

Aviation Security Cooperation

Advancing Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power in a Dynamic World

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Airpower is more than dropping bombs, strafing targets, firing missiles, providing precision navigation and timing, or protecting networks. It is also a way of influencing world situations in ways which support national objectives. . . . Through careful building of partnerships, Air Force forces can favorably shape the strategic environment by assessing, advising, training, and assisting host nation air forces in their efforts to counter internal or external threats.

—Volume I, Basic Doctrine

Given the stark fiscal constraints on the federal budget today, the US military faces hard decisions about which conventional capabilities to develop and deploy to address the wide range of challenges and global demands facing the nation.¹ The military services, including the US Air Force, have long argued that “traditional” capabilities for deterring and/or defeating nation-states would adequately handle “nontraditional” or “irregular” threats from nonstate actors such as terrorists or insurgents.² In recent years, the exclusive focus of the Air Force’s strategic planning and programming for confronting future traditional challenges related to operating in highly contested environments has put other Air Force capabilities important to the nation at grave risk.³ For example, as the war in Afghanistan draws down, the service is con-

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sidering divesting or drastically reducing its ability to organize, train, and equip (OT&E) general purpose force (GPF) air advisors.⁴

Such a divestiture would negatively affect America's security cooperation (SC) efforts at a time when it is relying far more on partner nations to address both traditional and nontraditional challenges to enduring US strategic interests. Furthermore, a divestiture would revert to the historic Air Force pattern of assuming that GPF air advisors and other SC-relevant personnel are no longer needed when major "irregular" conflicts are finished and that these skills can simply be resurrected, like a phoenix out of the ashes, on demand. Our recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly demonstrate the disastrous consequences of that assumption.

Instead, this article argues that it is in the Air Force's interests to OT&E an effective standing operational SC capability in the GPF. Doing so would help the service realize its vision of global vigilance, global reach, and global power; help deal with the challenges of highly contested environments; and provide a low-cost way to support US strategic interests and the nation's emphasis on shaping the strategic environment to prevent or deter conflict. It then details the requirements for attaining such a standing operational SC capability—basically, only an investment of dozens of billets and tens of millions of dollars annually in the short term.

Defining and Scoping Security Cooperation: What Exactly Are We Talking About?

Like many areas involving the US government or military, a myriad of confusing, overlapping terminology is associated with US assistance to other nations. In general, the different terms reflect a combination of who offers the assistance, its purpose or desired outcome, and/or the authority or law under which it is provided.⁵ The best overarching term to describe the work that the Air Force is often tasked to support or help execute when it assists other nations is *security cooperation*.

The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines SC as “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.”⁶ SC includes all security assistance, foreign internal defense, international armaments cooperation, and security force assistance (SFA) conducted by the DOD.⁷

Why Should the Air Force Organize, Train, and Equip to Support US Security Cooperation Efforts?

Security Cooperation Is a Key Enabler of Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power

When the Air Force articulates the value it brings to the nation, it contends that by effectively conducting its five core missions, it provides global vigilance, global reach, and global power.⁸ In turn, these capabilities serve America’s long-term security interests by giving its leaders unmatched options to confront an unpredictable future by helping to deter conflict, control escalation, and, when tasked, destroy an adversary’s military capacity.⁹

The recently released Air Force strategy acknowledges that “the Air Force must increasingly look internationally to effectively deliver *Global Vigilance—Global Reach—Global Power*. Partnerships enhance deterrence, build regional stability, offset costs, increase capability and capacity, and ensure access.”¹⁰ Indeed, the Air Force cannot achieve global vigilance, global reach, and global power without forward presence outside US territory. The service’s space-based command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, as well as tanker-assisted air assets based on American territory, can conduct its core missions only on a limited global scale that cannot effec-

tively support US strategic interests.¹¹ In addition, America's existing close strategic and regional partners cannot provide enough bases free from the threat of an adversary's long-range precision-strike munitions to enable effective air operations in areas of the world where US forces will likely have to operate.¹² The United States establishes and sustains access and thus forward presence in many countries around the globe through SC.¹³

SC also builds partner capacity and improves interoperability between US and partner nation air forces in key areas and countries critical to achieve global vigilance, global reach, and global power. For example, the Air-Sea Battle concept argues that SC engagement “ensures conceptual alignment with our partners and allies, builds necessary partner capacity and strengthens our relationships which facilitate and assure access to multiple domains in the event conflict occurs.”¹⁴ In addition, SC can improve interoperability between regional partner nations and the United States in areas such as integrated air and missile defense and maritime domain awareness critical to operating in highly contested environments. More capable partner nations in these environments may also reduce the necessary US forward footprint vulnerable to threats in those environments. Attaining the necessary interoperability and trust to encourage willing and capable partner nations in this way takes years of engagement involving long-term planning and a concerted effort to shape the environment prior to a crisis. As Gen James Amos, US Marine Corps commandant, is fond of saying, “You can't surge trust.”¹⁵ Furthermore, improved airspace and basing access to more nations in-theater would also greatly complicate an enemy's calculus and improve the chances of deterring aggressive action. Finally, SC that assists priority nations in establishing their own stability and/or contributing to regional security enables the US military to focus more on the direct challenges to global vigilance, global reach, and global power.

The Air Force Enjoys a Huge “Bang for the Buck” for Its Modest Investment in Security Cooperation

The Air Force’s combined efforts to OT&E the GPF to support US SC, summarized later in this article, *cost the service only about \$35 million a year in discretionary operation and maintenance (O&M) funding and 400–500 billets.*¹⁶ This tiny expenditure leverages billions of dollars of US government and partner nation spending, making SC one of the Air Force’s most potent investments. For example, the service influences over \$135 billion of its partner nations’ spending for capability development through 2,600 foreign military sales cases with 95 nations.¹⁷ Moreover, since fiscal year (FY) 2008, the Air Force has negotiated and signed 162 international agreements with 37 nations, leveraging \$13.2 billion in total foreign contributions.¹⁸

Harder to quantify, but also effective, are the SC activities the Air Force executes but are funded by other US government organizations. One example is the roughly \$100-million-a-year International Military Education and Training program underwritten by the State Department, which augments the ability of partner nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with US and regional coalition forces. Moreover, Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act gives the secretary of defense the authority to train and equip foreign military forces for counterterrorism and stability operations, as well as foreign security forces for counterterrorism operations. Total funding thus far for Section 1206 since its inception in FY 2006 exceeds \$2.2 billion.¹⁹

Combatant Commanders Need GPF Airmen Capable of Effectively Executing Security Cooperation Activities

Gen Mark Welsh, chief of staff of the Air Force, recently noted that partnership-building capability engagements by combatant commanders are not going away.²⁰ In reality, those commanders will continue to task the Air Force to provide personnel to support aviation-related SC for the foreseeable future. Not including overseas contingency-operation-

funded events in Afghanistan and Iraq, in FY 2016 and beyond, the service is expected to support at least 1,180 SC events needing more than 157,000 contact days in over 80 nations across the world per year.²¹ That is the equivalent of 631 man-years of contact days with partner nations potentially involving over 3,000 Airmen per year.²²

This high demand for events in permissive or uncertain environments is a major reason for using GPF Airmen in addition to combat aviation advisors from special operations forces (SOF). The limited supply of SOF assets should be employed against the growing demand of operations in hostile environments executing complex mission sets. GPF air advisors are neither a replacement for nor meant to duplicate SOF combat aviation advisors. Combatant commander and Air Force forces (AFFOR) planners need to understand how to employ and, when necessary, integrate both SOF and GPF assets efficiently to most effectively produce desired effects.

The Air Force Has Been Directed to Effectively Support America's Security Cooperation Efforts

Strategic guidance from the president, secretary of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offers consistent, detailed language describing the importance of SC in building partner capacity and shaping the global environment to support and realize enduring US strategic interests against both traditional and nontraditional challenges.²³ Taken together at the unclassified level, these sources of guidance boil down to the following related points:

1. *SC enhances homeland security*, enabling partner nations to counter threats to US interests and reducing the likelihood that these threats will reach America's shores. Indeed, the United States cannot counter these threats alone and needs the assistance of other nations.²⁴
2. *SC reduces the odds of the United States sending forces abroad to address future crises by enabling partner nations to act when military*

*force is necessary in a crisis.*²⁵ Consequently, the US military can turn its attention to the more serious threats to its interests.

3. *SC improves the odds of US access to, interoperability with, and/or cooperation with partner nations in future crises.*²⁶ SC often marks the start of an enduring defense relationship between the United States and the partner nation. For example, given that the life cycles of aviation-related platforms and infrastructure often exceed 30 years, these relationships help build the long-term trust that translates to enhanced access and interoperability.
4. *SC enhances regional security and stability relevant to US interests by improving a partner nation's ability to gain or maintain internal security and/or contribute directly to regional stability.*²⁷
5. *SC helps the United States shape the global environment and increase its influence by promoting partner support for US interests and shared universal values.*²⁸

Real-world examples of each of these SC benefits that involve or involved the Air Force exist at the “for official use only” and classified levels. As a result, the president directed the US military to strengthen its capacity to partner with other nations, train and assist their forces, and ensure that US defense strategy and policy are closely synchronized with American security-sector assistance efforts.²⁹ Moreover, the secretary of defense has ordered the services to (1) develop, maintain, institutionalize, and provide forces to conduct SC in support of combatant commanders' requirements;³⁰ (2) acquire both standard and nonstandard equipment necessary to conduct SFA-related activities;³¹ (3) establish personnel, training, education, and reporting requirements to conduct SFA-related activities;³² and (4) maintain scalable organizations to train and advise foreign security.³³ In turn, the Air Force's senior leadership has provided direction to the service consistent with the strategic guidance summarized above in various, mostly nonpublic, documents.³⁴ General Welsh recently stated that “our international partnerships are a significant tool in an era of declining budgets. We will continue to build partnerships in order to modernize and enhance

our security alliances and increase the capability and capacities of our friends.”³⁵

How Should the Air Force’s General Purpose Forces Organize, Train, and Equip to Effectively Support US Security Cooperation Efforts Overseas?

Organize

The service’s GPF is organized to support US SC efforts by using a combination of (1) full-time designated standing advisory units, (2) expeditionary forces of small teams or individuals either deployed or on short-duration temporary duty, and (3) manpower billets dedicated to full-time, SC-related positions.³⁶ There are only three full-time GPF-designated units that have an SC-related mission in their unit’s document statement and that report operational readiness in the Defense Readiness Reporting System: the 571st Mobility Support Advisory Squadron (MSAS), dedicated to US Southern Command’s area of responsibility (AOR); the 818 MSAS, dedicated to US Africa Command’s AOR; and the 435th Contingency Response Group (CRG) Air Advisor Branch, dedicated to US European Command’s AOR.³⁷

Additional units and programs could be tasked to conduct SC as a primary or secondary mission and report readiness instead of executing SC missions as expeditionary forces. US Pacific Air Forces’ 36 CRG contains a flight dedicated to SC missions supporting the US Pacific Command’s AOR. US Air Forces Central Command’s Air Warfare Center helps build partner capacity in support of the Air Force’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan.³⁸ The Inter-American Air Forces Academy trains officers and enlisted service members predominantly from Central and South American countries.³⁹ Additionally, the following programs and units execute SC as expeditionary forces:

- The International Health Specialists Program plans, leads, and executes health-related regional SC activities around the world and helps coordinate US military support to interagency disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and health-care infrastructure.
- The National Guard Bureau's State Partnership Program has developed partnerships between nearly every state's Guard Bureau (including Air National Guard units) and one or more nations throughout the world.⁴⁰
- The 438th Air Expeditionary Wing is aligned under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to conduct aviation foreign internal defense with Air Force and nonstandard fixed-wing aircraft to develop a "fully independent and operationally capable Afghan 'air force' that meets the security requirements of Afghanistan today . . . and tomorrow."⁴¹

Expeditionary forces may flow from these units or ad hoc from the Air Force at large via multiple task or volunteer methodologies. Primarily, combatant commands submit a request for forces through the global force management (GFM) system because they are executed under Title 10 authorities. Often, however, these events are executed via temporary duty orders rather than deployment orders because they are usually short notice and there is not enough time to properly execute a request for forces. Further, the Air Force Security Assistance Training office finds volunteers to fill security assistance needs in conjunction with a foreign military sale or other Title 22 funding authorities of the State Department.

The Air Force also maintains staff positions to plan and execute SC activities. Each AFFOR staff includes SC planners. One hundred fifty-nine SC officers serve on country teams as members of the Office of Defense Cooperation and similar organizations as SC liaisons with other nations. The Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) maintains a workforce of roughly 100 Airmen to support US arms sales and manage the community of SC practitioners comprised of personnel exchange officers, re-

gional affairs strategists, and political military affairs strategists. SAF/IA also has a staff that develops SC strategy for the Air Force and authors policy guidance to implement SC governing directives of the State Department and Congress.

Despite these efforts, recent internal Air Force analyses by subject-matter experts from across SC-related units and organizations highlight that the service cannot generate enough GPF standing units or expeditionary teams to meet the combatant commands' and SAF/IA's demand for SC personnel. Recognizing that the Air Force is a supply-based service, they recommend that the Air Force spend approximately \$2.6 million more in Air Force O&M funding annually and commit 80 additional billets.⁴² Doing so will

- develop a nonstandard fixed-wing assessment and advisory capability within the 571 and 818 MSAS;
- assign common SFA mission-essential tasks to designated units in order to track their readiness for executing this mission (ideal candidates include the Inter-American Air Forces Academy; US Air Forces Central Command's Air Warfare Center; the 36 CRG at Guam; the 36th Airlift Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan; the 612th Air Base Squadron in Honduras; and the soon-to-stand-up 81st Fighter Squadron tasked to conduct A-29 training with Afghan pilots and maintainers); and
- expand the current 10-person building-partner cell within the 36 CRG at Guam to a fully manned advisory squadron with 77 billets.

Although these recommendations should meet most of the known FY 2016 SC requirements of the Air Force, the same experts widely expect these requirements to increase substantially in the longer term. To meet this long-term demand, they believe that, in addition to the short-term adjustments above, the Air Force will also need to stand up two additional GPF advisor squadrons—one each for the Pacific and African AORs. Effectively meeting both the short-term FY 2016 requirements and the anticipated longer-term demand would require ap-

proximately \$9 million in additional Air Force O&M funding per year and 229 more billets.⁴³

Recent internal Air Force analyses also indicate a need to address how the service presents forces to the combatant commander and executes missions enacted by the State Department. Currently, Joint Staff business rules preclude use of the GFM system to task foreign military sales/foreign military financing missions executed under the State Department's Title 22 authority. SAF/IA established the Air Force Security Assistance Training office to find volunteers to fill missions that might last several days to years. This methodology creates difficulties when one tries to define command relationships and transfer operational control while managing deployment dwell times, readiness levels of air and space expeditionary forces, multiple resource-prioritization processes, and management of manning levels for career fields. GFM system shortfalls can often place undue scheduling turbulence and chain-of-command confusion on deploying Airmen and expose home-station commanders to inordinate responsibility risks. We recommend that senior leaders engage with the Joint Staff to establish a streamlined GFM process that will encompass all funding authorities and remain reactive enough to meet the short timelines often associated with SC.

Train

The effective execution of SC events requires various levels of advising and expeditionary skills, as well as relevant expertise in the language, region, and culture. The level of training depends on the complexity and duration of the SC activity or operation.⁴⁴ SC events of longer duration (greater than 30 days) in unknown or hostile environments and/or involving rigorous activities tend to require more training.⁴⁵

The Air Force funds various programs to help train GPF Airmen to support SC.⁴⁶ The Air Advisor Academy prepares air-minded professionals to assess, train, educate, advise, assist, and equip partner nations in the development and application of their aviation resources in the

native environment where they are expected to operate.⁴⁷ The Air Force Expeditionary Center readies Airmen to operate “outside the wire” when they are overseas and offers courses in language, region, and culture. Air University’s Air Force Culture and Language Center, responsible for training and education in culture and language across the entire service, features the Language Enabled Airman Program, which trains selected Airmen to perform their regular duties in another language and culture. The International Affairs Specialist Program develops select officers into regional affairs strategists and political military affairs strategists.⁴⁸ The Air Force’s Military Personnel Exchange Program allows Airmen fluent in foreign languages to swap jobs with a member of an allied nation’s air force to improve interoperability and understanding. The Overseas Developmental Education program permits officers and senior noncommissioned officers to attend professional military education schools and universities in partner and allied nations.

Oftentimes, however, despite these programs, Airmen assigned to SC-related tasks (1) lack adequate and relevant language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural training; (2) do not provide effective expertise on advising foreign militaries; (3) fail to conduct effective information operations; (4) lack planning experience regarding strategic (as opposed to operational) effects; (5) lack the skills to interact effectively with other government and nongovernment organizations; and/or (6) are not informing key decision makers and planners about available irregular warfare capabilities.⁴⁹

Of the anticipated Air Force SC events for FY 2016 and through the Future Years Defense Program, 19 percent require minimal to no training; 75 percent, some basic advisor training; and 6 percent, advanced advisor training.⁵⁰ Therefore, the subject-matter experts from the same Air Force-integrated process teams mentioned earlier recommended that the service do four things. The first is to baseline-fund one GPF air advisor school, such as the Air Advisor Academy or its equivalent after Operation Enduring Freedom concludes.

The second is to develop two skill-based training tracks (“basic” and “advanced”), regardless of assignment to expeditionary or designated unit/team. Both tracks need a tailorable syllabus that meets the DOD’s SFA training guidelines and provides flexible options responsible to mission requirements, threat, region, culture, and language. The recommended basic training track would call for one week of training in residence or in garrison via a mobile training team with the goal of ensuring that air advisors can conduct SC/SFA missions with limited scope and complexity in a permissive environment. The recommended advanced training track would require about five weeks of academics and training in residence with the goal of ensuring that air advisors can conduct missions involving complex tasks in permissive, uncertain, and, in rare instances, hostile environments.

The third is to baseline-fund Section 1203 training for those air advisor units that report readiness.⁵¹ This new authority for GPF allows air advisors to accomplish required readiness training with an advisor team conducting an “advising mission” with military/other security forces of a friendly foreign country. Doing so can provide excellent training opportunities as well as potentially reduce training costs and gain efficiencies in travel by combining readiness training for air advisors with actual missions.

Additionally, the service should incorporate SC planner training into educational venues for AFFOR staff officers. Airmen need additional training in legal authorities, Air Force advising capabilities, and funding mechanisms to plan and execute SC activities more effectively inside their theater of operations. Furthermore, AFFOR planners should have training in GPF/SOF integration, developing campaign support plans, developing aviation enterprise, and assessing them all during and after execution.

Baseline-funding one GPF air advisor school would cost approximately \$3–5 million annually in additional Air Force O&M funding and require 12 billets.⁵² Baseline-funding Section 1203 training for air

advisor units would cost another \$5–6 million annually in Air Force O&M funding.

Equip

In terms of aircraft, the Air Force's GPF does not currently devote any platforms specifically to the SC mission outside Afghanistan.⁵³ In 2009 the service began exploring options to quickly acquire a light attack / armed reconnaissance aircraft and a light mobility aircraft that could operate inexpensively in remote, permissive environments and help train and augment emerging air forces. Although the service confirmed the requirement for these aircraft, it decided in 2012 that it could not afford them, given the increasing fiscal constraints.⁵⁴

This lack of relevant aircraft creates a problem. The aviation needs and resources of emerging air forces are often different from those of fully developed air forces. Their members may need to learn only basic airmanship and gain experience with maintenance and operations. Many of these air forces need transferable, affordable, modular, and sustainable aircraft that more closely resemble what the United States uses for customs, border protection, and law enforcement as opposed to advanced combat. The fact that the Air Force does not fly these light aircraft limits its ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner nations.⁵⁵ Thus, potential partners must approach other suppliers, and the United States thereby misses significant shaping opportunities that could lead to important future access and other strategic benefits previously discussed.⁵⁶ Moreover, compelling reasons exist for the Air Force itself to fly these aircraft as part of direct operations in certain regions of the world that cannot be covered by the fleet's existing aircraft.⁵⁷

We agree with the direction of the *United States Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy 2013* for the service to establish a creative, effective, and affordable way to enhance its ability to develop partner nation air forces that use light aircraft. The document suggests several options if the Air Force still believes it cannot afford to procure light mobility air-

craft and light attack / armed reconnaissance platforms: (1) use the existing foreign military sales and SC infrastructure as a conduit for force structure employed by the Air Force Auxiliary, Air Reserve Component, civilian agencies, and law enforcement already performing comparable internal security missions with more applicable and affordable equipment; (2) purchase a handful of very basic, inexpensive “off-the-shelf” light aircraft to be attached to existing advisory units; (3) establish novel partnerships with contract service providers or civilian agencies to allow Airmen to gain and maintain proficiency in light aircraft in an internal security role; and/or (4) use current and future US trainer aircraft for this purpose where appropriate.⁵⁸

Summary

I did not disagree with [the services] on the need to prepare for large-scale, state-to-state conflict, but I was not talking about moving significant resources away from future conventional capabilities. I just wanted the defense budget and the services formally to acknowledge the need to provide for nontraditional capabilities and ensure that the resources necessary for the conflicts we were most likely to fight were also included in our budgeting, planning, training, and procurement.

—Robert Gates, Former Secretary of Defense

Toward this end, the Air Force, at a minimum, should establish an effective standing operational SC capability in the GPF. The service must shift its mind-set from providing “just-in-time” or inadequately trained Airmen to support SC on a largely ad hoc basis to using an institutionalized process and funding to organize and train Airmen to support SC effectively. When one combines our recommendations to improve how the Air Force both organizes and trains to support SC, such a shift would require an extra Air Force O&M investment of only \$13 million annually and 92 billets in the short term—a minor investment that would pay huge dividends. Doing so would not only meet

the needs of the combatant commander at a time when the nation is depending more than ever on allies and partner nations for its national security but also bolster the Air Force's ability to realize its vision of global vigilance, global reach, and global power.

Notes

1. The Department of Defense's force-planning construct instructs the US military to be "capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—a second aggressor in another region." It must produce these results in conflicts "rang[ing] from hybrid contingencies against proxy groups using asymmetric approaches, to a high-end conflict against a state power armed with WMD [weapons of mass destruction] or technologically advanced anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities." Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), vii, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

2. For a discussion of irregular warfare in the context of the Air Force and operations within the air, space, and cyberspace domains, see Department of the Air Force, *United States Air Force Irregular Warfare Strategy 2013: To Organize, Train, and Equip to Achieve Strategic Guidance* (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 2013), <http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/iw-strategy.pdf>; and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, "Annex 3-2, Irregular Warfare," 15 March 2013, <https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-2-Annex-IRREGULAR-WARFARE.pdf>. In addition, joint doctrine succinctly notes that "in identifying COGs [centers of gravity] it is important to remember that irregular warfare focuses on legitimacy and influence over a population, unlike traditional warfare, which employs direct military confrontation to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory to force a change in an adversary's government or policies." Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011, III-22, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. Robert Gates, former secretary of defense, spent an entire chapter of his recent memoir on how he "waged war on the Pentagon" to strike the right balance in defense planning and programming between developing "nontraditional" capabilities against nonstate actors (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan) and "traditional" capabilities to prepare for possible future wars against other nation-states. Although he agreed that traditional capabilities should receive the most attention, Gates believed that at least some dedicated funding should go to nontraditional capabilities to effectively conduct stability, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and special operations as well as help build partner nation capacity. The services, however, resisted Gates at every turn, arguing that all planning and programming should focus exclusively on traditional capabilities, which would also adequately address nonstate challenges. Robert M.

Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 142–46. Within the Air Force, several factors have likely led to that position. First, fiscal constraints have driven the service to minimize the number of different platforms it operates, favoring fewer types that can perform multiple missions adequately rather than more types of specialized aircraft that can conduct their mission perfectly. For example, the Air Force officially told Congress that “as the Air Force becomes smaller, we must retain multi-role aircraft that provide greater flexibility and more options for the joint force commander.” Department of the Air Force, *USAF Posture Statement 2014* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 14 March 2014), 10, http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/2014_POSTURE_STATEMENT_INTERACTIVEversion.pdf. Second, A2/AD strategies and capabilities of future state adversaries are widely expected to seriously challenge how the Air Force (and the Navy) conducts operations today. For excellent open-source discussions of the A2/AD issue, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, *7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century* (New York: Bantam Dell, 2009), 167–209; Mark Gunzinger with Christopher Dougherty, *Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran's Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011); and Andrew F. Krepinevich, *Why Air Sea Battle?* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010). Third, Air Force culture and tradition tend to concentrate on advanced technology, offensive operations, and the future—despite the fact that addressing most nontraditional challenges does not require those three approaches. For example, see D. Robert Worley, *Shaping U.S. Military Forces: Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 95–125; and Daniel L. Magruder Jr., “The US Air Force and Irregular Warfare: Success as a Hurdle,” *Small Wars Journal*, 2009, 1–11, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/272-magruder.pdf>. Gen Mark Welsh, chief of staff of the Air Force, also recently noted that the service “prides itself on being fueled by innovations, was born of technology and must stay ahead of the technological curve to be successful.” Aaron Mehta, “US Air Force Faces Shortage of Engineers,” *DefenseNews*, 26 March 2014, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140326/DEFREG02/303260029/USAF-Faces-Shortage-Engineers>. Finally, American forces have withdrawn from Iraq and are in the process of leaving Afghanistan. US strategic guidance clearly directs that America will no longer plan to engage in those types of long-term, large-scale counterinsurgency operations. See Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, 19.

3. One example from an open source: “As they have been for the past few years, USAF’s top priorities remain the F-35 fighter, the KC-46 tanker, and the Long-Range Strike Bomber. Other programs, readiness, force structure, and compensation will all be considered legitimate trade-offs to preserve these three keystone projects.” John A. Tirpak, “Low Budgets, High Technology,” *Air Force Magazine* 97, no. 4 (April 2014): 29.

4. It is important to emphasize that the primary role of the services in Title 10 of the *US Code* is to organize, train, and equip forces to support combatant commanders, who plan and conduct operations to carry out the strategic guidance and direction from the president. Therefore, the recommendations of this article address what the Air Force can control (i.e., how it organizes, trains, and equips) related to SC. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 25 March 2013, II-7, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf.

5. For a useful discussion of these terms and their relation to each other, refer to Taylor P. White, “Security Cooperation: How It All Fits,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 72 (1st Quarter, Janu-

ary 2014): 106–8. Forthcoming joint doctrine on SC intends to clarify these terms and their relationships to each other.

6. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 June 2014), 235, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Examples of specific Title 10 SC programs include the Warsaw Initiative Fund, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Ministry of Defense Advisors, Defense Institution Reform Initiative, National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program, Combatant Commander Initiative Fund, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Humanitarian Assistance/Foreign Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Demining Assistance, Personnel Exchange Program, Joint Combined Exchange Training, and Partnership for Peace.

7. The DOD defines “security assistance” as a “group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” *Ibid.*, 228. Examples include foreign military sales, foreign military financing, international military education and training, excess defense articles, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The DOD defines “foreign internal defense” as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” *Ibid.*, 103. International armaments cooperation “refers to a broad range of international activities in which the DOD and a foreign government(s) jointly manage efforts to satisfy common military requirements through cooperation in research, development, test, evaluation, acquisition, production and support of air, space, and cyberspace technology and systems.” Air Force Instruction 16-110, *U.S. Air Force Participation in International Armaments Cooperation (IAC) Programs*, 13 May 2013, 4, http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/saf_ia/publication/afi16-110/afi16-110.pdf. The DOD defines “security force assistance” as “the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.” JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary*, 235.

8. The Air Force lists its core missions as air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; global strike; and command and control. Department of the Air Force, *Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2013), 4, http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/images/airpower/GV_GR_GP_300DPI.pdf.

9. *Ibid.*, 4–12.

10. Department of the Air Force, *America's Air Force: A Call to the Future* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2014), 13, http://airman.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/AF_30_Year_Strategy_2.pdf.

11. “U.S. experience since World War II confirms that it is extremely difficult to accomplish reassurance, deterrence, and regional stability missions with forces based exclusively in the United States.” Even with tankers, Air Force aircraft that will be in the force structure for the next 20 or 30 years also lack the range and speed to sustain operational effects outside the western hemisphere from US territory alone; rather, they rely on forward operating

locations. Finally, sustaining global military activities requires forward presence to host critical support links such as en route airfields, ports, logistics facilities, communications, and early warning sites. Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Alan J. Vick, *The Posture Triangle: A New Framework for U.S. Air Force Global Presence*, RAND Project Air Force Research Report RR-402-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 9, 14, 75–76.

12. RAND's report considers the following nations dependable "strategic anchors" for the United States: the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, Korea, Australia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore. *Ibid.*, 17–35, 80.

13. The tie between SC and achieving success is frequently cited in the Air Force's global partnership strategy. Department of the Air Force, *US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy 2011* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2011), 6, 10, 13, 24, 27, <http://www.safia.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111228-013.pdf>. There are real-world examples of this connection involving the Air Force at the "for official use only" and classified levels.

14. Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle Office, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Air-Sea Battle Office, May 2013), 10, 13, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf>.

15. John Grady, "USMC Commandant: 'You Can't Surge Trust,'" *USNI News*, 10 April 2013, <http://news.usni.org/2013/04/10/usmc-commandant-you-cant-surge-trust>.

16. Within SOF, the 6th Special Operations Squadron is mostly paid for by US Special Operations Command but accounts for approximately 100 Air Force billets. According to a detailed analysis of Air Force SC spending by Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs–Strategy and Plans Division (SAF/IAGS) and the Air Force Irregular Warfare Directorate (AF/A3O-Q), the Air Force spends approximately \$220 million in O&M funds on SC-related activities a year but only about \$68 million is discretionary. (The rest is nondiscretionary spending required by the secretary of defense and/or international agreements such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, NATO strategic airlift capability C-17s, the Polish Aviation Detachment, arms control implementation, the Defense Language Institute / English Language Center, and air attaché training.) Of that \$68 million in discretionary spending, about \$35 million goes to OT&E Airmen to support SC activities as discussed in this article; \$13 million funds international cooperative research and development; \$10 million funds Air Force forces (AFFOR) SC engagements; \$9 million funds partner nation training and education; and less than \$2 million funds Air Force engagements such as the International Armaments Cooperation Forum, the International Health Specialist Program, senior leader engagements, and Operator Engagement Talks. Of the \$35 million or so that the Air Force spends annually on OT&E for SC, the two mobility support advisory squadrons (MSAS) and the building-partner cells of the two contingency response groups (CRG) combined cost about \$2 million annually in O&M funding and almost 200 billets. In terms of SC-related training expenses specific to Airmen, the programs described in this article cost roughly \$27 million annually and about 100–200 billets. In addition, Pacific Air Forces spends about \$5 million of its own O&M for SC-related exercises. The Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs maintains another 100 billets in support of arms-sales implementation as well as regional and political affairs specialists. In terms of equipment, the Air Force GPF does not pay for any aircraft used in SC efforts. If one also considers Air Force and AFFOR engagements as part of Airmen undergoing OT&E for SC, the total SC

OT&E costs to the service would rise to only \$47 million a year. These figures do not include what the Air Force executes related to US government SC activities funded by non-Air Force sources (such as joint and/or combined exercises, international military education and training events, or foreign military sales implementation and management).

17. Department of the Air Force, "Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs Mission Brief," March 2014.

18. Ibid.

19. Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report RS22855 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 April 2014), 2, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22855.pdf>.

20. John A. Tirpak, "Washington Watch," *Air Force Magazine* 96, no. 8 (August 2013): 10.

21. An "event" was used as the metric to determine overall demand and the need for specific air advisor skill levels to carry out the mission. "Contact days" were used as the metric to determine mission costs, effects on the air and space expeditionary forces construct, and level of effort. AF/A3O-Q recently surveyed AFFORs that support the combatant commanders on the projected SC events that the Air Force will be tasked to support in FY 2016. These figures do not include partner nation participation in professional military education in the continental United States, formal training and exercises, Air Force regional affairs strategists or political / military affairs strategists, combat air advising by SOF, overseas developmental education, demonstration teams, and events funded by overseas contingency operations funding or joint events.

22. Dividing 157,794 contact days by 250 man-days equals a business year.

23. Guidance from the president includes the National Security Strategy, US Counterterrorism Strategy, and Counter Transnational Organized Crime Strategy. Guidance from the secretary of defense includes the Defense Strategic Guidance, Defense Planning Guidance, Quadrennial Defense Review, and Guidance for the Employment of the Force. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also summed up these points in "Realizing the Asia-Pacific Rebalance," *Defense One*, 1 April 2014, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/04/realizing-asia-pacific-rebalance/81730/?oref=d-topstory>. Guidance from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff includes the National Military Strategy, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, and Cooperative Security Joint Operating Concept. Furthermore, one finds a compelling case for (1) how the national security strategy's enduring US strategic interests have benefited from US access and use of the global air domain, and (2) the need for the US government to think once again more strategically about where (and for what purpose) it focuses its aviation-related security (and other) assistance to partner nations in the rapidly emerging developing world to continue those benefits into the future. The Air Force does not and should not drive those decisions, but it does have a big stake in the outcome. See Mort Rolleston and Lt Col Peter Garretson, "A Vision for Global Aviation Enterprise Development," *Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) Journal of International Security Cooperation Management*, 17 March 2014, <http://www.disamjournal.org/articles/a-vision-for-global-aviation-enterprise-development-1299>.

24. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, v, vi, 36; President of the United States, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (Washington, DC: White House, June 2011), 1, 4, 6, 9, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy

.pdf; President of the United States, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, May 2010), 19, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; President of the United States, *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security* (Washington, DC: White House, July 2011), 24, 26–27, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf; and Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept*, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 May 2010), 16–17.

25. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 18, 22; and Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, January 2012), 3, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf.

26. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 5 April 2013, 3–4; Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, 35–37, 63; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011: Redefining America's Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 10, 14–15, <http://www.army.mil/info/references/docs/NMS%20FEB%202011.pdf>.

27. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 15; PPD 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 3; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 15; Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014*, 18–19, 35.

28. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 26, 48; PPD 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 3; Department of Defense, *2012 Guidance for Employment of the Force* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 4–5.

29. President of the United States, *National Security Strategy*, 11. The administration has recently introduced the term *security sector assistance*, governed by PPD 23, *Security Sector Assistance*. According to PPD 23, security sector assistance (SSA) refers to the “policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.” SSA is broader in scope than SC insofar as it includes not only DOD assistance to partner nation militaries with specific goals as outlined in the definition for SC but also US assistance to any partner nation institution (military and civilian) used to protect the state and its citizens, manage borders, help maintain international peace, enforce the law, and provide oversight to those institutions. Such SSA can help a partner nation’s security-sector reform effort. PPD 23, *Security Sector Assistance*, 3, 9.

30. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 21 December 2010, 26, 33; and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, 27 October 2010, 11.

31. DODI 5000.68, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, 11.

32. *Ibid.*

33. DODD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, 1 December 2008, 8.

34. See, for example, Department of the Air Force, *America's Air Force*, 13; Department of the Air Force, *Irregular Warfare Strategy 2013*, 13; Department of the Air Force, *Air Force 2023 Implementation Plan* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 11 March 2014), 13; and

Department of the Air Force, *United States Air Force Irregular Warfare Operations Roadmap FY12–FY15* (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, October 2012), 5.

35. Joe Pappalardo “PM Interview: Air Force Gen. Mark A. Welsh III,” *Popular Mechanics*, 15 April 2014, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/news/pm-interview-air-force-gen-mark-a-welsh-iii-16698594>.

36. Within Air Force Special Operations Command, the 6th Special Operations Squadron is a designated combat aviation advisor (CAA) unit that supports US Special Operations Command’s SC plans across the globe. CAA personnel “assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration,” particularly in uncertain and hostile environments. CAAs “possess specialized capabilities for foreign internal defense . . . unconventional warfare . . . and coalition support.” They are qualified to operate and maintain a variety of light aircraft and are authorized to advise on nearly any rotary- or fixed-wing mobility platform flown by partner nations. In addition, CAAs undergo extensive “training and education . . . intended to produce foreign language proficient, regionally-oriented, politically astute, and culturally aware aviation advisory experts.” US Air Force, “6th Special Operations Squadron,” fact sheet, accessed 7 August 2014, http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=21050&page=1.

37. MSAS teams help develop partner nations’ pilots, navigators, loadmasters, command and control, communications, airfield operations, logistics readiness officers / aerial port, aircraft maintenance, aeromedical evacuation, and support functions such as air base defense, intelligence, supply, fuels, survival-evasion resistance and escape, and civil engineering. Each MSAS is authorized 77 billets. Headquarters Air Mobility Command, briefing, subject: MSAS Deep Dive, 2013. A CRG’s primary mission is to assess, open, and operate air bases, bridging the gap between initial base seizure and the arrival of permanent sustainment forces. However, each CRG contains a building-partnership cell of approximately 20 people (usually double billeted) that fills military-to-military and other building-partner-capacity tasks as specified in the combatant commander’s plans. The CRG building-partner cells include the following engagement areas of expertise: airfield infrastructure development, search and rescue techniques and procedures, supply-chain management, command and control integration and improvement, network capabilities, force and installation protection, power-plant facility operation, vehicle and fleet maintenance, and noncommissioned officer development.

38. SSgt Jacob Morgan, “AFCENT Air Warfare Center Welcomes New Commander,” 380th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs, 19 August 2013, <http://www.380aew.afcent.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123360160>.

39. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy offers subjects such as information technology, supply and logistics training, security forces training, intelligence, pilot instrument training, helicopter crew chief training, and aircraft maintenance. Michelle Tan, “U.S., Latino Airmen Build Partnerships at IAAFA,” *Air Force Times*, 17 April 2011, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20110417/NEWS/104170315/U-S-Latino-airmen-build-partnerships-IAAFA>.

40. Although most of these partnerships involve Army National Guard units, some Air National Guard units have also created partnerships with certain nations, and some partnerships are joint, involving both the Army and Air National Guards. State Partnership Program events are often subject-matter exchanges, demonstrations of capabilities, or senior leader visits, usually involving the following areas (often unique to the Guard compared to active duty): disaster management and disaster-relief activities, military education, noncommis-

sioned officer development, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, port security, and military justice. Lawrence Kapp and Nina M. Serafino, *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress*, CRS Report R41957 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 15 August 2011), 2–15, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41957.pdf>.

41. “Our Mission,” 438th Air Expeditionary Wing, accessed 6 August 2014, <http://www.438aew.afcent.af.mil/main/welcome.asp>. For an open-source summary of US SC to build up the Afghan air force, see Maj Gen Michael A. Keltz, “Getting Our Partners Airborne: Training Air Advisors and Their Impact In-Theater,” *Air and Space Power Journal* 28, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 5–28, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/PDF/Issues/2014/ASPJ-May-Jun-2014.pdf>.

42. This \$2.6 million figure would cover the Air Force O&M cost of the additional MSAS unit for the Pacific AOR and enable all MSASs to conduct light aviation advising.

43. This \$9 million figure would cover the additional O&M costs of adding two Pacific MSAS units and one African MSAS unit and enabling all MSASs to conduct light aviation advising.

44. The Air Force can track advisor experience, language fluency, and regional/cultural skills through special experience identifiers. Only members certified as regional affairs strategists and political military affairs strategists, however, are awarded a secondary Air Force specialty code.

45. The nature of this additional SC-related training usually involves some combination of language and culture of the partner nation, coping with unknown or hostile environments, the limits of advising capability, relevant legal authorities, assessing and advising, and fitting the mission into the global combatant commander's theater campaign plan and the embassy's country plan.

46. Within Air Force Special Operations Command, the Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center “organizes, trains, educates and equips forces to conduct special operations missions; leads MAJCOM [major command] Irregular Warfare activities; executes special operations test and evaluation and lessons learned programs; and develops doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for Air Force Special Operations Forces.” “Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center,” Air Force Special Operations Command, accessed 7 August 2014, <http://www.afsoc.af.mil/afsoawc/>.

47. “Air Advisor Academy,” fact sheet, 37th Training Wing, US Air Force, 21 February 2013, <http://www.37trw.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=20201>.

48. See “International Affairs Specialist (IAS),” Air Force International Affairs, US Air Force, accessed 7 August 2014, <http://www.safia.hq.af.mil/internationalaffairsspecialist/>.

49. Department of the Air Force, *Irregular Warfare Strategy 2013*, 9, D-4. This document compiles shortfalls from various studies and analyses such as the Irregular Warfare Capabilities Based Assessment Campaign, the 2009 US Air Force CORONA South, the US Air Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team report, various Air Force core-function master plans, and various studies of SC conducted by the RAND Corporation for the Air Force.

50. AF/A3O-Q recently surveyed the AFFORs that support the combatant commanders on the projected SC events that the Air Force will be tasked to support in FY 2016. This data collection included the required level of training necessary to support these events.

51. Section 1203 of the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act provides an authority for GPF to train with the military forces or other security forces of a friendly foreign country if the secretary of defense determines that it is in the national security interests of the United

States to do so. That training may be conducted under this section only with the prior approval of the secretary of defense.

52. The Air Force is currently exploring several options that range from \$2.5–5.3 million in O&M funding a year. The training venue costs were computed at the “Future of Expeditionary Skills” work group on 15–18 July 2014 for the FY 2016–20 Future Years Defense Program.

53. In addition, on the SOF side, Air Force combat aviation advisors have deployed the C-145A light mobility aircraft since 2011 to support their mission (summarized earlier) to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces. US Special Operations Command is paying the costs of obtaining 16 of these aircraft by FY 2015 and operating them. “C-145A,” fact sheet, US Air Force, 17 December 2013, <http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/467765/c-145a.aspx>.

54. Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Priorities for a New Strategy with Constrained Budgets,” white paper (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, February 2012), 4, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2013/usaf/afd-120201-027-fy13-priorities.pdf>.

55. Similarly, America’s security-related aviation sales and assistance processes are clearly geared toward other advanced militaries rather than emerging air forces. Making matters worse is the fact that existing US laws, policies, and authorities governing SC and assistance often do not position the United States to effectively and affordably address these needs of emerging air forces compared to its strategic competitors. For details, see, for example, Thomas K. Livingston, *Building the Capacity of Partner States through Security Force Assistance*, CRS Report R41817 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 5 May 2011), 51–54, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41817.pdf>.

56. For example, “air component staffs agreed in their interviews that they need platforms that not only can be employed to conduct IW [irregular warfare] and BP [building partner] missions, but must also be transferrable, affordable, modular, and interoperable (TAMI). If there are no adequate US-made platforms for this purpose, the only alternative is that other suppliers (primarily Russia and China) will fill this role and diminish US influence.” *US Air Force Irregular Warfare Tiger Team: Observations and Recommendations*, 22 May 2009, 5. Moreover, the United States accounted for only 17 percent of supersonic combat aircraft, 1 percent of subsonic combat aircraft, 11 percent of other military aircraft, and 14 percent of military helicopters delivered to the developing world between 2004 and 2011. This adds up to a total “market share” of sales in the developing world of all military aircraft types of only 13 percent during this period. In three of the emerging regions of particular concern to US national security interests, US market share of military aviation sales is mostly worse: 16 percent in Latin America, 7 percent in the Asia/Pacific region, and 0 percent in Africa during this period. By comparison, China and Russia combined have a 42 percent military aviation market share in the developing world globally during the same period, 29 percent in Latin America, 54 percent in the Asia/Pacific region, and 44 percent in Africa. This would not be as much of a concern if close US allies were filling much of the remaining market share, but they are not. Richard F. Grimmett and Paul K. Kerr, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004–2011*, CRS Report R42678 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 24 August 2012), 64–68, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf>.

57. For example, see Col Michael W. Pietrucha, “The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung,” *Air and Space Power Journal* 28, no. 3 (May–June 2014): 133–56, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/digital/PDF/Issues/2014/ASPJ-May-Jun-2014.pdf>; and

Maj Jeremy L. Renken, “Airpower for Irregular Warfare: Reconciling USAF Theory and TACAIR Design with the Demands of Irregular Warfare and Special Operations” (master’s thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, July 2012).

58. Department of the Air Force, *Irregular Warfare Strategy 2013*, 13.



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