

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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## ABSTRACT

OPERATING IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN, LESSONS OF A DECADE OF WAR FOR THE DUTCH ARMY, by Major Antonius JC Selhorst, 117 pages.

Recent missions of Western Armies took place among the people, in foreign countries with very diverse cultures, while they had no clear understanding of the physical, cultural, and social environments that constitute the human domain. The United States (US) Armed Forces study “Decade of War” identifies trends during the 2001-2013 era of war on operating in this human domain, which ask for a fundamental change of doctrine, to address the root cause. Currently the Dutch Army (Royal Netherlands Army) tries to learn from the last decade of war too. Their lessons identified on the tactical level are comparable to those of the US Army. Because of the smaller scale of deployments, absence of a trends and root cause study, and lack of lessons on operational and strategic level, the Dutch Army missed some of the US lessons and the root cause. This thesis’ purpose is to help the Dutch Army to identify the trends in their lessons identified on operating in the human domain, including the root cause, and the feasibility of the US solutions, including those to address the root cause: a human domain and warfighting function “Engagement” in doctrine.

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## ACRONYMS

DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and education, Personnel, and Facilities
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PMESII	Political Military Economic Social Infrastructure Information
SFIR	Stabilization Force Iraq
US	United States



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Conflict, in all its forms, remains a fundamentally human endeavor. Destroying infrastructure and weaponry can shape an adversary's decisions, but rarely delivers a decisive outcome. Success depends as much on understanding the social and political fabric of the surroundings as it does on the ability to physically dominate them. In an environment defined by the intermingling of friends, enemies, and neutral parties, understanding social and cultural networks becomes just as important as the weapons we employ.

— General Ray Odierno, *The Force of Tomorrow*

#### Background

The Royal Netherlands Army, commonly known as the Dutch Army, and the Royal Marines have recently ended their current mission in Afghanistan and they left Iraq some years ago. At the same time the United States of America ended her more than a decade long deployment in Iraq, and will end her mission in Afghanistan soon. In order to prepare for future missions, both armies rely on lessons from these previous missions. One of the main lessons from these complex missions is that they took place among the people, in foreign countries with very diverse cultures.<sup>1</sup> In order to end their missions successfully, the United States (US) and Dutch land forces (Army, Marines and Special Forces) fought and won countless battles. Although these battles contribute to a

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<sup>1</sup>General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 5.

successful strategic outcome, ultimately it is the clash of human wills that has to be won to end a war.<sup>2</sup>

Western armies engage with a focus on technology and a tendency to view conflicts as a technical problem. Doctrine and military theory focus on the physical domains of air, sea, and land to defeat the opponent, and they overlook that war is a human enterprise.<sup>3</sup> Although humans conduct war with all kinds of weaponry, it above all is a clash of wills.<sup>4</sup> A clash between civilizations with humans, by humans, led by humans, with their own culture, feelings, interests, fears, honor, will and goals to achieve.<sup>5</sup> In Western Armies, there is no clear understanding of the importance of the human domain and there is no full understanding of the physical, cultural, and social environments that constitute the human domain.<sup>6</sup>

Future missions with US and Dutch land forces will most likely again take place among people in countries around the world with very different cultures.<sup>7</sup> These missions will be conducted in an unfamiliar foreign environment, with many entities present and

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<sup>2</sup>General Raymond T. Odierno, General James F. Amos, and Admiral William H. McRaven, *Strategic Landpower, Winning the Clash of Wills* (Washington, DC: Headquarters of the Army, Marines and Special Operations, 2013), 7.

<sup>3</sup>Frank Hoffman and Michael Davies, “Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?” *Small Wars Journal* (10 June, 2013): 1.

<sup>4</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

<sup>5</sup>Hoffman and Davies, 1.

<sup>6</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 2.

<sup>7</sup>Lt General M. de Kruijf, “Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment” (Point paper, Headquarters of the Army, Utrecht, The Netherlands, September 2013), 2.

multiple types of threats.<sup>8</sup> The mission theatres will probably contain state and non-state actors of whom some will conduct hybrid warfare without rules of engagement. Added to this complex environment is the ability for the state and non-state actors to operate cross border, physically, and virtually.<sup>9</sup> The success of future operations, on strategic, operational, and tactic levels will depend on the ability to understand, influence and control the human domain in order to enhance local and regional stability.<sup>10</sup>

The land forces are traditionally those who operate among the people and therefore part of the human domain. They are certainly not the only ones that are able to influence in the human domain. Air and maritime forces can conduct influence operations in the human domain to support land forces. Next to this, human interaction takes place in multiple dimensions, such as the internet and social media, whereas Cyber forces can support the land forces too.<sup>11</sup> The land forces will remain the supported force, and will therefore be the lead force, and have to take the human domain in to account on an operational and tactical level.

The theatre headquarters and the Government Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Development, are those who traditionally operate on the military and political strategic level.<sup>12</sup> Although land forces conduct battles and stabilization operations on

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<sup>8</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 3.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 6.

<sup>12</sup>The Dutch equivalent for a government department is a ministry. The Dutch equivalent for the US State Department is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

tactical and operational levels to contribute to a strategic success, a genuine strategic success depends on winning the clash of wills.<sup>13</sup> Military and civilian advisors on a strategic level must understand the role of the human dimension to be able to advise the elected policy makers, who have a final say on war, peace and diplomacy.<sup>14</sup>

According to the 2013 Dutch National Defense Strategy “In the interest of the Netherlands,” the Dutch land forces must be able to conduct future missions across the entire spectrum of violence, and cope with different types of threats and risks, within the Kingdom, or abroad.<sup>15</sup> The Dutch land forces are equipped with basic and niche capacities to be used within alliances. Basic capacities are land bound amphibious, air assault, and mechanized units. Niche capacities are the Netherlands/German Army Corps staff and the Civil Military Interaction Command.<sup>16</sup> The latter is a joint unit integrating Dutch influence capabilities, while the first is a pioneer within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the comprehensive approach. This approach encompasses comprehensive engagement with nations, institutions, and peoples around the world to protect and advance the national interests with a whole-of-government approach that includes defense, diplomacy, development, and other tools of national power.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>14</sup>David Vergun, “Influencing Narrative, Human Behavior Key to National Security,” *Army News Service*, 28 August 2013, [http://www.army.mil/article/110179/Influencing\\_narrative\\_\\_human\\_behavior\\_key\\_to\\_national\\_security/](http://www.army.mil/article/110179/Influencing_narrative__human_behavior_key_to_national_security/) (accessed 24 September 2013).

<sup>15</sup>J. Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defense, *In Het Belang Van Nederland* [in the Interest of the Netherlands] (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 5.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., 25.

<sup>17</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 1.

The Dutch Army, Marines and Special Forces will operate in, and influence the human domain. They will do so in all phases of conflict within human networks, be they physical or cyber related, on a tactical, operational, and strategic level. The current five phases of conflict range from a deteriorating situation, preparing for military action, major combat, stabilization, and finally return to civilian control.

To state that land forces have to operate in the human domain, on a tactical, operational, and strategic level, and higher headquarters in the human domain on the strategic and Governmental level, in order to be successful in missions, is easier said than done. This also accounts for stating that armies and their leaders must learn from previous missions.<sup>18</sup> The complexity lies in how and what to learn. At this moment it is unclear how the United States, Netherlands, and other Western countries can really learn to operate in the human domain as most armies struggle with the concept of the human domain. It will absolutely require a broad set of solutions, broader than doctrine and theory itself, to operate in the human domain.<sup>19</sup>

The commanders of the United States Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces released a White Paper in May 2013 titled “Strategic Landpower, Winning the Clash of Wills” stating that they want to expand the dialogue around the social sciences of warfare and the human domain, and formed a special Task Force for this reason.<sup>20</sup> This Task Force will study four major issues. The first issue is to look into the role of the land forces. Second, they will evaluate why past tactical and operational

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<sup>18</sup>Vergun.

<sup>19</sup>de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*, 2.

<sup>20</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 1.

successes did not always achieve strategic outcomes. Third, the Task Force will evaluate the necessity for identifying and achieving human objectives on tactical and operational levels. Last, they will look into the social sciences of warfare and review the need for a new warfighting function named “Engagement.”

In September 2013 the Commander of the Dutch Army released the point paper “Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment,” stating he also wants his army to learn from the discussion around the human domain.<sup>21</sup> Because of limited duration and level of participation of past Dutch deployments, the Dutch Armed Forces are probably not able to identify all the lessons concerning the social sciences of warfare on a comparable scale as the US Armed Forces. There is a significant chance that the Dutch Army can learn from the Task Force’s study as the Dutch land forces operate in similar missions with similar doctrine. It is therefore most valuable for the Dutch Army and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development, who participate in stabilization missions, to develop new insights for their organizations, based on the US Army lessons learned on operating in the human domain.

#### Research questions

Primary research question: What can the Dutch Army learn from the current United States Army developments in operating in the human domain?

Secondary research questions:

1. What US Army lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower?”

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<sup>21</sup>de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*, 1.



2. What Dutch Armed Forces lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain, and are they comparable to the US lessons identified?
3. What is the root cause of the Dutch Army shortfalls on operating in the human domain?
4. What US Army' proposals and solutions solve the Dutch Army shortfalls and are suitable for the Dutch Army?

### Assumption and relevance

As a main effort, land forces must improve their ability to operate within the human domain. This statement is widely based on the assumption that the coming missions will resemble those of the past decade. Based on this assumption, the relevance of this thesis is to help the Dutch Army and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development, to develop new insights for their organizations. To learn from the decade long Dutch and US Army deployments, their roles and struggles in the human domain.

### Definitions

Actor: an actor is an individual or group within a social network who acts to advance personnel interests. Relevant actors may include individuals, states and governments, coalitions, terrorist networks, and criminal organizations. They may also include multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and others able to influence the situation.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-7.

Civil Military Cooperation and Civil Military Operations: Civil Military Operations are “the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational objectives.”<sup>23</sup> The NATO equivalent term of Civil Military Operations is Civil Military Cooperation.<sup>24</sup>

Comprehensive approach: “comprehensive engagement with nations, institutions, and peoples around the world to protect and advance the national interests with a whole-of-government approach that includes defense, diplomacy, development, and other tools of national power.”<sup>25</sup>

Culture: Culture is “the shared beliefs, values, norms, customs, behaviors, and artifacts members of a society use to cope with the world and each other. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong and how they assess what is important and unimportant. Culture provides a framework for thought and decisions. What one culture considers rational, another culture may consider irrational.”<sup>26</sup>

DOTMLPF: DOTMLPF is an “analysis methodology to investigate solutions, products, and services, within the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel,

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<sup>23</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3.05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), GL-6.

<sup>24</sup>Royal Netherlands Army, Doctrine Publication (DP) 3.2, *Landoperaties* [Land Operations] (Amersfoort: Land Warfare Center, 2013), 4-8.

<sup>25</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 1.

<sup>26</sup>Department of the Army, ADRP 5-0, 9.

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities, and their internal relationships.”

DOTMLPF is the joint US term: the Dutch Armed Forces use the NATO term DOTMLPFI, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and interoperability, which covers the same areas including interoperability for combined and joined operations.<sup>27</sup>

Human domain of warfare: “the totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influences human behavior to the extent that success of any military strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”<sup>28</sup>

Lessons identified: a validated observation that is deemed important enough to change existing DOTMLPF.<sup>29</sup>

Lessons learned: result of an implemented proposal to solve lessons identified, in such a manner that the organization or capacity improved.<sup>30</sup>

Security Sector Reform and Security Forces Assistance: “Security Sector Reform activities focus on the inextricably linked governmental sectors of security and justice. The military’s primary role in Sector Security Reform is supporting the reform, restructuring, or reestablishment of the armed forces and the defense sector, which is

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<sup>27</sup>Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, *How the Army Runs, A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2011-2012* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2011), 10; NATO, *Bi-SC Lessons Learned Directive 80-6* (Lisboa, Portugal: Joined Analyses and Lessons Learned Centre, NATO, [2011]).

<sup>28</sup>de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*, 2.

<sup>29</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2012), 2.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*

accomplished through Security Forces Assistance. Security Forces Assistance specifically supports the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.”<sup>31</sup>

Social sciences: “a branch of science that deals with the institutions and functioning of human society with the interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of society.”<sup>32</sup> For this paper I adopted the broader definition as stated in the paper “Operational Relevance of Behavioral and Social Science to Department of Defense Missions.”<sup>33</sup> The definition includes the disciplines of anthropology, archaeology, area studies, behavioral science, communication, development studies, economics, history, human geography, law, linguistics, political science, public administration, psychology, and sociology.

Warfighting function: “a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions.”<sup>34</sup>

### Limitations and Delimitations

Time and classification issues are the main limitations of this study. Time is a limitation, as the current research by the Task Force “Strategic Landpower” will not be

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<sup>31</sup>Department of Defense, JP 3.05, II-12.

<sup>32</sup>The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, sv “social science,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20science> (accessed October 2013).

<sup>33</sup>Hriar Cabayan et al., *Operational Relevance of Behavioral and Social Science to DoD Missions* (USA: Sarah Canna, NSI Team, [March 2013]), 7.

<sup>34</sup>Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), 13.

finished at the time this study is due. Data collection will mainly be done by reading reports and books. The thesis is written as a contribution to Dutch Army doctrine, therefore Dutch Army and overarching Dutch Armed Forces doctrine is used for this thesis, excluding the doctrine of the Dutch Marines. Finally, the classification of some material will hamper the study. Because both the US army and the Dutch army are interested in the study, some data will not be used, because it is marked confidential. The study will be accessible to all.

The main delimitation is that the thesis will center on the human domain, social sciences of war and influence topics, although there are many more US Army lessons the Dutch Army can learn from. Within the main delimitation, the research is delimited to the missions of the Dutch and US forces within the last ten years. Theories concerning how to solve the issues that are older are not dismissed, they will also be reviewed. In chapter 4 and 5 the US and Dutch missions of the last ten years will be named and examined to determine the role of the land forces in recent years. Some of these missions will be dismissed in the antithesis and synthesis in later chapters because of their unique nature. Finally, a selection of the known literature will be used for this research, as too much has been written on the topic to review. The delimitation to literature is mentioned in chapter 3.

### Conclusion

In the future operating environment, the importance of the human domain is growing. Land forces will have a significant role in addressing the human factors in these

operations.<sup>35</sup> The main question for the Dutch Army is still how to do so. It is unclear how the Dutch Army, or any Western army for that matter, will be able to operate successfully in the human domain at all levels.<sup>36</sup> By learning from the decade long Dutch and US deployments, the social sciences of war and the struggles in the human domain, this thesis can help the Dutch Army, the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development, to identify new insights on how to operate in the human domain for their organizations.

The next chapter will review the literature on this topic, divided in US, Dutch, and other literature. It will be followed by the methodology of the research and the final chapters with my research findings.

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<sup>35</sup>Odierno, Amos and McRaven, 3.

<sup>36</sup>de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*, 2.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

For those placing unbridled faith in technology, war is a predictable, if disorderly, phenomenon, defeat a matter of simple cost/benefit analysis, and the effectiveness of any military capability a finite calculus of targets destroyed and casualties inflicted. . . . Real war is an inherently uncertain enterprise in which chance, friction, and the limitations of the human mind under stress profoundly limit our ability to predict outcomes; in which defeat to have any meaning must be inflicted above all in the minds of the defeated.

— Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC and  
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr, U.S. Army,  
*Preparing for War in the 21st Century*

#### Introduction

Over the years, much has been written about the human domain, or social sciences in war. Sun Tzu wrote about it 2.5 millennia ago, Clausewitz wrote about it in his unfinished work, and more reports and books were published after the nineteenth and twentieth century colonial wars.<sup>37</sup> After the colonial wars in the second half of the twentieth century, many countries dismissed the theory of operating among the people.<sup>38</sup> The US Army had to reinvent war among the people when they entered the Vietnam war, only to lose the capacity to do so after the conflict ended.

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<sup>37</sup>Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles, Project Gutenberg Ebook, 2008. Kindle ed., 2265-2266; Janeen Klinger, “Von Clausewitz on Social Sciences,” *Parameters* 36 (Spring 2006): 79.

<sup>38</sup>Thijs W. Brocades Zaalberg, “The Roots of Dutch Counterinsurgency: Balancing and Integrating Military and Civilian Efforts from Aceh to Uruzgan” (The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare 1775-2007, Selected papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians, Washington, DC, 2008), 128.

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, many armies in Western countries were focused on major conventional war between two sides, NATO and the Warsaw pact. At the same time, many countries became unstable without American or Soviet aide, and small groups or individuals became stronger.<sup>39</sup> A very turbulent era started with many small wars and stabilization missions in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, that became worse after Al Qaeda's 9/11/2001 attacks. Additionally, the media and internet became powerful means to communicate, expanding the means for conducting war in the information domain.<sup>40</sup>

This chapter contains literature on the US and Dutch lessons identified on operating in the human domain, since these attacks. The starting point for this literature review are the recently published US Army White Paper "Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills" and the Dutch point paper "Redefining Joint operations in a land environment."<sup>41</sup> The literature used are primary and secondary sources such as documents, reports, books, websites, and quotes, from the 2001-2013 period on the matter of human domain and social sciences of war. These sources from military, non-military, think tanks, journalist and history writers, give a broad review to avoid groupthink and alleviate bias. The review also ensures that the topic has not been researched before, and the primary question is not answered already.

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<sup>39</sup>Johanna Forman and Liora Danan, "Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations," *Prism* 4, no. 2 (2013): 33.

<sup>40</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff J-7, 15 June 2012), 22.

<sup>41</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven; de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*.



As the newest lessons identified present themselves, there are still many unsolved issues as General de Kruijf mentioned in his point paper. The question mainly is to find solutions for the identified lessons. Although the research questions describe the last decade as the period of research, a broader timeframe will be used to find proposals for the lessons identified. Operating in the human domain is something that has taken place since the beginning of mankind, for instance during the Vietnam and Malaysia Wars, and much has been written on them.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, the lessons learned in the human domain in previous periods, even of previous centuries, can be valuable.

The purpose of this chapter is to detect if there are enough sources on lessons identified, for both US and Dutch Armed Forces, including different views. It will explore some proposals for the lessons, and argue that further research is needed and possible. The first section of this chapter reviews the US Armed Forces documents, and sums up the general lessons identified as well as the major proposal that has led to this research. To reveal if there are similar issues in the Dutch Armed Forces, the second section reviews the Dutch documents on lessons identified from recent missions. Finally, this chapter concludes with current research and further research topics. The collected data contains information concerning the three secondary questions from the last decade on the role of land forces, lessons identified on understanding and operating in the human domain, and proposals for the way ahead.

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<sup>42</sup>Brocades Zaalberg, 127.

### Literature on US Armed Forces lessons identified

Since the last decade, much has been written in the United States about operating in the human domain by journalists, writers, Department of Defense, think tanks, and other institutions.<sup>43</sup> As mentioned before the starting point for this research is the White Paper “Strategic Landpower.” The main conclusion of the White Paper is that as a main effort of the US Armed Forces, the land forces must improve their ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the human domain. According to the White Paper other domains, such as sea, air and cyber can also play a role in defeating the enemy’s will with more technological solutions such as countering anti-access and area denial operations, but these domains are in support of the land forces.<sup>44</sup> This is the biggest pitfall of the White Paper. The commanders of the US land forces use the White Paper for budget negotiations, to underline the importance of the land forces in an era in which the Air Force and Navy are more important due to the new Air-Sea battle.<sup>45</sup> The White Paper is meant to counter the Air-Sea strategy.

For this research, it is therefore important to verify the lessons and use the lessons identified that led to the White Paper, mentioned in the study “Decade of War, Volume I, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations.” After ten years of war, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, asked for this thorough,

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<sup>43</sup>Robert H. Schultz, *The Marines Take Anbar: The Four Year Fight Against Al Qaeda* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 5093-5095.

<sup>44</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 5.

<sup>45</sup>Department of Defense, *Air-Sea Battle, Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: Air-Sea Battle Office, 2013), 4.

comprehensive study on the lessons of the past decade of US military operations.<sup>46</sup> The study “Decade of War” discusses eleven themes comprised from forty-six studies and articles. It consists of enduring lessons identified, including ways ahead per theme, from all joint US operations in the 2003-2012 period. The study includes military operations such as major combat operations in Iraq, counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and humanitarian assistance in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti.

The study “Decade of War” contains in total over 400 observations, of which many can be related to operating in the human domain. Factually the study answers the first secondary question: What US Army lessons identified on roles of the land forces and operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower?” According to the study “Decade of War,” US Armed Forces must improve their ability to operate, gather intelligence and influence in the human domain. The study “Decade of War” underlines the importance of indirect approaches, the battle of the narrative, and culturally aware servicemen.<sup>47</sup> The study furthermore stresses the current shortfalls of intelligence gathering in the human domain, and the inability of the US Army to change roles during missions.<sup>48</sup> The study “Decade of War” is a good basis for this research and it already comprises proposals to solve the lessons identified, probably relevant for the Dutch discussion on operating in the human domain.

The study “Decade of War” contains omissions too. In a recent version of *Prism*, James Dobbins states that the study “Decade of War” is lacking some important

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<sup>46</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, iii.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*

lessons.<sup>49</sup> The first omission is the decision to attack Iraq on the bases of an erroneous intelligence assessment.<sup>50</sup> The second omission is the judgment on the level of forces needed for the stabilization phase of Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>51</sup> Although these are political implications, they are made at the strategic level with US military advice and should therefore be in the lessons identified. More important: as result of these mishaps, the current president of the United States, President Obama, has embraced the view that counterinsurgency is too resource intensive to conduct in the future.<sup>52</sup> The two omissions influence this research, as the US strategy to engage in future conflicts probably will change.

Therefore, to have multiple viewpoints the study “Decade of War” will be compared to the lessons identified in other relevant literature, such as the book *The Marines Take Anbar*, and expert reviews from the *Prism* and *Small Wars* journals.<sup>53</sup> Both the White Paper and the book *The Marines Take Anbar: The Four-Year Fight Against Al Qaeda* focus on the ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the human domain.<sup>54</sup> In the book the author describes a unit in major combat that transitions to stabilization, to finally hand over the area to the local government and security forces.

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<sup>49</sup>James Dobbins, “Response to the Decade of War,” *Prism* 4, no. 3 (2013): 149.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>53</sup>Schultz.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 5542-5545.

The lessons from Anbar are not unique to that four-year battle, but give a unique first hand insight on the struggle in the human domain.<sup>55</sup>

### US Armed Forces solutions and proposals

Although the Task Force “Strategic Landpower” has not come up with a conclusion yet why there is a disconnect between tactical and strategic success, the White Paper and experts hint towards the absence of long time commitment of US land forces for one specific mission, such as the Iraq and Afghanistan deployments.<sup>56</sup> Instead of intervening in a conflict with a hybrid threat and stabilizing the country afterwards, the United States now seeks a strategy of preemptive problem solving in what they call phase zero.<sup>57</sup> In this phase the comprehensive approach should prevent a country from getting into a failed state with an insurgency or civil war. The State Department, Department of Development, and Department of Defense work together with indigenous forces, population and government in this preemptive battle.<sup>58</sup>

For the Department of Defense, the land forces will be regionally aligned to their Geographic Combatant Commands, and perform Civil Military Operations, Security Sector Reform, military aid programs and other types of missions, other than war. The

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., 5535-5539.

<sup>56</sup>Paul McLeary and John T. Bennett, “Next US Strategy Carries Heavy Expectation,” Defense News, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131211/DEFREG02/312110022/Next-US-Strategy-Carries-Heavy-Expectations> (accessed 12 December 2013).

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>General Raymond T. Odierno and Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, 2013 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2.

land forces must concentrate on helping prevent conflicts before they start, within the comprehensive approach. Land forces therefore establish partnerships with foreign forces, and assume roles in support of these forces. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers must be socio-culturally aware, but are often language deficient and need tools to understand and influence in the human domain. To contribute in this preemptive battle, the US Armed Forces try to implement the many minor proposals that are directly linked to the lessons identified in the “Decade of War.” These proposals all contribute to the new strategy, mostly in the form of research questions, directly linked to an issue.

Two related and more fundamental proposals for the lessons identified in a “Decade of War” and the White Paper are proposals for an extra warfighting function named Engagement and an extra domain named the human domain.<sup>59</sup> The commanders of the US land forces state that they want to develop the seventh warfighting function, named Engagement. In the US Army, warfighting functions are logically aligned groups of tasks and systems, with a common purpose.<sup>60</sup> The current six warfighting functions are mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, sustainment, protection and fires.<sup>61</sup> The new Engagement warfighting function is the whole of systems, methods and tasks that can influence the behavior of actors.<sup>62</sup> The US Army makes sure that during

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<sup>59</sup>Department of the Army, Pamphlet (Pam) 525-8-5, *The United States Army Functional Concept for Engagement* (Hampton, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 2014); Hoffman and Davies.

<sup>60</sup>Department of the Army, ADP 3-0, 13.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, 13-14.

<sup>62</sup>On 1 October 2013 Lieutenant-General Walker, Commander of Futures and Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center held a lecture at the Command and General Staff College in which he explained the new warfighting function.

decision making, commanders on all levels have to take systems, methods and tasks for influencing in to account, by institutionalizing the “Engagement” warfighting function in doctrine. It puts influencing at the heart of decision making.

The Engagement warfighting function comprises out of roles and tasks, and preconditions to influence. The major roles and tasks are Civil Military Operations, Security Force Assistance, and Special warfare such as Unconventional warfare, and Counterinsurgency.<sup>63</sup> The precondition to execute the roles is the ability for officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers to understand and operate (or influence) in the environment. The proposed doctrinal change is expected in late 2013.

Another fundamental proposal is that of a new domain, the human domain, as defined in the *Small Wars* article “Joint Force 2020 and the Human Domain, time for a New Conceptual Framework.”<sup>64</sup> The authors, Hoffman and Davies, two researchers at the National Defense University, state that Western countries, and their doctrine, overlook the principle that war is a clash of will, between humans and socio-political entities.<sup>65</sup> Their doctrine still focusses on physical domains such as air, land, sea, and in some countries space. The physical domains have a frame of reference that defines the planning and execution of war. Land, Air, and Sea Forces are aligned with their own physical domain, with their own characteristic platforms and maneuverability, for which they

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<sup>63</sup>Department of the Army, Pam 525-8-5, 8-11.

<sup>64</sup>Hoffman and Davies, 1.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

write doctrine.<sup>66</sup> In most Western countries the newly introduced cyber domain is still disputed for this reason, as the domain has no aligned force and is not physical.

Instead of adopting little pieces in doctrine or training, the efforts to gather and lock in the lessons from this last decade must be expanded to establish a human domain in doctrine.<sup>67</sup> Hoffman and Davies propose a Joint Concept for Human Domain to overcome this piece by piece adjustment of doctrine. The central idea is cross domain synergy defined as “the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across different domains, including the human domain, such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others.”<sup>68</sup> The purpose of operating across domains is to establish and sustain positional advantage and freedom of maneuver as required by the mission.

This human domain is an interesting perspective because it is an overarching idea instead of an adjustment to doctrine. The new warfighting function is, although a doctrinal change, an interesting development on a more practical level. Both proposals will be reviewed in this research, to see if they can be used as proposals for the Dutch lessons identified.

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>68</sup>Department of Defense, *Joint Operational Access Concept* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 2012), ii.



### Literature on Dutch Armed Forces lessons identified

The past decade of Dutch deployments consists of numerous small missions such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, Sector Security Reform, and stabilization missions.<sup>69</sup> Although some of the missions contained fierce combat at times, the Dutch Armed Forces did not conduct major combat in the classic way during this period. The largest and most important deployments in the last ten years were the stabilization missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chad. Next the Dutch contributed smaller deployments for ongoing stabilization missions in the Balkans in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, and Africa, and some special operations such as Non Combatant Evacuation Operations. A more detailed overview will be given in chapter 5, when the role of the Army will be analyzed.

In order to learn from previous missions, the Dutch Armed Forces review their missions on three levels: the Ministry of Defense, the Army, and the Centre of Excellences. Next to these there is the Netherlands Institute for Military History that researches missions during and after completion, and writes historical papers on them, including lessons to be learned. Unfortunately, there is no overarching study on enduring lessons identified comparable to the study “Decade of War.” For this part of this research, the lessons identified documents from both the Defense and Army level evaluations of the Iraq, Afghanistan and Chad missions are used: *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003 – 2005, Final Evaluation*

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<sup>69</sup>Netherlands Institute of Military History, “Missieoverzicht [Mission Overview],” Ministry of Defense, [http://www.defensie.nl/nimh/geschiedenis/internationale\\_operaties/missieoverzicht/](http://www.defensie.nl/nimh/geschiedenis/internationale_operaties/missieoverzicht/) (accessed 12 October 2013).

*Netherlands Contribution to ISAF, 2006–2010 and Lessons Identified ISAF.*<sup>70</sup> These documents include an underlying report from the former commanders of the Task Force in Afghanistan, *Memo of Former Commanders Task Force Uruzgan to Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces*.

The documents show trends in shortfalls on operating in the human domain, which can be categorized into intelligence gathering, influence and engagement capabilities, and interagency policy and tools for assessments.<sup>71</sup> Chapter 5 provides a more detailed overview of the aggregated shortfalls. The major Dutch Armed Forces lessons identified are on a tactical level, because there were almost no lessons identified on the military strategic or operational level. The reason for this is that the Dutch Armed Forces have no organic means for these levels and deploy as part of NATO headquarters at the operational and strategic level. Studies about the Dutch political and military strategic level of institutes such as Clingendaal and the Netherlands Institute for Military History are available to fill this gap in observations.

Next to official military evaluations and reports from think tanks, David Green provides an outside observation on the Dutch comprehensive approach. In his book, *The*

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<sup>70</sup>[Dutch] Eindevaluatie = [English] final evaluation.

<sup>71</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005* [Final Evaluation Stabilization Force IRAQ (SFIR) 2003-2005] (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2005); Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA* [Final Evaluation EUFOR Chad /RCA] (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2009); Ministry of Defense, *Final Evaluation Netherlands Participation to ISAF, 2006–2010* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2011); Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*; Colonel A. de Munnik and Colonel N. A. W. Tak, Memorandum Van Voormalige Commandanten Task Force Uruzgan Aan De Commandant Der Strijdkrachten [Memorandum of Former Commanders Task Force Uruzgan to the Chief of Defense] (Utrecht, The Netherlands: Headquarter of the Army, [2010]).

*Valley's Edge*, Green describes how he, as a US State Department employee, participated in the comprehensive approach, together with other interagency personnel, US special forces and Provincial Reconstruction Team led units like force protection and Civil Affairs teams. He gives frank remarks on the Dutch comprehensive approach in the province as they took over the command in 2006, to hand it over to the US forces in 2010 again. Green gives a unique outside observation, with lessons to be learned for the Dutch forces. The observations from *The Valley's Edge* will be used to verify or complement the Dutch evaluation reports.

### Conclusion

There is enough American and Dutch literature on lessons identified, and proposals to solve the lessons, to use for this research. On the American side, the White Paper and the *Small Wars* article, basically describe the same lessons identified as the study “a Decade of Warfare.” Lessons identified on the necessity to operate in the human domain and the importance and shortfalls of intelligence gathering. The lessons describe the changing role of the army and the current inability to change, based on the importance of indirect approaches and the battle in the information domain. The study “Decade of War” gives minor one-on-one related proposals to solve the lessons identified. The White Paper and the *Small Wars* article propose more fundamental changes to doctrine, such as a new warfighting function and the introduction of the human domain in doctrine. All proposals are reviewed in chapter 7 to determine if they are suitable for the Dutch Army.

On the Dutch side, the Dutch Armed Forces' evaluation reports of the last decade include lesser lessons identified for operating in the human domain than the American reports. The lessons identified are the shortfalls of intelligence gathering in the human

domain and the current challenges with influence and engagement capabilities.

Additionally, there are lessons identified on the comprehensive approach, the current decision making process and obsolete doctrine. The military evaluation reports can be complemented by sufficient documents on lessons identified by Dutch think tanks such as the Netherlands Institute for Military History and Clingendaal, or books such as *The Valley's Edge*.

From the rudimentary review, it appears that the Dutch Army struggles with some of same issues as the US Army and that it can learn from its struggle to operate in the human domain. Some proposals to solve these issues are given as a research question in “Decade of War,” for which various experts from think tanks, and Department of Defense institutes already published reports. A short list of some 200+ reports and documents on the matter are available at the Combined Arms Research Library for this research. Sufficient literature is available.

All these actions are bound to deliver proposals for minor adjustments to solve lessons identified. Subjects like the warfighting function “Engagement” and the joint Human Domain, are more basic and fundamental issues. A root cause analysis for the Dutch lessons identified must be conducted in this research to conclude if it is time for such fundamental adjustments to doctrine. When influence and engagement activities become part of the fundamentals of doctrine, they become part of the organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

This research can therefore deliver new insights for lessons identified on operating in the human domain where the Dutch Army has been struggling with for the at

least the last decade. The next chapter will describe the methodology that is used to answer the secondary questions in order to answer the primary question.

CHAPTER 3  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

If I had asked my customers what they wanted, they would have said a faster horse.

— Quote attributed to Henry Ford

Introduction

What can the Dutch Army learn from the current United States Army developments in operating in the human domain? The previous chapter showed that there is sufficient unclassified information available to research this question. This chapter contains the methods and sources used to answer this primary question, as well as the following secondary research questions:

1. What US Army lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower?”
2. What Dutch Armed Forces lessons learned, identify roles for the land forces on operating in the human domain, and are they comparable to the US lessons identified?
3. What is the root cause of the Dutch Army shortfalls on operating in the human domain?
4. What US Army’ proposals and solutions solve the Dutch Army shortfalls and are suitable for the Dutch Army?

This chapter describes the means and criteria to collect, analyze, and interpret the data found on the topic. The focus will be on the role of the armies and lessons learned in the social sciences of war and human domain.

## Data Analysis Method

In order to establish what the Dutch Army can learn from the US Army developments in operating in the human domain, a verification on common experiences and suitability must take place, to see if the US Army's proposals for solving their lessons identified are relevant for the Dutch Army. This research will therefore first sequentially answer the four secondary questions, whereas the secondary questions tie into the primary question as depicted in figure 1. To support this effort, the US and Dutch lessons are categorized along the three lines of roles, understanding, and influencing the human domain.

The answer to the primary research question will contain solutions for the Dutch lessons identified to help transfer them in to lessons learned. The NATO lessons learned cycle as depicted in figure 1, has five steps: identify, analyses, commit, implement, and share, which are then sub divided in two major parts of lessons identified and learned. This research focusses on the second step in the lessons identified part, analyses, including the sub parts root cause, and solutions. Identified Dutch lessons which already have been solved by the Dutch Army, will still be part of this research to determine if the US and Dutch Army decided to solve issues differently.

The Data Analysis Method used for this research is the double-loop learning process from Chris Argyris (figure 1) to determine the root cause for the inability to operate successfully in the human domain, and to identify the need for DOTMLPF adjustments. In single-loop learning, organizations correct errors on the spot with a direct related solution, so the organization can carry on. In double-loop learning, the error is corrected on the spot, as well as the underlying values, policies, objectives of the

organization.<sup>72</sup> Double-loop learning is more difficult, because it affects the organization's core values, policies or objectives, or doctrine.

The Argyris II model for the double-loop learning process consists of six phases, of which a maximum of five are within the span of this research: mapping, comparing, root cause identification, suitable proposals, and conclusion and advice.<sup>73</sup> Phase six, selling, is outside the scope of this research, although the results are presented to the Dutch Army. Next to the root cause and proposals to address it, this research will provide single-loop proposals for the Dutch Army on how to operate in the human domain, based on US lessons identified or learned and discussions.

The first phase of the double-loop process is mapping. In this phase, the first secondary question will be answered: What US Army lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper "Strategic Landpower?" To answer this question, qualitative research will determine the US lessons identified in two parts: roles of the land forces, and understanding and influencing the human domain. This review will determine the base on how the US Army operated in the human domain in the last decade, and how it wants to operate in the future.

Phase two of the double-loop learning process, the comparative case study, is to determine the Dutch Armed Forces lessons learned that identified roles of the land forces on operating in the human domain. This phase must also determine if the Dutch Army

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<sup>72</sup>M. K. Smith, "Chris Argyris: Theories of Action, Double-Loop Learning and Organizational Learning," the Encyclopedia of Informal Education, [www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm](http://www.infed.org/thinkers/argyris.htm) (accessed 16 October 2013).

<sup>73</sup>Ibid.



has comparable lessons identified on roles of the land forces and operating in the human domain as the US Army, and therefore a comparable basis. The comparative case study is done in two parts: first determine the roles of the Dutch Land Forces and compare them to the already reviewed roles of the US Land Forces. Second, find trends in lessons identified in understanding and influencing the human domain, and compare the basis lessons with the results of the first secondary question, the US Army lessons identified.

The result of the comparative case study will be a verification of common ground and a set of Dutch Army' lessons identified for the next phase in the double-loop learning process: root cause analyses. A sequence review of the total of Dutch Army's lessons identified on source versus symptoms will take place to determine if there is a root cause. This review is done by determining the cause of every sub set of lessons, divided in role, understanding and influencing. To keep the research within the limitations, this part will be conducted within the Dutch Armed Forces frame. Any social-political causes are outside the scope of this work.

What US Army proposals and solutions solve the Dutch Army shortfalls and are suitable for the Dutch Army? To answer the fourth and final secondary question, this research will use the earlier identified proposals and solutions. The goal of this phase is to determine whether these proposals are relevant and suitable for the Dutch Army. To determine relevance, every proposal must contribute to solving a current issue, or the root cause, within the Dutch comprehensive approach, or solve expected future requirements. To determine suitability, this research will conduct a review of every proposal versus Dutch doctrine or operating procedures with the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development.

The results of the last step, conclusion and recommendation, will answer the primary research question: What can the Dutch Army learn from the current US Army developments in operating in the human domain? A set of suitable proposals, linked to current issues, root cause or future requirements, will identify what the Dutch army can learn from the US Army in the human domain.

### Data Collection Methods

Chapter 2 contains a certain amount of qualitative data to answer the research questions, insufficiently in quality and depth though. Further data collection is needed. To collect data for this comparison, a broad set of documents, books, and reports is included. The short literature review of chapter 2 led to relevant, solid documents from the US Department of Defense, US State Department, Dutch Ministry of Defense, think tanks such as the RAND group, Clingendaal and the Netherlands Institute for Military History, and relevant books, journals, and articles. All these sources were reviewed on lessons identified, learned or proposals on operating in the human domain, US and Dutch.

For the US Department of Defense, the following institutes helped this research: Combined Arms Research Library, Combined Arms Lessons Learned, Taskforce Strategic Landpower (Concepts Development and Learning Directorate, Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command), and the National Defense University. For the Dutch Ministry of Defense, the Army Headquarters lessons learned branch, Army Warfare Center – doctrine development, Defense Intelligence Institute, Civil Military Interaction Command and the Netherlands/German Army Corps helped this research. For both Armies their Joint and army capstone doctrine is used. Information sources with multiple viewpoints from different sources such think

tanks, journals, and articles are included to prevent this thesis to be built on confirming evidence. In this line of work, multiple schools of thought have to be incorporated to come to solid conclusions.

### Audience

The audience for this research is broad and narrow at the same time. The primary audience is the Dutch Army Commander, and his Centre Of Excellences, to learn from the results. Probably some of the lessons for the Dutch Army are identified some time ago, but are still not implemented, or have been implemented solely as an addition to conventional warfare doctrine. This indicates that the current military culture might hamper accepting results of the study. The research methodology and sources must therefore be as accessible as possible, comprehensive, concise, and above all suitable for the Dutch Army.

### Conclusion

To find the answers to the research questions, information, lessons identified and learned, and proposals from various institutes, think tanks, military centers, doctrine, and other open sources will be evaluated with a double-loop research method. With this method, a list of proposals for the Dutch Army will be produced, and possibly a root cause can be designated of the inability to operate successful in the human domain. First, the following chapters will review the lessons identified on both US and Dutch sides, focusing on the differences and similarities.




Figure 1. Research methodology: Double learning model, NATO lessons learned cycle and interrelationship

Source: Created by author, adaption of Chris Argyris, *Overcoming Organizational Defenses: Facilitating Organizational Learning* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990), 94; NATO, *Bi-SC Lessons Learned Directive 80-6* (Lisboa, Portugal: Jointed Analyses and Lessons Learned Centre, NATO, [2011]), annex A.

## CHAPTER 4

### US ARMY LESSONS IDENTIFIED: STRATEGIC LANDPOWER

And each year, amazingly, there appear new archival sources, alongside fresh insights, controversies, and approaches, that should compel us to rethink earlier assumptions.

— Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned The Tide in the Second World War*

#### Introduction

What US Army lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower?” To answer this question, this chapter will describe the US Army lessons identified in two sections: roles of the land forces and lessons identified to understand and influence the human domain. This chapter will determine how the US Army operated in the human domain in the last decade, and how it would like to operate in the future.

#### Role of the US land forces

The literature review gives insight to the actual role of the US Army in the previous decade. Since 9/11, the United States deployed forces in almost every continent around the world. The US Armed Forces conducted conventional warfare during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in parts of Asia, and Odyssey Dawn in Libya. US Forces contributed to stabilization and counterinsurgency missions such as the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and OIF/OEF in a later phase. The US Forces also helped to build armies to fight counterinsurgency as in Security Forces Assistance operations in the

Philippines, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Humanitarian assistance was conducted in Pakistan, Haiti, and the homeland.<sup>74</sup> Missions in the last decade include a mix of conventional warfare, stabilization missions and humanitarian aid missions. This trend is also visible in the pre-2001 era as the United States conducted almost three hundred missions abroad since 1798.<sup>75</sup> Eleven of those missions were major combat, while the rest were other types of missions such as stability, humanitarian aid, anti-piracy and protecting United States interests, citizens or embassies.

The US Defense Strategic Guidance prescribes the types of missions the US Forces must be able to conduct.<sup>76</sup> The missions mentioned in the previous paragraph are stated in this document as: Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare; Deter and Defeat Aggression; Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations and Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations. Further types of mission as prescribed in the Defense Strategic Guidance are not mentioned in the literature review, but most certainly took place. These missions are: Project Power Despite Anti-Access Area Denial Challenges; Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction; Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space; Maintain a Safe, Secure and Effective Nuclear Deterrent and Provide a Stabilizing Presence.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, v.

<sup>75</sup>Richard F. Grimmet, RL30172, *Instances of use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2004* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004), 3-34.

<sup>76</sup>Odierno and McHugh, 1.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.

Although the name of the missions indicates a certain role for the land forces, there is actually no correlation between them. In a counterinsurgency mission for instance, the mix of roles for the land forces can be deterrence, combat, assisting local authority, training security forces, raising basic living conditions and provide humanitarian aid. Even during conventional warfare, addressing a hybrid threat, a mix of fighting, counterinsurgency, stabilization and probably even humanitarian aid could be necessary. The US Land forces had to deal with these varying roles in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999) and in the last decade in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>78</sup> Deterrence and defeat most of the time is followed by stabilization and humanitarian aid.

Generally, the trend for the US land forces is to operate physically among the people, in a wide range of roles, from combat to humanitarian aid. The US Army traditionally focusses on combat (conventional warfare) though, and tends to forget other types of operations than war, which surprisingly consumes more of their resources and efforts.<sup>79</sup> Future land forces deployments will take place in complex, or even chaotic environment, in a different culture, with a variety of roles, to counter hybrid threats and shape safe environments. In the future, unlike the past, the land forces must be able to switch in an instant between roles, as conventional warfare might at one moment end in providing humanitarian aid or taking over authorities of a region.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup>Kirsten Lundberg, *The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq* (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2006), 6.

<sup>79</sup>Forman and Danan, 31.

<sup>80</sup>Lundberg, 17.

The major lesson identified in the White Paper is the inability to create strategic success in the last conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Discussion among experts hints towards the prevalence that is needed for a clash between wills, and that ends, means, and ways on the strategic level were disconnected from the other levels.<sup>81</sup> Commitment is important, but a problem of its own because wars cost lives and capital. Instead of intervening in a conflict with a hybrid threat and stabilizing the country afterwards, the United States seeks a strategy of preemptive problem solving in what they call phase zero.<sup>82</sup> In phase zero, the comprehensive approach should prevent a country from getting into a failed state through insurgency or civil war. This phase zero precedes the current five phases: deteriorating situation, preparing for military action, major combat, stabilization and finally return to civilian control. The State Department, Department of Development and Department of Defense support the local government, indigenous forces, and population in this phase.<sup>83</sup> The roles for the land forces mostly remain the same.

#### US Armed Forces lessons identified

The US Army executed a variety of missions in the last decade. The US Armed Forces lessons identified are based on these missions with shifting roles during the missions. These lessons identified on operating in the human domain are fivefold: the

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<sup>81</sup>David E. Johnson, “Ends, Ways, and Means—the Debate we Still Need on Afghanistan,” RAND, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/2009/12/09/RAND.html> (accessed 9 December 2013).

<sup>82</sup>McLeary and Bennett.

<sup>83</sup>Odierno and McHugh, 3.



necessity to operate in the human domain, the importance and shortfalls of intelligence gathering, the changing role of the army and the inability to do so, the importance of indirect approaches and the battle of the narrative, and the importance of cultural awareness.

The necessity of operating in the human domain is explained in chapter 1 of this research as a unique capability to preclude and deter conflict through shaping operations that leverage partners and populations to enhance local and regional stability.<sup>84</sup> This is the primary lesson identified. The purpose of this focus is because the United States of America undertakes engagements without fully considering the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprise the human domain.<sup>85</sup>

The second lesson identified is the need for intelligence gathering in the human domain because of the non-state actors' power to influence operations and destabilize areas.<sup>86</sup> Additional factors include the complexity of rules of engagement that enable actors to misuse them and the increasing pace and forms of human interactions across regions, borders and continents by virtual connectivity.<sup>87</sup> The human environment is getting more complex by the interaction in the virtual domain. The virtual domain enhances the capabilities of human networks to communicate faster and more flexible in a densely populated area. Although actors are increasingly virtually connected, the last decade demonstrates that technical means are limited to provide reliable intelligence.

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<sup>84</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 3-4.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>86</sup>Schultz, 5669-5671.

<sup>87</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 3.

Human contact is the most reliable mean to identify how to influence people, (local-) government, informal government (e.g. tribal elders), militaries, and their leaders, and to assess how they will react.<sup>88</sup>

The third lesson identifies the changing role land forces have during missions. The roles given to the land forces are major combat, peacekeeping, comprehensive military engagement, security force assistance, building partner capacity, and stability operations. Their missions take place where the land forces intermingle with friendly, enemy, and neutral human networks that share space with them on the land and related cyberspace.<sup>89</sup> Standard training and equipment are primarily based on conventional warfare, and mostly ineffective in operations other than major combat.<sup>90</sup> The US Army was not prepared for an operation other than major combat, and not flexible enough to change quickly when needed.<sup>91</sup> Finally, adversaries used an unpredicted mix of conventional and unconventional warfare (hybrid), and used the population and information domain to counter US major combat capabilities.<sup>92</sup> These facts, enhanced with a failure to understand the environment, led to a mismatch of forces, capabilities, missions and goals.

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., 2-6.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>90</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I, 2*.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid.

The fourth lesson identified is that in the future, The US Armed Forces will continue to operate with a comprehensive approach.<sup>93</sup> After 2006, the US Army introduced the comprehensive approach in doctrine and the current missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>94</sup> This approach includes political, informational, and economic power in an indirect way with unconventional means against an adversary through the human environment. Guidance is needed for this approach that must have human objectives and actions to influence people, especially on the informational line of operation.<sup>95</sup> The importance of the battle in the information domain is often underestimated by the US Army, while adversaries used the domain to influence operations.

The fifth and final lesson identified is the impact of cultural differences on missions, within the US Defense organization itself, with State Department and Department of Development, and with outside actors such as coalition partners, host nations, and the operational environment.<sup>96</sup> Internal in the Army, Special Forces and conventional forces have cultural differences, while they have to work together. In support of a mission, a contingent of political and development advisers is needed, but interagency coordination is often hampered due to differences in culture, policy, planning, and training.<sup>97</sup> Coalition forces and host nations often have a different culture,

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<sup>93</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 2.

<sup>94</sup>Forman and Danan, 36.

<sup>95</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 11.

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>97</sup>Schultz, 5636-5639.

and pursue their own national interests. Additionally, there is the environment in which the land forces operate. Deep cultural understanding of the local population, its beliefs, perceptions and social and political relations are key for the forces to operate in the human domain.<sup>98</sup> In this “local” human domain, different actors form informal, unnatural alliances that have cleavages the land forces can exploit.<sup>99</sup> All these cultural differences create friction and have to be dealt with accordingly.<sup>100</sup>

These lessons identified indicate that US Armed Forces must use more unconventional means instead of conventional means. But there are other perspectives to consider. The authors of the White Paper underline the importance of the comprehensive approach. Non-kinetic lines of operations and the indirect approach are the way forward, but others like Schultz in *The Marines Take Anbar* state that war is still war!<sup>101</sup> Schultz states that armies must not lose the capability to fight. At any time land forces have the largest role in addressing human factors while fighting battles.<sup>102</sup> Special Forces are best suited for operating among the people, because of their ability to apply conventional and

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<sup>98</sup>Ibid., 5553-5556.

<sup>99</sup>Ibid., 5590-5593.

<sup>100</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 30-33.

<sup>101</sup>Schultz, 5699-5702.

<sup>102</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 3.

unconventional means, considering human dynamics.<sup>103</sup> Apparently conventional forces can learn from Special Forces in operating in the human domain.<sup>104</sup>

### Conclusion

What US Army lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces operating in the human domain led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower?” The White Paper “Strategic Landpower” states that land forces must improve their ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the human domain.<sup>105</sup> This is based on failure to consider fully or understand the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprises the human domain, which leads to a mismatch of forces, capabilities, missions and goals. It is also based on the assumption that in the future the land forces will operate in the human domain, to be successful in military engagements and in more in-direct approaches.

The lessons identified from the study “Decade of War,” with forty-six sub studies and over 400 observations, underscore these major lessons identified. The lessons leading to the release of the White Paper are: the necessity to operate in the human domain; the importance and shortfalls of intelligence gathering; the various roles of the army and the inability to change roles quickly; the importance of unconventional approaches and the battle of the narrative; and the importance of cultural awareness. In all six phases of a conflict, a mix of conventional and unconventional means and approaches is needed,

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Lt General Charles T. Cleveland, “Army Special Operations: Leading the Way in Human Domain Warfare,” *Army* (October 2012): 147.

<sup>105</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 1.

based on the local human dynamics. The US land forces have multiple roles in these approaches, from conventional warfare or combat, training coalition's forces, building government, restoring order to delivering humanitarian aid.

## CHAPTER 5

### DUTCH ARMY LESSONS: IDENTIFY AND COMPARE

The uncertainties surrounding the environment in which military power will be deployed will also lead to new criteria that determine the quality of our future military capabilities. Agility, flexibility and adaptability are, for example, often used attributions that military analysts add to the list of classic military competences. The problem is however, that we all have difficulty describing the required transformation of our armed forces to assure they are well prepared for future conflicts.

— Lieutenant-General Mart De Kruijf, *Redefining Joint operations in a land environment*

#### Introduction

What Dutch Armed Forces lessons learned, identified roles of the land forces on operating in the human domain? Are these Dutch lessons comparable to the US lessons learned? To answer these questions, this chapter will address phase two of the double-loop learning process: the comparative case study. The comparative case study, will reveal trends in the Dutch Army's lessons identified on roles of the land forces and operating in the human domain, and determine if there is a comparable basis to the US Army's lessons identified. This basis is needed for this research to ensure that the US Army proposals are suitable for the Dutch Army's lessons identified.

The comparative case study consist of two parts; first, determine the roles of the Dutch Land Forces and compare them to the already reviewed roles of US Land Forces. Second, determine trends across the Dutch deployments of the last decade in lessons on operating in the human domain, and compare these with the US Armed Forces lessons. The result of the comparative case study will be a verification of common ground and a

set of Dutch Army's lessons identified for the next phase in the double-loop learning process: root cause analyses.

### Role of the Dutch land forces

Tasks of the Dutch Armed Forces in the last decades were the defense of the Kingdom, supporting international peace and order, and support the Dutch government in homeland issues.<sup>106</sup> The Kingdom consists of the countries of the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and Saint Martin, and the Dutch Islands in the Caribbean of Bonaire, Saint Eustatius, and Saba. The past decade of Dutch deployments consists of numerous small missions such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, sector security reform and stabilization missions, in the Balkan in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, and Africa in Chad, and some special operations such as Non Combatant Evacuation Operations.<sup>107</sup> The two major Dutch deployments in that period were those to Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>108</sup>

The Dutch Armed Forces developed doctrine and equipment based on conventional warfare, and they normally conduct training and exercises for major combat, the "big war." In the period 2001-2013, the Dutch Armed Forces did not conduct major combat operations in the classic way, but contributed to two major stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Dutch land forces performed similar missions as the US land forces in the past decade, with the exception of major combat operations. All

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<sup>106</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Netherlands Defense Doctrine (NDD)* (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2009), 84.

<sup>107</sup>Netherlands Institute of Military History, *Missieoverzicht* [Mission Overview], 9-12.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*



of these missions can be placed in the second task of the Dutch Armed Forces: support international peace and order. The next part reviews three missions to determine the roles of the Dutch land forces.

The first Dutch deployment was the battalion sized task force in Iraq from July 2003 to March 2005, as part of the Stabilization Force Iraq (SFIR). The unit, some 1200 troops, was under the operational command of the British Division in the southern sector of Iraq, and charged with stabilizing Al Muthanna Province. The Dutch Marines battalion included infantry companies, a helicopter detachment, military police, medical field hospital, Civil Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations and an engineer- and logistics unit.<sup>109</sup> During the deployment, the battalion faced the challenge of temporarily taking over local government and police, while providing security, raising basic living conditions and training security forces.<sup>110</sup>

After the end of the Iraq mission, the Dutch contributed with modest contingents to Afghanistan in 2002 to 2004, with an infantry company in Kabul and a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Pom el Khomri. The next major Dutch Armed Forces deployment was to the Uruzgan province in Afghanistan, with a Task Force as a lead nation for a stabilization mission from 2006 to 2010. The Task Force consisted of some 1400 troops, organized in an infantry battalion, a Provincial Reconstruction Team, Psychological Operations element, engineer company, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition element and sustainment units for logistic and medical support. The composition and added Task Force level were based on the lessons identified from the

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<sup>109</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq 2003–2005*, 12-13.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*, 11.

Iraq mission. Because the Dutch Armed Forces had no dedicated Provincial Reconstruction Team, Psychological Operations and foreign military training capacity, and a very limited Civil Military Cooperation capacity, these tasks were done by scout, signal, tank, air defense, and artillery units with limited training prior to deployment.

The roles of the land forces during this mission were even more diverse than the Iraq mission. There was fierce battalion sized fighting, together with partnered Afghan forces, providing humanitarian aid during flooding, training and mentoring of security forces, mentoring of the local government, raising basic living conditions and other counterinsurgency roles such as deterrence and stabilizing presence.<sup>111</sup> The Dutch troops had to switch between these roles during operations and sometimes even during patrols.

In the same timeframe, the Dutch government sent a Marine scout unit to Goz Beida in Chad. The scout unit was part of the Irish-led Multinational Battalion South in the European Union Force Chad and Central African Republic.<sup>112</sup> The role of the scout unit was to help the battalion gain situational awareness, and allow the battalion to create a safe and secure environment for the refugees and internal displaced persons, and humanitarian missions.<sup>113</sup> The final mission was the Police Training Mission in Kunduz Afghanistan 2010-2013, in which the land forces provided protection for civilians and military police that trained and mentored the Afghan police.

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<sup>111</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 24-25; Ministry of Defense, *Final Evaluation Netherlands Participation to ISAF, 2006–2010*, 41-127.

<sup>112</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 3.

<sup>113</sup>*Ibid.*, 7.

Like US land forces, the major role of the Dutch land forces is to either be part of Alliance deterrence, or operate physically among the people, in a wide range of roles. These roles range from fighting, training security forces, mentoring of the local government, raising basic living conditions, deterrence, and stabilizing presence to humanitarian aid. Just like the US land forces, the Dutch land forces are equipped and trained for conventional warfare. Units such as tank, artillery, and signal and air defense were used to fill in the gap of influence capacities such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Civil Military Cooperation, military trainers and Psychological Operations. This is a clear mismatch between their traditional roles and the ones they fulfilled during the missions.

Although some argue that future wars will be different and stabilization operations are too costly to conduct, the roles probably will remain unchanged.<sup>114</sup> The armies have been operating among the people in missions other than war for some time now. In the new draft Netherlands Defense Doctrine of the Dutch Armed Forces, the Dutch Ministry of Defense redefine their roles as: the defense of national territory, NATO, and European Union (EU); assisting in the control of the EU's external borders; provide support within the Kingdom's borders; conducting evacuation operations of Dutch citizens as well as protecting Dutch embassies abroad and merchant shipping registered to the Kingdom of the Netherlands; stabilization operations in fragile states; stabilization operations designed to keep apart states or other actors as part of a peace settlement or ceasefire; observer, police, civil-military missions; humanitarian relief

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<sup>114</sup>Dobbins, 151.

operations; reconstruction in a former conflict area, and advice, train and educate security officials (Security Sector Reform).<sup>115</sup>

These missions reflect past experience. Generally, the roles of the US and Dutch land forces are comparable. The proposals that address the US Army lessons on operating in the human domain might therefore be useful to the Dutch Army.

#### Dutch Armed Forces lessons identified

The trends in lessons identified of the Dutch land forces are hard to determine. The evaluations are in a fixed layout with prescribed parts, but they are mostly written with input of the participating officers, which gives a biased view, due to the aim of the missions and the background of the participants. The Iraqi SFIR mission was officially a stabilization mission, the Afghanistan ISAF mission a reconstruction mission. The focus was different in both, but the roles were eventually the same. The comprehensive approach was not present in doctrine during the missions, although the Dutch used the comprehensive approach during the ISAF period.<sup>116</sup> The following enduring lessons are the results of interpreting the evaluation reports, finding similarities and continuing issues. These lessons can be categorized into the shortfalls of intelligence gathering in the human domain, the importance and lack of influence capabilities and the shortfalls in interagency policy and tools for assessments.

The first major lessons identified are intelligence shortfalls. Operations in the human domain are intelligence driven, bottom up, and require more non-traditional assets

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<sup>115</sup>Ministry of Defense, NDD, 2013, 39.

<sup>116</sup>Daniel R. Green, *The Valley's Edge* (Dulles: Potomac Books, 2012), 185.

than conventional warfare reconnaissance tasks. Special human and signal intelligence teams tried to gather information on human networks, but were mostly understaffed and wrongly equipped for the missions.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, the intelligence gathering units, such as scout units, traditionally focus on the enemy. To change to a human centric approach of gathering intelligence on humans and relations was hard for these units.<sup>118</sup> Because the missions were information driven, intelligence processing personnel were needed on all levels.

The Dutch Army introduced team intelligence cells at the company level, and operational analyses capacity at the task force level.<sup>119</sup> Especially the last category is not present in a large quantity in the Dutch Army.<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, the team intelligence cells were not trained to analyze non-enemy actors, their relations, or other relevant information within the human domain, and focused on the enemy.<sup>121</sup> Additional intelligence personnel were present in the Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations unit for this reason. This created another problem, as the Civil Military Cooperation personnel were not trained or accustomed to collect human and social intelligence. Mostly, they were focused on reconstruction efforts.<sup>122</sup> The value of Civil

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<sup>117</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005*, 13-23; Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 24-52.

<sup>118</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad*, 10-14.

<sup>119</sup>de Munnik and Tak, 6.

<sup>120</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 32.

<sup>121</sup>Green, 198.

<sup>122</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005*, 23.

Military Cooperation as human and social intelligence collection unit could not fully be exploited. Overall, the intelligence gathering and analyzing capacities were not adequately staffed or trained, nor flexible enough to adapt during the mission.<sup>123</sup>

In addition to the internal intelligence gathering, there is cooperation in the intelligence community. Although the reports state that cooperation with allied partners was excellent and information sharing was adequate, all reports contain remarks about the difficulty of cooperating with other nation's intelligence cells and intelligence sharing, because of classification policy and national information systems.<sup>124</sup> This also accounts for working together with the host nation, because generally the Dutch presume that operational security regulation prevents them of working with other non-allied nations.<sup>125</sup>

The second major lesson identified is the ability of the Dutch Armed forces to apply influence capabilities in a structured coherent manner. The Dutch Army relied on non-permanent Information Operations, Civil Military Cooperation, Sector Security Reform and Psychological Operations capabilities, which led to a permanent understaffed, undertrained, and unqualified personnel.<sup>126</sup> This also includes the interagency members present during the mission, such as the Political Advisor and

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<sup>123</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 10-14; Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 32.

<sup>124</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005*, 16; Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 10-14; Green, 198.

<sup>125</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie EUFOR Tchad/RCA*, 10-14.

<sup>126</sup>de Munnik and Tak, 7; Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005*, 13-26.

Development Advisor.<sup>127</sup> Because there was a lack of civilian government advisors in the Task Force, Civil Military Cooperation personnel trained, and assisted local government actors.<sup>128</sup> Civil Military Cooperation personnel were not selected and trained to influence leaders or groups though.<sup>129</sup>

The shortage of specialized advisors such as the Political Advisor, Development Advisor, and Information Operations officer hampered decision making. These specialists must, next to the Civil Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations and Sector Security Reform specialists, be available to exploit the benefits of the comprehensive approach. Computer Network Operations and offensive Electronic Warfare capabilities were also not used, because there were no specialists present in the Task Force Staff.<sup>130</sup> Another example of a lesson identified on the implemented comprehensive approach is that it helped the commanders in their decision making, but it was not sufficient. Knowledge about influence elements therefore has to be consolidated in new doctrine by the Dutch Army.<sup>131</sup>

Next to the lack of expertise about planning and applying influence activities, there was a limited ability to measure effectiveness in the influence activities.<sup>132</sup> The

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<sup>127</sup>de Munnik and Tak, 7.

<sup>128</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Final Evaluation Netherlands Participation to ISAF, 2006–2010*, 108-123.

<sup>129</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 13-27.

<sup>130</sup>*Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>131</sup>de Munnik and Tak, 7.

<sup>132</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Eindevaluatie Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) 2003–2005*, 26.

Dutch Armed Forces and interagency community did not have a measurement tool for the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) factors. Only the Psychological Operations units were able to do so in a limited way.<sup>133</sup> Even if progress could have been measured, there were no initial measurements performed in the beginning of the missions. Result indicators, or key performance indicators for the PMESII factors must be formulated, in order to establish a base at the beginning.<sup>134</sup>

Influence activities are complemented by strategic communication on one side of the influence spectrum, and by presence, posture, and profile on the other. The Dutch Army and Department of Foreign Affairs do not have a Strategic Communication operating procedure, which is needed to influence coalition, host nation, local population and enemy actors.<sup>135</sup> This led to contradicting and contra productive statements on the higher levels. The Dutch government considered the mission in Afghanistan strictly as a reconstruction mission, which resulted in public discussion by members of the government, every time the Dutch forces had to fight. This also sent a message to the opposing forces that there was a weak Dutch political support for the mission.<sup>136</sup>

On the other end of the influence spectrum, the Dutch Army did not perform in accordance with the rules of presence, posture, and profile. The reports state that Dutch

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<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Final Evaluation Netherlands Participation to ISAF, 2006–2010*, 108-123.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid; Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 12-30.

<sup>136</sup>Green, 161.



units mostly were undisciplined in wearing their uniforms and using issued equipment.<sup>137</sup> Soldiers themselves purchased other clothes and equipment because of the overall impression that other equipment and uniforms were better. Especially US and Australian Army combat gear was very popular. This gave an undisciplined impression to coalition, host nation, local population and the opposing forces.<sup>138</sup> The Dutch also deployed very slowly, carefully, and were very focused on setting the conditions for protection of themselves. Their vehicles were big armored vehicles, that occasionally destroyed property, and which were not practical for contact with the population.<sup>139</sup>

#### Comparison generic lessons identified

The Dutch Army lessons identified can be categorized into the shortfalls of intelligence gathering in the human domain, the importance and lack of influence capabilities, and the shortfalls in interagency policy and tools for assessments. The US Army lessons identified for operating in the human domain are depicted in chapter 4 and are similar. In this section, the more generic lessons are compared to determine a comparable bases and a similar discussion in the Dutch Army. This comparison is followed in the next chapter, by a more in depth analysis, to determine if there is a root cause in the Dutch Army for the lessons identified.

The first two US Armed Forces lessons identified are the need to understand and influence in the human domain due to the hybrid threat and the non-state actors' power to

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<sup>137</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 56.

<sup>138</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup>Green, 178-179.

influence operations and destabilize areas. Factors given are the complexity of rules of engagement that enable actors to misuse them and the increasing pace and forms of human interactions across regions, borders, and continents by virtual connectivity. Although not stated in the literature review, the Dutch Army Commander states the same in his point paper: “Only a resilient, versatile and adaptable military with direct knowledge of the situation can succeed against this type of enemy. . . . It will also require that we develop a new set of broad solutions for operating in a new domain of warfare referred to as the ‘human domain’.”<sup>140</sup>

Both armies’ lessons identified show a need to consider and understand the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprises the human domain. Human based intelligence is becoming more important. The Dutch have problems gathering intelligence in the human domain, and their lessons identified list on this subject is long. Next to understanding, there is the need to influence in the human domain. This requires a capability to influence, in all phases of a conflict, to deter, shape, engage, and stabilize in the human domain. More specific are the roles described in the beginning of this chapter. There is a mismatch between the doctrinal roles of both Armies and the roles they assumed during missions. New, more unconventional, roles are needed in doctrine for operating in the human domain.

Both the US and Dutch Armed Forces will continue to operate with the comprehensive approach. This approach includes political, informational, and economic power in an indirect way against an adversary through the human environment. Both agree in their lessons identified that strategic guidance is needed for this approach that

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<sup>140</sup>de Kruijf, *Redefining Joint Operations in a Land Environment*, 1.

must have human objectives and actions to influence people, supported by information operations. The importance of the battle of the narrative at all levels is often underestimated. Both armies identify the necessity of Information Operations and Strategic Communication, to outmaneuver opponents in the information sphere, and win the battle of the narrative.

Finally, there is a major lesson identified from the White Paper: the inability to create strategic success in the last major operations. Discussion among experts hint towards the prevalence that ends, means and ways on the strategic level were disconnected from the other levels.<sup>141</sup> Commitment is important, but commitment might be a problem on its own, as wars cost lives and capital. After the current budget cuts of both armies, the United States and the Netherlands simply do not have the forces necessary for a long commitment. A long lasting political commitment after the Iraq and Afghanistan missions can be very difficult to attain. Critics in both countries argue that future conflicts and the way Western nations will react, will change again.<sup>142</sup> As mentioned in chapter 2, US President Obama stated that he did not want the United States to get involved in a long time stabilization mission.<sup>143</sup> Although this might change the way the United States, NATO and the Netherlands conduct operations in the future, the roles of the land forces in these missions may well be the same as described.

Both the US and Dutch Army have similar roles, conduct operations in similar environments, want to understand and influence in the human domain, and will continue

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<sup>141</sup>Johnson.

<sup>142</sup>Forman and Danan, 36-41.

<sup>143</sup>Dobbins, 151.

to use the comprehensive approach. There is a similar base in both armies concerning the will and ability to operate in the human domain. For the way ahead, the US Army will institutionalize the roles other than war of the Army, in doctrine, with a new warfighting function. Based on this doctrine, they will select and train personnel on cultural awareness, language, and finally regionally align her troops with partners around the globe.<sup>144</sup> Although this means incorporation of more unconventional ways, the conventional way, combat, fighting, will still be an integral part of doctrine. Because of the focus on unconventional means by the Special Forces in the last decades, the army plans to learn from them. For their way ahead, the Dutch are also rewriting their doctrine. The newly released Joint Doctrine Publication depicts the new roles, and the soon to be released Land Doctrine Publication 3.2 will contain many lessons on influencing.<sup>145</sup> The time is right to contribute.

### Conclusion

What are the Dutch Army lessons learned that identified roles of the land forces for operating in the human domain, and are they comparable to the US lessons identified? On the operational and tactical level, forces have changing roles during missions. The roles given to the land forces are a variety of conventional warfare, training and mentoring of security forces, mentoring of the local government, raising basic living conditions, deterrence, stabilizing presence, and humanitarian aid. These are comparable to roles of the US land forces.

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<sup>144</sup>Department of the Army, Pam 525-8-5, 4; Odierno and McHugh, 1.

<sup>145</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 72-264.

The Dutch lessons identified are: shortfalls of intelligence gathering in the human domain, the importance and lack of influence capabilities, and the shortfalls in interagency policy and tools for assessments. Both the US and Dutch Armed Forces will continue to operate with the comprehensive approach. This approach includes political, informational, and economic power as unconventional means against an adversary through the human environment. Both agree in their lessons identified that strategic guidance is needed for this approach that must have human objectives and actions to influence people. Roles of the army and interagency communities are similar in both armies, along with the will to improve the ability to operate in the human domain.

## CHAPTER 6

### DUTCH ARMY LESSONS: THE ROOT CAUSE

A lot of scholars tend to divide themselves into either “lumpers” or “splitters”— those who see a single overriding cause for what goes on, and those who see only confusion or multitudinous parts. The second usually appears in some general or textbook form (that is, everything is included), the former in some tunnel-vision work with a sensationalist title (“the weapon that won the war”).

— Paul Kennedy, *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War*

#### Introduction

This chapter will determine the root cause of Dutch Army shortfalls on operating in the human domain. In order to do so, this chapter addresses phase three of the double-loop learning process: root cause analysis.<sup>146</sup> A sequence review of Dutch Army’s lessons identified on source versus symptoms will take place to determine if there is a root cause for the Dutch Army’s lessons identified. This review is done by determining the cause of every sub set (role, understanding and influencing) of the lessons identified. The root cause analysis will stop at a level that is controllable and manageable for the Dutch Army, and at which reasonable changes can be proposed.<sup>147</sup>

To determine if the new warfighting function or the human domain, are suitable solutions for the Dutch Army, the root cause analysis of the lessons identified therefore is necessary. Proposals of change for a root cause are mostly targets of defensive reasoning,

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<sup>146</sup>James J. Rooney and Lee N. Vanden Heuvel, “Root Cause Analysis for Beginners,” *Quality Progress Quality Basics* (July 2004): 45.

<sup>147</sup>*Ibid.*, 46.

as the root cause in most cases lies at the very heart of the organization.<sup>148</sup> The second section of this chapter will therefore review indicators for defensive reasoning, to validate the root cause, and to verify if a proposal for change would be acceptable.

### Lessons learned and root causes

To determine the root cause, first the Dutch lessons identified and learned are listed, categorized, and reviewed. The Dutch lessons identified as mentioned in chapter 5, can be categorized as shortfalls of the land forces and shortfalls of the interagency community. Both categories have subcategories with specific topics to examine. For every category a root cause analysis will detect one or more root causes for the shortfall.

The first categories of lessons identified are those of the land forces. These can be divided in a mismatch of intelligence capacity between traditional roles in conventional warfare and the intelligence and information gathering in the human domain; understaffed, trained and qualified Civil Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations, Information Operations and other influence personnel; the inability for Dutch land forces to operate according to presence, posture and profile and finally the inability to share intelligence with coalition and host nation partners.

Subcategory 1: mismatch between traditional intelligence and intelligence/information gathering and measuring in the human domain:

1. It was hard for traditionally intelligence gathering units, such as scout units, to change to a human centric approach of gathering intelligence on humans and relations, instead of the enemy.

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<sup>148</sup>Smith, “Chris Argyris.”

2. Intelligence processing personnel was needed on all levels, but not always quantitative or qualitative present. Team intelligence cells were introduced at the company level, and operational analyses capacity was introduced at the task force level.
3. Team Intelligence cells were trained to analyze enemy information and not trained to analyze human and human relationships. Extra intelligence personnel were present in the Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations unit for this reason.
4. Special human intelligence teams and signal intelligence gathered information on human networks, but they were understaffed and under- or wrongly equipped for the missions.
5. The inability to understand/measure progress. Result indicators must be formulated for the human domain, a base must be established in the beginning. Related to subcategory 6.

The intelligence gathering and analyzing capacities were based on the traditional role of conventional warfare, with a focus on enemy related intelligence gathering. The Dutch Army injected extra analyses personnel for the human domain, on different levels, to compensate this shortfall. The organic intelligence personnel were not flexible enough to adapt during the mission. The Dutch Army partially solved these shortfalls, by institutionalizing the Team Intel Cells at the company level and broadening the education and training of the intelligence personnel.<sup>149</sup> On the brigade level, the staff reorganized to

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<sup>149</sup>Defense Intelligence Institute, email correspondence with author, 17 December 2013.



a process structured staff, including an environment cell that reviews information and intelligence on all aspects of the mission, human domain included.<sup>150</sup> Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations intelligence personnel are added tailored to the mission. They still miss the tools to formulate and measure progress though. These are all single loop solutions. The organic intelligence personnel still does not focus on the human domain.

Subcategory 2: Understaffed, undertrained, or even unqualified Information Operations, Civil Military Cooperation, Sector Security Reform, Psychological Operations, and Computer Network Operations personnel and capabilities. Part of this is the lesson that Civil Military Cooperation personnel focused on reconstruction efforts and therefore not trained to influence key leaders or collect human and social intelligence. The value of Civil Military Cooperation as human and social intelligence collection unit could not be fully exploited. The contradiction in this lesson identified is that NATO doctrine instructs Civil Military Cooperation personnel not to collect information actively, but share information that was collected passively.<sup>151</sup> The Information Operations function is relatively new in the Dutch Armed Forces. An Information Operations personnel branch does not exist, just like there is no Information Operations Center of Excellence or school. The field of expertise is literally managed by a hand full of officers, because the number of officers needed is very small. No proposals for change

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<sup>150</sup>Royal Netherlands Army, Doctrine Publication (DP) 3.2.2.1, *Command Support in Land Operations* (Amersfoort, The Netherlands: Land Warfare Center, 2011), 3-8.

<sup>151</sup>NATO, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.10, *Information Operations* (Istanbul: NATO, 2009), 1-12.

are suggested in the lessons learned documents. Professionalizing this branch will prove very difficult, if not impossible in the current situation. For Computer Network Operations, the Dutch Armed Forces currently develops new doctrine and establishes a Cyber Center of Excellence and Cyber unit.

The Civil Military Cooperation organization was very small and continuity for the missions was provided by deploying staff officers from tank, artillery, signal and maintenance units with short training.<sup>152</sup> The Psychological Operations organization did not exist at all. This capability was provided by air defense units in an ad hoc manner with additional training. The single-loop proposal for solving the Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations shortage is to form a Civil and Military Interaction Command. Despite the necessity explained in the lessons learned document, the new unit will be very small with an active capacity of 90 officers and 900 reservists.<sup>153</sup> Compared to the strength of the Dutch Army of 18,645, 3,000 Marines, and light infantry reserve units of 3,500 men, this is almost insignificant.<sup>154</sup> The non-active capacity would be activated in times of need, using reservists and non-deployed units as mentioned. These units have almost all been dismantled during budget cuts and are not available to backfill the Civil Military Interaction Command anymore.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 32-41.

<sup>153</sup>Ministry of Defense, “1 Civiel En Militair Interactie Commando” [1 Civil Military Interaction Command], [http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/1\\_civiel\\_en\\_militair\\_interactiecommando/](http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/1_civiel_en_militair_interactiecommando/) (accessed 4 January 2014).

<sup>154</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Kerngegevens Defensie* [Key Data Defense Forces] (The Hague, The Netherlands: Ministry of Defense, 2013), 45.

<sup>155</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Kerngegevens Defensie*, 14.

Subcategory 3: The Dutch Army did not perform in accordance with the rules of presence, posture and profile, for soldiers and equipment. The single-loop proposal for the soldiers is to act according to discipline regulations. The problem with the large armored vehicles in relation to presence, posture, and profile was not noticed in the Dutch evaluations; therefore there is no proposal. This also accounts for the last subcategory 4: The difficulty of cooperating with other nations, including the host nation, intelligence cells and intelligence sharing. As this was not identified in the reports, no solutions are proposed.

The Dutch Army misses solutions for subcategories three and four. The solutions for subcategories one and two are single loop solutions that address the lessons identified directly. Therefore the organic intelligence personnel still does not focus on the human domain. The Dutch Army did not build a sufficient Civil Military Interaction Command, but relies on reservists. The Dutch soldiers are not trained on presence, posture and profile, there is no solution for the profile mismatch of the armored vehicles. Finally, the Dutch lessons do not address the shortfall in international intelligence sharing.

The lessons learned caused the Dutch Armed Forces and Army to review their capstone doctrine. Some adjustments of the National Defense Doctrine and Army Land Operations doctrine publication address the human domain.<sup>156</sup> These new doctrines will be published in 2014, which is too late for the reorganizations that took place last year due to budget cuts. Less than one percent of the forces are dedicated to operate in the human domain. The 2013 reorganizations reduced the Army to infantry land forces, with

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<sup>156</sup>Royal Netherlands Army, DP 3.2, 4-5 to 4-7, 7-6 to 7-24.

no backfill for influence capacities such as Information Operations, Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations.

The single root cause for the four sub categories is not hard to determine (see table 1). Current doctrine is based on the traditional role of the Dutch Army, to protect the Kingdom and support international peace and order. Support of international peace takes place with a variety of missions, such as peace keeping, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency. According to Dutch doctrine these missions occur after conventional warfare, hence the Dutch army emphasizes on conventional warfare. In an Army build on the DOTMLPF system, organization, training, material, and personnel are based on doctrine. Root cause: The focus of the Dutch Army is to protect the Kingdom, conduct conventional warfare. According to the Dutch Army doctrine, land forces units do not have a specific role in operating in the human domain. Specific units are added to the Army that do have a specific role in the human domain.

The second category of lessons identified are those of the interagency community. These can be divided in a shortage of specialists such as the Political Advisor, civilian government advisors, and Development Advisor; the inability to understand/measure progress and the absence of a strategic communication policy. More interagency personnel must be available, who are able to establish result indicators, measurement of progress and effectiveness. The interagency teams of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development had a limited ability to set result indicators or measure progress. Finally, the interagency community, the Ministry of Defense included, did not have a Strategic Communication operating procedure, which enhances the wrong message given

by the fragile Dutch political support to military missions in general. The lessons learned document proposes to create an interagency Strategic Communication policy.

Table 1. Dutch Army Lessons Identified Root Cause

Subcategory	Lesson identified	First level rca	Second level rca	Third level rca	Fourth level rca	Root cause
Mismatch between traditional intelligence and intelligence / information gathering and measuring in the human domain	Difficulty to adapt to a human centric approach of gathering intelligence	It is not part of their task, and therefore not part of their training.	The units they belong to do not have a role in the human domain.	The units are built for major combat	The main task for the Dutch Army is to fight and to protect the Kingdom	The focus of the Dutch Army is to protect the Kingdom, conduct conventional warfare. According to the Dutch Army doctrine, land forces units do not have a specific role in operating in the human domain. Specific units are added to the Army that do.
	Intelligence personnel was not quantitative or qualitative present.	They were not needed for organic task				
	Intelligence cells where trained to analyze enemy information, not human relationships. Info Ops personnel added	Due to their task, and the way Dutch forces made adjustments to intel with CIMIC and PsyOps	The units they belong to do not have a role in the human domain, the Info ops capabilities do.	The units are built for major combat, Info Ops is added for stability operation	The main task for the Dutch Army is to fight and to protect the Kingdom, Influence capability is added for stability operations	
	Humint Sigint teams information on human networks, understaffed and under- or wrongly equipped.	Sigint does not focus on human domain, humint capacity is small, and intended for stability ops.	The units have tasks in different roles: major combat or stabilization	Based on doctrine		
	The inability to understand / measure progress.	Not part of organic task, therefore not part of training.	The units they belong to do not have a role in the human domain.	The units are built for major combat		

Understaffed, undertrained or even unqualified info ops, CIMIC, SSR, PsyOps, CNO capabilities.	Understaffed, CIMIC, SSR, PsyOps, CNO capabilities.	Available officers are limited, there is no unit or info ops	Info Ops has no role in training and exercise of the conventional forces.	Based on doctrine	The main task for the Dutch Army is to fight and to protect the Kingdom	The focus of the Dutch Army is to protect the Kingdom, conduct conventional warfare. According to the Dutch Army doctrine, land forces units do not have a specific role in operating in the human domain. Specific units are added to the Army that do.
	Undertrained, unqualified Info Ops, CIMIC, SSR, PsyOps, CNO personnel and capabilities.	Available officers is limited, back fill takes time.	Backfill needs to be trained from basics	Due to absent base of knowledge on human domain		
Dutch Army did not perform in accordance with the rules of PPP	Soldiers did not perform in accordance PPP	They were unaware and not trained on the issue	Because they do not have a role in human domain in doctrine	The units are built for major combat		
	Equipment not in accordance PPP	Equipment is protection oriented	Not willing to take risk	Due to absent base of knowledge on human domain		
The difficulty of cooperating with other nations, intelligence cells and intelligence sharing	The difficulty of cooperating with other nations, intelligence cells and intelligence sharing	Intelligence is classified in a certain way to protect mission	Due to regulation and doctrine	Intelligence system is built on conventional war, not partnering		

*Source:* Created by author.

Note: RCA: Root Cause Analyses; CNO: Computer Network Operations; CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation; Info Ops: Information Operations; PsyOps: Psychological Operations; SSR: Security Sector Reform; Sigint: Signal Intelligence; Humint: Human Intelligence.

The root cause for the interagency category can be related to the relatively young development of the comprehensive approach, missing policy, and lack of experience within the Dutch ministries. This root cause will not be examined for doctrinal change, as

it is not controllable or manageable by the Dutch Army. Tools to cooperate with the interagency partners is within the scope.

### Defensive Reasoning versus Defensive Embracing

The root cause of the Dutch Army shortfalls on operating in the human domain is the traditional role of the army, defending the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Dutch land forces are traditionally not structured or trained to operate in the human domain. Their doctrine is based on conventional warfare as their primary role, while training and equipment are based on doctrine to fulfil the primary mission. Most missions are not major combat though and conducting conventional warfare is ineffective in missions other than war. As seen before, the US Army was not prepared for an operation other than major combat, and not flexible enough to change when needed. The Dutch Army too had issues changing as the equipment used for the operations was too robust and oversized. Both armies procured new equipment during missions which was more suitable for operating in different phases and roles for the army than conventional warfare.

The first decade after the Cold War (1990-2000) seemed to justify this focus on major combat, as the 1990 Gulf War was conducted as a conventional war and was successful. The numerous other operations were designated “military operations other than war” and often characterized as humanitarian ones.<sup>157</sup> The transition to a mix of roles only occurred after the Western armies adjusted their methods to face the challenge in Afghanistan and Iraq, after conventional warfare was not adequate. The transition also

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<sup>157</sup>Forman and Danan, 35-46.

included the adaptation of the comprehensive approach, which included participation of other ministries and international organizations.

After the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Dutch Armed Forces is divided in two camps: those who try to incorporate understanding and operating in the human domain in doctrine and the regular army, and those who see the last missions as lost battles due to the application of unconventional means. This last category uses defensive reasoning during and after the missions, and tries to prohibit that core values and doctrine are changed in line with the lessons identified.

During my deployment in 2008 to Afghanistan, I witnessed the unwillingness of a major part of the unit, to have contact with the local population. In lessons during the training period prior to the mission, all ranks learned that Provincial Reconstruction Team specialists were supposed to talk to the population on behalf of the unit. This perception was then visible throughout the mission. During patrols, communication with the population often was done by the Provincial Reconstruction Team specialists. Patrol leaders that accidentally damaged private property sent local owners to the Provincial Reconstruction Team, instead of paying the damage themselves right away. Medical personnel always asked the Provincial Reconstruction Team to support them when there were issues treating a local person. To the majority, operating in the human domain was done by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Psychological Operations and Information Operations specialists. Not by them.



After the missions ended, the Dutch infantry community held an after action review to see what they could learn.<sup>158</sup> This was based on the observation that Dutch forces did not battle as much as other coalition troops, and in most cases had a defensive and even evasive mindset, instead of an offensive mindset.<sup>159</sup> Lessons from more than twenty years of peacekeeping and reconstruction missions, enhanced these observations.<sup>160</sup> Observations that fighting during a counterinsurgency operation can do more harm than good were set aside.<sup>161</sup> The infantry community developed the credo of the warrior, lessons to be applied for a more offensive mindset, and lessons how to conduct operations in small wars in the future. These were focused on fighting, not on operating in the human domain or a combination of the two.

The other half of the Dutch Army adopted the indirect approach with unconventional means and operated in the human domain. The Civil Military Interaction Command, Special Forces and other experts currently conduct Civil Military Cooperation and Sector Security Reform missions, with a comprehensive approach, in Africa and some parts of the Middle East.<sup>162</sup> The intelligence community is making major progress

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<sup>158</sup>Wouter Hagemeyer, “Voorbereiden Op De Toekomst Vanuit Een Historisch Perspectief [Preparing for the Future from a Historical Perspective],” *De Infanterist* 9 (2011): 1.

<sup>159</sup>Noel Bommel van, “Kerntaak Infanteristen is Vechten ; Officieren: We Waren Te Passief” [Key Task for Infantry is Fighting; Officers: We were Too Passive], *De Volkskrant* (13 July 2011): 1.

<sup>160</sup>Brocades Zaalberg, 128.

<sup>161</sup>Lundberg, 17.

<sup>162</sup>Ministry of Defense, “Missies” [Missions], Ministry of Defense, [http://www.defensie.nl/missies/uitgezonden\\_militairen/](http://www.defensie.nl/missies/uitgezonden_militairen/) (accessed 5 January 2014).

in adapting to the challenge of understanding the human domain.<sup>163</sup> The Netherlands/German Army Corps and brigade levels have incorporated some level of comprehensive approach in their exercises, even with participation of other ministries and nongovernmental organizations.<sup>164</sup> All these changes are not enough. Officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and commanders at all levels, need to be able to understand and operate (or influence) in the environment as well.<sup>165</sup>

US Land Forces experiences in the battles for Mosul and Anbar show that land forces had to switch roles swiftly between conducting combat, supporting and training authorities and security forces, and raising basic living conditions.<sup>166</sup> Commanders could not rely on vast amounts of specialized personnel for these roles. The officers found themselves performing a combination of fighting and influencing. The new Netherlands Defense Doctrine and Land operations doctrine both address this change in mindset. As these are the capstone doctrines for the Dutch Army, they might help to overcome the defensive reasoning that prevents change.

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<sup>163</sup>Defense Intelligence Institute, email correspondence with author, 17 December 2013.

<sup>164</sup>Luc van de Goor, *Taking the Comprehensive Approach Beyond the Afghanistan Experience. Lessons Learned from Exercise Common Effort*. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendaal, 2011), 1; 11 Air Assault Brigade, email correspondence with author, 28 November 2013; 13 Mechanized Brigade, email correspondence with author, 6 January 2014.

<sup>165</sup>Hoffman and Davies, 1.

<sup>166</sup>Lundberg, 17-21; Schultz, 5610.

## Conclusion

What is the root cause of the Dutch Army shortfalls operating in the human domain? According to the Dutch doctrine, land forces units only have a role in operating in the human domain after offensive operations, or after a conflict is settled in a peacekeeping or stabilization mission. This misperception in doctrine blocks developing units, tasks, training, and other DOTMLPF factors that are derived from doctrine. Defensive reasoning within the majority of the Dutch land forces, specifically the infantry community, prevents adjusting to the new roles and doctrine. But there is a light at the end of the tunnel: the Netherlands/German Army Corps and brigade levels are incorporating the human domain in their exercises, and the new Netherlands Defense Doctrine and Land operations doctrine both address this change in roles. As these are the capstone doctrines for the Dutch Army, they might help to overcome the defensive reasoning that prevents change.

Second, there is the root cause for lessons identified for the interagency community. There is a lack of policy and experience on the comprehensive approach within the ministries. This root cause is not controllable by the Dutch Army, and therefore not within the scope of this research. Tools to cooperate with the interagency partners is within the scope though. US Army solutions on this topic will therefore be reviewed in the next chapter, together with all the other US Army proposals and lessons learned, to determine if they are suitable and usable for the Dutch Land Forces lessons identified. And of course if they help to solve the root cause and overcome the resistance to change.

## CHAPTER 7

### LESSONS OF A DECADE OF WAR FOR THE DUTCH ARMY

Specialized skills are essential for successful operations. The specialized skills required of soldiers today and in the future are articulated . . . as New Norms. They include operational adaptability, cultural and language proficiency, negotiation, digital literacy and space knowledge, weapons technical intelligence and site exploitation. These specialized skills must now become universal tasks.

— Lieutenant-General Michael A. Vane, *Military Review*

#### Introduction

What US Army's proposals and solutions to solve their lessons identified in the human domain are suitable for the Dutch Army? To answer this question, this chapter will start with the main lesson in the White Paper on land forces operating in the human domain.<sup>167</sup> Next, this chapter will review US proposals that address the Dutch lessons identified to determine if these proposals are suitable for the Dutch Army and help to address the root cause of the Dutch lessons identified.

#### Strategic direction

The Strategic White Paper and “Decade Of War” include, next to lessons learned from the past, a change in US political and military strategic direction. The past decade showed the West that to intervene in conflicts and stabilize countries afterwards, is a costly undertaking, in human and financial capital. The new US strategy includes a phase zero in which the deteriorating situation in a country is countered, with a comprehensive approach, which is also time consuming, but is likely to be much less costly in human

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<sup>167</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 3.

and financial capital. To support this strategy, US land forces will be regionally aligned. The US Army will mentor, train, and equip foreign security forces to enhance their capability to counter national threats. The US Army will also provide development aid to address core grievances. The objective of the military and development support is to prevent countries from becoming unstable.

In the past, these missions were conducted largely by US Special Forces, which in the US Armed Forces include Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. As of 2014, the regular forces of the US Army will build partnerships in regions that are vital to the US social and economic interests. US Army units will be assigned the roles that the Special Forces had before. The roles and tasks are Civil Military Operations, Army support to security cooperation, Security Assistance, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force Assistance, and finally Civil Affairs Operations.<sup>168</sup>

The roles and tasks encompass operating in the human domain, train and equip indigenous forces, help local government, and raise basic living conditions with aid projects.<sup>169</sup> As mentioned before, conventional land forces can learn from the Special Forces on how they performed these missions.<sup>170</sup> The precondition to execute the roles is the ability for officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers to understand and operate (or influence) in the human environment. Culture awareness, language efficiency, presence, posture and profile, and the ability to determine states in a deteriorating states,

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<sup>168</sup>Department of Defense, JP 3.05, II-9 to II-19.

<sup>169</sup>Ibid.

<sup>170</sup>Cleveland, 147.

are crucial capabilities for these strategies. These capabilities are lessons identified from the White Paper and “Decade of War.”

The prevention strategy, comprehensive approach tools, and new army roles are valuable for the Dutch Army. The Dutch national security strategy is built on coalitions for protection, and projecting hard and soft power to ensure regional security, in line with Dutch interests.<sup>171</sup> The Dutch Government strategy is shifting from a stove pipe approach by the ministries, towards a comprehensive approach, with a mixture of conventional and unconventional means. The Dutch Armed Forces use the comprehensive approach in all phases of a conflict, ranging from prevention, intervention and stabilizing to normalizing or hand over to local government.<sup>172</sup> The Dutch currently use a comprehensive approach for their Eastern-Europe, Africa and the Middle-East missions. These missions are mostly conducted in a NATO, EU, or United Nations coalition. The Dutch government has indicated that these areas will remain the focus for her security policy.<sup>173</sup> To work effectively, the Dutch Army formed coalitions with France and Belgium for their missions in Africa, and coalitions with Germany and Great Britain for missions in Europe and Asia.<sup>174</sup> Belgium, France, Great Brittan, and Germany use the comprehensive

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<sup>171</sup>Hennis-Plasschaert, 8; Klem, 17, 65.

<sup>172</sup>Klem, 7-17.

<sup>173</sup>Hennis-Plasschaert, 6-8.

<sup>174</sup>Ibid.; Lt General M. de Kruijf, *De Landmacht Van Morgen* [Tomorrows Army] (Utrecht, The Netherlands: Headquarters of the Army, 2014), 5.

approach too, and are used to align their comprehensive approach within a coalition approach such as the EU uses.<sup>175</sup>

Although the Dutch Armed Forces doctrine describes the prevention phase, the Dutch Army doctrine does not. This is clearly an omission, as the Dutch Army already conducts missions in this phase, including Civil Military Cooperation and Sector Security Reform, comparable to the US missions. The Dutch security strategy is comparable to that of the US, including a phase zero, with the difference being that the scale is smaller and more directed to areas neighboring Europe. Furthermore, the Dutch work solely in a coalition. Both prefer to win a conflict without fighting, and if combat is necessary, to integrate conventional and unconventional means.<sup>176</sup> As the Dutch Chief of Defense General Middendorp said: “To use both the sticks and the carrots that you have available.”<sup>177</sup>

#### American proposals for the Dutch

To integrate conventional and unconventional means, with a comprehensive approach, are generally the lessons identified by the Dutch Armed Forces in the last decade. In this section, proposals from “Decade Of War” are applied to the Dutch lessons one through seven as mentioned in the previous chapter, for both the Dutch Army and the Dutch interagency community.

Subcategory 1 and 6: There is a mismatch between traditional intelligence and

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<sup>175</sup>Klem, 33.

<sup>176</sup>Cabayan, 8.

<sup>177</sup>General T. A. Middendorp, Address to the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 April, 2013.

intelligence/information gathering and measuring in the human domain. Proposals: Develop and improve intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance for the Dutch Army, especially for the human domain and build a system to collect the information, even fused top down (traditional) and bottom up, with an emphasis on human dynamics products.<sup>178</sup> This includes collecting information from civilian means, the internet, and social media.<sup>179</sup> The Dutch Army must train intelligence personnel to deviate from traditional intelligence collection, if necessary. The Dutch intelligence community must use the PMESII factors for measurement, and apply nontraditional methods of collecting, fusing and measuring progress, to enhance strategic, operational and tactical human dynamics knowledge.<sup>180</sup> This human dynamics knowledge will help understand the historical and sociocultural factors, social processes, sociocultural “levers of change,” and “cultural landmines.” Next, the Dutch Army must strive to understand how military forces will impact the population, government and other structures.<sup>181</sup>

The Dutch Army must build relationships with interagency, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, academia and local nationals to aid this process.<sup>182</sup> Think tanks and academia also can provide insights into human behavior using social, cognitive

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<sup>178</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, *Understanding Human Dynamics* (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 2009); Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 5-10.

<sup>179</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 6.

<sup>180</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, 93.

<sup>181</sup>Cabayan, 8.

<sup>182</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 5-18.



and neurological science.<sup>183</sup> Relations with academia, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, and local nationals are not forged at need. Peace-time cooperation and prepositioning of intelligence or interagency personnel, collecting information in areas of interest is therefore a must.<sup>184</sup> A prerequisite for this way of working is to improve the language and cultural knowledge of the intelligence personnel.<sup>185</sup>

To build relations, integrate the interagency efforts, and be able to measure progress in a different way, the US Army uses Human Terrain Teams at brigade level and higher. Human Terrain Teams provide commanders with a better understanding of the people, customs, beliefs and motivating factors of the population.<sup>186</sup> The Human Terrain Team is a squad sized unit with at least a social scientist, research manager, human terrain analyst and a leader.<sup>187</sup> The Human Terrain Team is a good interim solution to bridge the gap, and learn. The ultimate goal is to include this capacity in the organic intelligence capacity. They could fit in the environment cell that the Dutch Army uses on the brigade level.

The Human Terrain Teams, and the US interagency communities use measurement tools such as Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments (MPICE), as a method to collect, fuse, and

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<sup>183</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, xi.

<sup>184</sup>Department of Defense, 5-6.

<sup>185</sup>Ibid.

<sup>186</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, 26.

<sup>187</sup>Nathan Finney, *Human Terrain Team Handbook* (Leavenworth, KS: Human Terrain System, 2008), 11.

measure progress, in order to enhance strategic, operational and tactical human dynamics knowledge.<sup>188</sup> The ICAF evaluates the context of the conflict, delivers understanding on core grievances and social/institutional resilience, identifies drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and finally delivers opportunities for decreasing the conflict.<sup>189</sup> The MPICE method provides a way to measure progress in an area, based on more than 800 indicators within the PMESII factors.<sup>190</sup> It defines goals, indicators, and measures, which can be aggregated to provide indicators of trends towards the achievement. Both ICAF and MPICE could be useful tools for the Dutch interagency and military intelligence branch, to fill in the gap of measurement systems in their organizations.

Subcategory 2: Information Operations, Civil Military Cooperation, Sector Security Reform, Psychological Operations, and Computer Network Operations personnel and capabilities were understaffed, undertrained or even unqualified. Proposals: Train all influence personnel and all leaders on the importance and techniques of information gathering, key leader engagement, influence operations, and proactive messaging.<sup>191</sup> In order to do so, an Information Operations course is needed. In a relatively small army, with a very small influence community, training leaders who are

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<sup>188</sup>Department of Defense, *Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution* (Suffolk, VA: Joint Staff, J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting, 2011), II-12 to II-13.

<sup>189</sup>Department of State, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2008), 6.

<sup>190</sup>Dziedzic Michael, Barbara Sotirin, and John Agoglia, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments, A Metrics Framework* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), x.

<sup>191</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 5-14.

able to handle the influence techniques without specialists is the preferred solution to tackle the problem. As seen before, these leaders sometimes have to assume different roles and perform key leader engagement through a transition of phase of conflict. To support this solution, the Dutch Army must establish a career development path within the branches of the Army to improve experience build up.<sup>192</sup> To assist the leaders, a cadre, reservists or civilians, of on-call human dynamics and civil affairs experts can provide extra mass and knowledge.<sup>193</sup> A prerequisite for this way of working, is to improve the language and cultural knowledge of the leaders.<sup>194</sup> The latter is addressed in the next subcategory.

Subcategory 3: The Dutch Army did not perform in accordance with the rules of presence, posture and profile, for soldiers and equipment. Proposals for soldiers: Select and educate soldiers and leaders on consequences of not reinforcing words with deeds, as part of cultural awareness and influence operations.<sup>195</sup> Cultural awareness of commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers can be achieved by changes in education, cultural training, language, and career development.<sup>196</sup> To build cultural aware troops, the Dutch Army has to identify and prioritize requirements for

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<sup>192</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, 12, 48-66.

<sup>193</sup>Ibid., 13.

<sup>194</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 5-6.

<sup>195</sup>Ibid., 13-14.

<sup>196</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, *Understanding Human Dynamics*, 12.

cultural awareness and build and sustain a mix of regional cultural aware troops.<sup>197</sup> This also accounts for language proficiency and extra on-call cadre mentioned in the previous subcategory.<sup>198</sup> As seen before, the presence, posture and profile, and cultural awareness goes beyond the impression made on the population. To develop socio-cultural awareness also implies cultural awareness of others such as governmental agencies, allies, nongovernmental organizations, and even sister services such as the navy and air force as they all come with their own values, sub cultures, ethics and traditions.<sup>199</sup> These cultures can be examined and taught to the troops.

Finally, leaders and soldiers must act within the settings of presence, posture and profile at different phases of a mission, in order to connect to the population, even accepting a higher risk to their lives.<sup>200</sup> This will require a different mindset for the Dutch Army which progresses with care, over protected during a stabilization phase. Two books used by the US Marine Corps to teach and use as a reference on cultural awareness are the *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* and *Applications in Operational Culture*:

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<sup>197</sup>Department of Defense, *Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise and Cultural Capabilities* (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of the Department of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 2010), 8.

<sup>198</sup>Ibid.

<sup>199</sup>Department of the Army, Pamphlet (Pam) 525-3-7-01, *The US Army Study of the Human Dimension in the Future 2015-2024* (Hampton, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 2008), 71-76.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid.

*Lessons from the Field*.<sup>201</sup> These are excellent examples, very descriptive on why and how to become cultural aware, how to include culture in decision making, and best practices. They are popular around the world, and more than 10000 copies have been distributed.<sup>202</sup> The Dutch Army could certainly use these books as an example for their training.

Proposals for equipment: Fighting a conventional war is still a role for the army, the equipment related is still needed. For operations among the people, the Dutch Army must be able to procure special equipment, such as vehicles that are open enough to connect to the population, but also protective enough. A fast procurement procedure is in place, the Dutch are used to having different vehicles during missions other than war. The current specifications for these vehicles, based on maximum protection for the soldiers, makes sure that vehicles bought are unsuitable for missions among the people. The Dutch Army must take culture, operating in the human domain, and thus presence, posture and profile, into account. With the same risk assessments as mentioned before, this will result in the right equipment.

Subcategory 4: Cooperating with other nations' intelligence cells and intelligence sharing was difficult for the Dutch Army. Proposal: The Dutch Army currently develops the technical capability to share information and intelligence with other, non-NATO, and even non-military partners. The rest depends on trust. The Dutch Army must promote

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<sup>201</sup>Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011); Patric M. Scalon, Paula Holmes-Eber, and Andrea L. Hamlen, *Applications in Operational Culture: Lessons from the Field* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2012).

<sup>202</sup>Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, IIIV.

fusion with partners and emphasize trust. As a prerequisite, policies on classification of intelligence and information must be re-evaluated to ensure the lowest as possible classification is used. This will demonstrate willingness to share instead of the current restrictive need to know policy.<sup>203</sup> The cultural changes as mentioned in subcategory one are a prerequisite for this subcategory.

Subcategory 5: There is a shortage of interagency capacity, such as the Political Advisor, civilian government advisors and Development Advisors. Proposal: The Dutch ministries must ensure availability of sufficient interagency personnel, involve them in planning and make training and execution mandatory for this personnel.<sup>204</sup> As a side effect for better cooperation in the field, engage with as many key nongovernmental organizations as possible and let them participate in planning, training and executing.<sup>205</sup> Both proposals will also assure closing the cultural gap between the various actors, or at least understanding of the cultural differences. The other agencies must buy in too, to implement these proposals. This should not be an issue, as the need for a comprehensive approach, and the need to train for this, are felt by the other Dutch ministries.<sup>206</sup>

Subcategory 7: The interagency community, Ministry of Defense included, does not have a Strategic Communication procedure. Proposal: Create a Strategic Communication policy and procedures, suitable for popular social media to deliver

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<sup>203</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 5-6.

<sup>204</sup>*Ibid.*, 27-28.

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>206</sup>Klem, 20.

messages.<sup>207</sup> The communication approach must be a swift, adaptive, proactive, aggressive, open, tailored to the audience, approach, based on PMESII factors.<sup>208</sup> The proposal to create a Strategic Communication policy is included in the Dutch ISAF lessons identified.<sup>209</sup> There should be sufficient support to establish this.

#### Addressing the root cause

The proposals mentioned in the previous section are all single-loop solutions, to solve the lessons identified. The deducted root cause is the focus of the Dutch Army to protect the Kingdom and therefore conduct conventional warfare. According to the Dutch Army doctrine, land forces units do not have a specific role in operating in the human domain, specific units have been added to the Dutch Army to complete these missions. This section will determine if the proposals for a new Warfighting Function and a new domain, the Human Domain, address the root cause of Dutch lessons identified. This section will do so by reviewing the proposals on addressing the root cause, suitability for the Dutch doctrine, the second and third order implications after implementing the proposal, and adjustments that are needed to be implemented.

Implementing (one of) these two proposals by the Dutch Army will make the single-loop proposals unnecessary in time, as their root-cause gets eliminated. The efforts to gather and lock in the lessons from the last decade must be expanded to achieve influencing in the human domain in the very heart of Dutch Army doctrine, instead of

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<sup>207</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 13-14.

<sup>208</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>209</sup>Ministry of Defense, *Lessons Identified ISAF*, 30-39.

adopting little pieces in the current doctrine.<sup>210</sup> To get past resistance and to change the core values and doctrine of the Dutch Armed Forces, can only be done in open culture, by rigorous analysis and not ignoring history.<sup>211</sup> This latter part will be addressed as much as possible.

### Proposal: The Warfighting Function “Engagement”

The new warfighting function “Engagement” is based on the lessons from a “Decade of War,” and addresses how the US Army can influence people, security forces and governments across a range of military operations.<sup>212</sup> The proposal describes what unconventional roles the US Army must be able to perform. It also describes what capabilities come along with these roles and the necessary prerequisites. A warfighting function is a collection of comparable critical functions (definitions, chapter 1).<sup>213</sup> The warfighting functions are linked to a joint function at the joint force level. As mentioned in chapter 2, the current six warfighting functions are mission command, intelligence, movement and maneuver, sustainment, protection and fires.<sup>214</sup> By institutionalizing the influence of the human domain in a warfighting function, the US Army makes sure that during decision making, commanders on all levels have to take systems, methods, and

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<sup>210</sup>Hoffman and Davies.

<sup>211</sup>Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-5.

<sup>212</sup>Department of the Army, Pam 525-8-5, 1.

<sup>213</sup>Department of the Army, ADP 3-0, 10.

<sup>214</sup>*Ibid.*, 13-14.



tasks for influencing in to account. It puts influencing and engaging at the heart of decision making.

In short, the proposal for the new warfighting function addresses that leaders at all levels must understand, consider, and influence the human domain, by influencing populations, security forces and governments, and basically work together with these actors to end the mission successfully.<sup>215</sup> The Army has to be able to act accordingly in all phases of a conflict. Leaders must be capable to determine what resources are necessary to be able to influence in a congruent manner. For this, the US land forces want a different approach towards educating and training their soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers. All need to be more culturally aware, improve language skills and be able to partner and train.<sup>216</sup> This will enhance their operational readiness, and their ability to integrate host nation, coalition or multinational organizations. To achieve this, the proposal describes that a cultural awareness and language program is essential.

The roles and tasks described in the proposal are roles designed for all phases of a conflict, to support either the security forces or government of a country, or raise the basic living conditions.<sup>217</sup> The US Armed Forces have been conducting these roles for a long time, but have not been institutionalized in doctrine for the US Army before. This allowed the conventional forces to ignore these roles after a mission and return to their traditional role of conventional warfare.

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<sup>215</sup>Department of the Army, Pam 525-8-5, 7.

<sup>216</sup>Ibid., 11-12.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid., 8-11.

The Dutch Army uses almost the same warfighting functions, *functies van militair optreden*, and framework for the integration of these warfighting functions in decision making.<sup>218</sup> The difference between the Dutch and US Army doctrine is the warfighting function “fires,” which is called “striking power” in the Dutch doctrine, and contains all influence capabilities as well.<sup>219</sup> Dutch Army capabilities such as Computer Network Operations, Civil Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations and Information Operations are based on this warfighting function. They are part of a pallet of capabilities that a commander can choose from to deliver striking power. The current War Fighting categories in the Dutch Army give a commander the opportunity to ignore the influence capabilities, and choose conventional or kinetic solutions. Introducing a new warfighting function, Engagement, and including the roles and capabilities, places the engagement function at a more prominent level.

The new warfighting function would be at the heart of the Dutch land forces capstone doctrine, DP 3.2 Land operations. Therefore it will drive capability development throughout the doctrine, training, materiel, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) factors the Dutch Army uses to build and shape her land forces. The new warfighting function will set the mindset for leaders and soldiers, that they are part of influencing by operating in that human domain, and there is no “them doing it” anymore, referring to the influence personnel such as Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations. The leaders and soldiers must participate fully, and use influence of the human domain in their decision making, in all factors of DOTMLPF,

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<sup>218</sup>Royal Netherlands Army, DP 3.2, 6-28 to 6-38.

<sup>219</sup>Ibid., 6-31.

from planning, to operating, to procuring new equipment.<sup>220</sup> In time, when the rest of doctrine has been reviewed again, the new warfighting function will make sure that all the other doctrine publications are based on it. However this is not enough.

The land forces are not the only ones that are able to influence the human domain. Air and maritime forces can conduct influence operations in the human domain to support the land forces. Cyber forces can support the land forces where human interaction takes place via communication means such as the internet and social media. Dutch joint doctrine has joint functions instead of warfighting functions, which are categorized and used in almost the same way as the warfighting functions.<sup>221</sup> In Dutch joint doctrine, maneuver and fires are combined into one joint function. To change towards the new strategy, the total of the Dutch Armed Forces has to adapt to a multi-role army, which is capable to fight adversaries on the one hand and conduct an indirect approach with unconventional means on the other, in more phases of an operation, including phase zero.<sup>222</sup> This change must be clarified in the Dutch capstone doctrine at the Ministry of Defense level.

A joint function “Engagement,” analog to the warfighting function needs to be introduced, and Human Domain/Dynamics knowledge must be an integral part of the joint and land forces planning.<sup>223</sup> In this way, the warfighting function and the joint function, address the root cause of the Dutch lessons identified. With this warfighting

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<sup>220</sup>Department of the Army, Pam 525-8-5, 11-13.

<sup>221</sup>Ministry of Defense, NDD, 2013, 102-103.

<sup>222</sup>Odierno, Amos, and McRaven, 9-10.

<sup>223</sup>Defense Science Board Task Force, 12-14.

function and joint function, the Dutch Army units will have a role in operating in the human domain. In NATO doctrine, Information Operations is a joint function on its own, as is Civil Military Cooperation.<sup>224</sup> As the Dutch doctrine is largely based on NATO doctrine, a proposal to change the NATO doctrine in this direction is also preferable. In short, the warfighting function Engagement, supports the single-loop proposals, and added with a joint function in the capstone doctrine could address the root cause. As the traditional doctrine, training, and equipment is already in place for conventional warfare, the lessons to be learned are on the unconventional approach. The term human domain and its concept are currently absent in Dutch doctrine.

#### Proposal: the Human Domain

The US Army and US Special Forces proposal of the Human Domain places the new domain in doctrine, at the very center of all the domains, and describes the human environment as a maneuver space to operate within.<sup>225</sup> Clausewitz stated that war is a clash of wills, between living opponents, with their pride, intellect, interest and will.<sup>226</sup> These living opponents, humans, conduct war on land, air, sea, space, and cyber, for which most Western Countries developed domains in their doctrine. These physical domains are not isolated, but interrelate and work cross boundary, and they all are guided

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<sup>224</sup>NATO, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01(D), *Allied Joint Doctrine* (Norfolk, VA: NATO, 2010), 5-3.

<sup>225</sup>F. G. Hoffman and T. X. Hammes, *Joint Force 2020 and Human Dynamics: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Research, National Defense University, 2013), 6.

<sup>226</sup>Clausewitz, 184.

by humans to influence humans (figure 2).<sup>227</sup> This puts the human in the heart of an operation, be it leadership of a country, the military leadership, or the population.

Western doctrine and platforms are based on the physical domains though, not the human domain.<sup>228</sup> Human actors operating military platforms can still have the will to fight, go underground, or operate from a neighboring country, when all their platforms have been destroyed. A lesson from the past decade is surely that winning a land battle or sea battle alone is not enough. Humans will find other ways to fight back. The US land forces argue that the human domain is the decisive domain.<sup>229</sup>

A new conceptual framework including the traditional domains is necessary to create a holistic view of the strategic environment, being the relevant enemy, neutral, and friendly Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure systems, and how they interrelate.<sup>230</sup> Ways and means must then be found to influence these systems and relations, an intervention to influence the attitudes and behavior of humans.<sup>231</sup> The proposed new definition by Hoffman and Hammes for the Human Domain: “the totality of the cognitive, information, social, cultural, and physical elements affecting and influencing human behavior to the extent that the success of any strategy, operation, or tactical action depends on the application of unique capabilities to identify

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<sup>227</sup>Hoffman and Hammes, 14.

<sup>228</sup>Ibid., 2.

<sup>229</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>230</sup>Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes, “Global Commons and Domain Interrelationships: Time for a New Conceptual Framework?,” *Strategic Forum*, no. 259 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, [2010]): 8-10.

<sup>231</sup>Hoffman and Hammes, 24.

and influence relevant populations, enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries.”<sup>232</sup> A clear and comprehensive definition, which encompasses all phases in conflict, and all socioscientific fields of expertise. The Dutch Armed Forces must embrace this definition in its doctrine.

The implementation of the definition of the human domain in the Dutch doctrine could support the change needed. A great amount of work still has to be done to make the human domain practical, feasible, and usable for the Dutch Army. The US Special Forces try to do so. They acknowledge that next to the proposals on personnel in the previous parts of this chapter, leaders must have strong political-military, negotiation and conflict-resolution competencies. US Special Forces also acknowledge that their leaders must have skills and abilities to understand and influence human actions and activities. To support their leaders, a planning process that focusses on achieving human domain desired effects is needed, together with a way to visualize and characterize the environment. To achieve the desired effects, the Special Forces must be equipped to operate in the Human Domain.<sup>233</sup> All these practical propositions are usable for the Dutch Army, in order to implement the human domain in doctrine.

The previous paragraphs indicates that the human domain is at the heart of doctrine. The human domain is a new domain in doctrine, and it addresses the way how to influence the key factor in war: the human. A part of the human domain idea is based

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<sup>232</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>233</sup>United States Special Operations Command, *Operating in the Human Domain SOF Concept Framework*, Draft (Washington, DC: US SOCOM, 2013).

on the British joint publication 4 “Understanding.”<sup>234</sup> The Dutch Army must follow the further development by the US Special Forces on the human domain and implement the definition in its doctrine. Further study on the British Joint Publication on Understanding is advisable.

### Conclusions

What US Army proposals and solutions to solve their lessons identified in the human domain are suitable for the Dutch Army? America’s proposals that could support the Dutch Army to operate in the human domain, are to define the human domain and create a warfighting function Engagement in doctrine, and update education and training accordingly. These proposals will increase the ability to understand and influence the human domain, with skills such as language proficiency, cultural awareness, key leader engagement, partnering, and eagerness to participate in a lessons learned system. Dutch Army units must adapt roles such as training security forces and helping local government with development to address grievances.<sup>235</sup> Make unit leaders used to joint and interagency cooperation, flexible task organizations, to be adaptive and transit between roles swiftly.<sup>236</sup> Unit leaders must assume risk and incorporate culture in decision making, to combine conventional and unconventional means.<sup>237</sup> The doctrinal

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<sup>234</sup>Hoffman and Hammes, 6; UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine Publication 4, *Understanding* (Shrivenham, UK: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre, December 2010).

<sup>235</sup>Department of Defense, *Decade of War, Volume I*, 34-35.

<sup>236</sup>*Ibid.*, 5-21.

<sup>237</sup>*Ibid.*; Salmoni and Holmes-Eber, 289.

proposals for a human domain and warfighting function Engagement, together with a phase zero “prevention,” would fundamentally change the Dutch capstone doctrine and address the root-cause of the Dutch lessons: the very absences in doctrine of the roles they had in the past decade.

For the interagency part of the comprehensive approach, the US proposals are best practices that they already apply. Work and train with nongovernmental organizations, and interagency, develop a Strategic Communication procedure and use ICAF and MPICE as tools for measurement of progress. The relatively young Dutch interagency community can learn from these best practices.




Figure 2. The human domain related to the physical domains

Source: US Special Forces Command, *Operating in the Human Domain SOF Concept Framework Draft* (Washington, DC: USSOCOM, 2013).



## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Life is a series of natural and spontaneous changes. Do not resist them; that only creates sorrow. Let reality be reality. Let things flow naturally forward in whatever way they like.

— Quote attributed to Lao Tzu, 6th century BC

#### Conclusions

What can the Dutch Army learn from the current US Army developments in operating in the human domain? The overall lesson is that, although there might be a shift in political and military strategy, future missions of land forces will take place in the human domain. In this domain fighting wins conventional battles, but to win the clashes of wills incorporates a more comprehensive approach with unconventional means. An approach in which actors, be they enemy, coalition, and proxy forces are influenced to support the mission and the end goal. For this approach there must be doctrine, a planning methodology, multi-role units with multi-role equipment, and very adaptive personnel, suited for operations in the human domain. This lesson on the human domain starts with the lessons of a decade of war.

In the past decade the US Army lessons identified roles of land forces operating in the human domain. These lessons led to the release of the White Paper “Strategic Landpower.” In addition to the traditional roles of land forces, conventional warfare and major combat, the US Army has acknowledged that the land forces have more roles. These roles consist of nation building, and roles such as training partner units and raising basic living conditions in failing or deteriorating states. The roles are based on working

and interacting with many actors such as mentioned before. These roles are not new though, as the army and especially the Marines and Special Forces have used them in the last two centuries during stabilization missions.<sup>238</sup> This time the US Army intends to institutionalize the roles instead of forgetting them and going back to business as usual. The Dutch Army conducted comparable missions as the US Army. Therefore institutionalizing the US lessons learned in Dutch doctrine could be wise. Assigning multiple roles to units, from combat to reconstruction, gathering intelligence to partnering, and training of indigenous forces, could help the Dutch prepare for future missions.

During missions that the Dutch Army conducted in the last decade, they used the conventional approach of combat and unconventional approaches such as Security Sector Reform, in both cases operating among the people. For this reason, the Dutch institutionalized the comprehensive approach. The lessons identified by the Dutch to operate among the people, or in the human domain are comparable to those of the US land forces. The Dutch and US Army agree that they have to improve their ability to understand and to operate in the human domain. The Dutch Army can learn from the US Army because of the much larger scale of the US Army's deployments and therefore identified lessons. Because the lessons are tied to the comprehensive approach, the Dutch interagency can learn from US Army and interagency initiatives too.

Dutch lessons for the land forces can be divided in four subcategories. First, there is a mismatch of intelligence capacity in the Dutch Army between traditional roles in

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<sup>238</sup>Lawrence A. Yates, *The US Military's Experience in Stability Operations 1789-2005*, Occasional Paper 15 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 23-40.

conventional warfare and the intelligence and information gathering in the human domain. Second, Civil Military Cooperation, Psychological Operations, Information Operations and other influence personnel of the Dutch Army is understaffed, undertrained and underqualified. Third, the Dutch Army is unable to operate according to presence, profile and posture methods, needed to connect to the local population. Fourth, the inability of the Dutch Army to share intelligence with coalition and host nation partners. The interagency community lessons identified can be divided in three subcategories: the interagency community is short of deployable staff such as the Political and Development Advisors; unable to understand and measure progress in an area; and there is no interagency Strategic Communication policy. The majority of these lessons are related to the relatively young development of the comprehensive approach.

In 2013 the Dutch Army institutionalized a Civil Military Interaction Command to cope with operations among the people, and in 2014 the Dutch Army will release their new capstone doctrine. The draft capstone doctrine for the Dutch Armed Forces, and the draft Dutch Army doctrine for land operations, based on the evaluations, consists of some adjustments that address operating in the human domain. Doctrine and unit tasks still describe differences between units that conduct conventional warfare and units that influence the human domain. This denies the fact that all units must be able to influence the human domain, as conventional warfare can transit into stabilization at any time.

Regular forces are required to interact with local actors, government, and provide security and raise basic living conditions, based on the previous mentioned lessons identified. This statement is enforced by the fact that less than one percent of the Dutch land forces are dedicated to operate in the human domain. A very small active component

has roles such as Psychological Operations and Civil Military Cooperation. Ad hoc formed units are deployed to conduct Security Sector Reform missions. The Dutch Army relies on backfill from conventional forces for these types of roles. The 2013 reorganizations reduced the Army to infantry land forces though, with no ability to support Information Operations, Civil Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations units to expand if needed. Conventional land units must have a role in these capabilities. Additionally, regular forces must be able to conduct operations in according to presence, posture and profile doctrine.

Current missions for the Dutch Army are to protect the Kingdom, and support international peace and order. The latter is described as peace keeping, reconstruction or counterinsurgency. According to Dutch Army doctrine these all occur after conventional warfare, which is why personnel manning, training, and equipping of Dutch Army units emphasizes on conventional warfare. Currently, there is resistance within the Dutch Army to change doctrine and adopt to the new role on operating in the human domain. The unwillingness to adopt to operating in the human domain, can lead back to the traditional role of the Dutch Army. If the Dutch Army returns solely to training and equipping for conventional warfare, their lessons of the last decade on operating in the human domain will be lost.

### Recommendations

US Army lessons learned from the last decade of war on operating in the human domain are suitable for the Dutch Army. The first lesson, described in detail in chapter 7, is to select and train all military personnel in operating in the human domain, make them cultural aware, negotiation capable, and improve their language capabilities. The aim is

to improve the military ability to operate in a different culture, with other governmental agencies, allies, nongovernmental organizations and sister services such as the navy and air force. The second lesson is train and equip Dutch Army units to accept more risk and conduct missions with a congruent presence, posture, and profile in order to reach out to the local population. The third and final lessons are based on understanding the human domain better. Intelligence collecting and processing personnel must be trained in gathering and processing information in the human domain, understand the historical and sociocultural factors, social processes, in order to detect sociocultural “levers of change,” and “cultural landmines.” Strive to understand how military forces will affect the population, government and other structures, and build relationships with interagency, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, academia, and local nationals to do so. Promote fusion with partners and emphasis trust. As a prerequisite classification levels must be re-evaluated and instituted as low as possible. The US Marine Corps books *Operational Culture for the Warfighter* and *Applications in Operational Culture: Lessons from the Field* could be very useful to the Dutch Army as a reference on how to become cultural aware, how to include culture in decision making, and best practices.

In the US Army the discussion on these topics is very lively. The US Army still is reluctant to incorporate a human domain, while the US Special Forces are introducing it. The US Army on the other hand has taken the opportunity to use many lessons learned from a decade of war in the human domain, to introduce a new warfighting function named “Engagement.” On the opposite, the Dutch Army discussion on lessons after a decade of war focus on the combat role of the army, because of the general feeling of lack of aggressiveness of the comprehensive approach. This discussion is clouded by

discussions on the loss of conventional capacities such as tanks and artillery due to the current budget cuts. An in depth discussion on operating in the human domain is tempered by this.

The Dutch Army must change the base of her capstone doctrine to overcome the defensive reasoning for the combat role of the Dutch Army. The Dutch Army and Dutch Armed Forces must adopt the warfighting function “Engagement” for the army and create a joint function “Engagement” on the joint level. Additionally the Dutch Army and Armed Forces must institutionalizing the human domain, as a cross cut domain, with a framework for planning. Finally, the Dutch Army must create a phase zero for missions in doctrine, named “prevention.”

US Army lessons on the comprehensive approach can help the Dutch Army in their effort to operate more effectively in the human domain. These lessons are categorized in resources, training, and procedures. Sufficient interagency personnel must be available for missions and involved in planning and training. The Dutch Army must also engage as many key nongovernmental organizations as possible during peacetime and let these nongovernmental organizations participate in planning, training and executing. The Dutch ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Development must create an interagency Strategic Communication policy and procedures, including means to deliver messages such as modern day social media. The Dutch Army could use Human Terrain Teams and analyzing mechanisms such as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Measuring Progress In Conflict Environments (MPICE) to fill in the gap of measurement systems in their interagency and military intelligence branch.

By learning from the decade long Dutch and US Army deployments, their roles and struggles in the human domain, the results, insights, and US proposals will help the Dutch Armed Forces as a whole, and the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development, to develop new insights for their organizations.

### Further Research

The focus of this thesis on the US and Dutch Army lessons learned of the past decade causes in some way a narrow view. The British Army has conducted a similar research and released a joint publication on “Understanding.” A closer look by the Dutch Army is advisable. Furthermore, a long-term, multi mission review of Dutch deployments, with the help of outsiders such as think tanks, journalists, and participants to these mission that are non-Dutch, is advisable. Participants can be the population, allies, or even former adversaries. This long-term review will help to identify trends and lessons for the Dutch Army that are missed by evaluating each mission on its own, in isolation. This thesis last proposal for the Dutch Army is therefore to change the current lessons learned system to an open and rigorous learning system, in order to prevail in future missions.

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