

AN ANALYSIS OF EXCELLING IN THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF  
OFFICERS' COURSE HAS ON FUTURE SUCCESS IN THE ARMY

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General Studies

by

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## ABSTRACT

AN ANALYSIS OF EXCELLING IN THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS' COURSE HAS ON FUTURE SUCCESS IN THE ARMY, by MAJ Dustin A. Blair, U.S. Army, 150 pages.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether a correlation exists between winning the Marshall Award and continued success in the Army, as well as, the likelihood of incentives increasing officers' academic performance in Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC). The research plan used a qualitative approach that included oral history interviews with Marshall Award Recipients from 2001-2011 as well as surveying CGSOC classes 14-01 and 14-02. Six evaluation criteria derived from Army policies were used to investigate the relationship between excelling in CGSOC and continued success: exclusive enumeration on OERs, selection for nominative positions, below the zone promotion to lieutenant colonel, selection for battalion command, selection for senior service college, and promotion to colonel. Randomly selected Army students were surveyed to examine if performance based incentives would increase students' academic performance. The research showed a correlation between interviewed Marshall Award Recipients and continued success in the Army. In addition, analysis indicated that CGSOC students might be motivated to increase academic performance through incentives such as: increased study and reflection time, priority in selecting next duty assignment, and increased chances for promotion. The study identifies the need for future research over several classes.

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## ACRONYMS

AOC	Advanced Operations Course
AER	Academic Evaluation Report
AR	Army Regulation
AWC	Air War College
BZ	Below the Zone
CAS3	Combined Arms Services Staff School
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CGSOC	Command and General Staff Officers' Course
DA PAM	Department of the Army Pamphlet
DA MEMO	Department of the Army Memorandum
FFGE	Fully Funded Graduate Education
FGSOC	Führungsakademie General Staff Officer Course
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
IRST	Independent Reflection and Study Time
OER	Officer Evaluation Report
OML	Order of Merit List
PME	Professional Military Education
RETO	Review of Education and Training for Officers
SSC	Senior Service College
USAWC	U.S. Army War College
XO	Executive Officer



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

I am convinced that learning and leadership are at the core of our profession. Military service must continue to be our Nation's preeminent leadership experience. We will continue to reform and leverage the Professional Military Education enterprise to advance our profession. It is more important than ever to get the most from the potential and performance of every Service member.

— Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey,  
“Joint Education White Paper”

The military has historically invested considerable time, energy, and talent in education and leader development. Senior leaders have long recognized that it takes a quality force consisting of professional, well-trained, and highly creative men and women to harness new technology by transforming organizations and adopting innovative doctrine.

— Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Henry H. Shelton  
“Professional Education: The Key to Transformation”

#### Background

The current culture in the US Army is counter to the Army's culture that led to success in the inter-war period and World War II. The late Congressman Ike Skelton frequently highlighted the fact that 31 of the 34 Corps Commanders leading the American Army to victory in World War II were previously instructors at some point in their military careers.<sup>1</sup> The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) recognizes each Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) top graduate with the Marshall Award. The award is named after General George C. Marshall. Marshall was not only a brilliant officer in World War I and the Chief of Staff of the Army in World War II, but

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<sup>1</sup>John S. Brown, “The Skelton Critique: Faculty Experience in Army Senior Leaders,” unpublished paper, January 2000.

was instrumental in championing education during the interwar period and preparing the US Army for World War II. The Marshall Award was first earned in 1960; however, the school only accounts for the number one graduate for each class dating back to 1947. The process for determining Marshall Award Recipients is addressed in CGSC Bulletin 903 and the CGSC Self Study of 8 January 2008. Staff Group Advisors nominate candidates, and the CGSOC Graduation Board selects the recipient based on documented academic achievement and other professional attributes.<sup>2</sup> It is worth noting that 14 of 76 Marshall Award Recipients went on to become General Officers.

CGSOC returned to centrally selected course with the second fiscal year class of 2014 referred to as 14-02.<sup>3</sup> Prior to 14-02, CGSC instituted a Commandant's List that recognizes the top 20 percent of each section. CGSC classes consist of sections, and sections contain staff groups. A section has 64 students and is further organized into four staff groups of 16 students. CGSC did not recognize any type of class ranking other than the Marshall Award recipient from approximately 1986 to 2011. The reason CGSC stopped recognizing is disputed. In 1928, CGSC stopped recognizing class ranking because the commandant Brigadier General Edward King desired to foster a spirit of

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<sup>2</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Self Study 8 January 2008* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 5-2.

<sup>3</sup>Class 14-01 is not a true centralized selected class. The class consists of officers from year groups 2001-2003. A panel of senior Army Officers selected best-qualified officers to make up class 14-01. Class 14-02 is the first centrally selected class since universal ILE ended.

collegiality and felt class ranking was producing unhealthy competition among officers.<sup>4</sup> It is fair to speculate that the disbanding of class ranking in 1986 was for similar reasons. It is hoped the current practice of recognizing the top 20 percent ensures a representative population from the graduating class is recognized as well as the Marshall Award Recipient.

### Primary and Secondary Research Questions

This thesis will explore if there is a relationship between earning the Marshall Award and continued professional success, as well as the likelihood of incentives increasing officers' academic performance in CGSOC. The target audience consists of commanders and leaders within the US Army who are concerned with continuing to produce future leaders capable of meeting the nation's needs. The US Army and the nation invest a substantial amount of resources to officers selected to attend CGSOC. There should be means to evaluate the return on this investment. There are three significant questions of importance that have not been examined in depth.

The primary research question was: What is the correlation between Marshall Award Recipients and future professional success?

The secondary research questions were:

1. Should the Army offer incentives for academic performance in CGSOC?
2. What CGSOC offered incentives motivate students to improve performance?
3. What Army offered incentives motivate students to improve performance?

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<sup>4</sup>Combined Arms Center, Command and General Staff School, *Annual Report Of The Commandant: The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1928-1929* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1929), 9-10.

### Current Environment

The Army's culture highly regards operational performance. This is demonstrated by the number of officers that deferred attendance at both the US Army War College (USAWC) and CGSOC in an effort to remain in the operational environment and deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>5</sup> This supports Colonel (Retired) Charles Allen's complaint that the Army has fostered an environment where it is more important to be selected for Professional Military Education (PME) than actually attend.<sup>6</sup> This trend is reinforced by the Army's personnel management system. Although officers receive an Academic Evaluation Report (AER) regarding their performance in PME, it is insignificant in comparison to the officer's performance in the field on the Officer Evaluation Report (OER).<sup>7</sup> The Army continues to promote a culture of doing rather than thinking.<sup>8</sup> Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, lays out commissioned officer professional developmental requirements and career management procedures, and guides the Army personnel management system. DA PAM 600-3 defines Branch/Functional Area (FA) development as developing a mastery of skills, knowledge, and attributes for

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<sup>5</sup>Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," *Proceedings* 136, no. 2 (February 2010), <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-02/too-busy-learn.html> (accessed February 4, 2014).

<sup>6</sup>Charles D. Allen, "Redress of Professional Military Education: The Clarion Call," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 59 (4th Quarter 2010): 97.

<sup>7</sup>Scales.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

an officer's grade in a specific branch or functional area.<sup>9</sup> Branch development for majors results from completion of an approved field grade intermediate level education program and successful performance in a branch or functional area assignment.<sup>10</sup> The Army currently offers little incentive to devote time or effort to an educational environment, as the Army's "muddy-boots"<sup>11</sup> culture values deployments and operational experience. This has been demonstrated in both USAWC and CGSOC seeing multiple deferments, which has resulted in a backlog of officers waiting to attend PME.<sup>12</sup> The thought of returning to teach is considered by some to be a sign of an officer that can no longer succeed in the operational Army.<sup>13</sup>

The two most senior Army Officers have spoken about the requirement for education and its value in producing and developing military leaders. General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since 2011 champions education and its value to the development of a Joint Service community capable of preparing the country for its next conflict and performing well in that conflict. Dempsey also champions the role education plays in advising civilian leadership on important matters involving

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<sup>9</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 16.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>11</sup>Thomas Boccardi, "Meritocracy in the Profession of Arms," *Military Review* 93, no. 1 (January-February 2013): 19.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 18-19.

<sup>13</sup>Scales.

military power.<sup>14</sup> Chief of Staff of the US Army since 2011 General Raymond Odierno echoed these sentiments while speaking to the USAWC Student Body in March 2014. “Education” he declared, “needs to be back in the forefront of everything the Army does, as it is fundamental to developing key leaders.”<sup>15</sup> The USAWC exists to produce skilled critical thinkers capable of solving complex problems in the global application of Landpower. In concert with USAWC, CGSOC exists to produce adaptive, self-aware field grade officers, capable of leading staffs from battalion to echelons above corps, who utilize critical and creative thinking to solve problems throughout the full range of military operations.<sup>16</sup>

The newly introduced philosophy of Mission Command requires a culture that is comfortable with ambiguity and mentally agile. Mission Command is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”<sup>17</sup> This requires an officer corps that is more than trained. Thomas Ricks, a Pulitzer prize winning journalist, former reporter for the *Washington Journal* and *Washington Post* and member of the Center for a New American Security, who lectures widely on military affairs and has written several pieces

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<sup>14</sup>Martin E. Dempsey, “Joint Education White Paper,” unpublished, July 2012, 1-6.

<sup>15</sup>U.S. Army War College Public Affairs, “Odierno to War College students: Education, adaptability key to future of Army,” The Official Homepage of the U.S. Army, <http://www.army.mil/article/85456.html> (accessed 26 March 2014).

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *CGSC ILE Self Study*, 1-3.

<sup>17</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

on the role of training versus education in the military, posits the problems the US military experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan were not due to a lack of training. The front-line Soldiers were well trained; however, training only prepares one for known situations; it is the responsibility of military leaders to prepare for the unknown and the unprecedented through education.<sup>18</sup>

In order to effectively utilize Mission Command, the US Army requires an officer corps that is well educated. It is education that develops the presence of mind to anticipate change, use critical thinking skills to solve complex problems, prepare for and overcome uncertainty, and lead through empowerment, trust, and understanding.<sup>19</sup> Leading an organization through complex and uncertain environments requires agility and adaptability.<sup>20</sup> Subordinate leaders are expected under Mission Command to exercise “disciplined initiative” in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in pursuit of a relative advantage on the battlefield.<sup>21</sup> “Disciplined initiative” is defined as action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, subordinates must possess a strong educational

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<sup>18</sup>Thomas E. Ricks, “General Failure,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 310, no. 4 (November 2012): 96-108, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148.html> (accessed 26 March 2014).

<sup>19</sup>Dempsey, “Joint Education White Paper,” 4.

<sup>20</sup>David G. Perkins, “Developing competent and committed Leaders capable of executing Army’s Doctrine 2015,” *Command and General Staff College Foundation News* (Fall 2013): 30.

<sup>21</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, 1.

<sup>22</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.



background in order to execute tasks within the limits of the commander's intent in complex and ambiguous environments.<sup>23</sup>

The onset of sequestration and budget reductions, rising social support and retiree costs, and a nation tired after a decade of war have set the stage for a dubious future for the US Army. The Army realizes training opportunities and resources will start to diminish as the war in Afghanistan transitions to an advise and equip mission with all conventional US forces out of Afghanistan. The requirement to educate the officer corps is a congressional mandate and as such receives oversight from Congress.<sup>24</sup> The US Army and US Government continue to invest considerable money and resources into Intermediate Level Education (ILE) referred to now as CGSOC. CGSOC was the name prior to 2005, when the Army stopped centrally selecting resident course attendance and provided the same education to all majors. Since the Army has returned to a centrally selected process to determine resident attendance, the name has returned to CGSOC. It is Congress's responsibility to ensure PME remains a priority for the services even in times of limited resources and high operational tempo, when the temptation exists to short change PME to provide manpower and resources to other competing activities.<sup>25</sup> The US

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<sup>23</sup>Martin E. Dempsey, "Mission Command White Paper," unpublished, April 2012, 6.

<sup>24</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 2009, 3.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*

Army is counting on CGSOC graduates to lead their Army into the unknown future and operate in ambiguous and often changing conditions.<sup>26</sup>

In these complex and ambiguous times, Odierno has stated the requirement for adaptive and agile leaders.<sup>27</sup> The US Army today is in a situation much like at the end of World War I or the end of the Cold War in that there is not a specific enemy for military forces to equip and train against. The history of the interwar period indicates an imperative to create an officer corps educated and emboldened to innovate exists; a far more difficult task than selecting a single innovative officer.<sup>28</sup> PME was a major factor in the process of successful innovation in the interwar period; it has been postulated that it will be even more important in the future but only as long as it fosters a broad conceptual framework that innovation requires.<sup>29</sup> Williamson Murray, an Emeritus Professor at the Ohio State University and accepted expert in military and political history, conclusions from study of the interwar period echo the findings of the Army Training and Leader Development Panel in 2001. The uncertainty of the future enemy as well as the future

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<sup>26</sup>Perkins, 8.

<sup>27</sup>Raymond T. Odierno, "The U.S. Army: Meeting the Nation's Strategic Priorities of the Future," *Army Magazine* 63, no. 10 (October 2013): 28.

<sup>28</sup>Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, eds. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 325.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

battlefield coupled with ever advancing technology require educated leaders to innovate, adapt and command these systems to defeat the nations adversaries.<sup>30</sup>

### Definitions of Terms

Above the Zone Promotion: A promotion eligibility category that consists of commissioned officers of the same grade and competitive category on the active duty list who are eligible for promotion consideration and whose date of rank is senior to any officer in the promotion zone.<sup>31</sup> This is typically a result of non-selection during the officer's promotion zone board.

Below the Zone (BZ) Promotion: A promotion eligibility category that consists of commissioned officers of the same grade and competitive category on the active duty list who are eligible for promotion consideration and whose date of rank is junior to any officer in the promotion zone.<sup>32</sup> Typically takes place a year prior to entering the promotion zone.

Education: Education provides intellectual constructs and principles. It helps develop individuals and leaders who can think, apply knowledge, and solve problems under uncertain or ambiguous conditions. Education is associated with "how to think." Education gives leaders and individuals the tools to think at all levels (organizationally and strategically) and to enhance leadership abilities along with knowledge and

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<sup>30</sup>Combined Arms Center, *The Army Training and Leader Development Panel Officer Study Report to the Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2003), OS-3.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>32</sup>*Ibid.*, 52.

experience. This achievement occurs over a leader's career with increasingly complex education, especially in the areas of leader development and the military art.<sup>33</sup>

Promotion Zone (Primary): A promotion eligibility category (defined by an announced range of date of rank) consisting of commissioned officers on the active duty list of the same grade and competitive category who are eligible for promotion consideration who as lieutenant colonels or below, are eligible for promotion consideration for the first time (excluding any below the zone consideration).<sup>34</sup>

Training: Army training is an organized, structured process based on sound principles of learning designed to increase the capability of individuals or units to perform specified tasks or skills, including problem solving. Training increases the ability to perform in situations with emphasis on competency, physical and mental skills, knowledge, and concepts.<sup>35</sup>

### Limitations

This thesis does not delve into the difference between distance learning and resident CGSOC. Distance learning students are not eligible for the Marshall Award. The potential and real differences in the courses, although advertised as the same course material, will require more focused thought as to how to implement incentives for both. The thesis does not discuss how to implement incentives in CGSOC. The analysis of

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>34</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-29, *Officer Promotions* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 54.

<sup>35</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Army Learning Policies and Systems* (Fort Eustis, VA: Government Printing Office, 2011), 23.

Marshall Award recipients does not analyze the performance of all 76; rather it focuses on a decade of officers and their subsequent performance. The thesis does not account for the performance of the rest of the CGSOC students in comparison to the Marshall Award Recipients.

The next chapter will review literature on, and related to this topic and provide an assessment of the material's significance to this study. It will be followed by an explanation of the methodology and then subsequent chapters examining each issue in detail.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this research was to determine if there is a correlation between excelling in CGSOC and continued success in the operational environment. Chapter 1 provided described the importance of professional military education and its expected importance in the future. A gap in previous research was identified early in the review of literature concerning the performance of Marshall Award recipients following CGSOC. The aim of the rest of this chapter is to develop a framework to guide development of an answer to the research question.

This chapter contains five sections. The first section reviews historical changes to CGSOC rooted in its relationship with the operational Army and Congress. Section two addresses current Army regulations and doctrine concerning education. Section three examines civilian perspectives on education and job performance. Section four focuses on previous research on the effect of education on military performance. Section five discusses contemporary literature identifying a conflict between education and operational assignments. The summary provides an organized conclusion reinforcing the importance of this study.

#### History of CGSC

The CGSC was created in 1881 as a tactical school known as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry.<sup>36</sup> General William T. Sherman founded the school

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<sup>36</sup>Jonathan M. House, “The Fort and the New School, 1881-1916,” in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Patin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 34.

because the officer corps was lacking in education and training which was part of a larger professional ethos in 19th century armies and societies in general labor specialization. In the school's infancy, it provided lieutenants and captains with needed focus on small unit tactics. During this time, the US Infantry and Cavalry School made slow progress in its mission of educating officers. Initially many commanders did not understand the purpose of the school and thus sent the officers that were available as opposed to the officers that should attend.<sup>37</sup> As a result, the first year of the two-year course was spent providing remedial instruction to unqualified officers. In 1888, Colonel McCook the school's third commandant removed all remedial studies, re-emphasized problem solving, and practical work.<sup>38</sup> Over the next decade, the school saw a dramatic improvement in both curriculum and teaching methodology. However, the Spanish-American War demonstrated the United States need for general staff officers.<sup>39</sup>

The school began slowly transforming from a tactical to an educational school and Fort Leavenworth became the home to four junior officer schools known as the "Army Service Schools."<sup>40</sup> In 1907, the school changed names to the School of the Line. The new name was symbolic of the school's future as it was focused on educating all line officers (Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry), and was seen as the first step in aligning CGSC

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<sup>37</sup>Ibid., 35.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., 36.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

within the professional military education system.<sup>41</sup> School of the Line graduates dominated staffs of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe.<sup>42</sup> Although few in number, Leavenworth trained officers demonstrated their worth during World War I and constituted 23 out of 26 divisions' chiefs of staff and five of the 26 division commanders.<sup>43</sup> The American Expeditionary Force's success at least at staff work, tactically the American Expeditionary Force was not as impressive vindicated the advocates of military education. After World War I, the school experienced many curriculum changes and the course length increased from one year to two years. In 1922, the School of the Line became the Command and General Staff School.<sup>44</sup> The course was shortened back to one year in 1935 as speculation of another war created a demand for more CGSC graduates. In 1939, the Army directed the school commandant, Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, to shorten the academic year and increase the number of students in each class.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Combined Arms Center, U.S. Infantry and Cavalry School, US Signal School, and Army Staff College, *Annual Report Of The Commandant: The General Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1907* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Staff College Press, 1907), 37.

<sup>42</sup>House, 37.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>Charles E. Heller, "World War I and the Interwar Years, 1916-1939," in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Patin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 38.

<sup>45</sup>John W. Patin, "Wars and New Challenges, 1939-1983," in *A Brief History of Fort Leavenworth, 1827-1983*, ed. John W. Patin (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 41.



The US Army realized the importance of an educated officer corps throughout the history of CGSC and has consistently tried to maximize the amount of resident taught CGSC graduates. Although the experiences in World Wars I and II may have seemed to emphasize the value of education. Multiple review boards determined a more rigorous education system was required.<sup>46</sup> The introduction of college officials raised educational standards and accreditation from the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools resulted in the Master of Military Arts and Sciences Program in 1974. The current CGSOC is a product of those officer education review boards' recommendations and improvements in the officer education system.

In 1946, the first Army commissioned education review board evaluated CGSC. The Gerow Board named after the board president Lieutenant General L. T. Gerow, found a continued need for educating officers, and recommended educating as many officers as possible at CGSC following World War II. Next in 1949, the Army commissioned the Eddy Board, named after Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, Commandant of the CGSC. The Eddy Board again recommended increasing officer attendance at CGSC as well as continued review boards to ensure officer education remained abreast of new world and military developments as they pertain to education.<sup>47</sup> The Korean War provides an illustration of the US Army's unpreparedness. Many of the senior leaders in the US Army were uncomfortable with Korea, as it posed the need for a deviation from the Eisenhower administration's adoption of a nuclear response. The

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<sup>46</sup>David Bresser, "Sustainability of Universal ILE" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2007), 4.

<sup>47</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *Report of the Department of the Army Board on Education System for Officers* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 9.

Korean War was a shift in American Doctrine fighting other than Total War. The tactics that were successful on the battlefield of Korea were the same tactics that failed miserably in the beginning of World War I. General Matthew Ridgway was able to use specificity and the use of military history to create a solution to the problem he faced in Korea. The Williams Board chaired by Lieutenant General Edward T. Williams was commissioned in 1957. The Williams study once again highlighted the significance of CGSC and the need for continued academic rigor in the curriculum. Although the Williams Board explored increasing attendance in resident CGSC, the board renewed selective attendance due to limitations on classroom space and student availability. In 1965, the Haines board examined different courses of action that would increase resident CGSC attendance. This board attempted to solve the issue of increasing resident CGSC enrollment while contending with the lack of resources. The Haines board found that academic enrollment could be increased due to a new CGSC building Bell Hall large built in 1959.

In 1977, General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the Army organized a study called a Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO). The board was the first to study officer education following the Vietnam War and was in response to an Office of Management and Budget 1975 assessment that too much was spent on officer education. The board investigated alternatives in the resource-constrained environment of the 1970s. The RETO board determined that whatever system might be implemented must meet the requirements for peacetime and wartime functions. The board examined all levels of officer education and training as well as other services' education systems. The RETO Board confirmed a previously held belief that all field-grade officers need a certain

minimum level of staff officer proficiency.<sup>48</sup> The board recognized that only about 20 percent of staff officers would need in-depth training and education provided by CGSC; the remaining staff officers could acquire a minimum level of proficiency in the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS<sup>3</sup>).<sup>49</sup> CAS3 was a nine-week temporary duty course offered at Fort Leavenworth. The curriculum focused on producing staff officers capable of serving on battalion and brigade level staffs.<sup>50</sup> The board recommended that shortly after selection for major, all officers could expect to attend a staff school. Those not selected for CGSOC would attend CAS3.<sup>51</sup> The resulting report was to advocate a system incorporating education and training needs for an officer's career and propose recommendations for officer management.<sup>52</sup>

From 1979 to 1981, General William Richardson was the Commander of the Combined Arms Center and the Commandant of CGSC. During this time, he was responsible for restructuring CGSC to meet the demands of a modern Army, developing the AirLand Battle Doctrine, reorganizing the Army's heavy divisions, and proposing the School for Advanced Military Studies.<sup>53</sup> His initiatives to educate officers to deal with

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<sup>48</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *A Review of Education and Training of Officers*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), VI-7.

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, VI-5-VI-6.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, VI-5.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, VI-6.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>53</sup>Command and General Staff College Foundation, "William Richardson (General, U.S. Army (Ret.)," <http://www.cgscfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Richardson.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2014).

the complexity of modern warfare were at odds with the RETO Board findings.<sup>54</sup> In 1983, Richardson became the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command. As the Training and Doctrine Command commander, Richardson focused branch schools on demanding and realistic training. He instituted the small group instruction in all branch schools to include CGSC and he revised AirLand Battle doctrine to cover the operational level of war.<sup>55</sup>

Congress passed the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act in 1981, which established guidelines for policies and procedures regarding officer training and education and created stable and predictable career paths. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Among other things, Goldwater-Nichols Act requires forces to train and attend joint education together to facilitate in peacetime the understanding that is required in wartime. These two Congressional acts reshaped Army officer management and professional military education, and produced two Army studies. The Professional Development of Officers Study recommended a change for the focus audience of CAS3 from the RETO board. The Professional Development of Officers Study recommended that captains attend CAS3 and CGSOC would build upon the principles taught in CAS3.<sup>56</sup> The outcomes of the Army studies were measures to achieve with Goldwater-

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<sup>54</sup>Kevin Benson, "School of Advanced Military Studies Commemorative History 1984-2009," unpublished, 2009, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/Events/SAMS25th/SAMS25YearsHistory.pdf> (accessed 8 June 2014), 4.

<sup>55</sup>Command and General Staff College Foundation, "William Richardson."

<sup>56</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, *Professional Development of Officers Study*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 26.

Nichols and the establishment of an officer development plan, which were incorporated into DA PAM 600-3.<sup>57</sup>

General Dennis Reimer Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study in 1996. The intent of this review was to produce recommendations that would project officer development into the twenty first century. The most significant recommendation from this review was that all operational career field majors attend resident education at CGSC or sister service equivalent school such as College of Naval Command and Staff, Air Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Command and Staff College or Naval Postgraduate School.

In 2001, the Army Training and Leader Development Panel convened to examine all facets of officer progression. The study identified a large pool of officers that were leaving the Army due to perceived inequity in opportunities. The officers felt they were not receiving adequate leader development experiences. In addition, many captains and majors doubted the possibility of a future career due to the Army's CGSOC selection policy.<sup>58</sup> The study made some significant recommendations, including all that majors receive the education experience provided at resident CGSOC known as ILE.<sup>59</sup> The Army Training and Leader Development Panel was influential in changing several aspects of officer training and development, most notably advocating universal ILE. Universal ILE was designed to do away with selective attendance in CGSOC and thereby

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., xxx.

<sup>58</sup>Combined Arms Center, *Army Training and Leader Development Panel, Officer Study Report to the Army*, OS-2.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., OS-12.

remove resident CGSOC as a discriminator for promotion and command selection. This study combined with Officer Personnel Management System XXI and the operational force requiring more officers educated to handle the pressure of executing operations in an uncertain environment, laid the groundwork for the Army adopting universal ILE in 2005.

In 2005, the first universal ILE class began at Fort Leavenworth. The Army provided a resident course experience for every active duty Army officer possible. There were several problems with sustaining universal ILE such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the inability to remove an entire year group at one time from the operational Army, and the perception that if an officer did well in the field that officer could receive constructive credit and not attend ILE.<sup>60</sup> The result of universal ILE was a backlog of officers waiting to attend ILE. In the meantime, many officers were filling positions of post-ILE graduates. Thus, professional military education was coming to many officers well after the time it was needed.

In 2012, the Army announced the transition to Optimization of Intermediate-Level Education. The central difference from Universal ILE is a shift from providing a resident ILE common core experience to all active duty Army officers to a merit-based board selection. This transition included referring to resident ILE at Fort Leavenworth as CGSC, and ultimately returning to the previous title CGSOC. According to the Secretary of the Army John McHugh:

optimized ILE will strengthen the importance of professional education as a component of the Army and:

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<sup>60</sup>Bresser, 22-23.

- a. provide a tailored, high-quality ILE opportunity for all officers;
- b. maximize the Army's return on its investment by focusing and synchronizing policies and programs to achieve the greatest effect;
- c. select and educate the right officers, in the right venue and at the right time, to assume key developmental positions;
- d. increase the relevance and professional importance of ILE; and
- e. reinforce education earlier in an officer's development timeline.<sup>61</sup>

Under optimized ILE, all officers still receive an opportunity to attend a venue of ILE through 10-month resident, 14-week satellite campus, or distributed learning. As a result, officers in year groups 2001-2003 were prioritized for resident seats in CGSOC class 14-01. A diverse panel of senior Army Officers that identified the best-qualified officers in each Year Group selected the officers enrolled in CGSOC class 14-01.<sup>62</sup> Year Group 2004 made up the first central board selected CGSOC class since the announcement of optimized ILE. The board was held as part of the major promotion board for Year Group 2004 and these officers began CGSOC in class 14-02.

The tension between CGSC producing well-educated officers that benefit the Army and the Army's desire to produce as many of these officers as possible remains. The Army returned to a Department of the Army Selection Board process for determining attendance in resident CGSOC with officer year group 2004. The tendency to shorten

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<sup>61</sup>Secretary of the Army, "Memorandum, Subject: Army Directive 2012-21 (Optimization of Intermediate-Level Education)," 2012, Official Department of the Army Publications and Forms, [http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/ad2012\\_21.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/ad2012_21.pdf) (assessed 24 May 2014).

<sup>62</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Human Resources Command, "AO-Level FAQ's for OILE, 2012," [https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/assets/pdf/oile\\_faqs.pdf](https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/assets/pdf/oile_faqs.pdf) (assessed 24 May 2014).

CGSC and push as many officers through as possible in times of conflict has existed throughout the history of CGSOC. The Army realizes the benefit of the education gleaned from attendance in resident CGSC, but seems to fail to realize the deleterious effect of compressing CGSOC timelines and universal attendance has on the quality of education received.

### Army Doctrine and Regulations

Army Regulations (AR) lay out the importance of officer education to the Army and the United States. AR 600-3 *The Army Personnel Development System*, prescribes policies and responsibilities for personnel developers' involvement in the Army's personnel management system. AR 600-8-29 *Officer Promotions*, supports the Army promotion system by prescribing policies, standards, and rules to ensure promotion of the best-qualified officers to fill positions of greater responsibility. Both mention educational requirements for officers for developmental purposes. Neither discusses the importance of actual performance during the educational experience.

AR 600-3 specifically prescribes screening officers for certain educational requirements before assignment to specific jobs. The regulation conceives education as a subset of overall development. Education is illustrated as a way to stratify officers into different Functional Groups. The need for training is mentioned to prepare officers for their next assignment, but the need for education is mentioned more as requirement to meet the requirement for a functional area, assignment priority, or career field



development.<sup>63</sup> AR 600-3 is important to this study because it gives authority to personnel developers to recommend changes to DA PAM 600-3. AR 600-3 also makes personnel developers responsible for supporting promotion, command opportunity, and advanced education (civilian and military) selections through the development of evaluation criteria to measure job performance.<sup>64</sup> The regulation does not set parameters or measures ensuring officers in fact develop habits of life-long learning. Nor does it set guidelines for how education prepares officers to confront unfamiliar situations. As a personnel management regulation, education level is seen as merely a requirement for certain career fields or assignments. The closest the regulation comes to establishing the importance of education is the requirement of personnel developers to analyze training and educational requirements against assignment priorities.<sup>65</sup> AR 600-3 does not define education or training; rather it categorizes both areas under development.

AR 600-8-29 is the regulatory statute for officer promotions. The regulation states that AERs as well as OERs are provided to promotion boards for assessment. The only guidance on matter of performance in either evaluation is a referred AER or OER will result in the officer being placed in a non-promotable status. This only happens in the event the referred evaluation was not in the officer's Official Military Personnel File for consideration by the promotion board.<sup>66</sup> The regulation then states a Promotion Review

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<sup>63</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-3, *The Army Personnel Development System* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 9-10.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>66</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 600-8-29, 11.

Board would reconsider the officer's eligibility for promotion. Promotion Review Boards are used to advise the Secretary of the Army in any case in which there is cause to believe that a commissioned or warrant officer on a promotion list is mentally, physically, morally, or professionally unqualified or unsuited to perform the duties of the grade for which he or she was selected for promotion.<sup>67</sup> In preparation for a promotion board, the only reference to education is that an officer should ensure their Officer Record Brief reflects the correct civilian education level attained.<sup>68</sup>

DA PAMs provide vague statements regarding the necessity of PME. DA PAM 600-2, *The Armed Forces Officer* lays out qualities that each officer must demonstrate, such as good conduct, standards, duty to mission and people, and sound thought. It examines the qualities of great leaders in the context of responsibilities, demands, and standards all military officers must maintain.<sup>69</sup> DA PAM 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* lays out commissioned officer development and key tasks to accomplish for promotion eligibility. The two documents proclaim the necessity of educating officers throughout their careers. DA PAM 600-2 provides a more definitive explanation regarding the need for education.

DA PAM 600-2 provides information on the multi-faceted duties of officers. The pamphlet gives instruction and examples of the nation's, leaders', and Soldiers' expectations of the officer corps. The pamphlet not only lists numerous educational

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<sup>67</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, AR 600-8-29, 42.

<sup>68</sup>*Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>69</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, *The Armed Forces Officer* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 1.

expectations, it also directly links performance in PME with future operational performance. The pamphlet states an officer's performance in school will directly bear on success in the operational environment.<sup>70</sup> The pamphlet also explains the intrinsic need for individual officers to value lifelong learning. The amount and diversity of study required to master the profession of the armed forces officer is so immense that every minute wasted puts the officer hours behind in knowledge.<sup>71</sup> It highlights how education is considered the base for successful execution of duties. An officer's profession involves hard work and hard thinking about duty, adversaries, and the protection of the Constitution.<sup>72</sup> The officer is expected to do the homework required to understand the aforementioned topics. DA PAM 600-2, states the necessity for effective communication skills. This is relevant to this study as CGSOC puts great emphasis on an officer's ability to effectively communicate. "All things being equal," DA PAM 600-2 declares, "the officer who has expended the effort to master the skills of writing and speaking will rise more rapidly, be a more effective leader and contribute more to the military service and the nation."<sup>73</sup> However, the pamphlet does not declare whether or not an assessment can be made of potential based on educational performance.

DA PAM 600-3 addresses the relationship between education, OERs, and AERs. In fact, the source contains an entire chapter on the subject of education. The pamphlet

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<sup>70</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, 7.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., 17.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 3.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 18.

lays out the education required to be a commissioned officer, different avenues to achieve advanced degrees, and the need to complete PME in order to be eligible for promotion. The goal of the Officer Education System is to produce officers who possess the necessary skills, attributes, and values to serve the nation. Leaders produced by the Officer Education System demonstrate confidence, critical judgment, and responsibility in a complex environment full of ambiguity and constantly changing.<sup>74</sup> However, it does not mention anything about performance in PME other than completion being necessary to secure key developmental jobs and be competitive for promotion. The Army Officer structure is pyramidal and advancement to increased positions of responsibility is determined by measures of performance and potential. The Officer Personnel Management System relies upon the OER as the mechanism to judge the value of an individual's performance and potential.<sup>75</sup> The OER is utilized to determine promotions, selection for further schooling, command and key billets, and retention in service and development opportunities.<sup>76</sup> The AER is utilized to explain the accomplishments, limitations and potential of students while in the educational institution.<sup>77</sup>

In the "Joint Education White Paper," General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff notes historical dependence on education during times of uncertainty such as the interwar period.<sup>78</sup> Education was the cornerstone of US Officers' ability to

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<sup>74</sup>Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 25.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., 12.

<sup>76</sup>Ibid.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 38.

<sup>78</sup>Dempsey, "Joint Education White Paper," 3.

adapt and innovate in the face of economic hardship in the 1930s and limited resources, which led to success in the European and Pacific theaters. Dempsey declares changes in the security environment necessitate the delivery of joint education like no other time in history.<sup>79</sup> He states that the Army as an institution must value education as well as educators. It is necessary for the best and brightest officers of today to teach the best and brightest officers of tomorrow.<sup>80</sup> To attract the best officers to serve as educators, the Army must acknowledge PME instructor duty as part of a successful career path. It is imperative that joint education prepares adaptive, critical thinking, and innovative leaders capable of operating in complex and unorganized environments.

He also expounds upon the need to develop life-long learners. Education must, Dempsey declares, become part of everyday life and not relegated simply to time in institutions. The US Army needs inquisitive men and women that are students of the Profession of Arms.<sup>81</sup> He asserts that time set aside in the duty day for individual learning, balanced with unit duties, is a sure sign of a commitment of life-long learning.

The paper states that education is important to prepare leaders for uncertainty, to understand all the elements of national power and comprehend the contemporary security environment, to recognize transitions, and to lead organizations through transitions. The purpose of PME is to develop leaders by conveying a broad body of knowledge and developing the habits of mind required in the Armed Forces.<sup>82</sup> The ability to conduct

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<sup>79</sup>Dempsey, "Joint Education White Paper," 3.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 5.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., 4.

operations at the speed of the security environment necessitates the use of Mission Command. Mission Command is defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”<sup>83</sup> In order to effectively use Mission Command, PME must cultivate the cognitive ability to understand, visualize, describe, and clearly express intent while taking initiative inside given intent, accepting risk, and building trust within teams.<sup>84</sup> This paper is significant because it also identifies a need to adjust the culture of the Army to recognize time away from the line in order to teach as a good investment in both the Army and the Soldier. Dempsey suggests truly harnessing the potential and performance of leaders requires the organization to encourage education and self-development.

### Civilian Perspective

In their 1999 Master’s thesis, written at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Civilian Department of Defense Employees,” Abdullah Usan and Mustafa Utoglu examine the effect of different levels of education on job performance. They used the basic Human Capital Theory as the basis for their analyses. Basic Human Capital Theory suggests that an individual’s productivity, and therefore his/her earnings, increase with

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<sup>83</sup>Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, 1.

<sup>84</sup>Dempsey, “Joint Education White Paper,” 4.

additional education.<sup>85</sup> As with other investments, individuals continue to invest as long as the potential future gains outweigh current costs. They devised four performance measures to study the effects, including salary level, promotion, retention, and performance level and constructed four multivariate models to examine the measures. Statistical analysis was used to develop the salary model, promotion, retention, and performance models. The research found significant positive effects on all performance measures except retention. The negative effect on retention is not surprising as increased education increases an employee's eligibility for promotion inside or outside the organization. These findings were in keeping with the basic Human Capital Theory.

Of particular interest to this research, Usan and Utoglu found that increased education led to increased performance on the job. In fact, attaining a graduate degree was found to significantly increase the probability of promotion and that employees that attained graduate degrees were much more likely to perform better than employees that did not further their education, as measured on annual performance ratings.<sup>86</sup> The research attributes the increased performance ratings to increased education's effect of enhancing an employee's adaptability and ability to cope with job demands.<sup>87</sup> Overall, the research found that employees with a master's degree were more productive, more likely to be promoted, and earned higher salaries. Although this study is important in demonstrating the effect graduate education has on job performance, it does not account

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<sup>85</sup>Abdullah Usan and Mustafa Utoglu, "The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Civilian Department of Defense Employees" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1999), 1.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 100-102.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., 95.

for the effect of presumed self-selectivity of those who pursue graduate education, which contrasts with PME where it is externally mandated.

In 1973, Dr. David Wise wrote the paper “Academic Achievement and Job Performance: Earnings and Promotions” at the University of California, Berkeley (later published in *The American Economic Review*) in which this paper studied the relationship between personal attributes, academic achievement, and job performance. He researched the correlation between academic performance and job performance using data from a specific group of individuals working in a large US manufacturing firm, which utilized a pyramidal management and promotion structure. Study participants were white, male; college graduates hired before the age of 30, who possessed differing degrees of academic performance at different colleges.<sup>88</sup> The data was analyzed using academic and non-academic individual attributes, high school and college extracurricular activities, college attended, academic performance, graduate school, and rank in graduate school.

Since there was no completely satisfactory way to measure job performance, he chose to look at rewards given based on job performance. Wise examined job performance by investigating salary and probability of promotion. He utilized two separate models to examine these aspects in isolation. Wise used the Ordinary Least Squares, a method for approximating unknown parameters (rate of salary increase) in a linear regression model (salary regression model). He also used maximum likelihood estimates, a method for predicting the parameters (probability of promotion) of a statistical. Wise used independent variables (such as experience, master’s degree, class

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<sup>88</sup>David A. Wise, “Academic Achievement and Job Performance: Earnings and Promotions” (Research paper, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, 1975), 6-7.



rank, leadership, etc.) in each model to examine their effects on the dependent variables (i.e. salary and probability of promotion).<sup>89</sup>

This research is relevant to the current study because Wise actually found that academic performance linked to job performance. He found that rate of salary increase and probability of promotion was twice as high for employees with a high-class rank from a selective school, as compared to employees with a low class rank from a poor school.<sup>90</sup> The study does mention that non-cognitive abilities (such as leadership and initiative) are significant in performance as well. However, Wise concluded that academic performance is a significant factor in job performance and that college education increases productive capability overall.<sup>91</sup>

In 2009, Thomas Ng and Daniel Feldman conducted a study “How Broadly Does Education Contribute to Job Performance?” published in *Personnel Psychology*. The researchers sought to determine if there is a connection between education level and job performance and if so, whether it affects more than core task performance. They considered whether there was an increase in a desire to assist others (citizenship performance), decrease in counterproductive (work place hostility, absenteeism) performance, or increases in performing in complex jobs. Ng and Feldman verified that the number of people attaining both undergraduate and graduate education has increased over the last two decades and most organizations use education as an indicator of

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<sup>89</sup>Wise, 18-23.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., 8.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., 57.

productivity.<sup>92</sup> However, they found there had been little research to support a correlation between education level and job performance. The study conducted a meta-analysis (compare and contrast results from different studies in hope of identifying patterns among study results) on 293 empirical studies conducted before 2007.<sup>93</sup>

Ng and Feldman expounded upon previous research. The difference between their study and previous studies was they investigated the effect education level had on core task performance (basic duties required of a particular job).<sup>94</sup> They examined the larger scope of job performance, consisting of citizenship behaviors (extra measures that benefit the organization rather just the employee to include creativity), counterproductive behaviors such as (tardiness or work place hostility), and core task behaviors.<sup>95</sup> The researchers also searched for connections between education level and moderating effects such as job level (manager versus non-manager), work experience, and job complexity.

This research is instructive because Feldman and Ng found that education level is positively related to core task performance and increased job performance in high-complexity jobs.<sup>96</sup> Feldman and Ng also found that education level resulted in lower incidence of counter productive workplace behavior, such as workplace aggression, but did not affect tardiness. However, they found that work experience did not affect the

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<sup>92</sup>Daniel Feldman and Thomas Ng, "How Broadly Does Education Contribute to Job Performance," *Personnel Psychology* 62, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 89.

<sup>93</sup>*Ibid.*, 97-98.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup>*Ibid.*, 104-109.

relationship between education level and job performance. That is tenure did not enhance job performance at a specific education level. In addition, evidence was not presented that education had a greater impact on the job performance of managers compared to non-managers. Although the research does suggest a positive relationship between education level and citizenship performance, a weak relationship was found between education and interpersonal citizenship behavior (helping other people on the job).<sup>97</sup> The strongest links between education and citizenship behaviors were tasks benefiting the organization and creativity.

### Previous Research

Four recent monographs or theses focused on professional military education or graduate level education and their effect on future performance. All four studies agree on the necessity for education and its positive effects on an officer's career. The first two find that academic performance translates into operational performance.

The School of Advanced Military Studies 2002 monograph "Command and General Staff Officer Education in the 21st Century: Examining the German Model" by Luke Grossman, examines the annual year 2001-2002 German General Staff education system in search of recommendations to improve CGSC. The monograph highlights German practices of evaluating and assigning officers based not only on schooling but also performance during schooling. The Fuhrungsakademie General Staff Officer Course (FGSOC) creates and evaluates academic rigor through two evaluation processes. First, FGSOC compares student performance against a set academic standard; second, FGSOC

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<sup>97</sup>Feldman and Ng, 104.

evaluates students' performance against one another.<sup>98</sup> The result of these methods is an atmosphere in which instructors expect a great amount of effort and performance. The system discourages and punishes students found to achieve top marks at the expense of fellow classmates. It is interesting that the course does not provide grades, but rather an end of course evaluation directly linked to students' immediate follow on duty stations and potential for future promotions.<sup>99</sup>

This monograph is of particular interest because it recommends incentives CGSOC could offer to improve academic performance based on methods proven effective in enhancing quality of the officer corps used in FGSOC. The author recommends rewarding top performing officers in CGSC by giving them first choice on assignments following CGSC.<sup>100</sup> First choice of duty assignment realistically supports the demands of Human Resources Command if CGSOC used a continuously updating order of merit list (OML). The OML would account for academic performance in Common Core when duty stations are selected. Students could then choose duty station based on their position on the OML and the duty assignments available. The monograph suggests a strong correlation between performance in PME and performance throughout an officer's career.<sup>101</sup> This is significant to the current research, as it suggests a need for further research to determine if there is linkage between academic performance and success in

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<sup>98</sup>Luke G. Grossman, "Command and General Staff Officer Education in the 21st Century: Examining the German Model" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2002), 22.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

<sup>100</sup>*Ibid.*, 78-79.

<sup>101</sup>*Ibid.*, 79.

the operational environment. Using American officers of World War II, Grossman illustrates the need for highly educated officers to properly employ armed forces on a complex battlefield.

In his 1995 master's thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, "A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic Performance and Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior U.S. Navy Officers," Thomas Buterbaugh examined naval officers and the effect of fully funded graduate education (FFGE) as well as undergraduate academic performance on promotion to the ranks of (O-5) Commander and (O-6) Captain. He selected two populations for analysis: those who appeared before the commander promotion board between the fiscal years 1981-1994 and those that appeared before the captain promotion board during the same time. He further broke these populations down into five warfare communities and two time periods: pre-draw down 1981-1989 and draw down 1990-1994.<sup>102</sup>

Buterbaugh found that the variables (FFGE and undergraduate academic performance) had a significant and positive effect on promotion to commander. He found that Surface Warfare Officers were most impacted by the combination of FFGE and undergraduate academic performance. Pilots were most affected by academic performance. Fleet Support and Supply Officers were most affected by FFGE.<sup>103</sup> The results for promotion to captain were somewhat different. Academic performance was found significant for the Surface Warfare Officer community, but only during the 1990-

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<sup>102</sup>Thomas A. Buterbaugh, "A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic Performance and Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior U.S. Navy Officers" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1995), 2.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 43.

1994 drawdown.<sup>104</sup> FFGE was found to be a significant factor for the Fleet Support and Supply Officer community and produced a greater promotion selection rate during pre-drawdown and drawdown years. This suggests a correlation between academic performance and performance in the field resulting in promotion to higher ranks. There are two potential differences worth discussing when comparing this study to the Army. First, at the time of Buterbaugh's study the Chief of Naval Operations' policy on graduate education stated that graduate education should have an effect on selection for promotion.<sup>105</sup> The Chief of Naval Operation's guidance was counter to the culture of the Navy, which had a negative view of anything that took place off a ship. Second, the Navy is more a technically focused service than the Army, which might account for higher grade point averages resulting in increased promotions. Another significant finding is the greater affinity for academic performance during the drawdown, as this is similar to where the Army is today.

In his 2011 doctoral dissertation at the University of Phoenix, "The Effects of Civilian Education on Performance and Career Advancement for Enlisted Members of the United States Army," Ronald Gilchrist surveyed a group of 13 enlisted members to determine the group's personal and professional views on the value of education. The members of the study consisted of male and female Soldiers, 24 to 50 years old, who were between the rank of Sergeant (E-5) and Sergeant Major (E-9), with their education ranging from some college to earning a Master's Degree.

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<sup>104</sup>Buterbaugh, 43.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid., 1-2.

Gilchrist found that college educated Soldiers were more able than non-college educated Soldiers to develop solutions to new or complex problems. All Soldiers were found to solve routine problems successfully. College educated Soldiers were found to ask amplifying questions concerning guidance or orders given; while non-college educated soldiers were found to follow orders at face value.<sup>106</sup> The interviewed leaders indicated the consequences of college education could be both a challenge and a benefit. The college educated Soldier tends to ask questions that can help accomplish given tasks, which was seen as a benefit yet the college educated Soldier might ask questions during an event that requires quick action, which was seen as a challenge for superiors.<sup>107</sup>

Although this study shows a linkage between problem solving and education, it does not address a few items important to this research. This study does not identify any linkage between graduate level education or professional military education and future performance. It does not provide any background on Soldiers' performances in educational environments and how that might affect performance in the military. Gilchrist does not account for increased education based on self-selection and the effect it has on performance. His research does not explore self-selection and which is cause and which is effect. Did college develop habits of mind to solve problems or did the college educated Soldiers already possess the intellectual curiosity to solve complex problems? In contrast to Buterbaugh's study, Gilchrist found that college education did not guarantee career advancement any more than experience.

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<sup>106</sup>Ronald Gilchrist, "The Effects of Civilian Education on Performance and Career Advancement for Enlisted Members of the United States Army" (Ph.D. diss., University of Phoenix, Phoenix, AZ, 2011), 86.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid.

This research is significant because it clearly identifies a linkage between education and solving new or more complicated problems. The Army's shift to the Mission Command philosophy requires leaders that can exercise disciplined initiative to create opportunity, and take action to develop the situation.<sup>108</sup> Disciplined initiative is required when current orders no longer apply to the situation, there is a lack of orders, or where there is an unforeseen opportunity or threat.<sup>109</sup> Linkage between education and ability to solve new or more complex problems was discovered in this research. Mission Command requires leaders that can execute disciplined initiative or solve new problems in the absence of orders.

In his USAWC Strategy Research Project, "Army Officer Professional Military Education System Reform to Produce Leader Competency for the Future," Colonel Cecil Lewis evaluates the Army's current view of education and identified problems with the Army's Officer Education System. He posits that a lack of overall educational value by the Army leads many officers to never bother to attain education above the required baccalaureate degree. Officers that do focus on education do so for personal development and miss an opportunity to gain a better understanding of strategic issues. He identifies incongruent practices between Army culture and developing intellectual sophistication as well as strategic leaders.

His research highlights areas where the Army's culture does not produce educated leaders capable of executing duties at the highest positions. He argues the Army must educate officers to work in an environment where ambiguity, complexity, and vital

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<sup>108</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 6-0, 2-4.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid.



national interest are part of the everyday experience.<sup>110</sup> Education that develops conceptual, critical, and theoretical thinking is paramount to assist leaders in preventing repeats of history. The author illustrates a terrific example utilizing the Vietnam War and the problems where strategists' failure to acknowledge the administration's domestic and economic issues resulted in poorly crafted operational objectives.<sup>111</sup> Intellectual capacity does not occur at a certain rank or after assuming a certain position. It takes time to learn to understand and deal with strategic issues, but in the current security environment officers at the most junior levels resolve issues that have strategic consequences. This highlights Lewis's point. Why then does the Army not sponsor a culture that encourages intellectual sophistication and lifelong learning from pre-commissioning through Senior Service College (SSC)?

His research is significant to the current research because he identifies a problem with the Army's culture. Transforming the Army takes more than just developing new technology and tactics. The Army must develop a PME system that forces officers to think through ambiguous and complex strategic situations. The Army's culture is a critical enabler of the lack of intellectual sophistication.<sup>112</sup> His research supports the argument that the Army needs to change the importance it places on not only education but also the ability to apply its lessons to current and future situations. Policy changes and

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<sup>110</sup>Cecil Lewis, "Army Officer Professional Military Education System Reform to Produce Leader Competency for the Future" (Master's research project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2006), 3-4.

<sup>111</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>112</sup>*Ibid.*, 2.

incorporating things like self-development on the OER are necessary to induce change.<sup>113</sup>

Lewis advises leaders, officers particularly, must value the importance of developing intellectual sophistication.

### Contemporary Problem Literature

The following three articles identify the US Army at a historic crossroads and argue it can use history to think about the future. The articles illustrate the overall lack of value in the Professional Military Education System by many officers. Dr. Daniel Hughes's chapter "Professors in the Colonels' World" from the book *Military Culture and Education* provides insight into the Air Force's attitude toward education. Hughes's comments suggest similar problems that plague professional military education in a sister service. In addition, Dr. Bradley Carter's chapter "No 'Holidays from History': Adult Learning, Professional Military Education, and Teaching History" from the book *Military Culture and Education* offers a stark contrast to other writings in this section in his experience and observations as an associate professor for the CGSC Satellite Campus at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

Now that the Army has returned to centrally selected CGSOC attendance, it is important to ensure the curriculum supports higher-level thinking. Dr. Nicholas Murray is an associate professor in the Department of Military History at CGSC. His article "Officer Education: What Lessons Does the French Defeat in 1871 have for the US Army Today" provides keen insight to aspects of CGSOC that need to improve. Murray likens the French application of combat experience in their colonial wars to the war with Prussia

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<sup>113</sup>Lewis, 12.

with the US Army experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. His argument is based on the US Army's tendency to misunderstand the context in which lessons were learned and therefore incorrectly apply them in the future. The exact problem the French experienced at the start of 1871 was that leaders took experiences from the colonial wars and tried to apply them in a war with Prussia without understanding the context in which their doctrine had been created.<sup>114</sup>

The French education system focused more on indoctrination and learning the steps of the process rather than understanding the process and when they should not conduct the process. The French officer corps was unable to realize their doctrine was failing, and even worse, was incapable of the critical thinking required to create new solutions.<sup>115</sup> Murray equates the learning environment that produced the French Army of 1870 to current CGSOC practices. The exercises performed in CGSOC focus students on performing steps to produce a product while many of the students miss the reason why the product is important.<sup>116</sup> This type of learning does not allow students time to dissect the process and understand why it is being done and better yet when they should deviate from the process altogether.

Murray posits the importance of the Prussian system was their valuing initiative and critical thinking. CGSOC needs to focus more time on courses such as military

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<sup>114</sup>Nicholas Murray, "Officer Education: What Lessons Does the French Defeat in 1871 have for the US Army Today," *Small Wars Journal* 9, no. 1 (January 2013), <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/officer-education-what-lessons-does-the-french-defeat-in-1871-have-for-the-us-army-today> (accessed 16 May 2014).

<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*

history that require students to digest events and understand historical context so they can determine if applying processes and methods to particular situations is sound.<sup>117</sup> This type of learning prepares officers for the uncertain. This same education is argued to have allowed the Prussians to outthink the French during the war.<sup>118</sup>

Murray's article is significant because it demonstrates that the French failed because their officer corps was not capable of critical thought, able to identify flaws in the doctrine, or capable of adapting to the changing operational environment.<sup>119</sup> He explains that as the nation moves forward the lessons learned over the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan may or may not be useful, but it is essential for the officer corps to be flexible thinkers with the ability to adapt to uncertainty. Murray also emphasizes a fault with the current CGSOC curriculum is the amount of contact hours with the students. It is necessary to give students time to absorb lessons from class and reflect on previous assignments or operations and place new knowledge into context. The current practice at CGSOC involves inundating students with a multitude of subjects. This is commonly referred to as "education that is a mile in wide but only an inch deep."<sup>120</sup>

The article "Redress of Professional Military Education: The Clarion Call" by US Army Colonel (Retired) Charles D. Allen, Professor in the Department of Command and

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<sup>117</sup>Murray.

<sup>118</sup>Ibid.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid.

<sup>120</sup>Andrew Meyerowich, "What students want to do, How we want to be remembered, and What students want to know" (Presentation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officers' Course Class 14-01, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 May 2014).

Leadership at the USAWC, examines the US Army's current organizational culture and attitudes toward PME. He argues the problem with Army PME is not the lack of focus, or limited resources, but the culture. Army policies and senior leaders state that education is important; however, there is an insidious belief that making the cut for school selection is more important than actual attendance.<sup>121</sup> There is a deep incongruency between the espoused value of education and enacted values that continues to grow worse, according to Allen.<sup>122</sup>

Allen highlights the current culture of deferral and the effect it is having on the Army's ability to produce capable senior leaders. The Army as an institution espouses the value of education and the role it plays in developing adaptive leaders, but the Army rewards the value of performance in the field.<sup>123</sup> Allen highlights the ease with which an intelligent, ambitious officer can defer PME and continue to go from one operational assignment to the next because the key to promotion lies in operational positions. Commanders keep their best and brightest officers beyond normal timelines to ensure they have an optimal team built of people they know and trust.<sup>124</sup> Allen illustrates this point effectively by reflecting upon both the Vietnam War and World War II. These two events demonstrate the adverse effects of undervaluing officer education. Following Vietnam, the Army found itself in the transition to a Volunteer force and short officers. As the Soviet Union was still a credible threat, leaders of the Army saw no choice but to

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<sup>121</sup>Allen, 97.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 94.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid., 100.

<sup>124</sup>Ibid., 98.

accelerate promotions. Company level commanders and battalion operation officers were assuming their duties without first attending the Captains' Career Course or CGSC respectively. These officers although talented did not have the proper balance between education, training, and experience. In 1940, USAWC and the Industrial War College were shut down due to an error of judgment in which the current need for officers was allowed to outweigh the eventual greater need for officers prepared to assume higher staff levels.<sup>125</sup> The culture of deferment is at the expense of the officer and the Army because that officer is not receiving PME at the right time in his career to develop him for future service.

Allen recommends the Army realign its culture. This will require an equal commitment by the institution, by leaders, and by individual officers to the pursuit of lifelong learning and development. In 2008, a War College General Officer Survey found that USAWC Graduates were believed to be prepared for service in senior leader positions, well versed in dealing with and planning for tomorrow's problems, while overseeing today's actions, and prepared to address problems without clear cut solutions.<sup>126</sup> The requirement as stated earlier is not on the academic institutions inside the Army to change but rather senior leaders and policies to reinforce this cultural change. The author posits that if nothing is done to correct the Army's current path, the institution will not have the Senior Military Leaders it needs to run the organization and advise the nation's civilian leadership effectively.

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<sup>125</sup>Allen, 100.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., 96.

Although this article deals with USAWC and its equivalents, many parallels are applicable to CGSOC. The culture of the Army is the same toward both CGSOC and USAWC. The mentality of deferment is evident in CGSOC classes over the past decade containing a high percentage of majors whom already served in key developmental positions. Of note, this article was published in 2010 and the culture of the Army could be in the process of change signified by a return to merit based selection to CGSOC and stricter rules precluding unnecessary deferments.

The article “Too Busy to Learn” by Major General Robert Scales (Retired), a former Commandant of USAWC, argues the US Army, much like the pre-World War I British Army, values Soldiers of action more than Soldiers of intellect. The personnel system and practiced values of the Army reward men and women that serve and perform in operational assignments and do little to reward intellectual merit. He argues that the disdain for intellectual officers is much deeper than is reflected in deferring PME to remain in operational positions through deployments.

Scales illustrates the grave results of a personnel system that rewards action over intellectual merit. During World War II, 31 of the 35 most successful Corps Commanders were instructors for at least one tour. Lieutenant General Troy H. Middleton is arguably the most successful of the Corps Commanders mentioned above.<sup>127</sup> He taught for 10 years at a series of schools and was a CGSC Honor Graduate in 1923. Today, there is a disappearance of experienced officers as instructors. The article posits a reason being a deeply held and not unjustified belief that becoming a service school instructor

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<sup>127</sup>Scales.

diminishes ones chances for promotion and command.<sup>128</sup> Scales refers to the Officer Personnel Management System as part of the problem. The personnel management system utilizes two separate reports to capture an officer's performance: the OER and AER. The OER measures an officer's on the job performance and is used to determine each officer's future potential. The AER measures overall intellectual achievement in an academic setting. Scales emphasizes that officers are avoiding schools and when they do attend PME know the AER has no real impact on career progression, thus reinforcing a culture favoring action opposed to thinking.<sup>129</sup>

He makes a strong argument for institutional changes that will make education truly valued in the Army. One would require AERs have the same weight as OERs.<sup>130</sup> The AER is issued to each officer during PME courses and contains information on how the officer performed in a learning environment. Currently, the AER presents a student's academic grades and whether a student exceeded course standards, achieved course standards, or did not achieve course standards. Scales argues the AER should also display how the officer performed against his peers through a class ranking.<sup>131</sup> He argues for the need for uniformed officers to teach in PME institutions and the need to place more emphasis on social sciences. He uses the history of the Goldwater Nichols Act to support an argument that a true change in the value of education will require legislative action.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>128</sup>Scales.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid.

<sup>131</sup>Ibid.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid.



This article recognizes the need for education to prepare officers for the future. The article identifies the need to evaluate officers on their performance in PME through a class ranking. The US Army officer corps and contemporary officers must, Scales argues, recognize that education, the value of lifelong learning, and intellectual merit are just as important as performance on the battlefield. For performance on the battlefield may lead to many tactical victories, but may be in vain if the engagements are not linked to a greater end state that answers the problem in the operational environment.

Dr. Daniel Hughes wrote the chapter “Professors in a Colonels’ World” as part of *Military Culture and Education*, published in 2010. Hughes has worked for the Department of Defense for 30 years and the last 18 were spent at the Air War College (AWC). AWC is the Air Force’s Senior Service College, equivalent to the Army War College. Similar to CGSOC, AWC faculty consists of military referred to as “the colonels” and civilians, including retired military.<sup>133</sup> Hughes identifies a distinct fracture between the colonels and civilian faculty regarding education, academic rigor, intellectual curiosity, and the concern for student experiences in PME.

He describes the military staff as doers rather than thinkers. In fact, the Air Force does not select AWC’s military staff based on academic abilities. Hughes echoes Scales’s comments on the disdain for academic pursuits.<sup>134</sup> He recounts numerous lower ranking generals who when addressing the class made the statement “it is only a lot of reading if

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<sup>133</sup>Daniel Hughes, “Professors in a Colonels’ World,” in *Military Culture and Education: Current Intersections of Academic and Military Cultures*, ed. Douglas Higbee (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 149-150.

<sup>134</sup>*Ibid.*, 160.

you do it.”<sup>135</sup> AWC’s military staff is comprised of colonels that have spent all their time in operational assignments, most have little experience in academia, and they are seen as unsuitable for further promotion. Hughes claims not a single colonel was promoted to brigadier general during his 18-year career at AWC.<sup>136</sup>

“The colonels” have more in common with the students than their civilian counterparts do. The military faculty, unlike civilian faculty, does not see a need for increasing academic rigor in AWC.<sup>137</sup> According to Hughes, 50 percent of the students would forgo AWC attendance if they could be otherwise certain of promotion to colonel. Both students and “the colonels” agree that increasing the chances for promotion to colonel is the primary reason to attend AWC. They focus on practical topics needed for the next duty assignment, rather than difficult questions or studying the context in which previous strategic decisions were made.”<sup>138</sup>

Hughes highlights a lack of academic standards entrenched in the culture of the Air Force. He cites the institution’s perception that AWC students are too valuable to fail. There is some validity to this concern. The military and the nation have invested substantial resources and time into AWC or USAWC students and since the military cannot directly hire senior officers, it is assumed better to have an officer whom minimally met course standards then lose that same officer.<sup>139</sup> As a result, officers have

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<sup>135</sup>Hughes, 159.

<sup>136</sup>*Ibid.*, 150.

<sup>137</sup>*Ibid.*, 153.

<sup>138</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup>*Ibid.*, 154.

the right to retake failed examinations or re-write unacceptable papers. “The insignificance of performance in school also plays a part,” declares Hughes, “since the main point is to graduate, not to excel.”<sup>140</sup> Hughes’s observations support both the principles of Human Capital Theory and Scales’s comments regarding USAWC. Again, Human Capital Theory suggests that individuals invest in education with an understanding it will provide a tangible benefit in the future such as promotion or increase in salary. When this correlation ceases to exist, individuals stop investing in their development. Scales made similar comments on the importance of performance in USAWC.

This chapter provides another example of the potential negative effect of undervaluing education. Hughes’s comments on AWC support the comments Scales made about USAWC. Many of Hughes’s opinions are transferable to CGSOC. His remarks are suggestive of the need to increase the importance of education in military culture. Education enables service components to evaluate the previous war with a critical mind and produce necessary innovation for success when engaged with future adversaries.

Dr. Bradley Carter wrote the chapter “No ‘Holidays from History’: Adult Learning, Professional Military Education, and Teaching History” as part of *Military Culture and Education* published in 2010. Carter has worked as an associate professor in the Department of Military History for three years at the CGSOC satellite campus<sup>141</sup> at

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<sup>140</sup>Hughes, 154.

<sup>141</sup>The satellite campuses are a three and one half month CGSOC common core curriculum. Students typically attend follow on branch/functional area credentialing

Fort Gordon, Georgia. Carter observes that CGSOC students are well read, traveled, and on par with even an honors undergraduate class.

Carter describes the faculty as professionals. Although unaccustomed to the independent work habits in academia, most have experience as trainers and many have experience teaching in civilian institutions.<sup>142</sup> His observations support Hughes's in the expectation of military faculty is for civilian faculty to be in their offices during duty hours whether or not they are productive is beside the fact. Carter declares the twenty-first-century US Army officer corps is professionalized and more highly educated than any time in history.<sup>143</sup> The school and faculty are committed to "teaching students how to think, not what to think."<sup>144</sup>

Carter describes the students as pragmatic and among the brightest he has ever taught.<sup>145</sup> CGSOC students are well read and consistently engage in the adult learning model. The adult learning model is a Socratic teaching methodology where students lead each other through an experiential learning environment and the instructor is present to bring to the surface what the students have learned.<sup>146</sup> Students possess the range and

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course and are then credentialed Military Education Level 4 and JPME 1. The same credentials a resident CGSOC student at Fort Leavenworth receives.

<sup>142</sup>Bradley Carter, "No 'Holidays from History': Adult Learning, Professional Military Education, and Teaching History," in *Military Culture and Education: Current Intersections of Academic and Military Cultures*, ed. Douglas Higbee (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 180.

<sup>143</sup>*Ibid.*, 169.

<sup>144</sup>*Ibid.*, 170.

<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*, 175.

<sup>146</sup>*Ibid.*, 171.

depth to discuss all topics brought up in class more so than Carter has seen in other academic environments. However, Carter recognizes the same problem exists in CGSOC as in any other learning institution, which is motivating students to critically engage the material in ways that connect the material to their larger lives.<sup>147</sup> These professionals break any stereotype referring to Army officers as ignorant knuckle-draggers.<sup>148</sup> Students tend to be tolerant and respectful of other religious or political beliefs. Carter does mention that he has the same issues with motivating some students to critically engage the material in ways that can make a difference in their lives.<sup>149</sup>

This chapter provides contrary views to the other works. Carter's observations are in opposition to Hughes's remarks. CGSOC students are described as valuing education, they arrive in class prepared to discuss current events and participate in thoughtful, critical seminar discussion.<sup>150</sup> Although there are identified problems with students connecting the lessons in class to current or future events, Carter's views reflect a culture that seems to already value education.

### Summary

Overall, the review of literature confirms: there is an area that has been identified as requiring further study, that civilian academic performance contributed to operational success for both military and Department of Defense civilians, but the previous research

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<sup>147</sup>Carter, 172.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid., 175.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., 172.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid., 175.

does not identify whether or not academic performance in PME results in operational success. Secondly, the military emphasis on training lays out no way to measure educational effectiveness. Third, the Army is in need of promoting a culture that promotes competition and the desire to excel in PME. Fourth, the Army is at an interesting crossroads with sequestration. Several officers will be released from service and the Army needs to have the ability to conduct such decisions in a holistic manner.

The following chapter will explain the methodology that will be employed to answer the key research questions and develop knowledge in this inadequately understood field.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This educational transformation will not happen overnight. Rather, it must be part of a reformation in Army culture so that officers accept life-long learning and education as an obligation of their profession. It should become a fundamental part of the Army professional ethic. In addition, if the Army acknowledges that education is indeed valuable, then it must build time into the professional culture for officers to routinely read, write, discuss, and learn.

— Jeffrey McCausland and Gregg Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st Century Army

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research is to assess the linkage, if any, between professional military education and future performance in the US Army, and consider what incentives might motivate CGSOC students to strive for excellence. The effect professional military education has on future performance was evaluated based on the success of Marshall Award Recipients in regard to their OERs, duty positions, promotion, and selection for command and senior service colleges. The effects academic based incentives could have on performance were evaluated based on responses to questions by students in CGSOC classes 14-01 and 14-02. The goal of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used to answer the primary research question: Is there a correlation between Marshall Award Recipients and continued successful performance in the US Army?

#### Bias

The researcher acknowledges his bias towards academic performance and future potential. The researcher graduated in the top five from his two previous professional military education courses. He also served two tours in the Ranger Regiment as an

officer. The researcher's experience was that the ranking on an individual's AER was scrutinized. Some members of the organization saw the class rank as a way of predicting what an officer would do when left to his own judgment. The anonymous survey of current CGSOC students is used to correct for bias.

This chapter has five sections consisting of research approach, data sources, procedures, analysis, and summary. The research approach section describes the qualitative research design and introduces evaluation criteria used in analysis of the main research question as well as the criteria for determining the value of performance based incentives in CGSOC. The data sources (respondents) section describes the sources for data collection and the methods used to protect the anonymity of survey participants and interviewees. The procedures section describes the process used to collect and analyze data. The analysis section describes the process of applying data gathered from oral history interviews and comparing with specified evaluation criteria (derived from ARs, DA PAMs, and Department of the Army Memorandum) and addresses the primary research question. The analysis section also describes the process for applying the data gathered from student surveys and addresses the secondary research question. The next section will outline the research approach.

### Research Approach

The researcher used a qualitative approach to gather responses to the primary and secondary research questions. The research included analysis of doctrine and literature, analysis of the historic role of professional military education, oral history interviews of previous Marshall Award Recipients, and surveys of two CGSOC classes.



The purpose of the doctrine and literature review was to determine the requirements against which to assess future success of Marshall Award Recipients, as well as assist in determining potential incentives ranging from low impact (CGSC could handle without expending any additional funds) to high impact (requires restructuring Army policies and procedures).

The purpose of the evaluation criteria to assess the Marshall Award Recipients was to determine if the officers demonstrated continued success in the operational environment. Student surveys were used to determine if offering incentives in CGSOC would motivate officers to strive for academic excellence and if so, what incentives were most effective. The next section sets the bounds of the sources of data.

### Data Sources

The previous chapter included an investigation of literature addressing the benefit of an educated officer corps as well as the role of education in uncertain situations. This research focused on the effect excelling in professional military education has upon an officer's potential for continued success in the operational environment. The research also focused on the requirements necessary, if any, to gain a greater academic commitment from officers currently enrolled in CGSOC.

For this research, 17 Marshall Award Recipients spanning the academic years of 2001-2011 participated in oral history interviews. As mentioned in the introduction, the General George C. Marshall Award is presented to the distinguished US graduate of the resident course.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>151</sup>U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, *US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) Self Study* 8, 5-2.

The researcher chose to study Marshall Award Recipients for several reasons. First, the Command and General Staff College does not use an OML. The top 20 percent is a designation based on each section's selection from their 64 students. The sections rank order students based on grade point average. Thus, students with the highest grade point averages in each section constitute the top 20 percent. It is possible for student A in section 11 to possess a higher grade point average than student B a Top 20 percent student in section 12. Student A is not recognized as part of the Top 20 percent because the ranking system only allows Top 20 percent in each section. Second, Marshall Award Recipients demonstrated an exceptional level of determination to succeed in professional military education. Third, studying Marshall Award Recipients was decided upon when initial research determined that neither the CGSC nor the Command and General Staff College Foundation had any information on what each class's distinguished graduate did after CGSC.

The evaluation criteria used to determine the answer to the primary research question were derived from traditional measures for evaluating successful Army Officers' careers prescribed in AR 600-3, DA PAM 600-3, AR 623-3, DA PAM 623-3 and Department of the Army Memorandum 600-2. The aforementioned documents denote the relevance of the following evaluation criteria:

1. Senior Rater Comments on performance consistent with an exclusive or strong narrative (i.e. enumeration top five percent or better, enumeration listed as a hard number, number four of 30 rated officers and promote below the zone/must promote to next rank) and potential (i.e. will/must command a battalion or brigade).

2. Selection for an exclusive position inside the brigade (Executive Officer or Brigade S3) or selection for a nominative position (i.e. General's Aide, service in a selective organization, selection for Joint or Army Staff, selection to work with Congressmen or the White House).

3. Below the zone promotion to lieutenant colonel, only attained by the truly exceptional officers since every officer promoted below the zone prevents an officer in or above the zone from being promoted.<sup>152</sup>

4. Promotion to colonel.

5. Selection for battalion command.

6. Selection for SSC.

In order to answer the secondary research question, should the US Army offer incentives for excelling in CGSOC? 470 US Army Officers from CGSOC classes 14-01 and 14-02 were randomly selected to participate in an anonymous survey. A total of 89 officers responded. The researcher surveyed both 14-01 and 14-02 due to the differences in the population of the classes. Class 14-01 is a mixture of officers from the universal ILE<sup>153</sup> process and branch selects. Class 14-02 is composed of officers selected by a centralized board. This approach to the survey sought to determine if offering

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<sup>152</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army Memorandum (DA MEMO) 600-2, *Personal-General Policies and Procedures for Active Duty-List Officer Selection Boards* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 11.

<sup>153</sup>Universal ILE was based on a series of boards starting with the Gerow Board in 1945 through the Army Training and Leader Development Panel in 2000. These studies found the importance of education CGSOC provides to the officer corps and the need to expose as many officers as possible to a resident experience.

performance based incentives in CGSOC would influence students to improve their performance.

Incentives require a process, such as an OML. Thus, the survey examined students' opinions on an OML based on academic performance during CGSOC. The use of an OML is not a new practice in the Army. All officers have experienced the effects of an OML during the process that brought them into the Army. The US Military Academy utilizes an OML, which helps determine cadets' branches and first duty assignments. Reserve Officer Training Corps and Officer Candidate School utilize an OML for cadets and candidates to choose the same items. Second, the survey inquired what incentives were most attractive to students. The researcher provided two categories of incentives: CGSC-offered incentives and Army-offered incentives. CGSC offered incentives included:

1. Prioritized parking.
2. Prioritized registration during electives sign up.
3. Ability to choose duty position in Advanced Operations Course (AOC) exercises.
4. Increased opportunity to participate in an exchange program.
5. Increased opportunity to participate in a staff ride.
6. Increased independent preparation and reflection time (essentially less time in class and more time for students to perform what they deem important).

Army offered incentives included:

1. Prioritized selection of next duty assignment.
2. Increased chances for promotion.

3. Reduced chances for selection during Officer Separation Boards.
4. Increased opportunity to attend Advanced Civil Schooling.
5. Increased opportunity to attend a SSC.

The incentives were identified based on student comments throughout the academic year and incentives the Army already offers to new officers mentioned above.

### Procedures

The Marshall Award interviewees were contacted via email and given an interview sheet with questions pertaining to the aforementioned areas of interest, along with a letter of informed consent, which they signed and returned. The researcher corresponded with each interviewee individually to protect their privacy and minimize accidental contamination of opinions. The researcher's committee and head of the Graduate Degree Program approved the interview questions prior to conduct of the first oral history interview. The researcher did not ask questions that if answered could place an officer in jeopardy of negative recourse. Thus, the questions were assessed as low risk to endangering interviewed officers' careers. The researcher conducted all correspondence via common access card enabled email and stored all interviews in a password-protected folder on his computer.

Randomly selected US Army Officers were administered the PME incentives survey utilizing the CGSC automated survey engine. The researcher's committee and Graduate Degree Program approved the incentives survey prior to its administration. The survey was only issued to US Army Officers, as the research pertains to the US Army. The survey featured few yes or no questions and maximized usage of Likert Scales. The Likert Scale allowed the researcher to gauge the strength of agreement or disagreement

and gave a participant the ability to choose no opinion on the question.<sup>154</sup> The researcher took measures to protect participants by making the survey anonymous and securing the results in a safe at home. Participants' anonymity minimized potential social desirability bias. That is participants should feel freer to answer questions with their true opinion and not feel judged by the researcher or readers of the thesis. The survey asked some general demographic questions, but then focused on participants' opinions on the effects of employing an OML and whether or not incentives would increase performance in CGSOC. The survey provided participants an opportunity to offer information the researcher did not consider by including two open-ended questions. The survey requested students rank order the incentives based on the two categories. The next section explains the process for analyzing the information gathered.

### Analysis

This section describes the method of applying data gathered from oral interviews and applying it to previously stated evaluation criteria. The researcher analyzed each of the oral interviews against previously stated evaluation criteria using a linear model. The recipients were analyzed across all applicable criteria.<sup>155</sup> Failure to achieve a single evaluation criterion did not exclude recipients from further evaluation. Each Marshall Award Recipient was determined to have continued a successful career if they achieved 75 percent of the evaluated criteria. A correlation between academic excellence in

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<sup>154</sup>Rensis Likert, "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes," *Archives of Psychology* 22, no. 140 (June 1932): 14.

<sup>155</sup>Recipients were not eligible for all the evaluation criteria. An evaluation criterion that was not achieved due to non-eligibility was not counted against the officer.

CGSOC and future success is determined if 50 percent of the interviewed Marshall Award Recipients were determined to have achieved success.

This section also describes the method of applying the data gathered from incentives survey. The researcher analyzed results from the incentives survey to determine the likelihood of improving academic performance in CGSOC by offering incentives. The data was first analyzed to determine whether CGSOC students favored an OML. Next, the researcher analyzed data for indications that an OML would motivate students to improve academic performance. Then the survey was analyzed to determine what incentives would most likely improve CGSOC students' performance. Incentives were determined effective if more than 50 percent of the participants answered affirmatively to increasing academic performance based on an OML or other possible incentives. The research rank ordered the possible incentives from most influential to least influential. An overall negative response for instituting an OML does not invalidate its worth so long as students agreed the OML or offered incentives would increase their academic performance. The Army should consider offering academic performance based incentives in CGSOC if more than 50 percent of the survey participants agree incentives would increase their academic performance.

### Summary

This chapter describes the process used to identify correlation between Marshall Award Recipients and continued success in the operational environment. The definition of "continued success" in the operational environment and the standards used to evaluate the findings were described earlier in this chapter under Data Sources. Oral History Interviews were used to gather data to compare to the established evaluation criteria. The

chapter also describes the method used to determine the effect of incentives on performance at CGSOC. An anonymous survey was given to US Army Officers in classes 14-01 and 14-02 to determine the likelihood of incentives improving academic performance at CGSOC. The next chapter presents the data collected from the research and provides an explanation of the analysis conducted.



## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

This research assessed whether or not there is a correlation between Marshall Award Recipients and continued success in the Army. In addition, Marshall Award Recipients were also asked whether their performance in CGSOC contributed to their performance in the operational environment. CGSOC students from classes 14-01 and 14-02 were surveyed to answer the secondary research question: Should the Army incentivize performance at CGSOC? This chapter applies the research methodology described in chapter 3, to generate and analyze information in accordance with the qualitative research design. The application of the research method will answer the primary and secondary research questions.

This chapter presents data from research and has three sections, the assessment of Marshall Award Recipients' subsequent success, CGSOC Performance Based Incentives Survey Assessment, and the chapter summary. The purpose of the Marshall Award Recipient assessment was to analyze officers that performed very well in an academic environment and then assess their results in the operational environment. This analysis was then used to support the secondary research question concerning performance-based incentives in CGSOC.

The Marshall Award Recipient assessment was the process for collecting data from oral history interviews with Marshall Award Recipients against six criteria discussed in chapter three indicative of success in the Army per DA PAM 600-3 and DA MEMO 600-2. These criteria are discussed in more depth later in this chapter are the results of analyzing Marshall Award Recipients' performance against these criteria.

The second section of this chapter assesses the survey evaluating CGSOC students' thoughts on offering incentives for academic performance in CGSOC. This survey assessed current CGSOC students' opinions regarding incentives to promote an increase in academic performance, the use of an OML to distribute the incentives, if CGSC could offer effective incentives, and if the Army could offer effective incentives. The survey was analyzed as an aggregate of the classes 14-01 and 14-02 and then each class was analyzed individually. This process takes into account potential bias in each group based on class composition<sup>156</sup> and what stage of the course the students were in. This section also discusses the results of the survey.

The final section of this chapter is the summary. This provides a review of the chapter as well as a transition to the final chapter, which offers conclusions and recommendations.

### Marshall Award Recipient Assessment

The Marshall Award Recipient Assessment was the means of collecting data from the analysis of 11 oral history interviews with Marshall Award Recipients against six evaluation criteria, defined in chapter 3. The six evaluation criteria are: senior rater enumeration on the OER, selection for a nominative assignment, promotion below the zone to lieutenant colonel, selection for battalion command, promotion to colonel and selection for SSC.

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<sup>156</sup>Class 14-01 is not a true centralized selected class. The class consists of officers from year groups 2001-2003. A panel of senior Army Officers selected best-qualified officers to make up class 14-01. Class 14-02 is the first centrally selected class since universal ILE ended.

Results from the assessment yielded one of two classifications for each Marshall Award Recipient: continued professional success or non-continued professional success. Continued professional success is defined as the recipient achieving 75 percent or greater of the evaluation criteria. Non-continued success is defined as the recipient achieved less than 75 percent of the evaluation criteria. Table 1 presents the model for the assessment of the Marshall Award Recipients against the six evaluation criteria. The analysis conducted provides recommendations for future research and areas for consideration to enhance the performance of individual officers and the Army.

Table 1. Marshall Award Recipients' Assessment						
	Nominative Position	Promotion LTC (BZ)	BN CMD (CSL)	Promotion COL	Selection for SSC	Enumeration
Recipient						
A	Yes	No	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes
B	Yes	No	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes
C	Yes	No	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes	Yes
D	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes
E	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes	Yes
F	Yes	No	N/A <sup>3</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes
G	Yes	No	No <sup>4</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	Yes
H	Yes	No	N/A <sup>3</sup>	Yes	Yes	N/A <sup>1</sup>
I	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A <sup>1</sup>
J	Yes	No	No	Yes	No <sup>4</sup>	N/A <sup>1</sup>
K	Yes	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>2</sup>	N/A <sup>1</sup>

*Source:* Created by author. Notes: 1. Recipient did not offer this information. 2. Recipient was not eligible based on retirement or time in service requirement. 3. Recipient was not eligible based on functional area or branch. 4. Recipient was selected as an alternate.

### Nominative Positions

Nominative Positions are reserved for the best officers and are considered career enhancing. These assignments require the use of a competitive selection process to evaluate an officer's files and determine if the officer possess the right credentials and experience to excel in this challenging assignment.<sup>157</sup> Included as part of the nominative positions were key brigade positions such as Brigade S3 and Brigade Executive Officer (XO). The Brigade XO is the commander's principal assistant. XOs are the key staff integrator and are typically delegated executive management authority.<sup>158</sup> The Brigade S3 or operations officer is the primary staff officer for integrating and synchronizing the operation for the commander.<sup>159</sup> Operations officers synchronize operations across the different planning horizons current, future, and plans integrating cells. Currently a total of 12 Battalion S3 and XO positions reside in a typical Brigade Combat Team. The Brigade Combat Team has one Brigade S3 and one Brigade XO position.

All interviewed Marshall Award Recipients were chosen for nominative positions. This finding supports Feldman and Ng's research in "How Broadly Does Education Contribute to Job Performance." Feldman and Ng found education is positively linked to increased performance in high-complexity jobs.<sup>160</sup> Marshall Recipient success as

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<sup>157</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 103.

<sup>158</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 2-4.

<sup>159</sup>*Ibid.*, 2-8.

<sup>160</sup>Feldman and Ng, 104-109.

annotated by enumeration on their OERs in their assignments led to selection for more complex assignments.

### BBZ Promotion to Lieutenant Colonel

BZ promotion to lieutenant colonel is reserved for officers that demonstrate performance superior to the performance of officers in the primary or above the zone categories. This is because an officer promoted BZ prevents an officer in the primary or above the zone from being promoted. The purpose of BZ promotions is to accelerate officers that have demonstrated superior performance and afford them sufficient remaining service to be available as a senior leader.<sup>161</sup>

Oral history interviews with the Marshall Award Recipients revealed that nine recipients were eligible for this criteria based on time in service. One of the nine eligible recipients was selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel BZ. There was not enough information collected to determine why other Marshall Award Recipients were not promoted BZ, but it should be pointed out that interviewed Marshall Recipients were largely not selected for promotion BZ to lieutenant colonel even when BZ promotion rate was 10.2 percent in 2007 as depicted in Table 2. The findings are somewhat in contrast to Buterbaugh's research "A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic Performance and Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior US Navy Officers." Buterbaugh found that FFGE and undergraduate academic performance were linked to promotion to commander.<sup>162</sup> Although Marshall Award Recipients were promoted to lieutenant

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<sup>161</sup>U.S. Department of the Army, DA MEMO 600-2, 11.

<sup>162</sup>Buterbaugh, 42-44.

colonel, so were an average of 83.5 percent of officers in the same years the interviewed Marshall Recipients were promoted per table 2. The lack of Marshall Award Recipients selected BZ for promotion to lieutenant colonel does not support previous research suggesting excelling in education increases job performance resulting in promotion by Dr. Wise.<sup>163</sup>

Table 2. Promotion Rates to Lieutenant Colonel Compared to Marshall Award Recipients Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, 2001-2013				
Year	Primary Zone (PZ) %	Below the Zone (BZ) %	Marshall Recipients Promoted PZ	Marshall Recipients Promoted BZ
2001	75.7	6.2		
2002	74.8	5.3		
2003	78.2	6.2		
2004	76.9	6.8	1	
2005	86.2	5.9	2	
2006	90.9	8.1		
2007	90.9	10.2	1	
2008	89.2	13.8		
2009	87.9	7.2		
2010	88	10.8		1
2011	87	3.6	2	
2012	82.9	8.3		
2013	71.8	5.2	1	

*Source:* Created by author.

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<sup>163</sup>Wise, 8.

### Centralized Selection for Battalion Command

Selection for battalion command is considered a key assignment or one of an exclusive group for many branches in the Army.<sup>164</sup> As such, the Army organizes a panel of senior officers with specific selection criteria from the Chief of Staff of the Army to select future battalion commanders.<sup>165</sup> Additionally, a very small percentage of each branch is selected for command and some functional areas do not have battalion command positions. Officers must volunteer to compete for battalion command and as of September 2013 officers must decide to “opt in” or not.<sup>166</sup> The new Army policy requires eligible officers to compete for all available commands and not commands only in a specific subcategory such as operations, training, or installation. DA MEMO 600-2 lays out the process boards execute to select the best officers to assume command positions.

The oral history interviews determined that seven recipients were eligible for battalion command. Five of the seven eligible recipients were selected for battalion command. This finding suggests support for Usan and Utoglu’s research in “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Civilian Department of Defense Employees.” Usan and Utoglu establish increased education’s positive effect on

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<sup>164</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 59, 71, 84, 106, 140, 145.

<sup>165</sup>Department of the Army, DA MEMO 600-2, 25.

<sup>166</sup>C. Todd Lopez, “Next command boards require ‘opt in, all in’ for eligible officers,” The Official Homepage of the U.S. Army, [http://www.army.mil/article/103210/Next\\_command\\_boards\\_require\\_\\_opt\\_in\\_\\_all\\_in\\_\\_\\_/](http://www.army.mil/article/103210/Next_command_boards_require__opt_in__all_in___/) (accessed 24 May 2014).

adaptability, performance ratings and promotion.<sup>167</sup> The percentage of Marshall Award Recipients selected for battalion command is suggestive of Colonel Grossman's findings in his School of Advanced Military Studies monograph "Command and General Staff Officer Education in the 21st Century: Examining the German Model." Grossman found a strong correlation between performance in military education and performance throughout an officer's career.<sup>168</sup> In addition, the interviewed Marshall Award Recipients selection for battalion command is more than twice the Infantry branch selection rate for fiscal year 2013.<sup>169</sup>

#### Promotion to Colonel

Promotion to colonel is realized by a very select few and truly represents the elite of the officer corps.<sup>170</sup> In fact, the typical promotion rate to colonel is approximately 50 percent and between the years of 2001 to 2011, the promotion rate ranged from 35.7 percent to 61 percent.<sup>171</sup> Colonels constitute the preponderance of Army strategic level leaders.<sup>172</sup> They are quite often the conduit between the generating force and the operating force.

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<sup>167</sup>Usan and Utoglu, 100-102.

<sup>168</sup>Grossman, 79.

<sup>169</sup>Christopher Kennedy, "Human Resources Command Brief to Command and General Staff College Class 13-02" (Presentation, Eisenhower Auditorium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 August 2013).

<sup>170</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 19.

<sup>171</sup>Kennedy.

<sup>172</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 60.



The oral history interviews revealed that three recipients were eligible for promotion to colonel. All three recipients were promoted to colonel in the primary zone. This finding is supportive by Feldman and Ng's conclusion that education increases creativity and performance in high-complexity jobs.<sup>173</sup> Colonels make maximum contributions to the Army as commanders and senior staff officers.

### Selection for SSC

Selection for SSC is extremely competitive. There are around 350 resident seats available in the USAWC every year. Officers are considered for attendance from their 16th year of service to their 23rd year of service during this time a cohort of officers can expect that 30 percent to 35 percent will attend the resident course.<sup>174</sup> A cohort is a specific group of officers pooled into a year group based on commissioning year. It is worth noting that each officer promoted BZ moves into a cohort one year older than his commissioning cohort did. SSC attendance is not necessary for promotion to colonel, but it is the final and most senior form of professional military education preparing officers for future strategic service.

The oral history interviews revealed that five recipients were eligible for selection to a SSC. Four out of five recipients were selected to attend a SSC or received a fellowship.

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<sup>173</sup>Feldman and Ng, 104-109.

<sup>174</sup>Headquarters, Department of the Army, DA PAM 600-3, 19.

### Senior Rater Enumeration

Senior rater enumeration on an OER is very important to boards selecting the best officers for promotion. Senior rater exclusive enumeration is typically used for officers that are top performers.<sup>175</sup> The lack of enumeration on an OER can be considered an indicator of performance as much as the presence of enumeration. Enumeration is often categorized into two groups: exclusive and strong. Exclusive enumeration is usually reserved for a center of mass report based on an immature profile or for the very best above center of mass reports. Strong narratives are used for above center of mass reports and the very best center of mass reports. Exclusive narratives provide more precise quantitative and qualitative remarks than strong narratives. Precise enumeration in the senior rater comments assists the promotion board in separating the very best from those that just performed well.

All recipients were assessed against this criterion. During oral history interviews, seven recipients commented on their senior raters' OER comments. All seven responded with at a minimum of strong enumeration comments on their OERs following CGSOC. Six of the seven reported receiving exclusive enumeration remarks on multiple OERs after CGSOC. This finding is supportive of previous research suggesting increased education results in superior ratings.<sup>176</sup>

A potential reason for only having seven recipients specify their enumeration is the oral history questions did not address this topic directly. The question specifically said: Following CGSOC, did the Senior Rater comments you received reflect the level of

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<sup>175</sup>Kennedy.

<sup>176</sup>Usan and Utoglu, 100-102.

excellence you exhibited in CGSOC, how so? Three of the recipients interpreted this question as querying whether the Marshall Award was mentioned on their OER following CGSOC, and Recipient K simply stated receiving good OERs in key developmental positions.

### Summary of Marshall Award Recipient Assessment

After analyzing all the information provided from the 11 oral history interviews, it was determined that eight of the 11 Marshall Award Recipients met 75 percent of the criteria and were classified as demonstrating continued professional success. It is worth noting that meeting 75 percent of the evaluation criteria means those recipients were evaluated against at least four of the six evaluation criteria. The one criterion that prevented six of the eight recipients from achieving 100 percent of the evaluation criteria was BZ promotion to lieutenant colonel. The other two recipients were not eligible for promotion at the time of the interviews. Of the three Marshall Award Recipients that are classified as non-continued professional success, the three recipients all achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel. The research cannot confirm if the three recipients achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel based on performance or due to accelerated demand because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The overall findings support the previous research addressed in the literature review, though. The research findings support a correlation between increased education and increased job performance, as measured by promotion and annual ratings.<sup>177</sup> In addition, the findings are indicative of Charles Allen's comments in his article "Redress of Professional Military Education: The Clarion Call."

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<sup>177</sup>Usan and Utoglu, 100-102.

Allen suggests that professional military education increases performance and the Army must regain a balance between operational needs and officers receiving education at the right time in their careers.<sup>178</sup>

#### CGSOC Performance Based Incentives Survey Assessment

The CGSOC Performance Based Incentives Survey Assessment was the process for collecting data from the responses of 89 respondents in CGSOC classes 14-01 and 14-02. The survey focused on determining the respondents' attitudes toward offering incentives for academic performance in CGSOC, utilizing an OML to distribute the incentives, effectiveness of incentives CGSOC can offer and effectiveness of incentives the Army can offer. The answers to the survey areas above provided the basis for discussion to answer the secondary research questions: Should the Army incentivize academic performance in CGSOC? If so, how?

The CGSOC Performance Based Incentives Survey was a random sample survey sent to 470 Army<sup>179</sup> CGSOC students from classes 14-01 and 14-02. 89 students responded to the survey, a 19 percent response rate. The two classes' responses were analyzed as an aggregate and then analyzed as individual classes. The intent was to determine if significant differences could be identified between 14-01, a partially select class, and 14-02 the first central board selected class since the end of Universal ILE. The surveys were analyzed to determine three things: first, students' thoughts on academic

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<sup>178</sup>Allen, 96.

<sup>179</sup>The survey was sent to Active Duty, Army National Guard and Army Reserve officers. The other branches of service were excluded as the research was interested in the possibility of increasing Army students' performance in professional military education.

performance based incentives during CGSOC; second, effective incentives CGSC can offer; third, effective incentives the Army can offer.

### Students' Thoughts on Performance Based Incentives at CGSOC

The first area of determining whether the Army should consider incentivizing academic performance in CGSOC is the students' opinions. This helps determine how current and future students might perceive the program. This portion of section two will address the analysis of the following questions:

Should CGSOC incentivize academic performance?

Would an OML at CGSOC improve academic performance?

Should the Army incentivize performance during CGSOC?

The analysis of the 89 surveys determined that the two classes were narrowly in favor of incentivizing performance in CGSOC. In response to the question should CGSOC incentivize academic performance, 31 respondents answered yes, 25 answered no and another 31 were indifferent to the idea. In response to the question of whether an OML at CGSOC would improve individual academic performance, 32 respondents answered yes, 30 answered no, and 26 were indifferent to the idea. In response to the question of whether the Army should incentivize performance during CGSOC, 34 respondents answered yes, 32 answered no, and 20 were indifferent. As mentioned previously, the number of responses in favor of these areas is numerically superior to the responses against these questions. The number of indifferent responses makes it difficult to discern whether these responses are based on a population of pragmatic students or a group that has nothing to gain from either outcome. The individual analyses of each class will enable further investigation on the indifferent responses.

Table 3. Comparison of 14-01 and 14-02 Responses to Incentivizing Performance in CGSOC							
	Class 14-01				Class 14-02		
	Yes	No	Indifferent		Yes	No	Indifferent
Should CGSOC incentivize academic performance?	23 (38.3%)	18 (30%)	19 (31.7%)		8 (29.6%)	7 (25.9%)	12 (44.4%)
Would an OML at CGSOC improve academic performance?	20 (32.7%)	23 (37.7%)	18 (29.5%)		12 (44.4%)	7 (25.9%)	8 (29.6%)
Should the Army incentivize academic performance at CGSOC?	23 (38.9%)	23 (38.9%)	13 (22%)		11 (40.7%)	9 (33.3%)	7 (25.9%)

*Source:* Created by author. Notes: The top figure in each column represents the actual response. The figure in parentheses represents the percentage of students per class allowing easy comparison between Class 14-01 and Class 14-02.

Class 14-01 had 63 respondents and exhibited a greater desire for CGSOC offered incentives than Army offered incentives. Table 3 presents the survey results to the three questions. In response to the question of whether CGSOC should incentivize academic performance, 23-responded yes, 18 responded no, and 19 were indifferent. Class 14-01 appears to be somewhat pragmatic in their response to the idea of an OML alone improving academic performance. Their responses to the statement, “if there were an OML at CGSOC, I would perform better,” 20 responded yes, 23 responded no, and 18 were indifferent. Usan and Utoglu’s discussion on Human Capital Theory in “The Effect of Graduate Education on the Job Performance of Civilian Department of Defense Employees,” is supported by these findings. The OML alone does not provide enough

future gain for students to contribute further present effort.<sup>180</sup> This also seems supported by the response to the next question. Class 14-01 provided the following responses to the question of whether the Army should incentivize performance during CGSOC: 23 responded yes, 23 responded no, and 13 were indifferent. Although this is an even split between the positive and negative responses, there is an observed increase in positive responses with the addition of tangible benefits. Students' dissimilar opinions on CGSOC performance based incentives and Army performance based incentives appears to revolve around doubts regarding an inability to grade fairly, the lack of balance that would ensue, and a diminution in camaraderie as shown in Appendix D.

A total of 27 students from Class 14-02 responded and demonstrated continued support for offering academic incentives. Table 3 presents the survey results to the three questions. In response to the question of whether CGSOC should incentivize academic performance, eight responded yes, seven responded no, and 12 were indifferent. Class 14-02 exhibited their greatest endorsement in their responses to the usefulness of an OML. Class 14-02 differed greatly from Class 14-01 in their responses to the usefulness of an OML. In response to the statement "if there were an OML at CGSOC, I would perform better," 12 responded yes, seven responded no, and eight were indifferent. Class 14-02 student opinions on the Army performance based incentives at CGSOC differed slightly from Class 14-01. The students provided the following responses to the question of whether the Army should offer performance based incentives during CGSOC, 11 responded yes, eight responded no, and seven were indifferent. It appears, based on Class 14-02, bias mentioned in chapter 3, that this class of board-selected officers is inclined to

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<sup>180</sup>Usan and Utoglu, 22.

support a competitive environment. Class 14-02 indicated that an OML alone motivated the most respondents. The students that opposed performance based incentives in CGSOC cited equity in grading, a loss of camaraderie, and the belief that performance should be intrinsically motivated. Class 14-02 responded with a greater increase in motivation from the Army offered incentives than the CGSOC offered incentives. This data is supported by the Human Capital Theory in which adults will invest time and effort into education where there is a likelihood of an increase in job success.

Comparing 14-01 to 14-02 provides some deeper insight. 14-01 was most in favor of CGSOC performance based incentives and more motivated by CGSOC performance incentives than 14-02. CGSC-offered performance incentives had the most number of indifferent responses of the questions. In fact, the number of indifferent responses decreased steadily from question one to question three. A possible explanation is the perception of increased risk to an officer's career as this topic moves from just CGSOC awareness to the Army recognizing academic performance. 14-02 replied with their most positive responses to increased academic performance based on an OML. This is in direct contrast to 14-01, as they least favored the use of an OML alone. This variance in the two classes is most likely attributable to their progress in the course. 14-02 is still in common core while 14-01 was in electives when they took the survey. 14-02 could still be motivated by an OML while 14-01 does not perceive any tangible result from an OML. In regard to the question of whether the Army should offer incentives based on academic performance, 14-01 responded with an equal number of yes and no answers, while 14-02 responded with slightly more yes answers than no answers. Both classes provided the fewest indifferent responses to this question. A possible answer to this steady decline of



indifferent answers is again based on the realization that Army sponsored incentives could greatly impact an officer's career. Some of the officers providing the indifferent responses felt more inclined to pick a side knowing the seriousness of an Army culture willing to reward officers based on academic performance.

### Effectiveness of CGSOC Sponsored Incentives

This portion of section two is focused on determining what incentives CGSC might offer students to maximize improvement in academic performance. The survey queried 470 students of which 89 responded on the possibility of the six CGSOC offered incentives motivating them to increase their academic performance: prioritized parking, choice of position in AOC exercises, priority in selection for foreign exchanges, prioritized enrollment during electives sign up, selection to attend a staff ride, and increased independent reflection and study time. As discussed in the first portion of section two, the students were slightly inclined to support CGSOC offered incentives for academic performance. However, the only incentive out of the six provided that motivated more than 50 percent of the surveyed students was increased independent reflection and study time (IRST). Table 4 points out that, 66 percent of the surveyed students agreed they would perform better if they received increased IRST. The following two incentives: priority selection for a foreign exchange and prioritized enrollment during electives sign up motivated 46 percent and 41 percent of the surveyed students to improve performance respectively.

Table 4. Combined Class 14-01 and 14-02 Responses to CGSOC Incentives						
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received prioritized parking, I would perform better.	2	5	17	29	36	<b>89</b>
	2%	6%	19%	33%	40%	
If I could choose my position in AOC exercises (i.e. O100, O200, etc.), I would perform better.	3	22	16	26	21	<b>88</b>
	3%	25%	18%	30%	24%	
If selection for exchange programs (UK, France, Germany, etc.) heavily considered academic performance, I would perform better.	18	23	16	15	17	<b>89</b>
	20%	26%	18%	17%	19%	
If I received prioritized enrollment during electives (to include preferred time of electives), I would perform better.	13	23	17	18	18	<b>89</b>
	15%	26%	19%	20%	20%	
If selection to attend a staff ride was based on academic performance, I would perform better.	7	16	26	23	17	<b>89</b>
	8%	18%	29%	26%	19%	
If I could receive increased independent reflection and study time, I would perform better.	34	25	12	9	9	<b>89</b>
	38%	28%	13%	10%	10%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>533</b>

*Source:* Created by author.

The researcher analyzed the responses from classes 14-01 and 14-02 independently to determine if the two classes were motivated by different CGSOC

offered incentives. Analysis of class 14-01 survey responses revealed that 71 percent of the surveyed students were motivated by increased IRST, and 38 percent of the surveyed students were motivated by priority selection for a foreign exchange. When asked to rank order the six CGSOC offered incentives, surveyed students overwhelmingly selected IRST as their top choice. Moreover, 80 percent of the 14-01 surveyed students ranked it as number two or better. Prioritized selection for a foreign exchange was a distant second, and 40 percent of 14-01 surveyed students ranked it in the top two.

The analysis of surveyed students from class 14-02 revealed a slight contrast from 14-01. The analysis of 14-02 survey responses revealed that 63 percent of the 14-02 surveyed students agreed they would perform better if they received priority selection for a foreign exchange, and 55 percent agreed they would perform better if they received increased IRST. When asked to rank order the six CGSOC offered incentives, 14-02 surveyed students overall selected priority selection for a foreign exchange as the highest ranked incentive. In addition, 60 percent of the 14-02 surveyed students ranked it in top two. Although, IRST was ranked second of the CGSOC incentives. 68 percent of the students ranked IRST in the top two. The variance in the two classes is most likely attributed to their respective progress in the CGSOC curriculum.

Table 5. Comparison of Class 14-01 and 14-02 Responses to CGSOC Incentives							
	Class 14-01				Class 14-02		
Rank	Incentive	Motivated <sup>1</sup>	Ranked Top 2 <sup>2</sup>		Incentive	Motivated <sup>1</sup>	Ranked Top 2 <sup>2</sup>
1.	IPRT	71	80		Foreign Exchange	63	60
2.	Foreign Exchange	38	40		IPRT	55	68

*Source:* Created by author. Notes: 1. This column accounts for the percentage of students who agreed the incentive would increase their performance. 2. This column accounts for the percentage of students who ranked this incentive in the top two.

The preliminary results suggest that although students were not significantly in favor of CGSOC offered incentives for academic performance, they are inclined to increase their performance if the correct incentives are offered. The surveyed students from both classes confirmed that three of the CGSOC-offered incentives would motivate more than 40 percent of them to increase performance in CGSOC. The results from 14-02, the first centrally selected class since the end of Universal ILE, supports this information, and lends confidence to the results for future classes.

#### Effectiveness of Army Sponsored Incentives

This portion of section two is focused on determining what incentives the Army can offer students to maximize academic performance. The same group of students responded to the following five potential Army offered incentives: OML based priority for selecting next duty station, reduced chance for selection in an officer separation board, increased significance of AER during promotion board, performance in CGSOC tracked as a discriminator during SSC selection and performance in CGSOC tracked as a discriminator when applying for advanced civil schooling. As discussed, in the first

portion of section two, the students were slightly inclined to support Army-offered incentives for academic performance in CGSOC. The study found that all five potential Army incentives motivated more than 50 percent of the surveyed students as depicted in table 6. In fact, the study found that the only Army incentive that motivated less than 60 percent of the surveyed class was performance in CGSOC tracked as a discriminator when applying for advanced civil schooling. 68 percent of the surveyed students agreed they would perform better if they received priority in selecting their next duty assignment. This supports by Colonel Luke Grossman's findings and recommendations in "Command and General Staff Officer Education for the 21st Century: Examining the German Model." Priority in selecting duty assignment is a common practice in German officer education system such as FGSOC.<sup>181</sup> The following two incentives: increased chances of promotion and performance in CGSOC used as a discriminator for selection to SSC motivated 66 percent and 64 percent of the surveyed students to improve performance respectively.

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<sup>181</sup>Grossman, 78-79.

Table 6. Combined Class 14-01 and 14-02 Responses to Army Incentives						
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received priority in selecting my next duty assignment, I would perform better.	33	26	13	6	10	<b>88</b>
	38%	30%	15%	7%	11%	
If strong academic performance in CGSOC reduced chances for being selected for Officer Separation Boards, I would perform better.	32	23	12	8	13	<b>88</b>
	36%	26%	14%	9%	15%	
If excelling in CGSOC increased chances for promotion, I would perform better.	36	22	14	6	10	<b>88</b>
	41%	25%	16%	7%	11%	
If performance in CGSOC were tracked as a discriminator for Advanced Civil Schooling, I would perform better.	28	21	19	10	10	<b>88</b>
	32%	24%	22%	11%	11%	
If performance in CGSOC were used as a discriminator for selection to a Senior Service College, I would perform better.	33	23	15	7	10	<b>88</b>
	38%	26%	17%	8%	11%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>440</b>

Source: Created by author.

#### Independent Analysis of Classes 14-01 and 14-02

The researcher analyzed the responses from classes 14-01 and 14-02 independently to determine how different Army offered incentives motivated the two

classes. Analysis of the 14-01 survey responses discovered that 67 percent of the surveyed students were motivated by three Army offered incentives: priority in selecting their next duty assignment, performance in CGSOC used as a discriminator for selection to attend SSC, and performance in CGSOC increasing chances for promotion. All of the offered Army incentives elicited greater than 60 percent of the surveyed students to agree to improve academic performance. When asked to rank order the five Army offered incentives, surveyed students selected priority in next duty assignment as their top choice with performance in CGSOC increasing chances of promotion as a close second. As depicted in table 7, 58 percent of 14-01 ranked priority choice of duty assignment in the top two, and 53 percent of 14-01 ranked increased chances for promotion in their top two. These findings seem to support the work of Grossman and Scales. Scales proclaimed that the Army needed to give equal weight to AERs and OERs in his article “Too Busy to Learn” to maximize participation in professional military education.<sup>182</sup> Grossman’s analysis of the German General Staff Education system supports both of these findings. German officers that excel in The FGSOE are given priority in selecting their next duty assignment and expected to increase their chances for promotion.<sup>183</sup>

The analysis of the surveyed students from class 14-02 revealed similar findings with a slightly more pronounced affinity for priority in selecting next duty assignment than 14-01. Class 14-02 survey responses revealed that 66 percent of the 14-02 surveyed students agreed they would perform better if they received priority selection for their next duty assignment, and 63 percent agreed they would perform better if they increased their

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<sup>182</sup>Scales.

<sup>183</sup>Grossman, 78-79.

chances for promotion. When asked to rank order the five Army-offered incentives, surveyed 14-02 students overall selected priority selection for next duty assignment, first, with 61 percent of the 14-02 surveyed students ranked it in top two. A total of 53 percent of the 14-02 students ranked increased chances for promotion in the top two. The results of the analysis conclude that classes 14-01 and 14-02 are more motivated by Army offered incentives and generally agree on the significance of each of the five incentives.

Table 7. Comparison of Class 14-01 and 14-02 Responses to Army Incentives							
	Class 14-01				Class 14-02		
Rank	Incentive	Motivated <sup>1</sup>	Ranked Top 2 <sup>2</sup>		Incentive	Motivated <sup>1</sup>	Ranked Top 2 <sup>2</sup>
1.	Duty Station	67	58		Duty Station	66	61
2.	Increased Promotion	67	53		Increased Promotion	63	53

*Source:* Created by author. Notes: 1. This column accounts for the percentage of students who agreed the incentive would increase their performance. 2. This column accounts for the percentage of students who ranked this incentive in the top two.

Although students were not significantly in favor of the Army offering incentives for academic performance in CGSOC, greater than 40 percent agreed to increase performance if any of the incentives were offered. The implementation of prioritizing selection for the next duty station inclined more than 66 percent of the surveyed students to agree to improve academic performance. The similar results from the two classes based on their demographics and biases add credibility to the study. These findings are



supported by Colonel Lewis's conclusions that the Army must provide tangible proof that it values education.<sup>184</sup>

### Summary

This chapter applied the research methodology laid out in chapter 3 to generate and analyze information in accordance with the qualitative research design. The analysis of 11 Marshall Award Recipients' oral history interviews generated data and allowed for further analysis against the six evaluation criteria to ultimately determine the answer to the primary research question. The assessment of the CGSOC Performance Based Incentives Survey provided data that when further analyzed provided an answer and points of discussion to the secondary research question. The analysis determined that although students did not strongly endorse performance-based incentives in CGSOC, a majority would increase their performance if incentives were offered. The analysis demonstrated that classes consisting of optimized ILE students and a mixture of selected and remaining universal ILE students both would perform better if incentives were offered. Army offered incentives stimulate the broadest population of students to improve academic performance in CGSOC.

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<sup>184</sup>Lewis, 12.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

The purpose of this research was to determine if there is a correlation between earning the Marshall Award and continued professional success. Marshall Award Recipients from a 10-year period were evaluated against criteria considered by the Army to be indicative of a successful career. The primary research question asked is: What is the correlation, if any, between the Marshall Award and future professional success? The answer to the primary research question is a probable correlation exists, as eight of the 11 recipients met the established criteria and achieved continued professional success.

The research used a qualitative approach to gather responses to the primary and secondary research questions. The research plan included an analysis of regulations and literature and an analysis of Marshall Award Recipient performance compared to benchmark standards. The research also analyzed surveys of CGSOC classes 14-01 and 14-02, which helped answer the following secondary research questions:

1. Should the Army incentivize academic performance at CGSOC?
2. What incentives can CGSOC offer to improve academic performance?
3. What incentives can the Army offer to improve academic performance at CGSOC?

The findings in chapter 4 revealed that although more students answered yes than no to the idea of the Army offering performance based incentives in CGSOC, those in favor did not constitute a statistically significant amount. The fact that there were so many students indifferent to incentives further complicated determining an answer.

However, the number of indifferent responses trended down as the incentives went from CGSOC offered to Army offered. The answer to the question: should the Army incentivize academic performance at CGSOC, is undetermined and requires further study over a series of classes.

While it appears incentives for academic performance are slightly favored, CGSOC has limited options to motivate students. The only incentive CGSOC could offer that motivated a majority of students was increased independent reflection and study time. This conclusion is in line with Dr. Nicholas Murray's analysis of comparing CGSOC to French PME prior to the 1870 war with Prussia. Officers need to time to think and reflect on the subjects they are studying.<sup>185</sup> CGSC requires that students spend too much time in class, according to Murray, becoming indoctrinated, rather than placing the lessons into context.<sup>186</sup> The researcher will make recommendations for implementing this incentive in the recommendations portion of this chapter.

Army offered incentives appear to effectively motivate academic performance. As mentioned previously, the question of whether the Army should offer incentives for academic performance in CGSOC seemed to force 35 percent of the indifferent students to answer yes or no. An Army offered incentive program for academic performance changes the potential outcomes for an officer who decides to prioritize events other than school while attending CGSOC. The number one incentive the Army can offer to improve academic performance is priority in selecting their next duty assignment. German professional military education has experienced great results from correlating

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<sup>185</sup>Murray.

<sup>186</sup>Ibid.

follow on duty assignment to academic performance.<sup>187</sup> A second incentive the Army can offer to improve academic performance is increased chances for promotion. Adult investment in education is contingent upon a likelihood of increased chances for promotion, higher earnings, or some other tangible benefit.<sup>188</sup> As the military mainly links pay increases to promotion, promotion is the only perceivable benefit resulting from increased education. Current practice plays a major role in the insignificance of performance in school, as the goal is to graduate rather than excel.<sup>189</sup>

The idea of Army offered incentives elicited more positive responses overall. The increase in motivation seems plausibly attributed to a shift in the Army's focus. Once the Army demonstrates the path to success is through professional military education, officers will respond accordingly.<sup>190</sup> In effect, Army offered incentives suggest the value of a potential shift in the Army's culture. The importance of education has been noted historically both in the military and in the civilian sectors. Previous research has shown the significance of academic performance in the work environment.<sup>191</sup> The success of the Marshall Award Recipients provides support to the importance of excelling in professional military education for an exclusive group.

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<sup>187</sup>Grossman, 22-23.

<sup>188</sup>Usan and Utoglu, 1.

<sup>189</sup>Hughes, 152-154.

<sup>190</sup>Allen, 100.

<sup>191</sup>Feldman and Ng, 104-109.

### Recommendations

The general conclusions from this research require further study over a series of CGSOC classes. The return to merit-based selection for resident attendance in CGSOC has the possibility of increasing overall student performance.

CGSOC should offer increased independent reflection and study time. Students' comments on the surveys reflected they would work much harder if they had more time to digest what they are studying. Quality graduate schools do not have students spend more than a dozen hours in class per week.<sup>192</sup> CGSOC could easily implement this by moving the first elective term between the common ILE core and AOC. The block time in electives gives students more time to themselves as well as providing some serendipitous benefits, such as focusing on classes students find interesting and developing a deeper understanding of different capabilities or processes that students can implement into exercises in AOC.

The Army should offer priority in choosing duty station of choice based on academic performance. German experience suggests that follow on duty station determined based on academic performance motivates officers to perform better in PME.<sup>193</sup> This action does not cost the Army any money, and it does not prevent Human Resources Command from ensuring "the right officer is assigned, to the right location, at the right time."<sup>194</sup> Officers would understand that the post has to have a valid requisition and position open in order to go there. Choice of duty assignment realistically supports

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<sup>192</sup>Murray.

<sup>193</sup>Grossman, 22-24.

<sup>194</sup>Kennedy.

the demands of Human Resources Command if CGSOC used a continuously updated OML. The OML would account for academic performance in Common Core when duty stations are selected. Students could then choose duty station based on their position on the OML and the duty assignments available. Duty assignments could become finalized after AOC to prevent officers' performance from declining. In addition, this action does not remove power from commanders submitting requests for officers. This merely gives interviewers another data point to determine the officers they want to hire. In addition, this has the unintended benefit of providing families with better stability.

The Army should also consider increasing the value of AERs in the promotion process. In order for officers to value education, the culture has to project that values culture. The AER not need outweigh OERs, but the Army should give AERs equal consideration. "Intellectual achievement must be graded," in the words of Scales, "and assessed with the same rigor and objectivity as manner of performance."<sup>195</sup> The Army should want to know what officers did for a year at CGSOC and ensure they are getting the best return on their investment.<sup>196</sup> This prevents a culture of "better to be selected than attend."

### Limitations

This research was not able to pursue every detail or line of inquiry on this subject. There are many items the research did not attempt to determine or explain. The largest limitation of this research is the study of Marshall Award Recipients. Marshall Award

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<sup>195</sup>Scales.

<sup>196</sup>Allen, 94-96.

Recipients constitute a small group of officers. Marshall Recipients represent one out of approximately 1,000 students and it is difficult to make general assumptions about education and Army officers based on this small population. It is possible that the correlation between excelling in education and future success is not germane to the entire officer corps. The research cannot determine whether the Marshall Award Recipients were successful because of their performance at CGSOC; however 10 of the 11 stated they believed their performance in CGSOC enabled their continued success in the Army. The research does not account for how the Marshall Award Recipients performed prior to CGSOC. The study is not able to account for the large number of indifferent responses in the surveys.

#### Areas for Further Research

There are several areas that warrant additional research.

1. CGSOC has a tumultuous history with class ranking. The school commandant abolished the honor and distinguished graduate system in 1929, arguing it created unhealthy competition and grades did not always match potential. Is there a process like the current German General Staff Officers Course to eliminate self-aggrandizement?
2. Is there a correlation between graduating in the top 20 percent and continued professional success?
3. Is previous performance a better indicator of future performance than education?
4. What impact has 13 years of war/conflict had on Army culture in the promotion system?

5. Should the Army have to offer incentives to improve academic performance in CGSOC?

6. Should the Army change its perceived culture regarding the relationship between operational performance and academic performance? If so, how?



## APPENDIX A

### MARSHALL AWARD RECIPIENT ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Thank you for your time to answer this short list of interview questions.

- What motivated you to perform so well in CGSOC (ILE)?
- Do you feel the Marshall Award helped in the assignments process after CGSOC (i.e. did you assume a KD position immediately or move ahead of other officers already on station)?
- Did you attend SAMS?
- Following CGSOC, did your gaining unit know you were a Marshall Award Recipient?
  - Was your selection as a Marshall Award Recipient ever mentioned in a positive or negative context?
- Did the Marshall Award prove beneficial to your rating?
- Following CGSOC, did the Senior Rater comments you received reflect the level of excellence you exhibited in CGSOC, how so?
- If applicable, what position / job followed your KD time as a MAJ? What position / job followed your KD time as a LTC?
- If applicable, were you selected for below the zone promotion to LTC and or COL?
- If applicable, what year were you selected for promotion to LTC and or COL?
- If applicable, were you selected for BN and or BDE CMD?
- If applicable, were you selected for a Senior Service College?

- Do you feel your performance in PME directly contributed to your performance in the operational environment?
- During your career, did you believe the Army could benefit from offering Officers' incentives for excelling in PME, specifically CGSOC and if so what incentives?

## APPENDIX B

### CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: \_\_\_\_\_ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Room 4508, Lewis & Clark Center  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, \_\_\_\_\_, participated in an oral history interview conducted by \_\_\_\_\_, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: \_\_\_\_\_ concerning the following topic:

\_\_\_\_\_.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

\_\_\_\_\_ None \_\_\_\_\_ Other:

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I

further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

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_____		
Name of Interviewee	Signature	Date

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_____	
Accepted on Behalf of the Army by	Date

## APPENDIX C

### INCENTIVIZING CGSOC PERFORMANCE

#### Summary Report

Friday, April 18, 2014

What is your component?

Response Rate: 97% (N=90) Question Type: Choose one

Active Duty	83
National Guard	5
Army Reserve	2
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>90</b>

What is your gender?

Response Rate: 96% (N=89) Question Type: Choose one

Male	80
Female	9
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>89</b>

What is you CGSOC Class?

Response Rate: 97% (N=90) Question Type: Choose one

AY1401	63
AY1402	27
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>90</b>

Have you satisfied your requirement for Key Development Credit as a Major (for example served as a BN/BDE S3 or XO)?

Response Rate: 97% (N=90) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	15
No	75
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>90</b>

How many months of rated Key Developmental Time do you have as a Major?

Response Rate: 16% (N=15) Question Type: Choose one

1-11 Months	2
12-18 Months	5
19-24 Months	4
25+ Months	4
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>15</b>

Should CGSOC incentivize academic performance?

Response Rate: 94% (N=87) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	31
No	25
Indifferent	31
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>87</b>

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received prioritized parking, I would perform better.	2 2%	5 6%	17 19%	29 33%	36 40%	<b>89</b>
If I could choose my position in AOC exercises (i.e. O100, O200, etc), I would perform better.	3 3%	22 25%	16 18%	26 30%	21 24%	<b>88</b>
If selection for exchange programs (UK, France, Germany, etc) heavily considered academic performance, I would perform better.	18 20%	23 26%	16 18%	15 17%	17 19%	<b>89</b>
If I received prioritized enrollment during electives (to include preferred time of	13 15%	23 26%	17 19%	18 20%	18 20%	<b>89</b>

electives), I would perform better.

If selection to attend a staff ride was based on academic performance, I would perform better.	7	16	26	23	17	<b>89</b>
	8%	18%	29%	26%	19%	
If I could receive increased independent reflection and study time, I would perform better.	34	25	12	9	9	<b>89</b>
	38%	28%	13%	10%	10%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>533</b>

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to which would motivate you to perform better:

Response Rate: 91% (N=85) Question Type: Rank

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in exercise duty position	5	8	9	20	28	12	0	<b>82</b>	<b>316</b>
	6%	9%	11%	24%	33%	14%	0%		
Prioritized parking at CGSOC	0	5	3	6	16	50	2	<b>82</b>	<b>219</b>
	0%	6%	4%	7%	19%	59%	2%		
Prioritized enrollment for electives of your choice and time	11	26	18	20	7	2	0	<b>84</b>	<b>428</b>
	13%	31%	21%	24%	8%	2%	0%		
Priority to participate in foreign exchange programs	17	22	24	10	8	3	0	<b>84</b>	<b>441</b>
	20%	26%	28%	12%	9%	4%	0%		
Increased Individual Reflection and Study time	47	18	8	3	5	2	1	<b>84</b>	<b>509</b>
	55%	21%	9%	4%	6%	2%	1%		
Priority to participate in a staff ride	2	5	21	23	17	13	1	<b>82</b>	<b>319</b>
	2%	6%	25%	27%	20%	15%	1%		
Other	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	<b>8</b>	<b>28</b>
	4%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	5%		
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>506</b>	

## Other Responses

Ability to test out of elective course and receive credit, and or more online credit awarded for self-study	<b>1</b>
Incectivation needs to start prior to coming here. Hopefully at the end of this survey there is a remarks box.	<b>1</b>
Is "1" best? I'll assume so. Sorry about skewing your results with this.	<b>1</b>

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Make the course a Masters Degree producing school for all selected (not just those who choose to complete an MMAS) like the other services.	1
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PREFERRED ASSIGNMENT AFTER COMPLETION	1
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<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>5</b>
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Comments and Recommendations for a CGSOC performance system for administering incentives?

**Response Rate: 42% (N=39) Question Type: Paragraph**

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How graded events would be weighted into the OML would be just as important as to the determination of whether or not to implement. If not planned well, the PT test could become the discriminator among students which would then pull attention away from academic performance.

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Strongly encourage a reduction in contact time. This would significantly improve my quality of work.

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No comments to list at this time.

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14-02 is a class of selected individuals, I don't believe creating an incentive program would make students perform better. I for one strive to do the best I can at all the assignments/tests and don't feel I should be punished because someone is smarter than me. Intelligence does not equal leadership qualities. This program would create a bad precedent.

---

My issue with this potential program is I feel people like me will always work hard because I care about my performance and I genuinely WANT to do well. This kind of program tends to 'motivate' those other individuals who would otherwise (or are currently) just skate through. I think it's best to leave it as it is and those who want to work hard, who care about their performance and set goals (such as graduating in the top 20%), will continue to do what they've always done. It shouldn't be up to CGSC (or the Army) to incentivize performance in an effort to get their professional officers to try harder.

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Fail people that don't meet standards

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I see it as a personal and professional failure if the only reason to perform better was an OML. It is the duty and job of each student(Military Officer) to perform.

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Part of the issue is not necessarily the students. A handful of faculty members have publicized the "stay out of trouble, and you WILL graduate" attitude. Combine that with the fact that most, if not all of the summer class already have their assignments, as long

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as I show up with a diploma (annotation on ORB), then I am good to go, whether I graduate #1 or #1001.

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I do not believe incentives correlate to class performance, therefore an incentive won't motivate me to "try harder"- I'm here in Kansas for a year, might as well give it my best.

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You would need to ensure that grading was standardized across the staff groups to have a fair OML.

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If a Major needs an incentive to do his or her job, they shouldn't be in the Army. A better question would be how to 'punish' or de-incentivize poor performance. Peer evals would probably address that.

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The six incentives are interesting, but none of them particularly excite me. However, knowing where I stand among my peers, through OML or other system, would be a great motivator. If done real time, either by staff section or CGSC-wide, this would provide frequent feedback on my efforts.

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Eliminate the +/- grading system, as it provides the opposite of an incentive because it punishes those who achieve a B- instead of a B, or an A- instead of an A. Recommend also developing a qualitative evaluation/ranking in addition to quantitative, because not everyone performs well under exam/writing situations; therefore, basing an OML only on the writing/exam grades is not a complete reflection of each student's performance & potential.

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no comments

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If there were higher quality students at CGSOC they would make each other perform better. If you kicked out a number of my classmates who have no business being in the Army, let alone in CGSOC, it would make the rest of the staff group better.

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The only area that would motivate me more is to have more time to read the material for class. I prefer to read then discuss. Right now the contact time was far too much in relation to the home material. Incentivizing grades is not the way to go either . . . some people are good at home tests..some are good at multiple choice and some are simply subject to the subjectivity of the professor. I do not think it could be objectively done.

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I think that some of the electives that offer skill identifiers should be incentivized. This way the organization is rewarding performance with opportunity.

---

OML is how West Point assigns branch and post (within the limitations of valid requirements).

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The only incentive required to perform better is an officer's desire to do so as a profession of arms. If an officer needs incentives to perform better than his or her best, then maybe this is not the profession for them.

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All OML and other incentives seem kind of stupid when the grading at CGSOC includes class participation which is completely subjective based on how the instructor grades, and after seeing the scores of classmates and myself, I think unless you go straight to academic grading only then the whole thing is a shame; so who cares.

---

This is my observation only, it seems as though weak academic students were carried, and/or awarded grades to ensure they made it through the course. This includes a few officers in my small group who never spoke, or contributed to the learning environment. In order to fix this, more classroom observation from quality control needs to take place. Those of us who continue to work hard for their grades sometimes suffer.

---

Students should want to do well here regardless of incentive. No matter what job we have in the army or what school we attend, we should always attempt to do our best, with or without incentives. I would probably perform better if there was more reflection time (time at home for me to do all of the homework). I am finding this out now with my elective schedule. I am able to balance my grad school work and my CGSOC work due to the time I have at home after 1230 each day of the week.

---

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>

---

The current calculations for class participation are too subjective and not standardized from one instructor to the next. CGSC needs more independent reflection and study time no matter which COA is adapted. More independent reflection and study time should not be an incentive. It is needed....period. More independent reflection and study time would facilitate higher grades.

---

I don't believe incentivizing anything at CGSOC will increase performance to the degree where it will be worth creating and maintaining the incentives. That's a different study in itself. In my humble opinion, if we truly wanted to see an increase in academic performance at CGSOC the Army would need to increase its overall standards. The Army CSM is discussing and implementing new dress standards, etc, but where does it say anything about no fat people. As long as I can get a profile and hold it until my hair falls out while continuing to be selected for CGSOC and be promoted there's no pressure for me to perform. There are guys here, one in particular some West Point, Oxford, Petraeus staff guy who is on profile and didn't take the PT test but is running a Tough Mudder at the end of April. He's not the only one. As long as the Army has weak standards that underline mediocrity, you're putting lip stick on a pig by trying to incentivize at the school. Once the Big Army plays ball, your program will be the carrot that takes people to levels of academia they haven't previously achieved because they arrived here with the winner mindset as opposed to arriving here trying to escape responsibility and anything

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remotely considered competitive.

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Incentive should be based on 360 evaluation of each student by peers and faculty. The total person concept must be applied.

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Each CGSOC Student's Academic Evaluation Report will capture their GPA and reflect their performance. The school should not have to incentivise field grade officers to perform better by handing out prizes.

---

The OML would be useful as long as it is not published. The SGA could email the top students individual and let them know due to grades etc, they have been selected for an incentive. Therefore it can be an individual drive to receive better grades. The intent should not be to make officers at the bottom look bad or drive an it's all about being on top attitude. We are at CGSOC to learn not to compete. That would make students not want to work together, now your drive is to perform better than an other students so you can receive an incentives.

---

I will perform the same with or without an incentive program. We are professional officers who were branch selected, now board selected, to be here for a year that is all the incentive you need.

---

I feel I performed to the best of my ability without incentives. I feel there is not enough reflection time, to spend time on the topics taught rather than pushing forward without time to reflect, read or research more on our own, or engage in deeper discussion with our peers. Not sure if incentives is the right answer. Perhaps a design approach to the program of instruction as a whole; analyzing the entire curriculum rather than cutting here and there to add content or reduce hours.

---

There is a down side to this also, though. There are already some people that are too competitive. I would envision there would be more, and less cooperation among colleagues, which would detract from the overall experience of CGSC. Double-edged sword somewhat...

---

There should be none. This course should meet the Army's criteria for development, but require students to apply themselves without incentives. His or her career will later reflect the effort put forward.

---

CONCUR THAT AN ACADEMIC OML WOULD BE AN ADEQUATE MEASURE FOR AN OML

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The parking option is ridiculous. CGSC doesn't have a parking problem, it has a MAJOR walking problem.

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The problem with incentivizing performance at CGSOC is that it links performance to a material/extrinsic reward. As professionals, we ought to be intrinsically motivated to

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learn as much as we can. If we fail to seize this opportunity, then we ultimately will pay the price of being passed over for promotion, etc. The Bottom Line is that our education is a personal responsibility--not the responsibility of an institution.

---

Need to standardize grading and evaluation. Oddly, the two MAJs with mechanized experience fared better in my class than the rest. Why? Because our instructor had spent his career in mechanized units. The SOF guy? Bottom of the pile. Why? Because the instructor had a bad experience with a team in AFG. Politics shouldn't play in a classroom.

---

I have been told repeatedly that CGSOC is a professional development program. Creating incentive or an OML will not foster professional development. Instead it will cause students to focus more on deliverables and easily measurable metrics of performance. CGSOC students are currently not rewarded for working well as a member of a team or building relationships.

---

This is our job. You shouldn't need an incentive to do you job. More incentives (except for stuff like SAMS, or limited availability stuff like foreign exchange) just makes students start competing with each other rather than coalesce as a group.

---

**Total Responses: 39**

If there were an OML at CGSOC, I would perform better.

Response Rate: 95% (N=88) Question Type: Choose one

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Yes	32
No	30
Indifferent	26
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>88</b>

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Is an OML the preferred method for allocating incentives?

Response Rate: 95% (N=88) Question Type: Choose one

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Yes	34
No	31
Indifferent	23
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>88</b>

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Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received priority in selecting my next duty assignment, I would perform better.	33	26	13	6	10	88
	38%	30%	15%	7%	11%	
If strong academic performance in CGSOC reduced chances for being selected for Officer Separation Boards, I would perform better.	32	23	12	8	13	88
	36%	26%	14%	9%	15%	
If excelling in CGSOC increased chances for promotion, I would perform better.	36	22	14	6	10	88
	41%	25%	16%	7%	11%	
If performance in CGSOC were tracked as a discriminator for Advanced Civil Schooling, I would perform better.	28	21	19	10	10	88
	32%	24%	22%	11%	11%	
If performance in CGSOC were used as a discriminator for selection to a Senior Service College, I would perform better.	33	23	15	7	10	88
	38%	26%	17%	8%	11%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>440</b>

Should the Army incentivize performance during CGSOC?

Response Rate: 92% (N=86) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	34
No	32
Indifferent to the idea	20
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>86</b>

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to what would motivate you to perform better:

Response Rate: 91% (N=85) Question Type: Rank

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in selecting next duty assignment	38 45%	12 14%	8 9%	13 15%	11 13%	0 0%	82	381
Reduced chances of selection during Officer Separation Board	12 14%	17 20%	14 16%	13 15%	25 29%	0 0%	81	302
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during Senior Service College selection boards	7 8%	13 15%	30 35%	21 25%	10 12%	0 0%	81	310
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during promotion boards	18 21%	27 32%	18 21%	14 16%	4 5%	0 0%	81	365
Increased opportunity in attending Advanced Civil Schooling	7 8%	13 15%	11 13%	20 24%	31 36%	0 0%	82	273
Other	3 4%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	3 4%	6	21
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>413</b>	

#### Other Responses

NONE	2
No of the above would motivate me to perform better - I always try to perform in order to exceed the standards.	1
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>3</b>

What are your thoughts on incentivizing performance in CGSOC?

Response Rate: 41% (N=38) Question Type: Paragraph

The incentives would have to be transparent to the students in order to be seen as relevant to the students.

Incentives should not be used as a motivator in order to motivate a person to achieve or exceed the standard.

It needs to be done IOT justify the validity of CGSOC otherwise there's no significance to attending the college if everyone has the same title next to their name of "graduate."

CGSC is where the Army taught me that doing the bare minimum is the smart thing to do. My lowest grade is an A-, and I only have two of those. Leadership who would tout the virtues of doing well as preparing yourself for the future have a misunderstanding of CGSC academics as they are presented. Focusing too much on the academics as

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presented reduced the ability of the student to focus and develop him or herself. Yet every student will get the same pat on the ass on their way out the door. If it's competitive, make it competitive, and if it's not, then don't church the school up all the time.

---

I don't think incentives should be offered for "working harder" in CGSC. Some people get it, some don't...that should be reward enough. If someone isn't "getting it" usually those are the people that are trying the hardest.

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I think the Army should base all of those things on both your OERs and AERs.

---

I think that rather incentivize, the standards should be higher.

---

These are much more impressive incentives. As it currently stands, there seems to be little incentive to do well in CGSC except the opportunity to be in the top 20%. However, most will tell you that your AER matters little after graduation.

---

I like the idea of having an OML that comes out of CGSOC that will assist or let high ranking students to attend advanced civil schooling. Also if a person is within the top 10% of the CGSOC class I believe they should be able to write a paper, with a topic given to them by a faculty member and then have that count as a masters thesis.

---

As a National Guardsman, increased significance of the AER on selection for Resident SSC boards, as well as increased significance of the AER on both promotion boards & for AGR control grade assignments (we must have an authorized MTOE/TDA position, as well as a control grade AGR position before we can get promoted), would be beneficial & provide great incentive to be the top performer.

---

Incentivizing performance at CGSOC is going to lead to most students not achieving balance during the year of CGSOC by competitive students worrying more about the grading rubric than the content of the course, and spending time with family, and physical and spiritual fitness that often get neglected in high-stress jobs.

---

I think this is a horrible idea. Some people are also balancing masters degree programs. It would be cut throat.. Not a good idea.. it doesn't matter if you get a 100 or a 90 as long as you are learning the material. Everyone learns different. I do not recommend this.

---

I do not believe that any schooling I have done in the Army has affected my performance or selection for ACS; however, that has not stopped me from performing well in them anyway.

---

An incentives program based on performance in CGSOC requires unbiased professionals to oversee the rating process. I am not so sure this will work for everyone, but it may increase the overall performance of the students.

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the priority of duty assignments is a difficult one to identify with this academic performance since most of us need a network to get a duty assignment that is of our choice. however, if HRC,DA, whoever wants to incentivise duty assignments then the students from here should get a priority for a division or BCT assignment as opposed to the "box-o-books" option. those guys get a new duty assignment usually a division or BCT then they jump the queue for KD slots.

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Incentivizing is much needed. The current system does not work. Several people in my staff group are zero value added, however, their ORB will reflect resident course and place them in the upper-half. I'm sure this story is not unique to me.

---

CGSC performance should be considered on promotion/CSL/and separation boards as it would help identify those who do the bare minimum or lag behind their peers from those who excel.

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again, unless you go straight to only academic grading and remove all subjective to grading the program is a sham; I have watched too much participant grading being completely subjective and based on the instructors' initial impressions (a rookie mistake for an instructor) and with such a failure in the fair grading of participation this would lead to a highly toxic environment at CGSOC.

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Long overdue, to some this year is simply a "have to do", and not a "want to do."

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>

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I believe that it would be beneficial to incentivize CGSOC however I do not think it is feasible due primarily to the diverse civilian education and military career backgrounds of students prior to arrival. If the incentives were punitive or negative in anyway, students who were disadvantaged would cry foul and there would be an increase in scrutiny placed on achieving "scores" rather than actually learning and retaining information. Additionally, I believe that there would be an increase in race and gender related complaints due to the race and gender bias within the DoD. Minority and female students would complain if tactics grades were weighed in higher for the overall students' academic scores due to the fact that a disproportionate amount of female and minority officers serve in MFE branches. I believe this could be accounted for if the performances were rated and incentives were awarded branch specifically.

---

The current calculations for class participation are too subjective and not standardized from one instructor to the next. Instructors are too biased based on branch and early performance in the course. There is no possible way to turn around a rough start in the beginning of CGSC and to be graded fairly by the instructors.

---

The Army absolutely must begin incentivizing performance at PME schooling. I excelled at both my OBC and CCC courses, finishing in the top 5% of my class both times. Regularly I watched officers fail exams only to be given a re-test, for which I was required to tutor them in order to ensure they passed. These individuals endured



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absolutely zero negative actions for their failure to meet the standard other than getting a second shot at the standard. Particularly in an Army where we are choosing who to keep and who to release performance at PME is a good indicator of talent, ability, and dedication to duty.

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I didn't like how you worded the previous pages questions. I answered them honestly for me. I'm the percent here that's already busting my ass in CGSOC, Masters at night, and trying not to get a divorce because I'm studying and my wife doesn't think I want to hang out with her. I would have "strongly agreed" on all of them if they weren't in the first person. I wouldn't study any harder if it was incentivized because I can't; however, I believe many of the smart people who mope around these halls and are capable of much more would perform better.

---

No General Officer gives two seconds to an AER nor will they. How you perform in school is no reflection on how you will perform as an officer in a line unit. It is only those in academia who believe that how I perform here will reflect in how I am as an officer. Incentive = stupid. I used this year here to enjoy my family, I did only well enough to pass the course. If I wanted to dedicate time to school I would have but family is way more important than listening to someone discuss their take on leadership, no offense but they were LTC (R) they have a limited knowledge of true leadership. How about replacing them with GOs and CEOs to teach us about leadership.

---

Anything worth doing is worth doing well. I believe that incentivizing performance in CGSOC has some positive benefits such as increased competition and focus on academics during. I am however, concerned about the potential for unhealthy competition and degradation in the level of collaboration among students within a staff group. I believe that one of the major objective of CGSOC should be to teach students how to work together as a team; it is therefore my opinion that ranking students on an individual OML scale could negatively impact their desire to build a team mentality.

---

The manner of performance captured on the Academic Evaluation Report should matter to selection boards. If it does not then there is no incentive to study hard compared to those who do the minimal possible to graduate.

---

First, with classes now being boarded for CGSC I'm sure most people won't be overly concerned about its impact on the OSBs (yet). Second, although I am somewhat interested in incentivizing the CGSOC-related aspects, electives, foreign exchange, etc. I think making it competitive at the Army level could seriously detract from the cooperation, team building, shared learning, and cohesion that takes place. I believe the school should strive to retain a free academic environment, the competitiveness army-wide is already in place just by being selected to attend CGSOC.

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More pressure in CGSC may result in higher negative effects. For some CGSOC is stressful enough.

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It should not be done. Your performance is already a basis for the OSB. They look at all OERs and 1059s now so row well and live. Everything you do helps you get promoted slack off for a year and you are not ready to support the commander and the subordinate companies.

---

See previous statement. Incentives should not result in better performance. As officers afforded the opportunity to attend the resident CGSC, without trying to balance normal MTOE/TDA duty with completing PME requirements, we should be expected to put full effort into our academics. An incentive program may increase an already prevalent sense of entitlement in many students.

---

Again, could make people more cut throat, and how much more of that do we really need among a bunch of type-A personalities?

---

Students should strive to perform well for their own benefit and to help them achieve success in their KD position. Providing a short term incentive simply makes it harder to identify the good officers from the lazy ones who need someone else to motivate them.

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GENERALLY, A PROFESSIONAL OFFICER SHOULD PERFORM TO THEIR BEST ABILITY, HOWEVER, AS A BONUS HOW YOU RANK AGAINST YOUR PEER GROUP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE ASSIGNMENT, ETC....

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It is a shame that it isn't already. I absolutely support this action.

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See previous comment

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Sure.

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Incentivizing CGSOC could benefit future field grade officers if additional metrics were implemented. For example, as field grade officers we will be expected to implement the "Mission Command" philosophy. Mission Command requires leaders to empower subordinates, build relationships, and be able to function as a team member. Currently there are no metrics in place that gauge a major's non-tangible qualities.

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**Total Responses: 38**

## APPENDIX D

### INCENTIVIZING CGSOC PERFORMANCE

#### Summary Report

Friday, April 18, 2014

What is your component?

Response Rate: 100% (N=63) Question Type: Choose one

Active Duty	60
National Guard	2
Army Reserve	1
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>63</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

What is your gender?

Response Rate: 98% (N=62) Question Type: Choose one

Male	56
Female	6
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>62</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

What is your CGSOC Class?

Response Rate: 100% (N=63) Question Type: Choose one

AY1401	63
AY1402	0
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>63</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

Have you satisfied your requirement for Key Development Credit as a Major (for example served as a BN/BDE S3 or XO)?

Response Rate: 100% (N=63) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	12
No	51
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>63</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

How many months of rated Key Developmental Time do you have as a Major?

Response Rate: 19% (N=12) Question Type: Choose one

1-11 Months	1
12-18 Months	5
19-24 Months	3
25+ Months	3
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>12</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

Should CGSOC incentivize academic performance?

Response Rate: 95% (N=60) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	23
No	18
Indifferent	19
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>60</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

### Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received prioritized parking, I would perform better.	2 3%	4 6%	11 18%	19 31%	26 42%	<b>62</b>
If I could choose my position in AOC exercises (i.e. O100, O200, etc), I would perform better.	2 3%	18 29%	10 16%	16 26%	16 26%	<b>62</b>
If selection for exchange programs (UK, France, Germany, etc) heavily considered academic performance, I would perform better.	12 19%	12 19%	12 19%	11 18%	15 24%	<b>62</b>

If I received prioritized enrollment during electives (to include preferred time of electives), I would perform better.	7	16	12	12	15	<b>62</b>
	11%	26%	19%	19%	24%	
If selection to attend a staff ride was based on academic performance, I would perform better.	5	14	15	14	14	<b>62</b>
	8%	23%	24%	23%	23%	
If I could receive increased independent reflection and study time, I would perform better.	25	19	7	5	6	<b>62</b>
	40%	31%	11%	8%	10%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>372</b>

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to which would motivate you to perform better:

**Response Rate: 95% (N=60) Question Type: Rank**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in exercise duty position	4	8	6	16	17	8	0	<b>59</b>	<b>237</b>
	7%	13%	10%	27%	28%	13%	0%		
Prioritized parking at CGSOC	0	5	0	3	8	41	2	<b>59</b>	<b>150</b>
	0%	8%	0%	5%	13%	68%	3%		
Prioritized enrollment for electives of your choice and time	6	15	14	16	7	2	0	<b>60</b>	<b>291</b>
	10%	25%	23%	27%	12%	3%	0%		
Priority to participate in foreign exchange programs	5	19	18	8	7	3	0	<b>60</b>	<b>298</b>
	8%	32%	30%	13%	12%	5%	0%		
Increased Individual Reflection and Study time	40	8	5	1	4	1	1	<b>60</b>	<b>372</b>
	67%	13%	8%	2%	7%	2%	2%		
Priority to participate in a staff ride	2	5	17	15	15	4	1	<b>59</b>	<b>243</b>
	3%	8%	28%	25%	25%	7%	2%		
Other	3	0	0	0	1	0	3	<b>7</b>	<b>27</b>
	5%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	5%		
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>364</b>	

## Other Responses

Ability to test out of elective course and receive credit, and or more online credit awarded for self-study	1
Incentivation needs to start prior to coming here. Hopefully at the end of this survey there is a remarks box.	1
Is "1" best? I'll assume so. Sorry about skewing your results with this.	1
Make the course a Masters Degree producing school for all selected (not just those who choose to complete an MMAS) like the other services.	1
PREFERRED ASSIGNMENT AFTER COMPLETION	1
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>5</b>

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Comments and Recommendations for a CGSOC performance system for administering incentives?

**Response Rate: 46% (N=29) Question Type: Paragraph**

How graded events would be weighted into the OML would be just as important as to the determination of whether or not to implement. If not planned well, the PT test could become the discriminator among students which would then pull attention away from academic performance.

If you convert CGSOC to a masters degree producing course for all that are selected (like the other services) then the incentive becomes getting the masters degree. Students in classes 14-01 and 14-02 have placed great emphasis on whatever masters program they selected to undertake versus the actual CGSOC curriculum. I have heard on several occasions "my main effort is (insert school here), and my secondary effort is CGSC".

Strongly encourage a reduction in contact time. This would significantly improve my quality of work.

No comments to list at this time.

My issue with this potential program is I feel people like me will always work hard because I care about my performance and I genuinely WANT to do well. This kind of program tends to 'motivate' those other individuals who would otherwise (or are currently) just skate through. I think it's best to leave it as it is and those who want to work hard, who care about their performance and set goals (such as graduating in the top 20%), will continue to do what they've always done. It shouldn't be up to CGSC (or the

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Army) to incentivize performance in an effort to get their professional officers to try harder.

---

Fail people that don't meet standards

---

I see it as a personal and professional failure if the only reason to perform better was an OML. It is the duty and job of each student(Military Officer) to perform.

---

Part of the issue is not necessarily the students. A handful of faculty members have publicized the "stay out of trouble, and you WILL graduate" attitude. Combine that with the fact that most, if not all of the summer class already have their assignments, as long as I show up with a diploma (annotation on ORB), then I am good to go, whether I graduate #1 or #1001.

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If a Major needs an incentive to do his or her job, they shouldn't be in the Army. A better question would be how to 'punish' or de-incentivize poor performance. Peer evals would probably address that.

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The six incentives are interesting, but none of them particularly excite me. However, knowing where I stand among my peers, through OML or other system, would be a great motivator. If done real time, either by staff section or CGSC-wide, this would provide frequent feedback on my efforts.

---

If there were higher quality students at CGSOC they would make each other perform better. If you kicked out a number of my classmates who have no business being in the Army, let alone in CGSOC, it would make the rest of the staff group better.

---

The only area that would motivate me more is to have more time to read the material for class. I prefer to read then discuss. Right now the contact time was far too much in relation to the home material. Incentivizing grades is not the way to go either . . . some people are good at home tests..some are good at multiple choice and some are simply subject to the subjectivity of the professor. I do not think it could be objectively done.

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---

The inly incentive required to perform better is an officers desire to do so as a profession of arms. If an officer needs incentives to perform better than his or her best, than maybe this is not the profession for them.

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This is my observation only, it seems as though weak academic students were carried, and or awarded grades to ensure they made it through the course. This includes a few

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officers in my small group who never spoke, or contributed to the learning environment. In order to fix this, more classroom observation from quality control needs to take place. Those of us who continue to work hard for their grades sometimes suffer.

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Students should want to do well here regardless of incentive. No matter what job we have in the army or what school we attend, we should always attempt to do our best, with or without incentives. I would probably perform better if there was more reflection time (time at home for me to do all of the homework). I am finding this out now with my elective schedule. I am able to balance my grad school work and my CGSOC work due to the time I have at home after 1230 each day of the week.

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<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>

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The current calculations for class participation are too subjective and not standardized from one instructor to the next. CGSC needs more independent reflection and study time no matter which COA is adapted. More independent reflection and study time should not be an incentive. It is needed....period. More independent reflection and study time would facilitate higher grades.

---

I don't believe incentivizing anything at CGSOC will increase performance to the degree where it will be worth creating and maintaining the incentives. That's a different study in itself. In my humble opinion, if we truly wanted to see an increase in academic performance at CGSOC the Army would need to increase its overall standards. The Army CSM is discussing and implementing new dress standards, etc, but where does it say anything about no fat people. As long as I can get a profile and hold it until my hair falls out while continuing to be selected for CGSOC and be promoted there's no pressure for me to perform. There are guys here, one in particular some West Point, Oxford, Petrause staff guy who is on profile and didn't take the PT test but is running a Tough Mudder at the end of April. He's not the only one. As long as the Army has weak standards that underline mediocracy, you're putting lip stick on a pig by trying to incentivize at the school. Once the Big Army plays ball, your program will be the carrot that takes people to levels of academia they haven't previously achieved because they arrived here with the winner mindset as opposed to arriving here trying to escape responsibility and anything remotely considered competitive.

---

Incentive should be based on 360 evaluation of each student by peers and faculty. The total person concept must be applied.

---

I will perform the same with or without an incentive program. We are professional officers who were branch selected, now board selected, to be here for a year that is all the incentive you need.

---

I feel I performed to the best of my ability without incentives. I feel there is not enough reflection time, to spend time on the topics taught rather than pushing forward without time to reflect, read or research more on our own, or engage in deeper discussion with our



peers. Not sure if incentives is the right answer. Perhaps a design approach to the program of instruction as a whole; analyzing the entire curriculum rather than cutting here and there to add content or reduce hours.

There is a down side to this also, though. There are already some people that are too competitive. I would envision there would be more, and less cooperation among colleagues, which would detract from the overall experience of CGSC. Double-edged sword somewhat...

There should be none. This course should meet the Army's criteria for development, but require students to apply themselves without incentives. His or her career will later reflect the effort put forward.

CONCUR THAT AN ACADEMIC OML WOULD BE AN ADEQUATE MEASURE FOR AN OML

The parking option is ridiculous. CGSC doesn't have a parking problem, it has a MAJOR walking problem.

The problem with incentivizing performance at CGSOC is that it links performance to a material/extrinsic reward. As professionals, we ought to be intrinsically motivated to learn as much as we can. If we fail to seize this opportunity, then we ultimately will pay the price of being passed over for promotion, etc. The Bottom Line is that our education is a personal responsibility--not the responsibility of an institution.

Need to standardize grading and evaluation. Oddly, the two MAJs with mechanized experience fared better in my class than the rest. Why? Because our instructor had spent his career in mechanized units. The SOF guy? Bottom of the pile. Why? Because the instructor had a bad experience with a team in AFG. Politics shouldn't play in a classroom.

---

**Total Responses: 29**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

If there were an OML at CGSOC, I would perform better.

**Response Rate: 97% (N=61) Question Type: Choose one**

Yes	20
No	23
Indifferent	18
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>61</b>

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Is an OML the preferred method for allocating incentives?

**Response Rate: 97% (N=61) Question Type: Choose one**

Yes	<b>24</b>
No	<b>23</b>
Indifferent	<b>14</b>
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>61</b>

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Scale 1

**Question Type: Choose one**

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received priority in selecting my next duty assignment, I would perform better.	21 34%	20 33%	11 18%	3 5%	6 10%	<b>61</b>
If strong academic performance in CGSOC reduced chances for being selected for Officer Separation Boards, I would perform better.	20 33%	19 31%	9 15%	5 8%	8 13%	<b>61</b>
If excelling in CGSOC increased chances for promotion, I would perform better.	22 36%	19 31%	11 18%	3 5%	6 10%	<b>61</b>
If performance in CGSOC were tracked as a discriminator for Advanced Civil Schooling, I would perform better.	20 33%	18 30%	12 20%	5 8%	6 10%	<b>61</b>
If performance in CGSOC were used as a discriminator for selection to a Senior Service College, I would perform better.	24 39%	17 28%	11 18%	3 5%	6 10%	<b>61</b>

<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>305</b>
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**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Should the Army incentivize performance during CGSOC?

**Response Rate: 94% (N=59) Question Type: Choose one**

Yes	<b>23</b>
No	<b>23</b>
Indifferent to the idea	<b>13</b>

**Total Responses 59**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to what would motivate you to perform better:

**Response Rate: 94% (N=59) Question Type: Rank**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in selecting next duty assignment	27 46%	7 12%	5 8%	10 17%	9 15%	0 0%	<b>58</b>	<b>265</b>
Reduced chances of selection during Officer Separation Board	8 14%	12 20%	9 15%	10 17%	18 31%	0 0%	<b>57</b>	<b>210</b>
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during Senior Service College selection boards	4 7%	10 17%	22 37%	15 25%	6 10%	0 0%	<b>57</b>	<b>219</b>
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during promotion boards	14 24%	17 29%	15 25%	8 14%	3 5%	0 0%	<b>57</b>	<b>259</b>
Increased opportunity in attending Advanced Civil Schooling	5 8%	12 20%	6 10%	14 24%	21 36%	0 0%	<b>58</b>	<b>198</b>
Other	1 2%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 3%	<b>3</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>290</b>	

Other Responses

No of the above would motivate me to perform better - I always try to perform in order to exceed the standards.	<b>1</b>
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**Total Responses 1**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

What are your thoughts on incentivizing performance in CGSOC?

Response Rate: 44% (N=28) Question Type: Paragraph

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The incentives would have to be transparent to the students in order to be seen as relevant to the students.

---

Incentives should not be used as a motivator in order to motivate a person to achieve or exceed the standard.

---

It needs to be done IOT justify the validity of CGSOC otherwise there's no significance to attending the college if everyone has the same title next to their name of "graduate."

---

CGSC is where the Army taught me that doing the bare minimum is the smart thing to do. My lowest grade is an A-, and I only have two of those. Leadership who would tout the virtues of doing well as preparing yourself for the future have a misunderstanding of CGSC academics as they are presented. Focusing too much on the academics as presented reduced the ability of the student to focus and develop him or herself. Yet every student will get the same pat on the ass on their way out the door. If it's competitive, make it competitive, and if it's not, then don't church the school up all the time.

---

I think that rather incentivize, the standards should be higher.

---

These are much more impressive incentives. As it currently stands, there seems to be little incentive to do well in CGSC except the opportunity to be in the top 20%. However, most will tell you that your AER matters little after graduation.

---

I like the idea of having an OML that comes out of CGSOC that will assist or let high ranking students to attend advanced civil schooling. Also if a person is within the top 10% of the CGSOC class I believe they should be able to write a paper, with a topic given to them by a faculty member and then have that count as a masters thesis.

---

Incentivizing performance at CGSOC is going to lead to most students not achieving balance during the year of CGSOC by cometicitive students worrying more about the grading ruberic than the content of the course, and spending time with family, and physical and spiritual fitness that often get neglected in high-stress jobs.

---

I do not believe that any schooling I have done in the Army has affected my performance or selection for ACS; however, that has not stopped me from performing well in them anyway.

---

An incentives program based on performance in CGSOC requires unbiased professionals to oversee the rating process. I am not so sure this will work for everyone, but it may increase the overall performance of the students.

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---

the priority of duty assignments is a difficult one to identify with this academic performance since most of us need a network to get a duty assignment that is of our choice. However, if HRC, DA, whoever wants to incentivize duty assignments then the students from here should get a priority for a division or BCT assignment as opposed to the "box-o-books" option. Those guys get a new duty assignment usually a division or BCT then they jump the queue for KD slots.

---

Incentivizing is much needed. The current system does not work. Several people in my staff group are zero value added, however, their ORB will reflect resident course and place them in the upper-half. I'm sure this story is not unique to me.

---

CGSC performance should be considered on promotion/CSL and separation boards as it would help identify those who do the bare minimum or lag behind their peers from those who excel.

---

Long overdue, to some this year is simply a "have to do", and not a "want to do."

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<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc>

---

I believe that it would be beneficial to incentivize CGSOC however I do not think it is feasible due primarily to the diverse civilian education and military career backgrounds of students prior to arrival. If the incentives were punitive or negative in anyway, students who were disadvantaged would cry foul and there would be an increase in scrutiny placed on achieving "scores" rather than actually learning and retaining information. Additionally, I believe that there would be an increase in race and gender related complaints due to the race and gender bias within the DoD. Minority and female students would complain if tactics grades were weighed in higher for the overall students' academic scores due to the fact that a disproportionate amount of female and minority officers serve in MFE branches. I believe this could be accounted for if the performances were rated and incentives were awarded branch specifically.

---

The current calculations for class participation are too subjective and not standardized from one instructor to the next. Instructors are too biased based on branch and early performance in the course. There is no possible way to turn around a rough start in the beginning of CGSC and to be graded fairly by the instructors.

---

I didn't like how you worded the previous pages questions. I answered them honestly for me. I'm the percent here that's already busting my ass in CGSOC, Masters at night, and trying not to get a divorce because I'm studying and my wife doesn't think I want to hang out with her. I would have "strongly agreed" on all of them if they weren't in the first person. I wouldn't study any harder if it was incentivized because I can't; however, I believe many of the smart people who mope around these halls and are capable of much more would perform better.

---

---

No General Officer gives two seconds to an AER nor will they. How you perform in school is no reflection on how you will perform as an officer in a line unit. It is only those in academia who believe that how I perform here will reflect in how I am as an officer. Incentive = stupid. I used this year here to enjoy my family, I did only well enough to pass the course. If I wanted to dedicate time to school I would have but family is way more important than listening to someone discuss their take on leadership, no offense but they were LTC (R) they have a limited knowledge of true leadership. How about replacing them with GOs and CEOs to teach us about leadership.

---

Anything worth doing is worth doing well. I believe that incentivizing performance in CGSOC has some positive benefits such as increased competition and focus on academics during. I am however, concerned about the potential for unhealthy competition and degradation in the level of collaboration among students within a staff group. I believe that one of the major objective of CGSOC should be to teach students how to work together as a team; it is therefore my opinion that ranking students on an individual OML scale could negatively impact their desire to build a team mentality.

---

It should not be done. Your performance is already a basis for the OSB. They look at all OERs and 1059s now so row well and live. Everything you do helps you get promoted slack off for a year and you are not ready to support the commander and the subordinate companies.

---

See previous statement. Incentives should not result in better performance. As officers afforded the opportunity to attend the resident CGSC, without trying to balance normal MTOE/TDA duty with completing PME requirements, we should be expected to put full effort into our academics. An incentive program may increase an already prevalent sense of entitlement in many students.

---

Again, could make people more cut throat, and how much more of that do we really need among a bunch of type-A personalities?

---

Students should strive to perform well for their own benefit and to help them achieve success in their KD position. Providing a short term incentive simply makes it harder to identify the good officers from the lazy ones who need someone else to motivate them.

---

GENERALLY, A PROFESSIONAL OFFICER SHOULD PERFORM TO THEIR BEST ABILITY, HOWEVER, AS A BONUS HOW YOU RANK AGAINST YOUR PEER GROUP SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE ASSIGNMENT, ETC....

---

It is a shame that it isn't already. I absolutely support this action.

---

See previous comment

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Sure.

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**Total Responses: 28**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1401*

## APPENDIX E

### INCENTIVIZING CGSOC PERFORMANCE

#### Summary Report

Friday, April 18, 2014

What is your component?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

Active Duty	23
National Guard	3
Army Reserve	1
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>27</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

What is your gender?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

Male	24
Female	3
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>27</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

What is your CGSOC Class?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

AY1401	0
AY1402	27
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>27</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

Have you satisfied your requirement for Key Development Credit as a Major (for example served as a BN/BDE S3 or XO)?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	3
No	24
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>27</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All



[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

How many months of rated Key Developmental Time do you have as a Major?

Response Rate: 11% (N=3) Question Type: Choose one

1-11 Months	1
12-18 Months	0
19-24 Months	1
25+ Months	1
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>3</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

Should CGSOC incentivize academic performance?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	8
No	7
Indifferent	12
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>27</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

### Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received prioritized parking, I would perform better.	0 0%	1 4%	6 22%	10 37%	10 37%	27
If I could choose my position in AOC exercises (i.e. O100, O200, etc), I would perform better.	1 4%	4 15%	6 23%	10 38%	5 19%	26
If selection for exchange programs (UK, France, Germany, etc) heavily considered academic performance, I would perform better.	6 22%	11 41%	4 15%	4 15%	2 7%	27

If I received prioritized enrollment during electives (to include preferred time of electives), I would perform better.	6	7	5	6	3	<b>27</b>
	22%	26%	19%	22%	11%	
If selection to attend a staff ride was based on academic performance, I would perform better.	2	2	11	9	3	<b>27</b>
	7%	7%	41%	33%	11%	
If I could receive increased independent reflection and study time, I would perform better.	9	6	5	4	3	<b>27</b>
	33%	22%	19%	15%	11%	
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>161</b>

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402*

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to which would motivate you to perform better:

**Response Rate: 93% (N=25) Question Type: Rank**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in exercise duty position	1	0	3	4	11	4	0	<b>23</b>	<b>79</b>
	4%	0%	12%	16%	44%	16%	0%		
Prioritized parking at CGSOC	0	0	3	3	8	9	0	<b>23</b>	<b>69</b>
	0%	0%	12%	12%	32%	36%	0%		
Prioritized enrollment for electives of your choice and time	5	11	4	4	0	0	0	<b>24</b>	<b>137</b>
	20%	44%	16%	16%	0%	0%	0%		
Priority to participate in foreign exchange programs	12	3	6	2	1	0	0	<b>24</b>	<b>143</b>
	48%	12%	24%	8%	4%	0%	0%		
Increased Individual Reflection and Study time	7	10	3	2	1	1	0	<b>24</b>	<b>137</b>
	28%	40%	12%	8%	4%	4%	0%		
Priority to participate in a staff ride	0	0	4	8	2	9	0	<b>23</b>	<b>76</b>
	0%	0%	16%	32%	8%	36%	0%		
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>
	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%		
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>142</b>	

## Other Responses

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### Total Responses

0

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402*

Comments and Recommendations for a CGSOC performance system for administering incentives?

**Response Rate: 37% (N=10) Question Type: Paragraph**

---

14-02 is a class of selected individuals, I don't believe creating an incentive program would make students perform better. I for one strive to do the best I can at all the assignments/tests and don't feel I should be punished because someone is smarter than me. Intelligence does not equal leadership qualities. This program would create a bad precedent.

I do not believe incentives correlate to class performance, therefore an incentive won't motivate me to "try harder"- I'm here in Kansas for a year, might as well give it my best. You would need to ensure that grading was standardized across the staff groups to have a fair OML.

Eliminate the +/- grading system, as it provides the opposite of an incentive because it punishes those who achieve a B- instead of a B, or an A- instead of an A. Recommend also developing a qualitative evaluation/ranking in addition to quantitative, because not everyone performs well under exam/writing situations; therefore, basing an OML only on the writing/exam grades is not a complete reflection of each student's performance & potential.

no comments

All OML and other incentives seems kind of stupid when the grading at CGSOC includes class participation which is completely subjective based on how the instructor grades, and after seeing the scores of classmates and myself, I think unless you go straight to academic grading only then the whole thing is a shame; so who cares.

Each CGSOC Student's Academic Evaluation Report will capture their GPA and reflect their performance. The school should not have to incentivise field grade officers to perform better by handing out prizes.

The OML would be useful as long as it is not published. The SGA could email the top students individual and let them know due to grades etc, they have been selected for an incentive. Therefore it can be an individual drive to receive better grades. The intent should not be to make officers at the bottom look bad or drive an it's all about being on top attitude. We are at CGSOC to learn not to compete. That would make students not

want to work together, now your drive is to perform better than an other students so you can receive an incentives.

I have been told repeatedly that CGSOC is a professional development program. Creating incentive or an OML will not foster professional development. Instead it will cause students to focus more on deliverables and easily measurable metrics of performance. CGSOC students are currently not rewarded for working well as a member of a team or building relationships.

This is our job. You shouldn't need an incentive to do you job. More incentives (except for stuff like SAMS, or limited availability stuff like foreign exchange) just makes students start competing with each other rather than coalesce as a group.

---

**Total Responses: 10**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is you CGSOC Class? AY1402*

If there were an OML at CGSOC, I would perform better.

**Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one**

Yes	12
No	7
Indifferent	8

---

**Total Responses 27**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is you CGSOC Class? AY1402*

Is an OML the preferred method for allocating incentives?

**Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one**

Yes	10
No	8
Indifferent	9

---

**Total Responses 27**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is you CGSOC Class? AY1402*

Please select your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements:

Scale 1

Question Type: Choose one

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total Responses
If I received priority in selecting my next duty assignment, I would perform better.	12 44%	6 22%	2 7%	3 11%	4 15%	27
If strong academic performance in CGSOC reduced chances for being selected for Officer Separation Boards, I would perform better.	12 44%	4 15%	3 11%	3 11%	5 19%	27
If excelling in CGSOC increased chances for promotion, I would perform better.	14 52%	3 11%	3 11%	3 11%	4 15%	27
If performance in CGSOC were tracked as a discriminator for Advanced Civil Schooling, I would perform better.	8 30%	3 11%	7 26%	5 19%	4 15%	27
If performance in CGSOC were used as a discriminator for selection to a Senior Service College, I would perform better.	9 33%	6 22%	4 15%	4 15%	4 15%	27
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>135</b>

Filter applied:

Match criteria: All

[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402

Should the Army incentivize performance during CGSOC?

Response Rate: 100% (N=27) Question Type: Choose one

Yes	11
No	9
Indifferent to the idea	7

---

**Total Responses****27****Filter applied:****Match criteria: All***[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402*

Of the following possible incentives, rank order them as to what would motivate you to perform better:

**Response Rate: 96% (N=26) Question Type: Rank**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	Total Responses	Rank Score
Priority in selecting next duty assignment	11 42%	5 19%	3 12%	3 12%	2 8%	0 0%	24	116
Reduced chances of selection during Officer Separation Board	4 15%	5 19%	5 19%	3 12%	7 27%	0 0%	24	92
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during Senior Service College selection boards	3 12%	3 12%	8 31%	6 23%	4 15%	0 0%	24	91
Increased significance of your Academic Evaluation Report during promotion boards	4 15%	10 38%	3 12%	6 23%	1 4%	0 0%	24	106
Increased opportunity in attending Advanced Civil Schooling	2 8%	1 4%	5 19%	6 23%	10 38%	0 0%	24	75
Other	2 8%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 4%	3	13
<b>Total Responses</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>123</b>	

Other Responses

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**NONE****2**

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**Total Responses****2****Filter applied:****Match criteria: All***[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402*

What are your thoughts on incentivizing performance in CGSOC?

**Response Rate: 37% (N=10) Question Type: Paragraph**

I don't think incentives should be offered for "working harder" in CGSC. Some people get it, some don't...that should be reward enough. If someone isn't "getting it" usually those are the people that are trying the hardest.

I think the Army should base all of those things on both your OERs and AERs.

As a National Guardsman, increased significance of the AER on selection for Resident SSC boards, as well as increased significance of the AER on both promotion boards &

---

for AGR control grade assignments (we must have an authorized MTOE/TDA position, as well as a control grade AGR position before we can get promoted), would be beneficial & provide great incentive to be the top performer.

---

I think this is a horrible idea. Some people are also balancing masters degree programs. It would be cut throat.. Not a good idea.. it doesnt matter if you get a 100 or a 90 as long as you are learning the material. Everyone learns different. I do not recommend this.

---

again, unless you go straight to only academic grading and remove all subjective to grading the program is a sham; I have watch too much participant grading being completely subjective and based on the instructors initial impressions (a rookie mistake for an instructor) and with such a failure in the fair grading of participation this would lead to a highly toxic environment at CGSOC.

---

The Army absolutely must begin incentivizing performance at PME schooling. I excelled at both my OBC and CCC courses, finishing in the top 5% of my class both times. Regularly I watched officers fail exams only to be given a re-test, for which I was required to tutor them in order to ensure they passed. These individuals endured absolutely zero negative actions for their failure to meet the standard other than getting a second shot at the standard. Particularly in an Army where we are choosing who to keep and who to release performance at PME is a good indicator of talent, ability, and dedication to duty.

---

The manner of performance captured on the Academic Evaluation Report should matter to selection boards. If it does not then their is no incentive to study hard compared to those who do the minimal possible to graduate.

---

First, with classes now being boarded for CGSC I'm sure most people won't be overly concerned about it's impact on the OSBs (yet). Second, although I am somewhat interested in incentivizing the CGSOC-related aspects, electives, foreign exchange, etc. I think making it competitive at the Army level could seriously detract from the cooperation, team building, shared learning, and cohesion that takes place. I believe the school should strive to retain a free academic environment, the competitiveness army-wide is already in place just by being selected to attend CGSOC.

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More pressure in CGSC may result in higher negative effects. For some CGSOC is stressful enough.

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Incentivizing CGSOC could benefit future field grade officers if additional metrics were implemented. For example, as field grade officers we will be expected to implement the "Mission Command" philosophy. Mission Command requires leaders to empower subordinates, build relationships, and be able to function as a team member. Currently there are no metrics in place that gauge a major's non-tangible qualities.

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**Total Responses: 10**

**Filter applied:**

**Match criteria: All**

*[Choose one] What is your CGSOC Class? AY1402*



APPENDIX F

SAMPLE SURVEY

**Incentivizing CGSOC Performance**

**The Purpose of this Survey is to gain insight into how incentivizing CGSOC academic success might motivate student performance and to fulfill the requirements for my Masters in Military Arts and Sciences.**

**Your participation in this survey is voluntary and your responses are confidential.**

**The survey will take approximately 5 to 10 minutes to complete.**

**If you have any questions or concerns during the survey, please contact Dr. Maria Clark (Human Protection Administrator). Her email address is maria.l.clark.civ@mail.mil**

**The survey has been reviewed and approved by the CGSC quality assurance office. The survey control number is 14-04-061**

Page 1 ▾ Next Save ■■■■■■■■■■ POWERED BY ALLEGIANCE

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