

## REACHING THE TARGET AUDIENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

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2014-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 13-06-2014		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2013 – JUN 2014	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Reaching The Target Audience				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)  MAJ Mark S. Flitton				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Military Information Support Operations (MISO) uses themes and messages to reach target audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.  This thesis looks at the German people as the target audience of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP or NS) from 1920 to 1941 to determine if the methods and techniques were effective in influencing the German people to believe or conform to NS ideology. The level of effectiveness is the number of German citizens who supported NS ideology or remained unopposed to their actions. The analysis will be conducted through the MISO Target Audience Analysis process to frame the research as well as conclude calculable strengths and weaknesses of MISO synchronize information related capabilities, methods and techniques.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Military Information Support Operations					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	82	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

REACHING THE TARGET AUDIENCE, by MAJOR Mark Flitton, USAR, 82 pages.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO), previously known as Psychological Operations (PSYOP), uses themes and messages to reach target audiences in order to influence their emotions, motives, reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

This thesis looks at the German people as the target audience of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP or NS) from 1920 to 1941 to determine if the methods and techniques were effective in influencing the German people to believe or conform to NS ideology. The level of effectiveness is the number of German citizens who supported NS ideology or remained unopposed to their actions. The analysis will be conducted through the MISO Target Audience Analysis process to frame the research as well as conclude calculable strengths and weaknesses of MISO synchronize information related capabilities, methods and techniques.

MISO does not support NS ideology or any past or current practice of the ideology. The analysis is strictly designed to look at the execution of NS propaganda and what persuasive influence it had over the German people. US national policy does not support MISO conducting any action beyond the established policies and procedures set by law for MISO. NS ideology was not only about persuasion through media. It was supported by the *Gestapo* and *Schutzstaffeln* (SS) agents through false imprisonment, rape, murder, and slaughter of innocent people who were against or did not conform to NS ideology.

Just as important to understanding NS propaganda is the importance of conducting a thorough Target Audience Analysis (TAA). The process of understanding a target audience is critical to determining if your Target Audience is susceptible and capable of being influenced. If a MISO operator does not understand the depth of an individual's condition, concerns, fears, ambitions, and vulnerabilities, then MISO will not be effective.

It is hoped that this document will assist in a more analytical formulation of Target Audience Analysis concepts, plans, programs, themes, and messages that can be synchronized effectively with national policy and commander's mission. MISO can have an incredible impact on a populace if it is planned, synchronized, and conducted properly.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the many enlisted Soldiers and officers I have had the privilege to work with throughout my career. All have chosen this profession which has not been easy and yet they persevere and serve this great nation with pride.

I also want to thank the commander's that I have had the great privilege to work for. LTC Larry Dietz, who I would not have been an officer today without his guidance during a Brigade Combat Training Program (BCTP) exercise at Fort Lewis, Washington. COL Barry Larrain and COL Miguel Castellanos both gave me a chance to prove myself as a leader and staff officer, and provided outstanding leadership and management guidance. COL Wayne Tasler who trusted and believed in me to take charge and fix the various units I had the privilege to command and expanded my knowledge in becoming a better person and an officer.

I am also grateful to the members of my thesis committee and my Small Group Advisors, LTC Steven Smith and Doctor William "Coach" Kuchinski. I am also thankful to the Fort Leavenworth's Combined Arms Research Library, who went out of their way to provide most of my research materials.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for supporting me over these many years as I have not been home enough to watch them grow. I am eternally grateful.

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## ACRONYMS

ARSOF	Army Special Operation Forces
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CED	Captured Enemy Documents
CEM	Captured Enemy Material
CF	Conventional Forces
DAF	Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labour Front)
DNVP	Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National formation of the NS)
IRC	Information Related Capability
LOP	Line of Persuasion
MARCO	Message, Audience, Reaction, Carrier, Origin
MILDEC	Military Deception
MIS	Military Information Support
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness
NS	National Socialist
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (National Socialist German Workers Party)
OE	Operational Environment People's Party)
PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical environment, and Time
PO	Psychological Operations Objectives
PSYOP	Psychological Operations

PTA	Potential Target Audience
RMVP	Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda)
SA	Sturm Abteilungen (Storm Troopers), paramilitary
SD	Sicherheitsdienst der SS (Secret Police Reports)
SIRC	Synchronize information related capabilities
SLE	Soldier and Leader Engagement
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SPO	Supporting Psychological Operations Objectives
SS	Schutzstaffeln, Nazi elite paramilitary formation,
TA	Target Audience
TAA	Target Audience Analysis
TAAP	Target Audience Analysis Process
U.S.	United States
USACAPOC	United States Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
USAJFKSWCS	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USG	United States government



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The concept of influencing, known as propaganda, has been around since the beginning of time. The definition of propaganda has only been around for the last four hundred years. It first appeared in 1623 describing a congregation for propagating the faith. The Catholic church used the term in 1718 to describe a school for priests (College of Propaganda) gathered to educate for foreign missions. In the 19th to early 20th century, propaganda was widely accepted as a neutral term meaning the dissemination of information in favor of any given cause. It wasn't until after World War II that the term took on the meaning of deception or manipulation of human emotions through words and messages using sorted facts or half truths.<sup>1</sup>

The “Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary” defines it as ideas or statements that are often false or exaggerated and that are spread in order to help a cause, a political leader, or government.<sup>2</sup> This definition is a modern version of the word expressing the disinformation approach to propaganda.

The “Business Dictionary” defines propaganda as a message designed to persuade its intended audience to think and behave in a certain manner.<sup>3</sup> Under this definition, advertising and political activism can be considered propaganda.

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<sup>1</sup>David Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 5.

<sup>2</sup>Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, “propaganda,” <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/propaganda> (accessed 18 March 2014).

<sup>3</sup>Business Dictionary, “propaganda,” <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/propaganda.html> (accessed 10 March 2014).

U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, defines propaganda as any form of communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.<sup>4</sup> Military Information Support Operations (MISO) use the term to indicate information and influence activities, conducted by enemy or hostile forces, elements, or groups against U.S. or coalition forces.

MISO, formally known as Psychological Operations (PSYOP), is an instrument of national power that uses synchronized information related capabilities (SIRC) to conduct inform and influence operations. It conducts activities once recognized as propaganda (by definition in the early 20th century) but due to social and political changes, the term propaganda is not associated with MISO.

Bradley C. Hosmer, President of the National Defense University, stated that "the negative connotations in the West of the word propaganda suggest we have treated political war as incompatible with democratic values and traditions."<sup>5</sup> Frank R. Barnett expressed that "some would argue that the ethics of democracy preclude too strenuous a concern with propaganda."<sup>6</sup> These statements explain why the terms propaganda and MISO are interrelated but the United States government has established a distinction

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<sup>4</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2005), D-1.

<sup>5</sup>Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett, *Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Rethinking the U.S. Approach* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), vii.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 152.

between them. They function in much the same way but the connotation and association to who is conducting the influencing is different.

Another difference between propaganda and military information support is propaganda is designed to influence internal (country) and external (foreign) audiences while MISO only targets external audiences. Again, the two activities are similar. They both use methods (tools) and techniques (themes, messages, lines of persuasion) to reach their audience but the receiver of MISO influence activities is not and cannot be a U.S. citizen. MISO conducts information operations in the United States when requested by FEMA to support natural disasters but it does not conduct influence operations.

For this thesis, propaganda will be defined as activities conducted by the NS and influence activities conducted by MISO. The methods and techniques are considered the same. The difference is the undercurrent of the NS message that was presented to their audience supported by physical action against non-conformers to NS ideology.

MISO does not support NS ideology or any past or current practice of the ideology. The thesis is strictly looking at the execution of NS propaganda and what persuasive influence it had over the German people. US national policy does not support MISO conducting any action beyond the established policies and procedures set by law for MISO operators. NS ideology was not only about persuasion through media, it was supported by *Ghestapo* and *Schutzstaffeln* (SS) agents who carried out acts of false imprisonment, rape, murder, and the slaughter of innocent people who were against or did not conform to NS ideology.

National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), better known as the National Socialist (NS) or Nazi Party, came into power on March 21, 1933 with Adolf Hitler as the

Chancellor of Germany under Reich President Paul von Hindenburg. In a few short years, the NS used propaganda to help transform Germany from a economically weak and militarily defeated country into a nation proud of their rich history, strong economy and a powerful military. All this was done at a time when the rest of the world was mired in the Great Depression. As dominating as NS propaganda was in the lives of the German people, it is important to analyze the methods and techniques without prejudice.

The primary goal of NS propaganda was to radically restructure German society so that social class, religion, and loyalties would be replaced by a heightened national awareness.<sup>7</sup> The aim was to bring about *Volksgemeinschaft*, a national or peoples community.<sup>8</sup> The *Volksgemeinschaft* required that all its members be centered on the same goal; dedicated to hard work and to put “the community before the individual” (*Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz*).<sup>9</sup>

There is evidence that NS propaganda reflected the aspirations of large sections of the population.<sup>10</sup> Thus, NS propaganda was as much about confirming as about converting public opinion.<sup>11</sup> MISO operators need to understand the foundation of a culture and ideology before they can begin to support or counter opinions and attitudes. It is also critical to understand that deep rooted ideologies in a society require very specific and detailed analysis to be effective in response.

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<sup>7</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 5.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 60.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 61.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

Adolf Hitler wrote, “The purpose of propaganda is not to provide interesting distraction for blasé young gentlemen, but to convince, and what I mean is to convince the masses. But the masses are slow moving, and they always require a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them.”<sup>12</sup> He also wrote, “When there is a change, it must not alter the content of what the propaganda is driving at, but in the end must always say the same thing. For instance, a slogan must be presented from different angles, but the end of all remarks must always and immutably be the slogan itself. Only in this way can the propaganda have a unified and complete effect.”<sup>13</sup> These thoughts are why MISO operators must understand propaganda. Propaganda and MISO are influence tools designed to persuade and influence a person’s perspective. Understanding propaganda will help MISO operators conduct informed synchronized information related capabilities more effectively.

New technology, such as radio and film with sound, was used extensively by the NS. Radio and film provided a powerful platform to disseminate propaganda messages. The effect of propaganda through the use of technology and its ability to create or develop emotional thoughts is required to be understood by the MISO operator.

This thesis does not support the use of NS propaganda but the process and its capabilities are important to understand. MISO must look to the past to develop more informed and effective MISO methods and techniques. The media of today is far more extensive in reaching a broader audience than the media of the 1930s. Information can

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<sup>12</sup>Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim, vol. 1 A Reckoning, “War Propaganda” (Geneva, IL: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998), 51.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 52.

travel around the world faster through the internet making propaganda more dangerous in the hands of an adversary. Adolf Hitler wrote “propaganda is no more than a weapon, though a frightful one in the hand of an expert.”<sup>14</sup> This is why MISO operators must look at how propaganda is used and countered proportionally. It is hoped that a deeper understanding of past propaganda methods may make MISO operators respond more effectively in today’s MISO activities.

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 18.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

There are over 433,000 references to psychological operations and Military Information Support Operations and over 83,000 references to NSDAP, NS, or Nazi propaganda in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). Of these references, a focus on keystone documents was maintained in order to keep the information consistent and maintain research defensible among a community of experts. Most of the material, except for the field manuals, is used by a community of experts as major sources of information. Their conclusions may differ slightly due to their research, but they are generally in agreement as to facts, conditions, purpose, and execution.

Field Manual (FM) 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations*, is the newest keystone doctrine manual for United States (U.S.) Army Military Information Support Operations (MISO). It is the authoritative reference for the U.S. Army in influencing foreign target audiences across the range of military operations.

The mission of MISO is explained in Chapter One, “Mission and Core Tasks”. It is important to understand what MISO is so that the best methods and techniques can be used. Combatant Commanders are increasingly recognizing the physical and psychological effects military activities have on populations. They expect MISO operators to be professionals in their field and who know how to reach their target audiences effectively. That is why it is important to understand the process of MISO and use related influence techniques from history to determine what past success that were used to support a given situation. In the words of Field Manual 3-05.302, *Tactical*

*Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, the definition of MISO is:

U.S. Army MISO forces are trained, educated, equipped, organized, mission-tailored, and purpose-designed to influence foreign individuals and groups, and inform both domestic and foreign populations. As such, they provide the DOD a robust capability to both inform and influence foreign audiences in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. MISO contribute to the accomplishment of the full range of conventional and SO missions by influencing, informing, and directing foreign audiences and populations in a manner consistent with U.S. national objectives.<sup>15</sup>

The gap in this FM is the lack of information that had been in previous FMs to describe the MISO process. For example, FM 3-53 does not cover in depth the MISO core tasks, operations, targeting, MISO Military Decision Making Process, aerial delivery, or Target Audience Analysis. New or revised doctrine has not been released at the time of this writing to support the gap of information. FM 3-05.301, *Psychological Operations Process, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* and FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, are still in effect as a main source of MISO information. FM 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, Chapter 6, describes the Seven Phase MISO (PSYOP) process, which will be used here to analyze NS propaganda methods and techniques.

The second phase in the Seven Phase MISO (PSYOP) process is the Target Audience Analysis (TAA). TAA is a detailed, systematic examination of PSYOP-relevant information to select Target Audiences (TAs) that can accomplish a given

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<sup>15</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-53, *Military Information Support Operations* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, January 2013), 1-1.



Supporting Psychological Operations Objectives (SPO).<sup>16</sup> The Target Audience Analysis Process (TAAP) is the method to analyze a target audience in order to select relevant information, messages, techniques that will shape or create an effect with the target audience.

The TAAP is designed to answer four questions. What target audiences will be most effective in accomplishing the desired behavioral or attitudinal response?<sup>17</sup> What Lines of Persuasion (LOP) will influence the target audience to achieve the objective?<sup>18</sup> What media will effectively carry the chosen LOP?<sup>19</sup> What events or measures of effectiveness will indicate success or failure of the PSYOP effort?<sup>20</sup> Understanding the TAAP is critical to MISO success. If the analysis of the target audience is flawed, then the message is flawed. If we cannot understand how to analyze a target audience then MISO cannot answer the questions properly. This will result in TAA being poorly executed or ineffective. This phase will be the method of comparison for this thesis of the NS target audience and propaganda methods and techniques. It is the research and analysis method for developing MISO programs, supporting programs, and their respective series.

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<sup>16</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302, *Tactical Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 2005), 6-2.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 6-4.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*

There are ten steps to the TAAP but eight are relevant to this thesis examination. Two are administrative processes. The ten steps evaluate the conditions that affect the target audience, determine the target audience's vulnerabilities, select LOPs, identify symbols, determine susceptible rating, determine accessibility, determine the target audience's effectiveness and determine the impact indicators.<sup>21</sup>

Another keystone document is the writings of William Shirer in the *Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. It is a single book composed of 6 chapters (called books) for which Book One: *The Rise of Adolf Hitler*, Book Two: *Triumph and Consolidation*, Book Three: *The Road to War*, and Book Four: *War: Early Victories and the Turning Point*, were used. It was first published in 1960 and won the 1961 National Book Award for Nonfiction.<sup>22</sup> It is a historical interpretation of the events in German history up through the fall of Nazi Germany. MISO doctrine is not Shirer's focus. What he does provide is an excellent source of information pertaining to Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, the German people, and the rise of the NS party. Mr. Shirer was a journalist who lived in Germany and saw first hand the development of Nazi Germany up to 1940. Mr. Shirer's work is relevant to this research as his work has been recognized as accurate and cited by many scholars. The comparison of MISO doctrine to the NS will be the qualitative analysis based on TAAP. The gap is the lack of any literature on the MISO study of methods and techniques in relation to NS propaganda.

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 6-5.

<sup>22</sup>William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 1484.

The three major publications that will be referenced the most throughout this thesis are by three renowned students of NS propaganda. Lancaster University Professor Aristotle A. Kallis wrote *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*. University of Kent Professor David Welch wrote *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*. Calvin College Professor Randall Bytwerk wrote *Bending Spines*, along with his collection of articles, artifacts, documents, posters, movies, and book collection on German propaganda posted on the Calvin College website.<sup>23</sup>

These three authors provided a wealth of knowledge to understanding NS propaganda. They used German government documents, writings directed contributed to Hitler, Goebbels and other leaders of the Third Reich, and scholarly works recognized as accurate and informative from countries around the world. Their depth of understanding the development and growth of the NS party with the leadership of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, helped formulate understanding of how the growth of a weak political party grew into a national, if not a world phenomenon. In addition, these authors often referenced each other. The relationship to MISO is that these books provide depth of information towards the NS's use of print, radio, film, the arts, parades, rallies, speeches and symbolism to portray strength and their vision for a new German society. They provide excellent insights to analyze and draw conclusions through the TAAP in order to determine relevance of NS propaganda to conducting better MISO campaigns.

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<sup>23</sup>Calvin College, German Propaganda Archive: Speeches, posters, art work, digital books and articles, <http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ww2era.htm> (accessed 18 March 2014).

Professor Bytwerk's edited book, *Landmark Speeches of National Socialism*, and Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) provide additional insights. They provide information on the thoughts, beliefs and ideas of the leaders of the NS. These two books tie in well with the three professors' works as they also reference this material throughout their research.

Another set of books to support the relationship between internal and external validity, which will be discussed in the next chapter, is the books on the life and times of German citizens living in the Third Reich. Richard Bessel's book *Life in the Third Reich* and Frederic Tubach and Sally Peterson's book *German Voices: Memories of Life During Hitler's Third Reich* provide insights into the daily lives of German before and during the war. These works provide personal insights on the influence of the NS on their lives.

These books do not directly relate the NS party to MISO but they do offer how NS propaganda was used and how it influenced the German populace. Each individual account did mention that throughout the pre-war and war years NS propaganda was a part of their daily lives. It was a question of what they believed and how much they believed the propaganda presented. Some were avid supporters, believing that Hitler truly cared for and represented the common German ideology and beliefs.. It was not until 1941, when the German military began to loose the war in Russia that many of the German people began to recognize that Hitler and the NS propaganda machine were not truthful. Support for Hitler and the NS began to decline.

Of the books, manuals, and internet websites used for this thesis, all documents and information conclude NS propaganda was the first twentieth century agency to use every means of communication available to build the masses of Germany into a frenzy of

support for the new Germany and Adolf Hitler. This frenzy, exploiting hatred for communism, the Jew, and Weimar government through *Volksgemeinschaft* and military success, will provide a good understanding of how propaganda was used.

This analysis will provide the gap in discussing the relationship of propaganda and synchronized information related capabilities (SIRC) through NS propaganda and MISO operations. The many sources clearly provide a framework to study the effectiveness of NS propaganda and for MISO operators to analyze what methods and techniques need to be evaluated to better support MISO SIRC in future operations.

Not all NS methods and techniques can be used effectively in today's MISO SIRC. The NS had highly skilled and professional writers, artists, researchers, and filmographers. MISO military occupational specialists are not trained at the professional level the NS party had at their disposal. These voids can be corrected. Efforts to increase education in sociology, psychology, social media, imagery, art, and history will provide highly educated and professional MISO operators to greatly improve support for future military operations.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research will use the qualitative research method to answer the primary question was NS propaganda effective in influencing the German people to believe or conform to NS ideology? The secondary question is what can be derived from NS propaganda that can help improve MISO synchronize information related capabilities, methods, and techniques using the MISO Target Audience Analysis Process (TAAP)? There is an absence of material relating to the study of MISO methods and techniques compared to NS propaganda methods and techniques. A qualitative method of research will rely on historical research and analysis from major sources of information in order to be accurate and reliable in presenting analysis and conclusion of information. Primary sources that are not available at the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were sought at other collections, libraries, and colleges.

The research methodology takes into account both internal and external validity to ensure accurate conclusions are drawn. Internal validity refers to the data it yields to allow the researcher to draw accurate conclusions about cause-and-effect and other relationships within the data.<sup>24</sup> External validity refers to results applying to situations beyond the study itself to which conclusions can be generalized to other contexts<sup>25</sup> For the purposes of internal validity, this paper uses the triangulation strategy. Paul D. Leedy

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<sup>24</sup>Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormond, *Practical Research: Planning and Design*, 8th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005), 104.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 105.

and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod define the strategy in “Practical Research: Planning and Design” as:

Multiple sources of data are collected with the hope that they will all converge to support a particular hypothesis or theory. This approach is especially common in qualitative research; for instance, a researcher might engage in many informal observations in the field and conduct in-depth interviews, then look for common themes that appear in the data gleaned from both methods. Triangulation is also common in mixed-method designs, in which both quantitative and qualitative data are collected to answer a single question.<sup>26</sup>

External validity is also important to research to determine useful information beyond the subject and time period studied. This paper is limited in using a representative sample to improve external validity as defined by Leedy and Ormrod as:

Whenever we conduct research to learn more about a particular category of objects or creatures... we will often study a sample from that category and then draw conclusions about the category as a whole . . . The human race is incredibly diverse in terms of culture, child-rearing practices, educational opportunities, personality characteristics, and so on. To the extent that we restrict our research to people with a particular set of characteristics, we may not be able to generalize our findings to those with a very different set of characteristics. Ideally, we want the participants in a research study to be a representative sample of the population about which we wish to draw conclusions.<sup>27</sup>

The limitation in using external validity is the lack of access to people who have experienced events, conditions, and perceptions of NS propaganda in Germany. What information is available is in personal accounts, biographies, video documentaries, and historical data. External validity is critical but limited.

An example of external validity is written in Frederic Tubach and Sally Patterson’s book *German Voices: Memories of Life During Hitler’s Third Reich*. Frederic Tubach stated:

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., 89.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 100.

My own childhood (from ages three to eighteen) in Nazi Germany and my research and teaching as a professor of German at the University of California, Berkeley, have shaped my insights as well, particularly concerning the pre–World War II years. As I heard people’s stories and read letters and other documents, it became increasingly clear to me that a crucial aspect in the study of the Nazi years is generally neglected, namely, the role of the everyday in shaping individual Germans’ experiences and beliefs—their *Lebenswelt*.<sup>28</sup>

All attempts to adhere to these methods and strategies will be done in order to ensure the research will be credible.

The sources used to conduct the research for this study all agree that propaganda was either effective in their portrayal of the NS ideology and beliefs and for a majority of the people propaganda reinforced the belief that they already held. This research provides lessons clearly applicable using TAAP and should be assessed even more to support MISO doctrine today.

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<sup>28</sup>Frederic C. Tubach and Sally Patterson, *German Voices: Memories of Life During Hitler's Third Reich* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011), 3.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

U.S. Army MISO forces are trained, educated, equipped, organized, mission-tailored, and purpose-designed to influence, inform, and direct foreign audiences and populations in a manner consistent with U.S. national objectives.<sup>1</sup> They plan, develop, and deliver information to inform and influence, and assess its effects.<sup>2</sup> They do this to maintain stability, avert crises, create understanding, deter aggression, and prevent escalation of armed conflict on the part of state and nonstate actors, their sympathizers and supporters.<sup>3</sup>

In limited conflict and major combat operations MISO are combat multipliers in that they increase the effectiveness of combat power, protect friendly forces, reduce the likelihood of noncombatant injury, and erode the enemy's will to resist.<sup>4</sup> This is done through effecting behavior change to create conditions where military operations result in fewer friendly, civilian, and enemy casualties; and shorten engagements, thereby limiting the consequences of collateral damage.<sup>5</sup> In addition, by influencing and informing, MISO can save lives and ultimately reduce suffering, undermine enemy objectives, increase

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<sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-53, 1-1.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

purpose and potency of U.S. military and interagency operations on the contemporary and future battlefield, and ease the transition to sustainable peace.<sup>6</sup>

During conflict, the end state of the commander is to impose his will on the enemy and destroy that enemy's ability to resist.<sup>7</sup> FM 3-53 *Military Information Support Operations*, states:

Commanders increasingly recognize the physical and psychological effects military activities have on populations. As such, they rely on information-related capabilities in all phases of military operations to amplify the effectiveness of lethal and nonlethal engagements. Synchronization of word and deed matter more as the media and the Internet carry both across borders and boundaries, and emerging technologies and social media increase access at the individual level to the media. Accordingly, MISO offer commanders, interagency partners, and HN and PN counterparts a means to inform and influence individuals and groups in ways that support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives.<sup>8</sup>

The timing of actions and messages, the environment and climate in which they carry out, and the manner in which they are delivered are critical to influencing the enemy's decision-making process and subsequent behavior.<sup>9</sup> With precise messages and purposeful actions delivered for effect at the most advantageous time, place, and duration, MISO can be very effective.<sup>10</sup>

MISO draws from multiple disciplines to ensure that relevant, timely, and effective messages are conveyed.<sup>11</sup> A few of these disciplines are: social and behavioral

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 1-4.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 1-1.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 1-5.

sciences, advertising, cultural anthropology, humanities, language, and cultural studies.<sup>12</sup>

To increase the effectiveness of the MISO message, specialists such as radio and television broadcasters, journalists, photographers, graphic artists, printers, and media design and development specialists are used.

Multiple disciplines, combined with specialists, provide a foundation for which synchronized information related capabilities are devised, developed, delivered, and assessed. The TAAP is used to determine best methods and techniques to reach a target audience. As discussed in chapter 2, TAAP is the research and analysis method for developing MISO programs and series using a ten step process, of these, Seven are relevant to this study. The ten step process is always trying to answer the four questions discussed in chapter 2 as to what the best methods and techniques to reach a specified target audience are.

The analysis of NS propaganda using the TAAP framework will define the conditions, vulnerabilities, lines of persuasion (LOPs), symbols, accessibility and effectiveness of the NS propaganda. It is the framework for this analysis.

Conditions are those existing elements that affect the target audience, but over which the target audience has limited control.<sup>13</sup> These conditions are stimulus, orientation, and behavior. Stimulus is an event or issue that has occurred that makes the target audience outward observation of the current state of existence, orientation is what the target audience feels or thinks about a given stimulus, and behavior is the outward

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302 (2005), 6-5.

observation or inaction after being exposed to a stimulus and filtering it through one's own orientation.<sup>14</sup>

Vulnerabilities are the needs, wants, or desires that arise from the conditions of a target audience.<sup>15</sup> They are what influence the target audience. The number of conditions that support the vulnerability determines the strength of the vulnerability. The desire of the target audience to fulfill, alleviate, or eliminate a vulnerability provides motivation for the target audience to change its behavior.<sup>16</sup>

A line of persuasion (LOP) is an argument used to obtain a desired behavioral response by exploiting vulnerabilities of a target audience. It is a detailed, thorough, and concise argument that persuades the target audience to behave in the desired manner.

Symbols are visual (graphic or short textual), audio, or audiovisual means used to convey, reinforce, or enhance a LOP.<sup>17</sup> To be effective, symbols must be recognizable, meaningful, and relevant to the target audience.

Accessibility is defined as the availability of an audience for targeting by MISO operators. It identifies what media can reach the target audience and to what degree the target audience can be influenced by each media type.

Effectiveness is the ability of the target audience to achieve the desired behavioral change.<sup>18</sup> By determining effectiveness, MISO operators can accurately target audiences

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 6-6.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., 6-7.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

that have the greatest probability of achieving the SPO. To determine if a target audience is going to be effected, it has to have some degree of control over its environment, the authority to act, and the power to accomplish the MISO objective. However, no target audience is all-powerful, and all target audiences have some limits in their environment such as sociological or psychological barriers. MISO has no legal, economic, or physical control over others, only the perception of control, if believed.

### Condition

The first step in understanding how to reach a specific target audience is to understand the condition of that audience. The condition of the audience will provide insight to the behavior or the inaction of an audience when exposed to stimulus.

By the 1920s many Germans believed that the defeat in World War I was a result of the Jews and communists within the Reich.<sup>19</sup> The Jews were seen as corrupt manipulators of economic and banking conditions and the communists as destroyers of the German way of life. They were also outraged by the requirement pay huge reparations, as well as the confiscation of their overseas empire and the navy.<sup>20</sup> The military and political elite responsible for the defeat blamed their errors on the new Weimar Republic, which had accepted the peace terms imposed by the victors.<sup>21</sup> When Germany could no longer keep up the reparation payments, the French occupied the Ruhr. This forced German politicians to sign into law economic policies which caused

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<sup>19</sup>Geoffrey Parker, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 298.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

massive inflation, destroying the savings of the middle class as well as trust on which the republic depended for its stability.<sup>22</sup>

The common German citizen was devastated by the failures of the Weimar government, the loss of a war that they thought they were winning, the increase of Bolshevik communism in Germany, the perceived failure of the war, malice of the Jews, and the economic sanctions and oppression that destroyed the German economy.

The common German citizen saw no end to the continual spiral of destruction of their society. A once-proud people, rooted in history of kingdoms and knights, conquests, and patriotism could not put food on the table to feed their families. Their pride was taken from them and there was no vision of when they were going to be lifted out of the abyss. The constant fighting among individuals over politics and the economy, and pushing the blame onto the government provided opportunities for people like Adolf Hitler to use oratorical skills and emotional expressionism to wedge individuals against the Weimar government and support change.

A German citizen living in a major city expressed his view of what he perceived was the common German citizen's view of the time period:

Over succeeding generations, however, that original, idyllic community had been destroyed by a process of economic and social modernization that culminated in nineteenth-century industrial capitalism. Traditional German values had been replaced with the values of the market-place, a capitalism that was increasingly associated with notions of liberalism and parliamentary democracy. Moreover, these changes had not been the result of anonymous, impersonal forces - quite the contrary, it was the Jews above all others who had subverted and undermined the original German tradition. Indeed, in early *volkisch* thinking, the very definition of what it was to be German was conceived in part in contradistinction to the Jews. The *Volk* was stable and settled - the Jews were wandering and rootless; the *Volk* was spiritual, the Jews were materialist; the *Volk* was the epitome of healthy

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

rural life, the Jews embodied the decadence and corruption of the life of the city. Moreover, the Jews were not a separate group in open conflict with the *Volk*: they had penetrated into the very heart of German society and culture, and it was this penetration that had undermined the strength and the purity of the German people. . . . In short, the Jews were the enemy, and it was only through their destruction that Germany could ever be reborn.<sup>23</sup>

Through this condition analysis, MISO can learn how experiences, environments, beliefs, customs, and events, affect an individual or group's perception of the world. It frames their beliefs and frames the reason why an individual or group might act, react, or respond, or not react, to a certain stimulus. It begins to open the MISO operators understanding of the individual or group and prepares the MISO operator for the next step of the TAAP.

### Vulnerability

The vulnerability of the German people drew on the needs, wants, or desires that arose from the conditions of their life and experiences. German vulnerabilities were motivations to change their condition.

The German people wanted stability in their life. They wanted a revived and strong Germany so that their lives and the next generation of Germans could be as honorable and proud as they once were. They desired to end the Treaty of Versailles's burdens, solve the perception of Jewish control of banking in Germany, and return to a state of normalcy with a strong economy, good jobs, and new vision of prosperity.

An example of German vulnerability is in the expression of a German citizen during the early part of 1933 when he stated, "Germans were already gripped by a fear of chaos and anarchy, and when the parliament building, a symbol of their tenuous

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<sup>23</sup>Tubach and Patterson, *German Voices*, 68.

democracy, went up in flames in Berlin, their extraordinary desire for security increased dramatically.”<sup>24</sup>

Vulnerability is the catalyst to developing the theme and message to inform and influence a target audience. MISO can learn from the vulnerability of the German people that the conditions were optimal for propaganda to build on their fears. Fear is a factor that should not be overlooked when developing a MISO campaign.

### Line of Persuasion (LOP)

A LOP is an argument used to obtain a desired behavior or attitude from the target audience.<sup>25</sup> A line of persuasion is a detailed, thorough, and concise argument that, ideally, will persuade the target audience to behave in a desired manner. Propaganda and MISO use slogans to support the LOP argument. A slogan is a word or phrase that is easy to remember and is used by a group or business to attract attention. The NS used LOPs and slogans extensively in their propaganda. When used properly, slogans take on further meaning in a target audience which reinforce and support the LOP.

Some examples of slogans are:

*Arbeit Macht Frei* (Work makes you free). The saying was used before the NS was formed but became a NS slogan over time. It was used as a slogan for the Weimar Republic Public Works Program that was intended to provide work for the unemployed.

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<sup>24</sup>Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, 272.

<sup>25</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302, (2005), 6-7.



It was used over the main gates at a number of Nazi concentration camps such as Auschwitz, Dachau, Thereseinstadt, and Sachsenhausen.<sup>26</sup>

*Führer befehl, wir folgen dir!* (Fuehrer command, we'll follow you!). This was a popular saying used at rallies and speeches by followers of the NS. It originally came from the song *Von Finnland bis zum Schwarzen Meer* (From Finland to the Black Sea).<sup>27</sup>

*Heim ins Reich* (Back home into the Reich). This statement was very popular in describing Adolf Hitler's initiative to convince ethnic Germans of the desirability to be reunited with Greater Germany. These included areas such as Austria, the Sudetenland, Danzig, western Poland, and regions ceded by the Treaty of Versailles.<sup>28</sup>

*Wann dem Führer wuste!* (If the Führer only knew!). This was an expression common during the Third Reich among those who supposed that Hitler could do no wrong. The implication being that anything in Germany that was not quite right was so only because Hitler did not know about it.<sup>29</sup> This expression was used in two ways. For those who supported Hitler, it was used as an expression of disgust for inaction or poor action of organizations, people, and conditions. It was also used as a sarcastic comment for those who did not fully support the NS ideology.

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<sup>26</sup>Wikimedia Commons, Category: Arbeit macht frei, imagery of Arbeit macht frei signage, [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Arbeit\\_macht\\_frei](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Arbeit_macht_frei) (accessed 4 February 2014).

<sup>27</sup>Yahoo Answers, Nazi slogans, <https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20100718114623AAohMFR> (accessed 18 March 2014).

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

*Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer* (One people, one nation, one leader). This is the most repeated political slogans used during this time period.<sup>30</sup> It is said by historian Joseph Bendersky that the slogan “left an indelible mark on the minds of most Germans who lived through the Nazi years. It appeared on countless posters and in publications; it was heard constantly in radio broadcasts and speeches.”<sup>31</sup> The slogan emphasized the absolute control of the party over practically every sector of German society and culture.<sup>32</sup>

NS used LOPs and slogans extensively. As in marketing, a catchy phrase or a memorable comment transcends boundaries and remains in the mind for extended periods of time. MISO must learn that LOPs are a great way to inform and influence a target audience and keep the message memorable. Over the many years in Iraq and Afghanistan, the ability to develop memorable messages with fitting slogans and LOPs has been lacking. MISO needs to understand that the condition and vulnerability help development LOPs and the used of memorable slogans can make the MISO message more effective.

### Symbols

NS symbolism was the outward expression of propaganda at its fullest. The NS used symbols to tie emotional responses to the ideology of the party. The *Hakenkruez*, better known as the swastika, was the major symbol of all NS imagery and still has great

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<sup>30</sup>Joseph W. Bendersky, *A Concise History of Nazi Germany: 1919-1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 105.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*

effect on the emotions of individuals today. The use of the color red as an example of the bloodshed by the German people is dominant in all NS imagery. For example, the NS flag, which later became the state flag, expressed the ideals of the NS and was used in every fashionable display to create a sea of red for emotional response.

Art work became controlled by the NS. An example is the poster artwork by Hans Schweitzer, better known as the artist Mjöltnir. Mjöltnir created the image of what the right look for a German citizen should be. Blonde hair, strong jaw, good posture, usually in uniform, and possibly with family or children. An example of his art work is presented in the Illustrated section of this analysis. One commentator said of the effectiveness of Mjöltnir's art:

What lengthy speeches failed to do, Mjöltnir, did in a second through the glowing fanaticism of his powerful art. Mjöltnir poster of the three Storm Troopers' heads is quintessential Nazi propaganda. His art was simple, emotional, and powerful. Hitler had said, "by the masses, brutality, and physical force are admired." These are three Nazi fighters, one young, the second middle-age, the third an older man, who have all clearly passed through the fires of combat, in the trenches or the streets, and whose faces have a male strength verging on brutality.<sup>33</sup>

The imagery of mass rallies through film, newspapers, and books created a strong impression of a united German people, devoted to NS ideology and Adolf Hitler. These images were designed to present Adolf Hitler as the savior of Germany. That through him, all Germans and anyone who followed him were promised a life of freedom, prosperity, and devotion of Hitler to them and that only through Hitler could life become better. These images were sent around the world to show that Hitler brought back the honor of the German people and that only through him and the NS could life be good and

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<sup>33</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 84.

prosperous. On the day Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, an observer commented on events in the town of Königsberg:

On March 6, 1933, the day after the overwhelming Nazi victory and a week after the *Reichstagsbrand*, the *Göttinger Tageblatt* reported that the venerable university town was festooned in full Nazi regalia, symbols of freedom and hope strictly watched over by ramrod-straight members of SA (*Sturmabteilung*, Storm Troopers, a.k.a. “Brown Shirts”) and SS units carrying flaming torches. Chancellor Hitler’s call to action rang forth from loudspeakers as he addressed a wildly enthusiastic crowd in Königsberg that had hurriedly assembled there from all parts of East Prussia to join him in celebration. At the end of the speech, when a Dutch prayer of thanks mingled with the deep metallic voices of the bells of the *Königsberg* cathedral, thousands of rapt listeners stood bare-headed in the rain and spontaneously began to sing the German national anthem *Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles*.<sup>34</sup>

Another example of symbolism is the NS’s focus on the youth as a reflection of the future Germany. The NS recognized early on the most efficient way to bind youngsters to the NS was to provide them with the kind of experiences that would guarantee loyalty to the party. The NS arranged celebrations, marches, sporting events, and, in general, a life filled with exciting events.

The NS was able to shape the youth through these events and many were willing to do what they were told in return. The Night of the Broken Glass (*Reichspogromnacht* or *Kristallnacht*) and the beginning of the war on September 1, 1939, began the change in attitude towards the NS. Hitler’s earlier slogans about youth being the nation’s hope and future and young people acting as the subjects of their own fate changed to fear of an unknown future and questioning the actions of the NS.

A German citizen stated that the end of his youth experience and view of Hitler changed is when he “realized that what he really intended was for our generation to be

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<sup>34</sup>Tubach and Patterson, *German Voices*, 14.

“*hart wie Kruppstahl, zäh wie Leder, flink wie Windhunde*” (hard as the steel of Krupp, tough as leather, and swift as greyhounds) . . . most of us felt uncertain whether we could rise to this challenge. Tough as leather might be all right for some, swift as greyhounds for others, but to ask all three utopian virtues of most young Germans was too much.”<sup>35</sup>

The strongest use of symbolism was the creation of the Hitler-myth by Joseph Goebbels. Making Hitler the symbol of the NS and its ideology gave focus to the German people that he was the single individual that could make Germany great again.

Before 1930, the Hitler-myth concept was mostly believed by a few hundred thousand followers.<sup>36</sup> After the 1930 election (18.3 per cent of the vote for the NS), the Hitler myth grew dramatically.<sup>37</sup> Germans saw in Hitler a way out of a collapsed economy, massive unemployment, and a growing communist influence. Those that surged to join the NS were often already willing volunteers of the Hitler-myth.<sup>38</sup> A new party member who wrote after hearing Hitler speak for the first time, “there was only one thing for me, either to win with Adolf Hitler or to die for him. The personality of the Fuhrer had me totally in its spell.”<sup>39</sup>

The image of a dynamic, energetic, leader who offered a decisive change of direction for the German people seemed appealing. He also seemed to have possessed the

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid.

<sup>36</sup>Randall L. Bytwerk, *Bending Spines* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004), 16.

<sup>37</sup>Ian Kershaw, *The ‘Hitler Myth’: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc, 1987), 72.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Richard Bessel, *Life in the Third Reich* (Oxford: University Press, 1987), 90.

ability to master the internal political situation that had strangled the Weimar government in a short time after he took office. Otto Dietrich, the NS Press Chief and Adolf Hitler's confidant, probably wrote the most insightful comment on Hitler's ability to influence the German people in his book written after the war. It gave a clear definition of the suggestive power of Hitler:

At one and the same time Hitler possessed the power of suggestion and the power to paralyze opposition. By oratory he was able to transmit the suggestive power of his will to the masses, so long as he personally confronted them. It may seem strange today that a very large majority of the Germans voted for Hitler in peacetime, thereby confirming his right to hold the power which old President von Hindenburg had handed to him. But we must realize that over the years Hitler spoke directly to some thirty-five million Germans – aside from the many millions who thronged to see him whenever he rode through the streets of towns and villages. Most of these people were caught and carried away by the suggestive power of his will. We must recall the economic misery of those early days. Hitler had pledged himself to realize the social, economic, and national aims of the people. He had preached to the people in the moving terms of morality and national purity. It is not strange; therefore, that Germans were spellbound by his personality, that they placed their trust in him. His initial successes justified that trust, strengthened it. Even in his later years his followers remained under his influence. For that influence operated on an emotional plane; the intellect could not shake it off, even when doubts arose. His personality acted upon the emotions of the masses in such a way as to paralyze their reasoning processes. That fact explains many things that otherwise appear incomprehensible today.<sup>40</sup>

The 1936 Berlin Olympics was another NS symbol of power, strength, and prosperity to the world that catapulted the political party onto the international stage. A German visitor from one of the provinces stated:

Truly, this city has adorned itself in a festive garb. Clean, scrubbed down, freshly painted house fronts, clean streets on which you could not find even the smallest piece of paper. This cleanliness really gets the attention of the visitors. The main street, Unter den Linden, is no longer recognizable. The endless row of flags and the ocean of lights at nightfall when the new lanterns are lit leave a profound

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<sup>40</sup>Otto Dietrich, *The Hitler I Knew: Memoirs of the Third Reich's Press Chief* (New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010), 9.

impression on us visitors, and it even impresses the Berliners, who are not easily fooled.<sup>41</sup>

Symbols are critical to supporting propaganda and MISO in reaching the target audience. When a symbol supports a message then the symbol takes on more depth and relevance to the message. When MISO is supporting messages through LOPs and symbols, the MISO message can be more effective. Combining the LOP and the symbol makes each element more memorable and recognizable as to what the message is. The target audience can be more accessible and susceptible to the LOP and the symbol when they are tied to the message. In today's marketing world, this is called branding; tying slogans, images, color, symbols and music to a product.<sup>42</sup> MISO must take full advantage of symbols and to do so is the requirement to understand the target audience.

MISO cannot support the establishment of a central-myth or the build-up of a youth program for ideological control. US national policy does not support MISO conducting this type of action. What can be learned is the counter to the central-myth figure and youth control. When adversarial propaganda is employed for this purpose, MISO can look at the various aspect of the central-myth symbol and focus on the weaknesses or falsehoods of the character. An example of when this was done is the character breakdown of Osama Bin Laden. There are several counters to his central-myth character that were used, such as he was a foreign-fighter sending locals to fight his war, he was killing fellow Muslims for his cause, he was wealthy and sending poor Muslims

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<sup>41</sup>Bessel, *Life in the Third Reich*, 134.

<sup>42</sup>Marc Gobe, *Emotional Branding: The New Paradigm for Connecting Brands to People* (New York, NY: Allworth Press, 2001), 2.

to fight in his place, and he was a criminal in Saudi Arabia. The messages were not only presented through US sources but also through Middle Eastern sources.

### Accessibility

Accessibility is defined as the availability of an audience for targeting by MISO.<sup>43</sup> It helps determine which media platform is the best to reach a target audience. It looks at what media is available, how the target audience uses each media, and analyzes the dynamics of the target audience when accessing each particular media.<sup>44</sup>

The NS used every media platform available to distribute propaganda. They consistently combined the LOPs with symbols when applicable, and constantly expressed the importance of being a united people for the good of greater Germany.

One of the NS propaganda methods to convey *Volksgemeinschaft* was the use of radio. The radio was a new form of communication in the world. It became popular in Europe in the 1920s but very few people had radios in their homes. It was common to visit public places (beer halls and community centers) to listen to the music and news radio until home radios became affordable in the early 1930s. During the era of the Weimar Germany from 1920 to 1933, radio broadcasts were controlled by the Postmaster General's office.<sup>45</sup> In March 1933, Chancellor Hitler transferred this power to the

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<sup>43</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.302, (2005), 6-4.

<sup>44</sup>Yale University. Philip Hamilton Macmillan Memorial Publication Fund, *The Goebbels Experiment: A Study Of The Nazi Propaganda Machine* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1943), 21.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 22.



Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda and placed Joseph Goebbels at the head.

Goebbels believed that radio was the most effective way of conveying a message to the masses.<sup>46</sup> He is quoted as saying, “What the press has been in the Nineteenth Century, radio will be for the Twentieth Century.”<sup>47</sup> His philosophy was based on his perception that the public went to the cinema for entertainment but radio could provide entertainment in their homes while also conveying the messages to support the *Volksgemeinschaft*. He also believed the radio would reach the bystander or intended listener who did not read newspapers as many people did not read newspapers.

Radio broadcasts played to the Nazi ideals, building upon national pride, patriotism, pride in Hitler, and Aryan pride. All households that possessed a radio had to pay 2 marks a month to cover the cost of radio broadcasting.<sup>48</sup> To ensure that all households could have a radio, Goebbels arranged for the production of two cheap types of radios priced at 35 and 72 marks that were known as “People’s Receivers”.<sup>49</sup>

Goebbels also used radio broadcasts to spread the word of NS abroad. He wanted to convey to the world the idea that NS was an acceptable political idea and his first radio broadcasts were performances by some of Germany’s top orchestras and opera singers. Once this approach had captured people’s attention, he introduced a system whereby little

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<sup>46</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 38.

<sup>47</sup>Aristotle A. Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War* (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 31.

<sup>48</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 41.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*

messages were broadcast in between the programs to in an effort to spread the words of Hitler in a minimalistic way. The broadcasts covered all of Western Europe and a huge broadcasting station at Essen, near Berlin, ensured that broadcasts could be heard around the world. By 1938, shortwave broadcasts were being transmitted 24 hours a day in twelve different languages.<sup>50</sup>

The use of the radio for NS propaganda was especially effective because the party leaders were effective public speakers. Radio provides a way for the listener to feel emotion that cannot be expressed as well in print. Radio broadcasts created an illusion of reality by developing the narrative of a united Germany, struggling together for a just cause, and the greatness of Germany to be achieved through Hitler. Under the influence of such an illusion, listeners may be swayed into accepting opinions as facts and making decisions based on emotion. Under ordinary circumstances, listeners could not hear programs twice, and have no time to make considered judgments of what radio voices may tell them. This was evident in the radio broadcasting of the infamous Nuremberg rallies as people were swept up in the euphoria. The NS set up huge loudspeakers mounted in public places for everyone to hear the broadcasts. Cafes and restaurants had the radios turned on for everyone to hear. People throughout Germany were transfixed to the drama of the event.<sup>51</sup>

MISO use radio as a means to broadcast messages to a target audience. It is used to influence the populace using messages supporting U.S. national objectives. It is

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<sup>50</sup>Glenn Aylett, *Transdiffusion*, Hitler's radio, [http://www.transdiffusion.org/radio/radiofeatures/hitlers\\_radio](http://www.transdiffusion.org/radio/radiofeatures/hitlers_radio) (accessed 7 February 2014).

<sup>51</sup>Kershaw, *The 'Hitler Myth'*, 56.

important to understand that radio can be used effectively if the message being broadcast is informative, emotional, and pertinent to the receiver. Many MISO programs used in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars were mundane and ineffective due to the nature of playing music followed by a message or talk show targeted more to what the military wanted than laying out a course of action desired by the listener. MISO needs to reevaluate the potential of radio, focus on its ability to broadcast over a large area, and be more effective in its messaging.

Another Nazi propaganda method was the use of printed products. Newspapers, posters, and handbills were used to as printed products have longevity as compared to radio or mass rallies. The Nazi Party bought a newspaper in Munich called the *Völkischer Beobachter* (The National or People's Observer). The newspaper had a small circulation and following the failure of the Putsch in 1923, the newspaper disappeared from newspaper stands until 26 February 1925.<sup>52</sup> Within two months of its re-launch it became a daily newspaper, and its circulation began to rise until in 1929 it reached a figure of 26,715.<sup>53</sup> Unlike the long, detailed articles and academic discussion of economic and social problems which characterized the political presses of the Weimar Republic, the *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote short hyperboles on typical National Socialist themes; the evil of Jewry and Bolshevism, the humiliation of the Versailles Treaty, and the weakness of the Weimar government, all of which were contrasted with NS patriotic slogans such as *Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer* ('One people, one nation, one leader').<sup>54</sup> The NS

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<sup>52</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 12.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 90.

purchased and used more newspaper companies to spread their message. In 1933, they nationalized all newspapers and controlled their content. This allowed them to invent or evoke social conditions they perceived as a way of furthering their goals. Any point of view that did not adhere to the party line was considered deviant and if someone said something against the NS, they lost their accreditation and their ability to publish.<sup>55</sup>

Posters and handbills became visual expressions of Nazism in art form. The goal was to evoke emotion for the *Volksgemeinschaft* as well as for other purposes. These included the projection of Hitler as the savior of Germany, rallying individuals to join the military, importance of producing goods for the war, and the importance of supporting the war. Other projections included racial and anti-Semitic views and beliefs, motherhood, the purity of the Aryan race, glory of the military, and the evils of Russia, Great Britain and the United States. All these posters and handbills demonstrated that the quality of art is important. Poor art work, does not succeed in producing an emotional tie to the product. If art presents a strong image, and uses strong bold colors, with a dynamic but short message, then the product evokes emotion the propagandist was trying to create.

MISO uses posters, handbills and leaflets in their operation. MISO operators must learn that these types of products are critical to mission success. It is often said a picture is worth a thousand words. MISO print products can be effective if the preparation and use of imagery evokes the message with conviction. Sloppy art work and poor imagery make the message worthless to the receiver. It can actually hinder the overall theme being presented. Often, poor imagery evokes anger from the receiver. When a poor product is

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<sup>55</sup>Lindley Fraser, *Germany Between Two Wars: A Study of Propaganda and War-Guilt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), 121.

presented, the receiver feels that the message is being “dumbed-down” to the receiver. For example, poorly drawn posters and handbills requesting information on Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were torn down or tossed back into Soldier’s faces with the statements, “We are not children. Stop treating us like one. Your stupid drawings are childish!” Drawings, cartoons, stick-figures, need to be evaluated to ensure they expand the message. There can be backlashes against MISO products. If not believed, it has no effect. If it evokes negative emotions then it provides no avenue to improve the relationship between the MISO operator and the receiver.

Another reason art work must be quality is to create longevity. Poor art work is removed because it is not pleasing to the eye. Quality art work remains displayed. If the target audience enjoys the art work for more than the message, the product takes on another dimension beyond the original message. For example, mine awareness Superman posters distributed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s were of such high quality that the posters are still on display in some schools and others consider them collectors items. Another example is the posters and art work from World War II are commonly reproduced and sold today for decorative art even though their original intent was to evoke emotion to support the war effort.

MISO operators must look at the quality of artwork being produced in MISO products. Getting the message across and evoking emotion to sustain the staying power of the image in support of the message is critical to the success of the MISO messaging.

One of the most dramatic Nazi propaganda techniques was the use of film. Alfred Hugenberg, the press baron and leader of the right-wing Conservative National People's Party (DNVP), bought the largest and most prestigious German film company, Ufa

(*Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft*).<sup>56</sup> The social and political activities of the Nazi Party were captured regularly by Ufa newsreels and shown to the German public on the large national network of Ufa cinemas.

An example of one of the dynamic films produced by the NS in the 1930s is the film *Triumph of the Will*. Nicholas Reeves wrote:

What made *Triumph of the Will* as effective as a visual introduction to the Nazi movement? The movie opens with a view out the window of an airplane. The spectator (eye of the camera) sees clouds move by swiftly as the plane descends for a landing—a new visual experience for most Germans, who had never flown in an airplane. The anonymous spectator, a German Everyman who takes in this novel scene—clouds, sky, and the city slowly unfolding below—though not identified until after the landing, is Hitler, who debarks to a tumultuous reception at the Nazi Party Rally in Nuremberg, the *Reichsparteitag* of 1934. In this opening scene, the identification between Hitler and the passive moviegoer takes place on a preconscious level: the eye of the camera and the eyes of the viewers watching the film in theaters all over Germany turn out to share Hitler's own field of vision as his JU-52 prepares to set down in Nuremberg. The documentary then switches to individual Germans pursuing various private tasks as they prepare to participate in the mass rally. Their activities are familiar to all: the old woman peering out the window from behind geranium boxes; young men polishing their shoes, washing themselves, or playing catch in a springtime meadow. The backdrop to all this is a sundrenched Nuremberg, the ancient and familiar city of the trade guilds and the Meistersinger, though now it is festooned with swastikas and striking streamers. As the film continues, individual Germans slowly transform into a mass. In one scene, uniformed members of an *Arbeitsdienst* (work brigade) are lined up in formation, with each member shouting out in turn: "Comrade, where are you from?" and another member of the group answering, "From the Alps," or another, "From the seashore." The subliminal message is clear: only in this tightly knit formation is it possible for them to hear and contact each other, to ask questions and give answers as to their origins. The scene concludes with a ritual chant by the entire group that gives voice to their solidarity as one body. Similar transformations of the individual are repeated throughout the documentary, up to the climax, when approximately 100,000 Nazi Party members, all assembled on the Nuremberg rally grounds, are organized into two huge blocks of black (the brown color of the Nazi uniforms in a black and white film) separated by a broad white concrete pathway, on which Hitler walks, slowly and silently, up to the tribune and the speaker's platform. The masses now become an aesthetic foil; all individual differences are obliterated in a

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<sup>56</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 14.

metamorphosis that presents only one individual, Adolf Hitler, in splendid isolation. This central scene of the Nazi celebration brings us back to the beginning of the documentary, where the eye that sees is initially our own; the propaganda equation is solved as we have become him, and he us. Depicted in this way, the masses are a centerpiece of Nazi aesthetics, signifying power. The film creates a realm of its own, one in isolation from anything around it, and Hitler emerges in the middle as a self-contained symbol devoid of any contingencies.<sup>57</sup>

Riefenstahl's film achieved its objective. Its purpose was to align the LOP with the symbols of the NS and heighten the Hitler-myth to increase the level of excitement and devotion to Hitler and the NS. The film constructed a complex and powerful portrait of the new National Socialist nation - masculine, disciplined, loyal, rooted in its medieval past, yet looking forward with confidence and optimism to its brave new future.<sup>58</sup> The two central themes were of Adolf Hitler and the supportive German people, united together in one cause for a better and stronger Germany. Rudolf Hess, the NS Deputy Fuehrer, spoke the last words in the film, summing up the propaganda message and belief for all Germans to follow, "The Party is Hitler. But Hitler is Germany, just as Germany is Hitler. Hitler! *Sieg Heil!*"<sup>59</sup>

NS used the power of imagery to portray what cannot be seen through the radio. The Germans who participated at Nuremberg were portrayed as representing the entire *Volk*, but in reality they were a visual expression of propaganda for Hitler being portrayed as the savior of Germany. To create such a grand impression, members of the various Nazi organizations from the entire country came together, arriving by train, bus,

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<sup>57</sup>Nicholas Reeves, *Power of Film Propaganda: Myth or Reality?* (London: Continuum International Publishing, 2004), 119.

<sup>58</sup>*Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*

and bicycle and filling the parade grounds with the brown uniform of the NS.<sup>60</sup> For moviegoers sitting in a dark theater, it must have been a huge impression of united and strong Germans. For most Germans, the broad band of white concrete on which Hitler slowly marched up to the speaker's platform in Nuremberg created an extraordinary, defining image and moment.

These films gave participants as well as film goers a powerful image of strength, unification, glory, and determination. The rallies would whip up mass enthusiasm and passion for the NS cause. Symbolism was everywhere. The red flag of the NS became the national flag of Germany, the massive display of well organized and perfectly in-line Soldiers, the wide area shots showing the thousands upon thousands of participants screaming and yelling in support of their leader. Hitler's part was the personification of the victorious leader, who would give an emotional speech about Germany's rise from the abyss as a defeated nation to a nation restructured, reorganized, and revived to become a great nation for thousands of years to come. These images were designed to create emotion and they did. The films were sent all over the world and they had great effect, both for and against the NS cause.

Another example of film and its influence was the film *Hiltejunge Quex*. It was a film created specifically for the youth to join the Hitler Youth. The movie focused on the natural preoccupations of young Germans: family conflicts, tragic consequences, divided

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., 121.



political loyalties, and the need for personal guidance.<sup>61</sup> It was a film that helped define youth support against the growth of communism in Germany.<sup>62</sup>

Today, film still creates an emotional response. Adversaries use film (today's technology is video) to support their propaganda. Extremist Islamic radicals use videos to exploit attacks against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and around the world. They use video for recruiting, messaging, and promotion of their ideology. MISO videos have been limited in countering adversarial video propaganda or the promoting of US efforts in Afghanistan or other parts of the world. This is due to the inability to get video to the adversary through an international audience without having it affect a domestic audience. What MISO videos has been created are limited in depth and content due to scope of work and target audience. MISO lack professional filmography in creating a body of work at the quality of *Triumph of the Will*. If MISO is to be a capable and an effective force multiplier then the emphasis on video and its ability to reach target audiences needs to be explored.

What has taken over from film is the use of internet social networking. Companies such as YouTube, Facebook, and Google+ provide internet users the ability to interact through photo and video sharing. These forms of media are more susceptible to marketing and propaganda because users are not commonly aware that influence techniques are being used against them. For example, the 2014 Super Bowl Budweiser commercial of a dog and a horse wanting to be together played on human emotions rather than a direct sell to buy beer.

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<sup>61</sup>Tubach and Patterson, *German Voices*, 52.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

MISO should examine the opportunity to work with marketing companies to gain expertise in order to better conduct synchronized information related capabilities against foreign target audiences. In today's age of electronic media and communication, the ability to disseminate messages and images is enormous. Videos, pictures, stories, and information can span the world within minutes. The internet broadcasts mass amounts of information that include adversary propaganda. Some people take in the unfiltered propaganda information and accept it as truthful or acceptable to their beliefs. Others may not be influenced but they may ponder the message and be susceptible for further messaging. MISO must look into this dimension and expand their capabilities to be effective in conducting MISO activities to foreign audiences or counter adversary propaganda.

### Effectiveness

Propaganda was effective in building support for NS ideology and the Hitler-myth. Newspaper, film and radio were the tools through which the ideology was presented and the mass political rallies, marching, and flag waving was the physical evidence that the ideology was believable.

The use of *Volksgemeinschaft* was a line of persuasion that supported the goal to radically restructure German society.<sup>63</sup> The desire to be a united and proud people was a vulnerability used by the NS to support Adlof Hitler and his ambition to expand German will across Europe. From 1935 to the summer of 1939, propaganda supported the efforts to unit Austria and the Sudatenland with German, the remilitarizing of the Rhineland and

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<sup>63</sup>Welch, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*, 116.

the posters drawn by Mjölnir, a well known artist, helped build support for joining and supporting the armed forces.<sup>64</sup> The messages supported the action and strengthened the resolve.

An example of the NS propaganda effectiveness of the Hitler-myth was spoken by a seventeen-year-old German girl prior to the outbreak of war with Europe saying “Hitler was a great man, a genius, a person sent to us from heaven. . . . We were convinced that Hitler was a man of peace and would do everything he could to settle things peacefully.”<sup>65</sup> The truth is Hitler desired war and used his image to hide his true ambitions. Hitler stated in private conversations that he used his “peace image” as an alibi towards the German people, “in order to show them that I have done everything to preserve peace.”<sup>66</sup>

Another example of NS propaganda effectiveness is the story of Soldiers writing home from the Russian Front. NS propaganda portrayed communist Bolsheviks as inferior subhuman’s whose ideology would destroy German society and way of life. German Soldiers fighting through Russia entered destroyed towns and villages and saw the devastation of burnt homes and dead bodies. One Soldier commented on brutality of the Russian army to their own people, “Adolf and I are marching against our great enemy Russia. Consequently, one of my wishes has been fulfilled, as I was gladly drawn into this blasphemous country . . . you see evidence of Jewish, Bolshevik cruelties which I can hardly believe possible . . . if until now I have taken the declarations of the government

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<sup>64</sup>Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 67.

<sup>65</sup>Illse McKee, *Tomorrow the World* (London: Dent, 1960), 27.

<sup>66</sup>Kershaw, *The ‘Hitler Myth’*, 144.

rather skeptically and critically, so today I can actually acknowledge the truth of these reports totally.”<sup>67</sup> The truth is, most of the towns were actually destroyed by German artillery and aircraft. They put the blame on the Russians to hide the process of exterminating the communists and Jews. It provided news footage to prove the evilness of Stalin and the Russian military towards their own people.

On a different scale, NS propaganda was not as effective as believed. Propaganda could not win over complete control of the German population. One reason NS propaganda failed is the message presented was not always built on truth. An example is the Germany attack on Poland in September 1939. The NS launched a propaganda campaign to build public support for a war against Poland. The German press played up “Polish atrocities,” referring to real or alleged discrimination and physical violence directed against ethnic Germans residing in Poland.<sup>68</sup> The NS staged a border incident to make it appear that Poland initiated hostilities against a radio station in Gleiwitz, Germany. The next day, Hitler announced his decision to send troops into Poland in response to Polish “incursions” into the Reich. The press was told by Goebbels to avoid using the word war. They reported that German troops had simply beaten back Polish attacks, a tactic designed to define Germany as the victim of aggression.<sup>69</sup> The initial

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<sup>67</sup>Stephen Fritz, *Frontsoldaten* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 196.

<sup>68</sup>Reinhold Pflugfelder, *World War II Through the Eyes of A German Child* (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2011), 36.

<sup>69</sup>Holocaust Encyclopedia, Deceiving the Public, Polish border incident, <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007822> (accessed 7 February 2014).

reports worked as the German people believed the reports. As time passed, the truth was discovered and people began to question their support for Hitler and the NS.

Another example of NS propaganda ineffectiveness is from a 1935 report from Munster, Germany noting that public enthusiasm for NS support was low. The sign was subtle: “since people fear legal consequences, their true feelings seldom are expressed in public. But their true opinions are evident in the obvious passivity of the population with regard to the movement’s feelings.”<sup>70</sup>

The emphasis here is MISO operators need to understand that propaganda falters if it is not supported with verifiable information. Over time, the German people began to realize that news presented by the NSADP was not reliable and the government would say what it needed to say only to reach its ends.<sup>71</sup>

Verifiable information supports the message and gives validation to the audience’s understanding of the message. MISO operators should look not only at the message presented but verifiable information as a second and third order of effect.

MISO must understand the foundation of an ideology before they can begin to support or counter the opinions and beliefs of an ideology. It is also critical to understand the depth of the opinions and beliefs in the ideology so that synchronized information related capabilities can be directed more accurately and effectively.

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<sup>70</sup>Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, 161.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, 162.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The NS used propaganda to deliver the ideological message to the masses. The endless stream of propaganda was delivered by radio, newspaper, posters, films, speeches, rallies, symbols, using lines of persuasion, symbols, imagery and music. The German citizen had daily contact with propaganda. For example, newspapers were filled with controlled news stories and images, the radio played *Volk* music and broadcast propaganda speeches, films started with newsreels about German life and the war effort. Even more was the symbolic red flag on buildings, above doorways, or hanging outside windows, a picture of Hitler was reported to be in every home, and posters of strong soldiers, proud workers, and excited youth lined the streets. The German citizen was inundated with propaganda from various sources and it can be said the individual was influenced; some deeply as evident by the mass rallies, marches and written accounts in documents and diaries and others as reluctant followers (based on surveys conducted after the war).<sup>1</sup> As Randal Bytwek said, “You cannot say “Heil Hitler” a dozen times a day without being affected.”<sup>2</sup>

Nicholas Reeves explained how strong propaganda supported the adulation of Hitler:

It has long been understood that the construction of a very particular set of attitudes towards the Fuehrer was at the heart of the National Socialist project.

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<sup>1</sup>Kershaw, *The ‘Hitler Myth’*, 263.

<sup>2</sup>Bytwerk, *Bending Spines*, 159.

The proposition that Adolf Hitler was uniquely capable of effecting that revolutionary transformation that would enable Germany once more to achieve its 'true' destiny was so important, not only because it encapsulated a positive, optimistic vision of the future, but also because it presented a powerful icon of unity in an otherwise deeply divided political culture. Moreover, popular as Hitler was when he took power in 1933, he became even more popular in the years that followed. The absence of free elections and public opinion polls makes it difficult to be absolutely certain, but an analysis of changing attitudes towards Hitler demonstrates a remarkable rise in popularity right through the first six years of Nazi rule; by the time Hitler celebrated his fiftieth birthday in April 1939, a Sopade report accepted that the extent of popular devotion to Hitler was not a figment of the propagandists' imagination: it derived 'from a naive faith which is not so easily destroyed'. Further, the spectacular military victories in the early months of the war served only to intensify that adulation and, by the early summer of 1941, Hitler was more popular than ever. An SD report commented on 'the childlike trust [with which] the most ordinary people in particular look up to the Fuehrer', and this and other reports repeatedly demonstrate that any anxieties which people had about the future of the war were dissipated by their unquestioning faith in Hitler. The Party, other Nazi leaders, even the military commanders, were fallible and capable of making mistakes - Hitler alone could be relied on to do only what was in the best interests of the nation. Hardly surprising, then, that Goebbels commented at the time that 'the creation of the Fuehrer myth' was, indeed, his greatest propaganda achievement.<sup>3</sup>

As stated in the introduction, the difference between propaganda and military information support is propaganda is designed to influence internal and external audiences while MISO only targets foreign audiences (external). The two activities use the same methods (tools) and techniques (the use of themes, messages, lines of persuasion) to reach their audience. The purpose of each activity is also the same; to influence the audience through emotional appeal in order to change behavior in accordance to each activities objective. Because propaganda and MISO are comparable in action and activity, studying NS propaganda will prepare the MISO operator to be more effective in applying MISO methods and techniques. Understanding the past will prepare MISO operators to be more effective in the future.

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<sup>3</sup>Reeves, *Power of Film Propaganda*, 95.

The positive messages and images of a powerful leader, nationalism and a strong military were portrayed by the NS as the means to a greater Germany. The negative persecution of the Jews and undesireables, and control of speech and civil rights were portayed as required to become the greater Germany. MISO draws upon Western democracy and the universals of civilization, not on totalitarian and socialist views which carry an undercurrent of control and deception. This difference is what makes propaganda and MISO diverge in their methods and techniques in messaging.

We must not forget that MISO does not support NS ideology or any past or current practice of the ideology. MISO operators do not support acts conducted by the *Ghestapo* or *SS* agents who falsly imprisoned, raped, murdered, and slaughtered innocent people who were against or did not conform to NS ideology.

The key to any propagandist or MISO operator is understanding the condition of the target audience, their vulnerabilities, plausible lines of persuasion, use of symbols, determining if they are susceptible to the symbols and lines of persuasion, getting the message to the target audience and observing the effects. NS propaganda understood the importance of these elements in their efforts to maintain the perception that the NS was in control of all activities of the German citizen. MISO operators can learn to apply these elements more effectively to create improved MISO campaigns and to be successful in influencing the target audience.

It is imperative that MISO evaluate the TAAP and begin to understand the depth of a target audience's belief systems, culture, current conditions, emotions, imagery, symbolisms, and vulnerabilities. Only through this understanding can MISO be more



effective in conducting SIRC and create better short-term and long-term effects that can persuade audiences to support military objectives.

And finally, since the TAAP is our method of determining the best efforts to influence the target audience, the TAAP should be adhered too. Working through the process is time consuming and requires tremendous effort. MISO operators need to conduct a thorough analysis to be effective which requires research, social, and psychological analysis. MISO operator must place our Soldiers and national objectives ahead of the finding quick solutions to an arduous process.

### Recommendations

1. The Target Audience Analysis Process must be taken seriously to be effective. The process of determining who the target audience is and then delving deep into the history, psyche, customs, perceptions, and vulnerabilities must be done to make MISO an effective tool in support of military operations. MISO does not do the research that is truly required to make it effective. MISO need to expand its sociological and psychological knowledge in the art of understanding human beings and how to effectively reach a target audience. This analysis clearly defined that the level of professionalism of NS propaganda was formidable. NS propaganda still lingers in the history books and has affected all concepts of propaganda. There is no question that people reacted to the messaging. MISO must reach this level of professionalism to be effective in future SIRC endeavors. Major marketing firms understand the importance of selling the message to an individual and they spend millions of dollars doing it. MISO may not have the money to invest in developing professional MISO operators to a master's degree level but they should. Lives are at stake and so is the nation.

2. MISO uses multimedia illustrators to produce posters, handbills, magazines, and computer generated art. NS propaganda posters, books, and art works were extremely professional in their approach to the image and framework of the design. MISO illustrators must raise themselves to this level of quality to provide credibility to the message and to reach the target audience more effectively. Imagery drives emotions and provokes thought. If the image is strong, the message is lasting in the mind of the receiver. If the imagery is bland or poor, it lowers accessibility for the receiver and carries no long term affect let alone any influential ability.

3. MISO must understand modern marketing and advertising techniques to produce more effective MISO products. Marketing and advertising focus on developing an image to make a product attractive and desireable. They understand that different types of media provoke or enhance certain feelings and desires. A TV commercial does not produce the same effect as a newspaper. Words spoken in public does not produce the same effect as words spoken over the radio. A colorful poster do not produce the same effect as black and white handbills. Each type of media must be used in its own way and supportive of the message being directed to the target audience. Understanding the capabilities of media through marketing and advertising techniques will make MISO products more effective in influencing the targe audience.

4. MISO must be consistent in the message and its method of delivery. MISO messaging in Afghanistan was one of many agencies delivering the same message to the same people. MISO operators should have coordinated with other agencies to make sure all the message were supportive of each other and saturation would not occur. For example, many of the agencies in Afghanistan were producing messages about IEDs. The

primary delivery method was radio, billboards, small signs, posters, handbills and internet. Each agency had mixed lines of persuasion, different phone numbers to contact for the same issue, different colors, styles of imagery, and symbols. The messages should have presented a unified effort of support to each other. Because of lack of coordination and message consistency, the messages were lost by information overload. MISO must understand importance of coordinated messaging to best support the commander's objective.


5. MISO operators need to expand their knowledge of history, sociology, psychology and marketing. This will make MISO operators more effective and consistent in their approach to conducting SIRC. Analysis of NS propaganda suggests that knowledge in these four disciplines will support MISO operators in being more effective and responsive to target audiences

## ILLUSTRATIONS



NS Propaganda Poster

Source: Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive, This is a typical early Nazi poster from 1921. The first Nazi posters has bright red backgrounds and a lot of text. This one announces that Hitler will speak, gives the topic, and notes that Jews are prohibited from attending. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler wrote: "We chose red for our posters, since it is vivid and was the color that most aroused our opponents. It forced them to notice and remember us." (Comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, The Nazis viewed this as one of their best posters. It is by Mjölnir (Hans Schweitzer). The caption translates: “National Socialism: The Organized Will of the Nation.” Goebbels claimed that Mjölnir perfected the art of drawing the Nazi Storm Trooper (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014)



NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, This vivid poster from the September 1930 Reichstag election summarizes Nazi ideology in a single image. A Nazi sword kills a snake, the blade passing through a red Star of David. The red words coming from the snake are: usury, Versailles, unemployment, war guilt lie, Marxism, Bolshevism, lies and betrayal, inflation, Locarno, Dawes Pact, Young Plan, corruption, Barmat, Kutistker, Sklarek (the last three Jews involved in major financial scandals), prostitution, terror, civil war. Courtesy of Dr. Robert D. Brooks (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





NS Propaganda Poster

Source: Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, I think this is also from 1932. It too deals with Hitler's citizenship. The caption: "A front soldier earns his German citizenship. All German front soldiers who, like Adolf Hitler, earned and proved their citizenship through blood and the risk of their lives, read the 'Völkischer Beobachter', the newspaper of their comrade Adolf Hitler. Fight for the truth! Death to the lie! Each German man and woman will vote for Adolf Hitler!" Courtesy of Dr. Robert D. Brooks (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



NS Propaganda Poster


*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, I think this dates to the Spring 1932 presidential elections, but I'm not absolutely sure. The caption reads: "Germans! Give your answer to the System! Elect Hitler!" "The System" was the pejorative Nazi term for the Weimar Republic. Courtesy of Dr. Robert D. Brooks (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, From the July 1932 Reichstag election. The text translates as: “We women vote for List 2: the National Socialists.” (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, This interesting poster appeared in 1932. The usual approach with posters is to use color to make them stand out. This one stands out because of Hitler's disembodied face floating on a black background. (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



NS Propaganda Poster


*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, "Work and Food," this poster says. It was used for the November 1932 Reichstag election. The Nazis viewed this as one of their most effective posters. (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, This poster is from the March 1933 Reichstag election, the last one in which Germans had a choice. The poster shows President Hindenburg and Chancellor Hitler. The caption: “The Reich will never be destroyed if you are united and loyal.” Courtesy of Dr. Robert D. Brooks (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





NS Propaganda Poster

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, This 1938 poster was issued shortly after the *Anschluss* with Austria. The caption: “One People, One Reich, One Fuehrer.” (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



Hitler Photograph

*Source:* Ian Kershaw, *History Today*, Hitler miming gestures to a record of his speeches; one of an extraordinary series of photographs he commissioned in 1925 to aid self-analysis and improve his hold over an audience. (comment by Ian Kershaw), <http://www.historytoday.com/ian-kershaw/hitler-myth> (accessed 14 February 2014).



1938 Nuremburg Rally Photograph

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, We tend to think of Nazism in black and white, since most photographs and films are in black and white. But the Nazis used color to excellent effect. Here are three photographs of the 1938 Nuremberg rally. This photograph is of the S.A. rally. Note the camera on the white platform directly ahead of Hitler, who is standing at the front of the speaker's platform. The e first two illustrations are from Hanns Kerrl, *Reichstagung in Nürnberg 1938* (Berlin: Vaterländischer Verlag C. M. Weller, 1939). The third is the cover of *NS Frauen-Warte*, the first October issue of 1938 (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





1938 Nuremberg Rally Photograph

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, Late in each rally, there was a huge parade in the center of Nuremberg. If you have seen Riefenstahl's *Triumph of the Will*, you will recognize the scene. Second to the left is Rudolf Hess, to the right Hermann Göring. (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





1932 Reich Youth Rally in Potsdam

Source: Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, *Deutschland erwacht: Werden, Kampf und Sieg der NS* (Hamburg: Zigarettens-Bilderdienst Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, 1934). These photographs are taken from one of the “bestsellers” of the Nazi era: *Germany Awakes: Growth, Battle and Victory of the NS*. First published in 1933, over a million copies were in print by the following year (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



1933 S.A. March in Dortmund

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, An S.A. march in Dortmund, 1933 (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





1933 S.A. March in Dortmund

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, Hitler speaks to a mass meeting of the S.A. in Dortmund, 1933 (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



Hitler in Dortmund, 1933

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, Hitler speaks to a mass meeting of the S.A. in Dortmund, 1933 (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).



Hitler in Dortmund, 1933

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, Hitler addresses a mass gathering of the S.A. in Dortmund, 1933.  
(comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).





1933 Nuremberg Rally

*Source:* Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, *Calvin College German Propaganda Archive*, Hitler A hundred thousand S.S. and S.A. men at the 1933 Nuremberg rally (comment by Professor Randall L. Bytwerk, Calvin College German Propaganda Archive), <http://www.bytwerk.com/gpa/posters2.htm> (accessed 14 February 2014).

## GLOSSARY

Accessibility. The availability of an audience for targeting by PSYOP.

Adversary. Anyone who contends with, opposes, or acts against one's interest. An adversary is not necessarily an enemy.

Effectiveness. The ability of the TA to carry out the desired behavioral change

Line of Persuasion. An argument used to obtain a desired behavior or attitude from the TA.

Media. Transmitters of information and Psychological Operations products.

*Mein Kampf*. An autobiographical manifesto by Adolf Hitler, in which he outlines his political ideology and future plan for Germany.

Military Information Support Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called MISO.

Nazi Party. Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie (National Socialist German Workers Party).

Propaganda. Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

Symbols. Visual (graphic or short textual), audio, or audiovisual means used to convey, reinforce, or enhance a LOP.

Target Audience Analysis. A detailed, systematic examination of Psychological Operations (PSYOP)-relevant information to select target audiences (TAs) that can accomplish a given supporting Psychological Operations objective (SPO).

Theme. A theme is a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective.

*Volksgemeinschaft*. a "national" or "people's community".

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