

A More Nuanced Approach to the Fourth Estate

**A Monograph
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The media and the military have very different views of where the balance between operational security and openness should lie. The military has struggled to find the optimal arrangement between inclusion and exclusion of media on the battlefield. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the most extensively reported war to date. One of the distinctive features of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the practice of "embedding," the Department of Defense (DoD) placing journalists within specific troop units to cover the conflict.

This monograph examines the DoD's rationale for choosing this time and conflict to implement such a shift in its approach towards the media. Technological changes facilitating the broadcast of information, increasingly media-savvy opponents, changes in the social demands for information, and the political leader's need to garner public support all influenced DoD's use of the embedded reporting concept for Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD's stated reason for the new program is only a partial explanation for program implementation. This monograph argues that the DoD sought to assure patriotic coverage and increase voluntary propaganda activity by the national media without the overt control measures used in the past to protect security.

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Abstract

A MORE NUANCED APPROACH TO THE FOURTH ESTATE by LTC George D. Lewis, United States Army, 44 pages.

The media and the military have very different views of where the balance between operational security and openness should lie. The military has struggled to find the optimal arrangement between inclusion and exclusion of media on the battlefield. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the most extensively reported war to date. One of the distinctive features of Operation Iraqi Freedom was the practice of “embedding,” the Department of Defense (DoD) placing journalists within specific troop units to cover the conflict. This represented a significant shift of a policy that had strictly limited press access less than a decade earlier.

This monograph examines the DoD’s rationale for choosing this time and conflict to implement such a shift in its approach towards the media. The history of the military and the media has been long and laced with considerable tension. A historical examination of the tension and relationship addresses the dissatisfaction among the military and the media with previous policies and the drivers of change. Technological changes facilitating the broadcast of information, increasingly media-savvy opponents, changes in the social demands for information, and the political leader’s need to garner public support all influenced DoD’s use of the embedded reporting concept for Operation Iraqi Freedom. DoD’s stated reason for the new program is only a partial explanation for program implementation. This monograph argues that the DoD sought to assure patriotic coverage and increase voluntary propaganda activity by the national media without the overt control measures used in the past to protect security. An examination of the successes and shortcomings of the program from a DoD and media perspective help reveal the risks DoD will take maintaining the program and permit an assessment of factors that might support continued use or discontinuation of the program in a future conflict.

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Introduction

Weeks before the convoys of M1 Abrams tanks, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and thousands of support vehicles punched through Iraqi defensive berms on the way to Baghdad, an army of journalists had been assembled in Kuwait by the Pentagon. 2,700 credentialed media were on hand to make the 2003 invasion of Iraq the most extensively reported war to date. One of the distinctive features of Operation Iraqi Freedom was “a slick new public relations concept known as embedding.”¹ “Embedded” media describes journalists who were assigned by the Pentagon or the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to specific troop units, traveled and lived with these units, and delivered reports from the position of these units during the conflict. This term could be applied to other historical interactions between journalists and United States military personnel. However, the rationale behind embedding, the scale of it, and also the term “embedding” were largely unprecedented.

The relationship between the military and the media is a dynamic and evolving one addressed in numerous literary works. Additionally, numerous works discuss the impact of embedding upon the tone and content of journalist reports. Current literature provides the military’s initial perception and perspective toward the use of embedded media. However, few authors address the rationale behind the DoD’s decision to embed journalists with units for the coverage of the war in Iraq.

DoD’s Embedded Media Program (EMP) represented a significant change from the policy during the first Gulf War; that policy had strictly limited press access less than a decade earlier. The EMP marks the outcome of a long process that saw the DoD move from ignoring the media to understanding the value of military-media relations and towards active media management. DoD’s stated reason for the new program, telling “the factual story” prior to enemy’s “disinformation and distortions,”² is likely only a

¹ Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, *Embedded: the Media at War in Iraq* (Guilford: The Lyons Press, 2003), xi.

² U.S. Secretary of Defense, OASD-PA, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding News Media During Possible Future Operations/deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) Area of

partial explanation for program implementation. The question remains as to why the DoD chose this time and conflict to implement such a significant shift in its approach towards the media by implementing an aggressive embedding program.

The media and the military have very different views of where the balance between operational security and openness should lie. While the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for a free press, tight security in military operations is critical to mission accomplishment. The resulting tensions between the two professions are an expected consequence of the differences in their respective obligations to the American public. However, operational level commanders must understand and leverage the media in the conduct of combat operations. The voracious public demand for near-instantaneous communication of information concerning the use of U.S. military force has created conditions in which tactical actions can have severe strategic repercussions based on media reports. In the 21st century, the operational level commander conducting combat operations must clearly understand the influence the media has on the success of operations and address the media in their planning and operations.

The military has struggled to find the optimal arrangement between inclusion and exclusion of media on the battlefield. Maintaining public opinion that favors the military remains a challenge. Balancing the public's right to know and the security of operating forces is a burden that the media and the military share. To answer the question why the DoD implemented an aggressive embedded media program for Operation Iraqi Freedom, this paper examines factors that influenced DoD's introduction (or re-introduction) of the embedded reporting concept as well as the rationale for introducing the new EMP beginning in 2002.

The history of the military and the media has been long and laced with considerable tension. A historical examination of this relationship from the World Wars through operations in Iraq provides trends and offers insights for the future. The lessons DoD learned from interacting with the media in prior

Responsibility (AOR),” United States Department of Defense News Archive, under 2.A., <http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf> (accessed July 20, 2011).

conflicts has influenced the development of current programs, therefore this paper begins by briefly describing the history of the relationship between the U.S. military and the civilian media. This relationship has evolved along with changes in society and technology. The programs that DoD previously used to interact with journalists on the battlefield and the reasons for changes over time will help provide context for the shift in DoD reasoning towards media engagement as it adopted EMP for operations in Iraq.

Before discussing the EMP, the question of why both the military and the media were dissatisfied with previous policies must be addressed. This paper examines how the promulgation of communications methods due to technological changes, increasingly media-savvy opponents, changes in the social demands for information, and the political leader's need to garner public support influenced DoD's use of the embedded reporting concept for Operation Iraqi Freedom. In the aftermath of 9/11 with the DoD preparing for the potential invasion of Iraq, the military hoped to gain more positive reporting by using the force of social cohesion. The decision was made to plan for operations using extensive embedded journalists with the goals of dominating news coverage of the war, countering enemy disinformation, and increasing public support.³ The EMP largely served its purpose of gaining and maintaining public support. To a country infatuated with reality TV, the Pentagon found a format that captivated much of the nation. After holding the media at arm's length following Vietnam, the military now appeared to accept the media as a potential force multiplier. Commanders realized they had limited themselves with the restrictive measures of the first Gulf War. They now realized that the media could display their units' achievements while boosting domestic public support through instant, credible news broadcasts.

Despite the success of the embed program, it did have its problems. The two most common complaints were a concern that reporters could not be objective in their reporting and that a journalist's reporting would lack the broader perspective and with it, the ability to frame their reports in a broader

³ Richard K. Wright and William H. Harkey, "Assessment of the DOD Embedded Media Program; Institute for Defense Analysis IDA Paper P-393," September 2004, IV-7. <http://militaryreporters.org/pdfs/embed%20study.pdf> (accessed October 15, 2011)

context. This paper examines the successes and shortcomings of the program from a DoD and media perspective. The assessment of DoD goals as well as its successes and failures should reveal the risks DoD will take maintaining the program and permit an assessment of factors that might support continued use or discontinuation of the program.

Although the U.S. media in 2003 may have had a largely favorable attitude toward the war, this was also the case with the Gulf War in 1991. But in that instance, U.S. military treatment of the media alienated correspondents and journalists in the media pool and was ultimately counterproductive.⁴ In contrast, this paper argues that DoD implemented the EMP to assure patriotism and improve voluntary propaganda activity from the national media without the need for overt control measures to protect security. The EMP is intended to reinforce positive attitudes toward military operations by making the journalist a participant who shares experiences with troop units.

Strategic and operational leaders within DoD may be better able to achieve desired information operations effects through the program. The media may benefit because the program reduces the cost of maintaining a journalist in the field and may offer distinctive reporting opportunities that resonate positively with viewers. To determine whether the DoD will implement such a program in the future, this paper concludes with a brief assessment of the future of the program and the numerous factors that will influence DoD and media coverage choices in a future conflict.

Media Perception of 'News'

Before examining the subject of the media-military relationship, it is beneficial to briefly highlight the media's standard for newsworthy stories. According to Deborah Potter, author of the *Handbook of Independent Journalism*, news is what is new and what is happening. Potter further states that most of what occurs around the world never makes it into the news. Every day the world is full of

⁴ Jonathan Alter, "In Bed with the Pentagon," *Newsweek*, March 10, 2003, 45; Tyrone L. Graham, *Media Impact: Why the Army Must Plant to Support the Media* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US. Army War College, 1996), 14-15, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA313506> (accessed December 10, 2011).

events such as war, environmental changes, heated debate, sporting competition, domestic violence, scientific advancements, political speeches, and human sorrows and happiness. Obviously, the news media neither can, nor would cover all of these events. Peter Turkington, consultant and partner in Strategic Communications Solutions, states, “The basic premise that attracts reporters is friction--two competing agendas; two people facing off over a contentious issue, two groups that are at odds with each other. Friction leads to interest, and that’s what reporters and editors want.”⁵

Another influence on the journalist’s story selection is the demand for a story that will appeal to and hold an audience’s attention. This is critical because the media is dependent upon advertising. Advertisers want to advertise in a medium that reaches the maximum amount of people; therefore, advertising companies typically advertise on mediums that have strong ratings in terms of readership, viewership, and volume of sales. As a result of these pressures and industry traditions, journalists look for stories that involve conflict and scandal or controversy, are capable of being made dramatic and personal, contain visual elements or impact, and fit a theme that is currently prominent in the news or society.⁶

These story requirements lead the media to decide and set the agenda as to what events are reported as news. The interpretation of world events is varied among different audiences, depending largely on the context that is portrayed to them by writers, editors, and publishers of the information they receive. While media organizations judge newsworthiness differently, the military recognizes that most major media outlets focus heavily on military operations during times of international crisis and war. The media has been, and will likely continue to be an influential actor in military operations.

The mission of the DoD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the nation. Operational security is the key element of military planning that seeks to deny

⁵ Peter Turkington, “What Is News?” All About Public Relations, <http://aboutpublicrelations.net/ucturkington.htm> (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁶ Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2001), 274; Deborah Potter, “What is News?” in *Handbook of Independent Journalism* (n.p.: U.S. Department of State: Bureau of International Information Programs, 2006), 5, Electronic Format.

information to the enemy. The military's desire to maximize the management of information to enhance security and affect the enemy contrasts with the media's objective to inform the American public. America's news media has long been known as the "Fourth Estate." This term has come to signify the important, independent function the media is supposed to perform in keeping the government honest and responsive to the public interest. An adversarial press is an important component of democracy; as Thomas Jefferson said, "Our liberty depends on the freedom of the press. . . ." The differences between the duties of the media and those of the military make historical tension predictable. The central issues of access and operational security also make the exclusion of tensions in future situations unlikely.

U.S. Military and Journalists in War

The tension between the media and the military is often traced back to the Mexican-American War.⁷ Although, one can argue that the start point of military-media relations has roots in the American Revolution. Pamphleteers including Thomas Paine, Samuel Adams, James Otis, and John Dickinson, wrote based on unconfirmed rumors from the battlefield and most of the actual battle data they published arrived in the form of letters written by someone known to be in the area. George Washington complained that loyalist newspapers harmed nationalistic confidence while patriotic ones knew nothing of maintaining military secrecy.⁸

The military has always been concerned about the control of information from the battlefield. Early in the history of the U.S. military, the time required to transmit information made control less critical. During the Revolutionary War the distance in time from the event and when the paper came off the press tended to be lengthy. The report on the battle of Kings Mountain was not published until weeks after the battle.⁹ The War of 1812 was similar to the American Revolution in terms of the delay between

⁷ Brayton Harris, *WAR NEWS: Blue & Gray in Black & White: Newspapers in the Civil War* (Charleston: CreateSpace, 2010), 1.

⁸ Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta and Collins G. Shackelford Jr., eds., *American Defense Policy*, 8th ed. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 129.

⁹ Nathaniel Lande, *Dispatches from the Front* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1998), 7.

the actual event and the report in the news. An example of existing communication delays is illustrated by the battle of New Orleans which occurred twelve days after the diplomats from each country signed the peace accord.

Whereas newspapers used a variety of sources to secure stories during the Revolutionary War, the Mexican-American War was the first conflict in which correspondents traveled with American Soldiers.¹⁰ News correspondents followed the forces on the battlefield and wrote dispatches from the front lines. General Zachary Taylor, Commander of the United States Army in Mexico, was accompanied by a newsman who rode with Taylor wherever he went and reported on the status of the Mexican American War.¹¹

Thirteen years later, the American Civil War saw a massive expansion in the number of war correspondents covering the war. Not only did the wide scope of the conflict draw additional coverage, but story transmission was eased by the availability of the telegraph. In the North alone, there were about 500 correspondents.¹² Additionally, the telegraph allowed editors to print news about an event the day after it occurred; therefore, editors encouraged correspondents to obtain news stories ahead of others and assigned reporters specifically to covering the war. Information during the Civil War had its foundations in immediacy vice accuracy. Reporting tended to be full of exaggerations, fake eyewitness accounts, rumors, and was politically partisan.¹³ The coverage was so broad and uncontrolled that reporters occasionally revealed troop movements and future plans. The military's operational security was sometimes compromised by the media's attempts to inform the public and sell stories. General Robert E.

¹⁰ Harris, 1; Michael S. Sweeney, *The Military and the Press: an Uneasy Truce* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006), 5; Daniel L. Baggio, "Army Cultural Change and Effective Media Relations" (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 5. in Air War College Gateway to the Internet, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/baggio_army_stratcomm.pdf (accessed October 11, 2011).

¹¹ Jason Deparle. "Military decision leading to the gulf war censorship," in *The Media and the Gulf War*, ed. Hedrick Smith (Washington, DC.: Seven Locks Pr, 1992), 63.

¹² Sweeney, 22.

¹³ Miles Hudson & John Stanier, *War and the Media: a Random Searchlight* (New York: NYU Press, 1998), 23; Sweeney, 19.

Lee regularly used agents to supply him with Northern newspapers in an effort to discover useful military information.¹⁴

Although Civil War coverage was often inaccurate, it was also restricted and censored. The North and the South both viewed the war as a matter of national survival. Both armies showed little respect for the noncombatant status of correspondents who reported from the front. Both sides also utilized official censorship, particularly in the North. Reporters were subject to courts martial if they disclosed sensitive information. In addition to official censorship, commanders in the field were often hostile to reporters.¹⁵ Henry W. Halleck expelled reporters from his camp. General William T. Sherman, a firm believer in press censorship, blamed the Union defeat in the first battle of Bull Run on the publication of orders of battle in Washington and New York newspapers and prohibited the printing of anything that excited hatred or undermined government authority, calling free speech and free press “relics of history.”¹⁶ Sherman’s clearly demonstrated antipathy to the press illustrates the tensions between operational security and the media during times of national emergency. Sherman was incensed by reports that published key information on troop movements and other logistical matters, giving detailed intelligence to the Confederacy and contributing to higher casualty rates. Sherman’s protests, though perhaps more colorful, were not unique from the protests of other prominent leaders of the time.

The World Wars

Despite the strict control of reporters during the Civil War, the U.S. government pressured Britain to allow correspondents back into France after the British military prohibited them from accompanying the British forces to France at the outbreak of World War I. President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to

¹⁴ Stephen W. Sears, *Chancellorsville* (New York: Mariner Books, 1998), 28; Kendall D. Gott and Combat Studies Institute (U.S.), eds., *The U.S. Army and the Media in Wartime, Historical Perspectives: Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2009 Military History Symposium* (Fort Leavenworth: Dept. of the Army, 2010), 19.

¹⁵ Douglas Porch, "No Bad Stories: The American Media-Military Relationship," *Naval War College Review* LV, no. 1 (Winter 2002), under “From the American Revolution to Vietnam,” <http://www.au.af.mil/pace/documents/art5-w02.htm> (accessed October 11, 2011); Sweeney, 19; Gott, 19.

¹⁶ Sweeney, 21; Porch, "No Bad Stories," under “From the American Revolution to Vietnam.”

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and warned him that by barring correspondents, Britain was hurting its case with the American public. Germany's favorable treatment of American reporters was resulting in extremely positive stories that began to swing public opinion in the United States where most people supported Britain and France in favor of Germany.¹⁷

Despite an initial desire for neutrality, Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare and the publication of the Zimmermann Telegram propelled Congress to declare war on the German Empire. The espionage act accompanied America's entry into World War I and was followed by the Sedition Act of 1918; both acts severely restricted the ability of the press to publish information on military operations or war production. The Espionage Act assigned fines up to \$10,000 and imprisonment for up to twenty years for those who "shall willfully obstruct recruiting." The Sedition Act amended the Espionage Act and imposed fines and imprisonment on the writers of any publication that printed disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the government, the Constitution, the military or naval forces and their respective uniforms, the flag, and any other language intended to bring these things into contempt, scorn, or disrepute.¹⁸ President Woodrow Wilson established a Committee on Public Information (CPI) that regulated censorship and produced propaganda to influence American public opinion toward supporting U.S. participation in the war. Not content with limiting the reports the press chose to publish, the government actively sought to supply information designed to further government support. Revelations about the activities of the CPI in the 1920s and 1930s shaped a longstanding opposition among the U.S. public regarding any attempts to recreate a similar organization.¹⁹

¹⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1971), 192; Phillip Knightly, *The First Casualty: from the Crimea to Vietnam: the War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 47.

¹⁸ John Byrne Cooke, *Reporting the War: Freedom of the Press from the American Revolution to the War On Terrorism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 98.

¹⁹ Robert T. Davis II, *The US Army and the Media in the 20th Century* (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 16.

In addition to the censorship at home, the U.S. military imposed its own system of effective censorship. Reporters had to apply for passes and identification cards and sign agreements that required them not to disclose any information that could benefit the enemy. Reporters were required to post a bond of \$1,000 that would be forfeit for any violation of the rules.²⁰ Photographs were also strictly controlled; the American government generally believed the vivid images of trench warfare were too gruesome to share with the public.²¹ Censorship was justified by the need to keep up the morale of the troops and the domestic audience. Credentialed war correspondents, reported from military camps well behind the lines in France. General John Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Force, accredited only thirty-one reporters and forbade travel to the front lines.²² Restricting access was another technique the military employed to control the flow of information from the front that reduced the need for active censorship. This method would reappear frequently in future conflicts as the military sought to control the flow of potentially sensitive information through the media.

During the interwar years, beginning in the 1930s, news reports delivered via radio expanded and flourished in the United States. The birth of broadcast journalism gave commentators the ability to deliver news to an audience hours before they had the opportunity to read about an event. Additionally, broadcast journalism provided the reporter the capability to describe events over the radio as they occurred. Live broadcasts became commonplace during World War II, as exemplified in the U.S. by the work of Edward R. Murrow. Correspondents in Europe reported using the new technology, radio, as well as traditional print technology.

With America's entry into World War II, only those reporters who agreed to full military censorship were given accreditation and allowed into the war theater. Despite the great value President

²⁰ Davis, 18.

²¹ Sweeney, 53.

²² William Hammond, "The News Media and the Military," in *Encyclopedia of the American Military: Studies of the History, Traditions, Policies, Institutions, and Roles of the Armed Forces in War and Peace*, ed. John E. Jessup and Louise B. Ketz (New York: Scribner Book Company, 1994), vol. 3, p. 2095.

Franklin D. Roosevelt placed on the free press, he believed that constitutional rights had to bend to the necessities of war.²³ Like with the CPI in World War I, the government created the Office of War Information (OWI) for World War II to promote support for the war effort. The government also established the Office of Censorship whose 13,500 employees made decisions to delete, delay, or suppress all or portions of any reports transmitted stateside; though it generally left combat zone censorship to the armed forces.²⁴

During WWI, a relatively small number of correspondents accompanied the American forces to Europe; WWII would see six times that number of war correspondents accompanying U.S. forces.²⁵ Journalists saw more and reported more than they had in WWI. The War and Navy Departments established an accreditation system under which journalists agreed to submit all stories to a military censor before publication. Once accredited the military provided officer's uniforms devoid of insignia and assisted in the feeding, transport and billeting of the reporters. The U.S. military permitted most of these correspondents, especially those in Europe and North Africa, to live side-by-side with military units and interview whomever they wished, although authorization to rove and report still varied among theater commanders.²⁶

The U.S. military often allowed reporters to send information over military telephone and teletypewriter networks to various news organizations. Additionally, the Army issued mobile radio transmitters and other elaborate equipment to reporters assigned to General Omar Bradley's Army Group to assist in sending voice or text.²⁷ It was also common practice to train reporters and prepare them for

²³ Sweeney, 66.

²⁴ Peter Duffy, "Keeping Secrets: How Censorship Has (and Hasn't) Changed Since World War II," *Columbia Journalism Review* (September/October 2010), http://www.cjr.org/essay/keeping_secrets.php?page=all&print=true (accessed October 11, 2011).

²⁵ Jack E. Pulwers, *The Press of Battle: the GI Reporter and the American People: the Story of Combat Correspondents, Information and News-fighting, Sighting, and Writing of World War II* (Raleigh, N.C.: Pentland Press (NC), 2003), 127.

²⁶ Sweeney, 99.

²⁷ Pulwers, 130.

upcoming military missions. This increased accommodation of the media by the military was reflected in Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Force planning for and projecting facilities for about 28 war correspondents to accompany troops on D-day.²⁸

Despite his concerns for operational security, General Dwight D. Eisenhower appreciated the power of the media in influencing domestic support and issued guidance to his commanders to provide accredited journalists the greatest possible leeway to gather information on the fighting. The press coverage in the Pacific had become such a powerful force in the competition for strategic priority and logistical support that he warned his staff they needed to increase efforts to “make the public more intimately aware of our difficulties.” He further warned, “public-opinion is likely to succumb to the wooing of the salesmanship of the Pacific” and result in divided effort and a lengthening of the war.²⁹

The Cold War Era

In contrast to World War I and II in which the United States entered after years of conflict by foreign nations, entry into the Korean War was abrupt and unexpected. The press was self-censored in accord with Defense Department rules and MacArthur stated after three months of fighting that war correspondents were responsible and had “struck the proper balance between public information and military security.”³⁰ This system quickly unraveled as the military was reluctant to share information and journalists aggressively sought more information to break stories ahead of the competition. In December

²⁸ Mary S. Mander, *Pen and Sword: American War Correspondents, 1898-1975* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010), 59 (lists 23); John Maxwell Hamilton, *Journalism's Roving Eye: a History of American Foreign Reporting* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009), 296 (lists 28); Anil Kumar Singh, *Military and Media* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2006), 37 (lists 27); Catherine Gourley, *War, Women, and the News: How Female Journalists Won the Battle to Cover World War II* (New York: Atheneum Books for Young Readers, 2007), 116 (lists 28).

²⁹ . Harry C Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, Naval Aide to General Eisenhower, 1942 to 1945* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), 282.

³⁰ Sweeney, 131.

of 1950, the military imposed a formal censorship system much like was in place during World War II.³¹ Although the media complained about the censorship, it appeared to work satisfactorily. At the end of the war, both the military and the media seemed to accept censorship as the solution to their basic conflict.³²

Although television coverage existed during the Korean War, televisions were in only one-third of American homes by 1952, and television cameras and support equipment were too cumbersome for reporters to use on the front lines. Korea was the last American conflict where print journalists, still photographers, and radio reporters were the dominant media force. The Korean War received extensive media coverage, but Vietnam was to surpass it with its extensive use of television to become what historian Clarence R. Wyatt called the “most covered, but least understood” war in American history.³³

The growth of television changed the government’s perception of censorship to control information. Reporters found Vietnam fully accessible to them, as long as they accepted voluntary ground rules that would allow them movement outside of Saigon and military cooperation. Although, official briefings in Saigon, despairingly referred to by the press as the “Five o’clock Follies,” were notably uninformative and frequently deceptive, press coverage was generally favorable until the Tet offensive of 1968.³⁴ The offensive contested claims by the White House and General William Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, that the United States and South Vietnam were on the brink of victory. The critical tone adopted by the press following Tet “confirm[ed] the widespread public view held well before Tet, that the people had been victims of a massive deception” and that the prospects for success were in fact doubtful.³⁵

³¹ Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion in the United States, 1950-1953* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2008), 161.

³² Winant Sidle, “The Gulf War Reheats Military-Media Controversy.”, *Military Review* 71, no. 9 (September 1991), 54, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/492/rec/15> (accessed September 9, 2011).

³³ Sweeney, 135 & 122.

³⁴ Porch, "No Bad Stories," under “The Vietnam War and Its Legacies.”

³⁵ Peter Young and Peter Jesser, *The Media and the Military: from the Crimea to Desert Strike* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 92.

In the years following Vietnam, many military officers viewed the press as an irritant and took the position that only public affairs officers (the new moniker for public information officers of the Vietnam era) should deal with reporters. Commanders showed little interest in dealing with the media. A 1983 study by students at the War College determined that the attitude of senior officers towards the media was extremely negative and the majority of officers did not “trust the media to tell the truth.”³⁶ “The attitude was that, if the media showed interest in covering an operation, the public affairs personnel could handle any arrangements required. Public affairs officers conducted their planning independently from the operators and were rarely familiar with details of the plan for military action.”³⁷

Thus, when the Grenada invasion was staged in 1983, the current generation of military operations planners simply did not think about accommodating the media. The military was unprepared when 600 reporters appeared in Barbados seeking to cover the invasion, and the press was kept out of the country for two days. Journalists that were resourceful enough to make it to the island were detained by the military. On the third day, under a great deal of pressure, the military granted access only to a small pool of fifteen reporters out of the nearly seven hundred in Barbados.³⁸

However, the lack of media access only served to heighten suspicions that the Pentagon was hiding something. Grenada infuriated the press and they clamored for the DoD to prevent a reoccurrence of such an incident. In response, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General John Vessey, convened the Sidle Commission to investigate the best way to ensure media access in future conflicts.

³⁶ Kendall D. Gott and Combat Studies Institute (U.S.), eds., *The U.S. Army and the Media in Wartime, Historical Perspectives: Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2009 Military History Symposium* (Fort Leavenworth: Dept. of the Army, 2010), 24.

³⁷ Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America’s Team; The Odd Couple— a Report On the Relationship between the Media and the Military* (Nashville: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University, 1995), 44., <http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/first/mediaandthemilitary/americansteamfull.pdf> (accessed September 9, 2011).

³⁸ Johanna Neuman, *Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving International Politics* (New York: St Martins Pr, 1996), 206; Sidle, 55.

The end result of this commission was the establishment of the DoD National Media Pool (DNMP).³⁹ The new arrangement would allow a selected pool of journalists and photographers, representing all aspects of the media, to provide wide dissemination of information in the early stages of an operation back to a centralized military headquarters.

The first test of the DNMP proved injurious for an already strained relationship as the United States planned and executed the invasion of Panama in 1989. Due to political concerns over the ability of the press pool to preserve operational security, reporters were notified and flown in late from Washington, missing the initial invasion. Instead, non-pool reporters made their way to Panama on their own to cover the invasion. The DoD sanctioned pool journalists arrived late and had to develop reports off of prepared DoD briefings and independent CNN reports.⁴⁰ This failure resulted in a renewed emphasis by the military on improving its interaction with the press. The new CJCS, General Colin Powell, was compelled to put the word out to commanders that he expected their personal involvement with respect to public affairs planning and execution. In the future, the CJCS expected commanders to plan media coverage and support requirements as an integral part of operations.⁴¹

Still, senior military leaders remained suspicious of the media. These suspicions, coupled with improvements in technology that allowed for more rapid transmission of stories, set the stage for another contentious military/media showdown. Despite the directives of the CJCS, Retired Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, concluded that the Vietnam veterans' disdain for the media still resulted in the new generation of military officers not trusting the media. "It takes root soon after they enter service. Like

³⁹ Aukofer and Lawrence, 44.

⁴⁰ Barry E. Venable, "The Army and the Media," *Military Review* 83, no. 1 (January-February 2002), 68, <http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/202/rec/8> (accessed September 19, 2011); Neuman, 208.

⁴¹ Aukofer and Lawrence, 44; Venable, 68.

racism, anti-Semitism, and all forms of bigotry, it is irrational but nonetheless real. The credo of the military seems to have become ‘duty, honor, country, and hate the media.’⁴²

As the Pentagon found itself planning to push the Iraqi military from Kuwait in 1990 a concerted effort was made by the Pentagon and the media to facilitate coverage of the developing conflict. Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a directive in May 1990 in which he reminded commanders “that military actions in Grenada and Panama demonstrated that otherwise successful operations are not total successes unless the media aspects are properly handled.”⁴³ In a continuing effort to repair the relationship with the press, the Pentagon activated the seventeen-member DNMP at the beginning of Operation Desert Shield. Despite the Pentagon’s good intentions, Saudi restrictions on granting visas to reporters stymied the pool. Faced with another Panama fiasco, many reporters decided to fly into Bahrain and find their own way to Saudi Arabia.⁴⁴ In the end, so many news outlets had reporters in the country (over 1600 at one point) that the DNMP became ineffective, and the military had to find new ways to meet the challenges of large number of reporters.

Public Affairs Offices grouped journalists who wanted access to military units into small pools with escort officers, and the military units provided transportation. However, limitations on transportation with military units and the vast distances covered in the operation resulted in many journalists covering operations from hotels and reporting information from the formal briefings provided by the military. Many reporters were unsatisfied, and the pooling of the press magnified tensions between the military and the media when only a few favored reporters were granted the ability to see and report on actual combat action. Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney went so far as to say that due to the nature of modern combat “the old romantic notions of a reporter going out sort of travelling with the troops are a thing of

⁴² Hedrick Smith, ed., *The Media and the Gulf War* (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Pr, 1992), 69.

⁴³ Colin Powell, “Dod National Media Pool Planning Requirements,” CALL Newsletter No. 00-6: Operation DESERT THUNDER - Kuwait; PUBLIC AFFAIRS, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_00-6_app.htm (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁴⁴ Porch, “Media/military Relations in the United States,” under “The Gulf War of 1991 and Press Pools.”

the past.”⁴⁵ While there was no censorship in place, the inability of journalists to move freely about during the combat operation resulted in the military successfully managing the media sent to cover the war.

It was only after the Gulf War that the military began to contemplate working with the media. Three years later, Operation Uphold Democracy was the first operation to plan for merging the media into units before operations began. The DNMP was briefed on the plans for the invasion and reporters were given access to combat units prior to the operation. Although a diplomatic settlement prevented the need for the invasion, the planning process validated the need for media involvement before operations began.⁴⁶

Inauguration of “embedded media”

Working under the premise that “there are wise men and women in both institutions who recognize that their ultimate goal the preservation of American freedoms is the same,”⁴⁷ a 1995 report on the relationship between media and military, proposed several methods to enhance mutual understanding. These methods included training journalists for combat situations, involving them in war games and general preparation, training officers of different ranks systematically in public affairs, and developing joint programs and seminars between military academies and journalism schools.⁴⁸ The new Army approach to constructive engagement with the media which developed later in the 1990s, appears to have taken many of its inspirations from this report and the assumption that the media could be brought back into a more cooperative frame by accommodating their needs, developing positive relations with them,

⁴⁵ Cheney, Richard. Interview. *Oral History: Richard Cheney*, from “Frontline: The Gulf War.” PBS Online. 1995, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/cheney/3.html> (accessed September 8, 2011).

⁴⁶ Thomas M. Hall, “The Military and the Media: Toward a Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” (master's thesis, Air University, 1995), 32., in <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcmedia.htm>, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/1563886/4/IV-A-NEW-STRATEGY-OF-ENGAGEMENT-AND-ENLARGEMENT> (accessed September 20, 2011) ; Aukofer and Lawrence, 45; Veneble, 70.

⁴⁷ Aukofer and Lawrence, viii.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 3-7.

granting them access, and trying to bridge the gulf between the organizational cultures of media and military.

Embedding is an ideal procedure to accomplish these tasks. Embedding increases access, since journalists, stories, and coverage no longer appear to be centrally directed as they were during the first Gulf war. A 2004 Rand Corporation study stated that the embedded system appears to be the best solution at balancing the needs of the three root constituencies, the press, the military, and the public. In addition, this study categorized the concept as a “broad innovative measure for wartime coverage.”⁴⁹ However, the labeled “new” concept of embedding journalists with the military was not actually a “new” concept but one that had historical roots and use in previous wars. Assimilating journalists into military units aids in overcoming suspicions about esprit de corps. Since individual journalists are integrated into established military units, they are predisposed to adapt accordingly.⁵⁰

It is likely that DoD officials knew of Britain's experience with a strictly controlled media pool during the Falklands War against Argentina. Journalists who reported from alongside British forces during the Falklands War "were completely reliant on the military, not only for access to the battle zone, but for food, shelter, protection, and transmission of their reports." Journalists developed "feelings of camaraderie" that may have been responsible for favorable coverage of British forces.⁵¹ The USMC had successfully used a process of embedding journalists with Marine units. After the Gulf War, an

⁴⁹ Christopher Paul and James J. Kim, *Reporters On the Battlefield: the Embedded Press System in Historical Context* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publishing, 2004), xiii.

⁵⁰ Laticia Reyes et al., “Embedded Broadcast Journalists: Reporting Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Frontline,” Department of Defense Joint Course in Communication, <http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/04A1/review.htm> (accessed October 11, 2011).

⁵¹ Sarah Miskin, Laura Rayner and Maria Lalic, *Media under Fire: Reporting Conflict in Iraq*, Current Issues Brief No 21 (Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library, March 24, 2003), under “Handling the media: lessons from the past” & “Executive Summary,” <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/2002-03/03cib21.htm> (accessed October 11, 2011).

examination of several news sources found that although the Army Soldiers outnumbered Marines by more than three to one, the number of stories about Marines outnumbered stories about the Army.⁵²

In late December 1995, the DoD decided to embed about two dozen journalists with Task Force Eagle deploying into Bosnia for Operation Joint Forge. The journalists were attached to the troops when they prepared to deploy in Germany. The journalists would spend several weeks in Bosnia living with the Soldiers and the reports they prepared were censored. By giving the journalists a deeper and closer look into the everyday life of the Soldiers, the DoD hoped the coverage would be more positive, and also hoped to overcome some of the existing resentment the military had towards the media.⁵³

A 1996 DoD Directive on Joint Public Affairs Operations had a section instructing combatant commanders on how to leverage public affairs and integrate media into formations. While this directive does not use the word “embed,” it does include two paragraphs that conceptually support the process. One paragraph addresses media support with a “goal to treat the news media as members of units” and another addresses assisting “news media in gaining access to the full spectrum of U.S. military units and personnel conducting joint and unilateral operations.”⁵⁴

The term “embedded media” first appeared in two DoD news briefings in June 1996, under the Clinton administration, by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD PA) Kenneth Bacon and his deputy, Michael Doubleday. With respect to ongoing military operations in Bosnia, the Pentagon defined embedding as the situation “where a reporter goes and lives with the unit for several days or a week and then writes a story about it.”⁵⁵ Already back in 1996, the objective was clearly stated, namely,

⁵² Tammy L. Miracle, “The Army and Embedded Media,” *Military Review* 83, no. 5 (September-October 2003), 44, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/199/rec/17> (accessed November 11, 2011).

⁵³ Paul and Kim, 48; Gott, 236.

⁵⁴ U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Joint Public Affairs Operations*, U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5400.13, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 9, 1996, 4.4.2-7, <http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/dodd/corres/pdf2/d540013p.pdf> (accessed October 11, 2011).

⁵⁵ Kenneth Bacon, “Dod News Briefing 5/7/96,” U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Transcripts, <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=515> (accessed September 12, 2011).

that, “with embedded media the whole idea is that the reporter becomes part of the unit.”⁵⁶ By allowing the media to become familiar with the unit and Soldiers, the DoD sought more positive reporting while increasing Soldier familiarity with the media.

Sociological research proposes that socialization is one of the military’s greatest strengths. Renowned sociologist and writer, Erving Goffman, equated the military to a total institution that not only controls all an individual’s activities, but also informs the construction of identity and relationships. In total institutions the individual’s civilian identity is undercut and a new identity is constructed as a member of the institution. In such a communal culture, individuality is repressed in favor of the institution’s larger values and goals.⁵⁷ The strategy of embedding relies on this force of social cohesion to induce journalists not to report negatively about the individuals he is living with and depending on for protection. However, the idea of integrating journalists into military units for the duration of a war was not yet considered.

Despite some controversy over the close relationship of the journalist with the unit, the practice was deemed a success and continued for stabilization force operations in Operation Joint Endeavor.⁵⁸ Following the operation, the Army added the concept of embedded journalists to its own doctrine. Army doctrine encouraged public affairs officers (PAOs) to “seek out those members of the media who are willing to spend extended periods of time with Soldiers during an operation, embedding them in the unit they will cover.”⁵⁹ The journalist eats, sleeps, and moves with the unit and is authorized free access to all

⁵⁶ Doubleday, “DoD News Briefing - 9 May 96.”

⁵⁷ Andrew M. Linder, “Controlling the Media in Iraq,” *Contexts* 7, no. 2 (Spring 2008): under “into the fray,” <http://contexts.org/articles/spring-2008/controlling-the-media-in-iraq/> (accessed July 20, 2011).

⁵⁸ Douglas V. Johnson, ed., *Warriors in Peace Operations* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 48, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub306.pdf> (accessed December 10, 2011); Margaret H. Belknap, “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?” *Parameters* (Autumn 2002), 107, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/02autumn/belknap.htm> (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁵⁹ U.S. Department of the Army. *Public Affairs Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 46-1 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 30, 1997), 24-25.

sections of the unit and is not escorted by public affairs personnel.⁶⁰ Additionally, the Army's public affairs doctrine identified that the military ensured operational security by establishing media ground rules that identified what can or cannot be covered or when the material can be reported. Kenneth Payne, author of the article, *The Media as an Instrument of War*, emphasized the benefit to commanders that control the media. He stated, "Today's military commanders stand to gain more than ever before from controlling the media and shaping their output."⁶¹

Although the 1997 *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations* did not contain any mention of embedded media, it identified the mission of joint public affairs as providing an expedited flow of accurate and timely information about the United States joint forces to the public and internal audiences. Likewise, it stated that the development of public affairs doctrine was based on "the need to accommodate the mission of the armed forces of the United States with that of the news media."⁶² This publication maintained that the military was accountable and responsible to the U.S. public for implementing its mission of national defense, with the news media as the principal means for communicating this information.

Joint public affairs has the vital task of providing consistent and credible information about U.S. joint forces to the American public and its allies via the news media and military journalists covering the operation. The military is assigned the responsibility to regularly work with the news media in order to ensure and facilitate the dissemination of accurate and timely information to the general public, military personnel, civilian employees and family members. During recent, previous conflicts, the PAO was the liaison between the military and the media.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁶¹ Kenneth Payne, "The Media as an Instrument of War," *Parameters* (Spring 2005):81.

⁶² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-61 (Suffolk: Doctrine and Education Group, May 14, 1997), II-1 & v.

⁶³ Hedrick Smith, ed., *The Media and the Gulf War/the Press and Democracy in Wartime* (Washington, DC: Seven Locks Pr, 1992), 69-70.

In contrast to Operation Joint Endeavor just over a year earlier, the Kosovo air campaign was marked by a censorship policy issued by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General Wesley Clark.⁶⁴ Journalists sought out other sources of information, and found the enemy central command. Milosevic ensured the press had access to sites of collateral damage resulting from the allied bombing campaign.⁶⁵ This collateral damage threatened to become the central issue of the Kosovo conflict.

Admiral James Ellis, the allied forces commander during the operation, observed that the enemy was much better at getting its story out than the allies. When the enemy killed numerous innocents, there was no coverage, but allied accidents were witnessed by the world through the evening news.⁶⁶ The military faced an issue of how to proactively implement a system of media relations that ensured operational security while providing enough media access to prevent detrimental enemy misinformation from having uncontested exposure in the news. At the conclusion of the air campaign, journalists were allowed limited access into military units, but the perception of a lack of cooperation between the military and the media had reemerged. This belief negated much of the success in media-military relations experienced during operations in Bosnia.⁶⁷

Despite this setback, several months before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the retired bureau chief of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and coauthor of the 1995 report on the relationship between media and military, stated that the military had embraced the 1995 report and had learned to plan for the presence of reporters in almost any military operation. But the media, he said, had largely ignored it. He claimed, “. . . virtually no response came from news organizations, despite our warnings in

⁶⁴ Margaret H. Belknap, “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?” *Parameters* (Autumn 2002), 107, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/02autumn/belknap.htm> (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁶⁵ Porch, “No Bad Stories,” under “Kosovo and the Future.”

⁶⁶ Gary Pounder, “Opportunity Lost: Public Affairs, Information Operations, and the Air War Against Serbia,” *Air and Space Power Journal* XIV, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 57, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj00/sum00/pounder.pdf> (accessed October 11, 2011).

⁶⁷ Michael Pasquarett, ed., *Perspectives on Embedded Media* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 9., http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/embedded_media_papers.pdf (accessed December 10, 2011).

‘America’s Team’ that unless editors and news directors planned for the future with their military counterparts, the media-military relationship once again could be dashed against the shoals of mistrust in the next big conflict.”⁶⁸

However, the military may not have embraced the report as firmly as he believed. After the attacks of 9/11, the Defense Department instructed all contractors to cut contacts with the press and made a deal with a mapping company to prevent press and public access to valuable maps for reporting the news.⁶⁹ It appeared as if the DoD might be lapsing back into an adversarial approach to the media.

On September 28, 2001, the ASD PA, Victoria Clarke, met with the Media Pool Bureau Chiefs to discuss ways to facilitate media access while maintaining operational security. It was announced that DoD was going to exercise the DNMP since it had experienced a complete turnover of personnel. The ASD PA also announced they were seeking opportunities to embed media in numerous operations.⁷⁰

On October 7, 2001, the War in Afghanistan, originally called Operation Infinite Justice before being renamed Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), began when U.S and British forces initiated aerial bombing campaigns targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda camps, then invaded Afghanistan with ground troops. The military did not initially embed journalists in Afghanistan and they had limited access to the combat zone. In one incident, journalists at a Marine base inside the country were locked in a warehouse to keep them from reporting on U.S. troops hit by friendly fire.⁷¹ Journalists had difficulty covering operations in Afghanistan simply because most of the ground elements of the campaign were special operations forces whose operational characteristics prevented reporters from covering their activities, and

⁶⁸ Frank Aukofer, “It Takes Two to Make a Team,” *Media Studies Journal* 15, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 32-33.

⁶⁹ Paul McMasters, “The War On Journalism,” The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, <http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=15211> (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁷⁰ Wright and Harkey, IV-5.

⁷¹ Sherry Ricchiardi, “Preparing For War,” *American Journalism Review* (March 2003), <http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=2794> (accessed November 11, 2011).

a common media complaint about Afghanistan was the lack of access to the frontlines. However, this access policy was about to change.

It wasn't until February 2002, when conventional forces began arriving in Afghanistan that limited embedding began. The idea of implementing the embed program on a large scale began shortly thereafter as part of the war preparations against Iraq. Discussions between the Secretary of Defense, the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the ASD PA about negative reporting arising from enemy disinformation in OEF were a vital stimulus driving their support of embedding media for operations in Iraq.⁷² A war against Iraq was considered well suited for the embedding of journalists on a broad scale, partly because it included all branches of the military.

The idea of embedding reporters and may have gained additional impetus from ASD-PA Victoria Clarke's experience in the public relations industry: Successful public relations professionals approach the market from a relationship standpoint. Katie Delahaye Paine, the CEO of a company that provides customized research that measures public relationships and brand image, wrote in *The Measurement Standard*, a public relations industry publication. "The better the relationship any of us have with a journalist, the better the chance of that journalist picking up and reporting our messages."⁷³ Clarke brought considerable public relations experience to DoD interaction with the media. Before her appointment, she worked with Hill and Knowlton, the public relations firm heavily involved in Gulf War I, and prior to that she was president of Bozell Eskew Advertising, an issue advocacy and corporate communications company. Although Clarke's claim that she "conceived, designed, and ran" the EMP may not be entirely accurate, she certainly was a driving force behind it.⁷⁴

⁷² Wright and Harkey, IV-6.

⁷³ Katie Delahaye Paine, "Army Intelligence. Army public affairs gets it right this time," *The Measurement Standard*, March 28, 2003. (<http://www.themeasurementstandard.com/Issues/303/eng/painemilitary303.asp>)

⁷⁴ Yahya R. Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, eds., *War, Media, and Propaganda: a Global Perspective* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 82; Margaret Sullivan, "Torie Clarke Advised 'Candor': Review of *Lipstick on a Pig*," *Washington Monthly*, March 2006. <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0603.sullivan.html> (accessed October 4, 2011).

Planning for Iraq

On January 14, 2002, a meeting of media bureau chiefs with DoD representatives discussed setting up the parameters for an embedded media system in Iraq if an invasion were to take place. The meeting resulted in the fifty-point Coalition Forces Land Component Command Ground Rules Agreement, which embedded journalists would be required to sign before accompanying troops. Unit commanders could restrict the use of electronic equipment in certain tactical situations but the Pentagon would not review or censor journalists dispatches. The DoD also reserved the right to determine which reporters were placed with which units. The objective of this arrangement was to give journalists as much access as possible without sacrificing operational security.⁷⁵

Also in early 2002, as part of the planning for the possible Iraq invasion, ASD-PA Victoria Clarke launched an effort to recruit "key influentials" to help promote the war. Clarke and a senior aide signed up more than 75 retired military officers to appear on television and radio news shows as military analysts, and/or to pen newspaper op/ed columns. The Pentagon was increasing its efforts towards generating favorable news coverage by the use of these military analysts. The Pentagon referred to the military analysts as "message force multipliers" or "surrogates," and reportedly held weekly meetings with them.⁷⁶

In early October 2002, a group of senior PA officials from the DoD met in Washington to review the media coverage and rules from previous conflicts. Their conclusions were synchronized with the developing plans for operations against Iraq. They determined that activation of the DNMP was not appropriate for the planned operation, nor was the presence of a large number of unilateral journalists desirable. The only practical solution, in the opinion of the group, was the embedding of journalists with the troops. The group's proposals were passed up to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who signed

⁷⁵ Ricchiardi; Paul and Kim, 53.

⁷⁶ David Barstow, "Message Machine: Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand," *New York Times*, April 20, 2008, 2-4. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html> (accessed December 10, 2011).

them. The proposals enumerated three goals: dominate news coverage of the war, counter enemy disinformation, and assist in securing U.S. public and international support.⁷⁷

On October 30, 2002, in one of the relatively frequent meetings with media bureau chiefs at the Pentagon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DASD PA), Bryan Whitman, outlined that, although no decision on war with Iraq had been made, his office had been actively involved in planning for the public affairs piece from the start. On this occasion, he disclosed the plan for “very extensive use of embedded media.”⁷⁸ According to the ASD PA Victoria Clarke “It was an extraordinary evolution of a concept that already existed.”⁷⁹

Secretary Rumsfeld, attending the same meeting, stated he was onboard with the public relations strategy of embedding media with Soldiers. Rumsfeld’s reasoning for support of the idea was that “In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan there was a great degree of skill on the part of the Taliban and the al Qaeda in news management.”⁸⁰ Embedded media for the Iraq invasion was viewed as the best way to combat the opposition’s media dominance because it granted access to professional journalists who would report what they saw on the ground. The presence of embedded media was critical because intelligence reports showed a growing Iraqi propaganda campaign.⁸¹ Rumsfeld’s announcement was a welcomed idea, especially after the policy of limited access that initially characterized the War in Afghanistan.

Although initially skeptical of the EMP, Commander of the United States Central Command, General Tommy Franks, he put his support behind the program after a briefing on the details of the program by Victoria Clarke. The argument that persuaded him was that the media would be reporting

⁷⁷ Gott, 238; Wright and Harkey, IV-7.

⁷⁸ Bryan Whitman, “ASD PA Clarke Meeting with Bureau Chiefs,” United States Department of Defense News Transcript, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/t11012002_t1030sd.htm (accessed September 12, 2011).

⁷⁹ Victoria Clarke, “Assessing Media Coverage of the War in Iraq: Press Reports, Pentagon Rules, and Lessons For the Future,” (The Brookings Institution, 2003), 3, <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20030617.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2011).

⁸⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, “ASD PA Clarke Meeting with Bureau Chiefs,” United States Department of Defense News Transcript, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/t11012002_t1030sd.htm (accessed September 12, 2011)

⁸¹ Katovsky and Carlson, xiii.

from the Soldier's perspective based on lessons from earlier conflicts. Despite some anti-military bias in reporting from Afghanistan, General Franks commented, "If the media were actually living and marching with the troops . . . they would experience war from the perspective of the Soldier or Marine."⁸² The intimacy that developed as a result of this would likely lead to more favorable coverage of the operation.

While the officers in the Pentagon worked on the Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) to lay out the rules and regulations for upcoming operations, a November 14, 2002 message to combatant commanders from Secretary Rumsfeld outlined the goals from the October DoD public relations meeting and explained how the public image of the military and the other national security organizations could be improved in the future. He emphasized the importance of providing both access and transportation to journalists, recommended daily information briefings, and stressed the importance of rapidly declassifying intelligence data for use by the media.⁸³

Once Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed that he considered embedding media a "core principle",⁸⁴ the media were then invited to training courses, so-called boot camps in places such as Quantico and Fort Benning in which their journalists would be prepared for their assignments in the gulf region. These three- to four-day boot camps took place from the second week of November, 2002 onward and received some minor coverage in U.S. newspapers.⁸⁵ A total of about 230 American journalists participated in the boot camp program. The rest had either prior wartime reporting experience or were trained by private consultants hired by their respective news agencies.⁸⁶

In February 2003, only a few weeks before the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DoD published the PAG on embedding media during possible future operations. Journalists embedded with

⁸² Thomas Rid, *War and Media Operations: the U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 134.

⁸³ Wright and Harkey, IV-6 - 7.

⁸⁴ Rumsfeld, "ASD PA Clarke Meeting with Bureau Chiefs."

⁸⁵ All of the costs associated with training the reporters, other than food, were paid for by the DoD.

⁸⁶ Paul and Kim, 53. (Attendance was not a prerequisite for being embedded or a guarantee of selection to embed. Only 50 percent of the attendees embedded with units.)

U.S. troops were required to sign a “Release, indemnification, and hold harmless agreement and agreement not to sue”, which specifies that journalists, their relatives, and their employers cannot hold the government responsible for injury or loss of life, and that the government has the discretion to revoke the embedded status at any time or reason as it sees fit. In turn, no specification is made as to whether and under what circumstances embedded journalists can terminate their stay with the assigned military unit. Both documents, the PAG and the agreement, specified that the embedding of journalists takes place “for the purpose of providing news media coverage before, during, and after military operations.”⁸⁷

The PAG defines precise rules for embedded journalists and their coverage. It states that journalists will be briefed in advance about “what information is sensitive and what the parameters are for covering this type of information”; journalists should also be briefed on “what information they should avoid covering.” If a unit commander decides that the coverage of a story would reveal sensitive information, “the commander may offer access if the reporter agrees to a security review of their coverage.” If sensitive information is found, “the media will be asked to remove that information.” Embargoing of media is also permitted for protecting operational security.⁸⁸

Despite the restrictions outlined in the PAG, the official policy of the DoD was “that media will have long-term, minimally restrictive access to U.S. air, ground and naval forces through embedding.”⁸⁹ The PAG recommended almost unrestricted access of the journalists to combat missions and the preparation and debriefing of them as possible. The unit the journalist was embedded with was responsible for providing billeting, food, and access to medical treatment. The journalist was also to be given access to military transportation and even assistance in transmitting their products using military

⁸⁷ “Release, Indemnification, and Hold Harmless Agreement and Agreement Not to Sue,” United States Department of Defense News Archive, <http://www.defense.gov/news/feb2003/d20030210embed.pdf> (accessed July 20, 2011).

⁸⁸ U.S. Secretary of Defense, OASD-PA, “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) On Embedding News Media During Possible Future Operations/deployments in the U.S. Central Commands (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR),” United States Department of Defense News Archive, under 2.A., <http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf> (accessed July 20, 2011).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

equipment if necessary. Embedded journalists were not allowed to carry weapons, use personal vehicles, or move to another military unit.⁹⁰

The PAG even stated that unit commanders were required to provide the opportunity for journalists to watch ongoing battles. The personal security of the journalist was not a reason to deny coverage. The journalist was personally responsible for his own safety in how he chose to view combat. The military was not responsible for the safety of the journalist in his coverage of the action.⁹¹ Despite the risks, most of the media bureau chiefs thought their people would be safer as embeds than as unilateral, and cited it as one of the primary incentives in having them in the program.⁹²

The Office of the ASD-PA asked the media outlets to name the number of reporters they wanted to be embedded, and left the assignment of specific units to the Pentagon. The planning figure the Pentagon used in distribution of the embed positions to the media requests was 70 percent national/regional, 20 percent international, and 10 percent local.⁹³ Major media outlets with large market share were allotted more than one slot. The decision on the number of embeds to employ in OIF was left to the major subordinate commanders because they would be responsible for integrating them into their units and providing support. Each component and each ground unit used different considerations and methods to determine how many embeds could be accommodated. The numbers for the Army and Marines fluctuated as force planning changed over time, ranging from 350 to 700.⁹⁴

At the start of OIF there were anywhere between 570 and 750 embedded journalists. Those numbers dropped considerably after the defeat of Iraq government forces. Numbers were down to 26

⁹⁰ Miracle, 43; U.S. Secretary of Defense, OASD-PA, "PAG," under 2.B and 2.C. (Ground commanders wanted the PAG changed to allow broadcast-media vehicles on the battlefield, and despite the PAG, 15 broadcast-media teams from the major broadcast-media organizations took vehicles and additional personnel into Iraq.)

⁹¹ U.S. Secretary of Defense, OASD-PA, "PAG," under 3.G.

⁹² Wright and Harkey, VI-23.

⁹³ Ibid., V-3

⁹⁴ Ibid., IV-10.

embedded reporters in late 2006.⁹⁵ Reasons include cost considerations, declining interest after the end of major combat operations, increased opportunity to move unilaterally around the country, and the establishment of media bureaus in Baghdad.⁹⁶

Criticism of the EMP

In the case of OIF, the political will to pursue a new public affairs strategy coincided with the availability of technological advances that made it possible to implement the EMP. Advanced communications and information technology made large-scale censorship of any kind virtually impossible.⁹⁷ Technology advances enable the media to submit live reports directly from the battlefield. Since journalists could be equipped with digital cameras, they did not have to rely on a larger crew to produce their coverage, nor did they require as much technical support for transmission as was the case in earlier wars. Even television reporters could be placed individually with troops and function as both cameraman and reporter, and capable of doing their own editing.⁹⁸

These technological advances help to explain part of the positive response of the media towards the EMP. This war differed from previous ones both in the amount and the type of live footage that it produced. An initial comprehensive study of Iraq war coverage on U.S. network television by the Pew Research Center provided some insight into live coverage, a central element of the embed program. They

⁹⁵ David Vaina, "The Vanishing Embedded Reporter in Iraq," Journalism.org, <http://www.journalism.org/node/2596> (accessed September 20, 2011).

⁹⁶ Ibid.; Wright and Harkey, VI-26.

⁹⁷ A survey of news executives listed ten new communication technologies the press used in the Gulf War: electronic mail and computer-to-computer communications; digital transmission of still photographs; facsimile transmission; portable satellite telephones; remotely sensed satellite imagery; frame capture of video images to print; laptop computers; international data transmission networks; flyaway satellite uplinks; and computer graphics [Dennis, Everette E., David Stebenne, John Pavlik, Mark Thalhimer, Craig LaMay, Dirk Smillie, Martha FitzSimon, Shirley Gazsi, and Seth Rachlin, *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict (a Report of the Gannett Foundation)*. (New York: Gannett Foundation Media Center/Columbia University, 1991), p. 35]. All these technological changes increase the speed of newsgathering and reporting and can bypass traditional security mechanisms.

⁹⁸ NBC Correspondent Kerry Sanders stated that the gear used a year earlier in Afghanistan filled 75-100 cases. By OIF, the technological improvements enabled the same capabilities to be carried in five or six cases. (Wright and Harkey, VII-33.)

found that slightly over 60 percent of embedded reports were live, with 80 percent of those audiovisual.⁹⁹ This opportunity to report live from the battlefields may explain the particularly strong reliance of TV networks on embedded reports.

While the firing of weapons was prominently featured, there was little indication of their impact; few images of human targets, human victims, or human consequences were shown in dispatches from embeds. The same study drew the interesting conclusion that the war in Iraq failed to “become the ultimate reality TV,” mainly because of the lack of editing that produced fragmentation, with sanitized white noise rather than subplots and retraceable story lines.¹⁰⁰ The most common criticism of the embedded reports was that they were just isolated pieces of a larger picture, and the reliance on their reports would fail to convey an accurate picture to viewers.¹⁰¹ This narrow view of the individual reporter was described by General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the “soda straw view of war.”¹⁰²

Embedding does result in the fragmentation of war reporting. This is to some extent the direct result of embedding journalists as isolated individuals into troop units. Not only are individual journalists restricted in their viewpoint by the activities of the units they are embedded in, but they also lack exchange with other members of the press corps. The day after OIF began, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, “What we're seeing are slices of the war in Iraq. We're seeing that particularized perspective that that reporter, or that commentator or that television camera happens to be able to see at that moment. And it is not what's taking place. What you see is taking place, to be sure, but it is one slice.”¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Embedded Reporters: What Are Americans Getting?” Journalism.org, under “Live and Unedited Versus Taped Packages,” <http://www.journalism.org/node/211> (accessed September 20, 2011).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., under “Through the Soda Straw.”

¹⁰¹ Ibid., under “Reality Television;” Wright and Harkey, VII-37.

¹⁰² Paul and Kim, 111.

¹⁰³ Donald Rumsfeld, “DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” United States Department of Defense News Transcript, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2074> (accessed September 17, 2011)

While this might be seen as a distinct disadvantage of embedding as opposed to the pool system, journalists from the United States and other countries overwhelmingly approved of the practice of embedding and regarded it as an improvement on media treatment and frontline access in earlier conflicts.¹⁰⁴ Better planning of the embed program and a greater abundance of resources and implementation of the public affairs doctrine at lower levels of the military hierarchy were mentioned as reasons for the comparatively smooth practice. However, the experiences of embeds with UK forces were less positive; where journalists encountered limited access to commanders, less favorable access to information, reduced levels of trust and cooperation, and even instances of censorship.¹⁰⁵

Despite the “soda-straw view” of war being a term used derisively and even called a tool of the DoD’s war propaganda,¹⁰⁶ media bureau chiefs understood that it was their responsibility to provide the broad view of the war. One bureau chief stated, “Critics who complain that all that is being reported is a soda-straw view of the war are wrong. Nobody said that an embed’s report is the story of the war. To get the overall picture requires inputs from many locations and sources. The overall view is the main story, with the embed stories as sidebars. Nobody expected them to do the big picture.”¹⁰⁷

While the embedded journalists acknowledged the inherent limitations on access that came from their dependence on the units they were assigned to, as well as the fragmented picture of the war that they could witness and report. Some stated that the absence of more graphic war imagery was part self-censorship “because they knew that the more gruesome scenes that they witnessed would not be shown.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Justin Lewis et al., *Too Close For Comfort? The Role of Embedded Reporting During the 2003 Iraq War: Summary Report* (Cardiff, Wales, UK: Cardiff School of Journalism, 2004), 2.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁰⁶ Steven Lee Myers, “Embedistan: Embedding in Iraq During the Invasion and the Drawdown,” *New York Times*, August 20, 2010. <http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/steven-lee-myers/> (accessed November 25, 2011).

¹⁰⁷ Wright and Harkey, VII-40.

¹⁰⁸ Lewis et al., 9.

Notwithstanding the formal restrictions, communication theory research demonstrates that relationships intensify through repeated disclosures of information between partners.¹⁰⁹ The framework of the EMP led to the establishment of mutual trust. The journalist integrated into the military unit to receive support in terms of resources and information; the military units were more willing to integrate the reporter if they could expect positive coverage of their performance. The EMP meant living together over an extended period. Whether a repayment in kind strategy for sympathetic reporting, or a bonding experience among embeds and units that resulted in journalists taking an inclusive perspective in their stories, the Pentagon likely intended long-term embedding to produce positive bias in reporting.¹¹⁰

Many journalists writing of their experiences in Iraq fall into an inclusive style of prose, talking of ‘my Battalion’ or our unit’ and even ‘my Marines,’ or saying ‘we took fire.’¹¹¹ As Geoffrey Mohan of the Los Angeles Times admitted, “no matter how much you guard against it, you start to identify with the people you’re embedded with, particularly when you’re being shot at. You start to look at the other side as the enemy; you lose sympathy toward the enemy dead, or those you classify as the enemy.”¹¹² Even if such positive bias occurs, it does not necessarily cause embedded journalists to give inaccurate or propagandistic accounts of operations they witness. One prominent journalist argued, “in this profession we are not paid to be neutral. We are paid to be fair, and they are completely different things.”¹¹³

While journalists may intend to report objectively, objectivity is seldom obtained, especially with more and more journalists working for large media corporations that have their own biases and

¹⁰⁹ Charles R. Berger and Richard J. Calabrese, “Some Explorations in Initial Interaction and Beyond: Toward a Developmental Theory of Interpersonal Communication,” *Human Communication Research* 1, no. 2 (December 1975): 100, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2958.1975.tb00258.x/pdf> (accessed November 26, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Lee Artz and Yahya R. Kamalipour, eds., *Bring 'em On: Media and Politics in the Iraq War* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 199.

¹¹¹ Katovsky and Carlson, 27, 53, 131, 136, 169, 189, etc.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 263.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 161.

preferences.¹¹⁴ Journalists generally work under a deadline and prefer to use information sources with whom they have worked before and have developed a trusting relationship; this adds to their selectivity in story selection. Many times these large media conglomerates place pressures on journalists and encourage or discourage stories depending upon a written story's implication to the parent company. Historically, objectivity has often been sacrificed for sensationalism.¹¹⁵

Most journalists claim that while they may feel a certain attachment to the unit they are with, they would not hesitate to publish a story that reflects negatively on that unit if such a situation came about.¹¹⁶ Media bureau chiefs did not feel that their embeds lost objectivity or that feelings of attachment impacted their ability to write fairly and accurately.¹¹⁷ Veteran reporter Joe Galloway writing before the start of OIF, stated "Any reporter who has the [courage] to go into combat is tough enough not to be co-opted by anyone."¹¹⁸

These claims of maintained objectivity cannot be applied across the spectrum of journalists. Journalists have admitted passing supplies or carrying ordinance during combat actions. Gavin Hewitt of the BBC admitted picking out targets for the military, arguably crossing the line from objective reporter to active combatant.¹¹⁹ *Boston Globe* Journalist, Scott Bernard Nelson, also disclosed that he pointed out

¹¹⁴ S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, and Linda S. Lichter, *The Media Elite: America's New Power Brokers* (New York: Hastings House, 1990), 88-92; Jim A. Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002); John R. Lott and Kevin A. Hassett, *Is Newspaper Coverage of Economic Events Politically Biased?* (October 19, 2004), 28, in Social Science Research Network, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=588453> (accessed January 2, 2012).

¹¹⁵ Lande, 127.

¹¹⁶ Gott, 35; Wright and Harkey, VII-17; Katovsky and Carlson, 262.

¹¹⁷ Wright and Harkey, VII-17.

¹¹⁸ James Janega and Tim Jones, Pentagon Gambles on Open-War Policy: Media still wary of access pledge, *Chicago Tribune*, January 26, 2003. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-01-26/news/0301260301_1_gulf-war-iraq-vietnam-war (accessed November 26, 2011).

¹¹⁹ Kamalipour and Snow, 11.

targets to a 50-cal gunner.¹²⁰ These and other examples clearly point to embedded journalists identifying positively with their supporting military unit.

A critical report on the military's animosity toward unilateral reporters claims that the idea of embedding was copied from a British program in World War I. In comparing the embedded journalists of the Iraq War with those of World War I, the report asserts that the modern embedded journalists lost the distinction between warrior and correspondent. The author claims to have found only one instance of an embed who "wrote a story highly critical of the behaviour of U.S. troops and which went against the official account of what had occurred."¹²¹

Several studies argue that embedded journalists tend to produce stories that are more supportive, encouraging, and affirmative of the U.S. military than those provided by unilateral reporters.¹²² One study of embedded media revealed that BBC coverage was more favorable toward the government's position on the war and another found that U.S.-embedded print coverage of the invasion phase of OIF was more positive toward the military.¹²³ While another study showed significant differences between embedded and unilateral television news reports, it was unable to conclude that embedding alone was responsible for the differences.¹²⁴

These studies attempted to examine the tone of articles rather than the content. Another comparison of embedded and non-embedded journalists' articles stated that the physical and

¹²⁰ Katovsky and Carlson, 200.

¹²¹ Phillip Knightley, "History or Bunkum?" *British Journalism Review* 14, no. 2 (June 2003): 9, <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1860/knightley1.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2011).

¹²² Mike Donnelly et al., "Embedded Journalism: How War Is Viewed Differently from the Frontlines Versus the Sidelines," Department of Defense Joint Course in Communication, <http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/03D1/Results.htm> (accessed December 17, 2011).

¹²³ Lewis et al, 5; Michel M. Haigh et al., "A Comparison of Embedded and Nonembedded Print Coverage of the U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 11, no. 2 (April 2006): 149.

¹²⁴ Michael Pfau et al., "Embedded Reporting During the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq: How the Embedding of Journalists Affects Television News Reports," *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* (December 2005): 9, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6836/is_4_49/?tag=content;col1 (accessed December 10, 2011).

psychological constraints on the embedded journalists greatly curtailed their ability to cover the war experience from a civilian perspective. The study went on to say that the much greater frequency and recognition of articles published by the embedded journalists, “proved a victory for the armed services in the historical tug-of-war between the press and military over journalistic freedom during war time.”¹²⁵ In analyzing print news articles from the beginning of the Iraqi war until the "Mission Accomplished" speech by President George W. Bush (March 19 - May1, 2003), 71 percent of published stories came from embedded journalists (100 percent of USA Today’s articles).¹²⁶ The EMP produced reports that presented the military in a more positive and less objective light that supported an “administration that hoped to build support for the war by depicting it as a successful mission with limited costs was able to do so through the embed program and without some of the more heavy-handed propaganda efforts of Operation Desert Storm.”¹²⁷

Though the Pentagon denies embedding journalists in order to highlight positive mission aspects, it was forced to terminate a one year, \$1.5 million contract with The Rendon Group to conduct “news analysis and media assessment” in late August 2009 after being exposed by *Stars and Stripes*, the independent, Pentagon-funded newspaper.¹²⁸ Documents from Rendon clearly stated that the purpose of their analysis was to assist public affairs officers ascertain the kind of coverage to expect from the journalist, whether to grant the embed request, and how the journalist could be manipulated towards more positive coverage. The *Stars and Stripes* also reported on documentation showing that the Rendon reports

¹²⁵ Linder, under “A Soldier’s Eye View” & the introduction.

¹²⁶ “Embedded Reporting Influences War Coverage, Study Shows,” Penn State Live, <http://live.psu.edu/story/18981> (accessed July 20, 2011).

¹²⁷ Linder, under “A Soldier’s Eye View.”

¹²⁸ Charlie Reed, Kevin Baron, and Leo Shane, “Files prove Pentagon is profiling reporters,” *Stars and Stripes*, August 27, 2009. <http://www.stripes.com/news/military-terminates-rendon-contract-1.94400> (accessed January 29, 2012); Kevin Baron, “Military Terminates Rendon Contract,” *Stars and Stripes*, August 31, 2009. <http://www.stripes.com/news/military-terminates-rendon-contract-1.94400> (accessed January 29, 2012).

“were used to limit access of journalists who had produced unfavorable coverage of U.S. war efforts.”¹²⁹

Aidan White, International Federation of Journalists General Secretary, condemned military vetting of journalists, stating “It strips away any pretence that the army is interested in helping journalists to work freely. It suggests they are more interested in propaganda than honest reporting.”¹³⁰

Two months earlier the military handling of the EMP had come under criticism after *Stars and Stripes* accused U.S. Army officials in Iraq of engaging in vetting practices when they barred their journalist from embedding with a unit of the 1st Cavalry Division because the reporter “refused to highlight” good news that the military wanted to emphasize.¹³¹ On the denied request to embed, Major Ramona Bellard, a public affairs officer, wrote “Despite the opportunity to visit areas of the city where Iraqi Army leaders, soldiers, national police and Iraqi police displayed commitment to partnership, Mr. Druzin refused to highlight any of this news.”¹³² The military’s action drew criticism from media watchdogs, “If they put these kind of conditions on it [the EMP], then I’d say the whole program will collapse,” warned Kelly McBride, a leader of a media training facility and think tank in St. Petersburg, Florida. “It’s not meant to be a public relations program for the military.”¹³³

Despite these claims of vetting by the military, much of the limited negative reporting appears to be self-censorship on the part of the media. Thousands of Iraqis were killed in the conflict yet the view presented to the American public was highly sanitized. In one instance, CNN showed an image of a dead Iraqi and the switchboard “lit up like a Christmas Tree” with angry viewers demanding a halt to such

¹²⁹ Mike Mount, “U.S. Military Drops Contract Profiling Reporters,” CNN.com, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-31/politics/us.afghanistan.reporters_1_reporter-profiles-stars-and-stripes-military?_s=PM:POLITICS (accessed January 29, 2012).

¹³⁰ Peter Graff, “U.S. Military Ends Journalist Profiling Contract,” *Reuters*, August 31, 2009. <http://mobile.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE57U1SG20090831?ca=rdt> (accessed January 29, 2012).

¹³¹ Army Bars Stars and Stripes Reporter from Covering 1st Cav Unit in Mosul, *Stars and Stripes*, June 24, 2009. <http://www.stripes.com/news/army-bars-stars-and-stripes-reporter-from-covering-1st-cav-unit-in-mosul-1.92692> (accessed January 29, 2012).

¹³² Leo Shane, “Media Watchdogs Blast Army’s Embed Ban,” *Stars and Stripes*, June 25, 2009. <http://www.stripes.com/news/media-watchdogs-blast-army-s-embed-ban-1.92718> (accessed January 29, 2012).

¹³³ Ibid.

graphic imagery.¹³⁴ The managing editor of Time, James Kelly stated, "You don't want to give the reader a sanitized war, but there has to be some judgment and taste."¹³⁵ Few images of corpses were ever shown to American newspaper readers. Of 241 published by the New York Times during the first week of OIF, only one showed a dead Iraqi.¹³⁶ An examination of image content indicates that "the military received the type of coverage it hoped when it installed the embedding program. For although journalists were allowed safer access to battlefronts that were denied in wars past, the images published from the actual battle areas were overwhelmingly pro-military."¹³⁷ Although the Pentagon did not directly control the output, it clearly benefited from the results.

Well before the use of embedded journalists in the Iraq war, the immediacy of 'live' news broadcasts was shown to contribute to "the automatic truth value."¹³⁸ Other studies have shown that the format of television reporting used by the embedded reporters affects audience perception of news reporting,¹³⁹ and argue that the military's willingness to embed television news reporter for OIF reflects an understanding of this potential to generate public support.¹⁴⁰ Others claim the illusion of unedited reporting was used by the military to elicit positive audience response,¹⁴¹ or that the Pentagon's handling

¹³⁴ Kamalipour and Snow, 74.

¹³⁵ Cynthia King and Paul Martin Lester, "Photographic Coverage During the Persian Gulf and Iraqi Wars in Three U.S. Newspapers," *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 82, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): under "Discussion," http://commfaculty.fullerton.edu/lester/writings/iraq_war.html (accessed November 25, 2011).

¹³⁶ Kamalipour and Snow, 87.

¹³⁷ King and Lester, under "Implications."

¹³⁸ Mary Ann Doane, "Information, Crisis, Catastrophe," in *Logics of Television: Essays in Cultural Criticism*, ed. Patricia Mellencamp (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 224.

¹³⁹ Rick W. Busselle and Bradley S. Greenberg, "The Nature of Television Realism Judgements," *Mass Communication and Society* 3, no. 2-3 (2000): 249-68; Helena Bilandzic, "The Perception of Distance in the Cultivation Process: A Theoretical Consideration of the Relationship between Television Content, Processing Experience, and Perceived Distance," *Communication Theory* 16, no. 3 (August 2006): 333-55.

¹⁴⁰ Ray Eldon Hiebert, "Public Relations and Propaganda in Framing the Iraq War: A Preliminary Review," *Public Relations Review* 29, no. 3 (2003): 243-55, <http://www.deepdyve.com/lp/elsevier/public-relations-and-propaganda-in-framing-the-iraq-war-a-preliminary-iEewQaEGmz> (accessed November 26, 2011).

¹⁴¹ Pamela Taylor Jackson and James Ronald Stanfield, "The Role of the Press in a Democracy: Heterodox Economics and the Propaganda Model," *Journal of Economic Issues* XXXVIII, no. 2 (June 2004): 475-82.

of the media took lessons from reality television, with a focus on entertainment at the expense of context.¹⁴²

While news organizations acknowledge that the EMP may raise questions about journalistic independence, they argue that these reports are only part of a broader coverage that incorporates expert analysis and reports from unilateral journalists. Embeds did report on unfavorable incidents, such as the report of William Branigan of the *Washington Post*, whose account of a checkpoint shooting was at odds with a Pentagon report.¹⁴³ When embedded reporters did write unfavorable accounts, they tended to understand the background and the context, and unit commanders were more confident in the ability of embedded journalists to report fairly and accurately than unilateral journalists.¹⁴⁴

The Future of the EMP

Following the DoD's experience with embedded media in OIF, there has been substantial emphasis placed on the virtues of media embedding, as documented in the updates of U.S. Military public affairs doctrine. The May 2005 publication mentions media embeds fourteen times and emphasizes the importance and relevance of public affairs to all military operations.¹⁴⁵ The August 2010 version continues this emphasis on embedded media, especially during the initial stages of a conflict.¹⁴⁶ It would appear that a robust media embed program will remain a key element of the DoD's media engagement strategy.

¹⁴² Roger Stahl, *Militainment, Inc.: War, Media, and Popular Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 86. [A cooperative venture between ABC and the Pentagon for a reality show covering Soldiers in Afghanistan employed Jerry Bruckheimer (*Top Gun* – 1986, *Black Hawk Down* – 2001, *Behind Enemy Lines* – 2001, *Armageddon* – 1998, *Pearl Harbor* – 2001) and Bertram van Munster (*COPS*).]

¹⁴³ Katovsky and Carlson, 229.

¹⁴⁴ Wright and Harkey, VII-43.

¹⁴⁵ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-61 (Suffolk: Doctrine and Education Group, May 9, 2005), III-24.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Public Affairs*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-61 (Suffolk: Doctrine and Education Group, August 25, 2010), III-9.

While the majority of Soldiers, commanders, journalists, and civilians had a positive perception of embedding,¹⁴⁷ the future of the EMP is not assured. The media and the public will likely expect to see a program very similar to the EMP used in the next major U.S. military operation. Changes in several factors could disappoint those expectations. The OIF policy decisions may not be reflective of future decisions. Although there is likely to be some continuation of the EMP, there are likely to be changes in its execution. When asked about the future of EMP, DASD PA Bryan Whitman stated past conflicts are not useful predictors of future actions; “so regardless of the lessons that we learned here, they’ll still have to be applied over whatever a future situation might be, to determine whether or not, or to what extent what we did in this conflict will be able to be repeated.”¹⁴⁸ The drive to Baghdad lasted only twenty-one days and the number of embeds dropped off considerably once Baghdad fell. One magazine journalist concluded that the EMP is still untested, “The real test will come in a conflict of longer duration, perhaps against an enemy that is far more competent and where there’s potential for real harm on U.S. troops in terms of casualties.”¹⁴⁹

In addition to the short duration of the invasion (at least the Combined Arms Maneuver portion of it), the quality of the opponent was comparatively low, weapons of mass destruction were not employed and casualties were low. This may not be the case in the future. Not only might high casualties dampen public support, the embeds’ near real-time reports of mass casualties would likely cause serious emotional turmoil for military families waiting on the comparatively slow military next-of-kin notification process. This could cause the DoD to reconsider the embed program despite likely media criticism of such a move.

¹⁴⁷ Artz and Kamalipour, 243; Katovsky and Carlson, 262; Wright and Harkey, S-9; Lewis, et al., 2; Paul and Kim, 126.

¹⁴⁸ Bryan Whitman, “Deputy Assistant Secretary Whitman Interview with the Christian Science Monitor,” United States Department of Defense News Transcript, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2476> (accessed September 17, 2011).

¹⁴⁹ Alicia C. Shepard, *Narrowing the Gap - Military, Media and the Iraq War - Cantigny Conference Series* (Chicago: The McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004), 74.

If major combat actions had lasted a long time, there would have been a need to establish a replacement/rotation policy for embeds. The long lead time for OIF allowed for joint planning and training to take place between the military and the media. This opportunity may not be present in a future conflict. A future operation in which the primary military component is the Air Force or Special Operations Forces would see significant changes to the EMP structure used in OIF. Because a drop-off in the number of embeds followed the fall of Baghdad, a future conflict in which U.S. armed forces engage in Wide Area Security is likely to see less demand from the media for the opportunity to embed. Also, technology changes, both within the military and the media, may change the structure of the EMP.

Conclusion

The history between the military and the media has been long and varied with considerable tension, especially when the military situation is most difficult. This friction grew into a rift during the later half of the Vietnam War. In every major military operation since Vietnam, the Pentagon has sought to restrict media access to the battlefield.¹⁵⁰ With the Iraq War, this trend appears to have ended.

In the past, with well-developed military control over the modes of communication between a theater and the U.S., the military tended toward censorship in theater. Even when there was no formal censorship, the military often followed practices aimed at controlling the information available to the media. The military dissatisfaction with the media coverage following the Vietnam War, led to the practice of the pool system as a means to control media access. The media and the military were both dissatisfied with the pool system of the 1990s. As a result, the Army looked to bringing the media back into a more cooperative frame by constructive engagement aimed at developing positive relations, granting them access, and trying to bridge the gulf between the organizational cultures of media and military.

¹⁵⁰ Rid, 5.

Based on past U.S. military experience with journalists, the experiences of the British in the Falklands War, and the Marines during Desert Storm, the DoD embedded about two dozen journalists with troops deploying to Bosnia from Germany. The journalists spent several weeks living with the Soldiers and their reports were censored. By using the force of social cohesion, the Army hoped to gain more positive reporting. This practice was deemed a success and subsequently added as a concept in Army doctrine.

With an increasingly media-savvy opponent and the proliferation of communications methods in recent years, theater censorship and information control have become increasingly less practicable. With a decline in the ability to control the dissemination of information, the U.S. military and the government are required to place increased emphasis on the shaping of the message. The renewed U.S. interest in strategic communication since the events of 9/11 is indicative of the desire to control the information provided through the media. The mission statement by the Office of Global Communications, established by President George W. Bush on January 21, 2003 articulated this interest. Executive order 13283 stated that its purpose was to advise the President and the heads of executive departments and agencies on how best to “ensure consistency in messages that will promote the interests of the United States abroad, prevent misunderstanding, build support for and among coalition partners of the United States, and inform international audiences.”¹⁵¹ Such wide ranging information coordination organizations make it difficult to draw a clear distinction between public relations and propaganda.¹⁵²

In late 2002, as the DoD prepared for a potential invasion of Iraq, the decision was made to plan for operations using embedded journalists to achieve the goals of dominating news coverage of the war,

¹⁵¹ U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, “Executive Order: Establishing the Office of Global Communications,” President George W. Bush White House Archives, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030121-3.html> (accessed January 29, 2012).

¹⁵² The Office of Global Communications was established after the closing of the Office of Strategic Influence. The Office of Global Communications itself was disbanded in April of 2005 and the National Security Council assumed its responsibilities.

countering enemy disinformation, and increasing public support.¹⁵³ When the invasion of Iraq began, the DoD had over 500 reporters positioned alongside Soldiers. The stories provided by these embedded reporters dominated news coverage. Although this coverage was fragmented and contributed to a narrow view of activities, journalists viewed the EMP as an improvement in frontline access compared to previous conflicts.

When asked about the practice of embedding journalists with the troops, Lt. Col. Rick Long, the former head of media relations for the U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq in 2004, confirmed it was “to dominate the information environment.”¹⁵⁴ The Pentagon established the EMP to reinforce positive attitudes toward U.S. military operations by placing journalists alongside troop units so they would face the same experiences. Todd Gitlin, a professor of Journalism and Sociology at Columbia University, warns that “Embeddedness has a built-in swerve toward propaganda . . . because an embedded reporter is on the team.”¹⁵⁵ The journalist’s desire to write negative stories about the troops they are traveling with is quite diminished. The EMP provided access the media wanted for its journalists while helping to assure patriotic coverage and voluntary propaganda activity from the national media without the need for overt control measures to protect security that earlier operations had demanded.

ASF-PA used "key influentials" to promote the war. As recently as 2008, the Pentagon used secret profiles to rate the work of journalists reporting from Afghanistan and deny disfavored reporters the opportunity to embed with units.¹⁵⁶ These DoD actions support the conclusion that the ASD-PA saw reporting in terms of propaganda activity. Additional evidence exists that embedding alters journalist’s reporting perspectives, showing substantially more positive attitudes and warmer feelings toward their

¹⁵³ Wright and Harkey, IV-7.

¹⁵⁴ Jeffery Khan, “Postmortem: Iraq War Media Coverage Dazzled but It Also Obscured,” UC Berkeley News, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/18_iraqmedia.shtml (accessed February 21, 2012).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Leo Shane, “Army Admits Using Profiles to Deny Reporters Access to Fighting Units,” *Stars and Stripes*, September 1, 2009. <http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2009/09/army-admits-using-profiles-to-deny-reporters-access-to-fighting-units/> (accessed January 29, 2012).

subjects than non-embedded journalists.¹⁵⁷ This resulting favorable reporting has been outlined in several studies since 2003. Despite the criticisms of the program and the resulting coverage, it is likely that reporters will be permitted to embed with combat units in the future as long as the Pentagon pursues information dominance and positive public perception.

¹⁵⁷ Paul Coupaud, Brian Davis, Rhys Evans and Jeff Pool, "Embedded Media with the Military," Department of Defense Joint Course in Communication. <http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/03C2/discussion.htm> (accessed December 17, 2011).

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