

THE LONG GAME: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY DRAWDOWNS

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General Studies

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TIMOTHY A. CRANE, MAJOR, US ARMY
B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Timothy A. Crane

Thesis Title: The Long Game: A Strategic Analysis of Military Drawdowns

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Jonathan M. Williams, M.A.

_____, Member
LTC Mark L. Pralat, M.A.

_____, Member
David L. Bitters, Ph.D.

Accepted this 13th day of June 2014 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

THE LONG GAME: A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF MILITARY DRAWDOWNS, by Timothy A. Crane, 97 pages.

This study seeks to answer how US leaders can enact policy utilizing the elements of national power to shape the contemporary environment and drive towards the desired environment.

The study analyzes defense drawdowns in the context of national and military ends, ways, means, and risks, in order to provide viable solutions for future defense posture. Prudent drawdown measures can maintain a significant level of deterrence—whereas the disregard will lead to belligerent aggression. This study will focus on the drawdown of the US Military from 1945 to the present and determine what lessons can be applied to today's strategic environment. With the gap between the current and desired environment identified, the purpose of this study is to determine a logical application of defense capabilities as an element of national power during the drawdown after the Global War on Terror. The results of this study suggest a force construct solution that includes the capabilities and requisite authorities necessary for increased conventional and special operations force interdependence through whole of government interoperability to shape the current environment through building partner capacity in order to prevent future conflict.

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ACRONYMS

BPC	Building Partner Capacity
CBRS	Concept Based Requirements System
CF	Conventional Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONUS	Continental US
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DRS	Division Restructuring Study
EU	European Union
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HN	Host Nation
HTLD	High Technology Light Division
HTMD	High Technology Motorized Division
HTTB	High Technology Test Bed
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum

NSS	National Security Strategy
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
QDDR	Quadrennial Development and Diplomacy Review
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RAF	Regionally Aligned Force
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
ROAD	Reorganization Objective Army Divisions
SAF	Special Action Force
SC	Security Cooperation
SF	Special Forces
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SFG	Special Forces Group
SOE	Special Operations Executive
SOF	Special Operations Force
SPARTAN	Special Proficiency at Rugged Terrain and National Building
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRICAP	Triple Capability
UAP	Unified Action Partner
UN	United Nations
USSOCOM	US Special Operations Command
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

We do not live in a binary world. Entropy is the way of things. Everything moves naturally from an ordered state to chaos, making predictability a fiction. General misunderstanding of this fundamental concept contributes to a gap between academic theory and practical application. Regardless of applied academic rigor, resultant models rarely transcend statistics and fall short of definitive predictive value. The reduction of the nearly infinite variables to a manageable number closes this gap but requires diligent analysis. Analyzing strategic variables of national power to determine predictive value and viable policy initiatives requires this diligence.

From the end of the dynastic era through the development of Western warfare, a democratizing trend obviated the need for social analysis. Social, military, and religious revolutions rose and fell often more quickly than societies could reflect and adjust. These revolutions eventually fostered new approaches to social analysis. The attempts to understand the myriad variables introduced an era of reductionist thinking. When studying this chaos within the proper frame of reference, constants emerge. For example, the human struggle to increase wealth and power in order to gain and wield influence remains constant. Similarly, the endeavor to maintain and improve the elements of national power after conflict also remains an historic constant. Promising, perhaps, but these constants do not provide absolute templates for solving military problems. Modern military historian Jay Luvaas explained that differences in situations and environments

prohibit a template solution for the conduct and execution of war.¹ Yet, a few hypotheses yield valuable lessons for military professionals.

A critical step in understanding warfare is recognizing this interdependent relationship between influencing variables of conflict. The studied variables are basic individual and societal goals and desires. Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* analyzes these proclivities and provides such a lesson. Likened to balancing an object suspended between three magnets, he posits an interdependent nature of three primary influences on the prosecution of war.² The need to balance Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity of the people, the military, and the government to prosecute war remains constant today.

In an increasingly interdependent world, regional unrest results in de-stabilization of global systems. The possible ramifications of action or inaction require considerable introspection from an appropriate point of reference. The first step to frame the environment appropriately is to correctly establish a point of reference. The current environment is broad and overwhelming at first glance. Subsequently, the issues facing the US are substantial and require reduction of variables to narrow the scope of analysis.

Current Environment

To frame the current environment in broad generalizations, the variables of basic individual and societal goals and desires are analyzed in terms of the political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information influences. Politically, the US seemingly lacks the national will to ally significant social change secondarily to the power of the election cycle. Militarily, the US lacks the will to apply full-spectrum military operations as over a decade of sustained combat approaches a prescribed conclusion. Economically, anger and frustration accompany the slow recovery of the

middle classes since 2007. This perhaps is a direct result of the paradoxical record-breaking profits across the financial sector.³ Socially, gender, racial, sexual, and economic unrest exist, but, arguably, US efforts continue to set the mark for world standards. In terms of infrastructure, the Eisenhower Highway System remains an example of American ingenuity and continues to provide a physical backbone to inter and intra state commerce. Finally, the sheer volume of information is perhaps useful only as a tool to marginalize any significant sources of a unified narrative, therefore, diluting those who would seek to discredit or systematically dismantle national order with an opposing narrative.

If no action is taken the results are intuitive. Without making positive change the US risks maintaining national values and interests. As the gap between current and desired environments grows more disparate, the costs and duration to meet emergent national security needs increase. It logically follows that the costs to close political, economic, and social gaps likewise would increase.

Desired Environment

To frame the desired environment, the same variables of basic individual and societal goals and desires are highlighted within a similar context of political, military, social, economic, infrastructure, and information. Politically, the US ideally is postured to maintain national values and interests while remaining a viable partner to international allies. Militarily, the US requires a military emboldened with the necessary strength to defend our borders and national interests abroad. Economically, the US seeks an environment conducive to international trade while domestically empowering the middle classes to promote further economic recovery. Socially, the US efforts need to continue

to set the mark for world standards while promoting individual rights and freedoms. In the desired environment, US infrastructure-continues to improve inter- and intra-state commerce. With a more efficient domestic economy, the US would be postured to increase both employment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Both of these would eventually result in a similarly increased international market position. Finally, as the volume of information increases exponentially, the US would ideally be postured to meet any network threat as well as maintain the ability to monitor and counter extremism.

Problem Statement

It is proving an increasingly difficult task to move from the identified current environment to the desired environment. A gap exists, and this gap will likely always exist between the two absolute environments. The question, however, is how to move from the current to the desired environment taking into account available resources, time, and emergent world events. As stated, the risks associated with inaction are severe. Recent events continue to drive the world from an ordered state. Precisely for the aforementioned motivations, regional agitators such as North Korea, Russia, and China seem to seek and prosecute de-stabilizing actions for individual gain. Zbigniew Brzezinski speculated that Asia over the next century might emulate 20th Century Europe, with the defining notion of state independence driving inter-state rivalries to armed conflict.⁴ Recently, Russia exploited unrest in Ukraine to seize control for potentially significant long-term economic and political gains. Un-deterred belligerent aggression is preventing change to the desired environment. So the question remains, how is this exploitative behavior deterred and what can the US do about it?

Operational Approach

This thesis provides case studies by extremes between chaos and order. Following this premise, the operational approach utilizes specific lines of effort to illustrate connections between tasks, effects, conditions, and desired end states. The lines of effort follow the logic of causal relationships used to shape strategic conditions.⁵ Utilizing the methods described by Dr. Harry Yarger, professor of National Security Policy at the US Army War College, this thesis focuses on the political, military, and economic lines of effort in the context of national and military ends, ways, means, and risks.⁶

In political terms, the international order is maintained by adherence to agreements. These agreements form balanced associations between international bodies and create a reliable interdependence. In order to remain reliable, security efforts are employed. The strength of the international cooperation maintains an acceptably stable peace.

In military terms, history provides examples of post-conflict drawdown solutions. The case studies show how assessed threats were balanced with capabilities. When further analyzing US national power through the post WWII interwar periods, a resultant constant is money. This study analyzes the defense budget because money is the historically indisputable constant born from emotional and intellectual intent. Analyzing the historic constant of money separates true intent from political rhetoric.

In economic terms, and perhaps obvious, money is appropriated for programs that are deemed important or valuable. Therefore, programs with identified contemporary strategic or national importance receive appropriated resources. Whether the temporal element is long term, or reaches merely to the next election cycle, it remains that funding

connotes interest, intent, and emotional or political interest. Over the past decade, the US has been the primary provider of military personnel and materiel to the conflicts across the globe.⁷ Defense spending in the US surpasses the next 13 countries in a world ranked list of national spending.⁸ As a result, the five drawdowns since the end of WWII will be analyzed in terms of resources allocated for defense.

This study analyzes defense drawdowns in the context of national and military ends, ways, means, and risks, in order to provide viable solutions for future defense posture. This complex problem requires the understanding that our actions transcend our time, and our efforts can produce far-reaching positive effects. Fixation on short-term remedies will ensure long-term discrepancies in the balance between threat and capability. This is, therefore, a long game and is won with responsible planning. Prudent drawdown measures can maintain a significant level of deterrence—whereas their disregard will lead to belligerent aggression. This study will focus on the drawdown of the US Military from 1945 to the present and determine what lessons can be applied to today's strategic environment. With the gap between the current and desired environment identified, the purpose of this study is to determine a logical application of defense capabilities as an element of national power during the drawdown after the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

The maintenance of international stability requires a consistency of military power. Further, the current situation in Ukraine will illustrate how foreign analysis of US drawdowns can be used for adversarial gain. This study will conclude by exploring these complex current events and the ways and means available to mitigate the natural risks of traditional linear thinking.

It is imperative that we understand this long game.

Research Question

With the problem appropriately framed, the primary research question emerges. This study seeks to answer how US leaders can enact policy utilizing the elements of national power to shape the contemporary environment and drive towards the desired environment. To this end, previous drawdowns are reviewed via a case study analysis approach. The drawdown case studies review national and military ends, ways, means, and risks from their contemporary perspectives in order to appropriately frame a contextual reference point. The secondary research question asks how US leaders enacted policy utilizing the elements of national power to shape their environments to reach the desired environment. The individual case studies seek to answer this question by illustrating how previous leaders leveraged the elements of national power to bridge the gap between their current and desired environments with appropriate policy initiatives.

Assumptions

It is an assumption that these relevant facts, policies, and conditions will remain the same for the foreseeable future. Past examples of military drawdowns are predictive of the suitability and feasibility of the relevant policies and pertinent practices for future application and use. Yet, it is an assumption that past events can provide predictive value to current policy decisions.

Limitations

Time, as perhaps with any study, is a limiting factor. Similarly, source accuracy when using only open source documents and the availability and access to information

and data also proves a surmountable limitation. Further, the primary investigator's limited experience in conducting original research introduces its own unique challenges. Significantly, possible investigator bias was anticipated and subsequently mitigated through model design. Finally, the author's American-centric viewpoint is a bias that requires accountability in any subsequent analysis on the subject.

Scope and Delineations

The study assesses the feasibility and suitability of the model of budgetary analysis juxtaposed to national strategic policy. It seeks to examine the implications of future policy for a specific military application. Through appropriate interpretation and use, the study determines the existing links between the budget and policy. This study will not describe or assess the rising cost of health care and the ramifications of discretionary spending, nor will the study examine the Veteran's Administration operations and budget or military retirement benefits.

Significance of Study

History is full of mind-boggling statistics. Seemingly un-associated numbers have a general tendency to dizzy and confuse. Further, to apply these numbers to a decision making process requires some finesse. For example, past military personnel levels and equipment costs are easy to review and analyze. However, using them as a predictive measure to make decisions, especially when the decisions are as important as national security, is unnerving. Yet this is specifically what this study will try to accomplish.

Army doctrine focuses on virtue ethics as a foundation for developing and fostering healthy organizational growth.⁹ The team will flourish that has a strong ethical

base and an accurate understanding of both the members and the organization. Developing and communicating a vision will improve unit cohesion and strategic direction. Dr. John Kotter, professor of leadership at the Harvard Business School, mentions that developing a vision clarifies, motivates, aligns, and coordinates subordinate efforts in a unified direction.¹⁰ The US needs to maintain the readiness and health of its military. Adherence to a vision with an understood ethical foundation will serve as a low-cost framework to ensure success during this period of change.

The US is facing a drawdown that will include potential force structure changes within the natural post-conflict reduction in personnel and budget. Historically, structural changes strive to meet the assessed threat with available elements of military power. Unfortunately, a national defense template does not exist. The enemy always gets a vote, and an element of chance always exists. It is therefore necessary to balance the probabilities of potential threats. Since the conclusion of World War II, and each subsequent major conflict, the US has reduced defense personnel strength by an average of 28.8 percent and decreased defense spending by an average of 2.1 percent. However, a simple regression analysis of peacetime expenditures yields an extrapolated trend-line that would require a 34.3 percent budget reduction for FY 17.¹¹

Alarming, perhaps, but the planned cancellation of overseas contingency operations allows for significant gains in reaching this budgetary mark. These fiscal constraints and an ever-changing threat necessitate a dynamic national security strategy.

Summary

As the result of exhausting other available means, war remains the ultimate expression of a national mass movement, supported by the people, managed through the

framework provided by the government, and executed by the military. However, as Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said, “war, once unleashed, is always uncontrollable, unpredictable, and painful far beyond the predications of those who beat the drum the loudest.”¹² It is obvious that leaders cannot ignore their obligation to respect Clausewitz’s delicate balance between the populace, military, and government.

The following chapter will examine the currently published methods of analysis and policy framework to gain a better understanding and visualization of the operational approach. The purpose of this study is to determine a logical application of defense capabilities as an element of national power during the next drawdown. This approach requires a clear identification of the gap between the current and desired environment. Lessons from previous drawdowns illustrate past attempts to avoid gaps in our national security strategy, primarily through maintaining combat-ready forces and supporting efforts to avoid conflict. Drawing from these lessons, the next chapter presents Yarger’s framework for strategic analysis as a method to identify the gap to reach the desired environment.¹³ As a military leader today, the cyclic nature of war and peace must be considered in every endeavor desiring a positive outcome. Without it, both fail.

¹Jay Luvaas, “Military History: Is It Still Practicable?” *Parameters* 12 (1982): 2-24.

²David Holden, “Explaining the Revolution” (Lecture, CGSOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 September 2013).

³Peter Morici, “US Economy Still Doomed Despite Abundance of Reasonable Solutions,” *FOX News Online*, 27 March 2014, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/27/us-economy-still-doomed-to-slow-growth-despite-abundance-reasonable-solutions/> (accessed 27 March 2014).

⁴Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 155.

⁵Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011).

⁶Harry R. Yarger, “Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy” (Strategic Studies Institute, February 2006).

⁷Brad Plumer, “America’s Staggering Defense Budget in Charts,” *The Washington Post Online*, 7 January 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/07/everything-chuck-hagel-needs-to-know-about-the-defense-budget-in-charts/> (accessed 27 March 2014).

⁸Ibid.

⁹Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2012), 3-1.

¹⁰Department of the Army, Reading L103 RB: *Leading Organizational Change: A Leader’s Role*, August 2013, <https://cgsc.blackboard.com> (accessed 22 October 2013), 4.

¹¹Department of Defense, *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2012).

¹²Chuck Hagel, *America: Our Next Chapter* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2008), 28.

¹³Yarger, 5-9, 31-32, 35-38, 40-42, 47-71.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The US is facing a shrinking and dynamically unstable world. Defense spending helped create a budget crisis and defense cuts must contribute to the solution.¹ The purpose of this study is to determine a logical application of defense capabilities as an element of national power in the post-GWOT world. Stability requires a consistency of military power. This maintenance of a deterrent force is a complex problem. Its solution shifts with time and the will of would-be adversaries. This chapter seeks to illustrate historic and current published analysis of the strategic implications of a post-conflict military drawdown.

Current Literature

The most significant literature utilized for this study were the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, and Dr. Harry Yarger's contribution to "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy." The construct of war and peace time policies properly frame the uses of these noted texts.

The US historically finds itself in one of two normal modalities: war and peace. Fiscal resources and national security requirements during either modality rarely resolve into a neatly, agreed-upon, and balanced solution. Yet, the difference in authorities, roles and responsibilities during war and peace are unique and distinct. The ways to prepare,

organize, equip, and employ forces are all clearly focused during conflict. During peacetime this clarity of purpose is traded for diplomatic murkiness. The military ways and means are subject to vast, wide-ranging interpretation and may be seemingly incongruent with national ends during peacetime. Some things, however, are not open to much variance in interpretation. Policy sets operational parameters. These parameters form a framework for the application of diplomacy. The framework must be understood in order to allow for adaptation to the current environment and drive toward the desired environment.

The government provides guidance for conducting foreign diplomacy. Within the context of Clausewitz's trinity, values, interests, and objectives represent a reason to maintain a military, shape the military's role in society, and set the course for national policy. As an enumerated power to Congress, Article 2, section 8 of the US Constitution reads, "the Congress shall have the power to . . . provide for the common defense and general Welfare of the United States."² The framers of the Constitution recognized in 1787 the unique relationship between the common defense and the general welfare of its citizens. Perhaps perfunctory rhetoric today, the understanding of military subordination to the people and the government permeates America's founding documents. As the keystone, the government acts continually to define the dynamic relationship between the military and the population. Napoleon desired to, "make the French army the army of the nation on a permanent basis, and to thereby durably, if partially, militarize that same nation."³ Arguably not a perfect balance, the effort indicates an understanding that a symbiotic association existed. The government uses the military as a tool for foreign diplomatic ends. Clausewitz maintains that the unity within these seemingly

contradictory elements, “lies in the concept that war is only a branch of political activity, that it is in no sense autonomous.”⁴ War, as Clausewitz explains, is an extension of national policy, a culminating event along the spectrum of diplomacy.

War, and specifically its official declaration, is complicated. Yet, it is always defined as the commitment of forces to obtain a national objective. Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the Constitution gives Congress the authority to declare war.⁵ The *War Powers Clause*, as it is known, sets the situational requirements and the administrative processes involved in committing forces in offensive international operations. Understandably, these operations bring additional resources not allocated otherwise. Engagements other than conventional war bring a potentially supplemented budget and focused purpose but are not a sustainable wellspring of resources. In periods of hostility, the military has a clear and concise mission, increased manning requirements, and an increased budget. During these times the military enjoys resource-driven latitude in personnel, facilities, equipment, and materiel. After years of war, unfortunately, this enhanced facultative operating environment becomes the norm, and perhaps is taken for granted. The game changes significantly during periods of peace when the augmentations cease.

Historically, the Armed Forces’ role during peacetime is two-fold: prepare for the next war and support on-going diplomatic initiatives to avoid the next war. Peacetime brings a renewed emphasis on domestic initiatives and a reduction in both funds and clarity of military purpose. Subsequently, maintaining a viable force is a complex problem. Balancing a shrinking budget with national security requirements becomes a more elucidated process with significant considerations and restrictions. Personnel

reductions, force modernization projects, materiel support and maintenance all require added scrutiny. A military mission to support diplomatic initiatives in order to counter violent extremism and build partner capacity missions requires extensive expertise in regional specialization.⁶ Utilizing the military as a diplomatic tool requires an entirely different approach than the now-familiar wartime paradigm.

With guidance from the National Security Staff, the State Department is the lead agency for operations responding to political and security crisis.⁷ Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that solving foreign policy problems today requires us to think regionally and globally.⁸ As part of a general effort to be fiscally responsible, the State Department pledged in the 2010's *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR)*, to make an effort to reduce organizational gaps and overlap.⁹ They further describe a plan to work with Congress to establish a Bureau for Counterterrorism with the intent to enhance capabilities to counter violent extremism, build partner capacity, and engage in counterterrorism diplomacy.¹⁰

The Department of Defense (DoD) is tasked with supporting the Commander in Chief's National Security Strategy. This requires that the force maintain a specific level of readiness in order to fight two major theater wars.¹¹ This is cheap in neither materiel nor personnel costs. Faced with budgetary reductions in the transition to a peacetime defense force, re-structuring becomes the mantra to adjust to the new operating environment.

In the most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, published in 2010, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates acknowledged that, "the current conflicts [are] at the top of our budgeting, policy, and program priorities."¹² He continues, addressing the

intent of the department to, “reform the way it does business—from developing and buying major weapons systems to managing our workforce.”¹³ The Secretary emphasizes working with civilian agencies and organizations, allies, and partner nations to prevent and deter conflict through cooperative efforts.¹⁴

The QDR addresses three potential scenarios for employment of the force. The first scenario is a major stabilization operation stressing the force’s ability to defeat a sophisticated adversary and support domestic response.¹⁵ The second is an operation deterring and defeating two regional aggressors while maintaining a heightened domestic alert posture. This scenario stresses the force’s combined arms capacity. The third is another major stabilization operation, but added a long-duration deterrence operation in a separate theater, a counterinsurgency mission, and extended support to domestic civil authorities. This last scenario emphasizes elements of the force tasked for counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations.¹⁶

Summary

Yarger presents a framework to analyze the strategic problem in order to identify the gap between the current and desired environment. Any solution to bridge this gap will follow the guidelines prescribed by national policy. These are the parameters for this study. Working within these parameters an analysis will show historic efforts to solve this same problem. The potential threat is described in the QDR. Yet the question remains: besides training and preparing for the next conventional conflict, what exactly is an appropriate peacetime mission and how does the Army complete the national security directives? The answers, as the case studies will show, are readiness, deterrence, and building partner nation capacity through a broader mechanism that utilizes a whole of

government approach rather than simply security force assistance. However, the US has historically taken different paths to meet national security requirements.

¹Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2010).

²National Center for Constitutional Studies, *The Constitution of the United States with Index and The Declaration of Independence* (Boise, ID: National Center for Constitutional Studies, 2012), 6.

³MacGregoary Knox and Williamson Murray, ed., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 794.

⁴Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. V. Krieger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 605.

⁵National Center for Constitutional Studies, *The Constitution of the United States with Index and The Declaration of Independence*.

⁶Andrew Feickert, *Army Drawdown and Restructuring* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2014).

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶*Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The cyclic nature of peace and war has proven an obstacle to maintaining a military force. War necessitates an increased force, while the opposite is true in peace. This adaptation from a large to small fighting force while maintaining readiness and an appropriate level of perceived deterrence requires mindful innovation in an increasingly belligerent global environment.

This study aims to demonstrate that the maintenance of international stability requires a consistency of military power. The maintenance of a plausible deterrent force is a complex problem. It is a moving solution, shifting with time and the enemy's will. This chapter seeks to illustrate the relationship between strategic budget analysis, foreign policy decisions, and their consequences through the deconstruction and categorization of five historic case studies.

Methodology

This study is an open-source, retrospective meta-analysis, organized into five historically distinct case studies for simplicity. The case studies include the periods after WWII, Korea, Vietnam, President Reagan's build-up, and the Cold War. The anomalous era of President Reagan's military expansion is included for review as a data set of statistical importance.

Ends, ways, means, and the assessment of risks describe strategy.¹ The "ends" describe the aim or purpose. The "ways" describe the method or course of action. The

“means” describe and account for assets or resources necessary to carry out the ways. The “risks” describe elements that require mitigation in order for the end to succeed.

The study will conclude with a predictive analysis on the current drawdown. To simplify the expansive topic of military draw downs, the study will focus on an analysis of overall DoD budget, personnel, and strategic formation adjustments as a juxtaposition of foreign policy decisions and intent to formulate a holistic understanding of each military drawdown case study. The study concludes with recommendations on how the Army can best support the drawdown while being prepared for the next fight.

The waxing and waning of conflict over the past century is a proven obstacle to military force consistency. War necessitates an increased force to compliment an increased threat, while the opposite is true when the threat is defeated or subsides. This transition to a leaner, yet ready, fighting force while maintaining readiness requires careful diligence in retaining professional relationships and lessons learned—especially in an aggressively complex global environment. How to make the adaptation from a large, actively fighting force to one that is smaller and ready to fight is not a new problem. However, allowing for innovative thought and acceptance of the results has changed over time. To examine this, Dr. Harry Yarger provides a framework to organize and examine data points.

General Maxwell D. Taylor described strategy as consisting of ends, ways, and means.² Yarger explores this concept and derives a method of analyzing strategy. The framework is divided into both national and military ends, ways, means, and risks. National ends consider values, interests, objectives, and potential conflicts with allies. Military ends consider military objectives, end states and whether these are congruent

with national (political) ends. National ways consider the diplomatic, information, military, and economic influences and whether any applications were inadequate or omitted. Military ways consider military concepts, courses of action and if they were synchronized with other ways. National means consider resources, capabilities, and potential disconnects between means and ways and ends. Military means consider resources, capabilities, and potential neglect of important military capabilities. Both national and military risks are identified and assessed as to the appropriate measures taken to mitigate. Essentially, Yarger's framework presents a method to analyze the strategic problem in order to identify the gap between the current and desired environments.³

War teaches many lessons. Leaders collect and study after action reports from combat in order to learn from success and failure. As previously mentioned, historian Jay Luvaas posited that a template solution for the execution of war did not exist, but that does not preclude analysis and effort.⁴ Societies throughout history developed creative solutions to mitigate assessed future threat. These efforts were motivated by many factors, and provide valuable insight to operational and tactical military problems. However, disastrous results followed from fear of organizational and operational change. The framework is important, but how past leaders assessed their contemporary situations is far more useful. The case studies in chapter 4 will explore this idea and illustrate the difficulties, triumphs and tragic miscalculations in drawing down a fighting force for an anticipated peace.

What follows is a description of war and peace within the context of US policy. The appropriate application of military power across the continuum of warfare is

logically a varied combination of the dipole extremes. At the very core of this issue of drawing down US defense posture is a requirement for a holistic understanding of these diametric situations within the context of contemporary governing policy.

Study Criteria

This study seeks to simplify a complex problem set by determining criteria to evaluate feasibility of method, suitability or relevance of examples, and credibility of sources. Timelines and other measures of effect and performance were not chosen as criteria based on an underlying desire to illustrate a political agenda. Primary sources were utilized where appropriate and available.

The following case studies were identified utilizing distinct parameters. First, the case studies follow a period of war and a distinct pattern of decreased military spending. Second, the case studies end with the commencement of renewed hostilities and follow a distinct pattern of increased military spending. Finally, the case studies illustrate the struggle with foreign policy initiatives, defense posture adjustments, and the resultant level of military preparedness. The exception is the Reagan era case study during which the military experienced an anomalous increase in expenditures and fundamental changes to organization and doctrine. The Reagan case study is included as an anomalous, yet insightfully necessary, era in military innovation.

Summary

The potential threat is set in the scenarios described by the QDR, yet the question remains: besides training and preparing for the next conventional conflict, what exactly are appropriate peacetime missions and how does the Army complete these directives?

The answer is, as it has remained since the end of WWII, readiness, deterrence, and building partner nation capacity. America has historically taken different paths to meet the same national security need.

¹LTC Mark L. Pralat, C212: Strategic Estimate (Lecture, CGSOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 September 2013).

²Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, 1989), 179.

³Yarger, "Strategic Theory for the 21st Century," 5-9, 31-32, 35-38, 40-42, 47-71.

⁴Luvaas, "Military History: Is It Still Practicable?" 2-24.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Conducting business in an increasingly interconnected world requires a multivariate perspective in order to derive situational understanding. Decision-makers painstakingly reduce variables in an effort to simplify, analyze, then interpret data into concise, predictive results. These reductive methods require significant effort to ascertain what Niccolo Machiavelli described as effectual truth, or a truth that leads to action.¹ However, the variables change in order of precedence depending on the perspective of the analyst.

This focus of this study is on the past US military drawdowns from 1945 to the present in order to determine what lessons can be applied to today's strategic environment. The purpose of this study is to determine the gap between the current and desired environment and to determine a logical application of defense capabilities and resources during the coming drawdown.

The operational approach of this study utilized specific lines of effort to illustrate connections between tasks, effects, conditions, and desired end states in the analyzed case studies. The lines of effort followed the logic of casual relationships used to shape strategic conditions.² Utilizing the methods described by Yarger, the study illustrated the political, military, and economic lines of effort in the context of national and military ends, ways, means, and risks.³ The findings are organized similarly to the case studies for continuity.

Observations

World War II Drawdown Case Study: 1945–1950

“The Soviet Union does not have to attack the United States to secure domination of the world. It can achieve its ends by isolating us and swallowing up all our allies.”⁴

National Ends

National ends consider values, interest, and objectives, and weigh potential points of friction. On 8 May 1945, Soviet and Polish troops successfully captured Berlin ending the war in Europe with the subsequent German unconditional surrender. Six years of warfare left Europe’s economy and infrastructure in disarray.

The US values maintained traditionally held beliefs in individual freedoms for select demographics, a democratic system with a strong, empowered government, and an isolationist view to world affairs. When it came to civil liberties, the Supreme Court maintained the findings of the 1896 ruling in *Plessy v Ferguson*, which found the separate but equal form of segregation constitutional.⁵ Economically, in response to the Great Depression, President Roosevelt enacted the New Deal. The New Deal was a public works program to relieve the poor, recover the economy, and reform the financial system. However, the New Deal required broadened scope of executive powers. In order to codify the New Deal, the Supreme Court modified Constitutional interpretation to allow for the increased power. As a result of decade-long financial reform efforts, the US interests focused on stabilizing domestic economic growth with the expansion of a free global market.

With most of Europe devastated in the aftermath of the war, the Soviet Union emerged as the military and ideological antagonist to western states. The Communist

Soviet Union challenged US values and interests. Fear of communism's spread was preached across most of American's tablecloths. American society's cultural insecurity with a globalized world coupled with Washington's concern over communism's domino effect easily won the new foreign policy bipartisan support. The US post-WWII force reduction was significantly influenced by the domestic adjustment to these new global threats.

US objectives shifted from national to international. The primary objective soon became stopping the spread of communism. Heavily influenced by George F. Kennan's *Long Telegram*, the Truman Doctrine defined American Cold War policy in Europe and around the world.⁶ Considered the start of the Cold War, this marked a fundamental change in foreign policy as the US shifted from the Monroe Doctrine philosophy of isolationism to containment in the face of nuclear-driven mutually assured destruction. This required a strong and secure Europe. Greece stood out as a primary contested country at the conclusion of the war, and the US focused rebuilding efforts as a result. The first step in the rebuilding process was to create security forces in Greece. This meant demobilization of the resistance factions that had banded together, albeit briefly, to fight the Germans. Although the demobilization was understood to be critical to the Greek rebuilding process, the focus of the Allied efforts remained elsewhere.

A seemingly inaccurate and immature world-view convoluted strategic analysis and veiled points of friction. Potential conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba emerged slowly as a result. Mitigation of those identified threats likewise developed slowly.

Military Ends

Military ends consider the military objectives, end states, and whether these are congruent with national ends. Perhaps as a result of an incomplete, or disinterested analysis of threats to security, the US military objectives and end-state seemed considerably overlooked. Without a clearly stated objective, the military floundered. Aimless, the military fell victim to harmful reductions.

National Ways

National ways consider the concepts and diplomatic, information, military, and economic influences. In diplomatic terms, the framework existed to foster international cooperation like no other time in history. In October 1945, the international community established the United Nations (UN) to replace the League of Nations and strengthen global cooperation. The UN provided relief supplies to the war ravaged European nations. The UN and allied nations began to address the European food shortages, endemic diseases, widespread unemployment, a virtually non-existent economy, and a war-torn infrastructure. The most pressing problem, perhaps, was the creation of new security forces.

The Truman Doctrine was another national way that brought nation-building activities, security assistance initiatives and modernization programs to the forefront of foreign policy. Building on the Truman Doctrine, Secretary of State George Marshall focused international aid efforts on rebuilding war-torn Europe.

Management of information and the media were not as significant as today. However, the gaining responsiveness of media and the shortened timeline for reporting fostered a better appreciation for managing a narrative.

In military terms, the US faced a massive drawdown after WWII. As an added motivator, President Harry S. Truman took great effort to balance the budget as quickly as possible.⁷ In his Jeffersonian approach to reducing post war military numbers, President Truman fought aggressively to reign in defense spending, although, with the luxury of historic perspective, without appropriate global analysis.

While there was considerable focus on rebuilding infrastructure and economies, regional security took a backseat. The efforts to build internal security forces in Korea suffered from little realized financial and materiel support. Although the national security requirements to maintain an Army remained, the drastic fluctuation in perceived threat questioned the need for a large standing conventional force (CF). This allowed the administration to mobilize American economic power to assist susceptible states while refraining from direct military intervention. Besides, what was the military to do while it was not at War?

In economic terms, the US made great effort to assist failing countries it assessed in danger of Soviet targeting and encroachment. In June 1944, world leaders conducted a global economic summit in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The Bretton Woods conference focused on post-war reconstruction, regional stability, and security. The conference concluded that these goals would be accomplished best through a convertibility of national currencies to a gold standard and the encouragement of open markets. After the conclusion of the war, the US enforced these standards to drive towards peace and stability. In a speech to Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman stated that the US would support Greece and Turkey with economic and military aid in an effort to prevent Soviet influence in the region.⁸ At Harvard University on 5

June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall officially introduced the European Recovery Program, later referred to as the Marshall Plan.⁹ The Marshall Plan was the American program to help rebuild European economies after the end of WWII. It was designed to prevent susceptibility of weak states to the encroachment of Soviet Communism. The plan was in effect from April 1948 to 1951, and the strategic goals were to rebuild war-devastated regions, remove trade barriers, modernize industry, and make Europe prosperous again.

Military Ways

Military ways consider the concepts and possible courses of action that link to military ends. Driven by the socioeconomic environment and technologic advancements prior to WWII, the Army had experimented with several operational force structure solutions. Notably, the Army had transitioned in 1939 from the World War I Square Infantry Division to the Triangular Infantry Division.¹⁰ Given the tactical situation, the Army had adapted to the Armored Division, from 1940 to 1943.¹¹ Resultantly, as WWII came to a close, the senior Army staff had experienced significant organizational transformations in the not too distant past. The experience would prove useful in the coming years as the Army transitioned once again.

After WWII, the U.S. European Theater of Operations formed the General Board to analyze lessons learned from the war.¹² As a result, the Board recommended the Army retain only three division types: infantry, armored and airborne.¹³ Excepting the recent advent of nuclear war, these new divisions reflected the Army's war experience and its belief that the nature of ground combat remained unchanged.¹⁴ General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, thought the proposed units too big, arguing that

they tried to account for every contingency under every condition, therefore violating the flexibility and economy of force principles of war.

As finally agreed upon, the new divisions retained much of the same structure of the WWII division. However, the issues facing the Army were limited funding for training, personnel, and supplies to perform basic maintenance.¹⁵

National Means

National means consider resources, capabilities, and possible disconnects between means and ways or ends. Military capabilities were seemingly under-valued as a resource for international diplomacy. As a result the US handicapped their military during the post WWII drawdown period. The average voter was no longer interested in waging foreign wars. The drive towards economic ways of reaching peace and international cooperation was reflected in the national budget. While US GDP during this period grew 5 percent annually, public spending decreased 8 percent annually. Policy changes reflected this divergent trend. The codification and execution of the Marshall Plan assisted foreign economies at the expense of the domestic military preparedness. This directly reflected lawmakers placating war-weary constituencies. The diminished readiness would be felt in the disastrous response to the North Korean invasion in 1952.

Military Means

Military means consider the resources and balance them with capabilities required to ensure the security of the nation and its interests. The Army's strength was cut in half during the first six months of 1946.¹⁶ The Army fell from 1,891,011 service members and a budget of \$189.6 billion in 1946 to 593,167 service members and a budget of \$43.2

billion in 1950. In all, the post WWII budget drove to a 93 percent troop reduction over a five-year period.¹⁷ This had severe consequences on unit and overall Army readiness.¹⁸

National Risks

Risks to US interests manifested themselves in new forms as the world emerged from WWII. A battle torn Europe ushered in a new era of assessing and evaluating the risks of regional unrest as a strategic threat. As an example, the struggle between Capitalist and Communist ideologies was beginning to play out through proxy forces across the embattled Greek countryside prior to the end of WWII. Viewed as the doorstep to Europe, Greek stability was paramount to Europe's future. A failure in Greece equaled a failure in Europe. This created an interesting diplomatic problem that was met with a military solution. In order to mitigate the risk of a failed Greek state increasing the entropy of Europe, the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS) deployed forces in April 1944 in order to assist the Allied efforts.¹⁹ The OSS and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) successfully organized, advised, and assisted the *andartes* against the Germans. This allowed the exiled government, under the Premier George Papandreaou, to return to Athens and to usher in stability and make efforts to rebuild Greece.²⁰

Military Risks

The rapid and drastic reduction of resources led to widespread equipment negligence as the Army found itself without the personnel to perform even the most basic maintenance.²¹ This introduced an otherwise avoidable risk to military readiness. Consequently, potential mitigating resources fell victim to the severe reductions. Thought to wield too much power during WWII, General William Donovan's OSS was disbanded

effective 1 October, 1946 by President Truman's Executive Order 9621.²² It was another year until the National Security Act of 1947 established the Central Intelligence Agency, and another three years until Special Anti-Guerilla Units were re-conceptualized in the Army's Special Text 31-20-1 (1950).²³

Korean War Drawdown Case Study: 1953–1965

This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals.²⁴

National Ends

On 27 July 1953, the US and South Korea entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty. This marked the end of combat operations. Years of conflict left a country and a people divided. The Asian political, military, and economic landscape would not recover quickly. The nuclear detente between the US and the Soviet Union increased the nation's basal anxiety level. As a result, US values and interests remained challenged. The US values shifted from traditionally held beliefs in a constitutionally empowered government towards a focus on individual freedoms. In 1952 the US Supreme Court's decision in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v Sawyer* limited the Executive Branch's ability to seize private property.²⁵ This ended a pro-government trend in judicial findings and ushered in an era of growing civil liberties. Following the trend, the *Brown v Board of Education* decision in 1954 found that segregation in schools violated the Constitution.²⁶ Further, the 1962 *Engel v Vitale* decision found that government directed prayer in school violated the First Amendment.²⁷ This trend toward individual freedoms continues through to the current sitting court. US global interests after the Korean War focused on the

maintenance and expansion of a free market. Real or perceived, this increased anxiety provided a consistent undertone to national discourse.

National objectives matured as the US role in international relations solidified and progressed. The primary objective was containing the spread of communism. The policy of containment continued and expanded in the face of the Soviet threat. Fear motivated constituents to bolster military capabilities, but wise and stalwart leadership cautioned against it. On 17 January 1961, President Eisenhower warned in his farewell address of the “military-industrial complex.”²⁸ Through his experience, he understood that the increased power and influence of the postwar defense industry could result in unnecessary defense spending. He feared it would eventually be in direct opposition to the country’s long-term interests.

Potential conflict with the Soviets spilled over into differing aspects of life. Sports arenas, technology, and space became virtual battlefields. In January 1961, on the political battlefield, the same month John F. Kennedy took office, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev pledged support for “wars of national liberation.”²⁹ Khrushchev’s statement instilled international communist movements with confidence.

Military Ends

The US military objectives clarified with a more accurate assessment of potential threats. With unsurpassed understanding of the US military, President Eisenhower advocated responsible reductions. Along with reducing overall troop levels, President Eisenhower also restructured the force in an attempt to find a more fiscally sustainable strategy for a military end state. Some of the defense spending reductions occurred naturally as the United States wound down its involvement in Korea, but President

Eisenhower also targeted unnecessary spending by terminating outdated and ineffective weapons systems best illustrated by effectively cancelling the B-70 Valkyrie bomber program.³⁰

As a result of an evolving world threat the US military instituted the Reorganization of the Current Infantry to counter the growing Soviet threat.³¹ As the infantry reorganized, so did another military competency. In contrast with the drawdown after WWII, a greater emphasis was placed on ensuring our partner nations had appropriate means to secure themselves. Conceptually, this was a departure from the trusted paradigm of a focus solely on decisive operations. This initiative included a renewed force to conduct counterinsurgent and guerilla operations.

National Ways

In diplomatic terms, the US emphasized international cooperation via political, military, and economic organizations. The conclusion of the Korean War saw a renewed emphasis on diplomatic gaps identified after WWII. Secretary of State John Dulles supported a foreign policy of massive retaliation and global containment. This was commonly referred to as brinksmanship, as it often threatened the advent of nuclear war.³² This translated in military terms directly to increasing capabilities to bolster deterrence and assist failing and failed partner nations to gain, maintain, and support security and stability. The renewed interest in the usefulness of building partner capacity was not a universal belief. However, shaping capabilities during peacetime could not be overlooked.

The increasing ability of the media to reach a broad audience indicated the strategic importance on managing information. But these capabilities did not supercede the ability of the government to manage the narrative.

In military terms, the US learned from the lessons provided by the WWII drawdown. President Eisenhower invested in the preparation of the American military while allowing the allocation of resources to civilian projects such as the German state-defense-inspired US Interstate Highway System.³³ His New Look policy focused on nuclear weapons rather than conventional forces to deter the Soviet Union and contain the spread of communism.

In economic terms, the US continued efforts to assist failing countries in order to prevent Soviet expansion and deter the spread of communism. President Eisenhower's reductions were motivated by his belief that national security was directly related to the health of the economy. President Eisenhower recognized that there was an opportunity cost to government spending. Specifically, money spent on defense initiatives diverted resources from investing in the long-term prosperity of the American people.³⁴ The most impressive aspect of this budgetary maneuvering is that this was all achieved while balancing the budget in 1956 and 1957.³⁵

Military Ways

The US needed to maintain a force to counter the perceived threat increase as technology and the cold war adversaries innovated and evolved. Unlike the defense reductions after WWII, the drawdown after the Korean War heralded a nearly unquestioned, responsible transition. This was primarily due to President Eisenhower's military experience and the reverence he held with senior military leaders.

Officially known as the Reorganization of the Current Infantry, the US military designed the Pentomic Division in 1955 in order to gain additional maneuver capability to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. It was an effort to apply a force against a battlefield that covered an area thousands of square miles in extent. In concept, there was a wider dispersion of formations to minimize the effect of an enemy's tactical atomic weapons.³⁶ The Pentomic Division structurally eliminated the regiment and battalion, replacing both in the airborne and infantry divisions with five self-sustained "battle groups."³⁷ The Pentomic Division concept was never fully implemented. The Pentomic Division was arguably at best a hastily conceived initiative in response to the new atomic weapon technology. Further, the Army lacked clear doctrine for battlefield employment.³⁸

Meanwhile, the efforts of COL Aaron Bank's 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) led the Kennedy Administration to broaden the scope of counterinsurgency (COIN) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations to counter communist-supported insurgencies in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.³⁹ The Special Operations debate was not based in proving military necessity. It was primarily focused on ownership and authority.

The Reorganization Objective Army Divisions (ROAD) concept of 1960 and the Army's 11th Air Assault Division (Test) of 1963 became the alternatives to the contemporary conventional battle-plan.⁴⁰ It remained debatable that the envisioned Pentomic Division could operate effectively on a nuclear battlefield. As Sean Hoover describes, the Pentomic Division "would not have been able to function on the lower ends of the spectrum of conflict, primarily against insurgencies."⁴¹

National Means

A renewed interest in utilizing the military as a resource for international diplomacy drove the US to prevent a recurrence of the WWII drawdown. However, steps were taken to avoid bolstering the military industrial complex unnecessarily. US GDP during this period grew 7 percent annually, and public spending also increased 7 percent annually. The attention of the administration on building national infrastructure, increasing the efficacy of the education system, and improving the healthcare system are reflected in the nearly congruent growth between GDP and public spending. Further, US support through the military to aid foreign diplomacy efforts increased regional stability and fostered better trade environments.

Military Means

Military means consider the resources and balance them with capabilities required to ensure the security of the nation and its interests. President Eisenhower cut defense spending by 27 percent after the Korean War.⁴² Eisenhower reduced military spending on personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement. Simultaneously, he dramatically increased funding for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E).

Transitioning to the New Look strategy of containment allowed President Eisenhower to further reduce military personnel expenses by 24 percent from 1953 to 1961.⁴³ Over the same eight year period the Army's budget declined by 42 percent, a \$74 billion decline, while the two nuclear arms of the military, the Navy and Air Force, saw smaller reductions of 16 percent and 25 percent, respectively.⁴⁴

The operational successes of Colonel Bank's 10th SFG after its inception led to an accurate assessment of their peacetime strategic exigency. The peacetime relationships

with foreign militaries built through 10th Group's efforts could not be understated. This led to the development of FID as a whole of government, cooperative effort.

The National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 182, from 1963 provided the necessary policy guidance and responsibilities to conduct operations such as Operation White Star in Laos. The result was a specially designed unit provisionally chartered to train, advise and assist host nation (HN) country forces.⁴⁵ The Special Action Force (SAF), as it was called, was a Special Forces led unit augmented with Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, Military Intelligence, Military Police, Engineer and Medical elements.⁴⁶

On 25 November 1963 the Army provisionally organized four regionally aligned units: 1st SFG aligned to SAF Asia; 8th SFG aligned to SAF Latin America; 3rd SFG aligned to SAF Africa and 6th SFG aligned to SAF Middle East. SAFs were assigned to Army Component Commands and OPCON to overseas Unified Commands.⁴⁷ They coordinated with the HN and prepared Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) campaign plans.⁴⁸

National Risks

The US faced similar risks as the previous drawdown period. However, the risks increased in severity and consequence of failure. In October 1957, the Soviets' Sputnik 1 became the first man-made object to satellite the earth. Enraged and frightened, President Eisenhower publically downplayed the launch, while pouring additional funding into the space program.⁴⁹

Khrushchev's October 1960 pledge to support wars of national liberation was a call to arms against colonialism.⁵⁰ This sentiment influenced the communists in North

Vietnam to intensify their armed efforts to unify Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. Several months later, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sponsored coup to overthrow Fidel Castro's government in Cuba failed and caused further damage to US-Soviet relations. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion pushed Cuba to ally with the Soviets and towards socialism. This was closely followed by the Cuban missile crisis that defined Secretary of State Dulles's brinkmanship foreign policy.

Military Risks

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev took great effort to reduce the size of the Soviet conventional military in favor of advanced missile technology. Funding was reallocated from defense to improving Soviet life. Concurrently, a split occurred in 1960 between Maoist-Marxist China and Lenin-Marxist Soviet Union, further convoluting regional unrest.

Emboldened by Khrushchev's promise of support, belligerent states began to take overtly aggressive action. On 2 November 1963 the South Vietnamese government was overthrown by a coup. Twenty days later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas and President Johnson was sworn in.

Vietnam War Drawdown Case Study: 1975–1980

From the beginning of our involvement in South Vietnam & Cambodia, I had always thought that we were doing the right things. Our policy was a natural outgrowth of decisions we had made at the end of World War II. In the immediate postwar period, the US mounted a foreign aid program to help rebuild the shattered economics of countries all over the world. The basic thrust behind them was the desire to eliminate, or at least contain, Communist aggression around the globe.⁵¹

National Ends

The US never experienced a more disparate period than the Vietnam War. The world was shrinking and unilateral actions taken by belligerent nations were increasingly impacting a broader audience. In April 1975, the last of the remaining troops left the Republic of South Vietnam. The departure effectively rendered the Vietnamese defenseless. But, the US placed foreign policy priorities elsewhere.

US values continued a trend away from beliefs in a strong government in favor of protecting individual freedoms. Continuing the shift to empowered civil liberties, the 1966 findings of *Miranda v Arizona* held that the Fifth Amendment required law enforcement to advise suspects of their rights.⁵² The trend toward increased empowerment of the citizenry continued as the US assumed an increased leadership role in world affairs. US interests focused on the recovery of the domestic economy, stabilization of resources and maintenance and expansion of a free market. The Soviet Union remained the ideological opposite to the US, and the US was perceived as militarily weak and diplomatically ineffectual. The Soviet threat increased from its emergence at the conclusion of WWII through the difficult reality of détente encountered as a backdrop during the Korean War. With a command economy and state needs tantamount to civil liberties, the Soviets posed as the ominous and real antithesis to American values and ideological interests.

US national objectives included countering the Soviet threat, stabilizing the economy and strengthening our allies through cooperative trade agreements. Potential points of friction mainly centered on the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. As direct or indirect influences to international trade and commerce, the Soviet block greatly

inhibited US trade objectives. The Soviets recognized Europe's energy dependence and began planning a pipeline connecting oil and gas producing regions across Ukraine to the oil and gas consumers.

Further, the growing dependence of Western nations on petroleum forced the Middle Eastern nations into the global marketplace. The US backing of Israel in the Yom Kippur War created friction with the Arab Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations. This resulted in the OPEC oil embargo of the US from 1973 to 1974.⁵³ The potential for US military involvement in the Middle East drove strategic planners to begin planning a battle that largely centered on the tank as the primary maneuver element. However, the US sought to prevent war in the Middle East in order to provide a stable region for energy resource procurement.

Military Ends

The military objectives and end state changed in the years prior to the Vietnam drawdown. Once identified, they resulted in fundamental institutional change. During the Vietnam War, the military objectives and end state grew incongruent with national ends. Planning for the drawdown commenced before the end of combat operations. In the early 1970s, Congress reviewed unilateral Executive Branch behavior during recent conflicts. Considering the analyzed actions during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, Congress determined that the Executive branch was circumventing Constitutional authority in committing forces without Congressional approval. As a result, Congress enacted the *War Powers Resolution* in 1973. This Resolution was an effort to limit the ability of the President to commit forces abroad unless the US or its interests were under direct attack. The act directed specific guidelines for reporting to Congress the necessity for the

commitment of forces. Ironically, no President subsequent the passing of the Resolution adhered to these guidelines. In fact, originally vetoed by President Richard Nixon, the Resolution has been considered unconstitutional by every president since codification into law. Regardless of the constitutionality, this inter-governmental disagreement is merely indicative of the divergent nature between facing reality and the nature of keeping a constituency happy before the next election cycle.

The military struggled with this discordant strategic planning. The Hollow Force haunted policy makers, budget planners, and negatively influenced decisions. Hesitant to invest in a fledgling force, congress required significant convincing to fund new programs. However, the military remained vigilant and stalwartly initiated a renewed emphasis on values and standards of conduct. It remained the understanding throughout the military that the Armed Forces were an expression of our Nation.

National Ways

Emerging from the Vietnam quagmire, the US faced expanding global challenges. The diplomatic troubles for the US began before the large-scale conventional operations of 1965. The US failed to gain a coalition in Vietnam with any substantial influence. The 1964 More Flags initiative did not result in any gained international involvement.⁵⁴ Traditional allies did little more than support through political rhetoric, and not actual troop or materiel support. Coalitions formed at the end of past conflicts wavered in strength as they searched for relevancy in the new world environment. The coalitions faltered in relative historic strength and necessitated extensive, if not cynically acknowledged, support. The More Flags initiative affected previously existing cooperative organizations.

In terms of managing information, the expanding role of the media throughout the Vietnam War increased transparency of tactical fights and became a too-slowly understood strategic consideration. The armed forces lost the narrative initiative during the war in Vietnam. The public did not understand the long-term necessity of investing in defense. Subsequently, politicians were reluctant to side with heavy military spending.

In military terms, strategic planning to mitigate the Soviet threat drove the post-war drawdown. A holistic understanding of the quagmire that defined the military's frustration during the Vietnam War required considerable reflection. This expansive effort was disregarded in light of the pressing Soviet threat and the promise of considerable profiteering off of military contracts. The OPEC oil embargo affected the US economy and subsequently increased global market awareness.⁵⁵ The depressed economy and fear of continuing inflation exacerbated the perceived need for stable energy resources. This eventually shaped the situational understanding of strategic planners. Perhaps as a result of this acute awareness and a perceived potential for Middle East military involvement, the US military began planning for a battle that focused on mechanized maneuver and high-technology weapons solutions.

Military Ways

Disillusioned with a misunderstood use of military force abroad, public support waned as the war in Vietnam came to a close. As a result, elected officials implemented defense spending cuts while operations remained continuous. The budget reductions realized prior to the cessation of combat operations necessitated real change. The military was facing the operational fallout of this reduced budget. The budget reductions resulted in a smaller Army, as the Army's end-strength declined from 1.57 million in 1968 to

785,000 in 1974. As a result, the Army experimented with new applications of available technology and formations. The military leadership, recognizing accurately the contemporary environment, conceptualized and executed radical institutional changes. The experimental nature of the triple capability 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP), 1971-1974, required unplanned expenditures as the capabilities and needs of the unit became realized and tested in combat.⁵⁶ The intent of the TRICAP division concept was to provide a fighting force with armor, rotary wing, and infantry assets as a combined arms team. As military personnel and materiel redeployed from Vietnam, military leadership recognized the need to reevaluate tried and tested concepts in order to meet the new military objectives. Despite facing continuing budgetary reductions, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger formally instituted General Abram's Total Force concept into policy in late 1973.⁵⁷ The Total Force policy objectives sought the integration of the Active and Reserve components in the most cost-effective manner. The purpose of the Total Force was to maintain as small a standing military as possible during peacetime yet retain the flexibility to rapidly expand to meet emergent commitments.⁵⁸ The same year, the transition to an all-volunteer Army began.

Although irregular warfare became a primary means of conducting business, the Army decided to shift back to decisive operations. The military struggled to adjust from irregular tactics back to traditional decisive operations. This return to traditional mission sets implied redefining mission and purpose juxtaposed to contemporary threats. The Vietnam War saw an emphasis on small unit tactics. The scale and scope of the irregular battle in Vietnam exceeded anything previously experienced and was not expected to occur again.

While in command of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General DePuy initiated the Division Restructuring Study (DRS), from 1975 to 1979.⁵⁹ The DRS found that the ROAD organization was inefficient and that the most appropriate way to organize a military force was to center on technology.⁶⁰ Advanced weapons and their employment were to drive military formations. This resulted in a post Vietnam doctrine that was relatively weapons and tactics heavy, where the infantry's primary role was to support armor.⁶¹ The Army began testing this concept but it was never completed. General Starry subsequently took command of TRADOC and initiated the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) to develop the Division 86 concept that ran from 1978 to 1980.⁶² Division 86 was focused on the commander's vision of the battlefield, and not centered on technology. This concept never made it to the testing phase.

National Means

The resources available to the US to allocate to the national defense were growing. In 1971, President Nixon uncoupled the US dollar from gold and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports in an effort to recover from stagflation.⁶³ This move of cancelling the convertibility to gold effectively ended the Bretton Woods system and created floating currencies. Regardless of international criticism, the US economy did improve in the short term. This resulted in another congruent period of growth and expenditures as GDP grew 15 percent annually and public spending increased 14 percent annually.

Military Means

Military leaders needed to balance available resources and the capabilities necessary to provide for the common defense. Perhaps resulting from pressure from both the public and Congress, President Nixon cut the defense budget by 29 percent as troops withdrew from Vietnam prior to the cessation of combat operations.⁶⁴ The drawdown added a difficult obstacle to this task. The end of combat operations in Vietnam found the military facing a significant reduction in personnel and budget. From 1975 to 1980, DoD manpower decreased from 3,207,000 to 3,054,000 personnel—a 4.8 percent decrease. The comparison to total US workforce was a constant 3 percent. The budget was expanded from \$86.1 billion in 1975 to \$141.9 billion in 1980, a 64.8 percent increase. Defense spending accounted for an average of 17 percent of total public spending and an average of 5 percent of the GDP during this drawdown period.⁶⁵ This was primarily the result of enhanced research, design, and procurement expenditures. These costs were secondary to the belief that the Soviet threat would be mitigated through technology. Of course, this was a theory that was welcomed by the military industrial complex. However, public support and political will proved a significant obstacle. This consideration haunted decision makers attempting to build capabilities to mitigate the Soviet threat. The addition of the general malaise felt throughout the Armed Forces after prolonged combat caused historians to refer to the post-Vietnam military as a Hollow Force.

National Risks

The risks identified by policy makers necessitated diligence in planning, prudent allocation of resources, and careful execution. The risks were twofold. First, they risked not meeting the national objectives. Mitigating the Soviet threat represented the greatest

risk to national interests and objectives. The Soviets represented a direct threat to national security. Their missile capabilities and economic posturing both effected the manner in which foreign policy was conducted by the US. The implications of diplomacy failure were exacerbated by Soviet influence on fragile, failing, and failed nations. A natural emphasis on mitigating threats through military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives followed.

Second, they risked permanent erosion of Middle East and Far East trade and relations. The ability to secure energy resources became an area of emphasis in both the civilian and defense sectors. Traveling east, India began nuclear testing in 1974, causing significant distress to an already unstable region.⁶⁶ The advent of a nuclear India increased already strained relationships with Pakistan and China. Further east, after the ideological split in 1960, Chinese and Soviet relations became increasingly antagonistic. This allowed for a unique opportunity for the US to increase diplomatic relations with the Chinese. In 1978, the Chinese de-regulated international trade in a move opposing the Soviets.⁶⁷

Military Risks

The risks of investing in a doctrine that advocated an operational solution centering on armor seemed obvious. First, this doctrinal shift emboldened the military industrial complex by focusing military operations on a technology. Second, the focus on technology drove the funding, training, and equipping of US forces away from the individual warfighter. The military, albeit improving on some fronts, seemingly disregarded the tactical lessons learned in Vietnam. The military moved away from an active peacetime diplomatic support role. The focus shied away from long-term building

partner capacity missions. This is a lesson the military would direly re-learn in during the Global War on Terror.

In an effort to forget the negative experiences in Vietnam and move forward, very few strategic planners placed an emphasis on building partner capacity and security force assistance. This seemingly purposeful forgetfulness was a serious unaccounted for risk. The lessons from building local cooperation in villages to building a national security force were not analyzed and implemented into doctrine well enough to clearly identify the military necessity of a permanent element that owned these tasks. Special Forces (SF) leaders recognized this issue and took steps to mitigate the anticipated risks.

SF leaders developed a program called Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation-building (SPARTAN).⁶⁸ SPARTAN was designed to demonstrate that the learned talents SF troops possessed were not irrelevant simply because the Vietnam War was over.⁶⁹ Deployed CONUS, the 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups worked to build roads and medical facilities and provide free medical treatment to impoverished citizens of North Carolina.⁷⁰ Despite this clarity of forethought, inter-service Special Operations Forces (SOF) efforts were not synched in resources or capabilities. Joint training was limited, under funded, and under emphasized. The results were disastrous. In April 1980 the inability of the military to coordinate special operations forces across components led to the failure to liberate hostages held in the US Embassy in Tehran.

The Reagan Anomaly Case Study: 1981–1989

[I]t's always very easy and very tempting politically to come up with arguments for neglecting defense spending in time of peace. One of the great tragedies of this century was that it was only after the balance of power was allowed to erode and a ruthless adversary, Adolf Hitler, deliberately weighed the risks and decided to strike that the importance of a strong defense was realized too late. That was

what happened in the years leading up to World War II. And especially for those of us who lived through that nightmare, it's a mistake that America and the free world must never make again.⁷¹

National Ends

National ends consider values, interest, and objectives, and weigh potential points of friction. On 20 January 1981, Ronald Reagan took office as the 40th President of the United States. Running on a platform advocating limited government, President Reagan paradoxically proselytized for increasing defense capabilities. Continuing a trend from the end of the Vietnam War, President Reagan empowered military leaders by allocating necessary resources.

America's values were tested internally and externally. Internally, a paradigm shift occurred where social safety nets were traded in favor of national security mechanisms. The US values began returning to the traditionally held beliefs in a democratic system of government. US interests focused on energy security and the aggressive expansion of a free market. In the face of a significant external threat, these fundamental changes in interest and objectives seemed justified. The primary objective was defeating the communist threat. However, a growing argument against a bolstered defensive posture gained momentum. Proponents of this domestic focus may have more aptly named this case study Eisenhower's Nightmare Realized, as the military industrial complex seemed to be the single biggest profiteer during this period. For example, Lockheed and Martin Marietta both contributors to the defense effort, received recurring lucrative contracts. Interestingly, Lockheed was found to have bribed foreign officials for government defense contracts yet suffered no significant loss in US contracts as a result of the findings. The end result of this domestic infrastructure versus defense

superstructure argument further polarized our nation. This division acted as a derisive agent, eroding our resolve on both fronts from within. Fortunately, national interests aligned around preserving the provisions of free trade and expanding into new markets. The economic interests provided motivation for the national objectives of bolstering vulnerable economies in order to further contain the spread of communism.

Potential Conflicts facing the US primarily remained focused on USSR and Warsaw Pact countries. The enormous purported nuclear threat stood as the primary justification for increasing defense spending. Even in light of Gorbachev's *perestroika* initiative to reconstruct Soviet political and economic systems to better fit with contemporary geopolitics, the Soviets could not change the world's fear and negative perceptions.⁷² The Middle East, however, seemed to emerge as the most likely potential conventional force battle. This idea permeated military conceptual tactics through strategic planning. This time period marked the most significant increase in defense spending. The remarkable point is that this did not occur with a concomitant increase in personnel, often referred to as the most expensive long-term defense expenditure. Rather, the money was spent on RTD&E and acquisitions.⁷³

Military Ends

Military ends consider the military objectives, end states, and whether these are congruent with national ends. The military institutional objectives gained much needed clarity in the years immediately following the Vietnam War. However, the political will to apply resources to designed concepts lacked the power to implement. The military recovered from the Hollow Force from the immediate post-Vietnam years through a return to time-tested values and persistent efforts of senior military and congressional

leaders.⁷⁴ As a cost-saving result, an increasing emphasis on building partner capacity and security force assistance was seen throughout the Reagan era.

National Ways

National ways consider the concepts and diplomatic, information, military, and economic influences. US diplomatic goals matured from the immediate post-Vietnam era in a noticeable turn towards conservative foreign policies. The US desired to utilize diplomatic assets to organize, coordinate, and manage international relations to deter aggression and provide assistance to vulnerable nations. This was a general effort to build and repair coalitions and diplomatic ties with marginalized nations, with the intent to foster expansion of international trade and the free market.

Managing the flow of information was becoming an art form. The increased role of the media in both national politics and international diplomacy required strict coordination and management of strategic communications. However, the US and Soviet media problems were diametrically opposed. The Soviets held control of the media sources available to its citizens. Despite Gorbachev's *glasnost* initiative, the government had strict control of the narrative and the result was a singular story without publically dissenting views.⁷⁵ The US, on the other hand, suffered from too much information. The difficulty was gaining consensus with a controlling idea without dissention disrupting the original intent. The narrative was hard fought and seldom won.

In military terms, the Reagan era was marked with aggressive budgetary expansion and a massive restructuring of the DoD. The era was defined by the ever-present Soviet threat, strategic planning to mitigate the threat, and the drive toward inter-service operational cooperation.

The 1973-1974 OPEC oil embargo drove the US to seek economic expansion and diversification into new markets. This was an example of a motivation that drove to the 1980 introduction of supply-side, or voodoo economics that drastically increased national debt.⁷⁶

Military Ways

Military ways consider the concepts and possible courses of action. From the end of WWII, military ways evolved conceptually from the initial argument of what capabilities to retain, to the Korean drawdown conceptual understanding of a military that responsibly balanced the threat. The focus shifted with the Vietnam drawdown repair of the force. During the Reagan era, the focus shifted further with the method of meeting the national threats without regard to the economic cost.

Although, they were the advances in working relationships and communications that directly contributed to success, an argument nevertheless ensued to significantly reduce personnel in favor of advanced weapons technology. As a logical continuation of GEN DePuy's technology centered doctrine, the Army continued to focus on the tools of war rather than the warfighter. The experiments varied in design and objective end state, but all focused on the enhancement and utilization of high technology equipment. The variations of innovating technological integration with maneuver units progressed from the High Technology Test Bed (HTTB), to the High Technology Light Division (HTLD), 7th Infantry Division (Light), 1983-1986, and finally to the High Technology Motorized Division (HTMD) (9th Infantry Division), 1980-1988.⁷⁷ The fate of these conceptual maneuver elements languished at the mercy of funding competition. Though not all concepts fell short of funding, some just failed to gain community support.

The persistent Soviet threat drove organizational planning toward joint operational synchronization, perhaps exemplified best militarily by the establishment of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

The success of the transition to an all-volunteer force and an increased effort on foreign military cooperation through security force assistance and open lines of communication and effort within the US military provided the conceptual framework for the success on 17 January, 1991 in Operation Desert Storm.

National Means

National means consider resources, capabilities, and possible disconnects between means and ways or ends. The economy continued to grow significantly. This continuing trend resulted in an annual GDP growth of 12 percent and annual public spending increase of 10 percent. Defense spending accounted for an average of 19 percent of total public spending and an average of 6 percent of the GDP during this period.

Military Means

Military means consider the resources and balance them with capabilities required to ensure the security of the nation and its interests. The overseas garrisons established to counter post-WWII threats continued to operate yet now displayed a more overt cooperative capacity.

The Army's acquisition of the Big Five—the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk and Patriot—added considerable military power and concomitant institutional changes. These acquisitions had significant fiscal consequences. From 1981 to 1989, DoD manpower increased from 3,120,000 to 3,320,000 personnel—a 6.0 percent increase.

The comparison to total US workforce was a constant 3 percent. The budget was expanded from \$175.8 billion in 1981 to \$291.5 billion in 1989, a 65.9 percent increase. This resulted in a growth rate that was 1.3 times greater than the growth after the Vietnam War and 4.0 times greater than the historic peacetime growth rate.⁷⁸

National Risks

The single most significant threat to US national ends was the USSR. Mitigation of this threat meant increases in defense expenditures, mainly in research, design, and acquisition of high technology weapons. The failure to meet the threat meant total annihilation. Or, at least that is what the public was told.

The Middle East threat was a highly charged subject mixing religion, emerging geopolitics, and vital natural resources into a veritable storm of emotion and terror. Fear and tradition clashed with basic needs into an amalgam of confusion. Emerging from 8 years of conflict in the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East was reeling in turmoil. Mitigating this threat meant preparing for the worst-case scenario. The worst-case scenario was a ground assault followed by regime change, occupation or both. This allowed military leaders to shift focus to high technology systems, and it allowed the military industrial complex to expand exponentially in the sale of said items.

South and Central America emerged from decades of unrest and international indifference to a direct threat to US welfare with the organization of the drug trade. Newly empowered drug organizations maintained political influence and control over local and national governments and shaped the environment to counter US interests. In the end, however, the US sought responsible application of resources to mitigate the risk of potential threat.

Military Risks

A focus on technology continued throughout the decade. The risks of holding the individual warfighter as a secondary component to his equipment remained unrecognized or simply disregarded.

Investment in shaping operations through building partner capacity in support of security cooperation was newly revitalized as fragile, failing, and failed states became a focus of communist deterrence. In July 1981, Pentagon officials warned the Reagan administration about the potentially de-stabilizing effects of the newly constructed Trans-Siberian pipeline.⁷⁹ This pipeline transported Siberian oil through Ukraine to the European market. From a strategic perspective, it is easy to understand Russia's interests in Ukraine. When the Trans-Siberian pipeline was completed in 1981, the Soviet Union owned the process from extraction through distribution to the European market.

Cold War Drawdown Case Study: 1991-2001

Two years ago, I began planning cuts in military spending that reflected the changes of the new era. But now, this year, with imperial communism gone, that process can be accelerated. . . . I want you to know that for half a century, American Presidents have longed to make such decisions and say such words. But even in the midst of celebration, we must keep caution as a friend. For the world is still a dangerous place. Only the dead have seen the end of conflict. And though yesterday's challenges are behind us, tomorrow's are being born.⁸⁰

National Ends

National ends consider values, interest, and objectives, and weigh potential points of friction. On 20 January 1989, President George H. W. Bush was sworn in to office. He faced a polarized world unraveling. As the Soviet Union struggled to regain a viable economy, the Middle East emerged from the Iran-Iraq War more unstable than ever before. On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait over an economic dispute. Subsequently,

the US deployed forces to the Persian Gulf and commenced an intense bombing campaign on 17 January 1991. Combat operations ceased after a lightning fast armor and technology supported assault on Iraqi Forces. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, Premier Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* policies attempted to adjust the Soviet system to increase compatibility in the rapidly changing world. Just a few months after the fall of Baghdad, on 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved. This ended the 46 years of bipolar geopolitics that had shaped US foreign policy.

Efforts to preserve national values and protect interests similarly shaped national objectives. The US values maintained traditionally held beliefs in a system of government amenable to family values, individual freedoms, and a rarely-admitted imperialist world view. In 1995, the findings from *United States v. Lopez* resulted in limiting Congress' power over state sovereignty. This is an indicator of the continuing liberalization that began in the WWII drawdown period.⁸¹ US interests remained focused on trade agreements and the expansion of a free market. The Reagan era enjoyed a confluence of available resources and a singular, achievable capability to mitigate threats to national security. The primary objective became the stabilization of fragile, failing, and failed states. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the emergence of non-state, hybrid, and rouge nation threats drove post-Cold War strategic planning. The era was marked with a renewed emphasis on re-allocation of assets to assist in US domestic infrastructure improvement.

During the Clinton presidency, potential conflicts dispersed and became more difficult to identify and assess. The Middle East became the primary focus for potential conventional military employment. Emerging actors of regional instability included

China's growing economy, Japan's growing wealth and power, India's first nuclear weapon testing in 1998, and former Soviet States dissolving into corrupt municipalities.⁸²

Military Ends

Military ends consider the military objectives, end states, and whether these are congruent with national ends. The era was marked with natural military personnel and budget reductions, coinciding with the renewed emphasis on re-allocation of assets to assist in US domestic infrastructure improvement. Accordingly, the DoD placed a greater emphasis on supporting DoS-led building partner capacity and security force assistance activities.

National Ways

National ways consider the concepts and diplomatic, information, military, and economic influences. Peacetime diplomatic coordination with foreign governments and military forces and a carry-over from the Reagan-era emphasis on inter- and intra-governmental cooperation formed a functional interdependence. A focus continued on assisting and building at-risk and unstable economies.

Managing the flow of information was becoming increasingly more complex. Variations of perspective shaped narratives based on content and timeliness of reporting. A growing bureaucracy exacerbated the criticality of managing strategic communications. The US continued to struggle with the availability of too much information. The difficulty remained gaining a consensus. Unfortunately, this usually meant simplifying the narrative in order to pander to the lowest common denominator, often diluting the original intent for cognitive processing.

Defense spending diminished without the looming Soviet threat. Resources were allocated in an effort to improve national infrastructure and re-establish the viability of social programs. The general intent was to maintain the upward mobility of the economy and ensure that conscious efforts were applied to help society in broader terms.

Military Ways

Military concepts and courses of action varied throughout this era with the exception being a focus on equipping the warfighter. The warfighter was not an end. Weapons, weapon technology, vehicles, and protective equipment all came with price tags, and the private sector could profit significantly. The warfighter did not profit the private sector.

The Army moved from Division to Brigade based operations through the Force XXI transformative concept. This was the logical precursor to the modular brigade concept. However, an operational gap persisted. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) attempted to close this gap through the application of conventional forces to support building partner capacity missions during peacetime. These efforts were largely abandoned before 2001. However, the lessons from the interagency and interdepartmental coordination in efforts with foreign military services directly contributed to the initial successes in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001.

National Means

National means consider resources, capabilities, and possible disconnects between means and ways or ends. In a continuation of the Reagan years, the economy continued its significant growth. The GDP increased 7 percent annually, while public expenditures

increased 5 percent throughout the post-Cold War era. Defense spending accounted for an average of 11 percent of total public spending and an average of 4 percent of the GDP during this drawdown period—a decrease from 19 percent and 6 percent respectively.⁸³

National defense capabilities demonstrated proficiency with the precise efficiency through combined arms maneuver in decisive operations. However, as a related serious disconnect, it remained debatable for many years to follow whether the US would require a mechanized capability to the degree necessary for success in Desert Storm. This marked an effort to shift focus further away from ground maneuver elements and more towards automated and long range aircraft and missile operations.

Military Means

Military means consider the resources and balance them with capabilities required to ensure the security of the nation and its interests. From 1991 to 2001, DoD manpower decreased from 3,121,000 to 2,138,000 personnel, a 32 percent decrease. This corresponded to a reduction from 2 percent to 1 percent of the total US workforce. The budget was reduced from \$310.6 billion in 1991 to \$251.3 billion in 1994, a 19 percent decrease.

National Risks

Dissolution of the USSR mired national threat analysis. For 46 years the Soviet Union provided an enemy to compete against. Now that the enemy dissolved and disbanded, the US was left with a struggle to pinpoint and understand new threats. The Middle East provided the US with a source of fear and fascination. The need for energy resources highlighted a need for understanding Middle East politics. The realized need

and the known unrest seemed to increase national anxiety. Following Desert Storm, US access to energy resources did not increase substantially but regional stability improved, providing for a safer and more constant source.

South and Central America remained a proximal threat. The agents of instability remained active and persistent. The result of the 1989 invasion of Panama provided some regional stability. However, the needed constant presence would prove exceedingly costly. Arguably, one of the most significant difficulties was the identification and assessment of potential destabilizers. The rise of the empowered civil organization came to the forefront of destabilizing actors. The failing and failed states were no longer at high risk of communist infection. The at-risk states were now susceptible to insurgent and terror group infiltration. This became a more prominent threat to US national security with the increasing use and popularity of the super-empowering Internet. In the end, however, the US sought responsible application of resources to mitigate the risk of potential threat.

Military Risks

Similar to the previous eras, a focus continued on technology. The view of the warfighter as secondary to equipment continued as a seemingly unrecognized risk. The DoD and DoS continued an expansion of building partner capacity in support of security cooperation. Coordinated efforts to identify fragile, failing, and failed states took a holistic approach to assessment. Logically, the solution also required a whole of government approach. Yet, the mechanisms for efficient execution of such a plan did not exist.

As one of the identified fragile states, Ukraine presented a unique challenge. When the Trans-Siberian pipeline was completed in 1981, the Soviet Union owned the process from extraction through distribution to the European market. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, introduced new actors in this supply chain with vested interests and considerable rights to ownership. Russia extracted and transported through the Ukraine, and the Ukraine enjoyed a considerable downstream piece of the distribution process.

Summary

The case studies illustrate that the needed force construct solution was the addition and maintenance of elements that serve to fulfill the tasks of security cooperation in support of a whole of government approach to building partner capacity. This includes, but is obviously not limited to, cultural, language, and foreign military equipment expertise. These attributes coincide directly with the skills associated with building allied nations' security capacity.

The following chapter will present an environmental frame for the post-GWOT world and will posit that the solution to maintaining our future security is answered through the study of our past.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

War necessitates an increased force to compliment an increased threat, while the opposite is true when the threat is defeated or subsides. How we make the transition from a large, actively fighting force to one that is smaller and ready to fight is a difficult problem. Adapting to a leaner fighting force while maintaining readiness requires careful diligence in the retention of the professional relationships and lessons learned, especially in a changing global environment.

The purpose of this study is to show that the maintenance of international stability requires a consistency of military power. The maintenance of a deterrent force is a complex problem. It possesses a solution that shifts with time and the will of would-be adversaries.

Interpretation of Findings

Continued international stability requires a consistency of military power. The primary research question seeks to determine how US leaders can enact policy utilizing the elements of national power to shape the contemporary environment and drive towards the desired environment. To this end, the drawdown case studies reviewed national and military ends, ways, means, and risks from their contemporary perspectives in order to appropriately frame a contextual reference point. The individual case studies answered the secondary research questions by illustrating how previous leaders enacted policy

through the elements of national power to bridge the gap between their current and desired environments.

Planning and executing military drawdowns evolved drastically throughout the modern era. From the disastrous restrictions placed on the defense infrastructure by a war weary constituency after WWII, the fear of unpreparedness has since been balanced by attainable defense capabilities. The Korean War drawdown displayed a responsible drawdown, with an emphasis on domestic issues while maintaining the capabilities necessary to mitigate the threat. With a greatly divergent nature between a rebelling youth, a discordant and indecisive government, and a resultantly unguided military, the Vietnam drawdown posed its own problems. As a result, the military leadership was focused on repairing the force from within. The post Vietnam era saw a return in the military to a values based system of professional ethics. The Reagan era concept of “folding the gap” with the Soviets regardless of the economic cost emboldened the military infrastructure and allowed significant growth. Although, with the increase of resources came the increased involvement of the military industrial complex and the resultant focus on equipment rather than the warfighter. This trend continued through the post Cold War era as an emphasis on high technology weapon systems took precedence over a highly trained force.

Recommendations for the Global War On Terror Drawdown

“Experience is not what happens to you; it’s what you do with what happens to you.”¹ The changes to the national defense must be part of a whole of government effort. Likewise, the Army needs to foster the ability to work through Unified Action Partners (UAP) in a coalesced effort toward shaping the current environment in order to prevent

future threats. This is captured in the whole of government concept of FID. Primarily conducted by SOF, FID is directly in support of Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) building partner capacity efforts. In today's world and the foreseeable future, every conflict will require wide-ranging expertise. Without a continued emphasis on the warfighter instead of equipment this expertise will be lost. The coming drawdown must meet criteria for suitability, acceptability, and feasibility. Suitability is a determination of efficacy within legal and ethical boundaries. The military seems reticent to publish specific personnel reductions predictions, for good reason. Perhaps the lessons from the post WWII 93 percent troop reduction will dissuade legislators from making the same mistakes.

Acceptability is a measure of cost and risk versus benefit. The defense budget should be increased to the historic peacetime average of 7 percent of the GDP. A defense budget under the historic average will likely result in severe consequences on unit and overall Army readiness.

Feasibility is measured in terms of available resources. The resources are available to maintain a stalwart and ready military. The GDP is an undeniable indicator to this end.

National and Military Ends

In assessing the congruency of national and military ends, the transition from wartime application to peacetime readiness is an historic challenge. The transition to peace shifts the balance of the elements of national power. Thomas Jefferson was apprehensive about having a standing peacetime Army, having gone so far as to remark, "never keep an unnecessary soldier."² Better to have the individual providing for the

national infrastructure in another way than to have a warrior sit idle. But does Jefferson's concept of a small standing Army really work without instituting a draft? Rachel Maddow, author and syndicated talk show host, furthered this thought and commented in her book, *Drift*, that "war is not a jobs program."³

Since 1945, the military strategic goals were not always congruent with national strategy. As the penultimate indicator of national interest and values, the Supreme Court trended throughout this period towards interpreting the Constitution away from favoring a strong government. The limited, yet growing, emphasis on individual liberty was in accord with the notion of a focus on a constitutionally empowered citizenry.

The United States arguably does not face a threat like the period at the end of the wars in Korea and Vietnam. After the United States withdrawal from both Korea and Vietnam, it still dealt with the massive Soviet military threat and its expansionist policy. Al Qaeda does not threaten the existence of the United States, and it has been suggested that China's military is nowhere near the threat posed by that of the former Soviet Union.⁴

National and Military Ways

In assessing national and military ways a common spirit of modernization during interwar periods historically drove the militaries of the world to make significant innovative improvements. Peace shifts the elements of national power and allows for creative organizational and doctrinal change.

While the US may not need a large standing peacetime Army, armies are simply not made overnight. This drastically discounts the wider complexities concerning rapid military utilization in response to an immediate threat. The peacetime Army needs to be

efficient and smaller yet maintain the capability to rapidly expand to confront a crisis. In order to accomplish this, however, the level of expertise across the peacetime force must not only be maintained, it must be expanded. The logical expansion is to incorporate building partner capacity and security force assistance capabilities within conventional units. The Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept would fill this institutional gap and allow conventional forces the opportunity to increase participation in SFA efforts. This would in turn provide necessary retention of capabilities and lessons learned. The lessons of the past ten years need to be maintained.

Taking the experiences gained across the force throughout Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, both conventional and special operations forces were involved in missions resembling Security Force Assistance and Building Partner Capacity. Both of these missions require a considerable understanding of the culture, language and history of the Host Nation.

National and Military Means

In assessing national and military means, the nation's financial commitment to defense is historically influenced by four interrelated factors. First, perfect security is not purchased. Second, the direction of the military must remain responsible and realistic regarding the perception of the short and long term threats to national security. Third, the national security establishment's strategy to deal with the perceived threats must likewise be responsible. Finally, the nation's fiscal condition must be considered.⁵ With the overt threat to national security and financial turmoil subsiding, the budget requires responsible reapportionment.




Figure 1. Budget analysis of the GWOT Drawdown

Source: Created by author, data utilized from 2012 Green Book.

The scheduled expenditure for 2016 is \$610.7 billion, which is below the historic trend for defense expenditures by \$7.3 billion, or 1.2 percent. Basically, the military has returned to spending that is in direct concordance with our historic expenditures during conflict. The difficulties lie in the years to come.




Figure 2. Total of defense and net public expenditures and Gross Domestic Product
Source: Created by author, data utilized from 2012 Green Book.

The extrapolated 2017 defense expenditure derived from the aggregate peacetime trend from 1945 to 2000 is \$401.3 billion. This amount is 34.3 percent below the current projected budget. The range between the historic reduction of 2.1 percent and the current potential decrease of 34.3 percent is staggeringly wide and open to significant interpretation. Defense spending projections account for 7 percent of future total public spending and 3 percent of the future GDP during this projected drawdown—a decrease from 11 percent and 4 percent respectively. We must work within our determined economic parameters and attempt to remove political influence when determining a defense strategy.




Figure 3. Defense expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product

Source: Created by author, data utilized from 2012 Green Book.




Figure 4. Defense expenditures as a percentage of total net public expenditures

Source: Created by author, data utilized from 2012 Green Book.

National and Military Risks

In assessing national and military risks, human nature is not predictable and true intentions often remain elusive. Human behavior cannot reduce to discrete, analyzable data sets. The risks in miscalculating predictive value cannot be overstated. Historian Howard Zinn stated that, “there is no flag large enough to cover the shame of killing innocent people for a purpose which is unattainable.”⁶ While qualitative data serves to promote hypothesis, scientifically discernible quantitative analysis possess significantly more predictive value. However, utilizing an analysis of socially derived data, yields useful predictive value.⁷ As modern statistician Nate Silver explains, whether one collects data, “in a quantitative or qualitative flavor is not as important as how you use it.”⁸ Similarly, no composite picture of the enemy is valid until the outset of the tactical battle. Therefore, military planning always involves a degree of risk since it is impossible to understand enemy capabilities and training entirely.

The Engineered Annexation of Crimea

The ability to determine future environments is of utmost strategic importance. Efforts to learn from past events are necessarily biased by knowledge of the real outcomes. However, applying the concept of social physics yields helpful perspectives on current events.⁹ Predicting future occurrence through the same type of social analysis remains significantly more difficult.¹⁰ When events are engineered, they follow recognizable patterns and develop in a predicable fashion. Zbigniew Brzezinski speculated in 2012 that 21st Century Asia may turn out to emulate 20th Century Europe, with the defining notion of state independence driving inter-state rivalries to heightened degrees of conflict.¹¹ Recent history in Russia and the former Soviet states are proving

Brzezinski correct. The Ukrainian instability followed easily predictable patterns—at least in retrospect. Political, economic, and social manipulation developed and executed by Vladimir Putin’s administration would sufficiently account for the civil unrest in Ukraine and the subsequent and current necessity for Russian involvement.

Putin took advantage of well-documented political, economic, and social volatility to manufacture unrest in Ukraine. In July 1981, Pentagon officials warned the Reagan administration about the potentially de-stabilizing effects of the newly constructed Trans-Siberian pipeline.¹² This pipeline transported Siberian oil through Ukraine to the European market. From a strategic perspective, it is easy to understand Russia’s interests in Ukraine. When the Trans-Siberian pipeline was completed in 1981, the Soviet Union owned the process from extraction through distribution to the European market. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, introduced new actors in this supply chain with vested interests and considerable rights to ownership. Now, Russia extracts and transports to the Ukraine, and the Ukraine enjoys a considerable downstream piece of the distribution process.

Using energy resources as a weapon is a global concern. Securing energy markets, therefore, has significant strategic implications. Putin stated that his ultimate goal is “a far-reaching revision of the post-Cold War strategic order in Europe.”¹³ To reach this end state, Putin habitually leverages Russian energy resources. In the summer of 2005, the Russians turned off the flow of gas to the Ukraine. The gas was bound for the European Union (EU) and the gesture represented intent to gain a political and economic advantage. As the 2005-06 winter approached, and the need for gas to heat European homes increased, the EU folded to the pressure and encouraged the Ukraine to negotiate

with Russia. Negotiations resulted in a multi-year contract that the international community regarded as punishment for the November 2004 Orange Revolution.¹⁴ The Russians again turned off the gas supply to the EU during the winter of 2009 in another attempt to flex economic power. In 2009, Ukraine lobbied for inclusion in the EU in an effort to solidify long-term economic stability. This time, when Russia turned off the gas, it was an attempt to portray the Ukraine as an unreliable asset to the expanding EU.¹⁵ Subsequently, the Ukrainian bid for membership failed, but the EU maintains strong interests in the Ukraine.

Russia understands the leverage that a subordinate Ukraine provides and is logically opposed to any unsupervised EU-Ukraine trade agreements. In a visit to Kiev in July 2013, Putin told the Ukrainian leaders to not stray too far from Russia's orbit regarding a proposed trade agreement with the EU.¹⁶ In November, Ukraine asked the EU to include economic support within the agreement in an effort to offset incurred debt to the Russians.¹⁷ The EU refused to include the support and Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich subsequently refused to sign the trade agreement. This sparked significant social unrest—and Russia possessed the right experience to exploit the situation. Previously, in 2008, Russian troops entered the South Ossetia region of Georgia in an announced move to protect Russian nationals and provide stability. In this case Russia made a concerted effort to equate economic strife to civil insecurity. Russia suffered no consequences from the international community for their maneuvers in South Ossetia. Perhaps this set an internationally perceived permissive environment for Russia to execute foreign policy initiatives without regard for second and third degree parties.

When faced with unrest in the Ukraine, the Russians knew how to exploit the initiative. In December 2013, Russia purchased \$15 billion in Ukrainian bonds in an effort to impose subordination.¹⁸ The economic distresses of the public intensified under the realization of new debt purchased by the Russians. The call for the ouster of the perceived weak President Yanukovich began to increase throughout the protesting crowds in Kiev. As the masses of protesters and violence increased, the Russians called for increased security at the Olympic Games. Due to a reported threat of Islamist militants, and a few incidents hundreds of miles away in Volgograd, Putin deployed 40,000 soldiers in January 2014, supposedly to defend the Olympic Games in Sochi.¹⁹ This provided a reasonable excuse to mass troops within reach of the Crimean region of Ukraine. On 18 February, President Yanukovich succumbed to social and political pressures and fled from office and from Ukraine. Putin confirmed that Russia granted him asylum. As the violence increased, Putin pressured the Ukrainian parliament to allow Russian troops into Ukraine to protect Russian nationals and provide stability.

These events follow a nearly textbook exploitation of social unrest. As a former KGB Lieutenant Colonel, Putin understands how to exploit mass movements. After fomenting unrest indirectly, Putin's narrative began with hope. As Eric Hoffer, the longshoreman social philosopher stated, the disillusioned are more likely to follow a leader selling hope than those handing out direct relief.²⁰ As Hoffer explained, "not only does a mass movement depict the present as mean and miserable—it deliberately makes it so."²¹ By denouncing the present instability, emphasizing an arguably non-existent glorious past and promising a brighter future, Putin applied a proven formula for success.

The Russian annexation of Crimea went to a vote on 16 March. The results of the vote underwent significant international scrutiny and debate.

The West is searching for viable recourse, but they are utilizing linear thinking in an attempt to solve a non-linear problem. While the Europeans are calling for unilateral EU-Russian negotiations, the US is pushing for economic assistance. Current financial analysts propose that a \$20 billion joint US and EU stimulus package would allow the Ukraine the necessary economic leverage to remove them from Russia's grasp.²² In an effort to push economic diplomacy, the US Congress approved economic assistance to the Ukraine on 6 March. As a result, Russia will not only gain strategically important terrain, but also gain a guaranteed return on their Ukraine bonds. We need a different approach.

Summary and Conclusions

The current shift in strategic emphasis from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific will foster changes across the force. If accurate, the illustrated Ukraine situation must be prevented from occurring in the future. The French FID and COIN theorist David Galula presented an operational approach utilizing his experiences in Algeria and focusing on the population as the center of gravity.²³ In political terms, the international order is maintained by adherence to agreements. These agreements create and maintain a reliable and acceptably stable peace. As Galula posits, these agreements are predicated on personal relationships and are reenforced by the will of the population. As the data from this study illustrates plainly, it is possible to shape and prevent conflicts. This recommended approach will require interoperability with other government agencies and departments. The US Army can contribute significantly to this effort abroad but it will

require promoting and codifying CF and SOF interdependence. While a conventional focus will always remain on conducting decisive operations, the Army must find a balance with an increased emphasis on supporting building partner capacity.

Recommendations for further study include three fundamental questions. First, how can the US reconcile discordant national and military ends? Second, how can the US military determine a balance between training, resourcing, and conducting decisive operations while supporting whole of government partner nation capacity efforts? Third, how can the US use the Ukraine example to shape and prevent further conflict? The gravity of these questions is obvious, but they fall out of the scope of this study nonetheless.

The results of this study suggest a force construct solution that includes the capabilities and requisite authorities necessary for increased conventional and special operations force interdependence through whole of government interoperability. The end is to shape the current environment through building partner capacity in order to prevent future conflict while simultaneously aligning national and military ends which have historically been discordant during drawdowns. As those who have spent over a decade at war can attest, the army's greatest resource is its people.

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